Revolution from below:

Grassroots participation in Thai civil society

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Darngnapasorn Na Pombejra
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Dedication
To dad and mom
To Charoen Wat-agson, Vanida Tantivitayapitak and Chairat Nanthachote.
This study applies the concept of civil society in analyzing the role of grassroots participation in Thai society. It aims to clarify the emergence of Thai local civil society and how it is developed and sustained. Civil society in Thailand often emerges from protest movements and then needs to adapt to survive when the protests end. The thesis examines this process.

The framework identifies the key factors in three phases: civil group establishment, civil group development and civil group sustainability. The participatory approach was used for observation, in-depth interview and textual analysis. The study used three local civil groups for comparison in two case studies. The cases showed that Thai local civil groups emerged in relation to social capital in their communities. Social capital, in terms of trust and reciprocity, operated through social bonding and relationships.

Villagers created informal structures through self-organization. Leaders played a very significant role, in particular to connect the actors within and outside the civil groups. The study shows that social capital facilitated the operation of civil groups. Individual social capital developed into group or collective social capital based on the groups’ values and norms, which could sustain the civil groups. The adaptation of the civil groups came about through building linkages with other organizations, both at horizontal and vertical levels. Civil groups that needed to convert to or combine with other organizations, such as NGOs, could not survive, so civil society that developed during the protest eroded.

The study found that the keys to effective Thai civil society are good human resources and local orientation. Leaders were very important for civil society to remain local in its orientation. Civil society also needs to be independent because civil society loses its horizontal ties, social capital and purpose when it is drawn into national politics, or is converted into NGOs and led by nationally oriented NGOs or activists. Consequently, Thai civil society requires self-organization and a local focus in order to be sustained in Thai society.
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Chapter One

Introduction

In Thailand, the concept of civil society emerged as an alternative for strengthening and consolidating democratization. Civil society appeared to be a public space for the Thai people, who have been facing crises of political development. The political process seemed to be an arena for elites, businessmen and politicians, while the grassroots have been largely ignored in Thai society. Consequently, the concept of civil society became, for some, the solution for problems of democratization, because this concept provides a platform for collective activities so that Thai grassroots can participate in the Thai democratic process.

Thailand’s democratization problem is due to an excess of state power. There have been many groups of Thai people involved in civil organization. Some groups established organizations to assist underprivileged Thai people in the form of foundations or NGOs. However, there particularly have been a lot of communities organized to present the grassroots’ demands, these grassroots groups mostly aim to respond to state policies that lead to conflicts between grassroots and the Thai state. These groups mainly organized the collective activities of people in the form of social groups, which indicates the social power of civil organization.

The term ‘civil society’ has recently become well known in political science. Some writers believe civil society is advantageous for democracy. For instance, Falk (2005, p. 285) states that civil society creates space for growing alternative ideologies. Putnam (1993) indicates that development of civil society encourages democracy. Heelsum (2005, p. 21) notes that civic community theory can be used to investigate the relationship between civic participation and political participation. In relation to different political performances (Putnam, 1993), the concept of civil society therefore has been accepted worldwide as a political development idea related to democratization. However, Thailand has different contexts from the West, which originated the
ideal of civil society. In this regard, the consideration of the Thai context needs to be understood in order to effectively apply the civil society concept to Thai society.

Recently, civil society appears to have grown progressively in Thailand. This has included the development of the concept of a civil society, but it has also been frequently conceptualized as consisting of social movements. The concept of civil society originated in Thai society in relation to political development when Thai politics was transformed by a student-led popular uprising on October 14, 1973. This marked the original emergence of activists that underpinned the role of grassroots in order to participate in democratization. This also provided evidence that the concept of civil society applied in practice to Thai politics, even though at the beginning the civil society concept applied to the Thai context more in relation to social sectors, in terms of voluntary organizations (Chuensiri, 1998; Yoshihide and Srisontisuk, 2003). Regarding this, the role of the student-led popular uprising in changing politics at the national level showed the power of people, which led Thai people to increasingly discuss the civil society concept as the solution for democratization and political development. In particular, the role of students indicated the social power built by people who had never had political power in Thai society previously.

In terms of political development, the grassroots also attempted to balance state power by seeking ways to participate in state decision-making, particularly in the policies or projects that affected the grassroots. Thai people consequently became more concerned about their rights to political participation, which were part of the democratic process. Civil organizations created by the grassroots seemingly promised revolutionary politics as a social force that could empower the grassroots (Yoshihide and Srisontisuk, 2003). Moreover, the ability of the grassroots in building civil organizations reflected the Thai people’s capability for democratization in terms of popular participation in the political process, which could make democracy sustainable in Thailand.

Thai civil society is currently emerging around Thailand. Civil organizations developed with different goals and in relation to many different problems. Therefore, they might develop in different ways in different places,
which also affects their capability for survival in Thai society. Civil groups have emerged to face the crises and confront the state and other state agencies; thus, the civil groups and the state are opponents, and the Thai state is an enemy in the grassroots' eyes because their problems came from state policies (Tantivitayapitak, 2008). In the same way, the state identified these civil groups as groups of local people who oppose the state or the development policies of the state. Facing these difficult situations, some civil groups succeed in their missions, others fail. Many disband; some civil groups develop under the circumstance of conflicts and are sustained after the crises.

With respect to the proposition that a civil society can be part of the solution for issues of democratization and political development, this notion of a civil society has become an interesting critical issue. For example, the question arises: if civil society is an enlightening idea for the political context, why has Thailand experienced so many crises resulting from the struggle of social movements that are rooted in civil society or civil organizations? Why has the growth in the prominence of the concept of ‘civil society’ coincided with political conflicts, and why has the very existence of Thai civil movements begun to be considered as a major political problem?

Given these questions, scholars need to present the reality of civil society and the role of grassroots that participate in developing civil organizations. Understanding civil society in Thailand may be a study of a microcosm or be a micro-reflection of the wider scope of Thai politics at the national level. It perhaps indicates a more subtle understanding of an increasing degree of political complexity at a time when the role of the grassroots appears as a key factor of democratization participating through civil society.

**Background to the Problem**

A current concern within Thailand contends that the Thai political system comprises a centralized state. It is also holds a high level of political power in decision-making. Additionally, the political sectors have become a site for elites, businessmen and the bourgeois to build channels to facilitate achieving their own interests through the system of representative democracy. Therefore Thailand has moved forward with a strong power of state and state agencies,
and the political sectors seem to operate separately from the grassroots even though the grassroots or local people are identified as the major group of people in the social sectors in Thai society. Ignoring the grassroots’ participation and voices, many policies and projects launched by the Thai state have faced the grassroots’ dissatisfaction because the policies and projects were decided by the authoritarian-style state.

Importantly, conflicts emerged due to policies and projects that mostly affected the grassroots or local people because the Thai state tended to pay more attention to issues of economic development, with the idea of industrialization and modernization, while ignoring the concern of the local communities’ livelihoods. Therefore, local people have attempted to participate politically by creating civil groups in order to address their lack of rights and power in relation to the state.

Moreover, it was often the case in the past, and in more recent political struggles, that local Thai communities have faced exclusion, and the consequences for development, especially in the case studies of this research, have involved conflict. Some of the political processes set up in order to fulfill the political interests for some politicians and business people have given birth to social movements, usually in which a group of local protesters have taken action to claim their rights from the Thai state.

The most recent social movements have been local communities affected by the decisions of the Thai state on the projects or policies that affect the lives of local people, such as environmental and agricultural problems. Moreover, governments have often seemed incapable of finding solutions, which has led local people across the country to attempt to claim their rights from the state by joining together in social movements. As a result, many grassroots groups have been engaged in protests and have obstructed many of the state’s policies and projects. Some of the projects have even been cancelled or postponed, but some, arguably including the worst and most hated, went ahead, like Map Ta Put and Mae Moh1.

1 Map Ta Put is a project of the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand located in Rayong Province. Mae Moh is the coal-fired power plant in Lampang province. Both projects are a controversial issue between local people and the Thai state due to the environmental degradation consequences of the projects (Forsyth, 2007).
Importance of Research
The idea of ‘civil society’ has become an important issue in Thailand recently. In particular, there are many social movements by local civil groups. There remains the question, however, as to whether or not they have had a strengthening effect on civil society more generally over the last few years. Significant to this research is the role of grassroots participation in terms of civil groups. The civil groups in this research refer to the organized groups of local people in their own communities. Further, these groups are considered important in the process of community or civil organizational change. In the Thai context, they are important for engaging the grassroots in local community development until they can be empowered to work with local and central government.

In other words, the politics of the local community and their participation is an important aspect. The development of the capacity of any community involves a study of the networks inside and outside the community. It is necessary to consider factors that influence community actions and intentions, and also necessary to learn about issues confronting all actors in the process.

There is a need for research with the grassroots communities to identify and understand the real issues they face as civil groups, in order to learn how to better ensure that the grassroots membership of civil groups can become organized more effectively. Furthermore, seeking successful ways for collaboration between local communities and local government (and their agents) may prove useful to decrease conflicts and to support the eventual development of democratization.

Research Questions and Objectives
Based on this background, this research has several main questions related to how the group of grassroots were established and developed into civil groups. How did the grassroots organize their civil groups during crises with the Thai state and probably other state agencies? Another lay question of this research is how the grassroots could sustain their civil groups after the end of crises.

To understand the civil groups, this research investigates the role of grassroots members of Thai local communities in relation to their
participation in the trajectory of the civil groups. The research describes and explains the form and function of the civil groups, with attempts to ascertain some of the possible factors that have determined the form and function of Thai civil organization. Additionally, this research examines how some of the more successful Thai grassroots organizations have developed in terms of the concept of civil society while analyzing some of the ways that local civil organizations successfully operate in order to move forward successfully and sustainably.

**Chapter Outline**

Chapter Two presents a critical assessment of the literature where possible with the aim of creating a theoretical framework with which to analyze the problem. This chapter reviews first the diverse definitions of civil society internationally, and then those used in the particular Thai context. The argument for civil society that it is a desirable aspect of democracy, as well as the challenges it faces, are focussed on. The chapter also reviews the various theoretical and research frameworks used to analyze democracy, participation and social capital that are used in the development of the framework for this research. Finally, the case studies are introduced, including the background and the rationale for choosing those case studies. The research methods used for the study and the choices of methodologies are also outlined.

Chapters Three and Four present the case studies and their contexts, applying the research framework, which analyzes the case studies in three phases: civil group establishment, civil group development and the sustaining of the civil group. Chapter Three has case one, the Pak Mun civil group. This chapter presents the background to the Pak Mun civil group and the emergence of a grassroots organization in terms of civil society concepts. The roles, actions and interactions of the civil group members (the grassroots in the case study), leaders and alliances involved are also explained in terms of Thai civil society relationships. The political activities of the case study are interpreted using the research framework.

Chapter Four has a second case study with two local civil groups, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The same framework is used as in the first case study. The emergence of each grassroots organization is examined.
Grassroots political activities are seen in terms of the roles, actions and interactions of the civil organization members, leaders and alliances.

Chapter Five presents the results of the study and discussion. This chapter tabulates, establishes themes and illustrates, with detailed examples, data from the two case studies pertaining to the interpretations of the origins and development of the organizations emerging out of community movements, along with the organizations’ characteristics, activities and roles. For example, the role of leadership will be addressed, including their strategies and networks.

This chapter also contains a discussion of the case studies in comparison, in terms of the potential for capacity building for ‘civil society organizations’ in the form of ‘civil groups’. A rationale is then developed for why grassroots utilize ‘civil groups’, and what is required for their self-organization. This is described as necessary if they are to achieve the capacity to fulfill an advisory role for state institutions. The chapter addresses the significance of the civil groups’ linkages, such as NGOs. It makes critical comments on the role of linkages as described in the literature. In addition, this chapter discusses this critique in relation to Thailand. Chapter Five concludes with an assessment of the contributions to the literature on civil society theory and theories of democratization. The possible practical significance of contributions for Thailand is provided. Finally, possible future research is outlined.
Chapter Two

A critical assessment of the literature on theoretical frameworks

Introduction
It is necessary to explore the overall ideal of civil society at the beginning of this study in order to pave the way for potentially grasping the way specific civil society emerges, before focussing on how it is doing so in Thailand. This chapter reviews first the historical concept and definitions of civil society. Second, the main argument for civil society is reviewed, namely that it is an effective approach for democracy. Third, the chapter reviews the challenges civil society faces, followed by how it is used in a particular Thai context. The chapter reviews various theoretical frameworks and develops research frameworks used in this study. Finally, the rationale for the chosen research methodology is discussed, followed by an outline of the research methods used in this study.

Definitions of civil society
The term ‘civil society’ has recently become increasingly well known internationally, and in various ways. However, it is accepted that the term is also very controversial.

Gramsci (1971) defines civil society as located between state and market, whereby its identity resembles a diverse whole of institutions with non-state and non-market structures and activities. In a narrower sense, for Gellner (1994, p. 56), civil society is a part of society which critically but constructively challenges the relevant political structure of states in order to provide channels to combine market efficiency with cooperative value (Edwards, 2004, p. 14). In the same way, Hadenius and Uggla (1996, p. 1621) have clarified the concept of civil society as that denoting “a certain arena of society which is
dominated by interactions of a certain kind”, by the public space between the state and individual people.

Gellner (1994, p. 5) defines civil society as “the set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which are strong enough to counterbalance the state”, and the different institutions can be described in terms of either formal or informal institutions. Other commentators, however, suggest that the emergent institutions of civil society can also have both formal and informal characteristics at the same time (Diamond, 1994, p. 6). Networks and cultural aspects of civil society have this characteristic (Hadenius and Ugglæ, 1996). Moreover, Gellner (1995) affirms that the segmental character of civil society marks traditional society. By this, Gellner means that the distinctive aspects of a particular civil society relate to the sociocultural form in which it operates.

For these theorists, civil society is the public space comprised of institutions that in their dominant interactions respond to the political system such that they impact on the operation of democracy (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, 1992). The essential nature of civil society is comprised of institutions which exist in the social space between the economic sector and state (Foley and Edwards, 1996; Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004). However, in recognizing this, there is also recognition that the institutions filling this space can be informal as well as formal. This can be understood by considering how democratic processes involve both formal and informal operations (Blau and Scott, 1962; Rehg and Bohman, 1996; Lauth, 2000). This is taken up further in the following sections when the roles of democracy and institutions of resistance in civil society are considered.

Historically, the concept of civil society originated from Western European countries’ concern with the development of democratization in terms of individual rights and freedoms (Lefort and Macey, 1988; Diamond, 1999; Edwards, 2009). It is an idea that has been explored in well-known works of major philosophers of Western Europe, such as Locke, Hobbes, Ferguson, Hegel and Marx. However, the idea has been overshadowed by the link to commerce by some theorists – in particular, by Ferguson, Hegel and Marx. Civil society is nevertheless still generally expected to develop participation, especially, for increased democratization.
Edwards (2009) reviews how some classical thinkers and those of the Enlightenment, such as Aristotle, Plato and Hobbes, also viewed civil society as a defence against unjustified invasions by the state. This is not to suggest that the state is essentially against civil society, but rather that the situation can become unbalanced towards the state (Kumar, 1993). Based on this, it can be proposed that the emergence of civil society re-establishes balance within social space (White, Howell and Xiaoyuan, 1996).

Edwards (2002) had earlier pointed out that the rise of civil society is causing a change in world politics, and it must be managed carefully because it needs to be useful for different situations and contexts. In these individual situations and contexts, different balances are provided by civil society, between the state and the economic sector, and also between formal and informal institutions.

Other contemporary writers, such as Putnam (1993), emphasize that civil society is not only different in different contexts, but also emphasize that the extent to which civil society has developed is a determining factor for the degree of democracy. As a result, it can be seen that civil society is seen to encourage democracy. For instance, Putnam (1993) suggests civic culture explains different political performances, in terms of democracy, in various regions of Italy. For Putnam, civic culture refers to a kind of social capital that supports the establishment and development of civil society, which ultimately encourages democracy (Heelsum, 2005, p. 20). The role of civic culture in terms of social capital is taken up further in the section outlining the framework used in the research.

Baker (1998, p. 81) also claims that civil society operates as a safeguard for democracy. Baker argues that where there is undemocratic state power, an independent civil society can operate and will emerge as a safeguard. Baker (1998, p. 82) also points out that in the case of the former communist states, civil society emerged as a necessary characteristic to maintain ‘self-determination’ and work to protect itself from the intrusion of both economic and state power. In Eastern Europe particularly, even after communism, the concept of civil society and defence against the powerful state has remained, not just to provide democratic opposition, but also for ‘self-organization’.
Consequently, according to Edwards (1998), civil society refers to various types and forms of organization; however, it generally includes informal as well as formal networks and associations between the family and the state, which impact on the levels and types of democracy. So the difficulty in understanding the term ‘civil society’ is due not only to the complexity of today’s society but also to the many ways it has been and is used, and what aspects are emphasized.

Following the main concepts of civil society found in Gellner, Edwards, Putnum, Baker and Hadenius and Uggla, civil society for the purpose of this thesis will be defined as diverse institutions that operate independently from the state and economic sectors in order to develop their democratization.

**Historical Development of the Concept of Civil Society**

Historically, the civil society idea has developed in diverse ways, with major theorists associated with the various traditions. Two main traditions can be distinguished, one focussing on commerce, and another focussing on state institutions. Shils (1991) has reviewed and sketched out the evolution of the orientation of the term ‘civil society’, pointing out that, while differences of scope have occurred, a consistent undertone has existed for many centuries, of a municipality of citizens with rights to participate and discuss political issues. Nevertheless, there are other emphases, which focus on commerce. In the year 1767, Adam Ferguson was the first to look at the features of civil society through the lens of commerce. In 1776, Adam Smith then detailed its nature, though without using the term. It was a century later that Karl Marx similarly used an economic lens, but with a different focus to Ferguson. On the other hand, after Adam Smith, early in 19th century, before Karl Marx, Friedrich Hegel focussed on the role of state institutions for civil society. For Hegel, even though the forms of civil society build upon the state, civil society and state are, having said that, separated (Levine, 2009, p. 356). Hegel’s view of civil society does, however, focus on the market mechanism to some extent. He does so when it is seen to lead to the development of conditions for materialism within bourgeois society’s social life. Even so, civil society, in Hegel’s view, does not only include the market. It is also concerned with other
parts of society, in particular emphasizing non-economic institutions as the central factor of civil society (Kumar, 1993, p. 377).

Marx developed the concept of civil society, extending the detailed work of Smith by incorporating the then newly developing factory system into a class system of analysis based on commercial activity. Marx, however, also developed his class system analysis by applying Hegel’s definition of the key origins of the civil society concept, but limited their scope.

In Marx’s class concept, it was also accepted that the role of the group of people comprising bourgeois society is the vital factor for the motivation of civil society (Maguire, 1978, p. 17). Marx’s view is that the ‘property-centred’ concern of the bourgeois class is at the heart of the civil society concept. Marx linked civil society and the state by emphasizing the role civil society has on the growth of capitalism and the political economy.

Marx’s thought provides critical insight into how classes of economic inequity arise from private ownership, even though something is lost in Marx’s critical adoption of Hegel. To place Marx and Hegel’s thought in juxtaposition, it can be seen that they both thought of civil society in similar ways in relation to commercial and economic features, but Marx took a narrower view. Civil society in Marx’s thought is equated with the whole of capitalist society, while Hegel referred to it as only one part of society, the bourgeois class. It has since led some Marxists to use the term ‘civil society’ to refer to both the commercial part of society as well as to the whole of society. Therefore, in the Marxian tradition’s analysis of civil society, the relation of non-bourgeois classes to civil society became obscured. This has arguably resulted in the failure in the Marxian tradition to recognise the cultural aspects of civil society, and hence also the regional differences in civil society. Nevertheless, the Marxist focus on commerce has also made a large impact and so also needs to be considered, even though it is not the focus of this research. An argument in this study is, however, that narrowing the focus of civil society to commerce only means one cannot capture its complexity in the contemporary world.

That civil society has multiple forms, as well as having multiple definitions and emphases, has brought some confusion, leading some theorists to question the usefulness of the term. Kumar (1993), for example,
outlined how the term has sometimes been taken to refer to a need to emphasize commercial activity when state power is seen to be needing to be limited, for example during the communist era, whilst in other contexts being taken to refer to a need to emphasize the power of the state to limit commercial interests. Kumar suggests that the ambiguity of the term indicates that it is a normative term, operating primarily with a ‘melancholic’, ‘feel-good’ orientation. Notwithstanding, civil society has remained relevant. It has even become a ‘shining emblem’ (Gellner, 1994, p. 1). So an alternative conclusion to Kumar can be reached and is taken up by this research, namely that the inconsistent definitions and aspects of civil society provide the possibility of illuminating the concept as a useful concept. It can be shown to be an ideal with the flexibility to enable applicability to multiple specific contexts, all of which are needed in order to allow practical contributions to be provided by the concept. Key contemporary political philosophers continue to value it precisely because these tensions in the concept are helpful to explore the phenomena of democratization.

The role of enhancing democracy is central but is not a sufficient explanation. Classical concerns with a polis of open discussion and free association have remained central even though they were eclipsed to some degree by a focus on the link to commerce by some modern thinkers, in particular Marxists. One approach is found in Antonio Gramsci’s thought.1 Gramsci (1971) defines hegemonic processes, of which commerce is a part, along with the state. The significance of hegemonic process, other than that provided by the state – for example commercial activities – are how Marxian concerns with coercive power are dealt with by contemporary commentators (Gellner 1994).

In summary, it can be seen that the origins of the term ‘civil society’ are explored at the modern edge by key political philosophers who have illuminated commerce as a key point that has led or allowed civil society to

become an idea within the development of liberal democracy. But this is neither a sufficient description, nor central. More importantly, civil society is the grassroots’ expression “bearing the premise of democratization” (Colas, 2002, p. 142). The concept has been described as a “wave of global citizen action” (Zadek and Raynard, 2004, p. 319) and the center of “globalization from below” with alternative ideologies “growing in its space” (Falk, 2002, p. 285). The concept of civil society has continued to evolve around the world up to the present. In this thesis a chief concern is to determine what features of civil society have evolved in Thailand and how these relate to how the concept of civil society has been evolving globally.

**Civil Society and Democracy**

The development of civil society is now global, and it has occurred in different contexts, so that some further differences within civil society have emerged globally. Ever since the neoliberal ideology has become globally hegemonic, with its domination promoted by groups of powerful state and international organizations (Thomas, 2001; Falk, 2002; Yeates, 2002; Plehwe, Walpen and Neunhöffer, 2007), there has also been recognition of the significance of Gramsci’s idea and concerns about the hegemonic power of the modern state destroying older forms of cultural life (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 146). For Gramsci there are two main aspects to hegemony – the economy and the ideological superstructure, which are related, and together form what he calls the ‘historical bloc’. The ‘historical bloc’ of hegemony can, however, also be considered to be comprised of two main ideas – political society and civil society (Cox, 1993). The economic or productive sphere is unable to contribute to civil society (Bratton, 1989; Hyden, 1997; Castells, 2011) and is instead reliant on the state to do so (Kumar, 1993, p. 382). Based on this, it can therefore be seen that hegemony is closely related to the state, as Gramsci argued. It is a hugely complicated realm, which contains the dynamic and relation between economic and ideological superstructure in terms of both political and civil society. The dynamic of the sphere of hegemony produces the ensemble of ideology to constitute spontaneous consent in society, which is ultimately what makes hegemony dominate social life. In this way, it can be seen that global neoliberal economic influence also imposes neoliberal
ideology onto local culture. Civil society, therefore, cannot become too tightly linked to neoliberal ideology because the cultural aspect of civil society can then be interfered with. Furthermore, civil society prevents and counterbalances such hegemonic power by using an idea of institutional pluralism (Gellner, 1994, p. 1).

Gellner (1994) affirms that civil society is the counter-vision ideal of institutional and ideological pluralism, which is set up against the monopoly of state power over society. It means the prevention of the domination of society by monopoly through the supporting and nurturing of social liberty. Similarly, Bermeo and Nord (2000) have presented the civil society idea as the ‘seedbed of liberty’, in reference to European countries such as Portugal, Russia, Italy, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, in order to present the bonding of liberalization with democratization. Such a view is also held by Baker (2002), who celebrates the understanding of civil society as the one singular point that engages the hegemonic liberal democratic perspective in his work.

Baker (1998, p. 85), however, warns that the concept of civil society remains based on the experiences of the West, where it originated. Inevitably, civil society is recognized as still being a ‘Eurocentric’ concept, and so it may not be applicable outside the West (Baker, 1998, p. 85). But according to Seligman (1995), the idea of civil society has now come to refer to the set of principles and practices for the thinkers who work under the liberal tradition of politics (Waldron, 1987; Aronowitz and Giroux, 2003), which allows multifarious views. As a result, the idea of civil society now resonates differently across the West and the rest of the world. Hann and Dunn (1996, p. 27), for example, explore this through the example of the Mormon Church – a religious group founded and based in the United States. Hann and Dunn have created a form of ‘civil society’ that looks much more like those described for ‘non-Western’ societies.

Edwards (1998) argues, however, that the differences in the forms of civil society are rather mainly due to the differences between levels of government and the differences expressed within representative democracy (Shils, 1991; White, 1994). So it can be interpreted that Edwards emphasizes the role of linkages between institutions and the need for flexibility in the
linkages as the primary difference. Also it can be proposed that, as well as traditional cultural differences, the multiple linkages available due to the differences found in democratic institutions create the types and forms of civil society (Stepan and Linz, 1996; Mercer, 2002), as well providing the flexibility related to the levels, types and interactions between the institutions of democracy.

So for many reasons, civil society challenges attempts at clarification as to its definitive identity and effective role in the social space. As Hadenius and Uggla (1996, p. 1621) argue, however, civil society can nevertheless be adequately described as containing both organized and collective activities that refer to groups arranged in social networks comprising of linkages. The basis of civil society organization is, from this perspective, independent and free both from the state and from construction by family bonds. It is comprised primarily of social networks associated with common objectives, which range from small to large levels within the organizations of civil society.

Additionally, Hadenius and Uggla (1996, p. 1622) state that the growth of collaboration and trust among citizens are factors that facilitate the ability to initiate activities in organizations and establish social networks. Significantly, social interactions are often developed by the mutual supports between organizations in social networks. Put differently, ‘social capital’, defined as the “potential groups have to develop requisite institutional structures and organization”, develops within the arena of civil society (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996, p. 1622). Or similarly, Newton (2001, p. 201) states that using the dense network of civil organizations can generate trust and cooperation between citizens and higher levels of civic engagement and participation. However, his research also provides evidence that social trust between citizens is not necessarily related to an equivalent higher level of political trust between people and political leaders.

Following Hadenius and Uggla’s definition of social capital, it is clear that there is potentially a wide range of social capital held by groups. Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the groups’ capacity is able to be easily changed. It is determined by regulatory and political constraints of history and context that are ‘path dependent’. So linkages between groups within civil
society to enable change in organizational structure are key means by which
groups with low social capital can learn to gain higher social capital.

Furthermore, Hadenius and Ugglä (1996, p. 1662) outline two main
aspects to what they define as the primary task of social capital for civil society,
which is to fulfill democratic functions. Firstly, a pluralist function to facilitate
collective action of different groups in society and, secondly, an educational
function whereby democracy’s fundamental principles and/or democratic
skills can be created by the experience of people through a process of learning
by doing in the democratic structures of civil society. Based on that, the
activities involved in civil society to fulfill the educational democratic function
have to be in horizontal operation. This is because the associations involved
within civil society must themselves be democratically structured if people are
to learn how to participate democratically (Hadenius and Ugglä, 1996, p.
1623).

Hadenius and Ugglä (1996, p. 1623) also point out, however, that
horizontal organization has to avoid becoming ‘locally “encapsulated”
together’. They emphasize that the best results are achieved when local civil
activities are to some degree vertically linked with regional and national levels.
Moreover, they conclude that there is inherent tension and even conflict
between horizontal integration and civil society activity. Incorporating this
insight with those of theorists emphasizing the role of democracy enables civil
activity to be seen to require a degree of vertical integration to provide
flexibility within horizontal integration. This synthesis provides a framework
for the research carried out here.

In summary it can be seen that social capital shapes civil society, while
the features of social capital are enforced by the power of hegemony within
society. Based on this, it can be understood that the forms, functions and
actions of civil society depend on the interweaving of sociocultural details,
which then result in the particular contribution of a collective action of people
to form particular interest groups and/or civic movements. Consequently,
social capital is an important factor for facilitating civil society, and will be
applied in the research framework in this study, with careful attention given to
the features of social capital in the Thai context and what sustains it.
Civil Society, Resistance and New Social Movements

Civil society can be developed to provide the ways of resistance for and by people against the state. Currently this is usually explored in terms of social movements. Accordingly, Diamond (1994, p. 6) identifies civil society as formal and informal organizations, including groups, particularly civic organizations and social movements. Moreover, Buechler (1995) specifically considers New Social Movement theory as being particularly useful in order to analyse the form of collective actions, and so New Social Movement theory can be expected to potentially provide an insight into civil society.

The complex interactions can be seen in part by how a significant feature of New Social Movement theory is a critical analysis of Marxist theory. Given this research’s argument that there is a strong link between New Social Movements and civil society, a study of New Social Movement theory potentially allows critical insights to be gained from the Marxist theory of civil society. Marx analyzed civil society as a feature of class conflict that emerged in response to industrialization, whereas some New Social Movement theorists have changed the attention from the analysis of the conflict of classes to look instead at the ways people in society are proposing new forms of society based on other logics of political action (Buechler, 1995, p. 442). They do so whilst still arguing in agreement with classical Marxism; however, society is still nevertheless dominated by capitalists and remains problematic because of this. But the New Social Movements emphasize networks or informal institutions rather than political parties or formal institutions; local action, rather than the seizure of the power of the state, is sought. It is a type of populist strategy.

These new theorists, who are generally critical of Marxist theory even though they have been influenced by it, take the New Social Movement model as the basis for the argument that there is a complicated society in the real world and civil society provides the capacity to create improvements in social life without having to try to resort to political revolt. From this perspective they argue that old-style Marxist-influenced political movements were unable to overthrow the hegemony of the state, even in the emergence of a post-industrial era, because they remain wedded to the power of the state and its influence on commerce.
There are some contemporary scholars, for instance Manuel Castells from Spain, Alain Tourain from France, Alberto Melucci from Italy and Jurgen Habermas from Germany, who have revived the New Social Movement model so it evolves closer to the hegemonic model of theorists who are far more sympathetic to Marx, in particular Gramsci. Their similarity to the other contemporary scholars is that they also attempt to show how the New Social Movement can be a way to strengthen society. The basis of their argument, however, is that the New Social Movement contains a diverse set of means and tactics by which the identity of groups or movements are constituted, thereby shaping the state power relationships with wider society in multiple ways. This is consistent with the framework developed by this research, which comprises of a need for both vertical and horizontal integration. The difference is that the framework developed here also provides a basis with which to create multiple means and tactics through the incorporation of vertical linkages.

Some of the New Social Movement theorists’ thoughts, such as Castells (1983), present grassroots mobilizations and urban social movement as practical attempts to protest hegemonic domination and to keep cultural identity. Interestingly, Tourain in this light has placed the New Social Movement between the logics of two systems. The first logic is that of the system that consists of the relations of domination due to the attempt to maximize processes of production, and the second logic is that of the system focussing on seeking to sustain individuality. Based on this analysis of the New Social Movement, it can be seen that the concept depends on the same principle as the civil society idea, namely, a synthesis of democracy and economy.

According to Buechler (1995), Jürgen Habermas adds a further insight, by proposing that social life is not only dominated by economic and political power but also by the supremacy of media colonization, dominating the area of social life that he calls the ‘lifeworld’ of everyday largely unconscious

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2 These theorists illustrate the New Social Movement theory in their own context (Buechler, 1995).
socialized and cultural activities. Habermas places the New Social Movement between the social system and the ‘lifeworld’, whereby the New Social Movement seeks to and potentially can protect the ‘lifeworld’ against the invasion of coercive and hegemonic societal modernization systems.

Another New Social Movement theorist, Alberto Melucci (1989), sums up the New Social Movement similarly as the way people respond to the modern world. Interestingly, he emphasizes the informal dimensions of the movement much more than their formal organization, as does Habermas with his notion of ‘lifeworld’. What he leaves out, however, is that this means that the influences on the ‘lifeworld’, for example the media, can provide both a means of resistance as well as a means of state and commercial coercion. This point is another feature of the framework developed by this research, because it is central to the formation and maintenance of linkages between the impact on the development of civil society and civil society existing.

However, one main point of their arguments is that this can and does still include participation in political parties. Moreover the New Social Movement is seen as a way to encourage people in society to have political motivation generally, so that it can become a counter-hegemonic strategy to all forms of hegemony. For instance, the New Social Movement can be rooted in people power as a counterbalance to state power. This is in response to how the old-style Marxist analysis of civil society, which relied purely on political movements to capture state power, failed to disrupt hegemony because they simply replaced one set of hegemonic ideas with another. One group continued to dominate the others to the exclusion of minorities, leading inevitably to a hierarchy within society and privileged elites, even if the hierarchy of groups had become inverted. By contrast, New Social Movement theory can potentially attack all such hegemonies from the basis of an understanding of civil society reliant on the role of the ‘lifeworld’.

Kumar (1993) adds a word of caution by pointing out that the notion of civil society remains ambiguous, and so reliance on civil society to provide resistance may be misguided. Kumar emphasizes that the features of civil society as the space between state and commerce also provide a means for coercive power by either state or commerce, or both, and that this is occurring through the processes of globalization. So New Social Movements cannot be
equated with civil society. Whereas New Social Movements can be said to always provide resistance to state and commercial coercion, civil society cannot, because civil society requires vertical integration to allow grassroots interaction and cooperation to work with the state.

In summary, Marx analyzed civil society within a paradigm of class conflict, enabling civil society to be usefully analyzed in terms of class. Owing to the effect of globalization on society in all countries, there has, however, been a growth in resistance to state and commercial power, including by social movements. This has led some scholars to now understand civil society as incorporating social movements, which refer to the collective actions of people as they act together in order to provide resistance by establishing different cultural identities, claiming the space and rights for minorities, and making society accept different ways of life. In that way, civil society contains social movements within the collective space that is neither the state nor the market, but cannot be equated with social movements of resistance due to the need for civil society to also facilitate linkages to allow grassroots to work with the state. This thesis focuses on the effectiveness of civil society to provide resistance, looking in particular at the importance of linkages to grassroots to do so, what features of civil society maintain these linkages, and how these may differ to social movements in the Thai context.

Thai Civil Society

The emergence of Thai civil society occurred prior to its formal conceptualization by scholars. As in many countries, however, Thai civil society has developed in ways that its conceptualization by scholars utilizing Western models of civil society has not been able to adequately analyze.

Commonly, civil society is conceptualized in Thailand as equivalent to social movements whose members are associated with various social roles; for example, farmers, fishermen and environmental groups (Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee, 1999). In actuality it can appear that, in Thailand, civil society is only comprised of social movements, but this is due to inadequate analysis of how civil society emerges. Its apparent development in Thailand into social movements is better able to be analyzed as being due to a limitation to its development and questions its sustainability. Moreover, conceptions of Thai
civil society are also often accepted as originating and having been developed from New Social Movements (Buechler, 1995, p. 446). As a result, the focus until now, in the study of Thai civil society, has been related to the concept of New Social Movements. This needs be corrected, so that the analysis of how civil society in Thailand became limited to social movements can be critiqued.

With respect to the proposition of civil society as the solution for democratization and political development, civil society has become an interesting critical issue. On the one hand, the concept of civil society in Thailand is an enlightening idea for political development. On the other hand, Thailand has experienced the crises resulting from the social movements rooted in civil society. The growth in the prominence of the concept of civil society has coincided with political conflicts, and Thai civil movements are often considered to be a major political problem. Thus, as reviewed in the previous section, that civil society in Thailand has different contexts from the Western one, which originated the ideal of civil society, so that, in order to apply the civil society concept effectively, consideration of the Thai contexts are needed.

Generally, Thai scholars consider civil society in three different yet related ways. There is the perspective of civil society under neo-Marxism, which is based on class\(^3\), and that stands on the political left wing. Secondly, there are many Thai scholars who emphasize civil society as community strengthenin\(^4\), and thirdly there are some who focus on social movements.\(^5\) These three different ways are related as all three focus on the horizontal dimension of civil society, leaving aside the vertical dimension of interaction with state institutions.

Even though there are these three different emphases, they all share a common idea of civil society in terms of being an alternative to existing democratic processes. Thai scholars generally agree in emphasizing the

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\(^3\) See more from Jiles Ungpakorn (2009) *Social Movement in Thailand* (Thai version); Prachatipatai-Rang-Ngan publication. He shows obviously that he is left wing.

\(^4\) Well-known Thai scholars, such as Prawase Wasi, Nithi Eiwriwong (Supawong and Kadkarnkai, 1997).

\(^5\) For example, Prapas Pintobtang (1998) shows his view in the book *Politics on the road: 99 days of forum of the poor and history of the demonstrations and protests in the Thai society*. 22
encouragement of Thai citizens to participate in political processes to claim rights and/or to protest against the state.

Social movements in Thailand have been formed by diverse groups which have issues that are broader than usual for civil society (Pongpajit, 2002). There is stronger than usual horizontal integration, at the expense of necessary vertical linkages and integration with regional and national state institutions. This being the case, most claims for the benefits of civil society are now focussing on the benefits of grassroots and special interest groups, which mostly relate significantly to community-based groups. For example, Boonmee (2007) believes that civil society in Thailand will provide alternatives to solve political problems if it also becomes focussed on the horizontal integration of grassroots and special interest groups. He applies the word ‘Sangkom Khemkhaeng’, meaning strong community, in order to develop the civil society ideal in Thailand. Boonmee (2007) explains that Thai society is mainly led by two types of power: state power and economic power. He implies that these two powers have class characteristics to leave out the middle and lower classes. Boonmee suggests, however, that a third type of power is possible to empower the middle and lower classes, which he terms Sangkom Khemkhaeng. He uses the term to refer to how people from diverse classes, careers and places of Thai society attempt to empower themselves through cooperation by participating in political issues. They do so by joining groups and/or social movements. He explains how the groups and movements use the networks of power diffusion within society as a strategy to achieve their specific goals.

Dr. Prawase Wasi, who is the one of the best-known social thinkers in Thailand, employs the set of words, ‘Community’ and ‘Civility’ in a fashion similar to the way others use the term ‘civil society’. Generally, he views civil society as a way to make local people stronger, by using the words ‘Pra Cha Sang Kom’, which means the community leads people to focus on the expansion of the horizontal networks which are the essential means to strengthen community or society. The idea is that if Thai communities are strong, this would enable them to take care of themselves in terms of well-

6 Sangkom Khemkhaeng = สังคมเข้มแข็ง
7 Pra Cha Sang Kom = ประชาสังคม
being and education, in particular, then members of the community would have the ability to take leading action within society. He insists that if the grassroots can be strengthened through their movements, then social movements are one of the ways to reform Thailand. However, it can be seen, for Wasi, networking is an effective factor to tie civil groups together, particularly in terms of horizontal networks (Wasi, 2000).

This brief survey of Thai scholars’ work on civil society indicates that there is a limited perspective in Thai scholars’ work in relation to what is considered to be civil society. On the one hand, some scholars use civil society as a narrow concept to refer to the strengthening of local community. On the other hand, some view civil society as a social movement that is a tool for political reform. Both sets of views, however, focus almost exclusively on horizontal networking, and therefore both overlook the role of vertical involvement with state institutions, as well as over emphasize horizontal integration to the extent that mass mobilization and/or community empowerment becomes equated with civil society.

To adequately analyse Thai scholarly work on the aspect of Thai civil society, it is necessary to remember the distinction between civil society in practice and the conceptualization of civil society. The work of the Thai scholars briefly surveyed and outlined above is a survey of their conceptualization of civil society, which has been based largely on international literature on civil society interested in the class dimension. It is instructive to be attentive to this because the period of international, then Thai, scholarly interest in Thai civil society coincided with the emergence of social movements, even though civil society was actually established prior to this by several decades. Civil society appeared in Thailand shortly after World War II, mainly through the work of voluntary organizations; for example the Red Cross and volunteer students from universities. However, it appears that soon after, scholarly interest in Thai civil society began when the ‘interesting’ social science phenomenon of mass social movements began to erupt in the 1980s, giving fuel for class-based analyses, and hence a focus on the horizontal dimension at the expense of the vertical dimension. This can be seen clearly in the work of Thai scholars who equate Thai civil society with social movements.
Two Thai scholars who survey the conceptualization by Thai scholars of civil society as social movements, Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee (1999), outline three ways to analyze Thai social movements in terms of their response to the state. The three ways are: (i) to cooperate with the state; (ii) to make demands of the state; (iii) to allow protests against the state. The first way, cooperation with the state is, however, uncommon, and they point out that if it is claimed, it is often experienced actually as the state dictating to citizens. In the same way, they point out that Chairat Charoensin-o-larn (1999) analyzes civil society as a new civic movement that does not have the aim to snatch power from the state, but rather to critically engage with the state. However, there is little evidence of this actually occurring. It is more common that civic movements refuse to accept the power of state and carry out civil disobedience to oppose the existing system so as to force social transformation (Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee, 1999, p. 5). Similarly, they point out that, even though Anek Laothamatas describes the Thai civic movement as a network of various groups or organizations that link the state and individual, the main point to be taken is that activities of civic movements are not undertaken with or through the state, but in order to limit the power and duties of the state (Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee, 1999, p. 6). It is considered by these scholars that it is in this arena of confrontation with the state that the networks of civil groups essentially act. The effect of this arena of confrontation toward the state, on the relationships linking the state and the individual, needs to be clarified but is overlooked by these scholars. It appears to be presumed by these scholars that this is normal for civil society, probably because the models used have drawn on class-based views of civil society that were applied when social movements began to emerge in Thailand. Nevertheless, the limitation of this approach has been seen by some Thai scholars who have recognized the important role that formal institutions as well as social movements play in Thai civil society.

There are some Thai scholars who look at civil society as a form of organization, and some scholars even use the term civil society in Thailand to mean non-profit organizations (Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee, 1999, p. 301). For example, Supawong (1997) claims that civil society refers to organizations that stand outside business. He claims that their goals focus on
collective benefits, so in other words, they must be non-profit organizations. He interprets non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as the main representative of the civic or social movement. There are many other Thai scholars who hold this point of view, because NGOs have been taking action in social movements since the 1976 (Thai) coup. For example, many NGOs play an important role at grassroots level to support local people’s claims for their rights in environmental management. Consequently, several Thai scholars, for example, Naruemon Thabchumpon (2008), Somchai Phatharathananunth (2006) and Bruce Missingham (2003), have paid attention to the role played by NGOs because they believe that NGOs could play a key role in the development of civil society in Thailand. However, it is also recognized, especially by Missingham (2003), that the role being played by NGOs toward the grassroots is paternalistic. The NGOs presume that the grassroots need the NGOs’ assistance to enable them to achieve their goals because the NGOs have superior knowledge due to their higher education (Naruemon, 2002). A paternalistic relationship has emerged between the middle class and the grassroots within the arena of civil society.

Even though Thai civil society and social movements have been growing gradually for many decades in this way, inspired by grassroots networking and non-profit organizations, Ungpakorn (2006) argues that the most obvious reason that civil society has emerged in Thailand is so that it can cause a decrease in state power in response to the Thai Rak Thai Party winning the election in 2005. By that time, Thai civil society, mostly led by NGOs, had begun to show the effort of the ‘third power’ of networks (Phongpaichit, 1999; Boonmee, 2007) in order to protect themselves from the hegemony of the Thai Rak Thai Party. Third power refers to the addition of civil society to attempt to balance the power of the state and business. However, he also points to the weakness of Thai civil society, which lacked any power to prevent the increasing economic encroachment caused by the

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8 For instance, the major Thai NGOs; NGOs Coordinating Committee on Development (Kor Por. Or Poh Choh) has been involved in many issues of environmental management problem and there extended to be NGOs network by region such as, for the Northern of Thailand which mostly focuses on Forestry management problem (Chaipan, ed., 2006).
populist policies of the government. As Missingham (2003) also points out, the Thai Rak Thai Party quickly proved to be paternalistic in its relations with the grassroots. Their arguments raise the interesting point that most Thai scholars’ perspectives about civil society are still normative. They focus their attention on conceptualizing civil society’s functions and roles but ignore its interaction with the actual surrounding factors, such as the sociocultural dimension. To move beyond this, there needs to be further consideration of the unique ‘path trajectory’ and its effect on social capital forming a civil society in the uniqueness of the Thai context. A key concern here is to consider what the actual establishment of civil society was in Thailand. The presumption that civil society emerged when conceptualization of it began in the face of ‘interesting’ social movements has to be put aside. The research here attempts to address this by developing a model comprised of general concepts outlining the phases of particular civil societies as they follow their own unique ‘path trajectories’, including the unique forms that enable it to fulfill its general function to enhance democratization.

With respect to the present models of thought of Thai scholars, where civil society is defined as the solution for democratization and political development, with an emphasis on the important role of NGOs, it is worth questioning the grassroots’ actual ability in Thailand to be self-organized into NGOs, including the possibility of civil society standing independently and integrating vertically with state power. Moreover, if Thai NGOs play the ‘third power’ on their own, excluding the role of the grassroots, it would have to be concluded that civil society cannot be described well by the concept of a ‘third power’. There would have to be four powers defined: state power, market power, NGO power, and the grassroots.

Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Thai civil society has recently begun to be considered a political problem, because it has been equated with social movements in terms of protests or mass mobilization. While there have in actuality been an increasing number of social movements (Pintobtang, 1998), this shows the growth of the civil society concept is being influenced by political agendas. It appears to have become an ideological tool of some NGOs and populist political parties because of its theoretical link to democratization. Pintobtang’s (1998) study, ‘Street Politics: 99 Days of the Assembly of the
Poor’, provides insights into the facts of the grassroots movement, emphasizing significantly the movement’s strategy to pressurize state decision-making. What is less clear, however, is how much the social movements can in fact be described as grassroots movements, given that they are orchestrated largely by NGOs. The horizontal interaction between NGOs and the grassroots is overlooked, when it needs to be a focus of analysis because one of the key ways in which the function of civil society enhances democratization is by civil society providing an educative role. Namely, the grassroots learn how to participate democratically within state institutions by doing so first horizontally within civil society. However, if NGOs are acting paternalistically toward the grassroots, the same as state institutions are, this educative role is not being carried out by civil society. Moreover, the NGO middle-class activists are orchestrating undemocratic confrontations with state institutions, and so neither are they an example to the grassroots they are supposedly guiding because of supposed superior knowledge.

The limitation in the development of civil society in Thailand can be seen in how the successful ones challenged state decision-making through the enormous efforts of social movement actors, with tragic consequences in some cases, although there have been some successes and some failures by diverse movements. Important values of civil society, including non-violence and tolerance, are conspicuously absent. For instance, the case of the Pak Mun villagers: the controversial case study of the dam construction presents details about how state decision-making is based on economic growth, and how this conflicts with local livelihoods, in particular for the local people in the north-east who then attempt to struggle and protect their rights (Phatharathananunth, 2006). There is also the example of a group of local people from Prachuab Kirikhan who protested the coal-fired plant projects, some of whom joined the Assembly of the Poor once this had moved to Bangkok.

These two cases indicate why Thai civil society groups have come to commonly be presented as social movements or ‘mobs’ on the street, and led to the image of civil groups or the civil society ideal as being the ‘problem’ rather than the ‘alternative’. Ultimately, the conflicts become chronic problems in the relationship between the Thai state and grassroots people, or
the organizations of civil society. Unlike in many other societies where state–
society conflict does not result in the fragmentation of society, in Thai society
the conflict results in social fragmentation, which is not helping
democratization. In contrast to the theory of civil society as it relates to many
other countries, in Thailand, it may be potentially creating a barrier to the
development of democracy.

In summary, Thailand could possibly develop and democratize its
politics through the emergence of many strong grassroots movements, which
might relate to the development of civil organizations. Theory on civil society
suggests that a cause may be inadequate vertical linkages between grassroots,
other civil societies and other organizations. An analysis of linkages is
therefore necessary to attempt to understand civil groups connecting to other
organizations in any kind of collective activity in relation to the political
processes. However, this thesis seeks to understand the dynamics of civil
society in Thailand to critically analyze how civil society can help democratize
the politics to Thailand. Of particular interest is the relationship of national
social movements or NGOs to civil society in Thailand and the significance of
the relationship. Therefore for the purposes of this thesis, analysis of linkages
is necessary to attempt to understand how civil groups’ connections to other
organizations in any kind of collective activity, relate to the development and
sustainability of civil society.

Social Capital and Thai Community Participation
The concept of social capital examines the linkages within networks in a
community and the relationships between the actors in networks or, in other
words, the role of members in a community. Social capital has been described
as the networks and connections between people (Coleman, 1988; Putnam,
1995) and is a kind of resource capital like economic and cultural capital
(Bourdieu, 2011; Kay, 2005). Also, social capital is a very important part of a
community because it contains the sense of belonging that exists between

study the case of Sweden, Kim (2000) studies in the case of Korea and the case of Japan
was studied by Pekanan (2003).
individuals and organizations and which comes from their connections. Social capital comprises trust, mutual understanding and shared norms and values, which can be other forms of capital – it is like a stock or fund or resource that can be used for community development.

Similarly, according to Fraser (2005), social capital can be affected by the political view of ‘community’, to prefer business or individual or inclusive community, according to the political views of the community. It can be seen that the community is closely related to social capital. The social capital in a community may be constructed by kinship bonds. It is primarily social networks associated through common objectives and ranges from low to high levels of civil society organization.

Kay (2005) states that social capital is created by the six elements of: trust; value; reciprocity; mutuality; shared norms of behavior; shared commitment and belonging, in both formal and informal social networks; and effective communication channels. The connections are important but other components such as trust can develop social capital in communities. Trust can be an important element of social capital because it is needed for the development and maintenance of other elements of social capital in social networks (Glaeser et al., 2000). Civic community building is created by trust in the same way (Fennema and Tillie, 2000).

In the case of Thailand, a broader view of trust does not appear to exist between the government and communities, perhaps due to the economic growth development policy of the government, which has a negative impact on the ecosystem and the livelihoods of local people; for example, the Kaeng Suea Ten Dam project (Sretthachau, 2000), the project of Map Ta Phut Industrial Estate (Sripoung, 2007) and the Mae Moh coal-fired power plant project (Kouprianov et al., 2002). Trust exists and is developed among people in local communities. Local people develop networks and develop shared views in order to seek proper ways for dealing with this kind of situation. Trust is an essential factor for building networks to support people so they can participate in their activities. Similarly, Williams (2005) states that the development of community and social capital brings community acknowledgement. The

10 Kaeng Suea Ten Dam = เขื่อนแก่งเสือเต้น
acknowledgement comes when the community view is recognized. The formal kind of community is most likely to be recognized, even though this form of community participation may not be the most common form for a group. However, the underlying sense of community and the networks and trust between them came out, and the social capital became clear as if the community achieved status and was recognized.

O’Sullivan and Tajaroensuk (1997, p. 41) state that social capital in Thailand is based on distinctive Thai culture ways. ‘Few societies place greater emphasis on relationships than Thailand. Social capital comes from the connections between people, which trust and shared norms and values build up. Moreover, Thai networks have an informal structure and are connected by kinship, friendship and neighborliness. There is a respect system by hierarchical status ranking in Thai culture. The young usually respect the elders (Komin, 1990a, 1990b), which leads to the presence of the other social capital factors. However, the relationship of networks is the same as social cohesion, which leads the people of a community or the actors of a network to come along and share their ‘sense of belonging’ and link their resources and livelihoods (McMillan and Chavis, 1986; Hardin, 2002; Ostrom and Walker, 2003). This kind of network produces collective action in Thai society (Promphakping, 2007).

Reciprocity is one kind of social capital factor in Thai society (Tsuruta, 2004; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Cheamchenkool, 2013). Castelfranchi (2008) states that reciprocity and trust are related, as reciprocity and trust are generated along with posonal relationships and networks (Maraffi et al., 2008). Reciprocation, or reciprocity, is created as doing something beneficial for other(s) and expecting to get (something) back. Evans (1995) studies the Lao peasants’ collective economy. His work explains the traditional labor exchange, which has the aspect of strict and loose reciprocity. Both kinds of reciprocity mean ways of helping (chuay leua) 11 with payback (torp thaen). 12 Strict reciprocity implies a kind of helping that needs to be according to rules

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11 Chuay lua = ช่วยเหลือ
12 Torp thaen = ตอบแทน
and exactly returned; for example, giving one day of work is returned by one
day of work or by the payment of one day’s rate. In contrast, loose reciprocity
is helping without any specific return. This appears in terms of the mutual
assistance that usually works for kinship, friends and neighbors, which they
assume will be balanced later on. Strict reciprocity tends to be cleared in
trading, while loose reciprocity is a way of helping each other in times of need.

In addition, reciprocity in the Thai context has some similar aspects to
Evans’s study of the Lao traditional labor exchange. According to
Srithongtham (2009) studies the role of social capital in the Thai community.
She explains that the feature of reciprocity produces Thai culture along with
the social norm in terms of being kind to others. Also, the features of
reciprocity are inherent in the manner of Thai society, and reciprocation is a
condition of Thai cultural values (Piyakarn, 2010). It can be seen that
reciprocity is one of social capital aspect, which is generated in Thai culture.
Moreover, the specific pattern of Thai reciprocation is that Thai people usually
appreciate help with an opportunity for future payback in mind.

Komin (1990b, 168) states, “Reciprocity of kindness, particularly the
value of being [grateful] is a highly valued characteristic in Thai society.” In
terms of this, Thai reciprocity seems to be ‘loose’ because it generates far more
from trade or favors and has no conditions to pay back.

In brief, the aspects of social capital in the Thai context appear in
accordance with Thai culture. Trust is the key factor relating to producing
social norms and values, together with reciprocal orientation. However, the
occurrence of social capital aspects in Thai society has different detail
depending on the specific societal and cultural aspect. However, the
occurrence of the various aspects of social capital in Thai society can be
expected to vary in detail, depending on the specific context. This thesis
focuses on the contextual details of social capital in an attempt to understand
the dynamics of how social capital works to support civil society.

