Asian New Zealanders: Identity, Belonging and Political Participation

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Abstract

National identity is often defined in terms of ‘ethnic’ (i.e., heritage-based criteria) or ‘civic’ (i.e., the adoption of a nation’s values and principles) features. This study examined the effects of national identity as ethnic versus civic on the political participation of Asian New Zealanders, exploring the potentially mediating role of national belongingness. Through an online experiment, a sample of Asian New Zealanders were randomly assigned to view national identity as normatively ethnic or civic via a short video. As hypothesised, individuals displayed a significant indirect effect of civic national identity on willingness to politically participate relative to a normative ethnic national identity or those in the control condition through a greater sense of national belongingness. In contrast, there was a significant indirect effect of ethnic national identity on willingness to politically participate relative to those in the civic and control conditions through a decreased sense of national belonging. These findings demonstrate that national identity is a form of social identity which indicates to immigrant ethnic minorities that they are either included within the ingroup (civic condition) or excluded as an outgroup member (ethnic condition) and that exclusion from the national identity can have consequences for their sense of national belonging and willingness to participate in politics.

Keywords: national identity; ethnic-civic nationhood, national belongingness, political participation, Asian New Zealanders
Asian New Zealanders: Identity, Belonging and Political Participation

In an increasingly globalised world, nation-states are becoming more diverse with many nations containing multiple ethnic groups within their borders. At present, New Zealand has one of the most ethnically diverse populations for a Western country, with the most recent census indicating that those who identify as European New Zealanders compose 74.6% of the population, Māori 15.6%, Asians 12.2% and Pacific peoples 7.8%, Middle Eastern, Latin American and African 1.2% (Statistics New Zealand, 2015a). In 2014/15, 43,085 new migrants were approved for resident visas in New Zealand. The largest source countries were China (17 per cent), India (16 per cent) and the United Kingdom (11 per cent; Ministry of Social Development, 2015), challenging traditional assumptions about ethnic homogeneity and social cohesion. Such trends are expected to continue in the coming years with people of Asian and Pasifika descent expected to comprise nearly 25% of the country’s population by 2026. Asia is a particularly significant source region (29%) for New Zealand immigrants (Ministry of Social Development, 2008) and the number of people identifying with Asian ethnicities is predicted to exceed the number identifying as Māori by the mid-2020s (Statistics New Zealand, 2015b). As such, it is important to better understand their experiences and the best way to integrate them within society so that they can make the most of civic life.

New Zealand is constitutionally a “bicultural” nation, acknowledging the partnership between the indigenous Māori and British settlers, based on the evolving interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi and special recognition of Māori as the indigenous peoples of New Zealand (Sibley & Ward, 2013). Though the New Zealand state was quickly formed using a British template of governance (namely, the Westminster system; see Pearson, 2000), the creation of nationhood required the construction of symbolic order and a collective identity. Common myths of origin, usually linked with the moment of colonial conquest, served as an
easy basis for nation-building as settler societies often imported stories and values from the ‘mother country’ Britain in order to create unity and preserve British sentiments (Baker, 2015; Pearson, 2000). However, this bicultural narrative of national identity does not provide guidance for those who are neither Māori nor European, including the proportionately significant Asian and Pasifika groups living in New Zealand. Some scholars point out that bicultural simply represents Māori and non-Māori (i.e., Pakeha / all other ethnicities. However, there is a strong tendency for people to perceive only Māori and European New Zealanders as truly Kiwi (e.g., Sibley & Barlow, 2009, Sibley, Hoverd & Liu, 2011; Sibley & Liu, 2007; Sibley, Liu & Khan, 2008; Sibley, Liu & Khan, 2010), with most academic literature using the term Pakeha as a synonym for European New Zealander. As such, there has been much public discourse about the role new ethnic groups play in the country’s changing landscape (Liu, 2005; Park, 2006; Sibley & Ward, 2013; Ward & Lin, 2005).

Because non-Māori and non-European groups are expected to be an increasing part of the national landscape in the coming decades, there is an increasing need to understand how such groups can be incorporated into the national identity to prevent the marginalisation of these ‘new’ ethnic groups.

While New Zealanders implicitly perceive both Māori and European New Zealanders as equally associated with national identity, this association does not extend to Asian New Zealanders. Even when Asian New Zealanders are explicitly stated to be New Zealand citizens and represent a comparable population size to Māori in New Zealand, they are excluded from the national category by the majority group (e.g., the New Zealand = bicultural effect; Sibley & Liu, 2007). This conclusion was further supported by the finding that New Zealand European participation favoured their ingroup and Māori over Asian New Zealanders. Research also shows that the level of warmth towards Asian New Zealanders was lower than that towards other ethnic groups, suggesting that some ethnic groups may
struggle to be included within a multicultural New Zealand (Sibley & Ward, 2013). While national identity may be most salient in times of crisis or international events, it is also reproduced on a daily basis through symbolism, such as flags, songs or bank notes (Baker, 2015). In New Zealand, symbolic markers of Māori culture are consensually represented in the national culture (e.g., the national anthem is sung in both Māori and English, Māori iconography is used on both bank notes and passports), adding a positive distinctiveness to the national identity and, thus, to what it means to be a New Zealander (Sibley & Liu, 2007; Sibley et al., 2008; Sibley et al., 2010). These findings taken together suggest that implicit conceptions of who is really considered “one of us” within a nation might relate more to which ethnic groups are symbolically represented within the national identity rather than simply which group is in the majority, or perhaps, which group has indigenous status (Sibley & Barlow, 2009; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014). For example, in the US context, data from over a dozen studies using a variety of implicit techniques to assess the association between ethnic and national stimuli (e.g., faces and symbols) shows that Americans unconsciously perceive White Americans as more American than their Asian-, African-, Hispanic-, and even Native-American counterparts (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos & Mohamed, 2014; Devos, Gavin & Quintana, 2010; Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010). Although American = White may be a convenient heuristic, there were significant differences in the degree to which different ethnic minority groups were associated with the national identity; African- and Native Americans were perceived as more American than Latino- and Asian- Americans. Suggesting that national identity is not easily granted to minority ethnic groups and when it is, the level of inclusion varies depending on which ethnic group is being considered.
National Identity and Social Identity

