QUI EST RESPONSABLE?
CHARLIE HEBDO, RESPONSIBILITY AND TERRORISM IN THE WEST

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by Katrina Prosser
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Responsibility has become a defining way in which the West analyses and discusses terrorism. It informs the way in which we view the perpetrators and the victims, and dominates discussion of what the appropriate response to an attack is. Using the case study of the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, I will examine the debates over responsibility following a terror attack in the West. I will break down the various reactions to the Charlie Hebdo attack in order to examine how and why they assigned responsibility as they did. I will analyse the major arguments within each response, drawing out the ways in which they framed social and political issues and how this influenced their contextualising of the Charlie Hebdo attack, terrorism and the assigning of responsibility. This will show the ways in which politics and social issues intersect and how the way in which we assign responsibility can differ depending on our viewpoints of those issues. It also shows that how we define terms like terrorism informs the way in which we assign responsibility, and how this ascription of responsibility informs responses to terrorism at both a social and policy level.
Introduction
Throughout the terror attacks of 2015 and 2016, responsibility has become a defining way in which we discuss and analyse terrorism in the West. The discussion over who exactly is responsible for a given attack dominates media coverage and frames our perception of the event. It helps us create narratives for a given event in order for us to help understand why it happened. Furthermore, how we assign responsibility following an attack informs what we think the appropriate response to terrorism is. Our perception of an appropriate response to an attack, at both a social and policy level, relies on who we assign responsibility to. This analysis of terrorism through the idea of responsibility came to prominence following the terror attack at the offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. In response to the attack on the magazine’s offices, different parties assigned responsibility differently and there was contentious discussion around who, exactly, was primarily responsible for what happened and what should be done in response.

The initial and most popular response was conceptualised as Je suis Charlie which placed responsibility for the attack with anyone but the magazine and closely aligned the editorial stance of the magazine with Western values. Not all agreed with this response, however, and a variety of other responses that problematised the assigning of responsibility emerged. One part of this response, the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement, came as a direct response to Je suis Charlie. This response, in contrast to the Je suis Charlie movement, was more ambiguous in the way that it ascribed responsibility and discussed the role that the magazine staff played bringing about the attack. Another variety of response looked specifically at the impact that Charlie Hebdo had on society in France and the way it normalised the ridicule of Muslims. Finally, for some, the role of the West and, more specifically, Western foreign policy in causing the attack was the primary concern when ascribing responsibility.

Central to all of these major responses to the Charlie Hebdo terror attack was the question of responsibility. Each response held a different party primarily responsible for the attack, either directly or indirectly. The way in which each response assigned responsibility as well as the contentious discussion around the concept itself following the attack brings important questions to mind and helps to explain why discussing the Charlie Hebdo attack, in itself, has a wider purpose and implications. How did the various responses to the Charlie Hebdo attack come about and how did the three responses assign primary responsibility differently? The answers to these questions help to show how we assign responsibility and what the implications are when we do. It also leads to more points of interest, which have a wider scope: what are the points of contention that separate the various responses? What does the way in which they ascribe responsibility reveal about current views on politics and social issues? How do the ways in which responsibility is assigned relate to the larger issue of terrorism and how does it relate to different opinions on who is most responsible for terror attacks in the West? These questions lead the research below and draw a wide picture that details the way in which the concept of terrorism and responsibility intersect with politics, culture and social issues.

When examining these specific issues, a case study of a singular event, like the Charlie Hebdo attack is useful. The case study of the Charlie Hebdo attack is especially pertinent because of the level of discussion around the issue of responsibility following the massacre. These discussions of responsibility became the most prominent way in which the attack was examined and analysed and they exemplified the ways in which the assigning of responsibility is informed by the political and social views of the writer. In essence, the discussion around the Charlie Hebdo attack demonstrated how we ascribe responsibility and the way in which politics, social issues, terrorism and responsibility intersect. While the overall responses to the Charlie Hebdo terror attack are exemplary of reactions to other attacks, the case study works in an almost exaggerated fashion due to the way in which the arguments over who was primarily responsible for the attack was explicated through the majority of discussion that followed. By using Charlie Hebdo as a case study a more in-depth and nuanced discussion of the wider issues around assignimg responsibility that are present after terror attacks in the West becomes clear. Essentially, the Charlie Hebdo attack works as a case study because it is
both emblematic of a wider trend and exceptional in the level of discussion of responsibility that it generated.

This is an especially important discussion in 2016, when a large number of terror attacks in the West have continued to occur. It has become such a prominent trend in the last two years that following the July 2016 attacks in Nice the French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls stated that, '[t]he times have changed, and France is going to have to live with terrorism' (2016, cited in Fisher, 2016). Following each of the terror attacks, both in the West and outside of it (though these tend to receive a smaller level of attention), there tends to be a large volume of commentary and debate over who or what is responsible for a specific attack or terrorism in general. This idea of ‘responsibility’ has come to frame so much discussion over terror attacks in the West and is used to try to discern why these attacks are occurring, and how they could possibly be stopped

This discussion of responsibility has predominately come through in discussions by the news media. Even in instances where a terrorist organisation claims responsibility for an attack, responsibility becomes a defining way in which the media discusses and contextualises an attack. For example, Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the March 2016 attack in Brussels. They claimed that they targeted Belgium because of the country's involvement in the US-led coalition that is fighting in Iraq and Syria (Bellini, 2016). In response to the reason given by ISIS, Claire Bernish published an article on AntiMedia.org, arguing that the US should take responsibility for the attack (Bernish, 2016). Following the attack in Nice, it was reported that even though the perpetrator was identified through ISIS' media as 'a soldier of the Islamic state', the identification did not mean that ISIS were responsible for the attack, but rather that they approved of it (Raven, 2016).

Discussions over who is responsible for terrorism in the West, in general, have also become prominent. Benedict Carey, writing for The New York Times, questioned whether terror attacks in the West, and mass killings in general, are caused by the large amounts of coverage that occurs in the media surrounding the perpetrators (Carey, 2016). In this line of thinking, the media are partly responsible and would need to adjust the way that they cover terrorism in order to stop any risk of glamorising the perpetrators (Carey, 2016). Furthermore, Time published an article that identified '5 Facts [that] Explain Why Europe is Ground Zero for Terrorism' (Bremmer, 2016), which examined what it was about Europe that was responsible for it being targeted by terrorists. And in his closing remarks for the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2016, US President Barack Obama noted that with ISIS currently losing territory in Syria and Iraq, 'we can anticipate it lashing out elsewhere, as we’ve seen most recently and tragically in countries from Turkey to Brussels' (2016, cited in Smith, 2016). This quote was used in an article on World Beyond War entitled, 'Obama Admits US Military Policy Responsible for Terrorist Attacks in Brussels' (2016), which framed the quote as an answer to questions of responsibility in reference to terror attacks in the West.

In all these articles, the commentators came to different conclusions about who is responsible for terrorism. What is important to note here is the fact that the way in which we assign responsibility following a terror attack has become a leading way in which we discuss terrorism; this idea of responsibility that came to a head following the Charlie Hebdo attack has dominated the way in which we analyse terrorism in 2016.

In approaching these issues, it is important to define some terms, namely 'terrorism' and 'responsibility'. The Charlie Hebdo attack was initially and almost exclusively defined as an act of terrorism in all analyses of the attack. It is important to define the term as it shows how categorising the act in such a way framed discussions and the assigning of responsibility. In essence, it creates a framework and demonstrates how the attack was perceived by those discussing it. Responsibility, as a term, is also important to define and separate from other similar concepts, like blame or liability, as it helps to show how there can be so many differing views on where the primary responsibility for the attack lies. Exploring the definition of a term like responsibility helps to explore the nuances in the three major reactions to the attack and how there came to be such contentious discussion over who was responsible for the attack even though the perpetrators' identities were never in question.
The Difficulty of Defining 'Terrorism'

There is no one definitive definition of terrorism. Although terrorism as a concept has existed since the French Revolution in the late 18th century, neither academics nor policy-makers have been able to develop a stable definition for the term. The first problem with developing a widely accepted definition is that terrorism is often used in a pejorative way to indicate violence that exists outside what is considered the norm (Richards, 2014, p. 214). As such, terrorism is a social construction and its application relies upon social, political and moral norms. Anthony Richards writes that because terrorism as a concept relies so much on social norms it means 'that in theory terrorism can indeed be whatever one says it is and that it therefore comes down to who has the power to define' (2014, p. 218). Furthermore, as Edward Said notes, '[t]he use of the word terrorism is usually unfocused, it usually has all kinds of implicit validations of one's own brand of violence, it's highly selective' (cited in Richards, 2014, p. 217). As a consequence, terrorism has become widely used to describe a form of 'extranormal' violence or 'violence that we don't like' (cited in Richards, 2014, p. 217). As such, 'terrorism' is a reflexive term based on norms and values rather than a fixed and stable concept.

This then leads to the second major reason for the failure to find a universal definition of terrorism. Because it has no fixed meaning, the concept is inconsistently used. As Martha Crenshaw writes, the term tends to be used in careless ways to serve rhetorical ends (2011, p. 206). Furthering this idea, Richards explains that even though terrorism was used widely before 9/11, since 2001 'it has been employed so widely and carelessly in public and discourse that there appears to be a wholesale disregard for any serious endeavour to treat terrorism as an analytical concept' (Richards, 2014, p. 214). In other words, because terrorism has no definitive fixed meaning and is used with such regularity, it has become largely redundant as anything other than a rhetorical concept.

These two major factors that limit our ability to define terrorism as an objective term can be seen when looking at its historical application. As stated above, terrorism was first coined as a concept during the French Revolution in the 18th century. As Jonathan White notes, terrorism was used to describe the actions of the French government and these actions were seen as a necessary way to achieve positive revolutionary change (2012, p. 8). However, going into the 19th and early 20th century, the term began to be used to describe violence or even organised action (like striking) committed by non-governmental groups against the state (White, 2012, p. 8). Following World War II, nationalist groups that rebelled against European hegemony were labelled as terrorists. During the mid to late 20th century, the term terrorism was applied more to left-wing groups that utilised violence for their own ends, such as the Red Army Faction in West Germany, as well as subnational groups that were sponsored by rogue regimes (White, 2012, p. 8). When looking at all these cases it becomes plain that terrorism became a term used for those who are using violence, acting outside and sometimes against those who are recognised as the legitimate government. Although the actions of the French revolutionaries in the 1790s and the anarchist or labour organisations in England during the 1800s do not contain many similar stands or approaches to achieve their ends they were both considered to be terrorists because they were working outside the established norms of the time, using violent acts to achieve their own political goals. Here we can see how terrorism is an inconsistently applied social construction.

The difficulty of defining terrorism is also evident in the United Nations' (UN) struggle to agree on a single definition. It was not until after 9/11 that the UN actually attempted to define the term in their resolutions (Saul, 2005, p. 142). Prior to this, although there have been mentions of terrorists in resolutions, the term was applied on an ad hoc basis that depended heavily on individual context (Saul, 2005, p. 142). The first time a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution contained the term ‘terrorism’ was Resolution 579 in 1985, in response to a number of hostage-takings and abductions that occurred over the previous year (Saul, 2005, p. 144). These included the hijacking of Trans World Airlines (TWA) Flight 847, the hijacking of EgyptAir Flight 648, the 1985 hijacking of the passenger ship the Achille Lauro, and the 1985 abduction by the South Lebanon Army of Finnish UN soldiers (Saul, 2005, p. 144). The resolution states that the Council recall 'the
statement [...] resolutely condemning all acts of terrorism, including hostage-taking' (UNSC, Res 579, 1985). The Resolution closes with the statement that the Council 'urges further development of international co-operation [...] to facilitate the prevention, prosecution and punishment of all acts of hostage-taking and abduction as manifestations of international terrorism' (UNSC, Res 579, 1985), but does not attempt, in any way, to provide a definition for the term itself. Rather, it was a term that was applied across a varied number of incidents including the assassination of the Lebanese President in 1989, the use of plastic explosives (Saul, 2005, p. 145-146), as well as the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 (also known as the Lockerbie bombing) by the Libyan government (UNSC, Res 731, 1992).

The term was also used in Resolution 687, which focused on a permanent ceasefire in Iraq in 1991 but again, did not specify what actions specifically constituted terrorism nor did it provide a working definition for the use of the term. Rather, the resolution condemned and renounced 'all acts, methods and practices of terrorism' (1991, cited in Saul, 2005, p. 146). A definition did not start to emerge in resolutions until 2003 in Resolution 511. While this Resolution does not explicitly define terrorism, it could be argued that 'the acts that it condemns partly illustrate [the UNSC's] conception of terrorism – including attacks on embassies and diplomats, UN premises, political leaders and religious sites' (Saul, 2005, p. 148). This is also the first resolution that gives authority for the use of force against terrorist acts (Saul, 2005, p. 148).

However, even more recently the UNSC has not provided any definition for the term terrorism in their resolutions. This lack of definition could be seen as a deliberate move as consensus on the counter-terrorism focused resolutions, such as Resolution 1373, depended on the avoidance of a single definition (Saul, 2005, p. 157). The Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC), a council set up following 9/11 by the UN which oversees the implementation of counter-terrorism measures that are passed by the UNSC through resolutions, also refused to define the term explicitly stating that 'its members had a fair idea of what was blatant terrorism' (2002, cited in Saul, 2005, p. 157). A given reason for this lack of definition, particularly in cases where counter-terrorism measures are the focus is perhaps because of the differences in domestic legal systems across different states (Saul, 2005, p. 158). If the UN or the CTC do not explicitly provide a definition of the term then states can define terrorism in accordance with their own interests without being held back by international legal barriers set by the international community (Saul, 2005, p. 158). In other words, the UN has not decided on a definition of terrorism, as the level of agreement that would be required to attain it has not been met by the international organisations. This, though not explicitly deliberate, arguably works in the favour of states, which are able to use and implement their own definition of the term.

In 2004, however, the UNSC did come up with a working definition for the term, even though they did not explicitly frame it as one. In Resolution 1566 the SC recalled the unjustifiability of:

criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (UNSC, Res 1566, 2004).

This definition seems to provide more of a general framework that states can work towards and under without becoming too specific. It is worth noting the subtle reference to the political nature of terrorism, something that has become central to defining the term since September 11, 2001 (9/11).

When looking at more legal definitions of terrorism it becomes clear that although governmental organisations have attempted to define terrorism within their legal framework, the concept still tends to be vague and open to interpretation. Furthermore, although these definitions have similarities in language and concept they are all different. For example, the working definition of terrorism within the US in the United States Code is 'premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents' (cited in Harris and Monaghan, 2013, p. 49). Conversely, Europol's definition does not contain a mention of the use of violence, focuses on a right-wing political stance and defines it as 'actors who have a revolutionary
nature and the belief in a need to change the political system' (cited in Harris and Monaghan, 2013, p. 50). The most detailed definition comes from the United Kingdom's Association of Police Officers which defines terrorists as:

individuals or groups whose activities go outside the normal democratic process and engage in crime and disorder in order to further their campaign. Extremists may operate independently, but will sometimes try to mask their activities by associating closely with legitimate campaigners (cited in Harris and Monaghan, 2013, p. 50).

Although the above definition does not include the specific mention of violence and does not mention intention or a psychological element to acts of terrorism, it provides an interesting point in making connections between individuals, larger groups and extremist movements.

One of the major points of difference between the above definitions of terrorism is the US' focus on subnational groups. This has become more of a point of focus in definitions following the events of 9/11. Since 2001, the way that terrorism is referred to and defined has changed and become more problematised. The focus of definitions since 2001 has been on 'illegitimate violence'; that is violence enacted by a non-legitimate (or non-state approved) force. This, of course, comes back to a definition of terrorism as lying outside of accepted or dominant norms. However, the role of power politics has become increasingly central to the definition of terrorism in the early 21st century. As White notes, acts of governments or any form of political repression could be considered acts of terrorism but rarely is terrorism used when discussing state-sanctioned violence (2012, p. 9). This is because of the increasing prominence of defining terrorism as operating at a sub-national level, by 'illegitimate' means.

There have been increasing discussions of the role of religion in defining terrorism as an extension of this. Because of the separation of church and state in western democracies (by varying degrees) and given the extremely coded nature of the concept of terrorism by pointing to 'subnational' groups in definitions, religiously motivated acts have been brought into the concept of terrorism. Although the UN states that 'terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group' (United Nations General Assembly, 2006, p. 2), the term has become increasingly coded in religious terms since the 9/11 attacks and tends to indicate a mixture of a religious element, political drive and violence. For example, journalists and news media tend to use the word terrorism when discussing acts of extremist Islamic groups and although there are no inconsistencies in their usage of the word, the role of religion (especially Islam) has become a key factor in defining an act of terrorism for the general populace (White, 2013, p. 10). However, it is worth keeping in mind that academic works and governmental organisations tend to distance their definition of terrorism from being exclusively tied to one religious ethos and rather speak about a religious drive behind terrorism in general terms (United Nations General Assembly, 2006, p. 2).

Terrorism as a concept is important to explore as it helps to explain why the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices – an event that seems exceptional as the action was directly and explicitly tied to the content that the magazine produced – was understood as a terrorist attack and why the Kouachi brothers who perpetrated the attack were labelled as terrorists. Although they stated during the attack that they were acting in response to the depictions of Muhammad that the magazine was well known for, therefore reacting to something direct and explicit, it is logical to assume that in taking the action that they did the Kouachi brothers sought to modify behaviour or norms in the West. In essence, although they were responding to a specific context, the brothers were hoping that their actions would have a wider impact and that this impact would occur due to a fear that their attack helped to create. In addition, given that they were working with Al Qaeda in Yemen, it is reasonable to assume that their attack on Charlie Hebdo was a part of something with a wider scope than simply changing the editorial stance of a single magazine. Almost immediately, the attack was labelled as terrorism because of this implication of a wider, psychological scope and impact as well as the links the brothers had with Muslim extremism (and, as noted above, colloquially in popular Western media Muslim extremism is usually exclusively tied to the concept of terrorism). The way that the media and political actors in the West defined the Charlie Hebdo attack as an act of terrorism coded the attack. It provided
a framework in which to understand what had happened, why it happened, and became one of the defining concepts that informed the discussion and analysis of the attack in the following months. In some sense, then, the political nature of the definition of terrorism allowed people to respond to the attack in a variety of ways, each of which, in turn, was based on a different assumption about where primary responsibility lay and what should be done about it.

**The Challenge of Ascribing 'Responsibility'**

The second issue that arises in the context of the Charlie Hebdo attack is, therefore, the way in which different responses assign responsibility. It is important to explore the concept of responsibility in order to show that the ascription of responsibility is not as straightforward as we might generally assume. This then, in part, helps to explain how different parties following the Charlie Hebdo attack could come to such different conclusions as to who was primarily responsible for the attack, and how this idea of responsibility has become so contested in analyses of terrorism in general.

In order to discern the working meaning for the term and ironing out certain issues and complexities when referring to the issue of responsibility it first needs to be distinguished from terms that are often thought to be synonymous with it: accountability and liability. According to Charles B. Neff, in his article about academic responsibility, the central factor that distinguishes accountability from responsibility is whether or not the assumption of responsibility is voluntary (Neff, 1969, p. 14). Neff writes, 'I propose that 'responsibility' be used to refer only to the voluntary assumption of an obligation, while 'accountability' be used to refer to the legal liability assigned to the performance or non-performance of certain acts or duties' (1969, p. 14). In other words, for Neff, 'accountability' is assigned when there is a causal link between action or inaction whereas 'responsibility' is the act of voluntarily creating a link when there is no causal relationship. Furthermore, he writes that '[t]he individual, not some legal code, determines what obligations are to be assumed and what the limits of adherence to those obligations are [...] Before an individual can assume an obligation he must be able and willing to respond to the values it represents' (Neff, 1969, pp. 16-17). Neff, then, sees responsibility as voluntary and individualistic. This gives a good starting point to discuss the nuances of the concept of responsibility as issues like individual and collective responsibility, voluntary or causal links are teased out.

Responsibility can refer to the individual or in conjunction with a collective. For example, the term 'collective responsibility' is extremely common. Indeed, as Tal Becker writes, in the Middle Ages collective responsibility was always assumed and a group was automatically responsible for the act(s) of its members (2006, p. 13). As Mark R. Reiff writes, 'the term 'collective responsibility' is commonly used to describe any situation in which all members of a group are held morally responsible for a wrong committed by less than all of them' (2008, p. 214). This is in stark contrast to Neff's concept of responsibility as being defined as something solely individual and voluntary. Furthermore, Reiff describes individual responsibility as largely attributed when a causal relationship exists (2008, p. 214). He writes, ‘[c]ausation connects the individual to the wrong and gives rise to various rights and obligations between that individual and the parties harmed’ (2008, p. 214). In defining 'collective responsibility' Reiff writes that the concept covers all cases in which an individual should be held responsible but instead the causal link between the wrong and the wrongdoer is attached to a larger group that the individual could be seen as belonging to (2008, pp. 214-215). As such, 'all members of the wrongdoer's group, including those whom we would not hesitate to characterise as civilians and even children can be held responsible for a wrong committed by any one of them' (2008, p. 215). This idea of 'collective responsibility' is usually invoked when the larger group is seen as contributing in some way to the wrongdoer's action; that they have committed a 'contributory fault' (Reiff, 2008, p. 217). In other words, according to Reiff, 'collective responsibility' is most commonly ascribed when the larger group is seen as contributing either directly or indirectly to the action of the individual and therefore all are seen as being at fault, and responsible for the wrongs committed. Thus, collective responsibility does not rely on a direct causal relationship between the wrong and those held to account for it.
Notably, these discussions all lean on the issue over whether responsibility is more based on either a causal connection between the party that has done wrong, or whether it is largely a voluntary or consent-based assumption of blame. Another way of looking at this separation in the concept of responsibility comes from Shanto Iyengar who names these two separate forms of responsibility as being 'causal' and 'treatment' based. He writes, '[c]ausal responsibility focuses on the origin of the problem, while treatment responsibility focuses on who or what has the power to either alleviate or to forestall alleviation of the problem' (1989, p. 879). However, Iyengar also writes that the ascribing of responsibility through a direct causal link is largely an artifice because '[i]ndividuals assign responsibility spontaneously' (1989, p. 879). Furthering this idea, J. R. Lucas claims that the causal link between a wrongdoer and a wrong committed can be difficult to discern as it relies both on intention of the wrongdoer and separating the wrongdoer's actions from other wider possible contributory factors (1993, p. 33).

