A Normative Power Paradox? Theory and Change in European Union Development Policy

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Abstract
One of the issues frequently raised when the EU’s role as a normative actor is considered is that of consistency/variation in its approach. Much of this has centred around a norms–interests dichotomy, and the question as to which carries most weight. While political and economic interests have clearly played an important role in EU development policy, offering an explanation for much of the geographic differentiation in its application, our argument here is that apparent inconsistencies are not necessarily reducible to a violation of norms or the prioritising of interests, but may be explicable through recognition of a further factor – a ‘theory filter’.

From its inception in the form of Association following the signing of the Treaty of Rome, through the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions and on to the Cotonou Agreement, the EU’s approach to development has undergone a fundamental transformation over time. Nevertheless, the normative identity of the Union has, over the same period, remained relatively stable. Intrinsic to this has been the way in which development itself has been conceived and understood. Development theory has in effect acted as a filter through which European norms have passed into EU development policy, meaning that key changes in policy have been linked to the evolution in conceptual issues of development, rather than to inconsistent application of norms or the prioritisation of other interests. The paper explores this process, examining the linkage between policy change and conceptual change from the advent of Associationism in 1957 through to the present post-Cotonou and (soon) post-MDG period, with agreement on new global Sustainable Development Goals envisioned for 2015.

Coined by Ian Manners in 2002, the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ has since gained significant traction in analyses of the European Union’s external relations, offering as it does
a framework for examining the role of an actor the nature of which has long been subject to debate. The normative power approach both dovetailed with earlier concepts such as ‘presence’, and was framed as a supplement to prevailing concepts such as civilian or military power.

According to Manners’ conception, it is the centrality of its core norms that defines the Union as an actor: “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Manners 2002: 252). At a basic level, therefore, norms occupy two places: (i) as a value to be transmitted to other actors and to be diffused throughout the international system – Manners’ (2002: 239) “idée force” or “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations”; and (ii) as a framework guiding the Union’s external relations – in this respect Manners argues that actions and policies must be “normatively explicable and justifiable to others” (2009: 2) and be “both normatively coherent and consistent” (2008, 56). This issue of consistency has since gained significant attention in the academic literature, being seen as a key conditioning principle in the application of normative power (Nicolaïdis and Nicolaïdis 2006: 348–349). Thus a range of studies have addressed inconsistencies in the EU’s external relations, and the apparent privileging of interests over norms.¹

As far as European Union development policy is concerned, two primary axes of variation have been evident: across space and over time. In the case of the former, it has long been noted – not least within the EU itself (see e.g. Ferrandi 1962: 7) – that there has been significant geographic differentiation in the application of policy, the product of a variety of competing interests.² The most significant of these is the historic colonial relationship which formed the first basis of selection of European development partners, defining initial engagement with (a largely francophone subset of) Africa, and later extension through that continent and beyond to the Caribbean and Pacific. The flip-side of this selectivity has been the exclusion of a number of developing countries, notably from Latin America and Asia. The historic exclusion of Latin America can be explained in terms of the absence of a colonial tie to the region among the early Member States of the EU, to which may be added the geopolitical reality of US interests embodied in the Monroe Doctrine. While ties between the two became closer from the mid-1980s, engagement significantly accelerated at the turn of the millennium as the Union began to disburse increased amounts of development assistance to the region in line with its economic and foreign policy interests, notably in the form of supporting local integration processes and pushing for increased market access. Where Asia is concerned, development has been a low priority in the relationship, notwithstanding the extent of need in the region. Rather, EU–Asia relations have been characterised by the primacy accorded to economic interests, with the Asian states largely perceived in terms of economic opportunity and threat. Thus what

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² For more detailed discussion of the variable geographic application of EU development policy, see Holland and Doidge (2012).
aid was distributed did not necessarily go to the poorest countries, but rather to those in which Europe had a particular economic interest – primarily the ASEAN states. For the period 1976–1991, for example, the states of Indochina received a combined total of €103 million (or €0.8 per capita) in aid, compared to Thailand which received €206 million (or €3.6 per capita) for the same period (European Commission 1994: 30). What is evident then, is that insofar as the geographic variation issue is concerned, competing interests have played an important role in the inconsistent application of EU development norms.

But it is with the second axis of variation that this paper is concerned – that of time. While the ‘norms–interests’ dichotomy has been a significant explanation for geographic differentiation, variation in Union policy over time is not necessarily reducible in this way. European Union development policy has, in the six decades since its inception, undergone significant transformation in its nature and application: rather than a consistent policy approach, what has been evident is a constantly evolving framework which now bears little resemblance to its origins. At the same time, the normative foundation of the Union has remained relatively stable. What seems apparent is that the Union’s guiding normative principles have been filtered through a (largely) externally constructed framework – that of development theory. Thus the stability of norms and variation in policy has not produced any fundamental violation of European values, but rather demonstrates the way in which the mechanism for achievement of normative principles may be subject to continuing redefinition.

This theory filter operates in two key ways. The first is the central point at issue in this paper: the notion that development theory acts as a gatekeeper for the application of norms to development policy. External conceptual frameworks in effect define or limit the parameters of debate and possibilities for action on issues of development within the European Union – a form of ‘bandwidth throttling’ – and therefore also define or limit the application of EU norms to its development framework, and in so doing help to shape those norms. The second element, underpinning the first, is the way in which this theory filter confers legitimacy. This addresses the issue, framed among others by Helene Sjursen (2002: 493; 2006: 247), that without reference to a broader ethical or cosmopolitan universality, norms may be seen as little more than the particularistic expression of localised value sets. Stated simply, the normative framework may be seen as little more than cultural bias in favour, in this case, of the European Union. As theoretical conceptualisations of development increasingly come to be embedded in the multilateral system and multilateral agreements – as, for example, has been the case with those elements falling under the Human Development umbrella which have deep roots in the UN system – they can be conceived as a set of values of which there is general acceptance. As such, through this process of embedding, they constitute what is in effect one element in a broader cosmopolitan order offering a level of multilateral legitimacy to specific normative action. This in turn strengthens the place of the development theory as a filter for the application of EU norms to its development policy.
The European Union’s Normative Foundation

As has already been suggested, the core norms of the European Union have remained relatively stable over time, differing only to the extent that they have been asserted with greater nuance through progressive iterations of the Union’s constitutive treaties. Drawing on the work of Manners (2002, 2008), and earlier iterations such as Weiler’s (1999: 238–263) ‘foundational ideals’, a set of core normative principles can be identified traceable in their raw form back to the period leading up to and including the Treaty of Rome. The first of these is the maintenance of peace, both on the European continent and in the wider world. The centrality of this to European integration cannot be understated, being the primary motive force underpinning the initial formation of the European Coal and Steel Community as highlighted in the 1950 Schuman Declaration.

Second is freedom, conceived broadly in social and political terms (including in the recognition of the right of states to determine their own policies), as well as in the centrality awarded to economic liberalism in the integration project (see e.g. Parker and Rosamond 2013). This appears in broad brushstrokes in the Treaty of Rome’s resolve to “preserve and strengthen peace and liberty” and reference to the principles of the UN Charter, and in the architecture of the common market project, but has gradually accreted greater detail over time. Further, progressive revisions of the Treaty of Rome have resulted in the clear expression of freedoms of persons, goods, services, capital and establishment (Manners 2008: 49).

Building on this second element, human rights, democracy and the rule of law constitute the third, fourth and fifth of the Union’s core norms. Again, initially appearing in the Treaty of Rome’s reference to the UN Charter, these too have undergone greater elaboration and centralisation within the European structure through, for example, the Maastricht Treaty’s CFSP provisions, and through the Lisbon Treaty’s (Arts. 1(3), 1(24)) highlighting of principles of non-discrimination, human equality; minority protection and so on.