Fundamental to national identity is the collection of beliefs or constitutive norms about the characteristics of a nation’s members; the attitudes, values and behaviours that members ought to display (Baker, 2015; Schildkraut, 2007). National identity is an example of a “social identity”, referring to those aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from being part of the national group. The essential criteria for large social categories, such as nations, ‘are that the individuals concerned define themselves and are defined by others as members of the group’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40). The social categorisation of individuals into groups is a cognitive tool used to create order and make sense of the social environment, allowing an individual to make sense of their place within the world in order to navigate social interactions. People’s conceptions of national identity are essentially prototypes (i.e., clearest cases or best examples of the category), with members of the ingroup (i.e., “us”) containing many attributes in common with each other and few attributes in common with other relevant outgroups (i.e., “them”; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). This creates a positive social identity and evaluation of one’s own group through social comparisons, fulfilling a core motivational need for positive distinctiveness (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In the context of national identity, this implies that, although multiple identity groups may exist within a nation, the perception of who “truly” belongs may depend on the psychological prototypes of “us” and “them” (Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014).

Ethnic and Civic Models of National Identity

National identities are fluid and dynamic, changing over time as a result of discursive struggles and negotiations between different groups within the nation (Baker, 2015). Thus, how nations adapt to the ethnic diversity within their borders has varied considerably. Research shows that our conceptions of national identity can be classified as either ethnic or civic (Brubaker, 2009; Pearson, 2000). Ethnic national identity is represented as seeking or
preserving the shared ethnicity and ancestry of common descent (‘blood’, ‘race’), history, language, or religion. Nations by this definition are fixed with strong group boundary demarcation, usually designed to be monolingual and unicultural by nature in order to preserve a homogenous form of social cohesion, with a distinct cultural heritage that cannot be adopted by newcomers (Pearson, 2000; Pehrson & Green, 2010). By contrast, civic national identity emphasises citizenship united by a shared set of political responsibilities, practices, and values (e.g. France; Brubaker, 1990). Nations by this definition are ones where ‘anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race or colour’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 24).

Although national identity can be construed in either ethnic or civic terms, some nations simultaneously reveal both conceptions of national identity simultaneously (e.g., the USA; Citrin, Reingold & Green, 1990; Schildkraut, 2007; New Zealand; Sibley, Hoverd, & Liu, 2011). At the extremes, the ethnic and civic models are pronounced, but as Brubaker (1990; 2009) notes, one should be cautious of overemphasising the severe contrast and simplicity of a binary perspective. Rather, one should consider these two conceptions as varying along a single continuum. Pearson (2000) argues that the interweaving of both civic and ethnic components of national identity best explains the current tensions in New Zealand’s ethnic politics.

Previous research demonstrates that people’s psychological conceptions of national identity affect perceivers’ attitudes, behaviours and willingness to include ethnic groups (for a review, see Yogeeswaran &Dasgupta, 2014; also see Citrin, Reingold & Green, 1990). For example, Wakefield and colleagues (2011) found that defining national identity in civic terms led majority group members in Scotland to judge a Chinese-heritage target as more Scottish and were more open to his criticism of Scotland relative to a neutral prime, indicating that the target was granted ingroup privileges such as the right to engage in civic life through debate.
Similarly, more helping behaviour was provided to a Chinese-target under the civic condition than when national identity was defined in ethnic terms. The helpful behaviour was mediated by increased inclusion of the Chinese-heritage target within the national identity. In contrast, when an ethnic conception of national identity was made salient, the Chinese-heritage target was perceived as an outgroup member and help was withheld as a result of being classified as one of “them” rather than one of “us” (Wakefield et al., 2011). Ethnic vs. civic conceptions of national identity affect the perceived national belongingness of certain ethnic groups within the nation and can affect the behaviour, or lack thereof, towards ethnic minorities.

**National Belongingness**

While many ethnic minorities develop a commitment to their host country and adopt a sense of national identity, their ethnic identity remains an important part of their self-concept. But having a strong ethnic identity does not diminish one’s ability to also have a strong national identity, as both can exist in the form of a dual identity (Elkins & Sides, 2007; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012). Strong ingroup attitudes can actually facilitate national unity in divided societies (Elkins & Sides, 2007), with social harmony best achieved by maintaining subgroup identities such as ethnic identity, and locating them within the context of a binding and more inclusive superordinate or national identity (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Verkuyten and Martinovic (2012) argue that a dual identity allows for a sense of national commitment and belonging without isolating oneself from one’s ethnic ingroup. However, the probability of a harmonious dual identity depends heavily on whether national identity is defined in ethnic or civic terms. It is more difficult for ethnic minorities to develop a sense of national belonging in nations that emphasise an ethnic (vs. civic) identity (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2012). This suggests that the civic conception of national identity is better suited to facilitate dual categorisation in which superordinate national and subgroup ethnic identities are acknowledged and promoted simultaneously.
One factor that may influence the adoption of national belongingness by ethnic subgroups is how inclusive the other groups are perceived to be. The “perpetual foreigner” stereotype proposes that some ethnic minorities will always be seen as the “other” within White Anglo-Saxon dominant societies; an effect that is particularly prevalent for Asians living in several countries (e.g., Cheryan & Monin, 2005; Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos & Heng, 2009; Huynh, Devos, & Smalarz, 2011; Thai, 2016). Otherwise known as “identity denial”, individuals who do not match the prototype of the ingroup can have their membership questioned or may not be recognised as part of the ingroup at all (Cheryan & Monin, 2005). Phinney, Cantu and Kurtz (1997) found that many American ethnic minority adolescents feel that mainstream culture generally means White and thus excludes them. For example, Cheryan and Monin, (2005) found that identity denial is a common occurrence in Asian Americans’ daily lives, with participants indicating that they were aware their American identity is denied by others despite feeling just as American as European Americans. Not only are ethnic minorities aware of being denied their national identity, but even after controlling for perceived discrimination, it was a significant predictor of internal identity conflict and a lower sense of belonging to American culture for Asian Americans, Latinos, and African Americans (Huynh et al., 2011). Likewise, Asamen and Berry (1987), found that the more Japanese Americans were aware of prejudices against their ethnic group, the more negatively they viewed themselves. Taken together, these findings suggest that it is not only important to understand how minority groups belong and fit within host societies, but also the negative outcomes that result when this sense of national belonging is withheld.

