…it is “in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord” (Antarctic Treaty, 1961).

JUDITH M. FRETTER

ABSTRACT

This review seeks to examine the incidence of conflict in the Antarctic and assess its causes. Existing literature in the field referring to conflict in the Antarctic is assessed and will help develop a typology of conflict and conflict management for the region’s potential conflicts.

1 Note that the term ‘the Antarctic’ refers to the area commonly recognised as the Antarctic region below the latitude of 60° South. Whereas ‘Antarctica’ refers only to the continent itself. In keeping with this, the Antarctic Treaty refers to the area south of 60° South, including ice shelves but excluding the high seas (see Article VI). To avoid confusion, the area considered in this review refers to the area south of 60° South, not just the continent itself.
A REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IN THE ANTARCTIC

…it is “in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord” (Antarctic Treaty, 1961).

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1.1 INTRODUCTION

The incidence of conflict in the Antarctic is scarce and, still scarcer, the incidence of armed conflict. Conflict has arisen more along the lines of conflict ‘associated’ with an Antarctic issue or conflict ‘spill-over’ between Antarctic Treaty states, consequently affecting their behaviour or relations in the Antarctic. Very few conflicts have centred on the continent itself. This is not to say that the Antarctic region has been devoid of one of the most common forms of human interaction, conflict. This literature review concentrates on identifying the incidence and types of conflict in the Antarctic.

Firstly, however, it is essential to point out the importance of context in an analysis of the Antarctic situation. Whilst world events have had their impact on the incidence of Antarctic conflict (see Table 1: Antarctic Development and Corresponding International Events), the issue of conflict in the Antarctic is transcended by two overarching events, the International Geophysical Year, July 1957 – December 1958 (IGY) and the Antarctic Treaty. The importance of the IGY lies in the fact that the seventh continent was internationally reaffirmed as a ‘natural laboratory’ for science. With the supervision of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), Antarctica’s role as a place for science and research was assured. It was this international science body that paved the way for the Antarctic Treaty, a document that purposefully accentuated science, not international politics or national territorial sovereignty (United Nations, 1986: 68; Reader’s Digest, 1985: 281).
There was some recognition that science could be used as a premise for expansion and claims in the Antarctic indeed, “some political leaders quickly realised how hidden ambitions could be cloaked by scientific research before an overt move is made” (Bertram, 1958: 105). The IGY saw unprecedented growth and population in Antarctica, with new bases and facilities springing up all over the place, with twelve nations setting up forty-four new stations in addition to those bases already in operation (Fox, 1985: 167, 168).

The Antarctic Treaty itself, (formulated on December 1, 1959 and brought into force June 23, 1961) is a living document and a monument to international compromise and cooperation. Occurring at a time when the continent’s early geo-strategic importance was pivotal, the Antarctic Treaty ensured that the Antarctic did not become embroiled in the geo-political struggles of the time [it occurred at the height of the Cold War\(^2\)] and set out conditions whereby the continent’s peaceful future would be secure (McDongial and Woodworth, 2001: 519). The Treaty enshrines the principle of cooperation in pursuit of science and states that ‘Antarctica’ be used for peaceful purposes only.

The preamble of the Treaty emphasises not once, but twice, the principle of Antarctica as a peaceful domain:

“recognising that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord.”

And,

“...that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will further the principles and purposes embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”

Article 1 of the Antarctic Treaty then goes on to specifically set out the parameters for ‘peaceful use’. Antarctica shall be: non-militarised (i.e. no military activities, bases or weapons testing is permitted – Article I); non-nuclear (i.e. no nuclear explosions or radioactive waste disposal is permitted - Article V); and, transparency of all activities is a formal expectation (i.e. parties have right of inspection to check observance of the Treaty – Article VII).