With this in mind, it is useful to consider the voluntary or consent-based assumption of responsibility. Because that direct causal link is so difficult (and some would argue impossible) to discern, the voluntary assumption of responsibility becomes more important. Most writers distinguish voluntary responsibility as 'moral responsibility'. Reiff, for example, writes,

One possible basis for assigning moral responsibility despite the absence of causal responsibility is consent. If someone agrees to be responsible for the wrongdoing of another, or perhaps even if he has merely allowed others to reasonably believe he has entered into such an agreement, there is arguably nothing unjust about holding him responsible for any injury that results (2008, p. 216).

Thus, according to Reiff, when regarding the responsibility of an individual, moral responsibility is assumed/voluntary/consent-based. However, as discussed above, this kind of moral responsibility also feeds into the idea of 'contributory fault', which is a way in which collective responsibility is ascribed. The main difference here is the agency of those who assume or are given the blame. As Judith Butler writes, 'individuals are responsible for the acts they bring about... [they are] agents with responsibility' (cited in Barnett, 2009, p. 360). Using this, one can see that in the conceptualisation of 'responsibility', the individual assumes moral responsibility, thus the 'wrongdoer' has agency. Converse to this, the collective is ascribed responsibility by another party and does not have agency.

The last facet of the concept of responsibility that needs to examined is that of 'social responsibility', particularly as it connects to journalists and news media. This is important as it will help to tease out some of the argument below and shows the ways in which concepts of responsibility are applied and discussed. In the 1940s, an American initiative brought the idea of media having a social responsibility towards society (Rao and N’Weerasinghe, 2011, p. 417). The outcome of that initiative, 'The Commission on Freedom of the Press', defined social responsibility in media as a 'truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events in a context which gives them meaning' (cited in Rao and N’Weerasinghe, 2011, p. 417). An extension of this 'social responsibility' has also been cited by Fredrick Seibert as 'the duty of the media to serve society and function in the public interest' (1963, p. 69). Jeffrey Sheuer writes that in this way 'journalistic excellence must be a basic democratic value [promoting] democracy in devotion to truth, context, and vigilance' (2008, cited in Lăzăroiu, 2012, p. 147). Furthermore, C. G. Christians and Kaarle Nordenstreng write that 'global social responsibility needs an ethical basis, commensurate in scope, that is universal ethical principles rather than the parochial moral guidelines represented by codes' (2004, p. 20). In other words, journalists, the press, and other media outlets are seen as having a social responsibility towards the public that they inform and there are established codes and norms of behaviour in order to inform their actions along these lines. This is important in order for the public to receive a contextual and informed flow of news and current events. As a Sri Lankan journalist, S. K. Neth described the concept, '[o]n the one hand social responsibility is the sum total of all journalistic guidelines, accuracy, responsibility, truthfulness, balance, impartiality, and the right to reply, on the other hand, it is a journalist's duty to protect social well being' (cited in Rao and N’Weerasinghe, 2011, p. 419). This is a very special application of responsibility, but it is clear that it appeals to the individual concept of responsibility wherein the 'wrongdoer' has some scope for agency. However, although it
seems rather counter-intuitive, it is important to note as social responsibility also places responsibility for a high quality of information to flow to the public on the shoulders of journalists and this idea comes into play in one of the arguments below.

The nature of the research presented below is an analysis and discussion of how the wider Western intellectual and political community ascribed responsibility following the Charlie Hebdo massacre. As such, the concept of responsibility is going to fall more in line with Reiff's definition of 'collective responsibility'. This is because, even though discussions differ over who is responsible for the attack, for the most part the responsibility discussed is ascribed, not assumed or inherent. Although a larger group or collective may not have a direct causal relationship to the attack, contributory fault may be ascribed to them in discussions of responsibility. In the majority of discussion below the Kouachi brothers have the direct causal link to the attack and thus have individual, voluntary-based responsibility for it, but the discussions pivot on the less direct, less agency-based responsibility which is ascribed to a wider group.

Another important point to note at this point is the importance of social responsibility as it applies to the media. As noted in the discussion above, in theory the idea of social responsibility informs how the media react to news and inform a wider public of events and this form of responsibility is at its core steeped in Western values like freedom of speech and democracy. This frames the way that the Charlie Hebdo attack was discussed and it also informs the points of contention between different viewpoints. The framing of social responsibility provides evidence that Western values are inherent in the reporting and reflection on the attack. The majority of writers cited and discussed below are writing from a specific Western perspective which, again, informs their discussion of the attack as well as their analyses of the wider contextual implications of it.

The Impact of 9/11

The definitions of terrorism and responsibility do not evolve in a vacuum. They are the result of cultural, social and political processes. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have had a huge impact on our understanding of terrorism and responsibility. These events have influenced the way that terrorism is defined in the 21st century, and have provided an interesting example of how responsibility is both ascribed and assumed by different parties. The attacks consisted of four coordinated plane hijackings which killed 2,973 people and cost the US around $500 billion in damages (Spiers, 2012, p.12). Al Qaeda assumed responsibility for the attacks and Osama bin Laden is widely considered to have played an integral role in planning them (Dearden, 2016). It was 9/11 that arguably made the term terrorism colloquially synonymous with Islamic extremism that is specifically targeted toward 'the West' or 'western values'. In immediate reaction to the attacks, the then President of the United States, George W. Bush gave an address to the nation wherein he stated,

"Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks [...] Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world [...] America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism [...] we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world (Bush, 2001)."

While affirming American values, Bush also used his address to the nation as a call for his allies and other states for support in what would become the ‘War on Terror’. These responses while not universally accepted, shaped the cultural and political context, particularly in regards to the concept of terrorism in the following years.

However, before moving on to how the 'War on Terror' started, as well as its larger political implications it is important to discuss the initial reactions to 9/11 of states around the world, as they were far from uniform. Tony Blair, for example, released a statement stating that Britain 'stood shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of need and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world' (cited in Utley, 2012, p. 2). The then president of France,
Jacques Chirac also conveyed a similar sentiment, stating that France would contribute in the 'battle against terrorism in all ways necessary' (cited in Utley, 2012, p. 2).

It is not surprising that Western nations had this reaction and neither is the fact that the statements of nations that are often in opposition to the US in the international arena were more tempered. Although, as Rachel Utley writes, all released statements of sympathy with the US and condemned the attacks, they contextualised their responses in interesting ways. Russia and India, for example, created links between the attacks of 9/11 and experiences of terrorism in their own states (Utley, 2012, p. 3). Even the Taliban-led regime in Afghanistan expressed sympathy for the US and condemned the attacks, though they refused to accept the idea that Osama bin Laden was responsible (Utley, 2012, p. 3). What is interesting here about the reactions of the international community to 9/11 is that they both created a broad-based commitment to future counter-terrorist action among traditional US allies (Utley, 2012, p. 3) and, at the same time, the reactions of those who were less enthusiastic (or rather emphatic) about their support for the US helped to create the dualistic idea of 'terrorism' as an absolute opposition to 'the West', an idea that the subsequent 'War on Terror' cemented.

Not all responses were, however, unified in their condemnation. Outside the official statements made by political leaders, there were some celebrations following the attacks in some parts of the Middle East; in Iraq, for example, which would later be invaded by the US in their 'War on Terror', state officials stated that it was the 'crimes against humanity' that the US had perpetrated that had caused the attacks (Utley, 2012, p. 3).

What is important here, though, is not necessarily the evolution of the 'War on Terror' itself but rather the way that it was used to generate meaning around these concepts of terrorism and responsibility. The 'War on Terror' has had a profound impact on the semiotic and social climate of the last decade. When talking about the responsibility of the US in the 'War on Terror', for example, Bush claimed in a State of the Union Address that 'history has called America and our allies into action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to fight freedom's fight' (cited in Hastedt, 2003, p. 14). The US, acting with agency, assumed the responsibility of leading the 'War on Terror'.

In addition, the impact that the 'War on Terror' has had on the colloquial definition of terrorism has brought the idea of collective responsibility (that is the non-voluntary, ascribed responsibility) to the fore. The 'War on Terror' as well as the creation of the Bush Doctrine as a whole was based upon the neoconservative idea that a western form democracy is needed to secure peace in foreign states (Haynes, 2005, pp.405-409). This placed the 'War on Terror' and its focus on both finding terrorists as well as establishing democracies in states that were seen as harbouring or contributing to terrorist feeling in direct opposition to terrorism in the form of jihad. In other words, it placed the 'War on Terror' as a response specifically to Islamic extremism in the Middle East. As Jeffrey Haynes writes, following 9/11 the goal of the US was led by the ambition to redraw the Middle East 'towards the establishment of pro-democracy, pro-American governments. The policy was ideologically informed by the fusion of two mutually reinforcing sets of ideas: religious ones emanating from the New Christian Right (NCR) and the secular concerns of influential neoconservatives' (Haynes, 2005, p. 405). This has created a sense of collective responsibility among those of the Muslim faith as the dialogue became oversimplified and reinforced that 'easy' dualism as terrorism became increasingly synonymous with 'Islamic extremism'. This dualism and the emphasis that is placed on Islam as the base ideology behind 'terrorism' has created the view that there is something inherently incompatible with the Muslim faith and 'peace', or rather, that there is something inherently violent and extreme about Islam. This has then lead to some believing that all who identify as religiously Muslim are contributing to terrorism by association, that by being a practising Muslim they have committed a contributory fault (Ryan, 2011, p. 1046).

Because of the dualistic nature of the discourse around the ‘War on Terror’, as well as the colloquial conception of terrorism as being linked to religious motivations (specifically Islamic
extremism), religion has become increasingly prominent in both motivations and discussion around international relations. As Haynes writes, 'there is widespread acceptance that militant Islam is a – perhaps the – main ideology competitor to 'western' conceptions of democracy' (2005, p. 398). This, of course, comes back to the neoconservative push which started (and framed) the 'War on Terror' as a fight for Western secular democracy, as well as the Western assumption that 'rationality and secularism go hand in hand and […] 'modern' political, economic and social systems around the world depend upon the […] 'privatization' of religion' (Haynes, 2005, p. 400). Because of this emphasis on the role of religion in politics (particularly international relations and foreign policy), the prominence of religion and the prominence of religious leaders in the international arena appear to have increased since 2001. In other words, it has pushed religion and religious motivation into the public sphere.

Writers and commentators, such as George Wiegel have gone so far as to call this resurgence in religious motivation and mobilisation an 'unsecularization of the world' (cited in Haynes, 2005, p. 399). While religious mobilisation was not unheard of before 2001 the focus on transnational religious movements has increased with the 'War on Terror'. As Haynes writes,

> In short, religion became politically marginalized over time in both western social sciences and political discourses. Now, however, the widespread visibility, vitality and political impact of religion suggests that we can no longer routinely discount religion as peripheral to the concerns of the cut and thrust of 'real' – that is, secular – political organization, competition and conflict (2005, p. 400).

The focus on religion as a transnational mobilising force is an important one to pause on. Groups, like Al Qaeda have, since 9/11, intentionally switched focus from being more focused on sponsoring or starting revolutionary khalifah movements in Middle East states to focus on Muslim minority populations of Western states in order to mobilise them behind their cause, placing primary emphasis on religious identity over that of national identity (Haynes, 2005, p. 403). This focus is also seen through ISIS’ social media campaigns that target Muslim populations by claiming ‘we are all ISIS’ (cited in Speckhard, 2015). This outreach works in direct opposition to the nation-first rhetoric that is emphasised in the West towards minority populations. It also helps to show how a rhetoric of tension between Islam and Western ideals and values has been created.

Outline

Framing my discussion of these issues below is an examination of the four major responses to the Charlie Hebdo attack, starting with the first to emerge: Je suis Charlie. In analysing Je suis Charlie more closely I will be focusing on the four major points of note within the movement: how it focuses on the ideal of free speech; how it argues against the prohibition of depicting Muhammad; the focus that the response puts on the importance of satire; and the discussion around the importance of secularism in Western (and more specifically French) society. I will be looking at the way in which the Je suis Charlie movement assigns responsibility collectively, focuses on the role of Islam in terrorism, and places value exclusively on Western ideals which are presented in direct contrast to Islam.

Following a discussion around the contexts and implications of the Je suis Charlie movement, I will then focus on the response that problematised the assigning of responsibility away from the magazine, a response which initially evolved in response to Je suis Charlie. A major aspect of this response was Je ne suis pas Charlie, which I will analyse in detail. When discussing Je ne suis pas Charlie I will examine the three most prominent aspects of the response: the discussions over issues of Islamophobia and racism; the idea of responsible speech as opposed to free speech; and finally the questioning of the ethics of Charlie Hebdo and whether the editorial decisions that magazine made lead to the attack, either directly or indirectly. In my discussion I will examine how those who aligned with the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument framed terrorism in less dualistic terms than the Je suis Charlie response which allowed them to problematisate the latter’s assigning of responsibility away from the magazine.
Following this I will look at the similar but distinct response which placed responsibility for the attack with the magazine but placed it in a slightly wider context. Where _Je ne suis pas Charlie_ looked at how the editorial decisions (specifically the depictions of Muhammad) led to the attack, this response examined how they contributed to a wider trend of Islamophobia both through their editorial stance towards Islam as well as their unwavering support of secularism. I will then examine how they argued that this normalisation of Islamophobia led to a rise of terrorism like that on the magazine’s offices. Similar to the _Je ne suis pas Charlie_ response, terrorism was defined in this response as a reaction to social issues caused by Western ideals. This meant that, unlike _Je suis Charlie_, the assigning of responsibility was placed with _Charlie Hebdo_ as they were presented as adding to the social milieu which creates extremism.

Finally, I will examine the smaller response to the attack that placed primary responsibility for the attack on Western foreign policy. This response was a lot smaller in scope and as such I will focus on the discussions of the legacy of September 11 and clash of civilisations rhetoric that are contained within the response. This response framed terrorism as inherently political in nature and, thus, ascribed responsibility for the attack at the political level.

The main difference between these four responses is the way in which they characterised terrorism. It was in the different framing of the term that allowed each response to ascribe responsibility differently. The outcome of assigning responsibility to different parties led to the different responses implicitly proposing different solutions to terrorism. Although the issue of ‘solving the problem of terrorism’ was not explicitly the focus of the responses, it is logical to assume that the assigning of responsibility is often seen in the first step of solving a problem. The disparity between each of the responses to _Charlie Hebdo_ makes clear the fundamental differences in the way in which Western society defines terrorism and as such, the fragmented discussions of the correct way to respond to such an issue.
Chapter 1: Je suis Charlie

The satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo* was created in 1970 following the termination of the magazine *Hara-Kiri Hebdo*, which was banned for mocking the death of Charles de Gaulle on one of its covers. According to Megan Gibson, much of the staff from *Hara-Kiri Hebdo* moved directly to the new publication (2015). The name of the magazine was a reference to the Charlie Brown comics with Hebdo being short for hebdomadaire, which means 'weekly' in French (Gibson, 2015). The magazine tended to focus on satirising high-profile political, entertainment and religious figures and was marked by a strong left-wing anarchist, bawdy sense of humour (Marlière, 2012). As Philippe Marlière wrote, *Charlie Hebdo* provided a 'memorable take on current affairs' for the youth who were engaged in the 1970s climate of class struggle in France (2012). *Charlie Hebdo* never had a particularly wide circulation but, despite being forced to end publication in 1981, it was revived in 1992 (Gibson, 2015).

When the publication was resurrected in 1992, there were significant changes to the staff, which changed the tone and direction of the magazine. Philippe Val, a former left-wing comic who became popular in the 1980s, took over as editor-in-chief. He was often described as 'dictatorial' and was renowned for firing those who opposed his views (Marlière, 2012). Val was a vocal supporter of the 2004 banning of the headscarf in state schools, and according to some, under his editorial control the tone of the magazine became more anti-Islamic than generally anti-religion which it had been earlier (Marlière, 2012). He left the magazine in 2009, after Nicolas Sarkozy appointed him the director of the French public radio station, *France Inter*. Following his departure Stéphane Charbonnier (also known as Charb) took over as editor-in-chief. Charbonnier started his career working at the satirical magazine *La Grosse Bertha*, which opposed the 1991 Gulf War. He became known for his 'uncompromising humour' but also, arguably, his commitment to remain fair and accurate (Fremion and Gravett, 2015). According to Marlière, Charbonnier, when he became editor-in-chief, tried to recapture the 'sense of irreverence' that was thought of as lost under Val's guidance, but also wanted to firmly establish the editorial position of the magazine firmly on the left (2012).

Throughout *Charlie Hebdo's* history, the publication has made many controversial editorial decisions and faced violent opposition as a result. Most notably, of course, the magazine has a history of publishing caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad and has spoken out publicly on numerous occasions about their right to do so. In 2006 *Charlie Hebdo* reprinted cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that first appeared in the Danish publication *Jyllands-Posten*. The initial publication of these cartoons led to protests by Muslim people across the world as well as an attack on the cartoonist Kurt Westgaard in 2010 who managed to survive by virtue of a panic room (Abbruzzese, 2015). Following *Charlie Hebdo's* reprinting of the cartoons in 2006, a controversial move in itself, Chirac, the then president of France, released a statement saying, 'Anything that can hurt the convictions of someone else, in particular religious convictions, should be avoided. Freedom of expression should be exercised in a spirit of responsibility' (cited in Gibson, 2015). Following the protests, the magazine published a manifesto named, 'Together, Facing the New Totalitarianism' which was co-signed by Salman Rushdie, Manuel Valls and a range of other writers, commentators and intellectuals who felt strongly about defending their right to free speech (Rose, 'Resist the Tyranny of Silence After Charlie Hebdo', 2015, p. 42). The manifesto stated,

After having overcome fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism, the world now faces a new global totalitarian threat: Islamism. We writers, journalists, intellectuals, call for resistance to religious totalitarianism and for the promotion of freedom, equal opportunity and secular values for all. Recent events, prompted by the publication of drawings of Muhammad in European newspapers, have revealed the necessity of the struggle for these universal values. This struggle will not be won by arms, but in the ideological field. [...] We refuse to renounce our critical spirit out of fear of being accused of “Islamophobia,” a wretched concept which confuses criticism of Islam as a religion and stigmatization of those who believe in it. We defend the universality of freedom of expression, so that a critical spirit can exist in every continent, towards each and every maltreatment and dogma. We appeal to democrats and free spirits in every country that our century may be one of light and not dark' (2006, cited in Rose, 'Resist the Tyranny of Silence', 2015, pp. 42-43).
From these two reactions, one by Chirac and the other by the *Charlie Hebdo* staff the two major opposing viewpoints that have dominated the commentary following the 2015 attack on the magazine's offices start to become clear. On the one side, Chirac speaks out in favour of a freedom of speech with limitations (or 'responsibility') when it comes to the Islamic religion, on the other hand *Charlie Hebdo* and its supporters speak in favour of a complete and unlimited freedom of speech.

Despite public reaction, *Charlie Hebdo* stuck to their editorial perspective and continued to publish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in their magazine. Following the publishing of caricatures of Muhammad in 2011 the offices of the magazine were firebombed. Furthermore, in 2012 the French government made the decision to close several embassies and schools after *Charlie Hebdo* published another caricature of Muhammad, which was again met with protest and threats (Abbruzzese, 2015). In response to these actions against the magazine and its editorial stance to publish depictions and caricatures of the Prophet, Charbonnier, backed up his decision to publish the cartoons by granting a series of interviews with various journalists. He told *Le Monde* ‘I've got no kids, no wife, no car, no credit cards. Perhaps what I'm going to say sounds a bit pompous, but I prefer to die standing up rather than living on my knees’ (cited in Fremoin and Gravett, 2015). Charbonnier also spoke out against those who viewed the decision to publish the images as an intentional provocation of Muslims. Speaking in 2012 he stated, ‘[w]e are only criticising one particular form of extremist Islam, albeit in a peculiar and satirically exaggerated form. We are not responsible for the excesses that happened elsewhere, just because we practice our right to freedom of expression within the legal limits’ (cited in Abbruzzese, 2015). He also stated, in response to potential threats to those working on the magazine, 'If we worried about the consequences of each of our drawings in each of our 1,057 issues, then we would have had to close shop a long time ago' (cited in Abbruzzese, 2015). In 2013 it was announced by the jihadist online magazine, *Inspire*, that Charbonnier was wanted 'dead or alive for crimes against Islam' (Fremoin and Gravett, 2015). The magazine was repeatedly accused of inciting Islamophobia with their on-going decision to publish cartoons of Muhammad despite public backlash. Speaking to the BBC about this Charbonnier noted, 'If we can poke fun at everything in France, if we can talk about anything in France apart from Islam or the consequences of Islamism, that is annoying' (cited in Gibson, 2015). *Charlie Hebdo* journalist Laurent Léger also publicly spoke about the magazine's decision to keep on publishing caricatures of Muhammad saying that it was more about drawing attention to extremist views than simply those who chose to practice the Islamic faith. He stated, 'The aim is to laugh […] We want to laugh at the extremists – every extremist. They can be Muslim, Jewish, Catholic. Everyone can be religious, extremist thoughts and acts we cannot accept' (cited in Gibson, 2015).

On the 7 January 2015 two men, with their faces covered by masks and carrying Kalashnikovs, entered the offices of Charlie Hebdo and opened fire during an editorial meeting. Twelve people were killed in the attack and a further eleven were injured. The gunmen were heard on a video of the attack shouting 'Allahu akbar', 'we've killed Charlie Hebdo', and 'we've avenged the prophet' (cited in Doherty and Davidson, 2015). Eyewitnesses of the attacked have said that the men claimed they were members of the Yemen-based section of Al Qaeda (Doherty and Davidson, 2015). Among the dead were Charbonnier, two police officers, a building maintenance worker, seven *Charlie Hebdo* columnists, and a friend of one of the victims who was visiting. The injured included four members of the *Charlie Hebdo* staff and police officers.

