TO REACT OR DELIBERATE?:
THE UTILITY OF NEW ZEALAND'S COUNTERINSURGENT COMMUNICATION DURING THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

at the University of Canterbury

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2016
# CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................................... 7

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................................. 8

LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................................... 10

GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................................................. 12

CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 13

CHAPTER 2 – DELIBERATIVE AND REACTIVE NARRATIVES .................................................................... 20
  2.1 INSURGENCY ...................................................................................................................................... 22
    2.1.1 POLITICAL .................................................................................................................................. 22
    2.1.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL ...................................................................................................................... 22
    2.1.3 EMOTIVE ..................................................................................................................................... 23
    2.1.4 IDEAS .......................................................................................................................................... 23
  2.2 COUNTERINSURGENCY ....................................................................................................................... 24
    2.2.1 POPULATION IS KEY .................................................................................................................. 24
    2.2.2 ISOLATE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR SUPPORT ...................................................................... 25
    2.2.3 LEGITIMACY .............................................................................................................................. 25
    2.2.4 UNDERSTAND THE POPULATION ............................................................................................ 26
    2.2.5 INVOLVE THE POPULATION ...................................................................................................... 26
    2.2.6 CONTROL EMOTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS ............................................................................ 27
    2.2.7 SIMPLICITY IS BEST .................................................................................................................. 27
    2.2.8 NARRATIVE .................................................................................................................................. 28
  2.3 DELIBERATIVE NARRATIVE .................................................................................................................. 29
    2.3.1 INCLUSIVE .................................................................................................................................... 29
    2.3.2 RESTRAINED .............................................................................................................................. 30
    2.3.3 CONSTRUCTED ............................................................................................................................ 30
    2.3.4 NUANCED ..................................................................................................................................... 31
    2.3.5 LITERAL ......................................................................................................................................... 31
  2.4 THE COUNTERINSURGENT COMMUNICATION PARADOX .................................................................... 32
  2.5 TERRORISM .......................................................................................................................................... 32
    2.5.1 FEAR AS THE PREEMINENT EMOTION ....................................................................................... 33
    2.5.2 STRATEGIC LOGIC OF TERRORISM ......................................................................................... 36
  2.6 THE EXPANDED AUDIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY COUNTERINSURGENCY .................................... 39
  2.7 COUNTERINSURGENT ARE PRE-EXISTING POLITICAL ACTORS .................................................... 38
  2.8 REACTIVE NARRATIVE ........................................................................................................................ 41
    2.8.1 EXCLUSIVE .................................................................................................................................... 43
    2.8.2 EMOTIVE ....................................................................................................................................... 44
    2.8.3 HYPERBOLIC ............................................................................................................................... 45
    2.8.4 ABSOLUTE .................................................................................................................................... 46
    2.8.5 FIGURATIVE .................................................................................................................................... 47
  2.9 REACTIVE AND DELIBERATIVE NARRATIVES ................................................................................... 47
  2.10 AIMS OF THE THESIS ...................................................................................................................... 49

CHAPTER THREE – METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 51
  3.1 FRAMING ............................................................................................................................................. 51
3.1.1 FRAMING AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ......................................................... 54
3.1.2 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 55
3.1.3 COMPOSITE FRAMES AND MASTERFRAMES ..................................................... 57
3.1.4 RESONANCE ........................................................................................................ 58
  3.1.4.1 CREDIBILITY .................................................................................................. 59
   3.1.4.1.1 EMPIRICAL CREDIBILITY ....................................................................... 59
  3.1.4.1.2 CONSISTENCY ......................................................................................... 59
   3.1.4.1.3 ARTICULATOR CREDIBILITY ................................................................... 60
  3.1.4.2 SALIENCE ...................................................................................................... 60
   3.1.4.2.1 CENTRALITY ......................................................................................... 60
  3.1.4.2.2 EXPERIENTIAL COMMENSURABILITY .................................................. 61
   3.1.4.2.3 NARRATIVE FIDELITY ......................................................................... 61
3.1.5 APPLICATION OF ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ...................................................... 61
  3.1.5.1 CONTENT ....................................................................................................... 61
   3.1.5.1 AUDIENCE ................................................................................................. 62
3.2 AUDIENCES ............................................................................................................. 66
3.3 RESEARCH METHOD ............................................................................................... 70
  3.3.1 DATA SET SELECTION ....................................................................................... 70
  3.3.2 INTER-CODER RELIABILITY .............................................................................. 76
3.4 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 82

CHAPTER 4 – REACTIVE COUNTERINSURGENT FRAMES ................................................. 82
4.1 – SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 82
  4.1.1 SELECTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE CASE STUDIES ......................... 98
4.2 9/11, 2001 ............................................................................................................... 102
  4.2.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY ........................................................................................... 102
   4.2.1.1 EXISTENTIAL THREAT DIAGNOSES ....................................................... 102
   4.2.1.2 TERRORISM AS AN IRRATIONAL TACTIC ............................................. 103
   4.2.1.3 TERRORISM AS THE ENEMY .................................................................... 107
   4.2.1.4 THE MOST SERIOUS GLOBAL THREAT .................................................. 109
   4.2.1.5 ALIENATING PROBLEM/ENEMY DIAGNOSES .................................... 112
  4.2.2 BLAME/IDEOLOGY ............................................................................................. 115
  4.2.2.1 IRRATIONAL .............................................................................................. 115
  4.2.2.3 ACTOR/VICTIM ......................................................................................... 117
   4.2.2.3.1 ALIENATING ACTOR IDENTIFICATIONS ............................................. 118
   4.2.2.3.2 ALIENATING VICTIM DESCRIPTION .................................................. 121
  4.2.4 STRATEGY/SOLUTION ....................................................................................... 123
   4.2.4.1 WAR ON AN ABSTRACT NOUN ................................................................. 124
   4.2.4.2 JUSTICE .................................................................................................... 126
   4.2.4.3 NO TOLERANCE ........................................................................................ 129
4.3 – AFGHANISTAN, 2001 .......................................................................................... 131
  4.3.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY ........................................................................................... 131
   4.3.1.1 ACTS OF TERROR .................................................................................... 133
   4.3.1.2 NEW ERA ................................................................................................ 135
   4.3.1.3 ENEMY BINARY ....................................................................................... 138
  4.3.2 BLAME/IDEOLOGY ............................................................................................. 140
   4.3.2.1 NOT MUSLIMS ....................................................................................... 140
   4.3.3 ACTOR/VICTIM ............................................................................................. 143
  4.3.4 STRATEGY/SOLUTION ....................................................................................... 145
   4.3.4.1 TARGETED ............................................................................................... 146
5.2.5 BLAME/IDEOLOGY CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 225
5.3 ACTOR/VICTIM .................................................................................................................................................... 228
  5.3.1 COLLECTIVE ACTOR IDENTIFICATIONS .......................................................................................................... 228
  5.3.2 ACTOR DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................................................ 232
  5.3.4 ACTOR CONNECTIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 236
  5.3.5 COLLECTIVE ACTOR ......................................................................................................................................... 240
  5.3.6 PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION .............................................................................................................................. 243
  5.3.7 VICTIM DESCRIPTIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 249
  5.3.8 ACTOR/VICTIM CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 253
5.4 STRATEGY/SOLUTION .......................................................................................................................................... 258
  5.4.1 MILITARY SCOPE OF STRATEGY ............................................................................................................................ 258
  5.4.2 COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES .................................................................................................................................. 262
  5.4.3 POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS ........................................................................................................... 266
  5.4.4 HARD STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS ..................................................................................................................... 270
  5.4.5 SOFT STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS ...................................................................................................................... 272
  5.4.6 DIALOGUE STRATEGIES .................................................................................................................................... 277
  5.4.7 SCOPE, FOCUS AND LENGTH ............................................................................................................................... 280
  5.4.8 EXPLICITLY INCLUSIVE STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS ....................................................................................... 286
  5.4.9 STRATEGY/SOLUTION CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 292
5.5 DELIBERATIVE FRAMING CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 295

CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 305
  6.1 FINDINGS OF CHAPTER FOUR .............................................................................................................................. 305
  6.2 FINDINGS OF CHAPTER FIVE ............................................................................................................................... 306
  6.3 FINAL HYPOTHESIS .............................................................................................................................................. 309
  6.4 THEORY AND PRACTICE ..................................................................................................................................... 316
  6.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................................................... 325
  6.6 FUTURE STUDY ..................................................................................................................................................... 328
  6.7 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ..................................................................................................................................... 330

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................................................ 338

APPENDIX ONE .......................................................................................................................................................... 390

APPENDIX TWO .......................................................................................................................................................... 397
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my family, particularly my mum for her unwavering support and my son, who frankly could not care less. I’d also like to thank Kat Payne for putting up with the epic millstone that a PhD inevitably is. Thanks too to my supervisors Babak Bahador and, especially, Jim Ockey, who has guided me through many perturbations and iterations. My colleagues John Reid and Golda Varona at the Ngai Tahu Research Centre have also been extremely helpful in their collegial advice and support, which I very much appreciate. Also, thanks to my friends, who probably care a bit more than my son, but a lot less than my mum! Finally, thanks to my dad, who may be gone but whose terse ‘course ya did’ will always resound in my ears whenever I achieve anything.

M. W. Rout, 2016.
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines New Zealand’s counterinsurgent communication – that is, its press releases that focus on the ‘war on terror’ – from 9/11 for a period of ten years. The aim is to understand the effectiveness of a counterinsurgent’s press releases in an era where the number of key audiences in a counterinsurgency has grown and targeting any of them is near-impossible, with a particular focus on how the different requirements of each key audience compromises the utility of communication for others.

The thesis identifies two narratives present in New Zealand’s counterinsurgent communication: the ‘deliberative’ and ‘reactive’. The former is understood to be honed by technocrats over time in a measured fashion – it is deliberated upon – while the latter is quickly crafted by politicians during the emotive shockwave that follows an attack – it is a reaction. It also proposes that these two narratives have differing functions, the deliberative serves to justify the counterinsurgent’s cause and legitimise them as an actor to both their own support population and the insurgent support population while the reactive helps control and direct the negative emotions generated by a terrorist attack within the counterinsurgent’s support audience, mobilises domestic support for action and also reinforces ingroup bonds with international allies.

Using population-centric counterinsurgency theory combined with insights on insurgent’s strategies and the characteristics of counterinsurgents, it outlines five key opposing qualities that define these narratives. The thesis creates an analytical framework that fuses framing theory with these five opposing qualities and extracts the necessary data from a decade’s worth New Zealand government press releases given by the Prime Minster, Foreign Affairs Minister and Minister of Defence using content analysis. Each deliberative and reactive framing task is examined using a combination of qualitative and quantitative assessments to provide a comprehensive understanding of the utility of these two narratives with regard to three key audiences: the insurgent support population, the domestic audience and the allied audience.

The findings suggest that these two different narratives to some degree, compromised the overall utility of New Zealand’s communication, specifically the justness of New Zealand’s cause and, consequently, their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent. Furthermore, the thesis argues that the reactive was of limited utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience, while the deliberative narrative was of utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and limited utility for allied
audience. It also concludes that the reactive was used more frequently following attacks, to a wider international rather than domestic audience and its use declined over time while the deliberative was used more for the domestic audience and was used more consistently over the period than the reactive. Finally, it warns that while democracies may be suited to fighting conventional conflicts, they are not so well placed with regard to communicating in counterinsurgencies, particularly when they have low direct stakes and high indirect stakes.
LIST OF TABLES

3.3.1 Table 1 – List of events, their dates and the total word count of their press releases ......................................................... 74
3.3.1 Table 2 – List of events and the interim periods with dates ........................................................................................................ 75
3.3.2 Table 1 – Reliability scores for deliberative and reactive narratives ..................................................................................... 80
3.3.2 Table 2 – Landis and Koch’s strength of agreement scale ......................................................................................................... 80
4.6.1 Table 1 – Total RCF frequencies for the different contexts, their word counts and each ratio .................................................. 163
4.6.1 Table 2 – Raw total frequencies for RCFs for each event, event word counts and ratio frequencies ........................................ 164
4.6.1 Table 3 – Total raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of RCFs per year for all contexts ............................................................ 166
4.6.1 Table 4 – Total frequencies of RCFs for each framing task ...................................................................................................... 168
4.6.2.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of existential threat RCF ................................................ 176
4.6.2.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of terrorism as irrational tactic RCF ......................... 176
4.6.2.3 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of terrorism as the enemy RCF ...................................... 177
4.6.2.4 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of most serious global threat RCF ............................. 178
4.6.2.5 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating problem/enemy RCF .............................. 179
4.6.2.6 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of terror RCF ................................................................. 180
4.6.2.7 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of new generation threat RCF ................................. 180
4.6.2.8 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of enemy binary RCF .................................................. 181
4.6.3.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of irrational blame RCF .................................................. 182
4.6.3.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of not Muslims RCF ..................................................... 183
4.6.4.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating actor RCF .................................................. 184
4.6.4.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating victim RCF .................................................. 184
4.6.5.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of war on abstract noun RCF ........................................ 185
4.6.5.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of justice RCF ................................................................. 186
4.6.5.3 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of no tolerance RCF ......................................................... 186
4.6.5.4 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of targeted RCF ............................................................ 187
4.6.5.5 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating solutions RCF ........................................... 187
5.1.1 Table 1 – Diagnosing the problem, annual totals .................................................................................................................. 190
5.1.1 Table 2 – Diagnosing the problem, context totals .................................................................................................................. 190
5.1.2 Table 1 – Identifying the enemy, annual totals ....................................................................................................................... 193
5.1.2 Table 2 – Identifying the enemy, context totals ....................................................................................................................... 193
5.1.3 Table 1 – Describing the scope of the threat, annual totals ................................................................................................. 196
5.1.3 Table 2 – Describing the scope of the threat, context totals ................................................................................................. 197
5.1.4 Table 1 – Describing the scope of the enemy, annual totals ................................................................................................. 199
5.1.4 Table 2 – Describing the scope of the enemy, context totals ................................................................................................. 200
5.1.5 Table 1 – Constricted problem diagnoses, annual totals ...................................................................................................... 202
5.1.5 Table 2 – Constricted problem diagnoses, context totals ..................................................................................................... 202
5.1.6 Table 1 – Connecting terrorism with other problems, annual totals ...................................................................................... 204
5.1.6 Table 2 – Connecting terrorism with other problems, context totals .................................................................................... 205
5.1.7 Table 1 – Wider security environment, annual totals ........................................................................................................... 208
5.1.7 Table 2 – Wider security environment, context totals ........................................................................................................... 208
5.1.8 Table 1 – Problem/Enemy DCF annual frequency totals and ratio counts ............................................................................. 210
5.1.8 Table 2 – Problem/Enemy DCF context frequency totals and ratio counts ........................................................................... 211
5.2.1 Table 1 – Grievance and anger, annual totals ....................................................................................................................... 213
5.2.1 Table 2 – Grievance and anger, context totals ....................................................................................................................... 213
5.2.2 Table 1 – Ideology and religion, annual totals ......................................................................................................................... 216
5.2.2 Table 2 – Ideology and religion, context totals ....................................................................................................................... 216
5.2.3 Table 1 – Failed states, annual totals ........................................................................................................................................ 218
5.2.3 Table 2 – Failed states, context totals ..................................................................................................................................... 219
5.2.4 Table 1 – Israel and Palestine, annual totals ......................................................................................................................... 221
5.2.4 Table 2 – Israel and Palestine, annual totals ......................................................................................................................... 221
5.2.6 Table 1 – Blame/Ideology annual frequency totals and ratio counts ...................................................................................... 224
5.2.6 Table 2 – Blame/Ideology context frequency totals and ratio counts ..................................................................................... 225
5.3.1 Table 1 – Collective actor terms, annual totals .................................................................................................................... 227
5.3.1 Table 2 – Collective actor terms, context totals .................................................................................................................... 228
5.3.3 Table 1 – Actor description, annual totals ........................................................................................................................... 231
5.3.3 Table 2 – Actor description, context totals ........................................................................................................................... 231
5.3.4 Table 1 – Actor connections, annual totals .......................................................................................................................... 235
5.3.4 Table 1 – Actor connections, context totals .......................................................................................................................... 236
5.3.5 Table 1 – Collective actor, annual totals ............................................................................................................................... 239
5.3.5 Table 2 – Collective actor, context totals ............................................................................................................................... 239
5.3.6 Table 1 – Military actor, annual totals........................................................................................................242
5.3.6 Table 2 – Military actor, context totals ...........................................................................................................243
5.3.7 Table 1 – Personnel descriptions, annual totals ..............................................................................................246
5.3.7 Table 2 – Personnel descriptions, context totals ..............................................................................................246
5.3.8 Table 1 – Victim descriptions, annual totals ...................................................................................................249
5.3.8 Table 2 – Victim descriptions, context totals ...................................................................................................249
5.3.9 Table 1 – Actor/Victim annual frequency totals and ratio counts .................................................................253
5.3.9 Table 2 – Actor/Victim context frequency totals and ratio counts .................................................................254
5.4.1 Table 1 – Military scope of strategies, annual totals .........................................................................................256
5.4.1 Table 2 – Military scope of strategies, context totals .........................................................................................256
5.4.2 Table 1 – Collective strategies, annual totals ...................................................................................................261
5.4.2 Table 2 – Collective strategies, context totals ...................................................................................................261
5.4.3 Table 1 – Political strategies and solutions, annual totals ..............................................................................264
5.4.3 Table 2 – Political strategies and solutions, context totals ..............................................................................265
5.4.4 Table 1 – Hard strategies and solutions, annual totals ....................................................................................268
5.4.4 Table 2 – Hard strategies and solutions, context totals ....................................................................................268
5.4.5 Table 1 – Soft strategies and solutions, annual totals ......................................................................................271
5.4.5 Table 2 – Soft strategies and solutions, context totals ......................................................................................271
5.4.6 Table 1 – Dialogue strategies, annual totals .....................................................................................................275
5.4.6 Table 2 – Dialogue strategies, context totals .....................................................................................................276
5.4.7 Table 1 – Solution scope and length, annual totals ..........................................................................................279
5.4.7 Table 2 – Solution scope and length, context totals ..........................................................................................279
5.4.8 Table 1 – Explicitly and implicitly inclusive solutions, annual totals ............................................................284
5.4.8 Table 2 – Explicitly and implicitly inclusive solutions, context totals ............................................................284
5.4.9 Table 1 – Solution annual frequency totals and ratio counts ...........................................................................288
5.4.9 Table 2 – Solution context frequency totals and ratio counts ...........................................................................289
5.5 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies, word count and ratio frequencies of DCFs ........................................291
5.5 Table 2 – Total RCF frequencies for the different contexts, their word counts and each ratio ..........................293
5.5 Table 3 – Total frequencies of DCFs for each framing task ..................................................................................294
GLOSSARY

9/11: September 11, 2001
APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
COIN: Counterinsurgency
DCF: Deliberative Counterinsurgent Frame
DoD: US Department of Defense
EU: European Union
FM 3-24: Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency
ICAT: International Campaign Against Terrorism
NZ: New Zealand
NZDF: New Zealand Defence Force
NZSAS: New Zealand Special Air Service
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
RCF: Reactive Counterinsurgent Frame
UK: United Kingdom
US: United States
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

At 8.46am on September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11, one of four planes hijacked that day, flew into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City. This impact was the first in a series of attacks that would have long-lasting and far-reaching repercussions. As the United States (US) President, George W. Bush, communicated his version of the events to the American people and wider world – in many ways, setting the tone for the following era of international relations that rose from the ashes of Ground Zero – it fell upon New Zealand’s (NZ) Acting Prime Minister, Jim Anderton, to respond to the attacks as the Prime Minister was in transit to Europe. This would be NZ’s first communication as a counterinsurgent in its ‘international campaign against terrorism’ (ICAT).  

Anderton’s initial response catalysed this thesis; in particular, two statements made within just 66 words of each other in his first short press release on September 12, 2001. The first was that “there is no evidence of any threat to New Zealand” and the second was that “[w]e must see this attack not only as an attack on the US, but as an attack on all civilised nations.” There is a degree of incongruity between these two statements. The first seeks to limit the threat, it fits into NZ’s entrenched security narrative: that as one of the most geographically distant states, which has promoted itself as a pragmatic and principled player in the international system, it faces little direct threat. The second, however, expands the threat, and, while it is not totally incompatible with aspects of NZ’s security narrative, it does not have the same fidelity as the first statement, as it not only portrays the threat in a way uncommon in NZ security policy but also uses language rare in domestic political discourse.

A review of NZ’s key security documents from before 9/11 reinforces this position. In these documents the threat from terrorism is portrayed in a relatively limited manner. The 1997 Shape of New Zealand’s Defence refers to terrorism as a ‘low-level’ threat and New Zealand’s Foreign Policy and Security Challenges from 2000 states that “[t]errorism represents a limited but continuing risk” and “[t]errorist activities by non-state organisations (often based on religious or ethnic causes) can present a threat. New Zealand is less likely to be the target of terrorist acts by ‘rogue

1 Here the term ‘counterinsurgent’ is used to refer to a state/government operating against an insurgency.
2 New Zealand is on Pacific Standard Time (18 hours ahead of New York) and while the attacks occurred on September 11, 2001, US time, in New Zealand they occurred on September 12.
The restrained nature of the terrorist threat assessment is clear in the Strategic Assessment 2000: “Some communal conflicts give rise to cross-border terrorism. Counter-terrorism measures, often entailing cooperation between states, have had many successes. But terrorism continues to be a threat.”

In the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, however, it is understood that “New Zealand’s interests would be affected by significant internal unrest in certain parts of Asia or insurgency that could spill over borders and/or pose a risk to New Zealanders.” Likewise, the Terrorism (Bombing and Funding) Bill states that “[t]errorism and crime are now global phenomena” and “[t]errorist acts are increasing”. While not as limited, these descriptions are not at the same existential level as Anderton’s second statement. Also, these less limited descriptions are countered by the general outlines of NZ’s threat level; Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 concludes that “there is no discernible threat to New Zealand’s physical security”. Similarly the New Zealand Defence Force Capability Reviews states that “no situation could be visualised in the foreseeable future which threatened New Zealand’s survival”. Finally, New Zealand’s Foreign Policy and Security Challenges states that “there is no direct threat to New Zealand or immediate interests”. Thus, even at the more extreme end, the majority of threat descriptions regarding terrorism or the threat in general are measured, matching Anderton’s first statement.

In contrast, the phrase ‘civilised nation/s’ is not used once in any of these documents, nor is the word ‘civilised’ on its own, though the term ‘civilisation’ is referred to once in the footnotes of the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 when quoting National minister Doug Kidd, who stated, with regard to Bosnia: “But we were all aware of the ethnic cleansing, the mass rape of women and

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9 Quigley, Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, 18.
11 “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy and Security Challenges”.
the ‘in-your-face’ affront to everything which we believe represents civilisation.’

A search of the official NZ Government website, beehive.govt.nz, for “civilised nation/s” returns only two uses of the phrase before the attacks on September 11, from an archive of exactly 12,531 press releases issued between 1993 and September 12, 2001, one by a Finance Minister and one by a Corrections Minister. Anderton’s second statement, then, is anomalous to both NZ’s security narrative and general domestic political discourse. What makes this even more interesting is that later on that same day, in her first reaction to the attacks, Prime Minister Helen Clark also stated that the “attacks against the United States were attacks against all civilised nations.”

It appears that something occurred to NZ’s security narrative on September 11 (9/11). This, it is proposed, was the introduction of a ‘reactive’ counterinsurgent narrative into NZ’s usually more ‘deliberative’ counterinsurgent narrative, from now simply referred to as the ‘reactive narrative’ and the ‘deliberative narrative’.

The contrast between Anderton’s two statements – one that outlines the threat situation in relatively clipped, direct and dispassionate phrasing and the other that uses more expansive, florid and moving language – launched this investigation into deliberative and reactive narratives. A narrative, as the US counterinsurgency field manual (hereafter FM 3-24) explains:

“is an organizational scheme expressed in story form. Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others’ intentions.”

Likewise, Stryker explains that:

“Narratives are sequential accounts. They organize material into chronological order to tell stories about what happened. These stories are conceptual wholes, built through selection and chronological linkage of otherwise discrete parts, each of which takes on meaning in light of the whole. Adopting a narrative form requires the narrator to focus on individual,

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12 Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, 28.
15 While these narratives will now be referred to as the ‘reactive narrative’ and the ‘deliberative narrative’, to be clear the ‘counterinsurgent’ component is essential as it is believed that these are versions of more comprehensive narratives that can be deployed for an array of different contexts.
institutional or collective actors; the actions they take; and when, where, why, how, and with what consequences they take them.”

A counterinsurgent narrative, then, is an organised account, one that not only seeks to provide a comprehensive account of reality but also aims to use this account as a means of achieving outcomes. Thus, as Tatham explains:

“Narratives are the foundation of all strategy. They are the organising framework for policy and the definitive reference for how events are to be argued and described. Their purpose is to bind together all of the actions of the government (possibly ‘governments’) when working in coalitions, and their representatives, under a common understanding.”

Narratives are a means of describing problems and proscribing solutions. Freedman believes narratives are “strategic because they do not arise spontaneously, but are deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current” and while this is largely correct, as will be argued, the term ‘spontaneously’ is somewhat misleading, particularly for the reactive as this is understood to be spontaneously built from these existing tropes. The two counterinsurgent narratives are strategic tools; they have a utility, although, because narratives are not objective accounts of reality but rather interpreted and negotiated by the audience, their utility varies depending on the audience.

As strategic tools, the deliberative and reactive narratives are understood as different accounts of reality with different utilities for different audiences. Five key opposing qualities distinguish these narratives; where the reactive is exclusive, emotive, hyperbolic, absolute and figurative, the deliberative is inclusive, restrained, constricted, nuanced and literal. The deliberative is believed to be a narrative largely produced by the technocratic components of the government and state – the analysts, experts and practitioners who advise on, study and conduct foreign policy and security affairs – in an ongoing and considered manner. In contrast, the reactive is a more quickly constructed narrative, mainly originating in the political element of the state using extant rhetoric to respond to dramatic events that can be considered ‘outré’ – extreme events beyond the everyday operational parameters of the governing body. Thus, the former is honed over time

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in a measured fashion – it is *deliberated* upon – while the latter is more hastily crafted during the emotive shockwave that follows an attack – it is a *reaction* to this shockwave. Anderton’s first statement, then, is an example of the deliberative and the second of the reactive.

Thus, one of the reasons Anderton used both narratives was probably that the September 11 attacks were so shocking that the generally deliberative nature of NZ’s security-oriented communications were ‘interrupted’ by the reaction to the attacks. However, to be clear, the reactive is not considered a *personal reaction* of shock, though this is a component, but rather more importantly is a necessary *political reaction* to events outside the norm. Specifically, it helps reduce some of the more politically dangerous emotional impacts of a terrorist attack for the counterinsurgent domestically whilst simultaneously enhancing relationships with other allied states, particularly when the victim state is a close ally, though its more expansive, florid and moving language could also alienate those who support the insurgent.

The fundamental aim of this thesis is to explore the utility of these two narratives with regard to the three key audiences: the insurgent, domestic and allied. To do this, Chapter Two will examine the deliberative and reactive narratives using a range of population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) literature as well as specialised terrorist studies. This chapter will serve as the literature review, grounding the thesis in the wider scholarship, justifying the identification of this situation as an insurgency and the NZ Government’s response as a counterinsurgency. It will first provide an overview of what is referred to as ‘classical’ and neoclassical COIN, illustrating the underlying theories and understandings that inform the deliberative narrative, from which the most important qualities of the deliberative will be extracted and examined. Following this, it will explain what is referred to as the counterinsurgent communication paradox, which addresses the strategic logic of terrorism, the centrality of a number of emotions, the expanded audience of the contemporary world and the nature of the counterinsurgent as a pre-existing political actor. From this, it will explain the drivers and nature of the reactive narrative and it will then outline the core reactive qualities. Finally, it will conclude with an overview and the outlining of the key hypotheses of the thesis.

Chapter Three will focus on methodology. Here the various analytic aspects will be explained and outlined. The first key focus will be on introducing the main theoretical tool used in the thesis, which is framing theory. This introduction will provide an explanation of this theory and justify its use, detailing that the focus will be on what are termed ‘reactive counterinsurgent
frames’ (RCFs) and ‘deliberative counterinsurgent frames’ (DCF) and explaining that each will be examined in their own separate research chapters. It will then go on to adapt framing theory for the thesis. As will be outlined, framing theory is highly flexible and has a number of varying components that enable it to be adapted for specific uses and this section will seek to develop the analytic framework of the thesis. This framework provides both the overarching structure of the two research chapters and the analytical tools within that structure. Following this, the three audiences will be described and some key generalisations about these audiences will be made. The point here is to provide an outline that will be filled in throughout the thesis, one that will inform not just the research but also help explain the following section, which is the data set used. The final section of this chapter will detail the method of analysis, which is a form of content analysis. That is, it will explain how the data was examined so that the analytical framework already outlined can be utilised. Here the focus will be on providing a practical explanation of how the actionable data was extracted from the wider data set and while this will be contextualised by a summary of content analysis as a diverse set of methodologies, the main thrust here is on the actual techniques used in the thesis. Finally, in the data set section, the selection and source of the data used in the thesis will be explained. This section will justify the use of ten years’ worth of NZ press releases from key government actors and the ways in which these have been selected, divided and categorised. It will also provide useful metrics for the following analysis, including a chronology of events, word counts and other useful parameters.

Next, Chapter Four will examine the use of reactive counterinsurgent frames. First it will provide a summary of all the events examined for the thesis, which, in turn, provides the information necessary to justify the selection of the case studies that will be presented. Once the rationale behind the selection of the case studies has been provided and the events selected outlined, it will then offer a detailed analysis of the four case studies, specifically 9/11, the Afghan Invasion, Bali 2002 and the Iraq Invasion. Then, after a brief overview of the uses of the reactive narrative in the events not selected for case studies, there will be a section at the end of the chapter that focuses on providing the total frequency of usages of each RCF over the entire period as well as an overview of the entire RCF as a whole.

Chapter Five will then focus on examining the uses of deliberative counterinsurgent frames. This chapter is not divided into specific events, both because of the consistent and constant nature of deliberative frames and because of the practicalities of examining this far more common narrative in such a fashion. There will be a focus on chronology within the analysis, but the
The overarching structure of the chapter will not be chronological. The frequencies of each DCF will be provided as each is examined. At the end of this chapter there will be a brief overview of the entire DCF before the conclusion proper.

Finally, Chapter Six will offer the overarching conclusion. Here the interactions and interferences between the two narratives will be examined and the general trends and usages of each explored in contrast to each other. This chapter will not only seek to review how these were used in particular reference to NZ and the ICAT but will also seek to understand the wider implications of these narratives, both in regard to counterinsurgency and to political rhetoric in general. It will also outline insights into the application of theory, research limitations, future study areas and a final concluding statement.

The thesis will now explain the deliberative and reactive narratives and their key qualities will be outlined.
CHAPTER TWO
DELIBERATIVE AND REACTIVE NARRATIVES

This chapter outlines the key qualities of the deliberative and reactive narratives and, in the process, justifies the central analytical division of this thesis. The former is hypothesised as a narrative that is of utility with regard to the insurgent support population while the latter is hypothesised as a narrative used by the counterinsurgent after a terrorist attack that is politically expedient for the domestic support population and international allies. While the deliberative helps the counterinsurgent defeat the insurgent, the reactive helps mobilise domestic and international audiences. Thus, these populations have very different communication requirements during a counterinsurgency, especially one where the insurgent’s main strategy is terrorism. What is of utility for the insurgent support population is often counterproductive for the domestic and international audiences and vice versa.

Critically, it is their different target audiences that provide the theoretical understanding of these two narratives. As noted, the deliberative is understood to target the insurgent support population while the reactive is seen as focusing on the domestic and international audiences. To outline the qualities of the deliberative, this chapter will first examine so called ‘population-centric’ COIN – often referred to as either ‘classical’ or ‘neo-classical’ depending on iteration – as this body of understanding is seen as providing the theoretical underpinning of the deliberative narrative. This assertion is based largely on the commonalities between the key principles of population-centric COIN and the deliberative counterinsurgent narrative – particularly that both focus on the insurgent support population – as well as the abundance of population-centric COIN theory in NZ’s key military doctrinal and operational publications.

The population-centric approach’s influence goes beyond NZ; the classical version reached its peak of popularity in the 1950s and 1960s after Malaya and Algeria, with a neo-classical crest after 9/11, when it became so influential that it was the chief inspiration of the US

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1 The delineations between these three terms is not consistent in the literature or even for a single theorist. David Kilcullen refers to population-centric as the classical approach in his book, Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), xv, while in a blog post, “Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal, January 27, 2007 accessed on 13/09/15, available from http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-of-classical-counterinsurgency, he refers to both population-centric and enemy-centric as classical. Likewise, neo-classical is not used by every scholar, nor is it used consistently by those that use it.

counterinsurgency field manual, *FM 3-24*, amongst many other states’ COIN doctrines.\(^3\) While the post-9/11 neo-classical COIN was somewhat updated, the similarities with the first wave are greater than the differences; Nagl, an *FM 3-24* author, believes “the differences between previous and current insurgencies are overstated.”\(^4\) Kilcullen refers to a “Neo-Classical Revival.”\(^5\) *FM 3-24*’s continuity has been criticised, Betz wrote: “it is pervaded by concepts drawn from Maoist-style People’s Revolutionary Warfare, which is not the sort of insurgency now being faced.”\(^6\) Gentile states: “idea of populations as the prize in war, that they are the focus, is drawn directly from the pages of FM 3-24”.\(^7\) Jones and Smith believe the classical “assumption, largely reflected in the Field Manual, suggests that an insurgency is something that originates abroad, and stays there.”\(^8\) Kilcullen believes the population-centric approach is the “dominant paradigm through which practitioners approach today’s conflict”.\(^9\)

This section will first provide an overview of insurgency and it will then explain the pertinent principles of population-centric COIN, with an emphasis on the key qualities that counterinsurgent must appreciate for their communication to be of utility with regard to the insurgent support population. The aim here is not to develop a comprehensive general outline of insurgency and counterinsurgency, but rather to hone in on those components relevant to counterinsurgent communication in general and an understanding of the two narratives specifically. The neo-classical population-centric COIN model will be used primarily for the counterinsurgent principles, with reference to any changes or debates, as this is the best way of gaining a clear understanding of deliberative communication that targets the insurgent support population as the fulcrum of success. It will not attempt a comprehensive delineation of the debates surrounding population-centric versus enemy-centric COIN, though it should be acknowledged that some are critical of the population-centric approach.\(^10\) This is intended to set up the following section, where the population-centric outlook is contextualised by an

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\(^6\) Betz quoted in Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency?” *Parameters* 37, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 73.

\(^7\) Gentile “A Strategy of Tactics,” 5.


examination of the strategic logic of terrorism and the counterinsurgent as political actor, as these provide the qualities of the reactive narrative.

2.1 INSURGENCY

The key to combating any opposition is understanding the enemy, their methods and the context of the conflict.\textsuperscript{11} The US Department of Defense (DoD) defines an insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”\textsuperscript{12} An insurgency, then, is when a non-governmental group uses violence to challenge the authority of a state in an organised manner.\textsuperscript{13} While 9/11 and the subsequent response have been categorised as ‘terrorism’ and a ‘war on terrorism’, respectively, according to British Army Field Manual on COIN, (hereafter \textit{Countering Insurgency}), al Qaeda can best be “defined as a religiously inspired, global insurgent movement that uses terrorist tactics”.\textsuperscript{14} Numerous leading scholars support this categorisation, as al Qaeda’s driving ambition is to become the legitimate authority in a number of states, creating a Caliphate.\textsuperscript{15} Terrorism will be examined below, suffice to say here that this study is focused on an insurgency that uses terrorism as a method of conflict. The rest of this section will focus on the key qualities of an insurgency with respect to communication.

2.1.1 POLITICAL

Insurgencies are inherently political, an insight that guides the population-centric model.\textsuperscript{16} Hoffman believes that some jihadis are apolitical, though leading theorists dispute this position.\textsuperscript{17} While some insurgents may not be interested in wider issues, motivated only by martyrdom, this does not define the movement as a whole. As such, perception is generally more important than reality – victory lies in the relative perception of both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent, which leads into the psychological nature of insurgency.\textsuperscript{18}

2.1.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{12} FM 3-24, 1-1 – 1-2.
\bibitem{13} FM 3-24.
\bibitem{14} \textit{Countering Insurgency}, 2-1
\bibitem{15} FM 3-24,1-1, 1-2.
\bibitem{17} Mark Grdovic, “Understanding Counterinsurgency,” \textit{Special Warfare} 17, no. 2 (2004): 5.
\end{thebibliography}
While all conflict is psychological, insurgency is even more of a ‘mind game’ than regular war because it is primarily political and the levers of action and determinants of success are largely intangible.\textsuperscript{19} Counterinsurgents may be physically dominant, but will struggle to win if they are unable to impact the politics of the situation. Payne writes that “the goal of the insurgent is as much an apathetic as a sympathetic population. So, some insurgent messages aim at exacerbating fear and uncertainty and thereby inducing apathy – terrorism is itself, of course, just such a type of message”.\textsuperscript{20} Perception is key as this is the lever of action upon which success is predicated and perception is influenced by emotions and ideas.

2.1.3 EMOTIVE

Emotions are important in insurgency as they guide cognition and perception, impacting decision-making.\textsuperscript{21} An insurgency is as much a battle of perceptions as a military operation.\textsuperscript{22} Ingram defines perception and what he refers to as ‘polarisation’ as “the ability of an actor to effectively shape how a population interprets and understands events and issues (perception) in order to drive the allegiance of the population towards themselves and away from the other actor (polarization)”, explaining that “perception and polarization” are “major pillars of an insurgent movement” and that an insurgency “is a battle to shape the perceptions of a population in crisis”.\textsuperscript{23} Emotion is one of the most important means of affecting perception, especially, as will be shown, because of the insurgent’s use of terrorism as a strategy.

2.1.4 IDEAS

Insurgency are driven by ideas. Insurgency is a ‘war of ideas’, as a conflict between narratives that express these ideas.\textsuperscript{24} As such, the counterinsurgent will know that they have won when their cause has become widely unpopular.\textsuperscript{25} That is, when the idea has been defeated, or has been perceived to be defeated. \textit{FM 3-24} states:

\textsuperscript{19} Countering Insurgency, 1-7; J. Michael. Waller, \textit{Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists} (Washington, DC: Institute of World Politics Press, 2007).
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{22} Countering Insurgency, 1-3.
\textsuperscript{23} Hararo Ingram, “A Four Dimensional Model of Insurgency and the Centrality of ‘Perception and Polarization’ to Strategic Success,” \textit{Small Wars Journal} (2013): 1,4.
\textsuperscript{24} Betz, “The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 515.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
“Ideas are a motivating factor in insurgent activities…The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative. A narrative is an organizational scheme expressed in story form. Narratives are central to representing identity, particularly the collective identity of religious sects, ethnic groupings, and tribal elements. Stories about a community’s history provide models of how actions and consequences are linked. Stories are often the basis for strategies and actions, as well as for interpreting others’ intentions.”

Ideas are seen as important in an insurgency, along with emotions they are the key mechanisms of impact on perception.

2.2 COUNTERINSURGENCY

Insurgencies have political goals, insurgents work to impact change on the psychological level and use emotions and ideas to affect perception. These factors helped guide the selection of the following counterinsurgent principles, drawn from the population-centric literature, which are most pertinent for ensuring the counterinsurgent’s communications are of utility with regard to the insurgent support population.

2.2.1 POPULATION IS KEY

The insurgent support population is the ‘key’ to victory in the population-centric model. In the classic model, the insurgent support population was a segment of the counterinsurgent’s own population as these were intra-state conflicts. While the neo-classical model encompasses transnational and global insurgencies, many experts feel it still has an undue focus on the classical intrastate struggle. The 2007 US Counterinsurgency Field Manual definition certainly reinforces this, stating insurgencies “normally seek to achieve one of two goals: to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within a single state, or to break away from state control and form an autonomous entity or ungoverned space that they can control.” Thus, the population focused on by the population-centric model is, generally, that of a single state. The key developers of the US COIN doctrine, Nagl, Crane, Petraeus and Caldwell, are well-known population-centric proponents. Nagl writes: “counterinsurgent and insurgent are both competing to win the

27 FM 3-24; Countering Insurgency.
29 Betz in Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency?"; Peters, “Progress and Peril.”
support of the population”.  

2.2.2 ISOLATE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR SUPPORT

The aim of the counterinsurgent is to isolate the insurgent from their support population and this key classical COIN principle remains central in the neo-classical model, though its scope has expanded from largely physical isolation to include a greater focus on ideological and psychological isolation.  

"contest for the support of the population provides counterinsurgency with its principal distinguishing characteristic; it is concerned primarily with moulding the population’s perceptions”, the “decisive effort is to isolate the insurgents by denying the local population as a base of support”.  

Isolating insurgents from their cause and support is a core population-centric COIN principle; the key is to discredit the insurgents in the eyes of the support population so that they are unable to maintain ongoing operational and ideological viability.

2.2.3 LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy remains the defining measure of success in population-centric COIN; it is, as Cohen et al. explain, “the main objective”.  

"primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.”  

A complex political concept, legitimacy can be summed up as recognition of the right to govern.  

In population-centric COIN, both the insurgent and counterinsurgent seek legitimacy from the support population and only one can have ‘sufficient’ legitimacy to rule the state.  

Legitimacy is based on the “perception [of the insurgent audience] of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions.”  

Victory is comes from recognition of one actor’s legitimacy relative to their opponent


34 FM 3-24, 1-1, 1-8, 7-2.


37 Field Manual, 37.


39 Countering Insurgency, 1-6.

40 US Joint Publication 3-07, quoted in Jamison Jo Medby and Russell W. Glenn, Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), 64.
and is decided in the minds of the population.\textsuperscript{41} In fact, both perceived legitimacy and the just effect of actions are able to increase power and the perception of illegitimacy just as unjust effect can constrain the exercise of power.\textsuperscript{42} Payne argues that success in contemporary conflict does not require the unconditional support of the population but rather their apathy or submissiveness.\textsuperscript{43} While the counterinsurgent wants to legitimise their own cause, they also need to try to delegitimise the insurgent’s cause.\textsuperscript{44}

2.2.4 UNDERSTAND THE POPULATION
Legitimacy’s centrality means counterinsurgents need to understand the insurgent support population.\textsuperscript{45} This principle is, largely, a new addition to population-centric COIN as previously the counterinsurgent and insurgent were made up of the same population so there was less chance of a cultural or religious chasm.\textsuperscript{46} Countering Insurgency stresses the need to understand the human terrain.\textsuperscript{47} Hunt et al. explain that a COIN campaign “requires a deep and nuanced understanding of culture, politics, economics, ideology, social networks, and the media.”\textsuperscript{48} A nested factor within this overarching principle is the need to understand the enemy, both internally and with respect to the wider insurgent support population.\textsuperscript{49} The point is that population-centric COIN that isolates the insurgent from their support by being perceived as relatively legitimate requires a broad and deep understanding of the support population and the enemy actor.

2.2.5 INVOLVE THE POPULATION
The counterinsurgent must also involve the population in the solution. This understanding dates back to Lawrence of Arabia and remains key in neo-classical COIN.\textsuperscript{50} As Kolenda and McChrystal explain: “When people own outcomes they will develop ways to ensure the solutions

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Tadd Sholtis, Military Strategy As Public Discourse America’s War in Afghanistan (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 20; FM 3-24, III-2; Payne, “Some Principles For Influence in Counterinsurgency,” 26.
\item \textsuperscript{44} David C. Gompert, Heads We Win: The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency (COIN) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2007), xi.
\item \textsuperscript{45} FM 3-24, 3-1.
\item \textsuperscript{46} Gompert, Heads We Win; Kilcullen, “State of a Controversial Art.”
\item \textsuperscript{47} Countering Insurgency.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Gompert, Heads We Win The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency.”
\end{itemize}
are durable... If you sweat for it, you protect it.”

The only way to get loyalty is to empower local actors by crafting shared objectives. One of the key methods for winning the ‘battle of the wills’ for the counterinsurgent is inclusive strategies and solutions. Thus, counterinsurgent must ensure that their actions and their narrative includes the insurgent support population.

**2.2.6 CONTROL EMOTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS**

The counterinsurgent also needs to control the emotions and expectations of the insurgent support population. This principle remains unchanged from the classical to neo-classical model. Chiarenza explains that “[e]motions like fear, anxiety, and alienation generate exploitable opportunities for the insurgent”. For this reason, the counterinsurgent must ensure that they control the emotions of the insurgent support population, Gompert details how counterproductive demonising the enemy is because of the anger and alienation it generates. Payne believes that conflict has always been a contest of wills where victory occurs by changing your enemy’s underlying attitudes through, amongst other factors, emotions. Expectation’s connection to legitimacy is apparent in *Countering Insurgency*, which states:

> “realistic local expectations are important and an enduring outcome is more likely if a long term view is adopted. Taking such an approach is important because it takes account of the population’s view. Populations are unlikely to actively support their government until they are convinced that the government has the means, ability and stamina to provide security and further their interests over the long term.”

The counterinsurgent must manage the emotions and expectations of the insurgent support population because perception lies at the heart of legitimacy.

**2.2.7 SIMPLICITY IS BEST**

Insurgents seek complexity as it confounds their opponent, meaning that the counterinsurgent needs to aim for their solutions to be relatively simple; that is not to say that the thought behind

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53 Jones and Smith, “Counter-Insurgency Politics,” 28.
54 Ibid., 28.
55 FM 3-24.
57 Gompert, 31.
59 *Countering Insurgency*, 1-8.
them should be limited but rather that the output should not be complicated. As Berlow shows, while counterinsurgency may be functionally complex, the best solutions come from reducing it to its most basic responsive components. For counterinsurgents, simplicity is the best way to win over the insurgent population. At the psychological level, Kilcullen recommends using a “single narrative”: a simple, unifying, easily expressed story or explanation that organizes people’s experience and provides an understanding of events. Likewise, Payne explains:

“Among the more common advice given to those seeking to persuade is to keep it simple. [Simplicity] can be used to the counterinsurgent’s advantage. Research shows that simple messages are more likely to be believed as true, and that repeating messages will reinforce that believability… Moreover, messages that are delivered in direct linguistic styles, using easily comprehensible vocabulary, and not hedged about with caveats, sub-clauses and close argument, are more convincing.”

Simplicity of approach for the counterinsurgent not only helps combat the insurgent’s complexity but also means the message can be more easily parsed by the insurgent support population.

2.2.8 NARRATIVE

The counterinsurgent must have a narrative that accommodates all of the above; a neo-classical addition to the population-centric model. As a contest for the support of the insurgent population the primary concern for a counterinsurgent is moulding the population’s perceptions, making a carefully crafted narrative that reinforces the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent central. As Freedman explains, counterinsurgencies are “understood in terms of the stories they tell as much as their direct impact on the enemy’s physical capacity”; at its most basic a narrative is the story of the counterinsurgent. Going deeper, Vlahos outlines that a “narrative is much more than just a story. Narrative may sound like a fancy literary word, but it is actually the

62 Stephen Vrooman, A Counterinsurgency Campaign Plan Concept: The Galula Compass (School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2005), 9.
63 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 42.
65 Countering Insurgency, 1–7.
foundation of all strategy, upon which all else—policy, rhetoric, and action—is built.” Drawing on the above principles, the narrative must be focused on the insurgent population with the aim of enhancing the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy whilst delegitimising the insurgents, it has to be crafted with an understanding of the insurgent support population and it must include them, it must control their emotion and it must be relatively simple.

2.3 DELIBERATIVE NARRATIVE

For counterinsurgent communication to be of utility for the insurgent support population, a number of recommendations can be drawn from the above. The nature of the insurgency and the principles that ensure utility suggest that the content of the counterinsurgent’s communication is essential to the overall success of the counterinsurgency. It is a political conflict, waged on the psychological plane, where emotions and ideas are the key weapons in affecting perception. To successfully counter it, the counterinsurgent must focus on the insurgent support population, isolating them from the insurgent and seeking to convince them that they are the legitimate actor by creating a simple narrative that is based on an understanding of the insurgent support population, that controls emotions and expectations and includes the insurgent support population. These factors provide a huge range of possible guides for the counterinsurgent’s narrative. However, rather than provide a comprehensive run down, five aspects will be given here, not just because they are important in general but also because they contrast with the qualities of the reactive narrative. A deliberative narrative should be: inclusive, restrained, constricted, nuanced, and literal. These are not mutually exclusive, but rather additive. They all connect and have significant overlap, though crucially each has a distinctive quality that demands its analysis independently.

2.3.1 INCLUSIVE

Firstly, counterinsurgent communication must be inclusive. This is the most important of the five and informs the other recommendations. An inclusive narrative isolates insurgents from their support by focusing on and including their support population, with the aim of the counterinsurgent being perceived as more legitimate than the insurgent. For a counterinsurgent, the emphasis on inclusion is fundamental. The counterinsurgent narrative must be focused on

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68 FM 3-24, I-7 - I-8.
ensuring the insurgent support population feels included in the outcome. The narrative should encourage the insurgent support population to see the counterinsurgent as a legitimate actor whose proposed solutions are just and do not just involve the support population but are beneficial to them. That is, communication must be phrased in a manner that does not alienate or exclude them and that does not delineate a self-serving outcome. The counterinsurgent is often already at a disadvantage, as they are either a state that is suffering a crisis of legitimacy, or they are an outside actor whose influence over the insurgent support population will be lower than the insurgent’s.

2.3.2 RESTRAINED
To ensure inclusiveness, counterinsurgent communication also needs to be emotively restrained. Specifically, it should not invoke negative emotions within the insurgent support population. The counterinsurgent needs to convince the insurgent support population that they are a legitimate actor. As Betz writes, in the ‘war of ideas’ “[a]rguments which appeal to reason are deemed more trustworthy than those which appeal to emotion”. The US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual suggests that “[c]alculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts.” Emotion can be a powerful means of persuasion but if misused it can generate significant blowback by excluding the insurgent support population; the narrative needs to embody ‘emotional intelligence’. The counterinsurgent is already at a disadvantage when it comes to emotion, the insurgent has an advantage in emotional manipulation, able to tap the key emotional concerns of the population, and the counterinsurgent should try to neutralise this rather than retaliating with their own emotive narrative.

2.3.3 CONSTRICTED
The narrative also needs to be constricted in its scope. That is, while the parameters of its descriptions and identifications need to be strict and precise, it should be pared-down to the creditable minimum. This serves to control emotions and expectations and can help reduce the
apparent legitimacy of the insurgent. Constricted descriptions of the threat posed by insurgents help to reduce the capacity of the insurgent, thus limiting their ability to impact the support population emotionally. A narrative that portrays a constricted scope of the threat the insurgent poses helps neutralise the insurgent’s ability to impact the insurgent support population’s emotions. At the same time, this negatively impacts their apparent legitimacy, as the insurgent needs to appear competent to be perceived as a replacement government. Constricted outcome identifications also ensure that the counterinsurgent does not unrealistically raise expectations that they cannot hope to meet with regard to their own proposed solutions, otherwise they risk creating what Gurr called the ‘revolutionary gap’ wherein expectations rise faster than reality and the counterinsurgent may experience a drop in apparent legitimacy.77

2.3.4 NUANCED

For the narrative to be inclusive, it has to be descriptively nuanced. Nuanced here means that the communication must be balanced in its identifications rather than extreme. It needs to be based on an understanding of the insurgent support population rather than a caricature of them.78 Nuanced language ensures that the communication is able to incorporate a refined understanding of the support population, meaning that it will be more inclusive. The “contextualisation of the conflict’s origins and the insurgents are essential if the… [narrative is] to be effective and nuanced”.79 Also, while it may seem counterintuitive, to reduce complexity of insurgency into a simple counterinsurgent message, a counterinsurgent narrative must be able to provide fine distinctions between issues. To communicate about a complex issue in a simple manner requires gradation and tone, not stark contrasts or simplifications.80

2.3.5 LITERAL

It is also important that the narrative is literal. That means that the intended meaning must be the primary definition of the word or words, the narrative should not be built from figurative or metaphorical components. The reason for this is that for the narrative to be able to help isolate the insurgents from their support and convince the support population of the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy, for it to be restrained, nuanced and constricted, it is best delivered in clear and direct

language as it has the least chance of being misperceived or distorted.\textsuperscript{81} This is particularly true when the insurgent support audience is from a different culture to the counterinsurgent. Use of literal phrasing will deliver ‘strategic clarity’ to the narrative.\textsuperscript{82} A ‘good’ narrative ensures the insurgent support population understand the reasons for counterinsurgent’s motives and actions, which is best served by being literal.\textsuperscript{83}

\section*{2.4 THE COUNTERINSURGENT COMMUNICATION PARADOX}

While this all works in theory, it is argued here that it is rare for the counterinsurgent’s communication output to ever completely meet these guides. That is, while the population-centric literature recommends that counterinsurgents use a narrative that is inclusive, restrained, constricted, nuanced and literal if they want to ensure their communication is of strategic utility for the insurgent support population, this does not always happen. Rather than solely using the deliberative narrative, the counterinsurgent also uses a reactive narrative. There are two major interconnected issues in practice that mean that counterinsurgent communication is unlikely to be as deliberative as the population-centric approach would demand: the strategic logic of terrorism as a tool of insurgency and the counterinsurgent as a pre-existing political actor with domestic and allied interests. These two issues will be explored, contextualising the above focus on population-centric COIN.

\section*{2.5 TERRORISM}

Terrorism is famously difficult to define and much ink and many pixels have been expended attempting to place this phenomenon in a neat conceptual box. In his review of definitions, Meisels notes that there are literally hundreds and Smith and Thomas explain “the difficulties in trying to define the phenomena even within the Executive Branch of the United States government are legendary.”\textsuperscript{84} Nevertheless, some clarification is required, though the aim here is not a complete definition but rather an orientating statement that enables exploration of the most relevant aspects.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{81} Daniel S. Roper, “Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War,” \textit{Parameters} 38, no. 3 (2008): 92.
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 92.
Schmid, writing of the definitional issues, lists the many attributes of terrorism commonly outlined:

“its often symbolic character, its often indiscriminate nature, its typical focus on civilian and non-combatant targets of violence, its sometimes provocative and sometimes retributive aims, the disruption of public order and the putting in danger of public security, the creation of a climate of fear to influence audiences wider than the direct victims, its disregard for the rules of war and the rules of punishment, and its asymmetrical character… Some key elements of many definitions also refer to the fact that terrorism is usually an instrument for the attempted realization of a political or religious project that perpetrators lacking mass support are seeking, that it generally involves a series of punctuated acts of demonstrative public violence, followed by threats of more in order to impress, intimidate and/or coerce target audiences.”

Merari is more succinct, he believes the three main elements of terrorism are the use (or threat) of violence, political objectives and the intention of sowing fear in a target population as a means of achieving these political objectives. Friedman’s focused definition of terrorism is “violence aimed at producing terror or extreme fear in a population and undertaken for political or ideological ends”. For the purpose of the thesis, these are seen as useful guides and while issues could be raised with many inclusions and absences in these outlines, there is only one particular commonality in all four that will be focused on here: fear as the functional emotion generated by terrorism.

2.5.1 FEAR AS THE PREEMINENT EMOTION

Much is made of fear as the preeminent emotion generated by terrorism. As well as the above, the DoD defines terrorism as “unlawful violence to inculcate fear”. Crenshaw explains that terrorism aims to create “fear and hostility in an audience identified as the ‘enemy’.” Terrorism “is violence used in order to create fear; but it is aimed at creating fear in order that the fear, in turn, will lead somebody else to embark on some quite different program of action that will accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires”, according to Dibb. Similarly, Braithwaite believes that terrorists “desire and require the cultivation and proliferation of public

88 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 34, 40.
fear”, explaining that “success is predicated upon being able to convert the fear that their attacks cause within the public into demands for policy change that would help bring about changes in line with the terrorists’ demands”.92 Finally, Meisels, concluding his review of definitions, writes:

“fear is a key element as it is tied at the most basic philological level to the term itself, as well as describing a seemingly basic feature of the phenomenon – its frightening intention and result. Consequently, most authors include this feature – literal terrorization – within their definition or description. This element appears to cut across political lines and is included in the widest variety of discussions on terrorism.”93

In short, fear is often portrayed as the emotion without peer when it comes to terrorism’s ability to effect change, the argument being that fear is able to impact perception and this changed perception will lead to different outcomes.

What makes this dominant focus on fear highly problematic is that it is also widely acknowledged that the counterinsurgent often utilises the fear generated by a terrorist attack for its own purposes.94 As Nacos et al. write, “hyping threat and fear is central to terrorist and counterterrorist rhetoric”.95 Likewise, Altheide refers to this as the “politics of fear”, examining “decision makers’ promotion and use of audience beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk, and fear, to achieve certain goals” in the wake of a terrorist attack.96 Thus, while many terrorism theorists refer to fear as the vital emotion of a terrorist attack, many also acknowledge that the victim state will often use fear to their own advantage. Braithwaite claims that terrorism works by converting the fear into policy changes that meet the terrorist’s objectives, yet a common response of the counterinsurgent is to use the fear to their own advantage, effectively using it to

95 Nacos et al., Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion, 35.
make policy changes that suit themselves rather than the terrorist. There is a major problem with this line of reasoning if, rather than enabling the terrorist to achieve their aims, fear can help the counterinsurgent achieve their own aims. There is also another issue with the apparent utility of fear, though this time as a means for the counterinsurgent to achieve their objectives. A number of studies looking at the interplay of emotions and risk perceptions have found that fear “evokes appraisals of uncertainty and situational control” while anger “is associated with appraisals of certainty and individual control”.\textsuperscript{97} The findings also show that with regard to a terrorist attack, for those in whom fear predominates, there is less certainty about the cause of an attack or the response, while for those in whom anger is the dominate emotion, the cause is more clearer, as is the need for a forceful military solution.\textsuperscript{98} Anger appears to be more politically expedient than fear, while fear does not seem that problematic for the counterinsurgent. Crucially, this suggests that the focus on fear as the preeminent emotion of terrorism is questionable.

Terrorist attacks undoubtedly generate fear, but they also evoke other emotional responses, including confusion, concern and, critically, anger.\textsuperscript{99} The confusion, concern and anger that occur as a response to terrorist attacks happen because the attacks are generally unexpected and they target random civilians, utilising violence and the media reaction to intentionally generate an emotional shockwave. To be specific, people are confused about why the attacks occurred and who was responsible, they are concerned that there are no measures in place to prevent future attacks, and they are angry that the attacks occurred.\textsuperscript{100} The emotions are critical for understanding not just the insurgent’s actions but the counterinsurgent’s response as well. As Small et al. write “[c]itizens’ attributions for the terrorist attacks merit systematic study not only for what they may reveal about basic cognitive-emotional processes but also for what they may reveal about policy preferences. Causal attributions can implicitly inform views on how one should respond toward terrorists and how one should prevent future attacks... Causal

\textsuperscript{97} See Jennifer S. Lerner, Roxana M. Gonzalez, Deborah A. Small and Baruch Fischhoff, “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment,” \textit{Psychological Science} 14, no. 2 (2003), for a list of the various studies.


\textsuperscript{99} Lerner et al., “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism.”; Sadler et al., “Emotions, Attributions, and Policy Endorsement in Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks.”

\textsuperscript{100} ‘Concern’ here will refer only to citizens’ worry about their state’s response and not concern over future terrorist attacks, which is seen as a component of ‘fear’.
attributions after an aggressive and tragic event may be shaped by emotion… anger drives and is
driven by thoughts of blame and punishment.”

2.5.2 STRATEGIC LOGIC OF TERRORISM

To understand the emotive power of terrorism, the means by which it translates into outcomes
needs to be explained. Kydd and Walter’s influential article – which itself builds on the work
done by Pape in his seminal article – outlines five principal strategic logics at work in a terrorist
campaign: attrition, intimidation, outbidding, provocation and spoiling. Briefly, attrition seeks
to impose unacceptable costs on the enemy government; intimidation aims to convince the
insurgent support population the terrorists are strong and the enemy government is weak;
outbidding is intended to show the insurgent support population that the terrorists have a greater
resolve than the enemy government; provocation is focused on forcing the enemy government
to overreact militarily with the aim of increasing support from insurgent support population; and
finally spoiling seeks to portray the moderates on their own side as weak to the enemy
government.

According to this model, the emotive power of terrorist attacks functions by either attempting to
influence the insurgent support audience, the enemy government or both, through the
generation of emotions and the impacts these have on the perception of the situation. But
importantly this can be direct, through the actual attacks themselves, or indirect, through the
response of the enemy government. As Kydd and Walter explain, while also overemphasising the
role of fear: “Terrorism works not simply because it instills fear in target populations, but
because it causes governments and individuals to respond in ways that aid the terrorists’
cause.” Thus, while terrorism can be used to directly target an audience with the aim of
generating an emotive impact that changes perceptions, insurgents also strategically plan attacks
taking into account how they expect the state to respond, aiming to provoke the
counterinsurgent into reacting in a manner that generates emotions in their support audience.

101 Deborah A. Small, Jennifer S. Lerner and Baruch Fischhoff, “Emotion Priming and Attributions for Terrorism:
103 Ibid., 51.
104 Ibid., 50.
105 Ibid.
As Mueller explains, “the costs of terrorism come much more from hasty, ill-considered, and over-wrought reactions, or overreactions, to it than from anything the terrorists have done.”

Kydd and Walter devised these five strategies by examining the types of uncertainty that can be generated by an attack – uncertainty of power, resolve and trustworthiness – and by splitting the audiences the terrorists are trying to influence into the insurgent support population and the enemy government. Attrition and spoiling seek to influence the enemy government while intimidation, outbidding and provocation target the insurgent support population. While these are a useful starting point, to explain how terrorism as a mechanism of insurgency impacts the strategic utility of the counterinsurgent’s narrative requires some adaption.

### 2.6 THE EXPANDED AUDIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY COUNTERINSURGENCY

One of the main issues with Kydd and Walter’s theory is that the delineation of the target audiences is limited. They state terrorists “play to two key audiences: governments whose policies they wish to influence and individuals on the terrorists’ own side whose support or obedience they seek to gain”, which reduces their model’s applicability to classical ‘single state’ insurgencies where the ‘enemy’ government rules the support population. However, contemporary insurgencies are rarely ‘single state’, either because the insurgents are targeting a foreign state, because they are acting in an area without clear governance or because the counterinsurgent is an alliance. As Kilcullen explains, the population-centric model “posits an insurgent challenge to a functioning (albeit often weak) state…. [and] tends to assume a bilateral struggle between the insurgent and counterinsurgent” where the contemporary situation has gone ‘beyond single state COIN’ and ‘beyond binary COIN’, to the point where in the current environment most counterinsurgents will not be the government of the insurgent support audience. Thus, aside from governments themselves, there are generally at least two distinct key support audiences: the insurgent support population and the enemy government support population (from now the ‘domestic support audience’).

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108 Ibid.


This expansion of actual support audiences has been amplified by the rapid globalisation of media and communications. Not only is the world more connected, but media and communications spheres have been ‘democratised’ meaning states can no longer control information flows. Metz writes:

“[In] the 20th century, insurgents struggled to reach external audiences… Now the global media, satellite communications, cell phones, the Internet, and other information technology gives insurgents instant access to national and world audiences”, explaining that it has given insurgents a greater ability to effect psychological impact, “[t]he terrorism of contemporary insurgents is thus designed to influence both a proximate audience and a distant one”.  

This audience can actually be expanded beyond just the enemy government’s own citizens to include the allied states and other actors, just as the insurgent support population can no longer be restricted to a single state but now includes all other self-identifying members, be they diasporic nationals or members of the same religion.

The existence of two key support audiences, combined with the impossibility for states to control the spread of information, means the emotive force of a terrorist attack takes a more convoluted course than Kydd and Walter’s model suggests. In particular, there is an almost unavoidable ‘spill-over’ from one key audience to another between these different strategic logics. Specifically, even if an insurgent aims to use an intimidation, outbidding or provocation strategy, their attack will almost inevitably intimidate the domestic support audience. The reason for this is that even though these three strategies seek to influence the insurgent support audience, they do so indirectly by acting on the enemy government, which will, inevitably, intimidate the domestic support audience. The domestic support audience are not aware of any specific ‘strategic logic’ behind an attack on their state, they will just be impacted emotionally. Thus, if the situation involves two distinct support populations, no matter what strategy the insurgent is using, the domestic support audience will be intimidated, which means that the counterinsurgent government is faced with managing two key audiences whose communication requirements are very different. And this is where the role of the counterinsurgent as a pre-existing political actor becomes important.

2.7 COUNTERINSURGENT ARE PRE-EXISTING POLITICAL ACTORS

111 Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux,” 118.
112 Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency (Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, 2007), 14, 39.
113 Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency,” 74.
The counterinsurgent state is not counterinsurgent. It is a pre-existing political actor that is both a government and a state and as such it has an array of pre-existing interests and obligations at both the domestic and international level. The counterinsurgent’s response to a terrorist attack will always be moderated by these interests and obligations, from the government’s desire to stay in power through to the state’s alliance arrangements, from political and economic interests to political and military obligations. The counterinsurgent’s response will also be shaped by the relative stakes of the insurgency for the counterinsurgent, including whether they are directly or indirectly threatened by the insurgency and whether the threat is serious or not. These two overarching sets of influencers – the counterinsurgent’s pre-existing interests and obligations as well as their relative stakes in the insurgency – have somewhat of an inverse relationship, the higher the relative stakes for the counterinsurgent the less likely they are to act in a way that takes their domestic and international interests and obligations into consideration. A counterinsurgency is not conducted in a vacuum, to understand the counterinsurgent’s response the political context must be understood and, in particular, their own support audience. As Metz notes, in the 20th Century:

“Nations facing serious insurgencies such as South Vietnam or, later, El Salvador, certainly had other security problems, but they paled in comparison to the insurgent threat. Insurgencies were organizationally simple. They involved the insurgents, the regime, and, sometimes, outside supporters of one side or the other... Rather than being discrete conflicts between insurgents and an established regime, [modern insurgencies] are nested in complex, multidimensional clashes having political, social, cultural, and economic components.”

It is likely that when a modern counterinsurgent responds to a terrorist attack their communication will not only be shaped by the attack itself and the demands of the counterinsurgency but also the wider multidimensionality Metz refers to, particularly what is politically expedient with regard to their own support population. When Kydd and Walter explain that “the challenge for policymakers in targeted countries is to calibrate their responses in ways that do not further any of the terrorists’ goals”, they ignore the counterinsurgent’s position as a pre-existing political actor, one whose responses are calibrated by many factors beyond the conflict itself.

Where a ‘classical’ insurgency-counterinsurgency was primarily focused on legitimacy, for a pre-existing political actor with wider interests and obligations conducting a complex global insurgency with a number of key audiences, there are a number of interrelated goals for communication. These will be outlined in full in the following chapter. Briefly, however, they are mobilisation, justification and legitimisation. While these are all intent on enhancing the counterinsurgent’s cause, they are different and not all are important for all the audiences. Mobilisation is focused on marshalling support for action and is only important for the state’s own support population, justification is interested in ensuring the action is seen as right and proper and is important for all three audiences, while legitimisation is about how the rightness and properness of the action reflects on perceptions of the government as right and proper and is vital for both insurgent and domestic support audiences.

This political context is seen as influencing all of the counterinsurgent’s communication because they are a pre-existing political actor. It is hypothesised that the deliberative narrative will display political influence, that rather than being purely technical and objective there will be ideological and politically pragmatic aspects to it and that it may even be used by the counterinsurgent to sanitise their actions so as to increase their communication’s utility with regard to their own support population during the course of the conflict. While the deliberative narrative is not seen as providing the necessary response immediately after an attack because it does not deal with the confusion, concern and anger generated, this does not mean that it is not of utility for a domestic support audience during the conflict. Rather, its utility with respect to the domestic support audience depends on political context, which can change over time.

Nevertheless, it is further hypothesised that in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack the counterinsurgent will not use a deliberative narrative because of the need to address the vacuum of comprehension, the need for reassurance and the anger that such an event generates – which are all exacerbated by fear. Take 9/11 as an example, the event that marks the beginning of this thesis’s period of interest. Fear, as a emotive propellant, was present. Sullivan speaks of the “psychic terror of 9/11”, explaining that “[i]n our panic, fear kept 40ilieu40ing upward… If our minds had not been flooded with dread, many of us would never have believed that 9/11 was just a dummy run for a much bigger strike with weapons of mass destruction”, concluding that “fear dominated my being”. On the vacuum of comprehension, Holland writes of the “profound silence… This was the void: devoid of (harmonised) meaning… The empty space of

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Ground Zero was mirrored in the vacuity of thought and words”. Jackson also refers to the “void of meaning” as 9/11 unfolded, that while the ‘facts’ were known, the meaning of the events was fluid and unsure. The need for reassurance dovetails with this vacuum. Ackerman states: “[w]hen terrorists strike on the scale of 9/11 nobody has the slightest idea of what may happen next. The citizenry confronts the shock of the unknown, and the resulting anxiety is qualitatively different from many other uncertainties in life”, going on to explains that terrorist attacks are a “public affront to national sovereignty” that require both symbolic and functional reassurance. Finally, Ross writes that “it seems only natural that a large-scale terrorist attack would spark anger” while Pemberton confirms that “anger was the dominant reaction of the American public to 9/11”. In the wake of this emotive shockwave, where the victim state’s citizenry are confused, concerned and angry, it is hypothesised that the counterinsurgent will use a narrative that best deals with these issues. The exigencies of the situation mean that rather than using the deliberative narrative they will choose one that is completely focused on addressing the needs of their own population by using what is referred to as a reactive narrative.

2.8 REACTIVE NARRATIVE

Thus there are several factors that shape a counterinsurgent narrative beyond the COIN principles. First, if the insurgent support population and domestic support audience are two separate entities, then no matter what strategic logic the insurgent is using, one of the results of an attack will be intimidation of the domestic support audience. Critically, however, the emotive impact on the domestic support audience will not just be fear, but also confusion, concern and anger. This is where the influence on communication becomes interesting; as a pre-existing political actor one of the counterinsurgent’s primary aims is their own political viability, they need to reassure their own support population that they are capable, not just as a counterinsurgent but as a government. Also, in cases where the insurgent support population and domestic support audience are different, the counterinsurgent’s most important audience immediately after an attack is their own support audience. As de Castella and McGarty write:

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117 Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, 1.
118 Jackson, *Writing the War on Terror*, 29.
119 Bruce A. Ackerman, *Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 44–45 – emphasis in original.
“The rhetoric used by the leaders of Western democracies about terrorism has attracted considerable attention... The implicit (sometimes explicit) understanding of political rhetoric is that it is designed to advance a leader’s political agenda. That is, by framing arguments in particular ways political leaders are seeking to convince audiences to support their political program”.

In other words, even though they are a counterinsurgent, in the wake of an attack their main focus is their own domestic support audience and their own political agenda. Their main aims, then, will be to address the negative emotions generated by the terrorist attack, while ensuring that they mobilise support for future counterinsurgent actions. These two aims are mutually reinforcing. Addressing the confusion, reassuring concerns and directing anger all work together to help mobilise support, a process that is empowered by the inchoate fear that follows a terrorist attack.

As well as the domestic considerations, another dynamic that may influence the counterinsurgent’s response is their international interests and obligations, though this particular factor would vary largely depending on context. All states operate in an existing set of international relationships, from enmity through to amity, and if rather than being the direct victim of terrorism the counterinsurgent has a close relationship with the victim, then their response will be moderated by this pre-existing relationship. There are two perceived interrelated levels to this particular dynamic. The first is that many states, especially those with a strong connection, have a ‘shared vocabulary’. That is, much of their political language will be similar because of factors like common origins, similar culture and mutual influence. In the wake of an attack the counterinsurgent may emphasise this shared vocabulary because it is of political utility with regard to the victim state. The second level is, and this is where context is critical, depending on the specific relationship between the two, the counterinsurgent may ‘mimic’ the victim’s response. This goes beyond just using a ‘shared vocabulary’ and refers to the wholesale repetition of key aspects of the victim’s narrative. Mimicking, it is thought, would occur because it is of even greater utility as it completely reinforces the victim’s own delineation of the situation. Either way, because of the confusion, concern and anger, it is more than likely that the victim state is using a reactive narrative.

These factors all mean that rather than reacting to a terrorist attack with a deliberative narrative, the counterinsurgent will react in a way that aims to neuter the emotive impact of the attack, one

that seeks to resolve the domestic support population’s confusion, alleviate their concerns and direct anger at the insurgent. However, because fear is not an emotion that actually threatens the counterinsurgent government’s own viability and can help with mobilisation, they may not actually try to ameliorate this emotion in the wake of an attack, despite this being the very emotion that most terrorism theorists stress as being the most important. That means that in the wake of an attack a counterinsurgent narrative will often be more focused on reducing confusion, eliminating concerns (about whether the government is capable) and, most critically, directing anger. This is not to say that in the wake of an attack every counterinsurgent will use the fear generated to further their political agenda but rather that it does not pose the same problems for the counterinsurgent as the other aspects of the emotional shockwave of a terrorist attack and that this means these aspects are likely to be dealt with by the counterinsurgent rather than fear per se.

For these reasons, the reactive narrative of the counterinsurgent will not be shaped by the counterinsurgent principles – that is with a narrative that is inclusive, restrained, constricted, nuanced and literal – but rather will be almost exactly the opposite: exclusive, emotive, hyperbolic, absolute and figurative. As will be shown, these qualities, while lacking strategic utility with regard to the insurgent support population, are of political expediency for the counterinsurgent as a political actor in the immediate wake of an attack.

2.8.1 EXCLUSIVE

First, it is argued that the counterinsurgent’s narrative will be exclusive after an attack. Exclusive here means that narrative will not involve or include the insurgent support population but rather will alienate them. It is common during conflict for a state to communicate in an exclusive manner that delineates an ‘Other’ outgroup, directing anger and mobilising support. As Demmers explains, “identities are constructed representations of the ‘self’ in relation to ‘the other’… [and] a key aspect of the mobilization of support for armed conflict is identity with the group, community or state whose representatives decide on the use of force against the ‘other’.” The counterinsurgent will use a narrative that is exclusive after an attack because their own support audience is intimidated and the counterinsurgent is more interested in negating or

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redirecting the negative emotions in their own support population, as well as serving the underlying mobilisation needs, not because they specifically want to exclude the insurgent support population. That means they will seek to direct anger at the insurgent and not themselves because it is politically expedient. The exclusive nature of the reactive narrative is largely shaped by its other listed qualities – that it is emotive, absolute, hyperbolic and figurative. This is inverse to the way in which the deliberative narrative functions. The importance of inclusivity is the key aim of the deliberative narrative, and this inclusivity informs the other critical qualities. Thus, a greater understanding of how the reactive narrative can be exclusive will best be gained by examining these other aspects.