The Research Framework
The research framework has been constructed to ensure that key dimensions
of civil society are addressed. The dimension allows exploration and analysis
of the phases of civil society, namely the establishment, development and
sustaining of civil society. Within these stages the various aspects, functions and processes involved are highlighted. Figure 1 below outlines the framework.

![Figure 1 The phases of civil society]

The overall research framework synthesizes the literature pertaining to the phases of civil society, namely the establishment, development and sustaining of civil society. The overall research framework is analytical in terms of how to understand Thai civil society with normative implications. Hence, the phases that are focussed on are first the establishment of civil society, second its development, and third its sustenance. The framework seeks to have general analytical significance to be applicable across cultures and historical periods and, moreover, to capture the dynamics so that the unique ‘path trajectories’ of civil society across cultures can be understood.

A research framework, able to capture the dynamics giving rise to unique ‘path trajectories’, is necessary to be able to adequately analyze the Thai civil situation for at least two pertinent reasons. One, there are inadequacies in the analysis of civil society in Thailand that appear to have arisen due to a failure to consider the different phases of Thai civil society. Scholars have looked at how Thai civil society is established, and also how it
occurs as social movements, and whether these two are related. This inadequacy in the analysis of Thai civil society appears to have led to overlooking how civil society developed after its establishment. And two, Thai civil society appears to be under threat of not being sustained, so greater clarity is being sought about what possible avenues are available to transform it into a sustainable form, after establishment.

The two reasons are possibly related because overlooking the emergent aspect of the establishment of civil society in Thailand appears to have coincided with also overlooking the role of state institutions in the development and sustaining of civil society. The research framework has been constructed to ensure that both of these oversights in the literature on Thai civil society, and potentially in other ‘path trajectories’ as well, are addressed by the research.

There are two main issues raised in the literature in relation to the general dynamics of civil society that have been incorporated into the construction of the research framework. One is the relationship of social capital to civil society (Fox, 1996; Brown, 1998; Fukuyama, 2001); the other is the relationship between the function and form of civil society (Heinrich, 2010, p. 25).

There are opposing perspectives on whether social capital is caused by civil society or civil society is the cause of social capital. The issue is related to the role of institutions in civil society and whether or not they are formal or informal. Putnam (1993, p. 89) emphasizes that social capital is produced by civil society, and so implicitly focusses on the role of formal institutions in civil society, including the possibility of its establishment by the external institutions of the state and of commerce, and hence through policy initiatives. In contrast, other scholars emphasize how civil society emerges due to the presence of social capital (Foley and Edwards, 1998). The role of culture and hence informal institutions of civil society are, for example, considered important in this perspective, though they also include awareness of the role of external shocks or interventions in the form of grievances and incentives. Culture is considered important because, unlike external shocks and interventions, which are unilateral in their effect on social capital, with culture
they are mutually supportive. So the participation of culture in social capital is the primal ingredient necessary for the establishment of civil society.

The research framework synthesizes these two views by recognizing that both views can be valid and can be incorporated together by considering the dynamics forming the phases of civil society. Even though the establishment of civil society is emergent and as a result, due to the prior presence of social capital, contra Putnam, Putnam’s model is nevertheless also correct in that civil society is also one of the sources of social capital, once civil society has been established. Accordingly, social capital continues to be a source of innovation as well within civil society once civil society is established. Thus, social capital remains a necessary feature for the development of civil society and continues to be necessary for its adaptability and therefore sustainability (Bourdieu, 1980). So the primal integration provided by culture appears to be necessary throughout the whole ‘path trajectory’ of civil society.

To frame the complex nature of civil society, systems theory has been utilized to produce Figure 2 below, to outline a non-linear and dialectical development process of civil society. Systems theory has been used to synthesize the various perspectives and models in the literature.

The establishment of civil society starts from its emergence from social capital due to multiple causes, including social capital’s primal integration with culture, but not initially including civil society (main arrow from left to right). Then as civil society begins to emerge, civil society becomes another cause of social capital (main arrow from right to left), thus creating a positive feedback within civil society that develops both social capital and civil society. The feedback is why the process of the development of civil society in relation to social capital is non-linear and hence complex and so appears potentially able to take on new unique ‘path trajectories’. Furthermore, the positive feedback can be considered to occur internally within civil society, because social capital can be considered to be part of civil society, thus creating a secondary but still internal integration within civil society. But because social capital initially exists before civil society, social capital has to also be modeled as a distinct aspect of civil society. This is why civil society is also dialectical and hence self-organizing in its dynamic, in relation to the role of social capital to develop civil society.
Moreover, the environmental or external causes of social capital (i.e. other than civil society and culture) and the environmental causes of civil society (i.e. other than social capital) are also significant for the necessary adaptation of social capital and civil society to their changing environment. Hence the various environmental or external causes of both social capital and civil society are significant for the sustainability of civil society. In particular, the continuing influence of culture in the production of social capital is significant, as is the influence of state institutions in the production of civil society. So the research framework has had to model these influences.

Also, when civil society develops and is sustained, mutually supportive relations are involved, and hence a tertiary new and external integration by civil society emerges. This includes horizontally – with other organizations of civil society, regional NGOs and local or regional state institutions – and vertically, for example with national state institutions and national NGOs (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). But there is also another important point made by Hadenius and Uggla (1996), which is that this (tertiary) integration has to be of a requisite level. It can be too strong, both in relation to horizontal integration and vertical integration. Hence the term linkage is used to describe the level of integration. Moreover, this therefore also applies to the role of values involved in social capital and civil society, for example trust. ‘Thin trust’ rather than ‘thick trust’ is the requisite level of trust for social capital and civil society (Newton, 1997; 1999). The same is noted as applying to the integration of culture and social capital. It has to be of a requisite level or it becomes too encapsulated and so pluralism is lost (Newton, 2001). Similarly, the (secondary) internal integration between social capital and civil society has to be of a requisite level to enable openness to allow innovative self-organization and external integration to develop (Baiocchi, Heller and Silva, 2008). Otherwise neither horizontal nor vertical linkages can be formed, and adaptation of civil society development cannot be continued, and civil society cannot be sustained.

Finally, the various requisite integrations involved in the dialectical nature of civil society in relation to social capital and hence culture, and also the continuing significance of external factors from the environment, raise questions about what is the boundary to civil society. This is also found
implicitly in the use of the terms ‘arena’ and ‘social space’ in the definition of civil society. The boundary that encompasses civil society appears to be fuzzy. This can be seen in how there is a two-way arrow between social capital and culture, and the one-way influences on social capital due to incentives or stimulates and grievances, which can often have their source in state decision-making. It is therefore arguable that it is helpful to consider the external institutional influences on social capital and civil society, otherwise the establishment, development and sustainability of civil society cannot be adequately appreciated. Some external institutions, such as NGOs, may interfere with civil society in some ways. This is particularly pertinent to the Thailand situation, because overlooking the significance of the effects of the various external influences, such as NGOs and state institutions, on civil society, appears to have led scholars of Thai civil society to mistakenly equate civil society with social movements. Accordingly, the research framework leaves open-ended what exactly the boundary to civil society is. It is developed in more detail later, in terms of the other key issue, that of the function and form of civil society, and how the fuzziness of the boundary of civil society is recognized in the literature in relation to the values of civil society and in the relationship of the environment to civil society.

Figure 2 The complex dynamic of civil society
The other issue, of the relationship between the form and function of civil society, further emphasizes the need to focus on the phases of civil society. Failing to do so confuses the function and form of civil society. The history of civil societies and their conceptualization highlights great diversity and complexity, including regional, and hence the inability to assume that a specific model of civil society at a particular time and place can be adequate in another time or place. Recognition of this has led some scholars to focus on the function rather than form of civil society, because the functions are more consistent than the forms (Heinrich, 2010, p. 29; Diamond, 1994, p. 7). The research framework adopts this approach but is also careful to continue to distinguish between function and form. Otherwise there is a danger of presuming certain forms of civil society and formal institutions in civil society have a particular function for civil society. This mistake is equivalent to assuming that civil society is not an emergent phenomenon, is not innovative in its development, and does not need to be adaptive to be sustained. According to the argument above, this mistake therefore overlooks the role of the causes of the emergence of civil society, such as social capital, and accordingly, culture, grievances and incentives. As outlined above, there are multiple sources of social capital other than civil society, including state institutions carrying out education, and cultural institutions, which are also causes for the emergence of civil society (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996; Heinrich 2010, p. 72).

As mentioned above, the role of external institutions in civil society is also a key and significant feature of the research framework. These are significant because there is disputed in the literature, some scholars argue that the environment of civil society is not part of civil society (Heinrich 2010, p. 67). This bracketing of the external environment, although, it is out of the research scope, potentially makes it impossible to understand adequately the causes of civil society, and hence the diversity of its forms and the strength of its functioning. So the research framework includes the environment.

A final related point is that some scholars also do not consider that the values of social capital involved in civil society are part of civil society, claiming instead that they are what constitute civil society (Heinrich, 2010, p. 56; Diamond, 1994). This view is akin to the opposite, one-sided and linear
view, that social capital is what forms civil society. Whereas social capital is also part of the situation, it fails to appreciate the complex dynamic nature of civil society. Hence the research framework also includes the values of civil society.

So the general components of the research framework that strengthen civil society include the key values and environmental factors. This is outlined below in figure 3.

The dynamic processes involving the key components of civil society, modeled by Figures 1 and 2, are not modeled in Figure 3, which instead sets out pertinent research concepts associated with the key components. The pertinent research concepts form the themes of the research framework. So Figure 3 provides further detail of the research framework outlined more schematically by Figure 1.

Figure 3 Component related to the strengthening of civil society
Several points can be deduced from Figures 1, 2 and 3. A central one is that the dynamism of civil society is associated with the creative role of social capital. Accordingly, the dynamism of civil society is expressed politically as participation in democratization, and commercially as entrepreneurship (Newton, 2001). Associated with this central point is the previously outlined deduction of a general description of the ‘path trajectory’ of the phases of civil society in terms of the three stages of requisite integration. The creativity necessary for civil society both requires requisite constraints, and also forms the requisite constraints in a dialectical manner.

The ‘path trajectory’ cannot start with any external integration, neither horizontal nor vertical, even though they can exist in other. The establishment of civil society is an arena comprised of culture, grievances and incentives, all of which initially only nurture social capital. As social capital emerges in the arena, requisite horizontal integration or linkages become established as social roles and the actors of civil society emerge; for example, the emergence of grassroots leaders, along with their interactions with other groups or organizations, both formal and informal. Even though vertical influences are present, for example the subject of grievance or incentives, there is no creative dialogue providing requisite vertical integration or linkages at this stage.

To describe the general complex dynamics involving horizontal and vertical integration between social systems, adaptive environmental management literature has been utilised. As well as supplying the terms horizontal and vertical integration, it also teases out the dynamics involved in cooperation where there are multiple and/or pluralistic institutions at play, as are found in civil society. In particular, the differences between reactive and proactive approaches are explored (Cohen, 1996). This has helped define the important actor roles, namely civil group members, leaders, activists and advisors. Associated with what can be deduced generally about the initial phase of the development of civil society is the need for requisite horizontal integration if the development of civil society is to continue. Features of requisite horizontal integration include the need for multiple inclusive institutions, which nevertheless have specific interests. According to adaptive environmental management literature, this provides resilience (Reed, Fraser and Dougill, 2006). One function of horizontal integration is to facilitate
participation and empowerment or self-organization. If there is too much horizontal integration through too much trust, strong leaders dominate, and so democratization through critical dialogue is hindered. Strong leadership in civil society can occur in grassroots mobilization and can therefore potentially become problematic. The two-way arrow between civil society and NGOs in Figure 2 refers to the need for critical dialogue to maintain requisite horizontal integration. Alternatively, if there are too many interests integrated into a single institution, decision-making within civil society becomes stifled due to internal conflict.

It can be further deduced that once the initial development phase of civil society is under way, requisite vertical integration is required if civil society is to be sustained. In terms of adaptive environmental management literature, adaptive governance is required (Armitage et al., 2009). Moreover, the occurrence of requisite vertical integration is tied in some way to the development of requisite horizontal integration. The openness to seek critical dialogue with state institutions, instead of either passively receiving incentives or reacting out of grievance, is tied to recognition of the inadequacy of relying solely on horizontal integration, which would in that case become too strong.

It can similarly also be deduced that there is the need for requisite vertical integration, or vertical linkages, provided by maintaining requisite horizontal integration or linkages. If there is too much trust by grassroots in state institutions, the key democratization values of self-organization, empowerment and critical dialogue are lost. However, the two-way arrow in Figure 2 between civil society and state institutions indicates the need for critical dialogue for requisite some conciliation processes in order to developing democratization. This is where civil groups can participate in the democratization process. To maintain both horizontal and vertical linkages implies requisite levels of both horizontal and vertical integration. Moreover, because linkages are dynamic, they imply critical dialogue, and so the process of democratization fulfilled by civil society can be summarized as being sustained to the extent that both horizontal and vertical linkages are established and maintained.

In summary, the research framework has been synthesized and deduced principally from Gellner (1995), Hadenius and Ugglæ (1996),
Diamond (1994) and Heinrich (2010), through the use of systems concepts. Gellner’s definitions of the institution of civil society have been extended to include the linkages between them and the role of social capital in establishing, developing and sustaining civil society. Hadenius and Uggla’s concept of requisite integration has been extended to consider the horizontal and vertical interactions, by appealing to the adaptive environmental management literature. Diamond’s model has therefore been clarified in terms of defining vertical and horizontal linkages. Finally, Heinrich’s analysis of what strengthens civil society has been extended to include the phases of civil society, so that the complex dynamic can be analysed and cross-fertilized by the development studies literature.

**Rationale for the Research Framework**

A composite research framework has had to be synthesized because the focus of the research has not been carried out previously in Thailand, and because there are unique features of civil society in Thailand. This means that similar studies elsewhere in the world have not required the type of framework developed here. The unique characteristics of Thai civil society that have had to be incorporated include a relatively greater role of social aspect, culture and social activities or actions in civil society. Clarification of the interactions occurring at both the horizontal and vertical dimensions has been found to be necessary to allow adequate analysis of the main innovations incorporated in the research framework developed here.

The theoretical frameworks constructed enable the functioning of democracy and the role of social capital to be examined through the lens of the emergence, development and sustenance of civil society. In turn, focusing on the functioning of democracy and the role of social capital provides a framework of analysis in order to illuminate aspects, tasks and processes of Thai civil society. However, to understand the dynamic situations surrounding those problems, which potentially can assist in improving the situations if incorporated into political processes, it is also important to consider how social capital assists in the functioning of democracy. This is the key reason for the analyses of the case studies, which clarify the characteristics of the processes and/or situations of the case studies.
From the background of the case studies, it is clear that Thailand has been facing serious situations of conflict and frustration between people and the state. In particular, they clearly illustrate that the concerns of local people have brought about very intensive levels of grassroots participation in some aspects of Thai civil society. The research framework synthesized from the literature review enables the research to begin by examining the opportunities for grassroots participation in Thai civil society. The establishment and development of civil society in both cases provides data about this. The key concepts of civil society presented in the framework are then used to analyze the activities and responses of local community organizations, including the ‘New Social Movements’. In particular, this enables the analysis of the establishment, development and sustenance of grassroots groups in the community with shared attitudes, who seek more autonomy and empowerment of their communities with a role in influencing the apparatus of state decision-making. Ultimately this allows some analysis of the role of the emergence of civil society in Thailand to promote democratic processes to be carried out. In particular the case studies are analyzed in terms of the social movements in Thailand that are engaging in processes to enhance participation and expand democratization. The concepts and models of civil society are used to analyze the case studies to gain a better understanding of the development of democratization within grassroots community movements.

In Thailand, civil society emerged out of a crisis and protest. Civil society usually referred to groups of grassroots or local people, who joined in the communities’ activities willingly. However, the association of local people could be developed to be social protests or mobilization later led by facing the crisis. Regarding this, horizontal ties, especially within communities, are very important early on, along with social bonding and relationships of people in the communities. Moreover, leadership had been very important for building solidarity and units of civil groups. These encouraged civil society to work productively, thus, the vertical ties of civil society with state institutions could not develop efficiently due to the protest orientation. Nonetheless, the crisis also leads civil society to some demand for external expertise and support, which can be problematic. It is due to civil society’s need to be converted to some other kinds of organizations or combined with other civil groups or
other organizations that means civil society cannot be sustained in the long
term.

In this regard, the study argues that even though there are a lot of civil
groups that have emerged in Thai society, not all of them can survive in the
long term. In terms of this, the research framework provides key components
in order to examine the hypotheses of this study, that Thai civil society needs
to remain local, and civil society needs to be independent in order to be
sustained.

**Background of Case Studies**
The two case studies selected for this research were chosen because, in the
context of different controversial issues involving community interaction with
the state, they have raised different aspects of the establishment, development
and sustenance of civil society in Thailand. In the first case, Dam, there was
strong resistance by local people towards the state and continual conflict since
the project was first launched, until now. In the second case, the Baan Krut
and Bor Nork civil groups, initial conflict arose in the face of the state’s
decision to build coal-fired power plants. Eventually, the projects were
cancelled due to local people’s resistance.

**Pak Mun civil group**
The Pak Mun Dam was constructed in the Khong Jiam district of the Ubon
Ratchathani province of the north-east region of Thailand. After the dam was
constructed and began operations in 1994, there were effects on people living
along the Mun River, one of Thailand’s richest rivers and the largest artery of
the Mae Khong River (Dudgeon, 2000). The Mun River originally contained
265 different kinds of fish in very beautiful surroundings, with wetlands and
other varied ecosystems, all of which have been negatively affected. The Pak
Mun Dam has had other serious negative impacts; for example, people could
no longer earn a living from the fisheries. Through the formation of a social
movement, the local people forced the government to be concerned about this
problem. There were many protests from many groups. Community
movements, through the media, researched the ecosystem themselves. As a
result of mediation between the community and state, the dam gates were
opened (so the dam was no longer operational) in June 2001, during the
temporary dry season, and this was repeated annually. This annual closing and opening of the dam gates has continued until the present and is also considered on the political agenda for annual state decision-making.

Pak Mun Dam is not the only contentious environmental issue, but it has also brought about many debatable issues such as rights, equality and top-down decision-making. The significant presentation of grassroots community struggles amidst the social changes forced on them has led to the dam being called ‘the shame monument of the power state’. The dam has cost a huge amount of money but it cannot be fully operationalized.

**Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group**
This case examines two related civil groups. The Baan Krut community was the local civil group opposed to the Hin Krut coal-fired power plant project, while the Bor Nork local civil group resisted the coal-fired power plant projects in their village. Both projects were run by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) jointly with the Union Power Development Co. Ltd and the Gulf Power Generation Co. Ltd. The projects were planned for construction in the Prachuab Kirikhan province in Thailand.

These projects were highly controversial because of the potential negative impact of coal plant emissions, but especially so because of the conflict between the people affected and the state that promoted the projects to them. The projects were part of an independent power production program, which was drafted in 1994 while Mr. Chuan Leekpai was the Prime Minister. At the beginning of the projects in 1995, Gulf Power Generation and district officials informed people in the area about the plan for the project. People in the village began protests against the project. Regulations that required public hearings were issued under a new Thai constitution called ‘The People’s Constitution’, in 1997. A complaint was handed to the Justice and Human Rights Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, and local representatives submitted a letter to the director of the Department of Harbors to revoke the approval of the department with respect to the impact on local fisheries. However, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of the Bor Nork Power Plant was approved in 1998. Moreover, the EIA of the Hin
Krut power plant project, which is essentially the same project and adjacent to the Bor Nork area, was approved.

People in both Baan Krut and Bor Nork villages played roles to protest against the projects in various ways, while the Thai state used the approved EIA as a strategy to negotiate with people in the area of the projects in order to take responsibility for the contract they had signed with the projects’ constructors. Nevertheless, the EIA was proven by the communities to have been mishandled by a consultant company hired by Gulf Power Generation Co. Ltd, the contractor of those projects. Among the flaws found in the EIA were that it had not adequately researched bird species and the complicated ecology of the wetlands, it did not look at acid rain effects on those wetlands, and it neglected to include the impact upon whales and dolphins, and they underestimated water resources for local fishing activities (Mekong Watch Japan Fact Sheet, 2002).

The projects were originally approved under the new Thai constitution, the first to stipulate public hearings in order to support democratic disciplinary accountability. Therefore, public hearings of Baan Krut and Bor Nork projects were held. However local people boycotted the hearings because the processes of the hearings were ambiguous and poorly communicated; villagers in opposition were excluded from decision-making processes. The hearings recommended resolution by establishing a committee to deal with the problems and to monitor pollution, but the committee was never active in monitoring the projects. Local people believed the hearing process was just a facade set up by the head and district chiefs who had made a profit from brokering land sales on behalf of the project construction company.13

As for the ecological problems, the projects would have harmed local community livelihoods, because of the negative impact of the projects on the small-scale fishing and agricultural activities of people in the villages. Thus, there would also likely have been social fragmentation problems due to

13 Personal talk with Jintana Kaewkow, the representative of Baan Krut community, member of tripartite committee, Bangkok (July 22, 2007).
conflicts in the local communities because only some business groups would have benefited from the projects. Moreover, many parts of the political process had problems, leading to it becoming a significant conflict between the communities and the state, which resulted from an ongoing prior lack of a role for local people in the democratic process and the distrust of people in participating in the procedure.

In brief, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups showed their strong role in protecting themselves from economic unfairness and state power. The demonstrations successfully halted the projects, and the five community groups that arose from this movement now continue to support each other to organize groups to protect their rights and engage in the general political participation processes.

**Methodologies and Methods**

This section covers the methodologies and methods which underpin and guide the proposed study, and also describes how the data was collected and analysed in this research.

The research is mainly qualitative, and the data collected has been mainly analysed inductively. This has been done because the intention is to make sense of the lived experiences, behaviors, emotions and feelings, as well as organizational and institutional functions and interactions among the actors involved in the case studies. This enables the unique features of the cases, namely the relatively greater role of social resistance, social movements and culture in civil society, to be addressed. Further, the data collected is descriptive and, in the patterns of relationships discovered, fits into categories, moving from the specific to analytic generalisations found in the literature (Glaser and Strauss, 1969; Patton, 2002). The approach to qualitative research taken here assumes that the reality constructions by actors cannot be separated from the world in which they are experienced, and that observations are inevitably contextual (Lincoln and Gub, 1985, p. 189). The qualitative research allowed the study of things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, lived experiences in terms of the meanings people brought to them. This case study approach has formed the essence of the research methodology. Drawing from Blumer (1969), the case study approach
used is a form of phenomenological inquiry that has brought to the fore the insights of the researcher in connection with understanding the meanings grassroots people and other actors give to their actions.

**Research methodologies**

There are two aspects to the research methodology. The first aspect covers data collection, and the second aspect covers how the data is analyzed. Specific research methodologies utilized in the research, however, cover both aspects. Four research methodologies have been explicitly used and synthesized to form the research methodology: hermeneutics, participatory approaches, discourse analysis, and grounded theory. The types of methodologies utilized also cover two types of data, primary data from fieldwork, and secondary or documentary data.

**Hermeneutics**

Hermeneutics is a critical phenomenological approach. This is necessary because the research is interdisciplinary. As shown in the research framework, civil society requires concepts and their synthesis from multiple disciplines to be able to understand the complexity of contemporary civil society.

Shapiro and Sica (1984, p. 15) state Giddens’s view in terms of hermeneutics: “Today ... real and profound convergences of interest and problems are occurring across broad spectra of intellectual life.” Hermeneutics is at the “very centre of these convergences, having both to contribute to and to learn from them.” Moreover, there are multiple insights brought to the fore, both from the micro level, such as from grassroots communities, and from the macro level, such as national or government institutions, as well as networks that link the micro and macro levels together, and from the researcher. Owing to the richness of the information generated from the controversial issues of the case studies, the research has required and challenged the researcher to engage with key informants to understand the issues. So the researcher is one of the important actors involved in discovering answers to the research questions and to achieve the research goals. The hermeneutic principle is that concepts and theories of the social sciences must make substantial reference to those of actors in the real world (Outhwaite, 1987, p. 108). This is the main reason that hermeneutic methodology has been
used in this research – because there are many actors related to the case of community participation in Thai civil society.

For Shapiro and Sica (1984, p. 3), hermeneutics is about the theory and practice of interpretation, but it does not give conditions to show the achievement or recognition of understanding. So the flexibility of the methodology is suited to the complexity of the study of civil society. Hermeneutics seeks to understand what is distant in time and culture, or obscured by ideology. The hermeneutical process aims to “make such understanding meaningful for life and thought” (Shapiro and Sica, 1984, p. 4). As part of this, hermeneutics seeks to clarify the cultural phenomena distorted by ideologies of class or power (Shapiro and Sica, 1984, p. 5). Because this research incorporates historical data and occurs across cultures, hermeneutics is appropriate to this research. Moreover, hermeneutics can also be applied to social situations for the interpretation and understanding of social events. It analyzes their meanings for humans and for the culture of humans. It stresses the importance of the context as well as the form of any social behavior, because the central principle of hermeneutics is that it is possible to understand the meaning of an action or statement only when it is related to the whole context (Shapiro and Sica, 1984, p. 4) of interpretation. Hermeneutics seeks to understand the meaning underlying human action as if interpreting texts rather than gaining knowledge of objects in nature, and which views experience as a narrative. Accordingly these research results are presented as narratives.

**Participatory approach**

The participation of a grassroots community involves in general terms “active involvement of people in making decisions about the implementation of processes, programmes and projects which affect them.” (Nelson and Wright, 1997, p. 2). This research uses a participatory approach as a tool for analyzing data about grassroots people who have been involved in Thai civil society. Nelson and Wright also note that if participation is to be effective, it must involve shifts in power. In this research, the empowerment is a process through which the grassroots are able to participate in order to shape their own lives and civil society institutions.
This research investigates the internal and external factors, which can maintain sustainable grassroots participation in civil society. This includes the manner of participation by and within institutions, as they seek to develop civil society and ultimately democratization. The features of the participatory approach are also used to determine who participates in Thai civil society. Participation defines the interactions or linkages within and between the civil institutions of society.

Discourse analysis approach
A discourse is a system of meanings. The understanding depends on different cultures and can be conditional on whether the discourse benefits or disadvantages people. Parker (1992, p. 7) also says that in terms of discourse analysis, things such as “speech, writing, non-verbal behaviour, ...” can all be forms of text. Parker (1992, p. 10) says discourse paints a picture of reality, and this forms statements about reality.

Ideas are structured by discourse in a community, so the ideas of knowledge and social practice come from a particular discourse (Intoo-Marn, 2003, p. 5). This is why discourse analysis is pertinent to the research of civil society, which contains collective activities. In this research, a ‘discourse community’ is a civil institution, which creates discourse representing the particular knowledge, interests, goals, cultural belief systems, trust and norms of that civil institution. A principle of discourse is used by a discourse community, which agrees on a meaning (Intoo-Marn, 2003, p. 4).

Burman and Parker (1993) state that language is organized into ‘discourses’ or ‘interpretive repertoires’, and these are able to influence how we experience and behave in the world. When people talk about a phenomenon, they must make use of shared patterns of meanings. The discourse analysis approach can examine how discourse is constructed in the discourse community. The reality for the community is a social construction (Intoo-Marn, 2003, p. 9).

Fairclough (1992, p. 226) states that the specific details about a particular kind of discourse concern the social situation in which the discourse is a part. Therefore research projects in discourse analysis must first look at forms of social practice and their relations to social structure. The disciplines
of sociology, political science and history are used. The ideal analysis of discourse is, however, interdisciplinary, which is how it is used here.

To analyze discourse, the signs and symbols of the discourse are first categorized for analysis. The discourse analysis then examines how discourse is constructed in the discourse community (Intoo-Marn, 2003, p. 5) and so is used in this research to analyze how civil institutions construct discourse. Fairclough (1992, p. 231) provides a summary of the three dimensions of analysis used in the practices of discourse analysis. It begins at a macro level, then goes into a micro level, and finally looks at an analysis of the social practice in which the discourse is used. The three dimensions are:

1) Discourse practice at the macro level looks at the relationship between texts and the relationship between discourses in terms of interpretation.

2) Text at the micro aspect is the analysis of individual texts in terms of description.

3) Social practice is the analysis of the situation in which the discourse is embedded or set in terms of the interpretation of both of the above dimensions.

In this research, the discourse approach is used to analyze all three dimensions. The discourse practice analysis at the macro level looks at the national plans, in terms of the linkages and interactions between the state government and the grassroots civil institutions, in the three case studies. The discourse practice analysis at the micro level looks at the internal interactions within the grassroots civil institutions of the three case studies, which are social practices for text production. The power and social relations, which are the networks in the case studies, are examined by the social practice dimension of discourse analysis.

Grounded theory approach
Glaser and Strauss (1967) have described grounded theory as a research methodology, which is developed inductively from the parts of the data. It means the researcher will get the ‘theory’ or ‘model’ from the data processing systematically, without first making such steps to conduct the research. The data itself assigns the outcomes, so grounded theory begins only with general
research questions. In other words, the research does not have the tight frame of a hypothesis. It is a general theory and a method to explain the social phenomena that is then used to focus on understanding action from the perspective of people, networks and communities and so is relevant for the research carried out here.

The name for the method is telling. The theory that is developed comes from or is ‘grounded’ in the actions, accounts and behavior of the participants that are the focus of the study. The development of the research framework required grounded theoretical study of the two cases, as outlined in the next section. Therefore, the realities, or the situations that are the focus of the case studies, can be kept close to the theory used.

To define grounded theory and its role, Strauss and Corbin (1998) say that a theory is a set of relationships that proposes a suitable explanation of the phenomenon being studied; for example, the focus of this research’s analysis of the linkages within Thai civil society. They also say that theory is “systematically interrelated through statements about relationships, to form a theoretical framework that explains some relevant social, psychological, educational, or other phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 22). This is how grounded theory is used in this research: to form an appropriate research framework to be used to consider the educational function of civil society, which is the key factor for democratization.

Charmaz (1994, p. 73) states that the function of a (grounded) theory is to make a phenomenon clear, to name particular concepts as a framework for the phenomena, to state the relationships between concepts, and to give a kind of framework for analysis. This is precisely how it has been used here.

*Research Methodology Synthesis*

Synthesis of the four research methodologies has been carried out according to a constructivist approach. According to Guba (1990, p. 27) in a constructivist approach:

> “Hermeneutic, dialectic individual constructions are elicited and refined hermeneutically, and compared and contrasted dialectically, with the aim of generating one (or a few) constructions on which there is substantial consensus” Guba (1990, p. 27).
Constructions have been created for each group or institution of Thai civil society researched within the case studies. The constructions involved the use of all four of the research methodologies according to a similar sequence, as shown in Figure 4 below.

The participatory approach structured the research data collection. The participatory approach ensured that grassroots groups and institutions, both formal and informal, were involved, with the intention of enabling their empowerment to better participate in civil society. Both internal and external factors of each grassroots group were considered. The external actors allowed the role of linkages in civil society to be focussed on.

![Figure 4 Research methodologies synthesis](image)

The use of grounded theory began with the construction of data from the detail of phenomena from the case studies. It was inductive, directed by the aims of the research and guided by the participatory approach.

Discourse analysis then located the data socially from the phenomena the grounded theory brought to the fore. Discourse analysis defined the ‘discourse community’ from which a consensus about the meaning of the phenomena was obtained. The ‘discourse communities’ are the informal and formal institutions of civil society in the case studies. During this analysis, the distinction yet inseparable relationship between ideas and social practice were noted. This ensured that the task of empowerment of grassroots groups to participate in civil society remained focussed upon.

Hermeneutics then flexibly, in interdisciplinary ways, created narratives about the linkages within civil society in the case studies. The narratives created sought to clarify the role of power within social structures.
and the empowerment process of grassroots actors within the arena of civil society between the state and commercial activities, and how this involves multiple features and cultural structures.

Finally, the four-step process for each case study, even though it was linear, was also cyclical and iterative to varying degrees. This was particularly so in relation to state institutions because they were to some extent common to the two cases.

Research methods
To complete the outline of the structure of the research design of the data collection, two distinct groups of informants were defined: those at the national level, and those at the regional level. The two levels have been defined as they reflect the structure of the arena of civil society. Collection of data from the two distinct groups enables linkages within the social space of civil society to be analyzed. The first level, set at the national level, contains government representatives and NGO representatives; the second level, set at the regional level, consists of local government representatives, local civil institution leaders and members of local civil institutions. However, the regional level groups of informants are different for each of the two cases, even though the types are similar for each case study. The national level groups of informants are, however, common to all the case studies. This means that for the national level data, the primary textual discourse analysis is the same, whereas the hermeneutics based on the context and social relations are different for each case.

Participation observation techniques
The researcher spent time living within the case study communities and working alongside and following activities of local communities for a sufficient period of time. Note-taking was the significant tool the researcher kept in mind for everyday fieldwork.

Formal, informal and in-depth interviewing techniques
Informal interviews were mostly used for those members of local civil institutions. Meanwhile, formal interviews took place with the participants of government and NGOs, namely at the national level. Using the ‘snowball’
process of sampling and selection of interviewees, the key informants of local civil institution leaders of case study communities were discovered during fieldwork, and in-depth interviews were set up with them.

*Group discussion*

This is the technique used for discussions and for gathering data from attending the local civil institution meetings (the questions are presented in the appendix). As a researcher, and also with the status of being a university lecturer, the researcher was given a role in the discussions. The researcher was trusted and respected, and expected to facilitate discussion due to the researcher having the status of an expert with an overview of the issues being discussed. This higher status role also assisted the snowballing process.
Chapter Three

The Case Study of Pak Mun Civil Group

“The Pak Mun villagers never called themselves ‘Hero’, in fact, they have no choice. So, the state intrusion by building the large dam indicated that Pak Mun villagers were excluded from policy processes. They had been fighting for their rights for more than 14 years” (Vanida, 2008).1

The Background to the Pak Mun Disputation

The Pak Mun Dam was a large irrigation and hydroelectric project launched by the Thai Government of Prime Minister Gen. Chatichai Choonhavan in 1989. At that time, Thailand was focussed on economic growth by the commercial sector, under the National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP).2 The NESDP contained the principles as the main guideline for the government’s implementation of economic growth. Consequently, there were many projects approved for the private sector, particularly infrastructure development projects. Moreover, there were also diverse projects and policies that the Thai Government generated as an industrial development plan which related also to the Power Development Plan (PDP) (Ratakidrungrod, 2002; Molle, Foran and Kakonen, 2012).

Prime Minister Gen. Chatichai aimed for turning battlefields into trade after the Cold War and the resolution of the Indochina War, the Thai Government aimed to be the fifth Tiger of Asia (Suea Tua Ti Hah)3 (Hussey, 1993; Dixon, 1999). As a result, the main goal of the 6th NESDP was to support economic development and the growth of industrial investment, and the Power Development Plan was developed to address the increased demand for electricity generation.

2 Previously, NESDP; the main national plan was the four years term of the economic plan. The first plan ran from 1961 to 1966. It developed into The National Economic and Social Development Plan by adding the social plan in the fourth term. However, Thailand is now on the 11th NESDP.
3 Suea Tua Ti Hah = เสือตัวที่ห้า.

Note: The 'four tiger economies of Asia' are Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.
In fact, there were six large hydropower and irrigation dam\textsuperscript{4} projects during the 1980s, which were planned by the Thai Government of Prime Minister Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda. But there were only two projects constructed: the first was the Ratchaprapha Dam, the second was the Pak Mun Dam, while the other four plans were stopped by protesters due to concerns about forest destruction. Thus there were signals from people who were dissatisfied by state decision-making, in particular the power plants, which caused Thai people many drastic problems. Therefore the projects arguably accumulated even though groups of local people were not strongly against the state decision. However, the Prem government had to postpone the plan to build four dams entirely.

Nevertheless, the Pak Mun Dam construction project still came forward for approval by the next government, which was the Gen. Chatichai cabinet. The approval of the Pak Mun project in 1989 sparked controversy about the implementation of authoritarian policies, as there was previously local opposition in the case of the Nam Choan Dam project. In other words, the Pak Mun Dam opponents had learnt to proactively seek to protect their livelihoods by the inspiration of the Nam Choan case. Moreover, the issue of the Pak Mun Dam constituted local group and helped to form the Thai national social movement, namely the Assembly of the Poor (AOP)\textsuperscript{5} a few years later.\textsuperscript{6}

The project of the Pak Mun Dam construction was developed by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), which took the main responsibility to build and operate the dam by the electricity planning of the Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO).\textsuperscript{7} The Pak Mun Dam project was located just 5.5 kilometers upstream of the confluence of the Mun and Mekong rivers in Khong Jiem district, Ubon Ratchathani province, in northeast Thailand. The dam’s capacity of generated electricity was to be 136 megawatts. EGAT expected the capacity of the dam could meet the highest needs of the people, otherwise Thailand would need a 150-megawatt gas turbine power plant instead. Nevertheless, there was an argument that the

\textsuperscript{4} Nam Choan, Haew Narok, Kaeng Krung, Kaeng Suea Ten, Rachaprapha and Pak Mun.

\textsuperscript{5} Assembly of the Poor (AOP) = Samatcha Khon Jon = สมัชชาคนจน

\textsuperscript{6} Vanida Tantivitayapitak (Mod) has known as a leader of Pak Mun villagers. She was also one of former The Assembly of the Poor (AOP).

\textsuperscript{7} The Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) used to be a department of the Thailand Ministry of Energy.
planned demand for power consumption was overestimated (Green World, 2000).

Construction of the dam began in 1991 amidst controversy, involving multiple agents, significantly the Thai Government, who made the decision and the project was implemented by EGAT. In terms of this, local people in this area were affected by the dam. The dam project was finally completed in 1994 after many confrontations with local people involved in many types of social movements. During the building of the dam, there were two main issues that drove local people against this project: one issue was the loss of assets and livelihoods due to inundation, and the other was the ecological effects. By the time the dam was eventually successfully built, these two contentious issues had been faced for the whole period (Ratakidrungrod, 2002). Moreover, the conflict between the Thai Government and the Mun River villagers continued afterwards and was still a protracted, chronic problem more than a decade afterwards.

The historical trajectory of the Pak Mun Dam since the project had been approved and until it was completed resulted in the villagers’ way of life being thoroughly destroyed (Roberts, 1993; Pintobtang, 1998; Awakul and Ogunlana, 2002). However, the experience from this project brought about a grassroots awakening so they could participate in state decision-making (Foran and Manorom, 2009). Significantly, the grassroots responded to the Thai state according to the Thai constitution amendment in 1997.8 The crucial aims of this constitution were rights for Thai citizens, and to encourage participation of Thai citizens in politics. It detailed the rights of Thai citizens and the political participation procedures noticeably so that it is named the ‘constitution of the Thai citizen’ (Klein, 1998; Bowornwathana and Farazmand, (2001); Bureekul and Thananithichot, (2002).

Accordingly, the Mun River villagers reluctantly then turned to the issue of a claim for compensation, after the dam was finally completed. In the case of a claim for compensation, the first point was in terms of losing their inundated assets, and the second was the loss of fisheries income (Green World, 2000). By that time, the Thai Government was under Prime Minister

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8 “The Constitution of The Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540” written No. 16 was ended by the coup in 2006.
Chuan Leekpai. The Mun River villagers and the anti-dam networks began to negotiate with the government for compensation during the period 1991–94 (‘Assembly of the Poor’, n.d.). The compensation campaign covered three years lost income from fisheries during the period of the dam construction. Likewise, there was also a compensation campaign claim for the case of the permanent loss of fisheries livelihoods.

With regard to the two aspects of the claim, Gen. Chavalit Yongjaiyudh’s government agreed to them in 1997. Nonetheless, the claim was later denied by the Chuan Leekpai government in 1998. As a result, the grassroots Mun River villagers who suffered the fickle cabinet’s consent process developed their actions, together with networks, in order to appeal not only on behalf of the victims of the state policy decision-making but also as Thai citizens who have rights to seek the improvement of the government’s transparency and accountability (Po-ngam, 2006).

Additionally, the villagers claimed against the government and state agency EGAT for more conditions by referring to citizens’ rights in order to take action for the improvement of government accountability, especially in terms of faulty decision-making. In this regard, the claim was extended to seek the opening of Pak Mun Dam’s sluice gates to allow fish migration between the Mun and Mekong rivers each year during the breeding season. This condition was sought as compensation in relation to faulty problem-solving in the design stages that should have been carried out to supply the villagers who were affected by the fishery problems associated with the dam.

Based on the conclusions of the study report of the World Commission on Dams (WCD), the Pak Mun Dam was the one case study that showed lessons could be learned from the state planning and decision-making process. It concluded that not only was the dam harming fisheries in the Mun River, but also that the benefits and costs of the project had been inadequately assessed. It can be seen that the Pak Mun Dam was built according to faulty state decision-making processes, because the actual capacity of the dam was found to be less than half of what had been expected. EGAT has, however, responded by arguing that the WCD study report was misleading and led to
unfair conclusions, because the report used data that was not credible and also used the wrong key purpose to justify the dam’s capability (World Commission on Dams, 2000).

In 2001, the government’s approval to open the Pak Mun Dam gates temporarily for one year was a brief victory for the Pak Mun villagers. They were also given a commitment by the then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra that there would be a further study of the impact upon downstream fisheries. The study was planned to consider the possible solution of opening the dam’s sluice gates permanently (Assembly of the Poor, n.d.).

Nevertheless, the government under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra failed to comply with the commitment. The cabinet confirmed instead a decision to close the sluice gates for eight months a year. The government ignored the study of Ubon Ratchathani University that recommended the dam should have its sluice gates open year-round. Consequently, there was more dissatisfaction by the grassroots, and networks motivated them to claim their rights in many ways, including rising up in protest.

The Pak Mun Dam is widely considered to be one of the most notorious problems between the state and grassroots (Foran, 2006). Both grassroots and their networks engaged in addressing the problems in many ways, mostly through groups of protesters. The villagers established a camp outside Government House in Bangkok for months. Most recently, in January 2011, a thousand villagers were mobilized in front of the city hall of the Ubol Ratchathani province to demand the permanent opening of the dam sluice gates and to reinforce their claim for compensation.

Accordingly, the Pak Mun Dam history shows that civil society arose through grassroots responses to the Pak Mun Dam project. In an attempt to understanding of the emergence of civil society through the Pak Mun Dam, villagers’ responses and participation, moreover, in seeking out Pak Mun civil society, developing and strengthening in the networks of a wider Thai civil society, the research framework outlined in chapter 2 (pp. 32–41) is used to frame the analysis.

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11 Phu Jad Karn (December 24, 2002, p. 6).
The Pak Mun Civil Group Establishment

In this study, the grassroots in the Pak Mun Dam case refer to both local people who live around the Mun River and those who have had their lives affected by the dam project. As a result, the grassroots who are mentioned in this research include not only the members of Khong Jiem district, where the dam was constructed, but also the Pak Mun Dam villagers who no longer live there, as well as other local people who live around the dam area. The other local people defined here to be grassroots are those also affected by the Pak Mun Dam construction project. They are defined by effect rather than through geography.

The original motivation of the grassroots to engage in collective action was found to be the factor that the grassroots attempted to protect their livelihoods (Ratakidrungrod, 2002). This collective action is what led to the emergence of civil society. The emergence of civil society out of the initial concern of the grassroots for their livelihoods occurred at the beginning of the project. The stages of the emergence of civil society at the beginning of the project are detailed below.

The emergence of grassroots civil group: Mun River villagers name ‘Mae Mun Man Yean Village’ (Long-lasting Mun River Village)\(^{12}\)

The Pak Mun civil societies were created by grassroots villagers who joined to form their groups around the dam area. All of them initially gathered informally. They were initiated immediately after the village was told of the decision by the government to build the dam. The decision was announced to the villagers by local government officers through the local hierarchical leader called both ‘Kamnan’\(^{13}\) and ‘Phu Yai Baan’\(^{14}\), but who was also locally traditionally called ‘Poh Yai’ in the north-east of Thailand, or ‘E-Sarn’ area.

The impact of being told and how it initiated the collective action is shown well by a 79-year-old villager on behalf of Poh Yai who said of the

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\(^{12}\) Mae Mun Man Yean = แม่มูลมั่นยืน This village developed to be the Assembly of the Poor (Samatcha Khon Jon) after 1995.

\(^{13}\) Kam Nan = ก้าน

\(^{14}\) Phu Yai Baan = ผู้ใหญ่บ้าน
initial period immediately after being told, “It was the time we know that we needed to be strong and you would not be strong if you stood alone.”

After the villagers knew they would be told to move, they continued to discuss the situation at Poh Yai’s place every evening. There were both male and female, including children, and some who came from other villages around Mun River in order to share their ideas.

At the beginning of the government’s announcement, Poh Yai’s place was the center of discussion most of the time, particularly after work. Some of the villagers were of the same family, though some were not, but most knew each other. Most importantly, they were facing the same problem, which had just been announced by the government; that they had to move out of their own places. This was an unusual situation. Even though it was quite usual for villagers to informally meet, it was not so usual for them to informally gather to talk about a serious issue. The serious issue added another dimension to the informal gatherings. What was also unusual about the informal meetings was that there were many villagers who came to join the meetings without formal invitation, who had several different kinds of roles and relationships to each other, meaning that normally they would not meet each other informally.

The villagers had formed a small informal civil society, initiated by an external event. Even though the formation of the arrangement was very unusual due to the issue stimulated by the state, which therefore required a leader or chairperson, it was nevertheless easy to join together because they were mostly either members of families, friends or neighbors. One villager who was in charge with leading grassroots said it felt normal, as if they were all like siblings.

In the case of the Pak Mun Dam, however, the villagers have more recently also developed more extensive networks, the best-known one being called 'Mae Mun Man Yean Village'. It was at this stage that civil society, in its full form, emerged. By addressing the cause of the emergence of civil society, so as to critically explore the factors underlying the Pak Mun grassroots power, it has been found that there are significant interactions between the four

15 Interview with Poh Yai Thongjan (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 28, 2008)
16 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008)
17 Interview with Poh Yai Pokoon (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 28, 2008)
18 Interview with Pudsu (Varinchamrap, Ubon Ratchathani, May 29, 2008).
factors in the emergence of civil society already outlined: the social capital; the culture aspects; the issues of incentives (or stimuli); and the consequences of grievances. These are now analyzed in greater detail, including emphasizing also the significant interactions between them.

**Social capital in the Pak Mun community**

To clarify the emergence of civil society in this stage is to begin by analyzing the phenomena according to the fundamental factors of civil society associated with social capital, which are outlined by the research framework. These are the factors that motivated the grassroots before they became members of the more extensive and integrated Mae Mun Man Yean Village civil society.

In terms of the research framework, at the later formation of Mae Mun Man Yean Village, members had built themselves up beyond the emergence stage, into the developing stage. The analysis of the developing stage is explained in the next step of the research framework, in the developing of the Pak Mun civil society section (p. 81). In this section the focus is still on the initial features of the process of the emergence of civil society that led to the emergence of the Mae Mun Man Yean Village.

The Pak Mun Dam villagers lived according to Thai local style. This has a relationship to social capital in terms of the role of culture. According to an informal group discussion19, the Pak Mun Dam sufferers concluded that the initial key significant thing that encouraged villagers to fight for about two decades was that they could trust each other, because they thought people who lived around the Mun River all achieved benefits from the same river and so could be considered to be like the same family. This was a traditional cultural interpretation of a relationship to the natural environment. The trust among them was such that they all believed that all villagers had a spiritual attachment to (adored) their places, as they all considered that the Mun River granted them their lives. Undoubtedly it was true that they were all devoted to preserving the Mun River and to fighting for it. But more importantly for social capital, they all shared it with each other and so trusted and understood

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19 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
each other. Accordingly, they were helpful to each other, which was useful in that it allowed the solving of problems.\textsuperscript{20}

With respect to trust among the grassroots, the leader of the Pak Mun villages told the researcher that he did not contrive himself to build trust. Trust was implicit and surprising, as many local people came from different villages; some of them had not known each other before, but they stayed together at his place in the first meeting, and similarly people previously unknown to each other also sometimes stayed afterwards at his place during the protest, such as during the 99-day protest in Bangkok in 1997. Almost all of the grassroots have become associated with Samatcha Khon Jon in such a way. He believed that: “It was due to the relationship beyond kinship or friendship through the common spirit of Mun River that they only took a few minutes after first meeting each other to trust each other.”\textsuperscript{21}

Besides the internal social capital factors revolving around the role of culture, there were also some external factors in terms of networks. These external factors are found, however, to have arisen due to the trust that spontaneously emerged, according to Tantivitayapitak (2008). Vanida played a recognized key role in the Pak Mun civil group; she started to join the Pak Mun villagers as a member of an NGO after the dam project had been underway for about a year. Initially she joined the grassroots covertly as a voluntary student from university, in order to try to hide her activity. She tried to hide that she worked for the NGO, due to the distrust of the NGO while she worked for the villagers in contrast. There was not the same spontaneous trust with outsiders, even members of NGOs claiming to want to help. Eventually Vanida resigned from her job at the NGO and simply helped villagers personally (Tantivitayapitak, 2008). At a certain point she became trusted, as if she was also a member of the village.

Vanida was the best well-known activist in the protest against the project. She was involved with encouraging and to some extent coordinating Pak Mun villagers to act against the dam project. In her interview with a magazine, she summed up the situation as to why she felt moved to become an activist, because the Pak Mun villagers were facing unfair implementation of

\textsuperscript{20} Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Poh Somkiat (Suan Ngern Mee Ma, Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
infrastructural development by the state authorities, and the dam project had brought inestimable suffering to them. Moreover, she was also particularly motivated to do something, because when the villagers had rejected the plan the Thai Government had proposed, as they had the right as Thai citizens to do, the Thai Government still nevertheless illegitimately used the authority of the state to dominate the villagers, and ignored their voices (Suthisakorn, 2007).

The period during which this research was carried out, in 2008, was a few months after Vanida had passed away. Thus, during the fieldwork all of the informants continually kept mentioning her support for them. This was unusual as she was an outsider. But the Pak Mun villagers realized that Vanida had devoted herself to the local people as a member of a Pak Mun village. She had become a trusted member of the developing civil society.

Poh Somkiat22 said that some NGOs had initially tried to lend a hand, but when they found the conflict might become too serious, and importantly that it might involve having to confront state agencies, they withdrew their support. So there had been no lasting support from anyone from outside, apart from Vanida. So, he (Poh Somkiat) and other villagers believed in Vanida’s intention, and she was given charge over some issues, even though she was an outsider. Importantly, it was because she did not belong to any NGO or state agency.23

Vanida had an assistant (Nanthachote), who was also an outsider, and he also came to be trusted. Nanthachote continued Vanida's work after she died. For this research, the researcher met Nanthachote personally during the fieldwork. According to Nanthachote’s role, he had supported the Pak Mun villagers, as he was Vanida’s assistant throughout the dam conflict, even though he only joined Vanida after the conflict between the villagers and state had already arisen. He said the villagers liked (and trusted) both Vanida and him because they both kept their roles as consultants only. They did not direct the villagers. They did not exert any power. According to Nanthachote, the Pak Mun villagers needed encouragement in terms of the way to respond to state power. They knew that being local people, and especially having no education,

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22 Interview with Poh Somkiat (Suan Ngern Mee Ma, Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
was what had until then led them to simply accept all the government’s commands without any disputes. When the villagers realized this they saw the value of the help that Vanida and Nanthachote were offering.

According to Nanthachote, as they were disadvantaged by limited education, the villagers had been abused by state agencies, which had more power and were much more sophisticated. For example, some traders tried to buy land at very low prices. They used the propaganda against the villagers to take advantage of them. The naïve villagers were easily fooled by the traders, which led the villagers to even greater suffering. The villagers missed out on getting compensation from the government at the end of the project due to the lack of tenure.

The pressure from the state created distrust between stakeholders, in this case the government, state agencies and villagers. In particular there was less trust between villagers and the people who were likely to get benefits from the situation, including NGOs. As a family of Pak Mun mentioned, there had been some people from NGOs who offered to help, but then tried to convince the villagers to move, without making the villagers consider what would happen after they moved, or helping the villagers get jobs after losing their livelihood through moving. It was this that showed the villagers that those people who offered help were in fact just working for the EGAT.

So, Vanida and Nanthachote were believed to be helping them deliberately, because they both always gave good advice concerning the villagers’ benefits (livelihood) and cared for the villagers’ safety first. This was in contrast to others who appeared good at the beginning, but then turned to take the state agencies’ side, so as to get some benefit later from the situation themselves in some way.

However, Nanthachote insisted that the Pak Mun villagers came to be a civil society with no outsider intervention or instigation. Vanida and he supported the villagers only as consultants, particularly in relation to guiding those who lost homes and livelihoods and became depressed. These villagers

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24 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008) and Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
25 Informal interview at dinner with Sithong’s family (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
26 Fieldwork (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
27 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
experienced state pressure on them as suffocating. It was a very dangerous situation, as when the villages got repressed in such a way they were liable to do illegal, unwise activities. Based on that kind of pressure on the villagers, as outsiders, Vanida and Nanthachote were needed to stand by the villagers to encourage them to be confident as Thai citizens who have rights the same as other Thai people do.

Although the mutual support of the Pak Mun grassroots was based on trust, which derived from the local culture, in addition there were some other stimuli and factors that caused the villagers to react more critically to the dam project. A 67-year-old female villager of Pak Mun\textsuperscript{28} told the researcher that it was because they cared for each other. In fact, she and her family were about to move to Yasotorn province, but she decided to join with the others to protest about the project, being aware of the pressures put by the government on other villagers.

\textit{Pak Mun community cultural aspects}

The culture aspects were found to be one of the key underpinning factors for the emergence of Pak Mun civil society. Generally, cultural aspects were considered to include all that indicates the beliefs and perspectives of the grassroots, as it shaped the various aspects of their lifestyle and actions. Thai local people basically live according to a traditional style, with their livelihoods based strongly on the antecedents proven reliable through generations, and shared social relations, in particular.

