Before/After: The governance of urban tourist spaces
in the context of the Christchurch CBD recovery

A thesis
submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Management
at the
University of Canterbury
by
Alberto Amore

Supervisors:  Prof. C. Michael Hall

                     Prof. John M. Jenkins

DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT, MARKETING AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, NEW ZEALAND
2017
Acknowledgements

I would like to deeply thank my senior supervisor, Prof. C. Michael Hall, for giving me the opportunity to do research under his wise and helpful supervision. His feedback and guidance throughout this study were inspirational and helped me a lot. I will never forget the moments of reflection and discussion on the research topic during our several meetings around a cup of coffee. I also would like to thank Prof. John M. Jenkins for his valuable support and his comments on each step of the research. His insightful comments were instrumental in my professional and intellectual maturation as a scholar. I appreciated and learnt a lot from his comments and I hope to continue the collaboration in the years to come.

My sincere thanks to Education New Zealand and the University of Canterbury for awarding me with the necessary funding to pursue my research. Special thanks to Irene Joseph, Irene Edgar and Donna Heslop-Williams for being patient and always available for every single administrative necessity. Thanks also to Dr Sanna Malinen, Dr Herb de Vries, Dr Tyron Love, Ass. Prof. Jörg Finsterwalder and Ass. Prof. Girish Prayag for involving me with teaching and research at the Department.

A special acknowledgement to Tim, Hannah, Hiran, Maya, William and Dao. We spent countless days in the office working on our respective research and I wish you guys all the best for the future. I also would like to Danilo, Valentina, Giuseppe, Chiara, Stefano and Mimmo for making this journey away from Italy unforgettable. A very special mention goes to Jody, Cooper and JC for the moments spent together.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for always believing in me. I thank my mother for giving me the strength when things seemed bleak and my father for his resilience in a key moment of our lives. Thanks also to my relatives, with a special mention to Erminio and Gianni for their indispensable help during the final stages of research. Thanks to my in-laws Debbie and Richard and to my best friend Mitsuharu for always being at my side. Most importantly, thanks to my wonderful wife Bailey, who has always been my point of reference to be a better man and a better scholar. Having you as a partner is the best thing I could have wished for. Ti amo more more.
Abstract

Research in the governance of urban tourist spaces is characterized by a lack of argumentative inquiry and scant use of critical theory. This is evident, particularly, in the study of tourism and post-disaster urban recovery, with very few contributions assessing the phenomenon from a social theory perspective. This thesis examines the complex phenomenon of planning and governance for urban tourism spaces in contexts facing physical recovery from natural disasters. It does so by looking at the governance dynamics and the mechanism of decision-making put in place before and after triggering events like earthquakes and tsunamis.

This thesis provides evidence from Christchurch, New Zealand, by focusing on the policies and strategies for the regeneration of the city centre put in place before and after the disruptive earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. The thesis looks at power relations, structures and ideologies through a Lukesian appraisal of pre-and-post disaster governance from two relevant urban tourist spaces located in the Christchurch central city area: the Arts Centre of Christchurch and the Town Hall and Performing Arts Precinct. The research strategy adopted for the study combined archival research, interviews with key stakeholders and fieldwork notes over a period of two years. The research deployed a comparative case study methodology that focuses on projects taking place within a spatially defined area of the city centre where special legislation was enacted as result of the earthquakes.

The findings from the interviews and their triangulation with documents retrieved from national and local authorities suggest that the earthquakes affected the engagement among stakeholders and the mechanisms of decision-making. Also, the findings show patterns of disaster capitalism in post-earthquake governance for urban tourist spaces in the Christchurch CBD, with episodes of exclusion, lobbying and amendment of rules and legislation that directly benefited the interests of a narrow group of privileged stakeholders. Overall, the study shows that the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 accelerated neoliberal practices of site development in Christchurch, with the seismic events used as a pretext to implement market-oriented site projects in the CBD area.
This study suggests that the governance of urban tourist spaces shifts toward corporatist modes of governance in the aftermath of a triggering event. In the case of the Arts Centre, the Town Hall and the Performing Arts Precinct, the post-earthquake governance of such spaces was characterized by episodes of lobbying by prominent stakeholders and exclusion of secondary actors from decision-making. The earthquakes and the amendments in the existing regulatory framework further downsized the input from the affected communities into tokenistic episodes of non-decision-making that legitimized projects and proposals drafted by a narrow group of people behind closed doors. Policies and strategies in post-earthquake Christchurch enshrined the rhetoric of early urban regeneration practices and reinforced the principles of neoliberal urban development. Ultimately, the emphasis on tourism in the policy discourses with respect to the Arts Centre, the Town Hall and the Performing Arts Precinct suggests that post-earthquake redevelopment in the Christchurch CBD underpins mainstream recovery agendas of cities across the world.

This research enriches and deepens the understanding of post-disaster governance at urban tourist site level and ties it to argumentative planning literature. This research integrated different yet complementary theories and concepts to provide new knowledge in the understanding of governance dynamics for urban tourist spaces in post-disaster contexts. In doing so, the research advanced the field of urban tourism governance towards the critical theory paradigm by including politics, interests, stakeholders and values in the analysis.
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Amore, A., Hail, C. M., & Jenkins, J. M. (forthcoming). They never said “Come here and let’s talk about it”: Exclusion and non-decision making in the rebuild of Christchurch, New Zealand. Local Economy, DOI TBA

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Secretary, Lynda Griffioen
Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz

Ref: HEC 2014/94

4 March 2015

Alberto Amore
Department of Management, Marketing & Entrepreneurship
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

Dear Alberto

The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal “Canterbury tales: planning and governance for tourism in post-earthquake Christchurch” has been considered and approved.

Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have provided in your email of 2 March 2015.

Best wishes for your project.

Yours sincerely

[Lindsey MacDonald]
Chair
University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee
Papers published from this research
(See Appendix C for full-text versions)


Other publications during the PhD tenure


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# Abbreviations

Institutions, Trusts and Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Full name</th>
<th>Scale</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC Arts Centre of Christchurch</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTB Arts Centre Trust Board</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIG Australian Insurance Group</td>
<td>Global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV Arts Voice</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRANZ Building Research Association of New Zealand</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C&amp;CT Christchurch &amp; Canterbury Tourism</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACST Community Arts Centre Steering Committee</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAT Canterbury Earthquake Appeal Trust</td>
<td>Regional/National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCBA Central City Business Association</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC Christchurch City Council</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDU Christchurch Central Development Unit</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCHL Christchurch City Holdings Limited</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCT Christchurch Civic Trust</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC Canterbury Development Corporation</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECC Canterbury Employers Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEHBF Canterbury Earthquake Heritage Building Fund</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERA Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERC Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission</td>
<td>National/Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNZ Creative New Zealand</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORE Central Owners Rebuild Entity</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO Christchurch Symphony Orchestra</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPMC Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECan Environment Canterbury</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQC Earthquake Commission</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCG Holmes Consulting Group</td>
<td>National</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>IANZ</td>
<td>International Accreditation New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITR</td>
<td>Isaac Theatre Royal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAG</td>
<td>Joint Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGEC</td>
<td>Local Government and Environment Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBIE</td>
<td>Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>Music Centre of Christchurch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCER</td>
<td>Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCH</td>
<td>Ministry for Culture and Heritage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFE</td>
<td>Ministry for the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZAS</td>
<td>New Zealand Arts Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZIA</td>
<td>New Zealand Institute of Architects</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZHPT</td>
<td>New Zealand Historic Places Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZT</td>
<td>New Zealand Treasury</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZRB</td>
<td>New Zealand Reserve Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZSEE</td>
<td>New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZSTATS</td>
<td>New Zealand Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOAC</td>
<td>Save Our Arts Centre</td>
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<td>TIANZ</td>
<td>Tourism Industry Association New Zealand</td>
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</table>
List of laws, strategies and plans

**National Laws**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCTB</td>
<td>Arts Centre of Christchurch Trust Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA 2004</td>
<td>Building Act 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERA 2011</td>
<td>Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERRA 2010</td>
<td>Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTA 1957</td>
<td>Charitable Trusts Act 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDEMA 2002</td>
<td>Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCRB</td>
<td>Greater Christchurch Regeneration Bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNZA 2014</td>
<td>Heritage New Zealand Act 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPA 1993</td>
<td>Historic Places Act 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA 2002</td>
<td>Local Government Act 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGOIMA 1987</td>
<td>Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA 1968</td>
<td>Municipal Corporations Act 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMAA 2009</td>
<td>Resource Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Act 2009</td>
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**Strategic documents and projects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APS 2002</td>
<td>Arts Policy and Strategy 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHRP</td>
<td>Built Heritage Recovery Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCF</td>
<td>Creative Communities Christchurch Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCRP</td>
<td>Christchurch Central Recovery Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCRS 2006-2016</td>
<td>Central City Revitalization Strategy 2006-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDS 2010-2031</td>
<td>Canterbury Economic Development Strategy 2010-2031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Cost-Sharing Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCRS</td>
<td>Greater Christchurch Recovery Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTCCP 2006-2016</td>
<td>Long-Term Council Community Plan 2006-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTCCP 2009-2019</td>
<td>Long-Term Council Community Plan 2009-2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDRF</td>
<td>Metropolitan Discretionary Response Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCoM</td>
<td>National Conservatorium of Music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYP 2013-2016</td>
<td>Three-Year Plan 2013-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VSRP</td>
<td>Visitor Sector Recovery Plan</td>
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</table>
Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Introduction to the study

This dissertation focuses on urban recovery and the governance of urban tourist space in Christchurch in the aftermath of the earthquakes of September 2010 and February 2011. The study illustrates the process of rebuilding tourist attractions and the political, social, economic and environmental constraints influencing the decision-making, planning and early implementation stages of the rebuilding process (Schuppert, 2011, p297). The majority of the works tend to focus on post-disaster and crisis management of single tourism organizations (e.g. Tse, So & Sin, 2006) or destinations (e.g. Gurtner, 2007) through a predominantly business approach. This thesis, however retrieves literature from social theory and planning studies as advocated for in research on tourism crisis and disaster management (Hall, 2013), urban tourism (Ashworth & Page, 2011), tourism policy and planning (Dredge & Jenkins, 2011b), tourism destination governance (Bramwell, 2011) and, most recently, tourism crisis and destination management (Muskat, Nakanishi & Blackman, 2014). The intent is to advance knowledge ‘beyond disciplines’; that is, to work alongside and with, rather than replacing other modes of inquiry (Coles, Hall & Duval, 2006). In particular, this thesis illustrates the phenomenon of destination recovery at a tourist attraction scale in a context of post-natural disaster crisis and compares the socio-political context’s changes before and after the major earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. Finally, this dissertation seeks to address the limited research with regards to “the detailed performance of social and political institutions during emergencies in cities” (Pelling, 2003, p42).

The relationship between urban regeneration and tourism with respect to the allocation and dispute of land in the aftermath of disasters is a very recent subject (e.g. Ozcevik, Turk, Tas, Yaman & Beygo, 2009; Saxena, 2014). This study provides a detailed narrative of the recovery process following the earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand. It examines two different, yet complementary, processes of rebuilding with relevance for the ‘new’ tourist city of
Christchurch in the period between September 2010 and September 2014. These projects are all located in the Central Business District (CBD) recovery zone identified by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) and they are the reflection of the wider cultural recovery programme with respect to sports, heritage buildings and the Arts (MCH, 2015). The sites identified are the Arts Centre and the proposed project for the Town Hall and wider Performing Arts Precinct. The research also compares the policy agenda for the rebuild of the tourist areas of Christchurch with the pre-earthquake urban management plan of tourism spaces outlined by the local authorities in the late 2000s.

The aim of this study is to identify and understand the forms of power with regards to planning and governance for urban tourism spaces in contexts facing physical recovery from natural disasters. It does so by illustrating the governance dynamics, the forms of power and the mechanisms of decision-making before and after a disaster. The study of post-earthquake Christchurch and its recovery as a tourist city represents an important empirical subject that needs to be analysed in detail in order to fill the social theory ‘gap’ in tourism knowledge (Tribe, 2004). The choice of two different recovery projects is based on the assumption that each of the outlined recovery narratives can illustrate different governance dynamics and contextual constraints towards a better understanding of the dedicated purposes and strategies for each one of the identified projects. The objectives of this research, therefore, are to:

1) critically analyse the land-use policies for urban tourism spaces in pre-and-post-earthquake Christchurch CBD;
2) examine the environmental and institutional factors that influence the planning decision-making process and implementation of projects in the Christchurch city centre before and after the earthquakes;
3) analyse the policy discourses with respect to urban regeneration in the Christchurch CBD before and after the earthquakes.

The choice of New Zealand as context for the study has both practical and research-specific reasons. As a foreign PhD candidate enrolled at the University of Canterbury, doing fieldwork in Christchurch was a chance not to miss, as it provided the ideal context to undertake this
specific kind of study. From a public policy perspective, moreover, New Zealand was an ideal field of research due to the governance shifts that have characterized the country over the last 80 years with respect to Keynesianism, neoliberalism and disaster capitalism (Easton, 1989; Harvey, 2005; Nel, 2015). The need to focus on dedicated cultural sites underpins the work of Zukin (1990) and the role that culture plays in the circulation of capital in cities (Harvey, 1989b). Moreover, the city of Christchurch had been the object of research in the field of tourism in the years before the earthquakes (Hall, 2008a; Pearce, 2001b, 2001c, 2011; Simmons, Fairweather & Shone, 2003; Thorns, 1997) and there is an increasing body of knowledge in post-disaster in urban contexts (e.g. Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Johnson, 2011; Johnson & Olshansky, 2010) that can be used as critical basis for discussion.

This study acknowledges the importance of including the longitudinal development of the city of Christchurch before the earthquakes highlighted in the crisis-driven urbanization paradigm (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014). However, it limits the analysis of policies to the period between September 2007 and September 2014. The reason for focusing on the policies from 2007 onward is fourfold. Firstly, it narrows the analysis to the years following the major reforms of the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA 2002), the Building Act 2004 (BA 2004) and the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEMA 2002), along with the ongoing amendment of the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA 1991). Secondly, it acknowledges a series of strategies outlined by the Christchurch City Council (CCC) and the Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) after the reform of the local authorities. Among these, the ones more relevant to the policy of Christchurch as a tourist destination include:

- the Arts Policy and Strategy 2002 (APS 2002) (CCC, 2002);
- the Central City Revitalization Strategy 2006-2016 (CCRS 2006-2016) (CCC, 2006a, 2006b, 2006e, 2007b);
- the Canterbury Economic Development Strategy 2010-2031 (CEDS 2010-2031) (CDC, 2010);

Thirdly, it eases the statistical comparison of regional and local data to the last censuses of 2008 and 2013, which adopted the new Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial
Classification (ANZSIC) (NZSTATS, 2014a). Lastly, it narrows the comparison, on the national scale, to two legislative periods, both of which led to the establishment of governments led by the same party (the National Party of New Zealand).

Limitedly to the sites at the heart of the research, the delimitation of the research to the period between September 2007 and September 2014 permits to include important episodes of governance that occurred in the two urban tourism spaces before the earthquakes. In fact, the governance reforms of the Arts Centre of Christchurch (ACC) (NZP, 2014c) and of the Council venue management culminated with the establishment of Vbase (CCC, 2008b) took place between the end of 2007 and the first months of 2008. Ultimately, the existence of governance episodes of the kind before the earthquakes allows for a greater understanding of the changes in governance and decision-making as result of the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes.

“Recovery is the least investigated phase of the four phases of disaster” (Al-Nammari, 2006, p2). The scale and magnitude of disasters change depending on the type of hazard and it is hard to define the time length and the characteristics of recovery a priori (Beach, 1967; Britton, 1979, 1986; Wilkinson, 2013). The process of recovery and reconstruction is “immensely complex” (Platt, 2012, p21) and involves “economic and social issues as well as geotechnical considerations” (ibid., p54). The simultaneous co-presence of different post-disaster needs requires a balance between house rebuilding, infrastructure readjustment, business recovery and provision of enhanced urban amenities (Bolton, 1996). Moreover, the overlapping of post-disaster stages in the long path towards full recovery further complicates the assessment of the context and of the different interests and values involved. For the purposes of this research, the focus is on the post-disaster phase also known as the ‘period of remedy’ (Britton, 1979), that begins when the immediate emergency ends (Beach, 1967) and that can take years to resolve. It is in this key phase that, under extraordinary time constraints, recovery is framed by the discourses of different interests over the best solutions for redevelopment (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Olshansky, Hopkins & Johnson, 2012). The examples that follow raise concerns over the outcomes and the implications for tourism in Christchurch, as the dedicated tourism authorities and organizations seem not to be decisive in the definition of the post-earthquake tourism recovery agenda. Nevertheless, given the
increasingly intra-urban competition for visitors characterising contemporary cities worldwide, the current destination governance regime and the related dynamics put in place for the city of Christchurch will have long-term implications for the future of tourism in the city.

The sites identified for the study are spatial expressions of two distinct forms of urban tourism (Ashworth & Page, 2011): heritage sightseeing and visits to cultural venues. A qualitative, constructionist narrative approach (Shkedi, 2005), a style particularly in vogue in recent works in urban sociology (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014) and tourism planning and policy (Dredge & Jenkins, 2011c; Jamal & Getz, 1999; Lemmetynen, 2009; Stevenson, 2007; Stevenson, Airey & Miller, 2008, 2009), helps explain the findings and the dynamics of governance and policy-making through three policy themes: haphazard coalescence; instrumentation policy; and planning by opportunity. This research attempts to provide a theorization of the phenomenon of contemporary urban tourism development in the light of late capitalism (Britton, 1991) and the rise of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007) as factors in post-disaster urban recovery (Adams, 2013; Gotham, 2007b; Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014; Smith, 2006) within the context of a predominantly neoliberal post-political policy environment (Olesen, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010).

1.2 Statement of the problem

The literature frames the phenomenon of tourism consumption as one of the key features of the intrinsically complex contemporary urban environment (Page & Hall, 2003; Selby, 2004), and acknowledges the relevance of tourism as one of the main urban strategies for economic revival and competitiveness (Richards & Wilson, 2006; Smith, 2006b; Smyth, 1994; Spirou, 2010). Cities currently embrace a fierce competitive discourse to attract potential tourists and encourage the establishment of visitor-dedicated facilities in the attempt to gain competitive advantage “with respect to the spatial division of consumption” (Harvey, 1989a, p9), attract and retain different forms of capitals (Amore, 2011; Hall, 2008a) and increase tax revenues (Hannigan, 2013). In the shift towards the neo-baroque (Amendola, 2009) and neoliberal-inspired contemporary city, tourism has become, de facto, one of the central features of the
regenerated urban built environment. Urban regeneration is an expression of spatial planning in the built environment and its roots can be traced back to the early downtown redevelopments throughout the 1970s (McCann & Ward, 2010) and the rise of flagship developments during the 1980s (Smyth, 1994). Tourism and leisure represent the major urban redevelopment strategies with respect to flagship developments, with planners and municipalities reshaping the urban landscape with an array of amenities, attractions and recreational districts constituting a ‘themed’ (Amendola, 2009), ‘hyper-real’ (Eco, 1997; Selby, Hayllar & Griffin, 2008; Urry, 2001), ‘keno-capitalist’ (Dear & Flusty, 1998) environment, or an ‘experiencescape’ (O’Dell, 2005).

The processes of contemporary urban change and regeneration in the built environment are an expression of the “complex, tangled mosaic of superimposed and interpenetrating nodes, levels, scales and morphologies” (Brenner, 2004, p66) known as spatial planning. In conceptual terms, spatial planning stretches beyond mere land-use planning and it refers to the “many aspects of planning practices [of] policy-making, policy integration, community participation, agency stakeholding and development management” (Tewdwr-Jones, 2004, p563) characterizing the shift from government to governance occurred along with neoliberal restructuring of the state during the 1980s and 1990s (Olesen, 2014; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Spatial planning is the outcome of the web of relations between stakeholders constituting the urban governance arena (Tewdwr-Jones, 2012). Urban governance is the socio-political environment emerging from the processes of negotiation among several parties and actors (Kooiman, 1993a, 1993b) within a locally globalizing urban policy environment (McCann & Ward, 2010). Urban governance does not occur in a political vacuum, it is intrinsically tied to the context where it takes place and it can be conceived as the sum of vested interests, values, institutional arrangements and power relations (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007c; Hall, 2008b; Hall & Jenkins, 1995) that stakeholders have with reference to land use and allocation (Tewdwr-Jones, 2012).

Cities in both the developed and the developing world, seem to tend towards an endless, zero-sum game of intra-urban competitiveness at the global scale between cities seeking for increased visitation numbers (Harvey, 1989a). Research shows that some urban regeneration strategies, particularly those with relevance to culture and tourism, do not always contribute
to the economic recovery of cities (Evans, 2005; Spirou, 2010) and their effectiveness as place marketing leverage have already been put into question (Miles, 2008; Paddison, 1993). Nevertheless, urban regeneration strategies remain a quite established urban entrepreneurial approach (Harvey, 1989a) even in a period of global financial instability and sovereign debt crisis. Arguably, urban regeneration strategies and tourism-related development are likely to occur under given political, social and cultural conditions that enhance the localness and the distinctiveness of destinations (Costa, 2013; McCann & Ward, 2010). What happens, however, when urban destinations need to quickly recover their built environment, capitals and visitors and re-gain competitive advantage in the aftermath of sudden yet unavoidable natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions? Or, as Olshansky et al. (2012, p173) put it, “Is there anything fundamentally different about urban redevelopment, public finance, organization of public institutions and social and economic problems when the subject of study is in a post-disaster environment?”.

Disasters are inevitable and particularly affect urban areas. Much of disaster preparedness policies tend to be “as naive as reckless” (Sönmez, Apostolopoulos & Tarlow, 1999, p443) and that disaster vulnerability lies within governance flaws (Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006). This research, therefore, concurs with social theorists and geographers that there is nothing natural about a natural disaster (Britton, 1986, 2001; Hartman & Squires, 2006; Pelling, 2003; Smith, 2006). Evidence from post-2004 tsunami Sri Lanka, for example, show how areas nearby tourist areas were abruptly destroyed due to the bulldozing of mangroves and scrub forests near the shore (Kinver, 2005; Robinson & Jarvie, 2008). In New Orleans, United States, the residential and industrial areas affected by Hurricane Katrina and subsequent flooding in 2005 were originally a wetland that experienced a severe flooding in 1965 (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014). The city of Genoa (Italy) has been experiencing severe flooding since the late 1970s due to the excessive concretization of river areas and uncontrolled urban development after WW2 (Douglas et al., 2010). Christchurch itself is in an earthquake-prone region and sustained most of its earthquake damage in areas prone to flooding that had been previously drained from a swamp (Hercus, 1942).

Notwithstanding from what perspective we discuss the phenomenon of urban natural disasters, the occurrence of hazards can lead to a stage of crisis (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014)
during which cities tend “to reconstruct the physical fabric […] thereby recreating physical vulnerability to future risk” (Pelling, 2003, p35). The cause-effect relationship between disaster and crisis challenges the taxonomies illustrated in the literature available in tourism, crisis and disaster management (Faulkner, 2001; Faulkner & Vikulov, 2001; Moreira, 2007; Prideaux, Laws & Faulkner, 2003; Ritchie, 2004), which tend to make a phenomenological distinction between crises and disasters or conceive them as synonyms. In particular, Faulkner (2001) classifies crisis as the result of organizational failure and human-induced actions and defines disasters as mere natural phenomena over which people and organizations have little control. Conversely, this study acknowledges the triggering and unpredictable nature of disasters and, as suggested by Prideaux et al. (2003), conceives crisis as the post-disaster phase during which the basis for recovery are cast and implemented (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014). Such a conceptualization underpins the epistemological roots of the words disaster and crisis themselves. In fact, the word disaster comes from the Latin dis-astrum (bad star or misfortune), while crisis comes from the Greek κρίσις (decision). Similarly, the Chinese ideogram for crisis is used to define an “opportunity” (Campiranon & Scott, 2007, p151) to improve an existing stage.

In the specific case of urban disasters, recent studies (Pelling & Blackburn, 2014; Saraçoğlu & Demirtaş-Milz, 2014; Tiso, 2014) suggest “the acceleration of a market-oriented mode of urban redevelopment […] known as disaster capitalism” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p10). The doctrine of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007) legitimizes the need to adopt a neoliberal development agenda by exploiting phases of crisis and uncertainty. Politicians and developers thus influence the policy-making arena to implement urban redevelopment policies that support their interests and those of major financial lobbies (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Klein, 2007). The justification and imposition of free-market dogmas in the aftermath of disasters resemble the neoliberal turns that occurred in the United States, United Kingdom, Sweden and many other western world countries between the 1980s and 1990s (Harvey, 2005). The radicalism of disaster capitalism and neoliberal agendas permeates the governance of states and cities in both the developed and the developing world (Klein, 2007; Stonich, 2008; Taşan-Kok & Baeten, 2012). Therefore, research on urban governance, particularly with respect to disaster capitalism and urban recovery, should analyse “how […] urban policies are produced in a global-relational context” (McCann & Ward, 2010, p176).
More importantly, there is need for empirical research on how the magnitude of natural disasters influence the “contested, market-oriented and cyclical mode of [...] crisis-driven urbanization” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p11, italics in the original) and how the midst of uncertainty, opportunity, priorities and future preparedness shapes the delivery of urban tourist spaces.

1.3 Research gaps

The occurrence of disasters and crises in tourist destination contexts is, arguably, the most marked example of “the chaotic nature of tourism systems” (McKercher, 1999, p425) and of their high vulnerability (Evans & Elphick, 2005; Ritchie, 2004) to sudden shocks (Lew, 2014). As Olshansky et al. (2012, p173) noted, “the study of post-disaster recovery is in its infancy and there is as yet no body of theory to guide researchers”. In particular, the dimension of post-disaster governance (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon, 2014; Mamula-Seadon, 2015; Tierney, 2012) related to the recovery of damaged infrastructure identified by Faulkner (2001), Orchiston and Higham (2016) and Scott, Laws and Prideaux (2008) is overlooked. Given the solid societal commitments towards recovery rebuilding and resilience of cities over the centuries (e.g. Lisbon, Warsaw, Tokyo, Berlin), the absence of research recommendations in urban tourism recovery (e.g. Mair, Ritchie & Walters, 2014) is, in some way, bizarre.

Current tourism knowledge is characterized by marked discontinuities among the different disciplinary fields. Urban tourism and tourism crisis and disaster management are characterized by theoretical gaps and a predominance of descriptive research (Ashworth & Page, 2011; Mair et al., 2014), while research on tourism governance and tourism planning and policy relies on more solid theoretical grounds (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007c; Dredge, Jenkins & Whitford, 2011a, Laws, Richins, Argusa & Scott, 2011). In post-disaster urban tourism crisis, the contributions of Gotham (2007b) and Gotham and Greenberg (2008, 2014) assess the phenomenon of post-disaster urban redevelopment and destination re-branding, but they do not focus their research on the regeneration of tourist spaces, particularly at attraction site level. The need for more studies of urban tourism sites from the perspective of planning and
policy has been long acknowledged in urban tourism literature (Pearce, 2001a). However, there is no relevant research of the kind, particularly from post-disaster urban contexts.

The current literature retrieved is characterized by a common, quite noticeable, social theory gap (Figure 1.1). The gap is particularly consistent in the literature on tourism crisis and disaster management and urban tourism. Undoubtedly, this specific field is currently experiencing a new stage in research calling for new insights from disciplines such as sociology, ecology and political sciences. The shift towards a new research paradigm advocating “the need to change the boundaries of the study to suit the event being researched” (Carlsen & Liburd, 2008, p268), underpins a post-disciplinary approach in tourism research (Coles et al., 2006; Coles, Hall & Duval, 2009, 2016). The call for a social sciences insight is stressed in recent works on tourism crisis and disaster management, particularly on the relationships between crises and socio-economic institutions (Hall, 2013). The field of urban tourism has only a liminal acknowledgement among scholars of the socio-political constraints behind the creation of urban tourist spaces and of specific amenities. (Ashworth & Page, 2011). The benefit of employing established contributions from planning theory and spatial planning in the study of tourism policy-making is acknowledged yet limited to a handful of scholars (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007d; Jenkins, Hall & Mkono, 2014; Page & Hall, 2003). Recent works call for or acknowledge the need to employ a social science approach (Ashworth & Page, 2011; Spirou, 2010). Nevertheless, the field of urban tourism shows a “lack of engagement [from] many tourism researchers with wider debates in urban studies” (Ashworth & Page, 2011, p2).

Conversely, the studies on tourism policy and planning have a more consistent body of theory on which it draws (Jenkins et al., 2014). Moreover, there are calls for more research to assess the relevance of the social dimension in tourism policy and planning (Dredge & Jenkins, 2011b) However, the literature “has yet to adequately embrace the policy implications of an increasingly globalized tourism system” (Jenkins et al., 2014, p542) and acknowledge the fuzzy, multi-planar governance of cities in the 21st Century (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009; Hillier, 2007). Similarly, with tourism planning and policy, the literature on tourism destination governance is characterized by a wide theoretical background addressing issues, approaches and methodologies (Laws, Argusa, Richins & Scott, 2011) from different disciplinary
perspectives. Albeit the literature acknowledges the need to employ a social theory paradigm in the research of tourism and governance, the potentialities of social theory in the study of tourism governance are still overlooked (Bramwell, 2011; Bramwell & Lane, 2011).

Figure 1.1: Research gaps with respect to social theory and social sciences

This thesis embraces a social theory approach with respect to urban sociology, political sociology, spatial planning and urban governance (Ashworth & Page, 2011; Bramwell, 2011; Dredge & Jenkins, 2011b; Hall, 2013). The inclusion of social theory, particularly of political sociology, can help understand tourism destination governance “as the political response to the growth of social complexity” (Walters, 2004, p40) and cyclical policy failures (Jessop, 2011) which inevitably lead to regimes of “metagovernance as designing and managing mixtures of hierarchies, networks and markets” (Meuleman, 2008, p73). Particularly for this research, there is a need for descriptive theorizations that help explain what occurs “during the decision and policy-making processes” (Jenkins et al., 2014, p545) with respect to post-disaster planning, third-wave neoliberalization (Olesen, 2014), financial instability (Stiglitz,
and disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007) in the shaping of Christchurch CBD spaces for leisure and tourism.

This thesis broadens the frontier of current research by reinforcing the nexus between the fields of current tourism literature and the insights from social theory. The contribution applies “existing frames in new contexts and settings” (Dredge, Jenkins & Whitford, 2011b, p16), particularly from spatial planning and planning theory, and deploys a narrative approach for the analysis and explanation of planning, governance and power in tourism studies. The intent is to address the shortcomings in the current literature by proposing a more solid theorization with respect to the governance of urban tourism spaces before and after a natural disaster. This study, therefore, adopts elements from critical theory to address the persisting double-neglect between urban studies and tourism studies.

1.4 Towards a post-disciplinary approach rooted in critical theory

Theories are “a product of their time” (Allmendinger, 2009, p7) and the outcome of the reflective understanding of society within which scholars interact as social actors (Johnston, 1979). Social theorists are well-aware of the relativity of theories but are not, nevertheless, discouraged to theorize and develop frameworks in order to increase the intelligibility (i.e. the ability of intellect to read through) of society. Social theory and policy theory are “not inherently predictive” (Hall, 1984, p12), their validity is constantly contested and any attempt to establish a framework is the combination of the ability of the researcher to read through the social phenomena and the tools of knowledge he or her is able to use (Hall, 1984). The relativity of theories is reiterated with respect to the conceptualization of knowledge as meta-narrative (Lyotard, 1979) which is also highlighted in tourism policy and planning literature (Dredge et al., 2011a).

The relativity of theory is often emphasized in urban studies and in policy analysis at large (Jenkins, 1978; Judge, Stoker & Wolman, 1995; Majone, 1980a, 1980b). Policy analysis can be conceived as a craftwork that seeks to assemble rational thinking to usable knowledge as a basis for argumentation (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007a; Hall, 2014). The researcher, with his or her
theoretical knowledge, can provide a line of thought grounded in theory to “establish the relationship between things [and] bring knowledge” (Montessori, 1976, p94). In turn, “our reading of urban form will be different depending on what element we are interested in and how we choose to study it” (Madanipour, 2001, p159). The relativity of theories and the positionality of the researcher also resembles the third moment of qualitative research characterized by interpretive perspectives (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, 2005; Phillimore & Goodson, 2004a; Riley & Love, 2000).

This research acknowledges the positionality of the researcher and the relativity of the theoretical insights. A consistent body of theories and literature used in this study are built on the fundaments of the Frankfurt School and its prominent scholars. One fundamental element is the critical appraisal and understanding of social structures (Williams, 2012) and social phenomena that eventually influenced the works of Giddens (1979, 1984, 1990), Harvey (1975, 1978, 1989a), Healey (1992, 1998a, 1998b), Le Galès (2011) and Smith (1979, 1986, 2002). The second core of theory emanates from the urban sociology tradition carried out through the decades from the founders of the Chicago School and its successors (Bell, 1973; Castells, 1989; Friedmann, 1973, 1987; Molotch, 1976; Sandercock, 1998, 2003). The third stream of works resembles the Anglo-governance school (Bevir, 2002; Bevir & Rhodes, 2006; Rhodes, 1994, 1996, 1997), while the theory of power is based on the work of Lukes (1986, 2005). These academic traditions with respect to social science have two common denominators: a strong Weberian influence and the city as a field of research, the latter seen as the very core of sociological inquiry (Saunders, 1981). The challenge here is to show the limited appraisal of Weberian thinking in the field of tourism (Coles & Church, 2007) while advocating for a greater inclusion of social theory in tourism studies.

Along with the aforementioned theoretical insights, this study acknowledges the relevance of complex systems theory reiterated in contributions on spatial planning, tourism policy and planning and destination governance (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007a; Innes & Booher, 2010; Laws et al., 2011), thus advocating for “interpretive social constructionist” (Dredge et al., 2011b, p29) and “socio-political constructionist” (Dredge & Lawrence, 2007, p207) approaches extensively used in disaster research (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Tierney, 2007). This research, moreover, advocates for the post-disciplinary nature of tourism research (Dredge
& Jenkins, 2011b) emphasized in the works of Coles et al. (2006, 2009, 2016). A post-disciplinary inquiry consists of a flexible and intellectually open research approach which rejects “the discursive and organisational construction (and worse, the fetishisation) of disciplinary boundaries” (Sum & Jessop, 2001, p89). The call for a post-disciplinary approach is also encouraged for disaster studies and the field of disaster sociology, which is mainly rooted in an interdisciplinary paradigm (Britton, 1979, 1986; Quarantelli & Dynes, 1977; Tierney, 2007) that acknowledges the linkages between ecological, social and organizational dimensions.

Complex phenomena such as that of this research call for “a theoretically sophisticated account of the diverse way in which political and economic elites use tourism to transform [the urban] space” (Gotham, 2002, p1736), on a persisting balance between detail and simplification. By acknowledging the importance of understanding “space in the context of how people assign meaning through its production and use” (Madanipour, 2001, p162), the theories identified for the dissertation highlight the development of space “as the product of stakeholder conflicts, alliances and agenda-setting” (Searle, 2009, p203) concealed behind the curtains of public debates. Space and policy-making, in turn, take place within a hegemonic and ‘spiky’ (Florida, 2010) global urban context of normalised neoliberal practices and post-political planning regimes that favour market and hierarchical forms of metagovernance (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009, 2010, 2012; Olesen, 2014) over archetypes of governance rooted in community-led decision-making.

1.5 Introduction to the post-earthquake Christchurch recovery

The city of Christchurch, located near the Pacific coast of the Canterbury region is the major city of the South Island, the biggest island of New Zealand. With a metropolitan population of 341,469 inhabitants as of the Census of June 2013 (CCC, 2013g; NZSTATS, 2013), Christchurch is the second biggest urban conglomeration of New Zealand after Auckland and home to more than a third of the people currently residing in the South Island (NZSTATS, 2013). The original European settlement was established between 1849 and 1850 as result of the Canterbury Expedition led by Captain Thomas. He chose a swampy area of a thousand acres (Hercus,
upon which Edward Jollie surveyed the four-line perimeter of historic Christchurch (CCDU, 2012d). This distinct historic area corresponds to the current CBD of the city of Christchurch and resembles the definition of a Tourism Business District (TBD) provided by Getz (1993, p580) with a “concentration of visitor-oriented attractions and services” such as museums, galleries, theatres, built heritage, parks and gardens, shopping streets, clustered accommodation and dining facilities within walking distance to each other.

The urban development of the historic area of Christchurch and the inner city neighbourhoods underpin the stages of the crisis-driven urbanization outlined by Gotham and Greenberg (2014). As previously noted, the area chosen for the first settlement was swampy and prone to flooding (Hercus, 1942). In addition to this, local and regional authorities coped with important problems of drainage due to the lack of adequate techniques and the exorbitant expenses to bring the equipment from overseas and transport it via land from the nearby port of Lyttleton (Hercus, 1942). Moreover, geological surveys in the CBD run in the 1960s (Holmes & Wood, 1968) and the early 1990s (Brown, Beethm, Paterson & Weeber, 1995; Brown & Weeber, 1992) identify a good portion of the CBD as liquefaction prone in the areas nearby the Avon River and on the east side of Christchurch. Finally, the region of Christchurch and Canterbury is earthquake-prone, with a record of earthquakes registered since the 1880s (Cayford, 2011b; Te Ara, 2013) and an active fault crossing the South Island north-to-south (GNS, 2014). The relevance of this latter geological condition for the development and planning of tourism is acknowledged in the work of Orchiston (2012, p59), which advocates for “disaster emergency planning to be incorporated into sustainable tourism strategies”.

In the light of the geological conditions of the region, it may be argued that the occurrence of a high-magnitude earthquake in Christchurch was expected. However, the depth of the epicentres and their closeness to Christchurch were unlikely to be predicted. Until the 7.1 M earthquake of September 4th, 2010, in fact, few geologists assumed the existence of a lateral fault line crossing the South Island (Ghisetti & Sibson, 2012; Quigley, 2010). Similarly, the characteristics of the February 22nd, 2011 earthquake were so unique that, despite being of a lower magnitude (6.3 M), its closeness to the surface (5 km), distance from Christchurch (15 km) and incredibly high peak of vertical ground acceleration (twice the force of gravity)
The economic impact of the earthquakes of September 4th, 2010 and February 22nd, 2011 in Christchurch and the Canterbury region were severe (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012). The economic repercussions of the earthquakes affected both the regional and national GDP (CDC, 2012; Doherty, 2011) (see Appendix A). The city of Christchurch and its CBD, inevitably, experienced acute economic downturns. Between September 2010 and June 2011, nearly 3,000 businesses shut down in the Christchurch CBD (Duffy, 2011), thousands of jobs were lost compared to the last census of 2006 (NZSTATS, 2013), with the manufacturing sector (-17%) and the retail sector (-6.1%) (NZSTATS, 2014b) experiencing severe losses. Similarly, tourism businesses experienced long-standing, negative economic impacts due to the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. Such a crisis particularly hit the CBD of Christchurch, but it also affected, although at lower levels, the Greater Christchurch area and other main tourist destinations of the Canterbury region and South Island. Losses were relevant with respect to tourist arrivals and nights (C&CT, 2011; Wallace, Simmons & Becken, 2011), heritage attractions (Ansley, 2011; Lochhead, 2011; NZHPT, 2013b), businesses (Hatton, 2013; Orchiston, Vargo & Seville, 2012b) and accommodation (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012). Until January 2013, tourism was the only key sector CERA considered as requiring monitoring due to its poor performance in the months following the major earthquakes (CERA, 2013a). Chapter 4 further illustrates the context of Christchurch before and after the earthquakes.

The circulation of financial capital is influencing the shape of the city of Christchurch and of its CBD (Gorrie, 2013; Miles, 2016). This is particularly evident with the repercussions that the earthquake had in the insurance market, the re-insurance process and the displacement of insurance payouts outside the CBD. Particularly with the first, some of the insurance companies decided to either withdraw from the New Zealand property market (e.g. ANSVAR) (Stewart, 2012, 2013) or announced insolvency right after the February earthquake (e.g. Western Pacific) (Grant Thornton, 2015). One of the main New Zealand insurance companies, AMI Insurance, was rescued by the government in March 2011 (van der Bergh, 2011) and later sold in part to the Australian Insurance Group (AIG) for NZD$ 380 million (Wright, 2013). With respect to reinsurance following the earthquakes, insurance companies increased the
premiums (Stock, 2013) by applying contracts based on the site value, thus disadvantaging developers, house owners and retailers. The reinsurance issue was particularly evident with privately-owned historic buildings. Those who did not have enough savings or insurance pay-outs to retain the building and reinsure it at the new conditions ended up selling their property to CERA and the CCDU. These, in most cases, proceed with the demolition of the unit to provide land to private investors. Such a situation suggests a process of induced gentrification by the private sector and the New Zealand Government at the expenses of current tenants and residents in the CBD area of Christchurch. Lastly, the disagreements with local developers and national authorities on land purchase, along with the seemingly risky development options made available for the mixed zones of the CBD, persuaded most of those who got insurance pay-outs to reinvest outside the central area itself or, at worst, redirect investments in other cities or countries (Gates, 2013a, 2013b). The few still seeking to invest in the CBD faced implementation problems that, in some circumstances, led to the closure of works for budget shortages (McCrone, 2014c).

Time has become a very important feature in the governance of post-earthquake Christchurch. The political and economic need for a ‘fast recovery’ behind the justification of implementing the reviewed blueprint for the CBD plan meant the dismissal of the pre-earthquake urban regeneration agenda set by the CCC (CCC, 2006a, 2006b, 2006e). Similarly, the Canterbury Economic Development Strategy 2013-2035 (CEDS 2013-2035) (CDC, 2013b) replaced the existing CEDS 2010-2031 (CDC, 2010) and became a branch of the wider economic strategy outlined in the Greater Christchurch Recovery Strategy (GCRS) (CERA, 2012a, 2013d), which relegated the CCC, the CDC and Environment Canterbury (ECan) to a secondary role under the all-embracing control of CERA and, subsequently, of the Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (MCER) (CERA, 2011a). The establishment of CERA and of the CCDU and the short lifespan of these authorities for the completion of the recovery process have been widely criticized by some political parties and members of the parliamentary opposition. In particular, the former parliamentarian for Christchurch East, Lianne Dalziel (Mayor of Christchurch since October 2013) argued that CERA should have been established as an independent Crown entity (Dalziel, 2011). However, CERA’s lifespan was too short for the delivery of some of the anchor projects identified in the CBD recovery plan. The withdrawal of EPIC Innovation from the Innovation Precinct project due to the slow process
of planning implementation (McClure & Hargreaves, 2014) further proves the difficulties that the New Zealand Government and its dedicated authorities faced in post-disaster recovery.

The governance dynamics in the recovery of Christchurch CBD and of the two projects at the heart of this dissertation show how the public sector, the private sector and representatives of the civic society are involved at different scale levels in the shaping of the new central areas of Christchurch. While the Town Hall and Performing Arts Precinct projects directly involved public authorities and the leading venue management agency within the CCC (Vbase), the Arts Centre was managed by a Trust established in the early 1970s following the relocation of the University of Canterbury outside the CBD (ACC, 2013d).

The legislation put in place for earthquake recovery was as decisive as the circulation of capitals in this crucial stage of post-financial crisis restructuring and the policy rationale that individuals manifested both publicly and “strategically away from direct public gaze” (Tewdwr-Jones, 2012, p4). Hall and Jenkins (1995) and Dredge and Jenkins (2007c, 2011b) provide a useful analytical framework of the tourism planning and policy processes within contexts influenced by institutional contexts, policy values and drivers. In essence, the alterations of the contextual conditions for recovery planning were the outcome of the policy flow channelled through the combined action of individuals and institutions, as overtly emphasized in governance and urban planning studies.

The policy flow and the governance dynamics shaping the urban environment of Christchurch and of its CBD were crucial for the future of the city as a tourist destination. Nevertheless, the anchor projects so far identified for the future tourist city are far from being completed. The Convention Centre Precinct was launched only in August 2014, the Performing Arts Precinct project has been widely reconsidered, the scheduled recovery of the Town Hall is far from its actual implementation, the Arts Centre is slowly being recovered, other major attractions such as the Christchurch Art Gallery remained closed for nearly four years and the Stadium project is still unclear (CCDU, 2014a). Since the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, tourism businesses from New Zealand and overseas have been showing an interest in returning to the CBD (Taylor, 2013) and rebuild the many facilities that were demolished. The tourism industry, along with the food and beverage and the retail sector, considerably suffered the side effects of the earthquakes and some of the activities relocated outside the CBD (Hatton,
Notwithstanding such commitment with bringing back the visitor economy to the CBD, the dedicated tourism authorities and organizations played only a marginal role in the process of planning decision-making culminated with the blueprint for the CBD issued in July 2012. Despite the awareness among players on the importance of tourism and hospitality in the process of urban renewal (CCDU, 2012d), the blueprint for the CBD and the amendments on the CCC’s City Plan simply suggest the necessity of creating mixed-used areas in the CBD for the hospitality sector (CCDU, 2012a).

The role played by tourism stakeholders and the importance given to organic tourism development was very limited. The tourism precinct suggested by ward councillor Tim Carter in the area between Cathedral Square and Manchester Street (McCrone, 2011) was not mentioned in the CBD blueprint and is likely to never be implemented. Leading tourism authorities such as the Christchurch & Canterbury Tourism (C&CT) were only involved with the promotion and re-branding of Christchurch to both national and international markets (C&CT, 2012b, 2013b, 2013c), and had no say in the attraction of tourism private investors in the Christchurch CBD. The latter, once the prerogative of the CDC, passed into the hands of CERA and the CCDU, who became de facto the gatekeepers for private investment attraction in the city. In March 2013, CERA welcomed proposals for tours and visitor services within the red-cordoned CBD (CERA, 2013g) and only a few of the pre-earthquake tourism services, such as the punting on the Avon River (Rush, 2012) and the Christchurch Tramway (C&CT, 2013d), were re-established. Similarly, with the case of the C&CT, the companies running these dedicated tourism services were relegated far back in the decision-making process for the recovery of the CBD. These forms of partnerships are qualitatively different from the pre-earthquake governance of tourism in the city of Christchurch, where the initiative in the building of attractions and amenities was, almost entirely, in the hands of the public sector and its participating companies.

1.5.1 Introduction to the case studies

The path towards the ultimate recovery blueprint took place during the preliminary stages of the demolition process and the several controversies that rose with reference to the
demolition of heritage buildings (Cairns, 2012b; Heather, 2011b; IConIC, 2014; Sachdeva, 2012b). Representatives of the local heritage lobby, experts of the New Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT) and local private developers tried in vain to give advice to CERA that historic buildings located in the areas of the CBD under the legislation of the authority could be rescued or did not need to be listed for demolition (Greenhill, 2012; Sachdeva, 2012b). Historic buildings could have been structurally and financially rescued, with the expertise of international partners like Miyamoto International and funding provided by the Canterbury Earthquake Heritage Building Fund (CEHBF). Nevertheless, the demolition team under CERA decided otherwise and ordered the bulldozing of the buildings. By September 2012, CERA demolished 174 of the 585 listed heritage buildings in Christchurch (Cairns, 2012b), the majority of which were located within the CBD area. An exception to the “old dungas” (Minister Brownlee, quoted in Chapman, 2011a, n.p.) approach by CERA and the national Government was the recovery of the Arts Centre, the biggest built heritage site in New Zealand (NZHPT, 2013a) and home to several cultural and leisure amenities. The governance ties around the Christchurch Arts Centre and its Trust eased the process of insurance pay-out and the process of rebuilding. The latter is expected to take at least 15 years (Gates, 2011b) and cost more than NZ$ 290 million (ACC, 2013a), most of which covered by insurance. The residual funds are likely to come from donations and the relocation of new businesses in the premises of the heritage property (Taylor, 2013). The decision of recovering the Arts Centre, however, implied the eviction of previous tenants and the opportunity to arrange new, more lucrative contracts as recommended by the consultancy report prepared for the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH) and the Arts Centre (Nahkies, 2012). Chapter 5 further addresses the governance of the Arts Centre site in the years before the first earthquake (2007-2010) and in the period between 2010 and 2014.

A major issue in the recovery of the Christchurch CBD was the purchase of land allotments for the proposed Performing Arts Precinct by the CCDU, which led to increasing tensions with local landlords and developers (Gates, 2013b). At first, the land purchased was going to be used for the building of parking spaces nearby the performing art venues, but CERA and the CCDU desisted from the Performing Arts Precinct project in April 2014 (CCDU, 2014e). The decision that eventually led to the downsizing of the Performing Arts Precinct project had a lot to do with the CCC’s decision to rescue the Town Hall (Brownlee, 2013b; Greenhill, 2013d;
Turner, 2013) and use most of the NZD$ 156 million budget agreed with the Crown (CCDU, 2013d; CERA, 2013b) for the recovery and strengthening of the venue. The residual funds available, nevertheless, were enough for the launching of one project (i.e. the Christchurch Centre for Music) in June 2014 (CCDU, 2014f; Gates, 201b).

The reopening of the Isaac Theatre Royal (ITR) in November 2014 (ITR, 2014a) represents the first key achievement in the creation of a performing arts hub in Christchurch. Soon after the earthquake of February 2011, the management of the theatre agreed on going ahead with the recovery project of the complex (ITR, 2011a) with a consistent share of the funds coming from the insurance payout (ITR, 2014a, 2014b). This project, along with the re-opening of nearby New Regent Street refurbished streetscape in early 2013 (Future Christchurch, 2013; McDonald, 2013b; NZHPT, 2013c) and the launch of the Conference Centre Precinct in August 2014 (CCDU, 2014c), persuaded developers to invest in the area regardless the Town Hall issue. Such investments were mostly in the form of accommodation facilities. The Rendezvous Hotel officially opened for business in May 2013 (Berry, 2012, 2013a, 2013b), followed by the Novotel near Cathedral Square in September 2013 (Wood, 2012). The Millennium and Copthorne Group, instead, has been facing difficulties in choosing the location for its project due to the time taken to decide the fate of the Town Hall (Wood, 2013), while the Crown Plaza Hotel Group purchased the site of the Forsyth Barr Tower to build its new complex (McDonald, 2014) in replacement of the demolished Parkroyal Hotel near the Town Hall (Greenhill, 2011; Young, 2012). Chapter 6 further illustrates the case study of the Performing Arts Precinct and recovery of the Town Hall.

The recovery of Christchurch and of its amenities in the aftermath of the earthquakes of September 4\textsuperscript{th}, 2010, February 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2011 involved multiple interests and constraints. This is particularly evident with the projects chosen for this study. For example, one of the former tenants of the ACC (i.e. the Court Theatre) was evicted from the Arts Centre in March 2011, but managed to quickly relocate to the Shed in Addington after a NZD$ 4.9 million refurbishment project (Moore, 2011b). The new venue was originally expected to be a temporary residence for the theatre, as the final blueprint for the central area of Christchurch issued in July 2012 designated a precinct for the Performing Arts in replacement of the Christchurch Town Hall complex in Victoria Square (CCDU, 2012b; 2012d). Nevertheless, the
decision of the CCC to rescue the Town Hall in November 2012 (CCC, 2012b, 2012c), later ratified in August 2013 (CCC, 2013h; Price, 2013) put the relocation of the Court Theatre in the designated Performing Arts Precinct in jeopardy.

The management team running the Arts Centre is unlikely to rent the premises to the Court Theatre at the same conditions as before the termination of the leases in March 2011 (ACC, 2012, 2013b; Gates, 2011b; Nahkies, 2012). Arguably, this last decision was based on the need to secure extra recovery to meet the budget of NZD$ 200 million (Gates, 2011c; van Beynen, 2013) for the repairs of the many buildings and the necessary earthquake strengthening that had not been done despite the warning of previous local administrations at the end of the 1990s (Bruce, 1999). As a result, the Court Theatre is currently stuck in its temporary venue and it might extend the tenancy contract (MCH, 2014a).

The recovery plan for the Christchurch CBD was quickly developed. It took only nine months for the CCC to develop the CBD plan draft to submit to the Ministry of Earthquake Recovery in December 2011 (CCC, 2011d). This procedure was foreseen by the CERA2011, the key legislative framework enacted after the earthquake of February 2011. However, the Ministry and the New Zealand Government decided to override the local authority in April 2012 after raising concerns about the governance issues within the CCC emerged between January and March 2012. Moreover, the Ministry argued that the draft plan of the CBD needed further amendments for the implementation stage. The subsequent establishment of the CCDU in April 2012 was followed by the delivery of the ultimate blueprint commissioned to a consortium of architecture firms led by Boffa Miskell (Boffa Miskell, 2013; CCDU, 2013c). The consortium took 100 days to unveil a blueprint plan identifying a series of anchor projects (CCDU, 2012b), which required compulsory land purchases (CERA, 2013f) and comprised a range of area development criteria for private investors (CCDU, 2014d). Nevertheless, the financial difficulties faced by the CCC, the difficulty in securing the insurance payouts (Cairns & Harford, 2014) and the scarce private participation in mixed-area developments inevitably led the CCDU to revise the land purchase programme and expect a downsizing of the CBD anchor projects (Stylianou, 2015).
1.6 Outline of the dissertation

This chapter provided a summary of the conceptual basis and of the advancements in the literature at the heart of this dissertation. Moreover, it provided an overview of the post-earthquake Christchurch context with a focus on the fragmented destination governance and the two projects chosen for the case studies. Chapter 2 extends the literature by illustrating the theories, the theoretical framework developed for the dissertation, the themes of the narrative and their application to two urban tourism settings: heritage and performing arts. Chapter 3, illustrates the research methodology of the dissertation, with a focus on the collection of politically sensible data, the experience from fieldwork and the analysis of data. Chapter 4 reviews the context of Christchurch before and after the earthquake through a longitudinal perspective, with a focus on the period between 2008 and 2014.

Chapter 5 discusses the decisions and the whole governance with respect to the Arts Centre site, particularly the rationale and the factors that led the Trust to shut the site, evict the original tenants and seek for new, more lucrative businesses from leisure and tourism sectors. Chapter 6 examines the governance dynamics and the relevance given to tourism in the policy decision-making stages that eventually led to the decision of recovering the Town Hall and subsequent downsizing of the original Performing Arts Precinct project. The narrative approach adopted stresses the political relevance of the assessments and project designs, the governance dynamics between stakeholders, the rationale used to justify the choice of the area for the site and the appeal to rescue the Town Hall.

Chapter 7 discusses the findings of the study by comparing the outcomes of the research with the current literature and it provides a theoretical synthesis and a series of propositions in light of the findings from the two case studies. Finally, Chapter 8 highlights the contributions and the limitations to the study and presents a series of research recommendations. Ultimately, the chapter provides a summary of the period after September 2014, with a focus on what happened to the two sites, the key changes to the governance and the likely outcomes for Christchurch as a tourist city in the years to come.
2.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the literature and the theories at the heart of the theoretical framework. As mainstream literature in policy analysis (Ham & Hill, 1984; Jenkins, 1978), planning theory (Allmendinger, 2009; Healey, 2006a) and tourism planning (Dredge, 2001a, 2001b; Dredge & Jenkins, 2007d) suggest, different and theoretically valid explanations can be developed. As Allmendinger (2009) otherwise puts it, theories are a constructed way to depict and understand the empirical realm through the enucleation of prescriptions and assumptions. All theories can be disproven but they “cannot be conclusively falsified” (Allmendinger, 2009, p6). By making theoretical roots and biases explicit, this chapter illustrates the literature used for the development of this research. It is argued here that a dedicated knowledge from different disciplines and fields, along with high-level research skills are needed for the development of a suitable theoretical framework for the purpose of this research.

The chapter consists of five main sections. Section 2.2 provides a summary of the literature review in the field of tourism and advocates for the framing of a body of knowledge rooted in critical theory with regards to the phenomenon of urban regeneration and tourism in pre-and-post disaster contexts. Section 2.3 presents the key points advocating for the use of Lukes’ theory of power as a cornerstone for the framing of the literature and the phenomena at the heart of this study, while Section 2.4 explores the relevant literature retrieved from disciplines and fields dealing with contemporary urban tourism, urban change and post-disaster urban recovery through a Lukesian perspective. Section 2.5 focuses on the illustration of the theoretical framework elaborated for the research and of its core elements of reference retrieved from the literature, while Section 2.6 provides the literature basis that led to the choice of the research themes of haphazard coalescence, instrumentation policy and planning by opportunity. Section 2.7 provides a summary of this chapter.
2.2 Literature review

Chaos models and conceptualizations are extensively used to describe destinations affected by hazards (e.g. Calgaro, 2010; Faulkner, 2001; Faulkner & Russell, 1997, 2001; McKercher, 1999; Ritchie, 2004, 2008; Scott et al., 2008; Speakman, 2014). These are mostly descriptive models and are seen as an advancement from linear staged models of crisis and disaster management and destination development (e.g. Butler, 1980; Murphy & Bayley, 1989; Weaver, 2000). However, the mere application of tourism crisis and disaster management models is not enough to provide a systemic insight of the complex dynamics taking place at tourist destinations affected by natural hazards. In fact, the mainstream literature in the field overlooks social and political dynamics affecting tourism during crises (Hall, 2013). Moreover, research contributions of this kind tend to overlook the rebuilding and recovery of tourist amenities in urban areas. Such neglect clashes with the literature on post-disaster in the wider domain urban studies, planning and architecture (e.g. Mitchell, 1999b; Pelling, 2003; Vale & Campanella, 2005b).

Most of the literature on crisis and disaster management in tourism looks at practices of recovery at the local level, with a significant body of knowledge analysing the phenomenon from a community perspective (Beeton, 2006; Biggs, Hall & Stoeckl, 2012; Calgaro & Lloyd, 2008; Gurtner, 2007; Hystad & Keller, 2008; Larsen, Calgaro & Thomalla, 2011; Robinson & Jarvie, 2008). A handful of these works built on the work of Pelling (2003) to stress how governance is central to a community’s ability to withstand a given disaster and recover from it (Calgaro, 2010; Calgaro & Lloyd, 2008). Nevertheless, none of these works assess post-disaster governance in tourism-related community contexts from a politics and power standpoint. In turn, “a number of very important questions regarding the processes that occur within communities, particularly with respect to which stakeholders have the greatest ability to achieve their aims and why” (Hall, 2003, p100) remain unanswered.

The inclusion of insights from urban tourism, tourism planning and policy and tourism destination governance may help understand the contextual and the dynamical forces that influence the recovery of destinations and of urban tourist spaces. Research discussing the
processes of urban regeneration and tourism from a political science (e.g. Doorne, 1998a, 1998b; Searle, 2009) or a sociological background (e.g. Spirou, 2010) provides an international understanding of the macro tendencies with respect to spatial changes in the contemporary city. Notwithstanding the wide spectrum of urban tourism research (Ashworth & Page, 2011; Page & Hall, 2003), the scarcity of research at urban tourist attractions highlighted more than a decade ago (Pearce, 2001a) is still far from being addressed. This is quite surprising given that “many management and planning issues” (Pearce, 2001a, p936) take place, de facto at micro-scale.

The acknowledgement of the political dimensions in tourism planning (Hall, 1994; Hall & Jenkins, 1995) represents one of the most researched insights in this field. It conceives the “highly political view of planning and planners” (Allmendinger, 2009, p148) the fragmented nature of institutional networks with respect to tourism development (Hall & Jenkins, 1995), the centrality of governance (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007b) and the importance of multi-scalar relationships between the public and the private stakeholders (Hall, 2008b). Most importantly, it embraces the idea of policy and planning as “intimately involved with relations of power and the exercise of power” (Fischer & Forester, 1993a, p7), particularly at the local and urban level, as illustrated in the studies of Doorne (1998a) and Lew (2007) in the regeneration of tourist areas in Wellington (New Zealand) and Guangzhou (China). More recently, scholars argued in favour of new paradigms that acknowledged the relevance of social constructionism, political sociology and storytelling as preferred approaches in the study of tourism planning and policy (Dredge & Jenkins, 2011a, 2011b; Dredge et al., 2011a).

There are multiple “ways of theorizing destination governance which are valid in understanding particular cases” (Laws et al., 2011, p4). Destination governance research can be broadly distinguished between business and political science traditions (Pechlaner & Volgger, 2013) or, preferably, under four main typologies of governance (Hall, 2010c, 2011a, 2012). In particular, we can distinguish between markets, communities, hierarchies and networks (Hall, 2011a), with the latter “seen as the most appropriate paradigm for the architecture of complexity” (Börzel, 1998, p253), particularly for the analysis of urban tourism contexts.
Current studies in urban tourism, tourism planning and policy and tourism destination governance provide conceptual and theoretical insight not explicitly addressed in the tourism crisis and disaster literature which are quintessential for the purposes of this research. This research builds upon the extensive research on urban regeneration, tourism and post-disaster redevelopment (Gotham, 2007b; Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Greenberg, 2008) and seeks to deepen the analysis with respect to the planning dynamics, the policy constraints and the principles concerning the development of urban tourist areas and amenities.

2.3 A Lukesian understanding of power in urban tourism, regeneration and governance

Contemporary urban policy and planning research is rooted in the theories of structuration (Giddens, 1979, 1984) and of power as radical view (Lukes, 2005), with the latter extensively used in the works of Patsy Healey (1993, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2003, 2006a). Conversely, the field of tourism knowledge seems not to fully grasp the theory of structuration, as highlighted in works on tourism policy planning (Bramwell & Meyer, 2007), pro-poor tourism (Truong, 2014) and tourism geography (Hall & Page, 2014; Perkins & Cushman, 1993). Similarly, the conceptualization of power rooted in Lukesian thinking is limited (Coles & Church, 2007), with some notable exceptions (Amore & Hall, 2016b; Doorne, 1998b; Farmaki, Altinay, Botterill & Hilke, 2015; Hall, 2003, 2007b, 2010b, 2010d, 2010e). Rather, power in tourism studies is mostly based on concepts and models retrieved from the works of Foucault (e.g. Craik, 1997; Dredge & Jamal, 2015; Morgan & Pritchard, 1998; Urry, 2001; Winter, 2007). For the purposes of this dissertation, therefore, it is necessary to further justify the choice of such seemingly overlooked theoretical insights rooted in Weberian and Lukesian thinking. The following section addresses the rationale behind the choice of the Lukesian approach to power theory over the Foucauldian paradigm.

The notion of power is fundamental for the purposes of this research (Hall & Jenkins, 1995). Power is an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1956; Hoy, 1986) that has been at the centre of philosophical debate since the early modern era (Foucault, 1994c, 2003) and it still generates a wide range of overlapping and/or contrasting conceptualizations (Arendt, 1970;
Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Coles & Church, 2007; Haugaard, 2003). In contemporary philosophical thought, there is a divide between those advocating for Foucauldian thinking and those closer to the Frankfurt School in general and the work of Jürgen Habermas in particular (Deleuze, 1994; Flyvbjerg, 1998a, 1998b; Hoy, 1986; McCarthy, 1994). There are, nevertheless, scholars who seek to recast the divide by acknowledging the late works of Foucault on power (Kelly, 1994) and his shift towards a critical thought underpinning a “form of philosophy that, from Hegel, through Nietzsche and Max Weber, to the Frankfurt School has founded a form of reflection in which [he] has tried to work” (Foucault, 1994a, p148).

Early Foucauldian research on power has been criticized for being not sufficiently theoretical and overly philosophical (Hoy, 1986). Moreover, Foucault’s early research seeks to “conduct a noneconomic analysis of power” (Foucault, 1994c, p28) by providing a genealogical historiography of modern mechanisms of domination/repression characterizing the modern society. Foucault himself asserts that he does not seek to construct a Theory of Power rooted on the definition of power as rationalization force upon society (Foucault, 1994b). Conversely, Foucault’s re-appraisals of power as the art of government and its exercise are at the heart of his late works on Governmentality (Foucault, 2003) and on the relation between power and knowledge (Foucault, 1980). The focus on the micro-practices of power and the rationalization of discourses are the common denominators throughout the works of Foucault. The appraisal of public policy that we see in the current literature (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 1998b; Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2009a; Le Galès, 2011) underpins the concern “with power at its extremities, in its more regional and local forms and institutions” (Foucault, 1994c, p34).

The position among critical theorists and exponents of the Frankfurt School stresses the divide between Foucauldian and Weberian thinking, as explicitly emphasized by Foucault himself on several occasions (e.g. Foucault, 1982). In particular, Jürgen Habermas dismisses the notion of power used by Foucault as “utterly unsociological” (Habermas, 1994a, p57) and “systematically ambiguous” (Habermas, 1994b, p83). Central to the critiques of Habermas are the works on power/knowledge (Foucault, 1980, 1990, 2002) and the alleged objectivity of the Foucauldian genealogical historiography (Kelly, 1994). Habermas argues that the notions of power and fragmented empowerment illustrated by Foucault are not able to fully grasp
the complexities of welfare-state democracies and of modern society at large (Habermas, 1994b).

Unlike with Habermas, Lukes (2005) acknowledges the divide, in Foucault, between his later writings on Governmentality and the early works on power/knowledge. Like Foucault, Lukes is interested in “the role of knowledge in the reproduction of relations of domination to analyse power” (Haugaard, 2003, p88) and he recognizes the importance of Foucauldian theorization of power in shifting the argument in political science (Lukes, 2005). However, Lukes argues that the early Foucauldian idea of power as both repressive and productive that renders “the governed governable through the social construction of subjects [makes] no sense” (Lukes, 2005, p98). Moreover, Lukes rejects the ultra-radical notion of power in which subjects are “social constructions, whose formation can be historically described” (Digeser, 1992, p980). In opposition to the alleged objectivity of Foucault’s genealogical historiography, Lukes stresses the intentional stance of subjects in decision-making (Dowding, 2006).

Following Hoy’s (1986) allegory of power as a chess game, the move of a given piece over another at the moment of capture represents Lukes’ first dimension, while the overall game strategy refers to both the first and the second dimension of power. The arrangement and rules of the game, instead, can be ascribed to the third dimension. Conversely:

On Foucault's model, the capture is indeed a 'micro-power', but it is also the effect of the overall arrangement of the pieces at the time as well as of the strategy leading up to and including the capture (Hoy, 1986, p135).

As Lukes (2005, p98) ironically notes “Foucault’s writings [...] exhibit an interesting kind of power: the power of seduction”. The Foucauldian notion of power is, in fact, extraordinarily popular in different research domains, particularly in the field of tourism studies. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the key commonalities and differences between the instances of Foucault, the position of the Frankfurt School and the radical view of Lukes with respect to the notion of power.
Table 2.1: A comparison between Foucauldian, Critical Theory and Lukesian approaches to power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Michel Foucault</th>
<th>School of Frankfurt/Critical Theory</th>
<th>Steven Lukes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical roots</strong></td>
<td>• Anti-Cartesian; • Advocates for a radical Kantian approach to critique; • Strongly influenced by the works of Nietzsche; • Some instances put him close to Marxian (power as held by political elite) and Weberian (critical theory and ontology of the present) thinking; • Admittedly anti-Marxist and anti-Weberian with respect to top-down structuralism power of political-juridical systems.</td>
<td>• Anti-Cartesian; • Advocates for a radical Kantian approach to critique; • Rooted in Hegelian, Marxist and Weberian thinking.</td>
<td>• Close to Marxist and Weberian thinking; • Influenced by thinkers of the Frankfurt School; • Influenced by the works of Gramsci on Hegemony.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research aim</strong></td>
<td>• Suggests which aspects of power to look at; • Emphasis on the role of knowledge in the reproduction of the relations of domination; • Seeks for a genealogical explanation of the relation between knowledge and power.</td>
<td>• Emphasis on who and which institutions hold political and juridical power; • Emphasis on how A is affecting B contrary to B’s real interests if, as result of ideological coercion, B is not actually aware of these interests.</td>
<td>• Suggests an analysis of what power is; • Emphasis on the role of knowledge in the reproduction of the relations of domination; • Emphasis on how A is affecting B contrary to B’s real interests if, as a result of ideological coercion, B is not actually aware of these interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research approach</strong></td>
<td>• Advocates for a critical analysis; • Acknowledges the unavoidable reflexivity of social inquiry; • His early works advocate for an essential incontestability of theories; • Argues that general social theory is pretentious and incompatible with the context transcendence; • power permeates society through discourse, rationalization and domination; • Advocates the possibility of non-ideological thinking or true consciousness.</td>
<td>• Advocate for a critical analysis; • Acknowledge the unavoidable reflexivity of social inquiry; • Combine contextualism with universalism to construct general accounts of the origins, structures and tendencies of existing social orders; • Acknowledge the notion of domination; • Incorporate the ideology criticism.</td>
<td>• Does not claim for the essential incontestability of theories; • Acknowledges the notion of domination; • Incorporates the ideology criticism; • Incorporates the idea of false consciousness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Unit of analysis
- Micro-practices of power of institutions and administrations;
- Domination/repression in prisons, psychiatric institutes;
- Feminist repression;
- Knowledge/power configurations throughout history.

- Macro and Meso practices of power;
- The relation between power and knowledge.

- Meso and Micro practices of power;
- Overt, covert and latent manifestations of power;
- Policy-making;
- Debates the notion of power by assessing works in the field of social and political sciences, with examples from urban realms.

### Emphasis on the role of structure
- Admittedly non-structuralist;
- Objects to those who use the infrastructure-superstructure model of materialist explanations.

- Predominantly structuralist;
- Conceive changes in the infrastructure-superstructure as correlated with and required by the change from one system of production to another.

- Relatively structuralist;
- Close to the instances of structure/agency advocated by Giddens.

### Emphasis on the role of agency
- Avoids suggesting that subjects possess power.

- Conceive power as something possessed by those who exercise it.

- Conceives the exercise of power from an agency-structure standpoint.

### Application in Public Policy Analysis (e.g.)


### Application in Planning Theory (e.g.)

- Forester (1989); Healey (2003).

### Application in Tourism Studies (e.g.)
- Predominantly in the study of tourism demand (Urry, 2001);
- Analysis of tourism policy (Fazito, Scott & Russell, 2016; Shone, 2013).


- Predominantly used in tourism and public policy (Farmaki et al., 2015; Hall, 2003).

Given the aim of this dissertation, the theory of power illustrated by Lukes seems to be more appropriate for the following reasons:

1) Lukes’ theory of power is multi-dimensional in the way it conceives the observable dimension of power described by Dahl (1957), the conscious and unconscious creation of barriers reinforcing authority (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970) and the notions of hegemony (Gramsci, 2008) and false consciousness (Haugaard, 2003). Conversely, Foucault does not envisage a multi-dimensional appraisal of power, even though some scholars conceive his works on power/knowledge as an alleged further dimension beyond the Lukes’ radical view (Digeser, 1992; Haugaard, 2003);

2) the notion of power provided by Lukes implies the notion of domination and ideological criticism advocated by the thinkers of the Frankfurt School (Hoy, 1986). Most precisely, the aim of Lukes’ research is “how to determine that A is affecting B contrary to B’s real interests if, as a result of ideological coercion, B is not actually aware of these interests” (Hoy, 1986, p132);

3) Lukes’ radical view acknowledges the role of human agency and confirming-structuration heralded by Giddens (1984) and the exponents of the Frankfurt School (Haugaard, 2003), in sharp contrast with Foucault, which “does not think of power as something possessed by those who exercise it” (Hoy, 1986, p134). Most importantly, the acknowledgement of human agency in Lukes’ radical view of power underpins contemporary planning theories and the institutionalist approach advocated in the works of Healey (1999, 2006a), which also provides a three-dimensional view of power and governance (Healey, 2006a, 2006c) rooted in Lukes’ theory of power;

4) Lukes’ conceptualization of power allows for a multi-scalar understanding of the phenomena at the heart of the research. In particular, Lukes’ power theory is widely accepted in the domain of policy analysis (Ham & Hill, 1984) and has margins of application in the dedicated field of tourism policy and planning (e.g. Farmaki et al., 2015; Hall, 2007b). Conversely, the Foucauldian appraisal of power dynamics admittedly overlooks the macro-level ideological influences that shape the contemporary society from the global down to the local scale;

5) the works of Foucault on power discourse are developed along longitudinal, genealogical historiography spanning from the Middle Ages until the modern era. Conversely, Lukes’
theorization of power is an ontology of the present that acknowledges the mechanisms of authority and ideological hegemony rooted in contemporary society;

6) Lukes’ power theory enables the researcher to explicit the current neoliberal dogmatism as the third face of power and to align the theories retrieved in this research to those focusing on the rise of neoliberalism (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 2005) and disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007; Saraçoğlu & Demirtaş-Milz, 2014) at the global and at the urban scale. Such an appraisal is not fully addressed in the studies rooted in Foucault’s idea of power developed throughout the 1970s (Flyvbjerg, 1998b; Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2009a; Le Galès, 2011).

Undoubtedly, there are points of convergence between the Lukesian and the Foucauldian notions and theorizations of power (Digeser, 1992; Dowding, 2006; Haugaard, 2003; Hoy, 1986; Shone, 2013). According to Shone (2013, p38) “Lukes’ third dimension intersects with Foucault’s power–knowledge framework, which also acknowledges the relational nature of power”. However, it is argued here that the Foucauldian appraisal of power intersects with the mainstream conceptualization of power as an observable and manipulative phenomenon. For example, some of the propositions that Flyvbjerg (1998b) articulates in the light of his longitudinal research on decision-making practices in Aalborg underpin the conceptualization of power as manipulative force explicated in Lukes’ second dimension of power. In particular, I refer to the third proposition in which “rationalization presented as rationality is a principal strategy in the exercise of power” (Flyvbjerg, 1998b, p228). Similarly, Le Galès (2011) debate on the relevance of instrumentation policy governance reflects two of the three dimensions of power, in particular, the demise of potential issues through rational sound instruments and criteria of good governance. Both Flyvbjerg and Le Galès are influenced by the works of Foucault. However, Lukes himself argues that the work of Flyvbjerg “does not support the extravagant claims made by Foucault and too many others that his thought offers an ultra-radical view of power” (Lukes, 2005, p107). In a similar fashion, the Le Galès employs the late works of Foucault on Governmentality, in particular, the “rational forms, technical procedures [and] instrumentations through which to operate” (Foucault, 1997, p203). As mentioned before, the works on Governmentality dissolve “the ultra-radicalism of Foucault’s view of power” (Lukes, 2005, p97) and “expose tensions within his earlier work” (Coles & Church, 2007, p26).
2.4 The three dimensions of urban regeneration, tourism and post-disaster governance

The forthcoming sections follow the three-dimensional view of power outlined by Lukes (2005). They articulate the existing knowledge with respect to the politics and governance of urban tourism spaces from both business as usual and post-disaster perspectives. Where available, the dedicated literature on heritage, culture and the arts was added to address each of the three dimensions of power in policy-making. In particular, Section 2.4.1 illustrates the overt phenomena of urban tourism and urban regeneration. Section 2.4.2 provides an insight of the literature with respect to the covert and latent dimensions of power that emerge in the governance of places as well as in the establishment of instruments and regulations. Section 2.4.3, finally, addresses the hegemonic dimension of power in the light of the current third wave of de-politicized neoliberal ideology and how it shapes urban areas with insights also from post-disaster cities.

2.4.1 The overt dimension: stakeholders’ roles and influences

Evidence from business as usual contexts

The overt dimension of power in the implementation of anchor projects and regeneration strategies for urban tourist spaces comprises the partnerships among particularly powerful key stakeholders (Britton, 1991), also known as urban growth coalitions (Logan & Molotch, 2007; Ward, 1997). The latter have become “an essential part of the overall process of urban planning and governance” (Dunn & Jamieson, 2011, p94), with tourism and leisure urban projects becoming a mainstream urban regeneration strategy in most of the major cities around the world (Harvey, 1989a; Smyth, 1994). Such urban regeneration programmes determine and allocate the land for anchor project development by often favouring some stakeholders rather than others (Owens & Cowell, 2011). This rationale is further stressed in Porter (2009, p242), who sees urban regeneration policies as an emerging “two broad, fuzzy-
edged forms of state activation” that silently delivers an urban renaissance of the few and often culminates with the well-known phenomenon of gentrification (Lees, Slater & Wyly, 2008; Smith, 2002).

Governance is described as the product of a failing mode of traditional policy-making (Hewitt de Alcántara, 1998; Jessop, 2002, 2011; Olesen, 2014) that brought to a wide-restructuring of the public sector between the 1980s and the early 2000s in most of the western countries. The contemporary shift from government to governance at different scales of the public policy domain led to a new stage in policy, planning and decision-making where heterogeneous arrays of stakeholders and shareholders address specific policy issues, interests and views. Governance is “a complex, multi-actor, multi-level process” (Paavola, Gouldson & Kluvánková-Oravská, 2009, p149) for “the management of the common affairs of political communities” (Healey, 2006a, p59) conveyed in elaborated webs of embedded relations. From a sociological perspective, the notion of governance encompasses:

all forms of collective action focused on the public realm (sphere) in one way or another, from those orchestrated by formal government agencies, to lobby groups, self-regulating groups and social campaigns and movements targeted at resistance or challenge to dominant governance relations (Healey, 2006b, p302).

Jessop (2011), however, argues that governance as ‘new’ mode of policy-making is likely to fail. The emerging literature on metagovernance (see Amore & Hall, 2016a) highlights how given modes of policy-making change depending on the policy objective or “during periods of crisis that threaten system integration and/or social cohesion” (Jessop, 2011, p115). Figure 2.1 illustrates the non-exclusive typologies and the forms of governance and metagovernance through which the state, policy actors, private interests and civic society aim at resolving “societal problems or creating societal opportunities” (Meuleman, 2008, p11).

Over the last 30 years, the spatial governance of cities has leaned towards enabling stimulation policies for urban tourism, with the widespread of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) for the creation of tourism-related redevelopment projects (Britton, 1991; Hall, 1999, 2006, 2008b; Harvey, 1989a). “The use of public-private partnerships in building the city of leisure is increasingly a common, sought-after strategy” (Spirou, 2010, p55), with the public
sector taking most of the investment risk with the ultimate purpose of attracting and fostering private investment in the area (Doorne, 1998b; Spirou, 2010). Concerns are nevertheless raised with respect to the influence of private interests, the governance issues among stakeholders, the use of taxpayer money to attract private investors and the ballooning of project costs (Flyvbjerg, 2008; Hall, 1999; Hall & Wilson, 2011; Schuppert, 2011; Spirou, 2010). In particular:

The relationship between the tourism industry and government tourism agencies clearly raises questions about the extent to which established policy processes lead to outcomes which are in the ‘public interest' and which contribute to sustainability rather than meeting just narrow sectoral interests (Hall, 1999, p285).

![Figure 2.1: Frameworks of governance and metagovernance.](image)

Source: Amore and Hall (2016a).
The literature suggests that the public sector’s role in partnerships for anchor projects is often pursued through dedicated quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (QuANGOs) or area development corporations (Connelly, 2007; Jones, 1998; Jones & Evans, 2008) that assemble the land and seek to find private developers for the delivery of such projects and the development of nearby retail/leisure spaces (Ashworth & Dietvorst, 1995; Hall, 1998; Jansen-Verbeke & van de Wiel, 1995). The involvement of the private sector is sought with financially risk-free investments or fiscal incentives aimed at attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the area (Britton, 1991; Spirou, 2010). These corporations and partnerships between public and private spheres of the economy are temporary: once the project is completed, the dedicated authority is disestablished (Jones & Evans, 2008).

The governance of heritage sites in urban areas often runs through partnerships that seek to recover and retain historic buildings and sites. Such partnerships can involve a heterogeneous array of local, national and international players that seek the opportunity to invest in the refurbishment of historic fabric into spaces for retail, leisure and tourism (Goebel, Sommer & Ives 2011; Rypkema, 2003). Harrill and Potts (2003) stress the importance of developing strategies for heritage tourism development that acknowledge the standpoint of residents and the role of community attachment. Nevertheless, the implementation of such projects is likely to create tensions between the economic interests of the private investors and the advocacy for high-standard conservation sought by heritage advocates (Park, 2013). Even when partnerships seek to prioritize the “long-term sustainability of local communities and their historical and cultural authenticity” (Park, 2013, p173), the empirical evidence suggests that economic gains often prevail over the integrity of the historic fabric (Pendlebury, 2002). Displacement of existing residents and shops is a likely outcome, particularly in urban heritage initiatives seeking short-term returns of investment (Diggle & Farrow, 1999; Gotham, 2005b).

The governance with respect to culture and the arts in cities can be broadly associated with the politics and the networking among stakeholders in the hosting of events (Dredge & Whitford, 2011) and the delivery of sites to boost the cultural, artistic and creative appeal of cities (Booyens & Rogerson, 2015; Lee, 2015; Madanipour, 2009; Throsby, 2010). The exploration of governance in events and tourism “provides opportunities to reflect on the characteristics of the public sphere in a well-defined temporal and spatial setting” (Dredge &
Moreover, it can provide a theoretical basis with respect to the forms of governance and the cultural policy outcomes (Markusen & Gadwa, 2010). Empirical evidence suggests that the governance is often fragmented (Booyens & Rogerson, 2015; Markusen & Gadwa, 2010; Whitford, 2009) and characterized by an imbalance of powers that, in some circumstances, compromises the pursuit of a genuine cultural development agenda to meet the interests of large arts institutions and real estate organizations (Markusen & Gadwa, 2010). The latter is particularly evident with respect to the arts organizations, which “typically suffer from problems of under-funding and under-valorisation” (Smith, 2006a, p4). Research on the governance of arts and cultural spaces with the involvement of anchor institutions is limited North American urban contexts (see Birch, Griffin, Johnson & Stover, 2013) and does not allow for an analysis of policies at the neighbourhood or district scale, particularly in medium and small cities (Markusen & Gadwa, 2010). Evidence from Miami and Washington (United States) suggests that public sector leadership and coalitions between arts institutions and neighbourhood associations are among the key factors for sustainable urban cultural anchors (Birch et al., 2013).

**Evidence from post-disaster contexts**

Cities in post-disaster contexts can become fertile ground for “highly fluid and constantly changing set of relationships” (Throgmorton, 2003, p130). However, recent advancements in the literature acknowledge that urban recovery planning takes place in a climate of uncertainty and disempowerment of traditional policy-making mechanisms, at the crossroads of compelling and risky urban recovery agendas for structural adjustments, quick economic upturn, attraction of foreign capital and competitive advantage gains that may overlook the occurrence of future disasters and the risks of increased vulnerability (Pelling, 2003). The “nested hierarchy of local, regional and international governance” (Pelling, 2003, p11) can thus hinder recovery and the “commitment to mutual understanding and collaboration” (Mitchell, 1999a, p46) that seek to minimize human exposure to future disasters. Ultimately, the coordinating role of government following major disasters is decisive in post-disaster recovery (Atkinson, 2013), especially “when large amounts of public funds are involved” (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon, 2014, p596).
Informal and formal governance actors and processes directly contribute to differential vulnerability and resilience in post-disaster destination contexts (Calgaro, 2010). In some cases, the pre-existing governance flaws can further exacerbate “cultural issues related to informal power structures and processes” (Calgaro, Dominey-Howes & Lloyd, 2013, p14). Nevertheless, there is a “need for more fundamental analysis of the relationships between different type of crises and the embeddedness of tourism within them” (Hall, 2013, p22), particularly in post-disaster urban contexts. Current evidence from New York and New Orleans (United States) suggests that disasters served as a pretext to clear areas and support public/private redevelopment partnerships. In both cases, part of the budget allocated for the recovery was diverted for the delivery of anchor projects. This process of steering post-disaster recovery with the implementation of market-obeying redevelopment strategies echoes the dynamics of the disaster capitalism doctrine (Klein, 2007) and of major urban governance shifts in countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis (Souliotis, 2013). Disaster recovery agendas, in turn, please the interests of corporations while further increasing the vulnerability of the people directly affected by the disaster (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014; Johnson, 2011; Johnson & Olsansky, 2010; Klein, 2007). This is particularly evident in post 9/11 New York (see Gotham & Greenberg, 2014).

Unlike with the practices of urban regeneration illustrated in the previous section, the “political conflicts over redevelopment are deeply spatialized as people negotiate and renegotiate meanings of and control over urban space” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p95). On the one hand, there is a greater citizenry engagement and proactive input on the discussion of spatial urban redevelopment following a major disaster. On the other hand, we have growth coalitions comprising big private interests and quest for big-scale redevelopments (Olsansky et al., 2012). In this context, tourism regeneration strategies are deployed as the palliative to justify the need of attractions in order to make the city a place worth to live in and visit. Depending on the magnitude of the disaster, the cordonning of consistent portions of the city for security reasons can be interpreted as the first sign of residential and retail displacement at the advantage of big investors. This process, referred to as disaster gentrification (Glück, 2013), uses disasters “to initiate or consolidate gentrification projects” (Glück, 2013, n.p.) which, ultimately, lead to contested forms of uneven urban redevelopment (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014).
In the wake of a major disaster, one of the key issues concerns the resulting “vertical and horizontal fragmentation of governance systems [as well as] responding to and recovering from impacts” (Britton, 2001, p53). It is quintessential to understand “how governance structures are often modified post-disaster, what the new structures are able to achieve compared to pre-existing structures” (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon, 2014, p578) and the response of destination managers “across regional and national levels of governance” (Orchiston & Higham, 2016, p69). “The complexities of large-scale disaster recovery often require more than hierarchical and centralized management processes” (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon, 2014, p596), with a greater engagement between the dedicated recovery authorities, the local government, the representatives of the private sector, non-government organizations and the plethora of civic associations and grassroots movements (Britton, 2001; Hayward, 2013, 2014; Johnson & Olshansky, 2013; Norman, 2004).

Nevertheless, it is likely that lobbying groups divert resources and decisions to matters dear to their personal gain. This was the case, for instance, of post-tsunami Sri Lanka, where “the tourism lobby in Asia had longed to be rid of the beachfront fishing villages” (Klein, 2007, p414). Similarly, in post-Katrina New Orleans, federal and state authorities coalesced with the “powerful tourism lobby […] eyeing the housing projects, several of them on prime land close to the French Quarter, the city’s tourism magnet” (Klein 2007, p415). Also, the designation of the Liberty Zone in New York following 9/11 and the decisions with respect to the redevelopment of Lower Manhattan were the expression of tight coalescences between federal and corporate interests, with very limited public hearings (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014). In each case, pro-business, growth coalitions flourished in a buffered governance arena resulting from the ‘exceptional circumstances’ caused a natural disaster (Klein, 2007).

Built heritage is often seen as a means for recovery in post-disaster context (see Amore, 2016a for a review). Avrami (2012, p187) asserts that “heritage can be a very important tool for recovery and rebuilding of community in the face of dramatic change and disasters”. Similarly, Chairatanananonda (2009) suggests that the allocation of public funds for historic buildings is valuable for both public and private interests. The recovery of built heritage in post-disaster contexts is usually addressed internationally and nationally through dedicated organizations that acknowledge the importance of site mitigation against hazards (Hall, Baird, James & Ram,
2016; Lattig, 2012). Nevertheless, the recent shift towards market-directing strategies of post-disaster recovery sees developers and government agencies often speculating on the vulnerability of heritage buildings in order to demolish sites with historic value so as to achieve radical redevelopment. Examples of such approaches can be found in post-Katrina New Orleans, where a significant portion of historic residential architecture in the heritage core of the city was demolished for “the lucrative economics of disaster recovery” (Verderber, 2009, p274). Evidence, from Christchurch, New Zealand, suggests that “political factors potentially caused more destruction to heritage than the series of earthquakes between 2010 and 2011 combined” (Amore, 2016a, p212). In particular, the national government favoured the interests of key local building owners and developers, thus making the conservation of heritage in New Zealand “a matter of market economics” (Brazendale, 2013, p245). Consequently, the landlords’ quest for ‘A-grade’ tenants in refurbished premises left medium and small retailers precluded from continuing their businesses due to the increased cost of rent (McDonagh, Borwing & Perkins, 2013, 2014).

Politics and policies for the arts are seldom included in urban recovery strategies, as in the case of Jiji in Taiwan (Cheng & Liao, 2017), Yogyakarta, Indonesia (Nakagawa & Suwa, 2010), and Osaka and Kobe in Japan (Ikeda, 2007; Nakagawa, 2010). Whilst some studies seek to assess the non-economic benefits of arts recovery policies in post-disaster contexts (e.g. Cheng and Liao, 2017), others highlight the flaws of cultural recovery policies (e.g. Nakagawa 2010) or the implementation of such policies in the aftermath of a major disaster (e.g. Nakagawa & Suwa, 2010). It is acknowledged that the constraints and the failures of cultural policies occur when government authorities downsize non-economic benefits of arts-led recovery in exchange for economic growth strategies in cities affected by natural disaster (Ikeda, 2007). However, the issue of post-disaster urban governance with regards to arts-led revitalization projects is far from being fully understood.

In conclusion, disasters become “open windows of opportunity that competing interests can exploit for their advantage” (Tierney, 2007, p512). The interests of major private actors like developers (Tierney, 2007) and of sectors like finance, insurance and real estate (also known as F.I.R.E) (Gotham, 2012; Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014; Smith, 2006) overrule the instances of residents and of small and medium businesses. The result is that those who had
been the most vulnerable in the aftermath of the disaster are further excluded in the rebuilding process, which thus becomes a matter for those few privileged who directly influence the redevelopment of cities (Klein, 2007).

2.4.2 The covert dimension: instruments and policy rules

Evidence from business as usual contexts

The second face of power encompasses the regulations, the instruments and the establishment of policies and strategies that direct and influence the urban regeneration agenda at large and the delivery of anchor projects. “This less visible, informal power […] is not just behind-the-scenes manipulation. It is also embedded in the thought-worlds of the powerful” (Healey, 2006a, p59). “The researcher must also consider the chance that some person or association could limit decision-making […] by influencing community values and political procedures and rituals” (Lukes, 2005, p6). Similarly, Ham and Hill (1984, p67) stress the need to “unravel the means by which the mobilisation of bias operates to limit the scope of debate”. Generally, the second dimension of power is associated with the notion of non-decision-making (Bachrach & Baratz, 1975) and, in particular, to “predominant norms, precedents, myths, institutions and procedures that undergird and characterize the political process” (ibid., p901). For the purpose of this research, the focus will be on the legislation, the rules, the episodes of non-decision-making and the use of documents and information in the governance of urban tourist spaces.

The study of policy outputs is based on the premise whereby we take “policies as dependent variables and attempts to understand these policies in terms of social, economic, technological and other factors” (Ham & Hill, 1984, pp9-10). The state sets the ‘rules of the game’ of governance. All of these elements affect what happens in destination governance. These issues are not new, but there is a need to ensure that the lack of ideological or distributional neutrality of governance modes and policy interventions is made explicit. As Majone (1989, p143) recognized:
The choice of policy instruments is not a technical problem that can be safely left to experts. It raises institutional, social, and moral issues that must be clarified [...] the naive faith of some analysts in the fail-safe properties of certain instruments allegedly capable of lifting the entire regulatory process out of the morass of public debate and compromise can only be explained by the constraining hold on their minds of a model of policymaking in which decisions are, in James Buchanan’s words, “handed down from on high by omniscient beings who cannot err”.

Among the research approaches focusing on the knowledge of policy and policy process, the focus on the instruments of public policy such as laws, regulations, guidelines and standards “is a fruitful avenue to demonstrate and interpret changing forms of governance” (Le Galès, 2011, p143). “The issue of public policy instruments is relatively little explored by academic analysts” (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007, p1) and predominantly rooted in functionalist assumptions such as the effectiveness of instruments and their alleged technical accuracy. As Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007, p3) suggest:

(1) public policy instrumentation is a major issue in public policy, since it reveals a (fairly explicit) theorization of the relationship between the governing and the governed: every instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it; and (2) instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the objective pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which structure public policy according to their own logic.

“The choice of instruments [...] may form the object of political conflicts [and] structure the process and its results” (Le Galès, 2011, p152). According to Lascoumes and Le Galès (2009a), there are up to five typologies of policy instruments. Two of such typologies are rooted on the classic definition of representative democracy and include the promulgation of acts and the implementation of economic and fiscal regulations. Table 2.2 illustrates the so-called new policy instruments that re-adapt the seminal work of Hood (1986) on the tools and resources of government in public policy-making (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2009a; Le Galès, 2011). The production of rules, laws, mechanisms of participation and knowledge favours the creation of a de-politicized environment in which the alleged neutrality of the instruments is used to pursue a political agenda (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2009a, 2009b) rooted in neoliberal ideology.
Table 2.2: Typology of new policy instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of new policy instrument</th>
<th>Type of political relations</th>
<th>Type of legitimacy</th>
<th>Example</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement-and-incentive-based</td>
<td>Mobilizing state</td>
<td>Direct involvement</td>
<td>PPPs regeneration projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information-and-communication-based</td>
<td>Audience democracy</td>
<td>Justification of decisions and accountability</td>
<td>Community forums</td>
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<tr>
<td>De facto and de jure standards/best practices</td>
<td>Competitive mechanisms</td>
<td>Scientific and/or market legitimation</td>
<td>Benchmarking</td>
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Adapted from Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007, 2009a) and Le Galès (2011).

Research in urban planning, urban governance and decision-making focusing on the relevance of instruments from a sociological perspective has only gained traction in the second half of the 2000s (Healey, 2006b; Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007). Current research suggests that the use political rhetoric for tangible results and the definition of goals can be used as tools of legitimation for the achievement of short-term projects (Stoker & Mossberger, 1984). Similarly, there are a series of mechanisms in urban regeneration practices influencing the urban policy programmes to prevent and/or resolve conflicts (Le Galès, 1998; Le Galès & Mawson, 1995). Moreover, allegedly neutral instruments such as statistics can be used to manipulate decision or obstruct the policies proposed by the oppositions (Flyvbjerg, 1998b). Researching the relevance of instruments in urban governance permits “to explore more explicitly the deeper structuring of […] practices but not always recognized by actors in the episodes in which they were engaged” (Healey, 2006b, p304). More recently, research on the policy instruments in urban governance has narrowed down to specific tools of legitimation and policy implementation. Critical research on urban projects, ultimately, discusses these instruments as evidence of governance beyond the state (Swyngedouw, 2005; Swyngedouw, Moulaert & Rodriguez, 2002; Taşan-Kok, 2010) and as the expression of a covert political will that has imposed itself as the best practice in the regulation, functioning and management of cities (Pinson, 2009).
Henderson (2003, p98) states that the politics in tourism goes “beyond the sphere of formal government structures and processes”, with ramifications that are often neglected (Farmaki et al., 2015; Richter, 1983). The current literature encompasses the analysis and study of social and political drivers and the functioning of social institutions. However, the fragmented nature of tourism and the governance of places suggest that public policies - at all scales - are “rarely exclusively devoted to tourism per se” (Hall, 2008b, p14). Stakeholders develop and legitimize such policies through a functionalist rhetoric that exalts the infallibility of instruments and has direct implications for tourism development (Hall & Page, 2014; Le Galès, 2011). An example can be found in the governance for events, where those proactively supporting mega-events “either shut down dissent or cynically manipulate debate through emphasis on intangibles like national pride [...] jobs and prosperity” (Getz & Page, 2016, p614).

Recent research in tourism planning and governance advocates “for greater reflection [...] to reveal deeper influences of policy development not immediately evident through relational of dialectical approaches to policy analysis” (Dredge & Jenkins, 2012, p232). Instruments such as documents, laws and regulations are legitimized within a framework in which the role of the state is crucial. The state is the main arena where different stakeholders with interests in tourism meet “to overcome their differences [and] rise above vested interests” (Britton, 1991, p458). “The political-economic structures and the prevailing political ideology in the destination state”, in turn, influence “the nature of state involvement and policies for tourism” (Sharpley & Knight, 2009, p242).

At the local level, instruments are likely to rationalize the decision of allowing the building of controversial projects (e.g. Higgins-Desbiolles, 2011), legitimize practices for the achievement of alleged sustainable urban tourism goals (e.g. Gindl & Wukovitsch, 2003) or promote creative urban tourism projects (Ponzini & Rossi, 2010). According to Dredge (2010), the rhetoric of public interest and global competitiveness can be decisive in legitimizing the building of large infrastructure for the purposes of tourism development, while Kayasü and Yetişkul (2016) argue that changes of the legal and institutional frameworks can directly contribute to the fulfilment of urban regeneration agendas. However, none of the aforementioned works address the second dimension of power and its instruments from a
political sociology perspective that underpins the works of Healey (2006b) and Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007).

Focusing on urban heritage, there is research discussing the manipulative rhetoric of conservationism and tourism behind the projects and the regeneration practices of ‘museification’ (Colini, Pecoriello, Tripodi & Zetti, 2009; Keating & Frantz, 2004). Place marketing strategies for heritage and culture can be instrumental tools “of pacification, depoliticization and massification” (Gotham, 2002, p1737), through which political and economic elites market and sell urban spaces for tourism and leisure. Heritage-led regeneration strategies are likely to advantage corporate and real estate interests at the expenses of the local community (Park, 2013). The policies and strategies of local authorities often do little to enhance the needs of residents and thus foster their political detachment in the transformation of heritage places into tourist spaces (Scarpaci, 2005). Extensive research on the Grainger Town Partnership and the refurbishment of the historic city centre of Newcastle, United Kingdom, shows how institutions routinized the pro-regeneration discourse over more conservationist stances for the retention of the historic fabric (Healey, 2006b; Healey, Cars, Madanipour & de Magalhães, 2002; Pendlebury, 2002). What emerges is that “episodes of governance are shaped by structuring power embodied in the mobilization of rules and norms, material resources and framing ideas” (Healey, 2006b, p306).

