Muhammad’s Nation is Called

The Potential for Endogenous Relocalisation in Muslim Communities in Indonesia

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology in the University of Canterbury by Wardah Alkatiri

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Abstract

Given that there has been no single view of the causes of global environmental degradation in the face of Third World developmentalism and widespread poverty, this thesis explores the potentials of Muslim groups to advance relocalisation, or returning to smaller scale, more self-reliant communities with simpler ways of living and with self-local governance. In particular, the research investigates the role of an Islamic symbolic universe in the adherents’ decisions to act, including how this affects interactions with the nation-state and modern sciences within the Indonesian context. In advancing this argument, I rely on social constructivism as it was developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, in conjunction with a Symbolic Interactionism premise, to develop a theoretical framework appropriate to Muslim communities and their voluntaristic actions. With a qualitative research method, the research focuses on four Indonesian Muslim groups: Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, Hidayatullah, An-Nadzir and the learning communities they established. Data sources include interviews with leaders, observations, participatory observations, documents, and texts. The outcome shows that capitalising on an Islamic symbolic universe to transition Muslim communities by endogenous relocalisation is possible and doable. Of the four Muslim organisations studied, all had potential for support of relocalisation in different ways, with Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir providing the closest example of green intentional communities which can be transformed into models of endogenous relocalisation by Muslim groups. The transformed models can be duplicated and their culture can be propagated, to convert Muslim society at large to live up to the Islamic ecological values for survival and sustainability. The thesis puts forward knowledge transmission by Murabbi as a way to make sustainability education relevant to Muslim societies, based on the understanding that one needs more than intellectual ability to comprehend knowledge, but rather time is needed to personalize it by living it. The thesis highlights epistemological pluralism as posing a serious challenge to the ‘whole-earth-one-world-family’ vision of the environmentalists. With that challenge in the background, it aims to offer a more realistic vision where at least one sector of humanity can possibly advance environmental movement on a global scale under its own ‘sacred canopy’, that is, a ‘global network of relocalisation by local Muslim communities’. Thereby, the thesis advocates decentralism as opposed to centralism, and Dar al-Islam Environmental governance for the Ummah within ‘night-watchman states’.

Keywords: Peak Oil and Climate Change; Pragmatic; Endogenous; Relocalisation; Sociology of Knowledge; Symbolic Universe.
Acknowledgements

This thesis is a part of my extensive journey that started long before I enrolled as a PhD student. In fact, the journey began 30 years ago when I was among the many Indonesian students who entered the industrial engineering departments with a single hope of being able to participate in the country's emerging developmentalist programme. That and what happened afterward have been instrumental in influencing my thoughts and my critiques of developmentalism.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In 570 A.D. Abraha, the ruler of Yemen, decided to destroy Ka’ba in Mecca. He marched at the head of a huge army. He camped outside Mecca, and then sent a few of his people to capture the camels of the Meccans. Of the camels captured, around 200 belonged to Abdul Muttalib, the chief of the Quraish, a grandfather of Prophet Muhammad. An officer from Abraha came to the Meccans, saying that they did not wish to hurt them but had come to demolish the Holy Ka’ba with his elephants. Abdul Muttalib said that they too did not want to fight Abraha. As for the Holy Ka’ba, it was the house of Allah and Allah would do whatever He pleased. Abdul Muttalib then went with some of his sons to see Abraha. Abraha welcomed him with respect. He expected Abdul Muttalib to ask him not to destroy the Holy Ka’ba but instead Abdul Muttalib ask for the return of his camels. Abraha was surprised that Abdul Muttalib was talking about camels when the Holy Ka’ba itself was going to be destroyed. In response to Abraha’s remarks, Abdul Muttalib gave a famous reply, saying: “I am the owner of the camels. The House too has a Master who looks after it”. On hearing this, Abraha shook his head and proudly replied: “There is none powerful enough to stop me.”

(Historical context (asbab al-nuzul) of Surah al-Fil (The Elephant) of the Quran (Q:105).

Muslims understand the Ka’ba was built by prophet Ibrahim (Abraham), so it had been considered a holy shrine for the believers even before the birth of Islam)

The story of Abraha and Abdul Muttalib inspired me to consider relocalisation
1 as a pragmatic position in the face of climate change and the ‘dilemma of oil’.

The enhanced greenhouse effect and ‘dilemma of oil’ are arguably the most life-threatening environmental problems and the most difficult political issues in the 21st century. The problem is double pronged: firstly, the economic-growth paradigm and consumption level of the consumer-capitalist societies; and secondly, poverty and the development project in the Third World (or developing countries). Both imply exploitation of natural resources. The ineffectiveness of the present form of environmental movements and global environmental governance is widely acknowledged (Speth, 2002; Park, 2008; Stern, 2006). They have been neither able to challenge the dominant political-economic and cultural paradigms which caused this problem in the first place, nor to persuade the majority of the population to act whether it is in the North or the poorer South. It is against this background that this research seeks to delve into socio-ecological problems without eliding the interlinked and dilemmatic situations of Third World poverty-development on the one hand, and natural resource exploitation-environmental degradation on the other. The research focused on Indonesia as a case study and attempted pragmatically to find an alternative environmental movement that could address both political-

1 The creation of smaller scale, less-unsustainable communities that are largely self-reliant, with self-local governance.
2 Whether oil has peaked already as some believe, or whether there are still abundant oil reserves as others argue. In case of the former, we are in the brink of scarcity; in case of the latter, we have so much oil that we are ‘cooking the planet’ with it given that environmental degradation, in mathematical language, is a function of (i) economic growth, in which energy is needed; and of (ii) human consumption, in which population, human needs, and lifestyle are factors.
economic-cultural challenges, and the desirability and practicability of an environmental movement supported by a wider reach of the Indonesian population.

My chemical-engineering background and five years’ experience in the Indonesian petrochemical industry during the 1990s have exposed me to the extent of industrial pollution through soil, water, and air. Witnessing the steep increase of pesticide and agrichemical uses, I was beginning to get alarmed by food safety issues for my own family and developed an interest in organic agriculture. As soon as I got a closer look at farming life in Java, numerous problems came to the surface. There were a lot more immediate problems occurring in the rural communities other than that of agrichemical-addiction. They were extreme poverty, an asymmetrical agricultural trading system, land grabbing, land conversion, urbanization and ecosystem destruction, economic policies that were not favouring the agricultural sector, and loss of confidence and cultural coherence in the villages, which led the young people to leave for the cities. I had always been given the ‘resource curse’ conundrum or ‘paradox of plenty’ as an answer to how poverty and famine could exist in places like Indonesia. This refers to the paradox that countries and regions with an abundance of natural resources tend to have worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources; perceived by me as a modern myth used to deflect all questions about global injustice.

Beginning in 1999, I was determined to fully dedicate myself to activism and set up, however small, a social-entrepreneurial organisation to sustain a ‘not-for-profit’ undertaking. This was named Amani\(^3\). During its operation there are varied international bodies that Amani has been non-financially acquainted with: World Wildlife Fund Indonesia (WWF); Centre for the Promotion of Imports from Developing Countries (CBI) and Programma Uitzending Managers (PUM) Netherlands; and Institut Européen d’Administration des Affaires (INSEAD) in France (note that Amani has been self-funded completely). From CBI and PUM Amani accessed expertise; INSEAD used Amani as a case study of social entrepreneurship for their MBA students – one student came for fieldwork and a large group of students paid Amani a visit in their study excursion in Asia; a couple of times WWF used Amani farms as the venue of their occasions. Activities for Amani include promoting sustainable agriculture among the rural communities; ecologically-sound life ways among the urban communities.

\(^3\) This is a catchy word for Indonesians as aman in Bahasa means ‘safe’ (to signify food safety), and Amani could be an abbreviation for ayo membantu petani, meaning, let’s help the peasant. In Arabic Amani means aspirations, wishes, in Swahili, peace.
population; and promoting fair-trade as an alternative system of distribution through the anti-capitalist cooperative where customers purchase directly from farmers.

While Amani had to struggle with the onslaught of various problems faced by the villagers in their local rural ecosystem, it also had to face the reality that elite Jakarta urban dwellers - the very people who supposedly make the policies to remedy the rural-urban migration situation and excessive urbanization, were acutely ‘sustainability-insensitive’. With the support of a friend who owned a large area of land, the ‘Cijeruk ecovillage’ was set up in Sukabumi, West Java. That was meant to transform the existing village into an ecological village, which Amani could make into a centre of its movement. Ironically, Amani has never been able to make it an ecovillage in the real sense of the term due precisely to the ‘exogenous’ nature of the attempt as it was initiated by an outsider to the village rather than initiated by the village members. For that reason, I was curious to find an ‘endogenous’ alternative to carry out the movement, initiated by the local communities themselves. Meanwhile, as a student of Islam, I was aware of Islamic activism designed to confront the very challenges that both environmental and social actions have been struggling with, thus I decided to examine the potential of Muslim groups to create an ‘endogenous’ movement for ecologically sound communities.

My background and the assumptions I have brought to the research were almost entirely different from those of majority students sent overseas by their governments to strive for national interests - they believe in an industrial development paradigm. An environmental activist is aware of discussions in ‘scientific ecology’ about the global footprint which suggest that human beings have moved into ecological overshoot, eating into the earth’s natural capital and undermining the earth’s ability to regenerate. Individuals no longer live off its naturally and sustainably replenished bounty as in the past. Moreover, most measures of human well-being show that quality of life in the industrial world peaked in the mid-1970s (Kunstler, 2005; Dawson, 2006) and “has been going downhill ever since, even while GDP has continued to climb” (Dawson, 2006:11-12). At the same time, the input of energy from cheap fossil fuels which has facilitated us to produce more and more, including more foods and material goods, can no longer be depended on. Meanwhile, as a social activist I was also aware that community integrity has been crushed by economic policies favouring mass production and industrialization. As a student of Islam, I was well-versed in Islamic values that are congruous with social and environmental sustainability. Relations with international environmental NGOs as well as Amani’s involvement in fair-trade activities have made me aware of the need to act on a global basis.

4 The most ‘celebriticized’ movement that strikes sympathetic chords of the top-income urban ‘lifestylers’.
Suffice to say that I also experienced the desperation that other environmental and poverty-reduction NGOs encountered in the Third World regarding intractable linkages between inequality, poverty and environmental problems. It is on that basis that I see the need to fashion different strategies of ‘transition’ in the light of the impending challenges of environmental crisis on the one hand, and ‘the end of oil’ on the other -- in order to guarantee the survival of the vast majority of Indonesian people. It has been argued that Climate Change’s effects are more threatening to the poor in the Third World (Jackson, 2002; Trainer, 2002; Steel, 2003:156-191; Sunderlin et al, 2005; Chang et al, 2003; Dallas, 2008). But at the same time, Kunstler’s (2005) ‘Long Emergency’ prediction suggests that the threats of peak oil are probably more lenient to the poor – especially those who are not directly impacted by climate change, for they have ‘less to lose’. Indeed, Kunstler (2005:3) predicts that the developed world will begin to suffer long before the oil and gas actually run out. The issues of peak oil and climate change are inextricably linked and have profound implications. However, “there are those who believe that peak oil is a more immediate and powerful lever than climate change in getting people to mend their fossil-fuel-dependent ways, and that therefore peak oil should be given headline treatment” (Buchan, 2012). There is also a hypothesis that peak oil will keep climate change in check (Scientific American, 2013). Given the goal of all science is understanding and prediction (Steuer, 2003), it is of no exaggeration to take the plausible forecast and scenarios of the peak oil literature into consideration and put this thesis in that light. Forecasts are always fallible, but some scenarios of future events are more likely than others. Peak oil literature (Heinberg, 2005; Kunstler, 2005) analyzes the heavy dependence of modern-day life on petroleum and predicts an extremely turbulent interval between the end of cheap oil and whatever energy replacement comes next. They forecast that the government is likely to be increasingly ineffectual and irrelevant in an energy-starved world. Kunstler (2005) believes that even in the face of epochal discontinuity there is a lot that can be done to assure the refashioning of daily life around authentic local communities based on balanced local economies, purposeful activity and a culture of ideas that are consistent with reality. I concur with him and argue that the strategies of responding to the twin challenges of peak oil and climate change must be genuinely rooted in their societies and based upon creativity from within. In further correspondence with Kunstler’s prediction (2005:235-236).

Oil (petroleum), natural gas, coal, oil shale, tar sand, coal bed methane (CBM) are all fossil fuel. It takes from 3 to 6 millions of years to naturally form fossil fuel from the decomposition of dead organisms. That is why they are generally considered non-renewable. With our modern-industrial-affluent-consumption lifestyle, we consume fossil fuel in a way that is depleting the available resources much faster than the new ones being made. Global oil production is now approaching or has already passed an all-time peak and can potentially end our industrial civilization. ‘The end of oil’ can also happen to all other fossil fuel.

The period when the price and supply of fossil fuels suffer oscillations and disruptions.
I argue that these models cannot be inspired anymore by ‘Left’ or ‘Right’ ideologies or other materialistic worldviews, for none of them would be appropriate in a world running into scarcity.

It is worth mentioning that my belief in ‘peak oil’ theory is not without a basis. My chemical-engineering education background provides a full understanding of the relations between petroleum and everything characterized as modern life. Oil has been used not only as the main source of energy linked to modern day amenities, but is also the raw material of almost every item needed everyday. Agricultural food production too depends on oil\(^7\) (see Pfeiffer, 2006). The marvels of 20\(^{th}\) century science and technology were only possible with access to abundant supplies of cheap fossil fuel. In addition, I encountered ‘peak oil’ reality first hand when I worked in a petrochemical project in Arun, Aceh from 1994-1998. The project was to build a natural-gas condensate fractionation unit in Phase-1, followed by Phase-2 to construct production facilities for a wide range of aromatic\(^8\) petrochemical derivatives from Naphtha produced in the Phase-1 unit. The project was designed by ignoring the signs of a depleting Arun condensate reserve – the so-called ‘cornucopian’s’ confidence that oil or natural gas exists in endless abundance in the earth’s deep interior. As a result, the Phase-1 fractionation unit was finally built and operated for a short while but then had to be shut down completely as feedstock was unavailable, and Phase-2 never started due to a lack of feedstock of the right specification being secured from around the world. I gained further familiarity with ‘peak oil’ issues from my husband who has been in the oil and gas services business throughout his career. Appendix 2 shows some data of Indonesia’s most current fossil fuels issues, reflecting the shortfall of their production and that none of these non-renewable resources are available for an unlimited future. An advocate of relocalisation, Ted Trainer (2009:1), is aware of this universal situation. He said: “All probably recoverable resources of coal, oil, gas, tar sand and shale oil, and uranium (via burner reactors) would have been exhausted by 2045”. In Kunstler’s (2005:5) sarcasm: “It is possible that the fossil fuel efflorescence was a one-shot deal for the human race”.

My multidisciplinary background sent me naturally towards a ‘systems-thinking’ paradigm. ‘Systems-thinking’ is a new way of seeing the world in terms of relationship, connectedness and context\(^9\) on the premise that everything is connected to everything else (Capra 1999). The proponents argue that at the heart of the crises facing the world today is the inability of people to identify the interconnected nature of the crises (Strachan, 2009). Sachs (2008:14) commented that

\[^{7}\text{For agrichemicals (fertilizers, pesticides)}\]
\[^{8}\text{Benzene, Toluene, Xylene}\]
\[^{9}\text{It has been drawn from different areas of study including cybernetics, ecology and complexity theory, and has developed a substantial body of knowledge}\]
“The problems just refuse to arrive in the neat categories of academic departments”. Therefore, the crises call for interconnected and interdisciplinary solutions. Further, the approach of ‘systems-thinking’ is fundamentally different from that of a traditional form of analysis that relies on reductionism\(^\text{10}\). Whereas traditional analysis breaks a phenomenon down into its constituent parts, a ‘systems thinking’ approach treats inter-related phenomena as a system. It studies the relationship between the pieces and the system as a whole. It has been propounded to develop the learner’s ability to recognize and analyze the interconnections within and between systems. Accordingly, concerning sustainability, ‘systems thinking’ calls for holism. It underlies the environmentalist’s vision of a ‘whole earth one world family’. My research grappled with the question “is a whole-earth-one-world-family-vision possible?”; given that ‘reality’ itself is socially constructed, and holism is therefore impossible for reasons of multiple ‘symbolic universes’ under which social construction of realities occurred (Berger and Luckmann, 1991[1966]). Moreover, there is ineluctable historical, social, and cultural ‘context’ of ‘knowledge’ to be considered, given the long and tumultuous colonial and post-colonial history of Indonesia.

In my Master’s study of Islamic Mysticism, we were introduced to sociology of religion briefly, only to give an idea of the contrast with mysticism. The combination led me to an understanding of ‘traditional religions’ as having two elements. One is ‘truths’ that are of a transcendent order in their origin, that came from the Divine, through the illumination of the Buddha, the descent of the Avatars of Hinduism, the prophetic reception in the monotheistic religions, and so forth. The other is the continuity of tradition, which always implies transmission, continuity and application of the principles of Divine Origin over the centuries within the particular civilization that the original revelation creates. Hence, there are traditional art, traditional dress, traditional music, traditional architecture, traditional science and so forth. In this way of looking, Islam as \textit{al-din} (Arabic, means: religion or creed, a faith or belief, a path or a way), or in Indonesian terms \textit{dinul Islam}, appears as both ‘truth’ that is of a transcendent order in its origin (Indonesian, \textit{wahyu}) that came from God, as well as a tradition and culture (Indonesian, \textit{tradisi} and \textit{budaya}). In this particular discussion, the different notions between ‘religion’ in the Western sense of the term (\textit{agama}, in Indonesian) and the Islamic concept of \textit{al-din al-Islam}, are worth mentioning. The term ‘religion’ from the Latin \textit{religare} has the root meaning ‘to tie’ or ‘to bind’. It is what binds humans to God. On the other hand, the Arabic term of religion, \textit{al-din}, carries a lexical meaning of ‘obedience, reward and subjugation’ – which are closely associated with ‘tradition’. In this sense, \textit{al-din} means at once religion and tradition in its most universal sense. The limited meaning that the

\(^{10}\) In fact, the word “analysis” actually comes from the root meaning “to break into constituent parts”.

term religion has gained in European language has caused certain authors in religious philosophy to limit this term only to the Western religions, especially in their exoteric expressions, distinguishing them from Hinduism, Taosim, and the like which they call ‘tradition’ rather than religion (Nasr, 1989:65-86).

Later on, in the literature review for my doctoral research, I read *The Revival of Political Hesychasm in Contemporary Orthodox Thought* by David Payne (2011) - not an environmental topic obviously, but the book gave me insights into what I had speculated on concerning the connectedness between social constructivism and environmental studies. *Political Hesychasm* is about a Neo-orthodox movement - a resurgence of public religion and a politicization of the Greek Orthodox church. Payne argues that the Neo-orthodox movement does not seek a religious nationalism as has been the predominant understanding, but rather seeks to ignite a universal religious movement, rooted in this particular understanding of the Greek identity, which actually transcends nationality. In light of the book, I saw a correspondence between the Neo-orthodox movement and Transnational Islam, and began to see Nationalism, Local Islam, and Global/Transnational Islam as competing factions in Indonesia. Upon completion of my review, I was sure that it was Berger and Luckmann’s social constructivism that I wanted to use as a theoretical framework that can explain at once, (1) the continuity of Islamic tradition, (2) the pseudo-religious character of secular nationalism in Indonesia, (3) and also to explain why the research problems under study, namely, sustainability-insensitive behaviors of developmentalists, exist among policymakers in Indonesia. The link that connects the three lies in the explanation of how cultures affect human consciousness and behaviour. I found two explanations, one from an anthropological perspective, and the other from Sociology of Knowledge.

From the review of environmental literature, I found anthropologists commenting on the tremendous importance of cosmologies in culture-driven consciousness and behaviour for developing sustainable practices around the world. The second explanation lies at the central question of the Sociology of Knowledge. Sociology of Knowledge is concerned with social knowledge and how it is shared with others in a society and how it is available to the common-sense of the ordinary member of society. In *The Social Construction of Reality*, Berger and Luckmann (1991[1966]) draw a complex step-by-step process of what people in a collectivity conceive as ‘reality’, and hence, of knowledge that guides their conduct in everyday life. The social construction of realities occurred under a symbolic universe. Right here I identified a possible correlation between nationalism, developmentalism and sustainability-insensitive behaviors. In Third World societies, we need to recognize nationalism as a project of identity and as a “pseudo-religion” (Ernst,
1994) that remains powerful. Like religion, nationalism equally dictates the way societies are organized according to their culturally-defined beliefs, as well as practices and relations with the material world in which developmentalism ideology is predominant. At the same token, as I was pragmatically looking for an alternative model of environmental movement that potentially has more chance to be heeded by a wider reach of the population, I saw the significance of Islam as a symbolic universe for the Muslims’ consciousness and behaviour. Given that symbolic universe is developed through histories of particular human collective’s interactions with the others (see Berger and Luckmann, 1991[1966]), it has a sociological dimension (political included) that arises from these interactions, besides the epistemic and paradigmatic characters. Moreover, symbolic universe has a capacity to confer identity and it has legitimation and allegiance characters. The religious symbolic universe has cosmic characters that transcend differences of race, class, gender and nationality. I decided, finally, that symbolic universe is the focal point of my thesis.

Subsequently, I had to consider what the other possible symbolic universes mean to the Indonesian Muslims. With the aforesaid definition in mind, I identified two of the most essential ones. They are Nationalism (including ethno-nationalism) and ‘Westernism’ (of which scientific worldview is a part). Accordingly, the symbolic universe proposition suggested two directions in my research:

1. The need to study the history of the collective, which means to examine the histories of social knowledge-formations in the given society
2. The need to study the system and institutions of knowledge transmission (education)

For that reason, my research began with an in-depth investigation of the history of modernization in Indonesia by way of colonization. From the sociology of knowledge point of view, colonization seeks to inculcate a ‘universal rationality’ while shattering the epistemic and moral community of pre-modern civilizations including that of Islam. My research includes an investigation of the ideological offspring that the combined power of colonialization and western hegemony have spawned in the development of modern education in Indonesia. In the Muslim world at large, Carl W. Ernst (1994) identified these ideologies are:

1. The pseudo-religion of nationalism
2. The positivistic belief in science, racism and evolutionism as a rationale for unbridled imperialism
3. The erosion of the public role of religion

These three ideologies are in perfect correspondence with the three constituents that I identified of particular Indonesian Muslims’ symbolic universes, namely: Nationalism, ‘Westernism’, and Islam. The study of symbolic universe entails the constructivist-interpretivist approaches of qualitative research methods. In this sense, the research draws on and engages with post-modernism’s critique
of modernism which involves analyses of modernism to undermine its claims to universal truth (Howarth, 1995).

Following that, while I concur with a ‘systems-thinking’ approach in dealing with socio-ecological issues, as a pragmatist, I chose to be realistic and to focus on social relations. Therefore, dissecting society along the lines of ‘symbolic universe’ as one’s center of allegiance is a necessity in order to make meaningful study of a pluralistic society such as Indonesia possible, and, if anything, find solutions that are realistic and doable. In light of this, this research is a study of the Indonesian Muslims’ symbolic universes, and a study of Islamic education and learning communities among Indonesian Muslims with a focus on four Muslim groups, drawing rigorously on both sociology of religion and sociology of knowledge. It attempts to understand the role of an Islamic symbolic universe in determining the willingness and possibility of Indonesian Muslim communities advancing **relocalisation** projects for survival and sustainability. That is, the creation of, or transforming the existing communities into, less-unsustainable communities which are largely self-sufficient, with self-local governance (Leonard & Barry, 2009; Bailey *et al.*, 2010; Barry, 2012). As concrete actions, a number of organizations such as Transition Network, Global Ecovillage Network, Findhorn Foundation, and Gaia Trust have attempted relocalisation models. The main goals of relocalisation are to increase community energy security, to strengthen local economies, and to dramatically improve environmental conditions and social equity. They developed strategies to build societies based on the local production of food, energy and goods, and the local development of currency, governance and culture. Lincoln Envirotown Trust (2016) in New Zealand is an example of a transition town that I have observed since 2011. The movement includes various projects such as: experimenting with sustainable housing, promoting waste reduction, reducing use of single-passenger autos, growing more local food, community garden, providing hands-on education about producing your own health food, ecosystem restoration, monitoring the quality of community water, engendering a robust local economy via support of local businesses, and the timebank – a trade in time credits rather than money which has been set up to strengthen community by creating opportunities for people to meet their neighbours and pool their resources and skills. Not less importantly, while the relocalisation movement envisions a world of empowered citizens and communities through designing and implementing their own pathways to a sustainable future, it aims to build bridges of hope and international solidarity (see e.g. Findhorn Foundation Statement, 2016; GEN Ecovillage, 2016; Transition Network and Solidarity, 2016). At this point, my research also investigates to what extent Islam can accommodate holism and supports international solidarity.
Above all, it is worth highlighting that I do not welcome the break-up of the Indonesian nation-state, but aim to be realistic and pragmatic, because in reality, Indonesian Muslim communities have been surviving for centuries with barely any help from external parties. Reflecting the story of Abraha and Abdul Muttalib in the current situation, peak oil and climate change appear as Abraha and his elephant troop who want to destroy people and the earth, and like Abdul Muttalib, I hold a pragmatic position. That is, attempting relocalisation for people in the Third World context in particular, to take charge of their own destinies.

1.1 Developing the Research Problem

Strong correlations between development schemes in the Third world and environmental degradation are widely acknowledged, but the consequences of irreversible decline of world oil production for the massive development and urbanization taking place in the developing world remains remarkably understudied. The research aims to envisage Indonesian Muslim groups from all branches of Islam to become agents of resilience helping their members and sympathizers make the transition from a pro-development oil dependent society. Theorists about ‘resilience’ (e.g. Trainer, 2000; Leonard and Barry, 2009, Barry, 2012) include the creation of less-unsustainable communities that are largely self-sufficient with self-local governance. The concept is referred to as ‘endogenous relocalisation’.

Another crucial issue needing examination in the context of the Third World is the issue of sustainability. ‘Sustainability’ has been defined as ‘meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (The Brundtland Commission, 1987). Nevertheless, there has been some difficulty in operationalizing this principle. It is either regarded as too broad a term to be usefully applied, or an oxymoron when used in the notion of ‘sustainable development’ that has been criticized severely as it is increasingly embraced by big businesses as part of their corporate ‘green-wash’. In the Third World context, sustainability is even more elusive. The Brundtland Commission’s report warned that the Third World faces the most daunting challenge of sustainability (Adams, 2001) while Pelt (1993) and others argue that sustainability in the Third World is highly intractable because the problems reside in the connection between inequality, poverty and environmental degradation.

Appendix 3 shows Indonesia’s deforestation rate and natural disaster statistics. Continued rampant corruption and a poor legal system are widely identified as the gravest problem in environmental governance and natural resource exploitation. Due to its geographical and topographical position Indonesia has had some of the most devastating natural disasters in the world and Figure 3 shows that the occurrence has become more frequent since the 1970s and
suddenly intensified since the early 2000s (statistics released on its website by the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, National Board for Disaster Management). Figure 4 indicates the nature of major disasters – flood, draught, storm, and landslide – is anthropogenic. Pragmatic research is concerned with applications: “what works”, and solutions to problems such as this (Creswell, 1998). It is noteworthy that all problem-oriented thought is infused with future consciousness and expectations of the continuity of historical existence.

Being engaged in the Third World problems on the one hand, and observing global politics and capitalism’s enduring domination and control over the post-colonial world, on the other, gives rise to a sentiment than can easily overshadow the need of a global collaboration for complex environmental challenges. The following brief review of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change issues illustrates the heart of the matter. The Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC, 1997) recognizes that:

(1) Developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of Greenhouse gases emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, and place a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. Without action to mitigate, emissions will rise strongly; and emissions from developing countries are likely to rise more rapidly. Consequently, it calls all nations for sharp and immediate reduction in Greenhouse gases emissions.

(2) While there has been an upsurge of international conferences, negotiations, action plans, treaties, and other initiatives on climate change in the past two to three decades, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) talks have experienced more failures than success in international diplomacy. Among the most important climate change summits were the 1972 Stockholm Conference; the 1992 Rio Earth Summit; the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg; and the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen in 2009 to agree on the funding required to end deforestation. It has become obvious that the real challenge for a global environmental diplomacy is to overcome the legitimacy of the individual nation state’s interest. Respect for national sovereignty requires agreement from many governments and no government can be forced to agree or to be obligated without its consent (Speth, 2002), hence, “countries continued to defend their sovereignty against undue encroachment” (Park et al, 2008:3). Therefore, treaties are hard to attain.

Given the interconnected nature of the vast network of the earth’s ecology, any solution, including a relocalisation approach, must have a global dimension as well. Herein, I saw the potential of the Ummah, global Muslim community, to advance the Islamic global environmental movement. My background as a member of Muslim society, a student of Islam, and a social and environmental activist gave me insights into the role of education in association with the problems at hand. Therefore, I was interested in investigating anthropological and epistemological aspects of sustainability in conjunction with socio-ecological problems in a Third World country such as
Indonesia as both an ex-colonized and nowadays, developing country. While many scholars, philosophers in particular, have argued about the ecological crisis being the consequence of Faustian pursuit of modern knowledge and its education system (Orr, 1991, 1994; Nasr, 1996, 1997, 2001a, 2004; Strachan, 2009), and that a flawed system has been disseminated globally, not many are aware that Indonesian Muslims possess a vast number of ‘living’ social-religious-institutions that have the potential for civic-engagement in the event of ecological-emergency. Moreover, the consequence of the tightfisted Dutch colonial government not providing popular education (Ricklefs et al, 2010; Frankema, 2014) has left Indonesia as a fertile ground for the development of Islamic education institutions such as pesantren and madrasah. Further, the Indonesian Muslims’ learning tradition also takes the forms of learning communities known as pengajian, majlis taklim, halqah, daurah. Through the network of Ulama, these Islamic learning communities have transcended ethnic and nation-state borders as well. From my view, traditionalist pesantren, can become potential institutions to disseminate sustainability education far more effectively than secular institutions because they are deeply rooted in Indonesian society. In addition, the pesantren education, that involves personalization of knowledge by murabbi educators (the kyai, Javanese, means the same as the Arabic ulama), who disseminate knowledge through living in it (Kazmi, 1991), is able to nurture and internalize ‘sustainability-literacy’ within pupils.

11 Pesantren is a home-grown traditional Islamic institute comparable to the ashram for Hindus or vihara for Buddhists, where disciples stay in the dormitories to learn religious philosophies, martial arts and meditation. Pesantren education emphasizes core values of sincerity, simplicity, and individual autonomy, solidarity and self-control. A sense of individual commitment to the faith is developed as young men and women are separated from their families. Close bonding between the student (santri) and the teacher (kyai, Javanese, means the same as the Arabic ulama) is developed as they learn closely from the teachers. In the past, pesantren were often referred to as pondok pesantren or just pondok – a word meaning a hut built of bamboo or other light materials. This usage reflected a heritage of humble origins and scholars wandering in search of knowledge. Pringle (2010) has commented that the pesantren tradition has a lot in common with the monastic tradition in Christianity, without the obligation of celibacy or a life-long commitment (p. 122), and Taylor (2004) noted that the pesantren community did not shun the world for religious contemplation, so they are not a monastic community. Further, Taylor has noted that the pesantren also keeps alive Java’s poetic tradition, composing moral tracts and romances in Javanese, and that all the great poets in the past have had a pesantren education. Madrasah are another form of Islamic education, overseen by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Indonesia (see Chapter 7).

12 Regular class conducted to teach Islam and Islamic practices

13 Murabbi is a fairly common and popular concept in literature on Islamic education. The concept was conceived and practiced during the early period of Muslim civilisation. The term murabbi can be understood from the Arabic word “rabba – yu rabbi – tarbiyah”, which means educating, caring, growing, and teaching with loving. Being a murabbi is being a person who possesses the knowledge, then he or she processes and interprets the information gathered from the surrounding world through the action. Murabbi is not only knowledgeable and wise but also pious, kind, and considerate, a person who combines a life of learning with a life of virtue, and hence a perfect and an ideal person to learn from. Murabbi is based on the understanding that one needs more than intellectual ability to comprehend the knowledge in text, but rather one needs time to personalise it by living it. In this sense, the traditionalist kyai and nyai in pesantren are the murabbis.
There are about 24,409 pesantren across the archipelago of Indonesia (data of Ministry of Religious Affairs, 2009). Pesantren learning communities comprised of those whose dwellings are within a bounded physical location similar to the ecovillage in the West, and those whose members, despite not living in the same place, are connected by emotional ties and spiritual leadership. A rapid and high-impact scale of changes requires leadership from established and culturally-rooted institutions in the societies. Therefore, pesantren, in their existing condition and potential for empowerment, are worth-studying. In addition, as I was interested in examining the role of the Islamic symbolic universe in its adherents’ interactions with and decisions about the environment, particularly within the context of the Indonesian nation-state with its pro-development orientation, I aimed to elaborate my theoretical framework by reviewing the debates of Muslim scholars over the ‘reconstruction of knowledge’.

Clarifying Terminologies:

Given the widely acknowledged ‘terminological chaos’ concerning the terms of Muslim groups, I need to make clear from the onset that terms traditionalist, modernist and reformist used in the thesis referred to categories made by Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Nasr, 1994, 2001a) and conform further with authors on Islam in Indonesia, such as Robert Pringle (2010). Nasr’s categorization of Muslim groups into traditionalist, modernist and reformist, was made in light of the decline of the traditional perspective of Islam in the wake of the historical process of modernization of the Muslim world and the subsequent rise of Islam as an ideology (see Lumbard, 2004). As I aimed to engage with post-modernism’s critique of modernism, I was interested in looking at traditional Islam closely. Accordingly, the term ‘tradition’ as used here:

is at once al-din in the meta-historical transcendent reality, which embraces all aspects of religion and its ramifications, al-Sunnah [my addition: Sunna], or that which, based upon sacred models, has become tradition as this word is usually understood, and al-silsilah, or the chain which relates each period, episode or stage of life and thought in the traditional world to the Origin, as one sees so clearly in Sufism. Tradition, therefore, is like a tree, the roots of which are sunk through revelation in the Divine Nature and from which the trunk and branches have grown over the ages. (Nasr, 1994:13)

Further, according to Nasr, traditional Islam is Islam that lives in a worldview that views the cosmos, the universe, as reflections of the Divine Names and Qualities (asma’ul Husna) and their Interactions (2001a:240). Concerning education, he describes traditional Islam as refusing to separate knowledge from the sacred, and therefore the category of ‘secular science’ was totally alien to its unitary view of knowledge. That definition points to the worldview of the Gnostics of Islam (Sufis, or, the ‘Arif).

Regarding modernist Muslims, Nasr describes the modernist schools range from:
those which wish to reinterpret Islam in the light of humanistic and rationalistic trends of Western thought and which ally themselves with the prevailing paradigm of liberalism in the West, to others which are drawn to Marxist world-view and which have become much more numerous during the decades following the Second World War (1994:301-2).

Among the modernist figures by Nasr’s category are scholars and thinkers attracted to French existentialism and the ones deeply influenced by Marxist thought. Nasr added:

This class of modernists has usually been deeply concerned at the same time with the social aspect of Islam and often a kind of ‘Third World philosophy’, which has been a hallmark of French intellectual circles since the Second World War, circles within which most of this type of Muslim ‘reformist’ thinkers have been nurtured. (1994:302)

At this point, while juxtaposing traditionalist and modernist, Nasr tells us to distinguish between the ‘authentic’ traditional and that of ‘pseudo’ traditional perspective of Islam which is “counter traditional, but which also displays certain characteristics outwardly similar to the traditional” (1994:18). He classifies the Salafis and Wahabis reformers as pseudo-traditionalists. He argues that the pseudo-traditional Islam, while claiming to revive Islam or to restore Islam to its original purity with the battle cry of ‘returning to the Quran and Sunna’ - is in fact creating something very different from the traditional Islam which was brought by the Prophet and which has survived and grown like a living tree during the last fourteen centuries (1994:18). In his portrayal, the pseudo-traditionalists’ intellectual attitudes are characterized by a positive emphasis upon the Shariah and yet, an opposition to Sufism and the mystical life as well as to Islamic philosophy and much of the rest of the Islamic intellectual tradition (2001a:134-5).

Considering what terms would be appropriate for Indonesian Muslims, I found Pringle (2010) was helpful. Pringle struggled with the terminological issues as well. He scrutinized one by one: Traditionalist, Reformist, Modernist, Salafi, Wahabi, Jihadist, Salafi-Jihadist, neo-Sufi (neo, can be attached to almost anything, neo-Santri, even neo-Modernist), Radicals, Fundamentalist, Orthodox -- except Islamists and Liberals which might have not been popular by the time he wrote his book. Finally, Pringle decided to use “Traditionalist” and “Reformist” to describe the two poles of Indonesian Islam. He describes Traditionalist as Sufi-influenced Islam, and Reformist as a “more legalistic style emphasizing the requirements of doctrine as interpreted by the trends in global or transnational Islam of this day” (Pringle, 2010:35). Pringle’s definitions are compatible with Nasr’s, i.e.: Traditionalists are Sufi-influenced, and Reformists are Shariah-minded. Pringle added “Others sometimes use “Modernist” to describe what I am calling Reformist” (p.13). That is also in correspondence with Nasr’s exposition of the Reformists as those who, in the name of an Islam that was rationalistically interpreted (thereby rejecting Sufism and the super-rational dimension of Islam), outwardly oppose things Western while at the same time allowing modern ideas to fill the
vacuum created in their mind and soul, as a result of their rejection of the Islamic intellectual traditions (1994, 2001a). In sum, that was how I came to define Traditionalist, Reformist and Modernist in the thesis.

1.2 The Research Subjects

The distinctive features of Islamic societies everywhere are the developments of communal, religious, and political institutions (Lapidus, 2002). I classified Indonesian Muslims into ‘community’ and non-community Muslims. The former are those who live in religious communities or are activist members of religious communities, thus having a stronger ‘sense of community’ and therefore the Ummah is a primary concern or focus. The latter are those who do not belong to any sort of religious community, hence the Ummah is secondary. The latter group are individuals who choose to live separate lives similar to the majority of the population in the Western world.

Indonesian Islam “is characterized by an unusually high degree of organization” (Bruinessen, 2013:21). The subjects of this research, Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir community in South Sulawesi have, in varied degrees, engaged in endogenous community development. ‘Community development’ refers to activities and practices of leaders, activists, involved citizens and professionals to improve various aspects of local communities (UNTERM, 2014). ‘Endogenous’, refers to the causes, goals, ideas and motivations originating from within, rather than from without (Haverkort and Rist, 2007:7). Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in particular, are regarded by many authors as the world’s largest mass-based and independent Muslim organisations. They have been providing education, health and social welfare services for decades. Relying on Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge and the symbolic interactionist approach in which people are understood to act toward things based on the meaning those things have for them, and these meanings are derived from social interaction and modified through interpretation, I seek to understand the relations between knowledge, meaning, and actions, in order to gain a better sociological understanding of these Muslim groups and their voluntary actions. Thereby, the thesis includes sociology of knowledge research -- that is concerned with how social knowledge is shared with others in a society -- into Muslims’ learning traditions and institutions, with the ultimate objective to find more effective, realistic and doable sustainability education for the Indonesian Muslim populace. This thesis also includes sociology of religion - whose task is to understand the ways in which religions not only influence, but are influenced by, the behaviour of both individuals and collectivities (Davie, 2007).
1.3 Research Questions

1. Can the existing Muslim groups take a role in transitioning peak oil and climate change for the Indonesian Muslims?
2. What endogenous features are already there among the Indonesian Muslim groups which can possibly be developed into relocalisation to build less-unsustainable Muslim communities, which are largely self-sufficient, with self-local governance?
3. In what ways could Indonesian Muslim groups respond to the call for global environmental actions to achieve the ‘whole earth one world family’ vision? In other words, in what ways can the global Muslim community (Ummah) provide an alternative to global environmental governance?
4. How can Muslim social science be done?

1.4 The Aims and Significance of This Study

Despite continuous media references -both international and national- to Muslims and negative attributes, ranging from backwardness to violence, I believe in the genuinely good nature of most Muslim people the world over. This led me to the centre point of sociology of knowledge according to which religion, ideologies and theoretical ideas are seen as closely related to social interests and conflicts (Berger and Luckmann, 1991). Therefore, the thesis aims to develop a more adequate theoretical framework to understand the voluntaristic nature of Muslim groups’ actions and to establish appropriate methods for studying a world of meaning of the actors, both individually and collectively. Besides seriously taking into account that cultural context and history are fundamental aspects of human cognition, the thesis shows that a different conceptualisation of ‘reality’ and of knowledge between Islam and the modern West has been the root of ‘misunderstanding’ of Muslims’ individual and social lives. On top of conflicts and power struggles, different cultural definitions of ‘the good life’ between one and another has made the contrast even more unbridgeable. The debates between Muslim thinkers in the reconstruction of knowledge that attempt to seek dialogue between Islam and modernity leads to the need for transformative understanding through an hermeneutical approach for a fruitful dialogue to occur (Zaidi, 2006).

Given that the research problem itself is concerned with socio-ecological issues in Indonesia, I aim to use the aforesaid theoretical framework and qualitative methods to explore the following issues and to contribute to the field of ‘religion and ecology’:

1. Willingness, ability and the possibility of the existing Indonesian Muslim groups to advance relocalisation as defined in the literature, for their survival and ecological sustainability.
2. What practical, cultural and ideological issues are involved in the Muslim communities being studied?
3. Possibility for the existing Indonesian Muslim groups to advance global Islamic environmental actions.
Thus, Chapter 1 has stated the outline of this study and explained the significance and aims of this research.

Chapter 2 develops an interpretive theoretical framework to study the relations between knowledge, meaning, and action that will be used for researching Indonesian Muslims and their symbolic universes. It explores the cognitive and affective component of a symbolic universe, studies the meaning-bestowing function of it, and how social interactions contribute to the creation of meaning. In the end, it discusses the incompatibility between the modern and Islamic system of thought and presents the debates over the Muslim reconstruction of knowledge project.

Chapter 3 outlines the constructivist-interpretivist methods used in the research.

Chapter 4 reviews the socio-ecological problems in a Third World country from different perspectives, political-economic and anthropological-epistemological, in order to achieve an holistic understanding of all issues that are involved. Herein, the personality characters: warriors, those who view economic and political issues as underlying the problem and sages, who see spiritual crisis at its heart, are examined\(^\text{14}\). Subsequently, chapter 4 reviews relocalisation ideals and movements as well as the features of Islam to explore the possibility of endogenous relocalisation to be advanced by existing local Muslim communities.

Chapter 5 narrates the national history of Indonesia. It describes the formation of nationalism, Islam and ‘westernism’ as three symbolic universes for Indonesian Muslims, and how they interact. The chapter highlights the interlinkage between environmental issues and national development.

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14 These terms are my own. In this research, I found that humans have different inborn traits, and these traits are responsible for leading them to view problems from different angles. For an explanation, I adopted the human typologies understood in traditional knowledge such as the Hindu caste system that divides people into four in which it was understood as their essential reality and without pejorative connotations which have become associated with them in the modern world. There are people who are inclined to be the sages; or, warriors; or, economic players; or, workers (Nasr, 1989:179). The warriors have the courage to fight and protect the people and the world; the sages are contemplative by nature and have an intellectual and sacerdotal inclination. The economic players have a mercantile nature, and finally, the workers are those whose virtue is to follow and to be led, to work according to the dictates of those who lead them. The contested ‘truths’ between the Sages and the Warriors popped up recurrently throughout the research project, ranging from environmental studies to religious issues, and extending from literature review to fieldwork. In my view, from that perspective, the contest reflects the so-called ‘Sufi-Salafi’ duality in Islamic studies. See more about the latter in 2.4.1.1.
Chapter 6 presents the modernist Muhammadiyah and its modern schools, and the traditionalist NU and its network of pesantren. It highlights responses of the two organisations against present-day socio-ecological crisis and probes into the strength and weaknesses of each organisation with respect to relocalisation. The chapter also highlights different modes of education between modern schools and traditionalist pesantren and investigates the strengths and weaknesses of each in disseminating ‘sustainability-literacy’.

Chapter 7 discusses comparatively sustainability education in the context of modern schools and traditionalist pesantren in order to explore the potential of Indonesian Islamic learning traditions.

Chapter 8 presents the network of fenced\textsuperscript{15}-pesantren communities by Hidayatullah, particularly the mother pesantren in Balikpapan, and the An-Nadzir rural community in South Sulawesi. It highlights the history and events that shed light on the meanings of fenced-pesantren for the leaders and recruits. The chapter presents their similarities with, and deficiencies in relation to, green-intentional communities in the Western world for a vision that I have, namely, to use the fenced-pesantren approach for endogenous Islamic relocalisation models to promote more sustainable ways of living to the Indonesian Muslim society at large.

Chapter 9 concludes this thesis.

Finally, this study is significant for the following reasons:

1. It fills the academic gaps in understanding both the individual and social lives of the Muslims. Through use of a constructivist-interpretivist qualitative approach with Berger and Luckmann’s symbolic universe, which encompasses cognitive, normative and affective components, this study explains two enduring contentions. One is between Indonesian Muslims and nationalism of the nation-state, and the other between Muslims’ thoughts and a modern scientific worldview.

2. With the inclusion of an esoteric dimension of religion recognised in Islamic epistemology as a legitimate part of knowledge, it modifies Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge and Berger’s sociology of religion to provide a better sociological understanding of the voluntary nature of religious actions.

\textsuperscript{15} Translated from an Indonesian language berpagar. That is my own term. I was inspired to use the word pagar (fence) from an answer of respondent Muniem from LPBI NU as he described the NU’s pesantren as “tidak berpagar” (have no fence) so that pesantren and the public fuse, to signify the style of the NU in contrast to Hidayatullah’s pesantren.
3. With the inclusion of Muslim thinkers, it provides understanding beyond Foucauldian ‘knowledge and power’ nexus of what have been at the heart of ‘Muslims’ reconstruction of knowledge project’.

4. The division of human personality into sages and warriors contributes to the understanding of dualisms, such as traditionalist and reformist interpretations of Islam, and anthropological-epistemological and political-economic views of the causes of ecological crisis in environmental studies.

5. It demonstrates different symbolic universes at play in a post-colonial society such as Indonesia, and how they determine the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of sustainability-literacy campaigns.

6. It gives new ideas on relocalisation in the Third World, including all issues involved.

7. It gives insights into deconstruction and reconstruction of all aspects of education needed in order to be consistent with the reality of depleting natural resources and the deteriorating condition of the earth.

8. It provides a deeper understanding of religious conflicts and contributes to the perennial question of how to co-exist in a pluralistic society.
Chapter 2

Knowledge in Community: Sociological Perspective

“In the end we will conserve only what we love; we will love only what we understand; and we will understand only what we have been taught.”

(Baba Dioum, Senegalese poet)

2.1 Introduction – theorising social knowledge

In order to investigate the willingness, ability and opportunities for Muslim communities in Indonesia to advance relocalisation projects, I begin by examining theoretical approaches that will help explain the ‘voluntaristic’ dimension of the social actions of religious people. Here I use sociological theories that make culture central to social analysis, rather than making struggles for economic gain and power central. In advancing arguments based on the centrality of culture, I rely on the theory of social constructivism, as developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991[1966]) in their key contribution to the sociology of knowledge, The Social Construction of Reality. By combining salient ideas from Marx, Nietzsche, Mead, and historicists especially Wilhelm Dilthey, and by rethinking the concept of ‘social knowledge’, they expanded both the definition of social knowledge and the field of the sociology of knowledge. From Marx it gets the concepts of ‘ideology’; from Nietzsche his ‘false consciousness’ and anti-idealism; and from the historicists the insistence that no historical situation could be understood except in its own terms.

Berger and Luckmann conceptualised society not as a system or a mechanism, but rather as a symbolic construction composed of ideas, meaning and language. Their concept of society is therefore more readily applicable to the study of Muslims in the context of a globalized world than the modern notion of society whereby society was ‘naturally’ mapped on to the bounded region of the nation state. Furthermore, Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge delineates the processes by which realities are socially constructed and ‘symbolic universes’ as sacred cosmic references are established. This is the basis of the sociology of religion expounded by Berger in The

16 Ideas serving as weapons for social interests.
17 Thought that is alienated from the real social being of the thinker.
18 Added additional perspectives on human thought as an instrument in the struggle for survival and power.
19 Which is translated as an emphasis on the social situation of thought.
20 This understanding grew up within the sociologies that emerged in the era of European nationalism.
Sacred Canopy (1967). In light of the central and authoritative nature of the Quran and Sunna21 for individual and social lives of Muslims across the epochs and geographical boundaries, Berger and Luckmann’s concept is, therefore, more appropriate to the Muslim’s socio-political phenomenon than the anti-unifying, anti-general concepts of the post-1960 critical theorists such as Foucault, who objected to a social theory that aims to grasp the essential structure and meaning of a society or an historical epoch, in favor of, local, flexible and provisional understandings. Berger and Luckmann (1991) also provide insights into the relationship between human thought and the social context within which it arises. From that perspective, cognitive reactions against the subjugation of non-Western civilizations (such as of Islam) by Western civilization in the name of the ‘Enlightenment project’ that was carried by the old and neo colonialism, can be framed within Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge alongside Foucault’s knowledge/power analysis in which knowledge is seen as inextricably linked to power (Foucault, 1972, 1980; Hindess, 1996; Seidman, 2008).

Phillip Hammond (1969) argued that a just evaluation of one sociologist of religion by another is rare, as he believes, it is “rare for the reason that it is difficult” (Hammond, 1969:415). Consequently, there has been no codified body of theory against which to measure its practitioners. He also believed that this could be because no agreement exists on what the central tasks of the sociology of religion are. In a more recent publication, The Sociology of Religion, Grace Davie (2007) concludes that the task of sociology of religion is to understand the ways in which religions not only influence, but are influenced by, the behaviour of both individuals and collectivities. She considers that this approach is just as relevant to late modernity as it has been to previous generations.

My own evaluation of Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge is a phenomenological one. I claim that, as a theoretical device, it is able to explain Muslims’ attitudes toward their religion, but only as far as the exoteric dimension of Islam (its law and traditions of practice) is concerned. Islam (like other religions) also has an esoteric or mystical dimension. I argue below that by failing to acknowledge or include the esoteric dimension of religious knowledge, Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge is not capable of comprehending or explaining the ‘voluntaristic’ nature of religious actions. This omission of the mystical dimension and its significance has, I argue, impeded the development of a sociology of religion which rings true from the interior perspectives of those who practice a religion – something that I contend is indispensable if religiosity in modern times is to be better understood. Thus, while I subscribe to the premises of Berger and Luckmann’s ‘social

21 Traditions of Prophet Muhammad
construction of reality’ in which religion, alongside political ideologies and theoretical ideas, is seen as closely tied to social interests and conflicts, I also introduce the concept which undergirds the ‘sacred purview of reality’ in oriental philosophy\textsuperscript{22} (Sawai, 2009). Accordingly, the tenet of the ‘Perennial Philosophy’\textsuperscript{23} that religion begins with the origin of the human state itself is propounded to be taken seriously, with the corollary of modifying Berger and Luckmann’s concept of the ‘symbolic universe’, and setting religious ‘symbolic universes’ apart from the secular ones.

Finally, the notion of ‘sacred canopy’ as a cosmic frame of reference that Berger and Luckmann developed provides a theoretical framework to appreciate the so-called ‘unified systemic worldview’ that has been widely referred to in the sustainable community development literature. The term covers the concept of an epistemic and moral community in pre-modern civilizations in which there was moral, cognitive and interpretive unity, and therefore meaning resided in axiomatically shared and publicly inscribed beliefs and understandings. As world history has unfolded since the sixteenth century CE, by way of the colonization of the Americas, Asia, Africa and Oceania by European powers, there have been aggressive attempts to shatter unified systemic

\textsuperscript{22} Oriental philosophy needs to be distinguished from ‘orientalism’. The former is concerned with variegated traditional oriental thought which has been developed in the orient since ancient times (Nasr, 2001a). The latter is a discourse which produces the orient as an object of power and knowledge. A number of themes in the discourse provides an explanation of oriental stagnation, offering covertly a legitimization of Western supremacy and colonial power, makes categorisation of oriental politics as despotic thus needs Western democracy, and contrasting the rationality of the occident with the sensual irrationalism of the orient (Turner, 1989)

\textsuperscript{23} At the beginning of the 20th century, while the West was strongly in the grip of anti-metaphysical and anti-religious philosophies, there was a counter-trend towards restating the ‘Perennial Philosophy’. This strain of thought was in opposition to modern European philosophies, considering them as deviations from the perennial heritage of humanity. Much of the activity of this school is related to Islam, and was based on the inner dimension of Islamic revelation (See Nasr, 2004). Perennial philosophy is also known as the ‘Traditionalist School’. This school is concerned with religion in its trans-historical reality, and refuses to accept the historicism of the academic approach. Although the traditionalist school does not neglect the social or psychological aspects of religion, it refuses to reduce religion to its social or psychological manifestations. Compared to other approaches, the traditionalist school encompasses more of the field of religion and therefore allows a meaningful understanding of a greater portion of the very complicated reality of religion. However, this school should not be identified with the sentimentalism that sees all religions as being the same. Further, only this school is able to provide the key to the understanding the complexities and enigmas of a single religion and the significance of the plurality of religions and their interrelationship. Concerning the nature of reality, the traditionalists refuse to accept as valid what they see as the truncated vision of reality currently held in the Western world, which has come to constitute the background for most studies of religion, especially in academic circles. Moreover, Perennial philosophers attempt to reaffirm the theomorphic nature of man as opposed to the plethora of “definitions” of man which have reduced the human condition to a biological organism (the “trousered ape” of Darwin), the social being determined by his material circumstances of Marx, the puppet of illicit desires and “seething excitations” buried in the sub-conscious of Freud, a cowardly herd of animals redeemed only by the “will to power” of the \textit{U</ }\textit{Ubermensch} of Nietzsche”, and so on. See Oldmeadow and Stoddart (2010:280). Despite the value they may have in shedding light on certain aspects of human being, in the views of the perennialists, the truncated concepts of man held by those thinkers have - by relinquishing consideration of human spiritual faculties - failed to understand religions as spiritual realities.
epistemologies and de-divinize the world in the quest for ‘universal rationality’. The result has been 
the emergence of mutilated unified systemic worldviews for those (such as the adherents of Islam) 
whose symbolic universes survive, and their civilizations have therefore continued (albeit truncated), 
while there was also an increased scale, scope and power of formal rationalization and bureaucracy 
accompanying the hegemonic imposition of Western culture. The reaction to colonisation in many 
colonised states has been the formation of two corresponding secular ‘symbolic universes’, namely, 
nationalism and ‘Westernism’. Thus it is possible to categorize Indonesian Muslims according to 
which of the three symbolic universes is dominant (see Table 3).

When Islam is the dominant symbolic universe, it is then possible to further investigate and 
understand the ‘unity’ of ‘Muhammad’s nation’ (see Table 3) on the level of (1) ‘thought language’, 
(2) moral grounds, and (3) allegiances, describing a collective phenomenon that (actually or 
potentially) transcends ethnic and national boundaries despite great differences among its 
adherents. Achieving such unity is reliant upon the important role played by 'symbolic universe 
maintenance personnel' (the Ulama and group leaders and their learning-communities) and 
specifically to their ability to confer identity, continuity with the past, and a shared belief in an ideal 
society. 'Muhammad’s nation' thus possesses features, elements and characteristics that are lacking 
in contemporary societies that are characterised by postmodernism and lack of faith in an all-
encompassing ideology. Taken together, they constitute the potential of 'Muhammad's nation' to 
advance a more effective and far-reaching global environmental movement.

2.2. The social construction of reality – an interpretive theoretical framework

First of all, we need to be clear that the subject matter of sociology is people and the world of 
everyday life. The world of everyday life is a world that originates in people’s thoughts and actions 
and is maintained as ‘real’ by these (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:33). The sociology of knowledge is 
centrered with everything that ‘passes for knowledge’ in a society. It deals with the relationship 
between human thought and the social context within which it arises. Among other things, it studies 
the social role of ideologies. In this approach, ideas - be they political ideologies, religions, or 
thetical ideas - are not understood as pure expressions of reason, but as being closely tied to 
social interests and conflicts. For example, ideas on the superiority of one class over another can 
function as instruments of class domination. According to Berger and Luckmann (1991) the central 
problem of the sociology of knowledge is contained in a nutshell in Pascal’s famous statement 
“What is truth on one side of the Pyrenees is error on the other” (p.17). In their Social Construction 
of Reality (Berger and Luckmann [1966], 1991), the key points of their theories are:

1. ‘Reality’ is socially constructed
It is worth noting, unlike philosophy, sociology does not go too far as to examine the
foundation of ‘reality’. It only contends with ‘reality’ as it was taken for granted by
people in the street. Any philosophical prolegomena of ‘reality’ is considered as pre-
sociological (pp.33-4). Nonetheless, given the particular purpose of their treatise they
cannot completely by-pass the philosophical problems. To address this fundamental
issue, they put forward a method they believe will be an adequate solution for the
philosophical problems as a starting point for sociological analysis, namely,
phenomenological analysis. Through phenomenological analysis, they elaborate in a
step-by-step complex theoretical system the process of the social construction of what
people in collectivity conceive as ‘reality’, and hence, of knowledge that guides their
conduct in everyday life.

2. Sociology of knowledge is also concerned with how (the process) ‘reality’ of everyday life
is shared with others in a society, and how it is available to the common-sense of the
ordinary member of society.

3. The process of knowledge distribution includes:
   a. Transmission of knowledge (education, school, learning circle, etc.).
   b. Experiences (because sociology is concerned with social world, experience in this term
   refers only to the ones from social interactions).

4. The process of construction of knowledge (of reality) and the process of construction of
social order is believed to take place concomitantly.

For Berger and Luckmann, society is understood as an ongoing dialectical process composed of three
steps of: 1) externalization, 2) objectivation and 3) internalization. Their theory begins with social
processes in the formation of the ‘self’ until ‘self’ is experienced as a subjectively and objectively
recognizable identity (p.68). Afterward, ‘men together’ produce a human environment with the
totality of its socio-cultural and psychological formations. It stands to this reason that social order is
understood as human product, or to be precise, social order is an ongoing human production. It is
produced by humans in the course of their ongoing externalization. From here onwards is what
Berger and Luckmann call externalization.

**Externalization, Objectivation, Internalization**

Because social order both in its genesis (past) and its existence (present) is a human product, no
ontological status may be ascribed to it (p.70). Berger and Luckmann assert that habitualization is a
key feature of human being. All human activity is subject to habitualization. Any action that is
repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern (pp.70-2), which can be reproduced with less
effort. Even a solitary individual must habitualize his own actions. In his solitary state, he has at least
one friend, that is, his own operating procedure to conduct his life from the moment he wakes up in
the morning to the moment he gets back to sleep. Habitualization carries psychological gain, it

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24 Externalization is the process of interacting with the world (p.69).
narrow choices and frees individuals from the burden of making decisions all the time. The process of habitualization precedes any institutionalization (pp.74-85).

Every institution must have typification of habitualized action which is shared by all members. For that reason, every institution controls human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel the members’ conducts in one direction as against the many other directions that would theoretically be possible. Berger and Luckmann argue that institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions (Note: human beings always have typificatory schemes in their minds. They use that to apprehend their fellow human beings). Even if only two persons, A and B, are in contact, A and B will begin to play roles vis-à-vis each other, some of which will be performed separately, some in common. For illustration, A is a Muslim, and B is a non-Muslim. A watches B perform, B watches A perform. In the long run, each will be able to predict the other’s action. Each is able to identify the recurrent pattern of the other’s action: A always does this, B always does that. Here is where the ‘roles’ of each begins. Even though there are only two individuals in this illustration and the reciprocal typification is not yet institutionalized, the nucleus of an institution is already present. Their ‘life together’ is now defined by a widening sphere of taken-for-granted routines. In this way A and B are said to have constructed their own world. Their institutional world has become objectified.

During the time of construction of the institutions, when interaction was only between A and B, their objectivity remained tenuous, easily changeable, and even playful. But then as A and B were getting older, they had to transmit the institutions they had made to the next generation (assuming they had children). For the children, this institutional world was the world, and for the parents the institutional world was no longer playful, it now became ‘serious’. The process of transmission strengthens the parent’s sense of ‘reality’. The institutional world was now experienced by people outside A and B as an objective ‘reality’. It had a history. It was there before these people were born and will be there after their death. This is what Berger and Luckmann call Objectivation – it is when a ‘reality’ confronts its original producer (which is the human him/herself) as facticity external to him/her. Language helps to provide logic for the objectivated social world (pp.82-7). The third step of individual self and society’s ongoing process is internalization; it refers to the process by which the objectivated social world attains the character of subjectivity (pp.149-204). This occurs after the objectivated social world has been incorporated into subjective consciousness through the process of socialization to become part of the individual’s subjective identity. From the three steps altogether, society emerges as having both objective and subjective reality, and in this manner the intersubjective commonsense world is constructed as a world that a man/woman shares with others.
At the same point with objectivation, the institutional world requires **legitimation**. That is, ways by which it can be ‘explained’ and ‘justified’ (p.79). For A and B, this was their biographical memory, but for the new generations, this was the **tradition**. To these new generations, the original meaning of the institution was inaccessible in terms of memory. It therefore became necessary to interpret this meaning to them in various legitimating formulas. This had to be consistent and comprehensive in terms of the institutional order if they were to carry conviction to the new generation. The same story must be told to all the children (pp.78-9). Accordingly, legitimation is a second-order of objectivation. It make objectively available and subjectively plausible the products of first-order objectivation that have been institutionalized. Berger and Luckmann elaborate legitimation process into four levels. The fourth level is the development of a sacred canopy – a **symbolic universe**.

Before we continue, it is important to underscore the nature of institutions as follows:

1. Institutions always have a history. It is impossible to understand an institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced.

2. Once formed, institutions have a tendency to persist. However, the process of institutionalization is not irreversible. For a variety of historical reasons, the scope of institutionalized actions may diminish and de-institutionalization may take place in certain areas of social life. For example, individualism in modern industrial society includes deinstitutionalization in the private sphere.

### 2.2.1 The Symbolic Universe Construction

As a matter of fact, only a small part of human experience is retained in one’s consciousness (p.85). The experiences that are so retained become sedimented as memorable entities. With these memorable entities A makes sense of his or her biography. If a number of individuals share a common biography, intersubjective sedimentation takes place. Intersubjective sedimentation can be called truly social only when it has been objectivated in a **sign system** because then it is possible to reiterate the objectification of those experiences (those memorable entities) (p.85). The sign system could be linguistic or others (I believe an icon such as a ‘cross’ for the crucifixion of Jesus is a potent example). Only then, these experiences can be transmitted from one generation to the next, and from one collectivity to another. “An objectively available sign system bestows a status of anonymity on the sedimented experiences by detaching them from their original context of concrete individual biographies, and making them generally available to all who share, or may share in the future, in the sign system in question” (p.85). In my view, this explication is pertinent to Islam and Muslim with regard to the history of Prophet Muhammad, his companions, and the Sunna that will be described further later.
With the help of language, people don’t need to reconstruct the original process of formation. Language objectivates the shared experiences and makes them available to all within the linguistic community, thus, becoming both the basis and the instrument of the collective stock of knowledge. Furthermore, language provides the means for objectifying new experiences, allowing their incorporation into the already existing stock of knowledge, and it is the most important means by which the objectivated and objectified sedimentations are transmitted in the tradition of the collectivity in question (p.86). Language becomes the depository of a large aggregate of collective sedimentation, and also makes the origin of actual sedimentation become unimportant. With language, legitimation is possible. ‘Explain’ and ‘justify’ are keywords of legitimation. Legitimation ‘explains’ the institutional world by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings and ‘justifies’ the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives. Therefore, legitimation is a matter of ‘values’ and ‘knowledge’. Legitimation not only tells the individual why he or she should perform one action and not another, it also tells him why things are what they are. In other words, ‘knowledge’ precedes ‘values’ in the legitimation of institutions (p.111).

For realities other than those of everyday experience, the process of legitimation (and signification) takes place as symbolic processes (p.113). This level of legitimation is different from the others. It is distinguished from the others by its scope of meaningful integration. Here Berger and Luckmann posit a hierarchical series of symbolic frameworks to give meaning and integration to the ever-widening segments of life. With the recognition that every set of activities is connected to something larger than itself in order to have meaning the meanings already attached to discrete objectivation processes need to be integrated to allow each of us to function as a whole person, and they also need to be legitimated to ‘make sense’. Berger and Luckmann coined the term symbolic universe to refer to what provides broader meaning to everyday life. Now, all sectors of the institutional order are integrated in an all-embracing frame of reference, which now constitutes a universe in the literal sense of the word, because all human experience can now be conceived of as taking place within it (p.114).

Symbolic universe is significant to both individual and social (group). For an individual, it has the legitimating function of one’s biography and one’s subjective identity: one’s identity is legitimated by placing it within the context of a symbolic universe (p.118). For the social group, symbolic universe provides comprehensive integration of discrete sectors of institutionalized conducts and processes (p.121). Symbolic universe also orders history as it locates all collective events in a cohesive unity that includes past, present and future (p.120).
The symbolic universe is conceived as a matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings; the entire historic society and the entire biography of the individual are seen as events taking place within this universe. ...Its meaning bestowing capacity far exceeds the domain of social life, so that the individual may ‘locate’ within it even in his most solitary experiences. (p.114)

The symbolic universe also orders history. It locates all collective events in a cohesive unity that includes past, present and future. With regard to the past, it establishes a ‘memory’ that is shared by all the individuals socialized within the collectivity. With regard to the future, it establishes a common frame of reference for the projection of individual actions. Thus the symbolic universe links men with their predecessors and their successors in a meaningful totality, serving to transcend the finitude of individual existence and bestowing meaning upon the individual’s death. All the members of a society can now conceive of themselves as belonging to a meaningful universe, which was there before they were born and will be there after they die. The empirical community is transposed on to a cosmic plane and made majestically independent of the vicissitudes of individual existence. (p.121)

One of the most important characters of a symbolic universe is that it also encompasses marginal situations of the life of the individual (p.114). Marginal situations constitute the most acute threat to taken-for-granted, routinized existence in society. In this situation the function of symbolic universe is to allow one ‘to return to reality’ – that is, reality of everyday life (p.116). Furthermore, Berger and Luckmann (1991) also conceptualize machineries of symbolic universe maintenance (pp.122-134). They argue that specific procedures of universe-maintenance become necessary when the symbolic universe becomes a problem (p.123). As long as this is not the case, a symbolic universe is self-maintaining. In addition, they assert that “the origins of a symbolic universe have their roots in the constitution of man” (p.121). They are: (a) Human as world-constructor (pp.121-2); (b) Human’s fear of chaos (pp.118, 121); (c) Human’s need of security and belonging (p.117); (d) Human’s need of explanation of inevitable death (p.119).

Building upon the already-elaborated frame of reference of sociology of knowledge he constructed with Luckmann ([1966] 1991), Berger (1967, 1968) developed a ‘sociology of religion’. The concept of the symbolic universe occupies a prominent place in his overall conceptual framework. He identifies religion as a type of symbolic universe. The religious and secular symbolic universes, he continued, may perform much the same function and thus may compete with one another for adherents. It is important to stress that Berger defines ‘religion’, in The Sacred Canopy (Berger, 1967:51), as: “the establishment, through human activity, of an all-embracing sacred order, that is, of a sacred cosmos that will be capable of maintaining itself in the ever-present face of chaos”.

28
Now it might be clear that Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge and Berger’s sociology of religion imply the following inferences relevant to the research:

1. As a social order, religion such as Islam was socially constructed. Therefore, it is human beings’ product.
2. There is no ontological root can be ascribed to Islam and the Muslim community.
3. Thus, the only plausible explanation for Prophet Muhammad and his Sunna is that he is a charismatic leader, full stop. Notably, this is what many Western scholars (including renowned Max Weber (Turner, 1998)) subscribe to explain the prophet and the full tenet of Islam.

Is this the best way to characterise the ‘reality’ of religion by religious communities, especially the Islamic groups which are the subject of this thesis?

2.2.2 Symbolic Universe Redefined

I suggest there are a number of weaknesses in Berger’s framework of a religious ‘symbolic universe’. They start with Berger and Luckmann’s (1991) underlying philosophical assumptions about humankind in which a human being has biological and social (and no spiritual) constitutions only, with a corollary that a “solitary human being is being on the animal level” (p.69). They also highlight the significance of chaos in their theoretical framework of society: “All social reality is precarious. All societies are constructions in the face of chaos” (pp.121-2). They describe further, with examples, the types of anomic terrors that arise whenever the legitimations that obscure this precariousness are threatened, or collapse. The death of a king, especially if it occurs with sudden violence, is an example. The popular reaction to the assassination of President Kennedy is another potent illustration. Berger and Luckmann recall how that had to be followed immediately with the most solemn reaffirmations of the continuing reality of the sheltering symbols. They continue by pointing out that the root of ‘symbolic universe’ lies in the constitution of humans themselves as the ‘world constructors’. That implies his or her capacity for ‘world-openness’, which in turn exposes him or her to the constant possibility of conflict between order and chaos. Elsewhere, their discussion suggests that we are persistently haunted by the prospect of our own death as we realize the temporal structure of our everyday life (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:37, 41). Are these the only or the best assumptions about human nature or the human condition on which to base a sociology of religion?

The Sacred Reality

From the perspective of Islam, Berger and Luckmann’s conception of reality has reduced reality by the fact that their inquiries were pondered and reflected upon within Kantian\(^\text{25}\) thought. For Kant,

\(^{25}\) Kant’s ‘agnosticism’ and Descartes’ cogito have been seen as pivotal in the process of destroying the sacramental quality of knowledge (Nasr, 1989).
noumena and phenomena must be separated, for only phenomena is the source of knowledge (hence, reality), while noumena such as religion, God, and divinity are merely the subject of faith that cannot provide knowledge. In contrast, noumena and phenomena cannot be separated in Islam. Phenomena -as it is subject to change- is the lowest level of knowledge, whereas the highest level must come from something that is not subject to change. Such an approach to reality has been shared by Oriental Philosophy in general as argued by Toshihiko Izutsu (Sawai, 2009). By Oriental Philosophy, Izutsu means varieations in oriental thought including those from the Middle East, India and China. Izutsu shows while there are obviously no historical connections, Oriental Philosophy shares an understanding of hierarchy of ‘reality’ that spans from a superficial level to a deep level. Oriental Philosophy also understands hierarchy of vision in perceiving reality, from those in the empirical world to those in its ‘original reality’ - that is, to see a thing in its indetermination. Oriental thoughts share a common characteristic regarding consciousness, understood as what is needed to open the depth of ‘reality’. Consciousness is attained through their own religious or philosophical experiences, through their own “special and systematic trainings” (Sawai, 2009:137). Additionally, Oriental Philosophy shares a common understanding of multilayered structures of consciousness. For Izutsu, Western thought, in contrast, leads eventually to “naïve realism” - that is, “a philosophical position which holds that things really are as they are perceived by us” (Sawai, 2009:136), not a thing as it is in its ‘original reality’. Izutsu also highlights, in Oriental Philosophy, the ‘many’ is found at the superficial level of ‘reality’, but when coming to a deep level, there is only the ‘one’. At that level, Oriental Philosophy speaks about ‘void’, ‘nothingness’ (Sawai, 2009:137), likewise, at a deep level Islam speaks of God as the ONLY Being, the ultimate Reality. The main stream of Oriental Philosophy has been traditionally “anti-cosmic,” that is, “ontologically destructive” (Sawai, 2009:133). Oriental philosophers always speak about negation of the reality of things and events in an empirical world. Terms such as ‘illusion’ and ‘dream’ are used by oriental philosophers to designate this concept of “non-realistic characteristic of reality” (Sawai, 2009:134-5).

In order to provide a better sociological understanding of religion in order to understand people who practice oriental religions and their traditions, the two concepts of reality, profane and sacred, need to be bridged. Firstly, to complement Berger and Luckmann, I would like to advance five assumptions derived from the traditionalist school of philosophy. This school represents the perspective of religious people themselves on the universal and perennial nature of humans. These assumptions about the nature of humans and their condition are:

26 It is often referred to as the ‘perennial philosophy’. See Footnote 1.
1. Humans stand between two unknowns, the first being their state before terrestrial life, and the second their state after death.

2. Humans are situated in a universal hierarchy of being. (For example, everyone is born as a child of two parents, which necessarily entails an unconditional ‘parent-child’ hierarchy. By analogy, this situation is extended to encompass ‘ruled-ruler’ and ‘created-creator’ hierarchies. This understanding of a hierarchy of being is particularly important in discussion of Islamic communities, where obedience to the ruler is understood as obligatory.)

3. Humans need to find shelter in the vast stretches of cosmic existence.

4. Humans need something bigger to be committed to, the one that Maslow realized later on and thus, sought to rectify his earlier assumptions.

5. Humans have a deep need for certainty. (Berger also took this into account in his desecularization thesis – see below.)

Furthermore, some recent psychological research on the human propensity to religious belief appears to be supportive of the assumptions listed above. These include:

(1) An international project led by Oxford University academics, conducted in 20 countries, which found that human thought is rooted in religious concepts. They gathered evidence that suggests that religion is a common facet of human nature across different societies (Barrett, 2011).

(2) Work by the neuroscientist Andrew Newberg, which suggests that not only do humans have habits of thought that lead them to see the supernatural in the natural and the extraordinary in the ordinary, but also that our brains may be 'wired for God', as shown by neuro-imaging studies that suggest that we come ‘preloaded with the software for belief’. Newberg found that the parietal lobe in the brain, which detects where our body physically ends and the larger world begins, can be 'silenced' by intense prayer or meditation, producing a sense of oneness with the cosmos or God (Newberg, 2001; 2006; 2009; 2010).

Another problem I see with Berger and Luckmann’s assumptions is related to their view that ordinary members of society invariably ‘inhabit’ a symbolic universe in a taken-for-granted attitude. I argue that this has not always been the case, given that not every place in the world experienced the secularization of Western Europe (e.g. Davie, 2007 and Karpov, 2010). The research encountered

27 Cf. the well known Hadith: “Listen to and obey your leader, even if he is an Abyssinian slave”.

28 Towards the end of his life Abraham Maslow recognized that he had been mistaken, and that self-actualization is not the ultimate end. While envisioning the ‘higher psychology’ he spoke of a psychology which is “transpersonal, transhuman, centered in the cosmos rather than in human needs and interests, going beyond humanness, identity, self-actualization, and the like”. He also said that “we need something “bigger than we are” to be awed by and to commit ourselves to”. (Maslow, 1999:xl)

29 In the Muslim world in particular, Gellner (1991) has written: “no secularization has taken place in the world of Islam”. See also Binder (1988) and Rahman, (1984).

