The Antarctic:

For Peaceful Purposes Only

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RESEARCH PROJECT
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Introduction

At the bottom of world maps Antarctica lies as a thin white line, inexcusably denying its importance to the rest of the planet. Cloaked in ice, its mysteries are conveniently covered, and its significance unknown to many. Its simplicity of form and clarity of colour belie its complexity. This complexity is not only of geological history, fascinating life forms, and critical ecosystems, but exists in the relationship humans have to the Antarctic and the agreements and accords that have arisen since its discovery. It is to this later complexity that the current study seeks to address.

In the preamble to the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, parties to its establishment recognised “that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord.” In addition, Article I states that “Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only.” (cited in Beeby, 1972). The simple phrase ‘peaceful purposes only’ is the key theme and guides the research and questions throughout this examination. As a student of social sciences with a background in environmental issues, sustainable development, and sociological and geographical theory, the term ‘peaceful purposes only’ raises a number of issues regarding the relationships and agendas that drive those who are involved in the Antarctic.

A framework is needed from which to examine this issue, and Klaus Dodds (2000) provides a very relevant examination from a critical geopolitical perspective of the three key theories for viewing world politics. Geopolitical theory takes as its study the issue of geographical influence on the nature of world politics. Critical geopolitics is an attempt to understand that different perspectives on the nature of world politics exist, and Dodds seeks to clarify the three key theories, identifying their principle tenets. These theories are elucidated in an examination of the communities of people who are involved in Antarctic politics. The framework also
needs to be able to be challenged to examine if its key principles are relevant to an examination of geopolitics in the Antarctic. The utilisation of the critical geopolitical model is based on a number of reasons:

- Its key tenets are rooted in sociological and geographical thought.
- The key theories identified relate, at least initially, to the three dominant communities in the Antarctic.
- It has a geographical basis, an important consideration when undertaking a regional analysis.
- Dodds has applied geopolitical thought to the Antarctic and is a known commentator and author on this issue.
- He endorses the notion that social scientific knowledge is theoretically based, and that world politics is thus fundamentally interpretative.

Utilising this theory, and combining it with the objective of retaining the Antarctic for peaceful purposes only, a number of issues become immediately apparent. The first issue concerns an identification of the nation states who are involved in the Antarctic. The Antarctic Treaty was initially signed by twelve nations, seven of whom were claimant nations in the Antarctic. This study addresses two of these nations, the United States and New Zealand. It discusses their relationship with each other, the other consultative parties, and other nation states both within and outside the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). It also looks at their response to other third parties, including nongovernmental and intergovernmental organisations, e.g. Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) and the United Nations (UN). The United States has had a significant presence, and is arguably the most important nation to providing an understanding of the development of relationships in the Antarctic (Joyner & Theis, 1997). As an initial signatory to the Treaty, and a nation state which had reserved the right to make a claim, it will be argued that United States is the Antarctic’s hegemonic power, and as such has an interest in preserving the status quo of the Antarctic Treaty System. The hegemony of the United States
was challenged by the breakdown in consensus occurring at the end of negotiations over the Convention on Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA), a breakdown over which some United States commentators are still smarting (Joyner, 2001, pers.comm.¹). New Zealand, as an initial claimant nation and smaller player in Antarctic affairs, provides an interesting juxtaposition to the United States. Despite the differences in size, a number of commonalities exist between the two nations. New Zealand maintains a close relationship with the United States through both a cooperative logistical support programme and their close proximity on Ross Island.

**Critical Geopolitics in the Antarctic: A Framework**

Three significant communities exist in the Antarctic, distinct from nation states: military, scientific, and environmental. These communities relate to the three key theories Dodds (2000) identifies in an analysis of critical geopolitics. Each of these theories represent different ways that geopolitical writers have viewed world politics. The first is ‘realism’ whereby nation states are seen as the predominant force in world politics, characterised by self-preservation and interest. It ignores the contributions of other actors on the international stage, including nongovernmental and international organisations. This body is the most influential in literature, although criticisms of it tackle its single focus on nation states. ‘Neo-realism’ is an attempt to inject scientific methods and dynamic interplay into the theme. The military community in the Antarctic represent the interests of national sovereignty and provide a highly visible presence of the nation states. It will be argued that the presence of the military through its direct reporting to national policy-makers, will

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¹Christopher Joyner (2001, pers.comm) believes that the abandonment of CRAMRA after an extensive process of negotiation is irresponsible given a likelihood of mining in the future, with the decision by Australia and France to abandon CRAMRA being politically advantageous at a time of heightened environmental awareness.
always seek to maintain this profile and ensure that national interests remain significant.

‘Liberal institutionalism’ is an attempt to include the presence of significant world players, e.g. United Nations, but without compromising the importance of state and national interests. It is characterised by limited international cooperation. The scientific community’s history in the Antarctic predates the Antarctic Treaty, but was given a boost by the International Geophysical Year (IGY) from 1957-59, from which the Antarctic Treaty was spawned. The international cooperation evident through the IGY is now supported by Articles II & III of the Treaty encouraging freedom of scientific investigation and continued international cooperation. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) is an international nongovernmental organisation which provides an oversight on the scientific programmes undertaken. However, this independence is compromised by the need for scientific communities to seek funding from public funding bodies, including government agencies. This hampers their attempts to retain independence, and, it will be argued, may contribute to their reluctance to become involved in political issues affecting the Antarctic (Wallace, 2002, pers.comm.).

The third theme is ‘globalisation’, where world politics are increasingly typified by human institutions outside the realm of individual nation states, an increase hastened by the ongoing compression of time and space. Environmental awareness in the Antarctic has occurred in a number of ways since its discovery by the early explorers, from declarations of the environment’s beauty and wilderness, to regulatory measures (e.g. Agreed Measures, 1964). However, the international environmental movement is a phenomenon of the latter part of the twentieth century, and arose as a result of greater awareness of the interconnectedness of the planet, and the intrinsic values of the plant and animal life that existed. Issues such as degradation, climate change, global warming, and the ozone hole, turned attention to the Antarctic. Released from
the necessity to seek state funding, with contributions coming from members throughout the world, environmental organisations had the freedom to criticise state interests and practices in the Antarctic, in a challenge which goes to the heart of Antarctic politics: the Antarctic Treaty System. Environmental nongovernmental organisations have had to work outside the treaty system to raise public awareness and press for change, and are treated with suspicion by many parties, a suspicion which may be created by nation states. It will be argued that the current structure of the ATS seeks to retain the power of nation states by restricting the entry and contribution of third parties to the process.