Social relations were a very important factor of social capital in the village. Generally, in Ubon Ratchathani province is annual droughts. The local people there are generally known as ‘Khon-E-Sarn’; they live mainly by small-scale farming and hunting, because the area is unsuitable for more extensive cultivation. Villagers who live near rivers, such as the Khong and Mun rivers, were fishermen. The exchanging of foods and some household stuffs was also available, rather than through formal trading. For instance, a villager said\textsuperscript{29}, “I used to catch fish and I then gave some to others, and they gave me some rice

\textsuperscript{28} Interview with Mae Charean (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
\textsuperscript{29} Interview with Sommai (Pibulmongsaharn, Ubon Ratchathani, June 3, 2008).
and vegetables.” This is an example of the long-established sustainable traditions of reciprocity in trade developed for the particular environment.

The traditional knowledge gave what can now be seen to be broad-mindedness in relation to economic options. The broad-mindedness of local people initiated and maintained a culture of reciprocity. This was normal among locals. It was passed on from generation to generation as it worked and was adapted to the local environment. The Pak Mun villager, Mae Yai Lah30, told the researcher that it was a very good way to live, as they shared with others different things they had, because no one had everything necessary for life. She said, “I had land for farming but I did not have a boat, therefore I could get fish and friends could have food from my farm.”

The feature of sharing resources in Thai culture also unavoidably relates to social relations. According to Poh Yai Loon31, the Pak Mun villagers had mostly associated as either family or as friends for many generations, so their thoughts and minds tended to be similar. So where there were additional local groups involved in relation to the dam issues, the villagers were able to continue to successfully interact with the increased diversity of types of member relationships. It was this similarity of their way of thinking that enabled the grassroots to keep unity among members.

Moreover, the culture of Pak Mun valued social ties, both among internal and external villages and/or groups that reflected the same norms and levels of trust. According to Narong32, a 37-year-old villager, he was very young at the time the project started. “I just followed my family to the meeting. I did not really understand much about the disadvantages of the dam but surely, I trusted what my family was doing.” There was a tradition of respect for seniority in Thai culture.

Another aspect of this is that the extended trust and relationships that developed through the project have not subsided. Tawin33, for example, revealed to the researcher that even though he joined the group of Pak Mun at the beginning because of the project, he continues to participate now even

30 Interview with Mae Lah (Pibulmongsaharn, Ubon Ratchathani, June 3, 2008).
31 Interview with Poh Yai Loon (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
32 Interview with Narong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
33 Interview with Tawin (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
though there is no more issue with the dam. He said, “I could not leave my friends to fight alone, they are all like a family from the Mun River.”

The cultural aspect affects the type of networks formed as well. For instance, local people who lived along the Mun River believe that to drink water from the same river implied a vow of motherland protection. Interestingly, the villagers believed that the nature of the Thai nation is a deep devotion to the Thai Nation as motherland. Therefore, they see national networks as an extension of local relationships. However, in terms of the external networks in the Pak Mun Dam case study, the grassroots also came to realize themselves, within their own extended traditional network, that there were other roles taken by the state. As the key activists like Vanida and Nanthachote said, they came to join with the Pak Mun villagers after the problem with the state had already been formulated by the grassroots. Thus, the Pak Mun cultural aspect will be shown to be the key factor underpinning the emergence of Mae Mun Man Yean village. This is a critical aspect of the research framework, emphasizing the centrality of culture.

The incentive or stimuli issues for emergence

The issue of incentive has proven to be a vital factor which stimulated Pak Mun villagers to develop their power. The incentive issues in this study occurred in terms of the Pak Mun villagers’ surroundings that impacted on the villagers’ living and perspectives. Accordingly, the incentive issues appeared to be negative rather than positive and motivated opposition to dam construction.

The various aspects of the issue of incentive (stimuli) are best seen in terms of conflicts, all of which impacted strongly on the grassroots. Consequently, analysis of the issue of incentives has required the crucial complement of focussing on what drove the grassroots to react strongly to certain events. The incentives were in all cases strongly felt reactions to events that brought conflict.

34 Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
35 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
36 Sarakadee Magazine (2007).
37 Interview with Nanthachote (Suan-NGen Mee Ma, Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
Stimulus issue: Livelihoods affected

The grassroots knew early on that the project of a large dam would change their lives. But it was only sometime later, due to diverse and continual problems that they knew in a way that led them to a reaction. The development of this type of knowledge emerged from the various incentives to develop civil society. In this regard, the common conflict involved for all of the various reactions was concern for their lifestyle. Even though this was the most stimulating issue for the Pak Mun villagers from the beginning, it took some time before it led to specific reactions.

Firstly, having to move out from their motherland was a very upsetting point for the villagers. The research shows that the government made careless decisions in the villagers’ lives, and this led to reactions. The village leader explained that, initially, they thought it was a confusing idea that the government wanted them to move and leave their homes. While the government told them the new dam project was needed to produce more power, this was worthless to them because the dam would lead to the loss of their careers and destroy their livelihoods. Later on, the confusion led to a strong reaction. A villager put it this way: “The command showed that the government overlooked the essence of local unity, which is the accumulated worth of this place. The dam was washing away all culture: of living, eating and helping each other in our places.”

An elderly lady villager described it in this way: “The government broke our kitchen.” She said initially she had no idea that her husband could not work as a fisherman anymore, but later described the situation saying, “How could we live if the pickle fish jar would be empty?” Likewise, Mae Tan spoke out that because her family grew rice to support her family members, her kitchen would be empty.”

Secondly, the livelihood dispute also extended to the issue of the well-being of the local society. Having to deal with the difficulty of moving, the villagers found that the dam project not only terminated the culture of

38 Interview with the official village leader (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
39 Interview with Poh Yai Pokoon (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
40 Interview with Mae Yai Pa (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
41 Pickle fish jar = Hai-Pla-Ra (acula).
42 Interview with Mae Tan (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 10, 2008).
supporting each other in such a small society like Pak Mun, but that the building of the dam also indirectly broke the social ties due to forced relocation. Mae Onsa, a 73-year-old villager, recalled her broken family that had once been a big family, as usual in native Thai culture. She mentioned that: “My son used to be a fisherman and his wife worked at home as a housewife. The daughter-in-law also had a small farm connected to my place. Unfortunately, he moved his family to Bangkok after they got money from the government and worked as construction laborers there. It was the pressure at that time.”

The government pushed some locals to leave their homes to take up hopeless challenges. Mae Onsa also recalled how she mentioned to her son: “It is impossible to take money and start a new life somewhere without fishing because we live from generation to generation from the fishing skill we got from our ancestors.”

Ultimately, her son and family just struggled for many years as poor people in Bangkok. Mae Onsa said, “We were born here so we know what is suitable for us, which never let us become poor.”

In the same way, Putha talked about the story of his family who went to try and find a job in many cities during the period the dam was built. Finally, about two years later, he found that he had to bring his wife and two sons back to his wife’s family in Surin province, while he continued to move back and forth for many years to seek jobs. He also said, “The state gave us no choice. They (the government) gave us some money with an insulting intention; it was just to kick us out of our homes.”

The significance of the incentives can be analyzed in terms of well-being. The well-being of the villagers was inseparable from the cultural aspects, which are based on interdependent characteristics of helping each other, rather than a self-interested commercial style. Mae Boonsong described her and her friends’ view about how the government overlooked the villagers’ way of life within their culture in this way: “At that time we had no

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43 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
44 Interview with Mae Onsa (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
45 Interview with Putha (Varinchamrab, Ubon Ratchathani, June 21, 2008).
46 Interview with Mae Boonsong from Pibulmangsaharn (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 6, 2008).
idea that, when looking to live in a new place, we could not help or support each other. We were not ready to change our lifestyle so that we must get everything by spending money.”

The outside view from Nanthachote\(^{47}\) summarizing the plight of the villagers was that the main aim of building the dam was national economic growth, overlooking completely the way it would damage the way of life of local people in Pak Mun village. Even though the government offered to pay for the loss of their careers, it could not compensate for what was the real loss of the villagers. In other words, due to the fact that the villagers were concerned more about living than wealth, money could not buy them better lives. This was the essential conflict that proved to be the source of incentives for the emergence of civil society. It was the driving issue that led to the rising up in reaction to what the government was doing.

_The stimulus issue: Equality and rights_

Generally, Thais in the E-Sarn are thought to be tractable and kind. They were strong and empathetic due to the familiarity of the struggle for livelihoods, which usually involved difficult work due to the geographical and natural environment’s challenges. Local people, such as the Pak Mun villagers, habitually focussed on their living and were usually outside of political processes.\(^{48}\) Furthermore, some villagers\(^{49}\) thought it was impossible to be advantaged by participation in politics, especially if their opponent was the state. According to Prapas (1998, p. 23–28), Thais had an apathetic participation in politics before 1973, and even then involvement only grew slightly in the years until 1982. The villagers mostly had no idea about ‘rights’ at that time, and even now many know they are just something they can claim as a Thai citizen. As a result, there was at the time questioning of why they must accept the dam, because it was not needed. A villager Boonsong\(^{50}\), from Pibulmangsaharn, shared her memory with the researcher. She was 62 at that time and thought she should be the one able to choose what was best for her

\(^{47}\) Interview with Nanthachote (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, March 28, 2008).
\(^{48}\) Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
\(^{49}\) Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
\(^{50}\) Interview with Boonsong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
life, not the government, and if she could not, that meant she had no ‘rights’. This was the way she understood ‘rights’.

In addition, Boonsong recalled the days she vowed to stay because she and her ancestors were born here as Mun River’s daughters and sons. When the government had a formal information session, Boonsong was the one who raised her hand in order to ask the government officer in the meeting why villagers had to leave their motherland for such a dam which they never wanted. The answer was that the dam project would be built to support the national development plan, that many other Thais could use more electricity for their businesses, and that it was part of developing the country.

Poh Somkiat\textsuperscript{51}, the leader of Pak Mun, said many questions had been asked of state representatives. The answers had been the same over and over again. He mentioned that all the answers were about other Thais who ran businesses. He also mentioned that the business owners were significantly overemphasized by all the government agencies. He summed it up by saying, “No money, then no rights.”\textsuperscript{52} So they realized it meant the local villagers at Pak Mun, who worked as farmers and fishermen, were overlooked by the government due to their not earning money to support the country’s development.

In this regard, the government representatives’ responses inevitably built up the Pak Mun villagers to realise that the government treated them unequally as Thai citizens. So the issue of discrimination arose recurrently. As Mae Nang\textsuperscript{53} told the researcher, “We were told by the local government officer that it was the duty of Thai citizens to be selfless, and it was for our country.” In other words, the villagers should move out for the dam construction in order to show their spirit to the Thai majority.

The thought of being discriminated against led to questioning by Pak Mun villagers. “Was it because we were poor so we did not have rights the same as rich people?” a member of Mae Nang’s family mentioned.\textsuperscript{54} On this point, the villagers generally gave similar comments, emphasizing the one-sided vision of the state decision. They also kept complaining in the informal

\textsuperscript{51} Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
\textsuperscript{52} No money, and then no rights = ไม่มีเงินก็ไม่มีสิทธิ์
\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Mae Nang and her family (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
\textsuperscript{54} Informal interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
group discussion about the government never being concerned about the income level of people in a small village. A villager\textsuperscript{55} blurted out, “We were just shoddy people,” and remarkably the others supported that they shared a similar feeling deep inside.

The inequity and sense of being exploited was entrenched among the Pak Mun villages. It was the main issue of dissatisfaction expressed by the villagers to the researcher throughout the fieldwork. As a downhearted statement by a villager\textsuperscript{56} summarized it: “Poor people must be the same as disabled people in the state’s eyes.” However, as the question of the discrimination issue had arisen from the original naiveté by the villagers, with silence being the initial unsatisfactory response, Mae Pa\textsuperscript{57} said, “We knew that we could not do anything, so we just cried.” Therefore the inequity and rights issues were just the beginning of the painful incentive issues.

\textit{The stimulus: The dishonesty of state agencies}

The response of disobedience by the villagers soon after they were informed about the dam project was expressed by rhetorical questions such as, ‘Why do we have to move?’ This was the main way the villagers presented their dissatisfaction to the state representatives. The state agencies were no longer listened to. The villagers had become stubborn.\textsuperscript{58}

On the one hand, looking from the other side, the Thai Government needed to clear the area for the project, which had already been committed to the EGAT. The issue of rights sprung up unexpectedly, with the villagers’ reaction seen as stubbornness. As a result, there was some clarification of the needs for the dam by the government, which was promoted by state representatives through local government organization processes.\textsuperscript{59}

An officer\textsuperscript{60} in Khong Jiem district revealed that it was a common duty of government officers to undertake the top hierarchy’s directions, and directions based on state authority. He said, “I was working as a local government officer at that time. The official memorandum came down here

\begin{itemize}
  \item[55] Informal group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
  \item[56] Informal interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
  \item[57] In-depth interview with Mae Pa (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
  \item[58] Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
  \item[59] Fieldnotes from the meeting with central government officers (Bangkok, Feb. 10, 2008).
  \item[60] Interview with the local government officer (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 20, 2008).
\end{itemize}
for moving the villagers in the dam project area, which surprisingly was very difficult work. Even though I felt the impropriety of the state directive, nevertheless I hoped that the villagers would move if they understood the benefits of the dam project.”

On the other hand, the explanation of the benefits of the project would never be accepted, due to the dam not being needed by the villagers. In other words, it was a wrong decision that the state had made autocratically for the villagers. As a result, to promote the benefits of the project was viewed by the villagers as propaganda from the state and EGAT, who definitely earned benefits, not the villagers. In doing this, the villagers had even more meetings and sought supporters in order to refuse the government and agency propaganda.

Recognizing that the provision of information was propaganda also let the villagers recognize the state’s dishonesty. A villager said, “The promoting of the benefits of the dam was about the benefits for others, not us, but they told us about good things. In fact, they tried to cover our eyes by lying about the good things of the dam, but hiding the costs of it.”

Thus, there were a lot of villagers who had surrendered reluctantly because government officers had convinced them that: “it was better to accept the compensation offer because it was impossible to go against state power, as otherwise you might get nothing”. But as will be shown later, this decision only brought further dissatisfaction and conflict later on.

Furthermore, the most important stimulus issue that continually drove the conflict was that there was an agreement document that showed a list of villagers’ names. The document was to support the dam project. Mae Lah recalled the shock she felt the day she found that her name and signature was on the dam project consent. She spoke out furiously: “My ID card labeled with the signature was just to get free dental service from the district health center. Some of us let it go, and were quiet, even though we knew what a painful fraud was carried out by the state.”

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61 Informal group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
62 Interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
63 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
64 Interview with Mae Lah (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
The stimulus: The ecological impact

In fact, when the local villager group had begun in the early stages, the issue of ecological impact had hardly arisen. But this essential point developed to become an obvious concern later on through academic encouragement. Ultimately, after the dam had been operating for some time, there was evidence of negative ecological impacts. The ecological issue was studied empirically by local fishing experts joining with the scientists in Ubon Ratchathani University.65

To raise the issue of environment and ecological impacts by local villagers, however, became seen as meaningless, due to there being no greater acceptable or scholastic or scientific knowledge than local knowledge, which came from personal experience, even though local scholars had been developing the empirical experience for generations.66 Accordingly, the Thai state insisted that the dam project would be implemented even though the villagers and environmentalists had collected 12,000 signatures in opposition to the dam. An appeal sent to the Bangkok World Bank office, the main financial provider for the project, and also sent to the prime minister, was rejected because the request to reconsider the project due to the concern of ecological loss was considered to be too late as the dam project was due to start just one month later.67

Surprisingly, at least to villagers, local traditional knowledge had not been able to force a reconsideration of the project, whereas the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process had supported the EGAT’s project documents. As Poh Somkiat68 said, “The local fishermen knew the Mun River of their hearts, they recognized all the good and bad things about taking care of the river, but I wondered why the EIA, made by the well-educated, overlooked the point of fish migration.”

Nonetheless, the villagers thought the government was blinded from viewing the argument of local fishermen about the ecological loss due to some

65  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008) and A working paper prepared for the World Commission on Dams (2000).
66  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
67  “Assembly of the Poor” (n.d.).
68  Informal group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
fish species possibly being affected, which might ultimately impact on fishing yields. An interesting point was that even though there was lessened concern about the fisheries by local people, they still kept fighting for solving the negative consequences by sharing and integrating their experiences with some university scholars, even after the dam had been completed and had commenced operation. The study provided very useful information in order to facilitate compensation processes for the villagers.

There were, however, significant negative consequences to the fisheries. The dam gate destroyed both fish populations and fertile riverbanks; for instance, Poh Sorn, a 73-year-old fisherman, mentioned: “Fishing before and after having the dam was definitely different. I could not now catch enough fish even for just my family, while I used to have more than enough to also sell at the local market.”

A university scholar told the researcher that: “The local villagers knew about the river ecology. They had learnt naturally that the river’s ecosystem was an essential source of foods for supplying their families’ dietary needs, and tried to prevent the destruction, but the villagers suffered from the mistakes of others at the end.”

The issue of ecological and environmental impact became evidence to confirm that the state decision was wrong. Moreover, these interesting issues called networks into play, along with more supporters. So there was even more attention from NGOs used on environmental and human rights, engaged as specialist advisors once the dam project was completed and operational. As a result, the evidence from their coordination provided vital encouragement for proving that the villagers had been affected by the dam, and that the state must take responsibility.

On this point, Nanthachote said, “Almost all of the villagers had given up because they had no idea of how to tackle the state, actually EGAT, anymore. They accepted the commission unwillingly, and tried to live their

69 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
70 Interview with Poh Sorn from Pibulmongsaharn (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008).
71 Interview with a University scholar (Ubon Ratchathani, June 10, 2008).
72 Interview with Nanthachote (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, March 28, 2008).
lives among the surrounding changes. However, with help from each other, both inside and outside Pak Mun community, the villagers also claimed for what they had lost. Even though they had failed to stop the dam and suffered for many years, they had nevertheless learnt how to struggle rationally”.

The stimulus issues also encouraged the grassroots to join together in order to struggle in the unsatisfactory situation. Moreover, the Pak Mun villagers had faced more grievance factors, which made the group of villagers become the state’s foe.

The emergence of Mae Mun Muan Yean village: Grievance factors

The Pak Mun villagers’ grievances accumulated throughout the trajectory of the Pak Mun Dam contention. According to Mae Sompong73, “Even though the grievances began to come ever since the first day we were informed by state that they would build the dam, nobody thought the troubles the dam would bring would be endless.” Comments from the villagers74 from diverse places and times have in similar ways all expressed that the dam is the symbol of the state’s hurting of people. Moreover, not only people, but also the environment; for example, in the words of Poh Somkiat75, “The Pak Mun Dam is the most shameful monument to the destroying of natural life.”

Based on the ongoing experiences of dissatisfaction by the villagers, it is possible to interpret the painful situation of this case as the cause of the eruption of grassroots power. The eruption occurred soon after the government approved the project, even though the villagers had appealed to the government to reconsider the negative impacts. The project started just a few months later, and as a result, there were confrontations during the preparation for the dam site, as the EGAT began to remove rocks and started blasting rapids for the water channel.

About four hundred villagers, mostly women and elders, occupied the dam site in order to interrupt the EGAT blasting. It was the undertaking by EGAT to blast rapids that highlighted the weak voice of villagers. It showed how the state agencies tried to brush off the villagers. Mae Sompong76, who

73 Interview with Mae Sompong (Bangkok, March 9, 2008).
74 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
75 Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
76 Interview with Mae Sompong (Bangkok, March 29, 2008).
was a dam opponent, recalled: “In fact, I had opposed the dam since the beginning by joining a rally with friends in order to ask about the real benefits of the project, whereas the state agencies had some local politicians, businessmen and local government officers to support them. It could be seen that the dam brought about community fragmentation right from the beginning.”

But Mae Sompong also told how it was even worse on the day the dam opponents and the dam supporters fought. She said, “The government and EGAT were deaf and blind so we really needed them to hear us. We put women and elders around the machines and held hands together. Some of us sat down on the rig explosion. Even though the women were safe, some of the guys got seriously injured. It seemed that we were at death’s door. It was very sad because the killers were sons of Mae Mun River. They wanted to kill their families.”

Moreover, the community talisman [ศาลเพียงตา] was destroyed at that time.

Poh Thongjan77, a 78-year-old villager, mentioned how the blasting of the rapids wiped out the vital symbol78 of the Mun River area. He spoke out miserably that: “They (the persons who brought about the dam) destroyed everything, not only land and river, but also ruined our spirit that we had preserved for hundreds of years; many of the things that were a symbol of peace and of our unity.”

The impact of the blasting of the rapids immediately and dramatically increased the villagers’ expression of dissatisfaction. The conflict was also intensified by the group of dam supporters who conspired with the state representatives. Nanthachote79 commented that it was tragic that the power of the state was insufficient to avoid the conflict, which the villagers understood as the state creating the fight deliberately. Due to this, the villagers lost all trust in the government and state agencies. He said, “The government either was closing one eye or backing up some villagers who supported the dam, while threatening the dam opponents, which ended up in violence. The discrimination brought conflict and created a deep social rift. Consequently,

77 Interview with Poh Thongjan (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008).
78 It calls Saan Pieng Tah (ศาลเพียงตา). It is the symbol of God of water or river.
79 Interview with Nanthachote (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, March 28, 2008).
the villagers who opposed the dam would come to need to protect their spiritual beliefs because it meant the way to keep their dignity”.

Poh Somkiat80 said that, a few days later, the villagers gave up the protest due to a suggestion from well-known activist, Vanida. The villagers agreed with Vanida in that it was better that they seek to find another way to respond, otherwise the villagers would only get into further trouble by being charged with illegal acts against EGAT. Poh Somkiat also said, “Arjarn Mod (Vanida) and Arjarn Pui (Nanthachote) seriously warned us that we would be caught in their (the government’s) trap if we got arrested. It would mean we would lose some of the village members, which would result in the loss of our community power. So in response to that, we decided we needed to be calm. Although we could not stop the building of the dam, we could, however, come back and be ready either to attempt to show the negative impact of the dam and the result it has had on our lives, or at least to show that we were not wrong.”

To be looked down on by outsiders as only having traditional knowledge was also very hurtful to the villagers’ feelings. A villager who worked as a fisherman and who was a local expert in Pak Mun revealed what was on his mind. It was that the state gave them no choice but to surrender until after the dam construction had been completed, at which point some of the villagers would come back to revive the argument in order to claim what they had lost. In his words, “We started to contact some scholars and finally, only after much dialogue, were they willing to help us. We learnt painfully about the perspective of outsiders; that the local scholars were not accepted as holding valid scientific knowledge. That was the unbelievable heartbreaking reason for the attitude of the people who were looking down on us.”81

In brief, the original grievances of the Pak Mun villagers accumulated due to state and general outside ignorance. A lack of social acceptance became a discrimination issue for the Pak Mun villagers, and the painful dissatisfaction they felt was also exploited to allow violent reactions against them.

80 Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
81 Informal discussion group (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 21, 2008).
The Development of the Pak Mun Civil Group

To look into how civil society develops, in this section the components of the development phase of the research framework (Figure 3) are used as a guideline. To pave the way to illustrating how civil society has developed, the establishment phase of civil society in the previous section has presented the emergent features of the Pak Mun civil society, using the model for the complex dynamic of civil society outlined in Figure 2. The local civil society organization identifies as a civil group in this study because it appears a civil group relies on the civil society concept.

Bearing this in mind, this section points out how Pak Mun civil society has been developed since the Pak Mun villagers came together after the dam construction was completed. According to the research framework, the development of grassroots civil society depends on its strength, which is determined by the structural aspect, actors, interactions and social capital, all of which also eventually lead to the sustaining of civil society, presented in the following section.

Pak Mun civil group strengthening: From home to street and back to the village

The previous explanation of the Pak Mun civil society indicated that at the beginning, the Pak Mun villagers constituted their own civil group informally. The villagers aimed to seize their rights as Thai citizens in order to protect or participate in developing their resources. They had continually attempted to raise their concerns with the Pak Mun Dam as a case study of human rights and environmental degradation needing to be solved by a policy process at the national level. As a result, the villagers had developed their own informal civil society organization to support a type of local movement, and then joined with other local civil society groups in order to place pressure on the state.

At that time, there were many diverse groups of local civil society who joined together as a social movement, namely the Assembly of the Poor (AOP) or Samatcha Khon Jon. As Missingham (2003) stated, the AOP was a civil organization best called a ‘lobby-style organization’. Moreover, the AOP was able to connect local movements with other agents, such as activists, NGOs
and media. For example, the activists Suriyan Tonhnueid and Lah worked on the case of the state’s unfair projects for the local villagers. The AOP connects to NGOs such as the Human Settlement Foundation. The involvement of many agents and actors, however, made the AOP complicated and required it to develop a formal organization.

The AOP contained the local movements shaped by the grassroots civil society that all had developed informally in different regions. What united them was that they were involved with similar problems, all various kinds of state policy intimidation. Pintobtang (1998, pp. 71–98), however, added that even though the AOP mainly constituted local movements from all around Thailand, it was the impacts of large dam projects that were the one vital issue to drive the local movements to join with the AOP. For instance, some of them were groups of local people already affected by large dam projects already completed, such as the Nam Phrom Dam, Rasi Salai Dam and Pak Mun Dam, and some local movements wanted to protect themselves from the threat of similar large dams. The latter groups wanted to stop large dam projects and so were arguing for terminating some projects that were about to be implemented, such as the Pong Khun Phet Dam and Kaeng Suea Ten Dam. As well as groups involved in these various ways with large dam projects, there were also some local civil movements concerned about land tenure rights. Most others were involved with other aspects of the issue of environmental degradation, if not large dam projects.

The AOP brought the afflicted local people’s issues from the villages to Bangkok, the capital city, through mass agitation (Baker, 2000). It was the grassroots’ opportunity to put rural politics into national politics, and moreover, the grassroots were also able to act collectively in order to influence state decision-making (Missingham, 1999). Consequently, the AOP became the most powerful lobby organization through the use of mass mobilization strategy, aimed at seeking equity and fairness in managing resources for all people. The mobilization of the AOP also aimed to put pressure on the Thai

82 Phone interview with Suriyan (June 18, 2012).
83 Phone interview with Lah (July 1, 2012).
84 Assembly of the Poor (n.d.).
85 See more Pintobtang (1998).
86 Pintobtang classifies the local movements in different types; issues of problem, regions and networks.
state on the issue of free rights, participation and self-determination (Missingham, 2003, p. 39), in particular through the 99-day demonstration in Bangkok from February to May 1997.

Vanida, the most important supporter of the AOP at Pak Mun declared that the groups of local movements in the AOP had mostly known each other before coming to join with the AOP. They had started as a small group in their own villages and had participated together in common activities every month. Bringing them together took time and involved many collective actions. Thus the local civil groups had not just immediately arisen.87

Notwithstanding this, the grassroots civil society still needed to be improved at the local level to become successful in the AOP because the local movements unavoidably contained too many diverse issues. So the grassroots civil society needed to focus the expression of their demands in order to show a collective strong opposition to the state. Because of this, the aspect of Mae Mun village Man Yean, the Pak Mun civil group had formed. Nanthachote88 commented that that was one strategy of local movements to keep directing their aims both ways; one being to move on the street to rise up against the problems, and the other to encourage civil movements’ members in their home areas in order to emphasize the problems. It was a kind of mobilization of villages with long-term protest.

Similarly, Suriyan89 explained that apart from placing groups of the AOP in front of the parliament, there were also local civil groups protesting all around Thailand; for example, the group of Pak Mun villagers who had protested in the Khong Jiem district, Ubon Ratchathani province on June 23, 2000. Placing the civil groups’ protest all around Thailand was a way to show the power of grassroots who were well organized both at the national and local level and came to be called the ‘Dao Kra Jaeye’ [ดาวกระจาย] strategy.90

Although the Pak Mun civil group played an important role in the AOP, due to the case of the Pak Mun Dam conflict being a widely controversial issue

87 Interviewed by Ornsom (March, 2007).
88 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
89 Phone interview with Suriyan (June 18, 2012).
90 Dao-Kra-Jaeye = ดาวกระจาย
that was watched by people throughout the country, the Pak Mun civil group ultimately resolved to seek to settle their problem back at the village.

Pak Mun civil group structure
The Pak Mun civil group was informal at the beginning. It also developed informally once the villagers resolved to shape it into the Mae Mun Man Yean village.

Poh Somkiat\textsuperscript{91} revealed that the Mae Mun Man Yean village was a part of the AOP at the local level. Most of the villagers came back to the village from trying to struggle in different ways of life after the dam construction had been completed and after receiving the migration subsidy from the government, only to find it was inadequate for temporary survival. In this regard, the returning of the villagers in order to join together in the Mae Mun Man Yean village indicates the aim of its formation. The common will to return constituted the informal resolve of the Pak Mun civil group without formal organization.

The villagers gradually came back to the village. Some villagers came back shortly after the dam was completed, and some came between the time that the AOP was set up in 1995 and the end of the AOP meetings in 1997 because they had no more money and could not find jobs.\textsuperscript{92} They started with their relatives or friends near the dam area. One of them, Boonlian\textsuperscript{93}, a 70-year-old villager who went away from his home with his family, came back alone to live with his relatives, whereas his wife continued to live with his daughter in Bangkok. He helped his relatives in the fields and earned an income for subsistence living. He said, “I had moved to live in Mae Mun Man Yean village even though it was set up as the place for fighting the state. I thought our living in a small village (Mae Mun Man Yean) would remind the state what they did to us.”

To clarify the phrase of the ‘set-up’ place, Poh Somkiat\textsuperscript{94} explained to the researcher that Mae Mun Man Yean was a model of the Pak Mun village, which was destroyed by the state. This village was full of valuable resources.

\textsuperscript{91} Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 21, 2008).
\textsuperscript{92} Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
\textsuperscript{93} Interview with Boonlian (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
\textsuperscript{94} Informal group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
Mae Mun Man Yean was created near the dam area. The village was not on the official map and census, so the location of the village could be decommissioned by the state; the village was not a stable place to live. It was a response to the state’s decision by the local people. “We set it up to be our fighting symbol in order to fight against the state,” Poh Somkiat said. It was the Pak Mun civil group’s circumstances that indicate the significance of the site for the village.

Before the Mae Mun Man Yean village was set up, coming together along with friends to share and exchange ideas was common for the Pak Mun civil group. Most of the meetings then took place at Poh Somkiat’s house. The villagers met in a small shed next to the main house, which was also Vanida’s shelter. It was called the centre of community knowledge (Soon Kwam Ru Chum Chon)95, where sometimes they had about a hundred villagers at a meeting. As Nanthachote96 said, “Although the place was small and unfurnished, it was not only used for learning local livelihoods during ordinary circumstances, but it was also the place for supporting the activities of the Pak Mun civil group through meetings and planning. Many important decisions on how to respond to the state were made there.”

Villagers came to the centre of community knowledge while the researcher was doing fieldwork, and group discussions took place in the same way they used to. The villagers said there was no official meeting process. They could sit on stools under the tree near the group meeting. Some of them even sat on the floor without any mats. The participants were happy with the casual style, which made them confident to speak up about the impacts of the dam because it was like talking to friends. Importantly they and everybody were free to talk and give their ideas. Moreover, they told the researcher that they could also have meetings anywhere else, even beside their paddy fields.97

The operating feature of the Pak Mun civil group in terms of the meeting surroundings seemed to be more casual consultation, due to how most villagers knew each other. Significantly, they were willing to share their experiences, which came from facing the same problems. However, they could

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95 Soon-Kwam-Ru-Chum-Chon = ศูนย์ความรู้ชุมชน
96 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
97 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008)

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discuss what they considered to be the most urgent problems in order to have them considered as first priority. Apart from that, there were the ongoing issues being managed by a group of local people, of how to respond to the state in the case of dam construction and how to alleviate the consequences.98

Looking into the Pak Mun civil group processes, the villagers’ activities were based on common aspects of Thai culture. The villagers revealed that they just followed the meeting resolutions, so it would be easy to participate with the group, which was full of respect for people.99 In this regard, the involvement of some elder villagers and traditional heads of the village shows that the Pak Mun civil group has strong respect for the elder people whom they called ‘mother’ or ‘father’ as ‘Poh Yai, Mae Yai, Poh and Mae’.100

As noted, the Pak Mun civil group was comprised mainly of elderly members rather than people of working age. Using the snowball technique in the research method of this study, there were only two interviewees out of twenty who were younger than forty. Moreover, the participants in the group discussions were in the same age range. Likewise, a young village coordinator101 said, “It was easy sometimes to work with the group of old people because they had much experience. There actually have never been any problems. Thus I preferred to work with more people in the same range of age.” In terms of this, the researcher thinks that there are two points: firstly, the Pak Mun civil group comprises few young villagers; and secondly, the difference in age is not a problem for the Pak Mun civil group organization. 102 (See the section on the Pak Mun civil group members (pp. 96–99).

The association and participation of the Pak Mun villagers reflected the structural aspect of civil organizations, shown through such activities as meetings and coordination. These activities comprised the functions and processes of civil organizational structure. But the structural aspect of the Pak Mun civil group was clearly informal.

98 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
99 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, Junde, 2008).
100 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
101 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
102 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
Innovation and self-organization of Pak Mun civil society

This research has also considered the development of civil society structure by looking into how the grassroots had recently improved in their association. This is relevant because civil innovation is a part of the civil society structure, both as a function and process. This required study of how the grassroots organized their own civil society organization.

The innovation of the Pak Mun civil group can be seen most clearly, once the Pak Mun villagers had joined with the AOP and other local civil groups, by how they adjusted the form of their group. The association with the AOP caused the altering of the form of the Pak Mun civil group in order to develop the escalation of networks needed. To put this in context, according to Vanida103, the AOP was a forum for the poor and powerless. The AOP fought for the rights of farmers and rural people. Likewise, the Mae Mun Man Yean village was a group of disaffected villagers. The makeshift village aimed to be a symbol against the dam and other development projects. However, both the AOP and Mae Mun Man Yean village were linked closely by the Pak Mun civil group’s role. Consequently, the evolution of the Pak Mun civil group was also reflected throughout by the events and activities of both.

The role of networks can be seen in the way the AOP was a social mobilization umbrella. Being part of it connected the Pak Mun civil group with other civil groups, which inevitably resulted in more complicated functions and processes. Consequently, the Pak Mun civil group needed to improve itself by developing more formal arrangements. Regarding this, because the main action of the AOP was definitely as a social movement or protest group, the AOP performances operated mainly in terms of a ‘mob’ (Pintoptang, 1998). As Poh Somkiat104 said, “In fact, it was not a problem, we just needed to be well prepared, such as who can come with the group or who should stay at home, because of their importance for our safety and existence. Importantly, if we go out of our place, it costs us more money, so we have to plan and work to follow the plan carefully.”

103 “Assembly of the Poor” (n.d.).
See more http://www.duangjan.com/board/index.php?topic=127.0
104 Interview with Poh Somkiat (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
Additionally, Poh Somkiat explained further on this point that, if it is necessary, the Pak Mun civil group sometimes had to adjust the number of members joining the protest group, depending on the budget and how important the event was. Therefore he had come to believe that the number of Pak Mun villagers in the AOP movement should be very high. They had carried out good arrangements for joining with the AOP 99-day march in 1997. He also said, “We went to join with as many as we could because they were important events. Marching with the AOP aimed to show our grassroots power, so we had to prepare everything in advance, such as food, members and budget. Moreover, we arranged some members to take care of the rest at the village as well.”

Mae Charoen revealed that she was one who stayed at the village while the other villagers went to join the AOP in Bangkok. She said, “It was disappointing to me at the beginning because I really wanted to join them as I used to. But it was the decision from the meeting that they left me and some others to look after the village. Thus I thought it was a part of our job opposing (the state) to do so. We were like a backup team, which needed to be ready to support the ones who were working. Ways of supporting them was doing some of the work in the place of my husband, and helping friends as much as we could. Most important was food preparation because we didn’t know how long it would be.”

Even though the Pak Mun civil group’s activities, while the villagers had joined the AOP, were managed by AOP organizers, there were other activities that also needed to be well coordinated. Nanthachote commented that the group of Pak Mun villagers had tried to rearrange their responsibilities. He said, “Actually, we were concerned about how to work with a lot of other people, but the villagers ultimately worked together with other civil groups harmoniously. In my view, it was because all the local people had similar character, culture and livelihoods that they worked together well. In the new organization with greater diversity there were a lot of problems, particularly when the long-term movement in Bangkok ran out of food.”

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105 Interview with Mae Charoen (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
106 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
The Pak Mun villagers, as a part of the AOP, had adjusted themselves in some of their work to fit into the AOP organization; for example, Narong, a 27-year-old villager, said, “I had a few roles when I was in the village, but I was set to be the leader of security for the group once I joined the marching.” In the same way, he also said that the Pak Mun villagers were chosen to work in suitable roles, such as being chefs and doing performances on stage. Apart from that, they just stayed with the group to make the power of a crowd.

Interestingly, Nanthachote confirmed that as activists with many years experience, the Pak Mun villagers were an inspiration in terms of rights issues for other locals, and he certainly believed that the villagers of the Pak Mun civil group had participated in the most performances of all the AOP groups recently. However, as well as the rights issue, there were also other key factors that facilitated the development of the civil organization of the group of Pak Mun villagers.

In May 1997, the AOP changed their action strategy from one of using large local civil movement power to challenge the state confrontation, to placing groups of local villagers around the country. So the local civil groups went back to their own locales and organized their civil movements by themselves, even though they had been protesting with the AOP at a national level in Bangkok for many years. In this regard, the Pak Mun villagers simply continued their group as a grassroots civil group, namely the Mae Mun Man Yean village.

In terms of the self-organized aspect of the Pak Mun civil group, it was based mainly on informal structures, which were explained accordingly in the previous section. Poh Somkiat revealed during the group discussion that all actions and activities were the group’s decision and responsibility, even though the group had no official organizational authority. This meant the group ran traditionally, without clear leaders. On this point, Nanthachote commented that the Pak Mun civil group emerged out of a necessity for fighting inequality due to the state’s unbalanced attention toward economic

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107 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
108 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
109 See p. 83
110 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
111 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
112 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
development. The villagers\textsuperscript{113} realized they were poor and had no power, which was the most important reason to encourage them to keep the group unofficial, with little or no running costs. The group worked independently, outside of business and political support. Thus the villagers recognized that the civil group had been organized naturally because of Vanida and Nanthachote, who were neither from business nor political sectors. This was the argument used to confirm the independent organizational aspect of the Pak Mun civil group.

In March 1999, the Mae Mun Man Yean village came to be center stage of the afflicted grassroots’ confrontation with the state, with the AOP as the main supporter and Vanida the AOP’s essential supervisor. Poh Somkiat\textsuperscript{114} said the village became a center for those who suffered due to state policies. “There were a lot people who came from all around the country. And there were some students from universities, both in Thailand and overseas, some of whom were reporters and journalists who were really interested in our village.”

Poh Somkiat as a key village informant, and Nanthachote as an in-charge activist supporter, told the researcher in the same way that the Mae Mun Man Yean village had been organized by the villagers themselves. According to the villagers visited by the researcher both during group discussion and individually, when asked about the differences between the time before and time after the emergence of the Mae Mun Man Yean village, almost all of them said there were some AOP staff who had taken over their operational work. This had occurred due to the Mae Mun Man Yean village having a greater diversity of members, so they just waited for a call to order some coordination of their own networks, or to join the activities (and protests). Thus, even though operational works had been taken over by AOP staff, they were still willing to participate with the village’s activities because the village still contained the respected elders from their original village.\textsuperscript{115}

The Mae Mun Man Yean village became a forum of rural and poor people. Apart from keeping up the activities within the village, based on their own culture and the identity of the Mun River villagers, the village members

\textsuperscript{113} Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
\textsuperscript{114} Interview with Poh Somkiat (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{115} Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
also frequently participated with others from outside over the next couple of years. For example, they joined in the rally on the 10th anniversary of the Pak Mun Dam, which was set up by the AOP and the Department of Quality Development, which was part of a state institution. Additionally, there were five more Mae Mun Man Yean villages that became established at other dams around the north-east a year later (Wanlipodom, 2000). Consequently, the local civil group at Pak Mun Dam accepted role of Mae Mun Man Yean village #1. By then, the six Mae Mun Man Yean as villages had all been participating together as civil movements for some time.116

The Pak Mun villagers had been working on their compensation for the damage caused by the dam continually during the first term of Thaksin’s government (2001–06). In this regard, most of the Pak Mun civil group’s activities were aimed at the reconciliation processes, while the number of Mae Mun Man Yean villagers was decreasing gradually over about four years.117 Poh Yai Thong118 revealed, “All meetings needed just a small group of Pak Mun representatives for them just to be listened to.” Happily, the claim to open the Pak Mun Dam sluice gates was successful at that time, and the processes of compensation seemed to be in progress, which resulted in a government resolution to open the dam sluice gates for a year.

In December 2002, the Pak Mun civil group returned to demonstrate in Bangkok owing to the unreliable nature of the state decision. The state reneged on the previous agreement to open the dam sluice gates. Consequently, the Pak Mun civil group used the mobilization of their members in a confrontation strategy to once again place pressure on the Thai state. Thus there were countless protests and mediation meetings all throughout Thaksin’s government from the year 2001 until September 19, 2006. 119

The Pak Mun civil demonstrations were supported significantly by the AOP as the issue of Pak Mun Dam had become a more complicated problem that pushed the villagers to need more networks to help them struggle to fight the state and EGAT. However, the Pak Mun civil group kept the heads of the

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116 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
117 Interview with Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
118 Interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
119 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008).
villagers group, namely Poh Krua Yai [พ่อครัวใหญ่]\textsuperscript{120}, to work in the group’s participation processes, whereas staff from the AOP took responsibility for the group’s functions, such as the running of the administrative processes. The AOP staff were known as ‘Kan Nam’ [แกนนำ].\textsuperscript{121}

The main research fieldwork of this study was collected during September 2007 to June 2008, when Thailand was facing a chaotic political situation. This was shortly after the Thaksin Shinawatra government was dissolved by a military coup, and there were also constitutional amendments a year later.\textsuperscript{122} Nevertheless, the Phalang Prachachon party\textsuperscript{123}, which belonged to former Prime Minister Thaksin, won the Thai election in early 2008, and Mr. Samak Soontornvej became the prime minister.

Meanwhile the researcher visited the Pak Mun case study site and had been asked to visit the Mae Mun Man Yean village by villagers (at an earlier time). I was, however, told that the Mae Mun Man Yean village had become a restricted area due to it having encountered persecution from the opposition. A similar story was told to me about how the village was burned twice, even though there was no mention of it in any media. Thus the interviews of some of the villagers’ opponents were the only possible information available to support the way of understanding of the Pak Mun civil group’s confrontation at that time.\textsuperscript{124}

It was noted in the research fieldwork from the period that not only had the Pak Mun civil group become less active due to the political contention during Mr. Samak Sundaravej’s regime, as he was accused of being a puppet for former Prime Minister Thaksin, but also most activities on behalf of the AOP had become related more to the political conflict at the national level rather than focussing on the claims for compensation. Some of the villagers\textsuperscript{125} said, “We are proud of the way they had fought, even though the Mae Mun

\textsuperscript{120} Poh-Krua-Yai = พ่อครัวใหญ่, is defined as the elder villagers who represented the leader of the villagers, who were in charge of political activites (Baker, 2000). See more Pintobtang (1998).
\textsuperscript{121} “Kan Nam” is defined as the leaders of the group carring out mobilization. They can be staff of NGOs, activists and villagers. See more Pintobtang (1998).
\textsuperscript{122} Thailand has the new constitution on August 24, 2007 and it was the 18th Thai constitution.
\textsuperscript{123} Phalang Prachachon party = พรรคพลังประชาชน
\textsuperscript{124} Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, May 29, 2008).
\textsuperscript{125} Group interview with the Pak Mun villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 29, 2008).
Man Yean was gone.” One of them spoke out: “To fight for making demands of
our rights to the state must be better than fighting for money, and Thai people
would know that we had been protesting for rights not just to get money.”

On the one hand, Poh Thongcharoen\textsuperscript{126}, who was the Pak Mun civil
group leader, as well as the group representative most of that time, said the
Pak Mun villagers showed significant grassroots power for many decades.
Even though the state and EGAT had engaged in some problem solving, the
Pak Mun civil group, as poor people, would not give up their aim to change the
state attitudes about poor people. On the other hand, there were some
villagers who gave up on joining in the activities due to them thinking the
group’s actions for a few years were aimed more to support politics. Also, if
they received their compensation successfully, that meant the Pak Mun
mission was complete. Nevertheless, the group of Pak Mun villagers still
contained a lot of local people who were affected by the dam so they were
willing to join the group’s activities regardless.\textsuperscript{127}

As well as the continuing effect of the dam, the reason given by some
villagers who persisted in joining the group’s activities for as long as possible
was due to them being unable to leave their friends to fight while they just
watched. A 37-year-old villager\textsuperscript{128} said, “I knew a little bit about why the
village leaders kept doing this in spite of how we got some money from the
government and that we could not do anything with the dam, such as destroy
it, but I was willing to join with our friends. I think we were like the same
family so I won’t let them fight alone.”

Talking to the villagers who decided to leave the civil group, most of
them said they might return to join the civil group’s activities if they needed to,
such as, if they got some new problems. Moreover, if the group leaders they
had known asked for their help and gave them important and necessary
reasons, they would do so. There were a few women, however, who said they
would not, as they were too old now and they must instead take care of their
descendants. Interestingly, there were also similar comments from a few
villagers in terms of joining the activities lately, which seemed distant from

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{126 Interview with Poh Thongcharoen (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).}
\footnote{127 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).}
\footnote{128 Interview with On (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 29, 2008).}
\end{footnotes}
their needs. They thought that what they did was now overly commanded by the AOP.129

In the year 2011, the researcher visited the case study site in Khong Jiem district. The Knowledge Community Centre was now empty. The key informants such as Poh Somkiat had gone elsewhere. A villager130 who used to join the research group discussion in 2008 said the centre of community knowledge had moved to a new location and almost all of them now worked as much as possible. He said, “There has been too strong a conflict between the political protests for many years lately. The red shirts, the group, which supports Thaksin, had very strong power. My friends and I don’t want to be taking that kind of side, even though we were not in the group of the red shirts. We had stopped joining the Pak Mun protest due to it having become mixed up with political protest, red and yellow shirts, which would never solve our problems.”

The research fieldwork in 2011 took place through informal surveys, mostly through personally visiting informants from earlier periods. The researcher tried to go to the same places and meet the same participants as much as possible. Unfortunately, only six of more than thirty previous participants were available. Some of them were just out of work, but some had definitely moved out. It was possible, however, to talk to Poh Somkiat who was in the group of Pak Mun civil leaders, and also other leaders, on the phone several times. This provided details of the ongoing story of problems the Pak Mun civil group had been facing. The Pak Mun civil group had learned the complex political processes by putting their claims into the mediation process again and again, which took a long time with each new government.131

Interestingly, the Pak Mun civil group was once again a major local civil group of a new mass movement organization called ‘PMove’ (Kabuankan Prachachon Phua Songkom Pentham).132 In fact, PMove emerged from the reorganization mainly of the AOP and almost all the local civil groups, which previously joined in movements. Lah133, an activist who replaced Vanida and

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129 Fieldnotes on the group interview (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 29, 2008).
130 Interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 25, 2011).
131 Fieldnotes (Bangkok and Ubon Ratchathani, June-July, 2011).
132 Kabuankan Prachachon Phua Songkom Pentham = ขบวนการประชาชนเพื่อสังคมเป็นธรรม
133 Phone interview with Lah (July 1, 2012).
Nanthachote, said she has been in charge as a consultant of PMove and that PMove had modified the organizational aspects in order to specifically match the local groups’ problems.

In terms of the Pak Mun civil group, the issue of their claims focussed on their concern over the permanent loss of the local villagers’ careers in terms of fisheries, in particular, even though the villagers who had been affected, in the case of migration due to the dam, had been paid. AOP staff134 said, “The villagers, however, still have a problem with long-term jobs due to the effect of the environmental degradation wrought by the dam, so that the villagers still need the state and the EGAT to open the dam’s gate. As a result, the suffering villagers came together to join PMove’s activities.”

To sum up for the Pak Mun civil group, the formation of informal grassroots civil society of Pak Mun villagers had shown the initial innovation to establish civil society. The group grew strongly within the aspects of informal form and function initially. Moreover, the ongoing participation in movements by the Pak Mun civil group as an essential part of the AOP led to the adoption of AOP ideas, strategies and organizational structures, which was also one of villagers’ strategies to help the group organize itself effectively. And the Pak Mun group has also shown the same adaptive ability by joining PMove in the last few years.

**Actors in Pak Mun civil society**

This section studies the factor of actors in the emergence of the civil group. Specifically this section focusses on how the Pak Mun civil group had persuaded Thai people to pay attention to marginalized people’s rights along with other problems; to see different ways of understanding things, both positively and negatively, in the case of Pak Mun civil group in particular. The key question is how local villagers can present their limited power in order to fight against the state power, even though they have been classified as local, poor or marginalized people.

In this regard, the actors in the Pak Mun civil group are understood to include whoever incited the group, such as local politicians, activists and NGOs. Nonetheless, people have different views about actors in civil society

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134 Interview with a AOP staff (Bangkok, June 30, 2011).
organization and mobilized groups. And the NGOs would also mostly be in people’s thoughts as the key actor, who operated civil organization and mobilization. For instance, a minister of the Yingluck government\textsuperscript{135} said, “Thailand was not led by NGOs so development policies should be decided by the Thai state (government) not a group of protesters who were led by NGOs.”

Similarly, the government officers\textsuperscript{136} who worked at a ministry focussing on people’s participation and development, told the researcher that the Pak Mun civil group came about due to the provocation of a few radical villagers. While some data refers to a local politician who was in charge in the formulation of the Pak Mun civil group at the beginning, it is interesting that this politician ultimately became an opponent of the Pak Mun group.

So given the strongly held views of outsiders, the actors can be assumed to be one of the important key factors of the Pak Mun civil group. The key actors in the case of Pak Mun civil society related to the research framework are comprised of five main groups: community members, leaders, activists, supporters and advisors. The following sections address each group.

\textit{Community members: The villagers as Pak Mun civil group members}

This study defined the community members of Pak Mun civil society to be not only the villagers who lived around the dam area, but to also encompass those people widely affected by the dam project. Moreover, due to the Pak Mun Dam case taking a long time and it being a complicated problem, the ways the villagers participated in the group’s activities varied. So the different ways they participated, together with the frequency of their participation, were considered when clarifying the status of a civil group member. These were considered to be more significant than geographical residence.

Pon, a 50-year-old villager\textsuperscript{137} said he had joined the Pak Mun group when the dam project was first announced by the government and had decided to move his family to live in Khon Khan; however, he confirmed that he rarely missed the group’s activities. Pon said, “I think I am a part of the Pak

\textsuperscript{135} Mr. Prodprasop on behalf of Puea Thai Party mentioned on the seminar of Thai political party policy declaration for Thailand development reform. The seminar was set by Matichon Press for the declaration of visions, goals, implementing of the three main political parties before the Thai national election on July 2011. (Fieldnotes, June 22, 2011).

\textsuperscript{136} Interview with the regional government officers. (Nonthaburi, March 2, 2008).

\textsuperscript{137} Interview with Pon (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
Mun group because of the spirit of my homeland. I will always belong to it (the
group) even though I may not be here.” In the same way, once any of the Pak
Mun civil members went to join other similar local civil group activities, they
were known as the villagers who came from the Pak Mun civil group (Pak Mun
villager).

To participate with the group’s activities indicated membership. There
were many ways and many times in which to participate, so the Pak Mun civil
group membership has been defined as being indicated by either the type of
the villager’s participation, or their regular participation. For example, the
villagers participated in traditional activities such as Tam Bun, which is a
kind of regular participation. However, participation can be at the meeting of
the civil group members for organizing the civil group. Also the civil group
could be indicated by the collective activities aimed at claiming compensation
from the state; for instance, the members of Pak Mun civil group joining
marches or protests.

Undeniably, group membership was clarified by the collective aspects
of the villagers’ participation. However, there were also Pak Mun villagers who
were identified as members even though they didn’t actually participate in the
activities of the group themselves. Mae Janta, a 72-year-old villager, said
she never joins any activities of the Pak Mun group. However, she insisted
strongly that she was a member of the group. She also said, “I must stay at
home to take care of everything in place of my husband and my son because
they leave for the meetings, sometimes for months, to protest. I do not
understand about how to be a member of the group. Someone used to ask me
if I had participated in the group, if I was a member. I said I did not
participate but I think my family already worked in the group instead of me so
I should belong to the Pak Mun group too.”

With respect to the membership of the Pak Mun civil group, the
researcher linked this point to the group discussion, where the participants
discussed what would terminate their membership. The villagers were

138 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
139 Tam Bun = ทําบุญ.
140 Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
141 Interview with Mae Janta (Khon-Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
disinterested in the fundamental membership due to their belief that the
group took place by the common spirit of the motherland, so the membership
originated essentially from the villagers who were native to the Mun River
area.

In the group discussion, a villager\textsuperscript{142} said, “If I said I am a Chow-Baan
Pak Mun (Pak Mun villager), it means I am definitely a member of the Pak
Mun group who tried to protect my homeland.” Moreover, the participants in
the group commented in the same way that the sense of the Pak Mun
membership is common among the community’s members. It seemed the Pak
Mun villagers were connected by the spirit of the motherland, which is usually
presented by calling Poh (Father), Mae (Mother), Phi (older brother or sister)
and Nong (younger brother or sister). In particular it is to help each other
through that kind of feeling that leads them to think and act in the same way.
As a result, if any one of the family were a member, then the whole family
would be members as well.\textsuperscript{143}

To follow through inferences from the group discussion of the sense of
the motherland being the important element underneath their membership,
villagers argued that some of the villagers took the Pak Mun opposition side,
even though they were also Pak Mun residents, due to their spirit of homeland
having been destroyed and replaced by a new attitude based strongly on
modernized development. The villagers helped each other to recall a case as
an example, and then one\textsuperscript{144} said, “We believe that all of the Pak Mun villagers
naturally loved the motherland. Those who took the opposition side just
changed after they got benefits such as money or a political position. One
politician who supported the opponents used to be one of the Pak Mun
group’s former leaders.”