2.8.2 EMOTIVE

It is also argued that the reactive narrative will be highly emotive. A terrorist attack is designed to provoke emotions, these emotions are a key component of terrorism’s power. And just as traditional provocation aims to make the counterinsurgent overreact militarily, it is believed that terrorism also provokes an emotional overreaction. As Crenshaw explains, “[t]here are few neutral terms in politics, because political language affects the perceptions of protagonists and audiences, and such effect acquires a greater urgency in the drama of terrorism.” At the personal level, the communicators will also be feeling emotional just as the rest of the domestic support audience will; at the pragmatic level, rational actor theory aside, emotion is critical to politics and political communication is saturated in emotional appeals. In the wake of an attack, it would be politically problematic for a counterinsurgent to respond in a measured and dispassionate manner. Politicians need to convey the right level and type of emotion, crying for no reason is as problematic as would not emoting be after a terrorist attack – there is a strict relationship between the event, the emotive response and the political utility of the communication. The counterinsurgent’s focus on their own support audience means that it is politically expedient to communicate in an emotive manner after an attack. Research has also shown that public displays of emotion after a natural or manmade disaster are cathartic, that

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125 Martha Crenshaw, quoted in Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 21-22.


shared grief is ‘good grief’. Thus, not only do they need to emote but must do so in a manner that their support population finds appropriate—though for obvious reasons while they will emote anger, they will not emote fear, concern and confusion. A number of scholars explore emotion’s role in politics, specifically anger. Ost believes that political parties “stoke and mobilize anger in order to gain and maintain support, that anger is the emotion politicians “capture and channel… by offering up an ‘enemy’ they identify as the source of the problem”. Likewise, Valentino et al. found that anger was a powerful mobiliser for participation in elections. Finally, Ross explains that not only is anger a predictable emotional response to terrorism but that it also generates a desire for revenge. Emotion, then, is critical to mobilisation of support. In turn, the emotive nature of the narrative makes it exclusive as the counterinsurgent will be attempting to direct the anger toward the insurgent and in so doing is likely to emote in a manner that excludes the support population.

2.8.3 HYPERBOLIC

After an attack, the reactive narrative is also likely to be hyperbolic. It will use language that exaggerates “narrative, descriptive and argumentative features and make assertions that are overstated, literally impossible, inconceivable or counterfactual in many different types of discourse context.” Exaggeration, or in some cases minimisation, enables the counterinsurgent to tailor the narrative to best serve their purposes, enabling them to reduce confusion, alleviate concerns and direct anger by amplifying and restricting aspects of the narrative to ensure these outcomes. While hyperbole is present in a range of areas, it is most likely to be seen in threat diagnosis. As Johnson has argued, threat exaggeration actually helps reduce confusion as it provides a degree of predictability and that this generation of order from chaos in turn gives the impression the communicator has control, reducing concern, all through the utilisation of fear

131 Ross, Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict, 85.
and anxiety. Furthermore, Johnson explains that threat exaggeration achieves consensus, mobilising support for a response. Crenshaw believes that terrorism’s apparent randomness and the shock of an attack mean it is highly susceptible to exaggeration. Wolfendale outlines the rationale for the hyperbolic narrative surrounding terrorism:

“exaggerating the threat of terrorism—scaring the public—is a means of achieving public acquiescence for significant and far-reaching changes to legislation and well as for the massive financial and military commitments “required” to fight terrorism at home and overseas”.

A hyperbolic narrative will also be exclusive, it does not have the capacity to outline the situation in a manner that is based on an understanding of the insurgent support population.

2.8.4 ABSOLUTE

It is also hypothesised that the reactive narrative will also be absolute in its language and identifications. In general, this means statements will be unambiguous, lacking nuance in interpretation. One of the most common forms of absolute language is binary pairing. Binary pairing is not balanced but rather exist as a violent hierarchy where one term dominates the other. This opposition generally involves a positive and negative term that are intrinsically connected, so that use of one automatically invokes its binary pair. Binaries are a frequent feature of political rhetoric, especially in the wake of an attack. Binary language is easily understood, especially those terms that are already well embedded in their support population, meaning that their use enables the counterinsurgent to reduce the confusion following an attack by portraying the situation in simplistic form, this in turn makes the communicator appear more

135 Ibid., 29.
141 Ibid., 235.
142 Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 21.
capable as it makes them appear informed, and this helps them focus anger by portraying blame in a singular fashion as one of the pair is inherently negative. Binaries also help mobilise support as they portray events as dilemmas that can only be resolved in one of two ways. By collapsing the situation into a polarizing binary, the possible responses are limited. However, a binary narrative directed at the government support population will not just lack the nuance necessary to understand the insurgent support population but will polarize the situation by portraying the insurgent support population in a negative manner, meaning it will be exclusive. Binaries are unifying for the ‘in’ group but this also creates an alienated ‘out’ group.

2.8.5 FIGURATIVE

Finally, it is argued that the reactive narrative will be figurative, even metaphoric. Like binaries, metaphors are pervasive in political rhetoric. As Lakoff and Johnson explain, metaphors are cognitive phenomena, the “essence of a metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” and the “fundamental role of metaphor is to project inference patterns from source domain to target domain”. A metaphor is, by its very nature, non-literal, meaning that their use will generally obscure the target because of the influence of the source. Metaphors interact with other figures of speech – such as metonymies and binaries – to communicate subliminal meanings by drawing on the unconscious emotional association of words. In effect, they are a shortcut to comprehension. The counterinsurgent is likely to use metaphors for the same reason as binaries, they are able to provide comprehension, reducing confusion in their support audience and thus making the communicator appear more capable. They are also able to direct anger and help mobilise support, they have a persuasive effect.

2.9 REACTIVE AND DELIBERATIVE NARRATIVES

The argument, then, is that not all of a counterinsurgent’s communication output will be focused on a narrative that is of strategic utility with regard to the insurgent support population. Rather, there will be two distinct narratives in the counterinsurgent’s communication that have different utilities for different audiences. After an attack, the counterinsurgent’s main priority will be

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145 Wood and Petriglieri”Transcending Polarization: Beyond Binary Thinking.”.
147 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
148 Ibid., 5, 128.
communicating with their own support population, addressing their confusion and concern and directing their anger. Then, over time, this reactive narrative will fade as the emotive impact of the attack declines, being replaced by a more deliberative narrative that is focused on communicating in a manner that is of strategic utility for the counterinsurgency, with this balance depending on the government and state’s interests and obligations as well as the counterinsurgent’s stake in the conflict.

Alexander and Klein talk of a three phase model for how a community reacts to terrorism – reaction, recoil and reorganization. In the first phase, most people are stunned and numb; by the second phase, they seek to make sense of what happened, looking for order and control; in the third phase, there is a mixture of adjustment and relapse, though with increasing resilience and positive outcomes. This sequence provides insight into how the counterinsurgent responds using these two narratives. The first phase is silence as they prepare their communications, the second phase is marked by a reactive narrative and the third phase is a mixture of adjustment back to a deliberative narrative with relapses of the reactive framing gradually diminishing.

The reason the third phase is referred to as an ‘adjustment back’ is that the deliberative narrative is the pragmatic communication that is largely produced by the technocratic components of the government and state, the analysts and scholars who advise on, study and fight counterinsurgency. As such, it would be produced in a relatively consistent and ongoing manner, with some spikes in frequency depending on context. This is why it has been termed ‘deliberative’, as it is the product of considered thought and preparation. In contrast, the reactive narrative is viewed as situation-specific, crafted by the political element of the government and occurring in the immediate wake of an attack. This is why it has been termed ‘reactive’, because it is seen as an expedient response to an anomalous situation. The division between reactive and deliberative is highly significant, not just in content and in usage patterns but also in terms of strategic utility. The mixture of reactive and deliberative narratives means that a counterinsurgent’s communication will be of varying utility for different audiences. The reactive narrative is hypothesised to lack in utility with regard to the insurgent support population as it is exclusive, while the deliberative narrative would have a mixed utility for the domestic support population – while its restrained, constricted, nuanced and literal nature would actually help ameliorate the fear from the attack, it would not deliver the same mobilisation that the counterinsurgent needs because of those very qualities. In other words, the argument is that

while the deliberative narrative addresses fear in the domestic support population, it would not help with the confusion, concern and anger.

Betz believes counterinsurgents “do not focus enough effort on winning and maintaining the hearts and minds of the most critical and accessible population: [their] own.” This has been true of the population-centric approach to counterinsurgency. Also though, this approach has ignored the counterinsurgent’s nature as a pre-existing political actor. Gompert explains:

“There is an undeniable need to maintain domestic support for global COIN… However, domestic words, before uttered, must be weighed for their potential effects on the perpetuation of jihad. Demonizing Islamic fundamentalism, however tempting and gratifying, is not needed to gain domestic support for COIN, which should be based on concern for security, not on hatred. It risks being interpreted as a condemnation of Islam.”

Here he is starting to untangle the major issues, that there are different audiences with different requirements, though the reality is even more complex. Any analysis of counterinsurgent communication must take a number of aspects into account: the counterinsurgent as a pre-existing political actor, the mixture of audiences and the varying utility between these audiences that mean that there are two highly contrasting narratives deployed during counterinsurgent communication. These factors create an interesting set of dynamics and it is the aim of this thesis to explore these dynamics using the NZ Government’s counterinsurgent communication during a ten year period during what will be called the International Campaign Against Terrorism (ICAT), from September 11, 2001, until September 2011.

2.10 AIMS OF THE THESIS

The main aim of this thesis is to examine NZ’s counterinsurgent communication to assess the existence of deliberative and reactive narratives and consider their utility on a number of key audiences, specifically the insurgent support population, the domestic audience and the allied audience. There are a number of consequent hypotheses that will be explored:

- The counterinsurgent’s communication will be a mixture of deliberative and reactive narratives and these will compromise the justness of their cause and, consequently, their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent.

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152 Betz, “The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 511.
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher during events, it will be higher for more deadly and shocking attacks, it will be higher for attacks on NZ’s allies and over the entire course of the period the reactive frequency will drop from 2001, while the deliberative narrative will be used with a consistent frequency over the period.

• The reactive narrative will be used more frequently when there is a wider international audience than a domestic audience while the deliberative narrative will be used more frequently when there is a domestic audience rather than wider audience.

• The reactive narrative components will be of limited utility for the insurgent audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience, and the deliberative narrative will be of utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and of limited utility for allied audience.

• The reactive narrative will predominantly focus on problem/enemy framing tasks while the deliberative narrative will predominantly focus on actor and solution framing tasks.

The focus will now turn to methods, specifically framing theory and content analysis, an outline of the three audiences, and a discussion of the data.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH DESIGN

The thesis will use framing theory as the main analytical framework as it focuses on both the construction and perception of communication, making it ideal as the key tool of examination. Framing’s other significant advantage is that it is incredibly flexible, providing numerous components that can be selected to tailor the analytical framework with precision. This chapter will also provide information on several other key methodological aspects as well, namely: audience selection, research method and the data set. The audience selection section will examine the target populations that will be the focus of the thesis. The research method section will then explain how content analysis will be used to examine the data, how the data set was selected, the source of the communications as well as the key events of the ICAT.

3.1 FRAMING

Framing is a cluster of theories and analytical techniques focused on understanding and examining how individuals and groups set agendas, built on an understanding of the creation and perception of communication. Frames are “basic cognitive structures which guide the perception and representation of reality”, they work like physical frames, focusing attention in some areas while simultaneously occluding others.¹ Framing has been chosen as it is the “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.”² Framing, therefore, has obvious utility, as counterinsurgent communication is the strategic effort to mobilise support and justify action. However, the ‘consciousness’ of the communication should not be overplayed, as while the counterinsurgent does generally chose what they say very carefully this does not mean all of their communication is so carefully curated; still, counterinsurgent communication has a strategic focus, which encapsulates this aspect better – it is objective-focused. As Desrosiers writes: “One of framing’s strengths over terms such as ‘discourse’ or ‘narrative’ is its ability to capture the strategic side of communication.”³ Framing is also a theory of communication, one that provides a nuanced and thorough examination of how communication is created and perceived.⁴ Framing allows analysis of how the “influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information from one

² Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6 – emphasis added.
location – such as a speech, utterance, news report, or novel – to that consciousness.”^5

Framing is comprised of many connected theories and techniques and an outline of these will help provide its full scope. Benford and Snow, quoting framing’s original theorist, Goffman, define frames as a “‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ occurrences within their life space and the world at large.”^6 They focus on the individual’s use of frames to comprehend situations and events, but frames are also a powerful tool in shaping interpretation. Gitlin believes frames are “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters.”^7 Entman further emphasises framing’s focus on creation and control: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”^8 The use of the word ‘select’ by both Gitlin and Entman is important in outlining framing’s full spectrum: with regard to communication reception, frames are a subconscious, internalised method of individual interpretation, while for communication creation they are viewed as a generally overt and deliberate method of controlling interpretation, though there are also subconscious aspects in creation as well. In some sense, these two positions can be explained through differences in individual role and functionality. For an individual interpreting events, a frame is essentially subconscious, for those attempting to diagnose a problem, attribute blame and propose a solution, framing is a selective, conscious process. Thus, for an active event framer, rather than an event decoder, framing can be used to shape other interpretations. In this way, framing is both a methodology for analysis and a tool for influencing interpretation: awareness of the process of framing as an internalised process enables both analysis and influence.

It is also important to note that frames are found throughout the process of communication, they are in the text or words, they are also in the minds of those who are communicating and those who are being communicated too and they are also found in a culture.^9 Frames are not, in Benford’s words, “‘things’ rather… [they are] dynamic processes associated with their social construction, negotiation, contestation, and transformation.”^10 Carragee and Roefs’ outline of the various foci of media framing studies neatly encapsulates the full spectrum which frames inhabit: “framing research examines how frames are sponsored by political actors, how journalists employ frames in the

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^8 Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” 52.
^9 Ibid., 53.
construction of news stories, how these stories articulate frames and how audience members interpret these frames.”

Frames are a hybrid concept, they exist within people’s minds and they appear in texts and speeches, they can be intentionally built and can also exist subconsciously. The success or failure of a frame will often come down to how well the frame within the discourse matches the audiences’ internal frame, a concept called resonance.

Framing is not without fault. As one of the leading framing scholars writes, “we have failed to demonstrate that one of our central theoretical constructs – collective action frames – affects mobilization.” Another area in which framing is lacking is the role of emotion. Benford states that framing has “neglected a vital social movement resource—emotions [and consequently] ignored the possibility of examining the ways in which movement actors produce, orchestrate, and strategically deploy emotions in pursuit of their collective goals.” Likewise, Buechler writes that this “lack of attention to emotions prevents framing from convincingly explaining how people actually become motivated to act collectively.” Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta explain that “[e]motions are a part of all social action, yet they have been given little or no place in most social-scientific theories.” The absence of emotion is problematic, “[s]ocial movement scholars increasingly argue for the centrality of emotions in movement theories”, and this will be one area of adaptation for the thesis. As will be shown below, another key concept in framing, resonance, has been criticized as a tautological concept. However, despite these problems, framing provides a useful toolkit for the analysis of NZ’s counterinsurgent communication during the ICAT. As Reese writes, “[f]raming’s value, however, does not hinge on its potential as a unified research domain but… as a provocative model that bridges parts of the field that need to be in touch with each other: quantitative and qualitative, empirical and interpretive, psychological and sociological, and academic and professional” concluding that “framing is more of a research program than a unified paradigm and that theoretical diversity has been beneficial in developing a comprehensive understanding of

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13 Benford, “An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective.” 412.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 419-420.
Thus, framing’s adaptation to suit the current project’s needs is justified as it usefulness is balanced out by its flexibility.

As stated, framing is used across a variety of academic disciplines for a variety of different purposes. The two that are most relevant for the study of insurgents and counterinsurgents are collective action frames (CAF) and substantive news frames (SNF). CAFs come from the study of social movements and focus on how these movements mobilise support, while SNFs originate in media studies and are concerned with how influence makers, such as politicians and the media shape perceptions. While CAFs main purpose is to urge action, SNFs generally make a moral judgement. Pisoiu opted to use CAFs rather than SNFs in her analysis of counter-terrorist communication because “frame conceptualisation in media studies is somewhat limited, as it only refers to a process of ‘selection’, rather than formulation anew” whereas “[t]he conceptualisation of social movements frames is more precise in terms of identifying framing functions: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational” and that “frame analysis in social movements has a clear focus on the act of ‘persuasion’ rather than ‘agenda-setting’.” In sum, while SNFs are focused on selection as a means of agenda setting, CAFs are formulated with the aim of persuading and mobilising their target audiences, which is of greater congruence with the methods and aims of the counterinsurgent. Therefore, while SNF literature has been used during the above general discussion of framing, CAF literature will be used exclusively during the following examination, both because it has a greater utility for the thesis and also to ensure theoretical and methodological clarity. The rest of this section will focus on outlining how framing can be used as an analytical framework, with a focus on the aspects of framing that will be used in this thesis, rather than on every component of framing theory, as there are a number of aspects that are either not relevant or too complex for the project.

3.1.1 FRAMING AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

There are a number of framing aspects that need to be discussed to outline how framing can function as a useful analytical framework. First, the section will examine the levels of analysis of framing, explaining what framing tasks, frames and masterframes are, as this forms the project’s overarching analytical division. Then the concept of resonance will be examined, as this is the means

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22 In particular, the strategic processes. The reason these have not been used are that, firstly, the project is considered complex enough without adding another layer of analysis and, secondly, there is actually a degree of congruence between the strategic processes and reactive and deliberative narrative qualities in that both serve as means of increasing resonance.
of gauging the efficacy of a frame. Benford and Snow outline six key mechanisms through which this functions, as grouped into the two categories of salience and credibility.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, while the levels of analysis provide the analytical structure, resonance is the tool of analysis used within this analytical structure.

3.1.2 LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

One of the most important aspects of framing that needs to be discussed is the various levels at which frames can be found. Framing is a dynamic concept, one found throughout the communication process, and frames themselves function at different levels, from specific to general.\textsuperscript{24} A frame can be a means of identifying a particular problem or solution, it can be a specific composite of these diagnostic, prognostic and mobilising components and it can be a deeply embedded composite that has a wider applicability.\textsuperscript{25}

At the micro-level, frames have a number of different functions. This can be seen in Benford and Snow’s explanation: “Collective action frames are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to affect change.”\textsuperscript{26} According to Snow and Benford, CAFs have four key tasks: identifying a problem, apportioning blame, proposing a solution and mobilising support.\textsuperscript{27} It should be noted that Gamson identified three framing tasks, identity, injustice and agency, wherein identity refers to who the collective action group is, injustice refers to what the problem is and agency refers to what the group are going to do about the problem; these are similar to Snow and Benford’s, with the obvious addition of actor framing.\textsuperscript{28} These ‘framing tasks’ provide a method of deconstructing the discourse into manageable analytic ‘chunks’.

While they are often called ‘framing tasks’, they are really frames in their own right. This can be seen in a number of quotes from leading theorists: Zuo and Benford: “framed their grievances in [counter]revolutionary terms”; Cress and Snow: “Diagnostic framing is important”; “diagnostic and

\textsuperscript{23} Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment”.
\textsuperscript{24} Benford, “An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective,”
\textsuperscript{25} Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment”.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 615.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.

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This apparent duality is not due to incoherence within framing but rather because framing is not bound to a single level. Frames are made up out of frames. There is a hierarchy to framing and this segment will make this stratification explicit so that the interactions between these levels can be recognised during analysis. Framing tasks are lower hierarchy frames that have a single function, such as diagnosing the problem, ascribing blame, identifying the enemy, describing the actors or proscribing the solution. Both the reactive and deliberative chapters will focus on examining individual framing tasks separately, the rest of this section will explain the exact division. Thus, at a practical level, while generally speaking ‘framing tasks’ will be used, sometimes they will be referred to as ‘frames’.

Many projects use either Benford and Snow’s four or Gamson’s three framing tasks, as outlined above, to divide the discourse up for analysis. This thesis will combine both, with an emphasis on the former. The reason for this is while Benford and Snow’s is seen as having greater congruency with counterinsurgency, the counterinsurgent is both a pre-existing political actor and a counterinsurgent, meaning actors are important. Including the framing of the actors enables the thesis to examine how the counterinsurgent frames themselves, their allies, their enemies and the victims, and it enables important relationships such as those between the enemy and the allies and between the enemy and the victims to be explored. The way the actors are framed is just as important as the way the problem, blame and solution are framed, so these three divisions will be included, though the enemy framing will be conducted as a part of the problem framing as these are often difficult to separate.

The division of the analysis at the framing tasks level is:

- Problem/Enemy: identifies and describes the threat and the enemy that poses the threat
- Blame/Ideology: identifies and ascribes blame, both direct and indirect, including ideological components.
- Actors/Victim: identifies and describes the counterinsurgent and its allies as well as victims.
- Strategy/Solution: identifies and describes the strategies and solutions used to overcome the threat; that is, in military parlance, ways and ends.

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While the majority of the actual analysis will be conducted at the framing task level, this is not the only level of examination and it is important to tease these out as they will become important when the paper seeks to come to conclusions.

### 3.1.3 COMPOSITE FRAMES AND MASTERFRAMES

CAFs are composite frames, they are frames constructed from framing tasks. Snow and Benford explain: “Collective action frames are constructed” with framing tasks, they are frames designed for a specific purpose, mobilising collective action.³¹ These composite frames bring the various framing tasks into a functional whole, using the description of the problem, attribution of blame, identification of actors and delineation of solution as a means of achieving an outcome. Benford explains that “most collective action frames are context specific”, listing examples like the “drunk driver frame, cold war frame, exploited worker frame, [and] environmental justice frame”.³² They are a mutually supporting set of frames that together fulfil the required tasks needed to achieve a chosen objective, be it mobilising support, in the case of CAF, or shaping opinion, in the case of SNF. While framing tasks have a single duty, such as outlining a problem, CAFs and SNFs are a grouping of these framing tasks that taken together facilitate an overall outcome.

Then there are masterframes, these are composite frames that “are so pervasive that they can be used in almost any situation, and…. posses a superior credibility, in that [they have] moved beyond empirical scrutiny.”³³ With respect to CAFs, it is said that masterframes “are simply collective action frames writ large that are adopted by multiple social movements”.³⁴ Swart thinks this definition is tautological; for him, masterframes are “symbolic frames that are culturally resonant to their historical 57ilieu”, they are “defined by [their] resonance with the cultural, political or historical 57ilieu in which it emerges rather than its adoption by other social movements”, such that the civil rights masterframe is one because of its cultural resonance with the postwar optimism rather than because it was used by many movements.³⁵ While Swart’s definition helps explain why masterframes dominate, because they strike a chord with a deeply embedded value, worldview, belief or trait within a society, there is middle ground between the two definitions. A masterframe is based on these symbolic frames that underpin a society or culture, adapted for use by the framer. The masterframe is constructed using these underlying symbolic frames, repurposed for a specific objective. A masterframe is a successful frame, a generic frame that is widely resonant and is able to

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³¹ Snow and Benford, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 615.
³³ Koenig, Routinizing Frame Analysis through the Use of CAQDAS, 3.
encapsulate and explain a diverse array of scenarios within a certain field or area. Generally, a masterframe is a set of ideas, beliefs or values that is widespread, culturally embedded and is also flexible and inclusive enough to serve in a vast number of roles.

While framing tasks perform a single duty, masterframes are the generalist, they connect to values, beliefs and ideas that are dominant within a society or culture, situated between these two extremes are objective-focused frames, such as CAFs, which bring together various framing tasks and will often use and adapt masterframes to achieve a desired outcome. This connection can be seen in Johnston and Noakes: “An innovative masterframe, for example, can spark derivative collective action frames and tactical innovations at the initiation of a cycle.” The composite frames examined in this thesis are the reactive and deliberative. While they are built using masterframes, they are objective-focused, tailoring the masterframes to their specific context. These composite ‘counterinsurgent frames’ will be examined through their framing tasks before being assessed as wholes afterwards. There are two counterinsurgent frames considered here: reactive counterinsurgent frames (RCFs) and deliberative counterinsurgent frames (DCFs). Because these are two distinct frames (built using two distinct narratives) they require independent analysis in their own separate chapters. Thus, the two research chapters will examine RCFs and DCFs individually.

3.1.4 RESONANCE

Resonance is another key aspect of framing. While the framing tasks will form the main analytical division, the various aspects of resonance will be used to examine each framing task. Resonance is a central framing concept, it refers to the efficacy of a frame, its ability to strike a chord and become an interpretive shortcut. As Williams writes: “Some frames ‘work’ better than others because they resonate with audiences who are prepared to hear the claim, or have experiences commensurate with the claims being made. In this sense resonance is the ‘fit’ between frames and audiences’ previous beliefs, worldviews and life experiences.” There are two sets of interrelated factors that account for a collective action frame’s resonance: the credibility of the frame and its salience. Credibility comes from three factors: frame consistency, empirical credibility and the credibility of the frame articulators. Salience also has three dimensions: centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity.

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37 Snow and Benford, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 618
38 Hank Johnston and John A. Noakes, “Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective,” 10.
39 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 619.
41 Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 619.
Benford notes resonance remains a somewhat tautological concept, a frame is said to work if it has resonance, and it has resonance if it worked, explaining “most scholars who have employed the concept have failed to operationalize frame resonance independent of its efforts.”\textsuperscript{42} Thus, the term ‘resonance’ will not be used in the research chapters, but rather, the six components will be utilised as the key analytical tools. As it stands, resonance is difficult to measure; however, this is not a major problem as while the counterinsurgent cannot ever fully quantify resonance (something which is obviously impossible), this does not mean it is a useless concept as they can still ‘estimated’ resonance. That is, they can make a calculated guess on whether or not their frames will have resonance with a particular audience based on an understanding of that audience’s cultural narrative, values, beliefs, day-to-day experiences and the many other factors that feed into this realm. In short, while some have decried the failure to operationalise resonance, ‘estimated’ resonance provides a set of measures by which to examine communication. Thus, while some argue that resonance is “extremely vague” as an academic theory, as a tool of analysis it delivers a degree of utility largely because it provides six factors with which to examine discourse.\textsuperscript{43} This thesis will use resonance in the same way, as a six-pronged tool for examining the resonance of each framing task through a wide array of metrics, which will be explained below.

Below are the six key qualities of resonance – the italicised term in each description will serve as the signifying tag throughout the thesis to indicate which aspect of resonance is being considered, though in some cases the division will be more arbitrary than in other examples as there is a considerable crossover between these various qualities.

3.1.4.1 CREDIBILITY

3.1.4.1.1 EMPIRICAL CREDIBILITY

Empirical credibility refers to the accuracy between a frame and real world events; the frame doesn not have to be ‘true’ but it must be able to be an accurate portrayal.\textsuperscript{44} This requires the framer to be perceived as telling the ‘truth’. The key focus here will be on whether the frames can be discredited. For the purpose of this thesis, this is taken as the most elementary of the credibility measures and will be measured by assessing whether the framing task can be proven to be untrue or, at a minimum, whether there are some major issues with its apparent veracity.

3.1.4.1.2 CONSISTENCY


\textsuperscript{44} Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 620.
Consistency can be broken into two components: consistency across frames and between frames and actions.\textsuperscript{45} For a frame to resonate with its target audiences, it must match reality, or rather the audience’s perception of reality, and it also must match the previous framing, and any contradictions negatively impact the resonance of the frame. The key focus when examining individual framing tasks will be accuracy with events, while the final conclusions will bring in the consistency across frames. Here, accuracy will be assessed not just by whether the framing can be discredited, as this adds nothing extra to the analysis; rather, it will also assess how precisely the frame explains the situation, meaning it will not just gauge how consistent the frame is with reality but how much it says. Accuracy comes from not just what is said but how much is said about it; the more information given about a topic the more accurate the portrayal, all other things equal.

3.1.4.1.3 ARTICULATOR CREDIBILITY
The final element of credibility involves the perceived credibility of the frame articulators, with variables such as status and knowledge considered important.\textsuperscript{46} As Benford and Snow explain: “Hypothetically, the greater the status and/or perceived expertise of the frame articulator and/or the organization they represent from the vantage point of potential adherents and constituents, the more plausible and resonant the framings or claims.”\textsuperscript{47} Here, the articulator possesses credibility because they are an elected politician, so the key focus will be on how informative the frame is with regard to insurgency and counterinsurgency. That is, whether the information provided is congruent with theories and principles on insurgency as well as counterinsurgent best practice, as this is a means of communicating expertise. This is not to say that the key audiences necessarily have an in-depth understanding of these theories and principles, but rather that by using these in their communication the counterinsurgent will appear to have a greater articulator credibility as they display technical knowledge and, in turn, the use of this technical knowledge will ensure a consistency across time and with events. These principles have essentially been honed over years, in part, to assess the credibility of articulators.

3.1.4.2 SALIENCE
3.1.4.2.1 CENTRALITY
Centrality refers to how essential the beliefs, values and ideas associated with the frames are to the target audiences.\textsuperscript{48} The closer the espoused beliefs, values and ideas are to the audience, the greater the hypothesised resonance of the frame. The focus then will be on the appeal of the frame to the

\textsuperscript{45} Johnston and Noakes, “Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective,” 15.
\textsuperscript{46} Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 620.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 621.
\textsuperscript{48} Johnston and Noakes, “Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a Perspective,” 11.
audience based on the ‘beliefs, values and ideas’ of the audience.⁴⁹ The thesis will assess this by attempting to gauge whether a framing task aligns with the beliefs, values and ideas of the various target audiences.

3.1.4.2.2 EXPERIENTIAL COMMENSURABILITY
Experiential commensurability focuses on whether the frames are congruent with the experiences of the targets of mobilisation.⁵⁰ This factor requires that frames are not too abstract or divergent from the audiences’ lives. The focus here, then, will be on whether the frame matches the audience’s experiences. To examine this, the thesis will assess whether the framing task is congruent with either the direct daily experiences of an audience or of their indirect historical experiences, though the later blends into narrative fidelity.

3.1.4.2.3 NARRATIVE FIDELITY
Narrative fidelity is concerned with the cultural resonance of the frames, how well they resonate with the target audiences’ cultural narrations, their myths and stories about themselves. The focus here is on how well the frame fits with the audience’s perception of themselves. However, the thesis will not just consider the deeply embedded cultural narratives, but will also include specific narratives about the ICAT, broadening the scope of this component. In particular, it will focus on the dominant narratives of the two key protagonists: al Qaeda and the US.

3.1.5 APPLICATION OF THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This section will outline how this analytical framework will be applied to each framing task in practice. The aim is to provide a clear, consistent referent for analysis, a structure that will be used throughout the thesis to ensure that every framing task is examined in the same manner using the same criteria. There will be two main sections for each examination of framing tasks throughout the thesis: content and audiences. Each has a slightly different focus and this will be explained below. It is important to note that each framing task will be examined using the content and audience division, not every single aspect mentioned below will be examined for each framing task as not all always relevant.

3.1.5.1 CONTENT
The content section is intent on examining the credibility of the framing task. To reduce repetition, rather than examine these separately for each audience these aspects have been placed together, as in almost every case there is little meaningful difference across audiences. While this may sometimes

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⁴⁹ Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,”
⁵⁰ Ibid., 621.
result in broader generalisations, in the interests of space and avoiding repetition it is necessary. Even though these are examined separately from the audiences, they will be referenced in the audience sections where relevant and this will help remEDIATE any generalisation.

This section will focus on gauging whether the framing task can be discredited, whether it is accurate and whether it is informative. Credibility has a close proximity with three of the five qualities of reactive and deliberative narratives, specifically literal/figurative, nuanced/absolute and constricted/hyperbolic, as these are all qualities that help determine whether a framing task is perceived as true, comes across as precise and is based on technical knowledge. Thus, it will use these three narrative qualities as means of assessing the three components of credibility. To examine these, the thesis will use a variety of means, including using situation-based evidence, well-regarded COIN literature, the internal logic of the framing task itself and the appearance of any ‘say-do’ gap between rhetoric and reality. The framing tasks vary from single words to larger sentence fragments and each has a differing scope, requiring a flexible approach.

3.1.5.2 AUDIENCE

The audience section will examine the salience of the framing task with regard to each specific audience as well as the emotional impact and the mobilising, justifying and legitimising outcomes.

The remaining two reactive and deliberative narrative qualities – restrained/emotive and inclusive/exclusive – will be used in this section as they have a congruency, specifically restrained/emotive with emotional impact and inclusive/exclusive with mobilisation, justification and legitimisation. Unlike the content section, it will focus on each audience individually and, where applicable, will also use the analysis from the content section. While salience is derived from framing resonance, the other aspects are sourced from elsewhere and need some extra explanation.

Salience combines the framing elements of centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity. The reason these have all been placed into a single category is they are felt to have a high degree of similarity and, as there is no direct way for the thesis to measure any one of them, they are more useful as a single analytical category than as three separate but similar ones. Decisions on salience will be made using studies on national/religious narratives and characters, opinion polls and survey information, as well as informed supposition based on audience generalisations, which will be outlined in a section below. It is recognised that this will often involve simplification, though perceived salience is still a useful metric. Depending on the specific framing task, one, two or all three of the aspects of framing salience will be examined and, in some cases, the salience will be gauged in general.
The need to control emotion comes largely from COIN theory, though, as noted, some framing theorists have indicated that it is a lacuna in the approach. As has already been examined, emotion is central to insurgency and counterinsurgency and the emotive impact of the framing task will be gauged for each audience (except for the allied audience, where emotion is of limited importance, something examined in the following section). For the insurgent audience the sole emotion considered will be whether the framing task could provoke anger, as this is the key means of alienating them from the counterinsurgent’s cause. For the domestic audience, the four emotions examined will be fear, confusion, concern and anger because, as explained in the previous chapter, these are considered the key emotions caused by terrorist attacks. To gauge these emotional impacts, the previous analyses regarding the content of the framing task and its salience will be used, as well as any useful polls or opinion that will help inform these assessments.

There are several key desired outcomes of counterinsurgent framing and the final analysis for each audience will be assessing whether the framing task would mobilise the domestic audience, and whether it would justify the counterinsurgent policies and actions for all audiences and whether they would legitimise the counterinsurgent as an actor for the insurgent and domestic audiences, which will be explained in below. Before this, however, a working understanding of what is meant by these three terms is needed.\(^{51}\) First, mobilisation, which comes from framing. Generally speaking, the social or political mobilisation referred to in the CAF literature is focused on marshalling active support for the cause in question.\(^{52}\) As Benford and Snow explain, ultimately CAFs are intended to “urge others to act in concert to affect change” by bringing together ‘consensus mobilisation’ and ‘action mobilisation’, which foster agreement and participation, respectively.\(^{53}\) The counterinsurgent is primarily interested in consensus mobilisation, so for the thesis ‘mobilising’ refers to the counterinsurgent marshalling support for political and military action.

Justification and legitimisation are closely connected. As noted, legitimacy is the primary goal in a ‘classical’ insurgency. For a state, legitimacy is the right and authority to govern; however, in situations where the counterinsurgent is not the state the insurgent is trying to take over or secede from, greater nuance is needed as, in this case, legitimacy is not as for the insurgent support audience and is only directly relevant for the domestic support audience. This is why justification is being considered as a metric as well. An outline of the two will help differentiate how they are relevant for the contemporary counterinsurgent. Nachbar explains that COIN doctrine generally focuses on pragmatic measurements rather than technical definitions, before explaining that

\(^{51}\) McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*.
\(^{52}\) Ibid.
\(^{53}\) Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements,” 615.
counterinsurgent legitimacy hinges on the legality and authority of a political actor, actualised in the compliance and consent of the governed.\textsuperscript{54} Barnes also refers to legality and authority in his definition of legitimacy for COIN, but goes on to explain that legitimacy reflects “cultural values and define[s] public perceptions of what is right and proper for a government and its military forces” before stating that this “creates a double standard of legitimacy for US COIN operations: they must have public support in both the US and in the area of operations.”\textsuperscript{55} On the other hand, Simmons explains that “[j]ustifying an act [or] a strategy typically involves showing it to be prudentially rational, morally acceptable, or both.”\textsuperscript{56} More specifically, Utting states that using “military force to counter insurgency requires justification and thus the use of this force has to be seen to be both proportionate and legitimate.”\textsuperscript{57} The key difference, then, is that while legitimacy is focused on how ‘right and proper’ the actor appears, justification regards the perception of how ‘right and proper’ the actions or policies of an actor appear. There is a high degree of shared ground here, with each influencing the other. The legitimacy of an actor can make their actions or policies appear more justified and the apparent justification of an actor’s actions or policies can have an impact on their legitimacy. That said, as it rests in the actor, legitimacy is a more holistic, and in many cases justification is a component of legitimacy. In practice, this means that generally justification is taken as a component of legitimacy for the counterinsurgent and while the former is more likely to be impacted by the counterinsurgent communication the latter is more impervious. How these two terms will be assessed will be outlined for each audience below.

The three concepts are similar and, in fact, Barnes uses ‘support’ above in reference to legitimacy, a number of social mobilisation theorists explain that CAFs ‘inspire and legitimate’, while Tarrow notes that CAFs “justify, dignify and animate collective action”, so some differentiation between them is required.\textsuperscript{58} Essentially, in COIN all three are focused on ensuring allegiance for the counterinsurgent cause, but while legitimisation emphasises the need for the actor to appear ‘right and proper’ and justification is focused on the actions and policies appearing ‘right and proper’, mobilisation is not always as bound regarding ‘rightness and properness’ and, therefore, the thesis will focus on the ‘inspire’ aspect of mobilisation noted above to help distinguish it from legitimisation and justification. This difference also suggests another useful distinction, mobilisation

is a more active if intermittent form of support while legitimisation is a more passive yet ongoing type of allegiance, with justification between the two, less constant than legitimisation yet requiring a greater consistency than mobilisation.

The reason the domestic audience is the only one considered for mobilisation is that it is critical for the counterinsurgent to secure support from their population, they are the counterinsurgent’s support audience after all. Justification is important for all three audiences, though for the allied actor this is as much about the justification of their own actions and policies to the domestic audience. Legitimacy is important for both the insurgent and domestic support audiences. For the insurgent audience, it is important as the counterinsurgent needs to appear to be the right and proper actor to be conducting an insurgency, while for the domestic audience it connects to the government’s general appearance of legitimacy as well as their rightness as a counterinsurgent. To gauge the mobilisation and legitimisation potential of a framing task, the previous aspects of both content and audience examination will be considered. Judging the mobilising, justifying and legitimising potential of a statement will be made by assessing the relative impact of these various factors, though often the impact on mobilisation, justification and legitimacy will be determined by a single standout aspect that trumps the other factors. A brief outline of how these work for each audience will help flesh out how this will function in the thesis.

For the insurgent support audience, both justification and legitimisation are important, though as they are connected they will not always both be considered. Generally, the analysis will consider whichever is most relevant to the particular framing task. Justifying the counterinsurgent’s actions and policies and legitimising their status as a counterinsurgent actor is critical with regard to the insurgent support population, but the delegitimisation of the insurgent’s cause is equally important. As explored in the previous chapter, in some cases apathy towards their own cause is generally the best the counterinsurgent can hope for with regard to many in the insurgent support population. Legitimacy is relative and if the counterinsurgent’s cause is shown to be lacking this will increase the insurgent’s legitimacy. Whatever legitimises one cause helps delegitimise the other. Thus, while in some cases the impact on the justification and legitimacy of the counterinsurgent’s actions, policies and status will be considered through direct influences, in other cases they will be indirect. Also, because the insurgent wants to be perceived as a legitimate political authority, anything that infers they have the tangible or intangible capacity for this objective will be taken as legitimising.

Mobilisation, justification and legitimacy are all essential for the domestic audience, they are, after all, the key support audience. They need the support for their political and military action, they want it to be perceived as right and proper and they want to be seen as the right and proper actor. As with
the insurgent support audience, the cross over between justification and legitimisation means that often only the most relevant will be examined for a particular framing task. Generally speaking, this means that justification will be the primary focus of the two, with legitimacy generally considered when the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause may impact their legitimacy. One important aspect must be mentioned: these three forms of support have a degree of conflict, in that often a framing task that is considered to deliver mobilisation may have some negative impacts on justification and legitimacy, and vice versa. This, also, will be examined during the main body of the thesis, but it plays an important role in the usage of reactive and deliberative counterinsurgent frames.

For the allied audience, the analysis will consider how the communication justified US actions and policies and whether the framing mobilised the NZ audience, as this has utility for the US cause, assessing whether the framing task had a positive or negative impact on the alliance between the US and NZ. For NZ, one of the key counterinsurgent communication tasks is balancing ‘alliance maintenance’ with actor differentiation. That is, between justifying US actions and policies and ensuring that NZ remains distinct from US actions and policies. The point here is that while NZ wants to retain and improve its relationship with the US, it also needs to ensure it appears independent. Generally speaking, US legitimacy as a counterinsurgent is not contingent on NZ actions, at least no to the same degree as justification, which will be the focus here.

### 3.2 AUDIENCES

As noted in Chapter 2, modern counterinsurgents need to consider several audiences. During the ICAT, the NZ Government was, generally, not the insurgent support population’s government, meaning that both the insurgent and domestic support audiences must be considered. It is also important to examine the allied audience as NZ was a minor partner in the ICAT and the US were the dominant allied actor. Therefore, there are three key audiences for this thesis: the insurgent support audience, the domestic audience and the allied actor audience. This section will outline each, aiming to justify the necessary generalisations involved.

The insurgent support audience is the largest and most diverse, encompassing roughly a billion Muslims. Thus, generalising about the insurgent support audience would seem the most difficult. However, Islam is “a complete comprehensive way of life” meaning any statement that has an impact on Islam or Islamic values, beliefs or identity can be assumed to have a widespread impact. Nevertheless, some of the most common generalisations need to be explained, though supporting evidence will also be given in the main body analysis.

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First, in practice, the analysis will not focus on ‘all Muslims’ but rather ‘swing voters’. That is, supporters who can be persuaded from their allegiance. Within the global Muslim community there is a wide range of individual, from active insurgents, to extreme supporters, though to less extreme and disengaged individuals through to extreme opponents. It is difficult for the counterinsurgent to legitimise their cause or delegitimise the insurgent’s with active insurgents; conversely, those extreme opponents are already essentially won over to the counterinsurgent’s cause, while the disengaged would be difficult to engage. Thus, the majority of the analysis will focus on the extreme and less extreme supporters.

Another generalisation is that some Muslims will be sensitive to Western actions, especially with regard to their regions and their religion; this comes from the many decades of Western intervention in Muslim regions and the ongoing cultural hegemony of the West, the relative ‘decline’ of the Arab and Muslim worlds in comparison to the West, the perception of the West’s double standards and the negative focus on Muslims following the September 11 attacks. This means that while some of the analysis may appear to be ‘thin-skinned’, this is derived from the perceived sensitivity of the insurgent support population.

Another assumption that is key to the analysis of the insurgent support population is that while it can be supposed that as a small actor almost all of NZ’s communications will go unheard and unread by the majority of the insurgent support population, their sensitivity means that one mistake by the NZ counterinsurgent could have disproportionate effects, such as the riots caused by the caricatures of the Prophet by a Danish newspaper and the attacks on the French paper Charlie Hebdo also provoked by cartoons. Therefore, the analysis will be conducted as if they were reading and hearing everything, even though it is acknowledged that this is not necessarily true.

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60 Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London: Routledge, 2009)
The domestic audience refers to the NZ population. While this is a diverse group of individuals, as with any nation there are various national characteristics, beliefs, traits and values that can be assigned to the NZ population as a whole, though this will not apply equally to everyone. These will be referenced during analysis, particularly with regard to NZ’s national narrative, or the overarching story New Zealanders have about themselves and their place in the world, including key aspects of the NZ ‘identity’. Likewise, references will be made to the NZ national character, or the type of qualities that New Zealanders see themselves as having. In short, generalisations will be made and while they will not accurately reflect every New Zealander, they reflect the ‘average’ New Zealander. These will be backed up by varying surveys, polls and academic works.

Briefly, the NZ national narrative is summarised as the following: NZ is a good international citizen that ‘swings above its weight’ when it comes to multilateral fora and collective security, and its foreign policy as guided by both principles and pragmatism. The NZ national character values the qualities of fairness, equality, liberal democracy, ingenuity, independence, hard work and ‘mateship’. Also, it is understood that a certain percentage of the NZ audience are wary, suspicious and mistrustful of the US, something that both the National and, in particular, the Labour Party are aware of and work to contain. With regard to the Labour and National Party, a brief summary of their own beliefs and narratives is important as well, particularly as National came to power at the end of 2008, giving them three years of counterinsurgent communication. Generally speaking, the Labour Party favours a narrative of idealist-internationalism with a focuses on collective security, multilateralism, peacekeeping and ‘new’ expanded security concerns while the National Party employ a realist-nationalism that emphasises national security, bilateralism, military operations and traditional security.

The allied audience is by far the most narrow, comprising just the American Government and, in particular, the Executive Branch. The US Government was the most important international audience because it was the key actor in the conflict, the actor that set the discourse agenda and the actor that NZ had, arguably, the most to gain or lose from depending on its own communication.

As will be examined, one of Bush’s early pronouncements was that “you are either with us or against us” – a phrase that was his “principal legitimation technique”.67

One critical generalisation of the allied audience regards Bush’s original narrative of the ICAT, which can best be defined as Manichean – that the US was fundamentally and exceptionally ‘good’ and was fighting a ‘war on terror’ against exceptionally ‘evil’ and ‘barbaric’ terrorists who threatened US ‘civilisation’ and ‘irrationally hated’ the US because of their ‘freedoms’ and their ‘existence’, attacking without ‘justification’ or ‘warning’.68 The ‘global war on terror’ was the floating signifier that provided the “holistic superstructure”, organising diverse events “into seamless and coherent chapters in the same account.”69 This was not a new narrative, but rather one built from existing tropes deeply embedded within the US national narrative, with antecedents in both World War Two and the Cold War, though many of the main components date back to the founding of the US.70

This narrative will be referred to through the analysis and, where relevant, specifics will be given and examined. While this was not the sole narrative used by the US during this period, it was the defining one, both because it was how the situation was framed from the outset and because it was the dominant one; that is, this was the metanarrative of America’s ‘war on terror’, the one that provided the ‘holistic superstructure’.71

Generally speaking, the allied audience is only interested in how NZ communication reflects on the US. This is because it is focused on its own interests and its aim is for NZ to portray itself as relatively independent whilst generally supportive of what the US says with regard to the ICAT. In practice, this means that the analysis for this audience will be more limited than for the other two. That said, the focus will not be limited to solely examining the allied actor as completely impersonal and interest-focused, as there will also be some aspects where the specific individual in power will be considered. Because the allied audience is so small, this personalisation is easily justified. President Bush was in power when the 9/11 attacks occurred and remained so until the beginning of 2009. In many respects, Bush set the tone for the discourse of the ICAT, particularly his Christianity and his

70 Restad, American Exceptionalism; Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism.
71 Jim A. Kuypers, Bush’s War: Media Bias and Justifications for War in a Terrorist Age (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006)
predilection for the ‘Wild West’, and where relevant these will be referred to, though only if they serve to reinforce US communication.\textsuperscript{72}

### 3.3 CONTENT ANALYSIS

The next aspect to be outlined is content analysis, the research method used to examine the data set. If framing is the key analytical tool, then content analysis is the device that provides the raw material to be assayed. While framing provides the structure and analytical tools, content analysis enables the relevant data – specifically, framing tasks – to be extracted from the larger data set. It provides the content with which to apply the analytical tools. Content analysis refers to a diverse array of quantitative and qualitative analytical methodologies that can be used to examine discourse. It is, as Holsti explains, “any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages”.\textsuperscript{73} Content analysis “classifies textual material, reducing it to more relevant, manageable bits of data”.\textsuperscript{74} Content analysis is the “systemic, and replicable examination of symbols of communication which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption.”\textsuperscript{75} Hsieh and Shannon write that qualitative content analysis is “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns”.\textsuperscript{76} Both approach the process of examining text in a similar way – though qualitative looks at context while quantitative generally does not and the qualitative usually develops hypothesis after analysis and the latter before – the main difference is in how conclusions are made, with quantitative using statistical measures and qualitative making subjective assertions. This thesis will use a mixture of both quantitative and qualitative approaches, looking at context and taking both objective and subjective conclusions from the data, though it will focus more on the qualitative. The actual approach is best explained in practice rather than by outlining the many different possible approaches laid out in various texts and guides.

#### 3.3.1 DATA SET SELECTION


\textsuperscript{77} Daniel Riffe, Frederick Fico, and Stephen Lacy, \textit{Analyzing Media Messages: Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research} (Mahwah, NJ [u.a.]: Erlbaum, 1998), 3.

\textsuperscript{78} Hsiu-Fang Hsieh and Sarah E. Shannon, “Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis,” \textit{Qualitative Health Research} 15, no. 9 (2005): 1278.
The data was sourced from the official NZ Government site, www.beehive.govt.nz, using the search terms ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorist/s’, ‘Afghanistan’ and ‘Iraq’. Every press release given by the prime minister (or acting prime minister, where relevant), the foreign minister and the defence minister that contained one or more of these terms and devoted at least 50% of its space to the ICAT, or at least 300 words on the ICAT if it was over 600 words long, within the time range of September 2001 to September 2011, was selected. This data set is relatively comprehensive, containing virtually every relevant press release regarding the ICAT. By sampling across 10 years the thesis was able to incorporate communications from both the Labour and National Governments who were involved in the ICAT. The course of this decade also saw an important shift in the ICAT for NZ and the National Party, with the second New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) death in several months occurring in September 2011. The decision to include the prime minister (or acting prime minister), the foreign minister and the defence minister meant that most important speeches and situations were included. The reason speeches that contain at least 300 words regarding the ICAT, where these 300 words did not comprise at least 50% of the total word count, were included was this meant significant speeches like the ones given at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to be included. These speeches covered numerous topics and would not have made it on the 50% threshold but were too important not to be included as they were given to key allies, including the US, often in the wake of major events. Also, any press releases relating to counter-terrorism measures such as the listing of terrorist entities or new legislation was excluded unless 50% of the content was in direct reference to the ICAT as the majority of these press releases were bureaucratic and technical in nature. The word counts include the titles of the press releases.

Two datasets were created each containing all press releases. One dataset was used for events and the other for annual counts. The first data set split the press releases up into three categories: events, wider audience and domestic audience. These events were determined through examination of the data set as a whole. Any terrorist attack that received its own press release was considered an event, as was any intervention in another state. The exceptions to this were any attacks that occurred in the Middle East, aside from Iraq and Turkey – these were all excluded from the data set as a whole. The reason for this is that there are a great number of these and while they are relevant it was not practical to cover every single one. Iraq was included because it was the site of one of the major campaigns of the ICAT and Turkey can, arguably, be seen as ‘transcontinental’, particularly Istanbul, where the attack occurred. Furthermore, any attacks in Afghanistan were considered as part of the ICAT, rather than as separate events. The reason this was not done for Iraq was that NZ did not have a combat function in Iraq, nor was the deployment long enough to be classified as a ‘campaign’. The list of events and their dates are as follows:
3.3.1 Table 1 – List of events, their dates and the total word count of their press releases:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Word Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/11</td>
<td>(11/09/2001)</td>
<td>1,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Invasion</td>
<td>(07/10/2001)</td>
<td>1,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>(13/12/01)</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>(12/10/2002)</td>
<td>1,105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq Invasion</td>
<td>(19/03/2003)</td>
<td>5,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghdad</td>
<td>(19/08/2003)</td>
<td>926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>(26/08/2003)</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>(11/03/2004)</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>(09/09/2004)</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>(07/07/2005)</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>(02/10/2005)</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>(11/07/2006)</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>(14/09/2008)</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>(20/09/2008)</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mumbai</td>
<td>(13/07/2011)</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the press releases for each event were put into a single document, while all the press releases between chronologically-ordered events were placed into one of two documents depending on whether they were given to a domestic audience or a wider international one (this context-based division will be explained below). Events to divide the data set is because this project is focused on examining whether the counterinsurgent used the reactive narrative more often during events (and to wider audiences). However, because there were so many events, and there were vastly varying gaps between them, it was also important to break up the press releases into annual documents and these counts were used for both the reactive and deliberative analysis as yet another form of examination. Each of these events will be examined in the reactive chapter, while the deliberative chapter will not have a chronological focus, but will rather examine the varying framing tasks in general, though reference to timing will be made within analysis for each framing task. Also, while the reactive chapter will provide both overall context counts and yearly context counts, the deliberative will only offer the former. Deliberative framing tasks are by far more numerous and the yearly counts with have been laborious and were not felt necessary. The events, interims and the cut off dates for their press releases are listed below:
### 3.3.1 Table 2 – List of events and the interim periods with dates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event/Interim</th>
<th>Date/Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan, 2001</td>
<td>(21/09/2001 – 07/10/2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim: Afghan, 2001 to Delhi, 2001</td>
<td>(07/10/2001 – 12/12/2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi, 2001</td>
<td>(13/12/2001 – 14/12/2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali, 2005</td>
<td>(02/10/2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delhi, 2008</td>
<td>(14/09/2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted, the press releases were also divided up into one of three ‘contexts’. The first context applies to those given during an event. These are press releases given in the immediate wake of an attack or those given in the lead up to an invasion. The next context applies to those that are considered to be given to a ‘wider’ audience, that is they have either been delivered outside NZ – excluding those given in-theatre to NZ personnel – or have been given in NZ to a visiting audience from representatives of either the US or Australia. Those press releases given during an event are also considered to be given to a wider audience because these are ‘high stakes’ press releases and, at the least, the allied actor’s local embassy staff will focus on these, if not members of the allied actor administration themselves. However, while these are all seen as being given to a wider audience, those given during an event are kept separate to allow for a greater degree of analytical fidelity. The wider audience focus is maintained here because it allows analysis of the hypothesis regarding whether reactive frames are more likely to be used when speaking to a wider audience than when speaking to a domestic audience. This is particularly important for several reasons. First, NZ was not the primary victim of any of the attacks but rather the junior alliance partner of several of the direct victim states. Second, because the senior alliance partner had made it clear that not only were they aware of the fact that NZ politicians spoke differently depending on whether it was a domestic or wider audience and had informed them in private conversations that they should not do this if they want to improve ties between the US and NZ. The final context applies to those given in NZ to the domestic audience and while these press releases are likely to have been read by citizens and politicians from other states, they have been delivered to a NZ audience and are considered to have been crafted specifically for that audience.

3.3.1 Table 3 – Total annual word count, word counts for each context annually and press release per year:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual total (%)</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Wider</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Press Releases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9,612 (5%)</td>
<td>3,138</td>
<td>4,305</td>
<td>2,169</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>26,036 (15%)</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>13,553</td>
<td>11,378</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>27,854 (16%)</td>
<td>6825</td>
<td>9,541</td>
<td>11,488</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>13,082 (7%)</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>1,866</td>
<td>10,633</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12,419 (7%)</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>2,230</td>
<td>9,660</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>28,813 (16%)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>6,092</td>
<td>22,491</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>22,981 (13%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,593</td>
<td>17,388</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,162 (2%)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1,742</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14,371 (8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4363</td>
<td>10,008</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5,921 (3%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4307</td>
<td>1,614</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>13,639 (8%)</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>9,510</td>
<td>3,985</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>177,890</td>
<td>13,354</td>
<td>61,980</td>
<td>102,556</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 162 press releases, 29 were during events, 49 were given to a wider audience and 84 were given to a domestic audience (which are listed and marked as such in the appendices).

Following the creation of the data set, a comprehensive read through with the aim of understanding what unit, or units, of analysis to work with was conducted. A unit of analysis is the “demarcated content about which we can define and observe one of more variables of theoretic interest.”

Generally speaking, content analysis focuses on a specific unit of analysis, which can be single words all the way up to entire bodies of content, such as articles, interviews etc. This thesis will use several different units of analysis, from manifest units such as single words and exact phrases to latent but conceptually congruent thematic units – that is framing tasks that have similar semantic subject matter without using the same words or phrases. While a manifest unit’s meaning “is easily understood or recognised”, latent content’s meanings “are present but... have not yet emerged or become visible”. A strictly quantitative analysis would not use manifest units as they are not ‘objective’. This thesis will use manifest units because while much of the data lends itself to a focus on single terms and phrases, it was felt that some of the more important nuances of reactive and deliberative narratives would be lost if there was not a wider focus on thematic units. An example will help explain this reasoning. Take one of the reactive problem diagnoses, referred to as ‘existential threat’ in the thesis. This particular diagnosis was not limited to a specific term or phrase but rather was expressed in a number of different manners – as a “threat to humanity”, as “catastrophic terrorism” and as a “threat to civilised people everywhere” being three examples. Thus, to only focus on the frequency of usage of one term or phrase would have limited the analysis of this diagnosis, meaning that some of the most important framing tasks would not be considered. That said, in most cases the framing task was a single term or phrase. However, because analysis beyond single terms or phrases was required, that is, because framing tasks are not limited to single terms or precise phrases, the entire corpus of the data set had to be read through in full to find all the examples of these thematic units. Thus, the method of obtaining the latent framing tasks was a comprehensive read through of the data set as a whole. As noted, the same data was divided up in two ways – chronologically by year and by event – and the frequency counts for both recorded, as was whether they were given during an event, to a wider audience or to a domestic one. It should also be noted that when a manifest unit is referred to in the thesis, its plural will be included in the analysis and any word count totals, even if not specifically mentioned, as in the interests of clarity and space it was felt that reference to plurals was distracting and unnecessary – though in some cases.

78 Riffe, Fico, and Lacy, Analyzing Media Messages: Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research, 60.
cases plurals were used for stylistic reasons. Likewise, a decision was made to refer to the frequency counts using numerals even when referring to those less than ten because this provides greater clarity and consistency when discussing the counts. Another important detail is that in some cases a manifest and latent unit may be counted in more than one framing task – though this only occurred within a single narrative count, not across narrative counts. In certain cases this will be noted, particularly when a theme is made up of a number of other framing tasks, but other examples where this is due to either a semantic ‘bleed’ or a latent unit being made of a number of manifest units from another framing task, this will not be explicitly mentioned. To be clear, the latter examples are relatively rare and do not compromise overall numbers.

Once the entire corpus had been read, a list of reactive and deliberative framing tasks was made. Each was categorised depending on whether it was reactive or deliberative using the five qualities and whether it was a problem/enemy, blame/ideology, actor/victim, or strategy/solution framing task. To be considered reactive or deliberative, a framing task had to display four of the five qualities of either narrative, including being either exclusive or inclusive with regard to the insurgent support audience. As almost every single word in these documents could be parsed in some way, this was an important means of limiting the analysis to the most fundamental elements. This process involved the rigorous delineation and operationalisation of the two narratives, but to ensure that this was as objective and reliable as possible, a test using inter-coder reliability was required.

### 3.3.2 INTER-CODER RELIABILITY

One of the key components of content analysis is inter-coder reliability. As Neuendorf explains, “given that a goal of content analysis is to identify and record relatively objective or inter-subjective characteristics of messages, reliability is paramount… without the establishment of reliability, content analysis measures are useless.”[^82] Inter-coder reliability involves two or more coders categorising units using an operationalised coding manual and then using these categorisations to compute a numerical index that measures the level of agreement between the coders.[^83] The aim is for the coders to get the same outcome from the same content using the same coding manual, thus establishing that the coding process is objective and repeatable. Ultimately, inter-coder reliability ensures that the process is reliable and, as Krippendorff and Bock note, “reliability is the extent to which data can be trusted to represent the phenomena”.[^84] They go on to explain that to make sure that the analysis is valid and reliable, it should have reproducible coding instructions, reliable data, an

agreement coefficient, a minimum level of agreement and testable distinctions.\(^{85}\)

The first step in the process was to write a coding manual, which can be found in the appendices. Both the deliberative and reactive were divided into the four framing tasks as outlined above: problem/enemy; blame/ideology; actor/victim; and, strategy/solution. These eight categories were then operationalised to ensure that the framing task for each narrative was objectively outlined. This process involves making sure that each category is rigorously defined and comprehensively outlined. It should be noted content analysis requires that categories are mutually exclusive and while the deliberative and reactive categories were, within the reactive there was a degree of cross-over.\(^{86}\) There were two reasons for this. Firstly, some reactive strategies contained a reactive problem as a component, such as ‘eradicate terrorism’ where ‘eradicate terrorism’ is a strategy and ‘terrorism’ is the problem, while some reactive problem diagnoses contained reactive actor identifications, like Anderton’s ‘attack on all civilised nations’ where ‘civilised nations’ is the actor and the whole phrase is the problem.\(^{87}\) The other reason was that some terms – including words like ‘evil’ – have such semantic scope that they are understood to be both an enemy identification and a blame attribution. In all cases, the crossover is made clear and, critically, the key division between deliberative and reactive is mutually exclusive. To ensure that the coding manual was accurate, comprehensive, clear and specific enough, a test sample of five articles was conducted by the two coders. This process provides a means of refining the manual to ensure that it can be used with reliability and accuracy during the coding proper.

Following the test code, both coders moved onto the full sample. There are 162 press releases in total. Lombard et al, state the sample size “should not be less than 50 units or 10%”; 50 units was felt too large, so 30 (with a total word count of 23,000, or 13% of total word count) were selected, as this is almost double the 10% minimum recommended.\(^{88}\) The sampling must be random, so the press releases were put in a chronological list, which can be found in the appendices, then a random start number (2) between 1-162 was acquired using an online service.\(^{89}\) A random interval number (7) between 4-20 was then acquired using the same online generator. The 30 articles were then selected by starting at the second press release on the list, which was the first selection, then counting down 7 to select the next press release and continuing in this fashion, without replacement, until the 30 were selected.

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\(^{85}\) Ibid.


\(^{87}\) To be clear, not all uses of ‘terrorism’ are considered reactive. As will be explained, only those where it is used as an ‘enemy stand-in’ like above are.

\(^{88}\) Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Cheryl Campanella Bracken, “Content Analysis in Mass Communication,” 601.

\(^{89}\) Find the random number generator at: https://www.random.org/
The 30 articles need to be coded by two coders, including the researcher. Once this was done, the results needed to be assessed. Lombard et al. review a number of different measures used to assess inter-coder reliability, examining the benefits of each.\(^{90}\) They quote Dewey, who refers to Cohen’s kappa as the “measure of choice”.\(^{91}\) Cohen’s kappa one of the most respected means of assessing intercoder reliability as it accounts for chance agreement, it is also commonly used for two coder situations and is recommended for nominal data.\(^{92}\) As such, it was selected as the measure of inter-coder reliability.\(^{93}\) Deen Freelon has an online calculator that can work out Cohen’s kappa and this was used to obtain the results.\(^{94}\)

3.3.2 Table 1 – Reliability scores for deliberative and reactive narratives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative</th>
<th>Percentage agreement</th>
<th>Cohen’s kappa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>0.783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactive</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>0.663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Landis and Koch, after examining a number of techniques for observer reliability measures, propose that the following scale be used to gauge the inter-coder reliability.\(^{95}\)

3.3.2 Table 2 – Landis and Koch’s strength of agreement scale:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Strength of Agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;0.00</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.00-0.20</td>
<td>Slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.21-0.40</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.41-0.60</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.61-0.80</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.81-1.00</td>
<td>Almost perfect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Landis and Koch work focused on the kappa statistic, and using their interpretation, the reliability between the two coders can be judged ‘substantial’, which reinforces the objectivity and reliability of the content analysis conducted in this thesis.\(^{96}\) With this, the analysis proper could be conducted.

\(^{90}\) Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Bracken, “Content Analysis in Mass Communication.”
\(^{91}\) Dewey quoted in Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Bracken, “Content Analysis in Mass Communication,” 593.
\(^{94}\) Deen Freelon’s inter-coder calculator can be found at: http://dfreelon.org/utils/recalfront/recal2/
\(^{96}\) Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Bracken, “Content Analysis in Mass Communication.”
The main component of this was acquiring the frequencies of all of the framing tasks. The latent units were counted manually, while the manifest unit frequencies were gathered using the concordance software, tlCorpus.\textsuperscript{97} The terms were inputted into the software and all the uses of the word or term were counted with particular reference to the context. This was considered particularly important as many of the words and phrases could be used for two or more different framing tasks. For example, ‘democracy’ can be used to identify an actor and a solution prognosis and it was important that these different usages were ascertained. Likewise, many of the framing task words and phrases were used as proper names, such as the ‘Provincial Reconstruction Team’ and the ‘Security Council’ and ensuring these were not included in any counts was as important. The concordance software shows each use of the term or phrase in its context, ensuring the different framing tasks and usages were able to be accurately identified. The frequency counts for each word or phrase were then recorded for both the yearly and event-based data sets, as was whether they were given during an event, to a wider or domestic audience. In most cases, the framing tasks that comprised of a single term or phrase were then grouped into thematic units as well. For example, the terms ‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘peace’, when used as solution prognoses, sharing similar conceptual ground and were, therefore, grouped together for the qualitative analysis. These thematic units will be explained in full the body of the research where applicable.

At this point, all the frequency counts and data regarding when a framing task was used and what context it was given in was known. To reduce the scope, any deliberative framing task that had not been used more than 8 times over the period was excluded from the analysis unless it had been used predominantly in a single year. The reason for this is that the deliberative framing task frequencies were, on the whole, far larger than the reactive and a lower threshold had to be set. Less than 8 uses over the period indicates a relatively insignificant impact on the deliberative narrative, though it would have more potential for impact if the uses were all clustered in one year. As noted, most framing tasks were put into thematic categories where this was prudent. The reason for this was not just issues of space, though this was considered important, but also because these thematic categories reduced repetition, as these thematically similar manifest and latent units shared many qualities. With the frequency counts and thematic categories, the application of framing as an analytical framework could begin. In the main body of the thesis, the majority of the analysis was qualitative, except for the focus on consistency of use for each framing task in the deliberative chapter and the conclusions of these chapters. In the concluding chapter, these two sets of quantitative counts are then brought together to examine the usage of deliberative and reactive frames. In these quantitative sections – at the end of the reactive chapter, during the deliberative and in the concluding chapter – the validity of the hypothesis was ascertained through the use of both

\textsuperscript{97} Available from http://tshwanedje.com/corpus/
raw frequency counts and ratios obtained by dividing the frequency by word count (either total word counts depending on context, as will be explained below, or annual context word counts) so as to gain an insight into the relative frequency of the narratives irrespective of word count. Because these ratios are generally very small decimal numbers, they will all be multiplied by 100 to provide a more manageable number, which will be done consistently throughout. Also, these ratios will be given using four numbers, and only to three decimal places where relevant and Swedish rounding will be used. These ratios will be referred to during the analysis as a way of comparing usage.

3.4 CONCLUSION

The utility of the narratives will be examined using framing theory as its focus on how discourse can legitimate and motivate target audiences through the strategic use of language to frame reality provides an excellent means of examining NZ’s counterinsurgent discourse for the appearance of reactive and deliberative counterinsurgent frames. At the pragmatic level, it also a useful means of dividing the discourse up into more discrete elements that facilitate analysis as well as providing a flexible set of analytical tools that can be deployed to examine the discourse itself. While the tautological nature of resonance has been noted as a potential problem, the six components of resonance are useful tools with which to examine counterinsurgent discourse. Here the fidelity of analysis is provided by breaking down resonance into core components, as these offer a means of gauging ‘resonance’ as a whole without needing to have a single measure for this quality. Thus, by using these six components as analytical tools and the different framing tasks as a means of dividing the discourse into manageable discrete aspects, framing theory provides the central analytical core of the thesis.

The thesis will examine three key audiences: the insurgent support, the domestic and the allied audiences. These three are being the key target audiences for counterinsurgent communication and the generalisations and justifications made will be referred to, and expanded upon, throughout the thesis. While making such generalisations does decrease the internal nuances of the audiences there is no other means of gauging the utility of counterinsurgent narratives for such large groups and even though there will always be contrary audience outcomes, that the generalisations made are accurate enough to provide a useful yardstick to assess utility as an aggregate measure.

If framing is the key analytical tool, then content analysis is the device that provides the raw material to be assayed. The data set from which this raw material is mined provides a relatively comprehensive cache of NZ Government press releases from between 2001-2011, offering a time span and scope that enables key events and differing governments to be examined. As noted, the data set comprises a significant percentage of the total output on the ICAT across the decade in
question and this delivers a breadth of results that could not be gained from a small set. The division of the data set into the three contexts allows for the examination of several of the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter while the division into yearly counts provided a baseline for the deliberative analysis. Content analysis enables the extraction of the framing tasks from the larger data set in a manner that delivers accuracy as it enables context to be ascertained to ensure that the term or phrase is actually being used in the manner perceived. It also offers a means of combining similar framing tasks into thematic groups. The use of content analysis means that the both quantitative and qualitative methods can be utilised to better understand the utility of deliberative and reactive narratives, which is important as while these narratives do have elements that make the use of a quantitative focus useful there are also components of these narratives that are not able to be examined without a qualitative understanding and content analysis is able to provide this balance between the two.
CHAPTER FOUR
REACTIVE COUNTERINSURGENT FRAMES

This chapter will examine the reactive narrative by first providing a qualitative analysis of its occurrence during several key events and then by offering a quantitative examination of its use across the entire period. Most of the hypotheses relating to the reactive narrative are quantitative and their analysis can be achieved by simply gathering and assessing frequency counts. However, the hypothesis regarding the reactive narrative’s varying utility with different audiences and hypothesis focus on the simultaneous use of the reactive and deliberative narratives together require qualitative analysis of all of the reactive framing tasks used by NZ during the ten-year period. That said, while a total of 17 events were selected for the total data set, presentation of individual analysis of each would not provide any greater insight into these qualitative hypothesis. To explain why this is the case, and to justify the selection of those that will receive selection, a summary of all the events examined will be provided before the case studies are given.

4.1 SUMMARY OF THE ICAT EVENTS

This section will provide a summary of all the ICAT events that have been examined in the thesis and, in the process, will help justify the selection of the case studies that will receive a full qualitative analysis in this chapter. First, however, an explanation as to why only some events will receive a case study is required. The reason is that offering every single event as a case study would result in repetition rather than increased insight. This repetition comes directly from some of the key hypothesized qualities of the reactive. The reactive’s sudden appearance in the wake of a shocking attack and then decline in usage means that, while it is not necessarily fully formed when first delivered, it is not a narrative that develops much in scope or complexity over time. Rather, the reactive is quickly constructed from pre-existing tropes in the early phase of use, then solidifying into a coherent and relatively final form soon after, before then decreasing in its usage as the shock of the catalysing event decreases. Related to this, the reactive narrative is relatively simple in its form and content. This means it is able to be quickly comprehended, which is why it is used in the first place. This ability to be quickly understood is one of its main strengths, but to maintain this strength it cannot change much or vary wildly as it must remain simple and easily digestible. Hence, the reason only a few cases studies are required is that the reactive is hypothesized to arrive well developed and is simple in form and content. The reactive’s hypothesized qualities not only provide the rationale for only examining several case studies but
in much the same way also help justify which events will be analysed; however, this justification requires the summarising of all of the events first to provide the information necessary to outline the selections. Specifically, the case studies will be selected using three criteria drawn from the reactive narrative’s hypothesized nature – shockingness of the attack; the closeness of the victim state to NZ; and the temporal proximity to the catalysing event – as well as some more event-specific rationale and pragmatic considerations, which will be detailed in the final part of this summary section.

It is also important to note that while the individual qualitative examination of all the events will not be provided in this chapter, all events were examined using the same framework and this examination informs the conclusions made in this chapter and the overall conclusion to the thesis, particularly with regard to the qualitative hypotheses. This overarching examination provided insight into a number of important and interesting aspects of the reactive narrative, including the consistency of its use across different governments within NZ and its capacity to provide alliance maintenance in varying contexts. Thus, it is important to provide an overview of each event as this provides contextual information necessary to understand the reactive narrative’s nature and usage patterns. Also, the events not covered by case studies will be given consideration after all the case studies have been provided and the different reactive framing tasks have been explained and examined, meaning that some background information about each is required.

As well as providing an overarching context, this summary will offer insight into how these sometimes disparate events were, largely, woven into a singular narrative that bound NZ, the US and the other allies/victims together. While the events selected can be considered as separate attacks, with some having very little to do with al Qaeda or 9/11, they can also be grouped together as ‘battles’ in the ‘war on terror’. That is, they are sequential components of a larger story and they were often rhetorically connected together, either through reference to 9/11, the wider ICAT or through some more subtle connection, though as will be shown this was not consistent. Furthermore, these events were frequently used as a way of forging connections between NZ and the direct victims of the attacks through the expression of sympathy or the pledge to work together. Thus, there was a twofold ‘grouping’ through the coverage, both of the events themselves and of NZ with the victim state. This summary will not only outline each event but will also show how many were rhetorically grouped together, and how NZ positioned itself as an ally or supporter of the victim state, starting with the US after 9/11 and then the
various victims states that followed during the following ten years, as well as providing an insight into those areas where the events were either not grouped together or where NZ did not want to associate itself with the victim state.

9/11 – 2001

On September 11, 2001, four hijacked commercial jets targeted the symbols of US political, economic and military might, killing almost 3000 people and destroying several landmark buildings. 9/11 deeply shocked the world, including NZ, it brought terrorism to the fore and gave America both a new cause and a new enemy.¹ Only a few days after the attack, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda had been identified as the perpetrators by Secretary of State Colin Powell.² Before the attacks, Bush was a relatively unpopular president with a deeply religious, neo-conservative outlook and a unilateralist view of foreign policy; 9/11 shaped his presidency, boosting his popularity, enabling huge domestic leverage and pushing his administration onto the global stage.³ The Labour Party, who were to conduct NZ’s counterinsurgency for the first seven years of the ICAT, had come to power in 1999 for first time since passing the nuclear free legislation in 1987. While central to the development of NZ’s independent, principled and pragmatic foreign policy, this legislation had severely compromised the relationship between NZ and the US.⁴ 9/11 can be seen as the beginning of a new era in relations between the two states. The attacks received an enormous amount of coverage in the NZ press, dominating the news cycle for the two weeks after, and the shock across the nation is clear in this coverage.⁵ Within the first few days after 9/11, NZ had issued a number of lengthy press releases about the attacks, which together comprised 1,454 words.⁶ As 9/11 was the original event it could not be connected to any others, but in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, NZ expressed sympathy and strongly associated itself with the American cause. In their first responses, Anderton said, the NZ government “extended sympathy” and that the “people of New Zealand will share your,

⁵ Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.
and the international community’s, sense of outrage and pain”, while Clark said that “New Zealand’s thoughts tonight are with President George Bush, his government and the American people”. Likewise, both pledged to work with the US in these responses, with Anderton saying “we will stand ready to offer help in any way we can” and Clark proclaiming that “New Zealand will do whatever it can to help”. These sentiments were mirrored in their statements over the following days, 9/11 was an event that brought NZ and the US closer together.

AFGHAN INVASION – 2001

Afghanistan, as the refuge of bin Laden and much of al Qaeda, was quickly pinpointed as the first ‘front’ of America’s ‘war on terror’. US and UK forces launched the first military component of the ICAT in October, commencing with an aerial bombing campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan before deploying ground forces in the following days. While not publically acknowledged at the time, the NZSAS were deployed later in the month, ushering in NZ’s active participation in the ICAT. The invasion followed a month of intense political manoeuvring from the Bush Administration, while the resultant occupation would last throughout the period covered by the thesis. In the weeks before, the invasion dominated the news cycle in NZ and the shock from 9/11 was still clear in the coverage. In the lead up to the invasion, NZ issued five in-depth press releases that accounted for 1,493 words in total, where they connected the invasion with 9/11 and professed support for the US and its campaign. For example, while in Washington, Goff offered “New Zealand’s unequivocal support for the global campaign which will be necessary to secure the world against future terrorist attacks”. Likewise, on the day of the invasion, Clark said, “New Zealand supports the United States… [and] endorsed the approach taken by the United States”, before explaining that the “Government believes that today’s military action is justified under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter

9 Hager, Other People’s Wars.
10 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days before the invasion.
12 Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.”
which enables a nation to act in self-defence”.  