Dodds (2002, pers.comm.) refers to the two prongs of globalisation: the environmental movement and commercialisation. Transnational corporations are growing exponentially, and are beginning to show an increased interest in the Antarctic, especially with the proposals for increased ship-borne tourism of passengers carrying in excess of 1000 passengers. Saatchi and Saatchi advocate the branding of Antarctica (Hall, cited in Tetley, 1998). Adventure Network, once a small company, is now owned by a large company, Grand Adventures (Kershaw, 2002, pers.comm.) The exploitation of living resources, in particular the fishing industry, under the auspices of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) is already running aground, with issues of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU), liability, and permits causing disagreement and concern. Although commercialisation is only recent to the Antarctic, it has the potential to become the next significant player. It will not be considered in detail in this analysis, although some of the issues that may arise in the future will be alluded to.

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²Dodds (2000) believes hegemonic powers allow nations to disproportionately influence discourse and shape geopolitical understandings of the world.
‘Peaceful Purposes Only’: Defining the Issue

Woven through the consideration of communities and nation states is the central issue of ‘peaceful purposes only’. This notion is inherently problematic, primarily as a result of its lack of definition. In the Antarctic Treaty it refers to the prohibition of measures of a military nature. In other words, defined by what it is not, rather than what it is. To the three identified communities, peaceful purposes has different meanings. Some have argued that deterrence of a military nature does not compromise the spirit of the Treaty. Due to the absence of any established definition, this study will seek to discover what ‘peaceful purposes’ means to the communities through an analysis of writings and personal communication.

Retention of the Antarctic for the use of peaceful purposes is an objective that all three communities appear to support. What has this meant since the establishment of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 and what challenges have had to be overcome? The mining of resources in the Antarctic could constitute a peaceful use of the Antarctic, and CRAMRA was an attempt to provide regulation for this industry should it go ahead. However it will be shown that CRAMRA divided the Antarctic Consultative Parties into two camps, destroying the consensus that had been the standard and potentially opening the Antarctic up to new regimes that may not have been peaceful. Auburn (1982) believes that the Treaty is not able to deal with issues of mining, commerce or industry, and this is perhaps aptly portrayed in an analysis of the collapse of CRAMRA. The negotiations surrounding CRAMRA also brought in two other significant groups to the Antarctic: the environmental movement; and secondly a large number of nation states, predominantly developing nations, not represented in the ATS. The challenge made by these nations, lead by Malaysia, was that the Antarctic, having no indigenous population, should be part of the ‘common heritage

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3 Auburn (1982) provides a discussion on the vagueness of the term, and the extremes to which it can be interpreted.
of mankind’. Essentially this was an argument for developing nations to share in the potential ‘spoils’ of resource exploitation should it proceed. The discussion on CRAMRA will include an analysis on the changes to the ATS that have occurred as a result of the ardent pressure by these two groups during the 1980s.

Military presence in Antarctica is legitimated by Article I in the Treaty, allowing military to be utilised for logistical and scientific support. The ongoing presence of military in the Antarctic is challenged by a number of commentators including Hemmings (1990). The geographical position of Antarctica was strategically relevant at the time of establishing the Antarctic Treaty, however its ongoing relevance has been questioned. It will be shown that it is in the interests of nations to retain a presence in the Antarctic, less so for military purposes, but increasingly for environmental, scientific and economic reasons (Beck, 1990).

The adoption of the Environmental Protocol (1991) in Madrid, signalled a cooling of the fracas surrounding the abandonment of CRAMRA, and enabled the issue of exploration and mining of non-living resources to be set aside for fifty years (Puri, 1997). What then are the current and ongoing threats to maintaining the Antarctic for peaceful purposes? It will be argued that commercial interests, including fishing and tourism pose significant threats to a system not designed to deal with such issues. The calls for a liability mechanism to be implemented, reflect the international recognition of the potential for commercial exploitation of the area. Possible conflicts over the allocation and sharing of resources, and the probability that at least some nations will continue the push for mining in the Antarctic, all raise concerns that the retention of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes could be tested. It has been proposed that the Antarctic be set aside as a World Park, with mining banned permanently, however throughout this analysis it will be seen that economic interests, state sovereignty, and the reluctance of Antarctic Consultative Parties to relinquish power will probably thwart this desire.
Dodds (2002, pers.comm.) believes that the world is becoming increasingly globalised. In terms of the Antarctic this raises questions about the ongoing management regime, issues regarding the expression of national interests and sovereignty, and the likelihood of increasing pressures from globalised commercial practice. It would also suggest greater demand will continue to come from international environmental organisations to be more involved in the affairs of the Antarctic. Arguments exist for retaining strong national claims (albeit set aside by the Antarctic Treaty) and remaining under the management of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (Joyner & Theis, 1997; Wong, 2002, pers.comm.). These will be elucidated and evaluated in terms of their likelihood for retaining the Antarctic as a peaceful zone. Consideration will be given to assessing the merits of adopting World Park Status which could be managed either through the Antarctic Treaty System or an intergovernmental organisation such as the United Nations (Dalziell, 2002, pers.comm.). A number of conclusions will be reached which will suggest that national interests will continue to dominate the Antarctic Treaty System processes, despite a general trend towards increasing globalisation.

**New Zealand in the Antarctic: Sovereignty and Strategy**

New Zealand’s presence in the Antarctic was legitimated in 1923 by an Order of Council. By this order sovereignty over the Ross Dependency was established. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty put aside issues of sovereignty in Article IV, in effect ‘freezing’ the position as it was at the time.
"Article IV

1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
   (a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted ... claims to territorial sovereignty ...

2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for ... supporting ... a claim to territorial sovereignty."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFaT) is responsible for New Zealand’s involvement in Antarctic. Within the Ministry the Antarctic Policy Unit is responsible for providing advice to the Minister. Despite the Antarctic Treaty deliberately setting aside territorial claims, it becomes obvious through an examination of the website and personal communications with the head of the Policy Unit, Felicity Wong (2002), that sovereignty in the Ross Dependency remains important to the New Zealand government. The webpage on the relationship of New Zealand to Antarctica covers the constitutional history, legal system, and the domestic legislation of environmental measures to protect the Antarctic. The page stresses the constitutional attachment of the Ross Dependency to New Zealand. Only a small paragraph at the end of the site refers to New Zealand’s support of the Antarctic Treaty System, with a brief reference to Article IV(1). No mention is made of Article IV(2). Wong stated that New Zealand strongly asserts their claim to the Ross Dependency. In particular she declared that sovereignty ‘gives’ New Zealand the right to prosecute within this region. It also allows us to try and set high environmental standards in the region, and act as a leader in this regard. The production of the Ross Sea Region 2001: A State of the Environment Report (Waterhouse, 2001) highlights New Zealand’s active involvement in carrying out this environmental mantle of responsibility in the region.

