CLASS AT THE MARGINS: THE CANTERBURY
HOTEL WORKERS' UNION* 1908 TO 1970

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*Officially, 'The Canterbury Hotel, Hospital,
Restaurant, Club and Related Trades Employees
Industrial Union of Workers'.
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ABSTRACT

The domestic workers in New Zealand's hotels, hospitals and restaurants have been at the margins of the historiography of the labour movement. Operating largely within the arbitration system, they have not been a group of workers in the front rank of industrial confrontation. Nevertheless, they have played an influential role within the labour movement, if not one which has attracted the attention of the media or of historians. As one of the largest sections of the working class, and a section which has continued to rapidly expand, their experiences are of significance in the history of the New Zealand labour movement.

The Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union (CHWU) founded in 1908, has been one of the three key unions within the hotel and restaurant industry in New Zealand, and at various times has made a significant contribution to the wider labour movement. In its first decade of operation, under the leadership of Liberal politician John Barr, the CHWU secured award coverage for most of the industry's workers in Christchurch as well as a six day working week. After Barr's departure in 1918, the union was guided for the next 36 years by Reginald Brooks, a staunch advocate of the Labour Party and the trade union movement. The union increased its strength in the 1920's, and after surviving the challenges of the depression, was able to further expand its coverage and greatly improve its members' wages and conditions under the first Labour government. Following the post-war period of dissension within the labour movement, Les Short became the new secretary and chartered the union through the new problems of the 1950's and 1960's. In 1967 and again in 1970, the CHWU undertook direct industrial action, breaking with a past tradition which had seen it abstain from strike action.

By the end of 1970, the CHWU constituted one of the largest unions in Canterbury. Representing over 5000 largely semi-skilled or unskilled workers, two thirds of whom were women, the union had been able to substantially improve the incomes and working conditions of its members, while at the same time contributing to the cause of the trade union movement and the Labour Party.
This thesis attempts to document the history of hotel, hospital and restaurant workers in Canterbury between 1908 and 1970. Its concern is with the experiences of the workplace — the hours of work, the rates of pay, the conditions and security of employment — and the collective struggle of the industry’s workers as a trade union, to defend and advance their interests. The workplace and the union are the two elements present throughout the thesis, and while major developments in the operation of the industry are discussed, the thesis is not intended to be a history of the liquor trade, the catering industry or the hospital system. Similarly, the thesis does not attempt to examine the complex cultural matrix of the lives of hotel and restaurant workers; it discusses the workers in their role as trade unionists, rather than as complete individuals with home and social lives.

Essentially, the story of the experiences of hotel, hospital and restaurant workers has been at the margins of the historiography of the New Zealand labour movement. Nevertheless, while not in the vanguard of industrial struggle, they constituted a large section of the working class, and wielded considerable influence within the labour movement. The Canterbury Hotel Workers’ Union (CHWU) played an important role in the direction of the national Hotel Workers’ Federation as well as within the local labour movement in Canterbury. Its struggles and successes on behalf of its members were often prosaic and achieved without recourse to direct industrial action. These experiences, were none-the-less a real and legitimate part of the history of the New Zealand movement. This thesis consciously sets out to portray the full range of the union’s activities, the large and small battles that were fought over hours, wages, employment and union coverage. These were the issues that were seen by the workers to be of vital concern. While retaining this emphasis, the history would be incomplete without considering the political and economic context in which the CHWU operated and by asking how and why the union acted in those larger historical events, of war, depression, and industrial conflict. Of particular concern is the CHWU’s role in the Labour Party and in the trade union movement in times of both conflict and co-operation.
Each chapter discusses a distinct chronological phase in the union’s history. The first ten years under the Liberal leadership of John Barr are covered by the first chapter. In the second chapter, the union rebuilds its organisation and faces the challenges of the depression; in the third, the CHWU prospers under the first Labour government while in the fourth phase it experiences the dissensions and confusion of the post-world war two era. In chapter five, from 1956 to 1969, the union steadily expands in size in a period of industrial tranquility, which is only broken in 1967. The epilogue examines the 1970 licensed hotel strike and the effect it had on the CHWU. Within each chapter the particular industrial and political issues of that period are discussed, but throughout the thesis there are five broad themes which reoccur: the wages and conditions of the workplace; the strategy and tactics adopted by the CHWU in pursuing its members interests; the internal politics of the union; the relationship with the wider labour movement; and the particular experiences of women workers, who continued to represent the majority of the CHWU’s members.

This history could not have been produced without the personal and organisational assistance provided by the staff of the Canterbury Hotel Workers’ Union. The fullest possible co-operation and access to documents and office facilities was furnished by Graham Harding the union’s secretary, while Allanah McLean patiently translated the earlier drafts into type. Particularly valuable were the experiences of three individuals who have been closely associated with the union’s development. Colin McCready (former secretary and executive member), Bob Ferguson (past president and former vice-president of the CHWU) and Les Short (former secretary of the CHWU and HWF) all willingly shared their insights into the events and people in the union’s past, and were important as sources in their own right as well as a cross-reference to written documentation.

Len Richardson, as the supervisor of the thesis gave valuable guidance, comment and encouragement. Melanie Nolan provided ideas and inspiration while Wilma Falconer and Wayne Townsend assisted with constructive comments. The photographs were supplied by the Alexander Turnbull Library and by Graeme Patterson. Gail Rankin performed the vexing task of typing the final copy.
Assistance was also willingly given by Bill Brooks, son of the former secretary of the CHWU Reg Brooks, and by Peter Cullen and Russ Revell the respective secretaries of the Wellington Hotel Workers’ Union and the HWF, who provided access to the records of their own organisations.
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NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

In several instances the full or official title of an organisation or of an award has been referred to in the text by a more readable and shortened form. In other cases a term, such as 'sector' has been consistently employed to denote a specific category. Similarly 'union' and 'unions' have been applied to a specific organisation or group of organisations.

ABBREVIATION OR TERM

AHWU  Auckland Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades I.U.O.W.
AJHR  Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives
AL  Alliance of Labour
AR  Annual Report of the CHWU
Award Titles  These have fluctuated with variations in hyphenation and between singular and plural. Those below are the official titles in 1970.
Licensed Hotels' Employees Award
Private Hotels' Employees Award
Tea-Rooms and Restaurant Employees Award
Chartered Clubs' Employees Award
Hospital Domestic Workers Award
N.Z. (except Westland) Private Hospitals' Domestic Workers Award
B Aw  Book of Awards
CHWU  Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union was the shortened and commonly employed name. Officially the union's names have been:
—Canterbury Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Industrial Union of Workers (1908 to 1937)
—Canterbury Hotel, Restaurant and Related Trades Employees' IUOW (1937 to 1955)
—Canterbury Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades Employees IUOW (1956 to 1982.)
—Canterbury Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant, Club and Related Trades Employees IUOW (1982.)
Corr  Correspondence
CT(L)C  Canterbury Trades (and Labour) Council
E Min  Executive Minutes
federation  Hotel Workers Federation (see HWF)
FL  Flashlight (National magazine of the HWF)
FOL  Federation of Labour
GWO  General Wage Order
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<tr>
<td>HANZ</td>
<td>Hotel Association of New Zealand (the employer’s union in the licensed hotels formerly known as the LVA)</td>
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<td>'hotel and restaurant workers'</td>
<td>usually employed as a shortened form to describe all workers including after 1937 those in hospitals and clubs.</td>
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<td>HWF</td>
<td>Hotel Workers Federation. Its official name underwent several changes but as in 1970 it was officially called: New Zealand Federated Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades Employees Industrial Association of Workers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC &amp; A Act</td>
<td>Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act.</td>
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<tr>
<td>'industry'</td>
<td>all hotels, restaurants, hospitals, clubs, rest homes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>Licensing Control Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>LH</td>
<td>Licensed Hotel</td>
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<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRC</td>
<td>(North Canterbury) Labour Representation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Lyttleton Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>LVA</td>
<td>Licensed Victuallers Association (the former name of the organisation representing employers in licensed hotels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Minutes (general &amp; special meetings, not executive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCHB</td>
<td>North Canterbury Hospital Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZPD</td>
<td>New Zealand Parliamentary Debates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PH</td>
<td>Private Hotel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Roberts Papers</td>
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<td>'sector'</td>
<td>a particular area of the industry covered by an award. There are a total of seven sectors (excluding the special case of the Air New Zealand Flight Kitchen) as at 31.12.70: licensed hotels, private hotels (including motels), tearooms (inc. restaurants, licensed restaurants, tearooms, snack-bars, take-away bars, pie carts and cafeterias), chartered clubs (inc. gentlemen’s clubs and working men’s clubs which sell liquor), public hospitals, private hospitals, rest homes</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress (New Zealand)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>'union'</td>
<td>the Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union, except where the text indicates otherwise.</td>
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<td>'unions'</td>
<td>generally, the affiliated hotel and restaurant workers unions acting collectively</td>
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<td>WHWU</td>
<td>Wellington Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades I.U.O.W.</td>
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<td>WP</td>
<td>Walsh Papers</td>
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<td>WPI</td>
<td>Wartime Price Index</td>
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NOTE ON TABLES

Contained within the thesis are several tables on award provisions and on the internal operation of the CHWU. The following information is to explain the selection, composition and terminology of these tables. It also serves as a common list of the abbreviations and sources used, material which would be too large and repetitious to include in the note at the end of each individual table.

1. Selection
The tables within the text and the data within each table, have been selected according to their significance in the history of the CHWU. A substantial amount of material has been excluded as less relevant and too unwieldy to include within the thesis. The tables are intended to be read in conjunction with the surrounding text and provide a clear and succinct presentation of the significant data. Selecting which award and what provisions should be included has been designed to provide the following:

- the major conditions of work, i.e. hours of work, holidays and sick leave;
- the major wages for work, i.e. weekly cash wage, board and lodging penalty rates and service allowances of a general nature;
- the wages of the major groups of workers, i.e. low graded kitchen staff, waitresses, maids and counterhands, and barmen;
- the range of pay rates, i.e. the highest paid chefs in the licensed hotels to the lowest paid maids;
- dychnonic movement in the major awards, especially the largest and pacesetting award, namely that for the licensed hotels;
- a comparison between the awards in the different sectors of the industry; and
- the position of wages and conditions at significant points in the CHWU's history, e.g. the first awards, the first dominion awards or the awards of the depression period.

As a consequence of this selection, supervision workers (such as head waitresses and head barmen) minor groups (such as waiters, porter-barmen, night porters and general hands) together with nuances of gradings in the kitchen, (e.g. 1st cooks in a five-handed kitchen or third cooks in a six handed kitchen) have been excluded. Similarly, the tables do not include the various minor allowances relating to either a specific task or reimbursing for a particular expense.
These allowances include payment for: night shifts, broken shifts, transport, uniforms, laundry, tools, the operation of kitchen boilers and beer systems. In the hospitals the basic rate of orderlies and maids was supplemented by the payment of several specific allowances for the performance of particular duties such as working in a mortuary, disposing of soiled material or handling mental patients.

2. Composition
The rates for wages provided in the tables are, of course, the legal minimum, and at certain times for certain workers, for instance senior cooks, the actual rates paid may be higher. In several awards the wage rate set out in the wages’ schedule is not the real legal minimum. In addition to the cash wage, workers in hotels received free board and lodgings, or were paid a cash allowance for the board, or for both, if no facilities were provided by the employer. With most workers in the earlier part of the century living in the hotel this was a significant part of their effective wage, and while its value subsequently declined relative to the cash wage it continued to be a component of the worker’s income. A further component was the service allowance payable first only to barstaff in 1951 but then to all licensed hotel workers, providing they had worked for at least 12 months with the same employer or in the same establishment. Its purpose was to raise the real wage of workers by avoiding the constraint of relativities operated by the Arbitration Court and was available to the majority of the workers in the licensed hotel sector. The final component in the weekly wage were the various General Wage Orders issued by the Arbitration Court, applied to the award but not always formally incorporated into the wages schedule. The figures used for wage rates incorporate these components and specific reference is made in the notes to the individual tables.

The award tables enable a comparison between the pay rates for the same type of work across the industry sectors. In comparing the rates between workers in hospital kitchens with those in hotels and restaurants, some qualification is necessary. For while the basis for pay rates in the latter was the number of workers in a kitchen, in hospitals the average number of meals prepared constituted the basis for the calculation. The comparisons in the tables provide an approximation in the instance between the sectors rather than an exact measure. Moreover, comparisons between the senior cooks and chefs in the licensed hotels with the senior cooks in other sectors has generally been avoided. The skills required in the kitchens of large licensed hotels and certain types of restaurants were qualitatively different
from the production line cooking necessary in hospitals, or the standards required in private hotels and general restaurants. Further, the senior cooks and chefs in licensed hotels were the omnipotent controllers in the kitchen, supervising and directing work. In the hospitals only limited authority was possessed by the 1st cook in any kitchen. At the levels of second cook and kitchenhand, however, the tasks, in hospitals and hotels do enable a more reliable comparison to be made.

In comparing other groups of workers across awards, the composition of the job may vary in some respects. For instance, a steward in a chartered club did not always perform the same amount of bar work as a barman in a licensed hotel. The rates given for stewards are either the standard rate, or when a higher rate for liquor service was introduced, the rate of pay for a steward who spent more than 50% of their time serving liquor. Similarly, the tasks of a porter or maid in a hotel were not identical to an orderlie or maid in a hospital. Nevertheless despite these qualifications, there is a sufficient degree of commonality present to ensure that the comparison is a useful one.

3. Terminology

The following is a common list of terms and abbreviations used in the tables:

- **b & I** board and lodging — the provision of meals and sleeping quarters in hotels. In restaurants and tearooms meals only were provided, usually two substantial meals each working day. Where a hotel or restaurant did not provide meals a cash allowance was paid, and in the case of the hotels a further allowance was paid in lieu of lodging.

- **casual** workers employed for less than five consecutive days. Distinct from regular part-timers employed throughout the week.

- **hk** number of hands (workers) in a kitchen. A plus sign indicates that the wage applied to kitchens of that size and greater.

- **M & F** male and female workers. Where no gender is specified the wage rates or conditions apply to both.

- **PR** pro rata. The pro rata of the normal weekly cash wage plus the specified percentage.

- **Special holidays** the term used in the awards for Statutory
holidays, such as Christmas Day & Labour Day. If staff were required to work on these days, they would be paid at a rate either 50% or 100% greater than the normal pro rata pay rate for a day's work.

The rate of pay is one quarter above the pro rata rate for a day's work, or 50% or 100% above the pro rata rate.

4. Sources
The Book of Awards has been the source for the information in the award tables. For the tables on the CHWU's operation, the membership statistics are from the Annual Reports of the Department of Labour listed as either H 11 or H 11A in the Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, and the financial figures from the Annual Reports & Balance Sheets of the CHWU, filed in the CHWU's offices.
INTRODUCTION

The organisation of hotel, hospital and restaurant workers into trade unions, was a project essentially of the twentieth century. Prior to 1900, a large number of hotels had been built in New Zealand but the industry’s workers had failed to establish any permanent trade union organisation. The industry itself consisted of three sectors. The licensed hotels providing alcohol, meals and accommodation, represented the largest sector of the industry. In addition there were small numbers of private hotels and boarding houses which served food and furnished accommodation, and a third sector of tearooms, restaurants and oyster-saloons which only provided meals.

In the province of Canterbury, it was the licensed hotel sector that employed the largest numbers of workers, had the largest sales turnover and the greatest number of establishments within the hotel and restaurant industry. Operating for six to seven days a week from 9am to 11 or 12pm, the licensed hotel functioned as a vital social centre in country and town alike. Besides providing for the thirsts of dusty travellers and work-weary locals, the licensed hotel was a place of musical entertainment and a rendezvous for individuals and political and social organisations. These hotels were concentrated largely in the heart of the provinces capital city, Christchurch, but along the highways from the city stood many other such oasis attracting the resident and the traveller. A cluster of licensed hotels had also developed in the late nineteenth century in the Port of Lyttelton to meet the needs of seamen and watersiders.

By the early years of the twentieth century small numbers of tearooms, restaurants and oyster-saloons had emerged in Christchurch and Timaru as well as at the beach boroughs of New Brighton and Sumner. Private hotels and boarding houses had developed in the two major centres and at the holiday resort of Akaroa.¹ The characteristic feature of these diverse establishments was their small scale. Usually they were family owned and operated enterprises, generally employing fewer than a dozen workers.

¹. There were three large ‘temperance boarding houses’ in Akaroa see Cyclopaedia of New Zealand: 3; Canterbury (Christchurch : The Cyclopaedia Co. Ltd, 1903)
There were exceptions to this, such as the “Leviathan” (see photograph 3), but generally the larger concentration of workers were employed in the licensed hotels of central Christchurch. Compared to other industries, in the urban economy of the early twentieth century, this smallness of scale was not untypical — factories in 1901 employed only 12.7 workers on average.

The workers who served the public in these hotels and restaurants were generally termed domestic workers. They were distinct, however, from domestic servants employed in the homes of the colonial elite and middle class. For while the two groups had in common domestic tasks, — cooking, serving and cleaning — they stood in decisively different relationships to their employer and the economy. Servants as such were outside the wage labour relationship between capitalists and the working class. As a group they were part of a transitional phase in the development of capitalism, which met the temporary domestic demands of a growing urban middle class. Smaller families, new technology and public utilities were key elements in their decline and virtual disappearance. In contrast hotel and restaurant workers were part of a growing capitalist economy, immersed in the wage labour relationship. Their workplaces became increasingly integrated into the economic system and their numbers and importance expanded.

Women performed the domestic tasks in the family home, and it was women who largely composed the domestic labour force both as paid servants in private homes and as workers in hotels and restaurants. Generally, these workers were semi-skilled or unskilled and worked long hours, in squalid conditions for a low rate of pay. Within the hierarchy of the working class, domestic workers occupied the lowest levels in terms of wages and status. In the category of domestic workers in hotels and restaurants were cooks, kitchenhands, barmen and barmaids, waiters and waitresses, porters pantry and laundry maids. Large numbers of male workers were only present in the occupations of barmen, porters and as senior cooks.

Organising the industry’s workers into trade unions, to overcome their exploitation, was a task fraught with difficulties. As largely semi-skilled or unskilled employees, hotel and restaurant workers lacked the advantages in the labour market possessed by skilled workers. Skilled workers had the opportunity to obtain a better, albeit still poor, price for their labour and were generally more difficult to recruit and replace. Unskilled and semi-skilled workers were more vulnerable to dismissal and in the event of industrial action could be more readily replaced by non-unionists.
Nevertheless, the new unionism in New Zealand in the 1880's and 1890's saw large numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled workers organise, even if many of the new unions enjoyed but a brief existence. Hotel and restaurant workers, however, were unable to establish any permanent union in the nineteenth century, and those that were formed were limited to a small number of generally male workers in the main cities.

The significance of the New Zealand experience, was that trade unionism was in fact constructed with success in the twentieth century, in the hotel and restaurant industry. Throughout the rest of the western world the difficulties of union organisation continued from the nineteenth into the twentieth century, so that even by the end of the 1960's, most of the industry's workers, in most other western nations remained without the protection of a trade union. Where a hotel and restaurant workers' union did exist it was usually confined to the larger licensed hotels in the major centres, and even that level of coverage had taken many decades to achieve. In sharp contrast, permanent trade unions were established in the hotel and restaurant industry in New Zealand prior to World War One and they secured both a wide occupational coverage — including male and female cooks, barstaff, maids, waiters and waitresses — and industry coverage — licensed hotels, restaurants, tearooms and subsequently private hotels. The coverage was further expanded in the 1930's to domestic workers in hospitals and chartered clubs. The reasons for the unique development in New Zealand of a strong hotel and restaurant union, lay in the first instance with the Liberal government's enactment of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1894. By creating a system of compulsory arbitration, the Liberal government provided a protective legal shelter under which weak and vulnerable workers, such as those in hotels and restaurants, could organise into trade unions. Despite the weaknesses and limitations of the arbitration system, the presence of a paternal state apparatus in industrial relations enabled the hotel and restaurant workers to secure from their employers a small space in which their union could operate. From this base, modest progress was made by the various hotel and restaurant workers' unions. The second factor, that reinforced this progress and generated further strength, was the enactment in 1936 of compulsory trade unionism by the Labour government. New groups of domestic workers were brought under the protection of the Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union, and the union's resources and industrial strength were significantly increased.
The operation of the Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union was centered on Christchurch, where the majority of the province's hotel and restaurant workers were employed. Similarly, it was among the workers in the licensed hotels that the strongest support existed for the union. This reflected the larger numbers of workers concentrated in individual establishments and the greater proportion of male workers who for various cultural reasons generally exhibited a greater level of trade union consciousness. The operation of the union has subsequently extended to all sectors of the industry — excluding those at sea, in the air and on rail — and to every corner of the province, but Christchurch and the licensed hotel sector have continued to be at the core of the union's activities. The geographical reach of the CHWU was marked by 'The Hermitage' at Mt Cook in the west, and the Chatham Islands in the east; to the south lay Waimate and to the north Kaikoura. While the CHWU was active in organising hotel and restaurant workers throughout the South Island, the union's official coverage remained within the traditional boundaries of the Canterbury province even after multi-district trade unions became legally possible in 1936.

Hotel, hospital and restaurant workers in Canterbury remained the focus of the CHWU's activities, but the union performed an important role in determining the national direction of the industry's workers. As an autonomous union in a national federation of hotel and restaurant workers' unions, the CHWU played an active and equal part in shaping decisions, and it was never reduced to the status of a backwater provincial branch carrying out the decisions of others. As a large union in its own right, it made a distinct contribution to the industrial and political streams of the labour movement in Canterbury and nationally.
CHAPTER ONE

THE ERA OF LIBERALISM, 1908 TO 1918

1. TO BUILD A UNION

The history of the Canterbury Hotel Workers' Union began on 24 February 1908. Held under the auspices of the Canterbury Trades and Labour Council (CTLC), the 56 workers who attended the inaugural meeting resolved to create "The Canterbury Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Industrial Union of Workers". The Hon. J. Barr (MLC), together with R. T. Bailey, from the CTLC were elected as president and secretary respectively. They were joined on the executive by workers from the industry, but it was Barr and Bailey who directed the union in its first year of operation.

In the first decade of the union's existence, its efforts were devoted to securing an award for each of the three sectors of the industry — licensed hotels, tearooms and private hotels — and attaining a six-day week. Progress was made in lowering the hours of work, raising the rate of pay and constructing a union organisation. The overall character of the CHWU in this first decade was one of industrial and political moderation.

The initiative for forming the CHWU was claimed by both Ted Howard, a leading socialist trade unionist in Christchurch, and by the staff of Warners Hotel. Either way, in early February 1908, the secretary of the Wellington Cooks and Waiters' Union, E. J. Carey, was contacted and he agreed to come to Christchurch to assist in organising the city's hotel and restaurant workers. This initiative paralleled the work of the CTLC in organising semi-skilled and unskilled workers during this period. Those who worked in hotels and restaurants merited attention as a large body of un-unionised workers whose occupation was characterised by long hours for

1 CHW Min 24 Feb 1908 p1
2 Ibid. For attendance see CHW AR 26 Feb 1909
3 CHW Min 2 Aug 1908 (Howard's claim, Warner's claim p9)
4 Most notably among agricultural workers and local body workers.
low wages. The CTLC was thus pleased to assist Carey, with the council’s president Hon. J. Barr (MLC) and secretary R. T. Bailey both playing a leading role. Similarly Carey’s involvement was part of a national effort by the Wellington Cooks’ and Waiters’ Union to establish unions for the industry in each of the main centres. An Otago union was formed in July 1908 and Auckland followed in October.1

Attempts to organise hotel workers in New Zealand had occurred prior to 1908, but with the exception of the Wellington Union all these unions had perished. In Christchurch two abortive attempts had been made. In August 1890 the “Canterbury Cooks’ and Waiters’ Union” with 25 members had been formed but disappeared in the same year in the wake of the defeated Maritime Strike.2 With the widening of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (IC&A) in 1900 to include workplaces such as hotels, renewed but separate efforts were made by local workers to organise in each of the four main centres. The Wellington Cooks’ and Waiters’ Union obtained an award in 1902 but it failed to cover barmen or women workers, or provide any preference rights for unionists. In the following year the “Canterbury Hotel, Club and Catering Employees Union” was formed by 94 workers, which attempted to secure an award for the licensed hotels.3 Unfortunately for reasons which remain unclear, Hooper the unions president, failed to file a case with the Arbitration Court.4 Although affiliating with the CTLC the union proved unable to organise itself and folded in 1905.5

2. THE POLITICS OF THE UNION
With the creation of the new union in 1908, the priority was to secure three awards to cover the licensed hotels, the tearooms and restaurants and the private hotels. From the beginning the union’s leadership was committed to an arbitrationist strategy, as the means to obtain better wages and conditions. The objective of the union, said the constitution, was to:

1 H. O. Roth “Under the Arbitration Act” Flashlight no. 7 1965 p11
2 H. O. Roth “In the beginning; the early years of hotel unionism in New Zealand” _FL_ 1 no. 6 1965 p11
3 Roth “Under the Arbitration Act” op cit
4 CTLC Min 1 Oct 1904
5 Roth “Under the Arbitration Act” op cit
JOHN BARR, first CHWU president and its secretary 1909 – 1918

Barr was a leading Liberal in the Christchurch trade union movement. He was the secretary of several trade unions, an appointee to the Legislative Council — parliament’s second chamber — and the Mayor of Sumner. Under his leadership the union remained a loyal participant in the arbitration system and opposed any attempts to create a labour movement independent of the Liberal Party.

(CTLC Archives, No. 43 University of Canterbury Library)
J. Barr.
Président.
overcome the evils arising from separate action and unfair competition, and by combining upon fair and honourable grounds..., achieve the benefit and protection of each individual member.

Schemes to 'elevate the calling', the constitution continued, would be considered and joint action taken with other labour bodies in the field of politics. All political questions however required the endorsement of a special meeting of the union's members.²

The focus of the CHWU was clearly to ameliorate the conditions of labour in the industry and not change the relationship between capital and labour. In the view of the executive, progress would be obtained through the correct legal machinery of arbitration. Peaceful negotiation and not the turbulence of direct action would mark the approach of the CHWU, in its first decade of activity.

Such an approach was typical of the mainstream of New Zealand trade unionism in this period. Peaceful, legal reform was the characteristic orientation — an orientation derived from recent historical lessons. The path of militancy exemplified by the Maritime Strike of 1890 had been tried and the resulting debacle remained fresh in the minds of many unionists. Moreover the progress achieved by the trade unions on the milk of the IC&A Act in the Liberal nursery, appeared to provide a further demonstration as to the efficacy of moderation. Certainly the small scale, localised and craft nature of most unions rendered them unfit for combat with the capitalists, and the protection of arbitration at least ensured survival and modest progress.

Times however changed. The development of new industry, the atrophy that beset the operation of the Arbitration Court and the rise of a new optimistic generation of union leaders all contributed to a breakdown of the system of arbitration.³ Where previously the trade unions had been dominated by craft-

1. Constitution of "The Canterbury Hotel & Restaurant Employees IUOW" p1 in CHW Min 24 Feb 1908
2. Ibid p3
3. For a general discussion of this issue see H.O. Roth Trade Unions in New Zealand. (Wellington: AH & AW Reed, 1973) pp23-27
liberalism, three broad tendencies were evident by 1908: the Liberals concentrated in small craft urban unions who were part of the coalition of interests constituting the Liberal Party; the labour independents, city based but with semi-skilled and unskilled workers advocating an independent political party for the working class; and thirdly the 'Red Feds', committed to socialism, direct struggle in the workplace outside the framework of arbitration. The latter's strength lay with very particular sections of the working class such as the miners.

While the struggle between these groups was reshaping the labour movement, the CHWU persisted in its Liberal orientation until 1918, by then craft-liberalism was politically almost extinct. The reasons why the CHWU sustained for so long that political orientation lie with the structure of the hotel and restaurant industry and Barr’s leadership of the union.

To unionise hotels and restaurants was to organise small and dispersed workplaces whose staff lacked a tradition of union consciousness. When the union began in 1908 there were at least 126 licensed hotels in North Canterbury, 48 tearooms and 11 large private hotels in Christchurch city alone. In the rest of the province there were many more hotels and eating houses, small boarding houses, chartered clubs and hospital kitchens. The total in 1924 was approximately 400. Regular inspection to ensure union membership and the enforcement of the awards posed a substantial problem, but to organise any large scale direct action in support of a claim, was a course requiring sustained determination and was still unlikely to succeed.

At the workplace a worker was in contact with generally only a few fellow workers. The employer often worked on the premises and in many establishments was assisted by family members. This close master/servant relationship tended to curtail the political articulation of the workers.

Finally two further difficulties confronted union organisers. As largely semi-skilled or unskilled the workforce could be replaced by ‘free labour’ in the event of a strike. The threat of substitution could also be used in daily practice as a disciplinary measure. Secondly, the predominantly female

1. LVA claimed 126 hotelkeepers as members AJHR 5 19a (1913) p66. 48 tearooms cited B_Aw IX (Wellington: Dept of Labour 1908) p825; 11 private hotels B_Aw X (1909) p507

2. 172 licensed hotels, 123 tearooms, 110 private hotels, plus chartered clubs. B_Aw XXV (1924) p274 & p1676; XXV a (1925) p630
workforce tended to militate against direct action for reasons of political consciousness and from their ability by marriage to achieve individual egress or to remain, but with a reduced dependency on their work as a source of income.

These structural factors while setting certain limitations do not completely explain the specific industrial and political outlook of the union. The persistence of a pro-Liberal perspective was a consequence of Barr's leadership of the union. Elected as president for 1908 he succeeded Bailey as secretary in February 1909, remaining in that office until 1918. For that period the politics of the CHWU were quintessentially the politics of the executive led by Barr.

John Barr had migrated to New Zealand in 1902 at the age of 35. A Scot who had worked in North America, his trade was that of a stonemason, although he had spent time as a weaver and as a lineman. After arriving in Christchurch Barr soon emerged as one of the leaders of the craft-liberal faction within the CTLC with the building trades as his centre of power. He became an influential trade unionist in Christchurch providing a regular column, "Labour's World" in the Lyttelton Times. As the labour movement and the Liberal Party became estranged Barr's continuing close association with the Liberals left him and the unions he led, increasingly isolated from the mainstream of the labour movement. While his influence within the trade unions declined his involvement in national and municipal politics increased. A Liberal appointee to the Legislative Council in 1907, he continued on the Council until 1930. In the meantime he became Mayor of Sumner, 1917, and a year later the Chairman of the Christchurch Tramway Board.

Moderate reform, cautiously and legally pursued was Barr's political creed. Society might, in his view, be gradually reformed to improve the conditions of the people but not radically transformed to change their positions. The worker the employer and the consumer each possessed certain rights and were

1 CHW Min 7 Feb 1909 p59. Bailey joined the Labour Dpt, rising to head the Chch office in the late 1930s. See Chapter and below.
2 G. H. Scholefield (Ed) Dictionary of New Zealand Biography (Wellington: Dept of Internal Affairs, 1940) p42.
3 Usually these were in the Saturday editions between 1907 and 1914.
4 Scholefield p42
entitled in Barr’s view, to fair wages, profits and prices. On the specific issue of arbitration Barr had “no hesitation in saying that the Arbitration Act... had been of the utmost benefit to the workers of New Zealand.” The system had been beneficial in the past and was still so. As for the hotel workers, Barr believed that to destroy the Arbitration Court would be to destroy the union.

Barr’s views on industrial tactics and the politics of trade unionism should also be noted. Strikes were on occasion justifiable in Barr’s view, but a ‘go-slow’ was a dishonest act, a form of theft from the employer. Ideally workers and management should co-operate and management should encourage their employees to take an interest in the problems of business in order that they might gain a broader appreciation of the difficulties of industry. The role of a trade union was to defend the interests of its members by raising their working conditions and the standard of their particular trade. While they might co-operate with other trade unions, Barr consistently and emphatically rejected any distinct political role or ideological objective for the labour movement. General political issues were not in his view a legitimate province for a trade union. As to an independent party for the working class he commented

I have stated time and again, that if a labour political party is deemed necessary let it be built outside of the trade unions, let it be an organisation entirely apart.

Such then were the cluster of views constituting Barr’s political panopoly: an acceptance of capitalism whose worst abuses would be ameliorated through the arbitration system and the Liberal Party.

To examine Barr’s politics is not to cast him as the omnipotent actor, director and writer of the union’s early history. The social structures and relationships of New Zealand society as operated and altered by social classes set the perimeters for the union’s policy options, as well as influencing the detail of their execution. Within and through such factors Barr was able to exercise a large degree of freedom because the union’s members and its executive acquiesced to, or supported such policies. Barr provides the pre-eminent example of the craft-liberalist vista that so dominated the union’s outlook in its first ten years.

1. NZPD 184 (1919) p224
2. NZPD 156 (1911) p1188
3. Ibid p1189
4. NZPD 184 (1919) pp222-3
5. Lyttelton Times 18 Mar 1911 p7
3. THE WORKPLACE

What then were the conditions of work in the hotel and restaurant industry, to which this strategy or arbitration and legislative reform was to be applied? It was an industry with very long hours, low pay, squalid living quarters and insecurity of employment. A normal week of work was between 70 and 90 hours, and could on rare occasions exceed 100 hours. Aside from a break of one afternoon each week the work routine in the industry operated seven days a week throughout the year, unrelieved by either statutory or annual holiday. The work day for kitchenstaff often began at 5 or 6am preparing breakfast and continued until after the evening meal to 9 or even 10pm. This day was only broken by short periods of free time in the morning and afternoon. Housemaids, barstaff and serving staff similarly worked long hours although generally less than those in the kitchens.

The daily reality of this experience was conveyed by several workers at hearings of the Labour Bills Select Committee on the Shops and Offices Act, in 1913. The various hotel workers' unions presented a number of cases to the committee and three of these expose the sort of workplace reality confronted by workers. Miss E. Sutton worked at Glenalvon, a private hotel in the North Island. She was paid a weekly wage of £1 for 14 to 16 hours work per day, with her weekly hours varying between 95 and 105. Miss Amy Hill was also employed at Glenalvon working as a kitchenmaid for 10s per week. Her hours were from 6.30am to 4pm with two fifteen minute breaks, followed by a further three hours work in the evening. This was a six-day a week routine with slightly fewer hours on Sunday. The weekly total was 81 hours. The third worker, Miss McNeil, was employed at Stonehurst for 76½ hours per week on 15s. Daily hours ranged from 10½ to 13 except for Thursday when there was a half-day holiday and only seven hours were worked.

Overall the working conditions for most of the industry's workers varied from the bad to the appalling. In addition to the issues of hours and pay there was the problem of cramp and unclean accommodation facilities. With hotel workers frequently living in their place of employment, the quality of their sleeping quarters, the washing facilities and the meals were of considerable importance. Workers reported that:

1. See AJHR 5 19a (1913) Labour Bills Select Committee on shops and offices Act also see G.J. Fryer 'Auckland Hotel Workers Union 1908-1914 (Research Essay, Auckland University, 1977).
2. AJHR 5 19a (1913) pp98-99
In the majority of hotels in New Zealand there is no such room as a servants dining room or a sitting room of any kind where we could get our meals comfortably, and the sleeping accommodation is simply disgraceful. In some places there are five or six men — waiters, bar men and porters — packed like sardines in a small unhealthy space... with no one to clean or tidy the place and no time to do so themselves.¹

To correct the worst of this exploitation, in hours, wages and living conditions, was the first aim of the union and the first steps were to secure two awards; the first to cover Christchurch's licensed hotels, and the second the city's tearooms and restaurants.² Private hotels and establishments outside of Christchurch would follow after these bridgeheads had been secured.

4. THE FIRST AWARDS

The union's negotiators met with the hotel employers, the Canterbury Licensed Victuallers' Association (LVA) in March 1908. An agreement was reached in the following month ³ and on 6 May the Arbitration Court issued the first award for the industry in Canterbury, which would cover the key area of the licensed hotels.⁴ It was the workers in the licensed hotels that were the largest, most organised and union conscious group and where the high profit of the liquor trade placed the employers in a more favourable economic position than their counterparts in the private hotels or tearooms. The pattern set in this sector would be vital in determining the conditions for the workers in the other weaker sectors and for those in the rest of the province.

1. Fryer op cit p 36 also see AJHR 5 19a (1913 ) p81
2. CHW Min 30 Mar 1908 p11
3. CHW Min 16 & 30 Mar (consider conditions); 24 Apr 1908 (agreement)
4. B Aw IX (1908) p252
For this first award the CHWU had claimed a 60 hour week for male workers, 52 hours for women and a daily maximum for all workers of 11 hours. The daily maximum was obtained but weekly hours were set in the award at 65 for all workers. In its primary goal of reducing hours the union had only been able to render unlawful the worst abuses and it remained still distant from the aim of achieving parity with the 52 hours week of the shop workers.

The weekly wage rates secured by the union ranged from £4 10s for chefs in the largest kitchens down to 15s for housemaids, with barmen on a minimum rate of £1 10s (see Table 1.1). The union’s claims were of course for higher rates, for instance £5 for the first class of chefs and £2 5s for barmen. It was the latter which showed the largest disparity between the figure claimed and that which was obtained. This overall hierarchy of rates, with the chefs at the top then followed by cooks and barmen, and at the bottom waitresses and maids, would persist as the pattern for the future.

These wage rates were all complemented by the provision of free board and lodging by the employer. The award prescribed that in the event of one or both not being provided then an allowance would be paid. As a result the effective wage rate for hotel workers was significantly higher than the weekly cash amount. A value of 15s per week was placed on the total of allowances for board and lodging.

Below the standard rates of pay were probationer rates for waiters and waitresses. New waiters were required to undergo a 12 month so-called training period at a wage of 15 to 20s per week, while waitresses served as probationers for six months at a rate of 10s, half the full-wage rate. The ratio of probationers to full-wage workers was however limited in any establishment to 1:3. Conversely, the union was able to secure payment for overtime at a rate of time-and-a-half with a minimum payment of 9d per hour for those workers on less than £1 10s a week.

1. CHW Min 2 Mar 1908
2. B Aw IX (1908) p252
3. CHW Min 2 Mar 1908
TABLE 1.1 THE FIRST AWARDS OF THE CHWU, 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Licensed Hotels (ChCh City)</th>
<th>Restaurants and Tearooms (ChCh City)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Weekly hours</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65 (male) 52 (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overtime</td>
<td>T½ or min 9d/hr</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
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Wages: Weekly

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<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
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<td>4-10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>15s</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Add board &amp; lodging^4</td>
<td>15s</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Meals (unspecified value)</td>
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Wages: Casual per day

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<tr>
<td>1st cook</td>
<td>£1</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>7/6</td>
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<tr>
<td>then 15^5</td>
<td></td>
<td>15s</td>
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<td>5s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waitress</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>7s</td>
<td>6s</td>
<td>5s</td>
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</table>

Notes: (see Note on Tables)

1. Electorates of ChCh North, South and East
2. Restaurants, Tearooms, Oyster-saloons within a 10 mile radius of the ChCh Chief Post Office.
3. Minimum rate of 9d/hr applies to workers earning £1 10s or less per week.
4. Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid. Meals only for business days in R. & T.
5. First day £1; 2nd and 3rd day 15s, thereafter ordinary.
In relation to union coverage and union preference the CHWU had achieved a modest success. First there was a preference clause providing that workers would join the union within one month of commencing employment in the industry. If they failed to enroll, and a competent union member was available, then the employer would dismiss the non-unionist. This union preference did not however apply to women workers, the majority in the industry. Second, in dismissing any worker the employer was now required to give 48 hours notice where previously no notice needed to be given. The award’s coverage was confined to the electorates of Christchurch North, East and South which while ensuring the majority of licensed hotels in and around the city were covered, did exclude those in Lyttleton, New Brighton and Sumner. The union was forced by the LVA to agree that it would not cite any hotel outside of the award area during the term of the award, that is not the award expired in April 1911.

Following this settlement in the licensed hotels, Bailey the unions secretary, proceeded to cite tearooms and restaurants in Christchurch to a conciliation hearing September 1908. The union and the employers reached agreement on the majority of other issues. Only the question of the wages for waitresses remained in dispute, which was resolved by the Arbitration Court when it issued an award in December. A 62 hour week for males and a 52 hour week for women was set by the award but the rates of pay after allowing for both the cash wage and the boarding and lodging allowances were lower than those in the licensed hotels.

On the disputed question of the wages: rates for waitresses, the ruling of the Arbitration Court favoured the union. The employers had originally offered 17/6d per week but only after the waitress completed a 12 months probationary period, at a rate of 14s for the first six months and thereafter an extra 1s for each subsequent three monthly period. Instead the court set a basic weekly rate of £1 and limited the probationary period to three months and at a rate of 15s per week.

1 B. Aw IX (1908) p252 clauses 8-10
2 Ibid Memorandum attached to award
3 CHW Min 8 Sep 1908 p35
4 B. Aw IX (1908) p825
5 B. Aw IX (1908) pp826-7
The union did secure a preference clause for all male and female workers and the award covered some 48 tearooms, oyster-salons and restaurants within a 10 mile radium of the Christchurch Chief Post Office, thereby including those in Sumner and New Brighton. ¹

Overall, these two awards did represent an advance and in terms of their wages, hours and union coverage were comparable to the only current award, for the industry, namely that of the Wellington union.² Indeed in two classifications the wage rates were higher. The Auckland award that followed was also settled with the same hours and similar wages.³

The limitation of coverage to the province's major city was typical of most union awards, with the workers in towns and in rural areas generally remaining unprotected by union coverage. Nevertheless the largest group of workers in Canterbury's licensed hotels and tearooms were now covered by an award for the first time.

5. DISSENT

Before the union could proceed to organise the workers in the private hotels, it was faced by internal conflict over the award for the licensed hotels. A group of 29 city barmen petitioned the CHWU claiming that they had not been consulted about the new award which rather than improve their wages affected them adversely.⁴ They complained that at present they were earning between 35s and 40s per week for 60 hours, while the new award provided a rate of only 30s for a 65 hour week⁵. The executive responded that the award conditions were the minimum legally permitted and they had been assured by the employers that any existing rates of pay above the award level would remain. ‘The barmen’ said the executive ‘had shown little interest in the award negotiation’ and resolved to consign the petition to the waste-paper basket.⁶

1. B_Aw_IX (1908) pp826-7
2. B_Aw_VIII (1907) p970
3. B_Aw_IX (1908) p875
4. CHW Min 4 May 1908
5. CTLC Min 30 May 1908 p258
6. CHW Min 4 May 1908
After this rebuff, the barmen approached James Thorn, an active socialist on the CTLC, to seek a remedy. Thorn, seeing merit in their case and its political character, placed a motion before the CTLC stating, ‘That a union in accepting a substantial reduction of wages . . . and an increase in hours, falls seriously away from the true objects of Unionism.’ The last four words contained the barb, for more was now at issue than the single complaint of the barmen.

The conflict, which now shifted to the arena of the CTLC became part of the wider struggle between the forces of craft-liberalism and independent labour. If Barr the champion of ‘true unionism’ against the dragon of political labour, was now revealed to be in practice the proponent of a weak and ineffectual unionism, then what were the consequences for the whole labour movement? Would poor wages and long hours continue to be the ‘lot’ of the worker under the timorous leadership of Liberals, such as Barr?

The battle that now ensued was sharp, and vigorous, and the result close. At the first meeting of the CTLC, when Thorn presented his motion criticising the CHWU, the craft-liberal faction was able to secure the motions deferral by 28 votes to 26. Instead a deputation was sent to the CHWU, seeking an explanation of their actions. At the next meeting of the CTLC, Rushbridge an ally of Barr, moved that the explanation provided by the CHWU be accepted as ‘entirely satisfactory’ and that the council should ‘strongly condemn Thorn’s discussion of the issue in the newspapers.’

In the course of the acrid debate that followed an attempt was made by Thorn’s allies to delete the criticism of his actions. The attempt failed only on the casting vote of the chair. Rushbridge’s full motion defending the CHWU was then passed.

While on this occasion the assault from independent labour had been repulsed, the closeness of the division revealed the fragility of the craft-liberals control of the union movement in Christchurch. Soon the balance of forces would shift slowly but decisively to the side of independent labour. Within a year it would be Barr and his allies who were in retreat.

1. CTLC Min 30 May 1908
2. CTLC Min 30 May 1908
3. CTLC Min 13 Jun 1908
The leadership of the CHWU was pleased with having established its first two awards and with the progress made in organising the industry’s workers in central Christchurch. With the term for the first two awards not expiring until 1911, and the agreement by the union with the LVA, that no additional licensed hotels were to be cited as parties to an award before that date, the focus of activity for the CHWU now shifted. Of course there were the daily tasks of award enforcement, but beyond this the two primary aims for the union in the next few years were first, to obtain an award for the private hotels, and second to secure a six-day week for workers in all sectors of the industry. In both these objectives the union would face a prolonged and frustrating struggle in the courts and in parliament. On neither issue did the union take the path of direct action.

The workers in private hotels were unprotected either by legislation or, (except in the case of certain Wellington hotels) by any award. Long hours for low pay was again the characteristic pattern. One angry correspondent in the Lyttelton Times claimed that large hotels in Christchurch were working their staff for 90 hours per week for a wage of £1. The owners, in the writers view, ‘were grabbing every shilling’ and urgent legislation was required to protect the workforce. The nature of the private hotel sector was to prove a continuing obstacle in obtaining such protection either in the Arbitration Court or in parliament.

A private hotel, as distinct from a licensed hotel, provided accommodation and meals but did not serve alcohol. Some private hotels served casual meals to the public, in addition to the provision of accommodation and food for both permanent boarders and the casual guest. In scope they ranged from small, family owned boarding houses managed by the ubiquitous widow, to large commercial establishments such as the Federal Hotel in Christchurch, with its 19 staff and in excess of 63 rooms. The total workforce was sizeable, with 11 of the private hotels in Christchurch employing nearly 150 workers, with many more in other establishments throughout the

1 B Aw VIII (1907) p970
2 LT 19 Oct 1911
3 Opponents of reform, in and out of parliament, frequently referred to impecunious widows who would be made destitute by any improvement in wages or hours.
4 AJHR 5 19a (1913) pp3-5
Large and small, in city and country town, the private hotel provided shelter and food but not alcohol. Sustained to a large extent by the strength of the prohibition movement, these hotels employed almost exclusively women workers and proved difficult to unionise. It was not until 1918 that the CHWU gained coverage for the large private hotels of the “Leviathan” genre (see next page) and it took until the 1930’s to extend unionisation to the family boarding houses such as “Mrs Brooks”.

(Alexander Turnbull Library)
province. In comparison to other city workers they constituted a very large body of non-unionised labour. Their variety made the obtaining of any legal protection difficult and politically sensitive.

The first, award protection for the workers in private hotels had been obtained by the Wellington Cooks and Waiters Union in 1907, as part of a wider award for hotels and restaurants. When the newly established unions in the other main centres attempted to follow Wellington's lead the Arbitration Court rejected their attempts to obtain any award coverage for private hotel workers. The Otago Hotel Workers' Union had reached agreement with three large private hotels in 1909, but any award coverage was refused by the court on the grounds that private hotel employers as a whole could not afford to pay the wages demanded by the union.

In Christchurch the CHWU had initially planned the same approach by obtaining a general award for private hotels. Instead it decided to select 11 city private hotels which operated both a boarding and restaurant trade. As the court had no intention of including all types of boarding houses and private hotels in any award, it was thus necessary for the union to establish that any private hotels it cited for an award had a special and distinctive character. This would enable any award to be confined to that particular type, and leave the general genre of private hotels unaffected.

The court, however, was not satisfied that the 11 hotels selected by the CHWU did represent a distinct class of establishment, and thus its general decision not to issue any award for private hotels stood. It was in the view of the court, "out of the question that the proprietors should all be required to pay the same wage to their workers, for that would mean driving a number of them out of business." In its view the provision of board and lodging together with a wage covering the necessities for living was sufficient. Aside from "special circumstances" the court believed it "ought not to attempt to regulate the wages of such workers."

1 B_Aw X (1909) p507
2 B_Aw VIII (1907) p970
3 B_Aw X (1909) p18
4 B_Aw X (1909) pp507-8
5 Ibid p508
6 Ibid
LEVIATHAN PRIVATE HOTEL, CHRISTCHURCH, 1912

One of the largest private hotels in Christchurch, the Leviathan was taken over by the Salvation Army in 1912 and renamed the "Peoples Palace". In subsequent decades there were intermittent skirmishes between the 'Army' and the CHWU over union coverage.