However, being a realistic document, parameters for conflict management were also set in place promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes between parties by such means as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice (Article XI). Article XI also provides recourse for parties to take their dispute to the International Court of Justice for settlement, should other methods have failed to resolve the issue. The onus on the parties to come up with a mutually satisfactory solution illustrates how much of a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ this was, especially considering the historical tandem events at the time (Berkman, 2002: 66).

An effort was also made to ensure the compliance of third parties that had been excluded from the Treaty. In Article X, signatory or claimant parties have a responsibility to exert ‘appropriate efforts’ to ensure that non-signatories do not infringe upon principles or purpose of Treaty.

In order to identify something of the nature conflict in the Antarctic, we must first establish definitions and scope for this review.

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\(^2\) The Cold War describes an ideological war between the communist-led Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the ‘free’ Western-bloc led by the United States of America (USA). This ideological war involved an arms race, ‘by-proxy’ wars fought between the two superpowers on foreign territory and a heightened state of tension between the two superpowers and those nations aligned with them in their respective ideological camps.
1.2 DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE

Despite the explicit terms set out in the Antarctic Treaty regarding conflict and its management, conflicts in the Antarctic have still emerged. This said, it is important to consider conflict in the Antarctic from two historical perspectives, conflict occurring prior to the Antarctic Treaty and conflicts occurring after its ratification. To give this some context, conflict in the Antarctic must also be viewed in tandem with international events that impacted on the interaction of Antarctic states (see Table 1: Antarctic Development and Corresponding International Events).

Antarctic conflict literature has generally been limited to an international level of analysis, that is it is limited to conflictual interactions on a state level not a national level or between non-state actors. In the Antarctic, this type of international interaction has occurred extra-nationally (on claimant territory outside the state’s immediate jurisdiction). However, it is wrong to assume that conflicts cannot involve non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations, institutions, entities or individuals. Consequently, there is no limitation placed on this review with regard to a level of analysis based on the types of protagonists involved.

For this review, types of international conflict can range from a very passive dispute (verbal contention) to a very active dispute (overt combat). International conflict encompasses any international interaction “where active means are employed” (Haas, 1974: 6) and describes a situation where there is

“a definable issue at stake [rather than merely general charges of ‘aggression’, ‘genocide’, or ‘intervention’]; there must be clearly visible parties with specific claims on one another, particularly an identified government as defendant; the dispute must be of an interstate character...” (Haas, Butterworth and Nye, 1972: 4).

Previous studies of international conflict have had a limited scope, qualified by fatality thresholds or criteria limiting the level of analysis, so that the term only pertained to inter-state conflicts. Studies of international conflict by Singer and Small [1982] and Bercovitch et alia [1991] were both limited the scope by a fatality threshold (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 16). There is good reason to abolish the fatality threshold criteria for any analysis of conflict in the Antarctic as there have been no recorded ‘conflict’ fatalities on Antarctica.

Inclusion of a conflict in this analysis is then qualified with a geographical proviso that, ‘the conflict occurred in the area known as the Antarctic, referring to the area south of 60°South, not just on the continent itself’.

1.3 HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Prior to the international Antarctic Treaty regime, conflict in the Antarctic characteristically involved issues of contested territorial sovereignty and imperial expansionism.

Conflict has existed in the Antarctic since its discovery in fifteenth century (Berkman, 2002: 34; McDongial and Woodworth, 2001: 384). Early conflict in the Antarctic was generally associated the finer aspects of exploration and discovery, for example, verifying the authenticity of early cartography and so conflict at this time was not violent. Once maps had been made and vast

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3 That is, “basic actor units...are relatively autonomous political units that control mutually separate territories or populations” (Haas, 1974: 5)
4 A recent incident involving an Australian private pilot who landed his aircraft at McMurdo Base, Antarctica caused diplomatic tension between Australia, New Zealand and USA when the question arose as to whether he should be supplied fuel to allow his safe return to Australia.
resources identified, it was more a question of competition that forced a push for resources, ostensibly sealing and whaling (Berkman, 2002: 43), as the spoils of the Southern Ocean was reaped. There was also a very competitive human desire to achieve Antarctic expeditionary ‘firsts’ and explore Antarctica simply ‘because it is there’ (Lowe, 1959). Eventually, exploration and discovery became a premise for sovereignty claims, coupled with proximity and the ability to establish a physical presence on the continent (Bertram, 1958: 104).