The sixth norm is that of international cooperation, broadly conceived. This stands as a default position for Europe, being intrinsic to its own integration process, and central to its approach to issues of global significance. Such rules-based cooperation to address common problems has been at the core of European integration since the outset, to be seen, for example, in the Schuman Declaration’s call to remove the barriers dividing Europe as a means both to make war “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Schuman, 1950, 1), and to achieve prosperity by providing a common basis for economic development (ibid.). Advocacy of a cooperative rules-based approach to international relations has since been concretised in the form of EU support for other regional integration arrangements, and of multilateral engagement through global negotiations and institutions, processes that are seen both as valuable in their own right, and as mechanisms for achieving other normative goals. More broadly, however, this norm of international cooperation is underpinned by, and emphasises, principles such as equality and partnership in the Union’s bilateral engagements, and equity in the international system.
Finally, the seventh norm is that of solidarity. This is to be understood both in terms of intra-EU relations and its external engagement, both of which elements are traceable to the Treaty of Rome. Intra-European solidarity found early expression in calls for economic and social progress, improved living and working conditions for European citizens, and for economic unity and harmonious development of member economies. It is, however, in external solidarity that the foundations of European Union development policy are to be found. It is on the basis of “the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries” and the “desir[e] to ensure their development and prosperity” (Preamble to the Treaty of Rome) that Union engagement in this area is built. Such external solidarity was directly linked to a sense of ethical or moral responsibility (Grilli 1993: 3) to “shoulder its responsibilities” (European Commission 1971: 14), being characterised by Commissioner for Overseas Development Robert Lemaignen as a “purely humanitarian aim” (Lemaignen 1960: 1), and was closely associated in early documents with principles such as equitable treatment (thus linking back to the principles underpinning its view of international cooperation), well-being and prosperity. As Commissioner for Development Claude Cheysson (1976: 9) later commented, “the fight for a new, more just and more equitable, economic order cannot be confined to the frontiers of Europe”. And indeed, that ethical or moral component has remained central to the Union’s conception of development, embodied, for example, in an ongoing focus on social justice. Expressions of international solidarity in development relations therefore featured, for example, in the preambles to each of the Lomé Conventions, and in key documents such as the 1982 memorandum on The Community’s Development Policy (European Commission 1982b: 3, 4) and the 1992 Communication on Development Cooperation Policy in the Run-Up to 2000 (European Commission 1992a: 39). That solidarity remains central to the Union’s view of its development policy is affirmed by the constancy of its refrain in the comments and statements of Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, for whom “[d]evelopment aid is both solidarity and an investment to make the world safer and more prosperous” (European Commission 2012).

What seems clear, then, is a human focus in the Union’s core norms, rooted firmly in Enlightenment ideals and the humanist tradition. Indeed, by the Lisbon Treaty, the importance of this heritage is made explicit, with the attempt to strengthen the foundation of the Union’s recognition of social and political freedoms through referencing Europe’s “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance” on which the “inalienable rights of the human person” are built (Art.1(1)). Peace, liberty and progress rest at the heart of this framework, with an emphasis on economic and social development, a broad advocacy of human freedoms, and specific emphasis on ideals such as respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. This human-centred framework is further underpinned by the solidarity norm, which both universalises its application to Europe and the wider world, and emphasises its ethical/moral foundation. It is this norm of solidarity that therefore provides

3 As such, this links closely with Manners’ (2008: 55–56) consideration of EU norms and virtue ethics.
4 For further examples see, inter alia: European Commission (2011); Three60 (2014: 19:13–19:56).
the foundation for European Union development policy,⁵ to be seen for example in Jacques Ferrandi’s⁶ question: “Could Europe, when it accepted the responsibility for a complete reconstruction of its internal and external relations, escape the great duty of making a real response to the question of relations between industrial countries and less advanced countries?” (Ferrandi 1962: 3–4).

Importantly, while this norm-set is traceable to the early years of European integration, constituting a foundation of values upon which the projet européen has itself been built, they have not always been translated into its development policy, notwithstanding the proximate historic origin of that framework. In this is to be found evidence of the role of the external theory filter in mediating the application of EU norms to its development policy, the demonstration of which will be the concern of the remainder of this paper. The analysis is not exhaustive, and indeed some of these norms – peace, for example – are not considered at all, but what becomes clear throughout is the progressive insertion of varying elements of the EU norm set into its development policy framework as conceptions of development evolve.

Growth Theory and Modernisation

The emergence of the EU’s development framework coincided with the birth of development itself. It took place in the context of accelerating economic growth among the core capitalist economies as they recovered from the ravages of the Second World War, and a continued belief in mono-economics – the view that a single economic model could be universally applied, addressing the problems of countries no matter where on the development spectrum they were situated. Further, a focus on achieving self-sustaining growth became increasingly evident (Harrod 1939, Domar 1947, Solow 1956), along with Keynes’ re-legitimisation of the role of the state in the economy, all contributing to the shaping of a new development agenda. From these foundations, applied to the historical experience of the developing world by Arthur Lewis (1954), came the ‘dual sector model’, positing a capitalist–traditional divide in developing countries. Development thus came to focus on the transformation of the traditional into the capitalist ‘growth-oriented’ sector or, in other words, industrialisation. As such, when the first theoretical frameworks dedicated to the problem of development emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, they essentially problematized the lack of development as being a deviation from the ideal of a Western industrial modernity, and therefore concerned themselves with fostering the transition away from the traditional society and towards a modern capitalist one.

⁵ This diverges from the model of Manners (2002, 2008), for whom ‘sustainable development’ lies at the heart of the European Union’s normative framework. The view taken in this paper is that solidarity is a ‘foundational norm’ of the EU, providing the motive force behind development policy. The ‘sustainability’ element is a far more recent one in the European approach, providing an example of exactly what this paper suggests – development theory as a filter for EU norms. In this view, Manners’ approach conflates what is in reality a policy with a norm, and therefore anchors the framework in a specific time period.

⁶ Director of Research and Development Programmes in the Directorate General for Overseas Development.
While from the 1960s separate strands within Modernisation emerged supplementing the view of an industrial capitalist modernity with a secular and rational cultural modernity (e.g. Inkeles and Smith 1974) and a democratic political modernity (e.g. Almond and Powell 1965), it was economic approaches building on earlier growth theories that were largely the focus of initial development interventions. Under the name ‘Modernisation Theory’, they envisaged a path of economic and (later) social change which would mimic the (theorised) path taken by the developed West and lead eventually to a convergence at a common destination – the advanced industrial society (as, for example, with Rostow’s (1960) five stages of economic growth). Development policy therefore centred on mechanisms by which the developing world could be driven along this path, with the developed world cast in the role of exemplars and expert guides. Indeed, while conceived in terms of state-led endogenous national development, Modernisation theories also found themselves advocating exogenous influences as mechanisms of progression. Modernisation therefore envisaged a role for the West as mid-wife to modernity, both as the source of needed capital through trade and investment – for which the participation of developing countries in the world economy was therefore key – and in the form of benign pedagogue.

Associationism

As the predominant model in the 1950s, the logic of Modernisation was clearly reflected in the establishment and early years of European Union development policy. When development policy was (against the wishes of many) incorporated into the Treaty of Rome as a *sine qua non* for French signature (Ravenhill 1985: 48), it came in the form of Association. Development was defined in terms of “economic, social and cultural development” and reflected the Union’s human focus by framing it in terms of “the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of [the Associated] countries and territories” (Treaty of Rome 1957: Art.131). In order to achieve this goal, the clear emphasis of the Treaty of Rome’s provisions was the process of industrialisation (Art.133(3)), and, notwithstanding the Union’s normative human focus, adhered to the prevailing orthodoxy that the state was in the best position to direct the development process. Association was therefore defined as a mechanism for transforming the EAMA states, with the intent to enable them “to catch up without excessive delay” by “supporting... their efforts to modernize and industrialise” (European Commission 1961: 3). As such, Association mirrored Modernisation Theory’s call for economic, social and cultural development, while prioritising economic growth through industrialisation. As a consequence, Association focused on the need for capital, assuming that this would be sufficient to finance industrial modernisation and generate continuing growth (Ferrandi 1962: 26–27). Capital was supplied

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7 Original text: EU policy toward the Associated states should “permettre aux économies associées de rattraper, sans délais excessifs, leur retard. ...mais aussi et surtout de participer à leur mutation et de soutenir ces pays dans leurs efforts de modernisation et d'industrialisation en vue de l’établissement d’un équilibre satisfaisant” (European Commission 1961: 3).
through two mechanisms: (i) the establishment of a free trade area, involving reciprocal market opening, enabling Associated states to generate foreign exchange through exports, primarily of commodities for which they were seen to have a competitive advantage; and (ii) the newly instituted European Development Fund – a process later characterised by Commission President Walter Hallstein (1963b: 2) as “pay[ing] out money and hop[ing] that it would yield positive results”.

Post-Rome: Later Modernisation and Structuralism
In the years following the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome, two notable elements gained increased prominence in development debate. First, a number of Modernisation Theorists diverged from the economic focus of those such as Rostow (1960), questioning whether capital alone was sufficient to achieve ‘catch up’. Theories of cultural and political modernisation therefore gained emphasis in the pursuit of industrial modernity. Second, criticisms of the mono-economic supposition came to the fore. When Dudley Seers (1963) challenged the notion that Western development corresponded to a standard model, arguing instead that it constituted a special case which could not subsequently be applied to the developing world, he was building upon critical analyses of economic Modernisation that had begun to emerge as early as 1950, notably in the Structuralist assessment of the Latin American case most prominently undertaken by economists Raul Prebisch (1950) and Hans Wolfgang Singer (1950). They noted that terms of trade for commodities were subject to declining returns, meaning that in practice an emphasis on the export of these products was unlikely to generate the growth, diversification and industrialisation that Modernisation theorists assumed. Underdevelopment was therefore not about these countries being further behind on the development path and the deficiencies of the traditional society, but rather about the mechanism of their insertion into the world trading system as peripheral economies vis-à-vis an industrialised core. The product was a relationship in which the terms of trade benefitted that core (which remained the locus of technical progress and rising prosperity) and served to perpetuate the peripheral status of developing countries. The proposed (though ultimately unsuccessful) solution was a policy of Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), focusing investment on establishing domestic substitutes for foreign goods, rather than exclusively on sectors of comparative advantage (i.e. commodities), and allowing broader technical and social development. The ISI approach was conceived as a mechanism for breaking out of the periphery.