(Alexander Turnbull Library)
Moreover, the Arbitration Court gave a generous interpretation to exemptions from award coverage provided under section 71 of 1908 IC & A Act. This section prevented any award being issued in respect of workers in non-pecuniary institutions, such as hospitals or for workers such as domestic servants in private homes. The court considered that domestic servants in private boarding houses fell within the same category. J. A. McCullough, the workers' representative on the court, dissented from both this view and from the judgement not to grant any specific award. For McCullough, the 'blatant sweating' in the industry necessitated award protection, a protection which he believed was legally possible for the court to give.\(^1\)

Blocked in the court, the hotel workers' unions sought the assistance of J. A. Millar, the Minister of Labour in the Liberal government, and a former trade union leader. Millar agreed to provide a measure of protection for the private hotel workers, by including them within the proposed Shops' and Offices' Amendment Act of 1910. Under the definition in the Act of a restaurant, as, "places where meals are provided and sold to the general public", the phrase "includes a private hotel" was inserted. Legal advice indicated that such an insertion would be sufficient to extend the Act's protective shelter to the private hotels.\(^2\)

The experience in the courts proved the protection to be in practice essentially valueless. When the Auckland Hotel Workers' Union (AWU) brought a case under the Act in 1911 the Arbitration Court interpreted the Act to mean that only those private hotels "selling a meal to the general public" were to be protected.\(^3\) A private hotel \textit{per se} was not simply another variety of restaurant, as for instance was a tearoom or oyster-saloon. To provide meals to residents or sell them to casual lodgers was insufficient to constitute the establishment a restaurant and hence be covered by the law.\(^4\)

Following this setback, a deputation from the various hotel workers' unions, including Barr, met with the Minister of Labour in October 1911.\(^5\) While

\(^1\) B._Aw X (1909)  
\(^2\) AJHR 5 19a (1913) p83  
\(^3\) Ibid p99; B._Aw XII (1911) p362  
\(^4\) Ibid  
\(^5\) LT 19 Oct 1911 p8
Millar stated that he was willing to initiate prosecutions in those instances where a meal was specifically sold he was not prepared to take action against boarding houses as a whole. At the most he might consider a further legislative change but only after the 1911 general election. Millar was, with good reason, concerned not to alienate further electoral support from the Liberals to the Reform Party, by initiating any more pro-labour legislation. Compromise suggestions by the union leaders which would enable the large commercial private hotels to be included but not the sensitive section of family boarding houses, were rejected by Millar. Rather he expressed his exasperation at being constantly portrayed by trade unionists as anti-worker. ¹

Worse followed. In 1912 the Wanganui Magistrates Court ruled in a further case involving a private hotel, that for the Act to apply, not only must the meals be sold by the establishment to the general public but that such sales must constitute a substantial part of the business. ² The result of this and the earlier decisions was to effectively exclude virtually all private hotels from the Act.

Despite submissions to the Labour Bills Select Committee of Parliament in 1912 and in 1913, no change was made to the Act. The unions thus failed to obtain legislative or award protection, except for two groups of hotels, one in Wellington and the other in Rotorua. ³ It was not until 1918 that any award protection for private hotels in Canterbury was finally secured.

7. A SIX-DAY WEEK

Parallel with these attempts to protect the private hotel workers, the CHWU had been lobbying parliament for a six-day week for all hotel and restaurant workers. In the first decade of the twentieth century trade unionists had sought a shorter working week, both by reducing the total number of hours and number of days. Workers in industry had gained a six day 48 hour week but others such as shop assistants worked 52 to 60 hours. A campaign for

1. LT. 19 Oct 1911 p8
2. AJHR 5 19a (1913) p100
3. B Aw VIII (1907) p970; XI (1910) p149
a 5½ day week, with a universal half-holiday on Saturday was mounted from 1906 onwards. Trade unions had formed local organising committees while the labour wing of the Liberal Party had introduced a bill into parliament but failed to obtain the enactment.¹

Such was the environment in which the hotel and restaurant workers pursued their case for shorter hours, and a six day week. Besides having among the highest number of hours, the seven day nature of the hotel section of the industry meant that kitchen staff and maids rarely had a Sunday or any other weekly holiday. Barstaff, however received an afternoon off during the week, and with the law requiring bars to be closed, a full day off on Sunday. Staff in restaurants also were normally able to obtain one day off a week. Thus the union’s primary concern was for the other workers in hotels. From 1909 to 1912 the various hotel workers’ unions, supported by the labour group of Liberal politicians lobbied parliament to obtain a legal right for all hotel workers to a six day week.² In 1912 they finally secured the support of the Labour Bills Select Committee who recommended a six-day week for hotel and restaurant workers with a day in lieu of Sunday.³ The employers however were able to mount vigorous and persistent opposition to the proposal and received a sympathetic hearing from the new Reform government of W. F. Massey. Massey, never to be a likely source of pro-labour legislation, after receiving some 140 telegrams from worried employers, decided to defer the issue until 1913.⁴ He had promised the employers, he said, that they would have a further opportunity to present evidence to the Select Committee in the next session.⁵

In the parliamentary debate of 1912 on the committee’s original recommendation, the Liberals argued for the fairness of the workers’ claim, while the speakers for the Reform government spoke of the financial and organisational burden likely to befall the employers. Liberal speakers pointed to the substantially lower hours and regular holidays enjoyed by other New Zealand workers in factories, shops and offices. As to those in the trade who spoke of

¹. NZPD 136-7 (1906) p570; see CHW Min 1 Mar 1909 p66
². see AJHR 5 119a (1909), 3 19b (1910); 5 19a (1912)
³. NZPD 161 (1912) p1235
⁴. W. F. Massey NZPD 161 (1912) p1236
⁵. Ibid p1049
financial ruin and higher prices, they replied that employers were unjust to demand that cheap meals should be provided at the expense of fair treatment for the employees. 'If prices had to be increased, so be it.' Conversely the Reform members talked of the enormous cost that a weekly holiday would impose on many marginally profitable employers and the impracticality in country areas of finding relieving labour. Opposition was not, however, simply confined to impecunious country families. One could clearly discern the resounding voice of profitable city employers who were anxious to preserve the status quo.

The proposal was referred back by the government to the select committee and when it re-emerged in the house in October 1913 a new recommendation was made. After hearing extensive submissions the Reform majority on the committee had decided that the setting of a six-day week would be left to the discretion of the Arbitration Court. Massey summarised the opposition to an automatic entitlement for a weekly holiday thus:

I think we all agree with the principle ... But ... it is not expedient or possible to arrange either by legislation or otherwise, for a six days (sic) a week in the case of hotels or restaurants, unless by inflicting a very serious hardship in some cases on the proprietors . . .

Liberal members of the committee had proposed a legal entitlement to a six-day week for all boroughs with a population over 6000. The more difficult country areas would be left to the discretion of the Arbitration Court. The government, however, was concerned first and foremost with ensuring the continuing profitability of the industry's employers, both in the country and the city. To include the city establishments but exempt

1. L. M. Isitt NZPD 161 (1912) p1236
2. Massey Ibid p1249
3. T. H. Davey NZPD 167 (1913) p1164
4. Massey Ibid p1161
those elsewhere would, in their view, place the city hotels at a competitive
disadvantage. ¹

As with the protection of workers in private hotels, a general provision
of a six-day week was rejected, by citing the financial fragility of small
family operated private hotels and boarding houses. Those which were
capable of absorbing the cost could not be automatically included because
either, they could not be clearly distinguished as a group, or because of the
alleged unfairness in including them but not others.

The Arbitration Court exercised this new power in 1914. When the CHWU
and other hotel workers' unions negotiated their awards they were able to
obtain from the court a provision for a six-day week.² Parliament had,
however, given a general exemption to those establishments where less than
three non-family members were employed,³and only those areas covered by
the union's awards were entitled to a six-day week. In Canterbury by
1914 this meant the licensed hotels in Christchurch, its surrounding
boroughs and in Timaru and Temuka, and the tearooms of Christchurch.

There is no evidence to suggest that the court was more sympathetic to the
workers' case as a result of their action in the General Strike of November
1913.⁴ In Auckland the hotel workers had expressed their frustration with
parliament to grant a statutory entitlement to a six-day week, by partici-
pating in the General Strike. Initially they had acted in support of the main
strike by refusing to serve the strike-breakers and special constables brought
in to defeat the strikers.⁵ The situation escalated as the hotel workers
struck for the specific demand of a six-day week and the hotel owners
responded by imposing a lock-out.

1. NZPD 167 (1913) pp1464 and 1171; Employers evidence
AJHR op cit p5
2. B_Aw XV (1914) p367
3. NZPD 167 (1913) p1
4. Fryer suggests that the Arbitration Court was prompted to
act by the AHWU's strike action. Rather the court now
had a clear indication of the legislature's intentions to
reduce hours.
5. Fryer p37
In Canterbury, at beach boroughs such as Sumner and New Brighton, as well as in the cities, there were numerous small tearooms and restaurants. Family owned, and employing almost entirely women workers, this sector of the industry proved difficult to organise. Wages and conditions were normally inferior to those in the licensed hotels and improvements generally followed advances made in the hotel sector.

(Alexander Turnbull Library)
After two weeks the strike was over and as with the General Strike the unionists had been defeated.\(^1\) For the AHWU the defeat did prove to be a temporary one and the union rapidly recovered.

Neither the CHWU nor the other hotel workers’ unions, joined in the strike. They gained a six-day week through the legal machinery of the Arbitration Court, and it is unlikely that the defeat of the strikers would have prompted the court to be more sympathetic to the workers in its deliberations.

8. AWARDS 1911 TO 1914

By 1911 the CHWU’s first Licensed Hotels’ Award had expired. During its term one alteration had been negotiated, when in 1910 the parties had agreed to clarify the union preference clause.\(^2\) The union undertook to maintain an employment bureau and provide the service free of charge to the employer. Such a service aimed to ensure that there was a supply of union labour available to fill any vacancies that arose. The new clause sought to remove those areas which had led to disagreement by a clear enunciation of the mutual responsibilities of the union and the employer and the union appeared to be pleased with the new arrangements.

The new licensed hotel agreement of 1911, incorporated the reduction in the hours of work provided for by the 1910 Shops and Offices Amendment Act\(^3\): 62 hours per week for men, and 58 for women were the new maximum ordinary hours of work in hotels. While some wages remained at their 1908 rate, the minimum rate for barmen was increased from £1 15s and a new category of second head barmen established at

1 Fryer pp48-9; see NZ Herald 8-10 Nov 1913 pp8-9
2 B Aw XI (1910) p76
3 B Aw XII (1911) p358; Shops and Offices Act 1910
The rate for head barmen was raised to £2.5s. Housemaids gained an extra 1/6d per week, and general hands an extra 5s. The only other significant change was in the extension of the coverage under the agreement to include the boroughs of Lyttelton, Woolston, Sumner and New Brighton, although the wage rates were slightly lower.

A year later this expansion of the unions' coverage continued with the establishing of a separate Licensed Hotels' Award for the Timaru and Washdyke area. Timaru had been visited by the union as early as November 1908, and an agent had been appointed in 1910. The local employers had, however, refused to become parties to the existing Christchurch award and indeed in 1912 they attempted unsuccessfully to create a local union controlled by themselves. Nevertheless an award was secured by the CHWU in 1912, which provided essentially the same hours, wages and general conditions as the 1911 Christchurch agreement.

No new award or agreement was reached for the tearooms and the 1908 award continued in force until it was renegotiated in 1918. By then, however the real value of wages had fallen substantially. In 1914 the union did enter into new agreements covering the licensed hotels. The first encompassed central Christchurch, while the second provided for the boroughs of the 1911 agreement but with the addition of hotels in Papanui and Addington. The only two important changes to wage rates were the reclassification of barmen at the higher common rate of £2.5s per week, and the setting of the female rate for staff in kitchens with less than four hands at three-fourths of the male rate. This appears to have been a decrease. All staff did continue to receive free board and lodging, the effective value of which had increased as indicated by the rise in the cash in lieu allowances from 15s to 22/6d.

1 B Aw XIII (1912) p173
2 CHW Min 1 Dec 1908 p49
3 CHW E Min 16 Feb 1910
4 CHW Min 11 Mar 1912 p225
5 B Aw XV (1914) p367
6 Ibid p518
For the union it was the reduction in the hours of work that marked 1914 as a significant year. First the Shops and Offices Amendment Act of 1913 had set the maximum weekly hours for women workers in the hotels at 56, a reduction of two hours.\(^1\) Second, the 1914 agreements formerly incorporated the Arbitration Courts ruling on the six-day week. While there was a qualification, which permitted an employer on up to four occasions per year not to provide a weekly holiday, if they failed to do so they were required to provide an extra day-off the following week or make a pay for the week at a rate of time-and-a-half.\(^2\)

After these advances the war years brought a period of hiatus to the activity of the union. While the union itself was inactive it was nevertheless, affected by the wider political and social developments. In particular, changes within the labour movement and the ascendancy of the prohibition movement had important consequences for the CHWU and its members.

### 9. THE UNION AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

The picture of the activities of the CHWU would be partial without painting in the wider background of the relations between the union and the labour movement. Central to this and constantly shaping it was the struggle between independent labour and craft-liberalism both at the national and local levels. In Canterbury the union had affiliated to the CTLC in July 1908,\(^3\) but departed the following year as part of the stream of Liberal secession.\(^4\) The Liberal union leaders had been gradually losing control of the CTLC and resented the increasing politicalisation. By political they meant a non-Liberal perspective. Such a change in the balance of forces was slow; but by 1912 independent labour was clearly ascendent, although a few unions did remain under Liberal leadership until after World War One.

1. Shops & Offices Amdt Act op cit
2. B. Aw XV (1914) p367
3. CHW Min 27 Jun 1908 p26
4. CTLC Min 15 May & 26 Jun 1909
In seceding from the CTLC in 1909, the hotel workers criticised this 'politizing' of meetings and claimed that the CTLC had neglected the particular concerns of the CHWU.

...we do not wish to be affiliated to the Trades Council which is not in touch with us, and which has shown very clearly that it does not intend to help us. What do we as a union care whether the P.M. visits England or not, or whether he sends Dreadnoughts.... they ought to be discussed in their proper places.... we expect to discuss the affairs of our union and to receive the help we need.¹

A deputation from the council addressed the union's general meeting.² They denied that political issues dominated meetings but did not concede that such discussions were inappropriate. To the charge of neglect they declared their readiness at any time to assist the CHWU with its problems. Some union members supported rejoining but when the vote was taken at the next union meeting the overwhelming majority favoured remaining disaffiliated.³ Attempts in subsequent years by the CTLC to regain the CHWU’s affiliation failed.⁴ From this point until 1919 the union was adrift from the main currents of the labour movement. Contact was confined largely to local liberal-led unions in the building trades, and no joint initiatives were undertaken with other trade unions, except for informal co-operation with the hotel workers unions in the other centres.

With the formation of hotel workers' unions in all the four main centres by 1909, proposals for a national federation had soon followed.⁵ The division between independent labour and craft-liberalism slowed the development and ultimately the federation was formed without Canterbury by the independent labour leaders who led the unions elsewhere. In the course of the negotiations, Barr attempted to ensure the acceptance of arbitration was a condition for any union joining the federation, and that only 'direct interests' and not 'party political' interests were to be discussed by the

1. LT 10 Jul 1909 p10
2. CHW Min 2 Aug 1909 p91
3. CHW Min 30 Sep 1909 p97
4. CHW Min 3 May 1910 p120; & 8 Jan 1912 p214
5. CHW Min 28 Jun 1909 p79; 5 Jul 1909 p84
federation. In 1911 the proposal for federation was formally rejected by the CHWU, Barr cited three specific objections. First, the past tactical errors by the federation; second the proposed support for the New Zealand Labour Party’s “Weekly Herald”; and third the capitation fee for 25% of the affiliates subscriptions. Co-operation did continue on an informal level between the unions, including joint delegations to the government, moreover, within the Canterbury union several members including Evans, the president from 1913 to 1915 had been prepared to support federation. In the wake of the defeat of the 1913 general strike however, and the call for a national strike by the Auckland executive (the current federation executive) Evans praised Barr for keeping the CHWU out of the national body, and thereby avoiding any disaster.

The controversial political and industrial issues of the decade brought no change to the union’s political viewpoint. For the Waihi strike and for the General Strike of 1913, the union’s executive and for general meeting, rejected requests for support. Nor did the CHWU participate in either of the Unity conferences designed to create a united political and industrial labour movement. This primarily reflected opposition to a labour movement independent of the Liberal Party. Nor are any pacifist or socialist views evident in the attitude of the executive or general meetings towards World War One. While support for the war was typical of most unions, including many advocates of independent labour, the CHWU’s overall stance on labour unity placed them with a small minority of right-wing trade unions.

1. CHW Min 9 Jan 1911 pp145-6
2. CHW Min 7 Feb 1911 pp153-4
3. CHW Min 16 Feb 1914 p277; original support by Evans 14 Nov 1911 p200
4. CHW Min 1 Jul 1912 p236; 7 Oct 1912 pp245-5
5. see CHW Min 26 Aug 1910 p137
7. Roth *Trade Unions* p35
10. ORGANISING THE UNION

Such then was the Liberal outlook of the union on the outside world but how did the union organise and manage its own internal affairs? At one level was the union's formal structure, with general meetings each fortnight and a Board of Management performing minimal administrative functions. In 1909 the general meetings became monthly and four years later one in each quarter.¹ They remained until 1913 as the source of authority in theory and practice for all major decisions. The change in form to greater executive authority did not reflect a change in the union's industrial or political direction. At both the general and executive meeting it was Barr the secretary who was the leading initiator and shaper of decisions and the interpreter of the wider political reality. The change was not a response to any real or perceived fear of radicalisation at the general meetings. Except for one minor incident in 1918, there is no evidence of any challenge to the union's Liberal orientation. Rather the change reflected the generally low level of participation and the efficiency of greater executive authority.

Participation in the affairs of the CHWU was generally low with a normal attendance of less than 20 at the union's general meetings. In some instances interest reached higher levels as in 1912 when 157 members voted in the postal ballot on the six-day week. The organisational activity of the union was centered in Barr's rented office in Manchester Street and not the workplace. Barr, aided by two or three members of each year's executive, and an office assistant, directed the union's industrial work, supervised its finances and gave the Liberal colour to the union's public pronouncements. Barr’s numerous commitments increasingly limited his work for the union and although Evans was appointed collector-organiser in 1917² the difficulties of regular contact were only partially overcome.

Contact with the membership was through visits and circulars to the workplace.³ A high staff turnover and dispersed worksites made this difficult. An attempt was made to publish a union newsletter – ‘The Recorder’

1. CHW Min 30 Jun 1913 p271
2. CHW Min 12 Feb 1917 p47
3. For eg. of circulars see CHW Correspondence Book Feb 1908 to Mar 1912 pp261, 296, 299.
but only one issue was produced.\textsuperscript{1} Many workers were familiar however with Barr’s political orientation through his column in the “Lyttelton Times”.

As to unofficial agitation by workers at individual workplaces, there is no evidence of any substantial struggle by workers to improve their conditions. Rather progress was made gradually by award re-negotiation and through its enforcement by the Labour Department and the unions officials. The strategy of vigorous workplace organisation promoted by the left of the labour movement was alien to the union’s Liberal leadership.

The union executive was concerned with more than the conditions of the worker at the workplace but not however in the sense of socialist education or political consciousness. Rather the focus was on the development of the individual intellect and the prompting of social interaction amongst union members. The organising of social events was discussed as early as March 1908\textsuperscript{2} and over the next five years irregular social, cricket and football events were organised. Attendance fluctuated and no permanent social club developed.\textsuperscript{3} In 1910, a small lending library was created\textsuperscript{4} and a year later the executive established a ‘Distress and Funeral Benefit Fund’.\textsuperscript{5} The fund was modest with income from levies, fines and donations, making maximum payments of five pounds for sickness and ten pounds for funerals. Five members received payments in 1912 and again in 1913 but by 1918 the fund had ceased to operate.\textsuperscript{6} In addition to these activities the union supported apprenticeship schemes for cooks\textsuperscript{7} and appointed a representative to the Technical College Board.\textsuperscript{8} It further attempted to organise the labour market, and thus assist the provision of union labour, by establishing in 1909 an employment bureau as part of the new union preference clause.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} CHW E Min 27 Jan 1911
  \item \textsuperscript{2} CHW Min 9 Mar 1908 p8
  \item \textsuperscript{3} see CHW Min 21 Sep 1908 p42; 28 Jun 1909 p79; 3 Jul 1911 p184; 3 Mar 1913 p262
  \item \textsuperscript{4} CHW Min 1 Mar 1910 p114
  \item \textsuperscript{5} CHW Min 7 Mar 1911 p156
  \item \textsuperscript{6} CHW Min 16 Feb 1914 p281
  \item \textsuperscript{7} CHW E Min 27 Jan 1911
  \item \textsuperscript{8} CHW Min 3 Mar 1913 p261
\end{itemize}
At a further level, the executive promoted the notion of responsibility between the trades workers and pride in one's particular craft. It was promoted with little effect. Evans, the CHWU president noted the non-attendance of members at a funeral of a fellow worker. He urged them to make "an effort to show outsiders respect for customs and one another"! Such activities reflected the craft orientation of the CHWU leadership but the essentially non-craft membership was less responsive. Certainly employment and training schemes and mutual co-operation can form part of a class conscious industrial unionism. Co-operation however is on a different level to that of conscious class solidarity. Moreover such schemes for the industrial unionist are beginning points in a long struggle, for the craft unionist they are the end of the vision for the workplace.

The collective effect of the CHWU's organisational efforts was to create a small union with modest finances centered in Christchurch city. The union's constitution had provided for organising an 'unlimited number of members in the "Hotels, Restaurants, Oyster Saloons, Tea Rooms, Clubs and Refreshment Rooms"' of Canterbury and a year later workers in Boarding Houses and Caterers were added to the organisational scope. Members paid an entrance fee of 5s for men and 2s for women with a weekly fee of 6d and 3d respectively, the differential reflecting the lower pay of women workers. Total membership grew to 294 by the end of 1909 and after considerable fluctuation only stood at 551 by December 1918. (See Table 1.2) In comparison to the other main centres, even after allowing for the differences in population, the CHWU appears to have achieved a lower level of unionisation. In 1918 the Auckland union had 3663 members, Wellington 2029 and Dunedin 601. Such an explanation is confirmed by the rapid rise in

1 CHW Min 16 Feb 1914 p276
2 Constitution of CHWU in CHW Min 24 Feb 1908
3 CHW Min 28 Jun 1909 p80
4 Constitution p2
5 AJHR 2 HII (1919) pp15, 17 & 20
the CHWU membership under the more energetic secretaryship of Brooks (see below) who had more than doubled the membership to 1083 by 1920.¹ In all these unions it was women who formed the majority of the membership and who faced particular problems over pay and their rights.

**TABLE 1.2 CHWU MEMBERSHIP AND FINANCE, 1908 TO 1918**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members¹</th>
<th>Annual Income² (£)</th>
<th>Net Assets² (£)</th>
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<td>1909</td>
<td>294</td>
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<td>98³</td>
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<td>362</td>
<td>272</td>
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<td>1915</td>
<td>454</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>443¹</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

1. As at 31 December
2. As for the financial year, which ends Feb or Mar in the following calendar year.
3. All financial figures are rounded to the nearest pound
4. £264 was collected by Brooks (Oct 1918 – Feb 1919) enabling the union to recover from a position worse than the figure of £443.

AJHR 3 H 11 (1921-22) p23
'To serve, to clean and to cook' — these processes fundamental to the operation of the public service provided by hotels and restaurants were the same unpaid tasks prescribed for women in the private home. In the hiring of labour for the public tasks the employer sought those who had traditionally performed that work and who could be paid the lowest possible wages. Women in turn sought such work, while men overwhelmingly did not. As with the international experience the pattern developed of a predominantly low paid female workforce, a pattern once established that was self-reinforcing. The significant exceptions to this pattern of female dominance were the senior cooks in the licensed hotels, barmen and hotel porters. While there were both male and female cooks the higher level of status and pay associated with chefs in the larger licensed hotels did make this an option considered by men as well as by women. The serving of liquor was a function socially prescribed for men and women, but increasingly New Zealand society saw such an association with the masculine character of the public house as unfitting for women. Porters performed bar cleaning, carrying and security duties, and these tasks society had also ascribed as appropriate for men.

Inequality in pay between men and women in the hotel and restaurant industry occurred at two levels. First, in the case of work outside of the kitchen women were paid a lower rate of pay for performing identical duties. For instance under the 1908 award a barman received a minimum of £1 10s per week and a barmaid £1 5s; the minimum for a waiter was £1 10s and for a waitress £1. Within the kitchen the situation was mixed in that the full-time staff in the licensed hotel generally received equal pay but casuals and kitchenstaff in restaurants and tearooms were paid according to their gender. At a second level the highest paid jobs, the chefs and senior cooks, tended to have a higher proportion of male workers than the industry as a whole, while the very worst paid were the female-only jobs of waitresses and housemaids. To some extent the differential rates reflected the differences in the skills required. Nevertheless this is only partially correct as males performing similarly unskilled work as porters, or general hands, still received several shillings more than their unskilled, but female counterparts.

1 B_Aw IX (1908) p252
women became concentrated in those jobs with low skills, status and pay and in turn their concentration in those jobs perpetuated that pattern.

If the union was to successfully organise the industry it was these women workers who needed to be enrolled in the union. Initially, from 1908 to 1911, women in the licensed hotels were excluded from the union’s preference clause and the employer was able to hire non-union female labour. Women were protected in restaurants and tearooms and subsequently in the licensed hotels but the unions recruiting drive was difficult and the place of women in the union a subordinate one. Beginning in 1909 and repeated irregularly thereafter special meetings were held to recruit women members. In 1910 as part of the preparation for the 1911 award for licensed hotels a committee of all women members was formed to examine and advise on the conditions of female workers. Nevertheless, the union’s executive remained almost exclusively male in its composition and general meetings reflected a similar dominance. Such a pattern was typical of trade-unionism and of most social institutions in the early twentieth century but given that the majority of the industry’s workers were women their virtually complete absence from the CHWU’s leadership is significant.

In a trade that was the target of the prohibition movement the place of women as workers or as customers was a particularly controversial issue. Reflecting the prejudices of society, prohibitionists perceived women who associated with liquor to be suspect as proper women, and as likely enticers of morally weak men to drink, or debauchery. Hotel bars were not, in their view, a place in which women should work or visit. By removing barmaids they hoped to reduce the attractiveness of drinking for men, and agitation by the prohibitionists, of both genders, secured a section in the Licensing Amendment Act of 1910 effectively prohibiting the hiring of any new barmaids. Only those barmaids registered by the due date could continue in employment and eligibility to register was confined to those with

1 B_Aw IX (1908) p252 Clause 10
2 CHW Min 20 Apr 1909 p74; 14 Nov 1911 p200
3 CHW Min 31 Oct 1910 p140
4 see LT 24 May 1911 p4
5 Licensing Amdt Act 1910 (rpt NZ Statutes IV p350)
   LT 21 Mar 1911 p8
three months continuous service in the proceeding 12 months who were sub-
ject to a test of their bona fides. An inadequate definition of a bar delayed
the Act’s effect and in 1912 the registration time was extended to June 1,
1913. 1 Nevertheless there was a steady reduction in barmaids as those
registered eventually left or retired.

The liquor trade and the CHWU were prepared to acquiesce in or support
the abolition of barmaids. While the employers disputed the arguments of the
prohibitionists as to the moral character of barmaids and their role as
enticers of men, they were prepared to accept their removal as part of
their own wider strategy of concession; a strategy that accepted particular
restraints and thereby hoped to avert prohibition. The CHWU passed
a resolution supporting the elimination of barmaids, in 1912 3 and again in
1914, when it urged “Mr Barr to do all in his power to secure the
termination of barmaids’ services in licensed hotels”. 4 It was carried
unanimously by the general meeting. Members appeared to have believed that
the first preference for employment should go to barmen, that it was not
appropriate for women to work in bars and that their lower pay affected
male employment.

The response of the barmaids to the Act was one of resentment but not
organised opposition. One of the barmaids interviewed by the “Lyttelton
Times” explained that she rejected the ‘trivial and petty restrictions of the
government’. 5 For herself having to support her mother and younger sisters,
‘the job was a source of good pay and was no less respectable than any
other’. There were ‘good and bad in any trade... and while not better off
morally or intellectually she was ‘not no good’ simply because she worked
in a hotel’. 6 Finally she protested the continuing public and official
surveillance. “...I am not allowed to go to supper with a man... in case
anyone should speak about it. I am heartily sick of all the spying and
restrictions....”

1 Massey NZPD 161 (1912) p1009; Barmaids Registration
   Act 1912 ( rpt NZ Statutes IV p366)
2 Justice Dept summary in The Liquor Laws of New Zealand
3 CHW E Min 12 Dec 1912
4 CHW Min 13 Jul 1914 p24
5 LT 21 Mar 1911 p8
6 Ibid
The attitude towards women on the other side of the bar, reinforced that view of public and official hostility towards women in licensed hotels. Hotels were predominantly male places but as customers women and men enjoyed an equal legal entitlement. To the reformers of the trade neither the public bar nor separate lounges were respectable places for women. The Auckland Licensing Committee, reviewing two hotel licenses in 1911, commented it was “more seemly for them to take their refreshments in their own homes”\(^1\). Both the committee and the “Lyttelton Times” editorial admitted that the incidence of drunkenness by women in Auckland was less than in districts where women were excluded from hotels, nor were any disastrous results evident in Auckland due to the access of women to licensed hotels. Such drinking however was not viewed as a respectable activity and was clearly contrary to public opinion. In renewing the licenses the committee was assured by the hotel keepers that henceforth they would cease serving women.\(^2\) Through such discretionary power many women were excluded and in 1916 women were legally prohibited from being in or about a licensed hotel after 6pm unless they were staff or members of the licensees family.\(^3\) Again this was allegedly to remove the lure of undesirable women.

12. PROHIBITION

The effects of prohibition extended beyond the employment of women. It was a movement of enormous political, social and organisational strength, supported by tens of thousands of New Zealanders and advocated with passion. It had become the foremost social issue in the country. Its ominous figure was a permanent feature of the union’s environment, and the struggle between the prohibitionists and the liquor trade — or between “fanaticism and greed” as Bollinger\(^4\) termed it — shaped the industry.

In the union’s first decade that struggle was one of concession by the trade in the face of the growing offensive. Such concessions were motivated by a genuine and certainly well-founded fear of destruction. From 1902 through until 1911 the prohibitionists had obtained a plurality in the

\(^1\) LT. 3 Jun 1911 p8  
\(^2\) Ibid; editorial p6  
\(^3\) NZ Official Yearbook (Wellington: Dept of Statistics 1916) p243  
When people thought of hotels or hotel workers, their visual image was usually the barman. The largest group of male workers in an industry with predominantly female labour, the barman was under threat of extinction in the earlier twentieth century as the prohibition movement gained in strength. In 1909, however, barmaids were as numerous as barmen; and it was to them that the prohibition movement brought unemployment. From 1910 onwards it became illegal to hire new barmaids and within a decade the serving of liquor was a task performed almost exclusively by men — as it would remain for nearly another 50 years.

(Alexander Turnbull Library)
licensing poll. They had succeeded in creating twelve dry electorates and obtained a significant reduction of hotel licenses in other districts and only the requirement of 60% to carry prohibition and the fragmented nature of the ballot had averted the trade's destruction. Nevertheless with 55% of the vote in 1911\textsuperscript{1} the threat remained. It grew with the alteration of the poll in 1919, lowering the majority to 50% although a third option, that of state purchase, was added. In the December ballot of 1919 prohibition failed by only 3263 votes to secure its goal.\textsuperscript{2} That was to prove its peak but the margin points to how close was the triumph of prohibition.

Although the ultimate victory was not achieved the worst abuses of the liquor trade were rectified as a consequence of the movement's agitation, assisted by cultural changes in New Zealand society. In addition to rectifying the worst, a panopoly of restrictions were instituted that re-shaped the hotels operations both for the good and the bad. In the course of the ten years from 1908 to 1918 the closing time for hotels was cut from 11pm to 10pm (1910) and further cut to 6pm in 1917, bottle store licenses were abolished, anti-treating regulations introduced, the drinking age raised from 18 to 21, the granting of new hotel licenses prohibited, and new club charters made virtually impossible.\textsuperscript{3} Through moral and legal coercion women were removed from both sides of the bar in many hotels, while non-drinking activities such as games and music were proscribed. The hotel ceased to be a centre of diverse social activity and became instead barren beer barns.

For the CHWU the struggle between the liquor trade and the prohibitionists posed two problems. First; the threat of prohibition made it difficult to argue for higher wages and improved job security. The hotelkeepers claimed declining profitability and the prospect of losing their capital and livelihood, and while the claims were exaggerated they did pose some structural restraints on higher wages. Second, the issue of prohibition

2. Liquor Laws of NZ op cit p3
3. Ibid
divided the labour movement primarily at the leadership level, creating a cross current in the conflict between independent labour and craft-liberalism. Prominent Liberals such as H. G. Ell and L. M. Isitt were close associates of Barr but leading prohibitionists. Amongst independent labour, McCombs was a prominent temperance advocate and Howard while rarely making a public reference was similarly sympathetic. Nevertheless Barr did not commit the union to support continuance candidates, thereby averting the potentially acute problem where a liberal prohibitionist faced an independent labour candidate. The jobs of many union members would have been unaffected by prohibition, but the barmen did desire a more active union policy. An unofficial meeting of barmen in November 1911, resolved to "leave no stone unturned to carry continuance at the forthcoming election" and requested support from other unionists. Barr disclaimed any official involvement as the union was adopting a neutral position in the election.

In 1915 and again in 1916 the prohibition movement petitioned parliament for the early closing of hotels. Similar measures had been undertaken in other parts of the British Empire, including much of Australia, and the prohibitionists claimed that reduced drinking would result from six o'clock closing and thus 'aid the nations war effort, financially, morally and physically'. The first petition contained 60,000 signatures and the second 100,000, and sufficient pressure persuaded parliament to enact the 1917 Sale of Liquor Restriction Act. The Act provided that for the duration of the war and for six months subsequently hotel bars would close at 6 p.m. A year later the hours were made permanent. They were not repealed until 1967, having profoundly influenced five decades of the life of the hotel industry and the pattern of social life in New Zealand.

2 Ibid p126
3 LT 20 Nov 1911 p7
4 LT 21 Nov 1911 p10
5 NZPD 176 (1916) p527
During the First World War the real value of wages, including those of hotel and restaurant workers, had fallen. Prices had increased by an average of 8% per year during the war and despite the Arbitration Court issuing a war bonus of approximately 10% to some lower paid workers, this was insufficient to maintain the wage levels of 1914.¹ The awards or agreements negotiated by the CHWU in 1914 received no increases or other changes until they were renegotiated in early 1918. Two new agreements for licensed hotels — one for Christchurch and the other for the rest of Canterbury — and a new award for tearooms and restaurants were made but they failed to recover the loss in spending power.

### TABLE 1.3 INTER-AWARD COMPARISON, 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Licensed Hotel (ChCh)¹</th>
<th>Licensed Hotel (Cant)²</th>
<th>Private Hotels &amp; Tearooms (ChCh)³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weekly hours</td>
<td>56 (male) 52 (female)</td>
<td>56 (male) 52 (female)</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages: Weekly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 5+ hk</td>
<td>4:10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 4 hk</td>
<td>4:0</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>4:0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4 hk</td>
<td>2:7/6</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>2:5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>1:10</td>
<td></td>
<td>1:12/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or counterhand</td>
<td>1:4</td>
<td></td>
<td>1:4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
<td>2:10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housemaid</td>
<td>1:2/6</td>
<td></td>
<td>1:2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add board &amp; lodging</td>
<td>1:2/6</td>
<td></td>
<td>1:2/6 (PH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages: Casual per day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st cook</td>
<td>0 then 15s 10s</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>£1 then 15s 10s (1st 3 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>7/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. Electorates of ChCh North, South, and East plus suburbs of Lyttelton, Sumner, New Brighton, Addington and Papanui.
2. Employers outside of ChCh who were members of the LVA.
3. Covered Restaurants, Tea Rooms and Oyster-Saloons within a 10-mile radius of ChCh Chief P.O. and eight private hotels in ChCh specifically cited.
4. Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid. Meals only in Tea Rooms.

For the first time in Canterbury private hotels received award protection, with eight hotels being included under the Tearooms Award. This was possible because of the more flexible attitude of the Arbitration Court under Justice Stringer and from whom the Auckland and Otago hotel workers had gained a similar interpretation. The court in accepting such inclusions confessed that the line drawn between different types of private hotels as to which should or should not fall under an award was in practice an arbitrary one.

Despite this, the majority of private hotel workers in Canterbury along with club and domestic hospital workers remained unprotected. The various hotel workers unions had from their creation sought, both in the negotiating of awards and through legislative reform, to gain protection for club workers. The courts and the government had rejected such claims contending that the clubs were essentially non-pecuniary organisations and hence precluded from award coverage by section 71 of the I.C. & A. Act. From the perspective of the union all workers were entitled to decent wages and conditions, and these were clearly lacked by workers in clubs. Their wage rates were reported to be 20% less than their counterparts in the licensed hotels. Agitation in 1911 over their conditions, where club stewards were alleged to be working up to 80 hours per week for £2 did lead to some improvement. Nevertheless neither unionisation nor any legal protection was achieved. A similar situation prevailed in the hospitals. There were 20 domestic staff — maids, porters and kitchen workers at Christchurch hospital with several others elsewhere in the province. They remained ununionised and continued to work long hours.

1 B_Aw XIX (1918) p603
2 B_Aw XVIII (1917) p1212 (Otago); p1275 (Auckland)
3 B_Aw XIX (1918) p609
4 Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (NZ Statutes, 1909)
5 AJHR 5 19a (1913) p40
6 LT 30 Jun 1911 p8
7 The Cyclopedia of New Zealand — Canterbury op cit p156
1918 also marked a change in the union's leadership. Barr had tendered his resignation as secretary in February 1918.¹ Now aged 51 Barr's public commitments – in the Legislative Council, as Mayor of Sumner and as the newly elected Chairman of the Christchurch Tramway Board – prevented him from continuing as secretary. It is unclear whether such a departure also reflected the final change in Barr's upward social progress from craftsman to the respectable member of the middle class. His departure was marked with a vote of thanks and certainly no acrimony. P. Evans, previously president and the current organiser, was elected unopposed as secretary. Evans continued the union's arbitrationist and Liberal orientation in his seven months in office. His negotiation of new industrial agreements in 1918 secured few gains and he proved incompetent in managing the union's finances. Although never large the union had amassed in excess of £260 in nett assets.² These reserves deteriorated from 1916 onwards and virtually disappeared in the course of Evan's seven months as secretary. Evan's expenditure exceeded the union's income by £88 and a situation of virtual bankruptcy was discovered upon his departure in September for military service.³ His resignation marked the end of the union's Liberal leadership and the beginning of a new era.

In the course of the ten years of Liberal leadership the union had endured and had been able to improve the hours and wages of its members. The union's primary success had been in the lowering of the hours of work. Where prior to 1908 a 70 to 90 hour week was not uncommon, the maxima prescribed in 1918 were 56 hours for men and 52 for women, and workers now had a weekly holiday. Such progress was of course relative given the prevalence of 52 and 48 hour weeks in shops and factories but by the standard of the past and of the industry overseas the reduction was an important advance for many workers. In terms of wages progress had been modest, qualified on the one hand by the trade-off in reducing hours and on the other by the inflationary impact of the first world war. As with the trade union movement as a whole,

¹ CHW Min 19 Feb 1918 p61
² CHW Min 6 Mar 1916 pp40-1
³ CHW Min 24 Oct 1918 p66
It was not until the 1920's that the union was able to fully recover the loss in real wages and regain its pre-war peak. Nevertheless, in comparison to most other workers, the hotel and restaurant workers did improve their relative position. As to other conditions the CHWU had been able to improve the standard of hotel accommodation for its members and institute a system of preference for the employment of unionists.

The union had established a firm organisational base in the provinces' largest population centre, Christchurch, and in the most important sector, the licensed hotels. Its financial resources were small however, and amongst its members there was a low level of union activism. The union also found itself outside the main stream of the labour movement led by the forces of independent labour. Its dependence on the arbitration system, its localised nature and the fragility of the union's finances, were all typical features of the New Zealand trade union movement at the end of the First World War.

There was one distinct contrast between the situation in which the union had commenced its operations in 1908 and the scene in 1918. Liberalism as a political force either in society at large or within the trade union movement, was almost extinct. It lingered in parliament for a further decade but only as a torpid and decaying irrelevance. While it did achieve office again in 1928, its existence as a distinct force with an ideology and life of its own had passed. To its right the Reform Party dominated government office while within the labour movement the forces of independent labour had achieved supremacy. With the election of Reginald A. Brooks as its new secretary in 1918, the CHWU finally ended its period of craft-liberalism and entered into a new, Labour era.
CHAPTER TWO

STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL, 1919 TO 1935

The decade of the 1920's was a period of struggle for the CHWU, as it sought to rebuild and expand. After achieving some modest success it was then confronted by the abyss of the great depression and for five years struggled to survive as a union and to protect the jobs, pay and conditions of its members.

After an initial period of instability, following the end of the Liberal leadership of the union, the CHWU was able to make progress in improving the conditions of work for the industry's workers, including a reduction in the hours of work. In 1924 the first dominion-wide award for the industry was obtained, and the remainder of the decade brought further, modest, advances. By 1931 the union was confronted by both internal difficulties and the onset of the darkest period of the depression. It survived both these problems and was intact to receive the rewards from the election of a Labour government in 1935, a victory, which its long years of cooperation in the labour movement had helped to achieve.

1. REBUILDING

Between 1918 and 1922, the CHWU experienced a time of instability. Six presidents and three secretaries held office in the course of this period, several of whom departed in unfavourable circumstances. Despite the difficulties the union was able to extend its award coverage to rural Canterbury, improve the provisions of its awards, and reconstruct its shattered finances.

Central in these achievements was the figure of Reginald Arnott Brooks, who had been elected as the union's new secretary in October 1918. In his first report in the following year, he criticised the recent lethargy of Barr and Evans in collecting union subscriptions and the union's lack of industrial strength. "The union has in the past been a joke" commented Brooks, "but we are just about turning the joke on the opposite side." He went on to stress the importance of the union in securing better pay and conditions and in rectifying award breeches. Brooks and the executive

1 Most notably Evans (CHW Min 5 Dec 1918) & Gilmore (E Min 28 Jan 1921 p58) as secretary & Cotton (E Min 26 May 1921 p66) as president. Presidents Malloy, Currie were also involved in controversy.

2 CHW Min 24 Oct 1918 p66

3 CHW Min 27 Feb 1919 p70
From 1919 to 1955 — except for two brief intervals — Brooks (front row: 2nd from right) was the secretary of the CHWU. Under his leadership the union forged a close association with the Labour Party, the Alliance of Labour and its successor the Federation of Labour. The new executive in 1919 faced the twin challenges of recovering the decline in wages that its members had suffered in the war years and in extending the union’s coverage to rural Canterbury. For the next 16 years the union would struggle, first to build, and then to survive the depression.

(CHWU)
that he led were resolved to improve this situation, and Brooks possessed the determination and skills to do so.

English by birth, Brooks had spent his earlier years on British ships, probably as a steward. After migrating to New Zealand he worked as a barman for a period in Christchurch hotels before being elected in February 1919 as vice-president of the CHWU. In October at the age of 35 he was elected to the secretaryship, a position he was to retain, except for two brief intervals until 1955.

Brooks' politics were based on a dual commitment to trade unionism and the Labour Party. While operating within the arbitration system, he strove to maximise the possible gains for his members through vigorous advocacy and enforcement, complemented by an efficiently organised union. He believed that the workers needed both a political and industrial organisation to advance their interests and the CHWU played an active role in both spheres, throughout most of his secretaryship. Brooks belonged to the middle stream of the labour movement. Conscious of class, he supported the reform of society to achieve greater equality and justice and increased social ownership, but he was not a proponent of any Marxist revolution.

The first measures undertaken by the union's new executive were directed at two areas. First, effective contact was re-established in the officially unionised workplaces of Christchurch, where the system of fees' collection and award enforcement had become spasmodic. Second, the union moved to establish awards for the remainder of Canterbury in the tearoom and private hotel sectors, and to renegotiate the old 1912 award for the licensed hotels of South Canterbury. All these goals were achieved, with the result that the union's membership grew to 1329 by 1922. The increase in members effected a rise in income and placed the union on a sound financial basis.

1 W. G. Brooks (Oral 10 Apr 1984) and L. Short (Oral 20 Jun 1984)
2 see NZ Royal Commission on Licensing 1945: Notes of Proceedings (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington) v 48 p7162
3 CHW Min 19 Feb 1918 p61
4 AJHR 2 H11 (1922) p17 As at 31 Dec 1921
5 CHW AR Mar 1922 (at p139)
The three awards negotiated for the non-Christchurch areas in 1919, not only contained rates of wages equal to those in the city awards, but several important advances. In the new South Canterbury Licensed Hotels Award\(^1\) all male and female kitchenstaff received the same rate of pay for performing the same task, whereas in North Canterbury (which included Christchurch) the female rate for cooks in the smaller kitchens was set at three-fourths of the male rate. Moreover, any work performed on a special (statutory) holiday would henceforth be paid at a rate of time-and-a-half, instead of the ordinary rate. The other two advances were contained in the new award for the Canterbury tearooms.\(^2\) This provided for a week’s paid annual holiday and double-time payment for any work on Good Friday and Christmas Day, as well as payment at time-and-a-half for four other special holidays. This was the first provision for a paid annual holiday for any group of hotel or restaurant workers in Canterbury.

In the year following these successes, however, the union underwent major internal dislocation. Already the CHWU had been forced to dismiss its country organiser for his unsatisfactory performance, and his successor in the job resigned after only one week.\(^3\) In mid-1920, the union’s president, vice-president, and R. Brooks the secretary all resigned.\(^4\) Brooks tendered his resignation out of disillusionment he said with the lack of interest shown by members in the affairs of the union.\(^5\) That September, T. Gilmore formerly a hotel worker in Wellington, was elected as the new secretary.\(^6\) Three months later he was discovered by the police in Rakaia in a disorientated state, and the unions safe was found empty.\(^7\) Following this debacle Brooks was re-elected as secretary and in April 1921 he was joined by E. G. East as the union’s new president.\(^8\) This marked the end of

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1. B Aw XX (1919) p892
2. B Aw XX (1919) p905
3. CHW E Min 27 Aug pp37-8; 22 Sep 1919 p39
4. CHW E Min 6 Sep 1920 p49
5. CHW Min 3 Oct 1920 p92
6. CHW Min 27 Sep 1920
7. CHW E Min 28 Jan 1921 p58
8. CHW E Min 28 Apr 1921 p116
the union's period of instability, and except for a brief interval in 1930, Brooks and East would continue in office for the next fifteen years, shaping the direction of the union's development.

2. HOURS AND WAGES, 1920 TO 1924

The period 1920 to 1922 brought both a reduction in the hours of work and a rise in the level of real wages for hotel and restaurant workers. In 1921 the new Shops and Offices Act set the maximum hours of work for the industry's workers at 48 per week.\(^1\) This represented a reduction of eight hours for men and four hours for women, a significant advance given that the union's first award in 1908 had been for 65 hours. The new level remained in operation until 1936, when the new Labour government introduced legislation for the 40 hour week.

Hotel and restaurant workers benefited from the general rise in real wage levels that workers obtained from the Arbitration Court in the early 1920's.\(^2\) This increase arose through both award settlements and from the system of cost-of-living bonuses issued by the court, which had arisen in the First World War as a temporary means to compensate workers for inflation. The bonuses were not permanent adjustments, as the phenomenon of inflation was believed to be a temporary one. When prices continued to rise in the post-war period the government made a series of amendments to the court's powers, in an attempt to find an orderly mechanism for an increasingly confused situation.\(^3\)

In determining the level of any cost-of-living bonus the court was obliged to reconcile two potentially contradictory criteria: on the one hand to maintain "the standard of living of the average worker at a reasonable level", and on the other to consider the economic circumstances of the particular industry to which the decision was to be applied.\(^4\)

After issuing its first bonus in 1916, further bonuses followed between 1918 and 1921. Generally they reflected the movement in the official cost-of-living index operated by the government statistician. In March 1920

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1. Shops and Offices Act 1921-22 (rpt NZ Statutes III p240)
2. J. Child "Wages Policy and Wages Movement in New Zealand 1914 to 1923" (Journal of Industrial Relations, 18 1971) p173
3. Ibid p166
4. Ibid p168
the court issued a wage bonus of 4s per week for adult males and 2s for females and juniors, effective as on 1 January 1920.\(^1\) From 1 May these bonuses were further increased to 10s and 5s respectively.\(^2\)

In the course of 1921 the situation changed. The court decided that the method of calculating rises in the cost-of-living employed by the government statistician, had led the court to grant an over-generous compensation to the workers.\(^3\) No further bonus was issued in 1921, and in 1922 the court moved to reduce wages. This decision reflected mounting pressure from farmers and employers, whose financial position had deteriorated from its post-war boom, for lower wage levels. The court now altered its method of determining a bonus by taking only the previous month’s movement in the cost-of-living index instead of the previous quarter, and on that basis projected a fall in the cost of living for the next six months. Hence it issued an order for the reduction of wage rates by 5s per week on the basis not of the price rises experienced but of the fall in prices it expected to occur. When indeed a decline did take place in the second half of 1922, it issued a further order reducing wage rates by an additional 3s per week for adult males 1/6d for females and 1s for juniors.\(^4\)

For the CHWU, as for the wider trade union movement, the period from 1918 to the court’s reductions of 1922 had produced a rise in real wages, but the level of 1922 had only equalled that of 1914. In short, the rises of the post war period had only compensated for the decline experienced in the course of the high inflation during World War One.\(^5\) While the decision of the court was attacked by many unions and several affiliates of the Alliance of Labour initiated industrial action, the trade union movement lacked the strength politically or industrially to reverse the court’s verdict. The CHWU sought specific exemptions from the cut for its lower paid awards but as with most other union applications the court declined the request.\(^6\)

\(^1\) B Aw XXI (1920) p156
\(^2\) Ibid p903
\(^3\) Child p168
\(^4\) Ibid p170
\(^5\) Child p173
\(^6\) B Aw XXIV (1923) pp27 & 29
After the wage cuts of 1922, the court’s power to issue general wage adjustments expired. From 1923 until the end of the decade each union was left to seek its own rates of wages back within the system of conciliation and arbitration. For the CHWU the most important step along this path was the establishment of dominion-wide awards.