Some aspects of Pak Mun membership are too personalized or too
individual to be fully clarified beyond being related to broader factors, such as
personal reasons, and other sectors in the emergence of the Pak Mun civil
group in the previous section.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{142} Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
\textsuperscript{143} Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
\textsuperscript{144} Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 12, 2008).
\textsuperscript{145} Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
All the Pak Mun members, both the villagers in the group discussion and the villagers who were interviewed by the researcher in the fieldwork, all had a similar idea of their membership developing due to the relationships among them, which resulted in particular in their respect and trust. According to a 21-year-old villager\textsuperscript{146}, he grew up during the ‘oppose the dam battle’ period. He said, “I think I must join the group. It was definitely my responsibility to respect Poh (Dad), Mae (Mom), Puh and Tah (grandfathers) and Yah and Yay (grandmothers).” Similarly, a 24-year-old female\textsuperscript{147} who holds a bachelor degree in law talked to the researcher when she visited her hometown, saying that she is a Pak Mun member but had no chance to join the group. “I took care of my mom and uncle when they went to the protest in Bangkok. I tried to support them as much as I could because I believed they all knew their rights,” she said.

To sum up, the consciousness of homeland was one vital fundamental factor for Pak Mun membership, even though their membership possibly ended for other reasons later on. Hence, the birthplace mindset of the members contributed to the sense in common, which resulted in group interactions and social capital of respect and trust.

\textit{The Pak Mun civil group leaders}

In accordance with the informal structure of the Pak Mun civil group, the main leaders of the group were also traditional and unofficial. More generally, however, the leadership of the Pak Mun civil group consisted of all the local leaders, in other words, all the leaders of the communities affected by the dam construction problems. These included official as well as traditional leaders.

The type of Pak Mun civil group leader can in principle be either civic, official or traditional. For instance, the official village leader called Pu Yai Baan, and the district official leader called Kam Nan, were both official local community leaders. At the same time the main leaders were traditional leaders. These were mostly the elderly people who had been respected and

\textsuperscript{146} Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 12, 2008).
\textsuperscript{147} Group interview with the villager (Varin-Chamrab, Ubon Ratchathani, May 29, 2008).
called Poh Yai (grandfather), Mae Yai (grandmother), Poh (father) and Mae (mother). 148

In the later stage of development of the Pak Mun civil group, all the Pak Mun civil group leaders were traditional leaders, but many of them had previously been some kind of official leader. Poh Somkiat 149 said, “I used to be a head of the village (Pu Yai Baan) many years ago. For Poh Yai Thong, he was in this position many times.” The point is that the official head of the village is not really important for the Pak Mun civil group, which is an unofficial organization. The official head of the village held the formal position of leader in the line of state administration and was accepted as the link between the formal and informal as well as the link between people and state. 151

Poh Somkiat also said, “During the period of the Pak Mun conflict until now, the official leaders of the village were all young and definitely need the support of the traditional leaders like me. Some of them even came to ask for help from us. [He sat with other traditional leaders.] The important thing about being the leader here depends on whether or not the villagers will listen and respect.”

Poh Yai Thong 152 said that being a leader of the Pak Mun civil group requires respect from the members due to the group’s activities being very difficult. Moreover, to join the group did not require any payment and actually usually cost the members money and time. He said, “They (villagers) knew exactly that they would get no money from the leader like me and as long as the problem is still going on I might endlessly ask them to join the group and assist. In contrast to this, they knew they could have got money from some opponent leaders if they had followed them.”

With regard to this, it was a consistent view expressed by the villagers that their respect for the leader came from their mind, and that no one could pay for that. 153

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148 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
149 Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
150 Note: the way to show the respect to other. Due to Poh Somkiat is younger than Poh Yai Thong.
151 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
152 Informal interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 18, 2008).
153 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).

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The leadership of the civil group reflected the degree of respect required in order to tie people together to also show mass power beyond the village, but there were also some differences. For example, Mae Sompong, who joined PMove as a representative of the leader of the group of the poor from E-Sarn, used to be a local leader of the Pak Mun civil group at an early stage. She said that at first she was a Pak Mun leader, and the respect came from family and friends. She said this enabled her to develop to become a leader in a bigger group, which then had different relationships beyond family and friends, and also from other poor people in other groups.

Mae Sompong also told the researcher, “It was very difficult to tie different people into one. There is the pressure from poverty produced by the state’s development policy that made villagers seek out anyone who could claim to lead them out of and help them to recover from the suffering of poverty.” Importantly, she also commented that the leader is one who must sincerely help them, which then enhances respect for the leader. “It was due to how I have been fighting for the problem of the Pak Mun Dam effects for decades, with my own grievances experienced deep inside my heart,” she said. In terms of this, the leadership of the Pak Mun civil group came from the villagers, who shared sufferings together with others. The relationships during the suffering times made the villagers trust and respect each other. However, to respect the seniority system is significant for the leadership.

In terms of the focus on the informal aspect of leader, it was notable that the role of Pak Mun leaders worked smoothly through using the community’s ties. Poh Yai Thong, Poh Somkiat and Mae Sompong commented in the same way that they led the Pak Mun group in ways which had dealt with a large number of villagers with the many different kinds of relationships, such as relatives and friends, but also employer and employee. With regard to this point, they all referred in particular to the necessary communication style. The Pak Mun civil group leaders had to communicate to other group members in a common way, by ensuring that contact was made to part of their family and/or friends. This was reflected in comments from the

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154 Interview with Mae Sompong (Bangkok, March 9, 2008).
155 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
156 Fieldnotes (Bangkok, Ubon Ratchathani, March-June 2008).
civil group’s members. According to the interviews with villagers, the comments clearly indicated that they preferred to get directions from the unofficial leaders, based on how they felt a similarity in lifestyle and opinions, and that the goals and path being shared was the reason that encouraged them to follow the leaders’ directions.

On the other hand, the Pak Mun villagers revealed that they felt uncomfortable dealing with the official leaders. The reasons are that, firstly, the official leaders had their official position authorized by the state. Consequently, all the official leaders definitely worked on behalf of the state or government, which usually represented some kind of power.

Secondly, some of the leaders were not local residents, especially the local government officers, who needed to work with local leaders. Almost all of them had just graduated, or had otherwise moved from another area for their benefit within the bureaucratic promotion system. This was the main reason that made the villagers think there was a gap between official leaders and their own traditional leaders.

Thirdly, the villagers gave an interesting reason that the political system manipulated some official leaders, because most had changed from initially being opponents to the dam, and had won the election by being voted in by the villagers themselves. In other words, they came to be leaders by the villagers’ encouragement and support, even though they then changed later, not long after being appointed as their leader.

Interestingly, there were also two similar comments from different sources. A comment from one villager was, “The official leaders keenly tried to be in the middle (sit on the fence), they just pretended not to take a side.” Another comment was made by an official leader, who said, “It was a common thing to work honestly under the rules of the administration, even though I thought it was unfair for the villagers sometimes. However, I could not break the rules of my career.” These two comments confirmed that the aspect of the formal position of the leader was a main barrier to decreasing the gap between government officers and the villagers. It was this barrier and gap

157 Interview with the villagers (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
158 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
159 Informal interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 21, 2008).
160 Interview with an official leader (Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008).
which resulted in the villagers working with their own civil group instead to provide their leadership.

Based on these reasons, the data illustrated that there was a gap between official leaders and villagers due to the villagers strongly thinking that the official leaders’ positions were on the opposite side to them. In particular, the official village leaders (Phu Yai Baan) from voting use this position to be involved more in politics.\textsuperscript{161} As the state representatives, their status tended to be on the side of state power. For the leaders who were appointed by the bureaucratic system, they were separated from the villagers’ attitude and thoughts that this kind of leader was a government officer who just came and went and who would not have anything in common, spiritually, with local people. Moreover, the villagers thought that the formal processes for setting up the leaders involved too much politics, which manipulated leaders to change and take the state’s side.\textsuperscript{162}

A comment from Nanthachote\textsuperscript{163}, who worked closely with the Pak Mun civil group, provided further perspective. He revealed that the villages have real leadership ability. Although they have less education, they nevertheless had learnt how to use their capabilities to lead the group. He referred to Vanida, who also realized this through recognizing the advantage of the poor local group in terms of their ability to admire and respect each other without any conditions or business motives. Additionally, Nanthachote explained how Vanida had tried to build up the Pak Mun group leaders in many ways by encouraging this ability.

Nanthachote and Poh Somkidt\textsuperscript{164} both told the researcher how Vanida had tied the villagers together. In other words, they had united Pak Mun civil group members based on the network of relationships in the Pak Mun community, such as families and neighbors. The existing relationships among the villagers were the essential thing needed by the Pak Mun leaders. Consequently, Vanida had encouraged older villagers around the Pak Mun community to become involved. Later, these became leaders who would build on and tie together their own network with each other. For example, Poh

\textsuperscript{161} Group interview with the former leaders (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 7, 2008).
\textsuperscript{162} Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
\textsuperscript{163} Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{164} Interview with Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
Somkiat said, “Poh Yai Thong had led the group of his family, friends and friends’ family. They were mostly local fishermen. For Poh Yai Pokoon, he led his group of farmers and Mae Prasit, she led her housewives group.” Nanthachote also gave a supportive comment that: “There were more leaders than we mentioned. They, however, usually met at Poh Somkiat’s place as the centre of the Pak Mun group. Above all, Vanida had tried to build the Pak Mun group by putting the attention significantly on the group of leaders rather than on an individual leader. So we would see that the Pak Mun group had many leaders, and everyone was important to the group.”

In summary, the data based on fieldwork indicates that, to be the leader of the Pak Mun civil group, it was necessary to show that the leaders were dedicated to the group’s benefits rather than personal interests. And it is because of this aspect of the Pak Mun group that the organization ran without an official leader. It was due to the focus on the strategy of relying on villagers’ bonding that helped the villagers’ relationships develop smoothly beyond their own traditional ties, which were based on the respect for the seniority system. The group’s relationships were also assisted by pressure in the group being minimized through not being shaped by a leader whom the villagers thought of as boss. Also, the leaders’ ability appeared during the time that the villagers were sharing suffering. As a result, the Pak Mun civil group had been associated for many decades with the same leaders, who had been involving the civil group actions and activities since the beginning.

The activists in the Pak Mun civil group

To follow the research framework, the next step is to consider activists, as one of the key actor types who play an important role in the case study. However, according to the research framework, the activist in this study needs to be identified in a very specific way. Here, they are defined as the actors who worked independently for the grassroots civil group, rather than working as representatives of, or on behalf of, any external organization.

The research framework has separated activists who work on behalf of the organizations from the activists who work independently as individuals. This is because working with personal aims rather than with organizational aims might result in different interactions within the civil group dynamics and
processes. As a result, in this study, the activists from organizations are, for clarity, defined as external actors within group interactions, and so are covered in the next section rather than in this section.

The two main and essential activists in the Pak Mun civil group have already been introduced. The first, with the widest reputation, is Miss Vanida Tantivitayapitak (Mod). The second is Mr. Nanthachote Chairat (Pui). Both of them are presented as providing dedicated support to the Pak Mun villagers throughout the whole trajectory of the Pak Mun contention. Nonetheless, there were also some other activists who played lesser but related roles in the case study who are also referred to in this section.

Owing to the Pak Mun Dam being a well-known, controversial case, Vanida was also inevitably very well known. Significantly, Vanida (or Mod) is recognized as the most important activist and the most powerful actor to strongly influence the largest mobilization of villagers in Thai history (Downing, 2010). Some of Vanida’s roles have already been presented in the previous section, as she was involved with the group of Pak Mun villagers right from the beginning. So analysis of her roles is pertinent to various aspects of the research framework in this study.

In an interview Vanida said that she was initially an activist who worked in a development foundation, which was a type of NGO. Her work related to several groups of local people who were affected by state policies, particularly in relation to the inequity for local people in terms of tenure rights and access to resources. While doing so, she worked around the north-eastern area where there also emerged many conflicts around environmental issues, such as the case of Kaeng Suea Ten Dam and Pak Mun Dam. After a few years of work to help several groups of poor people, Vanida decided to leave her work as an activist within the NGO, in order to independently join the group of Pak Mun villagers.

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165 Interview by Suthisakorn (2007).
166 In 2003, there were more than 100 NGOs in North-Eastern area (Chaipan, 2003, p.54). Thus, there were any number of NGOs in that period.
167 Thai NGOs (North-Eastern) have been classified according to the issue of the affliction of local people, to be one of 8 different groups of network; 1) Alternative Agriculture Network, 2) Resources and Environmental Network, 3) Child Network, 4) Aids Network, 5) Women Network, 6) Human Rights Network, 7) Community Business Network, and 8) Urban Community Network (Chaipan, 2003, p.54).
Poh Somkid told the researcher that the villagers called Vanida ‘Arjarn’ even though she begged to be called only by her name because she was just a normal woman who did not need to be highly respected.

He said, “We could say she was the heroine for the Pak Mun villagers because at that troubled time, there were some activists from the NGOs who seemed to be very keen to help the Pak Mun villagers seek a way to solve the problems brought by the dam, but because the issue seemed very difficult and hopeless, some of them changed their minds and gave up helping us, except Arjarn Mod.”

He also said, “Arjarn Mod was willing to help us dedicatedly. She left her job. She lived with us like with a family, had local foods in rural society even though she had choices to work for a high salary. She could have been comfortable and had a good life in a city like Bangkok instead of living awkwardly with local villagers in the countryside.”

Importantly, one of the strongest impressions of the Pak Mun villagers of Vanida was that she denied being a leader and did not hold any positions.

In this regard, Nanthachote told the researcher, “Vanida tried to be more of a supporter rather than the leader of the villagers. It was in order to encourage the villagers to learn the way of finding their solutions, by sharing their concerns and enabling them to make their decisions by themselves. Otherwise the villagers would possibly have become dominated by others.”

Moreover, Nanthachote’s memorial speech states: “Phi Mod did not fight for the poor, but she let the poor fight for themselves.” This initiative of Vanida clearly resulted in the Pak Mun civil group self-organizing with no specific leader. She supported the villagers to build leadership by learning about empowerment in the group. Significantly, Nanthachote revealed to the researcher that Vanida told him that to fight together with the villagers was the most worthwhile thing; that it was what made the villagers respect her, and that hopefully it would be useful social capital in order to be able to continue to support the group of Pak Mun villagers to reach their goals.

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168 Informal interview with Poh Somkiet, (Ubon Ratchathani, 13 May 2008).
169 Arjarn is a Thai word means teacher or master who full of knowledge. The persons call Arjarn are respected.
170 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
171 Pe is the word in Thai langue means older sister or older brother.
172 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
capital emerged among the Pak Mun villagers in relation to Vanida in terms of social relationship, especially trust, which tied the villagers (and activists Vanida and Nanthachote) together.

Nanthachote, as an activist himself, strongly agreed with Vanida’s idea of how to ensure that their support strengthened the group of Pak Mun villagers. He also disclosed that Vanida reminded him to keep on working as supporting actor rather than becoming a leader. It was consistent with what was written in her cremation book and in interviews. Vanida had a vision of letting the villagers learn to understand their rights in relation to participation in state decision-making which affected them.

According to Poh Yai Thong, “The reasons why the Pak Mun villagers respected Vanida and Nanthachote so much was because they worked on the difficult jobs that involved dangerous situations. Mod was charged by the police because of helping us fight the state. The state said she was a criminal and that what she was doing was illegal and bad for the country.”

Poh Yai Thong explained that he, however, knew nothing about Vanida’s ever breaking any laws, thus he and the Pak Mun villagers believed that it was out of great kindness and selflessness that Vanida did what she did for the villagers: while she aimed to fix the problems brought by the dam, to help the poor to have a better life, the state just ignored them. He said, “Mod had a very good heart and always cared for the villagers, and her heart might be stronger than some men because she was never afraid of any dangers when helping us.” He also related, however, that Vanida said, “I am not a self-sacrificing person, I just want to do what I can.” Nevertheless, she also revealed to him that the consequence of helping the poor contributed to her becoming an enemy of the state, which affected her life in many ways, so that: “I even was threatened to be killed. The opponents tried many things in order to discredit me, such as spreading rumors of having affairs with others’ husbands.” Nanthachote also mentioned that Vanida was harassed by malicious spreading of rumors of affairs, and that “the scariest harassment was that her life was threatened, but she never worried about it”.

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173 Informal group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
174 Interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
The case of a malicious rumor about an affair in order to try to blemish Vanida’s reputation revealed two features of the villagers’ beliefs about Vanida. Firstly, they believed that Vanida was ‘clean’ because she did not have secret personal benefits. This was regarded as special because the dam project had contributed such beneficial outcomes to some stakeholders that it had made conflicts among the stakeholders inevitable. So whereas it would have been easy and probably successful to raise the issue of self-interest in relation to many stakeholders, it could not destroy Vanida’s reputation. Because Vanida was so completely ‘clean’ in relation to having any individual interest, all that could be tried to discredit her was an attempt to create a malicious rumor about an affair, which was also unsuccessful.

Poh Somkiat\(^{175}\) stated, “There were some activists who had previously come to join the Pak Mun group. They tried to help us for just a few months, and then were gone. One of them quit their activist role, and another one tried to convince the villagers to give up the protest. We knew later that they got a lot of money from the opponents.”

Secondly, the villagers trusted Vanida’s dedication to the interests of the poor, due to how Vanida had devotedly supported the Pak Mun villagers in order to fight the encroaching state, in particular in relation to the inequity of resource access. Poh Yai Thong\(^{176}\) said, “She recently stayed side by side with us, even when it was very dangerous, involving serious conflict with state power. She was very brave.”

According to Poh Yai Thong, the fact that Vanida had stayed side by side with the Pak Mun villagers was the masterpiece of Vanida’s work, for the villagers felt they faced discrimination by the state. He said, “We are poor and have no knowledge. Nobody cared about us, especially the government, which was always only concerned for its own interests, whereas a small girl like Mod cared deeply about our suffering even though she only got bad things for helping us.”

Vanida faced the difficulties together with the Pak Mun villagers. One important case that made the villagers appreciate and adore Vanida is how she was prosecuted by EGAT in the case of being the leader for the invasion and

\(^{175}\) Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
\(^{176}\) Interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
occupation of the EGAT area. Poh Somkiat said, “She was not wrong because we (villagers) just wanted to talk to anyone from EGAT who could make a decision. Mod was a Pak Mun villager’s representative, which was most appropriate because she was educated, unlike us. Unfortunately for her, she was seen as having become a leader of a group of poor, demanding protesters and got prosecuted for it.”

The role of Vanida to support the Pak Mun civil group was, however, just as an advisor. She denied all positions as a leader when working with the group. Thus she was a person who is recognized as strongly developing the Pak Mun civil group. Through conversations with villagers, the researcher was also told in the same way that her (Vanida’s) role was mostly as the ‘thinker’ for the civil group, particularly in terms of thinking up the villagers’ reactions to the state. Nonetheless, the researcher noted that as playing the role of thinker, Vanida became the informal leader of the Pak Mun civil group.

For instance, Mae Prasit said, “Once I felt I could die to protect my homeland, but Mod told me and other villagers who tried to block the bombing for the dam construction that we have to keep our lives safe otherwise they (the opponents) could do anything with our homeland. It would be easy for them if we died.”

An old lady villager also said, “She gave us more alternatives in order to fight the state. Actually, we had no ideas other than to just die for our rights.” For Poh Thong, Vanida was like a promoter of him and other Pak Mun leaders. He said, “It was because I am just a villager who had no education that made it a bit difficult for me to deal with the state. Mod always reminded me to be confident, as I am a Thai citizen. I have rights. Moreover, she said that what I have done would be a collective benefit.”

Similarly, Mae Sompong, who presents herself as one of the leaders of the Pak Mun civil group, talked about how Vanida encouraged the women in the village to participate in the civil group. Generally, Thai females view their duties as domestic work rather than joining in the same work as the

177 Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
178 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
179 Group interview (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008).
180 Group interview (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008).
181 Group interview (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008).
182 Interview with Mae Sompong (Bangkok, March 9, 2008).
males. She said, “In the past, culturally, Thai women must stay at home. Mod was the first person to bring us into the public arena.”

Even though Vanida was not the Pak Mun civil group leader, she was, however, an advisor and promoter for the Pak Mun group. Her role was difficult due to it being unclear in its details, as well as depending on the villagers’ perspective. However, Vanida’s comments on it provided insights. She said she accepted that she was best as an advisor even though she could have been a leader of the Pak Mun civil group.183

Nanthachote184 explained, “Phi Mod was the best teacher for me, and definitely my model, even though I don’t think I could work half as well as her. She told me that the one thing I always keep in my mind, especially when I feel like giving up working with the villagers, is that she has no theory for doing her work, but only that she puts her heart and soul to think as if she were one of the Pak Mun villagers. So we must work on at it like we are facing it by ourselves: we must fix it because it is our own problem.”

Vanida told Nanthachote that to continue to work on helping the Pak Mun villagers was not only her thought about people’s rights, but that it was also to support the poor, that they were the same as her family. Nanthachote185 told the researcher that Vanida always gave very good support by positive speeches. He said, “I worked as Phi Mod’s assistant at the beginning. Her work style was deeply kind due to it coming from her very good mind and heart. I think this is the reason that made the villagers trust her so very much.” However, he commented repeatedly that trust between Vanida and the villagers had also been supported by her sharing of their suffering, together with them. He said, “It is very hard to know that people have a really good mind. Some people pretend to be good just because they want something. So the Pak Mun villagers took a long time to trust people outside their group. But Phi Mod and I had shared good and bad things with them, and they watched us every day in how we lived together with them. So we are not activists or NGOs and not outsiders, but we are part of Pak Mun villagers’ family.”

183 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
184 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
185 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
Nanthachote\textsuperscript{186} confirmed that trust is the most important factor for contributing strongly to the existing group. He explained, “Owing to the Pak Mun civil group aiming to be against dam construction, this group shared a strong goal in order to fight with the state. Consequently, it was interesting how the group could be so strong and keep fighting for so many years. For me, I believe strongly that it was because we trusted each other that we have the same goal that made the group work so well, and contributed to the group’s strengthening.”

Nevertheless, Nanthachote also added other critical comments related to the point of the Pak Mun group’s strengthening; he said\textsuperscript{187}, “It was very hard to unite the group. More people are more difficult to tie together. Especially, they experienced sensitively the pressure put on them by the opponent’s power. The attempt to somehow build the group of villagers’ harmony would be the toughest job for me.”

He explained his opinion that the activists’ role includes sometimes that of bringing reconciliation if the group had some disagreements. Consequently, an aptitude for psychology is needed in order to facilitate the work.

Significantly, contributing to the civil group’s bonding was the most essential role in order to strengthen the civil group, while also getting more members and extending networks. It was a strategy of Vanida that she had planned for the Pak Mun group. She said,\textsuperscript{188} “The number of civil group members who joined the protest reflects the quality of the civil group.” Based on this, the quality of the Pak Mun civil group can be clarified. It can be defined in terms of the strength of the unity of the group, which showed in terms of number of members participating in the group activities.

In this regard, the researcher considers that the roles of the activist are particularly important in terms of developing the quality of the civil group. This is due to the trust formed between the group of villagers and the activists on account of the roles of the activists, based on their relationships. Moreover, the activists played their roles by using the trust of the villagers to tie the

\textsuperscript{186} Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{187} Interview with Nanthachote (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, March 28, 2008).
\textsuperscript{188} Tantivitayapitak (2008).
group members together in order to strengthen both the group members’ participation and to attempt to get wider networks. Consequently, at Pak Mun the activists are possibly the key factor driving other factors, due to how they keep the civil group together. However, the role of trust between the activists and the villagers is the focus of the social capital section of this study.

As explained previously, an insightful aspect of Vanida’s roles in terms of being an activist in Pak Mun civil society was as a close advisor without knowingly using any methodologies. Even more interesting was that for other activists to successfully work in this civil group in the later years, they had to keep following and practicing techniques based on Vanida’s role. After Vanida passed away in December 2007, Nanthachote stepped in to replace her in the Pak Mun group, by following her approach. Unfortunately, Nanthachote died in a car accident in April 2008, during the period that data was being collected for this project. It was after this that the Pak Mun civil group started to get bogged down.

The researcher also collected data from April to July 2008 and found that the Pak Mun civil group had a vacant period in terms of activists supporting them. The work on interviews and focus groups with the Pak Mun villagers revealed that there were no new activists who approached or associated with the Pak Mun civil group. A villager said, “We are so sad but we must keep on fighting for our land even though we lost Arjarn Mod and Arjarn Pui. This is a hard time to move on and we hope we can get more good people (activists) to come to help us willingly.”

In addition, Poh Somkid gave his opinion about losing the important key supporters, which had a vital effect on the group of Pak Mun villagers. “Honestly, I think no one can replace them (Vanida and Nanthachote) really. It is because they shared happiness and suffering with us for their whole lives. However, it is better to have someone to help us sincerely like them. At the moment, Lah is the only one in my head,”, Poh Somkiat said.

Somporn Keundee (Lah) was Vanida and Nanthachote’s colleague. She was in the car accident with Nanthachote, which resulted in her being in

189 Fieldnotes (March–May, 2008).
190 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
191 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
hospital for about a year. During this period of the research fieldwork, the Pak Mun civil group had less activity than during the previous years. It was because the Pak Mun civil group was faced with uncertain status by suddenly not having the encouragement of an activist. The Pak Mun village civil group leaders, such as Poh Yai Thong and Poh Somkid, mostly stayed home to help their families work in order to earn some income. Fortunately, Poh Somkid with his strong leadership took the researcher to visit some of the Pak Mun civil group leaders and members who lived around Ubon Ratchathani during this period. While the female leader Mae Sompong went to Bangkok to live with her daughter to take care of the grandchildren, other Pak Mun female leaders and members stayed home to be housewives. In this regard, the researcher noted that the Pak Mun villagers had some good experience for leading the group after Vanida and Nanthachote. However, they seemed to have less confidence to continue their activities without the activists’ support.192

Unfortunately it was while the Pak Mun villagers experienced the lack of the activists’ support that the Thai Government of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej announced the relaunching of the mega project on Khong-Chee-Mun International Water Management. In this regard, the Pak Mun civil group was actually under pressure through the threat of getting more state policy invasion from the megaproject, just as they had less support. Poh Somkid193 said, “Even though Arjarn Mod and Arjarn Pui had taught us about standing on our own legs, and we have managed our group by ourselves so far, the Pak Mun villagers nevertheless undeniably feel weak due to losing them.”

At this point of the narrative, showing the trajectory of the Pak Mun civil group, presenting the Pak Mun civil group as an issue of environmental conservation has to be replaced by a situation of political chaos. This was due to the beginning of the mobilization of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) that came to be known as the ‘yellow shirts’. The Pak Mun civil group began to overlook the local aims of their group in order to join the civil mobilization at a national level.194

192 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
193 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
194 Phone interview with Poh Somkid (October 10, 2008).
In relation to the change that occurred, Poh Somkid\textsuperscript{195} told the researcher: “We thought what the Thai Government was trying to do through the Khong-Chee-Mun project reflects the general ignorance of them to the poor, and that they had not learnt from the Pak Mun case. And so the protest was needed in order to make it right for our children in the next generation.”

Importantly, he told the researcher that it was nevertheless an idea he had learned from Vanida and Nanthachote: “Mod and Pui guided the poor and uneducated people, like Pak Mun villagers, to learn many things from the past, but the Thai state does not appear to have anyone to guide them to do the right thing; governments never learn any lesson, especially from their mistakes.”

In the following years (2009), the Pak Mun civil group struggled to protect the dam opening time agreement they had won through their fight. The EGAT always appeared to look for the opportunity to close the dam sluice gates in order to generate the power. Once, in 2009, Poh Somkidi, on behalf of the Pak Mun civil group as its leader, was interviewed, and he accepted that the group of villagers was weak. However, Poh Somkait\textsuperscript{196} told the researcher in the following year that the civil group still had a few activities, though with fewer members. He said, “It has been a few years without Mod and Pui, and there have only been some new activists who came to visit us perfunctorily. So we have had to fight in the best ways we can, mostly by trying to tell the truth about the dam effects through the media, and through outsiders like you (the researcher).”

The researcher also asked him about Lah, who he had previously said could perhaps replace Vanida and Nanthachote. Poh Somkait answered, “Lah has tried to work for us but the Pak Mun civil group has changed lately and our goals have changed. It was in order to reach the new goals that the ways to support the group have also had to become different. Now, Lah and some of the villagers are connected to some of the NGOs, and I think now there is nothing wrong with the support she can provide through an NGO.”

Once the AOP (Assembly of the Poor) had changed its name to PMove (2011), the Pak Mun civil group joined national protests on behalf of a group

\textsuperscript{195} Phone interview with Poh Somkid (October 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{196} Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, June 26, 2011).
of poor villagers from Pak Mun, led by Lah. Accordingly, Lah’s role is better presented in terms of the framework in the section addressing interactions.

In summary, the role of activists who supported the Pak Mun civil group was very significant. For the Pak Mun civil group, Vanida and Nanthachote played an essential role as activists, which was to establish and develop the feeling that they were both Pak Mun villagers themselves who shared the same ideals and aims as the villagers in the civil group. After losing Vanida and Nanthachote, the Pak Mun civil group faced a feeling of insecurity due to the lack of encouragement provided by the type of leadership provided through the activist roles of Vanida and Nanthachote. Ultimately this led to the goals and operation or the leadership of the civil group having to change if it was to be sustained. As this occurred the activist role became replaced by interactions established with outside organizations and participation in national mobilizations.

**Pak Mun civil group’s advisors**

This study defines the advisors for the Pak Mun group as actors outside the civil group. Mostly, the advisors play their roles either by the Pak Mun group asking for help or they possibly involve the civil group for their own purposes. Moreover, the advisors interacted with the Pak Mun civil group with both formal and informal contact. Thus, to examine the advisors of the Pak Mun group considers roles that resulted in significant advantage for the Pak Mun civil group.

The nature of the Pak Mun civil group’s advisors are difficult to identify specifically, so this study classified the advisors in this case implies to the academic advisor in this case into those engaged with the Pak Mun group personally and those who had the responsibility of working as commentators or information providers. Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat\(^{197}\) told the researcher that there were some academics who helped the villagers in terms of integrating local fisheries knowledge with academic research in order to prove the negative effects of the Pak Mun Dam construction.

Academics from Ubon Rachathani University advised the Pak Mun civil group independently on the issue of fisheries degradation, and the Pak Mun

\(^{197}\) Interview with Nanthachote and Poh Somkid (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
civil group needed to prove that to claim compensation, and also to manage the times of closing the sluice gates to help to recover the ecological system. This happened in 2001 under the Thai state’s negotiation process, and the academics were part of the tripartite committee at that time. In this regard, the academics in the committee had taken the Pak Mun civil group’s side. Thus, the relationship between the academics and the Pak Mun civil group appeared to be encouraged.198

Poh Somkid199 told the researcher that there were many academics keen to study the group of Pak Mun villagers; however, they played less important roles, apart from the role of consultant in 2001. Consequently, the Pak Mun civil group thought that academics were useful for helping them spread the aims of the Pak Mun civil group to the public. In particular, the Pak Mun villagers needed the academics to clarify the oppression as the state encroached on their livelihoods by constructing the huge dam, with the aim of focusing on development ideology and related policies.

Nanthachote200 talked about the advisors of the Pak Mun group, saying that in fact the subsistence of the Pak Mun civil group grew rustically. Vanida and he were in charge of the consultancy, and other academics involved with the villagers in academic research (Vi Jai Thai Baan)201, including the tripartite processes with the Thai Government and EGAT, also came from Vanida and Nanthachote’s connections.

In addition, one important academic, Arjarn Prapas202, revealed that he saw that Nanthachote always consulted some academics who were top well-known academics in Thailand; in other words he called those academics the ‘Think Tank’ of Thailand. Arjarn Prapas also told the researcher that there were two main issues for consultation: first, the analysis of state actions and reactions, and second, planning the strategies or means to respond to the state actions. Moreover, he thought that the rest of the academics or researchers beside the ‘Think Tank’ had insufficient power to advise the Pak Mun villagers because the villagers would rather listen to Vanida and Nanthachote.

198 Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
199 Interview with Poh Somkid (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
200 Phone interview with Nanthachote (February 10, 2008).
201 Vi Jai Thai Baan = วิจัยไทบ้าน
202 Phone interview with Arjarn Prapas Pintobtang (June 20, 2013).
Nevertheless, the researcher noted villager group discussions about actors who gave the Pak Mun villagers suggestions in terms of how to operate the civil group. The discussions showed the academics had played a small role even in terms of giving knowledge to the villagers. The academics were mostly known by the leaders of the Pak Mun civil group, such as Poh Somkid, Poh Yai Thong and Mae Sompong, otherwise the rest of the villagers or the members of the Pak Mun civil group would never have consulted those academics directly.\(^{203}\)

The researcher also noted that the relations between the academics and villagers appeared to be perfunctory, particularly the academics or researchers who had no connection to the political processes. For instance, one of the academics from Ubon Ratchathani University joined the Pak Mun local fishermen in order to support knowledge integration in 2001. He was the only one to indicate that the Pak Mun villagers gained benefits from civil organization. Most research related to the Pak Mun civil group had not influenced political decision-making and was still just a draft or blueprint.\(^{204}\)

Accordingly, this study determined that apart from the small group of well-known academics who had a close relationship with Vanida, Nanthachote and the leaders of the Pak Mun civil group, such as Poh Somkiat, Poh Yai Thong and Mae Sompong, the academics were ineffective as advisors, particularly in the case of sharing knowledge.

Furthermore, the academics as advisors to the Pak Mun civil group rarely stood up for the civil group in terms of supporting the local knowledge to be accepted publicly. Importantly, the Pak Mun civil group’s advisors gave political action advice but there was no evidence that the advisors provided advice to the civil group in terms of organizing and developing, or the existence of the civil group at all.\(^{205}\)

To summarize the advisors of the Pak Mun civil group, this study approached the academics or researchers who were involved with the civil group both in formal and informal roles. However, the roles of academics as the advisors illustrated the need for their knowledge to be transmitted

\(^{203}\) Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1 and June 4, 2008).
\(^{204}\) Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
\(^{205}\) Fieldnotes (March–May, 2008).
through the civil group activists and leaders. Moreover, the key academics provided guidance in order to support the social mobilization strategies rather than the development of the civil society organization, while the academics who were involved with the Pak Mun civil group as researchers had less influence and were of little benefit to the Pak Mun civil group.

**The Pak Mun civil group’s funding support**

This section provides the Pak Mun civil group in relation to the questions: ‘How has the local group been able to survive?’ and ‘What are the sources of their funding?’ On this point, the situation of Pak Mun civil society is clarified by the aspect of civil society in which groups operate as non-profit organizations, leading to the explanation we see in this study that the funding appears to be unrelated to the benefits or political interests of commercial groups in a significant way. The funding support of the Pak Mun civil group appeared definitely in terms of the villagers’ fundraising. Moreover, to argue that the Pak Mun group earns revenue as a mercenary ‘hired gun’ – through being hired by others to join protests – is not credible. With regard to this, in the opinion of Vanida it was impossible that anyone could afford to illicitly finance the huge number of villagers in the protest, and it is not without problems to attempt to ‘hire’ protesters in the belief that all activities can be funded in this way. There is not a convincing argument that the group of protesters could be hired, particularly the group of villagers who joined the AOP (Samatcha Khon Jon). Regardless, the aim of this study is to consider carefully the case study of the Pak Mun civil group as a local civil organization, so the Pak Mun civil group has excluded the AOP from consideration even though some of their activities were related.

Generally, as in the nature of a civil group and its type of work, the survival of the villagers’ group was made possible by the members themselves. The villagers told the researcher that they supported each other in the same way in terms of supplying food and providing places for the group’s meetings and activities. Poh Yai Thong stated, “We need just a little more than

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206 “Pak Mun cooperative paid 1000 Baht to each protester”, Matichon, December 18, 2002.
207 Suthisakom (2007).
208 Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
209 Interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
everyday subsistence. It is just that sometimes we have more friends come to
visit and never think of attaching a cost.” For Mae Tha,\textsuperscript{210} she told the
researcher that she prepared food and drink for the meeting, saying, “They
usually bring food, and sometimes there is a lot of food left over after the
meeting.” The villagers think the work of the civil group, while it operated in
the village, imposed almost no additional cost to their normal living.\textsuperscript{211}
Additionally, Poh Somkiat\textsuperscript{212} noted, “Actually, food and living expenses came
from our ways of livelihood that are being destroyed by the dam. Even though
they are diminishing, we want to save them (rice, fish and food).”

In this regard, the Pak Mun civil group operated as an informal
organization, existing through voluntary contributions and assistance, which
is consistent with what the researcher found from fieldwork: that the
resources in terms of places, food and human resource for the organizers were
provided by group members and partisans. The places for the group’s
activities were mostly for meetings or informal talks, which involved the group
leaders, where food and drinks were needed sometimes and supplied
voluntarily.\textsuperscript{213}

On the other hand, work on increasing activities of the Pak Mun civil
group inevitably required more funding, especially the work relating to
activities outside the group. The members of the Pak Mun civil group
consequently used cultural activities as a channel for getting funds.
Nanthachote\textsuperscript{214} explained to the researcher that the funding of the group was
sometimes received through Buddhist festivals. Traditionally, the monks in
the temples organized the Buddhist festivals, which unite villagers in their
local areas. Poh Yai Thong\textsuperscript{215} stated, “The activities, such as meetings in the
village, incur just a small cost, but when we go out we need money for other
expenses like transportation or buying food. One way to get money is Tam-
Boon (receiving donations through the temple).”

\textsuperscript{210} Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
\textsuperscript{211} Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{212} Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{213} Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
\textsuperscript{214} Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{215} Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
\textsuperscript{215} Interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
Poh Somkiat spoke more about the donations through the temples, saying that it was through the monks associated with the villagers. He said, “The temples in this area are actually small and would not raise much money from Tam Boon. The Tam Boon, it is based on the Buddhist calendar, which prescribes events about two to three times a year; this is the best we can do.”

Regarding fundraising, the manner of raising funds by the Pak Mun civil group was through cultural and traditional means; this also links to the aspect of the Pak Mun group being self-organized as outlined in the previous section. Thus the activities of the temple events are a tool for getting donations for group funding. In addition to this method, funding similarly came from types of public donation. For example, Tod Kra Tin, Tod Pha Pa. However, from these donations the villagers must give some money for ‘Tam Boon’ to the temples.

Additionally, the Pak Mun civil group worked to gain a subsidy as a Non-Government Organization. The researcher found that the Pak Mun group representatives traveled widely in order to solicit funds. For example, the first meeting with Nanthachote in Bangkok was on the occasion of a trip that Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat took to Suan-Ngern-Me-Ma. Also, many times the researcher made contact with them by telephone and found they had traveled to this place. However, when the researcher was carrying out fieldwork afterwards, around the dam area, from talking to the villagers, the researcher found that they mentioned their leaders, such as Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat, had gone to Bangkok together in order to meet with the funding sponsors. The researcher noted that the primary sponsors of the Pak Mun civil group must be the persons related to Suan Ngern Me Ma.

Some of the supporters’ names and the amount of funding are unidentified yet; both Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat referred to the Suan Ngern Me Ma and The Royal Project Foundation, and The Habitat Thailand.

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216 Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
217 Buddhist activity calls Tod Kra Tin = ทอดกระถิน
218 Buddhist activity calls Tod Pha Pa = ทอดผ้าป่า
219 Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
220 Suan Ngern Me Ma (สวนเงินมีมา) is a group that aims at support voluntary activities in Thai society. It is linked to the big and well-known foundation; Sathirakoses-Nagapradjpa Foundation (SNF) = มูลนิธิเสฐียรโกศน์-นาคะประทีป.
221 Fieldnotes (March-June 2008).
Organization was also mentioned by Mae Sompong in the same way. They noted in a similar way that in order to get funding from organizations, there are formal procedures, and there have been a lot of other candidates also pursuing support. Consequently, they needed to talk in person to the staff in charge of the funding approval in such organizations. In this regard, the researcher considers accordingly that these personal connections must have resulted in successfully receiving support.222

According to Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat223, lately the Pak Mun civil group has experienced unstable support and funding, and therefore the budget for their activities has also been limited. From the researcher’s point of view, it affirms that it has been the efficiency of the Pak Mun civil group in organizing itself which resulted in the group’s ability to struggle, yet survive with limited funding, particularly with the outstanding ability to arrange their resources through social capital and reciprocity224 in terms of culture-based opportunities in order to acquire funding and support.

In the same way, the limitations and constraints on support forced the Pak Mun civil group to develop viable funding arrangements and effective preparation of their resources while the Pak Mun civil group joined the protests in Bangkok. Poh Somkiat and Mae Prasit225 spoke about having joined the protest in Bangkok. At that time, they carried as much food with them as they could because it would be a way to save money, enabling them to use money for other needs, such as drinking water. In addition, they revealed that some funding had been received from the AOP, but they insisted that the AOP paid for supporting the local activities, not hiring them.226

In summary, sharing between members and public donations are the main and essential sources of support and funding for the Pak Mun civil group, in addition to some subsidies from private foundations. Although this study found that the Pak Mun civil group supporters and resources were scarce, the study concludes that the Pak Mun civil group has demonstrated the capacity and ability to manage their resources efficiently rather than relying on an

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222 Fieldnotes (April-March 2008).
223 Interview with Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
224 See p. 29-32.
225 Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).
226 Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
increasing amount of support, which encouraged the Pak Mun civil group to develop and employ the strategy of organizing their support and funding productively.

**Pak Mun civil group interactions**

The research framework of this study expects interactions to be one of the main factors influencing the development of civil society. The study consequently examines the interactions of the Pak Mun civil group with others outside the group, and does so by looking at interactions as the various aspects of the activities and communication occurring in both horizontal and vertical ways.

*The horizontal interaction of the Pak Mun civil group*

The horizontal interactions in this study are considered within the context of the region in which Pak Mun exists and is furthermore focussed. The particular horizontal interactions are mainly concerned with how the Pak Mun civil group communicates to other civil groups, local NGOs and local government officers operating at the local level in the region. The horizontal interactions focus on the type of activities in which Pak Mun civil group participation and/or coordination resulted in benefits to the Pak Mun civil group.

A first point of overriding significance is that the Pak Mun civil group’s participation with other civil groups was continuous. This was because the other Thai civil groups emerged in similar ways and hence with similar trajectories, as explained in the previous emergence section (p. 83). In particular, however, the launching of the dam projects by the Thai state triggered the emergence of civil groups. Therefore the various civil groups emerged at about the same time and due possibly to this similar genesis; as they have been concurrently developing they have been helping each other. Poh Somkiat explained it this way: “We had been sharing a similar suffering since the state control us repressively. And we think that we can understand and help each other better than people who have never faced the same problems.” On this point, the researcher noted that the Pak Mun civil group and other civil groups participated reciprocally in their activities.

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227 Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
For instance, the old lady named Yay Hi who represented the villagers afflicted by Huey La Hah Dam. She joined the Pak Mun civil group even when she was actually in the other civil group. This indicated that the connections forming the interactions could be due to similar dissatisfactions.

Moreover, Nanthachote revealed that the participation of other villagers outside Pak Mun village, in other words, coordination of the other civil groups became the vital strategy of the Pak Mun civil group. It was a strategy that provided huge numbers of civil group members to give more power to the activities of mobilization or protest. The mutual benefits of an alliance of the Pak Mun civil group with other civil groups meant that they must to a significant degree participate in each other activities.

In this regard, the researcher’s view is that the key to success of this horizontal interaction strategy was the informal aspect of the civil group structure. To share members paradoxically turned weakness into strength. Even though such civil groups are categorized as marginalized groups which have just a small voice in Thai society, the informality of being marginalized enabled civil groups to form strong alliances through sharing experiences with common understanding, as well as sharing actual members, particularly the experiences they used to respond to the state.

The civil groups’ horizontal interactions, however, not only enabled them to develop the civil group through the exchange of experiences and through the civil groups’ network, but also enabled them to sustain the civil groups as a part of linking a civil group network (pp. 135–38). This was indicated precisely by a comment from the Pak Mun villagers that civil groups need to participate with each other because to fight individually would result in group weakness that would ultimately endanger the civil group.

In general, the Pak Mun civil group’s beneficial horizontal interactions involved participating in activities and sharing experiences with other civil groups. In particular it took forms that included other local features of civil

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228 Yay is the Thai word calls grandmother or old ladies in the same age range.
229 Interview with Yay Hi (Ubon Ratchathani, June 6, 2008).
230 Interview with Nanthachote (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, March 28, 2008).
231 Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
232 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 7, 2008).
233 Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
society. Poh Yai Thong\textsuperscript{234}, the Pak Mun civil group leader, and Mae Yai Pha\textsuperscript{235}, who was the Sirindhorn Dam civil group member, both said that fundraising for their civil groups involved using Buddhist traditions, and that it was one of their essential interactions. However, this particular interaction was also coordinated between civil groups to avoid setting up the use of temple activities at the same time. The civil groups took turns in raising money through this traditional interaction. Therefore, as well as culture having a role in the emergence of civil society, the Pak Mun civil group’s interactions to both develop and sustain civil society are also related to culture.\textsuperscript{236}

Another feature of horizontal interactions during the development phase of civil society was that the interactions of the Pak Mun civil group also developed, resulting in the continuing enlarging of the civil group network. The other civil groups located nearby to Pak Mun village and in the E-Sarn region became increasingly connected through activities, in both direct and indirect ways, to the Pak Mun civil group. The benefits of the increasing interactions were mutual. Some of the other E-Sarn civil group representatives\textsuperscript{237} concurred that to interact with the Pak Mun civil group supported not only the Pak Mun civil group to get a stronger and louder voice for themselves, but that their interactions also helped other small civil groups raise their issues and bring some issues, that would otherwise have stayed hidden, to the attention of the state (and public), and hence into the conciliation processes, together with the Pak Mun group’s issues.\textsuperscript{238}

Secondly, in the case of interaction with local NGOs, according to Poh Somkait\textsuperscript{239}, the group of Pak Mun villagers found that at first they were taken advantage of by NGOs, so they learnt that they had to be careful when contacting people outside their civil group, and later on they managed to establish successful interactions also with NGOs. However, the researcher believes that the ability to establish these successful interactions with NGOs was due to the Pak Mun civil group involving the best-known activists in

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{234} Interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 16, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{235} Interview with Mae Yai Pha (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 26, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{236} Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{237} Interview with the representatives of local groups in the meeting ran by the Department of Environmental Quality Promotion (Bangkok, March 4, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{238} Fieldnotes (Bangkok, March 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{239} Interview with Poh Somkiat (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Thailand, namely Vanida and Nanthachote, who involved other NGOs at a higher level than local NGOs. Consequently, it was the support wrought by Vanida and Nanthachote that brought the Pak Mun civil group to be able to jump over the local NGOs, who were experienced at taking advantage of them. They had already jumped over them to the national and international level. The Pak Mun civil group never established interactions with local NGOs.²⁴⁰

Finally, the interactions of the Pak Mun civil group with the local government appear to be a source of vulnerability, but nevertheless unavoidable. Right from the start, the local government was recognized as being in opposition to the Pak Mun civil group’s view, with the local government always standing by the state’s side. In particular, local government took the role as the state agency in the dam construction, which historically caused the grievance, leading in part to the emergence of the Pak Mun civil group. Therefore the local government was known to be in opposition so the civil group managed not to be taken advantage of by it. With regard to this, the Pak Mun civil group avoided interacting with the local government right from the start. Thus the form of the Pak Mun civil group and local government interaction mostly relates to the ways of their communications, such as to inform the state (and also the EGAT) of their claims and other communication and activities involved in the reconciliation processes.²⁴¹

In short, the horizontal interaction of the Pak Mun civil group presented the bonds of the Pak Mun civil group with other civil groups by local cultural aspects, and it was the common feeling based on their similar experiences that persuaded them to interact in each other activities. Conversely, their experiences led them to be careful when interacting with the local government, and to learn to be careful with the local NGOs, but nevertheless to harness the benefits of the organizational capacity of NGOs at a higher level (national and international), including the power of activists to help with their own their self-organizing capacity.

²⁴⁰ Fieldnotes (March-June 2008).
²⁴¹ Fieldnotes and interview with the local government officers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, (June 2008).
The vertical interaction of the Pak Mun civil group

The vertical interactions, similar to the horizontal interactions studied, focussed on the connections that brought benefits to the Pak Mun civil group. The horizontal and vertical interactions are, however, to some degree interrelated, because even national NGOs and central government are focussed on the broader and higher networks of vertical interactions, but they are still involved implicitly in the horizontal interactions with local government and NGOs as well.242

As explained previously, the horizontal interactions of the Pak Mun civil group occurred with other civil groups at the local level. Thus the extending of the Pak Mun civil group network not only developed widely on the horizontal level, but also the civil group’s interaction in the vertical dimension developed to the extent that any of the other civil groups were also interacting in the vertical dimension. Also, vertical interactions led to horizontal interactions of wider scope. The Pak Mun civil group interacted with other civil groups outside its area and had interactions at the national level with them. For example, Korn-uma243, the Bor Nork civil group leader, revealed that both the Pak Mun and the Bor Nork civil groups had participated in some events of the state mediation process. As a result, they had been connected in terms of sharing their experiences and the ways to deal with state agencies in particular.

Interestingly, there were other civil groups connected with the Pak Mun civil group through national interactions, such as the Tung-Yao community forestry civil group, which was located in the north of Thailand, and the civil group representatives of Pattani province, which contains the local fishery networks around the south of Thailand. Those representatives244 told the researcher that they all, along with yet other civil groups, frequently met at the reconciliation events at national level. In this regard, this study argues that the horizontal and vertical interactions of the Pak Mun civil group were related

242 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
243 Interview with Korn-uma in the meeting ran by the Department of Environmental Quality Promotion (Bangkok, March 4, 2008).
244 Interview with the representatives from province civil groups in the Political Development Council, Bangkok (July 5, 2011).
mainly by the participatory opportunities of the civil groups rather than by geographical features.\textsuperscript{245}

In the case of the interaction of the Pak Mun civil group with national NGOs, the interactions clearly illustrate they were a key civil group member of the AOP and, later on, of PMove. This occurred because the activists of the Pak Mun civil group linked both local and national NGOs together. Notwithstanding, the interactions between the Pak Mun civil group and national NGOs, such as the AOP and PMove, have also gradually deteriorated. The reason appears to be the loss of involvement of the nationally significant activists (Vanida and Nanthachote), who established the linkages. According to Poh Somkiat\textsuperscript{246}, “The Pak Mun civil group participated in the AOP mobilization but we are not included by the AOP,” and he refused to join some activities since the AOP became PMove. Furthermore, Arjarn Prapas also commented\textsuperscript{247} on this point, that the Pak Mun civil group had less interaction with PMove due to the reorganization of PMove, which resulted in having different ideas from the PMove leaders, who are no longer activists seeking to help the Pak Mun civil group.

Similarly, the Pak Mun civil group assumed that interaction with central government would be a mistake due to the opposition they received locally from the central government officers, who were commanded by the state. However, the Pak Mun civil group also tried to deal with central government diplomatically in order to promote the civil group’s benefits, once again with the assistance of the nationally significant activists helping them.\textsuperscript{248} Nanthachote\textsuperscript{249} told the researcher that the Pak Mun civil group and government officers in many departments interacted mainly in the events of the reconciliation process, but that he and the Pak Mun villagers agreed that the outcomes were never useful because the government officers in fact could not make final decisions.

Regarding this, the researcher’s view is that there was actually a big gap rather than any relationships between the Pak Mun civil group and the Thai

\textsuperscript{245} Fieldnotes (Bangkok, March 2008).
\textsuperscript{246} Phone interview with Poh Somkiat (July 10, 2011).
\textsuperscript{247} Phone Interview with Arjarn Prapas (June 20, 2013).
\textsuperscript{248} Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
\textsuperscript{249} Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
state, and that the attempted diplomatic interactions led to further breakdown in the possibility of interactions. The events of the mediation became a battle of two sides – the Thai Government, which held political power as the state, and the Pak Mun villagers, who fought for their own rights as Thai citizens. To consider the outcomes of the interactions between them does not reveal any beneficial outcomes, so the attempts at establishing vertical connections only indicate that such attempts result in ineffective solutions. From the researcher’s point of view, enmity is the important factor that produced the significant features of the failed interactions at national scale in particular.\textsuperscript{250}

In brief, the vertical interactions by the Pak Mun civil group showed that widening the network of interactions beyond the local scope involved vertical interactions. The broadening interaction network emerged through the coordination of the civil groups in the network involving both horizontal and vertical interactions. Likewise, the interaction with national NGOs appeared as interactions themselves developed from initially unbeneficial local interactions, and leading ultimately to a period when the Pak Mun civil group interacted with NGOs at the national level. This was unable to be sustained due to the loss of nationally significant activists facilitating the connections. Additionally, the interaction of the Pak Mun civil group with the government at national level seemed to be very weak. This was because state or government representatives were identified by the Pak Mun civil group as the opponent or enemy, irrespective of particular personal interactions. And what ultimately mattered was who had the power to make decisions. This is the exact opposite to the developed and sustained horizontal interactions, which was precisely the interpersonal feelings facilitated through local culture, along with shared experiences and understanding of being the common victims of the same state enemy. The relationship between the vertical and horizontal interactions involved, in complex ways, both the beneficial and detrimental influences on the Pak Mun civil group.

\textsuperscript{250} Fieldnotes (April-June 2008).
The social capital of Pak Mun civil group

This study considers social capital as a vital factor for the development of civil groups. According to the research framework, the relationship of social capital to civil society has paradoxically two opposing directions, but nevertheless it makes a recursive whole, namely, that not only is social capital caused by civil society but also that social capital is itself the cause of civil society (Figure 2).

Until now, this study has mainly emphasized the first direction of how social capital is caused by civil society, through the exploration of how civil society becomes established. So in this section the emphasis shifts to consider the aspects of Pak Mun civil society that created social capital. To set the scene for the study of this reverse direction, it is helpful to recall that it has already been found that the development of civil society is illustrated by the operation of Pak Mun civil society as an organization, which produces social capital in two different ways: social capital emerged internally within the Pak Mun civil group; and there were external factors causing social capital by connections or linkages to the Pak Mun civil group. The way in which social capital emerges from civil society is also the way that social capital causes civil society.