The two brothers who committed the attack then went on the run, taking a hostage and holding up in a printing warehouse outside of Paris. Two days later, following a standoff with police they were both killed and the hostage was released. The two men were identified as Cherif and Said Kouachi. Cherif had previously been jailed in 2008, was known to police as committing militant activities and was a part of the 'Buttes-Chaumont' network, which aided people in getting to Iraq in order to join Al-Qaeda (BBC News, 2015). He was previously detained in 2005 for trying to fly to Syria, which was at the time a 'gateway' destination for those wanting to fight in Iraq for terrorist organisations (BBC News, 2015). According to reports, once he was in jail he met Djamel Benghal,
a jihadist who was sentenced to ten years in prison for his role in a plot to bomb the US embassy in Paris (BBC News, 2015). Allegedly, the two brothers attended Mosque in Buttes-Chaumont and came under the influence of Farid Benyettou a radical Muslim leader in that area of Paris, they also met Boubaker al-Hakim a key figure in the Buttes-Chaumont network who is heavily linked to Al-Qaeda in Iraq (BBC News, 2015). In 2010, Cherif Kouachi was wanted by police in connection to an alleged plot to break another militant Islamist from jail (BBC News, 2015). Acquaintances of Cherif spoke to news journalists and said they were shocked about his role in the attacks of the Charlie Hebdo offices. One said that Cherif was 'well-behaved, friendly, polite, clean-looking and […] willing to help old and disabled people' (cited in BBC News, 2015). Another said that Cherif 'wasn't aggressive – he wasn't a crazy zealot, he was a calm person' (cited in BBC News, 2015). The family of a man that held up a Jewish supermarket in the wake of the attacks, killing four people and holding a number hostage also spoke out about the attacks, condemning his actions, as well as those of the Kouachi brothers. They offered their condolences to the victims of the attacks and stated, 'We absolutely do not share these extreme ideas. We hope there will not be any confusion between these odious acts and the Muslim religion' (cited in BBC News, 2015).

The first major public reaction to the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices was, unsurprisingly, one of support towards those who lost their lives in the attack. While other responses came in the following days, immediately after the attack Je suis Charlie was taken up as a message of support at rallies in Paris and around France and #JeSuisCharlie took over social media and trended internationally. The social and news commentary that immediately followed the attack was also overwhelmingly supportive of the staff at Charlie Hebdo. The Je suis Charlie response placed the responsibility for the attacks solely on the side of those who committed them as well as the wider Islamic collective. According to this argument, the Charlie Hebdo staff bore no responsibility for the violence that was visited upon them. Articles taking this perspective tended to rely upon the tenants of free speech and the importance of political satire. Some also looked to the Koran and questioned whether the depiction of Muhammad should really be considered blasphemous. Finally, Je suis Charlie rested on discussions of the exceptionalism of French secularism and promoted it as something to be protected and respected by both international groups and minority religious populations within France. At the core of the argument was the idea that the responsibility of the attack lay solely with those who committed the attack and Islamic extremism in general.

**Islamophobic Reactions**

However, initial reaction to the attack was, for some, fear and anger, which led to outbursts of Islamophobia across social media and in conservative traditional news media. Initial reactions from politicians tended call attention to the fact that those who committed the attack were not emblematic of the wider international community of Muslims as they attempted to stem the possible flow of violence toward Muslim communities. François Holland, for example, noted 'these terrorists, these fanatics have nothing to do with the Islamic religion' (cited in Muravchik, 2015, p. 37) and US Secretary of State John Kerry insisted that 'the biggest mistake we could make would be to blame Muslims for crimes… that their faith utterly rejects' (cited in Muravchik, 2015, p. 37). However, these statements had little effect on those who placed responsibility for the attack on the entire Muslim faith. The French Council for the Muslim Religion reported that following the attack (between the 7th and the 20th of January 2015) 128 anti-Muslim threats or actions had been reported to French authorities compared with the 133 that occurred in the entirety of 2014 (cited in Al Jezeera, 2015). These actions against the Muslim population of France included attacks on mosques and Muslim-owned businesses and at least one person was hospitalised following a physical assault (cited in Al Jezeera, 2015). The comment sections on news sites that covered the Charlie Hebdo attack and the role of Muslim extremism in the attack became a ground for anti-Islamic commentary. In a post on Facebook about the post-Charlie Hebdo attacks on the Muslim community, for example, commentators showed hostility towards Islamic people. One commenter stated, 'I'm not afraid but I think islam is more like Ebola the best cure is eradication. It isn't a faith it is a bully boy gang banging death cult [sic]' (Smith, 2015), while another wrote, '[n]ame one Islamic country that tolerates
freedom of religion, women's rights, and doesn't persecute you for being gay? [...] Your goal everywhere is Sharia. Non muslims [sic] have plenty to fear, especially their freedoms' (Vincent, 2015). Furthermore, Rupert Murdoch tweeted that the blame for attack (as well as other extremist acts) lay at the feet of the wider Muslim community. On the 10 January, 2015 he tweeted, 'Maybe most Moslems [sic] peaceful, but until they recognize and destroy their growing jihadist cancer they must be held responsible' (cited in Taub, 2015).

Even public figures who identify as more liberal in their politics came out as strongly anti-Muslim following the attack. For example, New York Times writer Thomas Friedman wrote that moderate Muslims should organise 'a million-person march against the jihadists across the Arab-Muslim world' (cited in Majerol, 2015, p. 17), also ascribing a collective responsibility on the wider Muslim community for supposed inaction in the face of extremism. Furthermore, television presenter, Bill Maher went on a televised tirade against Muslim people where he stated,

I know most Muslim people would not have carried out an attack like this [...] But here's the important point: Hundreds of millions of them support an attack like this. They applaud an attack like this. What they say is, “we don’t approve of violence, but you know what? You make fun of the Prophet, all bets are off” [...] That is mainstream in the Muslim world (cited in Winter, 2015).

All of these people saw their comments as their way of standing in solidarity against terrorism and they clearly come from a place of fear and anger.

While most of these comments were more of-the-cuff and presented in more informal spaces there were also reactions from formal media sources and politicians which placed responsibility for the attack on the wider Muslim community and worked to spread Islamophobia. This is most plainly seen in the reactions from conservative news media and political groups. Such outlets appear to be motivated by politics and Islamophobia in their initial reactions to the attack. Or rather, they play with fear and burgeoning Islamophobia in order to fulfil their own political ends. For example, the French party the Front National used the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices to push their own anti-immigration stance. David Rachline, the mayor of Fréjus and member of the Front National, spoke out about the attack at a political rally, saying that they have long predicted something similar would happen. He stated, 'Surely we can no longer wonder whether there might be some connection between this lightning-fast rise of radical fundamentalist Islam and this rampant immigration' (cited in Dominus, 2015). Although he did stop short of claiming that all Muslims were terrorists he did claim that 'in Europe recently [...] all terrorists are Muslims' (cited in Dominus, 2015). The ongoing attempts of the Front National to play off of these fears was, according to some, having an impact; a 2015 survey of France found that four in ten French people considered Muslim people to be a threat to French national identity (cited in Dominus, 2015).

As stated above, this Islamophobic idea that Muslim populations as a whole are a threat to Western people and their way of life also found a space in conservative news media. Following the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices, Fox News in the U.S. used extensive anti-Muslim rhetoric in their news reporting and analysis of the massacre. Steve Emerson, a frequent guest on the news show and reported expert on terrorism, claimed that within Europe there were numerous 'no-go zones' for non-Muslim populations that were set up by immigrants and imposed Sharia law (cited in Fisher, ‘It’s Not Just Fox News: Islamophobia on Cable News is Out of Control’, 2015). While this claim was widely debunked, as Max Fisher writes, 'his falsehoods were no joke for Fox News viewers, for whom the idea that Muslim-Europeans would set up mini-caliphates is quite consistent with Fox News' characterization of Muslims' (‘It’s Not Just Fox News’, 2015). In a more extreme example of Fox News’ Islamophobic reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attack, host Jeanine Pirro called for 'the United States to arm death squads throughout the Muslim world to kill Islamists and members of Islamic organizations' (Fisher, ‘It’s Not Just Fox News’, 2015). She stated, 'We need to kill them [...] Our job is to arm those [non-extremist] Muslims to the teeth, give them everything they need to take out these Islamic fanatics, let them do the job, and when they do, we need to simply look the other way' (cited in Fisher, ‘It’s Not Just Fox News’, 2015). It is important to note here that although Pirro
seemed to be focusing on extremists and terrorists as her target, she also named the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in her list of potential targets, an organisation that has renounced violence and whose members include women and children (Fisher, ‘It’s Not Just Fox News’, 2015). Furthermore, writing for FoxNews.com, John R. Lott posited that an attack like that on the Charlie Hebdo offices could possibly occur at any time and the only way to stop attacks was to increase the number of civilians carrying arms. This article is interesting, as unlike most Islamophobic articles published following the attack that focus on the threat to a wider Western 'community', Lott’s article focused on the threat that Muslim people pose to Jewish communities. He wrote, 'Today in Israel, over 12 percent of adult Jewish civilians are licensed to carry firearms. This complicates things for terrorists, as they don't know who might be able to stop them' (Lott, 2015). Lott also claimed that 'Since at least 1950, every single mass public shooting in Europe has occurred in gun-free zones' (2015) and because terrorists ignore and 'make fun' of gun bans more guns are the answer because '[w]e know that armed self-defense saves lives' (Lott, 2015). Interestingly, this argument also worked by placing the US 'right to bear arms' at the centre of the debate about terrorism.

**Free Speech**

Moving away from reactionary, Islamophobic responses to the Charlie Hebdo attack towards the more contextual and considered responses to the massacre, the first aspect of the Je suis Charlie argument that is important to focus on is the way it framed free speech. Free speech was frequently held up as something important and as having some kind of sacred value. Many commentators who wrote in favour of ascribing responsibility primarily (or solely) on the side of those who committed the acts justified their point of view by emphasising the importance of the concept of free speech (Rose, ‘A Europe Without Blasphemy is Back in the Middle Ages’, 2015; Ginsberg, 2016). A prime example of this is in an article for The Guardian by Jyllands-Posten journalist Flemming Rose. Rose wrote that attacks like those on the Charlie Hebdo offices constitute a battle for ideas and that 'suppressing critical speech across cultural, religious and ideological divisions may actually undermine the social peace, because it reinforces identity politics and points to our differences instead of stressing our shared humanity' (‘A Europe Without Blasphemy’, 2015). A similar attitude was advanced by Jodie Ginsberg (2015), who wrote that although she finds certain social dialogues around gender, sexuality and religion offensive, 'the fact that I find them offensive or anger-inducing cannot, and should never, be used as an excuse for shutting down their speech'. Writing about the wider implications of the discussion, Ginsberg also wrote, 'if the reaction to the latest attack is that there are no more debates about free expression, no more speech that one or the other person finds offensive, then the result will not be less offensive speech, it will be no speech at all' (2015).

Salman Rushdie also commented on the issue of free speech in relation to the Charlie Hebdo attacks, arguing that '[f]reedom is indivisible [...] You can't slice it up otherwise it ceases to be freedom. You can dislike Charlie Hebdo... [b]ut the fact that you dislike them has nothing to do with their right to speak' (cited in Associated Press, 2015). Online newspapers also published opinion letters from the public emphasising the value of free speech. One opinion letter stated that '[t]he attack on Charlie Hebdo was an assault on people at the cutting edge of freedom, since they represented the right to make fun of anyone. Killing a person who seeks to make people laugh at themselves is a blow to every free spirit on earth' (cited in Drymen, 2015). Most, if not all, of those who wrote their defences of Charlie Hebdo based on this tightly-held right to freedom of speech were absolute in their opinions. The general argument of these commentators was that Charlie Hebdo had every right to make fun of anyone that they choose and not face any repercussions for their actions. Furthermore, any discussions or reactions that would seek to limit this right to absolute freedom of speech constituted a 'slippery slope' that could lead to censorship and a less 'free' or democratic society.

This argument is one that rested on western liberal traditions. As such, most of the writers that argued this particular line tended to be from Western Europe or North America. It is important to take note of why exactly freedom of speech is held so highly in liberal societies. In Western states, as Erich Kolig writes, 'freedom of speech is intricately tied to a range of other freedoms' (2014, p. 76).
In other words, freedom of speech has become an important ideal in western democracies because it ties into and represents a range of 'freedoms' that are perceived as restricted in other states. This argument is typified in the phrase coined by the far-right Danish People's Party following the *Jyllands-Posten* riots, that 'freedom of speech is Danish, censorship is not' (cited in Keane, 2008, p. 846). Another example of this is when Yale University Press were accused of 'undermining academic freedom' when they chose to omit the *Jyllands-Posten* cartoons from an academic work about the crisis (cited in Glanville, 2009, p. 75). Christopher Hitchens also called the move 'the latest and perhaps the worst episode in the steady surrender to religious extremism' (cited in Glanville, 2009, p. 75). This perhaps illustrates the core of the argument, which harks back to the cultural dichotomy that was created following 9/11. That is, that similar to the way that terrorism is contrasted to liberal western democracy, freedom of speech has become exemplary of western values in contrast to religious extremism, particularly Islamic extremism. Arguably, this is why the discussion around *Charlie Hebdo* and the right to offend became so charged; the debate became an allegory for the apparent clash of western society against Islamic extremism. Free speech (and the right to offend) is in itself, in the West, considered an important cultural value and, in opposition to the perceived threat of Islamic extremism it takes on even more value.

A further extension of this line of thinking is seen in the argument that the call to ban depictions of Muhammad is backward and in opposition to the values of the more advanced, secular, liberal Western societies. Flemming Rose, for example, argued:

Many don't seem to understand the crucial distinction between words and deeds in a liberal democracy. It's a key difference between a free and un-free society, where authorities criminalise words as if they were deeds [...] Until the 17th Century – after the wars of religion in Europe – actions and words were not treated identically throughout Europe. [...] Lately we have witnessed a return of this illiberal way of looking at words and deeds (Rose, 'A Europe Without Blasphemy', 2015).

In Rose's discussion, there is a clear suggestion those who see depictions of Muhammad as blasphemous are trailing the more 'advanced' liberal, 'free' societies which refuse to criminalise speech.

This framing of the argument was particularly pertinent in the US commentary on the massacre. Mike Spradley, for example, noted that the attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices was not so much a direct attack on the magazine, but rather was an attack on the ideology and social freedom that the magazine represented:

I can assure you [...] that neither ISIS nor al-Qaeda require an excuse to murder the innocent or creative. [...] The very fact that republics and democratic governments exist threatens them to the very core of their extremist ideology. Their desire to enslave women, maim, murder and use the Holy Koran as an excuse or impetus to perform these savage acts is actually a greater evil than democracy, or the ideology of western society could ever possibly impose (2015).

Throughout his article, Spradley barely mentions the attack specifically, although it is mentioned in the title of his piece. Rather, he appears to be more interested in invoking this contrast between the advanced and free West and Islamic extremists who use religion as a way to enact their evil upon the former. For Spradley, the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* is simply an example of a battle in what is an ongoing conflict. Furthermore, he wrote that '[t]he excuse that a piece of cartoon or political art depicting the Prophet Mohammad [sic] was licence to murder is absurd' (2015), and ended his article with a call for unity amongst the West:

we in spirit must join the people who gathered in Paris to say we will not sacrifice our democratic societies, no matter how much we may protest their governmental policies. Because our republics and democracies give us certain rights [...] we must stand together and ensure that those rights are protected, defended and shared (2015).

Here Spradley clearly outlines what he sees as battle lines between two opposing ideals: those who use religion as an excuse for violence and those who support democracy and freedom of speech.
Similarly, Peter Jones asked, 'What would the ancients have made of Charlie Hebdo? The First Amendment tolerates that expression of opinions, however, offensive, but not behaviour that can be constructed as a threat. It is a distinction that Greeks and Romans might have been proud of' (2015). Likewise, Christopher J. van der Krogt wrote that it is clear, based on the Koran, 'the notion of free speech as a basic right is quite foreign to traditional Islam' (2014, p. 33). Again, the distinction is drawn between a Western, liberal society and the more backwards, less advanced other. Most discussions that used this 'freedom of speech' argument rely on the rhetorical use of the two 'opposing' civilisations, placing the responsibility of the attack on the 'backward, less advanced' group of Islamic extremists who feel threatened by the freedom of speech that democratic and republican societies of the West allow.

**Depictions of Muhammad**

A number of articles ascribing responsibility solely to the attackers or to Islam in general also went into a detailed analysis of the Koran and whether depictions of Muhammad really are – or should be – considered as blasphemous. In this vein, a number of articles were written following the attack where experts were either interviewed or quoted about the historical and cultural context around depictions of the Prophet. An example of this is John McManus' article 'Have Pictures of Muhammad Always Been Forbidden?' (2015). In this article, McManus looked at the history of depictions of Muhammad throughout recorded history. McManus interviewed experts on the Koran and questioned whether the fact that there are medieval depictions of Muhammad impacts the supposed prohibition of representations of the Prophet. Similarly, Mustafa Akyol wrote in 'Islam's Problem with Blasphemy' that 'wise Muslim religious leaders' should preach non-violent reactions to perceived insults to Muhammad as violence is often seen as immaturity by the wider public (2015). While not all pieces reached the same conclusion on the issue, a significant number found that because the Koran does not specifically state that depictions of Muhammad are forbidden, it is only extremists who have a problem with it and those extremists use religion as an excuse for their violent acts (Akyol, 2015; Spradley, 2015). Thus, the argument that the depiction of Muhammad is forbidden and that people in Western states should respect that prohibition is baseless and is only used to justify an attack on liberal society by extremists.

The most prominent approach writers used when discussing the Koran and the supposed prohibition on the depiction of Muhammad was usually analysing what the Koran actually says on the matter. This analysis, which drew upon previous scholarship, was then used to undermine the point of view that a prohibition on the depiction of Muhammad should be respected in Western society. An example of this is seen in the article that Christaine Gruber, a scholar who specialises in Islamic paintings of Muhammad, wrote in response to the *Charlie Hebdo* attack at the request of *Newsweek* about whether images of the Prophet are banned in Islam. Gruber wrote,

> The Koran does not prohibit figural imagery. Rather, it castigates the worship of idols […] Moreover, the *Hadith*, or Sayings of the Prophet, present us with an ambiguous picture at best […] If we turn to Islamic law, there does not exist a single legal decree, or *fatwa*, in the historical corpus that explicitly and decisively prohibits figural imagery, including images of the Prophet (2015).

Gruber then went on to state that the closest to a law forbidding the depiction of any figure came from the Taliban in 2001 when they wanted to destroy the Buddhas of Bamiyan and stated that all non-Islamic shrines and statues in Afghanistan should be destroyed (2015). However, as Gruber stated, 'this very modern decree remains entirely silent on the issue of figural images and sculptures within Islam' (2015).

This argument was based on scholarship that already existed prior to the *Charlie Hebdo* shootings, which had a similar thesis when discussing the Koran and Islam: that the doctrine does not contain any explicit prohibition. Furthermore, even if it did, it has no impact on those outside the religion and those who are pushing for a ban or even protesting depictions of Muhammad are either extremists or are blindly following an increasing wave of extremism within Islam or in Muslim-
majority states. Stephen Schwartz, writing in 2006, argued that the prohibition of depictions of Muhammad is directly tied to the rise of Wahhabism in the 18th century, but to this day there is no ‘firm and universal rule’ on the issue (p. 29). Schwartz then went on to discuss the Jyllands-Posten cartoons and wrote, ‘even if there were Muslim unanimity banning depiction of living beings or even the prophet, no normal Muslim believes that such rules apply to non-Muslims. Mainstream Muslims do not claim that the rules of the religion must be followed by those outside it’ (emphasis mine) (2006, p. 30). Responses to the Charlie Hebdo attack which focused on the issue of depicting Muhammad, tended to echo scholarship like that of Schwartz which concludes that the prohibition on depictions of the prophet is an extremist act in itself. Akyol, for example, went into specifics about the doctrine on the Koran in order to aid his discussion. He wrote:

> the Quran decrees no earthly punishment for blasphemy – or for apostasy (abandonment or renunciation of the faith), a related concept. Nor, for that matter, does the Quran command stoning, female circumcision or a ban on fine arts. All these doctrinal innovations, as it were, were brought into the literature of Islam as medieval scholars interpreted it, according to the norms of their time and milieu (2015).

Akyol pointed to a passage of the Koran which states ‘God has told you in the Book that when you hear God's revelations disbelieved in and mocked at, do not sit with them until they enter into some other discourse’ (cited in Akyol, 2015) as being the basis of blasphemy laws in Koran before the toughening of Shariah law which led to more extreme laws in regards to blasphemy. He took a similar approach as other writers when discussing the Koran, suggesting that, “do not sit with them” - that is the response the Quran suggests for mockery. Not violence. Not even censorship’ (2015).

**Satire**

Another example of the Je suis Charlie argument is that, not only is the liberal tradition of freedom of speech under attack with the targeting of the Charlie Hebdo staff, but that satire is also being assaulted. Similar to both previous arguments, this discussion centred on the threat posed by radical Islam to the 'freedoms' and traditions of the West. In this vein, some commentators overviewed a brief history of satire and how it works in order to show that, not only were Charlie Hebdo justified in their political commentary, but also that despite some calling their works racist, they are anything but. Max Fisher, for example, wrote, ‘that's what's tricky about two-layer satire like Charlie Hebdo: the joke only works if you see both layers [...] if you don't see that layer, then the covers can say something very different and very racist’ (‘What Everybody Gets Wrong About Charlie Hebdo and Racism’, 2015). Furthermore, online blog comments from French citizens also took this approach. One Frenchwoman wrote, 'American commentators have taken Charlie Hebdo cartoons out of context, representing the newspaper's parodies of right-wing racism as depictions of Charlie Hebdo's own ideas and beliefs [...] NO ONE in France considered Charlie Hebdo as racist' (cited in Miller, 2015). While some pointed out the inherent problematic elements of this argument (Kenan Malik, for example, wrote, 'What is really racist is the idea only nice white liberals want to challenge religion or demolish its pretensions or can handle satire or ridicule' (cited in Miller, 2015)), most did not touch on the other side of the argument. Rather, they drew on the dichotomy of the socially advanced Western society being under attack from those who are too reliant on religion and conservatism.