Barry Weeber from The Royal Forest & Bird Protection Society (2002, pers.comm.) believes that New Zealand’s strong position on sovereignty is only a recent
phenomenon occurring over the last five years. This strong sovereignty stance was not always held by New Zealand. In the negotiations prior to the Antarctic Treaty, Walter Nash, then Prime Minister, indicated that New Zealand was willing to consider surrendering its claim of sovereignty in the interests of an international regime for the Antarctic (Beeby, 1972). On this issue, New Zealand stood apart from other claimant nations, e.g. Chile, Argentina, France and Australia.

In December 2001 the Ministry revised its Statement of Strategic Interests in the Antarctic (see Appendix One). It expands on the previous 1995 statement, reducing the emphasis on economic well-being and introducing a number of conservation objectives, including biodiversity, sustainable use, and environmental stewardship. It still retains an essence of economic interest through the inclusion of sustainable use with regards to fishing and supporting Antarctic activities that enhance the social, cultural and economic benefits. The Antarctic Treaty System is also now acknowledged within the preamble, however New Zealand continues to assert its presence within the Ross Dependency as crucial to maintaining an effective role in the governance of the Antarctic. Weeber (2002, pers.comm.) believes that these objectives need to be taken further. He argues that New Zealand’s fishing interests have become central to the position adopted by MFaT, and that more attention needs to be paid to issues of reducing the risk of resource rivalry, and the importance of the Antarctic to the global climate.

New Zealand has become increasingly involved in reaping the economic benefits of resource extraction in the Antarctic. Until 1996 New Zealand was a non-fishing member of CCAMLR (Wong, 2002, pers.comm.). Since then it has supported the New Zealand-owned Sanfords Fishing exploratory fishing ventures in the Ross Sea which commenced in 1997 (Johansen, 2002, pers.comm.). Sanfords asserts it is taking a cautious approach to fishing in the region and is hoping to be given some ‘guarantee of ownership’ to CCAMLR-issued fishing rights in the area. Any
indications of this nature, e.g. the establishment of a quota system, are extremely unlikely to occur under the current regime (Weeber, 2002, pers.comm.). The level of resource extraction and economic potential in the Antarctic is new to New Zealand and perhaps outcounts for our strengthened position on sovereignty. Prior to this our economic interests in the region had been dominated by tourism (e.g. Antarctic Heritage Expeditions).

New Zealand was also heavily involved in the CRAMRA negotiations. Barnes (1982) noted that New Zealand was one of the most vocal in arguing for exploratory drilling in the Antarctic. Alongside the US, it remained highly in favour of CRAMRA when the split occurred between the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties in the 1989 Paris meeting (Rothwell, 1990). However, given the shift towards increased environmental protection in the 1980s and considering New Zealand’s Resource Management Act (1991) was also being negotiated at that time, the eventual movement of New Zealand to support the development of the Environmental Protocol (1991) could be construed as a natural occurrence of changing political thought. Increased environmental protection and the introduction of a raft of environmental tools to protect the Antarctic seem to stand at odds with the increased support of the New Zealand government towards fishing in the Ross Sea Region. Remembering the two prongs of increasing globalisation advanced by critical geopolitical theory, environmentalism and commercialisation, it is not surprising.

United States in the Antarctic: Hegemonic Power

Undeniably, the United States has the most significant presence in the Antarctic. McMurdo, the largest of its three stations, houses 1200 summer and 200 winter staff. Its military operations and scientific budget are not exceeded by any other nations. Joyner & Theis (1997, p1) argue that the United States is the “...chief architect of law
and policy for the Antarctic". Despite not lodging any claim below 60 degrees south, the United States has, under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, not renounced its right to assert a claim, although this cannot be asserted while the Treaty is in force⁴. Arguments exist about the nature of the freedom of scientific research to protect and serve United States national interests. Art Brown (2001, pers.comm.), from the National Science Foundation, has said that freedom to science is detrimental to National Interests [emphasis by Brown]. Joyner & Theis (1997) argue that the traditional assumption of the pursuit of global interests being irreconcilable with national interests is incorrect, and that US Antarctic policy explicitly serves national interests.

What are the national interests of the United States in the Antarctic? Consider first what are the national interests of any nation state: national security, self-preservation, economic sufficiency, national prestige, ideological ambitions, and power considerations (ibid). The United States does not have any core interests at risk in Antarctica, nevertheless their ongoing presence is deemed prudent. It has been stated by Presidential Memorandum No. 6646 of February 5th 1982, that it is in the interests of the United States to ‘maintain an active and influential presence’. Scientific endeavour, environmental issues, and economic opportunity are the prime reasons for ongoing US interest in the Antarctic (ibid).

Prior to the Antarctic Treaty, United States strategic interests were primarily of a military nature. In 1946-47 Operation Highjump deployed 4700 troops to the Antarctic under the command of Admiral Richard E Byrd. Having developed a strong military during World War II, the United States now sought to expand and continue to develop its military operations and capabilities. Operation Highjump had five designated purposes: training personnel and testing material in frigid zones;

⁴ Article IV(1(b)) and Article IV (2) of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.
consolidating US sovereignty over the largest practicable area of the Antarctic continent; determining feasibility of establishing and maintaining military bases; developing techniques for establishing and maintaining these bases; and increasing scientific knowledge of the area (Rose, 1980). An outcome of Operation Highjump was to raise concerns amongst the Latin American nations, who rightly saw the exercise as a challenge by the United States to seize parts of the continent for its exclusive use.