30 Davie (2007 p.2) identified “an overwhelming preoccupation with secularization as the dominant paradigm in the sociology of religion” should be seen in the light of European case in which it worked relatively well. Karpov argues there is ‘cultural lag’ among the sociologists to respond to desecularization phenomena realistically. Debates still largely revolve around an 18th and 19th century agenda originally set to herald religion’s decline in the West. Further, while survey-based assessments of religious trends have proliferated in
respondents who had questioned the taken-for-granted realities and went through a mystical journey to attain the absolute truth. Further, in the Muslim world context, Berger and Luckmann downplayed two important things they themselves mentioned in *The Social Construction of Reality* regarding what will “pass for knowledge”. One, is the ongoing presence of what they termed ‘significant persons’ in the internalization process of the society members (pp.151-200), or the ‘transmitters’ of traditional knowledge (p.88); or the carriers of ‘special knowledge’ who are institutionally defined (pp.157-8), or the “full-time personnel” for ‘symbolic universe’ maintenance (p.135); and the other is my own argument about experiences of a mystical-religious nature that the ordinary members of society can imbibe from these.

To contribute to the body of knowledge of the sociology of religion, I put forward an alternative phenomenological analysis to that of Berger and Luckmann, which demonstrates the universality of religion at certain levels. This has been developed in order to better understand the spiritual dimension of desecularization forces at play, and the opportunities, as well as challenges, in contemporary pluralistic and multicultural societies. I begin by observing that implicit in Berger’s approach are the assumptions of Cartesian dualism. Cartesian dualism posits the subject and the object as separate, independent and of real substance: as soon as I make an object of anything, I have to realize that it is the subject which objectifies something, it is only the subject who can do that, without the subject there is no object, and without the object there is no subject. The question is, then, whether this dualistic subject-object formulation is real or only mental. The elusive and problematic conundrum of subject-object has been one of the fundamental questions in philosophy since its inception. Either both the subject and object, mind and matter are real; or both are unreal, just imaginary. The latter is an extreme form of skepticism, wherein everything is relative and could not be known for sure, and I believe that this is devastating for the human mind – especially in view of the assumption posited above that a universal characteristic of human beings is their need of certainty.

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recent decades, large-scale content analytical studies of the philosophy, literature, arts and other cultural subsystem of a given religion have been marginal if not altogether forsaken by social scientists.

31 The Cartesian model has been regarded as one of the “inescapable frameworks” (Taylor 1989:3), traditions and streams of thought that circumscribe and shape the ways in which we conceive what it is to be a human agent, a person or a self (Jovchelovitch, 2007:16).

When Descartes posits ‘cogito ergo sum’ he makes “I”, that is the subject, as the only certainty. Still, he cannot explain and understand the subject-object relation. Modern science, on the other hand, assumes that the subject-object dualism is real. Although science cannot prove the reality of our experience, science has been most successful in explaining its empirical facts.

Then there is mysticism. Mystical thought holds that there is an original unity of subject and object, and to attain this unity is the goal of religion. Interestingly, this conception of underlying reality has been the perennial staple of religious and philosophical thought throughout the history of humanity. Almost every philosopher or religion speaks of this supreme reality.

The methods by which one achieves the desired union of subject and object are a major topic of discussion within the body of knowledge of mysticism. Systematic methods to kill the ego or “I” are the most commonly suggested routes to such union. The thinking behind this is that when ‘you’ are still there, no matter how little you are, you will continuously be in thrall to subject-object dualism: ‘I have a problem’ - I and the problem; ‘I want something’ - I and that something. You will also constantly be troubled by the questions of theodicy because you have your own standards of justice and goodness. The Sufis solve this problem by ceasing to exist and letting the Supreme Reality alone exist through a series of methods to kill ‘I’. To quote Persian Sufi, Hafiz (1317-1392), “Hafiz, you yourself are the veil for the self, move then from the midst” (Parsania, 2006:79). This self-extinction is called fana in the Islamic tradition. Suddenly, all problems disappear because “I” - who used to have those problems – has gone. If Wittgenstein solves the “I have a problem” through the disappearance of the problem (when he talked about living the right way involving acceptance of, or agreement with, the world) (Clack, 1999), the Sufis solve the problem by the disappearance of “I”. By the same token, this also solves the fundamental questions in formal theology that envisage God and the world as Creator and created in a completely distinct and ‘absolute’ manner. It can be said,

33..He expresses, at the beginning of his second “Meditation”, the aspiration of finding like Archimedes “a point that is firm and immovable”, of being “fortunate enough to discover only one thing that is certain and indubitable” (Descartes 1641/1989:85, cited in Jovchelovitch (2001:17). The center of Descartes' anxiety is still very much part of our troubles today: how can we be sure that our representation of the world is not deceiving us? How can I be certain that my knowledge of the world corresponds to the world outside me? “They were triggered by the interminable doubts that inhabited his mind, by the instability of human knowledge about the world, by a ‘malignant demon’ he invoked in his writings, whose tricks could deceive the senses and cast the shadow of doubt upon everything” (Jovchelovitch, 2001:17).

34 See among others, Studstill (2005).

35 See in various Sufi treatises. The notion of fana (self-annihilation), for example, was eloquently elucidated in the famous Futuh al-Ghaib (the Revelations of the Unseen) (Gilani, 1996) by Syekh Abdul Qadir Djilani (1077-1166).
nonetheless, that here is the significance of tradition\textsuperscript{36} in Islam. This Islamic tradition requires acts of obedience aimed at maintaining humility in order to prevent the self from being inflated back into a separate existence again.

Here it is worth noting that the tradition of the Prophet, \textit{Sunna}, has always been at the center of the Islamic symbolic universe. \textit{Sunna} is the second source of Islamic jurisprudence, the first being the Quran - the sacred text that for Muslims remains the verbatim words of God\textsuperscript{37}. Both sources are regarded as indispensable. \textit{Hadith} (the Prophet’s sayings and deeds) are part of the \textit{Sunna}. This underscores the centrality of Muhammad to Islamic spirituality, and hence is the meeting ground for diverse branches of Islam. Table 1 describes different provinces and levels of meaning of Muhammad to different Muslim individuals, and hence groups\textsuperscript{38}, integrated in a symbolic totality of an Islamic ‘symbolic universe’. They range from intrinsic, psychological, symbolic-interactionist and spiritual meanings, ascribed to the person’s state of affair and levels of the ‘self’.

The tradition of practical mysticism involves meticulous training of the self. A whole science of the soul in Sufism has been developed, based on the progressive perfection and transformation of the self toward the Self, which is the ultimate selfhood, through the transformation of the \textit{nafs}. In Arabic the word \textit{nafs} means at once soul, self and ego. In Sufism there is a differentiation between the Spirit (\textit{ruh}) and the psyche (\textit{nafs}). As ordinarily understood, the \textit{nafs} is the source of limitation, passion and fallenness, the source of all that makes man selfish and self-centered. This needs to be transformed with the help of the Spirit. Understanding this is of importance with regard to what the research findings show about how best to interpret the voluntaristic nature of some types (the esoteric-inclined) of Muslim groups. Needless to say, the spiritual journey understood in Sufism entails engagement in the social world.

According to this tradition, when the \textit{nafs} attains the stage of ‘soul at peace’ (\textit{nafs al-mutma’innah}) it gains knowledge of certainty and reposes in peace. This certainty can be explained

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Sunna} means ‘tradition of the Prophet’ or the ‘way of the Prophet’.

\textsuperscript{37} Islamic society since its inception has been founded on the basis of the Book (Quran) and the Tradition (\textit{Sunna}). The Quran and \textit{Sunna} have been the prime sources of Islamic epistemology. Muslims have derived their laws and regulations - about the management of their personal, familial, communal, commercial, and political lives - from these two sources. When there is no explicit verse in the Quran or reference in the Sunna, laws are derived from the available sources where they seem to come to a consensus (\textit{ijtihad wa istinbat}). Only on occasions when the three sources are not available is recourse to analogy and comparison taken (\textit{qiyas wa ra’ya}) (Mutahhari, 2004:23-4).

\textsuperscript{38} Individual personality also gets involved in the diversity of idiosyncrasy among religious groups, given that “in religion as in every other area of human endeavour, individual personalities play a much larger role than most social scientists and historians are willing to concede” (Berger, 1999:13).
using the frame of reference of the mystic as elucidated above - the union of subject and object, the knower and the known. This circumstance is known as the ‘unitive knowledge’, which is referred to as *Ma’rifah* or *Ma’rifat* Allah. It is about knowledge of the Supreme Reality, not by a man as an individual but by the divine center of human intelligence, which transcends the spatio-temporal order. In this formulation, the spiritual journey does not consist of speculative philosophy or dogmatic theology, but is an experimental science. The lack of consideration of this dimension in Berger’s sociology of religion in my view makes it inadequate for explaining the religious communities I have studied, and especially the ‘voluntaristic’ dimension of religious actions.

### 2.2.3. Contemporary Symbolic Universe

While Berger and Luckmann (1991) suggest religion as the most common symbolic universe in societies before modern times, Payne (2011) in a study of the Church of Greece argues that nationalism is a ‘new religion’ that arose out of the “ashes of the demise of traditional religious communities through the promotion of the vernacular in print languages and the fall of royal dynasties” (p.8). In studying a pluralistic society such as Indonesia’s where Islam and nationalism compete fiercely for individual identity and obedience, it is important to remember what Berger and Luckmann (pp 13-30) claim that the central problem of the sociology of knowledge is contained in a nutshell in Pascal’s famous statement “What is truth on one side of the Pyrenees is error on the other” (p. 17).

What symbolic universes are there in modern societies? Robert Wuthnow (1992) has investigated forms of religion that fit the ‘sacred canopy’ metaphor. His research tends to support Berger’s idea that in pluralistic societies individuals are “likely to draw on several ‘symbolic universes’ to cope with broad questions of meaning and purpose” (p.24). Wuthnow also draws attention to the fact that even in highly secularized societies most people are willing to discuss broad questions of meaning and purpose in life and to reflect on such cosmic questions. He presents empirical evidence to support the idea that it is experiences at the margin of everyday reality that tend to be an important source of reflection about broader questions of meaning and purpose. With this in mind, I would like to highlight similarities shared by religious and secular symbolic universes, and then point out what distinguishes the one from the other. Both religious and secular symbolic universe have:

39 In the Islamic tradition the Gnostic or illumintated sage is called *al-arif bi’Llah*, “the Gnostic who knows through or by God”.

1. A meaning-bestowing capacity that far exceeds the domain of social life, “so that the individual may ‘locate’ himself within it even in his most solitary experiences” (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:114).

2. A cognitive and a social dimension.

3. They are “social products with a history” (p.115), Berger and Luckmann (1991) suggest “if one is to understand their meaning, one has to understand the history of their production” (p.115).

The differences between religion and nationalism rest in issues of meaning. This requires incorporating an analysis of the ‘spiritual meaning’ of religion that is drawn from personal spiritual experiences as well as the traditions of the religion already given.

There are two common ways of accounting for the origin of “meaning” in the social sciences. The first regards “meaning” as being intrinsic to the thing under consideration, while the second regards “meaning” as an accretion of the thing being considered, associated with psychological elements such as feelings, memories, motives, etc. Given that the relationship between ideas and their sustaining social processes is always a dialectical one, we also need to consider a third method of accounting meaning in the body of theory, namely symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionists (Blumer, 1969) have a long history of building a non-positivistic sociology through studying meaning in rigorous ways. The symbolic interactionist framework holds that meaning arises from the processes of interaction between people. Thus society as a whole is seen as a process of symbolic interaction. In opposition to behaviourist theory, symbolic interactionists argue that humans do not react automatically to external stimuli, but rather subject them to a process of definition and interpretation. The meaning of things that people act towards are derived from social interaction and modified through interpretation. This means that humans engage in ‘minded’ and ‘self-reflexive’ behaviour in making reactions. Symbolic interactionism offers an “appropriate metaphysics of human nature and human group life which neuropsychology does not and cannot” (Becker, 2009:125). Becker (2009) notes that numerous sociological studies of culture (and religion, as part of culture) have been inspired by symbolic interactionism. With respect to cultural studies, “the interactionists’ emphasis on process stands, as Herbert Blumer insists, as a corrective to any view which insists that culture or social structure determines what people do” (Becker, 2009:6). I believe this is especially pertinent to empirical research on religious people and their actions. Therefore, symbolic interactionism is an appropriate theoretical framework to complement Berger and Luckman’s theories on the creation of symbolic universes, with Berger and Luckmann providing evidence that realities are socially constructed, while Blumer deals with how such meanings are socially constructed through interactions.
In regard to the latter, the symbolic interactionist Herbert Blumer (1969) argues that the nature of any and every object consists of the meaning that it has for the person for whom it is an object. An object may have a different meaning for different individuals. This meaning sets the way in which he or she sees the object, the way in which he or she is prepared to act toward it, and the way in which he or she is ready to talk about it. The three basic premises of symbolic interactionism are: firstly, people act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them, secondly, that the meanings of such things are derived from, or arise out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows; and thirdly, these meanings are handled in or modified through an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things they encounter (Blumer, 1969:1-20).

In the following table I sketch a ‘knowledge-meaning-action’ formulation by integrating symbolic interactionism, which sees ‘humans as action’, and symbolic universe which views ‘human as perception’. With regard to the meaning section of the table, I incorporate a fourth origin of meaning to differentiate religious from secular symbolic universes, and to recognize to the greatest extent possible the degree to which religion involves human activity. The fourth origin of meaning used in this instance, in the religious symbolic universes, is mystical experiences as the producers of non-representational\textsuperscript{41} knowledge and subsequent spiritual meanings. While social science is largely aware of various levels of realities and of meanings\textsuperscript{42}, my proposition is beyond that. I aim to raise awareness that there is inadequacy in the concept of human as mundane-being held in the present state of social sciences and the perspective of human thought as mere instrument in the struggle for survival and power, in both the idealist and anti-idealist schools.

\textsuperscript{41} Put simply, non-conceptual knowledge, \textit{ilm al-huduri} in Islam

\textsuperscript{42} Such as those mentioned in Berger and Luckmann (1991):“...the various layers of experience, and the different structures of meaning involved in, say, being bitten by a dog, remembering having been bitten by a dog, having a phobia about all dogs, and so forth” (p.35).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Interplay between Knowledge and Meaning</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source-1: Information (from socialization)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Origins of Meaning</strong></td>
<td><strong>Source-1: Meaning</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product: <strong>Representation</strong> (representational knowledge)</td>
<td>Three origins (source) of meaning have been widely accepted in social theories. They are intrinsic, psychological, and Symbolic Interactionism</td>
<td>Product: <strong>Action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example: Information about Prophet Muhammad</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Muhammad is the last Prophet ★ creates intrinsic meaning</td>
<td>1. Intrinsic Muhammad is the last Prophet for those who believe ★</td>
<td>Following the practices of the Prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Muhammad is genealogically an Arab ★ creates psychological meaning</td>
<td>2. Psychological Perhaps, for the Arabs and the progeny ★</td>
<td>Sentimental love (could be blind love too)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Muhammad is being offended often by the media ★ creates Symbolic Interactionism Meaning</td>
<td>3. Symbolic Interactionism Examples are abound ★</td>
<td>Reaction against offense, e.g. by Satanic Verses of Salman Rushdie; the movie <em>Innocence of Muslim; Faith Freedom</em> internet forum (As the Prophet was humiliated and people defended, the ‘meaning’ of the Prophet was escalated even higher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I propose the second source of ‘knowledge’ to be incorporated in religious symbolic universe, namely, <strong>mystical experience</strong>.</td>
<td>I propose the fourth source of meaning drawn from mystical experience to be incorporated in religious ‘symbolic universe’, namely, <strong>spiritual meaning</strong>.</td>
<td>I propose the second source of action drawn from spiritual meaning to be incorporated in religious ‘symbolic interactionism’, namely, <strong>love action</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Source-2: Mystical experience</strong></td>
<td><strong>Product: Non-representational knowledge</strong> (formless)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But when the person needs to name that experience in verbalized thought, he has to use language. That means he needs to shuffle through his stock of representational knowledge</td>
<td>4. From Mystical experience and Mystical knowledge, spiritual meaning emerged. ★</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Example: Mystical experience associated with Prophet Muhammad ★ creates spiritual meanings</strong></td>
<td>Gradation of spiritual meaning of Prophet Muhammad (the following illustration was made for the sake of discussion only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir has spiritual meaning of the Prophet grade-1 ★</td>
<td>Love action grade-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siti has spiritual meaning of the the Prophet grade-2 ★</td>
<td>Love action grade-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sukino has spiritual meaning of the Prophet grade-3 ★</td>
<td>Love action grade-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The highest spiritual meaning of the Prophet is “Nur Muhammad” as articulated by a number of respondents: Emha, Rangka, Said Aqil, Munhanif ★</td>
<td>The highest level of love action (<em>khawas al-khawas</em>, the perfected ones, in Sufism)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 “Knowledge-Meaning-Action” in Secular Symbolic Universe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge</th>
<th>Interplay between Knowledge and Meaning</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source-1: Information (from socialization)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product: Representation (representational knowledge)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origins of Meaning (Three origins: intrinsic, psychological, and Symbolic Interactionist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Information about ABC country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. ABC is where you live ▶ creates intrinsic meaning</td>
<td>1. Intrinsic Being a citizen ▶</td>
<td>ABC is simply a place to live</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ABC is your fatherland ▶ creates psychological meaning</td>
<td>2. Psychological Feeling of attachment to ABC ▶</td>
<td>Love of ABC and makes ABC his identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ABC is a Third World country, oppressed by the rich nations ▶ creates Symbolic Interactionism meaning</td>
<td>3. Symbolic Interactionist Nationalist sentiment ▶</td>
<td>Nationalist’s struggle for ABC independence and national identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Islamic system of thought recognises non-representational knowledge as ‘ilm huduri’ (Arabic for ‘knowledge by presence’) besides ‘ilm husuli’ (‘knowledge by correspondence’). Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi (2002) expounds this concept philosophically in “The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence”. Alongside knowledge of our own sensations, feelings, and bodies, mystical experiences – characterised by noetic quality – is ‘knowledge by presence’. Notably, in maintaining a uniform understanding of awareness, modern philosophy often disparaged the inclusion of these species of knowledge into the corpus of thinking. The exclusion, however, does not ipso facto prove the falsehood of these types of knowledge. In fact, they continue to submit themselves to philosophical inquiry and stand to further the search for the nature of being. Within ‘knowledge by presence’, the object is essential to the notion of knowledge and immanent in the mind of the knowing-subject without needing representation. It “has all its relations within the framework of itself, such that the whole anatomy of the notion can hold true without any implication of an external objective reference calling for an exterior relation” (Yazdi, 2002:43). It is immediately present in the mind of the knowing-subject and thus logically implied in the definition of the conception of knowledge itself. The division of knowledge into two in Islam, requires identification of the object into: (1) subjective, or essential, object, which is no other than the knowing-subject; and (2) objective, or accidental, object, which is the known-object -- and thus subsequently into: (1) immanent (internal) and (2) transitive (external) object (Yazdi, 2002:27-56). This division sheds light further on an understanding of hierarchy of vision in perceiving ‘reality’, through ‘special and systematic training’ for the ‘self’ of the knowing-subject in oriental religions already discussed. Knowledge by correspondence, on the other hand, operates within the
framework of completely separate knowing-subject and known-object, and requires correspondence relations between one and another. Because correspondence is indeed a dyadic relation, it logically follows that whenever the relation holds there must be a conjunction between the knowing-subject and the known-object. Therefore, the external object plays a major role in the essentiality of ‘knowledge by correspondence’, because if there were no external object there could be no representation of it, hence, no possibility of the existence of that knowledge at all.

It should be clear while the dichotomy of subject and object is not totally negated in Islamic system of thought for, in fact, it is the function of human being’s vision that makes the duality appear. The Islamic system aims to establish the integrity and systematic unity of human reason by pulling together all forms and manifestation of human awareness. In modern psychology, there are three hypotheses that attempt to explain how representation operates in the human mind. One of them, the “Language of Thought” formulation (Kim, 1990) holds that language is the central feature of all cognition. The corollary is that all thoughts are ‘sentence-like’. Such a framework can be understood within Islamic system as an exegesis of the verse of Quran (Q:2:30-9) saying that God taught Adam (signifies human) the names of everything, and with this knowledge Adam is even able to inform the angels their names, which the angels themselves did not know because God did not teach them (human’s level in Islam is higher than angel). This corresponds with a ‘language of thought’ formulation that representational knowledge is sentence-like. On the other hand, by their very nature, the mystics are the ones most sensible of the precariousness of representational knowledge. This is evident in Sufi poetry where the poets show that they are aware of the difficulties inherent in accessing the absolute truth behind words. A passage in one of the poems of Ibn Arabi, the great mystic of Islam, goes: “Deliver us, oh Allah, from the sea of names!”. More importantly, the power of meaning to determine one’s actions (as indicated in the table above) makes the symbolic universe not only a pair of glasses that the person uses to peer into social realities to make sense of them, but also something that possesses the power to draw ‘allegiances’, which then set forth the ‘normative authority’ (this refers to an explanation of what makes normative claims legitimately binding for that person, i.e. why he or she should regulate his or her actions with respect to particular normative claims). Moreover, besides normative elements, symbolic universes also encompass cognitive and affective components.

43 The other two hypotheses are: Intentional Psychology/Realism and, Avoiding Magical Theories of Mind. See Sterelny (1990).
Symbolic Universe contested: The case of Indonesia

Few countries in the world could match Indonesia’s diversity of population where some 300 different ethnicities live together. Ethnic conflicts have happened every now and then since the formation of the nation state (see Chapter 5). The greater the diversity of symbolic universe constituents in any given society the more complex problems emerge in the process of the social construction of intersubjective reality in that society, that is, a subjective world that the members share with each other in collectivity. In the midst of inequality, most notably, of wealth and power, the complexity multiplies around pragmatic issues. This opens the possibility of ‘hybridization’, i.e. the deliberate effort to synthesize different symbolic universes. Such hybridization helps explain the hate-love relationship between nationalists and ‘Westernists’ in Indonesian society. These are two ordinarily opposing groups which disagree on many issues, but see eye to eye with regard to supporting the capitalist developmentalism paradigm. In similar vein there are the attempts by modernist Muslims to hybridize Islam and ‘Westernism’ throughout the Muslim world in order to construct a modern society that participates economically and politically in the global system. Berger (2002) specifically refers to this particular group in Indonesia, which has emerged since the demise of Suharto, as “pro-capitalist, pro-democratic, tolerant of religious pluralism, but decisively committed to the Muslim faith” (Berger, 2002:13)

It is possible to classify Indonesian Muslim society, which is fairly secularized, into three groups according to the most dominant symbolic universes that they embrace, that is, the universe that compels their allegiance and provides ‘normative authority’. The three universes are Islam, nationalism and ‘Westernism’.

Table 3 Classification of Indonesian Muslims by Symbolic Universes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic Universe</th>
<th>Vision of Geographical-territory</th>
<th>Economic vision</th>
<th>Worldview with regard to present-day Ecological crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Islam (theo-centrism)</td>
<td>Muhammad’s nation**(global world)**</td>
<td>Islamic economics</td>
<td>Humans as divine creatures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Nationalism (nation-centrism)</td>
<td>Indonesian countrymen (Indonesia)</td>
<td>Capitalist economics</td>
<td>Humans as earth-bound creatures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Westernism (anthro and/or eco-centrism of the modern scientific worldview)</td>
<td>Citizens of the globalised world created by Western colonisation (global world)</td>
<td>Capitalist economics</td>
<td>Humans as earth-bound creatures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**See Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 for explanation.**
The Indonesian Muslims categorized under ‘Muhammad’s nation’ group in Table 3 are probably a numerical minority. As Robert Pringle says in *Understanding Islam in Indonesia: Politics and Diversity*:

> In the case of Indonesia, the term “Muslim” is also problematic. It usually means anyone whose faith is Islam, about 85% of the population. But it is also often used to mean someone who is politically a Muslim, as opposed to being a nationalist or a secularist, and votes for an Islamic political party. In this sense Muslims have always been a minority of the Indonesian population and remain so, despite the increase in Islamic religious observance in recent years. (Pringle, 2010:11)

Nevertheless, with a recognition that the relationships between ideas and their sustaining social processes are always dialectical, in this thesis I seriously consider the potential of ‘Muhammad’s nation’ to advance ‘relocalisation’ projects and to mobilize the environmental movement to rebuild sustainable Muslim communities with local self-governance. I do so for two reasons: firstly, the resilience of Islamic communities and movements at any given moment in Indonesian history, and secondly, the emergence of transnational Islamic movements.

### 2.3 Disenchancing the World, Shattering the ‘Unified Systemic Worldview’

Berger and Luckmann’s theory of social order and symbolic universe provides a framework to understand how the ‘unified systemic worldview’ that the literature on sustainable community development refers to (Maser, 1997) is relevant to the social formation of indigenous communities. In *Sustainable Community Development: principle and concepts*, Maser (1997) for instance, believes that the unspoiled indigenous culture may be operated by what he terms a ‘unified systemic worldview’ and the components of a community will change when the social focus shifts towards an ‘expansionist economic worldview’. He further notes that in a unified systemic worldview “people will realize that they are but one species among the many in a dynamic, ever-changing, interactive, interconnected, interdependent system, and a new sense of community will encompass all living things, including soils, within the common area” (Maser, 1997:99). There are five purposes that a local community in a unified systemic worldview serves (p.100):

1. Social participation – where and how people are able to interact with one another to create the relationships necessary for a feeling of value and self-worth
2. Mutual aid – services and support offered in times of individual or familial need
3. Economic products, as well as the availability of such commodities as food and clothing in the local area
4. Socialization – educating people about cultural values and acceptable norms. Social control – the means for maintaining those cultural values and acceptable norms

Maser contends that the current disintegration of family and community in American life has made it unlikely that most people in that country really have an intimate sense of belonging to a local
community. He believes that the people have largely lost their sense of connection to and with a community. Further, he argues that one reason for this lack of strong community connections might be the adoption of an expansionist economic worldview in which accumulating material possessions takes the place of developing a spirituality that is manifested in quality relationships and mutual caring. He asserts that if human society and its environment are ever to become sustainable it is necessary to rediscover or recreate our sense of community in order to balance the material with the spiritual, the pieces with the whole - which is the essential balance required in a unified systemic worldview (Maser, 1997:100).

Conversely, the disenchantment of the world, for Max Weber, is the essence of what is called modernity. Weber contends that the rationalization that characterises modernity will eventually shatter the unified systemic epistemologies that constitute pre-modern worldviews. According to Richard Jenkins, there are two aspects of disenchantment that reinforce each other. One is the secularization and the decline of magic, and the other is the increasing scale, scope, and power of the formal-rational logics and processes in the areas of science, bureaucracy, law and policy-making (Jenkins, 2000:12). Jenkins describes disenchantment thus:

It is the historical process by which the natural world and all areas of human experience become experienced and understood as less mysterious; defined, at least in principle, as knowable, predictable and manipulable by humans; conquered by and incorporated into the interpretive scheme of science and rational government. In a disenchanted world everything becomes understandable and tameable, even if not, for the moment, understood and tamed. Increasingly the world becomes human-centered and the universe – only apparently paradoxically- more impersonal. (Jenkins, 2000:12)

Weber’s disenchantment thesis seems to have been based on a number of assumptions, two key ones being that history has some direction, and that time is linear. Both these assumptions are distinctive to Western culture, with Jenkins claiming:

Even if we disregard the rich variety of communities and ethnicities in the pre-modern world, there is every reason to suggest that the European world, at least, has been disenchanted, in the sense of epistemically fragmented, for as long as we can perceive in the historical record. (Jenkins, 2000:15)

However, the diverse array of oppositional re-enchantment that we see today tells us that the world may never have really been disenchanted, or only unevenly so, and that “the progressive banishment of mystery in the face of ‘objective’ knowledge is an idea which was more defensible in Weber’s day than it is today” (Jenkins, 2000:17). In respect of disenchantment and re-enchantment,
we are witnessing in modern societies an array of opposing tendencies, themes and forces, and thus the world is arguably more mysterious today than ever. Peter Berger himself, after contributing to the sociological literature on secularization, admitted that he had mistakenly predicted an overall secularization. (Berger, 1999). The growing evidence of the resurgence of public religion in the late twentieth century has proved otherwise. In *The Desecularization of the World. Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, a collection of articles published in 1999 which Berger edited, he indicated the possible origins of counter-secularization forces. Two possible sources are nominated. One is associated with humankind’s deep need of certainty, and the other with the resentment of the masses who are not part of the elite’s Enlightenment program. As Berger expresses it:

One: Modernity tends to undermine the taken-for-granted certainties by which people lived through most of history. This is an uncomfortable state of affairs, for many an intolerable one, and religious movements that claim to give certainty have great appeal.

Two: A purely secular view of reality has its principal social location in an elite culture that, not surprisingly, is resented by large numbers of people who are not part of it but who feel its influence (most troublingly, as their children are subjected to an education that ignores or even directly attacks their own beliefs and values). Religious movements with a strongly anti-secular bent can therefore appeal to people with resentments that sometimes have quite non-religious sources. (Berger, 1999:11)

Having recognized all that, it may be understood that the ‘relocalisation’ itself falls under the re-enchantment category alongside desecularization, religious fundamentalism and varied resistance to mainstream paradigms and consumer lifestyles. As Jenkins (2000:18) puts it:

More generally, one can point to a wide range of substantial (re)enchantments which are decidedly modern: religious fundamentalism, whatever its hue; alternative lifestyles, many of them explicit resistances to urbanism and capitalism; neo-paganism and other invented spiritual traditions; and psychoanalysis/psychotherapy.

Jenkins also recognizes that the diverse portfolio of perspectives and practices that developed as a response to the rationalism of the Enlightenment shelters under the umbrella of romanticism, an “imagining of and yearning for a mythical pre-modern, un-rationalized past”. One may argue, therefore, that sustainable community development projects will necessarily exhibit tensions between rationalism and romanticism. On the other hand, we are seeing that while the modern world is in some respects becoming more homogeneous via the process known as globalization, it remains as divided by heterogeneity of culture as ever. Hannerz (1992:217-67) argues that “the global ecumene involves convergence and polycentric variety”; likewise Jenkins says:

The homogenizing effects of globalization necessarily produce a response in the (re)invention, valorization, and assertion of locality and distinctiveness. Homogeneity and
heterogeneity can no more be divorced than the formal and the informal, or similarity and
difference. The one entails the other. (Jenkins, 2000:16)

Finally, given that the unchallenged hegemony of the Western scientific paradigm began to fragment
in the twentieth century, and that modern human sciences are increasingly understood as
contingent rather than permanent and in need of other interpretive models, one can argue that the
characteristic postmodernist “rejection of totalizing theory;” and “pursuit of localizing and
contingent theories” (Bennett, 2005:28) could in itself be seen as part of the re-enchantment forces
that open up the possibility of greater epistemological pluralism.

2.4. Re-enchanting the World, Reconstructing the ‘Unified Systemic Worldview’

Given the current state of economy, politics, disintegrating families, violent social relations,
uncertain sense of security, and the confused condition of our guiding values, Maser contends that
the language of community is one way of overcoming an increasingly common yearning for clearer
ethical values on which to base a politics filled with meaning and purpose, or to reconnect people
with a set of shared values and principles with which to embrace the uncertainties of life. Maser
proposes community development, which is the democratic process at the local level of our
domestic lives, to be the best opportunity for applying the democratic process. Ethics must
therefore be nurtured as one of the most valuable assets in making human conditions work (pp.99-
107).

He argues that rekindling the spirit of community is a choice which it is difficult to make
because we often accept the route of least resistance in collective thinking that is embodied in the
current worldview, and only a few will chart their course against the current, driven by an inner need
to find their life’s fulfillment in and through sustainable community (Maser, 1997:242). According to
Maser, as they dare to risk criticism by the mainstreamers, these few people will become more
focused, and with increasing focus the clarity of the vision they behold comes ever closer to their
grasp. He applauds these people as the true pioneers of our time who are, instead of simply wanting
to turn back the clock, forward-looking and in coherence with an emergent holistic paradigm. As
they reach a place where materialism and spirituality are balanced, he argues that their focus will be
so concentrated, their faith so strong, that what to others seems to be effortful will become to them
increasingly effortless (Maser, 1997:242). It is therefore important at this point to make it clear that
attaining a sustainable lifestyle or Utopian-inspired ecological ‘art of living’ requires that society’s
focus shifts from “having” to “being” (Fromm, 1979), and moves towards finding a balanced
configuration of components of life. This is what was proposed by Hannah Arendt, a prominent
twentieth century thinker on the “good life” as glossed in de Geus (2009). She argues that human
fulfillment and living a rewarding, complete and well-spent life can best be approached from the perspective of a proper and balanced ordering of action, work and labor.

Not unlike Berger and Luckmann (1991), Maser (1997:38-44) too, in my view, has ignored the domain which had always been an integral part of the “unified systemic worldview” of pre-modern indigenous societies, namely, the transcendent spiritual order. Given that the worldview or paradigm is a “basic set of beliefs that guide action” (Guba, 1990:17), the ‘unified systemic worldview’ must be seen as “existing” not in the empirical order but in the so-called ‘symbolic universe’ of the given community. In the following section the debates among Muslim thinkers will be introduced, regarding reconstructing the ‘unified systemic worldview of Islam’ through ‘reconstruction of knowledge’ where no barrier would appear to exist between the sacred and the secular.

2.4.1 Muslim’s Cognitive Transformation

Sociology of knowledge studies the social role of ideologies. In this approach, ideas - be they political ideologies, religions, or theoretical ideas - are not understood as pure expressions of reason, but as being closely tied to social interests and conflicts. Accordingly, ideas on the superiority of one civilisation over another can function as instruments of subjugation and imperialism. Many have argued in this sense that western-style education in the Third World is continuing Western colonialism. The connection between knowledge and power and interaction between institutions and discourses have been the focus of Foucault’s studies (Seidman, 2008). Foucault’s deep interest in the social sciences has led him to investigate the social effects of knowledge such as psychiatry, criminology, penology, demography, sexology, economics and sociology. “He asserted that discourses that aim to reveal the truth of the abnormal personality or of human sexuality or the criminal, help to create and control the very objects they claim to know.” (Seidman, 2008: 361). Henceforth, scientific knowledge functions as a major social power through the state, the family, and institutions that support social welfare. As a result, the social scientific disciplines “shape the

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Many have argued that the “primal religions” or indigenous religions (so called in contrast to “revealed religions” such as Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism) have for millennia been the guardians of the natural environment with an “ear finely tuned to the message of the earth” (See Nasr, 1996 and Descola, 1986). Despite great differences in their myths and practices these religions present a remarkable morphological resemblance as far as the relation to nature or earth is concerned. The vision of the whole was always related to the sense of the holy, or sense of the sacred, which nature displays at every turn. The Quran says of this, “wherever you turn there is the Face of God” (Q:2: 115). In this way of seeing things, the non-existence of a “sense of the sacred” in modern culture implies that the adoption of the “unified systemic worldview” that Maser would like to propose as a basis for sustainable community development is well-nigh impossible, because to lose the sense of the sacred is also to become blind to the whole, and ultimately to forget the total order.
dominant ideas about who we are, what is permissible, what can be said, by whom, when, and in what form” (Seidman, 2008: 362). Until Foucault, this power/knowledge configuration had been submerged by the Enlightenment scientific vision which underpins aspects of developmentalism in Indonesia. Further, as a rejection of Western Enlightenment tradition Foucault puts forward an alternative to a scientific vision of human studies that he called ‘genealogy’ which shows “dominant discourses defining the social universe as natural conceal social interests and power relations.” (Seidman, 2008:359). Through his genealogical social analysis Foucault aims to show that the dominant knowledges are entangled in a history of social conflict, and central to this history is the exclusion or marginalization of discourses that speak for oppressed groups. This thesis adopts Foucault’s power/knowledge concept in investigating domination upon the Third World through discourses. At this point, different human personality characteristics as inborn traits have been adopted (see 1.4) to explain different cognitive reactions by the oppressed, Muslim groups – the reactions that manifested with the emergence of reformist and modernist Muslims since the 19th century. In this respect, alongside the power of the Islamic symbolic universe described above to contain within its orbit the dialectical relationships between Islam and modernity amongst pious Muslims, symbolic interactionism appears as helpful.

The symbolic interactionist perspective is that human conduct is a meaningful product of situated social interaction among self-conscious individuals (Hewitt, 2010) and provides a framework for individuals –rather than culture or social structure- concerning their actions. Symbolic interactionists argue that humans do not react automatically to external stimuli, but rather subject them to a process of definition and interpretation. They portray social behaviour from the perspective of participants by closely studying the concrete situations in which they form what is labelled “conduct”. Further:

Symbolic interactionists examine how people define situations and act on the basis of those definitions, as well as how the self is shaped by group membership and by the real and imagined boundaries between groups. Symbolic interactionists have investigated such topics as race and ethnic group relations, the formation of subcultures, life in communities and urban neighbourhoods, and collective behaviour. (Hewitt, 2010: 881)

From that perspective, the early reformist movement was a product of the situated social interaction Muslims had with the colonial West and modernity. Muslims reacted towards modernity according to their definition of what modernity was. The meanings of modernity that they acted towards were derived from social interactions they had with it and modified through interpretation. Different human personality characteristics appear to explain different lines of interpretation of modernity made by different Muslim groups. To the warrior types, the defeat of the Muslim world
and the violent European colonisation led them to suggest that Western sciences and technology were the secret of Western power, and thus Muslims needed to appropriate them and transform cognitively to adopt these. This group is commonly referred to as reformist or early modernist Muslims. To the *sages* the onslaught of rationalisation in the name of disenchantment led them to suggest that western thought is a worldview that is void of the sacred and marginalises religiously inspired worldviews, hence, the West is *kufr*, infidel. This led them to continuously be wary of modern-Western influences in the Muslims’ minds. A chronological advancement of the debates among Muslim thinkers on cultural, philosophical and cognitive transformation deemed necessary to confront modernity, is to follow.

2.4.1.1 Early Modernist Muslims

Reformist Muslims began with the figures such as Afghani (1838-1897), Abduh (Egypt, 1849–1905), and Iqbal (1875-1938). Scholars in the field refer to Islamic reformism interchangeably with the Salafi movement, Islamic revivalism, Islamic resurgence, political Islam, and Islamism. Another term that is recently used is Islamic fundamentalism. The first wave of reform movements emerged in the 19th century on the proposition that European imperial expansion was due to Muslims' religious laxity. A central issue in the debate among reformist intellectuals in the Middle East was whether to fight colonialism through political struggle or cultural struggle (Fuad, 2004). The former was championed by Afghani, whose appeal to Muslims around the world to unite against Western colonialism and to fight for immediate independence became the basis of Pan-Islamism. The latter was championed by Abduh who appealed for education of the Muslim people. Adopting the former would mean going for an armed revolutionary struggle, and adopting the latter for the longer struggle of setting up new educational institutions and reforming existing ones. Both influenced greatly Islamic movements in Indonesia (see Section 5.3).

Salafi reformists combined an anti-imperialist, pan-Islamic vision with an admiration for modern rationality and science, which they regarded as sources of Western progress and dominance (Zaidi, 2006). Abduh, for instance, stressed the role of reason, contending that, though there may be in religion that which transcends the understanding, there is nothing which reason finds impossible. He also believed that Muslims could adopt European science which itself owed (in his view) a great deal to Islam (Bennet, 2005:21). Another figure, Iqbal, is known to have advocated ‘progress’, arguing that in fact the Quran itself teaches that life is the process of progressive creation which necessitates that each generation -guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors- should be permitted to solve its own problems. While Iqbal was often accused of borrowing too much from
Western philosophy, he was also not uncritical of the West. He denounced the West’s petty nationalism and saw its materialistic worldview as bankrupt (Bennett, 2005).

It is worth noting, that the use of terms ‘reformist’ and ‘fundamentalist’ borrowed from the Protestant Christian Movement in the 19th century have caused confusion and were considered problematic by a notable group of academic scholars and Islamic activists. Firstly, there was no true affinity between Protestantism and Islamic reform. The latter call for return to the Quran and Sunna (traditions of Prophet Muhammad) in order to purify Islam from accretions of which locally-derived customs were part. Afsaruddin (2012) reminds, that fundamentalism in the Christian context refers to Protestant Christian movements which insisted on the acceptance of the Bible as the literal word of God, this is simply different to Islam because a Muslim by definition is someone who accepts the Qur’an as the literal word of God, “whether one is a conservative or liberal Muslim, there is a consensus on this issue; one cannot be a Muslim without accepting that the Quran is a divine, revealed text” (Afsaruddin, 2012). Therefore, from this point of view, “it doesn’t make sense to talk of Muslim fundamentalists as a separate group within Islam. With this warning in mind, “it is better to speak of Islamic revivalist or reform movements, and particularly in the 20th century, to talk about modernist Islam and political Islam” (Afsaruddin, 2012).

Clearly, there was direct correlation between colonial political-economic power with their military forces in the Muslim world and Islamic reformism. It must be highlighted, for the reformists, modern science and technology were the secret of colonial power, and hence, had to be appropriated to resist them. For this reason the Reformists have been labelled as early Modernists as well, since they are the ones who have propagated modern education in the Muslim world.

Critiques by the Sages

The Reformists or modernists Muslims have been criticised severely by the Traditionalist scholars (Nasr, 2001; Lumbard, 2004). For them, both movements represent subversion of traditional values and teachings from within the Islamic tradition.

In an effort to transform Islamic civilization, each has in fact hastened the onset of the very illness they sought to ameliorate. Rather than contemplating and evaluating Western civilization through the Islamic intellectual tradition, modernists have embraced many tenets of Western thought out of a deep sense of inferiority—a sense which results from mistaking the power of Western nations for the truth of Western ideologies. (Lumbard, 2004:69)
This whole scene of Islamic movements and thoughts brought to my mind, Gadamer’s (1976) conception of ‘prejudice’ to explain what has made some of the Muslims react against colonial power by reinterpretting Islam as a counter ideology, whereas others continue to reject the ‘ideologisation’ of Islam which in their view is nothing but de-divinising Islam. The former are inclined to political Islam whereas the latter to the ‘sound knowledge’ of Islam. From then on, the diversity of interpretations of Islam, and hence of learning communities, emerged. It ultimately led to the diversity of social movements that carry Islam as either an ideal or source of inspirations. In this respect, Moaddel and Talattof’s (2000) accounts are important. In discussing the modernists and fundamentalists they enumerated, nevertheless, factors they hold to have been uniting the two streams with the rest of the Muslims. They are: (i) The One God (Allah); (ii) The Book (Quran); (iii) Prophet Muhammad; and (iv) The Prophet’s traditions (Sunna):

In their efforts to formulate a distinctively Islamic response to the problems facing their communities, these thinkers could not and should not violate such core principles of Islam as God’s unity, the Quran being His word that descended to the people through Prophet Muhammad, and other fundamental religious dogma explicitly stated in the Quran (Moaddel and Talattof, 2000:3).

They noted further, “Besides the fact that they were devout Muslims, violating such principles meant that they would lose their right to speak as Muslims” (p.3). In relation to the key argument of the thesis about the uniting power of a symbolic universe, I highlight that disagreements between diverse groups of Muslims were around the interpretation of Islam in the context of modernity and not about the classical jurisprudence itself as Nasr (2001:251) also suggests. Esposito (2002) pointed out that in Islam what matters is not orthodoxy (correct doctrine) but orthopraxy (correct action). These uniting factors are crucial in my theoretical framework according to which Islamic movements can be considered as an alternative to a global environmental movement for the Muslim world by capitalising on the Islamic symbolic universe.

Relatedly, Zaidi (2006) argues further, that reformist figures, even those such as Qutb, Mawdudi and Hassan al-Banna who have been dubbed fathers of Islamic fundamentalism, or ‘ideologues’ and ‘pamphleteers’ (El-Fadl, 2001:56), at least did sense some of the implications of the cognitive transformation underlying modernity. Zaidi argues by giving the example of a well-known Islamist argument raised by Mawdudi that the liberal notion of popular sovereignty supersedes the sovereignty of God. Such an argument, according to Zaidi, should have not been simply rejected as

47 In his hermeneutics, Gadamer argues that prejudice defines the ground the interpreter him/herself occupies when he/she understands. Gadamer did not use ‘prejudice’ as a negative category, instead he aims to raise an awareness (and an acceptance) of individuals’ own pre-judgments (prejudices) and influence attempts to understand a text. I ponder that it is usually individuals’ own biases that are responsible for what is selected to study. It is unlikely that individuals research a text that they have no interest in.
superficial as individuals may also acknowledge the increasing exclusion of the Transcendent from
the political and moral realms. Similar treatment should have been applied to Qutb’s denunciation
of modernity as an Age of Jahiliyah (an Age of Ignorance) because of modernity’s reliance on a
strictly rationalist-empiricist epistemology that repudiates the authority of metaphysical truths.
Undoubtedly, Mawdudi and Qutb were speaking for an epistemology that is not limited to the
earthly realities.

Finally, while the political Islam of the 19th century was shaped by the struggle for
independence, thus, prone to nationalist sentiments (in Indonesia, see Chapter 5), the present-day
globalisation has given birth to non-nationalist and global-Islam which is more in accordance with
the anti-nationalism and anti-tribalism of Islam. This phenomenon should be seen in the light of
Berger and Luckmann (1991), that social change must be understood as standing in a dialectical
relationship to the history of ideas, and Blumer (1969), that meanings are socially constructed
through interactions. Globalisation, in terms of an enormous increase in the possibilities of
communication between an increasing number of people throughout the world, has helped the
Ummah become reified against the background of, and in interaction with, emerging global culture,
most of it Western, and indeed American, both in origin and content. That is accompanied with
promises of an international civil society towards democratic global governance, on the one hand,
and on the other, American economic and political hegemony with the cultural consequences of a
homogenised world resembling a Disneyland (Berger, 2002; 2003). In this sense, a transnational
Islamic movement arises out of the reified notion of Ummah in a dialectical relationship, and in
interaction with globalisation. The contemporary development of global Islam or transnational Islam
cannot be underestimated in contemplating an endogenous Islamic relocalisation model that is fully
attuned to a changing global environment.

2.4.1.2 Reconstruction of Knowledge Project

There are, among Muslim thinkers, those who realise that cultural, philosophical and cognitive
transformations conceptualised within modernity require far more sophisticated treatments of the
subject from a Muslim perspective than have been provided by political reformists, jihadists, neo-
revivalists and revolutionaries48(Zaidi, 2006:70) already given. They posited instead a cognitive
transformation through reconstruction of knowledge. Three names of scholars have been the most
well-known on this project: Nasr’s attempt to reformulate an Islamic science, al-Faruqi’s attempt to
Islamise the humanities and social science and the Ijmali’s critique of al-Faruqi’s project. Zaidi (2006)

48 Ones whose movements were re-enchanting the political, who Zaidi argued have obscured more holistic
treatments of modernity from a Muslim perspective (p.69).
outlines the project in chronological order. This suggests that there is more to Muslims’ desire to re-enchant the world than simply anti-imperialist sentiments - an account that corroborates my core argument in the onset of this chapter, that society is not just a struggle for economic gain and power. Zaidi’s account resonates with Manzo’s (1991) and Tucker’s (1999) critiques of dependency theory as well. According to them, because the dependency theory explains development from the logic of capital, it remained modernist and the cultural effect it was having on particular segments of the population, such as indigenous peoples, was not considered. Accordingly, Muslim’s reconstruction of knowledge must be placed beyond Foucault’s (1972) relationship between discourse and power, for it is concerned with broader questions than the issues of power in which economic and development schemes are always embedded. Using my theoretical framework, reconstruction of knowledge appears as signalling a ‘clash of symbolic universe’. What the proponents really pursue is cognitive consonance with the social construction of reality under an Islamic symbolic universe according to which God is Reality (al-Haq) and wherein the Muslims’ religious convictions and the world correspond. Consequently, to return to an Islamic civilisation in which there is moral, cognitive and interpretive unity, the proponents believe that it is imperative for the Muslim world to revitalise Islamic thought and to end what is perceived as the ‘West’s epistemological imperialism’, for the latter cannot meet the need of Muslims and is at the core of the economic and cultural poverty of the Muslim world (see Bennett, 2005). On this matter, Chapter 4 presents a number of authors who will argue that the imperialist and colonial development strategies have used theories of development as means to progress. The development theories stemming from the WWII era echo the Enlightenment discourse and capitalist notions of economic growth, and this Eurocentric development brought together modernisation and industrialisation (Preston, 1996). It assumes that progress equals economic growth which necessarily involves technological sophistication, urbanisation and high levels of consumption. Further, as knowledge is socially constructed and thus inextricably linked to power (Foucault, 1972, 1980; Hindess, 1996), the assumptions of Eurocentric development continue to marginalise indigenous peoples and their knowledge.

The early modernist narrative already given provides the cognitive-historical background of the formation of Reformist/Modernist Muhammadiyah and the Traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama being studied in Indonesia, including the splinter groups that followed, such as Hidayatullah and Qahhar’s

49 A theory of development that has been critical of the modernisation theory which held that all societies progress through similar stages of development from a Eurocentric perspective

50 It was influenced by Marxist concepts of inherent inequality in capitalism and understands underdevelopment as rooted in political structures and power relations (Preston, 1996).
movement that have used Islam as a political ideology. In the next discussion, I will present the reconstruction of knowledge espoused by Seyyed Hossein Nasr to provide a philosophical exposition of the cognitive transformation needed towards sustainability-literacy that the thesis seeks to articulate. This will be followed by the Ijmali ideas, to substantiate the call for reopening the gates of *ijtihađ*\(^\text{51}\) that the thesis also attempts to call for; a subject that has been common parlance among Muslim scholars world over, including those in Indonesia. With regard to *ijtihađ*, Nasr warns that opinion in Islamic law cannot be practised by “a mind that has been transformed by the tenets of modernism” (Nasr, 2001:193). *Ijtihađ* requires both profound critical attitudes toward the modern world combined with a deep understanding of this world.

**Nasr’s Reconstruction of Knowledge**

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, the prominent contemporary representative of traditionalist Islam, is known to be very critical of the uncritical assimilation of Islam and modernity that both modernists and fundamentalists advocate. He considers their *apologetic* turn since the late nineteenth century to have gradually nurtured a certain type of Muslim religious thinker “who had already unconsciously lost the intellectual battle to modernism and the West, and was now seeking only to defend his faith by showing that somehow practically every fashionable thought of the time had been Islamic before being adopted by the West” (Nasr, 2001:133-4). He criticised the *Salafi*’s attempts to “purify” Islam by returning to the sources of the religion, yet throwing away the later development of the Islamic traditions. This included Islamic philosophy and much of the rest of the Islamic intellectual tradition besides artistic traditions, and also their rejection of Sufism and the mystical life in their positive emphasis upon the *Shariah* (Nasr, 2001:134-5).

Regarding Western science and technology, Nasr criticises modernists and fundamentalists for what they both regard as an act of repossession under the argument that Western science and technology depends on knowledge that was originally acquired, mainly via Spain, from the Muslim world. Thus, when Muslims utilise Western technology, in fact they repossess what was originally theirs. He is especially critical of Muslim attempts to appropriate Western concepts and philosophical trends while neglecting Islamic metaphysics. According to him, the process of reconstruction of knowledge must begin with Muslim’s awareness that modern science is not identical with *‘ilm*, knowledge, that the Quran exhorts the believers to seek, and that Prophet Muhammad instructed his followers to seek from “cradle to the grave” (in a Hadith). Nasr contends

\(^{51}\) *Ijtihađ* is literally the intellectual effort of trained Islamic scholars to arrive at legal rulings not covered in the sacred sources. In the 10th century the point was reached when the scholars of all schools felt that all essential questions had been thoroughly discussed and finally settled. Henceforth, the gates of *ijtihađ* were closed.
that Muslims must realise that modern science is the most anthropocentric form of knowledge possible since it makes human reason and empirical data the sole criteria for the validity of all knowledge (1975). According to him, the character of modern science and Islamic science are diametrically opposed to each other: Western science denies the One and denies the relevance of the Transcendence (Nasr, 1989, 1993, 2007). By denying different orders of reality, the natural and social sciences exclude all other possibilities of knowing and destroy the sacred and metaphysical foundations of knowledge. Therefore, Nasr reminded modernists and fundamentalists alike that the nature and character of Islamic science are entirely different from those of modern science. In Nasr’s language, Islamic sciences have a ‘centre’ and modern sciences have no centre.

Besides philosophy and mysticism, environmental issues are one of Nasr’s major interests. His profound criticism of modernity and Western science and technology was made against the background of the destruction they have brought to the natural environment; the creation of a world which makes the ‘real appear illusory and the illusory real’ and a civilisation which has no meaning other than moving at accelerated speed. In response to Iqbal’s idea of progress mentioned earlier, and Iqbal’s attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam’s conception of God, time and space with Hegelian and Bergsonian conceptions, Nasr commented that secularism and evolutionism, in fact, represent the greatest philosophical threat (Nasr, 1993). That is because they have been appropriated by Muslim intellectuals such as Iqbal without realising that scientism extends the claims of evolutionism into the social realm, where it leads humans to forget God since it suggests that humans can become perfect solely by the processes of evolution and ‘progress’. Nasr is a student of the transcendental school of Mulla Sadra, Islamic Gnosticism Irfan, and Sufism. He once commented (2007) that the doctrine of substantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah) of Mulla Sadra, the 17th century Persian philosopher, can explain the theory of evolution without bringing in Darwinian ideas which exclude the role of God’s hand in evolutionary changes. Further, he denounced Iqbal for his attempt to synthesise the Sufi concept of al-insan al-kamil (the Perfect Man) with the Nietzschean concept of the Uberman, ideas that Nasr claims are the antipodes of one another.

52 “If you really master the doctrine of substantial motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah) of Mulla Sadra, the great seventeenth century Persian Islamic philosopher, you can explain a theory of evolution without being Darwinian evolutionist. You can believe in both the archetypal realities in God’s Knowledge that are reflected in the temporal flow and the constant flow and motion of the substance of the material world which bears the imprints of those archetypes. When I was studying Islamic philosophy in Persia, I studied just this one idea of Mulla Sadra for a whole year: the trans-substantial movement in the cosmos. How can God know this flow? Will this not introduce change in God’s knowledge? We studied just that one idea for months. This is, needless to say, a complicated issue; it is not for children. We have few people in the Islamic world who can understand such deep theological and philosophical ideas and are at the same time, good biologists and physicists, and that is a tragedy” (Nasr, 2007, p166).
On the other hand, Nasr recognised re-enchantment currents within modernity towards Romanticism, and argues that without the revival of philosophy and metaphysics in the true sense, they will not be able to overcome the de-sacralisation of knowledge. Therefore, for him, reconstruction of knowledge must once again turn to the concept of Tawhid in its metaphysical perspective (rather than its theological notion), to reveal the underlying unity and interrelatedness of all that exists and rediscover the primordial bond between God and humanity that has been severed. In all his writings, Nasr restated the concept of man as abd and khalifah of God in Islam. In the The Need for a Sacred Science (2004), he examined the fallacy of the Western linear conception of time, history and progress. He expounds elaborately time and human progress from a scientia sacra perspective. Herein he explains relations between time and Eternity, cyclical time in Oriental religions, and linear time “which came to the fore in Western philosophy and science as a result of a complex set of factors related to the secularization of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation as well as certain other philosophical and scientific ideas” (p.31). Since Descartes, purely quantitative conception of time and space came into being as defined mathematically by the \(x, y, z\) Cartesian coordinates to which \(t\) (time) is added. Henceforth, the nexus between the phenomenal world and higher level of existence was ruptured. Nasr explicates further the relation between a linear concept of time in the West and the idea of human progress through material evolution. The conquest of Asia, Africa and the New World not only have brought great wealth into Europe but also confidence in humans’ ability to conquer the world and to remold it. This success was due to the secularisation of humans and in turn hastened the process of secularisation and this-worldliness by encouraging human beings to devote all their energies to worldly activities as the hereafter became a more and more distant concept or belief rather than an immediate reality.

Henceforth, the idea of perfection and progress of the soul toward its upward, vertical dimension towards God (see ‘progressive perfection and transformation of the self toward the Self, in science of the soul in Sufism, in section 2.2.2) was transferred to a purely this-worldly and temporal progress. As an advocate for perennial philosophy, Nasr’s substantive critique of scientism and modernity is not meant solely for the benefit of Muslims but is a general defense of the

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Tawhid is the core of Islamic beliefs. Muslim theologians and Sufis from the early period were concerned with the meaning of tawhid, since it stands at the heart of Islamic revelations. Theologians tend to define it as Unity of the Godhead, while the Sufis interpret it as the principal Unity of all domains of reality and the subservience of all things in the Divine principle. From the tawhid perspective, Islam views religion not as a single instance of Divine guidance but all the revelations sent through the 124,000 prophets mentioned in traditional Islamic sources to the people of all ages and nations, of which the last in the present cycle of humanity is Muhammad. Jesus is one of the major prophets of Islam. Prophet Muhammad himself claimed not to have brought anything new but to have re-stated the Truth claimed by all the previous prophets and to have re-established the primordial tradition (al-din-al-hanif) which is the Truth lying within the nature of things.

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traditional conception of the Sacred. In his *Knowledge and the Sacred*, he chronicled the gradual process of desacralisation of knowledge that originated in the West by pointing to the history of Christianity. According to him, since the beginning, Christianity expanded in a world already suffering from rationalism and naturalism which “had stifled the spirit and hardened the heart as the seat of intelligence, dividing reason from its ontological root” (1989:35). It, therefore:

had to present itself as a way of love which had to sweep aside completely all the “ways of knowing” that lay before it, not distinguishing in its general theological formulations between intellection and ratiocination and preferring quite rightly a true theology and a false cosmology to a false theology and a true cosmology. ... All knowledge appeared to a large number of Christian theologians as “pride of intelligence” and a climate was created which, from early days, was not completely favorable to the sapiential perspective... . As a result, the mainstream of Christian theology, especially after the early centuries, insisted upon the *credo ut intelligam*, a formula later identified with Saint Anselm, while limiting the function of intellection to that of a handmaid of faith rather than the means of sanctification, which of course would not exclude the element of faith. (Nasr, 1989:35-6)

Nasr has made a nuanced and notional understanding of the words ‘to know’ and ‘knowledge’ that may easily be taken for granted. From his point of view, ‘knowledge’ extends in hierarchy from an empirical and rational mode of knowing to the highest form of knowledge, that is, the ‘unitive knowledge’ (Nasr, 1989), or *al-ma’rifah* previously given in section 2.2.1. Correspondingly, ‘to know’ extends from ratiocination to intellection. Nasr believes a new kind of scholar is needed to lead the Muslims into the future, scholars who know traditional Islam and the Western world in depth. Zaidi (2006) contrasted Nasr’s re-sacralisation of knowledge, which is a reversal of the process of rationalisation, with Weber’s *Entzauberundprozess*. He quoted Nasr’s statement: “Certainly my goal is to move in the opposite direction than what Max Weber called the *Entzauberundprozess*” (Nasr, 2001:274).

Since the 1960s, Nasr has been a prolific writer on environmental issues as much as in Islamic philosophy. For him, environmental crisis has deep spiritual, philosophical and religious roots and causes: it involves both the natural world as well as the microcosm within humans, and between these dimensions there are integral links. Therefore, although he recognises the role of science and technology in the making of the crisis, he does not see it as merely the result of bad engineering and faulty economic planning. Rather, it is a matter of modern technology in combination with the new image of man that has developed in the West since the Renaissance which he called the ‘promethean man’, the man who then carried out the industrial revolution:

As soon as the concept of nature changed and nature became a secularized mass, just an “it”, and what I have elsewhere called “Promethean man” was born, there was bound to be this destruction. ... After that change, man no longer felt any responsibility for nature.
Nature served only as a source of materials; it could be dominated and used for whatever purpose and in whichever way without having any rights of its own. (Nasr, 2007:125)

He exhorts us to be aware of the sternness of the crisis and rejected the ideas that the environmental crisis today is just another one that humankind has once had in the history.

Not that there was no contention or strife between man and nature before, not that ten thousand years ago when man was becoming agricultural, that shift had no impact on the natural environment, but such shifts did not create a crisis for there was a remarkable ecological harmony which continued. Had there been a crisis of the dimension we have now at that time, it is most likely that we would not even exist today (Nasr, 2007:120).

In response, Muzaffar Iqbal, another Muslim scholar, asserts that Nasr’s position on environmental crisis is impossible for Western sensibilities:

I say this because you are suggesting a fundamental shift in our view of God and nature and that, I think, may be very difficult for the general populace in the West. It may be asking too much from a non-Muslim to change his or her views about God and His relationship with humanity and nature. What you were saying about the nature of the change that took place in the West during the Renaissance is, after all, a significant historical development that has affected the course of Western civilization to such an extent that to ask for such a radical change- the kind of change you are suggesting- is to ask for a total re-orientation of the belief system – from a homocentric to a theomorphic, and that may be too much” (Iqbal in Nasr, 2007:132)

This is why Iqbal thinks that it may be easier for the Muslim world to recognise the roots of the environmental crisis for it would not involve such a huge step for the Muslims.

Muslims already have a certain set of beliefs which they partially apply in their lives – for instance, not eating pork – and perhaps it is easier for them to take the next step and understand that the natural environment is sacred and has rights upon them, just as they respect laws regarding eating, they can admit that there are certain laws regarding the natural world as well and respect them (Iqbal in Nasr, 2007:129)

To such a comment, Nasr added that not only are there explicit commands in the Quran and Hadith about the treatment of God’s creation but also in almost all languages spoken in the Muslim world there is a very rich tradition of the love of nature, in poetry and in aphorisms which deal with the subject. Then there are the works of Muslim philosophers and Sufis on the philosophy of nature. Therefore, Muslims have to resuscitate this tradition which has only recently been partially forgotten. Nasr agrees that this heritage can be revived much more easily for the Muslims than the Western tradition for contemporary Westerners. But Muslim governments, he added, do not want to pay attention to this matter, even when they are paying lip service to Islam, because they want to become masters of modern technology as fast as possible for political, military and economic reasons (Nasr, 2007:134).
Finally, Nasr points out the deep philosophical issues underlying the great paradox of the modern world. That is, “modern Western science emphasizes the continuity while modern Western culture emphasizes discontinuity” (Nasr, 2007:171) so much as to enable modern man to destroy much of the rest of creation in the name of human welfare. He asserts that Muslims have tremendous responsibility because Islam is one of the very few civilisations left in the world which is non-Western and which also has a vast scientific and intellectual tradition, and which can provide alternatives (Nasr, 2011). Otherwise, “where shall we be going?, we are going to evolve ourselves into non-existence” (Nasr, 2007:52).

**Sardar’s Reopen the Gates of ijtihad**

Together with Pervez Manzoor\(^5\), Ziauddin Sardar advocates an *ijmali* (from *ijma*’, social consensus and *jaml*, beauty/wholeness) approach that seeks to synthesise ‘pure knowledge’ with ‘moral knowledge’. Its guiding principles are social consensus (*ijma*), trusteeship (*khilafah*), public welfare (*istilah*) and justice (*adl*). Sardar (1984, 1985, 1987, 1989, 2011) shares the following in common with Nasr:

1. He wants to end what he calls the West’s epistemological imperialism by revitalising Islamic thought. He also holds that Western science has mistakenly and dangerously separated ethics and morality from its epistemology (Sardar, 1985).
2. He shares their concern to Islamise knowledge and argues very strongly that the Muslim world must develop its own paradigm as an alternative to that of the West which cannot meet the needs of Muslims.
3. He argues that the world needs epistemological pluralism where different cultures work out ‘their own way of being, doing and knowing’, construct ‘their own science and technologies’ and undertake ‘their own civilisational projects’, instead of copying the West (Sardar, 1989: 7). He is convinced that no civilisation can retain its vitality if it does not possess its own science. He denounced the claim of Western science to be neutral and value-free. Rather, it is profoundly secular and deeply rooted in Western free-market values, which are both alien to Islam (1989:48)
4. He also shares with Nasr in advocating “system thinking” and criticising compartmentalisation of knowledge, “since neither nature nor human activities are divided into watertight compartments marked “sociology”, “psychology” (1989:99).

According to Sardar, sciences in the Muslim world today are sciences that have been imported from the West. Such science fails to meet the needs of Muslim countries because it originates from a worldview that has divorced enquiry from such core values as justice and humanity’s trusteeship of nature, which are the central plank of Islamic beliefs and essential to the pursuit of science in the Muslim world. He continued with what happens when Muslim scientists are unable to incorporate Islamic values into their work: they “suffer acute schizophrenia” (1989:24) trapped between their

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\(^5\) Who will appear in the discussion of “the **Sages**” view of ecological crisis in section 4.2.2 (Manzoor, 1984), and section 4.4 (Manzoor, 1988).
operational and non-operational knowledge. By operational knowledge, he refers to technical know-how such as engineering, and by non-operational knowledge he refers to their value system. By this account, Sardar implored the Muslims to be aware of the clash between the Islamic knowledge system whereby there is moral, cognitive and interpretive unity, and the modern system of thought. Also, he articulated the correspondence between values and knowledge in a symbolic universe discussed in section 2.2.1.

Therefore, Sardar criticised al-Faruqi (1981, 1988, 1992) for his synthesis between the best that Western science can offer and Islamic values, because such synthesis would fail to produce a viable methodology to enable this. Even Faruqi’s principle of equating knowledge and truth, according to him, is unhelpful to the project of developing a pragmatic epistemology. Sardar also criticised Nasr’s Gnostic approach. It seems to be attributable to his lack of a grasp of Nasr’s metaphysical conception of knowledge and of knowing already elucidated. In his most recent work, though, he seemed to correct this position as he began to appreciate the “mystical quest for understanding the Absolute” (Sardar, 2011:374-5). Like Nasr, Sardar (1987) agrees that Islam must not be reduced to an ideology, which Nasr says, is a “Western concept” (Nasr, 1990:306). He (Sardar, 1985) describes “ideology as the antithesis of Islam, an enterprise of suppression and not a force for liberation”. “Ideology” he says, “closes down thought and analysis” and “ensures that mistakes and errors are perpetuated”, while Islam “requires an open attitude” (pp.81-2). What distinguishes Sardar from other thinkers is his insistence for revival of *ijtihad*. With the “closing of the gates” of *ijtihad*, Islamic science truly became a matter of history” (1989:18). In sum, the following chart illustrates how Sardar (1989) views Islamic science and Western science. He often claims that Islamic science will treat the environment with more respect than Western science, exercising stewardship as a divine duty.

Sardar (1987) argues the gates were probably closed to prevent unqualified people from misusing this.
Table 4 Western and Islamic Science

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western science</th>
<th>Islamic science</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puts its faith in rationality</td>
<td>Places its faith in revelation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values science for the sake of science</td>
<td>Sees science as a form of worship which has a spiritual and moral function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posits one all-powerful method as the only way of knowing reality</td>
<td>Uses many methods based on reason as well as revelation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims impartiality – to be value-free; a scientist is not responsible for the use of which his/her work is put</td>
<td>Claims partiality – towards the truth; consequences must be morally good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims the absence of bias</td>
<td>Admits the presence of subjectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduces the world to what can be empirically verified</td>
<td>Admits the reality of the spiritual dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is fragmented into disciplines</td>
<td>Values synthesis, is multi-disciplinary but holistic in its approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4.2 Critics of ‘Reconstruction of Knowledge’

To get a complete picture of Muslim scholars we need to recognise that the onslaught of rationalisation has made modernity appear as a largely normative account possessing right or wrong moral judgments for a sizeable portion of the population (Featherstone, 1991:6). Yet, it is a worldview that marginalises religiously inspired worldviews by “depriving knowledge of its teleological and sacred qualities” (Zaidi, 2006). Along this line of argument one can expect there would be pro-modernity thinkers among Muslim scholars towards ‘reconstruction of knowledge’, besides not all Muslim scholars comprehend the philosophical problems that reconstruction aims to rectify. Zaidi (2006) presents the critics of the literature on reconstruction among others as Bassam Tibbi, Oliver Roy, Mona Abaza, and Georg Stauth. Roy (1994) and Tibi (1995) argue that the literature of reconstruction simply represents an ideological reaction to Western economics and political dominance, and ‘an encroachment of religious fundamentalism into academia’. Zaidi (2006) also presents a defender of reconstruction, Pieterse (1996), who argues the ideological charge to reconstruction of knowledge discourse is rather meaningless and engages in “the all too familiar tropes of Orientalist scholarship which serves only to reassure ‘us’ moderns that obscurantism lurks on the ‘other’ side” (Zaidi, 2006:80). For Zaidi, such an attitude can be seen as “post-Enlightenment reflex of ideology critique, which threatens always to impose itself before the Other” (Zaidi, 2006: 81).

At the heart of Abaza and Stauth’s persistent criticism of reconstruction is what they see as the unawareness of the protagonists that they are part of a global cultural system that itself calls for the essentialisation of local truths, which, they believe, has taken place already through Orientalist
discourses. They see a problem in the ‘going native’ of the natives themselves. Abaza further questions the authenticity of reconstruction, and accused Nasr as being an “Orientalized Oriental” because he draws upon the work of Henry Corbin. On that, Zaidi shows the fallacy of Abaza’s argument. For him, the ‘going native’ of the native should not be a problem in view of the truth in “the role of the Other in constituting the Self” - especially as Nasr has been quite open in acknowledging the influence on his thought of Western sources that are critical of modernity. Elsewhere, in his more recent writing, Stauth (2002) put his hope in the possibility of “new methodologies in the cultural sciences”. He, however, still doubted that the protagonists can contribute to such new methodology since they critique an outdated model of positivistic science that does not account for a hermeneutically informed model of science. This is relevant to this thesis methodology that adopts a constructivist-interpretivist approach with an understanding that culture, context and history are fundamental aspects of human cognition, and that there is a link between cognition, meaning and action.

In the social sciences domain, a self-critique of reconstruction was made by Farid Alatas (1993). He first outlined the definitions of Islamisation of knowledge and Islamic science as understood by three Muslim scholars: Nasr, Al-Faruqi and Naquib al-Attas. To Alatas, Nasr’s notion of Islamised knowledge is best captured by the expression *scientia sacra* or sacred knowledge. This refers to knowledge that “lies at the heart of every revelation and is the center of that circle which encompasses and defines tradition” (Nasr, 1989:130). The eclipse of sacred knowledge in the modern world already given, causes a need for a science which can “relate the various levels of knowledge once again to the sacred” (Nasr, 2004:173). Further, what defines Islamic science as Islamic, for Nasr (1980), is (1) its ‘paradigm’ which is based on the Islamic worldview, and (2) the minds and eyes of the scientists are Muslim minds and eyes transformed by the spirit and form of the Quran. Al-Faruqi, on the other hand, called upon Muslim scholars to recast every discipline in modern knowledge “so as to embody the principles of Islam in its methodology, in its strategy, in what it regards as its data, its problems, its objectives, and its aspirations” (Al-Faruqi, 1988:16). Each discipline must be remolded along a triple axis that constitutes the concept of *tawhid* (unity), that is: unity of knowledge; of life; and of history. Unlike Nasr whose notion of Islamised knowledge transcends the religious boundaries towards *scientia sacra*, which is a transcendent unity of religions, Islamisation of knowledge for Al-Faruqi serves the cause of Islam (Al-Faruqi, 1988). The third scholar, Al-Attas, like Nasr, was concerned firstly with the effects of Westernisation on Muslims’ ‘minds and eyes’ (Al-Attas, 1978:130-1). Al-Attas posited that Islamisation of knowledge requires a liberation of knowledge from interpretations based on secular ideology. Especially, the isolation of the elements and key concepts in human sciences that constitute Western culture and
civilisation, such as: (1) “the dualistic vision of reality and truth, locked in despairing combat” (Al-Attas 1978:135); (2) the denial of absolute values and affirmation of relative values, as reflected in: “nothing can be certain, except the certainty that nothing can be certain” (p.136); and (3) the ‘drama and tragedy of unattainment’ held in the West as universal human nature and existence (pp.136-7, 155)\(^5\). Once knowledge is freed from these elements, it becomes ‘true knowledge’, that is, in harmony with the essential nature (fitra) of human, and thereby, Islamic.

Farid Alatas (1995:97-99) detailed his critiques of reconstruction apropos social sciences. The most relevant to the thesis is as follows. He pointed out that the call for Islamisation of knowledge goes beyond the assertion that science is value-laden. “The proponents do not refer to merely the value content of social scientific research activities, but to the very principles, methods, theories, and concepts in the social sciences that are to be Islamized”. The question is, what are the ways that a discipline of social sciences is defined by Islam and takes on an Islamic character? Is it that the discipline is to be defined by Islamic metaphysics and epistemology? If so, will that be adequate if the affirmations of Islamic philosophy are also common to many philosophical systems?

The three points of liberation of Al-Attas are in correspondence with my position in the thesis. To enumerate, they are, (1) my assumptions of the universal nature of humanity, (fitra) in which the primordial bond between humans and God is recognised, thus, humans and society are not just a struggle for economic gain and power; (2) my viewpoint that knowledge of certainty is possible, and therein is human’s felicity; (3) my cautious stance to normative judgment (drawn from my belief of God as the Ultimate Reality - a liberation from a dualistic vision of reality) with regard to any historical instances the research is concerned - which may appear to readers as suggesting nothing is right and nothing really wrong; (4) finally, my sociological framework that legitimates truth claims within any religion, and the claims are not necessarily related to one another. Therefore, through the methodology and theoretical framework, I intend to undertake Islamisation of sociology for my own project – an attempt that can be offered particularly to respond to Alatas’ questions aforementioned.