NZ was clearly connecting 9/11 with the invasion, but more importantly was proclaiming its ‘unequivocal support’ for the US.

**DELHI – 2001**

In the first terrorist event following 9/11 to be covered by a NZ press release, on December 13, 2001, the Indian Parliament in Delhi was attacked, killing 14.  

Two Islamic Kashmiri separatist groups were blamed for the attacks, part of a decades long conflict over the region.  

In their short press release of 191 words, while NZ did express “sympathies and condolences to the people of India”, they clearly framed this attack as if it was separate from the wider ICAT. Goff spoke of the problem as an “escalation of tensions in that part of the world”, his stated solution referred to “regional security” and of the need “to seek a peaceful solution to the entrenched problem of Kashmir dispute”.  

Unlike 9/11 and the Afghan Invasion, the Delhi attack did not receive any specific coverage from NZ newspapers in the aftermath, suggesting it would have barely registered with the public.  

This effort to delineate the attack as a purely local issue that required a requisite local solution was unsurprising if understood through the reactive narrative logic: India is not a major ally of NZ, also at this point in time NZ did not require any more of a threat to mobilise support, both because they did not openly have any forces deployed and because support and sympathy for the US cause was still high. Furthermore, the US specifically disconnected the Kashmir situation from the ICAT in their own response. Kampani explains that the US “disregarded the Indian government’s advice to forge a global coalition of democracies” after 9/11, deciding to “go it alone… and assemble a revolving coalition of partners” and “Pakistan’s emergence as a frontline state in the global campaign against terrorism caused enormous consternation in Delhi. Several senior Indian government leaders publically fulminated that the United States was out to pursue its own narrow agenda and that India would fight its battle against terrorism alone.”  

At this point, the US had such a wellspring of

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13 Clark, “PM Says Today’s Military Action Inevitable.”


15 The Hindu, “Parliament Attack Victims Remembered”.


17 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.

international support – and was more focused on the use of Pakistan as a base of operations for Afghanistan – that they did not want or need to connect these attacks to 9/11.

BALI – 2002

The next major attack occurred on October 12, 2002, when Jemaah Islamiyah members detonated three bombs across Bali. 19 202 people were killed, including 88 Australian tourists, who had been the main target of the bombers.20 While experts disagree on the degree of relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah and al Qaeda, the former had received funding, training and advice from the latter.21 Australia was the state most affected by the attacks, aside from Indonesia and, as a key American ally, the bombings served to strengthen the Howard Government’s resolve in the ICAT as well as having a major psychological impact on the Australian populace, thus further reinforcing Howard’s public support for operations.22 The attacks also impacted the NZ public because of their geographic proximity, the closeness of the victim state and the fact three New Zealanders died in the attacks, with the attack receiving widespread coverage in the NZ newspapers.23 Despite lack of clarity over the actual connection between these Jemaah Islamiyah and al Qaeda, unlike Delhi, Bali was immediately connected to the broader ICAT. In the two press releases given after Bali, totalling 1105 words combined, Clark connected the attacks with 9/11 and the ICAT, explaining that these “events bring home to us the continuing threat of international terrorism and the need to work closely within the Asia Pacific and globally to counter this threat”.24 She also showed solidarity with the victims, saying that “New Zealanders’ thoughts today are with all those who have borne the brunt of this outrage, particularly Australia and Indonesia” and that she had conveyed, “our sympathy to Australia for the heavy toll of injuries and death it has sustained”.25

IRAQ INVASION – 2003

19 Peter Chalk, Encyclopedia of Terrorism (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 91-92.
20 Ibid., 92-94.
23 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.
From late 2002, the US had been indicating they wished to invade Iraq despite growing disagreement amongst allies and the wider international community. The lead up to the Iraq Invasion was a period of immense international tension, with the Bush Administration veering further and further from their post-9/11 multilateral approach to a more unilateral focus. Iraq was an integral part of Bush’s ‘war on terror’ from the outset and he referred to Afghanistan and Iraq as the “two fronts of our war against terror” just before the invasion of Iraq. The US made the case against Iraq at the UN and numerous other forums, attempting to make the connection between Iraq, WMDs and terrorism. The UN Security Council was divided over the situation and, despite their attempts to gain its mandate, the US ended up going the unilateral route. The invasion began on March 19, 2003 and while NZ did not support or contribute to the invasion proper, in the months following they did deploy troops in a non-combat role. NZ had been under pressure to contribute since early 2002, but despite the improving relations with the US, NZ were consistently opposed to any action that was not mandated by the UN. The Iraq Invasion could never be shocking like a terrorist attack, but there was widespread opposition to this invasion and the lead up received extensive coverage in the NZ newspapers. The NZ government issued a number of press releases that totalled 5,542 words outlining their position.

While Delhi in 2001 had not been connected to the wider ICAT by either NZ or the US, Iraq marked a far more major divergence and, consequently, saw some awkward references from NZ regarding the situation and its relationship with the US as well. NZ spoke of the “crisis over Iraq” several times, inferring the issue was not Iraq itself but rather the US handling of the situation. Goff also warned that a “war judged by Middle Eastern and Islamic peoples as unjust risks creating sympathy and support for terrorists who would otherwise be condemned” and that a “war in Iraq would take attention” from the ICAT, directly contradicting Bush’s declaration that it was a ‘second front’. NZ was very careful in the way it referred to the US during this period, with the most overt statement of disagreement coming from Clark, who said that NZ considers

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28 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days before the invasion.
31 Goff, “Iraq Crisis: NZ's Position.”
it “a matter of profound regret to us that some of our closest friends have chosen to stand outside the Security Council at this point”.\textsuperscript{32} Generally, opposition was couched in more vague phrasing, like the “government deeply regrets the breakdown of the diplomatic process” and that the “international community was regrettably unable to reach common agreement”.\textsuperscript{33} On the day of the invasion, Clark even said that the “Iraqi leadership must take its full share of responsibility for this”, suggesting where she saw much of the blame being laid without being explicit.\textsuperscript{34} Iraq marked the low point in relations between NZ and the US during this period and saw NZ actively disconnecting the invasion from the ICAT while somewhat more passively disassociating itself from the US decision-making regarding Iraq.

**BAGHDAD – 2003**

Only a few months later, Iraq had descended into civil war. On August 19, 2003, a bomb was detonated at the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, killing 22 people, including the UN Special Representative in Iraq, and wounding at least 100.\textsuperscript{35} This was to be the most deadly attack to date as resistance towards the occupying Coalition grew.\textsuperscript{36} While it did receive a number of articles in the local newspapers, in the two weeks following this attack there were a number of other incidents in Iraq that also received coverage within NZ, suggesting this attack would more likely have been perceived as part of the wider civil war rather than a single shocking event.\textsuperscript{37} NZ issued several releases focused on the attack, with one given by Goff at the UN during a session on Iraq for a total word count of 926.\textsuperscript{38} In these press releases, NZ sought to reinforce its previous statements about what it saw as the problems of the Iraq Invasion while simultaneously beginning to connect events in Iraq with the wider ICAT. For example, Goff said that “over the last year we have witnessed ongoing terrorist attacks including in Casablanca, Riyadh and Jakarta, as well as Baghdad.”\textsuperscript{39} While they were not willing to express support for the US, Goff did say that “the international community must work together”, again reaffirming the unified approach

\textsuperscript{32} Clark, “Statement to Parliament on the Iraq Crisis.”


\textsuperscript{34} Clark, “Statement to the House on Military Action in Iraq.”


\textsuperscript{37} Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days subsequent to the attack


\textsuperscript{39} Goff, “NZ Statement To the UN General Debate.”
of the allies. Thus, only a few months after NZ had actively disconnected Iraq from the ICAT and more subtly rebuked the US, they were now beginning to make connections and fall back into the ‘work together’ narrative.

MUMBAI – 2003

Only a few days after the Baghdad bombings, on August 25, 2003, there were two car bombings in Mumbai, killing 54 and injuring 244 people. The Pakistan-based Kashmir rebel group Lashkar-e-Toiba was blamed for the attack, which were the latest in a string of similar, if less lethal, attacks in the city, with five previous bombings since December 2002, which had not been covered by NZ press releases. This attack was not even covered in any of the major NZ newspapers, suggesting it probably barely registered amongst the general NZ public. This marked the second attack in India the counterinsurgent had responded to since 9/11 and as Rabasa notes, “[a]lthough similarly violent events have occurred in the past… After 9/11, militant Islamic groups operating in India have developed a perspective more integrated with that of international terrorist groups regarding philosophical objectives and terrorist targets.”

Similarly, the alliance had also begun to see these groups and attacks as part of the wider ICAT. NZ issued a 224 word press release where it said it “extended his sympathy to the families of victims… [and] extends its support to Indian authorities in their on-going efforts to combat terrorism”. Thus, as well as offering sympathy, we see what had previously been seen as unrelated incidences of terrorism being woven into the US-led ‘war on terror’ through NZ’s offer of ‘support’, even if it seems to be limited to an intangible, rather than tangible, form. Admittedly this is a relatively tenuous connection, but compared to Delhi in 2001, where the incident was actively isolated from the wider ICAT, even this intangible support offers a degree of unity.

ISTANBUL – 2003

Later that year, on November 15 and 20, 2003, four truck bombs killed 60 people and wounded 700 in Istanbul. The attacks were conducted by a range of groups with various motivations.

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40 Ibid.
43 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.
working in concert, including some retaliating for the Iraq Invasion and others with their own interests. This would mark a new trend, from Istanbul on, a number of attacks outside Iraq would be motivated by the invasion. The ICAT had been expanded, as had resistance to it. The attacks received a few newspaper articles in NZ, which suggests some shock amongst the NZ public. Despite the stated causational links to Iraq and the fact it had suggested this could be a possibility after the invasion, the NZ government did not make these connections apparent in its 133 word press release regarding the attacks. It did, however, connect the attacks to the wider ICAT, explaining that it was “important that the international community continues to work together to counter terrorism. New Zealand will continue to do whatever it can to help”. Likewise, it used the attacks as a means of bonding with allies, stating that the “government is sending messages of sympathy to the Turkish and British governments, whose people have borne the brunt of this outrage.”

**MADRID – 2004**

Just a few months after Istanbul, on March 11, 2004, three days before Spain’s general elections, there were nine simultaneous, coordinated bombings against the commuter train system of Madrid; 191 people were killed and 1800 wounded from explosions on four trains. While both ETA and al Qaeda were initially suspected, eventually a group of al Qaeda-inspired Spanish Muslims were charged. Nevertheless, al Qaeda stated: “We declare our responsibility for what happened in Madrid exactly two-and-a-half years after the attacks on New York and Washington. This is an answer to the crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. If your injustices do not stop there will be more if god wills it”. The attacks marked a transition in tactics. Madrid was the first of a number of public transport attacks and its success at provoking the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq was probably one of the reasons that this particular terrorist tactic was used.

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47 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.


49 Clark, “PM Condemns Istanbul Bombings.”

50 Ibid.


52 CNN, “Spain Train Bombing Fast Facts”.

used several more times during the period.\textsuperscript{54} The coverage by NZ newspapers was relatively significant, with numerous articles during the news cycle, suggesting there would have been a relatively high degree of shock.\textsuperscript{55} By comparison, although the attacks were on a significant European ally, were tactically-innovative and had a relatively high death toll, NZ only issued a single 239 word press release, which suggests that by this point, responding to terrorist attacks had become somewhat routine. In his press release, Goff connected these attacks with the wider ICAT, expressed solidarity and framed a united allied front, explaining that the bombing “clearly justifies the intensive efforts that New Zealand is making, including in Afghanistan and the Asia-Pacific region, against terrorism. It also once again emphasises the need for the entire international community to cooperate and to maximize efforts to defeat terrorist organisations”, also stating that “government has expressed its deep sympathy on behalf of all New Zealanders”.\textsuperscript{56}

**JAKARTA – 2004**

Later that year, on September 9, 2004, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was attacked, killing 9 people and wounding over 150 more, though no Australians were injured or killed.\textsuperscript{57} The attacks occurred just before the final stage of the Indonesian presidential elections on September 20 and the Australian elections on October 9.\textsuperscript{58} According to the Indonesian charged with the attacks, the operation was financed by al Qaeda and “Australia was targeted because its government supported the US in Iraq”.\textsuperscript{59} This was the second significant attack in Indonesia since 9/11 and it received a high degree of coverage in the NZ newspapers, suggesting there would have been a consequent amount of shock amongst the public.\textsuperscript{60} The NZ government issued one 344 word press release in response in which Clark brought the attacks under the wider ICAT umbrella and committed to the united allied front, explaining that the “New Zealand Government condemns


\textsuperscript{55} Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.


\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{60} Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.
all acts of terrorism and will continue to work with the international community” and that she had called “Howard to convey New Zealand’s deep concern at the attack”.  

**LONDON – 2005**

On July 7, 2005, suicide bombers detonated devices across the London transport network, killing 52 citizens and injuring over 700. The four British national ‘cleanskin’ bombers were autonomous yet shared “an ideological affinity with the original Al Qaeda network, [operating] in the absence of any institutionalized training or recruitment”. As with Bali, Istanbul and Madrid, the bombers were largely motivated by the ICAT, in this case particularly the UK’s involvement in Iraq. The bombings occurred during the G8 Summit, and they strengthened the allied leaders’ resolve to continue the ICAT, reinforcing the ‘global’ nature of the conflict and the dangers of ‘homegrown’ terrorism. Across Europe, the fear of ‘homegrown’ terrorist attacks increased due to the large Muslim populations in most EU states. Another impact was the increase in racially-motivated attacks on European Muslims and their resultant increase in fear and alienation. The attacks received extensive coverage in the NZ newspapers and this, plus the high numbers of NZ citizens living in London, suggest this would have been a shocking event to most New Zealanders. Despite NZ’s close relationship with the UK and the shock of the public, NZ issued only two short press releases regarding the London bombings, totalling just 267 words combined, further showing how relatively routine these events had become. Even more interesting, unlike previous attacks, NZ did not connect the London bombings with the

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67 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, The Impact of 7 July 2005 London Bomb Attacks on Muslim Communities in the EU, 3.

68 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.

wider ICAT despite the bombings’ striking similarity to Madrid and the perpetrator’s stated motivation regarding the Iraq Invasion, which NZ had predicted would cause more terrorist attacks. They did, however, “convey the sympathy and deep concern of the government and people of New Zealand to the office of British Prime Minister Tony Blair”.\(^70\) One possible reason that the connection to the ICAT was not made could be that the association would be political untenable for the UK – that it was the close relationship between NZ and the UK that prevented this association.

**BALI – 2005**

Later that year, on October 1, 2005, there was a series of suicide attacks in Bali that killed 20 people and injured more than 100. The attacks occurred just before the third anniversary of Bali, 2002 and involved the same planners.\(^71\) The attacks received a relatively high degree of coverage from the NZ press, with a number of articles detailing risks to New Zealanders travelling, suggesting the shock would have been relatively high.\(^72\) There had been a number of other terrorist incidents across Indonesia between these two events, but none NZ had commented on directly, while for this attack NZ issued a press release of 262 words, probably because these attacks were symbolically connected to Bali, 2002, and the most deadly in Indonesia since those attacks.\(^73\) Clark did connect these with the wider ICAT, or at least the previous Bali attacks, explaining that they “occurred just days before the third anniversary of the October 2002 terrorist attacks on the same island.”\(^74\) She also expressed solidarity, explaining that NZ “thoughts are first and foremost with the families and friends of those who have borne the brunt” of the attacks and “offered whatever assistance Indonesia requires”.\(^75\) This attack marks the last event covered by the thesis that did not occur in the Indian subcontinent.

**MUMBAI – 2006**

On July 11, Mumbai was struck by coordinated bomb blasts on seven trains, which killed 209 and injured over 700 people.\(^76\) As the *New York Times* noted at the time, “[t]he attacks bore an

\(^70\) Clark, “PM Responds to London Blasts.”


\(^72\) Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.


\(^74\) Clark, “PM Condemns Bombings in Bali.”

\(^75\) Clark, “PM Condemns Bombings in Bali.”

obvious resemblance to the terrorist attacks on the London public transportation system last July
and the Madrid train bombings in March 2004”. A number of groups and organisations have
been alleged as the perpetrators, including Lashkar-e-Taiba as well as Pakistan’s ISI, though to
date there has been nothing conclusive. The NZ press gave the attacks a moderate degree of
coverage, though much was focused on one New Zealander’s ‘lucky escape’, suggesting there
would have been a moderate degree of shock amongst the populace. NZ issued a 230 word
press release regarding the attacks, but again did not specifically link them with the wider ICAT
despite the fact that they so closely resembled the two previous attacks. NZ did, however, frame
a unified front, saying “New Zealand joins with the rest of the international community in utterly
condemning this deplorable act of terrorism”. This unified front helps to rhetorically connect
the attacks with the wider ICAT. NZ also expressed sympathy, “Our thoughts at this time are
with the victims and families of all those affected – including those members of the Indian
community in New Zealand who may have links with those who may have been killed or injured
in the blasts.”

DELHI – 2008

On September 13, 2008, five synchronised explosions hit Delhi, killing 30 and injuring 10 more.
The attacks were claimed by Indian Mujahideen, a homegrown Indian Muslim terrorist group
who had struck earlier in 2008. Because these were not conducted by an external group, there
were fewer global security issues from these attacks than from others on the sub-continent.
Three bomb attacks had already occurred the same year in India, which NZ had not issued press
releases for. The NZ press barely covered this attack, with only one article that referenced the
government’s press release, suggesting this would not have had much impact amongst the NZ
public. Clark issued a 259 word press release in response a day after the Delhi attack, again not
connecting it to the wider ICAT. She did, though, express solidarity with India, saying that the
“Governor-General’s visit has underlined the strong bonds between India and New Zealand. We
extend our sympathy to India at this sad time.” Unlike Delhi 2001 or even Mumbai in 2003 or

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78 CNN, “India Police: Pakistan Spy Agency Behind Mumbai Bombings”.
79 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.
80 Peters, “Peters Condemns Mumbai Bombings.”
81 Peters, “Peters Condemns Mumbai Bombings.”
82 Chalk, Encyclopedia of Terrorism, 532.
83 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.
85 Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Bombings in India.”
2006, the solidarity expressed with India had gone from simply offering sympathy to also stating the two countries had a ‘strong bond’, which was probably because NZ had started discussions regarding a free trade agreement with India the year before.  

**ISLAMABAD – 2008**

Only a week later, on September 20, a truck filled with explosives detonated in front of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, killing 54 and injuring at least 266. The attack occurred only hours after President Asif Ali Zardari had made his first speech to the Pakistani parliament. The Taleban denied any involvement and while some commentators saw the attack as having ‘hallmarks’ of an al Qaeda attack, the motives and affiliation of the suicide bomber are as yet unknown. The press coverage in NZ was minimal, with only a few of articles and one of those focusing on the NZ cricket team’s tour, implying the shock was relatively limited in NZ. Clark issued a 271 word press release on September 21 in what would be her last statement on an event as Prime Minister before National took power on November 19. She did not connect this with the wider ICAT, going as far as to refer to the event as “internal terrorism”. However, she did express solidarity, saying that “New Zealand offers its sympathy to the people and government of Pakistan at this sad time. I know this is also a very worrying time for members of the Pakistani community in New Zealand, who fear for their loved ones, friends, and communities at home” before adding that “New Zealand and Pakistan have a longstanding relationship”. Again, Clark went beyond sympathy to express a shared bond, which was probably also due to trade, where NZ trade with Pakistan had jumped from below $30 million in 2003 to $80 million in 2008.

**MUMBAI – 2008**

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90 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.


92 Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Bombing in Pakistan.”

93 See https://figure.nz/chart/ke4ITWsw8ZOBoCvXVo for trade information
Beginning on Wednesday, 26 November and lasting until Saturday, 29 November 2008, 10 Pakistani members of Lashkar-e-Taiba conducted a series of 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across Mumbai, killing 164 people and wounding at least 308. The attacks brought Pakistani-Indian relations to the brink of war and had “a significant impact on counter-terrorism strategies around the world, with security services put on high alert to the risk of ‘Mumbai-style’ incursions on soft targets.” Following on from the attacks a few months before in Delhi and Islamabad, this event marked the end of a violent year on the subcontinent. There was a lot of coverage in the NZ press, with most focused on the New Zealanders caught up in the event, suggesting that this would have elicited a relatively high degree of shock in the country. NZ issued a 270 word press release, given by the new Foreign Affairs Minister, Murray McCully, whose government had taken power just over a week earlier. As with the previous attacks in 2008, McCully did not try to connect these attacks with the ICAT, nor, however, did he express any form of solidarity. This lack of connection or solidarity is somewhat surprising considering the ongoing attacks in the region; McCully’s newness to the position – having only taken office a week before – could help explain the lapse.

MUMBAI – 2011

In July, 2011, the final attack covered occurred in Mumbai. This attack involved a series of three coordinated bomb explosions at different locations, leaving 26 dead and 130 injured. The same group who were responsible for Delhi, 2008 have been charged with the attacks, which it is suspected were timed to derail the Indo-Pakistani peace talks. There was no coverage of the attacks in the NZ press, suggesting there was a limited shock amongst the populace.

96 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.
100 Based on a Factiva search that covered 14 days after the attack.
Minister John Key, who had only just returned from a trip to India, issued a 144 word press release the next day in which he expressed both a united front and solidarity with India, stating that he was “shocked and saddened” and he joined “with other world leaders in condemning the perpetrators while sending Prime Minister Singh and the people of Mumbai my heartfelt condolences”.¹⁰¹ Key’s recent trip to India to start negotiations on a free trade deal may help explain why he was more vocal in his expression of unity and solidarity than McCully.¹⁰²

4.1.1 SELECTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE CASE STUDIES

Events – specifically terrorist attacks – are fundamental to the reactive narrative, so having an event-focused analysis is crucial for understanding the reactive’s development and use, particularly with regard to assessing the qualitative hypotheses. The reactive, it is hypothesized, is able to overcome the politically-dangerous confusion, concern and anger that terrorist attacks generate amongst the domestic support population and, if the counterinsurgent is not the direct victim, it is also able to deliver alliance maintenance with the direct victim as they are likely to be using a reactive narrative as well for the same reasons. This means that not only are events crucial to understanding the reactive narrative, but that not all events are equal. As hypothesized, the reactive is more likely to be used in events that display certain qualities. First, it is more likely to be used the more shocking the attack is because this generates more potentially troubling emotions that the counterinsurgent needs to deal with. Second, the reactive is more likely to be used the closer the victim state is to the counterinsurgent communicator because it helps reinforce relationships between the states. Third, the reactive is more likely to be used the closer in time later events are to the first instigating event because once the reactive has been introduced into the domestic rhetoric it influences discourse for a limited duration. To be clear, these are somewhat complementary qualities. If an event is particularly shocking, then the reactive narrative is likely to be used no matter how close NZ is to the victim. Likewise, an event would not need to be very shocking to evoke a reactive response if it targeted one of NZ’s closest allies.

These three criteria – shockingness of the attack; the closeness of the victim state to NZ; and the temporal proximity to the catalysing event – form a key set of criteria in the selection of the events to be examined as case studies. Events that met these criteria generally got more coverage and this coverage usually contained more original reactive framing tasks while events that did not

meet these criteria received less coverage and the reactive frames used were variations of the same framing tasks rather than new types. While all three of these criteria contribute to these varying outcomes to differing degrees, the amount of coverage can be seen as being predominantly influenced by the level of shock and relationship of the victim state with NZ, while the originality or repetition of reactive framing tasks is influenced more by the proximity of events to the catalysing event. These three criteria form the main justifying framework for case study selection, but there were also some event-specific reasons behind the selection. These will all be examined below with respect to the four events selected as case studies: 9/11, the Afghan Invasion, Bali 2002 and the Iraq Invasion.

9/11 was the most deadly and shocking terrorist attack of the decade, creating an almost unprecedented level of confusion, concern and anger. More than just shocking for the US, 9/11 was a global event, one that was televised around the world in real time and was experienced by many millions. It also struck one of NZ’s closest allies at a time when NZ’s relationship with the US was beginning to mend after it had been severely strained by the nuclear free legislation NZ passed in the 1980s. As the first event, the instigating attack that saw NZ politicians use what was for them an uncharacteristically reactive narrative, 9/11 stands out as the most important of all the events the thesis covered and requires a case study analysis because was the catalyst event that not only saw NZ use the reactive narrative but also had many consequent events rhetorically connected to it.

The Afghan Invasion came less than a month after 9/11, when NZ support for the US was at an all-time high and the confusion, concern and anger caused by the attack was still widely felt. Thus, while the invasion was not shocking itself, the emotive impacts of 9/11 were still being felt. In fact, distinguishing between the aftermath of 9/11 and the lead up to the invasion is difficult and this proximity alone justifies the invasion as a case study as the full parameters of the reactive were still to be given at this point. Equally importantly, at this point in time, NZ was just beginning to rebuild its relationship with the US and there was a global consensus behind the US-led invasion, meaning that NZ’s continuing use of the reactive narrative was unsurprising. Also of specific interest here is that as a response to 9/11, the Afghan Invasion offers new solution-oriented framing that would not necessarily be produced immediately after an attack.
Bali was one of the first follow up attacks after 9/11 and it was one of the most deadly. It was also the geographically closest to NZ and the one that was directed at NZ’s closest ally and friend, meaning it generated more confusion, concern and anger in NZ than most of the other attacks covered. As well as qualifying as a case study because of the shock levels, closeness with the victim state and the short time span from 9/11, Bali also stands out because it provides an insight into how the closeness of the victim state may influence the way reactive narrative is used. The interplay between NZ and Australia’s framing of the event potentially provides insight into important characteristics of the reactive narrative and this in itself justifies its inclusion as a case study. As the only attack that successfully targeted a large number of Australians, it provides a unique perspective on the hypothesis regarding the closeness of the relationship between NZ and the victim state.

Finally, the Iraq Invasion, which does not conform with all three of the reactive-related criteria. While it was not shocking in the way a terrorist attack was, it came relatively early in the ICAT, as only the fifth event in the chronology of 17 and was included because this and, in particular, because of its unique status as the only time the reactive narrative was used against the US rather than directed at the enemy. Iraq stands out as it was the first time NZ opposed the US in their ‘war on terror’. It was felt useful to examine the Iraq Invasion as a case study as it marked the relative low point in NZ-US relationship during the ICAT, which had improved significantly following 9/11 and provides insight into how the reactive can be turned against an erstwhile ally.

Amongst these four case studies, then, are the most shocking attacks to NZ. They also all involve close allies of NZ and are, chronologically speaking, the first, second, fourth and fifth events in the sequence of 17 events in total. Because of this, it is unsurprising that these were the events that received the most coverage. 9/11, the Afghan Invasion, Bali and the Iraq Invasion all received over 1000 words – and Iraq received over five times this – while the other events received an average of 289. It is too premature to cover the originality of the framing for each event in detail as this will become clear throughout the rest of the chapter, though it can be said here that as they comprise four of the first five events, they inevitably contain the most original reactive framing.

Finally, several omissions need to be explained. First, while most of the other events are easily excluded as case studies – because they were not that shocking, because the victim state was not a close ally of NZ or because they occurred long after 9/11 – one does stand out as exceptional
in its exclusion: London. While the attack happened almost four years after 9/11, it was directed at one of NZ’s closest allies and was, relatively speaking, quite shocking as it struck in the heart of one of the world’s ‘global cities’, mirroring the 9/11 attacks on New York in this way. While this would suggest London would require its own case study, the reality was that across two press releases it received only 267 words and NZ did not even attempt to connect it with the wider ICAT. While this was somewhat surprising, it does suggest that the hypothesis regarding closeness of victim to communicator is not an absolute and that the three criteria outlined above have a relative relationship with each other.

Secondly, it may also seem surprising that none of the events that the new National Government covered are included as case studies as they could potentially provide extra insight into how the reactive was used by a different administration. However, they were not included because they did not add anything new to the analysis, mostly because they did not fit the criteria. Both Mumbai 2008 and 2011 were relatively unshocking for NZ, particularly because they were part of an ongoing series of attacks on the Indian subcontinent that predated 9/11 but also because none were as dramatic or extreme as events like 9/11 or even Bali 2002, Madrid or London. Likewise, they struck a state that NZ was not that close with, India, and while there was an increase in expressions of solidarity over that period, this growing relationship did not result in any added reactive framing. Obviously, they came seven or more years after the catalysing event as well. Furthermore, neither of the attacks had any unique points of interest. As will be explained at the end of the case studies, neither of these events provided any new reactive material, which reinforces the importance of the hypothesized qualities of the reactive used as the selective criteria and, with regard to the growing closeness in relations with India, reinforces the hypothesized relative relationship between the three mentioned in the paragraph above.

This chapter will now examine the four case studies individually.
4.2 – 9/11, 2001

9/11 was the event that led to NZ’s use of the reactive narrative and as such this section will begin to layout its development using Clark and Anderton’s four first press releases to review NZ’s initial response to 9/11. Anderton issued two releases on the 12th of September and Clark issued one that day and one on the 14th, which together comprised 1,454 words. Many of the most significant reactive framing tasks were used in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and their analysis is useful for showing how they frame the events.

4.2.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY

This section will examine how the counterinsurgent diagnosed the problem and identified the enemy using the reactive narrative. The following are all considered exclusive and all embody at least three other key qualities of the reactive – figurative, absolute, hyperbolic and emotive. The last press release used in this section was issued only several days after the attacks, before any significant details were known regarding the enemy, their motivation or objectives, meaning the counterinsurgent was communicating at a time where there was little known information outside the obvious and instantly apparent – that there had been several major, coordinated terrorist attacks. These reactive problem and enemy framing tasks served a powerful mobilisation role for the domestic audience by providing a diagnosis of the situation that helped reduce confusion, alleviate concern and direct anger for the domestic audience. They also reinforced the alliance with the US, especially as many of the diagnoses and identifications were similar or identical to Bush’s statements at the time. However, as will be shown, many had potentially negative consequences for the insurgent support population and while the domestic and allied audience were more important for the counterinsurgent at this point, it must be remembered that even in the immediate aftermath many of the globally-dispersed insurgent support population were already suffering from backlash.

4.2.1.1 EXISTENTIAL THREAT DIAGNOSES

In his first press release, Anderton framed the threat as existential: “We must see this attack not only as an attack on the United States, but as an attack on all civilised nations.” Later on September 12, Clark claimed the “attacks against the United States were attacks against all..."
civilised nations.” In his second press release, Anderton diagnosed the attacks as an “act against humanity.” As will be examined below, these latent threat diagnostic framing tasks are figurative, absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive – the binary component will be dealt with in the actor/victim section.

CONTENT

Before the enemy or their objective was known, these diagnoses verge on discreditable; even later, they remain questionable, as al Qaeda’s aggression was primarily directed against American hegemony rather than ‘civilisation’ or ‘humanity’. Their pre-attack fatwas specify the main target was the US for largely geopolitical reasons; neither fatwa referenced ‘civilisation’ or ‘humanity’, or included NZ. As figurative identifications, they cannot be discredited, though this does mean their accuracy is problematic, as the attacks targeted the US, not ‘civilisation’ or ‘humanity’ – something apparent not just from the physical location but in the choice of symbolic targets of US political, military and economic power. Ramsey reinforces this: “The terrorist threat was portrayed as an unprecedented, catastrophic, and existential one, as a challenge to our values, to our way of life, to civilization itself... None of the terrorist attacks in the US... literally threatened the life of the nation or freedom or democracy, still less ‘civilization’” or ‘humanity’. The accuracy was also stretched because these diagnoses exaggerate the scope from being a US problem to a far bigger, figurative threat that encompasses NZ. This ignores the tangible weakness of the enemy, meaning it also serves to exaggerate not just the problem but also the enemy, and does not inform regarding the reasons that insurgents generally use these tactics.

AUDIENCE

These identifications fit al Qaeda’s own ‘clash of civilisations’ narrative, suggesting they would be salient for the insurgent audience. The emotional aspect will be examined in the actor section, here the key impact is that these diagnoses help legitimise the insurgent’s cause by increasing

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105 Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Attacks in United States.”
106 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.”
their apparent capacity.\textsuperscript{112} It was the allies’ response, as much as the attacks themselves, that exaggerated a “fundamentally trivial group... [due to their] tendency to inflate al-Qaida’s importance and effectiveness”.\textsuperscript{113} These diagnoses meant that “the remnants of this tiny group have even been held to present an ‘existential’ threat”.\textsuperscript{114} The counterinsurgent’s “apocalyptic rhetoric and confrontational policies helped to fuel a self-fulfilling prophecy driving toward bin Laden’s vision of a clash of civilization.... [so that by] the mid-2000s, al Qaeda’s core arguments enjoyed widespread support”\textsuperscript{115}. These diagnoses exclude the population from the counterinsurgent’s cause by boosting the insurgent’s legitimacy, meaning they would not have a positive impact on the counterinsurgent’s justification or legitimacy.

These diagnoses appeared to match most New Zealanders’ experiences after the attacks as letters to newspapers immediately afterward show. One letter stated that: “I can’t help but wonder what, if anything, our Government plans to do to deter such attacks here.”\textsuperscript{116} Another wrote: “New Zealand’s naive Prime Minister says our country faces no threat. It seems to me that after the dastardly acts in New York and Washington, no country can be safe from attack by air or land or sea. Not even little ol’ New Zealand.”\textsuperscript{117} One correspondent, however, did refer to “nauseating patriotic drivel about how an attack on the US is an attack on all of us”.\textsuperscript{118} These letters suggest these diagnoses would have been salient to many, though not all. By diagnosing the risk as existential the counterinsurgent exacerbates potential for fear as the NZ audience are implied to be threatened. Crucially, however, these diagnoses play into common tropes, particularly the ‘clash of civilisations’ and ‘crimes against humanity’, meaning they would help reduce confusion following the attack. They are easily digested concepts that quickly inform the domestic audience of the nature of the conflict. As such, they also portray the counterinsurgent as understanding the threat, reducing concerns regarding their competency. Finally, these identifications redirect anger toward the insurgent because they suggest NZ is threatened, which

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{112} As noted, the issues of using the terms ‘civilisation’ and ‘humanity’ will be discussed in the Actor/Victim section.
\item\textsuperscript{113} Mueller and Stewart, “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11,” 80.
\item\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 80.
\item\textsuperscript{117} D. R. M. Pinfold, “Tempting Target,” The Evening Post, September 14, 2001, accessed on 10/07/15 , [online] available from Factiva.
\item\textsuperscript{118} Miles Lacey, “Mourn the Victims,” The Evening Standard, September 15, 2001, 7, accessed on 10/07/15 [online] available from Factiva.
\end{itemize}
would deliver powerful mobilisation at a time when NZ was actively considering going to war and would justify virtually any response.

Critically, these diagnoses fit Bush’s own narrative.\textsuperscript{119} For example, on September 11, he said “our way of life, our very freedom came under attack” and then the next day that the “enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world”.\textsuperscript{120} On November 10, 2001, he said “Civilization itself – the civilization we share – is threatened.”\textsuperscript{121} This shared vocabulary suggests that NZ agrees with the US threat diagnosis, and helps obscure the reasons the US was targeted just when the US needed their own particular culpability overlooked, especially in a country like NZ, where many on the left are generally suspicious and mistrustful of the US.\textsuperscript{122} Critically, by exaggerating the scope of the threat these diagnoses serve to mobilise support for the US in NZ, meaning that they would justify US efforts gather their global coalition, reinforcing the alliance.

4.2.1.2 TERRORISM AS AN IRRATIONAL TACTIC

On September 12, Clark described the attacks as “utterly incomprehensible violence”, a statement that implies terrorism is an irrational tactic, as ‘incomprehensible’ infers that there is no rationality underlying terrorist tactics.\textsuperscript{123} As will be analysed below, this latent diagnostic framing task is binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.

CONTENT

The term ‘incomprehensible’ cannot be discredited, as it can refer to the counterinsurgent’s inability to comprehend the ‘violence’ and, to be clear, there are a number of ways the terms that will be grouped under this framing task can be examined, however, the ‘irrational’ reading is seen an important possible reading to examine as it connects with deeper Orientalist narratives of East-West relations, furthermore Clark does refer to terrorism as ‘irrational’ several times

\textsuperscript{119} Lynch, \textit{The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East.}
\textsuperscript{123} Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Attacks in United States.”
during the ICAT.¹²⁴ Read as ‘irrational’, there are accuracy issues with ‘incomprehensible’ as it exaggerates the threat by invoking the rational-irrational binary. This binary obscures the reason terrorist tactics are utilised by ignoring the motives of the enemy and the mechanics of terrorism as a rational strategy used by a tangibly weak actor.¹²⁵ The irrational diagnosis ignores the political nature of insurgency and the utility of terrorist strategy and tactics as a means for non-state actors to challenge states.¹²⁶ Thus, these identifications are not informative as they imply anyone who uses terrorist tactics is inherently irrational, which in turn exaggerates the scope of the problem because there is no logic behind it, making it akin to a natural disaster that could occur anywhere without warning. As such, they call into question whether attacks can be prevented as well.

AUDIENCE

Referring to terrorism as an irrational tactic implies that the insurgents are irrational and that there are no grievances or logic underlying the actions, which would not appeal and could provoke anger in the insurgent support population. This is a common Orientalist portrayal, reinforcing the binary of the West as rational and the East as irrational.¹²⁷ That said, a Gallup poll found that 93% of Muslims thought 9/11 was not justified and a Pew poll found that 72% believed violence against civilians was never justified, which suggests many among the audience may also have seen the attacks as irrational and ‘incomprehensible’.¹²⁸ However, the 7% and 28% are of more interest here and even some who thought it was not justified may still have seen it as rational; as will be examined in the deliberative chapter, there are many strongly held grievances towards the US that even moderate Muslims share. As this diagnosis reinforces the negative Orientalist stereotype, obscures grievances and, consequently, could provoke anger, it helps


¹²⁶ Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency.”


justify the insurgent’s actions and may exclude the insurgent support population from the counterinsurgent’s cause, delegitimising them as the right actor.

The sudden and violent nature of terrorism means this diagnosis would match the experiences of the domestic audience. This is, after all, one of terrorism’s empowering factors, shocking the target audience with ‘incomprehensible’ violence. This diagnosis could reinforce the fear of the domestic audience, by portraying terrorism as an irrational tactic with no internal logic, the counterinsurgent extended the threat so as to make it all-pervasive. However, the main function of this diagnosis is justifying why the counterinsurgent did not predict or prevent the attack, addressing the confusion and reducing concern about their capability, as there is no way a counterinsurgent could predict the actions of an irrational enemy. It suggests the attacks had no logic, which also directs anger toward the enemy. As such, this diagnosis would aid mobilisation but they create issues for the justification of deliberative non-military solutions as it is impossible to reason with an irrational enemy.

This diagnosis fits their narrative of the US as innocent and good by precluding any focus on blame beyond the irrationality of the enemy. As noted, this would be particularly important for the US in NZ, where since the 1970-1980s the public have not been wholehearted supporters but whose political support they rely on for justifying their actions and policies. Also, as it helps mobilise support in NZ, effectively suggesting that any other state – including NZ – could be the next victim, it would be of utility for the US and would, in turn, would have a positive impact on the alliance.

4.2.1.3 TERRORISM AS THE ENEMY

Anderton and Clark identified ‘terrorism’ as the enemy. Both referred to the “scourge of terrorism” on September 12. Anderton also spoke of “suppressing terrorism” on the 12th. Then, on the 14th, Clark talked of the need to “combat terrorism”. ‘Terrorism’ here is being used as an enemy stand-in. These latent threat diagnosis framing tasks are, as will be examined below, figurative, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.

129 Neumann and Smith, “Strategic Terrorism.”
130 Kellner, From 9/11 to Terror War; 61.
131 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.”; Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Attacks in United States.”
132 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.”
133 Clark, “NZ Pledges Support to United States.” – The aspects of this frame that related to the solution component, such as the use of the word ‘combat’, will be discussed in the relevant section, this section will look at the use of the term ‘terrorism’ as the problem.
While not discreditable, experts agree that, as an enemy stand-in, the term ‘terrorism’ is not accurate or informative. The term is being used figuratively, rather than technically as “[t]errorism is a tactic, not an enemy”. It is inaccurate to refer to ‘terrorism’ as an enemy that can be directly fought when it is a method of organised violence used by a wide variety of groups. This diagnosis is not accurate as it “fails to make the distinction between the differing objectives of those who practice terrorism and the context surrounding its use”. The conflation of enemy and strategy exaggerates the scope of the threat by making it “amorphous and diffuse”. While al Qaeda has limited resources, ‘terrorism’ is essentially limitless in scope. These diagnoses misinform by obscuring the actual enemy with a generic method of violence, meaning any usage of ‘terrorism’ can be associated with this specific problem, so that various unrelated events or actors may become connected. The conflation of enemy and method has led COIN experts to suggest that politicians “distinguish Al Qaeda and the broader militant movement it symbolizes – entities that use terrorism – from the tactic of terrorism itself.” Also, used in this manner, the qualities of the enemy are transferred to the method of conflict they are using: this form of threat diagnosis anthropomorphises ‘terrorism’, further misinforming.

These identifications are unlikely to be salient for the insurgent support population as they conflate a specific enemy with a maligned method of conflict, essentially applying the negative aspects of ‘terrorism’ to the support population. In interviews with British Muslims, McGovern found that the “term ‘terrorism’ itself was seen to be one that ‘de-contextualised, de-politicised and demonised’”. It limits any understanding of motive, ascribing an a priori negative descriptor. It could also provoke anger as it makes every Muslim suspicious in the eyes of the Western public, an issue that would have many real world consequences for Muslims around the

137 Kruglanski et al, “What Should This Fight Be Called?” 102.
138 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 165.
139 McGovern, Countering Terror or Counter-Productive?, 38.
globe after 9/11. Also, used in this manner, it exaggerates the potential scope of the threat, thus potentially legitimising the insurgent cause, as rather than delineating a limited enemy it provides an unlimited threat, magnifying their capacity. Because these identifications conflate the insurgent with a negative method of conflict, thus reducing any understanding of motive, they are exclusionary as well, effectively making all Muslims ‘the enemy’, which compromise the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent as an actor.

These diagnoses would probably match the domestic audience’s experience as the actual enemy was unknown, the only referent the domestic audience had was that ‘terrorism’ has occurred. By anthropomorphising the threat they could provoke fear, the counterinsurgent applies frightening qualities and abilities, such as ‘scourge’, to a more amorphous and diffuse threat, exaggerating rather than limiting scope. They help reduce confusion, however, as the counterinsurgent is able to specifically blame ‘terrorism’ for the problem, which is the only visible threat at this point in time. They also may help reassure the population that the counterinsurgent is competent and understands the problem, helping direct anger towards ‘terrorism’ as it is made more sinister in these identifications. Because of the threat exaggeration, address concern and direct of anger, the counterinsurgent would gain mobilising potential from these identifications, though there are long-term justification issues because they clash with deliberative framing tasks.

These identifications fit the US narrative of the ‘war on terror’ as they make the same conflation, Bush used ‘terrorism’ as an enemy-stand in from the very start, talking of the “war against terrorism” on September 11, a “comprehensive assault on terrorism” on September 15 and the ‘scourge of terrorism’ on September 18. They also of utility as they exaggerate the scope of the threat and obscure the motives of the enemy, helping to justify the US global ‘war on terror’ and mobilise support amongst the NZ population and beyond through both functions. Also, these diagnoses create a situation where the domestic audience can be mobilised to support the US cause at a later date by proxy as this generic enemy identification can applied to almost any threat/group. As such, they would aid the alliance.

4.2.1.4 THE MOST SERIOUS GLOBAL THREAT

On September 12, Anderton diagnosed the threat as ‘global’ when he said “no country can be complacent”.141 This is the weaker component of the overall thematic grouping where terrorism is described as either ‘the most serious’ or ‘global’ threat. The diagnosis of terrorism as ‘the most serious global threat’, as will be examined below, is absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.

CONTENT
Terrorism is not the ‘most serious’ threat; in every key metric it ranks far below many other threats.142 Nor is it a ‘global’ threat, with the Global Terrorism Index Report concluding that the majority of attacks are concentrated in just a few areas and have relatively localised outcomes – certainly outliers like 9/11 have a more global impact but even then the impact comes largely from the reaction and not the attack itself.143 However, even sceptics of these absolute identifications agree there is “no way of making objective assessments”, meaning they cannot be discredited despite their unqualified nature.144 They are not accurate diagnoses though as they grossly exaggerate the risk: terrorism does not threaten ‘all of us’ but is rather more often a localized threat and, up to 2009, there had “been a decrease in terrorist incidents over the past two decades, global terrorism-related deaths average no more than a few hundred per year and, in contrast to the tens of millions killed by disease, small arms, state repression, famine, automobile accidents, global warming, crime, natural disasters and numerous other phenomena, terrorism ranks extremely low as a risk to personal safety”.145 These descriptions become even more troubling when the international response to 9/11 is considered, as they immediately reduced the threat from terrorism after the attacks.146 They are not informative either as they do not clearly convey the underlying calculus of this method of political violence. Terrorism is generally used by the weak against the strong, yet these descriptions portray it in a way that obscures this completely.

AUDIENCE

141 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.”
144 Jackson et al., Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, 129.
This diagnosis fits the insurgent’s own narrative and in so doing legitimises the enemy as the absolute formulations exaggerate their capabilities, ascribing them a massively inflated capacity as the ‘most serious’ and ‘global’ threat. This is something recognised by a number of academics and military practitioners alike, including Nagl: “By using language that inflated the threat from al Qaeda and bin Laden, the United States only glamorized and empowered them.”\(^{147}\) Pecastaing reiterates this: “the hysterical narrative about the threat of global jihad has been a self-fulfilling prophecy. It is the American public discourse on al Qaeda that has made al Qaeda what it is.”\(^{148}\) Kilcullen also emphasises this: “By treating terrorism as the number one national security concern and al Qa’ida (AQ) as its most important proponent, we have in effect elevated Usama bin Laden and his core leadership group, lending prestige and credibility to his claims of importance by treating him as worthy of our attention, resources, and blood.”\(^{149}\) One of al Qaeda’s main aims was to be seen as the ‘most serious’ and ‘global’ threat and these descriptions reinforce their legitimacy as an actor.\(^{150}\)

Diagnosing terrorism as the ‘most serious global’ threat would fit with the audience’s experience at this time. As noted above, the attacks were shocking in scope and audacity and left many with a new or enhanced fear of terrorism. These diagnoses strengthen the terror the insurgents want to cause rather than mitigating it; as Jackson writes, they serve to “empower terrorism and amplify its impact far beyond its objective capabilities to cause material harm”.\(^{151}\) Critically, however, they help reduce confusion because of their experiential commensurability, their centrality means that having the counterinsurgent describe it in this way would reinforce the audience’s perspective. They would have a mixed impact on the concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s capacity, as while they do help portray them as having a firm understanding of the situation, there are issues regarding why they could not predict or prevent the ‘most serious threat’. These diagnoses also help direct anger at the enemy as they are portrayed as posing the ‘most serious’ and ‘global’ threat to the domestic audience. Because of the fear exacerbation and anger direction, these diagnoses would aid in mobilising support for the counterinsurgent’s cause. They also help justify virtually any response because they exaggerate the seriousness but do not restrict the possible solutions as other reactive diagnoses do.

\(^{148}\) Pecastaing, “Rethinking the War on Terror,” 88 - emphasis added.
\(^{149}\) Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerrilla*, 263.
These identifications fit the US narrative; on September 20, Bush referred to al Qaeda as a “global terror network” with a “global reach”.\textsuperscript{152} Likewise, they would appeal to their belief of their ‘invincibility’, as they explain that the US was attacked by the ‘most serious global’ threat rather than a lesser threat.\textsuperscript{153} This diagnoses immediately after 9/11 would have been of utility for the US as it would have helped mobilise international support for the US cause as ‘no country can be complacent’ and justify virtually any response. Thus, they would have a positive impact on the alliance.

4.2.1.5 ALIENATING PROBLEM/ENEMY DIAGNOSES

Anderton and Clark used a number of alienating diagnoses in the wake of the attacks. Both used the term “scourge” on September 12, Clark also referred to the attacks as “cold-blooded” and “cowardly” on September 12.\textsuperscript{154} In his second press release, Anderton said that “[t]his has been an evil act. Evil people have conspired together to commit a cold and vicious act”.\textsuperscript{155} As will be examined, these manifest diagnostic framing tasks are binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.

CONTENT

None of these terms can be fully discredited because they all have a broad variation of accepted definitions, which also makes them relatively accurate. They are not informative, however. Firstly, all the terms delineate binary readings, specifically human-inhuman for ‘scourge’ and ‘cold-blooded’, good-evil for ‘evil’ and brave-cowardly for ‘cowardice’, thus exaggerating the threat, as they imply that the terrorists’ actions are not limited by culture, rationality, morality or humanity and obscuring the real nature of the conflict and the underlying motivations. In turn, these binaries exaggerate: ‘scourge’ “invokes notions of infection, dirt, squalor and sickness” and ‘cold-blooded’ portrays the attacks as being motivated by something other than emotion, at the extreme end as being inhuman – both reduce agency and humanity, transporting “terrorism from its specific historical and geographical location... to an abstract moral plain”.\textsuperscript{156} ‘Evil’ is not informative as it applies a label that refutes introspection or analysis, to condemn “all terrorism as unconditionally evil strips it of political context and ignores its inherent attraction to the

\textsuperscript{154} Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.” ; Clark, “ NZ Pledges Support to United States.”.
\textsuperscript{155} Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.
militarily helpless”, thus directing all blame at the enemy.\textsuperscript{157} “Cowardice” portrays the situation as a binary of brave-cowardly, exaggerating the qualities of the actors where the allies are brave and the enemy ‘cowardly’. The ultimate outcome of this is all these terms obscure the grievances and motives that underpin the enemy’s actions and exaggerate the qualities of the actors.

**AUDIENCE**

Inferring that the insurgents lack bravery, morality and even humanity would not appeal to the insurgent support population’s self-view as they reinforce the ongoing ‘Orientalism’ of Muslims that portrays the West as wholly ‘good’ and Muslims as wholly ‘bad’.\textsuperscript{158} This could incite anger as “[a]ll traits of aggression and wickedness are thus projected onto the Other while constituting oneself as good and pure.”\textsuperscript{159} This language is exclusionary, it casts anyone who supports the insurgents as wholly negative and “profoundly devalues” them.\textsuperscript{160} A key component of ongoing Muslim anger is not just their physical domination by Western states, but the ongoing psychological and cultural oppression.\textsuperscript{161} These terms also help justify enemy actions and legitimate their capacity, as they not only delineate the conflict in similar terms to those they use but also exaggerate the limitlessness of the threat, thus extending it both physically and psychologically, implying a greater capacity to achieve outcomes than they really possess.\textsuperscript{162}

These descriptors would be salient for the domestic population as they fit the common NZ political and media narrative.\textsuperscript{163} Also, NZ’s national character values ‘stoicism’ and ‘fairness’, making ‘coward’ an appealing slur.\textsuperscript{164} The use of the binary ‘evil’ would reassure the domestic audience that they are ‘good’, which would appeal in the wake of the attacks. However, while the everyday nature of these terms may make them seem innocuous, when connected to such a dramatic and frightening event they take on a more menacing air. Excluding ‘cowardly’, which

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{157} Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*, 8.
\textsuperscript{158} Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills, *At War with Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 9.
\textsuperscript{160} Steuter and Wills, *At War with Metaphor*, 9.
\textsuperscript{161} Ussama Makdisi, “‘Anti-Americanism’ in the Arab World: An Interpretation of a Brief History,” *The Journal of American History* 89, no. 2 (2002); Laura Nader, *Culture and Dignity: Dialogues between the Middle East and the West* (Hoboken: New Jersey, 2013), 10-11.
\textsuperscript{163} A search on www.stuff.co.nz has over 7000 results for ‘evil’, with the term used to describe everything from sugar to TV characters. ‘Cold-blooded’ delivers 662 returns, with most used to refer to murder. ‘Scourge’ gets 621 hits, with the term used in regard to wasps, emails and arthritis.
\end{footnotes}
helps lessen the threat, these terms could increase fear by exaggerating the threat as the enemy are portrayed as immoral and even inhuman. That said, they would alleviate confusion, as they portray the situation in a Manichean manner using easily parsable terms. Furthermore, they would help address concerns of competency as the counterinsurgent appears to understand the situation and these terms imply that there was nothing the counterinsurgent could have done to predict or stop the attacks. Finally, they direct anger as they apportion all the blame on the enemy; as Kellner notes, these types of identifications provoke “violent militaristic responses” because of their anger-directing capacity. Therefore, these terms deliver powerful mobilisation. However, they could cause issues for legitimacy as when the enemy is depicted in this manner it suggests that non-military solutions such as diplomacy may not work as the enemy are not moral, rational or even human, thus limiting justification of the counterinsurgent’s proposed deliberative solutions.

These identifications would be salient for the US as they fit their own narrative, Bush referred to “evil, despicable acts of terror”, ‘evil acts’ and said “[f]reedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward” on September 11, then on September 12 said that “[t]his will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil”. Bush used the term ‘evil’ in 319 speeches between taking office and June 2003, with 914 noun uses versus 182 for adjectives – for him, ‘evil’ is a ‘thing’. ‘Evil’ also reinforces the US’s self-identification as ‘good’, a binary deeply entrenched in the US national narrative. It is not just a part of the US narrative, but is more personal, as “Bush uses the word in an aggressively in-your-face born-again manner that takes its resonance from a long Judeo-Christian tradition of radical evil embodied in heroically diabolical figures.” Likewise, the “conventions of American political rhetoric oblige presidents to denounce terrorist attacks as ‘cowardly’.” Portraying the enemy as ‘cowardly’, immoral and inhuman and obscuring any blame that could be directed toward the US justifies any US response and would

168 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.”; Bush, “Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team.”
have a positive impact on the alliance, particularly as the counterinsurgent is using terms that go against NZ’s usually more internationalist neutral rhetoric. They are essentially mimicking US rhetoric, embedding it into the NZ population’s view of this conflict by aligning NZ’s worldview with the America’s.

4.2.2 BLAME/IDEOLOGY

This section will examine how the counterinsurgent attributed blame for the attacks using the reactive narrative. Again, as the press releases were issued before any significant information about the identity of the actors was known, this would appear to be a difficult task, especially the absolute aspect. However, as hypothesized one of the key functions of the reactive is to help direct blame towards to enemy after an emotionally shocking attack, so despite not having any concrete information it is unsurprising that the counterinsurgent will attempt to attribute blame in the immediate aftermath. This section draws on many of the same terms and phrases from the problem/enemy section as these also attribute blame.

4.2.2.1 IRRATIONAL

Anderton stated on September 12 that “no cause that can justify this”.\textsuperscript{173} This statement suggests that there is no rational justification for the enemy’s action. More ambiguous, but also reinforcing this, was Clark’s reference to “utterly incomprehensible violence” on September 12.\textsuperscript{174} Likewise, the alienating problem identifications of ‘evil’, ‘scourge’ and ‘cold-blooded’ blame an irrational enemy through their implication of immorality and dehumanisation. As will be outlined below, the irrational blame identification is absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive. This section will focus on the manifest ‘no cause’ attribution framing task both because it has not been examined and because it best embodies the irrational blame attribution.

CONTENT

While the ‘no cause’ phrase is an absolutist statement, it is difficult to discredit as the counterinsurgent is referring to the 9/11 attacks rather than terrorism in general, and justifying the summary killing of thousands of random people is extremely difficult. Furthermore, as with the irrational problem identification, there are many ways these could be read, but due to the embedded nature of the Orientalist narrative and the fact that the counterinsurgent is dealing with a Muslim insurgency, this interpretation must be considered. That said, it is not accurate or

\textsuperscript{173} Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.”

\textsuperscript{174} Clark, “NZ Pledges Support to United States.”
informative as it obscures the enemy’s grievances and motivations by invoking the rational-irrational binary, which not only overstates the scope of the threat, as an irrational enemy has no limits and their actions are illogical and thus random, but also judges any and all causes as *a priori* unjustified, exaggerating the irrationality of the enemy to occlude any other causational factors. Specifically, it does not inform regarding the enemy’s actual motivations, for, if they are irrational, they can have no rational reasons for the attack and the counterinsurgent need not go any deeper to attribute blame.

**AUDIENCE**

These identifications would have limited salience for the insurgent support population as they reinforce the Orientalist stereotype that Muslims are irrational, obscuring genuine grievances. As will be explored in the deliberative blame section, there is widespread resentment and anger over what are perceived as genuine grievances against the West, as well as the already noted widespread perception in the wider Muslim community, let alone the insurgent support population, that the West has a double standard when it comes to grievances, and these types of blame attribution match this experience. The irrational blame negates genuine grievances, considered central to causation, and could therefore provoke anger amongst the insurgent audience. That said, as already noted, a majority of Muslims thought that 9/11 was not justified, so these identifications would probably only appeal to the 7% who thought it was justified. Nevertheless, because they discount the legitimate grievances and reinforcing the irrationality of the enemy, this type of blame identification excludes the insurgent audience from the counterinsurgent’s cause and helping reinforce the justness of the insurgent’s actions, especially as it conforms to al Qaeda’s narrative regarding the West.

This sentiment would probably appeal to the domestic audience beliefs; as one letter to The Evening Post on the 18th exclaimed: “As for attacking the World Trade Center, I cannot see the justification for that at all”. However, it could exacerbate fear as it implies that the enemy is irrational and their attacks have no logic underlying them. As an absolute, however, it would help

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179 Miles Lacey, “No Country Deserves This,” *The Evening Post*, September 18, 2001, 8.
reduce confusion by providing the audience with a blanket statement regarding blame which, in
turn, would direct anger toward the enemy as this blame infers that they have not justification for
acting in the way they did. The main beneficial outcome for the irrational blame identification,
though, is its ability to address concerns about the competency of the counterinsurgent as they
remove any possibility the counterinsurgent’s actions are connected to the attacks and portray
events as completely unpredictable and thus unpreventable – if the enemy is irrational there can
be no understanding their actions. These identifications would mobilise support, though they
could negatively impact justification of counterinsurgent deliberative non-military solutions as
they are not consistent with this blame attribution. A study found that when “terrorists were
depicted as biased and irrational (vs. as objective and rational), participants were more likely to
advocate military action against terrorism and less likely to advocate diplomacy.”

The irrational blame attribution has a strong fit with the US narrative; as noted, Bush used the
term ‘evil’ a number of times in the first two days and he also inferred the enemy was irrational
when he stated on September 11 that “America was targeted for attack because we’re the
brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world”. Bush would later state, on
November 10, 2001, that “they hate, not our policies, but [sic] our existence”. As already
noted of the many problem and enemy diagnoses and identifications, in using this blame
attribution NZ justifies US actions and helps mobilise support for the US amongst the NZ
population, which is of utility for the US actor as they needed as much international support for
their coming actions in Afghanistan and beyond. Such was the US’s desire for the blame for
9/11 to be directed solely at the enemy that in 2004 the US Embassy personally put a stop to a
Labour Minister hosting a fundraiser where Michael Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 was to play, with the
cable explaining that “it is probable that this potential fiasco may only have been averted because
of our phone calls”. If there was concern at a film screening at a fundraiser three years after
the fact, the use of phrases like ‘no cause’ in the immediate aftermath would have significant
beneficial impacts on the alliance.

4.2.3 ACTOR/VICTIM

180 Emily Pronin, Kathleen Kennedy, and Sarah Butsch, “Bombing Versus Negotiating: How Preferences for
Combating Terrorism Are Affected by Perceived Terrorist Rationality,” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 28, no. 4
181 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.”
182 The Washington Post, “Text: President Bush Addresses the U.N.”
183 WikiLeaks, “New Zealand Minister Hosts Mike Moore’s Fahrenheit 9/11 Fundraiser (Almost),” WikiLeaks,
cable date, July 30, 2004, accessed on 12/12/14, available from
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04WELLINGTON647_a.html
This section will seek to examine how the counterinsurgent identified the various actors, excluding the enemy but including the victims, themselves and their allies, using the reactive narrative. In contrast to the previous two sections, these were ‘knowable’ attributes at this point. Considering the US was seeking to build a coalition, the actor identifications are a key mobilising tool as they help delineate in and outgroups.

4.2.3.1 ALIENATING ACTOR IDENTIFICATIONS

Anderton stated on September 12 that “New Zealanders share the despair and terrible loss that the whole of the civilised world feels... [and share] A determination felt by all decent people... [that] civilised societies everywhere – must work together” and that NZ would “stand with all other democratic countries”. Also as already noted, the attacks are referred to as attacks on both “all civilised nations” and “humanity”. As will be examined, these manifest actor identification framing tasks are figurative, binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.

CONTENT

These identifications are credible, all have a wide range of meanings and both ‘humanity’ and ‘civilised’ are used figuratively. It is when they are used in absolute formulations, such as the ‘whole civilised world’, ‘all decent people’ and ‘all other democratic countries’, their credibility becomes problematic, particularly the last one. Referring to ‘all other democratic countries’ is not a creditable identification as its scope and totality are illogical. Many of the states, including Pakistan, Russia, Oman, Qatar, Tajikistan, United Arab Emirates, that ‘stood together’ following 9/11 were not democratic, making this a discreditable statement. None of these are informative but rather they mask any actual qualities the actors and victims may possess, though, of the four, ‘democratic’ is the most detailed. All invoke binaries – human-inhuman, civilised-barbaric, democratic-undemocratic and decent-indecent – furthering the belief that no ‘human’, ‘civilised’, ‘democratic’, ‘decent’ person would commit terrorism. As a figurative term, ‘civilisation’ is “conceptually barren”, fulfilling an ideological function, rather than a semantic one. ‘Humanity’ is so broad it provides no actual information at all, while the terms ‘civilised’ and ‘decent’ are tautological identifications as people who were shocked by the attacks will self-identify as ‘civilised’ and ‘decent’. The main issues with ‘democratic’ is that the way it is used connects with

‘civilisation’ and also suggests that every single one of the allied actors are democratic, and also therefore ‘civilised’, that this is a defining difference between the allied actor and the enemy when it is demonstrably not. All the terms exaggerate the actor, especially in the absolute formulations, by giving them idealised qualities and inferring that all of them always act in a ‘human’, ‘civilised’, ‘democratic’, and ‘decent’ manner.

AUDIENCE

These terms would not fit the insurgent audience’s narrative, especially for Middle Eastern Muslims as their region was, at least up until several centuries ago, the ‘centre of civilisation’ and they are likely to see Western claims of embodying ‘civilisation’ as contrary to their worldview. This ‘civilised’ mantle passed on from the region itself to Islam, with the ‘Islamic golden age’ a key symbol of hope for resurgence amongst the insurgents and their support population.

Likewise, while to non-Muslims a Sharia theocracy may seem ‘uncivilised’ and ‘undemocratic’, for Muslims this is not necessarily the case: Qutb, al Qaeda’s ideological inspiration, envisioned a “government based on free choice, popular consensus and the application of laws prescribed by God [as it is] bound to promote confidence in its citizens”. These terms would not control emotion as they create an ingroup-outgroup situation where any insurgent supporter is instantly categorised as inhuman, uncivilised, undemocratic and indecent, which, considering their perception of the West’s history of suppressing ‘democratic’ movements around the world using what might be considered by some as inhuman, uncivilised and indecent methods, could also be parsed as hypocritical – as Bin Laden said: “Let us not forget one of your major characteristics, which is your duality in both manners and law. Your manners and policies have two categories: one for you and one for the others.” Also, they have an inescapable connection with colonialism and Orientalism. Ryan suggests that the source of Muslim anger is the “subjugation of most Muslim peoples of the Middle East, Asia and Africa to colonial rule by Europeans in the 19th and early 20th centuries”, while Mirsepassi states that many Muslims struggle to differentiate between colonisation of the past and the West’s actions during the war.

on terror. These terms could compromise the legitimacy of counterinsurgent as an actor as the language is exclusive rather than inclusive, portraying the counterinsurgent’s cause as an existential ‘clash of civilisations’.

These terms would be salient for the domestic audience because they are all ‘positive’ terms when the audience is part of the ingroup. In particular, ‘democracy’ would appeal as NZ self-identifies as a country of strong democratic values. In the wake of the attacks it would also be comforting to be told the way they are feeling is common across the ‘whole of the civilised world’. They also fit within the common tropes of a ‘clash of civilisations’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. They help to reduce confusion because they provide an obvious and easily parsed explanation for the attacks, that the enemy are inhuman, uncivilised and indecent, which helps address concerns regarding the counterinsurgent, as does the fact they make them appear to know how the whole ‘civilised world’ feels, and they direct anger because they absolve the actor of blame and direct it at the enemy. In turn, they would marshal support; as Huntington writes, in lieu of ideological motivation governments will seek to “mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.”

There are possible justification issues for deliberative solutions as many are incompatible with an inhuman, uncivilised and indecent enemy, though these identifications do help legitimise the counterinsurgent as the right actor because they are part of ‘civilisation’ and ‘humanity’.

These terms appealing to key US values and fit their narrative as the US portrayed the conflict as one between ‘civilisation and barbarians’ and sees itself as the embodiment of ‘civilisation’ and ‘democracy’ – the “city upon the hill”. Bush used this shared vocabulary on September 13, stating that “[c]ivilized people around the world denounce the evildoers”. As noted, on September 14 Bush said “these were attacks on the basic democratic values in which we all believe so passionately”. Also of interest is his statement on September 11, where he invokes both sides of the binary: “our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the best of America.” ‘Civilisation’, in particular, is central to the US narrative, the counterinsurgent is mimicking US forms of political dialogue, embedding them into the NZ

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194 Sibley et al., “Pluralistic and Monocultural Facets of New Zealand National Character and Identity,” 21
196 Kenneth L. Deutsch and Joseph R. Fornieri. An Invitation to Political Thought (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2009), 96; Jackson, Writing the War on Terror, 48.
198 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”.
population’s understanding of the conflict. Here, NZ’s identifications fit perfectly with Bush’s and help portray the US in a positive light, as ‘civilised’, ‘humane’, ‘decent’ and ‘democratic’ to the NZ audience, which helps mobilise domestic support, justifies US actions and positions them as a legitimate front of ‘civilisation’. As noted in many WikiLeaks cables, the US wanted NZ to express friendship and solidarity with them to the NZ public, and these actor identifications deliver this by using this salient ingroup collective actor identification.199 By appealing to key US tropes, reinforcing the US interpretation of the situation to the domestic audience, connecting NZ to the US as well as justifying and legitimising the US, these would aid the alliance.

4.2.3.2 ALIENATING VICTIM DESCRIPTION

Anderton referred to “the loss of so many innocent lives” and “innocent civilians” on September 12.200 While considered borderline reactive, this manifest victim identification framing task is, as will be shown below, binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary.

CONTENT

Using ‘innocent’ to describe the victims of the attacks is credible. Its use here is literal, as it refers to the victims’ ‘innocence’ with specific regard to the attacks rather than attempting to identify them as completely ‘innocent’. However, while it is credible it lacks accuracy because it creates a binary of innocent-guilty – and the portrayal of ‘innocent’ victims inevitably frames one side as ‘good’ and the other as ‘evil’ – and the binary nature exaggerates the situation.201 By portraying the victims in this manner, the counterinsurgent is representing the conflict in a Manichean manner wherein the victims and the allied actors are ‘innocent’ and the enemy is guilty. This is one of the rare reactive frames that are literal but have a binary and hyperbolic nature. The reason for this is because the term has a fluidity of applicability. While the implicit scope here is that the direct victims are ‘innocent’ of any direct causative connection to the attacks, it also frames the wider actor as well, implying the US were totally ‘innocent’ as well, expanding its

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200 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.”

scope in a binary and exaggerated manner. As Jackson notes, this term suggests ‘exceptional grievance’, divesting the US of “moral responsibility for counter-violence” and portraying the situation in a black and white manner.\textsuperscript{202}

**AUDIENCE**

Referring to the victims as ‘innocent’ would probably have mixed appeal for the insurgent support population. While it is likely that the more limited specific reference to the actual victims as ‘innocent’ of any causative link to the attacks would fit with their own experience, the wider implication that the US is ‘innocent’ is unlikely to appeal. As will be discussed in the deliberative blame section, many amongst the insurgent support population see the US as guilty of perpetrating many grievances and for this reason this identification has the potential to alienate and anger, excluding the insurgent support population from the counterinsurgent’s cause. The issue is that while the insurgent support population would understand that the actual victims were ‘innocent’ the use of this term within the wider reactive narrative gives the term a greater scope, implying the US have suffered an ‘exceptional grievance’ and are ‘innocent’ of all blame, and this is potentially incendiary. However, while this may be true for some, for others amongst the audience the term ‘innocent’ could compromise the justness of the insurgent’s actions as the killing of ‘innocents’ is prohibited by the Koran. After the attacks Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, issued a fatwa that stated that “[e]ven in times of war, Muslims are not allowed to kill anybody save the one who engages in face-to-face confrontation with them”.\textsuperscript{203}

These identifications would appeal to most of the domestic audience as the targeting of ‘innocent’ victims is a key part of the underlying calculus of terrorism. Though representative, a number of letters to the editor after 9/11 across NZ referred to the ‘innocence’ of the victims.\textsuperscript{204} One wrote: “The general reaction, at least in the western world, to the September 2001 destruction.... cannot possibly be understood without noting the importance, for the majority of the public, of the perception that these were above all else attacks on innocent victims.”\textsuperscript{205} With regard to controlling emotion, this term is seen having a moderate negative impact on fear, not so much because of its own meaning but largely because it reinforces the binary representation of the conflict. It does serve to reduce confusion as it labels the victims in a binary manner that

\textsuperscript{202} Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, 36.


fits with the general understanding of terrorism as targeting ‘innocents’. This is also helps reduce concern about the counterinsurgent’s capacity as it connects with the wider ‘evil and irrational’ framing that suggests there was no way to predict or prevent the attacks. It also serves to direct anger at the enemy as it portrays them attacking ‘innocent’ people. Overall, it delivers a high degree of mobilisation for the domestic population and helps justify military responses.

This identification fits the US narrative, Bush spoke of “an enemy who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people” on September 12.\textsuperscript{206} It also fits the deeper US narrative of exceptionalism and exceptional grievance, placing American suffering above all other suffering and helping to redirect any blame from the US.\textsuperscript{207} Commentators have noted 9/11 was described as the day that America ‘lost its innocence’, which connects the direct victim and the blameless actor aspects together.\textsuperscript{208} Bennett, writing in the NBR days after the attacks explained that the US “are likely to think of themselves as vulnerable, as victims and take many more measures of self-protection.”\textsuperscript{209} As noted, the NZ public has a mixed view of America’s general ‘innocence’, something that the US is keenly aware of, so the US would appreciate this victim identification’s expanded implication as it aided mobilisation in NZ and, therefore, justifies the US response and legitimises them as an actor, delivering alliance maintenance.

4.2.4 STRATEGY/SOLUTION

This section will examine the reactive strategies and solutions proposed by the counterinsurgent. These were, at this point in time, all essentially hypothetical and aspirational, though again this did not prevent the counterinsurgent from describing them in an absolute manner. That said, these were vague strategies and solutions, rather than specific ones, and they were all couched in a way that implied they were to be implemented in the future. While they may have some negative impacts for the insurgent audience, they deliver a range of positive outcomes with respect to the domestic and allied audience, particularly that they make the counterinsurgent appear competent, thus helping to reduce any concern about their capability.

\textsuperscript{206} Bush, “Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team.”
\textsuperscript{207} Alyson Manda Cole, The Cult of True Victimhood From the War on Welfare to the War on Terror (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2007), 162; Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 31–33.
4.2.4.1 WAR ON AN ABSTRACT NOUN

On September 12, Clark stated that we need to “fight the scourge of terrorism”, while, on September 14, Clark said we need to “combat terrorism”.\(^{210}\) Declaring war on an abstract noun, which can be both a strategy and a solution, is figurative, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary, as will be shown below.

CONTENT

These declarations of war on an abstract noun are used figuratively and cannot be discredited.\(^{211}\) As Lakoff argues, war – or any form of military action – on an abstract noun can only ever be metaphorical.\(^{212}\) Accuracy, then, is an issue, the use of a metaphoric solution obscures reality – as Record notes: “terrorism is not a proper noun”, asking how “you defeat a technique, as opposed to a flesh-and-blood enemy?”\(^{213}\) At best, it only provides a single aspect of a much larger necessary strategy; it exaggerates the military component of the strategy at the expense of the political, economic and diplomatic solutions and, in so doing, exaggerates the ease of the solution.\(^{214}\) At worst, it is deceptive because it delineates an impossible metaphoric solution. As a strategy, it does not inform about the complex and multifaceted actions required to counter terrorism, as COIN principles dictate an expanded mandate rather than a military-first approach that this framing task infers.\(^{215}\)

AUDIENCE

These strategies would not appeal to the insurgent audience as the ‘war on terror’ has been equated by many Muslims as being a war on Islam, suggesting that the use of martial terms by NZ may connect their strategy to the ‘war on terror’ itself.\(^{216}\) Al Qaeda have promoted this conflation as it serves their strategic interests: “Much al-Qaeda propaganda argues that “war on terrorism” is synonymous with ‘war against Islam’”.\(^{217}\) The United Kingdom (UK) Foreign Office asked its diplomats to stop using it to “avoid reinforcing and giving succour to the

\(^{210}\) Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Attacks in United States.”; Clark, “NZ Pledges Support to United States.”
\(^{211}\) Bensahel, “A Coalition of Coalitions,” 35.
\(^{212}\) Lakoff, “War on Terror, Rest In Peace.”
\(^{213}\) Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, 25.
\(^{216}\) Michaels, The Discourse Trap and the US Military From the War on Terror to the Surge, 21; Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer, At the Heart of Terror: Islam, Jihadists, and America’s War on Terrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 26.
terrorists’ narrative”.

In a 2012 letter bin Laden explained: “(the enemies) have largely stopped using the phrase ‘the war on terror’ in the context of not wanting to provoke Muslims, because they felt that saying the war on terror could appear to most people to be a war on Islam.”

Thus, these strategies could incite anger and exclude the insurgent support population from the counterinsurgent’s cause. They could also legitimise the enemy, as any ‘war-like’ terms confer de-facto combatant status on the enemy. War proper, that is conflict between two states, involves two or more legitimate opponents as “acting on behalf of a state has constituted the primary means of attaining combatant, and therefore legitimate, status.”

A poll on September 13, 2001, found only 42% of New Zealanders were in favour of a military attack while a 2012 survey found that only 35% of the NZ population sees “[c]ombating terrorism around the world” as a “very important” foreign policy goal, though this increases to 75% when “quite important” is included. Still, it was ranked as less important than NZ’s economy, supporting international human rights, countering climate change and improving international living standards. This suggests these strategies would have had limited appeal to a majority of the population. They could provoke fear amongst the domestic population as they focus on the most violent aspect of the solution, Brzezinski has commented that the “‘war on terror’ has created a culture of fear”.