3. **DOMINION AWARDS**

New Zealand’s system of industrial relations was one of small, localised unions matched by a patchwork of local agreements. Those unions operating under the IC & A Act were prohibited from forming multi-district unions, but as with the hotel and restaurant workers several did form national federations. The awards, however, remained separately negotiated local agreements, operating only in those districts where a trade union existed for that industry.

In the hotel and restaurant industry the four major unions, Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago, had each established in their own district an essentially two-tier award system. For each of the three sectors of the industry — licensed hotels, tearooms and private hotels — there was usually one award for the district’s main city and one for the rest of the province.

In Canterbury, in 1923, there was a Christchurch and a provincial award for tearooms, the same arrangement for the private hotels, but a North Canterbury (including Christchurch) Licensed Hotel's Award with a separate licensed hotel award for South Canterbury. In districts such as Westland no union or award existed and in others the award was of a lower standard and not effectively enforced.

To rectify this patchwork the hotel workers decided to negotiate a dominion wide award for each industry sector. All workers would then be covered, and all would obtain wages and conditions equivalent to those prevailing in the main centre awards. A dominion award was not a new concept in the trade union movement, as several unions such as the freezing workers and carpenters had already secured such an arrangement. Nevertheless, local awards were still the common pattern and employers in some industries remained opposed to any national agreements, believing they would strengthen the union’s negotiating power and tend to raise wages.

1 CHW Min 15 Jan 1923 p153
The employers in the licensed hotels were prepared to enter into a dominion award and they met with representatives of the hotel workers union in November 1923. Brooks had been instrumental in initiating the proposal and once it had been established in the licensed hotels the other sectors of the industry were likely to follow. In February 1924 the first New Zealand Licensed Hotels' Award was issued by the Arbitration Court, and dominion awards followed for the tearooms in November and for the private hotels in July 1925. (See Table 2.1)

### TABLE 2.1 THE FIRST DOMINION AWARDS 1924 / 25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Licensed Hotels (Feb 1924)</th>
<th>Private Hotels (July 1925)</th>
<th>Tearooms (Nov 1924)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weekly hours</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>6 (T%)</td>
<td>2 (OT) 4 (T%)</td>
<td>2 (OT) 4 (T%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wages : Weekly</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(M and F)</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 6hk</td>
<td>5-5</td>
<td>4·14</td>
<td>4·14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 4hk</td>
<td>4·12</td>
<td>4·1</td>
<td>4·1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4hk</td>
<td>3·2</td>
<td>2·13/6</td>
<td>2·13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>2·5</td>
<td>1·17/6</td>
<td>1·17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>1·11</td>
<td>1·11</td>
<td>1·15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
<td>3·2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add board and lodging ¹</td>
<td>1·10</td>
<td>1·10</td>
<td>1·12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wages: Casual per day</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st cook (1st 3 days) ²</td>
<td>1·5</td>
<td>1·5</td>
<td>1·5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress (1st 3 days) ²</td>
<td>12·6</td>
<td>12·6</td>
<td>12·6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress (single meal)</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>7/6</td>
<td>7/6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes :** (see Note on Tables)

1. Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid. Meals only in tearooms
2. Thereafter at pro rata of ordinary rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CHW Min 5 Nov 1923 p175</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CHW Min 15 Jan 1923 p153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the workers in the main centres there was little immediate benefit from the new arrangement, as the Arbitration Court had ensured a close relationship between the wage rates of the various local awards. The objective, however, of the dominion awards had been to improve the situation of those workers in the poorly or unorganised areas and to lay the basis for a future collective advance by all the nation's hotel and restaurant workers. Henceforth when awards arose for renegotiation, or a major dispute developed, the greater strength of the workers in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch would pull-up those in the weaker areas. Similarly the potentially debilitating effects of non-unionised low wage areas on the main centre rates was removed. Underlying this was the principle that no matter where you worked in New Zealand you were entitled to the same rate of pay for doing the same job.

4. WAGES AND THE WORKPLACE, 1925 TO 1930

Following the establishment of the dominion awards, the remainder of the decade brought modest, unspectacular advances in the wages and conditions of the CHWU's membership. The union continued to operate within the arbitration system and there were no significant industrial disputes. Most of the union's attention was focussed on the active enforcement of the union's awards at the workplace.

Enforcement was often a complex issue, as the structure of the industry and the complexities of the various awards provided extensive scope for disputation. For instance, the appropriate pay rate for most kitchen workers was dependent on the number of staff employed in the kitchen. A second cook in a four-handed kitchen was entitled to one rate but a different rate applied in a five-handed kitchen. The presence of casual staff and part-time workers complicated the calculation of the staffing level, as did the performance of certain kitchen duties by non-kitchen staff such as waitresses.

In small establishments workers might often perform a variety of duties, the rates of pay for which were different. Sometimes this could vary from week to week. It was a situation difficult for the union to closely monitor and the employer could place pressure upon a worker to take a rate of pay lower than the one to which they were entitled. One common practice by employers was to use a general hand to relieve a barman during meal breaks or on their time off, but pay only at the rate for a general hand and not the higher rate provided for barmen. Employers were able to disguise the actual hours worked on the bar by falsifying the wages book.
The unions did alter the award in order to raise the rate of pay applicable and regulate the hours for which a general hand could relieve. While the problem was reduced it was not completely eliminated.  

The union was faced with an array of other enforcement problems from claims for overtime, special allowances, under-payment for holidays, incorrect weekly wages and sub-standard quarters or meal provided by the employer to the staff. The recovery of money for a worker frequently proved problematic for two reasons. First many workers apparently succumbed to employer pressure and signed the time book for less hours than they had actually worked. When the worker subsequently left the job they would often contact the CHWU to lodge a claim for unpaid overtime. The second factor hindering the union’s recovery of wages was the IC & A Act. Under the act no claim could be lodged for the recovery of wages that was more than six-months old. Often by the time the union was informed of a case, action in the court was no longer possible.

Award enforcement was a responsibility of the Labour Department, as well as a task for the CHWU, but the complexities of the union’s awards and the multiplicity of workplaces posed problems for the department’s Christchurch office. In the early 1920’s the union criticised its operations suggesting it exhibited an employer bias in its decisions. Brooks met with the Minister of Labour, G. J. Andersen, outlining some 70 instances of departmental inaction over cases in the industry and the meeting appears to have produced a marked improvement in the Christchurch operation. The department subsequently took a more vigorous role in enforcing the awards and prosecuting recalcitrant employers.

Supplementing these enforcement activities the union was also responsible for obtaining compensation for injured workers and for operating an employment service. Under the Workers Compensation Act a worker was entitled to receive compensation at the rate of 66.6% of their total wage from 1926 up from 58% in 1922. Generally the claims lodged by the union were small and uncontested, but for some workers action by the union was critical. One worker, Miss Boyd, had

1 B Aw XXIX (1929) p798; XXX (1930) p748
2 CHW AR Mar 1922 (at p134)
3 CHW Min 24 Jul 1922 p146; see E Min 29 Dec 1930 p193
4 Workers Compensation Act (NZ Statutes 1926 p )
THE CITY HOTEL – OXFORD, CHRISTCHURCH 1911

The sale of liquor was a highly profitable activity and in the course of the first half of the twentieth century it became almost the sole activity in most city hotels. Accommodation, meals and entertainment departed and ‘vertical drinking’ and the six o’clock swill arrived. For the CHWU it was hotels such as the Oxford, together with establishments with accommodation and dining rooms like the United Service Hotel, that represented its strongest section in terms of both wages and union membership.

(Alexander Turnbull Library)
fractured her hip while working and after several years of legal action by the union, she was able to receive £850 in compensation. As for the employment service, the union had reorganised it as a licensed employment agency and it had established a central role in the hiring of labour in the hotel and restaurant industry. From the union’s perspective it provided a low cost service for its members and a source of information on the movement of labour.

In the last half of the 1920’s the union successfully negotiated wage increases and extra holidays. In the 1926-27 round of award negotiations – which began with the licensed hotels – barman gained a rise of 5/- per week, kitchenhands from 2/6 in the licensed hotels to 2/- or 1/6 in the tearooms and private hotels, while waitresses and maids in both types of hotels gained an extra 1/6. The rates for cooks did not change. The major change in the 1929-20 award negotiations was an extra special holiday and two days of annual leave for workers in licensed and private hotels. This marked the high tide of the union’s gains until the worse of the depression had passed, and a higher mark was not reached until 1938.

5. LABOUR SOLIDARITY

The decade of the 1920’s had been largely one for marking time by the labour movement. Politically the parliamentary Labour Party had grown in strength but remained out of office; in the industrial sphere the movement remained divided and seemingly incapable of cohesively wielding industrial power. During this period the CHWU had pursued a consistent and deliberate policy of cooperation with both the industrial and political arms of labour and regularly aided individual unions and progressive social causes. Such a policy was in sharp contrast to the conservative stance within the labour movement adopted by the union, during its first ten years under the leadership of the Liberals. Its support for both the parliamentary road advocated by the Labour Party and the path of industrial action emphasised by the Alliance of Labour, posed no difficulty for the union, which saw the two realms as complementary.

1 CHW AR 1934-5 Apr 1935
2 CHW AR 1922-3 Mar 1923; AR 1932-3 Mar 1933
3 B Aw XXVI p425, XXVII p837 and p545
4 B Aw XXIX p612, XXX p459 and p429
In the industrial sphere, the union had been instrumental in re-establishing the Hotel Workers' Federation in 1923.\(^1\) The same year it joined the Canterbury Trades and Labour Council, \(^2\) but disaffiliated 13 months later disillusioned with what it described as the council's industrial impotence and narrow craft outlook.\(^3\)

In May 1925 the leaders of the HWF including Brooks met with the Alliance of Labour. \(^4\) They decided to ballot their members as to whether or not they should affiliate to the Alliance, but the vote went against affiliation and it was not until early 1929 on the initiative of the CHWU that the federation joined.\(^5\) While the HWF continued throughout the decade it was largely a paper organisation. The effective power rested with the troika of secretaries from the three major unions, Auckland, Wellington and Canterbury. Either the secretary of the Auckland or Wellington unions acted as a part-time secretary for the federation. These three major unions and Otago had achieved a high level of unionisation but areas such as Nelson, Westland and Southland remained poorly organised, and the CHWU played an essential role in organising and financing their unionisation. This proved to be an on-going process of nurturing and regeneration through until the late 1930's. \(^6\)

Outside of the federation the CHWU demonstrated a consistent policy of solidarity with other trade unionists within and beyond New Zealand. For instance, in 1924 the union gave its support to the railway workers in their dispute, extended its sympathy to the Seamen and the Cooks' and Stewards' unions for the death of several of their members at sea, and donated money to the New Zealand Worker to aid in the defence of a libel action. \(^7\) The following year saw donations to the Alliance of Labour to help in

\(^1\) HWF Min 13 Sep 1923 (in CHW E Min Bk 1932-8)
\(^2\) CHW E Min 6 Mar 1923
\(^3\) CHW E Min 7 Apr 1924
\(^4\) HWF Min 28 May 1925
\(^5\) HWF Min 13-16 Feb 1929
\(^6\) see CHW Min 5 Jan 1923 p152; 23 Mar 1925 p201; 5 Nov 1923 p175, E Min 2 Feb 1925 p172; E Min 30 Jan 1933 pp99-101
\(^7\) CHW E Min 26 Apr 1924 p155; 25 Aug p163; & 13 Oct p166
the organising of the farm labourers, the Gardeners’ Union and a resolution of support to the tramway workers in their opposition to the private bus companies. In 1926 it sent £20 to Britain to support the General Strike and in 1929 it gave money in support of Australian coal miners. The contact that was noticeably missing was with the Brewery Workers’ Union. It appears that the latter was relatively quiescent in this period and neither union developed any joint plans of action, such as the cutting off of beer supplies in order to bring pressure upon difficult employers.

In the political sphere, the CHWU were loyal affiliates of the Labour Party, having originally joined in 1923. In terms of ideology, the union’s leadership was within the mainstream of the Labour Party and it rejected any contact with the small Communist Party. The specific topic of socialism did not arise formally in either the union’s executive or general meetings. Rather there was a more general but nevertheless strong commitment to social justice which was to be achieved through the activities of the trade unions and by the election of a Labour government. The union supported Labour’s electoral efforts by giving regular donations additional to its affiliation fees, and by providing the union’s car and Brooks’ time to aid in campaigning.

Overall the relationship between the CHWU and the wider labour movement was a harmonious and valuable one throughout the 1920’s, and this persisted into the turbulent years of the depression. Inside the CHWU the tranquility and order that had characterised its operations after 1922 came temporarily to an end in 1930, with conflict over the union’s leadership.

1 CHW E Min 17 Aug 1925 p12; 7 Dec p20; 19 Jan p195
2 CHW E Min 31 May 1926 p29
3 CHW E Min 14 Jun 1929 p118
4 see Canterbury Brewers, Bottlers, Bottle-washers & Aerated Water IUW Minute Books (University of Canterbury Library)
5 CHW E Min 6 Mar 1923 p114
6 see CHW E Min 9 Sep 1929 p127; 18 May 1931 p221; 12 Feb 1934 p149
7 eg CHW Min 23 Mar 1925 p119; AR Mar 1927 (at p227); E Min 14 Jun 1929 p118; E Min 21 Jul 1931 p252
6. THE UNION

The direction of the union through the course of the 1920's had rested with the executive and, in particular, with its secretary, Brooks. Considerable formal power continued to reside in the union's general meetings, but the level of attendance by members was usually 30 or less, although on two occasions it did reach 70%. Generally the union's membership appeared to be either satisfied with or indifferent to the union's political viewpoint, its administration and its industrial tactics. At the annual general meetings the elections for the executive were normally uncontested affairs and there is no evidence of substantial discontent or organised opposition to the leadership of the union.

As secretary of the CHWU, Brooks demanded the highest standards from himself and from the staff in the conduct both of the union's industrial work and of its financial management. As a consequence a number of inept or dilatory assistants departed in the course of the decade. The same vigour and efficiency marked all Brooks' activity including the rebuilding of the union's finances. From a mere £52 in nett assets in 1919, the union had steadily advanced in the course of the decade to reach £516 by 1931. A rising level of membership coupled with efficient collection and a spartan administration had brought about this transformation of the union's finances.

TABLE 2.2 CHWU MEMBERSHIP AND FINANCE, 1918 TO 1933

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members¹</th>
<th>Annual Income² (£)</th>
<th>Net Assets² (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>443³</td>
<td>52³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1540</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1558</td>
<td>2058</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>1790</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. As at 31 December
2. As for the financial year, which is Feb or Mar of the following calendar year
3. All financial figures are rounded to the nearest pound.
4. eg CHW Min 22 Apr 1929 p261; E Min 7 Jan 1929 p95
5. CHW AR Mar 1924 (at p185) Timaru award meeting; & Min 27 Sept 1920 p96 election of secretary.
6. CHW E Min 21, 24 & 31 May 1923 pp128-133
7. see CHW E Min 7 Jul 1924 p159 25 Feb B29 p100
8. CHW AR Feb 1919 (at p75); AR Mar 1931 (at p298)
In 1929, on the initiative of Brooks, the general meeting of the union amended the constitution to make the position of secretary a permanent rather than elective office. In addition, the responsibility for appointing all staff and setting their rates of remuneration was transferred from the general meeting to the executive, although the maximum salary levels had already been set by a general meeting. Such alterations confirmed the concentration of authority with the executive and were passed without any opposition from the meeting.

It was not Brooks, however, who was to benefit from these changes. At the end of 1929 Brooks resigned from the secretaryship taking up a managerial position at the Chateau Tongariro. F. J. Naill, a hotel workers' union official from Wellington, was appointed by the executive as his replacement, a decision supported by both Brooks and by East, the union’s president.

In the first year of Naill’s term the decision appeared to have been a sound one, with the executive expressing its satisfaction with his performance. By early 1931, disquieting facts began to emerge as to Naill’s past and current activities. Brooks had returned to Christchurch, and had been elected the union’s president in March 1931. At meetings of the union’s executive in the course of the next few weeks, Brooks criticised Naill’s handling of local complaints and his poor performance at the recent federation conference. At the meeting of April 20, Brooks sought Naill’s resignation, but the executive agreed instead to call a further special meeting of the executive. Before it could be held, Naill tendered his resignation and the executive then met to appoint Brooks as the new secretary. He was instructed to proceed immediately to Wellington, to attend the wages’ hearing in the Arbitration Court and attempt to retrieve what he could from a deteriorating situation.

1 CHW Min 21 Oct 1929
3 CHW Min 26 Nov 1929 pp276-8
4 CHW E Min 8 Sep 1930 p180
5 CHW Min 16 Mar 1931 p299
6 CHW E Min 23 Mar 1931 pp213-5
7 CHW E Min 20 Apr 1931 p217
8 CHW E Min 14 May 1931 p219
The replacement of Niall was an issue debated and determined within the confines of the executive. Nevertheless, it had been sparked by complaints from the union’s rank-and-file. In the seven page indictment of Niall’s performance, formally presented by Brooks to the executive following Niall’s resignation, these complaints constituted one of three broad charges levelled against Niall. First, Niall was criticised for his failure to provide adequate leadership of the union, second that he had been guilty of the maladministration of the union’s management, and third that he had neglected or mishandled numerous individual complaints made by the union’s members.

The chief charge under the first heading was Niall’s failure, together with the other leaders of the federation, to formulate any strategy to combat the impact of the depression upon the union’s members. No plan had been determined for the forthcoming award negotiations, and nor had any preliminary meeting been held with the licensed trade employers, the LVA. Moreover, Niall had departed from the federation conference before its completion, leaving the significant issues unresolved. Under the second charge a number of administrative criticisms were made by Brooks, but it was the third area, that of the individual complaints that represented the more important set of charges. Here, Brooks cited several cases where claims by members of the union involving wages, holidays and insurance, had been neglected or handled in a poor or dilatory manner by Niall. One complaint, from the workers at the Terminus Hotel, had been deliberately withheld from the notice of the executive, as it revealed Niall’s own inaction. Finally, Niall, in violation of the licensed hotel award, had agreed to permit an employer to hire ‘buttons’, junior staff employed for porter duties, at a low rate of pay.

In sum, the document presented to the executive demonstrated substantial deficiencies in Niall’s secretaryship. In other circumstances they may have only brought severe censure, but given the turbulent economic period that the union was now in and the traditionally high standard of performance demanded, and met, by Brooks the outcome was understandable. The presence of a proven alternative for the job made the decision easier. With the issue now resolved Brooks, the executive and the union’s members all turned their full attention to combatting the catastrophe of the depression.

1 CHW E Min 18 May 1931 p222
2 see HWF Min 1931 conference
Usually young and single, most waitresses who worked in hotels lived at their place of work. Together with maids they were the lowest paid strata of hotel workers; and as with other female hotel workers they were not covered by any union preference clause when the CHWU negotiated its first award in 1908. In 1910, preference was finally extended to women, but they continued to play only a minor part in the direction of the union’s affairs.

(Alexander Turnbull Library)
7. THE DEPRESSION: AN OVERVIEW

Beginning in 1930, the depression crashed down upon the labour movement in a series of waves. Factories closed, farms were abandoned, wages cut and a period of deprivation and despair settled upon the nation and in particular upon the working class. Unemployment was the greatest menace and most severe experience. By the end of 1931, 52,085 people were officially registered with the Unemployment Board and in September 1933 a peak of 79,435 had been reached. Many were without a job for most of the depression; some did have part-time work, while others experienced alternative periods of work and joblessness. If not directly affected, many workers had a family member who was without work, and the ever present threat of redundancy left few workers free from the fear of unemployment. For those fortunate to retain work for most of the period the suffering was significantly less. They did however endure cuts to their wages which were only partially offset by the fall in prices. The standard of living for most workers, and especially for low paid groups such as the hotel workers, had not been high when the depression began and only a small fall in living standards was necessary to produce widespread poverty. In or out of work, the members of the CHWU could not remain unaffected by the depression experience.

It was to combat these twin problems of job losses and pay cuts, that the energies of the union would be directed for the next five years. Determining the best strategy for this task was a dilemma for the CHWU, as it was for the labour movement as a whole. They did not know how bad, or for how long the depression was to be. The historian has seen this film and knows the last reel, and its actors. For the participants, the subsequent triumph of the Labour Party however was an undated hope. They were in the midst of a disaster, the worst in their experience, divided and hesitant as to the best means to defend their interests and survive the abyss that was opening beneath them. As the depression deepened, each union sought its own solution to the particular matrix of problems confronting it, a solution reflecting its own political consciousness and industrial strength. Seldom was there a comprehensive plan of battle developed by a union, but simply a general goal of minimising the impact of each new threat. In the course of the depression the tactics not only varied between unions but between occasions, as various weapons were deployed, bringing both victory and defeat.
This general strategy, of minimising the impact of each new problem, characterised the approach of the CHWU. Its tactics were flexible but marked by caution. Through its general approach ran two consistent themes: the avoidance of any strike action, and the maintenance of the closest possible cooperation with the labour movement. In dealing with the first of its problems, unemployment, it is this second theme of cooperation that was central to its activities throughout the depression.

Cooperation with the labour movement on the issue of unemployment and the general crisis of depression occurred at three levels. First, at the averly political level, the union supported the activities of the Labour Party in its campaign to secure government office. Within the hotel and restaurant industry unemployment had begun to have a marked effect by early 1931, with many hotels operating skeleton staff. The CHWU's membership fell from 1520 in 1929 to a mere 909 by the end of 1933. It was clear to the union, that the problem of unemployment among its members, as for that of the working class as a whole, was a consequence of the particular course taken by the Coalition government in managing the economic crisis. The government had determined that the problem would be resolved through deflation and unemployment, with the economic burden to be born by workers and small farmers in particular. To elect Labour was to remove, if not the entire problem, then at least a major cause for its severity.

In the meantime, at a second level, the CHWU played an active role in the labour movement's resistance to the government's measures. The Alliance of Labour played a central part in this opposition organising conferences, initiating delegations to the government, and protest campaigns and providing support and advice for individual trade unions. In practice all these efforts failed to effect a change to the government's strategy or modify significantly any of its proposals in respect of wage cuts, unemployment or the abolition of compulsory arbitration. There were many brave, and militant words, but

1 CHW E Min 16 Mar 1931 p305
2 AJHR 3 H11 (1930) p22 & (1934) p21
the various resolutions and attempts to organise boycotts proved quite ineffectual. Nevertheless, the CHWU continued to advocate support for the Alliance as the only viable means to preserve even the limited strength of the labour movement. It opposed moves by the WHWU to withdraw and participated in the national conferences and in numerous committees and delegations. It supported the demand for increases in the payment for the unemployment benefit, a shift in the burden of the unemployment tax from wage earners to other income earners, and the extension of the benefit's coverage for women workers, to an entitlement equivalent to that for men. With its predominantly female membership the issue was important for the CHWU, as was the question of the level of the unemployment tax levelled against women. Female workers were paying £700,000 per annum in tax to the Unemployment Board, but were only receiving £20,000 in unemployment payments. Again the delegation to the government, which included Brooks, failed to effect any reduction in the tax on women workers.

The third level of cooperation was in attempting to ameliorate the effects of unemployment or aid those workers suffering the hardships of industrial action. Unemployment had been present during the 1920's, and the CHWU had been a member of a local inter-union unemployment committee, and had provided it with periodic financial assistance. As the depression deepened the commitment of the union widened. The union gave financial support to unemployed workers' groups and joined several inter-union delegations to local bodies on behalf of the unemployed. Brooks was appointed to the executive of the union covering those workers on government relief work and

1 see Beaglehole Collection Victoria University of Wellington "No Wages Reduction Conference" RP D29 1931
2 CHW AR Apr 1932 (at p316)
3 CHW Min 16 Mar 1931 p305
4 CHW Min 27 Aug 1934 p373
5 CHW E Min 20 Jul 1925 p11; 16 Jul 1928 p77
6 CHW E Min 3 Sep 1934 p176 (There is not a clear distinction between which of the unemployed workers organisations received the money)
7 CHW E Min 2 Sep 1935 p219
a donation from the CHWU soon followed.¹ Financial aid was also given to the striking freezing workers in 1933, Tramway workers and to the Inangahau gold miners, despite the union's own precarious position.² Finally, the CHWU joined and supported the Christchurch Women's Unemployment Committee³. This committee created cooking and sewing centres employing some 70 workers, provided free meals and assisted women workers with rent payments.

This wider cooperation and assistance was an important element in maintaining the overall strength of the labour movement, but the CHWU also faced the struggle of maintaining its own strength, and indeed its continuing existence. The dramatic fall in the union's membership in the course of the depression cut the union's income and drained its financial reserves. In response to this the executive initiated a series of economy measures, including cuts to their own allowance and to the wages of Brooks and the staff.⁴ Moreover, Brooks was successful in persuading the union's members to raise the subscription fee in 1932 from 6d a week to 9d.⁵ Such an increase in the depth of the depression was a difficult step to take, but together with the cuts in expenditure was sufficient to ensure that the union remained solvent.

More than money, however, was necessary for the union to remain truly effective as a union. An able leadership was already present, and the hardships of the depression served to generate renewed activity from the union's rank-and-file. Meetings during the depression saw attendances regularly between 70 and 100, compared to the 30 or less common in the 1920's.⁶ The final element was to organise the union's resources and direct them to fight the second battle of the depression, the struggle to defend the wages and award protection of the union's members still in work.

¹ CHW E Min 13 Jun 1932 p54; & 3 Oct 1932 p76
² CHW E Min 30 Jan 1933; 9 May 1932 & 23 Apr 1934
³ CHW AR Mar 1933 (at p347) These committees operated under the auspices of the Unemployment Board see AJHR 3 H35 1933 p6.
⁴ CHW E Min 22 Feb 1932 pp280-1. Brooks made the recommendations. Initially they were reluctant to cut wages E Min 2 Nov 1931 p267
⁵ CHW Min 16 May 1932 p330
⁶ CHW Min 16 May 1932 p330 (99 members); 30 Nov 1932 p336 (95) 28 Jan 1935 (72).
8. THE WAGE STRUGGLE IN THE DEPRESSION

In the award round of 1929-1930, the CHWU had reached a high point in the standard of wages and conditions for its members. The next five years were spent in retreat as the union struggled to minimise the damage and prevent the complete rout of its hard won gains. In the early years of the depression it was faced by the two general attacks launched by the government in the form of the 10% cut in wages in May 1931 and the abolition of compulsory arbitration in December. Subsequently, as its awards expired in 1932, it had to develop the tactics appropriate to each particular situation.

The portent that there would be deep and widespread cuts to wages came with the decision of the Arbitration Court in December 1930, to reduce the wage rates in the Manawatu Flaxmill Workers Award by 33%. Niall then still the secretary of the CHWU, correctly observed that 'wage reductions were to be forced upon the weaker unions'. While the flaxmill workers were an affiliate of the Alliance of Labour, the Alliance had been powerless to prevent the reduction, either by the organising of effective political or industrial action.

In early 1931 the government announced a 10% wage cut for all civil servants as part of its economic policy of deflation. It further empowered the Arbitration Court to reduce the minimum award rates of pay in the private sector, which the court subsequently did with a general reduction also of 10%. In response to the government's announcement, the Alliance of Labour organised the 'No Wages Reduction Conference' bringing together a large number of the country's trade unions including the CHWU. The conference affirmed its opposition to any wage cuts and called upon workers to cut their own rent or mortgage payments by 15% in response to any wage cut and to boycott those firms which agreed to cut their employees' wages. Protest meetings were to be organised and trade unions were recommended to cancel their registration under the IC & A Act to avoid the reductions in their wages.

1 Finance Act (Part II) 1931 (rpt NZ Statutes III p1015) 2 Industrial Conciliation & Arbitration Amdt Act (NZ Statutes No. 3 1932 p21)
3 B_Aw.XXX (1930) p1010 4 CHW Min 30 Jun 1930 p285
There was considerable talk of industrial action, and even of a General Strike from the Communists and the left of the Labour Party. In practice there was a substantial gulf between the word and the deed. Despite the condemnation of arbitration by union leaders such as the Alliance's secretary, J. Roberts from the Waterside workers, and the exhortations for industrial action, Roberts realised the vulnerability and impotence of most unions and in practice he pursued a very cautious strategy. For the hotel workers, the cancellation of their registration was not a serious option. They choose to retain what protection they could within the arbitration system, rather than directly confront their employers in a battle in which the balance of forces and circumstance clearly rested with their opponents.

These circumstances were rendered more adverse by the government's decision, in December 1931, to abolish compulsory arbitration. Henceforth, in the event of the parties being unable to reach agreement in the conciliation stage of the system, either party could refuse to accept arbitration. If no settlement was reached within the specified period the award would lapse. As the various awards came up for renegotiation the employers insisted on making substantial wage cuts in addition to the 10% reduction that had already been ordered by the Arbitration Court. The unions resisted, the award would lapse and thus the employers were in a position to enforce their demands, unless the union could employ other action to modify their claims. In some industries compromises were reached, in others workers struck or took on-the-job action. Some unions were successful in modifying the employers' claims, but many suffered defeat and others the destruction of their organisation.

1 Liddell to Roberts 7 Nov 1932 RP I 4/2
2 As for example in rejecting strike action in support of the 1932-3 freezing workers strike.
3 CHW Min 13 Jul 1931 p307
The shelter of the arbitration system had enabled many weak New Zealand trade unions to survive, and to achieve modest advances in the standard of living of their members. Conversely, the system's emphasis on legal protection, enforcement and sanction had tended to dilute union activism and the material and psychological preparation necessary for waging a successful industrial struggle. ¹ Now exposed to the onrushing waves of the depression most trade unions were neither mentally nor materially prepared to struggle and swim by themselves. Like the others, the CHWU now had to learn in the depths of the depression, the skills of survival.

In deciding how to survive and preserve what it could of its members' conditions, the CHWU was sure about one issue: if it was to organise a strike, defeat was almost certain and its members would suffer severe hardship, far greater than the temporary losses the union might be forced to concede in negotiation. The hotel and restaurant workers lacked the economic leverage at the workplace, the political consciousness, financial resources and the favourable political and economic climate necessary to wage and win a strike. The workforce, being largely unskilled or semi-skilled could be easily replaced by 'free labour' drawn from the city's unemployed workers. No extensive training would be necessary nor would the workers need to be transported into an isolated and hostile community. Numerous, small and dispersed workplaces made effective picketing and control extremely difficult. Neither the CHWU nor the individual worker possessed the money necessary to sustain any protracted strike nor did they have direct political and industrial experience born of previous struggles. In the midst of a depression the ability of any union to wage and win a strike was at its lowest, when ironically the need to win was the greatest. At the most, the union could only hope to organise selected strikes, short in duration and confined to urban areas of the union's strongest sector, the licensed hotels. Any more radical course would be to invite disaster, an experience that was to befall much stronger unions in the depression years who took the path of direct action.

¹ CHW Min 26 Apr 1932 p326 (Pickards report)
The CHWU had to find other means to protect its members' interests. At first the leadership of the CHWU and the HWF was hesitant and confused. This was overcome with the return of Brooks as the secretary of the CHWU and the emergence of a new secretary from Auckland in the person of Frederick George Young. Young was elected the federation's secretary in 1932 and together with Brooks was able to provide the determination and skill necessary to guide the hotel workers through the worst years of the depression. Before they were confronted by the renegotiation of their three sector awards, however, there was the more general problem of seeking an exemption for their industry from the government's amendment abolishing compulsory arbitration.

In the government's original proposal a general exemption was to have been made for those trade unions whose membership was 60% or more female. There was an acknowledgement that these workers constituted a special case meriting protection because of their especially low wages and lack of industrial leverage. In short without recourse to the Arbitration Court they were especially vulnerable to severe exploitation by their employers. Such a general exemption did not materialise in the 1931 amendment to the IC & A Act, and representations by those unions with a high female membership, such as the CHWU, were made to the government in March 1932.

While the government was not prepared to make a general exemption, it did empower the Arbitration Court to make a specific order for women workers in a particular industry, setting the minimum rates of pay in the event of their award lapsing. This concession subsequently proved useful to the CHWU in dealing with the private hotels.

The first award battle for the CHWU was in the licensed hotel sector, where the 1929 award had expired at the end of 1931. Traditionally, it was the licensed hotel sector which contained the union's largest and most organised group of workers and where the basis for the rates of pay in the tearooms and private hotels was effectively determined. A good settlement was vital

1 see HWF Min 1929 to 1931; & 2 Feb 1932
2 HWF Min 2 Feb 1932
3 CHW E Min 2 Nov 1931 p265
4 Report on Amendment Bill to IC & A Act (in E Min p328)
for the CHWU, but the employers, the LVA, were equally determined to effect substantial cuts in wages and conditions. Their trade had fallen dramatically as the depression deepened, but many continued to pay high rents or mortgages on their properties. The LVA claimed that since 1928 annual income for a publican had fallen from £10,675 to a mere £5,432, or a fall of 49%. \(^1\) Even allowing for possible exaggeration by the LVA it was clear that the employers were facing substantial economic difficulties and hence they sought a total reduction of 20% in wages — inclusive of the 10% order of the Arbitration Court — changes in holidays and hours, and a new under 17 year old wage rate.\(^2\)

No new award was settled until late in 1932 as a consequence of the mutual determination of both the parties, and in particular the deliberate strategy of the HWF to prolong negotiations. \(^3\) This enabled the union to maintain the provisions of the old award for as long as the conciliation hearings continued. Simultaneously the unions applied pressure on the LVA with the assistance of the Alliance of Labour. In Wellington, the Watersiders' and Seamen's Unions boycotted hotels who attempted to cut their employees wages while Roberts, the Alliance's secretary assisted the HWF in the negotiations. \(^4\)

Within the industry, the HWF threatened to organise stop-work meetings in Auckland and Wellington. \(^5\) The cumulative effect of all these tactics was an award settlement in November 1932 that the unions found satisfactory in the light of the wider economic circumstances. Wages were cut by 5% in addition to the court's 10%, but the cut had been effectively delayed for a year. \(^6\) Chefs in the larger kitchens did lose slightly more and the annual holiday was reduced from seven to five days. The award continued until March 1935 when the union was able to renegotiate a new award providing for a general increase in wage rates of around 8%. \(^7\) The unions had been successful in limiting both the depth and duration of any wage reduction.

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1. Dominion 6 Aug 1932 (clipping no pagination) RP G130
2. Ibid & Dominion 18 Aug 1932
3. Brooks to Roberts 8 Jun 1932 RP D137
4. CHW E Min 27 Jun 1932 p57 (Secretary's Report)
5. CHW Min 16 May 1932 p330
6. B Aw XXXII (1932) p289
7. B Aw XXXV (1935) p211
The CHWU faced more acute difficulties in defending the interests of the workers in the tearooms and private hotels. In the union’s view the award claims of the tearoom employers were scandalous and they responded by extracting themselves from the conciliation hearing on a legal technicality. It decided that each union would try to reach a district agreement with its local employers. Auckland and Nelson reached new agreements, while the CHWU attempted to selectively enforce the conditions of the old tearooms award but without the force of legal sanction. The union was not prepared to negotiate a local agreement in 1932 or 1933 as it believed any settlement would prove unacceptably harsh. By mid-1934 the economic situation had improved sufficiently for the unions in Wellington and Canterbury to make a local settlement. Generally the rates were compatible with those in Auckland and represented a reduction of between 5.6% and 24% from the high level of 1930. (see Table 2.4) It was not until 1936 that the wage levels of 1930 were reached again.

1 Eg of employers claims see CHW Min at 19 July 1936
2 CHW E Min 25 Jan 1930

**TABLE 2.3 LICENSED HOTEL AWARD 1929 TO 1935**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weekly hours</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual holidays</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special holidays</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wages : Weekly</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 8hk</td>
<td>£6.0</td>
<td>£4.10</td>
<td>£4.17/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 6hk</td>
<td>£5.5</td>
<td>£4.10</td>
<td>£4.17/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 4hk</td>
<td>£4.12</td>
<td>£3.18/6</td>
<td>£4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Cook 4hk</td>
<td>£3.2</td>
<td>£2.13</td>
<td>£2.17/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>£2.7/6</td>
<td>£2.0/6</td>
<td>£2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>£1.12/6</td>
<td>£1.7/9</td>
<td>£1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
<td>£3.7</td>
<td>£2.17/6</td>
<td>£3.2/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add board &amp; lodgings¹</td>
<td>£1.10</td>
<td>£1.4</td>
<td>£1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Wages : Casual per day</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chef (1st 3 days)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress (1st 3 days)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman (1st 3 days)²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes :** (see Note on Tables)

1 Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid
2 Thereafter at pro rata of ordinary rate
A different course of action was taken by the CHWU in dealing with the private hotels. Their 1930 award had expired in 1932 and the unions were unable to reach a satisfactory agreement with the employers in conciliation. They decided to apply for a special minimum wage order from the Arbitration Court under the 1932 amendment to the IC & A Act to protect the pay levels of the female workers. The level set by the court represented a 20% reduction on the previous award rates. Furthermore the court altered the method of classification in the kitchens, changing the basis from the number of hands to the number of cooks. ¹ This had the effect of lowering the pay of certain cooks still further, and while the unions sought legal advice as to whether the court possessed the power to reclassify the basis for determining rates or merely the right to set minimum rates on the existing basis, the advice received confirmed the court’s authority.²

### TABLE 2.4 TEAROOMS AWARD 1930 TO 1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1933 (Northern)¹</th>
<th>1934 (Canterbury)²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weekly hours</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wages : Weekly</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Female)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st cook 6+hk</td>
<td>4-14</td>
<td>4-0/6</td>
<td>4-0/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st cook 4hk</td>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>3-8/3</td>
<td>3-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4hk</td>
<td>2-13</td>
<td>2-6/9</td>
<td>2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchen hand</td>
<td>1-19/6</td>
<td>1-13/3</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>1-15</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add meal allowance⁴</td>
<td>12s</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>10s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wages : Casual per day</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>(M &amp; F)</td>
<td>(M &amp; F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cook (1st 3 days)⁵</td>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>18s</td>
<td>15s (M) 12/6 (F)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>7/6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** (see Note on Tables)

1. No Dominion award operated in 1933, no award negotiated in Canterbury.
2. Local award.
3. As the vast majority of staff were women only the female wage rates are given.
4. Two substantial meals provided each working day, or cash value paid.
5. Thereafter at pro rata of ordinary rate.

¹ B Aw XXXII (1932) p546
² Corr Brooks to Roberts & R to B 29 Nov & 3 Dec 1932
³ RP D137
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1932 (Arbitration Ct Minimum Order)</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weekly hours</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wages: Weekly</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Female)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Female)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st cook 6+hk</td>
<td>4-14</td>
<td>(3c)&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt; 3-17/6</td>
<td>4-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st cook 4hk</td>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>(3c) 2-17/6</td>
<td>4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4hk</td>
<td>2-13/6</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-13/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>1-19</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>1-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>1-12/6</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>1-12/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add board &amp; lodging</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>1-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wages: Casual per day</th>
<th>(M &amp; F)</th>
<th>(M &amp; F)</th>
<th>(M &amp; F)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st cook (1st 3 days)&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>Pro rata of weekly rate +50%</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress (1st 3 days)&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>P.R. +50%</td>
<td>12/6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** (see Note on Tables)

1. After award lapsed, Arbitration Court issued a minimum rate of pay for all female workers in private hotels.
2. As provided by Shop & Offices Act
3. As virtually all staff were women, only their rate is given
4. The 1932 Order reclassified wage rates according to the number of cooks instead of previously the number of hands. Any comparisons are only approximate.
5. Thereafter at pro rata of ordinary rate
There was a second dimension to the problem of the private hotels — the scope of the minimum order’s coverage. In the course of the 1920’s the criterion for coverage under the Private Hotels Award had been the size of the establishment. For the earlier 1920s those with facilities for less than 20 guests were excluded but in 1927 the figure was lowered to less than 16.¹ With the new minimum order the question arose as whether only those private hotels which had been parties to the previous award were covered, or whether the whole industry was now to be encompassed? The court’s decision effectively extended protection by applying the order to any private hotel irrespective of size which provided casual meals and accommodation.² Where the hotel was essentially a boarding house providing services to permanent or semi-permanent residents the order would not apply. This redefinition did represent a gain for the unions one which they were able to utilise in obtaining expanded award coverage after the election of a Labour government. As to the award conditions it would not be until 1936 that the wage levels of the 1930 award were again obtained, until that date the 1932 Arbitration Court order applied.

While the CHWU had been to reduce significantly the impact of the depression on wages in the largest sector, the licensed hotels, it had to accept much larger cuts in the tearooms and private hotels. It believed, nevertheless, that delaying the negotiation of any new tearoom award enabled it to obtain a better settlement when the economic circumstances were more favourable. An earlier negotiation would have led to a poor agreement which would have proven subsequently difficult to rectify. Overall, given the limited industrial strength at its disposal the CHWU was able to perform comparably well, as well indeed as many stronger unions who were forced to accept wage cuts of 20%.

The depression did reveal the union’s vulnerability especially in the tearooms and private hotels and the need for it to strengthen its workplace organisation and create a ‘fighting fund’ for future conflicts.³ The election of the Labour government removed the urgency for any such action, and while the union did accrue substantial funds, workplace organisation continued to rest essentially with the visits of union officials.

1 B Aw XXVII (1927) p877 Memorandum; eg of exclusions XXII (1923) p578
2 B_Aw XXXIII (1933) p1121
3 Brooks to Roberts 8 Jun 1932 RP D137
As in the home, the task of serving food in public facilities in New Zealand was one assigned almost exclusively to women, either as counterhands or as waitresses. Whether in hotels or in tearooms, the lowest paid strata were the counterhands, waitresses and maids. In part this reflected lower levels of skill. However, the fundamental reason was the prevalence throughout the economy of lower pay for women performing the same job as men and lower pay for occupations where women workers predominated. Equal pay for the same job would not arrive for most women workers until the 1970's; improved relativities for jobs such as counterhands is a struggle not yet completed.

(Alexander Turnbull Library)
9. **DISUNITY ON THE EVE OF VICTORY**

With the worst of the depression now passed and the Labour Party preparing itself for electoral victory, the CHWU found itself embroiled in intra-party conflict. Political disagreements in the labour movement were a common occurrence, but given the past record of close cooperation evinced by the CHWU it was ironic that the conflict should occur now and with such bitterness. The discord was to prove a temporary one, but was viewed very seriously at the time. In fact there were two distinct disputes, one between the CHWU and elements of the Christchurch Labour Party and the other at a national level between Young and the Labour Party, but inevitably affecting the CHWU. Together they damaged the relationship with the party.

The first conflict had originated in late 1933 over the actions of the Labour mayor of Christchurch, D. G. Sullivan. Contrary to an express resolution of the Labour Representation Committee he had appointed two conservative chairmen to important committees of the city council. The CHWU was further dissatisfied with the general performance of the Mayor and his councillors in the management of the city and the particular praise bestowed by Sullivan on the Mt Cook Tourist Company. Sullivan had given a public speech congratulating the company on its ‘excellent business practice’ apparently unaware of their poor labour relations. Brooks rebuked Sullivan for making such a compliment ignorant of the facts. The effect of these disputes was that the CHWU withdrew its delegates from the LRC in November 1934, not returning until September 1935.

Young’s dispute with the Labour Party was more serious and more acrid. He was faced with expulsion from the party for allegedly manipulating the party’s candidacy for the Auckland mayoralty so as to ensure that the conservative opponent would win. In addition he was alleged to have described the Labour members of parliament ‘as a slimy lot of grease merchants’ at the annual conference of the Alliance of Labour. At the

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1 Brooks to Roberts 21 Jul 1933 RP D145 (Confirmed in NCLRC Min)
2 Ibid; The Press 26 Jun 1933 p16; CHW E Min 26 Nov 1934 p188; Delegates Report of Annual Conference p8 (at E Mirr p212)
3 CHW E Min 26 Nov 1934 p188; 30 Sep 1935 p222
4 CHW E Min 9 May 1935 pp201-4
heart of the disputes were larger political struggles, especially in Auckland, where leading trade unionists battled with leading politicians such as John A. Lee and W. Jordan. The unionists insisted on party discipline, while the politicians opposed the bloc voting power being used by the unionists to determine policy and candidates in the Auckland LRC.¹ That bloc vote, organised by Young with the enormous voting strength of the AHWU, had been decisive in selecting J. Sayegh as the Labour candidate for the mayoralty. Their opponents in the LRC saw Sayegh as inept and certain to lose, which he did, to the conservative Ernest Davies the managing director of New Zealand Breweries Ltd. Lee and others believed that Young and Davies had reached a deal to ensure that Davies would win the mayoralty in return for future favours to Young, the hotel workers and the Labour Party.² Certainly Young and Davies, and the Labour Party, would enjoy a close and controversial association over the next two decades, but on this occasion the party’s investigation of the charges failed to find clear evidence of any manipulation, although they did hold to be proven Young’s comment on the ‘grease merchants’.³ A vote to expel Young was narrowly defeated but he was nevertheless censured.⁴

Brooks had attended the conference on behalf of the CHWU, and he believed Young to be an innocent victim of political intrigues. Indeed he was incensed at the party’s treatment of Young as indicated by his report to the union’s executive. Describing ‘Big Jim’ Roberts’ (Alliance secretary and Labour Party vice-president) support for censure Brooks wrote

In voting, Roberts, like a white livered cur,

stuck his head down into his guts and just

put his slimy death-like hand up a few

inches above his shoulder.⁵

Brooks first loyalty was to Young rather than to politicians such as Lee. He was predisposed to support Young, even though he was largely unaware of the particular circumstances and certainly not involved himself in the political machinations.⁶

1 Young to Roberts 25 Jan 1935 RP 112/1; Roberts to Young 28 Jan 1935 RP 112/3; Y to R 11 Feb 1935 RP 1 12/4
2 John A Lee _Mine is the kingdom_ (Martinborough : A. Taylor, 1975) pp141-3
3 Y to R 12 Nov 1935 RP 1 15/1
4 CHW E Min 9 May 1935 pp201-4
5 CHW E Min 9 May 1935 p204
6 There is no evidence of any involvement by Brooks. Brooks resumed correspondence with Roberts during 1935.
The overall consequence of these local and national conflicts was the temporary alienation of the CHWU leadership from important elements within the Labour Party. The sensitivity shown by the CHWU over both local issues and the more serious questions surrounding Young's activities was the sort of sensitivity common when close friends discover suddenly a reprobate in their midst. For Brooks the policies and actions of the labour movement were central to his life, and where the party pursued a different course to that held by Brooks to be correct, his protests would soon follow. In the realm of party politics where Brooks went the CHWU executive largely followed.

Nevertheless, despite the intensity of feeling, the bitterness proved short-lived. The CHWU and the HWF remained within the Labour Party and with Labour's election soon assumed a position of importance within the party and within the soon to be formed Federation of Labour. The struggle to build and survive had ended for the union. Now it would enter a period of unparralled advance, securing better wages and conditions for its members, expanding and strengthening its organisation, and helping to construct a new welfare state.
CHAPTER THREE
LABOUR IN POWER, 1935 TO 1944

The years 1935 to 1944 were a time of unrivalled success and expansion for the Canterbury Hotel Workers’ Union. With the election of the first Labour government, the labour movement proceeded to the recovery of the ground it had lost in the course of the depression and to the creation of a new and better society for the working class. Heading the agenda for change to the lives of workers, were the issues of employment, shorter hours and higher pay, the extension of trade unionism to vulnerable and unorganised workers and the construction of a welfare state.¹ The agenda was unclear on many details and on the means by which many aspects of the policy would be implemented. Nor, was it complete, in that the question of social ownership was left unanswered. While the party’s constitution continued to state the socialisation of the economy as one of its objectives, there was no clear programme or deep commitment by the Labour Party leadership.

Nevertheless, the first four years of Labour rule did see the introduction of key planks in Labour’s platform for reform, such as the 40 hour week, compulsory unionism and the 1938 Social Security Act. For the hotel workers this pre-war period brought significant gains in wages and conditions and the extension of the CHWU’s coverage to domestic workers in hospitals, chartered clubs and institutional cafeterias. The onset of the Second World War however inaugurated a more difficult period, first with the conflict within the labour movement surrounding the Lee affair, thence the constraints of the war economy and finally the dispute between the CHWU and the HWF in the CHWU middle years of the 1940’s. Throughout the period the CHWU was a loyal and close associate of the Labour government and played a leading role in the labour movement. Essentially in the centre of the labour political spectrum, the union was primarily concerned to improve the wages and conditions of its members and support the building of a welfare state. While it did exhibit some support for more widespread social change it was not at the cutting edge of the debate over Socialism, rather it exhibited a more general commitment to greater equality and social justice.

The first full year of the new government saw the implementation of several key policies in the field of industrial relations, which provided concrete benefits for workers and structural changes favourable to the trade union movement. For the workers, the wages cut in the depression were restored to their per-depression levels, the principle of a minimum basic wage enacted, a 40 hour working week introduced and the level of workers’ accident compensation increased to 66 2/3% of the ordinary weekly wage together with an improved entitlement to compensation. For the unions the system of compulsory arbitration was re-established and a new system of compulsory unionism introduced. As a consequence thousands of previously unorganised workers were incorporated into existing unions or formed into entirely new trade unions. The effect was to transform the union movement. Henceforth the once dominant group of active militant unions, such as the seamen, the miners and the watersiders, would have to share some of their power within the labour movement with much larger but industrially less active unions, such as the now greatly expanded Clerical Workers’ Union. These unions possessed the large blocs of votes which were to become increasingly important within the Labour Party and the FOL, but while they were rich in votes and in financial resources they were poor in union consciousness and activism.