**Political Participation**

Political participation is considered not only a legal right by those who reside within democratic nations, but also a way in which individuals can shape the future. Yet voter turnout is in steady decline across many Western nations (Vowles, 2012). Though traditional
forms of political participation are in decline, non-traditional forms of civic engagement are on the rise (Dalton, 2008). However, it is not always possible to make a clear distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of political participation. Some political scientists try to resolve this issue by focusing on the level of commitment in terms of time, risk, or energy by distinguishing between ‘low-cost’ and ‘high-intensity’ participation (Whiteley & Seyd, 2002).

Others, focus on the proximity to institutionalisation, defining traditional forms of participation as those closely related to the electoral process (e.g., party membership, voting and contacting politicians), while non-conventional acts (e.g., demonstrating, political consumerism, or signing petitions) take place beyond party politics and are often labelled as apolitical by its participants (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010). This is consistent with Dalton’s (2008) two faces of citizenship, which suggests that there is a shift away from elections and party activity or institutionalized expressions of ‘citizen duty’ (e.g., allegiance to the state and voting) towards individualised and direct forms of action through ‘engaged citizenship’ (e.g., being actively involved in civil society groups and general political activity).

While the decision to vote is strongly affected by institutional and election-specific contextual variables for other forms of participation, additional factors may play a role (Quintelier & Blais, 2015). As such, it is important that research into political participation covers a broad repertoire of political actions. Previous research has shown that age is one of the most important predictors of political participation. Older individuals are also known to participate more often in traditional forms, with younger people expressing themselves through more alternative or direct forms of political participation (e.g., joining an internet forum or group, signing a petition, taking part in a demonstration; Marien et al., 2010; Tawhai, 2015). While previous research has identified education, gender and age to be
significant predictors in preference for non-conventional political participation, little is known about the role of national identification.

Immigrant groups are becoming increasingly involved in the politics of their host nation, and yet very little is known about the psychological motivations and obstacles of these ethnic minorities to politically participate. Leighley and Vedlita (1995) demonstrated that group conflicts (e.g. ingroup identification and outgroup hostility) are relevant to the study of political participation, with negative attitudes held by the general population (e.g., White-, African-, Mexican- and Asian-American) toward ethnic minorities a significantly negative predictor of political involvement, tending to demobilise African Americans and Asian Americans. An evaluation of dominant models of political participation found strong support for the socioeconomic status, psychological resource, and social connectedness as overall predictors of participation across four American ethnic groups. However, income and political efficacy were nonsignificant predictors for Asian Americans’ participation; indicating that different factors may affect specific ethnic groups within a nation (Leighley & Vedlita, 1995). According the social theory of political participation; voting is an inherently social behaviour best understood by focusing on the patterns of behaviour of others within ones immediate environment (e.g., personal networks, society as a whole; Rolfe, 2012). Accordingly, Voicu and Comsa (2014) found that the probability of immigrants voting increased in host countries where most other people voted. The increased probability of immigrants voting was the result of changes in the immigrants due to contact with the host country’s institutions, rather than the transference of voting habits from their country of origin. This indicates that immigrants adapt to the political context of their new host countries, learning through exposure and socialisation of political norms.

The present research aims to add to the current literature on national identity by exploring the relationship between national identity, a sense of belongingness, and political
participation, specifically among Asian New Zealanders. There is a general lack of research into the political participation of Asian New Zealanders and no work on the consequences of civic and ethnic conceptions of national identity on ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, prior research from New Zealand (e.g., Henderson, 2013; Park, 2006; Vowles, 2012) and the United States (e.g., Harder & Krosnick, 2008; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1995) indicates that Asian citizens are less politically active than the general population. Asian New Zealanders have been found to be 17-24% less likely to vote when compared to non-Maori and the general population (Park, 2006; Vowles, 2012). It estimated that only around 60% of Asian New Zealanders voted during the 2002 general election compared to 77% of the general population. Only 13.3% would sign a petition compared to 74.4% of the general population, with less than 10% participating in another form of political activity (e.g., protest, join a political party etc.; NZES, 2002). This indicates that Asian New Zealanders’ not only participate in politics less, but also differ in the type of political action they are likely to pursue.

**Sense of National Belonging Mediates Impact of National Identity on Political Participation**

Martineiello’s (2005) discussion of political integration of immigrants identifies four dimensions; acquiring rights, subjective identification with the host society, adopting democratic values, and political participation. New Zealand is unique in that non-citizen permanent residents have full voting rights, although recent immigrants are considerably less likely to be registered to vote than members of the general population, as 11.6% of immigrants remain unenrolled after three years of permanent residence (Henderson, 2013). The under-enrolment of recent immigrants highlights that although many immigrants have acquired the right to vote, they have not made the significant steps towards political participation. Previous findings suggest that ethnic vs. civic conceptions of national identity affect the national inclusion of certain ethnic groups by the majority members of the nation
(Yogeeswaran, Dasgupta & Gomez, 2012). The present research examines how these ethnic versus civic representations of national identity impact minority group members’ own sense of national belonging and their willingness to politically participate.

Political participation by ethnic minorities is mediated by a nation’s political environment or political opportunity structure (Koopmans, 2004). The political structure of a nation is comprised of ‘institutional’ and ‘discursive’ factors, which provide opportunities and constraints on an individual’s political behaviour. The institutional side consists of the actual structure of the political system; policies granting equal civic and cultural rights. While the discursive side may consist of public opinions, such as those toward migrants, expressing established notions of who can participate is reflected in the attitudes of the majority group and political media. Koopmans (2004) found that there was a strong positive relationship between countries where naturalisation was easy and frequent (e.g., the Netherlands versus Germany) and the degree to which immigrants participated proactively in public debates. Voicu and Comsa (2014) suggest that a nation with inclusive political practices and public attitudes is likely to increase the probability of immigrants voting, by creating a social-political environment in which expressing choice during elections is encouraged. Taken together, these findings suggest that countries that adopt a civic conception of national identity paired with a more inclusive political system may encourage a sense of national belonging or subjective identification with the host country which, in turn, encourages the adoption of political participation.