2.4.3 Is reconstruction of knowledge an issue in Indonesia?

Bennett (2005) divided Muslim thinkers into two broad ‘categories’: ‘Left’ and ‘Right’. The ‘Right’ are the Islamists who want to Islamise the world, while the ‘Left’ want to humanise Islam. The ‘Right’ sees Islam as a political religious entity and an ideology, while for the ‘Left’ Islam is a faith, a spiritual

\(^5\) For him the spirit of Western culture and civilisation is quite rightly depicted by the drama of Promethean and Camusian Sisyphus, which are alien to Islam.
and ethical tradition. The ‘Right’ looks to the past for perfection, thus, language such as ‘return’, ‘awaken’ and ‘reawaken’, and ‘renewal’ (tajdid) is typical of the Islamist movement, whereas, the ‘Left’ looks toward the future, thus, the modernists and progressives speak of reconstructing (Iqbal, 1930) or of rethinking Islam (Arkoun, 1934). According to Bennett, Tibi, Arkoun, Mernissi, Rahman and Soroush are on the ‘Left’, while the proponents of reconstruction of knowledge, Nasr, the Ijmali group, and al-Faruqi, are on the ‘Right’ (p.107). Apparently, Bennett’s categorisation does not always help. As already given, the protagonists of reconstruction of knowledge are the staunch critics of those who made Islam a political ideology. Moreover, Nasr is a prominent scholar in Islamic mysticism and perennial philosophy; and Sardar, instead of looking to the past, calls for Muslims to plan and work toward a vibrant future (2006), and calls for reopening the gate of ijtihad otherwise Islamic science remains a matter of history (1989).

As for Indonesia, I argue, given the strong colonial overtone of modern education in the Third World, the incompatibility of modern and Islamic systems of thought has been understudied. Except for the debate among the Muhammadiyah thinkers compiled by Fuad (2004) and the enduring contention between the Islamic education system and the imposition of national curricula such as outlined in Zuhdi (2006), the problems engendered by the incongruent two systems of thought have not been academically examined and documented. My fieldwork findings, however, will show that the protagonists of reconstruction such as Nasr, Sardar, and al-Faruqi perceive the reality of the Muslims in the grass roots more intuitively than the scholars on the ‘Left’ who dismissed reconstruction of knowledge literature.

2.5 Conclusion
This chapter develops an integrated framework to articulate the relationship between (a) knowledge, (b) meaning, and (c) action. Each one emerged as having two dimensions, philosophical and sociological.

1) The ‘philosophical knowledge’, which spiritual realm is part of, is concerned with cognition and representation. It is further classified into i) knowledge-by-correspondence (ilm husuli) and (ii) knowledge-by-presence (ilm huduri).

2) The ‘Sociological knowledge’ or social knowledge, on the other hand, is not a cognitive mental construction, which is achieved by progressively detaching one’s self from emotional, social and cultural links, as Jovchelovitch (2007:137) puts it. In this sense, Berger and Luckmann’s (1991) ‘social construction of reality’ is in agreement with Jovchelovitch’s (2007) ‘knowledge in context’. Both argues there are social, historical, and cultural contexts of human cognition, and that there is intersubjective architecture of the representations that produce knowledge. Therefore, unlike ‘philosophical knowledge’, sociological knowledge is a plastic phenomenon depending on ‘who’, ‘how’, ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘what for’ of the representation process.
Following that train of argument, there are, accordingly, two dimensions of meaning. I call them (1) ‘philosophical meaning’, in which spiritual is being part of, and (2) ‘sociological meaning’ derived from social interactions, which is none other than the symbolic interactionism premise of meaning.

Further, there are two dimensions of action. I call them (1) ‘philosophical action’, in which spiritual is being part of, and (2) ‘sociological action’ derived from social interactions.

There are also two dimensions of reality: (1) ‘philosophical reality’ and (2) ‘sociological reality’. ‘Philosophical reality’ comprises ‘reality’ understood in Occidental philosophy, and the different concept in Oriental philosophy of which ‘spiritual reality’ is part. ‘Sociological reality’ is, in fact, what Berger and Luckmann expounds in their ‘Social Construction of Reality’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5 Philosophical and Sociological Knowledge, Meaning, Action, Reality</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophical</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Knowledge by correspondence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ii) Knowledge by presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Intrinsic meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Psychological meaning</td>
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<tr>
<td>iii) Spiritual meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Philosophical action (including spiritual action, such as love)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) Reality in Occidental philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii) Reality in Oriental Philosophy (including spiritual reality)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It stands to these arguments that Berger and Luckmann’s sociological approach to religion as a symbolic universe, a sacred canopy, is not adequate to explain religious actions by the adherents. Therefore, religion must be singled out from secular symbolic universes such as nationalism and ‘westernism’. While the premise of a symbolic universe, to a large extent, is sufficient in explaining the exoteric dimension of Islam, Berger and Luckmann’s sociological approach to religion is not capable of fully understanding the ‘voluntaristic’ nature of religious actions without including the esoteric dimension, namely (1) spiritual knowledge, (2) spiritual meaning, and (3) spiritual action.

Further, it has been explicated that not only a different symbolic universe implies a different centre of allegiance, but each one also has a history, cognitive and social dimensions, as well as meaning-bestowing capacity. Therefore, a number of points come out as inferences.
1. Every religion, which necessarily has its own history, sacred books, individual prophets, and prophets’ traditions, gives rise to a different system of thought and different language (of thought).

2. Therefore, one cannot possibly use one religion as a standard to measure the truth and falsity of the other.

3. Finally, a more extensive conclusion can be made here. If rationality is the quality of being in possession of reason, which implies the conformity of one’s belief with one’s reasons to believe, or, conformity of one’s action with one’s reasons for action, it is no exaggeration to conclude that there cannot be, -or hardly be-, universal rationality under different symbolic universes. The issues behind Muslim’s reconstruction of knowledge proves this proposition. Thereby, dialogue and communication between knowledge systems - such as between modern thought and Islam, is a very complex and difficult task, some even doubt if this kind of task is possible at all.57

4. Only in mysticism - which speaks of the unity of subject and object, and hence, is not concerned so much with form and multiplicity – is it possible to converse about ‘universal truth’.

Moreover, Muslim reconstruction of knowledge debates seems to prove what Jovchelovitch holds about the “incommunicability of worldviews” (2006:109-112) that exist in the ‘communication with the knowledge of others’. Consequently, Muslims’ reconstruction of knowledge project that attempts to seek dialogue between Islam and modernity, and to address the possibility of epistemological pluralism that exists in a world characterised at once by homogeneity and heterogeneity, needs to be understood in a hermeneutic-dialogical manner (Zaidi, 2006). Herein I concur with Nasr that no easy synthesis between Islam and Western civilisation is possible, and with Zaidi, that at best a transformative understanding can be attempted for a fruitful dialogue to occur. By employing Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge, and the constructivist-interpretivist approach of qualitative research methods, I, therefore, aim for my thesis to contribute to those.

Berger’s (1967) ‘sacred canopy’ provides a theoretical framework to appreciate the so-called ‘unified systemic worldview’ that has been widely referred to in the sustainable community development literature. A unified systemic worldview is the concept of an epistemic and moral community in pre-modern civilisations in which there was moral, cognitive and interpretive unity, and therefore meaning resided in axiomatically shared and publicly inscribed beliefs and understandings. From this perspective, colonialism appeared as an aggressive attempt to shatter unified systemic epistemologies and de-divinise the world in the quest for ‘universal rationality’.

Running counter to Orientalism that makes the orient as merely an object of power and knowledge of the occident, and hence, being different from the West is a problem, this thesis aims to argue that non western communities have world views with equal right to consideration.

Among others, Needham (1972) argued that once individuals step outside their own representations, language, and culture, all that remain are senseless forms (Jovchelovitch 2006:112).
Differences are beauty, and hence need to be celebrated. Using the symbolic universe premise in explaining Muslims’ voluntaristic actions, I demonstrate that understanding an Islamic symbolic universe whose centre is the Quran and the Sunna is imperative to understand Muslim thoughts and actions. It also suggests that *homo islamicus* of the Orientalist might not be a myth. The *homo islamicus*, in this thesis is the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ – though it is important to stress that these are descriptive categories, not value judgments. They are the leaders and active members of Muslim groups. Under the proposal of Berger and Luckmann (1991) that social change must be understood as standing in a dialectical relationship to the history of ideas, and of symbolic interactionism’s tenet that meanings are socially constructed through interactions, my framework corresponds with the theory that sees religion as civilisation ‘with a great variety of local cultures’ (Sardar, 1996; Tibi, 1998:6). This view is able to shed light on the emergence of a reformist movement in the 19th century and transnational Islam today, as sub-universes under the Islamic symbolic universe.

Furthermore, while, the symbolic universe that encompasses cognitive, normative and affective components, besides dictating allegiance, is able to explain enduring contentions between Indonesian Muslims and secular-nationalists, and contentions between Muslims’ thoughts and modern-Western thoughts, Foucault (1972, 1980) accentuates further the discourse-power relations that the research fieldwork in Chapter 7 found applicable to the cases of Indonesian modernist Muslims.

Finally, the symbolic universe framework implies epistemological pluralism, which seems to be the opposite of the ‘whole earth one world family vision’ of the environmentalists. How this ironic twist can be overcome is to be found in the fieldwork.

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58 A fundamentally distinctive Islamic man in Orientalist Rodinson (1980).
Chapter 3

Methods

One day a fisherman was lying on a beautiful beach with his fishing pole propped up in the sand and his solitary line cast out into the sparkling blue surf. He was enjoying the warmth of the afternoon sun and the prospect of catching a fish.

About that time, a businessman came walking down the beach trying to relieve some of the stress of his workday. He noticed the fisherman sitting on the beach and decided to find out why this fisherman was fishing instead of working harder to make a living for himself and his family.

"You aren’t going to catch many fish that way," said the businessman to the fisherman, "you should be working rather than lying on the beach!"

The fisherman looked up at the businessman, smiled and replied, "And what will my reward be?"

"Well, you can get bigger nets and catch more fish!" was the businessman’s answer.

"And then what will my reward be?" asked the fisherman, still smiling.

The businessman replied, "You will make money and you’ll be able to buy a boat which will then result in larger catches of fish!"

"And then what will my reward be?" asked the fisherman again.

The businessman was beginning to get a little irritated with the fisherman’s questions.

"You can buy a bigger boat and hire some people to work for you!" he said.

"And then what will my reward be?" repeated the fisherman.

The businessman was getting angry. "Don’t you understand? You can build up a fleet of fishing boats, sail all over the world, and let all your employees catch fish for you!"

Once again the fisherman asked, "And then what will my reward be?"

The businessman was red with rage and shouted at the fisherman, "Don’t you understand that you can become so rich that you will never have to work for your living again! You can spend all the rest of your days sitting on this beach looking at the sunset. You won’t have a care in the world!"

The fisherman, still smiling, simply looked up, nodded and said: "And what do you think I am doing now?"
3.1 Introduction

This research is a sociological study of the Indonesian Muslim communities in relation to the socio-ecological crisis in the country. The research intends to study their responses to the Islamic worldview, laws, ethics, values and norms, given the subject matter of sociology of knowledge already given (see Chapter 2). The social interests, conflict and competing symbolic universes between religion and secular ideologies such as nationalism and ‘westernism’ are recognized, the research needs to consider social interactions between Muslims and the state. Accordingly, while these Muslims are treated in this study as part of the *Ummah* (global Muslim community) their context as Indonesian citizens is also examined. Thus, their symbolic universes are of central importance.

Chapter 1 presents my background, hence, my “paradigm” as “the basic belief system or worldview that guides the investigator, not only in choices of method but in ontologically and epistemologically fundamental ways” (Guba and Lincoln, 1994:105). While it was clearly stated in Chapter 1 that given the sternness of the intertwining social and ecological problem, I adopted a pragmatic approach in seeking a solution, nevertheless, in Chapter 2 I problematised the metaphysical assumptions undergirding the conventional paradigm in social science. Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework that I believe is able to nurture a dialogue and understanding between different, or radically different, traditions and communities between Muslims’ and the secular West’s. Thereby, the thesis engages in postmodernism, in the sense of a mode of interrogation that seeks to problematise the epistemological assumptions and notions of rationality which characterise much of social science. Assuming the task of postmodern social theory: to act as a ‘translation service’ within an interpretive framework (Bauman, 1988; Smart, 1996:423-4), I aim to gain detailed insight regarding the situation of Muslims in general (for the Islamic symbolic universe signifies the *Ummah*, global Muslim community), and the Indonesian Muslim groups in particular, so as to answer the question “why are these people acting the way they do?”. Therefore, qualitative method with a constructivist-interpretivist approach was considered the most appropriate design for the research. By Creswell (1998)’s definition, the research paradigm falls under ‘pragmatism’ as well, for pragmatism is concerned with applications: ‘what works’, and solutions to problems.

Taken together, pragmatism combined with constructivist-interpretivist paradigms in a postmodern research of Muslim groups, on the stern and complex social and environmental problems, must necessarily allow ‘the other’ to speak freely, and different value positions to emerge without being moderated. For this, the parable in the heading of the chapter serves two purposes. One, it articulates that fundamental and universal human needs encompass physical, psychological,
social and spiritual well-beings - and happiness is all that matters since happiness is what everyone strives for. More to the point of the research problem, happiness does not necessarily require modernity and developmentalism. Two, in this research the people involved are analyzed and the outcomes of their community-development undertakings are evaluated in the way that -to a certain extent- was portrayed by the parable. That is, the people have been listened to and the research reflects entrance into their worldview and exploration of ‘what works’. Such capacity to suspend convictions, interests, and prejudices and ultimately to put into parentheses the researcher’s agenda in order to listen to the research subjects, is what is needed as the requirement to map out and uncover local social knowledge that is usually undermined by modern presumptions dominant among the social researchers.

This chapter details the methodology design used to explore the ways, and to what extent, Muslim organizations in Indonesia are able to advance ‘relocalization’ for their community members to respond to peak oil and climate change challenges, and to mitigate poverty and create socially and environmentally sustainable Muslim communities, and advocate changes in members’ daily lives. Further inquiry to be sought is about overcoming the ironic twist identified in Chapter 2 between on the one hand, the persistence of symbolic universes which implies plurality of knowledge; and on the other, the ‘whole earth one world family vision of the environmentalists’ to which plurality of knowledge is a challenge.

The first part of this chapter addresses the scoping fieldwork used in this research to identify all the forms of the Indonesian Muslim organization. The subsequent parts address the methods used in the research of Indonesian Muslim organizations namely, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU); a network of pesantren communities, Hidayatullah; and a small rural Muslim community, an-Nadzir in South Sulawesi. Discussion on the research model involves data collection, recruitment and data analysis.

3.2 Research Methodology

3.2.1 Overarching Research Methods

Debates on socio-ecological problems and ecological politics in the literature discussed in Chapter 4 have been used to frame the overarching research questions as follows:

1. What do Islam and Muslim groups in Indonesia offer to mitigate poverty and environmental crisis?
2. What endogenous features are already present among the Indonesian Muslim groups which can possibly be developed into relocalization to build sustainable, largely self-sufficient Muslim communities, with self-local governance?
3. In what ways could Indonesian Muslim groups respond to the call for global environmental actions to achieve the ‘whole earth-one world family’ vision? In other words, in what ways can the global Muslim community (*Ummah*) provide an alternative to global environmental governance?

Using qualitative inquiry as generally described by Denzin (1998), the research questions are social inquiries about the ‘transformation’ of the existing Muslim communities toward relocalization. They required methods that address the existing community development activities and their potential for solutions. As stated earlier, the research paradigm is primarily pragmatism. Pragmatist researchers focus on the practical implications of the research and strive to emphasize the importance of conducting research that best addresses the research problem (Creswell, 1998). Creswell (p.23) elaborates, “pragmatist researchers look to the ‘what’ and ‘how’ to research based on its intended consequences – where they want to go with it”. This research, therefore, has utilized the techniques and procedures that best meet its aims, which involves not only exploring the groups’ potential for change but also their

- nature of consumption
- nature of economy
- cultural definition of ‘good life’
- governability and,
- social cohesion between Muslims of inter-ethnicities within the community

A total of 125 participants comprised of leaders and active members of the NU, Muhammadiyah, Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir were involved. In order to provide information about the nature of consumption in the community, their lifestyles were observed. To provide information necessary to understand their cultural definition of a ‘good life’, the ideals that the ‘learning-communities’ (including schools, *pesantren*) had been advocating were investigated. Furthermore, the ethnographic approach would describe a culture in order to understand their way of life “to move from what is heard or observed to what is actually meant” (Neuman, 1997:347). Right here, it is argued that in constructivist-interpretivist research, an adequate knowledge of the symbolic universe of the religious community being studied is necessary. It refers to knowledge of its history of formation, as well as knowledge of the system of thought and value within the given religion. Furthermore, in the previous chapter, Berger and Luckmann’s sociology of knowledge has contributed to a conceptual framework of reality as social construction, and hence, knowing as social action; as well as the expressiveness of knowledge insofar as it seeks to represent subjective, intersubjective and objective worlds. The significance of an interpretivist-constructivist approach, as defined by Denzin & Lincoln (1998), to be incorporated into this pragmatist research is becoming clearer, for there is a link between meaning, orientation, and action, as argued by many:
It is because of this ineluctable link between meaning, orientation, and action that naturalistic field researchers emphasize the importance of accessing and understanding the meaning systems of those studied (Denzin, 1989b; Emerson, 2001; Geertz, 1973, quoted in Lofland et al., 2006:133).

Through case studies, the research explored the nature of the economy of the community and sought to understand how social cohesion between Muslims of inter-ethnicities were formed and the way the members were governed. Case studies provide a rich and detailed description from the viewpoint of an insider.

Additionally, while this study of sustainable local community development was inspired by Schumacher’s (1973) ‘small is beautiful’ maxim, the fact that ‘small can be ugly’ too cannot be ignored - that is when there is total disregard of the outside world. Therefore, through in-depth interviews and discourse and content analysis of the printed and audio-visual material the organizations produced, the research also explores the groups’ potential for overcoming symbolic universe barriers and to investigate in what ways it is possible to create collaborative ecological actions with the rest of the Indonesian societies, and with the world community at large.

3.2.2 Scoping Fieldwork

The first step in this research was scoping fieldwork that was done in the Christmas holiday period in 2010. The underlying cultural factors characterizing each form of Indonesian Muslim community and the way they are connected to the global Muslim community (Ummah) were sought for identification.

During the scoping fieldwork, two NU-affiliated pesantren communities in rural East Java were visited, and the Hidayatullah head pesantren in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, where the leaders were met in unofficial visits known by the Muslims as silaturrahim, meaning, friendship between Muslims. The scoping fieldwork provided strong suggestions for consideration of Berger and Luckmann’s Social Construction of Reality. After the fieldwork, the anthropological literature on the Indonesian Muslims and the history of the Islamic movement in Indonesia was reviewed in order to have better understanding of the socio-cultural-historical background of the Muslim groups being studied. Clifford Geertz’s (1976) famous study of Javanese religion broadly divides Indonesian Muslims into three groups: santri, priyayi and abangan. Santri is a group of people who strictly maintain religious teachings. According to Geertz, santri culture is anti-bureaucratic, independent and egalitarian. Abangan is a group of people who are not concerned with the formal practice of religion, and in politics they tend to support secular, non-religious parties. Priyayi are the elite Javanese, they are a group of syncretic people who believe more in Hindu-Javanese values than in
Islamic ones, and in politics, like abangan, priyayi support the secular nationalist parties. Many scholars have criticized Geertz’s classification, emphasizing that Indonesian Islam is a more complex mix of diverse groups that cannot be described in one generalization. Pringle (2010:11), for instance, suggests, “it is difficult to label the diversity of Islam in Indonesia which reflects the complexity of the country itself”. One of the broader classifications inspired by the global religious-political typology was made by an Indonesian author, Deliar Noer (1973a). He classifies Indonesian Muslims according to their religious-political attitudes into ‘Traditionalist’ and ‘Reformist’; both groups are within the santri communities of Geertz’s categorization. It is noteworthy that most of the works already undertaken on the Indonesian Muslims and the typologies produced have been mainly reflective of religio-political attitudes. No one making rigorous sociological analysis of the people involved was found to produce a typology that has greater detail from the community theoretical perspective. Perhaps, Candland (2000) was the only exception since he argues that faith can be a form of social capital, for a community of believers need not have repeated face-to-face interactions to place trust in one another59. Meanwhile, I am in agreement with Berger and Luckmann (1991:146) that “no ‘history of ideas’ takes place in isolation from the blood and sweat of general history”. There is continuity between historical and contemporary patterns of cross-regional Islamic discourse. Thus, there is a need to search beyond the existing typologies of Indonesian Muslims so as to consider the most recent effects of ‘globalization’ manifested in the so-called ‘transnational Islam’.

From my scoping fieldwork and the focus of this study of the Muslim communities, the Indonesian Muslim society was differentiated into, roughly, two groups: (1) ‘community Muslims’, those who live or are activists in religious communities, thus having a stronger ‘sense of community’ and therefore the Ummah is a primary concern or focus; and (2) ‘non-community’ Muslims, those who do not belong to any sort of religious community, hence the Ummah is secondary (See Table 6). The latter group contains individuals who choose to live separate lives similar to the majority of the population in the Western world. They range from the mosque-goers who get together with other Muslims every once in a while and whose males come at least once a week in the Friday prayer congregation; to the ones who no longer consider themselves a member of the Ummah although Islam might still be stated as his/her religion in his/her KTP (Indonesian identification card). The research did not study ‘non-community Muslims’ because being employers and employees of, and hence dependent on, either government bodies or corporations, they did not seem to possess the

59Candland studied four religious associations considered to have sustained social capital through faith. They are the NU of Indonesia, Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, Sarvodaja Shramadana of Sri Lanka, and Santi Asok of Thailand. Each operates non-profit, voluntary community development.
capability and freedom to ‘make a difference’ that relocalization requires. Moreover, simply they are not members of any community from which any community development attempts can be advanced.

The outline of Indonesian Muslim societies can be described in the following table wherein the participants of this research are situated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Community Muslims’</th>
<th>‘Non-Community Muslims’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pesantren Communities</td>
<td>Organization-based Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fenced Pesantren</td>
<td>Fenceless Pesantren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional Communities of like-minded Muslims</td>
<td>Communities by spiritual leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example: Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir</td>
<td>Example: Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)-affiliated pesantren - Sufi orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Traditionalist</td>
<td>Mixed Reformist –Traditionalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Intelligentsias are distributed throughout the two groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pesantren are homegrown traditional Islamic education institutes (See Chapter 1). Having evolved for centuries they have produced huge networks of pesantren communities. NU is a mass organization. The lifeblood of the organization is the network of pesantren and the kyai (clerics). They expanded their influence through the creation of ‘learning communities’60 (majlis taklim, pengajian) in the larger society of Indonesian Muslims. Kyai are highly respected and widely consulted for spiritual, religious advice, as well as matters concerning health, family and community. There are about 14,000 NU-affiliated pesantren around Indonesia and each one has at least one kyai.

60 Refers to a group of people who share common emotions, values or beliefs and are actively engaged in learning together from each other and by habituation (Bonk, 2004).
The NU-affiliated pesantren community is characterized as ‘fenceless’ whereby connected spiritual leadership, emotional ties, cultural values, and Islamic school of thought connect a group of people, although they do not necessarily settle in the same location. Since their boundaries are more permeable the NU pesantren members are commonly referred to as ‘inclusive’ Islam.

The ‘fenced-pesantren’ communities of Hidayatullah emerged out of the comparable yearning for what Maser (1997:101) noted as the creation of sustainable community. That is, to be meaningful, a community must imply membership in a ‘human-scale collective’ where people can encounter one another face to face, and therefore, nurture human-scale structural systems within which people can feel safe and at home.

In contrast to the pesantren community, whose sense of community was developed through a relationship with the spiritual leader (kyai), the members of the organizational communities such as Muhammadiyah are connected merely by the values they share, the school of thought in which they believe, and the movement they participate in, without the centrality of, and the emotional ties with personal leaders.

Besides pesantren, the Sufi order (tarekat) is another institution that is attached to the kyai. The primary role of pesantren is educating the santri (student), whereas the activity of the tarekat or tasawuf focuses on building batin (the inner life of a person, the transformation of self in successive grades) (Turmudi, 2006). Nevertheless, there is a strict set of rules of the religiously legitimate Sufi order in such a way that not just anybody is qualified to found a new Sufi order. The NU kyai only recognizes and allows Muslims to practice tarekat who are legitimate (mu’tabarah). They recognize forty-six mu’tabarah orders. These orders have been founded and operated for centuries in a way unrestricted by geographical boundaries. Hence, the Sufi networks have always been transnational. Also, these Sufi orders have long been part of the fenceless pesantren too.

The new Transnational Islam phenomenon that emerged in the aftermath of contemporary globalization is often called ‘Islamist’ (see Chapter 2). The network capabilities of these Islamist groups have serious implications for the national politics and mainstream public domain in the countries in which they operate because the local conflicts in those areas can now be elevated to the global level (Noor, 2009).

I can pinpoint my place in the sketched typology of the Indonesian Muslim. Coming from a somewhat well-off Muslim family with mixed Indonesian-Arab background and mixed Traditionalist-

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61 See them in http://www.dokumenpemudatqn.com/2012/06/nama-nama-tarekat-mutabaroh.html
Reformist upbringing, my father and mother were among the very few Indonesian Muslims with santri background (see Geertz above) that received university education in the 1950s. I had the opportunity to study in Indonesian madrasah, government schools and institutes, and an Islamic college where Islamic knowledge was obtained. Such circumstances enabled me to view the problems of the Indonesian Muslim societies as both an insider and outsider. Being a Muslim, empathy with the grievances of the Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere is experienced, and practicing the thariqah (tasawuf), I can empathize with the religious experiences that some respondents explicitly or implicitly expressed. However, having been involved in varied secular-nationalist developmental projects in the past, which most of the time divorced me from the community lives I wished to improve, I view myself as an outsider.

Upon completion of the scoping exercise and the reading, the decision was made to focus the research on NU and Muhammadiyah to represent fenceless pesantren and organization-based communities. The main reason involved in their selection is that they are the oldest Muslim organizations in Indonesia and that no study of Indonesian Muslim society can be done without considering the two organizations. They both have a large membership and sympathizers, and represent mainstream Islam in Indonesia. Both are often regarded as the largest independent Islamic organizations in the entire Islamic world (Bruinessen, 2004; Ricklefs, 2010; Pringle, 2010 and others). Not only have they established networks of ‘learning communities’ but they have also engaged in education, health and social welfare. The research also selected the Hidayatullah network with mother pesantren in East Kalimantan and an-Nadzir in South Sulawesi for the category of fenced-pesantren communities due to the ‘intentional community’ approach they used in advancing the Islamic social movement. An-Nadzir and Hidayatullah have been connected through the emotional ties and familial bonds of the founder with the Darul Islam leaders in South Sulawesi (see Chapter 5 and 7). Despite the preliminary information collected from the internet blogs about An-Nadzir that tend to discredit them as eccentric people, I was particularly interested in this group because of their ecologically-sound farming practices that support the community and also expected to meet highly esoteric people who might give distinct views of environmental issues from an Islamic mysticism perspective. Another reason for selecting the Muslim communities outside Java is to avoid the Java-centric tendency of cultural studies in Indonesian Muslim society so far. Detailed discussion of these communities and organizations is provided in Chapter 6 and 7.

3.3 Data Collection and Informants
The main period of research was carried out in Indonesia for approximately 10 months. By online news and contacts with relatives and friends in Indonesia while being in New Zealand, I kept abreast
of Indonesia’s situation in relation to the research topic. Primary data was collected by me in the fieldwork that was stored in 39 audiotapes. The secondary data includes a box of books, magazines, news, leaflets and VCD produced by the three organizations under study, as well as their communities and their community development activities.

3.3.1 Data Collection

Data collection was conducted through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, participant observations, and compilation of secondary data concerning two major issues:

- The governmental policies on development and the socio-ecological issues. The respondents’ awareness on those issues was sought.
- Current issues on Islam in Indonesia in relation to globalization, Indonesian politics, and development programmes.

In addition to the above data collection methods, daily accounts of observations and experience were written and compiled in diary format. The texts obtained from the interviews and the daily notes taken by me have been coded. The coding process involved the categorizing of the texts into key ideas. The interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesian language, my first language. In many instances during the interviews, people in Java used Javanese expressions and jokes. It should be noted that I speak Javanese with Eastern Java dialect and understands the other dialects very well. The conversations in the case study communities in East Kalimantan and South Sulawesi were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia. As the conversations were translated, the translating process suggested by Birbil (2000) was referred to as a guide, especially in determining a better translation strategy to be adopted in the data analysis. Translation is described by Birbil (2000) as more than just changing the words or as Simon (1996:137-8, cited in Temple, 2002:5) asserts:

> The solutions to many of the translator’s dilemmas are not to be found in dictionaries, but rather in an understanding the way language is tied to local realities, to literally forms and to changing identities. Translators must constantly make decisions about the cultural meaning which language carries, and evaluate the degree to which the two different worlds they inhabit are ‘the same’.

According to Birbilli (2000), if the researcher managed to receive clear answers with coherent sentences from the interviewee, he or she should translate the text “word for word”. However, if the construction of the sentences received from the interviewee is complicated, it is suggested that the researcher summarizes the data.

3.3.2 Informants

Un-structured interviews were held with:
1. National and provincial leaders of the three organizations: Muhammadiyah, NU, Hidayatullah
2. Leaders of the case study communities: fenced-pesantren: Hidayatullah, an-Nadzir

**Focus Group followed by Un-structured (semi-structured) Interview with:**

1. Active Members of NU (the fenceless pesantren community)
2. Active Members of Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir (the fenced-pesantren communities)
3. Active Members of Muhammadiyah (the organizational community)

The members of the NU and Muhammadiyah who were contacted for the research lived in urban and rural areas around Jakarta and Surabaya, the capital of East Java where the organisations have a large membership. The members of Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir are the individuals living in the case study communities. Participant observations were held in the case studies communities. I stayed in the communities as a guest for approximately two weeks. I also attended the Hidayatullah national annual meeting on June 20-24, 2013, in Balikpapan.

Table 3.2 summarizes the participants and the qualitative methods used to obtain the information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Pesantren Communities</th>
<th>Fenceless</th>
<th>Fenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnographic Fieldwork</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td>Head Office. NU, Muhammadiyah, Hidayatullah Interview (22 people)</td>
<td>Grassroots NU-affiliated pesantren Interviews (and, or, focus group). (16 people)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Members</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah Two Focus Groups (each 10 people)</td>
<td>NU-affiliated pesantren community Interviews and/or focus groups (21 people)</td>
<td>Communities living in the enclaves Hidayatullah, an-Nadzir Interview and, or, focus group. The leaders and members in total (46 people). Participant Observations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The case studies of fenced-pesantren communities were carried out in the selected places as shown in the following table.
Table 8 Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fenced-Pesantren communities</th>
<th>Hidayatullah</th>
<th>An-Nadzir</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td>1. Kalimantan (Balikpapan, East Kalimantan) 2. Jakarta (Depok)</td>
<td>Sulawesi (Gowa, South Sulawesi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>School of thought</strong></td>
<td>Traditionalist-influenced Reformist Nowadays it is regarded as Islamist</td>
<td>Traditionalist-influenced Reformist The founders are Muhammadiyah’s cadre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristic</strong></td>
<td>Lack of esoterism</td>
<td>Highly esoteric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization</strong></td>
<td>Nation-wide networked</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nation-wide enterprise</td>
<td>Local enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Establishment</strong></td>
<td>Approx. 30yrs</td>
<td>Approx. 30yrs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The national and provincial leaders were interviewed in their Jakarta and Surabaya offices. Focus group discussions were carried out in single sex groups. The range of topics in the interview and discussion are elaborated below. Interviews, and or, focus group discussions were recorded and photos were taken of the people interviewed, including activities within the communities with their permission. Interviews with the leaders lasted approximately one hour, and with the members about 15-30 minutes each. The transcripts of interviews with the leaders were returned to them for comment. No negative responses were given to me afterward. Further, during the data collection it was realised that there was a need to investigate the ‘youth’, transnational’ and ‘Islamist’s view of the problems, besides Muhammadiyah, NU, Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir. Therefore, additionally, 3 persons were interviewed: Hizbut Tahrir’s spokesperson, a leader of young Muslims Emha Ainun Nadjib who is known to be very critical of the government, and Islamist scholar Adian Husaini. This provided a matrix for the understanding of the competences and ineptitudes of diverse Muslim groups in relation to relocalization.

3.3.3 Information Sought and Range of Topics Interviewed/Discussed

3.3.3.1 Four Organisations

National and Provincial Leaders of Three Organizations:
1. Their opinion about development policies in Indonesia
2. Their awareness about the latest environmental conditions in Indonesia, regarding:
   a. Deforestation, industrial pollution, oil supply and demand, etc.
   b. The importance of Indonesia’s forest as the second (or third) lung of the earth.
3. Their awareness about the causes of and actors in, environmental degradation in Indonesia
4. Information about the level of poverty among their members
5. Information regarding what the organizations have done about the two issues in question:
a. Their environmental programs
b. Their poverty reduction program
c. In which aspects the programs fall short

6. After describing relocalization briefly, organizations were asked about their opinion regarding “re-localization” or “alternative community” for their members, whether that is possible, in terms of:
   a. Land holding?
   b. Ecological restoration skills and knowledge of the organizations?
   c. Financial capability?
   d. Their capability to deploy an Islamic economic system as an alternative to the national economics?

7. Their opinions about the possibility of their organizations taking collaborative actions with organizations from the West, such as Global Ecovillage Network (GEN) and the Transition Town Network, in terms of empowerment, skills, knowledge and financial support; as well as the issues that are involved, if such cooperation is possible.

8. To get insight from NU, whose members are traditionally in the fenceless communities, and to Muhammadiyah who does not establish pesantren, whether ‘fenced-pesantren-like’ intentional communities are desirable to their members.

**Provincial members of Organization Communities** (Muhammadiyah and NU only, because Hidayatullah was covered in Case Studies of Fenced-Pesantren)

1. Their awareness about environmental issues
2. Their opinion regarding what they think they can do about them.
3. Population control /family planning
4. Motor vehicle usage and consumption of industrial products
5. Alternative economics
6. Ecological restorations

### 3.3.3.2 Fenced-Pesantren Case Studies:

**Community Leaders:**

1. Information about the organization’s policies on the ownership of the property
2. Information about financial support of the organization to the communities
3. Information about the organization’s strengths and weaknesses in performing ecological restoration activities and poverty reduction:
   a. Financially
   b. Skills and knowledge
   c. Management
   d. Land holding
   e. Relation with local/central government
   f. Relation with surrounding communities

**Community Members and Leaders: Information about their life**

1. The member’s motivations to live in the fenced-pesantren (intentional community)
2. Whether they are better off
3. Their own description of the community
4. How the conflicts are settled among the members
5. Their opinion of the organization
6. Their opinion about environmental activities in the community
7. Aspects of their life which support environmental sustainability
8. Whether they wish their children to continue living in the community
9. Observation of how pesantren culture works
10. Observation of other issues involved in sustainability issues which had not yet been identified by me

3.4 The Research Process

The proposal for this research was submitted to the University of Canterbury Ethics Committee before any interviewing commenced (see Appendix-7). The research is neither anonymous nor confidential for the leaders of the communities being studied. Informed consent was obtained through a signed consent form. Appointments with the organization leaders, national and provincial, were arranged through direct contact with the offices. Appointments with the members of the organizations’ ‘learning communities’ were arranged through social networks. Appointments with the case study ‘fenced-pesantren’ were arranged through the Jakarta head office. Requests for access to the case study communities were presented to the leaders in person upon arrival. There was no necessary selection of research informants in this qualitative research and there was not much difficulty in making appointments with the leaders and in gaining access to the communities. In retrospect, my social network played a significant role in this matter. I, as a citizen of Indonesia and a member of the Ummah who is happy to continue being so, would like to declare that this research has no intention to harm any respondent or their organizations. If the thesis somehow appears as being critical to any one organisation or any one individual, this should, therefore, be measured from the ethos of tawabul haqq\(^{62}\) (Q: 103:3) between one Muslim and another.

It is important to note that in every Muslim organization there are leaders, active members and sympathizers. While sympathizers constitute much bigger numbers, active members are almost always the ones who participated in the community development activities of the organizations, thus, they are also ‘leaders’ in that sense. The NU and Muhammadiyah leaders and members interviewed were largely open to giving their candid opinions and signed the consent forms. In contrast, the Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir leaders were more cautious about the intention of this research. Only after face-to-face introduction of the research background was I accepted. However, in general, they responded openly to the questions. As the community leaders provided access to the enclave of pesantren communities, the members of the communities followed them and welcomed my presence. In the Hidayatullah enclaves, everyone being interviewed signed the consent forms, while in An-Nadzir, the members refused to sign saying that they would follow their top leaders, thus, if the leaders agreed to sign then they too deemed themselves included.

\(^{62}\) (Recommend one another to the truth).
3.5 Data Analysis

The research method includes analysis and interpretation of archives; individual interviews; focus group discussions and participant-observations. In contrast to quantitative researchers, qualitative researchers measure with a wider variety of techniques and devise measures for difficult-to-observe aspects of the social world (Neuman, 1997). Most of the things that this research is interested in cannot be directly observed (attitudes, ideology), or are intangible (desirability, ability). Consequently, before any measuring could be carried out, a clear idea was needed about the specific interests and the measurement itself took place during data collection; as Neuman (1997:181) states, “While quantitative researchers think about variables and convert them into specific actions during a planning stage...Qualitative researchers measure during the data collection process”. Denzin & Lincoln (1998) argue that the interpretivist-constructivist emphasizes the world of experience as it is lived, felt, and undergone by social actors and the ability of the outsider to perceive and understand their social world63. To achieve that goal, the data collected in this research were focused on the aspects of social setting that include: 1.meaning, or cognitive aspects; 2.emotional aspect; and 3.ranking.

It is also important that in conducting qualitative research the theoretical framework and methods match what the researcher wants to know (Braun, 2006). Regarding the meaning or cognitive aspects, the insights of symbolic universe and symbolic interactionism were employed as the interpretive science in the pursuit to portray and understand the process of subjective interpretation and the meaning-making. They were also employed in the previous chapter to understand the link between meaning, orientation and action. Therefore, both Blumer’s (1969) symbolic interactionism that suggests ‘man as action’, and Berger and Luckmann’s (1999) symbolic universe that suggests ‘man as perception’ were utilized to complement each other in accessing and understanding the meaning system of the people being studied.

On the emotion or sentiment aspect, human archetypes or personality have been considered (see Chapter 2 regarding the Sages and Warriors) to understand that reality is not only socially constructed, but sometimes also individually. Further, the data also focused on ranking to examine one’s ability and possibility to advance relocalization. The higher the level of one’s

63 A symbolic interactionist, Blumer, argues that the nature of any and every object consists of the meaning that it has for the person for whom it is an object. An object may have a different meaning for different individuals. This meaning sets the way in which he sees the object, the way in which he is prepared to act toward it, and the way in which he is ready to talk about it. Two premises of Symbolic Interactionism are: firstly, people act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them, and the second premise, which needs highlighting in the case of the people under study, is that the meanings of such things are derived from, or arise out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellow (Blumer, 1969).
dependence on the government or present economic order to survive, the lower ranking the individual or group’s potential is to bring about social transformation such as relocalization. In other words, the more independent a group, the more potential they have. Correspondingly, the entrepreneurial individuals have more potential than government officials or corporate managers to generate changes. Also, the higher needs of conformity a group has with, hence exploited by, modernity, the lower potential and freedom the group has to advance endogenous Islamic relocalization. Ranking was also applied towards the size of the membership and infrastructure of the organizations and communities. The larger the size and the more nation-wide reaching of group’s infrastructure, the more potential and more effective they are.

Denzin & Lincoln contend that qualitative researchers stress not only the socially constructed nature of reality but also the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is studied and the situational constraints that shape inquiry (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Chapter 1 chronicled my engagement with what is being studied and outlined the paradigms and worldviews that I brought to the research project. In addition, my academic and practical background in Islamic philosophy and mysticism has provided the required understanding of Islamic system of thought and value to bring in verstehen⁶⁴ to grasp the meanings of actions from the actor’s point of view and to ‘wear their shoes’. The two backgrounds have been especially pertinent in a pragmatist research of the Muslim communities wherein diversity exists, because for a pragmatist, the world is not viewed as an absolute unity, so neither is it seen in the social world of the Muslim actors who participated in this study. In addition, as a pragmatist I am not committed to any one system of community development, therefore, equal weight has been given to each approach undertaken by all branches of Islam, ranging from the non-modernist Traditionalist’s to the modernist Reformist’s with the four qualities of human well-being: physical, psychological, social and spiritual, to provide the final input. From the data analysis the organizations were ranked by their potential and effectiveness for social transformation.

3.6 Theme Finding

The analysis of this research begins in the field, at the time of observation and interviewing, as I identified problems and concepts that appear likely to help in understanding the situation. When the fieldwork was completed, the coding process and text-mining of the data in this analysis were performed manually. There are four major themes and a number of subthemes that have emerged from this research: “A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the

⁶⁴ Systemic interpretive process in which an outside observer of a culture attempts to relate to it and understand others
research question, and represents some level of patterned responses or meaning within the data set” (Braun, 2006:82). They came from responses that appeared recurrently, combined with my prior understanding of Islamic worldview, and familiarity with the following subjects: the plethora of discourses and writings on contemporary issues that runs through the Muslim world; the Third World issues in relation to social and environmental problems; the issues involved in relocalization attempts in the West as identified in the literature and the research questions. Historical, cultural and political dimensions of Islam in Indonesia defined the context within which to examine theoretically and empirically the Indonesian Muslims’ relation with Islam as an overarching symbolic system. They provide a background for assessing their willingness, ability and possibility to pursue the relocalization ideals and actions aimed at developing sustainable and just Muslim communities with self-local governance. Since the research focused on finding solutions, the research orientation is more inductive (developing a new theory) than deductive (confirmatory). However, with examination of long Muslim philosophical and intellectual traditions already in place being an important element of the research, few insights are really new and therefore, induction does not necessarily lead to novel theoretical insights (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). Drawing from existing social theories and these long Islamic intellectual traditions, the inferential process of this research creatively produced a new research question and theoretical framework to modify the existing social theory based on surprising research evidence – a process known as abduction (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012). Abductive logic is adopted “when we engage in imaginative thinking about intriguing findings and then return to the field to check our conjectures” (Charmaz, 2009:137-8). From the abductive analysis, the research leads to developing the following themes: (1) clash of symbolic universe; (2) mistrust argued as colonial legacy; (3) Islam as a social movement; and (4) my philosophical assumptions and values which defined a belief in happiness as an ultimate human need has led to an unexpected theme of ‘happiness’. In discussing sustainability and the limited natural resource dilemma, the latter theme suggests the need to classify the Third Worlders’ happiness into two types as explicated in 7.2.5, one is ascribed to one’s lack of knowledge, and the other of contentment. Finally, the research provides insight into a possible model for endogenous Islamic relocalization, a theme that emerged from the fenced-pesantren community development in Chapter 7.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter has described the main methodological framework and processes adopted in this research. In-depth interviews, ethnography and case study methods used to gather information have been discussed and the constructivist-interpretivist approach to analyze data has been
explicated. The chapters that follow concentrate on the concept of endogenous relocalisation in the context of Muslim communities, against the background of global environmental crisis.
Chapter 4

For a Concept of Endogenous Relocalisation

“[Say]: To you be your way and to me mine” (The Quran: 109:6)

“We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them” (Albert Einstein)

4.1 Introduction

First of all, I concur with Oosthoek (2005), that the greatest challenge of sustainability is to overturn the historically deeply-embedded assumption that progress or development by way of unlimited natural resources exploitation is both inevitable and desirable. Therefore, this chapter aims to review the works already done to return to smaller scale, more self-reliant communities with simpler ways of living. This model of community development is termed as ‘relocalisation’. Relocalisation contends with combined concerns about peak oil, climate change, and industrial-economic globalization. From the onset it is worth highlighting that the proponents of relocalisation seek to dissociate the movement from its predecessor, conventional environmentalism and sustainable development. Relocalisation does not seek to shift the larger society at once, rather, to work on a community scale. It draws upon multiple disciplines with pragmatic strategies shaped around the ‘limits to growth’ analysis. It aims to equip people with resilience and adaptive capabilities in the face of looming scarcity and environmental degradation. This chapter aims to develop a concept of endogenous\textsuperscript{65} relocalisation as an ‘insurgent planning’\textsuperscript{66} movement to be carried out by, and for, Muslim communities themselves to respond to the challenge of peak oil and climate change.

To draw an holistic understanding of the socio-ecological problems in a Third World country like Indonesia, I present in the following section (4.2) a number of authors who argue from different perspectives: both political-economic, and anthropological-epistemological. Herein, the \textit{personality character} patterns used to classify the Muslims grouping in section 2.4 appear to characterize the authors as well. The former group, the \textit{warriors}, among others are Jerry Mander, Edward Goldsmith, David Korten and Herman Daly. In their analyses, massive global development projects bring long term benefits only to a minority “who sit at the hub of the process” and to a slightly larger minority

\textsuperscript{65} Endogenous development refers to “the sum of views, values and practices which marginalised, silenced or oppressed societal actors create from within in response to the initiatives of development coming from outside or being implemented top-down” (Haverkort and Rist 2007:7)

\textsuperscript{66} Radical planning practices from the standpoint of the global South, seasoned by the complexities of state-citizen relation in colonial and post-colonial regimes (Miraftab, 2009). Insurgence manifests in different spaces, geographical, social, political and technological. It encompasses ideas about access, democracy and participation (ACSP, 2012).
that “can retain economic connection to it”, while the rest of humanity is “left groping for fewer jobs and less land, living in violent societies on a ravaged planet” (Mander and Goldsmith, 1996:6). In the end, however, even to those minority beneficiaries, the benefits are temporary and unsustainable. Mander and Goldsmith (1996:12) quoted one ex-world leading financier, James Goldsmith, who said that for those people it will be like “winning at poker on the Titanic”.

Quite different views were given by the sages group. Authors in religious environmentalism in this group do not see the crisis as being simply economic or technological. It is much more a moral and spiritual crisis. Their views suggest the unchecked materialism that stemmed from the Scientific and Industrial Revolution has been the root of the problem. They are, among others, Richard C. Foltz et al, Tony Watling, Mary Evelyn Tucker, David L. Johnston and Whitney Bauman et al. I will briefly discuss their arguments to make a case for studying Indonesian Muslim groups’ leaders and active members to provide long-term solutions to the complex development-environment problems. This involves considering the importance of moral force and spiritual energy to galvanize actions, and the need for collective identity to mobilize people in larger segments of the population. Concerning this assertion, the notes of Nguitragool (2012) on the study of environmental governance in Indonesia must be taken into account. According to him, a lack of large-scale social cohesion in present-day Indonesia between civil society organizations and the public, has been a key issue besides a poor legal system.

The discussion of flawed paradigms of developmentalism and economic globalization in section 4.2 leads to the rationale for relocation in 4.3. The relocation activists’ literature gives practical sense to deal with the complex development-environment issues in the Third World. Jonathan Dawson, Ross Jackson, Ted Trainer, Rob Hopkins, and John Barry discuss grassroots actions and the practical problems involved. They provide green intentional community models as a rejection of what they see as an ‘outmoded dominant western worldview’ in favour of one that recognizes human-ecosystem interdependence. These models are propounded as concrete actions that can be done ‘here’ and ‘now’ on a small-scale by like-minded people who are committed to do so. They are supposed to represent a model that can be duplicated, and their culture can be propagated, to convert society at large. According to the ulterior motives for making these, I classified them into:

(1) The ‘redemptionists’ who have been driven by psychological dissonance between a sense of their own values and ethical standards and the behaviour that people are forced to adopt through participation in consumer-capitalist society, and
(2) The ‘survivalists’ who aim to prepare for the conditions of scarcity, which they anticipate will result from peak oil, climate change and looming ecological collapse.
Despite heated debates of relocalisation in the literature, it is worth noting that there have been no rigorous studies of ‘endogenous’ relocalisation models conducted in the Muslim world, nor any non-positivist qualitative researches undertaken to examine the desirability of Eurocentric development models to the Muslim population outside the elites – the very people who have been subject to development and Western Enlightenment projects. This situation reminded me of Foucault’s relationship between discourse and power. In broad terms, Foucault’s critique is to reveal how certain values are taken for granted by the acceptance of certain scientific models, and how the acceptance of those models as true makes it impossible to articulate alternative values (Howarth, 1995).

Martin Kohr’s notes on economic globalization in the Third World reinforce my line of argument in proposing endogenous Islamic relocalisation in section 4.4. Given the global-extent of the environmental crisis, section 4.4 contends with solutions that have a global dimension. Against that background, this section provides a context for putting forward Islam and Muslim activism as an alternative to the global environmental movement for the Muslim world. The pragmatic considerations within the analysis of Islamic activism and the *Ummah* to advance an alternative movement needs to take into account the Muslim world’s problems from a Muslims’ own point of view. For this, I begin with two responses common in the Muslim world identified by Manzoor (1988), namely, civil society and Islamic state approaches. I put forward the third model, relocalisation with self-local governance into perspective, to envision a global network of endogenous relocalisation by local Muslim communities within ‘minimal states’ (Nozick, 2013) in the post-oil world. Section 4.5 presents urbanization in Indonesia as the context for relocalisation. Examples of environmental activism by Muslims are given in section 4.6.

**4.2. Towards an Holistic Understanding of the Problems**

Exploring in depth the theme of sustainability with which the research is concerned, namely, 1) the Third World context of Indonesia; 2) faith-based social movements and religious environmentalism; 3) a pragmatic research that aims to find solutions, I classified literature into three streams. The first and the second are called the **Warriors** and the **Sages**, for their authors and thinkers correspondingly resonate with the *personality characters* already given. The **Warriors** denote knightly or political power and government-oriented traits; whereas the **Sages** denote sapiential or spiritual, and truth-seeking traits. The two characters have interpreted one problem through different spectacles. Both **Warriors** and **Sages** are composed of the **protesters** and **activists**. The former declare opposition without taking further actions, the latter take the lead to initiate and put the ideas into actions. Finally, the third body of literature has been entitled, the **Relocalisation**
Activists. It provides insights into pragmatic and strategic issues involved in the relocalisation attempts.

On the Third World issues, the Warriors authors have been in the anti-globalization camp, a synonym for anti-capitalism, whereas the Sages—especially the Muslims—are those who hold that the Third World crises are rooted in the moral and spiritual-destruction impacts of colonialism and post-colonial modernization that marginalizes religious worldviews. The Warrior literature provides insights into highly-charged issues that are most specific to the Muslim Warriors groups’ activism outlined in sections 2.4.1 and 5.3. They represent the ‘Reformist’ movements that emerged during the 19th century in response to European colonial power.

4.2.1 The Warriors

Warriors’ discourse can be identified by the common characteristics of their revolutionary aims to challenge the established capitalist order. These anti-globalization protesters argue that economic globalization today is no different to the old colonialism. However, the scale is new; so is the new global rules by which it now operates; the presence of technology to speed up its application everywhere and freely without restriction; and the abrupt shift of global political power that it introduces. Nader and Wallach (1996) added what is also new is the fact that world democratic countries voted to suppress their own democratically enacted laws in order to conform to the rules of the new central global bureaucracy. Another important account of the anti-globalization protester relevant to this research is the homogenization of global culture, lifestyle, and the level of technological immersion alongside aggressive advocacy of a uniform worldwide development model with the corresponding dismantlement of local economies.

According to the above-mentioned authors, economic globalization, which involves arguably the most fundamental redesign of the world’s political and economic arrangement since at least the Industrial Revolution, is based on flawed paradigms. They emphasized the preposterousness of the very idea that on a finite earth, an economic system based on limitless growth can be supported. Correspondingly, they criticized the global economy’s principles of economic growth and free trade. Thus, Daly (2005:80) imagined quite a different economic future:

The facts are plain and uncontestable: the biosphere is finite, nongrowing, closed (except for the constant input of solar energy), and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics. Any subsystem, such as the economy, must at some point cease growing and adapt itself to a dynamic equilibrium, something like a steady state.

Also, Warriors question the ideology of development itself and argue that using GNP (Gross National Product) as the primary tool to judge economic progress is actually a self-delusion. The global
The economy of today is shaped by the enduring pattern of colonialism. The present-day colonialism according to them, is a new kind of ‘corporate colonialism’ (Goldsmith, 1996; Korten, 1995, 1996) supported by a **casino economy** ruled by currency speculators (Barnet, 1996).

### 4.2.2. The Sages: Deep versus Religious Ecologists

Sages view the environmental crises as being rooted in the deeper level of human being. This camp consists of religious ecologists previously mentioned, and deep ecologists. Both groups have their own philosophers. For the larger argument in the remainder of the thesis, I highlight the differences between religious ecologists and deep ecologists. The difference is not obvious until their orientations are considered. While the deep-ecologist is eco-centric, the religious ecologist is Theocentric.

#### The Deep Ecologists

The ‘deep ecologists’, hold that ecology reveals that nature has intrinsic value (Lovelock, 1979; Rolston, 1992). Deep ecologists have heralded ecology as a truly post-modern science which rejects the modernist separation of fact and value, and discovers value in its subject matter (Howarth, 1995).

Ecosystems, they claim, are shown to be not merely highly complex mechanisms. They display features such as self-directedness, purposiveness, harmony and balance... They have suggested that ecology reveals that ecosystems are more than the sum of their parts. They have likened ecosystems to human communities, suggesting that balance and harmony are achieved by the members or components acting ‘for the sake of’ the ‘whole... [The ‘deep’ interpretation] might even be suggested that the ecosphere has something comparable to human consciousness that its unpredictability is due to its having something comparable to human freedom (Howarth, 1995:787-788).

Concerning a deep ecological view of nature, Manzoor (1986) made an important point from an Islamic perspective. He insists on distinguishing between ‘sacralization’ and ‘divinization’ of nature. The distinction clearly signifies different orientations. Islam views nature as the portent of God, and it certainly opposes desacralization of nature while it forbids divinization of nature, only God being the Divine. Nasr’s (2004) description of the deep vision of nature in Islamic belief, whereby nature is the portent (*ayah*) of God, is appropriate here:

> The Quran depicts nature as being ultimately a theophany which both veils and reveals God... to those whose inner eye has not become blinded by the concupiscent ego and the centrifugal tendencies of the passionate soul. (Nasr, 2004:131)

The cosmic dimension of the Quran was elaborated over the centuries by many Muslim sages who referred to the cosmic or ontological Quran (*al-Quran al-takwini*) as distinct from and complementing the composed or “written” Quran (*al-Quran al-tadwini*). ...For them the forms of nature were literally *ayah Allah, vestigial Dei*, a concept that was certainly known to
the traditional West before, with the advent of rationalism, symbols were turned into brute facts (Nasr, 2004:131).

Moreover, Nasr (1996:281) notes that the rapport between sacred rites and the harmony and order of nature is so much emphasized in Islam that, according to a Hadith, the world will not come to an end as long as there are people on earth who remember the Name of God and continue to invoke “Allah, Allah” a practice central to the ritual of Sufism. In this respect, the esoteric concept of *walayah* elucidates human’s guardianship of the earth. The word *walayah* from the root *w-l-y* means proximity. The concept is reciprocal. According to Quranic teachings, Allah is very near to all things. That means, human beings are near to Allah. Yet, the ‘proximity’ is perceived only by those who have achieved human ‘perfection’. Thus, someone who attained *walayah* is called *wali* Allah (the trusted, or friend of God). Accordingly, through the *wali* God governs the world invisibly, a power without which the order of nature would turn into chaos and the world would flounder. The concept of *walayah* is shared by both Sunni and Shia through Sufi orders. According to Matsumoto (2010), the concept *walayah* is “intrinsic to the philosophic tradition of Islam which is not found in other philosophic traditions. For this reason, philosophic inquiry into the concept “*walayah*” will help us to have true insight into the essence of Islamic thought” (Matsumoto, 2010:17). Based upon this concept, on the popular level throughout the Islamic world, there is a belief that God places on earth at all times saintly men and women who through their presence and the rituals and prayers that they perform preserve the order of nature (Nasr, 1996:281).

Further, the central theological anthropology of Islam is that human is both, vicegerent (*khalifah*) and servant (*abd*) of God. The vicegerent is responsible on earth to God for his/her actions, and the custodian and protector of earth of which he/she is given authority to control on the condition that he/she remains faithful to him/herself as the *khalifah* which is the central terrestrial figure. The Quran asserts explicitly. “I am setting on the earth a vice-gerent (*khalifah*)”. Nonetheless, this quality of vicegerency is complemented by that of servantship (*al-ubudiyyah*) towards God.

Man is God’s servant (*abd Allah*) and must obey Him accordingly. As *abd Allah* he must be passive towards God and receptive to the grace that flows from the world above. As *khalifah Allah* he must be active in the world sustaining cosmic harmony and disseminating the grace for which he is the channel as a result of his being the center creature in the terrestrial order. In the same way that God sustains and cares for the world, man is His vice-gerent must nurture and care for the ambience in which he plays the central role. He cannot

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67 See Imam al-Qurtubi’s (1214-1273)
68 Because the Sufi belongs to the inner dimension of Islam and transcends Shariah differences as well as the Sunni-Shia dichotomy (Nasr,2002:63)
neglect the care of the natural world without betraying that “trust” (al-amanah) which he accepted when he bore witness to God’s Lordship in the prayer eternal covenant (al-mithaq) to which the Quran refers in famous verse, “Am I not your Lord?, They (that is, members of humanity) uttered Yea, we bear witness”. (Q:7:172). Secular Muslim, on the other hand, sees the power of man as ruler upon the earth emphasized at the expense of his servanthood so that he is considered to be not the khalifah Allah, the vicegerent of God, but the khalifah of his own ego or of some worldly power or collectivity. (Nasr, 1993:134)

With such a perspective of human in Islam, thus, an inference:

...nothing is more dangerous for the natural environment than the practice of the power of vice-gerency by a humanity which no longer accept to be God’s servant, obedient to His commands and laws. There is no more dangerous a creature on earth than a khalifat Allah who no longer considers himself to be ‘abd Allah and who therefore does not see himself as owing allegiance to a being beyond himself (Nasr, 1993:134-5)

**The Religious Ecologists**

Unlike the **Warriors**, this group does not see the crisis as being simply economic or technological, but rather moral and spiritual issues. The dominant modern Western worldview is seen to have given rise to the problem.

The base of the crisis is not seen as being simply economic or technological, however. Rather, it is seen as much a moral and spiritual issue at heart, about the idea of nature as much as its physical form, a result of a dominant modern Western worldview (What Taylor (2001:1-2) terms the ‘modern social imaginary’), a particular anthropocentric and mechanistic imagination devaluing nature and overvaluing humanity, seeing nature as a resource - devoid of intrinsic value, subjective meaning or spirit to be used for the benefit of humanity, leading to destructive rather than protective action towards it (humanity is envisioned as dominant and active, separate from a nature that is subservient and passive – what is seen as the disenchantment of nature, a moral and spiritual emptiness or disorientation, without any guiding environmental ethic, other than an anthropocentric one) (Watling, 2009:2)

In general, they see the environmental crisis as a direct offspring of the scientific and industrial revolutions with their unchecked materialism which was superimposed over the spiritual and ethical values of society (Bruun and Kalland, 1995). Philosopher Habermas (2010) is deeply concerned that, in consequence, the moral grounds for transforming the economic globalization that is devouring earth’s ecosystem are unavailable or inadequately stated in secular philosophy alone. The proposition of philosopher Seyyed Hossein Nasr, a prominent representative of the school of traditional religions, is appropriate here. Nasr points out the philosophical roots of the Scientific and Industrial Revolution. He speaks of the philosophy of ‘people in rebellion against Heaven’, the promethean man, being at the root of everything wrong with modernism. This philosophy has, then, been carried in the baggage of modern sciences (Nasr, 1996, 2001, 2007, 1989), thus:

The independent critical function which reason should exercise vis-à-vis science, which is its own creation, has disappeared, and henceforth science which is the child of human
mind has itself become the judge of human values & the criterion of truth ... It is a science that makes certain assumptions as to the nature of reality (time, space, matter, etc.), but once these assumptions were made and a science came into being based upon them, they have been comfortably forgotten and the results of this science made to be the determining factor as to true nature of reality. (Nasr, 1969:25)

Guenon (2004) emphasizes the quantitative character of modern science as a general tendency which seeks, as an ideal, the reduction of all quality to quantity, and all that is essential in the metaphysical sense to the material and substantial.

Foltz et al (2003) is a collection of Muslim environmentalist scholars who write from the Islamic metaphysics and the Sharia point of view. With a single Islamic view of where humans belong in the hierarchy of being (human as vicegerent, khalifah, and servant, abd, of God), the book presents various perspectives of the Muslims on Islam and ecology that can serve as an introduction to Muslim environmentalism that, in central respect, is different from modern environmentalism. They include: the Sufi’s vision of the animate nature of universe and the primordial nature of humans (fitra) to live in harmony with nature; the question of how traditional Islam can guide contemporary Muslims in dealing with environmental crisis effectively; the obstacles in practicing Islamic environmental ethics in the modern world; the fact that traditional Islamic laws that addressed environmental management are no longer practiced in much of the Muslim world69; critiques of interest-based global banking systems that engender profit-seeking at the expense of environment and human communities; and the family planning in Muslim societies.

Watling (2009) studies a wide variety of religious traditions from East and West to explore religious innovations that allow an ecotopian vision to surface. According to him, ecological interpretations of Islam stress it as being a ‘religion of the book’ (Watling, 2009:158-172). He sees the Quran, Prophet Muhammad and Sharia as a way to awaken a higher consciousness of unified nature of humanity, nature, and God –reminiscent of the Islamic ‘unified systemic worldview’ discussed in section 2.3. Hope and Young (2000) gave three examples of Muslims in environmental actions promoting population control in Nairobi and Cairo. They portray lives of key spiritual leaders and activists in different religions searching to give life to a new or renewed human relationship with nature.

Bauman et al (2011) write on ‘religion and ecology’ as a field that studies both the broad intellectual traditions of religion (the attitudes and views of religious leaders, sacred texts, and traditions) and the everyday reality of religion on the ground (the practices and actions of the

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69 In an unusual example, in the Islamic Republic of Iran Islamic principles were beginning to be applied to environmental protection at both government and grassroots level.
adherents of religions in their everyday lives). They hold that the methodological commitment of this field is a synthesis of a scholarly attention to religious worldviews and to lived religion. They refuse to choose one as the primary focus, but are committed to understand both as complementary and mutually informative. Bohannon and O’Brien (2011) write about “Environmental Justice (EJ)” and “Eco-Justice”- the environmental movements related to social injustice in America where these terms: “environmental injustice”, “environmental racism” first appeared. The EJ movement took shape when the United Church of Christ (UCC) became involved with a black majority, rural community in Warren County. They were protesting the proposed siting in their country of a waste dump for Polychlorinated biphenyl, a highly toxic chemical.

In 1986 the UCC’s Commission for racial Justice became involved and sought to link what was happening in Warren County to a wider national trend...This survey led to a watershed document...Toxic Wastes and Race. The key finding was that, even when socio-economic factors are considered, race is the most statistically significant predictor in the siting of hazardous wastes (Bohannon and O’Brien, 2011:167).

The “Eco Justice” movement urged Christians to recognize the “eco justice crisis – the historic turning point at which the abuse of nature and the injustices to human being place the future in grave jeopardy, both for natural systems and for human society” (Bohannon and O’Brien, 2011:171). Furthermore, on the heel of Lynn White (1966) and Toynbee (1971), Bauman et al (2011:59-61) present the debates between DeWitt, a zoologist and evangelical theologian, who seeks to recover ecological themes that he believes have always existed in Christianity, and the markedly different approach of Hessel and Ruether, the editors of Christianity and Ecology. The latter call for “a reformation of their [Christian] tradition, which preserves its key elements but adapt others in light of contemporary realities” (Bauman et al, 2011:61). Another view is of Taylor (2009a, 2009b) who focuses on “dark green” religions which he defines as those that develop “from a deep sense of belonging to and connectedness in nature while perceiving the earth and its living systems to be sacred and interconnected” (Bauman et al, 2011:61). Taylor does not believe that there are inviolable revelations that will provide clear and final answers. Thus Taylor proposes to replace traditions like Christianity with a call for a different and – from his perspective - far more ecological religion. In Taylor’s view, religions like Christianity might become “green” but they will “view their environmental responsibilities as, at most, one of a variety of ethical responsibilities”, and so will not prioritize the natural world as much as “dark green” religions which place sacred value in the world of nature (Bauman et al, 2011:61). For him “most of the world’s major religions have worldviews that are antithetical to and compete with the worldviews found in the dark green religions” (p.61)

Answering critical views of religion such as those of Taylor, Manzoor (1986) and Nasr (1996) protested the absence of Islam from most works on religion and environmentalism. According to
Nasr, when monotheistic world religions were criticized for reasons aforementioned, “practically no account is taken of Islam except when it is criticized as part of the monotheistic family” (Nasr, 1996:214). More relevant to this research, they argue that little has been said of a billion Muslims who still live in Islam’s traditional cosmologies, “in a world peopled by angels and jinn, or psychic forces when everything is alive and under the command of God” (Nasr, 1996:214). As for the case of Indonesia, Nasr and Manzoor’s arguments are apt to respond to criticism of monotheistic religion made by Indonesians such as in the novel, Bilangan Fu by Ayu Utami (2008). The novel juxtaposed monotheistic religion vis-à-vis adat in which divinization of nature similar to Taylor’s ‘dark-green religions’ is often part. Discussion on this particular issue appeared in the fieldwork in section 8.3.

Grim and Tucker (2014:13) began with the critical question, if lives on earth are severely endangered, why have religions “been so late to participate in solutions to ecological challenges?” They suggest, nevertheless, that the combined power of science, technology, economic growth and modernization may well be the case that has overshadowed traditional connections to nature in the world religions. They contend with the promises and problems of religious environmentalism. They hold that religions have fostered “worldviews, symbol systems, ethical teaching, and ritual practices in religious ecologies that have the potential to inspire human imagination and evoke human energy for life-enhancing transformation” (Tucker and Grim, 2014:26) which can be harnessed for environmental and social change. Further, religions are the wellspring of cultures and civilizations and repositories of knowledge about sacred human relations, guiding human affairs, and orienting human-earth interactions. They noted that the United Nations Environmental Protection (UNEP) recognized this potential and has been working with religious communities since 1987. Nonetheless, relevant to the research objectives defined in Chapter 1, Grim and Tucker (2014) discuss the problems and promises of religion on environmental issues. According to them, among the potentials is the fact that religions are the largest NGOs in the world. Religions also make the claim of “allegiances that transcend differences of race, class, gender and nationality” (Grim and Tucker, 2014:26). On the other hand, among the problems are that religions can be dogmatic, intolerant, hierarchical and patriarchal.

Elsewhere, Johnston’s (2010) thesis seeks to construct a Muslim-Christian theological discourse on creation and humanity that could help adherents of both faiths work together to preserve our planet. He begins with an understanding of historical issues.

Following on the heels of the Renaissance and its cosmopolitan outlook, the era of Western colonialism in effect coincided with the fall of the last Muslim enclave of Andalusia, the proud city of Granada (1492). One of the ironies of history is that it was the pluralistic, largely tolerant and knowledge-thirsty civilization of Muslim Spain that ignited the
Renaissance in the first place. Sadly, this inclusive impulse of Andalusia was overpowered and destroyed by the twin engines of religious imperialism and the greed for power and money. What is more, the discovery of the Americas helped to fuel the growing European appetite for trade, and, in the wake of Industrial Revolution, its search for new markets to absorb a surplus of goods... in fact, the Protestant Reformation helped to break the monopoly of Rome on the interpretation of the Christian tradition in the West and provided a new impetus to the expanding reality of nation-states (Johnston, 2010:5-6)

He marshals world history to arrive at Postmodernity - a complex movement with salient points:

1. Radical questioning (and often rejection) of the Enlightenment’s view of history as a unitary human march toward progress, and when modernity’s optimism is dampened (p.12)
2. The Enlightenment’s dogma of “objective scientific truth” incorporated into Western consciousness is left behind (p.12)
3. Rejection of Enlightenment rationalism raises afresh the fundamental questions of epistemology (what do we know and how do we come to know it); ontology (what is being and how does it relate to truth); hermeneutics (how do persons apprehend the meaning of a text or interpret phenomena which they perceive through their five senses, whether the data of scientific research or the past events of history?) (p.12)
4. Postmodernism often takes on radical political stances. A case in point is Foucault’s denouncing of the power dimension behind discourse (p.13)
5. Postmodernism is also a hodge-podge of social movements and currents of thought in revolt against the certainties of Western Enlightenment project. (p.13)

In his view, postmodernism offers both hopes and problems to Muslim-Christian relations: first, postmodernism confirms the general Muslim sense of feeling oppressed by a Western-led neoliberal, corporate-run globalization process (p.14); second, postmodernism has rehabilitated the value of local culture and multiculturalism (p.15); finally, postmodernist hermeneutics subvert the literalism and rigidity of both Muslim and Christian conservatives in their approach to the Quran and Bible (p.15).

The Sages and the Research

In sum, the Sages literature inspired researching the potential of Muslims’ epistemic communities including their education institutions such as the personalization of knowledge by murabbi educators in traditionalist pesantren. The argument goes as follows. From the constructivists’ point of view, the idea of ‘nature’, like everything else, is socially constructed and is a product of human culture. “When we talk about the natural world, we reflect the values and assumptions of our societies” (Bauman et al, 2011:56). This means that nature has a social dimension. Accordingly, ‘knowledge’ and ‘sciences’ carry with them the philosophies upon which they were constructed. Here I argue that different social constructions of knowledge between modern and non-modern civilizations have created significant gaps in propagating awareness of environmental crisis to the
Third World population where non-western civilizations continue to present. Notably, a modern scientific worldview of nature does not speak with the same ‘thought-language’ of the people living within different symbolic systems. For example, in an International Science Policy Workshop held in Bogor, Indonesia, 16-18 June 2014, which I attended, Lucy Emerton from the Environment Management Group who once worked in Thailand, stated that to translate the complex environmental issues into the Thai language was hardly possible. In this situation, the gaps between scientists and lay-people get even wider, and consequently, while the Third World scientists and environmentalists pursue the scientific ways of environmental actions, the masses were doing everything else. With that in mind, I put forward that an ‘Islamic’ global environmental movement to be carried out endogenously by the Muslims, might be much more effective as an alternative to secular environmental movements in Muslim majority countries. In this matter, Foltz’s (2002) reminder is appropriate, to allow plurality of environmental movement outside the dominant Western-modern worldview to emerge:

The modernist vision of technology and progress is most responsible for throwing the life-support system of the entire planet out of balance. Yet, if we Westerners stop shouting our own solutions long enough to hear the many and varied voices that we have these past five centuries been striving to silence, we might be surprised to learn that they are telling us much of value about the world. We may even find that the solutions to our problems are already available, but the cultural blinders imposed by the dominant ideology have prevented us from seeing them. (Foltz et al., 2002:3)

4.2.3. The Relocalisation Activists: Redemptionists versus Survivalists

Relocalisation is a radical green political movement. As the effects of economic policies that ignore the needs of people and the planet become blindingly obvious, resistance is growing everywhere. In post-industrial societies there are groups of people trying to create what they claim would be a sustainable and just society. They often aim to achieve this by turning to the local economy, putting the means of production under social control (instead of market forces and profit), and having self-governance. These movements try to create room for social, ecological and spiritual values (Norberg, 2002; Dawson, 2006). Relocalisation aims to reweave the fabric of communities, rebuild sustainable, largely self-sufficient communities, and establish self-local governance. A more specific definition of relocalisation was made in response to impending peak oil challenges by a collaboration of International Transition Network and Post Carbon Institute (2010):

70 Vaclav Havel argues in Huntington (1996) that there is an immense variety of cultures, of peoples, of religious worlds, of historical traditions and historically formed attitudes that “single global civilization” is a sheer thin veneer that covers or conceals them.
71 http://www.ehs.unu.edu/article/read/call-for-abstracts-international-science-policy-workshop

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Relocalisation is a strategy to build societies based on the local production of food, energy and goods, and the local development of currency, governance and culture. The main goals of relocalisation are to increase community energy security, to strengthen local economies, and to improve environmental conditions and social equity. The relocalisation strategy developed in response to the environmental, social, political, and economic impacts of global-over reliance on cheap energy.

Against the background of complex development-environment problems and widespread poverty, I envisioned the relocalisation model to be practical and operable for the Indonesian Muslim groups such as Muhammadiyah, NU, Hidayatullah and others, considering their achievements in community development so far, and the nature of ‘Islam and ecology’ already given.

Many of the relocalisation ideals are inspired by the Western thinker, Schumacher, who himself was inspired by local Asian communities in his well-known book ‘Small is Beautiful’ (1989). The Gandhian ideal “no-affluence-no-poverty” has been one of the movement’s fundamentals, suggesting eco-socialism. Ecovillages are some of the most holistic and most important examples of relocalisation. The movements believe that these smaller-scale communities nurture more intimate relations among people and ensure that everyone is seen, heard and recognized – thus providing a sense of individual identity that is lacking in the anonymity and isolation of mass society (Norberg, 2002). Furthermore, Norberg argues that when people live in smaller-scale social and economic units, where mutual support is necessary, the human capacity for caring and kindness is enhanced. Ecovillages provide models for living close to the land and in community with one another – a vision that is inspiring for the increasing numbers of people who long to live in a way that is spiritually rewarding as well as ecologically sustainable. Increasingly, relocalisation has been debated as people have discovered that complex, interconnected issues must be dealt with rapidly and effectively if they are to achieve a resilient future in the face of climate change and peak oil (Leonard 2009, Hopkins 2008, Shuman 2000, Trainer 1998, 2006, Fotopoulos 2002, 2006, Garden 2006). The relocalisation activists believe that all good intentions and sophisticated analyses of global problems and solutions by academics, politicians, think tanks and concerned ordinary people mean nothing until, and unless, individual citizens take personal actions to change their lifestyles. Two factions of this literature are noteworthy. I call them the ‘redemptionists’ and ‘survivalists’ according to their ulterior motives.