With respect to arts and culture projects, the covert dimension of policy-making is far from being fully understood. The production of policy documents is the “consequence of the political environment, values and ideologies, the distribution of power, institutional frameworks and decision-making processes” (Whitford, 2009, p675). However, the authorities drafting such policy documents often lack expertise in culture and the arts, with most city planning departments likely to “hamper the creation of artistic spaces in cities” (Markusen & Gadwa, 2010, p384). “An explicit statement of the several norms that form their rationale and related goals” (Markusen & Gadwa, 2010, p380) is thus seen as necessary to deliver effective arts-led regeneration. Evidence on the practices of arts strategies at city level suggests that local authorities tend to omit social criteria and overemphasize economic and visitation figures (Thomas & Wood, 2003). Subsequently, culture-led redevelopment projects are put into question, as examples from international best practices often do not match with
the final outcome (Lee, 2015). Non-decision-making in cultural strategies seems to occur when a given stakeholder overwhelms the original intent of the state. This was, for example, the case of the creative and cultural agenda originally sought by the Taiwanese government for its major cities, which has been amended under the lobby of the tourism industry and has thus ignored “the essential nature of culture and creativity” (Lee, 2015, p478).

Evidence from post-disaster contexts

The second dimension of power in post-disaster governance for urban spaces is more marked than in normal processes of urban regeneration. With hindsight, some of the decisions taken by authorities, particularly in the early emergence phase, suggest that “individuals, groups and political coalitions […] seize the opportunity for political intervention” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p12). A common feature that emerges from examples around the world is what Olshansky et al. (2012) refer to as time-compression. “Because of time compression, governmental capacity to solve problems, provide resources, and take actions is insufficient” (Olshansky et al., 2012, p176). Thus, disasters and crises become fertile ground for radical institutional arrangements to ‘facilitate’ recovery. Such arrangements determine where “the true power over the recovery resides with the level of government that controls the flow of money and how it is acquired, allocated, disbursed, and audited” (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon, 2014, p596). Government response often culminates with the establishment of ad hoc agencies that take control of the affected zone ‘from above’ and cordon the area in coordination with the civil defence and the army (Johnson & Olshansky, 2013; Klein, 2007; Mamula-Seadon, 2015). These agencies operate either under special legislation or implement radical institutional change to pre-existing organizations and authorities.

Post-disaster recovery becomes the occasion for the betterment of urban spaces and radical changes in the existing spatial planning agenda. Criteria and best practices to encourage what has become known as Building Back Better (BBB) (UNISDR, 2010) are often adopted to increase the safety of the built environment and promote high-quality structural engineering solutions. The principles of BBB have been promoted in the aftermath of the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami and underpin the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action to address disaster risk
reduction (UNISDR, 2005) and the more recent Sendai Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2015). There are nevertheless authors that question the alleged neutrality of such instruments and their impact on the livelihood of coastal communities (Klein, 2007; Rice, 2005). These are further stressed in a series of reports and research which show that the mechanisms put in place in post-disaster recovery often fail in their initial developmental purposes (Lyons, 2009).

The adoption of instruments like zoning and tax easing in the areas hit by the disaster fall short in reducing community vulnerability. Findings from New York and New Orleans, suggest that such initiatives promoted deregulation to the advantage of the economic elite (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014). In particular, the Liberty Bond programme launched in New York after 9/11 was extended to the whole Lower Manhattan area, with more than 50% of the bonds given to Silverstein Properties (owner of the World Trade Centre) and Goldman Sachs (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014). Similarly, the Louisiana Gulf Opportunity (GO) Zone benefited major petrochemical industries, some of which located outside the actual zone affected by Hurricane Katrina (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008). The most affected communities by these disasters, instead, received very little or no support at all, thus leaving them further exposed to forthcoming vulnerabilities in the recovery process (Barrios, 2011; Smith, 2006).

The second face of power in post-disaster contexts with respect to tourism suggests that recovery strategies for vulnerable communities underpin norms, criteria and governance changes for disaster risk reduction assimilated from international and best examples worldwide (Larsen et al., 2011). However, these top-down strategies are unlikely to succeed, particularly when national government override culturally embedded local practices (Larsen et al., 2011). Processes of disaster risk reduction governance can enhance practices rooted in non-decision-making (Cohen, 2007; Klein, 2007). Strategies resulting from non-decision-making processes can be found in post-9/11 New York, with the restructuring of the local tourism marketing agency for the promotion of investment opportunities in Lower Manhattan (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014).

Tourism organizations and marketing professionals have become the institutional voices behind the re-branding strategies adopted in New Orleans, United States, following Hurricane Katrina (Gotham, 2007b) by siding the most affected segments of the population out of the official narrative. Findings from Cyprus following the 2012-2013 sovereign debt crisis (Farmaki
et al., 2015) suggests that the hospitality sector heavily shaped power relations among stakeholders, influenced sustainable tourism policy discourses and determined what were the “legitimate values in tourism development” (ibid., p183). None of the aforementioned works, however, deploys an instrumentation policy critique based on the works of Flyvbjerg (1998b), Healey (2006b), Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007) and Le Galès (2011).

Research on policy instruments with respect to the built heritage in post-disaster contexts is limited and focused on aspects beyond the core issues of tourism planning and policy. Regulatory frameworks for disaster recovery can either support heritage preservation work (Bigenwald & White, 2003) or set in motion large-scale demolition of historic buildings (Verderber, 2009). Research from New Zealand and Christchurch shows how the legislation promulgated in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquakes is “likely to reduce the level of protection available for heritage buildings” (Brazendale, 2013, p277). The study concludes that the reforms of key acts at country-level and the dedicated legislation put in place in the city of Christchurch through the *Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011* (CERA 2011) “could ultimately result in the loss of many heritage buildings throughout New Zealand” (Brazendale, 2013, p288). The destructive effects of such instruments can be already seen in Christchurch following the earthquake of 2011, where a set of Orders in Council and the legislative tools put in place by the New Zealand Government directly contributed to the loss of built heritage (Amore, 2016a). Conversely, post-earthquake recovery in L’Aquila and the Abruzzo region followed a series of international guidelines and best practices outlining “the key elements necessary for developing a strategic vision for improving the use of the vast cultural heritage” (OECD, 2013, p148). In this case, tourism was seen as a crucial element in legitimizing a shift in the governance towards a pro-development tourism strategy to reposition L’Aquila and other heritage towns like Sulmona in the global tourism map (OECD, 2013). However, the strategy’s recommendations to lessen the current environmental protections are questionable.

The second face of power in the implementation of culture and the arts redevelopment strategies in the aftermath of a major disaster is far from being fully understood. Emerging research from New Orleans, United States, indicates how “deliberate planning strategies – or non-planning strategies” (Gladstone, 2012, p223) favoured the rapid recovery of the tourism
industry in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The recovery strategy legitimized the powerful tourism and hospitality lobby in New Orleans by reinforcing the tourist space around the major attractions in the city and fostering the process of tourism gentrification that was gradually re-shaping the city before Katrina (Gladstone, 2012; Gotham, 2005b; Klein, 2007). Strategies focusing on major cultural events like Mardi Gras and the Sugar Bowl were implemented following Hurricane Katrina to legitimize the re-branding of the city through which political and economic elites sought “to subsidize the planning and building of new entertainment spaces and attractions along Canal Street and near the French Quarter” (Gotham, 2007b, p838). Finally, empirical findings from post-earthquake Christchurch, New Zealand, report the initiatives of the arts community to deliver a recovery strategy anchored on the “arts potential potency as an efficacious act in engaging the community with their new city becoming” (Parker, 2014, p338). This initiative was eventually overridden by the government with the launch of the recovery strategy for the arts (CERA, 2013m) (see Amore, 2016b and Chapter 6).

2.4.3 The hegemonic dimension: values and beliefs

Evidence from business as usual contexts

Lukes (2005) conceives the third dimension of power as a distorting force that misleads the opinion of institutions and individuals from the real interests of societal wellbeing. This conceptualization is rooted in Gramsci’s definition of hegemony as “the mode of class rule secured by consent” (Anderson, 1976, p42). In a similar vein, Jessop (1997, p51) articulates his thoughts from a Gramscian perspective to analyse urban regimes “in terms of strategically selective combinations of political society and civil society, of government and governance, of hegemony armoured by coercion”. It is argued here that the current hegemonic ideology is rooted in neoliberalism, the theories of scholars like Milton Friedman, George Stigler, Friedrich Hayek and the exponents of the Chicago School of Economics. “Freedom of the market and of trade is a cardinal feature of neoliberal thinking” (Harvey, 2005, p7), along with other dogmas such as market deregulation, free trade, laissez-faire, market-oriented policies, privatization of public assets, the reliance on the infallibility of the market and the
embracement business practices in public administrations (Porter, 2009; Rhodes, 1997; Sager, 2011; Stilwell, 2012; Swyngedow et al., 2002). Neoliberalism is the dominant political and economic paradigm of the contemporary society. As Brenner and Theodore (2002, p350) put it: “the linchpin of neoliberal ideology is the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development”.

The neoliberal agenda is particularly evident in the contemporary city, with the shift from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989a, 1989b) and the sprawl of Business Improvement District (BID) projects in hundreds of cities over the last 40 years (Hoyt, 2006; McCann & Ward, 2010). Urban regeneration strategies, particularly those oriented at the creation of urban tourist spaces, are rooted in such an urban entrepreneurial memorandum (Hoyt, 2006; Jones & Evans, 2008; Montgomery, 2004; Smith, 2006b; Smyth, 1994). The sedimentation of the neoliberal doctrine and its normalization in urban management discourse (Peck & Tickell, 2002) was possible thanks to dynamics of global localness (McCann & Ward, 2010) through which key individuals adapted neoliberal policy paradigms accordingly to the respective socio-political contexts (Olesen, 2014). The ultimate shift from government to governance illustrated in the previous sections further contributed to the affirmation of neoliberalism “as a dominant common-sense discourse” (Olesen, 2014, p291) in urban policy and planning agendas (Gotham, 2012; Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014; Spirou, 2010).

Contemporary policy-making takes place in an increasingly normalized neoliberal climate. On the one hand, Swyngedouw (2010) argues that, because the policy environment is permeated by the neoliberal doctrine, we should analyse policy-making within a post-political context. The latter conceptualization is adopted by Allmendinger and Haughton (2012) in their review of contemporary spatial planning in England to assess “how spatial planning has sought to replace the antagonistic, more open and transparent role and purpose of planning” (ibid., p90), On the other hand, Olesen (2014) asserts that the currently depoliticized policy-making debate blurs “the realpolitik [...] of strategic spatial planning” (Olesen, 2014, p291, *italics* in the original). In particular, Olesen addresses the currently depoliticized planning discourse as the third wave of neoliberalization resulting from the “hegemonic neoliberal discourses across scales of governance” (Olesen, 2014, p293). Within such a spatial planning paradigm,
allegedly neutral agents like city planners proactively assist the establishment of an “hegemonic neoliberal structure” (Clifford & Tewdwr-Jones, 2013, p58) which, de facto, accommodates the interests of the powerful while hindering the basic principles of sustainable urban planning agenda advocated by planning theorists (Tewdwr-Jones, 2004).

Notwithstanding the hegemonic affirmation of neoliberalism in planning discourse, there are scholars who critically challenged the dogmas of neoliberal doctrine (e.g. Allmendinger, 2009; Žižek, 2000). These critiques towards post-political, neoliberal hegemony adopt a critical theory approach to “rethink strategic spatial planning processes and interpretations of spatiality in the face of neoliberalism” (Olesen, 2014, p300) from a structure-actionist perspective in the attempt to provide an argumentative, counter-narrative that challenges hegemonic “neoliberal practices and concepts in strategic spatial planning” (Olesen, 2014, p296).

Research critically analysing the relationship between neoliberal political ideology and tourism is at a turning point. The recent publication edited by Mosedale (2016) seeks to provide “a solid basis for further, more specific analyses of the effects of the wider neoliberal project on tourism” (ibid., p1). The application of the neoliberal ideology in tourism is well documented (Britton, 1991; Hall, 2006; Higgins-Desbiolles, 2006). However, there are extensive features in the current tourism literature that lack the necessary critical appraisal of the phenomenon due to their overreliance on mainstream business literature (see Tribe, 2004 for a review).

The neoliberal paradigm has arisen in tourism policy discourse as result of the progressive decentralization of the public and the increasing reliance on market solutions in tourism policy-making (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2006; Jenkins, 1980, 1994). Hall (2008b) links the legitimation of neoliberalism to the meta-political narrative of competitiveness, while Dredge (2010) and Whitford (2009) identify neoliberal discourse as one of the dimensions in public policy-making in urban and regional tourism and events planning in Australia. Dredge and Jenkins (2012, p232) conceive neoliberalism and globalization among “the major socio-cultural and structural shifts” that legitimized the establishment of PPPs in contemporary tourism planning and policy practices.
Neoliberalism and globalization are driving forces in contemporary tourism governance (Beaumont & Dredge, 2010), particularly at national and international level (Mowforth, Charlton & Munt, 2008). Tourism is “an important plank supporting the prevailing model of neoliberal economic development” (Mowforth et al., 2008, p15) carried out by influential bodies and organizations through the different scales of governance. The recent literature in tourism policy and planning “explores particular episodes of tourism policymaking, relationships between structures, processes, cultures and actors [in the] understanding [of] broader implications of neoliberalism, globalisation, networks and governance” (Dredge & Jenkins, 2012, p247). There is, nevertheless, scope to more research beyond “old ways of knowing” (Dredge & Jenkins, 2011b) and provide a greater critical appraisal of policy-making and policy mechanisms in tourism planning. This new liminality in tourism planning can be very important in the understanding of the impacts of neoliberalization in planning, policy and governance activities that have been so far underestimated or even unrecognized (Amore & Hall, 2016a).

The literature in urban tourism similarly acknowledges the hegemonic neoliberal discourse. This awareness is rooted in the works of Harvey (1989a) on urban entrepreneurialism and tourism-oriented strategies as facets of a late phase of capitalism agenda (Bramwell & Rawding, 1996; Doorne, 1998b; Evans, 2007; Gotham, 2007c; Hall, 2006, 2008b; Judd & Fainstein, 1999; Law, 2000; Maitland & Ritchie, 2009; Spirou, 2010). A similar appraisal of urban tourism through the lens of neoliberalism can be found in Britton (1991) which argues that urban tourism “can be integrated into an analysis of territorial competition and economic restructuring [...] framed in an entrepreneurial ideology” (ibid., pp468-469). Overall, there is a tendency towards a critical appraisal around the phenomenon of urban tourism from a neoliberal discourse narrative. The most critical instances come from scholars with a background in urban sociology (Gotham, 2002, 2005a, 2005b; Spirou, 2010), geography and the political sciences (Dredge, 2010; Hall, 2006; Hall, Jenkins & Kearsley, 1997a, 1997b; Hall & Page, 2014; Hall & Wilson, 2011; Henry, 1988; Page & Hall, 2003) whose works seek to engage “tourism researchers with wider debates in urban studies” (Ashworth & Page, 2011, p2). Such critical appraisal argues that the “neoliberalising discourse has come to dominate a wide range of development debates, including tourism” (Dredge, 2010, p107). There are, nevertheless, many accounts of governance and policy intervention with respect to urban
tourism that overlook how “different conceptualizations reflect particular sets of values and ideologies with respect to the appropriate role of the state and the rights and responsibilities of the state and the individual” (Amore & Hall, 2016a, p111).

With respect to the built heritage, it is claimed that the conservation and restoration of historic places benefit the tourist economy of cities (Chang, Milne, Fallon & Pohlmann, 1996; Goebel et al., 2011; Park, 2013; Rypkema, 2003; Spirou, 2010). The conservation of historic buildings mainly applies to identified heritage buildings, but it can also be implemented along with wider policies of urban sustainability (McCallum, 2008), climate change adaptation (Hall et al., 2016) and gradual urban change (Hall, 2008b), with the emphasis being on preventive strategies aimed at challenging practices of inaction and demolition of the historic built environment (Ashworth & Tunbridge, 2000). The conservation of heritage is often an adaptive strategy that converts a given historic building to tourism and recreational uses (Park, 2013; Williams, 1995). Arguably, the retained historic building recreates and reinforces new place identities (Bailey, Miles & Stark, 2004; Shaw & Williams, 2004) that are appealing to both international and domestic tourists (Park, 2013). Nevertheless, it is questionable whether heritage-led strategies accentuate urban uniqueness (Chang et al., 1996) or foster the serial reproduction of universal cultural spaces (Rojek, 1995) across cities.

The development of performing arts venues and their promotion as urban tourist attractions, instead, has been associated with mainstream practices of culture-led regeneration (Jones & Evans, 2008) and, more recently, with the rise of the creative industries (Booyens & Rogerson, 2015; Evans, 2007; Lee, 2015; Richards & Wilson, 2006, 2007). Smith and von Krogh Strand (2010) suggest that performing arts venues can foster regeneration while enhancing collective identity and tourist appeal. Overall, there is consolidated awareness of the economic and urban marketing returns that performing arts events have in major cities (Dogan, 2010; Ingerson, 2001). Performing arts venues can “revitalise emptying downtowns, attract tourists [and] preserve historic buildings” (Fernandes, 2011, p631). Evidence from dedicated research on performing arts venues projects in Miami and Washington D.C. (United States) suggests that such facilities are likely to bring benefits at the neighbourhood level, act as an incubator for thriving arts community and become a major tourist attraction (Birch et al., 2013). There are, nevertheless, drawbacks in the pursuit of regeneration strategies
focusing on culture, the arts and the creative industries. Some of these strategies might not be able to generate the proclaimed outcomes, especially when they fall into the trap of serial reproduction (Richards & Wilson, 2006). The approach of governments to the arts is rather tokenistic, it is rooted in a rhetoric of cultural development that has been questioned for at least a decade and lacks a long-term vision of research, investments and support towards artistic production (Miles & Paddison, 2005; Smith 2006a). Processes of cultural regeneration require years to re-create a sense of place and generate a more sustainable economy.

**Evidence from post-disaster contexts**

Recent historic events show how disasters, crises and political turmoil can likely lead to the rise and consolidation of hegemonic neoliberal doctrine. Arguably, the *coup d’état* of 1973 in Chile is considered as the first example of the imposition of policies rooted in the principles of the Chicago School of Economics (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2007). The military government led to a new form of corporatism characterized by “a mutually supporting alliance between a police state and large corporations” (Klein, 2007, p86) that suppressed the most basic civil rights (Frank, 1976). Over the last 30 years, neoliberalism dictated the political and economic strategies in contexts facing a degree of instability and uncertainty due to triggering events such as wars, terrorist attacks, political turmoil, financial instability and ecological disasters. Under extraordinary circumstances, governments around the globe implemented a series of “crisis-exploiting methods [...] to leverage the privatization of the infrastructure, disaster creation and disaster response” (Klein, 2007, p289). The practice of pushing for neoliberal policies as palliative to recover from shock events is referred as either ‘shock doctrine’ or ‘disaster capitalism’ (Klein, 2007). The rhetoric around the infallibility of the market and the presence of no other alternatives manipulate the opinions of citizens personally struggling with crises that, ultimately, further deepen because of neoliberal policies.

The examples of disaster capitalism are several across the globe. In most circumstances, the reiterated reliance on neoliberalism as the best political paradigm possible generated a spiral of cyclic crises that heightened the vulnerability of most of the citizens and increased the benefits of corporations. Under the misleading assumption that “the laws of economics are
like the laws of engineering” (Summers, 1991, quoted in Klein, 2009), the neoliberal doctrine has been ruthlessly adopted for the benefit of the few and the displacement of the many. Examples specific to post-disaster contexts include:

- the reform of security and counter-terrorism in the United States following 9/11 culminated with the contracting of private corporations to handle state-sensitive matters, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Klein, 2007);
- the implementation by national governments and local authorities of deeply rooted neoliberal agendas for disaster response and post-disaster recovery, with examples from Honduras following the 1998 Hurricane Mitch (Shipley, 2013; Stonich, 2008); Sri Lanka and Thailand following the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami (Klein, 2007); FEMA and the State of Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Johnson, 2011; Johnson & Olshansky, 2010); and the post-earthquake recovery in Haiti (Olshansky & Etienne, 2011), Italy (Guzzanti, 2010), Chile (Imilan & Gonzalez, 2016), New Zealand (Miles, 2016) and Japan (Cho, 2014);
- urban redevelopment agendas rooted in neoliberalism and urban competitiveness, with examples from New York, (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014; Greenberg, 2008), New Orleans (Gotham, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Klein, 2007), L’Aquila (Guzzanti, 2010; Tiso, 2014) and Istanbul (Ozcevik et al., 2009). Under the call for extreme, quick-fix solutions to foster recovery (Olshansky et al., 2012), cities embark upon a set of decisions that downsize the stakeholder base involved in key decision-making stages and justify strong market-oriented solutions to increase favourable market conditions to major private interests while further exposing the state to the burden of public debt.

Research explicitly linking neoliberalism to post-disaster recovery and rebuilding policies in urban contexts is at a pioneering stage. The climate of instability triggers opportunistic forms of urban change (Nyseth, 2012) that underpin the neoliberal paradigms highlighted in contemporary spatial planning (Olesen, 2014). The embracement of a neoliberal post-disaster recovery agenda can lead to a series of flaws (Peck, 2006). Evidence from New York and New Orleans suggests that “longstanding policy trends emphasizing the neoliberalization of public services and resources” (Gotham, 2012, p634) had negative repercussions in the rebuild of the two cities. “Neoliberal frameworks have filtered into major policy debates and
constrained the formulation and implementation of post-disaster recovery programs” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, p1041) and recovery strategies (Johnson, 2011; Johnson & Olshansky, 2010). In particular, the neoliberal dogma of the market knows best influenced the recovery strategy in Lower Manhattan, where authorities relied on “speculative financing and market rule to engineering urban recovery” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, p1055). Ultimately, the hegemonic neoliberal agenda for post-disaster recovery in both New Orleans and New York has proven to be flawed, with “dysfunctional effects of market-centred policies” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, p1043) that disregarded the needs of communities to accomplish alleged economic growth through the rebuild.

Recent studies in the field of tourism suggest that the doctrine of disaster capitalism is often promoted in developing countries hit by natural disasters. The disaster caused by a natural hazard constitutes a window of opportunity to deploy a neoliberal agenda in which the promotion of international tourism is used as a leverage to promote privatization and create incentives for the attraction of international capitals for the rebuild (Stonich, 2008). “The strategic and symbolic significance of tourism” (Gunewardena, 2008, p70) influences the recovery agenda in coastal areas by neglecting the humanitarian needs of the affected communities. Evidence from Sri Lanka and Honduras suggest that governments rely on international tourism to generate foreign revenue and de-regularized redevelopment opportunities for luxury resorts at the expenses of the vulnerable local community (Klein, 2007; Stonich, 2008). The embrace of neoliberal ideology has several repercussions in terms of preparedness, emergency and recovery from disruptive events (Calgaro, 2010) and it can cause “massive social-ecological imbalances” that need to be addressed (ibid. p77).

With respect to urban tourism, the neoliberal/disaster capitalism paradigm is far from being fully understood. Current research mainly focuses on rebranding strategies, with a handful of the linking the promotion of cities to the neoliberal recovery agenda pursued by both national and local authorities (Gotham, 2007b, 2007c; Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Greenberg, 2008). In these cases, the implementation and promotion of a favourable recovery business climate have been pursued “as an opportunity to push through far-reaching neoliberal policy reforms” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, p1039). City marketing strategies in New York and New Orleans have portrayed utopian images of the two cities by leveraging on features such as
urban sustainability, cultural diversity and tourism. Ultimately, the re-branding of New York and New Orleans has been used “to teach best practices for market-oriented growth, while elevating the status of cities for the purpose of interurban competition” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p221).

Critical understanding of the hegemonic dimension of power with regards to the built heritage is far from being addressed. Current research tends to look at other aspects of the governance of post-disaster recovery (e.g. Krasnozhon & Rothschild, 2010), thus overlooking rebuild rhetoric and policy discourses framing post-disaster response. In light of the literature retrieved for the other sections of this chapter, it appears that cities subject to large-scale developments regard heritage as a roadblock rather than a resource. Similarly, cities where retention of historic buildings is a cornerstone of the recovery strategy frame heritage as a flywheel for long-term sustainable development. Regardless of the strategy adopted, policy discourses towards heritage tend to emphasize aspects like economic growth and competitiveness ahead of intangible values dear to the affected community.

The international literature overlooks the practices of cultural regeneration, recovery and urban identity in post-disaster contexts (Amore, 2016b). Evidence from post-Katrina New Orleans, suggests that urban managers recently started to acknowledge culture within the wider process of early post-disaster recovery and place branding (Gotham, 2007b). Here, the rhetoric of local tourism authorities stresses on the potentialities of culture as a factor of economic recovery and tourist promotion. In particular, the emphasis on the distinctive cultural features of New Orleans (jazz, colonial heritage and the carnival) “fulfils several strategic tourism objectives including attracting diverse kinds of niche tourists and generating business opportunities within the local tourism industry” (Gotham, 2007b, p834). Also, the visual arts have been central to the celebration of post-Katrina New Orleans. Taylor (2010) cites the case of the NOLA RISING campaign, where professional and amateur artists were encouraged to display their works in the attempt to rebuild and restore the spirit of the city. This should not be a surprise, as New Orleans has exhibited “an arts-entertainment recreation industry [...] larger than that characterizing the United States as a whole” (Baade & Matheson, 2007, p130) before Katrina.
2.5 Theoretical framework and its features

The previous sections illustrated the forms of knowledge retrieved from a wide array of research within the domain of social science, with a focus on urban tourism spaces, the practices of urban regeneration, the policies and the politics of urban governance and the ideology of neoliberalism in both ‘normal’ and post-disaster contexts. The literature has been discussed from a Lukesian perspective in order to extrapolate the three dimensions of power from the existing body of knowledge. The following section identifies and links the relevant frameworks found in the literature to the theoretical framework developed for the purposes of this research. The framing of “key concepts and ideas” (Hall, 2011a, p438) is a sine qua non condition in qualitative studies like the one at the heart of this dissertation. In particular, it is important to provide a good framework that permits to better understand the black box of policy-making (Easton, 1957), especially in overlooked phenomena such as post-disaster governance and institutional failure (Britton, 1979; Tierney, 2012). The aim here is to provide “a theoretically sophisticated account of the diverse ways in which political and economic elites use tourism to transform [urban] space” (Gotham, 2002, p1736), particularly in studies focusing on the relevance of tourism and governance in post-disaster urban redevelopment.

Undoubtedly, literature fragmentation and disciplinary parochialisms constituted a major issue in the elaboration of an exhaustive and detailed theoretical framework that met the criteria of this research.

What emerges is that there are three existing frameworks encompassing the key dimensions of analysis sought for this research. More specifically, the sustainable tourism policy framework (Farmaki et al., 2015) embraces a Lukesian approach in the study of tourism policy and planning long advocated in the field (Hall, 2003, 2010d). Similarly, the governance capacity framework (Healey, 1998a) allows for a structurationist analysis of governance in a way that reiterates the principles of Lukes’ power theory (Lukes, 2005). Most importantly, the framework is suited for urban research and it permits to better understand the articulateness of factors behind single episodes of governance (Healey, 2004, 2006b, 2006c). Finally, the crisis-driven urbanization framework (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014) allows for a greater understanding of “market-oriented, and cyclical mode of urban redevelopment” (ibid., p11) through the lens of neoliberalism and of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007).
2.5.1 The sustainable tourism policy framework

Farmaki et al. (2015) deploy a Lukesian approach to power theory in the analysis of the political factors influencing sustainable tourism implementation in Cyprus following the 2012-2013 sovereign debt crisis (Figure 2.2). The framework links sustainable tourism development and implementation practices to the interest of individuals, the instrumental allocation of power and the ideologies that influence “the processes in an unconscious way to the point that it conceals people's real interest” (Farmaki et al., 2015, p181). Arguably, the framework has three major credits. Firstly, it acknowledges the implementation phase of projects and initiatives (Schuppert, 2011), which underpins the dimension of policy outcomes commonly addressed in policy analysis (Easton, 1957; Ham & Hill, 1984; Simmons, Davis & Sager, 1974). Secondly, it allows for a comprehensive analysis of tourism policy and planning in complex political contexts characterized by external and internal forces “strongly embedded in the inherent political system and extant power structure” (Farmaki et al., 2015, p186). This feature underpins the works of Dredge (2001b), Dredge and Jenkins (2007c, 2011b), Hall (1994, 2008b), Hall and Jenkins (1995) and Healey (1997, 1998a) among others. Thirdly, it provides a multi-layered conceptualization of power that is key in Lukesian thinking (Hall, 2010d; Ham & Hill, 1984; Lukes, 2005) for understanding the politics of sustainable tourism.

The first dimension refers to the implementation of policies and overt action of key stakeholders in imposing their vision to other subjects (Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 2005). The second dimension conceives the policy agenda as “a strong interface between the political system and the socio-cultural environment” (Farmaki et al., 2015, p186) that legitimates given power discourses through manipulation and instrumentation policy (Le Galès, 2011; Lukes, 2005). The third dimension, finally, refers to the “prevailing political ideology” (Farmaki et al., 2015, p186) that sets the basis of the current hegemonic neoliberal discourse (Lukes, 2005; Olesen, 2014).
Figure 2.2: The sustainable tourism policy framework
Adapted from: Farmaki et al. (2015)
The framework, however, has at least one major limitation. In fact, the framework was developed to elaborate an analysis of state-wide tourism policies rather than dedicated urban tourism strategies. There are, indeed, exquisite urban features in the phenomenon at the heart of this research like land use planning and governance (Tewdwr-Jones, 2012) that cannot be fully grasped with the mere adoption of the sustainable tourism policy framework. It is argued here that Healey’s governance capacity framework can be a valuable complementary element to expand the analysis to policy processes (Healey, de Magalhaes, Madanipour & Pendlebury, 1999; Hogwood & Gunn, 1981) and the dynamics that seemingly take place inside the black-box of decision-making (Easton, 1957; Hall, 2008b; Hall & Jenkins, 1995).

2.5.2 The governance capacity framework

Figure 2.3 illustrates the components of the governance capacity framework. The framework was originally developed to evaluate the policy processes and the policy outcomes (as identified in Hogwood & Gunn, 1981) of the Grainger Town Partnership (GTP) in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, United Kingdom, between 1997 and 2003 (Healey, de Magalhães, Madanipour & Pendlebury, 2002, 2003). One of the major advantages of using this framework is the possibility to illustrate the multi-institutional trajectories among key stakeholders from a longitudinal and multiscalar perspective. Moreover, the framework permits the assessment of the dynamics between key stakeholders, the linkages among institutions and agents and the nexuses emerging from the interrelation between players within the multiscalar governance arena (Healey et al., 2002, 2003). Most importantly, the framework conceives governance capacity as the outcome of longitudinal dynamics between the three dimensions of power identified by Lukes (2005) (Coaffee & Healey, 2003; Healey, 1998a, 2006b; Healey et al., 2003).

Relational Resources (R) refer to the overt power relations, the governance morphology and the identification of main stakeholders. This dimension permits “to examine the dynamic dialectics of the relations between particular governance arenas and the webs of relations
Relational Resources also look at the extent of network integration and, overall, to the implementation of policies. This dimension resembles Lukes (2005) first dimension of power.

Figure 2.3: The development of governance capacity.
Source: adapted from Healey et al. (2003)

Mobilisation Capacity (M) are the structures of opportunity, the spaces of institutional debate and the identification of key individuals and the local Initiatives resulting from the inhibition of external forces from supra-local authorities (Healey, 1998a; Healey et al., 2002, 2003). This dimension looks, in particular, to the institutional spaces and the techniques in decision-making and non-decision-making (Healey et al., 1999). The Mobilisation Capacity considers access rules and instruments legitimizing power discourse, in a similar vein to Lukes (2005) second dimension of power.
Knowledge Resources (K) refer to the tacit knowledge and the ideas behind given policy agendas. Knowledge is here conceived as the result of structuration and “indicates the frames of reference to new stimuli and opportunities” (Healey et al., 1999, p8). This dimension refers to the values and beliefs behind policy-making (Simmons et al., 1974), it underpins the third dimension of power (Lukes, 2005) and it encompasses tacit knowledge the dynamics of power and the addressing of specific place management issues.

Tourism academics acknowledge the importance of including insights from the works of Healey in the understanding of tourism planning and policy-making at national, regional and urban level (Bramwell & Sharman, 1999; Costa, 2001; Dredge, 2001a, 2010; Dredge & Jenkins, 2003a, 2003b, 2011b, 2011c, 2012; Dredge & Lawrence, 2007; Hall, 1999, 2008b; Jamal, Stein & Harper, 2002; Michalko, 2004; Page & Hall, 2003; Yüksel, Yüksel & Bramwell, 2005). In particular, they endorse the idea of urban planning as being the expression of globally and locally embedded social relations as illustrated in the seminal framework of Healey (1998a) on institutional capital and place-making. Nevertheless, the empirical application of such frameworks in the field of tourism policy and planning analysis is currently limited and narrowed to the study of tourism private businesses (Thomas & Thomas, 2005, 2006). It is argued here that the governance capacity framework should be implemented to the study of urban planning as it was originally intended. Given the findings emerged from the GTP experience and the several contextual similarities between the research conducted in Newcastle and the one discussed in this dissertation, it can be stated that the governance capacity framework represents a particularly useful basis for the analysis of the governance dynamics behind the recovery of the Christchurch CBD and the redevelopment projects for heritage and the performing arts. The governance capacity model, however, has a major flaw as it appears to lack the adequate conceptual basis to frame the discourse of post-disaster recovery. In particular, the longitudinal approach illustrated in the framework does not apply adequately in a context currently coping with the crisis and recovery of urban tourist spaces from high-magnitude (Lew, 2014), ecological disasters (Pelling, 2003).
2.5.3 The crisis-driven urban development framework

Figure 2.4 illustrates the crisis-driven urbanization framework that was developed for the post-disaster redevelopment and re-branding of New York and New Orleans (Gotham, 2007b, 2012; Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014; Greenberg, 2008). The framework addresses the lack of the above-listed conceptual features by providing “a starting point to analyse the socio-spatial condition, policy repertories, regulatory and discursive strategies, and land use practices” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p11). The crisis-driven urbanization framework presents a range of advancements in the research of urban governance and post-disaster recovery. Like the governance capacity framework, this framework was developed for urban-scale research. Moreover, it acknowledges “the complex spatial and environmental histories behind disasters” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p2) and the exacerbation of urban crises and vulnerabilities caused by socio-economic, institutional and cultural contradictions (Ahrens & Rudolph, 2006; Britton, 2001; Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Mileti, 1999) rooted in the disaster capitalism paradigm (Klein, 2007).

A further advancement is the neat conceptual distinction “between ‘disaster’ and ‘crisis’, with the former understood as a contingent event that under the proper conditions can trigger and be transformed into the latter” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p6). This conceptual advancement underpins studies in disasters, crises and emergency management rooted in critical theory (Hartman & Squires, 2006), in contrast with mainstream notions assimilated from organizational sciences and chaos theory (Faulkner, 2001; Fink, 1986; Quarantelli, 1984) that often introduce the two terms as “essentially very similar and the main distinction between them is a root cause of the problem” (Faulkner, 2001, p138).

The crisis-driven urbanization framework acknowledges the existence of pre-disaster ecological vulnerabilities that eventually aggravate once the disaster occurs. Moreover, the framework distinguishes between short and long-term recovery and the likely changes in post-disaster governance across time (Tierney, 2012). Also, the framework identifies political coalitions through which actors “gain control over the policy-making arena and implement measures that support their interests” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p10). Such a phenomenon of opportunistic alliances underpins the well-established concept of urban growth machine first formulated by Molotch (1976). A final theoretical advancement specific
to the field of tourism is that the crisis-driven urbanization framework permits the analysis of governance beyond the mere networking of stakeholders and acknowledge the values and ideologies influencing the way places are governed (Amore & Hall, 2016a).

Figure 2.4: Crisis-driven urbanization framework.
Source: Adapted from Gotham and Greenberg (2014)
2.5.4 Theoretical framework of the study

Figure 2.5 illustrates the theoretical framework outlined for the purposes of the research. The framework underpins the crisis-driven urbanization rationale (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014) “to emphasize the socially, spatially and historically rooted processes of urbanization under conditions of crisis, rather than the finished form of the rebuilt city” (ibid., p11). Second, the framework conceives urban governance as a fluid overlapping of multiple stakeholders that engage each other at multiple scales through institutionalised and/or loose forms of coalescence to seek development opportunities (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009; Gaventa, 2006; Hall, 2005). Moreover, the framework acknowledges the spatial dimension of planning by linking the ecological dimension with urban governance. The resulting nexus permits the analysis of “the material and discursive forms of power” (Pelling, 2003, p4). In particular, the framework enables discussion of the post-disaster urban governance context by linking the spatial manifestations in the built environment with the power discourses, coalescences, policy instruments and the ideologies behind them.

Focusing on the urban governance dimension, the framework acknowledges the presence of a neoliberal-driven process of urban change that becomes particularly persistent in post-disaster scenarios (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014) and advocates for the creation of themed spaces with relevance to leisure and tourism which would not necessarily become effective in a business as usual scenario. The occurrence of a disaster becomes the occasion for the implementation of a neoliberal redevelopment agenda that is legitimized through manipulative power discourses and coalitions between key actors like the entrepreneurial state and the interests of major businesses. The post-disaster governance of cities takes place within a de-politicized policy environment that justifies the building of infrastructures for leisure and tourism purposes (Spirou, 2010, 2011). The core of urban governance is the policy environment (Hall, 1994; Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Healey, 2006a; Lukes, 2005; Simmons et al., 1974), which conceives the policy arena as the juxtaposition of local, national and global ties of actors, institutions, rules, values and beliefs behind the wider policy process.
Figure 2.5: Theoretical framework for the study

**Overt dimension (relations)**
actors; coalitions; lobbies; stakeholders

**Hegemonic dimension (knowledge)**
beliefs; ideology; rhetoric

**Covert dimension (mobilisation)**
agreements; documents; legislation; rules

Buildings and urban tourists precincts
The crisis-driven urbanization framework is particularly useful to illustrate the discontinuity between disasters and crises and, most importantly, to highlight the processes of urban recovery as the result of a systemic crisis-induced redevelopment in times of predominant neoliberal ideology (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014), high uncertainty and fluidity (Nyseth, 2012). The framework acknowledges the complexities “of stakeholder conflicts, alliances and agenda setting” (Searle, 2009, p203). within a “politically and economically charged atmosphere” (Tewdwr-Jones, 2012, p5). Moreover, it stresses the centrality of governance as the new paradigm of policy-making in the current stage of neoliberal normalization (Olesen, 2014) and de-politicalized, post-political (Swyngedouw, 2010) urban governance discourse. Finally, the framework acknowledges that the three dimensions of power (Lukes, 2005) act at different levels of the multi-planar urban governance (Hillier, 2007) by creating different and pragmatic policy environments depending on the specific, site-specific circumstances taking place within and among the urban redevelopment landscape.

Tourist destinations consist of multiple businesses and interconnecting network structures and processes operating across and through multiple scales (Calgaro, 2010; Dredge & Jenkins, 2003a; Urry, 2001). Given the extensive theoretical background, the application of the framework at the city level is extremely unfeasible. Similarly, the focus on the CBD area would not provide enough detail to the governance and policy-making of urban tourist spaces and anchor projects. Moreover, the existence of several recovery and redevelopment projects in the Christchurch CBD area call for a focus on a limited number of initiatives with respect to relevant features of the tourist city. In the light of the preliminary context analysis undertaken at the beginning of the research, two types of tourist attractions projects were identified: the recovery of heritage and its role in the city (Park, 2013; Pendlebury, 1999) and; the role of culture and the arts in the differentiation of urban space for leisure and tourism (Markusen & Gadwa, 2010; Smith, 2006b). These represent the foci of the case studies further illustrated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
2.6 Themes of the narrative

The following section illustrates the themes that were chosen for the narrative of the case studies. The choice of themes to unfold the narrative of case studies is not new in the field of policy analysis (e.g. Hall, 1984) tourism policy and planning (e.g. Dredge & Jenkins, 2012), urban planning (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 1998b), urban sociology (e.g. Gotham & Greenberg, 2014) and governance (e.g. Bevir, 2011a, 2011b). The essentially empirical nature of the research further calls for the deployment of themes for the narrative of the case studies.

The power of narrative is particularly stressed in Lyotard (1979), who conceives science at large as a form of storytelling consisting of theories, terminologies and analytical tools which are deployed by the scientist to provide a view of the empirical realm. With respect to the social sciences, Flyvbjerg (1998b) deploys the method of narratology assimilated from Wittgenstein (Gasking & Jackson, 1967), which resembles the features of the Socratic maieutic. Flyvbjerg (2001, 2006) is one of the main advocates of case studies as a privileged research method for the understanding and critical learning of planning practice. The latter is further stressed in the works of Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) and Sandercock (2003) which stress the importance of focusing on concrete manifestations of policy-making and on the pervasive force of story in planning practice. Healey (2006c, p124), also emphasizes how “specific episodes of urban governance” help in the understanding of the wider governance context. This paradigm has recently gained ground in the field of tourism knowledge (Dredge, 2010; Dredge & Jenkins, 2011c, 2012; Michalko, 2004). “Stories help us construct windows into how and why decisions are made” (Dredge & Jenkins, 2011a, p362). The choice of themes is quite heterogeneous. The literature retrieved provides plenty of narrative approaches, but a common feature can be identified, namely, a solid nexus between the theoretical frameworks and the themes of the narrative adopted.

Three narrative themes were identified for the purposes of this study. The choice of the themes is based on the literature retrieved for the theoretical framework and the insights illustrated throughout the chapter. Following a Lukesian appraisal of post-disaster urban governance, the themes chosen are: 1) haphazard impacts and coalescence, which reintroduces the pioneering work of Simmons et al. (1974) to look at the overt dimension of
power; 2) policy instruments and governance (Le Galès, 2011), which focuses on the instruments that manipulate and legitimize given policy outcomes, including the mechanisms of non-decision-making; and 3) crisis as opportunity after Gotham and Greenberg (2014), which narrows the narrative to the values and ideologies rooted in the current hegemonic neoliberal thinking. Each of these themes discusses the policies for planning and recovery of tourism spaces through a critical approach rooted in the argumentative tradition (Fischer & Forester, 1993b) and reiterated in tourism policy and planning literature (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007c).

The theme of haphazard coalescence addresses the overt dimension of power. Particularly in urban governance, stakeholders “can coalesce around issues other than economic growth” (Bahaire & Elliott-White, 1999, p254) as long as they are able to agree on supporting a given policy solution (Bryson & Crosby 1992). This suggests that policy-making consists of both formal and informal ties between individuals, groups and institutions (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009; Granovetter, 1972) depending on the policy issue and the convenience for stakeholders. However, this does not permit to predict ex-ante the causal flow of policy-making and the many constraints behind it (McKay & Yackee, 2007), but only to “demonstrate how policy-making should occur relative to pre-established standards” (Jenkins et. al, 2014, p545). “Policy-making is non-deterministic and is dynamic because there are always unanticipated consequences” (Simmons et al., 1974, p465, italics in the original) over time and across space (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007c, 2011b). This is particularly evident in post-disaster urban governance, where haphazard impacts and coalescences around a given policy issue can likely lead to unprecedented policy outcomes. As illustrated throughout the chapter, post-disaster policy-making tends to please the interests of corporations while further increasing the vulnerability of the people affected first-hand by the disaster. The coalitions among stakeholders, particularly among public authorities lack that element of transparency key to democratically legitimate governance regimes. The restricted access to documents (Hall, 2010e) and the withholding of crucial policy information (Hall & Wilson, 2011) by government institutions, instead, support the idea of growth coalitions as corporatist archetypes of governance (Healey, 2006a; Molotch, 1976) common to urban regeneration.
The second theme approaches instrumentation policy from a political sociology perspective introduced in the works of Peter Hall (1993), Lascoumes (2009) and Le Galès (2011). In particular, it conceives the public policy dimension of governance behind the establishment of given policy instruments (Le Galès, 2011), it shifts the focus on the policy choice and it provides a taxonomy of policy instruments listed by type of political relations and legitimacy (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2009a; Le Galès, 2011). Instrumentation policy advocates sharply challenge the functional approach according to which instruments are value-neutral (Le Galès, 2011). Rather, “they structure public policies and their outcomes; they have impacts on their own [and] the structure the modes of governance” (Le Galès, 2011, p151). Policy instrumentation is particularly concerned with environmental policy issues at both national (e.g. Lascoumes 2009) and urban (e.g. Crenson, 1971) levels. There are, nevertheless, contributions in the field of tourism assessing the socio-political relevance of tourism policy instruments (e.g. Dredge & Jenkins, 2012) and their implications to the respective spheres of influence (e.g. Hall, 2008b).

The third and final theme is the one of planning as opportunity. Ideally, disasters can pave the road to an unprecedented chance for redevelopment steering, political engagement and civic participation “to repair, reimagine, and transform the urban landscape” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p95) within vibrant socio-spatial relations (Gottdiener, 1993; Madanipour, 1996) and ongoing negotiations among a potentially vast array of stakeholders. The latter spontaneously arise from the rubble of disaster in the form of associations and civic mobilization groups and they can constitute an important feature for the establishment of “spatial politics of redevelopment” (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014, p95) and the pursuit of a regeneration strategy that supports principles such as urban authenticity (Zukin, 2009), slow-paced regeneration policy (Hall, 2008b; Page & Hall, 2003), creative turn (Richards & Wilson, 2007), long consultation (Le Galès, 2011) and collaborative planning (Healey, 2006a). Such a fluid momentum (Nyseth, 2012), however, does not mean that each party has the same weight in the policy redevelopment debate. Rather, there is often a sharp imbalance between growth coalitions and grassroots groups, the latter having a tokenistic participation in the debate or, at worst, being literally ostracized from the policy-making debate. Media (Cryle & Hillier, 2005) and the alleged expertise of planners and architects (Searle, 2009) become tools
of persuasion for the rationalization of a given doctrine of redevelopment which, de facto, encourages the vested interests of powerful growth coalitions and displaces the most disadvantaged and the unheard. This scenario is particularly valid in post-disaster urban recovery, where the policy environment is overwhelmed by urban growth coalition groups which destabilize the redevelopment debate and encourage a cumulative neoliberalization at the expenses of taxpayers (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014).

2.7 Summary

This chapter illustrated the literature available with respect to urban tourism, urban sociology, economic geography, spatial planning, planning theory and policy analysis. It introduced the post-disciplinary paradigm, the philosophical roots and the literature selected for the purposes of the study from a Lukesian perspective. Subsequently, it shifted the discussion to the development of urban tourism amenities in the contemporary, late capitalist phase of de-politicized neoliberal normalization and added to the discourse the dimension of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007) used in recent urban studies focusing on post-disaster recovery. Finally, the chapter discussed the core elements of the theoretical framework developed for the purposes of the research, as well as the themes of the narrative that were chosen for the analysis and reporting of the findings of the research.

The forthcoming chapter shifts the discourse from the literature to the research methods. It does so by illustrating the research strategy developed for the study along with the challenges encountered during the fieldwork. The chapter discusses the methods used to research the political dimension of urban phenomena and their application to the understanding of the governance for urban tourist spaces in a post-disaster context such as the one of the Christchurch CBD.
Chapter 3  
Research strategy, data collection and design  

3.1 Introduction  

Phenomenological studies are structured along ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological paradigms (Jennings, 2005; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Phillimore & Goodson, 2004b). The ontological dimension concerns the objective reality and the perception individuals have of it while the epistemological dimension refers to the knowledge acquired in reading through reality and depends on the individuals’ capacity to understand (i.e. intelligēre) such reality. The axiological dimension, instead, is the set of philosophical values and ethics of individuals. The previous two chapters addressed these dimensions by introducing the positionality of the researcher, the body of literature retrieved for the study, and the presentation of the Christchurch CBD context.  

This chapter illustrates the fieldwork, data collection and analysis of the research. The approach adopted to discuss the chapter is twofold. The chapter outlines the elements of convergence between the research strategy deployed for the study and the dedicated literature on research methods. The chapter then discusses some of the discontinuities encountered throughout the research phase in light of the extraordinary circumstances dictated by the post-disaster recovery context of Christchurch. The ultimate intent of this chapter is to critically appraise the strategy adopted during the fieldwork and the analysis of the data.  

This chapter consists of five sections. Section 3.2 illustrates the research strategy adopted for the purposes of the study, with a focus on case studies, archival research and interviews. Section 3.3 illustrates the points in common between the fieldwork experience of the research and the mainstream literature retrieved in the preparation of the research strategy. Section 3.4 discusses the emerging discontinuities between the actual fieldwork of the research and the literature in research methods and methodologies. Section Error! Reference
source not found. focuses on the analysis phase of the research by discussing the pros and the cons of using qualitative analysis software to conduct research in policy and planning for urban tourism spaces in post-disaster contexts. Finally, Section 3.6 provides a summary of the chapter.

3.2 Research strategy

As stated in Section 1.1, this research seeks to: analyse the land-use policies for urban tourism spaces in pre-and-post-earthquake Christchurch, New Zealand; examine the environmental and institutional factors that influence the planning decision-making process and implementation of the recovery and rebuilding of urban tourist spaces in the Christchurch city centre; and analyse the policy discourses with respect to urban regeneration in the Christchurch CBD before and after the earthquakes.

The research strategy developed for this study is rooted in a mix of qualitative research methods that underpin the definition of mixed research approach retrieved in the fields of human geography, sociology and tourism (Elwood, 2010; Franklin, 2009; Riley & Love, 2000). A design strategy of this kind, in particular, enables the understanding of the complexities and the heterogeneity of contemporary urban tourism and of tourism public policies. The implementation of a mixed research approach, moreover, permits the production of new knowledge about the phenomena by enabling the enucleation of research questions as well as the understanding of the research object through multi-scalar approaches during both the data collection and the analytical phases of the research.

A research strategy developed and implemented through mixed research approaches contributes to the understanding of phenomena and challenges the “assumption of a clear separation between representation and practice” (Elwood, 2010, p110). Ultimately, the design strategy at the heart of the research underpins the third moment in qualitative research in tourism (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Phillimore & Goodson, 2004a; Riley & Love, 2000) as it seeks “to make sense out of local situations” (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p9) through a dense narratology rooted in critical theory.
The research design developed for this study utilises the embedded multiple-case study method (Yin, 2009). Methodologically sound multiple-case designs are developed through a rich theoretical framework (Yin, 2009) and provide more robust evidence than single-case studies (Herriott & Firestone, 1983). The definition of the research design for this study was far from being straightforward. Throughout the research, there were moments where it was necessary to “reconsider one or more of the study’s original theoretical propositions” (Yin, 2009, p56). Redesigning the research strategy can be interpreted as a form of research bias. However, case studies cannot accommodate to an original yet abstract research design and neglect the empirical discovery emerging during the data collection and analysis. A margin of flexibility is, therefore, necessary to accommodate both research rigour and the ontological relativity of qualitative-based research. Figure 3.1 below illustrates the steps of the research strategy as well as the logical linking between the initial research questions and the qualitative research methods identified for the study. The latter are discussed, in detail, in the forthcoming sections.

3.2.1 Case study

The case study is a qualitative analytical instrument that seeks to understand complex phenomena through a combination of research methods. The case study research method is “not just a form of qualitative research” (Yin, 2009, p19) as it may go “beyond [...] by using a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence” (ibid.). Ultimately, case studies are conceived as bearing approaches that encompass both the qualitative/quantitative and the direct/indirect taxonomies of research methods. Case study research methods are versatile and adaptable to any specific socio-economic context and they may potentially provide more articulated answers to the research questions than any other research technique (Yin, 2009).
Figure 3.1: Research strategy for multiple case studies.

Adapted from COSMOS Corporation (1983)
Doing case study research in social sciences is far from being a straightforward and descriptive reporting of findings. Through methodologically sound case studies, researchers can “obtain place-specific conceptual insights that may then be tested for wider applicability through further case studies or the use of additional methodologies” (Beeton, 2005, p39). The case study as a research method is preferred when the focus of the research deals with contemporary phenomena that the researcher aims to understand, explore and explain to the audience, especially when the former has little control over the events (Yin, 2009). Usually, these events foresee the analysis of more than just one variable in a specific, contemporary context, thus making either the isolation or the manipulation of variables unrealistic. The case study as a research method “allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin, 2009, p4), to “use multiple sources of evidence” (ibid., p18), and to investigate a specific actual socio-economic phenomenon in depth, especially when “the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not [... evident” (ibid.). Arguably, the case study method has similarities with archival research and it generally relies on the same techniques used by historians. However, the case study research also envisages the employment of other research methods such as direct observation, ethnography and interviews.

Critics of the case study research method raise concerns with respect to, for example, the lack of research rigor, the provision of limited scientific generalizations and the considerable amount of time necessary to plan, design, prepare, collect, analyse and share the findings of the case study (Decrop, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 2009). In order to overcome these shortcomings, the coherency of case study research design has to be tested through a six-step assessment process comprising:

- constructing validity;
- external validity;
- internal validity;
- reliability;
- trustworthiness;
- replicability.
As stressed in Section 3.2, the case study design research needs to be constantly revised and evaluated to guarantee its coherency and prevent any possible flaw. The absence of a codified procedure in case study research design implementation implies that the success of the research depends on the skills of the researcher. A good social scientist should be able to ask good questions, to listen carefully the interviewees, to avoid biases, to be flexible, and to have a firm grasp of issues being studied (Yin, 2009).

Good case studies can advance social science research as longs as theory, reliability and validity issues are dealt with accordingly (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Case studies embody a range of peculiarities that distinguish them from other research methods. In terms of theory advancement, case studies provide “concrete, context-dependent knowledge [that is] more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p224).

With respect to empirical knowledge gain, instead, in-depth case studies allow for a critical and reflexive appraisal of the research object that is particularly suited for the study of policy processes and urban planning practices (Fischer & Forester, 1993b; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Healey et al., 1999; Moulaert, 2000; Moulaert, Martinelli, Swyngedouw & Gonzalez, 2010). Ultimately, good quality and accurate case study research can be achieved through dedicated field experience and adherence to research protocols (Woodside, 2010; Yin, 2009).

Case studies are extensively used in tourism-related research and they can be useful in illustrating the complex array of factors that influence individuals and institutions on given policy issues from time to time (Beeton, 2005). Until the end of the 1990s, “the use of case studies and qualitative methods in tourism research remained a largely underutilised methodology particularly with respect to policy analysis and theoretical development of the subject” (Doorne, 1998a, p15). Since the turn of the century, however, case studies have become the primary research method in tourism policy and planning (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007c, 2011b; Hall & Jenkins, 1995; Jennings, 2001), as they can help overcome the shortcomings in fieldwork common to other research methods (Beeton, 2005; Hall & Jenkins, 1995). Evidence from Xiao and Smith (2006, p742), for instance, show how the case study methodology “is most often seen in research pertaining to tourism development, planning, and community perceptions of or reactions to the impacts of tourism”. Particularly to urban
tourism and public policy research, the CABI Tourism Database reports up to 100 contributions that use a case study methodology. The approach in this research underpins such trends as it develops “case studies as stories of tourism planning and policy practice” (Dredge & Jenkins, 2011b, p7).

For the purpose of this study, it was necessary to narrow the units of research to a range of projects, stakeholders and events that would be feasible to manage throughout the doctoral programme. The focus on dedicated projects of recovery and rebuild in central Christchurch, as highlighted in Chapter 1, was further justified in the review of previous research conducted both in urban planning and tourism crisis and disaster management. It was decided to adopt a comparative case study methodology by focusing on projects taking place within a spatially defined area of the city where special legislation was being enacted as result of the earthquakes. Eventually, the preliminary study phase brought to the identification of the projects where to focus the research efforts: the Arts Centre and; the proposed project for the Town Hall and wider Performing Arts Precinct. Finally, it was important to set a temporal framework of reference common to both the projects. Due to unavoidable field constraints, it was decided to implement the data collection and analysis only to the period until September 2014 (see Section 1.1). The case study methodology was replicated for each of the projects. Figure 3.2 illustrates the case study protocol developed for the case studies in question.

3.2.2 Archival research

Research focusing on archived data “is not subject to possible distortion due to the interaction between the researcher and the subject studied” (Corbetta, 2003, p287) and it allows for a longitudinal approach in research. Moreover, the costs of data collection are relatively low (Berg, 2007; Corbetta, 2003) and the amount of data gathered is higher if compared other research techniques like surveys. Ultimately, the digitalization of data has further eased the access to sources in the archives (Timothy, 2012, p405), as well as the process to request documents to institutions and organizations.
Figure 3.2: Research design for the case studies
Nevertheless, there are up to three major flaws with the adoption of archival research. In particular, the information retrieved through documents can be incomplete and the researcher must be content with the information made formally available through the archives (Corbetta, 2003). The incompleteness of archived sources may be the result of existing restriction on relevant information (Hall, 2010e), which is common when it comes to crucial policy documents (Hall & Wilson, 2011). Moreover, institutional documents and media sources are far from being objective as they “often provide a distorted image” (Corbetta, 2003, p306) that reflects the distribution of overt and covert power relations within and between organizations (ibid.). Finally, archival research can potentially turn into a seemingly never-ending process (Bailey, 2008), as the variety of records and the vast amount of data available in archives require time to examine documents and identify exactly which ones should be requested for further access.

The use of archives as sources is a consolidated research approach in urban studies and urban planning. Examples include research on urban regeneration practices (e.g. Healey et al., 2002), urban-level policy-making (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 1998b), gentrification (Gotham, 2005) and governance (Gonzalez & Vigar, 2010). Similarly, “archives- based studies are becoming more mainstream in many academic fields, including tourism” (Timothy, 2012, p403). In particular, the collection of data from archives is a common practice in tourism policy and planning research (e.g. Dredge, 2001b; Grybovych, 2008; Johnston, 2014; Shone, 2013). The use of document analysis has been used in research focusing on cities and destinations hit by major disasters (e.g. Calgaro et al., 2013; Gotham, 2007b) and in studies focusing on tourism-related development policies at national (e.g. Dredge & Jenkins, 2012), regional (e.g. Shone, 2011), local (e.g. Reed, 1999) and urban level (e.g. Hall & Wilson, 2011).

For the purposes of the study, a range of secondary institutional documents was identified, including newspaper articles, radio, audio-visual material, official press releases, Government documents, Cabinet papers, Parliament records, court sentences, regulations, planning strategies, land records and archived documents to retrieve from trusts and private organizations (Andranovich & Riposa, 1993; Bailey, 2008; Berg, 2007; Corbetta, 2003; Timothy, 2012). A choice was made to focus predominantly on local media accounts, which acknowledged previous in-depth research in urban policy-making and urban tourism.
(Flyvbjerg, 1998b; Hall & Wilson, 2011). With respect to official press releases, the sources were retrieved from national and local authorities as well as from key organizations with relevant involvement in the policies and planning of Christchurch before and after the earthquakes. In terms of the official documentary records, relevant government, parliament and local council deliberations as well as court cases and verdicts were examined. Albeit most of these documents “are originally produced for some special limited audiences, […] they eventually find their way into the public domain” (Berg, 2007, p194). Planning documents and strategies are included among the data sources, as they are the ultimate outcome of governance episodes (Healey, 2004) and they best encapsulate the complexities of decision-making and their contexts (Dredge & Jenkins, 2012). Lastly, the choice to include the archives of trusts and organizations is a common practice in urban research (Andranovich & Riposa, 1993). In a post-disaster context like the one of Christchurch, these organizations extensively collected information and delivered reports of relevance for the purposes of the research. The archival sources retrieved covered the period between 2007 and 2014. The choice of the time period was justified by the need to provide a narrow temporary boundary that included both the stage before the earthquakes and the early years of recovery. Nonetheless, it allows for the inclusion of at least two terms for both national and local governments in the analysis.

3.2.3 Interviews

Whilst archival sources represent a very important source of data, particularly in data triangulation (Berg, 2007; Decrop, 2004; Yin, 2009), “not all research questions can be answered through the use of archival data, or at least not archival data alone” (Berg, 2007, p195). This section addresses the second qualitative research method – interviews – with a focus on semi-structured elite interviews.

Interviews “are an opinion collecting technique” (Yüksel, Yüksel & Bramwell, 1999, p352) commonly used in urban and tourism studies to gain findings from individuals. Far from being a neutral tool of data collection, interviewing is a “historically, politically and contextually bound” (Fontana & Frey, 2005, p695) research method that embodies “the complexity, uniqueness and indeterminateness of one-to-one human interaction” (Scheurich, 1995 p241).
The postmodern shift in qualitative social research at large and tourism research in particular (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Fontana & Frey, 2005; Phillimore & Goodson, 2004a; Riley & Love, 2000) increasingly acknowledges the degree of influence throughout the interview process between the researcher and the participants. This is particularly evident in the study of power and policy-making, where the positionality of the interviewer and of the interviewee entangle on overt and covert policy issues (Hall, 2010e). Ultimately, conducting good quality interviews strongly depends on the skills of the researcher (Bailey, 2008).

The literature in qualitative research methods provides an exhaustive review of interview typologies, techniques, and fieldwork guidelines (e.g. Hall, 2010a). In choosing the type of interviewing technique, a key factor was the need to find an approach that limited the impact of the researcher on the responses, allowed participants to explain complex topics and granted a high degree of reciprocity between the researcher and the participant throughout the interview process (Bailey, 2008; Fontana & Frey, 2005; Jennings, 2005). For the purposes of this research, the option was to conduct semi-structured interviews, as this approach enables the extrapolation of valuable information through a loose interview protocol. There are several advantages in using a semi-structured interviewing approach. Firstly, semi-structured interviews guarantee greater flexibility in fieldwork research as they allow, whereas necessary, the adoption of probing techniques to gain a better understanding of participants’ opinions and experience (Corbetta, 2003; Crano, Brewer & Lac, 2002; King & Horrocks, 2010). Moreover, the answers obtained through semi-structured interviews are, by far, more articulated than the responses collected through structured interview protocols (Bailey, 2008). Another factor to account is that of spontaneity, as semi-structured interviews tend to encourage a conversation-like style that eases participants’ attitude towards the researcher (Jennings, 2005). Thirdly, the researcher has the possibility to control and set the environmental conditions in order to facilitate a more effective and involving interview (King & Horrocks, 2010). This factor, in particular, allows the researcher to be flexible and customize the interview protocol to the respondents’ profile. Finally, the semi-structured interviews usually provide greater feedback, they ease the process of note taking throughout the session and they allow for the use of recording devices such as audio recorders and cameras (Jennings, 2005; King & Horrocks, 2010).
The definition *ex-ante* of an indicative number of participants to reach saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1968) is a key aspect in qualitative interview research, as the latter “is concerned with meaning and not making generalized hypothesis statements” (Mason, 2010, p1). According to a review on more than 2,500 doctoral dissertations in social sciences, the indicative number of interviewees to reach saturation is 31 (Mason, 2010), but the sample size varies depending on the kind of research undertaken. It emerges that for case studies, the average sample size is 36 (Mason, 2010), while for a qualitative evaluation, the average saturation sample size is 42 participants (ibid.). These figures resemble the data on indicative participants retrieved from a personal review of contributions of contributions in the field of urban studies and tourism policy and planning, with a mean sample size of 39 and 30 participants respectively. However, it should be noted that when it comes to interviewing political and economic elites as stakeholders in decision-making, “the number of participants who may be interviewed is likely to be relatively small” (Yüksel et al., 1999, p352). Rather than looking at a predetermined number of participants to interview, the research strategy adopted for this study sought to gather together as many participants as possible and determine the achievement of saturation as fieldwork went on.

This research is a phenomenological study that seeks to gain knowledge of the research object by listening and looking at findings within the many layers of *truth* between the overt and the covert dimension of decision-making (Ryan, 2005; Ryan & Hall, 2001). In utilizing this research strategy, the findings obtained through interviews were not always at “the forefront of the normal consciousness of the respondent” (Ryan, 2005, p9), as the questions dealt with confidential information on personal or profession-related topics. The project received ethics approval from the University of Canterbury. Participants were guaranteed confidentiality and pseudonyms were used during the fieldwork and the reporting of data.

Research methods literature is surprisingly scant when it comes to the relationships between researchers and the so-called elites (Darbi & Hall, 2014; Hughes & Cormode, 1998; Hunter, 1993; Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Penttinen & Tahvanainen, 2002). Researchers may find themselves as supplicants to the elites (Cormode & Hughes, 1999), with increasing issues in gaining access and unwillingness of participants “to answers questions in a straightforward way” (Williams, 2012, p161). Moreover, there are important ethical and practical issues that
need to be addressed through a critical appraisal of the researchers’ situatedness (Ward & Jones, 1999) and “the context-specific nature of different kinds of elite processes” (Hughes & Cormode, 1998, p2099). In light of the role and influence of elites in power structures and modes of governance (Healey, 2006a; Hunter, 1953; Mills, 2000; Williams, 2012), researchers recommend the adoption of flexible, semi-structured interview schedules that allow researchers to gain specific knowledge from privileged interviewees (Bailey, 2008; Williams, 2012).

Focusing on tourism research, “there are qualitatively different aspects in interviewing ‘up’” (Darbi & Hall, 2014, p832), especially in studies focusing on tourism-related decision-making processes as well as on the perspectives of elite participants (Bochaton & Lefebvre, 2010; Darbi & Hall, 2014; Jenkins et al., 2014; Stevenson, 2007; Stevenson et al., 2008; Yüksel et al., 1999). As “elite decisions directly affect the nature of tourism development” (Darbi & Hall, 2014, p834), it is important for researchers “to provide theoretical perspectives on the knowledge and perspectives” (ibid., p840) of those individuals that are in the forefront of decision-making (Richards, 1996). Research based on elite Interviewing in tourism policy and planning practices include national (e.g. Farmaki et al., 2015), local (e.g. Shone, 2013) and urban contexts (e.g. Stevenson et al., 2008). To date, however, research on tourism policy-making based on elite interviews is scant and “often […] conducted without an appreciation of the specific constraints […] to the research process” (Darbi & Hall, 2014, pp832-833). Whilst there is a degree of acknowledgement of the need to relate elite interview findings with either “the whole planning context” (Yüksel et al., 1999) or the perspective of decision-makers (Stevenson et al., 2008), research of the kind tends to neglect the methodological challenges common to elite interview. Arguably, “researchers may not wish to ‘bite the hand that feeds’” (Hall, 2010e, p41) and therefore opt for a lesser critical appraisal in the study of tourism policy and planning. There are, nevertheless, scholars advocating for an argumentative turn in the field (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007d) that underpins this approach being used in policy analysis and planning. As Fischer and Forester (1993a, p3) suggest:

... the argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning leads us to study critically the production of analysts’ claims—not to take them as ‘truth’, and not to take every claim to be as valid as any other.
Table 3.1 reports the breakdown of the indicative sample of prospective participants identified for each of the two case studies grouped by stakeholder group. For confidentiality purposes, the pseudonyms and institute affiliations of participants are not reported. In the identification of participants for the two case studies, the research sought to collect the participants’ opinions and direct experience of the key decision-making stages in the delivery of the recovery projects in the Christchurch CBD and the likely outcomes in terms of tourism appeal. Participants were recruited through both snowballing and formal presentation of the research project. This two-stage recruitment approach was necessary to overcome limited access to local elites in Christchurch and New Zealand in general. In doing so, the research complied with the interview protocol provided in research methods manuals and provided all the necessary information on the research and the topics to be discussed during the meetings (see Appendix B).

Table 3.1: Prospected number of participants to interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of stakeholder</th>
<th>Case Study #1:</th>
<th>Case Study #2:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Government Authorities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government Authorities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business sector people</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Society</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Undoubtedly, there have been unexpected challenges and opportunities that emerged in implementing the recommended interview protocol and the research strategy at large. These aspects are further discussed in the next two sections of the chapter, with a focus on the management of the case studies, the collection of archival documents and the undertaking of interviews.
3.3 Keep to the Code: points of convergence with research methods literature

This section is based on the field notes and the comments written throughout 2014 and 2015 on the evolution of the case study research strategy, the experience of archival research and the notes taken during the interview with elite participants. With respect to the case study research strategy, it should be noted that there is no codified research design for case studies (Yin, 2009). The need to identify recovery projects that best addressed the research questions of the thesis and the importance of data accessibility were acknowledged in the selection of the case studies (Yin, 2009). The list of case studies, however, was slightly amended during the preliminary context analysis run between September and December 2013. It soon became clear that there was scope to narrow the scale of analysis down to at least two site-specific projects foreseen in the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan (CCRP) and thus address one of the gaps highlighted in the literature (Pearce, 2001a).

There are several points of continuity between this work’s case study strategy and previous research. Firstly, this research took place in the late stages before the ultimate demise of CERA in April 2016. This context resembles the extensive research on the Grainger Town Partnership in Newcastle, United Kingdom, which ran between 1997 and 2003 (Healey et al., 1999, 2002). Secondly, the emphasis on the early stage of post-disaster recovery in Christchurch resembles previous research undertaken in New Orleans, United States (Gotham, 2007b), which looked at the first 18 months following Hurricane Katrina. A similar approach was implemented by Calgaro (2010), who commenced research nearly two years after the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami in South East Asia and conducted the fieldwork over a period of 18 months between 2006 and 2007. Finally, the choice of examining projects in a spatially limited area - the Christchurch CBD - reflects previous research in urban regeneration practices and post-disaster urban recovery (Gotham & Greenberg, 2008, 2014).

Central to this research were awareness of situatedness and reflexivity (Chok, 2010; Hall, 2004; Jensen & Glasmeier, 2009). A major concern was to avoid spontaneous judgement to comments and opinions collected during the fieldwork phase of the study in order to conduct objective sound research. Occasionally, I found myself in the middle of situations where confidential information had to be kept in accordance with the rules of the University of Canterbury and not be brought into conversation with colleagues and friends. Another issue
was the choice of qualitative research methods, which was mainly motivated by the contextual constraints emerged throughout the research period. For example, the exclusion of the public in the key phases of design, funding and implementation of projects precluded participant observation. Moreover, formal research could only commence at the end of 2013 following the submission of the research proposal to the Postgraduate Office. Furthermore, “issues of power, public policy and/or governance” (Hall, 2010e, p40) central to the study would have been hard to research or even discuss on an informal basis.

There were moments where the collection of information key to the research was rather straightforward, with institutions and participants willing to assist. In these cases, my positionality as an Italian research student towards the researched, New Zealand and Cantabrian stakeholders and organizations involved in the recovery of the Christchurch CBD, did not represent a barrier to access as occurred in previous studies of the kind (Sabot, 1999). Most likely, interviewees did not perceive biases when I asked sensitive questions or probed their argument with complementary findings. Moreover, there were at least two points of convergence between my positionality as a foreign research student and Simmel’s (1950) definition of the ‘stranger’. First, I had no personal commitments and I was not directly affected by the earthquakes. I therefore had a certain degree of distance and objectivity in drafting of the research and in selecting the data to collect and the participants to contact. Second, my objectivity did not imply passivity and required an extensive background check of facts, people and events prior to the interview phase of the study. I had to be knowledgeable of details in relation to the projects and the overt episodes of governance in order to get that extra bit of insider’s knowledge from the interviewees.

The collection and analysis of the sources followed standard protocols. The first round of archival source data collection was done to explore the context (Calgaro, 2010) and identify the key episodes of governance to address in detail with the document analysis (Healey et al., 2002). This second round of data analysis was done in accordance with the literature on policy instruments and governance (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007; Le Galès, 2011) and elite research methods (Williams, 2012), which exhorts researchers to verify and critically assess documents as sources created by third parties, and as the outcome of embedded power relations among and within institutions. The latter point is similar to a key methodological issue encountered
in elite interviewing (Darbi & Hall, 2014; Morris, 2009; Richards, 1996) which applies perfectly to the archival research experience of this study.

Accessing documents proved to be troublesome. Even though a substantial proportion of required documents was easily retrieved through open databases, library catalogues and organization websites (Berg, 2007; Timothy, 2012; Williams, 2012), the restriction to relevant information (Hall, 2010e) and the withholding of crucial policy information (Hall & Wilson, 2011) by both institutions and individuals suggested “that the best policy stories [were] often left untold” (Hall & Wilson, 2011, p134). Notwithstanding the adherence to formal research protocol in accessing archived documents (Yin, 2009), there have been several methodological issues throughout the research. Major barriers were encountered, in particular, in the Arts Centre case study. During the fieldwork phase of the study, the site was governed by a Trust Board that delegated responsibilities of archival management and access to the executive team. The latter acted as a barrier by denying an archival request access approved by the Ethics Committee on two separate occasions:

Dear Alberto,

Thank you for your note, sent by email on 3rd November.

I have now discussed your request with [person in charge for archival access], and I confirm our previous response in that we are not able to assist you with the information that you have requested.

Regards

In this case, the expectations of accessing the Arts Centre archives diminished as the fieldwork went on. While participants recommended and promoted the openness of the new directorship (Donna, Gregory and Vanessa), members of the Arts Centre Management Team were reluctant to collaborate or seek to get in contact with me despite the attempts via e-mail and phone to arrange a meeting. Ultimately, the lack of collaboration from the Management Team influenced my interview strategy as I had to make sure that the network developed for the case study would not be compromised.

Indirect barriers to archival access for the Arts Centre case study also emerged during the interview stage of the research, with participants claiming that the organization had uploaded the material I was seeking on the Arts Centre main website (informal meetings with Donna and Vanessa) or that the archival records at the Arts Centre lacked proper cataloguing
(informal meeting with Donna). Eventually, a good extent of material on the Arts Centre was retrieved with the support of the University of Canterbury Library and the archives of the CCC as both organizations had representatives in the Trust Board at the time of research. Similarly, relevant documents concerning the Trust Deed of the Arts Centre before and after the earthquakes were available online on the New Zealand Charity Services database, which contained statutory documents uploaded by registered charity organizations in accordance with the disposition of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 (CTA 1957).

With respect to the Town Hall and Performing Arts Precinct, one of the major barriers to archival access was the withholding of crucial information foreseen by the national and local legislation. This was the case with the Cabinet papers addressing the decisions over the CCRP and the Cost-Sharing Agreement (CSA), which underpin fieldwork notes on similar research conducted in New Zealand (Hall & Wilson, 2011). In the case of the Town Hall and Performing Arts Precinct, the leading project stakeholder - the CCC - refused to provide the breakdown of the costs for the project by stating that:

> Detailed information on facility estimates and cost sharing arrangements are commercially sensitive as these could adversely affect the Council’s position during procurement negotiations. Therefore, we have decided to withhold this information under the following sections of the Local Government Information and Meetings Act 1987 [LGOIMA 1987]:

- 7(2)(b)(ii) - to protect the commercial position of the person who supplied or who is the subject of the information, and
- 7(2)(h) - to enable any local authority holding the information to carry out, without prejudice or disadvantage, commercial activities.

In this case, the impossibility to access information from Council archives was tied to ongoing negotiations on the Performing Arts Precinct project and the tender process for the retention of the Town Hall. Unlike with the Arts Centre case, however, I was not much concerned with the repercussions of my archival requests to the proceeding of the interviews, as I relied on the provisions of the New Zealand legislation on information and meetings to seek access to sections of the CCC’s archives that were not publicly available. As the fieldwork went on, however, I discovered that one of the participants selected for the interview had received part of the information access requests concerning the implementation of the Performing
Arts Precinct. Eventually, the interview shed light on aspects of the project originally sought through the archival request.

Conducting archival research in a context like the one of post-earthquake Christchurch was, in some circumstances, frustrating. Notwithstanding my most genuine intention of understanding the policy environment of post-earthquake Christchurch, I found myself embedded in overt and covert webs of vested interests, bureaucracies and governance modes that partly restate the comments raised with respect to fieldwork research in tourism (Hall, 2010e). In particular, the identification of detailed documents and information to retrieve through OIAs was refined three times to make sure that all requests submitted would at least be answered. Some potentially compromising document requests, therefore, had to be sidelined in order to give priority to key information that was not available to the public. This process proved to be time-consuming, both in terms of scope and in-depth data collection. Ultimately, the archival experience of this study resembled that of Lorrimer (2009, p251), who acknowledged how:

the ‘archive’ was somewhere between a labyrinth and an impenetrable fortress. Escape was not an option. My surviving notebook records a series of searches attempted, each too tightly circumscribed, hunting for items unlikely to surface or perhaps even exist.

Expected challenges emerged throughout the interview stage of the research. The literature retrieval on elite interviews, in particular, proved to be useful in the development of the interview outline, gaining access to participants, dealing with research positionality managing ethical issues and in developing a rapport with interviewees. With respect to the interview outline, the decision was to opt for open-ended questions “in order to gain more spontaneous opinions and to avoid the potential bias from restricting responses to the researcher’s own fixed categories” (Yüksel et al., 1999, p355). In developing the outline for the case studies, it was important to schedule the contentious topics towards the end of the interview (Williams, 2012) and allow participants to make a personal, conclusive statement on the recovery projects addressed in the research (Tansey, 2007). Moreover, it was acknowledged that not all participants would have the same knowledge on key decision-making phases for the two projects. Pre-interview preparation (Mikecz, 2012) proved to be crucial to arrange the outline of interviews for each participant.
In terms of gaining access to elite participants, the fieldwork experience reinforced most of the remarks highlighted in elite interview literature. Unlike other qualitative interviews, the identification of the sample required a long period of research on government documents, directories (Andranovich & Riposa, 1993; Yin, 2009) and media (Williams, 2012). The participation rate of targeted respondents was positive (63% for the Arts Centre and 57% for the Town Hall and Performing Arts Precinct), with few cases of interviews declined. As the fieldwork went on, it emerged that at least five of the selected participants would not be available to allocate reasonable time to the interview due to their duties. Nonetheless, it was possible to meet with individuals that have been directly involved in key decision-making phases or have worked closely in designing and implementing both the CCRP and the recovery strategy for the Arts Centre. Access to these respondents was a success compared with similar research based on elite interviews (Yüksel et al., 1999). Figure 3.3 reports the participants by stakeholder group. Overall, 40 respondents agreed to record the meeting, while twelve other participants only took part in the first round of informal encounters. Recorded interviews lasted between twenty minutes and three hours. 

Figure 3.3: Participants to the research
Reflexivity is integral to interview-based research (Bailey, 2008). Given the research topic, it was important to allow participants to have a look at the interview outline beforehand and assure them about the confidentiality and the value of the interviews. During the first meeting, therefore, participants were given the option to read the interview outline beforehand and arrange an official recording meeting in accordance with their schedule in the forthcoming weeks. Nevertheless, there were moments where participants would accept to do the interview immediately or the very next day. Focusing on the reflexivity during the interviews, I caught the chance to ask fairly odd yet controversial questions off the interview schedule by taking advantage of my position as a foreign young scholar (Bochaton & Lefebvre, 2010). Occasionally, interviews had to be suspended due to the participants’ timing constraints and new meetings had to be arranged.

Timing choice was based on insights from previous research (Bochaton & Lefebvre, 2010; Ward & Jones, 1999) and the need to reduce external constraints in collecting potentially sensitive information. Arguably, timing the majority of fieldwork throughout 2015 (i.e., after the elections of 2014 and during the closing period of CERA’s existence) was decisive in getting a positive interview turnout. Getting in contact and interviewing the participants was a mix of luck and pragmatic use of gatekeepers (Costa & Kiss, 2011; Darbi & Hall, 2014; McDowell, 1998). In at least four circumstances, the participants were either on a holiday break or about to leave the organization they originally worked for. Gatekeepers were similarly decisive on several occasions as their professional and personal connections to other participants eased access to interviewees. Throughout the fieldwork, informal introductions were forwarded through both influential (Herod, 1999; Welch et al., 2002) and personal acquaintances outside the University of Canterbury. Nonetheless, the relevance of the university in the research context played, to some extent, an important role (Darbi & Hall, 2014), as several participants were alumni or collaborated with the institution on an occasional basis.

In dealing with power relations and research positionality during the fieldwork, I was embedded in a dynamic process of interrelations with organizations and participants, with the latter often being in a dominant position (Darbi & Hall, 2014). Given the situatedness of the researcher (Hall, 2004), a major concern was to avoid spontaneous judgement to comments and opinions collected during the fieldwork phase of the study. Interviews had, in
several circumstances, a colloquial tone that reflected a dynamic negotiation of roles and compliance between the parties (Goffman, 1959; Hall, 2010e). This was particularly evident with participants with experience in fields closer to planning, destination management and urban development. In transcribing the interviews, in particular, I realized the fluidity of my position throughout the interviews, in a continuous balance between research objectivity, argumentation and empathy with the participants’ instances (Darbi & Hall, 2014).

The letters forwarded to participants provided a full description of my affiliations, background and links to the University of Canterbury profile page. Moreover, the research had to comply with the ethics policy of the University of Canterbury and obtain written consent and signature from the participants before beginning the interview. This ethical issue is acknowledged in the literature (Darbi & Hall, 2014) and could not be avoided. Another relevant ethical issue is the tendency of participants to check and eventually amend the content of the transcription (Darbi & Hall, 2014). To overcome this problem, clauses that would permit participants to ask for the transcription of the interview were not explicitly inserted in the consent forms. Nevertheless, when two participants asked to check the extracts of their interview transcriptions on the dissertation, their request was accepted without question (meetings with Debbie and Marie). The option of the participants’ feedback on the interview was considered during the fieldwork due to likely language barriers (Bochaton & Lefebvre, 2010; Darbi & Hall, 2014; King & Horrocks, 2010). However, as transcriptions went on, no such issue became apparent. Arguably, the decision to transcribe the interview verbatim with the help of a transcription service saved some time in the analysis. A final ethical issue encountered during the fieldwork concerned the so-called trade-offs of personal information during and after the interviews. I disclosed information about myself to keep the quasi-conversational tone of the interview (post-interview with Adam). However, when asked to make a comment on a given decision on the recovery projects, I declined to answer as my personal judgement would have influenced the interview process (interview with Gabriel).

During the fieldwork, it was crucial to develop a rapport with participants and gain their trust (Darbi & Hall, 2014). Given the characteristics of the sample, it was crucial to develop a stakeholder map (Yüksel et al., 1999) and deepen the understanding of the participants.
before the interview. This was achieved by reviewing local media information prior and during introductory meetings. During the interviews, I noticed how participants developed their thoughts in answering the questions and the positionality behind their statements. In doing so, they portrayed an institutional presentation of the self, in a constant tension with my positionality and performance as researcher. This feature of the fieldwork resembled Goffman’s (1959) sociology of everyday life. Key discriminants were the interviewees’ affiliations with the organizations at the time of research and the use of a recording device during the conversation (Gillen, 2010). It emerged that some participants were particularly open to disclose personal thoughts off the record when they were no longer working for or about to leave the organization (meetings and interviews with Colin, Ernest, Gabriel, John, Kevin, Sam and Thomas). Conversely, those participants that had still ties with the key authorities around the projects discussed in the research deployed a distinctive public relations style that was hard to overcome (meetings with Catherine, Joseph and Marie). In some cases, the unwillingness to meet or grant interviews was adamant (requests sent to Albert, Derek and Simon).

The knowledgeability of the research topic was a key factor in building rapport and trust with participants before and during the interviews (Darbi & Hall, 2014). Once more, the pre-interview stage of the research gave the opportunity to grasp as much information as possible on the context during the conversations with participants. During the conversations, moreover, I would occasionally use my knowledge of the field to reinforce my credibility as a researcher and ease the conversation with respondents. The rapport with participants had to be built by reducing constraints of situations that would affect the tone of the conversation. The majority of the interviews were held in the participants’ offices. There were, however, cases where meetings were held at the participant’s house (interviews with Allison, Gabriel and Vanessa) or in other areas of the city (e.g. interview with Thomas).

The experience in dealing with elite participants improved as the fieldwork went on. There were moments during the interviews where the sequencing of questions had to be flexible in order to get the opportunity to access confidential details that emerged during the conversation. The fact of being from Italy helped eased the conversational tone when participants mentioned their personal holiday experiences in the Bel Paese (meetings and
interviews with Edward, Frank, Gabriel, James, Penny and Thomas). I was aware of the potential supplicant attitude common to this type of interviewing (Hughes & Cormode, 1998). At all times, it was important to downplay the role of the researcher and play the role of the good listener (Welch et al., 2002).

Interviews with participants were recorded to overcome language barriers and guarantee the accuracy of the information collected. In doing so, participants would eventually be unwilling to reveal confidential information during the recording. A clause for off-record conversation was therefore granted to participants who wished for the interview recording to be stopped. This provided the possibility to gain interesting information off the record (interviews with Adam, Martha, Thomas and Vanessa). The importance of collecting and managing information off the record is acknowledged (Gillen, 2010), but the core of the decision-making and key implementation phases of the recovery projects would still remain untold (Hall & Wilson, 2011). There have been, nevertheless, circumstances where the results exceeded the expectations, with participants being very conversational and generous with their insights and experiences throughout the interview process.

3.4 Going off the radar: emergent discontinuities with research methods literature

Some methodological aspects that were not addressed fully in the literature began to emerge while developing the research strategy and during the fieldwork. These issues ranged from research design to data collection and positionality in interviewing elite participants. This section illustrates these discontinuities and the expedients used to overcome unexpected issues with the conduction of the research.

A first issue that is not adequately addressed in the literature concerns the timing for each of the case studies. Given the emerging findings of the context, it was decided to do the fieldwork for the two case studies at the same time and follow the two recovery projects altogether. The rationale for such a methodological approach was three-fold. It allowed for the simultaneous collection of documents and data from the interviews around a set period,
that being March to November 2015. Second, doing the case studies fieldwork at the same
time would have prevented data from being obsolete at the time of comparison. Third, and
most importantly, the context of the Christchurch CBD left no room for a diachronic approach
to the case studies. Important decisions on individual projects overlapped with some key
decision at the CBD-area level that could not be overlooked.

A second aspect that needs further discussion concerns timing the access to the fieldwork. It
soon emerged that some archived documents and respondents would not be accessible. The
literature retrieved did not explicitly address the rationale behind the right timing to access
fieldwork in post-disaster situations. Moreover, the adoption of participant observation
deployed in doctoral dissertations in urban regeneration (Doorne, 1998b) and post-disaster
recovery (Calgaro, 2010) was not an option in this research due to my positionality and the
restrictions that key authorities often put in place to opposition members, journalists and
residents. Ultimately, the decision to set a narrow timeframe for fieldwork access was taken
following the first reading of the *Arts Centre of Christchurch Trust Bill (ACCTB)*, the
appointment of the CCC’s new Chief Executive in July 2014 and the Government’s
announcement to restructure CERA under the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
(DPMC) in September 2014 (Kirk & Fulton, 2014).

The restriction to relevant information that is not publicly available represented a key
methodological issue that is not adequately addressed in the literature. Previous experience
with classified government documents partly helped in handling the requests for archival
sources. However, it soon became clear that in a context such as the one of post-earthquake
Christchurch, the restriction of relevant information and the withholding of crucial policy
documents were particularly strict. With respect to government documents, a precautionary
approach was adopted in submitting the first request. Colleagues and acquaintances were
helpful in the understanding of the legislative and contextual barriers to fully-disclosed
documents. Some of the participants interviewed in the early stage of the fieldwork expressed
their frustration in accessing documents through OIA (meetings and interviews with Adam,
Debbie, Jack and Max). With respect to controversies over compulsory land acquisition
available on the archives, only one result was available to public access (*Minister for
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery v Ace Developments Ltd.*). As the fieldwork went on, it
emerged that the majority of the owners wanted “to keep this kind of negotiation private,
which means keeping it out of court” (email conversation with Shelley). In addition, in one case the organization declined to allow access to the requested documents by adding that I had already met with one of their members (Gregory) for an interview. In another, it was discovered that one of the participants identified for the interview (Josh) was also the person in charge for the sorting of documents requested the week before.

Another methodological aspect not fully addressed in relevant literature concerned the access to archived documents on recovery projects in the early implementation phase. The delays in delivering a programme for the delivery of the CBD anchor projects represented a key obstacle in obtaining strategies and detailed information on the business case for the Performing Arts Precinct, which was still under review at the time of the fieldwork (late 2015). The authorities justified the inaccessibility of these documents to the commercially sensitive information and the need to maintain confidentiality until their official release. Subsequently, information on the tendering process for the sites was not available at the time of fieldwork and the request was rejected because the information sought did not formally exist. Ultimately, difficulties in archival research were tied to tensions in the governance climate that emerged during the preliminary context analysis and the interviews with participants. This methodological issue proved to be of paramount importance and needs further discussion in the literature.

With respect to the interview strategy, the research methods literature overlooks the deployment of a 2-round interview process. The decision to adopt this process was justified in light of the methodology implemented on studies complementary to that of this research (e.g. Healey et al., 2002) and the need to develop trust in interviewing experienced managers, influential politicians and major local developers. Similarly, current literature on elite interview tends to juxtapose snowballing to formal recruitment techniques, thus overlooking the potential benefits of combining both approaches as the fieldwork evolves. Another aspect overlooked in the elite interview literature is the effect of participant snowballing and how it influences the original interview strategy. The timeframe originally allocated between the first informal meeting and the actual interview – two weeks minimum – decreased considerably as the research reached saturation. Most likely, word-of-mouth among participants working for the same organizations played a positive role in easing access to respondents. A final aspect specific to this study that is not fully acknowledged in elite
interview literature concerns the prioritization of participants to contact during the fieldwork. Given the research context and the case study strategy developed, getting access to respondents that had dealt with more than one of the recovery projects was paramount in terms of time-saving and sample saturation. Out of the original stakeholder map, which comprised 177 possible participants, 47 high-priority respondents were identified to contact. The latter figure met the sample saturation criteria for the type of study (Mason, 2010) and fieldwork efforts were subsequently directed at getting as many high-priority respondents as possible.

With respect to power relations and positionality throughout the interviews, the literature on elite interview does not adequately address the positionality of the researcher over potentially confidential policy issues and his or her situatedness towards respondents. I had to clarify to respondents that the study was not seeking an oppositional appraisal of the recovery projects. In a couple of circumstances, the genuine scholarly intent of the research had to be explained, particularly to those participants that raised questions over the purpose of the study. As a scholar interested in urban regeneration practices, it was easier to explain the purpose of the study to participants with a similar background. Conversely, I encountered difficulties in persuading other participants to provide their point of view on governance episodes and get further access to potentially sensitive information. In one circumstance, the selected participant declined the invite to the interview session as he was not fully sure of what sort of information I sought from him (informal meeting with Joseph). Similarly, there were situations where respondents showed enthusiasm over the research and expressed interest in the outcome of the study (meeting and interviews with Anna, David, Debbie and James). While one of these respondents argued that it was important for this sort of research to be carried out by a foreigner (Debbie), another one showed quite a strong interest in the outcome of the study and eventually offered support for the final editing (David). However, the ethical implications on the importance of not releasing findings until the completion of the doctoral programme were made clear and participants were reminded that the thesis would be requested for embargo for a period of at least a year (interviews with Debbie and James).

In terms of the ethical issues that emerged during the interviews, the literature overlooks the difficulties in obtaining ethics clearance for research similar to that discussed in this thesis.
Interviewing elite participants in the same city as the university (Christchurch) could potentially affect the privacy of respondents. Keeping the identity of participants confidential was integral to good research practice. Issues emerged, however, when participants were individuals with a highly-exposed social identity as in the case of this study. In particular, a paradoxical position was reached when the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee requested the interview schedule as a mandatory condition of ethics’ clearance. It was argued that this request was *de facto* an infringement to the privacy of participants as it would have been possible for the Committee members to guess the identity of some of the potential respondents from the outline of the questions. To overcome this issue, a note was included in the applications sent to the Committee members which specified that:

> The following outline of the unstructured interview is a summary of the topics that the researcher might ask participants to answer. The questions do not all apply to the participants identified for the interviews as they vary depending on the participant’s role in the organization/institution involved in the recovery of [project]. This process is meant to guarantee the confidentiality of participants, as some of the questions are addressed to a very limited and easily identifiable group of people.

A minor ethical issue that deserves some attention in the future concerns the role of social media in corroborating the identity of researchers. My profiles on Facebook and LinkedIn were rearranged in order to narrow the visualization of content to participants who might begin a fact-check search. Potentially sensitive information, including political views and posts from friends and acquaintances on the recovery of Christchurch, were filtered in order to reduce my exposure towards elite participants. Social media, on the other hand, were a valuable source in gaining information on the participants before contacting them. Nevertheless, LinkedIn profiles, in particular, were a valid source of information on the professional background of elite participants.

Researching a politically sensitive subject like the one of post-earthquake rebuild required an approach that slightly differed from that of the scholar as the ‘suppliant’ (Cormode & Hughes, 1999). Rather, on some occasions, I acted as a trustee of relevant information, particularly when respondents asked for further details on the study and how research would be reported (informal meetings with Debbie, Donna, Gabriel, Max and Ted). It was therefore decided to forward an outline of the questions before conducting the interview and some literature was also brought to interviews as further evidence of the interviewer’s
trustworthiness. These precautions proved to be effective in most of the informal meetings held with participants before the formal interviews. Only a handful of candidates declined the invitation to the final interview due to compelling work duties until the end of 2015. When interviewing the elite participants, the location was chosen in accordance with the interviewees’ busy agendas. While getting to the suggested venue did not represent an obstacle, there were episodes where the chosen locations were relatively noisy (interviews with Amanda, Blair, Gregory, Nick and Max). When participants asked to record the interview on campus, dedicated rooms were arranged to avoid environmental disturbance and set a tone of professionalism.

3.5 Analysis

Analysis in qualitative research can be broadly categorized along a structured/unstructured continuum (King & Horrocks, 2010; Timothy, 2012). Whilst structured approaches tend to focus on language and quantitative content extracted from archival material and interviews (Corbetta, 2003; Hall & Valentin, 2005; King & Horrocks, 2010; Timothy, 2012), unstructured approaches “are principally concerned with understanding the participants’ lived experience from their own position – to step inside their shoes, as it were” (King & Horrocks, 2010, p142). Although this research employs a phenomenological approach to analysis, it still requires the verbatim transcription of interviews (King & Horrocks, 2010; McLellan, MacQueen & Neidig, 2003). However, some of the issues with verbatim transcription of qualitative interviews reported in the literature (e.g. non-verbal communication and tone of voice) (King & Horrocks, 2010) were not addressed in the transcription because they were not relevant for the ultimate purpose of the research. Moreover, the inner relativity of politically sensitive data in general and the emerging findings of the research context meant that the sole focus was on the policy instances and positions of participants on the recovery projects at the heart of the study.

The second step in the research analysis methodology was to adopt a template analysis similar to the ones used for the analysis of archived sources (Timothy, 2012) and extend it to the interview transcriptions and the field notes. In light of the literature retrieved and illustrated in Chapter 2, it was decided to organize data and conduct a two-round analysis.
that echoed, in part, the analysis template used in the study of governance episodes in the Grainger Town Partnership in Newcastle, United Kingdom (Healey et al. 1999, 2002). The other categories of the analysis were added based on the crisis-driven urban development framework (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014), the disaster capitalism paradigm (Klein, 2007), the definition of power based on the work of Lukes (2005), the latest advancements in spatial planning (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009; Olesen, 2014; Tewdwr-Jones, 2012), the insights from instrument governance literature (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2009b; Le Galès, 2011) and the mainstream literature in urban regeneration, urban tourism, governance, metagovernance and tourism policy and planning (Amore & Hall, 2016a; Hall, 2011a; Jenkins et al., 2014; Jessop, 2011; Meuleman, 2008).

The third step in the analysis methodology concerned the use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). The literature suggests that the use of qualitative analysis software is widespread in the social sciences, particularly in grounded theory research (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013; Welsh, 2002). Nevertheless, there are at least three main shortcomings in comparison with manual-based analysis. A first issue concerns the tendency of software-based analysis to overwhelm the individuals’ capacity to autonomously interpret the findings and lead to what Richards (2002) refers to as ‘coding fetishism’. A second limitation often highlighted against the use of CAQDAS is the tendency to narrow the analysis to a point where the segmentation of text can mislead the researcher from seeing the bigger picture of the phenomenon being researched (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). Finally, CAQDAS can potentially lose the critical appraisal common to qualitative research and lead to more positivistic standpoints where “code and retrieve become the dominant approach to working with data” (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013, p8). It is argued here that “computers don’t analyse data” (Weitzman & Miles, 1995, p3) and that sound research strategy should not be influenced by its tools. Rather, research based on qualitative analysis software and manual methods should be seen as two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, the use of qualitative software can overcome human errors usually common with sole manual analysis. On the other, the creativity of researchers can enhance the applicability of qualitative software in data analysis beyond the mere computer-based logic.

Table 3.2 illustrates the methodology for data analysis developed for this study and applied to the two case studies discussed in the dissertation. A deductive approach was adopted to
analyse the data. Findings were coded based on a matrix that was developed prior to the ultimate analysis. None of the categories presented in the table emerged from the analysis of data.

Table 3.2 Methodology for data analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Data organization</th>
<th>1st round analysis</th>
<th>2nd round analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overt dimension of power</strong></td>
<td>significant individuals</td>
<td>Referents</td>
<td>Evolution of coalitions and forms of governance before and after the 2010-2011 earthquakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>lobbying/clienteles coalitions openness metagovernance archetype</td>
<td>depth and maturity Reach involvement/exclusion of stakeholders market type; PPPs; deliberative.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covert dimension of power</strong></td>
<td>organization structure legislation Rules Standards Information agreements and incentives mechanisms of non-decision-making</td>
<td>target and attitude aim, impact and rationale beneficiaries/non-beneficiaries</td>
<td>Impact of instruments and documents in non-decision-making before and after the 2010-2011 earthquakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hegemonic dimension of power</strong></td>
<td>urban regeneration tourism role of the market role of government</td>
<td>development; competitiveness, etc permanent/transitory central/marginal</td>
<td>Rhetoric and policy discourses for urban development before and after the 2010-2011 earthquakes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of relevance for this research is the use of a specific type for CAQDAS, NVivo 10. The software was used to manage a huge amount of data based on the community feedback from the *Share an Idea* initiative launched by the CCC in 2011 (QSR, 2014). Information was coded and arranged in themes that, eventually, “were incorporated into the draft Central City Plan” (QSR, 2014, p4). One of the respondents to the study (*Edward*) argued that the analysis methodology used was “primitive” because it looked exclusively at keywords during the coding of data. This episode is emblematic of how the extraction of given words out of the context is far from being objective, as it can manipulatively break the data to achieve a desired result. Unlike with the approach developed for the coding of the *Share an Idea* comments, this study opted to use NVivo to manage the high volume of data and ease the process of manual coding started at the beginning of the research. This approach is common in phenomenological qualitative research in social sciences (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013; Siccama & Penna, 2008; Welsh, 2002) as it allows to combine the accuracy of software-based analysis with the crafting of policy analysis common to manual-based research.