Operation Highjump was also in response to the growing Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. As the Cold War escalated, the Soviets established bases on all the territorial claims in Antarctica, and resisted the United States initiative to establish an international regime with the seven claimant nations during discussions in 1948 - 1950 (Beeby, 1972; Beck, 1990). They claimed in a memorandum to all seven claimant nations and the United States, that due to the discoveries in the nineteenth century of Bellinghausen and Lazarev, the Soviet Union had a right to be included in Antarctic affairs and decision-making. The United States were concerned about the increasing presence of the Soviet Union, and in recognising that their departure was unlikely and with the potential threat they might set up bases in the unclaimed portion of the Antarctic where the United States had made a strong basis for laying a claim, the United States conceded to some form of international accommodation (Joyner & Theis, 1997).

In addition to the Soviet Union, the United States had been concerned by ongoing conflict arising being the overlaying claims of the United Kingdom, Chile and Argentina, as well as the expeditions by Nazi Germany in 1938 to make a claim, later abandoned by their invasion of Poland. The United States had five major concerns regarding the military use of the Antarctic: as a base for raiders of vessels rounding either Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope, launching southern hemisphere attacks, and long-range nuclear weapons, or as a site for weather and satellite tracking.
stations, or for storage or refuge in the event of war (ibid). The United States saw
demilitarisation as an effective way to remove the Soviet military threat from the
region. Any military defense of the region would prove to be too expensive to mount.
Along with New Zealand and ten other nations, the United States forged and ratified
the Antarctic Treaty.

Aside from strategic military manoeuvring, it has been suggested the United States’
true motivation for initiating the Treaty was to gain a freedom of access throughout
the continent. However, the United States have never recognised any claims, and
their domestic policy of non-recognition allows their freedom of movement anyway
(Auburn, 1982). Despite their refusal to formally acknowledge any claims, it has
been argued that their station at the South Pole is in some respects an
acknowledgement of the claimant process as it places them strategically where all
other claims converge and gives them an interest in each sector (Joyner & Theis,
1997).

The nature of the ATS is that decisions are made by consensus. However, countries
can exert a certain will in determining the discourse and way in which events are
portrayed (Dodds, 2000). It is argued that the United States acts as the hegemonic
power within the ATS. The volume of published material on the Antarctic originates
primarily from western nations, often sharing a similar ideology. Issues of individual
rights, free trade, and sustainable development of economic resource use, are all part
of the political ideology of these nations. The United States, as a major economic
power, has enormous influence on these. Attempts by some other nations to enter the
Antarctic Treaty have been blocked, including Pakistan. Despite their presence in the
Antarctic, and the establishment of a base, they have not been admitted even on a
non-consultative basis. It has been suggested that this is due to the unwillingness of
the United States to allow an Islamic nation within the system (de Poorter, 2002,
pers.comm). It may also be due to the reluctance of Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties to include more nations who are fundamentally at odds with each other. India, who has a tense relationship with Pakistan, acceded to the Treaty in 1983 and was immediately granted Consultative Party status (Berkman, 2002). This was due in part to the demand from the international community to include developing nations within the Treaty System. It is suggested that granting India this status was to appease these criticisms (Berkman, 2001, pers.comm.).

Undoubtedly the United States has been a leading figure in Antarctic decision making, lead primarily by the size of their Antarctic operations. (Joyner & Theis, 1997). However their ongoing interest is now less for military purposes, and more for other reasons. It is argued that their desire to extract resources from the region is now tempered with an environmental imperative. The negotiations over CRAMRA would suggest that resource rivalry and the underlying territorial claims have the potential to upset the delicate balance of international cooperation occurring in the Antarctic. United States interests are better served by maintaining peace in the area. To continue to press for mineral extraction raises the debate of the ‘common heritage of mankind’\textsuperscript{5}, and could engender the breakdown of the ATS. If the ATS were to fall apart, territorial issues by current claimants, the push for inclusion by a number of other countries, and the debate about the ‘ownership’ of mineral extraction, would spark rivalry and discord. Whilst the potential for mineral resource extraction is currently unconfirmed and uneconomic, it is strategically irresponsible for the United States to see the current system fail. Thus the United States moved with other countries who favoured CRAMRA to seek a solution that would put on hold the mineral issues, and address the environmental concerns. Hence the development of

\textsuperscript{5}The ‘common heritage of mankind’ arose from the debate on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Developing nations believe that the Antarctic, like the deep seabed should belong to all and the profits from resource exploitation distributed to produce revenue for development activities in poor countries. The United States find this form of ‘international redistributive socialism’ abhorrent and contrary to national interest (Joyner & Theis, 1997).
the Environmental Protocol (1991) and the resumption of amicable relationships between the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty.

The current interests of the United States in the Antarctic are a mixture of environmental, resource, and security concerns, with economic interests playing second fiddle to environmental protection (Joyner & Theis, 1997). The genuineness of this is debatable. Greenpeace International’s surveying of bases in the Antarctic during the late 1980s and early 1990s would indicate that United States bases were no better than other nations at environmental protection. The dumping of rubbish and fuel leakages in Winter Quarters Bay in McMurdo Sound, amongst other practices, was highly criticised (Szabo & Dalziell, 1994). Their continuing delay alongside New Zealand to finish the clean-up of Cape Hallett would suggest that environmental protection and clean-up only occurs secondary to economic or politically advantageous considerations. Auburn (1982, p290) argues that the new wave of environmental responsibility is the latest “justification to legitimate the claims of the club to a monopoly of Antarctic decision-making.” Certainly sustainable development is a catch-cry with respect to environmental protection, and is becoming the favoured way of legitimising the extraction resources whilst managing for environmental fallout. Sustainable use of resources is an inherent part of the CCAMLR agreement and increasingly this agreement is becoming more focussed on the economics of fishing rather than environmental protection (Weeber, 2002, pers.comm.). In this sense, the United States environmental protection stance may resemble that of New Zealand.

‘Peaceful Purposes Only’ : Military involvement since the Antarctic Treaty

Since the demilitarisation of the Antarctic forged in the Antarctic Treaty, the immediate threat of military strike and conflict has dissipated. Despite conflicts occurring between nations outside of the zone, e.g. the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War
between Britain and Argentina, the Treaty has been lauded for its ability to continue to facilitate international cooperation. Often mentioned is the Antarctic Consultative Party Meeting whereby British and Argentinian representatives sat around the table to consider Antarctic matters at a time when their nations were at war (Joyner, 2001, pers.comm.). However the outward reduction of military aggression in the Antarctic does not mean that their presence no longer exists. Critical geopolitical theory identifies the key themes of the ‘realist’ perspective as national sovereignty, the importance of state boundaries, and the exercise of military power (Dodds, 2000).