Yaoundé Conventions
By the early 1960s, then, as decolonisation necessitated a revisiting of the framework linking the EU with the African and Malagasy states, the ground under the concept of development had shifted in some respects, a shift increasingly reflected in the European approach. Where the bare bones of industrialisation had been prioritised under the Treaty of Rome, the social and cultural aspects came to the fore as preparations began for a new architecture. In European terms, the human focus and the concept of progress remained central to its
approach, but were filtered in slightly different ways, supplementing the need for a modern economy with that of a need for modern people. Thus, in a 1962 speech to the African and Malagasy Economic Conference, Jacques Ferrandi bemoaned the gradual disappearance of ‘experienced men’, of ‘skilled men’ from the former colonial territories, suggesting a lacuna between rule by external masters and the ability to effectively take control of their own destinies. Ferrandi’s ‘experienced men’ echoed the concept of the ‘modern man’ that was becoming more prominent in Modernisation Theory, summarised later by Inkeles (1975: 327) as urbanised, educated, publicly conscious, politicised and engaged in the industrial economy. Indeed, according to Inkeles, second only to education in modernising men came the socialisation process of working in modern productive enterprises (factories) (332), thus intrinsically linking the modern man with the modern economy.

Structuralist concerns with declining terms of trade and the peripherality trap were also reflected in the EU’s revisiting of its development policy. In this respect Walter Hallstein’s June 1963 address to EAMA Ambassadors outlining the Union’s development policy was notable for its attempt to address issues of dependence. Significant effort was therefore made to clarify the so-called ‘constitutional position’ (Hallstein 1963b: 4), with the sovereignty of the Associated states emphasised both in terms of the structure of the relationship (ibid.), and in the goal of ‘economic independence’ (6, 8). Indeed, a strident defence was made of the EU’s aims “in reply to certain criticisms which are pure calumnies” (7), with Hallstein firmly stating that there is no intent to “perpetuate the earlier commercial structures ([as] suppliers of raw materials)” (ibid.). European Union sensitivity over this issue continued through the lifetime of the Yaoundés: at the signing of the second Convention, Commission President Jean Rey felt it necessary both to argue that criticisms were the result of a failure to understand the relationship, and to make the point that specific development plans were not dictated by Brussels, but originated in the Associated states themselves (Rey 1969: 3).8

The emerging critique concerning terms of trade was also recognised. In this respect, the goal of industrialisation was restated, with an emphasis placed on economic diversification to avoid the commodity trap (7–8). In a later address, at the signing of the Yaoundé Convention itself, Hallstein took the commodity price problem somewhat further, referencing a Commission proposal for a world-wide agreement to stabilise prices at a profitable level, and to guarantee higher incomes for producers (Hallstein 1963a: 4). Nevertheless, beyond some limited EDF funding for stabilisation in cases of ‘temporary’ fluctuations in world prices, this was not reflected in any significant fashion in the Convention itself, though it did act as an interesting precursor to future innovations.

Negotiations for the Yaoundé Convention consequently provided the first opportunity to reconsider the development approach. The result was a structure that rested on the kernel of Associationism, while introducing a couple of changes, cosmetic and

8 Going on to state by way of reinforcement that “this presumably plays its part in the very friendly welcome which... Europeans meet with everywhere in [the Associated states]... and which impresses us so strongly” (Rey 1969: 3).
practical, that reflected both the reality of political independence and the evolving development debate. Continuity was to be found in the spine of the Convention. Thus, reflecting ongoing emphasis both in the Modernisation approach and the Structuralist critique, the focus remained the state, with the sourcing and application of capital to achieve industrialisation seen as central. Similarly, bilateral free trade between the European Member States and the African and Malagasy states\(^9\) remained the practical basis of the relationship, though given the independence of these states this was a negotiated contractual outcome, rather than the unilateral imposition that had previously been the case.

The influence of the changed development debate was evident in two areas. First, the existing emphasis on industrialisation was supplemented by reference to diversification and the strengthening of economic independence, with both finding place in the Agreement’s Preamble. Nevertheless, beyond available EDF funding, the Convention put little in place to foster fundamental change in the economies of the Associated states. Second, Yaoundé responded to the increasing emphasis on the social and cultural aspects of Modernisation Theory, and the Structuralist critique of the technical progress gap. This was characterised by Hallstein (1963b: 8–9) as rectifying the prior failure to recognise the interdependence of all factors contributing to development. As such, Yaoundé saw a refocusing of EDF funding, with emphasis placed on technical cooperation notably in the form of education and training.

This Modernisation influenced framework, then, constitutes the effective starting position for EU development policy. As will be shown, by the 1970s (and indeed onwards), while the basic normative framework remains consistent, the analysis of development alters significantly, leading both to the re-interpretation of certain values in the developmental context, and to the injection of elements previously excluded.

**Dependency**

Throughout the 1960s, critiques of the Modernisation approach continued to evolve and gather pace. Drawing from the lessons of Structuralism, and on analyses of neo-Marxist scholars (including notably Paul Baran 1973 [1957]) focusing on the states of the periphery, Dependency Theory emerged in opposition to the mainstream model. Dependency extrapolated from the dynamics inherent in these earlier critiques, making the argument that underdevelopment was the product of insertion into the global capitalist system, embodied in the metropole–satellite structure. In this analysis, rather than simply being traditional societies lagging behind the developed world, advocates argued that underdevelopment was externally induced, that satellite economies were caused to be underdeveloped through their inclusion into the global economy (Frank 1966: 18). In this analysis, the success of the West was premised upon the exploitation of the rest – a

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\(^9\) Though free trade between the EAMA states, which had been the case under the Treaty of Rome, did not appear in Yaoundé, a product of these states’ newly independent status and choice not to continue with such access.
situation in which the development of the Third World is conditioned by the needs of the metropole (Dos Santos 1970: 231) – and was therefore not replicable. Stated succinctly, development and underdevelopment were conceived as “two sides of the same coin” (Frank 1967: 9).

Dependency therefore rejected the assertions of Modernisation, arguing that development was a virtual impossibility within the system as constituted. While at the extreme end of the spectrum dependistas argued for decoupling from the global economy and the pursuit of autarkic growth, in practice the majority of those drawing lessons from the Dependency school advocated more moderate solutions directly addressing imbalances in the structures of power. Dialogue therefore centred around the need for political, economic and institutional reforms to more effectively address the needs of the developing world. In this vein, calls for a renegotiation of the North–South relationship were concretised both in the G-77’s Algiers Charter (G-77 1967), and subsequently in the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (UN 1974). Central to this emergent Third Worldist perspective was the demand that international trade be re-oriented to ensure: better and more stable commodity prices; preferential and non-reciprocal access to developed world markets for developing countries; and greater volumes of economic and technical assistance with no strings attached.

**Lomé Convention**

By the 1970s, then, development was framed by the tension between these two incompatible strands – Modernisation and Dependency – and it was in this context that the first real innovation in the EU’s development policy evolved. Relatively soon after the signing of the second Yaoundé Convention in 1969, consideration began to be given to the next step in relations with the developing world, spurred by the launching of enlargement negotiations with the United Kingdom and the need to address the reality of its relations with the Commonwealth. From the outset, the new impact of Dependency Theory and the NIEO were evident. The 1971 Memorandum on a Community Policy for Development Co-operation which, for the first time, addressed the need to define a formal development policy, makes these influences clear. That the EU’s perspective was still strongly rooted in mainstream Modernisation was to be seen in the recognition that human progress was largely dependent on the ability to achieve “economic take-off”, a direct reference to Rostow’s (1960) ‘five stages of growth’ model (European Commission 1971: 18). That the new Third Worldist perspective was beginning to influence the approach of the EU was to be found in the Memorandum’s call for a policy based on making “its own contribution to the establishment of a more just international order” (European Commission 1971: 8), central to which was the provision by developed countries of privileged market access to the developing world (19). Issues of equity in the international system, underpinning the Union’s emphasis on international cooperation and solidarity, became increasingly prominent in EU development policy from this point onwards, a product of the stark
contrast drawn between the positions of the developed and developing worlds by the Dependency critique of Modernisation. In this respect, the Union found its calculus of equity challenged, with a rising recognition that the status quo may not produce the most socially just outcomes for the developing world. Finally, the Union’s human focus was clarified, moving beyond the “interests and prosperity” ideal expressed in the Treaty of Rome (1957: Art.131), to a slightly more focused aim of achieving “better conditions of life and of fulfilment for mankind”, which was linked to standards of education and health (European Commission 1971: 18).