Jedwab’s (2006) analysis of the Ethnic Diversity Survey of Statistics Canada concluded that having a strong ethnic identity and sense of ethnic belonging had no impact on voting participation, while a strong sense of national belonging positively correlated with voter participation. In contrast, Bevelander and Pendakur (2009) found that, while a high sense of belonging at the local level increased immigrants’ probability of voting, they found
no effect for Canadian/national sense of belonging and a negative effect for provincial sense of belonging. These contradictory findings suggest that further research is needed to establish the relationship between national sense of belonging and political participation.

There is a lack of integration in the current academic literature between the political sciences and social psychology in the study of national identity, belongingness, and political participation. The current study therefore aims to provide insight into the effects of national identity on political participation and explore the potentially mediating role of national belongingness in this relationship. This will be done by experimentally manipulating national identity within a sample of Asian New Zealanders. Depending on which condition they are randomly assigned to, participants will watch a short video designed to prime thoughts about national identity as ethnic, civic, or neutral. It is hypothesised that individuals who are exposed to a civic conception of national identity will express a greater sense of national belongingness, and therefore report a greater willingness to politically participate than individuals exposed to the ethnic or control conditions. However, those exposed to an ethnic conception of national identity will feel a lower sense of national belonging and subsequently be less willing to politically participate relative to their civic and control counterparts.

Method

Participants

A total of 412 Asian New Zealanders were recruited through use of flyers, social media, and ethnic community newsletters and email lists. Of these, only 235 completed the experiment. Of those 17 failed a basic manipulation check about the video and were therefore dropped leaving a sample of 218 participants including 115 males and 103 females ($M_{age} = 34.32$ years, $SD = 13.15$, age range = 18-70), with 37.3% being New Zealand Citizens, 26.4% having New Zealand Permanent Residence and 36.4% being non-New Zealand citizens.
All participants identified as being Asian (Filipino = 33.6%, Chinese = 25.5%, Indian = 17.3%) and living in New Zealand with adequate English language skills. It is important to note that ethnicity was measured by self-identification via multi-choice including an open-ended “other” text box, allowing the participants to choose one or multiple options from a list of possible answers or they could type their ethnicity of choice. As such participants were able to identify with more than one ethnicity (e.g., Chinese Singaporean, Indian New Zealander).

**Measures and Manipulations**

**Premanipulation questionnaire.** General demographic questions (age, gender, nationality, place of birth, how long they have been living in New Zealand and educational background) were included as part of a pre-manipulation questionnaire.

**Manipulation.** After completing the pre-manipulation questionnaire, participants were randomly assigned to watch one of three videos depicting scenes of New Zealand with an accompanying narrative that emphasized civic or ethnic conceptions of New Zealand national identity or neutral facts about New Zealand for the control group. For the ethnic and civic conditions, this was emphasised by reference to a “recent nationally representative survey revealed a vast majority of New Zealanders (83%) believe that to be a true New Zealander, one must” either (a) “be born in New Zealand and/or have ancestry in it” (ethnic condition) or (b) “be friendly, treat people fairly, and work hard” (civic condition). In the neutral condition, participants were shown no imagery of people and no mention of national identity in the narrative. For example, participants were told “New Zealand is an island nation in the south western Pacific Ocean”. Refer to Appendix A for complete video scripts.

**Post manipulation questionnaire.** After watching one of the three manipulation videos, participants were asked to answer three condition-specific questions. These referred to a “recent survey investigated what factors New Zealand people think are important in the
definition of being a ‘true’ New Zealander. The questions below are based on the results of these surveys.” Participants were then provided with three high percentage answers (e.g., 85%, 89%, 94%), and told to select what percentage of New Zealanders they thought agreed with the following statements. Example of an ethnic statement was “You are only a New Zealander, if you have a New Zealand parent”. Example of a civic statement was “Regardless of where you were born, if you feel like a New Zealander – you are a New Zealander”. Example of the neutral statement was “New Zealand cares about preserving its forests and oceans.”

**National belonging.** Sense of national belonging was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree* and 5 = *strongly agree*) taken from previous research (Sheldon & Bettencourt, 2002; Verkuyten, 2005). The scale had 6 items (e.g., “My New Zealand identity is an important part of my self” and “I feel a sense of commitment to New Zealand”) with higher scores indication a stronger sense of national belonging.

**Political participation.** Willingness to engage in political participation was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = *never* and 5 = *very frequently*) adapted from previous research (Marien et al., 2010; NZES 2002; Park, 2006) which was adapted slightly to include forms of e-participation (Gibson & Cantijoch, 2013). The scale had ten items (e.g., “Write, email or phone government officials, newspapers or TV station”, “Donate to a political party”, “Share a political post or comment online” and “Work in the community to solve a problem”) in order to encompass a wide range of different political activities. Higher scores indicated a greater willingness to politically participate.

**Procedure**

Participants were recruited to take part in an online survey assessing their social attitudes and feelings on various issues. The link to the study was advertised through ethnic social media sites, community groups and public areas on flyers. Those who followed the link
were first randomly assigned to one of three conditions (ethnic/civic/neutral) in a between-subjects design. The independent variable was national identity (ethnic/civic/neutral), while the dependent variables were national belongingness and political participation. Participants were then asked to think about the video they had watched earlier and provide comments on what they remembered and what the video said about New Zealand. Comments were coded (0 = video did not load, 1 = blank/not relevant, 2 = vague answer, 3 = meaningful answer) as a manipulation check to ensure that participants had watched and could recall the national identity manipulation. Participants were offered the chance to go in the draw to win one of three prizes at the competition of the experiment through a separate link.

Results

Manipulation check. Of the 235 participants who completed the experiment several failed the manipulation check. They either could not watch the video due to computer problems (N = 15), or failed to recall information about the video (N = 2). This left a final sample size of 218 participants used in the analyses that follow.