Looking more closely at this focus on satire the first aspect of the argument that needs addressing is the history of satire and the way that writers use in order to make their point. Satire, of course, has its roots in ancient Greece. As Anjali Suniti Bal et al write, 'Satire, the use of ridicule, irony or sarcasm to lampoon something or someone, is derived from the Greek for burlesque – an artistic composition used to generate laughter' (2009, p. 231). Further, as Virginia Ingram argues, satire can be seen as sacred because it has often generated persecution. She notes, 'As early as the seventh century BCE it was thought that Archilochus' satire was demonic and had the power to kill its intended target' (2015, p. 2). She then links this to the reaction to satire today, noting that it is still seen by many as injurious (2015, p. 2). In his article, 'Ancient and Modern: Socrates and Charlie Hebdo' Jones posits that throughout the history of satire a ‘whole range of imaginable scatological, sexual and verbal abuse [was] aimed directly at named or recognisable individuals' (2015), so in that
sense, the work of *Charlie Hebdo* is not new or shocking, rather it is a prime example of satire. Jones concludes, however, that 'the ancients would have had no truck with Charlie Hebdo' mainly because of the way that it treated religion, something seen as sacred and containing in the ancient world (2015).

One aspect that was often emphasised throughout these historic narratives of satire is the political nature, or rather, the political value of satire. Historically speaking, satire has focused on politics and politicians. As stated above, religion was seen as sacred and containing and thus was seen as out of bounds for public ridicule. Today, however, the intermingling of political and religious issues has become commonplace and religion is seen by many as worthy of ridicule. When talking specifically about the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks and the magazine's brand of humour, Ralph Steadman stated, 'It is quite reasonable for the reader to be offended [by their type of humour]. It's less reasonable to enter an office armed with two kalashnikovs and a grenade. Most people would regard that as something of an overreaction' (cited in Chalmers, 2015).

Furthermore, as Suniti Bal *et al* write, in the eighteenth century the word 'satire' was used specifically to refer to political cartoons (2009, p. 230). This argument assumes that satire as a whole, and cartooning more specifically can resist unwanted political change. As Robert Chalmers argues, there is a psychopathic character in one of my books who is described as dangerous because he believed that the pen was mightier than the sword, but didn't always have a pen to hand. People all over the world, on the streets and on social media, are finding all kinds of visual ways to rework that old proverb. This shooting could place cartoonists at the heart of contemporary conflict rather in the way that poetry became the most important form of artistic expression in the First World War (2015).

Another example of this way of thinking is demonstrated by David Feltmate who claims that, 'satire is a weapon which is directed with moral force at a target' (2013, p. 228). In other words, it is seen as a safe and accepted outlet for political discontent, making fun of those in power and the decisions that they make; a humorous form of protest. Furthermore, some commentators emphasise the potential for satire to challenge hierarchies, norms and official policies (Bigi *et al.*, 2011, p. 153; Hutcheon cited in Day, 2011, p. 12; Day, 2011, p. 12). This kind of protectionist argument towards satire can be seen in articles like Anthony Hatcher's 'Religious Satire can be a Positive Thing' written following the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre. He writes, 'Satire for good purposes from religious sources [...] should be protected speech, and satire from secular sources that degrades religion and deities and prophets should be just as protected' (2015). Steadman even goes as far as saying that cartooning as a form of visual satire can be more affecting than the written word. He notes, 'Sometimes you can't communicate the idea or emotion, but a drawing can. You can draw something, and people say, 'Oh, I see what you're getting at now' (cited in Chalmers, 2015).

The emphasis on the value of visual satire in the form of cartoons feeds into (or rather comes out of) organisations like *Cartooning for Peace* (*Dessins pour la Paix*), an initiative which aims to highlight the political journalistic value of cartooning and visual satire and the importance of freedom of expression. They also display some of the most powerful works of international artists to communities like schools as well as providing support and encouragement for the artists themselves. Following the attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices the cartoonist Plantu, a member of the initiative, noted 'Cartooning for Peace had been created for the very purpose of creating bridges between people, religions and regions and that cartoonists' work was “stronger” than the “barbaric acts” committed by the “cowards”' (cited in McKenzie, 2015). Furthermore, on the International Day of Peace (September 14) of 2015 the collective released a series of 'Vines' on the importance of freedom of speech.

The emphasis on the history and political value of satire within the *Je suis Charlie* response as well as the sacred nature of satirical works like *Charlie Hebdo* created a thesis in favour of liberal progressiveness in the face of the extremists who were presented as more reactionary in their politics. The actions of the Kouachi brothers and reactions to *Charlie Hebdo* are aligned, in this argument, as specifically against the West and Western ideals. The *Charlie Hebdo* attack was framed as not simply
an attack on one magazine office, but rather an attack on the sacredness of satire and, thus, freedom of political thought.

To further this idea, some writers analysed the number of covers of Charlie Hebdo that featured an Islamic subject on the cover. The analysis of covers is used to show that the magazine is not racist and the editorial staff did not target the minority population of Muslims disproportionately, as some in the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement have suggested. For example, Ilia Blinderman wrote, 'Religion is clearly of considerable import to Charlie Hebdo's editors; its weight, however, fails to exceed that of political concerns' (2015). Blinderman used the analysis of cover subjects to argue that although Charlie Hebdo did feature what some consider to be racist depictions of Muslims of its cover, the magazine did not 'single out' Islam. Instead, 'The magazine reserves the majority of its satire for those in power, irrespective of their political affiliations, lambasting former centre-right president Nicolas Sarkozy and current left-leaning president Francois Hollande more than any other figures [...] the hard-line National Front party and its xenophobic leader, Marine LePen claiming a third' (2015). Speaking specifically about religion on the covers of the magazine Blinderman wrote, 'Islam is hardly the only religion addressed in the magazine's pages. France's longstanding tradition of ridiculing faith is proudly upheld by Charlie Hebdo, with Catholicism, and Christianity in general, receiving constant and consistent salvos of criticism' (2015). Blinderman went one step further in his analysis of the Charlie Hebdo covers, asserting his position firmly in the Je suis Charlie camp, with the claim that:

Moreover, in addition to the fact that the magazine has fielded over a dozen lawsuits from Catholic organisations and a single one from a Muslim group in 2011, it merits a mention that covers deemed inordinately offensive to Christians – such as a graphic ménage-à-trois comprising God, Jesus and the holy ghost – failed to meet with violent reprisals (2015).

In other words, according to Blinderman, Charlie Hebdo was not only not singling out Islam or practising a form of Islamophobia but rather it covered Muslim extremism as a part of its focus on politics, religion, and satirising people in power. It is not at their feet that the blame for the attack lies, rather it is those who chose to react violently to the magazine's brand of humour.

French Secularism

Most writers who placed responsibility for the attack solely on those who committed it tended to ignore the fact that the Kouachi brothers were French born and raised, focusing instead on how the cartoons appear racist to foreigners, but, in fact, are not (Fisher, 'What Everyone Gets Wrong', 2015; Miller, 2015; Blinderman, 2015). When their French nationality is mentioned, the crux of the argument generally became the importance of the French societal context; that is, the importance of French secularism and rationalism. The range of discussions here were based predominantly upon the assumption that secularism and rationalism in French society (and history) is incredibly important and thus, needs to be protected from any religious encroachment, and that such encroachment is simply not 'French'. This is made most explicit in the editorial of the Charlie Hebdo issue following the attack:

We are going to hope that starting January 7, 2015, a firm defense of secularism will go without saying for everyone, that people will finally stop [...] legitimizing or even tolerating communalism and cultural relativism, which only opens the door to one thing: religious totalitarianism [...] there are several tools that can be used to try to resolve these serious problems, but they're all useless without secularism (cited in Anderson, 'The New Charlie Hebdo’s Editor’s Letter is a Passionate Defense of Secularism’, 2015).

It is secularism (particularly French secularism) that was held up by these editors as the most important ideal to be protected in the wake of the attacks.

Similarly, articles that followed this argument spoke of the importance of laïcité (public secularism) in France. Commentators writing using this particular line of argument also discussed the history of secularism in France to highlight its historical importance. They also overviewed the 'headscarf debate' and eventual banning of the headscarf in public schools to exemplify the
relationship between secular France and Muslim communities. Finally, they discussed how France's policy of integrating religious minorities into French culture, expecting them to assimilate to and abide by French core values impacts those who see themselves first and foremost as a part of a religious community rather than part of the larger national one. While these arguments fully placed responsibility for the attack with the attackers themselves, and completely exonerate the Charlie Hebdo staff from playing a role in their own deaths, they also tended to cover a more nuanced discussion of the way that the Muslim community interacts with and feels at home in a state where secularism is a tightly-held value and a major part of national identity.

The first way that writers used the French context to ascribe responsibility for the attack with the attackers is by detailing the history of secularism in France. This historical process was then used to describe the important and exceptional nature of secularism as a core value in French society. Joseph Bahout, for example, wrote:

Charlie Hebdo is only one of the remote and natural products of an enduring well-entrenched French tradition. This collective culture traces back to the “Gaulois” ancestry, an exuberant, turbulent, and undisciplined individualistic mind. […] This later became an added Voltarian pre- and post- Revolutionary Enlightenment thinking, one with permanent doubt – especially related to established dogmas and religions […] This culture believed in the right to think and to say whatever came to mind (2015).

Here, Bahout argued that although the attitude towards religion shown in Charlie Hebdo is not exceptional, there is something about the general French attitude towards it that is. Thus:

[distinctive of any other Western country this sentiment is unique to France, and from it stemmed a strong posture of anti-clericalism […] In this respect, France's version of secularism […] is so typical and idiosyncratic that it is not only quite impossible to translate to another language, be it English or Arabic, but also conceptually difficult to equate in other mental political systems (2015).

In other words, the secularist and rationalist society of France is seen by some as exceptional and the attack on the offices was not to defend the Muslim faith but rather to attack French secularism (and Western freedom of religion as a whole). This view can be seen in interviews with Charlie Hebdo's co-editor Gerard Biard, following the attack. He stated, 'Every time that we draw a cartoon of Muhammad, every time that we draw a cartoon of the Prophet, every time that we draw a cartoon of God, we defend the freedom of religion […] Religion should not be a political argument' (cited in Watkins, 2015).

This argument is based upon the history of secularism in France and the place it holds as a core value of the Republic. The separation between the church and the state was first enshrined in law in the 1905 loi de Séparation des Églises et del l’État (Law of the Separation of Churches and the State) and the concept of laïcité was mentioned in the constitution of the Fourth Republic (1946) and the Fifth Republic (1958). Although this principle was first used in order to decrease the role of the Catholic Church in French society, in a wider sense it worked to push religious practices into the private sphere and decrease the role of religion as a primary identifying factor. Jean-Paul Willaime writes that although secularism is an historical value in France, a distrust of religion and religious organisation has increased in recent years because of a perceived increase in religious extremism as well as the growth in the number of the population practising previously minority religions (2004, p. 377).

This history of the separation of church and state is, therefore, specifically tied to the history of the concept of laïcité, a concept that although hard to define in English is central to the French secular ideal. This concept was often brought up in discussions of French secularism as well as the response to the attack within France. For example, in an article about French institutional responses to the attack, Maïa de la Baume wrote about how there was a turn to increase the emphasis on secular values in French schools. She explained, 'French schools already have a secular code of conduct, but about 1,000 teachers and staff members would be trained on questions of “laïcité”. [Education
minister, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem] promised that a day devoted to secular laws would be celebrated once a year in every school’ (2015).

It is important here to explore what exactly laïcité is, what place it holds and French society, and why it is considered such a core value that following a terrorist attack it would be emphasised and strengthened within schools. L.V. Anderson defines the concept as 'secularism in the public sphere' and writes that it is a 'traditional core value in France' (‘The New Charlie Hebdo Editor’s Letter’, 2015). Kay Chadwick writes that 'the concept of laïcité in France is inextricably associated with the Republican ideal of liberté, égalité, fraternité, and represents a principle element at the heart of modern French identity' (2008, p. 47). She writes that its original definition was in the separation of the Catholic Church from the state of the republic and became more prominent after the state stopped recognising and subsidising any religion in the early 19th century (Chadwick, 2008, pp. 47-48). In its first formalised definition, established in 1880s following the complete separation of religion from state education the concept of laïcité had multiple parts:

in philosophical terms, secularism emphasised rationalism, intellectual progress and the ideals of the Enlightenment; its moral idea denied morality was the preserve of religion and promoted a universal moral identity based on a notion of human rights and responsibilities as encapsulated in the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (26 August 1789); its political project is also manifestly linked to the ideals of the 1789 Revolution as, for example, in its promotion of democracy and its opposition to political Catholicism; its cultural aim was to improve and to transform society through material progress' (Chadwick, 2008, pp. 49-50).

Chadwick writes that in a way secularism 'became the new 'religion' of France, complete with its own systems, dogma and values (2008, p. 50). Today, however, laïcité represents the freedom of religion within the state (Chadwick, 2008, p. 53). This is complicated by the integration of minority religious communities within France; the secularist values, which are long ingrained and promoted throughout French history, start to work in opposition to the freedom of religion which laïcité officially promotes. Thus, those who identify primarily as a part of a religious grouping become disadvantaged within the secular society. It is this French emphasis on secularism that a lot of the discussion that supports Charlie Hebdo's right to depict Muhammad, as well as to satirise Islam in a general sense, rests upon.

This clash could clearly be seen in the recent 'headscarf debate' which dominated French politics and led to the banning of the headscarf in public schools (as well as other 'conspicuous' religious iconography). The headscarf took on the role of representation of the increasing Muslim minority in France as well as the role of religion in the public sphere instead of the private. Like the discussion following the Charlie Hebdo massacre, this revealed the extent of the debate in France over the role of religion and whether it should be allowed to be 'visible' in the public sphere. This is an important discussion as it shows the extent of France's secularism and gives some context over the place that Islam holds and the attitudes towards it in French society and politics. Those that campaigned to stop the wearing of the headscarf in public schools used a similar argument to those who wrote in favour of secular ideals and absolute freedom of speech with regard to religion following the Charlie Hebdo massacre. As Willaime writes, 'France is unable to accept fully forms of cultural pluralism that are, or appear to be tied to a foreign culture, or forms of religion that refuse to confine themselves to the private sphere or to the domain of worship' (2004, p. 379). More specifically about the headscarf he writes, 'Wearing the veil becomes […] a symbol of clerical influence, the alienation of the female, and the justification for a new mobilization of laïcité as a fundamental value of the French Republic' (2004, p. 380). Although many writers acknowledge that women wear a headscarf or veil for different reasons and may willingly choose to do so, the main thrust of the argument seemed to come back to the role of religion in the public sphere and how certain religions (read: Islam) conflicts or is seen to undermine core French societal values. This, however, is not to oversimplify the debate and attitude of the French towards Islam. Several commissions have been held with one recommending that religious holidays be included in the school calendar in order to reflect the changing of the 'French spiritual landscape' (cited in Fernando, 2005, p. 15), and bodies to represent Muslim minority populations have also been created, such as the French Council of the Muslim Faith.
This all, of course, has to do with the approach of the French state towards religious and ethnic minorities within France. France has an integrationist approach to these communities which means that these minorities are 'integrated' within French national identity; i.e. that they are primarily identified as French as opposed to belonging to a cultural or religious group. In other words, minority populations are integrated into the French 'universalist model of nationhood based on republican values [which] awards citizenship, in principle […] without distinguishing their religion, culture or race' (Resnik, 2010, p. 203). France itself has the largest Muslim population in Europe, which is a mix of French-born Muslims, immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. The Muslim population of France sits at about 8 percent of the total French population (Bowen, 2015, p. 18). This integrationist approach towards minority populations has created, for some, a fear of 'communalism' in the Muslim communities. Communalism refers to Muslim populations living and interacting only amongst themselves, in other words, emphasising their religious or ethnic identity more than their national identity (Bowen, 2015, p. 20). As Jonathan Laurence writes, 'Since September 11th, French officials have accelerated efforts to “de-transnationalize” the cross-border solidarity of Muslims in Europe […] governments have aimed to shelter Muslim minorities from transnational political and religious pressures' (2005, p. 39), which further emphasises this integrationist approach towards ethnic and religious minorities.

It is this French context of integration and secularism that many of the Je suis Charlie response rests upon. The argument tended to be one that allowed Charlie Hebdo the right to depict Muhammad and satirise Islam. These two parts of French society were held up as the epitome of Western ideals integrated within the state. The long history, similarly to that of satire, of secularism in French society, as well as its history in creating policy in order to enforce secularism in the public sphere was presented as something to be celebrated (cited in Anderson, ‘The New Charlie Hebdo Editor’s Letter’, 2015). It was also presented as the very thing that the Kouachi brothers were against, and drew upon the dualism between Western and Islamic values (Bandow, 2015; Biard, cited in Watkins, 2015; Bahout, 2015; Charlie Hebdo, cited in Anderson, ‘The New Charlie Hebdo Editor’s Letter’, 2015).

**Conclusion**

The Je suis Charlie argument placed the responsibility for the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices solely onto those who committed the attacks. However, as an extension of this, some people who would consider themselves as defenders of the magazine place the responsibility of the attack not only on the Kourachi brothers or on 'terrorists' but rather on the larger Islamic international community. From this perspective Muslim people are viewed as a threat to the 'Western' way of life, their core values or ideals. This argument was one that rested upon the ideas that were born out of the 'War on Terror' that emphasise the importance of Western values and saw those values as being in direct contrast to those presented in Islam.

The more considered and less directly Islamophobic arguments in the Je suis Charlie movement rested upon a similar thought process. Some posited that the massacre is emblematic of an attack on free speech, one of the most tightly-held western ideals and that even if Charlie Hebo pushed boundaries on their depictions of Muslims and their treatment of the Muslim faith, they had a right to and should not have been 'punished' for their editorial decisions. Furthering this argument, those who argued within the Je suis Charlie viewpoint also analysed the Koran and drew attention to whether or not depictions of Muhammad are actually forbidden, or should be considered forbidden, in the Muslim faith. This argument worked to undermine the position of both extremists and moderates who rally against depictions of the Prophet and worked to prove that it is completely unreasonable to expect non-Muslim publications to ascribe to Muslim-created prohibition.

With this side of the argument writers ascribed no responsibility to the Charlie Hebdo editorial staff and argued that they were well within their rights to depict Muhammad in the way that they did. This fed into the larger argument about the importance of satire in the West and the long tradition and political importance of cartooning in history. To those who advanced such an argument, publications
like *Charlie Hebdo* are important because they speak a universal truth through their cartoons and are able to connect with political issues in a way that other modes of communication cannot. Therefore, there are no grounds for attacking them.

Some commentators on the attacks also went over the importance of secularism and rationalism within France, emphasising the importance of the separation of church and state. They looked at the French perspective and how it works to integrate minorities within a French identity, placing emphasis on a national identity rather than a religious or ethnic one.

At the heart of all of these different approaches and points that make up the *Je suis Charlie* argument was the seemingly fundamental difference between Western and Muslim populations as well as the idea of collective responsibility. The two 'sides' were presented as being separate idealistically and having completely different value systems. Whether speaking of extremists, terrorists, or moderate Muslim populations, they were treated as separate and different from the 'majority' population. They were presented as being a part of a religion that is both at odds with Western values and the Western way of life as well as acting violently in order to limit the amount of freedoms that Western ideals allow. Therefore, according to this argument, the staff at *Charlie Hebdo* could in no way be seen as being in anyway responsible for the attack on their staff as they were simply acting in a way that neatly and completely ties in to western values and working within an established Western tradition. This placed fault on the shoulders of those who committed the attacks, terrorists organisations in general, or, for some, even the larger Muslim population, whose opinions and values were treated as less important and less correct because they were seen as not working alongside, those valued and correct traditions and beliefs of the West. This argument rests strongly on the dualism between the West and Islam that the narrative of the 'War on Terror' created. Terrorism was presented as being a violent attack on Western values and the wider collective of Muslims is presented as being more ideologically aligned with the extremist terrorist narrative rather than with Western values. Therefore, for those within the *Je suis Charlie* narrative, the proper response to terrorism, like the *Charlie Hebdo* attack, was one that celebrated and lauded core Western values, highlighting their important role in Western society.
Chapter 2: Problematising Responsibility

Following the popularity of the Je suis Charlie response to the attack and the prominence of the hashtag on social media, responses to the movement emerged which took issue with many of the points raised in Je suis Charlie. These responses worked to problematise the arguments that were set forth in the Je suis Charlie movement and took issue with the way in which it assigned responsibility. Although these responses did not condone the attack on the magazine, they worked to argue against aligning the wider public response with the editorial stance of the magazine. The first of these responses came in direct response to Je suis Charlie and were critical of the magazine, their viewpoints and content. This Je ne suis pas Charlie response ascribed partial responsibility to the Charlie Hebdo editorial staff. The main issues that those who aligned themselves against the magazine argued were: that the editorial stance of the magazine was irresponsible at best, and at worst racist; that the West's clinging to the concept of free speech is extreme and that, particularly those in the media, need to employ a more responsible form of speech; and finally, that Charlie Hebdo acted unethically and irresponsibly in producing the content that they did. The second response which problematised the assigning of responsibility was one that looked at the role that Charlie Hebdo played in French society and the impact that its content had on the marginalisation of Muslims in France. Unlike Je ne suis pas Charlie, this perspective focused on assigning responsibility to French (and Western) society in general, rather than to the magazine itself. It was, therefore, from within the Je ne suis pas Charlie response and the wider response to the Je suis Charlie movement that the issue over responsibility for the attack became contentious.