**The Redemptionist**

Based on the assumption that ‘nature is finite’ and what economists call economic growth in reality is the liquidation of the natural wealth of the planet (Solnit, 2004), the redemptionists argue that the rich nations can only live as they do now because they have been taking and using up most of the scarce resources, and preventing most of the world’s people from having anything like a fair share.
Therefore, the redemptionists strongly argue that the rich nations cannot morally endorse their way of life and must accept the need to move to far simpler and less resource expensive ways (Trainer 1985, 1995, 2000; Jackson 2002). They advocate that the Third World should aim to rely on their own goods and services in order to escape from what they see as unfair relations with the First World, and the Third World should re-localize the problems as they become too complex and too interconnected. They often refer to economic analyses of the post-colonial Third World (such as those by Maren, 2002; Rosberg, 2005; Rich, 1995; Frank, 1984; Chossudovsky, 1988, 1991; Clairmonte, 1986; Easterly, 2002; Hancock, 1994) to infer that satisfactory development for the Third World is totally impossible in a global economy driven by market mechanisms (Trainer 1995, 1998, 2000, 2006), or, for that matter, by Bretton Woods-style economic assistance. There has been an increase in development in the Third World, but most of it has been completely inappropriate to the needs of the majority of people. Foreign investors never invest in what is most needed. These mechanisms have brought about Third World development in the interests of the rich, i.e. the Third World elites, the transnational corporations and the people in rich countries who consume the Third World’s raw materials. Thus, conventional-capitalist development is increasingly being seen as a process of plunder.

Further, alongside the argument that the scale of most social and economic institutions throughout the world’s history before the advent of colonialism and imperialism had been at the local level as opposed to regional, inter-regional or global, the anti-globalization authors argue that the process of globalization has to be brought to a halt as soon as possible and reversed. “Relocalisation is a shift in the direction of revitalized local, diversified and at least partially self-sufficient smaller economies” (Mander 1996:13). Mander believes this model offers more chance of success than the currently promoted, clearly utopian, globally-centralized expansionist model. Counter to the charge by the defenders of the global economy that local economy can be “provincial” and “autocratic”, Mander (1996) argues that considerable historical evidence showed local and indigenous economic-political systems have usually been more stable and peaceful than the chaotic one seen in the Third World or developing world today. In addition, the localists contend that the problems will be solved by production of local consumption – using local resources, under the guidance and control of local communities, and reflecting local and regional cultures and traditions within the’ limits of nature’. Following this train of thought, trade must be limited to providing those things that cannot be provided locally. Norberg (1996) speaks of shifting direction from global dependence to local interdependence; Berry (1996) makes a passionate plea for a return to community and an argument that a new political opportunity now exists, namely, “the party of community” against “the parties of globalization”; and Goldsmith (1996) calls for reversing
globalization by firstly identifying the ways in which corporations and the state have usurped all aspects of individuals’ lives and in response, viable local communities and participatory democracy are reestablished.

Influenced by this thought, there are groups of people who undertake intentional community living projects. They seek a whole new way of creating a new society, an alternative society. “Instead of doing battle with the ponderous dinosaur of the old society with all its fault and wrongs, we would just go out and create a new one”, is the adage of these movements (Bang 2005:32). The single theme in all relocalisation groups is their attempts to produce a coherent and ‘holistic’ approach to confront social and ecological problems through the creation of the ‘alternative society’ model, minimizing ecological impact but maximizing human happiness and well-being. Jackson (2002) founded GEN, a network of ‘intentional communities’ aimed to build such an alternative society. He believes that they will eventually win out “because the current system is not meeting the needs of a large percentage of the world’s population”. Regarding the Third World problems, he contends that the people in the West are predominantly unaware:

...the global society of the 21st century is in crisis – spiritually, socially and environmentally, though Western media mostly do not reflect this view, and this is not surprising since the crisis is most visible in the other 90% of the world’s population (Jackson and Jackson, 2002:130).

Another protagonist of intentional community movement, Trainer (2000), argues that to change and build a sustainable, just and satisfactory society, there is a requirement for a change from the materialistic and hedonistic lifestyles into a “Simpler Way” in which everyone will live very frugally and self-sufficiently in economies that are mostly small and have highly localized, self-sufficient and cooperative ways under social control (i.e. not determined by market forces or profit), and without any economic growth. None of these structural changes is possible without huge and radical value change (Trainer, 2000). For Trainer, the fate of the planet depends on the future of the global ecovillage movement and there is nothing more important for individuals to do now than to help the movement flourish (Trainer, 2006). Thus, the crucial task that must be performed is to have built the impressive examples of eco-villages which will show that a workable and attractive alternative is available (Trainer, 2000, 2006).

Gaia Trust, Findhorn Foundation, Schumacher Society, Sierra Club, Global Ecovillage Network (GEN), are among the redemptionist groups by my classification. They have developed ecovillages around the world and engaged in numerous fields of activity: the design of low-impact human settlements, promoting sustainable local economics, organic and locally based food production and processing, earth restoration, revival of participatory, community-scale governance,
social inclusion, peace activism and international solidarity, holistic - whole person education, and many others. Their activities may include water management, healing, culture and arts, waste management and recycling, spiritual enquiry and so on (Dawson 2006, Bang 2005, Jackson 2002). In sum, Jackson (2002) argues, the ecovillage movement is a reaction to the global socio-ecological crisis, but in positive and constructive mode, based on personal action in changing lifestyle in keeping with the longer term needs of a global society in ecological balance. “They may well be the models for the rest of the world to turn to, when the reality of the current crisis is finally acknowledged” (Jackson, 2002:130). In its latest development, GEN made a strategic shift from an inward emphasis on self-sufficiency toward more outward concentration on educational efforts and making cross linkages with citizen initiatives such as the Transition Town movement (Dawson, 2013) below.

**The Survivalist**

Literature belonging to the ‘survivalist’ category is characterized by its practical and solution-oriented initiatives aiming to create communities with the practical capacity to be resilient in the face of the dual challenge of climate change and ‘peak oil’ over which local communities have little control. While it continues the long-tradition of grassroots and other environmental-social movements that have campaigned against environmentally and socially damaging practices, it has arrived at last at the conclusion that ‘it’s too late for sustainability’.

Accordingly, the only realistic response would be to adapt creatively the global resource shortages, thus, transitioning into post-carbon world (Bailey et al., 2010; Barry, 2012). Henceforth, the concept of resilience emerges as a key human capacity to deal with uncertainties and vulnerability, “just as we cannot eliminate vulnerability, resilience must be the capacity to withstand and recover from ‘wounding’ and ‘harm’ we cannot eliminate” (Barry, 2012: 80). Subsequently, the word resilience is used as replacement for sustainability, and less unsustainable for sustainable (Bailey et al., 2010; Barry, 2012). The Transition Town (TT) movement by Transition Network, an example of this group, has become the fastest growing environmental movement in the global North (Hopkins, 2008). With over 30 official TT initiatives in the UK, the concept is now spreading to New Zealand, Canada and many more countries. Authors on Transition practice include Rob Hopkins, Liam Leonard, John Barry, and Stephen Quilley. The relocalisation theme at the heart of Transition movement was drawn from the logic of ‘peak oil’, that in the long term, chronic energy shock will engender a much more localized ‘bio-regional’ pattern of economic production and consumption (Heinberg, 2005; Kunstler, 2005, 2010).

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72 This is the position one can find in authors such as Kunstler (2005), Lovelock (2006) and Korowicz (2010). For them, humanity has already passed a tipping point and that we are inexorably on a downward trajectory in terms of energy use, social complexity, population growth, economic growth, and so on.
Imminent and permanent short fall in oil supply will increase year on year with massive geo-political, economic and social consequences. It also considers the reality and implications of rapid and potentially catastrophic climate change. In *The Transition Handbook, From Oil Dependency to Local Resilience*, Hopkins (2008) enumerates a number of distinct characteristics of TT:

1. is not a protest movement, it is non-confrontational
2. Supports national and multilateral efforts to reduce emissions and to develop new energy technologies and infrastructures
3. Leaves climate change protest to environmental campaigning groups, NGOs, and activists oriented towards a global civil society.
4. Takes resource and environmentally caused geo-political conflict for granted
5. Rather than campaigning against globalization or in favour of a ‘globalization from below’, the TT project is premised on the end of globalization and the inevitability of environmentally induced socio-economic and political disorder.
6. Sees the time for seeing ‘globalization as an invincible and unassailable behemoth, or localization as some kind of lifestyle choice, is over’ (Hopkins, 2008:15) and ‘Small is Inevitable’ (Hopkins, 2008:68).
7. Seeks to take charge of their own destinies and to develop relocalisation strategies, initiatives that anticipate what is seen to be inevitable reversal of globalization.
8. Argues that positive and up-lifting visions of a more friendly post-oil future are more likely to induce active participation and behavioral change.
9. Demonstrates the future with less oil could be preferable to the present (Hopkins, 2008:53; Kunstler, 2005)

The focus on the practical typifies Transition initiatives. In practice, measuring a community’s resilience is to undertake a SWOT analysis, that is, an informed examination of its Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats for advancing Transition movement (Barry, 2012). To address the mechanics of personal and social change the Transition Network used models from ‘addiction studies’ to explore the psychology of how individuals modify behaviors and acquire positive ones73 (Bailey et.al., 2010). Several techniques from organizational studies to promote community changes have been utilized in the Transition movement. The first is the creation of shadow economic, social and technological infrastructures in readiness for the failure of existing systems, PPI (Parallel Public Infrastructure) (Bailey et.al, 2010). These include:

- infrastructure to support locally-produced products, energy storage, public transport, currencies, seed storage, grains, reforestation, general municipal services, information sharing, and shortened supply chain (Bailey et.al, 2010:599)

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73"Typically the arguments claim that the first response people make when informed of peak oil and climate change and the inevitable transition at some near point in the future to a post-oil and climate change and transformed economy and society in the twenty-first century is, like an addict being confronted with their addiction, one of denial. Then comes anger, negotiation/compromise, before-if all goes well-acceptance, reflection, change and action to post-addiction state" (Barry, 2012:101).
Quite importantly, instead of informed by forecasting, PPI is informed by backcasting, a technique employed by several disciplines to explore the steps involved in achieving desired future states (Bailey et al., 2010). Mass communication technology including internet and open-source software has been crucial to the dissemination of Transition messages (Bailey et al., 2010). According to Barry (2012), the notion of resilience entails: creativity (make new inventions in response to necessity), as well as older virtues of fortitude, courage, foresight and prudence. Similar to green intentional community movements, the transition movement is indeed utopian, but their utopianism is deeply pragmatic (Sargisson, 2009).

To summarize, against the dual challenge of peak oil and climate change, the relocalisation movement appears very different from ‘conventional environmentalism’, or, ‘the exhausted, co-opted and compromised connotations of orthodox sustainable development’, or the ‘naïve techno-optimism’, or, ‘ecological modernization’, or the ‘green version of business as usual’ (Barry, 2012; Bailey et al., 2010). Relocalisation does not speak about a nation-state-scale of changes towards sustainable trajectories through changes in technology, the economy and government. Rather, it comes close to ‘survivalism’ (Barry, 2012). It draws upon pragmatic strategies to “save as much as we can of civilization, and as many people as we can” (Barry, 2012:83).

In response, Trainer gives a very positive view of the ‘survivalists’ approaches. According to him, if the world ever manages to create a tapestry of highly localized, ‘zero-growth economies’, it will have to be due to something like the Transition Town movement (Hopkins, 2008). But he also makes a ‘friendly critique’ of the movement, worrying too much emphasis has been given merely on building ‘resilience’ within consumer-capitalist society without giving attention to replacing the fundamental structure of consumer-capitalist society (Trainer, 2009a, 2009b). He argues that the existing economy is quite capable of accommodating what the Transition movement is doing. Thus, the Transition movement should attempt to replace the core institutions of consumer capitalism, rather than merely building resilience within them. Trainer puts forward a radical ‘zero growth economy’ in which,

(1) There can be no interest payments to eradicate growth

If you do away with growth then there can be no interest payments. ...The present economy literally runs on interest payments of one form or another, an economy without interest payments would have to be totally different mechanisms for carrying out many processes... (Trainer, 2011:77)

(2) There is radical change in cultural attitudes towards consumption, hence, the notion of ‘economic sufficiency’

(3) Market activity would not be driven by an ethics of profit maximization, but, presumably by some ethics of genuine mutual benefit and concern (Trainer, 2011).
The Challenges of Relocalisation

Besides what is perceived as ‘technophobia’, the question of scale has been the most ready criticism by conservative environmentalists to the “small is beautiful” philosophy of relocalisation (Lewis, 1992). Various challenges to relocalisation attempts have been documented. Middlemiss and Parrish (2010) noted that grassroots initiatives for sustainability rely on people with limited power, limited resources and limited ability to influence others, so volunteers can face challenges including hostility from local people, difficulties in securing funding, and ‘burn out’ as the strain of volunteering with limited support takes its toll. Sargisson (2009) identified financial hardship, unequal income distribution, increasing materialism in some members, boredom and distraction from original intent of the community as problems in green intentional communities she studied. Trainer identified cultural attitudes towards consumption as a huge problem. Consequently, limited choice of lifestyle in green intentional communities is identified by de Geus (2009) as a challenge. Thus, “What is required is much greater social change than Western society has undergone in several hundred years” (Trainer, 2011:17). Relatedly, being non-confrontational in action, Transition initiatives have yet to find strategies to influence corporations who spawn actively energy-dependent lifestyles (Bailey et al, 2010:600). As yet, no major corporations have become active partners in Transition initiatives. In sum, Dawson, the President of GEN Europe fostering the development of ecovillages in Africa identifies cultural renewal and economic empowerment at the root of the problem to be addressed in the relocalisation movement:

There are two key common threads which link the Northern intentional communities and Southern community-based initiatives: First, both were seeking to consciously regain greater democratic, popular control over community resources that were coming under greater attack from corporate capitalism. Second, both recognized that at root, the problem to be addressed was at least as much cultural as economic in nature. That is, in the South, traditional communities were being undermined both not only by the aggressive behavior of corporations in usurping control over community resources, but also by the barrage of media messages undermining traditional values and ways of life. In the North, meanwhile, efforts at self-reliance and restraint were swamped by the prevalent corporate-driven cultural norm that quality of life could be equated with levels of material consumption. Movements both North and South, consequently, defined their objectives equally in terms of cultural renewal and economic empowerment. (Dawson, 2006:18).

Kasper (2008) identified individualism as another challenge to ecovillages. Although people inclined to join an ecovillage tend to already reject this characteristic of US society, it is not a simple matter to unlearn a lifetime of socialization in the dominant culture. Elsewhere, from a political point of view, the Marxist-style criticisms see relocalisation as an utopian project that has no clear anti-systemic goals (Fotopoulos, 2000), and Bailey et al (2010) admitted, besides penetrating other global
networks that remains a major challenge; bridging the gap between community action and the political mainstream, is an altogether different challenge.

4.3 Relocalisation in the Green Politics Arena

From what is already presented, relocalisation is therefore a localized green political response to predominant un-sustainability, in which the primary aim is to reduce local un-sustainability as much as possible and enhance local resilience, rather than engage in much wider political projects to realize sustainability (Barry, 2012). This decentralist approach, however, has been criticized by the centralist proponent of green politics. How the arguments unfold is important to this research that considers the potentials of Muslim communities to advance relocalisation with local, rather than state’s governance.

Centralist analysis has been called neo-Malthusian or neo-Hobbesian. While there has been no new centralist analysis writing since 1970s, Heibroner (1977) and Ophuls (1977) have been continually referred to as centralist thinkers in ecological politics literature to date (Marshall, 1994; Press, 1996; Radcliffe, 2000). A number of issues raised by centralists in my opinion remained crucial in thinking of relocalisation. Centralists do not see the present democratic institutions and economic structure as being able to cope with the ecological crisis, and propose ‘centralized expert government’ and a largely authoritarian society. Heilbroner came up with a ‘collectivist state’ which he envisaged had to institute a large degree of intellectual control over its citizens. Further, he argues that a central role for an intellectual and skilled elite is needed while the mass of the population would have to be kept in the dark concerning disagreements between scientists (Heilbroner, 1977:26). In defence of capitalism, he considered an increase in planning and market control by both government and multinationals as necessary to sustain capitalism (1977). Heilbroner also foresaw the establishment of ‘statist religion’, a movement away from individual to communal ethic.

What is crucial in the statist religion, as I foresee, is the elevation of the collective and communal destiny of man to the forefront of public consciousness, and the absolute subordination of private interests to public requirements. (Heilbroner, 1977:95)

Ophuls (1977) proposes the ‘Hobbesian Solution’ of a strong state and the need of a scientific elite who would determine the requirements of the society. He agreed with Hardin’s sentiment that ‘Injustice is preferable to total ruin’ (Hardin and Badin, 1977:28)

Better that we should choose Brave New World and try to make it as benign as possible than to continue along the path of non-politics; for this would surely earn us – quite justly – the enmity of posterity (Ophuls, 1977b:171)
And he went so far as to consider the oligarchic system as well:

Thus, whatever its level of material affluence, the steady state society will not only be more authoritarian and less democratic than the industrial societies of today – the necessity to cope with the tragedy of the commons would alone ensure that – but it will also in all likelihood be much more oligarchic as well, with only those possessing the ecological and other competencies necessary to make prudent decisions allowed full participation in the political processes. (Ophuls, 1977:158)

Overall, Orr and Hill (1978:461) listed four assumptions implicit to all the centralist authors:

1. That an authoritarian state can cope with its own increased size and complexity
2. That it can muster sufficient skill to exert control over the external environment, and
3. That this condition can be maintained in perpetuity
4. That we have no other practical choice (1978:461)

In a diametrically opposed position to centralist, the decentralists hold that the more severe the problem the more difficult it would be for a centralist and authoritarian group to manage. For that reason, decentralization is inevitable. The political organization along decentralist lines is increasingly perceived to be “practical and desirable by activists in areas of politics which may not have as their original aim an ecological society” (Allaby, 1977:244). Decentralists are highly critical of the idea of ecological and development experts in the centralist’s thesis and questioned the role of the experts and their relationship to other members of society (Radcliffe, 2000). Within the decentralist faction are the eco-socialists which the eco-anarchists belong to. The debates between Ted Trainer “Simpler Way”, Takis Fotopoulos “Inclusive Democracy” and Mary Garden “Leaving Utopia” are appropriate here. The most debated areas about relocalisation ideas are i) the bottom-up approach of relocalisation as opposed to the top-down dominant paradigm; and ii) the exclusive approach of intentional community as opposed to the inclusiveness of open society.

Trainer’s decentralist Simpler Way can only be understood by limits to growth analysis. He rejects the underlying growth paradigm that traditionally shaped both capitalist and socialist economics and advocates a ‘zero-growth economy’. He advocates a radically low-consumption, anarchist answer to the question of social and economic transformation, and rejects conventional Marxist strategy of taking control of the state. For him, in a world of very limited resources it will not be possible for big centralized or authoritarian governments to run things satisfactorily. The zero-growth economy must never be introduced from the “top-down” but must be built from the grassroots up, without reliance on state support. The main issue is how to develop existing towns and suburbs into participatory eco-villages. The state, no matter how powerful or ruthless or benign, simply can’t make ecovillages work. They will not work unless there is widespread eagerness to cooperate and live simply and self-sufficiently (Trainer, 2000). While favouring renewable energy
Trainer (2007) criticizes the general assumption that renewable energy can replace oil to sustain consumer societies, and that the advancement of technology can sustain growth paradigm.

A Marxist, Takis Fotopoulos, the Inclusive Democracy theorist, critiques Trainer’s “Simpler Way” from a political point of view. He continues to argue that political movement is needed rather than simply bottom-up community self-initiated action. For him, only if present antisystemic activities prefiguring the system become an integral part of an antisystemic movement, could they be part of a solution to the critical problem, rather than the problem itself. According to Fotopoulos, the reason that Trainer adopts a “Simpler Way” scenario is because for him the greatest problem is scarcity, not democracy and power, whereas for the Inclusive Democracy (ID) viewpoint, the sustainability and scarcity problem could be solved somehow by the elites if they reach a complete cul-de-sac through the introduction of any kind of authoritarian or even fascist measures and restrictions they deem necessary at the moment of crisis. So, the real issue is not the problem of scarcity or sustainability but, rather, at whose expense these problems are going to be solved: are they going to be resolved at the expense of the elites and privileged social classes, or at the expense of the working classes and the weaker elements of society. The problem is, therefore, whether or not people will establish institutions securing the equal distribution of political, economic and social power (direct, economic and social democracy respectively) which can then create the institutional preconditions (inclusive democracy – i.e. decentralization in terms of confederated self-reliant demos) as well as the cultural preconditions (paideia) for ecological democracy (Fotopoulos, 2006). For Fotopoulos this is a far more likely scenario than Trainer’s “eco-rosy” scenario according to which people would quickly realize that the old system can no longer provide for them, forcing them to turn to local economic development, as governments would no longer be able or willing to run things for them, and leading, therefore to the emergence of local systems (Fotopoulos, 2006). He also critiques the “Simpler Way” and ecovillage model (which suggest that individuals could work here and now the transformation through small local groups is beginning to take more control over their local economies) as simply presuming that the condition could be achieved with no fight against capitalism. Even though the “Simpler Way” is death for capitalism, but the way they will defeat it is by ignoring it to death, by turning away from it and building those many bits of the alternative that they could easily build right now (Fotopoulos, 2006). According to Fotopoulos that premise is outright false. He asserts that he never assumed that the process could be completed without a fight against capitalism, simply by ignoring it.

In this respect, Mary Garden also argues that the GEN ecovillage movement does little to directly address ecological or environmental crisis as it does not lobby governments or try to change
the actions of corporations. In response, Jackson, founder of GEN, argues that individuals should not be looking to governments and other powerful institutions to implement solutions. Jackson states that the problems involved in living sustainably are too complex and too diverse to be solved from a traditional top-down perspective (Garden, 2006). Both Garden and Fotopoulos argue that the relationship of society to the economy and polity is completely ignored by GEN, presumably because the capitalist market economy and ‘representative’ democracy are taken for granted. In addition, GEN is accused of having partnership links with even the transnational elite-controlled UN and EU. Moreover, Garden and Fotopoulos share a common concern of their objection to what they call GEN’s ‘spiritual overtones’ of the movement (Garden, 2006; Fotopoulos, 2006). Garden has been sceptical of the prospect of the eco-village movement being regarded as the most significant movement in the twentieth century because the majority of people in the world have never heard of it. Those that have are more likely to dismiss it as another New Age rainbow or even find it objectionable as John in a blog on LiveJournal.com writes (Garden, 2006):

It smacks of retreatism: the world can go to hell, but we’ll be okay!” He points out that people in the world are extricated in a complicated, mostly invisible net of dependencies with it. But the problem does not exist at the level of individual choice. An eco-village situated within the borders of the US or Italy is not sovereign; its precondition of existence is the existence of the American or the Italian state and all that it entails. There is no escape in this way; the structure must be altered or nothing else matters (Garden, 2006:5)

Answering the critiques to Simpler Way and its alternative community, Trainer argues that the creation of eco-villages is neither about salvation nor the proponents are escapists who fled from the rat race. Rather, they are made up of people coming together with the right vision to form a new society or gradually converting the existing communities towards sustainable communities (Trainer, 2000, 2006). Trainer acknowledges the greatest challenge is not with rural intentional communities where most impressive examples of ecovillages are at present, but with converting existing settlements in dying country towns and the suburbs of big cities. The task is to convert them into highly self-sufficient cooperative local economies which are largely self-sufficient. Thus, people need to learn to begin producing for themselves their basic needs and other things they require. They need to learn to draw the resources from local gardens and restored forests (Trainer, 2006). Trainer recognizes the importance of political movement as well, but does not believe the existing movements are able to head in the required direction to manage to get to a sustainable and just world. He looks, instead, at small local groups that have already started taking more control over their local economies. Individuals’ role, according to Trainer (2006), is to lead and facilitate this through the formation of what he calls Community Development Cooperatives (CDC). Trainer (2006) points out that this is precisely his main difference with Fotopoulos who gives no help regarding the
ways individuals might begin the required political movement. In addition, Trainer holds that this revolution is about radical change in culture into a worldview which willingly and happily energizes the new ways because these new ways cannot be forced or even given, but need to be searched creatively. Furthermore, such revolution cannot be led by vanguard parties and there is no value in capturing state power.

If the revolution was simply about replacing capitalist control of consumer society by socialist control it could be in principle be done from the top down quickly, and if necessary ruthlessly. But the brutal, fundamental fact of coming severe scarcity means that this revolution can’t be like that. It means that the goal has to be largely autonomous small communities managing their local economies and ecosystems well to enable frugal, cooperative and highly self-sufficient lifestyles. (Trainer, 2006:3-4)

Trainer, in this respect, is in agreement with me and my thesis of studying existing local Muslim communities to advance relocalisation endogenously for their members, given that the revolution needed “can only be developed, worked out, learned by people where they live as they grope to local management of their particular local situation and conditions” (Trainer, 2006:4).

4.3.1 Relocalisation and the Research

From what has been presented, obviously, the redemptionists’ motives of solidarity with the poorer South, or deliverance from the ‘sins’ of the richer North, simply do not apply to the poor in the Third World. The survivalists’ seem to be more logically persuasive for the Muslim groups to mobilize provided they are informed of the peak oil and climate change consequences in socio-ecological domains. Therefore, the research focused on whether the ‘survivalists’ motives are able to raise the Muslim groups’ interest in relocalisation ideals. It is worth noting, nevertheless, while the fact that ecological and social problems in low income countries are arguably more pressing than in the post-industrial world74, relocalisation does not yet seem to have attracted the interest of high profile environmental groups in the Third World and no one has studied the combined concerns about peak oil, climate change, globalization, third world developmentalism and poverty in Indonesia. Studying all issues together is critically needed for the following reason. First, peak oil in Indonesia is an ‘unmentionable crisis’ as it is elsewhere as Greer (2013) argues. Second, like anywhere else, climate change in Indonesia appeared an abstract and distant issue. Third, the study of globalization without

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74 In addition to the bleak prospects of sustainability in the Third World discussed in section 4.2.1, Sunderlin et al (2005) in their work on livelihoods, forest and conservation in developing countries contend with the question whether poverty alleviation and forest conservation can be made convergent rather than divergent given the chronic rural poverty and the use of forest resources to prevent rural people from falling into deeper poverty. Concerning climate change and agriculture in developing countries, Mendelsohn (1999) argues that tropical regions in the developing world are particularly vulnerable to potential damage from environmental changes because the poor soils that cover large areas of these regions have made much of the land unusable for agriculture.
raising doubt has been undertaken by many Indonesian scholars in various disciplines. In my opinion, without an understanding of the twin challenges of peak oil and climate change, globalization study tends to encourage developmentalism and larger participation in the global economy for both economic growth and poverty eradication.

The ecovillage relocalisation movement by GEN is possibly the only prominent strategy that has been attempted in the Third World (Dawson, 2006; Jackson, 2002). Nevertheless, the GEN initiative is not endogenous\(^\text{75}\), it has been ‘imported’ from outside the Asian and African societies within which it has been implemented. In fact, while literature on various streams of relocalisation has documented the successes and failures of the movement in the Western world, there does not yet appear to have been a critical examination of the concept and its exigency, desirability and possibility in Third World countries or the Muslim world specifically. The lack of studies was commented on by Burke and Arjona (2013) who argued that preconceptions about the Global South have impeded the understanding about the challenges of creating ecovillages in the South.

For example, Ross Jackson’s argument that “people in the South grasp the revolutionary potential of ecovillages much quicker than Northerners” because “they still have their social fabrics more or less intact and see the ecovillage model as fully compatible with their village-based culture” leads us to misunderstand the context for and challenges of creating ecovillages in the South (Burke and Arjona, 2013:246).

Burke and Arjona argue that effective analysis requires that non-Northerners’ experiences are described without falling into common stereotypes of Southerners as “either fully comprehensible via the lens of poverty” or as “idyllic villagers with a natural, intuitive, almost magical ‘traditional’ knowledge of ecovillage living” (p.246). Further, they said:

Such essentialized preconceptions impede critical reflections on the actual experiences that give rise to and result from alternative political ecologies in the Global South. The same might be said for stereotypes of the North as a land of economic privilege, social alienation and lifestyle-based ecological devastation. The truth is far more interesting and far more useful (p.246).

To enter into the debates, I argue that a study of relocalisation in the Third World cannot be done without taking into account the enduring unequal power relations in the global political-economic order. Historical study and continuing analysis of economic and other relations between First World nations and their satellites in the Third World are presented by authors such as Chomsky (2002, 2003) Clarmonte (1986), Chossudovsky (1988, 1991), Boyce (1989) and Millet (2004). They suggest

\(^{75}\) Endogenous development refers to “the sum of views, values and practices which marginalised, silenced or oppressed societal actors create from within in response to the initiatives of development coming from outside or being implemented top-down” (Haerkort and Rist, 2007:7).
that the Third World is left with little capacity to respond to the challenge of sustainability appropriately. Herein, Martin Kohr (1996) from the Third World Network in Penang, Malaysia, one of the world’s leading voices of opposition to the present globalization pattern with offices in Asia, Africa and South America, is relevant to the research. According to Kohr, the world needs radical reshaping of the international economic and financial order so that economic power, wealth and income are more equitably distributed and so that the developed world will be forced to lower its irrationally high consumption levels:

If this is done, the level of industrial technology will be scaled down and there will be less need for the tremendous waste of energy, raw material and resources that now go toward the production of superfluous goods simply to maintain “effective demand” and to keep the monstrous economic machine going. If appropriate technology is appropriate for the Third World, it is even more essential as a substitute for the environmentally and socially obsolete high technology in the developed world (Kohr, 1996:57).

Yet, Kohr believes that “it is almost impossible to hope that the developed world will do this voluntarily”.

It will have to be forced to do so, either by a new unity of the Third World in the spirit of OPEC in the 1970s and early 1980s or by the economic or physical collapse of the world economic system (p.57)”.

He asserts that although the task to create a new economic and social order based on environmentally-sound principles seems impossible, and can make everyone “feel it will end in defeat”, it actually is the greatest challenge of the world today, for it is tackling the issue of the survival of the human species and of earth itself.

To sum up, the I have presented the concept of relocalisation as it is debated by its thinkers, to make the following points:

1. There is a need for endogenous models of relocalisation to be developed from within the Third World communities themselves.
2. Research is needed into the potential of Islam and the global Muslim community (Ummah) to advance a global Islamic environmental movement through a global network of endogenous relocalisation by local Muslim communities. On this, the following should be taken into consideration:
   (i) the non-organizational structure of Islam that suggests the inherently de-centralistic nature of Islam; and
   (ii) the quasi-centralized-nature of the Ummah by One God; one Book (the Quran); the Prophet Muhammad, and his tradition (Sunna) constitute the Islamic symbolic universe already discussed in Chapter 2.

4.4 What Islam has for Relocalisation

Further to Chapter 2 that explicates the potential of capitalizing on the Islamic symbolic universe to mobilize an alternative global environmental movement, this section investigates the features of
Islam to examine in what way Islam can accommodate relocalisation. It should be borne in mind, nevertheless, that the deliberation of what are considered as ‘positive’ qualities of Islam in this respect should be placed in the context of the ‘knowledge in community’ framework clarified in Chapter 2. That is, the knowledge of Islam as understood by the ordinary Muslims themselves, or, how Muslims view Islam themselves. Stated differently, neither does it assume that there is a universal rationality which Muslims and non-Muslims will certainly come to agree upon. It should be clear that the ‘knowledge in community’ framework in Chapter 2 implies there is hardly any universal rationality under different symbolic universes. In that sense I correspond with Jovchelovitch (2007) about ‘incommunicability of worldviews’. Therefore, while the thesis may fall under the category of postmodernism in that undermines the modernist claim of universal rationality, unlike postmodernism that “has its own metaphysics despite its frantic attempt to deny any metaphysical stance” (Farouk-Alli, 2006:32), this thesis articulates Islamic metaphysics. In further contrast with postmodernism that relativizes all truth claims, this thesis contends that truth claims are legitimate within each symbolic universe and are not necessarily related to others. Thus, it promotes hermeneutically-informed understanding beyond merely tolerance. Furthermore, unlike postmodernism that “does not constitute an alternative social and political project due to its inherent cynicism and nihilism” (Farouk-Alli, 2006:297), this thesis aims to offer an alternative -albeit not a universal project- that is, endogenous Islamic relocalisation. Looked at in this way, postmodernism articulates the Islamic principle to deal with plurality that the Quran tells us: \textit{lakum dinukum waliyadin} “[Say]: To you be your way, and to me mine” (Q: 109:6). It also articulates the Islamic principle that governs relations between humans, \textit{atta’aruf} or acquaintance, as the Quran tells us: ‘\textit{O people! We have formed you into nations and tribes so that you may know one another}’ (Q: 49:13) – it is not to conquer, or convert, or subjugate, but to reach out towards others.

\textbf{4.4.1 Islamic Utopia of the Medina Society}

In a pragmatic research that seeks realistic and doable solutions, this research considers Islamic utopia comparable to any other utopian imaginary that has inspired green intentional community movements in the West as illustrated in the \textit{relocalisation activist} literature. Medina community is believed by the Muslims to be the most perfect Islamic society, a society according to which all other Islamic societies are ‘judged’. Medina, the city where the Prophet Muhammad established the first Islamic political entity, recognizes religious, social, and cultural plurality among its citizens\textsuperscript{76}. This has

\textsuperscript{76} The Quran is perhaps the most universalist of all sacred scriptures in the sense of asserting openly that religion begins with the origin of the human state itself, that God has revealed religion to all people, and that He has created diverse religions so that followers of various religions would vie with each other in piety and virtue (See the Quran, 5:48).
been taken as a model set by the Prophet to reify Islam as a complete system governing all religious, social, political, cultural and economic orders and encompassing all things material, spiritual, societal, individual, and personal. Interest in Medina society has continuously renewed among Muslim communities whenever they face issues of plurality of religion, Islamic politics and governance, and justice. The similitude of Islamic utopia and ecological utopia is perhaps best illustrated in the following. In criticism of modern political thinkers on sustainable society through ecotopia, de Geus (2009) claimed that the notion of utopia has rarely received any recognition, “instead it is more often seen as a daydream, romantic and unreachable fantasy” (p.78), and the “inspirational side” (p.84) of utopias has been unjustly neglected.

4.4.2. Shariah, a Path to Justice, Happiness and Well-being

In section 4.2, Gandhians prescribed a “no affluence-no poverty” approach to the dilemmatic socio-ecological problems in a world that is finite. Herein, I would like to propose for the Muslims an approach that is more in accordance with Islamic values whereby justice and equality mean that people should have equal opportunity but this does not imply that they should be equal in poverty or in riches. Therefore, it should be clear that I am neither advocating communist principles of equality, nor the spiritual sentimentality of the New Age that the following example illustrates. Pepper (1991) noted the New Age communards’ response to the questions of Third World exploitation has often been made by subverting justice in their ramification of the concept of ‘happiness’:

Third World people are exploited. They can’t control this. But they can control how they feel. They can walk around in a victim consciousness or they can walk around enjoying everything. You go to Sri Langka and you see the kids happy, happy, happy. You go to America and you are not happy as a race...You can be happy living in cardboard boxes (cited in Pepper, 1991:110).

Thus, I concur with a Marxist critique such as:

The whole New Age package is a mind-bending and soul-destroying enterprise, its main aim being to uphold present power relations...in practice, my observation is that radical politics...
are denounced as the distressed product of victim consciousness, while conservative ideology and practice are accepted without much question...For, in essence, New Age philosophies fit very comfortably with laissez faire individualistic Thatcherite economics...When faced with problems of oppression or hostility, New Age advise us to ‘just let go of your anger ... of your emotional attachments to your cause...Do not, for God’s sake, stay with your feelings of anger, distress or whatever, do not recognize their source and act on them, including fighting for ‘social change’ (Francis. 1991:12-13).

Islamic thought distinguishes the world into alam kabir (macro cosmic) and alam soghir (micro cosmic). Alam kabir is concerned with the outer world, the empirical world, and alam soghir the inner world. Islamic law is concerned with both. In an interpretivist research of those issues, I argue that we must have a clear distinction between the two alam (realms) before any analysis of the relationship between injustice, poverty, and happiness can be made intellectually. Within my Islamic sensibility, I view happiness is concerned with the inner world, whereas poverty and injustice are within the outer world. In my view, regardless of the injustices inflicted upon them, the oppressed - without doubt- can be happy too. But in the final analysis, the oppressor too will have to deal with the consequence in the outer world, such as the global environment crisis that is being witnessed. By confusing the outer world with the inner world, the New Age’s view of happiness has subverted the highest ethical principle that circumscribes the two alam (realms), namely, ‘doing any harm to another is doing harm to oneself’. This credo pervades the sacred foundation of Sharia laws that is believed as a path to justice, happiness and well-being.

4.4.3 Islamic Economics

The most striking feature of Islamic economics from a Western perspective is the prohibition of interest (riba). The elimination of interest payment would clearly involve the rewriting of capitalistic economics as it exists today and would produce a major change in the functioning of both national and international economic and financial systems (Presley and Sessions, 1994). Therefore, Islamic economics is in correspondence with the ‘zero growth economy’ that Trainer envisions. The payment of riba is explicitly prohibited by the Quran and investors must instead be compensated by other means, the prevalent method for such remuneration is by means of mudarabah profit and loss sharing. In banning riba, Islam seeks to establish a society which is again based upon fairness and justice (Quran 2:239). According to Islam, all income should be commensurate with work effort. Lending money for interest permits the lender to augment his capital without effort as money does not create a surplus value by itself. Only through the marriage between labor and capital can a surplus or a deficit result: it is fairer, therefore, for a provider of capital to share the profit or loss with the borrower than to obtain a fixed return, regardless of the outcome of the borrower’s business. According to Presley and Sessions (1994), mudarabah is not quite the same as allowing limited liability equity as it requires taking on the losses of companies when they occur, as well as
enjoying the profits. With this exception, there is a rule which prohibits debt and allows equity. Presley and Sessions (1994) identify a number of substantial differences in Islamic political economy from ‘capitalistic’ economics:

(i) God is the creator and owner of wealth and people are the vicegerent of God; however, people can pursue and use wealth in the form of a trustship from God (Quran 20:6).

(ii) It is divine duty to work. Social justice is the result of productive labor and equal opportunities such that everyone can use all their abilities in work and gain just reward from that work effort.

(iii) Justice and equality in Islam means that people should have equal opportunity and does not imply that they should be equal in poverty or in riches (Chapra, 1985). However it is incumbent on the Islamic state to guarantee subsistence level to its citizens, that is a minimum level of food, clothing, shelter, medical care and education (Quran 2:275-9). The major purpose is to moderate social variances within Islamic society, and to enable the poor to lead a normal, spiritual and material life in dignity and contentment.

(iv) The scope of economic intervention is broad and can include state interference in many areas of economic activity (Saqr, 1986:59). Such interference can take many forms, including general guidance and regulation by the State, but also might embrace more direct state ownership and direction. The duties assigned to the State under Islam primarily consist of commanding, counseling, controlling and protecting. The Quran orders society to obey God, His Prophet and their rulers (Quran 4:59) (in that order). An Islamic economic system operates on the fundamental principle that the forces of supply and demand should work freely in the determination of prices in all markets. Only in exceptional circumstances is there a justification for state intervention and even here the objective of such intervention is not to hinder freedom of trade but to secure more perfect information in the marketplace or to regulate or organize economic activities so as to protect economic freedom without harming either buyers or sellers.

(v) There is no justification for the payment of interest on loans.

The authors argue that Islamic economics and its mudarabah arrangement are superior compared to debt contracts, because it will result in more investment and less volatility of investment.

4.4.4 Today’s Problem might be Tomorrow’s Solutions

In the following discussion there are three issues that overlap one another which must be taken into account in envisioning an endogenous relocalisation model for the Ummah.

1. The fragmentation of the Muslim world into nation-states
2. The contemporary phenomenon of Global Islam
3. The environmentalist’s view of the world divided into nation-states’ interests

(1) The fragmented Muslim world

After World War II, the Muslim world appeared to be “nothing more than a collection of nation-states each with limited resources and a myriad of insoluble problems” (Sardar, 2006:573). As a matter of fact, nationalism in the Muslim majority countries was not without religious implication
and created havoc and confusion. The apprehension of shirk has been the key argument of the Traditionalist Islam against the Western idea of nation-state (see Chapter 5). From the overall perspective of the Islamic world, Nasr (2001) argues that Arab nationalism did much to weaken Islam and alienated Muslim peoples from each other, “and to dissect and divide the heritage of Islam that belongs to all Muslim people by right” (p.139). According to Nasr, it is the Arab nationalism that easily gave rise –in reciprocity- to a certain subjective pride of antiquity in the non-Arab Muslims, and even resulted in anti-Islamic tendencies in many newly-established non-Arab Muslim countries (2001:184). From an Islamic intellectual perspective, Islam’s denouncement of nationalism and tribalism is founded on its theo-centrism principle. This horizontal-allegiance, in my view is like eco-centrism which has made nature an ultimate end. Both are prone to the same pitfalls. Allegiance and responsibilities to nature per se ultimately lead to indifference to humanity, as allegiance to humanity per se ultimately leads to indifference to nature (see the debates between deep and social ecology in Bookchin (1987)). In contrast, within the theo-centrism and unitary perspective of Islam, all aspects of life, as well as all degrees of cosmic manifestation, are governed by a single principle and are unified by a common centre. Tawhid, the core belief of Islam, and ‘La ilaha illa Llah’ means ultimately that there is no being or reality other than the Absolute Being or the Absolute Reality, for there cannot be two orders of reality. In other words, there is nothing outside the power of God, and in a more esoteric sense “nothing outside His Being” (See Nasr, 2001). Therefore, the Islamic worldview is ‘supreme-being-centric’ as opposed to anthropo-centric or eco-centric. Nature, therefore, is only the portent of God (Arabic: ayah) and there is an inextricable and permanent relation between natural environments and the ‘Divine Environment’ which sustains and permeates them that the Quran alludes to in many verses (See Nasr, 1993).

78 “As soon as the nationalists came to power since early independence there opened a hidden inner contradiction between the handful leaders and the relentless pressure from the masses” (Gibb, 1962: 330), for the European type of nationalism is by nature against the universalism of Islam.

79 Shirk is the greatest sin in Islam. It is to deify something besides God, including motherland, fatherland and patria.

80 “...the force of modernism combined with extreme nationalism makes those Arabs affected by it look with a sense of pride towards all that is Arabic, including Islam, which is seen in this case as a purely Arabic “phenomenon”, and with disdain towards the non-Arab Muslims, especially the Persians and the Turks. The same force make the Persian affected by them feel an intense tension within himself between his Islamic and pre-Islamic past, and when the force of Islam weaken within him, a disdain for the Arabs, even to the extent of wanting to “purify” the Persian language of the Arabic influences ...” (Nasr, 2001:184).
Manzoor (1988)\textsuperscript{81} and Farouk-Alli (2006) pronounce that having been disillusioned by the failure of ‘modern’ ideologies to solve the problems of Islamic societies, Muslim thinkers have been increasingly turning to authentically Islamic models for help. Manzoor (1988) identified two contemporary models being contested: the Sharia-oriented thought and ‘fundamentalist’ thought. The former demonstrated that “its natural purview is civil society whose institutions are able to bring under its jurisdiction without necessarily coming into conflict with the state”, while the demand of the latter is “nothing less than the capture of political power at the level of the state” (Manzoor, 1988:2). This research aims to put forward the third model\textsuperscript{82}, relocalisation with self-local governance. This could be unique to the Indonesian Muslim groups if there have been no community development attempts conducted by Muslim organizations outside Indonesia, or rather it could simply have been overlooked by Manzoor (1988) in his presentation. It is the ‘self-help’ community development model, the category that is most pertinent to the issues, problems and agendas of the research. Concurrently, the third model corresponds to the trend that Nasr contends as well:

...one can envisage the possibility of the rise, once again, of a trend in the future towards a kind of Islamic political thought which combines the ideal of the unity of the Islamic world, based on culture, Divine Law, intellectual life, etc., with separate political units which embrace the majority peoples and cultural zones of the Islamic world, such as the Arabic, the Persians, the Turkish, etc.. (Nasr, 1994:313).

Manzoor projects “the unity of Islam as a world civilization derives in large measure from its possession of a sacred law, the Shariah”, which is “envisaged by Muslims to embody the divine will that announciates the principle of moral order”. He argues, nonetheless, that creative interpretation of Shariah is necessary:

Only a creative reinterpretation of the Shariah’s legacy that enables it to work under modern conditions and yet be in consonance with the Islamic conscience, would lend meaning and cogency to the moral and civilizational aspirations of Muslims today (Manzoor, 1988:1).

For the sake of clarification, Manzoor adds that the movement back to the Shariah represents a reactionary backlash against the modern forces of progress and Enlightenment, a phenomenon that may be contrary to popular opinion in the West and even in some Muslim circles (1988:1). Furthermore, Manzoor argues that the Shariah-mindedness of the Reformist is associated with the notion of justice and equity in Islam:

\textsuperscript{81} In the Introduction of a collection of writings based on papers presented at the International Islamic Conference on ‘Dawa and Development in the Muslim World: The Future Perspective’ (Mecca, 11-15 October, 1987).

\textsuperscript{82} See Chapter 7.
For submerged beneath all the cross-currents of political activism and resurgence lies the bedrock of Islamic conscience that serves as the moral foundation of the Muslim’s historical search for justice and equity. (Manzoor, 1988:1)

(2) The contemporary phenomenon of Global Islam

Along a similar line of argument, according to Sardar (2006), as global politics is increasingly becoming civilizational politics, “it is imperative for Muslims to see themselves not in terms of nation-states and national interests, but as a civilization and in terms of civilizational interests” (p.573). He argues further that as a global civilization, Muslims possess vast resources and enormous potentials, which would enable them to solve most of their problems.

Only when molded into a civilization, which involves pooling of resources and sharing of potentials of Muslim countries to tackle common problems and goals, would Muslims be able to move beyond parochial concerns of fragmenting nation-state and acute global marginalization toward shaping a vibrant and dynamic future for themselves. (Sardar, 2006:574)

For Sardar, one of the main strengths of Islam is its diversity:

a diversity that exhibits itself in numerous historic ways of expressing Islam: a diversity that is enveloped by a unity: a unity that manifests itself as a matrix of concepts and values that all Muslims accept without qualification (p.574)

When this religious diversity is combined with an ethnic plurality, the bewildering number of ethnicities within the world of Islam, Sardar continued, the true multicultural nature of Islam comes to the fore. Finally, “The plurality and diversity of Islam are the cornerstones for shaping a dynamic, thriving Muslim civilization of the future”. (p.574)

(3) The environmentalist’s view of world divided into nation-states’ interests

On the other hand, increasing global interactions have made the apprehension of ‘whole earth, one world family’ vision of the environmentalist easier. Early forms of environmentalism framed the concept of nature in local and national terms aimed at defending and protecting local environment or the national heritage, but during the twentieth century the meaning of nature was gradually expanded into the international level and then from the 1970s into a much more global version (Sutton, 2000). However, ironically, national sovereignty continuously stand in the way of creating an international framework for collective actions. Toynbee (1976) depicts rightly:

The present-day global set of local sovereign states is...not capable of saving the biosphere from man-made pollution or of conserving the biosphere’s non-replaceable natural resources...Will mankind murder Mother Earth or will he redeem her? This is the enigmatic question which now confronts (sic) Man. (pp. 593-6)

A sweeping inter-linkage between modernization and the rest of the environmental-development issues discussed in this chapter was given by Wallerstein (1992). He argues that the eighteenth-
century Enlightenment asserted the possibility of a conscious rational reform of society, the idea of progress, and the virtues of science vis-à-vis religion. It gave rise to the modern idea that treated each individual as a free centred subject with rational control over his or her destiny, and that control extended to the nation-state level. Thus, each nation-state was considered to be sovereign and free to rationally control its progressive development. The further elaboration of these ideas in classical political economy produced the grounds for the emergence of a developmentalist ideology. Referring to the centralist-decentralist positions of ecological politics in Radcliffe (2000), I argue that the trend and aspiration toward a unified, yet decentralized, Islamic world and the movement back to the Shariah must be viewed as an opportunity of a new vehicle for global environmental-movement within the Ummah to transitioning peak oil, scarcity and climate change. By grasping overall features of Islam and the latest development in the Muslim world, the researcher puts forward an endogenous relocalisation model that has a global dimension, namely, ‘Global network of endogenous relocalisation by local Muslim communities’ within ‘minimal states’. Minimal state or night watchman state is a form of government in political philosophy where the state’s legitimate function is only the protection of individual from assault, theft, breach of contract, or frauds (e.g. see Nozick, 2013). The advocates of this school are called minarchists. They argue that the state has no right to use its force to interfere with transactions between people. The only legitimate governmental institutions are the military, police and courts. I believe this scheme might serve best the conditions of the post-oil world. Nonetheless, numerous issues remain to be addressed given the non-organizational structure of Islam where there is no central religious authority for the whole Ummah:

1. The question of who makes the decision and how they are to be enforced in such a decentralized system based upon participatory democracy, given the solutions required to solve ecological problems would be too difficult for average people to accept. Such issues were among the investigation needed of the organizations being studied.
2. The question about the methods of transition to such a system and the issues of coordination regarding the scientific activities and distribution of resources.
3. More importantly, the coordination of global actions and policies need to face the ground reality of ineluctable peculiarities of local problems.

Having described the Muslim world in general, what follows is the present-day situation of Indonesia, the field of the research.

4.5 The Field: Indonesia. Big is Not Beautiful

The contemporary society and political life of Indonesia are characterized by pervasive fragmentation (Aspinall, 2013) and rapid urbanization (Firman, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2009; Cybriwsky, 2001; Bunnell, 2011) with its socio-cultural consequences in forms of weakening social cohesion and
sense of community (Colletta, 1999; Greenstein et al, 2000; Buehler, 2003; Keiner, 2005; Leem, 2012). These researches support further the rationale of the thesis on Muslim groups to advance endogenous relocalisation.

Nguitragool’s study (2012) of environmental governance in Indonesia gives an insight relevant to the research. He shows that the lack of large-scale social cohesion between civil society organizations and the public has been a key issue in Indonesian society besides a poor legal system. By lack of social cohesion, he refers to the fragmentation along the axis of class inequality and identity politics. He identifies social cohesion as especially crucial for effective environmental governance. It is the minimum level of social collectivity – in terms of social bonds, solidarity and trusts that manifest in forms of shared identity, interest and societal goal - required to exert adequate pressure to allow public monitoring and mobilization to function as both motivation and constraints to the government. Indonesia provides a precious example that large scale public cohesion in the Third World countries is neither stable nor permanent. With a highly-diverse population by ethnicity and religion, the two identities have always been ready to provide a layer of self-identification and social bonding from which political mobilization could take place whenever dissatisfaction appears. The emphasis on ethnicity, kinship and familial bond which has been particularly salient of Indonesian social and political lives is also the one that encouraged corruption, collusion and nepotism which have become so entrenched. A history of political oppression and economic inequality has given rise to local and indigenous elites which intensified socio-political fragmentation during the decentralization era, and therefore, undermined larger social cohesion while corruption, collusion and nepotism continue to persist or even escalate and become decentralized and less predictable.

Growing consumerism and the emergence of a new middle class in Asian countries as the inevitable result of economic growth has at least two implications on environmental issues: the problem of waste and moral confusion. For example, with a population of around 50 million, the province of West Java where the Jakarta-Bandung urban belt resides, generates nearly 50,000 tonnes of solid waste per day. Only 50-60% is collected – the rest is dumped in canals, vacant lots, or burned. Secondly, under these circumstances, the mentality of the villagers and indigenous communities alike, who supposedly live in harmony with nature, is corroding, and “the idea that cash and the economy are everything was driven into people’s mind” (Nguitragool, 2009:64). Therefore, the environmental campaigns by the NGOs that romanticize the image of local communities as the guardian of the rainforests are increasingly seen as an unrealistic depiction given the changing realities of their lives. In fact, having been forced to take on the path of modernization,
the villagers and indigenous communities are getting confused by the NGOs and academia who advocate that their ancestor’s ways of life are in fact correct (Nguitragool 2012).

4.6 Muslims’ Actions for the Environment

Finally, the review of what Muslims have attempted to deal with regarding environmental issues is necessary here. What follows are religious environmental movements and my commentaries on how they differ from the relocalisation approach.

Alliance of Religion and Conservation (ARC), sister organization of WWF International, is probably the most prominent faith-based environmental actions organization. ARC is claimed to be a secular body that aims to help the world’s major religions develop their own environmental programmes based on their core teachings, beliefs and practices. The idea behind ARC emerged in 1986:

“Realizing that local religious leaders are often active and influential within their communities, he [Prince Philip] concluded that helping local religious leaders appreciate their responsibility for the environment and explain that responsibility to the people in their communities would raise environmental awareness around the world.”

Eco-pesantren is a program to introduce ecological awareness into the Islamic school curriculum that was launched in Indonesia by the Ministry of Environment in 2009. It was one of the programs alongside ‘green and clean campus’; ‘eco office’; and ‘love flowers and animals’. Mangunjaya et al. (2010, 2012) hold that the clerics (Ulama) in general and large Muslim organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, would be the right partners for the government and NGOs to popularize the environmental movement effectively. The paucity of scholarly writings on eco pesantren, other than a simple description of the program such as in Mangunjaya (2010:128), is plausible due to its infancy at the time this research is undertaken. Still, there are legitimate reasons to question the capability of the program to proceed and reach out to 24,000 pesantren all over the country, given the meager budget and lack of authority of the Ministry of Environment (Nguitragool, 2012:66), and the fact that none of the pesantren has been fully funded by the government or are under its control.

Muslim Association for Climate Change Action (MACCA) is an example of an attempt by the Muslims to respond to environmental problems by organizing conferences in the trans-national sphere. The first meeting was held in July 2009 in Istanbul where some 200 Muslim scholars, representatives of Islamic civil society, organizations and representatives of Environmental Ministries in Islamic countries, including among others, Morocco, Bahrain, Turkey, Indonesia,

83 http://fore.research.yale.edu/religion/judaism/projects/alliance_religions/
Senegal, and Kuwait were present. They agreed to spend the next seven years making and planning serious commitments to protecting the natural environment and combating climate change. The plan was drawn up by Earth Mates Dialogue Centre, an NGO based in the UK, and supported by ARC and UNDP. The idea of an action plan began with a 2008 workshop in Kuwait where 22 participants from 14 countries met for the first time. The action plan proposed an investigation in every level of Muslim activity from daily life to annual pilgrimages, from holy cities to the future training of Imams. Other proposals include:

- developing the major Muslim cities as green city models for other Islamic urban areas
- developing an Islamic label for environmentally friendly goods and services
- creating a best practice environmental guide for Islamic businesses

The project was planned to be managed through the formation of a new umbrella organisation, MACCA, the Muslim Associations for Climate Change Action. In April 2010, the International Muslim Conference on Climate Change was held in Bogor, Indonesia to set up MACCA to become a membership organization with different levels of membership and involvement. Unfortunately, after all the enthusiastic undertakings, what followed was the anticlimax of the conference. Ismed Haddad, a prominent and senior figure in Indonesia’s environmental movement, the person in charge of organizing the event in Bogor, enumerated two obstacles to MACCA’s success. One, “no entry (for the MACCA) to UNFCC84”, and the other is, “no reliable leadership”. For the purpose of this research, it is worth highlighting that point one is surprisingly counterintuitive to all the efforts of global environmental governance already discussed. By not giving space to non-state movement such as MACCA, it appears to me that the UN was playing another version of what Zimmerman (1989) called “the West’s hidden power trip”.

It is important to identify that this research of Indonesian Muslim groups and the pesantren communities begins with a very different set of assumptions, paradigm and point of departure than those of Mangunjaya (2010, 2012). Owing to my activist background, I have been skeptical about any exogenous85 models. The ARC-type of optimism on the potential of religious leaders and organizations did not address the key problems of sustainability that are associated with i) the nature of economy, of which the pesantren leaders have no control; ii) the nature of consumption, which large corporations, not the Ulama, have formulated; iii) and the cultural definition of ‘the good life’, which the Ulama have been struggling to exhort their adherents to follow given the so-called ‘modernization process’ has taken complete control of it. In conclusion, the I identified the

84 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
85 Growing or originating from outside.
following potential drawbacks of the aforementioned faith-based environmental movements to be taken into account in seeking an alternative model:

1. MACCA did not seem to be initiated (in all Muslim countries) by local Muslim communities from grassroots-up-towards the global Muslim community (Ummah). Rather, it was initiated by Muslim scientists and environmentalists, hence, not endogenous. This kind of movement is prone to leadership problems, thus, unsustainable.

2. The ideas behind Eco-Pesantren simply failed to address the heart of the problems associated with the nature of economy; the nature of consumption; and the developmentalism paradigm of which religious leaders, communities and pesantren people have no control.

3. Mangunjaya’s (2010, 2012) optimism that the NGOs and government agencies to work with Muslim organizations such as NU would be more effective to popularize environmental movement is a premature claim as the fieldwork in Chapter 6 will indicate. How would the Muslim organizations be effective to propagate Islamic ecological values if they have no jurisdictions? This argument substantiates the self-governance feature of relocalisation models that I am envisioning in the thesis.

4. In contrast to Johnston’s (2010) approach to Islam-Christianity relations that suggest action needs to begin with an understanding of historical issues presented in section 4.2.2, the ARC’s assumptions that secular conservation groups can work with Islamic-based organizations to reach grassroots more effectively is simply a naivety.

4.7 Conclusion

The warrior literature provides insights into the political-economic grievances shared by warrior Muslims groups against the enduring domination and control over the Muslim world. The sages literature inspired researching the potential of Muslims’ epistemic communities including their educational institutions such as madrasah and the personalization of knowledge by murabbi educators in traditionalist pesantren. The relocalisation activisits literature gives practical sense to deal with complex development-environment issues in the Third World from here and now. The literature emphasizes the need of an alternative society.

The thesis aims to contribute relocalisation with self-local governance as the third model following civil society and Islamic state that have been identified as two responses common to the failing development in the Muslim world. The non-organizational structure of Islam, that suggests the inherently decentralist nature, and the quasi-centralized-nature of the Ummah by one God, one Book, the Prophet Muhammad, and his tradition (Sunna), discussed in Chapter 2, suits the decentralist position of relocalisation in the green politics arena. Given the fact that the socio-ecological crisis has reached a global level, the proposed solution must have a global dimension, and hence, I envision ‘Islamic global environmental movement through a global network of endogenous relocalisation by local Muslim communities’ within the ‘minimal states’. The research, then, focused on investigating the potential of the existing Muslim community development to advance
endogenous relocalisation by creating impressive examples of alternative societies and bring about a cultural revolution. It explores whether the survivalists’ motives are able to raise the Muslim groups’ interests in relocalisation ideals.

In the conduct of the research, I concur with Bauman et al in section 4.2.2 that the methodological commitment of ‘religion and ecology’ should rely on synthesis of a scholarly attention to religious worldviews and to lived religion. In other words, this field should study both, the broad intellectual traditions of religion (the attitudes and views of religious leaders, sacred texts, and traditions) and the everyday reality of religion on the ground (the practices and actions of the adherents of religions in their everyday lives). Considering the potential of the leaders and active members of Muslim groups to mobilize changes, the research must limit focus to the former and not research everyday practices and actions of Muslims in the society at large.

Historical narrative of Indonesia in the next chapter illustrates how the cultural definition of a ‘well-developed’ country was shaped and held in the Third World nationalists’ imaginaries. This seems to have become an inhibitor among the Third World nationalists from gaining a sense of crisis in the face of peak oil and a wide range of environmental issues discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 5

A Twin Pregnancy: The National Scene of Indonesia

“Symbolic Universes are social products with a history. If one is to understand their meaning, one has to understand the history of their productions” (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:115)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides historical narration as a context of the social construction of Indonesian nationalism vis-à-vis ‘Indonesian Islam’ alongside ‘global Islam for Indonesians’\(^{86}\). Accordingly, its purpose is to present the gestation of twin ‘imagined communities’ and their symbolic universes. One is the ‘nationness’ of the ‘Indonesian countrymen’, and the other is the ‘global Ummah’ of the ‘Muhammad’s nation’- both were outlined in Chapter 2. Contestation between the ideals of the two ‘nations’-or two ‘imagined communities’- began since the formation of Indonesia’s nation-state and intensified during early independence. At this time, secular-nationalism as a conscious creation of the modernized educated elite was used as a means of ‘social control’ in relation to hegemonization and modernization. As already recognized in the Instrumentalist approach, nationalism was used to unify people from diverse religions and ethnic backgrounds. From the 1970s to the 1990s this secular-nationalism was even made ‘sacred’ and used as a means of ‘social control’ in an attempt to unify all the nation’s potentials toward a developmentalists’ programme. In more recent times, as Indonesia has entered globalization, this secular-nationalism was reignited once again to respond to the weakening of ‘nationness.’

To describe the two poles of Indonesian Islam (see 1.1), Pringle (2010) uses Traditionalists and Reformists in conformation with terminology used to outline worldwide Muslim groups in 2.4.1. The Traditionalist is the Sufi-influenced Islam, and Reformist, Pringle defined as a, “more legalistic style emphasizing the requirements of doctrine as interpreted by the trends in global or transnational Islam of this day” (p.35). Pringle was also aware that others may use Modernist for what he was calling Reformist because the Reformist movement has been associated with modern schooling with a heavy emphasis on general, academic, non-religious subjects oriented towards a secular professional career. Likewise, Indonesian Muslim, Deliar Noer (1973) also classifies the Indonesian Muslims according to their religious-political attitudes into Traditionalist and Reformist.

Section 5.2 and 5.3 show that the fortified notion of Ummah appeared for the first time on the heels of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 that facilitated the flow of early Reformist Islam ideas and was followed by the emergence of Reformist-Traditionalist duality in Indonesian Islam. The

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\(^{86}\) In this thesis, both ‘Indonesian Islam’ and ‘global Islam’ are the ‘sub-universe’ under Islamic symbolic universe.
duality was materialized by the formation of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The two organizations have been the largest mass organizations to this day and have become the mainstream insofar that one can say every other newer Muslim group must have been founded by the offspring of either one. Therefore, no study of Indonesian Muslim society can be made without beginning with these two essential organisations. Both Muhammadiyah and NU are active in the building of civil society. The community of NU, known as the Nahdliyyin, has been the largest population and represents the Traditionalist Islam. The community of Muhammadiyah represents the early generation of Reformist Islam. The organization was associated with modernization of the Muslim sector through the provision of basic Roman script literacy and further education from Modernist Muhammadiyah schools. During colonial times, the tensions between the colonized and the colonizer in the archipelago were replete with warfare in which the Muslim leaders and the pesantren played critical roles. That memory has helped to shape the relationship between Islam and nationalism. It is a relationship that complicates the future gravitation of the two organizations in an antagonistic direction. That is, toward Indonesian nationness on the one hand, and on the other, the unity of the Islamic world when the notion of *Ummah* and the ideal of *khilafah* have become strengthened among a sizeable portion of the Muslim population in the wake of globalization with the aids of information and telecommunication technology.

Section 5.4 and 5.5 highlight the long-standing contention between Muslims and the state, and 5.6 outlines the situation of contemporary Indonesian society and politics. The last part of this chapter highlights the ongoing conservative turn of Indonesian Islam. In this most current period characterized by pragmatism and postmodernism, Islam appeared as a ‘social movement’ and the Prophet Muhammad was resuscitated as ‘the leader’ in the absence of all-encompassing worldly ideologies. This phenomenon is important in exploring every avenue open for an anti-systemic movement that opposes and resists the prevailing capitalistic-developmentalist hegemony through grass roots grouping to advance the endogenous relocalisation discussed in Chapter 4.

### 5.2 The Coming of Islam

It has been widely accepted that Southeast Asia (today Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma) has long been a crossroads where ideas and people have met, bringing new influences and styles (Ricklefs *et al.*, 2010), and Muslims have been in contact with Southeast Asia from shortly after the time of the Prophet himself. Historians contend that when emissaries were sent to the court of China by the third of the Prophet’s successors – the Caliph ‘Uthman (644-56) – they must have reached there by sea through Southeast Asia (Ricklefs *et al.*, 2010). Afterward, Islamic ideas evidently travelled to Southeast Asia along the trade routes. When
the Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, visited Sumatra in 1292, he noted the presence of Muslims in some places, and when the Moroccan visitor, Ibn Batuta, visited Samudra Pasai in 1345-1346 he reported that the ruler followed the Shafi’i School of Islamic law, which remains the dominant school throughout Southeast Asia today. Prof. A.H. Johns (see Ricklefs et al, 2010:78-79) attempted to explain why the local people only began converting to Islam several centuries after traders had been travelling through Southeast Asia. He speculated that it was not until the emergence of Sufism as a dominant stream of Islam throughout the Muslim world from the 13th century that the locals, whose religions before the coming of Islam were characterized by the mystical doctrines of Hinduism and Buddhism, might have been attracted to this new faith of Islam if it, too, was presented in a mystical form.

The next phase of Islam in the archipelago now known as Indonesia was the contact it had with European powers. With the exception of uncolonized Siam (Thailand), Southeast Asia was colonized by almost all the great imperial powers (England, France, Holland, Portugal, Spain and the USA). The first Europeans arrived in Indonesia in 1511, when Portuguese traders sought to monopolize the sources of nutmeg, cloves and pepper in Maluku. After their conquest of the Islamic kingdom on the Malay Peninsula they were followed by Spaniards who both then began to propagate Christianity, being most successful in Maluku. Dutch and British traders followed. They started their quest for Indonesian spices to sell on the European market at very large profits. In 1602 the Dutch established the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) which became the dominant European source of power. For most of the colonial period, Dutch control over the archipelago was tenuous outside of coastal strongholds due to insurgencies, skirmishes, warfares and oppositions in which Muslim communities and leaders played important roles. Diponegoro is one of the most memorable figures in anti-colonial struggle, a man who links the three worlds of rural Java, the aristocracy and Islam. He was a Javanese prince who had been reared in a rural area where he studied in a pesantren, consorted with his teachers and became a devout Islamic mystic – hence his reputation as “the pesantren prince”. He once had a mystical experience that he was the ratu adil or saviour in Javanese mythology (Pringle, 2010:44). Inspired by the glory of Majapahit87 infused with the vision of enacting the Shariah law, he fought against the Dutch and their Javanese allies. Diponegoro was arrested in 1830, and afterward, the Dutch were able to rule Java without any serious opposition. Since then, Java has experienced the greatest degree of European involvement and real dominance, and was thereby much changed by Dutch rule – a process which then shaped the history of 20th century Indonesia. The struggles of the period 1808-1830 taught the Dutch an important lesson that

87 Believed to be the largest pre-independence kingdom in the archipelago.
they had to identify in Java as well as in the outer islands, the ‘friends’ – i.e. the business associates
and people who can be coopted into ruling on their behalf, from:

a cooperative local elite, almost invariably one whose authority rested on local customs and
aristocracy rather than the countervailing elites who claimed leadership based upon their
Islamic learning and piety. Thus the Dutch identified and often accentuated a dichotomy
between so-called ‘customary’ or ‘secular’ and Islamic elites (Ricklefs et al, 2010:220).

That policy shaped the history of Indonesian Muslims in the 20th century, for like most of the states
in the Islamic world, Indonesia did not emerge at independence, but rather inherited dominance by
elites from colonial administration (Joel 1988). Thus, it was ‘a later growth of an old tree’ (Vali Nasr,
2001). Since the end of the Diponegoro war, Javanese society has also been conflicted along lines of
religious identity, which were deepened with the arrival of Reformist Islam ideas (as discussed in the
next section), leading to a polarization of nominal (abangan) versus pious (putihan/santri) which has
been dangerously politicized in post-colonial Indonesia (Ricklefs et al, 2010:223).

A Novel by Douwes Dekker (1820-1887), Max Havelaar, detailing the abuse of colonial
power on Tanam Paksa (Enforcement Planting) eventually formed the motivation of the new Ethical
Policy by which the Dutch government attempted to “repay” their debt to their colonial subjects by
providing education. However, it did not deliver widespread educational opportunities rather, it
reached only some classes of indigenous peoples – generally those members of the elite loyal to the
colonial government (Ricklefs et al, 2010; Pringle 2010). Frankema (2014:2) argues that the spread of
popular education was not only hampered by lack of financial commitment, “but also notable
inequalities in the allocation of funds for education and a major reluctance to support investment in
private education, which may be interpreted as a consequence of the Dutch metropolitan
commitment to secular rule in an overwhelmingly Islamic society”.

The first educational reforms were at higher levels which brought together some of the most
intelligent Indonesians who proceeded to produce the earliest leaders of anti-colonial movements.
In 1889, one of the founders of the Ethical Policy, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, arrived in Indonesia.
He is most remembered for the divide-and-conquer realpolitik deployed firstly to win the Aceh War
(1873-1912). Regarding Islam, Hurgronje was “more than mildly contemptuous of the Dutch colonial
regime’s ignorance of the faith. He pointed out, with good reasons, that his compatriots had both
exaggerated and underestimated Islam’s power” (Pringle 2010:47). He made it very clear that there
was no well-organized central authority similar to the Papacy existing in Islam, and that the absence
of priestly authority between God and man and the authority operated through a network of Islamic
clerics are amongst the defining characteristics of this religion. Hurgronje also argued that the power
of Islam was nurtured by the pilgrimage to Mecca and the contact made there with foreign Muslims.
Coincidently, the opening of the Suez Canal, connecting the Red Sea and the Mediterranean in 1869, caused the pilgrimage \((hajj)\) traffic from Indonesia to the Middle East to grow dramatically and the spread of steam shipping around the same time made travel to the Arabian Peninsula easier and faster (Ricklefs 2010). Nevertheless, Hurgronje disagreed with the Dutch colonial government’s decision to place limits on the pilgrimage to restrict the flow of priestly subversives. He also resisted the Dutch assumption that since Indonesian Islam remained coloured by local superstition it should then be easy for Christian Missionary conversion.

Even in those parts of Java in which orthodox Islam has gained the least grip upon the population…the Hindu \(pandit\) (priest) would experience as great difficulties in communicating with simple peasants as would the Christian missionary; yet the Muslim Kyai if he deigns to stoop to this lowly creature, is assured of a deferential hearing. (Quoted in Pringle, 2010:47)

Instead, Hurgronje suggested offering a \textit{modus vivendi} to the majority of moderate Muslims including lifting restrictions on the pilgrimage while “ruthlessly suppressing political fanatics promoting rebellion” (Pringle, 2010:48). To carry this out successfully he proposed the political utility of indigenous pre-Islamic institutions and leaders, including the Javanese aristocracy and the customary leaders in the Outer Islands, as a force to counter expanding Islam (Pringle, 2010). Thus, his strategy was to oppose Islam to \textit{Adat} (local custom). He also believed very strongly that Islam would inexorably gain ground unless the Dutch promoted Dutch values, and especially Western education (Pringle 2010:49). Hurgronje’s strategy was grounded in scholarship. He spoke and read Arabic, wrote copiously about Islam, and helped Vollenhoven establish a prestigious school of \textit{adat} law at Leiden University in the Netherlands (see 5.6.1). Pringle (2010) argues that the substantial succession of studies on \textit{adat} by region covering the whole of The Indies was produced to no avail in the sense that they were used only to ‘please’ the locals whereas in reality they (\textit{adat}) are not effective in protecting the locals’ interests for reasons enumerated by Pringle below, and discussed further in discussion on \textit{Adat}-Revival in 5.6:

These volumes were supposedly no more than “guides” to \textit{adat} law, which in theory cannot be codified because it is mostly oral and would lose a necessary element of flexibility if committed to writing. This notwithstanding, \textit{adat} became a formal part of the Dutch colonial legal system, which featured different codes for Europeans, native Indonesians, and foreign minorities such as Chinese, and it remains an important element of Indonesian law today. (p. 49)

While the Dutch authorities continued to police the \textit{hajj} and set up an office in Jeddah to spy on the pilgrims (Pringle, 2010:49), the Dutch began to support a limited amount of education. In the later development, as the global depression pinched colonial revenues and the rise of political unrest led by educated Indonesians caused increasing problems, Dutch enthusiasm for education of all kinds
was dampened. As is shown in the 1930 census – after several decades of effort by Islamic, Christian, government and other schools – the Roman literacy rate in indigenous languages across Indonesia was only 7.4 per cent, and the literacy rate in Dutch was only 0.3 per cent, for the Dutch had never made it a priority to teach their language to Indonesians (Ricklefs et al, 2010:221). On the other hand, *cultuurstelsel*\(^{88}\) that rested upon compulsory labour had created opportunities for indigenous entrepreneurs in such fields as shipping, bricklaying, smithing, etc. The newly emerging Javanese commercial middle class and outer island entrepreneurs often had connections with Arab trading communities in the coastal cities including those who supported the Middle Eastern Islamic reform movement. As a result, more Indonesians could afford the pilgrimage (*hajj*) to Mecca where they encountered reformism first-hand.

### 5.3 Misunderstanding between the *Warriors* and the *Sages* began

Toward the end of the 19\(^{th}\) century, the increasing use of steamships, the Suez Canal, the Ethical Policy and educational reform of the Dutch, all coalesced to give rise to a division of society into three groups with three different anti-colonial strategies: 1) Secular-Nationalist, 2) Reformist, and 3) Traditionalist Islam. As for the second and the third groups, the increased mobility around the Muslim world explained Laffan’s (2003:310) argument that “pilgrimage and the wider Muslim world from the last quarter of the nineteenth century were crucial in shaping the imagined notion of the archipelago as a region” given that the Arab Reformist ideas at the time combined nationalist political tendencies with strong Islamic convictions. This time also marked the onset of what I termed ‘misunderstandings between the *warriors* and the *sages*’ among the Muslims that appear recurrently in the later centuries of Indonesia. It is a misunderstanding when one’s *personality character* determines his/her actions and that makes him/her in disagreement with another *personality character* regarding what is an appropriate response according to Islamic teachings to the challenges brought by the interactions with the West and modernity already given in 2.4.1. To reiterate, the *personality character* is understood as basic human motivation and pattern of behavior, to explain why there are people who are inclined to be the *sages*; or, *warriors*; or, *economic players*; or, *workers*. Perennial philosophers use the concept to explain the underlying philosophy of ‘castes’ in Hinduism (Nasr, 1989:179). Already given in 2.2.1, the traditionalists -that resonate the *sages*- coexisted relatively easily with many older elements in local customs (*adat*), whereas reformists at the time -that resonate the *warriors*- argued that the key to closing the gap with the secular West was to purge Islam of allegedly improper, locally derived practices (Pringle,

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88 Regulations issued by the Dutch government which required each villager to give a part of their land for the planting of crops for the export market at a price that is pre-determined. The villagers who had no land had to work 75 days a year in the government fields.
Accordingly, the reformists opposed fiercely syncretistic practices for which no precedent could be found in the Quran and Hadith, reflecting their commitment to the revitalization of Islam in the face of the West’s ascendance. There were some among the reformists who gradually took an ‘apologetic turn’ and caste Islam as the ‘religion of reason’ (e.g. see Euben, 1997). The latter are then called Modernist Muslims. Two famous names that are now forever associated with Islamic reform and modernism are al-Afghani and Abduh (see 2.4.1). From this point in time the diversity of Islamic movement as seen today emerged.