Despite the setting aside of territorial claims by the ATS, the presence of military in the Antarctic constitutes a very powerful visible display of national sovereignty. This presence is often surprising to the public (Hemmings, 1990).

As outlined earlier, it is questionable what constitutes ‘peaceful purposes’ and in particular how it relates to the presence of military in the Antarctic. A wide interpretation may consider that the use of military force for deterrence is acceptable, as is the testing of equipment and material in the conditions (ibid). Auburn (1982) argues that it is the purpose of the exercise that must provide the rationale for deciding. If it is for military purposes that programmes operate, or bases established, then it would be against the spirit of the Treaty. If however military use supports a legitimate scientific endeavour, then nothing is breached. Hemmings (1990) questions this logic. Under the Antarctic Treaty military use is permitted in two areas: logistical, technical, or manpower [sic] support; and scientific research. It is difficult to assess what is legitimate use. The crossover comes in the issue of support or scientific research that has military value. For example, the use of Hercules aircraft to transport equipment and people to the South Pole base is an extension of one of the objectives of Operation Highjump: to train personnel and test equipment in frigid zones. The testing of low-frequency radio operations in the low sound pollution area of the Antarctic is also claimed to have military significance (ibid).
During the 1959 Conference, New Zealand and a number of other nations were against the use of military personnel and services in the Antarctic, and unsuccessfully sought to have the provision removed. However it was accepted because of the difficulty most nations would encounter in trying to mount scientific expeditions without the support of the military (Auburn, 1982). Arguably, the military still provides the most cost-effective way to provide the logistical support needed to continue scientific investigation in the Antarctic, although a number of nations, including Germany and Poland, use entirely civilian means.

Arguments exist to the extent to which the Antarctic should continue to be demilitarised. Certainly the military presence causes ongoing concern for some nations. In negotiations to establish a Secretariat in Argentina for the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings, Britain stalled on their support due to the large Argentinian military presence in the Antarctic. Argentina’s reduction in the use of military, amongst other considerations, finally lead to Britain agreeing to support the nomination (Joyner, 2001, pers.comm., Hemmings, 2002, pers.comm.). The geostrategic decision for nations to continue a military presence to preserve national identity and deterrence, although not explicitly stated, is understandable in the light of issues surrounding territorial claims, the potential for resource exploitation, and the desire to maintain a visual presence. Thus it can be seen that nations and in particular the policy-makers utilise the military community in the Antarctic, supporting the dominance of the ‘realist’ view of world politics.

Other groups in the Antarctic have differing view on the use of military for logistical and scientific support. There is no doubt that distinctions are evident between the military community and those who are in the Antarctic for scientific endeavour, however the scientific community have remained mute on the issue of military presence, other than to acknowledge the support provided (pers.obs.). The environmental community on the other hand, have been outspoken at times regarding
the need to continue to demilitarise the Antarctic. Alan Hemmings (1990), an international member of ASOC, believes that logistical support is possible without the use of military, particularly considering the advances in technology since the signing of the Treaty. He also queries the relevance of using the military in a community that is becoming increasing globalised and suggests that Antarctica should continue to be demilitarised given the current international climate.

Interestingly an unusual alliance occurs regarding the use of military forces to deter unsustainable environmental practices. Take for instance the 1999 deployment of the New Zealand naval vessel, Te Kaha, and the use of Air Force Orions in monitoring the area between 60 deg and 74 deg south for illegal toothfish fishing (Hopper, 1999). Despite no illegal or unregulated fishing being discovered, the use of military monitoring (arguably deterrence) may contravene the spirit of the treaty. Although for laudable purposes, this activity was considered irregular by Antarctic Treaty members (Hemmings, 2002, pers.comm.). This highlights one of the issues that will arise in the Antarctic, particularly with regards to the monitoring of resource exploitation. Under CCAMLR no enforcement measures exist, which prompted New Zealand to undertake its own. This may have some environmental benefit, but what about the use of military for ‘peaceful purposes only’? How can environmental protection be best ensured when huge economic issues are at stake? The military are the obvious resource, and are used for peacekeeping around the world under the management of the United Nations. The enforcement of CCAMLR and other treaties may represent another role for the military in the Antarctic? Or, as is suggested by the environmental movement, should we remove the threat of resource rivalry and retain the Antarctic for peaceful purposes without risking it erupting into another zone of conflict (Wallace, 2002, pers.comm., Weeber, 2002, pers.comm.).
During the 1959 Conference, New Zealand and a number of other nations were against the use of military personnel and services in the Antarctic, and unsuccessfully sought to have the provision removed. However it was accepted because of the difficulty most nations would encounter in trying to mount scientific expeditions without the support of the military (Auburn, 1982). Arguably, the military still provides the most cost-effective way to provide the logistical support needed to continue scientific investigation in the Antarctic, although a number of nations, including Germany and Poland, use entirely civilian means.

Arguments exist to the extent to which the Antarctic should continue to be demilitarised. Certainly the military presence causes ongoing concern for some nations. In negotiations to establish a Secretariat in Argentina for the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings, Britain stalled on their support due to the large Argentinian military presence in the Antarctic. Argentina’s reduction in the use of military, amongst other considerations, finally lead to Britain agreeing to support the nomination (Joyner, 2001, pers.comm., Hemmings, 2002, pers.comm.). The geostrategic decision for nations to continue a military presence to preserve national identity and deterrence, although not explicitly stated, is understandable in the light of issues surrounding territorial claims, the potential for resource exploitation, and the desire to maintain a visual presence. Thus it can be seen that nations and in particular the policy-makers utilise the military community in the Antarctic, supporting the dominance of the ‘realist’ view of world politics.

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**Scientific Community: Attempts at Independence**

Operating somewhat independently from national jurisdiction, the scientific community, through the International Council of Scientific Union (ICSU) established the International Geophysical Year from 1957 - 59. During this time international scientific cooperation meant the establishment of a number of bases in the Antarctic, including Hallett Station, operated by New Zealand and the United States, and a number of joint scientific endeavours. Cooperation established during the IGY gave the nation states involved in the Antarctic a valid reason for maintaining an ongoing presence. This presence was articulated in the Antarctic Treaty in Articles II and III. Auburn (1982) argues that the true nature of national interests in the Antarctic is obscured by the emphasis on scientific research. Governments have not been interested in scientific research to such an extent elsewhere, and thus their motives for doing so in the Antarctic may be suspect.