Post-World War I [1914-1918], activities in the Antarctic were characterised by period of international antagonism (Berkman, 2002: 219). Immediately after World War I “many nations previously interested in Antarctic matters were in deep debt or social disruption. Germany was forced to relinquish its Antarctic claims under Article 118 of the Treaty of Versailles” (Martin, 1996: 162). With many of the nations concentrating on issues at home, Antarctica was left to the scientists and the fishermen. Whaling continued with a vengeance and a number of reports were now hinting at the environmental impact of unsustainable whaling resources.

With the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, a new wave of ‘neo-imperialism’ was launched in the Antarctic. During the 1930’s, Germany’s interest and activities in Antarctica increased markedly. Coupled with the German annexation of Norway, Adolf Hitler ordered the annexation of the Norwegian sector of Antarctica (a 65º arc claim of the continent). In a bid to secure the German claim, a German expedition comprising a ship, the Schwabenland, and two hydro-planes arrived in Antarctica. The two planes dropped 1.5 metre long aluminium javelins over the territory with swastika emblems emblazoned on their caps. On January 29, 1939, “a party aboard the Passat flew to a small bay at about 69º55’S and 19ºW” where the pilot, Rudolf Wahr proceeded to plant a swastika flag (Martin, 1996: 189-191; Reader’s Digest, 1985:264-265). To thwart German designs on the Norwegian claim to Queen Maud Land, Norway laid an official claim to the territory in 1939 based on the successful exploration of the territory by Roald Amundsen (Berkman, 2002: 46). It was also in the 1930’s that the USA started to make steps to secure an official presence with the flying expedition of Admiral Richard Byrd (Martin, 1996: 174-186).

The end of World War II in 1945 ushered in the politics of bipolar system, with the beginning of the Cold War. Peculiarly, geo-politics on the Ice did not take on the same chill as elsewhere in the world. Continuing the Cold War in the Antarctic was not entirely relevant to the immediate geo-strategic concerns of each state but there was enough evidence to suggest that superpower rivalry had made it to Antarctica. It was at this time that Russia and America sent their strongest contingents to the Ice. The Russians established numerous bases, not least one at Sovetskaya, at the Pole of Relative Inaccessibility. The 1956 American operation, dubbed ‘Deep Freeze II’ involved aircraft, ships and approximately 5000 personnel. The Americans established the Scott-Amundsen base at the South Pole itself – a politically charged decision that some saw as a move to control access to Antarctica’s interior (Fox, 1985: 167).

Despite the ramifications of the Cold War, the post-World War II period was characterised by unprecedented levels of international cooperation - the development of the IGY and the 1961 Antarctic Treaty are evidence to this. Both reflected a degree of idealistic optimism and assumed several of the founding principles espoused in the United Nations Charter (1945), in particular, the principle of international cooperation and peaceful conflict settlement.

On two separate occasions, during and immediately after World War II, open warfare was narrowly avoided on the continent (McDongial and Woodworth, 2001: 519). Britain, Chile and Argentina were all fervently involved in a ‘base race’, constructing their own permanent or physical bases to strengthen otherwise tenuous sovereignty in overlapping territorial claims (Bertram, 1958: 105). At one point, Britain suggested that the competing claims be settled by the International Court of

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5 The hydro-planes were Dornier Super Wals. Named the Boreas and the Passat, these flying boats were dubbed ‘aeroplane motherships’ (Reader’s Digest, 1985:264-265).
Justice, but Argentina and Chile rejected this suggestion and called instead for an international conference to decide on all Antarctic claims. With the claims unresolved in 1948, Britain and Argentina mobilised their respective naval warships to the region, increasing the perception that armed conflict was imminent. (McDongial and Woodworth, 2001: 518-519)

**Incidents of armed conflict** in the Antarctic are rare, in fact “the first and only shots so far fired in anger in Antarctica were in [February] 1952, when Argentines attempted to affright a British party at Hope Bay⁶ in [our] Falkland Island Dependencies, which we [Britain] have continually occupied since 1943” (Bertram, 1958: 105; McDongial and Woodworth, 2001: 519).