The EU’s acceptance of developing world demands firmed as negotiations for a successor to Yaoundé progressed, with a corresponding transition from a Union push for global solutions, to a position in which it was recognised that the EU could itself take action. As a consequence, the 1975 Lomé Convention articulated the ideals expressed in the 1971 Memorandum, informed by the demands of the Third World stemming from the considerable influence of Dependency Theory and the NIEO approach. ‘Fairness’ and ‘independence’ were recognised through the reformulation of core tenets of the relationship between Europe and what were now known as the ACP states. At the basic level, the principles of partnership and a contractual approach were emphasised, addressing accusations inherent within Dependency of continuing colonial domination. As such, sovereignty and the right of each state to determine its own development strategy, political and economic direction was affirmed (with assistance therefore being non-conditional). More significantly, the Convention abandoned the requirement for reciprocity that had been intrinsic to the trade relationship since the emergence of Associationism, responding directly to the call embodied in the NIEO concept for the special needs of developing countries to be recognised. Finally, Lomé addressed the commodity price question by introducing a Stabilisation of Export Earnings (STABEX) scheme for primary commodity exports, establishing a compensatory mechanism to even-out price fluctuations. STABEX was a direct response to Dependency (and the earlier Structuralists) and to the demands of the NIEO, and a significant derogation from the mainstream free trade-centric Modernisation model, reflecting directly the norm of solidarity so central to the Union’s approach to the developing world, and addressing the drive toward a more equitable system. Indeed, such is to be seen in the words of Commissioner for Development Claude Cheysson several months prior to the signature of Lomé I:

“What is the most striking... is that an absolutely original system, which has never existed anywhere in the world, was adopted a system of guarantee against lean years. This system is important for a country trying to develop, since it enables it to plan its production, but... it is important above all because of the recognition of the right to compensation when there is a fall in prices or in the quantities purchased. This is the fundamental point... We have recognized that the countries with which we will be associated have a right to compensation” (Cheysson 1974: 3).

Underpinning this sentiment was the view, expressed by the Principal Administrator for Development Cooperation Policy Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, that free markets are imperfect
The first Lomé Convention, then, was a product of its time, understandable only in terms of the geopolitical context in which it emerged, and of the popular demands of Dependency Theory and the NIEO. Its patterns were subsequently extended through the Lomé II (of 1979) and III (of 1984) iterations with only minor adjustments such as the second convention’s creation of the Stabilisation Scheme for Mineral Products (SYSMIN) as a companion to STABEX.

The Rise of the Market: Neoliberalism and Structural Adjustment

As the European Union was overhauling its development relationships through the early Lomés to reflect Third Worldist demands and the Dependency model, a new school of thought was gaining currency, one that was to have a significant impact on both the European Union’s internal market project and upon its external relations with the developing world. The emergence of Neoliberalism saw the resurrection of mono-economics and the consequent rejection of the assertion that the situation and experience of developing countries was incomparable to that of the developed West. From the 1970s this new model – built on the philosophical foundations of rational choice and methodological individualism and embodied in the political-economic agenda of a maximal free market (intrinsically linked to emergent processes of globalisation) and minimal state – gained increased prominence, underpinned by the two oil crises of the 1970s and the election of sympathetic and reform-minded governments under Thatcher in the United Kingdom (in 1979) and Reagan in the United States (in 1980). In terms of development, the rise of Neoliberalism involved a rejection both of the state-led approach generally, and of the inwardly-focused industrialisation approach (through e.g. Import-Substitution Industrialisation) associated particularly with Structuralism and Dependency. State intervention in the market and the pursuit of ISI strategies were seen to generate inefficiencies and a tendency towards rent-seeking behaviour, both of which were inimical to economic growth and development, an argument reinforced by the failure of the states in Africa and Latin America which had followed such policies to narrow the gap with the developed world. This heralded, for the scholars of the new model, the demise of a separate development economics (Bauer 1971; Lal 2002 [1983]: 180) and the return of the developing world to the mono-economic fold.

Significantly as far as EU norms and development policy are concerned, the new paradigm quickly came to dominate key multilateral organisations, including importantly the Bretton Woods institutions which had in the years since their founding come to play an increasingly prominent role in the developing world. By the early 1980s, the IMF and World Bank had been effectively purged of their Keynesian influences (Stiglitz 2002: 13) in favour of the new model of economic liberalisation involving deregulation, privatisation, the maintenance of fiscal discipline, non-interference of governments in the functioning of the market, outwardly-oriented free trade, and the effective insertion of developing countries into the global economy – a package of prescriptions later termed the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson 1990). When the developing world debt crisis struck – beginning in
Latin America with the defaults of Mexico and Brazil on their external loans in 1982 – this framework became the centrepiece of the response in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), a process which saw the (not always voluntary) application of the Neoliberal model to the indebted countries. Initially introduced in 1979 as a form of lending designed to help overcome balance of payments problems, Structural Adjustment quickly became a ‘one size fits all’ package of reforms designed to alter the foundation, functioning and interrelationship of state and economy in the developing world by removing barriers to the efficient functioning of the free market. In effect, “the only development policy that was officially approved was not having one – leaving it to the market to allocate resources, not the state” (Leys 1996: 42). Development aid was made increasingly conditional upon signing up to a Structural Adjustment Programme.

Lomé IV and the ‘Normalisation’ of EU Development Policy

The emergence of Neoliberalism, and its embedding in the IMF and World Bank – key institutions of global governance – had significant implications for the application of European Union norms to its development policy in two ways. First, the Neoliberal model led to a revisioning of the freedom norm, and a consequent reorientation of the Union’s policy framework. Second, the legitimacy element afforded the SAPs through their embedding in the Bretton Woods institutions served to undermine the ability of the EU to implement an alternative Structural Adjustment model. Together, these two elements served to pull EU development policy away from the Third Worldist perspective reflected in the early Lomés and towards the mainstream.

Economic liberal conceptions of freedom had always been central to integration in the EU (even if in an embedded form), a fact acknowledged directly by the first Commission President Walter Hallstein: “The basic law of the European Economic Community, its whole philosophy, is liberal. Its guiding principle is to establish undistorted competition in an undivided market” (Hallstein 1972: 29). But this market philosophy remained largely internal to the EU. Insofar as the developing countries were concerned, this liberal basis was subsumed by two overriding elements: (i) the established ‘constitutional position’ emphasising the freedom of states to determine their own internal policies and structures; and (ii) a recognition that markets could be as much the source of unfreedom as of freedom, a view encapsulated in the Third Worldist arguments of Dependency and the NIEO, and embodied in the special treatment accorded to the ACP states under the early Lomé Conventions. With the advent of the mono-economic Neoliberal model, and its progressive embedding in the architecture of global economic governance and in the European single market, the Union gradually resiled from these positions.

The move from embedded liberalism to Neoliberalism was evident in Europe from the mid-1980s. With the publication of the Commission’s 1985 White Paper (European Commission 1985) on the internal market, for example, the focus of analysis on competition policy shifted from market failures to failures of state regulation (Joerges 2004: 18), signalling what was to be a progressive freeing of the market from state intervention and a
move toward governance rather than government, a process cemented in place with the launching of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000 (European Council 2000). As such the enthronement of the freedom of the state was progressively diluted by a recognition of the freedom of the individual and a view that, rather than protecting the individual from the market, the state should facilitate the freedom of the individual to compete within that market. This reorientation within Europe from embedded liberalism to Neoliberalism, and a normative reorientation from freedom of the state to freedom of the individual and the market, laid the groundwork for a similar adjustment in the Union’s development policy undertaken in the context of the European response to Structural Adjustment and the conclusion of the fourth Lomé Convention.

With the proliferation of IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes during the 1980s, it became inevitable that the European Union would need to address the issue. Indeed, between 1979 and 1987 more than half of all World Bank lending to address issues of adjustment was to ACP states (Stevens and Killick 1989: 27), leading the Commission to assert that “Adjustment has become the daily bread of Africa and a sine qua non of their dialogue with the outside world” (Frisch and Boidin 1988: 1). While adjustment was initially broached with the creation of a 1987 programme to aid highly indebted low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Council of the EU 1987), the focus of the formulation of an EU policy was Lomé IV.