Scientific research has attempted to maintain an existence separate to the political manoeuvring by other parties in the Antarctic. Berkman (2002) believes that scientific research and international cooperation is the keystone to retaining the Antarctic for peaceful purposes only. The ability of science to answer questions of the past and future benefitting the global community, is enhanced by the Antarctic Treaty. The Antarctic is a platform from which knowledge relevant to the entire planet and beyond can be obtained. Issues such as international pollution fallout, monitoring of global warming and climate change, and astronomical and atmospheric studies provide extremely valuable information, assisting decision-making regarding the ongoing health of the planet and enabling informed policy to be made.

The scientific community seek to maintain their presence in the Antarctic as the most legitimate. For ongoing knowledge regarding the global significance of the Antarctic, this appears a worthwhile cause. However, scientific knowledge is not always in the
interests of the planet, and is sometimes for prestige or the pursuit of economic gain (Joyner & Theis, 1997; Pollock, 2001, pers.comm.). At the 1998 Antarctic Futures Conference in Christchurch, James Hall from Saatchi and Saatchi promoted the branding of Antarctica. He believed science could be used to promote brands, and suggested that scientists should “do science which companies will want to participate in.” (cited in Tetley, 1998). Scientific endeavour in the Antarctic is obviously expensive. Funding is an issue. If the point is reached where Antarctic scientific funding has to be sought from private companies, the ability of science to maintain a modicum of freedom of investigation may well be compromised by the economic imperative. Funding for the United States Antarctic Programme, administered by the National Science Foundation, has a budget of US$150 million, the bulk of which (85%) is for logistical support, leaving US$22.5 million for science. (Brown, 2001, pers.comm.). The New Zealand programme’s budget is approximately $35 million of which $7 million (20%) is for science, sought through a variety of funding agencies with the logistics provided by Antarctica New Zealand (Peterson, 2001, pers.comm.; Turvey, 2002, pers.comm.).

SCAR has attempted to maintain its political independence throughout the Treaty System, and participates in the process as an Observer, providing expertise upon request (Kimball, 1998). In 1980 it also established a subgroup, the SCAR Group of Specialists on Environmental Affairs and Conservation (GOSEAC), whose chief task is to provide scientific advice to SCAR on a variety of environmental matters (SCAR, 2002). SCAR is an international nongovernmental organisation, including nation state members from each ATCP. As such, it meets the ‘liberal institutionalist’ theory of world politics, operating outside nation states but through its structure, still with significant national interests.

Cath Wallace (2002, pers.comm.), a member of ECO (a New Zealand environmental umbrella group), and delegate to ASOC, noted scientists’ unwillingness to challenge
the CRAMRA negotiations, with few exceptions. Within the New Zealand, funding for scientific endeavour in the Antarctic was granted through the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), which was also responsible for administering the Antarctic programme. As such, many of the scientists were reluctant to speak out in case it harmed their chances of ongoing funding. However, it is not always the case that scientists hold their silence. In a collaborative effort with Greenpeace, significant members of the Antarctic scientific community put forward their case for Antarctica to become a World Park (Greenpeace, 1991)\(^6\).

Scientists operate both within and outside the structure of national interest.

**The Environmental Movement: Challenges to Antarctic Exclusivity and Practice**

Two issues appear to spur environmental interest in the Antarctic: concern over the preservation of the local environment; and the recognition that the Antarctic has global environmental significance. Although having an involvement in Antarctic affairs since the negotiation of CCAMLR, the environmental community headed by ASOC, Greenpeace International, and the World Wildlife Fund stepped up their campaigns around the time of the minerals negotiation. The realisation that the hitherto relatively untouched continent of Antarctica may be exploited in the way all other continents had been previously, caused grave concerns amongst those in the environmental community. This examination will focus on the actions of two environmental groups: ASOC's pressure on CRAMRA and Greenpeace International's involvement in monitoring bases at Ross Island and on the Antarctic Peninsula, as well as their establishment of a base at Cape Evans to lobby for a World Park.

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\(^6\) *Antarctica: The Scientists' Case for a World Park* included articles from ten prominent Antarctic scientists from a wide range of countries.
ASOC was galvanised into action by the minerals convention in 1982. Upon learning that these negotiations were to be conducted in closed meetings at Wellington, ASOC sought the support of New Zealand environmental groups to monitor the proceedings. Jim Barnes, a United States law and social policy expert, initiated ASOC’s involvement. He stated that Antarctic decision-making was shrouded in secrecy, and witnessing some of the early proposals for the minerals convention, believed that the ATCPs were acting in the economic interests of their own countries in devising a minerals regime that would ensure the profits were returned to them (Joyner & Theis, 1997; Wallace, 2002, pers.comm.). The argument for establishing a minerals regime presented by the ATCPs followed this logic: exploitation is inevitable, therefore controls will be needed, and thus institutions and rules need to be set. In other words security for the environment. However, closer examination of CRAMRA reveals it continually refers to significant adverse environmental effects and substantial risk to wildlife and the environment (Puri, 1997). ASOC analysed the material that was being produced during CRAMRA and concluded that the minerals regime was about facilitating mining by providing a legal and political framework for the establishment of property rights, ensuring all ATCPs shared in the proceeds (Wallace, 2002, pers.comm.). The proposed environmental measures were an auxiliary measure to give some legitimacy to the process. Because of ASOC’s concerns, the wider international community was engaged, including Greenpeace International (who were members of ASOC) and Jacques Cousteau to raise international public awareness. They also brought in a number of nations not represented in the ATS through approaches to the United Nations. Their efforts at raising international awareness were rewarded by the withdrawal of France and then Australia from the agreement, eventually splitting the ATCPs and resulting in the abandonment of CRAMRA.

Greenpeace International mounted a monitoring campaign of stations in the Antarctic from 1983/84 until 1994/95 (omitting 1993/94), concentrating on stations in the Ross Sea Region and along the Antarctic Peninsula. Their focus was on the environmental
practice of the stations and considered key issues such as waste disposal, incineration, fuel storage, sewage treatment, and after 1991, adherence to the Environmental Protocol. It is acknowledged by a wide variety of sources that the pressure brought to bear by Greenpeace on stations, did invoke a major clean-up programme, although standards between bases continue to vary (Berkman, 2001, pers.comm.; de Poorter, 2002, pers.comm.; Wratt, 2002, pers.comm.).

