Feminism in the Logic of Late Capitalism

Sheila Kunkle

Abstract: This essay considers how Feminism might become a force for radical change as construed through two perspectives: the Marxist vision of Kathi Weeks and the Hegelian logic of Slavoj Žižek. I begin by enumerating the antinomies of late capitalism and the ways it has subsumed our identities and commodified our social relations. I then elucidate how Weeks’ Marxist utopia (her demands of basic income and less work) require a “hopeful subject” and positive freedom, while Zizek’s Hegelian logic and vision of a communist future require the negativity of freedom, a divided subject, and hopelessness. Weeks’ feminism posits a direct opposition to capitalism, setting boundaries to its external limits, while Zizek’s Hegelian logic would require the reconfiguration of capitalism’s internal limits. Finally, I propose how a feminism geared towards its own extinction might make a Marxian move by way of Hegelian logic, through the consideration of Fredric Jameson’s “An American Utopia.”

Keywords: Feminism, Marx, Hegel, Capitalism, Utopia
In the Introduction of his work *Trouble in Paradise* (2014), Slavoj Žižek dedicates the book to a group of prostitutes he’s heard about who work at Cafe Photo in Sao Paolo, Brazil. These women (some of whom are graduate students in the Humanities) are remarkable because they choose their clients after conversing with them on some intellectual topic, and evaluating both their intelligence and attractiveness. Despite, as Žižek admits, the remaining class limitation of the setup (as both client and prostitute come from the middle class), he labels their activity “prostitution with a feminist twist” for what these women have found is a way to reverse in a small but significant way the coordinates of domination of traditional prostitution and, in so doing, have also opened up a space (in the formal sense) of a new perspective. That is, outside of the ethical question surrounding the content of the work, that of using their bodies as commodity in the sex industry, their reversal has opened up a space for us to discern the gap between form and content, between their act of autonomy and the “positive” content that fills it in. Theirs is not a movement for equality, and they make no formal claims on the political system, but their use of choice here, according to Žižek, reconfigures something essential about the way capitalism has come to define and structure the totality of our experience in the present era.

In *The Problem with Work* (2011), feminist scholar Kathi Weeks takes up a similar concern about how work has come to structure our sense of ourselves and our everyday lives. Inspired by second wave Marxist feminists, Weeks envisions a way to take the historical claim of “wages for housework” and repoliticize it in a way that goes beyond the family and identity politics of women’s concerns about equal wages, equal rights, and representation. By demanding a basic income and less work (shorter hours), feminists could formally open up a space of freedom to re-create life as such, as distinct from a life determined by the exploitation and oppressive domination of work that has consumed us all in late-stage capitalism. In this way, feminists’ desires for a more equitable world might come about through establishing a limit to the working day, and by subtracting income from wages, which would further blur the lines between production and reproduction.

These two thinkers would seem to present us with two different ways to conceive of feminism in the logic of late capitalism: Žižek’s argument points to contingent acts that open up spaces for the overturning of power structures inherent to capitalism, while Weeks posits a universal demand that would, she argues, open a space of freedom to configure both a life and a post-work politics beyond the reach of the capitalist work ethic and its totalizing system of production and consumption. While both authors recognize the way social relations are organized around work in late capitalism, Weeks sees radical change occurring through demands for reforms that would become
revolutionary in their effects, while Žižek would have us change the world wherein a politics against work (and by inclusion social movements like feminism) would not be needed, or more precisely, he would have us engage in revolutionary acts that “change the entire social situation so that workers themselves will no longer be ‘workers.’”

