Soviets on Ice

The Reception of Soviet Ice Hockey Propaganda in Canada, 1954-1981

This dissertation is submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of BA Honours in History at the University of Canterbury. This dissertation is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work of other historians used in the dissertation is credited to the author in the footnote references. The dissertation is approximately 9,936 words in length.

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Abstract:

This research paper examines how Soviet ice hockey was received by the Canadian media from 1954 to 1981. Canadian newspapers and game commentary have been utilised in this research paper to gauge reaction to the Soviet success in ice hockey, and how the media viewed the Soviet National team. Soviet ice hockey challenged the Canadian public’s core belief that they were the best at their national game. In the Cold War climate this feud between the two sporting rivals would enable the Soviets to capture the attention of the Canadian public on a level which was not emulated through another form of propaganda. As de-Stalinisation was occurring in the Soviet Union, ice hockey would emulate Nikita Khrushchev’s policy of aggressive ‘peaceful coexistence’ by beating a Western nation at its own game. This paper is the first to extensively analyse the Canadian newspapers The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star. Unlike most historiography in this field, this dissertation combines the amateur years of the Soviet-Canadian rivalry (1954-1969), with the games against professional NHL players in the Summit Series (1972-1981). From 1954 until 1970 ice hockey was seen as a clash of capitalist and socialist systems, however, the 1972 series personalised Soviet players to the Canadian media and public. Soviet ice hockey was a successful propaganda tool into Canada through applying a personal face to the Cold War foreign power.
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Introduction:

‘The Soviets simply pummelled the NHL side in an awesome display of hockey power, skill and opportunism … “Now we know how really strong they are,” said all-star coach Scotty Bowman. “It’s not a bitter loss for us. We recognize their strength. We have no excuses, our players gave it their best.”’¹

After 25 years of Soviet ice hockey domination, 1979 marked the first time that the Canadians did not attribute their loss to referees or to the exclusion of the best Canadian players. After the Soviet players proved that they could withstand, and succeed against, the professional Canadian National Hockey League (NHL) players they gained tremendous respect in Canada. Ice hockey was an integral aspect of Canadian society as it had the ability to captivate audiences and the public. Globe and Mail reporter, Dick Beddoes, wrote: ‘[i]f Canada cares about supremacy in anything it is hockey and, dammit, shoot that puck.’² This encouragement for Team Canada to succeed came after a loss of 7-3 to the Soviet National team in the 1972 Summit Series which startled Canada. The loss was unexpected, as predictions had flown in prior to the game which stated that Canada would have a complete sweep of the whole series. Soviet achievement penetrated the Canadian public forum as their mastery of ice hockey would generate a form of respect that could never be replicated. This Cold War enemy infiltrated into the West through popular culture and influenced Canada to re-think many of its preconceived assumptions.

Soviet success in ice hockey infiltrated into the Canadian public’s forum.³ The Canadian perception of the Soviet Union was transformed through the respect generated by their successful National ice hockey team. Nikita Khrushchev’s policy of ‘peaceful co-existence’, from 1954, saw a shift towards the Soviet Union’s involvement in international competition and cultural exchanges with the West.⁴ Subsequently, the Soviet Union invested in sports and developed programs which would enable success in international competition,

¹ F. Orr, ‘There’s no doubt about it NHL was just outclassed’, The Toronto Star, 12 Feb 1979, p. B1. Within this dissertation all newspaper footnotes will be provided in full. As multiple articles are from the same newspaper, date, and page, if abbreviated this would create ambiguity. Subsequently, all newspaper articles will be provided in full (except access information) in order to remain consistent, even when used in succession.
³ This dissertation will use ‘Soviet’ exclusively, except in quotation.
particularly the Olympics.\textsuperscript{5} In the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet Union National team established themselves as a major power in ice hockey. Between their first appearance in international ice hockey in 1954 and 1967 the Soviets won 92 games, lost eight, and tied six in the World Championship and Olympics.\textsuperscript{6} After Canada withdrew from international amateur hockey competition in 1970, there were several independent series between the Soviet national team and professional Canadian hockey players. These professionals were labelled the best hockey products of Canada and an accurate representation of Canada’s ice hockey potential.\textsuperscript{7} In the initial 1972 Summit Series the success of the Soviet Nationals against Team Canada generated respect for the Soviet Union in Canada. The Canadian media shows the shift towards a personalisation of the Soviet Union’s star ice hockey players through their personal decency and discipline.\textsuperscript{8}

This paper has been divided into three different sections to explore how ice hockey became a form of propaganda, and how it was received in the Canadian media. Chapter one establishes the political context behind the Soviet Union’s investment in sport, and ice hockey’s rise to popularity in the Soviet Union. Ice hockey was a means of challenging the social structure of the West by pitting a product of a socialist society against a capitalist society. The extent to which this clash of systems was an aggressive foreign policy of the Soviet Union, as demonstrated in ice hockey, is explored, and how this shifted over time. Within chapter two, the initial reception of the Soviet ice hockey team in international competition is analysed in the Canadian media. This chapter compares the perception of the Soviet Union in the context of Canadian newspapers and their response to the Soviets success in their first world championship in 1954 until 1970. Chapter three analyses the personalisation of the Soviet Union through the respect and individualisation of the Soviet National players from the Canadian media in the 1970s to early 1980s. Particular attention is drawn to the 1972 Summit Series as this was the first encounter between the Soviet Nationals and professional Canadian ice hockey players from the North American NHL.

One limitation of this dissertation was being restricted to English sources. Due to language limitations, Russian sources were inaccessible so secondary sources were relied upon

\textsuperscript{6} M. Smith, ‘One fluke goal, one offside; ‘great disappointment’: McLeod’, \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 28 March 1967, p. 32.
for this perspective. However, this potential limitation was overcome through focusing on the reception of the Soviet ice hockey team in Canada. There are also issues with the digitisation of Canada’s newspapers from this time period. Two major Canadian newspapers, The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star have been analysed because of their wide readership in Canada. Both of these newspapers are considered liberal, however, their large readership reflects the ‘popular’ nature of their issues. Articles from these two papers have also been focused upon due to the digitisation issues of Canadian newspapers from the 1950s till 1980s. These were two newspapers that were accessible through electronic means and by microfilm. Some smaller newspapers have been incorporated as well when electronically accessible. Original game footage commentary has been incorporated, where applicable, to provide a fuller view of public thought. Due to the limitations of the sources the last Soviet-Canada match analysed is in 1981.