After the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty (1961), there have been several conflicts within the Antarctic region. The most serious armed conflict which had the potential to spill over into Antarctic territory was that of the 1982 war between Argentina and Britain over the contested sovereignty of the Falkland/Malvina Islands. Literature examining territorial claims on the **Antarctic Peninsula and South Atlantic islands** are also numerous but most deal with the 1982 Falkland/Malvina Islands War a conflict that took place on South Georgia and the Falkland Islands just outside the Antarctic Treaty area – south of 60ºS latitude (Aulich, 1992; Barnett, 1982; Beck, 1983, 1990, 1994, 1995; Berruti, 1990; Calvert, 1982, 1983; Ceresole, 1988; Dillon, 1989; Dodds, 1993, 1996, 2002; Escude, 1988; Fox, 1985; Freedman, 1988; Hepple, 1988; House, 1983; Hoyos de, 1988; Joyner, 1985; Kelly and Child, 1988; Little, 1984; Miller, 1993; Morris, 1985; Pittman, 1986; Pyne, 2003; Royle, 1994; Smith, 1991; Tulchin, 1987).


In an effort to consolidate contested territorial claims, Argentina has caused diplomatic incidents by attempting to create an ‘Antarctican’, a citizen of Antarctica by birth right (Child, 1988a, 1990). “In January 1978 Emilio de Palm was born the first national of Argentine Antarctica at Hope Bay⁷…” (Fox, 1985: 79). This practice continues to receive international condemnation.

With an unprecedented level of international cooperation in the Antarctic, there is the possibility that **domestic political decisions may have repercussions for international relationships on the Ice**. In 1985, New Zealand feared that its cooperative relationship with the United States Antarctic Program (USAP) would be put in jeopardy after its new anti-nuclear policy rendered the Australia, New Zealand and United States [ANZUS] Defence Treaty inoperable (Brown, 1999: 309).

It is an odd marriage that sees a ‘demilitarised’ place set aside for peaceful purposes and science ending up with such a strong **symbiotic relationship with the military**. Once state control was asserted over access to the Antarctic, it was up to the state to provide the logistics to ‘permit’

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⁶ The British ‘Base D’ is situated on the Trinity Peninsula, or northernmost point of the Graham Land Peninsula (more generally known as the Antarctic Peninsula). Over the period from 1943-1958 that region has experienced what could be termed a ‘base race’ between Britain, Argentina and Chile attempting to strengthen claims by tiny occupations and the establishment of post offices. In fact, Britain’s formal claim to the area was made in 1908” (Bertram, 1958: 105). The United Kingdom has dealt severely to pushes by Argentina and Chile to assert sovereignty. On occasions the UK has ‘torn down flags and stations of foreign usurpers, arrested and deported illegal immigrants back to their country of origin and continued to go about her own business of research, discovery and annexation’ (Reader’s Digest, 1985 280).

⁷ The families stationed at the Hope Bay (Esperanza) ‘colony’ change each year and must require expensive logistical support. Chile has a similar ‘colony’ at Teniente Rodolfo Marsh, situated on Astrolabe Island of the Graham Land Peninsula (Fox, 1985: 79)
continued access to the ice. There can be no doubt that, without military expertise and resources, much of the science that is conducted today in Antarctica would not be possible if still funded and fuelled by private concerns.