Following Antonio Negri and Ernst Bloch, Weeks formulates her critique of work and vision of the future through a Marxist lens, while Žižek deploys the dialectic of Hegel. That is, while both thinkers agree with Marx in his realization that the revolution of the proletariat must come from the inherent antagonisms of capitalism, they deploy two different theories that diverge in their conceptions of the subject, freedom, hope, and utopia. To Weeks, freedom is conceived of as a positive force of self-determination; her “hopeful subject” is one that embraces the possibility of change through willful action. As such, she promotes demands that would limit capitalism’s external reach and that are not attached to specific parties or platforms; demands that would create new “imaginaries,” out of which we could construct our lives, and which require the cultivation of utopian hope. Žižek, however, locates hope itself as part of an idealized image of capitalism. Unlike Weeks’ conception of freedom, Žižek’s Hegelian freedom is not found in its positivity, or in a subject’s hopefulness, but rather in its negativity, and by way of a subject’s internal oppositions. As Hegel scholar Todd McGowan writes: “Freedom is the recognition that the subject is the source of its own opposition, that its negation does not rely on any external authority but involves instead its own self-relation.” Such a subject realizes that what it takes as a substantial authority can be revealed as insubstantial at any time. This conception of a divided subject and Hegel’s negativity of freedom call forth not direct opposition to authority, but rather its dialectical dismantling. It is this logic that Žižek deploys, where what we should seek is not simply external opposition, but a way to use capitalism’s internal logic against itself. Thus whereas Weeks seeks to put external limits on capitalism’s reach, Žižek would reconfigure the internal limits of capitalism, and this might mean the need for a violent act that disturbs the notion of a life-balance. According to him, we need to face the “tragic vision of history” itself, and, following Hegel, realize that “no hidden teleology is guiding us,” and “every intervention is a jump into the unknown, where the result always thwarts our expectations.”

In her meticulous and often brilliant argument for a post-work world, Weeks presents a feminism that seeks to limit the reach of capitalism by universal demands, thus allowing us a space to configure a utopia of our own design. By cutting back the duration of the working day and detaching income from wages, we could create life anew. But for Žižek, the future communist idea rests not on limiting capitalism, but rather on the need to understand how
capitalism subsumes all external limits, and to see that the obstacle it seeks to overcome is also the engine that keeps it expanding. Thus, whereas Week's utopia points us toward a society of egalitarianism, the communism of the future according to Žižek, is one that would have us see beyond the horizon of equality itself – a place not of utopia, but of new antinomies and oppositions. Tracing and considering each thinker's perspective allows us to see how a feminism directed towards radical change must first encounter the paradoxical logic of late capitalism. Ultimately the feminism of the future must look to its own extinction, and both Weeks' Marxist analysis and Žižek's Hegelian dialectic help us to see what would have to happen in the event of its passing.

Both authors readily recognize the contradictions of late capitalism and its drive to subsume all forms of production, consumption, social activity, and experience. One of Žižek's favorite examples to illustrate this logic is the way Starbucks has appropriated charity, for when you buy a cup of their coffee, you can be assured that part of the profits will go to the farmers in Guatemala who have produced it, and thus, you can feel good about your purchase while ensuring Starbucks a profit. The corporation co-opts charity and includes “giving” in the price of a cup of coffee, thus allowing the consumer to feel good about her contribution to the less fortunate while the structure of exploitation remains intact. In the field of work, Weeks finds the same logic in the contemporary capitalist workplace and offers an illuminating critique of several antinomies that keep us tied to the notion of production and income as our center of gravity. For example, she elucidates the way that management practices in the post-Ford era, as well as the rise of human resources departments have co-opted ideas such as “wellness” and offer the specious promise of personal fulfillment in countless practices and theories that attempt to “humanize” work. What such practices do is to tie the work ethic to feelings of individual accomplishment, wellness, and personal fulfillment, while management continues to perpetuate the conditions of its own intervention, and income remains tied to production and quantity. Just as buying a cup of Starbucks's coffee makes us feel good about incorporating charity with our consumption, we can feel taken care of at work, even while we are forced to work longer hours and subject our most private intimacies (like our weight, eating and drinking habits, etc.) to the monitoring of health insurance companies and “wellness” coaches. Workers cannot find a clear path to oppose these practices since to decline a wellness program would also mean higher insurance co-pays; and worse, such a worker would seem to be unconcerned about her health and wellness by not participating in the intrusive scrutiny and micro-managing that such programs demand.