There are several limitations to newspapers as sources. One restriction of articles is a reporter’s right to organise information and interpret events as they see fit. This has been taken into account when analysing sources within this dissertation, and can be useful for when understanding how the Soviet National team has been constructed in the media. The reporters of the The Toronto Star and The Globe and Mail are as accurate representation as newspapers allow, as these are two of the largest and most widely read newspapers in Canada. David Welch argues that newspapers have the ability to shape popular opinion, hence why these two newspapers are appropriate sources to analyse the reception of this propaganda. These articles have yet to be been analysed extensively and collectively. Rather, a small amount of the popular articles have occasionally been used within the history journal articles and books which analyse the Soviet-Canada ice hockey relationship.

There has been a rise in the scholarship of Soviet sporting from 2009 onwards. Prior to 2009, the general history of Soviet sporting was covered predominantly by Jim Riordan, particularly in his two works: ‘Soviet Sport and Foreign Policy’ and ‘Playing to New Rules: Soviet Sport and Perestroika’. However, these two articles either only briefly touch upon ice hockey or do not directly address the sport. Paul Harder’s thesis which focused on the implications of ice hockey in the Soviet Union provided an important contrast and contribution to the Soviet perspective of this dissertation. Historiographies which directly address the Canadian-Soviet rivalry tend to focus on the impact ice hockey had upon these two nations’

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11 Harder, European and Russian Studies, p. 3.
foreign affairs and policies towards each other. Jonathan Soares two articles ““Our Way of Life Against Theirs”: Ice Hockey and the Cold War’, and ““Very Correct Adversaries”: The Cold War on Ice from 1947 to the Squaw Valley Olympics’ were applicable to this dissertation, as they have provided contextual background to these two nations attitudes towards each other, and how ice hockey influenced their foreign policies.¹² Soares’ article ‘Very Correct Adversaries’ presents the events of 1954 to 1970 as being entirely separate from events of 1972,¹³ which is covered in his article ‘Our Way of Life Against Theirs’,¹⁴ as does most other historiography in this field. Therefore, this dissertation addresses this gap as it compares the amateur years of ice hockey in the World Championships and Olympics with the 1972 Summit Series and onwards. Soares’ argues that it was the Soviet system which reinforced the superiority of socialism over capitalism. However, this dissertation will show that ice hockey would facilitate a personalisation of the Soviet Union, in Canada, through ice hockey players.

Soviet investment in ice hockey occurred at a time of de-Stalinisation in the Soviet Union and Khrushchev’s foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. In Khrushchev’s era, international openness and participation would enable a demonstration of success of Communism. International achievement in areas of culture, science, and sports would generate goodwill towards the Soviet Union. This would be accomplished by progressing at an alarming rate so the Soviet Union could ‘catch up’ to the West and even surpass it within these fields. The openness which was experienced in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev did not extend to international sporting competitions, however. Victory had to be guaranteed in order for Soviet teams to partake in international matches, to prevent any embarrassment that would accompany a loss. This influenced rigorous training which would enable the Soviets to become skilled enough in their sport to win at the Olympics and international competitions. Similar to how the Cosmonauts generated goodwill towards the Soviet Union on their international tours, the Soviet ice hockey team provided a recognisable face to the foreign power.

The Soviet Union’s ice hockey team was an effective form of propaganda from the 1950s onwards as it was used within Daniel Lerner’s four conditions of propaganda. Firstly, it secured the attention of the public, secondly, used credible Soviet citizens, thirdly, broke predispositions held by the public, and fourthly, the socialist environment of Canada enabled

¹⁴ Soares, Diplomatic Games, pp. 251-296.
free thought in the public. Through the Soviet National teams consisting of disciplined athletes who had mastered the sport of ice hockey, they were the ideal propaganda device. The Canadian media and public who were exposed to these Soviet athletes admired them through their success and were able to criticise their own national athletes. This criticism was possible through construction of a free, capitalist society which did not enforce regulations upon the press, unlike the restrictions on the press in the Soviet Union.

Propaganda comes in different shades depending upon its basis in truth, which determines if it can be considered white (propaganda based in truth), grey (the extension of truth beyond its original meaning), or black (outright falsifications). Soviet ice hockey can be considered a form of white, cultural propaganda as it was designed to capture the ‘hearts and minds’ of those in the West. However, ice hockey’s propaganda success can be attributed to its basis in truth as ‘Soviet ice-hockey succeeded not because it was an efficient totalitarian institution, but because it was so atypical of the Soviet system.’ Scholarship has previously focused upon the use of the Soviet socialist system as a means of conveying propaganda to the West. Although this is accurate in terms of the 1950s and 1960s, there was a distinct turn in Soviet propaganda from the 1970s onwards. This turn can be attributed to the nature of the 1972 Summit Series as the Soviet National team succeeded against professional Canadian ice hockey players and gained the respect of the Canadian public. The 1972 Series was a distinct form of propaganda as the Soviet National team brought a personalisation of the socialist system to the Canadian public as Canada was exposed to the realities of the Communist system. This personalisation of players created an approachable element to the Soviet system.

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17 Welch, *Propaganda*, p. 23.
18 Welch, p. 23.
19 Harder, *European and Russian Studies*, p. 19.
Chapter One: Skating on Defrosting Ice - Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’

Although Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’ enabled freedom in the Soviet cultural sphere, it did not have the same effect upon the early years of international hockey. Rather, the Stalinist control was focused on the Soviet team in order to prevent potential international embarrassment that would have accompanied a significant loss. The political situation of the 1950s enabled ice hockey to develop naturally in the domestic front, but it retained tinges of Party influence. Khrushchev’s intentional de-Stalinisation policy in the 1950s affected the Soviet Union’s cultural policies; however, on sporting terms this is not achieved to the degree that it is always thought to have been. The early development of ice hockey occurred naturally as the physicality and qualities of the sport appealed to the Soviet public. The Party intervened as the sport developed to an international level to mediate international affairs and to ensure victory. Ice hockey rose to popularity within the Soviet Union due to its qualities that appealed to the Soviet character.21

While the terror that had engulfed producers of culture in Stalin’s era was broken through Khrushchev’s thaw, there was still a distinct right for the Party to intervene in international affairs. Khrushchev intentionally distanced himself from Stalin through his secret speech. Yet, this is contradiction as Khrushchev himself retained the use of gulags. Within his speech Khrushchev did not acknowledge the victims of the gulag camps who were unfairly imprisoned by Stalin. Instead the speech focused on the Party victims of Stalin, which distanced any current Party members’ involvement in any wrong-doings and portrayed themselves as the victims.22 The justification for the usual widespread narrative of the ‘thaw’ is seen through the growing voice of the intellectual elite within the Soviet Union. Denis Kozlov and Eleonory Gilburd justify this growth of the intelligentsia by claiming that it increased from 2.6 million in 1926 to 28.8 million in 1968.23 However, Anatoly Pinsky critiques this argument as the 100 million other adults within the Soviet Union are still excluded from this intelligentsia.24 Khrushchev’s secret speech only denounces Stalin after the Kirov murder and beginning of the mass terror in 1934.25

21 Harder, European and Russian Studies, p. 10.
Khrushchev began utilising areas of culture rather than relaxing control over these areas. Khrushchev referred to the right to impose within his memoirs ‘[t]he press and radio, literature, art, music, the cinema and theatre are a sharp ideological weapon of our Party. And the Party sees to it that that weapon should be kept ready for action at all times’. The Communist Party still retained the right to censorship, although not to the extent which existed under Stalin. The personal approval of the publication of Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich was a tactful decision to undercut Khrushchev’s rivals who were opposed to de-Stalinization. Therefore, Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’ was a slight loosening of central Party control, but there was still reminiscent of the dictatorship that occurred in previous years. Sport can be differentiated from literature within the Soviet Union, as it was an expression of international domination, as opposed to the domestic focus of a literature. The Party’s control can be seen as extending towards sport through the post-World War II years, as it became a popular form of recreational activity.

