The articulated limb: Theorizing indigenous Pacific participation in the military industrial complex

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Introduction

Articulation is not a simple matter. Language is the effect of articulation and so are bodies. Articulata are jointed animals; they are not smooth like the perfect spherical animals of Plato’s origin fantasy in the *Timaeus*. The articulata are cobbled together. It is the condition of being articulate. I rely on the articulata to breathe life into the artifactual cosmos of monsters this essay inhabits. Nature may be speechless, without language, in the human sense; but nature is highly articulate. Discourse is only one process of articulation. An articulated world has an undecidable number of modes and sites where connections can be made. The surfaces of this kind of world are not frictionless curved planes. Unlike things can be joined—and like things can be broken apart—and vice versa. Full of sensory hairs, evaginations, invaginations, and indentations, the surfaces which interest me are dissected by joints (Haraway, 1992: 324).

In July 2015 *Cosmopolitan* magazine published “7 Powerful Nude Photos” to “Show That Amputee War Veterans are Confident and Mad Hot” (*Cosmopolitan*, 2015). The article featured the work of photographer Michael Stokes in advance of the publication of a coffee-table book he was releasing with photographs of fourteen veterans of Gulf Wars. Although Stokes credits the inspiration for the coffee-table book to a model named Alex Minsky, nowhere in the article are the names of the featured models listed and none of the seven photographs selected for this preview of the book are captioned—it is the photographer’s brand (“MICHAEL STOKES PHOTOGRAPHY”) that dominates each one in large bold letters. All of the models are phenotypically white, and all the photographs bar one are taken indoors, in a studio setting. Only two models are posed with obvious military props: one of them, a single amputee, carries a firearm casually held across his groin. Another, a triple amputee, wears a pair of khaki shorts, and leans an attenuated arm on a camouflaged helmet. A prosthetic attachment protrudes below his elbow; next to the helmet is an artificial hand, waiting to be fitted. The model wears bomber glasses that he adjusts with his intact hand.

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1 It turns out that retired US Marine Corporal Alex Minsky is one of the models featured in the article – his is the last of the seven photographs. I found this out by Google searching “Alex Minsky” and cross-checking photographs shared on his public Facebook page. His tattoos match those of the man in the seventh photograph in the *Cosmopolitan* article. Alex Minsky has become a brand of his own: https://www.facebook.com/AlexMinskyFanPage/photos/pb.121059224721099.-2207520000.1439204554./487437074749977/?type=3&theater (accessed 10 August 2015). It also appears that some of the photographs featured in this 2015 *Cosmopolitan* article have been around since at least 2013.

2 It is probably the standard issue infantry rifle, the M4 Carbine: http://www.military.com/equipment/m4-carbine (accessed 21 August 2015).
He smiles slightly, sardonically, as he perches on a metal trunk...aware perhaps of the visual pun in which his bared though tattooed torso participates. Like two other models in the series, he wears “dog tags” or his military identification details hanging from a chain around his neck. The other two models in the series wearing dog tags do not display any other military signifiers—both of them single amputees with tattoos on their arms and torsos. In fact, all seven models are tattooed; some more elaborately than others. The lighting and their poses accentuate their toned musculature—all of them have washboard abs, defined pecs, bulging biceps; the single amputees show off tight quads and glutes. Six of the seven models wear prosthetic legs, the one who does not, as mentioned earlier, has a prosthetic forearm.

The Cosmopolitan article does not give any further detail about the content of Michael Stokes’ coffee table book. We are not told much about Stokes except that he funded his publication with a Kickstarter on-line fundraising campaign, and we are not told anything about the models other than that they are veterans who sought to be photographed as sexy. We also have no idea whether any of the seven other models included in the book might be of colour. One brief quote from Stokes suggests that there may have been some women, if not in this book, then at least in his portfolio: “these young men and women returning from war are still very young, want to build futures for themselves, and even though they have pension (sic) and are ‘retired,’ they are ready to take the world on” (Cosmopolitan, 2015). To be fair, the emphasis in this article is on image rather than text. It was first published on 17 July 2015 at 6:40pm, and when I downloaded the article eleven days later, it had attracted 288 comments and had been shared over 84,000 times. As is the magazine’s trademark, the interest value of the photographs lay in their eroticized aesthetics.

Contrast this recent Cosmopolitan feature with an image published in a Telegraph article in 2009. The photograph was taken outdoors, the human figure phenotypically black, male, and an adult double amputee. He is photographed in mid-stride on prosthetic legs down the marked racing lanes of a rusty red artificial turf. He is wearing sunglasses, but the rest of his face is animated in a broad open-mouthed smile—possibly a laugh. The sky behind him is a clear crisp blue, not a cloud in sight. On the horizon, some arid rolling hills and a sparse section of greenery. At the far end of the athletics track, the hazy outline of two more adult figures. The caption reads “Pte Derek Derenalagi ‘I’ve got no legs but I can run. I never thought it would be possible’” (Author Query: The work cited is not in the References.). Derenalagi, we learn from the full-length feature story, was among a group of six members of British armed forces selected for a weeklong training camp in California. The purpose of the camp was to develop their athletic potential in anticipation of the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games in London.