Je ne Suis pas Charlie

Where the Je suis Charlie response argued that the magazine was in no way responsible for the attack on their offices, the Je ne suis pas Charlie response assigned responsibility more ambiguously. Although the majority of writers did not explicitly state that the magazine bore some responsibility for the attack, almost all implicitly assigned responsibility more equally between the victims and attackers. In general, those who responded to the attack in alignment with Je ne suis pas Charlie, looked at the social issues around the attack and concluded that the magazine, through the content that they produced, contributed to the marginalisation and isolation of Muslim community. They then argue that this marginalisation is a cause of extremism which could then lead to attacks like those on the Charlie Hebdo offices. In essence, those aligned with the Je ne suis pas Charlie response saw the magazine contributing to wider issues which cause extremism and terrorism in the West and thus, that it bore some responsibility, either directly or indirectly, for the attack.

Racism

One of the tenets of the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument is that although the attacks themselves weren't justified, the depictions of the Muslim community as well as that of Muhammad were racist and thus the magazine should not be defended. This argument is focused on the opinion that the magazine had a racist or xenophobic agenda and took issue, in particular, with the magazine’s depiction of Muhammad. The Je ne suis pas Charlie argument used this idea that the magazine was racist as a way of partially assigning responsibility to the magazine's staff. For example, writing for The Catholic League website, Bill Donohue, a sociologist and civil activist, wrote that although terrorism like the shooting of the Charlie Hebdo offices 'cannot be tolerated' he also suggested that the magazine staff, and Stéphane Charbonnier in particular, played a role in what happened to them (2015). He states that 'What unites Muslims in their anger against Charlie Hebdo is the vulgar manner in which Muhammad has been portrayed… I am in total agreement with them' (2015). Writing more specifically about the role Charbonnier played in the attack Donohue wrote, 'It is too bad that he didn't understand the role he played in his tragic death … Had he not been so narcissistic [in his reaction to previous attempts on his life], he may still be alive' (2015). It is worth highlighting here that Donohue was writing for a Catholic-centred website and that the Catholic Church and the Pope were also
prominent targets for Charlie Hebdo's humour, so his stance on the magazine may have already been established prior to the shooting.

However, Donohue was not the only party that considered the staff at Charlie Hebdo at least partly responsible for the shooting. Following the attack, the Muslim Action Forum (MAF) in London promoted a gathering for the Muslim community in London. At this gathering the group expressed 'deep regret' at the attacks and said they were a 'violation of Islamic law' (Associated Press, 'British Muslims Gather in London', 2015) but stopped short of completely absolving Charlie Hebdo of responsibility for the attacks. At the rally, some people held signs with messages like 'Charlie and the abuse factory' and 'learn some manners' and a leaflet circulated by the MAF noted that Charlie Hebdo's publishing of cartoons featuring the Prophet was a 'stark reminder' that the freedom of speech argument is 'regularly utilised to insult personalities that others consider sacred' (Associated Press, 'British Muslims Gather in London', 2015). In explaining their position towards Charlie Hebdo following the attack, Shaykh Tauqir Ishaq, a senior spokesperson for MAF said,

Perpetual mistakes by extremists, either by cold-blooded killers or uncivilised expressionists, cannot be the way forward for a civilised society. The peace-loving majority of people must become vociferous in promoting global civility and responsible debate (2015, cited in Associated Press, 'British Muslims Gather in London, 2015).

In this case, although the MAF were not defending the terror attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices they do place responsibility for the attack equally on the shoulders of the 'cold-blooded killers' and the 'uncivilised expressionists' (the Charlie Hebdo staff). According to the quote above, both sides made 'mistakes' that led to what happened. In a similar vein, Jacob Canfield wrote about Charlie Hebdo's work that:

even by the most generous assessment [they are] incredibly racist cartoons. Hebdo's goal is to provoke, and these cartoons make it very clear who the white editorial staff was interested in provoking: France's incredibly marginalised, often attacked, Muslim immigrant community (2015).

Canfield also argued that '[t]he statement, 'Je Suis Charlie' works to erase and ignore the magazine's history of xenophobia, racism and homophobia' and '[f]or us to truly honor the victims of a terrorist attack on free speech, we must not spread hateful racism blithely' (2015). Here, again, although he did not justify the attack on the offices, Canfield expressed that those who worked for the magazine 'provoked' the Muslim community through what he considers to be racist cartoons. This argument implicitly ascribes some responsibility back on to the victims of the attack.

Jordan Weissmann also wrote that the depiction of Muhammad in Charlie Hebdo's cartoons was racist, stating, 'the cartoonists simply rendered Islam's founder as a hook-nosed wretch straight out of Edward Said's nightmares, seemingly for no purpose beyond antagonising Muslims who, rightly or wrongly, believe that depicting Mohammed at all is blasphemous' (2015). The one uniting stance that all these writers make is that the cartoons published by Charlie Hebdo were deliberately racist (or at least deliberately intended to provoke) and that because of this fact they were partly responsible for the attacks on their offices.

However, not all of those who aligned themselves with the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument ascribed responsibility to the victims of the attack. Greg Laden, for example, stated, '[a]t the very least, the [publishing of the cartoons] is not polite, is harassment, and racism' (2015). However, he does not ascribe any responsibility for the attack with the staff of the magazine. Similarly, L. V. Anderson, writing for Slate, argued 'You can decline to purchase Charlie Hebdo on the grounds that the cartoons are racist and inflammatory and simultaneously believe that Charlie Hebdo has a right to publish those cartoons freely and without the threat of violence' ('You Don't Have to Subscribe to Charlie Hebdo to Make a Statement About Free Speech', 2015). While Anderson and Laden write from the perspective that the cartoons published in Charlie Hebdo were racist or xenophobic, and they fit in more with the Je ne suis pas Charlie perspective, they stop short of ascribing any responsibility of the attack onto the shoulders of the staff of the magazine.
Despite this, the attitude that the magazine was racist and provocative and thus bears some responsibility for what happened is a common thread throughout the *Je ne suis pas Charlie* argument. An extension of this line of thought identifies the freedom of speech argument, insofar as it is related to the *Je suis Charlie* viewpoint, as often used to insult minority populations and lead to their further marginalisation. Canfield, for example, writes:

Political correctness did not kill twelve people at the *Charlie Hebdo* offices. To talk about this attack as an attack by ‘political correctness’ is the most disgusting, self-serving martyr bullshit I can imagine […] To invoke this garbage cartoon is to assert that white male cartoonist should never have to hear any complaints when they gleefully attack marginalised groups (2015).

Here, Canfield’s argument is clear: the argument that freedom of speech should be unlimited and uncriticised furthers the marginalisation of the Muslim population in the West and that by embracing the *Je suis Charlie* movement one is embracing a xenophobic and racist perspective.

Weissmann posits a similar argument in his article ‘*Charlie Hebdo* is Heroic and Racist’. As stated above, he writes that the way that Muhammed is depicted is based on racist stereotypes but then takes his argument a step further by linking those depictions to a wider context. He writes:

This, in a country where Muslims are a poor and harassed minority, maligned by a growing nationalist movement that has used liberal values like secularism and free speech to cloak garden-variety xenophobia, France is the place, remember, where the concept of free expression has failed to stop politicians from banning headscarves and burqas. *Charlie Hebdo* may claim to be a satirical, equal-opportunity offender. But there's good reason critics have compared it to a 'white power mag' (2015).

Similar to Canfield, Weissmann acknowledged that these cartoons were not published within a vacuum and what the world united around (*Je suis Charlie*) following the attack contained values and attitudes that further side-lined and undermined the position and protest of the Muslim population.

Stepping away from commentary and news reporting following the attack, arguments associated with the *Je ne suis pas Charlie* argument were also evident within the banlieues (suburbs) around Paris. As Henri Astier showed in his article on the reactions to the massacre in Parisian schools, while students in the more middle-class suburbs around Paris embraced the *Je suis Charlie* message, those living in the more working class or marginalised banlieues did not (‘*Charlie Hebdo* Attack: French Values Challenged in Schools’, 2015). In Saint-Denis (one of the poorest suburbs in Paris) one teacher expressed shock that the students seemed unconcerned with the attack and although some were confused because they consider Islam a peaceful religion and others were vocal about the right to offend religion, their attitudes were 'not the prevailing voice there' (Roder, 2015, cited in Astier, ‘French Values Challenged’, 2015). Another teacher stated that she was 'completely unprepared' for the reaction that her students, most of whom were from upwardly-mobile migrant families, had to the attack. She noted, 'I heard that they [the journalists] got what was coming to them. You do not mock the prophet' (cited in Astier, ‘French Values Challenged’, 2015). She also noted that while her students did observe the nation-wide minute of silence she felt it was more out of respect for her than for the victims (Astier, ‘French Values Challenged’, 2015). Days later she found her *Je suis Charlie* poster had been taken down and spat on and a student was caught re-enacting the massacre shouting 'Allahu Akbar' and miming shooting a Kalashnikov (Astier, ‘French Values Challenged’, 2015). Some students refused to observe the minute of silence all together (Astier, ‘French Values Challenged’, 2015). While these attitudes could be put down to teenagers behaving in an intentional anti-establishment, angry way, reports like Astier's show that while many in France responded with the arguably unifying *Je suis Charlie* response, not all did. In fact, the reports of students in poorer and mainly migrant-heavy areas of Paris may have felt marginalised even further by the *Je suis Charlie* message and thus embraced the *Je ne suis pas Charlie* argument as a result.

Another aspect of the *Je ne suis pas Charlie* argument that needs to be emphasized is the way that the freedom of speech argument in the *Je suis Charlie* movement is often used to defend offensive speech against a certain kind of people and is thrown away when offensive speech is made about
others. This harks back into the fact that the Muslim population in France is largely marginalised and under-represented and also ties into the specifically French history of colonisation as well as their own occupation during World War II and the after effects that are still existent today. For example, in numerous articles that identify with the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument, the example of Dieudonné M’bala M’bala is deployed to show how certain offensive speech is criminalised in France while the cartoons in Charlie Hebdo which they consider to be racist and offensive, are lauded as examples of the importance of free speech and French secular values (Malik, ‘Don’t Limit Free Speech in France’, 2015; Karlekar, 2015, cited in Trowbridge, 2015; New York Times, 2015). Following the unity rally in Paris, M’bala M’bala wrote ‘I feel like Charlie Coulibaly’ on his Facebook page, referencing Amedy Coulibaly, the man who held four hostages at gunpoint in a supermarket in Paris immediately following the Charlie Hebdo massacre. M’bala M’bala publicly stated, following his arrest, that the post was made to point to the fact that he felt isolated and alone due to the public unity behind Charlie Hebdo while his work is persecuted by authorities (Dodds, 2015). However, after making this post he began to be investigated for ‘defending terrorism’ (Malik, ‘Don't Limit Free Speech’, 2015). Previously, M’bala M’bala had been arrested and convicted several times for anti-Semitic hate speech. However, M’bala M’bala is popular within the banlieues of Paris and to many he represents the double standard within French society: the double standard that is the ‘right of a satirical magazine to mock Islam is held sacred […] yet Muslims are forbidden to express views that others may consider offensive’ (Malik, ‘Don't Limit Free Speech’, 2015). This of course, comes back to the history of France.

While hate speech is a crime in France it is specifically tied to anti-Semitism and came into effect following the Nazi occupation of France during World War II. It could be seen as a law to ensure that the crimes that occurred during that occupation never happen again and there are similar laws in other European countries that were either occupied or run by a Nazi government or that participated in the Holocaust (New York Times, 2015). Similarly, in France it is illegal to question the truthfulness of crimes that fall under the umbrella term of ‘crimes against humanity’ and thus, for example, Holocaust denial is illegal in France. However, it was decided in 2012 that this law did not extend to cover denial of the Armenian genocide as this would violate the right to freedom of speech (CNN Wire Staff, 2012). In 2014 France also became the first country to ban pro-Palestine demonstrations (Wadi, 2015). These laws are specifically tied to the history of France and though they are not explicitly about anti-Semitism they are closely tied with or used in protection of Jewish people (Malik, ‘Britain and France, Censorship and Identity’, 2015). However, it is also arguable that anti-hate speech laws are often not applied to Muslim people because of their position within French society. The wider Muslim population are often seen as a conservative and fundamentalist force within France which tends to pride itself on its secular nature and many of the Muslim population within France are either immigrants or descendants of immigrants from French colonies. There could possibly be a more historically racist assumption about them or at the very least an ‘othering’ of them, through the attitude that they are not really a part of French society, which is then used to justify discrimination against them (Malik, ‘Britain and France’, 2015).

In summary, the first major argument that is contained within the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement is one that was in direct response to Je suis Charlie’s lauding of free speech and centred around the issue of racism. While no writer explicitly stated that the staff at Charlie Hebdo were fully responsible for the attack that occurred, they place some blame for the attack on the provocative and perceived racist content of the magazine. The main thrust of this argument is that in producing the racist content that they did, the staff at Charlie Hebdo both contributed to the creation and deliberately provoked the attention of Muslim extremists. It then follows that the magazine itself was at least partially responsible for the massacre and that because of the content that they chose to produce they are not a publication to be lauded under the unifying banner of Je suis Charlie.
Responsible Speech vs. Free Speech
The racism aspect of the discussion really works as a starter for the more complex and in-depth arguments contained within the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement. As seen above, much of what has been discussed by proponents of the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement, who used the argument that the magazine was racist, also ties in to discussions over the right to complete and un-criticised free speech. While most laud the right to free speech in their writings, they tend to separate the unchecked right to free speech from what they consider racist and dangerous speech. Again, while none of these writers explicitly say that they place some responsibility for the attack with the writers of Charlie Hebdo, they discuss how racist and hate speech can contribute to or even directly lead to terror attacks which, whether they meant to or not, does assign at least partial responsibility to the victims.

The first major part of this push-back against the Je suis Charlie discussion of unlimited and unchecked freedom of speech centred around the argument that in order for different cultures to live alongside one another there needs to be a level of respect for what each other hold sacred. Unlike the freedom of speech argument in the Je suis Charlie movement, some tried to work out whether depictions of the Prophet should be considered by Muslims as sacrilegious, here it tended to be taken as a given. Furthermore, writers who followed this argument tended to separate the right to freedom of speech from the right to say or support what would constitute hate speech. Anderson, for example, wrote that ‘You may well feel it's your duty, as a citizen of a free democracy, the stand up for speech rights. But no one should feel it's their duty to prop up controversial speakers in the marketplace’ (i.e. pay money to support their work) ('You don't have to Subscribe to Charlie Hebdo', 2015).

This distinction tended to then be linked to the argument that Western societies are considered to be increasingly multicultural and thus, an argument for the importance of respecting what other cultures or religions consider sacred. More conservative and religious writers took up this argument in response to the Charlie Hebdo shooting and conflated the idea of respecting the culture of others with respecting the religion of others. Richard Haynes, for example, quoted Pope Francis speaking out against the Charlie Hebdo cartoons following the attack. Francis noted:

> everyone has not only the freedom and the right but the obligation to say what he thinks for the common good... we have the right to this freedom openly without offending... if my good friend […] says a curse word against my mother, he can expect a punch. It's normal. You cannot provoke. You cannot insult the faith of others. You cannot make fun of the faith of others (cited in Haynes, 2015).

Here the issue of provocation is raised again. The more conservative writers in this argument tend to either imply or, in the case of Pope Francis, explicitly assign blame to the Charlie Hebdo staff through what they see as the magazine acting in a provocative way.

However, not all agreed with the emphasis on religion and took a more moderate, less faith-based argument in favour of a more 'respectful' attitude towards the issue of the right to free speech. Tariq Modood, for example, argued that 'If people are to occupy the same political space without conflict, they mutually have to limit the extent to which they subject each other's fundamental beliefs to criticism' (cited in Malik, 'Britain and France', 2015). While, Malik's article as a whole did not fully embrace the more limited free speech argument that other writers, do he did note that:

> truly to defend free speech requires us to defend the right to express all views except that which directly incites violence […] The whole point of free speech is to create the conditions for robust debate. And one reason for such robust debate is to be able to challenge obnoxious and hateful views. To argue for free speech but not to utilise it to challenge bigotry seems to me immoral (Malik, 'Britain and France', 2015).

Here Malik seems to fall somewhere between the two opposing arguments, insofar as he disagrees with the Je suis Charlie movement and their unapologetic push towards the right to free speech, but he did not go as far as the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement who write in favour of tempering free speech. Rather, he argued that free speech is a right but that it should be used to create discussion over and across cultures. This is slightly different from both arguments because it also assumes some kind of meaning exchange between different cultures whereas both the Je suis Charlie and the Je ne
suis pas Charlie movements tend to see ‘Western culture’ and ‘Islamic culture’ as fundamentally different and separate from one another with no exchange or conversation occurring between the two of them.

Another way that free speech is often discussed while aligning more closely with the *Je ne suis pas Charlie* movement is when writers and commentators discussed the idea of ‘responsible speech’ in regards to the *Charlie Hebdo* magazine. These writers often took the view that *Charlie Hebdo* provided fuel for terrorists and helped worsen a culture of disrespect towards Muslims within Paris, which was at least partially responsible for the attack on the offices. Ronald W. Pies wrote, ‘freedom of speech – precious right that it is – comes with certain ethical responsibilities […]’ journalists, ethicists, and the general public must have a frank discussion of journalistic civility and ethical publishing standards' (2015). Writing more specifically about the link between free speech and extremism, Stuart Muszyniski explained:

> The bad thing about free speech is that, depending on who’s doing it, it’s not necessarily tasteful, appropriate or respectful […] *Charlie Hebdo* […] did nothing wrong, according to the law. It was just depicting the Prophet Mohammed in satirical and – to the Western world – comical ways. But it did exacerbate a culture of disrespect against Islam and its holy symbols and that was bound to inflame and induce anger and provided fuel for the terrorists (2015).

The link between complete free speech and the attack on the magazine, in Muszyniski’s piece, is clear and direct. The way that *Charlie Hebdo* was able to profit from lampooning Muhammed and Islam as a whole led to the drive of extremists towards retribution. Muszyniski also went back to the comments made by the Pope on the matter and wrote, '[h]e saw that, without respect, free speech falls apart because it can cause hurt, resentment, anger and negative reactions' (2015).

Speaking more specifically about the concept of responsible speech Carla Seaquist wrote, ‘*Charlie Hebdo* cannot duck its responsibility by touting itself as a “journal irresponsibile” … Stepping back and considered more generally, the insistence on the right to offend, to insult and humiliate, has ramifications and repercussions that reach deep and cost dearly' (2015). Seaquist then linked the idea of ’irresponsible speech’ to wider geopolitical and societal problems. She wrote that it ‘exacerbates conflict among nations’; ‘it diverts us from our responsibilities'; and ‘it leaves us with a depleted culture’ (2015). Seaquist saw, therefore, the more unlimited and unchecked form of free speech, where nothing is off-limits and nothing can be held sacred, as not only something negative and having more immediate consequences (like the *Charlie Hebdo* attack) but also having long-term and wider negative effects. All of this analysis comes back to one main comment: that being ‘responsible' with free speech is important because speech, whether it be actual speech, cartoons or literature, is a part of a wider conversation between people, cultures, groups, countries. Speech that is hateful can impact and anger other groups and that can, in turn, cause retaliation through anger, or it can also further lead to marginalisation and a culture of disrespect towards certain parts of the population.

The final part of the discussion about free speech within the *Je ne suis pas Charlie* movement revolved around the idea that this Western adherence to the idea of freedom of expression is another form of extremism. This discussion posits that the dialogue around freedom of expression as well the emphasis that on the importance of secularism was an extreme adherence to Western values. In France, for example, people like those at *Charlie Hebdo* are given the title of ‘laïc arid intégrist’ which is a derogatory term for ‘die-hard secularist’. Those who advanced this critique of Western extremism argue that the *Charlie Hebdo* staff were responsible for the attack and that there is ‘a sort of moral equivalence between deeply held secularist views and the “religious totalitarianism” [that the *Charlie Hebdo* staff loved to skewer' (Baquet, 2015). The idea here is that the secularists and the terrorists both hold their views equally strongly and that because their opinions are so unwavering they are equally extreme. While this discussion was not prominent within the wider *Je ne suis pas Charlie* movement, mainly because of the amount of responsibility that it places on the victims of the attack, it is important to note because it ascribes responsibility in an interesting way. It assumes that both belief systems are as dangerous as the other, one through its giving of offence and the other at its
reactionary response. In a way, this discussion is a more extreme version of that which holds up for
the importance of 'responsible speech' within multicultural societies. Those who argued that the
Western adherence of secularism and freedom of expression is just as extremist and dangerous as
extremist terrorist movements, are in their own way, arguing in favour of a more considered and
'responsible' attitude towards relating to one another within any given society. However, they gave
all the responsibility of this to those in the West. That is, they argued that if we want terrorism to stop
the West needs to stop being so extremist in its value system and bend towards what they see as a
middle ground of respect and 'responsible speech'.

The freedom of speech discussion within the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement centres on the
issue of respect. Respect towards different people is important to those who align with Je ne
suis pas Charlie response as the idea that different cultures and religions now, more than ever, occupy
the same social and political space is emphasised. This means, according to writers like Malik
('Britain and France', 2015), that in order to live together peacefully speech that is 'responsible' needs
to be employed. While none of the writers within this discussion go so far as to say that those who
worked for Charlie Hebdo deserved what happened to them, they all (either overtly or implicitly)
place at least partial responsibility for the massacre with the staff. Whether it be through provocation,
participating in, or enriching a culture which alienated and created a great deal of anger within the
men who turned towards extremism, these writers argue that while the staff did not deserve to die
their deaths were preventable, had they acted in a more 'responsible' way.

Was Charlie Hebdo Ethical and Responsible?
The final major part of the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement that needs to be covered is the concept
of journalistic responsibility. Some writers argued that Charlie Hebdo had a responsibility to practice
respectful journalism and not provoke an attack. This argument also has a solid grounding in social
responsibility. Writers who focused on the journalistic responsibilities of Charlie Hebdo's editors and
writers do not seek out to condone the attack on the magazine, but do place some responsibility for
the attack with the magazine as they saw it as failing to meet its responsibilities as a journal and being
'irresponsible' and 'unethical' in its content.