Ultimately, the decision to use NVivo to organize and implement a single round of analysis is a solution that acknowledges both relevant works using this software for the analysis (Calgaro, 2010; Healey et al., 2003) and open-ended manual archival research in post-disaster studies (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014). The use of NVivo, therefore, had no influence on the overall research strategy and on the interview schedule with participants. The software was only introduced on the eve of the fieldwork research phase to assist the first round of coding of data and provide a platform to review the extracts from the different sources of data collected for the research.

### 3.6 Summary

This chapter introduced the research strategy and the tools for research identified for the study. It illustrated the development of the research strategy and the adoption of a multiple case study approach articulated around archival research and elite interviewing. The chapter also discussed elements of continuity and discontinuity between the fieldwork experience of this study and the literature on research methods. In doing so, it recommended
advancements in the literature with regards to elite interview and archival access in post-disaster contexts. Finally, the chapter illustrated the analysis methodology and the justification for the adoption of an approach that recognized “the value of both manual and electronic tools in qualitative data analysis and management” (Welsh, 2002, n.p.).

The following chapter illustrates the context at the heart of the research before and after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. The chapter, in particular, introduces the pre-earthquake strategies of urban regeneration and identifies a range of covert vulnerabilities that became evident in the very aftermath of the earthquakes. The chapter suggests that the repercussions of the earthquakes to the tourism sector at large and to the existing amenities were devastating and that post-disaster governance for urban tourist spaces is currently framing the recovery of Christchurch as a tourist destination for the years to come.
Chapter 4
The Christchurch CBD context before and after the earthquakes

4.1 Introduction

This chapter acknowledges the relevance of geographical constraints in the uneven development of Christchurch since its foundation in 1850 and the exposure of the city to geological activity in the short-term. It builds upon the concept of crisis-driven urbanization (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014) to illustrate how the framing of the crisis affecting Christchurch and its tourist attractions is rooted on the non-decisions, defaults and institutional arrangements that have been affecting the governance of city spaces before, during and after the 2010-2011 earthquakes. The geological characteristics of a city built upon a swamp were decisive in the extent of damage following the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes. As Barton (2011, pA20) stated, “the upheaval of the earth on September 4 then again on February 22 has laid bare a terrible truth: Christchurch is built on unstable ground” subject to consistent liquefaction and lateral spreading. Similarly, the governance of urban tourist spaces has also shifted in response to the earthquakes following changes in administrations and the intervention of the national government in local and regional governance frameworks.

This chapter provides a summary of the context before and after the earthquakes, with a focus on the practices for urban regeneration in place before the seismic events and in the rebuilding phase. Prior to 2007, the Council had embarked on a long-term revitalization strategy for the CBD. This approach was progressively sidelined in favour of a stronger urban entrepreneurial agenda under Mayor Bob Parker, with a series of controversial anchor projects and land acquisitions between 2008 and 2010. Notwithstanding the existence of an urban regeneration strategy carried out by the CCC before the earthquakes, the New Zealand Government opted for a radical regeneration agenda to lead the post-earthquake recovery. Questions arise as to why the Government disregarded the CCC strategy and what
instruments and policy discourses where decisive in decision-making and non-decision-making in the redevelopment of the Christchurch CBD.

This chapter consists of five sections. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the Christchurch context following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 along with a brief on the geological vulnerabilities of the area based on a series of scientific reports commissioned before and after the seismic event. Section 4.3 introduces the governance in the Christchurch city area before and after the earthquakes, while Section 4.4 overviews the regeneration strategies put in place before and after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 by illustrating the key governance episodes that culminated with the release of the CCRP in late July 2012 and the approval of the CSA between the national Government and the CCC in June 2013. Section 4.5, finally, provides a summary of the chapter and provides the concluding overview of the contexts upon which are built the analyses of the two site-specific projects at the heart of the dissertation.

4.2 Context

The city of Christchurch, located on the Pacific coast of the Canterbury region, is the major urban area of the South Island of New Zealand (Figure 4.1). With a population of 341,469 inhabitants accounted in the Census of June 2013 (CCC, 2013g), Christchurch is the second biggest urban conglomeration of New Zealand after Auckland and home to more than a third of the people currently residing in the South Island (35.63%) (NZSTATS, 2013). In terms of territorial authority, the Christchurch city area is of 1,610 km$^2$ and comprises Christchurch, Lyttelton and the Banks Peninsula (NZSTATS, 2015b). The economic influence of Christchurch, however, stretches beyond the city administrative boundaries “and the commuting hinterland of the city” (Davoudi, 2003, p985). The metropolitan area known as Greater Christchurch comprises the Christchurch city area and the Waimakariri and Selwyn district councils, totalling a population of 436,053 over 10,378 km$^2$ (Table 4.1), Greater Christchurch is home to more than 80% of the residents of the Canterbury region and it is one of the main conurbations of Oceania (CDC, 2013a).
The city of Christchurch is named after the College of Christ Church in Oxford, United Kingdom. Historical records suggest that the first European settlement in Christchurch occurred at the end of the 1840s. The exploratory expedition to the region culminated with the identification of a thousand acres flat area between the port of Lyttleton and the farming properties located in what is now Riccarton (Hercus, 1942). The chosen area eventually became the city of Christchurch and corresponds to the current CBD of the city (CCC, 1999a) (Figure 4.2). The west end of the CBD is limited by Hagley Park, a large open space established in 1855. The area between the park and the Avon River is home to major Gothic Revival buildings, including the Canterbury Museum, the Botanic Gardens, the Provincial Chambers and the Arts Centre. The heart of the CBD is home to the Christ Church Cathedral and Cathedral Square which are delimited by Victoria Square to the north, Cashel Street to the south and Latimer Square to the east. The total area of the CBD is 6.33 Km², with a population of approximately 7,600 inhabitants (Census 2006). Given the overwhelming presence of administrative offices, retail and hospitality facilities before the earthquakes, the CBD resembled the characteristics of the tourist business district illustrated by Getz (1993).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Surface area (km²)</th>
<th>Population (Census 2006)</th>
<th>Population (Census 2013)</th>
<th>Variation 2006-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total CBD</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>7,563</td>
<td>4,899</td>
<td>-35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch City</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>348,435</td>
<td>341,469</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selwyn</td>
<td>6,553</td>
<td>33,666</td>
<td>44,595</td>
<td>+32.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waimakariri</td>
<td>2,218</td>
<td>42,834</td>
<td>49,989</td>
<td>+16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Greater Christchurch</td>
<td>10,379</td>
<td>424,935</td>
<td>436,053</td>
<td>+2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Canterbury Region</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>73.03%</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% South Island</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% New Zealand</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data retrieved from NZSTATS (2006, 2013, 2015b)
Figure 4.1: Christchurch city area

Figure 4.2: The Christchurch CBD

Image: Adapted from Blofeld (2011) CC-BY-SA-2.0 https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Location_map_New_Zealand_Christchurch.png
4.2.1 Geology of Christchurch and the Canterbury region

The geological surveys undertaken in Christchurch and the surrounding area suggest that the region is active and subject to earthquakes. Christchurch is located on the east coast of the South Island and near the Southern Alps, which separate the Canterbury Plains from the west coast of the island. The Southern Alps are, geologically speaking, a relatively recent mountain range that arose approximately 45 million years ago as result of the subduction of the Indo-Australian Plate into the Pacific Plate (Campbell & Hutching, 2007). The latter plate moves under the former and is forced down into the mantle along the Alpine Fault, a 600 km right-lateral strike-slip fault that cuts across the whole South Island from the Cook Strait down to the Fiordland region (GNS, 2016). The Alpine Fault is subject to large seismic events in the range of 8.0~9.0 $M$ every 250~330 years, the most recent of which occurred in 1717 (Norris & Cooper, 2001; Wells, Yetton, Duncan & Stewart, 1999). The repercussions and the mitigations of a major rupture in the Alpine Fault – referred to as the *Big One* (NZGEO, 2016) – are of major concern in the academic community, including tourism (Orchiston, 2012).

Before the earthquakes, geologists debated the existence of faults near Christchurch. The September 4th, 2010 earthquake, however, showed the existence of a fault line west of Christchurch, which is now known as the Greendale Fault (Quigley, 2010). As no rupture was evident on the surface, geologists concluded that the fault had been inactive since the end of the last glaciation and “had not moved for at least 16,000 years” (GNS, 2010, n.p.). Similarly, the February 22nd, 2011 earthquake led to the identification of two parallel faults across the city of Christchurch. The Port Hills Fault, which is located south-east of the Christchurch CBD, was identified right near the epicentre of the February 2011 earthquake. On the other hand, the Christchurch Fault cuts across the central city and runs east-west through the suburbs of Riccarton and New Brighton (Gorman, 2011a).

Since the settlement by the British in the Canterbury region at the end of the 1840s, Christchurch has experienced seismic activity. Historic records suggest that three major earthquakes hit Christchurch and Lyttleton on June 1869, December 1881 and September 1888 (Cayford, 2011a), with damage reported on the Christ Church Cathedral and its spire.
Another major earthquake was reported in the early 1920s, north of Christchurch, while the two earthquakes of 1929 were registered along the Southern Alps. Overall, “eight earthquakes caused significant building or contents damage in Canterbury” (ECan, 2008, p10) between 1860 and 1930. Before the 2010-2011 earthquakes, the region of Christchurch registered only two significant seismic events along the Alpine Fault, with epicentres in Arthur’s Pass (1994) and Cass (1995) (ECan, 2008). However, the seismic activity since the earthquake of September 4th, 2010 has no historical precedents. Data for the period between September 2010 and February 2014 report nearly 4,200 distinctive earth tremors, 55 of which are above 5.0 M, with a chance of 66% for another earthquake of the kind to hit Christchurch and the Canterbury region within a year (GeoNet, 2014). The last major earthquake registered in February 2016 (Nicholls, 2017) indicates that the seismic events in Christchurch and Canterbury are yet far from over.

Two in-depth geological studies conducted during the 1990s (Brown et al., 1995; Brown & Weeber, 1992) reported “a highly plausible scenario of earthquake prediction” (Brown et al., 1995, p430) and the likely impacts on Christchurch due to ground conditions. The area of Christchurch is, in fact, the result of the last glaciation and of fluvial debris that accumulated over the course of the last 7,000 years. In particular, the west end of the CBD ground is made of surface and subsurface alluvial slit and embedded gravel, while the area around Cathedral Square and the Avon River is made of surface or near surface gravel (Brown et al., 1995). Given the presence of water within a few meters in most of the CBD area, the two reports concluded that the potential of liquefaction was high, particularly in the event of a strong earthquake.

Following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, a series of geological surveys in the city centre revealed that “the water table is about 5 m deep in the western suburbs [and] within 1.0 m to 1.5 m […] to the east of the CBD” (Cubrinovski & McCahon, 2012, p5). Similarly, the western end of the CBD is characterized by alluvial gravels at shallow depths, with soft slits and peat concentrated near the surface on the east-end of the city centre (Cubrinovski & McCahon, 2012). Most importantly, the areas in the CBD in proximity to the Avon River were subject to severe liquefaction and episodes of lateral spreading that affected several high-rise buildings built upon shallow foundations (Cubrinovski & McCahon, 2012; Tonkin & Taylor, 2011a). As the report highlights:
There were many smaller buildings suffering serious damage to the foundations due to spreading as well as clear signs of effects of spreading on some larger buildings both at the foundations and through the superstructure (Cubrinovski & McCahon, 2012, p12).

Lateral spreading is a displacement of ground in a shallow underlying deposit as result of liquefaction (Cubrinovski & McCahon, 2012). Liquefaction occurs when “the shaking of the ground causes soils to lose their strength and behave more like a liquid than a solid” (Chapman, 2011b, pC3), thus causing extensive damage to buildings, especially the foundations. Up to a third of the buildings within the CBD area were levelled during the earthquake of February 2011 and several residential units will be likely to be demolished “because of the risks of liquefaction or unstable hillsides” (McCrone, 2011, pC3). This estimate underpins the findings of the Department of Geology at the University of Canterbury prior to the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, which suggested that at least a quarter of the central city area was potentially subject to liquefaction (Brown & Weeber, 1992).

4.2.2 The Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011

More than 19,000 between major earthquakes and aftershocks have been reported in Christchurch and the Canterbury region since the first severe quake on September 4th, 2010 (Nicholls, 2017). The seismic activity began with a 7.1 M earthquake on September 4th, 2010 at 4.35 a.m., with the epicentre located 40 km west of Christchurch (GNS, 2010; Miles, 2016). However, the depth of the epicentre (11 km) and the 0.8G peak ground acceleration reported in east Christchurch (Espiner & Van Beynen, 2011) did not cause extensive damage to the built environment in the central city. Most of the damages to the buildings were a direct consequence of liquefaction and lateral spreading (Platt, 2012). External damages were reported among unreinforced masonry buildings that had been reported as potentially vulnerable to moderate and high seismic events in the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE) bulletin released the day before the September earthquake (Russell & Ingham, 2010). A state of regional emergency of 11 days was declared for the city of Christchurch and the nearby districts of Selwyn and Waimakariri (MCDEM, 2016). Despite the striking images conveyed through the media, however, no fatalities were reported after this
powerful earthquake. Estimates on the damages as result of the earthquakes throughout September were in the range of NZD$ 6 billion (Platt, 2012).

Between October and November 2010, the seismic activity decreased considerably (Nicholls, 2017), but on at least three occasions, authorities partially closed the Christchurch CBD for safety reasons (Miles, 2016). Early demolitions began in the city centre following the CCC’s recommendation to submit demolition plans for two listed heritage buildings (CCC, 2010d; Gates, 2010). On Boxing Day 2010, a major aftershock hit the city of Christchurch during the busiest retail period of the year (Vaughan, 2010). More than 20 quakes were felt during that day, including a 4.9 M aftershock registered at 10.30 a.m. that forced authorities to shut parts of the Christchurch CBD and evacuate people from main shopping streets (Gorman & Brown, 2010). Unlike the earthquakes of September, the seismic activity was particularly felt in the Christchurch CBD, caused noticeable damage to at least 20 buildings (Giles, 2010; Vaughan, 2010) and had significant economic impacts on businesses in the CBD. As the Central City Business Association manager, Paul Lonsdale, admitted to the press, the Boxing Day aftershocks:

[…] could not have come at a worse time. [...] we were just starting to get some normality back into customers' psyche and getting a bit of positivity back and this is just a blow (quoted in Gorman & Brown, 2010, n.p.).

The major damages in the Christchurch CBD occurred as a result of the February 22nd earthquake registered at 12.51 p.m. The 6.3 M quake last for 24 seconds and struck during the peak of a business day (Duffy, 2011; Miles, 2016). The earthquake of February 22nd, 2011 caused 185 fatalities, 115 of which were in the collapse of the 12-storey Canterbury Television Tower in Madras Street, 18 casualties in the fall of the Pyne Gould Corporation House and another eight from to the fall of masonry along Colombo Street (GeoNet, 2011; Moore, 2011c; NZ Police, 2010; RC, 2011). The shallow depth of this second major earthquake (5 km underground), its epicentre (Lyttelton, near Christchurch), the sedimentary ground beneath the CBD and, most importantly, the peak ground acceleration (2.21G, the second highest ever recorded in the history of seismology) had severe repercussions on buildings, especially after thousands of aftershocks in less than six months (K. Collins, 2011; Nicholls, 2017).
As the New Zealand Reserve Bank (NZRB) report showed, the most affected urban areas were the eastern suburbs and the areas close to the Avon River (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012), while the Building Research Association of New Zealand (BRANZ) reported that soil liquefaction and lateral spreading were the main damages reported in the flat areas of Christchurch (Platt, 2012). The estimates of the damages caused by the February 2011 earthquake were between NZD$ 15 and NZD$ 20 billion, with the insurance sector covering 80% of the loss (Platt, 2012; Swiss RE, 2012). Mayor Bob Parker predicted that at least 60% of the CBD would be listed for demolition (S. Collins, 2011). In some cases, demolitions were carried out with owners being notified at the very last moment (Barton, 2001; Miles, 2016).

Following the deadly earthquake of February 22nd, 2011, moderate aftershocks hit the area, with two earthquakes further damaging the city centre (Gates, 2011)). In particular, the earthquake of June 13th, 2011 struck at 2.20 p.m. with a 6.3 M and an epicentre located 10 km east of Christchurch (Vickers, 2011). The earthquake caused the collapse of the façade and of the iconic rose window of the Christ Church Cathedral (Ansley, 2011; Scott, 2011), affected other key religious buildings such as the Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament (Ansley, 2011), further damaged the Great Hall of the Arts Centre, the Canterbury Museum and destroyed the Lyttelton Timeball Station (Gates, 2011c; Scott, 2011). Losses were estimated to be up to NZD$ 5 billion, a good extent of which was covered by insurance (Platt, 2012). Coincidentally, the earthquake struck the day Roger Sutton officially took office at CERA (Miles, 2016). The following day Sutton announced the demolition of further 50 buildings as part of a revised demolition programme that sought to quickly remediate the compelling issues related to the infrastructural damages caused by the earthquake (Wade, 2011). The earthquake of December 23rd, 2011 hit the east end of Christchurch, with several quakes in the range of 4.0~6.0 M over a period of three hours (Brookie, 2012). Liquefaction predominantly caused damages, with direct costs in the range of NZD$ 300 million (ibid.).

Estimates on the total cost of damages caused by the earthquakes up to December 2011 varies between NZD$ 30 billion (Deloitte, 2015a; Platt, 2012) and NZD$ 40 billion (NZT, 2013), while the rebuild costs are as high as NZD$ 40 billion (Deloitte, 2015a; RBNZ, 2016). Up to NZD$ 5 billion have been budgeted for the rebuild of infrastructure and facilities in the city centre (Deloitte, 2015a), most of which covered by national and local authorities (CERA,
2013b). Table 4.2 provides an overview of the costs of the recovery and the public-sector shares.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voice</th>
<th>Budgeted cost (NZD$ bn)</th>
<th>Public sector share (NZD$ bn)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>16~18.0</td>
<td>~13.6$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>~1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>5.0~7.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Horizontal...</strong></td>
<td>(~3.2)</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- <strong>Anchor projects</strong></td>
<td>(~1.6)</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>15.4~20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Following the last severe quake of December 2011, the area of Christchurch and Canterbury registered around 3,000 aftershocks in the period until January 2015 (Nicholls, 2017), a handful of which were relatively intense. Undoubtedly, the seismic activity in Christchurch and the Canterbury region has decreased over the time after the massive energy released since September 4th, 2010. However, some episodic quakes in the range of 5.0 M and the increasing probabilities of the Big One hitting the South Island in the years to come, leave Christchurch and the surrounding region quite exposed to seismic activities in the medium-term.

4.3 Governance in Christchurch before and after the earthquakes

Before the earthquakes, urban policies and land-use planning were two of the many duties carried out by the CCC in accordance with the principle of devolution and vertical subsidiarity under the LGA 2002. However, since the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the national Government embarked upon a set of public sector reforms that progressively turned New
Zealand into one the most centralized states in the world (Nel, 2015). At the national level, the proposed changes to the RMA 1991 were seen as an attempt towards a “more centralised decision-making contrary to the devolution trend of recent decades” (Glavovic, Saunders & Becker, 2010, p687). The reforms promoted by the national Government underpinned the principles dear to neoliberalism, with the streamlining of state authority and the embracement of policies close to the interests of major private companies. With respect to Christchurch and Canterbury, the Government decision to replace the democratically elected members of the ECan in March 2010 with commissioners appointed by the Ministry for the Environment (MFE) was seen as the deliberate attempt by the national authorities to exert top-down control over irrigation to accommodate the instances of the agribusiness sector (McCrone, 2012a).

Similarly, the national Government promoted the reform of the LGA 2002 as necessary in light of the alleged rise of public expenditure (NZP, 2012a). However, it should be noted that the debts of local authorities were the result of demanding infrastructural developments sought by the Central Government. In turn, local authorities encountered difficulties in implementing a Third Way style of governance that facilitated “engagement and partnership between the civil sector and the central and local government sectors” (Memon & Thomas, 2006, p139). An example with respect to Christchurch was the programme to reduce the vulnerability of masonry buildings against earthquakes originally foreseen in the Amendment 301A of the Municipal Corporations Act 1968 (MCA 1968). The lack of resources and coordination with national authorities much contributed in the passive approach by the CCC in implementing the legislation (Amore, 2016a; Russell & Ingham, 2010).

The absence of a major precipitating event since the 1931 Napier earthquake led New Zealand to develop an earthquake response system that had not been affected by the urgency imposed by any specific disaster event (Britton, 2001). Notwithstanding the introduction of new acts and guidelines put in place at the national level (e.g. CDEMA 2002), the authorities responsible for disaster response inherited organizational and legislative flaws highlighted since the early 1980s (Britton, 1981). As a result, before the earthquakes, there were no national policy and financial incentives to cope with earthquake-related disaster (Glavovic et al., 2010) and local authorities struggled “to translate policy and legal intentions into practical
reality through better inter-governmental cooperation” (ibid., p692). Following the first major earthquake of September 2010, “concerns were raised that, after local emergency powers expired, the central government might not have adequate statutory power to address the recovery needs of the region” (Johnson & Mamula-Seadon, 2014, p583). Nonetheless, since the September 4th 2010 earthquake, the governance for the recovery in Christchurch has been characterized by a top-down, haphazardous response.

A couple of days after the first earthquake, the national Government appointed Hon. Brownlee as MCER, established a dedicated Cabinet Committee, and began working on a new legislation to assist in the management of response and recovery for the Canterbury region (Key, 2010). On September 14, the Parliament unanimously passed the *Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act 2010 (CERRA 2010)*, which foresaw the establishment of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission (CERC) as the advisory entity to the Minister in relation to Orders in Council suspending ordinary legislation in Christchurch and the Canterbury region. Concerns were raised about the concentration of power in the hands of the Minister and the role of CERC as a ‘mere’ advisory body (Bennett, 2010; Geddis, 2010; Johnson & Mamula-Seadon, 2014). Law academics, in particular, argued that the new legislation set a dangerous precedent as it overrode “established constitutional values and principles in order to remove any inconvenient legal roadblock” (Geddis, 2010, n.p.) to cope with the scale of post-emergency rebuild and the issue of insurance claims between private households and the Earthquake Commission (EQC) (Miles, 2016). Minister Brownlee, however, justified the suspension of ordinary legislation in Christchurch and the Canterbury region as necessary to speed up the recovery process (Bennett, 2010; Johnson & Mamula-Seadon, 2014).

Following the February 22nd 2011 earthquake, the New Zealand Government declared a National State of Emergency for the first time in the country’s history (Carter, 2011a). The Christchurch CBD area was cordoned, with a large extent of it remaining closed for almost two years (CERA, 2013c; Greenhill, 2013b). Amid uncertainty and crisis, the Cabinet supported the idea of establishing a “stronger governance and leadership arrangements for the rebuilding and recovery of Greater Christchurch” (OMCER, 2011a, p2) as the mechanisms and the instruments put in place for the September 4th 2010 earthquake were not adequate to
cope with the scale of the disaster (OMCER, 2011a). The proposed legislation was expected “to provide the necessary leadership and certainty for the rebuilding and recovery of Greater Christchurch” (OMCER, 2011a, p1) by granting further concentration of decision-making powers to the MCER and establish a new authority to replace the CERC.

On March 29th, 2011, a special parliamentary order allowed for the creation of CERA as the new recovery authority, ahead of the enactment of the dedicated legislation (Brownlee, 2011; Miles, 2016). The latter was eventually promulgated on April 18th, 2011 after receiving bipartisan support in the Parliament by the major parties (NZP, 2011b). Under the new CERA 2011 legislation, CERA acted as the executive agency on behalf of the MCER. The Government could still promulgate new Orders in Council to suspend existing legislation, with the Minister recommending amendments to the CERA 2011 itself for the purposes of recovery (NZP, 2011b). The proposed governance arrangements also included three advisory groups to the Minister: the Cross-Party Forum consisting of local members of the Parliament; the Community Forum, which consisted of a narrow group of prominent citizens invited by the Minister; and a Review Panel to assist the Minister and the Cabinet (OMCER, 2011a, 2011b). Opposition parties, however, criticised the Minister for announcing the earthquake recovery legislation with “very short notice” (Cosgrove, quoted in NZP 2011b, p17902) and attempting to downsize the relevance of the Local Government and Environment Commission (LGEC) in the law-making process (ibid.).

Deputy State Commissioner John Ombler was appointed as interim Chief Executive for CERA to set the Output Plan for the first year of operations (CERA, 2011b). On April 30th, 2011, the state of national emergency ceased (Carter, 2011b) and CERA took over the recovery process on behalf of the MCER. In particular, CERA led the recovery strategy, policy and planning, while the CCC continued to handle with most of the Council related matters and the coordination of the Central City Plan (CERA, 2011f, 2011g). During this early stage, moreover, the interim Chief Executive established the basis for the recruitment of the staff and the schedule of community forums and of ministerial reports. The demolitions unit led by former Timaru Chief Executive, Warwick Isaacs, set and implemented the agenda for the demolition of the first 250 buildings in Christchurch, including major hotels like the Hotel Grand Chancellor (Heather, 2011a). On May 14th, 2011, Minister Brownlee announced the
appointment of Roger Sutton as the Chief Executive for CERA (Mace, 2011). The appointment of Roger Sutton, Chief Executive of Council-owned power company Orion Limited, had been rumoured since March 2011 (Miles, 2016) and it presumably was the “result of considerable local lobbying” (ibid., p91).

The establishment of the CCDU as a dedicated unit within CERA represented the key governance episode with respect to the CBD rebuild. The shift from the original provisions, which foresaw the CCC carrying out the drafting of the central city recovery plan, was decided during a Cabinet meeting in early April 2012 (DPMC, 2012a). A period of 100 days was given to the CCDU, the appointed Blueprint Team and staff seconded from the CCC to deliver a new CBD draft plan for Christchurch that included at least 12 potential anchor projects (DPMC, 2012c). All the people involved were restricted from releasing any information to the public during the period. Following the release of the CCRP, CERA used its special powers to purchase the land for the anchor projects, with the CCDU negotiating behind closed doors with the Chief Executive of the CCC the conditions of the CSA and the schedule for the delivery of the anchor projects. Finally, CERA and the CCDU led the investments attraction programme to promote the rebuild of the Christchurch CBD and the anchor projects to potential international investors.

The post-earthquake governance of Christchurch was characterized by unprecedented market deregulation that accommodated the interests of the insurance industry. Notwithstanding the extensive insurance coverage from both the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes (Platt, 2012; Swiss RE, 2012), “insurance companies in the Christchurch market have been rated the world’s slowest to respond to a major disaster” (Miles, 2016, p61). The absence of barriers to the insurance market in New Zealand led to a steady increase in new premiums, including those for civic infrastructure, commercial properties and tourism businesses (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012; Stock, 2013; Wallace & Simmons, 2012). The concerns over insurance agreements have been a key issue in the recovery and rebuilding of the Christchurch CBD, as they triggered the demolition of heritage buildings (Amore, 2016a; Platt, 2012).

Private insurance companies struggled as result of the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. Lloyd’s lost nearly NZ$ 687 million as result of the September 2010 earthquake (McDonald, 2011),
while the Government bailed out Christchurch-based AMI Insurance to help the company cover the claims from the February 2011 earthquake (van der Bergh, 2011). Conversely, Queenstown-based Western Pacific Insurance did not manage to meet the liabilities of its clients, with severe consequences for property owners in the Litchfield Street area (Gorrie, 2013; Grant Thornton, 2014; Miles, 2016). London-based Ansvar established a dedicated unit – ACS Limited New Zealand – to handle approximately NZD$ 800 million worth of insurance claims for commercial properties and prominent heritage buildings (KPMG, 2012; Stewart, 2012). The uncertainty of insurance coverage and liability also affected the CCC’s insurance company, Civic Assurance. A report from October 2011 reported that CCC assets worth nearly NZD$ 2 billion had “been significantly uninsured, leaving the city’s taxpayers having to foot the losses” (Miles, 2016, pp28-29). Since then, the CCC has been in negotiations with Civic Assurance and the reinsurers to handle the claims, with increasing tensions between the councillors and the CCC’s Chief Executive, Tony Marryatt (Cairns, 2013).

The earthquake legislation, the interventions of the national government and the deregulation of the insurance market have been shaping the recovery of Christchurch and of its CBD since the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. According to Miles (2016), the changes in the governance have channelled recovery into a path where some property owners get the best deal from the earthquakes, while others are tactically bullied by the Government. This became particularly evident with the compulsory land purchase carried out by CERA in the areas identified for the anchor projects. As one property owner publicly stated: “They are nationalising private property [and] buying up all this land and they will flog it off to the big corporates and make a huge killing on it” (quoted in McDonald & Sachdeva, 2012, pA1). Similarly, the attitude of private insurers and the strengthening of the building code in the aftermath of the earthquakes, led the private owners of the most damaged buildings to simply accept the pay-out offered by CERA, at conditions well below their original market value. Ultimately, the post-earthquake governance proved to be the result of an interventionist government whose neoliberal ideology has led to what Sarah Miles called the *Christchurch Fiasco* (Miles, 2016).
4.4 Urban regeneration in Christchurch and its CBD

4.4.1 Before the earthquakes

The regeneration strategies and plans adopted by the CCC prior to the earthquakes can be linked to the reform of public authorities that culminated with the promulgation of the LGA 2002. The Act empowered the CCC with the authority in land-use planning, including the identification of standards, building consents and zoning through the CCC City Plan. Moreover, the Act set the basis for greater community participation in the plans drafted by local authorities. As a result, the CCRS 2006-2016 sought to deliver the new projects for the CBD in accordance with the principles outlined in the CCC’s City Plan with respect to retail areas, residential facilities, heritage retention and the creation of public spaces (CCC, 1999b, 2006b).

Prior to the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, there were several regeneration projects underway in the city of Christchurch. The CCC was investing resources and developing policies to expand the process of regeneration in the CBD and embarked on a range of initiatives to promote the city as a place where to live work and visit. The role of the CCC as a proactive investor was particularly evident following the election of Bob Parker as Mayor in October 2007. During his first term, the CCC endorsed several projects, some of which eventually generated public murmuring. Christchurch was on the edge of an accelerated and more integrated regeneration path compared to the previous years. However, as this section illustrates, almost all the projects were gradually side-lined to give way to a new city for architects and planners to design out of a blank canvas (Roughan, 2011).

Since the early 2000s, the CBD of Christchurch became the heart of a more organic regeneration strategy following years of mixed result from a series of anchor projects in the previous decade. The steady decline of residents and business activities in the CBD brought councillors and staff of the CCC to embark on a 25-year regeneration strategy “to balance growth in suburban centres with improvements in the Central City” (CCC, 2001, p9). In the short-term, the CCC sought to support the revitalization of the CBD by designating areas for mixed developments, heritage retention, public art and greening projects (CCC, 2001). In 2006, in concurrence with the Long-Term Council Community Plan 2006-2016 (LTCCP 2006-
2016), the CCC launched the second phase of the regeneration strategy (CCC, 2006b, 2006d, 2006e), which provided “the underlying rationale for revitalisation projects and set priorities throughout the organisation for future Council funding and implementation decisions” (CCC, 2006b, pIII). The Central City South Plan (CCC, 2006c) and the Central City Lanes Plan (CCC, 2007b) were the direct emanations of this second stage of urban regeneration strategy.

With respect to tourism, the desired outcomes of the short-term revitalization strategy for the CBD were essentially oriented at the promotion of tourism business opportunities, particularly in relation to heritage and culture (CCC, 2001). Conversely, the second phase of the regeneration strategy acknowledged the need to increase the provision of amenities, accommodation and after-hours entertainment in order to make of the Christchurch CBD a “strong magnet providing a unique and memorable experience” (CCC, 2006b, p15). These recommendations were eventually translated into a set of actions over a period of 10 years to improve retail development, attract new visitor accommodation, promote heritage retention and further support culture and the arts in the city centre (CCC, 2006b).

In 2007, the launch of the Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy Plan aimed at making Greater Christchurch a thriving and attractive hub for innovative businesses and people by integrating tourism and the visitor economy into the strategic planning of the metropolitan area (CCC et al., 2007, 2010). With respect to the CBD, the Plan envisioned a range of issues, including the poor quality of public spaces, the fragmented land ownership and the need for the local Council to be a promoter and investor in the city centre (CCC et al., 2007, 2010). Two key strategies with respect to tourism and urban regeneration launched in this period were the ES 2007-2017 and the VS 2007-2017, which sought to promote the city of Christchurch as a thriving event and tourist destination for both domestic and overseas visitors (CCC, 2007c, 2007d).

Following the election of Bob Parker as Mayor of Christchurch in late 2007, the CCC resolved to amend the LTCCP 2006-2016 to include a dedicated revitalization budget for the CBD (NZD$ 27.2 million) and increase the strategic land purchase budget from NZD$ 20.5 million to NZD$ 134 million (CCC, 2009a, 2009b; OAG, 2009). The resulting Long-Term Council Community Plan 2009-2019 (LTCCP 2009-2019) considered the revitalization of the CBD a key goal to be
achieved by “encouraging more people to live within the four avenues, renovating [...] public areas, protecting heritage and promoting business” (CCC, 2009b, p23).

The CCC embarked a redevelopment programme worth NZD$ 14 million in conjunction with the City Mall upgrade, which included a 1.6 km expansion of the tramway along Cashel Street and High Street at the cost of NZD$ 11.5 million (CCC, 2006b, 2009a; Conway, 2009). Moreover, the CCC funded the NZD$ 133 million refurbishment project of the former New Zealand Post building as the new Civic Office in partnership with Ngai Tahu Property (Devitt & Gates, 2013). Focusing on the South City Plan, instead, the Council invited a New Zealand-based firm to develop the design of the Masterplan over an area of 30 hectares (Jasmax, 2016) and approved the purchase of privately-owned buildings in the area for a total of NZD$ 17 million (CCC, 2008c). The latter, however, turned out to be a controversial decision. Whilst the Mayor and Chief Executive argued that the Council paid the “fair price for the properties to secure this land for the benefit of the city and its future generations” (quoted in CCC, 2008c, n.p.), opposition councillors and the public opinion at large harshly criticized the purchase of the sites (Killick, 2012; Lee & Pryor, 2013). The list of projects provided here is not exhaustive. For the purposes of this research, the proposed project for the National Conservatorium of Music (NCoM) at the Arts Centre is addressed in the dedicated case study chapter.

4.4.2 After the earthquakes

September 2010 – February 2011: Early ideas for post-earthquake Christchurch

Following the first earthquake of September 2010, the regeneration of the Christchurch CBD was put at the heart of the recovery agenda. On the eve of the mayoral elections, the Mayor announced the appointment of Wellington-based Ian Athfield to lead the planning unit of the CCC. The Mayor argued that Athfield was “a manna from heaven” (Conway & Greenhill, pA1, 2010) and that his support to the Council staff would enable to foster the debate around the city’s future urban design (ibid.). However, local MP Jim Anderton argued that the appointment had very little to do with the post-earthquake emergency in Christchurch (Conway & Greenhill, 2010). A second important change under Mayor Bob Parker was the
establishment of the Central City Regeneration Committee (CCC, 2010c). During its short lifespan, the Committee reported to Council on the situation of the CBD following the earthquakes of September and December 2010 and recommended the introduction of urban design controls in the CBD to make good-quality design effective, particularly for private-led projects (CCC, 2011c).

Local architects and Ian Athfield joined forces to organize an exhibition to provide a new vision for the regeneration of Christchurch (Sheppard, 2014; Shiels, 2010). The event would be structured in forums and workshops “to seek ideas from the community as to what sort of city it would like Christchurch to be in the future” (Sheppard, 2014, p61). The exhibition was expected to run from February 12th until March 20th, 2011 to allow the community to take part to the exhibition and leave their written feedback. However, the earthquake of February 22nd, 2011 and the lifting of the cordon in the CBD led to the suspension of the event.

During the first months following the September 2010 earthquake, the input from the national Government on the regeneration projects taking place in the CBD was minimal. There were, however, instances among stakeholders to act fast on the redefinition of the City Plan. Among them, central city department store owner, Richard Ballantyne, was in favour of a smaller and more compact CBD and for the re-definition the rules for both the residential and commercial spaces (Steeman, 2010a). Concerns raised around the unbalanced retail growth between the central city and the suburban areas, which resulted in the decline of retail activity in the city centre over the years (Steeman, 2010a). Athfield himself argued that planning regulations were frustratingly hard to change and exhorted for the redefinition of the City Plan (McDonald, 2010).

February 2011 – February 2012: Developing plans and strategies for the recovery of the CBD

The CERA 2011 promulgated after the February 2011 earthquake foresaw the CERA Chief Executive to develop the GCRS, which represented the “overarching, long-term strategy for the reconstruction, rebuilding and recovery of Greater Christchurch” (Section 11 (3)) and included provisions to address the rebuild of infrastructure and facilities (ibid.). Moreover,
the Act identified the CCC as the authority responsible for the development of the CBD recovery plan in consultation with the affected communities (Section 17 (1)) in accordance with the LGA 2002 and urged the Council to submit the final draft to the Minister by the end of 2011.

The GCRS was the result of different inputs from international consulting companies (Wright, Greenhill & Sachdeva, 2012), national and local agencies, the business sector and community groups “to identify priorities, prepare plans and set directions for recovery activities” (CERA, 2011c, p1). Focusing on the CBD Recovery Plan, members of the CCC’s Strategy and Planning Team reprised the idea of organizing a round of workshops and receive direct feedback from the community on the rebuild the central city. The initiative culminated in mid-May 2011 with the Share an Idea initiative, where local and international planners discussed the challenges and the opportunities of rebuilding to an audience of 10,000 people (Bennett, Dann, Johnson & Reynolds, 2014). The initiative eventually led to the first draft of the central city recovery plan (CCC, 2011g). The Strategy and Planning Team submitted the plan for public consultation and stakeholder input on August 16th, 2011. The ultimate rationale behind the plan and the amended regulations for the CBD was “to create an environment which people will want to visit and shop in” (CCC, 2011h, p10). However, the plan did not provide explicit mention of the sites chosen for the above-mentioned projects and initiatives.

Between September and October 2011, the CCC gathered the feedback on the first CBD recovery plan and arranged a calendar of public hearings (CCC, 2011i). Those relevant for the regeneration strategy and related tourism development in the CBD included a joint submission by Tourism Industry Association New Zealand (TIANZ) and C&CT, CERA and the local of the New Zealand Institute of Architects (NZIA). All parties raised concerns on the existing regulatory framework and on the proposed changes to the Christchurch City Plan. CERA, TIANZ and the C&CT advocated for fast-track, market-led recovery of the CBD by repealing and replacing buildings regulations to expedite recovery (C&CT & TIANZ, 2011; CERA, 2011e). Conversely, the NZIA argued that projects needed “considerable study, modelling and design development” (NZIA, 2011b, p3). The CCC developed a revised Central City Plan based on the stakeholders’ feedback and forwarded the final draft to the MCER on December 15th, 2011 (CCC, 2011d, 2011l; Miles, 2016). In the final draft, the CCC envisioned
the opportunity “to create a distinctive identity for the Central City” (CCC, 2011d, p62) through the creation of low-rise urban precincts and “to organise and diversify the future development” (ibid. p81). Ultimately, the plan put a greater emphasis on the clustering of similar activities into precincts to provide “developers and investors with certainty in terms of land use” (CCC, 2011d, p81).

In hindsight, the feedback on CERA’s draft of the GCRS in late 2011 embodied features and issues of the post-earthquake governance of Christchurch that later characterized the redevelopment of urban tourist spaces in the CBD area (CERA, 2011d). In particular, the CCC advocated for community input on any forthcoming amendment of the Council’s budget for the rebuild and raised concerns on the limited emphasis on the CBD recovery in the GCRS’s vision (CCC, 2011f). Conversely, the NZIA and Ngāi Tahu welcomed the vision of the draft strategy and expressed interest in collaborating with CERA officials by offering their inputs and resources in the rebuild of Christchurch and its CBD (Ngāi Tahu, 2011; NZIA, 2011a).

February 2012 – July 2012: Anchor projects vs organic growth

The period between February and July 2012 brought to a shift in the recovery governance in Christchurch and in the regeneration agenda for the CBD. In the midst of the governance failures in the CCC, the national Government appointed former Nelson Mayor, Kerry Marshall, as special observer over a period of six months (Carter, 2012; Smith, 2012) to “help address any governance issues and work to rebuild the public confidence in the Council” (Smith, 2012, n.p.). During this period, complaints began to surface over the final CBD draft submitted by the CCC in December 2011. In particular, property owners expressed their concerns over the overly complicated set of rules and conditions for redevelopment presented by the Strategy and Planning Team. In their view, the scheme for a low-rise, green city made reinvestments challenging (McDonald, 2012a, 2012b; Miles, 2016). Moreover, because of the December 2011 earthquake, there were vivid uncertainties as to when rebuild would have begun. The Chief Executive of the Canterbury Employers Chamber of Commerce (CECC), Peter Townsend, called for a more flexible plan for the CBD to be integrated with the forthcoming GCRS (Steeman, 2012). Ultimately, Minister Brownlee and the Cabinet acknowledged that there
were flaws on the Central City draft and “agreed to mandate CERA as the delivery entity to lead the recovery of Christchurch’s CBD” (DPMC, 2012a, p3).

On April 18th, 2012, Minister Brownlee officially announced the establishment of the CCDU as the dedicated authority with the task of articulating a blueprint for the CBD and assisting investors in order to expedite the recovery and redevelopment of the Christchurch city centre (Brownlee, 2012b; DPMC, 2012a, 2012c). In presenting the new unit, Minister Brownlee emphasized the relevance of international best practices in the Government’s decision to take responsibility for the CBD recovery through CERA officials (Brownlee, 2012b). The CCDU and the MCER recommended applicants to deliver a blueprint that included a range of key anchor projects and their location within the CBD (CCDU, 2012b, 2012c). Eventually, the CCDU opted for the proposal submitted by a consortium of 13 local architects led by Don Miskell (CCDU, 2012c; Wright et al., 2012). The consortia, known as the Blueprint Team, worked with the CCDU senior staff and three CCC staff members over the new Christchurch Central Recovery Plan.

Unlike with the flexible and enabling approach adopted by the CCC planners, the CCDU opted for a strict masterplan that located areas for the development of the anchor projects and the facilities and amenities to be built within. Moreover, the CCDU and CERA tied the drafting of the CBD recovery plan to the GCRS, with the latter acting as the ultimate framework for the economic, social and cultural recovery of Christchurch. In the view of the recovery authorities, the plans and programmes under the GCRS and the integration with the rebuild plan for the CBD would expedite the rebuild of the city and “provide opportunities for local businesses and economic activities to relocate, maintain services and grow” (CERA, 2012a, p12).

The CCRP provided the redevelopment framework and the conditions for the investments to make the Christchurch CBD “the thriving heart of an international city” (CCDU, 2012d, p27). The CCRP consisted of a spatial Blueprint Plan (CCDU, 2012b) illustrating the location of 15 different anchor projects within a compact CBD surrounded by a land frame and the Avon River (Figure 4.3). Some of the themes originally identified in the CCC draft plans for the central city were renewed in the CCRP, with the addition of projects and precincts like a new multi-purpose Stadium, the expansion of the Cricket Oval at Hagley Park, a cultural centre to celebrate Maori identity, the Innovation Precinct on the south-east edge of the CBD and the
Performing Arts Precinct (CCDU, 2012d). The CCRP, moreover, identified the likely partnerships among public, private and philanthropic stakeholders for each of the anchor projects and provided an indicative project delivery schedule (CCDU, 2012d). Complementary to the Blueprint Plan and the identification of the anchor projects, the CCRP “directed the inclusion and removal of specific objectives, policies, rules and other methods in the Christchurch City Council’s District Plan” (CCDU, 2012a, p1). Among the new rules, the CCRP listed a revised set of policies on the role of the CBD, the list of the permitted activities in the city centre and detailed regulations for business zones, mixed-use areas and the precincts identified in the Blueprint Plan (CCDU, 2012a).

In less than four months, the national authorities overthrew the indications and the strategies developed by the CCC to reshape the CBD of Christchurch and redrafted the CBD plan by
referring to alleged international best practices in urban design (DPMC, 2012a). In the Government’s view, anchor projects were the best solution “to streamline the consent process [and] attract private investment into the city” (Steeman & Sachdeva, 2012, pA1). These projects would have provided “important guidance to the market” (Brownlee, 2012a, n.p.), including tourism and hospitality. Most of the cleared sites were designated for the anchor projects foreseen by the CCRP. The delivery of the CBD recovery plan was far from being straightforward. The decision-making process took almost two years to identify which facilities had to be developed in the CBD, where they would be built, the likely partners to involve and the estimated public expenditures. The decision-making for the redevelopment of the CBD took place in a context in which ‘normal’ political relationships and procedures changed, and institutional arrangements were altered.

August 2012 – June 2013: Sorting the land and the costs of the recovery

Following the release of the CCRP, CERA and the CCDU announced the strategy for the acquisition of the land and the implementation of the anchor projects (DPMC, 2012b). Around 840 properties in the CBD, including a quarter of the existing heritage buildings, were affected by the land designation and amalgamation foreseen for the anchor projects (Cairns, 2012a; Sachdeva, 2012b). The other areas of the Christchurch CBD would be under the planning authority of the CCC (CCDU, 2012d), which would also “be involved in transitional projects and events that attract people back to the central city” (CCDU, 2012d, p100).

The new regulations foreseen in the CCRP’s amended City Plan gave to the MCER the authority to designate the land for the identified anchor projects and keep the designation for a period up to ten years (CCDU, 2012a, 2012e). In practical terms, landowners and property developers had to submit project proposals in line with the strategy outlined for the anchor projects to have the ultimate consent from the Minister (CCDU, 2012f). On the other hand, buildings that had been repaired on designated sites before the official designation were likely to be demolished. This was the emblematic case of the Westende House on Manchester Street, which was eventually razed following months of intensive debates between the CCDU staff and the owner of the property, Shawn Stockman (Barton, 2012;
Stylianou, 2013b, 2015). Once the sites were acquired, the Crown could amalgamate and re-distribute land allotments, as the *RMA 1991* regulations did not apply to the sites identified in the CCRP (CCDU, 2012d, 2012e).

The mechanism set in place for the purchase of land advantaged the Crown and the recovery authorities and left legitimate owners with almost no alternatives. Even in the negotiated acquisition of land for the anchor projects, the MCER had the power to compulsory acquire the land and thus avoid delays in the negotiation process (CCDU, 2012e, 2013e). Owners were thus forced to settle for less rather than having their land stripped away. This was the case, for example, of Richard Peebles, who sold 11 sites worth nearly NZD$ 12 million for less than NZD$ 7.5 million between 2012 and 2013 (Greenhill, 2013c). High-ranked lawyers and judges acknowledged that the Crown’s offers were coercive and unfair (Stylianou, 2013c) and exhorted landowners to appeal to the High Court and the Court of Appeal. However, only one landowner has brought CERA and the Crown to Court since July 2012 (NZHC, 2015).

Towards the end of 2012, national and local governments began discussing the costs of the anchor projects. The commitment of CCC funds on the CCRP was unclear, as the Council still had to define the insurance claims for the facilities affected by the earthquakes and decide over the retention of the Town Hall (see Chapter 6) among other things. Not surprisingly, the CCC’s financial strategy for 2012-2013 Annual Plan did not include a detailed breakdown of the anchor projects introduced in the CCRP. The estimated the costs for the recovery were around NZD$ 982 million compared to the NZD$ 412 million figure foreseen in 2011 (CCC, 2012a). The new estimate was confirmed during the presentation of the CCRP by Minister Brownlee to the CCC a few days before the end of July 2012. The anchor projects included in the CCRP had severe repercussions to taxpayers and the Council’s long-term debt settlement plan (McCrone, 2013). While the Government argued that the CCC could manage to pay for its share of the costs by selling part of its assets (McCrone, 2013), Councillor Yani Johanson, submitted an inquiry to CERA to have a detailed breakdown of the costs for the anchor projects right after the release of the CCRP (Sachdeva & Wright, 2012). However, CERA did not release any information on the matter, despite the report forwarded to the Cabinet for approval having estimated breakdowns for land value and costs for each project (CERA, 2012b; Sachdeva & Wright, 2012).
The CCC acknowledged the need to make substantial amendments to both the 2012-2013 Annual Plan and the existing LTCCP 2009-2019 to make them consistent with the expected share of the costs for the infrastructure and the anchor projects outlined in the CCRP. A solution was proposed following a Cabinet meeting in January 2013, with a proposal to suspend the LGA 2002 and allow the CCC to develop an extraordinary long-term plan (McCrone, 2013). On February 11th, 2013, the CCC held an extraordinary meeting with the Minister and CERA to discuss the possibility “to allow an earthquake recovery cost-sharing method to be mutually agreed” (Brownlee, 2013a, n.p.). The Council resolved to develop the Three-Year Plan 2013-2016 (TYP 2013-2016) to submit to public consultation (CCC, 2013d, 2013f), with the Council and the Crown working together to draft the CSA for the anchor projects and the horizontal infrastructure by the end of April 2013 (CCC, 2013f).

The negotiations between the Crown and the CCC on February 11th, 2013 were held behind closed doors, with only two councillors opposing the motion to exclude the public (Cairns, 2013). Since the CCC’s resolution, the negotiations over the costs of the anchor projects were discussed between a small number of CCC and CCDU’s bureaucrats, with no feedback to the elected members of the Council. Negotiations lasted for months and eventually passed the April 2013 deadline. The draft of the TYP 2013-2016 submitted for public consultation between March and April 2013 estimated that the CCC contribution to the CBD recovery would be around NZD$ 767 million (CCC, 2013k). The figure was eventually confirmed in late June 2013 with the official release of the CSA (CERA, 2013b, 2013e) which, for the first time since July 2012, illustrated the breakdown of the costs for each of the anchor projects foreseen in the CCRP.

Table 4.3 reports the costs for the public sector as well as the share of the private sector investments for the aforementioned anchor projects. Ultimately, the national Government used its special powers to create a clause in the existing legislation to include expensive anchor projects in the CCC budget. The feedback from the community on the draft TYP 2013-2016 was tokenistic as negotiations between national and local representatives occurred behind closed doors.
Table 4.3: Estimated costs of anchor projects included in the CCRP as at late 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchor Project</th>
<th>Leading authority</th>
<th>Prospected cost NZD$ 000</th>
<th>Public share of costs NZD$ 000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avon River Precinct</td>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>106,000</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus Interchange</td>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>90,500</td>
<td>90,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Library</td>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>89,300</td>
<td>79,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention Centre Precinct</td>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>568,000</td>
<td>284,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cricket Oval</td>
<td>Canterbury Cricket</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake Memorial</td>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation Precinct</td>
<td>MBIE</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Sports Precinct</td>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>217,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing Arts Precinct</td>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>178,000</td>
<td>166,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Precinct</td>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stadium</td>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>506,000</td>
<td>290,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Puna Ahurea</td>
<td>Ngāi Tahu</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Cairns (2012c), Fulcher (2014), Greenhill (2013e), McDonald (2016a), NZP (2013a) and Strang (2015).

July 2013 – September 2014: early implementation of anchor projects

A few days after the announcement of the CSA and the release of the TYP 2013-2016, CERA announced the end of the cordon on the remaining areas of the CBD (Backhouse, 2013; CCC, 2013a; CERA, 2013c). A key decision occurred at the end of June 2013, when the Government announced that the CCC would be divested of its building consent authority to avoid further delays in the rebuild of Christchurch (Cairns & Young, 2013). The unprecedented takeover by the Government was based on the notice by International Accreditation New Zealand (IANZ) who warned the CCC that the accreditation was being revoked “to give positive assurance to building owners of full compliance with Building Act and Building Code requirements” (IANZ, 2013, p6).

Some of the anchor projects were given priority, including the Frame, the Bus Exchange hub, the Convention Precinct and the Metro Sports Centre. The CCDU staff took responsibility for
the design and development of business cases for the Stadium, the Convention Precinct, the Frame, the Metro Sports Facility, and the Te Papa Ōtākaro/Avon River Precinct (CCDU, 2013b, 2013d). The CCC would lead the project portfolios for the Hagley Cricket Oval, the Central Library and the Performing Arts Precinct (CERA, 2013e). Both the CCDU and the CCC hired project managers to fully deliver the projects by no later than 2017. Crucial in this phase was the marketing of Christchurch as a place to attract foreign investment. CERA and CCDU staff joined forces with the CCC and other key agencies to promote the rebuild of the CBD as a great opportunity for international private investors (CCDU, 2013f, 2013h).

Notwithstanding assurances from the CCDU Director, Warwick Isaacs, “uncertainty over the actual detail of the public sector anchor projects” (McCrone, 2014b, p104) persuaded most of the private sector to invest in other areas of the Christchurch CBD (Barton, 2011), while the few developers involved in the central city rebuild struggled in starting their constructions due to the lack of office space demand (McCrone, 2014c). Eventually, the CCDU began to slowly lift the designation in some of the sites identified for some of the anchor projects and give the titles back to the original landowners (Stylianou, 2014). Local developers raised concerns over the recovery management at CCDU and publicly exhorted Minister Brownlee to appoint property professionals with international experience to replace Warwick Isaacs (McCrone, 2014a). In early September 2014, rumours began to circulate over the demise of CERA’s Chief Executive, Roger Sutton, as part of the proposed restructuring of CERA as an agency under the DPMC (Fulton, 2014).

At Council level, the election of Lianne Dalziel as Mayor in October 2013 led to a centre-left coalition of councillors that sought to mark a divide from the mayoralty of Bob Parker. As former Member of the Parliament for East Christchurch, Dalziel had been one of the fiercest opponents to the takeover approach of Minister Brownlee and the Government in directing the recovery of Christchurch and of its CBD (e.g. Dalziel, 2011). During the first months of her term, Dalziel exhorted the Government to consider eventual re-negotiations over the CCRP and allow for greater community input (Harvie, 2014). Moreover, the new Mayor publicly criticized Parker for signing the CSA and Minister Brownlee for his lack of collaboration with the newly elected Council (Conway, 2014). In terms of decision-making, the new Council decided to hire an external advisor to have a clearer and impartial report on the CCC financial
strategy included in the TYP 2013-2016 (Korda Mentha, 2014). The final report released in April 2014 highlighted how the TYP 2013-2016 was mostly developed upon estimates that were no longer reliable and concluded that the rebuild of Christchurch would cost the CCC more than what was originally expected (Korda Mentha, 2014). The need to procure funds for the rebuild brought the Council to consider options for a radical internal reorganization and develop an amended financial strategy that would increase the local property tax and/or allow for the partial sale of Council key assets (Greenhill, 2013a; McCrone & Kozanic, 2014).

With respect to tourism, a new strategy was drafted in this period to foster the recovery of the sector in Christchurch (CDC, 2014). Notwithstanding the marketing efforts of the C&CT and signs of early recovery in the sector, the visitor economy figures for 2013 showed that the recovery of the city as a destination legged behind the worst scenario forecasted in the Visitor Sector Recovery Plan (VSRP). In mid-2014, the CDC, the C&CT, Vbase and the Event Management unit of the CCC joined forces to develop the Christchurch Visitor Strategy Background Paper, which highlighted the current flaws in the provision of leisure and nightlife amenities in the city compared to competing destinations in New Zealand and Australia (CDC, 2014). The report acknowledged the need to address potential issues with the rebuild, including the difficulty of tracking visitor patterns adjustments and the perceived lack of progress in the delivery of the anchor projects in the CBD (CDC, 2014). Ultimately, the report stressed the importance of anchor projects in the re-positioning of Christchurch as a tourist destination, along with the provision of new accommodation facilities in the city.

4.5 Summary

This chapter provided a longitudinal overview of the Christchurch CBD context before and after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 from regeneration and tourism perspectives. Christchurch’s chronic environmental vulnerabilities surfaced in the unprecedented seismic activity that hit the city for more than a year starting from the first 7.1 M earthquake of September 4th, 2010. As result, the spatial planning and governance setting of Christchurch radically changed in a brief yet intense period of time, with a strong centralization of planning efforts run by CERA, the CCDU and the MCER which side-lined the regeneration strategy
pursued by the CCC over a period of 15 years. The redevelopment of Christchurch and of its major tourist attractions took place in a period of increasing uncertainty and overlapping crises that decisively influenced the circulation of capital and the global-local nexuses between the public sector and private investors. In such a climate, the governance for area project developments has become highly critical. As the chapter illustrated, the participation in the CCC draft plan for the CBD had no precedents in New Zealand. Whilst stakeholders called for a stronger relationship and ties between the function of the private and public sectors, the development and implementation of the CCRP fell short in achieving that collaborative climate long advocated by stakeholders since the establishment of CERA in April 2011. As result, the city and its tourist spaces are still far from reaching the desired stage of resolution foreseen by CERA and the national authorities.

The earthquake further exacerbated the divide between the vision of the community and that of politicians and private developers. Similar to what Gotham and Greenberg (2014) suggest in the American context, the Christchurch CBD has been experiencing spatialized political conflicts over the redefinition of urban places in a process of uneven recovery that has advantaged a narrow group of stakeholders and political interests. The following chapters provide an analysis of these processes with findings from two dedicated projects of urban recovery taking place in the CBD. The two recovery projects in question are the Arts Centre (illustrated in Chapter 5), and the proposed project for the Town Hall and wider Performing Arts Precinct (discussed in Chapter 6).
Chapter 5
“Don’t you realize that there were some mighty trees already there?" The recovery of Arts Centre of Christchurch

I think it’s probably fair to say that the policies for heritage and the assessment criteria in the city plan were not as clear as they might have been but as the cases around the Conservatorium, they were effective in terms of protecting our most important heritage buildings from either unsympathetic alteration or degradation from the reaction of unsympathetic and out of scale buildings adjacent to them (Kevin).

Some of the recovery works are not purely conservationist, particularly the works done at the Boys High building next to the Gymnasium. Some of the reparation works are exquisitely based on financial possibilities and economic standards, the only concern being that of not spending too much (Penny).

5.1 Introduction

The above interview extracts illustrate two standpoints around the issues of heritage retention and site development at the Arts Centre. The first extract refers to the controversial project for the NCoM proposed by the ACC in partnership with the CCC and the University of Canterbury in 2009. In that case, the resource consent application for the project was rejected because of national and local regulations supporting the protection of historically relevant sites from intrusive development (CCC, 2010j). The second extract is from an informal meeting with a local heritage advocate that raised concerns over the earthquake recovery strategy for the Arts Centre. It is argued here that the current recovery project of the Arts Centre is rooted in a property-oriented strategy that put financial sustainability and commercial appeal to upmarket leisure businesses ahead of sound heritage site retention. As the Director of the ACC, Andre Lovatt, explained in October 2014, the Trust is “trying to save money all the time”

1 Response of one of the former tenants of the Arts Centre on the Arts Centre Vision presented by the ACC on August 2013.
(quoted in Gates, 2014a, pA9). The quest for financial stability is further reiterated in the ACCTB introduced to the Parliament for the first reading on June 2014 (NZP, 2014c, 2014d), which underpins the prevailing pro-market recovery agenda in post-earthquake Christchurch.

Between May 2010 and the earthquake of February 22nd, 2011, the ACC had managed to obtain the resource consent for the subdivision of the site into six allotments, designated two parcels of land for potential development (CCC, 2010i) and raised the insurance coverage with Ansvar from NZD$ 95 million to NZD$ 120 million for 21 of the 23 buildings of the site (ACC, 2011a). The latter brought to the ACC a degree of financial sustainability which has been sought since its establishment in 1979. Site-wise, the Arts Centre represented the exception to the systematic demolition of heritage buildings in Christchurch’s CBD (Amore, 2016a), but it should be acknowledged that some of the intrusive retention techniques used for the Arts Centre building could only be possible as result of the Orders in Council and the earthquake recovery legislation, which suspended the existing provisions for historic properties.

This chapter consists of five sections. Section 5.2 introduces the Arts Centre site and its development before and after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, with a focus on the period between 2007 and 2014. Section 5.3 illustrates the governance modes and the evolution of coalitions among stakeholders during key phases between 2007 and 2014, while Section 5.4 narrows the analysis on the episodes of decision-making, non-decision-making and regularization during the same period. Section 5.5, examines the hegemonic dimension of heritage-led regeneration and tourism-related development and how it evolved before and after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. Section 5.6, provides a summary of the chapter.

### 5.2 Chronology of the events

The site home to the Arts Centre is one of the oldest and most iconic places in Christchurch. At the end of the 1860s, the pioneering settlers of Christchurch acknowledged the need for a tertiary education alternative to the University of Otago. In 1873, Professor John Macmillan Brown and other colleagues from the United Kingdom founded the first chairs of the Canterbury College, which would later become the University of Canterbury. The historic
university site was built between 1877 and 1916, with most of the neo-gothic styled buildings being designed by Benjamin Mountfort, John James Collins and Richard Harman (Ansley 2011; Strange, 1994). Two further units were built between 1916 and 1929 to accommodate the administration staff (Registry building) and student representatives (Student Union building) (ACC, 2013k, 2013m). A final upgrade was completed in 1965 with the extension of the Registry on Montreal Street (Strange, 1994). Figure 5.1 illustrates the site of the Arts Centre as identified in the ultimate version of the Christchurch City Plan (CCC, 2015).

Between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, the site faced a period of uncertainty following the relocation of the University of Canterbury to the new campus in Ilam (Strange, 1994). In 1973, the New Zealand Government announced that “the buildings would be given to the people of Christchurch as an arts centre” (Strange, 1994, p101) and that “the use the buildings [would] draw from the threads of all the cultures in New Zealand and attempt to produce something uniquely New Zealand in character” (ibid.). The release of the feasibility study plan in 1974 saw the participation and the unanimous support of local politicians and community leaders. As Canterbury-based planner Malcolm Douglass lately reported, the initiative “was a rare example of those in the lead being supported by a huge groundswell of public feeling” (quoted in Strange, 1994, p103).

Since its establishment in 1979, the Arts Centre site has experienced a steady increase of tenants and users. Performing arts organizations were the first to relocate to the vacant premises of the complex (Free Theatre of Christchurch, 2014; Strange, 1994). The presence of cultural attractions and events within the complex fuelled the establishment of cafes and restaurants throughout the early 1980s, with the opening of Dux de Lux in the old Student Union building (Dux de Lux, 2014). Recreation and retail activities boosted during the following years. By 2003, the Arts Centre was home to 180 businesses in the site (ACC, 2003), with fashion company Untouched World moving to the site in 2004 (Clark, 2004). Site-specific attractions and tours have been hosted at the Arts Centre since the end of the 1990s.
Figure 5.1: Map of the Arts Centre

Source CCC (2015)
5.2.1  2007-2010: The Arts Centre before the earthquakes

Before the earthquakes, the Arts Centre was experiencing increasing vulnerabilities with regards to the management of the site. The ACC had undertaken preliminary earthquake and retention works throughout the 1980s (Crean, 2008; Strange, 1994), but it soon became clear that further works were needed to make the Arts Centre less prone to medium and high earthquakes (ACC, 2003). The first long-term programme for the strengthening of the buildings was announced at the end of 2007 and foresaw a systematic restoration project of NZD$ 25 million over a period of 15 years to strengthen and retain buildings in perpetuity (ACC, 2011a; Crean, 2007).

Another vulnerability of the Arts Centre concerned the attraction of high-end tenants. The real estate market never expressed interest in the Arts Centre as originally expected by the Community Arts Centre Steering Committee (CACST) (see CACST, 1974) and those expressing interest in relocating to the complex in the initial stages were low-rent tenants like the Court Theatre or very small businesses. Only a handful of tenants, including the Dux de Lux, paid commercial rents. Undoubtedly, the presence of these tenants positively contributed to the economy of the Arts Centre. Most of the revenues of the Arts Centre came from the renting of commercial premises and the property value of the Arts Centre had increased over the years (ACC, 2003, 2010a). However, profits were very marginal.

The tight national funding scheme for the retention of historic sites meant that the Arts Centre could only rely on the CCC’s dedicated funds to implement remediation and strengthening works in the site (CCC, 1999c, 2000, 2007a). However, the Council had progressively reduced its support to the Arts Centre over the years, with contributions dropping by nearly 35% between 2008 and 2010 (ACC, 2010a, 2011a). The decrease of public funds was partly re-addressed by the Council at the end of 2009, with the approval of a yearly grant of NZD$ 400,000 to the Arts Centre for seismic strengthening as part of the LTCCP 2009-2019 (CCC, 2009b, 2013b).
Between 2007 and 2010, the Arts Centre looked at project development solutions that would provide long-sought financial sustainability to the site. A preliminary project presented to tenants in 2007 foresaw the demolition and replacement of the 1950s Registry Building and the development of underground parking within the Arts Centre for the nearby CCC’s Civic Building (CCT, 2015). Inevitably tension with the Arts Centre tenants escalated during this period. As one of the participants recollects:

From memory, it was 2008, and the director at the time, Tony Payne, and his tenancy manager, Ken Franklin, came and saw me one afternoon in May, I think it May 2008, and they sort of presented me with this idea of this huge car park, and I was going: you’ve got to be f*****g kidding! If you dig holes there, buildings will fall into it if you’re not careful! (Ben).

In July 2008, Tony Paine resigned as Director of the Arts Centre after 10 years in the role (The Press, 2008). Under his management, the Arts Centre had flourished as a tourist attraction and site for cultural and leisure activities. However, the attraction of commercial tenants was criticized for being at odds with the original communitarian spirit of the Arts Centre (The Press, 2008). The position of Director was given to the Tenancies Manager, Ken Franklin, at the end of October 2008 (ACC, 2008a).

A series of decisions by the Arts Centre Trust Board (ACTB) with regards to site re-evaluation and Trust Deed amendments raised concerns among tenants and the Christchurch community at large. The site re-evaluation was seen as an attempt by the Trust to justify the application of full commercial rents on current and future tenancy agreements, while the amendments to the Trust Deed were criticized for being dictated by the Director and the Management team rather by the ACTB (SOAC, 2009b). In response, the ACC claimed that both the site re-evaluation and the amendments of the Trust Deed were legitimate, with the Board and the Management Team deciding together “in a measured and responsible way, based on appropriate professional advice” (ACC, 2010a, p3). However, when the Court Theatre began the negotiations on the extension of the lease, the fees proposed by the ACC were considered too high (Ben) and restrictive with regards to site upgrading (van Beynen, 2009). In the Trust’s view, the proposed rent reflected the operational costs of the Court Theatre premises (Gregory).
Frictions between the ACC and the tenants reached their peak with the controversial NCoM project announced in July 2009. The architects of the project, Sir Miles Warren and Richard McGowan, sought the opportunity to develop the carpark area into a two-block building (Warren, 2009) and provide a facility that met the needs of the University, the aims outlined in the Trust Deed and the CCC’s inner-city regeneration agenda (ACC, 1978, 2008b; CCC, 2006b). The lease of the land for the facility would have given “the Arts Centre the money to maintain, preserve and reconstruct existing buildings” (Conway, 2010d, pA1). The ACTB also commissioned a report in support of the resource consent “to realign the internal legal boundaries within the Arts Centre campus” (ACC, 2010b, p9) and void the existing amalgamation of land titles. According to the report, the reconfiguration of land to its original boundaries would grant the necessary conditions to ease the identification of two land parcels for future developments (ACC, 2010b).

The NCoM project was widely criticized by long-established tenants of the Arts Centre, heritage conservationists and resource management experts. A group of stakeholders opposing the project established the Save Our Arts Centre (SOAC) to oppose the decisions of the ACC (SOAC, 2010a). According to SOAC spokesperson, Dame Ann Hercus, the governance of the Arts Centre was questionable, as the changes to the Trust Deed in 2008, the alleged lack of readily available money emerging from leaked ACC reports from 2008 and 2009 (Gorman, 2010), the inclusion of clauses blocking objections to consent applications in the new tenancy contracts (Greenhill, 2009) and the application for subdivision of the site into six lots were seen as having a significant adverse effect on the ability to protect recognized heritage values (SOAC, 2010b).

On August 13th, 2009, the CCC voted 10 to 2 to proceed with the Special Consultative Procedure for the proposed project for the NCoM (Gates, 2009a). In presenting the report for the vote, the Chief Executive and the General Manager Corporate Services estimated the Council contribution could be in the range of NZD$ 14-20 million, with the building being leased to the University of Canterbury for a period of 35 years (CCC, 2009g; Gates, 2009a). However, when the Ombudsman ordered the CCC to make the costs of the NCoM project public, it turned out that the NCoM project would cost NZD$ 24.3 million, with a lease to the University for a period of 50 years (Mavis, 2009).
In early March 2010, the sentence of the Environment Court against the NCoM project reflected the overwhelming objections of 48 witnesses who opposed to the project. In ruling against the project, the Court stated that the decision was based on the solid evidence provided by the opponents of the project and on the interpretation of the *RMA 1991* regarding intrusive development projects in proximity of historic buildings (CCC, 2010j). Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the decision did not preclude future considerations for development projects within the Arts Centre (CCC, 2010j) and ruled in favour of the resource consent for land subdivision presented by the ACC (CCC, 2010i). Despite fierce opposition from CACST’s former member Malcolm Douglass and representatives from SOAC, the Environment Court did not acknowledge emerging issues to heritage integrity from consenting the subdivision of land (CCC, 2010i). In the Court’s view, the ATCB was entitled to make decisions regarding the site and identify the areas to sell or lease for future development.

The ACC began investigating the feasibility for an underground car park in one of the land parcels immediately after the Court’s decision (Conway, 2010e). In July 2010, the ACC designated the land previously identified for the NCoM for the development of the parking area (Conway, 2010e). On September 2nd, 2010, the Management Team ordered the relocation of 103 stallholders to the southern edge of the Arts Centre (Conway, 2010f), but works never took place due to the earthquakes.

### 5.2.2 2010-2014: The Arts Centre after the earthquakes

The Arts Centre suffered partial damage from the first earthquake swarm of September 2010. Only four buildings sustained relevant damage, while buildings leased for commercial activities were unaffected (Copeland, 2010; Sachdeva, 2010). Overall, damages were estimated in the range of NZD$ 25 million (ACC, 2011a) and tenants slowly returned to their businesses (Sachdeva, 2010). The Observatory Building and turret were partially deconstructed at the end of 2010 (Copeland, 2010). The then Arts Centre Director, Ken Franklin, reported that the recovery of the Observatory Building alone would cost up to NZD$ 13 million (Copeland, 2010).
Tensions with tenants continued after the first earthquake. The termination of 20 stallholder leases was interpreted “as a very sad and sorry excuse” (quoted in Conway, 2010a, pA4) to evict those tenants who were contrary to the parking area project. The ACC operations in the first months turned to be decisive in the governance of the site following the February 2011 earthquake. In late 2010, the Trust commissioned a study to assess the perceptions and expectations of the community around the Arts Centre site (ACC, 2011a) and developed the event strategy for 2011, which included “a major commitment to the Arts Festival, the Body Festival and [...] the Rugby World Cup” (ibid., p9). Around the same time, Ken Franklin began negotiations with Ansvar to increase the insurance coverage of the Arts Centre up to NZD$ 120 million (Gates, 2011k). In early February 2011, a new business, the Canterbury Cheesemongers, moved to the 1950s Registry Building extension having secured an advantageous 12-year lease (Stewart, 2011a, 2011b).

The earthquake of February 22nd, 2011 changed forever the fate of the Arts Centre and of its tenants. Following the inspection of buildings in early March 2011, 22 out of the 23 buildings of the complex were red-stickered and admission to tenants was restricted for safety reasons (Gates, 2011k). Notwithstanding the lifting of the emergency cordon around the Arts Centre (Robinson, 2011), structural engineers from Holmes Consulting Group (HCG) led by John Trowsdale were unable to make detailed damage assessments due to the magnitude of affected buildings in the wider Christchurch city area. On March 23rd, 2011, the ACC announced that, due to the high uncertainty with the recovery of the Arts Centre, the tenants had “to consider their own future in alternative spaces” (quoted in Gates, 2011e, pA3). Apart from the recently relocated Canterbury Cheesemongers, all the leases were unilaterally terminated (see Table 5.1).

The termination of leases was openly challenged by the tenants and the Christchurch community at large (Gates, 2011d; Williams, 2011b), but the ACC justified that the measure was necessary due to the uncertainties over the recovery of the site (Gates, 2011e). Matters such as liability, safety and insurance were detrimental in further restricting access to tenants to their former premises (Donna and Gregory) (ACC, 2012). Director Ken Franklin stated that the Trust had the obligation to direct funds to preserve the key heritage buildings and that funding the reopening of businesses was not contemplated as a recovery strategy (Gates,
2011q). Similarly, the Chairman of the ACTB, Deane Simmonds, asserted that tenants had the right to challenge the ACC with legal actions, but he also reproached that this would have taken “money away from preserving and restoring the buildings” (quoted in Gates, 2011m, pA9).

Table 5.1: List of major tenants at the Arts Centre and their relocation as at December 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>Type of business</th>
<th>First establishment</th>
<th>New location(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academy Cinemas</td>
<td>Movie theatre</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>The Colombo Mall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts Centre Bookshop</td>
<td>Bookstore</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Worcester Boulevard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backstage Bakery</td>
<td>Café</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>New business (St Asaph St Kitchen &amp; Stray Dog Bar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beadz Unlimited</td>
<td>Costume jewellery</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>New Regent Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury Cheesemongers</td>
<td>Cheese shop and dining</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Stayed at the Arts Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloister Cinema</td>
<td>Movie theatre</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Colombo Mall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee Corner</td>
<td>Café</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Upper Riccarton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court Theatre</td>
<td>Performing arts</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Shed in Addington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dux Live</td>
<td>Live music venue</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Addington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dux de Lux</td>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Riccarton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Theatre</td>
<td>Performing arts</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Temporarily at the Arts Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forget me knots</td>
<td>Knitted works</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Halswell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fudge Cottage</td>
<td>Sweets shop</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Bishopdale Mall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutherford’s Den</td>
<td>Tourist attraction</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Expected return to the Centre – end of 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAPE Public Art</td>
<td>Arts organization</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>St. Asaph Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA Gallery</td>
<td>Visual arts</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>University of Canterbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Ballet</td>
<td>Performing arts</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Sydenham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Puna Toi</td>
<td>Visual arts</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>University of Canterbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wool Studio</td>
<td>Knitted wear</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Middleton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untouched World</td>
<td>Clothing store</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>RE: Start Mall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodcraft Gallery</td>
<td>Woodcraft</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Linwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool Yarns and Fibres</td>
<td>Wool clothing</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Woolston</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes activities under the ACC, stallholders and ceased businesses. All the above relocations are within the Christchurch region.
On June 1st, 2011, seven long-established businesses decided to take legal action against the ACC and asked for the release of engineering reports on their former leased units (Gates, 2011o). Particularly with one prominent tenant, Richard Sinke, there were strong disagreements on the estimates for the recovery of the site once home to the Lux de Lux (Gates, 2011d, 2011g, 2011n; Yardley, 2011). Following the June 2011 earthquake, however, tenants began looking at alternative locations outside the Arts Centre to continue their business.

The earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 accelerated the process of internal governance reform of the ACC that had begun following the NCoM project controversy. After a preliminary discussion with the CCC after the September 2010 earthquake, the ACC Director and the Chair of the ACTB proposed a first revision of the Trust Deed for the Trust Board to approve. Given the uncertainty regarding the dispositions in the event of a possible dissolution of the ACC, members of the ACTB coalesced around the newly-appointed representative for the Christchurch Civic Trust (CCT), Hon. Margaret Austin and persuaded the Director to engage conversation with the MCH (Vanessa). This led to the appointment of Graeme Nahkies for the review of the ACC’s internal governance between November 2011 and May 2012.

Further damage assessments conducted in 2011 by HCG concluded that “the level of damage sustained to the buildings [was] far more significant than [could] be seen from the exterior” (quoted in Le Couteur, 2012, p18). As the report highlighted, the adjacency of buildings propagated the earthquake damage to almost all the units of the complex, with the Student Union building being particularly affected by ground liquefaction (Le Couteur, 2012). The overall insurance settlement (NZD$ 163 million) gave to the ACC the long-sought financial sustainability to carry on the retention of the buildings up to 100% of the revised building code (Gates, 2011a) and set the basis for a long-term NZD$ 290 million restoration (Dally, 2012).

Between May and October 2012, the ACC made a few important decisions that eventually set the path for the recovery of the site and the definition of a long-term strategy. Following the decision of Director Ken Franklin to resign due to family-related matters (Donna), the ACTB sought to fill the vacancy with an experienced manager with a background in structural engineering. Following a round of applications from New Zealand and overseas, the ACTB
unanimously agreed to appoint Andre Lovatt as the new Director (Vanessa). The appointment of Lovatt was seen as a softening of the ACC towards former tenants, with the latter invited to discuss the future of the Arts Centre in March 2013 (ACC, 2014a). However, the inclusion of former tenants in these discussions did not imply a return of old businesses back to the Arts Centre. Rather, the ACC engaged people “to test some ideas and generate some discussion” (Gates, 2013c, pA6).

In 2013 the Director and the ACTB began working on what would later become known as the Arts Centre Vision (ACC, 2013a, 2014a). This strategic document sought to respond to a range of issues with respect to heritage site management, tenancy agreements and anchor uses that would turn the complex into a cultural hub for the community and visitors alike (ACC, 2013b, 2013e, 2014a). Among the complementary activities, the ACC identified “education retreats, hospitality venues, boutique accommodation […] the Arts Centre Shop and a Members’ area” (ACC, 2014a, p7) as the ideal business solutions to turn the Arts Centre into a hub for creative entrepreneurs, residents and tourists (ACC, 2013b) – a 21st Century cluster for creative businesses (ACC, 2014a).

A series of key events that occurred in 2014 set the basis for the flourishing of a new Arts Centre following the earthquakes. The change of internal governance was presented as Private Bill to the Parliament for the first reading in June 2014. A handful of former tenants returned to the Arts Centre, such as the Free Theatre of Christchurch (ACC, 2014b). As at October 2014, the managers of the Arts Centre led by Andre Lovatt were trying to reduce the costs of the recovery project down to NZD$ 220 million (Gates, 2014a). In doing so, the restoration strategy adopted a mix of high-standard conservation works with more intrusive techniques (Gregory and Penny).

The reopening of the Arts Centre site is scheduled for the end of 2019. At the time of the fieldwork, three buildings are scheduled for re-opening (Gates, 2014a) (see Figure 5.2). The University of Canterbury will relocate in the Old Chemistry building along with the Logie Collection of Greek and Roman artefacts (UC, 2014, 2016), while a 3-D printing laboratory will open in the Common Room (Gates, 2014a).
Figure 5.2: Map of the Arts Centre and status of recovery as at March 2016
Source: ACC (2016b)
The Boys High School building was identified in the Arts Centre Vision as the ideal location for upmarket hospitality and retail operators (McDonald, 2013a). Finally, the ACC reached an agreement with the C&CT for the opening of the new I-Site at the end of 2016 (C&CT, 2016) and announced the reopening of Rutherford’s Den in the Great Hall and Clock Tower buildings (ACC, 2017).

The transition from the pre-earthquake governance model was still underway at the time of fieldwork, as the reform of the ACC’s internal governance became effective in January 2016 (see Chapter 8). The recovery was well underway despite an estimated funding shortcoming of NZD$ 50 million. This put the Trust in the position of raising NZD$ 5 million a year over a period of ten years (Gates, 2014a). The income from the rental of refurbished buildings will be higher than the one generated before the earthquakes, as the ACC has been looking for higher paying tenants (Gates, 2013a; McDonald, 2013a; Taylor, 2013). Speculations over a complementary strategy suggest that the ACC might take advantage of the new land arrangement and lease at least two land titles for development. The changes in the heritage legislation, in fact, encourage the adoption of development projects that would have been rejected before the earthquakes.

5.3 The overt dimension of power: haphazardous coalescence

The Directors that managed the Arts Centre in the years before the earthquakes had adopted diverse site solutions, including rental of commercial spaces, place marketing, and promotion of the Arts Centre as a place for artists, craftsmen and leisure (Elton). As a result, the pre-earthquake tenancy management had been “haphazardous and based on what the circumstances could offer” (Donna). This was emblematic in the case of the NCoM project, with the ACC, the CCC and the University of Canterbury coalescing on proposing a new site for the School of Music in the Christchurch CBD. The overruling of the project by the Environment Court put the governance of the Arts Centre under public scrutiny. The ACC, however, downsized the episode as a problem of communication between stakeholders and advocated for a corporatist model of governance for the Arts Centre.
Following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, there has been a shift towards an authoritative governance mode by the Trust, particularly in the unilateral decision of terminating the leases with all but one of its tenants. The seismic event gave to the Trust time and resources to develop the site, advance the reform of the ACTB and draft the first long-term tenancy strategy for the site. The Arts Centre has been promoted as an extraordinary example of recovery in the much-anguished post-earthquake recovery of Christchurch, but there are concerns as to what extent the community is still the main beneficiary of the Arts Centre, as was foreseen in the original Trust Deed.

5.3.1 Modes of governance and metagovernance

Focusing on the governance of the ACC before the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, the amended Trust Deed of 2008 foresaw up to 13 trust members appointed as representatives of key local and national stakeholders (ACC, 2008b). Seven of these members were appointed by the ACTB among prominent individuals, while the remaining six members were appointed by the CCC, the CCT, Ngāi Tahu, the NZHPT and the University of Canterbury (ACC, 2008b). The composition and mandate of the ACTB resembled the archetype of representative governance, with members elected and acting on behalf of the organizations that appointed them. The ACC also comprised a Director and a Management Team in charge of site maintenance, commercial activities and marketing of the Arts Centre. The Management Team often went beyond its original mandate. In October 2009, for example, the ACTB did not oppose the Director’s decision to amend tenancy agreements and deny to tenants the right to object to future projects at the site (Greenhill, 2009). Long-established tenant Richard Sinke criticized the decision and advocated for tenants to have a “legitimate, democratic say” (quoted in Greenhill, 2009, pA3), but in Franklin’s view, management’s goal was to protect the interests of the Trust Board (ACC, 2011a).

Before the 2010-2011 earthquakes, the majority of the ACTB members representing the key stakeholders supported the pro-development agenda of Directors Tony Payne and Ken Franklin. The latter proposed a series of amendments to the objectives of the Trust Deed with the support of the ACTB Chair, John Simpson (ACC, 2008b). This practice was criticized by other
members of the ACTB and organizations like the CCT. As one participant stressed during the interview:

[...] people have to understand very clearly that there is a huge difference between governance and management. [In the case of the Arts Centre] I think it would be fair to say that, back 5 years ago [i.e. 2010], the trustees were not operating effectively in their governance role and management was doing the law (Vanessa).

The pre-earthquake governance of the Arts Centre site was marked by the agreement between the ACC, the University of Canterbury and the CCC for the NCoM project (UC, 2009). The project was widely supported by the majority of the ACTB members and the Management Team. The agreement between the parties foresaw the lease of the new complex to the University of Canterbury, with the CCC carrying out the building of the facility through its controlled company, Civic Buildings Limited. The ACC, in turn, would have benefited from the renting of a land parcel originally designated for development (Gregory) and would have used the funds to refurbish most of the buildings (Conway, 2010d). The project had support from the NZHPT and the CCC’s Urban Design Panel (CCC, 2009f). Participants stressed the relevance of the project for the various organizations:

What the ACC hoped to get out of it was an income stream that would allow it to carry out earthquake strengthening. What the Council hoped to get out of it was the economic benefit of an increased number of students in the central city. What the University hoped to get out of it I think was a cheap solution to the need to expend capital on adequate housing [for] the School of Music (Kevin).

The Arts Centre Trust Deed recognized education as one of its core outputs. The National Conservatorium of Music was meant to be a centre for music education run by the University of Canterbury, in perfect harmony with the Trust Deed (Gregory).

The Mayor and the Executive Team were strong allies of the ACC for the NCoM project and recommended the approval of the initiative to councillors. The position of the Council, however, put the CCC representative in the ACTB, Councillor Sue Wells, in a conflict of interest, forcing her resignation from the ACTB in December 2009 (Gregory). Following the NCoM controversy, the CCC resolved to leave its position in the ACTB vacant and expressed its
intention to defer its direct participation on the ACTB to avoid future conflicts of interest (Nahkies, 2012).

The University of Canterbury and the ACC deliberated over the NCoM project behind closed doors and reached an agreement with the Mayor to establish a PPP for the facility. Under the provisions of the *LGA 2002*, the CCC had to submit the project proposal to a Special Consultative Procedure. Opponents to the NCoM project regarded the Special Consultative Procedure as the only governance arena where they could express their objections. The Mayor and high-ranked managers of the Executive Team tried to undermine the community consultation with a tight calendar, last minute announcements and withholding of crucial information.

The frictions between the tenants and the Arts Centre over the NCoM reflected an increasing legitimization crisis on how the site was governed. Tensions between Ken Franklin and prominent Arts Centre tenants lasted notwithstanding the ruling of the Environment Court against the NCoM project in May 2010. Some of the participants acknowledged the feelings of past and current Board Trust members later reported in the 2012 internal governance assessment, which stated that:

> there has been some loss of stakeholder and possibly public trust and confidence in the governance and management of the Arts Centre. There does appear to be some justification for concerns that the Trust Board has not communicated as effectively to stakeholders as it needed to (Nahkies, 2012, p.12).

The inclinations within the ACC towards a business-minded governance emerged in the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. Tenants and community-wide stakeholders were ousted from decision/making, with the Director and the ACTB advocating the need for site safety and quick repairs behind the unilateral decision to terminate commercial leases. The ACC Chair at that time, Cindy Robinson, argued, the “immediate challenge [was] to fund the repair and rebuild of the damaged structures” (quoted in ACC, 2012, p.4). Participants similarly acknowledged the turning point of earthquakes in the governance of the Arts Centre site, e.g.:
Post-earthquake completely changed the face of the Arts Centre [...] Obviously, it was an unsafe environment, so [the Trust Board] went through the difficult process of deciding to terminate the leases in advice tenants accordingly. [...] Some tough decisions had to be made in the best interests of the Arts Centre [so] that the site remained as an outstanding cultural centre that we respected, preserved and protected (Donna).

Following the unilateral termination of leases, the ACC embarked on the first-ever tenancy programme for the site, with a detailed timeline and identification of prospective tenants. The ACTB hired an Australian consultant from ARUP (Michelle Tabet). Participation was restricted to Board members, with a series of workshops that set the basis of what would have become the Arts Centre Vision. As participants recollected:

What was really significant at that time was – not so much the determination – but the willingness of the trustees to sit for a day and just contemplate what they wanted to achieve and what the Vision was that they had for the future. And they were fortunate in having a very, very good facilitator who led them through a whole raft of questions. It was thought-provoking and very, very productive (Vanessa).

There was a big consultation and that was facilitated by a consultant that worked the stages through the consultation process. [...] But bear in mind that the Vision statement was not theirs [ARUP’s]. They co-ordinated the process. [...] They were able to set the scope, the questions and manage the process. So, the Vision was not theirs. The Vision was of the people who have contributed to it [i.e. the trustees] (Gregory).

The post-earthquake procurement of tenants enshrined in the Arts Centre Vision is oriented at the attraction of “big tenants” (Gregory). Apart from the Free Theatre and the Rutherford’s Den, none of the former tenants were approached by the Director and the Management Team to return to the Arts Centre. At the time of fieldwork, agreements were underway to house the C&CT I-Site and reopen key cultural attractions like the Rutherford’s Den back in the Arts Centre (Gregory). Notwithstanding the NCoM controversy, “the University was still keen to come to town” (Gregory) and proposed a mixed-tenancy project that combined education, culture and exhibitions. The proposal was submitted to the ACTB and its Director for evaluation and it was eventually approved in mid-2014 (UC, 2014).
The earthquake of September 2010 became the pretext to accelerate the governance reform towards a business-like model. The re-organization of the ACC’s internal governance was discussed within a narrow group of vested parties, with representatives from the ACTB, the CCC and the CCT beginning conversations on the likely change of the existing representative governance model of the Trust Board. Discussions eventually reached a preliminary agreement over the design of “a new Act of Parliament to clarify the nature of the Arts Centre Trust” (CCT, 2015, p178). As one participant stressed during the interviews:

There were aspects of the board operations that could be perceived to be covert in a sense. Now, this led – of course – to the decision that the whole Board of the Arts Centre needed a complete reform. [...] It was perceived that necessary legislation had to take place to reform the Arts Centre Trust Board (Nick).

In April 2011, the Director and the ACTB Chair presented an amendment of the Trust Deed that included a clause addressing the future of the Arts Centre site in case of dissolution of the ACTB. Both Franklin and Simpson attempted to influence the decision-making process to get the amendments to the Trust Deed and transfer the Trust “into a statutory entity some via a Local Act” (Nahkies, 2012, p6), but “some board members were afraid that, if the Arts Centre remained closed for years, it would emerge dedicated to the interests of commerce” (CCT, 2015, p178). Ultimately, a coalition of trust members presented an alternative to the Director and the ACTB that foresaw the inclusion of the Minister for Culture and Heritage, Hon. Chris Finlayson, in the discussion over the future governance model for the Arts Centre site (Vanessa) (Gates, 2011b). This initiative eventually culminated with the appointment of Graeme Nahkies for the internal governance review at the end of 2011. The review was carried with the input of key national and local stakeholders like the CCT, CCC, C&CT, SOAC and CERA.

With the support of Nahkies, the members of the ACTB and other parties collaboratively sought to set the basis for the future of the Arts Centre and put aside previous mistrusts (Donna and Vanessa). Eventually, the ACTB recommended the identification of “alternatives to direct representation that would be better for both the Board and the stakeholder organisations” (Nahkies, 2012, p20), with a skill-based model being highly regarded among the members. Local and national governments welcomed the deliberation of the ACTB and
resolved to support the ACC with the preparation and promulgation of a Private Bill (ACC, 2013b; CCC, 2013b; Crawford, 2013).

In late June 2014, the representative for Christchurch Central, Hon. Nicky Wagner, officially presented the ACCTB for the first reading of the Bill in the New Zealand Parliament (NZP, 2014a, 2014b). Both majority and opposition parties welcomed the initiative of the ACC. As one of the participants commented on the first reading of the Bill:

> It was kind of unusual that those sorts of local bills were introduced in Parliament. But the Trust Board was quite clear what it wanted. [...] Everybody just got on with trying to do the best Bill they could. There was consensus within the Parliament and not real disagreement at all. So, the Bill went through very smoothly and I think it was one of the most pleasant bills I have been involved. [...] Everybody was working to a common purpose of seeing the Arts Centre restored and operating effectively (Debbie).

Stakeholders further supported the proposed new governance for the ACC in their submissions to the LGEC between August and November 2014. The ACC commented that a skill-based Board would be “consistent with governance best practice” (Lovatt & Crawford, 2014, p2) and overcome the shortcomings that had emerged in the composition of the Board prior to the earthquakes (ibid.). Similarly, the local heritage association favoured the establishment of a skill-based Board to “reduce the risk of the board becoming factionalized or dominated by particular individuals” (Lochhead, 2014, p2).

As the new ACTB was set to be established after the promulgation of the ACCTB in 2015, the current governance reform can only be assessed in light of the comments from key stakeholders and the feedback from participants during the fieldwork. Participants considered the loss of a representative basis within the Trust Board as a collateral consequence of more efficient governance:

> The Trust will no longer automatically have a representation. But that’s fine, you know. But we as a stakeholder will be able to nominate, it won’t be the same system, they won’t report back to us anymore, but we have confidence in the process that the governance model that’s been put in place will be more effective than the older one (Nick).
5.3.2 Stakeholder dynamics

The governance of the Arts Centre site before and after the earthquakes has been characterized by episodes of lobbying, either for or against the decisions of the ACC. Before the earthquakes, the Director and the ACTB were “inward-looking” (Kevin) and contributed to the increasing feeling of mistrust over the decisions taken. Arguably, the key episode of lobbying before the earthquakes took place during the NCoM controversy of 2009 and 2010.

Prior to the earthquakes, the ACTB included prominent local and national individuals with diverse backgrounds. The composition reflected the representative governance model of the ACC and its limitations with regards to the absence of representatives from the Christchurch community as foreseen in the original Trust Deed (Nahkies, 2012). Moreover, there was only one co-opted member with a background in arts and culture (Deborah McCormick) against three heritage advocates (Derek Anderson, Ian Lochhead and Joanna Mackenzie) (ACC, 2010a). The members were not exclusive to the ACTB as they held other positions while acting as trustees for the Arts Centre site.

Overall, the decision-making process within the ACTB was strongly influenced by its Chair John Simpson, who also had a role as deputy pro vice-chancellor at the University of Canterbury. Focusing on the Management Team, the Director of the ACC, Ken Franklin, was a strong advocate of the pro-development agenda for the site. Franklin had an extensive experience as site developer in Auckland and had worked as tenancy manager under the directorship of Tony Paine. Upon his appointment, the ACC further pursued the commercialization of the site and “new schemes were set afoot to let out whole floors of the Arts Centre for commercial activity, which was a totally unrelated to the arts” (Nick).

The lobbying of tenants and heritage stakeholders over the ACC decisions before the earthquakes were far from being effective. In October 2009, Franklin proposed the amendment of tenancy agreements to deny tenants the right to object to redevelopments in the future. Long-established tenant, Richard Sinke, criticized the decision and brought the issue to the attention of other tenants (Greenhill, 2009). Similarly, heritage lobbies questioned early proposals for the upgrading of premises to accommodate the interests of key commercial tenants (Gates, 2008). The ACTB, however, claimed that the Director and the
Management Team were ensuring “a sustainable future for the Arts Centre by investing in the conservation of the heritage values of the site, and creating opportunities for enhancement of the operation of the site” (ACC, 2008a, p1). Ultimately, the deliberation of the New Zealand Attorney General gave the ACC’s Management Team the legal justification for its pro-development agenda (Conway, 2010d).

The announcement of the NCoM project in June 2009 represented a key governance episode during which key individuals exercised a powerful influence in the decision-making process. The ACTB Chair, John Simpson had a clear interest in supporting a project that would have benefited the University of Canterbury, while Ken Franklin was adamant in leasing the necessary land for the complex to the CCC. A third key player was the New Zealand Attorney General and Minister for Culture and Heritage, Hon. Chris Finlayson, whose standpoint on the private nature of the ACC was detrimental in the ruling against the SOAC appeal in early 2010 (Conway, 2010d). A final influential player was prominent local architect Sir Miles Warren, who was appointed by the CCC to design the NCoM building. The influence of Warren in lobbying the CCC and other key stakeholders in New Zealand and Christchurch emerged during the Environment Court hearing over the NCoM project in March 2010:

Miles Warren insisted that the architects of Christchurch (referring to the Canterbury branch of the NZIA) should argue against him. But, all we said was that we admired what he does but we were making sure we were concentrating on the content of the project, not on him (Edward).

The CCC Mayor and the Executive Team deliberatively attempted to hijack decision-making in favour of the NCoM proposal by keeping elected councillors aside from the decision on the project and limiting its deliberative authority (CCC, 2009c, 2009d). Furthermore, the announcement of the project right after the release of the LTCCP 2009-2019 and the release of misleading project costs estimates sought to affect community input in the controversial project. Ultimately, the submission of evidence against the project and the appeals to the Environment Court and the High Court represented the sole occasions for the community to challenge the project and the governance of the Arts Centre.
Influential players within the Trust sought to legitimize the NCoM project by ostracizing those Trust members that opposed the building of the new facility within the Arts Centre site. Participants recollect episodes where John Simpson, exhorted Dr Ian Lochhead not to vote during the meetings due to his alleged interests as a representative from the University of Canterbury (*Kevin*). Eventually, Lochhead resigned as a Trust member after only one year in the position, in open contrast with the ACC’s direction of decisions (Gorman, 2009). Similarly, Joanna Mackenzie, representative of the CCT, was forced to resign after escalating tensions with Simpson and Franklin. Mackenzie was accused of leaking information on the financial situation of the ACC. As one participant explained:

> She was in fact told that she was not any longer a representative that she had to remove herself from the meetings when there were certain decisions made, particularly about the Music School issue. When she refused, they then threatened to a private investigator and it got very awkward and she was asked to give up all her papers (*Ben*).

Unlike with previous attempts of lobbying, the stakeholders opposing the NCoM project organized themselves around SOAC, the CCT and prominent heritage advocates (Macfie, 2009). The owner of the Dux de Lux, Richard Sinke, and other key tenants submitted their statements against the NCoM project during the Special Consultative Procedure (CCC, 2009c). The lobbying against the NCoM saw an overwhelming majority of applicants (475) opposing the project (CCC, 2009c). Major critics pointed at the limited consultation, the costs of the project, the proposed rent for the University of Canterbury, the implications for any future nomination of the Arts Centre as World Heritage site and the impact on the overall tourist appeal towards the heritage site.

Following the first earthquake of September 2010, the composition of the ACTB partially changed with the appointment of Margaret Austin as representative for the CCT and Jen Crawford as a co-opted member in replacement of Deborah McCormick. The ACTB Chair, John Simpson, left the ACC as his term at the Board had terminated. The appointment of Margaret Austin, a former politician with experience in the governance of culture and heritage, turned to be decisive in the post-earthquake governance of the ACC, as she played a key role in the decision of appointing Graeme Nahkies for the review of the ACTB commissioned by the MCH. Similarly, the appointment of Jen Crawford, resource management lawyer for Anderson Lloyd,
was valuable in getting the support among key stakeholders on the drafting of the white paper for the \textit{ACCTB}. As Chair of the ACTB, Jen Crawford led the transition towards the establishment of the new skills-based board in 2016.