Internal factors of social capital within the Pak Mun civil group

At civil group development stage, social capital appears to be an aspect of civil organization. The collective factors related to social capital will be the focus rather than a feature of individuals within the civil organization. There was, however, a shift towards it being more clearly an ability of individuals to participate in civil groups within later phases, once civil society has become established. The shift to the abilities of individuals is able to be seen and analyzed in terms of how social capital comes to be related to values and norms held by individuals rather than structural features of organizations. In particular, this result is shown at the local level where social capital is seen to be the cause of the growth of civil society.

According to Mae Sorn,251 being a Pak Mun group member was a great honour. She said, “There were two young people who said thank you to me once when I carried a Pak Mun poster in the mobilization of the AOP.” She explained that it was in admiration of her for all the fighting of the difficult

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251 Interview with Mae Sorn (Habitat for Humanity Thailand, Bangkok, April 4, 2008).
battles until that point. Likewise, the Pak Mun villagers revealed that joining the group pushed them to think more about the future. Furthermore, the Pak Mun civil group leaders\textsuperscript{252} mentioned in the same way that the organizing of the Pak Mun civil group gave them ideas of how to deal with different kinds of people. Most importantly, being part of the civil group encouraged people to acknowledge and value their local knowledge and livelihood.

Additionally, Nanthachote\textsuperscript{253} said, “It was really very difficult to get rid of the conflict among the villagers, but they did come to learn to think of the common benefits more than just for themselves, and to become proud of doing so.” Based on his point of view, together with the various Pak Mun villagers’ perspectives\textsuperscript{254}, the researcher noted that the Pak Mun villagers were proud of their civil group growth. They saw that the activities of their group reflected the consciousness of the protection of their birthplace. Moreover, working together revealed the significant value of the unity of local people.

As previously mentioned in the establishment phase section about the cultural and social aspects of the Pak Mun civil group, this study found that the establishment phase showed clearly the reciprocity within the Pak Mun civil group. In this phase, the reciprocity also appeared more obvious at the individual level and even among small groups of members in the Pak Mun group. However, according to Mae Prasit\textsuperscript{255}, there was also less support for each other in the group because of the extended period of fighting. Everything seemed scarce and weak. She said, “We have inadequate food and money, and even time for meetings. Most of us were busy working for our own careers in the last few years.” In this regard, the Pak Mun civil group experience also revealed, however, just how strongly the surrounding phenomena nevertheless influenced the capability and limitations of the Pak Mun civil group in order to produce social capital within the civil group.

From the researcher’s point of view, the study shows how social capital within the Pak Mun civil group is related closely to social relations in the group. Generally, the Pak Mun civil actors were bound together by trust, as present in the reciprocity, which then established the civil group, producing

\textsuperscript{252} Interview with the leaders of Pak Mun (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 7, 2008).
\textsuperscript{253} Interview with Nanthachote, Bangkok (April 4, 2008).
\textsuperscript{254} Group discussion, Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani (June 27, 2008).
\textsuperscript{255} Interview with Mae Prasit (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 27, 2008).
social relations and ultimately earning the value of generating the development of the civil group. To participate within the Pak Mun civil group made the villagers proud of their actions. It was because they succeeded in fighting with the agents of the state, even though they were just a small group of people who held little power in Thai society. Being in the Pak Mun group gave the courage and commitment to be self-sacrificing.256

In this regard, the researcher noted that the point of the Pak Mun civil group being able to be selfless was due to the villagers basically having the same lifestyle, which formed the basis of social bonding. Their livelihood was based on using natural resources in order to get income, and so the way of their reciprocity was well established with them, as it was also how they used common natural resources. As a result, the Pak Mun civil group expected that they would themselves benefit through the processes of maintaining and developing the civil group and their collective interests. The Pak Mun civil group therefore valued the priority of collective interests, and this became an implicitly held social norm for the Pak Mun group.

External factors enhancing social capital within the Pak Mun civil group

The development of the Pak Mun civil group in terms of social capital was related to external factors because social capital is a vital factor in maintaining the social network. Consequently, the growth of social capital within the civil group inevitably involved civil group social networks, both within and outside the civil group. In other words, external factors, in particular in terms of the social network and connections of the Pak Mun civil group were also an essential means to build social capital within the civil group.

At the Pak Mun establishment phase, social capital was the essential factor for civil group emergence and it continued to be significant. The need to fight against state power also led to the development (and sustaining) of the Pak Mun civil group. The fight against state power created the unity of the group, which is the key value of social capital. The elements of social capital within the civil group, such as trust, reciprocity, values and norms, pave the way for the development of social networks, especially the role of activists.

256  Fieldnotes (June–July 2008).
Arjarn Prapas\textsuperscript{257} told the researcher that Thai people currently seemed to understand and sympathize with the Pak Mun villagers’ affliction. Most people then received information about the Pak Mun villagers through the networks of academics, which were mostly connected by Vanida and Nanthachote. He explained that Thai people trust and understood better what the Pak Mun villagers were facing. Importantly, there were a lot of academics and media on the Pak Mun villagers’ side.

According to this, the researcher takes the case of the villagers’ network and connections to show the building of internal social capital for the Pak Mun group social networks. The trust in Vanida and Nanthachote produced social capital within the Pak Mun group at the beginning, along with the trust of local networks, which can be identified as external social capital. It can be seen that social capital components – trust, reciprocity, values and norms – worked together through the social networks and connections.\textsuperscript{258}

At first the Pak Mun civil group evidenced intensive social capital generation. Due to the conflicts that arose out of mass mobilization, social capital came to break down. Nanthachote\textsuperscript{259} revealed that Pak Mun faced insufficient support from other organizations due to a lack of trust from outsiders. There was initially the commonly held view by most Thai people who assumed that the Pak Mun villagers were a group of lazy and demanding people. This perception was overcome by the ability for social capital to be generated through the networking that Vanida and Nantochote connected. The group of the Pak Mun villagers’ leaders\textsuperscript{260} mentioned that to continue to connect to the outside after losing both Vanida and Nanthachote became more difficult.

The Pak Mun civil group later came to face the lack of trust from other networks due to the loss of Vanida and Nantochote. Moreover, the Pak Mun civil group also experienced the loss of social networking on account of the political mobilization conflict, namely between the Yellow and Red Shirts. In respect of this, four reasons were found from fieldwork information\textsuperscript{261}: firstly,
political mobilization made more opponents because the civil group could make more enemies from taking neither the Yellow nor Red Shirts’ side; secondly, the conflict between Yellow and Red Shirts needed more support from grassroots so they propagandised villages in different ways, which brought the conflict to the civil group and destroyed the civil group unity; thirdly, this situation caused some of the group members to leave the civil group in order to join the political mobilization, for various reasons, such as national politics being seen as more important than local politics; and lastly, national politics led some networks to act in ways different to the aims, in relation to the problems of the Pak Mun villagers or the dam project.

For these reasons, this study conceded that the social capital components of the Pak Mun civil group were negatively affected by the conflict of Yellow and Red mobilizations. The conflict interfered with social capital, as some members supported the Red Shirts, some the Yellow Shirts, and some neither. According to the participants’ comments, too many complications arose for them to be able to trust in people, even those in their group. Any actions could be due to political interest related to the Yellow Shirts or Red Shirts. So they had to be careful how they thought, talked and participated with others. Importantly, the NGOs also attempted to get villagers involved in national politics, which led some villagers to leave the civil group because of the NGOs’ control and intervention. As a result, there was less reciprocity, which caused a breakdown in the social relations and networks, particularly the fundraising processes. Importantly, this situation also affected the aims of the Pak Mun civil groups. For instance, the Pak Mun civil group leaders said they had to leave ‘group benefit’ behind. The Pak Mun civil group’s goals were interrupted and group unity broke down.

In brief, the social capital of the Pak Mun civil society operated successfully at the development phase. The social capital components were generated inside the civil organization and then extended to work widely outside the civil group. However, the different elements functioned in

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262 Interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 26, 2011).
263 Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 26, 2011).
Phone interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, July 2, 2012).
Phone interview with a villager (Varin Chamrap, Ubon Ratchathani, July 2, 2012).
264 Phone interview with a villager leader (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, July 1, 2012).
different ways and degrees, as both internal and external factors. In relation to internal factors, the role of activist leaders is essential, particularly to build trust. In relation to the external factors of social capital, values and norms were negatively affected by political division. As external social capital weakens, reciprocity and trust with other civil groups and also within networks also decreased.

The Sustainability of the Pak Mun Civil Group

In the phase of sustaining civil society, adaptation becomes the key concept to analyze data. Adaptation occurs through linkages, which can be either vertical or horizontal. Associated with both is the continuing role of social capital, but analysis also builds on the components associated with the strengthening of civil society, namely structure and actors, including the role of leaders.

The Pak Mun civil group linkages

Linkages in this study refer to the ways in which civil groups maintain connections to other organizations. The connections also identify the civil groups’ interaction, bonding and participation with external social capital. To form linkages is, however, not sufficient as they are just connections; also necessary are the ways in which connections are maintained as structures; for example, the role of coordination within the organization.

The horizontal linkages of the Pak Mun civil group

The aspects of horizontal linkage of the Pak Mun civil group can be seen in terms of how the civil group cooperated with other groups at the same level, which has been mentioned previously. However, the linkages in this section look in particular at sustaining the effectiveness of the civil group’s connections.

The horizontal linkages of the Pak Mun civil group formed relatively recently by the role of Vanida, who seemed being the part of national NGOs, only with the development of the group. Therefore NGOs in horizontal linkages of the Pak Mun civil group had the same organization as the vertical linkage. For example, the linkages between the Pak Mun civil group and the national NGOs, such as the AOP, were begun by Vanida and Nanthachote when the group first got started. The linkage formed in the aspect of civil
group interaction at the development stage supported the ability to obtain wider linkages. For the Pak Mun civil group, the linkage with the AOP, which had been built continually due to Vanida. Therefore, for the linkage aspect of the Pak Mun civil group and the AOP, it appears rather that they were a part of each other.

In Thailand, local NGOs also belong to national NGOs, so the vertical and horizontal linkage of NGOs could not be analyzed separately. In terms of this, the researcher believes that any aspects of group interactions that emerged and grew together form an essential base for further development of the linkages. In particular in the case of linkages between the Pak Mun civil group and the AOP, the linkages encompassed all the recent interactions of the Pak Mun civil group and the AOP, such as the individual connection by Vanida and Nanthachote. The interactions emerged while joining with the AOP to march to Bangkok with other civil groups. They then joined in other activities afterwards and thence became connected into the civil groups’ network. Eventually, the network connections facilitated the Pak Mun civil group to link to the AOP and PMove later without any difficulties. However, the linkage with the AOP failed at the end when the conflict of the Red and Yellow Shirts occurred.

For instance, with the connections by Vanida and Nanthachote, the Pak Mun civil group joined other civil groups, such as agriculture networks, forestry networks and the river basin development networks, that they had been connected with before linking officially to the AOP in 1995. Nevertheless, the linking to the AOP generally just maintained similar aspects to the other Pak Mun group interactions, though participation in the AOP involved wider and more diverse networks, which led eventually to the Pak Mun civil group becoming more formal in both function and form, as explained previously in the Pak Mun civil structure (pp. 83–87).

265 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008).
266 Fieldnotes (March-June 2008).
267 Interview with the Pak Mun villagers (Ubon Ratchathani, June 27-28, 2008).
268 Phone interview with Lah (May 29, 2013).
According to Nanthachote\textsuperscript{270}, the linking of the Pak Mun civil group with the AOP provided the Pak Mun villagers with the capability to work with other civil groups in the AOP. It gave them the opportunity to share their experiences. Apart from that, all the linkage activities had been organized by the AOP supervisors. Therefore the researcher, in the first place, questioned the value of linking with national NGOs, as the AOP was making the Pak Mun civil group lose their own civil group leadership.

Interestingly, the kind of sharing of how to be a civil group leader was a useful way to organize the civil groups’ network through linkage with the AOP. Leaders from each civil group were working together as the group of AOP leaders.\textsuperscript{271} With regard to this, it can be seen that the Pak Mun civil group had adapted their own informal leadership style through the AOP linkage. Even so, they still maintained their own organizational aspect, which was related to the ability to develop functional adaptations by the Pak Mun civil group. The Pak Mun civil group integrated the use of formal and informal leadership styles. Moreover, this civil group also showed adaptation of their leadership by being a horizontal coordinator through their managing of the civil groups’ network within the hierachical leadership style of the AOP’s linkage.\textsuperscript{272}

On the other hand, although the adaptive capability of the Pak Mun civil group seemed productive, the group suffered some challenges and difficulties on the way through linkage-building. As mentioned previously, the Pak Mun civil group had faced problems that arose due to the political conflict between the Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts, especially as it was also after the death of Nanthachote, who had maintained the linkage up to that point. However, the linkage with the AOP led them to connect to the Pak Mun again in 2011 under its new name, PMove.

As to the linkage between the Pak Mun civil group and PMove, this study found the difficulty faced by the Pak Mun civil group to adapt could be contrasted to the building of the original informal AOP linkage. Firstly, the form of the civil group had to change to become a formal organization when linked to the PMove due to the Pak Mun villagers having to formally connect

\textsuperscript{270} Interview with Nanthachote (March 28, 2008).
\textsuperscript{271} The group of AOP leaders = Pu Nam Ruam Moo (Pintoptang, 1998).
\textsuperscript{272} Interview with the villager leaders (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 7, 2008).
in the linkage. The Pak Mun civil group therefore had to become clarified as one of the Thai NGOs. Secondly, the group had to establish more and wider goals. Lastly, some of the Pak Mun civil group members refused to join NGOs.

To explain, the altering of the informal form to become part of the national NGOs led the Pak Mun civil group to need more management skills, owing to the increasing of size of the civil group combined with other groups, which also resulted in having more complicated procedures. For example, fundraising and organizational management ability became necessary factors in order to support the adaptation of the group in both form and function. According to Arjarn Prapas\(^{273}\), who studied how the Pak Mun civil group operated together with other civil groups during the mass mobilization in Bangkok organized by the AOP, the villagers\(^{274}\) revealed that AOP staff were the supervision team for the coordination of the mobilization. They also accepted that there were a lot more regulations in the AOP that the civil groups network left for the AOP team to inevitably work out, instead of doing it themselves.

The linkage with the AOP consequently expanded the wider structure of the organization, which contained the network of civil groups and thus the diverse aims of each group. To deal with the issue of many groups’ specific aims brought about concerns to increase the efficiency of conciliation efforts between groups and the state. As a result, further difficulties have emerged due to the question of how to incorporate the issues of each civil group into the general processes of confrontation with the state. This is an example of the barrier which arose because of the adapted form of the Pak Mun civil group; reorganization due to the linkage to PMove brought an inflexible structure with limited functions.

Furthermore, the researcher also determined the adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group’s form; after it had linked to the AOP, it had more formal form and functions. As Lah\(^{275}\), the PMove leader said, PMove has only similar features and goals to the AOP, thus there were some previous key members who left PMove because they were dissatisfied with the changing

\(^{273}\) Pintoptang (1998).
\(^{274}\) Interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchani, June 8, 2008).
\(^{275}\) Phone interview with Lah (July 1, 2012).
organizational style of PMove. A Pak Mun villager revealed that PMove had a
different leadership style, with its formal hierarchy. This only showed up later
as a difficulty with the linkage.

According to Arjarn Prapas\textsuperscript{276}, the AOP used the style of groups
supporting each other as the leadership style. This is the kind of leadership
that fits well with being distributed among the group of leaders, called
‘collective leadership’ (Pu Nam Ruam Moo)\textsuperscript{277}. Regarding this, the researcher
believes her study illustrates that there were also leadership aspects of the
AOP which appeared to be different to the leadership of the Pak Mun civil
group. Yet the hierarchical leadership of PMove was in stark contrast and
most definitely showed the dissimilarity to the informal leadership feature
that was related to many of the other factors of the Pak Mun civil group, in
particular the cultural basis of the group.

The vertical linkages of the Pak Mun civil group
The conflict over the Pak Mun Dam has been problematic for both the state
and the Pak Mun villagers. Their relative positions appear to be diametrically
opposed. Their interactions have therefore been difficult; nevertheless, this
study attempts to explore the factors that undermine linkages between the Pak
Mun civil group and the Thai state.

The Thai state is understood as the main foe of the Pak Mun civil group.
In particular, grievances that occurred during the history of the Pak Mun Dam
construction broke the relationship between the state and the Pak Mun civil
group. As a result, the Pak Mun civil group was denied interaction with the
state at all levels. Poh Somkiat\textsuperscript{278} revealed that the reason the Pak Mun
villagers had not recently joined state projects\textsuperscript{279} was because those projects
were set up in a perfunctory process in order to present the state’s position.
He referred, for instance, to the then Prime Minister Thaksin, who had
previously promised sympathy to the Pak Mun villagers, but when he became
the prime minister, he set up a committee which took the EGAT side and used
the polls to support the decision instead of using academic research.

\textsuperscript{277} Pu Nam Ruam Moo = ผู้นํารวมหมู่
\textsuperscript{278} Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{279} Fieldnotes from the meeting set by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
(Bangkok, March 4, 2008).
Communication with the state seemed ineffective because it involved a kind of one-way communication. Mae Sompong\textsuperscript{280} said, “The state never listens to us because we are poor. We sent many letters to the government, but that was useless.” For Poh Somkiat\textsuperscript{281}, he even spoke out sarcastically about it: “We wondered who the state is. We have never seen, never talked to him/her; is that why the state does not know that we suffer?” According to this, the researcher believes how the displeasure of the Pak Mun civil group accumulated due to there being many different representatives who took responsibility to contact the group of Pak Mun villagers, but nothing improved afterwards. Moreover, neither problems nor demands had been solved or even considered in the decision-making process. All together, the state’s unresponsiveness led the Pak Mun civil group to think that the state ignored their problems deliberately.

The Pak Mun civil group also experienced the meetings with the state as avoidance, with processes involving insincere conversations due to the state in fact never making any commitments. Nanthachote\textsuperscript{282} told the researcher that the meetings with state representatives were a state strategy to leave the problems behind or leave them out of the decision-making processes. Therefore, the state kept up this kind of process as an excuse to the Pak Mun villagers that those problems were still in the process of consideration. Moreover, the state broke promises given to the villagers, such as once Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra committed to the Pak Mun villagers on the issue of the dam operation timing; in contrast, the cabinet confirmed, instead, a decision to close the sluice gates in a different way\textsuperscript{283}.

The aspects of state projects and the state’s reactions seemed to be far removed from the Pak Mun villagers’ needs, and this is why they could not get any results or solutions. Consequently, the lack of state responses led the Pak Mun civil group to think that the state’s lack of concern was behind it all.

These actions and conclusions emphasized the weak connections and how state action became a stimulus factor to add a further layer of conflict.

\textsuperscript{280} Interview with Mae Sompong (Bangkok, March 9, 2008).
\textsuperscript{281} Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008).
\textsuperscript{282} Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{283} Phu Jad Karn (December 24, 2002, p.6).
To build the vertical linkages of the Pak Mun civil group seemed highly problematic. However, there was at least one state institution that did take responsibility in the Pak Mun case – the National Economic and Social Advisory Council (NESAC). NESAC is a state institution comprising the committees of the professions’ group representatives. NESAC emerged accordingly to the Constitution of Thailand 1997. NESAC works independently in order to provide advice to the government and state institutions. The committee works as an agent to link the state and people together.\footnote{Fieldnote (June 20, 2011).}

NESAC appeared to be the one possible channel to facilitate linkages between the Pak Mun civil group and the state. Unfortunately, there seemed to be little hope of building linkages. As Surapon\footnote{Interview with Surapon (Bangkok, Jan. 5, 2008).}, one of the NESAC committee, disclosed, the issue of the Pak Mun conflict had been difficult due to them having been involved several different governments, and commitments were thus changeable. Importantly also, NESAC had no power to influence or responsibility to be involved in the decision-making.

In summary, the horizontal linkages of the Pak Mun civil group had previously grown, in terms of its networks, at the development phase. Connection to external networks afterwards developed ultimately into the linkage with the AOP and PMove. This undermined the Pak Mun civil group structure, which was reorganized on account of the civil group’s linkage, weakening the ability to adapt. For the Pak Mun civil group, vertical linkages to the state appeared to be inefficient as there was a broken relationship in the first place. Importantly, the state delayed seeking solutions, and the arrogant attitude had frustrated the Pak Mun civil group to further prevent the link between them. So the Pak Mun civil group undeniably had an unsuccessful linkage with the Thai state.

\textit{Social capital and the sustainability of the Pak Mun civil group}

This study views social capital as a vital factor in order to examine the trajectory of the Pak Mun civil group. In charting the end of the trajectory, this research considers the features of social capital within the sustaining phase in
terms of collective action because the Pak Mun civil group developed a more formal civil organization.

It has been traced out in previous sections how the adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group produced social capital. This section considers how social capital could be the key factor for sustaining civil organization. Regarding this, the aspects of social capital arose due to the activities and outcomes of the Pak Mun civil group. The social capital of the Pak Mun civil group eroded through the move to follow the rather diverse aims and means of the civil organization as first the AOP and then PMove contained many civil groups in a network. To deal with the complications of this move, the individual social capital of the Pak Mun civil group members described in the previous phases needed to change to become more of a kind of collective social capital.

The emergence of the Pak Mun civil group as shown in the early part of this study was based on the traditional cultural social bonds of the Pak Mun residents. The Pak Mun villagers mostly trusted the people they knew. However, they learnt to also trust Vanida and Nanthachote, more so than others who worked within NGOs when the civil group was established. The Pak Mun civil group developed different types of trust during the adaptation phase. This was indicated by how the Pak Mun civil group connected with other civil groups later on, so their trust must be so as to relate to the surrounding people in the network. This was a different type of trust, because it would be difficult to get social bonds, such as friendship and kinship, throughout the wide social network. Consequently, the aspect of social capital understood in terms of trust had to be modified. The Pak Mun civil group leaders revealed this by stating that to build connections to other civil groups they had to approach it by considering the civil groups’ aims rather than looking at personal relationships. For example: “We can work with others because we shared the same outcomes even though we had never known each other previously,” one of the Pak Mun civil group leaders said.286

In this regard, the researcher noted that the connection of the Pak Mun civil group to other civil groups resulted in using less social bonding provided by kinship, friendship and neighborliness for operating the civil group. The

286 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).
aspects of social capital therefore became based on the relationship to the other civil groups rather than on individual or personal relationships. The Pak Mun civil group appeared to trust more in NGOs, such as the AOP, which developed yet further when they joined PMove. It was due to the Pak Mun civil group looking instead at the aims of NGOs, which had been supporting several civil groups.

Furthermore, owing to the wider connections of the civil network, there developed a greater diversity of members. A result was that the aspects of social capital analyzed in terms of norms and values transformed to become collective features. For instance, they became a formal organization after the Pak Mun civil group became assimilated into PMove. This required them to accept the idea of having a leader and therefore to be less concerned with maintaining a traditional leadership style. It can be seen that this kind of Pak Mun civil norm became necessary for the adaptation of the civil group, even though it caused them to lose some members. Nevertheless, the Pak Mun civil group adaptation brought about new norms with the values of formal organizations, including the accountability of the civil group, which was supported by PMove representatives.

In brief, it can be seen that the Pak Mun civil group developed their social capital from a personal or individual level to a collective level. To become a member of the civil group networks, such as the AOP and PMove, the Pak Mun civil group developed their collaborative skills based on their social capital, such as social bonding, trust and reciprocity, by adapting it to become a kind of collective social capital. Moreover, the emergence of tolerance in the Pak Mun civil group also sustained the Pak Mun civil group’s existence.

**Discussion and Conclusion: Pak Mun Civil Group**

Analysis of the trajectory of the Pak Mun civil group involves data from the 1990s until 2013, with most data collected between 2008 and 2009. Pak Mun villagers were affected by a dam construction project and formed a group when grievances, cultural aspect and the social capital factor were combined

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to initiate the group of villagers into a form of civil society. Since the launching of the dam project in 1989, the civil group began to emerge out of traditional collaborative meetings at the villagers’ homes in Pak Mun village. The meetings were led by traditional leaders and elderly villagers of the Pak Mun community. They were, however, an innovative outgrowth of traditional ways of meeting and discussing. The group’s methods were based on traditional cultural ways of thinking and acting. There was concern for protecting the motherland.

During the initial period, the Pak Mun civil group developed their group in order to appeal for their tenure rights, while the Thai state never stopped looking on their group as an impediment to the development of the Thai economy. The Thai state never sought to take a proactive approach to the establishment of the civil group by providing incentives for supporting the emergence of the civil group. Ultimately the Pak Mun Dam was completed, in 1994, even though there were many confrontations between the Pak Mun civil group and the government throughout the period of the project construction. Moreover, the consequences of the dam construction stimulated the Pak Mun villagers to continue to operate as the Pak Mun civil group even after the dam had been completed.

However, some NGOs were aware of the disruption to the villagers and they sought to assist. One of the NGO’s activists, Vanida, came to realise that the assistance provided by NGOs was not adequate, and problematic because of a lack of trust between them. The villagers also recognized this and distanced themselves from NGOs. Then Vanida left the NGO in order to help the villagers directly. This resulted in activist guidance to the villagers and sowed the seeds for the emergence of non-traditional development of a civil group. The Pak Mun civil group members learnt through this to organize themselves in order to respond to the Thai state. Once the civil group became established, due to the villagers’ grievances and the cultural aspects of the Pak Mun community, social capital development in terms of trust, social bonding and reciprocity in the Pak Mun community also came to be factors facilitating the development of the civil group.

The Pak Mun civil group developed during the period the government procrastinated. Apart from Vanida, the new civil group contacted academics in
universities, and other civil groups to build support. The civil group not only survived but also grew bigger, and established horizontal linkages to other groups. They marched to Bangkok to show the power of the civil groups network, with Pak Mun as the leader of the civil network organized by the NGO, the AOP. Their cause became a national issue, with the whole country now challenged by the villagers’ activities. This local civil group informed the city people of local village problems.

Unfortunately, Vanida passed away at the end of 2007 and her main assistant, Nanthachote, died a few months later, in 2008. Afterwards, Thailand also faced a difficult national political situation of conflicting mass movements, between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, which took center stage. The local civil group retreated back to the village, due to the issue of the Pak Mun Dam having become, by that stage, just a minor conflict. However, the AOP survived, in altered form, and another assistant of Vanida and Nanthachote – Lah – tried to continue to guide the civil group as the AOP reorganized to become an NGO called PMove.

The joining of the civil group to PMove, however, cut some of the traditional bonding of the Pak Mun civil group members. The Pak Mun civil group only had representatives in PMove, and the Pak Mun representative needed to follow the formal civil organization of NGOs. With that the leadership style changed because of the adaptation of function and form required to fit into the more complicated structure of an NGO network of civil groups. The formal style of how PMove operated as an NGO required adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group. As a result, some of the Pak Mun civil group members preferred to leave the group, while some of them joined PMove as the representatives of other groups, and so the civil group became smaller as participation declined. Thus, even though the Pak Mun civil group still survived, according to the definition of the aims of civil groups, the Pak Mun civil group underwent extensive changes, such that both the form and functions changed to be in accordance with NGOs.

The Pak Mun civil group trajectory has resulted in development and changes over a long period of time. This study emphasizes the complex dynamics of the development and changes that have occurred to the civil
The establishment phase of the Pak Mun civil group
The Pak Mun civil group emerged out of a group of local villagers. The villagers were bound together according to the Thai local style of social bonding, by reciprocity and trust. During this initial stage, the Pak Mun civil group clearly revealed the presence of social capital through the social bonding of relationships between individuals, such as kinship, friendship and neighborliness. Beside these various aspects of Pak Mun social capital, there were also essential tools facilitating the formation of civil groups.

The emergence of the civil group was triggered, however, by the pressure of the conflict between local people and the state. The villagers’ grievances initiated the emergence of the civil group. The grievance occurred because the Thai Government used the power of the state to drive the country to industrialization. The local villagers fought to protect the culture of their motherland and used their social capital to adapt. Moreover, trust between the villagers’ due to their social capital enabled the emergence of reciprocity at higher levels, which also occurred in the civil group. It can be seen that social capital components were the vital factors that facilitated the establishment of the Pak Mun civil group.

Briefly, the civil group emerged in the space between state and local livelihoods, by generating social capital with culture and some stimulus factors. Social capital, in terms of trust and reciprocity, worked to support civil group social bonding and relations.

The development phase of the Pak Mun civil group
At the development phase, the civil group of local villagers was strengthened by the innovation of a new identity, namely Mae Mun Man Yean village. This model village showed how they could create and organize a group of local villagers in terms of local civil society. These villagers worked using local knowledge and culture, which resulted in integrating the informal functions and form into the Mae Mun Man Yean village. The flexible functions and form, along with the self-organization of the Pak Mun civil group, indicated the innovation of the civil society structure clearly. Subsequently, the Pak Mun
civil group adjusted its structure to support joining the AOP, which escalated networks and improved the civil group organization powerfully.

Significantly, social capital played a vital role in strengthening the Pak Mun civil group. Firstly, trust and reciprocity maintained the informal civil group structure, in both the innovation and self-organization of the civil group, without the support of the business and political sectors. Secondly, the actors in the Pak Mun civil group employed trust and reciprocity in order to bind together the civil group members, activists and leaders. Thirdly, trust also connected the Pak Mun civil group with other civil groups and NGOs, in both horizontal and vertical interactions, even though there was a lack of trust for the vertical and horizontal interactions with the state.

It can be seen that social capital involved all components for strengthening the Pak Mun civil group. Nonetheless, this study examines two different aspects of social capital at this stage. The internal factors of social capital within the Pak Mun civil group developed the consciousness of home place through social relations. The generating of social bonding, trust and reciprocity produced the unity of the group, which ultimately appeared in the aspect of the values and norms of civil organization. In terms of the external factors of social capital, the social capital elements within the Pak Mun civil group are the grounding for social networks. However, the external social capital is weakened by the political confrontation brought by mass mobilization.

**The sustaining phase of the Pak Mun civil group**

The Pak Mun civil group’s sustainability emphasized civil group adaptation through linkages. Horizontal linkages focussed on how the civil group associated with other groups. Regarding this, this study found the adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group developed when the Pak Mun civil group connected to PMove. The Pak Mun civil group adaptation showed in terms of changing the traditional style of organization from informal to formal, damaging unity and social capital.

Moreover, the group established more and wider goals with other civil groups in the PMove network, although some of the Pak Mun civil group became part of PMove due to the tight linkage between them. In contrast, the
vertical linkages between the Pak Mun civil group and the Thai state were insufficient. Their broken relationship at all phases pushed the Pak Mun civil group to connect through horizontal linkages and ultimately led to mass mobilization. In terms of the vertical linkages of the Pak Mun civil group, connections to state institutions were insufficient due to having a broken relationship from the beginning. There was one channel to encourage the linkages of the Pak Mun civil group and the state, namely NESAC, but it has not been useful recently.

In the case of social capital, this study examines how social capital within the development phase produced the key factor for the Pak Mun civil group adaptation. The Pak Mun civil group developed their social capital from a personal or individual level to a collective level. The experience of trust in personal relationships became trust in the organization’s value. The link to the other civil groups with the AOP showed the wider social network, while indicating that the personal bonding needed the value of a group or an organization to confirm their trust.

This study uses the phases of civil society framework in order to clarify its practical form and function, and also to examine the ways to develop and sustain Pak Mun civil society. In this regard, the study portrays the possible consequences of the Pak Mun civil group dynamic, which relates to developing appropriate and realistic roles for local civil organizations.

Firstly, the Pak Mun civil group emerged as a civil organization through the mindfulness for the protection of their motherland. The civil group successfully developed through their social capital, which shows how self-organization of local people established a civil organization. It successfully countered the belief that the destruction of their livelihoods was pushing the local people to become out of control and violent.

Secondly, social bonds provided trust and reciprocity, assisted by the confidence provided by the citizens’ rights in the Thai constitution, which served as an incentive. Regarding this, the new form of local people as a civil group developed through social networks. The strengthening of social capital was a good grounding in civil adaptation in order to support the linkages within social networks. Thus social bonding that is too tight appears to be the main barrier to adaptation. Social relations that were too tight denied the
formal management aspects, even though this study also found limits to the strengthening of the Pak Mun civil group. Social bonding was defective because most of the group members and leaders were the elder villagers, and they seemed to lack any new civil members from the younger generation.

Thirdly, to sustain the civil group according to the civil society model, the civil group needed to adapt. In this case, the Pak Mun civil group associated with other civil groups in terms of the civil group network and finally, joined to PMove, which required adaptation. This link resulted in the loss of civil group identity and self-organization.

Fourthly, the study nevertheless argues that vertical interaction at the development phase could be possible and provide a chance to reduce the gap between state and local people. At the very least it could deal with the specific problems of each case and so be a good opportunity for reconciliation processes to be successful. It is more likely that this would occur if individuals in the civil group interacted themselves to address their specific issues rather than through group representatives or NGOs at the national stage.

To examine civil society in the Thai context, this study examines two civil groups in the second case study. Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group emerged through local villagers in two villages. The detail is outlined in Chapter Four.
Chapter Four

The Case Study of Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Group

“We will protect our birthplace from exploitation by the state and we might suffer in prison or death.” (Charoen Wat-agsorn)

The Background of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Groups

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged locally from two groups of villagers in the face of ongoing threats that industrial development would occur in the region. In 2008, a threat arose from Sahaviriya Steel Industries PCL (SSI), which planned the largest fully integrated flat steel plant to be established at Bang Sa Parn, near Baan Krut. Villagers at Bang Sa Parn are also being supported by the civil group network which emerged and developed from the Hin Krut and Bor Nork coal-fired power plant project conflicts. The regional civil group networks are not affiliated to any NGOs and are successfully sustaining themselves in order to continue to address issues as they arise. The civil group network remains under complete local control and leadership.

The civil groups started as an activity of the local village of Bor Nork, where the first coal-fired station was planned. A young local villager, Charoen Wat-agsorn, emerged as leader of the civil group. He was not a formal local village leader, but the group he established got support from the local village leaders and some local government officers. He had learnt from the civil group activities at Pak Mun, and then he invited Vanida (Pak Mun advisor) to be a Bor Nork consultant. Unfortunately, he was killed after he took charge of opposition to this project. However, his wife, Korn-uma (Krarok), took over and continued to be the leader, guided by Vanida (Vanida passed away from

1 Interview Charoen’s parent (March 29, 2008).
cancer in 2007). Afterwards, the Bor Nork civil group became linked to the Baan Krut and other civil groups in Prachuab Kirikhan province.

The Baan Krut civil group and Bor Nork civil group emerged about the same time, and also in the face of pressure from the coal-fired power plant project, planned by the Thai state with the state agency EGAT (see the section on the background of the case study, pp. 45–46). The Baan Krut villagers formed a civil group, which used the close social relation with the civil group at Bor Nork and also used Vanida. The two leaders of the two civil groups knew each other, which resulted in them being able to support each other in terms of protecting their home villages in particular. However, they both worked independently, and a network was established that grew to include six other local civil groups as well.²

In this case, the civil groups had faced sophisticated responses from the government and EGAT, who tried to push the projects through the public hearing legitimately, even though it was a deceptive process organized by state agencies. They formed a tripartite committee and many reconciliation processes were instigated by the company, which was also hired by state and EGAT (Confederation of Consumer Organization, 1997). Both Baan Krut and Bor Nork had also learnt from the Pak Mun civil group lesson, which resulted in them successfully strengthening and sustaining themselves without losing their civil groups’ identity, in particular.

The Hin Krut and Bor Nork coal-fired power plant projects, even though inhibited by the local civil groups, could be constructed because they were on Thai Government contracts. Consequently, the local civil group in Prachuab Kirikhan has been looking out for their home village continually. Furthermore, the civil groups network had recently shown their strength in terms of helping each other. Specifically, they showed the ability to build civil group networks. Also, this civil group could survive even without a leader when the Baan Krut civil group leader, Jintana, was imprisoned for alleged trespass onto the areas of the company when leading resistance to the building of the coal-fired power plant in 2011.

² Fieldnotes (Bor Nork; Tub Sa Kae and Baan Krut, February–April, 2008).
Jintana was released from prison after four months. She has been continuously leading the civil groups in order to look after the Baan Krut community to prevent harmful environmental consequences until now. Similarly, the widow of the former leader of the Bor Nork civil group, Kornuma, has been working as the leader of the civil group with a lengthy and persistent struggle of other members of a group called ‘Love Bor Nork group’. Later, in 2013, the case of the murder of Charoen Wat-agson was finally denied by the appeal court because there was not enough evidence to support his murder case.

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups had built their network. Six civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan emerged in terms of environmental protection, in 2008, and they increased to be eight groups in 2011. However, the number of these civil groups is flexible due to the informal aspects under the civil society concept. Thus Baan Krut and Bor Nork are still the main civil groups; in particular, both civil groups have supported not only the other civil groups in provincial and regional areas, but also the wider network of the other civil groups around Thailand. They connected to many civil groups, such as the civil group in Kra-bi and Nakorn-Sri-Tammarat provinces in the south of Thailand. Significantly, they are the key main civil groups, which were fundamental to the national civil groups network in terms of Thai energy reform.

The network of civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan province has strong unity. One civil group initially involved decided to take funding from an external business agency but was then expelled from the civil group network in 2012. Moreover, Baan Krut and Bor Nork had independent linkage to the national mass mobilization in 2013, which showed their liberated organization. In this case, national mass mobilization opposed the Thai state in the form of the Yingluck government. Consequently, reforming energy management in Thailand was an issue raised by the group of the mass mobilization leaders in order to get more local groups to oppose the state. Nevertheless, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups have resisted attempts to have external participation.
Civil Society Establishment of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork Villagers

The two civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork, are well known widely as the communities that are concerned about the environmental preservation of their home villages. However, this study examines the trajectory of both civil groups in order to seek out the roles of the grassroots as civil society organizations by using the research framework previously developed. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups are described in detail on the frame of establishment, development and sustaining phase.

The emergence of grassroots civil society: Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Group

As previously mentioned, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged about the same time. According to Anan, a group of Bor Nork villagers began uniting into a group after hearing that the coal-fired power plant would be located in their home village. Government information released also pushed the villagers to get together in order to discuss the destruction of their livelihood. The call for the announcement of a meeting of the local government officer was interesting for a lot of villagers.

At that time, Anan, who was a primary school teacher in Bor Nork, seemed to be the leader for raising questions about the project in the meeting. After the official meeting by the local government, the Bor Nork villagers started having informal group discussions. At the beginning, they met at school, otherwise at the temple. Sometimes the meetings took place at some villagers’ houses. It was a flexible arrangement at first for their meetings.

Similarly, the Baan Krut civil group emerged shortly after the Bor Nork coal-fired power plant project was announced. The case of Bor Nork also reminded the Baan Krut villagers about the effects of the project, in the same way as the Bor Nork villagers had learnt from the lesson of Mae Moh coal-fired power plant in Lampang province, known as an environmentally degraded area.

3 Interview with Anan (Bor- Nowk, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
4 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April, 2008).
Jintana, the leader of Baan Krut civil group, revealed that the group of villagers in Baan Krut emerged because they were concerned that the coal-fired power plant project may harm their livelihoods. Afterwards, the Baan Krut villagers investigated and continually examined the progress of the project. For instance, they were watching the rushed purchase of large plots of land and estates around the Baan Krut area. Moreover, they connected to some NGOs and academics in order to get more information relating to the project. The Baan Krut civil group mostly used Jintana’s house as a center as her house was the grocery shop where the villagers could sit and chat.

Even though the projects were halted as a result of the disapproval of local villagers, the projects were still on a state contract and could be restarted at any time. This situation sparked the villagers in both areas to watch their homes before it was too late. Nevertheless, there were some violent confrontations, particularly in terms of mass mobilization and the case of the killing of the Bor Nork civil group leader, Mr. Charoen Wat-agson. The group of Bor Nork villagers worked together to oppose the coal-fired power plant project, and the group of Baan Krut villagers also attempted to protect their community in the same way, and both groups connected to NGOs.

The NGOs played a role for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups as supporters. Sureerat, a local NGO leader in Prajuab Kirikhan, revealed an experience she had with local civil groups in this province, and both Baan Krut and Bor Nork in particular. She disclosed that the local people in Prajuab Kirikhan province seemed very keen to respond to the state and the state agency by themselves. Consequently, the NGOs had just assisted and mostly provided information, on an ongoing basis. The enthusiasm of these civil groups is shown in many kinds of actions from their beginning in 1997 until now. The Bor Nork civil group was known as Group Rak Thongthin Bor Nork, while the Baan Krut civil group was named Group Anurak Baan Krut. However, the researcher uses the terms Baan Krut civil group and Bor Nork civil group for this research.

5 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
6 Interview with Sureerat (Tub Sa Kae, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 20, 2008).
7 Group Rak Thongthin Bor Nork = กลุ่มรักษ์ท้องถิ่นบ่อนอก
8 Group Anurak Baan Krut = กลุ่มอนุรักษ์บ้านกรูด
In this section, the study examines the related factors of the emergence of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, and considers the social capital in terms of culture, incentive and grievances in both cases.

**Social capital in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups**

At this stage, the explanation of social capital outlined by the research framework will be presented. Social capital factors are essential fundamental factors of civil society development and sustaining phases. Social capital provided social bonding for the groups. Moreover, social relations in the case also brought about the social capital factors such as trust and reciprocity, which were activated primarily through the networks.

Both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged informally, which related significantly to the social relations in their groups. Korn-uma (Karok)\(^9\) told the researcher that she and her husband (Charoen)\(^10\) joined the group of villagers, which was supported by Anan and other villagers. All the original small group members were Bor Nork residents and they were mostly connected by friendship. Anan\(^11\), who was known as Kru-Tui, revealed that the group of villagers started as a small group of friends and their families. He said group discussion took place at the morning market, which was where they usually exchanged information. The coal-fired power plant project was a serious issue that caused the Bor Nork villagers concern about their livelihoods. Consequently, this project became the key issue that motivated more Bor Nork villagers to get together in order to deal with its imminent effects.

Anan and a few teachers took charge of arranging the meetings the first few times. Although he denied that he was the leader of the Bor Nork civil group, he also said, “I guess the villagers think me and the other teachers were educated so we seemed to be the leaders inevitably. At that time, we tried to contact anyone who could provide information about the coal-fired power plant project, including the ongoing Mae Moh coal-fired power plant project.

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\(^9\) Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 23, 2008).
\(^10\) Charoen Wat-agsorn was the leader of Bor Nork civil group.
\(^11\) Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
in Lampang ... we started to contact friends and family. We hoped at least they could help ...”

The Bor Nork meetings at the beginning were run by Anan and friends, and they initially used the connections of friends and families. In this regard, the Bor Nork civil group showed that social bonding in this community underpinned the civil group formation. At least it facilitated the civil group to get members and seek information in order for the group to continue operating.

At that time, the group of Bor Nork villagers also used their social relations for wider communication. Anan said that he and a group of teachers gave a newsletter to their students. It was about the coal-fired power plant project and it was like an invitation to the civil group meeting. Anan said, “I was pretty sure that the parents love their children. The information would make them concerned about their kids’ future, so my students brought their parents to meetings.” The Bor Nork villagers built more connections through their relationships. Social bonding in the community seemed to be a channel for forming the civil group, particularly through parent and teacher relationships.

Similarly, social relations also played an important role for the formation of the Baan Krut civil group. Jintana¹² told the researcher that the group of Baan Krut villagers had gathered before the official announcement from the state. They knew about the project through the Bor Nork case. The villagers guessed the project would come to Baan Krut. As a result, they started to discuss the project at her place, which was a local convenience shop. It seemed to be the center of information for customers, which included both friends and others.

Arpichart¹³, a Baan Krut villager, revealed that the coal-fired power plant project seemed to be just a rumor at first, but there were some friends and families who helped to find out about this project. He asked his friend’s cousin, who worked at the Energy Department, to check on the possibility of this project. Also, Jintana said that she and some villagers found information about an offer to buy a large area of land, which they supposed was for the

¹² Informal interview with Jintana (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 8, 2008).
¹³ Informal interview with Apichart (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 8, 2008).
project. Afterwards, Jintana’s house became a place for meetings and group discussion for the villagers. Even though the meetings started with a few villagers, it got a lot more villagers in the next few months. She said, “The villagers’ relationships in our community were strong; even though we are not real siblings or definitely in the same family, we were willing to help each other, especially for our hometown.”

Social relations in these communities were not the only key factor for building social networks and connections in the civil groups. Social relations also brought about social bonding in terms of social capital factors, such as trust, values, norms and reciprocity. For example, some villagers trusted Anan and the group of teachers because they taught their children. Chaleaw\textsuperscript{14}, a Bor Nork villager, told the researcher that: “Kru\textsuperscript{15} Tui (Anan) was the only educated person among local villagers once we were in the meeting with the government officer. Besides, he is an educated person, I believe that Kru must be a good person otherwise he couldn’t teach students. So I and other villagers were willing to join the meeting that he arranged afterwards.”

He also said that joining the meeting should be a way to help the Bor Nork community to get rid of the coal-fired power plant project. Importantly, the group of teachers who created the meetings had to have a good vision for the village. Consequently, it was reasonable to follow them. In the same way, a villager, Sanan\textsuperscript{16}, said that he and his friends had been coming to the meetings since the beginning because they thought the teachers must know that the coal-fired power plant project would impact badly on the villagers’ livelihoods. And he and his friends believed that the group meetings involved business interests.

Accordingly, the researcher\textsuperscript{17} concluded that the beginning of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups came through using social relations in a kind of friendship and kinship network for forming their groups. Moreover, the case of the Bor Nork civil group also showed social capital in terms of trust which emerged through social relations, such as friends and families, and the relationship of Anan and his students, while the building of trust was based on

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14 Interview with Chaleaw (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008).
15 Kru = ครู means teacher.
16 Interview with Sanan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008).
17 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April, 2008).
}
his acknowledgement of a good teacher. Likewise, Korn-uma\textsuperscript{18} commented that the group of Bor Nork villagers seemed to get together easily because they trusted in their friendship due to living in the same village. She said, “I’m sure that we have the same feeling and are concerned the project will destroy our homes ... I love my birthplace and we must have the same feeling that brings us together. I trust the love we all have for our birthplace, so that is the reason why we trust each other easily.”

Thus the civil groups indicated that social capital, in terms of trust, relied on social connections or social bonding. The villagers seemed to believe or trust in their families, friends and whoever identified as Baan Krut and Bor Nork residents. In particular, to trust the villagers who lived in the same communities seemed to be a loose bond but it also appeared to be a key tool for the civil group forming, the same as the other kinds of social bonding.

For instance, Samran\textsuperscript{19}, a Bor Nork villager, and Pra Wichit\textsuperscript{20}, a monk in Bor Nork temple, told the researcher that they are the older brothers of Charoen Wat-agsorn and they have worked for the Bor Nork civil group since the beginning, while La-aong\textsuperscript{21}, Tanomsak\textsuperscript{22} and Pratiew\textsuperscript{23} have also worked with the group, even though they knew each other as just villagers who lived in Bor Nork. Similarly, Jintana’s husband Itsara\textsuperscript{24} worked hard to support his wife as a leader of the Baan Krut civil group. Whereas Narong\textsuperscript{25} and Somdej\textsuperscript{26}, Baan Krut villagers, came to join the group as villagers concerned about their hometown.

On this point, the researcher\textsuperscript{27} believes that there was a similar kind of social bonding in both civil groups in terms of a loose bonding aspect apart from the social bonding as family. The loose bonding aspect appeared in terms of the civil group members being less concerned about kinship than friendship or neighborliness. According to Anan\textsuperscript{28} (Bor Nork) and Jintana (Baan Krut)\textsuperscript{29},

\textsuperscript{18} Informal group discussion (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{19} Interview with Samran (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Pra Wichit (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with La-aong (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{22} Interview with Tanomsak (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
\textsuperscript{23} Interview with Pratiew (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
\textsuperscript{24} Interview with Itsara (Baan Krut, Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{25} Interview with Narong (Baan Krut, Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{26} Interview with Somdej (Baan Krut, Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{27} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
\textsuperscript{28} Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
the groups started with many kinds of relationships, and family connections were helpful tools for the group progressing. Thus all connections were tied to trust among the villagers.

In other words, the civil group members were less concerned about kinship than friendship or neighborliness. Social relations were the vital factor for the group forming, thus social bonding was not necessarily tight. As Jintana\textsuperscript{30} said, “We don’t know or care much about whether whoever wants to join the group would be our families or not, but we believe that we all love and wish our birthplace would grow sustainably.” And Anan\textsuperscript{31} said they had less concern about how close the member relationship was, “... even though a close relationship, such as a family member, is helpful for communication in the group. However, we trust one thing – the Prajuab Kirikhan residents’ character. We have known as southern Thais (Khon Tai)\textsuperscript{32} a kind of sincere and strong people ... so we simply trust each other.”

The researcher\textsuperscript{33}, moreover, noted that both civil groups trust in their neighbors. Almost all the participants in these civil groups for this research are friends rather than families, and they easily trust each other as residents in the same area. Regarding this point, this study concluded that the forming of both civil groups comprised simply trust, which emerged through loose bonding. Loose social bonding came from having the same social characteristic of southern Thais, called ‘Khon Tai’. However, the most important aspect of this point was that simple trust, from a loose bonding among the villagers in both civil groups, appeared to be the most significant key support for the wider alliance of the civil groups and could enable the civil groups to get more villagers to join the groups.

Sureerat\textsuperscript{34}, an activist in Prajuab Kirikhan province, commented on this point, that trust among the villagers in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups appeared in terms of the southern identity, which perceives Khon Tai as strong, trustworthy and sincere. She also commented that trustworthiness usually appears in local culture, particularly in a society where people need to

\textsuperscript{29} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April, 2008).
\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Jintana (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{31} Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{32} Khon Tai = นุ้ยใต้
\textsuperscript{33} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April, 2008).
\textsuperscript{34} Interview with Sureerat (Tub Sa Kae, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 20, 2008).
support each other. Consequently, this led the study to rely more on social capital factors, which significantly related to culture.

As mentioned previously, social capital contains several factors that support the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups forming. Both Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups claimed the group of villagers seemed to have great confidence in their southern identity. Songsak\textsuperscript{35}, a Bor Nork villager, told the researcher that Bor Nork villagers are strong and brave to act on what they believe. Moreover, he said that the villagers are proud of their southern identity, with its down-to-earth character. “I have been in the group for many years. Khon Tai must be very earnest. Especially the case to protect our hometown from this project so we won’t let it happen to us, like Mae Moh villagers, because they are just too kind.”

A central government officer\textsuperscript{36} told the researcher about her experience with civil groups noting that the villagers in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups have strong and straightforward characters. She said, “These villagers have the Khon Tai style which is intrepid and brave. They won’t care about anything if they think they’re right. It is easier to deal with other villager groups.”

Both civil groups seemed to be proud of their character, which also brought them together to resist the projects. For example, a villager of Baan Krut, Chartchai\textsuperscript{37}, talked about his confident pride in southern people and said it must be a common feeling of the Baan Krut villagers generally. He said, “Opposing the coal-fired power plant project needs our dedicated people, such as Khon Tai, who are very brave same as us. You will see the megaproject could be built at many places around Thailand, but not in the south.” Based on this, the villagers in both groups believe that the southern identity has specific value to them. This could produce trustworthiness that bonds them together and builds unity.

Furthermore, the groups of villagers in Baan Krut and Bor Nork appeared to be confident in terms of having good quality livelihoods.

\textsuperscript{35} Interview with Songsak (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{36} Interview with central government officers (Bangkok, February 11, 2008).
\textsuperscript{37} Interview with Chartchai (Baan Krut, Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, 8, 2008).
According to the Bor Nork villagers\textsuperscript{38}, they are basically independent. The villagers mostly have their own land and careers, such as pineapple farm owners, asparagus farm owners, and some of them own boats for the local fishery. Likewise, Jintana said the Baan Krut villagers mostly have their own land and businesses. She said, “Fortunately, the villagers won’t worry much about leaving their jobs to participate in protecting our home place. To own farms does not require them to work every day, and the production is quite definitely stable.”

Some government officers\textsuperscript{39} also said that they think well-being is the point that supported the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities to be strong communities, so that it is difficult to negotiate with them through money. In terms of this, the researcher views that both being confident in their southern identity and having good livelihoods gives a strong grounding to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups so they are committed to creating groups without state agency intervention, such as resources offered, or any propaganda. Likewise, a villager\textsuperscript{40} in Bor Nork revealed that he refused an agent who tried to buy his land, which was supposed to be for building the coal-fired power plant. The agent also wanted him to convince his cousins, who owned the land around his, to sell their land too.

Similarly, a villager\textsuperscript{41} in Baan Krut said that there was a guy who asked him to convince other villagers to sign a letter that supported the coal-fired plant project. He said, “The offer was he would pay 1,500 baht each and I could get 500 baht each too.” He refused that offer and said, “It was too cheap to buy me and I think I will earn much more than that if I and Baan Krut villagers protect our land.” Other villagers as well told about the coal-fired power plant project agents coming around to convince the villagers. The agents said that the coal-fired power plant would support the Baan Krut villagers to get good jobs, because more than 3,000 workers would be needed for the project. Nevertheless, the villagers refused all kinds of offers as they had confidence in their own lifestyles and careers.

\textsuperscript{38} Group interview with villagers (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{39} Interview with government officer (Prajuab Kirikhan, March 24, 2008).
\textsuperscript{40} Interview with villager (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{41} Interview with villager (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
Accordingly, the researcher considers that these civil groups were formed by groups of villagers, possible due to their self-esteem and confidence. Moreover, the villagers’ self-esteem and confidence also related to the factor of trust in relation to their connections through social ties in the villages. Consequently, this study examines the self-esteem and confidence of the villagers, as significant supporting factors for facilitating social capital and building civil groups.

In the case of social capital, reciprocity was also important to both civil groups forming. Female Bor Nork villagers told the researcher that the villagers supported each other in many ways by encouraging the meetings. For example, some of them left their children together while the parents went to the meeting. In the same way, Panya, the Baan Krut villager, said he even took turns to look after farms with his friends, so he could follow the progress of the civil group.