Firstly, it is important to note how French journalism and the French journalistic tradition
differs from that in other Western states. Although Charlie Hebdo was a satirical magazine, it does
cover current events in its content and as such it is considered part of a wider journalistic field. This
is important, as it places Charlie Hebdo within its more specific context and provides a good base for
understanding writers who criticise the magazine for the content it published. As Lyombe Eko and
Dan Berkowitz write, 'Contemporary French journalists resent being considered news specialists
working from a detached objective stance to provide facts to society, valuing news analysis rather
than news reporting' (2009, p. 184), and '[t]his style of journalism prefers commentary over reporting,
subjective analysis and critique over a strict recounting of facts' (Eko and Berkowitz, 2009, p. 184).

This is perhaps more prominent in France because of the secular Republicanism that defines
the state. As Eko and Berkowitz write:

In the national context of France, which is marked by secular Republicanism and an emphasis on national unity
over multiculturalism and religious pluralism, to work within a specific journalistic paradigm becomes a sacred
expressive right, the duty of protecting it becomes a sacred civic responsibility. This is the fundamental vision
of the French secular Republican ideology. It is also the stock-in-trade of the French cultural studies perspective.
When either the sacred expressive right inherent in the journalistic paradigm or the civic responsibility to protect
that right is challenged by the political, social or cultural forces, journalists often rise to the defense of the right
of free expression as well as journalistic rituals and values (2009, p. 185).

These attitudes help to explain why so many defended the magazine following the attack and it also
helps to explain the attitude of the Charlie Hebdo staff following previous attacks or threats. It also
provides a good grounding for why some writers are critical of Charlie Hebdo as a publication, and
why they see the magazine as being irresponsible in its content.
However, it is also important to note the political implication of journalism, or rather how journalism and satire interacts with political processes. While Charlie Hebdo was not a traditional form of journalism, it did cover political issues and there is no doubt that those who work for the magazine consider it political in nature. Furthermore, given the meaning that the satirical magazine has taken on in its history in the political sphere (and, indeed, discussions over religion which have also become politicised) it is not irrelevant to cover journalistic ethics and the way that journalism interacts with politics when discussing Charlie Hebdo. As Eko and Berkowitz note, journalism and the news that it reports on, no matter how objective it is thought to be, 'are not naturally existing entities, but refined human constructions of preferred meanings' (2009, p.185). In this regard, Charlie Hebdo works like any other news outlet, placing meaning and creating an argument based on the 'facts' of any political event as the authors see them.

Michel Foucault argued that 'part of the power of journalism is its ability to assume didactic posture' (cited in Eko and Berkowitz, 2009, p. 187). Speaking specifically about the French press and the role that it plays within political history, Rodney Benson notes that from the 1970s to the 1990s journalism played a 'mobilising' role within French society and 'displayed a broader ideological diversity' (2005, p. 85). As has been previously discussed, satirical journalism also has a political role to play within society. Sharon Lockyer, for example, writes 'satirical newspapers and magazines have been, and continue to be, a medium of “protest and critique”, can sometimes inspire reform, or can be used as a corrective for poor social and political behaviour' (2006, p. 766). This is the mantle that Charlie Hebdo attempted to take up and it is the political role that those working at the magazine saw themselves playing within a wider political and social context. Not simply a magazine to make fun of those in power, but a journal that could criticise, mobilise and have a distinctive ideological viewpoint (Charlie Hebdo, ‘Who is Charlie Hebdo?’, 2016). Therefore, like all journalism, it played and interacted with the political sphere, and as such, it is seen by critics as having to conform or at least by guided by ideas focused around journalistic ethics and responsibilities.

These responsibilities need to be looked at in order to show how those who write in critique of Charlie Hebdo with specific reference to journalistic ethics and responsibilities build their argument against the magazine. Noting the relevant ethics in journalism is important, because those argue within the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement using an ethical grounding claim that, although Charlie Hebdo did not deserve the massacre on their offices, their work at the magazine failed to follow ‘responsible’ journalist ethics.

To start from a broader place, in his article on journalism in response to terrorism and global politics, Deni Elliot writes that 'journalism has the responsibility to create and maintain a voice separate from government and separate from outraged citizens' (2004, p. 29). Furthermore, he writes that maintaining independence, having high investigative skills, contextual analysis, and a 'patriotic' rather than 'nationalistic' tone are key essentials for responsible journalism (2004, pp. 29-30). In differentiating between the latter two terms he writes, 'Patriotic journalism is journalism that keeps in mind what citizens need to know to make educated decisions for self-governance. Nationalistic journalism […] is journalism that echoes what authorities want to say' (Elliot, 2004, p. 30).

In an overview of ethics in journalism Ron F. Smith and Gene Goodwin have a more complex list of what they consider key responsibilities for journalists to follow. They write, for example, that journalists need to treat people and events in a 'fair and compassionate' way, and that both the investigative process and the result must be both 'truthful and honorable' (1994, p. 31). Smith and Goodwin also write on the attitude and responsibility of journalists in their jobs. They write, 'Journalists have to be honest with themselves […] and, above all, the public. And a little humility wouldn't hurt. Arrogance has no place in a profession so dependent on credibility' (1994, p. 31). Writing more specifically about responsibility Smith and Goodwin argue that, 'the news media must be socially responsible and strive to serve the public good' (1994, p. 31).
In a more complex and recent discussion of journalistic ethics within a global context Herman Wasserman argues that in recent history those values that were presented as universal were, in actuality, simply Western values being imposed on other contexts and that the roots of it were grounded in Western rationalist thought (2010, p. 73). However, more recently this idea of 'universal values' has been challenged and that in order to approach media (in this case journalism) in an ethical way in the current globalized environment core concepts like respect for life, freedom, truth, and human dignity need to be evaluated in both Western and non-Western contexts, even if the definitions in both contexts differ from one another (2010, p. 79). Wasserman argues, in other words, that different value systems, meanings and contexts need to be taken into account in journalism rather than simply having producers of media (or journalists) from West imposing their own core values and ideals onto those outside of the Western context. It is more on these points that are more focused on behaviour, attitude and the idea of 'social responsibility' that most arguments against Charlie Hebdo are centred (Chernow, 2015; Palmer, 2015; Pies, 2015). From all these relevant ethics and responsibilities that different writers have put forth, it becomes clear that journalists see journalism as a separate source of information with significant cultural, social and political power and thus, feels a great deal of responsibility to make sure that the information they disseminate is done so in what they consider the proper manner.

With this in mind it becomes clear that those who responded to the attack, with the argument that Charlie Hebdo failed their responsibility towards the wider public in their editorial stance, treated this perceived failure as an incredibly serious issue. Therefore, those who argued that Charlie Hebdo was irresponsible in their actions at least partially placed a certain amount of blame on the satirical magazine for the massacre. A lot of this blame was discussed indirectly through pieces that explained or explored whether or not it was 'ethical' to publish the Charlie Hebdo cartoons that contributed to the anger and violence towards the magazine staff. Some magazines chose not to, in a move that journalist Stefanie Chernow called 'choosing to defend their basic editorial values of not promoting hate speech' (2015). Tom Kent, a leader in the Ethical Journalism Network and Standards Editor for the Associated Press noted:

> AP (Associated Press) tries hard not to be a conveyor belt for images and actions aimed at mocking or provoking people on the basis of religion, race or sexual orientation...While we run many photos that are politically or socially provocative, there are areas verging on hate speech and actions when we feel it is right to be cautious (cited in Chernow, 2015).

As stated earlier, these arguments emerged from debates over the re-publishing of the Charlie Hebdo cartoons rather than a direct judgement on the editorial decisions of the magazine itself. However, it is easy to see how they frame the cartoons as bordering on hate speech and discriminatory as grounds not to publish them. It follows that these people passed a level of judgement on Charlie Hebdo itself; that they considered it unethical of the magazine to publish cartoons that can so easily be seen as provocative, discriminatory or simply racist. These writers broadly fall within the Je ne suis pas Charlie camp because they did not believe that it was ethical to publish the cartoons that Charlie Hebdo did, and they showed this by not re-publishing the cartoons in their own publications. The commentators, however, did not explicitly state that Charlie Hebdo should not have been able to publish their own cartoons. Rather, most writing from this perspective drew a distinction between what media has a 'right' to publish and what they 'should' publish. Ronald W. Pies, for example, wrote, 'I would argue that while Charlie Hebdo had a legal 'right' to print such a drawing, it was hardly an act of responsible journalism' (2015). This is perhaps because the concept of freedom of speech is so vital to the media and particularly the journalistic field. However, those who considered journalistic ethics as being a main issue to discuss following the attack did not push the freedom of speech argument that those who wrote under the Je suis Charlie argument did. Rather, as illustrated by Pies it was argued that:

> it is the job of the journalist to ensure that everyone has their say, but that does not mean granting a license to lie, or spread malicious gossip or to encourage hostility and violence against any particular group. [...] As a writer, editor, and ethicist, I believe we have a moral responsibility to 'call out' Charlie Hebdo in this particular
instance, but also to make the broader point that freedom of speech – precious right that it is – comes with certain ethical responsibility (2015).

Pies’ argument is clear: although Charlie Hebdo did not deserve the attack on their magazine they acted irresponsibly from a journalistic perspective by producing the content that they did. This viewpoint is also offered by Aidan White who noted, ‘journalists must know better than to give voice to fresh acts of hatred and particularly to encourage Islamophobia’ (2015). While none of these writers specifically linked the content that Charlie Hebdo produced to the attack on their offices they did use the terms like ‘irresponsible’ and ‘provocative’ when discussing the editorial decisions of the magazine. They also emphasised the importance of acting ethically and responsibly with the unique power that media and journalists are given. In other words, they implied rather than explicitly stated, that Charlie Hebdo were not ethically responsible in producing the content that they did and it was that disregard for journalistic ethics that led to the hatred and violence towards them.

The Je ne suis pas Charlie movement was initially a direct response to the Je suis Charlie movement. However, as it progressed and the discussion around Charlie Hebdo itself became more complex the movement grew in size and scope and became more than simply a reaction to Je suis Charlie. Initially, discussion within the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument focused on what writers saw as the racist content of the magazine. They looked at the depictions of Muhammad and argued that free speech as a protective concept, as important as it is, should not be applied to the racist content that Charlie Hebdo produced. Commentators, in backing up their claims that the magazine was not one to be united behind, looked at the more ground-level reaction that came from Muslim groups and also students in public schools around Paris. They also discussed what they saw as inherent bias in French law in regard to hate speech. In all these discussions, whether they were focused directly on Charlie Hebdo or not, they implicated the magazine in playing an active role in the marginalisation of the Muslim population in France and thus partly creating and provoking the attack on their offices.

The issue of the concept of free speech was also focused on more specifically in itself within the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument. Commentators who discussed this issue focus on the concept of ‘responsible speech’ and how the West's clinging to the concept of free speech could be considered another form of ideological extremism that pays no mind to the cultural differences presented by other cultures and religions. Similar to the conclusion reached by those who focused on the issue of racism within Charlie Hebdo's content, those who focused specifically on the issue of free speech argued that the magazine's staff provoked the anger towards them and as such are either directly or indirectly implicated in it.

Finally, another aspect of the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement that was integral to the argument discusses journalistic responsibility and ethics. Here commentators concluded that Charlie Hebdo was irresponsible and unethical in the content that they produced and as such had detrimental social impact. At the heart of all of these aspects of the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement are two core concepts: provocation and responsibility. This argument used the idea of provocation as a way of assigning some responsibility for the attack with the magazine itself. It presented the idea that through the decision to publish images of Muhammad, Charlie Hebdo's staff provoked the ire of extremists which led to the attack, and if they had been more moderate in their stance towards Islam or produced different content the attack would not have occurred. The idea of responsibility is central because the commentators used it to help to try to explain why Charlie Hebdo produced the content that it did. It was not that the staff at the magazine were unintelligent or did not understand what they were doing but rather that they understood their position within a wider context and chose to act irresponsibly (or, rather, that they chose to produce irresponsible content). This idea placed the responsibility for the attack, again, not completely but partially at the feet of the magazine staff themselves and it worked to show Charlie Hebdo as having an active contributing role in the attack.
Although no writers ever condoned the attack or even came close to doing so, they did assign responsibility more equally between the extremists who carried out the attack and the staff of the magazine. The main thrust of the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument was that Charlie Hebdo, through the content they produced, both added to the social milieu which helps to create extremists within French society and also directly antagonised the extremists which, in turn, provoked the attack. Therefore, instead of simply being passive victims they bare at least some responsibility for the massacre in their own offices.

Unlike the Je suis Charlie movement that drew upon the dualistic narrative of terrorism which was created following the ‘war on terror’, the Je ne suis pas Charlie response conceptualised the causes of terrorism as being slightly different. Within the Je ne suis pas Charlie reaction terrorism was presented as being an extremist reaction to institutional and social-level racism created by the West. Thus, according to those who take this view, Charlie Hebdo and the Je suis Charlie response are both examples of the way in which the West, as well as the promotion of Western ideals, creates extremism. This is why the Je ne suis pas Charlie response is able to assign partial responsibility to the magazine. Terrorism is not framed as a wide group of people that are attacking the freedoms of the West, rather, terrorism is presented as being a small group of people who are responding to xenophobia and racism that are inherent in Western society (towards its Muslim population). The response to terrorism, then, though not explicitly presented within the Je ne suis pas Charlie responses, is to fix the societal and institutional biases against the marginalised Muslim population in the West.

**Charlie Hebdo and French Society**

Working alongside the Je ne suis pas Charlie response, while not wholly being a part of it, was the response that discussed the importance of placing the massacre within its social context; i.e., those who looked specifically at the event and the views of the parties involved while looking closely at its specifically French context. Where the writers who aligned with the Je suis Charlie movement focused on the historical importance of secularism within French society, those who at least partially placed responsibility for the event with the staff at Charlie Hebdo tended to focus more on the contemporary, socio-economic situation within France. They then linked this social context to the impact of the Charlie Hebdo cartoons and suggested that, when combined with the wider social milieu, the cartoons could lead towards more extremist views within French-Muslim society. This was examined to show how the Muslim population is largely excluded and ignored within French society and how this negatively impacts them and leads to extremism. While this response was very similar in conclusions and approach to the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement, this response was not presented as a direct critique of Charlie Hebdo and, as such, worked to a slightly different end.

**The Space of Islam in France**

France responded to their post-World War II burgeoning Muslim population with an 'integrationist' or 'assimilation' approach, as opposed to one that emphasises 'multiculturalism' that is favoured in states like Britain and Germany (Haynes, 2005, p. 404). This means that official social policy of France has tried to emphasise the nation over ethnicity or religion as a primary community identifier. This, in theory, would help all residents of France feel as if they not only have a stake in the social, economic and political systems but also that they can strive and thrive within the system (Bowen, 2009, p. 440). This, however, has led to some contentious law changes when it comes to religious expression as national identity (whether a person identifies as French) is considered as being above religious identity. An example of this is France's ban of religious symbols and wearing headscarves in public schools. In a 2004 debate, the then prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, declared that these laws would 'respond to those who would place their communalist affiliation above the Republic's laws' and that symbols like the veil could no longer be considered a sign of private religious affiliation but rather had taken on a larger political meaning’ (cited in Bowen, 2009, p. 444). In other words, since 9/11 Muslim populations are no longer seen as merely a minority population in France but rather they have become political actors (Ajala, 2014, p. 123). As a result of these kinds of policies, as John
R. Bowen writes, although there is arguably greater acceptance of Islam on an ‘everyday level’ in France, ‘French political efforts to shape an even-handed policy toward religion is […] unfolding in a social climate that retains strong doses of hostility to an Islamic public presence’ (2009, p. 440). One origin of this hostility is the growing concern about the ‘ghettoisation’ of Muslim populations and the level of ‘communalism’ in the poorer suburbs at the domestic level (Bowen, 2009, p. 443). In 2002, for example, a book named The Lost Territories of the Republic was released which condemned ‘communalism’ saying that ‘Arab Muslim culture’ was to blame for preventing the integration of Muslim people into the republic (cited in Bowen, 2009, p. 444). Directly following the 9/11 attacks, France’s Renseignements Généraux began compiling records of Muslim people that travelled outside the country. According to Bowen, some Muslim leaders informed him that it became easier for them to have their papers renewed as a consequence of this, as their identification as ‘good’ Muslims meant that they were not perceived as a security threat (2009, p. 443). France’s integrationist approach, as well as the heightened tensions surrounding Muslim populations and their assumed politicisation, has been subject to popular discourse within France. As Olivier Roy writes, this is because France as a whole is trying to reconcile and discern the role of religion (as opposed to their ideal of laïcité) in the creation of French national identity (2004, p. 337). France has a strong history of secularism and prides itself on its role in the Enlightenment and the birth of rationality and this is seen, particularly since 9/11, as being in direct opposition to religion and religious affiliation.

The approach of the French state towards its Muslim population in their everyday lives is an important one to note. This approach informs the way in which the wider (non-Muslim) French population views the role and space of religion, and specifically Islam, in the state. It also illustrates the contestation over the role of religion within the state. The reason given by the Kouachi brothers for their attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices was centred on the idea that the magazine did not respect their religion and mocked it by producing depictions of Muhammad. Many of the discussions that examined the role that Charlie Hebdo played in bringing on the attack on their offices focus specifically at the way in which the editorial content of the magazine normalised France’s official policy away from religious tolerance towards secularism. By looking more generally at the contested space of religion in France, it helps to give some wider context for the discussions that explicitly focus on ideas like secularism, religious tolerance and minority representation.

With this in mind, the next point that needs to be explored when looking at this response to the Charlie Hebdo attack, is the space that the minority Muslim population holds, or is seen to hold, within French society. One thing that is often focused on here is the relatively large Muslim population (60% of those incarcerated) in French prisons (Astier, ‘Paris Attack: Prisons Provide Fertile Ground for Islamists’, 2015). Because Coulibaly and Cherif Kouachi met in prison and forged other links with militant leaders in prison, those who emphasised the impact of Muslim marginalisation has on radicalisation with a specific focus on crime focused on whether the prison system plays a part in developing extremism. Missoum Chaoui, a Muslim leader who has worked as a prison chaplain in Paris notes, ‘[t]hey have been broken by educational failure, family breakdown, and unemployment. They are very fragile people’ (cited in Astier, ‘Prisons’, 2015). However, while some acknowledged that prisons are a serious problem ‘[n]o-one can really tell whether [they are] radicalised in prison or outside’ (Rance, 2015, cited in Astier, ‘Prisons’, 2015). Regardless, the general narrative that writers who focused on this issue employ is that radicalisation while in prison is an issue that needs to be addressed.

Speaking about how this radicalisation can work, Karim Mokhtari, who spent 6 years in prison and now works with young offenders, noted, ‘they say “the French never gave us a chance. They hate us. They are locking us up. These people are unbelievers. I do not have to apologise for what I have done because they shut me out”’ (cited in Astier, ‘Prisons’, 2015). He also stated that any ‘us versus them’ rhetoric tends to find a ready audience in prison (cited in Astier, ‘Prisons’, 2015). This, according to Astier, can be exacerbated by the ban on non-chaplain-led prayers with radical leaders calling collective prayer and those who take part being punished, which places religion and questions over
religious freedom into the forefront (‘Prisons’, 2015). While those, like Astier, who argued this link places responsibility on the shoulders of a wider society who contribute to the marginalisation and criminalisation of Muslim youth, they did not explicitly assign responsibility to the Charlie Hebdo staff for the attack. However, it is worth noting that by implication Charlie Hebdo is involved. Content produced by the magazine was seen by these writers as being a part of a larger problem and so while they are not directly responsible Charlie Hebdo contributed to the wider milieu, which allowed for marginalisation and extremism to flourish.

This wider social context was written about extensively and had two major driving points: that a large portion of the Muslim population in France live at a lower socio-economic status and that the French Republican focus on secularism has led to constraints on their religious freedom. The driving argument was that when these are combined with a wider social unease with the place of Muslims within France, secular society marginalises the population, which, in turn, leads some towards extremism. The editorial board at the New York Times, for example, released an editorial following the attack that clearly linked the wider social problems that Muslims face in France with the radicalisation of those who committed the attacks. The editorial reads, ‘The profiles of the three attackers […] are an indictment of the decades-long failure of France to address long-festering alienation and exclusion among too many Muslim immigrants and their French-born children’ (2015).

The editors provided a more specific example of this exclusion by focusing on the role that secularism plays. They wrote:

There is also the problem of France’s secularism. A ban on headscarves in public schools and on full-face veils feels to many Muslims like an unfair religious constraint on their religious freedom. Some also find it hard to accept that blasphemy is not a crime in France, and that Charlie Hebdo and other publications have the right to satirize religious leaders. Some students in French schools with large migrant and Muslim populations refused to participate in the national minute of silence following the Charlie Hebdo attack because they objected to what they had heard about the magazine's depictions of the Prophet Muhammad (2015).

Here, the editors did something slightly different from most who wrote about the social context and the attack. Rather than writing about the attack and not explicitly about Charlie Hebdo, the writers directly related the magazine to the wider social context. Although they did not explicitly say that Charlie Hebdo added to Muslim marginalisation through their cartoons, by placing the magazine as a part of the larger social exclusion of the Muslim population, they placed Charlie Hebdo firmly on the side that works to marginalise that minority.

Most writers who focus on the social context of France contributing to religious extremism lean on a similar argument and statistics. In a 2010 study, Julia Resnik, for example, pointed to the fact that ‘unemployment among Muslims is 50% higher than the rate that is currently observed among citizens of French origin and stands at 14%’ (Resnik, 2010, p. 213). Resnik also noted that there appears to be less social mobility for young Muslims, claiming that:

while higher education is often seen as [a] pathway out of the ghettos, it has become increasingly ineffective for French Muslim youth. While the unemployment rate for all college graduates in France is only 5%, college graduates of 'North African' origin face less certain futures. For these graduates the unemployment rate stands at 26.5%, over five times the national average for college graduates. Racist attitudes are often cited as a major hurdle for Muslim job applicants and under-employment is a chronic problem even for those who manage to find jobs (2010, p. 213).