As for the first group, the secular-nationalists mentioned in the beginning of this section, to reiterate, very few of these pre-independence intelligentsias were known as fervent Muslims given the criteria of who had access to modern education. This small but influential number of Indonesians went to study in Holland. Their stereotyped image of the “condescending colonial Dutch” (Pringle, 2010:55) was changed when they were exposed to Leftist Western thinking and returned home secularized. They would become the future protagonists of a secular-nationalist-socialist ideology in periods to come which is the root of insurmountable disagreements between their views and those of the Muslims’ in the later era of Indonesia. The disagreements are twofold: first, differences in philosophies and then, Islam’s rejection of nationalism as much as it is against tribalism and racism. Both reflect ‘clash of symbolic universe’ already given in 2.2.2, namely, Islam against nationalism and ‘westernism’.

By the end of World War II, Indonesians were becoming more aware of the anti-colonial movements. For the few members of the westernized elite mentioned earlier, confronting Dutch power was too risky compared to hoping for improvements through cooperation (Pringle, 2010), but for the devout Muslims who became the intelligentsia within the framework of Islamic scholarship, the alternative source lay in the new ideas from the Middle East, namely, reformist Islam. The

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89 Ricklefs et al (2010:469) puts rightly about profound cultural differences between Western and Islam: “The former generally emphasizes the idea of freedom as a means of liberating individual and social potential for good. The latter generally emphasizes the need to control freedom to restrict the individual and social potential for evil. It seeks justice rather than freedom”.

90 The important feature of the pesantren in relation to the future ‘global-local’ tensions between Indonesian Muslims and the nationalists is rooted in how the pesantren has nurtured fertile ground for the development of the ideal of unity of the Islamic world and the concept of the Ummah – the single, world Muslim community – which is rooted in Islamic principles. On that, Bruinessen (1994, 121-145) has said:

There is something paradoxical in the pesantren tradition. It is firmly rooted in the Indonesian soil, the pondok and pesantren may be called a typically Indonesian institution, in several respects unlike traditional schools elsewhere in the Muslim world. But at the same time this tradition is self-consciously international in orientation and continues to see not some place in the archipelago but Mecca as its focus or orientation.
reformists, including Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923), the founding father of Muhammadiyah, are the products of this process in this period.

Explaining Muhammadiyah with Symbolic Interactionism

Dahlan was born in a pious entrepreneur Muslim family in Yogyakarta which is believed to be in the lineage of Maulana Malik Ibrahim, one of the nine wali. He was reared in traditionalist pesantren. At the age of 15, he went to hajj. He stayed in Mecca for 5 years studying Islam from where he encountered the ideas of Muslim thinkers associated with Islam reformism (see 2.4.1) such as Afghani, Abduh, Rasyid Rida and Ibn Taymiyah (Muhammadiyah, 2012). Two years after he went home, he went to hajj again and stayed for another two years further studying Islam from Syekh Ahmad Khatib, who happened to be the same teacher of Kyai Haji Hasjim Asy’arie, the founder of the NU. Returning home in 1904, he applied and was accepted to be a teacher at OSVIA in Yogyakarta, a civil servant and teacher school run by the Dutch colonial regime. He also joined organizations for the struggle for independence movement, both of the secular and the Muslim nationalist activists: Boedi Utomo, Syarakat Islam, Jam’iyatul Khair; Pembela Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad SAW. Dahlan was deeply concerned with the poverty and backwardness of Muslims in Indonesia. He was immensely moved by Surah al-Maun of the Quran and decided to devote his life to propagating it to bring justice towards the orphans, the needy and the hungry (Muhammadiyah, 2012). Influenced by the aforementioned thinking of Abduh, in 1912 Dahlan founded Muhammadiyah (literally, the way of Muhammad) as a welfare organization based on Reformist ideology and emphasizing modern education as an anti-colonial strategy (Pringle, 2010; Fuad, 2004). He and reformist Islam at the time argued that tradition is the culprit for the backward condition of the Muslims, thus, tradition was viewed as having buried deep the real Islam and its power (Fuad, 2004:403). Therefore, the key to closing the gap with the secular West was to purify and revitalize Islam from un-Islamic locally derived customs and propagate the return to the Quran and Sunna. Accounts of interaction between Dahlan and the West and modernity are explicated by the following (see Fuad, 2004, 402-405).

Since the Dutch colonial government needed to introduce Western education in order to create a lower level workforce for its administrative offices, they gave the green-light to Muhammadiyah’s activities that recognized the possibilities of a new Dutch inspired system of education as an instrument of change that might improve the Indonesian Muslim community. The Dutch’s green-light seemed to have been responded to by Dutch Christian missionary groups as well to build and operate not only schools but also hospitals in various places in Java. These had stirred

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91 Nine revered saints who spread Islam in the archipelago.
and inspired Dahlan. Modelled on Christian missionary examples, Muhammadiyah focused its energy on proselytizing, education and welfare by establishing hospitals and modern schools, “He had found them to be the exact programmes he needed in order to achieve his desire both to improve the wretched condition of the Muslim communities and to propagate the words of Islam” (p.403).

Notably, cited in Fuad (2004:413), Alfian (1989:160-161)’s account shows that Dahlan was good friends with some Christian priests. Using a symbolic interactionist perspective in which meaning is considered “a central part of a person’s definition of the situation, which” then “eventuates in action of some sort” (Reynolds and Kinney, 2003:887), an explanation is produced.

The relations between meaning, cognition and action have been explicated in 2.2.2. In this way, ‘reality’ is not given but created through our interactions with one another. Dahlan’s interaction with the Dutch, Christian missionaries and secular nationalist activists defined the ‘reality’ of Muslims’ backwardness and poverty for him, and also of their hope and aspiration of progress from modern education. But at the same time, Islamic symbolic universe, such as Surah al-Ma’un of the Quran, remained the all-embracing conception of meaning, and hence, of action, for him to respond to that ‘reality’. It becomes clearer when we look at his refutation of the traditionalists’ accusation that said by imitating the Christian Dutch Dahlan was in fact inventing a new religion in his Muhammadiyah. Dahlan refuted that, saying: “Muhammadiyah attempt to raise Islam from its decadence. Too many Muslims, he continued, rely on the exegesis, instead of the original source, which is the Quran and Hadith themselves. We call the Ummah to return to the Quran and Hadith instead.” (Muhammadiyah, 2012). With this in mind I argue that other reformist Muslims’ thinking and actions such as that of Afghani and Abduh already given in 2.4.1 can also be explained using the same interactionist approach.

In 1938 Muhammadiyah claimed to have 1774 schools, 31 public libraries and 834 mosques and prayer houses and, with Muhammadiyah in the lead, “Muslim schools soon created a literate Muslim citizenry which numerically by far surpassed the few Indonesians versed in Western ways” (Benda, 1958:56).

As a reaction to the growing strength of Muhammadiyah, which appeared to challenge both the traditionalist Islamic style and the status of traditionalist elite, the NU, Nahdlatul Ulama, which means, ‘the rise of religious scholars’ was then established in 1926 by Kyai Haji Wahab Chasbullah with the support of East Java’s most respected traditionalist scholar, Kyai Haji Hasjim Asy’arie,

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92 Literacy in Roman script.
precisely to protect the institutions and practices that were criticized by the reformists. Although East Java was always the heartland of NU, it spread to all other parts of the archipelago.

From 1930-1940, Muhammadiyah had established branches over most of Indonesia, and the NU began to found economic and social activities besides its primary function as the guardian of its traditionalist Islamic practices. Both were active in anti-colonial movements although in opposing directions. The NU forbade the kyai and santri from wearing pantaloons and ties for this being an imitation of the Dutch, and from such a cultural movement the NU had been able to produce a society that contributed greatly to the struggle for the independence of Indonesia. Conversely, Muhammadiyah created schools along modern lines where the Dutch language was used and its schools soon became equivalent in quality to the Dutch, Catholic and Protestant schools. During the Japanese occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945), the two organizations sat together in a federation of reformists and traditionalists, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia – Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims), that was sponsored by the Japanese military authorities and explicitly created to support the Japanese in World War 2. Masyumi was born in 1943 and was intended to draw on a genuine Islamic base, and in March 1945, the Japanese established an Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI) to draft a constitution. The representatives of Masyumi were present in the committee with the other founding fathers of Indonesia.

The draft of the future state ideology, Pancasila (Sanskrit: five principles), was signed on June 22, 1945, as the Djakarta Charter by the future President, Sukarno, the future vice President, Hatta, and others, including seven Muslim politicians as the representatives of Masyumi. On August 17, 1945, the independence of Indonesia was declared by Sukarno and Hatta in Jakarta but seven of the words on the first principle (sila) of Pancasila stipulated in the Djakarta Charter (signed two months earlier), disappeared. In the charter it was specified as “Belief in God with obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Shariah (Islamic Law)” but in the constitution proclaimed on August 17, 1945 it was altered to the simple “Belief in God.” The intrigues behind the incident were complex. The original sila seemed to imply that the state would be responsible for implementing this provision, and would thus be some sort of quasi-Islamic State, and the seven words were aborted in response to objections by Indonesian Christians, and it was reported that Eastern Indonesia would secede if those were retained (Pringle, 2010; Ricklefs et al, 2010). At the end of October 1945 the Allied Forces returned to Indonesia but by then, on October 22, NU had proclaimed ‘holy war’ against the Dutch and made participation obligatory for all Muslims. The jihad resolution led to the ‘Battle of Surabaya’ in November 1945.
Indonesian independence was finally proclaimed but, as Pringle (2010:69) puts it, “the Jakarta Charter refused to recede quietly into the mist of history”. For Muslims, the loss of those seven words has stripped Pancasila bare of its spiritual meaning. In the fieldwork of this research, one of leaders of Hidayatullah gave a copy of a book on that particular issue. The book was published quite recently, in 2011. Regarding the role of Islam in the struggle for independence of Indonesia, Laffan (2003) has been able to show convincingly that the seeds of what would become Indonesian nationalism germinated in two cities in the central lands of Islam – Mecca and Medina – as much as in Leiden (through some Indonesians who studied there) or Batavia (now Jakarta, where many Indonesian secular activists expressed their desire for independence). Notwithstanding, it needs highlighting that the disputes over the ideals of independence between the Islamic and secular nationalists are as different as night and day. The nationalists believed in pursuing independence to create a nation-state for love and attachment to the motherland: *ibu pertiwi*, or *tanah air*. The Muslim clerics opposed such a nationalist sentiment that demanded complete allegiance. For them, freedom is the right of every human being as advocated by Islam, and this thereby cannot be pursued for any other goals than the praise of God alone, otherwise they will fall into a state of *shirk* for deification of something other than God (Noer, 1996:281). The tensions between Islamic and secular nationalisms continued to plague the history of Indonesia and this has evolved into the most recent development between Islamic nationalists against trans-nationalist Islamists, a matter that is discussed in Chapter 7.

In his work, Sirozi (2010) shows that even contemporary plurality of education in Indonesia has its root back in the colonial legacy. Because both secular and religious nationalist leaders have developed separate education programs since the colonial era, the new government of Sukarno found it difficult to define the character of the national education system. Under an urgent need of

93 "*Telaah Kritis Dasar Falsafah Negara Republik Indonesia* (critical review of Republic Indonesia’s constitution)” by H. Bambang Setyo MSc, Introduction by Prof. Dr. Hamdan Zoelva, SH, MH, Judge of Constitutional Court.

94 Quoting Hindia Baru, May 30, 1925.

95 For example: In the 1960s when Sukarno attempted to blend nationalism, communism and religion (including Islam) into a national ideology NASAKOM and the NU leadership decided to support, that caused a great distress among the *kyai* (the *pesantren* leaders) (Pringle, 2010:116). Another example, although NU and Masyumi declared in 1945 that resistance against the returning Allied forces in defense of the new Indonesia Fatherland was a ‘holy war’, when peace and independence arrived in 1949, and the state turned out to be a secular rather than an Islamic state, “most Indonesians were uncertain and divided about the place of political Islam in the new Republic” (Pringle, 2010:65). The tension never ceases to manifest in different forms. The most reason issues was about the flag-raising ceremony which is accompanied by the national anthem of Indonesia (*Indonesia Raya*) where people should salute the flag. It has been increasingly criticized by the revivalists Islamists and has caused heated debates since 2011 (see Metronews, 2011; ustadzaris.com, 2011; muslim.or.id, 2011).
political compromise, it was partially and temporally overcome by the implementation of a ‘dual system’. That is, the education model demanded by secular nationalists was accompanied by the religious education model demanded by Muslim leaders. The former was termed “general”, run by Department of Education and Culture, and the latter, “Islamic”, run by the Department of Religious Affairs. The result is a “complex, hard to follow and dualistic system” (Naim, 1996). While the “general” curriculum was designed to fulfill the state needs and aimed at training citizens to have “national identity”, the “Islamic” curriculum was characterized by Muslim values to attain inner perfection and develop a “Muslim identity”. The “general” emphasized the social aspect of responsibility, the “Islamic” emphasized religious responsibility. Both were apparently underpinned by different philosophies, and thus, continue to “run side by side like railway tracks, separated from one another” to the present day (Naim, 1996). This ‘Dual system’ is the child of “Twin Pregnancy” mentioned in the outset of this chapter.

5.4 Marginalization of Political Islam

Pringle (2010) contends that marginalization of Political Islam began with the era of the first President. Masyumi was banned by Sukarno in 1960 after its frequent clashes with Sukarno and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). Nationalism was the dominant force of Sukarno’s regime with Sukarno as its chief commander. He established Pancasila as a state ideology that was hoped to become a foundation for national identity. Given the tremendous diversity of Indonesian society, it was hoped that it would be a guide in creating a harmonious society based on religious tolerance, humanism, nationalism, democracy and social justice, but at that time, Indonesians were not really sure who they were, whether they belonged to their regional, or ethnic, or religious, or ideological identity (Pringle, 2010). So, in 1957 Sukarno declared Guided Democracy, a non-system of personal, authoritarian rule. He assumed, and many Indonesians agreed, that he alone could achieve national unity (Pringle, 2010:67). Thus, his famous statement:

“I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and ideologies. I have blended, blended, and blended them until finally they became the present Sukarno” (Latif, 2008, p.306, Quoted in Geertz 1972, p.322, and Fischer, 1959, p. 154.)

Nevertheless, he was also aware of the incompatibility between Islam and the idea of a nation-state. In one of his speeches, Sukarno rhetorically asked, “[...] can the Nationalist movement be joined with the Islamic movement, which essentially denies the nation? [...] With full conviction, I answer: “Yes!”’ (Sukarno, 1970: 38-9, in Burhanudin and Dijk, 2003). Not only did the government ban Masyumi and eliminate Islamic political power, but in the 1960s it also began to restrict the political activities of Muslim politicians (Hasbullah, 2002). Many activists were put in jail. These jailings had a big impact, “on the one hand, people had become aware that the Sukarno government, during
Guided Democracy, was tyrannical, and therefore had to be overthrown. On the other hand, people had become afraid they had to think carefully before opposing the government” (Noer, 1987:415, in Hasbullah, 2002:7). Further, Hasbullah noted that Muslim hatred of Sukarno and his chief supporters, the PKI, was great, and perhaps this was why Muslims were active in helping the New Order demolish the Old Order.

As in other infant post-colonial States, the history of the new Indonesian Republic was replete with civil war, social upheaval and horrific events. Five of the most significant are: the disputes over seven words in the Jakarta Charter (1945), the Communist-led Madiun Affair (1948), the Darul Islam uprising (1948-1962), the Outer Islands Rebellion (1957-1958) and the communal killings of the anti-communist revolution of 1965-1966 that have profoundly troubled Indonesians to this day. The Darul Islam rebellion proved that some Muslims put religion before national unity. It is worth noticing that Hidayatullah and the an-Nadzir community being studied were allegedly associated with the Darul Islam rebellion.

Social upheaval and political turmoil in post-colonial Indonesia seemed to be inescapable. Notably, among the states of Asia who won independence after World War II, only Vietnam and Indonesia did so through armed revolution (Ricklefs et al, 2010). Moreover, there had been long-standing conflicts that people across the archipelago had had with the colonial government. This meant struggles over independence had become customary among the people, and resisting legitimacy of the colonial state was part of their everyday lives. Nasr Vali (2005) noted that in most places these were done by using culture. Consequently, the new State had difficulty in reversing this trend and the national elite did not have much more to offer than to foist an indigenous nationalism on the general population by constantly reasserting the State’s ideology. He says:

Having initiated the masses to resisting authority, the nationalist elite were then saddled with the problem of establishing order over a more unruly society. Without the relations of order between the State and its subjects in place, the post-colonial State became more dependent on ideology to get consent to rule. (Nasr Vali, 2005:12)

He contends further that, in the Muslim world the problems were compounded by an ideological challenge from below, which took the form of “Islamism” – “a form whose power rested in the claim that it was not tainted by a connection with the West and that it has a base among the masses” (p.11).

5.5 Indonesian Muslims and Development

Many have commented about the invidious consequences that the new nation-state formation has brought to diverse people as they were incorporated, usually by force, into large, impersonal, and
usually irresponsible, nation-states (Bodley, 1990). The following discussion features a lethal combination of nationalism and the Modern-Western concepts of ‘progress’ and nationhood upon which Indonesian, like many other Third World nation-states’ ideologies, were anchored, leading to the destruction of the social as well as the natural environment.

Sukarno was ousted in the 1965 anti-communism revolution and these events were immensely traumatic to many Indonesians until the present day. His successor, General Suharto, ruled Indonesia with his heavy-handed regime for 32 years. Suharto’s greatest achievement was to promote successfully Indonesia’s economic development, including development in small towns and rural areas. Therefore, he was often dubbed Bapak Pembangunan: the father of development. From the chaos of Sukarno’s ‘old order,’ the New Order regime constructed a rapidly growing and modernizing economy built upon extractive industries, particularly in the outer islands with the help of sudden flows of foreign investment; yet with the physical development heavily concentrated in Java. The Outer Islanders became even more convinced that Jakarta’s rule was robbing them of their place as the major producers of Indonesia’s export earnings from oil, minerals, logs and timber, rubber and other cash crops and the grievances from this triggered secession movements in the later years. Thus, an archipelago that had limited political coherence before European colonization but was connected economically by inter-island trade, was now held together by a nation-state but with fewer independent economic links. Hence, as Renan (1882:892) put it, “nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist.” In addition, Anderson (1983) argues that in newly independent states a ‘subjective antiquity’ appears in the eyes of the nationalists. Similarly, Vali Nasr (2001:10) added that “the machinery of government was operated by the resurgence of traditional conceptions of authority which has taken the form of neo-patrimonialism”\(^\text{96}\). Those elements have been particularly true in Indonesia during the New Order. Hasbullah (2002:7), among others, noted that “Suharto personalized himself as a Javanese king and internalized the Javanese values and history inherited from his predecessors”. This, in the later period of “development”, incited a bitter indignation on the part of the Outer Islanders. For them nationalism was merely Javanization as part of the hegemonization of the ruler in Jakarta. Beginning in 1978, a national indoctrination programme, P4, was undertaken to inculcate the values of Pancasila in all citizens, especially school children and civil servants. Pancasila as an expression of nationalism was now used as an instrument of social and political control. It was even made sacred:

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Further, “While certainly being rational and modern, it interestingly is itself the product of colonialism, which protected and nurtured traditional institutions of authority and furthermore bolstered its paternalistic view of governance through similar colonial conception” (Nasr Vali 2001:10).
the day of the military coup by anti-communist generals, October 1, is commemorated every year as ‘Sacred Pancasila Day.’

In reference to polarization of “nominal abangan and pious santri” by the Dutch’s policy since the end of Diponegoro War, throughout the Suharto’s New Order period, economic capital was largely in the hands of a Chinese minority, while political capital was in the hands of the abangan Javanese priyayi. At the same time the pious santri had been economically and politically marginalized: as Wertheim (1975) puts it, they are “the outsiders”. According to Hefner (1997:78), “He (Suharto) was essentially hostile to Islam.” Hefner added that many Indonesianists believed that “the Suharto government was a resolute defender of abangan Javanese values, deeply opposed to anything that might expand Muslim influence in Indonesian politics and society” (Hasbullah, 2002:78). The Indonesian Muslim community attitudes are typically those of a minority group (Wertheim, 1975; Schwarz, 1997). Hasbullah has said:

In general, this is because politically and economically they were always on the periphery and were onlookers of the power circle, or borrowing Wertheim’s words, “the representatives of the Moslem community have rather consistently been assigned an outsider’s role” (1975:75). Therefore, far from establishing an Islamic state, or at least holding a political hegemony, over the past decades they were the marginalized group and their political terrain was peripheral. Regarded as being under long political coercion from various Javanese kingdoms, then the European colonial regime and, after the 1945 independence, from Sukarno’s and Soeharto’s authoritarian regimes, the Muslim community has long been the ‘outsiders.’ (Hasbullah, 2002:6)

Hasbullah (2002) noted that the attempt of Muslims to re-establish Masyumi in 1968 was refused by Suharto, who was backed by the military. The ban was also followed by the barring of Masyumi leaders from participation in the newly formed Parmusi party. Furthermore, in 1985, under the Catholic military Commander General Benny Moerdani, the regime executed a massacre of hundreds of Muslims in the 1984 Tanjung Priok (Jakarta) ‘closed-case’ (Hasbullah, 2002). Once again, the government removed Islamic bases from all political parties and mass organizations by insisting on Azas Tunggal Pancasila (Pancasila, the Only State Ideology). It has been long accepted that Suharto’s regime was also authoritarian and based on the power of military. Ricklefs et al (2010:383) noted:

The army clamped down on all dissent, restrained only by the limitations of Indonesia’s ramshackle bureaucratic structures. The military had no compunction about banning publications and imprisoning, torturing, or murdering opponents. Regime violence was particularly unrestrained in the outlying areas of Aceh, East Timor and Papua, where there were separatist sentiments and guerrilla resistance.

The Indonesian Muslims felt seriously frustrated since they were not able to increase their political position amidst economic disparities.
The military created a condominium over the country relying on itself and the bureaucracy. Student activists and Islamic leaders were soon alienated by their exclusion from the core of the regime and by its increasingly obvious corruption. Indeed it was the regime’s ever more extravagant corruption that did most to undermine its legitimacy as years went by. Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs built mutually lucrative alliances with members of the military elite, thereby exacerbating widespread anti-Chinese feelings in the country (Ricklefs et al, 2010:383).

Since many Indonesian Chinese are Christians, inequality in wealth and power has frequently triggered ethnic and religious conflicts up to this time.

Actually, inequality of opportunity was a cause of the reality that during the first years of the New Order period when developmentalism began its traction the majority of Muslims were ‘uneducated’ and therefore unable to supply manpower to meet the surge in demands for ‘qualified’ human resources to participate. They were poor and lacking skills, in Ali Murtopo’s words (1989), Muslims are the ‘orang sawah’ – a term that associates them with an unskilled rural society. As the political arena was dominated by activists who came from a secular nationalist, Christian, socialist background (Hasbullah, 2002), and non-Muslim political actors were holding important positions within the circles of the New Order elites, many in Muslim circles came to the conclusion that “the New Order government has been hijacked by an anti-Muslim alliances of Chinese, Catholics, former PSI socialists, and armed officers. Most fingers pointed to Major General Ali Murtopo as the mastermind behind these policies” (Hefner, 1997:78). This condition led to a psychology of ‘defeat,’ where, as a majority, they had to face the reality that in fact they are weak in power. They were only a majority in numbers but a minority in quality. In turn, the Muslim majority turned out to be a minority in mentality (Hasbullah 2002), and, as implied by Schwarz (1997:129), this is clearly an “anomaly.”

Schwarz concludes that the anomaly of a majority group that feels it is treated like a minority is often found in the relationship between and within Indonesia’s religious communities. Schwarz feels that, “Muslim leaders often sound and act like members of a persecuted minority” (1997, pp.129-30). When Muslims were enduring the most extreme political suppression at the beginning of the New Order, Mohammad Natsir, a Masjumi leader, expressed his anger by accurately and sorrowfully describing this condition: “They have treated us like cats with ring worm.” (McVey, 1983:199).

Surveying Suharto’s authoritarian government, Wertheim (1975:88, in Hasbullah 2002) concludes:

No doubt, the ummat Islam in Indonesia feels seriously frustrated. Not only has Islam not been able to increase its political position since Soekarno’s fall; in fact Islam has been relegated to a position rather similar to the one it occupied during the colonial period. In this sense, too, the Soeharto regime could be called “neo-colonialist.” As during colonial times,
the regime wants Islamic organizations to refrain from any political activity and to stick to innocuous, purely religious pursuits”

Many Third World authors on development studies write about this particular issue regarding national elites who turn to being new colonialists. Two of India’s leading scientists and environmental activists, Vandana Shiva and Jayanta Bandyo-Padhyay (Court, 1990:189), have argued:

Economic Growth was a new colonialism, draining resources away from those who needed them most. The discontinuity lay in the fact that it was now new national elites, not colonial powers, that masterminded the exploitation on grounds of “national interests” and growing gross national products, and it was accomplished with more powerful technologies of appropriation and destruction.

According to Nasr Vali (2005), the imperatives of hegemony and growth are particularly challenging to post-colonial states:

The continuity between the colonial and postcolonial states has to do with the fact that at the moment of independence an underdeveloped indigenous bourgeoisie was unable to contain the overdeveloped colonial state or to countervail the formidable alliances with key classes and social groups that bolstered colonial authority. Equally significant was the fact that the ruling bureaucratic elite that had managed the colonial state remain in control after independence. They had been a product of colonialism and had internalized its values of governance (p.10).

Further, Nas Vali argues that, “colonialism saddled the postcolonial state with attitudes and ambitions that have redoubled its desire for hegemony and yet made its attainment more elusive” (p.11), besides, the disparagement of Islam by later generations of Muslim governments had been much shaped by the colonial attitude to religion, particularly to Islam (p.42).

5.6 Indonesia Today

Further to Section 4.6, contemporary Indonesian society and politics are characterized by decentralization, fragmentation, systemic patronage, corruption, and nationalism that remain in dominant force. To complicate the situation further, these occurrences took place in coincidence with two global forces of contradictory nature: on the one hand, postmodernism that extols local narratives and diversity to replace grand and universal narratives, thus, the revival of adat (local customary); and on the other, the rise of radical Islam that calls for unity of the global Muslim community, the Ummah, which gave rise to some degree of global-local tensions on the religious level of the Indonesian Muslims.

98 He described the case of India and Pakistan.
5.6.1 Nationalism and Adat-Revival in the Midst of Globalization

Even in the present day, Indonesian nationalism remains a dominant force. In correspondence with Berger and Luckmann (1991), Benedict Anderson (2006) contends that nationality and nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind, and that to understand properly why today they command such a profound emotional legitimacy needs careful consideration of historical context. This has been particularly true of Indonesia in the light of its pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial pasts and how the country has constantly been threatened by internal clashes along both ideological and regional fault lines. That has nurtured a fear of internal revolt and disintegration, thus, a besieged mentality with regard to internal enemies, particularly Islam, with the history of Muslims’ rebellions already given. Anti-Malaysia is another recurrent theme (see Noor, 2009).

In a deeply pluralistic society such as Indonesia, pluralism of norms has always been a concern. Because of these, legal anthropology and legal pluralism are recognized as important subjects in the Indonesian universities. In Indonesian law, adat, Islam, and positive law of statutes, are each considered to be the sources of law. The Indonesian word adat is often translated as ‘custom’ or ‘customary law’. Adat has a wide range of usages. It has multiple meanings and often conflicting implications. The concept has become quite complicated as it has been interpreted in several ways throughout Indonesian history, reflecting the social situation in each period. The birth of adat law was midwifed by Vollenhoven at the school of adat law in Leiden University in the 1920s. Originally, the mere customs of the colony could not be considered as a form of law (Takano 2008) but Vollenhoven overturned that. Notwithstanding, the informal and uncodified character of most adat, and the idealization of order and stability, makes adat easy to be manipulated politically. In this regard, Davidson and Henley (2007) use the term “The protean politics of adat”. Section 5.2 presented Hurgronje’s policy on using adat law as a smokescreen to prevent the Muslims from endorsing Shariah law.

For the nationalists, the triumph of adat law school was partly good and partly bad. The acknowledgement of adat laws meant different ethnic groups were supposed to be governed according to their own diverse laws and customs, which meant undermining the nationalists’ attempt to draw national unity in diversity. Yet, Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and especially Suharto’s New Order invoked adat and emphasized the shared characteristics of adat such as gotong royong (mutual aid) and musyawarah-mufakat (unanimous agreement reached after thorough discussion) to assure obedience to authority (see Bourchier, 1997). In this respect, Thorburn (2002) noted the protean nature of adat in relation to devastation of natural resources during Suharto’s reign. The New Order regime uniquely combined “traditional” Javanese
patrimonialism, deference and social stratification with “unfettered capitalistic acquisition and expansion”, and with “a liberal dose of military power and pomp”. Thorburn (2002) said:

This mixture gave rise to a development juggernaut that undermined existing local social and normative orders as ruthlessly as it depleted forests and other natural riches. Prominent motifs permeating New Order society and governance included frequent references to adat and the ubiquitous political mantras musyawarah (deliberation) and mufakat (consensus). These were invoked as justifications for a range of political measures and economic policies, and to censure anyone who tried to object. The same “myth of adat” was conjured as well by the regime’s critics, and by local communities attempting to retain or regain some control over the pace or direction of local change (p.618)

The fall of the Suharto’s regime in 1998 was followed by a rapid decentralization movement. It also marked the beginning of what is discussed in the post-modernism, re-enchantment and desecularization literatures as an array of opposing tendencies, themes and forces. As more roles were given to local governments, adat became a vehicle for peoples’ voices against state control as well as a tool of ethno politics. This strengthened communal bonds and ethnic identities in many cases that gave rise to xenophobia which led to violence against migrants from other provinces. There was also the emergence of local elites who became raja kecil (small kings) that gave rise to decentralized ‘corruption’. As movements of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) spread worldwide, adat gained a new practical position (Takano, 2008). However, due to the prior weakening of adat as a result of urbanization and modernization, people are in fact no longer familiar with them, and the originality of adat are questionable and their aims are not easy to understand. Takano (2008) noted further that adat lack specific methods for conflict resolution, and therefore at the district court level adat is considered “not to be here”. Moreover, the vocabularies of adat such as musyawarah-mufakat are quite often mixed up with the new words ‘win-win solution’ to meet the needs of foreign investors.

On the other hand, the end of Suharto’s regime cleared the way for desecularization forces to happen. It marked the emergence of so-called transnational Islam in Indonesia, whence there began (1) increasing awareness of global Islamic issues among Indonesian Muslims, and (2) their participation in global Muslim discourses and activities centered on jihad and Shariah law. Islamists believe that such movement could neutralize the diversity of adat. In this sense, the adat-revival appears as a ‘secular complement to Islam [revival]’, as Headley (2008:4) puts it. The former revives without any ultimate cosmological reference, whereas the latter calls to return to the Quran and Sunna. Davidson and Henley (2007) present four factors to explain the nature and causes of adat revival: 1) support from international organizations; 2) oppression of the New Order regime; 3) opportunity of reformasi (the fall of New Order); and 4) the enduring role of adat in the political
imagination of nationalism. Meanwhile, Tania Li (2007) claims that both on a local and national level, appeal to *adat* tends to privilege elites, “especially senior men, who are empowered to speak on behalf of a presumed whole” (Headley, 2008:4). To Li and Davidson and Henley, the *adat* issues have evoked the link between ethnic rights and ethnic cleansing in the *Blut* and *Boden* of Nazi Germany. In contrast, Davidson and Henley (2007) defend a thesis that in Indonesia, it is Islam that has created ‘civility’ and historically provided the most “effective bridge between local cultures” (p.31).

For if one is looking to create *civility*, “in the Enlightenment sense of toleration and restraint with respect to differences in culture, opinion and faith”, then it is possible to claim that Islam “plays a kind of civilizing role in Indonesian political life” (Davson and Henley, 2007:31-2; quoted in Headley, 2008:5).

Davidson and Henley (2007:32) also noted that the current *adat* revival is “not coincidentally concentrated either in areas where Islamic conversion is blocked by Christianity or Hinduism, or in areas where Islamic conversion has taken place but pre-Islamic elements remain unusually important in social life…”

### 5.6.2 Patronage and Corruption

While there are positive changes that have occurred in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto, Aspinall (2010) and Blunt *et al* (2012) show that contemporary Indonesia remains a patronage society and patronage remains systemic within the government. Clientelistic practices (jobs or other favours in the bureaucracy in exchange for support at election time) are how elites exercise their influence. In more recent work, Aspinall (2013) contends that clientelistic relationships between politicians and their network of supporters is a fundamental ordering principal of the contemporary Indonesian state. Notably, money politics and corrupt practices continue to constitute and sustain patronage, as Blunt *et al* (2012) illustrates:

Suppose for a moment that you worked in an organisation where positions were bought and sold and where price was dependent on how well you knew the boss, the opportunities the position and organisation afforded for illicit gain and how much new ‘business’ and how many new contacts you could bring to the network that you were paying to join. Suppose further that, like others who had purchased their jobs, you had borrowed money from your extended family or from friends to pay in advance the going price—of about three times your annual salary—and that your (official) salary by itself was barely enough to cover the basic necessities of life. In Indonesia, these are typical conditions of patronage—in which state assets are treated as if they were the private property of elected or administrative officials or patrons, who are largely unaccountable and rule with the help of networks of clients that are paid off for their support (Dwiyanto *et al*., 2003; Kristiansen and Ramli, 2006; World Bank, 2000)… The poor are generally considered to be most disadvantaged under these conditions (e.g. Diminio, 2009). This logic has made the containment of corruption a central feature of development assistance rhetoric (e.g. Doig, 2006). (p.64)

According to Blunt *et al* (2012) Indonesia is an interesting case of patronage,
“because its development has entailed such long and close collaboration with market-oriented agencies, like the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development, and because it has been portrayed in the media and in the donor literature as a model of democratic development (Kristiansen and Santoso, 2006)” (p.65).

Yet, in Indonesia and elsewhere, the neo-liberal ‘promise’ has been that macro-economic and governance reform are sufficient to eliminate patronage, rent seeking and other bad practices and that steady progress is being made (Blunt et al, 2012). It is worth noting the following:

For Indonesia’s government, and for other governments with which it has close ties, the economic and governance indicators are sufficient to justify describing Indonesia as a ‘democratic success story’... Carothers (2011) has even described Indonesia as a ‘role model for post-Mubarak Egypt’ (Blunt et al, 2012:65)

On the contrary, as Chapter 4 outlined, critical theorists are in agreement with the Warriors’ view outlined in 4.2.1, arguing for Indonesia that in the last 10 years or so, coalitions of government and business interests have managed to retain their control of the state apparatus and to put it to their own uses for personal gain (e.g. Klinken, 2009; Luebke, 2009). Blunt et al, (2012) review a series of studies conducted over the last 10 years that confirm this and also present corroborating data gathered in this study during 2011, which, is in contrast to the statements of some governments and some scholars already given and to the statements and behaviour of much development assistance.

Reinforcing further the Warriors’ view that Third World development is a continual colonialism, Blunt et al (2012) noted:

we present empirical evidence to suggest that, whether by design or by default, development assistance has contributed to the spread and consolidation of patronage—by providing resources for predation (confirming earlier findings by, for example, World Bank, 2000), by not knowing how to address questions of patronage or by simply turning a blind eye to it. We are not alone in thinking this (p.65)

In addition, development assistance has been criticised by many for not giving sufficient attention in practice to the political mediation of state–society interactions, including patronage (Blunt et al, 2012:66). Proyek (Indonesian word for project, denoting development projects) as a source of patronage is widely accepted as it continues to characterize Indonesian politics (Aspinall, 2013). Additionally, Blunt demonstrates that wherever patronage is systemic, standard technocratic forms of governance reform alone are not likely to succeed, and are relatively easily deflected or reconstituted by patronage networks. Notably, the demise of Suharto with the dramatic political turmoil that followed by no means ended the patronage system and corruption. In the New Order’s centralised control and network of patronage, corruption was regulated by the centralised structure and took place mostly at high level. In a contemporary decentralization era, corruption has become more decentralised and less predictable (Nguitragool, 2011).
Resource nationalism

Indonesia is increasingly described as a country where ‘resource nationalism’ is on the rise (Warburton, 2014). Law 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining (the 2009 Mining Law) is the most widely referenced example of Indonesia’s rising resource nationalism. The natural resource sectors have largely steered Indonesia’s economic growth over the past decade. Mining contributes 12 per cent of Indonesia’s GDP. But large multinational companies dominate the sector, particularly American based companies such as Freeport McMoRan and Newmont. Freeport is the country’s largest copper producer by far, with 73 per cent of the market share and gross profits of 1.53 billion US$ in 2013 (Warburton, 2014). Since 2009 an assertive Indonesian government has begun introducing new laws and regulations that attempt to capture a larger share of these industry profits.

People use the term ‘resource nationalism’ in different ways. Industry commentators, journalists and some scholars typically deploy it to criticize government attempts to assert greater control over resource sectors at the expense of foreign investors. At best, such analysts frame resource nationalism as short-sighted, poor policy-making; at worst they see it as the work of corrupt, rent-seeking government elites. The proponents, in contrast, frame nationalist practices as a means of giving citizens a larger stake in their own finite resources, and achieving a more just system of rent distribution. Yet, while patronage remains systemic and wherein the clientelistic relationship between politicians and their network of supporters prevails, it is impossible to depend upon the spirit of redistribution, for there will be vested business interests and patronage relations among Indonesian legislators, besides the structural power and influence of the country’s massive foreign mining companies.

5.6.3 Fragmentation

Aspinall’s work (2013:30) shows that Indonesia’s contemporary society and political life are characterised by pervasive fragmentation which he argues is associated with neoliberalism. The question then refers to the way(s) patronage distribution and neoliberalism encourage fragmentation. At the most general level, the key link between patronage and fragmentation is that, where political connections are built not on the basis of ideological, identity, or like affinities, but on the basis of personalistic exchanges of political loyalty and material rewards, the possibilities for multiple patrons and clients to compete for individually beneficial political relationships are almost endless. A distinctive feature of Indonesian political life at present is its lack of powerful, permanent poles of attraction. Fragmentation is visible virtually everywhere. Almost every subset of civil society is characterized by atomization and there is myriad new or revivified local identities based on
ethnicity and region, with various forms of cultural revival, reinvigoration of customary institutions (Adat), proliferation of ethnic associations, and mobilization of local ethnic identities in virtually every region. Everywhere, Aspinall (2013) continues, identity patterns are becoming both more fragmented and more assertive. Many commentators have viewed such developments in a negative light, seeing them as a sign of parochial erosion of the sense of common citizenship required in a healthy polity.

In the Muslim societies, there is bewildering multiplication of Islamic movements (Aspinall, 2013:45-48). The growing influence of transnationally oriented Islamic movements has reduced the central importance of Muhammadiyah and NU in defining the moderate mainstream. In urban centers, where people are immersed in mobile and diverse social contexts, far removed from the closed social environment of the village, many are becoming:

“religious seekers” who might participate in a Hizbut Tahrir meeting one day, visit a celebrity preacher the next, and then download some fatwa from a favorite website the next morning before going on to participate in a particularly satisfying Sufi gathering. Religion is in other words coming to resemble an increasingly diverse marketplace inhabited by individual consumers, rather than being constituted by rigidly defined collective identities and their associated organizations into which a person is born and wedded until death. (Aspinall, 2013:46)

The latter suggests a process of ‘urbanization-induced deinstitutionalization’ in a private sphere (Berger and Luckmann, 1991) discussed in 2.2. Someone born in a traditionalist NU or reformist Muhammadiyah family can now choose to abandon their community traditions and join other ones (detailed in the fieldwork section in Chapter 6); the child of an NU family can join Hizbut Tahrir, as the child of Muhammadiyah can join the Sufi order.

5.7 The ‘Muhammad’s Nation’

Having located the position of Indonesian Islam and its communities in the wider context of Indonesia’s national history in connection with the Muslim world and the global world at large, I will explicate the relationship between contemporary globalization, global governance, global social movement, global environmental issues, and global Islam99. In what follows, a number of fragments are to be put together.

There has been debate on environmental ethics between the anthropocentric and eco-centric factions. Heilbroner (1977:94-6), for instance, contends on the need of ‘statist religion’ in

99 Discussed in Chapter 4, besides economic, one of the faces of globalization is when transportation, telecommunication and information technologies have allowed distant actions to increase significantly at the local level. In the Muslim world, globalization is also characterized by increased presence of transnational Islamic movements, such as Ikhwan al-Muslimin; Hizbut Tahrir; and Tablighi Jama’at in Indonesia.
order to breed a collectivist ethic, and of Ehrlich and Pirages (1974:279-80) on the need of ‘universal religion’ to be present to effect a true social transformation. Elsewhere, many have commented that the present model of globalization entails the demise of the state. It is also noted that the present pattern of world politics is characterized by governance without government (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), and furthermore, this period is characterized by pragmatism, postmodernism and a lack of faith in all-encompassing ideologies. These characteristics of this time have given rise to opposing tendencies toward globalization and localization that the thesis discusses. According to the Commission on Global Governance (1995:2), “governance is the sum of many ways that individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs.” Under this light, the notion of global governance in fact leads to a truly problematic question considering the plight of the Third World as identified in Chapter 4: ‘who does really govern the poor nations?’

Because a ‘Global State’ does not exist, the idea of global governance tends to reinforce the role of the powerful state and weaken the role of those who are already weak (O’Brien et al, 2000). Moreover, the process of global governance encompasses a broad range of actors besides the state. They include multilateral economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, WTO, and the large-scale private enterprises or multinational corporations that also participate in governance by attempting to influence the activities of international organizations and states (O’Brien et al, 2000). Yet, these actors have been identified in Chapter 4 as associates with what underlies the socio-ecological problems at hand. In some cases, private enterprises created their own systems of regulations and governance (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999 in O’Brien et al, 2000). Elsewhere, authors on peak oil and scarcity such as Howard Kunstler (2005), Richard Heinberg (2005) and Homer Dixon (2006) attempt to imagine a completely “new civilization”, while Herman Daly and John Cobb Jr. (1989) attempt to imagine a very different economic future. This situation has given rise to an array of grassroots relocalization initiatives in post-industrial societies such as the ecovillage and Transition Town stated in Chapter 4. They attempt to fashion fair and sustainable new societies. All those seemingly discrete events have to be taken into consideration in this thesis on the global relocalization movement by local Muslim communities.

In social movement theories, there are no universally accepted definitions of the concept of a social movement, but Doherty (2002) argues that the following four characteristics are found in many definitions. A social movement, firstly, must have a consciously shared collective identity; secondly, must act at least partly outside political institutions, using protest as one of its forms of action; thirdly, is characterized by un-institutionalized networks of interactions; and fourthly, must reject, or challenge, dominant forms of power. In the Muslim world context, Muhammadiyah and
NU have demonstrated in this chapter that social movements can emerge from, and be sustained by, Islamic education and learning communities. These types of social movement, in one way or another, are associated with social interactions and conflicts, thus, a clash of symbolic universes as discussed elaborately in Chapter 2. Inequalities in wealth and power between Muslims and the secular groups increased the tensions. Thenceforth, the four characteristics of social movements summarised by Doherty (2002) have appeared to commonly characterize everything undertaken in the name of Islam and the *Ummah*. For that reason, one can argue, by Doherty’s characteristics, that Islam and the *Ummah* in this particular juncture of history -as in the 19th century- have embodied into a kind of global social movement. I term the members or activists of this ‘newly-formed’ social movement as the “Muhammad’s nation”– a term that I choose to signify the presiding presence of the Prophet of Islam as the enduring leader of this nation. The ‘Muhammad’s nation’ members are Muslims, but not every Muslim is a member of the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ in this sense. Members of this nation stand out from the rest of the Indonesian Muslims in accordance with Doherty (2002), for they have a consciously shared collective identity; they act outside political institutions as a result of the separation between ‘the church and the state’ in modern politics; they have an un-institutionalized network of interaction; and they reject and challenge dominant forms of power. Those characteristics are present in the leaders and active members of the Muslim groups or communities. The conservative turn of Indonesian Islam that Bruinessen (2013) and others discussed recently (Hasan, 2009) can be explained by this ‘Muhammad’s nation’ phenomenon. The Muhammadiyah and NU’s socio-historical background outlined in this chapter can possibly be extrapolated to the Muslim world at large to explain the emergence of variegated present-day Islamic movements. It is appropriate to examine what Islam and the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ potentially offer to mitigate the severity of a world divided indefinitely by self-interests of nation-states, and to collectively respond to global environmental crisis.

Literature on environmental crisis and peak oil shows that this time is especially dangerous, an urgent time, a time of profound crisis. In this regard it is important to give attention to what Gibb (1968) predicted concerning the possibility of a response from the *Ummah* to an unpredictable future:

But no outside observer can estimate the strength of those unseen threads which at an hour of challenge draw the members of diverse groups into a single community of purpose and will, nor the vitality of a great idea, overlaid by the deposits of long centuries, when it is faced with new tasks and danger. The history of Islam in the nineteenth and twentieth century is a history of revival and efforts at readjustment under the double stimulus of challenge from within and pressing dangers from without. Slowly at first, and not without setbacks but with increasing momentum, the Muslim community has gathered itself together and begun to look to its defence; re-awakened and alert, it is searching for the
programme with which to advance united into an unknown and unpredictable future (Gibb, 1970:113)

According to Berger and Luckmann’s Sociology of Knowledge, meaning is produced and reproduced within a culture through various practices, phenomena and activities which serve as systems of signification. Historical narrative described how the present-day globalization has affected the long-standing contested ‘symbolic universes’ nationalism, and Islam in Indonesia. As a result, due to the continued survival of deep structures within Islamic culture by which meaning is produced and reproduced, the meaning of Prophet Muhammad is reproduced and resuscitated once again in fragmented Indonesia and the Prophet has re-emerged as a ‘leader’ in the leaderless society that globalization and neoliberalism imply.

The fieldwork chapters, nevertheless, show that diversity of emphases once again exists. They are between the exoteric and esoteric meanings of the Prophet given in Chapter 2. They are ranging from those who imitated the reported external qualities of the Prophet, to the ones who call for a return to the Quran and Sunna, and at the other end, those who resuscitated the esoteric tradition accompanying veneration practices of the Prophet (such as tawassul) which nowadays is gaining increasing popularity in Indonesia compared to a few decades ago\(^\text{100}\). In general, there is the majority for whom Islam is essentially an all-embracing ethical and social code, a way of life embodied in the Shariah (the exoteric) and there are also those who wish to follow the spiritual life in the Thariqah (the esoteric). It is not always possible to draw sharp lines of division between those referred to as the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ and the rest of the Indonesian Muslims, but the classification is useful for the purpose of analysis and discussion. From my observation, unique among the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ is a strong sense of connectedness in contrast to individualism that characterizes the present-day urban Muslims, as well as a distinct sense of direction. They have a remarkably high degree of solidarity with the members of the organization or pesantren where they belong, as well as a sense of belonging to the Ummah to the point that they are able to assess the world in terms of ‘them’ and ‘us,’ a characteristic that Doherty (2002:7) sees as necessity before people can act together. Further, Doherty added that activists will have stronger solidarity when they share values that provide meaning and justification for their actions. In that respect, the culture of the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ is dominated by a divine norm and a ‘presiding idea’ that they share across national and cultural boundaries into a single Islamic tradition. It is the sacred nature of this Islamic tradition that unites the ‘Muhammad’s nation’. Moreover, members also demonstrate the

\(^{100}\) For example: Majlis Nurul Mustafa, Majlis Rasulullah.
outstanding ability to minimize ethnic and linguistic barriers that are present elsewhere in the Indonesian pluralistic society.

Thus, this research question arises: “To what extent can ‘Muhammad’s nation’ possibly espouse the ‘whole-earth one-world family vision’ of the environmentalist?” The following section summarized my interviews on that issue.

Suharsono, a leader of Hidayatullah in the Jakarta head office:

“USAID had once offered us some help with some million dollars on an issue which I forgot what, it turned into a polemic within Hidayatullah because we had always been suspicious to the West’s intentions. Well, maybe they can clean up their toilets or their cities much better than we do, but we don’t trust they can clean their heads and their hearts from their evil intentions (laughter), and yet, they call us corrupt, but who made us corrupt at the first place? colonialism is a crime that cannot be redeemed simply with material aids, what they did to us in 350 years was idiotizing, darkening. Now let’s compare with what Islam did to us since the early arrival in Indonesia, we were taught of ethics, even in war, and remember the story of the church Aya of Sophia in Constantinople when Islam was in power, very different from what the West did to us, Islam came to the West and brought enlightenment”

Candra Kurnia, a leader of Hidayatullah in the Jakarta head office:

“Oh, well, we will see if New Zealand [because he saw myself was from a NZ university] is any different [than the rest of the West] (laughter) but doing any meaningful works with anything from US or UK is very unlikely for us”

Kyai Ahmad Mansur, NU leader in Surabaya urban centre, the founder of Porsikompak, Islamic microfinance for micro-business in Surabaya urban area.

“First of all what they call global warming, environmental crisis, etcetera is awu-awu (Eastern Javanese slang, more or less, bullshit). How can they talk about it while continually driving us into physical development? you look, now we can’t stop constructing new roads, malls, high rise building (laughter)”

Kyai Miftah Faqih, NU leader, who owned a pesantren in Kartosuro rural district and was a leader in the NU Jakarta head office.

“Certainly, but everything has to start from here (he put his palm on his chest). Without justice and honesty between races and nations, what they call “one world family vision” is merely their futile dreams”

Kyai Said Aqil Siraj, Chairman of the NU.

“Definitely, Prophet Muhammad himself always used different terms according to [whether] the message was addressed to the Muslims or to all mankind: ya ayyuhal muslimun or ya ayyuhan naas. Remember, such as in his hajj wada before he died, in his last wuqaf in Arafah he began his sermon with “ya ayyuhan naas, O people, your life, your property, your dignity must be respected because they are sacred - whatever your religion, whatever your ethnicity” the Prophet was giving a universal message, that was a declaration of human right, wasn’t it?”
Regardless of the universalistic perspective of Islam given in 4.4\textsuperscript{101}, the long-held tensions between Muslims and the West seemed to have engendered mistrusts and fears of the West against what the ‘one world family vision’ of the environmentalists appeared hardly possible for the ‘Muhammad’s nation’.

To investigate further, since I found that NU was among the attendees of the international climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009, I asked Siraj, Chairman of the NU, whether the *Ummah* remains capable of responding in a united way to the call of climate change issues given that the *Ummah* was no longer under the same political unit. He replied:

“As far as the vision of truth, Muslims have always been one. The theological principle of Islam is only one, there might be minute differences in our practices between one school with another, but that is not a big deal, everyone has to make *shalat*, everyone has to do *zakat*, everyone goes to *hajj*, et cetera, et cetera, what has divided us is political interests!, so if we return to our universal principles there is only one Islam, one *Ummah*. Back to your question, on that situation, we still have OKI (Bahasa of OIC, *The Organization of the Islamic Conference/Cooperation*), what is the point of OKI if not to unify the vision of *Ummah*, to assemble hand in hand?”

When I asked him to envisage whether OKI was capable of undertaking such a task, he replied:

“Yes, as far as the North also realizes that this earth belongs to everyone, which means, no more triumphalism, no more domination. They have been very-very *dzalim* this far (Arabic, ‘cruel,’ ‘unjust,’ ‘evil’, referring to the West) - the United Nation security councils for instance, isn’t that apparent unfairness before our eyes? 169 countries say yes but if one of the 5 says no, then all must follow, what is that? And then the Bretton Woods economy too - all blatant injustices – So, only when both North and South concede and cooperate then we Muslims can act together, and OKI will be the right vehicle to mobilize. A neutral and well accepted organization, such as NU, is required to initiate [this]”

Siraj’s answer casts light upon the research questions: ‘*In what ways could Indonesian Muslim groups respond to the call for global environmental actions to achieve the ‘whole earth-one world family’ vision*’, or, ‘*in what ways can the global Muslim community (Ummah) provide an alternative to global environmental governance*’ – an insight that has been contemplated further in the research conclusion.

5.8 Conclusion:

A detailed and close examination has revealed the fact that Indonesia has been forced into a global economic order and developmentalism within which the participation of Muslim groups has been insignificant or even minuscule, and where Islamic values and philosophies hardly play a role at all.

101 Considering the universalistic nature of the Quran which in many verses acknowledges the diversity of religion, and the belief of Islam as ‘*rahmatan lil alamin*’ (mercy to all nations) that the Quran says in Q21:107.
This fact must be taken into account in the study of ‘religion and ecology’ in answer to common questions; ‘why the non-Western religious societies do not reveal any less destructive trends and are not less industrial-attracted than the West?’ (Radcliffe, 2000:93-4). This issue is explained further in the fieldwork.

In this chapter, it has been demonstrated with Muhammadiyah and NU that social movements can emerge from, and be sustained by, Islamic education and learning communities. The same phenomenon will appear for other organizations in the fieldwork chapter. These types of social movement, in one way or another, are associated with social interactions and conflicts, thus, a ‘clash of symbolic universes’ was discussed elaborately in Chapter 2. Inequalities in wealth and power between Muslims and the secular groups only increased the tensions. Thenceforth, the four characteristics of social movements summarised by Doherty (2002) have appeared to commonly characterize everything undertaken in the name of Islam and the *Ummah*. For that reason, one can argue, by Doherty’s characteristics, that Islam and the *Ummah* since the 19th century to this particular juncture of history have embodied some sort of global social movement. I term the members or activists of this social movement as the “Muhammad’s nation”. Referring to Berger and Luckmann’s (1991) ongoing dialectical process of social construction of ‘reality’ in Section 2.2, the colonial history and the West’s enduring domination and control over the Muslim world have developed a typification of the West as either ‘the Christian West’ or ‘the infidel (*kufr*)’ in Muslims’ mind, and the Muslims continue to use this typification to apprehend the West down to this day. The Muhammadiyah and NU’s socio-historical background in this chapter can possibly be extrapolated into the Muslim world at large to explain the variegated Islamic movements and their contemporary ramifications.

The trend and aspiration toward a united, yet decentralized, Islamic world and the movement back to the *Shariah* can be viewed as an opportunity for a global environmental-movement of a different kind within the *Ummah*. To illustrate the logical structure of this model, it is necessary to envision a world summit being conducted by the *Ummah*, where Muslim scholars and the jurisprudents (*fuqaha*) make comprehensive deliberation about the environmental problems and arrive at consensus (*ijma*). The council that arranged the summit would also run regular meetings afterward. The council could be founded by Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as the chairman of NU, Said Aqil Siradj, suggested. Muslim communities around the world are called to mobilize ecological actions based upon Islamic jurisprudence in a decentralized Muslim world based upon communities. Leaders and active members of the learning-communities in Indonesia and elsewhere are the basic nucleuses. They are groups of people that discover the process, organize
and make it work. Fieldwork concerning these people has been conducted and the subsequent chapters present their responses.
Chapter 6

Inquiring into Relocalisation: The Muhammad’s nation in Constant Struggle

6.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with fieldwork, and focuses on the Modernist and Traditionalist ‘community-Muslims’ represented mainly by Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (NU). It begins with a detailed description of Muhammadiyah, then NU. Unlike the NU, the modern approach of Muhammadiyah’s movement has not been based on pesantren communities. Therefore, data collection concerning Muhammadiyah was carried out by interviewing the leaders and active members while for the Traditionalist NU the research involved observation of the pesantren and interviews with the leaders.

Besides providing more accounts of the long-standing contest between Western and Islamic globalization in Indonesia, this chapter provides examples of social actions advanced by Muhammadiyah and NU in confronting the impacts of capitalism’s over-utilization of natural resources and the disparity of its distribution. It highlights events and discourses among the Muslim groups related to these problems. Ultimately, the fieldwork aims to contribute to build holistic understanding of the following:

1) Willingness, ability and possibility of the existing Indonesian Muslim groups to advance relocalisation as defined in Chapter 4, to create green intentional community models that can be duplicated, and whose culture can be propagated, to convert Muslim society at large to live up to the Islamic ecological values, for both survival and sustainability.
2) Practical, cultural and ideological issues arising or shared by the Muslim communities being studied, regarding their ability to undertake relocalisation.
3) Possibility of the existing Muslim groups to take on global Islamic environmental actions, to envisage a global relocalisation network by local Muslim communities.

6.2 Muhammadiyah and Modernization in Indonesia

Muhammadiyah is an Indonesian Islamic organization, well known for providing education and health services. Up to the present time, Muhammadiyah is officially recognized as a non-political organization. The organization has five levels of leadership with several councils attached to each

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102 Nevertheless, the research findings show that despite increasing socio-ecological problems across the archipelago, Muhammadiyah and NU’s responses to the crisis have been no more than rescuing attempts as auxiliaries to the welfare functions they have been playing. This should be understood, given the fact that all Muslim groups – Muhammadiyah and NU not excepted - have been outside the power-center and not included in policy making in Indonesia, except, of course, through the Department of Religious Affairs, given the country’s majority population is Muslim.

103 See 5.3 about the history of Islam reformism behind its formation.
level: nation, province, country, district and village. Each is responsible for managing the organization’s affairs at that particular level. Once a year a national conference is held, and other regional ones might be held as necessary. In the 2010 report, Muhammadiyah owned and operated in total, about 17,000 schools (from kindergarten to high school), 170 colleges and universities, 750 health services such as public hospitals, clinics, and maternity hospitals; it also maintained 11,500 mosques. Muhammadiyah’s schools and hospitals were managed under the ‘Amal Usaha Muhammadiyah’ (profit-oriented or entrepreneurial activities) division. For its schools and hospitals Muhammadiyah has a hierarchical leadership structure. The provincial leaders are in charge of universities, while the lower levels of leadership are responsible for the lower educational levels. This structural managerial system is also applied to maintain hospitals. A different system is applied to non-profit institutions, such as mosques and orphanages, which are normally assigned to the village level of leadership. Outside schools, Muhammadiyah disseminates ideas through pengajian (Islamic study groups) in the mosques and printed media. Economic activities of the organization include minimarket and small financial institutions such as Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (people’s credit bank). However, Muhammadiyah does not prohibit the members being associated with a non-Shariah banking system, “because Shariah banking is not internationally connected”, one of the leaders in the Jakarta office said.

I did not interview any salaried professionals working in Muhammadiyah schools and healthcare. All respondents were leaders and active members -both male and female- who claimed to be unsalaried volunteers, they meant their activities as ibadah (part of worshipping God). Except some house-wife-only women in Aisyiyah, the female wing, everyone else’s main paid work profession was outside their activities in the organization. The initial support for Muhammadiyah had come mainly from Muslim middle-class merchants and traders. But sweeping economic changes after Indonesia’s independence caused a sharp decline among the Muslim small town merchants and traders who had previously been Muhammadiyah supporters (Fuad, 2004). This, however, did not prevent Muhammadiyah from growing. Although weakened substantially, the trading tradition among small-town Muslims continued. Their children went on to earn academic degrees, “rendering Muhammadiyah supporters the most educated among Muslims in Indonesia” (Nakamura, 1983, cited in Fuad, 2004:403). Thus, Muhammadiyah supporters now include more professionals than in the past.

104 For more detailed accounts see Fuad (2004:401-402).
6.2.1 Socio-Ecological crisis and the Muhammadiyah Leadership

Interplay between nationalist’s sentiment; reformist’s resentment of ‘imperialist West’; modernist’s aspiration of progress; and inferiority complex about Muslim’s backwardness and poverty, pervaded Muhammadiyah responses during the interviews. They gave rise to a certain degree of ambivalence towards environmental concerns. One of the general secretaries of the organization known to be knowledgeable of environmental issues, commented:

“No education has been given by government, so the Indonesian society is left completely unaware of the serious problems the earth is facing now, so, they will say “well, climate change is simply the will of God”. The Ulama know nothing about this either, environmental fiqh has never been studied as part of the Shariah, interpretations of the Quran and Sunna made by earlier generations have not been reviewed from the present-day point of view”

When I asked him whether that was part of the impact of Western colonization, he said:

“No, on the contrary, it is because the human mind had been shackled by religion, so when you think scientifically, you will be labeled liberal, secular”

On this note, Ahmad Najib Burhani (2013a) writes that Muhammadiyah has now been divided between the conservative and the liberal camps. By developing a narrative about the beginning of the Muhammadiyah movement the liberals want to make Muhammadiyah more progressive and modern which was the original goal of the movement. Liberals intend to convince people that they are walking in the footsteps of the movement’s founders, and they are therefore the legitimate heirs of Muhammadiyah. According to Burhani, intellectuals Abdul Munir Mulchan and Sukidi Mulyadi are among the proponents of such liberal views. They mentioned that the founder, Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan, was both a pluralist and a liberal, and a Muslim par excellence (Mulyadi, 2005). Mulyadi describes the early years of Muhammadiyah as a beautiful and excellent time that deserves to be replicated in Muhammadiyah’s present and future. Therefore, instead of applying the well-known motto “back to the Quran and Sunna” as a battle cry, the liberal group follows the slogan “back to Ahmad Dahlan and his interpretation of the Quran and Sunna” as the principle to liberate people from Muhammadiyah’s current problems. The other camp, the conservatives, condemns the liberal model of reenactment and the idea that the early years of Muhammadiyah should be taken as the model for the present. Although they are familiar with the historical record of the founding fathers and their deeds, they appear to reject the authority of the historical narrative of Muhammadiyah and consider it to be less authoritative than the origin of Islam. One of the leaders of the conservative faction, Yunahar Ilyas, firmly rejects the authority of the liberal myths: “this is the

105 Fiqh is Islamic jurisprudence. Fiqh al-Bi’ah is Islamic jurisprudence of environment.
Muhammadiyah, not the Dahlaniyah” (Muhammadiyah means the way of Muhammad; Dahlaniyah means the way of Dahlan) (Ilyas, 2013).

Further on environmental issues, the leader added:

“Look at the destructions on land, water, air, apart from the “2012 End of the World” movie controversy, I am among those who believe that the Qiyamah – apart from death, of course - is subject to human’s actions, it depends on the extent to which humans look after this earth. Since we are now already facing global warming, that means the threats are truly imminent. On the one hand climate uncertainty is already happening and yet our farmers are not well informed about what is going on and how to deal with those, so we are facing truly dire consequences. This is a very-very serious problem if you look from that perspective”

He criticized the fuel subsidy that has been provided as well:

“Just let the fuel prices soar unsubsidized so that people realize that the fossil fuel we have been consuming is unsustainable - the subsidy system is the den of robbers anyway (laughter) - and that we need to reduce the population of motor vehicles. No more cheap down-payments for vehicle credit, they only sound good for short term goals and of course, for tax purposes”

At the same time, he applauded India, Korea and Malaysia for having been self-reliant in automotive industries:

“While Indonesian has been so dependent, TATA in India, PROTON Malaysia, and KIA Korea have become tuan rumah [literally ‘host’, means, the lord] in their own country”

It is worth noting that further elaboration of modernity and the idea of progress in classical political economy produced the grounds for the emergence of a developmentalist ideology (Grosfoguel, 2000) that intensifies expansionist and competition paradigms. Against this backdrop, ‘small is beautiful’ ideals of relocalisation and sustainability are like a lone voice in the wilderness. According to the leader, the Indonesians in general are largely unaware of anything related to ecological issues, even for the most observable ones, let alone the ‘peak oil’. He bet that any Indonesian knows the fact that the country had not been an OPEC member since 2004. Nonetheless, he applauded the

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106 The movie sparked protests from the Ulama. It is considered as provocation against Islam because doomsday in Islam should not be visualized or predicted for it is the secret of God.

107 Muslims speak of two types of Qiyamah: Qiyamah al-sughra (the small Qiyamah), which occurs at the hour of death for each individual, and Qiyamah al-kubra (the major Qiyamah) which occurs at the hour of death for the entire world.
Indonesian President, Yudhoyono, for taking a courageous stance against the North in the UN climate change conference in Bali, 2007\textsuperscript{108}.

“\textbf{The North wanted to make Indonesian forest the earth’s lung, means, we can’t reap any advantages from the forest, ...pragmatically speaking, we are still greatly in need of the forest to sustain our people, logging is a crucial income for the country, 32 million of our population are under the poverty line...well, but what matters most is how our government can stand up and say [he uttered in English] “this is my country, I have the authority and sovereignty to manage this country, if you want to work with me please do on the basis of my agreement, but if you don’t then let us manage our own country”... Carbon Trade’ is a lucrative business, isn’t it?} \textsuperscript{109}

Again, it is worth noting here what Grosfoguel (2000) argues that developmentalism is linked to liberal ideology and to the idea of progress. In spite of their policy discrepancies, they all believed in national development and in the inevitable progress of the nation-state through the rational organization of society. Accordingly, the main bone of contention was how to ensure more wealth for a nation-state.

At the 45\textsuperscript{th} congress in Malang, 2005, Muhammadiyah founded a council for community empowerment. Officially stated in the organization profile, the vision of this new council is to seek alternative community development models and to encourage social transformation process in the Muhammadiyah society with \textit{Tawhid} (Islamic doctrine) as the spirit of the empowerment activities. The actual works included promoting sustainable agriculture best-practices through the \textit{pengajian} learning communities in the rural communities\textsuperscript{110}. The leader said, however:

“\textbf{But these kinds of preaching activities are cultural activities, they are social and voluntary in nature. Without structural supports such as government policies, these are just very slow movements. Even though, sometimes the government asked us to help in reforestation, such as, restoring unproductive land with seeding supplied by the governments, they’re still not adequate}”

Several times within the talks, the leader praised the leadership of the Shia Imams in Iran, where the Imams appear as real leaders in real-life issues, \textit{“not just being ‘imam’ in the prayer congregation like us here” (laughter)“}. In my view, his statement summed up the unresolved difficulties he probably

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}[\textsuperscript{108}]
\item See Appendix 4.
\item He was referring to the UN Climate Change summit in Bali in 2007 and its dramatic ending. See Appendix 4.
\item The leader provided information on a recent research by Munir Mulchan which shows that the ‘puritan farmers’ are Muhammadiyah’s members, whereas in Geertz’ report (Chapter 3), the farmers are the \textit{abangan} (non-practicing Muslims). Mulchan also gave information about the emergence of ‘santri kota’ (urban observant Muslims) all over Indonesia.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
had as to how modernism and Islam can be fused. Elsewhere, a senior officer in the Jakarta office, Sulomo, commented about the environmental crisis:

“You want to talk about the environment? But who caused climate change? the greenhouse thingy? All these have been rooted in the akhlaq, akhlaq of the leaders -if we can learn from the i’tibar [lesson] of the prophets we will understand why Indonesia has been punished on and on. This is the outcome of the capitalist political-economic order that made us the market of their economic activities, market of their culture too, look at what’s on our TV now-- yourself is a woman, you must understand what I mean - girls with hot pants, wearing clothes that look naked-- so disrespectful to women - the result is decadence of akhlaq, both among the leaders of this country and young generation. But then they provoked: “so, where is kuntum khoiru ummah, then?” (sigh) -isn’t that very clear? the conditions are amar ma’ruf (enjoin right conduct) and nahi munkar (forbid indecency) -if the two were not there, that’s void -we are in shortage of role models, if we remember Umar ibn Khattab, when he was a khilafah he lived very simple life, every night went around the city to make sure that everyone got food to eat, he didn’t wear beautiful cloths, once he did wear double cloth and his people protested because that’s not needed, he took it off. So, here we have why Allah punished us now”.

The comment suggests that he was very likely to be with the conservative faction of Muhammadiyah. His statement articulates not only the centrality of Islamic symbolic universe as Foltz et al (2003:xxxiv) mentioned, but also reflects the concerns shared between the Red, the Green, and Islam, that Melanie Phillips (2010) speculated as the ‘Red-Black-Green-Islamic Axis’. As the members found dissonance between the ideals of modernity and development and the ground reality of inequality, systemic injustice, and environmental degradation in the country that Muhammadiyah had been struggling with, they came to realize the non-existence of a consistent role model, and hence, were returning to the ‘Tradition’. Bruinessen (2013) noted a “conservative turn” in contemporary Indonesian Islam. Correspondingly, in my analysis of the emergence of the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ discussed in Chapter 5, the meaning of Prophet Muhammad is reproduced and resuscitated once again, and the Prophet re-emerged as a ‘leader’ in a leaderless society that globalization implies. Sulomo also revealed his opinion that the Indonesian population cannot possibly escape from the onslaught of values and cultures foreign to the religious ones.

111 Arabic term referring to the practice of virtue, morality and manner by the Muslims.
112 Quran verse: “O Ye are the best community sent forth unto mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency, and ye believe in Allah” (Q:3:110)
114 “The industrialization and modernization programmes carried out by the Suharto regime have brought signs, albeit sporadic, of national prosperity. Yet the basic economic problem of the ummah, as originally perceived by the founder, seems to persist. The majority of the ummah remain to constitute the economic underdog of the country” (Fuad, 2004:411).
Prof Syafi‘i Ma‘arif, a former chairman of Muhammadiyah, commented about the appalling condition of the Muslim world:

“Look at what happened in the Arab world, Palestine for example, the Hamas and the Fatah, they are not alike, you know? They fight one and another, both with Bismillah, can you imagine how tragic is that? We just have to admit this crude fact first, before we can do anything”

In essence, Ma‘arif was expressing his poignant concern about disunity between Muslims. In other words, it was an expression of his inner feeling of unity of brotherhood in faith. This confirms what has been expounded in my theoretical framework that the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ symbolic universe also encompasses affective components besides cognitive and normative. Additionally, it explains what has been commented on often by Western observers regarding Muslims. For example, Hope (2000) who noted the basic themes in Muslim belief: “despite many signs of disunity, most Muslims feel that the Islamic world is an entity” (p.155). Ma‘arif continued:

“We have about some 400 firqah (groups) within the Ummah at the moment, each claims to be the true one. shouldn’t it be easy to overcome with the Furqan\(^\text{115}\)? Quran is the criteria! Right? Even though different interpretations are inevitable, but still the benang merah\(^\text{116}\) is there. It is egoism and subjectivism that have divided us. We just have not been honest to our religion. I will say, the Muslim groups’ leaders have not been living in Islam prophetically, so here we are now, we make Islam only as a ritual religion, a private religion, no internalization of its values in our everyday lives, neither we use it in our everyday affairs, so, at the end, we are no different than those the materialists when ‘money’ is presented to us. Look at those who sit in the parliament, whether the Islamic parties or not, they are all alike”

Ma‘arif informs that what I term as the paradox\(^\text{117}\) of alaikum bil jam'a'ah\(^\text{118}\) being the challenge, and opportunity within the Ummah. To live in togetherness means to subjugate one’s individuality to a group. But paradoxically, to live in a group means possessing an equal chance toward a division from, or a union with, other groups to constitute the larger collectivity of the Ummah. The reasons for uniting or separating could be as simple as one’s liking or fondness of a camaraderie. Consequently, disunity within the Ummah will likely persist regardless of all the effort to unify the Muslim communities into a single pattern of thought and actions. The positive side would be the

\(^{115}\) Used by the Muslims interchangeably to refer to the Quran.

\(^{116}\) Literally, ‘red thread’, means in Bahasa as ‘the connector’.

\(^{117}\) The inspiration came suddenly at the moment I was interviewing with Kyai Miftah from the NU when he asked me back: “By the way, which Muslim group are you from?” I answered: “I’d like to say, not any one, just a Muslim”. And he replied: “No, you can’t, a Muslim must have a community, a group that she or he belongs to, you must do organization, alaikum bil jam'a'ah”.

\(^{118}\) A Hadith, understood by Muslims as an injunction to live in togetherness.
presence of many groups within the Ummah that ensures non-state leaderships are available to advance pragmatic solutions for local Muslim communities toward relocalisation, provided that it is allowed to happen\textsuperscript{119}. The negative side is too obvious to need further speculation given the present condition of the Ummah as Ma’arif described. In this sense, the potential of the Ummah to mobilize ecological actions in a collaborative, though decentralized and diverse manner, is not a figment, given the power of symbolic universe already expounded in Chapter 2.

Ma’arif continued with a rumour circulating among the Muslims. However unfounded\textsuperscript{120}, the rumour reflected Muslims’ bewilderment about the multidimensional crisis the world is facing:

“Oh, have you heard a circulating story in the internet about a Hadith raised by a syeikh in Cyprus? He said that the mission of the Prophet Muhammad \textit{solallahu alaihi wa salam} (peace be upon him) lasts only up to 1,500 years and then the \textit{Qiyamah}\textsuperscript{121}. So we are approaching the \textit{Qiyamah} now, you know? That means we have only 65 years left, Well, I said, we must remember that our Prophet is not a soothsayer, he never made prognostications, when he said about the fall of the Roman empire and that came true it was not his foretelling but the saying of the Quran, so we must be very-very careful about this matter”

In his article, “\textit{Dunia Islam Yang Masih Rapuh }”, Republika, February 1, 2011, Ma’arif criticised Islamists’ views. In his opinion, the Muslim world’s susceptibility to the West’s domination was caused by the feebleness of Islamic countries themselves. For him, radical introspection is needed, and that requires Muslims being critical of the Muslims themselves. Further, while being quite aware of mounting environmental issues, Ma’arif was disappointed by the Ulama’s lack of participation due to their ‘loss of contact’, hence relevance, with the real-life issues since colonial times.

“Everyone knows the \textit{dalil} (reference), \textit{surah} Rum is widely referred, right? \textit{dhaharal fasaadu fil barri wal bahri bimaa kasabat aydinnaasi li yudziiqahum ba’dha alladzi ‘amilu la‘allahum yarji’un}\textsuperscript{122}. But how to execute that, they don’t know. Their knowledge is so limited. Because, for the past hundreds of years, you know, Islam cannot be applied in everyday affairs, so Islam has evolved into a religion that only deals with doctrines, their correspondences to contemporary realities are not so clear to the Muslims anymore. The

\textsuperscript{119} Considering external forces that continue to ‘divide and conquer’ the Muslim people.

\textsuperscript{120} For there is strong prohibition in Islam to forecast the \textit{Hour}, as the Prophet himself, other than enumerating the signs, said “About that he who is questioned knows no more than the questioner” (in a Hadith “meeting with Angel Jibril”).