The union movement was also strengthened in its industrial work by several further legal changes enacted by the government. Under the 1936 Statutes Amendment Act the right of workers to join a trade union was extended to those employed by local authorities. The IC & A Amendment Act extended the length of time in which action could be initiated for the recovery of wages from six to twelve months while the 1937 IC & A

1. Finance Act (NZ Statutes No. 16 1936 p176)
2. Industrial Conciliation & Arbitration Amdt Act (NZ Statutes No. 6 1936 p74.)
3. Ibid
4. Workers Compensation Act (NZ Statutes No. 45 1936 p442)
5. IC & A Amdt Act op cit
6. Ibid
7. Statutes Amdt Act (NZ Statutes No. 58 1936 p634)
8. IC & A Amdt Act op cit
Amendment Act (No 2) introduced the principle of the “common rule” for citing employers to an award. Once a majority of an industry's employers in a particular district became parties to an award, all employers were subsequently bound, thus removing the difficulties encountered by unions such as the CHWU in locating and citing each and every employer in a district. The government also amended the Shops & Offices Act to extend legal protection to all boarding houses and private hotels, and expanded the definition of a restaurant to include a hotel with more than five boarders.

All these changes were beneficial to the CHWU and its members, but foremost amongst the advances of 1936 was the securing of the 40 hour week. Traditionally, domestic workers had been forced to work longer hours per week than most other workers and the new legislation of the Labour government enabled them to reduce their weekly hours from 48 to 44 or 40. Labour’s amendment to the IC & A Act had empowered the Arbitration Court to set the maximum working week at 40 hours in all awards, except where it was specifically shown to be impracticable for that particular industry in which case the week would be set at a maximum of 44 hours. The HWF first sought a 44 hour week for the licensed hotels when it held award negotiations with the LVA in April 1936. This it secured, (although the government had not as yet enacted the new 40 hour week legislation) and in August it applied to the Court and obtained a 40 hour week. However the union was not so successful in the tearooms and private hotel sectors. When the application was made to the Arbitration Court, under the new legislation, the court was only prepared to set the maximum at 44 hours per week. The court agreed with the employers that a 40 hour week, a cut of eight hours, would be impracticable for their businesses, which had already incurred the extra financial costs of the 1936 award round with its increased wage rates. While the more profitable licensed hotels could afford the extra costs of a shorter week the court believed the burden would be too great for the other two sectors. As had been a common occurrence since the struggle for a weekly holiday in the early years

1 IC & A Amdt Act No. 2 (NZ Statutes No. 10 1937 p39)
2 Shops & Offices Amdt Act (NZ Statutes No. 11 1936 p121)
3 The five boarders figure followed the decision of the Arbitration Court in 1932 see Chapter 2.
4 B. Aw. XXXVI (1936) p1039
5 Ibid p435
6 Ibid p835 (Private Hotels); p1055 (Tearooms)
of the twentieth century, the domestic workers had once again been
treated as a special case undeserving of the 40 hour week principle that
was a right for most other workers. Although those in the licensed hotels
had finally achieved parity with industrial workers, it was not until after
World War Two that the 40 hour week was finally gained for all the workers
represented by the CHWU.

The introduction by the Labour government of the principle of a minimum
wage also led to problems for the CHWU. While it supported the concept,
the union along with the Alliance of Labour, was concerned as to the actual
levels set by the Arbitration Court. For although the government had
enacted the principle it had delegated to the court the power to set the
actual rate of the minimum wage. Under the Act the level was to be
that which would be "sufficient to maintain a man, his wife and three
children in a fair and reasonable standard of comfort." 1 The court's
decision in 1936 provided for a minimum wage for males of £3-16
per week, and for females a wage of £1-16 per week,
representing 47% of the full male rate. 2 The CHWU and the Alliance
were displeased, believing that both the full rate for males was too low,
and that the female wage rate should have been set at least at 57%
rather than 47%. 3 The specific concern of the CHWU lay with the implications
of the female rate for its members in the tearooms and private hotels. These
workers were currently receiving a level of remuneration, including free
board and/or lodgings in addition to their cash wage, substantially above
the court's minimum level and the union feared that setting the female
rate at 47% would lead to pressure from the employers for lower wages.
The Alliance made representations to the government urging it to intervene
and set the minimum wage rates itself. While such intervention did not
eventuate, the Minister of Labour, H. T. Armstrong, did alleviate the fears
of the CHWU by assuring the union that no subsequent reductions would
occur in the wages of its female members. 4 This was to prove correct
and the union was able to preserve and in later years advance the wage
rates of women workers.

1 IC & A Amdt Act op cit
2 B Aw XXXVI (1936) p715.
3 Report on Basic Wage Case in CHW E Min 1936 p274
4 Ibid
The first award to be negotiated under the new government was that for the licensed hotels in April 1936. Negotiations took place in an environment favourable to the unions. The Labour government had already made it clear that it intended to introduce a 40 hour week, raise the level of wages, restore compulsory arbitration and reflate the economy. With the licensed trade gaining considerable benefit from the government's stimulation of the economy the LVA was prepared to agree to the main demands of the HWF, realising at the same time that it would soon be forced by legislation to accept such changes. Thus wage rates were restored by the new award to their 1929 level, an increase of 7 to 8%, and the weekly hours of work lowered from 48 to 40. Nevertheless, the HWF had achieved these gains in advance of the legislation thus providing an earlier benefit than would otherwise have been possible. Moreover, as the actual 1935 award was not due to expire until 1937, its early renegotiation in 1936 represented a tactical coup by the HWF.

In the course of the next two years further gains were made by the union for workers in licensed hotels. In 1937 an informal agreement was reached between the federation and the LVA to extend the entitlement of workers to the 'dry wage'. The 'dry wage' was the weekly cash wage together with the cash value of the board and lodgings allowances. Traditionally, where the employer provided suitable board and lodging the worker was required to live on the premises, unless they were married in which case they could elect to live away from the hotel and be paid the 'dry wage'. Now, in 1937, single barmen and other single males outside of the kitchen — except for night porters — could choose to receive the dry wage provided they lived in one of the four main centres.

In the new award round of 1938 the CHWU, as with the trade union movement as a whole, achieved a substantial rise in real wages. The year 1938 marked a peak in the level of real wages for New Zealand's workers and in the course of the next ten years they would fall slightly in value. It was not until the end of the 1940's that the peak of 1938 would be exceeded. As to the specific case of the hotel and restaurant workers, the 1938 award brought a general rise in wage rates

1 B_Aw XXXVI (1936) p1039
2 Indeed a validating provision s39 had to be placed in the 1936 Statutes Amdt Act.
3 CHW AR 1937 p2
4 see Baker op cit p587
of between 4 and 5% with larger gains being made by the kitchenhands.\(^1\) These low paid workers received an additional 12/6 per week, an increase of 26.3%, on their cash wage. Annual holidays were increased by an extra day to eight days while improved payments were secured for uniform and laundry expenses. Finally, the right of single males outside of the kitchen to choose the 'dry wage' was extended to those in towns with a population of 5,000 or more.

As in the past the benefits gained by the key Licensed Hotels Award in both 1936 and in 1938 generally flowed on to the tearooms and private hotel sectors. The Arbitration Court supported the re-establishment of the wage relativities between the three sectors that had existed prior to the depression, and the awards in 1936 and 1938 showed a similar rise in wages to that of the licensed hotels.\(^2\) Two important differences did exist however. First, the hours of work in the tearooms and private hotels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3.1 LICENSED HOTEL AWARD, 1935 TO 1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages : Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 8+hk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 6hk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 4hk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4hk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add board &amp; lodging(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages : Casual per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef (1st 3 days)(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand (1st 3 days)(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman (1st 3 days)(^3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: [see Note on Tables]

1 The 1935 Award already represented a 7% to 8% rise from the depression wage level.
2 Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid
3 Thereafter at pro rata of ordinary rate
4 £1-10 in 3 or more handed kitchen
1 B Aw XXXVIII (1938) p3779
2 Ibid p2853 & p3019
were now four hours longer than those in the licensed hotels. Secondly, the wage rates for kitchen workers in tearooms and private hotels continued to distinguish between male and female workers, with the rate for the latter remaining significantly below that for men. While female kitchenhands in the licensed hotels benefitted from an increase of 12/6 in the 1938 award, their counterparts in tearooms and private hotels received only an extra 2/6 per week, leaving them at a wage of 19/6, below that received by men and women in the licensed hotels.

Despite the problems in these sectors, the union had nevertheless made substantial progress in the course of only three years. Its largest group of workers, those in the licensed hotels, now worked eight hours less per week than they had in 1935 for a cash wage that was 20% higher for barstaff, 13% more for kitchenhands and 18% or more for cooks. Besides advancing the interests of its existing membership the CHWU had also expanded its coverage to previously unorganised groups of domestic workers, most notably those in the public hospitals and chartered clubs.

**TABLE 3.2 TEAROOMS AWARD 1934 TO 1938**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1934 (Canterbury)</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weekly hours</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wages : Weekly</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cook 6+hk</td>
<td>4-0/6</td>
<td>4-14</td>
<td>4-16/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Cook 4hk</td>
<td>3-10</td>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>4-3/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Cook 4hk</td>
<td>2-10</td>
<td>2-13/6</td>
<td>2-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>1-19</td>
<td>2-1/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>1-15</td>
<td>1-17/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add Meal allowance</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>12s</td>
<td>11 or 12s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wages : Casual per day</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st cook (1st 3 days)</td>
<td>15s(M) 12/6(F)</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>1 to 1-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress (1st 3 days)</td>
<td>10s</td>
<td>12/6</td>
<td>15s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** (see Note on Tables)

1 Local award
2 Two substantial meals provided each working day or cash value paid
3 Thereafter at the pro rata of the ordinary weekly rate.
4 £1-10 in three or more handed kitchen.
2. ORGANISING THE HOSPITALS

Until 1938 virtually all domestic workers in hospitals remained unprotected by union coverage. In Canterbury, discussions had occurred in the past as to the poor wages and conditions under which these domestic workers were required to work. Prior to the First World War and again in the 1920’s the CTLC had discussed the issue and representations had been made to the North Canterbury Hospital Board.¹ In 1926 the then president of the CHWU, E. G. East, had raised the problems being experienced by domestic workers at the Bottle Lake Hospital at a meeting of the union’s executive.² For the CHWU the priority was to organise those workers within the hotel and restaurant industry rather than to commence a battle on a new front. Much remained to be achieved for its current members and any new initiative faced the legal barrier of the IC & A Act. Under its provisions workers employed by local authorities and public bodies were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Act. With either the Reform or United parties holding government office there was little prospect of the Act being amended to permit a union to organise such workers and obtain an award from the Arbitration Court.

With the advent of a Labour government in 1935 the political and legal situation was transformed. The Statutes Amendment Act of 1936 removed the restrictions of the IC & A Act enabling the Arbitration Court to issue awards in respect of local authorities and public bodies.³ Secondly, the introduction of compulsory unionism necessitated the provision of union coverage, but it was not a hotel workers’ union that was the first to act. In 1937 the Wellington Cleaners Union obtained an award covering male porters and orderlies at Wellington Hospital.⁴ Meanwhile in Auckland a group of domestic hospital workers had applied to the government for the registration of a separate hospital-based union. While the Minister of Health P. Fraser, did express support for the concept of one union embracing all hospital workers, including domestic staff and nurses, H. T. Armstrong, the Minister of Labour and the FOL successfully supported coverage by the

¹ CTLC Min 17 Jul, 29 Jul 1905; 24 Mar 1906; 19 Oct 1907; 14 Feb 1920
² CHW E Min 13 Sep 1926 p36
³ Statutes Ammdt Act op cit
⁴ B_Aw_XXXVII (1937) p2219
HWF for all domestic hospital workers, Securing the support of the FOL and of the government not only reflected the merits of the claim by the HWF for coverage, but also the personal and political influence that both Young, the federation secretary, and Brooks, possessed within the labour movement.

With their right to organise the hospital workers now secure, the HWF decided that the major unions, Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago, would each negotiate their own local agreements according to the particular problems of their region. The first development in Canterbury, had been the enthusiasm shown by hospital workers to join the CHWU. Some 77 workers had signed to join the union, but because the union’s rules had not yet been amended to encompass domestic hospital workers their membership had to be suspended. In the meantime the union took the first steps towards creating a local agreement by investigating the existing conditions of work and the operation of the workplace. A special meeting of hospital workers was held on March 23 1938 at which Brooks discussed with the staff their existing hours, wages, conditions and duties. The discussion revealed several problems such as long hours, poor pay and inadequate staff facilities. There was also variation between hospitals, with some such as Christchurch Public Hospital generally having superior conditions. For instance while domestic workers at the Public Hospital received 10 days annual holiday per year, those at Bottle Lake were only paid for five days. Hours between institutions also varied with the staff at the Sanatorium working a 48 hour week while those at the Nursing Home were employed for 45 hours per week. The meeting also identified other anomalies such as the lack of any special allowance at the Fresh Air Home for domestic staff working under dangerous conditions. The workers present empowered Brooks to negotiate an agreement on behalf of the domestic hospital employees on the basis of the new agreement negotiated in Auckland.

1 HWF Circular 8 Nov 1937 in CHW E Min; FL 1 no. 11 1938 p3
2 HWF Circular op cit
3 CHW Min 19 Jul 1937
4 CHW Min 23 Mar 1938
5 Ibid
6 Ibid
Now with a clear understanding of the workplace and with the backing of the domestic staff, the CHWU proceeded to the negotiation of an industrial agreement. The AHWU had already negotiated an agreement for its district and after discussions with the other hotel workers' unions, the decision was made to enter into a multi-district agreement for the rest of New Zealand. Negotiations were begun with the Hospital Boards' Association and in 1938 a settlement was reached. The agreement while slightly inferior in terms of wages to that in Auckland did, nevertheless, constitute an important first step for Canterbury's workers.\(^1\) Wages and hours varied with the hospitals bed capacity and type. For instance, the large Wellington Public Hospital received the highest schedule of wages and a 40 hour week. Christchurch Public Hospital together with the other major provincial hospitals received the next highest schedule of wages and a 42 hour week. For the rural hospitals, maternity homes and specialist institutions, such as the two sanatoria in Christchurch, the hours were longer and the wage rates slightly lower. Although a 44 hour week was the maximum number of hours, hospitals could average the maximum over two or even four weeks, so that in any one week 50 hours might be worked without any payment for overtime.\(^2\) The wage rates for male domestic workers were standard throughout, and as with the kitchens in the union's other awards, the pay rates for cooks varied with the size of the kitchen's operation. Kitchenhands and maids, however, whose duties were not affected by the hospital's size, nevertheless received a lower rate at the other institutions in comparison to Wellington. The better conditions of the larger hospitals reflected the larger resources of the major boards and the union's inability for the moment to raise the conditions in the smaller and rural institutions up to an equivalent level. In particular, the longer hours were a consequence of the smaller staffing establishments of these hospitals and their inability to pay for either more staff or incur the costs of overtime. The achievement of standardised hours and wages was a task that would remain incomplete until the late 1940's having been interrupted by the advent of the Second World War.

\(^1\) see Agreement (dated 31 Aug 1938) in CHW E Min 15 Nov 1937

\(^2\) Agreement op cit
3. NEW DEPARTURES: CHARTERED CLUBS AND TOURISM

While the hospitals had represented the major area of expanded responsibility for the CHWU, the union had also increased its coverage to include chartered clubs, non-pecuniary institutions such as the YWCA and golf clubs, and government establishments including tourist hotels and hostels. Attempts had been made by the CHWU and other hotel worker’s unions to secure protection for chartered club workers since prior to World War One.\(^1\)

The Arbitration Court had declined to issue any award, exercising the discretion it held under the IC & A Act in respect of non-pecuniary institutions such as chartered clubs.\(^2\) There the issue rested, despite some subsequent efforts by the unions,\(^3\) until the election of the Labour government. In 1937 the government amended the IC & A Act to enable an award to be negotiated by the HWF. The agreement reached in October 1938 provided for a 44 hour week with wage rates comparable to the private hotels but less than those in the licensed hotels. Chartered club workers did, however, receive a two week annual holiday, longer than that for any other members of the HWF.\(^4\)

As had occurred with the chartered clubs the Labour government removed the barriers to union coverage of the government’s tourist hotels. Under the 1938 Licensed Hotel Award wages and conditions were extended to these institutions, except that special provisions were made in the award to meet the dual problems of the isolation of the hotels from the cities and the special demands of seasonal work.\(^5\) For instance, at The Hermitage free travel was provided for workers between the hotel and Timaru while staff could be employed for up to 48 hours in any one week, consisting of six 8-hour days, without incurring any overtime payments provided they received compensatory holidays.\(^6\) Despite these provisions the CHWU had to deal with an array of disputes concerning The Hermitage, covering overtime, weekend pay and travel costs. The claims were generally resolved to the union’s satisfaction but the problems tended to reoccur and the CHWU made representations to the government and the head office of the Tourist Department.\(^7\) As a consequence, the department replaced its manager at

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1. eg Select Committee on Shops & Offices Act AJHR 5 1 9a (1913) p38
2. see Beveridge (1914) 17 GLR 95; CHW E Min 14 Dec 1908 pp51-2
3. In 1930 a union delegation requested the government to extend coverage to chartered clubs. CHW E Min 27 Jan 1930 p146
4. Agreement (dated 23 Aug 1938) in CHW E Min
5. B Aw XXXVIII (1938) p3779
6. Ibid
7. CHW Min 14 Mar 1938
The Hermitage, while the union moved to improve its level of contact with the many itinerant workers who sought work at The Hermitage and in other tourist hotels.¹

Yet the activities of the CHWU in the field of tourism were not confined to the question of industrial relations. A close association between the union and the Labour government led to its participation in the government’s schemes to promote tourist development in the late 1930’s. In particular the CHWU became involved in the Group Travel concept introduced in 1939 by the Minister of Internal Affairs, W. E. Parry. Group Travel was intended to provide low cost travel for New Zealand workers within their own country and to reduce the problems of seasonal lows in tourist hotel occupancy.² The CHWU fully supported the scheme and Brooks was appointed as secretary of the South Island Group Travel Association, which represented the various organisations with an interest in tourism.³ The Association was successful in promoting and organising several group schemes and the increased numbers of tourists that it generated benefitted the CHWU by providing more work for hotel workers particularly in the off-season.⁴ The advent of World War Two interrupted the progress of the tourist industry and it was not until the war’s end that development was recommenced.

4. ENFORCEMENT IN THE COURTS AND AT THE WORKPLACE
Under the Labour government the CHWU was able to pursue a more vigorous policy towards the enforcement of its awards. The union was financially secure and confident of support from other members of the labour movement as well as sympathetic support from the government. It was in this assertive mood that the CHWU challenged not only individual employers but the actions of the courts, and of government departments. In an industry where legal enforcement played an important role in the protection of its members interests, deficiencies in the courts or the Department of Labour constituted serious problems.

¹ CHW Min 14 Mar 1938
² FL 1 No. 5 1938 p5; CHW E Min 8 May 1938 (Group Travel Conference)
³ CHW E Min 8 May 1938
⁴ Ibid
The first difficulty experienced by the union lay with the leniency shown by magistrates in fining employers for award violations. While the maximum legal penalty for a particular offence might be £100, the Labour Department would recommend a mere £10 and the magistrate impose a Lilliputian fine of only 10/-. In one case the union became especially incensed, when a 17 year old worker, with no legal counsel present, received a fine of £2 for failing to claim overtime, while the employer escaped with a penalty of only 5/-. 1 The Labour Department had recommended fines of £2 and £10 respectively. Such experiences, the union soon realised, were not confined to Canterbury, having been made aware of similar difficulties with the magistracy in other industrial districts. 2

Little however could be done.

A second area of difficulty arose for the CHWU from the inertia of the Christchurch office of the Labour Department in dealing with violations of CHWU awards. In several instances a breach of the award was shown to have occurred, but the department either declined to act or was dilatory in its proceedings. 3 Ironically, the officer-in-charge of the Christchurch office was R. T. Bailey, the founding secretary of the CHWU. (See Chapter 1). Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction with the department’s operations was such that the union decided to initiate its own legal proceedings in selected cases without recourse to the Labour Department. At the same time it met with the Minister of Labour and head office officials of the department to express its concerns. A temporary improvement in local enforcement resulted from these discussions but, by October 1939, the CHWU was once again dissatisfied with the Christchurch office. The CHWU executive expressed its lack of faith in Bailey as a fair and unbiased officer and requested the Minister of Labour to remove from Bailey his responsibility for award enforcement in the hotel industry and to initiate an enquiry into the department’s operation in Christchurch. 4 Bailey remained in the Christchurch office until his retirement in 1944, but in the meantime, beginning in January 1940, the union had initiated a new policy of dealing directly with all complaints instead of sharing the responsibility with the Labour Department. 5

1 CHW AR 1937-8 p4
2 FL 3 no 10 1940 p3
3 CHW E Min 15 Aug 1938
4 CHW E Min 18 Oct 1939; Min 30 Dec 1939
5 CHW Min 30 Dec 1939
In 1939 the union encountered a further problem with the courts, which threatened to remove or to reduce the scope of its award coverage. A series of cases arose in the course of that year involving workers who performed a variety of duties only some of which clearly came within the boundaries of the CHWU's awards. For instance, in the Perry case a worker was employed as a housekeeper/supervisor, spending some of her time on domestic duties covered by the Licensed Hotel Award but the remainder of her work was outside the award. While in the so-called milk-bar cases, the shop-assistants operated milk-shake machines which fell within the Tearooms Award but were otherwise employed as shop workers. In the Perry case the magistrate ruled against coverage by the CHWU's award, while in the milk-bar cases one magistrate had ruled in favour of the CHWU and the other against.

For the CHWU, as for the other hotel workers' unions, the decisions of the courts had important implications for union coverage. On behalf of the CHWU, the HWF appealed to the Arbitration Court against the two decisions which had rejected coverage. At the centre of the court's consideration was the applicability of the doctrine of substantial employment. While the magistrates had tended to give the doctrine a generous interpretation, deciding that the award did not apply as only a small proportion of the worker's duties fell under the CHWU's awards, the Arbitration Court took the opposite view. Justice Callan ruled that the doctrine could only be applied in very limited circumstances. In the Perry case two distinct jobs were being performed by the housekeeper/supervisor, and the first of these that of housekeeping, clearly fell within the Licensed Hotel Award and thus coverage by the CHWU. Similarly, Justice Callan stated that as the essentials of a milk-bar were present in the other cases then the Tearooms Award was to be enforced.

With this victory in the Arbitration Court, the union was then surprised to learn of the decision of the Supreme Court in a case involving the identical issue of substantial employment. While the case arose in a different industry, the Supreme Court made it clear that the doctrine of substantial employment

1 B _Aw_ XXXIX (1939) p1265
2 Ibid p1340
3 Ibid p1265
was to be given a generous interpretation and that it disagreed with Justice Callan's decision. The Supreme Court's decision alarmed the union, not only because of the effect on award coverage but also because of the extent of authority now claimed by the Supreme Court to overrule Arbitration Court decisions. The former possessed such power in respect of wage claims and in conflicts over jurisdiction. While this particular case was related to a wage claim the central question was one of industrial law; a question which was the responsibility of the Arbitration Court where it had already been ruled upon by Justice Callan.

In response to this new development, the HWF together with the Federation of Labour made representations to the Labour government in an attempt to amend the law and re-establish the clear authority of the Arbitration Court. The government was slow to act on the issue and in 1942 another employer successfully appealed to the Supreme Court on the issue of substantial employment. Once again the court gave a generous interpretation to the principle of substantial employment and reiterated that it had no intention of being subordinate to the Arbitration Court on any claims involving wages. In 1943, after further problems between the Supreme Court and other trade unionists, the government amended the I.C. & A Act, to grant the Arbitration Court final authority over all wage claims relating to breach of an award, thus removing the problem.

In the course of these difficulties with the judiciary the union continued to go about its daily business of resolving problems at the workplace. The disputes continued to be small in scale but nevertheless numerous and on occasion complex. Generally they were resolved through action by the union's officials who, once aware of the circumstances of the case, would confront the employer and persuade them to meet their legal

1. \textit{B Aw XL} (1940) p1185
2. \textit{EL} 3 no. 12 pp15-20
3. CHW E Min 15 Jul 1940
4. \textit{B Aw} 1943 (1943) p17. Decision on 17 Feb 1942
5. I.C & A Amdt Act (NZ Statutes No 25 1943 p256)
obligations. These disputes were not the material for dramatic headlines but an extract from an organising report in 1944 for South Canterbury demonstrate something of the reality of the union’s work.

Waimate Hotel: Non-union staff being employed and no staff list kept.
Ideal Milk Bar: Proportionate holiday allowances not being paid nor wages in lieu of notice.
Zenith Milk Bar: Failure to provide an allowance in lieu of meals.
Empire Hotel: Wages in arrears and overtime not paid.
Commercial Hotel: Non-union staff being employed as casuals.
Gladstone Hotel: Overtime not paid.
The Hermitage: Problems with accumulated holiday pay.  

Overall both the volume and the monetary value of claims handled by the union rose rapidly between 1935 and 1937 before levelling out and declining in the course of the war years. The union’s industrial work was marked by a sense of pride and commitment to its members welfare and by a continuing emphasis on efficiency and ‘scientifically controlled office systems’. Between Brooks and the union’s two organiser-collectors regular contact was maintained with city and provincial workers while the tasks of award negotiation and liaison with the government and the labour movement rested largely with Brooks.

5. BEER AND THE UNION

While the CHWU was engaged in these industrial activities the liquor industry was experiencing its own problems on the eve of World War Two. This time the threat came neither from prohibition nor from a depressed economy. The licensing polls of 1935 and 1938 had both shown a majority of more than two to one in favour of continuance, while the trade had prospered since the depression under the Labour government’s

1 CHW E Min 14 Feb 1944 p135  
2 CHW ARs 1935 to 1944  
3 CHW AR 1936-7 p17  
4 NZ Official Yearbook (Wellington: Dept of Statistics, 1949) p787
réflation of the economy. The new problem was taxation and the effect it had on the price of beer, an item traditionally sensitive amongst trade unionists. In the 1939 budget the Labour government levied an extra tax of 6d per gallon on the wholesale price of beer and followed this a few weeks later with a further tax of 3d together with a 15% levy on wines and spirits as part of its emergency war measures. The breweries proceeded to pass the full increase in price on to the publicans and they in turn raised their price to the public.

In response to the rise in beer prices the Communist Party, together with several trade union branches, initiated a boycott of beer, demanding that the brewery companies absorb the tax increases. While the boycott was short-lived and largely confined to Auckland it did prompt the government’s Price Investigation Tribunal to review the rises in price. As a result the Tribunal decided on a new rate which provided for more than three-quarters of the tax to be passed on to the consumer but did provide for a proportion to be absorbed by the breweries and the publicans.

The public agitation, and the agitation within the labour movement, generated by the boycott raised special problems for the hotel workers’ unions. On the one hand if the liquor trade was forced to absorb substantial tax increases then the ability of the unions to extract higher wages was reduced. Conversely, to support a higher price for beer would tend to alienate many other trade unionists. While the problem of wage rises leading to price increases existed in other sectors, the price of beer was traditionally especially sensitive to workers and the companies that manufactured it were commonly perceived — with good reason — as the archetypical profiteering capitalists. Moreover, there was the suspicion surrounding Young (the HWF secretary) and his close personal associations with Sir Ernest Davies, the managing director of New Zealand Breweries.

1 'Beer Boycott Supplement' FL 3 No. 1 1939
2 Ibid
3 Royal Commission on Licensing Report (Wellington: Gvt Printer, 1946)
4 see Lee Mine is the Kingdom op cit
Supporters of the boycott alleged he was a friend of the breweries placing their interests before those of the workers while Young charged his opponents with ulterior motives. The net result of charge and counter-charge was to further harden the antagonism between Young and the left-wing of the labour movement, although the CHWU retained a distance from the conflict. Problems over the relationship between the liquor trade and the HWF would occur again in 1942 and 1947 (see Chapter 4) but for the moment they represented just one more element in the growing conflict in the labour movement.

6. THE CHWU AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

Close and productive relations characterised the association between the CHWU and the Labour government between 1935 and 1944. The antagonism in 1934 and 1935 between the union and the Labour Party had proved to be an aberration and with the party's election to government office the union entered into a new period in which it played a loyal and active part in the rule of the Labour government. Both Young and Brooks came to occupy several important positions within the labour movement and together they acquired considerable power and influence. Brooks became the secretary of the new Canterbury Trades Council in 1937; was elected a member of the National Executive of the FOL and in the course of the war became a member of the government's Industrial Emergency Council. Young's influence was even greater with his membership of the FOL's National Executive, a term as president of the Auckland Trades Council, the secretaryship of both the HWF and the AHWU and an active player in the politics of the Auckland LRC. Indeed, Young emerged as one of the five most powerful union leaders of the era of the Labour government and proved himself to be a skilled, ruthless and ambitious leader. Brooks, on the other hand, retained a certain distance from the internal political machinations amongst the leadership of the labour movement remaining essentially concerned with the interests

1. 'Beer Boycott Supplement' op cit
2. CHW Min 19 Jul 1937 (Quarterly Rep) He resigned in 1938 (CHW E Min 25 Jul 1938) but was re-elected in 1940 (CTC E Min 25 Apr 1940) continuing until the end of 1942.
3. CTC E Min 25 Apr 1940
4. see Lee Mine is the kingdom op cit. In Lee's view Young was second only to Walsh as the most corrupt individual in NZ politics in the twentieth century p137
of the CHWU's members. Nevertheless, the CHWU and HWF did secure political leverage and political allies within the government and the FOL, and, in particular, a close relationship developed with Fintan Patrick Walsh.

From the 1930's until his death in 1963 as the then president of the FOL, Walsh was the dark colossus of the labour movement possessing a power that few dared to challenge. For the hotel workers he proved to be a valuable ally. In the depression he had acted as an advocate for the HWF in award negotiations as well as organising the selective boycott of licensed hotels in support of the union's position.\(^1\) In 1936 Walsh had given Brooks his personal assistance in dealing with a recalcitrant employer\(^2\) while he had also assisted Young with the reorganisation of the Wellington Hotel Workers Union in 1938.\(^3\) This pattern of cooperation between Walsh and the HWF continued in the 1940's and the combined power of Walsh and Young gave the hotel workers considerable leverage in advancing their interests.

Aside from holding an influential position in the labour movement the CHWU also held a particular political outlook. Essentially its viewpoint was a moderate one. It sought to advance the wages and conditions of its members, support its fellow trade unionists and the programme of the Labour government for the construction of a welfare state. While it did not actively campaign for the radical transformation of New Zealand society into a socialist state, and declined to have any association with the Communist Party, the union did favour greater economic equality and gave its support to several progressive causes. For instance, financial aid was sent to the Spanish Republicans in the course of the 1930's\(^4\) and for relief workers in China.\(^5\) Similarly the union was aware of the experiences of workers elsewhere in the world including those in hotels and restaurants,\(^6\) and besides the assistance it gave to trade unionists within New Zealand,\(^7\) it sent

1. 'Beer Boycott Supplement' op cit
2. Walsh to McDonald (hotelkeeper) 11 Jan 1936 RP D242
3. CHW E Min 9 May 1938
4. CHW E Min 7 Jun 1937 p299
5. CHW E Min 20 Dec 1937 p331; 24 Jul 1939
6. CHW E Min 27 Oct 1936 p269
7. eg Dental assistants CHW Min 19 Jul 1937; Domestic servants E Min 8 Jun 1936 p250
a donation to striking iron workers in New South Wales in 1938.\(^1\)

Within the HWF the first six years of the Labour government witnessed a period of close cooperation between the three major unions, Auckland, Wellington and Canterbury. These were confident years as the HWF grew in political and industrial influence, expanded its coverage to new groups of workers and established for itself a firm financial base. Two important organisational questions arose in the period of the late 1930's, the first of which was the proposal for a national union to replace the existing structure of a federation.

The desire for a more centralised structure had emerged in the depression years.\(^2\) Both Young and Brooks became dissatisfied with the perennial disorder and low standards of union organisation that characterised the small unions and believed that a national union would produce more effective and efficient results, than nine separate district unions. Two large unions, Auckland and Wellington covered all of the North Island except for Taranaki where a separate union operated. With six industrial districts in the South Island six independent unions had been created whose total membership was less than that of either Auckland or Wellington and who, except for Canterbury, suffered from poor organisation and a lack of finance. As the IC & A Act prevented the formation of multi-district unions this legal problem persisted until the Labour government amended the Act in 1936.\(^3\)

The approach of the HWF to the creation of a national union fell into two phases. From 1932 to 1936 the federation made a series of visits to the smaller unions which resulted in the reorganisation of their operations on a more efficient basis and the establishment of regular supervision by Young and Brooks.\(^4\) Young took responsibility for the Taranaki and Wellington unions while Brooks became the federation's South Island supervisor. These steps led to an improvement in the situation but each union continued to be a separate legal entity. Nevertheless the

1. CHW Min 14 Mar 1938
2. see CHW AR 1932-3 Mar 1933 p246
3. IC & A Amdt Act op cit
4. see CHW E Min 30 Jan 1933 p99; AR 1933-4 Mar 1934 p354; 27 Aug 1934 p373
intention to create one organisation remained and the prospect of its
realisation was viewed seriously. "We have fully made up our minds",
written Brooks, "to have one big Union of Hotel Workers in New Zealand
and no branch secretary or secretary are going to be allowed to obstruct
us." 1

In September 1936, with the IC & A Act now amended to permit multi-
district unions, the HWF resolved on a formal scheme to unify the country’s
hotel workers. 2 The first stage would see the creation of three large unions,
Auckland, Wellington and a South Island union based in Christchurch.
Once this had been achieved the federation would then consider the formation
of a single national union. Inevitably, convincing the leaders and members of
nine separate unions would take time and the programme for unification
was a cautious one. Although there were no serious political barriers
between the various unions, all of whom supported the Labour Party
and the arbitration system, there was nevertheless opposition to the creation
of a national union. Both the AHWU and WHWU were concerned that the
cost of a national union would be borne largely by themselves but the
benefit would essentially accrue to the smaller unions. 3 The Otago union
was opposed to the loss of its local autonomy and was not prepared to
become part of a South Island union based in Christchurch. 4 While
discussion on the issue continued Brooks had moved to become the
honorary secretary for all of the South Island unions except for Otago.
Each union retained its separate legal entity, its own executive and a
local assistant secretary but Brooks supervised the union’s operation and
presented the annual report. This arrangement proved to be a success but
it was the closest that the HWF came to union amalgamation.

By 1940 it was clear that no national union would be created. 5 Firstly
the necessity for a strong national body had receded with the improvements
that Young and Brooks, together with local workers, had been able to
effect in the district unions. The existing system of a federation had proved

1 CHW AR 1932-3 Mar 1933 p346
2 HWF Min 31 Aug – 4 Sep 1936 pp38-9, 95-7
3 Ibid p35
4 Ibid p96; CHW Min 19 Feb 1937
5 HWF National Emergency Policy Cmte Min 9 May 1940
to be a viable arrangement and the issue of amalgamation shrank in importance in comparison to the more pressing issues of award negotiation. Secondly, Young was satisfied with the power he possessed under the existing arrangement with his dual secretarship of the HWF and the AHWU, the largest and richest union, and showed no desire to press for amalgamation. Finally, the recent experiences of some national unions indicated to Brooks that such a scheme could generate considerable internal problems and that if any further changes in the HWF’s operations were required they could be made within the existing structure. With neither Young nor Brooks advocating a national union the other union leaders were similarly satisfied to retain the existing system. As a consequence the autonomy and importance of the CHWU continued, with Brooks together with Young and the WHWU secretary F. O’Sullivan forming the inner circle of decision making for the HWF. The CHWU did not suffer the fate of several other Canterbury unions who were reduced to branches of new national unions whose central direction lay with officials in Wellington. Rather it was able to develop its own particular approach within Canterbury and play a key role in the national strategy for the industry’s workers.

The creation of a nationwide union magazine was the second important organisational development of the 1930’s. Bearing the title “Flashlight” the first issue of the monthly magazine appeared in August 1937. Young had been the instigator and driving force behind the magazine and had secured sufficient advertising from the liquor industry to finance its publication costs. With the stated aims of improving contact with the federation’s members, raising their level of understanding and protecting the interests of the liquor industry, the magazine published a variety of articles covering award negotiations, industrial disputes, the federation’s conferences and the achievements of the Labour government. A prominent personality of the labour movement featured as the magazine’s cover photo, with Michael Savage on the first issue, Harry Holland on the second with subsequent appearances including Jim Roberts, John A. Lee and ‘Paddy’ Webb. On occasion articles also appeared on wider social and political issues. For instance material appeared on the performance of the Popular

1 Formally they constituted the ‘National Emergency Policy Cmte’ of the HWF but their interaction extended beyond the committee. see CHW AR 1936-7
2 EL 1 no. 1 1937 (see CHW Min 19 Jul 1937)
3 Ibid
4 see EL 1 Nos. 1-8
Front government in France, the contribution of Lenin to the labour movement and the exploitation of auto-workers in the United States employed by Ford. Union leaders and rank-and-file workers were able to learn of the experiences of other workers as well as being informed of the developments and difficulties in their own industry. "Flashlight" continued until July 1940 when it was decided to suspend publication during the war, but a suspension which lasted until 1963.

Besides its importance as an innovation in the HWF's organisational methods, the magazine also serves as an insight into the antagonisms within the labour movement between the Labour Party and the Communists. Initially "Flashlight" made no reference to Communism aside from the one article praising Lenin. By 1939 however, a series of articles were published attacking the Soviet Union and local Communists. Marked by their vitriolic tone the articles reflected the responses of many labour leaders to the reports of the Moscow trials and subsequently the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. More than this they represented wider conflicts within the Labour Party and the trade unions, as Communists sought to increase their activity in local branches. In such a conflict Young, a former Communist was now a bitter opponent of Communism, and the magazine reflected his viewpoint. It was not to be the Communists however, who were to be at the centre of conflict within the Labour Party in 1940. That distinction fell to one John A. Lee, parliamentary under-secretary in the Labour government.

7. THE LEE AFFAIR

The year 1940 witnessed the culmination within the Labour Party of the struggle between Lee and his supporters and the leadership of the party. In part it was a conflict over policy, reflecting differences in the combatant's visions of socialism and their attitudes towards financial reform. In part, it was a conflict over power — power of the caucus in relation to the cabinet and the power of the parliamentarians in relation to the leaders of the trade unions. Finally, it was also in part a struggle between strong, self-willed

1 FL 1 No. 3 1937 p13; No. 4 pp13 & 15
2 FL 3 No. 2 1939 p5; No. 3 pp3 & 21; No. 8 1940 p5; No. 9 p21.
3 The Press Christchurch 16 Feb 1939 p12 (Communists & General Labourers Union).
5 see E. Olssen John A. Lee (Dunedin: Univ. of Otago Press, 1977) p146
and ambitious men. By the conflict’s culmination these three elements had become fused, and for many it was impossible to distinguish between the question ‘which road does the party now take’ and the personalities that were advocating the alternative routes. While the battle was always more than the disciplining of an individual, the issue of policy could never relegate Lee’s character and actions to the incidental.

Since the election of the Labour government in 1935, Lee had become embroiled with Savage and other party leaders such as Nash over the conservative drift in the government’s policy in several areas but in particular in relation to financial reform. Moreover, his failure to receive a cabinet appointment, when others clearly less able were so rewarded, together with the authoritarian attitude that Savage showed towards the caucus, further increased Lee’s hostility towards the party’s leaders and their policies. The party leadership similarly became increasingly resentful of Lee and his supporters and their continuing agitation for changes in the party’s policies.

By June 1939 the forces within the labour movement opposed to Lee had begun to organise for a decisive battle, that would eliminate the agitation along with the agitators.¹ The leaders of the anti-Lee group were key trade unionists and officials within the Labour Party. F. P. Walsh, L. Glover, the HWF secretary F. Young together with J. Roberts who was now also president of the party, constituted the powerful trade union element in this alliance.² They were powerful both as a group of skilled and determined individuals and as officials who controlled a large bloc of votes within the party. Inside the party D. Wilson and M. Moohan, respectively the secretary and deputy secretary, were the chief organisers of the anti-Lee campaign. The antagonism between Young and Lee was a conflict that dated back to the early 1930’s. Both were determined and ambitious individuals who disliked the methods and the views expounded by the other and neither was prepared to surrender a centimetre of ground to the other. Lee saw Young as a corrupt and ambitious official motivated by a desire for power and not by principle.³

¹. see CHW E Min 26 Jun 1939
². Olssen pp151-2
³. see Lee Mine is the Kingdom op cit; Lee Diaries op cit
To Young, Lee was a dangerous egotist whose views and actions threatened the party and who gathered support from ‘Trouble-making Communists placesseekers and money cranks.’

With Young playing a leading role in the anti-Lee campaign it was inevitable that the CHWU would become embroiled in the conflict. The union’s politics tended towards the middle stream of the labour movement and Lee’s views exerted little attraction. More significantly however, Brooks placed loyalty to the labour movement as one of his highest values. Lee’s attacks on the party leadership and his dislike for party discipline were not characteristics that endeared themselves to Brooks. In addition Lee’s low opinion of the value of the trade union movement was not one likely to win trade unionists as supporters and given the organisational links between Young and Brooks in the form of the HWF, it was understandable that the CHWU found themselves against Lee. While Brooks was not a leader in the campaign as he was aware of the plan, contributed to the discussion and ultimately provided the votes of the CHWU for Lee’s expulsion.

While the campaign against Lee was recruiting further supporters Lee obligingly provided his opponents with the ammunition for his execution. In his article ‘Psycho-Pathology in Politics’ Lee attacked those politicians no longer mentally capable of leadership, but who persisted in retaining power with disastrous effect on their own political movements. While never named it was implied Savage was a present instance of the phenomenon. The article’s publication enabled Lee’s opponents to define the issue as an attempt by an ambitious Lee striving to destroy the beloved leader of the party. For many party members, it provided a stark choice. On 10 January at the Auckland LRC Young initiated the first battle in the final phase in the anti-Lee campaign. Young’s motion, which had been drafted by Walsh, sought to censure Lee for his article on Savage but Lee’s allies were able to turn the attack. They amended the motion to one expressing confidence in both Savage and Lee and were able to persuade a majority

1 E.L. 3 No. 9 1940 p3; No. 12 p3.
2 see J. A. Lee Socialism in New Zealand (London: T. Werner Laurie, 1939) pp260-1, 265.
3 “Psycho-Pathology in Politics” Tomorrow 6 Dec 1939 p75
4 Olssen p152; see The Press 15 Jan 1940 p6
of the LRC to pass the amended motion. With this defeat in Auckland the arena of conflict shifted south to the National Executive of the Labour Party. Instead of expelling Lee a temporary political compromise was reached with Lee agreeing to submit future political articles for the executive’s approval and to apologise to Savage.

The truce in the conflict endured until March 1940, when Lee decided to break the agreement on submitting political articles. Censorship was not a solution that could have lasted and when Lee did decide to act he believed that he could win the battle that would inevitably follow at the party’s annual conference. His confidence proved to be mistaken. Lee’s opponents were able to control the conference’s handling of the issue and with the introduction of card votes and the timely revelation of Savage’s imminent death they secured his expulsion from the party by 546 votes to 344. The HWF provided 40 valuable votes for the expulsion.

Neither before or after Lee’s expulsion were the merits of the issues surrounding the Lee affair debated within the CHWU. Brooks simply explained the issue to his executive as a conflict between politicians where the union’s role was to ensure that the living standards of its members were protected and that the Labour Party remained intact. For Brooks, Lee and his associates, such as D. C. McMillan, A. H. Nordmeyer and W. E. Barnard were ambitious and egotistical individuals unwilling to accept party discipline. He commented,

We have often said . . . that academic men such as Doctors, Lawyers and members of the Clergy do not come into politics for the benefit of the workers but for their own benefit.

1 Olssen pp 153-4
2 Ibid p159
3 Alexander Turnbull Library (Wellington) Walsh Papers M.S. 274 No. 347
4 CHW E Min 8 Jan 1940
5 CHW AR 1939-40 p10
Such a remark said much about the distance between the trade unionists and many politicians. Yet it would be erroneous to portray Brooks as completely antagonistic to both Lee and his political ideas. For while Brooks criticised Lee the man, he invited Clyde Carr the Labour member for Timaru to speak to the Timaru hotel workers. Carr was sympathetic to several of Lee’s views, but was not, said Brooks, a Leeite, as he was loyal to the party.\(^1\) Young’s view on the expulsion was quite unequivocal. “His (Lee’s) exit from the Party... provides a wonderful opportunity of getting rid of elements within the Party which we have all known (it) would be better without.” \(^2\) Young promised prompt action against “those who declined to accept Party discipline.”\(^3\) Discipline became an increasingly common phrase for the labour movement in the 1940’s as it shifted from the construction of a new society, to the management of a war and a war economy.

8. THE WAR ECONOMY

From 1940 until late in 1945 the incomes and working conditions of New Zealand’s workers were shaped by the political and economic decisions made in response to the exigencies of World War Two. It was a period in which the advances of the late 1930’s were preserved but in which no further progress was made. 1940 was the last full round of award negotiations for the CHWU until 1945. By 1940 the union had become responsible for a total of five awards. As well as hotels and tearooms the union now covered large numbers of domestic workers in the public hospitals and in the chartered clubs. Essentially the 1940 award round saw the maintenance by the union of the gains that had been made in 1938 for the licensed hotels, private hotels and tearooms. The peak in real wages of 1938 was maintained through the issue of a General Wage Order of 5% by the Arbitration Court, effective from August 12 1940.\(^4\) This increase compensated workers for the recent rises in prices and was the only change to wage rates in the hotel and tearoom sectors of the industry.

1. CHW Min 23 Jan 1941 Timaru in E Min book pp29-30
2. FL 3 Sep 1940 p21
3. Ibid
4. Baker op cit p280
TABLE 3.3 INTER-AWARD COMPARISON, 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Licensed H.</th>
<th>Private H.</th>
<th>Tearooms</th>
<th>Chartered Clubs</th>
<th>Public Hospitals</th>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>Annual holidays</td>
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<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<th>Wages: Weekly (inc b &amp; l)</th>
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<th>£</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>£</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st cook 4hk</td>
<td>6-11/6</td>
<td>5-13/6</td>
<td>4-13/6</td>
<td>5-10/6</td>
<td>5-16</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4hk</td>
<td>5-0</td>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>5-0</td>
<td>4-8/6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kitchen hand</td>
<td>4-10</td>
<td>3-11/6</td>
<td>2-11/6</td>
<td>4-7/6</td>
<td>3-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>3-6/6</td>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>2-7/6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3-7/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman/Steward</td>
<td>5-5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4-10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter/Orderly</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Wages: Casual per day</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st cook (1st 3 days)</td>
<td>1 to 1-10</td>
<td>1 to 1-10</td>
<td>1 to 1-10</td>
<td>1 to 1-10</td>
<td>P.R. + 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>15s</td>
<td>15s</td>
<td>15s</td>
<td>15s</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (see Note on Tables)
1. Wage rates are prior to GWO of 12/8/40 which increased rates by 5%.
2. Hospital award rates have been reduced by GWO to bring them into an equivalent position with the rest.
3. Hours in Canterbury hospitals. 40 hours in Ak and Wgt cities.
4. Aggregate entitlement
5. Wage rates include cash value of board, lodging, (£1-10 in LH & PH meals of 10s in T; £1.10 in CC)
6. Chck h2prTal
7. Porter in Chch and most hospitals after 1st year's service; 5-2/6 in Ak & Wgt.
8. Thereafter at the ordinary rate.
In the negotiations between the employers and the HWF, both parties were aware of the imminence of a GWO and rather than changing the award rates simply accepted the increase of the Arbitration Court. Overall most trade unionists, including the CHWU, were satisfied with the GWO of 5%, although an extra 1 or 2% would have been preferred.  

In comparing the wages and conditions in each of the union’s five sectors, it was clear that the Licensed Hotel Award continued to provide the best wages and conditions. Most significantly they continued to be the only section where workers had obtained a 40 hour week and where male and female kitchen workers received the same rate of pay for performing the same job. In the two new areas of the public hospitals and the chartered clubs the hours of work and rates of pay continued to be poor even though they represented an advance on the situation prior to their unionisation by the CHWU. Notable among the differences were the lower rates of pay for stewards in the chartered clubs in comparison to the barmen in the licensed hotels, even though the work was almost the same. The margin between wages in the two sectors was, however, reduced in the 1940 round.

With the Arbitration Court having issued its GWO the immediate problem of adjusting wages to meet the increases and prices was resolved. Now the Labour government proceeded to embark upon the creation of a comprehensive economic policy to meet the demands of the war. In September 1940 the government met with the leaders of the trade unions and the employers’ associations in the Economic Stabilization Conference to discuss a wages and prices strategy. While desirous of preserving the standard of living the government’s dominant aim was to minimise any inflationary spiral of price and wage increases. The Conference considered the various problems but it was not until September 1941 that the first of its recommendations were implemented with the stabilization of the prices of 38 essential commodities. While a more comprehensive regime

1. B. Aw XL (1940) p1164. Monteith the worker’s representative on the court favoured 7.5%. There was some concern over increased war taxes which reduced the net wage.
2. Baker p281
3. Ibid p287
of stabilization was being prepared by the new Economic Stabilization Committee, the Arbitration Court granted a further wage increase of 5% effective from April 1942.\(^1\) This increase together with the earlier GWO ensured that the movements in prices and wages since the beginning of the war were approximately equal, and thus the real wages of most of the country's workers had been maintained.\(^2\) Certain workers on higher incomes did not receive a full 5% rise as the GWO only applied to the first £5 per week of the wage for adult males, and £2-10 for females. Few of the CHWU's members however earned sufficiently high wages to be significantly affected by this qualification.