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3 The article offers hyperlinks to the Michael Stokes Photography Facebook page as well as to the Kickstarter site. On the Facebook page, which has over 673,000 likes, we learn that Michael Stokes is originally from Berkeley, California and now lives in Los Angeles; his second photography book and a 2016 calendar are now available. https://www.facebook.com/MichaelStokesPhotography (accessed 10 August 2015). The Kickstarter campaign commenced on 9 July 2015 and closed on 30 July 2015, raising US$411,134 from 3,536 pledgers: https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/michaelstokes/publish-two-large-scale-photo-books-by-michael-sto (accessed 10 August 2015). The book that features the models featured in the Cosmopolitan article is titled Bare Strength and among the six preview photos available on Amazon.com there is one phenotypically black model: http://www.amazon.com/Bare-Strength-Michael-Stokes/dp/3867877688/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&qid=1416581286&sr=8-4&keywords=bare+strength
The story opened, however, with a grim description of the event in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province that resulted in Derenalagi losing his legs; the account conveyed the horror that anti-tank mines wreak on human bodies. But there is no further reflection on the senselessness of war; instead the article resolutely focused on the recovery, determination and triumph of Derenalagi and his five British comrades. Only towards the end of the article was it revealed that Derenalagi was born in Fiji and joined the British Army (BA) in 2000. We are not told how or why a Fijian was in the BA, nor that he was one of over 2000 Fijians doing the same, nor how many other Fijians have been injured or killed while serving a country in which they do not have the rights of citizens. There are also no metrics offered to tell us how many times the article has been shared on social media; comments are not permitted or enabled below the story.

Both the *Cosmopolitan* and *Telegraph* images and articles are interesting and provocative for a range of reasons. Although none of the images of the men display any geographic, national or specifically ethnic signifiers, they can still be compared in a number of ways. The two articles target different audiences, and use different rhetorical strategies. As I have already pointed out, there is an immediate contrast in that the *Cosmopolitan* images focus on white male nudes while the *Telegraph* article focuses on a fully clothed black male. For the purposes of this article, what draws my attention is the conceptual significance of the missing limbs and the prostheses that in some cases replace them. These veterans’ arms and legs have been severed during militarized conflict and the two stories offer us possibilities for how to think about what the men can now do without them. In this article, I want to resist the temptation to reproduce colonial and imperialist practices of objectifying, fetishizing and even dissecting particular bodies with the result of reifying others.

Historically, black and native or indigenous bodies have not been treated with much dignity under colonial and imperialist regimes. While there is urgent political work as well as theorizing to be done about the ways that black and native or indigenous bodies intersect and diverge in the face of institutionalized and embodied racisms (e.g. see the social media hashtags of #blacklivesmatter and #nativelivesmatter), this article focuses its attention on contexts of indigeneity. To be precise, it is indigeneity in the Pacific Islands that I am concerned about here; and indigeneity is as complex in this region as it is anywhere else—with a range of Fourth World and Third World dynamics, from indigenous people marginalized within settler colonial states to fully self-governing indigenous people. Because Pte Derenalagi is from Fiji, our analysis of embodied experiences of militarization will have to reckon with what it means for him to be indigenous to the islands of Fiji. His being indigenous also demands that the analysis not objectify, fetishize or dissect him. One way of avoiding that would be by not isolating his body in the discussion. But is discussing Derenalagi’s body in relation to other bodies (such as those featured in the *Cosmopolitan* article) sufficient? What about the nameless Michael Stokes models? Is objectifying, fetishizing or dissecting their bodies permissible since the political, economic and cultural power dynamics between them and a female, black and native/indigenous analyst outside these pages are stacked somewhat in their favour?

The politics of representation and studies of representation are tricky, messy and not always productive. Donna Haraway, whose words constitute the epigraph I have used to open this

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4 See Teaiwa, 2005a for some reflections on the difference between black and indigenous.
article, would eschew representation in favour of articulation (Haraway, 1992). Taking my lead from Haraway, then, the anatomical study performed herein is not intended as a dissection, but a tracing of articulated joints. The body under examination, furthermore, is not human, though it has been made by humans and requires human participation to function. The body whose articulated joints I want to trace is a system—the Military Industrial Complex (MIC). Thus, I use embodiment as a metaphor to illuminate the ways that indigenous people and places from the Pacific get drawn into the global MIC. A number of questions will “ghost” this discussion: who or what constitutes the original articulated limb and who or what constitutes the prosthesis in the relationship between indigenous people and the MIC? How did the original articulation work; how was it severed; how did it heal? What does it mean to now have a prosthetic substitute for it? How does that work?

Cultural Studies and articulation theorists have long used the mechanistic model of the articulated lorry, truck and trailer or train to explain phenomena that operate as ensembles (Clifford 2003, 2001; Slack, 2006, 1996); indeed, the MIC can be seen as an exemplar of an articulated ensemble. In this article I propose that when it comes to analysing militarism, what Stuart Hall described as the “lines of tendential force” of articulation are in fact usefully understood through the model of an articulated limb (Slack, 1996). The article draws on contemporary examples from Guam and Fiji to describe some of the processes of geopolitical and labour articulation that help make indigenous participation in the MIC not only possible, but seemingly inevitable. The next section focuses on the Obama administration’s identification with an “Asia-Pacific pivot” defence orientation and a planned military build up on Guam as an illustration of the Pacific’s geopolitical articulation with the MIC. Following that is a discussion of the BA’s recruitment of Commonwealth soldiers from Fiji since 1998 as a case of the MIC’s articulation of Pacific people as labour. The political promise of articulation theory is in its signalling towards the possibility of disarticulation; I close the article with a consideration of how the Pacific and indigenous Pacific people—disarticulated from the MIC—might be re-embodied.