In addition, **many international legal issues remain unresolved.** Overlapping legal conventions in international regimes create perplexing conundrums for policy-makers. There already exists some conflict between national and international zones governing the ocean and sea-bed; the control of the high seas, exclusive economic zones and statistical fishing sectors as set out by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations [FAO]. (Berkman, 2002: 164, 219). Several Antarctic arrangements that do not seek to undermine international norms elsewhere, in fact create rather unfortunate international legal precedents over high seas freedoms, prerogatives held by the UN convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] and the unwritten tenets of ‘the common heritage of mankind’. Two other legal conundrums also await resolution: (1) ‘the jurisdictional overlap between the Antarctic Treaty, its 1991 Madrid Protocol and the 1980 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) and; (2) avoiding the creation of another jurisdictional overlap over sea-bed definitions between UNCLOS and the ‘continental shelf’. (Hemmings, 2003) The one saving grace for the ATS is the fact that the Antarctic Treaty is a living document and can be

Finally, it is interesting that despite interstate conflict, tension and disagreement, cooperation has persisted as the underpinning principle of international relations on (and around) the ‘Ice’.

> “From the outset of the Antarctic Treaty System, cooperation extended to the Soviet Union and the United States despite their growing ‘cold war’ differences. Antarctic claimant and non-claimant nations found common ground. Japan and the United States were collaborating in Antarctica, healing the animus of the previous decade. Even during the Falkland-Malvinas war in 1982, when all diplomatic channels were severed between Great Britain and Argentina, these two nations were meeting in Antarctica to discuss ‘matters of common interest’ regarding the region south of 60°south latitude” (Berkman, 2002: 221-222)

But, why have the repercussions of these events have been negligible in Antarctica? It seems that, to a degree, states have managed to compartmentalise elements of national interest whereby Antarctic policy and decisions have not been subject to the same rationale used to formulate other geo-strategic policy. The stipulation that ‘Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only’ and that ‘science’ must be the focus of state activities on the ice has provided a peaceful continuity which has now existed for over forty years. The sanctity of Antarctica and its environs has remained relatively unscathed, almost immune to the political jousting, skirmishes and aggression mete out in other regions of the globe.

Certainly a factor partially responsible for such a low incidence in Antarctic conflict, is the fact that all territorial claims were ‘held over’. That is, Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty stipulates that all national claims are effectively frozen.

> “No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force” (1961 Antarctic Treaty, Article IV)

Essentially, no new territorial claims will be recognised and nothing in the Treaty can be interpreted as a renunciation of any territorial claim. Considering the importance of territorial sovereignty and its potential to cause conflict elsewhere in the world, freezing the claims and leaving overlapping claims unresolved has minimised the likelihood of conflict but at the same time it has planted seeds of future conflict.

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8 Another report notes that Antarctic Treaty representatives were actually meeting in Wellington, New Zealand on June 14, 1982, “the day General Menendez surrendered his forces at Port Stanley, and both Argentine and British delegates were present and on speaking terms” (Fox, 1985: 175).
1.4 CONCLUSIONS

This literature review has concentrated on identifying the types and incidence of conflict in the Antarctic. This review is predominately an analysis of inter-state conflict, because since the general international push to establish sovereignty claims after World War II and the establishment of the US Antarctic Service in 1939\(^9\) (Reader’s Digest, 1985: 249), the Antarctic has become the domain of the ‘state’ in terms of access and control, inadvertently ending the era of amateurs and privately funded expeditions\(^10\). Thus, conflicts have been largely limited to state actors, not non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations.

Antarctica itself presents a unique conflict environment. In a simplistic comparison with the Arctic, claims and sovereignty are more problematic as Antarctica has no indigenous population, no contiguous territorial borders and does not hold to the traditional concepts of sovereignty. In the Arctic, claims have been made in keeping with contiguous territories, with the applying the concept of ‘limited’ sovereignty. (Bertram, 1958; Pyne, 2003: 334, 358, 360; Rothwell, 1991: 55-76; Young, 1990: 52)

As Bertram (1958: 104) aptly puts it, “in Antarctica festering sores of political contention remain”. Areas for potential conflict include:

- **Conflicting and unsettled sovereignty claims over territory**: Particularly those overlapping claims shared by United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile. A large portion of Antarctica remains ‘unclaimed’ and the US and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) refuse to recognise any sovereignty claims.