When the Economic Stabilization Emergency Regulations were introduced in 1942 a total of 110 essential items were stabilized at the prices prevailing on 15 December 1942. Wages were stabilized at the award rates current as at November 1942 and indexed linked to a new Wartime Price Index (WPI), comprising housing rental rates and the costs of commodities and services. The Arbitration Court was empowered to adjust wages, initially only if the WPI moved by more than 5%. In practice the government's policy of subsidisation ensured that the WPI moved by less than 5% and therefore the court issued no general order to alter the rates of wages.\(^3\)

The demands generated by the war inevitably led to sacrifices in domestic consumption and in the quality of life. Who was to sacrifice what was, however, an issue requiring political determination. For the Labour government and the leadership of the FOL, the system of economic stabilization was intended to ensure that the war effort would be a success without producing any significant decline in the wages and conditions of workers. They wished to avoid a repetition of the World War One experience where a cut in real wages was imposed upon the working class.\(^4\) The system established by the Labour government strove to maintain production for the war effort and company profits by ensuring that there was a minimum of industrial disturbance. Price stabilization was part of this strategy removing a potential source for industrial disharmony.

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1. Baker p285
2. Ibid Chart 58 p286
3. Ibid p299
4. Retail prices rose by an average of 8% p.a. (See Chapter 1) Brooks and the CHWU executive were aware of this inflation, and believed a conservative government would have repeated it in World War Two.
In addition, the cooperation of the trade unions was secured by the preservation of the hours of work, the levels of real wages and other working conditions largely at their pre-war level. For instance, the Labour government rejected the agitation by employers for an increase in the maximum ordinary hours of work to more than 40 per week, in order to meet production demands without the additional costs of overtime. With labour shortages in several industries overtime substantially increased enabling many workers to receive a rise in their weekly earnings. The increased cost did place pressure on the policy of stabilization but the levels of prices were held down through increased subsidization.

The trade unions played a central role in ensuring that this system of economic stabilization operated successfully. Besides their acceptance of the system, leading trade unionists were active participants in the control mechanisms. Within the government structure an Industrial Emergency Council was established to consider any proposed changes to the conditions of work in response to the requirements of the war. Young and Brooks both served on the council and along with other union leaders they were able to help in the shaping of the government's decisions. This combination of state control and self-discipline proved generally effective in ensuring that particular groups of workers did not violate the policy of wage stabilization and hence disturb the careful balancing of interests under the stabilization regime between workers, employers and the war effort. However, the place of the trade unions in the structure also enabled them to resist the demands of employers, ensuring that when the demands of the war economy did produce a problem the solution was a balanced one that protected the rights of workers.

In the hotel and restaurant industry several individual employers attempted to use the war as a reason to obtain extra work from their staff without proper payment or sought to circumvent other provisions of the awards. Brooks reported instances where an employer had told workers that overtime payments had been removed and that no extra payment was now required for work above the weekly maximum. The problem of labour shortages

1. Baker pp455-6
2. CTC E Min 25 Apr 1940
3. CHW AR 1942-3 Feb 1943
also raised problems in the public hospitals but the union and the North Canterbury Hospital Board (NCHB) were able to reach a satisfactory arrangement for the employment and payment of part-time staff. While retaining its belief in the principle of full time employment, the union recognised the particular labour problems caused by the war and reached a compromise with the NCHB. The only major change in the hotel and restaurant industry to the legal conditions of work was in respect of hours for female staff. Since the First World War women had been legally prohibited from working in a hotel or restaurant after 10.30 p.m. With the development of night time cabarets and more social functions in the late 1930's, employers lobbied the government and the unions to relax this restriction. It was not until 1943 however, that the unions and the employers agreed to a special arrangement permitting an extra hour to be worked after 10.30 p.m., provided that the woman was over 21 years of age, an extra payment of 3/- per week was made and satisfactory transport was provided by the employer to take her home.

Two of the CHWU's awards were renegotiated in the course of the war. In 1942 the Tearooms Award was amended by the parties to include the two GWO's of 1940 and 1942, but more importantly the HWF was able to renegotiate the hospital award to raise the wage rates of domestic staff employed outside of Auckland and Wellington to the levels in those cities. The initiative for the change had come from hospital workers in Canterbury. A total of 80 staff petitioned the CHWU in 1943 in favour of negotiating a new award, and while Brooks explained that the Economic Stabilization Regulations prevented any general rise in wages, the possibility did exist for seeking an exemption to be granted by the Arbitration Court on the basis of an anomaly in the wage rates. An agreement was negotiated between the CHWU and the North Canterbury Hospital Board, increasing the wage levels, but initially the court was reluctant to agree. A joint

1. Min of conference with NCHB 21 Oct 1941 CHW Min p56
2. Shops and Offices Amdt Act 1917; incorporated as S40 in Shops and Offices Act (rpt NZ Statutes III p240)
3. Tearooms & Restaurants Labour Legislation Modification Order 1943, No. 2 (NZ Gazette III 9 Dec 1943) p1471
4. B Aw XLII (1942)
5. CHW Min 29 Mar 1943; see Economic Stabilization Emergency Regulations 1942 No. 38
6. Agreement in CHW E Min 7 May 1943
approach was made by the HWF and the Hospital Boards' Association to the court and it agreed that an anomaly did exist, in that differential wage rates were paid on the basis of institutional size where that size was in fact an irrelevant consideration to the job performed by the worker. As a result a new national award was negotiated and kitchen hands, wardsmaids and male domestics outside of Auckland and Wellington received a substantial rise in pay to bring them up to the levels prevailing in those cities. In the case of male domestics this meant a rise of 5/- to reach a weekly wage of £5-2/6, with kitchenhands and wardsmaids gaining an extra 2/6 per week to raise their respective wages to £3-7/6 and £3-1/-.

The war years saw one further gain for the CHWU when the government passed the Annual Holidays Act in 1944. The Act established a minimum entitlement of two weeks annual paid leave for those workers who had completed 12 months continuous service. Where the period of service was less, a proportionate entitlement was provided. As a result workers in the licensed hotels and chartered clubs received an extra two days paid leave while those in private hotels and tearooms gained a further three days per year. Any other changes to wages or conditions had to wait until 1945 when the first full round of award negotiations since 1940 took place.

Overall, the CHWU was relatively satisfied with the operation of the system of economic stabilization. Its members had largely retained the gains of the 1930s despite the demands of the war and in contrast to the experiences of workers in other western nations, many of whom had suffered considerable hardship, and in contrast to the New Zealand experience in World War One. For one section, the hospital workers, the war years had brought a further advance in wages. From the perspective of the CHWU the most difficult problem in this period arose not in the realm of wages and conditions but in its relationship with the Hotel Workers Federation and in particular with its secretary, Fred Young.

1. B Aw 43 (1943) p725
2. Annual Holidays Act (NZ Statutes No. 5 1944 p30)
9. A FEDERATION DIVIDED

The once cooperative relationship that had existed between the CHWU and the Hotel Workers Federation deteriorated in the early years of the war to reach a point of crisis by 1942. Up until this change the control of the federation had rested with the troika of secretaries from the three major affiliated unions — Young from the AHWU, Brooks from the CHWU and F. O’Sullivan of the WHWU. The first two in particular had been vigorous and able advocates of the cause of the hotel and restaurant workers and the federation had achieved major advances in the wages and conditions of its members as well as expanding its coverage to new groups of workers in hospitals and chartered clubs. Moreover, the level of organisational efficiency and financial resources among the affiliates had substantially improved.

Yet after this period of success, the CHWU found itself increasingly dissatisfied with Young’s secretaryship of the federation. They were concerned with both Young’s attitude and lack of interest in the affairs of the HWF and with particular policy issues. Besides being both the secretary of the AHWU and the HWF, Young was increasingly involved in the internal politics of the FOL and the Labour Party. His organisation of the anti-Lee forces in Auckland was one of the more public examples of Young’s ‘extra-union’ activities and with the onset of war his membership of the FOL National Executive and the government’s Industrial Emergency Council further reduced his available time for the business of the HWF. As a consequence there were increasing delays in dealing with the business of the HWF, such as replying to correspondence and circularising information to the affiliates. Moreover, there seemed to be a lack of vigour and initiative about Young’s conduct of the federation’s affairs as evinced in his delatoriousness in securing an award in 1940 for the hospitals.

Young’s apparent lack of interest in the affairs of the HWF angered Brooks. While Young was undoubtedly an able negotiator and possessed of a certain dynamism and charisma his commitment to the interests of his members was less than complete. In contrast, Brooks was an able if scarcely dynamic union administrator, but one who combined intelligence with a total dedication to his union. He resented Young’s mismanagement

1. CHW E Min 15 Jul 1940
and had removed from his own union, and from other South Island unions, corrupt or incompetent officials. Increasingly, it seemed to Brooks that Young regarded the negotiation of the HWF’s awards as an amusing power game incidental to his wider political and personal ambitions. It appeared that the HWF provided an important power base for his wider ambitions in the labour movement, rather than the focus for commitment. Brooks came to believe that Young’s performance and his expensive lifestyle, partially financed by the HWF, were damaging to the interests of the members. At the same time there was a sense of personal animosity, Brooks knew that he could be a more dedicated federation secretary than Young. Nevertheless, personal ambition was clearly secondary in the criticisms levelled at Young’s performance and attitudes.

By early 1942 Brooks was determined to take more direct action against Young. In 1938 and again in 1940 he had confronted Young with his criticisms and despite promises to improve his performance Young had in fact become worse.1 At a meeting of the CHWU executive in March 1942, Brooks repeated his criticisms of Young’s inattention to the affairs of the HWF, his lack of initiative and the high financial cost of Young’s management, especially considering the federation’s inactivity.2 Describing Young as “temperamental and able to hypnotize himself into believing that he was doing a good job” he secured the executives’ authority to ‘go the full distance’ in rectifying the situation at the March conference of the federation. What exactly the full distance was remained unclear. Specifically, however, the CHWU sought to reduce the fees capitation paid to the HWF by the affiliated unions from 17.5% down to 10%. In addition, it wanted a significant improvement in the reporting of the HWF to its affiliates and in the recording of the federation’s expenses to ensure there was no waste or corruption.3 The conference did agree that in the light of the lower level of activity of the HWF during the war the capitation would be reduced to 15.5%. Young again assured Brooks that the management problems of the federation would be corrected.4

1 CHW E Min 12 Dec 1938; 15 Jul 1940; HWF National Emergency Policy Cmte 9 May 1940
2 CHW E Min 2 Mar 1942
3 Ibid
4 CHW E Min 2 Jun 1942
Between March and August 1942, however, relations between the CHWU and the federation rapidly deteriorated. There was no improvement in the conduct of the HWF’s affairs and numerous letters from Brooks seeking information or inquiring about particular actions went unanswered. By this stage the CHWU was in conflict with the HWF over both its general conduct and over specific issues of policy. Among the latter there were four major issues. First, the CHWU disagreed with Young’s actions in 1942 to support the LVA in defence of the liquor industry. Without the authority of the federation and unbeknown to Brooks, Young had met with the leaders of the LVA. Once Brooks became aware of these developments he sought information from Young on what was occurring to which Young failed to reply. Subsequent statements by Young on behalf of the HWF – in association with the LVA – attacked the Labour government for its increased taxation of the liquor industry. Brooks was alarmed by this criticism of the government and he rebuked Young for cooperating with the employers in the light of their continuing violations of the union’s awards. He publicly disassociated the CHWU from the criticism of the Labour government.

There were three further policy issues where Young and the CHWU were in conflict. The CHWU had sought action from Young on negotiating a new Chartered Clubs Award, but this had been rejected by the federation’s management committee on the grounds that the Economic Stabilisation Regulations made the situation unfavourable for any renegotiation. Secondly, following the 5% GWO, effective from April 1942, disagreement had arisen between Brooks and Young over whether the 5% was to be applied to the cash value of the board and lodging allowances. Brooks believed that it should apply but both Young and the Labour Department disagreed. Whether right or wrong, Brooks found himself arguing for a higher wage for his members against his own federation and it was not a position likely to enhance his view of the HWF. Finally, the CHWU was opposed to Young’s

1. CHW E Min 13 Jul; 10 Aug 1942
2. Resume of Correspondence in CHW Min 2 Oct 1942 p4
3. Ibid p6
4. Ibid p6
5. Ibid pp6-7
involvement in establishing a catering company for the Auckland waterfront. They were opposed to both the principle of forming a company and to the detrimental effect that the time spent by Young on the project was having on the business of the HWF.

By the middle of 1942 the CHWU had begun investigations into withdrawing from the federation. If the union was to remain in the HWF, it faced a major battle in attempting to secure sufficient support from the other affiliates to control or to remove Young. As secretary of the AHWU Young already commanded the largest voting contingent. While Brooks as honorary secretary of four small South Island unions besides the CHWU possessed a significant base of power he still required the support of the OHWU and the WHWU to defeat Young. In neither case was the leadership of these unions prepared to enter into a battle with Young which would probably be long and bitter. At times they too expressed criticism of Young's performance but they were prepared to accept the deficiencies of Young's leadership along with its advantages. In the meantime, Brooks proceeded to assess the possibilities and consequences of withdrawal. The CHWU's solicitor advised the executive that the union's members would still be entitled to the benefits of the awards that had been negotiated by the HWF even if the CHWU seceded. Moreover, in the event that a majority of the HWF's affiliates, five out of nine, wished to dissolve the federation the current awards would still remain in force.

Now that Brooks was assured that the conditions of his members and those of any other affiliates that withdrew would be secure, he called a conference of the South Island unions for 25 August 1942. All the unions were present except for Otago. Brooks circulated a resume of the CHWU's criticisms of the HWF and the opinion of the CHWU's solicitor on withdrawal. Those present resolved to withdraw from the federation and each then sought the necessary authority from their members. Each union held a special general meeting and duly obtained that authority.

1. CHW E Min 21 Dec 1942
2. Legal opinion of K. G. Archer attached to Resume of Correspondence op cit.
3. see CHW Min 2 Oct 1942
4. For CHWU resolution see CHW Min 2 Oct 1942; others CHW E Min 1 Feb 1943
Despite proposals in the 1930's to form a national union, the hotel and restaurant workers maintained a federal structure with nine autonomous district unions. The CHWU, together with the Auckland and Wellington unions were the three most powerful affiliates; and their respective secretaries, Brooks, F. Young and F. O'Sullivan, played the central role in the federation's direction from the 1930's to the 1950's. In particular, Young as secretary of the federation and the Auckland union from 1932 to 1963, was important in ensuring that the federation operated largely within the arbitration system and that it wielded considerable influence in the wider labour movement.

(Alexander Turnbull Library)
No withdrawal from the federation in fact occurred. Brooks had been in poor health for most of 1942, a result of several years of overwork coupled with high blood pressure. From the middle of 1942 Brooks suffered a stroke and was ordered to rest by his doctors. Despite recovering, the battle with the HWF appeared to be beyond both the personal strength of Brooks and the political power of the CHWU, and Young retained his dominance as leader of the federation.

For the remainder of the war years the situation remained unresolved and relations continued to be antagonistic between the CHWU and Young. The CHWU did meet with Young on some industrial issues and they were able to maintain a working relationship, albeit an uneasy one. Brooks continued to criticise aspects of Young’s management, criticisms that were occasionally echoed by F. O’Sullivan of the WHWU and by the Otago and Southland unions. Their action, however, never moved beyond talking to Young about the problem. In the meantime Brooks reduced his involvement outside of the CHWU, resigning as the honorary secretary of the small South Island unions in October 1943. He stated that they were now capable of managing their own affairs but his judgement was probably influenced by his disenchantment with the federation and his continuing poor health. The battle with Young had been lost and Brooks retreated to his stronghold in the CHWU for the remainder of the war.

10. THE STATE OF THE UNION IN 1944

Sustained growth and internal cohesion had marked the unions operation in the first nine years of the Labour government. The introduction of compulsory unionism and the extension of the union’s coverage to the public hospitals and chartered clubs generated a dramatic rise in the union’s membership and wealth, as shown in Table 3.4.

1. Resume of Correspondence op cit p8
2. CHW E Min 9 Dec 1944
3. CHW E Min 4 Oct 1943
TABLE 3.4 CHWU MEMBERSHIP AND FINANCE, 1935 TO 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Members¹</th>
<th>Annual Income² (£)</th>
<th>Net Assets² (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>1795³</td>
<td>209³</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>4303</td>
<td>1825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2170</td>
<td>5700</td>
<td>3029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3530</td>
<td>5563</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. As at 31 December.
2. As for the financial year which ends Feb in the following calendar year.
3. All financial figures are rounded to nearest £.

The extra income that the union received in this period went primarily into its accumulated funds. Regular and substantial surpluses were made by the union not simply because of the increased income but also because of the effective system of collection and efficient, economical administration. There was only a small rise in the costs of the union’s general operations with Brooks and one full-time organiser performing the union’s industrial work. While the organiser had been hired after the depression his employment only returned the number of staff to that of the 1920’s despite the union’s membership being 25% larger. There were, however, two areas where expenditure did rise significantly. First, the capitation paid to the HWF rose from 10% of the CHWU’s fees in 1935 to a peak of 17.5% before declining again to 15.5% in 1942.¹ The extra finance supported the federation’s higher levels of activity in the late 1930’s and provided a subsidy to the national magazine “Flashlight”. Nevertheless, by the 1940’s the CHWU believed that some of this funding was being wasted and abused. The second notable rise in expenditure was in funding for the Labour Party. In addition to capitation fees and regular donations the CHWU made a special grant to the party, of £550 for the 1938 election.² For the union this constituted more than 10% of its income in that year; for the party the total contributions of the HWF in 1938 represented the third largest trade union contribution.³ It was one of the more direct examples of the determination of the CHWU and HWF to keep Labour in power.

1. CHW E Min 14 Jul 1939 (17.5%); 2 Jun 1942 (15.5%)
2. CHW Min 14 Mar 1938
3. HWF gave £2,500. Six national unions or associations together provided one-third of the Labour Party’s funds.
The continuing accumulation of money by the CHWU did lead some members to seek a reduction in the union’s fees. The fees had been increased in the depression to avert financial collapse. Now, with growing financial security, attempts were made in 1937 and again in 1941 to lower the subscription but on both occasions the executive was able to prevent any resolution being passed. In 1943 after further complaints from members, the executive itself decided to act and reduced the weekly fees from 1/- (males and those females on male wage rates) and 9d (women workers) to 6d for all. While the agitation by members had not been especially large or determined, Brooks and the executive did believe that the union was sufficiently secure financially to sustain the cut and noted that the low level of activity by the HWF during the war years could not justify the continuance of the existing union fee. The income of the CHWU did decline as a consequence of this reduction in fees but the existing margin between income and expenditure together with a small reduction in its costs enabled the union still to produce a surplus.

The early years of the Labour government saw not only an increase in the union’s financial resources but also a rise in participation by workers in the union’s affairs. Some 220 workers crowded into the 1937 Annual General Meeting to discuss awards, holidays and workers’ compensation and meetings in the next few years usually attracted between 40 and 80 members. Similarly there had been an enthusiastic response from hospital workers in 1937 when the union moved to extend its coverage to this sector. Generally, the workers supported the leadership of Brooks and the executive and while the direction of the union’s affairs remained largely with the executive, rank-and-file members did on occasion initiate their own action, as for instance when the hospital workers petitioned the executive for a new award in 1943. Similarly, there was periodic criticisms and questioning of the union’s operations but there was no challenge to the union’s pro-Labour Party orientation and there is no evidence

1. CHW Min 15 Mar 1937; 20 Jan 1941
2. CHW E Min 24 May 1943. Initially a smaller reduction had been agreed to on 3 May 1943.
3. CHW AR 1944-5; E Min 24 Apr 1945
4. CHW Min 15 Mar 1937; see Min 1937-40
5. CHW Min 23 Mar 1938, (78 members attended).
6. CHW Min 29 Mar 1943
of any pro-Lee or Communist faction emerging within the union. As to
the executive, its membership was relatively stable between 1937 and 1944
and it was guided by and in turn supported the views and actions of
Brooks as secretary of the union. Elections for the executive during this
period were largely uncontested affairs with the incumbent members
being re-elected unopposed or the number of candidates equaling the number
of vacancies. Most of the changes in personnel occurred through the
executive appointing new members to fill the casual vacancies that arose
between the elections.¹

Nine years of a Labour government had brought substantial gains to
the CHWU and to its members. Domestic workers now enjoyed higher
wages, shorter hours and longer holidays, and access for themselves and their
families to better housing, health and education. Their union had become
financially secure, gained an influential voice in the labour movement,
and possessed of sufficient power and skill to defend their interests in
award negotiations and at the individual workplace. Such advances had
been achieved by the direct actions of the Labour government and those of
the CHWU and the trade union movement. Nevertheless, these gains
had not been made without conflict, without hesitation nor without lost
opportunities. For despite the very real advances that had been made, and
the limitations imposed by the war, further economic and social reform could
have been effected by the Labour government and the labour movement.
Instead a lack of vision or commitment to deeper social change, already
present among some leaders before the election 1935, came to dominate
the government and the movement. There was a complacency with the
achievements secured and the fear of defeat acted as a conservative brake
on any more radical measures. When the war ended the opportunity for
a new wave of political initiatives was not seized upon. Instead the post-war
years saw growing tension and conflict in the labour movement over
stabilization and the direction of the Labour government. It was a conflict
in which the CHWU itself became embroiled as the union experienced
a period of internal dissent.

¹ see AGM for re-elections, & E Min for casual vacancies
CHAPTER FOUR

A MOVEMENT DIVIDED, 1945 TO 1955

The years 1945 to 1955 formed a decade of division and hiatus in the history of the CHWU. Gone was the previous decade's almost omnipotent apparatus of labour power, based on an interlocking of government and trade union leadership. From 1949 the party of government was the National Party. In the years that followed the tensions nascent in the labour movement in the 1940’s exploded into the open, contributing to the duplicity and defeat of 1951. No new generation of labour leaders possessed of a post-war vision for the movement emerged to replace the increasingly old and tied men whose thinking seemed circumscribed by the depression experience. As with the wider labour movement, so too with the CHWU. Brooks continued as its secretary, but now in his sixties and in poor health, the sense of purpose and vigour of earlier years was rapidly fading and the union began to drift.

In the first period, from 1945 to 1950, the union was able to successfully negotiate improvements in its awards. However, within the CHWU there emerged a group of Communists and Labour Party supporters critical of the union’s level of activity and management. Concurrent with these developments, the liquor industry experienced its own upheaval in the form of the 1946 Royal Commission on Licensing, which roundly criticised the profits and corruption of the trade and recommended the nationalization of the industry. While this did not eventuate, private ownership was challenged by the emergence of community-owned licensing trusts.

In the second period, from 1950 to 1955, the union’s history was dominated by three events. 1951 saw the culmination of the internal conflict in the labour movement between the Waterside Workers’ Union and the leadership of the FOL. With a divided labour movement the National government was able to succeed in destroying the watersiders and their allies. The CHWU, while distrustful of the FOL leadership, and sympathetic towards the watersiders case did not take any action to support them. In 1953 the union faced an industrial struggle of its own in the licensed hotels but was
successful in combating the employers' attack on wages. Finally, the union experienced a second act of internal dissent, when opponents of the executive attempted to gain power in 1954. While it was again repulsed, it was the final scene in which Brooks would take part. After 36 years as the union's leader he retired in mid-1955 at the age of 71, and an era in the union's history had ended.

1. WAGES AND THE WORKPLACE, 1945 TO 1949

Constructing an economy for peacetime, and striving to arrest the drift towards electoral defeat, were the twin aims of the Labour government in the post-war era.\(^1\) Within the trade union movement, the left-wing pressed for more substantial wage increases both to compensate for the decline in real wages experienced during the latter years of the war economy, and to raise real wages in a period of labour shortage. The government, continuing to stress economic stability as the central element in its economic policy, acted to restrict wage and price increases. Such restraints on wages led to increasing tension between the government and many trade unionists, a tension that was intensified by the prospects of electoral defeat and the ideologically charged international political climate. Throughout the capitalist economies the years immediately following the end of World War Two brought political and industrial unrest. Conservatives and Communists, Socialists and Liberals were engaged in a struggle for power that was fought in the streets, in the parliaments and in the trade unions. While there was ideological fallout from these conflicts upon New Zealand, the degree of actual conflict was considerably milder than elsewhere. Nevertheless, the participants judged the conflict in terms of their own experience, and compared to the relatively peaceful patterns in industrial relations in the past thirty years the level of industrial action seemed excessive and inexcusable. It was made more so by the presence in power of the labour movement's own political party. Such a situation had the dual effect of raising the expectation amongst the left-wing, while leading the more conservative elements of the labour movement to resent any agitation against the government.\(^2\)

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1. For a discussion of the last years of the Labour government see M. Bassett *Confrontation '51: the 1951 waterfront dispute* (Wellington: Reed, 1972).

2. In the minutes of the CHWU & CTC there were frequent references to the "industrial unrest", the "endless wrangles and acrimony".
The government persisted with its system of economic stabilization although it was increasingly battered by pressures on prices and the clamour of wage claims. While the system of controls, including the issuing of Standard Wage Pronouncements by the Arbitration Court, tended to assist the weaker unions, they also served to restrict the stronger unions from obtaining the higher rates of wages that were possible in a period of labour shortage and economic growth. Moreover, many trade unionists perceived a decline in their living standards relative to the rising prosperity of the farming and business sectors. They too wished to share in this growth and not simply struggle to maintain the level of their real income at that of 1938-40. Indeed, there was some disagreement between the government and its union critics, over whether there had in fact been a fall in the workers' share of national income between 1938-40 and 1946-48. While in cash wages this was partially true, the growth in social security benefits and other measures appeared to have maintained the workers' share of real income. Nevertheless the demand for a better standard of living and not merely that of the past, persisted.

The HWF and the CHWU did not become embroiled with the government over the issue of higher wages. They essentially remained loyal supporters of the government and were neither personally nor politically predisposed to attack in public their policies, both because they wanted Labour to be re-elected and because they largely agreed with the government's direction. Nevertheless, their loyalty and support was severely tested in December 1945 over the question of the 40 hour week. When the concept of the 40 hour week had been introduced in 1936, the Arbitration Court had been given the discretion to permit those industries where the provision was regarded as impracticable to operate a 44 hour week. Thus workers in shops, tearooms and private hotels and in many hospitals continued to work a 44 hour week until 1945. In December that year the government amended the Shops and Offices Act so as to provide a statutory right for a 40 hour week for shop workers. Hotels and restaurants whose operations were also covered by the Act were excluded from the amendment. The CHWU was aghast at this omission and the failure of the government to consult

1. The Press 3 Mar 1949 p4. Also provides example of the debate within the labour movement.
2. Shops & Offices Amdt Act (NZ Statutes No. 38 1945 p309)
Young who besides being secretary of the HWF was now also a member of the Legislative Council. Nor were they pleased that Young had failed to make himself aware of the government’s plans to amend the law. Such was the level of dissatisfaction that the CHWU not only expressed its disappointment that after ‘thirty years of loyalty such an event could occur’ but proposed to the HWF that it disaffiliate from the Labour Party and the FOL.¹

The HWF did not disaffiliate as both Young and Brooks were able to successfully lobby the government to enact a further amendment to the Shops & Offices Act to include hotels and restaurants. This was passed in October 1946 and came into effect from July 1947.² While the licensed hotels had secured a 40 hour week in 1936 through the Arbitration Court, and the Act simply placed into statute their existing entitlement, the workers in tearooms and private hotels had obtained for the first time a 40 hour week, and equality with other workers. Similarly, 1947 saw the HWF negotiate a common 40 hour week for domestic workers in public hospitals.³ Prior to this there had been a mixed regime where the staff of the Auckland and Wellington hospitals enjoyed a 40 hour week but those elsewhere worked between 42 and 44 and on occasion longer without any payment for overtime. In Canterbury the new award brought a reduction in the ordinary hours of work at the major hospitals of two hours per week and of four hours in the small and mainly rural hospitals. The achievement of a 40 hour week for all domestic workers in hotels, tearooms, chartered clubs and hospitals had taken the union thirty nine years since its creation. In reaching its goal the union had persistently pursued a course of legal negotiation combined with political representation, and had not employed direct action. Whether, given the problems of depression and subsequently World War Two, a 40 hour week could have been achieved earlier is questionable. While an opportunity did exist in the late 1930’s the union was heavily preoccupied with extending coverage to new groups of workers and in raising wage rates for all sectors.

1. CHW E Min 16 Apr 1946; also see 26 Feb & 18 Jun 1946
2. Shops & Offices Amdt Act (NZ Statutes No. 24 1946 p217)
3. B_Aw_47 (1947) p3041
Besides achieving a 40 hour week, the late 1940’s also saw the union make gradual but valuable progress on the wages front. In 1945 the government had enabled a full round of award negotiations to take place. The new awards negotiated by the HWF incorporated the two 5% General Wage Orders of 1940 and 1942 and provided for a series of further increases of 10/- per week for most licensed hotel workers \(^1\) and 11/- for female workers in tearooms and private hotels. \(^2\) In the clubs and hospitals male workers gained an extra 11/8d per week and women workers 10/- \(^3\). Certain classes of cooks in the licensed hotels received higher increases, reflecting their higher wage rates, of between 10/6 and 15/3. However in relation to the cost of living, most workers in 1945 had experienced a small decline in their real wages compared to that of 1938-40.

From 1945 to the end of 1949 the weekly award wages for the union’s members rose generally in line with the rate of inflation. However, the union was able to increase the actual earnings of workers in hotels and chartered clubs by negotiating in the course of 1948 and 1949 the introduction of penalty rates of pay for weekend work. The agitation for this change had begun in 1948 when the Auckland and Wellington unions had held stop-work meetings in support of both a general wage rise and in particular for the establishment of penalty rates for the weekend. \(^4\) While any general rise was still limited by the Economic Stabilization Regulations penalty rates would effectively raise wages while remaining within the provisions of the regulations. In late 1948 the chartered club employers had accepted the union’s claim for penalty rates \(^5\) but the crucial achievement was in 1949 when the unions negotiated penalty rates for the largest sector, the licensed hotels. In the hotels, staff rostered to work on a Saturday received payment at time-and-a-half on the full wage rate (i.e. including the cash value of board and lodging) and on Sunday an extra 6/- if they were men or worked in the kitchen or 3/- if they were women workers employed outside of

\(^1\) B_Aw XLV (1945) p515
\(^2\) Ibid p2167; p609
\(^3\) Ibid p2236; p1950
\(^4\) CHW E Min 14 Dec 1948 p156a
\(^5\) B_Aw 48 (1948) p2401
the kitchen — this reflected the differences in the basic wage rates for the
two groups. Thus, if a worker was employed for eight hours on Saturday as
part of a normal 40 hour week their actual weekly wages were effectively
increased by 10%. Chartered club workers received time-and-a-half on Saturday
but double time on Sunday. When the new award for private hotels was neg-
ominated it provided for time-and-a-quarter on Saturday and time-and-a-half
rates for Sunday. While this lower level was a consequence of the lower
profitability of the private hotels it still represented an important improvement
in wages.

In a seven day industry, the introduction of penalty rates constituted a sig-
nificant advance in principle as well as an important financial gain. Work on
Saturday or Sunday was now accorded a special status recognising the sacrifice
made by workers in terms of their family and social life. It was no longer
regarded as part of the normal and acceptable requirements of the industry
to which the workers simply had to acquiesce. Moreover the penalty rates
occurred within the normal 40 hour week roster. They were not comparable
to the overtime payments received by workers in a five day industry where
weekend work was in excess of the normal working week of 40 hours. Relative
to domestic workers in tearooms and hospitals the introduction of penalty rates
represented an increase in the margin of pay for hotel and club staff. Sunday
work was part of the routine for hospital workers who were now distinctly
disadvantaged in comparison to hotels and clubs. A dispute did arise over the
penalty payment for night porters, whose shifts began at 10pm but continued
into the following day. The HWF negotiated the payment of Saturday rates
from 10pm on Friday, and Sunday rates from 10pm on Saturday.

Aside from penalty payments the post-war period also saw the union secure
a broken shift allowance in 1946 of 2/6 per week. This provided some
compensation for the inconvenience of working half the shift in the morning
and half later in the day with two to four hours unpaid time in between — a
traditional feature in the hotels. Gains were also made in holiday pay,
the entitlement to ‘dry pay’ and in the wages of casual workers.
All sections of the union’s membership received a rise in their
actual incomes through a series of changes in holidays and holiday pay.

1. B Aw 49 (1949) p257
2. Ibid p3521
3. B Aw 50 (1950) p91
4. B Aw 46 (1946) p2368 (LH); p2405 (PH)
Award negotiations increased the number of statutory holidays in a year from seven days to nine, or eight in the case of the private hotels, and raised the rate of pay for working on any of those days from time-and-a-half to double time.\(^1\) By virtue of the 1948 amendment to the Public Holidays Act,\(^2\) workers now also received the full entitlement to statutory holiday pay when the holiday was transferred to another day. The second of these specific changes was in respect of the entitlement to 'dry pay' under the Licensed Hotels Award. All married workers, together with single male barstaff, porters and general hands were entitled to choose to receive the 'dry pay', that is the full cash wage together with the cash value of the board and lodging allowances. The remaining staff had to accept board and lodging if the employer provided it. The group of single males, provided they lived in one of the four major cities, had had this right to choose since 1937. Now, in 1945 this right was extended to those in small towns\(^3\) and in 1949 to all licensed hotels.\(^4\) In the meantime, casual workers had their wage rates increased by at least the same, and in some instances more than the rise in the ordinary weekly wage for full-time staff. For instance, in the licensed hotels casual workers were now payed at the higher daily rate for the first five days of their employment instead of the previous three days.\(^5\) Secondly, casual workers in the chartered clubs became entitled to a daily rate of 15% above the pro-rata rate of full-time workers, rather than the previous margin of 10%.\(^6\)

In addition to these specific advances in pay, the CHWU also sought to further extend its workplace coverage into two new areas. First, the union tried, without success, to include domestic workers in university hostels and school boarding houses under the ambit of the Private Hotels Award. The Arbitration Court declined to grant coverage, ruling that university

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1. B Aw 46 (1946) p2368 (LH); p1281 (T); p2405 (PH)
2. Public Holidays Amdt Act (NZ Statutes No. 46 1948 p432)
3. BAw XLV (1945) p515
4. B Aw 49 (1949) p257
5. Ibid
6. B Aw 50 (1950) p1825
hostels did not fall within the definition of a private hotel. Moreover, in the event that some institutions may in the future fall within the definition of a ‘boarding house’ and hence be within the scope of the award, there was still a further barrier in terms of the union’s own rules. Only the CHWU and the WHWU provided in their rules for coverage of such workers, and any similar institution in another industrial district could not be cited as a party to any award. The court did provide, however, for a measure of protection for the workers at Christchurch’s College House and exempted the Deaconess’ Houses only for as long as they continued to pay their employees full pay during the vacations when the hostels were closed.

The CHWU did achieve success in the second area in which it sought to expand, namely the private hospitals. Up until 1948 domestic workers in these institutions possessed no award protection. In 1947 the HWF had initially moved to include these hospitals within the public hospitals award but decided against this on the grounds that the differences in the type of institution made any composite agreement too difficult to negotiate. Thus, after the 1947 award for public hospitals was settled, the HWF negotiated the first award for private hospitals in 1948. There were a total of 68 private hospitals in New Zealand including nine in Canterbury and with the growth of a public hospital system under Labour their importance and income had declined. Nevertheless the unions were able to negotiate an award that provided for the same rates of pay and conditions as those in the public hospitals.

The first five years following the war’s end had seen valuable gains made by the CHWU in the real incomes of its members, despite the effects of inflation, and improvements in the conditions of work, most notably with the extension of the 40 hour week to tearooms, private hotels and hospitals. Nevertheless, there was an expectation abroad amongst workers of a substantial improvement in their standard of living and there was frustration that the rate of improvement was too small and too low. While 1949 did bring a number of gains for hotel workers, this frustration had already become evident amongst a small group of workers within the CHWU.

1. B_Aw 50 (1950) p190
2. Ibid
3. B_Aw 47 (1947) p3041; 48 (1948) p2497
2. DISSENT IN THE UNION

For 25 years Brooks and his executive had directed the affairs of the union unchallenged by any rank-and-file dissent. The union's leadership had proved to be cohesive and stable, and most importantly successful in advancing or defending the interests of its members in times of depression and of prosperity. The union had been moderately left-wing in its politics and sound in its management and finances. This tranquillity was broken in 1947 when a small group of Communists together with some Labour Party supporters, made their appearance at the union's June general meeting. This group voiced their criticism of the union's general effectiveness, the payments made to its officers and the lack of publicity informing members about meetings and the elections for the executive.¹ While this first attack was parried by the executive and a majority of those members present supported the executive's viewpoint, the attack caused sufficient alarm for the executive to initiate an investigation into the backgrounds of the critics.² One of the leading critics was readily identified as Noel Smith, a Communist engineering worker who was also employed as a part-time barman. Brooks described the opposition as a 'group of Communists and fellow travellers' and the executive resolved that for future meetings membership cards would be checked so as to ensure that only CHWU members were admitted.³

The conflict that was to occur between the executive and this opposition group over the next two-and-a-half years, was a struggle over both the direction of the union and over specific aspects of its management. It was not simply an attempt by the Communists to obtain power in the union. While this was an element there were deficiencies in the union's operation and the grievances felt by the Communists and by non-Communist critics were genuinely held and in some cases justifiable. However, the wider political situation with its tensions between the left-wing of the labour movement and the Labour government shaped the way each side saw the issues and their opponents. Mutual antipathy, distrust and suspicion marked their behaviour rather than any reasoned and considered examination of the problems. To the Communists, Brooks appeared as an ageing conservative union bureaucrat; to Brooks the critics appeared to be a gang

1. CHW Min 23 Jun 1947
2. CHW E Min 15 Jul 1947 p89a
3. CHW E Min 15 Jul 1947 p89a of the five opposition candidates in 1945 all were male licensed hotel workers, and four of these had only joined the industry since 1945. see CHW Min 28 Mar 1949.
of conspirators out to seize power in the union.

Yet underneath this general antipathy certain specific issues could be identified. First, the opposition group wanted a more industrially active union both in negotiating awards and at the individual workplace. They desired that the standard of living of workers should be raised substantially and swiftly. The executive was more cautious in its attitude. It accepted a slower rate of progress as being more realistic, nor did it wish to engage any industrial agitation that could contribute to the electoral defeat of the Labour government. These were fundamental differences in political outlook and were not likely to be resolved simply by logical debate. As to the issue of the lack of industrial activity by the union at the workplace, it was evident that the union’s level of contact and award enforcement did leave scope for improvement. From the perspective of the past this activity was not notably deficient and was better than many other unions. The opposition, however, looked to improve the situation rather than continue as before.

The second area of criticism was the lack of publicity for the union’s general meetings and elections for the executive. Public notification of the general meetings was confined to inserts in the daily newspapers, and except in 1944, no circulars advertising meetings were sent to the workplace. The date for executive nominations was unspecified in the union’s constitution and the actual notification was placed only in the union’s office and often out of sight of members. Such practices did not encourage participation in the union’s affairs and elections for the executive were generally uncontested. The opposition thus had legitimate grievances with the union’s procedures grievances accentuated by the fact that they hindered their own ability to stand candidates for the executive elections.

The final claim by the opposition was for a greater role in the union’s affairs by the rank-and-file membership. They believed that such participation would produce a more democratic, active union, freed from bureaucratic abuse and invigorated with a greater militancy in its politics and tactics. Such a view was often articulated by left-wing members in many trade unions. The result, however, in unions such as the CHWU who had a traditionally

1. see discussion CHW Min 26 Mar 1945.
2. L. Short Oral op cit
3. eg Brooks report on meeting with Smith CHW E Min 23 Mar 1948 p128a
low level of membership involvement, was likely to be a shift of power from the elected executive to an unelected minority of activists, such as the Communists, who regularly attended the union’s meetings. Brooks believed that the control of the union by the executive ensured that a moderate policy in line with the views of the majority of the members was pursued and conducted in a responsible and efficient manner. For the opposition direct participation and the exercise of substantial power by ordinary members was an article of faith.

These then were the themes underlying the dissent within the union, issues that could not be easily separated from the wider political environment of the labour movement nor from the personalities involved, such as Brooks and Smith. In responding to the opposition the executive’s approach was two-fold. First, an attempt was made to incorporate the critics into the executive structure. Brooks proposed to Smith that he attend and observe an executive meeting in operation. In the event that a vacancy might subsequently arise he suggested to Smith that he could then stand for election. Smith declined such an offer, reiterating that his intention was not to join the executive but to increase rank-and-file control. Certainly as a lone voice on the executive he would have had considerably lesser influence than that possible for an organised group at a general meeting. The second step by the executive was to publicise the achievements that had been made by the union. For the 1948 Annual General Meeting they produced a comprehensive 14 page report on the union’s past 30 years of operation. The report stressed the improvements made in wages and conditions, the quantity of arrears in wages and allowances collected by the union and the wide range of work undertaken by Brooks both within the HWF and in the wider labour movement. Attached to the report were statements from the union’s auditors and solicitors attesting to the union’s efficiency in financial management and industrial litigation. Certainly, the executive had little to fear from any charges of dishonesty, nor, given its high level of activity up until World War Two, from charges of lethargy. It did, however, remain vulnerable to the criticisms that it was not currently sufficiently active and that its procedures for elections and meetings were inadequate, and a barrier to participation.

1. eg. Brooks report on meeting with Smith. CHW E Min 23 Mar 1948 p128a
2. see CHW Min 15 Mar 1948
At the 1948 Annual General Meeting and again in the following year, the opposition mounted an attack on the executive and on Brooks in particular. While the debate in 1948 was vigorous and the meeting lasted for two-and-a-half hours, the executive was able to rebuff the challenge. It was aided in this by the fact that the biennial election for the executive was not due until the following year and hence the opposition were unable to change the executive's membership. In 1949 however, the opposition group were organised and constitutionally able to elect a new executive. They submitted a complete list of candidates for the executive in time for the general meeting. The candidates included both Communists and non-Communists critical of the executive, with Noel Smith opposing the incumbent Andrew Wilson, for the office of president. Wilson, who was a chef by trade, had been president of the union since 1936. A supporter of the Labour Party he was a close and long-time associate of Brooks. While the opposition had prepared itself for the meeting, the executive had also organised its own supporters. With a total of 100 members present the meeting proved to be disorderly and the debate was acrid. Nevertheless, Wilson defeated Smith for the presidency by 54 votes to 35 while the incumbent executive was comfortably returned in a secret ballot by a margin of more than two to one.

The internal challenge to Brooks and the executive had for the moment been defeated. It did, however, shatter the relative tranquility of the union's operation and caused Brooks considerable alarm. While no changes to the union's operation had resulted from the challenge the threat had not disappeared. In the next few years events elsewhere took centre stage in the union's affairs, but the opposition group would reappear in 1954 to mount a final but again unsuccessful challenge.

1. see CHW Min 15 Mar 1948
2. CHW Min 28 Mar 1949
3. W. G. Brooks Oral op cit
4. CHW Min 28 Mar 1949
5. CHW E Min 12 Apr 1949
3. THE LIQUOR TRADE

While the CHWU had been beset by internal dissension, the liquor industry was experiencing dramatic developments of its own, many of which would ultimately affect the union's members. The overall position of the brewery companies was one of continuing expansion coupled with high and sustained profits, despite the introduction by the government of higher sales taxes in the course of World War Two. However, the brewery owners peaceful contemplation of their growing wealth was rudely jolted by significant developments in the mid and late 1940's.

The first of these jolts came with the creation of community controlled licensing trusts as a new form of ownership for the hotel industry. Invercargill was the site of the inaugural trust established in 1944. The city had been a 'dry' district since 1907 and when its citizens had voted for the restoration of licenses in 1943 there was loud opposition to the reestablishment of private ownership. By the Invercargill Licensing Trust Act of 1944 a board of trustees — with the local authorities and the government each nominating three members — was created to establish, own and operate all facilities for the sale of liquor in the district. 1 While the project did encounter financial problems and difficulties in finding a suitable location the trust did succeed in establishing a viable operation. A second licensing trust followed in Masterton in 1947 2 and after the passing of the Licensing Trust Act of 1949, further licensing trusts were established in the CHWU's own district at Ashburton and Geraldine. 3

For the hotel workers, the creation of trusts had the effect of establishing new job opportunities while also providing in their early years of operation wage rates moderately better than many other hotels. However, the HWF did come into conflict with the trusts over the issue of worker representation on the trust board. On several occasions the HWF unsuccessfully lobbied the government to obtain a worker's representation on the Invercargill Trust Board. 4 In Canterbury, the relationship that developed between the union and the local trusts was generally an amicable one, although there were occasional differences over particular workplace issues.

1. Invercargill Licensing Trust Act (NZ Statutes No. 4 1944 p18)
2. Masterton Licensing Trust Act (NZ Statutes No. 35 1947 p308)
3. Licensing Trust Act (NZ Statutes No. 43 1949 p742)
The second challenge to the power of the breweries came in the report of the 1946 Royal Commission on Licensing. Established by the Labour government in January 1945 the Commission’s purpose was to investigate all aspects of the liquor industry and make appropriate recommendations on its future. It consisted of eight members including a representative of the interests of labour namely F. G. Young secretary of the HWF. The Commission’s report was a comprehensive document which made a series of scathing attacks on aspects of the liquor industry, especially the high profits and poor standard of its services. The key recommendation was to nationalise the brewery companies. In the view of the majority, five of the eight members, the abuses that they had found throughout the trade stemmed from the profit motive inherent in private ownership. Only some form of public ownership could ensure that the industry was conducted in a socially responsible manner and they suggested a combination of a state brewery with community trust controlled hotels.

The radical proposal of nationalisation was not favourably received by the brewers, the Labour government nor by Young. Together with two other members of the Commission, Young had strongly dissented from the majority’s proposal for nationalisation. He supported the continuance of private ownership and assailed the proposal as one savouring of a ‘totalitarian state’ and not one for ‘freedom loving people’. Given his long standing and continuing close personal association with the brewery companies and his conservative position within the labour movement, Young’s attitude was not unexpected. Nevertheless, there was something ironic in the supposed representative of labour decrying nationalisation as totalitarian. The proposal did receive support from the FOL, individual trade unions and Labour Party branches. Prior to the war, the annual conference of the HWF itself had discussed a remit from the CHWU for the nationalisation of the breweries but decided that it was an ‘inopportune time’ to act. There was a division of opinion within the HWF and its submission to the Commission avoided any reference to nationalisation. Brooks, when presenting the submission, was asked for the federation’s view. “We have always” said Brooks “been practically more or less in favour of State control, ourselves”?

1. Royal Commission op cit p10
2. Ibid pp281 & 314
3. Ibid pp314 & 317
4. Ibid p419
5. Notes of Proceedings: NZ Royal Commission on Licensing 1945 (Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington) eg V19 p2758 (Watersiders Workers Union); V13 p1812 (FOL); V40 p5900 (Otago LRC).
6. FL 3 no. 1 1940 p13
7. Notes of Proceedings op cit V48 p7160; pp7142 - 7162
but avoided any statement that the HWF was officially for or against the proposal. Young, and the Labour government had no desire for nationalisation, and the 1948 Licensing Amendment Bill, designed to implement the Commissions recommendations, lacked any proposal for public ownership.

However, the proposal did affect the vote for state control at the 1946 national licensing poll. The rise was dramatic, increasing by 66% from 123,701 to 202,664. At 20.2% of the total vote it marked the highest proportion ever to be recorded in favour of state control and purchase. Whether the Labour government could have promoted the concept of nationalisation and built upon the degree of support already evident in the community will remain a matter of speculation, another of the lost opportunities in Labour’s last years in power.

The Licensing Amendment Act of 1948 did incorporate several of the Royal Commission’s recommendations, but it was considerably less sweeping in its reforms even in those areas outside of nationalisation. The Commission’s proposals had sought to modernise the industry, liberalise the law and improve the standard of services offered by the trade to the public. For instance, it proposed that snack foods and an adequate quantity of seating be introduced into the hotels. All hotels would have a standard measure for beer sales and they should be required to use Condys crystals in their bars so as to prevent the recycling of beer dregs and their sale back to the customer. The Commission also recommended the redistribution of hotel licenses to meet the changes in the pattern of population distribution and the extension of licenses for areas such as chartered clubs and restaurants. These suggestions were supported by Young who wanted to see improvements in the quality of services but not a change in ownership. The Act was more cautious, although it did establish a Licensing Control Commission to improve the supervision of the industry and to redistribute the existing number of licenses. In practice the Commission was not able to effect any significant redistribution because of the restriction imposed on its actions by the need to keep within the existing maximum number of licenses and the legal and financial barriers to cancelling licences where they were no longer required.