The concept of articulation has not often informed either studies of the Pacific Islands region (Carrier, 1992; Clifford, 2001; Kahn, 2000; Teaiwa, 2001, 2005b) or studies of militarization (Teaiwa, 2001, 2005b; Chisolm, 2008; Ginoza, 2015), but was widely used in the British school of Cultural Studies in the last two decades of the twentieth century. In the introduction to a volume on Cultural Studies, Lawrence Grossberg wrote that the concept of articulation “provides a way of describing the continual severing, realignment, and recombination of discourses, social groups, political interests and structures of power in a society” (Grossberg, Nelson and Treichler 1992: 8). Articulations generate the practice of providing layers upon layers of contextualization, of bringing backgrounds into foregrounds, and of more accurately representing cultural and political complexity. As Grossberg explained in another discussion:

Articulation can be understood as a more active version of the concept of determination: unlike notions of interaction or symbiosis, determination describes specific cause-and-effect relations. But, unlike notions of causality and simple notions of determination, articulation is always complex: not only does the cause have effects, but the effects themselves affect the cause, and both are themselves determined by a host of other relations. Articulations are never simple and singular... (Grossberg, 2014: 56) To encapsulate and illustrate the ensemble-like workings of articulations, Cultural Studies and articulation theorists have long
relied on the mechanistic model of the articulated lorry, truck and trailer or train (Clifford, 2003, 2001; Slack, Miller and Doak, 2006; Slack, 1996).

The late iconic British Cultural Studies scholar Stuart Hall is usually credited with using the image of the articulated lorry to illustrate the concept of articulations (Chen and Morley, 2006: 141; Clifford, 2001). Recognizing the cultural and idiomatic specificity of the lorry to Great Britain, some scholars have translated it into the truck and trailer model more easily understood by an American audience (e.g. Babe, 2010: 104; Sterne, 2008: 91; Storey, 2010). Others have used the train as an image. As Slack, Miller and Doak put it:

> Any identity might be compared to a train, which is constituted of many different types of train cars in a particular arrangement (or articulations). Each car is connected (or articulated) to another in a specific way that, taken as a whole (as a series of articulations), constitutes the identity of the train. Any specific train is thus a specific, particular set of articulations—an identifiable object with relatively clear-cut boundaries (Slack, Miller and Doak, 2006: 38).

While the models of the lorry, truck and trailer and train share some resonance with theories of ‘serial identities’ and ‘seriality’ (Young, 1994), they suggest that disarticulation and rearticulation can take place with relative ease. That is, that a little elbow grease and twisting or unlocking can release the trailer from the truck, or one train car from another. I understand Cultural Studies scholars’ commitment to such mechanistic models in part as a product of their suspicion of any kind of essentialism (Slack, 1996). Slack, in particular, stresses that no single element of the ‘train’ is necessary, and that even without a caboose, the cars can still signify their ‘train’-ness (Slack, Miller and Doak, 2006: 38-39). What signals the limits of the mechanistic models, however, is that not all Cultural Studies scholars are in agreement on the possibilities of disarticulation. Grossberg, for example, writes:

> The field of historical relations is never entirely open to any rearticulation. History is not merely a matter of human whim and creativity. People are never simply free to produce any articulation imaginable, and there are always possibilities which cannot even be imagined. For if human beings make history, it is always under conditions that they do not control (Grossberg, 2014: 114).

Significant here, then, is his earlier description of articulation as “a more active version of the concept of determination”—determination being a rather constraining cause and effect relationship. In fact, Grossberg asserts, articulations “cannot be extracted out of the interlocking context in which they are possible” (Grossberg, 2015: 56). One gets the sense from Grossberg that disarticulation at least is not as easy as unhooking a trailer from a lorry or truck, or swapping one train car with another in a series.

Indeed, according to Slack, Hall acknowledges that “some articulations... work from more privileged—or powerful—positions” and even “argues that some articulations are particularly potent, persistent, and effective” (Slack, 1996: 124). Hall describes such articulations as “lines of tendential forces”, and it is that tendentiality that demands an altogether different model than a lorry, truck and trailer or train. The articulated limb thus provides a more appropriate illustration and analogy of articulation’s engineering, the difficulty and trauma of disarticulation and the literal possibilities of rearticulation. For while the basic ball and socket of a hip or shoulder joint, the hinge of a knee, or the pivot and hinge of an elbow may share the fundamental mechanics of that joint between a lorry/truck
and trailer, or between a caboose and cars of a train, the ligaments, tendons, nerves and blood vessels that grow around an articulated limb make the possibility of disarticulation inevitably violent and traumatizing. I suggest that the MIC as an ensemble is held together not simply by mechanistic linkages but, at certain points in space and time, by tendential forces analogous to those surrounding an articulated limb. Let us turn now, then, to a consideration of the MIC in that light.

US President Dwight D. Eisenhower is commonly credited with coining the phrase “military industrial complex” because he used it in his farewell speech to the nation at the end of his term in office in 1961.5 There are quite a number of clips on YouTube replaying, excerpting and remixing this historical speech. Many of the YouTube “versions”, seem to have been uploaded by groups explicitly engaged in the peace and disarmament movement, and tend to focus on section IV of Eisenhower’s speech, and in particular the fourth to seventh paragraphs:

> Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence —economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Eisenhower identified the armaments industry as the foundation of the military industrial complex: armaments industry + the defence establishment = military industrial complex. But Eisenhower also recognized that this simple equation had very profound implications for wider US society and culture: “The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government....Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.” In this scenario, the military industrial complex generates “economic, political, even spiritual” influence,

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5 While an earlier articulation of the MIC can be traced to C. Wright Mills’ *The Power Elite* (1956), Eisenhower’s speech popularized the concept.
inevitably reshaping the “toil, resources and livelihood” of US citizens, and “the very structure” of US society.