With adjustment increasingly seen as an economic necessity, the only choice for developing countries being an “ordered, properly managed adjustment or forced adjustment” (Frisch and Boidin 1988: 3), the Union sought to establish its own approach in the framework for the fourth Lomé, one informed by its existing framework and its own normative base.¹⁰ Notwithstanding the movement within Europe towards Neoliberalism, the IMF and World Bank SAPs were rejected as too ideologically rigid, with the EU favouring a programme “carried out in a pragmatic and differentiated manner” (Council of the EU 1988: 101). Indeed, much was made of the “ideological neutrality” of the Lomé approach, which was seen to preclude the possibility of doctrinaire inflexibility, be it Neoliberal or other (European Commission 1992c: 16). A European adjustment model was therefore to draw upon the Lomé experience, reflecting key values such as equal partnership which had accreted around the development relationship since the emergence of Associationism (see e.g. Hallstein 1963a: 2), and recognising that economic growth “is not yet and not all development” (Frisch and Boidin 1988: 9). The Council of Development Ministers therefore called for an EU policy to take into account cultural and environmental matters, be cognisant of the social dimension of adjustment policies (e.g. the issues of impact on the population, and of social justice), and be directed by the developing countries themselves so as to respect and respond to the diverse local conditions (i.e. be non-coercive) (Council of the EU 1988: 101–102). In this respect, donors and lenders were conceived as simply a support for local government efforts, rather than as their replacement in determining policy

¹⁰ Most clearly those associated with states’ freedom to determine their political and economic direction, and emphasis on principles such as equality and partnership as a foundation for international engagement.
and its application (Frisch and Boidin 1988: 6). For the EU in this conception then, Structural Adjustment was a rather limited process, designed simply to redress lost balances between domestic supply and demand (Frisch and Boidin 1988: 2), a stark contrast to the all-encompassing reorientation of state and economy that was at the core of the Neoliberal model favoured by the Bretton Woods institutions. Importantly, however, effective coordination and policy convergence with the IMF and World Bank were seen as practical necessities if adjustment policies were to achieve their intended results, though on matters of convergence it was expected that the EU approach, given its ‘expertise’ and ‘experience’, would be a significant element in the mix (Council of the EU 1988: 103).

When Lomé IV was concluded in December 1989, these elements were reflected directly in its provisions on Structural Adjustment (Arts.243–250), a section described somewhat hyperbolically by Commissioner for Development Manuel Marín as “one of the leading innovations” of the Convention (European Commission 1992c: 1). Nevertheless, notwithstanding Union intentions, the reality proved somewhat different. An alternative EU model was limited by a range of factors. Internally, coherency was impacted by a lack of common vision between the Commission and some Member States, with the United Kingdom, for example, adopting a position more closely aligned with the International Financial Institutions (see e.g. Hansard 1988: col.699–700), a position that, as previously noted, was increasingly being reflected in the Union’s internal market programme. More significant, however, was the EU’s acceptance of the “leading role” of the IMF and World Bank (Council of the EU 1988: 103), conditioned by their position as multilateral institutions. The embedding of the Neoliberal prescription and of a particular model of Structural Adjustment within the multilateral IFIs provided this framework with an element of legitimacy with which the EU approach could not compete, in effect serving to define the parameters of EU engagement in relation to the debt crisis. Indeed, the view of the SAPs as ‘mainstream’ and of the EU model as an ‘alternative’ is indicative in this respect. As a result, notwithstanding the rhetoric surrounding the EU model, the Union’s adjustment policy was parsed through the Neoliberal Bretton Woods filter to the point where Commission officials themselves acknowledged that “there was no pretence in practice to follow any other path than that laid out by the World Bank and IMF” with Lomé IV providing “de facto support only” for their programmes (Brown 1999: 77). There was, in effect, only a single framework on offer. Indeed, even the innovations in EU adjustment policy – those centred on the social impact of the SAP framework – were in many ways simply a reflection of ongoing critical debate within the development community which were already impacting upon World Bank policy.

As a consequence, following the signing of Lomé IV, and as the Union’s own market integration progressed, EU development policy became increasingly normalised to the Neoliberal mainstream. By the early 1990s, with the return of mono-economics, the notion that developing countries constituted a special case that needed to be offered protections
in the global economy had largely fallen to the wayside. What was evident was a transition in the view of the international system from a place of evident inequity (as the Union had viewed it through the filter of Dependency), to one which saw the market as an even playing field. The view that the imperfection of markets justified the introduction of schemes such as STABEX and SYSMIN (Pirzio-Biroli 1980: 5) had therefore been replaced by one that saw such price support structures and non-reciprocal market access arrangements as having produced an ongoing lack of competitiveness (European Commission 1992b: 44–45), a perspective lifted directly from the Neoliberal songbook. Increased competitiveness and integration into a liberalised world economy (European Commission 1992a: 11; Council of the EU 1992: 74, 75), and the ability to access private funding through capital markets and bank loans (European Commission 1992b: 21; Council of the EU 1992: 74), were now seen as the key to economic growth and therefore development, with a corresponding downplaying of the role of the state as the primary agent of development. The freedom and agency of the state had been replaced by a view of the importance of individual and market freedoms in order to generate the trade and growth essential to development (European Commission 1992b: 36). This dilution of the ‘constitutional position’ clarified at the time of the first Yaoundé Convention signalled in effect a new more interventionist stance (of which Structural Adjustment was an example) in order to ensure that the correct policies were being pursued. ‘Good governance’ and ‘conditionality’ therefore became part of the policy framework in a way that was previously not possible. This marked a significant evolution in the European Union’s normative commitment to freedom as it applied to its development policy, a move conditioned by the application of the new Neoliberal policy filter.

**Putting the Human Back In**

The period from the 1970s was not the sole preserve of the Neoliberal mainstream however. Indeed, from this period can be dated a variety of ‘alternative’ theoretical influences that have helped shape the European Union’s application of norms to its development policy. Such alternative approaches were concerned with redefining the goals of development, shifting the frame of reference from an economic growth-centred to a poverty- and people-centred focus. From Dudley Seers’ (1969) call to move away from national income as an indicator of development to focus instead on issues of poverty, employment and inequality, through the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation’s (1975: 7) emphasis on “[d]evelopment of every man and woman – of the whole man and woman –

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11 Though special measures continued to be countenanced for the most impoverished states.
12 A relatively concise statement of the Union’s position on the role of the state and markets may be found in a 1995 speech by João de Deus Pinheiro, (Commissioner responsible for relations with the ACP and South Africa, and the Lomé Convention) to a meeting of the ‘Group of Seven for Private Sector Co-operation’ which asserts that “A prosperous private sector encourages a dynamic and sustainable economic development as well as larger and more equitable distribution of growth amidst the population” and therefore advocates the channelling of aid “towards more global structural adjustment objectives in order to establish a macro-economic context in which the private sector can prosper” (Pinheiro 1995).
and not just the growth of things, which are merely means”, the concern with reinserting
the human into development became increasingly evident.

This reorientation away from the national and global economy and towards poverty
and the poor subsequently produced a number of frameworks for conceiving development,
beginning with the emergence of the Basic Needs approach, launched officially at the ILO
World Employment Conference in 1976. Basic Needs recognised a dissonance between
economic growth on the one hand and outcomes for the poor on the other. Importantly,
the approach did not reject the emphasis on growth that was central to Modernisation,
Dependency and indeed Neoliberalism, but instead sought to alter the way in which
development and poverty were conceived and measured. Growth, it was argued, should not
be confused with development, but rather be seen simply as one – albeit necessary –
mechanism through which developmental outcomes can be achieved. Development policy
should not therefore focus simply on achieving growth, but should be concerned with
poverty and with meeting “the minimum standard of living which a society should set for
the poorest groups of its people” (ILO 1976: 7). As Mahbub ul Haq famously commented:
“We were taught to take care of our GNP as this will take care of poverty. Let us reverse this
and take care of poverty as this will take care of GNP” (ul Haq 1971: 6).

Development and poverty reduction were therefore conceived in terms of
maximising opportunities, with priority placed on delivering basic necessities (food, clothing,
shelter), services (water, sanitation, education, healthcare etc.) and participation in political
processes and decision-taking, all of which were intrinsically linked to the fulfilment of
fundamental human rights (ILO 1976: 32). “The basic needs concept”, it was argued, “is a
reminder that the objective of development effort is to provide all human beings with the
opportunity of a full life” (Streeten et al. 1981: 21). Indicative of this reorientation toward
the human was the emphasis on job creation and employment as a means for achieving
these goals (rather than simply a focus on increasing the aggregate national income) with
government policy directed toward this aim.

While the Basic Needs approach was not adopted with any particular relish by the
countries of the developing world, and indeed was undermined by the rise of Neoliberalism
and its emphasis on freeing markets from government intervention, it was indicative of a
new poverty- and people-centred orientation which was becoming increasingly evident as
an alternative to the mainstream conception of development. Indeed, such approaches
undertook something of a renaissance as the failures of Structural Adjustment became
apparent. From the mid-1980s, for example, the work of Amartya Sen began to have
significant influence, with his Capabilities Approach (Sen 1985) and subsequent conception
of ‘development as freedom’ (Sen 1999) focusing the lens of inquiry firmly on the human
side of development. For Sen, development was about delivering substantive freedoms and
eliminating sources of unfreedom (including, for example, poverty, tyranny, social and
economic deprivation etc.), a view which brought the fulfilment of human rights to the
heart of the development framework. As with Basic Needs, economic growth was conceived
in purely mechanistic terms, as a means to achieving human freedoms, standing alongside
other factors such as social and economic arrangements (education, healthcare etc.) and political and civil rights (3).