Critically, however, because of their figurative simplicity they help reduce confusion. They would also help alleviate concerns about the counterinsurgent’s capacity as they make the overall solution appear extremely easy and they infer the counterinsurgent already has a strategy to achieve it ready. This is probably their key appeal for the counterinsurgent, indicating they have moved the nation to a war-footing, delivering short-term mobilisation and justifying their response. Conversely, they do not control expectations as they outline an impossible solution, meaning that the counterinsurgent can never actually achieve the outcome they are identifying, creating a situation where expectations will not

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220 Michaels, The Discourse Trap and the US Military From the War on Terror to the Surge, 21; Kruglanski et al., “What Should This Fight Be Called?”109.


223 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?” 79-80.

be met. As the counterinsurgent cannot actually ‘fight’ or ‘combat’ terrorism, these failed expectations create an issue for long-term legitimacy as failure would reflect poorly on the counterinsurgent. COIN principles recommend a counterinsurgent delineates achievable goals as operational success is a key aspect in creating and maintaining domestic support for troop deployments. As Larson states, “operations failing to achieve their objectives tend to lose support” and by describing an impossible to achieve solution the counterinsurgent is creating conditions that could cost it public support in the long-term. Another issue is that ‘war’ implies a rational enemy, yet the reactive narrative portrays the enemy and their tactics as irrational.

As noted, Bush used the ‘war on terrorism’ formulation on September 11, then on September 12 he stated these “were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war”. The ‘war on terror’ was the defining phrase of the era, the ‘floating signifier’ for the entire conflict. Thus, these strategies fit the US narrative. Also, the US has a history of declaring war on abstract nouns, with wars being declared on drugs, cancer, teen pregnancy and drunk driving; it is a part of their national narrative. Further, it would match the US experience as they felt they were ‘at war’ after the attacks. NZ’s use of similar terms in the wake of the attacks would have appealed, particularly as it has been noted in cables from the US Embassy that Labour were “ideologically drawn to a peace-keeping role” and that the combat force had been re-gearied for these operations. Thus, by using such out-of-character bellicose terminology and mobilising their own population for ‘war’, the counterinsurgent helped justify US actions and would probably have improved their alliance with the US, particularly as the military component of their strategy was the most obvious response from the US in the wake of the attacks.

4.2.4.2 JUSTICE

On September 12 Anderton said “the perpetrators of this violence must be brought swiftly to justice” while on September 14 Clark stated that NZ and the international community need

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227 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.”; Bush, “Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team”.
“combat terrorism and to bring to justice the perpetrators”. While ‘justice’ can have a range of meanings, from court-based, ethical and deliberated process to frontier-style, violence-oriented retribution, as used here it embodies the latter, it refers to the “eradication of a threat”. That Clark connects the war on an abstract noun solution to this otherwise incompatible solution reinforces this point. As will be explored below, this manifest solution framing task is figurative, binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.

CONTENT
This solution cannot be discredited, at least this early on, not just because ‘justice’ is used figuratively – justice in this sense involves an air campaign rather than a court room – but also because it has an aspirant quality at this point and its accuracy is impossible to gauge. However, this solution is not informative as the counterinsurgent does not provide any information other than the term and ‘justice’ is, at best, “controversial and subjective”. That it can either an air campaign or a court room is highly problematic; it does not convey any useful details about the solution. As well as being figurative, it invokes the binary of just-unjust, exaggerating the allied actors’ ability to ‘bring justice’ whilst simultaneously making it their sole domain. ‘Justice’, as used here, is not an objective process but rather something one side possesses and the other does not, one that the allied actor can ‘bring’.

AUDIENCE
As used here, this solution would not fit the insurgent support population’s narrative as it implies the allies are the source of ‘justice’. In turn, it could incite anger as it not only reinforces the just-unjust binary but also the good-evil and civilised-barbaric binaries. Holland explains that Bush “loaded the term [justice] to broadly equate with removing the terrorist threat to America”. In other words, ‘justice’ is something that the allies are able to deliver, American/Western ‘justice’ is paramount and it is arbitrary. The US and allies are the source of justice and they define its parameters. Also, any ‘unjust’ action would discredit this identification, generating more anger because of the inconsistent use of this term. These factors could have negative implications for the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy as they exclude the insurgent support population by implying

231 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist Attacks in US.”; Clark, “NZ Pledges Support to United States.”
235 Holland, Selling the War on Terror, 116.
only the allies posses justice, and that this justice is violent. In turn, this legitimises the insurgent as the ‘bringer of Muslim justice’.

The ‘justice’ identification would appeal to the domestic audience as it is argued that justice is a relative, the domestic audience would associate with their proximate perspective – most would believe their government is a legitimate ‘bringer of justice’. An article in the Nelson Mail days after 9/11 stated that the “perpetrators must be brought to justice. And according to some, it has to be justice of an equal measure, an eye for an eye. For others it is more traditional civilised justice”. This suggests that even though this usage is read as the ‘eye for an eye’, some in NZ at the time may have still seen it as a court-based process. An article in the NBR on September 14 reinforces the former interpretation, “Justice in America is not a merciful figure... Undoubtedly the US will lash out in this instance”. An article in the Dominion backs this up, Bush has “promise the country justice against cowardly terrorists, invoking the Battle Hymn of the Republic and its ‘terrible, swift sword’”. Either way, this solution would also alleviate concern as it reassures that the counterinsurgent is going to rectify the situation, portraying a complex reality with a simplistic and uncompromising solution. Stating they will ‘bring them to justice’ belies the incredible complexity of the necessary solution. This would also aid in mobilising support for the counterinsurgent’s cause at this point in time. However, there could be long-term issues for justness of the response if the counterinsurgent is not seen to actually ‘bring justice’ in either the violent or deliberative manner.

This solution would appeal to the US as Clark essentially mimics Bush’s statements on September 11, who stated they would “bring them to justice”.

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237 Bennett, “US Will Want Swift Revenge,”
239 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”.
240 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,”.
241 Mark West and Chris Carey, “(Re)Enacting Frontier Justice: The Bush Administration’s Tactical Narration of the Old West Fantasy after September 11,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 92, no. 4 (2006): 380; see also Holland, Selling the War on Terror, 115 and Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, 129.
appeal but also because they drastically simplify a complex solution.\(^{242}\) By using the same identification as Bush, Clark reinforces the US perspective, justifies the US response and helps legitimise Bush as the ‘cowboy in chief’ who can ‘bring them to justice’ for the NZ audience, mobilising support for their cause which would deliver alliance maintenance.

### 4.2.4.3 NO TOLERANCE

On September 12 Clark stated that “[t]here can be no tolerance of such deliberate and cowardly acts of terrorism”.\(^{243}\) As will be examined below, this strategy is absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary.

#### CONTENT

This strategy is not considered credible as it is an uncompromisingly absolutist. Governments are rarely as intransigent as this statement makes them appear, Neumann notes that despite the rhetoric democratic states often negotiate with terrorist groups and while these are not the same, negotiation implies a degree of ‘tolerance’.\(^{244}\) Also, it is further discredited by the counterinsurgent’s own statements regarding their own ‘tolerance’ as an actor and the need for ‘tolerance’ as a strategy, which will be examined in the deliberative section. As an absolute position it is not informative, it is devoid of details or specifics, rather their real position, which is that they show ‘little tolerance’ rather than ‘no tolerance’. Furthermore, for a state that refers to itself as ‘tolerant’, as COIN expert Kilcullen explains, the real damage is “not the damage inflicted by terrorist attacks themselves but the damage inflicted by the reaction from societies that terrorists attack” and “our response to terrorism could cause us to take measures that, in important ways, we could cease to be ourselves”.\(^{245}\)

#### AUDIENCES

This strategy is unlikely to appeal and could incite anger in the insurgent support population. It implies that the counterinsurgent’s ‘tolerance’ to terrorism is contingent on who is using this method of violence, invoking the Orientalist binary that everything the West does is ‘good’ and ‘tolerable’ and everything the insurgent does is ‘evil’ and ‘intolerable’. The ‘no tolerance’ strategy is exclusive as it reinforces this binary view. This is clear in Aziz’s report: “As the government adopted a no-tolerance policy, a fear-stricken public watched as images of nefarious dark-

\(^{242}\) West and Carey, “(Re)Enacting Frontier Justice,” 380.

\(^{243}\) Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Attacks in United States.”

\(^{244}\) Peter R. Neumann, “Negotiating With Terrorists,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2007).

\(^{245}\) Kilcullen, Accidental Guerrilla, 273.
skinned, bearded Muslims flashed across millions of television screens. The message was, if there had ever been any doubt, the 9/11 attacks confirmed that Muslims and Arabs are inherently violent and intent upon destroying the American way of life. Thus, it excludes the insurgent support population from the counterinsurgent’s cause, not only compromising the justness of their response but also justifying the insurgent’s ‘intolerant’ actions.

Because it creates a binary where ‘tolerance’ is the only other option, this would appeal to the domestic audience who would be unlikely to want ‘tolerance’ in the wake of 9/11. It also serves to reassure the domestic population’s concerns regarding the counterinsurgent’s response as it portrays the strategy as simple and easily achievable and, in turn, gives the counterinsurgent the appearance of unwavering competency. However, it fails to delineate a realistic or achievable objective meaning that it does not limit expectation. It would deliver mobilisation at this point in time, but there are long-term justification issues if the counterinsurgent chooses to pursue ‘tolerant’ strategies, which could in turn impact legitimacy.

This strategy would appeal as a central pillar of the Bush Doctrine was ‘no tolerance’ for terrorism. It also fits the US narrative as it is common trope in their rhetoric: in 1985 Regan said, “America will never make concessions to terrorists” while in 1997 Clinton, after a suicide bombing in Jerusalem, said “there must be no tolerance for this kind of inhumanity”. By using this uncompromising language, the counterinsurgent would also enhance their alliance with the US because, as noted, the US have long running concerns over Labour’s affinity with peacekeeping and that NZ has a tendency for “ideologically motivated, self-congratulatory policies”. Furthermore, as a 2005 cable made clear, the US was worried that NZ Government was ‘tolerating’ extremists within the country, so these declarations would appeal. As this strategy would help mobilise NZ audience support and justifies US-led military action, it would deliver alliance maintenance.

4.3 – AFGHAN INVASION, 2001

In the five weeks between 9/11 and the Afghan Invasion, NZ issued a five press releases accounting for 1,493 words in total. The press releases studied in this section are Goff’s two given in the US on the 26th of September and the 3rd of October and Clark’s three given in Wellington on the 21st of September and the 8th and 9th of October.251 The invasion can be seen as a continuation of 9/11, in many ways, as the shock and emotion of the attacks was still widely felt and by now the RCF had begun to coalesce.

4.3.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY

In the lead up to the Afghan Invasion the counterinsurgent used a number of reactive frames covered in the 9/11 section to diagnose the problem and identify the enemy. Thus, we see that ‘terrorism’ was used as an enemy stand-in a number of times, it was referred to as an existential threat, terrorism was diagnosed as ‘the most serious global’ threat, it was also referred to as an irrational tactic several times and a number of alienating identifications were also used. Also, as will be shown, the counterinsurgent used a number of new reactive problem and enemy frames.

The term ‘terrorism’ was used as an enemy stand-in 11 times in total over the press releases, reinforcing the nebulous nature of the threat and ascribing the negative qualities of this maligned method of violence to the enemy.252 What makes this more troubling is the counterinsurgent now knows who the enemy is, having explained that they believe it is bin Laden and al Qaeda in a press release leading up to the invasion and thus targeting Afghanistan.253 Immediately after 9/11, it was not known who was responsible, but at this point the counterinsurgent knew, making this particular usage more problematic. However, it does fulfil several of the main objectives of the reactive narrative, which is to reduce confusion and alleviate concern as the counterinsurgent is able to appear knowledgeable by using a highly simplistic and easily parsed


253 Goff, “Government Briefed by United States on Bin Laden Connection.”
linguistic conflation that avoids the complexity of the actual enemy. At the same time, this justifies the US response on the eve of the invasion, delivering alliance maintenance.

Goff stated on September 26 that the attacks represented a “threat to civilised people everywhere”, framing them as an existential threat.\textsuperscript{254} As with immediately after 9/11, attacks that targeted the symbols of US political, economic and military power were exaggerated to infer a threat to ‘civilisation’. Goff even reinforced this exaggeration by stating that it threatened ‘civilised people everywhere’, explicitly increasing the scope. This could, admittedly, make it more inclusive for the insurgent support population, but as will be seen by his use of ‘brutal’ in the same press release, the binary component of this statement is strong and would still create legitimacy issues for the counterinsurgent amongst the insurgent support population. For the domestic and allied audience, the main outcome here is the mobilisation of support and justification of the impending invasion as the threat is existential and requires an extreme response.

On September 26, Goff said that “events of a fortnight ago have brought home the vulnerability of all of us to the threat posed by international terrorist organisations” and that “[t]errorism on the scale witnessed on 11 September is in our view the most serious current threat to international peace and security”.\textsuperscript{255} Here we see the full scope of the diagnosis that terrorism is ‘the most serious global’ threat, while the former statement matches Anderton’s ‘no country can be complacent’ as a ‘global’ threat, the second frames terrorism as the ‘most serious’. While the insurgent audience impacts would be the same here, on the eve of the Afghan Invasion these diagnoses would help justify US the solution, mobilising support for the domestic audience while framing the situation in a way that is of strategic utility for the US.

Also, Clark referred to 9/11 as “random acts of violence” on September 21, then on September 26 Goff called the attacks “indiscriminate”.\textsuperscript{256} Both diagnoses reinforce the belief that terrorism is an irrational tactic – like ‘incomprehensible’, they portray the use of terrorism as having no rational underpinning. ‘Indiscriminate’, in particular, an even stronger version of this reactive framing for several reasons. Firstly, it has a veneer of credibility as it infers a random nature and, while the victims may be ‘indiscriminate’, the targeting is ‘discriminate’. This apparent randomness is a quality of terrorism that increases the emotive shock of attacks and it gives this

\textsuperscript{254}Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.”
\textsuperscript{255}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{256}Clark, ““NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism.”; Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.”
term a semblance of credibility. Second, it invokes the venerable Just War Theory and connects with the many laws of war, it would match the domestic audience’s shared Western narrative. These terms help reduce confusion, alleviate concern and direct anger, and these functions are enhanced by the fact that ‘indiscriminate’ is contrasted by the counterinsurgent with the term ‘targeted’ to refer to their own actions in these press releases, which will be examined below. The diagnosis of terrorism as an irrational tactic would appeal to the US as they absolve them of blame, the word ‘random’ in particular infers this, and the US would appreciate NZ stating this to their own audience. This diagnoses also reaffirms the US position, helping justify the Afghan Invasion, as military force is the logic solution against an illogical tactic. However, this does create internal inconsistencies with the war as the solution, as for the West, war is rational.

Goff, on September 26, spoke of the “brutal repression of the Taleban regime” and, as ‘brutal’ can mean everything from “cruel” to “savage” to “inhuman”, this is classified as an alienating identification that invokes the civilised-barbaric and human-inhuman binaries. While Taleban-ruled Afghanistan may appear ‘brutal’ to the West, there are several issues with this description. Firstly, it occludes the West’s long and problematic role in Afghanistan as well as their support of many regimes around the world responsible for ‘brutal repression’. Secondly, it carries an Orientalist judgment that a government run under Islamic sharia laws is inherently uncivilised and even inhuman. Certainly the Taleban’s rule was ‘repressive’, especially toward women, but the term ‘brutal’ is binary, exaggerated, emotive and exclusionary. By referring to the Taleban as ‘brutal’ the counterinsurgent may exclude the insurgent support population by delegitimising them as the right actor. It does help reduce confusion, alleviate concern and direct anger for the domestic audience. In this particular context, the term helps to justify the invasion of an entire state by the US, as it conflates the Taleban with the already referenced barbarity and inhumanity of the enemy, reinforcing the ‘justness’ to the NZ population, delivering alliance maintenance. As will be shown in this section, the conflation of the Taleban with al Qaeda was a powerful mechanism of justification at this particular juncture, collapsing a complex relationship into a singular homogenous mass.

4.3.1.1 ACTS OF TERROR

On September 26 Goff referred to “acts of terror”.258 This section will examine the manifest unit of ‘terror’ and the manifest unit of ‘acts of terror’. As will be assessed below, these manifest diagnostic framing tasks are figurative, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary.

CONTENT

‘Acts of terror’ is figurative, these would literally be identified as ‘acts of terrorism’ or even more literally as ‘acts of terrorists’.259 Nevertheless, it is not discreditable because it is a common figurative usage.260 However, it is not accurate for several reasons. First, ‘terror’ can refer to a huge range of phenomena, with terrorism as a subset, meaning that it does not provide a targeted understanding.261 Even more problematic, the way this particular usage is formulated uses ‘terror’ as a stand-in for the enemy meaning that it anthropomorphises the threat and limits comprehension. Also, the term ‘terror’ serves “political and normative ends admirably despite hindering description of the social phenomena at which they point”.262 In other words, it obscures motives; while ‘terrorism’ conveys a range of details about actors, motives and outcomes, ‘terror’ only informs that an emotion that has been generated. As fear is a key emotion generated by terrorism, this is a piece of information that is unnecessary to communicate, unlike the other varied aspects of the problem that are not immediately apparent. While the use of the term ‘acts’ does provide some boundaries, it is also an exaggerated identification as it places all the emphasis on nebulous term that does not constrict the situation in the same way that ‘acts of terrorists’ does.

AUDIENCE

This phrase is unlikely to appeal to the insurgent audience as it conflates the insurgent with ‘terror’, effectively turning them into ‘terror’ and thus insinuating all Muslims are suspicious, and obscures their underlying motives. While not a major impact on its own, it works in conjunction with the same phrasing around ‘terrorism’. In turn, this could provoke anger amongst the insurgent support population as it portrays them as simply ‘bad’ rather than having any real grievances. This delegitimises the counterinsurgent as an actor as it excludes the insurgent population.

258 Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.”
262 Ibid., 5.
This identification would fit the domestic audience’s experiences as the aim of the attacks was to generate ‘terror’, meaning that use of the term becomes self-fulfilling. In turn, however, this term could provoke fear because it exaggerates the threat, its vagueness is in itself ‘terror’ inducing. Henaff writes that this “formulation allegorizes the public’s anguish into a threatening and indeterminate entity: ‘Terror.’ The threat is allegedly constant, unlimited, faceless, perverse, and implacable”. Because ‘terror’ is produced by the attacks, it does help reduce confusion as the counterinsurgent is using an obvious label that fits the experience of the audience, this also gives them the appearance of competency as they have used such a self-evident term. As it is a pejorative phrase, it would also direct anger at the enemy and would help to mobilise support for the counterinsurgent’s cause and justifies the military response to ‘terror’.

This phrase fits Bush’s own narrative, as noted he used this exact formulation on September 11, and the overarching ‘war on terror’ name, which is particularly important as they are about to launch their first major campaign of this war. The ‘of terror’ formulation is not one common to NZ rhetoric and this is a case of the counterinsurgent mimicking the US. NZ’s diagnosis connects the threat to the US solution in an almost inevitable way. These diagnoses make the threat seem more amorphous and widespread and obscures the motivations underlying the attack, which helps mobilise their cause with regard to the NZ population, and beyond. Like the word ‘evil’, it helps to portray the US in a positive light in NZ, helping limit any negative sentiment toward the superpower. It also exaggerates the threat, obscuring the real enemy, in a way that justifies the US invasion of the whole state of Afghanistan, meaning it would have a positive impact on the alliance.

4.3.1.2 NEW ERA

Goff cast the 9/11 attacks as the beginning of a ‘new era’ on September 26 when he stated that “further attacks were a real possibility”, these “attacks represent a new generation of security threat”, then went on to refer to “the next wave of terrorist attacks”. This latent unit will focus on any diagnosis that infers 9/11 marked the beginning of a new era or that more similar attacks were probable. As will be examined, these identifications are absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary.

263 Henaff, “Global Terror, Global Vengeance?” 74.
264 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.”
265 Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.”
CONTENT

Diagnosing the attacks as a ‘new era’ is impossible to discredit at this point as they make absolute statements about an unknown and unknowable future. They are not accurate though, as to describe the threat as “a rupture with... past and present uncharted challenges... is unsupported by evidence” is a task for future historians not contemporaneous politicians. Friedman believes that “September 11 was more an aberration than a harbinger of an age of deadlier terrorism”. As absolute representations at the most extreme end of the spectrum of possibilities they also inaccurately exaggerate the threat level dramatically. These are not informative identifications either as they suggest the attacks were markedly different from previous events when they were a combination of plane hijacking and suicide bombing. As Crenshaw writes: “Today’s terrorism is not a fundamentally or qualitatively “new” phenomenon but grounded in an evolving historical context.” The exaggerated nature of the threat obscures the reality, that terrorist attacks of this scope were probably less likely after 9/11, – especially because even only a few weeks after 9/11, terrorism had become the single most important global security issue and numerous solutions had already been put in place. Also the ‘newness’ constructs the attacks without a ‘history’, “severing all links between this act of terrorism and countless others that had preceded it, and by de-contextualizing it from the history of al Qaeda’s previous attacks.”

AUDIENCE

Even though the ‘new era’ identification obscures the motives for the attack it does fit with the insurgent’s narrative that they are the ‘new era’ for Islam. More problematic, these identifications legitimise the insurgent’s cause by giving the threat, and the enemy who pose it, a de facto status as a peer enemy. International relations is full of defined eras with recognised competitors, the Cold War was a distinct epoch, one where the US and USSR were peer enemies. Describing this


Friedman, “Managing Fear”.


as a ‘new era’ connects the current conflict with the Cold War, by describing the problem in this way the counterinsurgent confers legitimacy on their opponent.

The scale and shocking nature of the attacks suggest these descriptions would fit with the domestic audience’s experience. Ackerman explains that terrorist attacks of the 9/11 scale make audiences confront the shock of the unknown – stressing that no one knows what will happen next. One letter to a newspaper in NZ stated: “it is likely... that this type of terrorism witnessed in the United States [will hit] New Zealand.” Likewise, a New Zealander in New York at the time said, “[t]here was a feeling like anything could happen – that there could be another attack at any moment”. These diagnoses fail to manage the audience’s fear; claiming the attacks herald a ‘new era’ of terrorism would inflame public worry as they suggest more similar attacks are coming. However, they do alleviate confusion as it makes the counterinsurgent appear to be able to predict the future. Because they imply they were ‘new’ they also address concerns that the counterinsurgent was unable to predict or prevent them, justifying inaction. These diagnoses help direct anger at the enemy, who are portrayed as the next peer competitor following the USSR’s demise, framing them as a considerable threat. As such, they would provide aid in mobilising support and justifying action, as identifying the attacks as the beginning of a ‘new era’ of conflict would be more effective way of gaining domestic support for action than stating that they were an aberration. As McGovern writes: “This representation of a discontinuity with the past and the rise of a supposedly unprecedented threat has an evident instrumental purpose. It is one of the primary means by which new anti-terror law and policy is given justification, often giving more extensive and sweeping powers to the state.”

This diagnosis fits the US narrative, Bush talked about how “night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack” on September 20 and referred to “today’s new threat” on October 7. Likewise, it fits with the US narrative of exceptionalism, while other attacks are part of an ongoing pattern, these attacks were so much more that they started a ‘new

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273 Ackerman, Before the Next Attack, 44.
276 McGovern, Countering Terror or Counter-Productive? 12.
era’. It would also appeal to their belief that the “perceived rules of the game were fundamentally and irrevocably altered” by 9/11. By exaggerating the threat and portraying an unknowable future in absolute terms this diagnosis helps justify the US response to the attacks, as well as mobilising NZ support. As such, it would aid the alliance and even suggests that NZ will be ready to support the US for this entire ‘era’.

4.3.1.3 ENEMY BINARY
On September 21 Clark stated “President Bush delivered a clear and unequivocal message [that] the Taliban and other governments who harbour terrorists... should hand them over or share their fate”, then made an almost identical statement on the 8th. As will be examined below, these identifications are binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary.

CONTENT
The binary representation of actors is not discreditable, but is not accurate. From this point onward in the narrative, the Taleban are entwined with al Qaeda, they are “depicted as being cast from the same mold as al-Qaeda... [which] is a gross distortion”, as aside from a shared faith and origins in the Soviet-Afghan conflict they have little in common. As Fergusson notes, the two “have always been very different beasts”. It exaggerates the two’s closeness which in turn exaggerates the seriousness of the threat. This identification also creates a false dichotomy, ‘with us or against us’ portrays this as a situation with only two options when there is actual a spectrum of differing positions. This conflation reduces the potential for understanding, two separate and distinct actors are collapsed into one and then the spectrum of possible positions is reduced to a false dichotomy. Zalman and Clarke see this as a major flaw: “The central fallacy at the heart of the current narrative is that it employs a single prism to view a complex world”.

AUDIENCE

278 Holland, Selling the War on Terror, 104.
283 Susan Moeller, Packaging Terrorism: Co-Opting the News for Politics and Profit (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 95.
The ‘with us or against us’ identification is one of the most potentially damaging descriptions with regard to the insurgent population. It does not match the complex array of positions within the Muslim world that the insurgent audience would experience, so would not be salient except for the most extreme, who also see the situation in this binary manner. In turn, this simplified conflation could anger many because it reinforces the Orientalist narrative of the West as ‘good’ and the East as ‘evil’ – all the negative components of the binary are attached to this Other through this identification. In this way it serves as the principal legitimation technique for the ICAT, casting ‘all’ who oppose the US and allies as ‘evil’. It is also exclusionary, implying that no “middle ground is possible” and leaving the insurgent audience no room to equivocate on an incredible complex reality with a multitude of possible positions. The counterinsurgent could exclude members of the insurgent support population because these identifications portray the situation in such a simplistic, reductionist manner. Even Huntington believes that the ‘with us or against us’ formulation has had “catastrophic implications” because it incorporated local wars between Muslims and non-Muslims into a “broad clash of civilizations” Thus, by connecting these actors together the counterinsurgent also helped to legitimise the enemy as it is gave them the appearance of having a far greater capacity and justified their existential strategy. As Killcullen explains: “Al-Qa’eda’s claim to aggregate ‘dozens of local movements, grievances and issues’ into a single universal struggle constituted its seminal strategic achievement.”

Conflating the Taleban and al Qaeda would match most New Zealanders’ experience as few would be able to distinguish between them at this point. However, this binary representation could exacerbate fear; as Rothe and Muzzatti argue, the description promotes the belief that there are “enemies everywhere” which in turn helps to promote general panic amongst the population. It does, though, drastically reduce confusion as it grossly simplifies a complex situation. By reducing the complexity and offering a simplified enemy and consequent solution, the counterinsurgent also appears competent. Finally, it also helps to direct anger at a now monolithic and easily graspable enemy. This would aid short term mobilisation, and in particular, it would help justify the decision to wage a war rather than conduct a police action, as it connects

a shadowy terrorist network to a national government. However, because of this, it compromises the justification of non-military solutions.

Bush had used the ‘share their fate’ phrase the day before Clark and also said: “[e]ither you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”.\textsuperscript{290} That Clark mimics Bush’s identification, even referring to him as a source of information, suggests this would be salient for the allied actor as it not only fits their own narrative, but reinforces his articulator credibility to the NZ audience. Also, as the US are launching an invasion of Taleban-governed Afghanistan, this conflation is vital in justifying US action as otherwise they are simply ignoring sovereignty to get to a terrorist network, rather than legitimately waging war against a binary enemy. As such, these identifications would aid the alliance.

4.3.2 BLAME/IDEOLOGY

Blame attribution is vital on the eve of the invasion and the counterinsurgent used the same irrational blame as after 9/11, showing how this aspect of the RCF was solidifying into a key attribution. The above diagnoses of terrorism as an irrational tactic attribute blame. This is a particularly important function at this juncture. While the impacts on the insurgent support population would be the same as after 9/11, for the domestic and allied audience there is a heightened need for the counterinsurgent to emphasise the enemy as irrational at this point in time as they need to justify the invasion and these terms help to suggest that there could be no other option than the use of force because an irrational enemy cannot be reasoned with. Thus, the main function of these terms here is to mobilise support domestically through the reduction of confusion and the direction of anger and to reinforce the allied position by framing the blame in such a manner that their actions seem to be the only logical solution. They reinforce the developing RCF that the counterinsurgent alliance are rational and the enemy are irrational.

4.3.2.1 NOT MUSLIMS

Clark, on September 21, said that “President Bush made it clear that the teachings of the Islamic faith are good and must be distinguished from the terrorists who have blasphemed that faith and tried to hijack it.”\textsuperscript{291} “This ‘not Muslims’ blame attribution is interesting, as it was an attempt to add nuance by differentiating between the enemy and Islam the religion; however, as will be

\textsuperscript{290} Bush, “President Declares ‘Freedom at War with Fear’”.

\textsuperscript{291} Clark, “NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism.”
shown, because these attributions are absolute and hyperbolic, they do have potentially emotive and exclusive outcomes.

**CONTENT**

The ‘not Muslims’ attribution is discreditable when it comes to identifying ideology as the enemy do identify as Muslims and while they are at the ‘radical extremist fringe’ they are still a part of Islamic Umma. It renders a spectrum of possible beliefs into an absolutist dichotomy. This absolute attribution is not credible as the enemy consider themselves Muslim. Claiming the enemy have ‘blasphemed that faith’ is not accurate either as it does not provide any useful details about their ideology as the enemy’s actions are intrinsically linked to their faith; attempting to completely disassociate the enemy and their religion is a false portrayal, it delineates the situation as if there is a single, homogenous ‘Islam’ when the reality is that there are numerous schisms. This attribution exaggerates a simplified version of the religion, obscuring the reality that while many of Islam’s tenets can be used to discredit terrorism others can be used to justify it – just as with other religions, internal textual contradictions and personal and schismatic interpretations provide fuel for many different readings of the same documents of faith. These are not informative either as the key to winning any conflict, as Sun Tsu said, was to ‘know thy enemy’. Using this attribution also limits the solutions the counterinsurgent can propose, such as the Interfaith dialogues they promote later in the ICAT. If the enemy are ‘not Muslims’ then these Interfaith dialogues are pointless.

**AUDIENCE**

Even though many Muslim leaders expressed similar sentiments after 9/11, having an Anglo-Christian making statements of faith would not appeal to some of the insurgent support population – though obviously it would appeal to the majority of Muslims in general. The ‘not Muslims’ attribution could provoke anger as the counterinsurgent is judging a situation that they do not have the expertise to prognosticate on and, as Nayak and Malone explain, it furthers the

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Orientalist outlook that the West ‘knows’ more about Muslims’ own culture and beliefs.\textsuperscript{296} The counterinsurgent is not considered as having the credibility to make statements on the Islamic faith.\textsuperscript{297} As Gompert writes, for “non-Muslims to suggest religious interpretations to convince radicalized Muslims not to become terrorists is perilous and ineffectual.... Only Muslim condemnation will work”.\textsuperscript{298} While for many Muslims, including many in NZ, this attribution would be welcomed, for the more extreme supporters, it would not.\textsuperscript{299} Use of the ‘not Muslims’ attribution could alienate as it “implies that other Muslims see them as apostates, which is simply wrong”.\textsuperscript{300} This Orientalism would reinforce the insurgent’s legitimacy as it bolsters their position regarding Western hegemony.\textsuperscript{301} These attributions are exclusive, even excluding those in the population who practice a similar form of Islam from their own faith. As such, they would reduce the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy.

This attribution would not fit with the domestic audience’s experience as most would probably equate al Qaeda with Islam, an assertion backed up by the experiences of many Muslim New Zealanders after 9/11, who found that they were being judged because of their religion.\textsuperscript{302} It could exacerbate fear as it reinforces the irrational blame – the enemy are not guided by a religion, they have ‘blasphemed’ and even ‘hijacked’ their faith, all of which suggests they are irrational. However, it helps to clarify the situation by explaining that they are ‘no Muslims’ even though the reality is much more complex. This also makes the counterinsurgent appear knowledgeable and thus would reduce concerns regarding their competency. It would also help direct anger at the enemy as they are portrayed as ‘hijacking’ their own faith, of acting outside its rational parameters. Aside from the issue of centrality, these factors would aid in the mobilisation of the domestic audience, though because of the gross simplifications involved it could create justification issues later on for certain deliberative solutions, such as the aforementioned Interfaith dialogues.

\textsuperscript{297} Raymond L. Bingham, “Bridging the Religious Divide,” \textit{Parameters} 36, no. 3 (Autumn 2006).
\textsuperscript{300} Abid Ullah Jan, \textit{A War on Islam? What Does The "War on Terror" Mean for the Muslim and Non-Muslim World?} (Maktabah Al-Ansar: UK, 2002), 15.
\textsuperscript{301} P. Eric Louw, \textit{The Media and Political Process} (Los Angeles, Calif: SAGE, 2010), 168.
The speech Clark referred to was on September 20, when Bush said that Islam’s “teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah blaspheme the name of Allah... The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself”. Clark not only mimicked Bush but also again name checked him, suggesting this attribution would appeal because it helps cement his articulator credibility in NZ and beyond. At this point, the US was wanting to narrow down the blame from ‘Muslims’ to the conflated binary of al Qaeda and the Taleban and this statement by NZ helps to achieve this targeting of attribution. In doing this she not just reinforces the US’s enemy, justifying the ‘war on terror’, but also emphasises Bush’s legitimacy in NZ and beyond. These attributions would provide alliance maintenance.

4.3.3 ACTOR/VICTIM

The counterinsurgent used several already examined reactive actor identifications in the prelude to the Afghan Invasion, showing how the RCF was beginning to form. These identifications fit the overarching binary narrative of the ICAT as a battle between good and evil, between civilisation and barbarians. The first of these was when Goff referred to the “threat to civilised people everywhere” on September 26, using an alienating actor/victim definition. The timing of this statement on the eve of the invasion is particularly interesting, as the alliance were about to bring another era of suffering upon the Afghan people whilst referring to themselves as ‘civilised’. The problems with this identification are summed up by the former Marxist turned supporter of interventionist policies Christopher Hitchens’ troubling statement in November 2001: “Bombing Afghanistan back into the Stone Age’ was quite a favourite headline for some wobbly liberals. The slogan does all the work. But an instant’s thought shows that Afghanistan is being, if anything, bombed OUT of the Stone Age.” Hitchens’ is stating that Taleban Afghanistan was so ‘barbaric’ that even carpet bombing the country will ‘civilise’ them, his position is empowered by the belief that the allied actor is inherently ‘civilised’, something that NZ’s actor identifications supported on the eve of the invasion. At this time, this identification has the potential to provoke anger in the insurgent support population, coming as it does while the allied actor prepares to invade Afghanistan and reinforced by the fact that it was another Western state that ‘bombed Afghanistan into the Stone Age’ several decades ago. It does, however, serve to not just exaggerate the size of the coalition but also exaggerates their

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303 Bush, “President Declares ‘Freedom at War with Fear’”.
304 Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.”
virtuousness, which would help with mobilising domestic support by increasing fear and
directing anger as well as justifying the response. Likewise, it would help with the alliance as it
present the US in the manner they want to be portrayed to the NZ population – as the fount of
civilisation – which serves to justify their response and reflects positively on their legitimacy as
the ‘civilised’ actor.

On September 21, Clark contrasted the enemy who were ‘not Muslims’ with NZ’s “people of
many faiths, and all those faiths and those of peaceful intent”, using another form of the
alienating actor identification, and further showing how the binary RCF had begun to coalesce. Though ‘peaceful’ may not seem reactive, because she contrasts NZ with the enemy it creates a
binary of passive-aggressive. Bush had spoken about this issue on the 17th, which Clark was
referring to in her speech. Bush had explained that “Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t
represent peace. They represent evil and war”, fleshing out the binary aspect. This binary lacks
accuracy as it obscures the underlying motives of the conflict as it implies that the allied actor
could not have done anything aggressive to warrant any form of attack. The emphasis on being
‘peaceful’ precludes any examination of why the attack happened. It therefore exaggerates the
‘peaceful’ nature of the allied actor, portraying them as totally non-aggressive. The promotion of
the allied actor as ‘peaceful’ could incite anger as many in the insurgent support population
would consider the invasion of Afghanistan as an aggressive action, and the West’s long history
of violent interventions and invasions of Muslim countries would mean this type of identification
would come across as hypocritical. Framing the enemy and allied actor in binary form is
exclusionary and would not aid the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent’s cause. This identification
fits the domestic national narrative of NZ as a fair international actor that uses multilateral
forums rather than force to achieve its aims and there is a pacifist strain to it that rose to
prominence during the anti-nuclear movement. The main perceived utility of this identification is that it would help reduce confusion by providing a clear cut understanding of the conflict as
one of good versus evil, where the evil enemy are the aggressor and the good allies are the
defender, which in turn would help direct anger toward the enemy. This would aid mobilisation,
though there are potential justification issues depending on how an audience member reads the
‘peacefulness’ of the Afghan Invasion. However, the main purpose of this identification in the

306 Clark, “NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism.”
308 Sibley et al., “Pluralistic and Monocultural Facets of New Zealand National Character and Identity.”, 2; Peter
Skilling, “The Construction and Use of National Identity in Contemporary New Zealand Political Discourse,”
lead up to the invasion is that it reinforces the US interpretation of events, mirroring Bush’s own statements regarding the attack. Furthermore, its blame-obscuring nature would also appeal. This in turn means that this identification would help justify the US response, delivering alliance maintenance.

**4.3.4 STRATEGY/SOLUTION**

There were several examples of already examined RCF strategies and solutions used in this period, with both the war on an abstract noun and the justice aspects being reinforced as the alliance prepared to bring war from the abstract to the real and to bring the enemy to justice through the war. On the eve of the invasion, the reactive strategies and solutions went from rhetoric to reality, becoming embedded as key RCF components. This places the internal conflict between an irrational enemy and tactic and the rational solution of war into a more stark light.

The counterinsurgent used the war on an abstract noun framing task numerous times. Clark deployed the most troubling version, claiming NZ would work to “eradicate terrorism” on September 21. Clark, “NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism.” This formulation is particularly troubling as it not only proposes to fight an abstract noun as a strategy but suggests that it is possible to completely destroy the abstract noun as a solution – the idea that terrorism can be ‘eradicated’ is totally discreditable. This has one particularly interesting emotive consequence for the domestic audience, one that the other forms do not have to the same degree: it alleviates the domestic audience’s concern by reassuring them – in a manner akin to a parent reassuring their child – that the counterinsurgent will completely put an end to terrorism. In turn, though, it does not control expectation, which could have issues for justification and, ultimately, legitimacy with regard to the domestic audience. Goff also used “defeating terrorism”, “defeat terrorism” and the “fight against terrorism” on September 26, and, on October 8, Clark referred to the ‘campaign against terrorism’ several times, which while not as preposterous as ‘eradicating terrorism’ are still reactive as they propose a ‘war’ solution and actually emphasise the problem of fighting a war against an irrational tactic. Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.”; Clark, “PM Says Today’s Military Action Inevitable.” There is a disconnect between ‘fighting’ an irrational tactic and enemy. While there was widespread support for the invasion, there was also already resistance and wariness to the US overreacting and seeking vengeance by force, with a number of editorials in leading NZ papers and numerous

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309 Clark, “NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism.”
letters all rallying against ‘war’.

Therefore, these solutions have a mixed impact for the domestic audience, though they would deliver alliance maintenance for the allied audience as the counterinsurgent is portraying the situation to their own population in a way that suits the US agenda.

On September 21, Clark also proposed that as well as ‘eradicating terrorism’ NZ would help “bring the perpetrators to justice”, while on October 8 she again reiterated the aim to “bring to justice the perpetrators”, echoing language used by Bush in the lead up to the invasion. Here again, the counterinsurgent is framing the solution in a reactive manner, though as the invasion is yet to begin these still have an aspirant quality to them which somewhat mitigates their issues. Said in conjunction with the ‘eradicating terrorism’ solution, this appears aimed at reducing the domestic audience’s concerns as together these solutions delineate a future where those responsible have all been ‘eradicated’ and there is no more terrorism. In particular, this reinforces the alliance, as the counterinsurgent is reiterating the two key components of the US-focused solution to their own public, justifying their response.

4.3.4.1 TARGETED

On September 26 Goff explained that “any military action would be targeted and not indiscriminate” before referring to the “indiscriminate and appalling acts of terror”. This strategy, as will be examined below, are binary, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.

CONTENT

Despite the high level of collateral damage of the allied response, with up to 4000 Afghani civilians killed during the first three months, these were accidental rather than deliberate civilian casualties, meaning that this statement is not discreditable. However, it is inaccurate for a number of reasons. First, Goff presents it as a binary of discriminate-indiscriminate, meaning these terms are used to differentiate the actions of the two as much as possible through linguistic

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313 Goff, “Goff Meets Armitage in Washington.”;
manipulation. The binary pairing exaggerates the qualities of the two actors, limiting the capacity for the solution identification to deliver any useful information. Finally, the binary nature of the term overemphasises the nature of the two actors, implying that every aspect of the allied solution is ‘targeted’ and discriminate and that every aspect of the insurgent’s action is not ‘targeted’ and ‘indiscriminate’. Secondly, as a binary, the term ‘targeted’ has an obscurant quality as it emphasises the counterinsurgent’s own apparent justness and the enemy’s immorality that is based on the manipulation of language rather than a factual basis – and in so doing invokes the central dichotomy of good-evil. While the counterinsurgent action is ‘targeted and not indiscriminate’ the enemy’s is ‘indiscriminate and appalling’.

AUDIENCE
This identification would not fit with many of the insurgent audience’s experience, particularly with those who have directly suffered from allied bombing, who may feel that ‘targeted’ and ‘discriminate’ is not an accurate summation. This could generate anger as the juxtaposition between the two reinforces the binary division of the conflict, generating its own binary of discriminate-indiscriminate. Overall, this identification has the potential to be alienating. In turn, this would negatively impact the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy as they are delineating an exclusive reality where everything the insurgent does is ‘indiscriminate’ and everything the counterinsurgent does is ‘discriminate’. This apparent hypocrisy could also justify the insurgent’s actions.

The early reports in NZ newspapers reinforced the ‘targeted’ nature of the allied solution, suggesting it would fit with domestic experience.315 It also matches the common Western narrative of ‘surgical strikes’. Nevertheless, by November New Zealanders were writing letters speaking of those who “have died already as direct casualties of the bombing. The euphemism for these horrors is ‘collateral damage’”.316 Thus, salience is mixed as people’s experiences, knowledge and understandings vary. The main function, however, of this solution is that it reduces confusion by portraying the allies and enemy in easily parsed binary terms. It also allays concerns regarding the counterinsurgent’s competency, not just because they are responding in a moral manner but also that they are technically capable of ‘targeting’ their response. This binary also helps direct anger toward the enemy as they are the ones that act ‘indiscriminately’. While

there is a danger that as the civilian casualties mount during the invasion a say-do gap could appear, overall these descriptions would help justify the counterinsurgent’s actions.

Bush used the same language on September 20, speaking of “carefully targeted actions”, the US has long made much out of their ability to “conduct ‘clean’ or ‘surgical’ wars” and these solutions fit the US narrative, meaning that they would be salient for the allied actor as they reinforce this to the NZ audience, who as noted above were in some cases sceptical of this capacity. They would be particularly salient for the US just as their planes were about to start bombing the country as it would help minimise the negative publicity of any ‘collateral damage’. By helping reinforce the US narrative and sanitising their actions, this solution helps justify the US response and would aid the alliance.

4.3.4.1 ALIENATING SOLUTION
On October 8, Clark referred to NZ supporting the US determination to “root out” al Qaeda. As will be outlined below, this strategy is figurative, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusionary.

CONTENT
To ‘root out’ is literally to pull an entire plant out of the ground, meaning it is being used figuratively here. It is often used to mean “to remove or eliminate completely”. In the US, it can also refer to a pig ‘rooting out’ a plant, but the etymological source is still the same, as is the outcome – the elimination of the plant. As such, the term implies the complete eradication of the enemy, the escape of bin Laden and most of al Qaeda show it was not an accurate representation of the actual solution as applied in Afghanistan. However, it is not discreditable as the phrase is vague, having a broad range of applications. Its colloquial nature limits its accuracy though. It contains no useful information about the actual strategy that the counterinsurgent is implementing, the phrase does not provide any details about the scale or type of operations the counterinsurgent would use to attempt to capture al Qaeda members. This phrase exaggerates the ease of finding and either capturing or killing al Qaeda as it analogises the process to pulling a plant out. Its vernacular style, as will be explained below, also fits the Wild West narrative. This strategy is not informative either, as it is essentially diametrically opposed to the key

318 Clark, “PM Says Today’s Military Action Inevitable.”
319 Root out: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/root+out
320 Hager, Other People’s War, 40-42.
321 A search of stuff.co.nz shows numerous such uses of the phrase.
counterinsurgency principles, both the US COIN Field Manual and British Army Field Manual stress the importance of ‘tolerance’. 322

AUDIENCE

The term ‘root out’ suggests the enemy are a weed that needs to be removed, it is a dehumanising metaphor that would not be central to their perspective as it reinforces the human-inhuman binary. 323 This dehumanising quality, as well as the term’s use to refer to largely negative and unwanted entities mean it could also anger the insurgent support population. Because of this, the phrase excludes the insurgent support population, thus compromising the justness of their response and delegitimising the counterinsurgent.

The phrase is central to most New Zealanders as it is commonly used by media, with numerous articles on stuff.co.nz using the phrase for crime and a letter in The Evening Standard on the 18th referring to ‘rooting out’ terrorism. 324 This phrase helps reduce confusion as it portrays an extremely simplistic solution. It would address concern as it implies the solution is relatively easy, this glib phrase masks the vast physical and financial outlay required for a COIN operation involving hundreds of states, millions of personnel and billions of dollars. Because it is almost always used to refer to something negative it would help direct anger towards the enemy. It’s figurative nature makes it appear that the strategy is as simple as pulling a plant out. At this point in time, this solution would help mobilise support for the counterinsurgent. This suggestion of ease could have long-term issues for the justness of their response, however, as it does not control expectation.

These terms fit with an important aspect of the US national character and grand narrative: the American Wild West and the cowboy legend. The phrase ‘root out’ is colloquial, fitting into the ‘tough hombre’ vernacular of the Wild West. Bush had used the ‘root out’ strategy on September 19: “the mission is to root out terrorist activities. And there’s a variety of ways in which that can happen. Clearly, one of our focuses is to get people out of their caves, smoke them out”. 325 Here he connects this ‘rooting out’ with ‘smoking out’, another powerful cowboy trope. As noted in

322 FM 3-24, 3-13; Countering Insurgency, 4-12.
the 9/11 chapter, the Wild West grand narrative a powerful one for the general US public and particularly for Bush, who “[identified] himself as a cowboy [and] associated his presidency with the story of the mythic cowboy”\textsuperscript{326}. In mimicking Bush’s own cowboy rhetoric, Clark is speaking in a way that would be central to the US President and his own self-image and justifies the US response, which would in turn help with alliance maintenance.

4.4 – BALI, 2002
Clark issued two press releases, on October 14 and 15, referring to the Bali Bombing. This section will contrast NZ’s counterinsurgent with Australia’s because it informs the understanding of how reactive framing works, particularly the possibility of shared vocabulary and mimicking. Clark’s first press release featured just 3 reactive frames but the one on the following day contained 16 examples, where the former was 300 words the latter was 805. Even more revealing, all these reactive frames were similar or identical to those that Howard had used previously in a press release on October 13 and an address to parliament the next day, suggesting there is a degree of mimicking occurring.

4.4.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY
There were several instances where the counterinsurgent used already examined reactive frames, showing how the now-well developed RCF was able to be applied to a separate attack. What makes these diagnoses interesting is that they include several that show a clear mimicking of Howard. Firstly, Howard referred to the attacks as “brutal and very barbaric”, spoke of the “brutal and despicable way in which lives have been taken away on this occasion by an act of barbarity” and labelled them a “brutal reminder” in his press release. Then in his address he referred to them as “barbaric terrorist bombings”, a “brutal and despicable attack”, “brutal” and “barbaric brutal mass murder”. The day after Howard, on October 15, Clark used identical alienating problem identifications, referring to the events as both a “barbaric terrorist attack” and a “brutal attack”. Aside from Goff’s single use of ‘brutal’ in the lead up to the Afghan Invasion, these terms had not been used by NZ during the ICAT and while Clark used neither in her release on October 14, she then used both on October 15, which suggests Howard influenced her reactive framing of the attacks. Just as with ‘brutal’, ‘barbaric’ reinforces the civilised-barbaric binary underlying the reactive framing, both exaggerate the nature of the threat by portraying it as a ‘clash of civilisations’, generating negative emotions and excluding the

329 Howard, “Transcript of PM’s Comments on Bali Attacks.”
330 Howard, “Address to the Parliament Bombings in Bali.”
331 Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.”
insurgent audience from the counterinsurgent’s cause while reducing confusion, addressing concern and directing anger for the domestic audience. Here Clark’s statements help deliver alliance maintenance for both America and Australia, as these diagnoses fit both Howard and Bush’s interpretation of the threat, reinforce these to the NZ population and justify the ongoing ICAT.

Another interesting instance of Clark’s mimicking was after Howard referred to “those who employ terror and indiscriminate violence against innocent people” on October 14, the next day Clark talked of “those who use terror and indiscriminate violence against innocent people.” The use of ‘indiscriminate’ will be discussed below, but of interest is the fact Clark’s statement is one word off being verbatim. As well as being almost identical, they also use the same rhetorical method that obscures the enemy, referring to them as ‘those who’ rather than as ‘terrorists’ or any direct referent. The way ‘terror’ was used here is somewhat different to the earlier example, here it is also absolutist as it creates a binary between ‘those who use’ it and the allied actor when ‘terror’ is a common aspect of all conflict; there can be no argument that strategic bombing campaigns of World War Two involved the use of ‘terror’. In using it in this way, they make it even more exclusive, implying that the allies are ‘good’ and ‘civilised’ actors who do not ‘use terror’. This identification reduces confusion as it makes a clear delineation between actors and by inferring that the enemy are the ones who ‘use terror’ the counterinsurgent is also able to direct anger. It also succeeds in delivering alliance maintenance for both America and Australia, reinforcing the position that these states do not ‘use terror’ to the NZ population, helping justify their actions.

Another previously examined example of the reactive narrative where Clark appeared to be influenced by Howard was in her framing of terrorism as an irrational tactic. Howard referred to the attacks as ‘indiscriminate’ 6 times and said that terrorism could ‘strike anywhere’ in his two press releases. On October 15 Clark also referred to the “indiscriminate terrorist bombing” and stated that “[t]errorism has no boundaries. It can strike any place at any time”. Not only had she not used either problem diagnosis in the press release the previous day, she had even referred to the attack as ‘deliberate’, and while the term ‘indiscriminate’ had been used several

335 Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.”
times in the lead up to Afghanistan, the usage pattern still suggests that Clark was influenced by Howard’s statements the preceding day. This is particularly true for the ‘strike anywhere’ configuration, which is a particularly problematic. As Wolfendale writes: “Claims that terrorism is an ongoing, omnipresent threat that might strike at any time are not true reports of genuine risk assessments but are designed to instil anxiety and fear in the general population, leading to a generally held belief that a terrorist attack is inevitable.”336 It has a veneer of authenticity because the random victims of terrorist attacks makes the targeting appear random when they are actually chosen in a calculated and rational manner.337 The identification also severs the connection between the terrorist’s targeting and their motivations and objectives.338 The underlying implication of this identification is that states are not targeted because of specific actions and policy decisions, that terrorism is a random phenomenon and there is no way of predicting where it could strike next, which will be furthered discussed in the blame section below. While these types of identifications may help with domestic confusion and anger, what they really achieve is the addressing of concern, for if the attacks are as random as they are portrayed then there is nothing that the counterinsurgent could have done to prevent them. They justify allied actions and inactions, which could otherwise threaten legitimacy.

As well as mimicking Howard, Clark also used a number of other reactive frames, including referring to the attacks as ‘cowardly’ and using ‘cold-blooded’ 3 times in both press releases.339 While the latter has the same potentially mobilising, alienating and legitimising ramifications for the differing audiences here as it did after 9/11, the former has a different context here. When examined after 9/11 it was considered inaccurate because these were suicide attacks. The Bali Bombings were not suicide attacks and, while there are still issues of the counterinsurgent’s binary representation of all of its actions as ‘brave’ and all of the enemy’s actions as ‘cowardly’, in this specific case the attacks can more accurately be labelled ‘cowardly’.

Another already examined reactive frame that Clark used was terrorism as an enemy stand-in 4 times, all on October 15, referring to the need to “thwart terrorism”, that “[t]errorism has no boundaries”, the “global effort against terrorism”, and the “campaign against terrorism”.340 The major issue here is that she is conflating different enemies under the same signifier. Where before this metaphor had a slight degree of accuracy only because there was just a single enemy

337 Kydd and Walter, 50.
338 Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency.”
340 Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.”
at this point, after Bali it becomes more diffuse and complex. At this point the identity of the Bali attackers was not even known, but already Clark has connected them to al Qaeda, effectively legitimising the enemy’s capacity as an actor for the insurgent audience while boosting the possible fear in the domestic audience. This does help reduce confusion, give the counterinsurgent the appearance of understanding the threat and direct anger at ‘terrorism’, but as will be examined it does so at the expense of clarity and actually helps increase the apparent size, cohesion and capacity of the enemy. This linguistic device helps the alliance, however, connecting Bali to 9/11 and in the process aiding not just the US but also Australia by creating a united threat which enables them to justify their united response.

4.4.2 BLAME/IDEOLOGY

The RCF was clearly developed by Bali, centring on the attribution of sole blame on the enemy because they are ‘irrational’. Clark evoked the ‘irrational’ blame attribution when she said the attacks were ‘indiscriminate’ and stated that ‘terrorism has no boundaries. It can strike any place at any time’ on October 15, after Howard’s speeches. Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.” One of Howard’s uses of the ‘strike anywhere’ formulation reveals the flaws of this as a blame: “This event is a terrible reminder that terrorism can touch anybody anywhere and at any time and any country or any people, any leader or any nation that imagines that in some way they have secured immunity from terrorism because of this or that attitude or this or that part or position in the world, or this or that accident of geography is deluding themselves.”

The Sari Club in Bali was chosen as a target because it was frequented by Westerners, particularly Australians and Americans. As noted, in November 2002 bin Laden made this clear, stating that “Australia was warned about its participation in Afghanistan, and its ignoble contribution to the separation of East Timor. It ignored this warning until it was awakened by the echoes of explosions in Bali.” Bin Laden has also publically stated that “any nation that does not attack us will not be attacked”. The planner of the attack said they wanted to target the club the night before because there were a large number of Australian Football League players there and less locals on the street, showing the desire to increase Australian casualties and reduce local casualties. The ‘strike anywhere’ formulation directs blame solely at the ‘irrational’ enemy as it implies that there is no connection between the actions of the victim state and the terrorist attacks. As noted above, these

341 Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.”
342 Howard, “Transcript of PM’s Comments on Bali Attacks.”
343 Williams, “Australia”, 239.
identifications help reduce concern about the counterinsurgent’s competency. Certainly they help reduce confusion and redirect anger, but Howard’s formulation makes it clear that the main aim is to limit political damage by insinuating that they had nothing to do with the counterinsurgent’s own actions and there was nothing that could have been done to predict or prevent the attacks. They are, ultimately, focused on preserving the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent. By mimicking Howard at this junction, Clark would have reinforced the NZ-Australian alliance as she effectively deflects any blame from him to the NZ audience and beyond.

### 4.4.3 ACTOR/VICTIM

Clark spoke of “working with other countries who like us value freedom and democracy” on October 15, again invoking the alienating actor identification.\(^{346}\) Howard used similar language in his address, speaking of an “Australian community bound together by common values of openness, individual liberty and individual freedom”, explaining that “[w]e fight terrorism because we love freedom; we fight terrorism because we want to preserve the way of life that this country has; we fight terrorism because we share the values of other countries”.\(^{347}\) The term ‘freedom’ is also a key component of Bush’s rhetoric, as can be seen in his already quoted statement that ‘freedom and fear are at war’. Again, Clark appears to mimic Howard, who in turn is using the same vocabulary as Bush, using a frame that she had not used in the previous day’s press release. The West’s support of non-democratic states that restrict freedoms means that this is discreditable and valuing ‘freedom’ is an essentially meaningless statement as it can have many different meanings and applications, there are numerous academic attempts to define the concept whose very preponderance reinforce the trouble of defining the term.\(^{348}\) Clark’s statement appears falsifiable as it is logically inconsistent. The use of the term ‘freedom’ here is potentially even more problematic for accuracy as ‘democracy’ can at least be measured. While not framed as an absolute, the use of these binaries implies that the enemy does not value either ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’, creating a hypocritical, obscurant, alienating and potentially excluding narrative for the insurgent support population. While ‘democracy’ would appeal to the NZ population, the ‘freedom’ component would have far less appeal as this a core American value.\(^{349}\) Fisher sees the division so starkly it is the main focus of his book on the relations between the

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\(^{346}\) Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.”

\(^{347}\) Howard, Address to the Parliament Bombings in Bali.”


two countries, *Fairness and Freedom*, where he sees the key difference between the two state’s character as being NZ’s focus on fairness and the American’s on freedom.\(^{350}\) Thus, while the emotional impacts are similar for the domestic audience as they were after 9/11, the use of ‘freedom’ largely delivers a positive outcome with regard to the allied actor as it is such a core American value – as noted, Bush framed the ICAT as a war between “freedom and fear” and frequently conflates the US with ‘freedom’.\(^{351}\) It is also of utility as it frames the allied actor in a way that supports the US blame framing, that they are not responsible in any way for the insurgent’s actions, that rather than being provoked because of US foreign policy the insurgents acted because they are inherently evil. It also suggests that the alliance is one based on values rather than interesting, giving it the appearance of permanency to the NZ audience. By absolving the allied actor of blame and portraying the alliance as a values rather than interest-based one, the frame justifies both the US and Australian actions and legitimises them, providing alliance maintenance.

Clark also used the term ‘innocent’ to describe the victims 3 times, all on October 15.\(^{352}\) In general, the impacts are the same as after 9/11, though when she condemned “those who use terror and indiscriminate violence against innocent people” she connected the victim identification with the irrational blame and this reinforces the binary delineation of the conflict. Whereas after 9/11 the connections were less explicit, here the contrast is more clear. On one side there are ‘those who use terror and indiscriminate violence’ and on the other are the ‘innocent people’. This has the capacity to further exclude the insurgent support population, while delivering greater mobilisation for the domestic audience and absolution of blame for the allied actor.

### 4.4.4 Strategy/Solution

The counterinsurgent used a number of already examined reactive strategy and solution frames after Bali, the interesting point here is that while after 9/11 and in the lead up to Afghanistan, these solutions were all yet to be implemented, Bali occurred a year later and not only had there been operations in Afghanistan but Iraq had already been mooted by the US and allies as a possible second front of the ICAT. Thus, the strategy and solution components have had time to be put into place.

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\(^{351}\) Ibid.

\(^{352}\) Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.”
In one of the few pieces of reactive framing she used in the first press release, Clark stated there would be “no tolerance”, again casting the strategy as absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive.\(^{353}\) It does, however, succeed in allaying the domestic audience’s concerns about the counterinsurgent’s capability as it is forceful and simplistic. This is one of the most powerful reactive strategies as it actually requires no extra components and presents an uncompromising stance. It also helps with the alliance as Howard and Bush saw Bali as a reason to continue with the military campaign, meaning that Clark’s statement justified this to the NZ population and beyond.

Using an alienating strategy, Clark stated that those responsible need to be “hunted down” on October 15.\(^{354}\) Similar to ‘root out’, this phrase dehumanises as its etymological origins are in hunting animals, it also reduces a complex set of strategies to a simplified colloquial phrase that implies finding al Qaeda is as easy as ‘hunting down’ an animal and it also serves to allay concerns about the counterinsurgent as it makes a complex reality sound extremely simple to achieve and is couched in terms that are easily parsed. As Holland explains, “Bush’s first promise was to ‘hunt down’ the perpetrators. ‘Hunting down’ would become Bush’s preferred metaphor for capturing or killing terrorists”, meaning it would appeal to the US and help justify their response.\(^{355}\)

Clark said that those responsible must be “brought to justice” on October 15, again using this reactive solution.\(^{356}\) Its previous usages were difficult to discredit because they had an aspirant quality. However, Bali occurred over a year after 9/11 and its credibility as a solution had become increasingly questionable. Hager writes regarding Operation Anaconda in 2002: “[t]he plan was to wipe out the opposing force. Taking prisoners was not a priority” going on to explain that at the end of the first SAS deployment the invasion had “not assisted in bringing Osama bin Laden and anyone else responsible for the September 11 attacks to justice”, suggesting while not discreditable it was already questionable.\(^{357}\) As NZ and its allies were shown to be involved in the illegal transferring of enemy prisoners, the torture of suspects, the questionable detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay and the “unlawful” killing of

\(^{353}\) Clark, “NZ Appalled by Bali Bombing.”
\(^{354}\) Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.”
\(^{355}\) Holland, *Selling the War on Terror*, 116.
\(^{356}\) Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.”
\(^{357}\) Hager, *Other People’s Wars*, 50, 56.
Osama bin Laden, a say-do gap would appear, further discrediting this identification. The “systematic mistreatment of prisoners under the Bush Administration [that] had begun in Afghanistan” discredits claims of ‘justice’, even by NZ, and could compromise the justness of the NZ response. Again, this term reduces a complex solution to something extremely simple and gives the counterinsurgent the appearance of competency. It also helps justify the US solution to the NZ population, delivering alliance maintenance.

As noted, Clark used the war strategies and solutions on October 15, offering the weaker “campaign against terrorism” formulation. Nevertheless, the ‘campaign’ aspect carries military connotations and reinforces this particular solution identification. This has essentially the same impacts as after 9/11, except that over a year has passed and the NZ Government had already stated that they were “directly involved in Afghanistan in military, peacekeeping and development assistance capacities” meaning that there is a lack of internal consistency within the rhetoric between this war solution and NZ’s deliberative framing that was not present immediately after 9/11. While it could be argued that ‘campaign’ could be taken in a broader manner, it still reinforces the more absolute versions such as ‘eradicate terrorism’. This particular solution also helps connect Bali and 9/11, justifying the overarching ‘war on terror’.


Hager, Other People’s Wars, 64.

Clark, “Ministerial Statement on Bali Bombing.”

4.5 – IRAQ, 2003

The Iraq Invasion was the first time since 9/11 that NZ’s framing was diametrically opposed to the US, the only form of reactive framing used was actually used to differentiate NZ’s position from that of the US and the other key allies. It was actually the US narrative that had changed in the lead up to Iraq, as they had swung from their more deliberative set of solutions focused around multilateralism to focus more on the unilateral NZ issued a number press releases leading up to the 20th – Goff’s statements on March 12 and 13 and Clark’s on March 18 and 20, though only Goff’s on the 13th contained RCFs.¹

4.5.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY

What makes the use of the reactive problem/enemy framing tasks in the lead up to Iraq so interesting is that they are being used in a completely different context. While the US and other allies were using them as a means of connecting Iraq and Hussein to 9/11, NZ was trying to use them as a means of disconnecting these two. Here the RCF faces a huge challenge, it is being stretched by different actors in a way that sets it in diametrically opposing directions.

A rare example of reactive framing in the lead up to Iraq was Goff’s statements on March 13, that a “war in Iraq would take attention from the primary threat to international security, which is terrorism”.² When this diagnosis was used before the Afghan Invasion its main function was to mobilise support, here the counterinsurgent used it to argue against the Iraq Invasion because it detracts from the ‘primary threat’ of terrorism. Its impact on the insurgent support population would be mixed, while it still helps legitimise the enemy’s cause by exaggerating capacity, it has greater nuance as it was used in contrast to Iraq. With regard to the domestic audience, this would appeal as there was a relatively high level of opposition, with 32% of New Zealanders opposed to military action under any circumstances and 51% opposed to NZ offering any support at all.³ It also has the potential to evoke fear whilst reducing confusion and concern and directing anger. Here the reactive diagnosis justifies NZ inaction. The major difference in impact

² Goff, “Iraq Crisis: NZ’s Position.”
is for the allied actor; before this diagnosis would have aided alliance maintenance, but now it is being used to oppose US actions, here it would not have that outcome but rather could damage the alliance. It directly contrasts with Bush’s already quoted move to include Iraq as a front of the ‘war on terror’. A WikiLeaks cable from 2004 titled “New Zealand Condemns Terrorism, Hostage Taking in Iraq -- but Keeps Its Distance from USG on Iraq” shows how damaging this differentiation was, with Ambassador Swindells noting “Goff’s pointed reference to New Zealand’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq and that the GoNZ [Government of New Zealand] has no desire to be associated with USG actions in Iraq”. Despite using the same RCF as before, in this case framing terrorism as the ‘primary threat’ would not have delivered alliance maintenance because it was used to oppose US actions.

The counterinsurgent also used the terrorism as an enemy stand-in 2 times during the lead up, with Goff referring to the “campaign against terrorism” and the “coalition against terrorism” on the 13th. The flaws of this particular formulation are apparent at this point in the ICAT. As will be discussed in the solution section, NZ used this to distinguish its actions from US choices, while the US are used the same formulation as a method of connecting Iraq together with al Qaeda into a single threat. As well as using the same rhetorical method in the already referenced framing of Iraq as the ‘second front in the war on terror’ in his State of the Union speech, Bush referred to Hussein as a “brutal dictator... with ties to terrorism”. Thus, while NZ is referring to al Qaeda and related terrorist groups in this conflated problem and enemy identification, their ally was connecting Hussein to the threat, an association NZ refuted. This reveals the issues of this particular rhetorical device, it is unable to specifically identify an enemy and can be used in a variety of ways by different actors to such a degree that they contradict each other. It was relatively accurate after 9/11, when there was a ‘single’ enemy. It became less so after Bali when a new-yet-affiliated group was added into this rhetorical catchall, but by Iraq, when the US forced Iraq into this catchall diagnosis it became virtually nonsensical. This would be a relatively subliminal issue, with the only real impact that it would have compromised the justness of the US operation for the domestic audience.

4.5.2 ACTOR/VICTIM

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5 Goff, “Iraq Crisis: NZ’s Position.”
The only reactive frame used in the actor/victim category was in reference to victims. In some respects, this is unsurprising as NZ was attempting to distance itself from US actions. The counterinsurgent used the term ‘innocent’ to refer to both possible victims of the invasion and terrorist victims 2 times in the Iraq Invasion press releases. The counterinsurgent used this RCF in contrasting ways. The reference to terrorist victims fits into the wider ICAT narrative, while the reference to how the US can avoid loss of ‘innocent lives’ directed blame at the US using the same binary expansion mechanism, with ‘innocent’ inferring the US would be guilty of these deaths. This inversion has a more inclusive outcome for the insurgent support population as it infers that the US are culpable, it also serves to mobilise support for the domestic audience against the Iraq Invasion as it casts the situation in the same stark moral terms, and it is unlikely to appeal to the US as it compromises the justness of their cause to the NZ population, with a potentially negative impact on the alliance.

4.5.3 STRATEGY/SOLUTION

Goff’s war on an abstract noun uses, noted above, were particularly interesting in the lead up to Iraq as they sought to delineate a different position from the US. Whereas before this aspect of the RCF had been used in a manner positive to the alliance, during the lead up to Iraq NZ deployed it to question US actions. This can be seen when he addressed “the question of whether the crisis over Iraq challenges the relevancy of the United Nations”, with Goff explaining that there “are of course many other questions of concern in the world today [including] the on-going campaign against terrorism”. Goff used this strategy to argue against the Iraq Invasion in both uses, while the US used it to connect Afghanistan with the invasion. These uses may help justify NZ’s actions to the insurgent audience, showing they are able to differentiate between Iraq and the al Qaeda, giving their cause credibility. While in general these constructions deliver a certain ease of comprehension and reduce concern that the counterinsurgent is capable, here this is counterweighted by the fact the two erstwhile allies are able to use the same metaphoric construction to argue contradicting cases, suggesting that at this point in time this strategy may actually increase the confusion within the domestic audience rather than reducing it, which may also reflect negatively on their competency as a counterinsurgent. As will be examined in the several following sections on terrorist events in Iraq, it also shows how the RCF’s figurative nature means that it can be applied in conflicting ways.

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7 Goff, “Iraq Crisis: NZ’s Position”.
8 Goff, “Iraq Crisis: NZ’s Position.”
9 Ibid.
4.6 OVERVIEW OF THE REACTIVE USE IN THE OTHER EVENTS

Before providing the concluding analysis of the reactive frame, it is germane to offer a brief overview of the reactive frames used in the events that did not receive individual case study analysis before the chapter conclusion. These events were not examined individually because they failed to meet the key criteria given at the outset of this chapter. Generally speaking, the events not covered by case study were not as shocking as other attacks, the victim state was not that close an ally of NZ and/or they were a long time after the catalysing event of 9/11. The consequences of not meeting these criteria were that these events received less coverage and that the reactive frames used were variations of the same framing tasks rather than new types. While all three criteria contribute to these two consequences in differing degrees, the relative brevity of coverage can be seen as being predominantly influenced by the level of shock and relationship of victim state with NZ, while the repetition of frames is influenced more by the events coming later in the cycle.

Rather than describe all the reactive frames used in these events, this section will seek to outline the most important and interesting aspects. Firstly, looking at these events as a collective there were two dominant trends in the reactive framing usage, the two most commonly evoked were the irrational problem/enemy identification and corresponding blame/ideology attribution and the alienating problem/enemy identification. The frames that terrorism and, consequently, terrorists are irrational was invoked in 6 of the 13 events not covered: Delhi, 2001; Baghdad, 2003; Istanbul, 2003; Madrid, 2004; Bali, 2005; and London, 2005. As can be seen, the irrational problem/enemy and blame/ideology framing tasks were not used after 2005, despite there being 5 more events from 2006 on. This could be because the regularity with which these attacks were occurring and the growing problem of discriminating between regular and irregular conflict in Afghanistan and, in particular, Iraq meant that ‘irrationality’ had lost credibility as a label. While this is probably partly true, it could also be that by 2006 NZ was no longer using reactive framing to the same degree. This interpretation is backed up by the other major trend in these events, which was that there was only one framing task used after 2006 – ‘cowardly’ – which was one of the more mild, but also resonant with the domestic audience. While ‘cowardly’ had been used several times early on in the ICAT, it was to dominate as the reactive problem/enemy identification of choice in the latter half of the ICAT, also being used in 6 of the 13 events not covered: Bali, 2005; Mumbai, 2006; Delhi, 2008; Islamabad, 2008; Mumbai, 2008; and Mumbai, 2011. Thus, there appears to have been a type of switch from ‘irrationality’ to ‘cowardly as the pejorative descriptor of the enemy and their tactics. So popular was ‘cowardly’ that this was the
only reactive frame used for last four events: Delhi, 2008; Islamabad, 2008; Mumbai, 2008; and Mumbai, 2011. What makes this even more interesting is that 2008 marked the transition from Labour to National, with 2 of those 4 being issued by the Key Government. This was, to a degree, evidence of a degree of bipartisan consistency, although as it only involved the use of the same word several times it is hard to draw too strong a conclusion.

There were also several interesting aspects of certain events that deserve mention. First, the Baghdad bombing in 2003 saw Goff implore that the ICAT “should not become an excuse to justify actions that do not conform to international standards of humanity”. What makes this interesting is that it was directed at the US rather than the enemy, continuing the inversion of the reactive seen in the lead up to Iraq a few months earlier. In this particular context, as the ill-advised invasion was turning into an ineptly run occupation, it can be read as a veiled reference to the American role in Iraq, inferring their actions did not ‘conform to international standards of humanity’. By inverting the application of the binary pairing, Goff questions the justness of Iraq and contradicts the reactive narrative’s general delineation of the entire conflict, where the allies are inherently ‘just’. This shows that the reactive does have some malleability, that it is able to be obliquely redeployed against erstwhile allies even as it is being used against the enemy. The other event which is notable is Bali in 2005. This occurred just before the third anniversary of the 2002 attacks and saw a far higher number of reactive frames used than in most of the other unexamined events and also marked the turning point in communications, from the ‘irrational’ to the cowardly’. The higher usage of the reactive could be an ‘echo’ of Bali, 2002. Also, while only conjecture, National had just conceded defeat the day of the attack, after a closely fought election and Clark’s heavy use of the reactive may have been influenced by her domestic political situation.
4.7 REACTIVE FRAMING CONCLUSION

This section will examine the frequency of the reactive counterinsurgent frames for the entire period, seeking to assess the validity of the relevant hypotheses. Both the raw frequency of the framing tasks and the ratio, that is the frequency divided by either the total context word count, the annual context word count or the event word count and then multiplied by 100, will be used to assess these hypotheses. To be clear, raw and ratio counts serve as useful indicators that can be seen as complementary means of examining frequency. First, will be an overview of reactive framing across the entire period, before each framing task is examined individually, to explore the underlying frequencies and contexts of use as well as to provide an outline of the manifest and latent unit parameters of each framing task. To reiterate, the reactive hypotheses that were outlined in Chapter 2 that are be examined here were:

• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher during events.
• The reactive narrative will be used more frequently when there is a wider international audience than a domestic audience.
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher for more deadly and shocking attacks.
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher for attacks on NZ’s allies.
• Over the entire course of the period the reactive frequency will drop from 2001.
• The reactive narrative will predominantly focus on problem diagnoses and enemy identifications.
• The reactive narrative will be of limited utility for the insurgent audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience.

4.7.1 OVERVIEW

In general, the varying frequencies of usage for the reactive narrative show a clear pattern that confirm the above hypotheses. It should be noted that the actual frequency of usage for the reactive counterinsurgent frames was low, but still inferences can be taken that help reinforce the position of the hypotheses.

First, the hypothesis that the frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher during events appears to be confirmed by the data, as does the hypothesis that it will be used more for a wider audience than a domestic one.

4.7.1 Table 1 – Total RFC frequencies for the different contexts, their word counts and each ratio:
As can be seen in the table above, not only was the event context the highest usage as a raw number, but when the total word counts for each context are considered, it was just over five times as frequent as the wider context and almost eight times as frequent as the domestic context. Likewise, while the raw count is higher for the domestic audience than the wider audience, once the word counts have been taken into account, RCFs were one and a half times more likely to be given to the wider audience. The line graph below uses the annual RCF ratio frequency for each context using yearly context word counts to show the predominance of the reactive narrative during events as well as showing the slight dominance of the wider audience over the domestic audience:

It was also hypothesised that the frequency would be higher for more deadly and shocking attacks and that it would be higher for attacks on NZ’s allies, both of which the raw data suggests are accurate, though the ratio results are less conclusive.