- **Resources**: Fishing, bio-prospecting, mining and mineral exploitation (De Wit, 1985; United Nations, 1986; Vicuna, 1988), seabed, marine resources, law of the sea, global commons notions, management i.e. determining what is waste and what is historically significant. This factor may become more of an issue if/energy resources become scarcer.

- **Rights and freedom of access**: Controlling or restricting access to the continent could pose problems even though science, discovery and the ability to gain an understanding about Antarctica ‘is in the interest of all mankind’. Pressure may come from Third World nations to be included in the ATS [i.e. as more than non-claimant states] (United Nations, 1986: 68), particularly if resources become scarcer.

- **Uses**: Pressure to expand the uses of Antarctica and not restrict its uses to science. Tourism and its impact on the environment may push this question in the near future.

- **Scientific expansionism**: Establishment and encroachment of new bases on Antarctica and new developments e.g. construction of the French airstrip in Antarctica (Brown and May, 1989: 105); South Pole route.

- **Who can use Antarctica?**: This raises the question of where do transnational corporations & NGO's fit in the Antarctic equation. One obvious omission from this review is that of the role of non-state actors in the region and their potential to cause or be involved involvement in conflict. Third World nations may also consider the ATS to be an exclusive ‘club’ and pursue a greater presence on the continent (United Nations, 1986: 68).

- **Legal issues**: Overlapping conventions in international regimes e.g. the conflicting national and international zones governing the ocean and sea-bed; the control of the high seas, exclusive economic zones and statistical fishing sectors as set out by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations [FAO]. (Berkman, 2002: 164, 219)

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\(^9\) Interestingly, in terms of territorial claims, the USA adopted the approach known as Hughes Doctrine – this stated that discovery was not sufficient for establishing a territorial claim, physical settlement was a prerequisite (McDongial and Woodworth, 2001: 518)

\(^10\) Berkman (2002: 34) argues that “the first national expedition to Antarctica was conducted by Charles Wilkes who led the United States South Sea Exploring Expedition between 1838 and 1842”.
Towards a Typology of Antarctic Conflict

There have been very few serious, or at least, potentially serious conflicts within the Antarctic region. After reviewing the literature in this area, it is possible to develop a typology of conflict in the Antarctic. Essentially, six core conflict issues are identified that is, those issues that are the root cause of the conflict in the Antarctic:

1. **Geopolitical and strategic conflict**: including issues of imperialism and post-imperialism. The ‘spill-over’ of conflict from other geographic regions.
2. **Conflicting territorial claims in the Antarctic region**: raising issues of sovereignty, legal status and claim recognition.
3. **International legal issues**: overlapping international conventions and differing interpretations of protocols and protocol implementation.
4. **Environmental concerns**: differing environmental concerns and approaches to environmental management.
5. **Resource Use**: competition, exploitation and scarcity.
6. **Scientific expansionism**: establishment and encroachment of new facilities on Antarctica.

Methods of Conflict Management

No review of conflict can be complete without some consideration given to the methods of conflict management. There are three recognised modes of international conflict management: ‘(1) violence and coercion; (2) direct or indirect negotiation in its many forms [bargaining between the disputants]; (3) the binding [e.g. adjudication] or non-binding [e.g. mediation] intervention of a third party’11 (Bercovitch *et al*., 1991: 7). Under the terms of Antarctic Treaty, only the methods included in modes (2) and (3) are sanctioned responses to conflict.