The reciprocity that occurred in both civil groups at this stage seemed to be loose because there has unexpected in helping each other or exchange. The reciprocity of both civil groups occurred together with other social capital factors. The reciprocity aspect consequently appeared along with social relations, and mutual trust and confidence of the villagers. For instance, as Panya said, “... helping each other is the good thing we usually do for people around us. However, to help others depends on how close the relationship is.” In the same way, Jintana said the villagers are confident: “Khon Prajuab (or Khon Tai), we don’t like to ask for help if it’s not necessary ... and there was nothing serious in terms of the need for support for the group meeting. I think it was done individually.” Nonetheless, because social capital factors are related, so the reciprocity of both civil groups would appear in other issues of the research framework.

Again, the framework of this study finds that social capital for the emergence of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups was closely related to cultural aspects. Moreover, the incentive and grievance issues also significantly impacted on the forming of these civil groups.

42 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008).
43 Interview with villager (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
44 Interview with Panya (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
Cultural aspects were the key factor for the emergence of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in term of the social capital component. Thus the examination of cultural aspects and social capital are inevitably related. This study looked into the lifestyle of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers, together with their traditional circumstances, which motivated and/or encouraged the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers to form civil groups. Regarding this, the study determined that social relations are also related to the cultural aspect due to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork livelihoods and lifestyles being based strongly on their ancestors. The Bor Nork village leader said, “Most of the villagers in Bor Nork community have lived in this area a long time, many generations. We know each other by name, otherwise by the parents, so we can ask who is your dad or mom or your grandad?” The researcher thinks that the kind of long-term residence showed in the strong social bonds and social relations by sharing community ancestry, and it resulted in terms of kinship.

From the Bor Nork village group discussion, the villagers commented in the same way on the cultural aspect, in terms of respect for ancestors, that it was based on spending a long time building up their fortunes. They thought that all properties, and land in particular, came from the sacrifices of their parents. A villager said, “We know that our family faced a lot of difficulty in order to get this land ready to farm, so it is very valuable and honors our ancestors.” Similarly, the Baan Krut villagers told the researcher about their parents’ stories. One villager who owned a local fishery revealed that: “The coal-fired power plant could give us work as staff but it won’t be worth it at all if we replace our career with that job. Our career is like the traditional inheritance from our grandparents.” Moreover, the villagers believed that all traditional lifestyles must be respected and they should keep them as long as they can.

Accordingly, the villagers presented their culture in terms of having strong respect for their ancestors. Based on this, the farms and properties

45 Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
46 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
47 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
48 Interview with a villager (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
given by their parents became the motivation for protecting their homeland. Similarly, a villager⁴⁹ revealed that her family boycotted one of her siblings because she sold part of her land to the agent. “We are proud of keeping our land to farm, same as our grandad and dad have done in the past.” She also revealed that her sister sold the land to the agent of the coal-fired plant project. It was very shameful for her and other family members: “… because people here (Bor Nork) know each other well, so to sell the land seemed like my sister betrayed our parents because her sister would be the one who let the project come to destroy our hometown, while the others wanted to protect it.”

In the case of the Baan Krut community, the villagers have almost the same lifestyle. The villagers respected their grandparents strongly due to the inherited kinds of careers, such as agriculture and fishing. Moreover, the protection of their homeland was taught to the next generation. For instance, a 24-year-old villager⁵⁰ told the researcher that he believes in his parents enough to keep the local lifestyle. He said, “I am a young man in a young generation and I definitely love technology, but I think developing my homeland by building the coal-fired plant must be wrong and will destroy what our grandparents have done. If I have to choose, I of course choose to continue my parents’ idea.”

In this case, the researcher⁵¹ notes that these comments about the parental respect of the local villagers became the cultural-based aspect for the villagers in these communities. This kind of respect also showed the traditional perspectives, which are based on belief in the ancestors and through their livelihoods, in terms of careers such as farming, on their homeland and the local fisheries.

Thus the villagers also indicated that parental respect built up the villagers’ appreciation of local livelihoods, which was enhanced by social bonding such as kinship. However, the parental respect perspective also became the villagers’ inspiration for protecting their homeland. This was Baan Krut and Bor Nork’s common view, which ultimately integrated the local

⁴⁹ Interview with a villager (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
⁵⁰ Interview with a villager (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
⁵¹ Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
people in these communities together in terms of the environmental groups, namely ‘Group Anurak Baan Krut’ and ‘Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork’. 52

The incentive or stimuli issues for the emergence of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group

The incentive issues for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ formation appeared to be based on the villagers’ perspective in terms of protecting their birthplace. According to both Baan Krut and Bor Nork group discussion53, the villagers said that the need for keeping the local lifestyle, which is based on the homeland, and their vacations were the most important reasons that led them to oppose the large project. However, the incentive issues in this case appeared obviously in terms of the stimulus factor in relation to the environmental degradation and state dishonesty.

The stimuli issue: The environmental degradation concerns

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork coal-fired power plant projects were on the Thai national plan for industrial development. There had been similar projects in the places they had provided to lessen the negative effects on these civil groups; for example, the Mae Moh coal-fired plant project in Lampang province.

In this regard, Anan and the Bor Nork villagers54 told the researcher about the beginning of the Bor Nork civil group meeting and that the Mae Moh project had been discussed as a previous awful case. At that time, there was less information about the effects of a coal-fired power plant. Thus Anan and some teachers in Bor Nork school attempted to find out more about how the Mae Moh community was affected by the coal-fired power plant project in different ways; for example, he contacted a friend who works in the Energy Department in order to learn about the definite effects of this kind of project.

Similarly, Jintana55 revealed that the Baan Krut villagers also learnt from the Mae Moh lesson, particularly in the case of the impact on local villagers’ health. A power plant could prove lethal to the villagers, and she said,

52 Fieldnote (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008).
53 Fieldnote on Baan Krut and Bor Nork group discussions (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1-2, 2008).
54 Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
55 Informal group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
“Importantly, both the Thai state and the state enterprise EGAT ignored that the coal-fired power plant has been killing the villagers in Mae Moh community, and we won’t let it come to kill us.”

In the case of the Mae Moh coal-fired power plant project, it has been a controversial case in terms of the slower pace of development by the Thai state. The Mae Moh community was plagued by contamination as the Mae Moh coal-fired power plant released large quantities of waste water continuously. Additionally, several lawsuits had been brought against the project owner, EGAT, in the case of crop damage and impact on health.\(^56\)

In the case of the Bor Nork villagers, they thought the project was unnecessary. A villager\(^57\) said, “We need to keep our homeland clean, and the power from the project wouldn’t help our farms.” Thus Korn-uma said that the group of Bor Nork villagers was classed as a barrier to development: “Once the state representatives came to convince us, and my husband was the leader who talked to them. They told us that our country needs more power for economic development. If we oppose this project it means the Bor Nork villagers are selfish and oppose development as well.”

Additionally, Korn-uma\(^58\) (Bor Nork) and Jintana\(^59\) (Baan Krut) told the researcher that there were some meetings with government officers. The meetings explained the need to produce more electricity, and importantly, the presentation showed the coal-fired power plant projects are absolutely clean. Korn-uma said, “We know the power plant’s capacity could support just one department store so it is not worth it to develop it instead of our valuable home.”

Both Korn-uma and Jintana thought that the meetings were the way to let them support the government on political interests. The large projects were not needed but they actually support the business groups, and local villagers affected would be of no concern to them. Korn-uma\(^60\) also said, “If the coal-fired power plant projects are clean or won’t have any bad effects, let them

\(^{56}\) Green World (1994).
\(^{57}\) Interview with a villager (Baan Krut, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
\(^{58}\) Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
\(^{59}\) Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
\(^{60}\) Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
build them in their (the person who said the power plants are clean) home place.”

In the case of environmental degradation, both civil groups attempted to expand this issue into related organizations. For example, Jintana lead more than five busloads of villagers to meet a head of the department of marine sciences at Kasetsart University. The meeting was to ask the marine specialists at the university to study the Baan Krut coast area because the villagers thought that area possibly had good coral reefs and needed to be preserved. The villagers wished to get the specialists to come and survey it, and study it seriously. For the Bor Nork civil group, the Bor Nork villagers were concerned with a similar issue. They publicized pictures of whale sharks and Bryde’s whale near the Bor Nork coast. As a result, Bor Nork raised the issue of preserving the Bor Nork coast as a conservation area.

This study regards environment degradation concerns as an important incentive issue, which called the villagers in both communities into action, in terms of the civil group, from the beginning and these civil groups also kept this issue as a reason to oppose the projects and maintain unity.

The stimuli issue: Dissatisfaction with the state response

The plans for the coal-fired power plant project faced strong resistance from Thai people, especially local villagers. The issue of the negative impacts of the projects seemed to be in question. The information presented to the villagers was unclear. Importantly, the villagers had found different information from that which the state provided.61

The villagers62 revealed that they believed the state was insincere and extremely encouraging towards building these projects, even though the issue of environmental preservation was the essential point of concern. Consequently, they also believed that the state and its agents had to try many ways to carry out these projects. For instance, the state agencies attempted to brainwash the villagers. As Anan63 said, “There were some confrontations in Bor Nork as we (Bor Nork villagers) needed clearer information about the negative impacts of the coal-fired power plant, while the state agent took some

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61 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
62 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
63 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
local politicians and villagers to travel overseas in order to brainwash the villagers. Of course, they brought our friends to show just the good side of the coal-fired power plant.”

He also revealed that it was fortunate that the propaganda trip was unsuccessful since almost all of the villagers who traveled with the agent were still in opposition to the coal-fired power plant project.

The Baan Krut villagers complained that the plan of building this project was not indicated the concerning of the Thai state in the impact on the local villagers. The Thai state was also deceitful, using political propaganda to support the project. According to the researcher attempted to find out that why the coal-fired power plant project in Baan Krut called ‘Hin Krut’ even through this area called ‘Baan Krut’, a Baan Krut villager explained to the researcher that the name ‘Hin Krut’ referred to the submerged rocks along the Baan Krut coast. The response to the villagers argued that this area was useless, but well suited for the project.

Jintana and the group of Baan Krut villagers complained about the state agency attempting to mislead villagers and other Thai people by saying that the Baan Krut coastline has too many reefs and it is a worthless area so the state agency set the project’s name ‘Hin Krut’, which means ‘reef’. It made people confused so people might think the coal-fired power plant can use this area productively. It was the aim of the state and its agency that needed to working on the project by cheating Thai people. Jintana said, “The state doesn’t care that the project would ruin the natural resources or what bad things would happen to us. The state really needed to build the coal-fired power plant so they would do anything, even lie to the world.”

At the beginning, the villagers joined together, just to find out more information about the projects. They then found hidden information, which stimulated them to keep going to find out the facts about the coal-fired plant project. During the formative stage, both civil groups faced several kinds of state actions. The state reactions mostly aroused more villagers to oppose the projects. As Anan talked about the story of Bor Nork civil group, “In fact,
the group at the first meeting was just less than ten villagers, but it got more villagers, such as Charoen, after the government cheated on us.”

Significantly, the villagers believed that the state response seemed to look down on the local people. Sawin, the Bor Nork villager, said, “The government thinks we are such local villagers and must be stupid so they tried to wash our brains.” Whereas, Waree, the Baan Krut villager, said, “The state agents think their money can buy us.” Moreover, Korn-uma revealed that the government had a budget to let the local leaders attend their seminars, which were the negotiation process. However, she also said, “Even though we are local and low educated, the local villagers could see through a trick of the state, and the worst thing the Thai state did to the local villagers who opposed the coal-fired power plant was to incriminate us. The state and the IPP pictured themselves as the developer while the local villagers were framed as hindering the development.”

Similarly, Jintana said the Thai state used aspects of the democratic process surreptitiously: “The government asked the local villagers to use the democratic system so we tried many ways to work on the right track, such as sending a million documents through the formal system under the bureaucratic processes ... but what we did seemed to be meaningless so far. Importantly, the information we have studied on environmental issues went wrong at the end even though we studied with academics, specialists and NGOs, while the government accepted the EIA result without transparency.”

Anan also told the researcher that the villagers thought Thai democracy was flawed due to the actions of the government. The government asked the local villagers to respect the democratic system, but some processes showed that the democratic system went wrong in practice. He said, “We know that to follow the rule would be the right way to find a solution for both sides (state agency and villagers), but it was very stupid, wasn’t it? If the people who went to the public hearing mostly were not the Bor Nork residents ... we need a fair democratic process.”

67 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
68 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
69 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
70 Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
71 Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
72 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
Regarding the issue of the villagers’ dissatisfaction with the state and confrontation, the researcher believes that state reactions appeared to be the vital factor in provoking the villagers in both communities. State reactions, such as using political propaganda or manipulating processes for confrontation between the state and the group of local villagers, stimulated the villagers to expand the group more widely.

The grievance factors of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups
At the beginning, the situation of both civil groups was fine. The villagers came to the meeting just for sharing what information they knew. However, the situation became worse after the state and the groups of villagers had many confrontations. Both civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork, kept following the progress of the projects because of their serious concerns that the projects might begin immediately and it might be too late once they were under way.73

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers had fought to protect their places from the coal-fired power plant projects. Nevertheless, the projects showed no sign of stopping; consequently, there were about 20,000 villagers who marched to the city center of Prachuab Kirikhan province in December 1998. The villagers comprised a big group of protesters who blocked the main road to the south. Unfortunately, there was a violent confrontation between the villagers and hundreds of policeman.74 Anan recalled that it was a serious situation because the local villagers were considered a kind of terrorist. He said, “The small group of villagers had held meetings continually, but the projects were still going on, so we decided to show our standpoint that we definitely don’t need the coal-fired power plant. Not only the Bor Nork villagers came to the protest, the protesters came from everywhere in Prachuab Kirikhan. Sadly, the government ordered the police to attack us.”

Pra Wichit revealed more about the confrontation in 1998; he said at that time some of the villagers could not stay at home or even at the temple,

73 Fieldnotes (Prachuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008).
74 Fieldnotes (Prachuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008).
75 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
76 Group interview (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008).
which was usually the place for group meetings. Samran\textsuperscript{77}, as well, said that his brother Charoen was in danger because he played a very important role as one of the Bor Nork leaders at that time. The Bor Nork villagers\textsuperscript{78} told the researcher that the rising up of the locals occurred inevitably because the villagers were taken advantage of by the government. Prasert\textsuperscript{79}, one of the Bor Nork protesters, said, “We did everything in the hope they would be the right ways in the democratic process. What we have done proved useless so we came to protest because the government never listens to us. If our country is under the democratic system then the government must listen to us, but the government responded to us violently.”

The rising up of the local villagers ended with a compromise. A public hearing for both projects was set. Nonetheless, the villagers were disappointed the government responded violently to them.\textsuperscript{80}

The villagers\textsuperscript{81} said that both public hearings were done dubiously with no Prajuab Kirikhan residents. However, the coal-fired power plant projects were ultimately approved by a cabinet resolution. Afterwards, the state agency attempted to call the villagers to promote the advantages of the coal-fired power plants that the villagers had perceived conversely. As a result, the reconciliation process became more deception for the villagers. There were frequently rough confrontations between the state agency and the villagers. Moreover, the villagers strongly showed that they opposed all the state agency conciliations and kept contact directly with the government.

Jintana\textsuperscript{82} said the representatives of the villagers alternated to go to Bangkok in order to seek repeal of the projects. “We tried to do that for a year. Finally, both Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers went in their thousands to Bangkok a year later.” Korn-uma\textsuperscript{83} also told the same story that her husband Charoen took strong action in the group at that time. He offered to stop leading the villagers but he was denied. Anan also revealed that Charoen, in contrast, worked more dedicatedly for rejecting the projects. “At that time

\textsuperscript{77} Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008).
\textsuperscript{78} Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008).
\textsuperscript{79} Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008).
\textsuperscript{80} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
\textsuperscript{81} Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{82} Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{83} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
Charoen was the brave young man that encouraged a lot of villagers to join the group ... Accordingly, we think that the killing Charoen aimed to eliminate the strongest leader of us, so the group would be weak. In contrast, to kill Charoen wasn’t scary to us but it was a more important reason to keep fighting.”

The villagers\(^84\) revealed that the incompatibility of the state agency and the villagers led to more violent polemics. In 2003, Jintana was sued for trespassing by the state agency, which related to the conflict on the coal-fired power plant project. It was a reminder to the villagers that they needed to respond to the opponents carefully. Significantly, the death of Charoen in 2004 became the most powerful grievance and more reason for the local villagers’ opposition. The group of Bor Nork villagers had met routinely at the Bor Nork temple, in front of the dead body of Charoen.\(^85\) The villagers\(^86\) revealed that they kept fighting for their home place and also for the spirit of Charoen. Korn-uma\(^87\) also said, “At least the death of my husband must be worth making the issue of rights to protect our community to be of more concern.”

In summary, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups originated with social relations. Friends and families were the main relationship types, which supported the villagers to get together and build more connections. In particular, the role of teacher appeared to be important for the group at the beginning. The shared character of the villagers in terms of southern identity underpinned the villagers’ trust of each other and made them voice their opinions, especially regarding opposition to the coal-fired power plant project. Furthermore, the cultural aspect of both civil groups was strongly based on respect for parents. The concern for environment degradation was the incentive factor for the groups’ forming. The state response stimulated the groups to fight for their aims. Besides that, the grievances of the villagers facing violent reactions from the state and its agency, together with losing their leader, were factors that caused the civil group to associate more closely.

\(^84\) Group interview (Baan Krut, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
\(^85\) Fieldnotes (Prachuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008).
\(^86\) Villager meeting (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008).
\(^87\) Villager meeting (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008).
The Development of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Groups

In this section, the study looks into the development of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The research framework is used as the key tool to analyze the groups' development. The study points out how Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers have developed since they formed as groups. To look at the development of both groups, this study also emphasizes the groups' strengthening, which is framed by the groups' structural aspects, actors, interactions and social capital.

Strengthening of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups

The explanation of the development of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups started at the beginning of both groups, which were initiated by a few villagers. The Baan Krut villagers met at a local shop, while Bor Nork villagers joined together at the primary school and then moved to the Bor Nork temple. Both groups had attempted to fight to protect their places and livelihoods since 1996. The civil groups had strengthened gradually a few years later. Baan Krut became a well-known local environmental conservation organization called Group Anurak Baan Krut, and the Bor Nork civil group developed similarly to be called Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork.

The leader of Baan Krut, Jintana88, said the group had become stronger than where they started. “I don’t know how the strengthening of the group developed, but I believe that we are now strong enough to face off the opponents who want to destroy our home. We are ready to show that we have chosen a good and right thing for our hometown ... we have come far. We will not only help our community but also look after others who were harmed by the state.”

In the case of the development of the civil groups, this study explains that the strengthening of the groups developed from just a local group concerned about a local issue to being an organization that can intervene in state decision-making. Similarly, as Korn-uma89 said, the Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork has been developed from a group of local villagers. The protest against the state at the beginning was about rejecting the coal

88 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
89 Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
fired power plant project, but the group currently has more concerns in terms of human rights issues, which are ignored by the Thai state.

Presently, the strengthening of both civil groups has prevented the coal-fired power plant projects. The plans of both projects were cancelled. Even though both civil groups still keep watching for further state action, the civil groups also play a role in helping other communities which are facing similar conflicts.

*The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group structure*

To analyze the structural aspects of the case study, this study focusses significantly on the function and form of the civil group. Regarding this, the form of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups developed in terms of informal organization. They both used personal relationships for building the group from the beginning. Civil group functions also operated informally through social relations and networks.

In the case of the civil group form, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups are organizations without a specific office. These groups operated any place depending on the kind of work to be done. For example, the Bor Nork civil group usually had meetings at the Bor Nork temple, but they met at the home of the village head sometimes. For Baan Krut, Jintana took the researcher to see the place for the group meeting. However, she insisted that it was not an official place to work for the Baan Krut civil group. Importantly, the group mostly worked in several places such as the town hall and her place. An official office was unnecessary for the operation of both civil groups.

The structural aspect of both civil groups was definitely informal. According to Anan, the group of Bor Nork must be identified definitely as an informal organization even though the group tried to establish positions for the villagers in the group. The group of Bor Nork villagers had a simple arrangement in order to support their work productively. Consequently, the Bor Nork villagers started to have a group leader after the protest in 1998. He said, “We just do what we want to do to reach our aim (rejecting the project). We don’t need group management or any kind of organizing. So we just make everything simple; for example, when the group wanted someone to take

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90 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
responsibility for finding a bus, we just asked the villagers in the meeting. Moreover, we can work anywhere and anytime that is comfortable for most of us.”

In a similar way, the Baan Krut civil group developed as an informal organization. The structural aspect of the civil group comprised the local villagers working with local style. Jintana has been playing the role of a leader since the beginning. She believed the Baan Krut villagers worked for the group willingly even though they knew they would experience difficulty. Nevertheless, she confirmed that the group operates through villager unity. She\textsuperscript{91} said, “I think now (2008) the group works much better than when we started even though it is still kind of ‘we just help each other’ but everything seems easier than working formally ... Surely, we must have faced a lot of terrible barriers but I can confirm that nobody says no if we ask them to work for the group.”

Regarding this, the researcher thinks that Baan Krut indicated an informal form of civil group through the ways the villagers associated and worked. Civil group meetings were similar, as they came to have coffee together or visiting friends. Sometimes they came to the civil group meeting, at the same time dealing with their work. For example, a villager came to the meeting to talk about selling pineapples on his farm; he could get two jobs – for himself and for the village.\textsuperscript{92}

In terms of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ organization, the study examines their organization by how the groups operated. In these cases, the researcher noted that the organization of both civil groups operated in two kinds of work. Firstly, these groups worked on documents, particularly, to contact their networks in order to get more information. Accordingly, the groups needed to be proficient at managing and communicating.\textsuperscript{93} However, Jintana\textsuperscript{94} and Korn-uma\textsuperscript{95} told the researcher that they had a similar difficulty in terms of formal communication, which was needed when responding to the state. Korn-uma said, “To contact our networks is fine, but to contact the state

\textsuperscript{91} Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{92} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
\textsuperscript{93} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
\textsuperscript{94} Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{95} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
needed everything to be formal, such as memoranda.” Jintana thought to put the local villagers into the formal system was the way to debilitate the group. She said, “It was the trick of the state because they thought we have less education and are weak so the state forced us to use a formal process. They asked for a memorandum, declarations in terms of documents to show evidence. They are very difficult for us.”

Korn-uma96 said that to contact government institutions, a formal document was needed. Nevertheless, the most difficult work was to get the right channel to talk to government representatives, who have the power to make a decision. She said, “The officers in the state institutions always asked for documents and then said our request was being processed. The cabinet also said they hadn’t seen the issue yet or the issue was in the consideration process.”

Thus both civil groups deal with this difficulty patiently by using their networks, which used their relationships. These groups showed their ability of classifying what jobs they could do by themselves or asked supporters instead. Regarding this, the researcher thinks that these civil groups operated productively even though some of the jobs were done by outsiders, such as to transtate information in English about the plan for projects; the civil groups were not able to do that job, but they could find others to work on it instead. Therefore, the civil groups showed the ability to operate the civil group’s work effectively.

Secondly, the operation of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups indicated in terms of the villagers’ actions. As Korn-uma97 said, the Bor Nork civil group called Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork is a small, local organization. The group seemed to be intangible because it does not have even an office. Nevertheless, the most important feature of both groups focussed on the groups’ actions, which comprised not only how to get large networks for helping them to limit weaknesses, such as the difficulty of low knowledge of legal issues, but group actions also contained the ability to deal with opponents, such as learning the state and the state agency compromise

96 Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
97 Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
processes. This study believes that these showed that both civil groups were able to be pressure groups, which used their collective actions power.98

In the case of villager collective actions, this study looked into the villagers taking action for the civil groups. In particular, the actions that the groups used to pressure the state. The villager actions became the important key for both groups’ operations as their actions were the only way the villagers could present themselves in order to reach their aims. Like, Korn-uma said, “We don’t know what people call us. They probably think we are NGOs. Of course, we run the group without profit but we are not NGOs and not protesters. They will know what we are by looking at what we are doing. All that we are doing is for our community.”

Anan99 also told the researcher that the villager actions also have several levels based on the situation. He revealed that the group meetings had declined in the current year (2008), whereas there were innumerable meetings in previous years. It was because the present situation was hopeful for the villagers and there was no violent confrontation. He also explained that, “In the previous years the villagers had acted together as a group of protesters. The marching to Bangkok and blocking Prajuab Kirikhan province were the villagers’ reactions. All activities to respond to the opponents had been done by local villagers without the others, such as politicians and NGOs.” In the case of the villager reactions, the researcher noted that Anan tried to explain that the villagers’ uprising occurred as a response to the opponents, it was not the civil groups’ aim.

Sureerat100, a local NGO activist, commented on these civil groups, that Baan Krut and Bor Nork villager actions had shown the capability of both groups, which managed their works and roles productively. She said, “The villagers in Baan Krut and Bor Nork could deal with the difficult work in the negotiation process with the state in both direct and indirect ways. I think the villagers in these groups are good at managing their duties and roles, which relate to their responsibilities.”

98 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
99 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
100 Interview with Sureerat (Tub Sa Kae, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 20, 2008).
Similarly, as the Baan Krut villager\textsuperscript{101} said, “It was unnecessary to be in charge in the group all the time. Some roles need to be presented by the leader, and the villagers might need to show power which will be shown by us, just be ready for it.” On this point, Anan\textsuperscript{102} said that the actions of villagers presented the strong goals of the groups. There was a simple rule for the villagers to keep in mind. “We must think about our villages and we aim to protect them. Surely, we must pay for it, spending our personal money and time. However, we know that there nobody forced us to do that.” He also said that the aim of the villagers to protect their land led them to take action for the group willingly.

The civil groups operated casually but with a strong purpose. For Jintana, she thought that all the villager actions and group activities definitely followed the plans of the leaders. However, to reach the villagers’ aim would be the key factor for managing the groups effectively. She\textsuperscript{103} said, “The simple reason that the villagers were keen to take action was they don’t want to lose their good livelihoods.” Regarding this, the civil groups showed that the strong purpose of the groups pushed the villagers to take action in any roles, and the villagers took responsibility accordingly. In this regard, the study determined that the purpose of the groups related significantly to the organizing capability of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The purpose of the civil group was the guideline for the group actions. Consequently, these civil group leaders used the purpose of the groups to be a tool for designing the villagers’ actions. In other words, the purpose of the groups became the key tool for the functioning of group operation.

The structural aspects of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups are difficult to identify due to their informal features. However, this study argues that the structure of these civil groups operated certainly as informal organizations. The functions of the civil groups operated by using the purpose of the group as the guideline for the villagers in playing roles and taking actions. The civil group functions mostly related to document-based communication and the civil groups’ activities and actions. The civil groups

\textsuperscript{101} Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{102} Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{103} Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
organized importantly in terms of coordination or connections. Thus all
functions operated informally by the social connections of the groups.

**Innovation and self-organization of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups**

To examine the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ development, the study looks at the civil groups’ strengthening in terms of the innovation of the groups’ organization, including self-organization. Accordingly, this section explains how the grassroots in both groups created their works and organized their own civil groups relatively.

As we saw in the previous section, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups were established informally by the social capital factor. However, these civil groups not only emerged from the grassroots in the communities themselves, but also were organized by their own knowledge, resources and time. For example, as Jintana 104 (Baan Krut) said, the meetings were at her place. A small shed was beside her local convenience shop. Likewise, Korn- uma105 (Bor Nork) reported that the villagers met mostly at the temple. These places seemed to be the main places for group meetings since 1998. However, the groups had other places for their meeting; for example, Jintana took the researcher to Bang Sa Parn city council hall when collecting data for this research in 2008, whereas Korn-uma showed the researcher around the Bor Nork community to see the other places for their meetings. On this point, this study considers that the issue of places to work implied they were able to both take care of themselves and organize themselves. For the Bor Nork civil group, Anan told the researcher that he once had a meeting with Charoen and other leaders in a small shed beside a big drainpipe. This was during the period of the serious confrontations before Charoen was killed.

The grassroots in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups created the operating system for organizing their group by themselves. The groups created group functions by using their social relations and cultural aspects. The villagers associated in the meeting by their social bonding through social relationships. Consequently, this study deems that getting the villagers to

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104 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
105 Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
associate in the meetings, and the establishment of the civil groups afterwards indicated the innovation of the grassroots in terms of creating a participatory process in local communities. Moreover, the group of villagers also used cultural aspects to support their self-organization; for example, the local and casual lifestyle, which facilitated the meetings to take place anywhere and anytime.106

With support from social capital factors, the civil group meetings were produced by the coordination ability of the villagers. Watcharee107, an NGO activist from Bangkok, who was one of the group consultants, said that the group of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers created the civil groups for protecting their places by themselves. These groups had designed their work and assigned who would take action or responsibility for their plans from the beginning. As well, Sureerat confirmed that both civil groups operated well, even though they needed some support from her and others. The groups mostly needed support in terms of information, documents – particularly documents in English – and in the details of law. Thus these groups operated independently. All the group actions were made by their own decisions. In this regard, the study concludes that these civil groups designed working systems in terms of meeting and coordination related to the social capital in their groups. Furthermore, as the meeting and coordinating ability of the villagers produced civil group actions and activities, the villagers’ actions and activities in the civil groups were consequently a kind of civil group innovation in terms of the self-organizational ability.

Apart from Baan Krut and Bor Nork indicating the innovation of forming and operating their own civil groups, this study also explains that these groups also showed their self-organization through organizing and operating the groups by their own decisions. For example, according to Sureerat108, these Bor Nork and Baan Krut villagers asked the other civil groups for a lot of support. Thus these groups had made decisions without intervention by the others. In this point, both civil groups obviously showed that they have not only the ability to create their operating system, but also to

106 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
107 Interview with Watcharee (Bangkok, May 2, 2008).
108 Interview with Sureerat (Tub Sa Kae, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 20, 2008).
make decisions independently, which means these groups had good self-organizing capabilities.

Moreover, there were the events related to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups that illustrated these groups’ innovations for their self-organization. On this point, the researcher thinks that the organizing innovation and the self-organization definitely showed that the civil group had been developed and strengthened, even though some of the group actions emerged inevitably due to pressure from the opponents. Nevertheless, the group actions or reactions were included in terms of the innovation of the group operating. It was because of the operating system came up with the ways of the civil groups managing all activities, at least were designed by themselves. For example, Anan\textsuperscript{109} said that during the period of time when they had strong confrontation, together with protesting against the state, they needed careful plans to act or respond to the state. He said, “At that time, we had many kinds of strategy in order to fight the opponents. Charoen, other villagers and myself assigned the aspect of mobilization, such as coordination, to Jintana, about how many villagers from Baan Krut; the ways to block the main roads; who will be in charge of the negotiation …We seemed to be a group of soldiers in a war actually.”

He also revealed that the group had developed gradually because the situations surrounding them kept changing all the time so some strategies that used to be helpful might be useless afterwardS. On this point, the researcher thinks that the groups need to create and adjust the group actions in order to strengthen the groups. Like Korn-uma\textsuperscript{110} said, the local villagers realized they must be careful when responding to the state. “We didn’t know how to communicate with the state. To confront the state seemed to be complicated and dangerous so we must be very careful what we are going to do. The state looks at the local villagers as people in a lower class that must follow what they want. However, we showed that we might love our country much more than the politicians who held the state power.”

Even though the Bor Nork civil group created many ways to respond to the state, they mostly responded in terms of documents where they put their

\textsuperscript{109} Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).

\textsuperscript{110} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
claims into the government administration process. However, to promote themselves in public was a group innovation when they reacted to the state. In this regard, the group thus attempted to present itself carefully. For instance, Anan\textsuperscript{111} revealed that the local villagers’ uprising led many people to think that the villagers were terrorists. Nevertheless, the group of Bor Nork villagers tried hardly to rectify that this misleading picture made them out to be the root of the problem. Significantly, the group of villagers thought that to create and design appropriate group actions could strengthen the group progressively. Anan also said, “To fight with the state seemed to be very difficult, so we might make mistakes in our actions easily, such as when Jintana responded illegally to the state agency. Her case was a lesson for us. Also, the death of Charoen reminded us to think and act carefully. At this time, we couldn’t ask anybody to look after us because the state is our enemy so we must take care of ourselves.”

Regarding this, the researcher noted that the struggle of the civil groups was also the reason that innovation in their operating system and self-organized action were needed.\textsuperscript{112}

One of the Bor Nork civil group innovations was the promoting of people’s rights issues in terms of community participation in political decision-making. In the first few years, the issue of the coal-fired power plant projects in Baan Krut and Bor Nork seemed to be a tiny problem. However, the group of local villagers in both communities portrayed these projects to be the state offending by overlooking local voices. Afterwards, the Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork and the group Anurak Baan Krut developed, during the period of conflict, in order to confirm the local groups’ standpoint in terms of popular participation in the political process. Significantly, the idea to build up the local organization to push this issue became a national public concern.\textsuperscript{113}

On this point, Korn-uma\textsuperscript{114} said that the uprising of both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers reminded the other communities to think about their rights to participate in state decision-making. She said, “The state decision on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{111} Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{112} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-May, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{113} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-May, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{114} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\end{itemize}
the coal-fired power plant project was made without the local villagers’ agreement. Likewise, the state made decisions on the Mae Moh coal-fired power plant project, and the Mae Moh villagers have been suffering. We don’t want to suffer and we don’t want to see other communities experience it too.”

The civil groups Rakthongthin Bor Nork and Anurak Baan Krut are also known as local environmental conservation groups. These groups concerned recently about lacking of community participation and human rights issue.

In terms of the Bor Nork civil group innovation, the group of villagers attempted to create a strategy for raising their problem publicly. For example, they kept the body of Charoen at the Bor Nork temple on purpose. It was a group innovation in terms of promoting the issue of a group fighting for participation in political processes, and the civil group raised the case of Charoen’s death to show the flaw in political transparency. The Bor Nork villagers115 said that the meetings operated in front of Charoen’s body as a promise to him that his death would be a worthy lesson for Thai people.

Korn-uma116 revealed that her husband’s family agreed with keeping Charoen’s body at the temple to remind the group of villagers. She said, “His death reminds us to keep going to fight for the community’s rights, the right to protect our home.” Charoen’s younger brother Samran117 said, “His body might say that anyone might give up if they are afraid to die like him. In contrast, we wish that it might push us to work hard for our hometown.” Pra Wichit118, a monk in Bor Nork temple and Charoen’s older brother, said, “He (Charoen) was a good guy and he died to protect our home place. It was unfair for people who were being good. His death should be worthwhile in some way, at least for provoking other Thais to believe that goodness must win.” Nevertheless, Anan119 said that the Bor Nork villagers had been fighting because they believed that the case of Charoen’s death would encourage people to find a solution for land tenure. It was due to the death of Charoen in this kind of the coal-fired power plant project conflict reflected his courage,

115 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
116 Group meeting (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008).
117 Group meeting (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008).
118 Informal interview with Pra Wichit (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 8, 2008).
119 Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
which led people to keep protecting Bor Nork from the project. His death or his bravery would be worth it.

All the group actions were a strategy in order to promote the aim of the villagers in terms of environmental conservation and community participation. In particular, the group of villagers tried to argue that they had the capability to find information and make decisions on their lives. These group actions also created their desire to strengthen the civil group significantly.

In summary, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group innovation is clear from the beginning. The innovation of these civil groups showed as civil groups forming in terms of informal organizations. The groups used the advantages of social capital to link the villagers into the groups. Moreover, they designed the group managing system with their social relationships. The features of the civil group organizing operated in terms of the coordination ability and promoting the civil groups actions. Importantly, the self-organization of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups can be seen as these groups had been operating their own activities independently.

**Actors in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups**

In this study, the factor of actors is one important key to the strengthening of civil groups in the research framework. To clarify the actors in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, the roles of actors will be analyzed. However, the actors in these civil groups can be classified in terms of the members in both communities; the civil group leaders; the activists and the civil group advisors. Each group is explained in the following sections.

**Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group members**

In this study, Baan Krut and Bor Nork ‘civil group members’ refers to the villagers in both communities. Some of the civil group members probably were not resident in these communities but they were related to the communities in some way, such as they had friends and families there. With respect to both civil group memberships, the researcher examined these memberships in the fieldwork of this research. The observations for the civil group meetings found that the members in the meetings were in the same age range – between 25 and 45. The research group discussions, both formal and informal, had members aged 19 to 66 years for the participants.
According to Korn-uma, group membership seemed to be very difficult to identify, and the group had an imprecise number of members. Similarly, Jintana said, “Surely, the members of the group are villagers in our community. We have no idea how many members exactly are in our group. And we believe that the group has members from everywhere because to be a group member has no rule, no need to pay. It is so easy to count you (researcher) to be in our group, if you would like to.”

However, looking at the beginning of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ formation, the members of these groups were definitely the villagers in both communities. The groups’ members also came from social relations in these communities. For example, Jintana revealed that originally group meetings started with a few Baan Krut villagers. She said, “There were my husband, myself and a few friends with their families. I think we didn’t feel like any kind of members or staff of the organization. It was like a family meeting.”

In the same way, the Bor Nork civil group occurred with an informal style, and social relationships were important for engaging group members. According to Anan, the group of villagers came together informally. The meetings contained a small group of local villagers, and they were all Bor Nork residents. He said, “The members in the meetings were mainly families and friends. However, the members increased gradually. I think there was a high number of villagers in the meeting during 2002. It was in the period of time that we had serious confrontation with the government.”

Thus, Anan, Korn-uma and Jintana told the researcher in the same way that group membership currently emphasized agreement with the civil group aims and actions. In particular, the group members must understand the aims of the groups clearly, otherwise the groups might be frustrated. The civil group members also included the villagers outside Bor Nork village, who opposed the coal-fired power plant projects. As Anan said, “For me, the villagers who opposed the coal-fired power plant project were counted as members of the group.”

120 Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
121 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
122 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
123 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
Accordingly, the Baan Krut civil group members encompassed local villagers in Baan Krut, who protested against the coal-fired power plant project. Surapong\textsuperscript{124}, a Baan Krut villager, said, “There were many thousands of villagers and we couldn’t expect that they all agree with opposing the project. I think to join the group is not easy and fun. It is serious work and dangerous.”

In the same way, Chalaew\textsuperscript{125}, a Bor Nork villager, commented on the membership of the Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork. She said, “Anybody could be a group member. However, group membership can be identified by the roles and actions of the member.”

Also, the Baan Krut leader, Jintana\textsuperscript{126}, said that anybody might claim they were a Group Anurak Baan Krut member, and they might come from somewhere else because Baan Krut is now known widely. Regarding this, the researcher notes that these civil group memberships counted community residents, but also group members could be identified by the agreement that they have with the civil groups. The aim of the groups in terms of claiming the people’s right to participate in political decision-making recently became a stimulus to get more members.\textsuperscript{127}

Regarding civil group membership, both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups clarified their memberships by setting out the aim of the groups clearly. The strong aim and group actions were factors for getting more members. The groups were opened widely, especially for any people who agreed with the aims or the group’s point of views. For instance, Jamnong\textsuperscript{128}, a Tub Sa Kae resident, revealed that he and some friends thought they were Baan Krut and Bor Nork members. He said, “I and my friends joined both groups because we admired these groups’ point of views. We claimed that we joined these groups because we are Prajuab Kirikhan residents. We are concerned that the projects will destroy Baan Krut and Bor Nork villages, and they are located in Prajuab Kirikhan. We show this Khon Tai unity because we love our hometown as well.”

\textsuperscript{124} Interview with Surapong (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 8, 2008).
\textsuperscript{125} Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{126} Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{127} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
\textsuperscript{128} Interview with Jamnong (Tub Sa Kae, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 6, 2008).
The researcher noted that Bor Nork participants in the meetings and group discussions for this research were originally connected by Charoen’s siblings and relatives. On this point, Korn-uma129, the widow of Charoen, claimed that they generally had many statuses and roles in their communities. For example, she was Charoen’s wife and she was also a group member. She said, “I and all Charoen family’s members joined the Bor Nork group before the death of Charoen … At least we showed that we joined the group because we were concerned about our village, and the death of my husband was an extra reason afterwards.”

In the same way as the case of Bor Nork, the members of Baan Krut civil group contained members who were mostly friends and family. Thus Jintana130 claimed on this point that group membership was less important to identify. The members of the group required anybody who aims to participate with the group be sincere.

With respect to the membership of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, the researcher clarifies the membership of both civil groups in two kinds of roles. Firstly, the members played a role as the operations team of the civil groups. The group of activists in the villages comprised the members who played vital roles in operating the groups, including the leaders of the groups. For instance, the members in the group meetings have been joined together since the group was formed. Civil group members basically identified with friends and families of the villagers in the communities. The members of the group tended to be more affected by the problems of the issue they fought. These members participated closely and often in group activities.

Secondly, this study sees the civil group members in terms of supporter roles. This kind of member appeared to be anybody who supported the civil group’s aims and actions. This kind of member might join the group in some situation such as marching or the mobilization. Additionally, this explains why the leaders of Baan Krut and Bor Nork claimed that both civil groups have members from everywhere, due to their support for the group’s viewpoint, rather than requiring group membership for participation, in practice.

129 Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
130 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
In this regard, this study raises the point of civil group membership because the clarification of civil group members in two kinds of role implies the civil group operating and organizing, which is significantly related to other factors, such as leadership. For example, Anan\textsuperscript{131} said that the large number of members presented a strong local voice. It worked essentially when the groups needed to pressurize opponents, such as when the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups mobilized in 1998. He said the villagers who mobilized at that time were definitely from Baan Krut and Bor Nork, together with the villagers in the nearby area. On this point, this study argues that membership and the number of group members are related to the group’s efficiency.

In the case of the civil group, members encompassed anybody from anywhere. This means participation in group activities might not be required at face-to-face meetings. In this regard, both leaders, Jintana\textsuperscript{132} and Korn-uma\textsuperscript{133}, said that the groups counted all the group supporters even through the channels of media, linkages and networks. People in all channels that supported the civil groups were implied to be members of the groups. Furthermore, the two leaders also commented on the issue of civil group membership, that the feature of group membership focussed on the ability to raise the issue of the problems to the public, and the groups can seek members to support their groups.

As noted, the members of both civil groups seemed to be young. With respect to this, the researcher links this point to civil group actions and activities that they could support for building group membership. For example, the Bor Nork civil group had their own radio broadcasting station organized by the young civil group members. For the Baan Krut civil group, there was a football team of young civil group members.\textsuperscript{134} Regarding this, Anan\textsuperscript{135} believed that the young civil group members had grown with the perception that looking after their hometown was necessary. He said, “I think some of our young generation participated in their parents’ fight. They had learnt naturally about we have been working for our hometown such as bringing letters to

\textsuperscript{131} Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhon, April 1, 2008).
\textsuperscript{132} Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhon, April 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhon, April 4, 2008).
\textsuperscript{134} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhon, April-May, 2008).
\textsuperscript{135} Group interview (Bor Nork, April 4, 2008).
their families. Radio broadcasting might be just an entertainment activity for the young villagers but it was one way to build a new generation for continually supporting the group.”

On this point, the young members of the Bor Nork civil group\(^{136}\) told the researcher that they grew up seeing their parents participate in the group of Bor Nork villagers. They followed their parents’ work intimately. Apinya\(^{137}\), a young Bor Nork civil group member, said, “I don’t know exactly how to be a group member but I feel very good if I can be. I think it is very cool that I can be the one to do something to protect our hometown like my family used to do.” Regarding this, the researcher views that the new civil group members also came from previous group members. This reflected the continuing of the parents’ values by the young generations.

In brief, the study finds that the informal aspect of Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group structures accordingly employed informal membership. The members of these civil groups were basically made up of the villagers who were residents in these communities. Social relations in the communities were the vital factor for members associated with the groups. However, the roles of civil group members later appeared in terms of ‘supporters of the viewpoint’, while the main group of members played significant roles as a ‘think tank’ in order to operate these civil groups. Moreover, current civil group members played a role in recruiting new members.

**Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group leaders**

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups operated informally. The civil organization structural aspects were flexible in both form and function. These civil groups were comprised of members, also formed by the informal and traditional style. Both civil groups had leaders for their organization. In this study, the leaders are examined, along with some members who played an important role in the civil groups’ decision-making.

At the beginning of the Bor Nork civil group, the group of villagers gathered without a specific leader. As Anan\(^{138}\) said, he was supposed to be the group leader for a while because he was the one who organized the group

\(^{136}\) Group interview with the radio broadcast team (Bor Nork, May 9, 2008).

\(^{137}\) Group interview with the radio broadcast team (Bor Nork, May 9, 2008).

\(^{138}\) Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prachuap Kirikhon, April 1, 2008).
meetings and coordinated the villagers in the group’s activities. Anan said that the Bor Nork civil group operated inconsistently during the first two years. There was no exact plan to even show the government that the Bor Nork villagers strongly disagreed with the coal-fired power plant project. The group of local villagers, however, worked on outlining the consequences of the project without a specific leader.

Anan also said that it was fortunate that when Bor Nork civil group started and had no specific leader was under unserious situation. The group operation focussed mainly on finding out project information and was less concerned with the making of decisions. Nevertheless, in 1998, the situation of the group seemed to be more serious; in particular, the conflict over the coal-fired power plant project caused violent confrontations to occur among the government, the state agency and the group of villagers. As a result, Suchin was chosen by the group of Bor Nork villagers to be the first leader of the group, and Charoen became the leader the next year because Suchin stepped out of the Bor Nork civil group to work as an activist with an NGO.

For the Baan Krut civil group, Jintana139 revealed that the group leader tended to be unnecessary at the beginning. This was due to the group working mostly on finding information. However, she said, “The group of villagers came to work together, and we (Baan Krut villagers) didn’t care who was our leader. In fact, I can’t remember when I was selected to be leader. I think we were more concerned about working productively for the group. I think leader is just a position, it is not important.”

In terms of the importance of the group leader, the researcher raised this point in the group discussions for both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. This study found the views about the civil groups were similar. Firstly, the villagers emphasized the roles of the group leaders, which resulted in significant group benefits. For example, the Baan Krut villagers believed that Jintana was the one Baan Krut villager who worked hard for the group. She was good at group organization and especially well organized at the beginning, which impressed the villagers. Anan140 said he was thought to be the leader because he worked a lot during a difficult time for the group. Suchin, Charoen

139 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
140 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
and Korn-uma became the leaders of the group for the same reason. They worked hard for the group. In particular, their leadership allowed the group to operate efficiently. Anan also said, “Suchin and Charoen played a very important role in organizing the mobilization, which was difficult work for pressuring the government.” On this point, the researcher thinks that coordinating a huge number of local villagers across both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities showed the work efficiency of Suchin, Charoen, Korn-uma and Jintana. For Korn-uma, the researcher thought that the leaders, however, worked with the groups’ agreement and decisions were made by the group. Consequently, the group leadership came from the self-organized efficiency of the groups.

Secondly, the villagers in both civil groups believed that trustworthiness was required for the civil group leader because the civil groups were organizations that operated among conflicts. Significantly, the civil group members participated in the group because they trusted in the aim of the group in terms of protecting their communities. In this case, Anan revealed that there was a Bor Nork villager who acted closely as a leader, and he tried to convince the villagers to accept the project. The villagers knew at the end that the opponents thought he was the leader so they bought him with a big amount of money. From that kind of experience, the villagers thought trustworthiness was an important factor for organizing the civil group and for the group leaders in particular.

Also, the Baan Krut villagers commented in terms of trust in the group leader – that it was the most important requirement for being the leader of the group, as leader trustworthiness contributed to member cooperation and the efficiency of the group. As Werasak, a Baan Krut villager, said, “I and other villagers came to join the group because we trusted in the information provided by Jintana. Afterwards, we trusted in what she has done for the group.” Sutin said about Jintana that: “She was very brave

141 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
142 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
143 Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
144 Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
145 Interview with Sutin (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
to fight with the project owner.” Prapa\textsuperscript{146} said that the villagers kept joining the group because they trusted Jintana’s leadership. She also said, “We saw Phi Noi (Jintana) had to work in opposition to the project. She didn’t get any money but was in danger.” In this regard, the researcher concludes that the leader built trust through working for the group. The strong roles of the leaders in terms of focussing on community benefits resulted in leader trustworthiness.

Thirdly, with respect to the aspect of informal organization in a Thai traditional style, the seniority of the traditional leader is supposed to be focussed on choosing the civil group leaders. Nonetheless, the researcher noted that the leaders of both civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork, were young. However, the villagers’ group discussions indicated that the issue of leader age was dwarfed by the leader’s efficiency. Pittaya\textsuperscript{147}, the oldest Baan Krut villager in the group discussion, revealed that the leader’s age had never been an issue in group meetings. He said, “I think it is good, maybe much better, to have a young leader. Seniority isn’t required for being a leader anymore.” Similarly, Anan\textsuperscript{148} said that the Bor Nork civil group had good experience with group leaders recently. He said, “Charoen was very keen to talk to the opponents face to face. He was very brave. For Karok (Korn-uma), she works as hard as a man even though she is just a young lady. Karok knows how to approach the government representatives and develop more networks ... It is because they are young that they did these kinds of work better than me. I am too old to follow changes in the world.”

In this regard, the researcher concludes that leadership esteem must emphasize the leaders’ intentions. The strong intention of the leaders showed through the leader roles and actions, which ultimately developed respect for the leaders.

Fourthly, civil group leaders worked productively with official community leaders. Commnity leaders such as Pu Yai Baan and Kamnan\textsuperscript{149} had supported the civil group leaders in many ways, especially for connecting people in the villages. It showed the leadership efficiency of these civil groups.

\textsuperscript{146} Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{147} Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{148} Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{149} Kamnan= แกนนำ
Kamnan Jua\textsuperscript{150}, the Baan Krut community leader, revealed that Jintana is a Baan Krut villager who is an ordinary member but she is a leader for the civil group. He said, “I am a community leader officially, but I am just a member of the group Anurak Baan Krut and Jintana is my boss … I admired her because she worked dedicatedly for the group even though it is difficult and dangerous work.”

In addition, the study determined that official community leaders participated mostly in the civil group. Korn-uma\textsuperscript{151} revealed that there were 13 or 14 Bor Nork community leaders who joined the civil groups, and all of them played an important role as coordinating members. For the Baan Krut civil group, Jintana\textsuperscript{152} told the researcher that the leader of the Baan Krut civil group seemed to also be the leader of the Baan Krut community. She said, “I have no problem with being the leader. Most of the community leaders supported the group activities and they accepted my role.” Moreover, she confirmed that the traditional leaders and the official leaders encouraged her to work as the leader of the group by giving suggestions and building wider networks productively. “I would say that I could not be the leader without their support.”

Likewise, Korn-uma\textsuperscript{153} also said, “I am just the villagers’ representative. The other leaders (traditional leaders and official leaders) or any villagers can be the leader of the group.” Also, Jintana\textsuperscript{154} revealed that the group attempted to push group members to be elected as local politicians so there were some members working with the civil group cooperatively. In this regard, the civil groups illustrated that some official government leaders were linked to the civil group leadership and facilitated civil group leaders to work efficiently.

Fifthly, the researcher noted that the image of female leaders of both civil groups underpinned the civil groups’ strategy for promoting local groups publicly. In particular, both civil group leaders, Jintana and Korn-uma, have the image of a strong female leader, who had fought to protect their local

\textsuperscript{150} Interview with Kamnan Jua (Baan Krut, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 22, 2008).
\textsuperscript{151} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{152} Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{153} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{154} Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prachuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
communities. In terms of this, a central government officer told the researcher that the images of Jintana and Korn-uma seemed to be heroine symbols for the local community, which is in conflict with the government. They are known as strong leaders and became idols for other local groups, providing an opportunity to get more networks by promoting the groups to the public.

In brief, the leaders of Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups originated informally based self-organization. Their civil group leadership emphasized the leaders’ roles, which were produced through the actions and activities of the groups. The civil group leaders required trustworthiness as it related to concerns about community benefits. The traditional and official leaders facilitated teamwork for the leader even though both civil group leaders were female and young. They, however, could be respectable leaders for the civil groups.

**The activists in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups**

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups were formed by local villagers. The structure of both civil organizations appeared to be informal, and the civil groups organized themselves independently. In this regard, the case study is associated slightly with the activists. Thus, this study refers to those activists involved with the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups recently.

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups fortunately learnt a similar lesson from early problems. Vanida, the well-known activist of the Pak Mun case, was one of activists associated with these civil groups since the group formed. Nanthachote told the researcher that Vanida gave other local groups a lot of suggestions over the years. In the case of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, Anan said that Vanida had supported the group of Bor Nork in terms of providing detailed information of the project to the villagers. “She said that the villagers should know what will happen to their life and they should decide what they want to do. If the local people oppose the government without understanding the consequences, they would be just a group of local people who are called anti-government and anti-development.”

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155 Fieldnotes from the meeting with central government officers (Bangkok, Feb. 10, 2008).
156 Interview with Nantachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
Korn-uma\textsuperscript{157} revealed that Vanida was a respected person for her and Charoen, her husband. Vanida encouraged Charoen to lead the mobilization in 1998, and she always reminded Charoen to be safe all the time. In terms of civil group activation, she came to visit and joined the group meetings sometimes. Jintana\textsuperscript{158} thought Vanida was also a respected person, especially as she worked dedicatedly for the poor. However, Vanida only acted as a consultant and gave moral support to the civil group.

According to Anan\textsuperscript{159}, Suwit Watnoo was the only activist engaged with the Bor Nork civil group during the group formation. He joined the villagers’ group as an activist interested in the issue of human rights. Anan also said that Suwit was involved closely with group activities yet he never played a key role in any group decision-making. Suwit finally joined the AOP, which meant he was an NGO leader. “Suwit joined us closely as a member while he was a member of an NGO. Later he decided to be a part of the AOP and attempted to link us to the AOP but we declined it.” Apart from Suwit, Jintana, Korn-uma and Anan, all confirmed to the researcher that the civil groups were linked just a little to activists. Korn-uma\textsuperscript{160} said, “Even though we learnt from other cases of problems such as the Pak Mun and Mae Moh communities, there were no community leaders who played roles in our groups. We just had discussions sometimes, and mostly by phone.”