In addition, Greenpeace International also set up a base at Cape Evans in February 1987 to strengthen their position to lobby for a place in the Antarctic Treaty System, and to heighten awareness for the World Park campaign. In 1992 the base was dismantled following the introduction of the Environmental Protocol, enabling more effective utilisation of resources. The establishment and eventual clean-up of the base, which has left no visual scar on the landscape, provided a model for environmentally-friendly living in the Antarctic (pers.obs.) Measures included the utilisation of alternative fuel sources, the use of composting for human sewage, the removal of surplus packaging before transportation to Antarctica, and the retrograding of all waste, excluding filtered grey water (Szabo & Dalziel, 1994). During this campaign, Greenpeace International heightened attention to two major issues of environmental destruction in the Antarctic. The first was the initial construction of an airstrip by the French at Dumont D’Urville in 1983/84 which involved displacement of several bird species and the killing of a number of penguins following a series of explosions. The second was the grounding and sinking of the Argentinian resupply vessel, the Bahia Paraiso in 1989 spilling an estimated 600,000 litres of diesel into an ecologically sensitive area (ibid). Fuel spills are common around bases and airstrips in the Antarctic and it is through the highlighting of such

7It has been suggested that the French decision to withdraw from CRAMRA was as a result of negative media exposure generated by a number of environmentally unfriendly practices conducted by France including Dumont D’Urville, the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific, and the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior.
issues by Greenpeace International that environmental practices in the Antarctic have been prominent on the international agenda.

Obviously the environmental movement, especially internationally, operates separate to national interests. At times the movement comes in direct conflict with the governments of parties to the Antarctic Treaty System. They represent a global view of world politics, outlined in the key themes of interdependence, the establishment of networks, and the representation of global space (Dodds, 2000).

**CRAMRA: Splitting the Consensus**

Much has already been said about CRAMRA: the interests of nation states in executing a minerals regime, the purposeful exposure of the regime by the environmental movement, and its breakdown in consensus. What does all this mean for the future of the ATS? During the 1989 ATCM in Paris, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties were split into two groups: eight countries (including New Zealand and the United States) intent on promoting CRAMRA, and eleven countries supporting Australia and France’s call for the establishment of a World Park. The eventual decision to abandon CRAMRA came about through the need to reestablish consensus. As the likelihood of mining in the Antarctic was not in the near future, this decision was unlikely to cause any loss of economic opportunity, and enabled the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to be seen as acting in the interests of the environment (Joyner & Theis, 1997). But this claim of acting in environmental interests may be misleading, for not only would it restore consensus, but the advancement of an Environmental Protocol did not rule out the possibility of mining in the future, unlike the establishment of a World Park (particularly under the auspices of the United Nations), as was proposed by dissenting nations. Further, a number of environmental practices were lifted straight from CRAMRA into the new Environmental Protocol (Joyner, 2001, pers.comm.). Certainly the genuineness of
the decision to abandon CRAMRA by some of the nations may be in doubt, particularly as the French are now supposedly engaged in research along the continental shelf (Joyner & Theis, 1997). Russia, at the latest ATCM in St Petersberg acknowledged that its intensive off-shore operations may involve the potential for identifying sources of mineral and hydrocarbon deposits (ASOC, 2001).

It seems relevant to suggest that the ATS is not capable of handling the potential conflict that could arise from resource rivalry, particularly those that are finite. Nor is a resource regime likely to have the best possible outcome for the Antarctic environment, especially considering the economic focus that now dominates CCAMLR proceedings (Weeber, 2002, pers.comm.). Greenpeace International and other environmental movements still argue that the establishment of a World Park provides the best answer (Dalziell, 2002, pers.comm.; Weeber, 2002, pers.comm.).

Maintaining Peaceful Purposes: Is a World Park the answer?

Most commentators on the Antarctic now support the Antarctic Treaty System as the most workable regime for ongoing peace and stability in the area (Arenas, 1994; Beck, 1994; Dodds, 2002, pers.comm.). Suggestions that it has evolved in the 1980s to become more flexible and robust are worthy of consideration. It has grown from a small group of twelve nations to represent the interests of 70% of the planet’s population, with 44 countries now acceding to the Treaty System (Berkman, 2002). The rapid growth in countries joining during the 1980s could well be attributed to the willingness to be involved in a regime with the potential for economic benefit, however there is little doubt that the System is no longer a ‘club of exclusivity’ as it once was. Forty years on from the signing of the Antarctic Treaty, a number of issues confront this regime.
Firstly, there is demands that it must continue to accept the globalisation of the international community, and fundamentally adjust to this change through the accession of third parties to the Treaty System in ways more substantive than at present (Puri, 1997; Dodds, 2002, pers.comm.) Currently the only decision-makers in the System are nation states. It is believed that the introduction of nongovernmental and intergovernmental organisations as decision-makers may well serve interests (e.g. environmental) not adequately catered for by national delegations (Kimball, 1998). Secondly, the ATS must be able to provide some degree of assurance that environmental protocols and standards will be upheld and maintained, particularly under regimes of resource abstraction. This is difficult given the inability of the regime to provide for liability issues and maintain vigilant monitoring (especially regarding CCAMLR) (Barnes, 1982; Dodds, 2002, pers.comm.; Wallace, 2002, pers.comm.). Finally is the issue of maintaining a degree of consensus amongst the parties. As the number of nations, and the divergence of their ideologies increase, consensus may become difficult to maintain (Joyner, 2001, pers.comm.; Dodds, 2002, pers.comm.). It can only be hoped that nations will see the value in maintaining the Antarctic for ‘peaceful purposes’ and act in good faith to preserve consensus.

An alternative is to place the care of the Antarctic into a World Park. With increasing pressure from commercialisation in the form of fishing, tourism and the long term issue of mineral extraction, continuing pressures on the Antarctic environment can be assured. Greenpeace International (and other organisations) have always maintained that the only long-term solution is for the establishment of a World Park. They believe that this can occur either under the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty System, or under a new agency, perhaps under the umbrella of the United Nations (Dalziell, 2002, pers.comm.). Some, such as Joyner & Theis (1997) argue that the countries currently involved in the ATS, and especially the United States, are better placed to provide environmental protection than developing nations, whom they state have ‘lacklustre conservationist records’. This may indeed be true,
but neglects to take into account, the practice of some developed nations in funding environmentally unfriendly practices in developing nations (Overton, 1999).