Feminism itself does not escape this totalizing logic of capitalism; in its
many political variants from new social movements to contemporary identity politics, it has worked hard to secure equality and recognition, making advances in equal pay and greater access for women in several spheres of the capitalist system, but it has achieved these gains while also being complicit in the expanding scope of capitalism itself, which commodifies and subsumes all other spheres of life, including leisure and creativity. As Nancy Fraser argues, the critique of the family wage by second wave feminists serves today to legitimate the idea of flexible capitalism, which translates as more hours and a rise in poverty. Because neoliberal globalized capitalism has seen an influx of women of all nationalities and ethnicities into low-income work, while job-security, safety, and conditions have all declined, we now look back to see that “second-wave feminism’s critique of the family wage has enjoyed a perverse afterlife,” and capitalism in its neoliberalist (non-state) global reach has found ever new ways to subsume women’s demands for emancipation and equality under the logic of capitalist production, consumption, and accumulation.  

Fraser’s view of capitalism in its neoliberal global form encapsulates the Real or what Žižek calls “the mathem” of capitalism today, which is precisely this inexorable, spectral and abstract logic of Capital that is the determinant of our social reality. He writes: “The fate of whole strata of the population and sometimes of whole countries can be decided by this solipsistic speculative dance of Capital, which pursues its goal of profitability in blessed indifference as to how its movements might affect social reality.” This abstract capitalist dance now blurs the lines between pathologies and rational behavior, turning subjects into rational misers. That is, things like hoarding or the desire to accumulate (as well as earn as much as one can), and keeping one’s riches in private reserve are no longer pathologies, but becomes indistinguishable from rational behavior, especially in times of economic crisis. Hoarding and miserly accumulation are not aberrant excesses of capitalism, but are rather inherent to its internal logic. What Žižek touches on here is the way satisfaction in capitalism relates to enjoyment, and while he points to the enjoyment of excess (accumulation) in the example of the rational miser, this enjoyment is also part of the logic of lack. As Todd McGowan finds, capitalism’s constant generating of desire is coincident with assuring constant dissatisfaction, such that dissatisfaction becomes a form of enjoyment itself. Dissatisfaction, as he argues, forces subjects to rely on the promise of fulfillment, either through accumulation of capital or the acquisition of commodities. And as technology subtly yet drastically reshapes our daily lives, capitalists are finding new ways to replace the commodification of objects with the commercialization of ephemeral interactions and experiences. Marketers, in particular, are finding new ways to exploit a closed cycle of anxiety creation and alleviation through exploiting people’s fears of missing out on
“a special moment,” on “social” media such as Snapchat, Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, and in video games. As such experiences become woven into our daily lives, addictions are treated as “normal” everyday behavior. This circular logic of enjoyment through dissatisfaction generates the activity needed for the system of capitalism to perpetuate itself. Late capitalism runs on a spectral abstraction that veils the antinomies that continue to guarantee its own perpetuation without limit, and no movement (including feminism) to limit its reach and safeguard equal access, re-distribution, equal status and power, has found a way to surmount its contradictions.