Focusing on the Management Team, Director Ken Franklin concentrated his efforts in the insurance settlements before resigning for personal reasons in mid-2012. The ACTB sought to find a candidate outside its organization to run the large-scale recovery programme for the site. Ultimately, the Board appointed Andre Lovatt, a Christchurch-based structural engineer with management experience in New Zealand and overseas as project manager for ARUP. Through Lovatt, the ACTB hired Michelle Tabet for the development of the Arts Centre Vision (Tabet, 2015).

Tenants’ lobbying in the aftermath of the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes was active yet unfruitful. The termination of 20 stallholder leases following the September 2010 earthquake was initially challenged, with Stallholder’s Association criticising the ACC for using the earthquake “as a very sad and sorry excuse” (quoted in Conway, 2010a, pA4) to evict those who opposed the parking area project. Similarly, following the earthquake of February 2011, long-established tenants took legal action against the termination of the leases by the ACC (Gates, 2011o). The hope for these tenants was to return to their premises, with one of the Trust members (Derek Anderson) being a minor voice advocating for a more open collaboration between the ACC and its key tenants (Gates, 2011n, 2011p; Williams, 2011b). However, it soon became clear that the ACC would not have granted former tenants the right of returning to the Arts Centre in the future. The earthquake of June 2011 silenced the tenants’ issues and gave further legitimization to the decisions taken by the ATCB:

\begin{quote}
... there’s no way I could keep pushing my own particular vision or idea or business. It was like...it felt just not appropriate to keep going (Ben).
\end{quote}

Decisions and inputs from influential actors and organizations were framed under the emergency governance in response to the earthquakes. Occasionally, the ACC and its Director expressed opinions in support of the recovery agenda pursued by CERA and the national Government (ACC, 2011b). An episode revealing the orientation of the ACC in the recovery of the Arts Centre occurred during the amendment of the City Plan rules in 2012. In that specific
case, Director Andre Lovatt advocated for changes in the City Plan revisions to effectively deliver a full restoration of the site and give scope for further development of the vacant land parcels (ACC, 2012). Another formal case of lobbying took place during the submission to the LGEC, with the Director and the Chair of the ACTB seeking to get the approval on the proposed ACCTB (Lovatt & Crawford, 2014). A final, less visible episode of lobbying can be ascribed to the amendments in the building legislation and the building authority shift from the CCC to CERA in June 2013. In this latter case, the ACC sought to expedite resource and building consents that allowed intrusive restoration works and use of materials that were prohibited before the earthquakes.

The ACC rarely engaged with the community and stakeholders on matters related to the recovery of the Arts Centre following the earthquakes. In the case of the termination of leases following the September earthquake, the ACC unilaterally decided and supported the conditions that evicted, de facto, stallholders from the Arts Centre. Similarly, the decision to terminate the leases following the February 2011 earthquakes was done behind closed doors, without the involvement of long-established tenants (Gates, 2011e). As one of the participants observed, the Management Team of the ACC in this period was:

very obstructive, with no respect for people who’d been there half their lives, working there, creating businesses there. It was very disdainful, totally disrespectful. [...] Considering it was a public trust, effectively, it was not very open. It was a closed trust, but it was not supposed to be. It’s a public trust (Ben).

Moreover, the then Director Ken Franklin and most of the ACTB members disregarded the inputs from engineers consulted by the tenants when it came to the evaluation of damages in the Arts Centre (Gates, 2011n). Their decisions were based on the evidence from the engineers consulted by the ACC and the release of reports was precluded to the tenants (Gates, 2011d, 2011p).

In designing and launching the recovery strategy and the Arts Centre Vision, the ACTB and the Directors of the ACC complied with their role of guarantors of the site and minimized the input of the community. No community input was sought on the proposed recovery strategy for the Arts Centre, as decisions were taken by the ACTB “vested with the responsibility in governing
the site” (Donna) under the advice of the new Management Team. Even though the ACC welcomed the input of local “experts from the arts, heritage and cultural sectors, as well as representatives of key Arts Centre stakeholders and former tenants of the site” (ACC, 2013a, p1), only selected stakeholders from the arts and education sectors were considered in the definition of the Arts Centre as an “arts campus of the twenty-first century” (Jim). Key former tenants, as well as organizations like the CCT and Ngāi Tahu, were not proactively involved in the formulation of the Arts Centre Vision. This eventually influenced the exclusion of former tenants as eligible businesses in the refurbished site, including long-standing residents Dux de Lux and the Court Theatre.

5.4 The covert dimension of power: instrumentation policy

Findings on the covert dimension of power with regards to the Arts Centre following the earthquakes suggest that the triggering event intensified a market-driven process of site development which underpinned the pre-earthquake agenda. In the examples below, tokenistic forms of stakeholder engagement, the relevance of strategy documents, the reforms of rules and legislation and the rationale behind key agreements conveyed a mode of governance that framed the redevelopment of the Arts Centre under the logic of the market.

5.4.1 Mechanisms of non-decision-making

Episodes of non-decision-making characterized the governance of the Arts Centre site in the period between 2007 and 2010. These were particularly striking in the controversial NCoM project. The CCC’s Executive Team Statement of Intent for the NCoM project contemplated the strategic and financial implications of the project to the Council and supported the argument of the Arts Centre site being the only reasonably practicable option to consider for the new building (CCC, 2009c, 2009d, 2009h). Subsequently, the deliberations by the Council in August and November 2009 were a tokenistic legitimation of a project discussed at management level. The argument supporting the location of the Conservatorium in the Arts Centre site underpinned the development proposal of the University of Canterbury, which
disregarded other alternative locations in the CBD for the new building (CCC, 2009c, 2009h). Notwithstanding the availability of other premises in the CBD suited for the NCoM (Doig, 2009), the CCC and the University of Canterbury were resolute in considering the Arts Centre site as the only development solution (CCC, 2009c, 2009h).

Opponents to the NCoM project found themselves in a regulatory framework that downsized or excluded the wider community from effectively providing an input in the decision over the NCoM. In their view, both the ACC and the University of Canterbury were public trusts acting as private bodies, with decisions taken behind closed doors. In particular, they objected to the CCC’s attempts to exclude the community from the decision over the Conservatorium, as the Council was funding the project for the new building. The RMA 1991 legislation, however, did not forbid mandatory consultation process with the community for lodged resource consents. As the Environment Court reiterated in May 2010:

There is no requirement on an applicant for resource consent to consult with anyone […] We were told that the hearing we conducted was the only opportunity many submitters felt was given to them to be heard by a decision-maker in relation to the National Conservatorium of Music proposal. Whether that is true or not, it does not mean that this resource consent process can be a proper substitute for matters properly and better dealt with elsewhere. We would run a real risk of compromising the resource consent process were we to depart from the specific requirements of the RMA in reaching our decision (CCC, 2010j, p20).

Following the earthquakes, the episodes of non-decision-making exacerbated. The decisions concerning the governance reform were exclusive to the Trust Board. Notwithstanding the engagement with key stakeholders throughout the governance assessment and the public law character of the Trust Board decisions, the exclusive structure of the ACC precluded other parties from effectively contributing in the decision-making process. The ACTB “went beyond to what Graeme Nahkies was advising” (Vanessa) and its members were resolute in defining a new governance model for the site on their own:

We have made some decisions on where we should focus our attention and efforts in order to best fulfil the ambition of the Trust Deed. This will mean leaving behind some of the things we used to do before the earthquake (ACC, 2013b, p11).
The drafting and launch of the Arts Centre Vision were prominent episodes of non-decision-making over a publicly relevant site. Before the enucleation of the Arts Centre Vision, it was argued that “the Trust Board had the task (and opportunity) to determine how best to use and repopulate the site” (Nahkies, 2012, p11), meaning that third-party inputs would have been unlikely in the drafting of the document. Following the public release of the Arts Centre Vision in August 2013, the ACC sought the feedback of the community “to share in our progress, be part of events and activities, and help shape our future” (ACC, 2014a, p7). The engagement with the community, however, was far from being inclusive. The phase of public engagement was relatively short (a handful of sessions in less than two months) and the turnout (30 submissions) was comparatively small in comparison with the public feedback over the NCoM project before the earthquakes (ACC, 2013e, 2013f, 2013g). What was promoted as an opportunity to expand the participation base to the wider community (Donna) was arranged as a showcase for few stakeholders from the retail and the arts community (Ben and Jim). As participants reiterated:

We’ve been advised and informed of where they went, but we didn’t have a role in the decision-making of the Arts Centre Vision (Nick).

There were meetings you were invited to if you wanted to go and attend. But from memory, if you went to the meeting, they were presenting the Vision, it was fait accompli. It had already been done by the Management Team. [...] I was critical of the fact that they were not appreciating all the work that the tenants had put into their businesses. ... I just felt that they were pretty much ignored (Ben).

The community input from the community was a tokenistic legitimization of a strategy that had been set out by the ACTB and a narrow number of people. This was particularly relevant in the rationale behind the use of a Likert-scale survey as an instrument to get the opinion of the community. In the view of the ACC, the feedback from the survey would have been used “to inform the finalisation of the Vision, which [enabled] a master plan of the site restoration and use to be completed” (ACC, 2013f, p1). However, the survey simply asked respondents “to rank their preferred future uses of the site” (ACC, 2014a, p7) out of a list of pre-determined uses and the questions restricted the scope of the respondents’ potential feedback (ACC, 2013i, 2013j, 2014a). Rather than developing a platform for community engagement and
response to proposals, the ACC simply sought for a plebiscitary consent over a strategy document ready to be implemented.

5.4.2 Information withholding and manipulation

The period that preceded the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 was characterized by episodes of information manipulation to support the pro-development strategy of the ACC. The re-evaluation of the Arts Centre site of 2008, for example, was presented by the ACTB Chair, John Simpson, as “a common issue for owners of heritage buildings” (quoted in ACC, 2010a, p3), but tenants interpreted the evaluation as an attempt to justify the increase of rents to full commercial value. The Trust argued that the site re-evaluation reflected the real value of the Arts Centre as a heritage complex (ACC, 2010a), while tenants claimed that the site had increased in value because of the cultural and leisure amenities that were established at the Arts Centre over the years (Ben, and Elton).

The second case of information manipulation occurred following the submission of the resource consent for the subdivision of the Arts Centre site back to the original six land titles. The ACC was openly biased over the interpretation of the Arts Centre conservation plans and the original feasibility study of 1974, with one of its heritage consultants stressing that the plans “did not include consideration of the open spaces and buildings on the eastern third of the site” (CCC, 2010j, p18) and that they gave scope for potential future development in the vacant land (ACC, 2010b) (Allyson). This rationale, however, was challenged by the original planner, Malcolm Douglass, who presented alternative comments on the original feasibility study in which he had advocated for the amalgamation of titles for the sake of site integrity (David).

Episodes of information withholding characterized the NCoM project controversy between 2009 and 2010. The CCC’s Executive Team did not disclose the detailed costs of the NCoM project to the councillors for deliberation. This omission was challenged by Councillor Johanson, who submitted a request to the Ombudsman for the publication of the detailed financial information (Mavis, 2009). The CCC was forced to release the budget for the project a few days before the Special Consultative Procedure hearings of November 2009. By
withholding information, the Executive Team sought to minimise public dissent over a costly development project. Similarly, the ACC was criticized for not releasing the information on the NCoM project to the public during the Environment Court hearings. Opponents argued that a Trust with a public scope had to be transparent when public opinion overwhelmingly expressed their dissent towards the Conservatorium proposal. However, the Trust was adamant in withholding key information and kept acting as if it were a private entity (Nahkies, 2012).

The NCoM controversy saw a series of cases of information manipulation from the CCC and the ACC. During the Environment Court Appeal, local architects on behalf of the NZIA argued that the proposed Conservatorium building “was overscaled and that there were a number of things that needed a better exploration” (Edward). Dr Lochhead presented an alternative design of the NCoM project to illustrate the dominant impact that the building would have had on the Arts Centre site:

[…] it very clear to the commissioners just how dominant this building would be It was clear that it would be, by a considerable measure, the largest building on the Art Centre site. And rather than being subservient to the existing heritage buildings, it would be dominant – it would have a dominant impact on the site (Kevin).

The team of architects led by Sir Miles Warren was relatively vague on the project design before and during the hearings. During the appeal to the Environment Court, however, they revealed a complementary project of the Conservatorium partly built underground so that it would not obscure the nearby buildings (Edward and Kevin). Finally, the CCC report on the Conservatorium project stressed the relevance of the project to “the Council’s community outcomes, the Central City Strategy and the Central City Revitalisation Project” (CCC, 2009c, p1). The Council justified the NCoM project for its alleged cultural outputs and excused itself from considering other project options during the Special Consultative Procedure.

Following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the episodes of information withholding were particularly evident in the tensions between the ACC and the tenants whose leases were unilaterally terminated. Opponents argued that the ACC was unwilling to release the engineering reports because it feared that tenants would have used them as evidence to claim
their right return to the site (Gates, 2011p, 2011q). This was particularly the case of the reports on the Student Union Building, home to Dux de Lux. One of the participants raised doubts over the repairing estimates provided by the ACC for the building:

They are now saying that repairing this [talking about the Student Union Building] is going to cost like NZD$ 8.5/9 million [...] I don’t believe it’s NZD$ 9 million to fix it. It just gives them more reason... [...] There are a lot of unanswered questions, and that’s what I mean they’re not totally upfront about what’s going on (Ben).

A second example of information manipulation concerns the alleged restoration of the 1978 Trust Deed in the submission to the Parliament as part of the ACCTB. Both the Nahkies report and the Arts Centre Vision advocated for a revision of the ACTB and of its Trust Deed so that it reflected the original intentions of the Trust (ACC, 2013e, 2013i; Nahkies, 2012). The Arts Centre Vision itself stated that the “objectives of promoting the arts, culture, education and the heritage of the site” (ACC, 2016a, n.p.) reprised the goals set out by the Trust Deed of 1978 (ACC, 2013e). However, the Trust Deed attached to the Bill differs considerably from the original document. Rather, its objectives are the same as those reported in the controversial Trust Deed amendment of 2008 (see Section 5.4.3).

Episodes of information manipulation and withholding emerged in the documents that advocated for a business mode of governance for the new ACTB. The purpose of the report was to provide “a summary of governance issues faced by the Arts Centre; possible options to reform the governance [and] a preferred option for the MCH to consider” (Nahkies, 2012, p6). However, the report contained a series of biases in the assessment “of matters relating to the functionality and accountability of the governance structure of the Arts Centre” (Nahkies, 2012, p7). The report supported the pros of a business-like governance mode with evidence from a big New Zealand company (Fonterra), while emphasising the shortcomings of representative governance models from selected cultural organizations (Nahkies, 2012).

The governance of the ACTB as a private body granted independence from shareholders, greater leadership in decision-making and overcame the pre-earthquake governance flaws (Nahkies, 2012). A de-politicized Trust Board was “an acceptable as well as appropriate short-term measure” (Nahkies, 2012, p34) to effectively run the Arts Centre, improve the
accountability of its Trusts members and reinforce the rationale of the ACTB as a legally private entity. Just like in the case of the Trust Deed, the 1974 feasibility study was used to justify the establishment of a skill-based ACTB and replace the existing representative board (Nahkies, 2012). Surprisingly, heritage advocates and organizations that distrusted the inward-looking nature of the ACC before the earthquakes backed the proposed governance reform of the Arts Centre and supported the ACCTB to the LGEC in November 2014 (CCT, 2014).

Information manipulation could be evinced in the Arts Centre Vision. The ACC often regarded it as the main guideline for the restoration and tenancy strategy for each of the units of the site (ACC, 2014a, 2016a, 2016c). The rationale of the Arts Centre Vision was structured along a series of key and complementary anchor uses, with international best practices from cultural and arts clusters to justify the targeting of creative industries and A-grade cultural organizations as prospective tenants for the site (ACC, 2013e). The jargon used in promoting the Arts Centre Vision to the community stressed the necessity to have a plan and pre-established targets to get a more efficient use of the site that responds to current and future generations’ interests (ACC, 2013a, 2013e, 2014a).

Finally, the Arts Centre Vision was adamant in supporting the adoption of philanthropic schemes to partially fund the restoration of the Arts Centre. It did so by reporting records and research on US philanthropic donations, which had “a long record of appealing to the generosity of its population through tax-deductible donations to complement the meagre government funding” (ACC, 2013e, p13). However, it did not report evidence of philanthropic donations from New Zealand and naively claimed that organizations like the ACC would have been likely to have a greater appeal among prospective donors than “smaller and more in need organizations” (ACC, 2013e, p13).

5.4.3 Rules and legislation

The application and interpretation of rules had a relevant impact on the decision-making process of the Arts Centre before the earthquakes. Decisions and strategies for the management of the site had to comply with the objectives of the Trust Deed. The latter had been subject to five major amendments since the establishment of the ACC in 1979 (1989,
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1983, 1998, 2003, 2008). The last amendment, however, shifted the objectives of the ACC from heritage conservation and promotion of education, culture and the arts (ACC, 1978, 1993; Strange 1994) towards a site development agenda that acknowledged the creative industries as the preferred tenant at the expenses of the arts community (ACC, 2008b). Most importantly, the 2008 Trust Deed amendment introduced the principle of financial sustainability for the first time and regarded the Conservation Plan drafted by Ken Franklin as the preferred instrument for site conservation. Critics argued that the last variations to the Trust Deed “directly altered and detracted from the declared objects” of the Trust (Nahkies, 2012, pp8-9) and its orientation towards commercialization (Kevin and Nick). The ACC put preservation and cultural development goals one against the other, with the main criterion being the availability of funds. As the Annual Report for 2010 explained:

Since its inception, the Arts Centre has clearly always been underfunded. [...] Successive management teams and boards have endeavoured to balance the immense tension between the heavy financial requirements of conserving and maintaining the heritage buildings, while also providing a venue that fosters art in all its forms, culture and educational activity (ACC, 2011a, p3).

An interpretation issue that characterized the governance of the ACC before the earthquakes concerned the identification of the ultimate beneficiaries of the Arts Centre site. One of the participants argued that the Trust “was setup with the role of existing for the people of Christchurch and the visitors of the area” (Donna), in accordance with the provisions of the original Trust Deed. However, with the proposed development of the NCoM, “a lot of people came to feel this was just wrong” (Ben) as the decision had put the vested interests of the CCC and the University of Canterbury above those of the Christchurch community at large. Those opposing the Conservatorium project questioned the decisions of the ACC and appealed to the High Court. However, their objection was overruled by the Attorney General, which stated that the amendments to the Trust Deed were not “at odds with the charitable objects of the original trust” (Finlayson, quoted in Conway, 2010d, pA1). This decision further legitimized the governance of the ACC as a private entity.

A further set of rules relevant to the governance of the Arts Centre site before the earthquakes were enshrined in the CCC’s protocol on projects funded by the Council. As in the case of the
NCoM, the CCC’s Executive Team oversaw project cost estimates, the identification of feasible options and the authorization of the project budget (CCC, 2009c). Its recommendations were approved and expedited by the CCC’s Chief Executive (CCC, 2009c), with the support of the Mayor ahead of the final resolution by the councillors. This mechanism favoured the vested interests of the ACC and the University of Canterbury above those of the Christchurch community at large.

After the earthquakes, the ACC’s Director was adamant in assuring the community that the Arts Centre would have been restored in accordance with the obligations of site preservation and cultural development enshrined in the Trust Deed (ACC, 2011a). This was further reiterated in the Nahkies report, which assured that preservation and cultural development were “mutually interdependent and synergistic” principles of the Trust Deed (Nahkies, 2012, p9). However, as anticipated in Section 5.4.2, the version of the Trust Deed attached to the ACCTB contained the same objectives of the version amended in 2008 which advocated for a development-driven governance of the Arts Centre. The latter eventually resurfaced following the launch of the Arts Centre Vision in 2013 (ACC, 2013i, 2015b). The Vision, in fact, encouraged the rebuild of some units of the site to accommodate leisure businesses, creative industries and educational organizations (ACC, 2013e, ACC, 2016a). This, in turn, restricted the list of prospective tenants to those that met the new tenancy rules (ACC, 2013e). As one of the participants commented:

I think that, if you have a vision for the place, almost certainly that will determine the sort of people or the type of people that you will be looking at to come there and to achieve that vision. (Elton).

Unlike the projects illustrated in Chapter 6, the provisions of the draft recovery strategies for the Christchurch CBD marginally influenced the redevelopment of the Arts Centre. The ACC was legitimized to operate as a private entity and its board members were committed in pursuing a recovery of the site regardless of the strategy for heritage buildings set out by the CCC and CERA (CCC, 2011d, 2011g; CERA, 2012a, MCH, 2012b, 2013, 2014b).

Focusing on the legislation, the shortcomings in the body of legislation particularly affected heritage sites owned by charitable organizations as in the case of the ACC. The provisions
under the BA 2004 were limited to the policies for earthquake-prone buildings (Sections 122 and 124), with the CCC as the designated authority to deliberate the policy in accordance with Section 83 of the LGA 2002 (CCC, 2010k). Before the earthquakes, The Arts Centre fell under Category B of the earthquake-prone building policy (heritage masonry building of high value for the community) (CCC, 2010k). However, the CCC was rather passive “in requiring owners to reduce or remove the danger” (Russell & Ingham, 2010, p197), thus leaving any initiative of earthquake strengthening to the owners of historic buildings.

The NZHPT heritage management guidelines foreseen in the Historic Places Act 1993 (HPA 1993) had no statutory value for heritage site owners like the ACC. This was particularly evident in the NCoM resource consent appeal, with opponents claiming that the application of the NZHPT guidelines was “finalised after preliminary proposals for the development of the Conservatorium” (CCC, 2010j, p18). In the view of the Court, however, the ACC was entitled to commission the creation of dedicated guidelines for the site (CCC, 2010j). Similarly, the provisions of the LGA 2002 gave scope to the initiative of private owners. At the local level, the CCC had the authority “to identify all reasonable practical options for the achievement of the objective of a decision” (Section 77), but it had limited financial and jurisdictional authority to mandate the ACC to retain historic sites. The retention of the Arts Centre site, therefore, depended on the initiative of the ACC in procuring complementary sources of funding to those few made available at Council level.

The local legislation before the earthquakes played a key role in the NCoM project. The proponents of the building referred to the CCC’s City Plan rules for Cultural Zones in the CBD and the Central City Regeneration Strategy when presenting the project proposal to the councillors and the community at large. However, the rules and policies introduced in the City Plan had been subject to almost twenty updates and amendments (CCC, 2013e) since its promulgation in November 2005 to the point “that the policies for heritage and the assessment criteria in the City Plan were not as clear as they might have been” (Kevin). Eventually, the Environment Court acknowledged that the City Plan gave scope to the development of the vacant area designated for the NCoM and that the proposed facility underpinned the local policies for cultural sites like the Arts Centre.
The RMA 1991 represented the main legal instrument to protect heritage “from inappropriate subdivision, use and development” (Section 6(f)) as in the case of the NCoM project (Kevin and Paul). The Court acknowledged that the dispute over the NCoM had “significant resource management issues to resolve in accordance with the Act’s requirements” (CCC, 2010j, p23) and that the resource management legislation overruled the provisions of the City Plan (ibid.). Therefore, the national and local legislation on heritage proved to be decisive in challenging the rationale of development conveyed in the ACC’s own regulations and in overcoming the incongruences of the City Plan.

Conversely, the ruling of the Environment Court in favour of the proposed land subdivision of the Arts Centre was motivated in consideration of the Resource Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Act 2009 (RMAA 2009) promulgated by the national Government at the end of 2009. The amended legislation was applied because the ACC’s “application was lodged after 1 October 2009” (CCC, 2010i, p5). The Court could not deny the resource consent because the RMA 1991 and the City Plan did not give to authorities the power to decide on the use and management skills by site owners as in the case of the ACC (CCC, 2010i).

After the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, the legislation and the rules concerning the heritage sites was subject to substantial changes that eventually affected the governance of the Arts Centre. On September 10th, 2010, the CCC promulgated a new policy for earthquake-prone buildings that amended the minimum threshold for heritage buildings from 33% to 67% of the Building Code (CCC, 2010k). The change in the Building Code implied an increase in restoration costs for historic buildings that would need to be carried out by the initiative of property owners. The ACTB was nevertheless adamant to “bring the buildings up to the building code requirements” (ACC, 2012, p4).

In the period between the September 2010 and the February 2011 earthquakes, the CERRA 2010 and the promulgation of Orders in Council by the national Government suspended some provisions in the existing legislation for heritage sites. The CERA 2011 legislation established in the aftermath of the earthquake of February 2011 was further averse to the retention of existing buildings, with the Chief Executive of CERA having an overruling authority on unsafe buildings in accordance with the provisions of Section 38. CERA had no legal obligation to consult heritage stakeholders, it carried out demolitions without applying for resource
consents and was in charge with the drafting the Built Heritage Recovery Plan (BHRP) included in the GCRS (CERA, 2011c). The above provisions, however, did not fully apply to the Arts Centre site. Section 38 did not apply because the emergency cordon around the Arts Centre site had been already lifted when the *CERA 2011* came into effect. Similarly, the BHRP came into effect only the end of 2014 (MCH, 2014b), when the recovery and repopulation of the Arts Centre were already underway.

In contrast, Orders in Council gave to the MCER the power to exempt or modify ordinary legislation for any provision that was necessary to achieve the purposes foreseen in the earthquake recovery legislation. The provisions of the *HPA 1993* following the 2010-2011 earthquakes were altered or suspended in most of the Christchurch city area, with implications for the recovery of the Arts Centre. The heritage legislation was subject to a substantial, pro-development reform “driven by the Christchurch earthquakes” (Brazendale, 2013, p277) that culminated with the repeal of the Act and its replacement with the *Heritage New Zealand Act 2014* (*HNZA 2014*). The special provisions for the *RMA 1991* under the earthquake recovery legislation relegated the CCC and the NZHPT to a mere advisory role, with the ACC having the final say on earthquake upgrading solutions for the buildings of the site. Focusing on the *BA 2004*, the review of the minimum risk levels (Pamparin & Hare, 2012), the introduction of strict building code standards for the city of Christchurch (DBH, 2011) and the release of dedicated guidelines for masonry buildings (DBH, 2012; MBIE, 2012a, 2012b; OMBC, 2013) allowed intrusive recovery solutions for the Arts Centre buildings that would have not been considered before the earthquakes (*Matthew, John and Penny*).

The suspension of the CCC’s building consent accreditation in 2013 further eroded the role of the local authority, with CERA in charge of issuing consents for the retention of the Arts Centre. Ultimately, the *CTA 1957*, which was not suspended under the earthquake legislation, turned out to be decisive in the retention of the Arts Centre as it bound the ACC to reinvest the insurance pay-out on the site (*Donna*).

With respect to the City Plan, the ACTB “sought changes to the City Plan revisions” (ACC, 2012, p5) to efficiently deliver a full restoration of the site. Recommendations for a change of the heritage provisions were submitted by the ACC to the MCER and the CCC during the design of the CCRP (ACC, 2012, 2013b, 2013e; CCDU, 2012a). The revised City Plan helped lead to the
market-driven restoration of the Arts Centre. As the Director of the ACC, Andre Lovatt, emblematically stated:

Much of the restoration and strengthening programme has been undertaken under rule changes introduced to the Operative City Plan by the Central City Recovery Plan (CCRP) in 2012. These rules have significantly assisted the Trust in achieving the significant progress made on site to date, and it is important that this momentum is continued, to ensure that the Board’s Vision is met and that any new rules do not impose unnecessary additional layers of control, that may hinder the restoration process, through cost and time delays, and uncertainty as to consent outcomes (quoted in ACC, 2015b, p6).

The post-earthquake governance of the Arts Centre put site development before heritage conservation. Even though the ACC under Andre Lovatt considers the New Zealand ICOMOS Charter for heritage buildings as complementary to the Trust Deed objectives of protecting all the heritage buildings on the site in perpetuity (ACC, 2013b), the emphasis on “where possible” (ibid., p31) suggests that the recovery of the site will be subject to time and resources available. The latter reiterates the principle of maintaining “a sustainable and financially viable organisation” (NZP, 2014a, p6), as the ACTB “can't allow the repaired site to be financially unsustainable” (John). Amid the large-scale recovery of the Arts Centre, participants enthusiastically supported the preamble and the rationale of ACCTB, particularly the legal protection against possible changes to the Trust Deed in the future (Donna, John and Nick) (CCT, 2014). The principle of financial sustainability and the establishment of a skill-based ACTB enshrined in the ACCTB puts “a little concern for going into the future” (Nick) in a context where the conservation of heritage remains “a matter of market economics” (Brazendale, 2013, p245).

5.5 The hegemonic dimension of power: rebuild as opportunity

The governance of the Arts Centre between 2007 and 2010 was strongly oriented towards pro-development and commercialization of the site to attract big local and national tenants. The 2010-2011 earthquakes heightened the process of market-led governance of the site. The recovery strategy and the Arts Centre Vision were implemented through mechanisms and
coalitions among stakeholders that were rooted in the principles of market-led recovery. Ultimately, the seismic events of 2010 and 2011 simply accelerated the inevitable process of gentrification already occurring at the Arts Centre. The following section provides evidence linking the overt and covert dimensions of power to the hegemonic one, with an emphasis on the rhetoric around the roles of government and the market, urban regeneration discourses and tourism outcomes.

Prior to the earthquakes, the Council support of the NCoM project (CCC, 2009f, 2009h) was a clear episode of development opportunity overriding the instances of heritage vulnerability acknowledged in the CCRS 2006-2016 (CCC, 2006b). The achievement of the cultural development goals was particularly stressed by some of the stakeholders in favour of the project. The Chief Executive of the CECC, Peter Townsend, welcomed the project as an excellent opportunity that would have provided a positive impact on the CBD (CCC, 2009c).

The rationale of rebuild as opportunity was particularly strong in the decision-making over the Arts Centre in the aftermath of the September 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. In the 2010 Annual Report, the ACTB Deputy Chairman, Deane Simmonds, stated that the revitalization strategy for the Arts Centre provided “new opportunities for businesses, employment, entertainment, arts, culture and education” (ACC, 2011a, p5). The opportunity given by the earthquakes was reiterated in the 2012 Annual Report, in which the ACTB Chair, Jen Crawford, acknowledged how the post-earthquake recovery was a once in a lifetime occasion, “both at a management and governance level – to manage the myriad demands of the reconstruction and long-term protection of the Arts Centre” (ACC, 2013b, p3).

The opportunity rhetoric was particularly strong in the drafting and implementation of the Arts Centre Vision (ACC, 2013e). The document was promoted as an “opportunity to recast the future of the Arts Centre” (ACC, 2013h, n.p.) and “to re-imagine the Arts Centre [by] introducing new ideas for the future to create a vibrant hub of culture, arts and education” (C&CT, 2013a, n.p.) that oriented the site strategy towards the attraction of creative industries (ACC, 2013e). Local MP (and later minister responsible for the rebuild), Hon. Nicky Wagner, welcomed the release of the Arts Centre Vision as an opportunity for Building Back Better:
This is about not just restoring the physical buildings but also providing a foundation for arts, culture, heritage, and education in a much stronger way than has ever been done before. [...] We will benefit from not only restoring our history and culture but also from the site being strengthened and improved for future generations (quoted in NZP, 2014d p 18886).

Finally, the recovery of the Ars Centre has been showcased as an opportunity for the future of the Christchurch CBD and the city at large. The ACC acknowledged how “the Arts Centre will play a vital role in the rebirth of Christchurch as a creative city and through the region’s reconstruction effort” (ACC, 2013e, p5). Similarly, the contribution of the Arts Centre in the recovery of the arts, culture and leisure has been particularly emphasized by those organizations and stakeholders with a say or a key decision-making role with regards to the future of the site (e.g. CCT, 2014).

5.5.1 Rhetoric on market and government

Before the earthquakes, the Arts Centre was experiencing a phase of increasing commercialization that favoured rental income generation at the expenses of the vulnerable arts community. Under the directorship of Ken Franklin, the ACC embarked on a long-term strengthening programme for the Arts Centre site that sought to refurbish the buildings of the complex to accommodate the interests of current and prospective businesses (Jim). The aggressive entrepreneurial approach by the ACC embodied a range of development principles typical of contemporary site management, which put heritage conservation principles and cultural development agenda at odds. This approach exacerbated during the NCoM project controversy.

The post-earthquake governance of the Arts Centre further embraced the dogmas of corporatization and business management that had started to emerge in the years under Tony Payne and Ken Franklin’s directorships. The rhetoric of financial sustainability and the advocacy for a business-like governance mode (ACC, 2013b, 2013h; Nahkies, 2012) framed the recovery of the Arts Centre to the principles dear to market-led development. Particularly through the Arts Centre Vision, the ACC has been seeking to reach a full occupation of the site,
with subsequent displacement of artists once housed in the premises of the site. This aspect was raised by one of the participants:

Well, the Arts were always part, an important part of the Arts Centre. But, you know, it is around visual arts, you know, we can’t... we can't become the dumping ground of everybody’s piece of artwork on the site. We are going to do it in a controlled way, we have got to understand, you know, some of the commercial implications of that, because, equally, we need to tenant the site (John).

Upon release of the Arts Centre Vision in 2013, the ACC and the Management Team led by Andre Lovatt implemented the tenancy strategy for the site to attract creative industries to the complex and make of the Arts Centre “a hub of creative entrepreneurs in central Christchurch that is undeniably 21st Century” (ACC, 2016a, n.p.). Complementary businesses from retail and leisure are framed as complementary to these key anchors, in the attempt to attract “dynamic mix of tenants with broad appeal to our community, visitors and stakeholders” (ACC, 2016a, n.p.). A handful of big tenants comprising the University of Canterbury, C&CT and Rutherford’s Den embody the characteristics of mixed anchor uses enshrined in the Arts Centre Vision “to attract […] businesses to every part of the site – something that wasn’t possible before” (ACC, 2016a, n.p.). The ACTB considered having the University of Canterbury as tenant of the Old Chemistry Building as ideal because:

having essentially one big tenant per building was way easier to administrate from a lease point of view, opex, allocation costs of the building, it brings continuity, it brings a lot of people onto the site. It brings on, essentially, arts, music or educational part of the charter of the Arts Centre. And you bring a sense of activity in the site in terms of more security as well because you will have more people around. So, yeah, it ticked a lot of boxes as this would be a wonderful solution (Gregory).

Conversely, performing arts organizations, which once represented a key feature of the Arts Centre, are unlikely to be considered as prospective tenants due to the tight economic return the ACC would gain from leasing premises to these organizations (ACC, 2013e). As one participant commented:

Is the Arts Centre’s role to provide cheap access to venues for the performing arts? [...] We can go down that road and then struggle to find money. Or do you maximize your rental
return for the benefit of the complex as a whole? And, probably, the answer is not totally both of those, but something in the middle (John).

Focusing on the rhetoric on government, the ACC before the earthquakes conceived the public sector – particularly the CCC – as a complementary funding source and a key enabler of rules that prevented the loss of commercial revenues (ACC, 2007, 2010a). These standpoints emerged in the feedback submitted to the Department of Internal Affairs in June 2007, in which Franklin advocated for a review of the proposed Fire Rescue funding scheme to lessen the burden of insurance costs over the tenants of the Arts Centre and, in turn, prevent the loss of commercial revenues (ACC, 2007). In the Arts Centre’s view, the Government’s proposal to charge Fire and Rescue levies through property insurance would have negatively impacted on the Arts Centre finances, as more than two-thirds of the revenues came from tenancies (ACC, 2010a). At local government level, instead, the Arts Centre Management Team strongly advocated for a dedicated Council contribution to fund the retention and earthquake strengthening of the site. In their view, the commitment of the CCC had to be constant. However, the rationale of the Council budgeting between 2006 and 2010 had steadily streamlined the available local government funding.

Following the earthquakes, discussion on the role of the public sector in the recovery of the Arts Centre has been sidelined in the recovery agenda in favour of a policy discourse that praised business-like modes of governance. Key stakeholders were sceptical in the involvement of national and local government as either shareholder or contributor to the Arts Centre. The Annual Report for 2010, which was released following the September 2010 earthquake, acknowledged that:

Given the current operating environment in the city, there is understandably little appetite to marginally increase the financial contribution locally that would be directed towards the conservation works, so alternative options need to be investigated (ACC, 2011a, p5).

A similar emphasis on the marginal role to be played by the government authorities was stressed in the Nahkies report. The unwillingness of government intervention on the future of the Arts Centre was justified as result of the devastating repercussions of the earthquakes in the Christchurch CBD, with the Council unlikely “to take on extra funding obligations at this
time” (Nahkies, 2012, p37). This, in turn, reflected in the argumentation against a governance reform by change of ownership under either local and regional authority:

The City Council has a current right to nominate to the Trust Board; the Regional Council has had it in the past (when the Council was first formed in 1989). If, however, one of the reasons for a change was to give the Arts Centre a ‘home’ that would offer greater certainty about both post-earthquake restoration and future sustainability, neither option would seem particularly attractive in the present environment (Nahkies, 2012, p39).

5.5.2 Urban regeneration and development

Before the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the rhetoric of regeneration dominated the pro-development discourse around the Arts Centre. In presenting the NCoM project, the University of Canterbury Vice-Chancellor, Dr Rod Carr, argued that the relocation of the School Music in the CBD “would add to its vibrancy, attract more visitors and provide significant spin-offs for businesses in the inner city” (UC, 2009, p1), while Mayor Bob Parker stressed the value of the project in the wider city regeneration strategy (UC, 2009, p1). Similarly, the ACTB Chairman, John Simpson, argued that the Conservatorium project would have brought “a range of compelling benefits to the Arts Centre” (ACC, 2010a, p3) and that the new facility would have aligned “perfectly with the expectations expressed in the objects of our Trust Deed” (ibid.).

The proponents advocated for the NCoM by promoting the implications of the project for the economic and cultural future of the city centre. In their view, Christchurch would have benefited “considerably from having students and staff working, studying and socialising in the city centre” (CCC, 2009h, p10). Having the University of Canterbury back in the city centre would have contributed “to the revitalisation of the central city [and] add to the cultural activities already undertaken in that area” (CCC, 2009c, p8). Notwithstanding the evidence of the likely aesthetic impact of a large-sized development in a valuable heritage site, the proponents of the Conservatorium argued that “the project would allow a direct and long-term commitment to conservation, initially through seismic protection and subsequently by reducing the pressure on the existing buildings to produce revenue” (ACC, 2010a, p3).
The stakeholders opposing the Conservatorium project argued that the individuals and organizations supporting the development did not acknowledge the implications of having such a facility in the Arts Centre site. Albeit most of the stakeholders criticized the project in terms of its capacity to generate economic benefits (Ben), attract student population in the CBD (Vanessa) and conservation enhancement (Kevin), there were stakeholders from the arts sector backing the argument of the Conservatorium being a catalyst for central city regeneration:

I very much supported the idea of you know, the music being located here [at the Arts Centre]. It was wonderful to be in the city. [...] I thought it was important the University was in the city, and the Arts Centre was the obvious place for it to be (Jim).

The post-earthquake debating over the recovery of the Arts Centre embodied the same pro-development rhetoric of the previous years. The large-scale heritage retention programme for the site has been promoted as the once in a lifetime opportunity “to reinstate those design aspects that are characteristic of Gothic revival buildings” (ACC, 2013I, p2) and return architectural features that had been compromised by years of hap-hazard site management and restricted funding. The undisputed heritage value of the Arts Centre was nevertheless second to the “Arts Centre’s focus on arts, culture and education” (ACC, 2013C, p1). Ultimately, the ACC acknowledged the need to make amendments inside the buildings “to bring 19th Century infrastructure up to the task of accommodating for the needs of the 21st Century and beyond” (ACC, 2013E, p6). Notwithstanding the expensive restoration project underway for the listed heritage buildings, the ACC embraced the inputs of the recovery strategy and the Vision as appropriate to attract tenants to the complex (ACC, 2015A, 2015B).

A decisive turn on the redevelopment argumentations around the Art Centre concerned the so-called creative industries (ACC, 2013E). The ACC’s “ambition to achieve an authentic hub for creative entrepreneurs” (ACC, 2013A, p1) emerged since the re-opening of the Old Registry Building in July 2013, with the Trust seeking to attract creative industries to the newly-refurbished unit (ACC, 2013G). The rhetoric advocating for a creative-oriented redevelopment of the Arts Centre was particularly stressed in the Arts Centre Vision:

Governments and creative sectors across the world are increasingly recognising its importance as a generator of jobs, wealth and cultural engagement. At the heart of the
creative economy are the cultural and creative industries that lie at the crossroads of arts, culture, business and technology (ACC, 2013e, p11).

The first opportunity for the Arts Centre is to catalyse and host the rich programming and multiplicity of creative enterprises that are flourishing in the city at this time (ACC, 2013e, p29).

A co-working hub at the Arts Centre will reinforce the strong linkages between the arts, creative industries, and business. In a co-working environment, informal spaces, open collaboration spaces, incubating spaces and lettable office space provide a flexible platform for independent professionals and organisations to operate a business at the Arts Centre. Co-working hubs enable serendipitous social interactions which create value in the creation phase of projects and enterprises (ACC, 2013e, p20).

The rhetoric of Building Back Better was often emphasized by stakeholders and participants in presenting the ongoing and future projects for the Arts Centre (ACC, 2016c). Thanks to some of the extensive work made possible following the earthquakes, the Arts Centre was able “to better utilize those spaces that will be able to generate more income” (John).

5.5.3 Tourism

The growing commercialization of the Arts Centre site is particularly relevant to the arguments that the ACTB made with respect to tourism. The notion of the Arts Centre as a tourist attraction was particularly strong before the earthquakes, as the site was among the key attractions in the Christchurch CBD (C&CT, 2012a). In the view of the ACTB, the tourism economy contributed significantly to the site and the Arts Centre had to ensure the very best visitor experience (ACC, 2010a). The argument of tourist appeal, furthermore, was used to market the Arts Centre as a site for prospective commercial tenants and to unilaterally make amendments in the tenancy contracts because “there were a lot of awful commercial people [who] had a very cheap rental for a number of years” (Elton). The ACC believed that these amendments were legitimate due to the many visitors coming to the site every year (Gregory). However, some of the hospitality tenants acknowledged that the Arts Centre original purpose
as a place for local crafts and arts (Elton) had steadily led way to shops and stallholders selling tacky souvenirs to tourist (Claire) for the sake of greater revenue.

The re-definition of the Arts Centre as a tourist site was not unilaterally shared among decision-makers and consultants. According to the Nahkies report, “the restoration of the Arts Centre’s role as a tourist facility” (Nahkies, 2012, p11) was among the key management issues for the ACTB to sort out in the aftermath of the February 2011 earthquake. The centrality of tourism in the future of the Arts Centre was dear to the Management Team led by Ken Franklin following the 2011 seismic events:

> Our immediate challenge is [rebuild] so that the [...] visitors will have the confidence to return and enjoy what is now almost certainly the ‘jewel in the crown’ collection of heritage buildings in Christchurch (ACC, 2012, p4).

Most of the stakeholders and decision-makers, however, have steadily downplayed the role of tourism in the post-earthquake governance of the Arts Centre. For instance, the market research commissioned by the ACC following the September 2010 earthquake sought to provide the Trust with a strategy for “a site that encourage[d] regular attendance from the locals, and a site that [was] not simply a flagship for tourism” (ACC, 2011a, p9). The predominance of the locals over the visitors was further embraced following the appointment of Andre Lovatt as Director of the site. In presenting the 2012 Annual Report, Lovatt reiterated that the focuses of the ACC were that of “enabling the Arts Centre to reclaim its vitally important place in the lives of the people of Christchurch, and those who visit” (ACC, 2013b, p7) and of pursuing the attraction of creative entrepreneurs to the site (ibid.).

The Arts Centre Vision envisioned the community as the primary user of the site. From the very beginning, the Trust’s goal was to make of the Arts Centre “a cornerstone creative institution that responds to the needs of Cantabrians first and foremost” (ACC, 2013e, p8). Tourism and the visitor economy at large were conceived as collateral yet desired users of the Arts Centre. In the view of the Director, Andre Lovatt, by turning the Arts Centre as a place for the tenants and the residents, the appeal of the site among tourists would follow (ACC, 2013b, 2013e). As the Director further reiterated:
I also want us to focus our efforts on making the Arts Centre a place [where] domestic and international visitors will value the authenticity of the Arts Centre’s offer and become patrons themselves (ACC, 2013e, p4).

Some of the participants conceived tourism as subsidiary to the redevelopment of the Arts Centre as a site for creative industries and residents. According to Jim:

Building on the overall Vision that they have for the Arts Centre, the potential for this site is to become and what they’re developing in here in terms of the infrastructure is, this place [i.e. the Arts Centre] can become a draw card for the city. And I think one of the most important things – and best things – is that this is a much-loved site by for residents of the city, and perhaps one of the major criticisms of the site before the earthquake was that its identity was confused in the sense that it was very much aimed at tourism and aimed at, you know, appealing to tourists. [...] Whereas what they could do now, is to actually appeal to local residents, and make this a place – and if they actually start with that, then actually tourism I think would actually grow out of that because if the residents themselves love the site and actually want to spend time here and are part of making it, in actual fact that becomes exciting for tourists, because it’s a place with a real vibe and sense of community and participation and activity (Jim).

The Arts Centre Vision, however, recognized the potentialities of tourism and of visitor economy in the future of the Arts Centre. Andre Lovatt himself acknowledged that “domestic and international visitors will value the authenticity of the Arts Centre’s offer” (ACC, 2013e, p4) Throughout the Arts Centre Vision, tourism and hospitality are regarded as key elements “to allow visitors to linger on site and activate the site” (ACC, 2013e, p26). A further complementary use of the Arts Centre as a tourist site envisioned “the offering of boutique accommodation” (ACC, 2013e, p27) to enhance the visitor experience at the Arts Centre, which underpins other initiatives of the kind at heritage sites (ACC, 2013h). In this way, it is believed that visitors “will be able to come back to the site to experience the arts from a permanent venue” (ACC, 2014a, p1).

The importance of tourism for the Arts Centre site is further reiterated in the bipartisan support of the ACCTB in 2014. It is argued that visitors will be attracted by the cultural vibrancy of the site granted by “the original intentions of the Trust Deed” (NZP, 2014d, 18886) and the
presence of a mixed array of tenants and users (ACC, 2016a). The importance of tourism to the Arts Centre and the rhetoric of bringing some features of the site as originally intended is similarly emphasized among participants:

Oh, it [referring to the Arts Centre] will be a huge impact to leisure and tourism. By the end of this year [2015] we will have a third of the site re-activated and, by this time next year, it will be half. There will be activities that will draw people back to the CBD and part of the Vision for the Arts Centre has been to create a modern interpretation of what it used to be back in the past. (John)

The Vision is to re-instate this sort of attraction by increasing the offer of leisure, culture, education and experience to the community [...] We are developing a restoration and repopulation in a way that it will be a key tourist attractor once it is fully restored. To that end, we are working closely with other tourism agencies and with the regulatory authorities to ensure that there is a shining light of tourism that brings people back into the city (Donna).

It [tourism] is absolutely critical. These buildings are gems or architecture. The whole site is probably the last existing one in New Zealand if, in fact, there weren't any others of such quality. And as an entertainment, tourist area, it is integral to the city feels about itself. (Vanessa).

5.6 Summary

The recovery of the Arts Centre represents an exception to the systematic demolition of heritage buildings carried by the national recovery authorities since the establishment of CERA. The chapter illustrated the governance of the Arts Centre over the period between 2007-2014 by looking at the overt, covert and hegemonic dimensions of power and how stakeholders’ coalescences, instrumentation policy and policy discourses evolved before and after the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes. By looking at key episodes of governance we can conclude that, prior to the earthquakes, the Arts Centre was heading towards what can be considered as a second wave of retail gentrification, with escalating tensions between the ACC and the existing tenants culminated with the NCoM controversy of 2009-2010. The earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 heightened the process of gentrification, as the unilateral
termination of leases due to the seismic event gave to the ACC a once in a lifetime occasion to rethink its internal governance and the tenancy strategy.

As mentioned in the chapter, the new governance mode for the ACTB came into effect following the promulgation of the ACCTB. The new skill-based governance came into effect in early 2016 and most of the Trust and Management Team members were replaced by a smaller executive unit comprising local influential players from key cultural and educational organizations. Notwithstanding the rhetoric around the restoration of the Trust objectives enshrined in the original Trust Deed, the chapter showed how the objectives included in the Bill restate those of the controversial 2008 amendment. The emphasis on creative industries and the principle of financial sustainability are features of a governance archetype rooted in neoliberal thinking that places commercial needs foremost in the conceptualisation of heritage places.
Chapter 6

“CERA see arts as a decorative bit of icing on the cake”\textsuperscript{2}. The retention of the Town Hall and development of the Performing Arts Precinct

The Performing Arts Precinct really came out of, I think, the Government’s Blueprint as opposed to what the Council had come out of. The Council had come out with an idea of looking at a collaboration with some of the Performing Arts venues, but the Town Hall, from my point of view, was significant (Adam).

During the preparation of the Blueprint, the Blueprint Team was instructed by the Minister of Recovery to assume that the site of the Town Hall and the conditions of the Town Hall were such that it would not be possible to repair the Town Hall (Edward).

6.1 Introduction

The above interview extracts illustrate how the debates concerning the retention – or demolition – of the Town Hall influenced the decision-making process for the Performing Arts Precint project since its official launch in July 2012. Both extracts show how the initial precinct proposal was based on the political input from the central Government, which strongly advocated for the demolition of the Town Hall and its replacement with a brand-new cluster for the performing arts (Brownlee, 2013b). However, any decision over the Town Hall complex was subject to the CCC. Contrary to the recommendations from the central Government, the Council was adamant in retaining the facility, as suggested by the Council deliberations of November 2012 and August 2013 (CCC, 2012e, 2013h, 2013j). As result, the CCDU downsized the project of the Performing Arts Precinct by partially lifting designation for the site and announcing the first phase of the project to be carried out in partnership with the Music Centre of Christchurch (MCC) in mid-2014 (CCDU, 2014e, 2014f). The case of the Town Hall

\textsuperscript{2} Interview with Amanda
and Performing Arts Precinct is among the most controversial decisions in post-earthquake CBD rebuild, with a polarized debate among parties seeking to provide Christchurch with state-of-the-art performing venues.

The issue over performing arts venues Christchurch was particularly strong in the eve of the earthquakes. On the one hand, Vbase embarked on a NZD$ 20.2 million project for the restoration of the Town Hall (CCC 2011a; Vbase, 2011). On the other hand, some of the main performing arts organizations in the central city were on the verge to sort out their chronical tenancy issues with the decisive support of the CCC. As at September 2010, Christchurch could rely on a heterogeneous array of cultural and artistic venues and the city was renowned as a major cultural hub nationwide (Moore, 2013).

The repercussions of the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes were particularly hard for the arts stakeholders and the hosting of performing arts events in the city of Christchurch (Greenhill & Carville, 2011; Oliver, 2014). In the very aftermath of the February 2011 earthquakes, arts stakeholders coalesced together to lobby for a greater emphasis on the arts in the recovery of Christchurch. The engagement among arts advocates was unprecedented in a city like Christchurch, where the governance for the arts was strongly influenced by a narrow group of arts organizations closely tied to the CCC. It is argued here that the pleas from the arts community for arts venues and events were heavily exploited through *ad hoc* rhetoric by both local and national governments, with haphazardous decisions being made at the expenses of sound proposals.

This chapter consists of five sections. Section 6.2 introduces the context of the Town Hall and of the performing arts facilities before and after the earthquakes, with a focus on the period between 2007 and 2014. Section 6.3, presents a series of findings with respect to the modes of governance and the stakeholders’ dynamics before and after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. The analysis is further addressed in Section 6.4, which illustrates the mechanisms of non-decision-making, the role of information and the policy instruments in framing decisions over the Town Hall and the Performing Arts Precinct. Section 6.5 then introduces the rhetoric linking urban attractiveness and tourism to the Town Hall and the building of performing arts facilities in the Christchurch CBD. Finally, Section 6.6 provides a summary of the findings that emerged from the case study.
6.2 Chronology of the events

Before the earthquakes, the Christchurch CBD was home to a thriving performing arts community led by renowned performing arts organizations like the Court Theatre, the Free Theatre of Christchurch, the ITR, the MCC and the Christchurch Symphony Orchestra (CSO) (Crean, 2011b; CSO, 2013; Free Theatre of Christchurch, 2014; ITR, 2014b). The blooming of performing arts in the city centre was contemporary to the launch of the Town Hall project at the end of the 1960s and the relocation of theatre companies at the Arts Centre between 1976 and 1981 (CCC, 2012d, HMS, 2012). These venues made of Christchurch a national and international cultural hub with renowned performing arts venues that contributed to the marketing of the city as a tourist destination.

Unlike with the case of the Arts Centre, the location of arts facilities altered considerably as result of the earthquakes. The designation of the Performing Arts Precinct site was justified due to the presence of the ITR in the area and the Government’s overarching idea of establishing a dedicated district for theatres and concert halls close to the proposed Convention Centre Precinct (CCDU, 2012c, Wright, 2012). For the purposes of the narrative, this chapter focuses on four key governance episodes: the pre-earthquake policy agenda for performing arts venues; the drafting of the first central city recovery plan in 2011; the drafting of the Performing Arts Precinct in 2012 and; the CSA between the CCC and the Crown reached in 2013.

6.2.1 2007-2010: The performing arts venues before the earthquakes

Before the first earthquake of September 2010, the city of Christchurch was a national and international cultural hub with renowned performing arts venue and events. Focusing on the CBD area, the Town Hall of the Performing Arts (hereafter, the Town Hall) was a T-shaped complex designed by local architects Miles Warren and Maurice Mahoney and inaugurated in 1972 as part of the urban makeover for the 1974 Commonwealth Games (HCG, 2011a). Due to its iconicity, the Town Hall was awarded the NZIA’s Gold Medal in 1973 and it was listed as
a Group 1 heritage building by the CCC in 1995 (CCC, 1995a; W&M, 2014). Originally, the Town Hall was meant to be a multi-purpose building for conferences and cultural events. However, with the opening of new conference and event facilities in Christchurch during the 1990s, the Town Hall had become a secondary venue, with the CSO occasionally performing in the Auditorium. A key step towards the ultimate conversion of the Town Hall as a primary performing arts venue occurred in June 2009, with the CCC allocating NZD$ 20.2 million for the refurbishment of the facility and transferring the property of the complex to Vbase (CCC, 2009a, 2009b, 2009e). In June 2010, a conservation plan was prepared to upgrade the complex (CCC, 2013h; HMS, 2012). Resource consents were issued but works never began due to the earthquake of 2010 and 2011.

Unlike with the Town Hall, the key organizations identified in the Performing Arts Precinct – MCC, the CSO and the Court Theatre – were spread across the Christchurch CBD before the earthquakes. The MCC had a long-term lease in a listed heritage building on the south-east edge of the CBD. Such favourable lease was possible thanks to the decisive support of the CCC, which granted a contract from 2010 until 2029 and allocated funds for minor upgrades to the site (CCC, 2010e). Instead, the CSO was negotiating an agreement with the CCC for the purchase of the Salvation Army Citadel adjacent to the Town Hall in 2010 (CCC, 2013h), with the Council contributing up to NZD$ 2 million and the CSO covering the remaining NZD$ 3.25 million for the building (Conway, 2010b, 2010c). Finally, the Court Theatre did not own a venue, but it could rely on a special lease at the Arts Centre. Notwithstanding the relevance of the Court Theatre as performing arts venue in Christchurch and overseas (Steeman, 2008), there had been tensions with the ACC, particularly during the NCoM project controversy (see Chapter 5). Figure 6.1 shows the location of the afore-mentioned facilities as at September 2010.

6.2.2 2010-2014: The performing arts venues after the earthquakes

The earthquake of September 4th, 2010 did not affect the major performing arts venues in Christchurch (Steeman, 2010b). When the earthquake struck (4.35 am), all venues were closed, but events ran regularly despite limited damages. The CSO resumed its performances
at the Town Hall, while the Court Theatre and the MCC were able to return to their performing venues a few weeks after the earthquakes. In November 2010, the CSO reached the agreement with the CCC to get NZD$ 2 million for the purchase and refurbishment of the Salvation Army Citadel (Conway, 2010b).

The earthquake of February 22nd, 2011 severely damaged the performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD, with the forced closure of the Town Hall, the eviction of the Court Theatre from the Arts Centre and the demolition of the buildings home to the MCC and the CSO (Ansley, 2011; CERA, 2015; Gates, 2011e). Moreover, the establishment of the central city red cordon had severe consequences for performing arts organizations. The impossibility to access equipment and the lack of appropriate venues put ballet, acting and music concerts in a limbo during the first months following the earthquakes (Moore, 2011a, 2013). The resulting
The exodus of artists away from Christchurch further sharpened the crisis of the arts community (Moore, 2013).

The February 2011 earthquake proved to be particularly harsh to the CSO. The demolition of the Salvation Army Citadel and the closure of the Town Hall meant that the Orchestra had to find other performing and rehearsal facilities for the time being (Crean, 2011a; Moore, 2013). By April 2011, the CSO had found a temporary office location at the CPIT along with other local arts companies and the earthquake response division of Creative New Zealand (CNZ) (Moore, 2013). Nevertheless, the company was still struggling to find a new venue where to perform. The expansion of the Air Force Museum launched at the end of 2011 provided the CSO with the necessary space for the Orchestra to regularly run its programme (Gates, 2013d; Lee, 2011). The facility, however, was a temporary solution and it was far from being functional for the intended purposes. As the CSO acting Chief Executive – and retail magnate – Richard Ballantyne complained to the media in 2013, there were raising concerns “about not having a home, not having an appropriate facility to perform in and the time it will take to provide a facility” (quoted in Gates, 2013d, pA5).

The termination of leases at the Arts Centre left the Court Theatre without a performing venue. On late March 2011, the ACC informed the Court Theatre that the tenancy agreement was no longer valid (Gates, 2011e). With the intent of permanently leaving the Arts Centre, the Court Theatre looked at venues outside the cordoned city centre and launched a global fundraising campaign to convert an old grain store into a temporary theatre (Gates, 2011f, 2011h, 2011k; Moore, 2011d). Thanks to the philanthropy of actors from New Zealand and overseas (Lynch, 2011; Mathewson, 2011), the contribution from CNZ and the conspicuous donation from the Canterbury Earthquake Appeal Trust (CEAT), the Court Theatre managed to fund the refurbishment of an abandoned grainstore in the outskirts of the CBD. The new facility was opened at the end of 2011 (Gates, 2011f, 2011i; Lynch, 2011; Mathewson, 2011).

The February 22nd, 2011 earthquake severely hit the MCC site, with considerable damages on the walls and the collapse of the stairs inside the building (MCC, 2012a). Following a preliminary damage assessment in March 2011, the recovery authorities listed the building for demolition (MCC, 2012a). In June 2011, the MCC’s Manager, Bronwyn Bijl publicly stated that the company would be looking for a new site in the CBD where to build a new facility.
Conversation with the CCC between 2011 and 2012 culminated with the release of a project for the development of a new Centre in a way that was consistent with the CCC’s CBD draft plan (Law, 2012). Following the establishment of the CCDU in April 2012, however, the MCC and a group of local music organizations – Voice of Music – presented a joint submission to the recovery authorities with a recommendation to include a community music centre in the preparation of the final CBD plan (Moore, 2012). Unlike other performing arts organizations, the MCC had business interruption insurance and eventually secured a pay-out of approximately NZD$10 million (MCC, 2012a, 2012b, 2013).

The earthquake of February 22nd, 2011 severely affected the Town Hall, and the building has been closed to the public ever since. A series of geo-engineering assessments undertaken after the earthquakes reported noticeable damages to the structure, moderate to extensive lateral spreading and the presence of an old river terrace underneath the complex (EQC, 2012; HCG, 2011b; Tonkin & Taylor, 2011b). Reports concluded that the repeated aftershocks had decreased the load capacity of the Town Hall below the 33% threshold of the New Building Standards (NBS), but inferred that the complex could be restored above the 67% minimum requirement by reinforcing the site foundations and rebuilding the floor of the Auditorium (HCG, 2011b).

The earthquakes represented a key episode in the establishment of grassroots organizations advocating for the performing arts in the city. Among them, the Arts Voice group and Voice of Music represented major and secondary arts stakeholders through the design and launch of the central city recovery plan (AV, 2014; CCC, 2014c). One of the cornerstones of these organizations was to overcome the conservative model of key arts organizations as well as the fragmentations and hostilities within the arts community that characterised the pre-earthquake governance for performing arts venues. Arts Voice strongly advocated for the delivery of arts-related facilities in the city and proactively engaged institutions by submitting project proposals and suggestions to the recovery authorities. On the other hand, Voice of Music sought to lobby the local and national authorities to provide a fit-for-purpose music facility in the Christchurch CBD.

During the Share an Idea campaign, performing arts stakeholders highly regarded the importance of building new venues in the recovery of the Christchurch CBD (CCC, 2011j). The
CCC similarly stressed the need for new performing arts facilities in its preliminary central city plan in August 2011 and foresaw an investment of approximately NZD$ 76 million for a new theatre and community performance venues (CCC, 2011g). The plan, moreover, advocated for the retention of the Town Hall, thus acknowledging the instances of both the CCC and the community (CCC, 2011g). The M 5.5 aftershock of June 6th, 2011, however, further damaged the Town Hall, thus delaying its re-opening (Gates, 2011l; Gorman, 2011b; Sachdeva, 2011a). Nonetheless, the final draft of December 2011 reiterated the CCC’s commitment to retain the Town Hall (CCC, 2011d).

The ground and infrastructural damages reported to the Royal Commission by San Francisco-based Rutherford & Chekene on the Town Hall in April 2012 concluded that the full retention of the complex was uneconomic (Rutherford & Chekene, 2012). The national Government and the CCDU “had little expectations the Town Hall would remain” (Thomas) and instructed the Blueprint Team to design the precinct for the arts without including the building in the project (CCDU, 2012b). The Blueprint Team itself was aware that the existing Town Hall sat on “a very poor piece of land in geological terms and geotechnical terms” (Edward).

The CCRP represented a crucial moment for the performing arts organizations in Christchurch. Unlike with the CCC’s draft plans, which only provided a range of potential locations for the building of theatres and performing arts facilities (CCC, 2011d), the CCDU designated a dedicated area of the CBD for the performing arts. The area chosen for the Performing Arts Precinct comprised the land around the ITR (Wright, 2012), with CERA as project leader in collaboration with the CCC, MCH, the local Maori tribe Ngāi Tahu and representatives from the private sector (CCDU, 2012d). On paper, the precinct consisted of two blocks and it included restaurant facilities, two Auditoria and permanent venues for the CSO, the Court Theatre and the MCC (CCDU, 2012d) (Figure 6.2).

For projects such as the Performing Arts Precinct, planners were free to design the building first and then find a location regardless of the availability of feasible sites in the CBD (McCrone, 2012b). As the head architect for the Blueprint, Don Miskell, argued, the team had the opportunity to re-design the city centre from scratches, with the national Government using the statutory powers of the earthquake legislation to designate the land for the anchor
projects (McCrone, 2012b). Powers were exercised to locate the new Town Hall on a parcel of land with relevant market appeal (Edward).

The reactions to the Performing Arts Precinct were mixed. The then Director of the Central City Business Association (CCBA), Paul Lonsdale, was in favour of bringing together performing arts into a new cultural complex (Platt, 2012). The prospect tenants of the precinct and members of the Arts Voice group “were happy so long as they had support and there was home for the Court Theatre, Music Centre and so on” (Edward). Other members of the arts’ community, however, raised concerns about the location and the facilities outlined in the project (Anderson, 2012).

The input from the national Government on the Town Hall was at odds with the draft recovery plan issued by the CCC in 2011:

The Performing Arts Precinct really came out of, I think, the Government’s Blueprint as opposed to what the Council had come out of. The Council had come out with an idea of
looking at a collaboration with some of the Performing Arts venues, but the Town Hall, from my point of view, was significant (Adam).

Eventually, the Council voted unanimously to retain the Town Hall (CCC, 2012e) and instructed its staff to “evaluate the merits of retaining the main auditorium, and developing a new entrance and gathering space, provided the overall acoustic quality, and sense of place associated with the Town Hall” (CCC, 2012a, p10). Despite the CCC’s vote to retain the existing Town Hall complex, CERA and the CCDU announced the intention to take land for the Performing Arts Precinct site and proceed with the purchase of titles in the block south of Armagh Street (CCDU, 2013i; Gates, 2013b). By the end of April 2013, the Crown had bought NZD$ 12.5 million worth of land and had “agreements in place for the purchase of 33.5% of the land area designated for the precinct” (Isaacs, quoted in Gates, 2013b, pA2). On June 27th, 2013, the Crown and the CCC publicly announced the CSA, which confirmed the CCC as the lead of the project and in charge of the feasibility study for the proposed Performing Arts Precinct (CCC, 2013h; CERA, 2013b; Sheppard & Rout, 2013). The total of the public expenditure was of NZD$ 164 million; with CCC allocating NZD$ 157.5 million, and the Crown budgeting NZD$ 8 million of purchased land to be transferred to the Council.

The Council’s decision, in August 2013, to invest almost all the funds allocated for the retention of the Town Hall persuaded the CCDU to disinvest on 1.07 hectares originally identified for the new Town Hall project (CCDU, 2014e). The amended precinct plan was released in June 2014 and it is expected to develop a one block area dedicated to the culture and the arts (CCDU, 2014f). Unlike with what agreed back in 2013, the first building of the precinct – the MCC (later renamed The Piano) – was carried by CERA and the CCDU. The Crown land originally designated for a parking lot was leased to the MCC to initiate the project, with opening expected by the end of 2016 (Figure 6.3).

As at September 2014, the Horncastle Arena in Addington is the only fully operative venue out of the pre-earthquake facilities portfolio owned by Vbase. Meanwhile, the Council staff was instructed to start looking for tenders for the recovery of the Town Hall (Vbase, 2013, 2014). Limitedly to the Performing Arts Precinct, the Council is contributing NZD$30 million towards the project as part of the CSA with the Crown (CCC, 2014a). Real estate experts from Jones
Lang LaSalle were appointed “to provide a high-level review of the capital and operational funding requirement” of the Performing Arts Precinct (CCC, 2014a, p84).

![Figure 6.3: Performing Arts Precinct as at June 2014](source CCDU (2014g))

6.3 The overt dimension of power: haphazardous coalescence

Before the earthquakes, the increasingly relevant role of the CCC in the governance for performing arts venues and organizations had heightened the dependency of arts organizations to the initiatives of the Council. This directly contributed to the increase of fractions within the performing arts community. On the one hand, long-established organizations like the ITR, the CSO and the Court Theatre were in a privileged position when it came to Council support. On the other hand, the rush for funds exacerbated the competition between key performing arts organizations.

The earthquakes of September 2010 and December 2010 had minimal repercussions on the existing governance archetypes, as the existing agreements favouring the key performing arts organizations continued regardless of the minor damages to the facilities. Conversely, the
February 2011 earthquake brought to a quick-fix emergency metagovernance to reduce the liabilities of the affected stakeholders. Despite some spontaneous episodes of coalescence among stakeholders, the post-earthquake governance for performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD progressively shifted towards a mix of authoritative and deliberative coalitions led by a narrow number of influential organizations and people. Pre-earthquake unbalances resurfaced, with representatives from the long-established performing arts organizations lobbying the recovery authorities for their own benefit (Jim). The resulting Performing Arts Precinct was used as the base for the negotiations between the local and national authorities on the CSA, which saw high-ranked government officials aggreging on the budget for the site behind closed doors and no possibility of engagement from democratically elected councillors.

6.3.1 Modes of governance and metagovernance

Before the earthquakes, the decision-making process with respect to performing arts venues resembled the archetype of participative governance, with performing arts organizations providing advice in both the drafting of the ES 2007-2017 (CCC, 2007c) and the LTCCP 2009-2019 (CCC, 2009b). Forms of governance closer to the hierarchical model, instead, were prominent in the Council’s role as guarantor and main funding body for the key performing arts organizations in Christchurch (CCC, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010h). In the LTCCP 2009-2019, the CCC allocated NZD$ 24.2 million for the refurbishment of existing performing arts venues in the CBD and provided a total of NZD$ 6.9 million as grant scheme for culture and the arts over a period of ten years (CCC, 2009b, 2010a).

The period before the earthquakes was characterized by a series of coalitions between the Council and long-established performing arts organizations. With regards to the CSO, the CCC acted as guarantor for the organization and provided the Town Hall as exhibition space (CCC, 2009b, 2010a). Right before the September 2010 earthquake, the CSO entered negotiations with the CCC to get funds for the purchase and upgrading of the Salvation Army Citadel (CCC, 2009b, 2013h) and publicly expressed its support for the upgrading of the Town Hall to be included in the Council plans (Amanda). The CCC had relevant institutional and economic ties
also with the MCC, with the Council acting as the Head Lessee (CCC, 2010f, 2010h). Conversely, the coalition between the CCC and the Court Theatre was merely economic, with the Council originally allocating NZD$ 2 million in the LTCCP 2009-2019 for the expansion of the theatre facility at the Arts Centre (CCC, 2009b). However, the decision of the Council on the NCoM jeopardised the expansion project of the theatre at the Arts Centre.

There were, nevertheless, emerging issues over the management and the logistics for performing arts across the Christchurch CBD that affected both public authorities and arts stakeholders. In 2009, CNZ and the CCC conducted a preliminary assessment of the existing performing arts facilities in the city. Around the same time, the CCC looked at the possibility of revitalizing the old Odeon Theatre area and support the funding and implementation of a NZD$ 60 million arts development project (Gates, 2009b). However, the project was sidelined “because there were so many existing facilities that you wouldn’t have just knocked them down and rebuilt them somewhere else” (Colin).

The governance for the performing arts on the eve of the first earthquake slightly shifted towards a more interventionist role of the CCC, with the establishment of the Metropolitan Discretionary Response Fund (MDRF) to assist cultural organizations facing financial strife (CCC, 2010g). The CSO, the MCC and the Court Theatre were among the primary beneficiaries of this funding scheme, as they faced a steady decrease in revenues due to the repercussions of the 2007-2008 GFC. Also, the CCC embarked a two-year reform of Council-owned venue management companies that culminated with the establishment of Vbase (CCC, 2008b). The latter became the owner of the Town Hall following the CCC’s decision to transfer the property of the facility in 2010. Around the same period, the CCC allocated the necessary funds for the Town Hall refurbishment project to begin at the end of 2010 (CCC, 2009b, 2009e, 2010a, 2010l).

Overall, the ties between CCC and the performing arts stakeholders contributed to a fragmented governance (Amanda, Anna, Colin, Jim and Monica) in which conservative and long-established arts organizations like the CSO and the Court Theatre and the MCC were in a privileged position. Conversely, minor arts stakeholders were sidelined from decision-making. Albeit some efforts by the arts community and the creative sector, the governance for arts and performing arts spaces in Christchurch before the earthquakes “had been quite fractured”
A preliminary attempt to get minor performing arts stakeholders to coalesce under a shared project begun when the Council and CNZ worked on a report to assess the existing performing arts facilities. The Council looked at the possibility of revitalizing the old Odeon Theatre as part of a NZD$ 60 million arts complex development (Gates, 2009b). The Council staff explored the possibility to expand the CCRS 2006-2016 (CCC, 2006a, 2006b) by including the development of performing arts venues (Colin). However, the project “hadn’t been developed fully at all before the earthquakes” (Colin). Ultimately, the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 were decisive in encouraging such “high-level discussion” (Colin) at the heart of the planning debate.

The post-earthquake governance for the performing arts in Christchurch has been characterized by episodes of spontaneous, multi-stakeholder engagement that underpin the participatory governance archetype. The Share an Idea initiative was the occasion for performing arts stakeholders to spontaneously provide their input on the wants and needs for the recovery and rebuild of performing arts facilities in the Christchurch CBD (CCC, 2011j). The Council received nearly 5,000 comments addressing the role of culture and the arts in the recovery of Christchurch (CCC, 2011j). Most of the comments focused on performing arts venues and the provision of cultural spaces across the city (Lawrence). The participation of performing arts organizations was characterized by both individual and collective submissions. In the latter case, the input from Arts Voice – an advocacy group established in May 2011 with the support of CNZ – represented a crucial episode of participatory governance, with stakeholders submitting a detailed summary report in which they supported the CCC’s plan for new cultural venues, “the rebuild of the Town Hall as the city’s premier performing arts venue” (AV, 2011c, p4) and the establishment of a dedicated forum for the arts and the creative businesses (CCC, 2011g). As participants recollect:

I think that’s what Arts Voice did in their initial stages. [The group] presented something that all the arts people agreed to, before putting it into the Share an Idea process. They actually consulted more than they have ever consulted before, as far as I am aware (Amanda).

There was a separate movement in the public, a group formed called Arts Voice and they made a submission. [The CCC staff] collated the Share an Idea information and that gave [them] the bones for the plan, along with talking with the community and Arts Voice. And
then, when the draft came out of that, [the staff] was able to put it in a proposal identifying what they thought they needed (Anna).

Upon establishment of the CCDU in April 2012, the governance for performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD shifted towards a slightly amended mode of participatory governance, with stakeholders being identified and invited by a narrow group of key organizations and authorities. This rationale was prominent in the case of the Joint Action Group (JAG), which comprised stakeholders from the MCH, the CCC, CERA, the CCDU, CNZ and Ngāi Tahu. The aim of JAG was to increase institutional dialogue around projects with relevance to the arts and the cultural sectors (MCH, 2012a) and “provide a collaborative platform for the development of the Performing Arts Precinct in consultation with stakeholders and the Performing Arts Precinct project team” (CCC, 2013h, p3).

On paper, JAG had an open-door policy and local and arts advocates “could just get in touch if they wanted to come to a meeting or talk about something” (Anna). However, its members seldom included performing arts stakeholders as they progressively disengaged over the months following the announcement of the Performing Arts Precinct in July 2012 (Anna and Blair). Arts Voice suffered a major blow with the establishment of JAG, with a steady disengagement from the decisions on the Performing Arts Precinct:

In the early phases, JAG members had a role and they would also go to an Arts Voice meeting. That sort of petered out, those invitations stopped coming at a certain point (Anna).

More deliberative forms of governance were established once land designation and early project implementation gained momentum. The hiring of managers by both the CCC and the CCDU for their respective project teams after the announcement of the Performing Arts Precinct was the turning point towards deliberative archetypes of governance. The latter was prominent during the negotiations for the CSA between the Crown and the CCC. National and local authorities sought to find an agreement for the sharing of the costs for the Performing Arts Precinct ahead of the Town Hall decision and announced the deal before the release of the CCC’s 2013-2014 Annual Plan. The difficulties in reaching an agreement over all the anchor projects foreseen in the CCRP, the unresolved issue of the Town Hall insurance (Edward) and the need to make substantial amendments to the LTCCP 2009-2019 persuaded the Cabinet to
suggest the suspension of the *LGA 2002* and allow the CCC to develop a short-term plan that would have included the conditions for the funding of the precinct (McCrone, 2013). However, the effectiveness of the alleged joined governance between the CCC and the CCDU was put to question:

So, the politics of the shared leadership is a challenge. [...] You know, it sounds good, but you have to really be honest about that. If it’s joint leadership, then how does joint leadership work, and is that shared responsibility and is that shared decision-making... At many stages, that wasn’t the case (Anna).

Hierarchical, top-down forms of governance and decision-making prevailed in the drafting of projects and the designation of land. This was the case of the Cabinet’s decision to reject the City Plan changes included in the CCC’s final CBD draft plan and task the CCDU with drafting a new set of amendments and a masterplan that identified the areas for a set of anchor projects in the Christchurch city centre (DPMC, 2012a). The decision of withdrawing the proposed CCC’s final draft for the CBD was taken by the Cabinet before the establishment of the CCDU, as the MCER needed the Government’s approval to expand the financial resources of CERA (DPMC, 2012a). The Minister tasked the CCDU with developing the Blueprint in order to identify the development areas for a range of anchor projects (Brownlee, 2012a, 2012b), with a staff comprising Government officials, seconded Council staff and a team of architects to be appointed through a tender process. As one participant explained:

[CERA and the Government] went out a week before the public announcement about the establishment of CCDU. That was their first time where they actually did it. Many people thought that they developed a lot of the plan beforehand. But, literally, it was only a decision a week before the official launch of the CCDU (Thomas).

Albeit the CCC – in the person of the Mayor, Bob Parker – was welcomed the national Government’s takeover of the CBD rebuild, there was widespread discontent was within the Council (Gates & Sachdeva, 2012a, 2012b). As participants stressed during the interviews:

It [the CCC’ CBD draft plan] was a good piece of work. And done well. And, also, a good outcome. [...] The only thing that makes sense to me is that the Minister and Government had some other objectives they wanted to achieve out of the rebuild of Christchurch that
weren’t reflected in the plan the way they saw it. And they needed to work their way around how to alter the plan in a way to achieve those wider government outcomes (Colin).

[This was] very demoralizing for a local government. And for the level of consultation and expertise that had been brokered into that process. The CCC felt that they’d been able to capture a lot of that thinking into that plan. And so, to have it set aside, and then have another team created and given a hundred days to come up with a new one was very frustrating, because, essentially, it meant that you’d had all that expertise and knowledge just set aside and not tapped into (Anna).

The engagement between stakeholders around the conceptualization and design of the Performing Arts Precinct in the 2012 CCRP resembled the governance archetype common to top-down, quick-fix decision-making, with the consortium of architects seeking to comply with the input from the CCDU and the MCER on the area designated for the precinct:

[The architects] were really clustered in a part of the space where people knew that was their space. But they were there for confidential reasons. They weren't seen to be preparing a plan in a public space or in a private office. They were there, under control (Edward).

The Government wanted to keep control as much as possible. [...] The Central Government didn't trust other people. And Minister Brownlee, in particular, didn't want to give any power to anyone else. He wanted to control as much as he could (Gabriel).

Yeah, so the Minister had a final say in those things. Council also had a say in it, but it was not clear where the actual buck stopped and the fact that they, that central government, had the land meant that they held the power (Anna).

Traits of the hierarchical command-and-control role played by the Minister and the CCDU emerged in the drafting of the Performing Arts Precinct. Architects “were instructed by Brownlee to assume that the retention of the Town Hall was not possible” (Edward) and that a new facility had to be included in the project proposal (Edward and Thomas). The arts stakeholders’ recommendations for a widespread revitalization of the city through the arts was thus sidelined early in the process to lead the way to an alternative site development between the ITR and the proposed Convention Centre Precinct. The project was originally presented to stakeholders as Court Plus (Jim) and was the formative idea of what would later become the Performing Arts Precinct.
The mode of governance for the delivery of the Performing Arts Precinct underpinned that of other projects foreseen in the CCRP, with the establishment of dedicated PPPs between public and private actors. The original plan of 2012 foresaw CERA and the CCDU as the project leaders, in partnership with the CCC, the MCH, Ngāi Tahu and representatives from the private and philanthropic sectors (CCDU, 2012d). The early implementation of the Performing Arts Precinct foresaw two project teams under the CCC and the CCDU working as a joint group. However, the degree of collaboration between these teams and other stakeholders soon fell short:

The message to the public was very much: this is a joint delivery. But from experience, there was no joint about it whatsoever. So, it was very difficult to get information and collaborate (Anna).

The PPP for the Performing Arts Precinct was altered less than a year later, as result of the CSA. The CCC was identified as the project leader and as the sole entity carrying out the decision on the future of the Town Hall. CERA and the CCDU were in charge with the purchase of the land and the promotion of the project to private investors (CCDU, 2013e, 2013l). However, this proposed partnership never saw the light as the Crown – through the CCDU – decided to transfer part of the land purchased to the MCC for The Piano building in June 2014:

While this was supposed to be a City Council led project, the Ministry of Recovery, and particularly the Prime Minister, out of the blue, announced the construction of the Music Centre building would go ahead. And it was different in position from what we had been working on there. [...] The City Council was intensively annoyed to the point of saying: ‘Is this our project or is it a CERA project? And if it is a CERA’s project, just tell us what to do. Otherwise, CERA should step out and we will continue to do what we were thinking it was supposed to be doing in that part of the block’ (Edward).

6.3.2 Stakeholders dynamics

The governance of performing arts venues before the earthquakes was characterized by a narrow group of key individuals with influential positions in the decision-making process. These significant individuals held relevant positions in key political and institutional
organizations in Christchurch. Among them, Bruce Irvine, a senior consultant for Deloitte and Chairman of the Christchurch City Holdings Limited (CCHL) was also Director at Vbase and Trust member of the CSO (CCHL, 2009). Another stakeholder, Richard Ballantyne, was an influential central city businessman and Trust member of the CSO since 2007. The presence of such influential individuals on these organizations was not the exception to the rule. In the case of the MCC, for example, the influence of the Director Bronwyn Bijl was decisive in the CCC’s deliberation to extend the lease for the MCC building and approve the funding of its refurbishment on the eve of the September 2010 earthquake (CCC, 2010f; MCC, 2011b). Other cultural organizations like the ITR and the Christchurch Art Gallery also comprised prominent personalities on trust boards or in directorship roles (Feeney, 2011; ITR, 2009).

Before the earthquakes, the governance for performing arts venues was characterized by episodes of lobbying and forms of clientelism that put established organizations in a privileged position for Council funding. Between 2009 and 2010 the CSO, the MCC and the Court Theatre had managed to get the support of the CCC on their respective venue development proposals. Around NZD$ 5 million were allocated to improve the MCC building in Barbados Street, support the preliminary expansion project of the Court Theatre and help the CSO with the purchase of the Salvation Army Citadel (CCC, 2010f; Conway, 2010b). Moreover, the aforementioned organizations were among the primary beneficiaries of the MDRF ahead of other arts organizations (CCC, 2010g). The approval of the Town Hall refurbishment in June 2010, with extensive work to fix the James Hay Theatre section of the complex, was partly the result of CSO’s Director, Luke di Somma lobbying for a more functional facility (Amanda).

Since the first earthquake, the governance dynamics with regards to performing arts venues saw key individuals proactively shifting the decision-making process. Mayor Bob Parker, for instance, played a decisive role in the deliberation over the Salvation Army Citadel as new CSO rehearsal facility near the Town Hall in November 2010. This decision was not based on the likeability of forthcoming aftershocks. Rather, the Mayor justified the prompt deliberation of the Council arguing that the deal “was too good for the Council to turn down and that there was simply not enough time to consult publicly on the expense” (quoted in The Press, 2010, pA18).

The earthquakes of February and June 2011 spurred the pre-earthquake governance for performing arts venues and the role played by key individuals. Prominent individuals from key performing arts organizations were appointed as directors of the Arts Voice advocacy group, including Philip Aldridge (Director of the Court Theatre) and Luke di Somma (Artistic Director of the CSO). Both Aldridge and di Somma submitted individual comments and proposals to the CCC’s first draft of the central city plan.

The performing arts organizations were openly welcomed to provide extended feedback during the Share an Idea initiative (CCC, 2011j). The involvement of Arts Voice was sponsored through the support of CNZ and the arts community at large decisively contributed in providing their input to the CCC staff working on the cultural stream work. As one participant recalled:

Anybody that wanted to be involved could be involved. [...] We were trying to ensure that we had the theatre groups and that we had the representatives from theatres, from music, you know, from the various arts streams (Lawrence).

During this period, the Court Theatre emerged as the prime beneficiary in the development of performing arts facilities in the CBD. The theatre Director, Philip Aldridge, openly expressed its advocacy to the CCC for “a new theatre to be included in the plan” (Lawrence) and lobbied the CCC to involve the Court Theatre “in planning for the new theatre from the earliest stage, with complete consultation on design” (Aldridge, 2011, p3). Arts Voice and the arts community at large expressed their concerns as to whether the theatre project was specifically for Court Theatre (AV, 2011c) and rather advocated for the Council to “support a theatre that would be accessible for a wide range of independent theatre companies” (CCC, 2011j, p154). This aspect resurfaced in the drafting of the definitive version of the CCC’ CBD plan between October and December 2011.

We were working on the basis that we had things like the Isaacs Theatre Royal, the Court Theatre... We heard about some desires of the Arts community about some performance and venues and spaces. And so, we were trying to find a way to articulate those into the plan (Martha).

Key landowners and developers with an interest in the redevelopment of the city centre played an influential role after the early drafting of the CCC’s plans for the CBD. In particular,
the Carter Group and Anthony Gogh had strong ties with the government authorities and often supported their decisions for the redevelopment of the Christchurch Central city area (Stylianou, 2013a). The involvement of small city centre landowners gained momentum only because of the increasing media coverage following the establishment of the Central Owners Rebuild Entity (CORE) by developers Ernest Duval and Dean Marshall (Frank). Participants involved in the stakeholder engagement and drafting of the first CBD plan similarly stressed the influential input from key city centre landowners and developers (Amanda and Frank) and how it eventually overwhelmed the Arts Voice input in the identification of the cultural assets and projects. The location of the Performing Arts Precinct and the areas designated are evidence of the influence played by prominent local developers. Undoubtedly, “there was some level of protection of property values, particularly in the area where the Precinct was being considered” (Amanda).

The designation of the Performing Arts Precinct site benefited, for example, Angus McFarlane, who had expressed vivid criticism to the “obstructive, dictatorial and impractical” (quoted in Sachdeva & Carville, 2011, pA11) CCC’s draft plan for the CBD released in August 2011. His half-hectare allotment was purchased by the Crown in 2013 for approximately NZD$ 7.9 million (CCDU, 2013m, 2014h; Gates, 2013b; McDonald, 2013c). Similarly, the Carter Group benefited from the location of the Performing Arts Precinct being adjacent to the designated Convention Centre Precinct, as most of the land belonged to the Carter family. The extent of the lobbying from key central city developers and owners on the decision-making process was acknowledged by participants:

I think that it would be interesting to know, when we will have access to, you know, a lot of these conversations that are not public... but I suspect that there was a strong lobbying behind the scenes, especially from a number of prominent property owners and developers in the central city (Max).

There is evidence suggesting that the influential central city developers met regularly with the Council and the national Government authorities in the months that preceded the establishment of the CCDU in April 2012:

When [member of CORE] was invited to the City Council's group there was... there was only a couple of property people there. There was Carter, Gough, Ngāi Tahu and maybe
McFarlane. They were all big property owners. And there was inter-generational wealth. You know, the Carter Group had money transferred, same were the Goughs... same with McFarlane’s. But there were no representatives of small property owners (Frank).

There was a remark from Philip Carter, where he said: ‘We have been talking to the Government about the prospect of the Convention Centre since December 2011’. [...] It’s more than six months before the Blueprint was even announced! (Max).

Upon establishment of the CCDU in mid-April 2012, a group of eight senior architects with consolidated experience in New Zealand and overseas coalesced around Don Miskell, Andrew Barclay and Peter Marshall to work alongside Government officials in the drafting of the CCRP. Marshall, in particular, was determinant in involving long-established architect David Sheppard - President of the Canterbury Society of Arts and of the local NZIA – for the development of the arts precinct envisioned in the CCDU’s white paper (Edward). The way CERA and the CCDU were set up was highly political and it absorbed leading architects within its ranks (Edward). Following the release of the Blueprint, in fact, Don Miskell was appointed by the CCDU as Director for the implementation of the CCRP (CCDU, 2013a). The collaboration with the other architects of the Blueprint Team faded away, as Miskell “hired consultants from generally out of town and much junior in terms of staff” (Edward) and distanced himself from other senior architects in Christchurch.

During the drafting of the CCRP, the decisions regarding the development of performing arts facilities in the Christchurch CBD were a matter of three architects, key arts people like Philip Aldridge and two representatives of Arts Voice (Amanda, Edward and Jim). The inclusion of arts stakeholders by the CCDU and the Blueprint Team, however, endured only in the early phase of engagement (Edward). The location and features of the precinct were based on the inputs from the Court Theatre Chief Executive, Philip Aldridge (Jim). His development proposal, which comprised an outdoor space adjoined to a new theatre set the basis of what eventually became the Performing Arts Precinct (Edward and Jim). With respect to the location of the precinct within the Christchurch CBD, Minister Brownlee, and the Director of the CCDU, Warwick Isaacs, recommended for the precinct to be located near the ITR – considered a “natural magnet” (Thomas) to culture and the performing arts – and in proximity of the site designated for the Convention Centre Precinct. The rationale behind the project was put into question by participants:
And I think the determinant was probably somebody in the planning world at CERA, yeah, somebody up there - kind of putting things on maps without really much understanding of what the needs were (Amanda).

It was the Convention Centre Precinct first and foremost. Absolutely dominated. [They] also asked the Performing Arts to be close by so the partners of people going to a convention could easily go be entertained (Edward).

[They] liked the area for the Performing Arts Precinct was going to be close to the Convention Centre. So, people from the convention would logically have all that stuff going on in that part of town (Gabriel).

The ultimate decision-making process was in the hands of the Minister and a restricted circle of government officials. As participants acknowledged:

People never had a chance to have a say on the Blueprint. [...] There was no Governance to Governance meetings. It was all Governance to Officials and to the Minister. It was a not very good way to make decisions (Adam).

The whole thing in developing the idea, the Vision for the Performing Arts Precinct... CERA and the CCDU didn’t really engage the players enough and take them along with. There was... I think it was quite imposed on all different players. [...] I think they were not really engaged enough in the whole planning, of what it was going to be in the precinct, of who was going to pay for what without really wanting to be there (Gabriel).

The CCC was de facto exauthorized from the decision room. “The Government gave the Blueprint to the developers before it gave it to councillors” (Adam) and the members of the Parliament (Vicky). Albeit on paper Mayor Bob Parker defined the CCDU as “a true partnership between the Christchurch City Council and the Government” (CCC, 2012f, n.p.), there were tensions between the Mayor himself and Minister Brownlee:

The City Council was effectively shut down out of the process, but the Mayor at that time, Mr Bob Parker, became frustrated half-way through during the preparation of the Blueprint saying: ‘This is our city! We should be allowed to come in and see what is happening!’ And so, Brownlee reluctantly gave him a couple of times where we gave him a talk on what they were doing. [...] But effectively it was CERA-run, CERA-controlled-and-concealed under confidential, even from the City Council people (Edward).
For the final drafting of the Performing Arts Precinct, the CCDU restricted the meetings to the MCC, the CSO and the Court Theatre, with no engagement with the arts wider arts community (Amanda and Anna). Key performing arts organizations “just got back into doing their own work” (Amanda). The MCC and the Court Theatre had a strong influence in lobbying national and local authorities to get direct government support in the delivery of brand new facilities (Colin, Edward, Lawrence and Thomas). The Arts Voice group was briefed about the precinct fait accompli (Amanda). As participants commented:

[…] the Court Theatre was so massively benefited in the original plan, I know they were consulted and they were in favour. The Symphony Orchestra was consulted, I’m not sure they were for either, they were sort of biding their time and waiting to see what came out of it. […] There were winners and losers in their model. And the losers were the people that…it was kind of a ‘business as usual’ model, for us, and we thought that was a massive missed opportunity (Amanda).

The arts community had some concerns about what was perceived to be the same old players – more traditional organizations being supported, but that…more experimental types of performing arts in the city weren’t visible in that document (Anna).

Between August 2012 and June 2013, a restricted group of government officials led by the CCDU Director, Warwick Isaacs, negotiated with the CCC’s CEO, Tony Marryatt on what would later be known as the CSA. However, throughout the CSA negotiation process, the decisions of the CCDU team “had to get guidance from Mr Brownlee because […] it was his responsibility to Cabinet to have that document in the way that the Cabinet was happy” (Thomas). Conversely, the CCC’s Executive Team handling the negotiations precluded the elected councillors from accessing draft versions of the CSA. Only one opposition Councillor – Yani Johanson – voted against the final CEO report on the CSA and the decision to delegate Marryatt, Parker and Helen Broughton – Chair of the CCC’s Finance Committee – to sign the agreement with the national Government on behalf of the Council (CCC, 2013i). Councillors were unable to see the definitive version of the agreement (Adam), with the TYP 2013-2016 reporting that:

The CSA with the Crown provides that the final Council and Crown contributions could change as a result of further independent estimation, due for completion by 1 December 2014 (CCC, 2013d, p48).
Negotiations between the CCC and the CCDU on the CSA throughout 2013 was characterized by several meetings behind closed doors. Tony Marryat, Warwick Isaacs and a restricted number of government officials sorted the conditions for the funding of each of the anchor projects envisioned in the CCRP, including the Performing Arts Precinct:

There was a team of government officials behind him [Warwick Isaacs]. He just met with the front person and negotiate with Tony Marryatt. They had all sorts of people: they had Treasury people; they had people from the Ministry of Business, from the Ministry of Heritage and Culture... A number of Government officials from Government agencies, not just CERA. They formulated also things behind the CSA. He [Warwick Isaacs] was just acting as the front man, confronting with Tony [Marryatt] to do the negotiation. And, obviously, the final negotiation was done between the Major and Mr Brownlee. Because that's how these things go – on the last day, when things are done (Thomas).

The JAG team was not involved in the negotiations nor provided advice to the head managers of the CCC and the CCDU. This point was reiterated by one of the interviewees:

The CCC’s Executive Team were part of that conversation [i.e. the CSA], that’s a separate question. But, certainly, the consistent message from our organization was that we were not privy to any dialogue. [...] it’s disturbing, isn’t it? (Anna).

6.4 The covert dimension of power: instrumentation policy

The post-earthquake governance with respect to performing arts venues has been characterized by different episodes of non-decision-making that eroded the confidence of the community. Arts stakeholders, in particular, expressed vivid concerns on the lack of effective influence on the decisions made by the Council and the national recovery authorities. Undoubtedly, the impact of the earthquakes was decisive in the changes to the organizational structure within the CCC and to the establishment of CERA and the CCDU as dedicated authorities for the recovery and the redevelopment of the Christchurch CBD. Albeit these organizational changes were considered as necessary to “ensure focussed, timely and expedited recovery” (DPMC, 2012a, p6), there were shortcomings and concerns with respect to the handling of information available, the frenzy decision-making process and their
repercussion in the planning of the city (*Lawrence*). At first, CERA “was proposed to be small and to work in partnership with the City Council” (*Martha*). However, as months went by, CERA increased its staff base, especially following the Cabinet decision to setup the CCDU (DPMC, 2012a, 2012c). Key aspects such as design, location, land acquisition and tender process were seconded under the portfolio of Minister Brownlee, with CERA and the CCDU setting the basis for the redevelopment of the CBD through anchor projects and public-private partnerships (CCDU, 2013h).

Overall, the legislation since the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes has conveyed the pro-development agenda of the national Government through a series of amendments and legislation revoking that promoted and expedited anchor projects-led redevelopment in the Christchurch CBD. The provisions in the earthquake recovery legislation came in handy to direct land acquisitions and demolitions that paved the way for projects such as the Performing Arts Precinct. The structure put in place through the earthquake recovery legislation, with a set of new rules for land acquisition and the collection of relevant information from landowners by CERA officials, created a one-sided mechanism that made difficult for landowners to appeal against the decisions of the MCER and the CERA’s Chief Executive.

### 6.4.1 Non-decision-making

Before the earthquakes, there were episodes of governance characterized by mechanisms of non-decision-making with respect to urban strategies and the proposed development of performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD. Council deliberations on matters relevant to performing arts followed the mainstream principles of strategic and financial alignment, meaning that councillors voted on matters that were consistent with pre-established guidelines (CCC, 2007a, 2008a). This was the case of the vote for the extension of the MCC lease in August 2010, in which the staff recommended councillors to approve the decision because it fulfilled with purposes “directly aligned with heritage conservation, the arts, culture and learning” (CCC, 2010f, p225). Moreover, the engagement of Council staff with stakeholders did not foresee mechanisms for direct representation. For example, the ES 2007-
2017 was prepared by the CCC staff in light of submissions through a non-decision-making forum (the Strong Communities Portfolio Group) ahead of Council deliberation (CCC, 2007c). Councillors deliberated on a strategy submitted and recommended by CCC staff (CCC, 2007c), regardless of the stakeholders’ feedback on the draft.

The mechanism of public consultation for cultural projects in both the LTCCP 2006-2016 and the LTCCP 2009-2019 limited the capacity of the community to effectively present alternative strategies to those already put in place by the Council. Even though the LTCCPs provided “an opportunity for the public to participate in decision-making processes” (CCC, 2009e, p1), the Council limited the feedback of the community to a limited array of predetermined options (ibid.). This was the case, for instance, of the Statement of Proposal for the transfer of the Town Hall to Vbase approved by the Council in February 2009, which presented only one option to the case and did not seek for public submissions on the investment of NZD$ 35.7 million as equity to Vbase (CCC, 2009e).

A final example of non-decision-making mechanism with respect to the governance of the performing arts before the earthquakes was enshrined in the Council’s APS 2002. The strategy did not explicitly foresee a mechanism of direct decision-making between the performing arts organizations and the Council (CCC, 2002). This, in turn, favoured the clientelist relationship between established performing arts organizations and the CCC. The limitations of the APS 2002 were raised by one participant:

> What you’ll hear over and over again is that the Council Arts Policy hasn’t changed since 2002. As somebody who was operating in that context, it was frustrating because basically it was the usual suspects would get funding, and it would take forever to get funding. [...] It would be great to see an official policy kind of developed in tandem with that, that it’s not something you just write it and, right we’ve done it now, that’s the Arts Policy. But at least something that’s started, at least start developing an idea, otherwise in lieu of that what you have to rely on is the perspectives of staff members within the Council who we’re finding that at the moment, it’s a real challenge (Jim).

The policy environment following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 was characterized by episodes of non-decision-making that influenced the strategies and the plans for the
performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD. The rationale of restraining community input on the decision-making process was embodied, for example, in the establishment of the Community Forum under the CERA 2011. The forum acted as a mere advisory body to the Minister (CERA, 2011a) and was criticized since the drafting of the Act. Among its fiercest critics, the then MP for Christchurch Central, the Hon. Brendon Burns:

The Bill provides for the establishment of a community forum, but it is a forum of 20 people appointed by the Minister for Earthquake Recovery. [...] I am sorry, but that is not truly consultation. That is business as usual—doing things as they have always been done. [...] Even if the Minister wants to still have veto powers or the right to appoint others to his forum, he could actually allow the community to decide who its representatives are. That would really be a representative body, not a panel of chosen representatives (NZP, 2011b, pp17919-17920).