Likewise, Anan\textsuperscript{161} said, “We talked to Kanchana\textsuperscript{162}, the activist and leader of the Mae Moh civil group, but it was not about operating or organizing the group.” Whereas Jintana\textsuperscript{163} commented on the roles of activists in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, that there were no activists involved in these civil groups. In contrast, some of these civil group members and leaders have been activists in other civil groups recently. In this regard, these civil groups showed that activists played a less important role for these civil groups at the strengthening stage. The role of the activists mostly appeared to be as supporters and consultants for these civil groups.

\textsuperscript{157} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{158} Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
\textsuperscript{159} Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
\textsuperscript{160} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{161} Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
\textsuperscript{162} Maliwan Nakawiroj, a leader of the group of villagers, who suffered by Mae Moh coal fired power plant in Lampang province.
\textsuperscript{163} Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ advisors

The advisors to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in this study comprised academics who engaged these civil groups in terms of providing information and suggestions.

Apart from the activists, the academics from universities also played a role as advisors for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The first interview of this study with Jintana was when Jintana led a group of villagers to the Department of Marine Sciences at Kasetsart University. At that time, the civil group needed to get official support. Some university staff had been engaged with the civil groups previously. Jintana and Korn-uma told the researcher that they met Assistant Professor Dr. Thon Thamrongnawasawat, a marine-science lecturer in the Faculty of Fisheries at Kasetsart University, several times. Both civil groups thought that Dr. Thon could be the one to help them protect their places from the destruction of the coal-fired power plant projects. However, Dr. Thon revealed to the researcher that he suggested the villagers contact Kasetsart University formally. This was to assign him officially to provide specific information about the consequences of the projects, in particular, the effect on natural resources and environmental preservation.

Dr. Thon also commented on the issue of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers’ fight over rejecting the coal-fired power plant project and that the villagers needed to get more information in terms of the resource area in Prachuab Kirikhan province. He said, “I hoped that academic research could be the argument for preserving this area from the degradation of the project.” In this regard, the role of academics such as Dr. Thon indicated that they specifically supplied academic information for these civil groups due to these civil groups thought they have inadequate academic knowledge.

The role of the academic seemed to be to support the civil groups only in terms of scientific data. The villagers, however, thought that the scientific data from academic research could be essential evidence for rejecting the project. As Jintana said, “We didn’t expect that the academics would join us.

164 Fieldnotes (Bangkok and Prachuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008).
165 Interview with Dr. Thon Thamrongnawasawat (Bangkok, March 2, 2008).
166 Interview with Jintana (Bangkok, March 2, 2008).
The academic research provided data for helping the villagers to show people that the government had made a bad decision. Especially over the coal-fired power plant that will destroy our rich natural resources.”

Hence, Dr. Thon and the team of academics from Kasetsart University appeared to be the main group of advisors, who encouraged the development of civil groups. Both civil groups used scientific data to support the issue of natural resource degradation. Nonetheless, Jintana and Korn-uma said in the same way that there were some masters level students from several Thai universities who studied the issue of both Baan Krut and Bor Nork. Jintana also said, “Actually, the students’ studies were no help to the group. It was because they came and left and no one came back to provide any support afterwards.”

Anan said that the academics, such as the lecturers, researchers and university students, involved provided no help for the group of Bor Nork villagers, particularly, in terms of operating the group. However, he accepted that the scientific data from the team of academics from Kasetsart University was crucial evidence to help the civil group respond to the state reasonably. “We had scientific reasons to preserve our places and argue that the projects are dangerous ... and it was why we must protest the project.” Additionally, from group discussion the villagers also thought in a similar way that the Kasetsart University academics were the most vital advisory team for the civil groups. They thought academic research was an important strategy for the civil groups in order to promote the issue of the Hin Krut and Bor Nork coal-fired plant projects to be more broadly concerned. A Baan Krut villager told the researcher that, “We know the reason that we protested the project for, otherwise we look like stupid villagers since we opposed the investor.”

In this regard, the study found that the role of the academics supported the civil groups’ development indirectly. The academics assisted the civil groups in terms of information that the civil groups used for their operations, even though there was no advising in terms of the development of the civil

167 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
168 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).
169 Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
170 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
171 Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
groups directly. The information and scientific data of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork areas that was provided by the academics as researchers became a key tool of the civil groups to rely on and encourage civil groups to ultimately be strengthened.

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ supporters and funding

The groups of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers are clarified as civil organizations which also operated as non-profit organizations. Likewise, the study explained that these civil groups emerged informally and were community based. The funding and facilities of the civil groups were mainly supported by their own members. Apart from that, both civil groups received some funding from government projects.

According to the head of regional level government officers in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment\textsuperscript{172}, the groups of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers must be supported by the NGOs. These officers believed that it was impossible that a group of local villagers would be able to survive without outside support. The local government officers in Prajuab Kirikhan\textsuperscript{173} thought there were some NGOs and local businesses that supported these groups, because the groups seemed to operate without difficulty. In this regard, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups must have been sponsored by other organizations, in the government officials’ view.

To explain that the main funding of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups came from their own members, Anan\textsuperscript{174} revealed that the Bor Nork civil group basically worked through members’ support. The support referred to money and other facilities they gave to the group. He said, “In fact, we, I mean the group of Bor Nork villagers, didn’t need much money to run our group. We worked at the school or temple and had no need to pay for staff. We used our own cars or motorcycles. We can share or borrow some facilities in working for the group.”

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\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{172} Interview with the government officer, Department of Environmental Quality Promotion (Bangkok, March 4, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{173} Interview with the local government officers (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2-8, 2008).
\item \textsuperscript{174} Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
\end{enumerate}
\end{small}
Also, the villagers\textsuperscript{175} said that group meetings took place with no cost. Similarly, a Baan Krut villager said there was nothing to pay for the meetings. He thought that to join the civil group might cost a little more than the usual cost of living. “I joined the group from the beginning. I only paid for motorbike fuel.” Also, a female villager of Baan Krut\textsuperscript{176} said she was the one who usually sponsored drinks and snacks for the meetings. “I didn’t think these were a cost for the group meetings. They were like I treated my family and friends.”

The Bor Nork civil group saved funds for future group activities. Korn-uma\textsuperscript{177} revealed that the group definitely had no income, as it is a non-profit organization. She revealed that funding for the group came from members’ donations. “We didn’t have any good funding management because it is just a small amount of money. We just recorded what we spent and where we got it.” Pratiew\textsuperscript{178}, a Bor Nork villager and one of the members who worked for the group on its funding management team, told the researcher that the group of villagers had the idea to manage the money of the group. She revealed that she worked as kind of group treasurer. This work was needed for group members in order to manage the group’s treasury well, even though the group only had a small amount of money. Thus the group was not run as a business so the funding management just related to the group’s revenue and expenses, which could be managed easily and transparently. Moreover, the study found that the Bor Nork civil group treasury account was activated in 2013.\textsuperscript{179}

For the Baan Krut civil group, Jintana\textsuperscript{180} revealed that funding management seemed unnecessary to the Baan Krut civil group. She said, “We accepted that we don’t have a group financial system ... We used to think about it but we decided to do without funding during normal situations, and we are sure that it is not difficult to get funding when we need it.”

Also, the Baan Krut villagers\textsuperscript{181} gave more information in terms of the group’s funding – that they donated money to the group willingly when they

\textsuperscript{175} Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{176} Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
\textsuperscript{177} Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{178} Interview with Pratiew (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{179} Phone interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, December 10, 2013).
\textsuperscript{180} Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{181} Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
went to Bangkok and the donation was for the trips of the civil group. Apart from that, the villagers said they had shared in the expenses of group activities sometimes. Nonetheless, they insisted that money had never been a problem for running the group.

In this case, both civil groups have the same style of funding. The funding of the Baan Krut civil group also was earned by fundraising and donation along the same lines as the Bor Nork civil group. Anan\textsuperscript{182} said most fundraising of the Bor Nork civil group was during 2002 when group representatives went frequently to government meetings in Bangkok. The funding was mostly spent on travel. Afterwards, group activities appeared to cost nothing; otherwise the villagers would take a share in the expenses voluntarily. Likewise, the Bor Nork villagers\textsuperscript{183} told that they might only pay for coffee or tea at the group meeting. A villager\textsuperscript{184} said, “It was a very low cost compared with getting our work done. It was worth it to pay just a little so we could keep our village clean.” Moreover, some villagers\textsuperscript{185} told the researcher confidently that the group could get funding support in some ways because the villagers thought the donation to the civil group was like paying to protect their livelihoods. The villagers must be ready to support the group in terms of giving donations, sharing in expenses or raising funds.

Additionally, both civil group leaders\textsuperscript{186} revealed that there was some funding support by government institutions. However, all funding support appeared to be in order to participate in government projects. For example, Korn-uma\textsuperscript{187} said that she attended the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) seminar many times. There were some campaigns to support citizen participation provided by the MNRE, which related to the groups’ roles and there was some funding supported from these campaigns. Consequently, the group decided to participate in those campaigns not only to get the support funding but, significantly, to take the opportunity of joining the government reconciliation processes. She said, “In fact, we accepted the support funding from the state because we aimed to let them (the Thai state)}

\textsuperscript{182} Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{183} Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{184} Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{185} Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
\textsuperscript{186} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
\textsuperscript{187} Interview with Korn-uma (Bangkok, May 2, 2008).
know our (the group of villagers) viewpoint.” Likewise, the Baan Krut civil group leader, Jintana\textsuperscript{188}, also said, “We received just a small amount of money from the government to support the campaign. To be honest, the money from the state couldn’t allow our group to survive. I just want you to be clear where the group can get money.” In this regard, funding by government institutions appears to be insignificant to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ existence.

Also, Jintana\textsuperscript{189} told the researcher in early 2014 that the Baan Krut civil group has been operating without a conflict of interest. It might be due to the empty bank account of the group. She thought money could be a source of conflict so the Baan Krut civil group agreed to have fundraising only if necessary rather than collecting any funds. She said, “I think it was not our aim of the group to collect money even though it might be a good way to manage the group treasury. Thus, the group worked without fundraising for the last few years and it wasn’t a problem.” Similarly Thanom\textsuperscript{190}, a Bor Nork civil group member, revealed that the group had no more treasury management because the group has been operating only ordinary activities, which had focussed on meetings and monitoring environmental preservation. There were no extraordinary activities, such as marching or mobilizing, that incurred high costs for the civil group. As a result, the Bor Nork civil group agreed with the cancelation of the civil group bank account because they thought it was unnecessary.

In summary, the issue of funding appeared to be of little concern for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The revenue of each group came mainly from fundraising and donations. Basically, the civil group members took a share in the expenses of the group’s activities. Fundraising and donations were usually required for any extraordinary activities. Moreover, the civil groups indicated that occasionally they had a small amount of funding support from state institutions.

\textsuperscript{188} Interview with Jintana (Bangkok, March 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{189} Phone interview with Jintana (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 21, 2014).
\textsuperscript{190} Phone interview with Thanom (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 15, 2014).
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group interactions

In this section, the study focusses on Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group interactions, as civil group interactions, considered to be one of the main factors relating to civil group development. The study explains the horizontal and vertical interactions that the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups are involved in.

The horizontal interactions of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups

To consider the horizontal interactions of the civil group, this study looks at the activities and communications of the civil groups, where they are connected to other organizations. The study also identified as horizontal interactions the regional level of civil group interactions that contained other civil groups, local NGOs and local state institutions.

Basically, civil group interaction occurred between the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The forming of Baan Krut followed the formation of the Bor Nork civil group, which the Bor Nork villagers had already established. Anan\(^{191}\) said that a group of Baan Krut villagers contacted him immediately after the coal-fired power plant project in Baan Krut had been announced. Afterwards, Baan Krut initiated group meetings between the two in order to discuss the project. Both civil groups began cooperating in the sharing of information. Sometime later, Jintana and the Baan Krut villagers came to visit and join the Bor Nork meetings.

Jintana\(^{192}\) also explained that the interactions between the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups were mostly supportive of each other in terms of information. She said, “We worked independently. Bor Nork is one group, and Baan Krut is another. However, we knew that we needed to work together sometimes; for example, marching to Bangkok. Otherwise, the government wouldn’t hear the small group’s voice.”

Thus the interaction of the two civil groups was due to extraordinary activities; for example, the villagers mobilizing in 1998, and later traveling several times to Bangkok, in 2002, with a huge number of both of the civil

\(^{191}\) Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\(^{192}\) Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 8, 2008).
groups’ members. Moreover, the interaction between the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups also often occurred frequently in state conciliation processes. As Jintana said, “I and Karok (Korn-uma, the Bor Nork civil group leader) met incidentally sometimes in the government meetings. And we connected regularly in order to deal with the state and state agencies. At least, we seemed to have a little bit more power than dealing with them alone.”

Similarly, Korn-uma thought that to connect with other civil groups was what was necessary for the Bor Nork civil group. She revealed that, “Baan Krut has been facing the same problem as us. We are sometimes known as the same group as we presented our standpoints in the same way. However, to connect with each other raised the focus of our problem to be of greater interest to people.”

She also told the researcher that the collaboration of Baan Krut and Bor Nork was an important factor that led to the construction of the coal-fired power plant projects being deferred. The cooperation of the two groups of villagers seemed to have more power to pressure the state.

Similarly, Anan revealed that Baan Krut and Bor Nork worked closely throughout 1998 to 2002, particularly when the villagers mobilized in 1998, and traveling to Bangkok in 2002. At that time, the undertaking of the group connections were mostly led by Charoen. Apart from the group of Baan Krut villagers, the Bor Nork civil group also attempted to connect to the villagers in other communities in Prajuab Kirikhan province, such as Tab Sa Kae and Kui Buri communities. Anan said, “There were more people from other villages. They all thought that they should help us because they would need us to join them one day. For example, the Tab Sa Kae villagers consulted us afterwards once they heard that the state planed to build a dam in their place.”

Likewise, the connection of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups with other civil groups continued to develop. In 2008, the researcher joined meetings that involved collaboration between the Baan Krut and Bang Sa Parn civil groups. At that time, pressure for the coal-fired power plant construction

193 Fieldnotes (April-May, 2008).
194 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 8, 2008).
195 Interview with Korn-uma (Bangkok, May 2, 2008).
196 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
project had lessened, whereas a large steel industry project was planned in Bang Sa Parn. A Bang Sa Parn villager, Supoj, attempted to lead the Bang Sa Parn villagers to petition the government to reconsider the planned project. Supoj told the researcher that the Bang Sa Parn villagers were very keen to form the group because they were concerned about the impact of the large steel industry project, and environmental degradation, in particular.

Additionally, both civil groups participated in establishing other small civil groups around Prajuab Kirikhan. For instance, a group of Ow Noi villagers formed a civil group called the group of motherland conservation (Anurak Baan Kert group). Pachern, the group leader, said that the idea of forming the conservation group was learned from the former well-known civil groups, namely Baan Krut and Bor Nork. Similarly, the conservation and development of a wetlands group from Sam Roi Yod also emerged in the same way. These civil groups engaged with the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in terms of becoming a civil alliance in order to interact with the state and state agencies.

As mentioned previously, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups cooperated not only with other civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan, but also interacted with other civil groups, which have similar aims and activities around Thailand. For example, civil groups opposed the coal-fired power plant project in Kra Bi, Chumporn. The Kra Bi civil group coordinator, Sakkamon, said cooperation among some former civil groups was very helpful for the grassroots in responding to the state’s project implementation. He referred to the cases of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in terms of being the model of how to protect communities from being destroyed by coal-fired plant projects. Moreover, there were other civil groups in the south of Thailand that had become related, initiated by the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group networking with other groups.

197 Supoj Songseang is the leader of Bang Sa Parn civil group.
198 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, May 2008).
199 Interview with Supoj (Bang Sa Parn, May 20, 2008).
200 Phone interview with Pachern (January 11, 2011).
201 Phone interview with Sakkamon (Kra Bi, April 9, 2008).
Additionally, the extending of the civil groups’ network nationally was an important strategy of civil group development. Jintana\textsuperscript{202} revealed that she engaged the Baan Krut civil group with other civil groups by trying to build more networks. She said, “I have been connected myself as a Baan Krut civil group leader in order to get more power. At least the local villagers could develop stronger power to support each other at the conciliation process with the state.” Consequently, it can be seen that the Baan Krut civil group strategically attempted to build wider networks at the national level.

Interaction with other civil groups seemed to be based on the idea of civil group strengthening. According to Maliwan\textsuperscript{203}, the leader of Mae Moh villagers who were affected by the coal-fired power plant project, the case of Mae Moh could be seen as a tragic lesson in state mismanagement. The coal-fired power plant project resulted in hazards surrounding Mae Moh community. She said - the Mae Moh villagers had not been formed into a civil group at that time, although she had been a representative of the villagers in order to interact with other civil groups and other parties. In particular, she participated in the state conciliation processes, together with Baan Krut and Bor Nork leaders, many times. She also said, “I think we (groups of villagers or civil groups) need to be connected in order to make people power stronger.” The group of Mae Moh villagers had presented themselves as a civil group, and this civil group was one part of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group network.”

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups have nationwide interactions. However, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups had no interaction with local NGOs. Both civil group leaders insisted that the local NGOs had never been involved with their groups. Also, the civil groups’ members revealed in the same way that it was inappropriate to engage with any NGOs. It was due to them thinking that NGOs might have hidden agendas, because they were mainly supported by the state. As a result, they believed that the NGOs possibly represented part of the state apparatus.\textsuperscript{204} In the case of interaction with local NGOs, Jintana from Baan Krut and Anan from Bor Nork both

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{202} Phone interview with Jintana (Prajuab Kirikhan, May 21, 2014).
\item\textsuperscript{203} Phone interview with Maliwan (July 12, 2013).
\item\textsuperscript{204} Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008) and Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\end{itemize}
commented that both civil groups involved several interest groups and so could not provide backing for any NGOs or other organizations, because there could develop conflicts of interest, and so trust was not possible.205

Regarding this, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups both show that their horizontal interactions comprised of collaborations between Baan Krut and Bor Nork, together with other civil groups around Prajuab Kirikhan. Additionally, both civil groups also engaged with civil groups right across Thailand and scarcely interacted with local NGOs and local government.

The vertical interactions of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups

In the case of vertical interaction, both civil groups indicated a little interaction with NGOs and state institutions at the vertical level.

The Bor Nork civil group leader, Korn-uma206, revealed that the interaction of the Bor Nork civil group with national NGOs seemed to be scarce due to there being a lack of trust in other parties outside of the civil group. However, a little vertical interaction emerged through interaction with one NGO staff member named Watcharee (Pum).207 Watcharee belonged to a small NGO called ‘The Study of Alternative Energy Group’. Watcharee was the only NGO staff member involved with the civil groups. The civil groups acknowledged her as part of the network because Watcharee used to be Vanida’s co-worker.208 Korn-uma209 said, “Phi Pum was a channel for getting wider information. I didn’t think about her as being in an NGO or whatever she is, because we just needed more connections.”

As for the Bor Nork villagers, they thought their individual connections facilitated more networks. For them, interaction between the villagers and NGOs seemed unnecessary. They also mentioned that Watcharee was the only NGO staff member who connected to the Bor Nork civil group, but as a trusted friend. One villager210 said, “Actually, we never trust any NGOs because they are possibly backed up by some companies, so none of the NGOs dare to

205 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
206 Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
207 Interview with Watcharee (Bangkok, May 2, 2008).
208 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).
209 Interview with Korn-uma (Bangkok, May 2, 2008).
210 Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
connect to us.” Nevertheless, they thought that to connect with Watcharee benefited them, by getting them more allies in the network, even though she is in an NGO. They believe in friendship, which they consider can establish better interactions. They considered that the bonding of friendship creates connections to support the civil group developing into a higher level.

Watcharee told the researcher that she had become involved with both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups to provide them with recommendations. She said interactions mostly related to information exchange and participating in conferences. She accepted that the villagers in both communities have a negative impression of NGOs. Consequently, the interaction between her, as a member of an NGO, and these groups of villagers seemed to be less than with other groups. However, she insisted that the bonding among them showed itself in friendship, which at least resulted in helping them to get more friends in order to build civil group networks. Moreover, the study found that The Study of Alternatives Energy Group is a very small NGO even though it operates at a national level. Overall, these civil groups showed only a very thin line of interaction with NGOs at a national level.

The interaction with state institutions by the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups was also identified as a civil group development factor in this study. On this point, the Baan Krut civil group leader, Jintana, said the Baan Krut civil group had scarcely been connected to central government because projects provided by the Thai state seemed to be merely propaganda campaigns. She said, “There were some projects from the state that tried to show that the state was concerned about conflicts, whereas we found that the projects were mainly supported by state enterprises. Moreover, villagers such as myself have had a lawsuit that I would say that having ‘lawsuite’ is how we interact with state.”

Similarly, the villagers of the Bor Nork civil group talked about this issue in meetings. They were concerned that some of the state projects were possibly seeking to interfere with the work of the civil group. A villager said,

211 Interview with Watcharee (Bangkok, May 2, 2008).
212 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prachuab Kirikhan, May 8, 2008).
213 Group meeting (Bor Nork, Prachuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008).
“The state projects have activities to support us to protect our community, in particular, in the case of making our homeland clean. In contrast, the state still pushes the coal-fired power plant project, which is known as dirty and would destroy our home.”

Additionally, the Baan Krut villagers said there were, however, many kinds of activities from central government created to encourage local participation. For instance, the state campaign to provide training courses in resources and environmental management to volunteers. This project was provided to the villages by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE). The Baan Krut villagers participated in this project, and later related projects. A villager, Sutin214, said, “We hoped that the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment would be part of central government, which realized and understood the local villagers’ action in order to protect our resources and environment. We want the MNRE to take our side, even though we are scared the project might have some hidden agenda.”

The Bor Nork civil group also has a similar opinion. The group of Bor Nork villagers talked about their interactions with central government, saying there was some collaboration between the villagers and the Thai state. Kornuma215 told the researcher that, “The cooperation of the Baan Krut villagers seemed to be running smoothly on small, good projects. In contrast, the huge bad project of the coal-fired power plant still has been in conflict, so I would say there is no interaction … and we (herself on behalf of the Bor Nork civil group) believe that the connection with the state is very complicated due to the conflict of interest on one large project.”

The participation of the civil group in small projects with the state and the conflict with the large state project showed the impaired interaction of the Bor Nork civil group with central government. Notwithstanding this, the villagers thought that the connection from participation in state projects benefited the civil group. In particular, they saw it as a way to build networks for serving the civil group in the future. The conflict in relation to the large coal-fired power plant project needed to be solved in a different way in the

214 Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
215 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
conciliation process. As a result, civil group and state interactions appeared to be having more arguments than collaboration at this stage.\textsuperscript{216}

In brief, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups indicated two kinds of interactions with central government. Firstly, there were civil group interactions in terms of participating in policy implementation provided by state institutions. Secondly, there were civil groups’ interactions with central government expressed as responses against the coal-fired power plant project.

**The social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups**
Social capital plays an important role as a development factor of the civil groups in this study. The research framework has two points of view with which to explain the relationship of social capital to civil society. The first point of view indicates how social capital is created by civil society, and the second, how social capital is created from civil society.

Following the research framework, this study has thus far mainly focussed on the exploration of how civil society becomes established, which resulted in a study of social capital in the case studies. However, the opposing direction of how the civil groups are a cause of social capital is also important. The distinction between the two directions and how they are both involved in the development of civil groups is able to be analyzed by considering two kinds of social capital: the internal social capital factors, and social capital factors outside the civil groups.

**Internal factors of social capital within the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups**
In this study, social capital factors are considered to provide encouragement. This is how the causes of the growth of civil society are analyzed. Regarding internal social capital, it is encompassed primarily by individual social capital. This is what will be emphasized.

Social capital within the civil group was already present when the civil groups started; for example, the reciprocity during the villagers’ participation in civil group activities. As Pratew\textsuperscript{217} said, “We exchanged help to look after our garden while others went to join the group in the city.” In the same way,
the Baan Krut civil group members took turns to provide their place and food for the civil group meetings.218

It was the trust among the civil group members that was the aspect of social capital that grew and was also the root factor for civil group development. According to the Baan Krut leader, Jintana219, trust was the most essential factor since the formation of the group, right up to the present. She also said, “The Baan Krut civil group could not work on protecting our communities from the dirty power plant project; the villagers in the group could not be trusted. Because we might die like Charoen, due to resisting the interests of someone, it was very dangerous. So we must be confident that our group members can be trusted.”

For the civil group to operate there had to be trust, which gave the villagers confidence to participate in civil group activities. As Korn-uma220 revealed, the villagers in the Bor Nork civil group understood the danger of becoming involved in conflicts of interest. The death of Charoen was an example to remind them, and everybody was reminded that they could step out of the group at anytime. However, the Bor Nork villagers still maintained their relationships to take care of the community, right up till the present. Regarding this, the researcher notes that social capital in terms of trust appeared continually from the establishment phase through to the development stage.

Social capital in terms of values and norms emerged in the civil group during the development phase. Anan221 told the researcher that teenagers in the Bor Nork community seemed to be proud of the Bor Nork civil group’s reputation. What the civil group had done so far made them the heroes of the hometown in the young villagers’ eyes. Similarly, the researcher notes that the significance of the civil group’s values can be seen by how the villagers generally, in both Bor Nork and Baan Krut, were proud of their civil groups’ reputation, in terms of being a strong community able to stand up for local people’s rights. In particular, Charoen was respected as a hero of the local

218 Group meeting (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008).
219 Group meeting (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
220 Group meeting (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008).
221 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
people, because he died to protect their hometown, while Jintana appeared to be a symbol of a strong woman who fights for local rights.222

A consequence of civil group values is that the pride in the civil group’s reputation motivated the villagers to keep participating in civil group activities. Pra Wichit223 explained that the reputation of Charoen and the group of Bor Nork villagers were valued by the young generation in Bor Nork village and became established norms for the operation of the civil group. He said, “I’m glad to see the young people in Bor Nork keen to join together as a resource and environmental conservation group. The young villagers seemed to be proud of the Bor Nork civil group honor and like to continue the ideal of protecting the village.” In terms of this, the researcher notes that the values of civil group reputation generated a kind of norm in the Bor Nork village.

The social capital of the civil group in terms of norms appeared in the attempts of the villagers to maintain the conservation ideal of the civil group to be further. The civil group norm was built out of respect for the civil group leaders. Moreover, the civil group norm contains the ideal of building a collective consciousness and greater concern for collective interests as the first priority. For instance, a group of Bor Nork children joined together to participate in local radio broadcasting. They told the researcher that they tried to use the local radio broadcasting station as the channel to show that they have an ideal of resources and environmental conservation even though they are still a young generation.224 A 14-year-old girl named Pang225 said, “We heard about what the Bor Nork villagers had done for our village in the past. We knew uncle Charoen was very dedicated. We want to remind the people in the village that we must look after our hometown even though there is no more coal-fired power plant project ... Local radio broadcasting gives us a chance to talk to people in our village. Mostly, the program aims to communicate and to entertain people. However, we try to promote the idea of keeping our village clean.”

222  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
223  Informal interview with Pra Wichit (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008).
224  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
225  Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 20, 2008).
In the same way, a 21-year-old man, Jirasak, told the researcher that he thinks the Baan Krut leader, Jintana, and the group of Baan Krut are known widely in terms of being a group of local villagers that protected the community from the coal-fired power plant project. He said, “I think it is so cool that my local hometown is well known. Importantly, I feel very good to know that my parents also joined the group at that time, and I wish I could do that too, even though I just joined some small projects about community conservation at this time.”

Moreover, the young Baan Krut villagers admired the courage of the civil group leaders and what the civil group had done for the community. They thought the story of the Baan Krut battle would be a lesson for them not only to learn about resources and environmental protection, but also to teach them to understand more about conflict of interests related to the megaproject. The story of the Baan Krut villagers shows the ability of local people to form a group to participate in the political process, and the ability of local people to claim their rights. In terms of this, the researcher suggests that the battle of the Baan Krut civil group created social capital in terms of values and norms for the young villagers in Baan Krut.

External factors enhancing social capital within the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups

To explain the development of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in terms of external factors, this study focusses on the role of social networks. This role was an essential social capital factor, which enhanced the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The social network also encompasses details related to other social capital components, such as trust, reciprocity, values and norms. Moreover, the details of social relations can be further considered, because the social components worked through social relationships in the civil groups’ network.

Social relations in the social network of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups appeared obviously in the civil groups’ interactions. In other words, social relations can be seen in terms of how the civil groups interacted
within and outside network. In this case, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork connections to outsiders produced social capital in terms of trust for other civil groups. The interaction of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups with other civil groups occurred through their social relations, and their interactions were based in having values and norms to follow. For instance, the Bang Sa Parn civil group leader, Supoj, said that the group of Bang Sa Parn villagers established itself successfully by following the Baan Krut civil group leader’s guidelines. Similarly, the Tub Sa Kae civil group leader also told how their civil group grew strongly through the support of the Bor Nork civil group. Importantly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups continually participated with other civil groups.

Regarding this, the researcher noted that the trust of the other civil groups came from the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers’ social capital. The other civil groups trust in Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group values that they could fight to protect their homeland successfully. For instance, Supoj revealed that the group of Bang Sa Parn villagers wished to copy the Baan Krut group. It was because Baan Krut showed them how villagers could be in harmony. This helped the group form among the local villagers. He also believes that the group of Bang Sa Parn villagers could become a strong local community, the same as the Baan Krut civil group. Moreover, he said, “I strongly believe that the Baan Krut civil group sincerely helped us. I think we understand each other in that we both have to suffer from the force of state policy.”

On this point, in the researcher’s opinion, new civil groups emerged due to trust in the success of former civil groups such as Baan Krut and Bor Nork. The new civil groups trust in the way that Baan Krut and Bor Nork organized themselves. Therefore, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ self-organization also led other civil groups, and other outsiders, to admire them. According to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork leaders, Jintana and Korn-uma, both said in similar ways that the offer of support from NGOs and other organizations resulted in the civil group developing its own activities. They

229 Interview with Supoj (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 20, 2008).
230 Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008).
231 Interview with Supoj (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 20, 2008).
thought they should be wary of close social relations with NGOs. For example, Jintana\textsuperscript{232} revealed that the other civil groups trusted the Baan Krut civil group because the Baan Krut villagers associated with the group worked for the community’s benefit. Regarding other civil groups, the civil group worked independently without involvement with NGOs and businesses. For example, the leader of both civil groups thought that connecting to NGOs is not important for building the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group network. Both civil groups tended to think that they would lose trust if they connected to other organizations apart from local villagers or local groups.\textsuperscript{233}

Accordingly, the external social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups related to civil group social relations and networks. Social relations appeared in the form of reciprocity and trust. Reciprocity provided chances for civil groups to help each other, and trust built civil groups confident of participating in each other’s civil group activities, especially the activities that related to opposing the state. In regards to this, the researcher noted that both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups received other civil groups’ trust by giving the other civil groups support, which seemed to be a kind of social capital in terms of helping or reciprocity. Moreover, social relations also resulted in an aspect of social networks. To support the other civil groups, the civil groups’ network became a value for civil groups in terms of the ability to collaborate, which ultimately also built civil group solidarity and unity.

In summary, the social capital of both the Bor Nork and Baan Krut civil groups was generated in two ways. First, the internal social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork contains mainly aspects of individual social capital. In these cases, civil group social capital consisted of reciprocity, trust, values and norms among the villagers or members in the civil groups. Second, social capital outside the civil groups was also generated by the support that civil groups gave to others. The unity of Baan Krut and Bor Nork became the value of civil group solidarity. Moreover, the values of the civil groups tended to motivate other civil groups and appeared to originate from the norm of community participation. Nevertheless, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil

\textsuperscript{232} Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{233} Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April-May 2008).
groups remained more tightly connected to the group of local villagers and civil groups, rather than other networks such as NGOs and business enterprises.

**Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Group Sustainability**

In relation to the phase of sustaining civil society, this study looked into adaptation by civil groups, which is indicated in terms of either vertical or horizontal linkages. Regarding this, the role of social capital takes a central place as it is related to the continued strengthening of the development of the civil group.

**Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group linkages**

The linkages in this study refer not only to the connections of civil groups to other organizations, but also include interactions between civil groups, their bonding and degree of participation by members. Civil group linkage, which originated through external social capital will, however, be emphasized, particularly the forms of linkages which coordinate actors in organizations. Although the civil group linkages seem to be similar to civil group interactions in the development phase, the linkages in this phase are nevertheless significantly different, just as civil group interactions, which cause the sustaining of civil groups, are.

**The horizontal linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group**

As mentioned previously, the horizontal linkages of civil groups are related to the interactions occurring at the development phase. Regarding this, the study explores the Baan Krut and Bor Nork linkages by looking at aspects of civil group cooperation with other civil groups, and how this affected maintenance of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork groups as a civil organization.

The connection of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups was produced by their linkages, which were formed by a partisan network. To interact with other civil groups was one strategy of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups used in order to push the issue of a grassroots voice onto the national agenda. Jintana\(^{234}\), the Baan Krut civil group leader, revealed that the civil groups had expected that the coordination of them could make their

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\(^{234}\) Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prachuap Kirikhan, April 10, 2008)
problems more visible and their voice stronger and more appealing. She said, “We believe that the state might launch any projects without letting local people participate in the decision-making to our hometown anytime. Our connections to the other groups will show that we won’t accept arbitrary decision-making. The projects are important to local people so they shouldn’t be decided just by the state and business agencies.”

Also, Korn-uma\textsuperscript{235} said, “Even though links with other local communities by the Bor Nork civil group seemed to be the method for resisting the state, we have shown that we have joined to protect our hometown by claiming the rights of popular participation.”

Regarding this, the researcher noted that the connections of both civil groups created linkages in order to encourage communication of their issues and problems. The forms or structure of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, however, still functioned according to their own groups. There were no interventions into each other through linkages.\textsuperscript{236} In terms of this, Anan\textsuperscript{237} (Bor Nork) thought that the collaboration with other civil groups is an important way to get the attention of the state, but that combination of the civil groups is unnecessary for the Bor Nork civil group. He said, “We connected with other groups because we like to work with them, but we won’t combine with any group because we might have different goals. And we can get state attention in many ways.”

For the Baan Krut civil group\textsuperscript{238}, the villagers thought that the form of the connections for linking to other groups was based on the aim of the groups. Although other civil groups have different issues and problems, they nevertheless have a similar aim in terms of protecting their hometown through claiming their rights to participate in state decision-making. The Baan Krut villagers thought they needed to associate sometimes to achieve their mutual aim, but they should deal with the state separately for fixing different issues and problems.

\textsuperscript{235} Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{236} Fieldnotes (April-May 2008).
\textsuperscript{237} Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{238} Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008).
A villager\textsuperscript{239} told the researcher, for example, that the Baan Krut civil
group joined with the Mae Ram Pueng civil group for the community
discussion stage. At that time, the Mae Ram Pueng civil group was just a small
group of villagers, and they thought about adding the group of Mae Ram
Pueng villagers together with Baan Krut, as it might make a bigger and
possibly stronger civil group. However, Jintana\textsuperscript{240} told the researcher that,
four years later, the Mae Ram Pueng civil group was excluded from the
Prajuab Kirikhan civil group network because the group was funded by a state
enterprise. She said, “Fortunately, we kept from linking to this civil group as a
group in the civil network, otherwise that would be a problem.” Similarly,
according to Anan\textsuperscript{241} from Bor Nork: “Bor Nork and Baan Krut faced the same
problem about the same time. We worked together, but we never thought
about combining both of us into one group.” Importantly, both civil group
leaders thought that to merge the two civil groups together must cause their
functions to change, requiring a better structure to manage the group
productively.

In the researcher’s opinion, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’
adaptation appeared in the building of more linkages to other civil groups,
rather than transforming their structure to become bigger in size. Additionally,
both civil groups kept their informal structure and functions even though they
linked to other civil groups in their network. Importantly, both civil group
leaders responded to the question of the political conflict between the Yellow
Shirts and Red Shirts, as something that might negatively affect the civil group.
They said in the same way that the conflict was a different kind of political
thought. Jintana\textsuperscript{242} said, “We (Baan Krut civil group) are probably green, not
red or yellow. Undeniably, we can be red or yellow; however, it is just a
political view. We believe that no matter red or yellow, and with any
government, they support the coal-fired power plant project.”

Similarly, the Bor Nork leader, Korn-uma\textsuperscript{243}, said, “We got sick of
national politics. For the villagers, they could think or join either red or yellow.

\textsuperscript{239} Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
\textsuperscript{240} Phone interview with Jintana (March 1, 2012).
\textsuperscript{241} Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
\textsuperscript{242} Phone interview with Jintana (March 1, 2012).
\textsuperscript{243} Phone interview with Korn-uma (May 10, 2012).
However, for the civil group we won’t take sides on behalf of the group. We always keep in mind that the civil group is run to protect our hometown, not for supporting political parties or groups.”

Even though the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups seemed to be out of the national mobilization between Red and Yellow Shirts during 2011 and 2012, the villagers in both civil groups used to tell the researcher, in 2008, that they could create mass mobilization if it became necessary. Anan244 (Bor Nork) said, “We are like a troop which can be called to battle. I believe we can make it better and bigger than last time in 1998.” Korn-uma245 said, “We seem to be quiet, but we are concerned that the state might launch any project at any time, so I don’t think the villagers would stay quiet once projects come.” Moreover, Jintana246 (Baan Krut) also said, “I believe that if the state launches any projects in Baan Krut, the protest group will be bigger because we have many civil groups in our network.”

Regarding this, there are two vital points for Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group linkages. The first is that both civil groups adapt in the sustaining phase by using connections without alteration of the groups. It is because they are concerned about different goals if they combine with other groups. The second point is that in terms of the linkages in the civil group network, adaptation can develop to become mass mobilization, in order to not only sustain the civil group, but also to significantly increase the pressure able to be applied on the state by the civil group. In this point, Jintana247 said that the developing of mobilization needs more thought, because it might result in civil war, in the worse case.

The vertical linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups
In the case of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork coal-fired plant projects being cancelled, the conflict between these groups of villagers and the Thai state increased. Interaction between both civil groups and the Thai state became antagonistic. However, the connection of both civil groups with the Thai state

244 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
245 Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
246 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
247 Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
was a continuation of the lack of vertical interaction at the previous phase in the establishment of the civil groups.

According to Korn-uma, the group of Bor Nork villagers is local people who deny this kind of capitalism (coal-fired plant project), particularly in terms of economic development, along with megaprojects. She said, “To oppose the coal-fired power plant project in Bor Nork led the state to view us as a group with inferior vision.” Nevertheless, while the Bor Nork villagers recognized that the Thai state might think of them negatively, they also knew the state (government) needed their votes. In terms of this, Anan said the local politicians seemed to support the Bor Nork villagers. Connections to local politicians in Bor Nork and at the provincial level were empathetic. Nonetheless, he believed that the politicians involved had little power in the decision-making process for such large projects.

Similarly, Jintana and the Baan Krut villagers revealed that they had expected that all the connections they had built up would also facilitate the Baan Krut civil group. However, they realized that the power of local politicians was limited at party level so policy-making was not something they had much power over. Ultimately decision-making was done by the leaders of the government, along with elites and interest groups involved in political decision-making. Because of this, they thought it was unnecessary to link to any kind of state institution. Jintana said, “I think the Thai political decision-making system is too narrow to accept local people’s views. The Thai state especially contains huge benefits which are decided by such interest groups without local community participation, so we will never link because we were definitely out of the process.”

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups opposed the state megaprojects, particularly projects that tended to involve harming communities in terms of resources and environmental degradation. Both civil groups often raised the issue of the projects’ conflict of interests in terms of the civil groups’ interaction with the state. Also, they used the issue of the lack of transparency in the project processes, which involved several issues, such as

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248 Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
249 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
250 Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
251 Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
unclear EIA and public hearings. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups maintained a gap between the Thai state and themselves in order to stay away from any manipulative propaganda. For instance, the villagers in both groups told the researcher, in the same way, that some politicians in high positions in government, had visited the groups. This was just to show they ‘cared’ and were ‘concerned’ about the issues and problems relating to the projects.252

The Political Development Council (PDC)253 is a state institution and authority encouraging the Thai civil sector. According to a member of PDC254 there were 76 representatives, one from each province. The representative from Prachuab Kirikhan province, surprisingly, was a member of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The civil groups in Prachuab Kirikhan seemed to act as an anti-state force in the Political Development Council (PDC), even though the PDC is one of the state institutions for building linkages between the state and local people. In comparison, Jintana255 claimed that the Baan Krut and other civil groups never thought they were state antagonists, even though the civil groups had limited participation with the state in some ways. In fact, there was a provincial representative who could represent all people. Regarding this, the researcher argues that the linkages between the state and Baan Krut and Bor Nork actually appear to be in place but are not well formed.

For example, the National Economic and Social Advisory Council (NESAC) thought that the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups seemed to understand their roles well, particularly in their responses to the Thai state.256 Both civil groups communicated with state institutions in many ways. Some contacts were made through government offices by formal documents. In the researcher’s opinion, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups managed their linkage to the state to pursue their interests, such as the linkages they forged when they were opposing the projects. These were established when required but let go after the cancellation of the projects to revert back to an ordinary situation. The contact through formal documents was considered to be the appropriate linking to the state.

252 Fieldnotes (April-May 2008).
253 The Political Development Council (PDC) 重视发展委员会
254 Interview with a member of The Political Development Council (Bangkok, July 4, 2011).
255 Phone interview with Jintana (Prachuab Kirikhan, March 1, 2012).
256 Interview with the National Economic and Social Advisory Council (NESAC) members (Bangkok, June 14, 2011).
In brief, the horizontal linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups developed in the earlier phase. The linkages were comprised of their networks, in particular connections with other civil groups at the same level. Nonetheless, even though both civil groups operated by linking to other civil groups resulting in productive actions, both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups still maintained their own self-organized structures. In terms of the vertical linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, the case study indicates that there was very little linkage between the civil groups and the Thai state due to the civil groups attempting to protect themselves from any conflicts of interest.

**The sustainability of social capital for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups**

According to the research framework, social capital is the essential factor for establishing civil groups, for their development and also for the sustaining of civil groups. In this phase, the study emphasizes the social capital of Baan Krut and Bor Nork, presenting it in terms of the collective action it brought.

The social capital sustaining the civil groups developed from the establishment phase, which appeared in terms of individual social capital. As well as this, the strengthening of the civil groups in the developing phase was aligned to the leaders and the civil group reputations, both of which were still, however, related to individuals. This part of the study examines how the social capital of Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups progressed significantly during this phase from the perspective of the social capital elements such as trust, reciprocity, value and norms as they were adapted to provide collective action.

The trust shown within a civil group is not that of individual trustworthiness. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups support other civil groups on behalf of the civil group. They established social bonds also in the name of the Baan Krut civil group, without referring to individual relationships. For instance, Picharn, twenty-one years old, revealed that he went to Mae Rum Pueng beach and met a group of villagers who were in conflict with Sahaviriya Steel Industries PCL (SSI), the largest fully integrated...
flat steel plant. He said, “I told the group I’m one of the Baan Krut civil group so they let me go.”

Similarly, the Bor Nork villagers believe that social bonding and relationships in their group are still the same as when the group started. However, the civil group also worked on building up social ties by using the sense of being an environmental conservation group. The civil group’s goals and objectives in terms of supporting hometown preservation became a tie between civil group members and with other civil groups in the civil group network. For example, villagers could bring family members and friends into the group if they had the same goal and objectives with the civil group. A fifteen-year-old girl, Pim258, moved from another village to Bor Nork just a few months before the research was carried out. She joined the group of the Bor Nork community radio broadcast. She said, “I don’t know anybody here, but I knew about the group of villagers of Bor Nork. I learnt from school that we have concerns about our environment so I want to join the group.” In terms of this, the researcher noted that trust in the aims and objectives of the civil group encouraged the group to increase members and the network. The civil group’s activities present how the aspect of individual trust and social relations transformed to become the aspect of social relations and trustworthiness of the civil group.

Furthermore, the reciprocity of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups also appears with a collective aspect. Reciprocity plays a wide role in the civil groups’ network. The process of turning from helping each other to becoming a civil group helping other civil groups focusses on civil group benefit. For example, a villager259 told the researcher that after the coal-fired power plant project was cancelled, the group of Bor Nork villagers began to recognize other civil groups, such as Mae Rum Pueng as much more important. She said, “It is either the rejection of the building of the coal-fired power plant project or the organizing ability of the civil group. So we can help more communities or groups that are facing the same problems as we used to. In terms of this, we went to join with the Mae Rum Pueng group.”

258 Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 6, 2008).
259 Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008).
In the same way, the group of villagers tended to support other communities on behalf of the Bor Nork civil group rather than helping the network as individual villagers. Also Prapa, a Baan Krut villager said, “When we opposed the projects in 1994 it seemed to be very difficult to deal with things. We left our farm or children with friends sometimes. The offers from families and friends to assist were helpful at the time. However, the project has been cancelled at the moment so we think of other groups of villagers who are facing the same problem with us. They need more offers of help than we do. We joined and worked with them the same as we work in our group, sincerely.”

In regard to this, the study explains how the aspects of social capital such as trust and reciprocity emerged during the period when Baan Krut and Bor Nork connected with other civil groups, due to a kind of responsibility and duty to help the civil groups in their network. Trustworthiness was, however, based on what was well known about the civil groups, which was their aim to protect the hometown environment.

Also social capital, in terms of the value of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, at this stage was related to their reputation, which was able to motivate other civil groups and other communities to form civil groups in the same way as them. Their ability to protect their hometown has value and was their starting point, which inspired other communities to think about forming (civil) groups in order to look after their places. For instance, Padej, the leader of the Baan Kok Payom community in Satoon province, revealed that Baan Kok Payom emerged from six small groups of local villagers. He said, “I was disappointed once the state seemed to ignore my community as just a remote site. The state was overlooking what my community wanted for a better life. However, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities are a good pattern, which inspired me to form the group in order to look after our community. They are an example of the power of unity. At least, if my community were to face the harmful project we will be strong enough to protect ourselves.”

260 Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008).
261 Phone interview with Padej (May 11, 2013).
In the same way, the inspiration of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups produces a collective sense of consciousness in terms of looking after birthplaces for other communities. This seems to be a kind of building up in norms of Thai society. For example, the Baan Krut villagers knew the Baan Krut civil group had become widely known within Thai society, particularly the civil group leader, Jintana. Similarly, the Bor Nork civil group is well known because of Charoen. Although the well-known leaders of both civil groups seemed to be symbols for the civil group, the sustaining of both groups, however, stands on the civil group reputation, with the symbol seemed to have built up discursive power. According to Korn-uma, the state tried to build the coal-fired power plant by putting out the idea that the project would bring about more income and that the area would be developed for the villagers. She said, “We will insist on our idea that our hometown could be developed without a coal-fired power plant. To develop our community the villagers in this community should be allowed to live safely and happily. In contrast, the project must destroy our home, so we will tell people, persuade them to believe us that the state is wrong.”

Apart from that, the researcher notes that the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups had an ability to be tolerant. The experience of encountering state enterprises and agencies taught them to be tolerant in conflict situations. In the case of Jintana, she was sentenced to four months in jail due to the offense of trespassing at the coal-fired power plant project agency’s staff party. After she was released, Jintana revealed to the researcher that: “It was my fault, owing to my lack of tolerance. However, it was a great lesson learned by me as a leader of the group.” Moreover, she thought the Baan Krut civil group might end because the leader was in jail. Fortunately, the group was very patient and it operated productively without her.

In terms of this, Jintana argues that dealing with state enterprises and agencies, including even state institutions in the conciliation stage, requires the civil groups to learn to be more patient. She said, “The conciliation process comprises the opposition trying to convince us, and sometimes they make you look stupid in the public eye. I learnt that being more patient made

262 Group discussion (Bor Nork, Pratub Kirikhan, April 4, 2008).
263 Phone interview with Jintana (August 7, 2013).
us become more professional. If you can be patient that means the situation is controllable."

Apart from the increase in tolerance, which occurred as the civil groups adapted, the aspect of collectiveness also emerged at this stage. According to how the civil groups developed through their informal functions, the civil groups operated and worked on a local scale without concerning themselves with the groups in, or organization of, their networks. For example, being tolerant facilitated group communication because it led to communication becoming more formal. The long and complicated claims procedure was tolerated and accepted by the civil groups. A central government officer\textsuperscript{264} told the researcher that the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups dealt with central government departments systematically. The communication between the civil groups and government officers appears to be very professional. She confessed that, “At first, I thought the group of villagers from Baan Krut and Bor Nork might be self-willed. However, they have approached state institutions on behalf of the civil group intelligently so far.”

Moreover, the civil groups’ tolerance facilitated their collective action. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers told how they went to join other civil groups, although inconvenient, several times. They traveled sometimes long distances in order to support other civil groups in their network. Even though both projects were canceled, they were willing to support other civil groups, requiring lots of patience.\textsuperscript{265} Regarding this, the researcher argues that being tolerant significantly increased the civil groups’ operational ability. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups exist strongly due to the encouragement of their tolerance. In other words, the adaptation of the civil groups’ social capital supported their survival and sustainability.

On this point, the researcher argues that the social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups created development of thoughtfulness and considered reflection at the sustaining phase. The products of thoughtfulness refer to all social capital elements producing the collective aspect of social capital. The basis of trustworthiness of the civil group, as well as the civil group values, nurtures norms among the civil groups in the network.

\textsuperscript{264} Interview with central government officers (Bangkok, February 11, 2008).
\textsuperscript{265} Fieldnotes (April-May 2008).
Importantly, the emergence of shared norms became the procedure of building the civil group network widely and strongly.

In summary, the social capital elements of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups appear in the process of facilitative factors for civil group adaptation. The other civil groups respect the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups because they trust in the civil groups’ standpoint in keeping strong community. The reputation of both civil groups became an important value, which expanded to be norms shared in the civil group network. Moreover, the civil groups’ tolerance also developed the civil groups’ adaptation, including in terms of the civil group image.

**Discussion and Conclusion: The Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Groups**

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged out of the contentions between local communities and the Thai state’s enterprise, in particular the case of the coal-fired power plant projects in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ establishment was owing to the launching of two coal-fired power plant projects in Prajuab Kirikhan province in 1994. It provoked the groups of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers to collaborate in order to fight against these projects. Consequently, the civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork, emerged in regard to people’s rights in terms of public participation in environmental management policy. It was concern at how the effects of the projects could jeopardize the communities that led Baan Krut and Bor Nork to seek ways of dealing with this problem. At the beginning, a young villager of Bor Nork, Charoen, persuaded the villagers in the Bor Nork community to join together in order to discuss the project. He and his friends led the group of Bor Nork villagers to seek a solution by talking to friends, family and other residents in Bor Nork. The group activities started with meetings, group discussions and seeking more information in order to serve the aim of thwarting the project.

The group of Baan Krut villagers also emerged about the same time as Bor Nork, due to the two coal-fired power plant projects proceeding under the same national proposal. The group of Baan Krut villagers was led by Jintana, a female Baan Krut resident. With the same aim, both groups worked at finding
ways to deal with the Thai state and the state enterprises. The attempt by the villagers in both communities to establish groups resulted in the formation of self-organized groups, both with the same starting point of protecting the hometown.

The two civil groups developed more fully after their groups established themselves through facing the complicated contact with the Thai state and the state enterprises. Eventually, the civil groups responded to the state by blocking the main street in Prachuab Kirikhan with a group of villagers on 8 December 1998. This mobilization contained about thirty thousand local villagers in the Prachuab Kirikhan province. Moreover, they marched to Bangkok on 10 January 2002 because they were unclear about the state decision-making in building these projects. Both civil groups exerted pressure, which led the projects to be questioned; in particular, there were public hearings about both projects. The most important pressure on the projects was, however, the death of Charoen on 21 June 2004. The murder of the leader of the Bor Nork civil group was recognized as being related to his role as leader of the group and so led to disclosure of some of the conflict of interests behind the projects. Korn-uma, Charoen’s wife, then carried on the Bor Nork civil group as a civil group leader with the help of Charoen’s friends.

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups became involved in state reconciliation processes several times. During this period, these civil groups helped villagers in other communities around Prachuab Kirikhan province to also form civil groups, such as the Sam Roi Yod civil group in 2006, and the Mae Rum Pueng civil group in 2008.

The activities of resistance by the civil groups put pressure on the coal-fired power plant projects in both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities. The result was first for the projects to be postponed, then ultimately canceled. However, both civil groups, in particular the civil group leaders, Jintana and Korn-uma, continued to maintain group activities, which aimed to support local communities’ collaboration in the case of resources and environmental conservation awareness. Both groups built the civil group network more widely during this time. With the reputation of being strong civil groups that had overcome the state, the Baan Krut civil group leader, Jintana, and Korn-uma, the leader of Bor Nork civil group, remained in their roles to help other
local villagers nationally to form civil groups. This continues even though civil groups have to work amongst the national political conflict between Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt political movements.

According to the research framework, the case study of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups can be summarized according to the themes of an establishment phase, development phase and sustaining phase, as follows.

**The establishment phase of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups**

The emergence of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups relied heavily on social capital factors. The groups of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers both emerged through concern about the degradation of their livelihood coming from the huge state projects. The coal-fired power plant projects were the problem, which pushed the villagers in both communities to apply their social capital to form civil groups. The character of social capital contains trust, reciprocity, value and norms, which appear in the culture, grievances and incentives of the civil groups. Additionally, these social capital factors were interlocked by social bonding or social relations in the groups.

The social capital of Baan Krut and Bor Nork at the beginning stage appears at the individual level. Trust within the groups began with the social bonding and relationships of the villagers within the communities. The strong identity of southern Thai residents facilitated social relations. Consequently, trust within the civil groups was generated out of loose social bonding and relationships. Friendship and neighborliness were important components for the civil groups’ establishment, along with kinship.

Accordingly, the reciprocity involved was similar to helping, because of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork identity and lifestyle. The villagers seemed to be little inclined to help each other, but this was due to their independent lifestyle. The extra help was expressed when the villagers were on duty as part of the civil groups. Thus, civil group reciprocity occurred together and developed out of the other social capital factors. The villagers in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities exemplify how the strong identity of the southern Thai encourages villagers to have great confidence, which relates to producing the values of the villagers.
In the same way, the role of social capital factors also works together with the civil groups’ cultural traditions. There is strong respect for their ancestors. The perspective of honoring the parentage of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork formed the villagers’ attitude in terms of preserving the birthplace in order for it to be inherited by future generations. Because of this attitude, potential environmental degradation caused by the projects was a serious concern, bringing severe dissatisfaction at how the state responded. These are the main issues that became incentive factors, provoking the villagers to establish the civil group. The concern for environmental issues developed out of the value and conscience for birthplace preservation, while the issue of the dislike of the state’s response resulted in a lack of trust between the Thai state and the civil groups. In particular, the killing of one of the civil group leaders was a strong grievance factor that led the villagers to increasingly get together as civil groups.