An aspect which differed Khrushchev strongly from Stalin was his determination that the Soviet Union would stimulate goodwill and demonstrate the superiority of Communism through international success. International openness was a strong change from the Stalin era as Khrushchev was attempting to demonstrate the Soviet Union’s national success to the rest of the world. This would be accomplished by the Soviet Union out-performing Western nations in science, economics, and sport through ‘friendly’ competition. By denouncing Stalin on a personal level, Khrushchev was attempting to bring the Soviet Union back to Leninist political principles.

After the death of Stalin in 1953 there was need for a review of Soviet foreign policy among the top Party members. Although the foreign policies of the Soviet Union were not as aggressive, they were still tightly controlled as they attempted to present a perfect image of themselves. Khrushchev believed that ‘the socialist motherland could best advance its interests by stressing its peace-loving nature and by arousing “progressive forces” in the West and throughout the world.’ Subsequently, ice hockey could be a way of testing a product of a Communist society against the capitalist West.

One such progressive force which the Soviet Union accomplished before the West was the race into space. The Soviet space programme was used as a form of propaganda on a similar

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26 R. Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 429
28 Thompson, A Vision Unfulfilled, p. 374.
29 Thompson, p. 382.
30 Thompson, p. 385.
level to the Soviet ice hockey team. These Soviet cosmonauts were ideal representations of Soviet society, as Slava Gerovitch writes, ‘For many people around the world the cosmonauts – young, energetic, good-looking masters of cutting-edge technology – became a living embodiment of the bright, promising future.’ Just as these cosmonauts had out-performed all other nations by succeeding first in their field, the Soviet Union would attempt to triumph internationally in other areas, including sport. Through succeeding in the international forum the Soviet government believed it could generate goodwill towards the Soviet Union and appear modern. Therefore, ice hockey was a form of propaganda as it was intended to manipulate foreign audiences, similar to how the Soviets expressed domination over the United States by successfully launching into space first. Trevor Rockwell argues that the Soviets dedicated so much short-term interest into the Space program in order to use it ‘as propaganda vehicles … for selling the virtues of the socialist system’. The Soviet space programme can be compared with the Soviet national ice hockey team as both were used as political tools to create goodwill for the government. Canadian newspapers reported the appearance of the ‘cosmonauts wearing the gold star of Hero of the Soviet Union’ in ice hockey matches. They were placed behind the Soviets’ bench in order to ‘boost the team’s confidence’, and to remind the outside world of the Soviet Union’s achievements.

The adoption of the internationally recognised Canadian version of ice hockey in Russia displays the Communist Party’s focus upon the race Westwards. The interest in the Soviet Union’s development as an international success within the Olympics has influenced research in the past decade. Paul Harder addressed this early development of ice hockey in the Soviet Union and maintained that the decision to dominate amateur sports, particularly in the Olympic Games, was made by 1946. The post-war focus of the Soviet Union ‘catching up’ to the West produced Soviet success in ice hockey. The post-World War II boom in leisure and recreation influenced the Soviet expansion from international economic domination into the cultural realm of international sport. Under Khrushchev, the Stalinist policy of trying to surpass the

34 Rockwell, ‘Space Propaganda’, p. 5.
37 Harder, *European and Russian Studies*, p. 1.
West continued through the Stalinist economic claim ‘that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in per-capita output by 1971 and in other economic spheres by the 1980s.’38 Under the early establishment of ice hockey the head coach of the Soviet national team, Anatoli Tarasov, vowed to ‘catch up’ his team, similar to this economic promise. Tarasov would accomplish this by packing two years of development into one, as Canada already had a seventy year head start on the Soviets.39 Tarasov would have the time to develop the players in the Soviet team, and progress to a Western level, through the government only allowing the team to play once it could stand at an international level.

Although initially the development of ice hockey was not a political manoeuvre, the Party later took advantage of the switch to the Canadian version of the game to display international prowess and domination. Bandy was a popular, indigenous form of ice hockey in the Soviet Union which would be switched in favour of ‘Canadian hockey’ or ‘puck hockey’ early in the 1950s, without governmental pressure.40 Harder reinforces this point by claiming that Nikolay Romanov, chairman of the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sports Affairs, was a sound defender of this switch of forms.41 Romanov believed that switching from bandy to Canadian hockey would ‘prepare [the Soviet Union] for the future – for the Olympic Games’.42 Romanov’s endorsement of this switch should not be taken lightly as this occurred within the height of Stalinism in 1948, and the appropriation of another nation’s customs over the Soviets’ own could be viewed as a capital crime.43 Romanov’s defence of ice hockey placed the sport under the Communist Party’s eye through organising a game for Marshal Kliment Voroshilov to watch.44 It was reported that Voroshilov jokingly decided that ‘puck hockey’ ‘should henceforth be called Russian hockey, because it suits the character of the Russian person: it requires courage, split-second reactions, resourcefulness and great endurance. And if necessary you can fight.’45 The appeal of ice hockey to the Soviets is summed up well within Voroshilov’s words. From this point onwards, Party interest in the sport was inspired and would prove to be influential in the coming years as the Soviet national team developed.