4.7.1 Table 2 – Raw total frequencies for RCFs for each event, event word counts and ratio frequencies:
Mumbai, 2003  4   224   1.786
Istanbul, 2003  5   133   3.759
Madrid, 2004  5   239   2.092
Jakarta, 2004  1   344   0.291
London, 2005  5   267   1.873
Bali, 2005  10   262   3.817
Mumbai, 2006  4   230   1.739
Delhi, 2008  1   259   0.386
Islamabad, 2008  2   271   0.738
Mumbai, 2008  4   270   1.481
Mumbai, 2011  5   144   2.083

As can be seen, the highest frequency occurred during Afghanistan, 2001, with a total of 42 reactive framing tasks used, the second highest was 9/11 (41), followed by Bali, 2002, (35) at third. 9/11 and Bali, 2002, impacted NZ’s two most important allies, the US and Australia, respectively, while Afghanistan can was the extenuation of 9/11. After that, the data shows that the events with the most reactive framing were: Baghdad, 2003 (21), Bali, 2005 (10) and Iraq, 2003 (6), which impacted both the US and Australia. Likewise, while a subjective measure, 9/11 was the most ‘shocking’ of the events and duly had the highest raw frequency of any event, especially when Afghanistan, 2001 is included. The relatively limited reactive framing frequency for London, 2005 (5) is somewhat surprising. The following bar graph shows the raw frequencies of reactive frame tasks for each event.

The ratio frequency gained using the event word counts reveals a slightly different outcome. As the bar graph below shows, the highest frequency event was Bali, 2005, followed by Istanbul, 2003, with and Bali, 2002, third, while 9/11 and Afghanistan, 2001, were essentially fourth equal.
While this hypothesis was not completely validated by both raw and ratio frequencies, it is still felt to be relatively accurate because, aside from Istanbul, 2003, the top five events using the ratio frequency were still those considered the most important to NZ’s two key allies, the US and Australia. The reason that Iraq, 2003 did not feature higher is no doubt because of NZ’s opposition to that conflict.

It was also hypothesised that over the course of the ICAT the frequency of reactive framing tasks would drop from 2001. This hypothesis is also reinforced by the data, both raw and ratio.

4.7.1 Table 3 – Total raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of RCFs per year for all contexts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>556</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.441</td>
<td>0.607</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in the above table, the peak year for RCFs was 2002 when considered as a raw frequency count, with 2001 second only to 2002. The following line graph shows these raw frequencies for all contexts and in total. As can be seen, the general trend was for a spike up to 2002, before a precipitous drop by 2003 and then gradual decline from then on, with a slight rise in 2011. It should be noted, however, that as 9/11 occurred in September there was only roughly 16 weeks’ worth of press releases while the 2002 raw frequency comes from a full 52 weeks. Thus, while 2002 had a slightly higher raw count, if these differing time spans are accounted for then 2001 was essentially three times as high.
However, once the annual frequencies are divided by the annual word counts, the ratio figure shows that 2001 was the most frequent year for RCFs, with 2002 as the second most frequent. In fact, RCFs were over twice as common in 2001 than they were in 2002, once the differing word counts have been accounted for. What makes this drop fascinating is that while the attacks were never as big in scale or as audacious as 9/11, because of the increasing number of victim states, the reactive actually became more accurate over time, at least those framing tasks that exaggerated the scope. As can be seen in the graph below, the hypothesis that RCFs would drop from 2001 onward is supported by the ratio frequencies:
That said, the drop is not so clear when the ratios are divided out by context, as is shown in the line graph below. In particular, the event context shows a peak in 2002, followed by a drop in 2003-2004, before more peaks in 2005 and 2011. On the other hand, both the wider and domestic contexts are far more stable, though wider does show a slight peak in 2004. The reason that the event context was so uneven is probably due to a combination of there being no events in certain years, with 2007, 2009 and 2010 all eventless and all being the lowest and the relative significance of events, with those that were the most shocking and that targeted NZ’s closest allies occurring in the years that were the highest, particularly 2001, 2002 and 2005. Essentially, it is to be expected that the event RCFs would fluctuate depending on the number or scale of event in a year as this is specifically what it is measuring.

![Ratio frequency of RCFs for each context annually](image)

It was also hypothesised that the reactive narrative would be used most for the problem/enemy framing tasks, which is also supported by the data.

4.7.1 Table 4 – Total frequencies of RCFs for each framing task:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing Task</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem/Enemy</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blame/Ideology</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor/Victim</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy/Solution</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gaining any ratio is impossible as these are not mutually-exclusive and the discourse cannot be divided into distinct framing task word counts, so the raw numbers will have to suffice. Ratios would have little impact anyway as these figures take in all three contexts. As can be seen in the
table above, the problem/enemy framing task was almost three times as frequent as the next most common, solution, and accounting for almost 60% of the total uses. The below bar graph helps to reinforce the different frequencies of each framing task:

The final RCF hypothesis, that reactive narrative components would be of limited utility for the insurgent audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience, rests on assessing utility. The metrics of utility for the audiences are different; firstly, utility for the insurgent support audience comes from the counterinsurgent legitimising themselves as an actor and justifying their own cause as well as delegitimising the insurgent and compromising the justness of their cause; for the domestic audience, utility comes from how well the counterinsurgent’s communication mobilises support, justifies action and legitimises their role as a counterinsurgent within the domestic audience; while for the allied audience, utility comes from how well the counterinsurgent’s communication justifies the allied cause and how well it mobilises the domestic population. Thus, assessing this part of the hypothesis requires the examination of how well the reactive narrative achieved these outcomes for the three audiences.

The first part of the hypothesis, that the reactive narrative would be of limited utility for the insurgent audience, was well supported by the analysis. The reactive narrative compromised the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause, delegitimised them as an actor and justified the insurgent’s cause while legitimising them as an actor. With regard to the first two components, the conclusion is derived from the exclusive nature of the reactive narrative. The reactive narrative had the potential to alienate, anger and exclude the insurgent audience for a number of reasons. The reactive delineation of threat, enemy and allies demonised and dehumanised, it
reinforced the Orientalist narrative, portrayed the enemy, their religion and their culture as negative outgroup and, consequently, placed all the blame on them. The reactive narrative could also be perceived as hypocritical because the allies’ actions struggled to match their hyperbolic self-descriptions; for example, the identification as ‘civilised nations’ implies a standard of civilised behaviour that the allied actors have not always maintained from the insurgent support population’s point of view. Finally, the solutions proposed by the reactive could be parsed by the insurgent audience as a ‘clash of civilisations’ and even a ‘war on Islam’. It was a ‘war on terrorism’, where terrorism was conflated with the enemy, ‘hunting the enemy down’ with ‘no tolerance’ so they can be ‘brought to [frontier] justice’. Ultimately, the reactive narrative excluded the insurgent support population by not including them. Therefore, an important conclusion is that the reactive has an inverse utility for the domestic and insurgent support populations. In creating a positive ingroup that helped mobilise the domestic audience and reaffirm bonds with the allied actor, the reactive also generates a negative outgroup.

The reactive narrative also helped justify the insurgent’s cause and legitimise them as an actor. There are two aspects to this. With regarding to justifying their cause, the reactive narrative reinforced the insurgent’s own narrative by portraying the conflict in the same apocalyptic Manichean manner, by reinforcing the enemy’s portrayal of the West as hypocrites and through the use the Orientalist narrative that’s origins lie in the Western subjugation of Muslim-dominated areas and figures as an underlying grievance. This portrayal helps make the insurgent’s own apocalyptic cause appear more just. With regard to legitimacy, as well as the previous component feeding in, the reactive exaggerated the capacity of the insurgent, helping position them as a peer competitor and legitimising them as a political actor. It framed the enemy as the ‘most serious existential’ threat of a ‘new era’, unnecessarily inflated al Qaeda’s capacity as an actor akin to the Cold War-era USSR. For an insurgent group that wanted to create a pan-Islamic Caliphate, this inflation would have had a positive impact on their legitimacy.

A final observation is that while the utility of the reactive narrative was perceived to have changed over the course of the period for both the domestic and allied audiences, as will be examined below, this was not as apparent for the insurgent audience. Certainly, there was a small blip in framing around the Iraq Invasion when the counterinsurgent used the reactive to oppose the US, but only months later they reverted to using it to refer to the insurgent support population again. Also, there was a decline in the usage of the reactive narrative over time, but its
impacts on the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent’s cause did not change significantly. Referring to the insurgents as ‘evil’ was no less problematic in 2011 as it was in 2001.

It was also hypothesised that the reactive narrative would be of mixed utility for the domestic audience. The focus, then, is on how the reactive narrative mobilised support, justified the counterinsurgent’s action and legitimised them as an actor within that audience. The findings support this hypothesis, as while the reactive narrative delivered mobilisation for the counterinsurgent, it did so at the risk of compromising the justness of their cause over the long term, and consequently their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent. The reactive narrative’s capacity for mobilising support for the counterinsurgent’s cause comes from its five key qualities. By delineating the situation in a figurative, absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive manner, NZ counterinsurgents were able to create the sense of an overwhelming, immediate and personal risk in the domestic audience through the portrayal of an apocalyptic threat posed by an evil, barbaric and irrational enemy against their own good civilisation. This was apparent in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when NZ counterinsurgents framed the events as an ‘unjustifiable’ ‘attack on all civilised nations’ by ‘evil people’. The reactive narrative is able to defuse the potentially problematic emotional impacts of a terrorist attack while harnessing the more useful emotional outcomes to mobilise support. With regard to the problematic impacts, it reduces confusion by framing the situation in an easily parsed manner, using binaries and absolutes as well as figurative language that sacrifice nuance and accuracy for simplicity and clarity. It also allays concerns regarding the capacity of the counterinsurgent as it portrays the events as unpredictable and unpreventable, the enemy as totally to blame and the response as comprehensive, uncompromising and easily achieved. It also harnesses, and even exacerbates, the fear generated by attacks by extending the scope of the threat and portraying the enemy as evil and irrational and the victim state as innocent and good. This in turn, helps direct the anger towards the enemy, mobilising support for action. The supposition in Chapter 2 that the emotive shockwave that follows a terrorist attack was a component in explaining the reactive narrative’s use was largely supported by the examination. The reactive helps deal with the problematic emotions whilst harnessing and directing those that can be used to provide support in the domestic audience. In particular, the fear generated by a terrorist attack does not appear to be the most important emotive consequences of a terrorist attack, as the counterinsurgent use of the reactive appears to use and even amplify the fear in their own support population as it provides an effective means of mobilisation. If fear was really as dangerous an outcome of a terrorist attack as hypothesised by a number of scholars, then the counterinsurgent would not use the reactive
narrative after an attack.

The utility of the reactive narrative as a means of mobilising support for the counterinsurgent cause is clear: the state is essentially a protection racket, citizens look to their government to protect them from threat, exchanging security for revenue, and the reactive narrative diagnosed the threat after 9/11 as clear and present. NZ counterinsurgents’ use of the reactive narrative framed the threat in such a way that almost any response would be reasonable within the narrative’s own logical parameters. In fact, one important conclusion is that the reactive narrative’s main function is mobilising support, as it creates just such a situation; its central function is to generate the necessary political capital needed for action in the wake of an attack, which it does by utilising and even amplifying the sense of fear in its own constituency whilst simultaneously portraying the situation in simplistic manner that reduces any concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s capacity and directs all the anger following a terrorist attack towards the enemy. Delhi, 2001, was an interesting anomaly, as neither the US nor NZ framed the attack in an expansive manner that connected it to the wider ICAT; however, by Mumbai, 2003, attacks within India by the same group had been brought into the ICAT proper. The reason for this was probably that in 2001 this extension was not required to mobilise support. This reinforces the conclusion that the reactive narrative’s key function is mobilisation. As noted in Chapter 4, the reactive is often empowered by its apparent salience. Terrorist attacks are designed to create fear in the target audience and the counterinsurgent employs this fear to mobilise support. In fact, this apparent salience could help partially explain why the reactive narrative declined over the period, even though NZ did expand the scope of the threat none of the following attacks ever matched 9/11’s scale or audacity and, in turn, this meant that it increasingly lost its utility because of the decrease in salience for the domestic audience, particularly after 2005 when the last attack on a close ally occurred.

However, while the reactive narrative has a powerful mobilisation capacity, it also has the potential to compromise the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause for the domestic audience, and their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent, for a number of reasons. The first can be understood by contrasting how NZ counterinsurgents portrayed the 9/11 attacks as an existential threat and yet only ever deployed around 40 NZSAS combat personnel at a time, starting several months after the event, then in the coming years added at most several hundred NZDF personnel in largely noncombat roles. There was a major incongruence between the way NZ diagnosed the threat and their response. If the threat really was existential, then the prudent response would
have been far more immediate, more significant in scope and with a greater focus on combat. The reasons that the reactive narrative can compromise the justness of the cause and the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy can be drawn from that contrast between threat and response: the reactive did not match NZ’s actual response. The reactive narrative is a powerful means of mobilising support in the wake of a shocking terrorist attack, but its salience was short-lived following 9/11. Not only did ‘normality’ resume for most soon after, and the scale and audacity of subsequent attacks decreased over the coming years, but the reactive was also almost totally incompatible with NZ’s ongoing response. When the enemy is portrayed as evil, irrational and, consequently, extremely dangerous, non-military solutions are essentially illogical. Thus, another conclusion is that, for NZ, the mobilisational utility of the reactive narrative appears to have had an inverse relationship with its capacity to justify and legitimise. That is, while the reactive narrative may have helped marshal support, particularly in the immediate wake of 9/11, overall the reactive narrative would have had a detrimental impact on the ‘rightness and properness’ of the counterinsurgent’s cause, and consequently their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent, as the political and military action the counterinsurgent engaged in over the next ten years was largely inconsistent with the narrative components they had used to mobilise support.

Another reason the reactive narrative caused potential justness issues for the counterinsurgent was that, by its nature, it is not consistent. One of the most striking examples of this was the ongoing framing of terrorism as an irrational tactic and, consequently, of the enemy as irrational, which became more and more tenuous as the enemy reused successful tactics, refined other less successful ones and struck specific targets of its enemies. This issue became magnified when NZ framed attacks by the Iraqi insurgency as irrational, having only months earlier predicted them as a logical outcome of the invasion. Also, as the line between war and insurgency blurs, what was a ‘rational’ tactic in the former was still being framed as ‘irrational’ for the latter, further revealing the inconsistency. Likewise, inconsistencies became apparent as the use of terrorism as an enemy stand-in became ever more problematic over time as it had to encompasses increasingly diverse enemies within its semantic domain, particularly as different allies began using it in different ways before the Iraq Invasion. These issues revealed how the use of a figurative, absolute and hyperbolic narrative could come to compromise the justness of the counterinsurgent cause and, ultimately, their legitimacy, particularly over time and when the narrative is being used by an array of different actors.

The reactive narrative was also hypothesised as being of utility for the allied audience. This was
well supported by the analysis. There are two aspects to this, that the reactive narrative mobilised the domestic audience and justified the allied cause. The former has largely been discussed above; however, one reactive narrative quality is fundamental: the hyperbolic nature of the reactive. The exaggeration of the threat and enemy – aided by other reactive qualities – was of fundamental utility for the allied actor as it helped engender a sense of personal risk in the NZ population. It helped mobilise NZ by making the American problems NZ’s problems. The reactive narrative’s capacity to heighten the potential threat in such a geographically remote population delivered the greatest mobilisational utility for the allied audience, turning what could have been considered an attack specifically targeting the US into one that also targeted NZ. For the allied audience, the reactive narrative’s capacity to extend the threat so that it could help mobilise even a distant and relatively unthreatened population was its most powerful asset.

Generally, the reactive narrative also helped justify the allied actor’s cause, largely because it reinforced the Bush Administration’s own original narrative. That is, the reactive narrative helped make the US cause appear right and proper because it reiterated many of the same framing tasks that were central to the US ‘war on terror’ narrative. In particular, the many aspects of the reactive that helped to obscure any blame that could be directed at the US helped make their cause appear right and proper. By diagnosing the threat, identifying the enemy and actors and attributing blame in the same figurative, absolute and hyperbolic manner, NZ, as a geographically isolated state, gave the US’s own framing greater credibility and NZ’s position as an apparently independent actor would serve to empower the US cause. The reactive components of NZ’s narrative were, in most cases, so similar to the US narrative that they were virtually indistinguishable. Often, NZ reactive framing tasks overtly mimicked US rhetoric, with US President Bush identified as the source in some cases. There were enough clear cases of mimicking, particularly early on in the ICAT, that these alone are considered important reinforcements of the US cause. Interestingly, it was actually Clark’s mimicking of Howard after Bali, 2002, that revealed the influence the victim state’s rhetorical response can have on other allied counterinsurgents. While the response to 9/11 was not as clear cut, mimicking was more apparent in the lead up to the Afghan Invasion, where most of the explicit mimicking of Bush occurred, including the binary ‘with us or against us’ enemy identification considered a key justification of the US ‘war on terror’. While some aspects of the reactive narrative no doubt came from a shared vocabulary between NZ and the US, there were a number of clear cases of mimicking, such that NZ’s use of the reactive was probably largely influenced by the US.
Critically, however, NZ’s use of the reactive narrative in the lead up to the Iraq Invasion did have potential issues for the justness of allied actor’s cause. It was at this point that NZ’s reactive framing diverged in intent from the US cause, even if did not actually shift in content. While the US was using the rhetorical device of substituting terrorism for an enemy as a means of connecting 9/11 with Iraq, NZ used this same device to question the impending invasion. Thus, at this point, NZ’s references to the ‘campaign against terrorism’ were proposing the opposite solution to the US’s uses of this formulation. Likewise, whereas before NZ’s framing of terrorism as the primary threat justified the US cause, in the lead up to Iraq, NZ used it to frame their opposition to US actions. NZ also inverted the human-inhuman binary, implying the US had not met ‘international standards of humanity’. The same figurative, absolute and hyperbolic qualities that enable the reactive to be of utility for an allied audience also allow it to be turned against them. Thus, while generally the reactive narrative had a positive impact on the alliance, there were issues from early 2003 onward, once NZ had used it against the US.

The analysis will now turn to each reactive framing task individually.

4.7.2 PROBLEM/ENEMY

The hypothesis that the most RCFs would be problem diagnoses and enemy identifications has been demonstrated. These framing tasks far outweighed any of the others. In this section, the frequency of each problem and enemy framing task over the entire period will be examined and the relevant hypothesis – that RCFs will be used more for events than other contexts and more to wider audiences than domestic; and that they would decline over the period – will be assessed. Also, rather than assessing the hypothesis that the frequency would be higher for more shocking attacks and higher for close allies as few of the frequencies for each individual framing task are high enough for that type of analysis, it will rather state whether the framing task first appeared after a shocking event that targeted a close ally of NZ as this is a derivative component of this hypothesis.

4.7.2.1 EXISTENTIAL THREAT

To be considered in this section an identification must diagnose the threat as existential, implying that either humanity or civilisation was threatened. This latent unit can be expressed in a range of ways. The majority stated that there was an attack on or threat to ‘humanity’, ‘civilisation’, ‘civilised nations’, ‘civilised societies’ and ‘civilised people’. The other examples were: ‘the threat of catastrophic terrorism’ and “vulnerability of all of us to the threat posed by organised
international terrorism”.

4.7.2.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of existential threat RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<th>Ratio</th>
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<td>0.037</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The usage patterns for the existential threat diagnosis fit most of the RCF hypotheses. While 36% of all uses were during events and 57% given to a wider audience in raw frequency, the ratio comparisons indicate events three times as frequent as wider and 37 times as frequent as domestic. Likewise, it was more commonly used in wider than domestic context when considered in both raw and ratio form. Also, the first use appeared in the immediate wake of 9/11 and 50% of all uses were in 2001. When considered as a ratio RCFs were almost four times as frequent in 2001 as in the next most frequent year, 2002. This frame task almost disappeared after 2002, with just several of what could be called ‘echoes’ appearing in 2005 and 2007. These echoes are reappearances of the reactive narrative in a non-event context long after the significant event that caused the use of RCFs, often with a strategic function. For example, the 2007 echo – “New Zealand was shocked that terrorists had struck at the heart of the United States, and saw it as an attack against all humanity” – was given by Clark to an American audience at the height of the NZ-US rapprochement, referring back to 9/11, suggesting that it had a strategic alliance maintenance function.10

4.7.2.2 TERRORISM AS AN IRRATIONAL TACTIC

This section will focus on statements that specifically imply that terrorism is an irrational tactic. While alienating problem/enemy identifications could be considered to indirectly imply terrorism is not rational because they suggest the enemy is irrational, these are not included here but are in the irrational blame section. The identifications included here are specifically directed at terrorism as a tactic. In practice, this latent unit will focus on the specific references that terrorism is ‘incomprehensible’, ‘irrational’, ‘indiscriminate’, ‘pointless’, ‘senseless’, that it ‘can strike any place at any time’, that “distance is no guarantee of protection” and that ‘no one is immune from the threat’.

4.7.2.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of terrorism as irrational tactic RCF:

10 Clark, “Address to Asia Society Luncheon.”
The usage patterns conform to most of the RCF hypotheses. This RCF was used more for events than other in other contexts. It was twice times as likely to be used during an event than given to a wider audience and almost five times as likely than the domestic context when considered as a raw figure, and almost 10 times more frequent than wider uses and 35 times more frequent than domestic uses when word count is considered. Likewise, it was more commonly used in a wider context than domestic in both raw and ratio forms. Also, the first use appeared during the immediate response to 9/11 and while the highest raw frequency was 2002, when considered as a ratio it was one and a half times as frequent in 2001 as the next most frequent year, which was 2002. Over time, usage gradually declined, with only 2 uses after 2007. All 3 uses in 2007 were versions of the ‘strike anywhere’ identification that suddenly reappeared after not being used since Bali, 2002. They were given by Clark and Goff in the last half of 2007 to domestic audiences and while there could be any number of reasons for the reappearance, their clustering within a six month period suggests the first usage influenced the others, that they are ‘echoes’ of the first 2007 ‘echo’. These 3 uses in 2007 make the results for this RCF somewhat ambiguous but generally speaking it still appears to match the relevant hypothesis that RCFs will decline over time.

4.7.2.3 TERRORISM AS THE ENEMY

This section will consider all examples where the term ‘terrorism’ is used as an enemy stand-in. Specifically, cases where the name of the enemy organisation would be more accurately used than the word ‘terrorism’ as a problem diagnosis.

4.7.2.3 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of terrorism as the enemy RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.393</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.556</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.158</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Terrorism as an enemy stand-in fits some of the hypothesised RCF patterns. While in raw frequencies, event frequency is the lowest, when word count is accounted for it was two times
more common than wider uses and over three times more common than domestic uses. Also, while wider and domestic contexts are equal as raw counts, it was almost twice as common as a ratio for wider contexts. Part of the reason it was used so often to a domestic audience is probably because this particular formulation was found in the operational names used by the counterinsurgent, including the most common versions: ‘campaign against terrorism’ and ‘international campaign against terrorism’. These account for 29 uses, while the other formulations that use this ‘against terrorism’ format account for another 25. This RCF was first used in the immediate wake of 9/11. Its use as campaign name helps explain why 2006, a key year for the NZ-US rapprochement, was the highest ratio usage rather than 2001 – the counterinsurgent was seeking to reinforce their credentials as an active participant in the ICAT to the allied audience, which is reinforced by the 9 uses to a wider audiences versus the 7 to a domestic (0.149/0.031), showing this RCF was almost five times as likely to be given to a wider audience that year than to a domestic one as a ratio count.

4.7.2.4 MOST SERIOUS GLOBAL THREAT

This section will examine the usage patterns of all references to the threat from terrorism as being ‘primary’, ‘principal’, ‘the most serious’, ‘the greatest’, or ‘global’. The first four are manifest units, while the last latent unit requires the threat to be described as either threatening all of the countries in the world or threatening at a global level, as encapsulated by Anderton’s already noted statement that “no country can be complacent”.

4.7.2.4 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of most serious global threat RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These identifications do not follow the hypothesised RCF patterns as strongly as others have, with more given to a domestic audience than during an event or to a wider audience individually as a raw frequency. However, the ratio shows it was still almost four times more commonly given during an event than to a wider or domestic audience. Also, while it was higher in raw count for the domestic audience, it was slightly more commonly given to a wider audience than

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11 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist attacks in US.”
domestic as a ratio – suggesting it has a strong mobilising potential for the domestic audience. While it was first used immediately after 9/11, this RCF did not fit the decline from 2001 pattern, as 2004 was highest both in raw and ratio frequencies, though it did disappear from use by 2007. The ‘global’ component made up 9 of the ten uses from 2004 onwards and this could be explained by something that will be discussed in greater detail in the deliberative chapter, which is the ideological influence of the ruling party on the framing of the ICAT. To wit, the Labour Party have a strongly internationalist focus and this leads them to refer to many aspects of the conflict in terms that emphasise the international and global nature of the threat, the actors and the solution. The ‘most serious’ aspect fits the declining usage hypothesis better, with all but a single use in the first three years of the period.

4.7.2.5 ALIENATING PROBLEM/ENEMY DIAGNOSES

The section will be focused on the use of alienating terms applied to both the problem and enemy. Distinguishing between those applied to the problem and those applied to the enemy is difficult as even those terms not specifically applied to the enemy transfer to them. For example, when an attack is referred to as an ‘evil act’, it also infers the perpetrator is ‘evil’ too. NZ used alienating identifications – specifically the manifest terms ‘evil/s’, ‘barbaric’, ‘brutal/ity’, ‘cold blood/ed’, ‘scourge’, ‘plague/d’, ‘symptom’, ‘cowardly’ and ‘cowardice’ to refer either to terrorism or the enemy.

4.7.2.5 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating problem/enemy RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These diagnoses followed most of the hypothesised RCF patterns. In particular, context, as it was predominantly used during events when considered in both raw and ratio frequencies. For the former it was almost 10 times more likely to be used during an event than to a wider audience and almost five times more likely than to a domestic audience, while for the latter it was roughly 44 times more likely to be used during an event than to either a wider audience or domestic audience. That said, this RCF was used more in domestic contexts than wider ones in both raw and ratio counts, though both of these figures are negligible when compared to the dominance of use during events. Also, these diagnoses first appeared right after 9/11 and peaked
in 2001, before gradually disappearing from the counterinsurgent’s vocabulary both in raw and ratio frequencies, being almost twice as likely to be used in 2001 than the next highest year, 2005, in ratio.

4.7.2.6 TERROR
This section will consider all uses of the manifest unit ‘terror’ including when it is used as part of a phrase like ‘acts of terror’.

4.7.2.6 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of terror RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The usage patterns are relatively consistent with the RCF hypothesis, with the main issue being the predominance of uses to domestic audiences. However, while the raw frequency is higher for domestic audiences, the ratio count fits the hypothesis regarding use during events. That said, the domestic context was more common than the wider context in both raw and ratio counts. This RCF does fit the hypothesised decline over time, appearing on the eve of the Afghan Invasion, peaking in 2002 for the raw count and peak in 2001 for ratio count before fading from usage by 2007. The raw and ratio counts for this RCF suggest it may be a weaker form of the reactive narrative.

4.7.2.7 NEW ERA THREAT
This section will focus on any identification that infers that these attacks marked the beginning of a new generation of terrorist attacks, one that specifically or indirectly implies that the attacks were not an aberration but rather the beginning of a new era.

4.7.2.7 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of new generation threat RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ‘new era’ identification largely fits the hypothesised RCF patterns. It was mostly given
during an event, while only 29% of raw uses were during events, the ratio frequencies show it was almost five times as commonly used during events than to a wider audience and 15 times more frequent for event than domestic uses. Likewise, it was more likely to be used in a wider context than domestic in both raw and ratio counts. It was first used on during the lead up to the Afghan Invasion and the majority of uses occurred in 2001 when considered in both raw and ratio frequencies, with the ratio frequency showing it was six times more common than the next highest year, 2004. The usages in 2004 and 2007 are ‘echoes’, remnants of the reactive frame used in the wake of 9/11, fulfilling a strategic function. The first was given during an APEC conference and the second during the NZ-US rapprochement, suggesting they were focused on alliance maintenance and domestic mobilisation, respectively. This particular identification has a powerful mobilising capacity as it portrays the threat as ongoing. What makes this particular identification interesting is that while it was discreditable after 9/11, it could be argued it actually became more credible over time as there were a number of related attacks though none of these came close to matching 9/11 in scale. Its virtual abandonment after 2001 reinforces the hypothesis that the reactive narrative is adopted in the wake of a particularly shocking attack but its extreme nature means that it is not maintained.

4.7.2.8 ENEMY BINARY

This section will examine the usage of the enemy binary which conflates two separate enemies into a single category. This latent unit was first expressed using the phrase ‘share their fate’ during the Afghan Invasion. The other way it was expressed was when the counterinsurgent referred to al Qaeda and the Taleban without distinguishing between them. To be clear, a statement such as Clark’s in 2007 regarding “Al Qaeda elements being sheltered by the Talibain” is not a conflation. Goff’s statement from 2006 about “[v]iolence from Talibain and al Qaeda insurgents” is, because it does not differentiate between these two different actors. The enemy binary was used 19 times:

4.7.2.8 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of enemy binary RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Wider</th>
<th>Dom.</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/node/28718
This identification does not fit all the hypotheses. It was used most to the domestic audience in raw count and was only used marginally more often during events than to a domestic audience when considered as a ratio. Also, it was used more to a domestic audience than wider one in both raw and ratio counts, which could be because it was a necessary simplification when referring to a complex enemy in a domestic context. It was used first in the lead up to the Afghan Invasion, though also problematic for the RCF hypotheses was that its use peaked in 2006, in raw count, and 2005, in ratio count. The reason for this could be that during the 2005-2006 period the Afghan insurgency had become worse, the NZ PRT mandate had been extended and the counterinsurgent wanted to reinforce the need for the extended deployment.¹⁵

4.7.3 BLAME/IDEOLOGY

4.7.3.1 IRRATIONAL BLAME

This section will examine the usage patterns of the irrational blame identification, which is categorised as a statement that infers the enemy are irrational. Some negatively connect the enemy’s ideology or motivation and their strategy and tactics, though the parameters of this blame identification are broad, including all the terms identifications that infer terrorism is an irrational tactic plus all of the alienating problem identifications, references to ‘agendas of hate’ and other blame frames that imply the insurgent enemy are irrational actors such as having “no bottom line” to the action they will take.

4.7.3.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of irrational blame RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>0.232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The irrational blame identification fits most of the RCF hypotheses. It was used most during events, with the raw frequency for events showing it was used almost four times more often than to a wider audience and almost twice as much as to a domestic. The ratio count shows it was

used during an event just over 14 times more often than either other context. However, it was
given more to a domestic audience than wider one, in both raw and ratio counts. This was
unexpected, especially as the deliberative blame framing tasks were so frequently given to a
domestic audience. This RCF fits the decline hypothesis, it appeared in the immediate wake of
9/11, and peaked in 2001 in both raw and ratio frequencies and then faded from that point on. It
was almost three times as frequent in 2001 as the next highest year, 2005, when considered as a
ratio. Also telling is that 2001 and 2002 account for 51% of the total uses, when they are only
20% of the total word count.

4.7.3.2 NOT MUSLIMS
This section will examine the frequency and pattern of use for any identification that stated that
the enemy were ‘not Muslims’, including inferences they have ‘hijacked their faith’ or that they
‘discredited the cause they claim to represent’.

4.7.3.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of not Muslims RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This RCF fits some of the hypotheses. While it was not used most during events when
considered in raw form it was used more during an event than in other contexts when
considered as a ratio frequency. Furthermore, it was used more to a wider audience than to a
domestic one in both raw and ratio form. However, while it was used in the lead up to the
Afghan Invasion, it does not fit the declining usage as it was used more in 2004 than any other
year in both raw and ratio frequency counts, which can be explained by the interfaith conference
in 2004, which both uses referenced.16

4.7.4 ACTOR/VICTIM

5.19.4.1 ALIENATING ACTOR IDENTIFICATION

This section will focus on this latent unit by examining the usage patterns of any identifications
that identify the allied actors as ‘civilised’, ‘humanity’, ‘freedom’, ‘peaceful’ or ‘decent’, including

16 Clark, “Address at CEO APEC Summit.”; “Phil Goff, “Eminent New Zealanders to Attend Inter-Faith Meeting,”
all lexemes of civilised. With regard to ‘democratic’, the identification must specify that all the allied actors are ‘democratic’ or at least infer this, with the statement after Bali-02 regarding “other countries who like us value freedom and democracy” was the weakest form of this.

4.7.4.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating actor RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These identifications fit all the RCF hypotheses. They were used most during events in both raw and ratio counts. The ratio counts show that they were almost six times more common during events than to a wider audience and 21 times more common during events than for domestic contexts. Also, this RCF was more commonly used in a wider context than a domestic one in both raw and ratio counts. Likewise, the first examples were given immediately after 9/11, and 2001 was the highest year for both raw and ratio frequencies, with the 2001 uses almost three times that of 2002, the next highest year, when the frequencies are adjusted for word count. In total, 73% of all uses occurred in the first two years of the ICAT though they only account for 20% of the total word count.

4.7.4.2 ALIENATING VICTIM DESCRIPTION

This section will examine all the uses of the term ‘innocent’ and ‘good’ to refer to victims. To be counted, they have to be referring to actual victims of attacks rather than in the abstract.

4.7.4.2 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating victim RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This RCFs fits several of the hypothesised patterns. They were used most during events when considered in both raw and ratio counts. They were almost 10 times as likely to be used during an event than to a wider audience and 22 times more likely to be used during an event than to a domestic audience, when word count is accounted for. Likewise, they were more likely to be given to a wider audience than a domestic one in both raw and ratio counts. However, while they
did appear in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, they did not peak in 2001, but were actually most common in 2002 as a raw frequency and in 2008 as a ratio, though 2001 was second highest in both raw and ratio.

4.7.5 SOLUTION

4.7.5.1 WAR ON AN ABSTRACT NOUN
This section will focus on all solution identifications that use the terrorism as enemy stand-in formulations that then propose to use military means against the abstract noun, specifically the manifest units: ‘war against terrorism’, ‘campaign against terrorism’, ‘fight against terrorism’, ‘fight/ing terrorism,’ ‘defeat/ing terrorism’, ‘eradicate terrorism’, ‘combat/ing terrorism’ and ‘fight the scourge of terrorism’.

4.7.5.1 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of war on abstract noun RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These solutions fit the most of the hypothesised RCF patterns. With regard to context, these solutions were roughly half as likely to be used during an event as to a wider or domestic audience in raw numbers, but as a ratio it was almost three and almost five times more likely to be used during an event than to a wider or domestic audience, respectively. Also, while more commonly given to domestic audiences than wider as a raw figure, the opposite was true as a ratio count. Likewise, it was first used in the wake of 9/11 and while it peaked in 2002 as a raw frequency, 2001 was the highest year as a ratio frequency, with usage essentially declining over time. The reason the raw frequencies do not fit as well is probably due to ‘campaign against terrorism’ being used as the campaign name for the overall operation, hence the number of uses to domestic audiences and spike in 2002 when the counterinsurgent was mobilising support for their own deployments.

4.7.5.2 JUSTICE
This section will examine the usage patterns of the term ‘justice’. To be included here this manifest unit must either refer to the need to ‘bring’ the enemy to ‘justice’ or for the enemy to be ‘brought’ to ‘justice’.
This solution fits the hypothesised RCF patterning. The context usage shows that this was far more prevalent during events for both raw and ratio; in particular, the ratio counts are revealing, with the ‘justice’ solution eight times more likely to be used during events than to a wider audience and almost 23 times more likely to be used during event than to a domestic audience.

Also, it was more commonly given to a wider audience than domestic one when considered in both raw and ratio counts. The framing task first appeared after 9/11 and there was a rapid decline from the 2001 peak, in both raw and ratio frequencies, also fits the pattern. This RCF was six times more likely to be used in 2001 than in the next highest ratio frequency year, 2002, and essentially disappeared after 2003 except for a single use in 2009, when it was used by the National Government in their ‘snap debate on Afghanistan’ when the new government is attempting to remobilise support for the Afghanistan deployment.\textsuperscript{17}

\subsection*{4.7.5.3 NO TOLERANCE}

The ‘no tolerance’ solution is a manifest unit, to be included here this exact phrase must be used.

This solution identification fits several of the RCF hypotheses perfectly. It was only used during events and was not used in a wider or domestic context at all. The only hypothesis it does not fit is that wider context uses would be more prevalent than to domestic but considering how well it fits the other hypotheses this is not problematic as in some respects this hypothesis is subordinate to the one relating to the reactive narrative being used most during events. Also, it

appeared in the immediate wake of 9/11 and disappeared by 2003. While it was equal in usage as a raw count across these first three years, as a ratio it peaked 2001, declining by 2003.

4.7.5.4 TARGETED

This section will examine the frequency of solution descriptions as ‘targeted’. To be included, this manifest unit must either use the word ‘targeted’ or phrase ‘not indiscriminate’.

4.7.5.4 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of targeted RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This solution largely fits the hypothesised patterns for the RCF. With regard to events, while the raw figures favour the domestic context, the ratio shows that it was twice as frequently used during an event as to a domestic audience. That said, it was not used at all in a wider context and was used frequently for a domestic audience. This was probably due to the counterinsurgent’s desire to portray their own military action in a minimised manner to their domestic population, something that will be explored in the deliberative chapter. The annual pattern fits better, with both raw and ratio counts matching the hypothesis of peaking in 2001 and declining after that.

4.7.5.5 ALIENATING SOLUTIONS

This section will analyse the frequency of alienating solutions. Specifically, this section will examine the manifest usages of the phrases ‘root out’ and ‘hunted down’.

4.7.5.5 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies and ratio frequencies of alienating solutions RCF:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dom.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These solutions follow most of the hypothesised RCFs patterns. They were only used during an event, though this does of course go against the hypothesis that they would be more commonly used for a wider audience than a domestic one, but as noted this is subordinate to the hypothesis that suggested they would be used most often for events. They were also first used in the lead up
to the Afghan Invasion and were used most often in 2001 in both raw and ratio counts, before declining very rapidly and leaving the discourse by 2002.

The thesis will now examine the deliberative narrative.
CHAPTER FIVE
DELIBERATIVE COUNTERINSURGENT FRAMES

This chapter will examine the use of deliberative counterinsurgent frames (DCFs). The reason for this is that the deliberative narrative is not a ‘reactive’ one, but rather is relatively consistent and cohesive over time and thus does not require the same event-centric focus. That said, there will be reference to changes over time where relevant but this will be done within framing task sections and does not determine the structure of the chapter. Because of this structure, the annual and context word counts will be provided with each framing task and some preliminary examination of consistency will be given, though this will vary depending on relevance for each specific framing task. With regard to consistency, here it is taken as being used with little variation over the entire period. The word counts exclude any reactive uses – for example, the term ‘terrorism’ is reactive when used as an enemy stand-in but deliberative when used otherwise as a problem diagnosis. Also, the ratio, that is the raw frequency divided by the total or annual context word count times 100, will be referred to where relevant in this chapter but due to readability will not be given in the tables. With regard to explanation of latent units, while this will occur in the introduction to a framing task, in some cases this will be relatively limited as there will be also be examples given during the full analysis that are intended to help provide the parameters of these units.

5.1 PROBLEM/ENEMY

The purpose of this section is to examine the use of DCFs to diagnose the problem and identify the enemy. The main criteria for inclusion here is that the framing task is inclusive for the insurgent audience, with that inclusivity coming largely from the other four qualities of the deliberative narrative – literal, nuanced, constricted and restrained. That said, of all the framing task categories, the problem/enemy section includes the most borderline DCFs, in that sometimes their inclusivity came as much from them not being exclusive as being explicitly inclusive. This is largely due to their focus, as they still seek to diagnose problems and identify enemies, which is difficult to do in an overtly inclusive manner.

5.1.1 DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM

This section will look at how the counterinsurgent diagnosed the problem using the manifest units: ‘terrorism’, ‘insurgency’, and what will be referred to as the ‘attack’ terms of ‘terrorist attack’, ‘act of terrorism’, ‘act’ and ‘event’. As will be assessed below, these are literal, nuanced,
constricted, restrained and inclusive, though there is some variation.

5.1.1 Table 1 – Diagnosing the problem, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>terrorism</th>
<th>insurgency</th>
<th>terrorist attack</th>
<th>act of terrorism</th>
<th>act</th>
<th>event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.1 Table 2 – Diagnosing the problem, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>terrorism</th>
<th>insurgency</th>
<th>terrorist attack</th>
<th>act of terrorism</th>
<th>act</th>
<th>event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTENT**

None of these fit the hypothesis of consistent use in either raw or ratio counts. This is probably explained by their nature as problem diagnoses, they would drop over time as less attacks occurred. When considered as raw numbers, the majority of these diagnoses fit the hypothesised DCF pattern regarding domestic over wider use, but as ratios most do not. That said, ‘terrorist attacks’, the second most common, was used most for a domestic audience in both raw and ratio. ‘Terrorism’ and ‘terrorist attack/s’ formed the key aspects of the DCF problem diagnosis, comprising 83% together. The usage of ‘insurgency’ is also insightful as it only entered the lexicon in 2006 and was only applied to Afghanistan for the final 4 uses.

These diagnoses are credible as they all literally describe the situations to which they refer – technically speaking, the occurrences of 9/11 and the ongoing violence are all examples of ‘terrorism’, ‘terrorist attacks’, ‘acts’, ‘events’ and ‘insurgency’. In general, they are all considered accurate, though ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ do have issues as neither are as nuanced or constricted as the other terms. With respect to nuance, both have a political ‘taint’ to them that limits their accuracy. Tilly explains: “terrorism is so ‘real’ that it requires no extra definition,
‘true’ that no interpretation is necessary, so ‘concrete’ that no meaning need to be inferred”.¹

“Insurgency’ is also problematic; it only began to be used by NZ after the US started using it in
Iraq and the US used the term in a cynical manner to obscure what was occurring in the
occupied state.² NZ’s decision to begin using this term, first for Iraq and then for the ICAT, is
troubling because this use by the US as a means of avoiding more politically problematic labels
like ‘civil war’. The pejorative nature of ‘terrorism’ and insurgency’ means they label “violence of
which we do not approve”, but then the counterinsurgent is trying to direct opprobrium.³ More
problematic is that they leave scale and scope open to interpretation, such that while not
exaggerated, they are not constricted either. Despite these issues, they are not seen being as
problematic as the reactive diagnoses, they are just not as nuanced or constricted as the other
‘attack’ terms. In particular, the other terms are more informative as they specify an actual
situation – an ‘act’, ‘attack’ or ‘event’. Admittedly, used without ‘terrorist’ these are less nuanced
as they don’t specify the nature of the situation, but they are very constricted in their scope.
‘Terrorist attack/s’ is the most accurate and informative as in a single phrase it provides three
key details – that it was an ‘attack’ by ‘terrorists’ that used ‘terrorist’ methods, giving nuanced
details while narrowing the possible scope of the threat.

AUDIENCE

While all these diagnoses would probably match the insurgent support population’s experience,
the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ may have mixed salience because they prejudge the
situation and are not restrictive enough to exclude even the less extreme supporter. This
pejorative, all-encompassing nature was something British Muslims commented on in
interviews.⁴ Bin Laden’s position was mixed, he said that “the United States brands as terrorist
anyone... opposed to its imperialist policy and hegemony” but also stated “if liberating my land is
called terrorism, this is a great honour for me”.⁵ Still, all these diagnoses convey the
counterinsurgent’s opinion in a relatively restrained manner that avoids provoking negative
emotions in the insurgent support population, with ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ inferring an
inclusive agency and humanity on the enemy. The ‘attack’ terms aid the justness of the
counterinsurgent’s cause as they are unlikely to alienate, anger or, consequently, exclude the

¹ Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, Terror and Taboo: The Follies, Fables and Faces of Terrorism (New York:
² Anthony R. DiMaggio, Mass Media, Mass Propaganda: Examining American News in the "War on Terror" (Lanham, MD:
³ Alex P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, &
⁴ McGovern, Countering Terror or Counter-Productive? 38.
insurgent audience, but there are issues for ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ as they are pejorative and their lack of scope means unconnected situations can be linked, increasing the insurgent’s apparent capacity, legitimising them.

These diagnoses would be salient for the domestic audience. As Tilly notes, ‘terrorism’ requires no extra definition because it is such a dominant descriptor and for this reason it would fit New Zealanders’ narrative and match their experiences. Likewise, the other descriptors would match as they are commonly experienced terms, excluding ‘insurgency’, which is more obscure and specialised. While ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ provide nuanced information on the situation, they do not totally limit fear as they do not constrict scope and can be applied to many groups and attacks across time and geography. The other terms are all control fear as they refer to a specific ‘act’, ‘event’ or ‘attack’, constricting the scope to the specific situation. All of the terms are able to reduce confusion as they provide literal labels, but they offer limited reduction of concern and, aside from ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ would not direct anger as they are not pejorative. Their lack of scope means ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ can be connected to unrelated COIN situations, which can cause legitimacy issues depending on those linked situations. Overall, however, these identifications would justify the counterinsurgent’s cause though, with the exception of ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’, their literal, nuanced, constricted and restrained nature means they have limited mobilisational power.

Generally, these diagnoses would have a limited salience for the allied actor. They do not fit the US narrative as these terms all suggest that the threat is posed by an actor with agency, which implies that there are causal factors underlying the acts. Overall, they are all technical descriptions of the threat and while ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ do not constrict scope, they do not exaggerate it. However, ‘insurgency’ appears to have been mimicked, so its salience and utility would be greater as it did help downplay negative aspects of the ICAT when the US desired this suppression later in the period. While they are not specifically counterproductive to the US cause, these diagnoses do not aid it as they do not mobilise support within NZ and actually denote underlying causational factors to a somewhat sceptical domestic audience. As such, they are unlikely to have a positive impact on alliance maintenance.

5.1.2 IDENTIFYING THE ENEMY

The counterinsurgent used many DCF terms to identify the enemy, specifically the manifest

6 Tilly, “Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists.”
7 Jackson, Writing the War on Terror; Pecastaing, “Rethinking the War on Terror,” 81.
units ‘terrorist’, ‘insurgent’, ‘perpetrator’, ‘al Qaeda’, ‘bin Laden’ and ‘Taleban’ – excluding any reactive references of the last two. As will be examined below, these DCF identifications are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, though there is some variation.

5.1.2 Table 1 – Identifying the enemy, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>terrorist</th>
<th>insurgent</th>
<th>perpetrator</th>
<th>bin Laden</th>
<th>al Qaeda</th>
<th>Taleban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.2 Table 2 – Identifying the enemy, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>terrorist</th>
<th>insurgent</th>
<th>perpetrator</th>
<th>bin Laden</th>
<th>al Qaeda</th>
<th>Taleban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTENT**

Generally, these identifications were not used consistency over the period in raw or ratio counts, except for ‘al Qaeda’, which was consistent in both, excluding a spike in 2005. This lack of consistency was probably due to their focus on the enemy, which would decline with reduced attacks. Most, however, were used more to a domestic rather than wider audience as both raw and ratio figures, excluding ‘perpetrator’ and ‘Taleban’. The most common DCF aspect used to identify the enemy was ‘terrorist’, accounting for 65% of all identifications. One point of interest is the total disappearance of ‘bin Laden’ from the discourse after 2001, which probably relates to the failure to capture or kill him in Afghanistan. Also, ‘insurgent’ matches that of ‘insurgency’, but unlike ‘insurgency’ was only ever applied to Afghanistan.

In general, all of these terms are impossible to discredit as they are literal representations, especially the proper names. However, there are the same accuracy issues for ‘terrorist’ and

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8 These uses exclude any binary forms counted in the reactive section.
‘insurgent’ as with their diagnostic lexemes. They are not totally nuanced or constricted because they lack scope and serve as pejorative political labels that are selectively applied. Also, for ‘terrorist’, “[d]efining them via their use of a certain tactic (terrorism), which they share with every other insurgent movement in history, is less analytically useful than defining them in terms of their strategic and tactical approach.” It “erases any incentive that an audience might have to understand the point of view of those individuals and groups so that it can ignore the history behind their grievances”. However, ‘insurgent’ is also problematic as the US cynically used it to control perception of the situation in Iraq. As with ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’, however, the counterinsurgent is attempting to denigrate these actions and these terms help deliver this. More troubling, they provide no scope and obscure differences amongst enemies, reducing nuance.

Of particular interest with regard to accuracy is ‘perpetrator’ as this means to “be responsible for; commit: perpetrate a crime”. Many have argued that the attacks should have been described as crimes and this term provides nuanced information about the nature of the event, specifically agency and guilt. ‘Perpetrator’ causatively connects the enemy to the event by denoting that they are responsible for the crime. Use of the proper names is as nuanced and constricted as an enemy identification can get; it is also informative as it shows they are able to determine responsibility for events, which is essential in COIN.

AU迪ENCE

These identifications would probably be of mixed salience for the insurgent audience. ‘Terrorist’ and ‘insurgent’ would have the same varied appeal as their diagnostic lexemes. ‘Perpetrator’ would be salient as even the most extreme supporter is likely to see the insurgent actions as a crime. They are restrained identifications that do not provoke the insurgent audience as they

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13 Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, 16.
portray the enemy in a manner that infers humanity and agency. That said, ‘terrorist’, and to a lesser degree ‘insurgent’, are pejorative, but the counterinsurgent is trying to convey a negative opinion of these actors.17 ‘Perpetrators’, by contrast, is extremely restrained as it is not a pejorative or expansive label but rather links the insurgent to a crime. The terms ‘bin Laden’, ‘al Qaeda’ and ‘Taliban’ are unlikely to provoke any major negative emotions in the insurgent audience as they are proper names. While ‘terrorist’ and ‘insurgent’ may harm the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy with some of the support population their credibility and accuracy would help limit this outcome. Conversely, ‘perpetrators’ could delegitimise the insurgent, ‘al Qaeda’ wanted to be seen as combatants as this portrays them as peer competitors, conferring legitimacy.18 The use of the proper names reduces their apparent scope and thus legitimacy; it also helps to ‘taint’ them with their actions; over time, bin Laden realised the “al Qaeda brand had become a problem” when the US began to use the name specifically.19

These would be of varying salience for the domestic audience. Anderton’s statement on September 12, 2001, that “[t]errorists have carried out devastating attacks” and reference to the “the perpetrators of this violence” would probably have matched the domestic audience’s experiences and appealed to their beliefs regarding the situation. ‘Insurgent’ does not have the same everyday commonality and, particularly early on, the proper names would not match audience experiences. With regard to emotions, the term ‘terrorist’, and to a lesser degree ‘insurgent’, could generate fear in the domestic audience by “[exploiting] the fears of its own citizens” because of its negative connotations.20 ‘Perpetrator’ is commonly used to refer to a range of domestic criminals in NZ and this quotidian nature suggests it could manage fear.21 This is reinforced by the technical tone of the term ‘perpetrator’, which, has a less emotive character than similar terms such as ‘murderer’ or ‘killer’. Also, these terms help to control emotions by limiting expectation; wars are finite but crime fighting is ongoing, as counter-terrorism actions will be.22 These terms all help reduce confusion by labelling a largely invisible enemy. In particular, the use of proper names would help reduce concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s capacity as it shows they know who the enemy is. They are also seen as directing anger, either by

17 Ibid., 177.
18 Aukerman, “War, Crime or War Crime?” 149; Watkin, Warriors Without Rights?
21 Search of stuff.co.nz for ‘perpetrators’, accessed on 11/12/13, available from http://www.stuff.co.nz
use of negative labels or proper names that give the anger a focus. Thus, they would help mobilise support and justify the counterinsurgent’s cause.

Generally, these terms have some salience for the allied actor even though they do not fit the Bush’s original narrative identifications like “evil-doers” and ‘barbarians’. However, the disappearance of ‘bin Laden’ fits the US narrative, whose name disappeared so precipitously that a journalist told Bush in 2002, “Mr. President, in your speeches now you rarely talk or mention Osama bin Laden”. Also, ‘terrorist’ fits aspects of the narrative, particularly the ‘war on terror’ name – though they lack utility for the US cause as they confer human agency, inferring that there may be genuine grievances motivating the events, which could be problematic for the US, particularly with regard to the sceptical elements of the NZ population. Overall, while somewhat salient, these terms do not help justify the US cause and would have a limited impact on the alliance.

5.1.3 DESCRIBING THE SCOPE OF THE THREAT
The counterinsurgent diagnosed the scope of the threat in both a limited and expanded manner. There were two types considered for the former: ‘asymmetric threat’ and ‘no increased threat’. ‘Asymmetric threat’ diagnoses uses the manifest units of ‘asymmetric’ or ‘non-state’. The latent ‘no increased threat’ identification specified that there was no major change in NZ’s threat environment after 9/11. There were also two types of expanded scope diagnoses: ‘internationalised’ and ‘globalised’. The first comprised manifest diagnoses of the threat as ‘international/global/trans-national terrorism’. The latter involved latent diagnoses of a ‘globalised threat’, where terrorism was described as having global impacts or effecting global security. As will be examined below, these are all literal, nuanced and inclusive threat descriptions, with the limited also considered constricted.

5.1.3 Table 1 – Describing the scope of the threat, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>asymmetric</th>
<th>no increase</th>
<th>internationalised</th>
<th>globalised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 This contrasts with the RCF that diagnosed terrorism as threatening the world as a whole.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>asymmetric</th>
<th>no increase</th>
<th>internationalised</th>
<th>globalised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.3 Table 2 – Describing the scope of the threat, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>asymmetric</th>
<th>no increase</th>
<th>internationalised</th>
<th>globalised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

Neither of the limited scope diagnoses were used with any consistency in either count. Both of the expanded scope diagnoses were, though, particularly as raw figures. Even as ratio counts they were relatively consistent. One interesting spike for both of these occurred in 2011, where they were both the second highest annual ratio frequencies. As will be explored later, this was probably due to both the general need to mobilise and legitimise the domestic support audience this late in the ICAT and specifically due to the deaths of NZ soldiers in that year.

These are all credible as they are literal threat diagnoses, they all provide an accurate understanding of the threat as it stands, that it was not limited to a specific state or region, was yet at the same time NZ did not face a dramatically heightened threat from this ‘asymmetric’ threat. The credibility and accuracy was proven over the course of the ICAT, with attacks occurring throughout the world and no major incidences in NZ. The accuracy can be seen in Clark’s in 2002 ‘globalised threat’ identification – that the “tragedy of September 11 created an international sense of vulnerability as never before. Terrorism poses a threat not only to the security of nation states, but also has serious ramifications for global security and economic stability” – which provides a nuanced understanding of the threat without exaggerating it.\(^{26}\)

While the ‘internationalised’ diagnoses do not constrict the threat, though they do not exaggerate it either and are useful components in justifying NZ’s involvement in the ICAT, which can all be seen in Clark’s 2002 statement that “last month’s tragic events in Bali reminded New Zealanders

of the continuing threat of international terrorism and the need to work closely with others globally to counter the threat.27 Likewise, Anderton’s 2001 identification that “[t]here is no indication of any increased security threat within New Zealand” immediately after 9/11 provides a nuanced and constricted threat description that is considered accurate and informative.28 ‘Asymmetric’ references help constrict the threat by portraying it in a numerically limited manner, which is also informative regarding COIN.

AUDIENCE

In general, these identifications would match the insurgent audience’s experiences, especially the expanded scope diagnoses, as the Muslim community has experienced a significant proportion of terrorist attacks and ‘globalised’ violence, and as the ICAT went on this would be reinforced by the subsequent attacks.29 These identifications all control emotion as they describe the threat in a manner that infers agency and humanity, one that has a rational underpinning. Because of this they are all inclusive, helping legitimise the counterinsurgent’s cause. That said, the lack of threat constriction from the expanded scope diagnoses could provide some legitimacy to the insurgent as implies an enhanced capacity; as Marsden and Schmid explain, they imply “a far greater reach than [al Qaeda] is capable of.”30

The ‘no increased threat’ and ‘globalised threat’ are common components of NZ’s pre-9/11 narrative, suggesting they would fit for the domestic audience. However, the ‘no increased threat’ may not have matched experiences immediately after 9/11 due to the audience’s perception of the threat as examined in the reactive chapter. The term ‘asymmetric’ was probably too technical to be salient, something Burton acknowledged in 2002: “Terms such as ‘Asymmetric Warfare’, which were once completely unknown to the general public, are now occasionally referred to in media reports.”31 The expanded scope diagnoses could provoke some fear, but this is relatively moderate as they do not specifically imply a direct threat to NZ, while the limited scope diagnoses help control fear. These diagnoses reduce confusion by accurately describing the threat, thus delivering a degree of certitude to the counterinsurgent’s capacity, though at the same time by minimising the scope of the threat they do infer that the counterinsurgent should

27 Clark, “NZ Navy and Air Force to Join International Campaign Against Terrorism.”
be able to counter the threat relatively easily. They do not direct anger, though. In turn, the same quality that creates the potential for fear aids mobilisation and the ‘globalised threat’ delivers the highest mobilising potential of all of these as it accurately explains how the repercussions work, while the limited scope diagnoses provide the lowest.

These identifications would be of varying salience for the US. The expanded scope diagnoses fit the US narrative, but the limited scope diagnoses do not, and a 2006 cable reveals the negative light in which the ‘no increased threat’ identification would have been received: “the lack of a geographic threat also enables Kiwis to view the world with a sense of detachment and a bit of moral superiority... the official charged with international policy at the Ministry of Defense almost laughed out loud when Polcouns once suggested New Zealand might one day appreciate the option of U.S. military assistance.”32 The limited scope diagnoses would have a negative impact on the alliance, but the expanded scope diagnoses help the alliance as they give threat a fluidity of application and mobilise the NZ population. A Selchow explains, Bush used the term ‘global” strategically as a means of justification, its very broad scope and ambiguity enabled it to be used as a catchall term.33

5.1.4 DESCRIBING THE SCOPE OF THE ENEMY
The counterinsurgent described the scope of the enemy using a range of different size referents from limited to intermediate to expanded. Examples of these latent units are: “a narrow group of fanatical extremists” as limited, “terrorist organizations” as intermediate and “international terrorist networks” as expanded.34 As will be examined below, these are all literal, nuanced and inclusive threat descriptions, with the limited and intermediate also constricted.

5.1.4 Table 1– Describing the scope of the enemy, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>limited</th>
<th>intermediate</th>
<th>expanded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.4 Table 2 – Describing the scope of the enemy, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>limited</th>
<th>intermediate</th>
<th>expanded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

None of these identifications was used with any consistency over the period in either raw or ratio count. Also, while they were all used equally or more to a domestic audience in raw count, the ratio scores do not fit the DCF pattern. The other main points of interest are that the limited identifications were the least frequent while intermediate identifications were so predominant and that by 2008 none of these were used at all.

All three versions are credible, even the most expanded is literal and accurate, as technically al Qaeda can be considered a ‘international terrorist network’.35 Similarly, it is credible to describe them as a ‘narrow group’, even if their peak numbers were, at the upper estimate, 60,000.36 The three referents used in all the enemy scope identifications – ‘group’, ‘organisation’ or ‘network’ – all are literal descriptions and cannot be discredited, nor can the use of terms that provide extra scope like ‘small’ or ‘international’. However, the fact they are all credible does suggest that there are minor accuracy issues, as this variance shows there is a lack of precision, particularly at the expanded end where the terms could refer to a 1000 people or a 100,000; however, the use of ‘terrorist’ in all the intermediate and expanded forms would moderate the scope as terrorist groups’ never have a large membership as they are, by their nature, clandestine extremists who use this method of conflict precisely because of their small size. The limited identifications are the most informative as they explain that the enemy is far smaller than the counterinsurgent. These descriptions reduce the enemy as far as possible, drastically minimising their scope and in

so doing giving the descriptions real nuance and informing on the asymmetric nature of the enemy in a COIN. Clark gave one particularly informative example, where she explained that terrorism “is a threat by the small and often faceless against the strong”, not just providing a scope identification but connecting it with the use of terrorism.

AUDIENCE

These terms would probably match the insurgent audience’s experience, even the most extreme supporter would know they were a limited group and the expanded descriptions match the nature of the insurgent’s actions in varying locations around the world. Also, they are restrained descriptions that help control emotion by identifying the scope in a literal, nuanced and restricted manner. All are considered inclusive and would aid the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy and, importantly, help reduce the legitimacy of the insurgent’s cause by portraying their capacity in a constricted manner, in particular references to a ‘narrow group of fanatical extremists’.

These identifications would be salient for the domestic audience because they have a high degree of experiential commensurability. They may have varying salience depending on the timing – expanded scope identifications would better match domestic experiences after major events. They also serve to control emotion as they portray the scope of the enemy in a restrained manner. That said, the expanded descriptions do have the potential to exacerbate fear, particularly when used like Goff did in 2005 where he connected the scope with capacity, “September 11 was a watershed in demonstrating both the willingness and ability of an international terrorist group to engage in the mass murder of 3000 civilians to promote their cause”. These enemy identifications would not reduce confusion and they question the competency of the counterinsurgent because if the enemy is small in scope they should be relatively easy to beat. These enemy scope identifications do not direct anger at the enemy either. As such, they do not deliver mobilisation as they portray, as Clark said, a ‘small and often faceless’ enemy, though the expanded identifications have a greater mobilisation potential. They would have little impact on the justness of the cause, aside from those that use ‘international’, as it fits with Labour’s international narrative.

37 FM 3-24.
38 Clark, “Address to the NZ Apec Business Coalition.”
These scope descriptions do not fit Bush’s original narrative of existential threat and the limited descriptions would not appeal as they imply the US was hurt by a ‘narrow group’, countering US beliefs of invicibility.\textsuperscript{41} In turn, this has justification issues by inferring the US response may be overkill. The expanded references to an ‘international terrorist network’ would have a better fit and appeal. Generally, they are not of mobilisational utility either as they outline the enemy in a constricted manner that would not help generate support in remote NZ. For these reasons, they would have little positive impact on the alliance.

\textbf{5.1.5 CONSTRICTED PROBLEM DIAGNOSES}

The counterinsurgent used the manifest units: ‘violence’ and ‘murder’ to diagnose the problem. These are, as will be examined below, literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

\textbf{5.1.5 Table 1 – Constricted problem diagnoses, annual totals:}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>violence</th>
<th>murder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{5.1.5 Table 2 – Constricted problem diagnoses, context totals:}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>violence</th>
<th>murder</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{CONTENT}

Neither of these fits the hypothesis of consistent use over time, with both disappearing from use by 2008. As with other problem diagnoses, this is probably due to their use during events. Likewise, while ‘murder’ was used more to a domestic audience in raw form, neither fits the context hypothesis as a ratio count.

\textsuperscript{41} Snow, \textit{National Security for a New Era.}
These terms are considered credible and are used literally. ‘Violence’ refers to the “intentional use of physical force or power” while murder is the “killing of another person without justification or excuse, especially the crime of killing a person with malice aforethought or with recklessness manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”. Critically, they are accurate, describing events in a way that contains nuanced information about a number of key factors: that they were a carefully planned and targeted use of force that result in death. Neither term has loaded meaning beyond their literal definitions. They inform rather than obscure by explaining critical aspects relating to the attacks, directing opprobrium whilst retaining human agency, and, in turn, constrict the threat through their use of nuanced terminology as can be seen in Goff’s 2007 statement that al Qaeda “was responsible for the murder of nearly 3,000 people”.

**AUDIENCE**

These diagnoses would probably match with even the most extreme supporter when describing the various attacks. As Rabasa explains, most “Muslims were horrified by the death and destruction wreaked by the September 11 attacks but many – particularly in the Arab world – found some satisfaction in the idea that America’s nose had been bloodied and the United States had felt some of the pain that they believe had been inflicted on Muslims.” They also help control anger as while they negative they still emphasise human agency, as can be seen in Goff’s reference to the “willingness... to engage in the mass murder of 3000 civilians to promote their cause”, which clearly infers agency. As such, these descriptions aid the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause because they are inclusive, or rather not exclusive. The term ‘murder’ also compromises justness of the insurgent’s cause, reducing their actions from war to crime.

These diagnoses would be salient for the domestic audience, a number of articles in NZ papers referred to 9/11 as “mass murder”, while the term ‘violence’ would be self-evident. At the same time they manage fear as they constrict the threat diagnosis and reinforce the human agency by explaining they are deliberate – for example, in 2002 Clark referred to “[t]hose responsible for

45 Goff, “Defence and NZ Foreign Policy.”
the horrific violence of 11 September”, labelling the enemy ‘responsible’. This, in turn, describes events in a powerful manner that does not portray the situation as beyond normal human parameters. This would address confusion, though the emphasis on human agency could call into question the counterinsurgent’s failure to predict or prevent the attacks. However, the emphasis on agency does help direct anger, as it infers they made a rational choice to ‘murder’ people. Neither diagnosis would mobilise support as they are unexceptional and their constricted nature means the domestic audience would not feel threatened. They would help justify the non-military solutions, but would have a limited capacity to justify more bellicose responses.

While these terms do not fit Bush’s original narrative, he did refer to 9/11 as “mass murder” on September 11, 2001, and as ‘violence’ a number of times in the aftermath and their degree of opprobrium would appeal. The main issue is that they are not of mobilisational utility, as they limit the threat. Also, because they reinforce the agency and rationality of the enemy they would not aid US justness and could reinforce the suspicion many of the NZ population has towards the US regarding the underlying causes of the attacks. As such, they would probably have a neutral to positive impact on the alliance.

5.1.6 CONNECTING TERRORISM WITH OTHER PROBLEMS
The counterinsurgent connected terrorism to ‘other problems’. For example, in 2007 Clark connected “terrorism” to other “traditional transnational concerns, like infectious diseases, drug trafficking, refugees, environmental degradation, and humanitarian disasters.” One key issue that terrorism was connected to is WMDs which will be considered separately. As will be assessed below, these identifications are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, with some variation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>other problems</th>
<th>WMDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.6 Table 2 – Connecting terrorism with other problems, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Other Problems</th>
<th>WMDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

The both sets of diagnoses were made fairly consistently in raw count, though while ‘other problems’ was also consistent as a ratio count, the ‘WMD’ identification was more sporadic, with several peaks and troughs. While the ‘other problems’ and WMD diagnoses fit the context hypotheses, both in raw and ratio form, being used more in domestic than wider contexts. One area of interest is the drop for ‘WMDs’ in 2003 – the same year the allied counterinsurgent often made this connection – it was the lowest raw and ratio count for the first seven years.

The linking of terrorism with other literally referenced problems is credible as terrorism does not exist in a vacuum but is one of the many often interrelated issues that a counterinsurgent faces. It has long been acknowledged that states face a diverse array of national security threats from environmental to economic to military. Even the most extreme of the connections, with WMDs, is not discreditable even though Al Qaeda’s “attempts [to acquire WMDs] failed”. These connections are accurate as they place terrorism in context, constricting its threat, with the best showing how terrorism and the other problems are connected, such as Goff’s 2002 statement about “transnational issues such as drugs, arms trafficking, money-laundering, people smuggling, which have gained prominence as elements of the support structure for transnational criminal activity and terrorism”. These connections offer a nuanced understanding of how terrorism connects to the wider world and also constricts by contextualising and humanising it. It also helps the counterinsurgent offer accurate blame attributions and solutions that encompass a

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51 Friedman, “Managing Fear,” 82.
52 Goff, Address to No 43 Staff Course on Foreign Affairs and Trade.”
range of related problems. One issue with accuracy is how the counterinsurgent connects terrorism with WMDs, which, while credible lacks nuance and constriction as the counterinsurgent never explains how difficult this would be or how unlikely this eventuality is. It is also always framed in a way that presumes terrorists would immediately use the WMDs rather than take advantage of their powerful deterrent capacity, inferring they are irrational. This can be seen in Goff's 2001 statement that“[t]hose responsible for it foreshadow a willingness to use biological, chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction.” Not only is identifying a number of other concerns facing the state and the world credible and accurate, but it is also informative as often these other security issues have either a direct or indirect connection with terrorism and many of the issues the counterinsurgent lists, such as drug, gun and people smuggling, poverty, organised crime, over-population and climate change.

AUDIENCE
These diagnoses would match the insurgent support population’s experience as these other problems are ones that they perceive as being troubling (as will be explored in the blame section). In turn, this would help to control the anger as they do not alienate but rather offers a problem diagnoses that makes terrorism just one problem among many, humanising it and making these diagnoses inclusive. The connection between terrorism and WMDs, however, could alienate as it portrays the insurgent as an actor who would irrationally drop a nuclear bomb rather than rationally use it for deterrence. While the other connections help justify the counterinsurgent’s cause, the WMD connection is more problematic because it connects with the rational-irrational binary. In fact, this identification could legitimise the enemy as they imply they have the capacity and skill to make and use WMD. Nuclear weapons are an almost unrivalled “currency of power” in international relations; they confer upon those entities that possess them a degree of influence that overshadows every other weapon. Only a few states possess them and “[f]or some, nuclear weapons clearly are a status symbol, an indicator or attribute of major power.”

53 Mueller, “Harbinger Or Aberration?”
55 Goff, Goff statement to UN General Assembly.”
Polls of the domestic audience have shown that these types of problems are all important, suggesting these identifications would appeal to NZ values. While listing other threats to national security may not seem like a good method of controlling fear, because it contextualises and humanises the threat it helps limit fear as they make terrorist attacks more ordinary and interconnected, as can be seen in Goff’s above 2002 statement where he connects terrorism with the relatively banal ‘drugs, arms trafficking, money-laundering, people smuggling and criminal activity’. This would also help address confusion and allay concern, though it does not direct anger. The WMD connection could, however, increase fear, though it does help make the counterinsurgent appear competent and direct anger. Also, the regular connections could help justify the cause because it provides articulator credibility, showing that the counterinsurgent is able to see the ‘big picture’ rather than just narrowly focusing on terrorism, and it would also legitimise the more diverse solutions proposed as it helps reinforces the broad spectrum solution required. While the ‘other problems’ identification is unlikely to mobilise support, the ‘WMD’ identification would, as it exaggerates the threat.

Aside from the ‘WMD’ identifications, these diagnoses are unlikely to be salient for the allied actor as they contextualises and humanises the threat, which does not fit Bush’s original narrative. There are also justness issues as these identifications create the same causal connection between the enemy and the victim that infers there may be grievances underlying the attacks. With respect to the ‘WMD’ identifications, while the drop is only minor, it is interesting that 2003 is the lowest frequency of usage in the first seven years, right when the US was making this connection the most, which suggests that while this identification may appeal in the abstract, NZ’s seeming strategic reduction in its use when the US needed it the most would not appeal to the allied actor. In abstract, then, the ‘WMD’ identification would help the alliance as it mobilise NZ support and justifies the US cause, while the ‘other problems’ identification achieves neither and would not have a positive impact on the alliance.

5.1.7 WIDER THREAT ENVIRONMENT
The counterinsurgent described the wider threat environment a number of times, specifically referring to it as a ‘changed or ‘complex’ security environment. The first set refers to changing periods of international relations, using phrases like ‘post-Cold War’, explaining how 9/11 ‘changed’ the security environment, with the main difference between this and the ‘new

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59 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?” 79.
generation’ reactive frame being that there is no implication 9/11 was the first of many attacks. The ‘complex’ identification is a subset of the ‘changed security’ and involves any descriptions of the this ‘changed’ environment being ‘complex, the figures are mutually exclusive. These identifications, as will be examined below, are literal, nuanced, restrained and inclusive, with some variation.

5.1.7 Table 1 – Wider security environment, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>changed</th>
<th>complex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.7 Table2 – Wider security environment, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>changed</th>
<th>complex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTENT**

Neither of these wider security diagnoses were used with any consistency over the period and both spiked in 2006, and 2007 for ‘changed’ in raw and ratio counts. These spikes occurred during the rapprochement between NZ and the US when the former was trying to convince the latter, and their own population, of the value of this renewed relationship and this probably explains why NZ was used these so frequently in that year. They do both fit the hypothesis that the deliberative would be used more to a domestic than wider audience in raw and ratio measures, which suggests they were more interested in convincing their own population than the US.

These are all credible as they are literal representations of the wider threat environment, identifying that the security environment has changed and that it is complex. More importantly, they are accurate and informative as they deliver nuanced detail, as can be seen in Peters’ 2006
statement regarding the “complex set of overlapping international, trans-national and sub-national challenges”, which helps provide contextualised nuance in a constricted manner. While references to the ‘changed’ and ‘complex’ security environment are not constrictive, they are informative as they indicate areas of instability in the international system and label or identify a new phase in international relations and how the events of 9/11 impacted the wider security environment and how it connects with the ‘post-Cold War’ period, both of which are critical pieces of data for audiences to understand not just the threat but solutions also.

**AUDIENCE**

These diagnoses would match the insurgent support population’s experience, especially references to the changing security environment, which many would be experiencing first hand. Likewise, they would help to control emotion, particularly the connections between a ‘post-Cold War’ world and a ‘changed’ security environment as they contextualise the threat, humanising it. However, it could be argued that reference to 9/11’s impact on the security environment could help legitimacy the enemy as a significant actor.

The diagnoses of a ‘complex new security environment’ in the post-Cold War world would match the domestic audience’s experience of the changing world after 9/11. These diagnoses also help limit fear as they offer a causal understanding of the wider security environment, which in turn would help reduce the confusion. Even simple statements, such as Goff’s 2007 one that the “security outlook for the world has changed fundamentally in the post-9/11 era” help reduce confusion. However, while this would also help reduce the concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s capacity. None of these diagnoses direct anger at the enemy as they make it more of a systemic rather than personalised issue. Thus, while they help justify action over the long-term, especially with regard to many of the deliberative solutions, they do not have a high mobilisation potential as they do not portray the threat in an imminent or existential manner.

These identifications do not fit the US narrative as they ground it in history; however, they would appeal to a degree as they reinforce the belief within the US that 9/11 was era-defining event, which suggests a mixed salience. This in turn means that they would help justify the US cause as this could be seen as the defining reality of the ‘post 9/11’ world. Thus, while they do

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not mobilise the domestic population, because they aid the US cause they would provide a positive impact on the alliance.

5.1.8 PROBLEM/ENEMY CONCLUSION

The problem diagnoses and enemy identification usage frequencies and ratio counts will now be examined, as well as the context usages.

5.1.8 Table 1 – Problem/Enemy DCF annual frequency totals and ratio counts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Problem/Enemy</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>2.444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>1.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0.636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1152</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hypothesis that DCFs would be used consistently during the period is not borne out by the raw annual totals, which show 2002 to be the year they were used most frequently. This can be seen in the line graph below.
The same is true with the ratio, though only 2001 (2.44) stands out as a real aberration and the next ten years are relatively flat, with less variation between all of those years than between 2001 and the next highest year, 2002 (1.118). This can be seen in the line graph below.

![](image)

The hypothesis that DCFs would be more frequent in a domestic than wider context by the data for problem diagnoses and enemy identifications.

5.1.8 Table 2 – Problem/Enemy DCF context frequency totals and ratio counts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>0.532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>0.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1152</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The raw frequencies fit with this hypothesis, showing that domestic uses accounted for 55% of all uses. This can be seen in the bar graph below.
This hypothesis was also supported by the ratio counts, where the domestic audience uses still outnumbered the wider context usages.
5.2 BLAME/IDEOLOGY

This section will examine how the counterinsurgent attributed blame using DCFs. These attributions can be either direct or indirect, meaning they either identify aspects that specifically motivated the enemy or they describe background context that facilitated in some way. The deliberative narrative had far more blame attributions and they were more diverse in scope than those of the reactive. Again, the main criteria for inclusion here is that the framing task includes the insurgent support audience, with that inclusivity coming largely from the other four qualities of the deliberative narrative – literal, nuanced, constricted and restrained.