The development phase of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups

When analysing the development phase, this study emphasized civil group strengthening, which was framed by the groups’ structure, actors, interaction and social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. There was further formation by the villagers in both communities of environmental conservation groups, which they initiated during the previous establishment phase. The groups Rakthongthin Bor Nork and Anurak Baan Krut developed the form of an organization, even though the groups’ structures and functions still appeared to maintain an informal aspect. These civil groups took on a formal organizational structure to provide the ability to deal with the documents, which relates to dealing with the Thai bureaucracy. Besides that, the civil groups’ finances seemed to be managed well through the organization. Civil groups designed the functions of their organizations for the civil group members to be able to take up specific responsibilities. The development of both civil groups indicates an ability to innovate the group structure and their self-organizational capability.

The leaders of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups appear to be the essential facilitators of civil group strengthening during the development
phase. The civil groups’ members encompass the villagers surrounding the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities, who are committed to the same aim of opposing the coal-fired power plant projects. However, the civil groups’ members play several different roles. This arose mostly due to the need to participate in the conciliation processes, which involved the creation of civil group representatives. This is in contrast to how all the civil group members could be called to become part of a mass mobilization if civil group resolutions resulted in the need for it.

Another feature is how the civil groups’ members include the villagers of the new young generation. With regard to this, the civil group leaders present the young generation as having a very important role in the strengthening of civil groups. They work with confidence and have strong goals. Also the involvement of advisors to support the new young generation, for example with academic information, was all done without external funding support, which confirms the self-organizational ability of both civil groups.

In terms of civil group interaction, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups not only connected with each other, but also interacted with several other civil groups in Prachuab Kirikhan, which indicates their ability to create connections at the same level, even though there are scarcely any interactions with local NGOs and local government. Similarly, vertical interactions appear widely in terms of participating with civil group networks around Thailand, and by contrast there are very few connections to national NGOs and central government.

Aspects of the social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups during the development phase are aligned with social capital at the establishment phase. The internal factors of social capital with these civil groups contain individual social capital, which occurs within the civil groups. Trustworthiness among civil group members and leaders is the strengthening factor, as well as the values and norms coming from civil group members proud of their leaders, who are kinds of heroes and heroines in both communities. In terms of the external factors enhancing social capital, in both civil groups it appears as the social network, which is connected by other civil groups’ trustworthiness. Moreover, the values of the civil groups also bring about collaboration from other networks, including the norm of community
participation instilled into civil groups that originated from the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The values and norms of these civil groups returned to support and strengthen components of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups during this phase.

**The sustaining phase of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups**

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups indicate that the civil group is sustained through linkages, along with social capital. The adaptation of civil group linkages develops on top of the civil group interactions that emerged during the development phase. In the same way, the adaptation of social capital maintains the same components, but the aspects are significantly transformed.

During the sustaining phase, the linkages of the civil group adapted in terms of horizontal interactions, which emerged at the development phase. The features of the linkages appear in terms of collaboration. They involve the need for wider and stronger connections in order to support the forming of new civil groups. Importantly, the collaborations of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups built upon the civil groups’ reputation, which in turn sustains the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in Thai civil society. Through this adaptation of collaboration, both civil groups have been able to maintain their civil group structure and identity. However, the vertical linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups show scarce collaboration with state institutions, due to a lack of trust at the beginning, even though the NESAR and PDC can be a channel to reduce the gap between the civil groups and the Thai state.

Baan Krut and Bor Nork could sustain themselves after the crisis, when they had reached their goal. Therefore, these civil groups have changed their goals from opposing the coal-fired power plants in their places to help other civil groups facing similar crises. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups supported many small communities with self-organization, and new civil groups grew up around Thailand. The activities of these civil groups have changed from a kind of mobilization to providing information and sharing their experiences of dealing with the problems with the new civil groups. In terms of this, the changing goals and roles of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil
groups showed their adaptation ability, which made these civil groups able to sustain themselves.

In the case of social capital factors, features of the social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups adapted from an individual dimension to a collective dimension. Collective social capital emerged as the experience of trust in personal relationships developed to become trust in civil group values. Maintenance of the values and norms of the civil group rely on the civil groups’ reputations, though it is also enhanced by their tolerance and maintaining their strong starting point of traditional care for the home environment. This shows the civil groups’ capability, which could convert individual social capital into group or collective social capital. Furthermore, these civil groups’ values also encourage other civil groups to reproduce the norms by sharing them within the civil group network.

In conclusion, this study uses the research framework to portray Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group dynamics in order to clarify the practical form and function of the civil group. The existence of both civil groups is related to the developing of appropriate and realistic roles for local civil groups in Thai civil society.

Firstly, social capital at the establishment phase related to culture, grievances and incentive factors. The emergence of these factors was based on the underlying social relations of the civil groups.

Secondly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers indicated that the creation of the civil group structure and assigning of the management function were important. The leaders performed an important role, in leadership as well as in decision-making. Both civil groups’ leaders played appropriate roles, which became the key factor supporting the production of civil group values and norms in the next phase.

Thirdly, civil group adaptation at the sustainability phase relied on the interactions and social capital developed at the previous phase. This included linkages developed through civil group interactions in a wider network. In the same way, social capital at the development phase adapted from the individual form to be a collective aspect, which encouraged the sustaining of both civil groups in Thai society.
Fourthly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged as civil organizations about the same time. Sometimes they worked together, but they existed independently. On this point, the case study shows they had a similar establishment in terms of birthplace preservation ideals, while maintaining their own identities related to their self-organization ability, which indicated the civil groups’ ability to sustain themselves.

Lastly, there was a lack of interaction and linkage between the civil groups and the Thai state. Similarly, there was scarce interaction and linkages of the civil groups to NGOs due to the civil groups’ conceptions that the NGOs might be supported by EGAT. The case of the missing linkage between the civil groups and the state must be a concern for the Thai state, because the lack of good interaction and linkages between them and civil groups could be a barrier to political development in the long run.
Chapter Five

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter discusses the two case studies referred to in the two previous chapters, focusing particularly on how the two case studies align with the research framework. Summaries of the case studies of the Pak Mun civil group, and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, are highlighted in tables to provide easy comparison of the two case studies. Also, the research framework assessment follows.

Discussion of Case Study One: The Pak Mun Civil Group

The conclusion begins by examining the trajectory of the Pak Mun civil group, outlined in detail in Chapter Three. The civil group is presented according to the framing of the multiple phases of civil group trajectories, as presented in Chapter Two (Figure 1). The framing of the explanation of the Pak Mun civil group emphasized the components related to civil group emergence at the establishment phase, the strengthening elements at the development phase, and finally the adaptation factors sustaining the civil group.

The Pak Mun civil group emerged out of the association of Pak Mun villagers. The civil group started with the sharing of the villagers’ suffering in terms of the Pak Mun Dam construction project. This civil group formed when the plan for the Pak Mun Dam project was launched. The forming of the civil group was initiated by social capital within the community. Social capital aspects of trust, reciprocity, values and norms relate closely to social bonding and the relationship of the villagers in the civil group; for example, the villagers trusted more in their family members, or people they knew, than strangers; the Pak Mun villagers easily give offers of help (reciprocity) to people they knew, especially people who experienced the same problem as them. Social capital mainly compounded with civil group culture, which showed as aspects of lifestyle, beliefs and character or attitude of the villagers in the Pak Mun civil group. In contrast, the issue of grievances and incentives resulted in a loss of trust in the Thai state. Notably, the aim of the Pak Mun
civil group at the emergence stage was initially to stop the dam construction. Nevertheless, the dam was ultimately built (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment Phase</th>
<th>The emergence of the Pak Mun civil group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Capital</td>
<td>Trust and reciprocity through social bonding, particularly social relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Respect of elders. Local lifestyle with local tradition. Strong belief in the usefulness of the river. Trust in people and humble character.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>No incentive factors, but some issues stimulated responses as livelihoods were affected. Demanding of people’s equality and rights. Dishonesty by state agencies. Ecological impacts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 The emergence of the Pak Mun civil group at the establishment phase

To strengthen the civil group, the aims of the Pak Mun civil group during the development phase (Table 2) moved the aim from finding ways to encourage the discarding of the operation of the dam, to claiming for compensation to the villagers afflicted by the dam project. Pak Mun villagers strengthened their civil group by attempting to develop the group of Pak Mun villagers into a pressure group. In this regard, the Mae Mun Man Yean village was designed as the symbol of the Pak Mun civil group, to present the group as brave villagers. In other words, the Pak Mun villagers showed the ability for civil innovation and self-organization by building the Mae Mun Man Yean village to symbolize the Pak Mun civil group’s disobedience. However, the civil group remained with an informal structure and functioned the same as it did when the group emerged. In particular, the senior (elderly) hierarchy was maintained. Although the Pak Mun civil group had a specific location for its meetings and activities, the civil group used the Mae Mun Man Yean village as the civil group center instead of the community leaders’ houses.
At the development phase, the Pak Mun villagers operated their civil organization more clearly than in the previous phase, through two main kinds of activity. On the one hand, the villagers of the Pak Mun civil group showed that they were able to be a pressure group by mobilizing local villagers. Consequently, the civil group marched to Bangkok and protested in front of government offices. On the other hand, the group of Pak Mun villagers used the Mae Mun Man Yean village as a civil group space. The village was set up as an open stage, which provided deliberative processes for the civil group’s members to engage in. With the aim of being a pressure group, Pak Mun civil group membership was not specified, in order to increase the number of members when there was a need. As a result, the Mae Mun Man Yean village contained several villagers from diverse communities, which later came to be counted as part of the civil group network. To help fulfill its civil group operation, the village continued some traditional activities, such as local music and local wisdom. These activities reminded the Pak Mun villagers that their livelihoods had been affected by the dam and that traditional activities had been lost.

In the case of civil group actors, the main group of existing former leaders maintained their important roles in managing the civil group. However, the civil group members were mostly in the same age range as the leaders. Also, the Pak Mun civil group seemed to be influenced by activists, in particular, Vanida. The advisors assisted the civil group in terms of providing technical information to support their demands to abandon the dam operation and then later for compensation. Additionally, the Pak Mun civil group was funded through traditional fundraising, apart from some foundations which donated.

The Pak Mun civil group interacted with other civil groups and other communities’ activities in order to maintain connections for when the civil group needed mass mobilization. Reaching out to other civil groups to join protests became a significant aim of the civil group. Nonetheless, civil group interaction with the AOP started through Vanida’s connections. In contrast, interaction with local and central government seemed to fail.

In relation to social capital factors, the strengthening of the Pak Mun civil group social capital was indicated by the increasing unity of the local
people. Admiration for the Pak Mun civil group in terms of their experiences of the difficulty in dealing with the Thai state became the source of values for the civil group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Phase</th>
<th>The strengthening of the Pak Mun civil group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Created the Mae Mun Man Yean village. Informal structure with local traditional style (seniority hierarchy). Aims of the group focus on stopping the operation of the dam and then claiming compensation. Functions appear in the form of protest and ritual events. Organizing events was done with activists’ support. They used the leaders’ houses for the main meeting place and then built new villages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Main members were Pak Mun community villagers, but could be any villagers suffering problems from the state projects around the E-sarn area. Members mostly were elderly villagers. Leaders developed an organization beyond the informal traditional ties with the same leaders. Supported strongly by the activists. Advisors played few roles. Funding came from donation and fundraising.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
<td>Interacted with villagers in the village and other civil groups by participation in cultural and traditional events and protests. AOP involved by activists’ connections. Lack of interaction with local and central government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social capital</strong></td>
<td>Individual level of reciprocity and trust. Attempting to build up the civil group values and norms. Trust only in networks produced by activists. Political mobilization influenced civil group social relations and generated negative values and norms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 The strengthening of the Pak Mun civil group at the development phase

Moreover, the civil group attempted to build the norm of selflessness into the civil group. Apart from that, trustworthiness and reciprocity in the civil group appeared to be maintained at the individual level also. It was because the Pak Mun civil group operated together with trust and reciprocity that there
emerged social bonding. Regarding this, the Pak Mun villagers in the civil group presented that they sustained the trust of the elder villagers, traditional leaders and also Vanida. However, the social capital of the Pak Mun civil group was interfered with by the national political mobilization conflict later on, namely, the Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustaining Phase</th>
<th>The adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linkages</td>
<td>Linkages to other civil groups generated within the AOP. Civil group structure altered to be part of the AOP by learning to connect to the other civil groups. Linkages organized by AOP, then PMove. Adaptation appeared in the co-ordination and collaboration with other civil groups within AOP and PMove.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td>Trust in AOP and PMove. Decrease in reciprocity within the civil group. More tolerance with wider connections. Reputation for values and norms on behalf of the AOP and PMove.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 The adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group at the sustaining phase

The adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group appeared through the changing way the civil group existed in Thai civil society. As mentioned previously, the Pak Mun civil group initially operated in part as a pressure group, which related to building the network in order to increase their ability to apply pressure. Nonetheless, the Pak Mun civil group later also built up a civil group network by linking up with the AOP. The adaptation of the civil group resulted in learning to work with other civil groups at a wider level, with civil group structure and functions also changing to become part of an NGO; first the AOP and then PMove.

According to the altering of functions and forms due to adaptation, the Pak Mun civil group’s social capital aspects also changed to become more collective. Trust emerged among the Pak Mun civil group with the other civil groups and the AOP and PMove. There was, however, less reciprocity due to
the civil group becoming connected more to outsiders, so personal trust in others appeared to disappear. The civil group’s value and norms came to resemble the AOP and PMove (Table 3).

**Discussion on Case Study Two: The Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Groups**

The second case study contains two civil groups, which are examined together according to the research framework. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups will be summarized briefly, based on the context of the case study provided in Chapter Four, according to the research framework’s themes.

The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged when coal-fired power plant projects were announced for their districts. The launching of the projects provoked villagers in both communities. The social capital of both civil groups was related to the nature of the villagers. The civil groups emerged through the villagers’ social bonding and connections, which seemed to be loose. These civil groups showed the widely held trust in other villagers or residents around Baan Krut and Bor Nork, with specific social character. They have the social character of having strong confidence in their Thai southern identity, which manifested as independence and less reciprocity. However, social capital was also generated in relation to the civil groups’ cultural aspects. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group culture appeared in the local lifestyle and tradition, which is similar for all Thais. Hierarchy based on age is normally important, but within the civil groups there tended to be more emphasis on educated villagers. Teachers, monks and villagers who showed they had power or connections played significant roles at the beginning of the civil group, during the phase it was being established.

The cultural aspect of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups also included strong respectfulness of the villagers’ ancestry, because the villagers consider their homeland is protected by their ancestors and that it is the villagers’ responsibility to continue preserving it. Importantly, the villagers mostly earned their living on their own land. Moreover, the villagers had high self-esteem in the strong identity of the Thai southern style, which appeared in their integrity or forthright character. In terms of this, the reciprocity in the
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups seemed to be dispensable, due to the villagers appearing to be strong and independent.

Grievances definitely provoked the villagers to join civil groups. The coal-fired power plant projects brought together local villagers in both communities, as they became concerned at the potential environmental conservation issue. The projects also broke down some of the villagers’ relationships by the incentives offered. The communities were split by this and the resulting unfairness. The project was brought to a head through discrimination which arose in regard to the leaders of the civil groups, with one being murdered and the other put in jail, and the state appearing to ignore the situation and even standing beside those causing the oppression. There were no incentive factors for civil group establishment, and those that were present seemed to be better described as being generated by

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment Phase</th>
<th>Social Capital</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Grievances</th>
<th>Incentives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loose form of social bonding and connection. Trust in own strong identity, self-esteem and confidence. Less reciprocity.</td>
<td>Respect of teachers. Local lifestyle with local tradition. Strong belief in ancestry and southern character. Living with own properties and having independent character. Less traditional rituals. Used temple and community for group meetings.</td>
<td>Community fragmentation. Breakdown of social relationships. State overlooked environmental degradation concerns and stood by the opponents of the civil groups. One of the leaders was killed and another put in jail.</td>
<td>No incentives but some stimulation. Demanding participation of people with the state, and dishonesty in the public hearing process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 The emergence of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups at the establishment phase
stimulation through provocation. That there were stimulation factors rather than incentives produces a more reasonable explanation for civil group establishment (Table 4).

At the development phase, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups strengthened themselves by attempting to create well-managed procedures on top of the informal structure. Both Baan Krut and Bor Nork functioned effectively through the use of memorandums and document processes, which operated well to also present the civil groups’ aims. Promotion of the civil group pushed the group of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers to become the signature environmental conservation group. Meanwhile, facilitating mass marches and mobilization tended to also be an essential role of the civil groups in the negotiation process. Moreover, the civil groups came to represent effective participation of people to make the political process accountable, when the coal-fired power plant projects were cancelled.

With the informal structure and functions, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups also contained a simple condition for civil group membership. The civil groups’ members simply had to have the same aim and concern; it was opened widely to all the villagers around these communities to join the civil group if they wished. The civil groups’ leaders appeared to be the most important key actor for group empowerment. The leaders presented themselves cleverly as the local villagers’ representatives instead of civil group leaders. By comparison, there was little involvement of activists and advisors in the strengthening of the civil groups, so their role can be said to have been absent.

The interaction of the civil groups was a vital factor for the strengthening of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. In particular, the civil groups’ horizontal interactions showed the civil groups’ ability in terms of building up the civil group network. However, the connections to the other civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan were related to their common interests. The developing of the connections with other civil groups in the nearby area was carried out in the expectation of getting more collaboration in the future, if it became necessary. Moreover, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups seemed to learn more about dealing with the state through these connections. Thus there was little impetus to similarly seek connections with NGOs and
government, and accordingly, interaction with the NGOs and government appeared very slight in both the horizontal and vertical levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Phase</th>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Interactions</th>
<th>Social capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The strengthening of the</strong></td>
<td>Rakthongthin Bor Nork and Anurak Baan Krut created with informal structure. Self-organization presented in the ability of group functions and management. Attempting to operate the group systematically, through valuing the document procedure for claims and the groups’ actions. Presented works follow the aim of community preservation. Raising the need of state accountability. Significant innovation employed to promote the civil groups.</td>
<td>Members are mainly the communities’ residents with several generations. Leaders came from individual leadership ability, with social bonding and social support. Good relationships with official community leaders. Few roles for advisors. Funding came from donations and fundraising with little state institutional support.</td>
<td>Wide horizontal interaction through connections to other civil groups around the communities’ area. Started to interact across the whole south of Thailand by sharing information. Connected to local government occasionally. Participated in some central government projects, while keeping a strong stand in the conciliation process. Involved almost no local and national NGOs.</td>
<td>Individual level of reciprocity and trust within civil groups. Values and norms emerged from individual social capital. Building up of the civil groups’ values and norms came from the leaders and civil groups’ capability.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 The strengthening of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups at the development phase

Social capital factors also facilitated the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups to become strengthened at this phase. Even though reciprocity and trust was still maintained at the individual level, trust and support of each other
produced the civil groups’ values and norms. The aspect of values and norms emerged through the leaders’ and villagers’ courage, and included the unity of the civil group (Table 5).

Regarding the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ sustainability, both civil groups indicated the ability for adaptation by transforming the civil groups’ aim and role in order to perform appropriately. By this stage, the coal-fired power plant projects, which had led to the creation of the civil groups, had been cancelled, so they achieved their original aim to stop the projects. Consequently, the civil group seemed unnecessary after this. But the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups retained their connections with other civil groups in the civil group network. Their roles appeared, however, to change and to take on the role of assisting in the linking between other civil groups around Thailand. The connections and linkages took on the features of facilitating co-operation and collaboration between the other civil groups, and the linkages built up were mostly related to the leaders of both civil groups.

As mentioned previously, the role of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups after cancellation of the coal-fired plant project became one of supporters of local people who experienced conflict with the Thai state. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups used strength of identity, in terms of being small local groups who bravely rose up in order to oppose state power. In this regard, the leaders of both civil groups appeared to be ambassadors of a signature local group which encouraged civil groups nationwide to build up a civil group network. Importantly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork groups also sustained their capability of being self-organized with an informal structure and were careful to avoid taking sides in the national political mass mobilization conflict between Red and Yellow. Nonetheless, the linkages of the civil groups with the NGOs and the state were definitely fractured.

To sustain themselves, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups developed social capital as a means of survival. Again, the need of both civil groups seemed to disappear due to the projects being cancelled, but they continued to have a role in terms of encouraging collaboration through linkages, indicating that the social capital of these civil groups transformed to have a collective aspect, which was generated for other civil groups’ interests.
Trust within the civil groups developed on from the previous phase. It was based on the strength of the civil groups, which became a vital factor facilitating linkages. Additionally, the aspect of reciprocity appeared in terms of co-ordination and collaboration; in particular, the loose reciprocity within Baan Krut and Bor Nork seemed to support other civil groups by not expecting to be reimbursed. Accordingly, the collective aspect of these civil groups included civil organizational values. Furthermore, linkages that the civil groups built generated social norms in terms of encouraging other local communities to value their motherland. Apart from building social norms that valued environmental preservation, the civil group also shared this model of thought to Thai society through their civil group linkages and networks (Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustaining Phase</th>
<th>The adaptation of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkages</strong></td>
<td>Wide linkages to other civil groups. Building more civil networks by helping other civil groups deal with problems independently. Adaptation appeared in the ability for co-ordination and collaboration of other civil groups. Keep the civil groups’ identity. Leaders play important roles. No linking to NGOs and very little state institutional linkage. Attempting to avoid national political conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social capital</strong></td>
<td>Social capital showed through the linkages. Appeared in collective social capital aspects. Trust in organizational relationships (same aims). Reciprocity emerged broadly among diverse civil groups through collaboration. Tolerance and the collective interest concerned built up values and norms. Social trust developed from civil group values and the sharing of norms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 The adaptation of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups at the sustaining phase
Case Studies Findings in Comparative Framework

This thesis has examined two case studies: the Pak Mun civil group case study, and the two civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork. In this section, the case studies are compared using the concepts of the research framework. Discussion of the comparison of the case studies aims to generate answers to the research questions, which will be the guideline for how the discussion is presented.

The two case studies have been described and explained, using the conceptual research framework, as having three phases. The explanation of the establishment, development and sustaining phases of the two case studies emphasized the context of the civil group case studies’ trajectories, rather than looking at the cases through the same period of time. This is because the two cases with the three civil groups emerged in different periods. Nonetheless, the study deemed the path trajectory of the cases to be significant, because the aim of the study is to seek possible ways of sustaining civil groups. As a result, the survival of the civil groups currently will be focussed on, and the different time frame of the case studies will be left aside.

The similarities and differences of the case studies at the establishment phase

Comparison of the emergence of the Pak Mun civil group and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups is summarized in Table 7. At the civil group establishment phase, the case studies emerged through a similar situation, even though the first case study, Pak Mun, occurred about five years earlier than the second case, Baan Krut and Bor Nork. Regarding the difference in their starting period, the civil groups in the second case seemed to be more aware of what needed to be dealt with in such contentious circumstances. The second case study learned from the first case study, because the state failed in the commitments it had made to the Pak Mun civil group many times.

A feature of the similarities and differences is how reciprocity was expressed. That reciprocity occurred was a similarity, but equally, the way it was expressed was an important difference. In the first case study the reciprocity occurred within traditional community relationships. It indicated ‘loose reciprocity’ due to there being no accounting to ensure exacting
reciprocity. It was carried out within traditional patterns of the civil group’s activities. The second case study also showed the ‘loose reciprocity’ as there was neither accounting involved, however the forms it took were not tied to the traditional patterns due to greater independence and assertiveness of the community members, associated with the seeking and gaining of education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment Phase</th>
<th>Case study one</th>
<th>Case study two</th>
<th>Case study two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pak Mun civil group</td>
<td>Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Similarities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social capital</th>
<th>Differences</th>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust, reciprocity, social bonding</td>
<td>Social relationships and dependence</td>
<td>Trust, reciprocity, social bonding</td>
<td>Own identity, self-esteem and independence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Emergence</th>
<th>Grievances</th>
<th>Incentives (Stimulation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local lifestyle, easy trust</td>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td>State overlooks local wisdom, state took the opponents’ side</td>
<td>Livelihood affected, dishonesty of the state agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in river, humble character, elders respected traditional ritual</td>
<td>Social relationships and dependence</td>
<td>Discrimination, threatened. Village destroyed</td>
<td>People equality demanded, ecological impacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local lifestyle, easy trust</td>
<td>Trust, reciprocity, social bonding</td>
<td>State overlooks the villagers’ concerns, state took the opponents’ side</td>
<td>Livelihoods affected, dishonesty of the public hearing process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in ancestors, confident, education respected, less traditional ritual</td>
<td>Own identity, self-esteem and independence</td>
<td>Leader murdered, leader in jail, broken social relationships</td>
<td>People participating in state decision-making demanded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Remarks

Incentives appeared in terms of stimulating factors or provocation: lack of media support, but with activists backing up

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incentives appeared in terms of stimulating factors or provocation: lack of media support, but with activists backing up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 Comparison of the case studies at the establishment phase

The similarities of the case studies at the establishment phase

The Pak Mun, Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged quickly as a result of the pressure of conflict with the Thai state. These civil groups contained similar aspects of social capital, which underpinned civil group formation. Trust, reciprocity and social bonding were important factors for the emergence of the civil groups in both cases. In terms of trust, the villagers in these case studies were tied together by their personal trust, forming social bonding. The civil groups forming were related closely to the aspects of social relationship in these communities, such as kinship, friendship and
neighborliness. Also, reciprocity occurred in accordance with trust and social bonding found in the case studies.

In the case of grievances, the Pak Mun, Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups were all disappointed at the role of the government, or the Thai state, which seemed to stand on the opposite side to them. Besides, the civil groups were dissatisfied at the state's ignorance of Pak Mun traditional knowledge, and the environmental concerns of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers. Moreover, incentive factors seemed to be generated through stimulating circumstances that contributed to civil group formation. The stimulating issues for the Pak Mun civil group related to the affliction brought to them as a consequence of the dam construction, while the concerns about the potential effects of the proposed coal-fired power plant projects was the provoking issue for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers. Apart from that, the dishonesty of the Thai state and the state agency also forced the local villagers to seek a way in which to respond to the state, which resulted in them forming the civil groups.

**The differences in the case studies at the establishment phase**
Comparing the themes between the Pak Mun civil group and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups showed that they are more alike than different. Nevertheless, the dissimilarities of the case studies at the establishment phase are significant and relate to the different context of the two cases.

In the case of social capital, the case studies have trust, reciprocity and social bonding out of which the civil groups emerge similarly. However, there were some differences in the details of the social capital. The social bonding of Pak Mun seemed to be more focussed on social relations. Kinship, friendship and neighborliness tied the Pak Mun civil group members together, which also resulted in the reliance on each other. By contrast, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged with the self-esteem of the southern identity. Social bonding seemed to be based on the relationships of friends and neighbors rather than focussing on families. The social bonding of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork appeared in more open, wider relationships than in the Pak Mun civil group. Also, Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups indicated more independence than the Pak Mun civil group because of the social relationship
aspect or the villagers’ identity. Regardless of the cause, the study deems that there was a difference shown by social relationships in the first and second case studies, respectively, at the establishment phase.

Likewise, even though the cultural aspects of the civil groups existed within the same Thai traditional style, there were differences in the cases, which appeared in terms of the villagers’ beliefs and perspectives. The Pak Mun civil group believed in respect for the river. The rituals of community tradition became important activities of the civil group, together with respect for the elders, which as well reflected the humble character of the Pak Mun villagers. Whereas the villagers in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities, believed in their ancestors with a higher degree of self-confidence. They were proud of their careers, produced in their homeland, which were given them by former generations. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups were formed, along with the villagers’ livelihoods, by those who were educated. The elder hierarchy did not seem to be very important in associating with the civil group.

In terms of the case studies’ grievances and incentives, the grievances were the affliction factors that supported the civil groups’ forming. The discrimination issue arose in the Pak Mun civil group. The villagers were threatened and villages destroyed, reflecting the oppression that the Pak Mun villagers were facing at that time. By comparison the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups experienced the murder of one leader and the jailing of another. Nevertheless, the issue of broken social relationships in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities seemed to occur more strongly than in the case of the Pak Mun civil group. Additionally, the incentives of the case studies’ establishment appeared as provocation or stimulating factors, with the issue of people’s equality and ecological impacts raised by the Pak Mun civil group. In the case of Baan Krut and Bor Nork, they also raised the issue of the rights of people to participate in state decision-making, as one of the formative elements of their civil groups.

The similarities and differences in the case studies at the development phase

In this section, the study has tabulated and indicated the themes from the comparative analysis of the case studies at the development phase, in Table 8.
At the development phase, the Pak Mun civil group, and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups have presented both similar and different strengthening features, in relation to the research framework (Table 8).

**The similarities of the case studies at the development phase**

The case studies, the Pak Mun civil group, and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, at the development phase indicated similarity in civil group structure. For both cases the civil groups developed informal organization. These civil groups were formed based on the cultural aspects of Thai society. The informal structure of the civil groups could be identified as an innovation of the local villagers for both cases. However, the functions of these civil groups, even though both had informal structures, seemed to be different, which will be explained in the next section.

In the case of civil group actors, the members of these civil groups have the same membership, which mainly consisted of villagers in their communities. The civil groups’ leaders were all residents of the communities, and the leaders in two case studies had been in place for a long time, ever since the beginning of the civil groups. When the Bor Nork civil group leader, Charoen, was killed, his wife became the leader of Bor Nork civil group so that there was continuity.

For both of the case studies, interactions that developed encompassed both horizontal and vertical interactions. The horizontal interactions considered the civil groups’ connections to other communities or civil groups, local NGOs and local government. The vertical interaction of these civil groups looked at the civil groups’ connections to other communities or civil group networks in the wider area, as well as how the civil groups connected to NGOs and government at national level. Consequently, horizontal ties, especially within civil groups, became very important, while vertical ties developed inadequately because of the protest orientation.

Likewise, the social capital of the case studies indicated similarities in terms of developing the same aspects of social capital, which comprised of how trust and reciprocity were produced within the civil groups. Additionally, the social capital developing in both the Pak Mun civil group and the Baan
Krut and Bor Nork civil groups appeared at the individual level. Social capital components facilitated civil groups to develop in the further phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Phase</th>
<th>Case study one</th>
<th>Case study two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pak Mun civil group</td>
<td>Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>Informal, local style.</td>
<td>Seniority hierarchy, aim to claim for compensation. Operated in protests and ritual activities. Activists involved.</td>
<td>Informal, local style.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Long time with the same leaders.</td>
<td>Elder members, Pak Mun contained members from other provinces around eastern area. Activists supported. Some outsider funding appeared.</td>
<td>Long time with the same leaders, less of a role from advisors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interactions</strong></td>
<td>Same line of civil group connections.</td>
<td>Interacted through NGOs’ connections, lack of interaction with local and central government.</td>
<td>Same line of civil group connections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social capital</strong></td>
<td>Individual level of trust and reciprocity.</td>
<td>Trust, values and norms developed by the activists’ connections and networks. Influenced by political division.</td>
<td>Individual level of trust and reciprocity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks**
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups developed on building the group name and image. For the Pak Mun, the civil group image presented as the local villagers, and mostly in name of Yanida.

Table 8 Comparison of the case studies at the development phase

The differences in the case studies at the development phase
As mentioned in the previous section, the case studies have, according to the research framework, developed from the same factors. Apart from that, the case studies illustrated distinctive ways of strengthening their civil groups.
Both case studies represent innovations by civil groups, which add to the concept of civil society. In terms of civil group structure, these civil groups have informal structure, but they functioned as groups in different ways. At this phase, the Pak Mun civil group aimed to stop the operation of the dam and were claiming compensation. For the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, the aim focussed on demanding the cancellation of the projects, together with demanding transparency in the state’s processes and participation in state decision-making. Furthermore, this study determined that the aim of claiming compensation by the Pak Mun villagers seemed to be based on individual interest, while for Baan Krut and Bor Nork they aimed to employ political processes, which not only resulted in focussing on the civil groups’ shared interest but also developing a mechanism for participation by people in the political system more widely.

In terms of the civil group operation, Baan Krut and Bor Nork emphasized the use of document procedures, which facilitated the civil group being able to bring the problem of coal-fired power plant project issue into the political system. Regarding this, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups worked mostly in contact with whomever they could get to support the aim of the civil group. By contrast, the Pak Mun civil group operated by using mass marches and local talks on stages, along with traditional ritual activities. Therefore, the activities of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups developed out of protest and mobilization. They organized their activities in terms of participating in political process rather than being protesters as the social pressure group.

Importantly, it was undeniable that the Pak Mun civil group had in fact been supported by activists, even though the activists attempted to only play the role of supporter. Accordingly, the self-organizational ability of the Pak Mun civil group seemed to be less compared with the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, which organized themselves without the involvement of other parties.

The case studies also have different membership. Members of Baan Krut and Bor Nork identified obviously as Prajuab Kirikhan residents. For the Pak Mun civil group, members encompassed villagers around the E-Sarn area, which resulted in villagers from diverse groups. Besides that, the Pak Mun
civil group indicated that members had to be elder villagers, unlike in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, which contained members of varying age. In particular, the leadership team of Bor Nork was comprised of the younger generation of Bor Nork villagers, the same as in Baan Krut, which persuaded the civil group members to form a football team. This was in order to strengthen the group with a new young generation. This also reflected a different approach to the role of education and development of human resources. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups saw a need to ensure the leadership were educated and that this needed to be actively developed. By contrast, the Pak Mun civil group relied on external support from activists, and later from NGOs. Accordingly, the Pak Mun civil group type of leadership resulted in limitations to the operation of the civil group. For the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, the leaders played a strong role, absent in Pak Mun. The Pak Mun civil group had activists supported strongly as advisors, while Baan Krut and Bor Nork have little support from activists or advisors. One more difference was in relation to the actors involved. Some sponsors supported the Pak Mun civil group, while the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups had none. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups maintained their independence and self-determination through developing their own human resources with a focus on education.

The interactions described in the case studies also developed in different ways. In terms of horizontal interactions, the Pak Mun civil group connected to other communities or other civil groups through the activists’ connections. The interactions mostly appeared in joining in marching and protests, which were organized by NGOs. In the case of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, interaction appeared mostly in exchanging information and discussion, though they were also involved in blocking the main street and marching in the first few years. With regard to this, however, the interactions by Baan Krut and Bor Nork appeared to be attempts to build up the civil group network. Besides that, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups had some connections to local government through some of the civil group members who worked at the local government office, and with politicians. However, the interaction with national government was absent in both case studies. Briefly, the Pak Mun civil group interacted with NGOs through the activists’
connection, but there were no NGOs involved with the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in this phase.

In terms of the differences in social capital between the case studies, social capital within the Pak Mun civil group was retained at the individual level. Social bonding remained important for joining the group’s activities. Significantly, the Pak Mun civil group developed trust, values and norms through the activists’ connections and networks. Moreover, trust among the civil group members went wrong when facing national political conflict. Importantly, NGOs strongly influenced the social capital of the Pak Mun civil group. Similarly, for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, social capital was retained at the individual level, which also developed afterwards to become the values and norms of the civil groups. A key difference was, however, that trust in the leaders brought about the value of leadership, together with the civil group capability, such that it became the norm of the civil group. Additionally, Baan Krut and Bor Nork attempted to avoid the national political division in order to protect the civil group from becoming a political tool in the national political conflict. Thus, distrust resulting from the national conflict did not affect the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups.

**The similarities and differences in the case studies at the sustaining phase**

In this section, the study compares the case studies in regard to the sustaining of the civil groups. Through the long development of the Pak Mun civil group, and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, there emerged similarities and differences in their adaptation, due to the need for their own ways of surviving. The factors of civil group adaptation, linkages and social capital of the case studies are tabulated for comparison in Table 9.

**The similarities in the case studies at the sustaining phase**

The linkages formed in both of the case studies have two main similarities. Firstly, the Pak Mun civil group and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups all showed that they linked to other civil groups in a wider sphere during this phase. In particular, the linkages resulted in the ability of the civil groups to build up the civil group network as an important factor for the sustaining of the groups. Nonetheless, the linking to other civil groups and the building of
The civil group network of these two case studies emerged differently. Both case studies, however, equally show a lack of linking to state institutions. On this point, the scarce linkages to state institutions by both cases are related to the aspect of social capital. Trust was lost with state institutions right from the beginning phase, even though both cases existed with culture-based social capital, which maintained trust as the normal way to seek to relate with all people.

The differences in the case studies at the sustaining phase

The Pak Mun civil group and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups have adapted in different ways. In particular, the differences in linkages and social capital features resulted in differing ability of the civil groups to sustain themselves.

In the case of the Pak Mun civil group, the linkages occurred mainly to transform the civil group to become part of an NGO. At the beginning, Pak Mun related closely to the activist Vanida, who was the main founder of the NGO, the AOP. Afterwards, the Pak Mun civil group became assimilated into the AOP, and then PMove. Apart from that, the linking of the Pak Mun civil group with other civil groups at this phase became linkages produced through the NGO’s connections. Consequently, the activities and the way to interact with others came to be under the umbrella of the NGO as well.

In contrast, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ adaptation was presented as ways of building up the civil group network at the same level, with other local civil groups. The linkages were the interactions of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups to the other civil groups, located mainly in the same area, but also including other civil groups across Thailand. The linkages of these civil groups were developed through using their connections and interactions from the previous phase in order to link other civil groups together into a network of civil groups. The linkages they built up had the support of the other local communities to form civil groups, who then afterwards worked together. Importantly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups were able to maintain their civil organization form and their own identity. It was also clearly shown that these civil groups have no linkages to
NGOs, so could work independently. Furthermore, not linking to the NGOs also protected the civil groups from interference by NGOs’ resolutions.

In terms of the differences between the two case studies, the Pak Mun civil group transformed to become part of an NGO, resulting in less reciprocity due to the civil group’s functions taking on a more formal aspect. In the same way, civil group trust came to be generated by trust under the NGO, as well as values and norms. Tolerance by the civil group became a small factor and appeared to be replaced by the Pak Mun civil group adapting its ability to survive among other civil groups within the NGO’s network. Therefore, through becoming integrated with AOP and the PMove, the Pak Mun civil group became weakened. Decrease in membership and activity of the civil group was the consequence. The change in social capital, through changes in how trust, tolerance, values and norms operated, all of which came about as a result of forming linkages to become integrated nationally as part of AOP and the PMove, weakened the civil society of Pak Mun. A key reason is that the Pak Mun civil group did not show leadership as a collective, most likely because its leadership had always been heavily influenced by outside activist support. Individual relationships within AOP and then PMove became more important than the identity and leadership shown by the Pak Mun civil group. The weakening of the civil society of Pak Mun therefore also decreased the role it had to enhance local democratization, in particular in terms of the self-organization of the Pak Mun civil group. It can also be said that to the extent AOP and PMove contributed to social fragmentation, the Pak Mun civil group through becoming nationally integrated not only lost effectiveness in assisting local democratization, but also participated in hindering the democratization of politics nationally.

In the second case, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups existed in Thai society differently compared to the first case study, the Pak Mun civil group. At this phase, Baan Krut and Bor Nork present collective social capital aspects due to having adapted productively regarding the development of factors of social capital that had begun to be established in the previous phase. Individual trust from social bonding within the civil group seemed to be less
### Table 9 Comparison of the sustaining phase of the case studies

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sustaining Phase</th>
<th>Case study one</th>
<th>Case study two</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pak Mun civil group</td>
<td>Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Linkages</strong></td>
<td>Link to other civil groups, scarce linkage to state institutions.</td>
<td>Linkages produced by activists and NGOs. All activities were organized by NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social capital</strong></td>
<td>Remained culture-based.</td>
<td>Trust in NGOs, less reciprocity. Tolerance appeared only for working with others activated on behalf of NGOs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

important, because civil group trustworthiness, namely the reputation of the strong local group of villagers, increased progressively instead of personal connections. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups earned social trust more widely because both civil groups maintained participation of people and helped other civil groups around Thailand, even though the coal-fired power plant projects were cancelled. Regarding this, to build the civil group network by linking nationwide civil groups together presented a collective interest by the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. With the focus on the aim of collective interest, the reciprocity of these civil groups occurred in the shape of the loose expectation of getting back support from other civil groups. The
concern of collective interest generated not only social trust for the civil groups, but also values in relation to these civil groups’ reputation of being strong local groups able to protect their homeland from the encroachment of state projects. Most importantly, the collective social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups appeared in the sharing of the norm and idea that local people must look after their communities. Also that community preservation demands the need for local participation in the idea of protecting the homeland. The trajectory taken by the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group strengthened themselves and civil society generally through how they networked and supported new and other civil groups. It appears that the decision to not seek to become integrated nationally was significant in ensuring that this was the case. It was possible because of their greater self-leadership, due to not ever relying on outside activist or NGO support during earlier phases. Also, their identity remained strong and grew in importance as their leadership among local civil groups increased. The consequence was that their local activity was a democratizing influence on other local civil groups, nationally.

Research Framework Assessments
The research framework considered the key dimensions of civil society, which were used to explore and analyze the two case studies. The three phases of the civil groups were defined in order to examine empirically the Thai civil groups. In this section, the study evaluates the research framework by looking through the three phases of civil groups in relation to the case studies.

At the establishment phase (Figure 1), the study considered the emergence of civil groups as the interweaving of social capital factors (Fukuyama, 2001). This was found to be consistent with the sociocultural aspects of Thai society and to explain how the presence of social capital facilitates civil groups (Foley and Edwards, 1998). In terms of looking at the cultural aspect in particular, it was found to be an important feature to frame the forming of civil groups, particularly. Cultural aspects include the ordinary life of the grassroots, which appears as a collective aspect of the villagers. This, along with looking at the grievances, helped the researcher understand the political pressure that led the grassroots to become associated in new ways,
under extraordinary circumstances, to form civil groups. Also, grievance factors were significant in the interweaving of social capital. In this regard, social capital, cultural aspects and grievance factors were found to be intrinsically interrelated. For example, civil groups might have greater difficulty forming if there is loose social bonding not bound by reciprocity and commonly held cultural values and norms. The civil groups in the case studies all showed that they associated and operated easily because of the cultural aspect that contains social bonding and social relations, as well as trust and reciprocity produced through social bonding.

In the same way, grievances can be a factor that generates social capital to form groups. The suffering of state distrust provoked villagers into the need to be associated in order to protect themselves from the state and state agencies, as the only way to deal with this kind of hegemony. The intense grievances the villagers suffered are the reason for the civil group emerging. In the case of incentive factors, it does not seem to apply in the Thai context. These factors appear only in more negative manners, as stimulation, which motivates the grassroots more widely to join a group. The issues and problems creating the stimulation are, however, only indirectly related to the grassroots.

According to the literature synthesized in Chapter Two (pp. 6–40), the research framework aims to clarify how civil groups developed after their establishment, and also how civil groups existed after the issues or problem had been resolved. In this regard, the framework contained factors that can appropriately analyze civil group strengthening during the development phase (Figure 3). As Heinrich (2010) explains, the function and form of civil society are related. Based on this, it is necessary to examine these factors because the features of a civil group structure and their functions indicate the grassroots’ ability in terms of innovation and self-organization. Moreover, the capability of designing and organizing the civil group is also related to the civil group’s ability to be self-sustaining, which is a key finding of this research.

In terms of civil group actors, the research framework encompasses civil group members, leaders, activists, advisors and funding supporters (sponsors). From the literature review, scholars generally identified these actors in relation to the civil society concept. For instance, Boonmee (2007) refers to the integration of grassroots and special interest groups, while Wasi
(2000) talks about civil society as ‘community’ and ‘civility’. Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee (1999) imply civil society is equivalent to social movements, and there is even a study of how civil society relates to the terms ‘state and individual’ (Laothamatus, 1999). The research framework attempts to clarify specifically what civil society empirically contains in terms of the kinds of actors, in the Thai context. In this regard, this study has classified the specific actors of the civil group in order to describe their definitive roles for civil group development and sustainability. Based on this, the framework focuses on the role of actors rather than on their characteristics. It considers any people who are significantly involved in civil group operation. For example, NGOs can be considered as advisors or activists, depending on what role they play for the civil groups. Accordingly, the researcher deems that this framework is appropriate, as it has to be flexible when analyzing the actors in civil groups due to the actors usually playing many overlapping roles in the Thai civil society context.

The research framework has set civil group interactions as an aspect of how civil groups connect to other societal sections, both horizontally and vertically. Civil group interaction relates closely to the civil society conceptual model as Hadenius and Ugglå (1996) describe it, namely as a space of the interactions which are of a decentralized and democratic kind. Regarding this, the interactions examined are the horizontal and vertical interactions of the civil groups considered when analyzing the strengthening of the civil groups through the occurrence of decentralization and democratic processes. For instance, decentralization appears in the emerging of new civil groups, when it is unnecessary to belong to one big civil organization, such as exhibited by the autonomy of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. Meanwhile, the interactions of these civil groups with each other and other civil groups generates a kind of democratic process. As a result, the interaction factors required in the framework have in fact examined the strengthening and developing of the civil groups. Apart from that, to emphasize civil group interactions in the research framework addresses the point by Missingham (2003) already highlighted, that the interactions of civil society with actual surrounding factors have been ignored in the Thai context.
The analysis of social capital in accordance with the research framework has brought agreement with the point that Hadenius and Uggla (1996) make, that to develop civil organization requires social capital. In terms of this, the occurrences of the social capital factors help this study understand how civil groups develop themselves by integrating social capital factors within the groups. This also frames the external factors, which encourage the producing of social capital. It has helped the study consider the factors surrounding the civil groups in relation to the strengthening of the civil group at the development phase. Regarding this, the researcher deems that social capital at this phase progresses to become more collective in nature, and that this emerges as the integration of all factors in the framework occurs. Moreover, this process has been helpful in examining the strengthening of the civil groups in regard to the creation of civil group values and norms, as was reviewed in Chapter Two (pp. 33–34).

Moreover, the research framework is comprised of two key factors, which aim to examine the ways to sustain Thai civil organization. The key factors emphasize the linkages and social capital of the civil groups, which was reviewed in Chapter Two. In particular, Edwards (1998) claims that the explanation of the differences forms the need for civil society to emphasize the role of linkages, because civil society also relates to the differences between levels of government and its representatives. Regarding this, this research set out to analyze linkages as regional level features. Horizontal linkages have been focussed on in this research framework, because Boonmee (2007) argued that the horizontal integration of grassroots could provide alternatives to solve political problems. And, to put this factor in the research framework helped this study find out what linkages could sustain the civil groups, and which can be supportive of a strong local institution to counterbalance state power.

Also, finding useful linkages for the sustaining of civil groups appears to be consistent with what Wasi (2000) said about horizontal networks being an important tool to strengthen civil society in the Thai context. On this point, the research found that linkages are important for the building of civil group networks and also to encourage the sustaining of civil groups. Nevertheless, with the overlapping and complicated linkages of the civil group network, the
researcher deems that the framing for analyzing civil group linkages is better considered through the aspects of how they connect or link to the other civil groups or institutions. Significantly, the consequences of their links being mainly horizontal and within networks requires an emphasis on understanding the forms and functions of civil groups if the success or otherwise of linkages is to be understood. The production of the form and functions of civil groups after linking to other sectors could be interpreted as how civil groups maintain their sustainability, which refers to the idea of Edwards that implies the differences in forms of civil groups relate to the need for flexibility in linkages.

Nonetheless, the study has also pointed out that the role of vertical linkages has been overlooked when examining the roles of Thai civil organization (p. 22). The argument for the role of vertical linkages led this study to analyze the connection of civil groups to other civil groups across Thailand, together with the connections of civil groups with national NGOs and central government. Regarding this, it is undeniable that vertical linkages provide a requisite framing to seek the sustaining of civil groups. However, the research found that at national level there were connections to civil groups in the case studies, but that the connection with NGOs and state institutions were, by contrast, inadequate.

In terms of this, the study suggests that the flexible linkages identified as necessary for the sustaining of civil groups refer to the need to consider the contextual features that significantly influence what are the appropriate linkages. Therefore it is appropriate to take a regional perspective into account. Flexible linking facilitates the connecting of civil groups to other groups in the network, which is similar to how Hadenius and Ugglå (1996) describe civil society, as the group of linkages arranged in a social network. For this reason, the study contends that the linkages and networks are essential factors to analyze the sustaining of civil groups. Importantly, the study nevertheless raises a concern to ensure that empirically analyzing this factor needs to focus on the context of the civil groups, as this is what has to be adapted to, which can be interpreted as ensuring the sustainability of civil groups.

To examine the sustaining of civil groups, it is, however, also necessary to consider the aspect of social capital, which is generated continually right
from the establishment and development phases. In addition, social capital is a factor for civil society adaptability and sustainability (Bourdieu, 1980). With regard to this, this research also uses the aspect of social capital adaptation for interpreting the sustainability of civil groups. Social capital at this phase also refers to the features of linkages, according to the idea of Newton (2001). He emphasizes the role of social capital in terms of values and trust in civil society. Based on this view, this research found that social capital adaptation of the civil groups in the case studies appears more in a collective aspect through the linkages with other civil groups in the civil network. For example, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups get social trust from outsiders. The outsiders (other civil groups and other sectors) trust in the civil groups’ point of views, which become in turn the values and norms of the outsiders (civil groups and other sectors). Furthermore, the civil groups share their norms to others to encourage the civil groups to build a wider civil network in Thai society.

To summarize the main points, civil society in Thailand emerges out of crisis and protest: there is a crisis for the local community, leading to social protest. Consequently, horizontal ties, especially cultural processes within the village, are initially very important, along with social ties and leadership, because solidarity and unity are crucial. By contrast, vertical ties do not easily develop, because of the protest orientation initiating the formation of civil groups. It is at this stage that the two cases studied showed that there were at least two possible trajectories after the initial emergence of a civil group. One trajectory leads to the strengthening and sustaining of the civil group and local democratization, and one does not. It is not possible to generalize from two cases but the evidence from them nevertheless shows that there are some specific dynamics that deserve further research. Tensions arose as the factors that were crucial to the emergence and development of civil society, such as trust, reciprocity and social bonding, were not easily expanded to the national level, where relationships involved strangers rather than family and friends. Those tensions undermined the effectiveness of civil society and its capacity to encourage both local and national democracy. The tension arose out of the initial crisis out of which the civil group emerged, but the two cases show that it can be dealt with in different ways and that one is potentially more effective than the other. The crisis the community is experiencing at the early stage of
the emergence of a civil group can lead to some demand for external expertise, such as support from NGOs, but can become problematic due to intervention by NGOs, even during the early stage. Later on as the civil group develops and seeks to sustain itself the reliance on external expertise showed itself to result in lack of local leadership and civil group identity, which then led to seeking to become nationally integrated with NGOs, for leadership as well as resources. The more successful and sustainable solution for civil groups is to principally focus on the development of human resources within the civil group. The reason is because the reciprocity and trust of social capital cannot easily be translated from a local civil group, where local culture is central to the formation of social capital, to a national organization. Moreover, because local issues prompt the emergence of civil groups, the refocus to national issues may also be a difficult translation for a civil group to make. Therefore the approach that appears to be more successful and long term sustaining of civil society and local democratization, are processes that seek to build up the grassroots’ leadership through a focus on education and explicitly seeking to nurture a younger generation of leaders. It is this latter approach that allows civil society to be converted into something that can survive in normal times, so that it is sustainable over the long term. Otherwise, there is evidence that dependence on NGOs for guidance results in becoming also a pawn in wider political divisions and conflict, which is ultimately destructive of civil society, and also ceases to be a democratizing influence in the Thai context. Civil society needs to remain local in its orientation, because if it is drawn into national politics, led by NGOs or activists, it loses its horizontal ties, its purpose and its social capital. So civil society that works is, like the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan, embedded in the Thai local society and linked to other local civil society organizations in cooperative arrangements, but not subverted by national politics. Indeed such focussed persistence and integrity is inspirational to guide the emergence of civil society in other communities, to prepare and enable them to also stand up to the hegemonic influence of the state. Its democratizing influence is only local, but it has a national impact on local civil groups. This is how a civil society revolution from below has emerged in Thailand.
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and social capital; horizontal and vertical linkages between groups; potential for capacity building for community movement organizations and ability to fulfill an advisory role for state institutions.
Themes:
1. The grassroots participatory aspects of political activities; formal and informal.
2. The role of community members; actions and interactions.
3. The leaders involved in terms of Thai civil society.
4. The alliances involved in terms of Thai civil society.

Groups of interviewees:
1. Local community movement organization; leaders and members.
2. Local NGOs.
3. Local politicians and local government representatives.
4. National NGOs.

Questions:
Group 1
1. What kind is your organization? (Formal, informal)
2. How did your organization start?
3. Why did your organization start?
4. Who started your organization?
5. Who are your leaders now?
6. What is your role in your organization?
7. What does your organization do now?
8. How do you sustain your organization?
9. How do you get new members?
10. How do you interact with the rest of the community?
11. How do you interact with other organizations? (Government, NGOs, alliances).
12. Do you have something else you want to say?

Groups 2 and 4
1. What kinds/name of your organization? (formal, informal)
2. How did your organization start?
3. Why did your organization start?
4. Who started your organization?
5. Who are your leaders now?
6. What is your role in your organization?
7. What does your organization do now?
8. How do you sustain your organization?
9. How do you interact with the community?
10. How do you interact with other NGOs?
11. How do you interact with government organizations?
12. Do you have something else you want to say?

Groups 3 and 5
1. In your role, how do you interact with the community and NGOs?
2. From your experience, what are the problems working with the community and NGOs?
3. What do you think about how to solve the problems?
4. Do you have something else you want to say?