40 Harder, European and Russian Studies, p. 7.
41 Harder, p. 9.
42 Harder, p. 9.
43 Harder, p. 9.
44 Harder, p. 10.
Party interference occurred in the pursuit to make the Soviet Union ice hockey team fit for competition at an international level and prepared for the Olympics. The little funding that was provided to the sport of bandy was pulled with the growing interest in ice hockey. This forced many of the top bandy stars to convert, and the skill set they brought with them was crucial to the quick development of the game. Although Harder argued that Anatoli Tarasov was the founder of the Soviet style of hockey, Robert Edelman attributed the unique style to the players who played bandy in the winter, and soccer in the summer. As players adopted these two sports’ techniques, including passing, stick-handling, and weaving, they were able to bring a fast moving version of ice hockey to the physically contact focused Canadians. Baltic players were essential to the establishment of Soviet hockey through their knowledge and experience in the Canadian version of ice hockey which been adopted within their years of post-World War I independence. Even though these Baltic players were well adapted to the Western version of hockey, they could not match the physicality of the Moscow players in the 1940s. Before playing the West in the international ice hockey forum, the quickly developed Soviet National team had to ensure that victory was guaranteed to members of the Communist Party. The first games played on an international level was a three game series against the leading Czechoslovakian club in 1948. Authorities were so fearful of a negative result within this series that these matches were labelled as ‘combined training sessions’ to prevent potential bad press reports. Authorities wanted to gauge the ability of the team before allowing them to play against any Western teams in order to ensure that there would be no negative publicity. Sport was an important international contact zone and could influence nations perceptions. Nazi Germany demonstrated this form of soft-power in the 1936 Olympic games as they attempted to use football to show Germany as a ‘decent, friendly, peace-loving nation’ through ‘festive culture’ and ‘mass staging’. Ice hockey, similar to Nazi football, had the influential ability to help or hinder the Soviet Union’s international image.

Ice hockey was cultivated in a time period that largely ignored its development until it reached the international stage. Then hockey was heavily mediated by the government in order to prevent any international embarrassment that would accompany a loss. The Soviet national

46 Harder, European and Russian Studies, p. 1.
48 Edelman, Serious Fun, p. 111.
49 Edelman, p. 111.
50 Edelman, p. 111.
51 Harder, European and Russian Studies, p. 11.
team had to prove its ability to the State by performing against a friendly Communist nation in secret games which does not align with the openness that Khrushchev’s ‘thaw’ was supposed to have brought to the Soviet Union. Therefore, this cultural ‘thaw’ that occurred can only be applied to sport on a domestic level, as the progressive international policy that the Union held had to be protected. Sport was one way that nations could set their best players in opposition against each other in a friendly manner. The Soviet Union was trying to progress as fast as possible in all areas to reach this level of competition. Ice hockey was a respected sport in the West and this came to challenge the preconceived notions that Canada had held against the Soviet Union, as the Soviets came to dominate Canada’s favourite sport in the international stage.
Chapter Two: Amateurism, Domination, and Establishing World Champions – 1950 - 1969

The Soviet Union’s instant success at their first ice hockey World Championship sent a tremor of disbelief through the Canadian media. However, through the Soviets’ dedication to ice hockey, and their ability to master the sport, the Canadian media embraced the Soviet Union’s domination in the international amateur world of ice hockey throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Throughout this time period the Canadian media was distinctly aware that the Soviets were exploiting this sporting success in ice hockey as a political tool to display their superiority. Khrushchev saw the return to international competition as a means to display socialist society. Therefore, the Canadian media addressed this comparison of societies through a critical eye. Ice hockey was an effective political propaganda tool in Canada, as it captured the attention of the Canadian public. The reception of the Soviet ice hockey team as a form of propaganda in the Canadian media can be measured in several ways: through the initial reaction to the Soviet team’s successes, the admiration of the Soviet team’s skill, the way that language in newspaper articles broke down Cold War analogies and stereotypes, and the rejection of Soviet success due to the Canada Hockey Amateur Association’s denial that the Soviets used ‘amateur’ players. The Soviets managed to penetrate to the core of Canadian culture and successfully play Canada’s beloved game of ice hockey to a remarkable standard. This Soviet use of ice hockey as a form of propaganda was received in the Canadian media through their inability to deny the Soviets impressive achievements in ice hockey. By analysing Canadian newspapers, it is apparent that Soviet-Canadian relations were improved through ice hockey.

In order to understand how ice hockey was used as an instrument to cultivating goodwill between Canada and the Soviet Union, the foreign affairs of Canada must first be explored. Canadian-Soviet foreign relations were affected throughout the 1950s and 1960s as the Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s attitude towards the Soviet Union fluctuated. Diefenbaker’s initial tough stance on Soviet relations in 1957 led to a strong focus on Canadian domestic affairs.53 The Soviet Union established its interest in trade with Canada in 1958 with an invitation for Canadian businessmen to visit the USSR. These businessmen toured steel mills, aircraft assembly lines, Soviet uranium mines, and attended a two hour meeting with

Khrushchev in the Kremlin.54 Khrushchev’s interest in establishing trade relations with the Canadians was explicit as he stated that he was ‘a businessman too … and if our countries can make a mutual profit, no one will be happier than me’.55 Diefenbaker’s rigid stance against the Soviet Union was challenged with the appointment of Howard Green to Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada in 1960.56 Green was interested in international diplomacy and was instantly against Diefenbaker’s pro-American attitude. In 1960, Green voted to reject the United States nomination of Turkey for a seat on the Security Council in the Fourteenth General Assembly of the United Nations and instead supported the vote of communist Poland.57 Throughout the early 1960s Green’s role as the Canadian Secretary of External Affairs would enable him to increase goodwill between Canada and the Soviet Union as he declared that ‘in the world today Canada has only friends and no enemies.’58

Initial reaction to the Soviet team’s successes in 1954 in the Canadian media reflected the disbelief that occurred as the Soviets captured the world ice hockey championship in their first appearance in the tournament. In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s foreign policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ influenced a shift towards cultural exchange and allowed sports teams to compete on an international level against the West. James Riordan has classified domination in sport as a politically determined effort of ‘psychological warfare’.59 This was undertaken in order to further socialism on an international stage through the Soviet Union’s sporting success.60 Sport is often presented in existing historiography as a means to compare the two social systems in the Soviet Union. Soares reinforces that ice hockey was a way of directly comparing societies, as ‘objective measures’ of culture like ‘jazz, [and] ballet’ are dis disputable.61 Instead, ‘it was easy to tell which side won a hockey game.’62 The demonstration of Communist superiority to the West was a Soviet policy throughout the 1960s. Stated within an article in Communist Affairs in 1964: ‘To the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], as to Soviet government officials and many Soviet citizens, international sporting and athletic competitions are primarily indicators that their ideology and their way of life are not only right but superior

54 Glazov, Foreign Policy, Security and Strategic Studies, p. 77.
55 Glazov, p. 87.
56 Glazov, p. 89.
57 Glazov, p. 89.
58 Glazov, p. 90.
59 Riordan, Soviet Studies, p. 322, 324.
60 Riordan, p. 322, 324.
61 Soares, Diplomatic Games, p. 253.
to those of the capitalist countries.’

Although demonstrating the success of a Communist society to the West may have been an initial objective of the Soviet Union, the personalisation of their players and the popularisation of them in Canada would be the real success of the Soviet hockey rivalry.