So, in a system that reaches ever outward to break through and subsume external limits (in a way that deflects us from its internal contradictions), where do we turn to conceive of and generate change? And how would feminism play a part in the radicalization and disruption of social relations that the capitalist system perpetuates? We know that for Marx the solution lies in his fantasy of utopia, which entails solving the contradictions between the forces of production and the means of production, with the promise of unleashing productivity unattached to income or profits in a future communism. And this is the guiding force of Weeks’s feminist theory. To her credit, Weeks offers a detailed consideration and critique of her own propositions and she is well aware of the risk that the subtracted life she proposes could itself easily be co-opted by management initiatives: “[...] in which case life would function less against work than as a further basis for its hegemony.” She further realizes that life and work cannot be discreetly separated from each other, so that the political project that would confront us in the post-work environment would be the continual invention of life. Yet even if envisioned as a negotiable utopia, there would be no guarantee that a form of paternalism might not end up characterizing the post-work world. Striking here is that these exact same demands for a basic income and less work appear among conservatives who wish to reign in the excesses of capitalism, by way of a paternalistic authority. For example, authors Robert and Edward Skidelsky, in their How Much is Enough: Money and the good life, (2013) argue for a “non-coercive paternalism” to help educate us for leisure, monitor our consumption, and reduce advertising, etc. By guaranteeing a basic wage and less work, we might, they claim, be able to realize the Keynesian dream of freedom, leisure, and the good life. Paternalism occurs also under the name of “Conscious Capitalism” promoted by Whole Foods founder and co-CEO John Mackay. Such philosophies and practices work to safeguard in the words of Nancy Fraser, the “masculinist romance of the free, unencumbered, self fashioning individual” while they promise a benevolent workplace, organic production, and workers’ shares in the company; meanwhile, the entire edifice of exploitation and profit remains unchanged.
Weeks’ hope in the end relies on the central place that hope itself will play in a new imaginary of a post-work world and a life beyond capitalism. Here she envisions a utopia and the life that would emerge as a web of relations, a Deleuzean “qualities of experience” as an incomplete process, and not as a possession. Ultimately, Weeks’s utopian speculation presents “a vision of a world beyond gender and sexual identities as we now know them,” which is a sentiment Weeks takes from Shulamith Firestone’s *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution* (2003).15 Weeks admires Firestone’s imaginary not so much for the content of her speculation, but rather for the form it calls forth, providing us with a creative way to think the impossible. Whereas Marx gives us a future utopia to invent, and a hope for a future post-work world, it will be up to us to realize how non-work (life outside of work) can be imagined as productive in itself, and how we might create new human needs based not on acquisition, accumulation and commodification, but, as Weeks specifies “on cultivating a wealth of needs for care, sociality, pleasure, activity, desire, and affect that exceed the world of work.”16 Although our efforts today might produce fruits that we will not be around to enjoy, we can imagine our part in a future world to be determined as we go; one where work doesn’t define us, and where we receive a basic wage tied to life and not production.

Žižek’s take on our future shares something with Weeks’ and that is that the future will not be “our future.” But his turn to a Hegelian logic ultimately takes him on a dialectical trajectory where hope is replaced by hopelessness; not in terms of “all is lost,” but rather as a pre-requisite for a courageous venture into the unknown. In several of his works Žižek lays out the dark prognosis of our future: “the global capitalist system is approaching an apocalyptic zero-point,” and this includes ecological crises, biogenetic engineering, and most significantly, an explosive growth in social divisions and exclusions, e.g. new apartheids, from gated communities to the *favelas* of Brazil.17 Marx’s utopia (even as an empty placeholder as conceived by Weeks) is not a solution, because Marx’s conception of Communism is really an idealized image of capitalism, a capitalism of expanded self-reproduction which has somehow subtracted its internal logic of profit and exploitation.

The prostitution with a feminist twist that Žižek refers to in terms of women working in Cafe Photo in Brazil is one intervention that equals a radical act (without a political proposal or written demand for change). But throughout Žižek’s writings, he offers a number of interventions, acts, reversals, and unlikely combinations that would work to drastically change our social relations under late capitalism. They include demanding things that disturb the very core of the hegemonic ideology, such as universal healthcare. He writes: “In the aftermath of Wall Street protests, we should indeed endeavor to mobilize people around
such demands – however, it is no less important to remain simultaneously subtracted from the pragmatic field of negotiations and concrete proposals.”