\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Qiyamah} is known as the day of resurrection. It is understood by the Muslims as eschatological ‘the end of the world’. Belief in \textit{Qiyamah} and afterlife is one of the six articles of Islamic faith, alongside belief in One God; the angels of God; the Books of God, especially the Quran; the prophets of God, especially Muhammad; \textit{Qada} and \textit{Qadar} (the supremacy of God’s will, predestination).

\textsuperscript{122} “Corruption doth appear on land and sea because of which men’s hands have done, that He may make them taste a part of that which they have done, in order that they may return” (Q:30:41)
Ulama masters the *kitab kuning*\(^{123}\) only, they don’t comprehend the *kitab putih*\(^{124}\). From then on, the gap is just widening.”

In response to my question about the notion of progress, Ma’arif gave his opinion that reminds me of Nasr’s criticism of the modernist’s view of progress—a belief that everything will become better simply by progressing over time. Such belief makes people forget both God and the limit of nature.

“If you look at the Quran, it talks about the progress of time optimistically, such as Surah Dhuha, for example, *wal akhiratu khoirul laka minal ‘ula*\(^{125}\), even though some interpreted it as saying about the Madinah period as being better than the Makkah’s, but at least it is a progressive outlook. So when there are Muslims who bring up the pessimistic Hadith, I would say those Hadith need to be re-reviewed, re-studied. How come we talk about regressing when everybody else is progressing? So, I think what they are doing in Turkey now is on the right track, they began with Hadith narration by al-Bukhari Muslim. I’m not expert on that, but I see the crucial needs to study the exegesis of the Quran and Hadith at this particular moment in history. As we see what the Taliban did to the women, they made their own interpretations of Islam which has been really devastating Islam. For them, women are just *suargo manut neroko katut*\(^{126}\), so someone like you can’t possibly make your study (laughter)”

Ma’arif was also concerned about population growth in developing countries:

“Its’ really scary! If you look at the prediction, in 2045 Indonesia is predicted to have a 450 million population. So, let me conclude, I will say that we need a leader who *sudah selesai dengan dirinya sendiri*\(^{127}\) to deal with these very complex issues. Let’s be optimistic, however, this country is very rich!”

Bruinessen (2013) noted that the Muhammadiyah’s concern with education has continued. The group has been strongly represented in the higher echelons of the Ministry of Education. In the post-Suharto period, it has successfully attempted to gain control of the Ministry and its view of education has influenced the legislation. Detailed description of Muhammadiyah’s education is presented in chapter 7. In the following section I will examine how the same issues apply to the traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia:

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123 Classical texts of various Islamic disciplines. These works are collectively known in Indonesia as ‘*kitab kuning*’, literally, yellow book. According to Van Bruinessen (1994), that name is allegedly owed to the tinted paper on which the first Middle Eastern editions reaching Indonesia was printed.


125 “And verily, the latter portion will be better for thee than the former” (Q:93:4).

126 Javanese old proverb, literally, “to the heaven she was passenger, to the hell she was attached”, refers to the fate of total submission of a woman to her husband.

127 Loosely translated: “has accomplished him/herself”.

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(1) Do they have a self-reliance culture such as the Muhammadiyah’s trading and entrepreneurship traditions?
(2) Do they have as much ambiguous nationalist-globalist tendency as leaders of Muhammadiyah?
(3) How strong is the power of Islamic symbolic universe to ‘move’ the traditionalists?
(4) Finally, in what ways can the traditionalist Muslims be called for relocalisation for survival and sustainability?

6.3 Nahdlatul Ulama: Conserving Islamic Traditions

This section is a presentation of both the Indonesian traditionalist Muslims and the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as the coordinating body of their scholars (kyai) and their pesantren. In the literature, NU has been considered as a political force (Hefner, 1987; Dijk, 1996; Bush, 2009) and the fatwa maker alongside MUI-Council of Indonesian Ulama (Laffan, 2005). Literature on pesantren has primarily focused on their roles as (i) community development agent (Candland, 2000); (ii) civil society (Sirry, 2010; Bush, 2009, Hefner, 2000); (iii) loci of Sufi order and the order’s recruits (Howell, 2001, Dhofier, 1999); and (iv) provider of schooling (Lukens Bull, 2001; Bruinessen, 2009; Pohl, 2009). A description of each account will unfold as the discussion goes. It begins with a description of the NU, and then focuses on the research interests.

To reiterate what has already been specified in earlier chapters, NU is the world’s largest Muslim mass-based organization (Bruinessen, 2004). It has always been a multifunctional organization: social, educational, and political (Pringle, 2010). From this research though, I did not see the organization as one that can be described easily. Perhaps, Laffan (2005:96) shares my opinion best. According to him:

Although NU claims the largest mass-membership of any Muslim organization in the world, it is still best seen as an alliance of scholars, their pupils and extended families with a backbone of prominent ‘ulama’ known as kiai. Some of these kiais run pesantrens, oversee Sufi brotherhoods (tarekat), and even patronise the activities of a range of non-government organizations. Taken as a whole, NU is capable of mobilizing large numbers of delegates from throughout the archipelago.

The NU community is often called Nahdliyyin. NU’s influences are most dominant in Java or among the Javanese who make up nearly 42% of the Indonesian population. Before massive urbanization took place in Java and other islands, Nahdliyyin were largely rural and pesantren-educated. The lifeblood of the NU is the network of kyai. In its present form, NU is basically a charitable body, helping to fill many of the shortcomings of the Indonesian government in society (Pringle, 2010). NU funds hospitals and organizes local communities (neighborhood or kampung) into more coherent groups and helps to combat poverty. There is a central board in Jakarta and provincial boards in each

128 Learned interpretation and religious opinion about an issue by a qualified jurist pertaining to the Islamic law.
of Indonesia's provinces that direct the organization. The NU has both informally and formally affiliated organizations. Organizational affiliates, such as Ikatan Putri-Putri, Fatayat, and Muslimat (associations of NU girls, younger women, and older women, respectively), are composed of NU members and report to the NU plenary, but have no formal role in the NU hierarchy. Muslimat is an important association within the NU. It was founded in March 1946 to ‘improve the well-being and status of Muslim women.’ (Tristiawati and Munir, 1995:2). The wives of kyai are often the provincial leaders within the Muslimat. There are ten such autonomous organizations affiliated to the NU. It is revealing of the social solidarity within the NU that these organizations are typically referred to as being part of the NU family (Candland, 2000).

With regard to community development, Candland (2000:36) explains that the provincial committees administer other organizations within the formal structure of the NU, such as the LKK (Lembaga Kemaslahatan Keluarga - Family Welfare Institute) and the LAKPESDAM (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia - Institute for Studies and Human Resource Development). There are twelve such formal lembaga (institutions). The LPPNU and LPNU, for example, coordinate NU activities in the fields of employment generation and rural development. One of the organizations formed within the formal structure of the NU was the LKK. It was founded in December 1977 to promote family welfare, largely through reproductive health and family planning, by the Yayasan Kesejahteraan Muslimat (Women’s Welfare Foundation), an institution established and operated by Muslimat. Previously, family welfare activities of the NU were coordinated by the Yayasan Kesejahteraan Muslimat. The LKK conducts training programs for health care workers, works with domestic and international governmental and nongovernmental agencies, and produces and distributes pamphlets and books on reproductive health. One of the truly remarkable accomplishments of the LKK, achieved with the help of the association of young NU women, Fatayat, was the reinterpretation of the Quran and Hadith that lead to a fatwa in favour of family planning, including specific kinds of tubal ligations and vasectomies (Saifuddin Zuhri et al., 1979; Masyhuri, 2000). International Planned Parenthood and the United Nations Children’s Fund have recognized the work of Fatayat and Muslimat as instrumental in promoting reproductive health and raising mother and infant survival rates throughout Indonesia.

Like Muhammadiyah and other Muslim organizations, NU has a body for collection of zakat, infaq and shodaqoh, the forms of Islamic philanthropy, LAZIS NU (Lembaga Amil, Zakat, Infaq, Shodaqoh NU). By the end of 2009, the East Java branch of NU launched a local TV station, TV9, aired from Surabaya. TV9 provides alternative information and programs to the mainstream media and aimed to be an alternative media for Muslims. Among the programs are the pengajian (learning
circles) of the NU-affiliated kyai, entrepreneurship, and entertainment alternatives to the so-called ‘infotainments’ that the Indonesians - women in particular - have been mesmerized by (see Heryanto, 2008). “TV9 entertainments are free of ghibah (backbiting)”, said Kyai Mutawakkil Alallah (Nahdlatul Ulama, 2011), the President Commissioner, in that regard. In 2012, the same branch of NU founded Mabadiku Bintang Sembilan Cooperative, which aimed to empower the NU to combat poverty. The cooperative is supposed to turn the NU from “lower hand” to become an “upper hand” in a Hadith: “the upper hand is better than the lower hand” (he who gives the charity is better than the one who takes it) (Nahldatul Ulama, 2013). In short, there are governance structures for setting up local activities which can be expected to be explored from the NU, the kyais and pesantren communities under the Sages and Relocalisation Activists discussions in Chapter 4.

6.3.1 NU: From anti-systemic, to anti-politics

The NU played an active role in the fight for Indonesian independence and was involved in the writing of the ideology of Indonesian state as well as in the indictment of the loss of the “seven words” from Pancasila (Siry, 2010); and became a political party in 1952. Afterward, NU-state relations continued to be complex. Until the early 1980s, “the politics of distrust were the main feature of the relationship between NU and the state” (Sirry, 2010:63). Confrontation with the state jeopardized NU by being involved too much in practical politics with little gain. In 1984 at the NU Situbondo National Congress, under the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid, it withdrew from formal politics as part of Kembali ke Khittah 1926 (Return to Guidelines 1926). Wahid believed that NU and its pesantren network could become a vital component of a civil society that inspires democracy (Sirry, 2010:70). NU began to promote civil society discourse and shifted its focus from politics to social and community development. While it has never again become a political party, NU has remained active in the world of Indonesian politics since 1984 (Bush, 2009).

For Bush (2009:28), the adoption of Khittah’26 signaled a victory of intellectual groups over the politicians that had dominated the NU for decades, and henceforth, the intellectuals maintained

129 “Because the orientation of these infotainment programmes is entertainment, which can make profit by creating cheap entertainment, the quality of the information presented in such shows barely has any relevance. These programmes are not intended to increase the quality of public understanding of current affairs and issues of importance to the public. Rather these programmes ‘deceive’ society, in particular women” (Arivia, 2005, cited in Yulianto, 2008:141). “Celebrity shows become a kind of ‘air pollution’ that the female audience consumes everyday...dissuaded and distracted women from participation in public life of major importance” (Heryanto, 2008:141)

130 A considerable amount of discussion and debate has been generated about the true purpose of the original establishment of NU. Most NU scholars describe the main motivations being religious and social – to maintain and protect ahlu sunnah wal jamaah...which means ‘those who follow the Sunna’ (Bush, 2001:36)
a strong position. Nonetheless, both the politicians and anti-politicians “invoked Khittah’26 and harkened back to NU’s original purpose and nature in support of their cause” (Bush, 2009:28). With the anti-political stance “the traditionalists began a more overt campaign against conflation of Islam and politics” (Sirry, 2010:69), yet, some pesantren leaders continue to be interested in politics. Moreover, the establishment of National Awakening Party (PKB) in 1998, based largely on an NU constituency, and that Abdurrahman Wahid himself decided to run for the presidency, complicated the situation even further. What Sirry (2010: 69-71) describes as the complication engendered by the rise of Wahid to the presidency caught my attention. Like other Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, Wahid had grappled with the idea of nation-state vis-à-vis Islam for a long time. Since the 1970s he expressed his thinking through his prolific writing and debating especially what it means to be an Indonesian Muslim and detailing the proper relationship between Islam and the state (Burhani, 2013).

During his presidency, in interview with Hutanuwart (2004:226-246) – in which they discuss an alternative to a Western model of development in Asia - Wahid said that he believes Islam, as a way of life, has no clear concept of state (p.237). He adopted a nation-state idea for Indonesia instead, and infused it with the principles that characterized his pursuit of civil society ideals. For instance: (i) he wanted to reduce the role of the government, talked in cabinet that ministers should not try to curtail or challenge the people’s ability to be active, instead, the government should only make plans and then coordinate with the NGOs in organizing activities (p.229); (ii) aiming at ‘food sovereignty’131, he wanted to save the agriculture sector from foreign investment and multinational corporations, and keep it instead for local communities and peoples (p.229). His unfailing good presupposition of others demonstrates the pesantren characteristic of husnu dzon (Arabic, thinking of others and their actions in positive light), which sadly, cannot always be applied to the so-called ‘global-political economic’ realms, as the following accounts show. While he wanted to change the strategy towards economic growth, by not depending on foreign investment, export, and industrialization anymore, instead, building a people’s economy and catering for the domestic market (p.237), he continued to resist the interviewers’ negative view of capitalism (p.230-232). He put forward, instead, his confidence in ‘agency’ and the good innate nature of human beings (which evokes the Sages in 4.2.2), that even an IMF which in his eyes is only an ‘instrument’, can always be...

131 Food sovereignty is food self-reliance movement for sustainability, growing from the farmers, fishers, indigenous people and landless workers most impacted by global hunger and poverty. Food sovereignty goes well beyond ensuring that people have enough food to meet their physical needs. It asserts that people must reclaim their power in the food system by rebuilding their relationships between people and the land, and between food providers and those who eat. It is rooted in ongoing global struggles over control of food, land, water, and livelihoods (e.g. Wittman, 2010; Patel, 2007).
changed toward serving the people (p.233). Notably, the Rupiah went down steadily throughout his period, and the interviewer provoked discussion of that by suggesting it showed that international agencies that control the money wanted him to fail (p.233). Still Wahid resisted this argument. Furthermore, for peace and stability of the country, Wahid wanted to pardon Suharto and to exercise leniency – a proposition that raised anger of Indonesians, mainly of the “Western-educated intellectuals” (p.228). From the relocalisation and ‘knowledge in community’ perspective, I argue that Wahid provides a full-circle experimentation of civil society activists trying to apply the small-scale, largely homogenous community’s contexts of *pesantren* and its network, in a vast, complex, and heterogeneous nation-state system.

The civil society discourse gained popularity soon after the end of Suharto. Many modernist scholars preferred to use *masyarakat madani* instead -a word associated with the society of Medina\(^{132}\). Henceforth, the debates came to ignite another interpretation of civil society as ‘Islamic state’, which provoked the traditionalists. For the traditionalists, referring to the Medina charter and society means they must hold the political agenda of Islamization. For the modernist, leaving the term untranslated has made the traditionalists appear to be victims of Western hegemony of meaning (Sirry, 2010:67). Another important impact of the NU’s anti-political stance is the emergence of a growing number of Muslim NGOs\(^{133}\) targeting the *pesantren* to become key institutions in community development. The *pesantren* provided Muslim activists with an extensive network of institutions that spread throughout Indonesia and down to the grass-roots level (Sirry, 2010:65). In what follows, I will describe the NU’s environmental activism through Lembaga Penanggulangan Bencana dan Perubahan Iklim (Disaster and Climate Change Board, henceforth, LPBI). Interviews were made with eleven leaders of LPBI in the Jakarta head office.

### 6.3.2 Better Late than Never: LPBI NU

LPBI is an ad-hoc committee focusing on the impact of climate change. It is a further development of community-based disaster risk management. The committee was established recently (August 2010). Apparently the NU has been in cooperation with a number of national and international donors in disaster management issues. Names such as the Australian Government (AusAID), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Mangrove Forest for the Future (MFF), Consortium for Disaster Education (CDE program) are among the NU’s partners in disaster management.

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132 See 4.4.1
133 In response to Suharto’s repressive regime towards political Islam, Indonesia witnessed mushrooming Muslim activism.
Additionally, the NU was with the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia in Conference of the Parties (COP 15) and the world conference on climate change in Copenhagen (2009); Bali Roadmap (2007); WOC (World Ocean Conference) in Manado (2009); conference of the UN ISDR (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction) in Bangkok (2007); International MACCA (Moslem Action for Climate Change Adaptation) in Bogor (2010); Climate International Project by DNPI (National Council on Climate Change) in Jakarta (2010).

All the LPBI leaders interviewed admitted that among the most vulnerable to the natural disasters such as flooding and landslide were the Nahdliyyin given that they were mainly in rural and lower income urban areas. Yayah Ruchyati told that until 2007 there was no legislation to regulate the activities that potentially caused environmental damage. “Only when nature was degraded everywhere and natural disasters arrived, has the legislation finally been made”. This echoes Adams’s (2001) warning of the late awareness about environmental problems in the Third World, for in the initial periods of industrialization, resources were abundant and places where waste could be discarded were readily available. I inquired further to Mun’iem, another LPBI leader: “but what about sustainable development that Professor Emil Salim has spoken of since 1980s, do you mean that concept doesn’t work or is just falling short?”

“Of course not. What kind of sustainable development is that, if what they meant by development is constructing high-rise buildings, roads, industries like that? Can you imagine how many mountains need to be sacrificed, how many hectares of forest have to be destroyed in order to supply granite, marble, stone, wood that a building like that requires? What a contradiction that they’ve been talking about: development and sustainability - very illogical”

In the same year LPBI was established (2010), the multinational environmental group WWF joined forces with LPBI NU to spread the message about saving the environment. The head of WWF Indonesia, Efransjah, said the agreement called for a combination of environmental conservation and religious values to deal with the impact of climate change. Efransjah was confident that the NU’s extensive network would help to disseminate public awareness about preserving the environment and biodiversity.134

The head of LPBI, Avianto Muhtadi, who, at the time, was a PhD student at the University of Indonesia, said that LPBI was founded out of the awareness that climate change is a serious threat, not only to the coastal areas of an archipelagic country like Indonesia, but also to the inland in the form of changing rain pattern and drought that may cause changes in planting seasons and lead to food crisis. Avianto Muhtadi was involved in the Indonesian National Board for Disaster

Management (BNPB) and being the head of the National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction (Planas PRB).

Before continuing it is necessary to distinguish between LPBI NU and the Nahdliyyin pesantren. Apparently, LPBI is an NGO to help any community rather than assuming the role of community leader that the kyai takes in his own pesantren community. For a closer look at an LPBI project on flood response in Jakarta, I interviewed Wahib who was in charge of the garbage management project. He commented immediately, “yeah, the corporations enjoy the profit and we look after the garbage.” Jakarta obviously had a very ineffective garbage system and flooding is just one of the consequences. Wahib explained a project on household garbage management in the slum area located just behind an affluent estate, “Green Garden”, West Jakarta. LPBI trained people in that area to find the value of garbage through creativity and to reuse it or compost it. They built compost houses and provided facilities and trained the neighborhood leaders to further teach the people. I inquired further whether the same trainings were made for the “Green Garden” residents.

“Oh, people living in such a housing complex certainly have a different way of thinking, they will say: “I can pay for that, so don’t bother me with anything like that”, but people living behind their complex, when the flood came they had to face it, whereas those rich people not - even if the flood was so big that their houses got affected, they can easily escape to a hotel - the end of the matter!”

I asked him whether it was easy to teach these people in the slum area, though.

“Well, not so easy. In order to succeed we need to find individuals with high commitment”

Whether LPBI is able to expand the garbage management activities outside Jakarta remains to be seen. In the fieldwork in Surabaya city, by chance I came to know Fitri (name has been changed), a young lady known to be highly committed in garbage management volunteering activities, who would have been the right person for Wahib’s project. Fitri was a high school teacher who lived in kampung Kembang Kuning, a lower class urban settlement. People knew Fitri as being passionate in voicing “green and clean” projects. She trained men and women in Kembang Kuning doing composting and garbage work similar to Wahib’s project. When she was interviewed, apparently she was not in good spirits.

“I’m tired, really tired. That should be the job of the government, the ruler, not people like me. The government had to enforce it, enact it, and then it will work. Honestly, I’m fed up. It was really hard to persuade the people. If I were sick who would care about me? I came to the point that I have to think about myself now”

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Another important point was made by Ahmad Muryadi, a Nahdliyyin community leader in Kembang Kuning neighborhood. I asked him, what he thought about the people’s awareness of waste issues and their sense of responsibility towards the stream which appeared filled with garbage and trash bags.

“In a nutshell we can say that although people in this area today are none without higher college education, at least they got S1 (graduate) if not S2 (Master), but their environmental consciousness and social responsibility is, let’s say, only at primary-school-level, or at most junior high school. People like that only think about themselves, if you talk to them about environment, they will think of their immediate environment, which is only around themselves”.

Owing to its ties with the NU, LPBI could have better rapport and ability to communicate with people on the grass-root level than other NGOs. But not unlike the disadvantages of NGOs in general (William, 1991), it has limited project coverage and limited authority over the project areas in order to make impactful and long-lasting changes, besides dependence on outside financial resources.

6.3.3 Overwhelmed with Obligations

The LPBI’s capacity seems to be limited, it is important to note that however entrenched, the traditionalist pesantren have been far from able to contain the rapacious capitalist interests to ravage the livelihoods of people living nearby. During the visit to pesantren Riyadlul Jannah, Pacet, Mojokerto - about 7 km away from Munhanif’s pesantren - there were people who came to seek help on behalf of the villagers whose places were flooded as sand mining destroyed the riverbank. Obviously, these people were not necessarily pesantren members. Gus Yusuf, a young member of staff, said that 93 spots in Mojokerto district were in conflict including 50 villages severely harmed.

“They protested to the local government, it didn’t work, they escalated it to province level, it didn’t work, they reported it to the police, it didn’t work either, so where else to go if not to seek refuge with the kyai”

Yusuf also mentioned a potential religious conflict caused by the appropriation of 300 hectares of land in Trawas by Ciputra, the most prominent developer in high-class real estate that planned to make it a Christian resort complex with a Chinese graveyard, named “Trawas Memorial Park”.

“In their plot design, there will be a huge Cross, they said it will be the largest Cross in the world that will be visible from the air when you are on the plane. They meant it to welcome Jesus that they believe will come down in year 2020”

Different from the official stance of the NU, Kyai Munhanif puts forward his opinion that there is only one way to solve the disparity problems. That is, to enact Shariah law in Indonesia, and for that,
all Muslim constituents must support just one Islamic political party. Apparently, Munhanif is not with the anti-politics:

“If Indonesia turned to be like this, it is not anybody’s fault but the Muslims’ themselves. Kanjeng Nabi (Javanese, blessed Prophet), prescribed that for us 1,400 years ago ...zamaanu ala’nnasi yadullunnas minal ulama wal fuqaha... There will come a day when the Ummah distances themselves from Ulama (scholars) and Fuqaha (jurists), so Allah will send them three things: despot leaders; their works are bereft of blessing; and, died without faith”.

As he mentioned Shariah law, I asked his opinion about Adat law in comparison. He answered with a big smile:

“I’ve been asked by people about this matter over and over. Let me try to make it simple for everyone to understand. Say, if there are 1000 trees in the forest over here, and there are 1000 people living in this village. In state’s law, all trees belong to the state, so, it is up to the state to give it to anyone they wish, and in fact, they give them to the ‘big men’ (referring to corporations), and we here are only as the onlookers. In Adat law, anyone stealing the wood is hurting the adat, hence, the community. But in in Islamic law, the 1000 trees belong to everyone, remember the surah al-Baqarah of the Quran, wa lakum ma fil ardi jami’a n so everyone is entitled to one. And if you don’t do that, you violate Allah’s rule, so you have to deal with Him by yourself. Alhamdulillah (praise to Allah), I can give numerous examples to these people. Those, who when they were in power, did breach Allah’s rule by giving clearances on massive forest plunder after Gus Dur stated that forest belongs to the people, if you remember (laughter), are now facing Allah’s punishment, wala tulqu bi aydikum ila at-tahlukah -by destroying others they destroyed themselves- all the money they got seemed to slip away just like that, - illness, child’s problems, mental health problems, and so on -now we can see how they are living in misery”

In his deliberation, Munhanif seems to have emphasized the equality aspect of Shariah law with regard to natural resource distribution for this has been perceived as a major concern of rural communities. He forgot to highlight that Shariah law includes treatment of nature as well, without which it ends up with what had been attempted by President Abdurrahman Wahid as he previously mentioned. His opinion of the supremacy of Shariah over adat law also indicated the traditionalists’ turn, suggesting the homogenizing effect of contemporary globalization upon the Muslims. Azra’s (2013) commentary is appropriate here:

Thus, in the initial stages, Islam probably occupied only a marginal position in local tradition, but through the years, Islam became more central and transcended many diverse local traditions. This is clear in the case of the Minangkabau experience of Islam, for instance. In

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136 During his short tenure (1999-2001), President Abdurrahman Wahid (known as Gus Dur) made a statement that turned to be a fiasco. He stated that Indonesian forests belonged to the people. The statement was responded to immediately by massive forest plunder by corporations in the name of ‘people right’

137 See Chapter 5 - the traditionalist used to accommodate local customs.
the initial process of Islamisation, the Minangkabau people followed the principle of ‘syara’ bersendi adat; adat bersendi syara’ (syara’ [Islam] is based on adat [local tradition]; adat is based on syara’). Later, after the end of the Padri war, this principle was changed into ‘adat bersendi syara’; syara’ bersendi kitabullah’ (adat is based on Islam; Islam is based on the Qur’an). (p.65)

Contrasting positions seem to appear from the top-level of NU leadership in the Jakarta head office. In pre-emption towards ideas that appeared to him being against the ideal of NKRI nation-state, one leader responded totally negatively to my question about the possibility of a green intentional community model with self-local governance for the Nahdliyyin members:

“Like ‘Al-Salam fenced-pesantren’ [name of the fenced-pesantren group has been changed for ethical considerations], is that what you meant? Here is my opinion about them, if it were just to liberate their people from dependency on the big system, that’s fine, but that kind of radical attempt is a problem in itself. Are you aware that their ideology is a problematic one?” [Note the fenced-pesantren group officially stated Islam, instead of Pancasila, as their ideology]

The leader continued:

“We, the Nahdliyyin, believe in the middle-way, the moderate way. In our eyes, the present situation is still fine. We always have positive thinking that everything can be changed with dialogue and consensus. If we have to make changes we will do that together with the whole nation, not in such an exclusive system, but with the participatory one”.

Eleven leaders interviewed gave almost resolute negative answers towards the green-intentional community relocalisation concept with self-local governance: “We have the Nahdliyyin pesantren community model already, and that works”, is their answer. I inquired further regarding what is likely if the prognosis of the environmentalist were to be true that there are impending environmental cataclysm and converging crisis in all facets of life in the near future. The following answers captured the heart of the matter:

“When it comes to be poor, we are the expert (laughter)”

“That should be a problem for the wealthy, not the Nahdliyyin. We have always been poor, being rich is what we have not yet tasted (laughter)”

“The Nahdliyyin is very robust. Although they have been among the poorest in Indonesian society, very rare, if any, of them committed suicide, their bonding with the kyai has made them strong”

On the grass-root levels though, both NU and Muhammadiyah leaderships show a moderate level of eagerness with the following themes dominating their responses: i) need of model, ii) need of knowledge and skills about relocalisation, and iii) need of leadership. Answers from NU and Muhammadiyah sympathizers who worked as professionals outside the two organizations highlighted i) the need of job security that an intentional community might not be able to provide,
and ii) the need of leadership by existing Muslim groups. In fact, all those responses confirm the opinion of community builders such as Trainer (2000, 2006) and Jackson (2002) in Chapter 4, who believe that social change could best be achieved through the construction and demonstration of an ideal model that could be duplicated throughout the country. Nasr (2009:139) also believes that green-intentional communities such as ecovillages “can be very important models for developing saner ways of living”.

6.3.4 The Party’s Over: Responses to Ecological Crisis

Despite the intertwining challenges of poverty and vulnerability of the poor to environmental disasters, this research shows that the NU, like Muhammadiyah, as the largest umbrella of the Muslim populace only did what they could do to mitigate the impacts, instead of attempting to radically transform the economic policies. This is understandable given that both were peripheral from national policy-making capacity. During an interview with Kyai Said Aqil Siraj, the chairman of the NU, and Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah, impressions were given of being exasperated by the country’s inability to overcome corruption that gave rise to all crises at a multi-dimensional level in Indonesia. Tellingly, however, giving prudent and cautious responses and being wary of taking side with either one extreme, including when answering questions, is the unique characteristic of the Nahdliyyin’s attitudes as shown in the following transcripts.

I asked Siraj, what would be the best way to deal with the present situation of the socio-ecological crisis in the country, whether to take a survivalist’s approach to seize greater control of destiny, or fatalistic, to just let it go and whatever will be will be. His answer went as follows:

“Well, both extremes are not right. This responsibility is for of all of us together, also with the government, to restore...in this sense is to return to Tasawuf that taught us: those who follow their egos are those who forgot Allah, and those who forgot Allah are those who forgot themselves. What is inflicting us now is the result of those. Do you know that the Qur'an mandated it clearly?...Isn’t that terrifying? So, even though the Qur'an says wa-sakkhara al-

I asked further, “but does that mean you think all people partook equally in destroying nature, then?”

“No, of course the large corporations did. Remember, the Prophet commanded, there are three things that cannot be privatized: water, fuel and forest, those are derived from the Quran, so, the Divine Law has been violated and there we are now…the Quran says *Walawi ittabaa ’al haqqu ahwaahum lafasadati al-samawatu wal ardu*, had the truth followed their desires, the heavens and the earth and all those therein would have fallen in total disorder (Q:23:71). This situation takes us back to the Pharaoh’s time, it was narrated in the Quran how the Pharaoh’s Dynasty was crumbled by the greed of the traders named Qarun and Haman, aren’t they similar to those corporations, then?”

“So, who do you think should begin to take action”?

“Well, of course the policies have to be re-reviewed, but as you know we inherited an utterly corrupt bureaucracy, a very corrupt one …now we have freedom of speech, even too much sometimes, we have barely more transparent legal process, but social justice is still very far from reality… “

“What if the young people say that justice can only be gained by fighting back?”

“Yes, but the cost is too high!”

The response of Syafi’i Ma’arif of Muhammadiyah was nothing short of indeterminate in tone:

“Certainly, unholy conspiracy between the ruler and the black conglomerates were behind all those. What can the religious communities do? At best we can only make normative callings, but who is the real ruler?”

In order to analyze the potential of the Muhammadiyah and NU to promote relocalisation ideals that also have global visions of reclaiming the balance of the life-support system of the entire earth based on personal action in changing lifestyle discussed in Chapter 4, a comparison of their views with the newly emerging transnational Islam groups in Indonesia needs to be made. For example, there is a contrast between Muhammadiyah and NU’s top leaders’ responses, with the spokesperson of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Roni Ruslan, in the answer to my question regarding whether survivalism or fatalism approach is best in their perspective. Hizbut Tahrir, the Party of Liberation, is a foreign-

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139 “God has subjected (*sakhara*) nature to humankind” does not mean the ordinary conquest of nature as claimed by many modern Muslims thirsty for the power which modern science bestowed upon humans. Rather it means the dominion over things which mankind is allowed to exercise only on the condition that it be according to God’s Law and precisely because human is God’s vice-gerent on earth.

140 See 2.4.1 and 3.2.1 about this organization.
based mass organization which advocates restoration of a global caliphate. By its famous slogan in Indonesia “Indonesia Will Become Better with Shariah”, it has been seen as threatening to Pancasila.

“No, we don’t want to vanish together. Go away from Muslim lands, let us take care of ourselves using our own Islamic laws, and for sure the environmental crisis will be overcome. Let us re-build the khilafah. Remember, khilafah is a mandate from Allah to all Muslims, look the Quran surah Al-Imran 140. That is our answer” (Roni Ruslan)

In my opinion, both the nature of the problems and the nature of the people in the present-day crisis, demand pragmatic rather than heuristic solutions from religion. And also, as Berger and Luckmann (1999:146) said, no history of ideas takes place in isolation from the blood and sweat of general history. It is against this background that I argue, it can be contextualized that a good number of energetic young people have fled their ‘parents’ to join the more zealous groups in the transnational movement. Hizbut Tahrir is known to be quite popular among students and young people in the Middle East, including those pursuing their degrees in Western countries (Azra, 2013:72). In Indonesia, alongside the Prosperous Welfare Party (PKS) who is regarded as the Indonesian version of Muslim Brotherhood; apolitical Tablighi Jama’at; and various Salafi movements, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) is a new movement that competes for influence with moderate NU and Muhammadiyah (Bruinessen, 2013:3). The energetic image of PKS as combatant of corruption and vice also attracted young members of NU and Muhammadiyah (Feillard, 2013). An NU spokesman openly acknowledged the infiltration of transnational Islam’s ideas into its communities through mosque activities141. At the most extreme end, research on the religious life of terrorist individuals in Indonesia conducted by Puslitbang Kehidupan Keagamaan (Research Center of Religious Life) in the Department of Religious Affairs reveals the religious cultural background of the Indonesian terrorists are Nahdliyyin, who are “discontented with the Nahdliyyin way”, then, “turned to modernists, puritan, and Wahabism-influenced” ways of Islam (Sugiyarto, 2009, cited in Jamil, 2011:370). Additional research by the Center for the Study of Religion and Culture, CSRC, Benih-Benih Islam Radikal di Masjid: Studi Kasus Jakarta dan Solo (Al-Makassary, 2010) warns that radical Islamic groups have attracted many young members of the NU and Muhammadiyah by penetrating into the two groups’ learning communities in their mosques, especially in Jakarta and Solo. The book even posed a challenge to the claim made by NU and Muhammadiyah about the unanimous acceptance of Pancasila and the unity of nation-state (NKRI) by the members. The research shows that 21% of people in the grass-root level still yearn for an Islamic state and 32% for

141 E.g. see: http://aisar.wordpress.com/2008/05/16/kh-imam-ghazai-said-nu-diserang-hizbut-tahrir-ikhwanul-muslim-dan-salafy/#comment-3582
Khilafah. Kyai Muchid in Surabaya city admitted to me that the Nahdliyyin young generations were increasingly attracted to radical Islam.

“They might have lost their patience to see mounting problems in our society, you see, we have more and more poor people today, what would you say if the costs they had to spend in doing the farming was more than what they would earn from selling the crops? look, the fish ponds and shrimp ponds in Gresik have now turned into buildings, supermarkets, storehouses, factories, the villagers there had nowhere to work, our young people now see us as a snail (he refers to the Nahdliyyin, the Traditionalists) well, NU always intends to hug them [the Reformists, Islamists] but our philosophy is how to ‘kenek iwake gak buthek banyune’ (Javanese idiom, means literally, ‘the fish caught without troubling the water’).

Vice Secretary General of the NU in Jakarta head office, Enceng Sobirin, even acknowledged the problem as potentially having wider implications for the existence of the NU and its style of Islam:

“The future of NU is not bright. Firstly, the NU style of Islam is not an instant teaching. It demands commitment to go through a long training and socialization in the pesantren or in the family in order to grasp the full import of Islam. The style of Islam that we see growing in Indonesia today is an instant one, the one that is deliverable in a short time, albeit superficially, but perhaps that’s the easy way for today’s people, even though some will not be satisfied with that kind of Islam at the end, I believe. I observed both trends though, the increase of people going to instant Islam but also another trend accompanying, the rise of interest in Sufism from the non Nahdliyyin background, especially the urban. That’s why learning circles of kyai such as Said Aqil Siraj, Quraisy Shihab attracted more and more members. At this point I think the gravest task of NU today - which is not so easy - is to reformulate its style to meet the condition of the Muslims today, especially as we see massive urbanization has altered the entire Java rural lives into urban”

Enceng’s comment confirms precisely Hasan’s (2009:237) account of contemporary Indonesian Muslims’ piety:

Unlike religious discussions held in traditional Islamic school (pesantren), …While the pesantren requires its students to master Islamic subjects using the kitab kuning …, new centres of Islamic teaching that thrived among urban middle class are inclined to offer a sort of ‘instant’ Islam and practical guide much needed by participants for their everyday life. Relying on any accessible texts, the debates were yet assertive in an attempt to objectify religious messages. What Eickelman (1992; 1999) calls objectification process signifies the emergence of a distinctive style of religious activism oriented to “a broad, mass educated (national) public rather than a narrow circle of religious adepts” (Hefner, 1997)

Urbanization and globalization seem to have altered the mentalities of young constituents. Differences between theirs and Muhammadiyah’s, are therefore less pronounced now. The situation evokes Gadamer’s hermeneutic principle according to which the interpreter’s present situation has positive value in the process of understanding (Linge, 1977). On the positive side, this could be favorable in envisioning a collaborative environmental movement by Muslim groups for there would be less peculiarity of local issues to deal with.
In the eyes of people like Emha Ainun Nadjib, a prominent figure and a spiritual leader especially popular among young people and apposite to speak for the poor, NU possesses enormous potential whether they were aware or not. A brief introduction of Emha, also known as Cak Nun, is appropriate. Emha, Javanese, is a poet, intellectual, and a prolific preacher who founded a number of learning communities in different places. He came from a Masyumi\textsuperscript{142} family background and used to be known as an anti-Suharto activist in Yogyakarta. Assisted by his mother and his brother, he has managed to perform a monthly *pengajian* gathering every ‘full moon night’ since 1992 at Menturo village, Sumobito district, Jombang. The name of the gathering ‘Padang Mbulan’, is Javanese for ‘full moon’. Thousands of members went to Menturo to follow the activity. In his preaching, poetry, books and drama, Emha wishes to destroy the walls between different groups of Islam such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and so forth. The public loved the activity and soon it became a religious tourism for anyone who wishes to find peace of mind. The members of the activity come from all over Indonesia, sometimes even from overseas. In this activity, the members are also entertained with Islamic music, “Shalawatan” and “Hadrah” (view the links in the Footnotes\textsuperscript{143}). The musical groups also come from all over Indonesia. To make the gathering merrier, people make merchandise and food markets in the surrounding area. Emha said that he observed glaring instances of the country’s leadership being too soft in their dealings of Indonesia’s foreign relations, “we must have been more prosperous if we didn’t have a government, without a state is even better!” Yet, he saw the potential of the NU as the only possible savior in this situation given that they are deeply rooted in society. He saw the potential of the NU to be alternative to the State:

“Yes, NU is able, very able if they were so willing, who else? I observed the NGO like INSIS in Yogyakarta, they attempted to advance empowerment of local people, you know? Only in doing one RT (neighborhood) they got frustrated (laughter) they turned out to be busy themselves while the rest of the people didn’t care (laughter)”

But when he was asked whether he would be interested in promoting relocalisation in his learning communities, he answered:

“No, I don’t have that ability. In the situation of Indonesia today, I don’t think anyone can do that individually. Honestly I feel compassionate for the suffering of our poor people, so I don’t want to give them any more burden. I will let them enjoy with a little they can get, to taste a little bit of what has been gobbled by their elite brothers who sit in the government offices and corporations. They’re just beginning to enjoy motorcycles, so I can’t say, “oh no-no, stop, go back to your old bike” (laughter). If that prognosis is true and the cataclysm

\textsuperscript{142} The major Muslim party, founded in 1945, banned by Sukarno in 1960 and dissolved. See Chapter-5.

\textsuperscript{143} http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6jO0-5Dtrk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G4yq_KFVLXk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PrNQrY3bRIg
comes, well, *wis ayo nek bongko, bongko bareng* (rude-Javanese retort: let’s go to hell together then) (laughter)"

He also recognized a problem with the NU:

“In this stern situation, if the NU is so willing to grab control, to father the people once again, so that those who live in the village feel, “O yes, we have a father called Said Aqil Siraj” then the situation will change drastically. When people had that feeling, their hearts were so consoled, whatever they are told to do they will do, including what you’re envisioning [he meant, relocalisation models], this is the nature of our people. For yourself, I’m telling you, until the NU have that courage, you should not consider them too seriously in your study (laughter)"

Over and above, he strongly believes that nothing can be done as long as the grip of external domination continues:

“This country needs a leader like Chavez or Ahmadinejad if it is to continue as a country. Breaking up relations with the rest of the world is a must, let’s say for five years, to let us fashion our own solutions to this problem. There is no other way! Do you think those smart people in the rich countries will help us out? Come on! They could have fooled students like yourself too (laughter)"

Emha made no bones about the Third World self-perception of collective victimhood and, reciprocally, collective mistrust of everything associated with the West. His statements also suggest that to the politically aware individuals, the NGOs are but pawns for the Western interests in the country. Similarly, Sardar (1998) said:

‘Humanitarian work’, ‘charitable work’, ‘development assistance’ and ‘disaster relief’ are all smokescreens for the real motives behind the NGO presence in the South: self-aggrandizement, promotion of Western values and culture, including conversion to Christianity, including dependency, demonstrating the helplessness of those they are supposedly helping and promoting what has been aptly described as a ‘disaster pornography’(p.78)

Apart from his political expressions, Emha wrote a drama performed by Teater Perdikan in 2012. The drama’s title *Nabi Darurat- Rasul Ad-Hoc*, literally, ‘Messenger in Urgency, Ad-Hoc Prophet’, articulated people’s confusions about the present conditions of the country. The play calls the people to return to “Nur Muhammad”, literally, the light of Muhammad. He was talking about the ‘Ultimate Self’ or the highest attainment of the self, which in Islamic tradition is the ‘perfect man’ or insan kamil that manifested in the human form as Prophet Muhammad. Herein Emha made an unignorable point to challenge Berger and Luckmann’s approach. Further to what I argued in 2.2.1 about a dualistic vision of reality having made Berger and Luckmann’s approach inadequate to explain the religious attitudes of the Muslims being studied, Emha’s story posed another challenge to Berger and Luckmann’s assumption of human nature. The quest by humans to find their Ultimate
Selves, to whom there is no more ‘illusion’ and wherein the felicity lies, cannot be explained satisfactorily if the human him/herself is the producer of ‘reality’ as Berger and Luckmann (1991:67-70) assumed. Also, implicit to mystical experiences that are associated with the attaining of one’s Ultimate Self are drives to act that cannot be explained by the three origins of meaning widely accepted in social sciences, namely; intrinsic, psychological and meaning that arises in the process of interaction between people. For that reason, I put forward in Table 1 another source of meaning drawn from mystical experience, namely, ‘spiritual meaning’, to be incorporated in the religious ‘symbolic universe’.

To date, the NU-style of Islam continues to preach contentment, that is, being satiated with whatever situation one has in his/her life. A major example is given by a hymn known as Syiir tanpo waton (see Appendix 4) that the NU-affiliated mosques chant five times a day prior to daily prayer times. Everyone visiting my new house in Surabaya can hear the song with clarity from the mosque nearby. However, the mystical approach of the Nahdliyyin towards Shariah laws in verses 2; 3; 4 and 6 of the hymn could have been factors that drove their younger generations out from the Nahdliyyin constituencies, given the Shariah-mindedness of the younger generation as noted by Enceng Shobirin above. This resonates with the discussion in chapter 4 regarding the underlying relations between Shariah, justice, well-being and happiness which suggest that only Shariah is able to lead the Muslim world to justice, happiness and well-being. Moreover, the nature of present-day problems insists people to think of pragmatic solutions. Therefore, discontentment with the ‘contentment’ approach of the Nahdliyyin might have caused the Indonesian Muslims to splinter into even more diverse groups. Without giving equal emphasis to Shariah law as much as ‘contentment’, the Nahdliyyin risked itself to fall prey into Marx’s “opium of the people” critique by the young Muslims, as well as being used by the capitalists to protect their agendas.

6.3.5 Urbanization, Conformity and Monolithic Islam

Saniotis (2012:152) claimed approximately 900 of 17,000 pesantren in Indonesia have implemented eco-friendly practices such as water, energy and waste management, and Indonesia was coined as the home of ‘eco-Islam’ as many pesantren are now utilizing Islamic ecological principles. To my eyes, however, physical appearances of many pesantren in Java were far from signaling an ecological awareness. The Indonesian word pesantren is used interchangeably with pondok. Pondok means a hut built of bamboo or other light materials. Ziemek (1986) suggests pondok originates from Arabic

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144 Sharia aims to foster obedience to God and serves the protection of (i) life; (ii) religion and freedom of it; (iii) mind and intellect, including freedom of conscience and thought; (iv) lineage and family; (v) ownership (see e.g. Harthout (2011) and Abiad (2008)). The over emphasis of certain aspects of Sharia’s penal code in the media has led to the overshadowing of the moral principles which comprises true Sharia.
funduk, meaning ‘lodging for travellers’. According to Pringle (2010), that reflected a heritage of humble origins and scholars wandering in search of knowledge. Today, most pesantren have been reconstructed from simple buildings into permanent buildings. Many of them appear as massive buildings, partly due to space expansion and the need of facility improvement, which, in my view, often ended up reflecting no signs of environmental prudence. In my visit to a rural pesantren an-Nur Fatmah, in Mbleik village, Mojokerto, East Java, I saw mossed structures of an unfinished three story building that showed the construction had been suspended for quite a while. I asked the kyai why he needed to build classrooms with concrete instead of light materials such as bamboo (which, I wondered would be more ecological as well), given that what he was doing would need a lot more money to accomplish. He replied in an affirmative tone: “We’d like to build proper classrooms for our santri, the really good ones, like other schools do. But of course raising funds is not easy”. This case aptly describes ‘conformity’ that I notice as being the greatest obstacle to promote ecological justification of simplicity in urbanized societies. Conformity is the most general concept to explain individual acts in some way because of influence from others. Breckler, Olson and Wiggins (2006) note that conformity is nevertheless limited to changes in behavior caused by other people and does not refer to effects of other people on internal concepts like attitudes or beliefs. Therefore, people can participate in the acts of destroying the environment without necessarily believing in capitalism or in the philosophy of progress. In addition, people are more likely to conform in ambiguous situations where they are unclear about how they should respond.

The situation of modernist Muslims already discussed for Muhammadiyah applies to the Third-World in general. That is to say, until the Westerners - who represent the dominant worldview and culture in the eyes of the ex-colonized - undividedly call for radical shift toward sustainability, the ecological issues will remain inconclusive to the latter. For the Muslims in particular, unless the discourse was brought up unanimously, and not ambiguously presented side by side with the prevailing developmentalism and its capitalistic paradigms, the chance of radical shift towards sustainability, or relocalisation, to be heard by the modernist -and revivalists in particular- is low, because it will appear as another scheme intended by the West to deceive the Muslims. To the traditionalist Muslims, the situation is equally dilemmatic, that is to say, until Islamic laws that govern the matters are enacted for the global Ummah, ecological issues will remain secondary. This is especially true given that Islam is understood by the adherents as the ‘middle path’ (wasataniyyah), and Muslims ‘the middle nation’145 (ummah wasatan). Hence, theologically speaking Islam does not condone any forms of extremism. Therefore, an individual’s suggestion to make the

145 “Thus, We have appointed you a middle nation” (Q:2:143).
lawful (halal) unlawful (haram) is widely accepted by the Muslims as a kind of falsehood. In this situation, if things that appear unsustainable conduct in the eyes of the environmentalists are under the halal categories, the Muslims are innocent of responsibility.

Another case in point; eight years after Sardar (2006) celebrated the diversity and multiculturalism in Islam as one of its strengths, in 2014 he was struck by the urbanized face of Mecca (NY Times, 2014) as he found the holiest site of Islam had undergone huge transformation in the past 10 years. From a dusty desert town struggling to cope with the ever-increasing number of pilgrims arriving for the annual Hajj, Mecca was now a city that soars above its surrounding with a glittering array of skyscrapers, shopping malls and luxury hotels. To the al-Saud monarchy, Mecca is their vision of the future – “a steel and concrete metropolis built on the proceeds of enormous oil wealth that showcases their national pride” (The Independent, 2011). To the critics, Mecca, once a place where Prophet Mohamed insisted all Muslims would be equal, has become a playground for the rich, an ultramodern enclave where naked capitalism has usurped spirituality as the city’s raison d’être. Sardar (NY Times, 2014) bemoaned the far-reaching implication of this on the weakening of diversity in Islam.

The cultural devastation of Mecca has radically transformed the city. Unlike Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo, Mecca was never a great intellectual and cultural center of Islam. But it was always a pluralistic city where debate among different Muslim sects and schools of thought was not unusual. Now it has been reduced to a monolithic religious entity where only one, ahistoric, literal interpretation of Islam is permitted, and where all other sects, outside of the Salafist brand of Saudi Islam, are regarded as false.

Again, Sardar enunciates Gadamer’s hermeneutic principle according to which the interpreter’s present situation has positive value in the process of understanding (Linge, 1977). Given the present-day globalization and urbanization, the trend toward monolithic interpretation of Islam is inevitable. In this regard, I concur with Sardar (NY Times, 2014), who also authored Mecca: The Sacred City that “Mecca is a microcosm of the Muslim world (Sardar, 2014). What happens to and in the city has a profound effect on Muslims everywhere”.

6.4 Is Re-localisation Desirable to Muhammadiyah and NU?
Indonesia’s environmental problems are increasing faster than the Ministry of Environment and the existing environmental NGOs can solve. Chapter 4 introduced a relocalisation approach. It contends with combined concerns about peak oil, climate change, and industrial-economic globalization, and draws upon multiple disciplines with pragmatic strategies shaped around the ‘limits to growth’ analysis. Unlike conventional environmentalism and sustainable development, relocalisation does not seek to shift the whole society at once, much less, the entire nation-state. Rather, it seeks to
work at a community scale. It aims to equip people with resilience and adaptive capabilities in the face of looming scarcity and environmental degradation. It is, therefore, important to know whether endogenous Islamic relocalisation is desirable to Muhammadiyah and the NU.

The most debated issues about relocalisation are the self-initiated nature of the actions that seek to act from ‘here’ and ‘now’ as opposed to engendering a political movement, and thereby, a bottom-up approach that begins at a small-community scale organized by like-minded people as opposed to a top-down approach for large scale open society. Herein, I would like to analyze the ability, possibility and willingness of Muhammadiyah and NU as large mass-based organizations that have been deeply rooted in Indonesian society, to advance relocalisation. Through their schools, pesantren and learning communities, one can envision radical changes in the nature of consumption, the nature of economy, and the cultural definition of ‘good life’ can be promoted in accordance with today’s global ecological conditions. Given the size and achievements of Muhammadiyah and NU in community development, I came to envision that the two organizations could become pressure groups in demanding land and resource allotments from the Indonesian government for the Muslim communities to advance relocalisation by creating green-intentional community models to live up to Islamic ecological values and laws, and then to network these communities across the archipelago. This way, with the aids of information and telecommunication technology, one can imagine a large-scale and sweeping relocalisation movement to be advanced by Indonesian Muslim groups. As a Muslim-majority country, these Muslim communities could inspire the rest of the Indonesian society, and simultaneously through global Muslims’ networking - again with the help of IT and telecommunication technology - could encourage the global Ummah to mobilize Islamic socio-ecological actions. In this sense, my vision is more like Trainer’s ‘Simpler Way’ as detailed in 4.3.

Trainer, however, has been criticized by Fotopoulos and Garden for having relied on communities rather than the state government. In response to the critics, I would like to reintroduce two issues. First, I presented President Abdurrahman Wahid’s attempts to bring about relocalisation ideals via the state, and how they failed. Second, I argue in Chapter 1 that a vast country like Indonesia cannot cope with the vicissitudes of the ‘peak oil’ problems, and chapter 5 shows pervasive fragmentation that characterizes Indonesia today. Therefore, realistic and doable solutions on the local community levels based on balanced local economies, purposeful activity and a culture of ideas that are consistent with reality, need to be fashioned. The analysis of Muhammadiyah and NU’s ability and possibility towards this end was made against a number of challenges to relocalisation attempts as previously summarized in chapter 4. They are, on the leadership side, people with limited power, limited resources and limited ability to influence others, and the
challenge of bridging the gap between community action and the political mainstream. On the members’ side, individualism, consumer-capitalist cultures, economic empowerment, unequal income distribution, lack of solidarity, increasing materialism in some members, boredom and distraction from original intent have been identified as major problems. It is against these issues that I considered the potential of ‘community Muslims’ and their distinct worldviews in the first place. From my analysis of what was already given in this chapter, I came to conclude that both Muhammadiyah and NU organizations are Able, considering their achievements in community development, and it is Possible, considering Islamic values and ethos to create an alternative economy that does not rest on a growth paradigm. It is supported by the power of the Islamic symbolic universe to accommodate holism and to espouse a global, instead of merely local or national, relocalisation movement within the framework of Ummah. However, due to a number of reasons, the two organizations did not seem to be willing to advance relocalisation.

With the insights from the following, an overarching issue emerged from the research findings:

i) historical narratives of Muhammadiyah, NU, and the formation of the Indonesian nation-state itself (see Chapter 5);

ii) the symbolic universe theoretical insights;

iii) my familiarity with the plethora of Indonesian news and articles about Muhammadiyah and NU who continuously made assertions publicly that both stand for Pancasila and NKRI in the face of transnational Islam (e.g. Misrawi, 2010; Muslimedianews, 2014a; Muslimedianews, 2014b; Republika, 2014; Madinatuliman, 2015; NU, 2015);

iv) research notes and transcripts

The overarching issue is, the difficult position of Muhammadiyah and NU, caught between, 1) working for government expectation that they will support the nation-state’s integrity against the rise of disintegration forces, and 2) the reality of the State’s failure to provide social justice, eradicate poverty and vulnerability of the poor to increasing environmental disasters, and 3) the combination of those with the flows of transnational Islamic movements along which Shariah economics has been advocated to replace the existing capitalist political-economic system.

The idea of self-governance is likely to be the most undesirable element of relocalisation, for it may have appeared to the top-level leadership of the Muhammadiyah and NU - who engage closely with the Indonesian central government - as inciting secession or disintegration, hence, an antithesis to the ideal of NKRI. Emanating from the NU’s anti-political stance was an overly preemptive attitude towards any ideas that appear as associated with political Islam, or against the ideal of NKRI nation-state. Sirry (2010:69) noted this tendency as well. This particular situation, apropos the research, has an unfortunate implication of the impossibility of communicating relocalisation ideals lucidly and intellectually with some of the top-level leaderships of the NU and Muhammadiyah. What is more, national history as detailed in Chapter 5 shows the two
organizations played substantial roles in the struggle for independence from colonial power, and hence, to some extent have been entangled with nation-building and a sense of belonging to the state-system. In this sense, the latest flows of Islamic ideas and movements in the form of global or transnational Islam provided a pretext and justification for another round of resurgence of nationalism. An explanation with Berger and Luckmann’s framework can be made here. Similar to the emergence of “Reformist-Traditionalist” duality in the 19th century, the arrival of ‘transnational’ Islam has reinstated the typification of ‘national Islam’, which suddenly found correspondence with the secular nationalists’ ideals. A book authored by one of LPBI leaders, respondent Imdadun Rahmat (2012), “Ideologi Politik PKS. Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parelemen” (PKS Political Ideology. From Campus Mosques to House of Parliament) is an example of a clash between ‘national’ and ‘transnational’ Muslims in Indonesia. Another one, “Ilusi Negara Islam” (the Illusion of an Islamic State: Transnational Islam Expansion in Indonesia), (2009), carries two names of important leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU, i.e. Syafi’i Ma’arif and Abdurahman Wahid. Ma’arif gives the Prologue to the book, and Wahid (1940-2009) who passed away in the year the book was published, is said to be the editor. Because Wahid was known to be hard of seeing (sightless) many doubted that he could edit a book and have argued the book as merely a hoax to divide and conquer further the Indonesian Muslims. The book argues that transnational Islamist ideas are a Saudi-led conspiracy. It triggered heated arguments. One in the Indonesian FaithFreedom internet forum suggested a conspiracy was made to prepare a new place that is rich with natural resources (Indonesia) in place of the arid-unproductive (Arabian) after the oil finished. The book was claimed to be the result of two years of research sponsored by LibForAll foundation.

In sum, for the NU top-level leadership in Jakarta especially, while they were fully aware of the dire consequences of environmental crisis, a pre-emptive attitude towards everything that appears as an instigation to secession from the NKRI, or promoting Shariah law, or facilitating transnational Islam, pervaded their aversion to relocalisation. There were also strong reasons for the unattractiveness of relocalisation that came from their confidence of the viability of existing traditionalist pesantren community development models, besides, of course, the acts of surrender to God’s Will common among the Muslims in general.

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146 E.g. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Hidayatullah. HTI retorted that the book was manufactured by LibForAll on behalf of the capitalist for fear of Shariah economics: http://m.hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2011/06/13/doktrin-ansyaad-mbai-kepala-bnpt-paranoid-terhadap-syariat/ Hidayatullah argued that in fact, LibForAll is more dangerous to the NKRI: http://m.hidayatullah.com/artikel/opini/read/2011/06/10/3909/siapa-yang-lebih-membahayakan-nkri.html

6.5 Conclusion

Chapter 5 shows that Indonesian nationalism remains a dominant force to this day. Benedict Anderson (2006), in correspondence with Berger and Luckmann’s (1991) symbolic universe, contends that nationality and nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind, and that to understand properly why today they command such a profound emotional legitimacy needs careful consideration of historical context. In the light of Indonesia’s pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial pasts, and how the country has constantly been threatened by internal clashes along both ideological and regional fault lines, a fear of internal revolt and disintegration continues to bedevil Indonesia’s government. With the history of Muslims’ rebellions, Islam has been considered as one potential internal enemy too. Therefore, as this chapter shows, on the institutional levels, competition for allegiance between nation-state and Islam continues to beset the Muhammadiyah and NU’s top leaders. This appeared as a major obstacle in the possibility and desirability of relocalisation through the creation of green intentional community models with self-local governance. On the personal levels, though, the power of symbolic universe to draw ‘allegiances’ that I argued in section 2.2.2, which then set forth ‘normative authority’ (what makes normative claims legitimately binding for that person\(^{148}\)) provides a liberating framework for individual enterprise. My framework in Chapter 2 -wherein religious symbolic universe is compounded with personality characters- recognises the agency of the individual alongside structures to provide the explanatory and causal forces in society. For that reason, allegiance to Islam among Muhammadiyah and NU individuals can be very personal and cannot be predicted.

The subsequent chapters elaborate further on the dynamics of how Islamic ‘social movements’ (Doherty, 2002)\(^{149}\) can emerge from Muslim learning communities. The development of social movements from learning communities can be understood from the relationship between cognition and institution as follows. Throughout the existence of Indonesia’s nation-state (since 1945), the ongoing question for the Muslim community has been how to create a strong, pious, and faithful Islamic society in the context of a modernizing, globalizing and secular state (e.g. see Lukens-Bull, 2001). Since the onset, I had been intrigued by the Indonesian Muslims’ learning tradition that has been pivotal in ‘conserving Islam’ in the minds of the Muslims and through which the ideals of Islamic society would be sustained across history (See 3.2.1). Besides institutionalized Muslim learning traditions such as *madrasah* and *pesantren* they take the forms of what is known as

\(^{148}\) Such as why he/she should regulate his/her actions with respect to particular normative claims.

\(^{149}\) Characterized by: (i) having a consciously shared collective identity; (ii) must act at least partly outside political institutions, using protest as one of its forms of action; (iii) characterized by un-institutionalized networks of interactions; and (iv) must reject, or challenge, dominant forms of power.
pengajian, majlis taklim, halqah, daurah. Through the network of Ulama, these Islamic learning communities have transcended ethnic and nation-state borders as well. In Chapter 2 Berger and Luckmann’s ‘social construction of reality’ highlights that an individual tends to be shackled by a symbolic universe -- a system of symbols that encompasses ideas and meanings. With these in mind a framework is formed for the relationship between person and institution, they are: i) Islam as a symbolic universe; ii) learning communities as the intermediary between persons and Islam; and iii) two levels of institutions, namely, individual organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU, and then, the Ummah whereby all individual organizations are subsumed. Eventually, these individual organizations such as Muhammadiyah and NU appear as what Berger and Luckmann (1991:135) call the ‘full-time personnel for symbolic universe maintenance’ in a non-organizational religion such as Islam whereby there is no one central religious authority for the whole Ummah. The subsequent chapter presents Muhammadiyah and NU schools, and pesantren, in the quest for suitable sustainability-education rather than simply scientific education per se, for Muslim communities.

150 Regular classes conducted to teach Islam and Islamic practices.
Chapter 7

Investigating Learning Communities: Modernist Schools and Traditionalist Pesantren

“Do not wait: the time will never be ‘just right’. Start where you stand, and work whatever tools you may have at your command and better tools will be found as you go along” (Napoleon Hill)

7.1 Introduction

While Muhammadiyah and NU organisations in their present forms are not promising to advance the relocalisation movement towards transitioning for Indonesian Muslim communities, I consider their potential to encourage relocalisation through the dissemination of sustainability education, considering the two have a vast infrastructure and are deeply rooted in Indonesian society. Previous chapters demonstrate that social movements can emerge from Muslim learning communities, and through the network of Ulama (including kyai) these Islamic learning communities have transcended ethnic and nation-state borders as well. Thereby, within the sustainability-literacy education (Stibbe, 2009) and insurgent planning framework mentioned in 4.1, Muhammadiyah and NU’s (and in fact all other Muslim groups’) learning communities, including schools, pesantren, pengajian, majlis taklim, halqah, daurah have the potential to be transformed into training centers to mobilize relocalisation, based upon Islamic values and jurisprudence as detailed in section 4.4. These institutions, in preparation for the stark changes due in the future in the interval between the end of cheap oil and whatever new energy comes next, can be empowered to create communities with the practical capacity to be resilient in the face of peak oil and climate uncertainty.

Berger and Luckmann (1991) show in Chapter 2 that society is a symbolic construction composed of ideas, meaning and language. Chapter 5 shows further social, historical, and cultural contexts have been at the basis of the formation of Indonesian ‘social knowledge’ and ‘social logic’. Moreover, Jovchelovitch (2007) stresses the pliability of ‘social knowledge’ according to which social knowledge is not only concerned with cognition and representation but is a plastic phenomenon dependent on the ‘who’, ‘how’, ‘what’, ‘why’, and ‘what for’ of representation. It follows from these arguments that I considers the potential of Muslim learning communities, Muslim groups’ leaders and the Ulama (including kyai) have the potential to disseminate sustainability education. They could do this more effectively to Indonesian observant Muslims than the secular counterpart process such as the national curriculum programme. My proposition is reinforced further by the following facts:

a. Indonesia has the world’s largest Muslim population.
b. PEW research (2006) shows more than 90% Muslims in Indonesia say religion is very important in their life.
c. Hefner (2013: 49) argues that “both ethnographic and survey studies have demonstrated Indonesian Muslims these days tend to be quite observant, carrying out religious duties at rates comparable to or higher than Muslims in Morocco or Lebanon, and much higher than in Iran (Muljani & Liddle 2007, cf. Bakhtiari, 2001)”.

Therefore, it can be imagined if the Ulama, kyai, and the groups’ active members are made knowledgeable about the big issues on how mankind live on this planet, and that the world is changing, resources are dwindling and the population is growing, and hence, there is increasing pressure on food security, fresh water, and the ecosystem, they will be able to ‘translate’ these issues into Muslims ‘language’ and sensibility to be communicated effectively, leading the Ummah to act upon them. In this scheme, the gaps between scientists and lay-people discussed in Foltz et al (2003) will be overcome. Moreover, these leaders of the Muslim epistemic communities possess a worldview which provides the moral grounds for transforming the economic globalization that Habermas (1987) argues is not available in a secular worldview. This scheme also echoes Watling (2009) who argues that the Quran, Prophet Muhammad and Sharia is a way to awaken Muslims of a higher consciousness of the unified nature of humanity, nature, and God. Therefore, the question is what practical mechanism can be utilized to achieve the scheme.

The previous chapter shows that Muslim organisations such as Muhammadiyah and NU have charitable bodies for collection of zakat, infaq and shodaqoh, the forms of Islamic philanthropy to provide, among others, education for those individuals in need. Besides this, the Indonesians Ministry of Religious Affairs has been channeling scholarship funding for the pesantren students to pursue higher education in universities (e.g. Kementrian Agama, 2014; 2015). Furthermore, Saudi and other Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Oman, UAE, as well as Iran have been providing funding for Indonesian Muslim students to study Islam and modern sciences abroad (see for example: KBRI Riyadh, 2015; Pusat Info Beasiswa, 2015; Kabarmakkah, 2014; Dikti, 2012; FTK-IAIN, 2015; UIIN, 2015; Nahdlatul Ulama, 2005). This funding for religious and educational purposes can be redirected towards education for relocalisation purposes if the programme is well-prepared and the rationale is understood by the sponsors. As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, without an understanding of the twin challenge of peak oil and climate change, scholarships for study of modern knowledge overseas tend to encourage developmentalism for larger participation in the global economy for both economic growth and poverty eradication (also, see Overton, 2010). This chapter, thus, aims to

151 As Overton argues that Western aid and development programmes directed at helping poorer countries have been largely unsuccessful as indicated by the ratio of income of 20 to 1 between rich and poor countries, he commented: “our international students, from so called underdeveloped countries, do not accept that development is a dead concept. They say ‘you’ve got what we want, we are here to learn how to get it’.” Overton, 2010)
explore in detail what endogenous features are already existent among the Muhammadiyah and NU’s learning communities which can possibly be developed into education towards relocalisation. It begins in 7.2 with contextualizing modern education in the centre of present-day development-environment problems. This evokes discussion on reconstruction of knowledge by Muslim thinkers.

Sections 7.3 and 7.4 describe Muhammadiyah and NU’s education institutions and philosophies against the background of the government program in modernizing Indonesian Muslims through the national curricula. The processes by which ‘reality’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1991) is shared among Muslims and how it is available to the common-sense of members of Muslims society is taking place in these Islamic education institutions as well as in the family. In section 7.3 Foucault’s (1972, 1980) discourse-power relations become relevant to explaining the cooptation of Indonesian modernist Muslims by developmentalists and how that may inhibit ‘sustainability literacy’, hence, their sense of crisis, needed to encourage relocalisation today. Section 7.5 discusses the strength and weakness of the Muhammadiyah and NU’s existing learning communities, followed by what is needed by both to facilitate relocalisation to come into existence.

**7.2 Modern Knowledge. A Double-edged Sword**

Socio-ecological crisis in Indonesia demonstrates the great irony of modern education and its knowledge system. It resonates with the environmental educator David Orr’s (1991:2) apt conclusion, “It is worth noting that this [environmental destruction] is not the work of ignorant people. It is, rather, largely the result of work by people with BAs, BScs, LLBs, MBAs, and PhDs”. Orr reminds us that “our education up till now has in some ways created a monster” (p.1).

The success of the New Order regime of Suharto which made the development of a modern national education system as one of its top priorities has been followed by massive forest plunder and unprecedented environmental degradation. In fact, Orr’s (1991) critique of modern knowledge resonates both with Muslim’s critiques of the modern knowledge system as I outlined and Kazmi’s (1999) Islamic critique of the modern education system. Both argue that learning, in the modern sense of the term, in itself will never make people ethical. This leads to the question of what exactly is wrong with modern education. Quoted in Orr (1991:2), Wiesel's answer:

> It emphasized theories instead of values, concepts rather than human beings, abstraction rather than consciousness, answers instead of questions, ideology and efficiency rather than conscience.

Further, Strachan (2009) and Sachs (2008) presented a systems-thinking perspective according to which people's inability to identify the interconnected nature of the crises has been at the heart of the socio-ecological crises facing the world today. The protagonists put the blame on the limited
experiences of the world that the formal education system is grounded on and the increasingly reductionist experience that makes the learners more specialized and less prepared for the interconnected complexity of the world (Stibbe, 2009). Therefore, the crises call for interconnected and interdisciplinary solutions, and hence, reformation of education. Sustainability education intended for relocalisation among Muslims must provide alternative societies for the students to have hopes that what they studied is relevant, useful, and in accordance with reality (without an alternative society, sustainability education in the hustle and bustle of Third World developmentalist programmes is simply unrealistic). Secondly, it needs personalization of knowledge by ‘significant persons’ in the internalization process of the society members (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:151-200). They are, the Ulama (including kyais) and parents.

7.3 Muhammadiyah’s Educational Programme

Chapters 2 and 5 explained one basic premise of the Islamic reformist movement which is based on the assumption that tradition is the cause of the backward condition of the Muslim population. This was seen to have deeply buried the “real” Islam and its power. Accordingly, reformists believe that modern science and technology will provide the key to lift the Muslim Ummah out of poverty and backwardness as well as to cleanse Islam of old-fashioned ideas. Being a reformist, then modernist Islamic movement, Muhammadiyah has been struggling to reconcile religious requirements with those of modernity. Consequently, there is tension between Muhammadiyah’s modernizing tendency on the one hand, and its desire to remain Islamic on the other (Fuad, 2004). In what follows, the manner in which modern science and its knowledge system were appropriated and possessed by Indonesian modernist Muslims and their educational institutions, will be detailed.

After Indonesia’s independence, Muhammadiyah changed its school system in accordance with the national system (Fuad, 2004:405). The Indonesian state designs two national curricula: general and Islamic. General schools are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, and Islamic schools, madrasah, are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs that designs the national curriculum for them. The goal of the madrasah curricula is to make the madrasahs part of the labor supply mechanism by making their graduates learn general skills that would make them employable in the job market (p.406). While a small percentage of the madrasah are public and run under the madrasah national system, a large majority of them are privately run. As Fuad (p.406) noted, Muhammadiyah schools have adopted one of these two national curricula, and all its colleges adopted general curricula. Close to half of the Muhammadiyah schools have opted to be madrasah which indicates that a significant number among the rank and file of Muhammadiyah supporters are concerned about giving their children the basic religious education which they deem adequate at the
expense of less general education. Nonetheless, Muhammadiyah continued to be wary of the inadequacy of the *madrasah* system to prepare students for life in modern times. The Indonesian state also applies the two curricula system on higher education.

In 1975, the government issued a ministerial decree signed by the Minister of Education; Minister of Religious Affairs (then, Mukti Ali, a leader and thinker of Muhammadiyah); and the Minister of Internal Affairs, declaring that graduates of the *madrasah* were considered to be of the same level of qualification as those of the general schools (Fuad, 2004:407). They were given access to the general university system, and this gave Muhammadiyah a chance to advance through establishing its own university systems. Notably, the state also sought to extend control over the Islamic schools (*madrasah*). The government provided financial benefits for the schools that adopted the national curricula. One of the purposes of making the diploma received from the *madrasah* equal to one received from a public school was to permit switching between public and Islamic schools throughout one’s educational career. Due to these changes, the prestige of a *madrasah* education increased as more *madrasah* graduates were accepted into secular colleges and universities.

An explanation of the nationally-deployed modern knowledge system for Indonesian Muslims and the role of modernist thinkers can be given from Foucault’s ‘power/discourse’ perspective as follows. It should be noted that economic and development schemes are inextricably linked to power. For Foucault (1980), power is not synonymous with repression. It operates in, and circulates in, all social relations. Discourse is conceptualized as the nexus of power–knowledge (Foucault, 1977:27). As the New Order regime of Suharto set out on its developmentalist programme, it needed to depoliticize Islam. The regime made the development of a modern national education system one of its top priorities “in order to reinforce the depoliticization of Islam” (Hwang, 2012:69-72). The developmentalists created discourse and chose modernist Muslim thinkers such as of Muhammadiyah to create the discourse of modernity and education for the Muslim portion of the population – and thereby, for the state to exercise power over the Muslim populace. The effects can be either negative or positive, shaping the subjectivity of individuals towards the ideal citizens of the state and/or of Islamic communities. As a result, while the regime co-opted existing Islamist groups to its viewpoint, it appeared to be an attempt to increase economic opportunities for Islamic school graduates.

In fact, from a constructionist perspective, knowledge is never free from ideological, political and cultural interests (Berger and Luckmann, 1991). Along this line, Zuhdi (2006) writes a history of modernization of Indonesia’s Islamic school curricula. He shows that a curriculum is not something
taken for granted but created and constructed by certain people. Zuhdi is in correspondence with Goodson (1994) who argues that school curricula are a ‘social artifact’ conceived and made for deliberate human purposes. On top of the problems caused by plurality of education as mentioned in section 5.3, Indonesia’s education system has been continuously troubled by the three contested symbolic universes Nationalism, Westernism (i.e. scientific worldview), and Islam. The three have competed for influence especially in the character-building curriculum. For illustration, see Kemendikbud (2013) and Frederick (2011) where Pancasila was presented as the all-time key element in the nation building curriculum; Dwirahayu (2001) where Mathematics was put forward to be integrated into character education; and Zuhdi (2006) where Islamic education was described as having to struggle with the imposition of Pancasila and a secular scientific worldview. As a result, Indonesian character-building ends up nowhere. Character-building appeared to be the most deficient aspect of the Indonesian school system. It has been widely complained about and debated. For illustration a statement by a teacher below captured the heart of the matter:

“Many of the city’s teachers have questioned Indonesia’s education system since apparently it can produce International Science Olympics gold-medalists, and yet the country still ranks high among the most corrupt in the world”

And comments by an observer expressed the disappointment:

“The immediate problem pertaining to the idea of character education is that it is not an entirely new concept. In fact, albeit changes in national curriculum, character education has always been present in many forms: Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (PMP), Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan (PPKn), Budi Pekerti, etc. More often than not, it was the approaches and the names that were being substituted while the contents remained similar. In short, values and norms have always been transferred and cultivated in schools throughout all the years. The question therefore lies in why regardless of this, the right attitudes still do not seem to be in place. From personal experience, the most common complaints that students make about these classes are they are either boring, or full of hypocrisy, or a simple waste of time. It is boring and full of hypocrisy because students know that what they witness in real life is a far cry from what they are taught to do. When answering multiple-choice examination questions, there is a high tendency that students will pick the best normative

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“Beginning under Guided Democracy (1959–65) and strengthened in the New Order after 1975, a key feature of the national curriculum—as was the case for other national institutions—has been instruction in the Pancasila... But with the end of the New Order in 1998 and the beginning of the campaign to decentralize the national government, provincial and district-level administrators obtained increasing autonomy in determining the content of schooling, and Pancasila began to play a diminishing role in the curriculum” (Frederick, 2011:151).