1. NZOY 1949 op cit p787
2. Licensing Arndt Act (NZ Statutes No. 74 1948 p918)
3. Royal Commission op cit p295
4. Ibid p307 The use of the crystals decomposed the dregs thus eliminating the notorious, profitable and not uncommon practice, of selling beer slops, water and even sawdust to customers during the rush hour.
5. Ibid p419
The Royal Commission had proposed one further radical change – the abolition of six o’clock closing. The government again decided not to implement the recommendation but held instead, in March 1949, a national referendum on the issue. Voters were offered the choice between continuing six o’clock closing or later closing – but with a two hour break and later opening hours. By a decisive majority of 473,478 to 158,850 New Zealanders voted to retain six o’clock but the turnout of voters was extremely low with less than half of those eligible actually voting. For many the issue was irrelevant. The Communists and other left-wing elements in the labour movement saw the real issue as that of nationalisation while liberal critics such as A. R. D. Fairburn viewed later hours of closing as simply the chance to spend even a longer time in the same alcoholic sty. Any fundamental change to the ownership or the conduct of the industry had remained in abeyance. Indeed, in the lead-up to the referendum there was a notable absence of any publicity supporting later closing. The only material that appeared came from the advocates of temperance, the New Zealand Alliance who together with several churches campaigned for the retention of six o’clock closing. They had been the originators of the restriction and it had remained an article of faith that such a provision was conducive to their cause. The high profits generated in the one hour daily swill, also made it an article of faith to which the liquor trade was happy to subscribe. As a result, the trade refrained from taking any part in the referendum confident that no change would occur. Young did express support for extended hours, but neither the HWF nor any other particular group publicly campaigned for later closing. In such circumstances the turnout of voters and the result were less than a surprise.

The liquor industry had been challenged by these series of events, but with the exception of the continuing development of the licensing trusts the industry's position remained much as before and the power of the brewery companies continued along the high road of profitability. Any radical change to the industry’s operations would have to wait until a second wave of reform in the early 1960’s.

1. NZ Official Yearbook 1950 op cit p893
2. People’s Voice  Feb  1949
4. The Press  Feb & Mar 1949
5. Royal Commission p420. Young did not however support a two hour break.
1949 brought not merely a referendum on six o’clock closing but in November the end of the Labour government. While the electoral defeat was not large it was in a sense almost a merciful act, terminating a government whose last years had been marked by a loss of vision and acrimonious debate between the factions of the labour movement. Power, ideology and personal ambitions were all contributory factors to the increasing factionalism and tensions that beset the labour movement in the last years of the 1940’s. This political environment continued after Labour’s defeat and was significant in shaping the manner in which the 1951 Waterfront dispute developed, was fought and was ended.

For its part, the CHWU remained largely outside of the acrimony and political machinations that characterised these years. Nevertheless, there were some instances where the union was in conflict with others in the trade union movement, most notably over some of the more radical public pronouncements of the leaders of the Canterbury Trades Council. The CTC’s president, John Roberts and its secretary, ‘Archie’ Grant, made a number of statements on international events and organised activities in support of world peace. The CHWU executive saw the public profile adopted by the council as inappropriate and were concerned at the seemingly pro-Soviet orientation exhibited by the CTC’s leaders. Minor disputes also occurred over demarcation and the authority of the trades councils in places such as Timaru and Oamaru. Yet while minor they did reflect something of the antagonistic and uncooperative manner in which trade unionists of varied political persuasions conducted their relations with their supposed colleagues in the labour movement.

These conflicts, while indicative of the environment, pale beside the struggle between the Waterside Workers’ Union and the leadership of the FOL. By 1950 the intensity of the conflict had reached the point of irreconcilable separation. The antagonism reflected fundamental differences in political outlook between the radicalism of the watersiders and the more conservative position of the FOL leaders, including their approaches towards the arbitration system. For the Waterside Workers Union, such a system together

1. CHW E Min 7 Oct 1947 p96a
2. CHW E Min 12 Aug 1947 p93a
3. Background for dispute is from Bassett Confrontation ‘51 op cit
with the other controls of the Labour government — and now the new National government — were barriers to their path to higher wages, and to the preservation of their pay relativities with others they sought to breach such barriers. The conflict with the FOL was further accentuated by the intense personal animosities that existed between the watersiders’ leadership and that of the FOL and the mutual determination to win. For the FOL the arbitration system was an accepted part of the country’s industrial relations while the leadership and attitudes of the watersiders were not. Weakening the power of the Waterside Workers Union would decisively curb the threat of the left-wing of the labour movement and the personal ambitions of ‘Jock’ Barnes, the watersiders’ president, to the incumbent leadership of the FOL. Assured of the support of the moderate majority of its affiliates, the FOL leadership took a firm, uncompromising line with the watersiders that would either lead to their subordination within the federation or to their expulsion and isolation.

The decisive phase in this conflict began in January 1950. The particular issues chosen by the FOL on which to act were not vital concerns but nevertheless were useful for the battle with the watersiders. The first letter sent in January by the FOL National Executive to the Waterside Workers Union suggested that they cease their membership of the Communist-led World Federation of Trade Unions.1 This would be in accordance with the FOL’s general policy of dissociation from the WFTU. A second letter sought an apology from the WWU for their criticism of the FO’s role in the 1949 carpenters’ dispute. Predictably, the watersiders refused to do either and an ultimatum quickly followed from the FOL to comply or face expulsion from the federation.2 However, before this could occur a number of trade unions intervened on behalf of the WWU to avert immediate action. While not necessarily supporters of the views or actions of the watersiders they nevertheless regarded the actions of the FOL National Executive as extreme, unnecessary and unconstitutional. They succeeded in securing a delay in any further action until the FOL’s annual conference in April. 3

1. Bassett p42
2. Ibid
3. Ibid p43
The prospects for the reconciliation of the WWU and the FOL leadership were remote. "The position", observed Brooks who attended the conference on behalf of the CHWU, "looked hopeless from the start with the speeches of both sides containing threats." The conference passed the National Executive's motion calling upon the WWU to withdraw its criticism over the 1949 carpenters' dispute within one month. It then became clear to many delegates that this would enable the national executive to proceed with the expulsion of the watersiders, an action to which many were still opposed. An attempt was then made to recommit the motion but this failed by a narrow 149 votes to 137. The watersiders together with 60 delegates from other trade unions thereupon walked from the conference hall. Some attempt was made by the secessionists to re-establish unity over the next few days but after these moves were rebuffed by the FOL the watersiders and their allies proceeded to the creation of a new national body, the Trade Union Congress.

The trade union movement did not divide along clear and unequivocal lines between supporting the watersiders or the FOL leadership. Many unionists while not agreeing with the political outlook of the watersiders nevertheless were critical of the divisive and aggressive approach being adopted by the FOL. The HWF and the CHWU both fell into this middle group and were faced with the dilemma of which side to support. At the April FOL conference, Young the HWF secretary, had also departed from the hall and joined the watersiders in their deliberations. The secessionist unions elected Young as the provisional chairman of the new TUC. This placed Young in a position which directly challenged the FOL and brought the onset of a political crisis within the Hotel Workers' Federation.

Young's alignment with the watersiders had come as a complete and unpleasant surprise for his colleagues in the HWF, including Brooks and the CHWU. Officially the HWF were still affiliated to the FOL. Young's departure from the conference had occurred without consulting his fellow secretaries in the federation and Brooks and the others had remained in their seats. They were surprised, moreover, because the HWF

1. CHW E min 24 Apr 1950
2. Bassett p43
3. Ibid pp43-44
4. Ibid N 38 p222
5. CHW E Min 24 Apr 1950
conference, held the previous month, had decided to adopt a neutral position in the dispute. The HWF would support only one national trade union organisation and would work to reform the FOL from within\(^1\). The need for change in the FOL was indeed recognised as shown by Young's speech to the HWF conference:

\[\ldots \text{the FOL has been no asset.}\ldots \text{On the contrary it had been frequently used against us (with) unjust allegations against our union.}\ldots \text{Every Conference was taken up with bitter controversies between disputing factions (with disputes) between the National Executive and the Wharfies. We should refuse to be parties to a split regardless of who was right and wrong (it was) paramount to preserve a united front against the Nationalist Government who would attack if we were dis-united.}\]

This generally reflected the critical view of the conference but such a stand did not entail leaving the FOL.

Now, in the wake of the events at the FOL conference, Young interpreted his actions in associating with the TUC as those of a moderate counsel. His intention was to reunite the TUC unions with the FOL but on a new basis. A single national body was still his aim. Skilled orator and tactician that he was this explanation still failed to allay the fears of his colleagues in the HWF including Brooks.

At the CHWU executive meeting in April, president A. Wilson and executive member L. Nielson were particularly angry with Young's actions. By "associating with Unions... under Communist domination", they said, Young had "damaged the reputation of the hotel workers\(^4\). At the next meeting, the executive resolved to reaffirm their support for continuing membership of the FOL and demanded Young adhere to the policy of the HWF's March conference\(^5\).

Pressure began to mount on Young as the WHWU joined Canterbury in its criticism and Young decided to call a special conference of the

1. CHW E Min 24 Apr 1950
2. HWF Min at CHW E Min 8 May 1950
3. CHW E Min 22 May 1950
4. CHW E Min 24 Apr 1950
5. CHW E Min 8 May 1950
HWF to explain his position. Again, claiming that his intention was to aid in the re-uniting of the trade union movement, Young succeeded in evading any censure and preserved a qualified freedom of manoeuvre. Young was allowed to continue his association with the TUC but was forced to accept a deadline of 1 June 1950 by which his involvement must cease. Until that time he would attempt to obtain agreement for reunion and would not act to widen the already existing division in the trade union movement.

On this particular issue, unlike the conflicts of the past, it was Brooks and not Young that possessed the strongest position. Backed by the other affiliates of the HWF and free from any organised rank-and-file opposition within the CHWU itself, Brooks was first able to confine Young’s scope of action and ultimately force him to retreat. Young could not look to the support of the FOL leadership so that on this issue he was largely alone and engaged in a very dangerous game. Why Young choose such a course is unclear. Certainly he had not undergone any transformation in his political views and acquired a desire to support the Communists and others on the left-wing of the labour movement. As with other moderate unionists he was dissatisfied with the achievements and tactics of the FOL and may have perceived his role in the TUC as an opportunity to construct a powerful opposition to the Walsh leadership of the FOL and force it to compromise and perhaps even succumb. Without the dissenting unions within the FOL, it would certainly have been impossible to successfully oppose Walsh. Given his past ambitions, including candidacy for the presidency of the FOL, it is possible that Young envisaged a leading role for himself in any realignment of power that might result from the reunion of the trade union movement.

As the June deadline approached unity remained a distant prospect. Pressure mounted within other unions who had supported the watersiders, to leave the TUC and there was a noticeable drift back to the FOL stable.

1. CHW E Min 22 May 1950
2. Ibid
3. CHW E Min 30 Apr 1946 p41a
4. Bassett N 46 & 47 p223
Now, with Young's attempts to arrange a unity conference of both sides having failed, Brooks moved to enforce the 1 June deadline. A meeting of the HWF was called but first Brooks prepared his own political base in Canterbury. On 6 June the CHWU executive met and considered Young's continuing work on behalf of the TUC. They resolved to re-affirm their support for the FOL and their opposition to Young's activities. 1 Following the executive meeting a special general meeting was held that same evening. In an animated discussion with 43 members present it resolved to endorse the position of the executive and issue a press statement to protect 'the union's good name' from allegations of Communist sympathies. 2 Seven days later the executive called for a special conference of the HWF to seek Young's dismissal as the federation's secretary. Despite Young's formidable political skills he was unable to resist the pressure from the other members of the HWF and he was forced to relinquish his position and end his relationship with the TUC. 3 With such a retreat, Young was allowed to continue as HWF secretary. Resourceful to the end Young gained the concession from the conference that while they would remain in the FOL he would draft a secret proposal to amend the FOL's constitution. It was agreed that their dissatisfaction with the Walsh leadership of the FOL would remain 'disguised' while the various hotel workers' unions considered changes to the FOL's structure. 4

In reality the forces in revolt against the FOL had broken up. The second half of 1950 saw the watersiders left increasingly isolated and by the time that the waterfront dispute commenced in February 1951 they had few allies left. As the conflict between the watersiders and their employers began to develop the HWF showed sympathy and support towards the watersiders' case. The watersiders' leaders 'Jock' Barnes and 'Toby' Hill addressed the 1951 February conference of the HWF on their dispute with the employers. The HWF unanimously resolved to:

Wholeheartedly endorse the stand being taken by the waterside workers in the interests of the wage claims of their own and other workers... and offers our full practical support to the extent possible in this present dispute. 5

1. CHW E Min 6 Jun 1950
2. CHW Min 6 Jun 1950
3. Report to Executive on Emergency Conference CHW E Min 4 Jul 1950
4. Ibid
There was a realisation that the struggle for higher wages was a common one for all workers, even if the HWF would pursue a more circumspect approach in obtaining wage increases for its members. Moreover, the HWF recognised the folly for the whole labour movement to allow the National government to intervene in the dispute and destroy the WWU, irrespective of the particular circumstances of the case.¹

As the dispute intensified in the early months of 1951 informal contact between the HWF and the WWU was maintained. The HWF attempted to act as an intermediary between the government and the watersiders. Young, in association with the parliamentary leader of the Labour Party, Walter Nash, and other Labour Party figures sought in vain to obtain a compromise settlement.² By the middle of July, with all attempts to reach a settlement having failed, the National government had succeeded in destroying the watersiders and their union. Several other unions who had struck in support of the WWU, such as the Wellington freezing workers and Wellington drivers suffered a similar fate. For the government, such a victory over the country's strongest and most militant union had been a dream which they had hardly thought possible to realise. The divisions within the labour movement, the persistence of the watersiders in continuing their struggle despite their vulnerable position and the determination of the government to exploit the opportunity to defeat the WWU combined to ensure the WWU's destruction.

Few trade unions escaped unscathed from the trauma of 1951. Many experienced intense internal conflict between those for or against action in support of the watersiders. As the dispute intensified and the prospects of victory or even compromise disappeared the dilemma of whether to continue support or withdraw became still more acute. Feelings of solidarity clashed with those of reason and self-preservation. Some choose to fight until the end despite the hopelessness of the situation while others saw defeat as inevitable and the destruction of their own union a futile gesture.³

2. CHW E Min 10 Apr 1951; see Bassett pp148-150
3. The Freezing Workers Union was one example where leaders and members were severely divided.
The various hotel workers' unions remained outside of the dispute. They lacked either the strategic economic position to influence the battle or the necessary commitment and experience amongst the rank-and-file to sustain any direct action in support of the watersiders.

In contrast to the experience of the watersiders, the period 1949 to 1951 had brought several positive gains to the hotel workers. Certainly there had been the defeat of the Labour government and the threat of voluntary unionism proposed by the National Party in its election manifesto. However, this had been averted by the FOL's representations to the government which had stressed the disastrous effects on the power of the moderate trade unions within the union movement. ¹ For the CHWU its enactment would have led to a serious problem in retaining and recruiting members in the tea-room and private hotel sectors where union organisation and trade union consciousness were weak. The more positive events for the CHWU lay in securing major gains in the licensed hotel section, first in late 1949 with penalty rates for weekend work (see section 1 above) and then in the next award round in 1951 with further increases in wages for barstaff. Thus despite its expressions of dissatisfaction over wages the union was, in a relatively short period, able to achieve the advances it desired without recourse to industrial action beyond stop-work meetings. Despite the apparent darkness of the defeat of the watersiders the experiences of many other unions including the CHWU was of modest success. Thus while the waterfront dispute was the most dramatic event in post-war labour history it was but one part of a picture which had light as well as dark features; that showed success as well as martyrdom and defeat.

5. WAGE CONFLICT IN THE LICENSED HOTELS

The awards covered by the CHWU had all received the 5% interim General Wage Order of 1950, and in the following year the Arbitration Court's full order of 15% — from which the interim 5% was deducted. These increases applied to the cash wage, board and lodging allowances and to uniform expenses, and the overall effect was to adjust real wages by slightly less than the movement in prices.

¹ Bassett p206; n46 p223
THE COOKS

In the licensed hotels males held the senior cooking positions in the kitchens. In tearooms, private hotels and hospitals all grades in the kitchen were normally staffed by women. In the licensed hotels kitchen staff had a long established right to equal pay for equal work; in the rest of the industry, women were paid less for the same job. As the most skilled section of the union’s members the cooks earned the highest rates of pay and were among the more active in union affairs. In the years 1936 to 1970 they provided four of the CHWU’s five presidents — Wilson, Nielsen, Tremaine and Dyer.

(Alexander Turnbull Library)
The key change in this period for the CHWU was in the licensed hotels where a special service allowance was introduced in 1951 for barstaff. After completing 12 months continuous service with the same employer at the same establishment, a bartender now received an extra payment of 10/- per week, representing an effective increase of 6% on the full weekly wage of £8 10/8d. Such an allowance avoided the relativity constraints of the Arbitration Court over the weekly wage for semi-skilled and unskilled workers. With the majority of barstaff eligible to receive the payment they had made a significant gain in their wages relative to other workers in the licensed hotel and other workers generally. Moreover, with the principle of a 12 months service allowance established in the industry, the union could, and did, claim for its extension to other licensed hotel workers. It was not until 1960 however that this was finally achieved.

Besides the service allowance the 1951 award negotiation had also secured a three weeks annual holiday for all licensed hotel staff after five years service. Obtaining these two gains had entailed several months of conciliation talks with the employers. The issues were resolved however without the necessity for any direct action nor recourse to the Arbitration Court. Such a pattern of direct negotiation, with the court playing an essentially passive role, became the characteristic feature of the union's award rounds in the 1950's.

After the union successes in the 1951 negotiations, a counter-offensive was mounted by the licensed hotel employers (the LVA) in 1952. The LVA proposed that the 10/- service allowance for barstaff be removed together with all the permit requirements restricting the use of part-time barmen and cleaners. While these were the LVA's official claims it soon became clear to the HWF that the originators and motive force for the proposals lay with the two major breweries — New Zealand and Dominion — and the secretary of the Auckland LVA. Understandably the CHWU along with the other affiliates of the HWF were alarmed by the employers' attack, as the unions had intended to lodge claims for a further weekly wage rise for all workers to compensate them for price rises since the last award.

1. B_Aw_51 (1951) p1921
2. Ibid
3. Report on Management Cmte CHW E Min 17 Feb 1953
The response of the HWF to the employers was to hold stop-work meetings in Auckland and Wellington and to hold private discussions with the management of Dominion and New Zealand Breweries. The stop-work meetings rejected the employers’ claims, expressing disbelief that the ordinary members of the LVA were responsible for such propositions. Workers were asked to contact their own employers about the claims and their subsequent responses indicated that most were either unaware of, or did not support, the LVA’s position. After these preliminary skirmishes, the HWF and LVA met in conciliation in April 1953. The assessors for the LVA were predominately from the three largest breweries, Dominion, New Zealand and Ballins, while on the unions’ side the HWF had appointed the vice-president of the FOL F. P. Walsh as its advocate. No agreement was reached and the meeting was adjourned.

The HWF now moved to strengthen its negotiating position by initiating the selective boycott of brewery owned hotels in Auckland and Wellington by trade unionists. Action was postponed however until the parties met again in conciliation on 28 May. The employers and in particular the major breweries had modified their position and were willing to accept the existing wages and conditions and in addition offer a rise of 5/- per week for all workers effective from 1 June 1953, with a further increase of 5/- to be considered in the light of any General Wage Order from the Arbitration Court.

This new offer represented a considerable movement by the LVA from its original position, which had been influenced by union pressure even though up until this point such pressure had not as yet reached the stage of direct industrial action. However, from the perspective of the HWF the new offer simply returned the negotiations to a realistic basis eliminating any question of a wage cut. The new offer was still unacceptable and the conflict now shifted to the size and date of a wage increase instead of whether any increase would even occur. To press their case for a higher and earlier rise the HWF now initiated a campaign of direct action. Stop-work

1. Report on Management Committee CHW E Min 17 Feb 1953
2. Federation Circular 22 Aug 1953 at CHW E Min 19 Oct 1953
4. Report on Conciliation Council CHW E Min 8 Jun 1953
meetings were held in Auckland and Wellington and a strategy of on-the-job agitation was adopted as the means of achieving its goal. Selected hotels would again be boycotted but this time hotel barstaff would institute work practices designed to lower sales and profits. ¹ For instance, each drinker would be closely scrutinized to ensure that they were over the legal drinking age of 21, a practice that would slow service and hence sales. The nine ounce beer handles would be filled to the brim by barstaff who would also refuse to engage in any of the highly profitable, if illegal practices of after-hours trading. The unions would not issue any further part-time permits for barstaff; and part-time workers, who were generally employed in the peak trading period of 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. would be asked to withdraw their labour. If they did not, then the full-time barstaff would refuse to work alongside any part-timers. Such tactics struck at the ability of the hotels to sell their product without generally affecting the wages of the workers. As a further measure a fighting fund was established, funded by voluntary donations to pay for the pickets to be posted at boycotted hotels.²

From 10 to 24 June these tactics were employed in Auckland and Wellington with mixed success. In Auckland the union distributed 26,000 pamphlets explaining their case to the public, while the employers attempted to reduce the pressure on their hotels by shifting beer supplies between them. The employers' resistance was apparently strengthened by rumours that the government would be opposed to any increase in beer prices if the employers accepted a 10/- wage rise. The government denied such a suggestion.³

With continuing opposition to a higher wage offer coming from the employers in the South Island, the southern affiliates of the HWF were requested to take some direct action to place pressure on their local employers. In Canterbury, the CHWU executive was reluctant to act. Brooks believed that it was difficult to obtain support in Christchurch as many staff were experienced and were paid above the award rates, and a substantial proportion of the city's barmen had profitable sidelines such as acting as bookies for horse racing.⁴

1. Federation Circular 22 Aug 1953 at CHW E Min 19 Oct 1953
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. CHW E Min 22 Jun 1953
Other members of the executive expressed similarly pessimistic views, stating that workers in Canterbury would accept the employers’ last offer of a 5/- increase. Nevertheless, the executive decided to call a special meeting of the federation to be held in Christchurch, which would be able to hear the latest report on the situation and generate publicity for the union’s wage claims.

On 30 June 1953 the special conference was held and it was resolved that the Taranaki and South Island unions should take some form of direct action, although it left the specific measures to the discretion of each executive.² The FOL was requested to consider obtaining the assistance of the brewery workers and brewery drivers while affiliated unions of the HWF would approach individual hotel licensees to seek a full 10/- wage increase. The CHWU obtained the support of watersiders and seamen at Lyttelton and initiated selected boycotts of hotels in the port while plans were also made for action on the West Coast.³ These were modest steps but the threat of further industrial action and the determination of the unions to persist in their campaign was sufficient to alarm the employers.

By 6 July the LVA was prepared to offer an immediate increase of 5/- per week with no qualification as to any future wage order that might be issued by the Arbitration Court nor the term of the award. In Young’s view, the threat of action being expanded in the South Island had been a ‘material assistance in bringing the Dispute to a final settlement’.⁴ Meetings of workers in Auckland and Wellington voted for the acceptance of the offer and the LVA and HWF reached formal agreement.⁵

This rise was a reward for the persistence of the HWF and it completed the series of gains that the unions had made in the licensed hotels since the end of World War Two. While weekly wages had largely maintained their real

1. CHW E Min 22 Jun 1953
2.” CHW E Min 6 Jul 1953
3. CHW E Min 27 Jul 1953; Federation circular op cit for West Coast.
4. Federation Circular op cit
5. Ibid 594 votes to 6 in Auckland; 396 to 4 in Wellington.
value the introduction of penalty rates, changes to holiday pay, and the new service allowance had all boosted real earnings for licensed hotel workers. As Table 4.1 indicates the wages earned by barstaff rose particularly significantly and as a bonus all licensed hotel staff had an expanded entitlement to annual and special holidays.

TABLE 4.1 LICENSED HOTEL AWARD, 1945 TO 1954

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1954(Nov)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>2 wks</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs service</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>7 (T½)</td>
<td>9 (DT)</td>
<td>9 (DT)</td>
<td>9 (DT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday/Sunday</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Sat T½</td>
<td>7th or 3/2</td>
<td>Both T½</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sun 6/- or 3/-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly Wages</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 10+ hk</td>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>9-19/10</td>
<td>12-3/11</td>
<td>13-19/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 6hk</td>
<td>6-5/3</td>
<td>7-18/2</td>
<td>9-16</td>
<td>11-11/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4hk</td>
<td>4-0</td>
<td>5-9/11</td>
<td>7-0/6</td>
<td>8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>3-10</td>
<td>5-3/8</td>
<td>6-16/11</td>
<td>8-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>2-6/6</td>
<td>3-11/2</td>
<td>4-12</td>
<td>5-12/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>5-15/5</td>
<td>7-6/10 to 7-18/4</td>
<td>8-17/2 to 9-10/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add board &amp; lodging</td>
<td>4-10</td>
<td>1-13</td>
<td>1-18</td>
<td>2-2/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages: Casual per weekday</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef</td>
<td>1 to 10</td>
<td>1-10 to 2-0/11</td>
<td>1-17/4 to 2-9/10</td>
<td>2-4 to 2-18/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
<td>1-5s</td>
<td>1-15/5</td>
<td>2-3/7</td>
<td>2-11/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress (single meal)</td>
<td>8/6</td>
<td>8/6</td>
<td>15/6</td>
<td>19s1d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: [See note on Tables]
1. If worked, payment at time-and-a-half or double-time
2. Plus 6/- per day males and kitchenworkers; 3/- other females.
3. Higher figure includes service allowance payable after 12 months service with the same employer which was effectively an increase in wage rates.
4. Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid.
5. First 3 days only thereafter at ordinary rate in 1945 and 1949. Every weekday in 1951 and 1954.
6. DISSENT IN THE UNION

A period of internal quiescence had followed the defeat of the opposition group in the 1949 executive election. However, in 1954 the opposition reemerged with essentially the same personalities including Noel Smith of the Communist Party. Once again the group was a heterogenous collection of Communists and independent critics and again at the centre of the debate was the union's alleged inactivity and the deficiencies in its meeting and electoral procedures. The opposition had two objectives: first to contest and win the 1955 elections for the executive; and second
to amend the union's rules. Specifically, they wanted to improve the publicity for the union's general meetings, improve the opportunity for members to stand for the executive and transform the position of secretary from that of a permanent appointment to one requiring regular election. The last proposal together with the contesting of the executive elections posed a clear challenge to Brooks as secretary and the incumbent executive.

It was ironic that the challenge now being mounted was against an executive that had changed significantly in its personal composition since the first conflicts with the opposition group in 1947. With the resignation of president Andrew Wilson in 1952 only four of the nine members of the executive had held office prior to 1947. The group that had been associated with Brooks since the early 1930's had been replaced by a more diverse executive. Amongst the new members was Colin McCready, one of Brooks' critics in the late 1940's, who had been appointed to a casual vacancy by the executive in 1952. A young chef at the United Service Hotel he belonged to a new generation which looked to the problems of the future rather than to the triumphs and conflicts of the past which still seemed to shape Brook's outlook. One sign of the changing times on the executive was the disagreement between Brooks and McCready in early 1955 on the union's relations with HWF secretary, F. Young. Brooks had drafted a letter to Young criticising the federation's work and recalling several of the past points of disagreement between the CHWU and the HWF. McCready and president 'Lou' Nielsen opposed Brooks and successfully insisted that several of the issues contained in the letter be deleted. As McCready put it "it was time that we stopped arguing over things in the past.... not getting [us] anywhere.... He would not support sending the letter until he had read the letter and the minutes himself." What was significant was that Brooks' judgement was openly challenged and his views, which on the HWF as well as on industrial issues had virtually always been endorsed, were being rejected.

1. see CHW E Min 27 Mar 1946. For 1954 incumbent executive see CHW AR 1951-2, which contains members who were re-elected in 1953 for two year terms. For changes between 1952 and 1955 see E Min 6 Jul 1953.
2. CHW E Min 5 Aug 1952
4. CHW E Min 28 Mar 1955
For the 1955 executive elections the opposition submitted a complete list of candidates. The executive was surprised and early in March discussed the issue and decided to make certain concessions to the opposition. While the cost, some £250, was cited as a factor in not wishing to contest a postal ballot, the primary purpose of the concessions was to avert any potential takeover by the opposition group. F. Gerard, an elderly long serving member of the executive together with the president Lou Nielsen agreed to forfeit the dual positions they held as both trustees and as executive members. In addition Mrs Keats, who was in poor health and now indeed a small employer, would be requested to resign. As a result of these steps three vacancies would be created on the executive which would be offered to the opposition group at the Annual General Meeting. Before this the executive held a further discussion of the situation on 28 April and on this occasion McCready questioned the continuing membership of three executive members. F. Gerard, Mrs Webster and Mrs Donaldson, the first two of whom had been on the executive prior to 1947, had all ceased to work in the industry or to be financial members of the union. ‘If questions were asked at the AGM’ suggested McCready ‘then the rest of the executive could be embarrassed.’ Mrs Webster replied that she ‘knew a great deal about the industry and was intensely interested’ and for the moment the matter rested.

In March 1955 the union held its Annual General Meeting. With 80 members present the meeting witnessed a vigorous challenge by the opposition group. They first unsuccessfully attempted to have the union’s balance sheet printed and distributed to all members. Brooks defended the existing arrangement of limiting access to those members in attendance at the general meeting or those who choose to visit the union office where they could also see a copy. However, the opposition had more success on the question of who would be the returning officer for the forthcoming executive

1. CHW E Min 14 Mar 1955
2. Ibid
3. CHW E Min 28 Apr 1955
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. CHW Min 28 Mar 1955
The executive had appointed Tom Martin of the Seamens' Union—a long time associate of Brooks—as the returning officer but this was rejected by the meeting who recommended instead that a neutral official from the Labour department conduct the elections. While the power to make the decision was entirely in the hands of the executive, they decided to follow this recommendation.

With the opposition having rejected the offer of three seats on the executive the postal election had proceeded. Before it could be completed, however, two factors intervened to force its abandonment. Firstly, the opposition alleged that by marking on the circular to members the names of the incumbent members of the executive, the executive had attempted to influence the ballot. It was the second factor, though, which proved to be decisive. As four of the incumbent members of the executive standing for re-election were no longer financial members of the union, the returning officer ruled them ineligible and the ballot void. Brooks consulted Young on the problem but it was clear that the ruling was legally correct. Following the advice of the returning officer the executive called a special meeting of the union to cancel the ballot and reopen nominations. There was disagreement with the opposition over whether the ballot should be for all the executive positions or only, as the opposition wanted, for a limited number. After a long discussion the meeting agreed to a full new ballot being conducted.

In August 1955 the executive election finally took place. With several incumbent members no longer eligible a number of new candidates appeared outside of the opposition group, several of whom had been encouraged to stand by the executive. The election saw the defeat of all the opposition candidates except for one non-Communist, B. Franklin. Politically, the executive retained its essential pro-Labour Party orientation and its commitment

1. CHW Min 28 Mar 1955
2. CHW E Min 18 Apr 1955
3. see CHW Min 13 May 1955; E Min 18 Apr 1955
4. CHW E Min 2 May 1955
5. Ibid
6. CHW E Min 7 May 1955
7. CHW E Min 13 May 1955
8. CHW AR 1955-6
to the conciliation and arbitration system. Nevertheless, the personal composition of the executive had undergone a further change which marked the final stages of its break with the personal associations and values of the 1930's. Now only the president 'Lou' Nielsen had been a member of the executive prior to 1947, out of a total executive membership of 12, six of whom were members for the first time. ¹

In the course of the turmoil over the elections Brooks had been increasingly absent from the conduct of the union’s affairs. The union’s day-to-day operations rested with Les Short, the assistant secretary since 1954, president Lou Nielsen and the office manager Miss Humm. ² Brooks now aged 71 was in poor physical health and his condition had been exacerbated by the psychological stress of recent events. In June 1955 he tendered his resignation as secretary of the union, trusting the responsibility for defending the union against the opposition to Short and Nielsen. ³

Before the election result of August 1955, the opposition had taken the initiative in June on its second objective, the amending of the union’s constitution. On 13 June a petition was delivered to the executive containing the constitutional amendments, the most important of which were the proposals for a biennial election for the office of secretary and a mandatory circular to members notifying them of the opening of nominations for the executive elections. ⁴ On 14 June, with 35 members attending, the general meeting considered the constitutional changes. However, the majority felt that the instability introduced by a biennial election for the secretaryship was likely to undermine the union’s effectiveness and along with the other proposals the amendment was decisively rejected by the meeting. ⁵

Throughout the conflict with the opposition there had been two dimensions to the criticism of the union’s management. The Communists disliked the union’s arbitrationist approach and the emphasis on professional officials, such as Brooks, to perform the union’s work. As George Finlayson, one of the Communist critics — and subsequently to become the president of

1. CHW AR 1955-6; E Min 27 Mar 1946
2. see CHW E Min 28 Feb 1955, 6 Jul 1953, 29 Aug 1950
3. CHW E Min 9 Jul 1955
4. CHW E Min 13 Jun 1955
5. CHW Min 14 Jun 1955
the National Union of Railwaymen — put it, they disliked the ‘fancy filing and record systems’ and preferred direct action by the ordinary workers. For the Communists the proposed reforms to the constitution sought to produce both a more radical, rank-and-file controlled union and the elimination of procedural deficiencies. The independent critics in the opposition were primarily concerned with creating fair and democratic procedures, rather than producing a more radical union. Short, who was acting as secretary for the June general meeting in Brooks absence, was prepared to cooperate with the opposition in removing the short-comings in the union’s procedures but without surrendering control of the CHWU to the opposition group. Unlike the personal animosities that had developed between Brooks and his critics, Short was able to reassure the opposition that he was open to suggestions of reform. He indicated his support for the principle of a regularly elected secretary but preferred that the term be longer than only two years. Short further suggested that a committee be formed to consider the procedural changes to the constitution. As no notice of such a proposal had been given, unanimity was required and this was not obtained. However, Short called a further general meeting the following week and a committee was then formed comprising Noel Smith and B. Franklin from the opposition and four union officials.

The committee presented a final report in December 1955 which was ratified by the union’s general meeting. The reports recommendations satisfied the main criticisms made by the opposition group over the union’s procedures. On the crucial issue of the secretaryship the committee recommended that henceforth a four-yearly election should be held by postal ballot. From now on the opening of nominations for the executive would be publicised in a circular sent to each workplace three weeks prior to the Annual General Meeting. Casual vacancies would also require an election by ballot and the executive would only retain its traditional power to make an appointment where the vacancy arose within six months of a normal executive election. Short also took the opportunity to update the

1. CHW Min 14 Jun 1955
2. Ibid
3. CHW Min 21 Jun 1955
4. CHW Min 12 Dec 1955
union’s name by including ‘hospital’ in the title to reflect the large number of workers in this sector under the union’s coverage. Henceforth the union would be officially known as ‘The Canterbury Hotel, Hospital, Restaurant and Related Trades I.U.W.’. All these recommendations were incorporated into the union’s constitution and came into effect from the beginning of 1956.  

The conflict with the opposition had once again seen the electoral defeat of their candidates — except for B. Franklin. On this occasion, however, several reforms had been made which largely met their demands. Nevertheless, control of the union remained in the hands of Labour Party supporters and while the personalities of the executive had changed the power of the executive compared to rank-and-file members, remained virtually intact. There was a postscript to the saga of dissent. The new constitutional provision for an elected secretary enjoyed but one brief trial, with Short decisively defeating the Communist candidate. In 1957, executive member and union organiser Murray Rhodes successfully persuaded the union’s general meeting to delete the elective provision and return once more to a permanent appointment. Short and others on the executive remained neutral towards the change and with no appearance at the meeting by the Communists, Rhodes’ amendment was passed. Thus, the opposition were ultimately thwarted in one of their central demands.

7. THE END OF THE BROOKS ERA

With his resignation in June 1955, Reg Brooks had ended his 36 years of leadership of the CHWU and a chapter in its history. The combination of age, deteriorating health and the turmoil of recent events in the union had forced Brooks to depart. He left, however, satisfied that his assistant secretary, Les Short, would prove an able and honest successor. Since his appointment first as the union’s organiser in September 1953, Short had demonstrated competence and integrity in his work for the union. He had undertaken the

1. CHW Min 12 Dec 1955
2. Registered on 20 Dec 1955
241 A MANCHESTER STREET

The upstairs offices were the rented home for the CHWU from 1929 to 1957. The first office of the union had been at 138 Manchester Street but after one year they moved to 162, now the site of Norwich Insurance. In 1919 the new executive established the union's office in Trades Hall, where it remained until 1929.

(G. Patterson)
daily rounds of workplace visits and had then gained experience in award
eegotiations as a member of the HWF group of assessors in 1954.\(^1\) Now
finally he had been tested in the fire of internal dissent and along with
the union survived intact.

Brooks left to his successors both a viable organisation and a number of
achievements in the wages and conditions of the workers he had represented
for more than three decades. In the last ten years since the war, the wages
and conditions of the CHWU’s members had continued to move forward,
albeit at times more slowly and modestly than many might have desired.
Nevertheless, a real gain in incomes had been obtained for most of the
union’s members in the course of the period from 1945 to 1955. As with the
wider labour movement the union’s members shared in the growing prosperity
of the New Zealand economy but the relative gains by labour were less
than those made by the business and farming sectors of the economy.\(^2\) A
period of labour shortages which continued to be a feature of the economy
did aid the union’s case for raising wages. As to the comparability between
the union’s sections, Table 4.2 shows the decisive margin held by the workers
in the licensed hotels. While all had made some real gains in wages the
introduction of penalty rates and the service allowance in the case of the barmen
had increased the gap between this section and other sectors. The most
significant development for those workers in the post war decade had been
in the lowering of their ordinary weekly hours from 44 to 40.

As to the union organisation, the end of Brooks’ secretaryship had left
the union financially strong and with a large and still growing membership.
In the ten years since the war’s end the CHWU had expanded by 703
members to reach a total membership of 2713 by the end of 1955.\(^3\)
Similarly its annual income and nett assets had more than doubled in the
same period to reach respectively £7868 per annum and £15,026.\(^4\) The
union’s membership made it the fourth largest in Canterbury.\(^5\)

1. CHW E Min 21 Jun 1954
2. BAw 54 (1954) p p 1374-6
3. AJHR H11 (1956)
4. CHW AR 1955-6
5. AJHR 2 H11 (1945) p21
### TABLE 4.2 INTER-AWARD COMPARISON, 1954-55

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Licensed Hotels</th>
<th>Private Hotels</th>
<th>Tearooms</th>
<th>Chartered Clubs</th>
<th>Public Hospitals</th>
<th>Private Hospitals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>2 weeks; 3 after 5 years</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>2 weeks; 3 after 10 years</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>9 (DT)</td>
<td>8 (DT)</td>
<td>7 (T½) 2 (DT)</td>
<td>9 (DT)</td>
<td>9 (DT)</td>
<td>9 (DT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday/Sunday</td>
<td>Both T½</td>
<td>Sat T½ Sun T½</td>
<td>Sat T½ Sun DT</td>
<td>Sat T½ Sun DT</td>
<td>Sun DT</td>
<td>Sun DT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Wages:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Licensed Hotels</th>
<th>Private Hotels</th>
<th>Tearooms</th>
<th>Chartered Clubs</th>
<th>Public Hospitals</th>
<th>Private Hospitals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weekly (incl b &amp; l)²</td>
<td>M &amp; F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st cook 4hk</td>
<td>12-16/11²</td>
<td>10-14/3²</td>
<td>9-15/6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10-5/6</td>
<td>10-2/6⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4hk</td>
<td>10-12/11</td>
<td>8-18/3</td>
<td>7-16/6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8-9/1</td>
<td>9-8/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>10-8/11</td>
<td>7-18/5</td>
<td>7-0/4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7-9/6</td>
<td>7-9/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>7-15/4</td>
<td>7-8/1</td>
<td>6-10/7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7-0/6⁴</td>
<td>7-1/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman/Steward</td>
<td>11-13/1³</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9-11/6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter/Orderly</td>
<td>10-4/8</td>
<td>9-15/7</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9-18/0(M)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Wages:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Licensed Hotels</th>
<th>Private Hotels</th>
<th>Tearooms</th>
<th>Chartered Clubs</th>
<th>Public Hospitals</th>
<th>Private Hospitals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casual</td>
<td>2-2/3 to 2-16/1</td>
<td>2-2 to 2-16/1</td>
<td>2-7/9 to 3-6/19 +15%</td>
<td>+20%</td>
<td>+20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress (single meal)</td>
<td>18s 4d</td>
<td>17s 8d</td>
<td>17s 8d</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. All rates as at Nov 1954 including 13% GWO of Oct 1954 except Tearooms Feb 1955. Chartered Clubs rate based on 1952 award still current and adjusted by GWOs.

2. Wage rates include cash value of board and lodgings.

3. Includes service allowance of 13s (11s 6d + GWO).

4. Rates for stewards serving alcohol for more than 20 hours per week.

5. Rate for 1st and 2nd cooks in kitchens with subsistence of 201-300 meals.

6. Each weekday for five days in LH but for Private Hotels, and Tearooms 1st 3 days only, thereafter the pro-rata of the ordinary rate. Higher weekend rates in LH.

7. Lower rate for less than 3hk; higher 3hk plus.

8. For first 2 hours.
The accumulation of a substantial cash reserve had led the executive as early as 1946 to purchase an office building for the union in the form of a two-storey building in Ferry Road.\(^1\) At a cost of £2600 the building was intended to provide a secure investment for the union as well as office facilities. However, no actual transfer of the union’s office occurred and when the union sold the Ferry Road building in 1951, it continued to operate from its rented rooms in Manchester Street.\(^2\) The only other important financial development in the period was the increase in the union’s fees from their 1945 level of 6d per week to 1/- by 1953.\(^3\) This together with the rising membership and austere financial management assured the union’s continuing accumulation of funds.

The largest deficiency in the union’s operation was in the low level of membership activity. In the licensed hotel dispute in 1953 this weakness had been most recently evident. The union leadership had made no serious attempt to lead, involve and organise its members and although many unions in the arbitration tradition suffered from such a problem, both the Auckland and Wellington unions had demonstrated on this occasion that a higher level of activity at the workplace was possible. Brooks was reluctant to rectify this with more workplace contact.

Nevertheless Brooks had succeeded in charting the union vessel through three turbulent decades including the storms of the depression. Friends and critics alike acknowledged his ability, commitment and integrity. The commitment of the union had dominated his life and he was to die only a year after his resignation. His relations with the union in these last months were not entirely pleasant as Brooks had expected some form of pension from the union for his services. He bitterly rejected the union’s offer of a gift in the form of an arm-chair, and the subsequent offer of £1.10 per week for the rest of his life.\(^4\) Neither the executive or the general meeting were prepared to make any substantial on-going payment especially in the light of the recent dissension within the union. When Brooks suffered a fatal stroke in 1956, an obituary appeared in the “Standard” praising Brooks for his honesty and hard work for the CHWU and the Labour government.\(^5\)

1. CHW E Min 13 Aug 1946 p54; AR 1946-7
2. CHW E Min 15 Jan 1952
3. CHW E Min 27 Jul 1953
4. CHW Min 13 Sep 1955
With the passing of Brooks a decisive phase in the union's history had ended. A phase in which the union had been rebuilt, achieved significant gains for its members and entered into a close alliance with the labour movement. Now in 1956 the union had a new secretary, a largely new and younger executive, a new name, and the new challenges of a different era to face.
CHAPTER FIVE

AMITY AND AFFLUENCE, 1956 TO 1969

The years 1956 to 1969 brought a period of economic prosperity to New Zealand and its people. The standard of living rose, unemployment virtually disappeared and many New Zealand industries expanded and modernised. These changes occurred in a period of relative tranquility in politics and in industrial relations. It was not until the last years of the 1960's that New Zealand again experienced significant industrial conflict between workers and their employers.

These dominant tendencies of prosperity, modernisation and industrial peace, also marked the experience of the hotel, hospital and restaurant workers in these decades. The hotel industry witnessed radical change in its operation, first with the 1962 Sale of Liquor Act and then with the introduction in 1967 of 10 o'clock closing; while the rise of the motor hotel largely supplanted the traditional type of private hotel. It was in the areas of the restaurants, clubs and hospitals that the largest expansion took place. In particular the number of food outlets, diverse in their variety, proliferated, reflecting the growth in population, in national prosperity and the growing trend to eat away from home. For the union, the period also brought a modest advance in the prosperity of its members and the union’s organisation — advances achieved largely free from either industrial or internal strife. There was, however, the growing challenge for the union of labour casualisation. Despite some successes by the CHWU in slowing its development and in ensuring that adequate wages were paid for part-time and casual workers, the tendency for employers to casualise the industry’s workforce continued to increase between 1956 and 1969. With the onset of the 1970’s this process rapidly accelerated leading to a further decline in regular full-time employment, with the majority of the industry’s workers becoming part-time or casual employees.

The last years of the 1960’s also witnessed a change from the previously tranquil nature of industrial relations. Parallel with developments in the wider labour movement, the CHWU became involved in a greater degree of
industrial conflict. Sparked by the introduction of 10 o’clock closing the union initiated strike action in 1967 and in the course of the next two years the union became more active by expanding its coverage to include domestic workers in rest homes and, following the AHWU, the Air New Zealand Flight Kitchen. By 1970 the level of industrial conflict in New Zealand industry was substantially above that for the period from 1952 to 1969, and the conflict would further intensify in the early 1970’s in both the hotel and restaurant industry and throughout the New Zealand economy.

1. THE NEW FACE OF THE INDUSTRY

In the early 1960’s the hotel and restaurant industry underwent a series of changes that marked its entry into the modern era. With changes to the licensing laws in 1961 and again in 1962, the first fresh winds of change began to disperse the dust and cobwebs that had gathered around the licensed trade’s operations since World War One. At the same time, the old inner city private hotels largely gave way to the new motor hotel and the city’s landscape became dotted with new tearooms and quick-lunch outlets. For the staff of the hotels change also came to the training of workers, with the creation of a chef training scheme that formed an important part of a concerted campaign to raise the status and quality of the catering industry and its workers.

The promise of licensing reform, contained in the report of the 1946 Royal Commission had failed to eventuate in the 1950’s. In 1959 a fresh initiative emerged. In a new attempt to overcome the increasingly antiquated licensing laws and liquor facilities parliament established a select committee to examine the situation. Its report led first, to the Licensing Amendment Act of 1961 and then to the 1962 Sale of Liquor Act. These two measures inaugurated the beginning of a new look for the industry. Chief among the initial reforms was the commencement of a comprehensive review by the Licensing Control Commission of all those establishments operating a liquor license. Existing licences became provisional and in the course of the next six years the Commission visited the hundreds of

1 Licensing Amendment Act (NZ Statutes No. 135 1961) p2013
2 Sale of Liquor Act (NZ Statutes No. 139 1962) p1101
3 Licensing Amdt Act op cit, for the CHWU’s attitude to reform see CHW Min 11 Jul 1960
PARK AVENUE MOTEL, CHRISTCHURCH

The phenomena of the motor hotel, or motel, as it became known, reached New Zealand in the late 1950's. Growth was rapid and within a few years the motel was the dominant type of private hotel. Normally providing accommodation alone, the motel usually employed only one or two female domestic workers, and this sector remained an area of low pay and weak in trade union consciousness.

(G. Patterson)
hotels throughout the country, examining their location and the standard of their service. A permanent licence was issued by the Commission only when the hotel complied with its requirements. The investigations revealed numerous sub-standard facilities which frequently had 'non-existent accommodation services', despite their legal obligations to provide such a service.¹ Now, under the new 1961 Act, a hotel was no longer legally required to provide accommodation and the Commission could issue a separate tavern-only licence. The 1962 Sale of Liquor Act further aided in this modernisation by providing for two distinct licences, one for the premises and the other for the individual publican. This enabled action to be taken by the various authorities against a reprobate hotelkeeper without removing the community's liquor facility, a consequence which had restricted the Commission's work in the 1950's. The third important change to the liquor trade came in 1960 with the licensing of restaurants to provide liquor, although initially this was limited to a total of ten licences for all of New Zealand. By March 1966 the number had risen to 44, including seven in Christchurch.²

While these steps towards modernisation were taking place in the licensed hotel sector, the face of the private hotels had undergone a radical transformation. The steady decline in the old style of private hotels since the end of World War Two had culminated in the late 1950's with the emergence of the motor hotel or motel in their stead. The traditional private hotel provided low priced accommodation and meals, but without liquor sales they were never a particularly profitable activity. Patronage of the private hotels declined in the post-war period and the owners generally lacked the desire or the resources, or the prospect of a viable return on their investment, to upgrade or modernise their hotels. Located in the inner city with poor vehicle access the facilities generally became rundown. In their place arose the phenomenon of the motel which was already established in the United States of America and Australia. These modern facilities with self-contained units were orientated towards the new and growing market of the car travelling guest. From the perspective of management, motels avoided the costs associated with providing any food service and

¹ For reports on the progress of the Commission see AJHR H3 (1955 to 1971)
² AJHR 2 H3 (1966) p15
required only a minimal number of staff besides the owner-manager to service the rooms. While the CHWU maintained its coverage of the part-time workers that remained organising the workers remained difficult and they continued to follow behind the wage movements of the licensed hotels.

Meanwhile the tearoom sector had undergone a rapid expansion, reflecting the growth in population and in its affluence but also a change in lifestyles towards more eating out. The predominant growth was in daytime tearooms providing lunches and afternoon teas supplemented by increases in the number of take-away food outlets. These operations were generally small-scale and operated by a private individual or a family rather than by any large company. Although several department stores did operate tearooms, the development of food outlets under the control of large businesses, in the form of multi-nationals such as Kentucky Fried Chicken, did not occur until the late 1960's and it was not until the following decade that this new form became a firm feature of the cityscape. Similarly, from the late 1960's onwards licensed restaurants and other facilities orientated towards evening meals rapidly grew adding yet another dimension to the industry.