However, within the ATS, there are several avenues open to parties wanting to resolve conflicts:

- **Internal Antarctic Treaty System Appeal Process**: Working within an international regulatory authority which has an appeal process for resolving disagreements e.g. CEE’s - Comprehensive Environmental Evaluations within the ATS.
- **Role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)**: Adjudication over Antarctic issues in the ICJ has not been utilised by the Treaty states mainly because the adjudication over claims proffers a win-lose decision and they would rather continue with the uncertainty than try to win a case based on weak legal grounds (Bertram, 1958: 104).
- **Facilitation through the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCM’s)**: Disagreements can be facilitated through the ATCM’s. This forum, like the United Nations, offers the parties an formal as well as informal means of discussion. Quiet diplomacy or ‘shuttle diplomacy’ at this interstate level allows parties to negotiate and settle their dispute discretely with or without the involvement of a third party.
- **International Mediation**: Impartial third parties (state actors, individuals or NGO’s) provide another avenue for conflict resolution, one that leaves much of the decision-making power with the parties. The third party has the ability to offer solutions and resources to help the parties peacefully settle their dispute, without fear of a win-lose solution being imposed upon them.
- **ATS Conflict Management Provisions**: Different methods of conflict management are set out in the Antarctic Treaty System and can be initiated by the parties to resolve their conflict.

11 Terminology also includes: ‘intercessory roles encompassing good-offices, communication-facilitation and investigative functions; intermediary roles encompassing more active mediation strategies and directive techniques whereby a mediator can propose a solution or even make a verdict; and interventionist roles encompassing the authorisation of a unilateral use of force and organising or participating in multilateral attempts to coerce one or both of the disputants’ (Raymond, 1994: 36).
- **A future role for the United Nations in conflict management?**: Many Antarctic Treaty claimant and non-claimant states do not want to pass the administration of the Antarctic to the United Nations, preferring to maintain Antarctic Treaty regime exclusivity in all matters (Bridgman, 2000/2001: 8-10).

- **ATS Secretariat**: With the creation of a new ATS Secretariat, there is an increasing possibility that the ATS Secretariat will act in a similar way to the UN Secretary-General, able to use the ‘good offices’ of the position to personally resolve conflicts between member states (Hemmings, 2003).