Focusing more on the role that secularism plays in their marginalisation Resnik argued, ‘[t]he republican model, which did not succeed in integrating young immigrants encountering social and economic lack of opportunities, encouraged, in turn, the development of reactive ethnic identities.’ (Resnik, 2010, p. 213). Although Resnik was not writing in reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attack, her argument about the exclusion of the Muslim population in France, its lack of opportunities, and perceived constraints on religious freedoms, can lead to radicalisation was prominent within the post-Charlie Hebdo discourse. This also an example of how the Je ne suis pas Charlie response and those who focus on the French social context differ. While this argument is not a part of the Je ne suis pas Charlie movement, it is similar to the Je ne suis pas Charlie response in the way that it argues in
opposition to (or is, at least, suspicious of) the more extremist clinging to Western ideals such as secularism which characterises the *Je suis Charlie* movement.

*Je suis Charlie’ and Exclusion*

Another point of criticism that those who focused on the impact of *Charlie Hebdo* in French society emphasised within their arguments was the harm that the popularity of the *Je suis Charlie* movement generated for Muslims in France. Some argued that the West's unity behind the *Je suis Charlie* could further alienate the community and even worsen cases of Islamophobia. Because the nature of the cartoons in *Charlie Hebdo* seem to be a contentious issue around the discussions of the attack, the unquestionable rallying behind the magazine to the point of identifying so strongly with its editorial point of view, to some, shows prejudices within Western society. This prejudice favours the Western viewpoint and marginalises the voice of the Muslim community who may find the cartoons offensive and yet still condemn the attack.

As Angelique Chrisafis noted, ‘The slogan *Je suis Charlie* became a worldwide rallying cry but proved complex, and to some extent, excluding. It didn't fit with those who utterly condemned the shooting, but didn't agree with the magazine's caricatures of Muhammad’ (2015). One of the most vocal writers who argued from this perspective was Emmanuel Todd, who claimed that immigrants and the children of immigrants were absent from most of the *Je suis Charlie* marches in France following the attack, and the marches themselves were ‘an odious display of middle-class domination, prejudice and Islamophobia’ (cited in Chrisafis, 2015). He also noted that 'the most enthusiastic demonstrations […] had occurred in the country's most historically Catholic and reactionary regions' (cited in Chrisafis, 2015). For Todd, who has since published a book on the subject, the marches and the central message of *Je suis Charlie* following the massacre reinforced the xenophobic and specifically Islamophobic ideals by placing Muslims and the West as two opposing sides and using Islam as a scapegoat. His book, *Who is Charlie?*, it should be noted, is highly controversial and many in France see it as blasphemous, gratuitous and harmful (Chrisafis, 2015). Speaking about the effect that the rallies had on French society, Todd noted, ‘[a]fter the rallies, we saw Islamophobic behaviour everywhere; it loosened people's tongues' (cited in Chrisafis, 2015). It is worth restating here that there were a number of crimes of retribution on mosques and other buildings within Muslim communities, as well as assaults on Islamic people. Speaking more specifically about *Charlie Hebdo* itself, Todd noted that '[w]ith my book, I was demanding the right to counter-blaspheme: to say that the caricatures of Muhammad were obscene, rubbish, totally historically out of sync and the expression of rampant Islamophobia' (cited in Chrisafis, 2015). Here Todd placed *Charlie Hebdo* within a wider social movement that led to the alienation and, potentially, the radicalisation of those who attacked their offices. Like most who aligned with the *Je ne suis pas Charlie* movement, although he did not directly ascribe responsibility to the magazine, Todd did implicate *Charlie Hebdo* within a wider context and paints the magazine as a contributor to xenophobia and Islamophobia within French society.

Those whose response to the attack focused on wider French social context had, therefore, a more implicit way of assigning responsibility, though they did ascribe it partially to *Charlie Hebdo*. The staff at *Charlie Hebdo* were presented as being active contributing members of what could be called the 'dark side' of French society: a society that clings to Western secularist thinking so tightly that they alienate and create a milieu that works to radicalise young religious people. In a sense, they helped create and popularise a society that radicalises Muslims and then laughs at their religious beliefs. Those who focused on the social context of the attacks examined the way that the Muslim population within France are marginalised and, in their opinion, their religious freedoms are impinged upon through France's emphasis on secularism as a founding value of the Republic. These writers also looked at the way that this alienation leads towards poverty and a large number of Muslims criminalised and populating the prison system, which, it is argued, can possibly lead towards radicalisation. Those who focused in on the social context of France also looked more critically on
the possible impact that the *Je suis Charlie* rallies had on the Muslim population and how they worked to reinforce the status-quo and further exclude those who condemn the attack but do not support *Charlie Hebdo's* depictions of Muhammad. These commentators implicated *Charlie Hebdo* within this wider social context which is hostile towards immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants; a context that leads towards radicalisation and terrorism.

What is perhaps the most interesting part of this discussion, however, is the way that it characterises the Muslim population within France. Although those who are writing within this movement see themselves as completely separate from those who argue under *Je suis Charlie*, both arguments rely on a one-dimensional characterisation of Muslims. Those who look closely at the social context within France paint the Muslim population as being solely marginalised, living in poverty, and with little chance of social mobility. While this may be the reality for some (even perhaps a majority) it is, of course, an oversimplification, a picture that is easily employed in order to back up a supposedly more socially-minded discussion. Those who focus on the social context also saw the radicalisation of the Muslim population as likely and ignored other kinds of political action that Muslim people take in order to stand up for their rights. While it may not be a deliberate part of the argument it is one that rises to the top upon closer inspection. While they did not condone terrorism, it is as if those who approached the debate from this perspective thought that the only outlet that Muslims have for feelings of marginalisation or anger towards their social situation within France is extremism and terrorism and anything else is ignored (or at best not emphasised). Both sides are told from the Western perspective and caricature the Muslim population in any way they see fit, in order to strengthen their perspective and validate their discussion. Both sides of the coin seem to capitalise on this idea that Islam is fundamentally separate and different from the West and western political values.

**Conclusion**

While the response which problematised the assigning of responsibility following the *Charlie Hebdo* attack initially emerged in response to the *Je suis Charlie* movement, it grew in scope and argument. The *Je ne suis pas Charlie* response argued in direct opposition to the *Je suis Charlie* movement and looked at the editorial decisions of *Charlie Hebdo* and whether their editorial decisions were racist, or even ethical. They also analysed the idea that was so popular within the *Je suis Charlie* movement that free speech should be unlimited and protected against any infringements. The *Je ne suis pas Charlie* response argued that while free speech was an important ideal, the idea of responsible speech is more appropriate within the current social climate. However, the other major part of this response to the *Charlie Hebdo* attack took this argument one step further. While the *Je ne suis pas Charlie* response assigned responsibility to *Charlie Hebdo* based on the content that it produced, this response looked primarily at the place that the magazine held in French society. While this part of the response found fault with the magazine and its content, it assigned responsibility primarily to Western society, and *Charlie Hebdo* was argued as having contributed to, promoted and normalised the kind of society which creates terrorism.

For both of these arguments, terrorism is framed as a response to a specific social context. That the marginalisation of Muslim people in the West, as well as the promotion of Western secular values as superior to all others, has led to the rise of extremist thought within those Islamic communities and led to terrorism against the West. As such, a magazine like *Charlie Hebdo* that promotes those values and pokes fun at Islam, as well as the French society that pushes for integration into a French secular identity are responsible for the attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices, as well as terrorism in the West in general. For these commentators, terrorism is about ideology and social issues and it is through the creation of a more inclusive West that favours the inclusion of different value systems and the idea of responsible and respectful speech over unlimited free speech. According to this argument, if these things happen, those who become terrorists would not be able to be radicalised against the West, and this would diminish terrorism.
Chapter 3: The Responsibility of the West

The final major reaction to the attack on the Charlie Hebdo offices was one that placed responsibility for the attack on the West, or rather, on Western foreign policy. According to this viewpoint, Western foreign policy (since 9/11) created a political and social environment that fostered extremist politics and allowed terrorism in the West to flourish. This response came a little after both Je suis Charlie and Je ne suis pas Charlie arguments became prominent and worked as an exploration of wider socio-political issues that lead to the attack. Those who focused on the wider causes of the attack look specifically at Western foreign policy post-9/11 and how that foreign policy possibly created an environment in which terrorism, particularly home-grown terrorism in the West, could become seemingly more common. 'Clash of civilisations' rhetoric was also deployed when arguing that the West and Western foreign policy is responsible for terrorism as it was seen as creating an 'us vs. them' narrative in the West that both created the social environment in which terrorism could grow and also radicalised both sides against one another. One major point of note with this reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attack is that it was less about the attack on the magazine itself and more about what leads to, causes and is responsible for terrorism in general in the West. Here, the specifics of the Charlie Hebdo are de-emphasised and the attack on their offices is seen less as an exceptional case and more of an example of a larger trend.

'France's 9/11'

Those who focused on Western foreign policy as having a direct causal role in the Charlie Hebdo attack tended to consider how Western foreign policy and international relations have changed since 9/11. They looked at how the launch of the 'War on Terror' destabilised the Middle East and radicalised some within the region leading to the escalation of terrorist activity. They also created a link between 9/11 and the 2015 attacks in France and looked at how the West's response to the Charlie Hebdo attack was, according to them, fundamentally political in nature, serving primarily to show support for Western policy in the Middle East. Writers who focused on the importance of Western foreign policy when looking at the Charlie Hebdo attack characterised the event as being political in nature rather than having its roots in ideological or moral differences.

The largest part of the argument that placed blame for the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo offices on international politics suggested that Western foreign policy post-9/11 led to the radicalisation of Islamic extremists and thus to terror attacks. The major thrust of this argument was that the 'War on Terror' led to increased destabilisation in the Middle East and that has increased support for extremist Muslim groups and undermined any confidence in Western states. For example, former French Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin described ISIS as a 'deformed child' of Western foreign policy (cited in Milne, 2015). This opinion is based on arguments that existed previously and can be seen in official reports like the 2004 task force report commissioned by the Pentagon. The report stated that 'American direct intervention in the Muslim world has paradoxically elevated the stature and support for radical Islamists' (cited in Greenwald, 2016). While the report focused primarily on terror attacks in the US and the impacts of American foreign policy, it is important to note that other Western states (like France) have also been, or continue to be, militarily involved in wars in predominantly Islamic states. It is, therefore, 'Western violence' that is often pointed to as being a 'causal factor in anti-Western terrorism' (Greenwald, 2016).

Following the Charlie Hebdo massacre, The Guardian published a piece by Seumas Milne in which he noted that, following the 9/11 attack, 'George Bush launched his war on terror, laying waste to countries and spreading terror on a global scale' (2015) and argued that because of the continued military presence in the Middle East threats in the West, like the Charlie Hebdo attack, will only grow (Milne, 2015). In his article Milne implicitly created a link between the 'War on Terror' and the subsequent rise in terror attacks across the globe.
This critique of Western foreign policy as bearing the responsibility for terror attacks, though inherently political in nature, was not necessarily tied to one political 'wing'; both the 'right' and the 'left' criticised the role that Western foreign policy played following the attack. Nigel Farage, the then leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), for example, suggested in the European Parliament that the West needs 'an honest admission that actually our political decisions have led to much of what has happened' and also noted that Western foreign policy, specifically in regards to the Middle East created deep 'resentments' with Muslim people. Farage concluded that 'unless we are prepared to admit our own culpability in much of what has happened, we are not going to be able to find solutions' (cited in Saul, 2015). Likewise, Noam Chomsky blamed the attack as well as the wider trend of terror attacks on Western foreign policy. He noted, '[t]he only information we have [in regards to why terror attacks occur] is the explanation given by ISIS [...] they say, if you bomb us we'll attack you [...] where did all this come from? The invasion of Iraq [...] and so on' (cited in Tesfaye, 2015).

Another point that was emphasised within this argument was how war in the Middle East has directly radicalised and led to the training of terrorists. The most obvious link that was brought forth in creating this link was the Kouachi brothers themselves, who were trained in Yemen by Al Qaeda and according to some were 'radicalised by the Iraq war' (Milne, 2015). The brothers, from this point of view, saw themselves as carrying out the attacks, in part, for revenge for the 'children of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria' and the Muslim peoples killed in Palestine (Milne, 2015). Others who saw the direct link between Western foreign policy and Islamic extremism in the form of terrorism also tended to quote other extremists in order to back-up their argument. In a piece about the Charlie Hebdo attack and the role of the 'War on Terror', for example, Duncan Thomas wrote that Dzhokar Tsarnaev (otherwise known as 'The Boston Bomber') wrote a message while hiding from armed forces which read, 'The US government is killing our innocent civilians but most of you already know that... stop killing our innocent people and we will stop' (cited in Thomas, 2015). Thomas also quoted Michael Adebolajo who during his trial for the murder of British Army soldier Lee Rigby told the court, 'It was the Iraq war that affected me the most... I saw 'Operation Shock and Awe' and it disgusted me. The way it was reported was as if it was praiseworthy, saying 'look at the might and awe of the West and America'. Every one of those bombs was killing people' (cited in Thomas, 2015). Thomas then used these remarks to create a link between the 'War on Terror' (and the larger Western foreign policy in the Middle East) and the violence that terrorists inflict in Western societies. He noted, '[b]oth Tsarnaev and Adebolajo unambiguously saw themselves as answering violence with violence [...] 'Jihad' follows the same logic as the west's own 'Crusade' [...] with 'combatants' simply defined as any adult male in the vicinity' (2015). Furthering his argument, which linked in more 'home-grown' terrorism Thomas wrote:

In the globalised world of the twenty-first century, the internationalised, industrialised and institutionalised violence of [these] politics abroad engenders an inevitable blowback in the sporadic yet highly spectacular violence of terror at home: for the first time in history, foreign militarism has a domestic price claimed through equivalent means, if not to a remotely equivalent scale (2015).

While journalists and writers who followed this argument did draw a seemingly logical line between the violence that the region has seen following the launch of the 'War on Terror' and how that leads to the growth of extremism and violence as a result, they also de-emphasised the words of the Kouachi brothers, who claimed they attacked the offices of Charlie Hebdo to defend the Prophet. This, as stated previously, could be because writers who hold this belief are focused more on the wider trend and context, rather than the attack itself as a single event.

The way in which non-Western commentators, populations and political leaders reacted to the massacre was another prominent part of the argument that blamed Western foreign policy for the attack on Charlie Hebdo. Although not all leaders reacted in a way that blamed the West and Western politics for the attack, those that did were identified as representing a specific link between the massacre on the Charlie Hebdo headquarters and the 'War on Terror'. It was reported by Joshua Muravchik, for example, that following the reporting of the attack in Tehran, protestors gathered
outside the French embassy and shouted slogans like 'death to Charlie' and 'death to France' (2015, p.44). Furthermore, a newspaper in Russia asked the question, 'Did the Americans Plan the Paris Terror Attack?' and quoted political scientist, Alexander Zhilin who suggested that the attack on the magazine was planned in response to France's softening towards Russia in the form of questioning sanctions against them (Oliphant, 2015). Echoing this sentiment was a 9/11 conspiracy theorist named Thierry Meyssan who stated, '[w]e should consider all assumptions and admit that at this stage, its most likely purpose is to divide us; and its sponsors are most likely in Washington' (cited in Roy, 'A Guide to the Charlie Hebdo Shooting Conspiracy Theories', 2015). Another example of this is when the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, noted that 'Games are being played with the Islamic world, we need to be aware of this' (cited in Malm, 2015), noting that Muslims were deliberately being blamed for something committed by French citizens in order to 'punish' the Muslim world (cited in Malm, 2015). Although this does not specifically reference the 'War on Terror', it does draw upon the 'clash of civilisations' rhetoric that rose to prominence following 9/11. While Erdoğan did appear to be deploying this rhetoric in order to push his own political ideals forward (his interview continues into verbal attacks on Israel), the fact that he placed responsibility for the attack on the shoulders of the West, through its involvement in the Middle East, is worth noting. His anti-Semitic arguments were also taken up by a larger audience who argued that the attack was a Jewish conspiracy, potentially sponsored by Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, in order to turn Western society against Muslims (Roy, 'A Guide’, 2015). This all tied into the idea that Western foreign policy since 9/11 created a fundamental gap between the West and the 'Muslim world' and that Western foreign policy works against anything other than Western interests.

Those who placed the attack within a wider political context also looked at the reactions and speeches given by politicians following the attack in order to show how the attack was viewed as fundamentally political in nature. More specifically, these speeches were used to show how the reaction by political figures differed or did not differ to that that occurred following 9/11. This, again, served to place the massacre within a wider political context, looking specifically at the role in which politics - specifically Western politics - played in perpetuating terror attacks. While most leaders initially warned of the dangers of Islamophobia in reaction the attacks and emphasised solidarity, for many this reaction called to mind George W. Bush's initial statements following 9/11 when he stated that, '[Islam's] teachings are good and peaceful' and that 'the terrorists are traitors to their own faith' (cited in Muravchik, 2015, p. 38). Milne, for example, noted a connection between the rhetoric used by Bush leading up to the launch of what has become the 'War on Terror' and the public reaction to the Charlie Hebdo killings from former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, who declared a 'war of civilisations' for the attack which he identified as being on 'our freedoms' (cited in Milne, 2015). Milne also emphasised Hollande's later speech in which the President declared 'freedom will always be stronger than barbarity. France has always known how to defeat its enemies' (cited in Thomas, 2015).

French Prime Minister Manuel Valls also employed similar rhetoric and declared that France should prepare for war, 'a war against terrorism, against jihadism, against radical Islam, against everything that is aimed at breaking fraternity, freedom, solidarity' (cited in Schiavenza, 2015). Many found these remarks similar to a speech given by President Bush following the 9/11 attacks in which he claimed 'our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there […] It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated (cited in Schiavenza, 2015). It is this idea of 'clash of civilisations' that has grown since the 'War on Terror' and, for many, was also flourishing post-Charlie Hebdo. In his piece for the Guardian, Milne wrote:

The production on Wednesday of a state-sponsored edition of Charlie Hebdo became the latest test of a “with us or against us” commitment to “our values”, as French MPs voted by 488 votes to one to press on with the military campaign in Iraq. To judge by the record of the past 13 years, it will prove a poisonous combination, and not just for France (2015).
Here, the link to a wider political context becomes explicit. Not only did Milne argue that the ‘War on Terror’ and Western foreign policy in the Middle East contributed to the attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices, but also that history is repeating itself following the attack and that the reaction of French MPs to reaffirm their military commitment in Iraq will potentially have negative and violent effects in the future.

A number of commentators also claim that states in which terror attacks occur demonstrates the link between terror attacks in the West and Western foreign policy. Those who focused on this link, again, framed the *Charlie Hebdo* attack as a political act, rather than an ideological one and situated the attack within a wider context that de-emphasised the individual elements of the attack itself and saw it as a part of a larger trend of attacks in Western states. This link between Western foreign policy and the states in which terror attacks occur was typified by Glenn Greenwald who argued:

> There's a reason the U.S. and NATO counties are the targets of this type of violence by South Korea, Brazil, and Mexico are not. Terrorists don't place pieces of paper with the names of the world's countries in a hat and then randomly pick one out and attack that one. Only pure self-delusion could lead one to assert that Spain's and the U.K.'s participation in the 2003 invasion of Iraq played no causal role in the 2004 train bombing in Madrid and the 2005 bombing in London. Even British intelligence officials acknowledged that link (2016).

Although Greenwald wrote more about the November 2015 terror attack in Paris rather than in specific reference to *Charlie Hebdo*, those who responded to the November attacks tended to create some kind of link between the *Charlie Hebdo* attack and the later one. Rather than seeing the November attacks as an event in themselves, they contextualised them as a burgeoning trend of attacks, a trend that began with *Charlie Hebdo* (Euronews, 2016; Todd, 2016; Walt, 2016). The argument that states are chosen specifically because of the politics of their governments may seem an obvious argument for many, but it is an important argument to note because of the way that it created a definitive link between Western (and in this case French) foreign policy with the attack.

This argument was often not covered within the *Je suis Charlie* and *Je ne suis pas Charlie* movements, which tended to focus more on the exceptionalism of the attack as well looking at the immediate context in which the attack occurred. This is especially clear when looking at the November attacks for which ISIS claimed responsibility, noting in a statement that they chose France because of ‘their war against Islam in France and their strikes against Muslims in their lands of the Caliphate with their jets’ (cited in Greenwald, 2016). France started bombing ISIS strongholds in Iraq following the *Charlie Hebdo* attack in January 2015 and started bombing Syria in September. For those who discussed the causal link between Western foreign policy and terrorism (and specifically terror attacks in the West), this is why the wider political context of *Charlie Hebdo* is a more apt place to ascribe responsibility, because it was, for them, a political act with political consequences in the forms of foreign policy – and these political consequences have real and violent implications.

However, not all who detailed this link between Western foreign policy and terror attacks were willing to assign complete responsibility for the *Charlie Hebdo* attack on politics. Rather, they saw foreign policy as just one contributing factor among many and argued that those who placed blame for terrorism squarely on the shoulders of governmental foreign policy decisions oversimplified the problem. British Labour MP Pat McFadden, for example, noted in the House of Commons during a debate over whether the West was implicit in inciting terror attacks:

> May I ask the Prime Minister to reject the view that sees terrorist acts as always being a response or reaction to what we in the west do? Does he agree that such an approach risks infantilizing the terrorists and treating them like children, when the truth is that they are adults who are entirely responsible for what they do? […] Unless we are clear about that, we fail even to understand the threat we face, let alone confront it and ultimately overcome it (cited in Greenwald, 2016).

This is cited in Greenwald’s article and although he disagrees with the absolutism of McFadden’s point and argues instead that there is a direct causal link between terrorism in the West and Western foreign policy, Greenwald does concede that, ‘none of this is to say that Western interference in that
part of the world is the only cause of anti-Western “terrorism,” nor is it to say that it's the principle cause in every case' (2016). Thus Greenwald, while acknowledging the role that Western foreign policy plays in terror attacks, did admit that there are other factors at play, something that is often de-emphasised by other writers who focus on the link between western policy and terrorism (Milne, 2015; Thomas, 2015). Rather, Greenwald's argument ascribes primary responsibility to the wider political context while acknowledging that there were other contributing factors that led to the attack.