The last of the significant developments in the hotel and restaurant industry was in the field of staff training. Until the late 1950's no formal system of training existed for cooks or other catering staff and skills were acquired either on the job, in the home, or through previous experience as cooks on ships. Aside from a small section of licensed hotels and restaurants in the upper end of the market, there was no requirement for the production of a sophisticated cuisine. In most establishments the meals were relatively basic and of a limited variety. The training scheme that was developed in the late 1950's for cooks was directed largely towards that upper end of the market.

Jointly owned by the New Zealand food company Watties and the American company Kentucky Fried Chicken.
Together with several Auckland chefs, Young, the secretary of the HWF, inaugurated a trial training scheme in 1957. In the course of the 1960's the number of cooks undergoing training continued to rise and by the decades end, after considerable difficulties, training schemes had been established in several technical institutes. Christchurch did not establish its polytechnic scheme, however, until 1972.

Parallel with the development of training, the HWF and the CHWU had supported a general effort to raise the professional standard and status of cooking. The unions had played a key role in the late 1950's in forming a National Chefs Association which aimed to raise the status of the catering trade and the occupation, promote training and improve the wages and conditions of chefs. Their activities were intended to supplement the work of the union and indeed the leadership of the association lay with key union officials. George Armstrong, the assistant secretary of the AHWU, became the national secretary of the association while in Canterbury, Les Short undertook the job of the local secretary with Lou Nielsen, the CHWU president, acting as the local association's vice-president. In addition to the support of the Chefs Association the union became involved in the Food and Cookery Association, which also aimed to promote the catering industry and in local competitions that provided a testing arena for the skills of chefs.

Taken together these four changes, in the licensed hotels, private hotels, tearooms and in staff training, led to the reshaping of the industry to meet the changes in life styles and rise in prosperity. By 1969 the industry was significantly different in its character from that of the post-war era, and would experience even more radical changes in the 1970's.

1. See FL 1 no 18 1968 p15. Young had raised the issue earlier in 1946 see CHW E Min 22 Jul 1946
2. CHW E Min 14 Oct 1957
3. Ibid
2. CASUALISATION

While the industry was undergoing these changes, the dominant place held by full-time workers was also beginning to be eroded. Increasingly employers were hiring regular part-time workers or casual staff to meet particular daily, weekly or seasonal needs. There had, of course, always been an element of casualisation present in the industry reflecting the variations in work requirements, especially for workers such as waitresses. Nor indeed did the changes in the 1960's establish casual labour as the dominant form in the industry. That radical change would have to await the decade of the 1970's. In the meantime while the movement towards such a position was accelerating, the majority of employees in hotels and restaurants continued to be full-time. Where casuals were introduced, they were usually in the expanding sections of the trade, such as evening bar-work (following the introduction of 10 o'clock closing in 1967), licensed restaurants and tearooms. As the industry as a whole expanded, both full-time and casual numbers grew, but the relative proportion of casuals increased.

Nevertheless, the significant feature of New Zealand's hotels and restaurants was that regular full-time employment had remained so dominant for so long. Such a feature distinguished the New Zealand industry from its international counterparts where casualisation had assumed a major role at an early stage and where many workers consequently lacked the security or income of regular employment. To explain why this was a common international experience is to identify certain fundamental features of the industry's operations. To understand the second issue, why the New Zealand experience was distinct, requires an examination of the roles played in the industry's history by prohibition and compulsory unionism.

The hotel and catering industry is an industry of peaks and lows in work requirements. At certain points in the day large numbers of staff are required to serve a meal and to clean away afterwards. Similarly, the requirements for kitchenstaff, barstaff, serving and cleaning staff vary between different times in the day, the days in a week and the period of the year. In a highly labour intensive industry maximising the efficient use of labour is central to the profitability of the employers. To ensure that each hour of labour
time was productive, workers would be hired only for a particular meal or task and the down-time — the time in which no or only marginally productive work is performed — consequent in employing full-time workers could be kept to a minimum. Furthermore, in small hotels and restaurants it was more expensive to employ a full-time cleaner than to hire labour for a short period of intense cleaning. To meet the differing labour needs of each employer a variety of practices developed varying between the type of establishment and the type of work. Such practices also changed over the years as the enterprise changed and various practices were found to be more or less efficient. Generally, senior cooks remained full-time workers while serving and cleaning staff might be employed on a regular basis each week but only for a few hours in each day covering the busiest period. Alternatively, one worker might perform a combination of duties such as waitressing during meal times with work as a housemaid in the morning period. Again, a hotel might employ staff in combinations of full-time workers and casuals to cover the wide time spread of the three main daily meals.

The demand by employers for casual labour was only half the equation. A potential supply also had to exist in the form of workers to work irregularly or on a regular but part-time basis. While some full time workers sought a secondary job, the general international pattern was for the supply of labour to come from married women, students and the marginalised unemployed, often from among migrants or ethnic minorites.1 Women predominated because of the gender role associations of domestic work and because of the suitability of combining part-time and flexible work hours with family demands. The low pay, status and level of skill was unattractive to male workers who had the opportunity to seek more skilled or career-orientated jobs. Moreover, while women might seek both full-time and casual work, male workers continued to be full-time workers in order to support either themselves or their families. Thus in some areas such as cleaning, where both full-time and part-time labour were suitable options, the unavailability and usually higher wage rates for male workers led

employers to hire large numbers of part-time women, who were available and cheaper.

In the early years of low pay and long hours, in New Zealand as elsewhere, there was little necessity for employers to employ casual labour. In New Zealand in the early twentieth century workers could be employed from 70 to 90 hours a week up to 13 hours on any one day, each and every weekend, with the cost to the employer being seldom more than a £1 a week. (see Chapter 1) With no penalty payments for statutory holidays or the weekend and little if any overtime, the employer could meet the demands of the wide time spread of meals and always have a supply of labour on hand. Casuals were used, but in an essentially supplementary role, to meet especially heavy demands and for special catering occasions, such as banquets. Nevertheless the necessity for casualisation was low because of the low wages and long hours of full time workers and also because of a second factor, namely the family structure of most enterprises. This structure led to the use of family members but also to a less professional and aggressive approach to business management. As the century progressed there was increasing competition and especially from the 1950's onwards in areas such as the licensed hotels there was a greater professionalism in management and attention to organising labour in the most profitable manner possible.

While the profit motive underlay changes in the pattern of employment leading to more casual and part-time labour, this tendency could be modified by the collective strength possessed by that country's workers and by the intervention of the state. Where unionisation was weak, and restraints from the state, either in respect of labour laws or liquor laws, few, then the employers could exercise the power to substitute casual labour for full-time in order to maximise their profits.

In New Zealand the experience of the hotel and restaurant industry was different largely because of the collective strength acquired by the workers and limitations on the industry imposed by the state. In particular, the licensing laws prevented the development of a night-time dimension to the trade. The six o'clock closing of hotel bars from
1917 provided hours of work suitable for full-time regular employment, with the two hour peak in sales between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. being met by the hiring of part-time workers. Similarly, the absence of virtually any licensed restaurants further limited the scope for casual labour which was normally employed for the evening business. The state's second variety of intervention added to the strength of the workers. The system of compulsory arbitration provided a valuable framework in which unionism could emerge in the industry and secure a minimum set of conditions. In an industry where the organising of workers was historically and internationally a difficult objective to realise, this system was an important aid. With the establishment of compulsory unionism by the first Labour government in 1936, the relative power of the workers in the industry was further reinforced. From this position of strength the union was able to secure, maintain and enforce award provisions that circumscribed the employer's power to deploy labour when and where they required and in particular to limit and regulate casual labour. Thus the power of the unions, supported by state legislation in the fields of labour and liquor, constituted a force sufficiently powerful to meet and defeat most attempts by the employers to casualise the industry's labour.

The battles between the employers and the workers in New Zealand over casualisation occurred in two general stages. In the 1940's the labour shortages occasioned by the war led to staffing problems in the hospitals. At the same time the licensed hotels for financial reasons as well as because of the shortage of labour moved towards contract cleaning in the bar areas. In the public hospitals cleaning had been performed by male domestics and wardsmaids employed by the local hospital board. The labour shortages originating in World War Two continued on into the 1950's accentuated by the expansion of the hospital system. As a consequence, employers hired married women as part-time domestics. First in Canterbury in the late 1940's and then elsewhere in New Zealand, the employment of casuals became intimately linked with contracting. The Crothalls Company developed this system in Christchurch which transferred the employment and management of cleaning staffs from the hospital board to the contractor. From the board's perspective this shifted the management problems and theoretically
led to a cheaper cleaning cost as a result of the particular management expertise of the contractors. The CHWU was able to ensure that Crothalls were made a party to the Hospital Domestic Workers’ Award, the contract workers were members of the union, and that they hence gained protection in terms of pay, conditions and security of employment.¹

Beginning in 1944 several arrangements covering part-time staff were agreed between Crothalls and the CHWU.² In 1949 they negotiated a more comprehensive wage regime that provided for payment based on broad categories of hours rather than the specific number of hours that an individual worked. Essentially this provided that the worker would receive the maximum payment for each category, minimising the fluctuations in wages and imposing a penalty on the employers for the use of part-time labour. If a cleaner worked up to and including 10 hours in a week, wages for the full 10 hours would be paid even if the worker was employed for only 8. This structure continued on up until 30 hours with rates set for 15, 20 and 25 hour periods and those workers between a category receiving payment for the maximum period.³

Licensed hotels were the second area where casual cleaning was introduced in this first period. Previously, a hotel would have employed a full-time male porter-barman, who combined cleaning duties with the carrying of goods, a miscellany of minor tasks and the relieving of the barstaff during their meal break. With the introduction of part-time cleaners under a contractor only the cleaning duties in the bar room area would be performed and each and every hour would be spent working, thus eliminating any cost arising from unproductive time. Once again the unions were able to ensure that the contractors in the licensed hotels were covered by the award and that the scope of their operations were restricted. No contract cleaning was permitted in the accommodation areas of the licensed hotels which remained the preserve of the housemaids.⁴

A minimum hourly wage rate was set in the Licensed Hotel Awards and irrespective of the time actually worked there was a minimum payment

1. B Aw 47 (1947) p3041
2. CHW E Min 9 Oct 1944; 11 Sep 1945
3. CHW E Min 9 Aug 1949
4. see B Aw 51 (1951) p1921
for one-and-a-half hours work. The award further noted that by accepting casual labour the unions were making a special concession in recognition of the difficulties in obtaining full-time labour. They did not accept that the hiring of casual labour was in any sense a divine right of management. Rather, the question was one for negotiation and agreement between the union and the employers.

This principle of union control in the area of casual or part-time labour was embodied within the general award provisions. Firstly, the employment of any part-time workers was subject to the issuing of a permit by the union secretary in that district. The fact that permission had to be sought, underlined the union’s insistence that the principle of a 40 hour week was the norm for the industry. Deviation from that principle required either an approval from the union or incurred a penalty rate of pay which was the second means the unions possessed to restrict the use of casual labour. Under the first mechanism, the part-time permit the employer was required to specify the name and numbers of the workers that he or she sought, the place of work and the period of hours. The union was able to use this system to limit the employment of part-timers as well as to obtain concessions in exchange for cooperation in issuing permits or conversely employ it as a sanction against difficult employers. For instance, in the 1960’s the CHWU agreed to issue part-time permits to the White Heron Hotel in return for a wider dry pay entitlement and free meals. On other occasions the threat of cancelling permits placed pressure upon the employer to cooperate over a particular issue in dispute while in 1964 the union used it to cancel a large number of part-time positions leading to the creation of 25 additional full-time jobs. Despite periodic agitation by the employers the permit system persisted although in practice it did not always work as effectively as the union might desire. Any union action was constrained by the limited availability of full-time workers and

1. A standard mechanism existed in the industry’s awards which remained largely unchanged over the decades. See eg B Aw 51 (1951) p192
2. CHW E Min 17 Nov 1969
3. CHW Min 6 Apr 1964
the inevitable peak periods of demand that could only be met by casual labour. Nevertheless, the union was able to influence the development of casualisation to the advantage of its members.

Penalty rates for employing casual labour was the second of these general award mechanisms. Casual workers could be hired either for a day or in the case of waiters and waitresses for a single meal. To do so however, cost the employer 20% more than the pro-rata rate for a full-time worker.¹ The penalty was intended to help protect full-time workers while also benefitting casual staff. Once more the contrast between such a provision and the common overseas experience is sharp. In Britain, for instance, with a mere 5% of hotel and catering workers in trade unions, many casuals could be hired for rates of pay not simply lacking any penalty element but devoid of any minimum award rate. There was a legal state minimum wage but this was extremely low and in practice frequently violated.² A casual worker in New Zealand received a higher basic rate of pay, additional penalty payments for weekend and holiday work and the benefits of award conditions. Moreover, such pay and conditions were likely to be effectively enforced through the presence of an active union.

When the second stage of casualisation developed and accelerated in the late 1960's and into the 1970's these award provisions assisted the union to ensure that wages for full-time, part-time and casual labour were protected. The union also slowed the spread of casualisation but was unable to withstand the force and breadth of the trend as the industry developed new areas especially suitable for casual labour and became increasingly competitive and concerned to maximise the use of labour. These new areas included the introduction of 10 o'clock closing in the licensed hotels and the rapid growth of restaurants. More New Zealanders, following the international pattern, ate more meals away from home. As a consequence thousands of new food establishments providing lunch and evening meals as well as

1. see Table 5.1
takeaway food emerged, which required large numbers of casual serving staff for short periods of time. This change to eating habits reflected the changing role of women in society, more of whom in the late 1960's and the 1970's were seeking full time employment and were not prepared to simultaneously perform full-time unpaid domestic labour at home. Thus casualisation was a consequence not simply of legal changes to the hotel and restaurant industry but a consequence of its reconstruction to meet the new demands of society and deliver its services as profitably as possible.

One further effect of casualisation should be noted. Casualising labour generally had an adverse effect on the level of union consciousness and the collective strength of hotel and restaurant workers. For most casual workers, work in the industry was secondary to their main employment, to tertiary education or served to supplement the primary full-time income of their spouse. There was a strong tendency for workers to feel a lesser degree of concern with their wages and conditions. Their energies, interests and whatever trade union consciousness the worker did possess were focussed elsewhere. Employed in small workplaces with a high turnover of staff, casual workers frequently lacked contact with other workers and with their union. This lack of contact and the diverse experiences and interests of casual workers acted to hinder the development of a common workplace consciousness and the action that would result from such an awareness. Nor, given the payment of penalty rates and the protection of award provisions, was there a strong material incentive for workers to organise. From the perspective of many casual workers their brief time in the industry could provide them with a good income in a short period of work from unskilled or semi-skilled labour without any apparent need to become active in their union or in contesting work practices imposed by the employer at the workplace. These problems while present in the 1960's intensified with the growth in casualisation in the 1970's and posed a significant problem for the long-term effectiveness of the CHWU.
3. WAGES AND THE WORKPLACE, 1956 TO 1966

Casualisation was an ongoing challenge for the CHWU. It was however far from being the only industrial issue that confronted the union in the 1950's and 1960's. Wages and conditions remained at the forefront of the union's activities, and, as with the wider trade union movement, the CHWU was able to make modest advances between 1956 and 1966. Real wages rose in a period of acute labour shortages and sustained economic growth. In certain sectors, such as transport and in the new industrial projects, the actual rates of pay secured through unions negotiating individual agreements with their employers were substantially in excess of the minimum rates prescribed in the awards. For other workers, including those in the hotels, hospitals and restaurants steady but less dramatic rises were secured through the process of conciliation hearings with employers, supplemented by the occasional General Wage Order of the Arbitration Court. Direct action was unnecessary in terms of the union's claims and recourse to the court for a settlement was rare for most unions. While groups such as the CHWU did receive some indirect benefit through the higher wages being obtained in certain sectors affecting the general wage rates of the labour market, they generally lost ground relative to more skilled workers over the course of this period.1

Within the industry, the relativity between the union's various awards remained essentially as before, with the licensed hotels being the sector with the highest overall pay rates. While in the licensed hotels, male and female kitchen workers were paid the same rate for the same work, a different and lower rate persisted for female workers in the tearooms and private hotels for all categories of work. In practice, few males were ever employed so that virtually all workers in these sectors were female and poorly paid. In the hospital sector, public hospital workers maintained their traditional wage margin over their counterparts in the private hospitals and while the conditions were generally identical, the private hospitals lacked the sick-leave provisions available to the public hospital workers.2

1. See N. S. Woods Troubled Heritage: The Main Stream of Developments in Private Sector Industrial Relations in New Zealand (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington, 1979)

2. see Table 5.1
This was the overall pattern between 1956 and 1966, but within this period certain specific changes also occurred. In the licensed hotels the payment of the 12 months service allowance, which the bar staff had possessed since 1951, was extended to all workers in 1960 although at a lower rate. Thus while the 1960 Licensed Hotel Award provided for a rate of 14/3d per week to bar staff who had completed one year's service all other staff received an extra 5/-.

This effective wage rise for licensed hotel workers outside of the bar further increased the margin between them and the unions members in other sectors. A second important development came in the public hospitals with the reclassification of the smaller kitchens which had the effect of raising the pay of workers in the smaller hospitals up to a common rate for those with 100 beds or less. A more significant advance was made in 1965 with the extension of equal pay to female cleaners working on contract in the licensed hotels.

Now, both females and males received an hourly rate of 8/3d where previously the rate for men had been 7/7d and for women only 6/5d per hour. In addition, the minimum period for which payment had to be made was extended by 30 minutes to two hours. The final development in incomes during this period was the series of attempts by the CHWU to raise the number and the dollar amounts for special payments covering uniforms, work tools and laundering. These were only partially successful and claims for allowances for barstaff for shoes and ties were usually conceded in the course of negotiations for higher weekly wages.

The award conditions relating to workplace facilities for staff remained essentially unchanged from those of the early 1950's. Except for the tearoom sector many staff continued to live at their work institution and hence it was important to monitor their living conditions. These resident workers were entitled to adequate sleeping and toilet facilities lockers, laundries and sitting-rooms and an area in which to eat. Non-resident workers were similarly legally entitled to changing and eating facilities. Enforcement to ensure that these conditions were met was one

1. B_Aw 60 (1960) p1117
2. B_Aw 61 (1961) p1901
3. B_Aw 65 (1965) p1281; of B_Aw 63(1963) p673.
4. For examples of these claims see CHW Min 18 Dec 1955 (shoes); E Min 15 Jul 1959 (ties); E Min 27 Oct 1964 (trousers); & E Min 14 Mar 1966
of the first initiatives undertaken by Short, the union's new secretary, in 1956. Investigations revealed inadequate facilities in several Christchurch licensed hotels. At the United Service, the laundry and its washing machines were unsatisfactory, while the Warners and Excelsior hotels required new staff rooms and the Clarendon both a sitting room and an improved laundry.¹ The union successfully persuaded the management to improve their conditions to a satisfactory level. Similarly at the public hospitals the union was also successful in improving the inadequate laundry facilities, lockers and sitting rooms.²

In the area of special leave and holidays the union had mixed success in the early 1960's. Paid sick leave remained an entitlement that was confined to public hospital workers and the union consistently failed in its claims to extend the provision into other awards. No provision existed in any of the union's awards for bereavement or any variety of domestic leave, a situation that was typical of most awards and agreements of that time. On holidays the union did make some progress. First, in 1961, the payment for a statutory holiday was extended to workers who were not rostered to work on that particularly day.³ In a seven-day-industry, the practice of rostering had meant that those who did work on a statutory holiday received payment at time-and-a-half or double-time, but those who did not remained unpaid. In other five-day-industries, a worker who did not work on a statutory holiday effectively received a paid holiday. Now, as from 1960, hotel, restaurant and hospital workers gained the same right. The second improvement came initially in 1964 as part of the general advance of the trade union movement, with the securing of an extra special holiday, January 2nd.⁴ In 1965 the entitlement to three weeks annual holiday after a period of service was extended to private hotels and in 1966 to tearooms.⁵ The union's members in the licensed hotels and hospitals already possessed such an entitlement after completing five years service, but the extension to the new sectors was on the basis of 10 years service.

1. CHW Min 27 Jun 1956
2. CHW Min 18 Dec 1956; AR 1955-6 Feb 1956
3. They received an extra day's annual holiday B Aw 1961 (61) p257
4. First CHWU award to benefit was the Tearooms Award May 1964 B Aw 64 (1964) p577. The other awards followed as they arose for renegotiation over 1964 and 1965.
The mid-1960’s also brought a change to the basis for calculating overtime and weekend penalty payments for hospital workers. Overtime became payable at the rate of double time after three hours in any one week instead of the previous four. This level had already been achieved by the licensed hotels and clubs in the previous decade but it was now extended to tearooms (1964), private hotels and hospitals. (1965)¹ Hospital workers made a further gain by obtaining their long sought after claim for a penalty payment for work on Saturdays.² The establishment of a rate of time-and-a-quarter recognised the applicability of the five-day-week principle to all industries and brought the hospitals into line with the rest of the union’s awards where penalty rates existed for both days of the weekend. Although the new rate was still less than the time-and-a-half rate of the licensed hotels, hospital workers were eligible for double-time on Sundays compared to only time-and-a-half for the workers in licensed hotels.

Enforcement at the workplace of the awards provisions continued to occupy the union’s daily routine but few disputes of significance emerged between 1956 and 1966. The union was usually able to resolve a dispute with an employer without recourse to any form of direct action. Twice, however, the CHWU did act to withdraw from a hotel the supply of beer. For instance, at the Royal Hotel in 1964 the publican had refused to discuss with the union his employment of a non-unionist in the bottle store who also lacked a part-time permit.³ In addition, the publican was employing some eight barmaids contrary to the agreement between the LVA (the employers association) and the CHWU which prevented their employment.⁴ If the hotel was permitted to act in this way then a dangerous precedent could be created. However the publican persisted in his position until Short, in his other capacity as the secretary of the Canterbury branch of the Brewery Workers’ Union (see below) organised the cutting of the hotel’s supply of beer. The publican soon capitulated and agreed to cease the employment of the barmaids and ensure that the bottle-store worker joined the union, in return for which the union would issue a part-time permit.⁵

1. B Aw 64 (1964) p577 (Tearooms); 65 (1965) p2561 (Public Hospitals); p2539 (PH).
2. B Aw 65 (1965) p2561
3. The Press 14 Aug 1964 p1; see 13 Aug 1964 p1 for the beginning of the dispute.
4. CHW Min 12 Dec 1961; see section on women below.
5. The Press 15 Aug 1964 p4
The only notable instance of direct action by workers took place at the Ashburton Licensing Trust in 1965. The new award increased the level of wages for licensed hotel workers and the Trust management had decided to alter the hours worked by the bar-staff in order to eliminate a broken shift allowance that the staff had received since 1958. The overall effect of the change was to lower the award increase so that workers would only receive an effective rise of 4/- for an extra two-and-a-half hours work. After a meeting of the workers resolved to withdraw their labour, the Trust agreed to return to the previous payments and apply the full award increase. 1

The period brought forth only one major dispute over an award interpretation, when in 1960 disagreement arose over the payment of transport expenses for hospital workers. Essentially, the award provided that the employer would either provide transport or pay an allowance to those workers who commenced or finished work outside the normal hours of public transport. The ambiguous construction of the clause led to a dispute between the AHWU and the Cook Hospital Board that eventually required a national resolution by the Arbitration Court. 2 On the suggestion of the court the clause was subsequently amended in 1963 with the new provision providing a clear statement of rights. Henceforth, all hospital domestic workers living beyond half-a-mile from their workplace, beginning or finishing their work shift outside of the hours of public transport would be conveyed to and from their homes at the expense of the employer. Where they used their own transport an allowance of 1/- per day would be paid by the employer. 3

Overall, the ten year period from 1956 to 1966 brought modest advances in wages and conditions for the union’s members. They were achieved in a climate of relatively peaceful industrial relations. The comparative positions of the union’s sectors (as shown in Table 5.1 below) again showed that licensed hotel workers enjoyed the highest rates of wages. In terms of conditions the decade had seen the other sectors obtaining provisions that brought them almost to a level of parity with the licensed hotels. In one respect, the workers in public hospitals did have a

1. The Press 14 Jul 1965 p1
2. B Aw 60 (1960) p2281
3. B Aw 63 (1963) p1921
## TABLE 5.1 INTER-AWARD COMPARISON, c1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Licensed Hotel</th>
<th>Private Hotel</th>
<th>Tearooms¹</th>
<th>Chartered Clubs²</th>
<th>Public Hospitals</th>
<th>Private Hospitals³</th>
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<tr>
<td>Annual Holidays</td>
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<td>2 wks: 3 after 10 years</td>
<td>As PH</td>
<td>As PH</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saturday / Sunday</td>
<td>Both T½</td>
<td>Both T½</td>
<td>Sat T½</td>
<td>Sat T½</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sick leave days p.a.</td>
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<td>—</td>
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### Wages: Weekly (inc B & L)⁴

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<td>1st cook 4hk</td>
<td>17-17/7 ⁵</td>
<td>14-2/1</td>
<td>13-16/6</td>
<td>15-7/3</td>
<td>12-5/3</td>
<td>15-4/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4hk</td>
<td>15-5/4 ⁵</td>
<td>12-7/0</td>
<td>11-9/6</td>
<td>12-17/5</td>
<td>10-2/7</td>
<td>14-7/1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>15-0/2 ²</td>
<td>11-2/9</td>
<td>10-8/3</td>
<td>11-16/3</td>
<td>8-19/10</td>
<td>10-18/5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>11-16/9</td>
<td>10-10/3</td>
<td>9-18</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8-10/0</td>
<td>10-8/4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barman / Steward</td>
<td>16-11/15</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13-19/10 ⁶</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter / Orderly</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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### Wages: Casual per day

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<td>Chef</td>
<td>3-11/1</td>
<td>3-11/1</td>
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<td>3-11/1</td>
<td>3-11/1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Note: See Note on Tables

1. Aug. 1966 award negotiation, end of 1965 round
2. Dec. 1964 negotiation current to 1967
4. Wage rates include cash value of board and lodging
5. Includes service allowance 15/6 wk barstaff and 7/6 wk for other workers.
6. Rate for stewards serving alcohol, for more than 20 hrs per week
7. In addition eligible for various special allowances related to tasks performed
8. Rate for first 5 days in LH but only for first 3 days in PH & T. Variation in T. PH depends on kitchen size.
9. Pro-rata of weekly rate plus 15 or 20%. Casuals not generally used in hospitals.
superior entitlement namely sick leave which reflected the greater risks of ill health for staff in hospitals.1 In the second half of the 1960's there was a noticeable rise in the industrial temperature and while no major disputes arose in the majority of the union's sectors, the workers in the licensed hotels did become involved in widespread industrial action following the introduction of 10 o'clock closing in 1967.

4. 1967

The Labour and National Parties, continuing the tradition of a bipartisan approach to licensing reform, had both promised in their 1966 election manifestoes to hold a referendum on the abolition of six o'clock closing.2 Accordingly, the National government upon its re-election introduced legislation in May 1967 to hold a national poll. The government proposed that the ballot form would provide for two options: the continuance of six o'clock closing, or the introduction of 10 o'clock closing, providing that the total weekly hours of opening would remain the same and that hotels would close for an evening meal break.3 By the time the select committee had finished its deliberations the form of the ballot had been reworded to provide for a more simple choice.

Support for the extension of licensing hours was widespread. The public, politicians and the industry favoured reform. The Statutes Revision Select Committee received submissions from the Hotel Association and the Hotel Workers Federation supporting later closing but opposed to the two hour evening meal break during which the hotel bar would be closed.4 Opposition to the principle of later closing was confined essentially to the temperance movement.5 When the bill reemerged from the committee in late June the proposal for an evening meal break had been deleted and the ballot form no longer included any specific reference to the total hours of opening nor to 10 o'clock.6 Deleting the reference to 10 o'clock

1. The entitlement for sick leave for domestic workers in public hospitals was consistent with the general practice for employees in public hospitals to receive compensation for the health risks of their workplace.

2. NZPD 350 (1967) p859

3. Ibid

4. NZPD 351 (1967) pp1375-6

5. Ibid p2007

6. Ibid p1376
accommodated the requests for flexibility from districts that preferred 11 p.m. as the closing time. The effect of these changes was to maximise the potential support for later closing and avoid any complications on the form.

When the referendum was finally held on 27 September 1967 the voters had a simple choice between the continuance of six o’clock closing and “later closing, the actual hours of sale to be decided according to local conditions.” With a high poll of 71% of the electorate, later closing was carried by a margin of two to one. Having secured this mandate the government then proceeded to introduce legislation to establish ten o’clock closing as the normal late hour for trading but empowered the local licensing committees to vary the exact hours of opening and closing provided that the maximum operating hours did not exceed 11 per day. The new hours were to commence on 9 October 1967.

Clearly the introduction of later closing would mean that the barstaff would be performing night duties and hence raised the question of payment for night work. This problem did not however suddenly arise as both the HWF and the HANZ had believed that later closing would be the probable result of the referendum. Consequently earlier in 1967 they had discussed the issue of payment for night work as part of the general negotiation for the new Licensed Hotel Award. While the parties had reached agreement on a number of the union’s claims only partial settlement had been made over the wages and conditions for night work. The union did secure an amendment to the award so as to give preference for any overtime work to full-time staff before casual workers. They could only agree however to reopen negotiations on night work in the event that later closing was carried in the referendum.

When later closing was carried on 27 September, negotiations recommenced but broke down on 6 October only three days prior to the inauguration of 10 o’clock closing. The employers offered an additional 10c per hour

1. NZPD 351 (1967) p1996
2. NZPD 353 (1967) p3495
for work performed after 7 p.m. while the HWF claimed 15c per hour.\(^1\) From the union's perspective the offer was especially inadequate in that many workers presently eligible for broken shift allowances would receive virtually no overall increase in their pay.

With no agreement reached by Friday 6 October, the leadership of the Hotel Workers Federation decided to initiate direct but selective action to begin on the first night of the new 10 o'clock regime. The action would be selective in three senses. First only those workers seeking the extra payment, namely barstaff and bottlestore staff, would be involved. Secondly, the action would be confined to certain major cities, while thirdly it would be limited to the withdrawal of labour from 7 p.m. onwards each night.\(^2\) Normal service would continue during the day.

This proposed strategy was referred to the executive of each of the federation's unions for its consideration. Short, the CHWU secretary who had been involved in making the initial decision obtained the support of the Canterbury executive for immediate action. At its meeting on 9 October they recommended that Christchurch barstaff withdraw their labour from 7 p.m. onwards, beginning as of that evening.\(^3\) They also called a special stop work meeting of the city's barstaff for the 11th to endorse the executive's recommendation. With 300 members in attendance the stop work meeting voted overwhelmingly in favour of ceasing work at 7 p.m.\(^4\) Their resolve was strengthened by pledges of support from the Drivers and Brewery Workers' Union and by the news that the Hotel Association intended to take legal action against Short for organising a strike without a secret ballot of the CHWU's members. Short responded that the union was not on strike, rather its members were continuing to work normal hours but declined to commence additional evening work when the terms for which had yet to be agreed.\(^5\) As is often the case in industrial issues it would be the success or failure of the action that would ultimately settle the issue rather than the nuances of legal interpretation.

1. CHW E Min 9 Oct 1967
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. CHW Min 11 Oct 1967
5. Ibid
Short and Ferguson belonged to the new generation of union leaders who had experienced the depression while young rather than as union members. Both were born in New Zealand, whereas Barr and Brooks had migrated from Britain; both had worked in the hospital sector of the industry, whereas their predecessors had only worked in hotels. Ferguson was the first working barman to become president of the union in forty years, while in the 1970's Short became the first Canterbury secretary to attain the secretaryship of the federation. Finally Short and Ferguson would lead the CHWU into the first industrial action in its history, in 1967.

(CHWU)
Within a few nights of this industrial action, the pressure upon the employers had become obvious. As patrons crowded enthusiastically into the city's bars after 7 p.m., the publicans attempted to quench their thirsts. Aided by family members, a handful of non-unionists but few union barstaff, the publicans were able to keep their hotels open but with only one or two bars operating. Legally the employers were in a difficult position as the licensing laws now required that their bars remain open until 10 p.m. Employers in different districts sought the approval of the local licensing committees to close all hotel bars after 7 p.m. but it appeared that they lacked the authority for such a step.\footnote{1}

Industrial action had been taken by workers in Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington and Christchurch.\footnote{2} By confining the campaign to only selected cities the unions had concentrated their efforts on the strongest and most trade union conscious of its members. There was neither sufficient time nor the organisational strength, or the resources to mount and sustain industrial action throughout the country. Moreover, the action in the main centres was sufficient to place pressure on the employers. The campaign did however suffer two setbacks. One major centre, Dunedin, voted against taking any industrial action,\footnote{3} while in Invercargill the union's suffered a largely symbolic defeat. Invercargill as such did not represent an essential centre for the HWF's strategy, but it was the home town of the national president of the federation, 'Dot' Delaney. Delaney had been the secretary of the Southland Hotel and Restaurant Workers Union since the 1940's. Of a broad frame and standing in excess of six feet her formidable character had become something of a legend in the industry and she had achieved the distinction of becoming the first woman president of the federation, although the power in the HWF continued to rest with the secretary. In 1967 Delaney had wanted the hotel workers in Invercargill to cease work after 7 p.m. as part of the national campaign, and she had come to see the issue as one of confidence in her own leadership.\footnote{4} By a narrow margin — 32 to 26 — the local workers voted against taking any action and consequently

\begin{enumerate}
\item The Press 12 Oct 1967 p1; 14 Oct p1
\item The Press 10 Oct 1967 p1
\item Ibid
\item Short Oral op cit
\end{enumerate}
Delaney tendered her resignation as secretary of the Southland union. While this was a defeat in the short term Delaney did in fact return as secretary in 1968.

Yet despite these setbacks in the south, the overall position of the HWF remained strong. It was strengthened further by the announcement that Auckland and Wellington brewery workers would cut-off the supply of beer to any hotel that was employing non-union labour during the evening. By 17 October, eight days after selective action had begun, the Hotel Association met with the HWF and a settlement was reached. An extra 12c an hour would be paid to barstaff working after 7 p.m. with a minimum payment of 25c per night. Each worker would receive an evening meal or an allowance in lieu of 50c per night. In addition, any worker who was transferred from an existing broken shift arrangement would suffer no reduction in their pay. Both parties agreed to the negotiation of a new award in four months time.

The settlement was a small victory for the unions. The campaign had produced a clear material gain for barstaff without any loss to their normal weekly pay. The demands were obtainable and the strategy proved to be correctly attuned to the situation. Moreover, besides the immediate material benefit, the action effected a change in the union consciousness and the self-confidence of many hotel workers. In Canterbury, for the first time, a general campaign of direct action had been organised and a victory had been won. 1967 provided a practical demonstration of the effect of collective action and the achievement of success left a feeling of exhilaration amongst many workers. Three years hence, the union would again embark upon direct action and the strength of its members would be more severely tested.

5. THE UNION AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1960's

The industrial action of 1967, while atypical for the CHWU in terms of its intensity, did indicate the field in which the union was primarily concerned throughout the 1960's, the area of wages and conditions in

1. The Press 11 Oct 1967 p1
2. Ibid
3. The Press 17 Oct 1967 p1
its industry. Indeed, industrial issues assumed such an importance for the trade union movement, as well as for the CHWU, that their political activity between 1955 and 1970, declined to its lowest level since the 1920's. This decline was a consequence of a political environment in which an ideological consensus had settled upon the Labour and National Parties. While National remained in office for virtually all of this period, it did not initiate any major assault upon either the labour movement, the welfare state, or indeed upon much of the economic ownership and controls that had been erected by the first Labour government. Certainly there was a poverty of innovation and in the later years signs of weathering to the welfare structure, but there were neither divisive actions taken by the government, nor radical demands by the labour movement that led to any fundamental political cleavages. In a period of rising national prosperity and full employment the trade unions saw little need to mount any concerted challenge to the National government in order to elect a Labour Party, which while offering differences in emphasis had no radical vision to change economic ownership or the power of workers at the workplace. Nor indeed did most trade unionists desire any dramatic changes to New Zealand society. Rather they were satisfied to extract better conditions within the system through their negotiations with the employers. There were elements within the Labour Party and the trade unions who did speak of social ownership and class struggle. For instance, K. Baxter, secretary of the FOL, reiterated in 1963 the Federation's commitment to achieving the socialisation of the economy by democratic means, in response to the comments of the then leader of the parliamentary Labour Party A. Nordmeyer, that questions of class and ownership were 'outdated Marxist' concepts.1 Baxter's comments were not however typical of the views that dominated the FOL leadership for most of the 1960's.

A characteristic feature of the 1960's was the increasing separation between the Labour Party and the trade unions, as both arms of the labour movement operated within their own compartments. Each sought to improve living conditions for New Zealand workers not by uniting to redesign the entire house but rather by rearranging the furniture

1. See CTC A3 (p) letter Baxter to McDonald 27 Nov 1969 & article 'What of tomorrow' Oct 1963 by Baxter
in their own private living rooms. While many unions, including the
CHWU, did remain as loyal affiliates of the Labour Party, active invol-
vement within its structures declined to a minor activity inconsequential
beside their industrial affairs. With the contest between Labour and
National virtually reduced to questions of traditional loyalites, person-
alities and nuances of emphasis, the vigour and substance of the CHWU's
support for Labour pales beside its efforts in the 1930's and 1940's,
which had included organisational support and donations of £500.
(See Chapter 3) Now, except for the 1957 general election when the
CHWU organised and helped finance the election of N. Pickering as the
member for St Albans, 1 no major organisational efforts were made by
the CHWU on behalf of the Labour Party in any municipal or national

The Labour Party, similarly exhibited scant concern to retain and sustain
trade union support or re-invigorate the relationship between political
and industrial labour. Its brief term of government between 1957
and 1960 brought little in the way of political vision or reform nor the
development of an intimate relationship with the trade union movement,
which had marked the first Labour government. With the return of
National in 1960 the gulf between the party and the unions continued
to widen and the trade unions sought to reach their own modus
vivandi with the employers and the National government.

Outside of the realm of parliamentary politics, the CHWU did perceive
a legitimate if modest role for itself on wider economic and social
questions. While the union's actions were normally confined to motions
of principle, small donations or press statements, it did recognise that
the union had a right to comment and act upon issues outside of the
immediate concerns in its industry. Generally its stance was a progressive
one, opposing apartheid and the Vietnam War as well as the involvement
of New Zealand in the International Monetary Fund. 2 Similarly, it
gave support to the nuclear disarmament movement 3 and to bodies such
as the Maori Education Fund 4 and the Workers Educational Association. 5

2. CHW E Min 12 Jun 1961
3. CHW E Min 21 Jul 1958
4. CHW E Min 16 Apr 1962
5. This was a long running annual donation, dating from the 1920's
It was an outlook perhaps best described as social democratic rather than radical. Up until the later years of the 1960's, when the issue of the Vietnam War rose to prominence, there were few moments of intense political controversy between 1955 and 1960 and although the union's executive did debate several of these issues, few discussions occurred among the union’s rank-and-file within any of the CHWU’s structures. The leadership did however take a position of opposition to nuclear testing in 1964, and in the following year, Short the union’s secretary was sent by the CTC as its delegate to an Australian conference on nuclear war. Racism in New Zealand and in South Africa both featured in the union’s discussions, and along with the CTC the union recorded its opposition to the 1960 All Black Tour of South Africa, if Maori players were excluded from the team, and gave support to the campaign of the ‘Citizens against the All Black Tour’, despite the unpopularity of such a stance in 1960. With the intensification of the war in Vietnam, the CHWU expressed its opposition to the American invasion, in line with the general stance of the FOL and the Labour Party which called for the withdrawal of United States forces from South Vietnam. While never in the forefront of its activities the views expressed by the CHWU do indicate an awareness of the wider political issues of the 1960's and reveal the general political outlook of the union's executive.

Within its own industry, the CHWU enjoyed a period of generally amicable and constructive relations in the 1960's with the Hotel Workers Federation. The CHWU was the third largest affiliate of the HWF and its secretary, Short, came to play an increasingly important role in the federation’s business in the course of the decade. Up until his death in 1962, Frederick Young continued to dominate the federation’s affairs as both the secretary of the largest affiliate the AHWU, and of the HWF itself. Young’s formidable negotiating skills and knowledge of the industry made him a prime weapon in the union’s tactical armoury. He remained unchall-

1. CHW E Min 8 Jun 1964; It had discussed the issue earlier E Min 24 Apr 1957
2. CHW E Min 22 Nov 1965
3. CHW E Min 2 Nov 1959; 19 Apr 1960; Min 29 Sep 1959
4. see EL 1 no. 9 1966 p3; No 13 1967 p3
engaged as the secretary of the HWF and while still an important figure within the FOL he no longer possessed the power and influence that he had held in the years of the first Labour government. Young enjoyed his last years of power before his death, but was no longer striving to meet any personal or political challenges. Upon his death the assistant secretary of the AHWU, George Armstrong, acceded to the offices of Auckland and federation secretary. A long-time associate of Young, Armstrong's election as HWF secretary essentially saw the continuance of his predecessor's policies in respect of industrial action and politics. Having received his trade union training amongst a generation of determined and ruthless leaders in a period of factions and political tensions, Armstrong was an experienced and strong negotiator but his thinking remained fixed in terms of past experiences rather than open towards future challenges. Improving wages and conditions for his members was the priority for Armstrong and he had little interest in achieving any wider social changes. Bitterly anti-Communist he continued the pattern of antagonism that had existed between the AHWU and the Communists on into the early 1970's. It was an antagonism that moved beyond ideology to embrace issues of power and personality. The CHWU did not become involved in such a conflict but maintained a satisfactory relationship with the AHWU on the issues of securing better wages and conditions for their members.

Relations with the trade union movement in Christchurch during the 1960's were similarly harmonious in their character. At the official level, Short was an executive member of the Canterbury Trades Council from 1955 and vice-president from 1963 to 1970. Politically the union remained firmly in the middle stream of the labour river and continued to be loyal members of the CTC, the FOL and the Labour Party. The CHWU provided financial and moral support to other trade unionists engaged in industrial struggles and Short was active in the wider concerns of the movement as both the vice-president of the CTC and as the representative on the National Council of the FOL.

1. The comments on Young and Armstrong are adapted from discussions with Short op cit, R. Ferguson (Oral 1984) and C. McCready (Oral 1984)
2. see CTC Min Nov in each year 1955 to 1970
3. see CTC E Min especially 1965-70
He also assisted in resolving several demarcation disputes between other unions that occurred in the course of the 1960’s. Short’s re-election as vice-president throughout the 1960’s pointed to the standing of himself and the CHWU in the CTC. While the union was not noted for its industrial militancy, it did constitute a major voice in the movements affairs. For most of the decade it was the third largest union in Canterbury with a membership that increased from 3,800 to over 5,000 by the decade’s end.¹

The union’s closest relationship with another trade union was that with the Brewery Workers Union? Such an association would seem natural enough, but in fact little contact had existed between the two unions prior to the 1950’s. Each was concerned with the problems in its own industry and the organising and amalgamation of the workers in its sector. In September 1958, Short the secretary of the CHWU became the secretary of the Canterbury branch of the Brewery Workers Union. He was to hold that position until 1969 and the two unions were able to work closely together, for the first time. As both unions dealt with the major brewery companies they had a number of issues in common. For the brewery workers, the association with the hotel workers gave them access to a skilled secretary with office facilities at a relatively cheap cost. For the hotel workers, the link increased their bargaining strength through the sympathetic hearing they were likely to receive to requests to cut the supply of beer in times of industrial action. Nevertheless, no formal merger of the two unions took place, each retaining a separate executive and identity. A joint secretary was a local arrangement, as any formal merger would have required a national agreement between the New Zealand Brewery Workers Union, which was organised on a national basis, and the federally organised HWF. When Short resigned, as the secretary of the Canterbury branch of the Brewery Workers Union in 1969, he was succeeded by Gordon Walker². Walker had been an organiser with the CHWU in the 1960's and he continued the close relationship between the two unions. In this capacity, as well as subsequently as the secretary of the CTC, he proved a useful ally of the CHWU.

¹ see AJHR H11 (1960, 1965, 1968)
² CHW E Min 5 Oct 1959
³ CHW E Min 30 Jun 1969
The 1960’s had been a decade sparse in political achievements for the CHWU or for the wider labour movement. The union had played a role in the movement and expressed its views on wider issues, while continuing to enjoy amicable relations with other trade unionists, free from the political strife of earlier decades. Yet this absence of strife was not unconnected to the absence from political office and power of the Labour Party. Such power would have generated both the challenges and the inevitable conflicts. Similarly, such political quiesence also reflected the labour movements acceptance of the prosperity it had been able to secure within the system free from the threat of depression and from political attacks upon its existence.

6. MONEY, MOTELS AND MEMBERS

Free from economic or political threats, the union and its members had prospered in the course of the 1960’s. Nor was this prosperity disrupted by any internal dissensions within the union. Rather the CHWU grew larger and wealthier in an atmosphere of calm and confidence. By 1970 its annual income had tripled, in comparison to that of 1956, to reach $47,000. Its net assets in the same period had risen to $86,706. The primary cause of this growth had been the dramatic increase in membership, with the union’s subscription having remained static from 1955 to 1967. Table 5.2 below indicates the sustained growth in money and members, although in the last years of the 1960’s the effects of inflation tended to reduce the real value of the increases in revenue. Membership growth also slowed in the last years of the decade, with virtually no increase between 1967 and 1970.

**TABLE 5.2 CHWU MEMBERSHIP & FINANCE 1956 TO 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>MEMBERS¹</th>
<th>ANNUAL INCOME ($)²</th>
<th>NET ASSETS ($)²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>15,736</td>
<td>30,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3884</td>
<td>21,932</td>
<td>43,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>4676</td>
<td>27,866</td>
<td>61,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>5093</td>
<td>47,288</td>
<td>80,325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. As at 31 December
2. Financial year ends 1 Mar or 4 Feb of following year
3. All financial figures have been converted to dollar equivalents.

1. CHW AR 1970-1
2. Ibid ¹
3. CHW Min 3 Apr 1967
323 MANCHESTER STREET

Purchased in 1957, this was the first headquarters which the union owned and it remained its home until 1967.

(G. Patterson)
In the light of the cash reserves that the union had already accumulated in the Brooks era, the 1956 executive had discussed the purchase of a building that would serve as both a base for the union’s operations and as a sensible investment of the union’s funds. A suitable large two-storey house was selected in Manchester Street priced at £6350, and approval was given by a Special General Meeting of the union in March 1956.¹ Unlike the earlier building in Ferry Road purchased in 1949 (see Chapter 4), the CHWU did take occupancy of its Manchester Street home and remained there until 1968. Such a purchase was a first for a ‘hotel workers’ union in New Zealand and stood apart from the common pattern for unions of remaining tenants in the local trades hall. While extensions to the Canterbury Trades Hall had been discussed, no clear plans had emerged and the union decided in favour of developing its own facilities.²

As early as 1963, the executive of the CHWU had considered acquiring premises larger than its Manchester office with provision for a social hall. After deciding against extending these offices, the union resolved upon a larger three-storey building at 127 Lichfield Street and commenced negotiations.³ They proved long and torturous and it was not until 31 January 1968, that the union finally acquired possession of its new facilities.⁴ The final purchase, costing £37,000, included two three-storey buildings linked together. The second had cost only a fraction of the total price and enabled the union to acquire a substantial complex, which provided office space, two union halls, an internal car park with a further one-third of the area still available for commercial rental.

A programme of renovation and development commenced and in 1970 space was let to a retail shop, which would also provide discounts for union members. The new building provided the union with a secure asset, a source for future income and sufficient space to accommodate the continuing expansion of the union’s industrial operations.

1. CHW Min 20 Mar 1956
2. Ibid
3. CHW E Min 9 Nov 1963
4. CHW E Min 10 Apr 1967
127 LICHFIELD STREET

The union's home since 1968, this three-storey, twin building complex provided the union with sufficient space for a set of offices, two halls, a boardroom, carparking and a further floor for rental space.

(G. Patterson)
Besides these moves to secure its financial future, the union executive had been anxious to develop new welfare services for its members. The casual employment agency, which had been opened in the 1920's continued to operate but by the mid-1950's the executive was looking to the creation of new services. One proposal was for the establishment of a sickness fund. Except for those workers in public hospitals, no other members of the union were entitled under any award to paid sick leave. Investigations, however, revealed a number of legal and administrative difficulties and the investigating committee recommended not to proceed with the idea.¹

It was as a consequence of this search for new services, that the proposal arose for holiday motels. The union would own and operate these motels in order to provide low cost holiday accommodation to its members. The rentals, it was intended, would repay the mortgage and help finance further purchases.² In 1959, the general meeting of the union approved the scheme and a section was purchased in Akaroa.³ Unfortunately it soon became apparent to the executive, that the number of rooms annually available in the motels for hire, would be insignificant in comparison to the potential demand of the union's large and growing membership. The benefit would inevitably accrue to a few workers and dissension would soon arise amongst those who were excluded.⁴ In 1963 the executive decided to abandon the motel scheme and direct the union's finances to other activities which were capable of providing more widespread benefits.⁵ The general meeting confirmed this change in direction⁶ and the executive turned its attention to the development of the union's social facilities and the creation of a bulk-purchase scheme for its members. It was the former which took precedence with the union acquiring its new building complex in 1968, to meet the financial, organisational and social needs of its members. The subsequent development of a retail shop providing discounts to union members went someway towards meeting the second intention of enabling workers to obtain cheaper goods.