A complementary forum foreseen in the earthquake recovery legislation was the Cross-Party Forum, which the Minister had to arrange and summon “from time to time for the purpose of providing the Minister with information or advice” (Section 7 CERA 2011). However, the attitude of Minister Brownlee and his entourage was far from being collaborative, with decisions being taken by the dedicated Cabinet behind closed doors. As participants commented on the flaws of the Cross-Party Forum:

[...] the Forum was intentionally unproductive in that any suggestion that we had been made from the Cross-Party Forum had been dismissed by the Minister. And often items that we asked to be put on the agenda were not even on the agenda (Vicky).

At Council level, the rationale behind the Share an Idea initiative sought to channel the community input within the bureaucratic decision-making process of the CCC staff. This mechanism of soft non-decision-making “tried to educate people at the same time as it asked for their opinions” (Lawrence), with the organization of workshops held by keynote speakers invited by the Council in 2011 (Adam and James). The Share an Idea initiative – albeit being welcomed among participants – was a tokenistic form of community engagement characterized by some decision-making flaws. In particular, it used NVivo to code the high volume of feedback from the community (QSR, 2014), but the CCC staff:
 [...] did it in a very primitive way by looking for keywords. People gave [their feedback] innocently, which is great because it came from everyone. But I think there was the general feeling that maybe all these things were spot on. But the fact that they have taken that very primitive collection system of analysis and call it public participation, I think it is to miss the point (Edward).

The episodes of non-decision-making heightened following the establishment of the CCDU as the unit in charge with the delivery of the anchor projects in the Christchurch CBD. The authorities did not seek for further inputs from the community and sought to decide over site designations behind closed doors to avoid any leak of commercially confidential information during the design of the Masterplan (CCDU, 2013f). The designation of the precinct was dictated by the pre-determined conditions set out by the MCER and the Cabinet (CCDU, 2012c; DPMC, 2012c), with the Blueprint team following the instructions of the leading authorities on where to locate the facilities. As one participant recollected the episode:

The key point is that one of the instructions for the Blueprint was to include the location of ten anchor projects in space. They didn’t quite expect to get what [the Blueprint Team] gave them. But the bones of it was that it very much reflected the discussions we had with the CERA Director, namely, that of a Masterplan locating key activities and space. So, sadly, the work since is that CERA has become more powerful, they have taken people they have, with no public participation. CERA said there was no problem, not big embarrassment with changing the plan, but it has given no... It has said there is no reason to explain those or to see public consultation or public approval of those (Edward).

The input was for the Performing Arts Precinct to be “an activator for the Square and the Convention Centre because they integrated each other very nicely” (Thomas). This meant that any development option that hindered the building of the anchor projects nearby would be sidelined. This was the case of a proposed development option for the precinct in Victoria Square, which foresaw the partial retention of the existing Town Hall and the development of the CSO and of the MCC on land already owned by the Council. This development proposal was not considered as ideal by the CCDU and Minister Brownlee, with the latter advocating for the Performing Arts Precinct to be located in the blocks between Gloucester Street and Armagh Street so that it did not hinder the Convention Centre Precinct (Edward).
The negotiations between the CCDU and the CCC in the drafting of the CSA were undertaken by using the Blueprint as the parameter in the decisions for the allocation of the public share of the project budget (Edward). The community and the elected councillors did not have the opportunity to comment or deliberate on the CSA, as it was announced after the scheduled hearings for the TYP 2013-2016 (CCC, 2013f).

The attitude of the national authorities in the key governance episodes around the delivery of the Performing Arts Precinct was that of making decisions at Cabinet level and then seek to implement them regardless of the work done by the Council and the planners working on the precinct. Instead, they referred to the tokenistic community input from Share an Idea to justify their decisions. One participant synthesized the perceived feeling of stakeholders being unable to embark basic decision-making with the national Government:

That's people problem all the way through this project and process since 2010. The public was not consulted; Mr Brownlee does not like... does not believe in it. It gets nervous about the whole slowing of process up. He uses delays as the reason. But, also, he hides what he refers back to the Council's one week-end planning and the 106,000 post notes they received that time... [He said] that was public participation on which they are working. And that there is no need for any further because they got all the input from the community (Edward).

6.4.2 Information withholding and manipulation

The withholding and manipulation of information before and after the earthquakes played a relevant role in influencing the governance for performing arts venues in the city of Christchurch. The drafting of reports for the CCC before the earthquakes, for instance, was the result of the input from relevant local performing arts organizations. The latter provided suggestions as to whether the city needed new facilities in the CBD to host concerts and plays. Ultimately, the information conveyed to the CCC before the earthquakes was used to begin investigating the possibility of revitalizing the old Odeon Theatre and the nearby area as home to a performing arts district. The process of information gathering and the relevance of performing arts stakeholders in setting the basis for the development of the site was highlighted by one of the participants:
Yes, and I think that’s in that previous knowledge we had about gaps with venues I think, and then that arts planning, it certainly fed its way into there. So, we had some arts people seconded into the strategy and planning teams to provide perspective and ideas so that certainly carried that through, so we were able to access information we already had from other sources to feed into that bigger picture (Colin).

Following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, any document concerning current and future performing arts facilities in the Christchurch CBD was subject to the provisions of the earthquake recovery legislation and the decisions of the Cabinet. In particular, the CERA 2011 gave to CERA’s Chief Executive the authority to commission report and request the provision and dissemination of information for what concerned land, buildings, strategies and plans. National recovery authorities could withhold information whereas necessary and apply the Orders in Council for the LGOIMA 1987 on information released by the CCC (OMCER, 2011b) (see also CERA 2011, Section 71(3)(m)).

To expedite the delivery of the recovery in Christchurch, the DPMC foresaw the possibility for CERA of:

[...] gathering of information about any structure or any infrastructure affected by the events that is relevant to how to minimise the damage caused by the events or is necessary for developing the Recovery Strategy or a Recovery Plan (OMCER, 2011b, p4).

The information on the economic constraints and land conditions was subject to the discretion of CERA and of the Chief Executive, who would release documents upon written request. Subsequently, the publication of Cabinet meetings and documents on the Performing Arts Precinct was tightly censored. The rationale behind the withholding of information had to do with the possible leak of commercially confidential information during the design of the Blueprint. This aspect was emphasized with respect to difficulties among stakeholders in the drafting of the Performing Arts Precinct:

The frustration was probably based around the lack of knowing really what was going on. Because of the commercial confidentiality with that process, it was really difficult. We could talk to people, but getting appointments was difficult – it was a really, really tough process. Very closed, very closed door (Blair).
Following the release of the Blueprint, both CERA and the CCDU kept withholding relevant information that would have influenced the market during the negotiation with the landowners for the purchase of the designated land (CERA 2011, Section 30(2)). The difficulties in getting access to relevant information on the Performing Arts Precinct and the other projects outlined in the CCRP was stressed by interviewees (Adam, Anna, Debbie and Max). One of them also acknowledged the possibility that documents held by CERA would be erased at the time of its dissolution in April 2016 (Anna).

The procedure of information collection and use for the purposes of recovery was a stronghold in the mechanism put in place by the national authorities for the negotiation of land located in the designated area of the Performing Arts Precinct. CERA commissioned Ernst & Young to develop the Christchurch Central City Commercial Property Market Study and used it as the parameter in the negotiation of land acquisition with private landowners (CCDU, 2013g, 2013i; DPMC 2012a; Ernst & Young, 2012). The study suggested that the blocks of land later designated for the Performing Arts Precinct were adjacent to a block of land that had a strong appeal among tenants, property owners and consumers with interests in the hospitality industry (Ernst & Young, 2012). However, the study’s methodology had flaws. Questions can be raised as to whether the sample of tenants was representative, as the study did not explicit the characteristics of the sample and the response rate to the survey to property owners was relatively small (6.3% turnout). Moreover, the respondents to the qualitative property market research reported in the study were long-established landowners and developers in the Christchurch CBD, including Richard Peebles and Andy McFarlane (Ernst & Young, 2012). Finally, there was no mention as to whether the number of participants to the survey matched that of the qualitative market research.

CERA embarked on negotiations with “the owners of the land and those persons with a registered interest” (CCDU, 2013i, p1). In sending the questionnaires to the property owners of land designated for the Performing Arts Precinct, the recovery authorities stated that:

> a full and accurate picture of your property and personal position would assist CERA and the Crown’s Agent, The Property Group, (on behalf of the Crown) in making the acquisition process as straightforward as possible (CCDU, 2012g, p1).
Although the negotiations for the land parcels in the area designated for the Performing Arts Precinct were quickly completed, it can be argued that the national authorities had an undisputed advantage in negotiating land acquisition. Landowners who had their land acquired had the feeling that CERA, the CCDU and the Crown were forcing the selling of properties, knowing the ongoing struggles of owners with mortgages, insurance and the lack of revenue from tenancies. One participant described in detail the situation with land negotiation with CERA and the Crown:

There were a lot of fractious feelings between the landowners who had their land acquired. I had property owners ringing me up in tears because they might have had a piece of land worth a million dollars and they might have a 500,000 of mortgage to the bank... the designation went on the land... they couldn’t lease it, they couldn’t sell it, they couldn’t do anything with it. The Crown would offer 600,000 and their bank would be saying: ‘You need to take the money’. It was like if somebody like you owning the house and the Crown coming along and say: ‘We are going to take that house from you. We are going to pay for it. But you can’t go anywhere near the house. You can’t live in it, you can’t rent it out, you can’t mortgage it, you can’t do anything. And we are going to tell you how much we are going to pay for it and we are going to tell you when we are going to pay you for it’. And in the meantime, you pay the rates, you pay the insurance, you pay the mortgage. That’s exactly what it was like (Frank).

Focusing on the concept behind the CCRP and the Blueprint, one of the points repeatedly raised by the national authorities and the CCDU officials was that the recovery plan for the CBD was built upon the community feedback during the Share an Idea initiative (CCDU, 2012d, 2014b, 2016). However, the rationale for the subdivision of the CBD into anchor project areas was based on a government white paper titled Christchurch Central Business District Blueprint - Implementing Anchor Projects, released by the CCDU to prospective tenders just two days after the official announcement of the unit (CCDU, 2012c). The CCDU built the Request for Proposals on national and international post-disaster redevelopment and urban regeneration practices (Brownlee, 2012a; CCDU, 2012d; DPMC, 2012a). The latter, referred to large-scale urban projects in London, Wellington, Singapore and Brisbane, while international cases of post-disaster rebuild included Kobe, New Orleans, New York and Beirut. The report, conversely, did not consider the input from internationally-relevant post-disaster rebuild from Los Angeles and San Francisco. This aspect was raised, in particular, by one participant:
\[\ldots\] all these ideas about where things should be in the city, about precincts and the blueprint of the city as represented, were internally driven by CERA, who created the CCDU and then decided to create this roadmap, the city plan within 100 days \[\ldots\] The Government made the decision early on that there was going to be a top-down, command and control Beirut model to redesign the city as opposed to the San Francisco model, bottom-up (Frank).

The drafting of the Performing Arts Precinct disregarded the information made available by Arts Voice to the CCC during the hearing sessions of late October 2011. Despite the “extensive consultation with stakeholders and constituents within the arts and creative communities” (AV, 2011c. p11) and the advocacy of Arts Voice to represent the wants and needs of performing arts organization with the national recovery authorities, the approach of CERA and of the CCDU was to find stakeholders that supported their vision of anchor project-led redevelopment of the Christchurch CBD. One participant from the local arts sector stressed on the piecemeal approach by the CCDU and the Blueprint Team in developing the CCRP:

> All the things that we brought to the table from Arts Voice, as how we knew that the arts practitioners wanted to be engaged were completely lost and unfortunately not used (Amanda).

6.4.3 Rules and legislation

Before the earthquakes, the CCC acted as promoter, advocate and facilitator for the arts community in fulfilment of the APS 2002 (CCC, 2002) and the ES 2007-2017 (CCC, 2007c). The APS 2002 established the role of the Council as a promoter, enabler and manager “of arts resources and assets” (CCC, 2002, p3). The ES 2007-2017, instead, foresaw the local authority and Vbase to work together on aspects such as the promotion of Christchurch as an event destination and the bidding for nationally and internationally relevant events (CCC, 2007c).

The 2006 *Earthquake-prone, Dangerous and Insanitary Buildings Policy* was a relevant policy for the building of performing arts venues before the earthquakes, as it determined the level of earthquake risk for Christchurch based on the GNS report of 2003 and 2005 (CCC, 2010m). However, the discovery of a new fault line in the Darfield area after the September 2010 earthquake persuaded the local authorities to increase the minimum threshold for building
strengthening from 33% to a 67% of the Building Code (CCC 2010k, 2010m). This change in the policy increased the strengthening works for unreinforced masonry buildings like the MCC building in Barbados Street and historic premises like the building home to the Court Theatre at the Arts Centre (see Chapter 5).

The deliberations of councillors on matters dear to the promotion of performing arts before the earthquakes relied on the reports from the Community Services Management Team. The latter provided information and recommendations to councillors on Council-funded programmes such as the MDRF (CCC, 2010f). For decisions on performing arts facilities, instead, reports were drafted with the support of the Strategy and Planning Team and the Liveable City Programme Manager. This was the case, for example, of the vote over the extension of the MCC lease in late August 2010 (CCC, 2010f).

At the national level, the CNZ was the reference body for performing arts organizations. Prior to the earthquakes, one of the CNZ’s key responsibilities was “to allocate available funding to arts projects for professional and community art” (CNZ, 2010, p25), with a dedicated team established in Christchurch. One of CNZ’s strategic objectives was to foster the development of high-quality art in New Zealand by supporting, among others, performing arts organizations (CNZ, 2010). The latter were encouraged to seek innovation and creativity through “emerging artforms, including new media, digital arts and moving-image arts” (CNZ, 2010, p14).

Before the earthquakes, the body of legislation with relevance for performing arts venues was enshrined in the BA 2004, the RMA 1991 and the LGA 2002. With respect to the BA 2004, the body of legislation as at September 2007 was meant overcome previous building regulations shortcomings (NZP, 2010, 2011a). The nation-wide crisis of the building sector and the repercussions of the 2007-2008 GFC in New Zealand brought parties to re-discuss the legislation. The amendments promulgated in 2009, however, had no direct relevance in the delivery of performing arts venues before the earthquakes.

Focusing on the RMA 1991, the legislation had been subject to amendments before the earthquakes (see Section 5.4.3). The national Government claimed that the reform was meant to tackle on “slow and overly bureaucratic processes” (Hon. Nick Smith, quoted in NZP, 2009a, p1486), but members of the opposition parties expressed vivid concerns on the implications “for community participation in decision-making, and that the new measures would dilute the
strengths of the principal Act” (NZP, 2009b, p2). Submissions to the LGEC by representatives of the CCC likewise argued that the new legislation fell short in streamlining the consent process, created “greater complexity, uncertainty, and increased timeframes and costs” (CCC, 2009i, p1). In the view of Councillor Yani Johanson:

The changes introduced by this Bill will erode the ability for the public to participate in a meaningful and constructive manner. It appears to make it easier for developers to do whatever they like and harder for the community to be involved (Johanson, 2009, p1).

The overarching framework that legitimized the Council as the authority in charge with promoting culture and the arts was enshrined in the LGA 2002. The Act dictated the ground rules for the stakeholder consultation on the LTCCP 2009-2019 and the Council annual plans:

The Council provides opportunities for the community to participate in decision-making that contribute to a well-governed city, by providing information, undertaking consultation, and processing the community’s input (CCC, 2007a, p22).

The Council regularly seeks community input on a range of issues, including draft policies, local capital works projects, and the Council’s 10-year community plan (CCC, 2010b, p63).

The pre-earthquake Council plans included the dispositions for the funding of the Court Theatre redevelopment (CCC, 2009b) and included the “NZD$ 750,000 grant contribution over seven years” (CCC, 2010f, p223) for the refurbishment project for the MCC building. Most importantly, the plans made provisions for the ownership transfer of the Town Hall to Vbase to increase management and revenue outputs for both the Council and its venue management company (CCC, 2009b; Vbase, 2009).

Finally, at Council level, the City Plan represented the legally binding set of rules for the development of premises within the urban area. Prior to the earthquakes, the areas home to the Town Hall and to the premises of what would be later designated as the Performing Arts Precinct were labelled as Central City Zone, with no specific provisions on building height limit and business development options (CCC, 1995b). Only the MCC was located in one of the CBD’s cultural zones and thus subject to a dedicated set of development rules (CCC, 2005, 2009j). A key feature of the City Plan was the list of historic buildings and its implications for the Council. The MCC and the Town Hall were listed as Group 1 heritage sites under the City
Plan and considered as “buildings [...] of international or national significance, the protection of which is considered essential” (NZHPT, 2011, p1). Particularly for the Town Hall, the listing under the District Plan differed considerably from that provided by the NZHPT, which did not include the complex among the relevant historic sites of New Zealand. However, the HPA 1993 (Section 32) and the LGA 2002 allowed the CCC to provide a legally-binding list of historic sites into its District Plan. The relevance of the heritage list of sites in the CCC’ City Plan over the national list was stressed by participants during the interviews (Brian, Martha and Penny).

Following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the ES 2007-2017 remained unchanged. Similarly, the organizational structure of CNZ did not change (CNZ, 2013), but the organization increased the funding stream to Christchurch with the establishment of the Creative Communities Christchurch Fund (CCCF) (CCC, 2012c). During the drafting of the CBD recovery plan in May 2011, the CCC endorsed a revision of the APS 2002 (CCC, 2011g). This decision was particularly welcomed by the wide arts community (AV, 2011c), but the Council halted the revision of the policy since the takeover by CERA and the CCDU in 2012. As one participant stressed:

I mean, what you’ll hear over and over again is that the Council Arts Policy hasn’t changed since 2002. So, there’s a real frustration that that hasn’t been adjusted. And as somebody who was operating in that context, it was frustrating because basically it was the usual suspects would get funding, and it would take forever to get funding (Jim).

The environmental uncertainties as a result of the earthquakes did not alter the ruling for Council deliberations on matters dear to the performing arts. The CCC still defined the conditions and the objectives to provide amenities and means of support for the arts and the hosting of events (CCC, 2010b, 2012b). Councillors deliberated on recommendations made by staff (CCC, 2011a) and were expected to vote in line with the vision and the objectives outlined in the strategies. These included, but were not limited to, budget allocations and the establishment of partnerships with public and private stakeholders (CCC, 2011a). The need to work on the recovery and provision of performing arts venues brought the Community Services Management Team to work closely with the staff from Strategy and Planning. The engagement between the two teams became official when the Council arts advisors:
[were] seconded into the Strategy and Planning teams to provide perspective and ideas so that certainly carried that through, so we were able to access information we already had from other sources to feed into that bigger picture (Colin).

Since the earthquakes, the organization of the Council went under four major internal changes. The first one occurred during the Share an Idea initiative, with a steering team of five-six people looking at the overall plan (Lawrence and Martha) and a team of art advisors and urban planners working on the arts recovery programme in collaboration with the stakeholders of the facilities to rebuild (Anna). The CCC’s Management Team was further amended following the establishment of the CCDU and the release of the CCRP at the end of July 2012 (Josh). A third change occurred following the release of the CSA in June 2013, with the establishment of the Major Facilities Rebuild Unit (CCC, 2013c) and the appointment of a project director responsible for the delivery of anchor projects led by the CCC like the Performing Arts Precinct (Josh). A final organizational change was made in late 2014, with the project team working on the best business case for the arts-related anchor projects funded by the Council (Taylor) to integrate with the CCRP (CCC, 2012g).

After the September 2010 earthquake, new sets of rules were introduced to regulate specific aspects of the rebuild. These, in turn, had a direct impact on the design and delivery of performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD. On the one hand, the Better Business Case rules set by the New Zealand Treasury (NZT) in 2011 were meant to explore “value, opportunities, costs, risks and feasibility” (NZT, 2015c, p6) in the delivery of the anchor projects foreseen in the CCRP. CERA and the Government embraced the guidelines and organized training sessions for local authority staff to attend during the drafting of the Blueprint in 2012 (CERA, 2012c). The use of the Better Business Case in the drafting of the Performing Arts Precinct transpired during a conversation with one participant:

If I talk about the Performing Arts Precinct, that is totally informed by stakeholders in terms of their requirements, but also their view of the benefits that the performing arts industry brings to the community. It involves some research on the value that performing arts industry brings to the local economy and in terms of the multiplier effect and generate through retail, food & beverage and hospitality. All hang off a single ticket purchase (Taylor).
On the other hand, CERA introduced a set of rules for the designation and acquisition of land for the anchor projects. The designation could last between three and ten years (CCDU, 2013g), with the national authorities negotiating the purchase of land titles with the owners based on the property evaluation feedback from Telfer Young and Colliers (CCDU, 2012e, 2012f). The rules for the anchor projects land did not preclude the possibility for owners to sideline any alternative project on the table at the time of designation (CCDU, 2012e). The designation could be lifted whereas the recovery authorities downsized the project, as in the case of the area north of Armagh Street in April 2014 (CCDU, 2014e). Similarly, the lifting of the designation on the land home to the Forsyth Barr building at the corner of Armagh Street was announced only when private investors from the hospitality industry expressed interest in buying the property (CCDU, 2015a; Wood, 2014b). In this case, the CCDU’s decision “was about allowing or desiring that buildings complementary and uses complementary to the precinct could remain” (Thomas).

The official notification issued at the end of March 2013 was for privately-owned land in the block between Armagh Street and Gloucester Street (CCDU, 2013i). Negotiations were done on a case-by-case basis. In defining the price for the acquisition of land, one of the rules for the recovery authorities was that it would not be re-sold to the original owner. Moreover:

The price must not include any increase or decrease in values attributable to the public work. The public work in this instance is the actual Anchor Project on the site and the Anchor Project(s) in the immediate vicinity. In some cases, based on valuation evidence, it may also include the effect of the other Anchor Projects (CCDU, 2013j).

These rules turned to be appealing for those owning the land designated for the Performing Arts Precinct. Unlike with other anchor projects in the CBD, particularly the East Frame, eleven out of thirteen landowners settled with the Crown for the acquisition of their properties, with three landowners settling within two months from the date of notification (CCDU, 2013m, 2014h).

The solution of running the delivery of the anchor projects through public-private partnerships was explicitly acknowledged and encouraged in both the CCRP and the Vision for the Performing Art Precinct (CCDU, 2012d, 2016). The latter would only be released in early 2016, but was nonetheless foreseen by stakeholders as necessary for the implementation of the
projects (CCC, 2013h). Just as with the Better Business Case rules, the guidelines for the public-private partnerships were provided by the Ministry of Finance, which regarded them as two faces of the same coin (NZT, 2015a, 2015b).

The relevance of legislation and guidelines with respect to the delivery of performing arts venues in the city of Christchurch changed considerably as result of the 2010-2011 earthquakes. Undoubtedly, decision-making on performing arts venues was heavily affected by the CERA 2011. The promulgation of the earthquake recovery legislation was expedited with bipartisan support as opposition party members sought to work together with the national Government in a time of crisis (Debbie and Denzel). CERA and the MCER had unprecedented decisional powers as Orders in Council exempted or modified ordinary legislation for any provision that was necessary to achieve the purposes of recovery (OMCER, 2011b).

The rationale of centralized decision-making being subject to the decisions of the Minister was criticized since the first reading of the earthquake recovery Bill in April 2011:

> The legislation is flawed for a number of reasons, but fundamentally for this reason: the Government has chosen the ‘command and control’ model, essential for disaster response but the antithesis of what is required in recovery (Hon. Lianne Dalziel, quoted in NZP, 2011b, p17906).

> The fact that we have a multi-agency Government department with one Minister is not a good start to an open and transparent process [...] There cannot be any feeling of suspicion about this. We need an open and transparent process. We need to know what is happening because it is our place where it is happening (Hon. Ruth Dyson, quoted in NZP, 2011b, p17914).

The CERA 2011 framed the delivery and recovery of Christchurch since its promulgation. The Act predetermined the national and local authorities that CCC had to include in drafting the CBD recovery plan, with the MCER having the final say (see CERA 2011, Section 17). Moreover, it enabled a highly-hierarchical decision-making scheme through which the MCER and the Cabinet and the power to veto or amend plans and strategies carried by CERA and the CCC (see CERA 2011, Sections 8-10). The Share an Idea initiative, the consultation process held in
September 2011 and the submission of comments to the MCER (CCC, 2011h, 2011l) were carried out in accordance with the earthquake recovery legislation and the provisions under the LGA 2002 (see CERA 2011, Section 17(6)).

The provisions of the earthquake recovery legislation had an impact on the decision-making process that led to the launch of the Performing Arts Precinct in July 2012. For instance:

The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act allows a Central Business District recovery plan, as with other recovery plans, to make changes directly to Resource Management Act (RMA) plans without going through the RMA’s Schedule 1 processes. There is no right of appeal to these changes (CERA, 2011e, p15).

Similarly, the earthquake recovery legislation granted the exemption from part of the existing resource management enactments for the changes in the City Plan provided along with the CBD recovery plan developed by the CCC:

The process for making the changes to the City Plan as set out in this Recovery Plan is not subject to Section 32 or Schedule 1 processes under the Resource Management Act 1991 (see [...] There is no right of appeal on the contents of the final Recovery Plan (and directed changes to the City Plan) to the Environment Court. Achieving the outcome envisaged for the Recovery Plan would be accelerated by extinguishing some existing use rights. This can only be achieved by the Minister exercising his powers under Section 27 of the CERA 2011 (CCC, 2011h, p3).

The intentionally wide scope enshrined in the earthquake recovery legislation allowed the national Government to establish the CCDU as a unit within CERA, with the latter being “able to initiate the development of the CBD blueprint immediately, while putting in place the structures, systems and resources to undertake the other functions” (DPMC, 2012a, p18). The Minister ruled for the establishment of a dedicated central city rebuild unit within CERA because the earthquake recovery legislation provided the adequate statutory powers to draft and implement the CBD recovery plan in a relatively brief period (DPMC, 2012a).

Another significant aspect of the legislation in the delivery of performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD was the legally binding character of the CCRP and of the CBD Blueprint (New Zealand Gazette, 2012). The Cabinet foresaw the possibility to amend “the CBD Recovery Plan
and/or the CCC’s City Plan using powers under the CERA 2011” (DPMC, 2012a, p12). This meant that the new document had to be applied as an emanation of the earthquake recovery legislation, with subsequent implications on the existing enactments. Albeit the CCDU reiterated the possibility to amend the plans and the designation of land for the anchor projects throughout the lifespan of the unit, the general interpretation of the CCRP suggested otherwise:

The approved Recovery Plan is a critical document which has statutory effect from the day it is publicly notified in the Gazette. From that time, all people making decisions on Resource Management Act (RMA) matters (and related statutes) must not act inconsistently with the Recovery Plan. This relates to decisions on resource consent applications, applications to amend CCC’s City Plan, applications for designations etc. Where there is any inconsistency between the Recovery Plan and any other RMA document, the Recovery Plan prevails (CCDU, 2013f, n.p.).

Another relevant aspect of the earthquake legislation with implications for the Performing Arts Precinct concerned the identification and purchase of land. The head architect for the implementation of the Blueprint, Don Miskell, claimed that the Government would have used “its earthquake powers to buy land and even knock down existing good buildings if necessary” (quoted in McCrone, 2012b, pC2), as the earthquake legislation gave to the recovery authorities the power to acquire and amalgamate land for the anchor projects. The process saw the Governor-General issue a Proclamation to take the land based on the recommendations of the MCER (see CERA 2011, Section 55). This provision had no precedents in New Zealand, as local government lacked the authority to compulsory take land. This aspect was raised by one of the participants with regards to the delivery of cultural projects foreseen in the CCC’s draft plans for the CBD and those outlined in the final CCRP:

I think there was quite a lot of communality, at the project level, between what Council prepared and what was finally approved. [...] One of the things that we talked long and hard about when the Council was putting the draft together was that they have located some of these projects and they did talk about some preferred areas,... preferred sites for locating some of the projects. But they didn’t, at the end, have no power to acquire the land apart from the public works act process. And not everything in here [i.e. the December CCC draft plan for the CBD] could necessarily be clustered as a public work. [...] So, the advantage was the Minister having those powers as they could be identified on particular sites (Martha).
A further episode of command-and-control powers of the CERA legislation was the decision to repeal the LTCCP 2009-2019 and replace it with the TYP 2013-2016. Prior to that, the CCC had referred to the existing long-term plan in budgeting for the refurbishment and building of performing arts facilities (CCC, 2011g). National and local authorities struggled to find a common ground for the funding of the anchor projects outlined in the CCRP. Eventually, Minister Brownlee agreed with the CCC to adopt a new plan and use the special powers of the earthquake recovery legislation to suspend the provisions of the LGA 2002.

It was an interesting time because at a higher level, not just around performing arts, but you know, the City Council’s original plan was actually pretty good. [...] We had planned to do the city within the financial constraints that we had, and he [the Minister] said yep that’s great but if you lift those financial constraints a bit, more money comes in from other places, and there’s these other big things you could do. And it would be worthwhile to do them (Colin).

The TYP 2013-2016 left an open clause for the CSA, with the financial strategy section of the plan taking “into account the latest-available information on the Crown’s recovery plans and its commitments to cost sharing for the rebuild” (CCC, 2013d, p47). The CSA was only announced a few days before the end of the fiscal year, thus leaving councillors without the opportunity to object to the CSA. One participant stressed the asynchrony of the TYP 2013-16 and the CSA upon councillors’ deliberation:

The problem is that the Cost Sharing [Agreement] and the Three-year Plan, so, the two documents that set out how we are going to spend the money, didn’t have any relationship. So, the Cost Sharing [Agreement] was done in secret, it was well overdue. It should have been done in April [2013] or, even, December 2012, but we didn't have it until mid-2013. [...] So, with the Three-year Plan consultation, the Mayor [Bob Parker] would not let me move amendments to give a fact to what people, the public, had said in our Three-Year Plan because he said it was contrary to the Cost Share... the secret CSA they signed three days before (Adam).

Finally, the earthquake recovery legislation provided the legal basis for the amendment and revoking of the rules for the CBD reported in the CCC’s City Plan. A substantial revision of the existing plan had been advocated by the CCC’s Chief Executive, Tony Marryatt, a few days
before the earthquake of February 2011 (Conway, 2011). The drafting of the recovery plan for the central city became the opportunity to substantially revision the existing rules for the CBD area (CCC, 2011h). These changes were implemented by the CCDU technocrats during the drafting of the CCRP, which identified the area for the Performing Arts Precinct and established a set of new rules and spatial uses specific to the precinct in the amended City Plan (CCDU, 2012a). As the Plan reports:

> [...] the Minister as the Requiring Authority has initial financial responsibility for identified anchor projects, being public works, to enable the recovery of Greater Christchurch and the implementation of the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan. These public works are designated in the City Plan under section 24 of the *Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act*. All designations included within Volume 3, Part 12, Rule 2.10A shall lapse after 10 years unless given effect to (CCDU, 2012a, p77).

Parallel to the earthquake recovery legislation, the national Government embarked a series of reforms that had repercussions in the rebuild of Christchurch and its CBD. With respect to the *BA 2004*. The amended Bill presented to the Parliament in February 2012 heightened the parliamentary debate over the rebuild of Christchurch. The MP for Christchurch Central, Hon. Nicky Wagner expressed her support for the drafted legislation:

> Now, of course, there is a real growth in the sector, focused on the rebuild of Christchurch. [...] and people are estimating that that rebuild will cost up to NZD$30 billion. So, there are important savings to be made with this legislation. [...] With the pace that is required for the rebuild of Christchurch, it is particularly important that we reduce red tape (NZP, 2012b, p680).

On the other hand, the Hon. Trevor Mallard argued that the proposed amendments would lead to “a removal from the regulatory authorities” (quoted in NZP, 2012b, p680) in the name of the free-market approach advocated by the national Government.

With respect to the *RMA 1991*, the New Zealand Parliament embarked the process to further change the legislation based on the input of the MFE (see MFE, 2012). The proposed changes in the legislation, however, were criticized for replicating the same shortcomings of the earthquake recovery legislation (NZP, 2012c, 2013b) and the reform was eventually sidelined.
Focusing on the LGA 2002, the majority party presented an amended Bill in 2012 that introduced “financial prudence requirements for local authorities” (NZP, 2012d, p2840) and foresaw a greater involvement of the Crown “in the affairs of individual councils, with the aim of providing assistance to councils before situations become critical” (NZP, 2012e, p2). The change in the legislation went through regardless the advice of local authorities, including the CCC. As the Hon. Phil Twyford put it:

“There is no evidence that non-core activities like social and cultural activities, like economic development, for example, have any relationship to the increase in council debt. It has been shown conclusively that the increase in council debt is largely related to catching up on the infrastructure deficit, and councils dealing with the unfunded mandates that have been imposed on them by central government legislation” (quoted in NZP, 2012f, p6779).

6.5 The hegemonic dimension of power: rebuild as opportunity

Prior to the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, there was no explicit mention of performing arts as an opportunity for urban redevelopment in Christchurch. The CBD revitalization strategy of 2006, for instance, referred to the ES 2007-2017 and the APS 2002 as the cornerstones for the delivery of the strategy’s objectives (CCC, 2006b). The ES 2007-2017 explained the need to “seek and support events that contributed towards the vitality of the city centre and Christchurch’s indoor venue” (CCC, 2007c, p12), both in terms of facility development and opportunity to strengthen the image of the city (ibid.). Conversely, the APS 2002 did not fully address the binomial between the arts and the urban environment. The strategy simply encouraged the CCC to identify and explore opportunities for “the promotion, development and marketing of the arts” (CCC, 2002, p5) in a perspective of long-term economic sustainability of the city (ibid.).

The policy discourses around performing arts venues and urban regeneration differed substantially before and after the earthquakes. The urban regeneration strategy for the Christchurch CBD before the earthquakes was articulated over “a 25-year revitalisation effort” (CCC, 2006e, p6), while the Cabinet papers establishing the CCDU noted that there was a three-year “window of opportunity to get the framework in place and establish momentum
and confidence for recovery” (DPMC, 2012a, p2). Ultimately, the discussions over performing arts-led urban regeneration before the earthquakes sought to use existing facilities in the CBD as catalysts for the spontaneous clustering of arts organizations (Gates, 2009b). Conversely, the post-earthquake redevelopment agenda pursued a property-led strategy in the drafting and delivery of the Performing Arts Precinct. One participant, in particular, made a comparison between pre- and post-earthquake regeneration approaches for the arts in the Christchurch CBD:

I forget the fine details but there was certainly a discussion. But my recollection is that there was no conceptualization of a precinct as an area where things happened inside and nothing is going to happen outside. I think we had a more organic approach to it. [...] I do not think that we were thinking of introducing a whole lot of things just in that area. It was more about a range of venues around the city (Lawrence).

The idea of developing performing arts venues as a once in a lifetime opportunity for the future of the city emerged since the Share an Idea initiative of May and June 2011. The input from the stakeholders stressed the potentialities of developing a neighbourhood for the artist community in a similar fashion to pre-earthquake revitalization projects in the South of Litchfield (SOL) area (CCC, 2011j). Complementary inputs encouraged the retention and improvement of the existing performing arts venues in the city, the provision of multi-purpose new facilities, and the identification of anchor tenants to spur the development of spaces for the performing arts in the CBD (CCC, 2011e, 2011k). In acknowledging the values and beliefs from the performing arts stakeholders, the CCC’s draft plans for the CBD (CCC, 2011d; 2011g) concluded that:

[...] there is a real opportunity to anchor the arts community around a set of top facilities which will be a catalyst to recover and develop a thriving arts and performance community in the Central City (CCC, 2011d, p89).

The CCC conceived the recovery as an opportunity for arts and cultural organization to grow within the CBD without confining them in a designated area of the city. The redevelopment of the city would “happen organically” (Lawrence) through an enabling framework that targeted the performing arts among the key game-changers in the recovery of Christchurch. The Council:
 [...] believed that clusters occurred – as they occur around the world – they occur organically. So, there was a synergy between a group of theatres open up on the same street. It kind of makes sense. The Council does not tell them to do that. They do it because it is an advantage to their business. And we believe that was the best way for a city to develop as well. And while we might use one or two catalysts to promote that – whether with the [Isaac] Theatre Royal the Town Hall or something else – we were not going to tell everybody in the performing arts: ‘That’s where you have to go!’ (Lawrence).

Conversely, the CCDU embarked a recovery strategy closer to “the Government’s ideological agenda, with big projects such as convention centres and stadiums rather than small community projects” (Max). In the view of the national Government, the earthquakes “provided an unprecedented opportunity to rethink, revitalise and renew central Christchurch” (CCDU, 2012d, p2) through a bold vision that directed investments and gave certainty to the market through anchor projects like the Performing Arts Precinct (CCDU, 2012d; DPMC, 2012a). Since the drafting of the Blueprint, the scale of redevelopment was a direct emanation of the national Government, which sought to:

[make] sure we weren’t thinking too small. We needed to think bigger, and to achieve the economic recovery for Christchurch. Because Christchurch is a very important part of the national economy. It’s 18% GDP, 15% of the population, a major part of the recovery of the economy (Colin).

The national Government believed that the redevelopment of the CBD through anchor projects provided “opportunities for private sector and philanthropic involvement” (CCDU, 2012d, p45). Subsequently, the CCRP was “designed to maximise the opportunities” (CCDU, 2013e, n.p.) for retail, hospitality and commercial property through “a Masterplan approach” (Lawrence) that determined the location, the facilities and the amenities of the precincts. “One of the reasons behind the Performing Arts Precinct was the opportunity presented by the earthquake to do some physical consolidation of facilities” (Colin). In doing so, the proponents claimed that:

A thriving performing arts sector is one component of the broader recovery of the arts sector in Christchurch. The collective impact of a range of initiatives will contribute to the recovery of the arts sector as a whole. The successful development and long-term activation of the
Performing Arts Precinct relies on maintaining an awareness of these initiatives and understanding the ways in which they can inform the development of the Performing Arts Precinct project (CCC, 2013h, pp1-2).

The rhetoric of anchor projects and attraction of private investments for the development of the Christchurch CBD, however, fell short in overlooking the challenges that poorly-funded cultural organization would encounter due to the rise of building costs and land value caused by the CCRP itself. Particularly with the Performing Arts Precinct, the increasing interest of the hotel industry to be located in proximity to the nearby Convention Centre Precinct and the interest of one hotel operator for the Forsyth Barr building led to the downsizing of the development area south of Armagh Street. As one participant commented:

[...] there’s no backwards steps being taken on what the Christchurch central recovery plan wants to deliver in terms of vibrancy and stimulating private sector capital investment. However, the cost of land and the cost of occupancy are very challenging for cultural organizations. So, we have to find some ways of mitigating the cost associated with relocating back into the CBD (Blair).

### 6.5.1 The roles of market and of government

The policy discourse with respect to the role of Government in the governance of performing arts venues before the earthquakes conceived the local Council as the leading authority in charge of sponsoring and promoting events “so that the city could continue to reap their economic and social benefits” (CCC, 2006e, p21). The key role of the Council was to act as guardian, manager and promoter of the arts (CCC, 2002, p5) and “to fund the arts and arts organizations [...] with the greatest ability and potential to deliver the Council’s arts goals” (CCC, 2002). Central Government agencies similarly acknowledged the economic, social and cultural outcomes of the performing arts (CCC, 2007c), but did not provide leadership across venues, support services, marketing and funding performing arts organizations (ibid.). Overall, revitalizations strategies focusing on the arts advocated for the establishment of partnerships with the private and the voluntary sectors (CCC, 2002, 2006b). Ultimately, public authorities advocated for performing arts venues “to be managed on a commercial and co-ordinated
basis and to build profitability while maintaining affordable community access” (CCC, 2007a, p6) (see also CCC, 2008b, 2010b).

Following the earthquakes, we witnessed a greater collaboration between the Council and the Central Government. This was particularly evident in the delivery of the Performing Arts Precinct through “a mixed-model development that incorporates hospitality, residential and a range of retail to make the numbers for the precinct stack up and offset some of those operational costs” (Anna). Both national and local authorities were adamant in the identification “of a range of options and locations” (CERA, 2011e, p19) and encouraged the involvement of the business sector in the arts (CCC, 2011j), with the national Government willing to provide support only with targeted contributions “based on agreed priorities for short and long-term development” (ibid.). However, the role of the CCC was constrained within the national Government recovery agenda, with the Council “working really hard to try and get over the line with the Minister” (Anna).

The earthquakes heightened the influence of market forces in the delivery of performing arts venues. Particularly with the Performing Arts Precinct, the national Government positions was to lift pre-earthquake financial constraints in order to foster venue development (Colin). This was evident in the Minister’s decision to instruct the CCDU with the drafting of a new, less restrictive District Plan (Thomas). As one participant commented on the episode:

[...] the thing that concerned me about the Blueprint was that it seemed to focus on the privatization of public space. And I think this is something that people still haven’t quite comprehended just how much public space we have lost in the central city that has been put into private development. [...] Many of the projects are trying to get private development with public money (Adam).

This decision to support a market-led redevelopment of performing arts premises and decrease the local budget for culture and arts in the CCC annual plans (CCC, 2011a, 2012a) put financially weak arts organization under the harsh competition of the market. Government stakeholders auspicated for an unspecified “alternative model” (Blair) that discouraged public subsidizing performing arts organizations and recognized the inefficiency of mere private ownership for performing arts venues (Blair). On the other hand, culture and arts advocates recommended “a proactive support for the relocation of performing arts facilities back to the
CBD” (Anna). According to Arts Voice, in particular, the recovery of the CBD should have considered the implementation of incentives and area developments exclusively for the arts and the creative sector in order to stimulate cultural attractions for leisure and tourism (AV, 2011a, 2011b). Ultimately, “the Central Government of New Zealand did not recognize culture as an income generator” (Edward) and opted for a real-estate led model for performing art venues.

6.5.2 Urban regeneration and development

The rationale for arts-led regeneration in the city of Christchurch before the earthquakes was enshrined in the APS 2002 and the CCRS 2006-2016 (CCC, 2002, 2006e). The APS 2002 acknowledged the relevance of the arts to “generate new employment opportunities, develop opportunities for arts expression and participation as well as improving the quality of the built environment” (CCC, 2002, p1). Particular relevance was given to the role of the arts “in the City’s social, cultural and economic development” (CCC, 2002, p1), with an emphasis on the positive city marketing impact (ibid.). Moreover, the strategy championed the arts “as a vehicle for urban renewal” (CCC, 2002, p1), as acknowledged in the CCC-led projects across the CBD. Focusing instead on the CCRS 2006-2016, arts and culture were regarded as one of the desired outcomes in the development of clusters and mixed-use projects across the Christchurch CBD (CCC, 2006b). The strategy explicitly supported the development of cultural facilities, particularly those that sought to retain and refurbish the existing urban fabric of the city (CCC, 2006c, 2006e). Ultimately, the strategy enhanced “arts and entertainment options by increasing the range of attractions, spaces to socialise, and places to dine and recreate” (CCC, 2006e, p52).

The policy discourse for arts and culture-led regeneration was reiterated on the eve of the first earthquake. The LTCCP 2009-2019 recognized that the arts contributed to “the economy, identity, health and wellbeing” (CCC, 2009b, p189) and that it was important for the city and the region to have performing arts venues like the Town Hall for both economic and cultural development purposes (CCC, 2009b). This point was also reiterated in the proposal for the NZD$ 60 million arts district development around the old Odeon Theatre (Gates, 2009b) as it
reprised a revitalization approach dear to the urban revitalization agenda (CCC 2006a, 2006b, 2006c).

Following the February 2011 earthquake, the policy discourse advocating for a dedicated zone for the performing arts in the Christchurch CBD area gained momentum. During the Share an Idea initiative, arts stakeholders advocated for “a stunning centre for the performing arts [...] a cultural hub for all creative expressions” (CCC, 2011j, p126) that celebrated the arts community of the city and provided quality entertainment along with other leisure activities (CCC, 2011g, 2011j). One stakeholder recommended for the precinct to be in the recently cleared area near the Arts Centre and the Art Gallery:

a cultural area should be encouraged, less office space, more residential and entertainment centres. Cafes, restaurants, perhaps new performance spaces built in the now empty areas (CCC, 2011j, p125).

During the phases that culminated with the release of the CCRP, both local and national recovery authorities agreed on providing a dedicated area of the city to the performing arts. However, the local Government supported the CCC staff’s idea of a cultural precinct as a long-term organic growth, whereas the national Government was adamant in pursuing a redevelopment strategy based on the development of anchor projects to foster development (Anna and Lawrence). The disagreement with the anchor project-led strategy for the Performing Arts Precinct enshrined in the CCDU was stressed by two participants:

The performing arts precinct itself, I mean I have a problem with precincts as a concept anyway. I mean, I understand collaborative spaces, I understand grouping things together that work together, but I don’t understand ghettoizing particular activities into one space separated from another. So that’s like a starting point. If we are going to have a performing arts precinct, if that’s what they want, then obviously there’s a role for that to play in activating the city (Amanda).

We were more flexible about the notion of a precinct. That it didn’t necessarily all need to be co-located because, at the time, the blueprint really looked at putting all performing arts facilities in one place stacked up. So, we weren’t that happy with that, because we were more interested in a mixed-model development. Because we know the operational costs in the
central city would be a real challenge, and these are organizations that most of them have on-going funding requirements from us (Anna).

In presenting the Performing Arts Precinct, authorities emphasized the relevance of the project in terms of central city revitalization. The CCC supported the idea of relocating the Court Theatre in the precinct because they argued that “the spinoff effects on local business were quite significant” (Anna). The national Government’s belief was that of the Performing Arts Precinct being a catalyst for urban revitalization (Colin). In their view:

The successful development and long-term activation of the Performing Arts Precinct relies on maintaining an awareness of these initiatives and understanding the ways in which they can inform the development of the project (CCC, 2013h, p29).

However, the project delivery model overemphasized the importance of venues development and disregarded the spinoff effects of extemporaneous arts-related projects in the transition towards full recovery. The dichotomy between government and arts stakeholder’s views on the precinct is best summarized in the following interview extracts:

I think there was always the view that the performing arts, and the broad arts in general, bring vibrancy to the central city. And give people reasons to come. And having a vibrant cultural life in the city is seen as integral, not only to recovery but also to the overall experience of the city. It’s vital. And an organization like the Court Theatre, for example, has a massive impact on hospitality and foot traffic with their shows (Anna).

Well, it was a very conservative model of how they see arts. It was basically – and this is what the Minister said many times in meetings – opera, ballet and symphony. That’s the performing arts, end of the story, done and dusted, all good. […] It’s not based on a vision of what we want the arts to achieve or to be in this city, it’s based on a very old-fashioned idea of the arts (Amanda).

Ultimately, influential performing arts organizations met the recovery agenda of national authorities, regardless of the actual implications in terms of urban revitalization:

I think that CERA sees arts as a decorative bit of icing on the cake, if we’re lucky enough to get a cake. So that’s how far away from consideration of the arts they are. They quite like to
bring an artist in here or there. They don’t care about the arts. And I think that just comes through, so clearly, in their documentation. And their thinking (Amanda).

Even Council stakeholders expressed scepticism on the model pursued by national authorities in the delivery of the Performing Arts Precinct within the wider revitalisation of the Christchurch CBD.

I’m something of a sceptic about the performing arts precinct as a draw card. [...] I know what the town planners talked about, having this amazing draw card, but when I saw what was going to go on it I didn’t see that as a major draw card. Certainly, the Court Theatre was absolutely vital to the financial viability. But the Music Centre is just a facility for people to come and teach and learn music. That doesn’t activate a city; that just creates traffic issues after school. We had the CSO coming in but not as a performance space, as a rehearsal space. I suspect they would have done some concerts in their chamber as well, but once again not really activating the city as I would see it. [...] I must say I was always a bit sceptical about whether it would achieve that town-planning goal of activating the central city (Colin).

6.5.3 Tourism

Before the earthquakes, the CCC’s APS 2002 identified tourists among the desired targets in the process of making the city of Christchurch an internationally renowned “home of vibrant arts and arts activities” (CCC, 2002, p6). The promotion of arts “as a magnet to visitors” (CCC, 2002, p6) was supported by the local authority mainly as a mean to project a positive image of the city to incoming tourists (ibid.). In a similar vein, the VS 2007-2017 acknowledged the contribution of the visitor economy “to the vibrancy of Christchurch” (CCC, 2007d, p5). The binomial arts/tourism was also emphasized in the CCRS 2006-2016, with an emphasis on the implications of urban space theming (CCC, 2006a, 2006b, 2006e). Finally, the ES 2007-2017 acknowledged the importance of performing arts events as a resource to attract visitors to the city (CCC, 2007c) and exhorted authorities to attract big events “and make better use of existing venues” (ibid., p29).

The relevance of tourism in the provision of performing arts venues and events did not change following the earthquakes. During the Share an Idea initiative, stakeholders stressed on the
potentialities of creating a dedicated cultural hub comprising theatre facilities and the importance of providing a range of leisure amenities to attract both locals and tourists to the area (CCC, 2011j). The resulting CBD draft recovery plans embodied the Council’s belief over the benefits of establishing the conditions for the arts community to be clustered in a dedicated area of the city and anchor a range of visitor-related amenities to boost urban tourism (CCC, 2011d, 2011g).

The relevance of tourism and hospitality was reinforced in the recovery agenda set by the CCDU and the national Government in 2012. The white paper that set the guidelines for the CCRP and the Blueprint advocated for a recovery strategy to “strengthen the city’s role as the central point for commerce [and] tourism in the South Island [and] provide confidence for residents, businesses and visitors” (CCDU, 2012c, p11). This feature resurfaced in the business cases drafting for the Performing Arts Precinct and the Town Hall:

a civic and event facility will act as a key destination for tourists and out of town visitors. Events hosted at a performance venue provide a focal point for a reason to visit Christchurch. A large performance venue will bring in headline performances that will attract visitors from throughout the South Island. Such visitors may stay on after a show, increasing the tourism spend in the city (Deloitte, 2015b, p12).

The idea of the arts as an activator for hospitality-related was acknowledged by stakeholders during the interviews. “Cafes and restaurants tend to group around where people are coming in and out” (Amanda) and arts facilities represented a key asset in the redevelopment of urban tourist spaces. As Anna reiterated, “there was always the view that the performing arts, and the broad arts in general, bring vibrancy to the central city”.

Nevertheless, the view of the arts as a catalyst for leisure development overpowered other related benefits of arts-led redevelopment. This was particularly stressed in a comment on the Performing Arts Precinct and the missed opportunities of a genuine arts revitalisation of the Christchurch CBD:

[...] we had been through this enormous process, spent a huge number of hours, talking to people, writing, researching, you know... Just all manner of work, to find that it was boiled
down to the Performing Arts Precinct. With a very generic idea of the arts role in the recovery. And it’s like, leisure and entertainment (Amanda).

6.6 Summary

The chapter presented the key decision-making stages in the drafting of urban tourist spaces for the performing arts by comparing the coalitions, rules and policy discourses before and after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. What emerged was a highly dynamic process of multi-stakeholder engagement and substantial amendment of guidelines and regulatory frameworks that favoured a given strategy for the delivery of what eventually became known as the Performing Arts Precinct. Notwithstanding the input from a wide range of the arts community, the recovery authorities heightened a governance for the performing arts that reiterated the pre-earthquake flaws, favoured a market-led delivery of the Performing Arts Precinct and put further financial pressure on economically vulnerable organizations.

As the chapter mentioned, the full delivery of the Performing Arts Precinct was still underway at the time of fieldwork. The highly dynamic governance flaws around the project, the juxtaposition between national and local authorities and the delays with the insurance settlements affected the delivery of the precinct as it was originally intended. Rather than enabling the organic growth of arts and transitional projects in the designated premises, the approach of national recovery authorities focused almost exclusively on the economic return from established arts organizations and their potentialities as a catalyst for hospitality and leisure development of the city centre.

The next chapter provides a discussion of the findings from the cases illustrated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 and links them to the literature. A series of propositions are presented to provide a synthesis of the phenomenon of governance with respect to urban tourist spaces in post-disaster contexts.
Chapter 7
Discussion

7.1 Introduction

The episodes of governance for urban tourist spaces in pre-and-post earthquake Christchurch presented in this study provide some insights on the coalition dynamics among stakeholders, the mechanisms of land-use planning, the instruments of decision-making and the values and beliefs conveyed before and after a triggering event like the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. The earthquakes shed light “on what nearly everyone previously failed to attend to and took for granted” (Lukes 2006, p1), thus resulting in greater concern over community participation in recovery and rebuilding debates. Episodes of exclusion and non-decision-making that were identified in this study suggest that post-disaster governance in Christchurch followed the neoliberal script evidenced from similar contexts across the globe. As Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 showed, there are traits common to mainstream market-obeying policies behind the decision-making rationale of government, recovery authorities and key organizations.

The following chapter examines the findings of this research, placing the knowledge derived from the fieldwork into a broader context. Section 7.2 discusses the outputs of the research in light of the aim and objectives outlined in Chapter 1 by focusing on each of the site-specific case studies addressed in this dissertation. Section 7.3 discusses the findings of the case studies in light of the existing body of knowledge. Subsequently, Section 7.4 presents propositions based on the findings of the two case studies. Given the complexity of the governance environments and the interrelations of different forms of power, the propositions will be framed around Lukes’ thee dimensions of power, with a series of statements from each of the case studies. Finally, Section 7.5 provides an ultimate synthesis in the phenomenology of urban regeneration, urban governance and tourism in pre-and-post-disaster contexts.
7.2 Discussion of research objectives

The aim of this study was to identify and understand the forms of power with regards to the governance and planning of urban tourism spaces in contexts facing physical recovery from natural disasters. It sought to answer the question raised by Olshansky et al. (2012) as to whether there is “anything fundamentally different about urban redevelopment, public finance, organization of public institutions, and social and economic problems when the subject of study is in a post-disaster environment” (ibid. p173). Subsequently, three research objectives were stated, namely:

1) critically analyse the land-use policies for urban tourism spaces in pre-and-post-earthquake Christchurch, New Zealand;

2) examine the environmental and institutional factors that influence the planning decision-making process and implementation of project in the Christchurch city centre before and after the earthquakes;

3) analyse the policy discourses with respect to urban regeneration in the Christchurch CBD before and after the earthquakes.

This thesis was structured so that the objectives were tied to the theory and the three narratives that were chosen for the two case studies at the heart of the research. The objectives discussed below draw broadly from the findings presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.

7.2.1 Land use policies for urban tourism spaces before and after the earthquakes

Land-use policies for urban tourist spaces in pre-earthquake Christchurch were characterized by a set of special zoning rules with respect to heritage and cultural amenities. These were embraced in the 2006 Regeneration Strategy for the Christchurch CBD, which first sought to promote the theming of central city premises based on the type of facilities and leisure activities located within the CBD. Following the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes, national and local authorities coalesced to draft a new strategy for the regeneration and rebuild of the
Christchurch CBD. At first, the strategy consisted of potential site development recommendations for cultural facilities and leisure amenities that were complementary to the pre-earthquake regeneration strategy. However, following the establishment of the CCDU in April 2012, the land-use plan for the Christchurch CBD was drastically amended with the identification of precincts and the introduction of new rules that bound the redevelopment of the targeted CBD areas through a range of anchor projects. The latter sought to provide the “market certainty and confidence” (DPMC, 2012a, p2) that the draft recovery strategies released by the CCC in 2011 were unable to guarantee.

With respect to the first case study presented in this thesis, evidence from the Arts Centre before the earthquakes suggests that the authority and the Management Team responsible for the complex had embarked on a strategy aimed at attracting anchor tenants and allocating some of the vacant land parcels for the development of new facilities. The project of the NCoM in partnership with the CCC and the University of Canterbury underpinned the pro-development agenda of the ACC and its Director, but the legislation on resource management for heritage sites did not allow for aesthetically intrusive development such as the one foreseen in the Conservatorium project. Nevertheless, the ACC managed to obtain the resource consent for the land subdivision within the site by taking advantage of the partial amendment of the RMA 1991 at the end of 2009. The approval for land subdivision turned to be decisive in terms of future development within the Arts Centre, with two of the six land titles designated for the building of new facilities.

Following the earthquakes, the concerns over the liability towards the Arts Centre tenants and the need to secure the site from further collapses were used as leverage by the ACC and its Director to unilaterally terminate the leases and rethink the redevelopment of the complex for the future. In terms of site recovery, the Arts Centre was still bound to the national legislation on resource management consent for heritage sites, while the rules on earthquake-prone buildings introduced by the CCC a few days after the September 2010 earthquake increased the building standards and the costs of retaining masonry buildings like those at the Arts Centre. The changes in the dispositions for historic buildings following the February 2011 earthquakes paved the way for more intrusive, cost-saving building options for the retention of the Arts Centre that would not have been possible prior to 2011. The ACC, with the decisive
input from ARUP’s consultants, drafted and launched two distinctive yet complementary strategies to retain and repopulate the Arts Centre. Both strategies advocated for more efficient and financially sustainable management of the Arts Centre premises that allowed for intrusive retention techniques to accommodate the wants and needs of prospective, high-grade tenants.

Focusing on the Performing Arts Precinct case study, it emerges that the CCC’s policies concerning the provision and management of performing arts facilities before the earthquakes represented a complementary policy output of the Central City Regeneration Strategy. Even if the latter did not explicitly foresee dedicated plans and projects for performing arts venues, the influence of the CCC in the rationalization of the regeneration discourse culminated with a series of deliberations that directly benefited key performing arts organizations like the MCC, the CSO and the Court Theatre. Similarly, the decision to fund the refurbishment of the Town Hall in 2009 was tied to the regeneration strategy for the central city and, more specifically, the entrepreneurial urban policy agenda of Mayor Bob Parker.

The severe damages to most of the venues as result of the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 put the future of performing arts facilities at the centre of the CBD recovery agenda. The provision of performing arts venues was among the key policy goals of the CBD draft plans of August and December 2011 released by the CCC. With the takeover of the planning authority by the national Government in 2012, the land-use policy for performing arts venues in the CBD radically shifted towards a site development model in which the existing urban fabric had to give way to new and allegedly better build facilities. This new approach had a relevant impact in the planning of performing arts venues. The site development strategy pursued by the national recovery authorities advocated for a dedicated area of the CBD to be home to a cluster of new performing arts venues. The targeted area had to be contiguous to a key tourism anchor and provide land parcels for the development of leisure amenities in between. A handful of anchor projects and a list of prospective tenants for the Performing Arts Precinct were identified, with established organizations like the CSO, the MCC and the Court Theatre being the ultimate beneficiaries of the redevelopment project. The rationale behind the delivery of the Performing Arts Precinct placed the building of facilities ahead of the development of strategies to effectively support the arts in the challenging post-earthquake
context. The recovery authorities identified the instruments for the purchase and amalgamation of land titles through the Crown a few weeks after the release of the CCRP, thus spatially constraining the development of performing arts venues in a given area of the CBD.

7.2.2 Decision-making process for urban tourism spaces before and after the earthquakes

Before the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, the decision-making process with respect to the planning of the Christchurch CBD was characterized by emerging episodes of corporatism involving key elected representatives of the CCC and prominent local landowners and developers. Moreover, the lobbying by a handful of influential organizations and individuals had drawn planning and development proposals down to a series of increasingly controversial projects. As a result, the CCC had spiralled into an inward-looking decision-making practice, with most of the key decisions excluding the public from Council sessions. The actions of elected councillors were limited to the mere deliberation of project proposals discussed ahead of time by the Mayor and the Chief Executive behind closed doors. Following the earthquakes, the decision-making process did not change much. Notwithstanding signs of a more opened and collaborative governance climate during the Share an Idea initiative, the mechanisms for decision-making for the CBD were further subject to the decision of a narrow group of Government representatives and bureaucrats. Modes of authoritative governance set the rules and the stakeholders to involve in the drafting of projects, with little or no room for the community to have a legitimate say in the future of their city.

With respect to the Arts Centre, the governance climate before the earthquakes was characterized by the juxtaposition between, on the one hand, the tenants and prominent individuals of the Christchurch civic society and, on the other hand, the interests of the ACC, the CCC and the University of Canterbury. The latter coalition sought to influence the decision-making process by presenting the building of the NCoM as a project opportunity that would have benefited the Arts Centre and the Christchurch CBD at large. Prominent advocates of the project manipulated and rationalized every single aspect of the NCoM decision-making process to meet their interests. Participants who were directly involved during the controversy around the NCoM project acknowledged episodes of open obstruction and side-
lining of opposition, particularly against dissenting members of the ACTB. Following the Environment Court decision against the NCoM building, the ACC had to cope with a loss of credibility and resenting public opinion.

Following the earthquake of September 2010, the newly-appointed members of the ACTB attempted to address the increasing tensions within the ACC. The Trust acknowledged that the organizations had some major governance flaws as result of the management of the site. The earthquake of February 2011 triggered a series of decisions that framed the recovery of the Arts Centre. The corporatist mode of metagovernance during the very first weeks of the emergency phase culminated with the unilateral decision of terminating the leases for 22 of the 23 buildings and the cordonning of the Arts Centre site. Prominent members of the ACTB set the basis for the drafting of the internal governance review and the elaboration of the Arts Centre Vision in a governance climate within which opposition stakeholders were excluded from decision-making. Undoubtedly, the feedback from stakeholders and the Christchurch community may indicate that their support for the governance reform and the Arts Centre Vision was unanimous. However, there is no doubt that the mechanisms behind the drafting of the strategies and the rationalization of wants and needs by the ACC relegated stakeholders to a tokenistic role, as the development strategy for the site was approved behind closed doors. Ultimately, the reform of the ACTB into a skills-based authority in replacement of the representative mode of governance suggests a radical shift towards a business model, in accordance with the advice from public policy consultants.

Findings from the second case study indicate that the pre-earthquake governance climate with regards to performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD was characterized by fragmentation within the performing arts community, with long-established organizations having quasi-exclusionary relationships with the CCC. The latter would arrange project proposals for performing arts venues and act as a patron for the benefit of ‘traditional’ performing arts organizations such as the MCC, the CSO and the Court Theatre. Such paternalistic approach by the CCC was implemented within the regulatory frames of Council activities for culture, the arts and urban regeneration strategies incorporated in the LTCCP 2006-2016 and the LTCCP 2009-2019. The CCC also acted as a provider of performing arts facilities through its venue management company Vbase.
Following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, a collaborative appraisal of the role of performing arts in the city gained momentum with the *Share an Idea* initiative and, more importantly, the establishment of Arts Voice as an advocacy group representing the wide arts community of Christchurch. The climate of collaboration among performing arts stakeholders acknowledged the shortcomings of the pre-earthquake governance for performing arts venues in Christchurch and sought to recast the policies and the strategies for the arts by drafting and implementing a vision of Christchurch as a city for the arts. Although the initiative by Arts Voice advocates was supported at the national level by the New Zealand Arts Society (NZAS) and CNZ, the takeover by the MCER and CERA in April 2012 undermined the delivery of the vision advocated by the Christchurch arts community. The latter was progressively silenced in a governance climate that favoured the return to the same old ways benefiting the long-established performing arts organizations.

7.2.3 *Policy discourses before and after the earthquakes*

The policy discourse behind the CBD regeneration strategy before the earthquakes was a continuation of the strategy first launched in 2001. Its long-term vision advocated for “a vibrant and prosperous business centre” (CCC, 2006b, p5), with economic recovery, leisure and culture being the strongholds. The re-adaptation of the existing built environment underpinned most of the plans for the regeneration of the CBD, with the CCC at the forefront as both enabler and regulator of heritage retention projects across the city. The building of brand-new facilities and amenities eventually surfaced during the first mayoralty of Bob Parker, with the expansion of the tram route and the regeneration project of the SOL Square area. The urban entrepreneurial agenda for the development of the CBD advocated the Council at the forefront of regeneration projects. Under Parker, the Council expanded its budget for the purchase of land in the city centre and for the refurbishment of key civic amenities like the Town Hall and the Convention Centre (CCC, 2009b).

Following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the policy discourses in the redevelopment plans for the Christchurch CBD did not change. The climate of uncertainty in the aftermath of the earthquake and the importance of the Christchurch CBD to the economy of New Zealand led
to a stronger urban entrepreneurial agenda in which both national and local authorities acknowledged the importance of redeveloping and retaining key amenities for the future of the CBD. These new facilities were promoted as necessary infrastructural investments to boost key sectors of the Christchurch economy severely hit by the earthquakes. In this context, tourism was among the key priorities in the redevelopment agenda. The establishment of the CCDU and the subsequent release of the CCRP further heightened the anchor project-led policy discourse, with the Blueprint identifying location, size and desired users of 14 projects to be carried out through partnerships between government authorities and private sector investors.

Evidence from the Arts Centre before the earthquakes shows how the then Director and the majority of the ACTB members embarked a pro-development site strategy for the complex in which instances of heritage conservation and integrity had been progressively set aside. The ACC advocated for a policy discourse that encouraged a new strategy for the site and put the economic return from commercial activities ahead of the cultural and educational intents enshrined in the original Trust Deed. The policy discourses supporting the NCoM project were emblematic of a site management strategy that seconded a cultural and heritage site to a financial logic. Following the announcement of the NCOM, however, the overwhelming majority of stakeholders challenged the rhetoric of alleged cultural and community benefits heralded by the ACC.

The policy discourses over the Arts Centre following the earthquakes reiterated most of the market-oriented standpoints of the pro-development arguments emerged before the seismic event. The ACC used the earthquakes as a pretext to accelerate its pro-development agenda. The recovery strategy, the Arts Centre Vision and the internal governance reform enshrine features dear to the neoliberal doctrine, with business-like governance modes, the quest for lucrative anchor tenants and the conversion of spaces to meet the needs and wants of prospected a-grade tenants. The provision of spaces for tourism and leisure purposes is particularly strong in the current policy discourse and represents an important change from the governance of the Arts Centre site before the earthquakes.

The policy discourses with respect to the provision of performing arts venues before the earthquakes were rooted in a rhetoric that stressed on the economic and residential benefits.
of having world-class cultural facilities in Christchurch. In particular, the provision of performing arts spaces was subject to principles such as re-adaptation of existing facilities in the CBD and their conversion as theatres or concert halls. Overall, the principle of environmental sustainability prevailed when it came to the development of facilities, with the Council’s role as patron and enabler for the arts being paramount in the policy discourse.

The earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 had important implications in the conveying of a different policy discourse for performing arts facilities in the Christchurch CBD. The substantial damages to the existing facilities in the Christchurch city centre were used as a pretext to convey a new development narrative that promoted the building of brand-new, fit-for-purpose facilities to meet the wants and needs of performing arts organizations. At first, this policy discourse emerged in the drafting of the CBD draft plans in 2011. The plans acknowledged the input from the arts community for the creation of clusters across the city centre and the idea that arts and creative organizations would organically flourish and pave the way to long-lasting regeneration. However, with the establishment of the CCDU, the policy discourse further shifted towards a conceptualization of the performing arts close to that of mainstream anchor projects, in which the presence of a new performing arts venue would attract private investors and businesses in the targeted area. This was the case of the new Town Hall project foreseen in the original Performing Arts Precinct launched in July 2012 (CCDU, 2013k). The rhetoric of the anchor projects was complementary to that of induced leisure and tourism-related development, as the provision of new performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD would have added value to the city of Christchurch as an event destination.

7.3 Significant analogies and differences from previous studies

This section integrates the findings presented in the case studies with the existing body of knowledge. It does so by first comparing the key results of the study with complementary research on post-earthquake urban governance in Christchurch and, subsequently, links this research with the literature illustrated in Chapter 2.
This research reinforces the findings of Hayward (2013, 2014) on the implications of hierarchical metagovernance in the emergency and recovery stages following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes in Christchurch. Her study stresses on “the loss of an effective or meaningful democratic voice at local government level” (Hayward, 2013, p37) and the ostracization of grassroots movements from collaborative decision-making (ibid.) in the recovery of the city centre. Similarly, the influential position of key performing arts organizations and the urban redevelopment agenda for the Performing Arts Precinct illustrated in Chapter 6 underpin complementary research on the arts community and the decision-making processes for urban spaces on the eve of the earthquakes (Feeney, 2011; Johnston, 2014) and in the current phase of recovery (Oliver, 2014). With respect to tenancies in the Christchurch CBD, instead, the results illustrated in Chapter 5 are complementary to similar studies on retail displacement from other heritage premises in the Christchurch city centre (McDonagh et al., 2013, 2014). Focusing on the rules and legislation following the earthquakes, finally, this study concurs with the conclusions of Brazendale (2013) on the marketization of built heritage. In her view, the provisions of the CERA 2011 reflect the market-driven reform of New Zealand carried by the national Government during the last years (Amore & Hall, 2017a; Cretney, 2017a; Hall. 2017; McCrone, 2012a).

Interesting differences were identified with respect to the effective contributions of top-down modes of governance and metagovernance supported in complementary studies on post-earthquake Christchurch. This study defies the claims by Johnson and Mamula-Seadon (2014) on the benefits of hierarchical governance in expediting decision-making. As illustrated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, the implementation of the CCRP and the delivery of the anchor projects were delayed in part due to the institutional clashes between the national Government and the CCC on matters subject to the deliberation of the democratically elected Council. This study, moreover, challenges the idea of increased inter-agency collaboration in post-disaster governance presented by Orchiston and Higham (2016). Particularly with site-specific urban tourism precincts, this study found that mechanisms of exclusion and non-decision-making prevented tourism stakeholders to effectively collaborate in the drafting, design and implementation of the Arts Centre recovery project and the Performing Arts Precinct.
The findings from post-earthquake Christchurch echo most of the traits of neoliberal policies in post-disaster contexts discussed in the literature (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Johnson, 2011; Klein, 2007). Notwithstanding the proposals submitted by organizations consisting of prominent members of the Christchurch citizenry, the government strictly held to their recovery agenda. Even when some of the recommendations to the authorities reinforced neoliberal dogmas such as tax relief, the recovery authorities were reluctant to establish any kind of dialogue and kept relying on international consultancies instead. Such unwillingness to engage in possible alternatives and collaboration by the recovery authorities reflects the findings from developing country contexts in the wake of natural disasters (Damiani, 2008; Klein, 2007; Larsen et al., 2011).

Limited democratic participation, exclusion of dissent and the perceived infallibility of the national Government’s recovery agenda were also highlighted in research findings from L’Aquila and Istanbul (Ozcevik et al., 2009; Tiso, 2014). The centralization of decision-making in post-earthquake Christchurch had very few precedents, but recent disasters of the kind suggest it has become the norm (Johnson & Olshansky, 2013). The mounting adversities and the need to provide immediate response in the wake of a disaster suggest that “public involvement and community processes are difficult to conduct” (Olshansky et al., 2012, p176). The findings from this study suggest that the issue of time was used by key authorities to expedite decision-making and project delivery. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the case of the Performing Arts Precinct, the national authorities deliberately sidelined inputs from Arts Voice and used extracts from Share an Idea to legitimize a project “designed for profitable [and] traditional forms of performance” (Oliver, 2014, p346). Overall, this study argues that post-disaster contexts exacerbate the power struggles between state authorities, small and large-scale private stakeholders and the affected communities highlighted in other works (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014; Pelling, 2003).

The findings of this study underpin the statements of Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009) on the importance of community coalescence in the wake of disaster. The state of national emergency declared after the February 22nd 2011 earthquake kept businesses and residents away from their premises thus hindering their ability to stand against the top-down recovery agenda from the beginning. Spontaneous initiatives of community response and civic society
engagement were kettled by the overly bureaucratic and narrowly-focussed national government response to disaster. The study agrees with Barrios’ (2011) argument on how residents’ inputs on reconstruction are kept aside by government in order to implement recovery plans rooted in the neoliberal dogmas of development and investment. Notwithstanding the mobilization of resources and people in counter-recovery debates, the experience of Christchurch can be regarded as an example of manipulative post-disaster governance characterized by little or no control at all by the affected residents (Davidson et al., 2007).

This study agrees that “the use of public-private partnerships in building the city of leisure is increasingly a common, sought-after strategy” (Spirou, 2010, p55) that benefits “narrow sectorial interests” (Hall, 1999, p285) at the expense of community-wide concerns. In the case of the Arts Centre, for example, this study concurs with similar works focusing on the marketization and gentrification heritage premises (Gotham, 2005b; Pendlebury, 2012), with private interests and profiting prevailing on the community view of heritage as a socio-cultural asset in the identity of the city. Focusing on the Performing Arts Precinct, instead, there are striking similarities with the findings illustrated in Chapter 6 and the evidence supported by the dedicated literature (Booyens & Rogerson, 2015; Markusen & Gadwa, 2010; Whitford, 2009). The issue of under-funded performing arts organizations highlighted in this study is similarly acknowledged in the existing body of knowledge (Smith, 2006a). Conversely, the lack of collaboration with grassroots organizations in the drafting of the precinct suggests likely flaws in the delivery of sustainable urban cultural anchors (Birch et al., 2013).

The Christchurch situation reflects the concept of ‘mobilisation of bias’ first developed by Schattschneider (1960) and later elaborated by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Lukes (2005), which implies that some issues are organised into politics whereas others are organised out. The post-disaster governance of Christchurch reflects Schattschneider’s (1960, p71) observation that “all forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others”. The mobilisation of bias and non-decision-making practices operated in at least three ways in the Christchurch context with respect to post-disaster community interests and responses. First, it served to prevent the formulation of grievances. For example, even though there was no real relationship between
the Share an Idea process and the disaster recovery plan, statements by the government that there was a relationship were used to suggest that voices had been listened to and incorporated in the government response. Second, even if grievances are formulated within interests, some community actors anticipated opposition by the government and associated stakeholders and, consequently, did not raise an issue or withdraw their involvement in community coalitions to instead enter into their own negotiations with government or at least protect their existing assets from further erosion. Such a situation was especially a reflection of the government’s negotiating tactics with respect to arts and cultural organisations in the city recovery process. Finally, when issues were raised and especially when community groups sought input into policy and decision-making processes, the government was not willing to ‘hear’ alternative policy arguments from those outside their neoliberal post-disaster paradigm and implemented institutional arrangements to ensure that this would not occur, thus also lessening the potential political legitimacy of such groups. The Christchurch case is more than what Parry and Morris (1974) termed ‘negative decision-making’ and instead reflects a more widespread use of non-decision-making tactics.

7.4 The Christchurch CBD as a metaphor: Propositions for post-disaster urban tourism

A series of propositions are hereby presented in light on the findings from the two case studies presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. These propositions derive from the post-earthquake Christchurch CBD redevelopment context and represent a useful benchmark and a valuable basis to compare-and-contrast the traits of post-disaster governance and redevelopment policy-making for urban tourism precincts in other contexts.

The articulation of findings through propositions in this section underpins complementary research in the fields of urban politics, urban regeneration, governance and urban tourism. The study of Flyvbjerg (1998b) on the rationalization of urban politics discourses in Aalborg, Denmark, provided ten propositions “understood as theory inductively founded upon concrete phenomenology” (ibid., p226). Similarly, Swyngedouw and Moulaert (2010) considered the governance dynamics and potentials for change in urban policy emerged from
different neighbourhood-level experiences across Europe and provided a range of recommendations to enhance the academic debate and support practices of social innovation to tackle episodes of social exclusion and fragmentation. The use of empirical generalizations synthesizing complex social phenomena was also used in Porter (2009), with findings being discussed through a dual interpretative appraisal of neoliberal-led practices of urban regeneration in inner-city areas. Finally, with respect to urban tourism, Spirou (2010) enucleates five propositions linking the existing literature on tourism and urban change to the findings collected from cities across the world.

The use of propositions as a basis for discussion can be also traced in studies focusing on post-disaster governance and resilience of tourist destinations and cities. Calgaro (2010), for example, enucleates the factors that heighten the resilience of coastal destinations to hazards in post-tsunami Thailand and concludes that they provide “a solid grounding for the development of appropriate resilience building strategies and more sustainable futures for tourism-dependent communities” (ibid. p303). In a similar vein, Gotham and Greenberg (2014) link the findings from their extensive research in New York and New Orleans to the “urbanization of crisis – whereby crises of all kinds increasingly are impacted by urbanization or have a pivotal urban dimension” (ibid., p241).

The propositions reported below drawn upon Lukes’ three-dimensional conceptualization of power. Overall, these propositions are articulated on the basis that pre-disaster urban development practices and policy discourses rooted in the neoliberal dogma of market-led urban regeneration are expedited in the aftermath of large-scale triggering events.

*Proposition #1: Decision-making processes for urban tourist spaces in post-disaster contexts are carried through highly hierarchical modes of governance and metagovernance*

Following the earthquakes, the Arts Centre embarked a drastic governance reform that combined corporatist and top-down modes of governance. The handling of key decisions for the site continued to be taken behind closed doors, with aftershocks and the persisting state of emergency muffling the decisions that eventually framed the recovery strategy for the site and reformed the Trust Deed.
The case of the Arts Centre suggests that the organizational structure of the Trust gave to the Directors a very influential role in the appointment of consultants to draft the Arts Centre Vision and run the internal governance assessment. The perceived climate of uncertainty and commitment of key Board members for the cause of rescuing the Arts Centre further legitimized the draconian authority of the Directors. The ACTB legitimized the decision of Franklin and his Management Team to unilaterally terminate the leases to tenants in March 2011. Similarly, Andre Lovatt was given wide authority in the implementation of the recovery strategy for the different units of the Arts Centre and seconded a consultant from his previous company, ARUP, to run the workshops with the ACTB that eventually led to the drafting and release of the Arts Centre Vision in 2013.

In the case of the Performing Arts Precinct, the governance structure following the earthquake gave extraordinary decisional authority to the MCER, who had the final say on matters such as the delivery of the recovery plan for the CBD and CERA’s GCRS. Under the Minister, the Chief Executive of CERA and the Director of the CCDU conveyed the input of the Cabinet with respect to location, size and type of facilities to be included in the designated precinct. The Minister and the Cabinet later proved their higher influence by announcing the first project of the Performing Arts Precinct in June 2014, with the Crown leasing the land to the MCC rather than to the CCC as originally foreseen in the CSA.

At first, the arts community considered the earthquake recovery as a once in a lifetime opportunity to shift the governance of performing arts venues away from the paternalistic and piecemeal role of the CCC as main funding authority for a narrow group of established organizations. However, despite some laudable initiatives, the approach by the CCDU and the national authorities reiterated the same paternalistic mode of governance, as it best fitted with the rebuilding agenda. Ultimately, the coalitions between national authorities and established performing arts organization during the drafting of the CCRP culminated with the launch of the Performing Arts Precinct in July 2012.
Proposition #2: Decision-making is influenced by those stakeholders who own or have authority over the land

The ownership of the land was a key factor in the delivery of the Arts Centre recovery project. The ACC was the undisputed guardian authority in charge with the management of the site and was, de facto, the owner of the land titles and of the twenty-three buildings of the complex. This aspect expedited the decisions on the recovery strategy for the site and its implementation over a period of eight years. The ACC, moreover, was entitled to allocate some of the land parcels for new developments following the Environment Court decision of 2010. This aspect was raised by the ACC’s Management Team as a plausible solution for leasing allotments and gain additional funding for the completion of the recovery strategy by 2019.

The provisions by the CCDU and CERA with regards to land acquisitions and amalgamation of land parcels ousted the right of private property in the areas designated for the Performing Arts Precinct. The Crown was the sole entity with the right to negotiate the acquisition of land and it did it under the conditions established by recovery authority officials and consultants. This, in turn, created a mechanism of ‘land grab’ that was not possible in a business as usual context. Most importantly, the location of the proposed new Town Hall was an input of Minister Brownlee and officials at the CCDU, with the existing Town Hall to be demolished in order to widen the green space adjacent to the proposed the Convention Centre Precinct.

Proposition #3: Established stakeholders benefit from decisions over urban tourist spaces, while secondary or grassroots organizations are set aside

In the case of the Arts Centre, the appointment of new Board members following the September 2010 earthquake did not lead to a drastic revision of the heavily criticized pro-development agenda. Rather, the new members were decisive in bringing expertise and personal connections that culminated with the appointments of consultants and site managers that drafted the recovery strategy and the Arts Centre Vision. Moreover, the Director of the ACC did not resign following the earthquakes and the spiral of critics following the NCoM project controversy. Instead, he played a decisive role in the termination of leases in March 2011.
The governance of the site following the earthquakes did not seek collaboration with third parties and stakeholders who had a strong interest in the future of the site. Secondary and small stakeholders acknowledged that the decisions taken by the ACC did not seek consultation or feedback from former tenants and cultural stakeholders. The involvement of stakeholders in the internal governance audit of late 2011 was limited to major local and national authorities as well as former members of the ACTB. Similarly, the strategies for the redevelopment and repopulation of the site did not seek for genuine feedback from stakeholders. Those who had publicly criticized the decisions of the ACC were kept at arm’s length, with a restricted group of former tenants invited to the presentation of the strategies *fait accompli*.

The governance for performing arts venues after the earthquakes championed the pre-existing network of people and organizations, who used their influence at the local and national level to seek support and funding solutions for the drafting, building and delivery of fit-for-purpose facilities. This was the case, in particular, of the Court Theatre, whose Director’s influence in the ideas behind the new theatre in the CCC’s CBD draft plans of 2011 and in the Performing Arts Precinct foreseen in the CCRP proved to be decisive. Also, the CSO looked after its own interests when it came to the inclusion of a new concert hall in the proposed project in the CCRP and sought to influence decision-making so that the organization would manage to have a permanent site to locate its office and rehearsal spaces.

The several arts organizations and individuals that coalesced to form the Arts Voice advocacy group were progressively sidelined a few days after the meeting with the Blueprint architects and the CCDU staff. Their legitimacy as the group representing the Christchurch arts community was eventually challenged when the newly-appointed JAG recommended for the group to widen its representative base in order to be considered as an interested party in the meetings with the CCC, CERA, the CCDU, CNZ and the MCH. Arts Voice members, however, were discouraged by the shift in the delivery of cultural and arts-related amenities in the Christchurch CBD and progressively resigned from the advocacy group.
Proposition #4: The drafting and implementation of recovery projects are carried through mechanisms of non-decision-making

With respect to the Arts Centre, the engagement with the community on the Arts Centre Vision was far from being collaborative. The use of structured surveys with pre-established site development paths represented a mechanism to legitimize consent on a strategy that the ACC had already been approved behind closed doors with the input from ARUP consultants. Albeit a restricted group of former tenants were invited to the presentation of the Vision, their role in the decision on the tenancy strategy was tokenistic.

In a similar vein, the episodes of engagement with residents and performing arts stakeholders through Share an Idea and the CCC’s annual plans following the 2010 and the 2011 earthquakes were limited to tokenistic episodes of non-decision-making. The feedback from participants on the retention of the existing Town Hall, for example, was used to legitimize the view of the CCC and of heritage advocates over a decision that was already under discussion at Council level before the deliberations of November 2012 and August 2013. With respect to the Performing Arts Precinct, instead, arts stakeholders sought to provide advice and collaborate with the authorities during the drafting of the project. However, it soon became clear that a more constructive feedback would not be sought when the CCDU introduced the conceptual idea of the Court Plus, which would be later renamed as Performing Arts Precinct.

Proposition #5: The impact of the earthquake recovery legislation was uneven and differed from site to site

The earthquake recovery acts promulgated in 2010 and 2011 foresaw a series of exemptions from the existing body of legislation for the Christchurch CBD and the Greater Christchurch city areas. In principle, these dispositions were promulgated to foster the physical and economic recovery of the city. The application of the special legislation, however, differed considerably when we look at the two projects at the heart of the study. The legislation did not fully apply to the Arts Centre, as the emergency cordon around the site had been lifted before the establishment of CERA and the promulgation of the CERA 2011. Moreover, the
management of the heritage site remained under the control of the ACC, whereas other private owners seeking to gain access to their properties had to cope with the intransigence of CERA’s demolitions team. Conversely, the Arts Centre site was subject to the CCDU’s amendments of the City Plan in July 2012 and the changes in the legislation for earthquake-prone buildings and historical sites. These, in turn, provided a series of rules that allowed the use intrusive techniques for the refurbishment of facilities like the Arts Centre.

The earthquake recovery legislation was decisive in the demolition of most of the existing performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD. The expedited demolitions of the buildings home to the MCC and the CSO were carried in accordance with the dispositions of Section 38 of the CERA 2011, as the facilities were located within the CBD emergency cordon and were thus subject to the decision of the recovery authorities. The old Town Hall was also located in the red cordon, but its status as major civic facility meant that any decision on the complex had to wait for detailed geotechnology reports, in accordance with the recommendations of the Earthquake Royal Commission.

Focusing on the Performing Arts Precinct, the dispositions under the earthquake legislation gave to the Cabinet the power to establish the CCDU and legitimize the amendment of the existing City Plan so that it did not conflict with the purpose of economic recovery enshrined in the CERA 2011. The changes in the City Plan accommodated the development rules for the area designated for the Performing Arts Precinct. The latter had to include commercial and leisure activities complementary to a range of pre-established performing arts venues. Ultimately, the dispositions for the precinct meant that performing arts precincts seeking to relocate in the Christchurch CBD could only move to the Performing Arts Precinct and cope with the competition for land with private developers seeking to build retail and leisure spaces in proximity to highly-valuable real estate premises.

**Proposition #6: Organizations took advantage of the Government’s top-down recovery agenda**

In the case of the Arts Centre, both the ACC and the Director supported the promulgation of the new rules as well as the dispositions over vacant land within the site. On the one hand, the new rules legitimised cheaper building retention techniques that helped to contain part
of the costs budgeted for the recovery of the site. On the other hand, the disposition for the Arts Centre under the new planning regulations gave to the ACC conditions for site development that would not have been possible under the pre-earthquake legislation. The relevance of the new rules for the purposes of the pro-development strategy of the ACC re-emerged during the first reading of the ACCTB in June 2014. The Bill reformed the existing ACTB and the objectives of the Trust Deed by further legitimizing the corporatist and pro-development governance of the site.

Focusing on the Performing Arts Precinct, the decision to exclude and include stakeholders depended on which government authority led the processes of consultation and decision-making and on the object of such decisions. Whilst arts stakeholders, particularly the prospected tenants, were involved throughout the design and early implementation of the Performing Arts Precinct, decisions such as those regarding the CSA were exclusive to the government authorities. Not surprisingly, following the release of the CSA for the Performing Arts Precinct, the authority leading the project (the CCC) re-embraced an open-door policy to potential new tenants for the site. As one participant highlighted:

I think another key point to make is that Council was, has always been of the opinion that although there were the three main stakeholders designated for that precinct area, there would always be an area-wide process calling for expressions of interest for residual tenancies in that precinct. That’s been our [the CCC] prerogative from the outset, and that wasn’t articulated in the Blueprint. But it has been something that we have communicated (Anna).

Proposition #7: The recovery of urban tourist spaces reiterates features of the disaster capitalism paradigm

In the recovery projects addressed in this study, it emerged that the impact of the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes on the built environment were used a pretext by key authorities and organizations to embark strategies of spatial displacement. In the case of the Arts Centre, for instance, the earthquakes and the need to secure the site from further collapses and aftershocks were used as a justification to unilaterally terminate the leases and prohibit the
access to the site to former tenants. Similarly, the fast-track demolition of performing arts venues in the CBD was justified as necessary despite the buildings being within the red cordon and access being restricted.

The rhetoric of building back better is a common feature in post-disaster policy discourses rooted in disaster capitalism. The pursuit of allegedly better building solutions in the case of the Arts Centre was legitimised in the recovery strategy and in the vision for the site, with the latter enucleating a series of building refurbishment options to increase the appeal of the complex to high-grade prospective tenants. Similarly, the approach of the national Government in promoting the building of a brand-new Town Hall as part of the Performing Arts Precinct was characterized by a policy discourse that emphasized the benefits of providing a fit-for-purpose venue for the arts community. In turn, Minister Brownlee and the CCDU criticized the alternative solution of retaining the existing Town Hall and the associated exorbitant costs for its full refurbishment.

The policy discourses for the Arts Centre and the facilities foreseen in the Performing Arts Precinct reiterated the rhetoric of financial sustainability during the different stage of drafting, decision-making and implementation of the projects. In the case of the Arts Centre, the principle of financial sustainability became the benchmark in the governance of the site following the earthquakes and was eventually included in the Bill presented to the New Zealand Parliament in 2014. Therefore, the future of the Arts Centre and its retention as heritage site will depend on the returns it will generate from the leasing of land and premises to high-grade tenants. Similarly, the delivery and management of the facilities for the Performing Arts Precinct are being carried in observance of demand-driven budgetary and financial principles. Albeit the national Government advocated for a bold thinking in the drafting of the precinct, the funding of the projects has to be carried through the pay-out from the insurance and the selling of Council-owned assets.
Proposition #8: The neoliberal-driven regeneration agenda of urban space heightens in post-disaster contexts

The case studies addressed in this thesis suggest that the policy discourses for cultural sites in post-disasters contexts further embrace market-driven redevelopment agendas. The latter was adopted, for example, in the tenancy agenda pursued by the ACC in the years before the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes and in the Arts Centre Vision released in 2013. The conceptualization of anchor uses and the increase of rental space for lucrative creative businesses represented a radical shift from the original tenancy strategy characterized by low-rent premises for local artists and performing arts organizations. Undoubtedly, most of the arts tenants had progressively left the Arts Centre before the September 2010 earthquake as result of the commercialization strategy pursued by the ACC. The earthquakes simply accelerated the shift towards the redevelopment and management of the Arts Centre site as a market-driven business.

Focusing on the performing arts venues, the policy discourses following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 reprised site development practices dear to neoliberal urban planning. The delivery of the CBD recovery through a series of anchor projects advocated by the CCDU, in fact, embodied a redevelopment agenda in which the Performing Arts Precinct was portrayed as the ultimate project to attract investments for the delivery of brand-new arts and cultural facilities. The latter, in turn, would have increased the interest of private developers with interests in the retail and hospitality industries. This regeneration strategy differed considerably from the CCC’s strategy for performing arts venues before the earthquakes and the project proposals included in the CBD recovery drafts of 2011.

Proposition #9: The rhetoric of tourism development is embodied in post-disaster policy discourses

The rhetoric of tourism and hospitality played a relevant part in the promotion of recovery and redevelopment strategies for the two sites at the heart of this study. The Arts Centre Vision acknowledged the implications of creative-oriented tenancy strategy with respect to visitor appeal. Whilst the inclusion of creative businesses underpinned the objectives of the 2008 amended version of the Trust Deed, the identification of tourist services and amenities
as prospective tenants to the site was first introduced following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. The rationale promoting the inclusion of hospitality alongside core creative and educational services was based on a handful of international practices used by the ACC as a benchmark in the drafting of the recovery strategy.

Similarly, the drafting of the Performing Arts Precinct and the identification of the complementary services around the key projects were rooted in a rhetoric that put tourism and hospitality as major players in the development of the site. The identification of prospective performing arts organizations and the location of the precinct within the CBD followed a policy discourse that stressed on the implications of the precinct in terms of leisure, tourism and night economy. Stakeholders supporting the precinct stressed on the advantages of locating the Performing Arts Precinct in proximity to the proposed Convention Centre Precinct and on the benefits of providing a range of cultural amenities to conference delegates. Also in this case, the body of knowledge was rooted on a range of international practices stressing on the hospitality and tourism-related benefits of clustering performing arts venues alongside leisure and retail services.

7.5 Urban regeneration, urban governance and tourism in pre-and-post-disaster contexts: a synthesis

The process of urban regeneration in a context of post-disaster recovery shares a number of essential traits and significant differences with mainstream urban regeneration Figure 7.1). Both forms of regeneration take place in a predominantly de-politicised climate (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012; Swyngedouw, 2010) within which dedicated PPPs pursue the logic of market and competitiveness (Keil, 2009). Secondly, mainstream and post-disaster urban regeneration are conceived as an opportunity to radically change the urban landscape and tackle economic decline. Thirdly, both forms of regeneration are justified through the rhetoric of international ‘best practices’ (Theodore & Peck, 2011) and their impacts in terms of place competitiveness (Bristow, 2010; Hall, 2007a, 2008b). Fourthly, both forms of regeneration focus on leisure and tourism-oriented ‘anchor’ or ‘flagship’ projects, such as convention centres, art galleries, museums, stadia, and design or cultural precincts/quarters, all often tied
in with the hosting of events, as the desired urban redevelopment strategy. Undoubtedly, there are striking analogies between the redevelopment of inner urban spaces from industrial brownfields and the systematic demolition or buildings following urban natural disasters. In the latter case, the logic of the *tabula rasa* give way to the re-allocation of land for leisure and tourism spaces (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014).

Figure 7.1: Relationships between urban regeneration as usual and post-disaster regeneration

Adapted from Amore and Hall (2016b)
Unlike with mainstream urban regeneration, post-disaster urban regeneration takes place in a context in which growth coalitions use exogenous crises and disasters to deliver a neoliberal-driven redevelopment of the city. As demonstrated in this thesis, recovery authorities justify market-directed strategies as a solution to quickly fix the dysfunctional climate of uncertainty. Within such crisis climate, normal planning and decision-making practices are suspended in order to expedite economic recovery and development. Secondly, the role of the insurance industry is pivotal in post-disaster urban redevelopment (Adams, 2013; Gotham, 2012) as insurance agreements dictate the pay-out conditions and the amount of money allocated for the rebuild. Thirdly, the redevelopment of urban areas in the aftermath of disasters occurs in a climate of increased land contestation, with disputes on clearance and selling of land parcels. Fourthly, radical institutional change and time compression are common features in post-disaster contexts (Atkinson, 2013; Gotham & Greenberg, 2014; Olshansky et al., 2012). This calls for a shift from governance to metagovernance (Amore & Hall, 2016a; Jessop, 2003, 2011; Meuleman, 2008; Sørensen, 2006) to increase the understanding of “shadowed hierarchical authority” (Scharpf, 1994, p41) and linkages to the different dimensions of power. Finally, time compression affects both political institutions and the power relations between government and citizens, with direct repercussions on the governance of cities. Redevelopment is carried through dedicated recovery agencies lacking democratic legitimacy (Johnson & Olshansky, 2013) and coalitions between major public and private stakeholders. The neoliberal rebuild agenda is legitimized through none or tokenistic community involvement (Hall, 1994; Nyseth, 2012; Timothy, 2007) that heighten the detachment between institutions and citizenry.

7.6 Summary

This chapter discussed the objectives originally outlined in the Introduction chapter and articulated the discussion considering the findings from the two case studies at the heart of the research. The chapter also discussed significant analogies and differences between the findings of this research and those currently reported in the literature in the attempt to fill the research gap on post-disaster governance for urban tourist precincts. A series of propositions were presented to highlight relevant aspects of post-disaster governance in the Christchurch
CBD that can be of reference for future contributions in the field. Finally, the chapter provided a synthesis of the literature and the findings of this study by presenting a framework that illustrated similarities and differences between practices of urban regeneration in ‘business as usual’ contexts and in contexts of post-disaster urban recovery.
Chapter 8
Conclusions

8.1 Introduction

This thesis illustrated the process of urban regeneration in the CBD of Christchurch before and after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 by providing findings on dedicated projects for the retention of built heritage and the delivery of cultural venues. What emerged was a governance climate where the rhetoric of urban competitiveness and market-driven redevelopment permeated the agendas of the MCER, CERA and the CCDU. These, in turn, influenced the process of urban recovery, with implications for the recovery strategies adopted by organizations and the built environment of the CBD at large.

This chapter presents general conclusions drawn from the research findings and main lines of argument provided in the previous chapters. Section 8.1 summarises the main findings of this research and presents the theoretical and practical contributions to the study of post-disaster governance for urban tourist spaces. Section 8.3, instead, acknowledges the limitations of the thesis and outlines a range of recommendations for further research. Section 8.4 identifies potential insights for further research to advance knowledge in post-disaster urban governance, with an emphasis on extended studies focusing in post-earthquake Christchurch. Finally, Section 8.5 presents the concluding remarks of the thesis.

8.2 Contributions of the study

The body of knowledge with respect to urban tourism, tourism policy and planning and governance has steadily increased over the last 30 years. The review of the literature upon which this study was crafted shows that research differs in terms of aims, objectives and methods used. However, almost no research attention was given to the governance of urban tourist spaces in post-disaster contexts. The handful of works seeking to address the topic
seem to show traits of the long-lasting ‘double neglect’ between urban and tourism studies that still permeates research in urban tourism (Ashworth & Page, 2011). This study attempted to grasp different yet complementary theories and concepts to provide new knowledge in the understanding of governance dynamics for urban tourist spaces in post-disaster contexts.

The insights obtained from this research represent an advancement in the study of post-disaster governance with respect to urban tourism. As reiterated throughout the thesis, tourism studies, in general, do not engage “with the way policy arenas actually operate” in times of crisis (Hall, 2013, p21). The inclusion of insights from urban tourism, tourism planning and policy and tourism destination governance sought to provide a theoretical framing to better grasp the phenomenon at the heart of the study. However, the extensive literature on tourism was proven to be characterized by a “failure to set policy and action in a broader and more critical framework” (Mowforth & Munt, 2015, p297). This study, therefore, used social theory and planning theory to move beyond “old ways of knowing” in current tourism research (Dredge & Jenkins, 2011b, p5) and provide an enhanced theoretical basis that allowed the understanding of often-implicit assumptions regarding the role of the state, businesses, civic society and individuals in urban destination governance and planning (Amore & Hall, 2016a; Bramwell & Lane, 2011).