Factor analysis. The factor structure of the 10 political participation items was examined using principle component analysis (PCA). Firstly, all 10 items correlated at least .3 with at least one other item, suggesting reasonable factorability (see Table 1, for correlation matrix). Secondly, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sample adequacy was .90, above the recommended value of .60, indicating that the data was sufficient for exploratory factor analysis. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, $\chi^2 (45) = 1605.93, p < .001$, showing that there were patterned relationships between the items. The communalities were all above .3 (see Table 2, for PCA communalities), further confirming that each item shared some common variance with other items. Given these overall indicators, further factor analysis was conducted with all 10 items.
Principle component analysis was initially used because the primary purpose of these analyses was to identify the potential number of factors present in political participation. The initial eigenvalues showed that the first factor explained 58% of the variance, the second factor 13% of the variance. The two-factor solution, which explained 71% of the variance in total scores, was supported due to the ‘levelling off’ of eigenvalues on the scree plot after two factors (see Figure 1, for scree plot), and eigenvalues of less than 1.0 for the subsequent factors.

For subsequent analysis, principal axis factor analysis (PAF) was used, as PCA is only a data reduction method and does not distinguish between shared and unique variance (Costello & Osborne, 2005). A PAF analysis of the 10 items, with a fixed number of two factors using a promax rotation, was conducted (see Table 2, for PAF communalities). The factor correlation matrix’s correlation coefficients were substantial (i.e., = .66), well over the Tabachnick and Fiddell (2011) threshold of .32, making the oblique rotation preferable. Analysis of the pattern matrix clearly indicated substantial differences in factor loadings for each item with no cross-loadings. The coefficients with the highest loading were retained for that factor, with all retained loadings above .60. Factor one contained items 5-10 and factor two contained items 1-4 (refer to Table 3, for factor loadings). The structure matrix supports these findings with the corresponding positive correlations between the variables and the factors (refer to Table 3, for item correlations).

The factor labels ‘civic engagement’ and ‘party involvement’ were chosen because they suited the extracted factors. Conceptually, the items in factor one (e.g., take part in a demonstration, work in the community to solve a problem) related to forms of ‘civic engagement’, whereas factor two’s items (e.g., be nominated as a political candidate, assist a political campaign) related specifically to political ‘party involvement’. Internal consistency for each of these scales was examined using Cronbach’s alpha. The alphas were high; party
involvement subscale consisted of four items (α = .91), and the civic engagement subscale consisted of six items (α = .89). No substantial increase in alpha for any of the scales could have been achieved by eliminating more items. Overall, these analyses indicated that two distinct factors were underlying political participation, party involvement and civic engagement, and that these factors were highly internally consistent. Thus, these data support referring to the party involvement and civic engagement as two separate factors and the current study will subsequently refer to them as such.

**Sense of national belonging.** First, we collapsed the six items from this measure into an index of national belonging after establishing it had good reliability (α = .93). Then, a one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of national identity on sense of national belonging in the ethnic, civic and neutral conditions. There was a significant main effect of national identity on national belonging, \( F(2, 216) = 10.52, p < .001. \) Asian participants who watched a video framing New Zealand national identity as normatively ethnic reported a significantly lower sense of national belonging (\( M = 3.40; SD = 1.01 \)) relative to those in the control condition (\( M = 3.84; SD = .99 \)), \( t(216) = 2.76, p = .006. \) Similarly, participants in the civic condition (\( M = 4.11; SD = .84 \)) reported significantly higher sense of national belonging relative to those in the ethnic condition \( t(216) = -4.55, p < .001. \) However, the difference in sense of national belonging between those in the civic and control condition was only marginal, \( t(216) = 1.72, p = .087. \)

**Civic engagement.** A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of national identity on civic participation in ethnic, civic and neutral conditions. There was a non-significant main effect of national identity on civic participation, \( F(2,216) = .82, p = .443. \) Asian participants who watched a video framing New Zealand national identity as normatively ethnic reported no significant difference in civic participation (\( M = 3.90; SD = 1.64 \)) relative to those in the control condition (\( M = 4.20; SD = \)
1.55), \( t(216) = 1.18, p = .239 \). Similarly participants in the civic condition (\( M = 4.15; SD = 1.40 \)) reported no significant difference relative to those in the ethnic condition \( t(216) = -.19, p = .847 \). In the control condition, participants reported no significant difference relative to those in the ethnic condition \( t(216) = -.100, p = .317 \) or the control condition \( t(216) = -.19, p = .847 \).

**Party involvement.** A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of national identity on party involvement in ethnic, civic and neutral conditions. Here, too, there was a non-significant main effect of national identity on party involvement, \( F(2,217) = 1.42, p = .244 \). Asian participants who watched a video framing New Zealand national identity as normatively ethnic reported no significant difference in party involvement \( (M = 3.00; SD = 1.73) \) relative to those in the control condition \( (M = 3.01; SD = 1.78) \), \( t(217) = .072, p = .942 \). Similarly, participants in the civic condition \( (M = 3.41; SD = 1.63) \) reported no significant difference relative to those in the ethnic condition \( t(217) = -1.51, p = .133 \) or the control condition \( t(217) = 1.40, p = .162 \).

**Mediation analyses.** Mediation analyses tested whether there was a significant indirect effect of national identity on civic engagement and party involvement via national belonging. Following the procedure outlined in Hayes (2013; Hayes, Preacher & Myers, 2011), we computed the indirect effect using bias-corrected bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples. Note that if the confidence interval (CI) in these analyses does not include zero, the effect is considered statistically significant. These analyses revealed that sense of belonging significantly mediated the effect of a national identity (relative to control) on civic engagement, indirect coefficient = 0.05, \( SE = 0.03, 95\% CI [0.01, 0.12] \). Similarly, national belonging significantly mediated the effect of national identity (relative to control) on party involvement, indirect coefficient = 0.05, \( SE = 0.03, 95\% CI [0.01, 0.12] \) (see Figure 2, for conceptual mediation relationship). Although only indirect effects were found, Hayes et al. (2011) point out that it is possible for indirect effects to exist in the absence of a direct association between predictor and criterion variables, especially in models that are likely to
involve more than one mediating variable through which the effect is carried. Basic causal mediation models, such as this one (see Figure 2) are rarely sufficient to describe and explain the complexity of actual social phenomenon such as political outcomes. These findings suggest that, although there is no direct effect of national identity conceptions on civic engagement and party involvement, there is an indirect effect of national identity conceptions on both through sense of national belongingness.