Contrary to Slack and others’ insistence that articulations are random and non-necessary (Slack, 1996), Eisenhower’s MIC illustrates Grossberg’s notion of articulations as a more active version of determination. The MIC relies for its identity on the armaments industry and the defence establishment; the articulation of these two elements is what is necessary to produce the MIC. However, if we interpret the ‘armaments industry’ too narrowly to focus exclusively on weapons production, we may miss out on what Jonathan Galloway described as those ‘military-industrial linkages’ that point us to the MIC’s articulations with the petroleum, metals, rubber, chemicals, transport, electronics, paper and food industries (Galloway, 1972). The MIC therefore might be usefully imagined as an articulation of industry (including armaments) and the defence establishment.

I do not intend to trace either the historical or contemporary contours of the MIC such as it might have been in Eisenhower’s 1961 and such as it might function more broadly today out of the USA and other developed nations. There is ample literature on that (e.g. Fallows, 2002; Lieberson, 1971; Lowry, 1970; Markusen et al., 1991; Moskos, 1974; Phillips, 1973; Wolf, Jr., 1969), and there has been a promising uptake in interdisciplinary fields such as Media Studies and Film Studies for the purpose of interrogating what some call the military-entertainment complex (Lenoir, 2000) and others are calling the military-industrial-media-entertainment network (e.g. Der Derian, 2009). Important work by Angela Davis and others is also revealing the extent to which the prison-industrial complex and the MIC are imbricated (e.g. Davis, 2003, 2005). And, of course, there is the military-industrial-academic complex (Feldman, 1989; Giroux, 2007; Leslie, 1994), which the contributions to this special issue and the purpose of this very journal must seek to counter. Comparative research that tests the model of the MIC outside of the US, however, seems to be scant (e.g. Mintz, 1985), and this article offers a contribution to that literature from the Pacific.

If according to Eisenhower the MIC was a novel condition of the post-WWII era, the Pacific’s incorporation into the MIC could not have occurred any earlier than this. Of course, there is a longer history of militarization in the Pacific Islands (see Firth, 1987; Teaiwa, 2001, 2008) that establishes the precedents for later militarized articulations. Space does not allow me to provide a more comprehensive accounting of the scope and range of MIC articulations in the Pacific, but it is useful to think about them as following patterns that can be distinguished along colonial and postcolonial lines, and geo-political and labour lines, although these may sometimes overlap and intersect.

As an unincorporated organized territory of the US, Guam is an exemplary site from which to observe the US MIC’s colonial articulations with the Pacific for geo-political reasons. As a former British colony and now sovereign nation, Fiji exemplifies the MIC’s postcolonial

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6 An analysis of the military-industrial linkages between 1960-1970 found that the companies most dependent on defense contracts in this period were at the time “medium-sized firms” such as Boeing, Lockheed, Hughes Aircraft, and North American Rockwell; together they received 50% of all defense contracts (Galloway, 1972: 494–495). By 2013 Boeing and Lockheed Martin were the number 1 and number 2 companies respectively, on a list of the top ten companies profiting from war: “In 2011, the 100 largest contractors sold $410 billion in arms and military services. Just 10 of those companies sold over $208 billion” (Weigley, 2013). Boeing and Lockheed Martin combined sold $86.1 billion in arms in 2011.
articulations with the region as a source of militarized—and arguably skilled—labour. There are certainly other examples worth considering, but for the purposes of illustration, this article focuses on Guam and Fiji, and in doing so traces how they are articulated into international or global MICs—the US, and the UK/US/UN nexus respectively.

Neither Guam nor Fiji possesses an indigenous MIC—i.e. there is no generative articulation of a defence establishment with a local armaments industry or broader local industry in either of these Pacific Islands. This might suggest Guam and Fiji are simply interchangeable or disposable prostheses in relation to the MIC, but I propose that it is useful to persist with the articulated limb image in order to try to understand how the MIC relates to this region. The ensuing discussion about Guam therefore, can be imagined with the MIC as a shoulder-like joint that then connects in a colonial and geo-political fashion to the Pacific in a sort of elbow-like pivot relationship. While for the discussion about Fiji, the MIC can be thought of as a hip-like joint that links through to Pacific people as postcolonial labour at a knee-like hinge joint.

**The Pacific ‘pivot’: Guam’s geo-political articulation with the MIC**

Guam has at times been described as the “tip of the spear” (Governor of Guam, Hon Felix P Camacho in Government Printing Office, 2008: 6). In 2005 Rear Admiral John Bird used the term to describe Guam’s utility in US defence (PDN 2 November 2005 cited in Crocombe, 2007: 353). I can only speculate as to why “the tip of the spear” discourse was not picked up by the Obama administration in 2009—certainly its overtly primitivist, phallic and belligerent associations probably made the phrasing seem un-politick. There is the problem, too, that the phrase is ubiquitous in militarized discourse—having been applied to military strategy in Iraq and the Gulf (e.g. Hoffman, 2010; Michaels, 2008), in other national contexts such as Canada (Horn and Wyczynski, 2002), as well as being a moniker claimed by different services or divisions (e.g. Rainey, 1998).

Much more clearly than “the tip of the spear”, then, “Pacific pivot” discourse performs a colonial and geo-political articulation specific to Guam in relation to the US MIC that demands closer examination. Also known as the “Asia-Pacific pivot”, it has been closely identified with the Obama administration and describes an orientation of US foreign policy that includes economic, diplomatic and military-strategic dimensions (Aguon, 2006: 20; CRS, 2012). But imagining the Pacific Island territory of Guam as a pivot for US interests in Asia predates Obama and Clinton. As early as 2005 and 2006 the Pentagon was using the concept (Halloran, 2006).