5.2.1 GRIEVANCES AND ANGER

A common set of deliberative blame identifications referenced grievances, and anger generated by these grievances. ‘Grievances’ are the manifest units: ‘poverty’, ‘governance’, ‘ethnic tension’, ‘inequality’, ‘corruption’, ‘repression’ and ‘injustice’. To be included as a blame factor, the grievances must be connected to the problem of terrorism, though this can be an indirect inference rather than a direct connection. The latent unit of ‘anger’ covers any negative emotions generated by grievances, as contrasted with the ‘irrational’ anger of the reactive narrative. As will be examined, these are considered inclusive, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

5.2.1 Table 1 – Grievance and anger, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>grievance</th>
<th>anger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.1 Table 2 – Grievance and anger, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>grievance</th>
<th>anger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Neither was used that consistently as a raw or ratio count. Grievances spike in 2002, 2005, 2006 and 2007 in both counts, while anger peaked in 2002. The 2002 spike could be explained coming from the counterinsurgent’s need to legitimise deployment while the spike during the rapprochement is probably related to NZ’s drive to be seen as a competent counterinsurgent. Both fit the context hypothesis in both counts, with anger only given to a domestic audience. Also of interest here is the almost total lack of usage by the National Party, who account for 3% of uses when their total word count percentage is 19%.

All of these grievances and resulting anger were given using literal descriptions and are credible, especially when the ‘grievances’ are given together as they often were because they are root causes, or preconditions, for terrorism rather than direct, trigger causes. Anger is also credible as bin Laden referred to the humiliation of the Islamic world as a motivation. These identifications offer literal identifications of genuine underlying grievances that can be connected to a wide range of resulting social ills that include but are not limited to terrorism. Likewise, referring to ‘anger’ as an outcome of grievances like poverty and corruption is self-evident as reacting to these problems in this manner is part of human nature. These attributions are also accurate as they offer a nuanced understanding of the underlying blame factors. Specifically listing the grievances that motivate insurgents provides diverse underlying economic, political, legal and social factors, which are all important to providing an overall understanding of how and why insurgencies emerge. Connecting these to anger is also accurate as it helps to make the blame identification more understandable as the grievances are shown as generating a negative emotion which leads to the insurgency. They are also nuanced and constricted as they describe the underlying blame factors in a humanising manner, describing genuine grievances that virtually anybody could empathise with and then connecting them with a resulting anger, humanising the causational realities underlying the conflict. These are also informative as they are commonly referenced underlying attributions in the COIN and conflict literature, the ‘grievances’ listed by the counterinsurgent are the same as those listed in the literature.

**AUDIENCE**

Esposito and Mogahed’s 2007 review of Gallup Poll data of 10 predominantly Muslim countries found that one of the main causes of support for terrorism were issues of inequality and injustice between Muslims and the West, suggesting these attributions would be salient for the insurgent audience. Likewise, Marsalla argues that global economic inequalities are an important grievance to Muslims. Also, governance issues also appear to be important, particularly for the more extreme supporters, with Gallup finding that “50 percent of the politically radicalized feel more strongly that their progress will be helped by ‘moving toward governmental democracy’.”

Pew also found that predominantly Muslim countries identified government corruption as a major issue in their lagging development. With regard to anger, Gallup found that alienation is a big issue amongst Muslim populations. Because these blame identifications accurately match the insurgent support population experiences while humanising the situation, they avoid provoking negative emotions. As such, these attributions are inclusive and would help justify the counterinsurgent’s cause, though they do also reinforce al Qaeda’s own narrative, suggesting they may positively impact the insurgent’s legitimacy as well.

These would appeal to New Zealanders as fairness and equality are key component of the national character, so any blame that mentions injustice, inequality, corruption and other related concepts is salient. Because they humanise the situation they also limit any fear and help reduce confusion. However, as these attributions would not reduce concern as they describe a range of long-term issues that have been known for decades, implying that the counterinsurgent should have worked harder to prevent and predict the anger from these grievances. Also, these attributions do not direct anger because they humanise the underlying situation. Overall, these attributions would not deliver mobilisation, though they do have potentially positive impacts on the long-term justness of the counterinsurgent’s deliberative solutions, particularly those that are designed to remedy these ‘grievances’.

These would not be salient for the allied actor because they contradict Bush’s original narrative that the enemy ‘hates their freedoms’. While the counterinsurgent does not make it explicit, some

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64 Esposito and Mogahed, “Battle for Muslims’ Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken,” 38-40.
66 Esposito and Mogahed, “Battle for Muslims’ Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken,” 37.
67 Pew Research, “Muslim-Western Tensions Persist”.
69 Schmid, Al-Qaeda’s ‘Single Narrative’ and Attempts to Develop Counter Narratives.
70 Sibley et al., “Pluralistic and Monocultural Facets of New Zealand National Character and Identity,” 21; Fischer, Fairness and Freedom.
in the NZ audience would probably connect certain grievances, particularly injustice, poverty and inequality with US global political and economic domination, as occurred in a number of articles by NZ journalists.\(^{71}\) The identification of these grievances and the resulting rational anger also negatively impact the justness of the US cause as it was premised on irrational anger, which means these attributions would not have a positive impact on the alliance.

5.2.2 IDEOLOGY AND RELIGION

The counterinsurgent used a number of ideological and religious terms, or terms that could imply religious aspects including intensity or degree of belief, specifically the manifest units ‘extremist’, ‘fanatic’, ‘radical’, ‘zealot’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalist’, referred to as the ‘extremist’ terms from here on. This section will examine these, showing that they are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

5.2.2 Table 1 – Ideology and religion, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>extremist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.2 Table 2 – Ideology and religion, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>extremist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

None of these attributions were used consistently over the period as raw or ration count. The reason for this inconsistency was probably due to their use in the wake of attacks, causing them to cluster in those years. However, the extremist terms were given more to a domestic audience than wider one, as both raw and ration counts.

The extremist terms are credible as they refer to the intensity of belief, the degree to which their beliefs conform to the mainstream or the willingness to act for their belief, and statements regarding al Qaeda’s ‘fringe’ beliefs and willingness to act on these beliefs are highly creditable. None of them define the doctrinal correctness of the enemy’s beliefs, which also delivers articulator credibility. While the these identifications are credible, ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ lacks accuracy, as not all fundamentalists are violent. Aside from this, the extremist terms have a degree of nuance and constriction, they inform that the enemy is outside the mainstream in their beliefs and that they are willing to act on them, all of which is critical information regarding ideology and religious belief and particularly connecting it to blame – these terms help explain why the enemy have used terrorism as a method of violence.

AUDIENCE

As noted, most Muslims have a relatively similar view on grievances, but differ on how to act on these and this is clearly related to the extremist terms. These terms contextualise how ‘fringe’ terrorist actions are, meaning the more extreme supporter may find these terms unappealing though they may appeal to the less extreme. These attributions are relatively unemotive, particularly for pronouncements that make strong statements about people’s faith and beliefs, meaning they would be inclusive for the less extreme. One of the main outcomes of these attributions is that they reduce the scope of the enemy, portraying them in a limited manner, implying that the insurgent is a ‘fringe’ group with limited wider support and, thus, delegitimising them.

Use of the extremist terms would be salient for most New Zealanders as killing oneself and others for a cause would be far outside their own beliefs and experiences and these terms capture this accurately. That said, issues of religiosity would not be salient as in general New Zealanders


73 Betz, “The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” 511.
lack knowledge about Islam and this debate is beyond most people’s experience.\textsuperscript{74} These attributions constrict the scope of the ideology as they imply there is a limited number of possible adherents so they control fear, as can be seen in Goff’s 2004 statement that “[w]e must not allow a minority of extremists to turn religious differences into a clash of civilisations”.\textsuperscript{75} They also help reduce confusion as they explain why the enemy acted in the way that they did. However, because they describe the enemy in such a limited manner, they would not help with concern about the counterinsurgent’s capacity, though they do help direct anger. In general, they provide a degree of mobilisation, though because they portray the enemy is a limit way this would not be very substantial. They would help justify the deliberative solutions as this blame requires solving.

The extremist terms do not fit Bush’s original narrative as they reduce the scope of the blame to a small ‘fringe’ group rather than as an ‘existential threat’. That said, Bush did use similar language from the outset, though even then he mixed narratives. On September 20, 2001, he explained that the insurgents practice a “fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam.”\textsuperscript{76} Despite this, as these terms do not justify the US cause and do not mobilise the domestic population, they are not seen as aiding the alliance.

5.2.3 FAILED STATES

The counterinsurgent also blamed ‘failed states’ for creating ‘havens’ for terrorist groups. This blame attribution must use the terms ‘failed’, ‘failure’, ‘weak’, ‘fragile’ or ‘haven’ to refer to states, connecting this to terrorism, as Clark did in her 2004 statement that as “a failed state Afghanistan had become a haven for, and source of, extremism”, which counts as 2 uses for ‘failed state’ and ‘haven’.\textsuperscript{77} These blame identifications, as will be examined below, are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Year & failed states \\
\hline
2001 & 2 \\
2002 & 3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


\textsuperscript{75} Goff, “Eminent New Zealanders to Attend Inter-Faith Meeting.”

\textsuperscript{76} Bush, “President Bush Addresses the Nation.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.3 Table 2 – Failed states, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>failed states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTENT**

This blame attribution was used quite consistently, both in raw and ratio count. As a ratio count, though, there was a spike in 2008 but, excluding this, the overall trend was for consistent usage. The context usage is between the ratio and the DCF, though there were no uses during an event. One interesting aspect is that National accounted for 35% of uses of the term ‘haven’ when their word count is only 19% of the total. One point of interest is that the more technocratic ‘failed state’ formulations were used exclusively by Labour, while National showed a predilection for the ‘haven’ phrasing, accounting for 11 of the 19 uses (58%) when their word count was only 19% of the total.

While there has been much academic debate about whether ‘failed states’ facilitate terrorism, this blame is impossible to discredit as it is generally depends on semantics. However, there is issue with this description’s specific authenticity: the governance of the Taleban was the most coherent and effective the country had had in decades, including the post-invasion era of the period covered in this thesis. As Atkins writes, “Omar had his Islamist Taliban regime firmly in control of most of Afghanistan”. That said, it could be argued much of this stability was due to al Qaeda support. The identification is particularly troubling as it serves as a component of the invasion and occupation justification, a process that itself has failed to create a functioning

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state. These attributions lack accuracy as they obscures the true relationship between al Qaeda and the Taleban, instead honing in on one particular component. They are “vague and imprecise, selectively and politically applied, founded on a number of highly contested assumptions and narratives, and functions in part to obscure state sources of terror.” They exaggerate the geopolitical component and obscures the politico-social aspect of the connection between states and terrorists. Bin Laden swore an oath to help the Taleban fight the Northern Alliance in the last stand out region, in return the Taleban let al Qaeda build training camps in Afghanistan. The reason that al Qaeda was in Afghanistan was not because it was a failed state but rather because of an allegiance made between them and the Taleban.

AUDIENCE
These attributions would have a mixed salience for the insurgent audience. In one sense they insinuate that certain non-Western areas are “‘breeding grounds’ of terrorism”, which would not appeal to their beliefs as they reinforce the Orientalist narrative that these areas are inherently ‘bad’. However, many may have direct experience of living in a ‘failed state’ and this identification may carry some salience, particularly for the less extreme supporter who would not necessarily blame everything on the West. Depending on salience, they attributions could provoke anger by implying the states ‘failed’ because they are non-Western or they could be perceived as an accurate identification that matches the supporters’ own experience. While the former interpretation may provoke anger, the latter would help control it. These attributions are, if not inclusive then, not exclusive and would have a relatively neutral impact on justness and legitimacy.

These attributions would be salient for the domestic audience, matching their experience and fitting the general international security narrative as well, though it would have probably increased in salience over the course of the ICAT as their exposure to the narrative grew. These attributions may provoke some fear as they imply that all ‘failed states’ are hothouses for

81 Campana and Ducol, “Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens,” 396-397.
83 Campana and Ducol “Rethinking Terrorist Safe Havens,”.
85 Jackson, The State and Terrorist Sanctuaries, 6.
terrorism, though this is not serious as ‘failed states’ are not that common. They do reduce confusion by providing an easily parsed and clear cut connection, as can be seen in Goff’s linkage that Afghanistan was “a failed state in which terrorists such as Al Qaeda could thrive”.86 However, they do not allay concerns as if the connection was as obvious as this blame makes out then the counterinsurgent should have predicted and prevented the attacks. These attributions do not direct anger, as they blame the abstract concept of governance. Overall, then, they would have limited mobilisation potential, but critically they helps with the long term justification of the response, particularly of any governance-related solutions.

In his second speech on the 11th of September, Bush said the “US Government will make no distinction between the terrorists who extreme the acts and those who harbor them” and referred to “nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism” on the 20th.87 This suggests these attributions would be salient as they fit Bush’s original narrative. These threat diagnoses also fit with their focus on ‘nation-building’ in Afghanistan.88 As Hager argues, Bush made the ‘harbouring’ bridge so early on because of the administration’s underlying and pre-existing goals of invading both Afghanistan and Iraq.89 Thus, these attributions help justify the US cause to the NZ audience, particularly the Afghan Invasion, meaning they would have a positive impact on the alliance.

5.2.4 ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

The Israel-Palestine conflict was referenced as an underlying blame factor that had played a part in motivating the insurgency by the counterinsurgent. This latent unit must refer to both actors, their conflict and its influence on terrorism or international security in general, such as in Goff’s 2002 attribution that “failure to resolve differences between Israeli and Palestinian people in the Middle East continues to be a catalyst for recruitment into terrorism”.90 As will be explored below, this is literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

5.2.4 Table 1 – Israel and Palestine, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Israel/Palestine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

87 Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.”; Bush, “President Declares ‘Freedom at War with Fear’.”
89 Hager, Other People’s Wars, 22.
90 Goff, Goff statement to UN General Assembly.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.4 Table 2 – Israel and Palestine, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Israel/Palestine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

This attribution was not used with a great degree of consistency, measured in either raw or ratio count. In both it spiked in 2002 and then disappeared by 2006. It does not match the hypothesis regarding context either, used equally to domestic and wider audiences as a raw form and more to a wider audience as a ratio form. The reason for both of these issues is probably explained by the 4 uses by NZ to oppose the Iraq Invasion.

This blame identification is given literally by the counterinsurgent, both actors are named and the ongoing conflict between the two is referenced as one blame factor and is considered a very credible blame identification as the Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most prominent and long-lasting grievances of the Islamic world and was a key component of bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa.\(^91\) Even if, as some contend, this was a symbolic rather than specific motivation, its credibility is still sound as it forms a substantial component of bin Laden’s rhetoric regarding al Qaeda’s grievances.\(^92\) Furthermore, the Israel/Palestine situation is often referenced as one of the drivers of terrorism beyond al Qaeda.\(^93\) It, as Lebovic writes, “serves as a touchstone in a broader

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pan-Arab and/or pan-Islamic struggle.”94 This attribution is also accurate and informative as it connects the current events to a major source of tension in international politics, whilst never only blaming this conflict or directly connecting them. Goff’s use of the term ‘catalyst’ embodies this, and all of the identifications make similar linkages. This provides a fidelity of understanding, as the counterinsurgent never totally blames the Israel-Palestine conflict but indicates that this is one of many causes that motivate the enemy. Not only does this provide nuance, but it also constricts the scope of the threat as it humanises the enemy by explaining that they have been impacted by this well known crisis.

AUDIENCE

These attributions would probably be salient for the majority of the insurgent support population. A number of polls show most people in predominantly Muslim countries have strong views of Israel and Palestine and do not believe there can be peaceful Israeli-Palestinian coexistence.95 Another poll of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates states found that “larger majorities, in each country, disagree with the notion that ‘Arab countries should pay more attention to their own internal issues than to the Palestinians.”96 ‘The proportions who reject that assertion range from 60 percent of Kuwaitis, to 63 percent of Emiratis, to 65 percent of Saudis’.97 These polls suggest that mention of the Israel/Palestine problem as a cause that motivated al Qaeda would be salient for most of the insurgent support population. Because of this, and because the counterinsurgent always referred to it as one of many underlying factors, these identifications help control emotion and, as they display an understanding of how the Israel-Palestine conflict generates negative emotions, are inclusive as well, justifying the counterinsurgent cause.

This attribution would probably match New Zealanders’ experiences as well because of its position as one of the most well known crises in international relations and resultant ongoing ubiquity in the media. A report by an undoubtedly biased interest group noted that there were over 300 items of news and opinion regarding Israel-Palestine in a 13 month period to

94 Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States, 115.
December 2010. Including the above organisation, there are six interest groups active in NZ on the topic, some that have been operating for over 30 years. This blame attribution controls fear as it humanises the enemy and it also helps to reduce the confusion as it explains why the enemy are conducting an insurgency. It does not reduce concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s capability, however, as the conflict is prominent and long-running, suggesting the counterinsurgent should have been able to predict the problems. It does not direct anger, either, as by humanising the blame it makes it more understandable. Thus, there are limited mobilisation benefits from this, though it may help justify certain solutions targeting this particular conflict.

This attribution would probably not be salient for the US, largely as it does not fit the Bush’s original narrative because it humanises the underlying causes of the conflict and, in turn, directs attention at a conflict that the US have had a long and problematic involvement with. Another issue is that several of the uses were specifically targeted at arguing against the US-led invasion of Iraq, with NZ suggesting that rather than Iraq the US and allies should be trying to remedy issues that they believed actually led to terrorism. Almost third of all the uses were openly critical of US action, meaning they question the justness of the allied cause and, thus, would be unlikely to have a positive impact on the alliance.

5.2.5 BLAME/IDEOLOGY CONCLUSION

This section will examine the relevant hypothesis of the DCF for the blame and ideology identifications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Problem/Enemy</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hypothesis that DCFs would be used consistently throughout the period is not well substantiated by the raw frequencies. As the data shows, there were several peak years, including 2002, 2005, 2006 and 2007, and several trough years, such as 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011. This can be seen in the line graph below.

The hypothesis was not well supported by the ratio count either, with a similar peak and trough like pattern being visible. This can seen in the line graph below.
5.2.6 Table 2 – Blame/Ideology context frequency totals and ratio counts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hypothesis that DCFs were more likely to be given in a domestic context is support by the data, both in terms of raw frequency and ratio count. The raw numbers show that the domestic uses of blame and ideology account for 73% of all uses and were 18 times more frequent than for events. This can be seen in the bar graph below.
The hypothesis is also supported by the ratio counts, which show that the domestic context was almost twice as common as for events and wider usage. This can be seen in the bar graph below.
5.3 ACTOR/VICTIM

The section will examine how the counterinsurgent identified itself, its allies and the victims using the deliberative narrative. The actor/victim section is of interest here as the reactive narrative was not used often for these framing tasks. As with the other sections, the main criteria for inclusion is that the framing task was inclusive for the insurgent audience, though in this section the criteria are somewhat more broad, as many of these relate to the allied actor and the inclusivity will be ascertained on whether the framing task is credible, accurate, informative and measured. Because this section is focused on actor descriptions, there will be a greater focus on legitimacy as these framing tasks reflect on this in the most direct manner.

5.3.1 COLLECTIVE ACTOR IDENTIFICATIONS

The counterinsurgent referred to the collective actor using the terms ‘international community’, ‘coalition’, and the, from now on, ‘broad coalition’ terms of ‘broad/est coalition’, ‘global coalition’, ‘international force’ or ‘multinational force’.100 While all ‘international community’ uses included NZ, ‘coalition’ was used both inclusively and exclusively. Goff’s statement that “[o]ur SAS personnel are regarded as being among the best in the field by other coalition forces” is an example of the former while in his explanation that “[w]e are not, however, a member of the coalition in Iraq” is an example of the latter.101 As will be examined, these collective actor identifications are literal, nuanced, restrained and inclusive.

5.3.1 Table 1 – Collective actor terms, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>intl. community</th>
<th>coalition</th>
<th>broad coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100 ‘Coalition’ counts and ‘broad coalition’ are mutually exclusive.
5.3.1 Table 2 – Collective actor terms, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>intl. community</th>
<th>coalition</th>
<th>broad coalition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

These were used with a degree of consistency over the period, in raw or ratio counts. ‘International community’ was used relatively consistently until 2007, but saw a precipitous drop from 2008 on, ‘coalition’ spiked in 2003 and ‘broad coalition’ declined from 2009. These can be explained by ideology and strategy. ‘International community’ and ‘broad coalition’ both fit the Labour Party internationalist narrative and the drop in usage once National came to power in 2008 fits their nationalist narrative. The spike for ‘coalition’ occurred in the year that NZ deployed the PRT and used the term to differentiate between itself and the US-led ‘coalition’ in Iraq – though only 7 of the 27 uses in 2003 were for the latter. While ‘international community’ only fits the context hypothesis in raw count, both ‘coalition’ and ‘broad coalition’ fit for both raw and ratio.

These terms are credible as they are literal descriptions of the collective actor. While some argue that ‘international community’ is figurative, as used here it is considered literal. It is argued that for most people, the focus of the ‘international community’ would be a ‘community of states’ and not some idealistic ‘universal community of individuals’ as some have argued – and a ‘community of states’ is literally what the counterinsurgent is referring to when they use this term. These descriptions all attempt to label a collective actor in a manner that reflects their true nature. This gives these identifications an accuracy, particularly as NZ used ‘international community’ to refer to the larger grouping that incorporates like-minded states that may not actually be playing an active part in the ‘coalition’ and then used ‘coalition’ to refer to those states actively working together. This provides a degree of fidelity as the counterinsurgent used different terms to refer to different groupings they are involved with, allowing them to hone in depending on what grouping they are referring to. The ‘broad coalition’ identifications are also accurate as they add extra nuance about the scope of the alliance. However, these terms were not always used accurately. As noted above, ‘coalition’ has been used by NZ to refer to itself and

allies and then to differentiate between itself and the US-led ‘coalition’ in Iraq and this flexibility reveals a certain lack of accuracy. While NZ did not use ‘international community’ in the same manner during the ICAT, it also has the same inherent flexibility as it provides no concrete parameters regarding membership. While they are nuanced, these terms do not provide a constricted focus as they do not have specific referents; however, this is not as critical when the actor is referring to themselves and these descriptions do not unrealistically exaggerating the scope either.

AUDIENCE

‘International community’ has a flexibility that would be broad enough to be salient for the insurgent support population. The more extreme supporter may see this grouping as “dignifying the west, of globalising it, of making it sound more respectable, more neutral and high-faluting”. The less extreme supporter may focus more on how “Muslim nation-states have insisted on full participation in the Western-authored ‘international community’” during the ICAT. It appeals either way, though the former may be angered by it as a euphemism for the West. The term ‘coalition’ is less flexible, though here it did include many Muslim-majority states, at least for the ICAT, and the term is relatively neutral so while possibly not salient it would not repel. References to a ‘broad coalition’ mitigate the inflexibility of ‘coalition’, though have the same potential salience issues as ‘international community’. Overall, they are seen as relatively measured actor descriptions and their use would have a mixed outcome for the insurgent audience, they may alienate some, pushing them away from the counterinsurgent’s cause, while for others may see them as inclusive. Both ‘international community’ and ‘broad coalition’ identifications are inclusive, as Gompert et al. note, broad-based participation “promote[s] acceptance by the contested population”. Still both are seen as inclusive as they are able to encompass the insurgent support population and they, therefore, help legitimise the counterinsurgent. At the same time, they may also delegitimise the insurgent as they “heighten[s] their sense of isolation” and imply that they do not have as widespread support as the counterinsurgent. Essentially, by emphasising the size of the allied actor they constrict the scope of the enemy, suggesting that these types of identifications are indirectly constrictive.

106 David C. Gompert, John Gordon, Adam Grissom, Dave Prelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O’Connell, Brooke K. Stearns, and Robert Edwards Hunter, War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency (Santa Monica, CA [u.a.]: Rand Corp, 2008), 249.
These identifications would probably appeal to most New Zealanders, particularly ‘international community’ as the belief that the country is an international actor that contributes to international peace and security and is an effective member of the ‘international community’ is a key part of the national narrative.107 While ‘coalition’ does not fit the national narrative to the same degree, it still connects into the same sense of an international grouping acting together, though this is somewhat tainted during the ICAT when NZ start using it to differentiate between themselves and the US-led alliance in Iraq. The ‘broad coalition’ helps make ‘coalition’ more salient for the domestic audience. All three would help control emotion as they refer to large groups acting to counter the threat. They also help to reduce confusion as they are all commonly used terms with a pedigree that goes back beyond the ICAT. As such, they would also help reduce concern about the counterinsurgent’s capabilities. They do not direct anger, however. ‘International community’ has a powerful mobilising potential as it is as much an aspirational term as it is an accurate identifier. It would also help justify the cause, and, particularly, legitimise the actor, Herbst refers to ‘international community’ as an “all-purpose legitimizing device in matters of foreign policy” and Eichenberg concluded, after looking at a quarter of a century of public opinion polls, that “multilateral sentiment does matter” for legitimacy.108 ‘Coalition’ has a lesser degree of mobilisation, justification and legitimisation potential due to its relative neutrality.

It has been argued that ‘international community’ would appeal to the US as “it is immediately apparent that the international community is America’s most loyal ally, supporting each and every of our aspirations, preferences, complaints or demands.”109 However, while this may be true, the term does not fit Bush’s original narrative for the ICAT, which is more focused on the ‘good civilisation’. Also, the way NZ used ‘coalition’ to distinguish itself from those states acting in Iraq suggests that this term would not appeal. However, NZ’s use of this identification to argue against Iraq means that, in practice, by 2003, this would have limited positive impact on the alliance. As US Ambassador Swindells said publically: “For the first time in our shared history, New Zealanders were not with us in a major military conflict... Traditional allies –

Australians, British and Americans – fought side by side”.\(^{110}\) Privately, in a 2004 cable, he noted that NZ “was careful to acknowledge the [Government of New Zealand’s] clearly stated position that New Zealand is NOT/NOT a member of the Coalition.”\(^{111}\) However, overall, these terms justify the US cause due to their venerability and were of utility as they mobilised the NZ population, but would have a relatively limited impact on the alliance relationship.

### 5.3.2 ACTOR DESCRIPTION

NZ described itself in a number of ways. It referred to its ‘values’ and ‘interests’, that it was ‘sovereign/independent’. It also used the latent identifications of being a ‘multilateralist’, a ‘good international citizen’ and explained how its ‘size dictates foreign policy’. Respectively, these described NZ as preferring to work with other states on foreign policy, having a pragmatic and principled foreign policy and described how NZ’s foreign policy was shaped by its particular geopolitics. These actor descriptions are, as will be shown, literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, though with some variation.

#### 5.3.2 Table 1 – Actor description, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>interests/values</th>
<th>sovereign</th>
<th>multilateralist</th>
<th>Intl. citizen</th>
<th>size/FP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5.3.2 Table 2 – Actor description, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>interests/values</th>
<th>sovereign</th>
<th>multilateralist</th>
<th>Intl. citizen</th>
<th>size/FP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The identifications of ‘interests’ and values’, ‘multilateralist’ and ‘good international citizen’ were used with a degree of consistency in raw and ratio form, though there was a drop in for the last two when National took power. This fits with the differing ideologies of the two parties. Also of interest is the near absence of any of these framing tasks in 2001, as is the predominance of ‘sovereign/independent’ and ‘multilateralist’ framing tasks in the years of rapprochement. All were used more to a domestic audience in raw form, though only ‘multicultural’, ‘multilateralist’ and ‘size dictates foreign policy’ matched this hypothesis as ratio counts. NZ’s consistency regarding multilateralism – both in rhetoric and reality – contrasts with the US, which swung towards a unilateralist position regarding Iraq as the two states’ relations dropped to a post-9/11 low.

These actor descriptions are all credible, NZ can literally be identified as ‘multicultural’, ‘sovereign/independent’ and a ‘multilateralist’, furthermore, its ‘size dictates foreign policy’ and its ‘interests and values’ play an important role in its actions in general and as a counterinsurgent. That said, there is a slight issue with the ‘sovereign/independent’ identification and, in turn, the ‘multilateralist’ one. These identifications spiked during the years of rapprochement when NZ could arguably be said to be the least ‘sovereign/independent’, and more bilateral than ‘multilateral’. The post-9/11 period marked a change in NZ’s foreign policy, where the principled pragmatism that had marked the previous several decades began to change and as a number of commentators have suggested there has been a weakening, or perceived weakening, of NZ’s ‘independent view’ in the years since 2001. However, this does not discredit these statements, as objectively NZ was still a ‘sovereign’ state that was acting ‘multilaterally’.

These descriptions are highly accurate as they help to delineate not just a detailed but a useful description that provides an explanation of why it acts in the way it does. The references to how ‘size dictates foreign policy’ and NZ’s ‘interests’ add particular nuance as they are informative about the pragmatic aspects of foreign policy in general and counterinsurgency in particular. This provides a degree of candour, as the concept of ‘national interest’ as a key aspect of international relations and one that guides every states’ actions. The references to ‘values and interests’ is more accurate and informative when the counterinsurgent explains how this shapes their actions.

as Goff did in his 2002 speech: explaining that “[f]or New Zealand, the basic national objectives are to protect and promote our national interests and values while ensuring that we play a positive role in world affairs.” As well as providing a detailed set of ‘values and interests’ that provide a relatively comprehensive delineation of the counterinsurgent and showing how they influence solutions, these descriptions are also constricted, in that they do not exaggerate NZ’s status. Even the ‘good international citizen’ description is relatively constricted, with international politicians stating NZ has ‘punched above its weight’ in the international community, working harder than most states to be perceived as a strong supporter of multilateralism though there is admittedly a degree of self-promotion involved.115

AUDIENCE
These identifications would have a degree of salience for the insurgent audience, not because the ‘values’ such as ‘multiculturalism’ and a ‘multilateralism’ would appeal but rather because NZ credibly and informatively explains how their ‘values’, ‘interests’ and ‘size’ influence their actions, which would match insurgent experience. However, the identification as ‘sovereign/independent’ is somewhat problematic, it is unlikely that this would match experience because of NZ’s allied actions during the ICAT. As Tariq Ali wrote, “[e]ssentially there is no such thing as a New Zealand foreign policy... Politically, psychologically and mentally the Australian and New Zealand elites are firmly attached to the United States”. On the other hand, the ‘multicultural’ identifications are being directed, to a degree, at the insurgent audience, as they appear designed to reinforce NZ’s tolerance of different ethnicities and religions. In general, these descriptions would not generate negative emotions as they are self-referential and do so in a manner that is not exclusive or alienating. Thus, they provide justify the counterinsurgent’s cause.

These identifications would have a powerful appeal for the domestic audience, especially the ‘sovereign/independent’ and ‘multilateralist’ ones, as they go to the very core of NZ’s national character.117 NZ’s “identity is underpinned by its position as an independent and principled player on the world stage”.118 These descriptions also control emotion, ameliorating fear as they

114 Goff, “Address to No 43 Staff Course on Foreign Affairs and Trade.”
115 Buchanan, “Deconstructing New Zealand Foreign Policy”.
emphasise NZ acts ‘multilaterally’ for its own interests and is guided geopolitical realities. Also critically, they would reduce concern as they help to explain the pragmatic underpinning of NZ foreign policy, connecting with the concept of collective security. The ‘multilateral’ descriptions would also help to allay any concerns regarding the counterinsurgent’s competency, particularly the pragmatic descriptions and the ‘multilateralism’. They do not, however, direct anger. Despite this lack of anger direction, these identifications would have a degree of mobilisation capacity as the actor descriptions connect with a justification of certain deliberative solutions, particularly ‘multilateral’ solutions. They also have a powerful impact on the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent, portraying NZ as a principled and pragmatic collective global actor.

The major issue for the US comes from the ‘multilateral’, ‘sovereign/independent’ and ‘good international citizen’ identifications. A number of US Embassy cables from WikiLeaks reveal how the US felt about these identifications. Firstly, with respect to ‘multilateral, a cable from 2004 stated the US believes “the [NZ] government’s view of multilateralism as a means to limit U.S. power”. Likewise, another cable stated that “Goff’s unacceptable response [was] that New Zealand is happy working around the edges of the status quo.” Also, with regard to NZ’s ‘independence’ a 2004 WikiLeaks cable that explained that NZ’s “decision to sit out the invasion of Iraq was a reminder of how far its security policies and interests have drifted from those of its traditional allies”. Another 2004 cable explained NZ’s “is loath to take actions that would identify it as a supporter of Israel and, by proxy, the United States.” US irritation at NZ’s ‘independence’ can be seen in a cable in 2005, which was reacting to Labour’s use of anti-American rhetoric in the election, stating that “a vote for the National Party means a vote against NZ’s independent foreign policy.” Also, a 2006 cable noted that NZ preferred distant deployments as they are “keeping with New Zealand’s identity as a global good citizen, always ready to pitch in” before noting that “the entire defense outlay this year is included in the portion of the budget entitles [sic] “national identity”, with the tone suggesting the US find the ‘good international citizen’ identification idealistic and problematic. This is confirmed by a 2005 cable where the ambassador wished NZ would move “from ideologically motivated, self-

120 WikiLeaks, “Message from Ambassador Swindells: NZ Foreign Secretary Phil Goff’s May 25-7 Visit to Washington”.
124 WikiLeaks, “Thinly Stretched New Zealand Military Aims High, But Can It Deliver?”
congratulatory policies to a clear vision of New Zealand’s role in the world”. Reference to ‘interests’ would appeal, in a 2005 cable Swindells explained the US wanted NZ “to spell out that motivation -- that New Zealand is acting out of its interests rather than out of ideology”. Thus, aside from ‘interests’, in general these identifications are not appealing, with ‘multilateral’ and ‘sovereign/independent’ the most problematic. While they may not appeal to the US, the ‘sovereign/independent’ identification has a certain utility for the justness of the US response as having a supposedly ‘independent’ state support their cause delivers greater credibility. However, in general these identifications would not have any positive impact on the alliance, as from the above cables it seems that the US would rather have a publicly compliant partner, even as they shifted from their own more ‘multilateralist’ approach in the early phase of the ICAT to their unilateralist stance regarding Iraq.

5.3.4 ACTOR CONNECTIONS

The counterinsurgent often described its connections with the US. In some cases, this latent unit was as simple as stating that NZ had “close ties” or was ‘close friends’, though in other cases the counterinsurgent referred to having “shared values”, while other examples included descriptions of a “shared history”, particularly past military actions. This section will examine identifications of actor connections made that refer to ‘ties’, ‘friendship’, ‘shared history’ or ‘shared values’. As will be shown, they are considered literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

5.3.4 Table 1 – Actor connections, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>close ties/shared history</th>
<th>shared values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

125 WikiLeaks, “The Two Worlds of Middle Earth: New Zealand’s Strategic Policies”.
127 These ‘shared values’ counts do not include references to New Zealand’s own ‘values’.
5.3.4 Table 1 – Actor connections, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>close ties/shared history</th>
<th>shared values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

Both of these were used relatively consistently, considered in both raw and ratio. That said, the ‘closer ties’ description did increase during National’s time in power dramatically while ‘shared values’ spiked in 2006. These can be explained by ideology and strategy, respectively. National traditionally has a focus on bilateral relationships, which is probably why the first rose over time. The ‘shared values’ identification spiked during the rapprochement and appears to have been used strategically to help develop the relationship between the two states. They did not fit the context hypothesis, there was a clear divide in audience, with NZ far more likely to use these descriptions to a wider audience than domestic, both as a raw and ratio counts. This helps reinforce the belief these were used to enhance relations with the US.

These descriptions are credible as they are literal descriptions of certain connections between the two states. NZ has ‘close ties’ politically, militarily, economically and socially with the US and the relationships is one built on a ‘shared history’ and ‘shared values’. With regard to accuracy, they deliver important details about the nature of the connection between NZ and the US. Some identifications outline the pragmatic reasons for NZ’s ‘close ties’, such as Goff’s 2002 statement that the “United States, the worlds [sic] only superpower, has the economic political and military strength which makes it a key power in every sphere. Our views diverge in a number of areas but we co operate closely in most.”128 Others explain how the values relate to the relationship, like new Minister of Defence Wayne Mapp’s 2009 statement that “[w]e also share the same values, our economies are increasingly intertwined, and our view of the world is similar”.129 These identifications provide detailed nuance, they offer an understanding of how and why NZ and the US are connected. However, while they are generally felt to be constricted, the ‘shared values’ identifications are somewhat exaggerated as while the two states do ‘share values’ there are also some key differences and these identifications exaggerate the common ones at the expense of those that are not ‘shared’. However, this is somewhat moderated as the counterinsurgent does make this clear in some cases, such as Goff’s 2006 statement that NZ and the US have taken

128 Goff, “Address to No 43 Staff Course on Foreign Affairs and Trade.”
“different paths to common values. Different histories, location, size and experience clearly produce different outlooks and create different responsibilities. But a shared western heritage, which has shaped common liberal and democratic values, has also produced a like-mindedness that draws our countries together.” Thus, these identifications provide important details in an accurate, tailored manner.

AUDIENCE
These identifications would have experiential commensurability for the insurgent support population due to NZ’s position as a long term ally of the US with the same colonial origins and military past. Speaking of ‘shared values’ could potentially anger and alienate the insurgent audience, as much of the reactive narrative is based on ‘values’ and even though the counterinsurgent does not use these terms in any of the ‘shared values’ descriptions there is still a danger that these connections could be made, which may provoke anger. Aside from this issue, the identifications have a slight positive influence on the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy, though this is not significant.

Referring to ‘close ties’ with the US would be divisive for the domestic audience, while for some it would be salient, for others it would not appeal. This is something that the US recognised, a 2007 cable stating that “polling suggests up to half of all Kiwis believe New Zealand does not need a closer relationship with the United States”.

Another WikiLeaks document showed “that New Zealand officials doubted there was public support for the closer [security] ties and preferred to keep them secret.” That said, a report following the anti-nuclear legislation found that 77% of New Zealanders still wanted a continuing alliance with the US. Likewise, Headley and Reitzig found that while 51% of NZ viewed the US positively, only 28% viewed them negatively.

The counterinsurgent only refers to ‘close ties’ and not ‘closer ties’, which infers they are wary of the danger of the latter. Likewise, while NZ is more alike than dissimilar to the US, references to ‘shared values’ would possibly not hold huge appeal as NZ’s national character is intrinsically tied to its new found ‘independence’ following the anti-nuclear legislation; in other words, a fundamental aspect of NZ’s national character is tied to it differentiating itself and its

131 WikiLeaks, “PM Clark Goes to Washington”.
134 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?”.
values from the US. The ‘shared history’ is not problematic and would probably appeal to most. Explaining that NZ has ‘close ties’ and a ‘shared history’ with the US would reduce fear by connecting the country with the sole superpower. Likewise, they help to explain why NZ is supporting the US after the attacks, because of the ‘close ties’, ‘shared history’ and ‘shared values’. This all makes the counterinsurgent appear capable as they are tying themselves to this superpower. However, these do not really direct anger, except possibly by making the victim state seem closer and more similar to the domestic audience, which may increase empathy. In general, these identifications are unlikely to mobilise support but would help with justification by providing an understanding of why NZ is supporting the US.

These identifications would have a strong salience for the US, particularly ‘shared values’ as this fits Bush’s original narrative. As Ambassador Swindells noted in 2005, “we need to move away from the quid pro quo, issue-by-issue approach that now characterizes U.S.-New Zealand interactions and instead foster a wide-ranging, forward-looking relationship built on shared values and common interests”, going on to say that “Embassy staff have pointed out repeatedly to MFAT colleagues that the absence of [Government of NZ] public acknowledgment of the importance of United States-New Zealand ties is both noticeable and regrettable”. A 2007 cable showed how much had changed, stating that Clark’s speech will “present a more positive focus on overall US-NZ relations”. Another 2007 cable, sent regarding the 20 year anniversary of the anti-nuclear legislation, reinforced this: “the Labour Government might have used the occasion of the anniversary to focus on NZ’s principled stand against the U.S. The fact that the Government chose to focus instead on the warming of the bilateral relationship and proliferation issues demonstrates how much it wants to keep relations on their improving track.” However, while in general these are appealing, it is not completely positive because the US were aware that NZ was more willing to speak of these ‘close ties’ to an international audience rather than a domestic one. As a cable from 2004 explained: “We further note that PM Clark is apparently much more willing to highlight her excellent relations with President Bush when speaking to an Australian audience than to domestic Kiwi audiences.” Likewise, a 2006 cable explained that Clark “values the intelligence relationship very highly. It has ensured that New Zealand still has

135 Buchanan, “Deconstructing New Zealand Foreign Policy”.
136 WikiLeaks, “Message from Ambassador Swindells: NZ Foreign Secretary Phil Goff’s May 25-7 Visit to Washington”.
137 WikiLeaks, “PM Clark Goes to Washington”.
some access and influence in Washington while allowing Clark to maintain the Labour Party's public ambivalence about the U.S. at home.” In 2007, there were still issues regarding the way NZ spoke of the US, with a cable noting that a senior diplomat had told “New Zealand [it] must continue to find new ways to cooperate and to improve the ‘tonality’ of its public messages concerning the United States”. Thus, while the identification would appeal, and justifies the alliance, because it was made more often to a wider international audience, these impacts would have been reduced as the US were aware of how NZ targeted specific audiences.

5.3.5 COLLECTIVE ACTOR
The counterinsurgent referred to the collective actor using the manifest units ‘UN’, ‘United Nations and the ‘Security Council’. As will be examined below, these are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive identifications.

5.3.5 Table 1 – Collective actor, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>UN-positive</th>
<th>UN-negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.5 Table 2 – Collective actor, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>UN-positive</th>
<th>UN-negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT
The ‘UN’ was referred to relatively consistently throughout, as both a raw and ratio figure, though it did spike in 2003 for both. The specifically positive and negative references were less

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141 WikiLeaks, “EAP DAS Davies January 16-7 Meetings with GNZ Officials”.

241
consistent and also spiked in 2003. This fits with the extensive discussion regarding Iraq in that year, NZ was being honest about the flaws of the UN in the face of US criticism while balancing this with positive descriptions. Another interesting revelation from the usage is that the National Party rarely ever mention the UN, with only 27 of the 510 references, which fits their ideological positioning as a bilaterally-oriented realist. With regard to the context hypothesis, the ‘UN’ references fit for both raw and ratio. The positive and negative ones were used more to a wider audience, in both counts, which fits with their usage in 2003 with regard to Iraq.

NZ’s overarching position on the UN is considered credible. Generally speaking, Clark’s government refers to the UN as the most important international body that offers the best means of collectively maintaining international law and world security – or as Goff referred to it in 2002, “a model for international unity of purpose”. In other words, it is described in a mix of aspirational and descriptive language. It is also referred to in a realistic if more negative manner, such as when Goff explained in 2001 to the General Assembly that “[n]o one would claim that the United Nations has an unblemished record of success. But without it the world would be a much less secure place”. In the lead up to the Iraq Invasion, NZ’s rhetoric around the UN was similarly both aspirational and realistic and while it was often positive it never let idealism replace truth, which is why all the identifications are creditable.

Even more importantly, these identifications are highly accurate. NZ counterinsurgents outlined the role, composition and limitations of the UN in a comprehensive manner that explained how and why the UN was acting in the way it was and in the lead up to the Iraq Invasion this helped expose American attempts to distance themselves from any blame. Just after the invasion began, Goff gave a powerful example of this, explaining that the “United Nations system relies on the collective will of all its members. It is these member states that set its priorities. The UN cannot act without their consent. It falls therefore upon us all to make the UN relevant in today’s world.”  He blends an explanation of how the UN functions with a criticism of the US and its actions in an accurate manner. In contrast, a week earlier, Bush had said, “[t]he United Nations

Security Council has not lived up to its responsibilities, so we will rise to ours.” Bush spoke of the UN and the US as completely distinct, when it is one of the most powerful and influential members. The NZ identifications provide a nuance that Bush’s do not, constricting their descriptions by balancing the positive and negative identifications in a way that ensures accuracy.

AUDIENCE

There is a vast difference in opinion of the UN across the Muslim majority states, while 61% of the population in Lebanon view it favourably (the only majority for Muslim countries in the survey), only 17% do in Turkey. Pew found that in Indonesia and Malaysia, major non-Middle Eastern Muslim states, there was strong UN support, with the former at 82% and the latter at 60%. Another poll of predominantly Muslims states found widespread support for the UN gaining greater powers but also a strong perception that the UN is still dominated by the US. The mixture between hope the UN can help them and disillusion with the US dominance suggests that NZ’s positive yet realistic descriptions would probably be salient for many of the insurgent support population, appealing to their mixed beliefs and matching their contrary experiences. NZ’s position on the UN mirrors the insurgent audience’s ambivalence and would have a restrained emotional impact on them. In turn, this would help justify NZ’s cause as they are realistic about the flaws and issues with the UN, but are also aspirational about what it can achieve, which makes it inclusive.

New Zealanders have a strong affinity with the UN and are proud of the state being an ‘international citizen’, meaning that the general and positive identifications would appeal. As noted in a 2005 WikiLeaks cable, both Permanent Representative “Banks and Mosley admitted that New Zealanders can be somewhat unrealistic when it comes to their confidence in the United Nations and the organization’s potential to bring order to the world.” The negative references would not damage this salience because they were realistic and largely in context of...

149 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?”
US attacks on the UN and, overall, NZ’s descriptions of the UN would have matched New Zealanders experience of a largely positive but still flawed organisation. References to the UN would control fear as they connect with the larger international community and make it appear like NZ is part of a larger collective. They would also help reduce confusion because most foreign affairs references are contextualised by this internationalist framework. In turn, this makes the counterinsurgent appear competent because of this membership. However, these identifications would not direct anger. Thus, they do not have any short term mobilisation capacity but they would help with long-term justness, especially for multilateral solutions.

As already referenced, the US saw NZ’s references to multilateralism as a “means to limit U.S. power”, wanting the state to be more overtly bilateral in its support, suggesting that the constant identification of the ‘UN’ would not be salient.\textsuperscript{151} This is further reinforced by the fact that NZ used the positive identification so often during the lead up to Iraq as a means of justifying why they chose to publically refuse to support the invasion. Therefore, while these identifications do not have a negative impact on the US cause in general, in the lead up to Iraq they were specifically used in this manner and overall they would not have a positive impact on the alliance.

5.3.6 PERSONNEL IDENTIFICATION

The counterinsurgent used a number of terms to identify its personnel. Specifically this manifest unit involved the terms ‘personnel’, ‘soldier’, ‘troop’ and ‘peacekeeper’. As will be examined, these are inclusive, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, though there are some accuracy issues.

5.3.6 Table 1 – Military actor, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>personnel</th>
<th>soldier</th>
<th>troop</th>
<th>peacekeeper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{151} WikiLeaks, “The U.S.-New Zealand Relationship: What We Could Not Say in the Mission Program Plan”.

244
CONTENT

‘Personnel’ was used consistently over the period, particularly in ratio count. The other three were not. ‘Soldier’ and ‘troop’ both show a significant increase at the end of the period, particularly ‘soldier’. To break down uses of ‘soldier’, it should be explained that 11 of the references regarded alive NZDF members serving during the ICAT, 6 were for members injured during the ICAT, 13 were historic or generic references and 30 regarded people killed during the ICAT. Of the 37 uses of the term in 2010-2011, 29 referred to dead and 2 to wounded. The spike 2011 occurred when the NZDF lost a number of personnel and it is hard not to conclude that NZDF members are ‘personnel’ when they are alive and ‘soldiers’ when they die. That 29 of the 60 usages refer to dead ‘soldiers’ suggests that this interpretation is correct. Certainly ‘personnel’ has broader scope and can refer to all members of the NZDF rather than just the army, but the numbers are still out of balance. Also, while there would be an expected increase in more military terminology from the National Party due to their ideological focus, the massive preponderance of use in reference to those who have been killed suggests that this interpretation is correct. Most of the pre-2010 references of ‘soldiers’ were to NZDF members serving in historic conflicts and it is further hypothesised that the counterinsurgent believes that while the domestic audience are proud of this military history, contemporary operations do not share that appeal, which is why the term ‘personnel’ is used so frequently. All of the identifications fit the hypothesis that regarding context, being given to a domestic audience more than a wider one in both raw and ratio counts.

All the terms were used literally, so there are no credibility issues. However, as can be seen by the way they are used, they vary in accuracy. Semantically there is little difference between the first three terms, with ‘personnel’ referring to “[p]eople employed in an organization or engaged in an organized undertaking such as military service”, ‘soldier’ referring to “[a] person who serves in an
army” and ‘troops’ referring to “[s]oldiers or armed forces”. However, the term ‘personnel’ is more generic and vague with the least militaresque overtones, while ‘soldiers’ and ‘troops’ have unmistakably martial implications. ‘Personnel’ can be used to refer to non-military organisations and this broadness means that when used in military situations it is able to somewhat mask the military nature of the situation, meaning that it is not as accurate because it is ambiguous. From the consistency analysis, it can be seen that the counterinsurgent uses ‘personnel’ in an obscuring fashion, only using ‘soldiers’ when their forces have been killed or injured. Thus, the nuance available between these terms is largely lost because they are being used in an obscuring fashion to constrict the nature of the deployment.

**AUDIENCE**

There are no perceived major impacts for the insurgent audience, all of these terms would match their experience of Western militaries and any minimising of the military nature of the counterinsurgent would be unlikely to be apparent to the insurgent audience. Thus, they control emotion and do not exclude the insurgent support population.

Of all the terms, ‘peacekeepers’ would probably be most salient as it fits within NZ’s already examined narrative as a ‘good international citizen that punches above its weight’, which is supported by the fact that while 85% of the country support peacekeeping operations, military solutions, such as the deployment of the SAS, fall below 50%. The possible change in salience mooted above fits with the powerful ‘pacifying’ impact that the 1980s anti-nuclear movement had on the national character. ‘Personnel’ would likely be second as it does not have the overtly militaristic tones that would might repel many New Zealanders, while ‘soldiers’ and ‘troops’ are the least salient as they do not fit NZ’s narrative. A point of interest here is how the NZ Army themselves perceive this, with one illuminating remark from a soldier in Afghanistan asking a New Zealand Herald reporter, “[w]ill you call us peacekeepers?... It’s been a long time since I’ve seen the Army referred to as soldiers” with reporter then writing “there’s little peace to

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keep near Kabul, and the Kiwis are strictly soldiers.” Clearly, for this soldier at least, his experience is commensurate with the term ‘soldier’ and not ‘peacekeeper’. With respect to emotion, this section will focus on the impacts in a different way as these terms are being used as a means of limiting domestic fears and concerns regarding overly ‘militaristic’ actions that do not match how New Zealanders see their nation rather than specifically to do with the threat. This is inversed for the NZDF, whose members can be considered in this section as a segment of the NZ population. For them, or the above individual at least, it seems clear that there is a degree of anger regarding the terminology used to refer to them, in particular the gap between rhetoric and reality. They see themselves as ‘soldiers’ and ‘troops’ not ‘peacekeepers’ or ‘personnel’ because of the operational environment. This is something that the US Embassy notes, writing that the “redefinition of the military’s role as peacekeepers rather than peacemakers have made recruitment and retention more difficult”. The terms ‘personnel’ and ‘peacekeepers’ have a greater mobilising potential for the NZ audience because they fit the national narrative. The major issue here is that use of the terms in this manner could negatively impact the counterinsurgent’s justness and legitimacy, which occurred in the last years of the ICAT as ‘personnel’ who were mentoring became ‘soldiers’ who were dying in combat. Ensuring that their words match their actions is critical and as these usages show, this gap did appear and the counterinsurgent had to ‘course correct’, changing how they were identifying their military force because reality did not match their rhetoric.

The downplaying of military aspects would not be salient for the US. In a number of cables, Swindells made it clear that the Embassy is not impressed with NZ’s insistence on portraying itself as an internationalist peacekeeper to the domestic audience. Swindells refers to NZ’s foreign policy outlook as having ‘two worlds’, the realist and idealist, with this dichotomy generating much concern for the US. The persistent use of minimal military terms exacerbates this concern. More specifically, terms ‘soldiers’ and ‘troops’ would have the best fit for the allied audience as their overarching label for the ICAT was the ‘war on terror’ and it is ‘soldiers’ and ‘troops’ who fight war not ‘personnel’ or ‘peacekeepers’. Also, as Bacevich writes, the US has an

158 WikiLeaks, “The Two Worlds of Middle Earth: New Zealand’s Strategic Policies”.
“infatuation with military power” and an “idealized image of the American soldier.” Military power is central to the US narrative and the American soldier is core to this narrative. By portraying their force to their own audience in this manner, NZ infers the ICAT is largely non-military, which conflicts with the US narrative and the justness of their ‘war on terror’, which could negatively impact the alliance.

5.3.7 PERSONNEL DESCRIPTIONS

The counterinsurgent described their own personnel in a positive manner. This latent unit includes references such as the NZDF having a “reputation for excellence” or “[o]ur personnel have an international reputation for excellence” as well as statements that a “special feature of Kiwi forces has been their ability to relate to local people.” As will be examined below, these are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

5.3.7 Table 1 – Personnel descriptions, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>positive personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.7 Table 2 – Personnel descriptions, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>positive personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT


This identification was not used with great consistency, with three years where it was not used at all and several years – 2003/2007 in raw, 2007/2010 in ratio – where it spiked. The reason for these spikes appears to be the deployment of the PRT, for 2003, the rapprochement for 2007 and National’s need to mobilise support for the continuing deployment in Afghanistan. It does fit the context hypothesis, with this identification given more to a domestic audience than a wider one in both raw and ratio counts.

These are credible identifications as the NZDF has a reputation for excellence in a number of areas and these identifications are given in a literal manner that specifically describes the positive qualities. For example, in 2005 Goff explained that a “special feature of Kiwi forces has been their ability to relate to local people”. This is also accurate, particularly when this is further explained, such as Goff’s 2007 statement that “[o]ur smallness, our multicultural nature and good pre-deployment training predispose us towards being sensitive rather than arrogant towards local populations and winning their trust and support”. This provides detailed information on not only what makes NZ personnel good but why this is so. As well as being nuanced descriptions, they are constricted as they do not exaggerate but rather accurately convey positive attributes.

The only time the counterinsurgent used terms like ‘heroism’ and ‘bravery’ was in 2007 when the SAS received medals for showing these qualities and even this is constricted, with Clark even saying they are “modest about their achievements”. These are also informative as one of the key operational objectives of a COIN operation is to convince the insurgent support population that their forces are competent, which this identification does.

**AUDIENCE**

The description of positive attributes of the counterinsurgent’s force are unlikely to be salient for the insurgent support population as few would have any beliefs, experiences or narratives about the NZDF. In turn, they would have a limited emotive impact. However, they are inclusive as they not only refer to the personnel in a positive manner but often (8 times) do so in a way that

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162 Goff, “NZ’s Role in Peacekeeping and in Afghanistan.”


indicates they are good at ‘relating to local people’, which legitimises the counterinsurgent, particularly as they help to convince the audience the counterinsurgent’s forces are competent and, consequently, the proper force to be responding.

These identifications would appeal to the domestic audience, even accounting for the pacifist strain of the national character, as 15 of the identifications refer to the NZDF’s ability in peacekeeping rather than conflict situations and 8 to their ability to get along with locals while the more overt military ones refer to specific situations rather than to general bellicose qualities. These identifications control fear as they portray the counterinsurgent as competent, though in so doing may not reduce the confusion as this competency suggests the counterinsurgent should have been able to predict and prevent any attacks. They do not direct anger. Thus, while they may legitimise because they show the counterinsurgent’s personnel are ‘right and proper’, and thus the counterinsurgent is ‘right and proper’, for the solutions proposed, they do not deliver any mobilisation.

These identifications would be unlikely to appeal to the US as it does not match their opinion of the NZDF. A 2006 cable, titled ‘Thinly Stretched New Zealand Military Aims High, But Can It Deliver?’ explained that the NZDF was “being rebuilt after decades of neglect” and that even if all measures were put in place it “will take time for the military to significantly improve its level of capability”. Also, the US narrative is one of a more warlike military force, and this emphasis on ‘soft power’ would not fit this narrative. It could therefore not provide any significant alliance maintenance either, though the implication that the US has competent allies could help justify their cause, though this is minor.

5.3.7 VICTIM DESCRIPTIONS

The counterinsurgent referred to the victims using a number of different terms, including the manifest units of ‘victim’, ‘civilian’, as ‘New Zealander’, as well as the latent unit of ‘expanded victims’. To be included an ‘expanded victim’ description needs to maximise the scope of the victims, either through use of numbers, such as Goff’s 2001 reference to the “more than 6000 lives lost”, or by reference to the number of nationalities or different faiths, like his 2002 explanation that “[t]hose who died came from 79 different countries, were of mixed age, gender, religion and ethnicity.” As will be examined below, these identifications are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

166 WikiLeaks, “Thinly Stretched New Zealand Military Aims High, But Can It Deliver?".
5.3.8 Table 1 – Victim descriptions, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>victim</th>
<th>civilian</th>
<th>New Zealander</th>
<th>expanded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.8 Table 2 – Victim descriptions, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>victim</th>
<th>civilian</th>
<th>New Zealander</th>
<th>expanded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTENT**

None of these was used with any consistency in either raw or ratio count, though the expanded victim came close. The most pronounced consistency issue was the dramatic increase of ‘New Zealander’ identifications by the National Government from 2009, despite none being killed by terrorism in those years. The reason for this rise is probably due a combination of reasons, firstly National’s focus on national rather than international security and because of the nature of a long campaign. The National Party is ideologically ‘Realist’ and have a greater focus on national security and less faith in international security arrangements, meaning that an emphasis on NZ victims is to be expected.\(^\text{167}\) However, while this may have played role it is also likely that issues of continuing to mobilise support for a long campaign may have lead to the increase in this framing. National came to power seven years after the 9/11 attacks, to ensure domestic support they need to maintain the immediacy of these attacks many years after the event and framing victims as New Zealanders provides this sense of immediacy. With regard to the context hypothesis, none of these were given more to a domestic audience than wider in either raw or ratio form, which is probably due to their focus on identifying victims, which means they would be used more after events.

These ‘victim’ identifications are credible. They are all self-evident descriptions that have an undeniable fidelity, those killed and injured were ‘victims’ as they had “been attacked, injured, robbed, or killed by someone else”. Likewise, they were ‘civilians’ as they were “not a member of the military”. The counterinsurgent was very careful not to identify ‘New Zealanders’ as ‘victims’ unless they were sure, after 9/11 Anderton stated he was getting “the earliest possible definitive advice about New Zealanders who may have been caught up in this tragedy” and NZ was similarly cautious after every event. Finally, the reference to the expanded victim identification is also a credible description, as the counterinsurgent either gives the exact numbers killed and injured (15 times out of 28) and their nationalities – at least as they were known at the time – or used phrasing that implies a certain scope that cannot be discredited. All of these examples are literal descriptions of the ‘victims’, delivering an identification that has unimpeachable fidelity.

These identifications are also particularly accurate and informative for a number of reasons. Firstly, the term ‘civilian’ conveys a vital component of terrorist attacks: that they target non-combatants. This is accurate and informative as it is one of the underlying mechanisms that empowers terrorist attacks. ‘Civilian’ also helps confer agency on the enemy as the ‘victims’ have been targeted for this reason – by labelling them as having this quality the counterinsurgent is also suggesting that the enemy chose ‘civilians’ for this reason. Also, referring to ‘victims’ as ‘New Zealanders’ humanises the ‘victims’, ‘giving them a face’. Likewise, labelling the expanded description of the victims provides useful detail, specifically helping identify the number, nationality and faith of the ‘victims’. This, in turn, communicates the indiscriminate targeting of terrorist attacks, thus, that some of the victims may have been Arab or Muslim. As well as providing useful information, they all do so in a constricted manner, each portrays the ‘victims’ in a limited manner that does not amplify any quality beyond accuracy. Even the expanded victim constricts as it often quantifies the number killed and even when it does not it still refers to the scale of the victims in a manner that has fidelity.

AUDIENCE
The terms ‘victim’ and ‘civilian’ would probably have an experiential commensurability for the insurgent support population, their credibility and accuracy are unimpeachable. However, there

170 Anderton, “Ministerial Statement: Terrorist attacks in US.”
is a slight danger that the focus on domestic victims could alienate some insurgents. The issue here is that there is a perception that the West only cares about their own victims, that they are indifferent to the suffering of the Muslim and Arab populations.\textsuperscript{171} This is a perception backed up by coverage in many Western states; as Alberts’ writes, “most of America’s dominant media pay little mind to the victims of U.S. aggression.”\textsuperscript{172} This in turn reinforces the insurgent grand narrative that the West is self-serving and hypocritical, justifying the insurgent cause and excluding the support population from the counterinsurgent’s cause. This would be somewhat balanced out by the expanded descriptions, though only a couple specifically refer to religion. This is a missed opportunity by the counterinsurgent for, as McCabe writes, one of al Qaeda’s biggest failures was its “indifference to Muslim casualties” as “[s]uch behavior has probably been the predominant factor in alienating Middle East Muslims, who, while frequently having no particular objections to non-Muslims, especially westerners, Israelis, or Indians, being killed, react vehemently when they are the target. Thus, al Qaeda and the jihadis have at times alienated potential and actual sympathizers.”\textsuperscript{173} McCabe’s recommendation is “to emphasize the human cost associated with jihadi atrocities, especially as it impacts innocent Muslims. We need to develop an information campaign that puts a human face on the victims.”\textsuperscript{174} This is something that Hunt et al. and Gompert all recommend as well.\textsuperscript{175} Nevertheless, these all control emotion as they are restrained in their tone and scope, providing a nuanced and constricted labelling of the ‘victims’. Thus, they are all being inclusive, especially the expanded victim, and would help the counterinsurgent’s legitimacy.

The term ‘victim’ would match the domestic audience’s experience, particularly immediately after attacks, especially the visceral images of the ‘victims’ themselves. However, ‘civilian’ probably would not have the same degree of fidelity as it is a more technical term. The identification of ‘New Zealanders’ as ‘victims’ would have a powerful salience, Loewenstein and Small list proximity and in-group similarity/shared nationality as key factors in eliciting sympathy for victims, explain that proximity “tends to increase sympathy toward victims who are in other ways sympathy-evoking, whereas distance tends to decrease it” and that research “on intergroup relations and social categorization consistently finds that people care more about others in their

\textsuperscript{174} McCabe, “The Strategic Failures of al Qaeda”.
\textsuperscript{175} Hunt, et al., “Beyond Bullets,” 18, Gompert, \textit{Heads We Win The Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency}
in-group than in their out-group”. The expanded identification would probably have less appeal than the identification of ‘New Zealand victims’. With respect to emotion, all could actually increase fear. ‘Victim’ and ‘civilian’ could increase fear as they imply a degree of ‘innocence’ that suggests the domestic audience could themselves one day be in the same position. Both ‘New Zealanders as victims’ and the expanded description have the same impact, but in a more direct manner, with the former the more direct of the two. These terms all help to reduce confusion by labelling the ‘victims’ using credible and accurate terms that provide useful information. While this would help reduce concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s capability, overall, all four of these have negative impacts on the perception of the counterinsurgent’s capability as they imply that the counterinsurgent was unable to protect the expanded ‘victims’, particularly those from ‘New Zealand’. Because of the identification of non-combatant status and shared nationality, they would help direct anger. The most powerful mobilising identification is that ‘New Zealanders’ were victims as it makes the situation more immediate and personal. All, however, have a high mobilising capacity. Also, the terms ‘civilian’ and ‘victim’ have a justifying capacity as they both help delineate an ‘ideal victim’, which would help generate more compassion from the audience.177

These terms would be salient for the allied audience. As already noted, the US Embassy had commented that ‘the lack of a geographic threat also enables Kiwis to view the world with a sense of detachment and a bit of moral superiority’ before noting an official had laughed at the thought of NZ ever needing US military assistance, which suggests that the reference to ‘New Zealanders as victims’ would appeal. Generally, the terms all fit into Bush’s original narrative, expanding the victim beyond the US and inferring an innocence, which means they would all justify the US cause. Also, because they all help mobilise support in the domestic population, they would be of utility for the US cause. Overall, these identifications would have a positive impact on the alliance.

5.3.9 ACTOR/VICTIM CONCLUSION

The actor and victim identifications usage frequencies and ratio counts will now be examined, as well as the context usages.


5.3.9 Table 1 – Actor/Victim annual frequency totals and ratio counts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actor/Victim Frequency</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0.978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>0.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>1.418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>1.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>0.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1696</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen that the hypothesis that DCFs would be consistent over time was not well supported by the raw annual counts, which show that 2003 (402) had almost double the frequency of the next highest year, 2006 (245). This can be seen in the line graph below:

However, these variations were largely evened out when the annual word counts were factored in for the ratio count. The line graph below shows how much closer these all were to each other than the raw frequencies.
5.3.9 Table 2 – Actor/Victim context frequency totals and ratio counts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1.206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>1.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1696</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hypothesis that DCFs would be more commonly used to a domestic audience is supported by the raw frequencies for each, with the DCF actor and victim identifications accounting for 53% of all uses and almost six times as likely to be given to a domestic audience than during an event. This can be seen in the bar graph below.
However, when the ratios are accounted for, these DCFs were more likely to be used during an event than to a domestic audience, though the difference between the three contexts is far less significant, as can be seen in the bar graph below:
5.4 STRATEGY/SOLUTION

This section will examine how DCFs were used to propose strategies and solutions. As with the other framing tasks, the main criteria was whether the strategy or solution was inclusive, though other areas were also influential. These strategy and solution DCFs cover a range of different aspects and while efforts to differentiate between strategies and solutions have been made, they lines are not always clear. In some cases, a single manifest unit can be both, such as ‘security’ or ‘democracy’ and it can be difficult to disentangle how a term is being used. Also, strategies are frequently pitched as solutions; that is, the ‘way’ component of a strategy is framed as an ‘end’, either as a first step in achieving an objective or simply as a solution on its own.

5.4.1 MILITARY SCOPE OF STRATEGY

The counterinsurgent outlined a range of strategies with varying military scope using the manifest units ‘war’, ‘conflict’, ‘fight’, ‘military action’, ‘intervention’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘mentoring’. While all of these terms are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, there were some issues that need to be explored.

5.4.1 Table 1 – Military scope of strategies, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>war</th>
<th>conflict</th>
<th>fight</th>
<th>military action</th>
<th>intervention</th>
<th>peacekeeping</th>
<th>mentoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.1 Table 2 – Military scope of strategies, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>war</th>
<th>conflict</th>
<th>fight</th>
<th>military/action</th>
<th>intervention</th>
<th>peacekeeping</th>
<th>mentoring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

Overall, none of these was used with any consistency. There was a spike in use for ‘war’,
‘conflict’ and ‘military/action’ in 2003, both in raw and ratio frequencies. This is explained by the divide between terms used predominantly for Iraq and those used for the wider ICAT. 82% of uses of ‘war’, 69% of uses of ‘conflict’ and 53% of uses of ‘military/action’ were for Iraq (all 6 uses of ‘invasion’ were also all in reference to Iraq but did not meet the DCF threshold). In contrast, 85% of uses of ‘intervention’, 89% of uses of ‘peacekeeping’, 100% of uses of ‘fight’ and 100% of uses of ‘mentoring’ were all for Afghanistan and the wider ICAT. With regard to contexts, ‘conflict’, ‘fight’, ‘intervention’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘mentoring’ were all given more to a domestic than wider audience as raw counts, which fits with their reference to Afghanistan, though only ‘mentoring’ fitted this hypothesis in ratio count.

Technically, these strategies are all correct, they are literal descriptions of the actions the counterinsurgent took during the ICAT. The term ‘war’ specifically refers to regular interstate conflict, which in some respects both Afghanistan and Iraq were. It is also undeniable that both theatres involved ‘fighting’, ‘conflict’, ‘military/action’ and ‘peacekeeping’, use of these terms for either is credible. Even the term ‘mentoring’ is impossible to discredit as it could apply to virtually any action where the counterinsurgent’s forces were training another, all the way up to working with them in combat, which was the case.

However, as the consistency usages show, there are some major accuracy issues. While in the abstract these terms provide nuance, the way the counterinsurgent used them was somewhat obscurant. In virtually every example, the counterinsurgent used the more bellicose strategy to refer to Iraq and the less belligerent strategy to refer to Afghanistan and the wider ICAT despite only being involved in the latter in a military role and despite their involvement in the latter lasting far longer. This reduces the accuracy, and thus the nuance, of these strategies as rather than being used to help differentiate between types of operations they were being used in a political manner to constrict the military nature of NZ operations in Afghanistan. Thus, while they are not nuanced, they are constricted, which is how the counterinsurgent uses them. Certainly, it could be argued that the UN Mandate for Afghanistan made it a different operation to Iraq, but there was still ‘fighting’, ‘conflict’ and ‘military action’ in the former and the terms ‘invasion’ and ‘intervention’ do not convey the difference of mandated and non-mandated. The danger for the counterinsurgent is that a say-do gap may appear, when reality no longer matches rhetoric. While NZ was only involved in Iraq in a non-military role, the PRTs were combined operations that involved aspects across the spectrum from humanitarian assistance to ‘military’
operations, though many believe the ‘soft’ component was a front for the military operation.\textsuperscript{178} For many years, there was no say-do gap, beyond the works of those highly critical of NZ’s actions in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{179} However, it was the term ‘mentoring’ that exposed the lack of accuracy of the counterinsurgent’s terminology. This gap is clear in the differing positions of Prime Minister Key who “defended the use of the word ‘mentoring’ to describe the role of the New Zealand SAS Afghanistan alongside the Afghan Crisis Response Unit – and appeared to be at odds with his defence minister, Wayne Mapp, who... conceded there was a “substantial combat component” in the SAS role.”\textsuperscript{180} The say-do gap meant that the head of the NZDF had to admit that “[t]he term mentoring does need explanation”.\textsuperscript{181} The counterinsurgent used the term to try to control perceptions of the nature of the operation, rather than using an informative term that represented the situation in a manner that enabled understanding. As Trotter writes: “‘Mentoring’: it’s such a reassuring – and decidedly non-military – expression.”\textsuperscript{182}

**AUDIENCE**

The more bellicent strategies would fit the more extreme supporter’s narrative of the West as an invader, while terms like ‘peacekeeping’ would probably not appeal as they would be perceived as a euphemism for occupation. That said, the less bellicent strategies may help control emotion better by neutralising this narrative, but as they have been used here there is some potential for problems. The more bellicose would help control anger as they were used to by NZ to oppose the Iraq Invasion. The main issues and risks lie with the perception of a say-do gap, particularly for those with direct experience that does not match NZ’s framing, which could anger the insurgent support population, delegitimising the counterinsurgent’s cause and legitimising the enemy’s. As has been noted, the enemy has referred to the hypocrisy of the West and the political use of these strategies to obscure the military aspect of operations in Afghanistan, of portraying the action there as an ‘intervention’ rather than an ‘invasion’ could provoke anger.


\textsuperscript{179} Vernon Small, Tracy Watkins and Danya Levy, “Key: No Honour for Soldiers by Withdrawing,” stuff.co.nz, September 29, 2011, accessed on 13/05/15, available from \url{http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/5701508/Key-no-honour-for-soldiers-by-withdrawing}

\textsuperscript{180} Small, Watkins and Levy, Key: No Honour for Soldiers by Withdrawing”.

The less belligerent strategies would have a greater salience for the NZ audience, appealing to the core values and fitting the national narrative. A 2010 poll found that while 72% of New Zealanders supported the PRT, only 47% supported the upcoming deployment of the SAS. In their article on NZ foreign policy and public opinion Headley and Reitzig write that both Clark and Key’s actions in the past decade or so have proven that both have “been favourable to the idea of ‘humanitarian intervention’, [and] sceptical about ‘regime change’”, which effectively reflects the divide examined here. NZ used the dislike of the more bellicose strategies to help them denigrate the US-led invasion in Iraq. These strategies would have certain key impacts on emotion. Immediately after 9/11, the more belligerent would probably have exacerbated fear as they imply that the threat is more serious. However, they are better at reducing confusion as they delineate the situation in a more clear cut and comprehensible manner. The reason for this is that using force to combat force is more intuitive than using a range of ‘soft’ options. This, in turn, means that the bellicose strategies would help reduce concern about the counterinsurgent’s capabilities, though this would change over time as the less bellicose strategies have a better congruency with the deliberative problem and blame identifications that became more common over the ICAT. Finally, the more bellicose strategies direct anger more as they fit with the reactive problem and blame identifications and the use of force implies greater guilt than less bellicose strategies do. With such high levels of public support for the less belligerent strategies, their use would help to justify the counterinsurgent’s cause, though, as noted, in the early years of the ICAT the more bellicose would have also probably helped with mobilisation. However, as occurred in 2010-2011, there is the danger that use of the less belligerent terms in an arena that includes a high degree of combat could result in a say-do gap, which could in turn compromise the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause. As Trotter said at the time of the NZSAS deaths, it has become “increasingly clear that whether our SAS troopers are engaged in operations initiated by ISAF, or the Taliban, the role they play is very far from that of the passive advisor. On the contrary, all the evidence emerging from Afghanistan suggests that our SAS leads from the front, and that such Afghan Government support as may be found in these operations is located (how to say this politely?) at some distance from the action.” Buchanan also voiced scepticism at the time of the deaths, referring to the actions of one of those killed as not just as ‘combat’ but as a first responder and then saying that “raises the question as to why Mr. Key has from the day he announced the re-deployment insisted that the SAS are in a non-combat ‘mentoring’ and support

184 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?”, 74.
185 Trotter, “New Zealand Troops In Afghanistan”.
role.” He goes on to note the “lack of synchronization of the government PR spin” with regard to Key and Mapp’s conflicting statements. In her pro-Key piece, Coddington admits that “Stephenson possibly has a point – mentoring is a strange word, since the SAS’ work, by definition, is dangerous.” This could also damage the justness of the counterinsurgent cause, and the duplicity may lead some of the domestic population to question the legitimacy of the government as a counterinsurgent.

In general, NZ’s overemphasis on less belligerent strategies would lack salience for the US, with a 2006 cable stating that Labour were “ideologically drawn to a peace-keeping role”, that there has been “a costly decision” to “reorient the NZDF from a combat into a peacekeeping force in line with the goals of Labour” and that the government “seems most heavily focused” on “multilateral peace support and humanitarian operations”. As has already been noted, the US were generally disappointed with NZ foreign policy and strategy, especially the unwillingness to maintain their military capability and the use of less belligerent terms exacerbates this outcome. The belligerent strategies would have a greater appeal in the abstract as they fit with the ‘war on terror’ narrative, though NZ’s use of terms like ‘invasion’ with regard to Iraq suggests that in context they would not have appealed as these terms were being used to portray US actions negatively to the NZ public. Therefore, neither of these types of strategies helps justify the US cause or provides alliance maintenance.