This research has examined the interrelationships between complementary bodies of knowledge in tourism and included insights from current research in urban studies, planning theory and political sciences in the attempt to understand and analyse concrete situations through a post-disciplinary approach. This approach was particularly appropriate, as the intricate context of post-earthquake Christchurch required the ability to stretch beyond the boundaries of disciplines. As Sayer (1999, p2), argued: “identification which so many academics have with their disciplines is actually counterproductive from the point of view of making progress in understanding society”. This study is built on a range of different studies from complementary fields of research and disciplines and provides an alternative, post-disciplinary appraisal of the phenomenon at the heart of the research. One of the most important contributions of this study, therefore, lies in the integration of complementary bodies of research in the context of post-earthquake governance for urban tourist spaces in Christchurch.
Another key contribution of this study is the illustration of findings from area-based recovery projects in the Christchurch CBD with relevance to the future of the city as a tourist destination. The inclusion of two recovery projects permitted to identify similarities and differences between often taken-for-granted processes of urban governance. As this study showed, the delivery of the two projects was strongly influenced by insurance and financial constraints before and after the earthquakes. Similarly, there were rules and laws that applied specifically depending on the type of facility, land-use and land ownership, with the Arts Centre being a private-led recovery project carried partly outside the tight command-and-control governance of the recovery authorities. Lobbies and corporatist modes of governance became the norm in post-disaster governance for urban tourist spaces in the Christchurch CBD, with other forms of participation and community engagement being sidelined through both silent and openly obstructive episodes of exclusion. Overall, the projects resemble traits of the disaster capitalism ideology, with the earthquakes representing the triggering event for the implementation of projects rooted in the mainstream neoliberal rhetoric of market infallibility, urban competitiveness, attraction of private investors and promotion of tourism. This research represents a first step in the study of governance for urban tourist sites in post-disaster contexts, but it is also an important advancement in the argumentative appraisal of tourism-related development in urban areas.

This research sought to provide a Lukesian appraisal of governance and policy-making that is often overlooked in tourism studies in favour of alternative theorizations rooted in the Foucauldian conceptualization of power (Church & Coles, 2007). As this study explained, Lukes’ (2005) theorization of power acknowledges the role of human agency and confirming-structuration heralded by Giddens (1984) and the exponents of the Frankfurt School (Haugaard, 2003), in sharp contrast with Foucault, who “does not think of power as something possessed by those who exercise it” (Hoy, 1986, p134). Most importantly, the acknowledgement of human agency in Lukes’ work underpins contemporary planning theories and the institutionalist approach advocated in the works of Healey (1999, 2006a, 2006c) and Jessop (1997) among others. Similarly, the influence of neoliberalism as a hegemonic force in contemporary urban regimes is a cornerstone of the disaster capitalism doctrine (Klein, 2007, 2015). This study tied together these works and theories to provide a theoretical framework fit for the purposes of research.
The participants who took part to the study provided quite a counter-narrative to the one officially conveyed by the recovery authorities. All participants were personally involved in most of the key episodes of governance and decision-making processes with respect to the rebuild of the Christchurch CBD and the two recovery projects at the heart of the research. Their input was shed light on untold aspects of stakeholder engagement with respect to the Arts Centre, the Town Hall and the Performing Arts Precinct. Moreover, the participants shared relevant information on the rationale behind rules and instruments deployed throughout the processes of drafting, release and early implementation of the recovery projects for heritage, culture and performing arts venues in the Christchurch CBD. These findings, in turn, reinforced the critical appraisal of government documents, Cabinet papers and strategies collected for the purposes of the study. The experience from the fieldwork provided interesting insights with respect to power relations and researcher positionality throughout the interview that can be used in the future to address constraints common to situated research.

This research reinforces most of the critical stances around post-disaster governance in Christchurch reported in contributions written over the last years on the rebuild of the city. In particular, it agrees with the “fundamental dichotomy of interests between private insurance and individual and community recovery” (Miles, 2016, p4) that characterized the rebuild of Christchurch. This study, moreover, underpins the comments of McCrone (2014b) with respect to the stalling of private sector investment on the anchor projects. As at November 2015, there was no explicit private sector interest in investing on projects led by either CERA or the CCC. There are similar patterns to what occurred to the Arts Centre and other areas of the Christchurch CBD with respect to the displacement of businesses from heritage premises (McDonagh et al., 2014). Specifically, with the performing arts, the findings of this study agree with the observations of Oliver (2014) and Parker (2014) on the repercussions of the CCRP and the Blueprint for the Christchurch arts community. Conversely, this study provides a theoretically-grounded analysis of the governance in post-earthquake Christchurch that challenges some of the findings provided in other studies. In particular, this study challenges the work of Johnson and Mamula-Seadon (2014, p600), which concludes that “there are signs that the centralization may have helped to strengthen horizontal coordination at the national level and expedite policy and decision-making”. Most importantly, it challenges the ‘sugar-
coated’ narrative conveyed by the national Government on the promising outcomes of post-disaster governance with respect to the rebuild of key civic facilities in the Christchurch CBD.

The contributions of this study for the advancement of academic research are several. To a certain extent, this can be considered as the first empirical study to ever address site-specific episodes of governance for urban tourist spaces in a context of post-disaster recovery. Moreover, this study is one of the few to appraise overt, covert and hegemonic dimensions of power influencing decision-making for urban tourist spaces in pre-and-post disaster contexts.

The research is built around Lukes’ (2005) conceptualization of power, which allows for a critical argumentation of decision-making processes through a structurationist perspective. The theoretical framework developed for this study represents an advancement to current research on urban tourism governance in pre-and-post disaster contexts. The theoretical framework, although limited to only two specific sites in the context of the Christchurch CBD rebuild allows for a multi-dimensional discussion of the post-disaster urban governance context by linking the coalitions between stakeholders to rules, laws and the ideologies behind them. It is hoped that this research will draw attention among academics on a currently overlooked aspect of post-disaster recovery.

The findings of this study have empirical relevance for stakeholders dealing with site-level post-disaster governance and decision-making in urban areas. From a local perspective, planners and authorities can rely on a counter-narrative to the one portrayed by government officials with respect to the rebuild of Christchurch. Readers can have a greater understanding of the power dynamics and interests in the rebuild of the CBD and of its amenities. On a broader scale, this research draws greater attention to decisions with respect to site development before the earthquakes and their relevance in framing recovery. More specifically, the findings from this research can be used to better understand the shortcomings of the post-disaster governance model applied in Christchurch following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011.

There are similarities between the findings reported in this thesis and those emerging from the other post-disaster regeneration projects in Christchurch (Amore & Hall, 2017b), New Orleans (Gotham & Greenberg, 2014) and L’Aquila (Guzzanti, 2010). The findings of this study are potentially transferable to large-scale urban regeneration projects where stakeholders
and exponents of the civic society openly challenge the advocacy for greater public spending and infrastructural development of government authorities. Moreover, findings on overt and covert forms of power from post-earthquake Christchurch shed light on the rise of authoritative modes of metagovernance in established democratic societies and the daunting similarities with processes of urban regeneration in global South cities (e.g. Jakarta, Rio de Janeiro).

The findings of this study can be compared to human-induced disasters and crises as long as the focus of the research is on urban contexts. Two additional conditions for a sound comparison require a context where the influence of the F.I.R.E sector and the scale of the damage are relevant. A third condition for a comparative research is the position of cities in the global urban hierarchy. This study acknowledges the notion of ‘ordinary cities’ as part of “a world of interactions and flows” (Robinson, 2006, p109), meaning that comparing the findings of Christchurch with those of a given megacity would be subject to criticism. A final contextual condition concerns the need to focus the analysis to time-compressed forms of metagovernance. The latter are a common feature in post-disaster contexts, as government authorities embark on radical institutional changes as remedy to tackle down the crisis and expedite recovery.

In summary, this research shows how hybrid forms of knowledge production rejecting unwarranted disciplinary parochialism (Hellström, Jacob & Wenneberg, 2003) allow for a greater appraisal of complex phenomena that need to be understood with proactive learning and research situatedness rather than with a single disciplinary approach (after Sayer, 1999). By combining different theoretical insights, this study contributes to fostering argumentative research in post-disaster governance in a phase of contemporary society characterized by hegemonic hyper-neoliberal normalization. It does so by narrowing its attention to specific sites and projects that represent the unit of reference in the rebuild of cities and places following a disaster. While the implications of this study for further academic debate is taken-for-granted, there is scope for effectively contributing to the arguments of practitioners and policy-makers eager to go beyond simplistic appraisals of international (alleged) best practices.
8.3 Limitations of the study

Over the course of this research, a series of limitations emerged. This section first addresses the shortcomings of the study with respect to the research process. The section then addresses the limitations with respect to the number and characteristics of the case studies developed for the project. Finally, it summarizes the constraints emerged throughout the fieldwork.

Conducting a study on decision-making and urban tourism governance during the rebuild of the Christchurch CBD proved to be challenging in terms of meeting the requirements of the doctoral programme at the University of Canterbury. The decision of covering the period between 2007 and 2014 and the exclusion of the last two years from the analysis was dictated by the deadlines of full-time doctoral degree. Throughout the research, there has been a constant imbalance between time and place. In the case of the Arts Centre, the issue of ‘being at the right place at the right time’ granted a relevant amount of data and evidence from participants. Conversely, the postponements on the Performing Arts Precinct project made data collection challenging. As it turned out during the writing of this dissertation, important episodes of governance with respect to the proposed project to the Performing Arts Precinct only took place following the end of the fieldwork in November 2015.

The imbalance between covering simultaneous events of decision-making and the highly dynamic processes of governance for urban tourist spaces between 2007 and 2014 was time-consuming and some of the documents necessary for a greater understanding of narrow features of decisions were impossible to retrieve. This, in turn, influenced the decision of conducting interviews in 2015, in the attempt to retrieve up-to-date insights from participants. Similarly, the decision to postpone the request for government documents to national authorities was justified by the need of ‘waiting for the waters to calm down’ and look for the public release of documents by CERA and the DPMC. However, site-specific information on these documents was withheld and subject to the restrictions available under the New Zealand legislation and the extraordinary circumstances of the recovery. This study, therefore, agrees with Hall and Wilson (2011, p134) statement that “the best policy stories are often left untold”. The conceptualization of policy-making a ‘black box’ (Easton, 1957) is particularly suited in a context such as the one of post-disaster Christchurch. Although it
should be noted that there is a difference in being aware of what is happening inside the black box and being able to ‘prove’ what is happening to the satisfaction of academic assessment and libel law.

A further limitation of the study concerns the number and typology of case studies of the research. Arguably, the inclusion of more than two case studies to this kind of research would have guaranteed a wider base of evidence and reinforce the statements reported in Section 7.4 and the findings reported in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Similarly, the focus on the city of Christchurch provides findings from only one urban context. During the drafting of the research proposal, the researcher and the supervisory team discussed the possibility of adding site-specific projects from other urban areas with contextual characteristics similar to those of Christchurch. This option was however sidelined as the data collection and preparation for the fieldwork in Christchurch drifted attentions and resources to the projects taking shape in the CBD area.

With respect to the fieldwork phase of the study, the researcher has tried to ensure the accuracy of the interview transcriptions. In most cases, the notes were written during the interviews and transcribed as soon as possible when the researcher’s memory was still fresh. For the interviews off-the-record, the need for accuracy required a supplementary effort. Fortunately, this difficulty was overcome, to a certain extent, with the triangulation of the field notes with the data from the extensive archival search. With respect to recorded interviews, instead, extreme accuracy was required during the transcription verbatim of the conversations with the participants. Also in this latter case, efforts were made to triangulate data between different data sources in order to minimise the risk of data misinterpretation.

A final limitation of the study concerns the restriction to relevant information not publicly available. Notwithstanding the meticulous approach in the preparation and submission of formal archival requests, the unique contextual constraints of the post-earthquake governance environment in Christchurch represented a major roadblock in the capacity of collecting relevant documents. Trusts involved first-hand with the arts and culture referred to the documents uploaded on the national database for charitable organizations. Conversely, the requests to consult the trusts’ minutes and strategy documents were denied. The submission of OIAs to national and local authorities permitted the collection of documents
and communications of relevance for the purposes of the study. There were nevertheless site-specific documents that could not be retrieved at the time of fieldwork due to commercially sensitive and confidential information that could not be released during the tendering process.

8.4 Future research

Drawing upon the research reported in this thesis, several areas have emerged that may provide significant potential for further research. Limited to the post-earthquake recovery of Christchurch, the first recommendation for further research is to extend the period of analysis to September 2017. This would permit to have a greater understanding of the decision-making processes with respect to the rebuild of Christchurch and of its CBD throughout the whole lifespan of CERA and the CCDU and include the recent repercussions of the November 2016 Kaikoura earthquake in the recovery of Christchurch and the Canterbury region at large. Particularly with the sites at the heart of this research, the inclusion of successive episodes of governance would permit to critically assess the scheduled completion of the Performing Arts Precinct and the full recovery of the Arts Centre and the Town Hall.

A complementary recommendation for further research concerns the introduction and promulgation of the Greater Christchurch Recovery Bill (GCRB) that replaced the CERA 2011 in April 2016. Following the disestablishment of CERA, the national and local government set the basis for the establishment of new recovery and rebuild authorities for Christchurch: Regenerate Christchurch and Ōtākaro Limited (see Section 8.5 below). It would be useful to have a longitudinal appraisal of the episodes of governance under two different bodies of legislation and compare the findings of this research with those from the aforementioned authorities.

A second recommendation to the study of post-disaster governance for urban tourist spaces in Christchurch concerns the inclusion of other site-development projects in the Christchurch CBD and outside the city centre area with relevance to tourism. The CCRP included 14 different anchor projects, some of which of great relevance to the positioning of Christchurch as a
tourist destination. These projects were far from being implemented at the time of fieldwork and it would be interesting to add further knowledge to the one already addressed in this study. Similarly, there is scope to expand the research to site-specific redevelopment projects outside the Christchurch city centre. A project under consideration at the time of fieldwork was that of turning the former QE II park into a biosphere (Stylianou, 2016b). The inclusion of evidence from the other neighbourhoods of Christchurch can increase the understanding of spatially clustered practices of resilience and recovery and add complementary findings to current studies (e.g. Cretney, 2016, 2017b).

This study recommends advancing the study of pre-and-post-disaster governance for urban tourist spaces at site-specific level with the inclusion of further case studies from other contexts. The increasing vulnerability of cities to natural and man-induced hazards represents an important base for empirical studies of the kind. As illustrated in the thesis, critical scholarship on post-disaster urban governance is at a pioneering stage but it has been steadily growing, with findings from both English and non-English speaking countries. It is hoped that this research can help developing argumentative international scholarship on the governance for urban tourist spaces in contexts of post-disaster recovery. There is scope to advance the field with further research on urban metagovernance and recovery processes as a result of human-induced disasters such as wars and political unrest. There are a handful of cities across the globe (e.g. Aleppo, Baghdad, Sarajevo) that can be used as basis to advance research.

Further studies are required that can collect findings and recommend practices for both national and local government authorities on post-disaster urban governance. The evidence from this study suggests that there is a divide between the narrative conveyed by official authorities and the spatial outcome of their recovery strategies. This has led to a “perceived policy failure [...] which cannot be explained within the existing paradigm” (Greener, 2001, p135). Therefore, scholars should be on the forefront of what Hall (1993) refers to as third-order change and lead the change of the current policy agenda as result of neoliberal normalization. As Hall (2011b, p665) otherwise puts it:

[...] it is the growing awareness of the contradictions in, and policy failure of, liberal environmentalism that may also offer an opportunity for third-order change. [...] However, any understanding of the potential for third-order change needs to be grounded in research
of the interrelationships between power, values, norms and interests and how they influence the selection of policy instruments, indicators and settings within broader frames of governance and change.

8.5 Concluding remarks

At the time of writing (July 2017), the rebuild of Christchurch CBD and of urban tourism spaces is gaining momentum. Some of the anchor projects not addressed in this research are either completed or near completion. This was the case of the Hagley Cricket Oval, which was expedited under the earthquake legislation for the 2015 ICC Cricket World Cup. Private-led development within the CBD is underway, with most of the prospected retail precinct to be opened by the end of 2017 despite increasing problems with exceeding commercial and office space (Hutching, 2017; McDonald, 2017). There are a handful of projects that stalled or are behind schedule. This is the case of the Convention Centre Precinct, which was first announced by the national Government in August 2014 (CCDU, 2014c) but eventually parted ways with the private contractor chosen for the building of the complex (Truebridge, 2016). As at April 2017, Ōtākaro Limited completed the land remediation works and released the preliminary design of the precinct (Ōtākaro Limited, 2017), with the completion of the project scheduled for the end of 2019 (Reid, 2017).

During the fieldwork stage of the research, CERA and the CCDU were progressively amended and downsized over the lifespan of the CERA 2011. Prior to the September 2014 general elections, the Prime Minister, Hon. John Key, had announced that CERA would be transferred under the DPMC (Kirk & Fulton, 2014). A second major change at CERA culminated with the resignation, in November 2014, of the Chief Executive, Roger Sutton, who was found guilty of serious misconduct by the State Services Commission (Davison, 2014). A few months later, the CCDU Director, Warwick Isaacs, stepped down to become the new CEO of Stonewood Homes (CCDU, 2015b). The feeling among some of the participants on both resignations, however, is that there were strong political pressures due to the fiasco of the recovery in Christchurch and the delays in the rebuild. Particularly in the case of Roger Sutton, the media attention of the misconduct distracted public opinion from the shortcomings of recovery and the political responsibilities of the New Zealand Government behind it.
CERA and the CCDU ceased operations in April 2016, but the trajectory of the CBD regeneration remains unchanged. The introduction and promulgation of the GCRB was announced as a significant step change in the national Government’s approach to the rebuild. As Minister Brownlee stated:

We will work closely with councils and other local stakeholders to progressively pass governance and management of the rebuild to the Canterbury community’ […] We are currently setting up an establishment board which will have a specific focus on ensuring there is greater commercial discipline in [the] delivery [of the Crown’s major projects and precincts in the central city] … Regeneration is the focus now. It is time to look ahead to the long-term success of the rebuild in order to continue growing confidence in Greater Christchurch (Brownlee, 2015, n.p).

Regenerate Christchurch took most of the operations from CERA and included the Avon River corridor to the areas designated for the extensive urban regeneration strategy (Regenerate Christchurch, 2016). However, there seem to be persistent governance shortcomings with respect to the relationship between the national Government and the CCC. Just like CERA, Regenerate Christchurch acts as an executive authority under a Minister. Until May 2017, this position was under the portfolio of the former MCER, Hon. Gerry Brownlee, meaning that the post-disaster governance of Christchurch has constantly been in the hands of the same person since the first earthquake of September 4th, 2010.

Since late 2015, the recovery and repopulation of the Arts Centre proceeded regularly (Wright, 2015). Starting from January 2016, the new, skill-based ACTB became operative, with some members of the former, representative-based Trust being appointed by Regenerate Christchurch (Stylianou, 2016a). Under the new Director, Felicity Price, the Arts Centre is implementing the site recovery strategy and the tenancy strategy for each of the buildings of the complex. As at the end of 2016, the C&CT new I-Site office had relocated to the Arts Centre, along with the first leisure businesses since the earthquake of February 2011 (McDonald, 2016b, 2016c). Other units of the Centre are now open to the public, including the Rutherford’s Den (ACC, 2017) and the Old Chemistry building now home to the University of Canterbury School of Music (ACC, 2016d). Considering the site development following the end of the fieldwork, it can be argued that the seismic events of 2010 and 2011 created the
conditions for a new phase of gentrification at the Arts Centre that would not have occurred so quickly in a business as usual scenario. The retention and redevelopment of the site, in fact, resembles the phenomenon of tourism gentrification highlighted by Gotham (2005), with the Arts Centre Vision used to attract more lucrative tenants to the site.

Focusing on the Town Hall, the retention of the complex is still underway, with the completion of works scheduled for mid-June 2018 (Gates, 2016a). The major remediation work was completed at the end of 2016, with 1,100 new piles injected eight metres into the ground with special jet grouting machines (Gates, 2016a), but there were a series of delays in the restoration of the Auditorium building. Nonetheless, the CCC is still confident to complete the recovery of the complex within the budget of NZD$ 127.5 million foreseen in the 2014-15 Annual Plan (CCC, 2014a, 2014b). The retention of the Town Hall is being carried by the CCC division in charge with the delivery of the Council-led anchor projects and implemented as a separate project from the Performing Arts Precinct.

With respect to the Performing Arts Precinct, the only anchor project completed at the time of writing (July 2017) is that of The Piano. The new facility officially opened in August 2016, costing a third more than the budget originally allocated (McDonald, 2016d). The purchase of the last two land parcels of the precinct was carried by Ōtākaro Limited in mid-2016 (Gates, 2016b) and the land purchased by the Crown will be, most likely, transferred to the CCC. In the view of the CCC’s head of vertical capital delivery, Liam Nolan, the “acquisition of the land will provide confidence to Council, Crown and stakeholders involved in the process” (quoted in Gates, 2016b, pA1). The JAG and the prospected tenants of the precinct drafted and released the Vision for the Performing Arts Precinct after more than a year of negotiations between parties. However, the document partly addresses the requirements for best business case study recommended by the NZT in 2012.

During the fieldwork, representatives of the coalitions expressed optimism on the form of governance between national authorities, the CCC and the key beneficiaries of the Performing Arts Precinct project. There were, however, some scepticisms with respect to the delivery of the facilities to house the CSO and the Court Theatre due to the limited budget available and the limited national and local funds for performing arts organizations. Particularly for the Court Theatre:
We’re looking at an integrated development around the Court Theatre. So, we will have other businesses involved. And getting that set up, that structure set up with Crown and City Council is quite complex. Because, on a standalone basis, the Court Theatre can’t afford to go in. And as a funding agency, we are reluctant to support them going in, because their business will fail under the pressure of those (Blair).

Performing arts organizations in Christchurch are still struggling with finding a permanent solution for their relocation in the Performing Arts Precinct. This aspect emerged during the meetings with arts stakeholders, who expressed their doubts on the possibility of developing a site for the performing arts with tight public funding and the implications of market-driven event strategies on the overall quality of artistic production.

The case studies narrated throughout this thesis resemble what the ancient Greeks would call *agôn*, or struggle. The characters of these intricate narratives are still on the stage of Christchurch’s post-earthquake recovery. It will take years of normalization to turn these into tragedies or tales with happy endings.

Gramsci (1921, quoted in Williams, 1975, p2) once said that “history teaches, but it has no pupils”; whatever the future holds, my plea is to acknowledge the valuable findings outlined in this thesis and to use these stories in the future to learn from the failures of the past. The future will provide many new disasters, particularly in earthquake-prone regions like New Zealand. The use readers make of this work will be decisive in the context of anticipating and responding to future events that the people of Christchurch and New Zealand will face.
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Appendices
Appendix A: The Christchurch city economy before and after the earthquakes

According to the last economic report issued before the September 4th, 2010 earthquake, the GDP of Christchurch City and Greater Christchurch were NZD$ 15 billion and NZD$ 16.2 billion respectively (CCDU, 2012; CDC, 2010). The Canterbury region GDP was around NZD$ 24 billion and was growing faster compared to the national data (CDC, 2010). Christchurch City represented the main economic hub of the Canterbury region and counted, alone, for more than a third of the entire GDP of the South Island.

Following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, different agencies sought to assess the impact of the quakes in the economy of Christchurch and New Zealand at large (CERA, 2012d, 2013a; Doherty, 2011; Parker & Steenkamp, 2012; Platt, 2012; Wallace, Simmons & Becken, 2011). Estimates by Westpac on the immediate impact of the February 2011 earthquake, suggested that the activity disruption in Christchurch was worth around NZD $ 4 billion, which corresponded to approximately 2% of the New Zealand GDP for that year (Wallace et al., 2011). At the regional level, the regional GDP shrunk 4.3% between March 2010 and March 2011, while the total workforce decreased 8.4% during the same period (Steeman, 2012).

Further economic reports issued in 2012 by the NZRB (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012) and CERA (2012a) suggested that earthquakes in Christchurch and the Canterbury region resulted in a quick and severe negative economic drop of to the national and regional GDP. Nevertheless, the rebound of the regional economy following June 2011, was quick, with exports and the construction sector leading the way (CERA, 2012a; MBIE, 2013b; Parker & Steenkamp, 2012). Overall, “the Canterbury economy has been quite resilient, and the wider New Zealand economy appears to have been little affected” (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012, p13) by the intense seismic activity.

Since the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, national and local authorities have been stressing the importance of quick rebuilding and its contribution to GDP growth. Minister Gerry Brownlee, for example, argued that the investment of both the public and the private sector in the rebuild of Christchurch would bring long-standing growth to the city (Brownlee, 2012a,
The National Bank reported a steady increase of the regional GDP (+4.4%) just one year after the major earthquake of February 2011 (CERA, 2012c). Between 2010 and 2013, the GDP of Christchurch has considerably risen (+25.1%), at a rate higher than that of the Canterbury region and New Zealand (see Table 1). The CDC foresees the city of Christchurch to be the key engine for the economic growth of the Canterbury region for the years to come and advocates for a competitive urban environment that can channel the opportunity of the rebuild to deliver a world-class city “with greater employment opportunities, higher average wages and more career prospects” (CDC, 2013c, p10).

Table 1: GDP of Christchurch, Greater Christchurch and their shares at regional and national level as at March 2010 and March 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>March 2010</th>
<th>March 2013</th>
<th>Variation 2010/2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch City</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>18,773</td>
<td>+25.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury Region</td>
<td>24,671</td>
<td>26,818</td>
<td>+8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Christchurch</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Island</td>
<td>40,997</td>
<td>45,855</td>
<td>+11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Christchurch</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>195,164</td>
<td>218,809</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Christchurch</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data elaborated from CCDU (2012), CDC (2010, 2014) and NZSTATS (2010, 2013)

The businesses that ‘benefited’ the most from the earthquakes were those directly related to construction and demolition (NZSTATS, 2014; Parker & Steenkamp, 2012). There has been a jump in the demand for skilled labour force and construction materials beyond the capacities of New Zealand (MBIE, 2014; Parker & Steenkamp, 2012). National and regional stakeholders looked at the rebuild of Christchurch as an important economic opportunity that would have boosted the country’s GDP over a period of ten years (CDC, 2013a; NZSTATS, 2014). Prominent local developers like Philip Carter and Anthony Gough looked at the rebuild as an opportunity for the economic future of the city, while the CDC included the rebuild among the key game-changers in the development strategy for Christchurch and the Canterbury region (CDC, 2013b, 2013c). Questions should be asked, however, about the actual contribution of an economy dependent on the construction sector once the rebuild is terminated.
Table 2: Business units, workforce and localization indexes of strategic sectors for the city of Christchurch (years 2010 and 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Business units</th>
<th>Workforce</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Localization Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christchurch</td>
<td>variation</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>vs Greater Christchurch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>-5.5%</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>2,067</td>
<td></td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>24,530</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>88.7%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td>2,208</td>
<td>-6.25%</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td></td>
<td>98.3%</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>11,190</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT &amp; Media</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>-10.6%</td>
<td>98.3%</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>3,860</td>
<td>-32.1%</td>
<td>90.4%</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>2,620</td>
<td></td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>2,499</td>
<td>-1.3%</td>
<td>98.6%</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>-7.3%</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>4,170</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>95.9%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Services</td>
<td>4,164</td>
<td>+4.3%</td>
<td>87.1%</td>
<td>86.9%</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>13,070</td>
<td>+18.3%</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>4,344</td>
<td></td>
<td>89.8%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>-3.8%</td>
<td>89.9%</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
<td>76.7%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>2,193</td>
<td>-3.8%</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>23,380</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
<td>95.4%</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37,877</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
<td>76.6%</td>
<td>58.21%</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>37,689</td>
<td></td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>185,140</td>
<td>+1.2%</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NZSTATS. Data elaborated by the Author
Table 3: Business units, workforce and localization indexes of strategic sectors for the Christchurch CBD (years 2010 and 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CBD variation</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Localization Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>-42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>-50.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>-40.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>-46.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT &amp; Media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>-57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>-70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>-40.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>-84.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>-47.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>7,030</td>
<td>3,130</td>
<td>-55.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>-43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>8,670</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>-12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>5903</td>
<td>3579</td>
<td>-39.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>50,760</td>
<td>28,430</td>
<td>-44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NZSTATS. Data elaborated by the Author
At the city level, the only key sector to increase since the earthquakes is that of public services. Since 2010, business relocation outside the city centre was particularly evident around Cathedral Square and the area within the red cordon (NZSTATS, 2015). Data elaborated from the CCBA shows that nearly two-thirds of the CBD businesses either ceased operations or moved away from the CBD (Hatton, 2013). Relocation of businesses mainly concentrated in the suburban areas of Riccarton, Addington, Hornby and Wigram (NZSTATS, 2015) and it is unlikely to see these businesses returning to the city centre. This can be ascribed, essentially, to two factors: the pending commercial leases (Barton, 2011; OAG, 2012) and the authorities’ strategy to attract A-grade tenants to the CBD, including government offices and corporate branches (Fletcher, 2016; Sheppard & Rout, 2016).

Table 4 and Table 5 report the data of tourism business units and workforce in the city of Christchurch and its CBD. Before the earthquakes, the city of Christchurch was home to most of the tourism-related businesses within the Greater Christchurch, with nearly 90% of the total count in the metropolitan area. A similar trend can be seen by comparing the data of Christchurch with those of the Canterbury region, with more than two-thirds of the regional tourism businesses located in the city of Christchurch alone. Following the earthquakes, hotels and hostels’ capacity were severely affected (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012), but many managed to survive a period of severe hardship thanks to insurance (Orchiston, Vargo & Seville, 2012a). As a result, less than 16.3% of the hotels and restaurant businesses relocated outside the city or permanently closed. Three years after the major earthquakes, few big hotels have re-opened in the Christchurch CBD (Wood, 2012a, 2012b, 2013), but the climate of uncertainty around some of the areas of the Christchurch CBD remained high. At the time of fieldwork, the appeal of the CBD was rising, but there were still concerns around key anchor projects like the Convention Centre Precinct and the Stadium.
Table 4: Business units, workforce and localization indexes of tourism-related sectors for the city of Christchurch (years 2010 and 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christchurch variation</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Localization Index</th>
<th>vs Greater Christchurch</th>
<th>vs Canterbury</th>
<th>vs New Zealand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Retail</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>3,155</td>
<td>2,844</td>
<td>-9.9%</td>
<td>91.2%</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>20,180</td>
<td>19,910</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>90.2%</td>
<td>87.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hospitality</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>1,763</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>-16.3%</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>87.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>13,350</td>
<td>11,360</td>
<td>-14.9%</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arts &amp; Recreation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>-9.8%</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>4,050</td>
<td>3,050</td>
<td>-24.7%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>93.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Tourism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>5,670</td>
<td>4,998</td>
<td>-11.9%</td>
<td>88.3%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>37,580</td>
<td>34,320</td>
<td>-8.7%</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NZSTATS. Data elaborated by the Author
Table 5: Business units, workforce and localization indexes of tourism-related sectors for the Christchurch CBD (years 2010 and 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CBD</th>
<th>variation</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Localization Index</th>
<th>Localization Index</th>
<th>Localization Index</th>
<th>Localization Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>% Christchurch</td>
<td>% Greater Christchurch</td>
<td>% Canterbury</td>
<td>% New Zealand</td>
<td>vs Christchurch</td>
<td>vs Greater Christchurch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>-51.9%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>4,290</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>-40.3%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>-60.7%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>4,810</td>
<td>1,210</td>
<td>-74.8%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts &amp; Recreation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-33.3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>-47.7%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Tourism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business units</td>
<td>1,143</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>-53.8%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>10,420</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>-57.2%</td>
<td>27.8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NZSTATS. Data elaborated by the Author
The number of businesses in arts and recreation in the CBD decreased only by 30 units (-33.3%) since 2010, with some key activities going back to business in the CBD shortly after the earthquakes. Three years after the first earthquake, the number of arts and recreation businesses only decreased by 9.8% compared to 2010.

In terms of retail activity, the presence of the cordon made businesses hard – if not impossible – to reopen quickly and assess the effective damage, with subsequent raising frustration among CBD business owners. Moreover, uncertainties around the termination of business and retail leasing contracts (Collins, 2013) put several retailers in a limbo between the desire of continuing business in the city centre and the need to resume activity as soon as possible. As other studies conducted in the Christchurch CBD suggest, retailers once located around SOL Square have been struggling to relocate and some of them eventually went out of business (McDonagh et al., 2014). There are, nevertheless, some notable exceptions like the opening of the RE: Start Mall in Cashel Street at the end of 2011, which provided a set of temporary facilities for a range of locally distinctive retail shops to relocate near the Ballantynes department store (Re:START, 2014). Undoubtedly, the CBD lost its relevance in terms of tourism-related business units in comparison with the rest of the city, the Greater Christchurch area and the Canterbury region. This trend is further supported by comparing the data on localization index between 2010 and 2013. Overall, there is a loss of localization advantage for tourism-related businesses in the CBD. Only the arts and recreation sector seem to have further clustered in the city centre since the earthquakes, but its ratio is still below 1 compared to the urban, metropolitan and regional data.

Focusing instead on the tourism-related job units in the CBD up to 2013, the closure and demolition of accommodation within the Christchurch CBD had important repercussions in terms of staff layoffs (Williams, 2011a; Wood & Taylor, 2011a). Similarly, the closure of tourist attractions forced tourism-related business such as tourist information centres, cultural venues and restaurants to reduce their respective staff (C&CT, 2011; Gates, 2011; Williams, 2011b; Wood & Taylor, 2011b). Overall, more than half of the workforce lost between 2010 and 2013 (55%), with nearly three-quarters of the jobs gone in the hospitality sector (74.8%) almost half of the jobs in arts and recreation (47.7%) and two-fifths in retail (40.3%).
Since the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the city centre has lost most of its business localization advantage to the rest of the city, particularly with respect to restaurants, pubs and clubs. Although another study from March 2013 suggests that the figures for these subsectors for the city of Christchurch are back to pre-quake levels (UC, 2013), the data available for the CBD suggest the contrary. In fact, the only subsectors that saw a further clustering of businesses in the city centre are museums and accommodations. Focusing on the workforce units, the CBD lost its localization advantage in all the hospitality subsectors, with pubs and bars reporting the worst trend. Just as for the business units, museum jobs seem to have further clustered in the CBD since 2010, with a ratio of 5-to-1 in comparison with the workforce employed in the rest of the city.

Christchurch and its CBD were home to a great share of heritage buildings, many of which renowned for their peculiar neo-Gothic traits. Not surprisingly, the city was marketed to visitors as the most English city of New Zealand (Berlitz, 2012). Table 6 below provides a summary of the key attractions in the city of Christchurch before and after the earthquakes. The majority of Christchurch the key attractions were located within the CBD area or in the immediate inner-city areas. There were, nevertheless, attractions built in the suburbs of the city during the last decades like the QE II Stadium, the Air Force Museum, the Antarctic Centre and the Christchurch Gondola. As at September 2010, Christchurch could rely on a heterogeneous array of cultural and artistic venues. Vbase, which managed the Town Hall, the Horncastle Arena, the AMI Stadium and the International Convention Centre (ICC) on the behalf of the CCC, estimated a volume of approximately 2,000 events per year being held at its venues (Meier, 2013), for a total of approximately NZD$ 30 million in direct revenues and about NZD$ 100 million in terms of satellite activities profits (Gorman, 2011b).

Christchurch is the main tourism gateway to the southern regions of New Zealand (CCDU, 2012). Before the earthquake of September 2010, the city experienced a steady increase of international visitors and nights over the years. The data on Greater Christchurch and the Canterbury region suggest that Christchurch was the main accommodation hub, with peaks above 90% when compared with the total of the tourist flow in Christchurch, Waimakariri and Selwyn. The predominance of Christchurch as a tourist destination is further highlighted in Table 7, which shows how the city was the hub for arrivals and nights in the Greater
Christchurch area. A similar finding emerges when we compare the data of Christchurch with the wider Canterbury region statistics. The table also reports the key tourist data before and after the earthquakes for the city of Christchurch along with the trends registered at regional and national level.

Table 6: Main tourist attractions in Christchurch CBD before and after the earthquakes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attraction</th>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Status as September 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts Centre of Christchurch</td>
<td>Museum, arts and restaurants</td>
<td>Partially reopened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury Museum</td>
<td>Museum</td>
<td>Reopened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardboard Cathedral</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>New (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashel Street Mall</td>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>Reopened as RE: Start Mall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ Church Cathedral</td>
<td>Heritage</td>
<td>Closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch Art Gallery</td>
<td>Visual arts</td>
<td>Under repairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch Casino</td>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td>Reopened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch Convention Centre</td>
<td>MICE</td>
<td>Demolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch Tram</td>
<td>Sightseeing</td>
<td>Reopened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention Centre Precinct</td>
<td>MICE</td>
<td>Announced August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagley Oval</td>
<td>Sports facility</td>
<td>Refurbished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagley Park and Botanical Gardens</td>
<td>Recreational/Outdoors</td>
<td>Reopened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaac Theatre Royal</td>
<td>Performing arts</td>
<td>Reopened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regent Street Shops</td>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>Reopened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punting on the Avon</td>
<td>Sightseeing</td>
<td>Reopened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quake City</td>
<td>Museum</td>
<td>New (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOL Square area</td>
<td>Retail and restaurants</td>
<td>Mostly demolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Piano</td>
<td>Performing Arts</td>
<td>Announced June 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Hall</td>
<td>Performing arts</td>
<td>Under repairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7: Key tourist data for the city of Christchurch, Greater Christchurch and the Canterbury Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christchurch variation</th>
<th>Greater Christchurch variation</th>
<th>Canterbury variation</th>
<th>New Zealand variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arrivals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1,756,140</td>
<td>1,090,397</td>
<td>-37.9%</td>
<td>1,864,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>957,044</td>
<td>542,453</td>
<td>-43.3%</td>
<td>1,019,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nights</strong></td>
<td>3,345,060</td>
<td>2,217,731</td>
<td>-33.7%</td>
<td>3,509,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>2,158,279</td>
<td>1,377,056</td>
<td>-36.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>1,186,781</td>
<td>840,675</td>
<td>-29.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average stay</strong></td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>+4.7%</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>+12%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>+3.4%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupancy rate</strong></td>
<td>50.79%</td>
<td>53.97%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visitor spending</strong></td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>-19.1%</td>
<td>1,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>-3.5%</td>
<td>1,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>-36%</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NZSTATS data elaborated by the Author.

Some data on RTI, arrivals and stays were not available for the Greater Christchurch area and the Canterbury Region.
Before the earthquakes, “the tourism industry in Christchurch contributed 16 per cent to total tourism activity in New Zealand” (Orchiston et al., 2012a, p21). According to the Regional Economic Activity Report (MBIE, 2010), the visitor economy in Christchurch represented 10.2% of the total spending in the city, for a combined total of more than NZD$ 1.7 billion between domestic and international visitors. The latter spent around NZD$ 845 million, with more than half of it coming from only two incoming markets (Australia and the United Kingdom). Conversely, the origin of domestic tourist spending is less polarized, with Auckland, Wellington and Otago representing the major share within the New Zealand visitor economy.

At city-level, the tourism sector experienced the long-standing economic negative impact due to the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 (C&CT, 2011, 2012a, 2013a; CDC, 2013d; CERA, 2012a; MBIE, 2013b; Parker & Steenkamp, 2012; Wallace & Simmons, 2012; Wallace et al., 2011). At the regional level, the C&CT estimated a loss NZD$ 230 million for the regional tourism sector ascribable to the drastic drop in international arrivals and night stays throughout 2011 (Parker & Steenkamp, 2012; Wallace & Simmons, 2012; Wood, 2012b). Similarly, CERA identified tourism as one of the most severely affected sectors in the Canterbury region up until late 2012 (CERA, 2012a).

In terms of tourism flows, tourists avoided Christchurch and Canterbury (C&CT & TIANZ, 2011) and opted for other locations across the country. TIANZ concluded that “some regions and specific destinations benefitted from displacement as a result of the Christchurch earthquake” (Wallace & Simmons, 2012, p13) but eventually warned that, in the medium term, the loss of Christchurch as a pivotal hub impacted on “visitation patterns and the numbers visiting other destinations and regions of the South Island” (Wallace et al., 2011, p12).

The earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 substantially affected visitor spending in Christchurch. According to the Regional Economic Activity Report (MBIE, 2013a) the visitor economy in the city is estimated around NZD$ 1.42 billion, nearly NZD$ 300 million less than in 2010. The international tourist market spending in Christchurch has dropped down to NZD$ 541 million, with consistent losses from all major incoming tourism markets except China. Conversely, the domestic market spending in the city slightly has slightly decreased (NZD$ 884.5 million) with Auckland, Wellington and Otago still the major origins of the domestic tourism market to
Christchurch. Focusing instead on the data retrieved from the Tourism Satellite Account (NZSTATS, 2016) it emerges that the total tourism expenditure in Christchurch for the year ending March 2013 is of approximately NZD$ 1.4 billion, with an average spending of NZD$ 847 per tourist.

The tourism economy of Christchurch and its CBD suffered acutely from the consequences of the earthquakes. The repeated aftershocks, adverse media coverage, the relevant infrastructural damage in many buildings, the slow pace of planning the recovery of the Christchurch CBD and the delays in settlement claims made the recovery process very painful to the tourist industry (Orchiston et al., 2012a, 2012b). As CERA’s monthly economic surveys show, the tourism sector struggled more than other key sectors of the city to recover, particularly after the February 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2011 earthquake (CERA, 2012b). The loss of facilities and destination appeal among incoming tourists from international markets are of a great concern among tourist operators both in Christchurch and the rest of New Zealand (Wallace & Simmons, 2012, p11). Despite some encouraging initiatives in Christchurch and in the CBD before since the lifting of the red cordon in June 2013 with new attractions and events (CERA, 2013b; FESTA, 2014; O'Neill, 2013; Squires, 2012), the re-opening of some key amenities and tours (C&CT, 2013b) and the inclusion of Christchurch as host city for the 2015 Cricket World Cup and the 2015 Under 20 FIFA World Cup games (FIFA, 2014; ICC, 2014), the city is far from recovering as a tourist destination. As one stakeholder admitted with respect to the VSRP (C&CT, 2012b), the recovery of the city as destination between 2010 and 2013 lagged behind the forecasted worst scenario foreseen in the VSRP (Elton).

The earthquakes in Christchurch and the Canterbury region had a minor impact on national tourism. As Table 7 shows, arrivals decreased by less than 4%, with domestic tourism showing a positive trend that was not found in the data on Christchurch, Greater Christchurch and the Canterbury region. The decrease of international tourists might suggest a correlation between the earthquakes and the negative media impact of the disaster on international tourism market, but it should be noted that the data reflects the repercussions of the 2007-2008 GFC in key tourist markets for New Zealand. Queenstown and Auckland further consolidated their position as a main tourist destination in New Zealand and the country
registered an increase of average stays and visitor spending among both national and international visitors since the earthquakes.
References


Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). (2014). *FIFA under 20 World Cup Matches*. Zurich, Switzerland: FIFA.


## Appendix B: List of interviews and research protocol

### Appendix B-1: List of interviews taken during the fieldwork

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview #</th>
<th>Date and location</th>
<th>Participant acronym</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>August 3\textsuperscript{rd} 2015, 1.00 pm, Christchurch CBD</td>
<td>Frank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>August 6\textsuperscript{th} 2015, 11.00 am, University of Canterbury</td>
<td>James</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td>August 7\textsuperscript{th} 2015, 11.15 am, Christchurch CBD</td>
<td>Max</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4</td>
<td>August 13\textsuperscript{th} 2015, 11.00 am, Christchurch</td>
<td>Gabriel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5</td>
<td>August 14\textsuperscript{th} 2015, 11.00 am, Christchurch</td>
<td>John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6</td>
<td>August 21\textsuperscript{st} 2015, 4.15 pm, Christchurch CBD</td>
<td>Amanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7</td>
<td>August 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2015, 3.00 pm, Christchurch</td>
<td>Allyson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8</td>
<td>August 25\textsuperscript{th} 2015, 11.00 am, Christchurch CBD</td>
<td>Donna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9</td>
<td>September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2015, 1.00 pm, Christchurch CBD</td>
<td>Adam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10</td>
<td>September 14\textsuperscript{th} 2015, 11.30 am, Christchurch CBD</td>
<td>Debbie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11</td>
<td>September 15\textsuperscript{th} 2015, 9.00 am, Christchurch CBD</td>
<td>Anna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#12</td>
<td>September 22\textsuperscript{nd} 2015, 2.00 pm, University of Canterbury</td>
<td>Kevin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#13</td>
<td>September 23\textsuperscript{rd} 2015, 5.00 pm, Christchurch CBD</td>
<td>Sam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14</td>
<td>September 24\textsuperscript{th} 2015, 10.00 am, Christchurch</td>
<td>Nick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#15</td>
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<td>#51</td>
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**Off-record interviews**

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</table>
Appendix B-2: Letter of introduction to the study

Alberto Amore  
Ph.D. Candidate  
Department of Management, Marketing, and Entrepreneurship  
School of Business and Law  
University of Canterbury  
Private Bag 4800  
Christchurch 8140  
New Zealand  

Mobile: 021 0838 3826  
E-Mail: alberto.amore@pg.canterbury.ac.nz  
Candidate profile: http://www.mang.canterbury.ac.nz/people/amore.shtml  

Christchurch, 15th July 2014

“Canterbury Tales. Planning and governance for tourism in post-earthquake Christchurch”

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION  
(Generic)

To whom it may concern:

This letter is to introduce Alberto Amore and his research on post-earthquake recovery in the Christchurch CBD area. Please read the following information sheet introducing the study, the researcher, the use of data and the conditions for field research applied by the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee.

About the study
This study examines the decision-making processes and the implementation of three projects in the Christchurch CBD: 1) the recovery of the Arts Centre of Christchurch, 2) the building of the new AMI Stadium and 3) the Performing Arts Precinct project and Town Hall recovery. The aim is to analyse the practices of land-use policy and planning of urban tourism spaces in given areas of the Christchurch CBD. In particular, this study seeks to assess the policy environment on projects foreseen in the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan as well as on initiatives for the recovery of the built heritage. The analysis focuses on the period between September 2010 and September 2014. This study, finally, compares the current post-earthquake policies with the pre-earthquake tourism management and urban regeneration plans outlined by the local authorities and stakeholders.

About the researcher
Alberto Amore is a Ph.D. candidate from Italy with an extensive knowledge in tourism destination management and practices of urban regeneration. He has a four-year experience as administrative staff assistant at the University of Milano-Bicocca as well as a valuable internship experience at the Embassy of Italy in Lisbon (Portugal), where he assisted the vice-ambassador and his chancellery duties. Mr. Amore is well aware of the importance of maintaining confidentiality on any kind of information coming from individuals working for public authorities, university and corporate organizations.

Mr. Amore always showed a strong interest with public policy and the management of urban spaces back in his hometown (Milan) and around the major cities of Europe. More recently, his research interests shifted to North American and Australian urban planning, with a focus on the building of tourist spaces in former industrial zones, docklands and inner city areas.

Despite Mr. Amore’s good written and communication skills, he is not an English native speaker. For this reason he will need to use a voice recorder as a support while undertaking interviews. Interviews will, of course, comply with the rules on confidentiality and privacy that the University of

About the intended use of the data
The information collected will help Mr. Anon in the analysis of public documents. It will also provide a greater understanding of the institutional environment and support the findings retrieved from primary and secondary data collected so far.

The sources of the information collected will remain confidential. In particular, the name of participants will not appear in the final dissertation or in any future publication. The inclusion of anonymous quotations in the researcher’s contributions will be subject to the permission of the participants and/or the institutions and organizations consulted during the research. Similarly, the extracts from documents obtained through archival access request will be quoted and referenced only upon written authorization of the institution/organization.

About the conditions for field research
The participation to interviews and the provision of documents not publicly available is voluntary. There are no known or anticipated risks for participants during the interviews and confidentiality will always be guaranteed for the period of field research.

The data collected will be used exclusively for academic purposes and it will be stored in securely locked locations at the University of Canterbury. Any digital source will be encrypted with dedicated software. Access to files will be limited to the researcher and his supervisors. Under University policies the period of storage foreseen for this type of research is ten years, following which the researcher will proceed with the destruction of all data.

The names of participants contacted during the field research will never be mentioned or divulged to any third party. Such personal details and contacts will only be used for contacting participants, institutions and organizations for the purposes of this research.
The research is being carried out as a requirement for Ph.D. degree at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand by Alberto Amore under the supervision of Professor C. Michael Hall (E-mail: michael.hall@canterbury.ac.nz; Phone: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8612). He will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. If you have any complaints regarding this project please address to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand (E-mail: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).

Please read the enclosed consent form and the attachments of this information sheet. The signature of the consent form is mandatory for the participation to the project. The researcher and his supervisors guarantee the confidentiality and that your identity will not be reported to third parties. Please return the form with the signature to the researcher himself or at the address details provided in this information sheet. Alternatively, scan a copy of the form and forward it via email to alberto.amore@pg.canterbury.ac.nz.

Thank you in advance for your time and assistance in this project.

Yours sincerely,

Alberto Amore
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Management, Marketing, and Entrepreneurship
School of Business and Law
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800
Christchurch 8140
New Zealand
Appendix B-3: Interview outline for the Arts Centre of Christchurch case study

Alberto Amore  
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Private Bag 4800  
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Mobile: 021 0838 3826  
E-Mail: alberto.amore@spu.canterbury.ac.nz  
Candidate profile: http://www.mang.canterbury.ac.nz/people/amore.shtml  

Christchurch, 15th July 2014

"Canterbury Tales. Planning and governance for tourism in post-earthquake Christchurch"

About the study  
You are invited to take part to a study on decision-making and the implementation of urban projects in the Christchurch CBD area. These projects were chosen due to their relevance for the future of Christchurch as tourist destination and include: 1) the recovery of the Arts Centre of Christchurch, 2) the building of the new AMI Stadium and, 3) the Performing Arts Precinct project and Town Hall recovery. The aim of this research is to analyse the political, economic and social factors that have been influencing the delivery of such projects in the period between September 2010 and September 2014. This study, moreover, compares the current post-earthquake policies with the pre-earthquake tourism management and urban regeneration plans outlined by the local authorities and stakeholders.

Following the consultation of primary and secondary documents, this research now seeks relevant information from individuals who proactively participated in the processes of decision-making and project implementation of the above-mentioned projects. Due to your position and first-hand experience with the recovery of Christchurch and of its major tourist areas, the researcher believes that you are a very valuable source of information for the purposes of this study.

Your knowledge of the events and of the factors behind the rebuilding of Christchurch CBD and of its key tourist areas can represent an important turning point in the study of tourism planning practices in New Zealand and overseas. In fact, the current literature overlooks the importance of political, economic and social factors behind the planning and implementation of tourist area projects in post-disaster urban contexts.

About the researcher  
Alberto Amore is a Ph.D. candidate from Italy with an extensive knowledge on tourism destination management and practices of urban regeneration. He has a four-year experience as an administrative staff assistant at the University of Milano-Bicocca as well as a valuable internship experience at the Embassy of Italy in Lisbon (Portugal), where he assisted the vice-ambassador and his chancellery duties. Moreover, Mr. Amore has relevant research experience with interviewing administrative staff and managers during his master's studies in Newcastle-upon-Tyne (United Kingdom). Mr. Amore is well aware of the importance of maintaining confidentiality on any kind of information coming from individuals working for public authorities, university and corporate organizations.

Mr. Amore always showed a strong interest with policy and the management of urban spaces in his hometown (Milan) and around the major cities of Europe. More recently, his research interests focussed on planning practices in North America and Australasia, with a particular focus on the building of tourist recreational spaces in former industrial zones, docklands and inner city areas.

Despite Mr. Amore's good written and communication skills, he is not an English native speaker. For this reason he will need to use a voice recorder as a support while undertaking interviews.
This will be undertaken in compliance with the rules on confidentiality and privacy that the University establishes in its Human Ethics Policy.

**About the interview and the intended use of the data**

Your participation in this study is voluntary and there are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant. The researcher will use a voice recorder as support, but you can ask to pause the recording at any time during the interview. You can also decide to withdraw from the interview at any time, including withdrawal of any information you have provided.

This unstructured interview session is likely to take between 40 to 90 minutes. The length of the interview is an estimate based on the researcher personal experience with interviews of this kind in the United Kingdom and on the mainstream literature in the field. Due to the quasi-conversational style of this interview, it is recommended to set the meeting at your workplace. The researcher can eventually meet you at your private home or in any other indoor meeting venue that best suits you. You will decide in what day and at what time you want to take part to the interview and you are free to postpone it to another day in case last-minute working duties occur. In the latter case, you can contact the researcher at one of the contacts available on the top of this information sheet.

The information collected during the interview will be immediately transcribed by the researcher and subsequently forwarded to you to double-check the content and clarify your statements whereas necessary. The extract will be then checked to insert omissions in order to meet the confidentiality and the privacy principles outlined in the information sheet for this research as well as in the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee Policy. Your name or position will never be mentioned. Instead, the researcher will use a pseudonym to identify you as participant in the appendix of the dissertation. You may request a copy of the final report at the conclusion of the project when data analysis is completed. The researcher will cite extracts of the interview only under your written consent and inform you of any use of the information provided.

Under University policies, only the researcher and his supervisor team can access the data retrieved from this interview. The period of storage foreseen for this type of research is ten years, following which the researcher will proceed with the destruction of all data.
This research is being carried out as a requirement for Ph.D. degree at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand by Alberto Amore under the supervision of Professor C. Michael Hall (e-mail: michael.hall@canterbury.ac.nz; Phone: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8012. He will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. If you have any complaints regarding this project please address to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand (e-mail: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).

Please read the enclosed consent form and the attachments of this information sheet. The signature of the consent form is mandatory for the participation to the project. The researcher and his supervisors guarantee the confidentiality and that your identity will not be reported to third parties. Please return the form with the signature to the researcher himself or at the address details provided in this information sheet. Alternatively, scan a copy of the form and forward it via email to alberto.amore@pg.canterbury.ac.nz

Thank you in advance for your time and assistance in this project.

Yours sincerely,

Alberto Amore
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Management, Marketing, and Entrepreneurship
School of Business and Law
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800
Christchurch 8140
New Zealand
CASE STUDY 1 – The Christchurch Arts Centre

Note for the Human Ethics Committee:
The following outline of the unstructured interview is a summary of the topics that the researcher might ask participants to answer. The questions do not all apply to the participants identified for the interviews, as they vary depending on the participant’s role in the organization/institution involved in the recovery of the Christchurch Arts Centre. The ultimate outline of the interview will be forwarded to each of the 13 participants via e-mail within 5 business days before the scheduled interview. This process is meant to guarantee the confidentiality of participants, as some of the questions are addressed to a very limited and easily identifiable group of people. Moreover, this process will help participants to brainstorm better the information and the data that the researcher is going to ask during the interview session.

Section 1 (20 minutes approximately): The recovery project of the Arts Centre
Period of analysis: September 2010 to September 2014

In this first phase of the interview, the participant will be asked to provide a brief summary of the Arts Centre recovery project launched in the aftermath of the earthquake of February 2011. The main purpose of this section is to have a first-hand opinion about the key stages that accompanied the decision-making and the implementation of the recovery project of the Arts Centre to discuss in detail in the second section. Secondly, this section seeks to obtain the respondents’ opinion on the expected tourism impacts that the recovery of the Arts Centre is likely to bring in the new Christchurch CBD. Finally, this section will conclude with an overview of (eventual) alternative recovery projects for the recovery of the Arts Centre and it will seek to preliminarily understand the reason why such projects were not implemented.

Section 2 (45 minutes approximately): Dynamics and constraints influencing the recovery of the Arts Centre
Period of analysis: September 2010 to September 2014

In this section, the participant will discuss with the researcher the policy environment that influenced the decision-making and the implementation of the Arts Centre recovery project outlined in the previous section. Emphasis will be given on the identification of key individuals and their vested interests, on the decisional policy instruments and on the values and beliefs that influenced the project over time. Along with this assessment, the participant will be asked to illustrate the role of tourism stakeholders and the emphasis given to tourism-related instances in the process of decision-making and implementation of the Arts Centre recovery project. The conclusive part of the section, instead, will assess which stakeholders sought to influence the decision-making and implementation of the Arts Centre recovery project but eventually failed.

Section 3 (20 minutes approximately): The strategic plan of the Arts Centre before the earthquake
Period of analysis: 2007 until September 2014
This section seeks to gain information about projects and plans for the Arts Centre discussed before the earthquake and the relevance they gave to tourism and tourism-related outcomes. In parallel with this pre-earthquake overview, the participant is sought to illustrate the relevant change in the governance of the Arts Centre before and after the earthquake. The participant will be subsequently asked the pros and cons of such changes from the perspective of the tourism stakeholders. Lastly, the participant will be asked if the governance around the Arts Centre heritage complex would have evolved differently without a triggering event such as the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011.

**Section 4 (15 minutes approximately): Summary**

In this last section, the participant is expected to provide information about the interconnections between the Arts Centre recovery project and other projects outlined in the CCDU’s CBD Recovery Plan limitedly to stakeholders, instruments, decisions and allocation of resources. The purpose is to identify links between the Arts Centre recovery project, the building of the new Stadium and the Performing Arts Precinct project. The section will conclude with the identification of (eventual) linkages between the recovery project for the Arts Centre and private-led tourism projects.
Appendix B-4: Archival access request for the Arts Centre of Christchurch case study

Alberto Amore
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Management, Marketing, and Entrepreneurship
School of Business and Law
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4890
Christchurch 8140
New Zealand

Mobile: 021 6038 3826
E-Mail: alberto.amore@pg.canterbury.ac.nz
Candidate profile: http://www.mang.canterbury.ac.nz/people/amore.shtml

“Canterbury Tales. Planning and governance for tourism in post-earthquake Christchurch”

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO ACCESS RESTRICTED MATERIAL

About the study
This study examines the decision-making and the implementation of three projects in the Christchurch CBD. One of such projects focuses on the recovery and vision of the Arts Centre of Christchurch, which was included in the project due to its relevance for the recovery of the built heritage. The aim is to analyse the practices of land-use policy planning of key urban tourism spaces in given areas of the Christchurch CBD following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. Finally, this study compares the current post-earthquake policies with the pre-earthquake tourism management and urban regeneration plans outlined by the local authorities and stakeholders. Following the consultation of primary and secondary documents, this research now seeks relevant information on policy-making decisions from complementary sources held at your institution/organization archives. In accordance with the New Zealand archives protocol, the researcher hereby requests permission to access the above-mentioned sources and make copies of them whereas allowed. The documents sought, in particular, are:

- Minutes of the Trust board meetings addressing the following topics:
  - The proposed project of the National Conservatorium of Music (2008-2010);
  - The partnerships with UC and the CCC for the National Conservatorium of Music (2008-2010);
  - The re-negotiation of the insurance with Ansvar (September 2010 until January 2011);
  - The settlement with Ansvar for the payout of the insurance (February 2011 until mid-2012);
  - The internal governance assessment prior to the appointment of Graeme Nahkies;
  - The appointment of ARUP as consultant for the release of the Arts Centre Vision;
  - Issues and aspects with respect to the Arts Centre as site for leisure and tourism;
  - Site management plans, in particular conservation plans for the units of the Arts Centre;

- Email communications between the former Director, Ken Franklin and the Minister for Heritage and Culture culminating with the appointment of Graeme Nahkies for the internal governance assessment;

- Eventual email communications between the former Director, Ken Franklin and Ansvar (later ACS Limited) for the payout of the insurance;

- Eventual email communications between the current Director, Andre Lovatt, and potential consultants for the of the Arts Centre Vision;
- Eventual email communications between the current Director, Andre Lovatt and ARUP in the consultation process that led to the ultimate release of the Arts Centre Vision in 2013.

- Extracts of the meeting with stakeholders with the announcement of the Arts Centre Vision in 2012.

These documents are expected to provide a greater understanding of the events and of the factors influencing the recovery of the Arts Centre as key heritage attraction. Undoubtedly, the collection and reading of such restricted archival sources is very important for the purposes of this research. The findings that can be retrieved from your archives, in fact, can contribute to new insights on land-use tourism planning and urban renewal in post-disaster urban contexts.

About the researcher
Alberto Amore is a Ph.D. candidate from Italy with an extensive knowledge of tourism destination management and practices of urban regeneration. He has a four-year experience as an administrative staff assistant at the University of Milano-Bicocca (Italy) as well as a valuable internship experience at the Embassy of Italy in Lisbon (Portugal), where he assisted the vice ambassador in the reporting of official and unclassified reports to the Italian State Department in Rome. Mr. Amore is, therefore, well aware of the importance of maintaining confidentiality on any kind of information coming from within public authorities, university and corporate working environments.

Mr. Amore has always showed a strong interest in public policy and the management of urban spaces in his hometown (Milan) and around the major cities of Europe. More recently, his research interests shifted to North American and Australian planning practices, with a particular focus on the building of tourist spaces in former industrial zones, docklands and inner city areas.

Intended use of the records
Whereas necessary the researcher will come in person at Arts Centre to retrieve the archival sources to which he will be granted access. He will bring a valid New Zealand driving license with him for identification purposes. Whereas your institution/organization issues a permission letter, the researcher will bring this further identification document to comply with the protocol for restricted archival access.

Copies of the most relevant documents are likely to be asked. However, in case such request cannot be accomplished due to the institution/organization statutory regulations, the researcher will simply take notes of the relevant features of such documents. Furthermore, in case the retrieved archival sources cannot be taken outside the institution/organization, the researcher will arrange alternative solutions for the note-taking of findings from such restricted sources.

Whereas a copy of relevant documents is provided, its use will be exclusively for academic purposes. Copies will be stored in securely locked locations at the University of Canterbury. Any digital copy will be encrypted with dedicated software and authorization to access files will be limited to the researcher and his supervisors.

Under University policies, only the researcher and his supervisor team can access the data retrieved from this interview. The period of storage foreseen for this type of research is ten years, following which the researcher will precede with the destruction of all data.

The researcher and the institution/organization will mutually agree on the publication of extracts from the restricted records and arrange all the necessary omissions. In case no explicit referencing and quotation permissions are provided, the researcher will simply aggregate the findings in order to avoid any possible identification of the organization/institution. Notwithstanding, the researcher will comply with the rules on confidentiality and privacy that the University of Canterbury establishes in its Human Ethics Policy.
The research is being carried out as a requirement for Ph.D. degree at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand by Alberto Amore under the supervision of Professor C. Michael Hall (E-mail: michael.hall@canterbury.ac.nz; Phone: 64 3 364 2987 ext. 8812). Prof. Hall will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (Ref HEC 2014/94). If you have any complaints regarding this project please address to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand (E-mail: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).

Please read the enclosed consent form and the attachments of this information sheet. The signature of the consent form is mandatory for the participation to the project. The researchers and their supervisors guarantee the confidentiality and that your identity will not be reported to third parties. Please return the form with the signature to the researcher himself or at the address details provided in this information sheet. Alternatively, scan a copy of the form and forward it via email to alberto.amore@pg.canterbury.ac.nz.

Thank you in advance for your time and assistance in this project.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

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Appendix B-5: Interview outline for the Town Hall and Performing Arts Precinct case study

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Christchurch, 15th July 2014

“Canterbury Tales. Planning and governance for tourism in post-earthquake Christchurch”

About the study
You are invited to take part in a study on decision-making and the implementation of urban projects in the Christchurch CBD area. These projects were chosen due to their relevance for the future of Christchurch as a tourist destination and include: 1) the recovery of the Arts Centre of Christchurch; 2) the building of the new AMI Stadium and; 3) the Performing Arts Precinct project and Town Hall recovery. The aim of this research is to analyse the political, economic and social factors that have been influencing the delivery of such projects in the period between September 2010 and September 2014. This study, moreover, compares the current post-earthquake policies with the pre-earthquake tourism management and urban regeneration plans outlined by the local authorities and stakeholders.

Following the consultation of primary and secondary documents, this research now seeks relevant information from individuals who proactively participated in the processes of decision-making and project implementation of the above-mentioned projects. Due to your position and first-hand experience with the recovery of Christchurch and of its major tourist areas, the researcher believes that you are a very valuable source of information for the purposes of the study.

Your knowledge of the events and of the factors behind the rebuilding of Christchurch CBD and of its key tourist areas can represent an important turning point in the study of tourism planning practices in New Zealand and overseas. In fact, the current literature overlooks the importance of political, economic and social factors behind the planning and implementation of tourist area projects in post-disaster urban contexts.

About the researcher
Alberto Amore is a Ph.D. candidate from Italy with an extensive knowledge on tourism destination management and practices of urban regeneration. He has a four-year experience as an administrative staff assistant at the University of Milano-Bicocca as well as a valuable internship experience at the Embassy of Italy in Lisbon (Portugal), where he assisted the vice-ambassador and his chancellery duties. Moreover, Mr. Amore has relevant research experience with interviewing administrative staff and managers gained during his master’s studies in Newcastle-upon-Tyne (United Kingdom). Mr. Amore is well aware of the importance of maintaining confidentiality on any kind of information coming from individuals working for public authorities, university and corporate organizations.

Mr. Amore always showed a strong interest with policy and the management of urban spaces in his hometown (Milan) and around the major cities of Europe. More recently, his research interests focussed on planning practices in North America and Australasia, with a particular focus on the building of tourist recreational spaces in former industrial zones, docklands and inner city areas.

Despite Mr. Amore’s good written and communication skills, he is not an English native speaker. For this reason he will need to use a voice recorder as a support while undertaking interviews.
This will be undertaken in compliance with the rules on confidentiality and privacy that the University establishes in its Human Ethics Policy.

**About the interview and the intended use of the data**

Your participation in this study is voluntary and there are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant. The researcher will use a voice recorder as support, but you can ask to pause the recording at any time during the interview. You can also decide to withdraw from the interview at any time, including withdrawal of any information you have provided.

This unstructured interview session is likely to take between 40 to 90 minutes. The length of the interview is an estimate based on the researcher personal experience with interviews of this kind in the United Kingdom and on the mainstream literature in the field. Due to the quasi-conversational style of this interview, it is recommended to set the meeting at your workplace. The researcher can eventually meet you at your private home or in any other indoor meeting venue that best suits you. You will decide in what day and at what time you want to take part to the interview and you are free to postpone it to another day in case last-minute working duties occur. In the latter case, you can contact the researcher at one of the contacts available on the top of this information sheet.

The information collected during the interview will be immediately transcribed by the researcher and subsequently forwarded to you to double-check the content and clarify your statements whereas necessary. The extract will be then checked to insert omissions in order to meet the confidentiality and the privacy principles outlined in the information sheet for this research as well as in the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee Policy. Your name or position will never be mentioned. Instead, the researcher will use a pseudonym to identify you as participant in the appendix of the dissertation. You may request a copy of the final report at the conclusion of the project when data analysis is completed. The researcher will cite extracts of the interview only under your written consent and inform you of any use of the information provided.

Under University policies, only the researcher and his supervisor team can access the data retrieved from this interview. The period of storage foreseen for this type of research is ten years, following which the researcher will precede with the destruction of all data.
This research is being carried out as a requirement for Ph.D. degree at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand by Alberto Amore under the supervision of Professor C. Michael Hall (e-mail: michael.hall@canterbury.ac.nz; Phone: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8612. He will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.

This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. If you have any complaints regarding this project please address to The Chair, Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand (e-mail: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).

Please read the enclosed consent form and the attachments of this information sheet. The signature of the consent form is mandatory for the participation to the project. The researcher and his supervisors guarantee the confidentiality and that your identity will not be reported to third parties. Please return the form with the signature to the researcher himself or at the address details provided in this information sheet. Alternatively, scan a copy of the form and forward it via email to alberto.amore@pg.canterbury.ac.nz.

Thank you in advance for your time and assistance in this project.

Yours sincerely,

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New Zealand
CASE STUDY 2 – The Performing Arts Precinct Project
(The case study comprises the recovery project of the Christchurch Town Hall that was not listed on the CCDU Plan of July 2012)

Note for the Human Ethics Committee.
The following outline of the unstructured interview is a summary of the topics that the researcher might ask participants to answer. The questions do not all apply to the participants identified for the interviews, as they vary depending on the participant's role in the organization/institution involved in the recovery of the Christchurch Town Hall and subsequent downsizing of the Performing Arts Precinct project. The ultimate outline of the interview will be forwarded to each of the 13 participants via e-mail within 5 business days before the scheduled interview. This process is meant to guarantee the confidentiality of participants, as some of the questions are addressed to a very limited and easily identifiable group of people. Moreover, this process will help participants to brainstorm better the information and the data that the researcher is going to ask during the interview session.

Section 1 (20 minutes approximately): The recovery project of the Arts Centre
Period of analysis: September 2010 to September 2014

In this first phase of the interview, the participant will be asked to provide a brief summary of the Performing Arts Centre project officially launched July 2014. The main purpose of this section is to have a first-hand opinion about the key stages that accompanied the decision-making and the implementation of the precinct project and the recovery of the Town Hall to discuss in detail in the second section. Secondly, this section seeks to obtain the respondents' opinion on the expected tourism impacts that the precinct and the recovery of the Town Hall are likely to bring in the new Christchurch CBD. Finally, this section will conclude with an overview of (eventual) alternative projects for the performing arts and it will seek to preliminarily understand the reason why such projects were not implemented.

Section 2 (45 minutes approximately): Dynamics and constraints influencing the recovery of the Arts Centre
Period of analysis: September 2010 to September 2014

In this section, the participant will discuss with the researcher the policy environment that influenced the decision-making and the implementation of the Performing Arts Precinct and the Town Hall recovery projects outlined in the previous section. Emphasis will be given on the identification of key individuals and their vested interests, on the decision policy instruments and on the values and beliefs that influenced the projects over time. Along with these assessments, the participant will be asked to illustrate the role of tourism stakeholders and the emphasis given to tourism-related instances on the Performing Arts Precinct project and on the Town Hall recovery project. The conclusive part of the section, instead, will assess which stakeholders sought to influence the decision-making and implementation of the two projects but eventually failed.
Section 3 (20 minutes approximately): The strategic plan of the Arts Centre before the earthquake

Period of analysis: 2007 until September 2014

This section seeks to gain information about projects and plans for dedicated venues for the performing arts discussed before the earthquake and the relevance they gave to tourism and tourism-related outcomes. The section will also focus on the Town Hall retention plans scheduled before the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. In parallel with these pre-earthquake overviews, the participant is sought to illustrate (any) relevant changes in the governance of the Town Hall before and after the earthquake. The participant will be subsequently asked the pros and cons of such changes from the perspective of the tourism stakeholders and the project of the Performing Arts Precinct. Lastly, the participant will be asked if the governance around the Town Hall would have evolved differently without a triggering event such as the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011.

Section 4 (15 minutes approximately): Summary

In this last section, the participant is expected to provide information about the interconnections between the Performing Arts Precinct project, the Town Hall recovery project and other projects outlined in the CDCU’s CBD Recovery Plan limitedly to stakeholders, instruments, decisions and allocation of resources. The purpose is to identify links between the Performing Arts Precinct project, the building of the new Stadium and the recovery of the Arts Centre. The section will conclude with the identification of (eventual) linkages between the Performing Arts Precinct project and private-led tourism projects.
Appendix B-6: Archival access request for the Town Hall and Performing Arts Precinct case study

Christchurch, 09th November 2015

“Canterbury Tales. Planning and governance for tourism in post-earthquake Christchurch”

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO ACCESS Archived MATERIAL

About the study
This study examines the decision-making and the implementation of the Performing Arts Precinct project and Town Hall recovery. The aim is to analyse the practices of land-use policy and planning of urban tourism spaces in given areas of the Christchurch CBD. In particular, this study seeks to assess the policy environment on projects foreseen in the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan with a focus on anchor projects for the sports and culture. Finally, this study compares the current post-earthquake policies with the pre-earthquake tourism management and urban regeneration plans outlined by the local authorities and stakeholders.

Following the consultation of primary and secondary documents, this research now seeks relevant information on policy-making decisions from complementary sources held at your institution/archives archives. In accordance with the New Zealand archives protocol, the researcher hereby requests permission to access the above-mentioned sources and make copies of them whereas allowed. The documents sought, in particular, are:

- Request #1 - The Government response to the CCC draft central city plan submitted to the Minister of Earthquake Recovery on December 2011;
- Request #2 - The list of the 15 case study cities that were identified as basis for the development of the Central City Recovery Plan;
- Request #3 - The Government Electronic Tenders Service (GETS) for the appointment of the Blueprint Team and the list of tenders that were eventually sidelined;
- Request #4 - The list of the stadium that were included for the study for the Stadium project in the CBD and eventual summary reports
- Request #5 - The GETS published until September 2014 for the Performing Arts Precinct;
- Request #6 - The intentions to take land, type of ownership and total costs for the sites designated for the Performing Arts Precinct (including the section north of Armagh Street eventually lifted)
- Request #7 - Documents (or extracts of it) that mention the relevance of the Performing Arts Precinct for the visitor economy and the hospitality sector.
- Request #8 - Eventual minutes of the hearing with the representative of the tourism sector (including Christchurch and Canterbury Tourism, TIANZ, the Ministry of Tourism and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and the Employment).

These documents are expected to provide a greater understanding of the events and of the factors influencing the rebuild of relevant sites in the Christchurch CBD. Undoubtedly, the collection and
reading of such restricted archival sources is very important for the purposes of this research. The findings that can be retrieved from your archives, in fact, can contribute to new insights on land-use tourism planning and urban renewal in post-disaster urban contexts.

About the researcher
Alberto Amore is a Ph.D. candidate from Italy with an extensive knowledge of tourism destination management and practices of urban regeneration. He has a four-year experience as an administrative staff assistant at the University of Milano-Bicocca (Italy) as well as a valuable internship experience at the Embassy of Italy in Lisbon (Portugal), where he assisted the vice-ambassador in the reporting of official and unclassified reports to the Italian State Department in Rome. Mr. Amore is, therefore, well aware of the importance of maintaining confidentiality on any kind of information coming from within public authorities, university, and corporate working environments.

Mr. Amore has always showed a strong interest in public policy and the management of urban spaces in his hometown (Milan) and around the major cities of Europe. More recently, his research interests shifted to North American and Australasian planning practices, with a particular focus on the building of tourist spaces in former industrial zones, docklands and inner city areas.

Intended use of the records
Whereas needed, the researcher will come in person at institution/organization to retrieve the archival sources to which he will be granted access. He will bring a valid New Zealand driving license with him for identification purposes. Whereas your institution/organization issues a permission letter, the researcher will bring this further identification document to comply with the protocol for restricted archival access.

Copies of the most relevant documents are likely to be asked. However, in case such request cannot be accomplished due to the institution/organization statutory regulations, the researcher will simply take notes of the relevant features of such documents. Furthermore, in case the retrieved archival sources cannot be taken outside the institution/organization, the researcher will arrange alternative solutions for the note-taking of findings from such restricted sources.

Whereas a copy of relevant documents is provided, its use will be exclusively for academic purposes. Copies will be stored in securely locked locations at the University of Canterbury. Any digital copy will be encrypted with dedicated software and authorization to access files will be limited to the researcher and his supervisors.

Under University policies, only the researcher and his supervisor team can access the data retrieved from this interview. The period of storage foreseen for this type of research is ten years, following which the researcher will precede with the destruction of all data.

The researcher and the institution/organization will mutually agree on the publication of extracts from the restricted records and arrange all the necessary omissions. In case no explicit referencing and quotation permissions are provided, the researcher will simply aggregate the findings in order to avoid any possible identification of the organization/institution. Notwithstanding, the researcher will comply with the rules on confidentiality and privacy that the University of Canterbury establishes in its Human Ethics Policy.
The research is being carried out as a requirement for Ph.D. degree at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand by Alberto Amore under the supervision of Professor C. Michael Hall (E-mail: michael.hall@canterbury.ac.nz; Phone: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8812). Prof. Hall will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.

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[Signature]

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Appendix C: Papers published from this research
Chapter 8
Regeneration from the rubble. Culture and creative urban renewal in post-earthquake Christchurch, New Zealand
Alberto Amore
(as sent to the editor for the final printing)

Resumo
Culture and the arts have been extensively used in the practices of urban regeneration and economic revival during the last thirty years. Evidence from Europe, North America and Australia suggest that culture-led regeneration is able to enhance the city’s sense of identity and, subsequently, become a lever for community engagement and socioeconomic revival in derelict areas. The increasing demand for culture within our society and the relative shift towards knowledge-intensive services are fully expressed in the postmodern, neo-baroque built environment of our cities.
The current literature conceives culture and creative-led regeneration strategies as the new frontier in the regeneration agenda and it illustrates their implementation in contexts where urban change is the result of repeated waves of regeneration projects. To this date, however, there are limited accounts discussing culture and creative-led regenerations practices in contexts seeking for a quick recovery of the urban environment.
The following study illustrates the culture-led regeneration strategies outlined and implemented for the physical recovery of central Christchurch (New Zealand) in the aftermath of the earthquake of 2011. The need for quick economic activation and restoration of urban identity through culture and creative arts is here sought through a mix of anchor projects and initiatives to retain and attract the necessary creative capital for the spatial recovery of the city.

Introduction
The potentialities of culture and the creative industries in the economy and identity of cities are consolidated practices of urban entrepreneurialism nowadays [1]. In particular, culture-led urban regeneration strategies have been well-established practices of spatial planning during the last decades [2-5] in several cities worldwide [6].
This chapter illustrates the phenomena of culture and creative-led regeneration by stressing their potentialities as mean for post-disaster urban recovery. The findings are from larger doctoral research currently undertaking in Christchurch (New Zealand), whose historic central city was severely affected by a 6.3 M. earthquake on February 22nd 2011[7].

Cultural regeneration and urban recovery
Different forms of cultural regeneration have been implemented in the last decades to tackle down economic decay and boost economic reprise. Arguably, the first wave of cultural regeneration practices started with the
appreciation of historic neighbourhoods, as occurred in the USA [8] and the UK [9] between the 1960s and the 1970s. From the 1980s on, the building of museums, concert halls and art galleries became the prominent strategy of cultural regeneration, particularly in those cities that lacked or did not invest in the preservation and promotion of the existing heritage [10]. Overall, flagship cultural projects have had alternate success. On the one hand, such projects can be a strong catalyst of civic pride [10], and generate relevant economic impacts [11]. On the other hand these projects generate employment opportunities almost exclusively to the service and hospitality sectors [12] and their effectiveness to the genuine cultural development of the city has been put into question [13].

A complementary strategy to cultural anchor projects is the one of public art, which foresees the introduction of artistic elements within the urban realm to foster gentrification and tackle down the spiral of urban decline. The roots of public art can be found in pioneering initiatives in France and Scandinavian countries during the 1980s [14], but there are important cases of such culture-led regeneration practice in the rest of Europe, with examples from the UK [15], Spain [16] and Portugal [17]. Public art has consolidated as urban regeneration strategy also outside Europe, with examples from USA [18], Canada [19], Australia [20]. Public art can increase the value of land, tackle down vandalism, generate employment, attract investors and boost cultural tourism [21]. As Cameron and Coaffee suggest, the provision or art markers represent “a sort of promoter of regeneration and associated gentrification” [15]. Similarly, the creation of temporary sites for public art has the ability “to quickly and clearly transform a place […] and highlight the importance of public spaces” [22]. There are nevertheless scholars who argue that the approach of governments to the arts is rather tokenistic and lacks of a long-term vision of research, investments and support towards artistic production [23].

Cultural facilities and public art can both be enlisted in area-based projects known as cultural precincts to combine existing cultural facilities with newly designed ones over the years. A recent trend is the creation of cultural precincts ex novo as strategy of a paramount master plan. These initiatives are often implemented along with the hosting of mega-events. This enables the availability of land and it considerably inhibits local stakeholders’ oppositions. Notwithstanding the promising visions, the hosting of mega events does not necessarily imply economic revival [24] and cultural development. Rather, it may lead to a troubling post-event legacy [24, 25] and annihilation of spontaneous cultural capital.

In response to large scale projects, recent strategies of cultural regeneration encouraged the clustering of knowledge-based intensive services (KIBS) and creative communities within the same area in order to reinforce innovation, economic development and social capital of deprived neighbourhoods. Clusters and creative spaces represent important strategies of urban entrepreneurialism in the creative turn of cultural regeneration [13]. This ultimate strategy of cultural regeneration acknowledges the centrality of the creative class [26] and stresses the importance of culture being “central to the regeneration process, rather than a mere ‘add-on’ or appendage” [2].

**Cultural Regeneration and Urban Identity**
The binomial between culture and identity is well addressed in urban studies. At site-specific level, the phenomenology of place identification is based on a spatial-cognitive dialectic between the sight (e.g. a building) and the marker (i.e. the representation of the given building) [27]. At destination level, instead, place identity is the combination of projected, organic, induced and modified induced images [28, 29]. Selby, finally, conceives urban identity as a part of a dynamic and cyclical process of collective and individual knowledge consisting of experiences and images conveyed through both direct perceptions of the space and mediated representations of the place [30].

Urban identity is particularly tied to the built and the social environment of the city. Throughout the second half of the 20th Century, the appreciation of the urban fabric and its intrinsic heritage value spread from major cities in the USA and the UK [8, 9, 31], which culminated with the heritagization of historic city areas [32] and docklands [3, 4, 33]. The strengthening of urban identity through its built environment represents a decisive factor in urban re-development. To achieve this, cities need to pursue strategies that stress different elements such as culture and tradition [34], heritage and nostalgia [4] and experience and local authenticity. The spread of place marketing agencies in major cities around the world [14] are the emblematic evidence of a tendency towards urban aestheticization [35] in the contemporary urban discourse. As facet of the contemporary society, the city and its identity are reflexively negotiated within a global-local nexus [36] where globalizing forces influence the representation of the local [37].

This widely consolidated tool of urban identity change, however, requires years to re-create a sense of place. Moreover, it is privilege only for those who can afford (money-wise) the access to cultural venues and events. The example of the cultural precinct of Newcastle-Gateshead is somehow revealing, with a low attendance to cultural events among low-income residents living in the nearby marginalised areas of the regenerated waterfront [38]. This eventually led scholars to raise concerns on the socio-cultural benefits of culture-led regeneration projects [39].

Culture-led regeneration projects can forge urban identities ex novo, particularly through iconic buildings and urban policies that foster the commodification of difficult pasts. Again, the example of the Guggenheim in Bilbao (Spain) [40] shows how culture-led regeneration can be successfully used to re-image the identity of the city. Also, the regeneration through culture implemented in Gateshead (UK) created a new sense of urban identity and civic pride at both urban and regional level in the North East of England [3]. The case of Łódź (Poland), instead, shows how the predominant political discourse behind the process of cultural regeneration aims at reframing a new urban identity to replace the recent socialist past of the city [41].

In conclusion, we can state that the built environment of a city represents a very important element or urban identity. In particular, grassroots initiatives in support of historically significant buildings, the refurbishment of derelict industrial areas and dedicated policies of cultural regeneration can plan “an important role in improving neighbourhood identity and external image” [42]. Empirical evidence from different urban contexts clearly shows that the arts and the cultural industries can restore or create new identities “in an eclectic urban society conscious of not only the traditions, but also of other cultures and lifestyles” [24]. There are nevertheless concerns about who truly benefits from culture-led regeneration projects, especially those large-scale initiatives
deployed by local and national authorities.

**Cultural regeneration as a lever for urban recovery from natural disasters**

In the light of the literature retrieved, it can be stated that the practices of culture-led and creative-led regeneration as means for post-disaster urban re-development and re-identity is currently overlooked. Arguably, the reason of such limited emphasis has to do with the current foci of mainstream post-disaster urban research. For example Atkinson assesses “the variations in business resilience in the aftermath of hurricanes” in Palm Beach and New Orleans (USA) [43], while Gotham assesses the tourism re-branding of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina [44]. With respect to the built heritage, Mokhtari et al. assesses the initiatives to retain the historic city of Bam (Iran) [45], while Al-Nammari investigates the long-term recovery of public and NGO-owned historic buildings with findings from post-Loma Prieta earthquake in San Francisco (USA) [46].

Evidence from post-Katrina New Orleans (USA) suggests that urban managers recently started to acknowledge culture within the wider process of early post-disaster recovery and place branding [44]. Here, the local tourism authorities stress the potentialities of culture as factor of economic recovery and tourist promotion. In particular, the emphasis on the distinctive cultural features of New Orleans (jazz, colonial heritage and the carnival) “fulfils several strategic tourism objectives including attracting diverse kinds of niche tourists and generating business opportunities within the local tourism industry” [44]. Limitedly with the visual arts, instead, the NOLA RISING campaign represents a unique initiative to encourage professional and amateur artists to display their works in the attempt to rebuild and restore the spirit of the city [47].

In conclusion, the importance of culture and the creative arts in the process of post-disaster urban recovery is still far from being fully acknowledged. The following sections address this knowledge gap by providing empirical evidence from different projects of culture-led regeneration currently implemented in the city of Christchurch (New Zealand) in the aftermath of the earthquake of February 22nd 2011. The need for quick economic activation and restoration of urban identity through culture and creative arts is here sought through a mix of anchor projects and grassroots initiatives to retain and attract cultural and creative industries from New Zealand and overseas. The aim is to re-position the city of Christchurch as the main cultural hub of New Zealand [48].

**Culture and the creative arts in post-earthquake Christchurch**

Christchurch is the main urban area in the South Island of New Zealand (Figure 1), with approximately 342,000 inhabitants [49]. Before the earthquake of February 22nd 2011, the city of Christchurch was nationally and internationally renowned for the relevant neo-gothic built heritage of its city centre [7]. Along with its historic built environment, the city had experienced a spontaneous boost with respect to the performing arts during the 1970s and the 1980s. More recently, the Christchurch City Council (CCC) proactively promoted the investment in public
art, visual arts and the sponsoring of cultural events [50-52]. Similarly, the main schools for tertiary education in the city were adding creative capital to the city.

The earthquake of February 22nd 2011 severely hit both for the arts community and the cultural attractions and facilities of the city. The arts and the creative communities, in particular, were affected by the insufficient insurance payoffs, the policy environment and the restricted state budget allocations. Notwithstanding the establishment of dedicated funding schemes such as the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Fund (CERF) [53] and the Canterbury Earthquake Heritage Buildings Fund (CEHBF) [54], “Christchurch faced a looming cultural crisis at a time when the arts had the potential to play a major role in the mental and physical recovery” [48] of the city.

Table 1 illustrates the findings with respect to heritage and the arts. The identification of the categories underpins the definitions adopted by the UNSECO World Heritage Centre [55], the New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage (NZMCH) [56] and mainstream literature in cultural regeneration [23]. The insights considered for the purposes of the study include spaces (i.e. the identification of areas) and the emerging identities (i.e. the perceived contributions to the identity of the city).

Figure 1 Location map of Christchurch, New Zealand
Table 1 Summary of the findings for post-earthquake cultural regeneration in Christchurch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heritage</th>
<th>Tangible</th>
<th>Intangible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arts Centre</td>
<td>Te Puna Ahurea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peterborough Centre</td>
<td>Marker of a new post-colonial city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>Performing</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isaac Theatre Royal</td>
<td>Gap Filler Project</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Court Theatre</td>
<td>FESTA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Performing Arts Precinct</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visual</td>
<td>Outer Spaces</td>
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Spaces

The earthquake of February 22nd 2011 severely hit the built environment of Christchurch and of its historic centre in particular. Given the negligence with a considerable portion of unreinforced masonry buildings with relevant historic value [57], many heritage buildings in Christchurch suffered severe damage. Among these, the symbolic Christchurch Cathedral and the Church of the Blessed Sacrament are likely to be demolished at the time of writing, while the Arts Centre represents one of the few examples of heritage retention and recovery in Christchurch [58]. The ongoing recovery of the Arts Centre was possible thanks to the initiative of the Arts Centre CEO, Ken Franklin, who had re-insured the complex in January 2011 [59], and the prompt decision of the Arts Centre Trust Board to plan the recovery of the complex without the supervision of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA). Another relevant historic building to be retained is the Peterborough Centre, whose refurbishment is being currently run by a private foreign company (Ceres) [60]. Arguably, these initiatives are the most prominent exceptions to the progressive bulldozing of the historic buildings which is characterizing the post-earthquake early recovery of Christchurch.

Focusing on the intangible heritage, the Blueprint Plan [61] released in July 2012 by the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) foresees the creation of the Te Puna Ahurea Cultural Centre to celebrate the local Māori and Polynesian cultures [62]. Unlike with other cultural projects, the building of the Te Puna Ahurea is led by the Ngai Tahu Property division [63] and it will be act both as education and exhibition centre. At the time of writing, however, the project only identified the area of the development, while project costs and delivery times have not been made public yet.

Performing arts venues seem to represent a key theme in the recovery of Christchurch. Soon after the earthquakes, the Isaac Theatre Royal CEO, Neil Cox, announced that the Board agreed to restore the key architectural features of the “prestigious heritage theatrical venue” [64]. The project took almost four years and
culminated with the re-opening of the theatre in November 2014 [65]. Similarly, the Court Theatre Director, Philip Aldridge, re-opened in December 2011 in a new temporary venue (The Shed) outside the historic city area [66]. At the time of writing, the Court Theatre extended the lease at The Shed and it is considering the idea of establishing near the Isaac Theatre Royal on a permanent basis [67]. Lastly, the Performing Arts Precinct foreseen in the CCDU Blueprint Plan was officially launched in June 2014 [68] after fierce debates around the retention of the Town Hall, The latter suffered severe damages due to the earthquakes, but the CCC nevertheless voted to retain and strengthen the venue [69]. The exorbitant costs downsized the Performing Arts Precinct project and the expectations of the arts stakeholders for a dedicated and innovative venue.

With respect to the public arts, the Christchurch-based Arts Voice originally proposed the location of public art along the Avon River [70], but the CCDU Blueprint Plan disregarded the recommendations of the artists’ community. Notwithstanding the lack of collaboration between the unit and the local grassroots initiatives, the city of Christchurch experienced important initiatives of public art in the areas left empty by the demolitions. One of such initiatives is the Gap Filler Project, where proactive communities of artists promote creative forms of temporary public art [71] (Figure 2). Along with the Gap Filler Project, the Festival of Transitional Architecture (FESTA) integrates architecture with performing and visual arts with a series of annual events [72].

Finally, the Christchurch Gallery Board has been promoting the hosting of temporary galleries in empty buildings since the closure of the Contemporary Art Gallery for work repairs. One of such projects – Outer Spaces – consists of events and exhibitions in unconventional sites or temporary venues throughout the city [72]. Local artists Matt Akehurst, Oscar Enberg and Sebastian Warne, on the other hand, opened the ABC space in September 2011 to provide the arts community a place where to display their artworks [48].

Figure 2 The Gap Filler Pallet Pavilion in Victoria Square (source: Gap Filler Project, 2014)
Emerging identities

The initiatives to promote heritage and the arts in post-earthquake Christchurch show significant potentialities to re-create a sense of urban identity among the residents. The temporary projects of public art and the examples of heritage recovery are remarkable examples of community resilience in the face of disaster and demolition tout-court. This section illustrates the opinions of arts and heritage stakeholders with respect to the future urban identity of Christchurch.

Focusing on the tangible heritage, the recovery of the Arts Centre is seen as the sine qua non opportunity to restore and strengthen a complex with unique heritage value for Christchurch and New Zealand [73]. The aim is to accurately restore the complex and ensure its relevance for generations to come [74]. Nevertheless, there is a widespread opinion that the demolition of historic architecture elsewhere in Christchurch and the attitudes towards symbolic heritage like the Christ Church Cathedral (Figure 3) shattered the strong identity roots of the city with its characteristic neo-gothic built heritage [75]. Conversely, the Te Puna Ahiurea is envisioned as a remarkable step forward in the acknowledgement of local Māori oral traditions as distinctive feature of the identity of post-earthquake Christchurch [65].

With respect to the performing arts, the recovery of the Isaac Theatre Royal in November 2014 was welcomed as the turning point in the recovery of Christchurch’s urban identity as renowned cultural hub in New Zealand and the Pacific [67]. Similarly, the opening of the Court Theatre temporary venue exalted the resilience of the artists’ community in a period of uncertainty and shattered urban identity as result of the earthquakes and displacement of venues outside the city centre [76]. Identity and sense of place were finally decisive in the decision to retain the original Town Hall as main venue for the performing arts [77]. In this case however, the resulting downsizing of the Performing Arts Precinct is perceived as a missed chance to re-frame the identity of Christchurch as vibrant city for culture and the arts [78].

The allocation of public artworks through the Gap Filler Project and FESTA are meant to bring energy, positivity, creativity to the several empty areas in Christchurch through the participation of artists and citizens, who directly contribute to the creation of spontaneous urban identities and spaces [79]. Extemporaneity is the recurrent characteristic of these post-earthquake initiatives. With nearly 80% of the central area being demolished, these forms of grassroots artscape initiatives represent a remarkable example of landscape design and urban identity and they can “inform and influence the long-term permanent recovery of the city” [80].

Lastly, the Outer Spaces initiative launched by the Contemporary Art Gallery is expression of the strong commitment of Christchurch towards the arts and their importance notwithstanding the earthquakes of February 22nd 2011. In this case, there is a perceived sense of continuity between pre-and-post-disaster that stretches beyond the venue itself and spreads in the vacant spaces of the city. Similarly, the ABC run by local artists provided a prompt response to the need of arts and art spaces sought by both the artists’ community [48, 81] and the citizens of Christchurch [82].
Figure 3 The Christ Church Cathedral in 2014 (source: The Press)

Conclusions

Evidences from Christchurch suggest that heritage and the arts are decisive tools in the recovery of the city. What emerges is a fluid urban identity featuring features of the pre-quake identity and elements of vibrant creativity. Both elements are expression of spontaneous grassroots groups established in the aftermath of the earthquakes. Examples include movements to save heritage from demolition (e.g. ICONIC) [83], represent the artists’ community in the recovery planning stages (e.g. Arts Voice) [70], and arrange venues and spaces for temporary exhibitions of artworks in the city (e.g. LIVS) [84].

The cultural anchor projects outlined by the CCDU were expected to foster the role of the arts and creative industries in the recovery of the city. Nevertheless, such projects are being delivered within a persisting divides between national authorities, grassroots movements and civic society [72]. The tensions between these stakeholders inexorably affected the rebuilding and recovery of Christchurch, with the systematic demolition of historic buildings and the struggle of performing artists seeking for permanent venues. Despite interesting local initiatives of culture-led regeneration initiatives and projects proposals, the authorities responsible for the rebuilding of the city seem not to acknowledge the vision of the creative community. As one arts’ stakeholder recently commented, “it is hard to see how these large institutions alone will develop a thriving, diverse arts culture” [72].

The recommendation for the future is a more proactive collaboration among arts’ stakeholders and planning authorities through forms of coalescence and democratic participation that can boost creative urban change and deliver a new urban identity of Christchurch as vibrant hub for the arts and as city with relevant heritage.
Referências

6 I do (not) want you back!
(Re)gentrification of the arts centre, Christchurch

Alberto Amore

Introduction
This chapter examines the strategies that are shaping the recovery of the Arts Centre of Christchurch (ACC) through the lens of gentrification. It is argued here that the Arts Centre of Christchurch Trust Board (hereafter the Trust) took advantage of the climate of emergency following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 to accelerate the process of site development that was interrupted on the eve of the first quake, when the commission appointed by the Christchurch City Council (CCC) refused the Trust’s project for the National Conservatorium of Music. The current Arts Centre development plan (released in August 2013) (ACC 2013a, 2014a) identifies creative businesses and upmarket hospitality businesses as the desired tenants for the site and does not foresee clauses for former tenants to return to Arts Centre.

This study utilises theories of gentrification and links them to the emerging paradigm of crisis-driven urbanisation. It argues that the decisions of the Trust following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 are framing a market-led recovery of the Arts Centre that move beyond its original community focus. While mainstream literature has hitherto discussed the process of retail gentrification at the neighbourhood level, this study illustrates the phenomenon of retail displacement within a site of historic relevance, thus providing an insight which has been overlooked.

Literature
Investment in the historic urban fabric has become a widespread practice of urban regeneration in many developed countries (Ashworth and Tunbridge 2000). In several cases, the safeguarding and retention of historic places results in a new use of heritage premises. Such physical ‘rehabilitation of old structures’ (Smith 1982: 139), however, is likely to stimulate an inexorable process of gentrification. The notion of gentrification used here applies to a wide spectrum of city users, who represent the main targets of urban strategies in the contemporary city (Harvey 1989). That is, the re-use of old buildings can encourage a process of capital reinvestment (Smith 2000) for the creation of spatially embedded places
designed for a more affluent class of people with distinctive cultural consumption characteristics (Zukin 1990). Particularly with respect to heritage buildings, ‘the establishment of legally-protected landmark historic districts confirms the selective construction [of] both monopoly rents and a monopoly of consumption rights’ (Zukin 1990: 42).

Gentrification is ‘a global urban strategy that is densely connected into the circuits of global capital and cultural circulation [under] the leading edge of neoliberal urbanism’ (Lees, Slater and Wyly 2008: 132). The study of gentrification is useful to understand the roots of urban development as the outcome of highly political processes (Betancur 2002) following market-driven and market-obeying policies of urban development (Porter 2009) whose ultimate aim is the increase of rent values ‘for the right to use land’ (Lees et al. 2008: 51), which may not be commensurate with some of the original roles of publicly owned properties. While most works on gentrification address the phenomenon of residential displacement, its effects ‘on neighbourhood attributes such as retail remains an underrepresented area of study’ (Greenberger 2013: 1) (Table 6.1). Only a limited set of works discusses the displacement of commercial activities as result of upscale retail diversification in historic neighbourhoods (Zukin et al. 2009). The latter goes hand-in-hand with tourism, as the establishment of leisure shops and restaurants contributes to the transformation of a given site ‘into a relatively affluent and exclusive enclave marked by a proliferation of corporate entertainment and tourism venues’ (Gotham 2005: 1099). To date, however, the process of retail and tourist gentrification within historic sites has been overlooked. The work by Gonzalez and Waley (2013) is one of the very few contributions that illustrate the process of retail gentrification within a site of historic relevance (i.e. the Kirkgate Market in central Leeds, UK). Nevertheless, this work does not illustrate a context of crisis following a natural or human-induced disaster.