**Discussion**

The present study used a video manipulation to examine the effects of national identity on political participation and sense of national belonging. The aim of the study was to establish whether the framing of national identity as either normatively ethnic or civic terms influenced Asian New Zealanders’ willingness to politically participate in range of different political activities. A secondary goal was to investigate the potentially mediating role sense of national belonging played in this relationship.

These data show that the conceptualisation of national identity (ethnic versus civic) affected sense of national belonging of Asian New Zealanders which, in turn, affected their willingness to politically participate. This trend was consistent across both civic engagement and party involvement, with similar overall effects. Analyses showed that the effect of the national identity manipulation directly affected sense of national belonging, but did not directly affect willingness to politically participate. However, analysis of indirect effects confirmed the mediating role of sense of national belonging, with civic engagement and party involvement becoming significant after accounting for sense of national belonging. These data therefore show that the way in which national identity is expressed (i.e., ethnic or civic criteria) is consequential for Asian New Zealanders’ political participation, with this tendency being mediated by the individual’s sense of national belonging.
Moreover, exploratory factor analysis revealed that political participation consisted of two correlated, albeit separate, factors. The data revealed a simple structure with each factor containing the highest loading with the other being close to zero. Therefore, the factors were labelled based on their shared conceptual ties to the items; civic engagement and party involvement. Subsequent analyses found that the effects of national identity and sense of national belonging on civic engagement and party involvement followed the same direction and had similar effect sizes. These results indicate that although political participation contains two distinct factors, both are affected by national identity and national sense of belonging in the same way (i.e., they were both positively correlated with sense of national belonging).

While previous research has shown the effects of national identity on majority group members’ attitudes towards the national inclusion of ethnic minorities (for a review, see Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2014), this is one of the first studies to show the effects on ethnic minorities’ sense of national belonging. Our findings suggest that a greater sense of national belonging obtained in the civic condition, results in a greater willingness for Asian New Zealanders to politically participate. These findings differ dramatically from those of Bevelander and Pendakur (2009) who found that a sense of national belonging had a negative impact on provincial and federal voting of ethnic minorities in Canada. However, our findings are consistent Jedwab (2006), who showed that support national belongingness of Canadian ethnic minorities was positively associated with federal voting turnout. If Asian New Zealanders willingness to politically participate is significantly influenced by their sense of national belongingness as our results suggest, this may explain why traditional socioeconomic theories of voter turnout do not explain Asian New Zealander political participation (Park, 2006).
Martineiello’s (2005) discussion of political integration of immigrants identifies four dimensions including acquiring rights, subjective identification with the host society, adopting democratic values, and political participation. Previous research shows that simply having the right to vote does not necessarily guarantee that immigrants will enact that right (Henderson, 2013). We suggest that framing national identity within a civic context allows ethnic minorities to subjectively identify with their host society, which encourages civic duty by increasing their sense of national belonging and priming political participation. Civic national identity was primed by granting inclusion to those who were “willing to subscribe to core New Zealand values, fulfil civic responsibilities, and serve the public good.” Ideals such as “service to their nation and community”, “work[ing] for the betterment of New Zealand civil society and be[ing] politically conscious”, were all included within the civic manipulation, paired with encompassing terms highlighting the fact that to be “truly kiwi” one did not have to be born in New Zealand, but simply had to embrace these values. Research shows that immigrants themselves draw a distinction between their legal rights and responsibilities as citizens and actual feelings of national belonging, the latter of which comes from how they define their identity in relation to their host country (Brettell, 2006).

While many claim that political participation is in overall decline, Dalton (2008) suggests that rather than an erosion of political participation, most developed Western societies are experiencing a norm shift in attitudes towards citizenship; from a pattern of duty-based citizenship to engaged citizenship. Our findings suggest that changing the framing of national identity to a more civic nature may encourage civic values and greater engagement with the political process, especially when effort is made to counter ethnic exclusion, such as the assumption that one has to native born to be “truly kiwi”. It is not simply enough for ethnic minorities to be granted voting rights, they must also feel that they are truly welcome to be actively engage.
Our findings imply that the perceived inclusion or exclusion of ethnic minorities within the ingroup national identity can have consequences to their sense of national belonging and willingness to engage in civic life. These findings complement and extend previous work, including that of Wakefield and colleagues (2011) who found that national identity affects the degree to which ethnic minorities are listened to when criticising the national group, as debate and the free expression of opinions from all citizens are important features of political participation. However, unlike earlier work in the area, the present research demonstrates that not only do conceptions of the national identity as ethnic versus civic impact how the majority group sees the minority, but rather, it directly impacts minorities’ self-conceptions.

Park (2006) found that Asian New Zealanders have considerably lower external efficacy compared to the general population, suggesting that a feeling of “political helplessness” is prevalent among Asian New Zealanders (Park, 2006, p. 119). It may be that this feeling of political helplessness is the result of a lower sense of national belonging due to New Zealand’s simultaneous conception of an ethnic and civic national identity (Pearson, 2000; Sibley, Hoverd, & Liu, 2011), and exclusion of Asian New Zealanders from the national identity (Sibley & Barlow, 2009). Inclusion within the national identity, such as that experienced under the civic condition, allows individuals to define themselves as a member of the ingroup and to reap the benefits of that membership (e.g., the ability to politically participate). Further research into the link between political efficacy and sense of national belonging amongst ethnic minorities may help unravel the general unwillingness of Asian New Zealanders to politically participate.

Furthermore, our findings help to clarify the ongoing debate over the division of political behaviour into two factors. Park (2006) and Whitely and Seyde (2002) both propose that “working in the community” (high-intensity) and “signing petitions” (low-intensity) are
examples of two distinct categories of political activities, supporting Whitely and Seyde’s high- and low-intensity political participation model. However, our results found that both items are part of one factor reflecting civic engagement, supporting the institutional model (Marien et al., 2010). Our factor labelled party involvement is conceptually similar with institutional activities such as “join a political party” or “attend a political meeting;” activities linked to becoming part of the political system. While civic engagement relates to those non-institutional activities such as “political consumerism,” “participating in demonstrations,” and “signing petitions” which have an indirect impact on political decision making, going beyond the realm of party politics. While the items included within our factors may not completely match with the range of activities proposed by Marien and colleagues (2010), they do conceptually overlap, supporting a division of political participation based on proximity to traditional party politics rather than the more individualised forms of civic activities.