5.4.2 COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES

The counterinsurgent referred to the need for a collective strategy. The two most common forms of this latent unit were either for calls for a ‘multilateral’ strategy where states ‘work together’, or the counterinsurgent emphasised the importance of the ‘UN’ when acting ‘multilaterally’. The analysis here will examine any strategy that outlines the need for the allied actors to solve the problem in a collective manner, or, at the least, references the international scope, either specifically referring to the ‘UN’ or ‘multilaterally’. With regard to the ‘UN’ strategy, this can include references to the ‘Security Council’ as well as ‘mandates’ and ‘resolutions’. As

187 Buchanan, “Paul G. Buchanan On The PM And The NZSAS ‘Mentoring’”.
189 Wikileaks, “Thinly Stretched New Zealand Military Aims High, But Can It Deliver?”. 190 Wikileaks, “The Two Worlds of Middle Earth: New Zealand’s Strategic Policies”; Wikileaks, “The Two Worlds of Middle Earth: New Zealand’s Strategic Policies”.
will be shown, these strategies are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

5.4.2 Table 1 – Collective strategies, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>multilateral</th>
<th>UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.2 Table 2 – Collective strategies, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>multilateral</th>
<th>UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

Neither of these strategies was used with consistency over the period for either raw or ratio counts. The multilateral strategies were used predominantly in the first three years in both counts, while the ‘UN’-focused strategies spiked in 2003 for both counts. There was a significant drop in usage for both when National took power that was probably due to their ideological preference for ‘traditional’ security and bilateral relations. The dramatic rise of ‘UN’ strategies during 2003, occurred when NZ was opposing US unilateralism in Iraq and over the whole period, 22% of all these two strategies were used to oppose the Iraq Invasion.

Collective strategies are credible, there was a huge unity of effort in the years after 9/11 and emphasising the need to ‘work together’, either ‘multilaterally’ or through the ‘UN’ is a literal description of useful strategy.\(^ {191}\) They are also credible because NZ has a long-standing commitment to “conflict and dispute resolution, human rights, environmental change, limits on commercial whaling and a number of other important policy areas in multinational fora”;

essence, they are backed up by NZ’s history of collective action.\textsuperscript{192} The specific strategies ranged from the colloquial ‘work together’ through to more technical strategies, such as Goff’s 2001 statement that “[m]ultilateral action and cooperation on a wider front is also necessary if we are to be successful in removing the threat of terrorism”; all refer to the collective strategy in a manner that clearly describes the ‘multilateral’ nature of the strategy.

These strategies are also accurate, as they deliver important information regarding the counterinsurgent’s response to the threat, either explaining that the international community needs to ‘work together’ or that the ‘UN’ is an important body for implementing solutions. They are also informative, as the need for a ‘multilateral’ response to insurgency is a central axiom of COIN; generally speaking the more states acting together, the more politically, militarily and economically effective the COIN campaign.\textsuperscript{193} Equally important, multilateralism adds legitimacy: a “broad multilateral COIN can impart legitimacy... to COIN, internationally, at home, and to some extent in the countries facing insurgency.”\textsuperscript{194} While the different strategies vary in specificity, even the most basic ‘work together’ (45 times) captures the essence of the collective strategy in a pithy phrase that provides insight. At the more technical and detailed end, statements like Goff’s 2004 one that “[i]nternational action, however, should take place within the UN Charter and multilaterally through a proper decision making process” provide even greater nuance, while also constricting the solution by bounding it within international law and governance structures that refine the counterinsurgent’s intent and channel of action. This statement is also one of the many that serves as a method of opposing US unilateralism in Iraq and shows how the counterinsurgent is able to use a strategy to indirectly oppose another strategy in a highly nuanced and constricted manner. In general, all of these strategies are informative and constricted in their scope.

AUDIENCE

These strategies would be salient for the insurgent support population. The less extreme would feel included by these strategies as their states are part of the UN, while for the more extreme, these would appeal to their belief the West always ‘works together’. From the lead up to Iraq on, NZ’s references to the ‘UN’-oriented strategies would have a strong appeal as they would have fitted most of the audience’s narrative of the situation. Surveys of Muslim majority states in 2002

\textsuperscript{192} Buchanan, “Deconstructing New Zealand Foreign Policy”.
\textsuperscript{193} Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Vol. 4, 2008), 104-105; \textit{FM 3-24, IV-2-IV-3}
\textsuperscript{194} Gompert, et al, \textit{War by Other Means}, xlix.
and 2003 found widespread anger regarding US unilateralism.\footnote{Andrew Kohut, “Arab and Muslim Perceptions of the United States,” \textit{Pew Research Center}, November 10, 2005, accessed on 13/11/14, available from http://www.pewresearch.org/2005/11/10/arab-and-muslim-perceptions-of-the-united-states/} Thus, both sets of strategies control emotion in the insurgent support population because they describe the response in a restrained manner that involved the support population and, because of this, they have a positive impact on the justness of NZ’s cause. In particular, its ongoing use of this solution as a means to oppose US unilateralism delivers the biggest justification, and consequently, legitimisation benefits with this audience.

These strategies are highly salient for the domestic audience as the NZ narrative is one of a country that works collectively.\footnote{Robert Ayson, “New Zealand Defence and Security Policy,” in \textit{New Zealand in World Affairs 4, 1990-2005}, ed. Roderic Alley (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2007), 135; Fischer, \textit{Fairness and Freedom}, 347.} By describing the collective nature of the response the counterinsurgent is ensuring it will fit with this deeply held narrative. As Headley and Reitzig write, “[a]pproval of New Zealand contributing towards UN peacekeeping has been high for some time—for example, in 1994, there was 88 percent support [and that a] number of individual polls have also shown that New Zealanders are favourable towards the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’”.\footnote{Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?”, 81.} However, while they would appeal in general, as a WikiLeaks cable noted, Clark was “willing to address [intelligence] targets of marginal benefit to New Zealand that could do her political harm if made public”, suggesting there are limits to this appeal as Clark hid ‘working together’ when it tied NZ too closely to the US agenda.\footnote{Hager, “US Cables Spill Beans on NZ Ties,”.} These strategies reduce fear as they connect with the collective actor and give the appearance that the counterinsurgent is acting with the majority to implement solutions. This may not address confusion as it makes the imbalance of power between the allied actor and the enemy so big that it suggests the attacks should have been predicted and prevented. Likewise, while acting in concert does confer a degree of capacity, this same capacity does suggest that the counterinsurgent is not as competent as they are portraying. These strategies do not direct anger either. Overall, these have a low mobilisation potential as they make the threat seem small in comparison to the response, though they do justify the response as they fit within NZ’s national narrative.

These strategies would be theoretically salient for the US as they fit their general narrative, and after 9/11 they probably were. As Goff noted after his visit to Washington on the 27th of September, 2001, NZ’s offer to ‘work together’ was “hugely appreciated” by the administration,
most probably, it is contended, because having as many allies as possible would reinforce the legitimacy of their cause in NZ and beyond. As the US referred to NZ support, they did not actually need it in Afghanistan early on, as Hager noted senior military personnel had to lobby the US to be included and when the SAS arrived there was little for them to do. As a US reporter noted, the SAS “seemed to exist as much for public relations... as it did for any military necessity.” However, they are also considered highly problematic for NZ-US relations. As already noted, the US believed that “the current government’s view of multilateralism [was] a means to limit U.S. power”. Another cable from 2005 explained, in reference to Afghanistan, that NZ “officials have clearly defined these efforts to the New Zealand public as multilateral initiatives, with only the most tentative of nods our way. We’d like that to change.” As these were expressed after Iraq, they are a clear statement that the US was not only aware of NZ’s use of these strategies as a means of opposing them, but found them troubling. Therefore, while they would have helped justify the US cause early on, by late 2002 these would not justify the US cause to the NZ audience and would not have aided the alliance.

5.4.3 POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS

The counterinsurgent referred to ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’ as strategies and solutions. This section will examine all references to these political strategies and solutions. Any usage of these terms to refer to states other than Afghanistan or Iraq was discounted, as were references to ‘poor governance’ or a ‘lack of democracy’ as a problem, though general references to “promoting a stable, secure and prosperous world” through “good governance [and] democracy”, such as Goff did in 2002, were counted as one for each term. As will be examined, these solutions are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, though as will be shown there is an element of reactive.

5.4.3 Table 1 – Political strategies and solutions, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>democracy</th>
<th>governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

199 Hager, Other People’s Wars, 25.
200 Ibid., 32-33, 43.
201 Ibid., 43.
203 WikiLeaks, “Message from Ambassador Swindells: NZ Foreign Secretary Phil Goff’s May 25-7 Visit to Washington”.
5.4.3 Table 2 – Political strategies and solutions, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>democracy</th>
<th>governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

Neither was used consistently for either raw or ratio. Rather, the usage for both spiked in 2006, one of the key years of rapprochement, which suggests NZ saw these political elements as strategically important for its relationship with the US. One interesting aspect of consistency is that the National Government used the term ‘governance’ far more than ‘democracy’, it is speculated that this is because they are more interested in the technical component of the solution than the idealistic. Labour, on the other hand, account for almost all the uses of ‘democracy’ as a solution, which fits with their more idealistic and internationalist ideology. While ‘democracy’ was not used more in a domestic context for either count, ‘governance’ fitted the hypothesis in both raw and ratio. This may be explained by the former’s more idealistic tone and its possible appeal to the US.

These are credible when given as strategies, as the counterinsurgent did actually apply ‘democratising’ and ‘governance’ strategies. As solutions, they are questionable in their validity as it is debateable whether either Afghanistan or Iraq could be considered viable ‘democracies’ after the years of intensive efforts, with the 2012 Democracy Index ranking them at 152 and 113 respectively, out of 167 states.205 Despite all the effort and resources, both countries are in the bottom third of ranked states, which suggests that over the period, this solution was not completely creditable.

The accuracy of these strategies and solutions depends on the degree to which the counterinsurgent outlines what is involved. The issue is that most did not go beyond use of the terms ‘democracy’ or ‘governance’ and when they did expand, it was often to state that NZ “supported democratic elections”. There were only a few instances where the counterinsurgent goes into any depth, such as Goff’s 2006 statement that “interventions while achieving stability do not by themselves establish political cultures which accept the rule of law, and respect authority deriving from democratic process. Establishing that culture, developing leadership capacity and putting in place sustainable economic and social development are longer term processes.” These types of descriptions deliver greater nuance.

**AUDIENCE**

These strategies and solutions have some saliency issues for the insurgent support population. It has been suggested that Islam and ‘democracy’ are a poor match. Countering that, a Pew Research survey found that “[s]olid majorities in Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan”, with numbers ranging from 61 % to 84%, want democracy. However, this does not account for the context. While Muslims may want democracy, they would rather it was ‘home grown’ instead of externally imposed. ‘Democracy’ has a pejorative aspect in some Muslim societies as it is associated with the imposition of Western liberal values and a resultant secularism and moral corruption. This impression is only enhanced when the ‘democracy’ is being forced on a state following an invasion. Thus, while ‘democracy’ may be salient in the abstract, as an enforced solution it is unlikely to appeal to their belief of how it should be achieved. It could even generate anger, as it not only has a hegemonic aspect that connects back to the Cold War, but there is an internal contradiction involved in forcing people to become democratic. This is backed up by a 2007 Pew survey, which found that the dominant opinion in Muslim majority

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states was that the US “promotes democracy mostly where it serves its self-interest.”

Interestingly, this is a view shared by 63% of Americans. As the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) explains, “US governments have never brought “peace” and “democracy” in any country... [the] US and allies invaded our country under fine slogans of “democracy”... but today they are supporting and helping the dirtiest enemies of such values in Afghanistan.” Another possible cause of anger is that the term ‘democracy’ was a key component of Bush’s problem definition, such as his statement on September 12, 2001, that “[f]reedom and democracy are under attack”.

This all suggests that the ‘democracy’ strategy and solution would not help justify the counterinsurgent’s cause and its inclusiveness is dependent on how independent NZ is perceived to be and how much impact of the idea of enforced ‘democracy’ has on the audience.

These strategies and solutions would have limited appeal for the domestic audience, even though ‘democracy’ is a key part of the NZ national identity, this is tempered by Headley and Reitzig’s findings that of nine foreign policy goals, ‘promoting democracy in other countries’ ranked lowest for New Zealanders. While New Zealanders are proud of their own democratic nature, it is not as popular as a strategy or solution. As Headley and Reitzig write, “the majority opposed the use of force to restore or establish democracy in undemocratic countries, suggesting scepticism about ‘regime change’.” This is something that the Deputy Prime Minister Cullen expressed at a meeting with the US in 2008, explaining that it is “difficult to establish a democracy in a country with such strong tribal traditions.” While these may help to control fear, they do little for confusion and the most important emotion they could generate is concern regarding the counterinsurgent’s competency as the domestic audience are not confident in imposing democracy. Overall, the political strategies and solutions would not direct anger. Thus, they are of little mobilisational use. The negative domestic perception of ‘democractising’ also means it would not positively impact the justness of the counterinsurgent cause.

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212 Kull, *Feeling Betrayed*, 107
215 Bush, “Remarks by the President In Photo Opportunity with the National Security Team”.
216 Sibley et al., “Pluralistic and Monocultural Facets of New Zealand National Character and Identity,” 22; Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?”, 78.
217 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?”, 81.
The political strategies and solutions would be salient for the allied actor as this term is an important part of Bush’s original narrative, featuring as both a blame attribution and solution. During a 2006 meeting on Afghanistan, Rice stated that the US goal was “the ongoing transformation of Afghanistan from tyranny to democracy” and that their aim was “to empower the Afghan people to guarantee democracy’s enduring success – not just as a form of governance, but as a way of life.”\textsuperscript{219} NZ even made 3 references to “Bush’s freedom and democracy agenda”, all in 2006.\textsuperscript{220} This would likely also aid in alliance maintenance as it justifies the US cause.

5.4.4 HARD STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS
The counterinsurgent referred to a group of similarly themed hard strategies and solutions, using the manifest units ‘secure/security’, ‘stable/stability’ and ‘peace’. This section will examine any references to these as solutions, either ways or ends, but will ignore when their absence or lack is used as problem identification, such as statements regarding “security issues” or a “lack of security”. As will be analysed, these strategies and solutions are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, though ‘peace’ is borderline reactive.

5.4.4 Table 1 – Hard strategies and solutions, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>secure/security</th>
<th>stable/stability</th>
<th>peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.4 Table 2 – Hard strategies and solutions, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>secure/security</th>
<th>stable/stability</th>
<th>peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
CONTENT

‘Security’ and ‘stability’ were used relatively consistently, in both raw and ratio counts, though both were rarely used in 2001 and peaked during the years of rapprochement. This peak fits with the general understanding of the rapprochement and NZ’s desire to portray itself as a facilitator of ‘security’ and ‘stability’ at that time. ‘Peace’ showed a greater decline from an early peak, which fits with its borderline reactive nature. All three were used more to a domestic audience than a wider, in both ratio and raw form.

These strategies and solutions are considered credible as the counterinsurgent did implement ‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘peace’ focused strategies and solutions during the ICAT. They are all literal descriptions of the strategies and solutions that the counterinsurgent was enacting, though ‘peace’ was sometimes used in a manner close to figurative. The terms ‘security’ and ‘stability’ are accurate, as can be seen in Goff’s 2007 statement that NZ was working on “how best to achieve and sustain security and stability”. Goff connected the terms together and described them in a way that infers they not only need to be created but maintained, providing important details about both the counterinsurgent’s strategy and solution. The use of ‘peace’ was more problematic. At the more reactive end is Goff’s 2002 statement that “[w]e pray that out of the ashes of the World Trade Centre may arise... enduring peace.” This is mitigated by the way it is used the majority of the time, such as in statements like Goff’s in 2007 that NZ “had come to help them achieve peace and stability.” The 2002 example was given in New York during the first anniversary of 9/11, explaining why it has a more binary and exaggerated nature, but even this most reactive usage fits within the overall deliberative schema.

AUDIENCE

These strategies and solutions would probably appeal to the insurgent support population in the abstract, though they may be pessimistic about them in context of the ICAT. As RAWA write, the US “have never brought ‘peace’... in any country. It has only forced war on countless

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

221 Goff, “New Zealand’s Defence Policy.”
countries, causing destruction, killing and disasters.”

A 2013 survey of 65 countries found that the US was ranked as the ‘biggest threat to world peace’ amongst Muslim-majority states. Thus, they are likely to have a mixed appeal when given by NZ as this perception could anger the insurgent support population, suggesting that in practice these strategies and solutions are not that restrained. That said, as will be discussed later, they are not just restrained and inclusive in abstract but can be used in a manner that specifically emphasises inclusiveness, such as Goff’s example above, where NZ wants to “help them achieve peace”.

These strategies and solutions have a natural appeal to New Zealanders, not just because of the innate self-desire for ‘peace’ but also because promotion of these strategies and solutions has long been a part of the national narrative and they fit within the various ‘very important’ and ‘quite important’ foreign policy goals Headley and Reitzig identified amongst the NZ population. They are strategies and solutions that reduce potential for fear as they offer relatively glib but positive sounding ‘ways’ and ‘ends’. However, they do not seem to address confusion in any decisive manner. Nor do they have any major positive outcome for the counterinsurgent’s apparent capacity or for directing anger at the counterinsurgent. Thus, these do not deliver a high degree of mobilisation but they would confer long term justification and legitimacy as they fit into New Zealanders’ expected view of how their country should act as a counterinsurgent.

While ‘peace’ fits Bush’s original narrative, the other two do not. However, they would probably still appeal because, as discussed, the US believed NZ was not focused enough on ‘security’ and these ‘hard’ solutions would help ameliorate US concerns. That said, they do not help mobilise the NZ audience and they do not justify the US cause to the same degree as the reactive narrative, so they would have a limited utility for the US and would have a relatively neutral impact on the alliance.

5.4.5 SOFT STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS

The counterinsurgent also used soft strategies and solutions; specifically the manifest units: ‘reconstruction’, ‘development’, ‘humanitarian’ assistance and ‘human rights’. This section will consider all uses of these terms as strategies and solutions, though it will not include references

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223 RAWA.
225 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?”.
that identify the lack of these as problems, such as references to a ‘lack of development’ or ‘human rights issues’. As will be examined, these are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, though there are some issues.

5.4.5 Table 1 – Soft strategies and solutions, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>reconstruction</th>
<th>development</th>
<th>humanitarian</th>
<th>human rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.5 Table 2 – Soft strategies and solutions, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>reconstruction</th>
<th>development</th>
<th>humanitarian</th>
<th>human rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTENT**

None of these were used with consistency, all spiking in different years. For ‘reconstruction’ and ‘humanitarian’ the spike was 2003, in both raw and ratio count. This was due to their use for Iraq, with 30 of the 43 uses of the former and 32 of the 33 of the latter in 2003 given with respect to Iraq. NZ appeared to be using these terms to differentiate from the ‘hard’ US solutions. The other two peaked during the years of rapprochement, in both raw and ratio counts, suggesting they were used strategically as a means of positioning NZ as a serious alliance partner. All four fitted the hypothesis regarding the context, being given to a domestic audience more than a wider one, both in raw and ratio counts.

These identification are considered credible; ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ can encompass a huge range of strategies and solutions elements, from economic to social to political, from infrastructure to schools to legal systems, all of which NZ were involved with to some degree in
Afghanistan, and, to a lesser extent, Iraq. Likewise, ‘humanitarian’ assistance and ‘human rights’ have a broad scope of reference, covering the promotion of human welfare and social reforms, which NZ did during the ICAT, and the solution of a state that respects ‘human rights’.

These strategies and solutions are all relatively accurate. They all provide nuance, offering a range of specific actions and objectives that encompass ‘nation building’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’ operations – these are terms that are a part of the internationalist lexicon and their use during the counterinsurgency provides details about what the counterinsurgent is doing as a component of their overarching solution that fits into these common state intervention activities. This is furthered enhanced when the counterinsurgent explains what they are doing, such as Goff’s 2006 statement that “[r]ecent reconstruction work includes rehabilitation and provision of roads and bridges, and construction of district police stations and provision of police vehicles.” The nuance is also enhanced when the counterinsurgent uses modifiers to specify what the ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ are focused on. For example, the term ‘reconstruction’ becomes more constricted if it is referred to as ‘civil reconstruction’, which occurred 7 times, as does ‘development’ when it is referred to as ‘economic development’, which occurred 15 times. Finally, nuance is also provided when the counterinsurgent explains that there are issues with these solutions, such as Clark’s 2007 statement that “post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction will rarely follow a positive linear trend.” That said, when these terms are used without any extra description or specific modifiers they can be somewhat vague and thus are not as constricted. However, they are considered relatively informative and even without the modifiers or descriptions of specific activities these strategies and solutions label the counterinsurgent’s actions in a nuanced and, if not constricted then, unexaggerated manner. Even when the counterinsurgent does not specify the scope of the strategy or solution, it has an inherently limited nature for one particular reason: the name of the deployment in Afghanistan is the ‘Provincial Reconstruction Team’ and though these references are not counted here they help to provide context for the scope of the ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’, i.e. it is at the provincial level. These strategies and solutions are also informative, as they are central COIN

229 Clark, “Address to Asia Society Luncheon.”
principles – Tujan et al. explain that ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ are crucial to the success of a COIN campaign.\textsuperscript{250} Similarly, Mansoor emphasises that while security is key to achieving aims, ‘humanitarian assistance’ is critical for winning ‘hearts and minds’.\textsuperscript{251}

**AUDIENCE**

While these strategies and solutions would be salient in the abstract, as they all components the insurgent support population would believe in, there are some potential negative implications in application. In particular, the term ‘development’ is a western concept that is \textit{a priori} good.\textsuperscript{252} Thus, it would not necessarily appeal to the insurgent audience, not because they are ‘anti-development’ in the purely semantic sense but that the externally imposed and controlled Western ‘development’ would not appeal. Also important, as already noted many of the insurgent support population blame the West, and the US in particular, for the lack of economic development experienced in many Muslim countries means these terms may not match. Likewise, the term ‘reconstruction’ carries with it an implied destruction, which in both Afghanistan and Iraq was at least partly caused by the counterinsurgents. Thus, when specifically given by a Western state towards a predominantly Muslim state, the sense of anger many Muslims feel would mean that they may not appeal. They would not associate Western states with progressive ‘development’ or ‘human rights’ but rather with the retardation of ‘development’ and suppression of ‘human rights’. This all depends on how closely the various aspects of the audience associate NZ with the US and how clearly delineated NZ is as a sovereign actor with an independent view’, but as above it is contended that for many the counterinsurgent is too closely allied with the US for ‘development’ to have a positive impact. Another issue is that for those actually in Afghanistan the emergence of a say-do gap would have been nearly instant as NZ counterinsurgents began referring to ‘development assistance’ and ‘humanitarian aid’ before any of these solutions had occurred.\textsuperscript{253} This would have got worse over time, as evident in RAWA’s 2009 report: “There is no sight of reconstruction despite the jaw-dropping 32 billion dollars of aid.”\textsuperscript{254} In reference to the ‘humanitarian’ aspect of the solution, the same report explains that while “Western media created a lot of hype about the so-called ‘liberation of Afghan women’... in fact, shamefully, the situation of women has got worse in the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{253} Hager, \textit{Other People’s Wars}, 84-88.
\textsuperscript{254} RAWA.
\end{flushright}
past eight years.” However, while these have the capacity to evoke negative emotions they are not inherently exclusive and, as with ‘security’, ‘stability’ and ‘peace’, can be used in an explicitly inclusive manner, such as Goff’s 2004 statement that “NZ will continue to work with Iraq on reconstruction and humanitarian needs.” Overall, they help justify the counterinsurgent cause as they are relatively inclusive and have positive connotations.

These strategies and solutions would be salient for the majority of the domestic audience as they fit the country’s internationalist national narrative and appeal to core beliefs. Headley and Reitzig’s study of NZ opinions found that ‘promoting human rights abroad’ was the second most important foreign policy goal behind ‘strengthening the New Zealand economy’, while ‘improving standards of living in poor countries’ was fifth, confirming the belief that these would appeal to most New Zealanders. As they conclude, a “number of individual polls have also shown that New Zealanders are favourable towards the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’”. They are key goals of the UN, as evidenced by the 2000 Millennium Declaration and consequent five year progress report, ‘In Larger Freedom: Toward Security, Development and Human Rights for All’. These strategies and solutions, then, help limit fear as they describe positive outcomes that encompass a wide range of actions. They also help reduce confusion as they suggest a lack of these qualities are to blame for the situation, which connects with deliberative blame attributions. They would probably have a mixed impact on competency as while they are credible, fit with the NZ national narrative and attributions, these were existing issues which suggests the counterinsurgent should have been able to predict and prevent attacks. They do not direct anger at the enemy but rather deflecting it by connecting with these easily parsed grievances. In general, they do not provide powerful mobilisation but would help justify the counterinsurgent’s cause, not just because it is a part of the national narrative, but because it is a key goal of the UN. One issue is that there is a possibility for a say-do gap, though admittedly with strategies and solutions as vague as these it is less likely than in other solutions. As Hager outlines, the ‘development assistance’ that was being conducted at the time of Goff’s

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235 RAWA.
238 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?”, 78.
239 Headley and Reitzig, “Does Foreign Policy Represent the Views of the Public?”, 81.
speech was, at best, limited and incompetent and, at worst, deceptive, as some of the work was focused on ‘quick fix’ jobs to assist military operations rather than long term projects to aid Afghans.\(^{241}\)

In general, these terms fit the US narrative as they cast the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq in a positive manner. They also fit with the US narrative of their unique record of post-conflict ‘reconstruction’, from Germany and Japan after World War Two through to Korea.\(^{242}\) However, there are two issues; first, NZ used ‘reconstruction’ and ‘humanitarian’ assistance frequently to outline their opposition to the Iraq Invasion. Second, any salience would be tempered by ongoing US irritation at NZ’s desire to emphasise its ‘humanitarian’ action over military solutions.\(^{243}\) Thus, while ostensibly these would have a positive impact on the justness of the US cause, in fact, they may not have a positive impact on the alliance.

### 5.4.6 DIALOGUE STRATEGIES

The counterinsurgent also used a number of dialogue-focused strategies using the manifest units of ‘diplomacy’ ‘dialogue’, ‘discuss’, ‘discussion’ or ‘tolerance’. The solution of ‘tolerance’ is included here as it was often listed as resulting from the ‘dialogue’ strategy, such as Goff’s 2004 statement that an interfaith “meeting will encourage leaders to come together to discuss how they, and we, can promote tolerance, mutual respect and harmony between people of difference religion, cultures and ethnic origins”.\(^{244}\) These are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive, as will be shown.

#### 5.4.6 Table 1 – Dialogue strategies, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>dialogue</th>
<th>diplomacy</th>
<th>tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{241}\) Hager, *Other People’s Wars*, 84-88.


\(^{243}\) WikiLeaks, “New Zealand Prime Minister Clark in State of the Nation: "No Worries"; Media Reaction Muted”.

\(^{244}\) Goff, “Eminent New Zealanders to Attend Inter-Faith Meeting.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>dialogue</th>
<th>diplomacy</th>
<th>tolerance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.6 Table 2 – Dialogue strategies, context totals:

CONTENT

None of these was used with any real consistency in either raw or ratio count, and all essentially disappeared by 2008, which fits with National’s focus on traditional security. Both ‘dialogue’ and ‘diplomacy’ spiked during the years of rapprochement, suggesting NZ believed they gave them credibility as an alliance partner. With regard to the context hypothesis, only ‘dialogue’ was used more to a domestic than wider audience in both raw and ratio counts, while the other two only matched as a raw count.

These are credible as all literal references to a specific set of strategies that encompass ‘dialogue’ actions, NZ was engaged in ‘dialogue’ strategies during the ICAT, from UN-based approaches to specific interfaith conferences to bilateral negotiations. The ‘dialogue’ and ‘tolerance’ references are accurate, particularly as they are almost all descriptive, referring to specific forums and connecting ‘dialogue’ to outcomes such as ‘tolerance’; as well as the above example, this can be seen in Clark’s 2007 statement about “a range of regional and global processes have been put in place to build greater tolerance and understanding. In our region, there is the Asia Pacific Regional Interfaith Dialogue.” These strategies provide detail not just on what the counterinsurgent is doing but how it can impact the problem, delivering nuance. They are also constricted as they are presented in a manner that never oversells the outcome or exaggerates the importance. While the counterinsurgent rarely explained what the ‘diplomatic’ actions were, these are still accurate as ‘diplomacy’ is a self-evident term that is able to convey the types of strategies being implemented. Contained within the term is a set of implied details, including diplomats, embassies, meetings, negotiations, compromises and agreements, that are all implicit. Thus, when the term is used by the counterinsurgent it outlines a specific set of actors and processes that provide nuance. This is particularly potent when NZ used this term as a means of opposing the Iraq Invasion, such as Clark’s 2003 statement that “[w]e have a strong preference

for a diplomatic solution to the crisis.”246 There is more layered information contained within the term ‘diplomatic’ compared to the military strategies. The ‘diplomatic’ strategy is also constricted as it is never given in a manner that implies any scale or scope, but rather is usually given as a component of a wider strategy, such as Peters’ 2006 statement that “New Zealand’s response to these challenges of state failure, in our neighbourhood and beyond, must encompass the full range of diplomatic, military and development tools.”247 They are also informative as the various ‘dialogue’ approaches are a key principle of a successful COIN campaign, with COIN practitioners and theorists advising a counterinsurgent maintain channels for dialogue and promote tolerance.248

AUDIENCE

The ‘dialogue’ strategies would be salient for the insurgent support population, as they infer negotiation and compromise. However, while ‘dialogue’ and ‘tolerance’ are relatively generic, ‘diplomacy’ may encounter some issues as there is a widely held belief amongst Muslims that bodies like the UN are vehicles for US foreign policy, and the ongoing issues with the Oslo Peace Accords mean that in practice ‘diplomacy’ may not have hold much appeal for the insurgent audience.249 That said, the use of this strategy to oppose the Iraq Invasion would match their experience and appeal to beliefs. While some in the audience may react negatively to ‘diplomacy’ because of the historical precedent, overall, the ‘diplomatic’ strategy would have a restrained emotive impact as it outlines a process that involves compromise and agreements. This suggests that the counterinsurgent will deal with the enemy in a humanised manner that values their rationality. Furthermore, the use to oppose the Iraq Invasion would help negate any negative emotional outcome as it reinforces the NZ independence of action. The use of ‘dialogue’ and ‘tolerance’ are restrained because they, like ‘diplomacy’ suggest that there will be discussion and compromise on both sides, with an aim of meeting in the middle. Thus, these solutions are highly inclusive and would have a positive impact on the justness of the counterinsurgent cause, particularly once NZ started using ‘diplomacy’ as a means of opposing

the Iraq Invasion.

These would be salient for New Zealanders as they fit the internationalist aspect of the national narrative. There is one aspect that means it may not be totally central: the oft-stated position that a state should ‘never negotiate with terrorists’. As noted, NZ used a form of this when it said they would show ‘no tolerance’. The ‘dialogue’ strategies clash with this reactive framing task. However, overall they would probably appeal because they are explicitly connected with the UN, such as Clark’s 2003 reference to the “diplomatic process being conducted in the Security Council”, and because they were used as a means of contrasting NZ’s position with the unpopular Iraq Invasion. The ‘dialogue’ strategies help control fear as they portray the enemy as human and rational, able to be negotiated with. In turn, however, this does not help address the confusion regarding the reasons for the attacks. Nor does it reinforce the counterinsurgent’s capability as using a rational ‘dialogue’ strategy portrays the enemy as rational, which infers the attacks were rational and leads to questions of why they were not able to be predicted or prevented. This reasoning also means that these strategies do not direct anger as they suggest that the enemy acted in a rational manner and had a reasonable motivation. Thus, while this strategy would help justify the counterinsurgent cause by connecting with NZ’s internationalist narrative, it does not aid mobilisation.

The ‘dialogue’ strategies are unlikely to be salient for the US as they do not fit into Bush’s original ‘war on terror’ narrative, but rather directly clash with its militaristic overtones. As they not only humanise and rationalise the enemy but also suggest there are issues the allies need to compromise on, they also imply that there were legitimate grievances behind the attacks, meaning they do not help justify the US cause. Furthermore, they do not help mobilise NZ for the US as they imply that the enemy does not need to be fought but rather can be negotiated with. Thus, they would not have a positive impact on the alliance.

5.4.7 SCOPE, FOCUS AND LENGTH

The counterinsurgent described the scope, focus and length of their strategies and solution. For scope, this latent unit was referred to in ‘expanded mandate’ terms, either using an overarching phrase, such as ‘multifaceted’ or explicitly listing both hard and soft strategies and solutions, often explaining the connections between them. With regard to focus, the counterinsurgent

250 Neumann, “Negotiating with Terrorists”.
251 Clark, “Statement to the House on Military Action in Iraq.”
referred to the targeting ‘root causes’. This involved the manifest units ‘causes’ or ‘conditions’ in reference to terrorism. While the counterinsurgent sometimes listed the ‘root causes’ (17 out of 22), this was not necessary for inclusion. The counterinsurgent also referred to the solution being ‘long-term’, this latent unit includes any references to the strategies or solutions requiring a long term effort. As will be shown, these are literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive.

5.4.7 Table 1 – Solution scope and length, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Faceted</th>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Long Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.7 Table 2 – Solution scope and length, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Faceted</th>
<th>Causes</th>
<th>Long Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTENT

The ‘multifaceted’ strategies and solutions were used consistently in both raw and ratio form until 2008, then their use dropped. This fits with the National’s more traditional security focus. Likewise, the high usage from 2005-2007 during the years of rapprochement fits with Labour’s internationalist outlook and with their attempts to convince the US that they are a reliable coalition partner. Connecting the hard and soft aspects also peaked in those years, which also fits with the government’s efforts, and National’s limited use of this fits their traditional security focus. The ‘root causes’ strategy was not used consistently in either measure, with a spike in 2002 for both raw and ratio frequencies. The ‘long time’ solution description was not used consistently over the period in either raw or ratio counts. However, its drop off in 2007 was probably because by this point that the campaign would last a ‘long time’ was self-evident as it had. With regard to context, the ‘multifaceted’ and ‘root causes’ strategies and solutions matched the hypothesis in both raw and ratio counts, while the ‘long time’ only matched for raw, which
was probably connected to its early use as a means of reassuring the US it would ‘stay the course’.

These are all credible. With respect to the ‘multifaceted’ strategies and solutions, the use of hard and soft approaches is an accurate summation of the broad strategies and solutions that the counterinsurgent implemented in Afghanistan, and to a lesser degree Iraq, as part of the ICAT. The ‘root causes’ strategy matched the actual actions the counterinsurgent pursued during the ICAT, though for those that did not list any actual ‘conditions’ this credibility came from vagueness. Likewise, the ‘long term’ solution description is credible as NZ was involved for over a decade. These strategies and solutions are all literal, they outline either the scope of the solution, often listing the various components that the counterinsurgent is utilising and even explaining how they all work together, or they explain that the solution will be ‘long term’. In all cases, the terms used are exact representations of the scope or length of the solution.

They are considered accurate. The ‘multifaceted’ strategies and solutions help inform the audience that the counterinsurgent’s response encompasses a number of different actions and outcomes, and listing these actions and outcomes delivers even greater distinction regarding the nature of their response. While all the ‘multifaceted’ references provides useful information in a nuanced manner, it is the connections between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ solutions that provide the most detailed outline of how the solutions function together (77 of the 84 uses). For example, Goff’s 2005 explanation that “[o]ne of the key impediments to reconstruction work and development is the security situation. Without security, development is impossible, and without development security by itself cannot achieve economic and social progress.” This provides a description that not just outlines the solutions but also helps to offers an understanding as to why they are needed and how they function together. In turn, these ‘multifaceted’ strategies and solutions constrict as they show that the problem can only be solved by a number of different actions working in a complementary fashion, which portrays the complexity and difficulty in a realistic manner. The ‘root causes’ solutions were accurate, with those that provided a list the most nuanced. This can be seen Goff’s statement in 2002 that NZ need to implement “measures to tackle the causes of terrorism. Injustice, lack of opportunity, hopelessness, desperation and the failure of legitimate channels to redress grievances, all give rise to resort to terrorist actions. The failure to resolve differences between Israeli and Palestinian people in the Middle East continues

252 Hoadley, “New Zealand Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan”.
253 Goff, “NZ’s Role in Peacekeeping and in Afghanistan.”
to be a catalyst for recruitment into terrorism.”254 Here he connects the ‘root causes’ strategy with the blame attribution. Likewise, the ‘long term’ solution descriptions are accurate as they provide an important aspect of the solution length, but also indicate that the counterinsurgent has the commitment to see the solution through, as is evident in Clark’s 2002 statement that “it will require a long-term commitment from all members of the international community”.255 As well as delivering nuance, these statements are constricted as they also portray the solution in a realistic manner that delivers accurate details about the difficulty of achieving success.

The ‘multifaceted’, hard and soft strategies and solutions are also informative as expanded mandate responses are a central COIN principle, with the literature recommending the use of the full resource of the state including political, military, economic and social levers to effect change by fusing a political strategy with an integrated civil-military effort.256 Cohen emphasises “the critical importance of a secure and stable environment for achieving economic and political development”, which is precisely what the counterinsurgent is describing when they explain why the solutions must be connected.257 The ‘root causes’ strategy is a key COIN principle, with Countering Insurgency explaining that counterinsurgency “is defined as ‘Those military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing the root causes’. Successful counterinsurgency requires a multifaceted approach that addresses the political, economic, social, cultural and security dimensions of the unrest.”258 Thus, not only is ‘root causes’ a central principle but it connects with the ‘multifaceted’ strategies and solutions. Also, time is a key component in COIN and these solution identifications inform about how long the counterinsurgent is prepared to conduct operations for, as recommended by COIN theorists.259

**AUDIENCE**

These would be salient for the insurgent support population. For ‘multifaceted’ this is largely for the same reasons as the hard and soft strategies and solutions as examined. The ‘root causes’

254 Goff, “Goff Speech to 9/11 ANZAC Service In New York.”
258 Countering Insurgency, 1-6.
strategies would have a particular salience, they would match the audience’s experiences and would appeal as they seek to address the underlying grievances. The ‘long term’ descriptions would appeal as they infer that the counterinsurgent is committed to ensuring they obtain their stated outcomes. Because the military solutions are contextualised through connection with the ‘soft’ solutions, they do not have the same potentially repelling outcome as strictly military actions may. In turn, these are then all have a restrained emotive outcome as they are grounded in an understanding of the genuine grievances that motivate the insurgents and the requirements of a COIN and they are inclusive, particularly the ‘multifaceted’, as they approach the enemy as a rational human with legitimate grievances and security and development needs.

These have a mixed salience for the domestic audience, largely because of the various reasons discussed in both the hard and soft strategy and solution sections. The soft approaches would have a greater appeal than the hard ones as the NZ population has shown many times that they have a preference for these types of operations.260 The ‘root causes’ strategies may not appeal as they imply difficult to fulfil measures. This can be seen in Goff’s 2002 statement that the “conditions that give rise to terrorism are complex and need addressing on a number of fronts he most obvious current cause which gives rise to sympathy for terrorism is the ongoing failure to resolve the conflict in the Middle East.”261 Here he refers to these ‘root causes’ as ‘complex’ and references the long-running and difficult to resolve issues of the Middle East, including the Israel-Palestine conflict, which are unlikely to appeal because of the low chance of success. The ‘long term’ identification has little appeal as, in general, democratic publics do not like protracted conflicts and this position would probably be as true for NZ.262 While the ‘multifaceted’ solutions control fear, as they delineate a comprehensive solution and, in some cases, explain how these will work together, the ‘root causes’ and ‘long term’ strategies and solutions have a negative impact on fear as they state that the campaign will take a long time and needs to address some of the most intractable issues in international relations. None of these reduce confusion as both infer that the problem is extensive and complex, requiring a ‘long term’ ‘multifaceted’ solution. However, while the ‘multifaceted’ solution does confer a degree of capacity on the counterinsurgent as it shows them acting in a wide ranging manner to solve the problem, the ‘root causes’ and ‘long term’ strategies and are more problematic. While they do show

commitment, the complexity of the required solution and the amount of time required to solve it does suggest the counterinsurgent is not that capable, particularly with regard to the deliberative problem identifications. None of these identifications direct anger at the enemy either, though the ‘long term’ identification may increase anger at the counterinsurgent because they are involving the state in such a lengthy campaign. As such, these identifications do not aid in mobilisation though they do aid in justifying the campaign, especially as time goes on the reality of the ‘long time’ becomes more apparent.

The ‘multifaceted’ and ‘root causes’ strategies and solutions would probably lack salience for the US because they do not fit Bush’s original ‘war on terror’ narrative’s militarism, straying into the ‘humanitarianism’ that angers the US when NZ emphasises it. The ‘long term’ solution fits their own narrative, on September 12, 2001, Bush was already stating “This battle will take time and resolve.” It is also of utility for their cause, as well as needing initial support for their cause, the US also required other actors to stay committed, as evidenced by the continuing ‘requests’ for NZ to contribute to the ICAT despite the NZ’s military’s tiny size in comparison to the US. As Wikileaks has revealed, a US general even came to NZ in 2006 and “gave the CENTCOM “Long War” presentation to several hundred NZDF personnel”. Thus, while the ‘multifaceted’ and ‘root causes’ strategies and solutions do not help justify the US ‘war on terror’, the ‘long term’ solutions reinforce the US cause, justifying their actions and delivering alliance maintenance.

5.4.8 EXPLICITLY INCLUSIVE STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS

This section will examine the latent unit of explicitly inclusive strategies and solutions. To be seen as explicitly inclusive, the strategy or solution must either refer to working with the local population, such as Goff’s 2001 statement about “working with as broad a coalition of Afghan groups as is possible to create a viable political, economic and social infrastructure”, or outline a solution with specific reference to positive outcomes for the local population, like Goff’s 2008 statement that “New Zealand shares the international community’s interest in a stable

263 Bush, “President Bush Meets with National Security Team.”
Afghanistan in which Afghans can enjoy increasing standards of living.” Implicitly inclusive strategies and solutions are those that that outline positives without connecting them specifically to the insurgent support population or appear to have outcomes that are not targeted for the insurgent support population – they are here referred to as implicit to contrast with the explicitly inclusive ones and will only be examined in comparison to the explicit ones. An example of an implicit solution can be seen in Mapp’s 2009 statement that “members of NATO and ISAF intend that current operations, including New Zealand’s contribution through the PRT, will produce security and stability in Afghanistan.” For positive but implicit strategies and solutions, such as democracy, governance, development, reconstruction, stability, security, peace, rebuilding, war, conflict, fighting, military action, intervention and invasion m solutions could be said to be positive for the local population, but unless given with specific reference to local wellbeing they serve mainly international interests. As will be shown, the implicit strategies and solutions are all literal, nuanced, constricted and restrained.

5.4.8 Table 1 – Explicitly and implicitly inclusive solutions, annual totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>explicit</th>
<th>implicit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.8 Table 2 – Explicitly and implicitly inclusive solutions, context totals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>explicit</th>
<th>implicit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONTENT**

It should be noted that while the inclusive frequencies are comprehensive, the exclusive numbers

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267 Mapp, “Defence Minister Attending ISAF Meeting.”
are a guide compiled from strategies and solutions considered implicit rather than explicit – the already examined strategies and solutions of democracy, governance, development, reconstruction, stability, security, peace, rebuilding, war, conflict, fighting, military action, intervention and invasion – with any inclusive strategies and solutions that used these terms subtracted from the above figures. The explicitly inclusive strategies and solutions were used consistently, both in raw and ratio counts. There were slight dips in 2002, 2008-2010 but compared to many other deliberative framing tasks, these were minor. The explicitly inclusive strategies and solutions also fitted the context hypothesis, being used more to a domestic audience than wider one in both raw and ratio figures.

The explicit strategies and solutions are credible as NZ has a long history of working closely with local populations and the NZDF has a reputation for their ability to undertake this work.268 This inclusive nature continued in Afghanistan, with Hoadley noting that “NZ PRT commanders from the start gave high priority to engagement with the host authorities and community.”269 Inclusivity is more than lofty rhetoric, on the ground it is a key focus. In a thesis based on interviews with former frontline NZ peacekeepers, one of the recurring themes Furnari found was they “thought it crucial to support local people in their work, decision making processes, implementation of new programs etc., rather than doing things for them” and that “good relationships are central to effective peacekeeping” with the understanding that growing good relationships is “the vehicle through which peacekeeping most effectively operates.”270 The inclusive strategy or solution is one that goes from governmental levels to the frontline peacekeeping personnel.

The explicit strategies and solutions were accurate as they specifically included insurgent audience and, in general, the formulations provided a nuanced delineation of how the strategy or solution would function. Some are considered more accurate than others. In 2007, Goff provided a technical and informative version at a military seminar: “The relationship between the intervening partners and the host needs to be a partnership in pursuit of shared goals. Being invited by the host government and maintaining a consent environment are important elements

in the success of a mission.”

He also offered a more informal version in 2001, “[i]t is important, however, that it is the Afghans themselves who do this.”

Key offered a less detailed, borderline exclusive, example in 2011, explaining that NZ was there “to help the Afghan people”. The point being that the explicit strategies and solutions offered an insight into how the counterinsurgent could actually succeed, while the implicit ones referred to outcomes like “ensuring peace and stability”, such as Goff did in 2002, or listed hard and soft aspects, while the explicit ones got to the very heart of what a counterinsurgent must do and how they could actually win by referencing the support population, and this was far more nuanced. They were also more constricted as rather than referring to an exaggerated “global peace”, like Goff did in 2002, they targeted the specific population.

The explicit solutions were also informative as inclusiveness is a core component of COIN doctrine, with the need to adopt inclusive strategies and solutions from the strategic to the tactical level widely acknowledged as one of, if not the, fundamental means of justifying and legitimising the COIN operation, with the US FM 3-24 explaining that the “local population and local government officials should view any project as their own and not one that has been imposed on them by outside agencies”.

**AUDIENCE**

The explicit strategies and solutions would have probably been salient as they would match the insurgent support’s own experiences of disempowerment and would have appealed to their belief that they are important actors who need to be involved in the process. At best they referred to them as if they not only have agency but that they are also equal partners, Goff’s above references to ‘shared goals’ and ‘partnership’ helped to create this agency and equivalency. Any strategy and solution that referred to the insurgent audience and stated that they have a role to play in the outcome would have had a far greater salience than those that simply stated they want to ‘stabilise Afghanistan’ as the former implied the counterinsurgent had the wellbeing and interests of the local population in mind, appealing to their own beliefs. The explicit strategies and solutions also would have helped to control the audience emotion, generating a sense that

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274 FM 3-24, 10-12; Cohen et al., “Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency”.

they would be ones that they help to shape and implement, rather than being externally imposed. The implicit strategies and solutions were more likely to anger the insurgent support population, as noted above in the democracy analysis, a majority see the US as using democracy as a tool for self-aggrandisement. As noted in the blame section, many in the Muslim world also blame the US for lack of development and other grievances, which would only reinforce the alienation of implicit strategies and solutions. It should be noted that the explicit strategy and solution must be credible for it to control emotion, as if the rhetoric and reality do not match they could potentially increase anger as they are hypocritical, something that would be particularly important for audiences in occupied states. Hager recounts a raid led by the NZ SAS in 2002 which was based on faulty intelligence and resulted in a high number of arrests, the illegal handling of prisoners by US forces and the abandonment of the village with many joining the Taleban – an inclusive strategy or solution would not control the anger for these Afghans as it would not match reality.\(^{276}\) This also highlights issues relating to counterinsurgent in an alliance, where one actor’s actions can discredit the other’s communications. The explicit strategies and solutions would help to justify the counterinsurgent’s cause as they involve them, making them feel that they are a part of the process and that they have a stake in the outcome. They show that the counterinsurgent is flexible and understands the need for the involving the insurgent audience, that their cause is not just their own security but the wellbeing of the insurgent audience. The implicit strategies and solutions would only limit the justness of the cause as the tie into the preconceived notions that the US and west are acting for selfish reasons.

The explicit solutions would have limited salience for the domestic audience compared to the implicit ones. That is because they match their experience as they outlines strategies and solutions that are in the NZ interest, they are focused on solutions that will reduce the threat to NZ and international security, which would appeal to the domestic audience beliefs of self-preservation. They have a focus on national security, which have an innate appeal to any citizenry. The implicit strategies and solutions would help limit fear more effectively as well as they are directed at national security outcomes, while the explicit strategies and solutions may appear to be too limited and not punitive enough. Also, the implicit strategies and solutions reduce confusion in a way that the explicit ones cannot, because the latter are more complex and target a specific grouping. Likewise, the implicit strategies and solutions would address concerns about the competency of the counterinsurgent as they are focused on national security, while the explicit ones may appear to be pandering to the enemy. Finally, neither directs anger in any major way, though the implicit ones would to some degree as they imply there is a threat to

\(^{276}\) Hager, *Other People’s Wars*, 59-61.
national security and to ‘global peace’ that needs addressing. Therefore, the implicit solutions deliver greater mobilisation and justification than the inclusive ones.

The implicit strategies and solutions would have greater salience for the US, especially those that focus on aspects such as ‘global security’ and other areas where the US desired NZ place more emphasis on to their own population. The explicit strategies and solutions do not fit the Bush’s original narrative. Because the implicit strategies and solutions help to mobilise the domestic population they may have a positive impact on the alliance, while the explicit ones would not as they fail to reinforce the US narrative or justify their actions and do not help mobilise any support for their cause.

5.4.9 STRATEGY/SOLUTION CONCLUSION

The solution identifications usage frequencies and ratio counts will now be examined, as well as the context usages, though it should be noted these excluded the implicit solutions considered above as these counts were made from the other solutions.

5.4.9 Table 1 – Solution annual frequency totals and ratio counts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Actor/Victim Frequency</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>0.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>1.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>1.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>0.934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>0.975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1581</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen that the hypothesis that DCFs would be consistent over the course of the period is not well supported by the raw annual counts, as can be seen in the line graph below. There were spikes in the years 2002, 2003, 2006 and 2007, with troughs in all other years.
This does even out more when they are considered in ratio form, and while there is a general decline from 2008 onward though compared to other framing tasks already considered, the solution framing task does appear to be relatively consistently used across the period. This can be seen in the line graph below, which shows that there is little variation across the ten years.

![Solution DCF ratio annual](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>1.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>0.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>0.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1581</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.9 Table 2 – Solution context frequency totals and ratio counts:
The hypothesis that DCFs would be used more to a domestic audience than during events or to a wider audience appears to be supported by the raw data. The domestic uses account for 58% of all uses. This can be seen in the following bar graph.

However, this hypothesis is not as well supported by the ratio frequencies, where the event usages score higher than the other two contexts and is almost equal to both other two contexts, as can be seen in the bar graph below:
5.5 DELIBERATIVE FRAMING CONCLUSION

This section will seek to assess the relevant deliberative counterinsurgent frame (DCF) hypotheses before the final, concluding chapter, where all the hypotheses that compare the reactive and deliberative narratives will be examined. As outlined in Chapter Two, these are:

- The deliberative narrative will be used with a consistent frequency over the period.
- The deliberative narrative will be used more frequently when there is a domestic audience rather than wider audience.
- The deliberative narrative will predominantly focus on actor and solution framing tasks.
- The deliberative narrative will be of utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and of limited utility for the wider international audience.

First, the hypothesis that DCFs would be used consistently over the period is not well supported by the raw frequencies but is better supported by the ratio frequencies.

5.5 Table 1 – Total and annual raw frequencies, word count and ratio frequencies of DCFs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Word Count</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>9,612</td>
<td>4.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>26,036</td>
<td>2.861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>27,854</td>
<td>3.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>13,082</td>
<td>2.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>12,419</td>
<td>3.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>28,813</td>
<td>2.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>22,981</td>
<td>2.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3,162</td>
<td>2.751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>14,371</td>
<td>1.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>5,921</td>
<td>1.621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>13,639</td>
<td>1.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4651</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in the table above, there was quite a large variation in frequencies over the period, with the highest year (2003) having almost ten times as many DCFs as the lowest (2008). This is obvious in the line graph below, which shows several spikes, which occurred in 2002-2003 and 2006-2007, followed by a precipitous drop off in frequency from 2008 onward.
The consistency of the DCFs is more apparent when the ratio frequency is examined. As the below line graph shows, much of the variation is removed when the differing annual word counts are taken into account. That said, there is still a general decline in frequency over the period, but the DCFs are still seen as being used consistently when considered in ratio frequency.

However, in both raw and ratio frequencies, the drop in usage is most noticeable from the beginning of the National Party’s term, which may help explain it as the deliberative narrative has less congruency with their more traditional/realist security focus. Also, this period followed the NZ-US rapprochement and this may also explain the decline in DCFs from 2008 onward.

The next hypothesis examined is that the deliberative narrative would be used more in domestic
contexts than wider international ones.

5.5 Table 2 – Total RCF frequencies for the different contexts, their word counts and each ratio:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Word Count</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>13,354</td>
<td>4.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wider</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>61,980</td>
<td>2.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>2612</td>
<td>102,556</td>
<td>2.547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This hypothesis is well supported by the raw frequencies, where domestic uses were almost twice as prevalent. This can be seen in the following bar graph.

Even when the context word counts are taken into account, the domestic uses were more common, though the margin is far smaller and does not deliver the same support for this hypothesis as the raw figures. It was expected that even in ratio form these figures would favour the domestic audience in a more pronounced manner. One reason for the greater than expected usage to the wider audience could be that a part of this wider audience is the domestic audience. In other words, these are not necessarily mutually exclusive audiences and this makes distinctions difficult. The slim margin between domestic and wider contexts can be seen in the bar graph below.
The next hypothesis, that DCFs will focus more on actor and solution framing tasks, is well supported.

5.5 Table 3 – Total frequencies of DCFs for each framing task:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framing Task</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Problem/Enemy</td>
<td>1152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blame/Ideology</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor/Victim</td>
<td>1696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy/Solution</td>
<td>1581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4651</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from the above figures, the actor/victim and strategy/solution framing tasks were the first and second highest, respectively, in frequency and together they comprise 70% of the total number of DCFs used over the period. That said, the problem/enemy framing task was also used fairly frequently, comprising 25% of total uses; however, the strategy/solution framing task made up 34% of total uses and the actor/victim 36%. Nevertheless, these two framing tasks were more frequent than the others and the following bar graph illustrates this.
The final hypothesis that needs to be examined is that the deliberative narrative will be of utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and of limited utility for the wider international audience. As with the similar hypothesis in the reactive conclusion, this section rests on utility and again, the utility for each audience varies: for the insurgent support audience, it is about the relative justness and legitimacy of the two combatants’ causes; for the domestic support population, it is a combination of mobilisation, justification and legitimacy; while for the allied actor is involves the mobilisation of the domestic support population and the justification of their own cause.

First, it was hypothesised that the deliberative narrative would be of utility for the insurgent audience; that is, it would justify the counterinsurgent’s cause, legitimise them as an actor and compromised the justness of the insurgent’s cause and delegitimise them as an actor. The first two aspects were influenced by the inclusiveness of the framing tasks and was generally supported in the analysis. Overall, the deliberative narrative framed the ICAT in a manner that included the insurgent support population, justifying the counterinsurgent cause and legitimising them as an actor. This inclusiveness was largely embodied by the solutions, where the counterinsurgent often explicitly referred to the insurgent support population as either an active part in or direct beneficiary of the solution. However, the deliberative narrative did not have to be explicitly inclusive to help justify and legitimise. As many of the actor identifications were focused on NZ, they were not inclusive but because of their credibility, accuracy and, consequent candour, delivered legitimacy as they would help the insurgent audience to understand why this small, distant state was acting. Specifically, the identification of NZ as an
independent principled and pragmatic multilateral actor helped contextualise the rest of NZ’s counterinsurgent communication. Thus, one conclusion regarding the deliberative is that while many actor identifications cannot be inclusive, they act as a conceptual foundation for the rest of the framing tasks and are able to make those more inclusive as they are made more credible through this conceptual foundation. For example, the explicitly inclusive strategies and solutions were given greater integrity because NZ explained it was acting out of both self-interest and morality. This finding comes with the warning that the actor identification must match reality and while it was unlikely that many in the insurgent support audience perceived NZ’s position as an independent principled and pragmatic multilateral actor changing significantly over the period, the general trend means this identification was likely to lose salience as NZ’s bilateral connection with the US strengthened.

However, there were elements of the deliberative narrative that were not as inclusive and not of utility, particularly problem/enemy framing tasks. Interestingly, these framing tasks were the only areas where the deliberative narrative overlapped with the insurgent’s own narrative, specifically ‘terrorism/terrorist’, with bin Laden relishing the opprobrium those terms carry. Thus, while the ‘terrorism/terrorist’ problem diagnosis and enemy identification has an audience-independent salience, they may not have the most utility for the insurgent support population. The diagnosis of ‘murder’ and enemy identification of ‘perpetrators’ delivers opprobrium without excluding the insurgent support population or reinforcing the insurgent cause. However, the counterinsurgent walks a fine line as the terms ‘terrorism/terrorist’ are the most credible and salient terms that can be used for these situations, functioning as a short-hand means of diagnosing the problem and identifying the enemy that all audiences can parse.

The deliberative narrative also compromised the justness of the insurgent’s cause and delegitimised them as an actor, largely via the problem/enemy framing tasks, where the literal, nuanced and constricted diagnoses and identifications served to reduce the apparent capacity of the insurgent in a credible, accurate and informative manner. The most powerful of these involved the counterinsurgent communicating one of the defining characteristics of a terrorist insurgency: the tangible weakness of the enemy. This was done by referring to their small size and the limited threat they posed. A way the narrative could compromise the justness of the insurgent’s cause was by identifying Muslims as victims of attacks, which was only done twice in an indirect manner by referring to victims being of many religions. These methods of compromising the justness of the insurgent’s cause were not used often by NZ during the ICAT
and stand as a missed opportunity. There were also other areas that the deliberative narrative did not cover which would have further compromised the justness the insurgent’s cause, including the enemy’s connections with the global drug trade and the use of Muslim authorities to discredit al Qaeda, including their interpretations and bin Laden’s lack of religious qualifications. Conversely, however, some absences from the deliberative narrative helped compromise the justness of the insurgent narrative. For example, NZ barely engaged with the insurgent narrative over the entire period, did not refer to any of the many justifications made by al Qaeda or even use the terms ‘jihad’, ‘jihadi’ and ‘caliphate’ once over the ten years.

It was also hypothesised that the deliberative narrative would be of mixed utility for the domestic audience. This was supported by the analysis, for while the deliberative generally functioned well as a means of justifying the counterinsurgent’s cause and legitimising them as an actor, it was often of limited mobilisational utility. The two main reasons that it functioned well as a means of justifying and legitimising was because it was internally consistent and consistent with NZ’s response. While the actor identifications provided the conceptual foundation for the insurgent, for the domestic audience these foundations were provided by both the actor identifications and the blame attributions. The solutions had to be consistent with the actor identifications and the blame attributions for the counterinsurgent to convince the domestic audience that their cause was right and proper. The actor identifications essentially worked in the same way as they did for the insurgent audience, explaining why NZ would act and how it would act; that is, on principle and pragmatic grounds and independently but also multilaterally. Furthermore, the blame attributions, particularly grievances, gave the rest of the deliberative narrative integrity by not just explaining why the insurgents were acting but, in so doing, outlining how the right and proper solutions the counterinsurgent can use solve the problem. Certainly not every aspect of this conceptual foundation was consistent but overall the deliberative strategies and solutions, such as democracy, governance, security, stability, peace, reconstruction, development, humanitarian assistance, human rights, dialogue and diplomacy, as outlined and conducted by the counterinsurgent, were consistent with the grievance blame attributions of poverty, governance, ethnic tension, inequality, corruption, repression and injustice. One conclusion, then, is that for the domestic audience, the actor identifications and blame attributions provide the conceptual foundation and that the rest of the counterinsurgent’s framing needs to be consistent with these framing tasks to help justify their cause and legitimise them as the right actor.

Generally, the deliberative narrative was also consistent with NZ’s response, which helped
reinforce the rightness and properness of their cause as it delivered a fidelity between rhetoric and reality. In particular, the deliberative blame attributions, actor identifications, strategies and solutions matched the ways NZ responded. The Iraq Invasion helped to reinforce this consistency; NZ had stated from the outset of the ICAT that it would only act multilaterally under a UN mandate and refused to take part in or support the invasion because there was no mandate. The use of certain actor identifications as well as strategies and solutions during their opposition to the conflict would have reinforced their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent, which would have had reflected well on the justness of their ICAT actions as well. However, the Iraq Invasion also marked the point where an inconsistency between rhetoric and reality became apparent for the deliberative narrative. The divergence appeared in how the counterinsurgent framed actions in the two separate theatres, one NZ supported and one it did not. NZ used more bellicose terminology to refer to Iraq strategies than Afghanistan strategies. Afghanistan was a peacekeeping intervention that involved fighting while Iraq was a war that involved military action. While the potential for this to compromise the counterinsurgent cause’s justness for the domestic audience was limited as the opinions regarding these two operations matched the rhetoric, this became more problematic in 2011 when the say-do gap between the term ‘mentoring’ and the combat situations the NZSAS faced in Afghanistan was exposed by two deaths. This situation uncovered inconsistencies between the deliberative narrative and NZ’s actual actions. These deaths also revealed another inconsistency between NZ rhetoric and reality, the use of the term ‘soldier’. As the analysis found, this term was far more likely to be used after a death. Together, these deliberative actor and solution identifications threatened to compromise the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause because they were exposed as inconsistent with reality – specifically, that personnel were actually soldiers and that the mentoring involved combat. This could, in turn, create issues for their legitimacy.

While the deliberative narrative had a generally positive impact on the counterinsurgent’s justness and legitimacy, its mobilisational utility was more limited. This was largely due to the problem diagnoses, enemy identifications and blame attributions, which controlled the fear of the threat in the domestic audience by portraying it in a literal, nuanced and constricted manner. These framing tasks helped reduce the scope of the threat and of the enemy, they contextualised it as one of many problems in a complex wider security environment, they helped humanise the enemy by explaining their grievances. One solution task particularly troubling for domestic mobilisation was that the ICAT would take a long time, as protracted conflicts do not generally appeal to democratic publics. There were, however, a number of connected aspects of the
deliberative narrative that had a perceived positive impact on mobilising support, which were the multilateral and collective action actor identifications and solutions. Taken together, these framing tasks outlined the case for NZ actively participating in the ICAT because of its principled and pragmatic support of collective security and the multilateral system rather than because of any direct threat. Thus, these did, in turn, help to rationalise the problem/enemy framing tasks that did not specifically mobilise support by explaining why action was needed despite the lack of threat. Nevertheless, in comparison to the mobilising capacity of the reactive narrative, the deliberative was far more limited in its ability to inspire support amongst the domestic population. The deliberative mobilisation relies on the domestic audience making connections between a number of complex political concepts, while the reactive mobilisation works on the emphasising the threat to the domestic audience.

It was also hypothesised that the deliberative narrative would be of limited utility for the allied audience and, consequently, had a limited positive impact on the alliance. This was supported by the analysis, as the deliberative had a limited mobilisational outcome on the domestic audience and it compromised the justness of the US cause as laid out in Bush’s original narrative. The former has already been dealt with, though one interesting point to make is that the components of the deliberative that best mobilised support amongst the domestic audience – multilateralism and collective security – were some of the least salient for the US once it began to shift its attention towards Iraq. While these actor descriptions would have resonated with the US in the first year or so of the ICAT, from Bush’s State of the Union speech in early 2003, NZ’s consistent multilateral focus would have had decreasing salience with the US. As was shown in the cables, the US decried NZ’s references to these values and policies. Thus, the components of the deliberative that had the greatest mobilisational utility for the domestic audience were some of the most repellent to the US and would have had a negative impact on the alliance despite their mobilisational utility.

The deliberative also contradicted the US narrative in a number of ways, which helped compromised the justness of the US cause. Many aspects of the deliberative narrative contradicted Bush’s original narrative, particularly the diagnoses that NZ faced no increased threat from this narrow, non-state group of insurgents who were motivated by a number of grievances but were willing to enter into dialogue and deploy for multifaceted but largely non-military solutions with the aim of helping the insurgent support population to create a peaceful democracy. These components contradict the portrayal of the enemy as irrational, motivated by
hatred of American freedoms, the threat as existential and the requirement of a war between
goood and evil. Certainly, these components were present in other US security narratives, but they
are incompatible with Bush’s original defining narrative and, therefore, would not help make the
US cause appear right and proper. The WikiLeaks cables revealed just how much certain NZ
positions and pronouncements irritated the US, including the no increased threat diagnosis, the
emphasis on non-military solutions and, particularly, NZ’s opposition to the Iraq Invasion. That
said, much of the US irritation was focused on NZ’s principled and multilateral foreign policy
and its reticence to emphasise its close ties with the US to the NZ population. It is suggested that
the US were less irritated by how NZ chose to frame the conflict specifically than on how they
chose not to portray themselves as junior partner in a bilateral relationship with the US. There
were also aspects of the deliberative that helped justify the US cause, particularly the less
nuanced and less constricted problem diagnoses, the safe haven blame attribution, the expanded
collective actor and close ties actor identifications, the long time and hard strategy and solution
delineations. Also, it should be noted that the utility of the deliberative narrative would have
changed significantly over the course of the ten year period. In the first year of the ICAT the US
used a multilateral framing – particular for actor and solution framing tasks – meaning NZ’s
deliberative framing would have been of utility at this point. However, the US narrative became
increasingly unilateralist as the tide of support following 9/11 turned to widespread disagreement
over Iraq. Then, by around 2006-2007 when the failings of the Iraq Invasion were clear to
virtually every major actor in the US, NZ’s use of the deliberative would have increased in utility
as it was beginning to realign with the US narrative. Thus, the multilateral actor identifications
would have had an early resonance that quickly changed, as evidenced by the way the US
understood how NZ used the term ‘multilateral’ after Iraq, before becoming more resonant as
the failures of Iraq became apparent. That said, generally speaking the deliberative narrative did
not reinforce the rightness or properness of Bush’s original narrative or the US cause and overall
it did not aid the alliance because of this lack of reinforcement, though this did vary during the
period.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

This chapter summarises the findings on this study of the two narratives used by NZ during the international campaign against terrorism (ICAT). In the process, it will assess the remaining hypothesis, examining how these two narratives functioned together, seeking to understand how they interacted and interfered with one another. Then it will undertake a broader examination of the project as a whole, including the research’s ramifications for the relevant literature, the limitations of the research, further research potential as well as final thoughts on the inherent problems democracies face countering insurgencies. First, however, it will provide a summary of the hypotheses that have already been examined in the previous two chapters, to give some context for the following discussion.

6.1 FINDINGS OF CHAPTER FOUR

Chapter Four examined the reactive narrative, which is the political response to terrorist attacks. The narrative’s primary focus was the domestic and allied audiences and its five key qualities are that it was figurative, absolute, hyperbolic, emotive and exclusive. This chapter examined the following hypotheses:

• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher during events.
• The reactive narrative will be used more frequently when there is a wider international audience than a domestic audience.
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher for more deadly and shocking attacks.
• The frequency of the reactive narrative will be higher for attacks on NZ’s allies.
• Over the entire course of the period the reactive frequency will drop from 2001.
• The reactive narrative will predominantly focus on problem diagnoses and enemy identifications.
• The reactive narrative will be of limited utility for the insurgent audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience.

The first hypothesis regarding reactive narratives being used more during events comes from their perceived nature as ‘reactions’ to terrorist attacks. As was shown, reactive counterinsurgent frames (RCFs) were more frequently used during events than in any other context, both in raw frequency and once the differing word counts had been taken into account. While only
marginally more prevalent as a raw figure, the ratio count showed them to be used five times more often during events than to a wider audience and almost eight times more often than to a domestic audience. The data supports the belief that the reactive narrative is predominantly one of response to the emotive shockwave of a terrorist attack.

The second hypothesis, that they would be used more when communicating with a wider audience than a domestic one was also borne out by the data, though only when word count was taken into account. While slightly lower in raw frequency, as a ratio count they were one and a half times more likely to be given to a wider audience than a domestic one. Also, when event press releases were added to wider audience, they were almost twice as frequent as domestic as a raw count and two and a half times as frequent as a ratio count. This hypothesis is based on the belief that the reactive narrative has a greater utility for the victim state because it helps reduce confusion, address concerns and direct anger at a time when the victim state needs this extreme emotive shock quelled and channelled. Again, the data supports the understanding of the reactive narrative as a means for the counterinsurgent to reinforce their strategic political alliances in the wake of an attack.

The hypothesis that the frequency of RCFs would be higher when an attack is shocking and/or targets one of NZ’s closer allies was largely derived from the above insights. The hypothesis that reactive narrative is largely a ‘response’ to terrorist attacks infers that a more shocking attack would provoke a larger response. The hypothesis that it has a greater perceived utility for the victim state infers it would be used more for close allies. While the reactive was used more for shocking attacks and close allies when measured by raw frequencies, the ratio figures gave a more mixed outcome as the highest ratio count for an event was Istanbul in 2003. However, the next four events were 9/11, the Afghan Invasion and the two Bali attacks, which targeted NZ’s two main allies, the US and Australia, and, for 9/11 and Bali 2002, were two of the more shocking attacks.

The hypothesis that the reactive frequency would drop from 2001 over the period was largely borne out by the data. Overall, the trend for decline was pronounced and the exceptions – that 2002 was higher than 2001 as a raw figure – can be explained by the fact that 2001 was not a complete year. This hypothesis came from the belief that this particular reactive narrative was not part of NZ’s traditional security narrative, but rather was used because of scale and impact of 9/11 and the data suggests this understanding is generally accurate.
Finally, the hypothesis that the reactive narrative would predominantly focus on problem
diagnoses and enemy identifications was also supported by the data, accounting for almost 60%
of the total uses as a raw count. This hypothesis came from the nature of the reactive narrative as
a response to an attack, which suggests that it would be more likely to focus on diagnosing the
problem and identifying the enemy than on the other framing tasks because this was the best
means of reducing confusion, addressing concerns and directing anger; that is, of dealing with
the emotive consequences of an attack.

The final reactive hypothesis was that it would be of limited utility for the insurgent audience,
mixed utility for the domestic audience and utility for the allied audience. This was a qualitative
assessment based on the analysis of the different framing tasks. Generally speaking, this
hypothesis was well supported by the analysis, though the utility with regard to the domestic and
allied audience was found to have changed over the period. For the domestic audience, this was
largely due to the declining salience of the threat from terrorist attacks, while for the allied
audience it was largely due to NZ’s use of the reactive during their opposition to the Iraq
Invasion. Nevertheless, the overall gradation of utility between audiences matched the
hypothesis well.

6.2 FINDINGS OF CHAPTER FIVE

Chapter Five was focused on examining the deliberative narrative. It did not follow the same
event structure because the deliberative narrative was understood as NZ’s traditional security
narrative and as such would be used consistently no matter what events were occurring. The
narrative’s five main qualities, those that contrast with the five of the reactive, were that it was
literal, nuanced, constricted, restrained and inclusive. As well as seeking to examine each framing
task, this chapter also assessed the following hypotheses:

• The deliberative narrative will be used with a consistent frequency over the period
• The deliberative narrative will be used more frequently when there is a domestic audience
  rather than wider audience.
• The deliberative narrative will predominantly focus on actor and solution framing tasks.
• The deliberative narrative will be of utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility
  for the domestic audience and of limited utility for the allied audience.
The hypothesis that the deliberative narrative would be used with a consistent frequency over the period was not well supported by the data. Of all the hypotheses examined in the preceding two chapters, this was the least conclusive. While the deliberative counterinsurgent frames (DCFs) appeared to be more consistent when word count was taken into account, there was still an apparent and unexpected decline over the period. This hypothesis was derived from the belief that the deliberative narrative was NZ’s traditional security narrative and would be used in a consistent manner. The reason for this decline was probably due to the fading salience of the ICAT over the period and the National Party’s lower affinity with the deliberative narrative.

The second hypothesis, that DCFs would be used more frequently when there is a domestic audience rather than wider audience, was also not conclusively supported by the data. While it was more predominantly used in a domestic context, in both raw and ratio counts, the ratio count was closer than expected. As noted, this could be due to the fact a part of the wider audience is the domestic audience, but nevertheless, the findings were still surprising. This hypothesis was based on the understanding that the reactive was of greater utility to the allied victim state and the belief that the deliberative was of greater long term utility for the domestic audience than the allied audience because of its links to NZ’s traditional security narrative.

The hypothesis that the deliberative narrative would predominantly focus on actor/victim and solution framing tasks was largely backed by the findings, together comprising 66% of all DCFs. While the problem/enemy frequency was relatively high as well, the actor/victim and solution framing tasks were still highest and second highest, respectively. The thought behind this hypothesis was that as the deliberative narrative is understood to be the product of the counterinsurgent experts within and beyond a government, it was more likely to focus on identifications of the counterinsurgent, their allies and the solutions proposed, something backed up by the data.

The final hypothesis for the deliberative was that it would be of utility for the insurgent support audience, mixed utility for the domestic audience and of limited utility for the allied audience. This was a qualitative assessment made using the various analyses of the various DCF framing tasks and was reasonably well supported in general, though there were greater problems for utility with regard to the insurgent support audience than hypothesised, particularly from solutions. This was not just limited to the military strategies but also democracy and development as they were imposed externally by force. Also, in some cases, the deliberative was of some utility for the allied audience, particularly actor and solution framing tasks that reinforced the large size and comprehensive scope of the allies’ coalition and response,
respectively. Compared to the matching hypothesis for the reactive narrative, the outcome for the deliberative narrative was not as clean cut. Generally speaking, it depended on the specific framing task, as some had a greater than expected utility for the allied audience and a lesser than expected utility for the insurgent support audience. This suggests that the deliberative narrative is able to be shaped to suit specific purposes. The mixed utility for the domestic audience was better supported, with the deliberative narrative providing little mobilisation while delivering greater justification and reinforcing the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent.

6.3 FINAL HYPOTHESIS

To this point, the reactive and deliberative have been examined separately as this was the best way of gaining an understanding of the two. However, they are not used independently, but rather are generally used at the same time. That means that they interact and, potentially interfere, with each other. They cannot only be considered in isolation, as this would miss a key dynamic, and the analysis will now turn to the unexamined hypothesis given in Chapter Two:

• The counterinsurgent’s communication will be a mixture of deliberative and reactive narratives and these will compromise the justness of their cause and, consequently, their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent.

The first part of this hypothesis is easily answered. The use of two narratives was apparent from Anderton’s initial response to 9/11, where he said “there is no evidence of any threat to New Zealand” before stating that “[w]e must see this attack not only as an attack on the United States, but as an attack on all civilised nations.” That said, while every press release contained at least one DCF, not every press release contained components of the reactive narrative. The analysis in Chapter Four supports the belief that this was because this narrative is ‘reactive’, that it was used most in response to events and to wider audiences and so was more likely to appear in these contexts than a domestic one.

The second part of the hypothesis, that the reactive and deliberative will compromise the justness of the counterinsurgent’s cause and, consequently, their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent, is central to the thesis, for it is focused on how these two narratives interact and interfere with each other. Managing this dynamic lies at the heart of communication for the counterinsurgent as they need their cause to be seen as justified and for them to appear as legitimate amongst the

1 Anderton, “New Zealand Response to US Attacks.”
key audiences. The qualitative assessment of this hypothesis will bring together the analysis of the various RCFs and DCFs completed in Chapters Four and Five, using these various threads to gain an overarching understanding of how the use of two distinct narratives impacted the overall justness of the cause. In practice, then, much of this analysis will focus on how one narrative impacts the perception of the rightness and properness of the other narrative, and on how this impacted the justness of their cause and their legitimacy as a counterinsurgent.