In 2011, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave it renewed force in her articulation of “America’s Pacific Century” (Clinton, 2011). Clinton outlined a range of commitments in the Asia-Pacific region that portrayed US treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the

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7 “Guam is becoming the tip of the spear for our country's mission in this part of the world, where emerging threats and growing American interests rest. Just as the people of Guam and the nation—and the region have answered the call of duty, fighting in every war and conflict of the past century, we stand ready to support our country in this strategic mission to help improve the security of the nation.”

8 A site titled “Just the Tip of the Spear” is run by former and current US Marines as an alternative to a Facebook site that was closed down because of members’ posting of jokes, memes, and other material that drew censure from officials. [http://jttots-com.webs.com](http://jttots-com.webs.com)
Philippines and Thailand as “the fulcrum of our strategic turn” (Clinton, 2011: 4); with a special emphasis on the treaty with Japan as “the cornerstone of peace and stability in the region” (Clinton, 2011: 5). Clinton’s statement came on the heels of an early tenure marked by an unprecedented level of US engagement in East Asia and the Pacific: in her first three years in office she had made thirty-six state visits to this part of the world while her predecessors had made only eighteen, twenty-one and twenty-six visits respectively in the same period (CRS, 2012: 17). Of course, Clinton’s historic attendance at the Pacific Islands Forum Heads of Government meeting in Rarotonga in 2012 was hailed as confirmation that the Obama administration was placing value not just on Asia, but also the Pacific Islands (Larsen, 2012).

Although neither the territory of Guam nor the state of Hawai’i received any mention in Clinton’s statement, this has to be understood in terms of their being legally a part of the US domestic sphere, and thus having historically made up the conditions of possibility for the US to so vigorously engage with Asia. A map of the Asia-Pacific produced for a Congressional Research Service report on the Pacific pivot identifies Guam alongside Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, the Malacca Straits, Singapore, Darwin and Perth as key sites of deployment and planned deployment for US troops (CRS, 2012: 3). Hawai’i’s absence from the map is noticeable, especially considering that it used to be CINCPAC or the base of the “Commander in Chief Pacific”, and now figures in US military global strategy as NCTAMS PAC or “Naval Computer and Telecommunications Area Master Station Pacific”. (If we were to use another metaphor Hawai’i might be conceived as the head of the octopus!) But of the eight sites on the 2012 CRS map, Guam stands out as the only one which is bona fide US soil—making its status as a colonial territory the most fundamental tendential force for its geopolitical articulation into the MIC.

Since Guam was awarded to the US as a result of the Spanish-American war in 1898, the island was governed by the US Navy until 1950, and it has remained an important naval base for the US in the Pacific to this day. Although the Pacific was not a major theatre for World War I, a German vessel was scuttled in Guam’s Apra Harbor in 1917 by Marines at the order of the US Naval Governor (Rogers, 1995), making Guam the site of America’s first hostile act against the Germans in the war. Of course, in World War II Guam was significant first because of Japanese occupation (following a day after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941) and then the eventual “liberation” by US forces in 1944. Guam having primarily been a naval base before this, Andersen Air Force base was established as a consequence of the “liberation” and as a key site for launching air attacks on Japan in the final throes of the war (Rogers, 1995). Later, during the Vietnam war, B-52 bombers departed from Andersen (Rogers, 1995). The American “liberation” has been a powerful historical and cultural tendential force in securing Guam’s pivotal relationship with the US MIC (Bevacqua, 2010; Camacho, 2011), even when in the post-war period US military investment in Guam has ebbed and flowed depending on the geo-political direction of US foreign policy priorities.9

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9 During the US Senate hearings on the proposed military build-up on Guam, Senator Daniel Akaka of Hawai’i explicitly referred to the significance of Guam’s gratitude for “liberation”: “I also want to take this opportunity to express my support of H.R. 1595, the Guam World War II Loyalty Recognition Act, which passed in the House and is currently pending before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The people of Guam deserve no less than to be recognized for the loyalty and courage they displayed during the World War II occupation of Guam by the Japanese. I know the Representative here from Guam has worked hard
While Guam’s geographic utility to the US is clear from its “forward” positioning in relation to Asia, the political dimensions that secure its geo-political articulation with the US MIC cohere around the Organic Act of 1950. This Act transformed Guam from an unorganized unincorporated territory of the United States into an organized unincorporated territory: it ended the US naval administration and provided a means of civilian self-government for the island, while also conferring a limited form of citizenship to residents born on the island (Rogers, 1995). Thus, the people of Guam have a non-voting representative in the US Congress and do not participate in Presidential elections. The Organic Act therefore positions Guam in an interesting liminal legal and political position—between limbs, one might say.

Chamorro scholar Keith Camacho has pointed out that Guam’s geo-political value to the US is not defensive, but “an ‘offensive’ border for the purpose of attacking perceived enemies of the U.S” (Camacho, 2012). The Pacific Studies scholar the late Ron Crocombe also noted that:

Guam’s military importance is reflected in the fact that it has the largest fuel storage capacity of any US air force base in the world. In 2006, it conducted the largest US aircraft carrier exercises off Guam since the Vietnam War, and the world’s largest war games exercise of the year was conducted further east in the Pacific. It is part of the attempt to intimidate China despite official protestations that it is ‘never aimed at anybody’ (Crocombe, 2007: 353).