This transition toward people-centred conceptions of poverty and development was logically accompanied by analysis of the position of a range of subaltern groups. In particular, despite earlier provenance, the gendered impact of development became the subject of debate from the late 1970s. Stemming from Esther Boserup’s (1970) work on *Women’s Role in Economic Development*, the Women in Development (WID) approach emerged, making the case that women had been marginalised in the economy and differentially (and largely negatively) impacted by developmental interventions such as mechanisation and industrialisation. The focus was therefore on the absence of women from development. The WID approach did not, however, challenge the underlying logics of development associated with, for example, the drive to modernity, but instead pushed for the benefits of this to be more evenly distributed by recognising the needs of women – an ‘add women and stir’ approach (Harding 1987: 15). For this reason, it was easily absorbed by the developmental mainstream, finding its way, for example, into World Bank policy. However, it was precisely the failure of WID to challenge the underlying assumptions of mainstream development, and its co-option into the Neoliberal model, that was the source of significant further critique. In particular, its lack of attention to the social, political and economic structures within which women were embedded meant it offered little analysis of the implications of class or the mechanisms of capitalist accumulation for both women and men (Rai 2002: 61). The response from the late 1980s was the rise of Gender and Development (GAD), a more overtly critical analysis focused on gender and the patterns of social and political power that determined the position of women (and indeed men) in society. In particular, GAD examined the gendered impact of Neoliberal Structural Adjustment policies, of the asymmetrical distribution of power within households, and of the failure to recognise unpaid work undertaken predominantly by women within the home. As such, it challenged not only the developmental mainstream, but also alternative approaches such as Basic Needs which, while highlighting the needs of the household, failed to penetrate further to unpack the gendered power relations within the family unit (63–64).

Finally, alongside these two elements, also evident was the increased prominence of environmental issues, again as a direct response to the ‘growth as development’ orthodoxy inherent in the Modernisation, Dependency and Neoliberal models. While environmental issues had gained some attention in the early 1970s, with the convening, for example, of the *Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment* in 1972 and the publication of the Club of Rome’s report on *The Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al. 1972) in the same year, it was not until the 1980s that environmental concerns were seen as more than alarmist rhetoric. A series of disasters (e.g. Bhopal in 1984, Chernobyl in 1986) and increased scientific evidence as to the impact of unconstrained economic growth (e.g. the ozone hole above the Antarctic, pollution of rivers and oceans, desertification, climate change) served to elevate the environmental issue in the public and political consciousness, leading for example to the convening of the World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland
Commission) in 1983, the subsequent report of which popularised the term ‘sustainable development’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987), and of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio Earth Summit) in 1992. Environmental critiques of mainstream development, centring around the concept of sustainability, challenged the pursuit of growth without regard to the ecological consequences, highlighted poverty and unequal patterns of resource consumption, and explored the impact of environmental harms on the poor, including vulnerability to natural disasters, food security and so on.

Together, these three elements – the orientation towards poverty and the needs of the poor, the focus on gender, and the environment – formed the foundation for an alternative development, a counterpoint to the mainstream, that is human-focused, pro-poor, concerned with equity, social justice and human rights, green, endogenous and participatory (Pieterse 1998: 354). Most prominently, these alternative approaches have coalesced in the form of Human Development, a concept intrinsically linked with the United Nations system. Indeed, the publication in 1990 of the UNDP’s first Human Development Report constituted something of a watershed for the approach, bringing together concerns from these various people-focused alternatives to espouse a view of development as “a process of enlarging people’s choices” (UNDP 1990: 10). Initially highlighting the possession of substantive choices to lead a long and healthy life, be educated and enjoy a decent standard of living, alongside political freedoms, human rights and self-respect, the UNDP’s approach subsequently extended to draw more fully on the various ‘alternative developments’, including the environmental dimension (with a consequent emphasis on ‘sustainable human development’) as well as according added weight to issues of gender and empowerment. As with the place of Neoliberalism and Structural Adjustment in the IFIs, that such a conception was embedded in the UN framework gave it significant added legitimacy.

Central to this alternative human development framework, then, has been the prioritisation of poverty reduction and, critically, an extension of its conceptualisation beyond simple economic deprivation. Poverty in this view is the central focus of development, not just a symptom of underdevelopment to be addressed through policies of economic growth and trickle-down. By the end of the 1980s, in the context of the increasingly evident social consequences of Neoliberal Structural Adjustment (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart 1987; South Commission 1990), Human Development approaches to poverty were gaining traction. In 1990, the World Bank published its thirteenth World Development Report which focused on poverty, a significant shift of position which saw a weakening (though not abandonment) of its emphasis on structural reform processes. While income deprivation clearly remained at the heart of the World Bank’s approach, the report both acknowledged the need for a public policy focus on the poor, defining reducing poverty as “the fundamental objective of economic development” (World Bank 1990: 24), and recognised the importance to poverty reduction of healthcare, education, nutrition and so

13 Indicatively, under the leadership of Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen.
on (3), elements to which access had suffered as a consequence of the Structural Adjustment policies of the 1980’s ‘lost decade of development’.

The decade of the 1990s subsequently saw progressive convergence around the poverty reduction focus in development, as well as increased acceptance of its human dimensions, particularly as assumptions underpinning Neoliberal economic reform prescriptions came increasingly to be challenged as a consequence of evident failures, including, for example, the 1997 East Asian financial crisis. By 1998, the President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, was acknowledging this reorientation, arguing that “[t]oo often we have focused too much on the economics, without a sufficient understanding of the social, the political, the environmental, and the cultural aspects of society” (Wolfensohn 1998: 12) and calling for a focus on building “a more peaceful and equitable world... where poverty and suffering will be reduced” (20). The Word Bank and IMF’s subsequent transition from Structural Adjustment Programmes to Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in 1999 provided something of a marker of this change in the IFIs.

Most significantly, the reorientation of the broader international community toward a poverty- and people-centred conception of development was given practical expression with the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals, first agreed in the Millennium Declaration (UN 2000), and expressed in their final form at the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development. In short, the international community had coalesced around an intent “to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic growth and promote sustainable development as we advance to a fully inclusive and equitable global economic system” (UN 2003: §I.1). The MDGs quickly came to dominate the framing of developmental interventions, notwithstanding their narrow scope. Indeed, conceiving development through the lens of the MDGs is somewhat akin to viewing the Mona Lisa through a colander. Nevertheless, in defining a set of clear targets, the MDGs provided necessary delimitation to an otherwise Brobdingnagian challenge, establishing a framework upon which development policy could be hung, and in relation to which international cooperation could be facilitated.

The Reframing of EU Development Policy

For the European Union, the emergence of these alternative frameworks and the Human Development approach signalled what would be a progressive reorientation of its development policy. In this respect, the influence of these external frameworks was felt in two interlinked processes: (i) a refocusing of development on the human level, bringing it into line with the human focus underpinning the Union’s normative framework; and (ii) a broadening of the conception of poverty, legitimising the application of a range of norms to development policy that had been at the core of the European value set since the early years of European integration. The incorporation of these alternative frames into EU policy was a progressive affair. Issues to do with the environment, for example, began to feature

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from the 1980s, reflecting the rising international concern over that decade. In 1984, the Commission published its first Communication on the environmental dimension of development policy, in which ecological management and sustainable resource use were highlighted (European Commission 1984). Having been effectively absent from the framework of EU relations with the developing world to that point, this constituted a significant step. Indeed, by the end of the decade, environmental concerns were increasingly being mainstreamed into a number of its geographic policy documents.15

Of more interest, and worth deeper consideration, was the place of gender, reflecting as it did a clear filtering of external theoretical constructs not only into EU relations with the developing world, but Union policy more broadly. The issue of gender equality in European integration is traceable back to the Treaty of Rome’s call for equal pay for equal work (Art.119), though this was motivated more by the need to harmonise social and labour costs in establishing a common market in which one member – France – had already instituted such a policy, than by a drive to address the interests of women or of social justice (Hoskyns 1996: 49, 57). Notwithstanding this early inclusion, or the place of Human Rights and the values of equality and social justice at the core of the EU’s normative identity, over subsequent decades gender equality remained an under-emphasised policy area, largely focused on issues of employment (Rossilli 2000). In terms of development policy, issues of gender remained entirely absent until the 1980s, emerging as a direct response to the Women in Development approach which was increasingly coming to influence multilateral institutions. The first World Conference for Women was convened in 1975 (the UN ‘Year of Women’), leading to the designation of 1976–1985 as the United Nations ‘Decade for Women’. Drawing directly on WID, the decade saw a push to see ‘women’s concerns’ incorporated into the machinery of government in the developing world, and into the mechanisms of donor institutions (Moser 1993: 111). The evolution of European Union policy was both firmly rooted in, and a response to, this context.