Another potential causal link to Western foreign policy and terror attacks in the West emerges through analysis of the politicised nature of the official reaction to terror attacks of politicians and figureheads. When analysing and discussing this reaction specifically, some commentators argued that the political nature of official reaction to terror attacks shows how state leaders interpret terror attacks as inherently political in nature. In the case of the Charlie Hebdo attack, many wrote specifically about the Je suis Charlie march and those who attended it, aligning themselves with not only the magazine's ideals but also France's official reaction in policy to the attacks (i.e. the decision to initiate bombings in Iraq and Syria) (Milne, 2015; Thomas, 2015). Many figureheads and statespeople attended the Je suis Charlie demonstration in Paris and while many of them were leaders of states that would be considered to be France's traditional allies, there were also many there who, for some commentators, seemed unexpected. On this issue, Milne noted that:

A march supposedly to defend freedom of expression was led by serried ranks of warmongers and autocrats: from Nato war leaders and Israel's Binyamin Netanyahu to Jordan's King Abdullah and Egypt's foreign minister, who between them have jailed, killed and flogged any number of journalists while staging massacres and interventions that have left hundreds of thousands dead, bombing TV stations from Serbia to Afghanistan as they go.’ (2015).

Here Milne highlighted that many in attendance may not have been there because they support Western ideals like freedom of expression. Rather, they were there because the march was not one that centred on the importance of Western ideals, but Western politics. Milne continued, 'The scene was beyond satire. But it also highlighted the central role of the war on terror in the Paris atrocities, and how the serried ranks are likely to use them for their own ends' (2015).

Taking this argument one step further, the displays at events like the Je suis Charlie demonstration, for some, also showed a fundamental support for Western states and the citizens of those states above all others. Thomas, for example, wrote:

If we truly believe that we are indeed “all Charlie”, are we not compelled to offer the same solidarity to all the victims of the 'War on Terror'? Are we not also Shakar Aamer, imprisoned for thirteen years in Guantanamo without trial? Are we not Moazzam Begg, recently released after years in the same totalitarian facility, whose only “crime” was attempting to publicise evidence of western governments' complicity in torture? Are we not the victims of that torture, the children slaughtered in drone strikes, the hundreds of thousands killed in an illegal and pointless war in Iraq? Are we not the dozens of Muslims butchered by while fascists since 2001 across the Western world? (2015).

According to Thomas, the display of unity behind Je suis Charlie following the attack was not simply an act where like-minded Westerners stood up and defended their ideals and values in the face of adversity. Rather it was a Western show of support for Western foreign policy in the Middle East, specifically the 'War on Terror' and the future campaigns to be launched by France as retribution. It was a political response to a political act.

That emphasis on the political nature of the Charlie Hebdo attack is what primarily defines the argument that places the responsibility for the attack on post-9/11 Western foreign policy. Rather than looking at why terrorists would target a satirical magazine, or looking at the given ideological reasons for such an attack, writers see the massacre as another example of terrorism on western soil, the causes which are fundamentally political in nature. From looking at the larger umbrella of western foreign policy towards the Middle East following 9/11, to comparing the Charlie Hebdo attack (as well as the later terror attacks in Paris, committed by ISIS) to 9/11 and looking at the political nature of the response by leaders in France and the wider Western world, those who blamed western foreign
policy for the *Charlie Hebdo* massacre saw the attack as a part of a larger trend of attacks that are caused primarily by official governmental policy and have serious knock-on political implications.

**Clash of Civilisations**

As mentioned above, the level of discussion surrounding 'clash of civilisations' rhetoric was so high following the attack that it warranted a closer analysis. Essentially, writers argued that Western foreign policy created an 'us vs them' rhetoric that worked to unite the West in their opposition to Muslim extremists. However, some argued that this rhetoric has expanded and caused tension on both sides leading to Islamophobia and also increasing the likelihood of terror attacks on Western soil. Essentially, they argued that because this 'us vs them' rhetoric has become so common-place in reactions to terror attacks that it actually works to mobilise both sides against each other which on the side of Muslim extremists actually works as a recruitment tool for Muslim populations on Western soil. In essence, they argued that this rhetoric is primarily responsible for more terror attacks, like that on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices, to occur.

The 'us vs. them' myth that has been created and disseminated in Western states also works to galvanise extremist groups against Western states, and in the case of *Charlie Hebdo* to see themselves in direct conflict with Western ideals and morals. It was, for some, particularly pertinent following the *Charlie Hebdo* attack as the *Je suis Charlie* slogan worked as a way to unify they West, not necessarily against terrorism, but against Muslim people. The prevalence of this 'us vs them' rhetoric is summed up well by Olivier Roy who wrote:

> The issue of the compatibility between Islam and French or Western political culture is no longer confined to the usual suspects: the populist right, conservative Christians or staunch secularists from the left. The issue has become emotional and now pervades the entire political spectrum (‘There Are More French Muslims Working for French Security than Al Qaeda’, 2015, p. 48).

Writing more specifically about how Muslim extremism works with this dichotomy in order to serve their own ends, Roy claims that, '[t]hey invent an Islam which opposes itself to the West […] they are not seeking the Islamization of society in which they live but the realization of their sick fantasy of heroism' (2015, p. 49). In other words, the 'us vs them' myth that was created by Western foreign policy following 9/11 has become a radicalising factor both in the Middle East and the West where marginalised people use the 'Enlightened West' vs. 'Barbaric East' rhetoric to unify against an opposition.

While this narrative of two opposing and fundamentally different sides is, according to some, recognised as nonsense and simply political, war-time rhetoric, it is worth noting the significant impact that it has had on radicalising people and giving them a 'viable' target. Deepa Kumar, for example, wrote that 'clash of civilisations' rhetoric 'undergrids so much of the public discussion today [...] and informs, in different ways, both the conservative and liberal forms of Islamophobia' (2015, p. 122). Likewise, Hamza Hamouchene suggested that, 'some pundits and politicians have caricatured what happened along the lines of 'Clash of Civilisations' between enlightened and freedom-loving Westerners on the one hand and Violent and Evil Muslims on the other hand' (2015). This is inherently problematic thinking for many as, '[i]t is racist to presume [...] that Muslims are fundamentally incapable of adopting liberalism along with their faith' (Syed and Haider, 2015). For these writers the blame for terrorist acts, like that on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices, is directly linked to this 'us vs. them' rhetoric that has been employed by political leaders following 9/11.

This kind of thinking also furthers the cycle of extremism and terrorism, as it informs reaction to every attack that occurs. This is important for some commentators, insofar as it creates a cycle of distrust, which in the West can manifest in Islamophobia, further marginalising Muslim populations and potentially leading to more extremism and terrorism both in the West and in the Middle East. Following the *Charlie Hebdo* attack, for example, children were interviewed by the media and noted that they felt they were treated differently. Nine-year-old Ayman was quoted as saying, 'When I arrived at school [...] some friends treated me like a terrorist' (cited in Gee, 2015) and thirteen-year-
old Abdelkader said 'I took the metro with my mother who wears a headscarf. When we entered the carriage, I heard a woman say, 'Oh no, not this now'" (cited in Gee, 2015). In France they announced a 'war' on terrorism and 10,000 French paramilitary police 'took to the streets' in a show of force, and in the US, conservatives lambasted President Obama for not renewing the country's efforts in the Middle East (Ignatius, 2015). There was, therefore, a sense of heightened anxiety that was created and presented itself in 'us vs. them' rhetoric.

Kumar makes the important note that instead of there being a continual and fundamental clash between the two opposing sides, 'cultural perceptions of Muslims in the West have changed with time and context' (2015, p. 122), and it is this context that provides fertile grounds for terrorist attacks. The staff at Spiegel Online also touched on this issue in an editorial following the attack, claiming that '[t]his week's events in France could ultimately pour fuel on the flames of widespread French anxiety about an Islam that many believe is threatening the fabric of the country's very identity' (2015). In this state of heightened anxiety where two sides are threatened by the other and see the other as fundamentally dangerous to them, extremists can take advantage (on both sides) and play up these anxieties for their own ends. In this vein, Juan Cole, for example, writes that:

The problem for a terrorist group like al-Qaeda is that its recruitment pool is Muslims, but most Muslims are not interested in terrorism [...] Al-Qaeda wants to mentally colonize French Muslims, but faces a wall of disinterest. But if it can get non-Muslim French to be beastly to ethnic Muslims on the grounds that they are Muslims, it can start creating a common political identity around grievance against discrimination (2015).

Or, as Khalil Merroun, a French-Moroccan imam, noted following the attack '[terrorists] are trying to make divisions in society. They want to turn us against society, and society against us' (cited in Stolozoff, 2016). Lebanese cartoonist Karl Sharro noted that terror attacks like that on the Charlie Hebdo are not about Islam but rather:

about a contemporary world system that is particularly adept at grinding down whatever decent values exist in Islam and other faith systems [...] Decades of the combined onslaught of extreme capitalism and extreme religion have shaped necropolitics of the oppressed that is the mirror image of the necropolitics of the local and western governments, and the oppression and violence they've imposed (cited in LeVine, 2015).

In other words, according to Sharro, it is the Western, capitalist policies that have created a 'necropolitics' on both sides that are seen as fundamentally opposing one another and it is this opposition, not Islam, that is causing terror attacks and extremist movements. Kumar tied up his piece on the problematic 'clash of civilisations' rhetoric by noting, 'As the racist backlash after Charlie Hebdo shows there is an urgent need for scholars [...] to take the time to engage in public debates, and to publish analyses in venues that are easily accessible, in order to push back against the racist hegemonic narrative' (2015, p. 128).

Commentators who focus on this 'us vs. them' narrative that evolved from the 'War on Terror' as a cause of the Charlie Hebdo attack primarily argue, therefore, that it is a dangerous mind-set for a large population to have. They argue that terrorism is born out of this rhetoric, as it creates unity in the face of a common enemy and can be used as a recruitment tool for extremist groups who utilise the rhetoric as a way to achieve their own ends. Essentially, like most writers who focus on the role that Western foreign policy played in causing the Charlie Hebdo attack, they did not focus exclusively on the attack itself but rather discussed it as a part of a larger trend, one that because of the on-going problematic reaction to attacks in West is likely to continue. This is the crux of their argument: that if the West gives into this rhetoric that was created to serve a military campaign in the Middle East, attacks like that on the Charlie Hebdo offices are likely to continue as both sides become increasingly mobilised against one another (Cole, 2015; Furedi, 2015; Milne, 2015; Roy, ‘More French Muslims’, 2015).

The last thing that is emphasised by those who assigned responsibility to Western foreign policy for the Charlie Hebdo attack (as well as others like it) is that the attack on the magazine's offices is a part of a larger cycle and that this cycle is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. In
an article for *The Daily Beast*, Maajid Nawaz typified this argument in his statement that, 'Jihadist terrorism is alive and kicking. And though we must continue to put terrorists on the back foot [...] we will never kill our way out of this phenomenon' (2015). In an opinion piece for *CNN*, Noam Chomsky went one step further and spoke about the politics of memory in the West in regards to policy of intervention and military campaigns. He critiqued Floyd Abrams, an American civil rights lawyer quoted in the *New York Times* as stating that the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* was the greatest assault on journalists 'in living memory'. Chomsky countered that this opinion 'has to do with the concept of “living memory”, a category carefully constructed to include Their crimes against us while scrupulously excluding Our crimes against them' (2015). It is this blindness towards the implications of official foreign policy that some writers see as being extremely dangerous as it creates a cycle of similar policies following attacks which then leads to more attacks in the West as terrorists are galvanised and radicalised. As Chomsky ended his article his position, and the position of other writers who argue along similar lines to him became clear: 'Contrary to the eloquent pronouncement, it is not the case that “Terrorism is terrorism. There's no two ways about it.” There are definitely two ways about it: theirs versus ours' (2015).

**Conclusion**

Those who argued that Western foreign policy following 9/11 had a direct role in the *Charlie Hebdo* attack take a wider perspective than those whose arguments fit in the *Je suis* or *Je ne suis pas Charlie* movements. Rather than looking at the context of the attack on its own and taking into account the specifics of the massacre, these commentators treated the attack as a part of a wider trend of more 'home-grown' terror attacks in the West. Instead of looking at what motivated the attack specifically, they looked at why there is a growing trend of terror attacks in the West. This argument was generally linked up to Western foreign policy since 9/11 and leads to the conclusion that the 'War on Terror' has destabilised the Middle East, leading to the radicalisation and training of extremists in order to fight back against what they see as an antagonistic West. In order to strengthen this link, some also highlighted the rhetoric that came from the *Charlie Hebdo* attack, where it was compared to 9/11 and led to France declaring its own 'War on Terror' in response. Commentators who focused on this saw this trend towards an aggressive foreign policy and heavy military involvement in the region as dangerous for the West and argue that it could possibly lead to more attacks in the West in the future. One thing that all writers who argued that Western foreign policy as responsible for the *Charlie Hebdo* attack (and other attacks like it) agreed on is that they saw the massacre, and terrorism as whole, as inherently *political* in nature. From this perspective, it is the politics of the attack that should be focused on when ascribing responsibility, not the specifically claimed ideological or moral reasons that were given. According to these commentators, politics was responsible for the attack first and foremost and thus, the appropriate response to terrorism is through adjustments to Western foreign policy.
Conclusion

The rhetoric of ‘Je suis’ became a popular way to show support for a given community throughout terror attacks in 2015 and 2016. To name a few more recent examples, the ‘Je suis response’ became popular as a response to the March 2016 attacks in Brussels (Je suis Bruxelles); the June 2016 terror attack in Istanbul (Je suis Istanbul); the shooting in Orlando, Florida in June 2016 (Je suis Orlando); the July 2016 attack in Baghdad (Je suis Baghdad); and, finally, in July 2016 following the attack of Bastille Day celebrators on a beach in Nice, Je suis Nice became popular online. Following the Nice attack, the response quickly morphed into Je suis épuisé (I am exhausted). ‘Je suis’ has become a way in which people can express their solidarity with the victims of a terror attack (Emery, 2016). It has become a way in which people show that they stand united against terrorism.

However, because the response is shared online, predominately on either Twitter or Facebook, it is applied inconsistently, as some have been quick to point out. Liz Cookman, writing for The Guardian, for example, asked: ‘Where is Ankara’s “Je Suis” moment?’ following a wave of terror bombings in Turkey was met with comparative silence online (2016). For Cookman and James Taylor, who wrote a Facebook post speaking out against the lack of reaction which went viral, one of the causes for this ‘lack of sympathy’ is ignorance of Turkey, which stems from the fact that it has a large Muslim population (Cookman, 2015). Taylor noted, ‘Contrary to what many people think, Turkey is not the Middle East. Ankara is not a war zone [a problematic distinction in itself], it is a normal modern bustling city, just like any other European capital’ (cited in Cookman, 2016). The amount of discussion that has occurred following each terror attack about the application of the ‘Je suis’ label shows the way in which the responses to the Charlie Hebdo attack exemplified, and shaped the way in which the Western media and publics respond to terror. It shows the way in which reactions to terror attacks in the West are, by in large, uniformed in their condemnation but also how the rhetoric that became popular following the Charlie Hebdo attack has impacted the way in which we frame and talk about terrorism.

Another example of how this idea of responsibility has framed the way in which we discuss terrorism, is Charlie Hebdo’s editorial asking the question ‘how did we end up here?’ following the March 2016 terror attacks in Brussels. In this editorial, the staff of the magazine placed responsibility for the terror attacks, and terror attacks in general, on the wider Islamic community. In order to do this, they identified three people to represent a wider community in their discussion: firstly, the scholar Tariq Ramadan who argues that Western secularism needs to adapt to the increasingly large place that religion is taking in the West; secondly, an Islamic woman who chooses to wear a veil; and finally, a Muslim baker who refuses to sell pork products in his shop (Charlie Hebdo, 2016). The magazine then uses these three examples of people who are living in the West as contributing to terror attacks in Brussels simply through, in some way or another, practising Islam within the public sphere, as their existence in Western society creates a space for religion when it should be secular (Charlie Hebdo, 2016). In essence, this editorial ascribed contributory fault, for the terror attacks in Brussels, to the wider Muslim community in the West simply because they practise Islam.

Following the publication of this editorial a large number of responses appeared (Ebner, 2016; Naravane, 2016; Sherwood, 2016; Timberg, 2016; Withnall, 2016). These pieces ranged in opinion but largely echoed a lot of the discussion that followed the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015. Some continued to align Charlie Hebdo’s editorial stance with Western values and Western literary tradition. Julie Ebner, for example, wrote that the viewpoint of the editorial was not that Muslim people are the problem but rather that they are the solution to terror attacks in the West and that ‘Charlie Hebdo’s mission statement reads [...] like a 21st century version of Voltaire’ (Ebner, 2016). Not all agreed with this viewpoint, however, and argued that the editorial served to show how the magazine is not just secular and satirical but offensive and racist (cited in Naravane, 2016). Many articles that were critical of the editorial followed the critique offered by Nigerian-American writer Teju who wrote:
it's hard not to recall the vicious development of ‘the Jewish question’ in Europe and the horrifying persecution it resulted in. Charlie’s logic is frighteningly familiar: that there are no innocent Muslims, that ‘something must be done’ about these people, regardless of their likeability, their peacefulness or their personal repudiation of violence (cited in Naravane, 2016).

The editorial on the Brussels attacks, as with the debate on the Charlie Hebdo attack itself, divided opinion between those who saw Charlie Hebdo as an important bastion arguing for secularism and Western values like free speech, and those who saw the magazine as Islamophobic and dangerous in the content that it produces.

This response shows that the level of debate around the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015 was not exceptional. Rather, it was emblematic of wider debates and perspectives as an example of the way in which the concept of responsibility is discussed and politicised following a terror attack. It also shows the way in which responses to terrorism are framed by social, cultural and political views as well as the way in which a given response to terrorism fundamentally defines the way in which terrorism is responded to at both a social and policy level.

The main reason why the three major responses to the Charlie Hebdo attack came to such different conclusions was because they defined terrorism in slightly different ways. This, then, informed the way in which the ascribed responsibility to different parties. The Je suis Charlie response, firstly, tended to define terrorism as specifically Islamic and a direct threat to Western values. Therefore, the main thrust of their response to the Charlie Hebdo attack was to emphasise the importance of Western values and to celebrate those values as a form of protectionism against that terrorist threat. The Je suis Charlie argument emphasised the unity of the West in response to the attack and as such, implicitly ascribed a form of collective responsibility towards the wider Muslim population living in the West.

The second major response came in direct opposition to the first. Je ne suis pas Charlie argument, emphasised different social issues which led them to problematise the Je suis Charlie response. Where Je suis Charlie framed the discussion of terrorism as almost an ideological battle, with terrorists seeking mainly to erode the freedoms and values of the West, Je ne suis pas Charlie focused on the negative impact that those Western ideals can have on minority populations. They placed partial responsibility for the attack on the magazine itself, which they argued was deliberately irresponsible and provocative in the content that it produced. Furthermore, they saw the Je suis Charlie movement as a dangerous extension of the kind of behaviour that led to the attack in the first place.

Working alongside the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument but pushing it one step further was a similar response which focused on the marginalised space of Islam in France also emerged. While this response works alongside the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument, and comes to similar conclusions, it looked more specifically at the impact that Charlie Hebdo had on French society as well as the role that it played in normalising or promoting Western ideals. Like the Je ne suis pas Charlie argument, which saw terrorism as a response to Western xenophobia and racism, this response assigned partial responsibility for the attack with Charlie Hebdo as it saw the role of the magazine as one that contributed to the further marginalisation of Muslim people in France. This marginalisation was then presented as being one of the major radicalising factors behind terrorism in the West. Because of this, they placed responsibility for the attack, and terrorism as whole, with the West's social and cultural landscape and the lack of space and tolerance that it affords to others. They framed terrorism as a response to the lack of space given to minorities in West.

The third major response was similar in the way in which they defined the causes of terrorism. This response, however, framed terrorism as being a response to Western politics, rather than Western society. This final response saw Western foreign policy as being a major contributor to terrorism and thus, the responsibility for the attack lay in the political field. While Je suis Charlie grew from the dualism between the West and Islam following the ‘War on Terror’, those who focused on Western
politics focus on the impact of that dualism. They focus on the political nature of terrorism and see it as a response, not to ideology, but to official foreign policy. By focusing on terrorism as political, they ascribed responsibility for terror attacks in the West to military and political engagement of the West in the Middle East.

While, as noted in the introduction above, terrorism can be both social and political, the way in which each response defines the primary driving factor behind terrorism differently in order to aide their discussions, shows the way in which the framing of the issue of terrorism informs how we define responsibility and how we think it should be responded to. The first two responses focus on social/ideological drive behind terrorism, leading to conclusions focusing on the importance of value systems and social policy. Conversely, because the third response frames terrorism as predominately political, it pushes for responses to terrorism through policy as being the most effective way to combat it.

That is the central point to end on: that the way in which terrorism is framed informs the way in which responsibility for a terror attack is ascribed, and how responsibility is ascribed informs the responses to terrorism that are presented. For those who view Islam as being responsible for terror attacks, the promotion of secular, Western values, and the unity of the ‘non-Muslim’ West is the correct response to terrorism. These values are presented as being opposite to Islam extremism and the target of terrorism. For those who see Western society as being responsible for the growth in terror attacks in the West, the correct response to terrorism is one that involves reforming Western views of ‘the other’ and creating a more inclusive and tolerant society. For those who embrace this perspective, emphasising the importance of Western values over all others is the wrong approach as it works to diminish the value systems of others within Western society and normalises their marginalisation. Finally, for those who see terrorism as primarily political, the correct response to terrorism needs to happen at the policy level. For these people, policy decisions, by the West, created terrorism and it is through changing that approach to foreign policy that terrorism can be stopped.

These three responses are typified within the responses to Charlie Hebdo but they are also representative of the ways in which terrorism is discussed and framed in the West. As the Charlie Hebdo attack was one in what has become many terror attacks in the West, this question over what the ‘correct’ response to terrorism has become more urgent. What Charlie Hebdo showed us was that the answer to that question remains largely subjective and it comes down to two things: what you think terrorism is, and who you think is responsible for it.
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