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answers without necessarily buying the ideas. The classes are branded a waste of time because grades from these subjects will not earn them the competitive advantage to getting into their favourite school or getting a good job.\textsuperscript{154}

Herein, I argue that a ‘sense of sustainability’ that the research is concerned with is nothing but an outcome of a character-building process alongside honesty, frugality, responsibility, commitment, fair-mindedness, perseverance, and integrity. In a successful character-building education, once students are made aware of the limits of nature and of social justice, they will apply the aforementioned qualities (honesty, frugality, responsibility and so on) towards human and non-human creatures, and hence, become sustainability-sensitive individuals. Therefore, awareness of the limits of nature and of social justice should be made as key part of a character-building education before everything else, to prepare a foundation in the students’ cognition for further education in the future. By inference, given the situation of Indonesia and its national curriculum on character-building education, I argue that little, if any, can be expected for a sustainability-literacy education from a character-building system that has proved to be a failure, and from the one infused by a developmentalism paradigm based upon assumption of unlimited natural resources. Moreover, the emphasis of the modern education system in providing skill sets often fails to take into consideration environmental limits, social justice, or adaptation to the deteriorating ability of the Earth to support human life (Stibbe, 2009). The very first sentence in the government’s press release in 2014 regarding the rationale of the new Indonesia’s curriculum, makes a blatant example of such unawareness: “in order to make Indonesia a big country [my bold]...and to respond to what the analysts have been predicting about the ‘rise of Asia’ in this century” (Kemendikbud, 2014). The remarkable economic growth in Asia and the continuing growth rates has made the possibility of so-called ‘Asian Century’ a case in point. According to estimates, by the year 2027 China will overtake the US as the world’s largest economy and by 2050 its economy will be twice as large as that of the US (Jacques, 2009). Alongside China, Engardio (2006) writes about the economic rise of India as well, and how the two revolutionized global business. Dahlman (2011) contends that rapid economic growth of China and India, combined with their large populations, is creating global environmental sustainability problems.

The complex background already mentioned describes the manner in which the modern science and knowledge system was appropriated and possessed by Indonesian modernist Muslims and their educational institutions. In addition, besides uncritical acceptance of modernity, I argue that the nationalist component in the national curricula will become an enormous obstacle when it

\textsuperscript{154} http://www.globalindonesianvoices.com/5377/character-education-building-the-nation-from-school/
comes to the need to fashion a way to look at humankind in entirety as one, but complex and interconnected community, and the earth also as one, but complex and interconnected system. The lack of critical attitudes is illustrated in the following. A secretary of the Muhammadiyah Education Board, explicitly told me:

“Our schools see nothing is wrong with the modern system of thought. There should be no rejection of any education system and any knowledge system, because we are prepared to deal with modernity and changes. Our schools operate on the basis that all knowledge is from Allah”

His statement recalls Nasr and al-Attas’ critiques of the modernists’ stance in reconstruction of knowledge debates. According to Nasr, modern scientific knowledge cannot be merely absorbed into an Islamic worldview due to its anthropocentric form, for it makes human reason and empirical data the sole criteria for the validity of all knowledge (Nasr, 2001a). Additionally, by denying different orders of reality, the natural and social sciences exclude all other possibilities of knowing and destroying the sacred and metaphysical foundations of knowledge. In addition, “The classical error of modern civilization is to mistake the quantitative accumulation of information for qualitative penetration into the inner meaning of things” (Nasr, 1989:6). In this respect, Muhammadiyah has indeed been criticized by Indonesian Muslim intellectuals for putting too much emphasis on providing schooling and healthcare and lagging behind in producing ideas (Fuad, 2004: 401). At the time of the founder, KH. Ahmad Dahlan (See section 5.3), a major strategy was to synthesize religion and science in school curricula as though the incongruent epistemologies that exist between Islam and the modern Western system of thought would not be an issue, but today, rendering the struggle towards the synthesis has become utterly complicated.

Fuad (2004) presented the debates between Muhammadiyah thinkers, Kuntowijoyo, Mukti Ali, Amin Abdullah, and Syafi’i Ma’arif regarding the difficulties Muhammadiyah has been struggling with conceptualizing an alternative modernity - both culturally and epistemologically - based on Islam, and their efforts to realize such a concept. Kuntowijoyo’s critique was centered on the failure of Muhammadiyah to cater to the need for an alternative modernity that would “allow Indonesian Muslims to appropriate modernity and yet remain anchored in their Islamic values, to modernize themselves without having to adopt Western symbols” (p.408). Others debated about science itself, natural sciences in particular. Ali complained about the lack of integration between science and religion, and pointed out further that “those who understand Islam do not understand the world” and “among those who understand the modern world only few understand Islamic teachings” (p.408). Abdullah contends that because the talk has been limited to the level of ethics it never touched the root of the problem, which “is epistemology” (p.409). Yet, according to him, the idea of
fusing Islam and modern knowledge is “impracticable” (p.409), for there is a “dilemma between the inadequacy of the talk of Islamization of modern knowledge on the level of ethics and the insurmountable barrier to going deeper to the level of epistemology” (p.409). Abdullah had long been concerned with the dichotomization of science and faith in the modern system of thought. He launched a project, “Epistemologi Keilmuan Interkonektif-Integratif” (integrated-interconnected epistemology) (Suharyanta and Sutarman, 2012), that aims to produce people who are both religious and knowledgeable about science. Counter to Abdullah, Ma’arif believes that modern science is value-free. Like al-Faruqi’s argument (1988)\(^\text{155}\), Ma’arif believes that by applying Islamic ethics Muslims can appropriate modern sciences without having to worry about philosophical problems (p.408). A quite pragmatic position was put forward by Nung Muhajir from Ahmad Dahlan University in Yogyakarta. He argued that theoretical and philosophical problems of Islamic knowledge must be pushed back in favor of the practical consideration of improving the economic chances of the students (p.409). It is worth noting when Suharto aspired for technological development and appointed the technology guru Habibie to set up capital-intensive high technology, Muhammadiyah universities responded by creating undergraduate study programmes that enable “the economic empowerment of the Ummah” (p.411):

These include programmes in engineering and business that help young Muslims survive competition in the job market. They are also programmes that generate money that Muhammadiyah universities need in order to sustain their own continuity” (Fuad, 2004:411)

The idea that anything new is necessarily good and desirable because it is currently an era of progress is fundamental to the ideology of modernity (Wallerstein, 1992a; 1992b). To the modernist Muslims, this attitude has become the greatest challenge to reconstruction of knowledge towards Islamic moral, cognitive and interpretive unity discussed in chapter 2. In the same manner, it poses a challenge to endogenous relocalisation aspirations discussed in Chapter 4. To add more detail concerning epistemology, Muhammadiyah, like reformists generally, tends to avoid the subject of Islamic metaphysics such as Sufism and Islamic philosophy. The statement of one leader in Surabaya during an interview gives an illustration, “we don’t mind Sufism, as long as it is al-Ghazali’s school, not Ibn Arabi’”’. Many have interpreted al-Ghazali’s school of Sufism as concerned only with the Sufi’s ethics (e.g. Quasem, 1974), whereas Ibn Arabi’s is highly philosophical, mystical and relies heavily on intellectual intuition (Chittick, 1989). Neglecting the metaphysical element in the understanding of Islam, and reducing it to ethics and morality, has impoverished the epistemology of

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\(^{155}\) In which he outlines a systematic, 12-step work-plan by which Muslims can actively integrate modern knowledge ‘into the corpus of Islamic legacy by eliminating, amending, re-interpreting and adapting its components, as the worldview of Islam and its value dictates’ (Al-Faruqi, 1988:30).
the modernist Muslims and created a barrier to the understanding of the ontological root of knowledge. This evokes what the traditionalist authors such as Lumbard (2004) and Nasr (2001a) argued has been behind ‘the decline of knowledge and the rise of ideology’ in the world of Islam. It also recalls the Sage’s arguments in section 4.2.2 regarding what has undermined human’s capacity for a ‘deep sense of sustainability’.

Self-critique of the Muhammadiyah schools was raised in a focus group of young members in Surabaya, equating the proliferation of the schools with potato chips production: “Muhammadiyah schools are no different than any other schools in Indonesia, only with ‘Muhammadiyah flavor’ added (laughter)”. Radical comment against the modern knowledge system was made by a senior leader in the Advisory Board of Muhammadiyah, Sukriyanto, son of charismatic chairman A.R. Fachruddin (1916-1995). Regarding the modern approach of Muhammadiya’s school, he said:

“I often say to my fellows, only being driven by one Surah of the Quran\textsuperscript{156} we have gone this far, yet the Quran has 114 \textit{Surah}, so it’s time to explore the other \textit{Surah}, we haven’t done that enough, much less to study the \textit{ayat kawniah}\textsuperscript{157}."

By recognizing the ontological Quran, Sukriyanto was aware of difference between ratiocination and intellection that Nasr elucidates (1989). Responding to my question about the curriculum of Muhammadiya’s schools, he quickly grasped my points and expressed his apprehension, saying that he had been troubled by his thoughts that Muhammadiyah schools might have just produced the same people as the ones whom the organisation had been criticizing - people who devastated Indonesia.

Finally, the debates between the Muhammadiyah thinkers indicate what Zaidi (2006:82) commented on, that Muslims are engaging deeply with the philosophical implication of modernity. The overarching theme of the debates and the impossibility for synthesis between Islam and a modern worldview, in my argument, is the manifest of the clash between symbolic universes: one is the \textit{pontifical man}’s\textsuperscript{158} and the other is the \textit{promethean man}’s\textsuperscript{159}. My theoretical framework in Chapter 2 even leads to suggest that universal rationality is hardly possible under different symbolic universes. Justice is a potent example. As for the Islamic symbolic universe, justice is vertically

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\textsuperscript{156} Quran \textit{Surah Al-Maa’uun}. See 5.3.

\textsuperscript{157} He referred to the ontological or cosmic Quran, \textit{al-Quran al-takwini}, as distinct from \textit{al-Quran al-tadwini}, the composed or ‘written’ Quran.

\textsuperscript{158} ‘Bridge between Heaven and the earth’

\textsuperscript{159} ‘Man in rebellion against the Heaven’
legislated (by Divine law), whereas Western justice is legislated horizontally i.e. it is based on reciprocal relations between human beings.

7.3.1 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Modernists’ Approaches for Sustainability

The research findings suggest that if Muhammadiyah is expected to advance endogenous relocalisation for transforming the existing Muslim communities to meet the reality of dwindling natural resources and the deteriorating condition of the earth, their weaknesses lie right at the heart of their strengths. Their large network of schools and universities at first glance appeared promising. But upon a more detailed look, having been driven by their aims to appropriate modern education and ‘progress’ for Muslims has deprived them of the understanding of the complex world in an holistic way that allows them to remain cautious of possible ‘flaws’ of modernity and the idea of progress -- thus, of developmentalist ideology. In this sense, Muhammadiyah is in good company with the Indonesian modern-progressive society at large. This complex and mutually-reinforcing agenda between nationalist and modernist Muslims implies an insurmountable challenge to the Muslim’s ‘reconstruction of knowledge’ attempts discussed in section 2.4.1.2 towards the ‘unified systemic worldview of Islam’ whereby there is moral, cognitive and interpretive unity. It equally poses a challenge, even for Muslims, to overturn the historically deeply-embedded assumption that ‘progress’ or development by way of unlimited natural resources exploitation is both inevitable and desirable as elaborated in Chapter 4. Additionally, the nationalist component in the national curricula will become an enormous obstacle when it comes to the need to fashion a way to look at humankind in entirety as one but complex and interconnected community, and the earth, as one but complex and interconnected system.

Due to their modern predilection, the modernists are more likely to heed the call for ‘relocalisation’ if it were relayed through the same channels that had called them for modernization in the first place. In contemporary times, these channels are Western media, Western governments, and Western academia, for they have been the source of the ‘epistemologies’ of the modernist Muslims. However, climate change and global warming have often been dismissed by the Muslims – the revivalists in particular - as the West’s conspiracy to weaken the Third World and Muslim world (e.g. see Globalmuslim, 2012; Islampos, 2014). For that reason, only when modern environmental strategies such as Transition Towns really gain traction, will the modernists be inspired. Henceforth, pedagogies such as Transformative Sustainability Learning (TSL) that can be integrated across existing curricula in tertiary education, will motivate their educational enterprises to change.

TSL is a series of learning objectives corresponding to cognitive (head), psychomotor (hands) and affective (heart) domains of learning that facilitate personal experience for participants
resulting in profound changes in knowledge, skills and attitudes related to enhancing ecological, social and economic justice. (Sipos et al, 2008:69).

Within the TSL framework, their colleges and universities can take an active role as centers for both inquiry and action in local, regional, and global space to disseminate practical and solution-oriented initiatives aiming to create communities with the practical capacity to be resilient in the face of the dual challenge of climate change and ‘peak oil’. This, however, requires the very structural foundations and goals of schooling to be examined, and for the most part, rebuilt. Sustainability education must “be prepared to deconstruct and reconstruct all aspects of teaching and learning” (Sipos et al, 2008: 70). Modernist Muslims, therefore, must no longer, as Orr (1991) argues, assume that it is education that will save us. They need, first of all, to have the ability to examine the philosophical baggage of modern sciences, without this the modernist thinkers are not able to develop critical thinking to identify the underpinning philosophical assumptions of modernity. The latter is required to take place for the cognitive and intellectual transformation that Habermas (1987) argues are the co-requisites of modernity itself. On a more profound level, without realizing the non-dualistic vision of reality and a comprehensive metaphysical perspective of the unity of all phenomena that Islam calls Tawhid, the Muhammadiyah thinkers continue to be confined in the dualistic vision of realities, thus, are unable to transcend the impasse of modernity and to engage in dialogue with the world outside Islam.

7.4 Pesantren Learning Communities

The previous section shows how modernity was appropriated by reformist and modernist Muslims for Muslims’ own agenda and was given meaning quite different from its Western origin. It also shows that Muslims’ responses to modernity have been influenced more by internal dynamics within Muslim civilization than merely reactions to non-Muslims. In this section I will examine how the same issues apply to the traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia:

(1) What is their educational situation like concerning sense of sustainability and sustainability-literacy already given?
(2) How did they respond to modernity?
(3) What is their position vis-à-vis Muslims’ ‘reconstruction of knowledge’ that the thesis argues as imperative for nurturing sustainability-literacy via the Muslims’ own sensibility and ‘thought language’, in order to disseminate environmental messages more effectively, and to incite spontaneity and creativity from a larger portion of Indonesian society?

Contrary to Clifford Geertz’s (1960) prediction more than 50 years ago that pesantren would disappear, Indonesia witnessed pesantren institutions surviving the challenges of modernity.

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160 He predicted in *The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker* that they would be crushed by modernity.
Lukens-Bull (2001) writes, “not only have some kyai contradicted these expectations, but that what they are engaging in is not mere brokerage” (p.350). I had been intrigued by this fact, and wished to investigate the secrets behind the pesantren’s survivability to envisage whether it is a suitable vehicle for the environmental-sustainability agenda. Moreover, given that I argued in section 4.2.2, the traditionalist groups are supposedly with the Sages camp, I need to investigate the following:

1. What is the meaning of pesantren to the members?
2. How did the tradition survive?
3. In what ways could pesantren possibly advance relocalisation?
4. If grouping and creating multiplicity are intrinsic to the nature of human being, to what extent is the ‘whole earth-one world family’ vision of the environmentalist possible for the pesantren Muslims?

Lost in Translation

From this research, I argue that the most unfortunate situation to the understanding of the world of meaning of a pesantren is the definition given in almost all English writing of pesantren as ‘Islamic boarding school’ (Bruinessen, 2004, 2008; Candland, 2000; Zuhdi, 2006; Frederick, 2011; Maunah, 2010; Hefner, 2007; Pohl, 2009; Bush, 2009; Tan, 2014; Mangunjaya, 2010; Burhanuddin, 2013; Woodward, 2010, 2011; Nilan, 2009; Lukens-Bull, 2001). Words do not always have the same meaning within differing contexts. This is especially true in the perspective of different civilizations. An understanding of pesantren from the traditionalist Islam is of utmost importance given the heated public debate in the West about the presumed role of Islamic education in the spread of Muslim militancy. Pesantren is not simply a boarding school. Unlike ‘school’ in the ordinary sense of the term, the centre figure of a pesantren is the kyai, who is the founder and leader of the pesantren, as well as the master teacher. And unlike school in the modern sense of the term, a pesantren embodies Islamic philosophy of learning a ‘sound knowledge’, in which divine knowledge is part. As clarified in Chapter 2, divine knowledge is impossible for the reasoning mind to comprehend, because reason is based on correspondence whereas there is no correspondence between ‘abstract’ (sacred) spiritual realities and the knowing subjects. Hence, intellectual grasp of these realities must be limited to their attributes and effects. Therefore, to know spiritual realities is not possible through theoretical understanding, but only when the spiritual seeker has been fully liberated from all worldly limitations, conditions and attachments, as in discussion of ‘unitive
knowledge’ and Sufism (e.g. see Tabataba’i, 2009). Therefore, a traditionalist pesantren resembles what is known in other Islamic worlds as zawiyah\textsuperscript{162}, the homes of the thariqah.

Another crucial distinction between modern and Islamic philosophy that needs to be highlighted to understand traditionalist pesantren methods is Ricklefs’ (2010: 469) distinction between modern and Islamic culture: “The former generally emphasizes the idea of freedom as a means of liberating individual and social potential for good. The latter generally emphasizes the need to control freedom to restrict the individual and social potential for evil. It seeks justice rather than freedom”. Misapprehending these core principles has misled most authors on pesantren into explaining the pupils’ attitude of reverent respect for, and unquestioning obedience to, the kyai, by simply analyzing it in terms of Weberian charismatic leadership (e.g. Bruinessen, 1994)\textsuperscript{163}. The same proposition has been propounded to explain the disciple-master relation in the Sufi order, and prophet-follower relation in the whole tenet of Islam (e.g. Turner, 1998). As already outlined in Chapter 2, the most basic element of Islamic belief is that God is the Ultimate Reality. This principle is hard to grasp without self-extinction or annihilation (fana). In the Sufi tradition, the extinction is undergone through stages. To reach the extinction of the self in God (fana fi-Allah), one needs to firstly go through extinction in the Master (fana fi al-mursyid), then, extinction in the Prophet (fana fi-Rasul). The reformists refused this among other features of the traditionalists\textsuperscript{164}. They reject taqlid (adherence to past interpretations of Islam), replace what is perceived as uncritical following of the classical fiqh texts, and urge the importance of returning directly to the Quran and Sunna, and proclaimed the need for independent interpretation or ijtihad (See Bruinessen, 2008; Natana, 2004; Parray, 2013). Conversely, for the traditionalists, fiqh belonged to the essential core of Islam, and fiqh was impossible without taqlid, following the rulings of the great Ulama of the past who had developed the madzhab or classical legal school (Bruinessen, 2008). Traditionalists also stressed the harmonization of juridical and mystical aspects of Islamic learning through the teaching of fiqh and tasawwuf (Sufism), much as is still done today (Laffan, 2005: 94).

Bruinessen (1994: 4) and Lukens-Bull (2001: 354) noted that the pesantren tradition is pervaded by a highly devotional and mystical attitude. Supererogatory prayers and the recitals of

\textsuperscript{162} “The Zawiyahs fulfilled their primary function, which was the performance of dhikr (calling upon the Divine Presence) and learning at the feet of the master” (Dockrat, 2003: 363).

\textsuperscript{163} The same issue has perplexed Pohl (2009:146) in drawing a conclusion from her work of pesantren education, as she found ambivalence between the principally egalitarian character of life of pesantren and the uncontested authority of the kyai. Although, Hefner points out, vertical structure of authority can in some cases serve to maintain social harmony and restore non-violent relation (Pohl, 2009:146).

\textsuperscript{164} See 2.4.1 and 5.3.
litanies (*dzikir, wirid, ratib*) complement the canonical obligations. Many *kyai* are moreover affiliated with a mystical order (*tarekat*) and teach their followers its specific devotions and mystical exercises. Further, Bruinessen (1994:2-5) explains that the traditionalists (i) venerate the Prophet highly; (ii) visit the graves of the saints and *kyai*; and correspondingly, (iii) hold the concept of *wasila*, or spiritual mediation, that there is unbroken chain from one’s teacher, living or dead, through previous teachers and saints to the Prophet and hence to God. This notion evokes Berger and Luckmann’s (1991) symbolic universe:

Thus the symbolic universe links men with their predecessors and their successors in a meaningful totality, serving to transcend the finitude of individual existence and bestowing meaning upon the individual’s death. All the members of a society can now conceive of themselves as belonging to a meaningful universe, which was there before they were born and will be there after they die. The empirical community is transposed onto a cosmic plane and made majestically independent of the vicissitudes of individual existence (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 95).

Another distinctive feature of traditionalist *pesantren* is the transmission of *kitab kuning*, classical texts of the various Islamic disciplines, together with commentaries, glosses and super commentaries on these basic texts written over the ages. Although the materials are in written texts, their oral transmission is considered essential (Bruinessen, 1994: 3). The *pesantren* community holds *kitab kuning* “to be of high importance in determining how to live as good Muslims in a globalizing and modernizing world. These texts are critical components of *pesantren* curricula” (Lukens-Bull, 2001:352). By the aforementioned criteria, Muhammadiyah’s boarding schools, which over the last few decades claimed to have been established modeled after the *pesantren*, cannot be considered *pesantren* in the true sense of the term. In an interview, Kyai Miftah Faqih, the chairman of *pesantren* association of the NU, *Ma’had Rabitah al-Islamiyah* (MRI) with which some 14,000 traditionalist *pesantren* are associated, used even stricter criteria, “anyone that doesn’t teach *kitab kuning* is not a *pesantren*”.

Concerning the argument of the thesis on the uniting power of symbolic universe, I would like to stress that disagreements between reformists, modernists and traditionalists do not negate the authoritative centrality of the Quran and the *Sunna*. Disagreements between them were around the interpretation of Islam in the context of modernity and do not involve so much the nature of God, eschatology or the practice of the rites of religion as seen in the West in debates between more traditional and modern interpreters of religion. Muslims’ disagreements were most of all around interpretations and applications of Islam to the social and human domains (Nasr, 2001:251), and not about the classical jurisprudence itself, but whether it can be reinterpreted in the light of modern circumstances, and if so how (Pringle, 2010:14).
Before presenting the modernization of pesantren, what follows are two precious evidences the research revealed in the traditionalist pesantren that can contribute to the debates on plurality of epistemology and the sociology of religion.

There, indeed, is plurality of knowledge

In what follows I highlight research findings from a traditionalist pesantren to support my argument that there is plurality of knowledge to be considered in discussing global environmental issues. In my interview with Kyai Munhanif who founded pesantren an-Nur Fatmah in Mbelik, Trawas, East Java, I asked his opinion about the seemingly converging ecological catastrophe. He stopped for a few seconds before continuing. In the opening of his talk, he changed the language from Bahasa to higher Javanese165, denoting politeness and honor to the subject he was about to talk.

“Those, the Salafi - mashaAllah (exclamation166), they just don’t understand history, they may know, but only superficially. If one hastens for something that is not yet the time, he will be tortured by that particular thing, that’s a Hadith, do you know? -- This world goes through five phases: Nubuwah, the age of the prophets, up to Prophet Muhammad solallahu ‘alaihi wa salam (peace be upon him), then, Khilafah, the times of the Islamic khilafah167, then, Salatin, the times of kingdoms, then, Jababiroh, the times of unrest when nothing can govern humankind anymore, not religions, nor states. So, we are now in the Jababiroh phase. If you ask me till when? Some have thought, perhaps 200 years to go – that if we listened to Ronggowarsito168, but of course only Allah knows (laughter). The fifth phase is when the Imam Mahdi comes, followed by 3 years drought across the entire world, and then Khilafah comes back. So, the Salafis do not need to hurry, it’s not the time yet for khilafah to rule the whole Ummah. After a while, then Jud and Ma’jud will come, that’s from the Quran you know? Jud will eat all vegetation, and Ma’jud all animals, etc. That time - this story in kitab Bada’i al-Zuhur goes - the earth is so fertile that one mango can be eaten by ten due to the greatness of the fruit, and the people’s condition is so prosperous that no one will accept anyone’s aid (laughter)”

Munhanif’s deliberation brought to my mind Nasr’s (1975) critique of Iqbal and other Salafi reformers for falling prey to a linear evolutionary conception of history and progress, and for failing to develop traditional Islamic conceptions of ‘Time’ and ‘Man’ (See discussion of linear and cyclical

165 There are degrees of politeness in Javanese language: ngoko, krama andhap, krama madya, krama inggil.
166 Indonesian Muslims sometimes use that to express strong disapproval.
167 The first system of governance established in Islam. It is believed to be the perfect way of ruling the Islamic Ummah. It is worth noting that khilafah was not intended to be a religious authority, as Islam emphasizes the direct link between man and God (ittisal).
168 Ronggowarsito is an eminent Javanese poet who lived in the Kasunanan palace of Surakarta in the 19th century. He wrote a number of mystical books.
time (Nasr, 2004)). Munhanif also articulated a case in point of plurality of knowledge that has been argued since the outset of the thesis. Muslims believe in the returning of khilafah that will govern the Ummah towards ‘the end time’, or the end of ‘this cycle of humanity’ (upon which God will create a new cycle for He is always The Creator, Al-Khaliq). Moreover, the belief of Muslims in Qiyamah (the eschatological ‘end-time’), Qada and Qadar (predestination), and inevitable death, has given to what in the West has led to “gloom and doom” environmental discourse, quite different meanings. If the problems appeared, or perceived, as too hard to confront or even fraught with conspiracy as the history of Earth Summits in Appendix 4 shows, Muslims could be easily dissuaded from taking actions against anything to do with climate change for it will appear to them as a sign that the ‘Hour’ has come. In this respect, the importance of doctrine of predestination in the beliefs and practices of Muslims is worth noting. The doctrine has been reflected in the mentality and conduct of Muslim people. Edward William Lane (Cohen-Mor, 2001: 14) who lived in Cairo for an extended period of time in the nineteenth century during which he penetrated the inner life of the Egyptians, reports:

Influenced by their belief in predestination, the men display, in times of distressing uncertainty, an exemplary patience, and after any afflicting event, a remarkable degree of resignation and fortitude, approaching nearly to apathy, generally exhibiting their sorrow only by a sigh and the exclamation of “Allah Kareem” (“God is bountiful”) ...When [the Muslim] see his end approaching, his resignation is still conspicuous; he exclaims, “Verily to God we belong, and verily to Him we return!”

I found Lane’s notes are quite appropriate to describe observant Muslims in Indonesia that I see as ascribing to that particular aspect of Islamic doctrine, Qada and Qadar. The same note can be reported from my interview with respondent Emha Ainun Nadjib (who lived in Yogyakarta) who witnessed the remarkable fortitude of Muslim victims in the Merapi volcano explosion in Yogyakarta in 2006. According to Emha, their faith has made the people strong and resilient in extreme adversity.

“In such panic-stricken situation people ran away exclaiming ‘Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar’. After things settled down you won’t believe to see how they returned to their lives after so much loss. They were able to simply say: “yo wis takdire“ [Javanese: “well, it was predestined”. Takdir in Javanese = takdir in Indonesian = taqdir in Arabic, from the root word Qadar]”

Emha continued:

“I was stunned to observe this people. I came to a conclusion at the end, that humans have unfathomable depths of dimensions that no sciences can explain”

Furthermore, the following note of Lane is relevant to the research inquiry of Muslims’ willingness for relocalisation. He remarks further that the belief in predestination does not prevent Muslims
from doing or making efforts to obtain what they want, or being careless in avoiding danger, but the belief engenders reliance on God:

The same belief in predestination renders the Muslim utterly devoid of presumption with regard to his future actions or to any future events. He never speaks of anything that he intends to do, or any circumstance which he expects or hopes may come to pass, without adding “If it be the will of God”; and in like manner, in speaking of a past event of which he is not certain, he generally prefaces or concludes what he says with expression, “God is all-knowing” (or, “God is most knowing”) (Lane cited in Cohen-Mor 2001: 14-5)

Accordingly, the belief in the supremacy of God’s will implies that Muslims are the least likely to pursue transition or relocalisation on the basis of ‘survivalism’ as outlined in section 4.2.3. Despite all the potentials to capitalize on the Islamic symbolic universe to instigate radical socio-ecological actions on a global scale, that kind of spiritual repose of Muslims can be both negative and positive at once. It is positive to the Muslims themselves as it liberates them from the fear of both minor and major Qiyamah. And it can be negative for those who hope radical socio-ecological actions can take place if the obstacles are perceived by the Muslims to be invincible. Someone who believes in predestination will do his/her best to the farthest extent of his/her ability. Once he/she feels what needed further is beyond his/her capacity, he/she will be easily dissuaded to accept the situation as his/her fate, thus, become resigned. Therefore, Muslims need to create endogenous relocalisation movements by and for themselves whereby socio-ecological actions take place within the matrix of Muslims’ own causes and propagated by Muslims’ own faith ‘language’. Only these attempts have the possibility to be responded to with spontaneity and creativity within Muslims’ own sensibility and world of meaning. Here, again, is the importance of hermeneutically-informed Sociology for the non-Western societies.

For a Truer Sociology of Religion

Kyai Munhanif (aged 49) founded his pesantren some twenty years ago when he had just completed his education at pesantren Sarang, in Rembang, Central Java, owned by Kyai Maimun Zubair known as a a wali (saint) who was 90 years old at the time. Feeling his knowledge was not enough he set off wandering from one kyai to another including a visit to the graves of the wali songo (nine walis)\(^{169}\).

In my journey I stopped by at a pesantren in Jetis, Mojokerto. When I entered the main room the words written on the blackboard caught my eyes, they were exactly the matter that I was searching for. Apparently they just had a discussion on that. I said to myself “this

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\(^{169}\)Nine revered saints of Islam in Indonesia because of their historic role in the spread of Islam. Visiting the graves is a practice encouraged in Islam to remember Hereafter and love expression to the deceased, to feel them remain being part of the loved ones, and to treat them kindly with salam and dhu’u’a (prayer). Because some locals have misconstrued the intention of visiting graves into seeking help from the buried instead of Allah, the Reformist fiercely opposed the practice.
is the place you’re looking for”. I stayed there for four months studying from the kyai. Afterward he told me that I can’t proceed further without experiencing it, I was told to go and find a new place where I can found my own pesantren.

While the role of historical and cultural context (local Javanese culture and the history of nine walis) to social knowledge in shaping Munhanif’s cognition can be understood, without an understanding of the spiritual dimension of: (1) knowledge (from what he perceived as a spiritual experience seeing at the deep-philosophical question he had been grappling with for a long time written on the blackboard); (2) meaning (of visiting the graves of the nine walis), and (3) action (of founding his own pesantren), Munhanif’s voluntary actions can never be understood. He provides the example of how Berger and Luckmann failed to explain adequately religious attitudes of the Muslims in particular. Munhanif also problematized Berger and Luckmann’s assumption of the taken-for-grantedness of religion, and their basic assumptions of man as ‘world constructor’. If they were the case, why did Munhanif feel that the knowledge he had obtained from his teacher known as a wali was not enough? To certain individuals (evoking the ‘sage’ personality character), granting subjective character to the objectivated factities (referring to internalization, the last step in Berger and Luckmann’s social construction of ‘reality’) still does not satisfy their deep-philosophical questions, and hence, this has called forth a quest for ‘unitive knowledge’ (mar’ifah) to know the Ultimate Reality, or the Absolute Truth, where subject and object are united.

7.4.1 Modernizing the Traditionalists

Pesantren are privately run and fall under the Ministry of Religion. For Pohl, the prevailing dualistic structures and the continued challenges to indigenous educational institutions such as the pesantren cannot be understood fully without references to the colonial period. Pohl referred to Hurgronje’s assertion that indigenous resistance to the colonial regime associated with Islam could best be overcome through the process of cultural association: “reducing and ultimately defeating the influence of Islam in Indonesia. In competition with the attraction of Western education and cultural association, Islam could not be but the loser” (cited in Pohl, 2011:86). In fact, after Independence in 1945, the real challenge to pesantren education is the government’s national curricula and the modernist Muslims’ discourse (Laffan, 2005; Howell, 2001; Sirry, 2010; Pohl, 2009). The demands for formal education and state certification have caused the modification or loss of some pesantren characteristics. Abdurrahman Wahid remarked, for instance,

the santri no longer sought education in different pesantren resulting in a loss of the tradition of journeying to study. Rather the demands of state-certified education require them to stay at one pesantren for the whole length of formal schooling (cited in Pohl, 2009:108)
It is common for today’s pesantren to deliver the ‘general’ curricula (Lukens-Bull, 2001). Nevertheless, Pohl (2009) and Laffan (2005) note aspects of Sufi tradition remain strongly present in today’s pesantren environment, and Howell (2001) presents several authors that have emphasized the continuing emphasis of Sufism within the pesantren. An illustration of the influence of Sufi ethics in character-building in the pesantren education was given by Pohl (2011:123-124), in a study of pesantren al-Muayyad Windan in Mangkuyudan, Surakarta.

Not just the study of religious texts but everything that can be related to life in the pesantren and its daily affairs is considered part of the curriculum. In order to illustrate the importance of these aspects of pondok life for the educational process, Kiai Dian refers to values from the mystical tradition, in part from the Naqsyabandiyah order. The Naqsyabandiyah is the mandatory tarekat (Sufi order) at Windan, and all santri belong to it. This is partially grounded in the history of the pesantren which in its origin retained strong ties with Naqsyabandiyah. Sufi practices such as zikir and tahliil are part of the daily and weekly routines. Kiai Dian speaks of the need for a “spiritualization of education” (spiritualisasi pendidikan). Studying religious text alone, he remarks, is not enough to effect personal growth. Working with one’s hands, he notes, is nobler than a life of incessant worship if the latter is supported by the charity and sweat of others. The different tasks that have to be undertaken in the running and upkeep of the pesantren, from cleaning the yard to discarding trash and scrubbing sanitary facilities, directly contribute to character building and self-improvement as they challenge a santri’s pride and bring about a sense of dignity of and respect for others. (p.124)

While the national policy has imposed particular difficulties for the pesantren (Sirry, 2010), notwithstanding, my interview with Kyai Miftah Faqih, the chairman of MRI, suggests pesantrens are fully independent institutions. The state could not impose national curricula: “although the principles in all our pesantren is Wasoyatan Abya li Abna and Ta’limun Muta’ALLim (refers to the Islamic classic books on philosophy of education), but there is no single curriculum for the Traditionalist pesantren. It’s simply not the Nahdliyyin way to standardize like that”. In general, contemporary pesantren curricula comprises of i) character development, ii) mysticism, iii) general or secular knowledge, iv) vocational training (Lukens-Bull, 2001:354).

The adoption of a national system of education was not without criticism. Pohl (2011) admitted an ambivalent result in her evaluation, which suggests the relevance of Muslim reconstruction of knowledge debates (covered in section 2.4.1).

In the wider context our evaluation of the above outlined developments will have to concede ambivalent results. Although most pesantren have become co-operative institutions within the national system of education, the consequences that the integration into the state system has for pesantren is subject to an ongoing debate. While some see as a result of educational integration a well-balanced education that provides both religious and general training and allows graduates to continue their studies in the state’s formal system of higher learning, many kiai and santri signaled an awareness of the possible and at times
very real dilemma for pesantren posed by the integration of formal learning, namely that students conceive of traditional religious education only as secondary (Pohl, 2011: pp.147-8)

The dilemma signaled that the kyai and santri perceived a dichotomy is present between secular and religious courses instead of being united in a ‘unified systemic worldview’ that Islam espouses where there appears no separation between the sacred and the secular. Pohl (2011) makes it clearer:

Furthermore, the question remains of whether the pesantren have achieved a truly integrated concept of education or a dualism between religious and formal learning. Some critics hold that the addition of formal, secular schooling within the pesantren tradition is achieved only by separating rather than integrating these two fields of learning (p.148)

In Pohl’s view the difficulties of adopting a national system were exacerbated by formidable problems of infrastructure such as a lack of financial resources, facilities, equipment, textbooks, as well as a scarcity of qualified teaching staff (p.146). Whether it was the dilemma or the lack of financial resources that have inhibited the far-reaching modernization reform from occurring across the Nahdliyyin pesantren remains to be examined. Come what may, my search for literature, books, and archives of articles failed to show that the debates on ‘reconstruction of knowledge’ as outlined in 2.4.1.2 have ever taken place among the kyai and the pesantren learning communities. This suggests that so far, the Nahdliyyin kyai might not have needed to confront the gravitation of the Western symbolic universe as much as the modernists in Muhammadiyah.

Finally, ever since tertiary education has been seen as the vanguard of Indonesian modernization and globalization, pesantren leaders view the need to engage in this arena as well in order to continue to shape the moral and Islamic values and practices of Indonesia’s future leadership (Lukens-Bull, 2001:355). Lukens Bull outlines six strategies that have been attempted by pesantren to respond to modernity and globalisation: i) conducting learning circles on campuses, which is considered to fail to mold the students’ characters and only imparts superficial religious knowledge, given the profound difference between ‘knowing about Islam’ and ‘living Islamic life’; ii) establish colleges in pesantren, which is relatively rare; iii) establish pesantren on college campuses, which is also rare; iv) allow college students to live at regular pesantren; v) establish a religious college with no pesantren features such as state Islamic colleges, IAIN, and ninety-five NU colleges and universities at the moment; and vi) establish autonomous pesantren for college students.

7.4.2 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Traditionalists’ Approaches for Sustainability

Sociology of knowledge is concerned with the process by which subjective meanings become objective facticities. From Berger and Luckmann’s model of three ongoing dialectical steps in the society: externalization, objectification and internalization, what the kyai have been doing for their pupils in this sense is promoting the third step, internalization. The objectivated social world of the
learning-community members attains the character of subjectivity through the process of internalization and becomes his/her subjective identity. Another role of the kyai is providing examples that imitate the tradition of the Prophet (Sunna). This process is explained by Bruinessen (2008) regarding the pesantren “Love and even veneration for the Ulama of the past was and is an important part of the pesantren tradition. Where possible, one was expected to follow their example, especially in legal thought” (p.221). Accordingly, it can be said, rather than the NU organisation, the kyais are the real ‘full-time personnel of symbolic universe maintenance’ for the followers. One can argue further that even without the NU, as long as the kyais and their learning communities are there, traditionalist Islam will continue, and conversely, if there is no kyai there is no NU. Thus, a point can be made as follows. While the NU is capable of mobilizing a large number of people as anticipated in the beginning of the research, NU cannot be viewed in isolation from the kyai considering the independent role of the kyai. To be effective, the intended mobilization must revolve around the Islamic symbolic universe which the kyai are maintaining. Elsewhere, a candid response by Islamist intellectual, Adian Husaini, gets to the core of the issue. Responding to my question about the environmental crisis he said:

“I’ve been contemplating about the environmental crisis issues for a long time and came to the conclusion that Muslims should come up with a society model as a solution to help themselves, and work out for the entire Islamic world. Otherwise, who else will help us? America? (laughter)”

While his statement compels to re-evaluate the presumption that UNCED types of global environmental governance are welcomed by the entire world population, his opinion corresponds with what I have been contemplating. For the Indonesian Muslims, the call for a radical shift towards sustainability will be responded to enthusiastically only if it was brought up by Muslims themselves through Muslims’ own traditional channels and mobilized through Muslims’ own ‘heart and mind’. Moreover, characters required for ‘sustainability-literacy’ (Stibbe, 2009), mainly: simplicity, self-discipline, reflective heart, and wisdom, are what traditionalist pesantren able to deliver. Literature on education and sustainability in intersection with a number of disciplines such as engineering, business, agriculture, ecology, public policy, sociology and psychology, demonstrate the difficulty in long-term behavioural change regarding sustainability (Savageau, 2013). Savageau, who explores the concept of self-audit and self-reflection, argues that real change in behavior must connect with individuals in a very personal way: “If individuals do not internalize changes in their behavior and are not more actively engaged in finding personal means of auditing their behavior and choices, sustainability will remain remote and impersonal” (p.22). Therefore, the concept of personalized
knowledge by a *murabbi*\(^{170}\), the educator, in Islamic philosophy of education (Kazmi, 1999) is pertinent. This concept has been exemplified in this research by the *pesantren* educators such as the traditionalist *kyai* and *nyai*, as well as male and female *murabbi* in the *pesantren* Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir community introduced in the next chapter. The *murabbi* disseminates knowledge through living in it. *Murabbi* does what parents do but much more explicitly and at a higher level of sophistication (Kazmi, 1999). As he/she is doing it, he/she inculcates character into the soul of the students. With this in mind, what the traditionalist *pesantren* system needs is enrichment instead of being replaced by something else that engagement with international aid agencies often implies\(^ {171}\). The demand of secularizing the traditionalist system will only diminish its strength – what international bodies aimed to harness in the first place. The enrichment of *pesantren* will be done automatically with the provision of education about sustainability and relocalisation for the *murabbi*, as part of the *Ulama, kyai*, Muslim group leaders and active members mentioned previously. This can be conducted either through the NU organization or through direct contacts with individual *pesantrens*.

### 7.5 Discussing Sustainability Education

Unlike the “worn out, co-opted and compromised connotations of orthodox ‘sustainable development’” (Barry, 2012:83), the protagonists of relocalisation, tellingly claim that it is already too late for sustainability within the typical western lifestyle. Thus, the only intelligent course of action is to prepare to adapt creatively to global resource shortages, and transitioning into a post-carbon world with climate uncertainty. Following this train of thought, I found Stibbe (2009) an appropriate source of literature for the case being studied. Stibbe presents a collection of writing that covers a wide range of skills and attributes needed to respond to the threats of climate change, peak oil, resource depletion, economic uncertainty and energy insecurity with creativity, ingenuity and new ways of thinking, in order to reinvent both self and society. The book promotes the significance of holism, reflexive heart and wisdom, simplicity, unified systemic worldview and non-materialism that is needed to resuscitate sustainability literacy and to develop skills for the changing world. Given these features are among those that have long been the bone of contention between Islam and a modern system of thought, and among those that have been pursued in the Muslim

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\(^{170}\) *Murabbi* is not only knowledgeable and wise but also pious, kind, and considerate; a person who combines a life of learning with a life of virtue, and hence a perfect and an ideal person to learn from. *Murabbi* is based on the understanding that one needs more than intellectual ability to comprehend the knowledge in text, but rather he needs time to personalize it by living it.

\(^{171}\) E.g. “Indeed significant Australian aid funding is directed to improving resources and curricula in Indonesian Muslim schools (for example, Downer 2007), with the implicit aim of combating the growth of regional Islamist terrorism” (Nilan, 2009:219).
reconstruction of knowledge project, Stibbe (2009), rather than the Indonesian national curriculum of environmental education, or the UN Education for Sustainable Consumption (ESC) (UNEP, 2014) being implemented in Indonesia, is the most suitable reference to appraise the existing Muhammadiyah and NU education.

Table 9 summarizes competencies counted as sustainability-literate skills by a number of authors in Stibbe (2009). The Muhammadiyah education system is capable (or has potential) to provide a few items, i.e. practical skills (1.b; 12.b; 13.a; and 16.b) and a Shariah economics paradigm (12.b). It fails on all other criterion for the following reasons:

- a) It is not possible to induce holism in national curricula under progressive, developmentalist and nationalist ideology (1a; 3a; 9a)
- b) There is no single norm of justice to refer to in national curricula (2a)
- c) It is impossible to incorporate wisdom in a modern-system of thought\(^{172}\) (2b; 8a; 9b; 10a)
- d) Modernists’ inability to profoundly criticize modernity (4a)
- e) Muhammadiyah has not invented intentional communities for an alternative society (4b; 5a; 6a; 16a)
- f) Indonesians in general have been merely technological users rather than producers (15a).

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\(^{172}\) Philosophy in its original sense is the love of wisdom (\textit{philos} the Latin of love, and \textit{Sophia} wisdom). It is a thought process being wedded to intellection or the doctrinal aspect of an integral spiritual way, the metaphysics, and theosophy. The source of this philosophy is the experience or direct knowledge of the Truth that is experience of spiritual nature, the un-mediated or direct access to Reality. On the contrary, the currently accepted definition of philosophy in the West as a thought process completely cut off from intellection and spiritual experience, an information theory which is almost similar to logical analysis and even a mental play, has made it not only no longer philosophy as the love of wisdom but went so far as to deny the very category of wisdom as a legitimate form of knowledge.
Table 9 Sustainability-literacy and Skills for Transitioning Peak Oil and Scarcity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pointer</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Manage complex sustainability problems (Bland Tomkinson) a. Holism first; then b. Practical skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ability to reflect on deeply-held opinions about social justice and sustainability (Mychele Goldberg) a. Sense of justice b. Reflective heart and Wisdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ability to view the world relationally (Stephen Sterling) a. Holism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ability to critique the values of an unsustainable society and consider alternatives (Jeffery Newman), and envision scenarios of a more desirable future (Sue Wayman) a. Critical attitudes toward modernity b. Alternative society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ability to expose advertising discourse that undermines sustainability and resist them (Arran Stibbe); and Communication skills for sustainability (John Blewitt) a. Alternative society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ability to envisage and enable a viable future through connected actions a. Alternative society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ability to experience meaning, purpose, and satisfaction through non-material wealth (Paul Maiteny) a. Mystical life</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>The ability to research and reflect on the roots of emotional well-being (Morgan Phillips) a. Reflective heart &amp; Wisdom</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>The ability to think about the self in interconnection and interdependence with the surrounding world (John Danvers) a. Holism b. Reflective heart &amp; Wisdom</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>The ability to investigate cultural artifacts from an ecological perspective (Greg Garrard), and understanding and respect for the cultural aspect of sustainability (Kim Polistina) a. Reflective heart &amp; Wisdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Awareness of the animate qualities of the earth a. Islamic mysticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Economic awareness based on ecological and ethical values (Satish Kumar) a. Sharia economics b. Practical skills in economic activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>The art of personal sufficiency (John Naish), and Skills for transition to a post-fuel age (Stephen Quilley) a. Practical skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Permaculture Design (Patrick Whitefield), and Community gardening (Alma Clavin) a. Practical skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ability to evaluate technological innovations (Gavin Harper), and to design systems, technologies and equipment in an appropriate way (Mike Clifford) a. Technological skills imbued with reflective heart and wisdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>From my own experience, a last point: Entrepreneurial ability to create socially and environmentally responsible businesses a. Alternative society b. Entrepreneurial skills, with reflective heart and wisdom</td>
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</table>

The traditionalists’ pesantren, on the other hand, have more potentials than modern schools in their ability to nurture holism (1a; 3a; 9a); sense of justice by Islamic norms (2a); reflective heart (2b; 8a; 9b; 10a); Shariah economics paradigm (12b); mystical life (7a); and Islamic mysticism (11a). Correspondingly, with practical skills added, traditionalist pesantren will be able to: manage complex sustainability problems (1b.); Permaculture Design (14a); Art of personal sufficiency and skills for transition to a post-fuel age (13a); Entrepreneurial skills (16b). With related knowledge added, the pesantren students will be able to: view the world relationally (3a); critique the values of an unsustainable society and consider alternatives and envision scenarios of a more desirable future (4a); think about the self in interconnection and interdependence with the surrounding world (9a). Moreover, the existing pesantren could be transformed into training centers for the nuclei of a
relocalisation movement. They are, face-to-face associations of friends who interact with each other frequently and over a long period of time (Maser, 1997, Biddle, 1965). For creating a network of intentional communities as an alternative society, these nuclei will discover the process, organize and make it work. People in the nuclei will consider the steps to be taken, plan the actions and reflect upon events to learn from them.

Call for Introspection
While a systems-thinking argument entails that people’s inability to identify the interconnected nature of the crises has been at the heart of the socio-ecological crises facing the world today, to my awareness, there has been no systems-thinking research undertaken about the correlation between nationalism and sustainability. In the following, I will argue that from a sustainability point of view, nationalist sentiments have exacerbated the plight of modern education already presented.

It should be considered that if individuals are taught to be a member of a country; and as a citizen are supposed to defend their country from the looter nations who glare hungrily all the time at a country’s wealth; and the collective experiences about those were sedimented in museums and history books, how can the aforementioned individuals be expected to see the world as a ‘one world family’ as the environmentalists plead? Amidst the presence of burgeoning cultural icons of globalisation such as (in percent market share): KFC (30%), Starbucks (30%), McDonalds (11%), and Coca Cola (78%) (Merdeka, 2012; Fast Food Share, 2011; UNEP, 2014), Indonesia continuously made the observers alarmed by its political leaders’ call for nationalism. As an Indonesian citizen who studied in Indonesian schools, I understand that Indonesian nationalism has always been complex, as Chapter 5 described. While the country is far from being a belligerent state, since its beginning as a nation-state, Indonesia has had to grapple with several instances of internal rebellions that jeopardized the country’s nation-building process. According to Farish A. Noor (2012), a senior fellow who has been researching Indonesia for over 10 years, a vast country like Indonesia will need some emotive and symbolic force to keep it together. For Noor, in the face of new ethnic (read Adat-revival) and religious demands, “as long as it is inclusive and not bellicose, nationalism

173 In 2013, Indonesia’s imports of packaged F&B (food and beverage) products rose to US$6.1 billion, more than doubling from US$2.9 billion in 2009. In addition, per capita consumer expenditure on food services (including restaurants and cafés) increased by 12% in 2013, considerably outstripping the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8% during the period 2007-2013. Indonesians’ increased spending on packaged food and growing preference for dining out at contemporary-styled outlets represents a real opportunity for foreign food exporters and the operators of cafés, restaurants and fast-food chains. Packaged food traders may also find considerable potential in selling to modern grocery retailers, including hypermarkets and convenience stores. (Economist-pick, 2014).
may well be the glue that keeps the country together\(^{174}\). Yet, in the face of climate change and peak oil, the notion of nation-state will gradually lose its significance and become irrelevant.

Transformative Sustainability Learning (TSL) already mentioned (Sipos, 2008) identified a major problem in sustainability education, namely, conflict of interests that are bound to arise between institutions of higher education and a student’s local environment. University and community, thus, must find or create the necessary common ground to minimize the conflicts by creating university-community collaborations. In my view, this problem suggests the need of an alternative society where the sustainability-aware individuals can put into actions the ecologically-sound knowledge and skills, to reverse the trend of unsustainable consumer-capitalist society. That is tantamount to the green-intentional community of relocalisation discussed in Chapter 4. These alternative societies or intentional communities will become models for the larger Indonesian society whereby the dominant paradigm of consumer-capitalism-developmentalism prevails. Character-building education such as the National Curriculum of Environmental Education (Adiwiyata, 2012) that is being deployed in a society where shopping malls and advertisement-funded media continue to entice consumerism, is doomed to fail. This situation evokes Orr’s statement (1991:6) of “the power of examples over words” and Young (1993) who argues that education on sustainability that does not provide direct experiences to students will more likely produce short-term changes. Furthermore, there is potential danger in raising environmental awareness among young people. Orr (1991:6) identified that for the Western world context, students hear about global responsibility while being educated in institutions that often invest their financial weight in the most irresponsible things. The lessons being taught are those of hypocrisy and ultimately despair. Students learn, without anyone ever saying it, that they are helpless to overcome the frightening gap between ideals and reality. What is desperately needed are faculty and administrators who provide role models of integrity, care, thoughtfulness, and institutions that are capable of embodying ideals wholly and completely in all of their operations.

In Indonesia, on top of the already complex education system where students and teachers have been struggling\(^{175}\), previous chapters show that there is very little space for ordinary citizens to wrest control over their destiny from the government and corporation-led life spaces to make changes. Thus, to give too much information about environmental problems is to give a source of desperation. Emha alluded in section 6.3.4 when he said that he did not want to add more burden to


the people by encouraging them to change their life ways. His position is understandable for that will not be possible to change people’s ways of living without initially correcting the nature of economy, the nature of consumption, and the cultural definition of ‘good life’ in the society at large which, in the Third World context especially, are beyond communities’ control (see discussion in sections 4.2.1 and 4.6). The creation of alternative society, with an alternative economy, and alternative culture, to the economy and culture of consumer-capitalist contemporary Indonesian society at large, is what is needed by the Muslims to bring relocalisation into being.

7.6 Conclusion

The thesis discovered the potential of Muslim groups’ learning communities, (schools, pesantren, pengajian, majlis taklim, halqah, daurah) to be transformed into training centers to mobilize ecological actions based upon Islamic values and jurisprudence presented in sections 4.2 and 4.4. The available scholarship funding for Muslim religious and educational purposes can be redirected towards education for relocalisation projects. First the Ulama, kyai, and the groups’ active members are made knowledgeable through formal education -in the modern-sense of the term- about the complex issues in the present-day socio-ecological crisis, which are inextricably linked to Third World development on the one hand, and poverty on the other, including learning skills about relocalisation actions through training and participatory observation in green intentional communities and grass-root initiatives in Western world. Then they will be able to communicate these issues using Muslims’ own ‘language’ and sensibility and to call for the Ummah to act upon them. Mobilization that revolves around the Islamic symbolic universe which the Ulama and kyais are maintaining is bound to be effective.

As the research was seeking suitable methods to disseminate ecological messages and ‘sustainability-literacy’, it found developmentalism and nationalism components in the national curricula problematic. Notably, the two components are among elements that must be adopted by the modern schools of Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist pesantren of the NU. Nationalism and developmentalism will mutually hamper the development of characters for ‘sustainability-literacy’. The desire to engage in competition and expansion that the two induced will become an insurmountable hindrance to students’ self-reflection.

The research found numerous strengths of traditionalist pesantren that need to be maintained with much enrichment to be added. The modern schools of Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, together with all secular-national schools of Indonesia need to be prepared to deconstruct and reconstruct all aspects of teaching and learning, in order to be consistent with the reality of depleting natural resources and the deteriorating condition of the earth.
Finally, in the light of a symbolic universe premise, I would like to summarise the potential of Muslim groups in comparison with the state and environmental NGOs, along the lines of the aspects of social setting that have been taken in the research analysis. They are: (1) cognitive aspect; (2) meaning aspect; (3) emotional aspect; and (4) ranking of potentials.

Table 10 Comparing the potentials of Muslim groups; the state; and environmental NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. The State</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive (Worldview)</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning (Symbolic Universe)</td>
<td>Developmentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional (Symbolic Universe)</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ranking | i) Have ‘normative authority’ (thus, listened and obeyed by) nationalist Indonesians  
ii) Due to nationalism, it does not espouse holism  
iii) Due to its high needs of conformity with modernity, it can easily be exploited by it  
iv) While preaching sustainability, it can sit comfortably in a capitalistic-developmentalist paradigm  
v) Hold the highest power in natural resource authority for distribution |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Environmental NGOs</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive (Worldview)</td>
<td>Truth (from a Scientific-Ecological perspective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning (Symbolic Universe)</td>
<td>Eco-centrism or Anthropo-centrism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional (Symbolic Universe)</td>
<td>Westernism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ranking | i) It does not speak in the same thought ‘language’ as the Muslims  
ii) Has ‘normative authority’ (thus, listened and obeyed by) environmentalists and scientists only  
iii) Due to its scientific worldview, it espouses holism, hence, global humanity  
iv) Due to its dependence on funding and need of high conformity to modernity, it could be exploited by modernity and the financial providers  
v) Have no power in natural resource appropriation |

<table>
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<tr>
<th>3. Muslim Groups</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive (Worldview)</td>
<td>Truth (from Islamic perspective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning (Symbolic Universe)</td>
<td>Theo-centrism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional (Symbolic Universe)</td>
<td>Islam (and the global Ummah)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Ranking | i) Have ‘normative authority’ (hence, listened and obeyed by) Muslims world over including lay people (the observant ones in particular)  
ii) Due to being ‘theo-centric’, espouses holism, hence, global humanity  
iii) Due to Islamic symbolic universe, needs to act on Islamic terms to implement Islamic laws, values, ethics and norms, and hence, needs self-governance  
iv) Mostly independent from state and corporation (in terms of funding and supports)  
v) Less need for conformity to modernity  
vii) Potentially have more power than NGOs in natural resource appropriation |
Chapter 8
Discovering Possibilities: Models of Endogenous Relocalisation by Muslim Groups

8.1 Introduction
This chapter provides two examples of intentional community models already undertaken endogenously by Muslim groups that can be considered in envisioning relocalisation. They are the pesantren-network of Hidayatullah, particularly the mother-pesantren at Balikpapan and one at Depok, and An-Nadzir community in Gowa, South Sulawesi. In order to provide a wider scope of Indonesian Muslims, and to test the efficacy of Islamic symbolic universe with different ethnicities, the fieldwork was conducted outside Java where the membership composition of the communities is dominated not by Javanese as for the NU and Muhammadiyah’s respondents in the previous chapter. It is worth noting though, like other Indonesian Muslim groups, both communities were founded by the offspring of either Muhammadiyah or NU. However, by subscribing to the ideals of the Darul Islam, Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir have not been entangled by the burden of ‘nationalism’ and nation-state system. This has enabled them to gain greater control over their members’ destiny through fenced-pesantren, which is neither desirable to the traditionalist NU for it is against their inclusive approach, or to the Muhammadiyah who chose the modern approaches, or, to both concerning national-ideological reasons.

Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir exemplified intentional community models by urban and rural Muslims respectively. I put the two groups forward to address the following issues from what have been discussed in previous chapters:

1. The need of alternative societies where the sustainability-aware individuals can put into actions the ecologically-sound knowledge and skills, to reverse the trend of unsustainable consumer-capitalist society, discussed in Chapter 7.
2. The need to construct and demonstrate an ideal model that could be duplicated throughout the country.
3. The need of self-governance, hence, land allotment and jurisdiction, for the local Muslim communities to create intentional communities that are socially and environmentally responsible.
4. The need of social capital for effective mobilization to take place.

In addition,

5. Because the elites are tied to their fortunes, ideology, loyalty, and intransigence, they are unlikely to initiate revolutionary changes that threaten their wealth and power (Somma, 2009:42). Therefore, radical changes should be sought only from outside the elite circles.
6. Outlined in section 4.6, the ‘Eco-Pesantren’ programme by the Ministry of Environment failed to address the heart of the problems, namely: the nature of economy; the nature of
consumption; and the developmentalism paradigm. In addition, there is legitimate reason to question the ability of the program to proceed and reach out to 24,000 pesantren all over the country, given the “meager budget and lack of authority” of the Ministry of Environment (Nguitragool, 2012:66).

In contrast to green intentional communities in the West, neither the Hidayatullah nor An-Nadzir community was designed, based on the ecological utopian principles and techniques embraced by bioregionalism, permaculture and ecovillages (Pyhala, 2013) for developing closed-loop, symbiotic, self-sustaining human habitats and production systems that do not result in ecological degradation and social injustice. Nonetheless, as the community members reduce their dependence on the global economy and replace it with household and local economies, they reduce the demand that drives current inequities. After all, it should be borne in mind that bioregionalism, permaculture and ecovillages seek to enable people to become more self-reliant, and in the process, relieve the social injustices and ecological degradation created by the global political economy (Pyhala, 2013).

This chapter begins with the history behind the formation of the two communities, followed by ethnographic accounts that illustrate the meaning of fenced-pesantren for the leaders and the recruits. ‘Clash of symbolic universe’ and the Islamic utopia of the Medina society that plagued the state-Muslim relations continued to appear as the main themes. Correspondingly, while Hidayatullah resonates a reinterpretation of khilafah, an-Nadzir reflects the notion of walayah\(^{176}\) both concerned with the concept of governance in Islam. Further, pertaining relocalisation and sustainability agendas, both provide an inspiration from the concept of murabbi that they adopted from the traditionalist education system (see section 6.3.3). Additionally, An-Nadzir provides notional understanding of Imam Mahdi, the messianic savior that will appear to institute a reign of justice. In a broader sense, Hidayatullah was developed upon a combination of the following reasons:

a) The search for similarity and like-mindedness outside the Muhammadiyah-NU mainstream Islam;
b) Yearning for close knit ties of village communities, security and camaraderie of a large family;
c) Parents’ concerns over their children’s encounter with un-Islamic influences;
d) The leaders’ political instincts to circumvent those hardships through the creation of their own space for self-governance, and by doing that, ignoring the state and the dominant political-economic order that it encompasses.

Erich Fromm’s work on ‘having and being’ as two fundamental human orientations toward the self and the world, and Hannah Arendt’s vita activa, give explanations for the formation, development

\(^{176}\) See the discussion of Islamic version of deep-ecology in section 4.2.2.
and stability of Hidayatullah’s community. In *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt argues that there are three fundamental human activities: labour, work and action. Labour is the activity that is linked to the biological process of the human body and the satisfaction of direct physical needs, like the provision of food and drink. Work is the activity that creates an artificial world of enduring objects, to provide a stable living environment for humans. Action corresponds to the fundamental human condition of plurality and is directed at the creation of a public sphere in which people can enjoy political freedom (Arendt, 1985, pp.7, 50-54). Arendt contends that while action was of the highest significance in the Greek ‘polis’, in ranking (followed by work and finally labour), in modern times the hierarchy has been completely reversed. Political changes resulting in the systematic loss of so-called spaces of political action and the loss of distinction between the private and public realms have contributed to this reversal. Nowadays, the value of labour and production of consumption goods are consistently overrated, whereas the value of the more meaningful activities of acting in the public realm and creating lasting products have almost disappeared (Arendt, 1985, pp.294-305). Arendt argues that in our era the goal of human activities (*vita activa*) is no longer to be found in sustaining a public sphere of political action or in creative work, but in routine labour, growing economic welfare, abundance and mass consumption. Nowadays, increasing wealth and the greatest consumer happiness of the greatest number are the basic aims of social and political life (Arendt, 1985, p 133).

As an esoteric community, An-Nadzir, on the other hand, reveals the mystical quest of ‘unitive knowledge’ and ‘ultimate Self’, and hence, of the Absolute Truth, characterized the drives of the member recruits (see Section 2.2.2). Both fenced-*pesantren* communities, nevertheless, made another example of Foucault’s (in Rabinow, 1991, p.75) argument, that resisting power can be undertaken by detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates. The two communities also provide examples of the ‘hearts and minds’ model of social movement where people give their sentiments or meanings to the world, for which Gamson (Zald, 2004) criticized Zald and McCarthy’s heavy ‘institutional and organisational’ approaches to social movements.

Minor findings, but ineluctable in the debates of ecological restoration, are presented in the ethnographic description of the Hidayatullah in East Kalimantan and Jakarta. It demonstrates a challenge in re-ruralizing the urbanites and the dilemma if they are to place them into immediate contact with wilderness, as they have long lost contact with indigenous knowledge and practices to deal with nature. This is especially challenging in the tropics, where ecological restorations entail harmful animals within restored ecosystems. The fieldwork at an-Nadzir as a rural community
demonstrates everyday routines and practical knowledge that needed to be confronted pragmatically in rural society.

No doubt, Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir are merely examples of limitless variants of Islamic communities, but each provides inspiration to envision relocalisation by Indonesian observant Muslims as able to transition after ‘peak oil’ and climate change. As a Muslim majority country, the picture of Indonesia will be quite different if every Muslim group, invariably, created intentional communities like the Hidayatullah ones, for their urbanite members, to be promoted as models for developing saner ways of living according to Islamic ecological principles. Similarly, if all traditional kyai and their staffs possess the ecologically-sound knowledge and skills of the an-Nadzir leaders to transition the observant rural Muslims into sustainable agriculture and production, the picture of Indonesian villages will be less gloomy. In these portrayals, the existing modus Vivendi created since the Dutch colonial times that wants Islamic organisations to refrain from any political activity and to stick to innocuous and purely religious pursuits, is reversed toward the Islamic ethos where the sacred and the secular are inseparable.

8.2 Pesantren Network of Hidayatullah

The pesantren Hidayatullah learning community was founded by Abdullah Said in 1973. Hidayatullah has five levels of leadership with several foundations (yayasan) attached to each level: nation, province, district, country and village. Each is responsible for managing the organisation’s affairs at that particular level. Once a year a national conference is held, and others might be held as necessary. In 2013 Hidayatullah ran in total about 297 schools in 33 provinces177 from kindergarten to high school, five colleges, and numerous (unrecorded) economic institutions (for example, 22 in East Java). Economic institutions are managed by the yayasan (foundations). Since 2000, Hidayatullah transformed its Indonesian legal status from ‘Orsos’ (social institution) to ‘Ormas’ (mass organisation) which implies a more system-oriented, in lieu of charismatic leader-oriented, management of the organisation. In an official statement, the organisation claimed to have not been linked with Darul Islam, both organisationally and in its methods (reiterated in the interviews with Abdurrahman Muhammad, the Hidayatullah chairman in 2000-2005). Although Hidayatullah is not officially associated with Darul Islam, I concluded nevertheless, that they are tied inspirationally and emotionally as the story of the founding father below suggests. Moreover, Aziz Kahar, a son of Kahar Muzakkar (Qahhar Mudzakkar), the Darul Islam leader in South Sulawesi, was once one of the directors of Hidayatullah pesantren in Jakarta and in Makassar (Bakti, 2005:138).

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177 Until the end of 2012 (when the fieldwork was undertaken), Indonesia had 33 provinces.
What follows is the history of Hidayatullah’s formation. The description of Abdullah Said and other pioneers of the pesantren is taken from his biography, *Mencetak Kader* by Manshur Salbu (2009). Abdullah Said was born in 1945; the year Indonesia proclaimed its Independence, in a remote village in Sinjai, South Sulawesi. He is a Bugis ethnic. His parents named him Muhsin Kahar. Later in his life he needed to change that name, and he then became Abdullah Said. He came from a religious family, his father Kyai Abdul Kahar Syuaib was a religious leader in the village, and his grandfather was known by the villagers as ‘orang tua yang rajin berdzikir’ (old man who chants the dzikir): “when he was tilling the ground or cutting grass for livestock, his humming dzikir could be heard from afar” (p.7), he wrote. The village where he spent his childhood had lasting marks on Said’s life. He recalled that the habits of making daily prayers in *jama’ah* (congregation) in the mosque and forming a close relationship with *ulama*, the way his father raised him, were influential in his later life. He retained a number of affecting memories about the remoteness of the village that were filled with vibrant religious rural community lives. In his portrayal, Sinjai was a green and fertile area located in the highland, from where the view of the Gulf of Bone and the surrounding nine islands was lovely. In his day, there were no motor vehicles, so people went to Sinjai town on foot, horse or bike. His grandfather was also known as a man who loved gardening. There were many kinds of fruit trees in his garden, and if a villager stole the fruits, Said remembered, his grandpa simply laughed and said “that’s good he came to choose what he liked, if I’m the one who gave [it] to him he may not like what I gave”. Besides his memory of the beautiful scenery, he also could not forget the taste and sweetness of pao apang, a sort of mango that can be found only in that area, and the delicious penjang, white thread anchovy fish that appear only once a year in the sea, wrapped in banana leaf and roasted. There lived in that village a number of the activists of the Darul Islam movement, then in rebellion, led by the famous Abdul Kahar Muzakkar (note the name, ‘Kahar’ which they share).

In 1958, after he completed primary school, he continued to a school for Islamic teachers in Makassar, a capital of South Sulawesi, about 200 km away from his village. There he felt for the first time alienation and the plight of city lives. He recalled the horror and disgust he felt seeing people in the city getting together in *lontang* (pubs) widespread in the city, drinking *ballo* (alcohol drink made of fermented rice) and eating *baluta* (food made of animal blood) – both are forbidden in Islam. He often saw them fighting, hitting each other for trivial matters. He felt homesick for his village and the religious atmosphere it had. Said had displayed political talent since he was quite young. At that secondary school, he started being an activist of Indonesian Muslim Student (PII), one of the Muslim

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178 Invoke the divine names of Allah.
organisations who opposed strongly the reigning communist party (PKI) during Sukarno’s regime. He admitted that PII laid the foundation for him to be ‘militant and skillful in organisation’, and where he came to know numerous local and national Muslim activists. Afterward, he continued his tertiary education in the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) in Makassar, but quit in the third semester. He thought he would have learnt more from a direct relationship with the Ulama, and felt he had wasted his youth in IAIN and would rather do organisation. Since then, he has been an activist in a number of organisations, including Muhammadiyah, where he learnt the skills of regenerating the cadre. When a new Islamic party, Parmusi was established in 1968, Said joined it. Parmusi aimed to embody Masyumi that Sukarno had banned and put many of its activists in jail. He hoped that in the new regime of Suharto, Islamic politics should have a chance. But after a while he realized that Suharto was no different to Sukarno, and came to a conclusion that the ideals of Islam can never succeed if they are pursued through national schemes. Henceforth, he dreamt of a fenced pesantren learning community, where the cadre or nuclei of Muslim groups will be well-taken care of as well. He looked in retrospect, and was touched by all those organisations of whom he said, “with a mere trifle of cadre management, had produced uncompromising activists to save Islam from those who wanted to dim its light” (Salbu, 2009:27). The community he envisioned had to be self-reliant with self-production of food, in which Shariah laws were enacted and where every issue will be resolved by the guidance of the Sunna. In such a place the learning process occurred without being obstructed by the fuss of worldly matters and burdened by financial needs.

A story of such a place in Libya from Kyai Mas Mansyur from Surabaya who once visited when he was studying in the University of al-Azhar, Cairo, Egypt, was an inspiration to Said. The place in Libya was called Syanggit, led by Syaiqh Sidi Abdullah. It had its own date and wheat farms, cattle, sheep, horses and camels, managed by the Syaiqh and his family. They looked after 5,000 students who stayed in a dormitory with 100 bedrooms. The students woke up at daybreak, made the fajr prayer in congregation led by the Syaiqh, and prepared for the classroom learning that began at 7 a.m. They did many interesting learning activities, including horse riding, swimming, and different kinds of games. They studied various Islamic disciplines. The only thing he found strange about that place was that everybody there was male, “that must look like a male village”, he commented. Said was determined to make his dream come true. He learnt that the idea of fenced-pesantren was once proposed to the Muhammadiyah congress by Kyai Mas Mansyur in 1941, but was rejected. The organisation chose to establish a university, instead.

Said began the journey with creating learning circles in which he became the preacher. His eloquence and his wide reading made him attractive to a wide range of audiences. But unlike the
Traditionalist *kyai*, Said aimed to produce from his learning community the cadres of his movement. This evokes what Bennett (2005:22) distinguishes between “neo-traditionalist” and “Modernist”: the modernist (like Muhammadiyah) tended to concentrate on education, whereas, the neo-traditionalists (like Said) founded movements and reached popular audiences. In 1969 Said was ‘wanted’ by the police after launching actions against gambling that was rampant in South Sulawesi at that time and even endorsed by the government as ‘lotteries’.

Walking 40 km on foot, aided by his companion, he fled Sulawesi in a ship that was about to depart without knowing where to go. Being disguised as a livestock keeper on the ship, he managed to sail safely and landed in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan. His South Sulawesi background, his ‘Kahar’ name, his courageous trait in contrast with Javanese deference, his ideology, and the type of his companions, altogether could have made the Indonesian government associate him with the Darul Islam rebellion led by Kahar Muzakkar as will be seen later. Thenceforth, he decided to change his name to Abdullah Said, and made a solemn oath to dedicate his life to Islam and nothing else. He recalled a dream he had before that happened. He heard a voice reciting a verse of the Quran when God checked the attempt to kill prophet Yusuf (Joseph). He interpreted it as God’s blessing to let him be alive to keep on endeavoring for Islam. He continued spawning cadres in the new place and attracted numerous like-minded friends from different places in Indonesia, male and female. They then became the pioneers of Hidayatullah including four female cadres he called “the Big Four” (using precisely these English words). One of them, Aida Chered, became his wife in the future, and a respondent in this research. The first Hidayatullah *pesantren* was held in a house of a local businessman who supported his movement. As they grew bigger, they moved to two different places before they finally settled in Gunung Tembak, the land they obtained from the mayor of Balikpapan, also his supporter. It was the location of the fieldwork for this research.

The construction of the campus in this new place was fraught with the physical struggle of the pioneer’s life. Chopping out paths through thick bush, and building a mosque and homes from scratch with constant threats from poisonous snakes and centipedes were the everyday routine. There was not a big enough supply of food, so sometimes they collected and cooked whatever looked edible from the bush and swamp. Everyone developed the habits of practicing the fast of prophet Daud (David) - meaning fast one day and not the next, the effects of which were felt by them as spiritually rewarding and clearing the mind and heart. Said raised the spirits of the cadres by bringing to their mind that they were working to get God’s blessing and to be able to be thankful and satisfied with those blessings (known in Islam as *rida*). They filled their days and nights after work time with prayer, Quran reading and *dzikir*. In 1976 the work was completed.
Said’s story compels transformative understanding and hermeneutically-informed social theories in place of a rationalist view in measuring his worldview and world of meaning. Not only did Said display characteristics of the warrior personality character to whom politics is the main concern, but also the role of Islamic symbolic universe as a source of ideas and meaning for him.

8.2.1 The Khilafah Reinterpreted

Pringle (2011) commented that the mother pesantren in Balikpapan turned out to be a remarkably successful institution. ‘Campus’ for the Hidayatullah is an enclave composed of schools, mosque, housing complex and student dormitory. The first one in Balikpapan has been extended to include a reforested wood, community garden, a large pond, self-managed water facility and “pasar umi” (mom’s market) selling household groceries. Campus-1 is located in Gunung Tembak, East Balikpapan, with an area of 200 hectares and a little more than a fifteen hundred inhabitants. When I visited on this research, Campus-2, within sight from the gate of campus-1, was under construction. Balikpapan is a seaport city on the east coast island of Kalimantan (Borneo). It is a resource-rich region known for timber and petroleum export products, and famous as one of Indonesia’s “oil cities”. Before the oil boom of the early 1900s, Balikpapan was an isolated Bugis ethnic fishing village.

The Hidayatullah community in Balikpapan attracts people to join their activities although they do not necessarily become active members or cadre who are ready to be assigned to assume tasks in other branches. I came to know a lady, Rahima, (name has been changed), who, together with her husband, joined Hidayatullah’s activities for a number of years. Rahima’s husband was a professional in an oil company in Balikpapan, and he had recently passed away when she was being interviewed.

“I decided to live inside the Hidayatullah’s campus in order to give my two sons a good Islamic neighborhood and to have a ‘village’ for myself to settle down in the rest of my life. It’s really hard to raise children in the cities as you know the influences are so bad. My big son has been studying in another pesantren outside Balikpapan and my late husband wanted our little son to be a hafiz (a person who memorizes the Quran completely), he seems able to do so, so we put him here”

While all properties in the campus-1 are owned by the organisation, the campus-2 that was under construction is intended to be purchased by the members with a condition that it cannot be transferred to anyone without prior consent of the Hidayatullah. The condition was made in order to keep the campus inhabited by the members only. The price of the land was quite low. Rahima bought a plot of land, more or less 300m², and built a house with a vegetable garden on the back.
Fieldwork was also conducted in Depok campus near Jakarta. It was built in 1991. Here the organisation was not able to obtain a larger plot of land than the existing three hectares, therefore not every member was given a chance to live inside the enclave. There are some individuals who can afford to buy a piece of land adjacent to it and it is intended that the complex will expand gradually. It took a lot of trouble with the traffic and tricky roads to get to the location which was in the farthest outskirts of Jakarta city. Shodiq, a member, has been living in the complex for fifteen years. He came from a nominal Muslim farmer family background in Central Java. Both Shodiq and his wife work fulltime to serve the schools and students’ dormitory and receive in-kind remuneration instead of salary.