The level of militarized investment in Guam by the US can be quantified and measured in material terms, and—in a way that articulations theory usefully prepares us for—can take place alongside and simultaneously with other forms of apparent divestment. As Australian academic David Hegarty has observed:

The US has been winding down its role in the South Pacific since the end of the Cold War. It has been (sic) closed embassies in Solomon Islands and Samoa, aid posts in Papua New Guinea and Fiji, and has wound back its provision of educational assistance in the form of scholarships. At the military level, though, the US is looking to expand its presence. Secretary of Defence Robert Gates said in May 2009 that the US was ‘actually increasing our military presence [in the central and western Pacific], with new air, naval and marine assets based...in Guam’.... Indeed, over the next several years the US intends to spend A$18 billion on turning the island of Guam into what the generals are calling an unsinkable aircraft carrier’.... This, however, is directed squarely at China, and is intended as a warning about China’s activities in the Taiwan Strait, rather than being directed towards South Pacific regional security (Hegarty, 2013: 217).

In many ways Guam is not just a pivot point that allows the US to effectively position and launch its military might towards Asia when required, it is also a weathervane of sorts. In the way that some people insist their elbows and knees help them forecast the weather, the tendential forces that twist, turn and twinge around Guam can indicate the directions and vicissitudes of US military-strategic investment.
For Guam, the biggest development of the Obama administration and Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State and the ultimate endorsement of its role as a Pacific “pivot” seemed to be the proposal to relocate 8,000 US Marines from Okinawa by 2014. Of course, given that the Marines would inevitably come with dependents, and their relocation would require a level of infrastructural extension and strengthening that the existing Guam labour force was unlikely sufficient for, the projected demographic impact of the relocation was estimated as a population increase of between 40-50,000 on top of Guam’s existing population of 117,000. The initial cost of the relocation had been calculated at around US$10 billion, of which Japan—rather interestingly—was to bear over 60% of the costs (United States Senate, 2008). Known colloquially as “the military build-up”, this proposal engendered extensive community consultations, oppositional activist organizing, commercial endorsement and lobbying, and Congressional committee hearings. By the time of this writing, however, the Marines have not been relocated, although dimensions of the infrastructural preparation have taken place. The Global Economic Crisis (GEC), in which began precisely as Obama was taking office, was the primary reason for slowing down the build-up; but in spite of the GEC, Guam remains as articulated into the US MIC as it has ever been.

**Fiji: labour articulations with the MIC**

Although often eclipsed by the US as a superpower, the United Kingdom is a crucial player in the global MIC. Some commentators might suggest that a clearly defined British defence industrial base has been overtaken by mergers and partnerships with European and American corporations (Majumdar, 2015). However, today, one of the world’s largest defence contractors is a British multinational known as BAE Systems, the result of a merger between British Aerospace and Marconi Electronic Systems in 1999, which brought together some of Britain’s most important aircraft, warship and defence electronics manufacturers (Durham, 2015). Remembering that the MIC is not solely confined to industry, where does the UK stand in terms of its defence establishment? The US is certainly globally dominant in terms of force capacity and defence spending; Russia, China, and India also are among the world’s top five military powers; and the UK comes in at fifth, which is not insignificant. While Britain’s defence establishment in the post-World War II and Cold War period has been aligned very closely with US foreign policy, I propose that the way that the BA has recruited militarized labour from former colonies such as Fiji relies on its specific historical relationships rather than generalized notions of an available pool of global labour.

Fiji has functioned as a reliable and versatile source of militarized labour for Great Britain since colonial rule was established there in 1874, through World War I and to World II (see Ravuvu, 1988). More pertinentl, in the period when British colonialism in Fiji overlapped

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10 The whole relocation of the US Marines from Okinawa to Guam is somewhat in question now with the Abe government shifting to a more explicitly militarist position and in fact proposing more bases on Okinawa. See: [http://japanfocus.org/-International_Scholars_Artists_and_Activists-Petition/4370/article.html](http://japanfocus.org/-International_Scholars_Artists_and_Activists-Petition/4370/article.html)

11 According to 2012 figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Index (SIPRI), 34—over a third—of the world’s top 100 arms producers were registered as US corporations. The next largest producers of arms by national origin were Russia and Britain, with nine corporations each in the top 100 (Sedghi, 2012).

with the emergence of the global MIC, the Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) played a key role in Britain’s anti-Communist military campaign in Southeast Asia, with one thousand six hundred men from Fiji serving in Malaya between 1952 and 1956 (Madigibuli, 2014). What the social and cultural impact of this scale of international military service on Fiji was is not clear—especially when many of the men would have previously served in WWII—but there is a clear sense of ideological loyalty to Great Britain among Fijians that continues a pattern of tendential force established when Fijian chiefs ceded their country to Queen Victoria. Although not all Fijian labour has been willingly surrendered to the British, the dominant narrative of Fiji-British colonial relations would suggest otherwise (Nicole, 2010).

The next occasion when Fiji figured as a militarized labour source for the colonial motherland was in 1961 when the BA recruited 212 soldiers from the islands for service mostly in Great Britain, Germany, Cyprus, and several covert operations, particularly in the Middle East. In terms of thinking about Fiji’s articulation into a British MIC, however, this recruitment of soldiers is distinct from the service of Fijians in the RFMF around the same time. For one thing, the 212 Fijians who enlisted in the BA in 1961 were directly articulated into the British defence establishment (i.e. armaments industry + defence establishment [← add 212 Fiji soldiers here] = British MIC c.1961), whereas the RFMF might be seen as connecting to the British MIC at a separate joint (i.e. British MIC + RFMF c.1961). Once Fiji became independent in 1970, the RFMF’s military capacity had shrunk to around 4000 troops (Fiji Parliament, 1997). Fiji might have been disarticulated completely from the British MIC at that point, but events in the Middle East created new needs for militarized labour.