That women had largely been ignored in EU development policy was to be seen in the 1982 Commission Communication preparing for the third World Conference for Women (convened in 1985), which was to review progress over the preceding decade. The Communication, while identifying women and development as an issue on which the Conference should place particular emphasis, was able to say nothing other than that it was “the subject of a considerable amount of work by the Community with a view to the definition of a Community policy in that field” (European Commission 1982a: 2). Indeed, the memorandum on The Community’s Development Policy (European Commission 1982b) released earlier that year did not once mention women. The integration of women into EU development policy was therefore relatively late. It was only on the basis of calls from the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers that the Commission began to elaborate an EU position. In February 1981, the Parliament asserted the need for development

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15 The 1990 guidelines for cooperation with Asia and Latin America, for example, evidenced considerable focus on issues to do with the environment, while those of poverty, gender and human rights featured only in passing (European Commission 1990).
cooperation to address the needs of women in all areas, a demand that it was to reiterate over the following years (Adinolfi et al. 1984: 36). In November 1982, the Council of Ministers similarly weighed in, publishing a resolution in which, drawing directly on the WID approach, it called for women to be taken fully into account in development policy and planning, recognising the differential impact on women of developmental interventions (notably those associated with industrialisation and the mechanisation of agriculture), and focusing on sectors in which women play an important role (20–21). In response, by the end of 1982 the Commission had established a Women in Development desk within DG Development, and begun working towards an associated policy. As this suggests, gender equality as a European development norm was defined in its parameters by the WID approach, with analysis and policy formation directly reflecting this framework.

The first application of this gender norm in EU relations with the developing world occurred in the third Lomé Convention in 1985 which, for the first time, established the objectives of meeting basic needs, enhancing people’s capacities, and recognising the role of women (Art.4). Indeed, women had been specifically mentioned only five times in the prior convention, each in relation to tariffs on women’s clothing (Annex II). The third Convention was therefore something of a (limited) watershed. Lomé III set the target of “enhancing the work of women, improving their living conditions, expanding their role and promoting their status in the production and development process” (Art.123) by providing better access to education, healthcare, credit, and technologies “aimed at alleviating the arduous nature of their tasks”. In this way, issues of gender were viewed by the Union entirely through the WID framework, with women identified simply as repositories of needs resulting from their exclusion from the development process, rather than from any underlying structures of power. Indicatively, the incorporation of women was seen largely in instrumental terms – as an issue of enhancing the value of human resources (Art.118) rather than of equity or social justice – which in practice saw them playing the part of “passive beneficiaries” (European Commission 1991b: 67). This was reinforced in the fourth Lomé Convention, which itself heralded the movement of EU policy toward the Neoliberal mainstream, a framework within which WID had come to be comfortably nested. Thus, while acknowledging “the human person, as the central agent and beneficiary of development” and highlighting the “equal rights of men and women” (Preamble), Lomé IV still viewed the process of ensuring equal benefit in terms simply of adding women to the mix. Intrinsic to this was a view of women as an underutilised economic resource, and the consequent need to see them incorporated as efficient and effective participants in the productive economy (e.g. Art.153(a), Art.229(o)). In the words of the Commission (1991b: 2), the place of women in development “is considered an economic issue with long-term social, cultural and political effects”. Notwithstanding this economic view, however, notably absent from the Convention was any linkage of issues of gender to the impact of Structural Adjustment or trade, absences that formed one of the foundations of the emerging GAD analysis.
The role of external frameworks in filtering European Union policy was again made clear when, in the wake of the fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, the international development community formally replaced the WID framework with the Gender and Development approach, and prioritised gender mainstreaming as the strategy for achieving the goal of gender equality. In short, mainstreaming is a “process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels” (UN 1997: 24). It is an attempt to move away from a focus on what development can gain by including women, to focus instead on the way in which development can be altered in order to achieve gender equality and social justice (True 2010: 191). The extent to which this was to influence the conception of gender and the place of women in development in EU policy became clear with the publication of a Commission Communication on *Integrating Gender Issues in Development Cooperation* (European Commission 1995). The Communication clearly demonstrated the influence of GAD and the push for mainstreaming, engaging with underlying power relations in a manner not previously seen in EU development policy by acknowledging, for example, that “[t]here are differences between women’s and men’s status, access to resources and to development opportunities, control of assets and decision-making powers”, and that “division of labour between women and men is based on socially constituted concepts of what is ‘women’s work’ and what is ‘men’s work’” (European Commission 1995: 1). This was further clarified in the resulting Council Regulation of 1998 which acknowledged “the different and interrelated roles, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men relative to development, which are culturally specific and socially constructed, and can change over time, inter alia, as a result of policy interventions” (Council of the EU 1998: Art.1(3)). When the Cotonou Agreement was concluded in 2000, it was this perspective that prevailed, with the explicit adoption of a Gender and Development approach into the EU’s relations with the ACP. Thus Cotonou mainstreamed gender by requiring that “[s]ystematic account shall be taken of the situation of women and gender issues in all areas” (Art.1), and acknowledged that addressing gender issues involved considering the position of both women and men by specifying that cooperation “shall help strengthen policies and programmes that improve, ensure and broaden the equal participation of men and women in all spheres of political, economic, social and cultural life” (Art.31).

Worth finally highlighting is the fact that the issue of gender and gender mainstreaming in development policy preceded its more general application within the European Union. As previously noted, EU gender policies had progressed little beyond addressing matters of equality in employment and education. Indeed, when the Delors Commission reintroduced social policy into the internal market programme toward the end of the 1980s, it was notable for failing to significantly address or progress the position of women (Hoskyn 1996: 153–155). The consideration of issues of gender in EU development policy, both in the form of the earlier WID approach and more recent GAD framework, was therefore notable, with the development framework acting as an effective transmission belt to internal policy. Thus, following the rise of gender mainstreaming at the Beijing World
Conference on Women in 1995 and its adoption by the Commission into the development framework, the Treaty of Amsterdam for the first time gave formal expression to the norm of gender equality, requiring that “[i]n all the activities... the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women” (Art.2).

With the environment and issues of gender already influencing the Union’s development policy by the end of the 1980s, poverty and the broader Human Development focus soon also found their place. By the early 1990s, as the failures of a decade of Structural Adjustment – in terms both of the direct impact of the reform process on the poor (Cornia, Jolly and Stewart 1987; South Commission 1990) and of high and rising inequalities (Wade 2001) – were becoming increasingly evident, and alternative frames of development were stretching beyond the UN system to influence institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF, the poverty- and people-centred conception of development began to filter more clearly into European Union policy. Initially accorded only passing reference (see e.g. European Commission 1990), in the wake of the 1990 World Development Report (World Bank 1990) the poverty focus quickly moved closer to the heart of European conceptions of the development process. In 1991, the Commission was signatory to a G7 Economic Summit declaration which asserted as developmental priorities the alleviation of poverty and the delivery of needs such as healthcare and education (G7 1991: §38), and linked, however tentatively, human rights with developmental outcomes (§36). Commissioner for Development Cooperation Manuel Marín’s subsequent contribution to the debate on the development provisions of the draft TEU is to be seen in this context, with his call for a policy of structural reform of state, society and economy as the necessary foundation from which to address “issues as fundamental as the fight against poverty” (Marín 1991: §§3–4) reflecting both the increasing centrality of Neoliberal orthodoxy to the Union’s vision of development, and the emergence of poverty reduction onto the agenda. The signature of the Treaty on European Union in February 1992 formalised this shift. The TEU both provided a legal mandate for action in the arena of development cooperation and, reflecting the changing conception of development, established three priority objectives: (i) the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries; (ii) their integration into the global economy; and (iii) the campaign against poverty (Art.130u[1]), though afforded no suggestion as to what this latter meant in practice. Furthermore, development policy was required to contribute to the general aim of consolidating democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Art.130u[2]). Notwithstanding the claim that such issues had been an implicit goal of the European Union policy framework from the outset (European Commission 1993: 2), it was the TEU that, for the first time, formalised the fight against poverty as a developmental goal. Indeed, the suggestion that poverty reduction was an implicit outcome of previous developmental interventions is to miss the very position that provided the foundation for its prioritisation from the 1990s: the assertion of Seers (1969) and the critics of Neoliberalism during the 1970s and 1980s that poverty reduction should
not simply be seen as a side-effect of other policies, but rather should be the focus of the development process.

That the Union’s conception of development was moving closer to the human-centred framework was further to be seen in the progressive inclusion of normative elements which, though long at the core of European identity, had been largely absent from its development policy. The drafting of the TEU proved significant in this respect, requiring the Commission’s consideration of these new developmental priorities. Thus, notwithstanding passing reference in the preamble to Lomé III, the fourth Lomé Convention for the first time drew a link between human rights and development, with the assertion that “[c]ooperation shall be directed towards development centred on man, the main protagonist and beneficiary of development, which thus entails respect for and promotion of all human rights”, and with such rights “recognized as a basic factor of real development” (Art.5). The negotiation of the TEU further reinforced this shift, with the Commission finding itself forced to address such elements directly in response to the draft Treaty. The 1991 Communication on Human Rights, Democracy and Development Cooperation Policy is to be seen in this context (European Commission 1991a).