To address this gap, studies on retail gentrification have emerged to illustrate how urban redevelopment policies use disasters as pretext ‘to initiate or consolidate gentrification projects’ (Glück 2013: 3). Studies from Manchester (Massey 2005), New York and New Orleans (Gotham and Greenberg 2014) show how key stakeholders seized the opportunity to implement neoliberal policy responses to transform cities through projects ‘previously off the table due to bureaucratic inertia, lack of funding’ (Gotham and Greenberg 2014: 95) or opposition by the existing community.

The relationship between gentrification and disaster is discussed below through a longitudinal review of the dynamics of the recovery of the Arts Centre. This study differs from other research undertaken in the South of Lichfield areas of Christchurch (e.g. McDonagh, Borwing and Perkins 2013, 2014), which illustrates how the earthquake halted the process of gentrification. However, it suggests that the earthquake triggered the displacement of low-rent businesses and that ‘the rents demanded for retail space in new buildings appear to preclude small owner-operated businesses’ (McDonagh et al. 2014: 1).
### Table 6.1 Overview of literature on retail gentrification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>CBD</th>
<th>Post-disaster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Process of retail gentrification as expression of socio-spatial changes in uses and consumers of the city (Zukin 1990).</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newcastle upon Tyne</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Displacement of low-cost retailers as result of regeneration in the historic centre of the city (Diggle and Farrow 1999).</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Supply-side analysis of trade and retail in four neighbourhoods at the margins of the CBD (Bridge and Dowling 2001).</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Retail gentrification with strong pro-market policies of displacement and refurbishment of the urban fabric for the night economy (Butler and Robson 2001).</td>
<td>–</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Private-led restoration of the retail areas following the IRA bombings of 1996 (Massey 2005).</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Orleans</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Retail gentrification as complementary dimension of tourist gentrification in key tourist areas of the city (Gotham 2005).</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Longitudinal analysis of retail gentrification in two areas of the city. Rise of upscale restaurants and boutiques as facet of neighbourhood’s creative capital and distinctiveness (Zukin et al. 2009).</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Neighbourhood / Site</td>
<td>Retail gentrification in the historic centre of Barcelona, with displacement of low-cost retailers. Analysis of policies to attract new retailers in closed premises (Pascual-Molinas and Ribera-Fumaz 2009).</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>CBD</th>
<th>Post-disaster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Analysis of production-led gentrification through the study of business and corporation settlement in clustered neighbourhoods (Dot Jutgla, Cesella and Pallares-Barbera, 2010).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seville</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Retail gentrification as triggering agent of users’ and residents’ displacement (Díaz Parra 2008).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Retail gentrification and repercussions on black American community (Sullivan and Shaw 2011).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Ethnic neighbourhood transformation through the lens of retail gentrification (Murdic and Teixeira 2011).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leeds</td>
<td>Site</td>
<td>Process of retail gentrification in central markets as result of market-led policies and real estate interests in renting premises to upmarket tenants (Gonzalez and Waley 2013).</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Understanding of retail change as reflex of production-led gentrification through longitudinal study on local retailers (Greenberger 2013).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Retail resilience and displacement as result of the 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes (McDonagh et al. 2013).</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Catherine</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Displacement of existing retailers and attraction of creative and tourism businesses (Wierzba 2014).</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>Attitude of long-established businesses towards gentrification of the neighbourhood (Jeong et al. 2015).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Case study: the Arts Centre of Christchurch

The Arts Centre of Christchurch is a complex of Gothic Revival buildings once home to the University of Canterbury (UC) (New Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT) 2011), and located on the western edge of the Christchurch CBD. The first facilities were built between 1877 and 1882 (ACC 2013c) by English-born architect Benjamin Mountfort, who was also appointed for the design of further buildings through the 1890s (ACC 2013d; 2013f). Since 1990, the 23 buildings of the Arts Centre have been registered as places of special or outstanding historical significance (Heritage New Zealand (HNZ) 2015). Before the earthquakes, the Arts Centre was one of the major tourist attractions of the so-called “cultural precinct” (Christchurch Tourism 2008). Between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, however, the site faced a period of uncertainty following the relocation of the University of Canterbury to the peripheral campus area in Ilam (Strange 1994). This phase heightened the processes of pioneering gentrification (Smith 1986) and ‘vulnerability intensification’, which refers to the ‘increasing vulnerability of urban populations and ecosystems to future disasters’ as result of the deepening of vulnerabilities in the aftermath of a disaster (Gotham and Greenberg 2014: 12) that were occurring in relation to the location/site.

1978–2008: pioneering gentrification in a highly vulnerable site

The period between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s illustrates the features of the first wave of gentrification (Hackworth and Smith 2001), with the establishment of arts stakeholders in the vacant premises of the complex. The Court Theatre was the first tenant to relocate to the Arts Centre in 1975 (Strange 1994), followed by the Free Theatre of Christchurch in 1982 (Free Theatre of Christchurch 2014). The presence of cultural attractions and events within the complex fuelled the establishment of cafes and restaurants throughout the early 1980s, with the opening of Dux de Lux restaurant and bar in the old Student Union building (Dux de Lux 2014). Recreation and retail activities were boosted throughout the 1990s with the opening of stores such as Beadz Unlimited (Stewart 2011a) and the establishment of stallholders in the atrium of the complex. By 2003, the Arts Centre was home to 180 small to medium businesses (ACC 2003). In 2004, finally, the site welcomed the first high-end retail tenant with the opening of clothing store Untouched World in the Old Registry building (Clark 2004). Unlike other forms of gentrification, however, the property of the premises remained firmly in the hands of the Trust, as foreseen in the original Trust Deed from 1978. Businesses operated as tenants in the premises for commercial use identified in the original feasibility study of 1974 (Community Arts Centre Steering Committee 1974).

Given the historic relevance of the site, this early phase also reflected some features of the third phase of classical gentrification (Clay 1979) during which the site gains relevant media and community interest, and gentrifiers move in with higher disposable incomes (the first phase is marked by pioneers who...
complement the existing population; the second by the share of pioneers increasing and changes in the composition of retail and services). The announcement in 1973 that ‘the buildings would be given to the people of Christchurch as an arts centre’ (Strange 1994: 101) was followed by the statement of the then New Zealand Prime Minister, the Hon. Norman Kirk, who hoped that the use of ‘the buildings [would] draw from the threads of all the cultures in New Zealand and attempt to produce something uniquely New Zealand in character’ (quoted in Strange 1994: 101). Similarly, the release of the feasibility study plan in 1974 saw the participation and the unanimous support of politicians and community leaders. As Canterbury-based planner Malcolm Douglass later reported, this initiative ‘was a rare example of those in the lead being supported by a huge groundswell of public feeling’ (quoted in Strange 1994: 103).

The years that preceded the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 were characterised by increased vulnerabilities and a lack of resources that resembled the crisis-driven urbanisation model (Gotham and Greenberg 2014). Since the establishment of the Trust in December 1978, building strengthening, retention of historic buildings, attraction of high-end tenants and lack of public funding had been major ongoing concerns. The Trust was able to undertake preliminary earthquake strengthening and retention works throughout the 1980s (Strange 1994; Crean 2008), but it soon became clear that further works were going to be needed to make the Arts Centre less prone to medium and strong earthquakes (ACC 2003). However, works only began at the end of 2007 as part of a systematic restoration project of NZD$25 million over a period of 15 years (Crean 2007), with the aim being to strengthen the buildings and then retain them in perpetuity (ACC 2011). However, the real estate market never expressed interest in the Arts Centre as originally expected (Community Arts Centre Steering Committee 1974), and it did not attract high-end retailers. Rather, those expressing interest in relocating to the complex were low-rent arts stakeholders such as the Court Theatre or single-person owned businesses. Nevertheless, the presence of tenants positively contributed to the economy of the Arts Centre. In fact, most of the revenues of the Arts Centre came from the renting of commercial premises (ACC 2010a). Similarly, the presence of a several businesses increased the tourist appeal of the site and thus led directly to the increase in the Arts Centre assets value from NZD$14 million in 2002 (ACC 2003) to $21.2 million in 2008 (ACC 2010a). Finally, the ACC’s continued tight financial position made the retention of the Arts Centre in its previous guise, with a substantial community organisational base, problematic. Despite feasibility studies that had recommended that the Trust meet all its expenditure from its income (Community Arts Centre Steering Committee 1974), the Arts Centre had to cope with extraordinary expenditures of earthquake strengthening costing millions of dollars. Given the limited heritage funding in New Zealand (see also Chapter 13, this volume), the CCC was the only major body from which grants could be accessed. However, the Council had progressively reduced its support to the Arts Centre in the early 2000s (ACC 2003). Eventually, the CCC granted the amount of funds requested by the Arts Centre in 2003 (NZS400,000 per annum) at the end of 2009 (CCC 2013).
This phase of pioneering gentrification took place in the context of the progressive shift of businesses and residents to outside the Christchurch CBD. The slow but inexorable decline of the central city attracted low-rent tenants, such as artists and small hospitality entrepreneurs, to the premises handed to the Arts Centre Steering Committee and, later, the Trust. The site, however, had important structural vulnerabilities that could not be entirely addressed with the tight financial assets available since the establishment of the Trust. Under the pressure of financial sustainability and the need to reinforce the site, seeking for high-end tenants and increasing the commercial space of the centre became the paramount strategies for the Trust to manage the site in quasi-absence of public funds.

**2008–2010: second wave of gentrification**

This phase is marked by an increasing struggle between owners and tenants (Hackworth and Smith 2001). The pressures around the Trust resulted in an aggressive entrepreneurial approach (Lees et al. 2008) at the expense of the most vulnerable tenants and community groups. The Trust acknowledged that venues such as the National Conservatorium of Music would be crucial in the development of the Arts Centre. This phase, moreover, underpins one of the features of the second wave gentrification highlighted by Gotham (2005), with cultural anchors used to consolidate a new wave of gentrification led by more lucrative tenants. The earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, however, deflected the process of gentrification to a new path.

Early concerns among tenants emerged at the end of 2008, when the Trust asked advisors to review the Arts Centre assets value. The advisors concluded that the tangible assets of the Arts Centre as at December 2009 were worth NZD$100.74 million, with a depreciation rate of 0.2 per cent per annum (ACC 2010a, 2011). The Trust, however, admitted that there would not be ‘upward pressure on tenant rentals’ (ACC 2010a: 5), as the latter were based on the rental market for retail spaces in the Christchurch CBD (ACC 2010a). As the former Arts Centre Chairman, John Simpson, explained, this new method of site value was:

>a common issue for owners of heritage buildings, in part arising from a difficult fit between the reporting requirements and standards of the governing legislation (written for normal commercial buildings) and the unique characteristics and performance of heritage assets.

(ACC 2010a: 3)

Frictions between the Trust and the tenants reached their peak when the Trust launched a project in collaboration with the University of Canterbury and the Christchurch City Council to build a National Conservatorium of Music within the heritage complex. The lease of the land for the facility would have given ‘the Arts Centre the money to maintain, preserve and reconstruct existing buildings’ (Conway 2010b) and thus complete the necessary earthquake strengthening.
works. The project was widely criticised by long-established tenants of the Arts Centre, heritage conservationists and resource management experts. In particular, the Court Theatre considered relocating outside the Arts Centre (van Beynen 2009), while a group of fierce opponents established the Save Our Arts Centre (SOAC) to oppose the Trust and the Council (SOAC 2010a). Other concerns raised by SOAC were the changes to the Trust Deed in 2008, the alleged lack of available funds reported in the Trust reports of 2008 and 2009 (Gorman 2010), the inclusion of clauses blocking objections to consent applications in the new tenancy contracts (Greenhill 2009), and the subdivision of the site into six lots. The latter, in particular, was seen as having a significant adverse effect on the ability to protect recognised heritage values (SOAC 2010b).

The consent to proceed with the building of the conservatorium, in the end, was denied by the CCC hearing commission on March 2010 (CCC 2010) in accordance with the legislation on historic heritage protection established by the Resource Management Act 1991. This decision, however, did not stop the Trust from developing an underground car parking area in the heart of the Centre. On 2 September 2010, the Trust team ordered the relocation of 103 stallholders to the Southern edge of the centre in order to empty the area and initiate the works (Conway 2010c). Then the first earthquake struck.

2010–2014: framing the re-gentrification of the arts centre

Following the first major earthquake of 4 September 2010, businesses remained closed for a few days, but none of the buildings leased for commercial use suffered significant damage, and by mid-September most of the activities had reopened (Sachdeva 2010). Nevertheless, 20 stallholders had their licence terminated (Conway 2010a). According to the Stallholder’s Association, the Trust used the earthquake ‘as a very sad and sorry excuse’ (Conway 2010a: A.4) to evict those who were opposed to the parking area project. In early February 2011, the Trust leased part of the Registry building to the Canterbury Cheesemongers, who had lost their previous building in the September earthquake (Stewart 2011b).

In contrast, the earthquake of 22 February 2011 had severe consequences for tenants at the Arts Centre. Following inspection in early March, 22 out of the 23 buildings of the complex were red-stickered (Gates 2011g) and admission to tenants was restricted by civil defence for safety reasons until 8 March. On 23 March the Trust announced that, due to the high uncertainty with the recovery of the Arts Centre, the tenants had ‘to consider their own future in alternative spaces’ (Gates 2011d: A.3). With the exception of the Canterbury Cheesemongers, all the tenants were unilaterally evicted by the Trust. Nevertheless, long-established businesses decided to fight the eviction. Seven of these businesses took legal action against the Trust and requested the release of engineering reports on their former leased units (Gates 2011j). The hope of these tenants was to return back to their premises (Gates 2011k), but they soon realised that the Trust would not grant them the right of returning to the Arts Centre in the future. Other businesses, instead, relocated to alternative premises immediately following the
Table 6.2 List of long-established tenants and relocation following the earthquake of February 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenants (as at September 2010)*</th>
<th>Type of business</th>
<th>First established</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>New location(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academy Cinemas</td>
<td>Movie theatre</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>The Colombo Mall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annie’s Wine Bar</td>
<td>Bar</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisan Fibres</td>
<td>Handcrafted clothing</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts Centre Bookshop</td>
<td>Bookstore</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Worcester Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts Centre Leather Shop</td>
<td>Handcrafted leather goods</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backstage Bakery</td>
<td>Café</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>New business (St Asaph, St Kitchen &amp; Stray Dog Bar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beadz Unlimited</td>
<td>Costume jewellery</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>New Regent Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury Cheesemongers</td>
<td>Cheese shop and dining</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Remained</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cave Rock Gallery</td>
<td>Art shop and gallery</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloister Cinema</td>
<td>Movie theatre</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Colombo Mall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee Corner</td>
<td>Café</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Upper Riccarton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connexion Gallery</td>
<td>Cooperative of jewel makers</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Disestablished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court Theatre</td>
<td>Performing arts</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shed in Addington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dux Live</td>
<td>Live music venue</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Addington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dux de Lux</td>
<td>Restaurant</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Riccarton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Theatre</td>
<td>Performing arts</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Returned</td>
<td>Temporarily at Arts Centre (until 2016)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
### Table 6.2 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenants (as at September 2010)*</th>
<th>Type of business</th>
<th>First established</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>New location(s)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fudge Cottage</td>
<td>Sweets shop</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Bishopdale Mall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Jade &amp; Opal Centre</td>
<td>Jewellery</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palate</td>
<td>Shop and dining</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rutherford’s Den</td>
<td>Tourist attraction</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Expected return to the Centre: end of 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salamander Gallery</td>
<td>Gallery and laboratory</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA Gallery</td>
<td>Visual arts</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>University of Canterbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Ballet</td>
<td>Performing arts</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Sydenham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Puna Toi</td>
<td>Visual arts</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>University of Canterbury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Te Toi Mana</td>
<td>Arts shop and gallery (Maori Art)</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Christchurch Carving and Bone Studio</td>
<td>Carving art shop and gallery</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Wool Studio</td>
<td>Knitted wear</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Middleton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Untouched World</td>
<td>Clothing store</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>RE:Start Mall Burnside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visually Maori</td>
<td>Arts shop and gallery (Maori Art)</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodcraft Gallery</td>
<td>Woodcraft</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Linwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool Yarns and Fibres</td>
<td>Wool clothing</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Woolston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zander Imaging</td>
<td>Visual arts</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Lease terminated</td>
<td>Shut down</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excludes activities under the Arts Centre Trust and stallholders. All of the above relocations are within the Christchurch region.

Eviction. Among these were the Court Theatre, which reopened at the end of 2011 in a new temporary location outside the CBD (Gates 2011e) and expressed interest in eventually relocating to the proposed Performing Arts Precinct (Dally 2012b) (Table 6.2).
Of interest is the fight against eviction carried on by the owner of Dux de Lux, Richard Sinke. According to an engineering report commissioned by Sinke, the building that was home to the Dux de Lux could be re-occupied in a very short period (Yardley 2011a) at a reasonable cost (NZD$390,000) (Gates 2011i). Sinke proposed to personally finance the restructuring works, thus gaining the sympathy of local opinion (Gates 2011c). In June 2011 the Trust agreed to meet Sinke and discuss the future of the restaurant as part of the reconstruction and revitalisation of the Arts Centre (Gates 2011h). Nevertheless, the Trust informed Sinke that the full strengthening of the building would have made the repairs very expensive and unnecessary for a secondary building (Gates 2011f). Finally, Sinke decided to reopen two new facilities outside the CBD between 2011 and 2012 (Greenhill 2011; Turner 2012), with a third restaurant to be opened in 2015 (Dally 2015).

The decision to unilaterally terminate leases and evict tenants from the Arts Centre was justified on safety grounds. However, it soon became clear that the Trust could now concentrate its efforts on the projects of earthquake restoration and re-gentrification of the centre. After the earthquake of 2010, the Trust announced that strengthening of damaged buildings was crucial, the costs of which further affected the financial liabilities of the Arts Centre (Sachdeva 2010). The eviction of tenants following the earthquake of February 2011 was seen as a necessary measure given the ‘unclear, yet long, time needed for the recovery’ (Gates 2011d: A.3). The Director of the Arts Centre, Ken Franklin, stated that the Trust had the obligation to direct funds to preserve the key heritage buildings, and funding the reopening of businesses was not contemplated as a recovery strategy (Gates 2011i). Similarly, the Chairman of the Trust, Deane Simmonds, asserted that tenants had the right to challenge the Trust with legal actions, but he also noted that this would have taken ‘money away from preserving and restoring the buildings’ (Gates 2011h: A.9).

In the first months after the February earthquake, the limited funds available to the Trust were allocated to extraordinary works on key buildings (Gates 2011g) and a detailed scanning of the Arts Centre (ACC 2012). The latter was decisive in securing the pay-out from insurers and thus permitted the Trust to obtain more than NZD$350 million between 2011 and 2013 (ACC 2014a). Therefore, the Trust was able to fund the strengthening of buildings to 100 per cent of the revised building code (Gates 2011a). Priority was given to restoring key heritage buildings, but the Trust assured the public that demolition of secondary buildings was out of question (Gates 2011a). In the absence of significant public funding to help restore the Arts Centre and support the tenancy of its previous community organisations, the strategies used to restore the Arts Centre have only served to reinforce the overall direction of the Centre towards high-end retail with its accompanying higher rents. The earthquake has therefore served to accelerate existing gentrification processes.

The intransigence of Trust members towards former tenants seemed to soften with the appointment of Andre Lovatt as Director in October 2012 and the inclusion of new members in the Trust Board. Among them, the newly appointed Chairwoman, Jen Crawford, stated that tenants ousted by the 2011 earthquakes
would be “invited” to return (Mann 2012), once the Trust completed the recovery of buildings (scheduled for 2018) and achieved financial sustainability (ACC 2013a). The new Director also welcomed former tenants in March 2013 to discuss the future of the Arts Centre (ACC 2014a). However, their inclusion did not imply a return of old businesses back to the Arts Centre. Rather, it simply engaged people ‘to test some ideas and generate some discussion’ (Gates 2013b: A.6).

Since May 2013, the Trust established a memorandum of understanding with the Christchurch Arts Festival to host the event in a temporary venue outside the Arts Centre (ACC 2013b), and subscribed to an agreement with the Canterbury Museum for the promotion of heritage and the hosting of joint events (New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage (NZMCH) 2014). The Trust is contributing to the re-initiation of the Cultural Precinct (ACC 2013a). Lovatt also welcomed stakeholders to pick from a shortlist of established international best practices (ACC 2014a) identified by ‘a range of experts from the arts, heritage and culture sectors’ (ACC 2013e: 11). The resulting Vision for the Arts Centre identified a range of anchor uses of the complex, with a range of complementary activities gravitating around them (ACC 2013a, 2014a) (Table 6.3).

Among the complementary activities, the Arts Centre identified ‘education retreats, hospitality venues, boutique accommodation [. . .] the Arts Centre Shop and a Members’ area’ (ACC 2014a: 7) as the ideal business solutions to turn the Arts Centre into a hub for creative entrepreneurs, general public and tourists (ACC 2013a). The implementation of this new vision is conceived as an opportunity to bring new activities and users to a 21st-century cluster for creative businesses (ACC 2014a). The decisions undertaken since the appointment of the new Director suggest a strong direction towards the arts and the creative businesses. In particular, the Trust allocated the first fully restored building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.3 The proposed vision for the Arts Centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Element</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Educate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: derived from ACC 2013a, 2014a.
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(i.e. the Registry building) to a design company (McDonald 2013). Similarly, the Trust is considering expressions of interests from the hospitality sector for the recently re-opened Gymnasium building (Gates 2013a), which is the temporary home of the Free Theatre (ACC 2014b). At the time of writing, three buildings are scheduled for re-opening (Gates 2014). The University of Canterbury will relocate its music and classics departments to the Old Chemistry building along with a collection of Greek and Roman artefacts (UC 2014), while a 3-D printing laboratory will open in the Common Room (Gates 2014). Lastly, the Boys High School building will be made available to upmarket hospitality and retail operators (McDonald 2013). The reopening of the whole site is scheduled for the end of 2018 (Gates 2014) at a cost of NZD$290 million.

Nevertheless, the persisting shortfall between the costs of recovery and the funds available (Dally 2012a) and the limited fundraising following the major contribution for the rebuild of the Tower and the Great Hall (Gates 2011b) puts the Trust in need of raising approximately NZD$5 million by 2024 (Gates 2014) in order to build back better. This means that, as throughout the CBD, the rents of refurbished buildings will be higher than those agreed before the earthquakes. Not surprisingly, as Lovatt stated, the Arts Centre ‘is looking at trying to do things like getting good tenants in there who can pay rent and contribute to the future of the Arts Centre’ (Gates 2013a: A2). The expected move of “A-grade tenants” to the Arts Centre has also been welcomed among real estate agents, who suggest that the complex may ‘tempt big hospitality businesses from Christchurch’ (McDonald 2013) and the rest of the country (Taylor 2013). A complementary strategy may encourage site developments or the demolition of secondary heritage buildings. In fact, the Trust secured the subdivision of the land assets as planned before the earthquakes (ACC 2010b) and recent changes in the heritage legislation (Brazendale 2013) encourage de facto the adoption of projects that had been previously rejected.

Conclusions

This chapter illustrated how exogenous events, such as an earthquake, can decisively alter the trajectory of development and positioning of a locally, if not nationally, significant nonprofit cultural organisation responsible for the conservation and management of heritage. The seismic events of 2010 and 2011 created the conditions for a new phase of gentrification that would not have occurred so quickly in a business as usual scenario. Perhaps somewhat ironically, given the physical impacts on the Arts Centre, the earthquakes, via the opportunities made available by insurance funding, have been decisive in providing the Arts Centre a degree of financial sustainability it has sought since first established in late 1978.

Undoubtedly, the earthquakes represented a decisive turning point in giving the Trust the opportunity to conserve the integrity of the buildings while promoting the arts and the creative industries. The recovery of the Arts Centre, however, shows how the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 heightened the second wave of gentrification that had encountered legal and community opposition.
between 2009 and the first major earthquake. The decisions of the Trust suggest a strong market-led redevelopment strategy that is supported only thanks to the important insurance pay-outs. Along with the expensive recovery project, the Trust is continuing to seek new uses in addition to the current high-end retail and lifestyle business opportunities for the Arts Centre in order to guarantee financial sustainability in the long term.

At the time of writing, the Arts Centre has revised its internal governance (Nahkies 2012) and a private bill is currently under scrutiny at the New Zealand Parliament (New Zealand Parliament 2015) to retain the site for the public in the event of future earthquakes. Authorities and heritage stakeholders welcome the move to a skills-based Trust board and the upcoming legislation for the site (Lochhead 2014) as ideal solutions to prevent the rise of frictions between the Trust and the community as occurred before the earthquakes. In fact, the decisions of the Trust under the direction of former director Ken Franklin were perceived as abuses of authority from a board which was ‘charged with acting in the public interest’ (Yardley 2011b: C.4). Arguably, the appointment of new Trust members is expected to establish new forms of engagement between the Trust and the community (New Zealand Parliament 2015). However, it appears that the plans of the current Trust underpin the pre-earthquake projects of up-market development which were fiercely opposed by many in the local community. This inevitably raises concerns as to what extent the community is still the main beneficiary of the Arts Centre, as was originally foreseen in the Trust Deed of 1974.

References

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Community Arts Centre Steering Committee (1974) Old University Precinct Future Use Feasibility [sic] Study, Christchurch: Community Arts Centre Steering Committee.


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———(2011e) ‘Court’s new theatre promises to become landmark for recovery’, The Press, 8 December, A.2.
———(2011g) ‘Rebuilding Arts Centre may take years, cost $100m’, The Press, 15 March, A.4.


Save Our Arts Centre (SOAC) (2010a) Registration decision: Save Our Arts Centre Incorporated, Christchurch: SOAC.


13 The governance of built heritage in the post-earthquake Christchurch CBD

Alberto Amore

Introduction

Four years after the earthquake of 22 February 2011, the collapse of iconic heritage buildings in Christchurch, New Zealand, is still a vivid memory for the people of Canterbury. Despite civic initiatives and the recommendations of the New Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT) (as of 2014, Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga), the leading national built heritage agency, national government authorities listed a substantial portion of the built heritage located in Christchurch’s CBD for demolition. The controversial speech by the Earthquake Recovery Minister Gerry Brownlee, in which he described Christchurch’s heritage architecture as ‘old dungs’ (Chapman 2011), best synthesises the attitude of the national government towards historic buildings. A handful of sites survived demolition, but their recovery was only possible thanks to a series of favourable conditions.

This chapter is relevant for the understanding of an emerging approach with respect to heritage in post-disaster rebuilding. Following the crisis-driven urbanisation model (Gotham and Greenberg 2014), the study shows how the roots of the systematic demolition of heritage buildings in the CBD of Christchurch are founded on the flaws in governance that existed before the earthquakes. At the same time, the release of the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan (CCRP) (Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) 2012) and the Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch (RSGC) (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) 2012) disregarded the importance of heritage as tool of economic redevelopment previously highlighted in the CBD draft plans issued by the Christchurch City Council (CCC). This approach eventually changed with the release of the heritage buildings and places recovery programme in November 2014 (Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH) 2014), by which time much of the built heritage had already been irreversibly lost.

Literature review

The approach towards built heritage can be broadly divided between strategies for the safeguarding and conservation of historic sites, inaction, and demolition (Ashworth and Tunbridge 2000). The protection of historic buildings is a fairly
common practice in urban regeneration strategies around the world. The core principle is that historic buildings ‘positively impact economic development’ (Spirou 2010: 29) and urban tourism (Park 2013) as well as cultural reasons for heritage conservation (Hall and McArthur 1996). Among the strategies for historic building prevention, facadism (Jones and Evans 2008; Pendlebury 2002) is the most common practice adopted in urban regeneration strategies. The conservation of historic buildings mainly applies to identified heritage buildings, but it can also be implemented along with wider policies of urban sustainability (McCallum 2008), climate change adaptation (Hall et al. 2015), and gradual urban change (Hall 2008), with the emphasis being on preventive strategies aimed at challenging practices of inaction and demolition of the historic built environment.

What happens, however, when built heritage needs to be retained in the aftermath of natural and human-induced disasters? Built heritage is often seen as a means for recovery in post-disaster contexts (Table 13.1). Avrami (2012: 187) asserts that ‘heritage can be a very important tool for recovery and rebuilding of community in the face of dramatic change and disasters’. Others suggest that the

| Table 13.1 Conservation approaches in post-disaster contexts: findings from the literature |
| City (country) | Disaster (year) | Strategy adopted |
| Bam (Iran) | Earthquake (2003) | Recovery of the historic centre through international collaboration of heritage authorities to promote the relocation of craftsmanship (Mokhtari, Nejati, and Shad 2008). |
| Mostar (Croatia) | War (1994) | Reconstruction of destructed key heritage as re-affirmation of urban identity in post-war contexts (Kane 2011). |
| Arequipa (Chile) | Earthquake (2001) | Restoration and retention of key heritage buildings through the establishment of local coalitions (Rivera Garcia 2011). |

(Continued)
Table 13.1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City (country)</th>
<th>Disaster (year)</th>
<th>Strategy adopted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charleston (USA)</td>
<td>Hurricane (1989)</td>
<td>Local coalition of heritage lobbyists to recover historic properties (Sparks 2012).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The allocation of public funds for ‘historic buildings endangered by large scale public works, pollution and natural disaster’ (Chairatananonda 2009: 65) is valuable for both public and private interests. Clearly, built heritage can be an important resource (Brazendale 2013) that appropriate policy measures can protect (Bigenwald and White 2003). A similar approach towards built heritage recovery in post-disaster contexts is highlighted in several guidelines issued by international bodies, national states and NGOs, such as the World Monuments Fund, the World Heritage Programme and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) (Lattig 2012). Within integrated approaches towards heritage management (Hall and McArthur 1998), the repair of historic buildings also serves to mitigate sites against hazards (Lattig 2012; Hall et al. 2015).

However, much of the literature seems to overlook the contemporary shift towards market-directing strategies of post-disaster recovery and their influence on the planning process (Le Gales 2011) and the political dimension of heritage management (Hall and McArthur 1996). Developers and government agencies often speculate on the vulnerability of heritage buildings in order to demolish sites with historic value so as to achieve a radical redevelopment of urban form. Examples of such approaches can be found in post-Katrina New Orleans, where a significant portion of historic residential architecture in the heritage core of the city that could have otherwise been conserved or retained was demolished between 2005 and 2008. The example of New Orleans, in fact, suggests that the post-hazard redevelopment undermined the historic traits of the city while advantaging ‘the lucrative economics of disaster recovery’ (Verderber 2009: 274).

It is suggested here that ‘there is no such a thing as a natural disaster’ (Smith 2006). Rather, disasters are caused by pre-existing vulnerabilities upon which top-down political and market drivers frame the recovery. Cities affected by natural disasters often become places of neoliberal experimentation in which extraordinary measures are undertaken to boost economic recovery under the principles of market-led policy-making (Gotham and Greenberg 2014). While authorities seek and legitimise their approaches by exploiting the climate of uncertainty and instability caused by disasters (Klein 2007), communities are relatively powerless and subject to political and economic constraints that inhibit de facto the quest for a more equitable and collaborative recovery agenda (Harvey and Potter 2009). In such contexts, multiscalar regimes tend to encourage expensive
redevelopment projects while downplaying the potentialities of heritage in the wider redevelopment strategies. This may be because of the perceived costs of retaining heritage and/or the desire to amalgamate the land parcels on which built heritage stands for development projects. This process is best synthesised in the crisis-driven urbanisation model (Gotham and Greenberg 2014), which highlights how pre-disaster vulnerabilities and growth coalitions can lead to an uneven recovery governance (see also Amore and Hall, Chapter 12, this volume).

**Context**

The focus of this analysis is the historic centre of Christchurch. The area is part of what was declared a city by Royal Charter in 1856, thereby making it the oldest city in New Zealand (Christchurch City Libraries (CCL) 2015). The historic centre corresponds to the current CBD, as identified in the dedicated legislation for the recovery of the city after the earthquakes (Section 4(1) (a) of the *Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011*) (see also Chapter 12, this volume). Before the earthquakes, the CBD was home to remarkable examples of late 19th-century historic sites, such as the Christ Church Cathedral (completed between 1864 and 1904), the Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament (completed in 1905), the Provincial Council Buildings (completed between 1858 and 1865) and the Arts Centre (formerly the University of Canterbury and completed between 1877 and the late 1920s) (Ansley 2011). Table 13.2 lists an array of the 173 nationally and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site name</th>
<th>Category (NZHPT)</th>
<th>Group (CCC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANZ Bank Building</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts Centre</td>
<td>I and II</td>
<td>1, 2 and 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avon Theatre</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridge of Remembrance</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury Club</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury Museum</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury Public Library</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>1 and 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury Society of Arts Gallery</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ Church Cathedral</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ College</td>
<td>I and II</td>
<td>1, 2 and 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen’s War Memorial</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Statue</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(Continued)
### Table 13.2 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site name</th>
<th>Category (NZHPT)</th>
<th>Group (CCC)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cranmer Courts</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Durham Street Methodist Church</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guthrey Centre</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harald's Building</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaac Theatre Royal</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyttelton Times Building</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magistrates Court</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchester Courts</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music Centre of Christchurch</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regent Street Historic Area</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odeon Theatre</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our City</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Government Building</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Terrace Baptist Church</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterborough Centre</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Trust Office</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regent Theatre</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rollerston Statue</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St John the Baptist Church</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Paul's Church</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Press Building</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria Clock Tower</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Category I** refers to buildings and places of special or outstanding historical or cultural significance.

**Category II** refers to buildings and places of outstanding historical or cultural reference.

**Group 1** refers to buildings, places and objects of international or national significance, the protection of which is considered essential.

**Group 2** refers to buildings, places and objects which are of national or regional importance, the protection of which is seen as very important.

**Group 3** refers to buildings, places and objects which are of regional or metropolitan significance, the protection of which is seen as important.

**Group 4** refers to buildings, places and objects which are of regional or metropolitan significance, the protection of which is seen as desirable.

Sources: Derived from NZHPT (2011c, 2013a) and HNZ (2015b)
regionally relevant buildings located in the CBD of Christchurch (Heritage New Zealand (HNZ) 2015).

In light of the crisis-driven urbanisation model, the governance of heritage buildings in Christchurch before the earthquake was decisive in the escalation of the crisis following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. Up to four different, yet complementary, pre-earthquake factors eventually persuaded authorities to list a good portion of the built heritage of the CBD for demolition (Figure 13.1). Reports from the NZHPT exhorted the government to address the flaws of governance, promote building retention and upgrade the legislation to prevent the decay of the historic built environment (e.g. McLean 2009). Nevertheless, the government’s direct investment for the retention of historic sites remained marginal.

Most of the heritage buildings in Christchurch were built with unreinforced masonry, a technique used in England and Scotland but not suited for an earthquake-prone country like New Zealand (Ingham and Griffith 2011). Only a few heritage buildings were strengthened to sustain moderate or more intense earthquakes (Russell and Ingham 2010). During the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, unreinforced masonry buildings in the CBD suffered substantial damage (Ingham and Griffith 2011). According to Ingham et al.’s (2011) preliminary report for the NZHPT, 48 per cent of such buildings could be listed for demolition.

The predominance of non-reinforced masonry buildings with historical value is the consequence of an executive default of the CCC in applying the dedicated legislation ‘to classify earthquake prone buildings and require owners to reduce
or remove the danger’ (Russell and Ingham 2010: 197). A report issued by the New Zealand Society of Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE) on the eve of the September 2010 earthquake highlighted the predominantly passive approach of the CCC in promoting masonry building reinforcement among private owners (Russell and Ingham 2010). A prominent exception was the refurbishment of warehouses in South of Litchfield in the early 2000s (New Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT) 2011a). In this case, in fact, the change of use foresaw a mandatory earthquake-strengthening of historic buildings above 33 per cent of that required in the Building Code, but the legislation did not make provision for fiscal incentives to owners who sought to retain and strengthen such buildings, including those listed in the NZHPT registry. Finally, many historic sites were owned by religious organisations (NZHPT 2013a) that did not have the financial means or the willingness to undertake earthquake strengthening works to their properties. Consequently, a large number of historic buildings did not meet the minimum requirement of 33 per cent recommended by the NZSEE, when Christchurch was hit by the earthquakes (Holmes Consulting Group 2011).

The national legislation with respect to heritage before the earthquakes (i.e. HPA 1993) established the NZHPT as an independent Crown agency of the Ministry of Culture and Heritage (MCH) (Section 39) with limited budget allocations and roles at national level. The NZHPT could not acquire new historic properties, and the budget for the 48 sites under its direct responsibility was very limited (NZD$1.05 million in 2010). The NZHPT could assist the owners of buildings enlisted in the national registry with practical guidelines (NZHPT 2007), but the latter were not enforceable mandatory requirements as in other countries. The Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991 represented the main legal instrument to protect heritage ‘from inappropriate subdivision, use and development’ (Section 6(f)). Under this Act, the NZHPT could require the designation of heritage orders and thus rescue sites of historic relevance from immediate demolition and radical reconstruction.

The CCC only had limited financial and jurisdictional authority to encourage private owners to retain historic sites. The management guidelines in the CCC’s Heritage Conservation Policy were only applicable to sites owned or run by the Council. To cope with such restrictions, the CCC established a policy to ‘work with building owners, developers and community to find compatible new uses for under-utilised heritage buildings and heritage buildings at risk of demolition’ (CCC 1999: 11). Focusing on financial instruments, the CCC had established two funding schemes in support of heritage: the Historic Building Emergency Fund ‘for the retention of significant-listed buildings under imminent threat of demolition’ (CCC 2000); and the Heritage Retention Incentive Fund to assist private owners who sought ‘the conservation, protection and maintenance’ (CCC 1999: 12) of their historically valuable properties. These initiatives, however, were far from meeting ‘the need for substantial seismic upgrading’ (Nahkies 2011: 16). The recovery and retention of historic sites instead depended on the proactive involvement and goodwill of private developers and investors.
Wreck the old dungas!

Early inspections in the aftermath of the 4 September 2010 earthquake reported damage to several historic buildings in the CBD. Of the 173 historic sites in central Christchurch, Manchester Courts was the first building listed for demolition (CCC 2010a), followed by four other buildings (Heather 2011b). In contrast, the 22 February 2011 earthquake represented the turning point for the governance of heritage in Christchurch’s CBD. Between March and November 2011, 45 per cent of listed heritage buildings had been demolished within the Central City (CCC 2011b: 69). As of March 2015, 76 heritage buildings of national relevance have been demolished (Table 13.3).

Local and national heritage advocates agree that the public pronouncement by the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery against what he termed as ‘old dungas’ synthesises the disregard of heritage by national government authorities and its potential role as a means for post-disaster recovery and redevelopment (Halliday 2014). There are, nevertheless, three different elements that should be considered in order to critically analyse the socio-spatial conflicts of post-earthquake heritage governance in Christchurch and in the CBD in particular. These include the market drivers, particularly insurance and real estate; heritage and planning policies and legal instruments; and the final decision to demolish or restore.

The recovery of Christchurch is strongly influenced by the role of the insurance sector, and the governance of built heritage in the CBD is no exception. The NZHPT reported inadequate private insurance of heritage buildings and argued that, with hindsight, the insurance coverage provided by the EQC should have also been applied to public heritage buildings (NZHPT 2011b). On the other hand, the Insurance Council of New Zealand argued that the earthquake strengthening of heritage buildings to the level required of new ones would increase the costs of reinsurance and thus compromise ‘the willingness of insurers to invest in the New Zealand’ (The Insurance Council of NZ Incorporated v Christchurch City Council 2012).

The pay-out of premiums for heritage properties were particularly troubling. While ANSVAR, a UK-based company specialising in heritage insurance, cancelled coverage to several key heritage sites in Christchurch and proceeded with

Table 13.3 Listed heritage buildings before and after the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NZHPT Category</th>
<th>As at September 2010</th>
<th>As at March 2015</th>
<th>Demolished and partially demolished</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: HNZ 2015b; NZHPT 2011b, 2013a.
insurers claims case by case (KPMG 2012; Stewart 2012), national insurers
such as Western Pacific Insurance became insolvent in the immediate
aftermath of the February 2011 earthquake (Grant Thornton 2015). The lack
of a solid insurance basis, the rocketing of seismic strengthening costs (City Owners
Rebuild Entity (CORE) 2011), and the evacuation of many historic properties
after the earthquake of February 2011 hampered asset values. This generated a
climate of greater uncertainty among building owners.

Under a market-driven post-earthquake governance regime, ‘the future for
remaining heritage buildings [lay] with the owners and insurers’ (Christchurch
Central Development Unit (CCDU) 2013) as the District Plan legislation was
suspended under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011. Despite efforts
among engineers and architects to obtain solutions for historic buildings, many
owners pursued the demolition of their properties in order to gain compensation
from the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and re-invested
elsewhere.

The emergency management tools deployed in the aftermath of the earthquakes
heightened the vulnerability of heritage buildings. The state of emergency issued
after the earthquake of February 2011 (Carter 2011) culminated with the cor-
doning of the CBD areas for several months. Particularly during the first weeks of
the cordon, owners had to comply with safety measures set by CERA and other
authorities. The cordon of premises within the CBD and the repeated after-
shocks exasperated local developers and business people seeking to assess the dam-
age to their properties (Robinson 2011b). The adoption of emergency measures
to conserve heritage buildings was not among the priorities of either the Civil
Defence or CERA (Waikato Times 2011). Rather, the controversial application of
“red stickers” (a notice to display the safety level of a building) to list historic build-
ings as unsafe caused frictions between CERA and heritage stakeholders. On the
one hand, the NZHPT reported that 27 of the demolished historic buildings could
have been retained (Platt 2012). On the other, San Francisco–based Miyamoto
International provided alternative reports in which it was shown that some heritage
buildings tagged as highly unsafe by CERA were instead safe and could be retained
with limited expenses (Miyamoto International 2014).

The special legislation established in the aftermath of the September 2010
earthquake and further strengthened following the earthquake of February 2011
was also adverse to the retention of heritage buildings. According to the Can-
terbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011, the Chief Executive of CERA had over-
ruling authority on buildings listed as unsafe. In particular, Section 38 of the
Act empowered CERA to commission works where the owner failed to provide
a satisfactory retention plan for his or her property. Particularly with respect to
heritage buildings in the CBD, the Act gave CERA and the Chief Executive the
power to overrule pre-established national legislation supporting the safeguard-
ing of heritage (i.e. the RMA 1991 and the HPA 1993) and the CCC planning
authority as foreseen by the Local Government Act 2002 (Section 71 (2) (3)).
CERA also had no legal obligation to consult heritage stakeholders and could
carry out demolitions without resource consents.
The rebuilding of the CBD progressively overlooked the relevance of heritage as means for economic recovery. While the first central city draft plans acknowledged the economic importance of restoring heritage buildings (CCC 2011a) and identified the funding solutions available for the recovery of key landmarks (CCC 2011b), the CCRP only recommended the retention of the remaining heritage buildings in specific areas of the CBD (CCDU 2012). The CCDU referred to the Built Heritage Recovery Plan under the Greater Christchurch Recovery Strategy (GCRS), but the plan was only released in November 2014 (MCH 2014). This Plan broadly underpins what was originally foreseen in the CCC’s CBD plans but states that ‘heritage recovery is an integral part of the recovery of Greater Christchurch, not a roadblock to [it]’ (MCH 2014: 6), but by this time much of the built heritage of the CBD had been lost. The reality is that apart from some isolated cases (e.g. the Arts Centre, the New Regent Street precinct), heritage was not seen as an economic driver and was instead regarded as an obstacle to the recovery of Christchurch to be demolished where necessary.

The systematic demolition of heritage buildings aroused fierce opposition from heritage stakeholders and owners. Between February and December 2011 a local heritage lobbying group known as IConIC provided the Civil Defence national controller and CERA a list of 40 ‘heritage buildings, the retention of which was deemed essential’ (IConIC 2011). A group of heritage building owners also recommended that both CERA and the CCC provide timely advice to owners on the work needed to retain heritage buildings and suggested a system of fiscal incentives to encourage the recovery of historic properties (CORE 2011). Despite the efforts of these groups to prevent the demolition of heritage buildings, and the availability of funds through the Canterbury Earthquake Heritage Buildings Fund (CEHBF) and the CCC Heritage Grants, the strong pressures of the market and the role played by national authorities led to several owners accepting the compensation from CERA and thus the demolition of their properties, as with the case of the Guthrey House (Heather 2011c).

There are nevertheless exceptions where heritage was successfully retained. The Canterbury Heritage Trust (CHT) successfully managed to rescue the Excelsior Hotel, built in the late 19th century, from the demolition scheduled by CERA and proceeded with its restoration (Heather 2011a). The Old Governor’s Building and the Spanish Mission style shops in New Regent Street from 1932 were similarly spared from demolition (NZHPT 2013b). The following subsection focuses on the main heritage restoration project currently underway in the Christchurch CBD: the Arts Centre of Christchurch (see also Amore, Chapter 6, this volume).

The Arts Centre of Christchurch

The Arts Centre of Christchurch is a complex of 23 Category I and II sites built between the 1880s and the 1920s (HNZ 2015a). Together with the Canterbury Museum, and the Christchurch Art Gallery, it was the core feature of the Cultural
Precinct of Christchurch (CCC 2006) and one of the main tourist attractions of the city. Originally home to the University of Canterbury, the Arts Centre was converted to a facility for cultural exhibitions and businesses following the takeover by the Arts Centre Trust in 1978.

After a first round of earthquake strengthening during the 1980s (Crean 2008), the Trust launched a new programme of further earthquake strengthening commencing in late 2007 (Crean 2007; Le Couteur 2011). To fund these works, the Trust intended to lease part of the land for the building of the National Conservatorium of Music but a planning commission hearing eventually refused the building consent in March 2010 (CCC 2010b). The earthquake of September 2010 caused approximately NZD$25 million worth of damage and required extraordinary measures to retain the Observatory building (Copeland 2010). The complex was eventually re-opened, but the earthquake of 22 February 2011 caused severe damage to the complex and forced the Trust to close the complex and evict all but one of the tenants (Gates 2011). At the time of writing (July 2015), only two of the 22 cordoned units are fully repaired. The damage was estimated to cost NZD$200 million to repair (The Arts Centre of Christchurch Incorporated (ACC) 2012).

The recovery of the Art Centre was possible thanks to four favourable conditions. First, the Arts Centre area was only cordoned until 6 March 2011 (Robinson 2011a). Access was therefore granted before the official establishment of CERA and the promulgation of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 at the end of March 2011. Moreover, the Trust did not apply to CERA for engineering assessments for the complex and instead hired its own team of engineers to assess the damages to the buildings, collect broken masonry, remove unstable sections of the roofs and pile into wooden crates for later reinstatement (Le Couteur 2011).

Insurance also played a decisive role in the decision to recover the Arts Centre. Following the earthquake of September 2010, the then Chief Executive of the Trust, Ken Franklin, started talks with the primary insurer (ANSVAR) to raise the insurance cover from NZD$95 to NZD$116 million (Barton 2012). Despite concerns about ANSVAR’s financial instability, Franklin was able to negotiate close to NZD$40 million pay-out of earthquake insurance proceeds for business interruption and material damage by the end of 2011 (ACC 2012) and, later, secured a further NZD$122 million claim with its primary insurer (ACC 2013b). The settlement with ANSVAR enabled the Arts Centre Trust to quickly begin the first major recovery works on the Clock Tower and College Hall in late 2011 (ACC 2012). Most importantly, it gave the Trust the possibility to cover most of the restoration costs for the whole complex (Dally 2012a) and negotiate a settlement with its secondary insurer (Lumley NZ Limited) (ACC 2013b).

A third decisive factor was the firm intention of the Trust to proceed with the full physical recovery of the Arts Centre and strengthen the buildings in accordance with the earthquake standards established by legislation, the NZSEE and NZHPT (ACC 2013b). The key challenge was ‘to rebuild the damaged structures and bring the buildings up to building code requirements’ (ACC 2012: 5).
One of the tasks of André Lovatt, who was appointed as new Chief Executive in October 2012, is to continue to pursue the full restoration and strengthening of the Arts Centre ‘so it survives the next few hundred years’ (Dally 2012a: 4). The Trust aims to retain the heritage of the Arts Centre, as reiterated in the Arts Centre of Christchurch Trust Bill that was promulgated as private act on June 2015 ‘to provide legal foundations for the Trust board to continue to be able to respond to, and recover from, the impact of the earthquakes’ (New Zealand Parliament 2015). The ultimate vision of the Trust is ‘to recast the future of the Arts Centre [. . .], ensure its relevance for generations to come’ (ACC 2013d), re-establish its centrality as a heritage site (ACC 2012), and as a major cultural resource (ACC 2013b) for the new Christchurch.

Finally, fundraising campaigns for the retention of heritage in Christchurch after the earthquakes were quite favourable for the Arts Centre. Given the importance of this heritage complex, the Trust managed to obtain significant contributions from national and international charities in the immediate aftermath of the February earthquake. Among these, the American Robertson Foundation, the Lion Foundation, Fletcher Building and the Canterbury Earthquake Heritage Building Fund donated NZD$14.8 million for the recovery of the Clock Tower and the Great Hall building (ACC 2014; Christchurch Earthquake Appeal Trust (CEAT) 2011). These sums allowed the Trust to commence the recovery of its main heritage building and therefore run the various rounds of negotiations with its insurance companies with relatively little pressure compared to many other local entities.

At the time of writing, the restoration of the Arts Centre is still underway. The budget for restoration programme is approximately NZD$290 million (Dally 2012b) and it will be ‘developed in accordance with the requirements of the Resource Management Act [. . .] the Historic Places Act [and] the principles of the International Council for Monuments and Sites New Zealand Charter’ (ACC 2013e). Some of the units are fully recovered and reopened to public (ACC 2013c), but it will take at least 15 years for the Arts Centre to fully recover. In the meantime, the Trust has adopted a new Trust Deed which includes the possibility of winding up the current Trust and transferring the property of the site under the Crown (i.e. the NZHPT) if the Trust fails to carry out the objective of ‘conserving and maintaining the heritage integrity of the land and buildings of the Arts Centre’ (Arts Centre of Christchurch Trust Bill 2014: 9). This sort of exit strategy was included in the bill in order to safeguard the Arts Centre in the event of major earthquakes in the near future.

Conclusions

The earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 severely changed the governance of built heritage in Christchurch and its CBD. While the flaws of pre-earthquake governance were integral to creating the crisis of post-disaster built heritage conservation, the period following the earthquake of 22 February 2011 led to an unprecedented top-down demolition process that erased nationally relevant buildings that the
minister responsible for earthquake recovery referred to as ‘old dungs’. Despite
international reports and the expertise of local heritage stakeholders that repeat-
edly stressed ‘the long-term benefits of heritage architecture and the historic
environment’ (Halliday 2014: 210), the approach to recovery run by the authori-
ties (CERA in primis) resembled the speculative post-disaster governance for
heritage buildings that occurred in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina (e.g. Verderber 2009). The main purpose of the leading authorities was
to allocate new spaces in the CBD to locate the anchor projects foreseen in the
CCDU’s CCRP (see Chapter 12, this volume). Such an approach underpinned
the crisis framing stage in which ‘political coalitions [. . .] seize opportunity for
political intervention’ (Gotham and Greenberg 2014: 12). A similar approach
followed the earthquake of April 2009 in L’Aquila (Italy); the national authori-
ties and key developer lobbies launched a €833 million project for brand-new
residential areas rather than retaining homes and commercial premises in the his-
toric area, where repairs were economically feasible (Tiso 2014). In the same way,
the post-9/11 relief funds were mainly awarded to the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey, with the remainder allocated to properties in the eastern
dge of Lower Manhattan rather than on the western premises, where most of
the middle and low-income residents and businesses were located (Gotham and
Greenberg 2014).

Undoubtedly, the climate of persisting uncertainty and the repeated aftershocks
shaking Christchurch became the pretext for [or was it simply the unavoidable
reality which led to] the adoption of zealous safety measures that impeded private
owners to access cordoned buildings, evaluate the damages to their properties
and timely budget repair costs. The issue of safety annihilated the principle of
heritage retention as an obligation towards future generations. The President of
NZSEE, Prof. Stefano Pampanin, acknowledged that engineers took speedy deci-
sions under the persisting concern of safety heralded ‘by a number of stakehold-
ers’ (Pampanin and Hare 2012) and did not provide adequate advice on feasible
techniques of heritage retention. The result is what local architectural historian
Jessica Halliday (2014) described as ‘urbicide’. In sum, political factors poten-
tially caused more destruction to heritage than the series of earthquakes between
2010 and 2011 combined.

What emerges from the experience in Christchurch is a predominantly market-
led approach to heritage appraisal and management. The earthquakes made the
financial sustainability of heritage places highly vulnerable and left owners with
only one option: the acceptance of the compensation from CERA. The example
of the Arts Centre should not mislead. In this case the recovery program of the
complex is mainly funded by insurance pay-outs and the donation of trusts and
foundations from New Zealand and overseas. New Zealand’s central government
and its agencies do not provide recovery funding of any kind, even for what is
considered ‘one of the most unique heritage sites in the Southern Hemisphere’
(ACC 2013a). As Auckland-based barrister Nicola Jane Brazendale (2013: 245)
states, the conservation of heritage in New Zealand remains ‘a matter of market
economics’.
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12 ‘Regeneration is the focus now’

Anchor projects and delivering a new CBD for Christchurch

Alberto Amore and C. Michael Hall

Introduction

The series of strong earthquakes from September 2010 to June 2011 severely damaged the built environment of the Christchurch CBD and the economic core of the city. The rebuild of the central area soon became a major task for the national government authorities, which developed a dedicated strategy for the CBD in conjunction with the Christchurch City Council (CCC) and the main local institutions. This chapter examines urban regeneration practices in a post-disaster context. In particular, it acknowledges that there are common traits between mainstream practices of regeneration and urban redevelopment strategies following disasters. Nevertheless, it suggests that the latter case also resembles features of disaster capitalism, as highlighted in the relevant literature on post-disaster recovery in US cities (e.g. Gotham and Greenberg 2014).

The following section discusses the relevant literature for the purposes of the study. The next section introduces the pre-earthquake situation and the main stages of regeneration that have occurred within the CBD. Broader issues of urban regeneration in suburban areas, including strategies, infrastructure rebuild and housing availability are not discussed, although some relationships are noted, including by policy makers. The chapter then presents an analysis of the rebuilding of the CBD with a focus on the delivery of the anchor projects outlined in the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan (Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) 2012) (hereafter the Plan). The final section summarises the findings of the study and discusses the emerging consequences of the strategy adopted in the light of current events.

Literature review

The literature on urban regeneration and spatial planning provides numerous case studies and findings from hundreds of cities (see Kalandides et al. 2011 for a review). What emerges is that CBDs and the adjacent inner city areas are the foci of different urban redevelopment strategies. These include, but are not limited to, cultural venues, sports facilities, and convention and exhibition centres – all of which are elements of the tourism industry. In particular, the relevance of tourism as urban
regeneration strategy is a facet of ‘the spatial division of consumption’ (Harvey 1989: 9) and the ultimate frontier of capital internationalisation (Britton 1991).

To date, however, the phenomenon of tourism-oriented, urban regeneration strategies in contexts of coping with major crises and disasters is generally overlooked. Major works on disasters, urban resilience and vulnerability (e.g. Pelling 2003; Vale and Campanella 2005) ignore the phenomenon of urban regeneration. Similarly, studies dealing with tourism, as well as crisis and disaster recovery (e.g. Gurtner 2007), seem to overlook the phenomenon of post-disaster recovery of urban tourist spaces. Only a handful of contributions, mostly limited to the U.S. context, address the phenomenon of CBD regeneration, tourism and post-disaster redevelopment (Gotham 2007; Gotham and Greenberg 2008, 2014; Wagner Frisch and Fields 2008; Saxena 2014).

The process of urban regeneration in a context of post-disaster recovery shares a number of essential traits with mainstream urban regeneration as well as showing some significant differences (Figure 12.1). Both forms of regeneration take place in a predominantly de-politicised climate (Swyngedouw 2010; Allmendinger and Haughton 2012) where public-private partnerships pursue the logics of market and competitiveness (Keil 2009). They are also conceived as an opportunity to radically change the urban landscape and tackle perceived economic decline. Both forms of regeneration are often justified through the rhetoric of benchmarking of overseas

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**Figure 12.1** Relationships between urban regeneration as usual and post-disaster regeneration
“best practices” (Theodore and Peck 2012) framed by the importance of places being “competitive” in the global economy in order to attract international capital and tourists (Hall 2007; Bristow 2010). Therefore, yet most importantly, both forms of regeneration focus on leisure and tourism-oriented “anchor” or “flagship” projects, such as convention centres, art galleries, museums, stadia, and design or cultural precincts/quarters, all often tied in with the hosting of events, as the best urban redevelopment strategy. Unsurprisingly, there are significant physical and political analogies between the clearances of brownfields in industrial urban areas and the systematic demolition or buildings following urban natural disasters. The latter, in particular, follow the logics of tabula rasa (Gotham and Greenberg 2014) for the allocation of land for leisure and tourism spaces (Spirou 2010).

Post-disaster urban regeneration, however, takes place in a more unstable context than mainstream regeneration. Importantly, the phenomenon of regeneration as a process of urban restructuring is an expression of the second circuit of capital (Harvey 1978), also referred to as “fictitious capital” (Becker et al. 2010), which is constituted by real estate, its financial conduits, state regulation of space, and by those distinct social groups that invest in real estate so as to maximise capitalised land rent (Gottdiener 1990). Similarly, the post-disaster regeneration underpinning the phenomenology of disaster capitalism (Klein 2007), as demonstrated in post-9/11 New York (Gotham and Greenberg 2008, 2014), post-Katrina New Orleans (Hartman and Squires 2006; Johnson 2011; Gotham and Greenberg 2014), and post–Van earthquake in Turkey (Saraçöglu and Demirtas-Milz 2014) also serves to maintain core land rent values, although in the poorer and often most affected suburbs, such state initiatives are usually absent. Mainstream forms of urban regeneration tend to be situated within general market discourse while regeneration in cities following disasters is used by the state to justify market-directed strategies as a solution to quickly fix the dysfunctional climate of “uncertainty” (Porter 2009). Nevertheless, even here substantial similarities occur, with event-led regeneration in particular being used to create a climate of crisis in which normal planning and decision-making are often suspended in order to achieve event deadlines (Hall 2006), while even non–event-led regeneration is often justified within discourses of economic, employment and even aesthetic crisis (Smyth 2005).

Undoubtedly, the role of insurance companies in influencing mainstream regeneration and associated decision-making is less decisive than in a context of post-disaster regeneration, as shown in studies undertaken in New Orleans (Gotham 2012; Adams 2013). In the case of post-disaster regeneration, insurance policies will affect not only how much money is available for rebuild but also, in many cases, the nature of what acts as a replacement for what has been lost or damaged. Finally, mainstream urban regeneration practices tend to take place in land portions that have a unique ownership or have decreased their value over time (Smith 1979). Conversely, the regeneration of urban areas in the aftermath of disasters often occurs in a climate of land contestation, with disputes on clearance and selling of land parcels, although some similarities do exist – for example, with respect to state intervention being used to amalgamate land holdings for specific projects, often in the face of opposition from community groups (Smyth 2005).
Context

The CBD of Christchurch corresponds to the historic core of the city originally designed by Edward Jollie in 1850 (Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) 2012). It comprises the areas of Hagley Park, Cathedral Square and the Avon Loop, with a total surface area of 6.33 km2 (New Zealand Statistics (NZSTATS) 2015a). Before the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, 8,280 residents lived in the CBD (NZSTATS 2015a), along with 5,989 businesses and 51,280 employees who worked in the CBD (NZSTATS 2015b). Following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the population of the CBD decreased by nearly 40 per cent, the number of businesses dropped by 39 per cent, and the number of workers shrunk by 39.4 per cent (NZSTATS 2015b).

Following an urban strategy oriented toward flagship projects throughout the 1990s, the CBD of Christchurch became the heart of a more organic regeneration strategy in the 2000s (CCC 2001, 2004, 2006). The decentralisation of responsibilities to local level as a result of the Local Government Act 2002 gave the CCC authority in planning and urban regeneration strategy. During this period, the conversion of warehouses in the south-east frame of the CBD culminated with the creation of the South of Litchfield precinct, a pedestrian area home to leisure and the creative industries (Hall 2008a; New Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT) 2011). On the eve of the first major earthquake, the Christchurch Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) set out a project to ‘develop [a] business attraction and retention programme for the city focusing on development opportunities within key industry sectors’ (Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) 2010: 28).

The urban development of Christchurch’s CBD, however, took place upon highly unstable geology. The soil beneath the CBD is prone to liquefaction and lateral spreading (Brown and Weeber 1992; Cubrinovski and McCAhorn 2012). Moreover, much of the original settlement was built upon reclaimed swamps near the Avon River (Brown and Weeber 1992) and the areas of Cathedral Square and the Avon Loop (Hercus 1942). Last, but most importantly, the Christchurch urban region is relatively close to the Alpine Fault and it is subject to major seismic activity (> 7.0 M as measured on the Richter scale) every 200–280 years (Wells et al. 1999). Given that the last earthquake along the Alpine Fault occurred in 1717 (Orchiston 2012), the chances of new major earthquakes hitting the region are relatively high. In fact, the earthquakes registered between 2010 and 2011 are the result of a secondary fault south of Christchurch that had not been recorded before (Quigley 2010).

The first major earthquake in September 2010 (M 7.1) and the following aftershocks between November and December of that year only severely damaged a small amount of CBD’s the built environment, with the closure of premises generally only occurring for a limited time. In stark contrast, the earthquake of 22 February 2011 (M 6.3) severely hit the CBD with severe damage to key buildings (Table 12.1). The soil structure of Christchurch CBD heightened the powerful ground acceleration registered at the epicentre of the 22 February earthquake. Seismograms located in the city reported peak accelerations in a range of 1.2 – 1.6 G (Holmes Consulting Group (HCG) 2011), along with substantial liquefaction in proximity to the Avon River and several cases of lateral spreading...
Regeneration is the focus now’

The end result of the earthquake event was the loss of approximately 60–70 per cent of buildings in the CBD together with severe damage to infrastructure and utilities (Rebuild Christchurch 2012) and the loss of 185 lives.

Delivering a new CBD for Christchurch

The delivery of the CBD recovery plan was far from straightforward. The decision-making process took almost two and a half years to identify which facilities had to be developed in the CBD, where they would be built, the likely partners to involve and the estimated public expenditures (Table 12.2). As a result, the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Damages following February 2011 earthquake</th>
<th>Status (as at March 2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMI Stadium</td>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Partially demolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Project for eventual new stadium under way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts Centre</td>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>3 buildings open to public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19 buildings to open by 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury Museum</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Reopened to public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christ Church Cathedral</td>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Partial demolition and rebuilding under scrutiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch Art Gallery</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Closed until the end of 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch Casino</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Reopened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christchurch Central Police Station</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>To be demolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cranmer Court</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Demolished in 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forsyth Barr</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Retention underway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagley Cricket Oval</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Reopened to public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention Centre</td>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Demolished in 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Building for a new convention centre officially started in August 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Regent Street shops</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Reopened to public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South of Lichfield district</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Several buildings demolished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Part of High St. currently closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaac Theatre Royal</td>
<td>Relevant</td>
<td>Reopened to public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Hall</td>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Retention underway</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Cubrinovski and McCahon 2012).
Table 12.2 Chronology of events from the earthquake of 2010 until the release of the cost-sharing agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 September 2010</td>
<td>A 7.1 earthquake hits the Canterbury region. Relevant damages in the CBD and lifting of a temporary cordon in some central city premises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 September 2010</td>
<td>Appointment of Hon. Gerry Brownlee as interim Minister of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 September 2010</td>
<td>Enactment of the <em>Canterbury Earthquake Response and Recovery Act</em> (CERR Act 2010), which established the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission (CERC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September to December</td>
<td>Enactment of orders in council to partially suspend the application of acts as foreseen in Section 6 Par. 4 of the CERR Act 2010. Acts include but are not limited to: the Building Act 2004; the Earthquake Commission Act 1993; Historic Places Act 1993; the Local Government Act 2002; the Resource Management Act 1991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2010</td>
<td>Mayoral elections in Christchurch. Incumbent Mayor Bob Parker is re-elected for a second term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 February 2011</td>
<td>A 6.3 earthquake severely hits Christchurch and its CBD. State of national emergency is declared. Establishment of the red cordon for the CBD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March 2011</td>
<td>Establishment of CERA as Crown as state authority with Order in Council 65/2011. The suspension of legislation is extended over a period of five years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 April 2011</td>
<td>Enactment of the <em>Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act</em>. The Act outlines the roles and powers of the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, the CEO of CERA, the CCC and the relevant ministers. The Act also establishes the Community Forum and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Review Panel as audit bodies. Section 17 of the Act gives the CCC the exclusive power to develop a recovery plan for the CBD within nine months and it recommends a consultation process with the affected communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May to June 2011</td>
<td>The CCC holds the <em>Share an Idea</em> initiative to collect suggestions for the future of the CBD among the civic society. More than 100,000 suggestions are submitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>The CCC appoints teams of volunteering experts to deliver the first draft of the CBD plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2011</td>
<td>The CCC submits the first CBD draft to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery and the CEO of CERA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 September 2011</td>
<td>The Government and the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery recommend changes to the first draft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 September 2011</td>
<td>Government officials and the CCC meet to discuss opportunities for the CBD redevelopment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
first expressions of interest to attract private investors were only listed in October 2013, when the Minister for Earthquake Recovery, the Hon. Gerry Brownlee, announced the call for international developers for the Convention Centre project (Brownlee 2013c).

The decision-making for the redevelopment of the CBD took place in a context in which “normal” political relationships and procedures were changed and institutional arrangements altered. As Hayward (2013: 37) notes, the National Party-led national government ‘used the earthquakes as justification to suspend regional government elections’ and established the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) as the main body for the management of the early emergency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October to November 2011</td>
<td>The CCC meets main local stakeholders to elaborate a second draft to submit to the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2011</td>
<td>Submission of the CBD recovery plan for Ministerial approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 April 2012</td>
<td>Minister Gerry Brownlee announces the establishment of the CCDU as dedicated planning unit for the CBD. CCC is disempowered from its planning authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April to July 2012</td>
<td>The CCDU establishes a consortium of architects and planners to come with a definitive blueprint of the CBD. Boffa Miskell is the leading firm of the consortium, which includes architects from Woods Bagot, Populous, Sheppard and Rout, RCP, and Warren and Mahoney.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July 2012</td>
<td>The CBD Blueprint Plan is officially released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 August 2012</td>
<td>Release of the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan and announcement of the lands designated for the 16 anchor projects. Identification of the likely partnerships for each of the projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2012 to August 2013</td>
<td>Purchase of land parcels for the anchor projects. Controversies arise among landowners and government authorities. After one year, 60 per cent of the land for the anchor projects is secured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2012 to May 2013</td>
<td>The CCC, CERA, the Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery and the New Zealand Government start discussing the budget for the projects and the share of the public expenditures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>Complete removal of the red cordon from the CBD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June 2013</td>
<td>Cost-sharing agreement is officially announced. The Government will be key public investor for the Frame, the Avon River Precinct and the Convention Centre Precinct. The CCC will lead the project for the Stadium and the Metro Sports Facility. The total of the public investment (including horizontal infrastructures) is NZD$4.8 billion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
phase and the assessment of buildings for demolition. The Share an Idea initiative, run by the CCC to involve the community in the delivery of the draft plans, became a relatively tokenistic form of involvement (Dobbs and Moore 2002) as the Plan, in the end, was delivered by a team of architects and planners led by Boffa Miskell (2013). The same Plan identified the likely partnerships among public and private stakeholders (i.e. the PPPs) for the delivery of the projects. PPPs are very common in mainstream urban regeneration and the redevelopment strategy for the Christchurch CBD identified several opportunities for cost-sharing agreements between national and public authorities and the private sector in June 2013 (CCDU 2013a; CERA 2013a; New Zealand Parliament 2013).

In the post-disaster context, authorities sought to reshape the CBD ‘based on international best practice urban design’ (Brownlee 2013a: 5). The resulting injection of government funds for the recovery of the CBD (NZD$4.8 billion) (CDC 2013), however, was marked by ‘socio-spatial conflicts and political struggles’ (Gotham and Greenberg 2014: 95) between public authorities and the local stakeholders. The latter emerged after the announcement of the stadium project in the south-east of the CBD (CCDU 2012; 2013a), which many local residents saw as an unnecessary and expensive project (Gates 2013b). Similar concerns were raised among local arts stakeholders following the CCC decision to fully restore the Town Hall and thus divert most of the budget for performing arts venues to retain a single facility (CCC 2012).

Ideally, the rebuilding of a CBD resembles the conceptualisation of planning as momentum (Nyseth 2012), during which ‘systems are open to new insights, ideas and behaviour’ (Laws and Rein 2003: 175). Nevertheless, the redevelopment of a CBD is perhaps better characterised by a persisting climate of uncertainty and power struggles within coalitions, especially with respect to where the regeneration cost should lie and the type of projects that should be incorporated. The stadium and the performing arts projects are emblematic of the controversies between national and local authorities. While national authorities pushed for the building of a brand new covered stadium (Stylianou 2012), the CCC argued that the cost-sharing agreement for the stadium forced the council to financially expose its assets to meet the costs not covered by insurance (Cairns 2014). Similarly, the CCC decision to retain the Town Hall was opposed by the Earthquake Recovery Minister, Hon. Brownlee (2013b), who argued that the existing complex was outdated and needed to be replaced with a new international venue for the performing arts. As such the Christchurch CBD rebuild also brought into focus differently political philosophies and policies with respect to state ownership of assets, with the national government encouraging the sale of assets to the private sector and the CCC seeking to retain assets in public ownership where possible. (This situation may of course change in future national and local government elections).

Reliance on the effectiveness of anchor projects as a redevelopment strategy is often paired with the benchmarking of “best practices” overseas (McCann and Ward 2010). For example, the Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery cited the redevelopment of Lower Manhattan in the aftermath of 9/11 as one of
the most prominent examples of redevelopment following a disaster (Brownlee 2012). The CCC held meetings in August 2011 to identify benchmark examples from post-IRA bombings in downtown Manchester (UK) and post-earthquake San Francisco (US) (CCC 2011). Christchurch also joined the network of Resilient Cities pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation to ‘become more resilient to the physical, social and economic challenges that are a growing part of the 21st century’ (Rockefeller Foundation 2014).

*The rhetoric of anchor projects as best practice in the recovery of the CBD*

National and local authorities had diverging ideas with respect to the rebuilding of the CBD. While CERA and the Government identified anchor projects as the preferred urban redevelopment strategy to ‘ensure Christchurch’s rebuilt and repaired homes retain their value in the future’ (Sutton 2014: 54), the CCC envisioned the CBD draft Plan as the opportunity ‘to create a distinctive identity for the Central City’ (CCC 2011: 62) through the creation of low-rise urban precincts ‘to organise and diversify the future development’ (CCC 2011: 81). The CCC draft plans were the outcome of local community engagement in the Share an Idea initiative and the proactive participation of local and international experts in cultural and creative-led regeneration. On the other hand, the vision of the national authorities was that anchor projects were the best solution ‘to streamline the consent process [and] attract private investment into the city’ (Steeman and Sachdeva 2012).

With the establishment of the CCDU in April 2012 the national government gave CERA and the Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery the necessary planning authority to overrule the CCC and deliver a market-oriented urban redevelopment strategy. The Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery asserted that the Plan would ‘be vital to achieve a coherent roll-out of a number of anchor projects such as public buildings and strategic city blocks, and [would] provide important guidance to the market’ (Brownlee 2012).

Anchor projects were also identified as crucial in the ‘reviving of the city’s hospitality and tourism sector’ (Brownlee 2012). Such a belief was shared among all the key tourism stakeholders (e.g. Tourism Industry Association of New Zealand (TIANZ) 2014). In particular, the building of a new convention centre was seen as ‘the key anchor project’ (CCDU 2014b) for the new CBD, while the delivery of the Performing Arts Precint would ‘[catalyse] development and recovery of the central city’ (CCDU 2014c) and ‘support tourism and hospitality’ (CCDU 2012: 77). Finally, the delivery of the new stadium was seen as ‘a world-class option for attracting and hosting events [of] international level’ (CCDU 2012: 85).

Demolition and the compulsory purchase of land became the instruments for quickly securing the areas in which anchor projects would be built. By July 2012, CERA and private owners had demolished nearly 70 per cent of the buildings located in the CBD (Rebuild Christchurch 2012). Such systematic demolition was favoured thanks to special legal arrangements included in the *Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011*, the Plan overruling existing planning legislation.
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(CCDU 2013b), and the forced eviction of businesses and landowners from the cordoned zones of the CBD (see also Chapter 13, this volume). In the example of South of Lichfield, the state of emergency issued after the earthquakes accelerated the demolition of several buildings that CERA listed as unsafe under Section 38 of the Act. As result, local property developer Lisle Hood lost 11 of the 16 buildings he owned in the area (Schwartz 2013), while other parts of the site were demolished between June 2011 and May 2012 (Platt 2012). In contrast, the purchase of land for anchor projects following the release of the Plan foresaw for owners the possibility of negotiating a sale to the authorities. This was the case of Angus McFarlane, who sold half a hectare of land to CERA for the proposed Performing Arts Precinct for NZD$12.5 million (Gates 2013a). CERA, however, could proceed with the compulsory purchase of land for the anchor projects and issue notices of intention to take land valid for a period of at least three years (CCDU 2013c). In this case negotiation was still possible, but CERA could still proceed with the acquisition without the contentious purchase being resolved (CCDU 2013c). Eventually, many landowners accepted the offer price set by CERA and its real estate auditors (Greenhill 2013) and invested the revenues elsewhere.

**CBD regeneration on unstable grounds: emerging traits of disaster capitalism**

The redevelopment of the Christchurch CBD exemplifies the disaster capitalism doctrine emerging from empirical evidence in cities affected by natural hazards such as New Orleans (Johnson 2011), L’Aquila (Tiso 2014) and Sendai (Treat 2012). In Christchurch, the earthquake recovery is seen by the national government as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to radically change the highly parcelled ownership of land in the CBD and sell allotments to attract major international developers. Despite the willingness of local landowners and developers to reinvest the insurance pay-outs in the CBD, the cordoning of the CBD, the instrumental abuse of demolition assents by CERA and the criteria for the development of private projects in the CBD has “locked in” the trajectory of the CBD rebuilding process (Schwartz 2013). As a result, the majority of local developers invested in the areas surrounding the CBD (i.e. Papanui, Riccarton and Addington), while those who persisted in the re-investment of revenues in the central city faced market and financial constraints. For example, local developer Antony Gough suspended the development of a commercial precinct in the CBD in 2014 due to the reluctance of commercial businesses to return to the CBD (McCrone 2014). This inevitably raises questions as to whose market response the national authorities thought about when they initially released the guidelines for the redevelopment of the CBD.

Insurance is an issue that differentiates post-disaster regeneration from “normal” regeneration processes. Insurance companies are serving to proactively shape the new built environment of the CBD by taking advantage of the market-driven rebuilding climate established by the national government (Hayward 2013). Following the earthquakes, the insurance premiums for some of the buildings nearly tripled (Business Day 2011) along with those of many suburban
residences. As the rating agency Standard and Poor’s reported (2011), the need for quick re-capitalisation in the light of the relevant loss of liquidity following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 resulted in increasing the re-insurance cover costs to owners. The pay-out of premiums with respect to properties was also protracted in many cases. While foreign insurance companies such as ANSVAR decided to withdraw from the New Zealand market following the pay-out of claims (Stewart 2012), local-based insurers like Western Pacific Limited cancelled insurance contracts (Grant Thornton 2015). The insolvency of Western Pacific Limited particularly affected the developers and owners of South of Lichfield, whose claims remain far from being fully settled (Steeman 2014). Even in the case of major public-owned facilities, the pay-outs are far from straightforward.

The most prominent example is the debate on the insurance pay-out of the AMI Stadium. The AMI Stadium insurer (Civic Assurance) argues that the facility can be fixed and thus denies the pay-out of NZD$143 million to the CCC (Cairns 2014). The council, on the other hand, is not willing to fully expose its assets to cover the share of the costs for the new stadium (NZD$253 million) without the share from the insurance pay-out and intends to re-negotiate or revoke the cost-sharing agreement originally signed with the Crown (central government) in June 2013 (Cairns 2014). As result, the eventual building and delivery of the new stadium in the south-east frame of the CBD is now postponed to at least 2019 (3 News 2014; CCDU 2014a).

The rebuilding of the CBD is characterised by market-directing strategies (Porter 2009) aimed at attracting international investors. The government is acting as the enabler to encourage corporate developers to invest in the anchor projects in Christchurch with conspicuous investments in land purchase and direct infrastructural investment. The decision to appoint international developers (Plenary Group and Accor Hotels) for the delivery of the Convention Centre Precinct (CCDU 2014b) is the most prominent example of the approach sought by authorities for what is seen as the key anchor project for the city (Conway 2014). Policy makers promoted the virtues of “the market” in the achievement of development and competitiveness for the CBD of Christchurch in the long term and the rhetoric of “must do” enables redevelopment strategies that would have not been adopted before the earthquakes (Sutton 2014). The rebuilding is seen as an opportunity to reframe and boost the redevelopment of ‘Christchurch into the best little city in the world’ (Brownlee 2013d). The role of the market framed the decision-making process that culminated with the release of the Plan. However, since July 2012, authorities have had to downsize the Convention Centre Precinct project (Conway 2014) as well as the plans for the Stadium, the Performing Arts Precinct and the Frame (Stylianou 2015). The search for international investors led to the redevelopment plans of the CBD being regarded as uneconomic by many local developers (Stylianou 2013) and being ostracised by many in the local community (e.g. Sage 2014).

A final feature of the “shock doctrine” in the redevelopment of Christchurch CBD is the land purchase led by the CERA for the anchor projects. The process consisted of three mechanisms for land acquisition. CERA and the Minister
for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery ‘[could] acquire land compulsorily in the name of the Crown’ (CERA 2013b: 3) upon compensation in accordance with the legislation established by the Public Works Act 1981 for ‘current market value of the land’ (CERA 2013b: 4). The second option foresees CERA and the owner negotiating the purchase of parcels in accordance with the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011. Finally, the area designated for the anchor projects could be negotiated with CERA ‘using its own valuations as a base for negotiations’ (CCDU 2013c). On the eve of the cost sharing agreement official announcement, CERA had purchased land for anchor projects for a total of NZD$231.6 million (Greenhill 2013). This one-sided scheme of land purchase for anchor projects, however, was often seen by landowners as a process of confiscation and “thievery” (Gates 2013a).

Conclusions

This chapter illustrated the process of urban regeneration in the CBD of Christchurch following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. What emerges is a sluggish recovery governance climate where the rhetoric of urban competitiveness and market-driven redevelopment fuelled the redevelopment agenda established by the Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, CERA and the CCDU. The decisions taken by these bodies inevitably led to protracted disputes on land use, land value and project feasibility among key stakeholders. Moreover, the national authorities’ desire to attract foreign investors in the rebuilding of the CBD hampered a more organic re-investment of insurance pay-outs by local developers. Finally, the prolonged cordoning of the CBD for nearly two years decreased the appeal of commercial investment in the area and eventually encouraged the relocation of offices and retail in the outskirts of the CBD.

The decision to revise the proposals of the CCC and of the wider Christchurch civic society was essentially motivated by concerns ‘on the attractiveness and [. . . ] the need to future-proof the investment in the city’ (CERA 2011: 7). In the words of former CERA CEO, Roger Sutton, the new CBD had to attract ‘jobs, businesses, attractive tertiary programmes and facilities’ (Sutton 2014: 54) with the anchor projects being regarded by the national government as essential for this. Notwithstanding the highly market-driven approach to regeneration and the use of allegedly consolidated forms of partnerships between public and private stakeholders, the delivery of the anchor projects as originally set in the Plan has almost entirely failed with respect to the purpose of attracting international investors.

The utilisation of anchor projects has already proved its limited applicability and value in mainstream urban regeneration (Hall 1997; Cameron and Gonzalez 2007; Jones and Evans 2008; McCann and Ward 2010). However, it seems to have been appealing to national government policy makers and agencies in the development of post-disaster urban redevelopment strategies in Christchurch. Nevertheless, the adoption of “property-oriented growth strategies” (Hall 2008b: 200) does not necessarily imply increased competitiveness in real terms. Rather, the adoption of a “low road” urban regeneration strategy (Malecki 2004) only succeeds in replicating what has already been attempted elsewhere. The public
vision of a more sustainable city that was promoted in the first wave of city council led planning post the first earthquake, and which built on previous approaches to the regeneration of the central city, was lost in the national government’s rebuild strategy. Instead, the focus turned to flagship type developments that were meant to attract international capital, and although public participation has been allowed on specific elements of the rebuild, such as the central city public library and Cathedral Square (albeit with as yet no decision on the future of the Cathedral itself) the community’s broader vision of sustainability has been lost. In introducing a new Greater Christchurch Regeneration Bill to replace the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 in 2016, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Minister Gerry Brownlee stated, ‘It is evident that the community wants a significant step-change in our approach to this rebuild . . . We will work closely with councils and other local stakeholders to progressively pass governance and management of the rebuild to the Canterbury community’ (Brownlee 2015). However, by this time the trajectory of the CBD regeneration has already been set. According to the Minister

We are currently setting up an establishment board which will have a specific focus on ensuring there is greater commercial discipline in [the] delivery [of the Crown’s major projects and precincts in the central city] . . . Regeneration is the focus now. It is time to look ahead to the long-term success of the rebuild in order to continue growing confidence in greater Christchurch. (Brownlee 2015)

However, the success of regeneration is not just measured by the erection of buildings and market confidence. Successful long-term regeneration requires an inclusive approach that also integrates social, environmental and local economic considerations and considers the linkages between the city and the suburbs. This is especially the case in post-disaster cities. By enforcing a neoliberal programme of regeneration projects in the Christchurch CBD, the national government will likely not only manage to make much of the new Christchurch look like elsewhere, but also repeat the same failures.

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Regeneration is the focus now


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Regeneration is the focus now


From governance to meta-governance in tourism? Re-incorporating politics, interests and values in the analysis of tourism governance

Alberto Amore & C. Michael Hall

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From governance to meta-governance in tourism? Re-incorporating politics, interests and values in the analysis of tourism governance

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ABSTRACT

Despite its theorization in the political and policy sciences in the early 1990s, the concept of metagovernance has gained relatively little recognition in tourism studies. Nevertheless, its significance in the political sciences and policy literature, especially as a result of the perceived failure of governance systems following the recent global financial crisis, has only served to reinforce its relevance. Metagovernance addresses some of the perceived failures of traditional governance approaches and associated interventions, and has enabled the understanding of central-state led regimes of shadowed hierarchical authorities and local-level micro-practices of social innovation and self-government. In contrast, tourism studies have tended to restrict study of the political dimension of tourism governance and the role of the state under the traditional parallelism between government and governance. Examination of how governance is itself governed enables a better understanding of the practices of planning and policy making affecting tourism and destinations. In particular, the applications of concepts of governance are inextricably linked to a given set of value assumptions which predetermine the range of its application. A short example of the application of the metagovernance paradigm is provided from the New Zealand context. It is concluded that governance mechanisms are not value-neutral and instead serve to highlight the allocation of power in a destination and the dominance of particular values and interests.

Introduction

Since the work of Greenwood (1993), the concept of governance has steadily gained interest from students of tourism studies. Tourism researchers have come to utilize approaches and models from established literatures on governance in business studies, political sciences, public policy and the wider social sciences (e.g. Beritelli, Bieger, & Laesser, 2007; Bramwell, 2011; Pechlaner, Beritelli, Pichler, Peters, & Scott, 2015; Pechlaner & Volgger, 2013; Ruhanen, Scott, Ritchie, & Tkaczynski, 2010). Nevertheless, tourism studies have ‘generally remained stuck in examining the traditional models of governing and governance’ (Jenkins, Hall, & Mkono, 2014, p. 542). One dimension of this is that much governance related tourism scholarship has missed the substantial interest in ‘metagovernance’ in political administration, public policy and planning theory (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009; Jessop, 2011; Meuleman, 2008).

The purpose of this paper is to explain and review the significance of metagovernance for tourism research and examine some of its potential implications. Metagovernance is simultaneously both a critical approach to the study of governance and a way of thinking about how governance is structured and applied. As a result, metagovernance reflects the idea that interventions and policies are reflections of theories (Pierre & Peters, 2000; Stoker, 1998). In the case of governance such often implicit theories usually cover both theories of the role of the state and the proper actions of government and theories of social interaction and change in social systems. Every mode of policy intervention has implicit assumptions about the role of the state and how societies and the organizations and individuals within them work (Hall, 2013). The importance of this for understanding tourism governance and policy making cannot be overstated. As Hall (2011a, p. 438) argued:

the ways in which policies are designed to act have implicit theoretical foundations and hence assumptions about, for instance, the appropriate role of the state; the relationship between the state and individual policy actors (businesses, associations, individuals); their responsibilities; and how they are supposed to act politically.

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Conceptualized as ‘the governance of governance’ (Jessop, 2011, p. 106), metagovernance developed as a critique of perceived analytical and empirical weaknesses in the governance literature (Whitehead, 2003). Metagovernance attracted considerable interest as a result of the financial and economic crisis affecting most of the OECD countries and the associated perceived failure of existing governance regimes and the neoliberal project (e.g. Harvey, 2005a, 2005b; Jessop, 2002, 2003, 2004; Klein, 2007; Kooiman, 2003). Therefore, metagovernance is a concept that explicitly questions the values, norms, principles and paradigms/ideologies that underpin governance systems and governing approaches (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009). This includes the assumptions that shape the application and promotion of different forms of intervention (Hall, 2013), and how political authorities promote and guide the ‘self-organisation of governance systems through the “rules of the game”, organizational knowledge, institutional tactics and other political strategies’ (Jessop, 1997, p. 575). Following Whitehead (2003, p. 7) among others (e.g. Allen & Cochrane, 2007; Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2005), a metagovernance frame:

1. Enables the political and economic changes associated with governance to be positioned within the context of changes of state power, strategy and intervention; and
2. Tends to break down the arbitrary divide that is sometimes constructed between government and governance.

This paper highlights the importance of metagovernance issues with respect to multi-stakeholder decision making and planning practices at destination and national scales. An example is provided from a post-disaster destination context that reflects how metagovernance questions the notion of resilience ‘as the basis for a new sustainability approach’ (Lew, 2014, p. 17) in tourism planning and policy, by highlighting assumptions regarding the role of the state and individual and collective actions, responsibilities and rights, and the consequent implications. Therefore, this paper also provides new insights from the so-called ‘political science tradition’ (Pechlaner & Volgger, 2013, p. 7) of tourism governance literature, as exemplified by the work of authors such as Hall and Jenkins (1995), Hall (2007), Dredge and Pforr (2008), Bramwell (2011) and Dredge and Jenkins (2011), among others. It does this by illustrating the theoretical and conceptual advancements in governance studies and the recent turn towards the metagovernance paradigm before focusing specifically on the tourism governance literature. The paper potentially provides insights into the often fragmented insights on the processes of tourism destination governance while overlooking ‘episodes’ (Healey, 2004, 2005) and micro-practices that would allow a deeper understanding of the ‘patterns of relations within the processes of development’ (Clarke & Raffay, 2011, p. 318). In addition, it acknowledges the existence of significant theoretical fragmentation in studies of governance in tourism due to the persisting divergence between the business and political sciences literatures (Pechlaner & Volgger, 2013; Ruhanen et al., 2010). It is therefore suggested that greater recognition of the metagovernance paradigm would potentially enable students of tourism to better understand and make overt the often implicit assumptions regarding the roles of the state, business, civic society and individuals in tourism governance and associated tourism policy and planning interventions.

**Governance and metagovernance**

Governance is an extremely popular yet disputed concept among academic and international institutions and non-government organizations (Hewitt de Alcántara, 1998). ‘Governance is defined in dozens of different and in some respects contrasting ways’ (Meuleman, 2008, p. 11) in fields such as political sciences, public administration, geography and sociology (Bevir, 2011). At the most general level, governance is a ‘complex pattern of consumer-oriented public policies’ (Salet, Thorney, & Kreukels, 2003, p. 3) that emerge from ‘governing activities of social, political and administrative actors’ (Kooiman, 1993, p. 2) in the context of ‘state disarticulation’ (Frederickson & Smith, 2003), [also referred to as ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 384) or the ‘hollowing out’ of the state (Jessop, 1994; Milward, 1996). Governance was initially conceived as a new form of public management structured along market and quasi-market organizational models (Rhodes, 1996, 1997). This meant that governance was understood as a process whereby formal governing structures were no longer focused primarily on the traditional roles of public sector government, but instead increasingly incorporated a range of interests drawn from the private sector and civil society (Whitehead, 2003) through public-private partnerships and the privatization of public sector activities. From this grounding, both state and policy actors, as well as researchers, started to address the partnerships between the public sector, business interests and societal actors through the network paradigm (Castells, 2010). Interest in direct democratic practices at the local and neighbourhood level in many Western societies was also integrated with recognition of the significance of social capital
(Putnam, 2000; Putnam & Gross, 2002) and of community driven social innovation (Moulaert, Martinelli, Swyngedouw, & Gonzalez, 2010; Vicari Haddock & Moulaert, 2009; Vitale, 2009). The important point here is that governance is simultaneously used as both an account of ‘contemporary state adaptation to its economic and political environment’ (sometimes termed ‘new governance’), as well as ‘the conceptual and theoretical representation of the role of the state in the coordination of socioeconomic systems’ (Hall, 2011a, p. 440). Consequently, those working on governance have consistently emphasized the role of networks (Rhodes, 1997), associations (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985), regimes (Stone, 1989), growth coalitions (Harvey, 1989) and entangled hierarchies of power and the associated processes of ‘negotiated co-ordination’ (Scharpf, 1994) in the organization of political and economic activity (Hall, 2011a; Whitehead, 2003).

Central to the study of governance in most OECD countries was the devolution of authority to the regional and local government bodies throughout the late 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s (Jones & MacLeod, 1999; OECD, 2005; Pike, Rodríguez-Pose, & Tomaney, 2006). Initially, research on this shift in the scale of policy regimes was focused on the horizontal and vertical linkages between governance actors. However, scales began to be conceived as ‘the product of economic, political and social activities and relationships’ (Smith, 1995, p. 61) among different stakeholders (Jessop, Brenner, & Jones, 2008; Tewdwr-Jones, 2012). While the existence of uneven forms of governance between supranational stakeholders and local actors is widely acknowledged (e.g. Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Sørensen & Torfing, 2005), more recent contributions suggest the adoption of concepts such as ‘soft spaces’ and ‘fuzzy’ boundaries (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009; Kettl, 2015) to illustrate the sometimes unclear (Meuleman, 2008) yet highly dynamic and fragmented governance environment. However, while the conceptualization of polycentricity (Rodriguez, Williams, & Hall, 2014) and fuzzy boundaries ‘allow for a much richer range of governance combinations’ (Meuleman, 2008, p. viii), it can ‘lead to contentions locally over who should set visions and directions for change’ (Tewdwr-Jones, 2012, p. 47).

Meuleman (2008) indicated an array of ideal types and hybrid forms of governance that coalesce around the key paradigms and concepts of hierarchies, networks, markets and communities (Pierre & Peters, 2000; Thompson, Frances, Levačić, & Mitchell, 1991; Treib, Bähr, & Falkner, 2007; Figure 1). However, this framework does not adequately address issues of scale, which has clear importance for public policy and implementation (Healey, 2006). Moreover, the applications of concepts of governance are inextricably linked to a given set of value assumptions which predetermine the range of its application. Many accounts of governance and policy intervention, including in tourism, fail to acknowledge that different conceptualizations reflect particular sets of values and ideologies with respect to the appropriate role of the state and the rights and responsibilities of the state and the individual. This has meant, for example, that the impacts of neoliberalization and neoliberal hegemony on planning, policy and governance activities may be under estimated or even unrecognized (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2012; Hall, 2013; Olesen, 2014; Tewdwr-Jones, 2012).

Therefore, what currently exists in many developed countries is a complex network of hybrid and multi-jurisdictional forms of governance (Bevir, 2011). Governance has become ‘a complex, multi-actor and multi-level process’ (Paavola, Gouldson, & Kluvánková-Oravská, 2009, p. 150) through which the state, policy actors, private interests and civic society aims at resolving ‘societal problems or creating societal opportunities’ (Meuleman, 2008, p. 11). This is particularly appropriate for the study of tourism destinations giving the complex interrelations between different stakeholders ‘with diverse and often divergent goals and objectives’ (Laws, Argusa, Richins, & Scott, 2011, p. 1). However, the presence of different and potentially conflicting governance mechanisms imply practical problems in addressing issues (Meuleman, 2008) and ‘an underlying uneasiness with the ways in which planning and planners seek to unify such diversity into a plan’ (Allmendinger, 2009, p. 172). This is because different interventions lead to different winners and losers in the policy process and reinforce the dominance or hegemony of different values.

Despite the seeming dominance of new public management thinking with its emphasis on polycentric approaches to policy making and planning and the significance of the public-private partnerships and the role of the market, questions are increasingly raised as to whether traditional modes of governance can still provide appropriate responses to societal issues (Agh, 2010; Bell & Hindmoor, 2009; Torfing, 2014). Crises often play an important part in policy learning and paradigm change (Hall, 2011b). During the recession of the 1970s, the perceived failings of hierarchical approaches ‘led to public sector reforms intended to advance marketization’ (Bevir, 2011, p. 6). Similarly, the failure of neoliberalized governance modes via financial deregulation, marketization and public-private partnerships that frame current economic and environmental crises are feeding demands for another
paradigm shift in policy learning and policy making (Hall, 2011b). However, policy learning and change is extremely difficult when operating in a supposedly ‘depoliticized’ climate in developed countries, when paradigms and approaches which lie beyond the pale of existing socio-technical systems are ‘doomed to be forever marginal no matter how … policy-engaged their advocates might be. To break through this log jam it would be necessary to reopen a set of basic questions about the role of the state (Shove, 2010, p. 1283), and accordingly require a re-conceptualization and re-theorization of governance.

Metagovernance

From an etymological perspective, metagovernance refers to what is after governance (from the Greek μετά, ‘beyond’, ‘upon’ or ‘after’). The conceptual origins of metagovernance can arguably be tracked back to the works of Kooiman (1993) and Dunsire (1993) on third-order change and collibration (Jessop, 2011). As well as providing a philosophical umbrella for governance activities, metagovernance is also a response to the perception that the state is withdrawing from governance, whereby political authorities at national and other levels are regarded as encouraging the self-organization of partnerships, networks and governance regimes. Yet as Jessop (1997) highlighted, the state continues to: provide the ground rules for governance; ensure the compatibility of different governance mechanisms and regimes; deploy a relative monopoly of organisational intelligence and information with which to shape cognitive expectations; act as a ‘court of appeal’ for disputes arising within and over governance; seek to rebalance power differentials by strengthening weaker forces or systems in the interests of system integration and/or social cohesion; try to modify the self-understanding of identities, strategic capacities and the interests of individual and collective actors in different strategic contexts and hence alter their implications for preferred strategies and tactics; and also assume political responsibility in the event of governance failure. (p. 575)

Metagovernance focuses explicitly on the practices and procedures that secure governmental influence, command and control within governance regimes with its originality derived from its emphasis on relationality and negotiated links between government and governance, whereas governance draws attention to the processes that dislocate political organization from government and the state (Whitehead, 2003). The notion of metagovernance as self-regulating governance is derived from the ‘German school’ of governance (Enroth, 2011), particularly from the works of Mayntz (1993) and Scharpf (1994), which is primarily concerned with how coordination can be achieved despite the potential limits of vertical hierarchical power (governments, the state, the firm) and horizontal networks of self-coordination (governance, regimes, clans) (Whitehead, 2003). Sørensen (2006) and Jessop (1997,
2002, 2003, 2011), who are key influences in the role of metagovernance as a response to the perceived failure of governance modes (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009; Meuleman, 2008; Tewdwr-Jones, 2012), draw heavily on the German school and, particularly what Scharpf (1994, p. 36) describes as ‘structurally embedded self-co-ordination’. Scharpf’s (1994) identification of the importance of the relationships between vertical structures and horizontal networks of self-coordination provides two significant advantages for understanding governance (Whitehead, 2003). First, political hierarchies are recognized ‘as important arenas within which the negotiations and political struggles associated with governance are played out, without necessarily ascribing a deterministic logic to the exercise of hierarchical power’ (Scharpf, 1994, p. 40). Second, it helps reveal the interdependencies between hierarchical intervention and local political coordination: ‘just as hierarchical power is realized in and through local political practices and negotiations, so too is the effective coordination capacity of local political networks and clans enhanced by virtue of their “embeddedness” within hierarchical structures’ (Scharpf, 1994, p. 40).

Sørensen (2006) highlighted the potentialities of metagovernance as a self-regulating model of representative democracy ‘through which a range of legitimate and resourceful actors aim to combine, facilitate, shape and direct particular forms of governance’ (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009, p. 245). In turn, this stimulates collaboration among stakeholders towards a shared goal under the guide of capable metagovernors that legitimate their decisions by devolving competence and authority to governance networks (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005, 2009). However, Jessop (2011) referred to metagovernance as a description of a ‘counter-tendency’ in ‘the organization of the conditions of self-organization’ (Jessop, 2002, p. 241). According to Jessop (2011), metagovernance represents a response to the failure of complex multi-institutional governance modes and suggests that conceptualizing governance as hierarchies, markets, networks and/or communities have flaws that inexorably lead to their failure (see also Hall, 2011a) (Table 1). Metagovernance is therefore conceived as a reflexive reframing in response to economic inefficiency, excessive managerialism and policy ineffectiveness, fragmented communication and mistrusted behaviours of key actors (Jessop, 2011).