RFMF contracts for UN peacekeeping in Lebanon beginning in 1978 and Sinai in 1982 provided new ligaments and tendons for strengthening Fiji’s articulation into a global MIC in which both the UK and the US were stakeholders, and in a region in which British imperial power was waning while the US’s was waxing. The level of demand for Fiji’s participation in international peacekeeping is indicated by Fiji’s monthly deployment of 120 troops for each of eleven months per year for UN missions in the late 1970s and early 1980s; the UN is indisputably a key player in the exponential growth of Fiji’s militarized labour force. Much of the commentary surrounding Fiji’s multiple coups, between 1987-2006, has highlighted the role of the UN in entrenching peacekeeping as part of Fiji’s economy; in this regard, the military is one of the most reliable employers of indigenous Fijian males (e.g. Firth and Fraenkel, 2009). Of course, although the UN does not endorse the intervention of national forces in democratic processes, it is clear that experience and exposure gained through UN peacekeeping in the Middle East has literally equipped and more abstractly empowered the military as a political actor in Fiji (Teaiwa, 2008). The RFMF’s interventions into and disruptions of electoral and parliamentary processes, however, are also an outcome of racial and political tensions in the country that are directly attributable to British colonialism (Lal, 1990; Lal, 1992; Nicole, 2010). As a result of this combination of international and domestic circumstances the size of Fiji’s armed forces ballooned to 6,000 by 1988 (Fiji Parliament 1997). Through these processes, we can trace Fiji’s articulation, as labour and through UN peacekeeping, into a global MIC that emerges out of the confluence of various national MICs, primarily US, British, and Israeli. (US MIC + British MIC + Israeli MIC i.e. Global MIC investments in the Middle East ←→ UN Peacekeeping Forces [← add thousands of Fiji soldiers here].)
In the late 1990s, the BA returned to Fiji to recruit once more; this time, however, Fiji was not a colony but an independent, sovereign nation. Post-war fatigue and the end of peacetime conscription in 1960 had required the BA to make up its numbers by recruiting Commonwealth soldiers in the 1960s (Baynes, 1972). In the late 1990s a different sort of malaise was deterring the British from voluntarily enlisting, but by the early 2000s, the events of 9/11 gave new impetus to military recruitment both domestically and internationally (Ware, 2012). Fiji responded to the British overtures so enthusiastically that within ten years of recruitment commencing there were more soldiers from Fiji (over 2000) in the BA than from any other Commonwealth nation (excluding Gurkhas, who have a particular history of service within the BA, see Ware, 2012).

In the context of “just” wars or causes, military service is often reified and heroized; and as long as the military is viewed as an institution rather than an organization, soldiering is understood as a performance of citizenship and civic duty rather than work (Levy, 2007). In Fiji, ever since the RFMF took an explicitly oppositional stance in relation to the Labour party in 1987, there has been a striking reluctance among analysts to frame soldiers as labourers. Indeed, as Levy has observed, there is a tendency for there to be an inverse relationship between material and symbolic rewards for soldiers: the higher their pay, the less respect they can expect from society and vice versa (Levy, 2007). In Fiji, contemporary perceptions of “labouring” identities are complicated by a history of colonial discourse which has since the 1870s posited “labour” as degraded and the pastoral “native” as noble (Lal, 1998; Nandan and Mason, 2000).

Military service during World War II was in fact figured by the most influential Fijian chiefly elite leader of the twentieth century, Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, as an ethno-national duty: “Eda na sega ni kilai noi taukei kevaka e na sega mada ni dave e liu na noda dra” (quoted in Ravuvu, 1988: 15). Sukuna’s encouragement of indigenous Fijians to sign up for service during World War II was also conveniently juxtaposed against Indo-Fijians’ protests against a military pay rate which was graduated on racial lines with Europeans earning higher wages than other enlistees from the colony (Ravuvu, 1988; Parliament of Fiji, 1997; Teaiwa, 2008). In a previous article, I have documented some examples of the extent to which indigenous Fijians have embraced an ethos of heroic sacrifice and immiseration in the military, and indeed worked to subsidise military projects that should have been funded wholly by the state (Teaiwa, 2005). Sukuna’s rhetorical disarticulation of indigenous military service from labour functioned as an ideological tendential force to bind indigenous Fijians to the British, and also resonated with the colonial discourse of “martial races”, which posited indigenous soldiering not as work but as a performance of an essential identity.

Paul Higate notes that this discourse continues through to contemporary figurations of Fijians in the private military security industry (Higate, 2012), although the mercenary taint helps to illuminate their labour more clearly (Levy, 2007). Indeed, by paying attention to the recruitment of Fijians by private military security companies, we can also understand how the militarized labour from Fiji that is getting articulated into the global MIC can extend beyond soldiering to include occupations such as hairdressing and laundering (Bennett, 2009; RNZI, 2008; Stillman, 2011). However, nothing draws attention to the status of an activity as labour more than the threat of unemployment; and in 2015, when ninety Fijians in

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13 "Fijians will never be recognized (by other nations) unless our blood is spilt first” (Ravuvu 1988: 15).
the British Army were made redundant, that single event signalled the reality of Fiji and Fijians’ roles as a (vulnerable, if not entirely dispensable) source of labour for the global MIC (Fiji Sun, 2015).

Although there are certainly strong historical and ideological forces that can be thought of as tendential in terms of the articulation between Fiji and the global MIC, the greatest of the lines of tendential force is undeniably economic. When the market was providing not more than 2000 jobs a year for 17,000 high school leavers (Mausio, 2003), labour migration was a boon. In 2010 Fiji economist Wadan Narsey was quoted as attributing a large proportion of Fiji’s US$160 million in remittances to militarized migrant labour earnings, accounting for more than the value of the sugar industry, which had served for over a century as the backbone of the national economy (Radio New Zealand, 2010). Fiji’s military and economic planners have astutely positioned the country as a ready labour pool for the current and growing crisis in Syria. Within six months of its first deployment of 140 troops to the Golan Heights in June 2013, the number of Fiji troops in Syria had grown to 500 (Fiji Government, 2013, 2014); Prime Minister Bainimarama has announced plans to raise this number to 1,000 annually (FBC News, 2014). So even if the British Army can no longer take Fiji’s surplus labour, there is still confidence that the global MIC can make use of it.