We have to realize that direct opposition (especially as we’ve seen in the case of feminist demands), becomes a double-edged sword, for it increases the reach of the very system that keeps us all oppressed. In Žižek’s view, one can resist through absolute negativity; by being nonproductive, by refusing to change, by refusing a wellness program, by going limp during a protest, etc. Finding a way out of our current dilemmas might also require a “Thatcher of the Left,” or that we combine trust in the people with a form of terror (ruthless policing), especially in the case of equal energy consumption. In his own consideration of a Communist horizon Žižek rethinks Marx’s notion of commodity fetishism and reveals new ways that global capitalism ensures its perpetuation through things like technology’s determination of our daily social relations, new forms of exploitation in rent (rather than ownership), and the increasing privatization of everything alongside the expansion of the ephemeral Commons. To Žižek, the result of all these processes has been the gradual disintegration of social life proper, and as such, feminism as a variation of “identity politics” becomes “[...] a recourse to a particular identity as a substitute for the missing universal public space.”

Whereas Marx gives us a utopia to create, Hegel reveals how our freedom lies in reconfiguring the internal limits of capitalism. As McGowan writes, “if we conceive of freedom in opposition, it produces a hysterical subject, incapable of seeing how its rebellion actually feeds the authority that it challenges.”

Real change must come about when we alter the internal limits of capitalism, and Hegel’s concept of Aufhebung (sublation), forces us to recognize that the limit is not only a contingent barrier, but also a necessary obstacle constituted through the structure’s own logical requirements. Whereas for Marx, reaching communism would unleash and allow unlimited productivity, for Hegel the possibility of an egalitarian society would have to include seeing how an internal limit could be reconfigured and we could come to value different things in the process. So that rather than opposing a limit, we would find, according to McGowan, a way to value it: “It would be a society that embraced its obstacle as its very condition of possibility.”

In the world of work we can find an example of this very idea, where an internal contradiction is reconfigured not through opposition, but by seeing the “engine” of the internal contradiction in a new way. The example is found in Žižek’s consideration of Karantani’s proposal of a gift society in his Trouble in Paradise, where he refers us to career analyst, Daniel Pink’s 2009 book Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us. In this popular work, Pink presents findings by behavioral science researchers at MIT conducted for the purpose of
finding the key to motivate workers. Specifically, the studies found that workers became most productive when they were given the autonomy to do work of their choice; when they could develop a sense of mastery over the work; and when they felt the work had purpose and improved the world in some way. The researchers ultimately found that, “The best use of money as a motivator is to pay people enough to take the issue of money off the table.”23 As Žižek relates, this is perhaps the closest we would come to Marx’s idea of utopia, where people would produce based on need, without becoming identified as a “worker” relying on wages to live. To reach this state, however, many things would have to happen, including the disappearance of capitalism as we know it; and the idea of management and all the schools of management that teach students how to manage would have to go out of existence. But I would suggest, also, that this research reveals something about the way we might use Hegelian logic to find a way to change the internal limit of capitalism itself (rather than stage demands in opposition to it), and this requires, as McGowan proposes, the realization that our satisfaction can be found with the means rather than the ends and final causes of productivity and capitalism. By immersing ourselves “in the traumatic satisfaction of work that matters more than its goal,” we find “an alternative system to capitalism existing within the capitalist framework itself....The product becomes a by-product of the means, not the end that the means aims at accomplishing.”24

If Weeks could find a way to harness capitalism’s self-revolutionizing logic by way of external limits, and safeguard against managerial tendencies towards self-perpetuation and domination, then perhaps her call for a basic income and less work might achieve a feminist utopia, bringing with it our ability to value the means (a life to be determined under conditions of freedom) over the ends (the current capitalist determination of our lives as workers). However, in the logic of late capitalism feminists’ demands necessarily continue to widen, especially as the manifestations of perverse modernizations (like human trafficking, the rise of ISIS, and other crimes that target women specifically) emerge and find their way into the capitalist world of profit and exchange, while the social dimension of our lives continues to disappear. To conceive of a world where feminism itself is no longer needed, we must continue to think of impossible ways that this might happen. And to contribute to this effort, I offer my final consideration of feminism’s possible future by way of comparing our two authors’ responses to Fredric Jameson’s essay, “An American Utopia: Dual Power and the University Army” (as revised in 2016).25 Briefly, Jameson proposes that representative democracy be replaced by a military democracy, an army, which will share dual power with the government (until the state eventually withers away). It is the classless army that will take over Marx’s base in the economy;
the army will be tasked with the elimination of the profit-oriented dimensions of finance capitalism, information technology (computers will designate who gets what job), and conduct surveillance of the bureaucracy. Commodities will be eliminated and everyone’s basic needs will be taken care of. Jameson is well aware of the ruse he is perpetrating here, referring to his fantasy in the Epilogue as a “shell game” designed to get us talking about a utopia and configuring ways out of our current capitalist impasses.26