Calls for new modes of governance in public administration beyond the new public management started to emerge in the mid-2000s (Hall & Zapata Campos, 2014), when Dutch public managers and regional authorities argued that shifting between and combining hierarchies, markets and networks modes of governance were the best ways of cooperation in the event of disasters and subsequent recovery (Meuleman, 2008). Focusing on the UK context, policy makers and scholars acknowledged the rise of challenges of effective policy making as result of the so-called ‘third way’ and the subsequent devolution of legislative power to regional and metropolitan authorities (Allmendinger & Haughton, 2009; Heley, 2013; Heley & Moles, 2012; Tewdwr-Jones, 2012). In Denmark, Lund (2009), demonstrated how metagovernance modes for effective environmental conservation and stakeholder participation were hindered by the pressure of national bodies and of conservation authorities in particular. Outside the EU, interest in metagovernance has also focused on regional environmental issues. For example, forest-based communities in British Columbia (Canada) pursued institutional innovations and metagovernance modes to cope with the mountain pine beetle epidemic (Parkins, 2008).

Nevertheless, metagovernance is not designed to replace theories of governance. Instead, it is premised on better contextualizing the different regimes of governance, which is also where much emphasis has been placed in tourism studies (Hall, 2011a), and explores how changes in governmental hierarchies can facilitate, via command and control activities, the proliferation of more devolved governance practices (Whitehead, 2003). In other words, devolved governance activities exist because of the result of state action not instead of the absence of state action. Rather than being a substitute for state control, governance practices are instead interpreted from a meta-governance perspective as new articulations of state power and become, as Scharpf (1994, p. 41) states, the persistent ‘shadow of hierarchical authority’. This is also regarded as an important component of critiques of the impact of neoliberalism on state activity because, as Davies (2013, p. 4), observed, there is a ‘persistence of hierarchy, especially coercion, in the governing system’ that strengthens neoliberal hegemony. For example, the recent financial and economic crisis affecting the Eurozone led to a hybrid regime that combines hierarchical and networked modes of governance at supranational level (Jessop, 2013), with key country members and EU authorities imposing austerity measures and neoliberal restructur- ing agendas on weaker member states within a technocratic and ‘depoliticized’ institutional void.

**Tourism governance**

As a subject, tourism studies has come relatively late to the literature on governance. As of late 2015, more than 75% of the contributions on tourism and governance were written from 2008 onwards and are marked
by a plethora of conceptualizations and approaches. For example, Ruhanen et al. (2010) concluded that there were at least 72 different dimensions of governance available in tourism studies, with definitions mainly derived from business, health and political sciences. However, a simple divide is that tourism scholars tend to distinguish between corporate (private) governance and the political dimension of public governance (Hall, 2011a; Pechlaner & Volgger, 2013; Ruhanen et al., 2010). Nevertheless, other key themes with respect to tourism governance can be identified. Moscardo (2008, 2011a, 2011b), highlighted the importance of knowledge and empowerment in community-based tourism approaches. Network approaches to tourism governance are also regarded as significant for destination management and marketing organizations, and regional and sectoral innovation and product systems (e.g. Baggio, Scott, & Cooper, 2011; Dredge & Pfarr, 2008; Pavlovich, 2008; Scott, Baggio, & Cooper, 2008). For example, Bertelli et al. (2007, p. 96) noted, ‘the systemic nature of tourism products generates the need for a broad involvement of destination stakeholders in the destination management organization’s (DMO) activities and makes destination governance, defined as the setting up and developing of rules and mechanisms for business strategies by involving destination stakeholders’.

Tourism planning and policy are inextricably interrelated with territorial tourism governance (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007; Hall, 2008; Pechlaner & Volgger, 2013). Studies of governance in tourism have tended to focus on different modes (e.g. d’Angella, De Carlo, & Sainaghi, 2010; Dredge & Jamal, 2015; Hall, 2011a; Meuleman, 2008; Wan & Bramwell, 2015; Zapata & Hall, 2012) and scales (e.g. Hall, 2008; Smith, 1995). Nevertheless, much of the writing on governance in tourism reflects something of the ‘haphazard shopping list’ of all possible dimensions of governance that Treib et al. (2007, p. 5) identified in the political science and public policy literature. This has meant that the ‘conceptual and theoretical representations of the role of the state in the coordination of socio-economic systems’ (Hall, 2011a, p. 440) have generally not been noted, along with the different modes of ‘contemporary state adaptation to its economic and political environment’ (Hall, 2011a, p. 439) which, in political science, are acknowledged as essential reflexive dimensions of metagovernance (Meuleman, 2008). In other words, much of the work related to governance in tourism has managed to define the state out of governance processes or at least minimize its role in comparison to emphasizing market (business), network (voluntary self-organization) or community (local) approaches.

The dominant approaches to governance in the tourism literature reflect Rhodes (1996, pp. 652—653) conceptualization of governance as a new process of governing ‘a changed condition of ordered rule [and] a new method by which society is governed’. For example, the conceptualization of governance as network is useful to analyze ‘complex sets of relationships … that cross functional, hierarchical or geographic boundaries’ (Baggio, Scott, & Cooper, 2008, p. 3) and to discuss themes such as bargaining, the role of interest groups and the influence of constraints (Hall, 2011a). Community-based governance emphasizes local participatory initiatives for direct democracy, with an historical focus on the importance of community interests and decision making and more recent attention to ‘the significance of social capital in community and economic development’ (Hall, 2011a, p. 447). Governance via the market emphasizes the state ‘restructuring, rescaling, and reordering’ (Jessop, 2002, p. 452) and the adoption of market-led approaches to efficiently allocate resources, e.g. using tourism as a commercial mechanism to facilitate biodiversity conservation. In contrast, governance as hierarchy distinguishes between the private and public sectors by focusing on the key roles of government authorities.

### Table 1. Modes of governance and reasons for failure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metagovernance response</th>
<th>Exchange</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Community</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of meta-exchange</td>
<td>Substantive and goal oriented</td>
<td>Reflexive and procedural</td>
<td>Value-oriented</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness of meta-control and meta-coordination</td>
<td>Effective goal attainment</td>
<td>Negotiated consent and consensus</td>
<td>Required commitment; consensus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homo hierarchicus</td>
<td>Homo politicus</td>
<td>Homo fidelis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World market</td>
<td>Organizational space</td>
<td>Co-location, The local</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons for failure</td>
<td>Economic inefficiency, market failures and inadequacies; individual behaviour is based on more than utilitarianism</td>
<td>Ineffectiveness, bureaucratization, red tape; extra-territorial events</td>
<td>Noise, talking shop, secrecy, distorted communication; solidification as sub-governments</td>
<td>Betrayal, mistrust, overtly idealistic, co-dependency, asymmetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homo economicus</td>
<td>Homo polis</td>
<td>Meta-hetararchy</td>
<td>Avoid reification of the local</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: After Jessop (2011); Hall (2011a).
The adoption of governance concepts has had substantial influence on tourism destination planning and policy (Hall, 2011a). Tourism planning and policy strategies have gained increased commercial relevance since the radical restructuring of public agencies from the late 1980s onward (Dredge & Jenkins, 2007; Hall, 1999, 2008; Hall & Jenkins, 1995). Nevertheless, institutions with jurisdiction on trade, environment, culture and economic development arguably have a greater impact on tourism flows than the dedicated tourism authorities (Hall, 2008). Moreover, the tourism private sector at large is often characterized by internal parochialisms and lack of collaboration with public authorities and the local community (Zahra, 2011), with sections of the latter often ignored or defined out of decision-making processes, policies and destination strategies meant to increase the visitor economy are challenged (Higgins-Desbiolles, 2011). Therefore, it is not surprising that contributions with respect to tourism destination planning often stress the need of involving public and private actors to gather consensus and to make stakeholder strategies converge towards the same goals in the interests of tourism (Bramwell & Lane, 2000; Jamal & Getz, 1999; Gill & Williams, 1994). Yet, as Göymen (2000, p. 1027) stated ‘participation is easier advocated than achieved’.

Governance modes are not panaceas to resolve the problems of effective, long-standing and collaborative tourism planning. Public-private partnerships in tourism are usually expressions of market interests (Hall, 1999; Zapata & Hall, 2012), community-led governance and so-called ‘bottom-up’ initiatives may never be effective where social capital is low or where there are vested networked relations (Costa, 2013; Jamal & Getz, 1999) that override some community interests. The restructuring of public management can also increase fragmentation rather than promote intra-institutional cohesion (Zahra, 2011). Moreover, as the political science literature highlights, governance modes are prone to fail (Jessop, 2002), particularly in the event of crises (Hall, 2010). Therefore, a stronger appreciation of the assumptions and values that underlie hierarchies, networks, markets and communities, particularly with respect to the role of the state, may help make governance regimes more effective and transparent and lead to the improved governance of governance; in other words, metagovernance.

Metagovernance in tourism studies

According to Jenkins et al. (2014, p. 549) ‘there is a wide range of tourism metagovernance practice in operation’ which has been overlooked in the literature, partly due to the predominant governance paradigm in tourism planning and policy. Recent reviews of the tourism literature suggest the need to move beyond ‘old ways of knowing’ (Dredge & Jenkins, 2011, p. 5), often by embracing post-structural (Dredge & Jamal, 2015) and/or post-disciplinary paradigms (e.g. Coles, Hall, & Duval, 2006, 2016). In the case of sustainable tourism this has also been described as the need to bring about ‘third-order change’ (Hall, 2011b), i.e. a paradigm change that occurs when a new goal hierarchy is adopted by policy makers because the coherence of the existing policy paradigm has been undermined, rather than changes in government instruments and techniques (second-order change), or incremental change in the settings of policy instruments (first-order change).

Major global issues (e.g. financial and economic crisis, economic inequality, climate and environmental change, and refugee flows), and the ‘increasing normalization of neoliberal practices and concepts’ (Olesen, 2014, p. 292) in political economy (e.g. Hall, 2016a), have had a considerable impact on tourism at national, regional and local scales (Giovanelli, Rotondo, & Fadda, 2015; Hall, 2010). However, the challenges to tourism governance in regions with a strong economic and employment dependence on visitors are more than just an artefact of change in the external environment. Rather, it is often failures in destination governance and the inability of stakeholders to acknowledge the importance of developing participation consensus (Costa, 2013; Spyriadis, Buhals, & Fyall, 2011), that is increasingly centred on the development of more ‘resilient’ destinations and associated planning strategies (Lew, 2014; Hall, 2016b).

The heterogeneity of stakeholder objectives suggests that successful tourism destination governance in terms of legitimate consensus generation is often hard to achieve, particularly in addressing the problematic issue of sustainability (Bramwell, 2011). For example, there is often a basic conflict between stakeholders and interests that coalesce around sustainability while others focus on continued growth in visitor arrivals (Gössling, Ring, Dwyer, Andersson, & Hall, 2015). A number of authors, including Wan and Bramwell (2015) in examining tourism policy in Hong Kong; Giovanelli et al. (2015) in the study of tourism networks in Sardinia, and Lamers, van der Duim, van Wijk, Nthiga, and Visseren-Hamakers (2014) with respect to conservation tourism partnerships in Kenya, have noted the concept of metagovernance as a way of understanding how the policy system is ‘steered’, while Bregoli (2013) has utilized it with respect to coordination of destination brand identity in Edinburgh. Spyriadis et al. (2011) also examined the dynamics of destination governance via the lenses of governance and metagovernance. Nevertheless, the
extent of engagement with the metagovernance literature in tourism remains relatively weak. Although the importance of the governance of governance in tourism is often invoked, its implications remain little examined. For example, Spyriadis et al. (2011) quoted Sørensen’s (2006) political science article on metagovernance with respect to it meaning ‘the organization of the conditions in terms of their structurally inscribed strategic selectivity, i.e. of their asymmetrical privileging of some outcomes over others’ (Sørensen, 2006, p. 108), and then go on to suggest:

From this perspective, DMOs have an important role to play as vehicles of metagovernance … the role of the DMO is central in coordinating and integrating the development and implementation of policies and strategies at intersectoral (across sectors) and intergovernmental (across the levels of government) levels (Spyriadis et al., 2011, p. 198).

However, as with many accounts of governance in tourism, they fail to acknowledge either the asymmetrical privileging of some outcomes over others (i.e. winners and losers in the governance process) or the ‘tangled hierarchies’ (Sørensen, 2006, p. 108) of governance. It should therefore be no surprise that Spyriadis et al. (2011, p. 198) claimed that, ‘essentially, destination metagovernance relates to the need of the destination actively to form governance structures and manage their mechanisms, conflict and tensions’ without recognizing that DMOs are themselves embedded within hierarchies of governance; and that their role and decisions not only favour certain interests over others but also certain values. This is why the notion of metagovernance is potentially so valuable to tourism research. Theories of metagovernance suggest that both the motivational impetus to collaborate, coordinate and integrate and the subsequent management of the motivational frameworks associated with governance (e.g. strategic plans) are not exclusively situated in local/destination political agreements, concessions and compromises, but are also driven by the hierarchical power of the state and government operating over a range of different spatial scales (Whitehead, 2003). Indeed, as noted above, what becomes important from a metagovernance perspective is the extent to which governance practices are articulations of state power and become, to use Scharpf’s (1994, p. 41) term again, the persistent ‘shadow of hierarchical authority’. Unfortunately, much of the work in tourism has failed to recognize these shadows – the actual political practices, techniques and punitive actions of the state – because it labours under the notion that much of what is discussed is somehow ‘objective’, ‘rational’ and ‘apolitical’ or is at least presented as such. These are illustrated in the following brief example of Christchurch in New Zealand, where the local level is being shaped via central state actions.

Metagovernance in post-earthquake Christchurch, New Zealand

New Zealand was one of the first countries to employ a neoliberal agenda centred on a streamlined state intervention and reliance on market drivers. Initially, this was to cope with the oil crisis and the loss of the UK as the primary export market in the 1970s (Easton, 1989), but more recently this has become part of a drive towards ‘balanced budgets’, and market-led economic growth following the effects of the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the impacts of Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 (Hall, Malinen, Vosslamber, & Wordsworth, 2016).

The national government agenda is strongly focused on using state intervention to further embed the economy in international markets. Tourism is an important dimension of this strategy, not only with respect to attracting international tourists, especially from the increasingly important Chinese market, but also with respect to national branding. As Lewis (2011, p. 280) commented:

Economic nationalism, which reduces national identity building to a calculus of economic success in the global from the edge, is deeply embedded. It is cultivated by popular media, industry actors, education curricula, science funding, and even domestic art, as well as national development agencies.

An important element of promoting New Zealand is the role of New Zealand Inc/NZ Inc (New Zealand Incorporated), which is referred to in many government reports. For example, the 2013/14 Annual Report of New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE) stated under ‘Our purpose’:

We work with international investors to identify business opportunities in New Zealand, focused on target industries and regions that need capital and connections to grow, and, alongside our NZ Inc partners (within government and the business community), to build credibility in our national brand. (NZTE, 2014, p. 4)

This national account of contemporary governance in New Zealand is important because it frames what happens at a regional destination level, especially in a highly centralized unicameral political system where local and regional government powers are weak, and with no codified constitution and no house of review as in other Westminster style democracies (it was abolished in 1950). The ‘shadow of hierarchical authority’ (Scharpf, 1994, p. 41) is seen in the notion of NZ Inc as
it embraces not just a ‘whole of government’ approach to governance and branding, but also the inclusion of corporate partners in the development of economic policies and branding strategies. NZ Inc reflects an approach where the country is run like a business with the prime minister as its chief executive and the voters as the profit-maximizing stockholders looking for the best possible return from the national enterprise (McCrone, 2012a). In order to achieve this, the John Key led National Party’s neoliberal economic model is highly centralized and highly interventionist with ‘one people united under a single business plan’ (McCrone, 2012a, p.C4) and brand. For example, the government sought to create, with mixed success, new metropolitan-wide authorities in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch in order to reduce the number of councils in order to make them more internationally competitive and attract capital and tourists (McCrone, 2012b). However, as the concept of metagovernance stresses, branding and coordination strategies are not value-free tools. The NZ Inc model is one of state intervention to maximize economic growth accompanied by its framing in terms of national wellbeing and presented as a ‘necessity’ for a resilient economy and society rather than an explicit ideology (Hall, 2016a). As Lewis (2011) commented with respect to Brand New Zealand and branding New Zealand, it is about more than brand awareness, value adding and linking firms to markets, it ‘is a calculated and calculating entanglement of territory, imaginary, measurement, technology, practice and identity building’ and ‘is far from politically, culturally, socially or economically innocent’ (Lewis, 2011, pp. 282–283).

From September 2010 to the end of 2011 the city of Christchurch, the second biggest city in the country and main gateway for the South Island of New Zealand, was struck by a major earthquake sequence that caused loss of life and substantially affected the city’s CBD with approximately 70% of buildings being lost. These shocks greatly affected the tourism sector (CERA, 2012). The damage to attractions, image and infrastructure in the aftermath of the earthquakes resulted in a drastic drop of international arrivals and overnight stays in Christchurch (Christchurch and Canterbury Tourism, 2013). In response the Canterbury region and Christchurch city have been at the forefront of a national government ‘roll-with-it neoliberalization’ (Keil, 2009, p. 232) experiment, from which the notion of the region as a tourist destination and hence destination management and marketing cannot be divorced. In order to achieve its aims, the National Party led central government has three primary governmental mechanisms for asserting control over the local state: strategic frameworks and guidance, monitoring and assessment measures, and fear and discipline (Table 2).

In jurisdictions such as New Zealand the capacities, directions and trajectories of DMOs are set as much by the actions of the state as by any internal decision making and marketing logic. DMOs act and operate in specific spaces of metagovernance. For example, the power of the state to discipline destinations and the organizations within them can be undertaken via both financial and legislative means. At its most extreme, it can mean the dissolution of an organization or a reduction in its powers. Crises, including natural disasters, provide significant rationale for such actions, what Klein (2007) described as ‘disaster capitalism’ where changes in governance are justified as essential or unavoidable in order to ensure greater regional or destination ‘resilience’. In March 2010, the Ministry of the Environment dissolved the democratically elected Canterbury District Council (ECan) which has primary responsibilities for environment and resource management because the authority could not reach a decision on the water management in the region that was favourable to farming interests. A fully democratic regional council will not be elected again until 2019. Similarly, following the severe February 2011 earthquake which damaged much of the central city, the national government via the promulgation of Orders in Council, along with the establishment of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) in April 2011, overrode established legislative procedures for resource consent, in order to boost the construction and real estate development sector and seek to attract foreign direct investment in the rebuild (Amore & Hall, 2016; Hayward, 2013).

The creation of specific legislative and institutional powers also makes it easier for the central state to structure strategic frameworks and guidance at the destination level. For example, CERA oversaw the implementation of a land use recovery plan in which ‘cultural assets and strategic commercial buildings’ (CERA, 2013) are considered as strategic features of the city. The zoning of the CBD as illustrated in the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) and Central City Recovery Plan and the amendments to the previous district plan set the basis for the development of large-scale retail and hospitality developments. The rebuild protocol culminated with the release of the Central City Rebuild Plan (CCDU, 2012), which foresees the building of key tourism and leisure ‘anchor projects’, such as a new stadium and a convention centre for international sport events and business tourism (CCDU, 2014). Importantly, these initiatives were followed even though many of the elements in the plan were not ones identified as
significant from earlier public consultation by local government (Amore & Hall, 2016). As Hayward (2013), in commenting on the Christchurch earthquakes, observed: … the rhetoric of resilience is used to justify authorities making decisions quickly and measuring their impact on recovery by the speed with which the city returns to a ‘new normal’ or experiences ‘certainty’ as firm centralised decision making … the drive for efficiency is all too frequently used to justify expert command-and-control decision making with little or no meaningful local scrutiny or community leadership in decision making (p. 4).

Overall, these destination level approaches underpin the wider NZ Inc pro-development agenda of central government in New Zealand (McCrone, 2012a; Hall, 2016a; Hayward, 2013). The illustrative points are that the understanding of governance in tourism at the destination level is incomplete without understanding the actions (and inactions) of the state and how a seemingly depoliticized or ‘value-free’ notion such as ‘resilience’ can be used to justify a range of hierarchically imposed central state actions that overwhelm community governance approaches. Metagovernance necessitates a perspective that understands tourism governance within a much wider set of horizontal and vertical linkages and relationships as well as the relationship between governmental techniques and ideologies and values (Hall, 2013). The capacities and strategies of tourism governance require the acquiescence and, in some cases, the direct involvement of the state that lead to tourism governance and development moving along some trajectories and not others. A focus on metagovernance therefore seeks to make governance more transparent and raises questions as to why some strategies are employed and not others and who wins and who loses in decision making, especially with respect to the values and interests in what is an overtly political context.

Table 2. Governmental techniques for asserting control.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Examples of actions and interventions</th>
<th>Evidence from Christchurch</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Development and regeneration strategy</td>
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<td>Bidding guidance and negotiations</td>
<td>International search for new Convention Centre operator (October 2013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control of funds</td>
<td>Cost-sharing agreement for projects under the Crown</td>
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<td>Monitoring and assessment measures</td>
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<td>Key indicators/ Outputs measurement</td>
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<td>Fear and discipline</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Creation of new agencies</td>
<td>Establishment of the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) (April 2012)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Withdrawal or claw-back of funds</td>
<td>Reduction of land for ‘anchor projects’, e.g. convention centre, stadium (January 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project appraisal</td>
<td>Business cases for proposed Performing Arts Precinct (June 2012).</td>
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</table>

Conclusions

This article has sought to further link the domain of political sciences with that of tourism policy and planning in order ‘to contribute to broader debates on governance’ (Hall, 2011a, p. 451). In doing so it has drawn on the notion of metagovernance to highlight how many studies of governance in tourism have tended to focus on the techniques or methods of governance rather than the values that may underlie the selection of particular interventions (Hall, 2013, 2015). In particular, it has emphasized how the governance of governance is not just a ‘technical’ issue; instead, metagovernance illustrates how the shadow of hierarchical power serves central state and other interests (and their values), is connected to power relationships at various scales, and provides for different sets of winners and losers depending on the intersection between growth interests and central government. The state sets the ‘rules of the game’ of governance. All of these elements affect what happens in destination governance. These issues are not new, but there is a need to ensure that the lack of ideological or distributional neutrality of governance modes and policy interventions is made explicit. As Majone (1989) recognized:

The choice of policy instruments is not a technical problem that can be safely left to experts. It raises institutional, social, and moral issues that must be clarified … The naive faith of some analysts in the fail-safe properties of certain instruments allegedly capable of lifting the entire regulatory process out of the morass of public debate and compromise can only be explained by the constraining hold on their minds of a model of policymaking in which decisions are, in James Buchanan’s words, “handed down from on high by omniscient beings who cannot err”. (Majone, 1989, p. 143)

Destination management and marketing, while serving some interests, may simultaneously be acting to reduce the power of others who do not share the supposed ‘consensus’ on the value of tourism as an economic enterprise. For example, Hall (2011b, p. 665) argued:
Far too much attention has been given to the assumption that a well-designed institution is "good" because it facilitates cooperation and network development rather than a focus on norms and institutionalisation as first and necessary steps in the assessment of what kind of changes institutional arrangements are promoting and their potential outcomes.

As Malpas and Wickham (1995) have noted, all forms of governance fail in some ways, although 'different forms of governance fail in different ways' (Jessop, 2011, p. 113). This is not to suggest that activities such as coordination and networking are without value, far from it, but it is to suggest that the values and interests of those who promote tourism and the organizational means by which it is brought into effect, including those within the academy, require far greater scrutiny and transparency that what has hitherto usually been the case in the tourism governance literature.

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National and urban public policy in tourism. 
Towards the emergence of a hyperneoliberal script?

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Abstract: Following the 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), some national governments have been pursuing a counter-reform of the public sector characterised by further policy centralisation and the ‘hollowing out’ of regional authorities. Public expenditure and sovereign public debt reductions have become the pretext for the implementation of hyperneoliberal development agendas aimed at the attraction of inward capitals and a further ‘competitive’ repositioning of major cities within a global market. Tourism and the visitor economy have been used as leverage for the attraction of capital and skilled people in the long-term development strategies of cities. This article illustrates how crises have led the way in the recent restructuring of the public sector and of destination management organisations (DMOs) in particular. Findings from national and urban development strategies recently implemented in New Zealand suggest a strong, market-driven agenda that follows a hyperneoliberal script.
**1 Introduction**

The 2007–2009 GFC and the economic stagnation of developed countries have affected the tourism economy at large (UNWTO, 2009). Developed countries with chronic sovereign public debt such as Greece, Portugal and Italy have further struggled to recover due to the adoption of harsh austerity measures (Giovanelli et al., 2015; Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos, 2009; Palma Brito, 2014), while other developed countries such as the UK underwent a major restructuring of the tourism public sector during the same period (Coles et al., 2012). Overall, there has been a market-oriented redefinition of the role of tourism in the policy discourse along with the reallocation of roles and responsibilities between public and private stakeholders (OECD, 2012).

At a local level, there has been a further erosion of the public sector in the developed countries, with direct repercussions for tourism policy (Jenkins et al., 2014; Mesquita Nunes, 2014). This is particularly evident in urban contexts, where the merging of authorities and the reorganisation of responsibilities has resulted in more exclusive forms of decision-making and market-oriented strategies of urban competitiveness being marked by tokenistic forms of public participation and consultation (Bristow, 2010). This results in increasingly depoliticised and normalised forms of neoliberal practices and concepts (Olesen, 2014) within which “tourism is subsumed under a wider economic development agenda” [Pike and Page, (2014), p.204]. It is argued here that urban tourist
destinations have embraced a new frontier of hyper neoliberal development agenda that harshens the competition for the attraction of visitors and capitals on a global-local scale.

This paper addresses the literature with regards to the politics and the governance of DMOs in the context of the city of Christchurch, New Zealand. For the purposes of this paper, the DMO nomenclature is here used to identify the authority with the mandate of promoting and/or managing the given destination on behalf of tourism stakeholders (Leiper et al., 2008; Wang, 2011). The aim of the paper is fourfold. Firstly, it provides an appraisal of the hyper neoliberal urban agenda through a theoretical framework that acknowledges the three dimensions of power (Lukes, 2005; Hall, 2010a), the three waves of neoliberalisation (Olesen, 2014) and the paradigm of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007). Secondly, it argues that the recent reforms in the public sector call for the conceptualisation of metagovernance in the field of tourism (Jenkins et al., 2014; Spyridis et al., 2011) that underpins the paramount literature in political sciences (Meuleman, 2008; Jessop, 2011). Thirdly, it introduces the reforms in the public sector with relevance to urban tourism and place promotion in the increasingly competitive urban tourism market. Finally, it seeks to address a gap in the literature with respect to urban DMOs in times of economic crisis and public expenditure cuts.

2 Literature

2.1 Public policy and urban DMOs

The literature on DMOs first emerged in the early 1970s (Jenkins et al., 2011; Pike, 2002; Pike and Page, 2014). However, according to Jenkins et al. (2011), research on the political dimension of DMOs lacks conceptual and theoretical development and engagement with the wider public policy literature. With respect to urban tourism research, Ashworth and Page (2011, p.13) similarly argue that “to begin to understand tourism in the city we must embrace urban studies and its theoretical critiques”. Yet, while there is substantial awareness of the way in which tourism is integral to the overall positioning of urban centres and processes of place making (Andersson, 2014a, 2014b; Degen and Garcia, 2012), there is surprisingly little research on the relationships between public policy and urban DMOs.

This research gap is further evident in light of the recent public sector reforms in Western countries as a result of the 2007–2009 GFC. The literature, so far, has addressed some of the repercussions of the crisis in the wider tourism sector (Giovanelli et al., 2015; Hall, 2010b; Kapiki, 2012; Mesquita Nunes, 2014; Palma Brito, 2014; Royo, 2009) as well as in urban tourism destinations (Dredge and Jamal, 2013; Montanari, 2010; Stylidis and Terzioud, 2014). Relatively little research has been published so far with respect to public sector reforms and their impact on urban DMO governance. Notably, Dredge and Jamal (2013) acknowledge the relevance of the GFC in the progressive softening of DMO governance in the Gold Coast (Australia) and highlight how the progressive weakening of the state has jeopardised “any form of integrated or holistic destination management” [Dredge and Jamal, (2013), p.574]. Recent doctoral research on the topic focuses on Auckland (New Zealand), with the works of Fathimath (2015) and Locke (2012) on the Auckland Tourism, Events and Economic Development (ATEEED) initiative and the role of tourism stakeholders following the amalgamation of local authorities in the Auckland metropolitan region. None of the above-mentioned studies,
however, explicitly deal with the extent to which the GFC and the public sector reforms affect urban tourism policy making and the changing DMOs governance.

The present paper addresses these gaps in research with findings from the ongoing changes in destination strategy and DMO governance taking place in Christchurch, New Zealand. The city has been used as case study for previous research in urban tourism, particularly in a post-crisis context (see Amore and Hall, 2016a; Hall et al., 2016b; Hall, 2017, for reviews), but the governance changes affecting the local DMO [i.e., Christchurch and Canterbury Tourism (C&CT)] have, so far, been overlooked. This paper therefore reprises the relevance of meta-narrative in tourism planning and policy (Dredge et al., 2011) with respect to DMOs, in order to illustrate how changes in governance and the urban built environment go hand-in-hand in the shaping of what has been termed the hyperneoliberal tourist city in which tourism urbanisation “is linked to meta or hyper-neoliberal discourses; hegemonic, market driven and market-led” [Bosman and Dredge, (2011), p.1].

2.2 Theoretical framework

Over the last thirty years, states, regional authorities, and cities have established DMOs “as the main vehicle to compete and attract visitors to their distinctive place or visitor space” [Pike and Page, (2014), p.202]. The role of the public sector in providing the resources “to market the region or nation as destination” [Britton, (1991), p.458] is secondary, although intimately related to, other public policy plans of economic growth and development. Public policies, at all scales, are “rarely exclusively devoted to tourism per se” [Hall, (2008), p.14]. This is particularly evident in urban contexts where tourism policies have underpinned the wider urban restructuring from places of production to spaces of consumption [Fainstein, 2014; Pike and Page, 2014].

Bramwell and Rawding (1994, p.433) suggest that, although public-private “partnership organizations with an involvement in tourism are becoming increasingly common”, the interests of businesses tend to prevail over the instances of local democracy, resource management, and planning. However, the effectiveness of market archetypes of destination governance is questionable from a public policy perspective (Hall, 1999) as the interests of the private sector often overrule those of civic society. The predominance of corporatist and public-private organisation types in destination management results, in fact, in the handing of power authority to unelected institutions, thus missing the aims of inclusiveness and collaboration heralded in mainstream Western government development agendas (Lovelock, 2001).

Recent empirical findings and academic debates advocate for alternative approaches and forms of DMO that underpin the collaborative planning paradigm (Healey, 2006). The call for more integrated approaches in tourism planning (Hall, 2008), in particular, has led to the conceptualisation of integrated destination management (IDM) (Jamal and Jamrozy, 2006), which combines principles of communicative planning with those of destination management (Harril, 2009), social capital (Costa, 2013) and multi-scalar networked collaboration (Hall, 2008). However, “the politics of DMO decision making can make the best theories unworkable in practise” [Pike and Page, (2014), p.211]. This is further evident in light of the public sector reforms following the 2007–2008 GFC, with the enactment of hierarchical modes of metagovernance (Jessop, 2011; Meuleman, 2008) in spatial planning (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009; Olesen, 2014;
Hyper-neoliberalism, also referred to as ‘hyperliberalism’ (Booth, 2006), exists in situations when neoliberalism is taken to extremes with respect to processes of marketisation (Fuchs, 2010, 2013) and, of particular interest for the present paper, the ongoing corporatisation and privatisation of public services (Bosman, 2007). Hyperneoliberalism is conceptualised “as a response to the new global capitalist crisis” [Fuchs, (2013), p.39] and is often characterised by the adoption of austerity measures that put societies under further stress (Marriott, 2014). “Under hyper-neoliberalism, profound structural changes are taking place in the way governments govern and public-private partnerships become the preferred mechanism to deal with a variety of public policy issues” [Dredge and Jamal, (2013), p.560]. Governments further withdraw from providing public goods while encouraging private and not-for-profit organisations to supply services and expose societies to increasing global market competition (Bosman, 2007). For urban DMOs the neoliberal rhetoric of market-led development agendas in tourism only further predominates under hyperneoliberalism. Ironically, the response to the failure of neoliberal economic model following the 2007–2009 GFC seems to have been an intensification of the neoliberal project, leading to a dominant hyperneoliberal public discourse on austerity and public expenditure reduction.

The rise of hyperneoliberalism and its impacts on DMO governance can be explained through three complementary perspectives. The first one is that of the hegemonic, neoliberal and ‘de-politicised’ environment (Harvey, 2005; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2010) “in which potential issues are kept out of politics” [Lukes, (2005), p.28, italics in the original]. Tourism policy and planning, including urban DMOs, are no exception to this hegemonic trend (Britton, 1991; Hall, 2006, 2010a) that has been shaping the urban environment and branded cities as exclusive spaces for high-end leisure and recreation (Brabazon, 2014; Gotham, 2007; Spirou, 2010). Even the GFC seems not to arrest the proliferation of tourist spaces and the efforts in destination marketing (Spirou, 2010), and, if anything, has accelerated some of these processes.

A second explanation for the rise of hyperneoliberalism underpins the three waves of neoliberalisation in urban policymaking identified by Olesen (2014). The current form of neoliberalisation, also known as ‘roll-with-it neoliberalisation’ [Keil, (2009), p.232], is conceived of as “as a period dominated by hegemonic neoliberal discourses across scales of governance” [Olesen, (2014), p.293]. Again, the heightened neoliberal development agendas (Monaghan and O’Flynn, 2012) that led to the 2007–2009 GFC seem not to raise questions about the inner flaws of neoliberalism. Instead, the crisis has been used as leverage to further promote neoliberalism (i.e., hyperneoliberalism) the only alternative to recover from economic recession rather than a return to more hierarchical governance approaches.

Finally, the third explanation to the rise of the hyperneoliberal paradigm is the shift from governance to metagovernance (Kooiman and Jentoft, 2009). The concept of metagovernance has gained attention as ‘the governance of governance’ [Jessop, (2011), p.106], especially in the midst of the economic crisis affecting most of the Western countries and the perceived failure of existing governance regimes. “Governance is prone to failure” [Jessop, (2011), p.113] and metagovernance emerges as a mixture of hierarchies, markets, and networks in the wake of disasters (Meuleman, 2008) that consolidates throughout the recovery stage. However, metagovernance may simply displace governance flaws ‘into a more or less remote future’ [Jessop, (2011), p.117] and
it is similarly prone to failure in the long run (Jessop, 2011). Therefore, it is no surprise that in the response to crises in tourism the OECD (2012, p.52) further stresses the importance “for governments to include private sector representatives in discussions”.

Figure 1 illustrates the paradigm of hyperneoliberalism within the frame of crisis-prone capitalism. The figure partly reprises the logic of disaster capitalism and the dualism between sustainability and capitalism from Klein (2007, 2014). It conceives public policy and the dedicated sphere of tourism policy making as covert manifestations of the contemporary depoliticised environment in which policy interventions are limited by the ‘rationality’ of a narrow range of economic thinking (Hall, 2011, 2013). In such a situation hyperneoliberalism dominates the socio-technical system and frames the policy agenda that affect directly and indirectly impact tourism destinations and DMOs and sets destinations on particular development trajectories (Hall, 2016). Moreover, the figure acknowledges the exogenous pressures that events such as crises and disasters can have in the public policy sphere including tourism. Lastly, the figure regards hyperneoliberalism as being reinforced by, if not a direct consequence of, crisis-prone capitalism and argues that because socio-technical systems and institutions are already set on certain economic and policy trajectories the hyperneoliberal doctrine will only further exacerbate the propensity to further crises and failures.

3 Method

This article is partly based on findings from research undertaken between April 2013 and November 2015. Data for the analysis was collected from New Zealand Government Cabinet papers, national government agencies (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, New Zealand Story), the Christchurch City Council (CCC) archives, and documents retrieved from the Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC), Vbase and the C&CT. In
addition, a two-round series of semi-structured interviews with seven elite participants was undertaken in Christchurch between September 2015 and November 2015. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and two hours. For ethics purposes, the names of the participants reported in this essay are fictional and their affiliations are not reported. The period of fieldwork took place during the major restructuring of the CCC under the current CEO, Dr. Karleen Edwards. This meant that some of the participants originally identified were no longer available for interview as they had resigned from their position.

The authors acknowledge that, at the time of writing, changes in the local DMO (i.e., the C&CT) are underway towards the establishment of a single agency responsible for tourism promotion, event management, and economic development. Participants paralleled the creation of such new agency to that of the ATEED based in Auckland to provide the interviewer with a close example to compare. Some participants declined to answer some of the questions mainly due to lack of a definitive decision by the leading authorities. The resignation of C&CT CEO, Tim Hunter, in mid-November 2015 was a turning point towards the creation of a new agency to be established in 2016.

4 Crises, public sector reforms and their impacts in tourism policy and planning: a multi-scalar overview

The New Zealand economy was particularly affected by the 2007–2009 GFC. As the New Zealand Treasury reports, “business and consumer confidence plummeted as uncertainty dominated the global financial and economic environment” (New Zealand Treasury, 2010), exchange rates shifted, and key export-led sectors such as manufacturing, agribusiness, and tourism considerably weakened between 2008 and 2012. The New Zealand central government underwent a series of important changes in the national legislation to ease the attraction of inward capitals and corporate investments (Kelsey, 2015). Along with international branding and marketing campaigns to position New Zealand as a place to visit live and invest and the holding of a referendum on whether to select a new flag (Hall, 2017), the national government gradually eroded the autonomy of regional and local authorities by increasingly centralising power and control at the central level (Kelsey, 2014, 2015; Nel, 2015), thus turning New Zealand into one of the most centralised governments in the Western world (OECD, 2013). At the same time, the national government adopted a centralised strategy for major sports events that culminated with the hosting of the Rugby World Cup (2011), the Cricket World Cup (2015) and the FIFA under 20 World Cup (2015). Finally, the government launched the Regional Investment Attraction Programme “to encourage more international firms to invest in New Zealand’s regional economies to increase growth and jobs” (New Zealand Government, 2014).

The reforms of the public sector in New Zealand over the last years have increasingly exposed regions and local authorities to global market forces (Kelsey, 2015). This particularly affects the mission of economic development agencies (EDAs) in small communities as they struggle to develop economic development strategies for the local businesses and communities. Conversely, EDAs such as the ATEED in Auckland have had much greater resources to outline an articulated development strategy addressed to businesses, the tourism economy, higher education and attraction of foreign direct investments (FDIs). The amalgamation of Auckland City Council with the nearby authorities and the subsequent disestablishment of the Auckland Regional Council (ARC)
in 2010 further concentrated trade and visitor economy shares within the borders of the new Auckland Super City (Gattung, 2015), with 35% of the national GDP (ATEED, 2015a), more than NZD$ 14 billion in imports and exports via air (NZSTATS, 2014) and NZD$ 6.5 billion total tourism expenditure (ATEED, 2015b).

The market-obeying imprint of current legislation in New Zealand is reflected in amended legislation (e.g., Historic Places Act 2014; Resource Management Act 1991; Local Government Act 2002) (Kelsey, 2014; Amore and Hall, 2016a). For example, the amendments to the Local Government Act 2002 promulgated between 2010 and 2014 encourage the amalgamation of major urban councils into new unitary authorities to reprise the Super City example of Auckland (Kelsey, 2015). These amendments aim to encourage greater private involvement in public services through the establishment of development agreements and provide councils with the legislative authority to propose reorganisation and a more ‘efficient’ use of resources (Kelsey, 2015).

With respect to tourism legislation, New Zealand has been a pioneer in tourism and destination management and marketing. New Zealand was one of the first countries in the world to establish a national tourism office and one of the first countries to reform the national agency into a more corporate structure with members from the private sector being appointed by the Minister of Tourism (Treloar and Hall, 2004). At the regional level, the New Zealand Tourism Strategy 2010 (Tourism Strategy Group, 2001), advocated the reform of the existing regional tourism organisations (RTOs) and the establishment of the Regional Tourism Organisations of New Zealand (RTONZ) to represent the interests of the regional tourism bodies throughout the country (Shone, 2013). RTOs, moreover, were expected to be accountable towards the local council and the community with respect to budgeting of place marketing initiatives. Collaboration between RTOs, local authorities and EDAs was encouraged along with a greater participation of the private sector in the development of destination strategies (Shone, 2013).

Following the GFC, there have been further gradual changes with respect to the governance of tourism. The incumbent Prime Minister, Hon. John Key, appointed himself as Minister of Tourism and the Ministry of Tourism was integrated into the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) (OECD, 2012), which was then eventually merged under the portfolio of the Ministry for Business, Innovation and the Employment (NZMBIE) in 2012. The government increased the funding to tourism for the branding and promotion of New Zealand regions and key destinations to overseas markets (New Zealand Treasury, 2008a, 2015) and the establishment of the Major Events Development Fund under the MED portfolio (OECD, 2012). Conversely, the national government budget allocated to councils has been reduced in real terms since 2007 (New Zealand Treasury, 2008b, 2012). In 2011, the Local Government Borrowing Act 2011 set the basis for a more “efficient funding costs and diversified funding sources for New Zealand local authorities” (NZLGFA, 2016) under the New Zealand Local Government Funding Agency (NZLGFA). Finally, in 2013, local government funding merged into the Internal Affairs budget. This meant less public funding for local authorities and the necessity for councils to secure funds under the rules of the market.

In 2013, the government launched the tourism growth partnerships (TGPs) “to overcome constraints to growth and lift the value that international tourism delivers to New Zealand” (NZMBIE, 2015a). A key goal of the national tourism strategy put in place by the government is to attract the allegedly lucrative business tourism sector to
New Zealand. The creation of new national convention centres in Auckland and Queenstown in partnership with Sky City Casino (OECD, 2012) and of the Convention Centre Precinct in Christchurch with a private consortium led by Plenary Group (CCDU, 2014) underpin the tourism strategy up to 2015, which foresees the implementation of a pro-growth strategy that would have increased the flow of international tourist arrivals and the return of investment from the private sector (TNZ, 2007). It should therefore not be a surprise that the current tourism strategy (to 2025) (TIANZ, 2015) seeks to improve the competitiveness of New Zealand’s tourism economy by further increasing the investment on business events and attracting the lucrative Chinese inbound tourism market.

4.1 Christchurch

Christchurch is the second city of New Zealand after Auckland and the main metropolitan area of the South Island. The tourism economy represents one of the region’s core exports to overseas markets but has struggled over recent years (Orchiston et al., 2016). The sector was particularly affected by the repercussions of the GFC, as its main inbound tourism markets (Australia, the UK and the USA) were particularly hit by the crisis. A further, decisive event affecting the tourism economy were the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 that hit Christchurch and the wider Canterbury region, for an estimated loss of USD $21 billion (Swiss RE, 2012). During this period, democratic processes in Christchurch and the wider Canterbury region were severely restricted, with the suspension of the regional council (ECan) in 2010 and the creation of dedicated authorities like the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) in 2011 and the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) in 2012 to deliver the recovery of Christchurch. Undoubtedly, the GFC and the earthquakes represented a turning point for the local tourism industry, with the C&CT seeking to implement a recovery strategy to tackle down the loss of more than one million guest nights between 2009 and 2012 (C&CT, 2010, 2012). At the same time, such events represented an opportunity to reorganise institutions in a period of emergency and increasing uncertainty.

With respect to tourism, the suspension of ECan did not directly affect the governance of the C&CT although it does have broader implications for the region’s natural resource base. The response of the authorities following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 sought to support businesses, particularly in the hospitality sector, in a phase of increasing uncertainty and a steady drop of visitors to the city (Potter et al., 2015). The national government established CERA and the CCDU to rebuild the city and oversee the delivery of key anchor projects such as the new Convention Centre Precinct to increase the appeal of the city to major hospitality and tourism stakeholders in New Zealand and overseas (Amore and Hall, 2016a). The C&CT, a CCC funded body that operates as a private company, issued a visitor recovery strategy (VRS) to “assist accelerating the recovery of visitor flows to the city” [C&CT, (2012), p.1]. The strategy is one of the 42 recovery projects under the supervision of the local EDA (i.e., the CDC) outlined in the Christchurch Economic Development Strategy (CEDS) (CDC, 2013), which seeks to increase the competitiveness of Christchurch and the Canterbury Region in collaboration with 26 leading stakeholders for the next 25 years (CDC, 2013).

As a destination marketing organisation, the C&CT mainly focused its efforts on marketing initiatives to key international markets such as Australia and China (C&CT, 2013a) and collaborates with Christchurch International Airport Limited (CIAL) to
strengthen the role of Christchurch as the main gateway to the South Island and thus reduce the loss of passenger flow experienced in the aftermath of the earthquakes to the advantage of Queenstown Airport (interview with ‘Jeb’). Parallel to the VRS, the C&CT also released a sports tourism strategy in collaboration with a local destination consulting company and the CCC to increase the appeal of Christchurch as international sports event destination (C&CT, 2013b). Finally, it submitted proposals to CERA, the CCC and the national government to support the delivery of the new Convention Centre (C&CT, 2011) and the Avon River Park to reposition Christchurch as a key international destination and thus reduce the loss of visitors following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 (informal meeting with ‘Joseph’). Notwithstanding such initiatives and engagement with the redevelopment of Christchurch, the visitor economy figures show that the recovery of the city as destination between 2010 and 2013 still lagged behind the forecasted worst scenario of the VRS (informal meeting with ‘Elton’).

The C&CT and major regional tourism stakeholders also launched three partnership projects under the TGP funding programme to attract visitors from Australia and China (NZMBIE, 2015b, 2015c) and the Christchurch Adventure Park (NZMBIE, 2015d). In light of the problems encountered with long-term recovery, in 2014 C&CT released a 5-year strategic plan to reposition Christchurch as a major destination for business tourism, sports tourism and education tourism (C&CT, 2014). In addition, C&CT collaborated with the CDC, Vbase and the events management unit of the CCC for the release of the report *Christchurch City of Opportunity* (CDC, 2015), which reviews the current CEDS with new key objectives (informal meeting with ‘Ted’) to complement the new CCC-led regeneration authority (regenerate Christchurch) in partnership with the national government that will replace CERA in mid-2016. In particular, the collaboration between C&CT and CDC is expected to lead many of the economic development activities identified in the CCC long-term plan 2015–2025.

At the time of writing, the C&CT, which operates as a private business with only two members of the board appointed by the CCC, is likely to merge with the CCC events management unit CDC and Vbase into a single public-private organisation (Fulton, 2015b). The new agency is meant to maximise the benefits of combining place branding with urban development and minimise the inefficiencies that had arisen through duplication (CCC, 2015b). This amalgamation is part of the extensive CCC cost-saving restructuring (Law, 2015) that began in mid-2013 with the resignation of the CCC CEO Tony Marryatt and the appointment, in May 2014, of Dr. Karleen Edwards as new Chief Executive. Following the advice of a Wellington-based consulting agency with expertise in market-oriented public management (Cameron Partners), the CCC commercial architecture is likely to incorporate rebuilding, commercial investment tourism and development under the umbrella of a new CCC-controlled company (Cameron Partners, 2014).

### 5 Traits of hyperneoliberalism in the reorganisation of the CCC and C&CT

In light of the events that led to the decision, in November 2015, to restructure the C&CT and merge it with other CCC controlled companies (i.e., CDC, Vbase and the events management unit of the CCC) it can be argued that the reorganisation of the local
government sector in Christchurch, demonstrates the traits of hyperneoliberalism that reflect the wider refocusing of the New Zealand public sector. In such a regime, the centralisation of powers steadily supersedes the devolution that characterised the reforms of the public authorities in New Zealand as foreseen in the original Local Government Act 2002 (Kelsey, 2015). Democratically elected authorities were replaced by unelected commissioners and authorities such as CERA and the CCDU that are directly answerable to central, national party-led, government. Similarly, the legislation that was originally put in place for the conservation of historic sites and natural resources has been progressively dismantled in order to further embed the New Zealand economy to the influences of markets (Amore, 2016). The unicameral political system and the absence of a written constitution in New Zealand eased the process of reforms promulgated by the National Party government from late 2008 onwards, with local authorities simply implementing the legislation that emanated from Wellington (Kelsey, 2014, 2015).

Following the GFC and the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the CCC has undergone substantial changes in reorganising its resources to increase ‘efficiency’ and ‘competitiveness’ while reducing costs. It may be argued that the national government proactively subsidised businesses to cope with the aftermath of the earthquake or that the government contribution to the rebuild of Christchurch is in the range of many billions of dollars (New Zealand Government, 2011). However, the actual contribution of the national government to the rebuild of Christchurch is approximately of NZD$ 2 billion (McCrone, 2015) as most of the funds redirected to the city recovery come from the Earthquake Commission (EQC) reserves that accumulated over the years as a result of insurance payments linked to the owners of residential properties rather than new central government spending. Conversely, the CCC has to allocate up to NZD$ 1.9 billion for infrastructure and anchor projects under a binding cost-sharing agreement (CERA, 2013) that can only be re-negotiated under ministerial approval (informal meeting with ‘Jack’). Given the financial struggle of the CCC resulting from the underinsured policy agreements with its major insurer (Civic Assurance), there were only two options: to comply with the rebuilding agenda, i.e., selling part of the shares from its local public companies (McCrone, 2015) or increasing the council taxation (interview with ‘Adam’).

With any direct money injection from the national government, the CCC eventually voted in June 2015 to propose the selling of shares from strategic assets such as Orion Energy, CIAL, and the Lyttelton Port of Christchurch (LPC) (Cairns and Law, 2015).

Similarly, we can identify traits of the hyperneoliberal doctrine in the reorganisation of the CCC internal organisation and of its key commercial agencies, namely, C&CT and CDC. Following the resignation of Tony Marryatt as CEO of the CCC in 2013, the CCC appointed an internal senior manager (Jane Parfitt) as interim CEO. Ms. Parfitt started a series of organisational rationalisations that began with the disestablishment of top management positions to streamline the council’s building control authority (Cairns, 2013a). The restructuring followed the inputs of Doug Martin, from Wellington-based consultants MartinJenkins, who was one of the main contributors of the State Sector Act 1988 (Easton, 1997) during the neoliberal shift in public management in New Zealand. (MartinJenkins also produced the report that led to the replacement of the democratically elected councillors of ECAn by central government appointees). This represents the first major restructuring of the CCC internal structure since 2003 (Cairns, 2013b), when the CCC implemented changes at the top management level to support the council’s objectives identified in the original Local Government Act 2002. The reorganisation of the CCC further continued after the appointment of Dr. Edwards as new CEO in May
2014 and culminated in 2015 with a substantial downsizing of the CCC bureaucratic structure (Cairns and Sherwood, 2015).

Elements of the hyperneoliberal agenda in public policy can be also seen with the decision in mid-November 2015, to develop a business case to address the merging of the C&CT with CDC, Vbase, and the event management unit of the CCC. The proposal follows the input of consultants Cameron & Partners that recommended the establishment of a public-funded company to oversee the rebuild of the city, the attraction of businesses, the development of a strategic plan and the branding of the city as a place to visit, work and live. The CCC partly followed the recommendation by establishing Development Christchurch Limited under the CCC holdings in April 2015 (CCC, 2015a) and reprised the Auckland experience with ATEED to incorporate tourism, events, and development under a single authority. C&CT Chief Executive, Tim Hunter, resigned before the end of his term as part of the reform (Fulton, 2015b). In the view of the CCC “tourism, events, economic development and city promotion are inextricably linked and must be approached in a more joined up manner” (Fulton, 2015a). Given the financial struggles of the C&CT following the earthquakes and the need for the CCC to maximise its recapitalisation and minimise its costs, the decision to merge organisations under a single authority is framed in neoliberal terms as the only alternative left to maximise resources to redevelop and rebrand the city of Christchurch to overseas markets. The establishment of such a body as a public-private company also serves to further distance tourism policy making from the wider community that is being branded.

Finally, traits of the hyperneoliberal agenda are seen in the recent debates about a ‘Super-City’ for Christchurch that would amalgamate the CCC with the nearby district councils of Selwyn and Waimakariri (Ching et al., 2013). The proposed boundaries reprise the Greater Christchurch area identified in the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 and underpin the Super City example of Auckland. However, rumours in 2014 about a unitary authority for Greater Christchurch did not meet strong support among local politicians (interview with ‘Adam’). Concerns were similarly stressed by local political analysts, which highlighted the increasing democratic vacuum that has characterised the Christchurch and the Canterbury Region since 2010 with the suspension of elected representation at ECan and the overpowering control of CERA in Greater Christchurch (McCrone, 2014).

6 Conclusions

This paper sought to address a gap in the literature with respect to the governance of urban DMOs by reference to findings from the major urban destination of Christchurch, New Zealand, that has been struggling to fully recover since the GFC and natural disaster. In particular, it highlights the importance of a context of large-scale public sector reforms and their repercussions on local DMOs. Unlike other works focusing on the governance of tourism in times of financial crisis, austerity, and public sector reform, this paper interprets the overall context as profoundly rooted in a doctrine that shows traits of hyperneoliberalism and a democratic vacuum at the expense of the local community. The paper shows how top-down practices of tourism policy have been utilised in New Zealand and Christchurch as the main response to crisis and recovery.
This article has also provided an insight on the public policy reforms that were promulgated in New Zealand since the outbreak of the GFC and illustrated their impacts on the reform of local bureaucracies and controlled companies with findings from Christchurch. The paper identified a hyperneoliberal trait in the public policy agenda emanating from the national government that reformed the governance of tourism and local authorities. In particular, with respect to DMOs, the government maintained the business-like imprint of TNZ while injecting more funds for the promotion of the country to overseas markets. Conversely, the policy for local DMOs does not foresee the injection of funds to the 29 Regional Tourism Authorities, which can only rely on local councils as the main source of public funding. Findings from Christchurch suggest that the CCC is looking towards a renewed rationalisation of its resources in which the local DMO is most likely going to merge with the local EDA. This solution also underpins the model already adopted in Auckland with the establishment of the ATEED as well as recommendations from the public management consultants that have been involved with major neoliberal reforms in New Zealand since the end of the 1980s.

The context in which the C&CT is being reformed reprises the several examples of suspended democracy illustrated in the *Shock Doctrine* (Klein, 2007). The introduction of austerity measures to tighten public expenditure was coupled with market-oriented politics for the attraction of international funds and corporate. Along with a merely marginal role in the recovery decision-making debate, C&CT faced, as C&CT board chairman Dave Hawkey stated, ‘a time of unprecedented challenges’ (in Fulton, 2015a) along with the regional tourism economy at large. The downsizing of the C&CT staff following the earthquakes, (informal meeting with ‘Joseph’) and the closure of most hospitality and cultural facilities between 2011 and 2013 severely affected tourism in Christchurch (C&CT, 2013a; Hall et al., 2016b). At the same time, the financial struggles of the CCC, i.e., the main public funding body of C&CT and the delay in central government driven projects like the new Convention Centre Precinct (Weekes, 2015) will negatively impact the implementation of the VRS and the rebranding of the city as a business tourism destination for years to come (informal meeting with ‘Joseph’).

Further research will be required to address the reform of C&CT and its merger with CDC, Vbase, and the events management unit of CCC following the release of the business case in mid-2016. Similarly, it would be interesting to compare the local tourism development agenda of Christchurch with those of the other major urban destinations in New Zealand (Auckland and Wellington) from a theoretically informed perspective. Finally, the hyperneoliberal urban redevelopment agenda set in place in Christchurch following the earthquakes has yet to be fully implemented. The forthcoming Regenerate Christchurch authority that replaced CERA in April 2016 and the role of the reformed tourism development agency in the decision-making process can potentially be objects for research in the future in both a singular and comparative perspective.

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They never said “Come here and let's talk about it”: Exclusion and non-decision making in the rebuild of Christchurch, New Zealand

(as re-submitted to the journal for publication)

Abstract
Decision-making in urban contexts is increasingly characterized by a depoliticized environment that has normalized neoliberal urban policies. These are further pursued in post-disaster contexts across the globe with narratives that overshadow the views and demands of the affected communities. Spatial contestation and exclusion of certain groups from key decisions and episodes of non-decision making thus shape urban redevelopment through top-down governance. This paper provides a Lukesian narrative on post-earthquake Christchurch, where the redevelopment of the city has been characterized by a strong command-and-control rebuild agenda emanating from the national government, regardless of the feedback and criticisms from the affected community.

Keywords
Decision-making, grassroots organizations, non-decision making, post-disaster governance, power, spatial contestation

Introduction
The city of Christchurch is the major urban area of the South Island of New Zealand. Nearly 19,000 earthquakes and aftershocks had been reported in Christchurch and the surrounding Canterbury region since the first severe 7.1 magnitude (M) earthquake on September 4th, 2010 (Nicholls, 2017). This seismic activity reached its destructive peak on February 22nd, 2011 when a 6.3 M earthquake hit the city centre causing 185 fatalities and damage estimated by the insurance sector as close to USD$ 25 billion for the major earthquake events combined (Hall et al., 2016a).

The rebuild of the city is occurring in a context increasingly characterized by a hegemonic neoliberal discourse (Keil, 2009; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Purcell, 2009) that promotes the establishment of ad hoc Private-Public Partnerships (PPPs) (Jones and Evans, 2013) and the adoption of international “best practice” cases as key elements in urban development (Hoyt, 2006). In recent years, urban planning in the wake of disasters has embraced a wide range of urban regeneration practices, from flagship development and culture-led regeneration projects (Smyth, 1994; Spirou, 2006) to heritage and event-led regeneration (Hayes and Karamichas, 2011; Pendlebury, 1999; Rypkema, 2003).

Although the spatial outcomes of regeneration practices have been haphazard, their implementation is discussed through a range of socio-political variables such as capital circulation, the role of government, power dynamics and community engagement (Harvey, 2012; Searle, 2005, 2009; Spirou, 2010), that are integral to what Healey (1998) describes as "relational resources". Relational resources refer to ‘the dynamic dialectics of the relations between particular governance arenas and the webs of relations which pass through them’ (Healey et al., 1999: 9). However, relational resources are not evenly distributed in space and time, and some governance arenas may be highly constrained by virtue of the policy settings of some of the main actors and the structuring of power between actors (e.g. MacLeod, 2013). This appears particularly to be the case in the context of urban regeneration, where local communities are influenced, and in some circumstances overwhelmed, by government and private sector interests (e.g. Doorne, 1998; Porter, 2009; Amore and Hall, 2016). In such cases, episodes of contested development and residential displacement may be neutralized within a depoliticized environment of “consensus”, rationalization and power (Cryle and Hillier, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 1998) and the related development of new sets of institutional arrangements to legitimize response to a “crisis” (Fuller, 2010).
The imbalance between local community and top-down decision-making is further evident in cities affected by large-scale disasters and subsequent crises. In these cases, affected communities are often sidelined from decision-making or involved in tokenistic forms of participation run by key recovery authorities (Cho, 2014; Gotham and Greenberg, 2014; Klein, 2007). Whilst there is a growing body of literature on public-private initiatives in the process of post-disaster recovery (Gotham, 2012; Johnson and Olshansky, 2013; Mamula-Seadon, 2014), research on the wants, needs, demands and frustrations of grassroots community movements in such processes are more limited. The purpose of this paper is to provide a narrative of the episodes of exclusion and non-decision making in the case of three grassroots organizations in the post-disaster reconstruction of Christchurch, New Zealand, following a series of earthquakes in 2010-2011.

Post-Disaster Governance

Over the last thirty years, urban development in developed countries has increasingly been promoted and implemented through dedicated PPPs in pursuit of market-led and market-obeying policies (Geddes and Wagner, 2013; Harding, 2016; Porter, 2013). In urban regeneration processes, spatial contestation among stakeholders is usually sidelined by top-down decision-making through consensus building and manipulation. Consensus building appears particularly effective in urban projects focusing on economically depressed areas (Searle, 2009) where site contestation is minimal (Amore and Hall, 2016). Such potential manipulation is a subtle form of power that neutralizes antagonisms through some carefully choreographed processes for participation which minimise the potential for those with conflicting views to be given a meaningful hearing (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012: 90). The recent shift in urban governance towards centralized decision-making and enhanced market-oriented policies (Lewis and Murphy, 2015; Nel, 2015; Olsen, 2014) has only further eroded the ability of neighbourhood-level organizations to engage in and influence key decision-making processes. Examples include land-use plans, transportation systems, green spaces and residential and leisure area developments (Hall, 2013; Johnson and Osborne, 2003).

Post-disaster governance is an emerging research area that focuses on ‘the material and discursive forms of power’ (Pelling, 2003: 4), primarily rooted in neoliberal policy discourses that are exercised post-disaster. At the urban level, many post-disaster redevelopments serve to reinforce the neoliberal dogmas of competitiveness and streamlined decision-making, with examples from New York (Gotham and Greenberg, 2008, 2014; Greenberg, 2008), New Orleans (Adams, 2013; Gotham, 2012; Gotham and Greenberg, 2014; Johnson, 2011; Johnson and Olshansky, 2010; Klein, 2007), L’Aquila (Tiso, 2014), Istanbul (Özevick et al., 2009), Christchurch (Amore and Hall, 2016, 2017a, 2017b) and Sendai (Cho, 2014). Faced by demands from central governments and major business and real estate interests for extreme, quick-fix solutions to foster recovery (Olshansky, Hopkins, and Johnson, 2012), cities embark upon a set of decisions and actions that effectively downsize the stakeholder base involved in key decision-making stages and justify strong market-oriented solutions in order to increase favourable conditions for major private interests.

Despite portrayals of supposed consensus on the appropriateness of policy measures, post-disaster urban recovery processes are characterized by spatial contestation, and disputes over changed senses of place, demolition, land sales, and site amalgamations (Amore and Hall, 2016; Gotham and Greenberg, 2014). Many of the policy decisions taken on these matters tend to be formulated to meet narrow sectoral interests and negatively impact affected communities. This is particularly evident in post-disaster decisions on the demolition of damaged historic fabric (Amore, 2016; Verderber, 2009), urban rezoning (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014) and community displacement (Adams, 2013; Glück, 2013; Johnson and Olshansky, 2010; Klein, 2007) as leverage to promote gentrification projects. There is also a related and growing body of literature on the role of government and market forces in the process of post-disaster recovery (Atkinson, 2013; Bakema et al. 2017; Blanco, 2015; Gotham, 2012, 2016; Johnson and Olshansky, 2013; Mamula-Seadon, 2014), but research on the interests, demands and frustrations of grassroots community movements is still at an
early stage, particularly with respect to the extent to which they are embedded in the relational resources that exist in the post-disaster urban development policy arena.

Concerns over community participation in post-disaster decision-making apply to urban redevelopment practices in both developed and developing countries (Barrios, 2011; Berke and Campanella, 2006; Davidson et al., 2007). Scholars acknowledge the often substantial divide between theory and practice, as well as a discontinuity between official representations of participation and stakeholder consensus and those of affected communities (Duval-Diop, Curtis, and Clark, 2010). As the literature on post-disaster governance suggests, government-led recovery is often far from being effective (Hutanuwatr, Bolin, and Pijawka, 2013). Community participation in urban areas, may be tokenistic or absent, for example, as in the case of the 1999 Izmit earthquake in Turkey (Davidson et al., 2007). However, the community response in the aftermath of a disaster and the ability of its members to coalesce into associations is widely regarded as being critical in the recovery process (Chamlee-Wright and Storr, 2009; Hayward, 2013; Li et al., 2010). The legitimacy and role of community interests in the process of recovery need to be considered within the wider frame of post-disaster governance, with a particular focus on the modalities through which individuals engage as political subjects with recovery authorities in order to achieve the changes for which they advocate (Pitzalis, 2015).

The bulk of the literature in post-disaster governance reprises the notion of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007) in the analysis of the implementation of national and international market-led policies aimed at boosting economic development in the wake of events such as natural disasters and wars. However, the way neoliberal political ideology permeates the balances of power among individuals and institutions is poorly addressed. The redevelopment agenda set by powerful recovery authorities is challenged by politically weak and sometimes powerless communities, with the latter being unable to maintain and further their needs and wants (Lukes, 2006). In contexts where intense contestation culminates in an ‘explosion of spaces’ (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014: 56), it is therefore important to focus on the coalescence of community groups and their engagement with top-down redevelopment policies. This study deploys a critical policy-making analysis rooted in Lukes’ (2005) three-dimension theorization of power. The paper attempts to explain explicit latent forms of power (Chandrasekhar, 2010, 2012) and ‘enhance political science inquiry’ (Simmons and Casper, 2012: 676) in the study of community participation in post-disaster governance.

The choice of the Lukesian approach was preferred over other works on power theory for four main reasons. Firstly, it implies the notion of domination and ideological criticism advocated in mainstream critical theory to determine how authorities coerce opposition to the point they are unaware of their real interests (Hoy, 1986). Secondly, it provides a tri-dimensional appraisal of power phenomenology in policy-making (Robinson, 2006) that incorporates the notion of non-decision making in the political process (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Gerson, 1971). Thirdly, Lukes’ framework is built upon a critical appraisal of literature of policy and power in urban contexts (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Dahl, 1961). Fourthly, Lukes’ notion of power is at the heart of the communicative turn in planning theory and spatial planning (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Healey, 1992) upon which Healey (1998, 2004, 2006a, 2006b) develops the notion of episodes of governance as the outcome of relational resources (first dimension), mobilization capacity (second dimension) and knowledge (third dimension).

For the purposes of this research, the analysis of policy processes primarily focuses on the first two dimensions of power, although there are clearly elements of the third dimension of power with respect to the logic of the neoliberal project often unquestioned by policy makers. The assessment of relational resources permits the examination of ‘the dynamic dialectics of the relations between particular governance arenas and the webs of relations which pass through them’ (Healey et al., 1999: 9). Emphasis is given to those episodes of overt friction between grassroots organizations and recovery authorities, including argumentation and exclusion from key decisions.

Mobilization capacity draws on the importance of institutional spaces and the significance of techniques (Healey et al., 1999) that influence decision-making. Examples
include legislation, regulations and the release of "expert" reports to influence or manipulate opinions and neutralize dissent. These, in turn, are often framed by episodes of non-decision making that set aside the claims, needs and wants of many of the most affected or vulnerable communities. Such instances are addressed in mainstream planning and governance studies (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 1998; Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007; Le Gales, 2011), with scant research in post-disaster urban redevelopment contexts (e.g. Gotham, 2016). Although it has been previously argued that disasters become occasions for the implementation of a neoliberal redevelopment agenda that legitimizes entrepreneurial state authorities and business interests (Klein, 2007), only limited attention has been given to the role of post-disaster governance in excluding certain community interests and policy actors, while engaging others. Researching this phenomenon from the perspective of grassroots organizations is therefore expected to provide new insights in the study of non-decision making in the urban post-disaster context, such as those of post-earthquake Christchurch.

Context

In response to the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, the New Zealand Government embarked on a strong command-and-control recovery governance regime (Brookie, 2012; Johnson and Olshansky, 2013). The promulgation of a special legislation giving extraordinary decisional powers to the newly-appointed Minister for the earthquake recovery was advocated and voted by the majority of the parties one week after the September earthquake (Brookie, 2012; New Zealand Parliament, 2010). There were, nevertheless, concerns over the implications of “abandoning established constitutional values and principles in order to remove any inconvenient legal roadblock” (Geddis, 2010: n.p.) for the purposes of the emergency legislation. Following the February 2011 earthquake and the promulgation of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011, the Minister for the earthquake recovery gained further powers thus becoming the political authority in charge of creating recovery plans for the city of Christchurch (CERA, 2011a; Hartevelt, 2011; Johnson and Mamula-Seadon, 2014). With the establishment of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) in March 2011 and of the Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) in April 2012 (Brownlee, 2011, 2012), the Minister took the helm of an extensive bureaucratic organization with the goal of expediting the recovery of the city and the wider region (CERA, 2011b; DPMC, 2012).

Community engagement in the emergency and early recovery from the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes was characterized by episodes of solidarity and coalescence overlooked in mainstream community resilience literature (Hayward, 2013). Prominent representatives of the civic society and residents affected from the disasters established grassroots organizations to cope with important matters such as disaster relief, insurance settlements, business recovery, heritage protection, city centre rebuild and the arts (Hall et al., 2016b; Miles, 2016; Oliver, 2014). Most of these bottom-up initiatives were established to provide aid and support to the affected communities and sectors and collaborate with the recovery authorities. However, as the emergency phase came to an end in May 2011, increasing opposition emerged to the national government’s top-down recovery agenda.

Some of the grassroots organizations were the result of the citizenry’s spontaneous response to the September 2010 earthquake to help communities during the emergency phase (Student Volunteer Army). These organisations provide free assistance to residents over insurance claims (Earthquake Services) and allocate temporary premises to public arts projects (Gap Filler, 2014). Other community organizations arose in response to the February 22nd 2011 earthquake to represent the interests of small central city developers and landlords (Central Owners Rebuild Entity – CORE), lobby against the demolition of historic buildings (Interest in Conserving the Identity of Christchurch – IConIC) and share accurate information regarding the earthquake recovery process at the neighbourhood level (Canterbury Community Earthquake Recovery Network – CanCERN). Other coalitions of stakeholders would further develop as organized bodies to represent specific interests. This was the case of Arts Voice, an advocacy group that represented major and secondary arts stakeholders through the design and launch of the central city recovery plan (Arts Voice, 2014). Starting from 2012, some sections of the affected community of Christchurch openly challenged the
decisions of the national government on a range of issues, including the demolition of iconic buildings (Cranmer Court and the Christchurch Town Hall) (Dann, 2014) and the building of amenities in green areas (Hagley Park) (HPA, 2013).

Post-earthquake governance in Christchurch was ‘hewed to the national administrative leadership, derived authority from the top rung of government and articulated policies approved by the reigning administration’ (Johnson and Olshansky, 2013: 16). Throughout its existence (from April 2011 - April 2016), the governance arrangements for CERA and the CCDU concentrated decisional powers under the Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, Hon. Gerry Brownlee, and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) (CERA, 2011b, 2011c). As the post-disaster institutional arrangements and policy agenda took shape, community concerns began to emerge with respect to the neoliberal agenda of the national government behind the city rebuild and the reforms promulgated on matters such as resource consents, built heritage and local government (Amore, 2016; Brazendale, 2013; Hayward, 2014). Throughout the recovery process, community involvement appeared piecemeal and tokenistic (Hayward, 2014). Initiatives such as Share an Idea (CCC, 2011c) in which the public were invited to provide their ideas on the future of the city, received a remarkable community turnout, but the use of such feedback was questionable. For example, the recovery plan for the central city by CERA and the CCDU was promoted as the ultimate output of the Share an Idea initiative (CCDU, 2013) even though the official white paper behind the recovery plan (CCDU, 2012) does not even mention it. The recovery plan experience not only provides a material form of the way in which the articulation of ‘crisis’ is utilised by institutional and other key actors to further neoliberal agendas (Fuller, 2010), but also serves to illustrate the way in which community “voice” can be sidelined or misappropriated. It is to the examination of these issues that this paper now turns.

Method

Research methods and analysis of the findings underpin previous research in urban governance and central city redevelopment (Healey et al., 2002). The findings of this paper are based on research undertaken between April 2013 and November 2015. The focus of the data collection was on the development of new amenities for leisure and tourism in the Christchurch central business district (CBD) following the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. Data for the analysis was collected from grassroots organization websites, as well as from the Christchurch City Council (CCC) and the DPMC’s archives. A two-round series of semi-structured interviews with 12 participants was undertaken between May and November 2015. The preliminary selection of participants for these interviews was arranged through contacts at informal meetings with local citizens in the early stages of the fieldwork. The first author recruited participants through direct contact and then used a snowball sampling technique through recommendations made by interviewees. The names of the interviewees are confidential and pseudonyms are used. The interviewees’ affiliations are not reported.

Interview extracts were coded with the support of NVivo and grouped under the categories illustrated in Table 1. The analysis sought to assess the engagement of civic society as vested stakeholder in relation to the recovery authority agenda (Healey et al., 2002), while the identification of the “episodes of governance” (Healey, 2006b) looked, in particular, at forms of exclusion, participation mechanisms and the impact of structure-agency dynamics on a set of grassroots organizations. The Lukesian notion of “powerlessness” (Lukes, 2006) is used in the analysis to look at observable conflicts and agenda displacement through relational and mobilization resources (Healey, 1998; Healey et al. 2002; Robinson, 2006).

[Table 1 about here]

For the purposes of this study, the authors only examined those grassroots organizations that acted as advocacy groups concerning redevelopment debates throughout the recovery of the Christchurch CBD (Figure 1). The organizations at the heart of the analysis are: Arts Voice; CORE; and IConiC. Arts Voice is an advocacy group representing major and secondary arts stakeholders established following the February 2011 earthquake. The
purpose of the group is to provide project suggestions and solutions to deliver an effective recovery of the city through the arts by establishing temporary and permanent cultural facilities in the affected areas of the city. CORE, instead, is a network of nearly two-hundred central city building owners lobbying for a rebuild of the city by presenting financial and engineering redevelopment solutions for the authorities to consider. Throughout its lifespan, CORE provided evidence from the rebuild of San Francisco (1989), Los Angeles (1994) and Kobe (1995) in its attempt to propose alternative solutions to the rebuild strategy embraced by the recovery authorities. Finally, IConIC is a group of Christchurch residents proactively lobbying against the systematic demolition of the historic building in the city centre embraced by the recovery authorities following the February 2011 earthquake. In their view, historic buildings can 'be repaired, strengthened and returned to economic use' (IConIC, 2014: n.p.).

[Figure 1 about here]

Exclusion and marginalization of grassroots organizations

The proposed governance arrangements recommended to the Cabinet upon the establishment of CERA in late March 2011 (CERA, 2011a, 2011b) foresaw the creation of a community forum consisting of at least 20 ‘suitably qualified’ individuals appointed by the Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (New Zealand Parliament, 2011). As decision-making over the recovery evolved, the Community Forum followed the top-down national government agenda, particularly during the design and release of the central city recovery plan by the CCDU in mid-2012 (CERA, 2012a, 2012b). In turn, the supposed advisory powers of the Community Forum were fictitious and its members were mainly summoned to receive notification of intended changes in the legislation (Orders in Council) (CERA, 2012c). Most importantly, those openly challenging the decisions of CERA and of the Minister with regards to the rebuild of Christchurch never made the shortlist of members.

The Minister himself was unwilling to engage with grassroots groups during the early phase of the recovery. Arts Voice representatives, for example, only managed to engage with CERA and CCDU staff in the early phase of the central city plan design in mid-2012 as part of a stakeholder audit. CORE took part in a handful of meetings with the Minister as well as CERA, the CCC, Ngai Tahu (the region’s Maori iwi (tribe)) and big property owners in 2011 and 2012. What emerged from the meetings was that those with decision making power had a narrow understanding of real estate development in post-disaster contexts, with consultants coming in from overseas telling the CCDU and telling CERA what the city should do (Frank). IConIC representatives acknowledged the difficulty in setting a meeting with the Minister because ‘he was very reluctant to attend the meeting as he thought he would be criticized’ (Denzel) but they eventually managed to hold a meeting with him and major heritage building advocates and owners in August 2011. Overall, the representatives of these grassroots organizations agreed that the whole city was being re-designed without too much public involvement.

Arts Voice

The strongly centralized post-disaster governance in Christchurch undermined the genuine efforts of Arts Voice as an advocacy group. One of the main rationales of this organization was to overcome pre-earthquake arts governance shortcomings, the conservative model of key arts organizations, and the fragmentation and hostilities within the arts community. Representatives showed optimism that the consultations by Arts Voice in the initial stages led to the presentation of ‘something that all the arts people agreed to’ (Amanda). Arts Voice advocated for the arts community and the potential impact ‘of the arts in this new city that was going to emerge’ (Jim) through the recovery process. However, as the debates over the rebuild went on, rising uncertainties, lack of collaboration among stakeholders and the pressure of key players meant that the Arts Voice initiative became a ‘wasted opportunity’ (Amanda), with little or no change at all in the governance for the arts in Christchurch (Leonard).
Exclusion from key decisions for the arts community increased when CERA and the CCDU omitted the CCC from the design of the central city recovery plan in late April 2012 (Brownlee, 2012). This was despite widespread acknowledgement of the importance of culture and the arts in the early stages of the city rebuild (Finsterwalder and Hall, 2016). Representatives from Arts Voice met with the CCDU architects team early in the process to present their suggestions for the delivery of arts-related facilities in the city. However, their proposals were never considered as the authorities in charge had already identified an indicative location for a dedicated arts precinct in the city centre (CCDU, 2012).

Once the recovery plan was released, the advocacy role of Arts Voice faded away. Its Director resigned from the position in August 2012 when it became clear that major arts organizations had begun one-to-one conversations with the government and recovery authorities (Amanda). Arts stakeholders that had felt underrepresented by Arts Voice looked at the newly-established Joint Action Group (JAG) as the new forum through which to interact with CERA, the CCDU, the CCC and the Ministry for Heritage and Culture (MHC). The Group, however, fell short in enhancing collaboration and opportunities for bottom-up stakeholder engagement. There were major flaws with respect to the relationship with CERA members and the sharing of information on the Performing Arts Precinct, especially following the CCC decision on the retention of the Town Hall (CCC, 2012, 2013). Ultimately, the vested interests of single arts organizations, with which government agencies preferred to work, further eroded collaborative efforts within the arts community. In early 2013, the Music Centre undertook a separate negotiation with the CCDU team for the building of their new facility in the Performing Arts Precinct. Tensions between local and national government over the leadership in the delivery of the Performing Arts Precinct (Anna and Edward) sidelined the wants and needs of the overwhelming majority of the arts community. Their exclusion from the drafting of the vision for the Performing Arts Precinct (CCC, 2015) represented another missed opportunity.

**CORE**

Following the February 2011 earthquake, most of the Christchurch city centre remained cordoned, thus keeping owners off their properties. Increasing uncertainties over the fate of the city centre, following the establishment of CERA and the escalation of demolitions, led to a group of central city owners establishing a dedicated entity representing their instances to the government and recovery authorities. Initially, the main focus of the CORE group was to lobby on behalf of hundreds of small owners against the flight of capital away from the city centre and lobby the government on recovery funding (CORE, 2011). CORE represented ‘what the people, the owners of the city’ (Frank) thought had to be done for the future of the city centre.

The CORE group soon gained the attention of the local media which, in turn, framed them as a legitimate representative of the affected community. The CCC gave to CORE’s key representatives the opportunity to submit their group’s proposals throughout the drafting of the central city plan and to take part in a series of meetings at the presence of the top-four landowners in the city (Frank). Frictions between the latter and leading CORE group representatives escalated after the release of the central city recovery plan on matters like land amalgamation and site development guidelines for the anchor projects. Frank stressed:

The group wasn't involved in the final drafting. No one would give any information about the nature and breadth of the plan. All they said was that it was bold and that there would be winners and losers [...] Groups like the City Council and the Government picked people, not because they have a real knowledge or skill, but just because of who they were [...] The lack of collaboration with the privates and the attitude of the government with regards to the acquisition of land for the anchor projects eventually led privates and developers to work outside the CBD.

Along with the exclusion from decision-making, many of the CORE group representatives were negatively affected by the master plan and rules foreshadowed for the central city recovery. The compulsory land acquisition for some of the anchor projects forced many small central
city owners to sell their properties (Greenhill, 2013a, 2013b). Land designation was withheld until the release of the master plan, with owners getting letters from CERA between August and September 2012. The concentration of land under the government, in turn, affected the CORE group membership and advocacy for central city development.

**IConIC**

The controversial comment on Christchurch’s heritage architecture as ‘old dungs’ by the Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery six days after the February 22rd 2011 earthquake (Chapman, 2011) best synthesises the attitude of the national government towards historic buildings. The systematic demolition of the Christchurch city centre raised concerns over the retention of historic buildings, including iconic markers like the Christ Church Cathedral, the Provincial Chambers and Cranmer Courts. Concurrent with the establishment of CERA, a group of heritage lobbyists, historic building owners, engineers and lawyers established the IConIC group “with the aim of advocating for the retention of Christchurch’s architectural heritage” (IConIC, 2011, n.p.). The group lobbied the recovery authorities for a moratorium on heritage demolitions taking place inside the red cordon and presented them with a list of must-save buildings with the support of the local branch of the New Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT).

Leading members of the IConIC group sought to proactively collaborate with the authorities monitoring demolitions in the red cordon. In particular, ‘one of the representatives from IConIC, who was also involved with CORE, offered to provide information on buildings’ ownership and to act as a go-between’ (Kevin), but authorities never contacted him. Similarly, the chairman of IConIC invited the Minister of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery to a meeting in Christchurch. The Minister met with a group of 20 IConIC representatives in mid-August 2011 to discuss the list of “must-save” buildings. The meeting, however, fell short in establishing a minimum of dialogue between the group and the position of the government with respect to private property rights.

IConIC took part in the hearings during the early drafting of the central city recovery plan through the institutional arrangements outlined in the legislation (IConIC, 2011). The group tried to lobby the MHC for greater support for heritage preservation (IConIC, 2011). However, the post-disaster governance for heritage buildings disregarded those advocating on behalf of the wider Christchurch community, as Kevin mentions:

> The Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery had powers to modify other legislation by orders from the Council. This meant that a very small group of people in the immediate aftermath were making decisions about the future of heritage.

Following the release of the master plan in mid-2012, IConIC further opposed the government’s redevelopment agenda by challenging CERA and the Minister on a range of controversies around heritage buildings and green spaces. IConIC heritage advocates lobbied the government by opposing the Hagley Park Cricket Oval Project (July 2012), protesting the demolition of Cranmer Courts (October 2012) and supporting the full retention of the Town Hall (August 2013). IConIC was the only grassroots organization ‘seeking or trying to present a generalized voice in favour of preservation where possible’ (Allyson).

**Non-decision making**

Since the establishment of CERA, the bulk of the decisions were taken during Cabinet meetings and executed by CERA staff. Few of the minor initiatives by Community Forum members were acknowledged by the CERA Chief Executive, as Government conceived the group as a platform where to legitimize the recovery agenda. Grassroots organizations sought to provide their input in Council-led decision-making initiatives as well as in the drafting of the CCDU’s recovery plan for the Christchurch CBD. The mechanisms for community engagement and drafting of recovery plans and strategies relegated the affected communities to tokenistic forms of participation. Albeit the CCDU asserted that the *Share an Idea* initiative was at the basis of the recovery plan for the central
city (CCDU, 2013), the white paper forwarded to the Blueprint Team was drafted by Government official by retrieving recovery practices from fifteen cities across the world (CCDU, 2012). The anchor projects and the proposed public-private partnerships for the delivery of the facilities in the Christchurch CBD were an outcome of this document.

**Arts Voice**

Post-disaster governance in Christchurch fell short in establishing a collaborative environment between the arts advocates and the recovery authorities. Throughout the drafting of the central city plan, the CCC failed to identify potential areas for arts-related projects that could implement the projects presented by Arts Voice (CCC, 2011a, 2011b). Jim commented:

> The Council had so much on, you could tell. But it would have been good if they actually took that seriously. [Instead] things just happened helter-skelter and some really great things did not happen or were not supported to continue and it just ended up with whatever was easiest.

The Government had a monolithic view concerning the role of the arts in the recovery that emerged in the identification of the Performing Arts Precinct as an ancillary project to the large-scale Convention Centre in the heart of the city (Edward) or something nice to have to make the built environment more liveable (Leonard). The Arts Voice group submitted a range of arts-centred projects for the revitalization of the city. Their idea was to spread the arts through the city centre rather than clustering into one little corner, “but the whole process seemed like problematic in that only the CCDU group was – more or less – going to decide this whole plan” (Jim). Jim also notes:

> On the second day on their job, the CCDU Blueprint Team ditched the ideas for the Arts Circus and the River of Arts and came with a new proposal, which was the formative idea of the Performing Arts Precinct, a totally new idea that come out of, well, nobody knew where that came from.

A range of sites and development solutions were identified by both the CCDU planning team and Arts Voice advocates. A project solution for an extension of new facilities next to the Town Hall was particularly welcomed by several parties but it was eventually sidelined due to political and strategic implications (Edward). The recovery authorities, and the Minister in particular, ‘instructed the CCDU planners to assume that the Town Hall would have been demolished and that they had to find an alternative location for the precinct’ (Edward). Following the release of the master plan in mid-2012, however, the Town Hall issue was brought back into discussion. Arts Voice found itself in the middle of a contentious disagreement between the Council and CERA, with decisions being taken on the architectural relevance of the site rather than on its functionality as arts venue. According to Amanda:

> We had to go through what was called the JAG [Joint Action Group], which included the Council, CERA and Creative New Zealand, but we found it really frustrating. [...] We weren’t representative anymore, we didn’t have an agreed vision, people had their own agendas now, and it didn’t seem like productive way of working anymore.

Following the CCC decision, in August 2013, to keep the Town Hall, the Minister did not use his special powers to object its retention (Thomas). Arts Voice representatives took part in a workshop run by the Council on the future of the Town Hall and raised concerns over investing most of the budget for the performing arts to retain an inefficient arts facility (Gates, 2013; Greenhill, 2013c). CERA officials initially backed Arts Voice’s criticisms but eventually stepped back on the eve of the meeting (Leonard). This episode eroded the Arts Voice’s advocacy for the arts community. Arts stakeholders did not publicly confront the CCC during the meeting, as many of them feared the implications in terms of Council subsidies for the arts (Leonard).
**CORE**

Recovery authorities handled post-disaster governance over central city buildings by disregarding the inputs and the instances brought by the CORE group on behalf of its representatives. The group, in particular, recommended to CERA an alternative earthquake bonds solution to support owners’ efforts in the recovery and to reconsider the timeframe for the demolitions (CORE, 2011). The CORE group earthquake bonds scheme, which had similarities with the Treasury Bill issued by the US Government after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, was eventually put forward through a feasibility plan with the consultancy of KPMG (Frank). The scheme received media coverage and had public support from some members of parliament (Migone, 2011) as an alternative to increased taxation, but the Minister ditched CORE’s submission as ‘rubbish’ (Williams, 2011) and persisted in carrying on the increasingly expensive market-led recovery of the city centre.

With respect to demolitions of city centre properties, the CORE group lobbied the recovery authorities to grant owners eased access to buildings, assess damages and make arrangements in a timely manner (CORE, 2011). The scheme for demolitions under the Section 38 of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 gave CERA excessive powers to justify the demolition of buildings within the central city cordon. Several building owners in the city centre received demolition notices with very short notice, including easily salvageable buildings. James regarded demolitions as ‘criminal’:

> Under the Section 38, you’ve got ten days to get things. So, I got a report done and the engineer came up with a solution for it, but they [CERA] turned it down, giving no reason for turning it down, I tried to get discussion between the CERA engineers and my engineer, and they wouldn’t engage in any conversation about it at all. It was coming down, and that was it – it was demolished.

As the drafting of the central city plan went on, authorities disregarded the inputs from the CORE group and persisted on the recovery agenda. Following the release of the central city plan, however, CORE representatives objected to the East Frame project, the concentration of land titles by the government and the schemes for land designations and compulsory acquisitions. The group’s view was that the authorities ‘should have released the plan and what were their aspirations and then put in place some objective ways to determine land value’ (Frank) rather than keeping the whole process behind closed doors. The group also thought that the East Frame project and subsequent land purchase was not necessary and argued that CERA ‘should have bought some of land to open it up and then incentivise the existing property owners to build a level or residential with certain guidelines and plans in place’ (Frank). Although both CERA and the CCDU argued that the master plan was, in some ways, flexible, none of the CORE group’s arguments were considered for possible amendments in the recovery plan, as in the case of the Retail Precinct, addressed by Frank:

> They came up with this idea while outlining the Blueprint where we had to have 7,500 square meters of land to do a development. It was absolutely nonsense. Because, if you think about it, 7,500 square meters is nearly two acres of land. Who had two acres of land in the city? […] There was this big thinking concept going on around Christchurch, but Christchurch is a small town. And I think they would have had much better outcomes if they had a forum for people to sit down and express their views.

**IConIC**

Recovery authorities carried out a vast scale demolition of heritage buildings in Christchurch regardless of the instances of residents and representatives of IConIC. The key cabinet papers regarding CERA and the CCDU do not mention the arguments and pleas of the IConIC group. Rather, the position of the national government advocated for a vision of
the city centre as a blank canvas (Sutton, 2014) that ignored any alternative rebuild narrative. Moreover, the post-disaster governance of Christchurch gravitated around the substantial figure of the Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, who had a very strict vision on the recovery that left no space for democratic dialogue. During the demolition of Cranmer Courts (recognised by both the CCC and the NZHPT as one of the most significant heritage buildings in Christchurch) at the end of 2012, the IConIC chairman commented how ‘some of the 20th century’s most brutal regimes did more to save their country’s heritage than CERA and the national government had done in Christchurch’ (Macfie, 2013: 69).

The CCC, instead, did acknowledge input from IConIC in drafting their recovery plan. However, their plan never came to light after the establishment of the CCDU in April 2012. Heritage advocates and Council authorities eventually coalesced during the decision over the retention of the Town Hall later in 2013. According to Edward, the content of reports to the recommending committee and the influence of a prominent architect influenced the decision of the CCC:

During that time, the lobby groups established that the Town Hall should be considered a future heritage building - I think they called it something like modern heritage. But, also, I think there was a very strong sentiment with the community led by this lobby group not to lose any more of our buildings in central Christchurch. [...] This lobby group was able to capitalize on that and believed that that was a good building. That was very closely related to the Architect’s influence in the city where he wanted that to remain as part of his legacy.

Evidence from the cases above show how the mechanisms of decision-making put in place after the earthquakes sidelined the needs and wants of grassroots organizations with interest in Christchurch rebuild. Engagement with the affected communities was far from constructive; rather, their inputs were reiteratively disregarded although, on few occasions, they were used to legitimate recovery policy discourses. When it came to deliberate on a strategy or a project, the recovery authorities referred to national and international consultants at odds with sound instances from distinguished local advocates. The rationale of the earthquake recovery legislation was dominated by a strongly hierarchical governance centred in the figure of the Minister for the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery, with the affected communities unable to democratically engage with institutions.

Discussion
Evidence from post-earthquake Christchurch shows how key decisions over the rebuild of the city disregarded the instances and the feedback of the local community on several occasions. The so-called Community Forum did not include any of the representatives from the grassroots organizations at the heart of the study. Dissenting groups were kept at arm’s length while those organizations that strived to collaborate with the government authorities eventually succumbed to the top-down recovery agenda. The earthquakes shed light ‘on what nearly everyone previously failed to attend to and took for granted’ (Lukes 2006: 1), thus resulting in demands for greater community participation over recovery and rebuilding debates. However, episodes of exclusion and non-decision-making that were identified in this study suggest that post-disaster governance in Christchurch followed the neoliberal script evinced from similar contexts observed across the globe outlined earlier in this paper.

The findings from post-earthquake Christchurch reprise most of the traits of neoliberal policies in post-disaster contexts discussed in the literature (Gotham and Greenberg, 2014; Johnson, 2011; Klein, 2007). Notwithstanding the proposals submitted by organizations consisting of prominent members of the Christchurch citizenry, the government strictly held to their recovery agenda. Even when some of the recommendations to the authorities reinforced neoliberal dogma, as in the case of the CORE group earthquake bond scheme, the recovery authorities were reluctant to establish any kind of dialogue and kept relying on international consultancies instead. Such unwillingness to engage in possible alternatives and collaboration
by the recovery authorities reflects the findings from developing country contexts in the wake of natural disasters (Damiani, 2008; Klein, 2007; Larsen, Calgaro, and Thomalla, 2011).

This study agrees with Hayward (2013, 2014) on the shortcomings of post-disaster governance in Christchurch. Limited democratic participation, exclusion of dissent and the perceived infallibility of the national government’s recovery authority agenda were also highlighted in earlier research findings (see Ozcevik et al., 2009; Tiso, 2014). Overall, the study argues that post-disaster contexts heighten the power struggles between state authorities, small and large-scale private stakeholders and the affected communities highlighted in other works (see Gotham and Greenberg, 2014; Pelling, 2003).

The findings of this study underpin the statements of Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2009) on the importance of community coalescence in the wake of disaster. The state of national emergency declared after the February 22nd earthquake kept businesses and residents away from their premises thus hindering their ability to influence or even stand against the top-down recovery agenda from the beginning. Spontaneous initiatives of community response and civic society engagement were kettled by an overly bureaucratic and narrowly focussed national government response to disaster. The study agrees with Barrios (2011) argument on how residents’ inputs on reconstruction are kept aside by government in order to implement recovery plans rooted in neoliberal visions of development and investment. Notwithstanding the mobilization of resources and people in counter-recovery debates, the experience of Christchurch can be regarded as an example of manipulative post-disaster governance characterized by little or no control at all by the affected residents (Davidson et al., 2007).

The Christchurch situation therefore reflects the concept of ‘mobilisation of bias’, first developed by Schattschneider (1960: 71) and later elaborated by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1970) and Lukes (2005). The concept of mobilisation of bias implies that some issues are organised into politics whereas others are organised out. The post-disaster governance of Christchurch reflects Schattschneider’s (1960: 71) observation that ‘all forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others’. The mobilisation of bias and non-decision making practices operated in at least three ways in the Christchurch context with respect to post-disaster community interests and responses. First, it served to prevent formulation of grievances. For example, even though there was no real relationship between the Share an Idea process and the disaster recovery plan, statements by national government that there was a relationship were used to suggest that “voices” had been listened to and incorporated in their response. Second, even if grievances are formulated within interests, some community actors anticipated opposition by government and associated stakeholders and, consequently, did not raise an issue or withdrew their involvement in community coalitions to instead enter into their own negotiations with government or at least protect their existing assets from further erosion. Such a situation was especially a reflection of government negotiating tactics with respect to arts and cultural organisations in the city recovery process. Finally, when issues were raised and especially when community groups sought input into policy and decision-making processes, the national government was not willing to ‘hear’ alternative policy arguments from those outside their neoliberal post-disaster paradigm. Indeed, the national government implemented institutional arrangements to ensure that this would not occur, lessening the potential political legitimacy of such groups. The Christchurch case is more than what Parry and Morris (1974) termed ‘negative decision making’; rather, it reflects a more widespread use of non-decision-making tactics.

**Conclusion**

This paper illustrated the community response to disaster and recovery by addressing the governance dynamics between grassroots organizations and top-down recovery authorities. It did so by deploying Lukes’ theory of power in the analysis of episodes of governance where organizations established by concerned citizens were excluded from decision-making or confined in a frame of rules and practices. The findings from post-earthquake Christchurch suggest that, despite increased civic engagement among residents, the post-disaster governance of the city was characterized by a highly hierarchical decision-
making process that largely ignored the wants needs and expectations of the affected community. This was particularly evident in the key stages of decision-making culminated with the release of the central city plan and in the government’s handling of the insurance crisis.

The Christchurch situation, as with other post-disaster recovery situations, also represents a material form of the way in which the articulation of ‘crisis’ is utilised by institutional and other key actors to further neoliberal agendas (Fuller, 2010). Clearly, in the Christchurch case, the crisis was actual as well as perceived. Nevertheless, ideational/discursive ‘crisis talk’ was used by the nation-state as a means by which to induce institutional change and establish new path-dependent arrangements, even in the face of opposition from local government and community groups. In doing so, non-decision making as well as overt use of power was used by central government actors to frame problems and solutions for public consumption by marginalising voices of opposition. This was achieved by limiting their involvement in the institutional arrangements established for recovery and the rebuild, and by undermining their legitimacy as actors in the policy process through public pronouncements, non-negotiation and the development of relations with more ‘acceptable’ actors close to the market-led rebuilding agenda.

The reasons for non-decision making and the domination, in a Lukesian sense, of governance and post-disaster policy making by neoliberal dogma in the Christchurch context are potentially complex. They highlight the substantial policy-action gap that exists on much of the wider literature on post-disaster management (Hall et al, 2016a). Such literature often emphasises the importance of inclusive and equitable mechanisms for community participation in post-disaster recovery – and the development of greater resilience for the future. The reality is that the neoliberal framing of disaster response and urban rebuild, combined with a temporal political need to be seen to be “doing something”, actively works against incorporating local stakeholders in the design and implementation of policy responses. This is especially the case when the scale of the disaster means that the economic and political powers of the central state can be used to enforce the acquiescence of the local state and further limit the access of community interests to decision-making structures. The Christchurch example, and other case studies in the literature (e.g. Gotham, 2012; Gotham and Greenberg, 2014) highlight the importance of further study of post-disaster governance and the larger implications of local and national power structures in urban disaster recovery.

In this paper, we did not look at the many other grassroots associations that emerged in Christchurch in response to the earthquakes. Research is needed to analyse, in particular, the instances of grassroots organizations advocating against the government’s market-led redefinition of insurance policies in Christchurch and New Zealand. Further research is similarly required to address further episodes of governance in the delivery of the recovery strategy in Christchurch following the disestablishment of CERA and the creation of a new entity - Regenerate Christchurch - in April 2016. In the view of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Minister, Hon. Gerry Brownlee, the new legislation would enable greater engagement between the recovery authorities, the Council and local stakeholders ‘to progressively pass governance and management of the rebuild to the Canterbury community’ (Brownlee, 2015: n.p.). More research is welcomed to shed light on episodes of governance and power relations between the current government recovery agenda and the grassroots organizations at the heart of this study. Finally, it would be useful to compare the findings of this research with those from grassroots organizations in other contexts coping with the early stage of post-disaster recovery.

References


IConIC (2011) Interests in Conserving the Identity of Christchurch (IConIC) [Press release] Christchurch: IConIC.


Figure 1. Christchurch CBD and the emergency cordon (in red). Courtesy of Google Maps (2017)

Table 1. Data analysis methodology.

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Healey’s Relational Resources
Healey’s Mobilization Resources
Healey’s Knowledge Resources