The reactive and deliberative narratives were often contradictory. Each compromised the rightness and properness of the other to such a degree that they could not both be perceived as right and proper simultaneously without, at the most, cognitive dissonance or, at the least, inattention. Used together, as NZ did during the ICAT, they could have created problems for the overall justness of the cause and NZ's legitimacy. This does not mean that the incompatibility would have been obvious to every person in every audience, but rather the constituent qualities of these the framing tasks of these two narratives make them counterproductive when used together. The reactive delineated an irrational enemy who was motivated by hate, posed an existential threat, could not be tolerated and required a military solution, while the deliberative portrayed a rational enemy who was motivated by an array of grievances, posed a serious but manageable threat and should be dealt with using a range of largely non-military solutions. They were fundamentally incompatible in almost every respect such that if one was to be perceived as right and proper then the other could not be.

As well as Anderton’s initial catalyst, there were a number of other powerful examples of just how incompatible these narratives were. The contradiction was apparent in the two narratives’ threat diagnoses, even within a single press release. Take Goff’s speech in Washington on September 26, 2001. First, he said “[i]t is important that the whole world sees the target of the campaign as the narrow group of fanatical extremists who commit indiscriminate and appalling acts of terror, and not a particular country or religion”. Then only a few sentences later he referred to “the next wave of terrorist attacks” and stated that the “attacks represent a new generation of security threat to civilised people everywhere”. These diagnoses are not commensurate, the first constricted the scope of the threat to a narrow group while the latter two portray it as a new era of civilisational conflict akin to the Cold War. Considering the timing and his audience, it is unsurprising he used the reactive narrative to help justify the impending US invasion of Afghanistan. However, the deliberative diagnoses compromised the justness of
this by explaining that the enemy was not a ‘particular country’, just as a ‘particular country’ was about to be invaded.

Another example of the incompatibility can be seen in the contrast between deliberative threat diagnoses like Goff’s in 2005 that “we do not have a direct sense of threat [from terrorism] here in New Zealand” with Clark’s 2002 threat diagnosis that “[t]errorism knows no global boundaries and distance is no guarantee of protection”. These diagnoses explicitly contradict one another, in the deliberative the threat was portrayed as limited, NZ had no ‘direct sense of threat’, while the reactive narrative delineates a threat that knew no global boundaries and distance (often promoted as NZ’s strategic strength) was no guarantee of protection. What makes this interesting is that the reactive actually became more credible over the period, as the attacks spread, while the deliberative became less accurate, as NZ’s action as a counterinsurgent increased its risk of being targeted. However, these types of reactive diagnoses declined over time, while this type of deliberative diagnosis peaked in 2007. It is also pertinent that Goff’s statement came from a foreign policy speech given to the United Nations Association of New Zealand and the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, while Clark’s came from her speech on the first anniversary of 9/11 at the US Embassy. Context mattered, it influenced the counterinsurgent to use different, conflicting narratives.

One incompatibility that stood out, and encompassed many of the reactive problem diagnoses and enemy identifications, was blaming the enemy as irrational. This involved diagnosis of terrorism as an irrational, pointless scourge that could strike anyone, anywhere at any time and the identification of terrorists as cold-blooded, evil people with an agenda of hatred, with no bottom line and an unjustifiable cause. If this blame attribution was credible and accurate, then it placed the rightness and properness of virtually every deliberative component into jeopardy, and vice versa. Even more troubling, it cast the main function of the counterinsurgent deliberative narrative as illogical, for if the enemy was irrational then trying to include them in the solution was itself an illogical, possibly even irrational, objective. This can be seen in a speech given by Clark in the US in 2002. First she stated that “terrorism is a common enemy. It is faceless, ideological and seemingly irrational”, then she explained that to ‘combat terrorism’, NZ had “provided humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan” and “increased our contributions to UN and other international efforts to assist the Afghan people in rebuilding their nation”. To brand

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terrorism as irrational and then refer to assisting Afghans rebuild their nation is illogical, if the enemy really was irrational then the right response would not rely on the enemy making rational cost-benefit analyses regarding the material improvement of their state.

Clark again referred to terrorism as ‘irrational’ in a speech to APEC in 2004, but also said it was a “threat by the small and often faceless against the strong; it is usually not state sponsored or managed”. She provided a credible, accurate and informative summary of the underlying dynamics that drive terrorism yet still referred to it as irrational. There is a disconnect; she explained why it is a rational choice of the small and faceless against the strong but still referred to terrorism, and by default its practitioners, as irrational. The context may help to explain this; Clark faced a diverse international audience that included the US President, so while she would want to appear considered and deliberative in her threat diagnosis she would also want to ensure that she directed blame toward the enemy. While most wider context speeches were either given to an exclusively US or Australian audience, this audience was much more diverse and, arguably, had even higher stakes because it included numerous different heads of state rather than just representatives of one state.

Branding terrorism and terrorists as irrational is also incompatible with many deliberative solutions. In particular, the strategy of targeting root causes. Take Goff’s 2005 statement that “actions to suppress terrorism must be accompanied by measures to tackle the root causes of terrorism. Injustice, lack of opportunity, hopelessness, desperation and the failure of legitimate channels to redress grievances all give rise to terrorist actions.” This solution only makes sense if the enemy was rational. Underlying this incompatibility is the conflict between blaming an irrational enemy and blaming rational grievances, as these two different attributions cannot both be right and proper.

Generally speaking, deliberative grievance attributions and root causes solutions were incompatible with reactive solutions like the need to ‘eradicate terrorism’; unless, of course, the counterinsurgent was proposing to completely eradicate the many root causes and grievances they listed, including poverty, governance, ethnic tension, inequality, corruption, repression, injustice and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Here the solutions of the two narratives were widely at odds, the reactive solution was incredibly brief, absolute and, consequently, appeared relatively easy to achieve; the deliberative solution was longer, nuanced, far more complex and appeared

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6 Clark, “Address to the NZ Apec Business Coalition.”
7 Goff, “Address to No 43 Staff Course on Foreign Affairs and Trade.”
8 Clark, “NZ Shares US Determination to Root Out Terrorism.”
difficult if not impossible to achieve. This difference helps explain why reactive solutions were used after attacks and why deliberative solutions, and supporting blame attributions, were less likely to be given in that state of emotional flux. The ‘eradicate terrorism’ phrase was first used on the eve of the Afghan Invasion, when issues regarding the root causes of terrorism would not have helped justify the invasion. However, over the coming months and years, when the possibility of eradicating terrorism would have lost salience, the counterinsurgent needed to outline more pragmatic and hopeful solutions like addressing root causes.

There were two interconnected forces at work that made the use of these two narratives more problematic for the counterinsurgent. The first was globalisation and the second was the changing nature of insurgency. Globalisation, in all its forms, from culture to communication to trade to travel, has meant that it is virtually impossible for a counterinsurgent to isolate a specific audience they want to communicate with, both because of the spread of the information, communication and media spheres and because of the growing connections between states. Globalisation has also helped catalyse change in insurgency, from what were largely intra-state to what are now more often international and even global conflicts. These dynamics have not only meant that there are more actors and key audiences than ever before but they also mean that there are a number of actors that have a wider variation of direct and indirect stakes in the outcome (that is either the direct threat from the insurgency or any other more circuitous ramifications of the conflict) who need legitimisation, justification and mobilisation from various audiences. To be clear, when insurgencies are restricted to a single state, this not only means that there is a very simple divide in audience between those who see the state as more legitimate and those who see the insurgents as more legitimate, but that the direct stakes are relatively high for all involved. In the globalised contemporary environment, this is no longer true. The ICAT served as the perfect example, not only were the actors and audiences numerous and diverse, but the stakes were a lot more varied as well. NZ had a number of key audiences that it had to communicate with, each with differing requirements and while its direct stakes in the ICAT were comparatively low, its indirect stakes with regard to the US were relatively high. Thus, it was left in a situation where to satisfy these varying factors, one of the best options was to utilise two differing narratives. However, these narratives were inherently contradictory and while they were able to meet the differing requirements of each audience individually, their use together in the contemporary globalised environment meant that they compromised the rightness and properness of each other. It also frequently angered the US and had the potential to provoke the insurgent enemy.
NZ had relatively low direct stakes in the conflict as it was not attacked. The risk for a minor ally such as NZ in a conflict against a global insurgent network was that use of the reactive narrative could make the state a more apparent and attractive target than it was otherwise. As explained, a large part of the motivation behind attacks against Australia (Bali 2002 and 2005; Jakarta 204), Spain (Madrid 2004) and the UK (Istanbul, 2003; London 2005) was their participation in the ICAT and their connection with the US. While it would be inaccurate to directly connect these attacks with use of a reactive narrative, the inverse is true, the reactive did not help defuse the situation or help differentiate between the different allied states. Of particular danger to NZ were 'homegrown' terrorists, who may become alienated by their own state's use of the reactive narrative and decided to conduct 'lone wolf' operations.

The same was true for the use of the deliberative narrative and the higher, if indirect, stakes with regard to the US. NZ's use of the deliberative endangered its improving relationship with the US as it contradicted the American delineation of the situation, particularly in the early years. This risk was more real and could have cost NZ more in the long term than the use of reactive did with regard to the insurgent support populace. As shown by the Wikileaks cables, NZ's use of the deliberative narrative to argue against the Iraq Invasion did set the relationship between NZ and the US back for a period.

The fact that NZ was not the direct victim of any terrorist attacks nor was it the senior counterinsurgent reduced their direct stakes whilst increasing their indirect stakes. Consequently, this increased the complexity of their communication as NZ had to communicate in a way that was of utility for the insurgent audience, their senior ally and their own support audience. The major issue that arose from not being directly attacked was that mobilising support from their domestic audience was not as easy for NZ and this lack of direct threat meant the reactive narrative was the most effective way of mobilising the domestic populace. Early on, mobilising support would have been easy because of the shock of 9/11 but even within a few months certain sectors of the NZ public's solidarity was fading, making the counterinsurgent's task of maintaining support progressively difficult. In other words, the reactive was used most often when it was least useful with regards to mobilisation, suggesting it is its other functions – specifically managing the negative domestic emotions and alliance maintenance – that drive its use. Ultimately, it was the deliberative narrative that delivered this outcome, as rather than relying on the sense of direct threat and the fear that generated to mobilise support, it sought to justify the continuing deployment through an emphasis on a pragmatic and principled foreign policy premised on collective security.
The main issue NZ faced as a junior counterinsurgent was balancing the needs of three, rather than two, key audiences. NZ was placed in a tenuous position, needing to ensure their communication did not raise the stakes outlined above with the allied and insurgent audiences whilst still appealing to their own support audience. This was heightened for NZ because the US chose to frame the situation as a binary ‘us against them’ and because of its problematic history with the US and the resultant mixed opinion of the US amongst the domestic audience. Taken together, this meant that the normally thin line a junior counterinsurgent must walk was even thinner for NZ. The cables released by WikiLeaks revealed the pressure the NZ Government was under to communicate its unwavering support for the US. This political support was, arguably, NZ’s most important contribution to the US cause and the pressure to provide it in an uncritical and constant manner was real and ongoing, particularly after 2003 and up until 2007, when the mistakes of Iraq had become apparent in the US and their own narrative had become more deliberative.

The interaction between the two narratives and their potential impacts on NZ’s justness and legitimacy were apparent with regard to the insurgent and allied audiences. The deliberative was well suited to the insurgent audience while the reactive fitted with the allied actor’s own narrative. The problem was that NZ was unable to target their communication to the respective audiences. Even if they had, the use of two contrasting narratives was most problematic for the domestic audience. The counterinsurgent needed to mobilise support, justify their cause and be seen as a legitimate counterinsurgent with regard to the domestic support audience. No other audience required all three and while each narrative was able to deliver positive results for some of these, used together these narratives were unable to ensure that all three conditions were met in an ongoing way. On one hand, the reactive helped mobilise support for action and justified the more belligerent responses but was not well suited for justifying expanded mandate responses or inclusive solutions. On the other hand, the deliberative helped justify long-term, expanded mandate responses and legitimised the counterinsurgent as a pragmatic but principled collective actor, but was not as powerful a means of mobilising support as the reactive. The area where these two narratives interacted and interfered with each other for the domestic audience was at the interface between justification and legitimacy. Generally speaking, NZ was a legitimate counterinsurgent for the domestic audience by default, but in a small way their general legitimacy as a political actor depended on the ongoing apparent justness of their cause. While this was unlikely, there is some historical precedent to this, with Vietnam and Afghanistan standing as two counterinsurgencies that had serious political consequences for the US and USSR respectively. Even in contemporary insurgencies, where the insurgents are not citizens of all the
counterinsurgent actors, with the modern media even a small tactical mistake can have strategic and political consequences to such a degree that the general legitimacy of a counterinsurgent is on the line.\(^9\) With regard to the interaction between these two narratives, the issue that could have damaged the government’s legitimacy was the contrast between reactive problem/enemy framing and deliberative solutions. By diagnosing the problem and identifying the enemy in such a frightening manner and then responding in such a limited and inclusive way, the counterinsurgent risked compromising their political legitimacy, though only in a limited manner. This would have been much more serious if NZ had been attacked. In other words, the domestic stakes were actually very much entangled with the stakes for the other two audiences, if NZ had been attacked then the political legitimacy of the government could have suffered. Also, if the US backlash to NZ’s intransigence had been more extreme, then NZ’s political legitimacy could have been impacted. This again shows how interconnected the three audiences were for NZ and the complexity of communicating in a globalised environment.

6.4 THEORY AND PRACTICE

This section will compare the theoretical literature examined in Chapters Two and Three with the findings of the research to ascertain how they fared in application, seeking to use the practical application to refine aspects of the literature as well as the general understanding of counterinsurgency as a phenomenon. It will also examine the use of NZ as a case study.

The first issue that must be dealt with is the ongoing suitability of the population-centric model, as this was a major theoretical component in the thesis. There are two key components of the population-centric that need to be reassessed; firstly, its insurgent population-centric nature and, secondly, its emphasis on legitimacy as the key metric. With regard to the first, the population-centric approach believes that the insurgent support audience are the key to victory. This was emphasised by the UK’s *Countering Insurgency* Field Manual, which emphasise that the insurgent “population is central to the outcome of the campaign” under the heading ‘The Enduring Characteristics of Counterinsurgency’.\(^10\) Ngal, Caldwell and Gompert all make similar points in their work.\(^11\) Furthermore, the population-centric approach believes that to achieve victory the counterinsurgent must isolate the insurgent from their support populace. *FM 3-24* explains that in COIN the “decisive effort is to isolate the insurgents by denying the local population as a base

\(^9\) Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal.”
\(^10\) *Countering Insurgency*, 1-8.
\(^11\) Manea, interview with David Nagl; Caldwell quoted in Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics,” 5; Gompert, *Heads We Win*, x.
of support”.

Likewise, Cohen et al. state that “[i]solating insurgents from their cause and support” is a critical component of population-centric COIN. The insurgent populace remains the central fulcrum of success for population-centric approach.

However, while the insurgent populace remains important in COIN, it is no longer the single most important audience for all involved counterinsurgents. Contemporary insurgencies are not neat conflicts between a state and a segment of their populace, but rather increasingly involve strategic, and often hierarchical, groupings on both sides. As Kilcullen notes, the neo-classical model “still fundamentally views the conflict as a binary struggle” between a single insurgent and a single counterinsurgent; there are few distinctions made between domestic and international populaces in population-centric COIN, something this thesis has sought to address.

There are two aspects to this, the first is that inherent in the population-centric’s focus is an assumption that the insurgent support audience is a cohesive single group that can actually be targeted. The reality in the contemporary era is that the support audience are far more diffuse and diverse. They can be spread around the globe, connected through shared ideas and communication channels, that they are can be interspersed in many of the counterinsurgent’s domestic populaces and that this support group will change over time, often in response to the actions of the counterinsurgents. The insurgent support populace is now partly derived from globally dispersed communities who are connected as never before by improved information and transportation technologies. The population-centric model remains fixated on a population, when in actuality it is more accurate to speak of insurgent support populaces. While much of the debate in COIN has been on whether the focus should be population-centric or enemy-centric, this analysis suggests that the real focus should be on populations, plural, which in turn suggests that it should also be on enemies, plural. Furthermore, the fluidity and diversity of the insurgent populace also suggests that distinctions between ‘enemy’ and ‘supporter’ may not be as clear cut as these debates assume. As a conflict goes on, those who may have originally been supporters, or neutral, may become the enemy as events may radicalise them. The length and intensity of the ICAT was such that over the decade there was much room for changing allegiances within the insurgent audience, with the Iraq Invasion marking a point where many went from ‘supporter’ to ‘enemy’.

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12 FM 3-24, 7-2.
15 Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Insurgency?”
A related component is that ‘isolating’ the insurgent support populace is increasingly difficult in this dispersed yet connected era. In the classical model, isolation referred to a largely physical process, but in the neo-classical it has taken on a greater ideological and psychological component. In the contemporary era, however, achieving either type of isolation is problematic. Physical isolation for the entire support populace is virtually impossible to achieve, as they are dispersed around the globe, with many living in various allied counterinsurgents’ territories. Likewise, ideological and psychological isolation is unlikely because the internet has allowed the massive expansion of available information which has got increasingly difficult to ‘gatekeep’. In the modern age, trying to ‘isolate’ the insurgent support populace has become a somewhat archaic objective, though the neo-classical model still promotes this as a key COIN objective. It was for this reason, amongst others, that the thesis considered the three main audiences throughout the period, ‘isolating’ any audience was impossible.

Second, the counterinsurgent is more likely to not be the insurgent’s own government, meaning the relative importance of the domestic support audience has grown. During the ICAT, a diverse coalition was pitched against an amalgam of groups, including al Qaeda and the Taleban, whose members were generally not citizens of the coalition states. As Dixon explains, “Global Insurgency means that the war must be fought at home as well as abroad; domestic public opinion could influence and even determine the campaign.” In the contemporary era, for many counterinsurgents, mobilising support and justifying their actions is critical. Thus, in some cases the domestic support audience are equally if not more important, particularly for democratic counterinsurgents whose support bases are notoriously fickle when it comes to counterinsurgencies. Depending on the counterinsurgent, the international audience may also be important. Thus, there are, at a minimum, three key audiences for any counterinsurgent: the insurgent support, domestic support, international support. The population-centric model overemphasises the importance of the insurgent populace at the expense of other key audiences, failing to provide a nuanced understanding of the relative importance of different audiences to the different types of counterinsurgent. The point is not that the population-centric school has not acknowledged the expanded actors in contemporary COIN but rather that it continues to portray the insurgent support populace as the most important. This obscures the potential diversity of allied counterinsurgents, whose own populaces are likely to be the most important audience. To remain relevant the population-centric model needs to emphasise the variety of actors and how this impacts the importance of the insurgent support populace, mapping the

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potential positions of the network of coalition actors to provide an insight into the different requirements and balances each actor has with regard to key audiences. The insurgent support populace remains important but this is not an absolute or singular position, it must be moderated by the context of the counterinsurgent actor who in many cases is more worried about winning other prizes, like a free trade deal with the US. The COIN literature has largely approached the nature of the counterinsurgent in a singular manner, overlooking the different types of counterinsurgent and their different stakes.

The above indicates there is another related issue, that of stakes. The population-centric model portrays legitimacy as the key stake for the counterinsurgent. Specifically, the relative legitimacy between the insurgent and counterinsurgent is seen as the defining metric for victory. Thus, loss of relative legitimacy can be seen as the main stake for the counterinsurgent. FM 3-24 is typical of the literature, explaining that legitimacy is the ‘central issue’ in COIN.¹⁸ In the population-centric model, relative legitimacy is still portrayed as the main stake for the counterinsurgent. However, in the ICAT, many of the counterinsurgent actors took part as much because of their connections with the US as due to any direct stakes. Yet the population-centric approach remains intent on these direct stakes and while relative legitimacy between insurgent and counterinsurgent remains important, it only provides a part of the bigger picture. Legitimacy is no longer the single stake in a counterinsurgency as the conflicts are no longer between two actors fighting over the becoming or remaining the legitimate authority in a single state. Kilcullen believes it “may be appropriate to move beyond the population-centric conception of COIN as a competition for legitimate government... [legitimacy] may be a secondary factor”.¹⁹ As political actors with pre-existing domestic and international interests and obligations, a counterinsurgent has much more at stake than simply being seen as legitimate by the insurgent support audience. In many cases they would be equally if not more concerned with how their own support audience perceive the conflict. At stake is their wider political legitimacy as the government of their state, a legitimacy that supersedes this insurgency-specific legitimacy. Also of importance is the international context in which they operate. In a large counterinsurgency coalition there is a huge set of indirect stakes that connects all the various member states, from the tangible interests and obligations, such as free trade agreements, to less tangible interests and obligations, such as enhanced political capital. In the modern era, the counterinsurgent must consider their support population, their allies, the host country, the wider global audience as well as the insurgent support audience. These indirect stakes provide an insight into the motivations and drivers that

¹⁸ FM 3-24, 1-8.
lead counterinsurgents to participate in a coalition and help explain their actions. In particular, these indirect stakes help explain why a counterinsurgent may communicate in a manner that appears to go against the population-centric approach, placing their motivations in context, revealing the complex network of interests and obligations that shape their motivations and actions. For NZ, as well as the US, there are a number of other key states that have an influence on communication, including Australia, the UK, and the Pacific Island states, as well as international organisations like the UN. The direct and indirect stakes can be measured by, amongst other indicators, the metrics of mobilisation, justification and legitimisation. To remain relevant, the population-centric approach needs to develop a better understanding of the stakes, both direct and indirect, for the counterinsurgent as this provides a more comprehensive understanding of why and how they respond to an insurgency. Put simply, these stakes shape counterinsurgent communication and action and need to be understood better.

The population-centric COIN focus has largely been on the insurgent and their support populace, and not the counterinsurgents and their support. A major reason for this is probably due to the remaining influence of the classical model that was focused on an internal struggle between a state and an insurgent component of its own populace. This helps explain why legitimacy remains the ‘key’ stake. The analysis here suggests that there needs to be a greater focus on the counterinsurgent and their support populace, an updated understanding of modern insurgencies and a, resulting, shift away from a singular focus on legitimacy as the main stake. This insight is best contextualised with the above understanding of the multiple key audiences, as examining the mobilisation, justification and legitimisation with regard to the many important audiences provides a far more nuanced understanding of the counterinsurgent’s communication. Insurgencies are inherently political and so too are their responses and this insight would help population-centric theory develop a better understanding of the different stakes for differing counterinsurgents.

Another one of the theoretical insights developed in Chapter Two was the belief that fear was not the only or even most important emotion generated by a terrorist attack despite fear frequently being listed in the literature as the most important emotional outcome. As noted, the DoD believes the aim of terrorism is to ‘inculcate fear’ while Hoffman defines terrorism as the "deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence" as a

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means of intimidating a wider target audience. Likewise, Crenshaw explains that terrorism aims to create “fear and hostility in an audience identified as the ‘enemy’.” Conversely, many scholars explained that counterinsurgents used fear for their own purposes. Nacos et al. explanation is typical of this view: that “hyping threat and fear is central to terrorist and counterterrorist rhetoric”. Fear, according to the literature, serves the purposes of both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent.

The analysis reinforced the latter interpretation, that fear is used by the counterinsurgent. When Anderton and Clark both framed 9/11 as an ‘attack on all civilised nations’ and described the enemy as ‘evil’ in the immediate aftermath, they were not trying to ameliorate the fear. This means that the former position is somewhat problematic, particularly the belief that fear is the fulcrum through which terrorists achieve their goals. This is not a fringe understanding, Crenshaw, Hoffman, Kydd and Walter are highly respected and influential terrorism theorists. In their highly cited article, Kydd and Walter state that “[e]ffective counterstrategies cannot be designed without first understanding the strategic logic that drives terrorist violence” before referring to fear as the key emotive mechanism, yet the literature and this study suggest that their understanding of the strategic logic of terrorism is, at best, incomplete. Naturally, terrorists may still believe that fear is the most important emotion for them to elicit, but the analysis here suggests that a more complete understanding of the emotions and the roles they play is required.

It was proposed that the most important emotions for a counterinsurgent to try to address after an attack are confusion, concern and anger, which is why the reactive narrative is used in response to an attack, as it is the best way of addressing these emotions. This was based on a number of sources. For example, confusion was apparent in Holland’s work. Likewise, Jackson referred to the confusion created by 9/11. Concern was also noted as a key emotion by Ackerman. Anger, too, was expressed as an important emotion in Ross and Pemberton stated works. Needing to address these emotions helps explain the statements made by NZ counterinsurgents after attacks. Take the term ‘cowardly’, used to react to eight terrorist events.

21 For DoD and Hoffman quotes see Inside Terrorism, 31,40.
23 Nacos et al., Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion, 35
25 Holland, Selling the War on Terror, 1.
26 Jackson, Writing the War on Terror, 29.
27 Bruce A. Ackerman, Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 44-45 – emphasis in original.
This one word helps address all three, it reduces confusion by explaining why the enemy chose to use terrorism rather than fighting a ‘fair’ fight; in turn, this helps to reduce concern as it makes the enemy seem weak and it directs anger at them because of their lack of moral and physical courage. The thesis reinforced the importance of these emotions in shaping the counterinsurgent’s response to a terrorist attack. While terrorists’ main focus may be in inducing fear, this fear is not the counterinsurgent’s primary concern and they appear to use it to quell the other more concerning emotions. The reactive narrative seems ideally suited to amplifying the potential fear of the victim audience as a means of addressing these three emotions. The findings of this thesis suggest fear should not be considered as the sole emotion generated by terrorism or as the main mechanism by which the insurgent achieves their goals as it does not provide the insurgent with any direct benefits and actually helps their enemy to mobilise forces against them.

This understanding of the emotive shockwave and the counterinsurgent response is seen as one of the most significant contributions of this thesis to the literature, demonstrating that rather than being the most effective emotion terrorists harness to achieve their objectives, fear is largely counterproductive as counterinsurgents are able to harness it for their own purposes. Fear does not threaten the counterinsurgent’s own political legitimacy and can actually be used to manipulate the domestic populace. Confusion, concern and anger are more important emotions that a counterinsurgent needs to deal with after an attack to ensure their ongoing political control. This is a major failing in the literature, particularly as the judo-like use of fear by the victim state is a well-known phenomenon and yet this erroneous understanding of terrorism’s strategic logic is still being widely perpetuated. This failure is particularly problematic considering the considerable academic, political and military resources that have been focussed on terrorism since 9/11. There have been some insightful studies into the full array of emotive impacts of terrorism, including those referenced in Chapter Two such as Alexander and Klein’s three phase model for how a community reacts to terrorism and the examination into how emotion affects citizens’ responses to risk by Lerner et al. It seems that most of these studies, however, are done by psychologists and their insights do not appear to have been absorbed by the terrorism experts. Fear as the key emotive means by which terrorists achieve their goals still remains dominant in the terrorism literature, despite evidence to the contrary. If the post-9/11 era is to have an intellectual legacy, one component needs to be a better understanding of the underlying strategic logic of terrorism as a method of political violence.

The decision to use framing theory as the key means of structuring and guiding the analysis provided a useful set of tools and processes for examining the narratives. Generally, framing’s flexibility and ability to be adapted to suit the topic were very useful. However, there was one area, however, where the theory was lacking: emotion. This lacuna was particularly problematic considering the above discussion on the importance of emotion in studying terrorism and insurgency. Benford, amongst others, has highlighted that framing has “neglected a vital social movement resource—emotions [and consequently] ignored the possibility of examining the ways in which movement actors produce, orchestrate, and strategically deploy emotions in pursuit of their collective goals.”

Because of the importance of emotion as a key part of terrorism’s underlying strategic logic and as a critical component in mobilising support, this addition was necessary. In practice, this addition was achieved by simply considering the emotional impact of each framing task on the different key audiences as delineated by the understanding of the emotive shockwave created by a terrorist attack, for the domestic audience, and using a religious/cultural understanding of the insurgent audience. The main utility of including emotion was gaining an insight into why a counterinsurgent chose to use a particular narrative in a particular context, particularly the reactive in the wake of terrorist events. It also provided an insight into how a counterinsurgent can best communicate to an insurgent audience in a manner that includes them. The study of counterinsurgent communication would be incomplete without reference to emotion, it is the what empowers terrorism and it is also a powerful means of mobilisation for the counterinsurgent. That it works in both directions means that framing not only needs to place more emphasis on emotion but also needs to develop a more nuanced understanding of where it fits in the framing process and how it works. Framing theory needs to develop an understanding of how “movement actors produce, orchestrate, and strategically deploy emotions in pursuit of their collective goals”, this insight is essential in the realm of counterinsurgent communication and for all political communication.

It also means that the models of people as rational actors used by framing theorists, amongst others, need to be moderated with an understanding that audiences are as emotional as they are rational.

The decision to use NZ as a case study was also revealing for a number of reasons; in particular, that it was not a direct victim and that it was a junior partner in the coalition with a problematic history with the senior partner. This meant that while NZ had low direct stakes, they had high indirect stakes and, consequently, the complexity of their communication was increased, as NZ

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30 Benford, “An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective,” 419-420.
31 Ibid., 419-420.
had to balance their approach so that it was not only of utility for the insurgent audience but was also of utility for their senior ally and their own support audience. Because NZ was not targeted directly, mobilising support and justifying their response to their domestic audience was not as easy as if the state had been attacked. This lack of direct threat meant the reactive narrative was the most effective way of mobilising the domestic populace – though it was probably used as much as a means of emphasising solidarity with the US as immediately after 9/11 mobilising support would have been relatively easy because of the shock of the attack. However, even within a few months this solidarity was fading, making the counterinsurgent’s task of ensuring their populace supported their response over the long term progressively difficult. To ensure the domestic audience remained mobilised, the counterinsurgent used the reactive narrative. There is a limit to its salience, however, as the memory of the attacks recede, it would not have the same experiential commensurability with an audience that was not attacked. This was where the deliberative narrative became useful. Rather than amplifying the threat and directing anger to mobilise, it justified the continuing deployment through an emphasis on a pragmatic and principled foreign policy premised on collective security. Thus, examining a state that was not a direct victim allowed a greater examination of the interplay between the deliberative and reactive, as the counterinsurgent was unable to use the residual emotional shock generated by an attack. This provided insights that may not have been as visible if a direct victim had been studied instead as the counterinsurgent had to use the two different narratives to achieve their desired outcomes.

That NZ was a junior coalition member and had a problematic history with the US was also effective for a case study. If the US had been selected, the audience dynamics would have been very different. NZ as junior counterinsurgent was placed in a tenuous position where they needed to ensure their communication pleased, or rather did not displease, the two very different insurgent and allied audiences. This was heightened for NZ both because the US chose to frame the situation as a binary ‘us against them’ and because of its chequered relationship with the US. Taken together, these two factors meant that the normally thin line a junior counterinsurgent would have to walk was even thinner for NZ during the ICAT. The cables released by WikiLeaks revealed the political pressure the NZ Government was under to communicate its unwavering support for the US and its ‘war on terror’. This political support was, arguably, NZ’s most important contribution to the US cause and the pressure to provide it in an uncritical and

constant manner was real and ongoing. Adding to the complexity of the situation was the mixed opinion of the US within the domestic audience. Not only would any junior counterinsurgent face issues communicating to three distinct audiences, but in this case NZ was even more restricted. NZ had to try not to anger the US whilst ensuring that its communication did not overplay the relationship between the two to such a degree that it was not salient for the unsupportive members of the NZ populace. The multiple audiences made maintaining consistency in communication more difficult for the counterinsurgent as they were unable to specifically target any one audience. This did not stop them trying, as was revealed by the Wikileaks cables, NZ’s attempts to use the more resonant US narrative when speaking to a wider audience than to a specifically domestic one. However, they were caught trying to target their message, though as the thesis revealed they did continue to choose a narrative depending on the context. NZ’s position as the junior counterinsurgent helped to highlight the issues of consistency in the modern era where no communication can be targeted. The decision to focus on NZ’s counterinsurgent communication made the analysis more complex than if the senior allied actor had been studied, but it also provided a greater insight into the dynamics underlying counterinsurgent communication, particularly the limitations created by the counterinsurgent’s existing political obligations and relational history as well as the problems of targeting brought about by the modern globalised media and communications network.

6.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

As with any project, there were a number of limitations, both methodological and case based. The first limitation was that the division of press releases by context did not create mutually exclusive categories, specifically, the division between wider and domestic audiences. This division was done consistently by categorising wider audience press releases as those delivered outside NZ or given in NZ to a visiting audience of representatives of either the US or Australia while domestic press releases were given in NZ to a domestic audience. The problem, however, is that in the modern era all communication has a wider audience and it is probable that the counterinsurgent communicators have an understanding of this reality. Therefore, examining the differing frequencies of the reactive and deliberative narrative for these two different contexts is not as revealing regarding the counterinsurgent’s decision to use the reactive as a means of alliance maintenance as expected because the counterinsurgent would be aware that everything they were saying was, at the least, being followed by allied state representatives in NZ. However, as noted, the US Embassy believed NZ politicians were less likely to talk positively about their
relationship with the US depending on whether the audience was domestic or not. While this is not empirical proof, it does help reinforce the division of the press releases into context because the allied actor believed NZ communicated differently depending on context. Overcoming this limitation would be extremely difficult because of the diffuse nature of modern communications, but while the findings that compare narrative usages between wider and domestic contexts are not as robust as between event and non-event contexts, the US Embassy’s perception of context-different framing suggest there is some efficacy to this division.

Another limitation was that the use of both latent and manifest units reduced the fidelity of the findings. The inclusion of latent units meant that the findings are more subjective than if the research had focused on manifest units only. The nature of latent units as semantically similar framing tasks that do not use the same terms means that that often a decision to include or exclude must be made and there will always be a degree of interpretation. That said, the use of the inter-coder reliability tests to ensure that the operationalisation of the reactive and deliberative framing tasks was objective and replicable ensured that this interpretation was very limited and that, generally speaking, even the latent units were well delineated. Latent units were vital for the project as many of the most important framing tasks, particularly the reactive, were latent. Without examining both types of units, the analysis would have missed some of the most important framing tasks and, therefore, would not have been able to develop the same comprehensive understanding of NZ’s counterinsurgent communication.

Another methodological limitation was that tracing the reactive’s origins was difficult. As part of NZ’s national security narrative, the origin and history of the deliberative is relatively clear and can be traced back through NZ’s key security policies and documents. However, the same cannot be said for the reactive narrative. While in some cases reference to President Bush’s use of the same term or phrase just before a NZ use suggested it was an example of mimicking, in other cases the origins were not so clear. Anderton’s use of reactive framing tasks in response to 9/11, for example, did not involve direct reference to US statements and the timing was such that their use was more likely due to a shared vocabulary rather than any direct repetition of allied partners. As the examination in the introduction showed, before 9/11, the reactive was extremely rare in NZ’s security narrative and general domestic political discourse; yet, as the reactive was not always used as an obvious case of mimicking, it is not alien to the wider NZ narrative. Many of its key tropes have a long lineage in Western history, but it appears NZ had largely moved on from using these until 9/11. It was, however, beyond the scope of this project
to attempt to determine the exact reasons the reactive narrative was used as this task is a thesis on its own. While determining the reasons for the reactive narrative’s use would have helped the project, inferences can be made through the obvious cases of mimicking as well as the overall patterns of use mapped out in this thesis.

The final methodological limitation was that in some cases it was what the counterinsurgent did not say that was of utility. One of the more prominent examples of this was that NZ did not refer to al Qaeda’s narrative during the period or use key terms such as ‘jihad’, ‘jihadi’ and ‘caliphate’. The methodology used for the thesis focused on extant framing tasks and examining the utility of non-existent framing tasks was beyond the parameters of the project, despite the fact that these are also powerful means of shaping the perceptions of a conflict. Examining the non-use of framing tasks would have required a completely different approach that compared and contrasted NZ and al Qaeda’s narratives to understand the gaps between the two. This limitation might better be considered as a direction for future, related research, as the project only focused on existing framing tasks. It does not detract from the main focus as this was on comparing the use of the reactive and deliberative narrative as they were used in a certain period.

The case-based limitation was that the focus was on a junior ally who was not directly attacked. This decision meant that, in some respects, NZ’s response mimicked the US and the study did not provide any tangible data on how a direct victim state would respond to a terrorist attack, nor did it provide any information about the way in which a senior counterinsurgent would communicate during a counterinsurgency. Consequently, many of the findings would not be applicable to a state that was the direct victim or was the senior counterinsurgent and the hypotheses regarding the wider context would not be as relevant for a victim state. Ultimately, this project was much more focused on the allied actors than a project that examined a senior counterinsurgent’s communication. While these limitations mean that the findings are not as easily generalised to direct victim states or senior counterinsurgents, the focus on a junior ally who was not directly attacked meant that the dynamics of the reactive narrative, in particular, were able to be better examined as its utility in the wake of an attack and as a way of reinforcing connections with friendly victim states was more obvious in NZ’s cause than it would have been in a study of the US response. The reactive’s ability to help ease the emotional stress of the domestic support, mobilise their support and reinforce the parameters of the allied ingroup in the wake of an attack were made apparent in this case study. This usage was made more interesting by the scarcity of this narrative in pre-9/11 political and military discourse, NZ’s
generally limited use of this narrative meant that its deployment was more obvious after 9/11.

6.6 FUTURE STUDY

There are a number of avenues for future study, including several suggested by the above limitations. As noted in the limitations, this project was focused on a junior ally that was not directly attacked. While this enabled an understanding of the way the reactive was used as both a means of mollifying the domestic populace and reinforcing relationships with friendly victim states, a comparative study that looked at a range of different actors communicating during the same period would provide an increased understanding of the dynamics of both narratives. This type of study would focus on a senior counterinsurgent that was a direct victim, a senior counterinsurgent that was not a direct victim, a junior counterinsurgent that was a direct victim and a junior counterinsurgent that was not a direct victim, and could also add middle-sized counterinsurgents as well to add even greater nuance. Clearly, the more states compared would enhance the understanding of how these two narratives function and why they are used, with the ultimate project comparing the tens of states. By comparing the way the narratives were used by the different types of counterinsurgents, a far greater understanding of these two narratives could be gained, particularly the nature of mimicking, the influence of pre-existing political relationships and public opinion, as well as the role of the traditional security narrative. This type of study could also add insights from substantive news framing, such as Entman’s understanding of cascading activation, to provide a tool for understanding mimicking, in particular.34

Another potential future study would involve tracing the use of the reactive and deliberative narratives in NZ political communication as this would provide both an insight into the reasons for the narratives use as well as an understanding of how they change over time, particularly as influenced by changing threat levels and technology. This would help to assess the validity of the hypothesis that the reactive narrative is most likely used in response to shocking attacks on close allies and, in turn, whether it is largely the result of mimicking or shared vocabulary, as well as helping confirm whether its key function is to mobilise support for political and military action. In turn, this would further help the understanding of fear’s importance in the domestic audience, particularly as the historical terrorist events could be assessed for their potential to generate fear in the NZ audience, specifically comparing the earlier years of aircraft hijacking by nationalist insurgents to the revolutionary insurgent attacks conducted from 9/11 onward. It would also

help provide an understanding of the development of the deliberative narrative, in particular assessing the interplay between NZ’s growing independent foreign policy over the second half of the twentieth century and the influence of the two main political parties. The Labour Party has a greater ideological congruence with the deliberative narrative and the public support this narrative gained during the 1970s and 1980s meant that the National Party had to adopt this narrative despite some ideological incompatibility. Examining the development of NZ’s largely deliberative security narrative would outline which party favoured which framing tasks and how these various components were built into the overarching frame by the two parties. This type of project would not only help map out the dynamics of this historical process, shedding light on how each party adopted, adapted or converted the various framing aspects, but could also provide insight into the potential reverse transition if the reactive narrative ever becomes more dominant in everyday NZ security rhetoric.

Another useful study that would help bolster the understanding of reactive and deliberative narratives would directly measure their impact on an audience. The aim would be to gather hard data on the salience, emotive impacts and mobilising, justifying and legitimising outcomes these narratives have on audience, focusing on both ingroups and outgroups. This would provide an excellent way of gauging the actual utility of the deliberative and reactive, particularly assessing whether the deliberative’s ‘population-centric ’ focus was still relevant in contemporary situations as well as examining how the reactive actually dealt with the various emotions generated by an attack. In turn, this would help assess the validity of the belief that fear is not as important as has been stated in the literature. It would also help examine how these two narratives interact and interfere with each other, providing an insight into whether any or many in an audience are able to see both as just and legitimate or not. Of particular interest would be a study of this sort that monitored an audience over a significant period of time as this would help chart the possible change in salience of the reactive as well as the potential for the deliberative to build legitimacy over long periods. This would not only provide academics with a useful set of information that could be used to further refine the understanding of both these narratives but would also enable counterinsurgents to refine their narratives to achieve the optimal mobilising, justifying and legitimising outcomes with regard to key audiences. It could also help to refine the use of framing for counterinsurgencies by examining which aspects of resonance are the most important. Through analysis of different audience types as well, it could provide an understanding of if and how resonance varies across types of groups, particularly different cultures, something important in modern counterinsurgencies. This type of project could help to
turn resonance from a tautological concept into a more rigorous and unidirectional understanding. Another useful insight from a study of this nature would be understanding if and how people register the contradictions between the reactive and deliberative when used together, helping to explain if they are aware of them at all, whether people are selectively biased towards one or the other and only that narrative registers, whether they have a more fluid and flexible way of registering the contradictions or whether something else is going on.

Another useful future study would expand the scope of these narratives to examine their use beyond counterinsurgency into other areas of political communication as they have the potential to be utilised in a range of different political contexts. There are a number of important dynamics that this type of study could help examine, including the general applicability of these two narratives beyond counterinsurgency, their relative use by leftwing and rightwing governments, any influence the use of these narratives in one political context may have on other contexts and how their use in different contexts impacts their mobilising and legitimising capacity. One particular area of interest would be to track any potential influence these narratives had after 9/11 on other areas of political communication, examining whether the rise in use of the reactive narrative had an impact on a state’s general political communication. This type of study could build directly onto the results of this thesis, comparing NZ’s political communication in a range of other areas from 9/11 onward to see if there were any corresponding impacts.

Finally, a useful study would examine the communication of the ICAT in historical and current context, seeking to understand whether it was an aberration or was a consistent step in an ongoing transition. This project would need to examine the numerous previous counterinsurgent campaigns to assess whether there are any aspects of continuity or whether the consequences of 9/11 are best treated as an outlier. This would help determine whether the findings in this study, and the many on US communications during the period, are able to be applied to other situations or whether they are best restricted to understanding the ‘war on terror’. If it is found to be more of an aberration than a continuation, this creates a number of related questions. In particular, whether it was the scale and novelty of the attacks themselves or the particular response as directed by Bush that led to this aberrance.

6.7 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The aim of this thesis was to examine the reactive and deliberative narratives as strategic tools in
countering an insurgency with regard to the three key audiences: the insurgent, domestic and allied. It was a complex undertaking, to examine the communicative output of the NZ Government over a ten year period using a demanding analytical framework. Overall, the findings reinforced the original impressions of these two narratives: one was a reaction to an extreme situation, the other was the result of deliberation. The exploration of the use of these two narratives between 2001 and 2011 revealed that the shock of 9/11 caused NZ to communicate in a reactive manner, that this reactive communication declined over the period as the shock faded and that the reactive was used more during events and to a wider audience. It also showed that the deliberative was used more often to a domestic audience and that it was by far the more common narrative in general. The key issue, however, was the incompatibility of these two narratives. The reactive’s utility comes from its ability to create a powerful ingroup by excluding the outgroup, while the deliberative’s utility comes from its capacity to bring the outgroup into the ingroup. They work in conflicting and contradictory ways meaning that when they are being given to a mixed audience, as all communications are in the contemporary environment, meaning that they impact the utility of one another. The counterinsurgent uses these two narratives in a conflict at their peril as they not only impact the utility of each other but could erode their legitimacy, both domestically and to a wider audience. Consistency is key to communicating well during a counterinsurgency, assuming, of course, that audiences not only pay attention but actively connect the various pieces. Even if they do not, if the media are fulfilling their role as the fourth estate, the more egregious inconsistencies should be picked up.

This brings up one issue that needs to be specifically addressed, the deliberative’s connection with NZ’s traditional security narrative and its entwined resonance with the domestic audience. The history of usage was probably a part of the reason that the counterinsurgent continued to use deliberative framing tasks that were discreditable, aside from the political benefits accrued. That is to say that in some respects, the counterinsurgent was increasingly trapped by their previous communications. They had spent so long framing the Afghan deployment in a certain way that they could not change narratives to fit changing circumstances without repercussions, yet events eventually ended up exposing this divergence in a more problematic manner than if they had been more credible and accurate in their communication earlier on. The point being that a counterinsurgent is, to a degree, limited in what they can reasonably say about a situation by their previous communications and this consistency is a key component in determining both the content and reception of counterinsurgent communication. That means that no matter what narrative is used, its past use will limit the potential resonance and utility of future
communications. These internal and external drivers for consistency mean that a counterinsurgent should choose their narrative wisely, as they may well be forced to use it for the duration no matter how much circumstances change.

This has particular ramifications for NZ, as not only has the bilateral relationship between NZ and the US improved dramatically but also the National Party, who are less inclined towards the deliberative narrative, has been in power for almost three terms. These two factors threaten what has been a bipartisan approach to foreign policy and defence, and communication regarding these areas. If the two main parties of NZ were to adopt different security narratives and different counterinsurgent narratives, the consistency of NZ’s approach could be severely compromised over the long terms required to conduct a counterinsurgency. While the use of both narratives was problematic during the ICAT, at least they were used in a consistent manner by both parties, deployed in response to attacks and when talking to wider audiences. If the two parties adopted contrasting narratives as their standard response, NZ’s ability as a counterinsurgent, and more generally in international relations, would be compromised. Even more complex is that NZ’s mixed-member proportional representation system and history of mixed-party cabinets means that there is the potential for key roles to be held by MPs using different narratives to respond to the same situation. Fortunately for NZ, the New Zealand First MP Winston Peters’ communications in the Labour-led Government were relatively consistent, but there is potential for future problems with diverse cabinets and differing narratives. For NZ to remain as effective internationally, it needs to ensure that it uses a consistent narrative that has enough flexibility within it to suit changing circumstances.

A consistent narrative across communicators and even parties could be achieved through the use of a set of core values to guide and ground counterinsurgent communication. These values would need to be discerned and delineated by the government in collaboration with the relevant ministries and would need to have a both general resonance with the wider NZ public as well as a specific utility with respect to counterinsurgency – though not all values would need to fulfil both simultaneously. This has a clear congruity with the constructivist school of international relations, which sees foreign policy and national security as historically and socially constructed, based on the understanding “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”

35 Katzenstein, one of

35 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.
the leading constructivist theorists, has expressed the importance of avoiding the “sterility of realism and the naïveté of liberalism” by understanding the importance of culture, norms and identity when it comes to foreign policy and national security.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, it is recommended that NZ foreign policy and national security communications in general could be improved by viewing NZ decision-making through a constructivist lens. By reflecting on its culture, norms and identity and how they shape its foreign policy and national security, NZ could delineate a set of values that would help anchor all its communications. Understanding the wider socio-cultural context that underlies its decision-making would allow NZ to communicate in a clear and consistent manner that was of utility both domestically and internationally. In turn, some of the general values could be selected for specific counterinsurgency communication, those with a particular congruence to the insurgent-counterinsurgent dynamic and a resonance with the various key audiences highlighted and emphasised as the foundational aspects of all communication output during operations.

Several of the values used during the ICAT and referenced in the thesis provide an example of how this could ground communication. Take ‘tolerance’, which NZ used a number of times, this reflects on both NZ as a ‘multicultural’ society that believes in ‘fairness’ and also fits with the population-centric COIN approach. Likewise, the ‘multilateral’ values NZ referenced during the ICAT are popular amongst New Zealanders. Emphasis of ‘multilateral values’ would help justify NZ contributions to counterinsurgent operations that it has low direct stakes in to the domestic populace whilst also helping communicate that the NZ operation was inclusive to the insurgent populace. Properly devised, these values would provide the ideal means to orient the government’s communications. In fact, used in the right way they could even enable elements of the reactive and deliberative narratives to be used together with a degree of consistency in certain areas. For example, while NZ emphasised its values, which it shares with other states that it has formed an alliance with, it did not explicitly connect these deliberative actor and solution frames with the reactive narrative. It could have constructed a narrative that made these connections, explaining that it was joining with those states that it shared these values with to protect the values from those who seek their overthrow. Rather than refer to 9/11 as an ‘attack on civilisation’ they could have framed it as an ‘attack on our shared values’. This has the same mobilising capacity without the same alienating outcome and it helps connect the more reactive and more deliberative strands of NZ’s communication. While not providing enough elasticity to

bridge the most extreme reactive aspects with the most moderate deliberative components, it
does offer the potential for a some aspects of each narrative to be used in a consistent manner.
For example, ‘tolerance’ has a congruence with the reactive value of ‘freedom’ and the
deliberative need for inclusiveness, thus providing a means for NZ counterinsurgent
communication to have both reactive and deliberative facets. The use of a set of values as the
basic guide for shaping all counterinsurgent communications would help ensure that there was a
higher degree of consistency within the politician’s and government’s own communications and
across party lines.

This does suggest that NZ needs to review its counterinsurgent communication processes and
protocols with the aim of ensuring consistency through the use of a values-framework.
Considering the findings of the thesis, NZ needs to greater preparation and coordination of all
its important communication. It would appear that much of NZ’s communications are
conducted in a relatively ad hoc manner, particularly those immediately after an attack, and this is
no longer acceptable in the contemporary context. While sending off a hastily prepared press
release with no broader governmental coordination or scrutiny may not have been an issue when
its potential audience was largely restricted to NZ, in the globalised world it is highly
problematic. As the terrorist incidents and social unrest caused by the Danish and French comics
show, it does not take much to bring unwanted negative attention. While they cannot specifically
prepare for future terrorist attacks the NZ government should also have a set of guidelines in
place that ensure they always communicating in a way that is both cross-culturally acceptable and
is consistent with NZ’s core values. While a set of processes and protocols would help ensure
that all the communications are subjected to the necessary scrutiny the development of a set of
guidelines would provide a benchmark that would help politicians to quickly write a press
release.

The need for a review suggests that there should be a greater interaction between politicians and
academia. Not only can academics bring their specialised knowledge to the problem but it also
means that a government that is struggling to do more with less is able to effectively outsource
some of the work. One of the probable reasons that much of NZ’s current counterinsurgent
communication occurs with no broader governmental coordination or scrutiny is lack of
resources. For a small state, the new pressures regarding this area place increasing strain on
already struggling ministries. The trend in NZ has been for the government to limit academic
access to certain information but this reticence only ends up limiting the pool of analysis they
can call on. The NZ government needs to be more willing to engage with external experts and while operational secrecy should always be maintained, an increased flow of information and consultation would encourage a synergistic relationship that benefits both parties.

It is also suggested here that NZ should aim for greater transparency in its counterinsurgent communication. Both Clark and Key have been criticised for obscuring what they believe are unpopular military deployments or operations by refusing to talk about them, by using the ‘I will not comment on operational matters’ line or by using misleading terminology, like ‘mentoring’, to describe them. While these tactics may have worked in the past, in the globalised world they are just as likely to backfire as they are no longer able to control this information to the same degree. While it is not suggested that they reveal information that could endanger personnel or compromise operations, their ongoing attempts to managed public perception of military deployments is problematic, for them politically, for the NZ public and for the morale of the NZDF. The findings of this research suggest it would be better for the NZ government to be more transparent as not only would it ensure that their communications are consistent with their actions but also that in many cases the domestic audience support the overarching justifications given for their actions, even if they do not always support the specific actions themselves, because they are congruent with their core values. In fact, having widely agreed values in place would make transparency easier as they provide an overarching means of justifying less popular actions.

Another one of the major insights this thesis provided is the incompatibility between a democratically-elected government and the exigencies of a counterinsurgent as a communicator. While democracy’s general issues regarding counterinsurgency have been noted, the issues surrounding communication have not. One of the main reasons for this incompatibility is that a democracy must not only consider the impacts of their communication on the insurgent support audience but also must mobilise and justify the deployment to their own support audience. As has been shown, often the best means of mobilising support amongst the domestic audience for a low-stake cause have counterproductive impacts on the insurgent support audience and the best ways of justifying a cause and legitimising an actor as a counterinsurgent with respect to the insurgent audience have little mobilisational capacity with regard to the domestic audience. This is a problem inherent to democracy, where the government must constantly ensure they have the support of their constituency and their cause is perceived as legitimate, a problem other regime

37 Merom, *How Democracies Lose Small Wars*; Reiter and Stam, *Democracies at War*;
types do not necessarily have to manage. Another key reason this issue is magnified for counterinsurgencies is the lengthy campaigns required for most COIN operations. Not only do democratic governments need to maintain this difficult balance between the two key support populaces but they must also do so over a prolonged period. Also, counterinsurgencies rarely pose the same threat to a state as regular interstate war, meaning that the democratic counterinsurgent must mobilise support and justify a cause that does not have the same direct threat to their own support populace as a war.

These pressures all mean that there is a danger that democracy is undermined during a counterinsurgency campaign through loss of transparency, actions outside the rule of law and control of the media, particularly if the indirect stakes are high enough. During the ICAT, NZ was guilty of compromising transparency – particularly the insistence on referring to the SAS role as ‘mentoring’ when they were in combat situations – and while it may not have damaged NZ democracy, these infringements are subtly corrosive and the potential for damage exists, even if it is limited. The same issue also comes from the other direction: the contemporary counterinsurgent often seeks to impose democracy in the host nation, a contradictory position of seeking to force a people to adopt a system of choice, and this hypocrisy can also erode the apparent legitimacy of democracy as a system of government both domestically and in general. Forcing another state to become a democracy is unlikely to promote democratic governance within that state.\textsuperscript{38}

A nested issue is that alongside the general degradation of democracy that comes with imposing a democratic regime, the democratic counterinsurgent also aims to set up a fellow counterinsurgent with the very same flaws that limit their ability to effectively conduct a counterinsurgent communication campaign. The democratisation solution may help the counterinsurgent justify their cause with their own support populace, but it replicates the problems they themselves experience in mobilising support and justifying their cause to different audiences in the newly democratised allied counterinsurgent state. The newly democratic counterinsurgent must ensure that they are able to mobilise support within their own populace while justifying action. While the stakes would admittedly be far higher for these states (such as Afghanistan and Iraq in the ICAT), their legitimacy would be far lower because the democratic government had been externally imposed, meaning that they would already be at a disadvantage. Thus, they would face even greater mobilisation, justification and legitimacy pressures which

\textsuperscript{38} Caraley, “Editor’s Foreword.”
may, in turn, lead to democracy being compromised as the newly democratic government communicates in undemocratic ways to secure victory in the counterinsurgency.

These issues pose future problems as the democratic states move further towards a world of decreasing interstate regular conflict and rising insurgencies, all conducted on an increasingly globalised stage where there are multiple audiences with varying requirements. For the contemporary counterinsurgent, an understanding of the dynamics of both the reactive and deliberative narratives, both separately and in conjunction, will be crucial, as this provide the modern counterinsurgent with the tools to achieve various aims amongst differing audience

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APPENDIX ONE

PRESS RELEASES

In this appendix, the press releases that made up the data set will be provided. Specifically, the
date, the issuer, the title and the context will be given for each. These press releases were all
and ‘Iraq’, then selected using specific criteria before being categorised by context, as outlined in
Chapter 2.

3 October. Phil Goff, “Government Briefed by United States on Bin Laden Connection.”
(Event).
9 October. Helen Clark, “PM Receives Briefing From President Bush.” (Event).
15 October. Helen Clark, “Response to Terrorism High on APEC Leaders' Agenda.” (Wider).
19 October. Helen Clark, “New Century, New Economy: PM's speech to APEC CEOs in
Shanghai.” (Wider).
27 October. Phil Goff, “New Zealand and Humanity After the World Trade Centre Suicide
Bombings.” (Domestic).
13 November. Phil Goff, “Goff Statement to UN General Assembly.” (Wider).

2002 – total number of press releases: 22
29 January. Helen Clark, “Extra Funding for Counter Terrorism Efforts.” (Domestic).
12 May. Helen Clark, “PM to Open Symposium on Terrorism.” (Domestic).
13 May. Helen Clark, “Address to Symposium on World Terrorism.” (Domestic).
2 July. Phil Goff, “Goff Criticises Green Stance on Terrorism.” (Domestic).
6 August. Phil Goff, “Address to the Australian Defence College - Centre of Defence and Strategic Studies.” (Wider).
15 September. Phil Goff, “Goff Statement to UN General Assembly.” (Wider).
27 September. Phil Goff, “Address to No 43 Staff Course on Foreign Affairs and Trade.” (Domestic).
9 October. Phil Goff, “Goff Second Reading Speech of the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill.” (Domestic).
11 November. Helen Clark, “NZ Navy and Air Force to Join International Campaign Against Terrorism.” (Domestic).
3 December. Phil Goff, “Goff to Afghanistan to Iran.” (Domestic).
13 December. Helen Clark, “The United States and NZ: Co-operating for Prosperity.” (Wider).

29 January. Helen Clark, “President Bush's State of the Union Address.” (Wider).
5 May. Mark Burton, “P3 Orion deploys to the Gulf of Oman.” (Domestic).
9 June. Helen Clark, “Government Assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraq.”
(Domestic).
27 June. Phil Goff, “The Ethics of Foreign Policy.” (Domestic).
7 July. Mark Burton, “New Zealand to Lead Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan.”
(Domestic).
4 August. Mark Burton, “Minister Welcomes Home Crew of Te Mana.” (Domestic).
11 August. Mark Burton, “NZDF Deployment to Iraq.” (Domestic).
20 August. Phil Goff, “Goff Condemns Attack on UN in Iraq.” (Event).
23 August. Phil Goff, “Goff Offers Sympathy to India Bomb Blast Victims.” (Event).
25 August. Helen Clark, “Prime Minister Farewells Afghanistan Deployment.” (Domestic).
22 September. Helen Clark, “NZDF to lead Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Team”
(Domestic).
27 September. Phil Goff, “NZ Statement to the UN General Debate.” (Event).
12 October. Phil Goff, “Goff Speech to Bali Bombing Commemoration.” (Domestic).
21 November. Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Istanbul Bombings.” (Event).

8 March. Helen Clark, “Further NZ Contribution to Afghanistan, International Campaign
Against Terrorism.” (Domestic).
23 June. Helen Clark, “Address to the NZ Institute of International Affairs.” (Domestic).
17 August. Phil Goff, “Goff Meets Leaders, NZ Troops, in Afghanistan.” (Domestic).
9 September. Helen Clark, “Helen Clark Responds to Jakarta Bomb Blast.” (Event).
11 October. Phil Goff, “NZ to Mark Second Anniversary of Bali Bombing.” (Domestic).
Citizen.” (Domestic).
20 November. Helen Clark, “Address at CEO APEC Summit.” (Wider).
3 December. Phil Goff, “Goff welcomes report on UN reform.” (Domestic).
3 December. Phil Goff, “Eminent New Zealanders to Attend Inter-Faith Meeting.” (Domestic).
8 December. Phil Goff, “Regional security threats post 9/11.” (Domestic).

19 April. Phil Goff, “Multilateralism in NZ Foreign Policy.” (Domestic).
27 June. Phil Goff, “Meeting the Challenges of Security and Development.” (Domestic).
8 July. Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Attacks on Mosques.” (Event).
1 August. Phil Goff, “Defence and NZ foreign policy.” (Wider).
16 September. Phil Goff, “NZ Signs Treaty Against Nuclear Terrorism.” (Domestic).
2 October. Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Bombings in Bali.” (Event).
10 November. Phil Goff. “NZ's Role in Peacekeeping and in Afghanistan.” (Domestic).

1 February. Phil Goff, “Goff Positive about Afghanistan Contribution.” (Wider).
22 February. Phil Goff, “Trade, Defence and Disarmament Policy Over the Next Five Years.” (Domestic).
10 April. Phil Goff, “Military Presense (sic) in Afghanistan Important, says Goff.” (Domestic).
4 October. Phil Goff, “New Zealand – Our Place in the World and Our Defence Policy.” (Domestic).


21 March. Helen Clark, “President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Clark of New Zealand to the White House.” (Wider).


23 May. Phil Goff, “Presentation of the US Presidential Unit Citation.” (Domestic).


2 July. Phil Goff, “NZSAS Gallantry In Afghanistan Recognised.” (Domestic).

3 July. Phil Goff, “The Role of Defence Forces in Development.” (Domestic).


12 July. Phil Goff, “Meeting Contemporary Security Challenges.” (Domestic).


11 December. Helen Clark, “NZDF Command No 48 Staff Course.” (Domestic).


2 April. Phil Goff, “Navy Frigate to Deploy to Persian Gulf.” (Domestic).

4 April. Phil Goff, “NZ Strengthens Deployment in Afghanistan.” (Domestic).

14 September. Helen Clark, Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Bombings in India,” (Event).
21 September. Helen Clark, “PM Condemns Terrorist Bombing in Pakistan.” (Event).
30 September. Phil Goff, “NZ Extends Role in UN Peacekeeping Mission in Iraq.” (Domestic).

8 October. Murray McCully, “Remarks With New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully After Their Meeting.” (Wider).

4 May. John Key, “PM Concludes Visit to Afghanistan.” (Domestic).
4 August. Wayne Mapp and Heather Roy, “Govt Pays Respects to Officer Killed in Action.” (Domestic).

1 February. John Key, “SAS Deployment to be Extended by 12 Months.” (Domestic).
16 February. John Key, “Reply to Prime Minister Gillard’s address to the House.” (Wider).
16 February. Wayne Mapp, “Tragic Death of Soldier in Bamyan Road Accident.” (Domestic).
12 April. Murray McCully, “McCully to Attend International Talks on Afghanistan and Attend ANZAC service in Gallipoli.” (Domestic).
25 April. Murray McCully, “At the New Zealand Memorial Service, Chunuk Bair Memorial, Gallipoli.” (Domestic).
22 August. Wayne Mapp, “Condolences to Family of Corporal Doug Grant.” (Domestic).
APPENDIX TWO

In this appendix the coding manuals for the deliberative and reactive narratives can be found.

INSTRUCTIONS

Framing tasks: The discourse is divided up into five ‘framing tasks’. These are different functional components of rhetoric that seek to outline problems, identify actors, attribute blame, propose solutions and justify these solutions. Each will be explained individually below, but first it needs to be made clear that these are not always mutually exclusive; in some cases, a single word or phrase can have two or more functions in discourse. This will be made clear in the coding form below.

To be considered as ‘present’ a framing task needs to only be used a single time in a press release. Any term or list of terms that are marked as ‘manifest’ means that these exact term or phrase must be used, though to be clear this includes all possible plurals, spellings and lexemes of that term. For example, the term ‘civilisation’ can be represented as ‘civilisations’, ‘civilization’ and ‘civilised’. The term ‘latent’ refers to identifications that are not exact terms or phrases, but rather have the same or similar subject matter expressed using different terms and phrases. These latent units will be explained and two examples provided to offer the parameters of these units.

DELIBERATIVE CODING MANUAL

Five qualities of the Deliberative Narrative:

Literal: The deliberative uses literal language, such as ‘terrorism is a strategy generally used by weak actors’.

Nuanced: The deliberative uses nuanced language, such as ‘while New Zealand faces no direct threat, our globalised world means that New Zealanders are threatened directly and indirectly’.

Constricted: The deliberative constricts the situation, providing a measured outline, such as ‘the threat posed by a narrow group of extremists’.

Restraint: The deliberative is restrained and does not evoke strong emotions, such as “the root causes of terrorism are injustice, inequality and ethnic tension’.

Inclusive: The deliberative will include the insurgent support population, either implicitly (by not specifically excluding them) or explicitly. Implicitly inclusive can be references to a “humanitarian” solution, while inclusive is exemplified by statements like “we must work with Afghans to create a stable country for them’.

Problem/Enemy – This section is focused on both the counterinsurgent’s diagnoses of the threat and descriptions of the enemy. Threat diagnoses do not need to refer specifically to ‘terrorism’ but can must connect to the 9/11 and/or post 9/11 world. Enemy identifications do not have to refer to ‘terrorists’ specifically but can include characteristics ascribed to ‘terrorism’ that are human qualities.

- Described the scope of the threat either using manifest the terms ‘asymmetric’ or ‘non-state’.
- Stated there is ‘no increased threat’ to New Zealand after 9/11 (latent). Examples: ‘there is no evidence of any threat to New Zealand’; ‘Our strength is in one sense our geographic location; we have no direct threat to our sovereignty or conflicts with our neighbours.’
- Described the scope of the threat using the manifest terms ‘international terrorism’/global terrorism’/trans-national terrorism’.
- Described the scope of the threat as ‘globalised’ (latent). Terrorism described as having global impacts
Examples, ‘Terrorism poses a threat not only to the security of nation states, but also has serious ramifications for global security and economic stability; ‘launching attacks on innocent civilian populations around the world’.

- Referred to the scope of the enemy using manifest terms ‘group’, ‘organisation’ or ‘network’, can include the manifest terms ‘terrorist’ as well as manifest size refersents ‘narrow’, ‘small’, ‘international’, ‘global’ or ‘trans-national’.
- Used the manifest terms ‘violence’ or ‘murder’ to refer to terrorist attacks or terrorism in general.
- Connected ‘terrorism/terrorists’ with other issues (latent). Only needs to mention one other issue and does not have to specifically state they are connected but just list them together. Examples of issues are: crime, global warming, infectious diseases, drug trafficking, refugees, environmental degradation, and humanitarian disasters and WMDs.
- Referred to the security environment either manifest term ‘complex’ or latent unit of ‘changed’. ‘Changed’ refers to changing period of international relations, using phrases like ‘post-Cold War’ or ‘post 11 September’ or reference to ‘new security challenges’.

**Blame/Ideology –** This section looks at both the blame attributions the counterinsurgent gives for ‘terrorism’ as well as any references to the ‘terrorist’s’ ideology. Often the blame/ideology components are also problem diagnoses and enemy identifications.

- Blamed terrorism on ‘Israel-Palestine’ conflict (latent), this must refer to both actors, their conflict and its influence on terrorism or international security in general. Example: ‘failure to resolve differences between Israeli and Palestinian people in the Middle East continues to be a catalyst for recruitment into terrorism’.

**Actor/Victim –** This section examines how the counterinsurgent describes themselves, their allies and the victims of terrorism.

- Referred to New Zealand’s ‘values’ or ‘interests’ using those manifest terms.
- Said New Zealand was either ‘sovereign’ or ‘independent’ using those manifest terms.
- Referred to New Zealand being a ‘multilateralist’ or ‘internationalist’ (latent) that prefers to work collectively/multilaterally and has respect for ‘international law’. Examples: ‘New Zealand has consistently been internationalist in its outlook and ready to contribute to international security’; ‘We place emphasis on multilateral institutions’.
- Referred to New Zealand as a ‘good international citizen’ or a ‘principled actor’ (latent). Examples: ‘We aim in practical ways to advance human rights, good governance, democracy and the rule of law’; ‘ours is a principled position’.
- Explained how its ‘size dictates foreign policy’ by referring to New Zealand’s size or remoteness and making a connection with foreign policy. Example: ‘New Zealanders appreciate that as a small nation we have a strong vested interest in the international rule of law’; ‘Despite our isolation geographically, we have never been isolationist in our foreign and defence policies’.
- Refers to US and/or Australia using terms ‘close ties’, ‘friends’, ‘friendship’, ‘relationship’, ‘cooperation’, ‘bilateral’, ‘shared values’, while other examples included descriptions of a ‘shared history’, particularly past military actions. Example: ‘The United States... Our views diverge in a number of areas but we cooperate closely in most’; ‘Relations with the US are important. Our links are broad-ranging’.
- Made either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ statements about UN (latent). Examples: ‘It is the United Nations acting collectively which will win the wars against terrorism’; ‘The UN has of course failed on many occasions to resolve issues’.
- Referred to its own forces using manifest terms ‘personnel’, ‘soldier/s’, ‘troop/s’ or ‘peacekeeper/s’
- Made ‘positive statements’ about own personnel (latent). Examples; ‘reputation for excellence’ or ‘world-class personnel’.
- Referred to people killed or injured by terrorism using manifest terms ‘victim/s’, ‘civilian/s’, as ‘New Zealander/s’
- Referred to ‘expanded victims’ (latent) by either referring to the ‘nationalities’ or the ‘number’ of the victims. Examples: ‘Those who died came from 79 different countries, were of mixed age, gender, religion and ethnicity’; ‘The more than 6000 lives lost’.

**Strategy/Solution** – This section is interested in both the strategies the counterinsurgent proposes to solve the problem and the outcomes and objectives they aim to achieve.
- Referred to ‘collective’ or ‘multilateral’ solutions (latent). Can be either under UN aegis or just collective of states, includes using phrases like ‘work together’ or referring to ‘mandate/s’ or ‘resolution/s’.
- Referred to solutions using manifest units ‘democracy’ or ‘governance’.
- Referred to solutions using manifest units ‘secure/security’, ‘stable/stability’ or ‘peace’.
- Referred to solutions using manifest units ‘reconstruction’, ‘development’, ‘humanitarian’ assistance or ‘human rights’.
- Referred to solutions using manifest unit ‘diplomacy’, ‘dialogue’ ‘discuss’, ‘discussion’ or ‘tolerance’.
- Referred to solutions using manifest unit ‘multifaceted’.
- Referred to solutions using mixture of at least one from each category of manifest units ‘secure/security’, ‘stable/stability’ or ‘peace’ AND ‘reconstruction’, ‘development’, ‘humanitarian’ assistance or ‘human rights’.
- Referred to a solution that explicitly ‘includes’ the insurgent population (latent). This can include any references to specific nationalities, such as ‘Afghanis’ or even just state they are ‘working for’ a population. Examples: ‘work with the Afghan people to create an effective and democratic form of government’; ‘secure a peaceful and prosperous future for Afghanistan’.

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**REACTIVE CODING MANUAL**

**Five qualities of the Reactive Narrative:**

**Figurative:** The reactive uses figurative/metaphoric language, such as ‘plague of terrorism’.

**Absolute/ Binary:** The reactive uses absolute and binary language, such as ‘all of civilisation’ or ‘good vs. evil’.

**Hyperbolic:** The reactive exaggerates or understates the situation, usually exaggerating the threat and understating complexity of solution, such as ‘terrorism is the greatest threat to the world’, or ‘hunt down the enemy’.

**Emotive:** The reactive will use emotive language that has the potential to anger the insurgent support audience, such as ‘evil people’, ‘agendas of hatred’.

**Exclusive:** The reactive will not include the insurgent support population but rather will alienate them. Exclusivity is generally the result of the other four qualities – ‘good vs. evil’, ‘agendas of hatred’ etc. all exclude the insurgent population.
Problem/Enemy – This section is focused on both the counterinsurgent’s diagnoses of the threat and descriptions of the enemy. Threat diagnoses do not need to refer specifically to ‘terrorism’ but must connect to 9/11 and/or post 9/11 world. Enemy identifications do not have to refer to ‘terrorists’ specifically but can include characteristics ascribed to ‘terrorism’ that are human qualities.

- Identified the attacks/threat from terrorism using manifest terms ‘humanity’, ‘civilisation’, ‘civilised nations’, ‘civilised societies’ and ‘civilised people’.
- Terrorism described as an irrational tactic or strategy using manifest terms ‘incomprehensible’, ‘irrational’, ‘indiscriminate’, ‘pointless’, ‘senseless’, that it ‘can strike any place at any time’, that ‘distance is no guarantee of protection’ and that ‘no one is immune from the threat’; ‘Terrorism knows no global boundaries’ and ‘distance is no guarantee of protection’.
- Uses the term ‘terrorism’ when an enemy referent should be used (latent). Ascribes qualities that would be more accurately applied to a human enemy rather than a tactic. Examples: ‘terrorism is a common enemy’; ‘terrorism is still a very real threat’; ‘scourge of terrorism’; ‘combat terrorism’.
- Terrorism described as the most serious threat using manifest terms ‘primary’, ‘principal’, ‘the most serious’, ‘the greatest’ threat.
- Referred to terrorism as a ‘global threat’ (latent). Must state terrorism threatens world/globe or that terrorism is global. Examples: ‘the threat that terrorism poses to ourselves and to the world’; ‘global terrorism’.
- Used the manifest term ‘terror’ instead of terrorism, including in formulations like ‘act of terror’ or ‘war on terror’.
- Used the manifest terms ‘new era’, ‘new generation’, ‘next wave’ or that ‘the world changed on September 11, 2001’ to refer to terrorism.
- Refers to the enemy in a binary/absolute manner. Most extreme version uses the ‘share their fate’ statement (latent), less extreme refers to ‘al Qaeda and Taleban’ without distinction. Examples: ‘Violence from Taleban and al Qaeda insurgents’; ‘Al Qaeda and Talibian forces’.

Blame/Ideology – This section looks at both the blame attributions the counterinsurgent gives for ‘terrorism’ as well as any references to the ‘terrorist’s’ ideology. Often the blame/ideology components are also problem diagnoses and enemy identifications.

- Describes terrorists as irrational. Includes any reference to terrorism as an irrational tactic/strategy – that is manifest terms ‘incomprehensible’, ‘irrational’, ‘indiscriminate’, ‘pointless’, ‘senseless’, that it ‘can strike any place at any time’, that ‘distance is no guarantee of protection’ and that ‘no one is immune from the threat’; ‘Terrorism knows no global boundaries and distance is no guarantee of protection’ OR any use of alienating problem/enemy manifest terms ‘evil/s’, ‘barbaric’, ‘brutal/ity’, ‘cold blood/ed’, ‘scourge’, ‘plague/d’, ‘symptom’, OR manifest terms ‘agendas of hate’, or terrorists ‘no bottom line’.
- Statements that terrorists are ‘not Muslims’ or that they have ‘blasphemed their faith’ (latent). Examples: ‘terrorists have ‘hijacked their faith’, ‘they discredit the cause they claim to represent’.

Actor/Victim – This section examines how the counterinsurgent describes themselves, their allies and the victims of terrorism.

- Used the manifest terms ‘civilised’, ‘humanity’, ‘democratic’, ‘peaceful’ or ‘decent’. With regard to ‘democratic’, the identification must specify that ‘all the allied actors are democratic’. Examples: “working with other countries who like us value freedom and democracy”.
- Uses alienating terms to refer to victims of terrorism using manifest terms ‘innocent’ or ‘good’.

Strategy/Solution – This section is interested in both the strategies the counterinsurgent proposes to solve the problem and the outcomes and objectives they aim to achieve.

- Solutions that use the ‘terrorism as enemy stand-in formulation’ and propose to use military means against the abstract noun, specifically manifest terms: ‘war against terrorism’, ‘campaign against

- Solutions that use the manifest term ‘justice’ and either refer to the need to ‘bring’ the enemy to ‘justice’ or for the enemy to be ‘brought to justice’.
- Manifest solutions that state that there must be ‘no tolerance’ of terrorism or terrorists.
- Solutions that use alienating phrases, specifically manifest terms ‘root out’ and ‘hunted down’.