The need for a reconceptualisation of European Union development policy as a consequence of the TEU subsequently resulted in the 1992 Commission Communication on Development Cooperation Policy in the Run-Up to 2000 (European Commission 1992a), and its affirmation by the Council of Development Ministers (Council of the EU 1992). The Communication continued the process of steadily integrating elements of the Human Development framework into EU policy, but was still notably weighted toward the economic side of the equation with poverty viewed as simply a by-product of economic failings, rectifiable through emphases on growth, viable economic structures, and “the ironing-out of inequalities” (§38). The focus therefore remained the creation of a stable market economy, though broader concerns were introduced, with emphasis placed on participation (both through formal democratic systems and in the engagement of local populations in the management of aid projects (§35)) and on sustainability (with environmental and demographic issues addressed (§36)), though again these were largely viewed in relation to economic priorities. Recognition was given to broader people-centred approaches through passing reference to “all the operations which contribute to human development, in particular basic health care and education schemes” (§38). The increasing influence of such conceptions of development was, however, to be further seen in a discussion paper annexed to the Communication, which took the emphasis on democracy and human rights beyond a perceived economic impact to link it directly to outcomes at the human level: “This human-orientated policy aims just as much at relieving the misery, and improving the

16 Lomé IV thus mirrored, in many ways, the words of Commissioner for Development Claude Cheysson a decade earlier at the signing of the second Convention. Said Cheysson “the goal of our joint action is to serve man, such action exists only for him and through him. Man, no matter where he may be, is entitled to respect for his dignity and his person, he is entitled to life and to hope... and his fundamental rights” (Cheysson 1979: 3).
physical well-being of the population assisted as at ensuring that rights, freedoms and the dignify of each and every member are respected” European Commission 1992b: 57).

It was not until the following year, under direction from the Council (Council of the EU 1992: §29), that substantive consideration was given to the meaning of the TEU’s prioritisation of ‘the campaign against poverty’. The resulting Communication on The Policy of the Community and Its Member States on the Campaign Against Poverty in Developing Countries (European Commission 1993) drew heavily on human-centred alternative approaches. Criticising the “dogged belief” in policies of macroeconomic stabilisation and adjustment as mechanisms for achieving poverty reduction through economic growth and trickle-down (§19), the Communication went on to acknowledge the increased emphasis on social, political and institutional aspects of poverty, and highlighted participation and engagement of the poor in social, political and economic life (§20). In so doing it directly reflected the framework formalised by the UNDP (1990), acknowledging that economic growth, while necessary, is an insufficient condition for development and poverty reduction (European Commission 1993: §19; UNDP 1990: 11) and the importance of viewing human beings as participants in, rather than simply beneficiaries of, development (European Commission 1993: §11; UNDP 1990: 11). In this latter respect, poverty reduction, democracy and human rights were intrinsically linked within the Communication (European Commission 1993: §8). This poverty reduction focus, contextualised within the framework of Human Development, became further entrenched in the following years, with the 1996 Council Resolution on Human and Social Development and European Union Development Policy (Council of the EU 1996) to an extent completing this transition. The resolution endorsed the people-oriented conception of development (§1), and called for this framework to be centralised in the Union’s policy, in terms both of design and implementation of macroeconomic policy and development projects, and in guiding assessments of performance and effectiveness (§3).

By the mid-1990s then, the Union’s conception of development and of developmental priorities had shifted markedly under the influence of poverty- and people-centred frameworks, embodied most clearly in the UNDP’s conception of Human Development. Poverty reduction had moved to centre stage, with its broad conception leading to the incorporation of elements such as human rights into the Union’s development policy for the first time, and with environmental concerns and the issue of gender, the influence of which is traceable back to the 1980s, further horizontally integrated into the policy framework (Council of the EU 1993: §57). As the MDG architecture emerged and became entrenched, providing a clear set of internationally agreed targets for poverty-reduction rooted in the Human Development framework, the Union oriented its development policy accordingly. By the 2005 European Consensus on Development (European Parliament, Commission and Council 2006), it was clear that the Millennium Development Goals had become an established reference point for EU policy.

**Conclusion**
What is clear is that there has been significant evolution in the nature of European Union development policy over time, influenced in large part by changing external conceptualisations of development. These external models have therefore played a significant role in shaping the Union’s development policy, and in the manner in which its core normative framework is filtered into that policy.

Most prominent has been the role of this exogenously-derived filter in acting as a gatekeeper between this normative framework and development policy. In conceptualising development and the development process in specific ways, these models have effectively defined which norms will find their way into that policy. In this respect, the narrowness of approach of the early frameworks – Modernisation and Dependency – served to limit the elements of the European normative framework reflected in its development policy. Human rights (including issues of gender) and democracy are absent from these models, which instead focused largely on economics and growth. As a consequence, these elements were also absent from Union policy as given expression in the Association, Yaoundé and early Lomé structures. It is only as conceptualisations of development have broadened, with the rise of people-centred orientations (as embodied in the Human Development approach) and the view that poverty reduction and development are about more than simply economic growth, that these norms have correspondingly filtered through into EU development policy. Issues of gender as a reflection of fundamental human rights, for example, only found their way into the Union’s development framework as the analysis of WID and GAD theorists forced them onto the development agenda. Similarly, democracy has only been given practical recognition in the EU’s policy as a consequence of the emphasis placed by people-centred frameworks on the participation of the poor in their own development. The consequence of which is that, as these external theoretical filters have progressively opened the gates on development, the Union’s own policy has come to more closely reflect the human focus that has underpinned its core norms since the outset. Having said this, however, it is also clear that the European Union’s normative base shapes the way in which it responds to such models of development. Put simply, were, for example, a human rights norm not at the heart of European identity, it would not have found a place in EU development policy regardless of its emergence as a central element in Human Development.

Beyond this fundamental gatekeeper role, external development frameworks have also played a part in influencing the interpretation of European norms in the context of development. In relation to gender, for example, external models have shaped the way in which the human right of gender equality is parsed into policy. Thus initially the EU approach followed closely the WID framework, simply adding women into existing developmental policy and practice. As gendered analyses of development moved toward a more focused consideration of underlying structures of social and political power, however, and this ‘add women and stir’ (Harding 1987: 15) approach was increasingly discounted, so too did the way in which the EU conceived gender equality in development change. This
move from WID to GAD, in other words, underpinned the way in which this particular human rights norm was interpreted and applied.

This has similarly been the case with the changing view of freedom, highlighted in the transition from the position held under the Yaoundé Conventions and the first three Lomés to that obtaining from Lomé IV, a transformation underpinned by the evolution in the conceptualisation of development from the state-led frameworks of Modernisation and Dependency, to the market-led Neoliberal model. In this respect, the emphasis shifted from the freedom of the state to determine its own internal policies and priorities in pursuit of development, to one which saw the state as part of the problem, as the source of unfreedoms which impacted the ability of the market to generate growth and therefore development. As a consequence, the focus of the Union’s freedom norm was moved from the state apparatus to the individual acting in the free market. This focus on the individual person was further reinforced as Human Development gained increasing influence, and as a consequence participation and engagement in the development process came to the fore.

Finally, the legitimacy aspect of these external filters, derived from the embedding of particular conceptualisations of development within key governance structures and international institutions, is not to be underestimated. The adoption by the IMF and World Bank of the Neoliberal policy prescription, and its application in the form of Structural Adjustment, provides the clearest example of this. The embedding of this prescription and approach in these institutions conferred sufficient legitimacy for it to be considered the mainstream, and in turn limited the ability of the European Union to define an alternative approach to the issue of Adjustment. The product was, notwithstanding European rhetoric to the contrary, the establishment of an EU position that did little more than support that of the IFIs. Along the same lines, the embedding of the Human Development approach in the UNDP, and multilateral agreement on the Millennium Development Goals, facilitated the European policy-shift toward human-centred development and, subsequently, toward a focus on the specific targets outlined by the MDGs. Interestingly, in the earlier tension between Modernisation and Dependency, characterised by lack of international agreement around a particular model, the European Union was afforded the greatest flexibility to pursue its own path, one which bore influence from both sides. That the resulting early Lomé framework was unique is evidenced by contemporaneous views that it constituted a model for the future of North–South relations. As development theories have come to colonise international fora, this space for pursuit of an individual approach has correspondingly narrowed.

What the development policy case demonstrates, then, is something of a paradox in relation to Normative Power Europe. At the heart of the NPE approach is the importance of ‘what Europe is’ (Manners 2002: 252), and the manner in which its core values are diffused throughout the international system and in so doing shape ‘the normal’ (239). And yet, insofar as development policy is concerned, it is evident that EU norms are, at least in part, shaped and delimited by exogenous theories of development. Thus, where the NPE approach was defined as a way to conceptualise European Union influence on the global
stage, the development policy example shows the influence of external theoretical constructs in defining what is normal for the European Union itself.
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