Canadian newspapers reacted to the Soviet’s world championship title with surprise and disbelief. The title, in bold, on the front page of *The Globe and Mail* the day after the final between Canada and the Soviet Union, read ‘Russia defeats Canada 7-2 to Win World Hockey Title’. This victory by the Soviet Union’s ice hockey team was described as ‘one of the greatest upsets in the history of the annual tournament’ by Canadian media. Although there was disappointment in the Canadian performance, the Canadian press was respectful towards the Soviet victory, due to how successfully the Soviets performed.

The Canadian press’ admiration of the Soviet team began in the 1954 hockey world championship as the Soviets displayed a remarkable form of the game. *The Globe and Mail* reported that the Soviet’s team played an ‘almost flawless hockey’ game and the Soviets’ technique relied on ‘fast-skating’ combined with ‘body-checking fiercely’.

However, this success was partially overshadowed by the Canadian claims that there was ‘[a] mass psychosis’ created ‘against us … and even some referees were affected.’ This was due to a previous game where one German player lost four teeth due to fierce body-checking by the Canadians.

The Canadians believed that the referees were targeting them for excessive force throughout their following games, due to this incident with the Germans. This tactic of blaming refereeing in poor performances which resulted in losses followed Canada throughout this international feud.

Rather than simply acknowledging the success of the Soviet teams there is a history of blaming either the refereeing or the international ruling system of the International Ice Hockey Federation. Overall, however, players and staff, such as George F.

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Dudley, secretary treasurer of the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association, still do acknowledge the Soviet success as ‘[t]hey deserve our congratulations on their victory’. The success of the Soviets is never denied, rather the process of blaming referees for poor performances becomes a way of coping with poor Canadian performances.

The Soviet Union and Canada were virtually equally matched in their ice hockey feud in the 1950s, until the decline of Canadian hockey in the early 1960s. The political implications in Canadian hockey is evident within the early years. In 1955 The Globe and Mail reporter Archie MacKenzie wrote: ‘Canada triumphed today in her hockey cold war with Russia.’ Subsequently, this ice hockey match can be viewed as more than simply a game, but rather the meeting of world affairs on an ice rink. From 1956, a trend would be established where the Soviet Union hockey representatives would outplay most teams for the world championship.

There was a large amount of respect generated for the Soviet Union through the success of their ice hockey team. Most nations, even the United States’ head coach Johnny Mariucci commented in 1956 that: ‘[t]hey are a great team – a really great team. They never made one mistake throughout the entire tournament.’ An element of respect is evident within Canadian articles as they draw upon the Soviet team’s ability to become so prominent in the international ice hockey scene at an alarming rate. A Canadian reporter wrote in 1956 that ‘[i]t was no fluke. The Russians established themselves as a power in international hockey by capturing the Olympic, world, and European titles… And the losers played magnificent hockey.’ Even into the 1960s, when the Soviet Union was dominating the Canadian ice hockey team in international performances, the Canadian media still admired the skill and performance of the Soviets. Canadian coach Father Bauer said ‘I don’t want to take anything away from the performance of this great Russian team. They deserve the win’, after the 1966 world championship finale. Father Bauer’s comment reflects the Soviets’ successful mastery of the sport, as it was made despite Canada not having won a game against them in four years. This ability for sport to transcend political difference and generate goodwill for a nation is what

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74 ‘Soviet Pucksters Post Convincing 2-0 Victory in Crucial Final Game’, Globe and Mail, 6 February 1956, p. 20.
Party leaders in the Soviet Union strived to achieve as it was a form of propaganda that could not be replicated elsewhere.

Both the Canadian media and prominent Canadian sportspeople understood the growing importance of sport as a propaganda tool. This attributes an element of success to the Soviet Union through the display of sport and their ability to master different disciplines efficiently. Riordan emphasised that this policy was reminiscent of the eugenics-focused mass movement of sporting in the Soviet Union. This mass movement of sporting and physical well-being was an aggressive political policy designed to display a societal superiority of socialism over capitalism. Riordan’s analysis also exposed five key foreign policies of the Soviet Union’s ‘peaceful coexistence’, two of which can be applied to Canada:

1) Promoting relations with pro-Soviet and potentially sympathetic groupings abroad and undermining ‘bourgeois’ and social-democratic authority,….

3) Attaining world sporting supremacy as a nation-state (after the last war) – particularly through the Olympic Games – for the purposes principally of enhancing the status of the USSR and Soviet communism abroad.

These two foreign policies of the Soviet Union indicated the intentional policy of communicating the superiority of socialism through sport. Jay Scherer and Hart Cantelon argue that Canada showed a ‘total failure to grasp’ what was ‘at stake here for the …[S]oviets. To them, a competition of this nature is something just short of war’. The Globe and Mail believed that the Canadian government did not take advantage of the propaganda ability of sport, which it felt had the potential to reach the general public. Canadian coach Bobby Bauer, of the 1956 third-placing team, believed that the Canadian government needed to allow them to present a team filled with hand-picked players in the following 1957 World Championship tournament. Bauer believed that this would be ‘the best propaganda weapon the Canadian Government could devise’. Here, Bauer was stating that Canada had not yet realised the effect a sports team could have upon a nation. It was, as Bauer

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77 J. Riordan, Soviet Studies, p. 324.
78 J. Riordan, pp. 326, 331.
79 Scherer, and Cantelon, Journal of Canadian Studies, p. 43.
stated: ‘the cheapest form of publicity a country can get. And it’s the best publicity.’ 82 Although Canada had not yet come to realise the propaganda effect a sports team can have on the international forum, it is clear that it was an important aspect of the Soviet foreign policy from the conception of Khrushchev’s ‘peaceful coexistence’ policy in 1953. 83 Although the Soviets did generate goodwill through their successes in the ice hockey field in these world championships, the Canadian media justified that these amateurs were not the best hockey product of Canada. It would only be later when the Soviet National team met with Canadian professional players, in the early 1970s, that the Soviets would gain the full respect of the Canadian media and public.