¹. CHW E Min 15 Jun 1959
². Ibid
³. CHW Min 29 Sep 1959
⁴. CHW Min 15 Jul 1963
⁵. CHW E Min 8 Jul 1963
⁶. CHW Min, 15 Jul 1963
Within the union, the relationship between the membership and the executive was free from any of the acrimony that had marked the latter years of the Brooks era. The level of involvement by workers in the late 1950's and early 1960's was generally low with meeting attendances usually between 14 and 30. Low participation was a feature common to many trade unions in the quiet years between 1955 and 1966, and not unexpected in a union with dispersed workplaces and a high turnover of members. There was, however, a distinct change in 1967, when the CHWU held its first ever mass stop-work meeting over the payment of a night allowance, after the introduction of 10 o'clock closing. The series of stop-work meetings that were held demonstrated clear, sustained and enthusiastic support by the rank-and-file for the union's strategy. The barstaff maintained their industrial action and their unity ensured that the union was able to secure a satisfactory settlement. In 1970 the union's members in the licensed hotels would again demonstrate their determination by sustaining direct action and winning a substantial rise in their wages. (see Epilogue) Generally it was this sector, especially the male barstaff, and the male cooks, that were the most active in the union, both as participants in general meetings and as the source which provided most of the members for the executive.

By the end of the 1960's the union was stable, large and financially secure. Its weakness remained in the low level of union consciousness and activity amongst the majority of its members, especially those in the tearooms and in the private hotels. While its past gains had been largely achieved by the union's executive and officials, both 1967 and 1970 provided powerful examples of action being successfully undertaken by the union's rank-and-file under the leadership of its executive. However, the full picture of the union, its members and their experiences would be incomplete without depicting the special features of the union's largest group of workers, women.

7. WOMEN

Women workers, like their male counterparts, were affected by the improvements in wages and conditions that the CHWU secured for its
members in the course of the post-war era; but they were not affected in the same way, for there were a number of special circumstances that shaped their experiences in the workplace and within the union itself. Their work, their pay and their power changed little between 1945 and 1970 relative to male workers in the industry.

The division of labour between male and female workers was in essence the same as it had been since the end of the First World War. Cooking, serving and cleaning were tasks performed overwhelmingly by women. Males did dominate the higher skilled strata of chefs in the licensed hotels, but in other grades and in other establishments such as hospitals and private hotels virtually all kitchen workers were women. A similar exclusiveness applied to the serving of food where waitresses and female counterhands constituted the workforce. Women also were the main source of cleaners in the hospitals and private hotels and the maids in the licensed hotels. In short, to work in most sections of a hospital, tearoom, or hotel was to work almost exclusively amongst women. The only areas exempt from this pattern were the higher strata of chefs, the hospital orderlies and the barstaff.

It was in the serving of liquor that a change to the traditional division of labour did occur. Since the Licensing Amendment Act of 1910, the employment of barmaids in New Zealand had been proscribed and those already in employment gradually departed from the trade. Thus, for the next 50 years the serving of liquor in New Zealand was a task that society assigned almost exclusively to men. Internationally the function of serving liquor was assigned by some societies to men, by others to women, and yet by others to both. ¹ Such was the cultural

¹ For a discussion of the division of labour in restaurants in the USA see J. P. Spradley and B. J. Mann, The Cocktail Waitress: Women’s Work in a Man’s World (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975)
flexibility with which societies could determine the division of labour. In New Zealand in 1960 the law was again amended but this time to permit the reintroduction of barmaids. In the course of the rest of the decade there was a slow rise in the number of barmaids but the majority of staff continued to be men. For the CHWU, as for the other hotel workers unions, the priority was to protect the full-time employment of married men. They opposed the reintroduction of barmaids and after the enactment of the new law, they reached agreement with the Hotel Association to restrict the employment of barmaids. A joint committee of employers and union representatives was established in the various union districts to consider applications by employers to hire barmaids. No barmaid could be employed in a public bar without the committee's approval and no barman was to be dismissed and replaced by a barmaid. The agreement was effective in maintaining the predominance of male barstaff for most of the 1960's.

While the agreement in the licensed hotels was generally supported by the employers, problems did arise in the chartered clubs and in the licensed restaurants. In the late 1950's certain chartered clubs utilising an anomaly in the law were able to employ women to serve liquor. More importantly however, the CHWU discovered that women were being illegally employed in licensed restaurants to serve liquor. They complained to the Licensing Control Commission but rather than agreeing with the union the Commission decided to give a new interpretation to the law. Henceforth, a waitress could be employed to serve wine providing they were 25 years of age or over. The union made its criticisms known to the Commission, but was unable to change the decision.

In the 1960's the principle of equal pay for men and women had continued to be strongly held by the union, but it was only partially realised. Equal pay had existed since the first award of 190.

1. Licensing Amdt Act 1961 op cit
2. CHW Min 12 Dec 1961
3. Agreement was reaffirmed in 1967 CHW E Min 12 Jun 1967
4. CHW E Min 9 Oct 1957, 21 May 1958
kitchen staff in the licensed hotels. Similarly, cleaners and bar staff — since the reintroduction of barmaids in 1961 — together with casual waiters and waitresses had also gained equal pay. Fulltime waiters and waitresses remained, however, on different rates of pay. Outside of the licensed hotels, lower rates of pay for female workers persisted. While there was no particular financial incentive for employers in licensed hotels to prefer women workers, the employers in the other sectors stood to make a larger profit from hiring lower paid women workers. As a consequence few men were ever employed in tearooms or private hotels and the award provisions for male wage rates were in reality only nominal. Compared to the women workers in the licensed hotels women in these sectors generally received a lower weekly income.

Aside from receiving a lower rate of pay for many jobs which were the same, women workers were also concentrated in the lower paid jobs in the industry. The differences in pay rates between jobs, in part, reflected differences in skills, with the higher pay rates applying to the more skilled work performed by chefs and senior cooks. Few women, however, occupied these jobs although many did work as second and third graded cooks. Among semiskilled and unskilled workers the differences in pay — for instance between barmen and waitresses and maids — was more a consequence of gender and trade union consciousness than purely a reflection of skill. Overall, the lowest paid jobs, namely as waitresses and maids, were occupied exclusively by women.

In the period from 1945 to 1970, the relative position of waitresses and maids did improve compared to barmen, the largest group of male workers. As Table 5.3 shows while barmen remained ahead their margin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1945 (£)</th>
<th>1954 (£)</th>
<th>1965 (£)</th>
<th>1970 ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or Maid</td>
<td>3 16/6</td>
<td>7 15/4</td>
<td>11 16/9</td>
<td>37.04 (18 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
<td>6 0</td>
<td>11 13/1</td>
<td>16 1/11</td>
<td>47.37 (23 13/8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>5 0</td>
<td>10 8/11</td>
<td>15 0/2</td>
<td>45.40 (22 14/9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Waitress rate as % of barman rate: 63.75% 66.6% 73.54% 78.19%

Note: 1. All rates include board and lodging and services allowances.
decreased. The ability to narrow the margin was constrained, however, by the wage rates for male and female workers elsewhere in the workforce, where higher rates for men tended to pull up that for barmen, while the lower rates for women, especially with the persistence of junior rates for the large number of female shop assistants tended to push down the pay of waitresses and maids. Even in 1970 these junior rates ranged from $14.15 a week to only $28.20 for 21 year olds.

Low rates of pay were not the only problem that confronted women at the workplace. Sexual harassment by male employers, customers or workers, was a hazard of employment in hotels and restaurants as it was in many other occupations. Indeed, the overseas experience and the experience in colonial New Zealand, pointed to the hotel bar as a high profile area for exploitation and harassment of women as workers and as customers. The passing of the Licensing Amendment Act in 1910 however led to the rapid removal of barmaids from hotels while through both legislation and social approbation, women largely ceased to be customers in the main bars of hotels. As a consequence the potential area of harassment was reduced through the removal, for other reasons, of the victims if not the offenders. In other areas of the hotel and to a lesser extent in tearooms and restaurants there continued to be contact between female workers and men. There is an absence of sufficient recorded evidence to establish accurately the degree and extent of harassment. It is unclear whether the incidence increased, declined or fluctuated but there are some isolated reports that do confirm that the problem existed. To some extent this absence of evidence could point to differences in social attitudes that accepted or submitted to behaviour of a kind that today would be identified as sexual harassment.

One incident is reported, where the CHWU had no doubts as to the unacceptability of the employer's behaviour. At the Culverden Hotel in 1939, the male employer was found not only to have failed to pay the wages of several women workers, but to have undertaken a campaign of harassment. Sexual favours were demanded by the employer, the boyfriends of staff prohibited from the premises and the female staff subjected to a continual campaign of spying. The staff had contacted the police, and the union supported the non-renewal of the hotelkeepers licence.¹

¹. CHW E Min 24 May 1939; Also see E.L 1 No. 18 1968 or sexual harassment by French Rugby team in Auckland.
There was one further dimension to the special circumstances of women workers, and that was their participation in the decisions and actions of the CHWU. The past pattern of male barstaff and cooks being the union's most active members continued on through the 1960's. At the level of rank-and-file involvement few women attended the union's general meetings, while at the level of the executive their participation in fact declined.

In the 1940's there had been at least three women members of the executive, but out of a total of 10 positions in the 1960's there was a mere one or two held by women. Aside from one woman vice-president, all major positions secretary and assistant secretary were occupied exclusively by men. It was a pattern repeated throughout the country's hotel workers' unions with only two women having obtained the office of secretary, both in minor unions. 'Dot' Delaney, the long-serving secretary of the Southland Hotel Workers' Union became the first woman president of the HWF in 1963, but her prominence was the exception. Such a disparity was especially noticeable in relation to the composition of the union's membership two-thirds of whom were women. The low level of involvement reflected both the traditional difficulties in organising the small and dispersed workplaces where large numbers of women worked and the part-time and casual nature of much of the female workforce.

Yet it also reflected the shared attitudes of male and female workers that men had a more important and legitimate role to play in the union. Thus, while the full-time male workers had developed a tradition of activity in the union's affairs there was no expectation that women would do the same and no specific campaign was launched by the union in the 1960's to encourage such involvement. Moreover, as with workers as a whole, the absence of any severe exploitation in the industry, removed any compelling necessity to become involved in the union's affairs, with many being content to leave the direction of the CHWU to the executive.

8. NEW ADVANCES: 1968 & 1969

The last two years of the 1960's saw a number of gains being made by the CHWU, but not without considerable struggle. This struggle was however confined to the courts and conciliation. In 1968 the major

1. see CHW ARs 1955 to 1970

2. CHW E Min 2 Sep 1963. The other secretary was Ms Mitchell in Nelson in the 1940’s. There was a woman president Ms Green in Southland in the 1930’s.
battle arose over the issuing of a General Wage Order by the Arbitration Court. This issue was fought by the FOL and while the CHWU gave its support it was not necessary for them to take any direct action. The HWF had already completed its award negotiations in early 1968, nevertheless most of the increases it had obtained in wage rates only partially compensated for the rise in prices since the previous negotiations. In order to rectify the decline in real wages of workers, the FOL applied to the Arbitration Court for a General Wage Order. The court, however, rejected the application and issued the now ‘infamous’ nil wage order. While it agreed that a small fall in real wages had occurred the court declined to compensate for this fall on the basis that the New Zealand economy was in a poor condition. In response industrial action was initiated by several of the FOL’s affiliated unions and after a new combined approach by the FOL and the Employers’ Federation, the court reconsidered its position and issued a 5% General Wage Order in August 1968. For the CHWU, the overall effect of its award negotiations and the GWO was to produce a small rise in the real incomes of its members. In some instances a more substantial gain was made, through increases in the service allowances in the licensed hotels that were negotiated in the 1968 award. For instance, kitchenstaff secured the same level of allowance that was paid to barstaff, once they had completed 12 month’s service. Previously the latter had received an allowance of $1.55 per week but kitchen workers merely 75c. Now both were paid $1.59 per week. In addition waitresses and maids in the licensed hotels also obtained a rise in their service allowance to $1.39 from 75c.

In the following year the union’s members benefited from improvements in their leave entitlement and holiday pay. Workers were now eligible for long service leave, a provision which had already been recently obtained in several other industries. Henceforth after a worker completed 20 years service with the same employer they were entitled to an extra week’s

1. B Aw 68 (1968) p1281
2. Ibid p1334. The employer and worker representatives on the court both supported the increase, while judge Tyndall believed that 5% was still too high.
3. Ibid p97
special leave, with the entitlement rising to five weeks special leave after 40 years service.\footnote{1} The second change to conditions occurred in the payment for annual holidays, which was negotiated with the government by the FOL on behalf of all trade unions. Where previously the basis for determining holiday pay had been the ordinary weekly wage, from 1969 onwards the rate was set according to the "average weekly taxable earnings", a figure which included overtime and special payments. The level of the new figure was set at a maximum of 30% above that of the ordinary rate.\footnote{2} However the HWF was able to agree with their employers to amend their awards so as to include the penalty rates paid for Saturday and Sunday within the definition of the ordinary rate.\footnote{3} This raised the effective maximum and together with special payments and overtime, the overall effect was to substantially raise the holiday pay for the CHWU's members.

It was in the area of award coverage, that the most significant developments occurred for the union in 1969. On the one hand the union fought and lost a battle over which of its awards should cover certain types of motels. On the other the union achieved two notable successes by expanding its coverage into two new areas, namely Rest Homes and the Air New Zealand Flight Kitchen.

The dispute over award coverage in the motel sector had begun in 1968, although it was not settled until 1969. While the majority of motels continued to be drive-in accommodation facilities, some bearing the same motel nomenclature had developed very different characteristics. A normal motel was covered by the Private Hotels Award and as such operated no liquor facilities. Some establishments designated as motels did provide liquor facilities but operated under a tourist hotel licence and despite their designation were covered by the Licensed Hotel Award. The problem area for the CHWU was rather with those motels operating a licensed restaurant facility not under a tourist hotel licence. By remaining under the Private Hotels Award they could pay a lower pay rate than that payable for a worker in a licensed hotel.

1. \cite{B_Aw_69_1969_p2736_LH}
2. see \cite{CHW_AR_1970-1}
3. \cite{B_Aw_69_1969_p2736}
From the union's perspective these hybrids of motels with a restaurant attached or in close proximity, were operating a profitable liquor outlet yet paying poor wages while competing with a normal licensed hotel. In order to rectify this problem, the HWF and the Hotel Association agreed in 1968 to extend the award definition of the licensed hotel industry so as to include 'licensed motels' and 'motels with Licensed Restaurants attached'. For the moment the Arbitration Court accepted this extension but it reserved the right to rule on the principle of coverage when the motels concerned lodged a specific case in the court.

In December 1968 the specific issue of award coverage came before the court and it duly ruled against the HWF and against the inclusion of such motels within the Licensed Hotel Award. While accepting that these motels did show a number of similarities to a licensed hotel, the court also held that there were important differences. To include these motels within the Licensed Hotel Award, would in the court's view, lead to their domination by the employers of the licensed hotels in award negotiations resulting in settlements acceptable to the majority group but possibly quite unacceptable to the motel employers. Forcing their inclusion would be likely to generate more problems than it would solve. In the meantime, until the nature of motel operations developed further, the motel would remain within the Private Hotels Award and any associated licensed restaurant within the scope of the Tearooms Award.

The unions did however achieve success in their second battle over award coverage, namely the securing of an award for workers in Rest Homes. Small, privately owned rest homes had emerged in the 1960's to provide permanent accommodation together with meals and support services for the aged. In 1968 the CHWU had cited the 'Cedar Nursing Home', a Christchurch rest home, as a party to the Private Hotels Award. The home employed a staff of 10, including three with nursing or nurse aid training, to service its 20 elderly residents. In deciding against the union's application the Arbitration Court ruled that such a home was distinct from

1. B_Aw 68 (1968) p97 see Memorandum attached.
2. B_Aw 68 (1968) p2178
3. Ibid
4. Ibid p1931
a private hotel in that its services were not for the general public, but rather were only suitable for a specific group, i.e. the aged. As an alternative claim, the CHWU had sought to include the rest homes within the Private Hospitals Award. This was also rejected by the court, on the grounds that a hospital provided medical care, while a rest home furnished no such care but simply a place of residence.¹

The decisions of the Arbitration Court, while legally sound, still left the domestic workers in rest homes bereft of award protection. In response to this the CHWU decided to initiate an award to specifically cover rest homes. In July 1969 the union obtained an award covering 20 Christchurch rest homes, which included all their staff except for nurses and mid-wives.² This was a first for New Zealand and provided a 40 hour week, with special payments for work on weekends and special holidays. Allowances were provided for broken shifts, night work, transport and uniforms and the wage rates were generally comparable to workers in the hospital sector.

While the CHWU had been expanding its coverage to rest home workers, the AHWU had negotiated an award with Air New Zealand for their Auckland ground kitchen. Settled in February 1969, the new award covered those workers who prepared the food for cabin service.³ In August this new award was extended to the Christchurch flight kitchen.⁴ The wages and conditions compared favourably with the union’s leading award for the licensed hotels and indeed certain entitlements in respect of conditions were superior. For instance, all shift workers received three weeks annual holiday entitlement, while all staff were eligible for sick leave. No workers under the Licensed Hotel Award were eligible for comparable entitlements.

By the end of 1969, the membership of the CHWU encompassed domestic workers in licensed and private hotels (including motels),

1. B Aw 68 (1968) p1931
2. B Aw 69 (1969) p1471. The court award embodied the agreement reached in negotiations between the union and the rest home employers.
4. Ibid p1683
public and private hospitals, chartered clubs, tearooms, takeaway bars and restaurants, industrial cafeterias, rest homes and the Air New Zealand Flight Kitchen. The union’s membership exceeded 5,000 workers including full-time, part-time and casual employees, and the majority of members were women. In the years from 1956 to 1969 the union had become a stronger and richer organisation, while securing for its members a rise in their real wages, through both the weekly wage, but also through allowances and changes to the basis of payments. In addition there had been some improvements to conditions. Nevertheless, much remained to be done and the effects of rising prices in 1969 and 1970 began to erode the gains in wages. In 1970 the CHWU confronted this challenge and undertook the most significant campaign of industrial action in its history.
CHAPTER 6: EPILOGUE

1970: A NEW MILITANCY

The last years of the 1960's revealed fractures in the industrial tranquility that had been so pervasive throughout labour relations in New Zealand since 1955. The break had become clearly visible in 1968 after the FOL had successfully challenged the Arbitration Court over the nil General Wage Order. The direct industrial action taken by several of its affiliates in support of its claim for a wage rise marked the beginning of the demise of the approach of the recent past.

The process of breakdown had its origins in the peaceful decade that followed 1951. Industrialisation and labour shortages enabled those unions in a position of industrial strength to obtain ruling wage rates substantially above the minimum rates prescribed in awards. Separate settlements were entered into between these unions and individual companies especially in the Auckland district. As the Arbitration Court tried to maintain the consistency and relativity between awards it tended to produce conservative decisions that lead to frustration among many trade unionists. Those unions in less industrially strategic positions, who continued within the traditional award system, such as the hotel workers, witnessed the decline in their award rates relative to the actual rates of pay being secured by the stronger unions. By the middle years of the 1960's there was a growing tendency for unions to leap-frog one another in order to maintain their relativities. Increasingly, direct action proved to be the most effective and expeditious means of achieving such ends. Inflation further fuelled the problem, but underlying the chorus of claims for higher wages, was a rising expectation among workers as to the standard of living to which they believed they were entitled in a period which had produced a substantial rise in the total wealth of the nation.

By 1970, there was a current of industrial tension in the thoughts and actions of employers and workers. The arbitration system was proving unable to meet the demands of labour with many employers

1. see N. S. Woods op cit
resisting a settlement in conciliation and relying instead on the Arbitration Court to impose a more conservative decision. At the annual conference of the Federation of Labour in May 1970, president, Tom Skinner, articulated the frustrations of the labour movement with the situation:

It has been this pattern of stone-walling by employers which has compelled the unions to turn away from the full machinery of conciliation and arbitration and instead to insist on settlements directly with their employers. In the final analysis, workers have little choice but to move away from reliance on arbitration and engage in direct bargaining with their employers.

The successes already achieved by direct action, and the comments of the FOL president did not pass unnoticed by either the leadership or the members of the CHWU. In Canterbury, as elsewhere, there was a growing demand among hotel, hospital and restaurant workers, that their wages needed to be raised, urgently and substantially. Their thinking was influenced by the daily news and daily experience of rising prices, but also by an awareness of a loss of relativity to other workers, whose direct action had secured for them higher rates of pay. In March 1970 the HWF had negotiated a 13% rise in pay for public hospital workers, but the pressure for a larger and immediate increase in the licensed hotels continued to build. In response, the federation decided to initiate the early renegotiation of the Licensed Hotel Award, which was not due to expire until November.

On 1 July, the HWF met with the Hotel Association, but the association declined to discuss the union’s claims until they had consulted their own members further. They proposed that the opening of formal negotiations be postponed until 22 July. Such a delay was rejected by the HWF who were anxious to achieve the earliest possible increase in pay. In response they decided to place pressure upon the employers and indicate the determination of workers, by organising stop-work

1. FL 1 no. 25 1970 p13
2. B Aw 70 (1970) p851
3. CHW E Min 23 May 1970
meetings in the country’s major cities. In excess of 700 licensed hotel workers attended Christchurch’s stop-work meeting on 6 July.\(^1\) Short, the CHWU secretary, spoke of the increased wages secured by other workers and the consequent loss of relativity for hotel workers. Moreover, he noted, the employers were enjoying sufficient profitability to enable them to pay a higher wage. Walker, secretary of the CTC and the Canterbury branch of the Brewery Workers Union, followed Short and pledged the support of the Canterbury Trades Council. After further discussion, the union president R. Ferguson, put the motion to cease work for the remainder of the day and to withdraw their labour on each future Saturday. No total strike would be undertaken but instead selective action would occur the employer’s highest day of trading, Saturday. While workers would lose some income they would still be able to maintain a reasonable weekly wage and sustain the action for a longer period.

How long the campaign might last, was unknown, but with the strong support for action shown by workers in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, the HWF re-entered negotiations with a strengthened position. With the unions seeking a 30\% wage increase, the employers were only prepared to offer a 15\% rise. As a consequence a further series of stop-work meetings were held on Friday 17 July.\(^2\) They confirmed their leadership’s rejection of the 15\% offer, while in Wellington the workers decided to expand the industrial action to include Fridays as well as Saturday. At the Christchurch meeting, members authorised the executive to enter into separate agreements with any hotelkeeper who was prepared to grant a 30\% wage increase to all male and female employees. In addition an emergency fund was established to provide financial aid to any worker temporarily in difficulty.\(^3\)

A pattern had now evolved, of weekly negotiation, a stop-work meeting on the Friday, followed by industrial action on the Saturday. This continued through the course of July, as the union maintained its

1. CHW Min 6 Jul 1970
2. CHW Min 17 Jul 1970; The Press 18 Jul 1970 p1
3. Ibid
resolve and the employers were placed under increasing pressure. In Canterbury, industrial action was being undertaken by all three sections of licensed hotel staff — the barstaff, kitchen workers and those employed in the accommodation side of the hotel. Geographically, action was centred in Christchurch but included the approximately dozen hotels in Lyttelton, Governor's Bay and Kaiapoi, three centres close to Christchurch. Morale among the workers continued to remain high throughout July, and indeed the freedom from work on Saturdays enabled many workers to participate in weekend social activities which their normal pattern of work had often precluded. Some staff, living-in at their place of work had the ironic treat of seeing their employers or managers working, while they themselves were still able to receive the accommodation and meals provided under the award.

Meanwhile at the negotiating table the employers had altered their offer to provide a range of increases from 11 to 16.5%. This was as unacceptable as before to the HWF but the employers had agreed to move on the union's second claim to bring the date for commencing any new rates forward to 6 July. This was the situation that the CHWU reported back to its members on 24 July.¹ The executive recommended that while the new wage offer was unacceptable, industrial action for Saturday should be suspended pending further negotiations. However, this was decisively rejected by the stop-work meeting, where a secret ballot showed a majority of 322 to 202 in favour of continuing the industrial action.²

While the ranks of the workers were exhibiting firm determination, those of the employers were showing signs of division. From as early as 8 July there had been reports that some of the independent publicans in Christchurch had favoured a more generous offer than that of the brewery-company-dominated Hotel Association.³ Approaches had been made by some publicans to the CHWU and on 24 July The Press reported that eight city hotel owners had agreed to a 30% wage rise.⁴ In the meantime the HWF had proceeded to complete negotiations with the tearoom and private hotel employers and secured a settlement in July providing for

1. CHW Min 24 Jul 1970
2. Ibid
3. The Press 8 Jul 1970 p1
4. The Press 24 Jul 1970 p1
a 20% rise in wages.¹ This had the effect of strengthening the HWF's position in relation to the licensed hotel employers, as any offer less than 20% would produce rates less in the licensed hotels than in the other traditionally weaker sections. (In reality the lower rates of pay for most women workers in tearooms and private hotels would still leave these sections in arrears, but the full male rate would be lower.)

Faced with the developments within its own sector and in the tearooms and private hotels, the employers raised their wage offer to 25% for all male and female workers, including casuals, effective from 6 July 1970.² In addition, the night shift allowance for waitresses would be increased, the entitlement to an annual holiday of three weeks became available after only three years of service — instead of the previous five—and for the first time a paid sick leave provision of five days per annum was introduced. The HWF recommended the acceptance of the offer and the stop-work meetings voted overwhelmingly in favour of endorsement.³

The dispute was now over and it was clear that the unions had achieved a major victory. To explain why there was such a victory is to ask first, about the relative strengths of the contenders and second, the topography of the field in which the duel was fought. The HWF decided upon a strategy and set of tactics that proved appropriate to their goals. There was a considered national decision, which did not suffer from the disorder of spontaneity or regional dissent. While the strategy ensured that the employers did suffer financially the jobs and incomes of workers were maintained and enabled them to sustain the action. As in 1967, industrial action was focussed on the major centres where the union was strong, while other towns such as Gisborne continued to work normal hours but sent financial assistance to workers taking action.⁴ The union's leadership remained sufficiently united throughout the course of the campaign and was able to keep in close contact with members through the regular weekly stop-work meetings. The fundamental strength on the union's side was the commitment and unity of rank-and-file members, who were prepared to endure the small loss in weekly pay in order to secure a

¹ The Press 11 Jul 1970 p1
² CHW Min 31 Jul 1970
³ Ibid
⁴ The Press 18 Jul 1970 p1
substantial rise in their annual wage. They were convinced they had a
good case and showed sufficient confidence in themselves and their leaders
to believe they could win. Nor was their confidence undermined by the
emergence of any complicating factors. Throughout the dispute the focus
remained on a 30% wage rise backdated to 6 July. In contrast, the
employers, despite their initial resistance, showed a lack of unity and
resolve and were not prepared to sustain financial losses for more
than one month.

The environment in which the issue was played out was also favourable
to the union. There was relatively full-employment which removed the
fear of being made jobless and limited the prospect of 'scab' labour;
there was sufficient prosperity to enable workers to sustain a temporary
loss in income. Moreover there was little prospect of any immediate
intervention by the state on behalf of the employers nor was there any
economic controls which prevented the union seeking such a rise. The
media, in Christchurch at least, was neutral towards the action and
did not portray the hotel workers as 'militants', 'communists' or
'privileged workers'. Thus there was little media or indeed public pressure
upon the union urging it to acquiesce to the employers as the union
action left them largely unharmed. Finally, the union had the support
of the trade union movement and could rely on action by brewery
workers and brewery tanker drivers if the situation became difficult.

These then were the elements in the equation, but ultimately as a contest
between people the result could never be predicted with certainty. The
particular settlement was a consequence of the specific interplay of the
negotiators and their members. While in broad terms the substantial
achievements made by the HWF reflected the underlying situation, it
was still conceivable that either side could have altered the outcome at
various stages to produce a smaller or even a higher increase.

The benefits secured in the licensed hotels flowed on to the workers
in the hospitals and chartered clubs. In addition to the 17% that the
HWF had obtained for public hospital workers in March, a further rise
of 13% was now negotiated. Private hospital workers received a total rise of 31% to reach a level of wage parity with the public sector, while in the chartered clubs workers obtained a 25% rise, the same as that for the licensed hotels. Similarly, club workers also obtained a sick leave entitlement of five days per year under their new award.

1970 had brought a significant advance by the union in its otherwise steady progress since the mid-1950's. While wage rates throughout the economy had moved by an average of 20% during 1970-71, the CHW had achieved a better than average gain. Overall there had been a rise in the real incomes of all the union's members and an improvement in their conditions of work, especially in respect of various leave entitlements. Table 6.1 indicates the progress made in the union's largest sector, the licensed hotels. In other sectors there had been similar progress and a noticeable reduction in the gap between the conditions prevailing in the licensed hotels and those in the other sectors.

The relative positions of the union's awards in 1970, continued to show that the licensed hotel sector possessed the best overall provision among the union's general awards. (see Table 6.1) Although the new Flight Kitchen Award provided the best wages, except for kitchen hands for any single group of workers. As in the past the most significant difference between the wage rates of pay in the licensed hotels and those for hospitals, tearooms and private hotels, lay in the existence of lower rates for women workers. With virtually all kitchen employees, serving and cleaning staff being women, it was their pay rate and not the award rate for men which was relevant to any comparison. In the 1970 round of negotiations the 25% increase obtained for the licensed hotels widened the margin over tearoom and private hotel workers who only received the 20% rise. Equal pay for equal work for all domestic workers, would remain a challenge for the union into the early 1970's.

1. B Aw 70 (1970) p3185
2. B Aw 71 (1971) p120
TABLE 6.1 LICENSED HOTEL AWARD:
1955 TO 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
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<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 3 yrs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10 L.S.(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday/Sunday</td>
<td>Both T(\frac{1}{2})</td>
<td>Both T(\frac{1}{2})</td>
<td>Both T(\frac{1}{2})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick leave days p.a.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Wages : Weekly**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>£</th>
<th>$^3</th>
<th>(£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chef 10+ hk</td>
<td>13-19/7</td>
<td>18-16/2</td>
<td>55.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 6hk</td>
<td>11-11/9</td>
<td>15-11/7</td>
<td>46.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chef 4 hk</td>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>14-9/1</td>
<td>43.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd cook 4 hk</td>
<td>8-10</td>
<td>11-16/10</td>
<td>36.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>8-6</td>
<td>11-11/3</td>
<td>35.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>5-12/5</td>
<td>8-8/3</td>
<td>26.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
<td>8-17/2 to 9-10/2(^2)</td>
<td>12-13/5(^2)</td>
<td>37.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add board &amp; lodging</td>
<td>2-2/11</td>
<td>3-8/6</td>
<td>10.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Wages : Casual per day**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>(£)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chef(^5)</td>
<td>2-2/1 to 2-16/2</td>
<td>3-11/1</td>
<td>9.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress (single meal)(^6)</td>
<td>18s 4d</td>
<td>1-2/9</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaners on contract (hourly)</td>
<td>6s 9d(M) 5s 7d (F)</td>
<td>18/3</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barman</td>
<td>2-9/2</td>
<td>3-2/6</td>
<td>9-13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note :** (see Note on Tables)

1. Long Service leave
2. Includes service allowance of 13s
3. Include service allowance of 15/6 week barstaff and 7/6 week other workers (1965) and allowance of 1.74 for all 1970
4. Provided in addition to the weekly wage or the cash value paid
5. Lower rate for less than 3 hk; higher rate 3 hk plus 1965, 1965 & 1970 all kitchens.
6. For first 2 hours.
TABLE 6.2 INTER-AWARD COMPARISON, 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Licensed Hotels</th>
<th>Private Hotels</th>
<th>Tearooms</th>
<th>Chartered Clubs</th>
<th>Public Hospitals</th>
<th>Private Hospitals</th>
<th>Rest Homes</th>
<th>Air N.Z. Flight Kitchens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual holidays</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 10 yrs</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 10 yrs</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 in</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 2 &amp; 3 wk</td>
<td>2 wks; 3 after 5 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special holidays</td>
<td>10 &amp; LS²</td>
<td>10 &amp; LS</td>
<td>10 &amp; LS</td>
<td>10 &amp; LS</td>
<td>10 &amp; LS</td>
<td>10 &amp; LS</td>
<td>10 &amp; LS</td>
<td>10 &amp; LS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday/Sunday</td>
<td>Both T½</td>
<td>Both T½</td>
<td>Sat T½ Sun DT</td>
<td>Sat T½ Sun DT</td>
<td>Sat T½ Sun DT</td>
<td>Sat T½ Sun DT</td>
<td>Sat T½ Sun DT</td>
<td>Sat T½ Sun DT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick leave days p.a.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wages: Weekly (Inc B &amp; L)³ $</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st cook 14hk</td>
<td>53.52</td>
<td>38.47</td>
<td>36.48</td>
<td>51.76</td>
<td>41.27</td>
<td>41.27</td>
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<td>54.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd cook 14hk</td>
<td>46.16</td>
<td>32.63</td>
<td>30.52</td>
<td>44.42</td>
<td>39.38</td>
<td>39.38</td>
<td>36.40</td>
<td>47.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenhand</td>
<td>45.40</td>
<td>29.51</td>
<td>27.72</td>
<td>40.00</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>29.90</td>
<td>38.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress or maid</td>
<td>37.04</td>
<td>27.15</td>
<td>26.40</td>
<td>34.32</td>
<td>29.62</td>
<td>29.62</td>
<td>29.62</td>
<td>28.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barmen/Steward</td>
<td>47.37</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>45.63</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter/Orderly</td>
<td>43.07</td>
<td>36.63(M)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>42.50(M)⁶</td>
<td>42.50(M)⁶</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wages: Casual per day</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
<th>$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st cook ⁷</td>
<td>9.76</td>
<td>7.08 to 9.27</td>
<td>8.10 to 11.08</td>
<td>PR + 15%⁹</td>
<td>PR + 20%⁹</td>
<td>PR + 20%⁹</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waitress (single meal)⁸</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (see Note on Tables)

1. Negotiated in March 1971
2. Long Service Leave
3. Wage rates include each value of board and lodgings
4. Includes Service allowance of $1.74 for all LH staff
5. Rate for stewards serving alcohol for more than 20 hrs per week.
6. In addition eligible for various special allowances related to tasks performed
7. Rate for first 5 days in LH, but only first 3 days in PH & T and thereafter at ordinary rates.
8. For first two hours
9. Pro-rata of weekly rate plus 15 or 20%. Casuals rarely used in hospitals.
CONCLUSION

Growth and success were the two central characteristics of the CHWU’s first sixty years of activity. The growth of the union from 294 members in 1908 to more than 5,000 in 1970, was a consequence of the expansion of the hotel and restaurant industry and the extension of the union’s coverage into new areas such as hospitals, chartered clubs and rest homes. Growth within the industry had been uneven, with the largest expansion occurring in the tearoom sector, while the number of licensed hotels had largely remained static. The mode of operation in the industry and the pattern of ownership had also undergone change. By 1970 the typical licensed hotel in Canterbury was a tavern providing alcohol but no accommodation; the typical private hotel was a modern self-contained motel, while an array of diverse food outlets, from tearooms to takeaway bars and restaurants had developed in the tearoom sector. The pattern of family or individual ownership still predominated in the tearoom and private hotel sectors, but in the licensed hotels corporate enterprise in the form of Dominion and New Zealand Breweries dominated. Some corporate enterprise did exist in the tearoom sector, where department stores had a traditional share of the luncheon and afternoon tea segment of the market, and the formation of the joint New Zealand-American enterprise, Kentucky Fried Chicken, further increased the role played by corporate operations. The overall expansion and continuing prosperity of the industry assisted the union by providing an economic environment that favoured the securing of better wages and conditions. The change towards more corporate ownership, tended to distinguish more clearly between employer and workers, reducing the family or personal relationships at the workplace which had generally lessened the level of trade union consciousness. Nevertheless, the continuing supremacy of family and individual ownership in numerous small tearooms helped to ensure that union consciousness did remain weak in this sector of the industry.

The success of the CHWU in raising the real wages of its members and improving their conditions of work, was in part a consequence of the general material progress obtained by the New Zealand trade union movement in the course of the twentieth century. Such progress reflected the rise in the national economic prosperity of New Zealand, but the labour movement had to struggle to secure its share of that wealth, and in turn
the CHWU and the other hotel workers’ unions had to strive to ensure their members at least maintained the level of their incomes relative to other workers. In comparison to similar groups of workers in New Zealand (i.e. groups of largely unskilled or semi-skilled women workers) the CHWU achieved a greater rise in the levels of real incomes. In relation to hotel and restaurant workers in other western nations, those in New Zealand achieved a greater degree of success both in terms of their wages and conditions and in the universality of union coverage. Internationally, hotel and restaurant workers were among the poorest paid sections of the working class, and where union coverage did exist it was confined usually to the licensed hotel sector.

The reasons for the success of the CHWU were a combination of structural and political factors. Compulsory arbitration and compulsory unionism had given the union strength and security in negotiating and enforcing awards. It further provided the union with a sufficiently large membership base to finance a strong union organisation. With the union operating throughout the labour market for hotel and restaurant workers no sector with low paid non-union labour could emerge to undermine the overall wage levels of the industry’s workers. The close association with the wider labour movement over several decades, and in particular with the Labour government between 1935 and 1949, ensured that the problems facing the union’s members were given attention and that the union exercised an important influence in shaping decisions affecting its members. The influence within the movement possessed by the CHWU and the Hotel Workers Federation, was a consequence firstly of the size of their membership and finances, and secondly a result of the determined and skilled leadership shown by individuals such as Young, Brooks and Short. For while the structural and political factors clearly brought opportunities to the CHWU to improve the wages and conditions of workers, it required competent leadership backed by a united organisation, to exploit them successfully.

Throughout its history the industrial strategy pursued by the CHWU was one of caution. It was an approach which had enabled the union to survive the dark years of the early 1930’s and yet had not prevented it from securing several important advances in the wages and conditions of work of its members. From 1908 until 1967, the union pursued its objectives without recourse to either strike action or on-the-job agitation.
Such an experience was typical of the other hotel workers' unions, except in two instances. The Auckland and Wellington hotel workers' unions had both taken industrial action in the 1952 licensed hotel dispute, while the Auckland union had participated in the general strike of 1913. As the third largest union in the industry, the CHWU could have been expected to have undertaken some industrial action in 1952, but Brooks and the CHWU executive were not confident of membership support. Rather, from the foundation of the union until 1967, the primary weapons of the CHWU's arsenal were the skills of its officials and the sanction of the law. When award negotiations became particularly difficult the union benefited from being part of a united federation and to some extent could rely on the prospect of industrial action by the AHWU to place pressure upon the employers. It was a distinct change, therefore, when the CHWU took strike action in 1967 and again in 1970. In both instances, the resolve and unity shown by the licensed hotel workers demonstrated that a new dimension had been added to the union's strength.

The CHWU had retained its identity as an autonomous union but with a reputation for loyalty to the labour movement. It determined its own direction on industrial and political issues, but pursued a path of close cooperation with the Hotel Workers' Federation and with the wider labour movement. Within the movement the size and resources of the union had given it considerable influence, but unlike unions such as the freezing workers, watersiders or miners, it lacked a traditional militancy at the workplace. Without this strength it had been unable to play a leading role in industrial struggle. The successful industrial action of 1967 and 1970, had shown that the CHWU did possess a substantial degree of support at the workplace which could be mobilized to obtain the union's demands. It was a power nevertheless still confined to licensed hotel workers. Moreover, the force of the union's demands for better wages and conditions remained subject to two further constraints: the majority of its members lacked a monopoly of certain skills that other trade unionists could use to bid-up the price of their labour, and the workforce as a whole was not in a strategic position in the economy which could be used to gain bargaining leverage. These factors limited the heights to which the CHWU could aspire to reach in the overall hierarchy of wage rates.
In the course of the first sixty-two years of its existence, the CHWU had experienced the adversities, dissensions and challenges that had confronted the working class. Its members had suffered the scars of depression, the hardships of low pay, long hours and squalid work-places and had been subject throughout their working day to the power of the employer. Their response had not been that of stronger and more militant unions, but they had, nevertheless, struggled to defend their interests and to contribute to the general defence of the labour movement.

In 1908, the workers in hotels and restaurants had been at the margins of the working class: isolated from one another and the wider working class, and outside of the struggle of the labour movement. In the early years of the century they developed a sectional consciousness — an awareness of the antagonistic nature of their interests and those of the industry’s employers but not one which identified themselves with other workers. In the course of six decades of union activity, a consciousness evolved which did identify with the interests of labour, both the Labour Party and the trade union movement. This development was uneven, with many members of the CHWU working in tearooms and private hotels having not moved beyond a sectional consciousness. Nevertheless, hotel, hospital and restaurant workers, generally saw themselves as part of the working class — their experiences at work, family relationships and values constituted the matrix of this consciousness. It was not a revolutionary class consciousness. Workers did not seek the destruction of capitalism, either by radical reform or sudden revolution, but it was none-the-less a consciousness of a distinct and opposing set of interests determined by the economic and social relationship of class.

By the end of 1970 the CHWU represented a large and growing group of workers who formed an increasingly large section of the New Zealand working class. On the margins of that class in 1908 they had by 1971 become integral and active participants.
APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CHWU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1908 | Canterbury Hotel & Restaurant Workers Union formed on 24 Feb. Hon J. Barr (MLC) elected president; R. T. Bailey elected as secretary.  
First award in Canterbury for licensed hotel workers in May. Provides 65 hr week and covers Chch city.  
Union joins CTLC.  
First award in Canterbury for tearoom workers in December provides for 62 hr week (males) and 52 hr week (females) and covers Chch city. |
| 1909 | Barr elected to replace Bailey as secretary.  
Union disaffiliates from CTLC. |
| 1910 | Licensing Amendment Act prohibits hiring new barmaids. |
| 1911 | LH award extended to outer Chch and hrs cut to 62 (males) and 52 (females) in LH. |
| 1912 | First LH award in South Canterbury. Covers Timaru and Washdyke.  
Waihi strike. CHWU takes no action. |
| 1913 | Shops & Offices Act amended permitting Arbitration Court to provide six day week for hotel and restaurant workers.  
General Strike. AHWU strikes in support of six day week. No action by CHWU. |
| 1914 | Arbitration Court grants six-day week in hotel and tearoom awards. |
| 1917 | Six o’clock closing introduced for LH bars as temporary war measure. |
| 1918 | Barr resigns as secretary and seceded by Evans.  
Private Hotels included for first time in a Canterbury award.  
Hours of work in hotels and tearooms cut to 56 (males)  
Evans resigns as secretary and is succeeded by R. A. Brooks.  
Six o’clock closing becomes permanent. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Prohibition fails to win December referendum by only 3263 votes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Brooks resigns as secretary and is replaced by Gilmore for three months, but returns in February 1921.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>East begins 15 year term as president. 48 hour week introduced for hotels and tearooms by Shops &amp; Offices Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Arbitration Court orders wage cut of 5/- per week in May and a further cut of 3/- to 1/6 in December.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>CHWU joins CTLC, NCLRC and HWF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Dominion awards established for LH and tearooms. CHWU leaves CTLC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Dominion award for PH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>HWF affiliates to the Alliance of Labour. Brooks resigns as secretary and is replaced by Niall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Niall forced to resign by CHWU executive. Brooks returns as secretary for third and final time. In line with government policy, Arbitration Court cuts wages by 10%. Government abolishes compulsory arbitration. PH and tearoom awards expire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>HWF secures protection from Arbitration Court for minimum wage rates for women in PH. Young elected secretary of HWF. After lengthy struggle, HWF accepts 5% cut in LH award.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Unemployment reaches 79,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Labour government elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Labour government introduced 40 hr week, minimum wage and compulsory unionism. Compulsory arbitration and 10% wage cut of 1931 restored. LH award obtains 40 hr week, but 44 hrs in PH and teashop awards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
<td>EVENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>East dies and Wilson elected as new president, beginning 16 year term in office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>FOL formed and CHWU affiliates to reorganised Canterbury Trades Council. Brooks elected as council secretary (resigns 1938).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Wage rates in CHWU awards reach peak level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>CHWU begins organising domestic workers in public hospitals and chartered clubs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>First industrial agreements obtained for public hospital workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>J. A. Lee expelled from Labour Party. CHWU supports expulsion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>First award for public hospital workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Brooks reelected secretary of CTC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>General Wage Order of 5% issued.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Second GWO issued of 5%. Economic Stabilization introduced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Conflict between CHWU and HWF reaches crisis. CHWU organises disaffiliation of South Island unions but ultimately no withdrawal occurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Annual Holidays Act provides for two weeks paid leave a year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>First licensing trust created in Invercargill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>First full round of award negotiations since 1940. Rises of between 10 and 11/-..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Contract cleaning of hospitals begins in Chch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Royal Commission on Licensing recommends nationalisation of the brewery industry. Young of the HWF opposes plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>40 hr week extended to PH, tearooms and public hospitals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>First award for domestic workers in private hospitals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
<td>EVENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1949  | Penalty rates of pay introduced in LH, PH and chartered clubs for weekend work.  
        | Referendum favours maintaining six o’clock closing.  
        | Labour government defeated at November election.  |
| 1950  | Split in FOL between Watersiders and National Executive.  
        | Young elected chairman of break-away Trade Union Congress. CHWU and other HWF affiliates oppose Young’s association with TUC and force him to leave TUC.  |
| 1951  | Waterfront dispute. CHWU remains neutral but sympathetic to watersiders. Young acts as mediator between National government and watersiders.  
        | Service allowance of 10/- week secured for barmen.  |
| 1952  | Employers attempt to cut wages in LH award. Campaign led by AHWU and WHWU defeats attempt and gains further wage rise.  |
| 1955  | Opposition group within CHWU attempts to defeat executive in election. After internal conflict, opposition group defeated.  
        | Brooks retires as secretary after 36 years and is succeeded by L. N. Short.  |
| 1957  | CHWU moves its operations to its newly purchased premises in Manchester St.  |
        | Young dies after 30 years as HWF secretary.  |
| 1967  | 10 o’clock closing carried in referendum. National industrial action by LH barstaff who refuse to work after 7 p.m. unless higher nightshift allowance paid. Unions win 12c an hr.  |
| 1968  | CHWU moves into newly purchased Lichfield Street building.  
<pre><code>    | Nil Wage Order issued by Arbitration Court results in industrial action by FOL affiliates. Court agrees to 5% order.  |
</code></pre>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>First award for Air New Zealand Flight Kitchen staff in Auckland followed by Chch in August. First award in New Zealand for rest home workers secured by CHWU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>National strike action by LH workers to secure immediate 30% wage rise. Labour withdrawn every Saturday for one month in selected cities. Unions win 25% rise plus sick leave and extra holidays.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: OFFICIALS OF THE CHWU

1908 TO 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hon J. Barr</td>
<td>R. T. Bailey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(MLC) 1 (1908)</td>
<td>Hon J. Barr (MLC) 1 (1909-1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Mulligan</td>
<td>(1909-1911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Crawford</td>
<td>(Nov 1911-Feb 1912)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. W. Evans</td>
<td>(Feb 1912-Apr 1912)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Springer</td>
<td>(1912)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. W. Evans</td>
<td>(1913-1916)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Lauder</td>
<td>(1916-1917)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms Etheridge</td>
<td>(Nov 1917-Feb 1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Norwood</td>
<td>(Feb 1918-Apr 1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Malloy</td>
<td>(1918)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Currie</td>
<td>(Feb 1919-Jun 1919)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Ellison</td>
<td>(1919-1920)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Currie</td>
<td>(Sep 1920-Mar 1921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Cotton</td>
<td>(Mar 1921-May 1921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. G. East</td>
<td>(1921-1931)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. A. Brooks</td>
<td>(Mar 1931-May 1931)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. G. East</td>
<td>(1931-1936)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Wilson</td>
<td>(1936-1952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Nielsen</td>
<td>(1953-1959)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. A. Ferguson</td>
<td>(1959-1961)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Tremaine</td>
<td>(1961-1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Dyer</td>
<td>(1964-1967)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
1 Member of the Legislative Council
APPENDIX C: MEMBERSHIP OF THE CHWU:
1908 TO 1970

MEMBERS

5000
4000
3000
2000
1000

YEAR


Figures as at 31 December

Source: Annual Reports of the Department of Labour

H 11A or H 11 AJHR
NOTE ON SOURCES

In recounting this story the minute books of the CHWU have been of immeasurable assistance. Besides providing a complete record of executive and general meetings from 1908 to 1970, they also contain numerous and detailed reports on the union's industrial, political and internal activities between 1920 and 1955. Several of these reports provide an interesting and as yet largely untouched, source on the developments in Canterbury and in New Zealand in the wider labour movement. The minutes of the HWF, the national magazine Flashlight, and the Roberts Papers provided very useful material on the 1930's, and in the case of the former also on the 1940's. Throughout, the Book of Awards provided the necessary award statistics as well as decisions and memorandums of the Arbitration Court on claims and disputes.

Several other sources performed a useful supplementary role. In the first decade, the NZPD and AJHR provided useful data on the conditions of the workplace, the debate over the six-day week and award coverage for the private hotels. For the 1960's and 1970, the Christchurch Star and The Press provided coverage of the union's industrial action. In addition, the minute books of the CTLC and NCLRC shed light on the relationship between the union and the wider labour movement, and Fryer's research essay was informative on the experiences of the Auckland union prior to World War One.

Several secondary sources provided both comparative and theoretical perspectives. Particularly valuable were, Braverman, Hyman, Mackie and Pattulo, and Wertheimer.
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* For official title see Note on Abbreviations
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