Limitations and Future Directions

In evaluating this research, it is important to note that we measured political participation across a range of different activities and not simply on voting behaviour. While the present study has examined how ethnic versus civic conceptions of national identity affect willingness to politically participate, it is unclear whether these findings will extend to actual behaviour. Although there is debate, voting studies generally find there is a strong correlation between intention to vote and reported turnout or validated vote (Achen & Blais, 2016). Quintelier and Blais (2015) found a fairly limited intention-behaviour gap for party membership and participation in legal and illegal protest, suggesting that this relationship extends to other forms of political participation. Taken together, these findings suggest that expressing a willingness to participate, such as the measure used in the present study, is a useful, although imperfect, predictor of future behaviour. However, it does create the need
for future work to examine if the effects of national identity on political participation extend beyond willingness and intentions to actual behaviour.

One significant limitation of the present research was the sample size; this was due to the limited financial resources and time pressures. The sampling strategy used relied on the distribution of the survey by way of advertising in local Asian supermarkets, churches, universities, online forums, facebook groups, ethnic newspapers and word of mouth. After participants were excluded for incomplete answers or failing the manipulation check, this left a significant, but limited, sample. Future research should look investing resources into reaching a larger sample of the Asian New Zealand population, either by contracting a professional survey service or distributing the research via analysis of the Parliamentary Electoral Roll, in addition to the means used in this study in order to test that these findings generalise. A larger and more targeted sample would also allow the data to be further analysed by ethnic group rather than grouping participants together in a pan-ethnic Asian group. While Park’s (2006) findings suggest that there is a pan-ethnic identity developing amongst Asian New Zealanders in recent years due to the external categorisation of the majority group, this was not found to necessarily encourage political participation or to include all the Asian ethnic groups. Park’s own work focused exclusively on Chinese and Korean New Zealanders and research on voter turnout shows that, although Asian New Zealanders vote less than the general population (Asian 60%, general population 77%; NZES, 2002), this is not true for Indian New Zealanders, who actually vote more than the general population (79.7%; Nachowitz, 2015). These differences in voter turnout highlight the importance in studying ethnic differences and not losing trends amongst averages. Therefore, future research should test whether our findings generalise to all the major Asian New Zealand ethnic groups and are not hiding any significant trends by grouping these culturally and historically different minority groups together. However, our findings should
be consistent because national identity relies on ingroup inclusion rather than culturally specific differences.

Furthermore, although the present research focuses on the effects of national identity on the perceptions and behaviours of Asian New Zealanders, future work should examine whether similar results are obtained for other minority ethnic groups, such as Māori and Pasifika. Because New Zealand national identity already encompasses both Māori and European ethnicities (Sibley & Barlow, 2009, Sibley, Hoverd & Liu, 2011; Sibley & Liu, 2007; Sibley, Liu & Khan, 2008, 2010), one may expect no significant difference between the ethnic and civic conditions when examining Māori. However, it would be beneficial to establish that, while a civic conception of national identity increases Asian New Zealanders rates of political participation, it does not detract from Māori involvement in politics. This question is important for future work because in order to achieve broader civic engagement, one needs to know that involving one group will not inadvertently inhibit the participation of other groups within society.

**Broader Implications and Conclusion**

Beyond its theoretical contributions, the current research also has practical implications for debates on how to best encourage political participation amongst ethnic minorities and avoid separatism and marginalisation. Political leaders have often used common enemies or threats, such as immigrants or religious fundamentalism, as a tool to unify the nation, clearly defining “us” and “them”. (Barker, 2015). Political psychology of intergroup conflict turns our attention to the ways in which issues and ethnic stereotypes can be manipulated to produce particular anxieties in the minds of citizens (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors & Preston, 2010). In recent years, the political rhetoric around national identity and debates over who “truly” belongs in a country has become increasingly frequent as nations become less homogenous and intergroup interactions increase. Our data suggests that when
national identity is framed in civic terms, it increases Asian New Zealanders willingness to politically participate due to an increased sense of national belonging. This suggests that portraying a civic ideal of nationality may help ethnic minorities avoid feelings of exclusion from society and in turn combat political marginalisation. Understanding how to avoid feelings of exclusion and positively encourage ethnic groups to be included within the political sphere will help political leaders navigate the changing demographic landscape and the contentious issues that arise, such as immigration, ethnic diversity, and the use of ethnic and religious clothing in public.

In conclusion, our research demonstrated that national identity (ethnic versus civic) effects Asian New Zealanders’ sense of national belonging which, in turn, influences their political participation. These effects are evident in several different forms of political participation including civic participation and party involvement. These results are unique in that they provide insight into the socio-psychological influence of national identity on political participation, specifically for an ethnic minority not traditionally studied or included within the New Zealand identity. What this tells us is that the way in which we frame national identity (i.e., as either inclusive of those who share our values or exclusive of those who do not share our heritage) has consequences for the genuine inclusion of ethnic minorities within civic life. Our research suggests that ethnic categorisation not only results in Asian New Zealanders feeling as if they do not belong, but actually discourages them from politically integrating and acting on their legal rights to be represented. The question now, then, is how do we promote a civic New Zealand national identity and ensure that Asian New Zealanders and other ethnic minorities feel included and hence promote greater integration, cultural diversity and political legitimacy?
References


Citizenship: Legal status, Rights and Political Participation (pp. 83-105).
Amsterdam, Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press.