The ability for ice hockey to reach many thousands who would not normally be swept up in political diplomacy is evident through the rise in the use of technology in ice hockey games. The 1955 final between Russia and Canada was reported to have been listened to by thousands on the radio, and audiences watched the game on television in the host nation of Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Canada. 84 There was also a live radio broadcast which was aired in Canada and eight European countries. 85 This enabled the propaganda success of the Soviet team to reach broader audiences across multiple nations. As the use of television rose, so too did the propaganda image of the Soviets. In 1968 it was reported that the final Canadian-Soviet game was broadcasted over television and ‘[i]t was a contest with global interest seen… by millions.’ 86 However, this would be superseded by the mass interest generated in the later 1972 Summit Series between the Canadian and Soviet national teams.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Canadian media strengthened the stereotypes of Communism through the language and analogies applied to the Soviet ice hockey team in newspaper articles. This continued until after the first 1972 Summit Series, when the Soviet Nationals were individualised by the media through their success against the professional Canadian players. The Soviet ice hockey team was being shaped as a representation for their society, and the media was sustaining Russian stereotypes by applying them to the ice hockey team in a borderline satirical manner. On a satirical level the Canadian media pleaded for their game to be kept out of the ‘grasping maulies of hairy-legged furiness’. 87 This metaphor, where

83 Riordan, Soviet Studies, p. 327.
the Canadian reporter likens the Soviet players to the Russian Bear, was made prior to the personalisation of the Soviet players. The image of the bear is drawn upon due to its long history as a metaphor of Russia. Its use in this Canadian newspaper depersonalised the Soviet players and was designed to generate feelings of patriotism to protect ice hockey as Canada perceived it as its own game. The ‘methodical hockey machine’ allegory of the Soviet team is referred to several times throughout The Globe and Mail as the players’ strict discipline and aggregating sameness is taunted. This ‘strict discipline’ which the Soviets maintain at all times is referred to consistently by Canadian media as a point of praise, particularly when compared to the violence of the Canadian players. This discipline that the Soviet team demonstrates would come to be a focal point of praise the Canadian media would focus upon throughout the 1970s. The disappointment in the actions of Canada’s own team through the players’ lack of discipline is criticised by their media for fights on the ice and their drunken nights both before and after games. Therefore, the Soviet team’s discipline was both admired and seen through a satirical lens as they had ‘[e]verything in order, military style.’ The use of this language to describe the Soviet representatives in Canadian media feeds into the stereotype of the Soviet Union as a rigid dictatorship controlling society. This would become more apparent throughout the 1970s, as the rivalry between the two teams intensified.

The Soviets’ success in international ice hockey was perceived to be an intentional political propaganda movement designed to demonstrate that Communism was a superior society. Within the Canadian media this policy was strongly denied because the Soviet Union was only playing Canadian amateurs, not their professional hockey players who were banned from the World Championships and Olympic Games. One point of contention was that the Soviets made ‘political hay out of their hockey success’ and was subsequently justified due to


the Canadian representatives only being their nation’s amateurs. Conversely, the Soviet team was made up of professionals. However, Soviets’ avoided this ‘professional’ title as players’ professions were either listed as students or military personal in the Soviet Union. Therefore, under international guidelines the Soviet team had to be considered amateurs, despite training for eleven months out of a year. Alan Eagleson, a former Canadian hockey agent, was in favour of the involvement of professional players in these amateur systems throughout the 1960s as he states:

They [the Soviet Team] suggest that their success is the result of the Communistic system. It is important to explain to a Swede or a Czech or a Russian that our national team this year was not our best hockey product. They say ‘Canada’ is on our player’s sweaters. They must be Canada’s best.

This ability for the Soviets to hide their professional players under the title of amateurs became an ever focused upon issue in the Canadian media as Canada slipped from world championship status to not even placing. As the Soviet, Swedish, and Czechoslovakian teams superseded them through their ability to have professional players represent their nations, the Canadian Hockey Amateur Association appealed to the International Ice Hockey Federation for intervention. However, as the International Ice Hockey Federation would not move on their position on banning openly professional players in international competitions, the Canadians removed themselves from international hockey tournaments in 1970. This led to privately held tours between a Soviet national team and professional Canadian representatives from the NHL.

The 1960s enabled a shift in Soviet-Canadian relations, as a more open exchange between the two nations was made. The appointment of John Kennedy as United States President led to Diefenbaker becoming less reliant on America, due to his perception of

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‘American overassertiveness and insensitivity.’ The beginning of open-air flights between Moscow and Montreal in 1966 saw a more direct exchange of culture and co-operation. The 1967 Expo tour brought six thousand Soviet representatives consisting of ‘senior officials, journalists, Intourist representatives, cultural figures [including an ice hockey team], agriculture and other “experts”’ to Canada. This followed reports which suggested that since Canada began to distance itself from America, it was looking more directly to the Soviet Union for both friendship and trade. Subsequently, the impact of ice hockey throughout the 1960s became more integral to the exchange between the Soviet Union and Canada as they attempted to establish a new relationship. This would become even more apparent with the appointment of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who has been described as the ‘darling of the Soviet’, in 1968.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Soviet national team was an effective form of propaganda in how it has been represented in the Canadian media. The media’s reception of the Soviet team reflects the growing interest in the nation as they became a dominant force in international ice hockey. The Soviet Union’s success in ice hockey enabled it to generate international goodwill as Khrushchev had intended to do through his foreign policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’. The Soviet government intended for sport to be an effective way of displaying the superiority of one social system over another through the mastery of the sport and their ability to do so within a short period of time. The Soviet ice hockey team displayed this dominance as they became the world champions within their first appearance in the ice hockey world championships, and as they progressively pushed Canada out of contention for the title.

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98 Glazov, *Foreign Policy, Security and Strategic Studies*, p. 107.
101 Black, p. 260.
102 Black, p. 263.

From the 1970s onwards the Soviet Union was considered a serious contender against Canada in ice hockey as the rivalry intensified through several series against professional Canadian hockey players. The ice hockey tournaments between these two rivals were often interpreted in the media as a clash of cultures. Ice hockey was considered a way to measure the two forms of societal systems that had produced these hockey programs. However, ice hockey moved beyond this societal comparison through the personalisation of players in the Canadian media. As a measure of propaganda ice hockey was effective due to its ability to reach audiences on a popular level. The Soviet hockey team stimulated goodwill in Canada through their discipline. Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Robert Ford, stated that ‘even one exhibition match by a good Canadian pro hockey team here would do more for Canadian prestige in this country than all the rest of our “cultural” efforts put together.’ 103 Evidently, the way to gain respect and goodwill was recognised through a successful demonstration of ice hockey. The Canadian media recognised ice hockey was no longer solely Canada’s through the Soviets’ ability to succeed against professional Canadian ice hockey players. In Canadian newspapers there was an establishment of respect for the Soviet Union through their mastery of ice hockey, which improved the Soviet Union’s prestige. The effectiveness of Soviet ice hockey as a propaganda tool can also be measured through the success of a Soviet fan-base in Canada. Its ultimate success was that ice hockey became ‘socialism with a human face’, in Canada. 104 Ice hockey was an important propaganda machine as it enabled the exchange of culture between the Soviet Union and Canada. Ice hockey was a ‘fair, objective measure of different societies’ ability to develop talent’, 105 and it enabled a personalisation of the USSR to the Canadian public.