The central principles in Greenpeace’s advocation for a World Park involve recognition of the intrinsic value of the continent, protection of all wildlife and ecological communities, use of the continent for only high-quality scientific research, and maintenance of the area as a zone of peace (Szabo & Dalziell, 1994). Essentially these do not differ from the use of the Antarctic as a ‘natural reserve’ as is now established under the Environmental Protocol. The difference is in the long-term preservation of the Antarctic from the possibility of mineral exploitation. Some argue that this is achieved through the fifty-year ban currently in place in the Environmental Protocol (de Poorter, 2002, pers.comm.). Others however argue that we must maintain a vigilance (e.g. Wallace, 2002, pers.comm.), and work towards the World Park regime (Dalziell, 2002, pers.comm.). There is no doubt in the minds of some commentators that resource rivalry will be the undoing of the use of the Antarctic for ‘peaceful purposes only’ (e.g. Joyner & Theis, 1997; Robinson, 2001, pers.comm.; Dodds, 2002, pers.comm.; Wallace, 2002, pers.comm.; & Weeber, 2002, pers.comm.). This is further asserted by Auburn (1982) who believes that the Antarctic Treaty System was not constructed to deal with issues of resource use, these thoughts echoed again later by Puri (1997).

The likelihood of gaining a World Park regime outside the Antarctic Treaty System is highly improbable given the effort to which some nations have gone to preserve their claimant or potential claimant status within the Antarctic. Many of these countries have no doubt, despite legal disagreement, that their claim in the Antarctic is a legitimate slice of their national territory (Joyner & Theis, 1997). Rothwell (1990) also believes that before any notion of Antarctica as a World Park can be achieved, issues regarding the demands of the Third World for a greater administrative role and the claims by seven nations, will have to be taken into account. Some commentators
argue, however, that despite this improbability, it should be realised that growing
globalisation will eventually lead demand for a much more inclusive international
regime (Puri, 1997). Whether the Antarctic Treaty System can adapt to such a large
change is questionable. It has been suggested that the way to start the development of
a World Park for Antarctica would be by initiating a Marine Reserve in the waters
south of 60 degrees latitude (Weeber, 2002, pers.comm.).

It would seem the World Park notion would be the best way forward to protect the
Antarctic environment for the future given a number of factors: the economic
interests of nation states, the potential for conflict over resource rivalry, the unsettled
debate of resource profit allocation, and the queries regarding environmental
genuineness by states involved in the Antarctic. Achievement of this aim will need to
be meet by continued vigilance on the part of watchdog groups, and ongoing
negotiations between consultative and non-consultative parties (Wallace, 2002,
pers.comm.). The inclusion of third parties into the Antarctic Treaty System could
well see a movement towards this aim, however, this must be measured against the
increased likelihood of a breakdown in consensus.

Conclusion

From this discussion, a number of conclusions have been reached. Firstly the theories
of critical geopolitical thought offer an excellent framework for analysing the
communities in the Antarctic. It has been shown that realism is the most influential
literature in geopolitics, guiding decision-making within the Antarctic Treaty System.
Science does indeed occupy the liberal institutionalist view, trying to bridge the gap
between realism and globalisation. Despite national interest assertion, globalisation
is becoming increasingly widespread in the Antarctic, suggesting areas for future
concern.
It has been shown that the military presence in the Antarctic represents an organised and responsive display of national interest, unlikely to be passed over in favour of civilian operation, with the scientific community providing the rationale for nations to be involved in the Antarctic. Scientific endeavour in seeking insights and solutions to global environmental issues remain the most legitimate use of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes. The environmental nongovernmental organisation movement has been influential and successful in challenging the exclusivity of the Antarctic Treaty System.

The Antarctic Treaty System has matured over the 1980s to represent a system that has the potential to provide ongoing management of the Antarctic, at least in the medium term. However, the ATS must accept increasing globalisation, and adopt a structure that allows for the constructive input of third parties, primarily intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations. Issues of commercialisation in the Antarctic, particularly relating to resource extraction, have the potential to undermine the Antarctic as a zone of peace. The Antarctic plays a crucial role in global politics, and its future as a global commons must pay attention to wider issues of development and underdevelopment internationally.

To retain the Antarctic for peaceful purposes only will need to ensure that national interests are put aside for the sake of international harmony, a regime that may well be best suited by adoption of the World Park. While nations remain intent on pursuing national interest and increasing economic pressure is applied, the likelihood of this outcome is remote. The pressure to make changes in the meantime will continue to come from parties outside the Antarctic Treaty System.
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Appendix One

1995 NZ Statement of Strategic Objective

The conservation of the intrinsic values of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, for the benefit of the world community and for present and future generations of New Zealanders, reflected in active and responsible stewardship, that promotes New Zealand’s interests in:

- Maintaining its long term interest in and commitment to the Ross Dependency
- National security, through keeping Antarctica as a neutral and non-aligned neighbour
- Economic well being, through enhancing New Zealand’s economic opportunities within the parameters of the Antarctic Treaty System
- Internation stability, by enhancing New Zealand’s leadership in the governance of Antarctica
- Promoting New Zealand’s values and ideology by promoting Antarctica as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science

Antarctica: Revised NZ Strategic Interests (as at 12 December 2001)

The maintenance of the intrinsic values of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, for the benefit of the world community and for present and future generations of New Zealanders, reflected in active and responsible stewardship, under the Antarctic Treaty System, that promotes New Zealand’s interests in:

- National and international peace and security through a commitment to keeping Antarctica peaceful, nuclear free, and its environment protected;
- Continued influence in Antarctic governance through maintaining an effective role in the Antarctic Treaty System and credible presence in the Ross Dependency;
- Conserving, protecting, and understanding the biodiversity of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, in particular the biodiversity of the Ross Sea region, including protection and management of special areas;
- Conservation, including sustainable use*, of the marine living resources of the Southern Ocean, and in particular the Ross Sea, in accordance with CCAMLR;
- Supporting and where appropriate leading, high quality Antarctic and Southern Ocean science that benefits from the unique research opportunities provided by Antarctica;
- Demonstrating and advocating for best practice in environmental stewardship and all other activities throughout Antarctica, and in particular the Ross Sea region;
- Ensuring that all activity is undertaken in a manner consistent with Antarctica’s status as a natural reserve devoted to peace and science, and within this context support Antarctic related activities that enhance social, cultural and economic benefits to New Zealand and the wider global community.

*Sustainable use means the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations. (Convention on Biological Diversity).

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9ibid