Given the limitations of this review, it is impossible to empirically analyse the incidence and effects of conflict on Antarctic politics. In saying this, it is also disappointing that no analysis has been conducted to assess the use and effectiveness of the above conflict management mechanisms. Future research into conflict and its management in the Antarctic might do well to consider both of these elements and compare their incidence and effectiveness with those mechanisms employed in the Arctic. Given its unique context, one can only speculate that the Antarctic experience in conflict management might provide an exemplary standard for the management of international conflicts in general.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Antarctic Development and Corresponding International Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1884</td>
<td>Ross Ice shelf and Victoria Land claimed by Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>International Geographical Congress makes Antarctica the main target for future exploration.</td>
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<td>1908</td>
<td>British claim Falkland Island Dependency – British Antarctic Territory.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914-1918</td>
<td>WORLD WAR I: period of international antagonism (Berkman, 2002: 219)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 1929</td>
<td>US Admiral Byrd's first expedition, from “Little America” base in Ross Dependency, over-flies South Pole.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept 1931</td>
<td>International Whaling Convention signed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 1933</td>
<td>Australian Antarctic Territory established by UK Order in Council (42% of Antarctic), followed by AAT Acceptance Act 1933 and Australian Order in Council in 1936 bringing UK Order into operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1934</td>
<td>US authorises Lincoln Ellsworth to make claims to unexplored territory by drops from his aircraft, without implying advanced governmental knowledge or approval.</td>
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<td>1924</td>
<td>France claims Terre Adele.</td>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>Norway claimed Dronning Maud Land to counter German interest.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1939</td>
<td>NZ agrees to recognise Norwegian claim (Norway does not reciprocate in regard to Ross Dependency. US reserves its position on claims).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 1939</td>
<td>WORLD WAR II: Outbreak of World War II.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 1939</td>
<td>Roosevelt’s instructions to Byrd envisage extensive exploration in several sectors, claimed and unclaimed, establishment of bases in UK sector and in Ross Dependency and assertion of claims through air-drops or in claims.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Chile counter claims British sector.</td>
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<td>1943</td>
<td>Argentina counter claims British/Chilean sector.</td>
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<td>1945</td>
<td>Peace declared World War II ends.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 1946</td>
<td>UK authorities urge NZ and Australia to take steps, including establishment of permanent bases, to strengthen their territorial claims.</td>
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<td>1946-47</td>
<td>Byrd leads large-scale naval expedition to Antarctic (“Operation High Jump”).</td>
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<td>mid-1940's</td>
<td>Confidential US policy paper maintains policy of non-recognition of other claims and reservation of US rights, but expresses preference for eventual settlement of territorial problems in Antarctica by international action and agreement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 1948</td>
<td>State Department planners recommend support for international status for Antarctica in form of UN trusteeship administered by US and existing claimants and assertion of US claim to areas to which it has best rights through discovery and exploration.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 1946</td>
<td>NZ Cabinet sets up committee to make proposals for joint expedition with UK and Australia, but expresses preference for UN control of Antarctica to avoid disputes over sovereignty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 1948</td>
<td>NZ expresses (to UK and Australia and not US) its preferences for UN control of Antarctica – and settlement by International Court of disputed claims.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 1948</td>
<td>Chile objects to US proposals. Affirms sovereignty over claimed territory and proposes alternative declaration of a five year standstill, providing that new bases should not prejudice existing claims.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb 1949</td>
<td>Australia rejects surrender of sovereignty involved in US proposals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1954</td>
<td>US National Security Council decides US should reassert its rights in Antarctica and seek agreement among the “free world” claimants which will reserve their respective rights pending a solution to their claims, while permitting freedom of exploration and scientific investigation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 1957</td>
<td>IGY begins.</td>
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<td>Jul 1957</td>
<td>US Secretary of State stresses to NZ Minister of External Affairs the need to “squeeze” the Russians out of the Antarctica.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 1957</td>
<td>UK produces new proposal for internationalisation of Antarctica, controlled by claimants and the US and USSR with minimal links to the UN.</td>
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<td>Jan 1958</td>
<td>US advises intention to retain stations at McMurdo, Marie Byrd land and at the South Pole.</td>
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<td>Jan 1958</td>
<td>US and UK put proposals for the internationalisation of the Antarctic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan 1958</td>
<td>Australian Cabinet opposes internationalisation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar 1958</td>
<td>Australia now prepared to accept International agreement comprising demilitarisation, freezing of claims, inclusion of Soviet Union, but maintaining right of exclusive exploitation.</td>
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</tbody>
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| Mar 1958   | US circulates to states participating in IGY proposal for Antarctic Treaty freezing legal status quo ensuring use for
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Antarctic Development and Corresponding International Events</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1958</td>
<td>US produces draft Treaty article which would freeze status quo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec 1958</td>
<td>IGY ends.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 1961</td>
<td>Antarctic Treaty comes into force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>US install a nuclear power plant at their McMurdo base. The plant was decommissioned in 1972.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 1962</td>
<td>Cuban missile crisis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Falklands War.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 1989</td>
<td>Fall of the Berlin Wall.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>ATCM establishes guidelines for tourism and non-government activities, including for visitors, organisers and conductors of expeditions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>ATCM agrees on standardised checklist for Antarctic Treaty Inspections.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>ATCM establishes guidelines for the preparation of Environmental Impact Assessment's in Antarctica.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ATCM establishes guidelines for Antarctic shipping and related activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>ATCM establishes guidelines for assessing defining and proposing new protected areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>24th ATCM in St Petersburg agree to establish the Secretariat in Buenos Aires Argentina.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept 2001</td>
<td>ATCM agree to review the current list of designated historic sites and monuments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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