### Table 1
**Correlation Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Be nominated as a political candidate.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Join a political party.</td>
<td>.77**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Assist in a political campaign.</td>
<td>.67**</td>
<td>.83**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Make a donation towards a political campaign.</td>
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<td>.74**</td>
<td>.77**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Write, email or phone a government official, newspaper or a TV station.</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Take part in a protest or demonstration.</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sign a petition for a political cause.</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>.68**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Work in the community to solve a problem.</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sign up to receive information or follow a politician on social media.</td>
<td>.45**</td>
<td>.53**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.58**</td>
<td>.50**</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Share a political post or comment online.</td>
<td>.41**</td>
<td>.47**</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.59**</td>
<td>.57**</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.69**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). N = 233-235.**
## Table 2

*Communalities for Principle Component Analysis and Principle Axis Factoring*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>PCA Initial</th>
<th>PCA Extracted</th>
<th>PAF Initial</th>
<th>PAF Extracted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Be nominated as a political candidate.</td>
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<td>.73</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join a political party.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in a political campaign.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make a donation towards a political campaign.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write, email or phone a government official, newspaper or a TV station.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in a protest or demonstration.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign a petition for a political cause.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work in the community to solve a problem.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign up to receive information or follow a politician on social media.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share a political post or comment online.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3
*Pattern/Structure Factor Matrix using Promax Rotation*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pattern Matrix</th>
<th>Structure Matrix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Factor 1:</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Engage</td>
<td>Party Involve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be nominated as a political candidate.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join a political party.</td>
<td>-.098</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assist in a political campaign.</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make a donation towards a political campaign.</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write, email or phone a government official, newspaper or a TV station.</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take part in a protest or demonstration.</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign a petition for a political cause.</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work in the community to solve a problem.</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign up to receive information or follow a politician on social media.</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share a political post or comment online.</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Coefficients with the highest loading and correlation are italicized and retained for that factor.
Figure 1. Scree Plot indicating potentially two factors, with ‘levelling off’ of eigenvalues at component 3.

Figure 2. Conceptual diagram of the indirect effect of national identity on civic engagement and party involvement through national belonging.
Appendix A

Ethnic Script

New Zealand national identity is built on shared ethnic heritage primarily originating in European and Maori descent. The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 signified the special bicultural relationship between the Maori and the British Crown which now defines New Zealand national identity.

Maori identify with New Zealand as the indigenous people of the land, while European New Zealanders share a strong bond with Britain through New Zealand’s membership in the Commonwealth, the Queen as the Head of State and the New Zealand flag which proudly contains the British Union Jack. Together Maori and European New Zealanders have overcome their differences and come together to form a unique national identity, fought alongside each other in Gallipoli, and made sacrifices to shape the nation as it is today. It is these strong bonds to the past that help New Zealanders define who they are and develop a shared sense of identity as New Zealanders.

When asked to define what it means to be a ‘true’ New Zealander, a recent nationally representative survey revealed that a vast majority of New Zealanders (83%) believed that to be a true New Zealander, one must be born in New Zealand and/or have ancestry in it. The same survey also revealed that a majority of New Zealanders (70%) thought that to be truly ‘Kiwi’, one must have European or Maori ancestry and embrace the culture and values of these founding groups of New Zealand.

New Zealand values are rooted in Anglo-European Christian traditions as well as Maori culture, which some argue are only understood by those who were born in New Zealand and have New Zealand parents. Being born and raised in New Zealand is important because it is through shared experiences, being surrounded by New Zealand culture and speaking English, that helps form the New Zealand identity.
Civic Script

New Zealand national identity is built on a shared commitment to civic service, core political ideals, values and standards. Since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, New Zealand has been a nation of immigrants or the decedents of immigrants, contributing to New Zealand culture.

As a liberal democracy, New Zealanders place a lot of emphasis on values such as individual freedom, respect for the nation’s laws, friendliness, equality, and industriousness. A special emphasis is also placed on being environmentally conscious, having a ‘can-do’ attitude, showing pride for the country, while having a laid back and outdoorsy attitude. As such, regardless of where you were born, if you share some of these values and feel at home in New Zealand, then you are a New Zealander.

When asked to define what it means to be a ‘true’ New Zealander, a recent nationally representative survey revealed that a vast majority of New Zealanders (83%) believed that to be a true New Zealander, one must be friendly, treat people fairly, and work hard. The same survey also revealed that most New Zealanders (70%) embrace service to their nation and community and believe that to be truly ‘Kiwi’, one must work for the betterment of New Zealand civil society and be politically conscious. It is these strong beliefs in the values and civic responsibilities that help New Zealanders define who they are and develop a feeling of belongingness to New Zealand.

New Zealand national identity is not defined by where you are born, where your parents were born and whether you share the same, culture, language or religion. Regardless of where you were born, to be a New Zealander all you need to do is be committed to New Zealand, respect the country’s laws, institutions, people, and the environment. New Zealand is defined by its emphasis on freedom and opportunities given to individuals who are willing to subscribe to core New Zealand values, fulfil civic responsibilities, and serve the public good.
Neutral Script

New Zealand is an island nation in the south western Pacific Ocean. The country geographically comprises two main landmasses; that of the North Island and the South Island and numerous smaller islands. The country's varied topography and its sharp mountain peaks, such as the Southern Alps, owe much to the tectonic uplift of land and volcanic eruptions.

New Zealand's capital city is Wellington, while its most populous city is Auckland. New Zealand is long and narrow with about 15,000 km of coastline and a total land area of 268,000 square kilometres. Because of its far-flung outlying islands and long coastline, the country has extensive marine resources.

The South Island is the largest landmass of New Zealand, and is divided along its length by the Southern Alps. There are 18 peaks over 3,000 metres, the highest of which is Aoraki / Mount Cook at 3,754 metres. The North Island is less mountainous but is marked byvolcanism. The highly active Taupo Volcanic Zone has formed a large volcanic plateau, punctuated by the North Island's highest mountain, Mount Ruapehu. The plateau also hosts the country's largest lake, Lake Taupo, nestled in one of the world's most active super volcanoes.

Because of New Zealand’s remoteness, it was one of the last lands to be settled by humans. During its long period of isolation, New Zealand developed a distinctive biodiversity of animal, fungal and plant life. New Zealand has many unique native fish, insects, birds, lizards and frogs. The only native mammals are bats and marine mammals. The endemic flightless kiwi is a national icon.

Before the arrival of humans an estimated 80% of the land was covered in forest, with only high alpine, wet, infertile and volcanic areas without trees. Massive deforestation occurred after humans arrived, with around half the forest cover lost to fire after Polynesian settlement. Much of the remaining forest fell after European settlement, being logged or cleared to make room for pastoral farming, leaving forest occupying only 23% of the land.

Source: New Zealand (n.d.)