**Conclusion: Is disarticulation from the MIC possible?**

Little literature explores the embodied experiences of indigenous people in war and peacekeeping; indeed, although it is growing, there is still only a small body of research on indigenous military histories (Risman, et al.). Indigenous experiences of militarization are often ignored—and sometimes deliberately marginalized—by non-indigenous scholars on the grounds that they are statistically irrelevant; that because they constitute a minority presence, there is nothing for a dominant group or groups to learn from paying attention to them. Often, what such dismissals really signify is that the dominant group is unwilling to surrender its paradigms, for one of the most profound effects of a genuine reckoning with indigenous knowledge is having one’s epistemological foundations challenged. This is certainly the case around issues of embodiment: a whole anthropological literature exists which documents and explores the ways that indigenous concepts of the body—and therefore, knowing through the body—are radically different from the strictly sensory and individualized experience that western scientific literature inscribes. In Papua New Guinea and Fiji respectively, for example, Crook and Becker describe embodiment as thoroughly esoteric and socio-centric (Becker, xxxx; Crook, 2007).

Colonialism and imperialism have not been kind to indigenous bodies (e.g. Smith, 1999; Starn, 2004). Indigenous people have been variously displaced, dispossessed, had their labour brutally extracted, suffered from introduced diseases, and had their bodies subjected to numerous indignities in the interests of colonial economics, jurisprudence, medical science, and anthropological observation. As someone with indigenous ancestry in the Pacific, I have thus been reluctant to reproduce any of these processes. The avoidance of such methods requires a special vigilance, especially in this age of social media when images of the body are more easily commoditized and fetishized than ever before. Militarized bodies carry a certain currency in the contemporary marketplace of images, as do particular representations of the indigenous body—often highly aestheticized and romanticized. While
social media has become a dynamic space for counter-hegemonic resistance and ideological warfare—most visible in the extraordinary productivity around memes—it is naïve to assume that this will translate into substantive checks and balances in the policy realm, the economy, or “the real world”. Still, the sorts of images that come through to us on social media can help us think through more critically the ways that indigenous participation in the MIC is made both possible and necessary.

I began this article by foregrounding the human body in order to draw attention to the concept of the articulated limb as a theoretical device. The bulk of my discussion, however, has focused on describing the MIC as a metaphorical body, with Pacific places and people serving as its articulated extensions. Guam, I proposed, can be understood as a geo-political site of articulation with the US MIC; while Fiji can be viewed as a source of militarized labour that has been variously articulated with the British and the UN/US/global MIC. A combination of tendential forces can be identified at work at these sites of articulation, but for Guam I highlighted historical lines of tendential force, while in Fiji I emphasized economic ones. Ideological lines of tendential force are also clearly at work in both Guam and Fiji, and I have tried to acknowledge this.

I was moved to displace my examination of embodiment onto the MIC in order to avoid the political problem of fetishizing or dissecting actual indigenous bodies. However, the images of military veteran amputees I described in the introduction to this article are compellingly instructive. As has been acknowledged earlier, the promise of articulation theory is disarticulation. In the Michael Stokes photographs and the picture of Pte Derek Drenalagi that I described in the opening paragraphs of this article, the prostheses that replace their amputated limbs serve to reassure us that however damaging militarized violence might be, some of us can survive it; some of us can continue to live and function and even excel. In these cases, physical/physiological disarticulation of original limbs was immediately compensated for by prosthetic rearticulations. So if the lines of tendential force that bind Guam and Fiji respectively to the MIC make it impossible to simply unhook them, does this mean that disarticulation must be as violent as the severing of a limb by something like a mine blast? Given my proposal that Guam’s lines of tendential force to the US are primarily geo-political and that Fiji’s to the British/UN/US/global MIC are economic, and both are buttressed by ideology, what could disarticulation look like? Against the odds, there are individuals and communities in Guam and Fiji who are asking such questions, even if they are not using the same language. In Guam, indigenous sovereignty and non-indigenous demilitarization activists across several generations have begun to reclaim the Chamorro name for the island, which is Guahan (Aguon, 2006; Vine, 2015). It is a move that symbolically and psychologically resists the US MIC’s cartographic appropriation of Pacific space and places for its own aggrandizing purposes; a first step towards pursuing a sovereign and demilitarized future for Guahan.

In Fiji and in Guam, women’s and feminist groups have long maintained a commitment to seeking demilitarized solutions to their island economies’ development challenges (Camacho, 2012; Teaiwa, 2008). But the economic logic and the lure of employment and social mobility through military or militarized service is as difficult to resist in Fiji as on Guam. Perhaps it is only the death of a loved one that can make survivors re-evaluate the worth of soldiering as labour? On 1 September 2006, Ranger Anare Draiva, a Fijian serving with the British Army in the Helmand province of Afghanistan, was shot dead in an exchange of fire
with Taliban forces. When most Fijian families to this point had mourned their British Army war dead as heroes of a good fight, three of Draiva’s sisters collectively signed an anti-war petition organised by the British-based “Military Families Against the War” and spoke to the press in support of the group (Carrell, 2006). This unprecedented, and so far unRepeated, political statement by family members of a Fijian soldier, pointed a way to the possibilities for Fijians to start thinking about disarticulating from the MIC.

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