Interesting here is that although Žižek’s response essay praises many of Jameson’s bold moves (for example, his idea of a universal conscription aims at making the political sphere disappear; he does not try to do away with envy but retains it as an inevitable part of social interaction, and so on), it also notes its several key problems. Primary among them is how an army would be able to do its job: who would be in positions of power, and how would the state and dual power not fall into the same historical traps as, for example, Stalinism did? Stalin’s policies created a gigantic bureaucracy with the Five Year plan, which became incredibly inefficient such that it was the “underground” economy that people came to depend on and use. The problem here was that the Party could not become the depoliticized vanguard for the working class that it was designed to be; instead, it became the watchdogs of the more perfunctory state organs. If the state should wither away then, Žižek asks, who will command the army and how; who will allocate jobs and how; and how will the proposed psychoanalytic institutions regulate pleasures?27 In contrast, in her response essay Weeks begins by questioning Jameson’s claim of a “gender-neutral military,” since the army historically has been a bastion of masculinist excess, militarized on notions that not only exclude the feminine, but that require its demeaning. She writes: “As a gendered machine for the production of leaders and subordinates, it is difficult for me to imagine the army, even a universal army, one that is itself transformed over time, as capable of coexisting with, let alone as a school for, the development of democratic capacities and egalitarian values.”28

But moving here to Hegel’s concept of Aufhebung (sublation), and for how the internal limits of a system might be reconfigured, I’d like to propose a Marxian move by way of Hegelian logic; that is, to avoid the mistake of Marx that a higher order utopia is possible, one where contradictions cease and antinomies can be avoided. I’d like to suggest that we consider a different way of creating positions of authority in Jameson’s universal army. Here our efforts should be not to take away its masculinity, but to use its masculinity against itself, in support of feminist demands (for redistributions, equality, representation, etc.). That is, I suggest an “army with a feminist twist,” which would require the “manning” of the leadership positions with selected females.
- and the model candidate might be Lisbeth Salander as portrayed by Rooney Mara in David Fincher’s 2011 film, *The Girl With the Dragon Tattoo*. Lisbeth found a way to punish her rapist and keep his excesses in check through relatively non-violent coercive means, e.g. by tattooing shaming words on his torso. Such an army’s first order of business would be to establish and ruthlessly enforce non-productivity, banning all work that is not valued for its means or detached from the ends of capitalist gain (in contrast to Jameson’s vision where it would be an army of limited work). This army with a feminist twist would reopen the gap between form and content, allowing us also an interlude to experience our enjoyment detached from the dissatisfaction that late capitalism finds endless ways to perpetuate.

---


2. Kathi Weeks, *The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke UP, 2011). Weeks reconfigures the demand of “wages for housework,” in the name of the family into shorter hours and less work universally, as a way to reposition the argument from women’s particular demands to universal goals of freedom and autonomy. She writes: “Conceived in these terms, time is a resource to use however we might wish....to create spaces in which to constitute new subjectivities, new work and nonwork ethics, and new practices of care and sociality.” Weeks, *The Problem with Work*, 174.


14 Fraser, *Fortunes of Feminism*, 220.


18 Žižek, *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*, 84.


22 McGowan, *Capitalism and Desire*, 156.


24 McGowan, *Capitalism and Desire*, 175.