Canada withdrew from the World Championship in 1970 for the next seven years in response to the exclusion of professional ice hockey players in international competitions. Georgy Rogusky, Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Physical Culture and Sport described this time without Canada in the amateur world champions as ‘boring’ and looked to reinstate

103 Soares, Diplomatic Games, pp. 251-252.
this rivalry. As a means of re-instating themselves as the dominant force in hockey, the Soviets met with a team of professional Canadians, from the NHL, in the 1972 Summit Series. The Soviet Union looked to use this tournament to develop ‘a mutual design of friendship through hockey.’ After the series was proposed a NHL all-star defenseman, Brad Park, stated that the Summit Series was one ‘hell of an idea. You can say it’s the old Canadian patriotism, but I’m tired of getting beaten by the Russians.’ There was a changing attitude in Canada towards the Soviets in the international forum as Canadian fans became disgruntled with watching their amateur players lose. The resounding belief that Canadian hockey was the best in the world rang forth in Canadian media as the Summit Series approached. This ‘myth of invincibility of the best Canadian professionals’ was shattered in the first Summit Series as the Canadians lost 7-3. The Soviets would go on to win three games, draw one, and lose four to Canada. Despite the Canadians winning the last three games, and subsequently the series, there was a resounding rejection throughout the tournament by the Canadian media. Through losing the majority of the four games on Canadian soil Team Canada was rejected by the media, and described as ‘losers in both’ games. Despite this rejection of Team Canada there was a newfound respect established for the Soviets in the Canadian media.

At the conclusion of the 1972 Summit Series the Soviet players are individualised in the media, rather than their collective unite image found in articles of The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star prior to the series. There is a distinct shift in the presentation of players within these two newspapers when the Soviet team was successful against Team Canada. Initially, the

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Soviets are described as being ‘like sheep’ and described as having ‘a collective look’.\textsuperscript{113} This collectivisation of players is reinforced through their matching red helmets which reporter Dick Beddoes says ‘obscure[s] their faces and hides whatever personality seems more obvious when a player goes bareheaded’\textsuperscript{114} Soviet officials and commentators are described as also being ‘practically indistinguishable’ due to using the same party script which reiterates that there are also ice hockey stars in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{115} The Canadian media came to repeat this party line after several games into the Summit Series. This break from the collectivisation of the Soviet hockey players in the 1972 series led to the exposure of Soviet hockey stars to the Canadian public.

The individualisation of the Soviet national ice hockey players throughout the 1970s and 1980s enabled a form of propaganda which was based on a personal level to most of the Canadian public. These Soviet players were popularised through their ability to master their position in ice hockey. The hockey series had ‘produced many surprises’ for Canada as they ‘discovered a huge new supply of players to admire – Kharlamov, Yakushev, Tretiak.’\textsuperscript{116} Dan Proudfoot reported that the Canadian fans, perhaps, learned the most from the series. The fans now had a large pool of new players to admire and they learned that there was a more exciting game than those of the NHL.\textsuperscript{117} Even Team Canada were reported to have become fans of Vladislav Tretiak, the young Soviet goal tender.\textsuperscript{118} Individual Soviet players were reported on extensively beyond any other reports on prominent ice hockey nations such as Sweden and Czechoslovakia in \textit{The Globe and Mail} and \textit{Toronto Star}.

In the 1972 Summit Series, the Canadian public was captivated with the visiting Soviet team who often drew national interest and endearment. The Canadian public pursued the Soviet ice hockey players for autographs in the 1972 series, and even exchanged Canadian silver for Russian coins.\textsuperscript{119} Many Canadian fans abandoned their own team through the embarrassment

\textsuperscript{113} D. Beddoes, ‘Russians Arrive, Refuse to Predict Outcome of Hockey’s Super Series’, \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 31 August 1972.
\textsuperscript{115} D. Beddoes, ‘Russian hockey team has an aggregate sameness, including red helmets’ \textit{The Globe and Mail}, 1 September 1972.
\textsuperscript{117} D. Proudfoot, ‘Canadian team outplayed in every area, stunned coach admits’, 4 September 1972.
of their actions, and the team’s losses. One Finnish newsman was reported as not understanding how the Canadian fans endured the opening loss of the 1972 Summit Series with such little emotion. The newsmen stated: ‘You’re smiling and laughing and clap for each Russian goal. You don’t look angry at all.’ Louis Cauz explained the Finnish newsmen’s confusion at the expression of Canadian fans by saying they were covering up their embarrassment through smiles and jokes. By cheering for the Soviet team it covered up the shame of the fans, particularly when Team Canada departed the ice without shaking the hands of the Soviet team. This common custom in the amateur ice hockey world was abandoned by the Canadian professionals after the first 1972 loss to the Soviets drew booing from the crowd and heavy criticism in the media. Canadian fans began to admire the Soviet ice hockey players through their mastery of the game, and through comparison to their own nations faults.

The 1972 Summit Series was a turning point in the relationship between the Soviet Union and Canada. Soviet ice hockey players brought a humane aspect of the Soviet Union into the Canadian public. The wide range of public attention superseded any of the World Championships and Olympic games the Soviets won throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The Globe and Mail reinforces this Canadian investment into the 1972 Summit Series. Beddoes reinforced that despite ice hockey only being a game there are ‘15-million Canadians’ who were invested in the Series. This popularity of the hockey games captured the attention of the Canadian public to a degree that reportedly surprised the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The 1972 Series was reported to have been so captivating that newspapers said even ‘crime, accidents and fires paused’ for the final game. Although this is an exaggeration it does show the extent to which the Canadian public was captivated by the results of the final game which determined the 1972 series.

Respect from the Canadian media and public was generated through the extensive discipline of the Soviet ice hockey players. The Soviet players displayed discipline both on and off the ice which was unmatched by Canadian players. Extensive criticism was placed upon

the Canadian team by the media for their behaviour in comparison to the Soviets. On the ice Team Canada players were aggressive and there were reports of their own fans being upset by ‘cheap shots’ including one player ‘whacking an opponent with his stick’. The Soviets were viewed as having the complete opposite temperament to the Canadians. In an incident where a Soviet player was intentionally hit in the face with a Canadian player’s stick the Canadian commentators said ‘[i]n any other game you would have seen a big fight there. The tolerance level by the Soviets is unbelievable. They’re disciplined athletes.’ Jay Scherer and Hart Cantelon argue that the discipline displayed by the Soviet players in the 1974 Summit Series was meant to ‘serve as an ideological template for the ordinary Soviet citizen.’ However, Scherer and Cantelon’s argument can be extended into the Canadian public, rather than just for the Soviet public. The Soviet ice hockey team’s discipline contrasted sharply with the Canadian team who so frequently resorted to violence on the ice. In the 1974 Summit Series, a Canadian player, Ricky Ley, lost his temper at a Soviet player whom he had been contesting with throughout the match. Ley had to be pulled off Valeri Kharlamov who ‘suffered several facial cuts’ during the altercation. The Toronto Star reporter, Jim Proudfoot, declared that ‘Team Canada’s goodwill mission to Moscow can be listed as a dismal failure’ due to the incident. Such incidents influenced a positive view of the Soviet ice hockey team due to being instructed by their coaches ‘not to fight’ and subsequently, ‘they will take anything’ from the Canadian side.

During the Summit Series and Canada Cups in the 1970s and early 1980s there was an ongoing competition between the Soviet Communist lifestyle against the capitalist Canadian society. These two cultures had both produced outstanding hockey teams. There was still a comparison between the collectivisation basis of the Soviet National team, and the individualistic play of Team Canada in the media. The 1972 Summit Series was an attempt for Canada to reassert its dominance in the sport through the use of professional players. Globe and Mail reporter Dick Beddoes said that Canada had invested so much into the series that ‘in

131 USSR–Canada Summit Series 1972 game 1 part 2.
Canada … a loss in the series [would be] grimly viewed as the sunset of civilisation.  

Due to this series having opposing training techniques it was seen in the media as a ‘tussle between sports philosophies that are nearly diametrically opposed’. These philosophies and societal structures certainly impacted the way that players performed on the ice. The Soviets were viewed as a more collective unit who utilised each other through extensive puck passing. Scherer and Cantelon argue that in the 1972 Soviet Series, Canada was attempting to affirm a capitalist ‘way of life in the context of the Cold War’. However, Canada was trying to reconstruct their position as the best hockey nation in the world rather than affirm their nation’s superiority of capitalism over socialism. Although it has been established that this was a dominant foreign policy in the Soviet Union, it was absent from the Canadian government’s objective. As John Soares argued, the 1972 Series was a way of gaging the popular attitude of the Soviet Union in the West. The series goes beyond the comparison of lifestyles as the two nations met on the ice.

Due to the popularity of the 1972 Summit Series many Canadian fans travelled to the Soviet Union to attend the series. This caused a physical exchanging of culture which exposed many to the reality of the Soviet Union. Subsequently there was a normalisation and personalisation of the Soviet lifestyle to Canadians. The 3,000 Canadian visitor’s experience was often reported in the Canadian media which shows the change in perspective towards the Soviet Union. One Globe and Mail reporter wrote that there was a merging of Canadian fans in Moscow after one game, who were embraced by the ‘hockey-mad Russians’, who were eager to gain ‘mementos [such] as Canadian flags and maple leaf lapel pins’. Both nations

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136 J. Soares, Diplomatic Games, p. 282.


exchanged mementos when in Moscow for the final four games of the 1972 Summit Series. After receiving his gift one Canadian coach was reported to have been inclined to take up stamp collecting… for he was clutching a collection of Russian stamps in his hand as he talked. “This?” he said, holding up the small book with the picture of Lenin on the front. “This is the gift they gave us before the game. We gave them Manitoba clips, and they gave us these little books of stamps. Nice, eh? It will be nice for memories of this.”

These gifts exhibit the changes in culture and break from previous conceptions of prejudice held towards Communism through the Canadian coaches’ acceptance of these books with Lenin on the cover. Mementos such as this Lenin stamp book embody the openness that ice hockey brought to Canada in the 1970s, as cultural contact softened the cold war political tension. This physical exchange of culture enabled a contact zone which personalised the Soviet Union directly to many Canadians, and the Canadian public through media coverage.

Through the success of the Soviet ice hockey team against Team Canada, in the 1970s, there was their acceptance that ice hockey was no longer just Canada’s. Instead it was recognised within the media that the Soviets had inherited the game alongside the Canadians, through the Soviets’ mastery of the sport. This acceptance of Soviet success in ice hockey by the Canadian media and the Soviets being raised to equal the Canadians is a significant advancement. The media reported that ‘[i]f Canada cares about supremacy in anything it is hockey’. Subsequently, as the Canadian public and media began to realise the skill of the Soviet National team they admitted that it was no longer their game. Dan Proudfoot wrote in 1972 that:

One of the 10,000 fans at Winnipeg Arena last night left behind a sign which read “It’s Still Our Game.” It ended up in a pile of litter, an appropriate resting place for the idea…. Team Canada and the Soviet Union Nationals ties 4-4, and never was such an ending more suitable. After last night’s play, hockey belongs to both countries.

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140 D. Proudfoot, ‘Russian’s Tretiak earns ultimate praise from NHL goalies’, 8 September 1972.
The Soviet Union achieved ultimate respect from Canada as they admitted that ice hockey was now both nations’ sport. The Soviets had penetrated into the West through their ability to master the Canadian game of ice hockey beyond what the Canadians could do themselves.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Soviet National ice hockey team generated goodwill for the Soviet Union in Canada. This was accomplished through the discipline of the Soviet team and by refraining from behaviour displayed by Team Canada. Through ice hockey a close contact of the socialist and capitalist societies met with exchanges of cultures made. The view of the Soviet Union was vastly improved through the respect of the Canadian public, as seen through the Canadian media. This impacted how the Soviet Union was portrayed in Canada as it familiarised the Communist society on a personal level for many Canadians, through the Soviet mastery of their favoured game of ice hockey.
Conclusion:

Ice hockey was an integral aspect of Canadian-Soviet relations throughout 1954 - 1981. It clearly represented aspects of both nation’s foreign policies. Although governmental control was loosened under Khrushchev, areas regarding international affairs were still heavily mediated. Subsequently, a national ice hockey team could only participate in the World Championship after victory had been guaranteed. Once the Soviet ice hockey teams reached this level they could quickly generate an impressive record against the world’s best hockey teams. This mediated beginning for Soviet ice hockey allowed the Soviet progression image to be portrayed to the West, as they had mastered a sport within 15 years when Canada had a 50-year head start. Canada began to intentionally distance itself from the United States throughout the 1960s and 1970s, which enabled Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to draw the nation closer to the Soviet Union. The exchange of sport became a crucial means for Canada to be exposed to Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence.

Between 1954 and 1969 the Soviet Union began to dominate the international ice hockey amateur World Championships and Olympics by outclassing any other nation. These early years of rivalry were received by Canadian media as the meeting of two social systems; however, it can be also seen as presenting the Soviet Union in a friendly manner. This initially broke down preconceived ideas of the Soviet Union, but would not capture the attention of the Canadian public and media to the extent of the 1972 Summit Series. Excuses could no longer adequately explain the losses of the Canadian team through the inclusion of professional NHL players in this series. The skill and discipline displayed by the Soviet National Team would capture the attention of the public through contrast to Team Canada. The 1972 Summit Series would embody Khrushchev’s foreign policy and the impersonal cold war became ‘socialism with a human face’. From this perspective Soviet ice hockey was a successful form of propaganda as it broke Cold War barriers and preconceived assumptions held by the Canadian media and public. The praise of the Canadian media and the Canadian public fan’s reflected the mastery of the Soviets on ice, and their success as a propaganda tool into Canada.

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