“We live with a very small economy. We have good supposition of God though, that His hand will always be extended to us whenever we need help. As you see we don’t live like people out there, we don’t have to have a TV and the luxury stuff like them. We feel secured because we know that our children will be taken care of, in our network we have schools from kindergarten to university. For anyone who has tasted the life of being anonymous out there they will agree that it is a lot easier to manage your family if you live in a community where everyone helps and exhorts one another like us here”

And, Ikhwan:

“The feeling of being in a large family is wonderful here, considering we’re not related familial-wise. I got an example, my friends will give you more. My wife was advised by the doctor to give birth through caesarian, I was so shocked, how could I afford the surgery? (titter). But that’s done at the end, paid jointly by everyone. So, there’s no shortage in here, insyaAllah”

“Because we perform prayer in congregation, the sense of togetherness is maintained. If we have a problem, we share with one another”

“Because we are like-minded, we can let our children play and make friends freely without being worried”

One of Hidayatullah’s values is insistence on the five times a day prayer being conducted in congregation (jama’ah) in its mosques for the males who at the time of prayer happen to be around the campus. They believe it to be the most effective method to maintain social capital among them. Male and female focus group discussions gave identical answers to Shodiq and Ikhwan’s reasoning for living in the Hidayatullah communities. It is interesting to note that among members living in the Depok campus were men who worked in government offices and their wives served the Hidayatullah schools.

Clearly all the people of Hidayatullah placed community-living at the highest importance. They see small-scale communities like the ones they have established and networked as a manifestation of the khilafah. Syaikhul in Jakarta head office said:
“We are not the ones who feel frustrated because *khilafah Islamiyah* is not there, we still can have it by ourselves, in a small scale”

“The members can make a living outside the Hidayatullah, but when they are going home they are going to the community”

And, Suharsono in Jakarta head office:

“What we are doing is in accordance with the Hadith saying that every collectivity must have a leader, “When three men travel together, they should make one of them a leader”

Hidayatullah states explicitly that rebuilding Islamic civilization is its vision. In its notary act of establishment, the organisation is officially defined as a mass organisation and mentioned as an Islamic movement. Further, it is meant to be a medium of the holy struggle (*jihad*) and taking *jihad* as an injunction for all Muslims on board, individually (*infitaradi*) and collectively (*jama’i*). The Hidayatullah members’ families were proud to be families of *mujahid* (those who engaged in *jihad*). Slogans such as “*Indahnya menjadi keluarga mujahid*” (how beautiful it is to be a *mujahid* family) are ordinary in this community. The alumni of Hidayatullah rapidly produced a network. While initially the members were mainly Bugis ethnic diaspora, over the years they have become increasingly diverse. The network is managed in a system of organisation with clearly defined criteria of zones, regions and areas for its branches. The male members in a focus group recalled the vision of Abdullah Said for a model of Islamic society in Indonesia.

“He said we wanted to make a place so that when people come to visit and observe, they can tell what Islam is like, that Islam is beautiful – sounds like the title of that Trans TV program “*Islam is beautiful*” by Ustadz Maulana”

Zainuddin Musaddad, the head of *pesantren*, snapped: “*beautiful in story!*” and the rest of them laughed,

“Yes, that’s how the Muslims’ attitudes are today, they only tell about Islam, that Islam is beautiful - but only in story, No-Action-Talk-Only”

They just articulated bitter feelings they have experienced through enduring attempts to discourage Muslim organisations from politics and to stick to purely religious pursuits. Due to perceived ties with the Darul Islam rebellion, the organisation continues to be counted as a potential threat. Sidney Jones (2003), an American expert on terrorism in the ICG (International Crisis Group), and Solahudin (2013), identified Darul Islam as the origin of the Jamaah Islamiyah terrorist underground network. According to John T. Sidel (2007), in order to appreciate the broader context of Islamist activities and influence in Southeast Asia, it is essential to understand the ways in which European and American colonial rule created lasting obstacles to the promotion of Islamist politics in Southeast Asia. He argues that coverage of terrorist events in South East Asia focuses on description, rather than explanation, events, rather than causes. Furthermore, scholarship on Southeast Asian terrorism
relies too much on official sources from the security services, which could have a professional interest in exaggerating the danger. Also, several individuals in Southeast Asian security apparatuses have personal and ideological reasons for not telling the truth. Perhaps, Hidayatullah will be seen in a different light if Kahar Muzakar finally has the status conferred of a ‘national hero’ instead of a rebel, a perspective being proposed by Muhammadiyah to the Senate. While the organisation continuously received a defamatory label associated with militant Islam, it also often received prestigious official visits, such as former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President Habibie, and Megawati’s vice president Hamzah Haz. In 1984 the mother pesantren in Balikpapan received the Kalpataru prize for environmental conservation.

I found two social phenomena in the Hidayatullah community in Balikpapan that made it seem like an appropriate medium for change. One is an image of a vision of Erich Fromm’s “community of being” as opposed to “community of having” in the debates over sustainable lifestyle (de Geus, 2009:91)179 displaying a balanced configuration of Arendt’s vita-activa. The other is the fact that they have been living, indeed, in the “imagined Darul Islam” which now has been reified. Due to the fact that they are in a position of having to provide nearly everything by themselves with very limited funding, I observed everyone, men and women including the youth, always engaged in providing various kinds of public services to the community such as cleaning, gardening, taking part in the builders’ work, cutting wood for constructing, maintenance and so forth, besides managing schools and everyday needs of the students living in dormitory while not forgetting to conduct regular halaqah (learning circles) in which some of the leaders were the murabbi. A sense of connection with the rest of Hidayatullah members in different places seemed to have been well maintained by regular meetings held regionally or nationally ranging from every three months, to yearly, then to five-yearly, depending on the scope of the assembly. Under its women’s division, Mushida (Muslimah Hidayatullah), the women enjoyed equal opportunities for being active in public life as well as to get connected through the equally regular women’s meetings.

Besides being a school provider, Hidayatullah has been active in humanitarian works as well. In disaster relief activities they engage with other Muslim groups, national and international. There are two sources of funding stated by the leaders: economic activities and zakat. Baitul Maal

179 “...in a less high level consumption society the overall emphasis will not be on the outward characteristics of status and success, but on the inward aspect of human well-being. One can think of relaxation, balance, a focus on and attention for our fellow-beings (human and non-human), the enjoyment of pleasant and meaningful work, contributing to the community, but also the importance of the spiritual, just to be and exist in a dignified, relaxed and elegant way, instead of constantly being eager to accumulate possessions of whatever kind” (de Geus, 2009:91).
Hidayatullah\textsuperscript{180} is the financial institution they founded to manage their funds. Economic activities of the organisation include charitable business such as schools, and profit making business such as palm oil plantation and many small-scale entrepreneurial undertakings. In the focus group discussion with the male leaders in Balikpapan the head, Zainudin Musaddad claimed:

“People who often associated us with Wahabism and terrorism must have thought that Hidayatullah has been funded by the Saudi Arabian emir\textsuperscript{181}- no, we aren’t, we would love to have one if they are interested in our movement so that we can do more things, maybe from the publication of your thesis someone who reads will be interested to help us financially (laughter). Anyway, but we believe there must be a blessing in disguise that none of the Middle-Easterners have helped us so far - of course we received a dates-fruit parcel every Ramadhan (laughter) – otherwise, we would have been caught by those who accused us over and over that we are terrorist camps, such as Sidney Jones. I’ll tell you what, have you seen the map of Indonesia downstairs with networking lines linking all our branches across the archipelago? That one was reported by Sidney Jones as a network of terrorist cells (laughter)”

As the discussion continued, Zainuddin enumerated three challenges of Hidayatullah into the future. Here are his actual words:

“One is human resource. We can’t possibly order what types of people are eligible to our group. So we just have to accept whoever comes. That’s a real challenge. For instance, there was a person very capable in worldly matters but the quality of his Islamic capacity was low, he might be a good engineer but didn’t keep his five-times daily prayers and was not able to wake up to join our \textit{fajr} prayer congregation in the daybreak,

Two, we don’t have large funding, only very limited. We haven’t been able to make large corporations support our activities, that’s why we can’t invite great people to join and help. But this weakness can also be seen as great opportunities for our people to maximize whatever capacity they have to help the community. And usually, people who came here because of the calling in their hearts turned out to be amazing far beyond people who work for money,

Three is the external factor. There are always people who think of our movement negatively. They continually draw us into the political sphere, label us extremists, investigate us secretly under the guise of research, and so on. Well, even though we should not take those too seriously but honestly they caused psychological burdens too sometimes. So, I would admit the three are our weaknesses. Of course you can find hundreds from your own investigation (laughter). I have to claim though, that we here are happy people, truly happy. I often compare with friends and relatives who look so glamorous but on a deeper look I pitied them”

And the female group answered:

“Transforming culture is the greatest challenge for women as we are working in grass-root level with a wide range of ethnicities. Teaching about hygiene and aesthetics, for instance,

\textsuperscript{180} www.bmh.or.id
\textsuperscript{181} Prince, used in a variety of places in the Arab world.
and then about raising children and code of conduct and Islamic manner, are truly challenging”

### 8.2.2 The Pesantren-inspired Reformists

While it can be said that NU, Muhammadiyah and Hidayatullah have founded and maintained a substantial network of ‘learning communities’, it is obvious that Hidayatullah is distinct from the two giants. What singles out Hidayatullah from NU and Muhammadiyah is in its combining Traditionalist and Reformist approaches. From the Traditionalist, it adopted two features: one, the concept of murabbi as personalization of education and two, making pesantren learning institutions the centre of their social movement (“the anchor of Islamic society” – in the language of the leaders in focus group discussion). From Reformist, Hidayatullah adopted modern school approaches. So, the combination was: make the pesantren community members dwell together in a defined location as if it were “fenced” and then network them. The fact that it adopted the highly exoteric-oriented method of Islam and has less attraction to Sufism ascribes to its Reformist origin. This has continued to attract the equally warrior individuals as new members. In a notary-stipulated document about the decisions made by the Hidayatullah national convention in December 2010, the organisation claimed to follow as a model of its struggle the periodization of the advent of Quranic revelations182. The organisation believes that a struggle must necessarily be ‘kaffah’, further defined as ‘holistic and integrated’. That is, to develop a society they must begin with developing individuals, then, family, and that must be in all aspects: moral, cultural, social, economic, politic, security, and law. Obedience to Allah and the Prophet is defined as the key if the movement is to succeed. In brief, Hidayatullah aims to rebuild Islamic civilization.

Even though they, too, had to contend with growing problems in the society at large, my observation of the two communities in Balikpapan and Depok, Jakarta, suggests that the institution was remarkably well and alive. In general, the communities have greater control of their own destiny compared to the larger society of Indonesia. In that respect, it is worth presenting that in the focus group discussion with the male leaders in Jakarta, a flippant, joking answer to my question regarding what their opinion about the multi-dimensional crisis in Indonesia was: “That’s true, but that’s Indonesia, our neighbor (laughter)”. As they created their own space for self-governance they felt they did not need to concern themselves too much with the state and the dominant political-economic order that encompasses it.

182 Meccan surah revealed before Hijrah, Madinah surah after Hijrah. Hijrah is the migration of Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina. Meccan surah deals with spirituality, Medina with social issues including the laws of Islam (Shariah).
8.2.3 Cognitive Warfare

In the focus group discussion with leaders in Balikpapan, “crisis of conscience and cognitive dissonance” was resolutely agreed by everyone to be the reason why they were there.

“The more we learned in college the more we felt uneasy, everything seemed upside down, we couldn’t find any relevance to what we had studied with what we found in real life, it was bitter to realize that our years in school were totally useless. By the way, have you heard that ripping up our school and college certificates was the initiation ritual for early members of Hidayatullah like us (laughter)?”

“Please highlight that, bertentangan dengan kata hati, (dissonance) by being with the mainstream out there, was the reason for all of us to get together here”

Their statements strike a number of foci of the research. Firstly, it recalls Trainer’s (2012) critical views of “education under consumer capitalism” in which schools and universities, while teaching things that are “of no apparent relevance to students” (p.3) and “legitimise social position and inequality” (p.1), among other things:

Help to produce enthusiastic consumers, people who are keen to get ahead, succeed and get rich, who identify modernity and progress with affluence and see Western ways as the goal for the Third World, and who accept the market system and think technical wizardry will solve all problems. Just as they have passively consumed the activities, work and decisions presented by their teachers, so they passively consume the products, services and decisions presented to them by government, corporations, and professionals (Trainer, 2012:1)

Secondly, as it might have been clear this far, all conflicts between Islam and secularism in Indonesia take place primarily in the cognitive arena. This situation resonates, once again, Jovchelovitch’s (2001) ‘knowledge in context’ and Hutchin’s (1995) view of cognition, according to which culture, context and history are fundamental aspects of human cognition. In this relation, Sidel’s (2007) argument is appropriate. For him, the incorporation of Southeast Asia into the world capitalist economy under conditions of colonial rule established both the enduring subordination of Muslims to non-Muslims not only in the market, but also education:

the construction of modern colonial states in the region established the enduring patterns of subordination of Islamic traditions of learning and socialization (and thus of acquiring cultural and social capital) to those pioneered in the Christian West and reconfigured as “secular” (Sidel. 2007:11)

Subsequently,

These legacies prefigured the notably profane—indeed, at times obscene—forms of machine politics, money politics, and oligarchic rule so prevalent today throughout much of Southeast Asia. (p.11)
The leaders’ statement just evoked what Abdelwahab Elmessiri (Farouk-Alli, 2006:292) called ‘comprehensive secularism’ as the identity of Western modernity. For Elmessiri, ‘comprehensive secularism’ does not merely aim at the separation of ‘Church and state’ and some aspects of public life, but it aims at the separation of all values – religious, moral, or human – not only from the state but also from public and private life and from the world at large. A female respondent, after a long informal chat with me about the barrage of un-Islamic influences in larger society, ranging from consumerism that penetrates into Muslim families to the influence of liberal thoughts that often stirred up such emotional arguments between Muslim leaders, said:

“You seem to understand us, so you yourself must be facing lots of hardship to be without a community like us”

She provides further insight into what has been discussed in the previous chapter that the meaning of pesantren is much more than an ‘Islamic boarding school’. Even if one part of the Hidayatullah leaders’ motives to build a pesantren community was redressing political grievances, there is more to it than ideological reaction to un-Islamic economics and political dominance. The lady indicated the need of moral, cognitive and interpretive unity under an Islamic symbolic universe that has been debated by Muslims interested in the reconstruction of knowledge.

Relatedly, the pesantren Hidayatullah’s code of conduct places a rigid restriction on the use of media in order to develop cautious attitudes towards alien ideas.

“They need to be made aware of, and trained to restrain, so that later in the rest of their life they will be cautious of ideas alien to Islam”

During my visit I was given accommodation in the female block of campus-1. I was staying in the house of a lecturer, Abdul Gofar, whose wife, Yati, was in charge of managing the female student dormitory. Yati seemed to be one of the ladies in the communities from whom students seek help in their everyday life affairs. Upon my request, every night during my stay a female student accompanied me. Sometimes a number of them came for a chat in my bedroom. There I had the opportunities to be in discussion with them and hearing their honest concerns about studying at the pesantren. Obviously, the institute lacked a variety of subjects for students’ interests. The Hidayatullah campus in Balikpapan only focusses on the study of Shariah law; the one in Surabaya on Education, and in Depok, Shariah Economics. As an example, a female student from Sulawesi whose parents were Hidayatullah leaders, complained:

“Actually I’m interested in Psychology so much but we don’t have that here, so I have no choice but to study Shariah”
When I raised the issue in the Focus Group Discussion with male members, the head, Musaddad responded,

“That’s true. We haven’t yet had the ability to establish a good university with a range of subjects while we continued to be Islamic at the same time - in a sense, of truly Islamic sciences, or the sciences that are Islamic - I’m sure you know what I mean. Well, what about you joining us and we build a high quality Islamic university together?”

Hidayatullah funds its students to study in universities in the Middle East such as Medina. This way, the organisation has been connected to the world of Islam through scholarly engagement. I was interviewing Abdul Gofar, a lecturer of Shariah about whether they were studying the environmental fiqh, the Shariah on environment. Gofar answered:

“No, it’s been long forgotten. I’m pretty sure no one has been studying that knowledge in the entire Indonesia. I heard though, there are one or two scholars researching it in Yemen. I’ll find out for you if you are interested to get in touch with them. Do you mind briefing me with the most salient issues on the environmental studies so that I can start thinking about the pertinent law in Shariah?”

In the material presented above it can be seen that the Shariah approach, rather than the ‘deep green’ version, might be more appealing to the Islamists or jihadists (formerly, reformists) towards Islamic environmental discourses.

8.2.4 Globalism under a ‘Sacred Canopy’

One of the shortcomings of what ecological utopianism attempts to achieve identified in the literature is to assume an extreme degree of isolation (de Geus, 2009). Aldous Huxley, Thomas More and William Morris situate their utopias on a remote island; Murray Bookchin and B.F. Skinner in an isolated environment; and Ernest Callenbach in a completely secluded nation. For these thinkers, contact with outsiders is considered threatening, because bad influences, disruptive ideas or behaviour patterns introduced from outside could directly endanger the extremely delicate balance of their ideal societies. That particular principle of ecological utopia does not sound congruent with the global aspiration of Islam. An insight into Muslims’ position on this issue is required to envisage a global network of relocalisation by local Muslim communities.

With a symbolic universe framework the relation between Islam and Indonesians as non-Arab Muslims is explainable. The Nahdliyin adopted the concept of wasila (Bruinessen, 1994) or to draw spiritually near to the Prophet. Interviews with Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir reveal another spiritual concept. Three male leaders on separate occasions mentioned in the middle of the talks, more or less:
“We must distinguish between Muhammad as the son of Abdullah (the father of Prophet Muhammad) and Muhammad as the last Prophet. Being the son of Abdullah he is an Arab, but being the last Prophet he is transcendent.”

The same statements were made by leaders of an-Nadzir (see the next section). Thereby, it can be said, in comparison with the Arabs, the Indonesian observant Muslims have adopted and developed a more sublime meaning of Prophet Muhammad and of being Muslims, which might have not been readily the case among the Arabs, as Gardet (1961:147) said: “Even today it is still true to say that, to an Arab, Muslim means totally Arab...”. And Nasr (2001a: 133) stated:

For a simple Arab Muslim in the street, any Muslim who knows a few verses of the Quran and can perform his prayers is considered to be “an Arab”, for in his mind to be Arab and to be Muslim are the same.

In addition, almost all respondents from Hidayatullah both female and male answered confidently (one person said and others agreed), more or less, with the following statement to my question whether they wanted their children to continue in the same group as the parents:

“Islam is universal and not for any ethnicity exclusively, so we don’t mind if our children want to go anywhere and join any Muslim groups there”

This suggests Putnam’s (2000) concept of social capital, that for the Muslims living in a community, the Ummah, global Muslim community is a primary concern and their ethnic identity is subsumed within it. Putnam discusses relations between social connectedness and civic engagement with all forms of social capital. According to him, members of associations are much more likely than non-members to participate in politics, to spend time with neighbors, to express social trust and so on. However, as Zald and McCarthy (1994) argue, tension between competition and cooperation is always present in any Social Movement Industry (SMI). SMI refers to a congeries of social movement organizations that pursue common goals. From this perspective, diverse Muslim groups compose an SMI. Zald and McCarthy (1994) argue that effects from external influences such as social control will affect interactions within a SMI. Therefore, social control by the Indonesian government affects interactions between Muslim groups in Indonesia. It will be clear by the following illustration. To get an insight into relationships between Muslim groups, I inquired what the Hidayatullah members perceived about their relationships with Muhammadiyah and NU. Nearly all male leaders answered that the relationships with NU and Muhammadiyah, “on the level of ukuwwah Islamiyah (brotherhood among Muslims)”, “on the grass-root levels especially”, “have always been good and in harmony”, while on the top-national level leadership their answers suggested that it had not always been the case given the NU overt anti-politics stance (see section 6.3.1), and the liberal Islam
movement in Indonesia, which took a very critical stance against the Islamists (Ali, 2005). In this respect, Artawijaya (2012), author of the book, 'Indonesia Tanpa Liberal', contends, “Liberal NGOs in Indonesia often collaborated with the West to discredit Islam. When the UN human rights commission claimed that Indonesia is an intolerant society, they were given data by Indonesian NGOs” To conclude the interview, I asked the leaders in the Focus Group Discussion about their level of confidence in continuing their movement into the future.

“Of course we are confident to continue. What would be the reason for not being confident if you are advancing good causes and the truth? The West itself, who advocates falsehood, is so confident (laughter)”

8.2.5 The Challenges of Greening the Urbanites

Drawing from this research, I wish to contribute to a debate on the challenges of greening the urbanites. Within this conversation, several scholars have explicitly and convincingly argued that practical skills must be developed in a short time in order to deal with the on-the-ground challenges of ecological restoration and nurturing behavioural changes that are long-lasting. A minor finding that came accidentally during my stay in the Hidayatullah pesantren in Balikpapan suggests particular challenges in the tropics besides a need of skills such as environmental planning concerning the use of land and design of the environment. A visit to the pesantren in Depok strongly indicates the need of practical skills of ecological management and restoration for the murabbi educator, who disseminates knowledge through living it. It calls for further research on appropriate methods of educating sustainability for pesantren.

Yasin, 5 years old, a son of Gofar, in whose house I was staying was stung by forest bees when he was playing with the other children. As has been described earlier, the Hidayatullah campus-1 turned out to be a housing complex surrounded by a small forest replanted by them with seedlings obtained from the local government. Possibly, Yasin and his friends had done something that unintentionally caused the hive dangling in a big tree to fall out. The Borneo forest beehive was as big as a soccer ball and the bee was human thumb size. The poison could be very harmful. Even after Yasin had been treated with traditional herbal ointment and the bee stings were taken out, still I could hear Yasin crying out all night long. The female student sleeping in my bedroom told me earlier that she once found a snake in the bathroom in that bedroom and another time in the kitchen. In addition, even though mosquitoes are a prevalent problem everywhere in the tropics, I

183 JIL (Liberal Islam Network) is a loose network of intellectuals disseminating critical and liberal interpretations of Islam.
found the ones in the Hidayatullah complex in Balikpapan were a lot more prevalent than, for instance, in Surabaya where I was from. The challenge of re-ruralizing urban societies when one considers the apprehension of food crisis in Indonesia on the heel of massive urbanization, was present in the Hidayatullah community in Depok, Jakarta. They seemed to have been made a target in pilot projects by university students and the government, whereby they received seeds of food crops, chickens and fresh water fish. Unfortunately, the project did not work, “We don’t have those farming skills anymore”, said Shodiq and Suharsono. This lack of ecological skills pose another challenge that must be considered in addition to two pre-requirements namely: i) land allotment and ii) self-governance, needed for creating a green intentional community movement by Indonesian Muslim groups. Unlike environmental activists who normally have interests and skills in ecological issues already, which were the reasons why they joined the environmental movement in the first place, such interests and skills might not be readily available among the activists of Muslim groups.

‘Happiness’ is another important theme that emerged from the fieldwork. It calls for further study to be addressed to the question of how individuals can live comfortably and well within the limited ecological boundaries of the earth. In this sense, the fenced-pesantren communities make a striking contrast with respondent Sumiyati (name has been changed), a villager that I met accidentally in a friend’s home during the fieldwork. Sumiyati represents the Indonesian non-elite society at large, hence, the majority population. She said:

“People in my village are now happy to buy motorbikes from China, they are very cheap! We can afford them by installment with almost no down payment. It’s time to get rid of our bicycles now”

“I’ll tell you what. Even in my village there is Superindo now (the name of a huge supermarket chain). People can find everything they like as long as they have money (laughter) - that’s why people seek pesugihan (the sorcerer) again these days, they need their help to bring fortune”

This simple illustration, at least, suggests there are different kinds of happiness. Happiness is surely one of the most contested concepts. Different ideology promotes different measurements of happiness as shown by different levels of happiness a country like Indonesia can get from different polls. The fact that the poor are able to enjoy their condition and be happy is no doubt, pleasing. But since it is necessary to discuss happiness intellectually, it is found that Sumiyati’s happiness is the one that stimulated frantic urbanization, traffic jammed with motorbikes then, the need of more

185 Happiness index of Indonesia ranges between 76 out of 156 countries (Helliwell, 2013) to the top level of another survey in 2012 with 51% of people claiming to be “very happy”.
roads to be constructed and, therefore, more land to be converted which entails more deprivation and marginalization of the poor, and so forth. It is a vicious circle of developmentalism. As soon as the poor have the means, they will become another quick spender, and as soon as they have the opportunity of power, they could become another corrupt officer. The outright opposite was provided by people who chose deliberately to join and to live within the fenced pesantren. The insights of Arendt’s (1998) *vita-activa* and Fromm’s (1979) ‘community of being versus community of having’ are able to explain ‘happiness’ of the people who chose to live voluntarily in places such as the fenced-pesantren of Hidayatullah.

### 8.3 Community of An-Nadzir, Gowa, South Sulawesi

An-Nadzir community members settled in Kampung Mawang village, Gowa, 25 km toward south from Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi. The community was founded in 1998 in Jakarta by Kyai Syamsuri Abdul Majid who came from Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan. There were about a thousand people living there. I was particularly interested in this group because of their ecologically-sound farming practice, which supports the community. The two current leaders at the time of my visit, Daeng Rangka and Lukman Asli Bakti were among Syamsuri’s first disciples when he was spreading his teaching around Sulawesi. He attracted a large number of followers; all of whom held Syamsuri in high respect as the most learned ulama and a holy man associated with Qahhar Mudzakkar (often spelled as ‘Kahar Muzakkar’), the leader of the Darul Islam rebellion in South Sulawesi. A brief overview of Qahhar Mudzakkar is appropriate at this point. The following is summarized from Andi F. Bakti’s (2005) ‘*Collective Memories of the Qahhar’s Movement*’.

#### 8.3.1 Qahhar’s Movement

Qahhar was born in Luwu, South Sulawesi in 1920. When he was growing up his parents sent him to study at a Muhammadiyah school in Java and there he was first involved in the Indonesian Independence Struggle against the Dutch. Despite his accomplishments, he was passed over for leadership by the then President Sukarno, and other high-ranking officials. With the support of loyal followers he established his own command and proclaimed a guerilla war against the Republic in 1950. Afterward, he joined the Darul Islam movement founded by S.M. Kartosuwiryo in West Java. In 1953 he formally announced the integration of Sulawesi into this Islamic state. As the Darul Islam weakened in Java, in 1957, he declared the outright independence of Sulawesi. In 1962, he proclaimed the independent East Indonesia RPII, *Republik Persatuan Islam Indonesia* (Islamic Federated Republic of Indonesia), with a centre in Sulawesi and himself as “*khalifah*” (caliph). In 1963, acting on the advice of his foreign ministers, he decided to sever all political links with Javanese Indonesia as the only means of saving Sulawesi from Javanese domination. In 1965, the
Indonesian army in Jakarta declared it had killed Qahhar. Because no one saw the corpse, the claim had been refuted by his followers, and generated rumors suffused with both political and mystical speculations. Some believe that his death was faked and he merely disappeared for political reasons, and others believe that he ascended to Heaven temporarily, awaiting the time when it is necessary to come back, a tomanurung in the local myth, which found correspondence with the Imam Mahdi in Islam. The latter group’s belief was buttressed by a speech he purportedly made shortly before he left: “I’ll go away from you all for some time, don’t even try to look for me, because you simply can’t. But if I want to, I can easily find you” (Bakti, 2005:127). The afore-mentioned Kyai Syamsuri who came from Kalimantan and propagated ideas central to Qahhar’s presentations was then believed to be Qahhar himself, but replacing his old strategy with a new one.

Bakti argues that memories of Qahhar framed by quasi-spiritual contact shape the movement’s collective memory and are central to how the movement sustains its cohesiveness long after the alleged-death of its leader. The ideas are perpetuated and broadened through cell-based organisations and play a role in the contemporary regional movement in South Sulawesi. The “core group” includes a number of members of NGOs who are involved in a varied field of activities ranging from cooperatives, legal practice and farming, to youth training and professionals employed in Sulawesi as teachers, lecturers, lawyers, consultants and engineers. They were fully aware of the consequences of being loyalists, such as being identified, captured, detained, tortured, and killed. When Suharto’s centralized regime ended and the periphery regions sought decentralization, Qahhar became the symbol of independence from Javanese hegemony and Jakarta’s alleged role as colonizer. Slogans such as “Javanese colonialism”, “Majapahitism”, and “Javanese syncretism and communism” are heard regularly in the core group’s meetings, which according to Bakti, aim to construct memories of the ties between the original Qahhar’s movement and the contemporary situation.

Members of the movement identified themselves as having been colonized by the Javanese who are literally depicted as foreigners. Some staff of the contemporary movement said, “it’s not the Javanese that we don’t like, but their exploitative domination, their colonization and their openness to communism”, and “Some of us, including Qahhar, are married to Javanese because we love them, but we don’t like their corrupted values” (Bakti, 2005:132). The members also reject national transmigration policy that is seen as simply a means to spread Javanese domination over the outer-islands and infuse all the nation’s peoples with Javanese values. They also view the national family-planning (KB) program as a means to control the growth of non-Javanese. As for an economic policy, they believe local natural resources have been taken away from them so as to feed and enrich the Javanese. They believe that Javanese values have become strong
and predominant in the national framework, largely because of the constant support of the military and central bureaucracy, both of which are regarded as being Javanese-dominated.

**Scholars' Commentaries on Messianism**

Referring to Nasr (1994:302-3), Qahhar’s movement can be seen as an example of Messianism\(^\text{186}\). According to Nasr, Messianism has always been present in Islam and has manifested itself whenever the Islamic community has felt an immense danger to its world of value and meaning.

It was one of the appearances of a charismatic figure claiming to be the Mahdi or his representative in direct contact with God and his Agents in the Universe and representing a divine intervention in history with eschatological overtone (p.303).

Qahhar’s movement also demonstrates what Jenkins (2012) argued about disenchantment and re-enchantment in section 2.3. According to Jenkins, although modernization seems to have made the world homogenous to a certain degree, the world remains as divided by heterogeneity of culture as ever. Jenkins claims further that spirituality, among other things, is the origin of re-enchantment.

### 8.3.2 Decentralising South Sulawesi

In the midst of the decentralization that took place after Suharto’s New Order ended, the tacit ideological perpetuation of Qahhar’s movement by the core members through myth and personal recollection has taken institutionalized forms. Two of them are *Komite Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam* – Organizing Committee for the Preparation for the Application of Islamic Law (KPPSI) founded by Qahhar’s son, Abdul Aziz in 2000; and *Pusat Amanat Referendum Rakyat Sulawesi* (PARAS) – Centre for Trusteeship of the Sulawesi People’s Referendum, also founded in 2000. The main purpose of KPPSI is to promote the implementation of Islamic law, Shariah, in South Sulawesi, and the PARAS focuses on gaining popular support for a referendum, asking whether to remain within the unitary state of republican Indonesia or to work towards independence.

Many have written on KPPSI and its agenda to implement Shariah law – both from positive and negative outlooks (Feener, 2013; Nordholt, 2007; Jonsson, 2006; Hooker, 2008). Hooker puts forward a thesis that there is a Shariah that has been formulated to meet the needs of Islam in Indonesia on its own terms. He examined four regional Shariah codes including the one by KPPSI who has been attempting to pursue decentralization and getting some form of autonomy for South Sulawesi. For Hooker, the two most interesting features of the South Sulawesi draft are its

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\(^{186}\) Messianism is the belief in a messiah, a savior or redeemer. Many religions have a messiah concept including the Jewish Messiah, the Christian Christ, the Muslim Imam Mahdi, the Buddhist Maitreya, the Hindu Kalki, and the Zoroastrian Saoshyant. The concept goes hand in hand with the idea of corruption of the time and that divine intervention is needed through a specially selected and supported human. (Nasr, 2004).
correctness as a formal document and its stated intention to shift the economy and trade of the area from a secular to Sharia basis. The elucidation of the code points out that the traditional inhabitants of the province, the Bugis, Makasarese, and Mandarese, have long been known as devout Muslims. They argue that South Sulawesi merits the honor of being called the ‘Verandah of Medina’ just as Aceh is called the ‘Verandah of Mecca’. The contemporary argument for the code starts with “the failure of present law to bring peace, justice and prosperity to the region” (p.261) and that Sharia would provide a solution to these ongoing problems of mismanagement. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the elucidation sum up the positions that are important to my research:

It is essential that the government respond positively to these very strong aspirations of the community of South Sulawesi, because they are an endeavour to maintain and protect the Unitary State of the Republic Indonesia [NKRI, my note], and because these aspirations are carried out in a peaceful and constitutional manner. If the government does not respond positively, the voices of aspirations of those who wish to separate themselves will become stronger, growing like a snow ball, and eventually it will not be easy to overcome them.

The granting of Special Autonomy for the implementation of Islamic Syariah is a perfect solution because it is cohesive for the nation as well as being an endeavour to broaden the participation of the community of South Sulawesi in building a special nation in South Sulawesi (Hooker, 2008:261-262)

While wrestling with local South Sulawesi issues, KPPSI is not isolated from being connected to the Muslim world at large. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, that has been active in seeking to build relationships with all local groups, has become a key channel to joining the transnational movement. In addition, the chairman of Wahdah Islamiyah (WI), another South Sulawesi-based Muslim group that has been connected to the transnational movement through scholarly exchanges, was among the founders of KPPSI (Jurdj, 2012:8).

8.3.3 An-Nadzir: the Esoteric Community

An-Nadzir community is one of Qahhar’s movements. The community leader, Daeng Rangka, once a Muhammadiyah cadre, is an indigenous Gowan ethnic. He is known to be a descendent of Syekh Yusuf, a ruler of Gowa in the mid 17th century who struggled against the Dutch trade monopoly. Yusuf was captured and banished to Ceylon, and then to Cape Town in South Africa till the end of his life. Yusuf is regarded as the introducer of Islamic faith by the South African locals. Interestingly, besides a grave in Cape Town, there is also the grave of Syekh Yusuf in Gowa, another one on Putera Island, and one more on Maluku Island, which are treated by the locals with great esteem. They could have been memorial graves built by his students.

The largest proportion of members of an-Nadzir community came from South Sulawesi although there were also some from Sumatera, Kalimantan and Papua. The community is an
example of a small-scale rural farming community with simple community organisation. Rangka is an example of an ideal leader in the relocalisation of rural community envisaged in this thesis, aimed at rebuilding self-sufficient sustainable communities with local governance. As a teacher with expertise in organic farming in a local government-owned agriculture academy, STTP, Rangka was leading his community into integrated farming practices. They were utilizing the seemingly abandoned land of STTP. In fact, the STTP gate turned out to be the entrance to get into an-Nadzir community. To me, Rangka seemed to be a hands-on leader who managed to run the everyday small scale economic activities: tilling the 18 hectares of rice-field and orchard, goat and cattle husbandry, fish breeding in the eight hectare Mawang lake, and running a rice-mill, photocopy service, drinking water filling plant, cellular phone top-up, and a motorbike garage. Rangka is, therefore, a **murabbi**.

He was a charismatic leader. Once a visitor was accepted and welcomed by him the whole community including the non-an-Nadzir people living outside the gate were welcoming without barrier. To my surprise, Rangka, who was discussed in the internet forum as a crank Muslim, even once accused of being a “terrorist” camp leader, appeared to have maintained good relations with the villagers as well as with local government officers. While I was staying in the community, the STTP officers held their annual meeting in an-Nadzir’s hut standing on the lake of Mawang. The accommodation that Rangka arranged for me was the house of his niece, Marwah, right off the STTP gate. Marwah’s husband was Javanese. He was in the army doing military service in Java. I was treated very kindly by everyone, both inside and outside the STTP gate. When I was invited by Rangka’s wife for tea with the other women in the community, I was even welcomed to move to their house.

The term ‘Muhammad’s nation’ that I coined was exteriorized in an-Nadzir male members who aimed to mimic the Prophet’s appearance. All an-Nadzir men were bearded with shoulder-length long hair. During prayer time the men wore black robes with turbans. They often got their hair henna-dyed. Those symbols were not of little importance to them. Rangka explained:

The Prophet’s hair was long to shoulder, so why not the Muslim men’s? Men must appear as men, having beard and mustache, the Muhammad’s way is the salvation, “*laqod kana lakum fi Rasu-lullahi uswatun hasanah, liman kana yarjullaha waal yaumal-akhira wadzaka-rallaha katsira*187”. Muhammad is the image of God, he doesn’t say anything but the sayings of God, he moves not but the movements of God, so we are here attempting to be the image of Muhammad. Please note, by that we are not saying that there is no salvation outside

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187 Quran 33: 21: “There is indeed a good model for you in the Messenger of Allah (Muhammad) - for the one who has hope in Allah and the Last Day, and remembers Allah profusely.”
Muhammad’s as you know the Quran also tells us\textsuperscript{188}, but the question is where are their holy books now? Have they got them well preserved?

An-Nadzir protested against the existing government’s education system, which according to them produced nothing but corrupt individuals in the government and private sectors. Because the community was composed of relatively young people, they had not developed a through alternative education for those aged over 13 years like the ones in the Hidayatullah.

Being a Muslim myself, I found the sound of their *azan maghrib* in the sunset - a melodious call to prayer- from their small mosque was really tranquilizing. Each evening at the *maghrib* time the male members performed the prayer in *jama’ah* (congregation) followed by discussions, formally or informally. Obviously, Rangka and Lukman were highly esoteric personalities and an-Nadzir appealed to equally esoteric individuals. They sought the return of Islam to the unified systemic worldview, or unitary perspective of Islam, *Tawhid*, in which God is understood as the Ultimate Reality (*al-Haq*) - the one they felt has been partly forgotten or only literally and superficially understood by the majority of Muslims today. Rangka argues:

“If your teacher (*Mursyid*) didn’t ‘know’ Allah, leave them, they’re dead-end tunnels, its fairy tales that they’re telling you. The first step for Muslims to do is to ‘know’ Allah, once you ‘know’ Him you’ll have nothing to be afraid of except Him. Otherwise, as you see today, Muslims are such cowardly creatures. We, an-Nadzir people, know Him, and I myself have experienced the union with Him”

**Theo-centric Deep-Ecology**

On the issue of world crisis, I was surprised to know Rangka, Lukman and Epong were fully aware of the environmental conditions, and that the earth is endangered and in disequilibrium. They are internet-literate and aware of the most current world issues. According to Lukman, the name “an-Nadzir” means an admonisher,

“What we are doing here is to remind ourselves, the an-Nadzir people, as well as all Muslims, the *Ummah* outside our gate. We, who gather here, are the people who fear and are shy of Allah. You will find nothing that we are doing but the formulation of what was prescribed by the Prophet and has been corrupted as time went by, so here we are to remind of that”

He enunciated an apprehension of rampant injustice and the question of “the end of history”:

“The Prophet said that Allah will defer the Hour, the end of history, when there is a man who will resurrect justice and fill out the world with truth as much as it has been filled with injustices”

\textsuperscript{188} Expressed in several verses, like the famous Q:35:24: “There never was a community without a prophet having lived among them”.

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The man that Lukman was referring was Imam Mahdi\(^{189}\), the savior in Islamic tradition. An-Nadzir community believes that they are preparing the 313 men who would be assisting Mahdi, *the Bani Tamim*\(^{190}\). Lukman continued:

“We don’t know if we have qualified people for the Bani Tamim here, all we do is keep on trying to do good and resuscitate Islam as it was originally brought up by the Prophet”

On that, Rangka said on another occasion:

“Alli Ibn Abi Talib\(^{191}\) has prophesized that one day the Arab will be astonished to watch, when the Quran is coming back but not through the hands of the Arab, rather people who do not speak the language of it\(^{192}\)”

And Epong, his assistant, a *hafiz*\(^{193}\) and University of al-Azhar Cairo graduate, added to what Rangka said:

“That’s true, those people, the *Bani Tamim*, are not Arabs. Look at Quran Surah al-Jumuah:3”

The notions they were speculating on juxtapose ‘globalism under a sacred canopy’ already discussed (see section 7.2.4) with a kind of ‘localism under a global sacred canopy’, which has been possible only by the non-organisational structure of Islam. Further, Rangka described the metaphysical relations of *Bani Tamim* and nature. His description articulates the concept of *walayah*, with regard to humans’ guardianship of the earth discussed in section 4.2.2 about the Islamic version of deep-ecology:

“Wherever there is one of the Bani Tamim living you can tell from how nature looks so happy and alive\(^{194}\). Muslims have forgotten that humans are the *khalifah* (vicegerent) as well as the *‘abd* (servant) of Allah. What is the *khalifah* supposed to do? Three, firstly, managing the earth, and then being the leader, and then fulfilling and upholding that trust (*amanah*) through enacting the divine laws. As the Muslims forgot those tasks, and don’t understand anymore the meaning of *Laa ilaha illalLah*\(^{195}\), they became timid, as you can see everywhere.

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189 When injustice is rampant Imam al-Mahdi, as portrayed by a Hadith, is a man who abides to the Islamic Law and will uphold justice on earth.

190 They meant Bani Tamim as the assistance of Imam Mahdi.

191 Ali Ibn Abi Talib is the closet person to the Prophet.

192 The Quran is preserved in its original language, Arabic. Although translation into other languages is allowed the recitation of the Quran, such as in Muslim’s everyday prayer, is only done in its original language. It is believed to be this way to preserve the authenticity of the original text.

193 *Hafiz* is a person who has completely memorized the Quran.

194 See the Islamic version of deep-ecology in section 4.2.2.

195 ‘No God but God’. The most important creed of Islam.
Only tears have made them terrified and paralyzed, isn’t that a sign that they don’t know Allah anymore?”

As a grass-roots thinker, Rangka has enunciated the major source of cognitive dissonance among Muslims about different concepts of ‘reality’ already given in Chapter 2. The main idea of the humanism of the Renaissance in which humans are the centre of all things -thus, everything revolves around humans- is the antithesis of the concept of human in Islam. As the Muslims adopt humanism through the modern system of thought, they are placed in great inconsistency with what they believe. Festinger (1957) contends that an individual strives toward consistency within himself, the kind of consistency between what a person knows or believes and what he/she does. According to him, cognitive dissonance leads to activity oriented towards dissonance reduction just as hunger leads to activity oriented toward hunger reduction. The activity of dissonance reduction aims to achieve consonance, or active avoidance of situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance. Such a cognitive dissonance that accompanied a clash of symbolic universe can be propounded as another explanation behind the de-secularization waves in the Muslim world. I asked Rangka his opinion of the future of Indonesia. He answered with full confidence:

“Indonesia is going to be with the khilafah Islamiyah which will be coming soon”.

I asked further how that would be possible given the present nation-State structure of the country.

“(Laughter) Nothing is impossible if Allah so wills. Look, I can tell from your features that you are an Arab descendent, and your husband is not, how did that happen?”

I inquired further if he meant a revolution would need to take place for a khilafah Islamiyah to be established.

“No, no revolution, everything will be handed over just like that when the time comes. It is a matter of God’s will”

8.3.4 An-Nadzir’s Contribution to Deep VS. Social Ecology Debates

As the world becomes a more dangerous place to live there is every reason to expect such forms of Mahdiism in the Islamic world will continue. An-Nadzir also exemplifies the Islamic version of deep-ecology; theirs is neither characterized by eco-centrism nor anthopo-centrism, but a theo-centric one. Considering the ‘unpardonable sin’ of divinizing other than God (Shirk) in Islamic faith -which has been alluded to by Manzoor in section 4.2.2- the theo-centric deep ecology is the most appropriate school for the Muslims, although limited to the esoteric-inclined individuals196. Unlike

196 The term deep ecology signifies its advocates’ deeply felt spiritual connections to the earth’s living systems. The experiences are the ground of their intuitive, affective perception of the sacredness and interconnection
the eco-centric deep-ecologist, an-Nadzir is not politically and historically-naïve. Their insistence on Shariah laws has in fact made them a striking contrast to deep-ecologists in the literature, who are known as largely evading confrontation with the problems posed by huge power as well as the issues of poverty and inequality (Pepper, 1996:29). This characteristic has made the critics disparaging - that ‘deep’-green in reality is ‘shallow’ (Bradford, 1989). The An-Nadzir counterpart, KPPSI, seems to know enough realpolitik to get into the battle of pursuing Islamic laws. Furthermore, the following accounts are worth noting.

Despite the anti-Javanese sentiments that prevail in South Sulawesi, by placing God at the center of allegiance instead of nature, or human, the Qahhar’s movement in general has been saved from the risk of slipping into the ‘blut und boden of Nazism’. This, is especially significant if we consider the bloody ethnic conflict that happened in Indonesia such as the massacre of immigrant Maduras by indigenous Dayaks in Sampit, Central Kalimantan, in 2001. The ethnic cleansing was associated with long-held economic and social grievances of the Dayaks, competition over local resources and new opportunities for political mobilization along ethnic lines (Combs, 2009). Bookchin (1990) reminds us that the deep-ecology’s obsession with community and oneness with nature too could go very wrong. With only minor ideological tilt, Bookchin argues, allegiance to nature [as well as to human, or patria in tribalism and nationalism] can enable massacres such as those of the Nazis. For Indonesia in particular, this situation is reminiscent of the pitfall of ‘adat-revival’ which was often supported by international organisations for being a ‘secular complement to Islam-revival’ as already presented in section 5.6.

8.4 Murabbi and Alternative Society for Relevantizing Sustainability Education

Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir provide examples of possible models of alternative society for the Indonesian Muslims. I found the significance of murabbi (pesantren educator) and personalized knowledge in their models. Mentioned previously (See section 7.4.2), a murabbi is ‘a person who combines a life of learning with a life of virtue, and hence a perfect and an ideal person to learn from’ (Kazmi, 1999). According to this view, the necessary prerequisite for education is an encounter of a personal kind between two beings. The two beings can be two human beings, or God and a of all life. Deep ecology has been criticized for being intellectually incoherent, ignorant of socio-economic factors in environmental problems, and given to mysticism and misanthropy. Social-ecologists criticize deep ecologists’ overemphasis on cultural factors (worldview, religion, philosophy) in diagnosing the roots of, and solutions to, environmental problems, for it has minimized their understanding of the roles played by political, and economic factors inherent in global capitalism. For a more detailed account and criticism of deep ecology, see Taylor and Zimmerman (2005).

197 For further intellectual analysis, I suggest looking at the debates about relations between Heidegger’s thought; his deep ecology; his own version of National Socialism; and his involvement in Nazism (E.g. Zimmerman, 1993; Bruggemeier et al, 2005; Sluga, 1993).
human being. Thus, education is the result of a personal encounter between a teacher and student. In response to the question: Why should the truth of the knowledge matter? A *murabbi* gives the answer with his/her life. If his/her life has acquired a quality that is worth emulating, then the truth that has shaped his/her life is worth consenting to. In Islamic tradition, the person who best embodies the qualities of a *murabbi* is the Prophet Muhammad. This premise provides another explanation of the role of Sunna (tradition of the Prophet) for the Muslims that have been discussed in detail from Chapter 2 onward.

For a *murabbi* the only way to understand knowledge is to live it, and to test its validity is to see what difference it makes to his/her life as a Muslim. “What a *murabbi* then teaches is not an impersonal body of theoretical knowledge that he/she has mastered and accepted its truth based on the objective principle of verification but rather teaches knowledge that he/she has lived and having lived found it to be true or false” (p.218). Kazmi highlights that education, in this view, is about helping students to create a configuration of meaning that tells them what is and what is not important:

This structure does not only tell them what is true or false, or that stealing is wrong and one should avoid bad company. This structure gives them something more fundamental than any moral code or ethical principle. For even though a child may know right from wrong and true from false but if he/she has not learnt that it is important to always speak the truth and to do what is right, he/she may not act according to those norms. The knowledge of norms alone is not sufficient to make me act according to them; I need to be impressed that following these norms is important, that it matters to live by them. If my father demands that I should always speak the truth but hardly ever speaks the truth himself, would telling of the truth impress me? (Kazmi, 1999:217)

Personal encounter is the matrix that allows all other modes of communication to be effective. Further, seeing, watching, doing and thinking constitutes an education: “I have to observe several judgments being made in understanding football before I get the hang of them. It is seeing, watching, doing and thinking simultaneously that helps me to get the inside view of the game or, as they say, get a handle on it” (Kazmi, 1999:215). The notion of personal knowledge that is particularistic and not generalizable in the concept of *murabbi* is in correspondence with my argument that there is hardly universal rationality where there are different symbolic universes. Furthermore, for the *murabbi*, there is almost no distance between knowledge and practice, between theory and praxis, between knowing and acting. Taking those together, I put forward a proposition that a more effective sustainability education can be provided by the *murabbi*.

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As God teaches Adam (human) the names of everything (Q:2:30-9) already discussed in section 2.2.3.
8.5 Is National or Trans-national Islam better?

While Islam as a religion has always been transnational, the contemporary word ‘transnational Islam’ can mean many things. It can mean atrocious terrorist groups, or radical Islam and the two books by NU and Muhammadiyah leaders (Wahid, 2009; Rahmad, 2012) seemed to refer to it in this sense (see section 6.4). Mandaville (2009) includes Sufi brotherhoods, Islamist parties and groups, renewal/pietistic movements, charitable organisations and da’wa organizations as transnational. The primary conduits for cross-border transmission include scholarly engagement and studying abroad, labor migration, new media, and ritual obligation such as pilgrimage (Mandaville, 2009:2). Envisioning a global network of relocalisation by Muslim groups needs Muslim groups that espouse transnational relations with other groups. With these criteria, Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir by my evaluation are more attuned to the global relocalisation movement requirements. Whether Muhammadiyah and NU really do not fit with global dimension of Islam remains subject to further research. The following fieldwork findings showed a striking contrast to a loathing of particular trans-national Islamic groups outlined in the two leaders’ books. Two Nahdliyyin kyai in East Java gave positive appreciations, with answers such as:

“O yes, I know, Hizbut Tahrir and the like, they seem successful in recruiting students from one campus to another. But of course the government doesn’t like them, that’s why they were slandered and repressed”

And,

“I supported Jamaah Tabligh. The Nahdliyin needs to be resurrected with that kind of puritanical message, to keep their daily prayer, and the rich Muslims need to be reminded of their obligation to pay zakat. The rich have to be reminded that by paying his zakat does not mean he becomes a generous man, it was just his obligation. So, if you just pay the due amount of your zakat actually you are still stingy, only your duty was fulfilled”

The NU and Muhammadiyah sympathizers working as professionals outside the organisations gave resolutely positive views of ‘Global Islam’, and a Muhammadiyah senior leader in Jakarta said: “Even Muhammadiyah is no longer confined to Indonesia. We are beginning to have branches in the US, Australia, and so on... soon we’ll be global”.

I came to realize that nationalism and religious exclusivism are part of the same thing in the end. I reflected that humankind is very prone to fall into both. It is probably because humankind cannot stand too many realities. ‘Whole earth, one world family vision’ of the environmentalist can be honestly advocated only by the ones who have reached the Ultimate Self, to whom there are no more illusions of nation-states barriers and self-interests\textsuperscript{199}. He/she is the ‘universal person’ in the

\textsuperscript{199} Considering, (i) certain deep ecologists (see section 4.4.3) turned out to be racists, believing that “Third World peoples should be permitted to starve to death and that desperate Indian immigrants from Latin America
true sense of the term, and can act beyond a symbolic universe’s confines. I was personally enlightened on this particular issue during the research. I also came to see the correspondence in it with the concept of the unity of the Islamic world. Also, the reasoning behind the concept of dividing the world politics into three by the great Ulama in the past, namely: (i) dar al-Islam, the ‘abode of Islam’ or where Islam rules as a majority religion, that is where the Islamic Sacred Law or Shariah governs human life; (ii) dar al-sulh, the ‘abode of peace’ where Muslims live as the minority but where they are at peace and can practice their religion freely; and finally (iii) dar al-harb, the ‘abode of conflict or war’, where Muslims are not only in minority but where they are in a state of conflict with and struggle against the external social and political environment in order to be able to practice their religion. The Quran and the early Ulama seemed to be aware of human’s limitations aforementioned. If only the concept of dar al-Islam were applied, one can easily imagine a global Islamic environmental movement within the dar al-Islam, as a result of which the world will have to deal with far less of nation-states’ interests during world climate diplomacy, for instance. As mentioned previously (see section 1.1) the real challenge for a global environmental diplomacy is to overcome the legitimacy of an individual nation state’s interest. Respect for national sovereignty requires agreement from many governments and no government can be forced to agree or to be obligated without its consent (Speth, 2002), hence, “countries continued to defend their sovereignty against undue encroachment” (Park et al, 2008:3). Treaties would be much easier to attain within dar al-Islam.

8.6 Conclusion

My vision of a post-Carbon world is in line with Trainer’s Simpler Way. The fenced-pesantren learning communities, therefore, can be envisioned as alternative societies to transition from peak oil and climate change for Indonesian urban and rural observant Muslims. Their strengths include the availability (abundance) of: social capital, self-discipline, solidarity, faith energies, resilience-by virtue of Islamic faith in Qada and Qadar (the supremacy of God’s will), an Islamic economic and Islamic business ethos as an alternative to capitalist or socialist paradigms. While the survivalist’s motivations might not suit well the belief in Qada and Qadar, a transition movement can be presented in the Muslim context as a kind of responsibility to God following what Prophet Muhammad says, “Every one of you is a guardian, and responsible for what is in his custody” (Hadith). The fenced-pesantren models can possibly be networked into global ecological mobilization should be excluded by the border cops from the United States lest they burden “our” ecological resources” (Bookchin, 1987); and (ii) certain deep-ecologist’s connections with Nazi ideals of land and identity (Zimmerman, 1993; Bruggemeier et al, 2005; Sluga, 1993); and (iii) the UNFCC did not provide room for non-state movement such as by the Ummah (see section 4.6) which in my eyes, is another manifestation of the West’s “hidden power trips” (Zimmerman, 1989)
with the rest of the Muslim world for the concept of *Ummah* provides a substratum and infrastructure to link and interconnect Muslim groups on a global scale. Nonetheless, while they have a wide range of capabilities to overcome a number of weaknesses of the ecotopian intentional communities in the literature, in their present-day conditions, Muslims lack information about the latest socio-ecological conditions of the planet and its people, and lack pragmatic knowledge and skills to confront the problems in a carbon-constrained world. I identified that what is needed includes:

- Alternative energy and creation of an energy-descent plan
- Sustainable agriculture
- Fresh water crisis and wastewater treatment
- Rubbish treatment
- Ecological buildings
- Environmental planning
- Ecosystem restorations
- Production of consumables toward self-sufficiency within the community, e.g. processed foods (cooking oils, sauces, flours, etc), toiletries (soap, tooth paste, body lotions), drinking water (Jackson and Svensson, 2002; Bang, 2005; Dawson, 2006; Lockyer and Veteto, 2013)

Once they are able to produce socially and ecologically responsible products and services based upon Islamic economics and business ethics, the community members should seek to expand their trading activities with the other ecologically-sound Muslim communities both in Indonesia and overseas.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

“[God] Show me things as they are. You make things appear beautiful when in reality they are ugly; You make things appear ugly when in reality they are beautiful. Show us therefore each thing as it is, lest we fall into a snare and be ever errant”.

(Jalal Ad-Din Muhammad Rumi (1207-1273))

The scale of this research required an iterative process of interpretation to collect divergent information and comprehend the subtlety of meaning from events and phenomena through analysis of prolonged, complex processes of social interaction involving history, local cultures, religious doctrines and practices, languages, and actions. Being constantly guided by the overarching research problems, issues, background, agendas and pragmatic objectives to find solutions, the process of interpretation led me to move inductively from vague ideas and the seemingly unstructured pattern of data into themes. On many occasions, repeating the process of collecting new data was needed, then interpreting and focusing the data into the aspects of social settings to consider either new themes, or new insights to substantiate or disprove the previously identified themes. It is worth noting that as qualitative research, this research is highly cyclical.

A detailed and close examination has revealed the fact that Indonesia has been forced into a global economic order and developmentalism within which the participation of Muslim groups has been insignificant or even minuscule, and where Islamic values and philosophies hardly play a role at all. This fact must be taken into account in the study of ‘religion and ecology’ in answer to common questions: ‘why the non-Western religious societies do not reveal any less destructive trends and are not less industrial-attracted than the West?’ (Radcliffe, 2000:93-4), or, if lives on earth are severely endangered, “why they [religions] have been so late to participate in solutions to ecological challenges?” (Grim and Tucker, 2014: 13).

In general, the research findings confirm what was also noted by Foltz et al (2003:xxxiv) that discourses on environmental issues amongst Muslims with strong Islamic sensibility (a mark of the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ in the thesis) are characterised by a point of view that environmental degradation is merely a symptom of the broader and more alarming calamity. Their concerns are not just with this world but also the next, that human societies are not living in accordance with God’s will. Fieldwork and literature show that when they came to talk about environmental crisis, they were more immediately concerned with the issues of social justice and human relationship with God rather than about the condition of the environment ‘scientifically’. This fact, as conversations with leaders of Muslim organisations show, further reinforces the importance of the Islamic symbolic...
universe in conveying environmental messages effectively to the Muslim audiences. The thesis demonstrates the normative, cognitive and affective components of a symbolic universe. Therefore, the calls for radical shift towards sustainability will receive an enthusiastic response only if brought up by the Muslims themselves through the Muslims’ own traditional channels, and mobilised through the Muslims’ own ‘hearts and minds’. In a larger argument, I came to conclude that no aspects of Muslim problems could hope to be changed satisfactorily unless solutions are consistent with ‘Islamic tradition’.

Despite these facts, however, the potential of varied Indonesian Muslims groups in advancing environmental actions has never been studied academically in depth; the potential of an Islamic symbolic universe in mobilising global environmental actions has not been recognised adequately by the sociologists; and the potential of Muslim learning traditions in nurturing sustainability education has not been taken into account in environmental studies. This is especially surprising given the heated debates on the presumed role of Islamic education in the spread of Muslim militancy. In addition, there has been no study of relocalisation as a radical environmental movement undertaken in Indonesia, much less an ‘endogenous’ relocalisation in the Muslim world. Besides, to my awareness, there has been no non-positivist, qualitative research that examines the desirability of Eurocentric development models to the non-elite Muslim population – the very people who have been subject to development and Western Enlightenment projects. All these may suggest, on the one hand, the accounts of Islam-o-phobia, and on the other, Foucault’s discourse/power where discourse is conceptualised as the nexus of power–knowledge (Foucault, 1977) and where certain values and scientific models are taken for granted as ‘true’. Thereby, contemporary discourse in Indonesian politics and the environmental movement is dominated by the nationalist and westernist’s views, reflecting the positions of ‘the Right’ (the World Economic Forum camp - neoliberal capitalists), and ‘the Left’ (the World Social Forum camp - socialists). In contrast to those, this thesis shows that a global network of relocalisation by local Muslim communities is possible and doable and should be pursued in the face of climate change and the ‘end of oil’.

A pragmatic research paradigm, by Creswell’s (1998) definition, is the ‘primal driver’ of this thesis. Pragmatic research seeks ‘solutions’ and ‘what works’. Thereby, alongside an assumption that happiness is what every human strives for, a pragmatic paradigm liberates me in analysing the conditions of the Muslim communities being studied and their community development from two academic ‘shackles’ identified by postmodernism, namely, (i) the power of ‘truth’ that has been shaped and created by dominant discourse on modernity, progress, and development, and (ii)
‘Western hegemony of meaning’ in words such as: *savage, pre-modern, under-developed*. It needs highlighting that ‘what works’ in this thesis has been considered from both human and environmental perspectives. Eventually, a pragmatic paradigm liberates me from the ‘dualistic vision of reality’ that is manifested in binaries which structure the following texts: *good-bad, civilized-savage; modern-pre-modern; developed-underdeveloped*. A liberation from the ‘dualistic vision of reality’ is identified by Al-Attas (1978) in the ‘reconstruction of knowledge’ debates (see section 2.4.1) as a pre-requisite for ‘Islamisation of social science’ to occur. Dualistic vision of reality does not conform to the unitary perspective of Islam where all aspects of life and all degrees of cosmic manifestation are governed by a single principle and are unified by a common center, thus, there is nothing outside the power of God (Nasr, 2001b). In more esoteric terms, there is nothing outside His Being, for there cannot be two orders of reality (Nasr, 2001b).

Working toward pragmatic objectives this research and its analysis are concerned with both people as individuals, and institutions as the doers of social movements. Thus, it engages heavily with the ‘knowledge-meaning-action’ trilogy, and hence, cannot ignore the social and historical context of human thought. Therefore, while pragmatism, as aforementioned, liberated me from the ‘dualistic vision of reality’ in the philosophical sense of the term, studying the world of meaning of Indonesian Muslims and gaining an understanding of their actions necessitated me to consider ‘reality’ in the sociological sense of the term as being ‘socially-constructed’. The latter has placed this thesis in a sociology of knowledge framework where binaries that structure texts re-appear after they disappear within my pragmatic mode of thought. Thus, *Orient-Occident, Muslim-non-Muslim, Nation A-Nation B* are inevitable. They are sociological ‘realities’ that must be dealt with by the thesis even though I have adopted a unitary perspective of Islam where everything is governed by a single principle and unified by a common center. Accordingly, given that grouping and creating multiplicity are intrinsic to the sociological nature of human being, with Berger and Luckmann’s symbolic universe premise I draw a bold demarcation line between Muslims -the ‘Muhammad’s nation’ in particular- and the rest of Indonesian society. Thereby, a dualism of *‘Muhammad’s Nation’-Other Nations* emerged. With this, I aimed to work out the realistic and doable, rather than the normative and *awu-awu* solutions. In this sense, a symbolic universe signifies a center of allegiance, the objective, and the world of meaning for individuals or collectively it is such a centre to their actions. Henceforth, five major themes and a number of subthemes emerged. They are: (i) clash of symbolic universes that predominate in relations between Muslims and the state and Muslims and modernity; (ii) mistrust of the West that I argue can be ascribed to the colonial legacy; (iii) Islam as a social movement rather than merely faith (iv) different kinds of Happiness; and (v) possible models of endogenous Islamic relocalisation. Eventually, if grouping and creating
multiplicity are intrinsic to the sociological nature of human beings, the question of the extent to which the ‘whole earth-one world family’ vision of the environmentalist is possible should, therefore, be addressed to the question of how interactions between one nation and another have been made thus far.

Throughout the thesis I gave phenomenological perspectives. From my practising Muslim background I introduced spiritual experience and spiritual meaning into a symbolic universe premise in order to modify Berger and Luckmann’s model of sociology of knowledge and Berger’s sociology of religion to explain Muslims’ decisions to act voluntarily more effectively,.. From my social activist background, my awareness of political power as enablement and constraint of social change directed me towards a relocalisation paradigm with self-governance. It is worth noting that a practitioner point of view is actor-oriented. Thus, it gives emphasis to the determinative factors of the actor’s decision to act. This background serves to explain why I needed to consider both social and individual determinative factors in human thought. These are the reasons why I could never ignore the influences of human personality-characters from the insights of the Traditional Science of Man (Nasr, 1989) to explain differences of approach that contribute to duality of the Reformist-Traditionalist in the world of Islam as well as the Warrior-Sage in environmental literature on Third World issues. As for endogenous relocalisation, Hidayatullah and An-Nadzir communities appear to represent the Warrior and Sage expressions respectively. This finding suggests that both characters offer relocalisation solutions that may attract like-minded individuals.

While Berger and Luckmann (1991), who make culture, rather than struggles for economic gain and power central to social analysis, are able to explain the enduring contentions between Indonesian Muslims and secular-nationalists, and between Muslims’ thoughts and modern-Western thoughts, Foucault (1972, 1980) and symbolic interactionist’s emphasis on process are helpful to explain the modernist Muslims in particular. As it has been clear, modernist Muslims have been at the forefront of modernising Islam, and hence, are subject to Western hegemony and Foucauldian power-knowledge relationships. Herein, everything that may appear as counterintuitive throughout the whole thesis, is explained. Foucault uses the power-knowledge term to signify that power is constituted through an accepted form of knowledge, scientific understanding, and truth (1998). He argues that through the education system, the media, and the flux of political and economic ideologies, ‘general politics’ and a ‘regime of truth’ are constantly reinforced and redefined. In this sense, the ‘battle of truth’ is the battle of ‘the rules according to which the true and false are separated and specific effects of power are attached to the true’. Also, a ‘battle of truth’ is a battle
concerning ‘the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays’ (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1991:175).

As for the modernist Muslim, once he/she steps outside the boundary of an Islamic symbolic universe into the modern system of thought, he/she has to struggle with the forces of the modern-Western symbolic universe. Therefore, he/she either finds the need to stand as corrective of the Muslims themselves (tends to criticize and is often unable to accept the ground realities of Muslims nor to appreciate their good merits), or is pulled completely by the gravity of the modern-Western symbolic universe alongside progressive Indonesians. The case of Tibi’s emphatic and wholehearted endorsement of modernity as described in Farouk-Alli (2006:288-9) is a categorical example. The situation has made the modernists unable to delegitimise modernity in order to open up a new intellectual space. As a consequence, instead of engaging in dialogues with the world outside Islam, Indonesian liberals such as JIL, for instance, have spent most of their energies in endless squabbles with conservative majority Muslims (see Republika, 2013; Indonesia Tanpa JIL, 2013). To reiterate (see section 8.2.5), JIL is a loose network of intellectuals disseminating critical and liberal interpretations of Islam. The network was developed in the early 2000s by young modernised-progressive scholars with modernist and traditionalist backgrounds who received scholarships to pursue degrees in Western universities. JIL has become emblematic to many conservatives of what is believed to be attempts by the West to undermine Islam through an outspoken advocacy of SEPILIS (stands for SECULARISM, in a sense of restricting Islam within the limits of individual-God relations; PLURALISM, or denying religious truth, hence, relativism; and LIBERALISM, in a sense of judging religion by the use of freedom of thinking and relegating revelations). In 2004, the NU decided to clear their organisations from JIL influences (NU, 2004; JIL, 2004) and in 2005, the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) declared SEPILIS as haram (unlawful) (See Voragen, 2007). The JIL protagonists contend with the question of how to achieve civility and inclusive citizenship in deeply plural societies in which this nowadays becomes a universal issue (see Hefner, 2001:4). Elsewhere, more recently, Umar (2014) analyses the political and discursive construction of such ‘moderate Islam’ discourse in contemporary Indonesia in its relation with Indonesia’s Foreign Policy and the US-led Global War on Terrorism that made Southeast Asia the ‘second front’ of the war. Based on Rabasa et al (2007) and Mamdani (2001), Umar contextualises JIL within the US political project that has divided the world into “Good Muslims” and “Bad Muslims”. He argues, “The US government had been involved in building a moderate Muslim network through building a civil society network, giving some grants through donor organisations, and Public Diplomacy (Rabasa et al, 2007)” (Umar, 2014:20). Thus, Umar argues that JIL is an example in Indonesia in which “US government did not directly assist the network, however; there were many donor organisations involved in
disseminating a moderate Islamic platform to Indonesia’s civil society institutions” (Umar, 2014:21). This situation evokes, once again, Foucault who sees power as “diffused rather than concentrated, embodied and enacted rather than possessed, discursive rather than purely coercive, and constitutes agents rather than being deployed by them” (Gaventa, 2003:1).

The traditionalist kyais and their disciples, on the other hand, have survived the challenge of modernity not by confronting it but by remaining within the Islamic symbolic universe. That makes them relatively more relaxed than the Modernist or Reformist in facing the world. They are also the place to return to for urban Muslims seeking ‘sound knowledge’ of Islam and to re-enchant the world. This also evokes Alatas’s (1995:90-1) critique of the ‘captive mind’ and the claim of universality of sciences made by practitioners of social sciences by ignoring “the differences in inter-subjective meanings between Western and non-Western settings and persists in using Western categories, even in cases where they may not be relevant”. From the outline of the development of Indonesia, there is empirical evidence that the traditionalists enjoy sufficient intellectual freedom to survive the challenges of modernity to this day and into the future, with limited government support. Further, in consideration of what constitutes well-being, physical, mental, social and spiritual, the traditionalists possess, probably, less of the first, but obviously are affluent in the last three. While they might have less wealth, the case study communities have ample convivial company; time and opportunity for praying and contemplation; opportunity to fulfill social obligations; intellectual stimulus (certainly, from an Islamic symbolic universe) to reflect on history and mythology and speculate on metaphysics; to compose poetry and rhetoric.

On the other hand, because of the same reasons, the traditionalists, even those who are interested in politics, largely do not appear to be keen to challenge radically the established capitalist order, which the state is viewed as a supporter of, as is the case of, for example, Hizbut Tahrir (a characteristically Warrior group see section 4.2.1). Here is the potential pitfall for the traditionalists as the case of the NU has shown. In the name of peace, understood as the absence of conflicts, the traditionalist might be used to make people accept the stability provided by ‘unjust rule’, and in the name of social responsibility they can possibly be manipulated to use religion in defense of nationalism. Therefore, unless called for by Islamic tradition (the Quran, Sunna, practices and exegesis of the righteous predecessors (salaf as-salih)), they are not likely to make radical changes needed in the transition that climate change and peak oil require, whereas the modernists and reformists like Muhammadiyah, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, KPPSI, PKS, Hidayatullah, DDI and others are more prepared for radical changes once made aware of the problems from the channel of modern rational thinking. The latter also have potential to support the endorsement of Shariah law,
even pursuing the ‘night watchman state’ or a ‘minimal State’ (Nozick, 2013) -that I believe- would serve best the conditions of a post-oil world, for it gives a chance for equality of resource distribution, and a life of creativity that liberates people to freely choose their own social arrangements.

Lastly, the fenced pesantren communities such as Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir, provide more straightforward examples of Foucault’s argument that to challenge power is not a matter of seeking some ‘absolute truth’ but ‘of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates’ (Foucault, in Rabinow, 1991:75). Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir’s creative interpretations of khilafah and walayah are what Manzoor (1988) hoped to happen before Shariah is implementable under the modern day conditions of Muslim society. Hidayatullah has explicitly interpreted the governance of their intentional fenced-pesantren community as a khilafah on a small scale, a community scale, where they can implement Islamic laws, values, ethics, norms and ethos holistically (kaffah). While An-Nadzir did not state explicitly as Hidayatullah, from their own description of their community’s agenda, I came to view this esoteric community as an expression of the esoteric concept of guardianship (walayah). The two can be taken as exemplary pragmatic actions drawn upon calculation of the most possible and doable endeavors they can take within the constraints of a nation-state, to implement what they believe.

Unfortunately, the very word, ‘pragmatic’ nowadays is a derogatory term used to discourage Muslims from any attempts to put the Shariah law into practice (Doran, 2002). This point of view might be associated with what has been largely considered as the dark effects of modernization. Philosopher Charles Taylor included ‘instrumental reason’ as one of three malaises of modernity besides individualism and loss of freedom. For Taylor, instrumental reason is “a kind of rationality that we draw on when we calculate the most economical application of means to a given end. In this scheme of things maximum efficiency and the best cost–output ratio is the measure of success” (Farouk-Alli, 2006:294). Thus, ‘instrumental reason’ can be easily attributed to Muslim’s pragmatism, and often used to imply an association with terrorism. This research, conversely, demonstrates that pragmatism can be harnessed positively to create endogenous self-help solutions for Muslims’ problems. Thereby, a network of endogenous relocalisation by local Muslim communities is envisioned as possible and doable in this thesis. It will be a network of diverse green intentional communities, where Muslims from diverse interpretations of Islam can implement what they ‘believe’, and where their young people can exercise their visions of Islamic societies. I believe it is the only way ahead for the existing groups to adopt. This scheme serves as reinterpretation of khilafah to map out a path from the present impasse. It also serves to anticipate undesirable future
possibilities in the face of peak oil, climate change and scarcity - reminiscent of the act of digging a
trench that Prophet Muhammad gave as an example of preparedness to minimise casualties in
anticipating the Battle of Khandaq (see Sardar, 2006). In such a constellation, each community will
strive for its own betterment in a circumstance that the Muslims understand as ‘fastabiqul khairat’ –
race in good deeds (Quran 2:148).

While the thesis highlights the strength and fortitude of the poor in the face of misery in
their life, it has been spelled out that the thesis neither advocates for the spiritual sentimentality of
the New Age in foregrounding happiness, nor the communist’s principle of equality. Rather, it aims
to promote the implementation of Shariah law as the effective path for committed Muslims to
justice, happiness and well-being. In this respect, it is appropriate to mention Llewellyn in Foltz
(2003) who writes in detail about Shariah environmental law including: its legal and ethical
philosophy; source and methods of jurisprudence; its ultimate objectives (maqasid); its principles for
weighing benefits and detriments; its laws of property; its allocation and accountability in the use of
renewable and nonrenewable resources; environmental planning which includes its legal instrument
for protected areas (harim) and inviolate zones (hima), and other legal instruments such as waqf
(charitable foundations and endowments); iqta (grants of unowned lands); ijara (lease of state-
owned lands); and ikhtikar (designation of lands for special purposes).

Obviously, the environmental Shariah has lagged far behind in contributing solutions to the
Muslim world problems today, for virtually all legislation in Muslim countries is borrowed from the
industrialised West (Llewelyn, 2003). The office of Muhtasib, jurists, who had to be thoroughly
familiar with the rulings of Islamic law with jurisdiction over many of the responsibilities of
environmental protection and conservation, has long disappeared (Llewellyn, 2003:221). It is also
the responsibility of the Muhtasib to draw up Sharia based policies (Al-Siyasat al-Sharia) that are
fundamental to environmental policy and legislation such as, in the present-day context: population
control, development and lifestyle, animal rights, or international cooperation and conflicts
(Llewelyn, 2003:222). Llewelyn’s description of environmental Shariah supports my critique of the
religious environmental movement in Indonesia as outlined in section 4.6: “How would the Muslim
organisations be effective in propagating Islamic ecological values if they have no jurisdictions?” This
argument substantiates the self-governance feature of relocalisation models that I put forward in
the thesis. Further, my position, in fact, echoes Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328 CE) who declared that
government is one of the most important requirements of Islam, for the fundamental obligation to
command the right and forbid the wrong cannot be discharged without power and authority
(Rosenthal, 1958) (See ‘amar ma’ruf and nahi munkar’ in Chapter 6). Therefore, if only the existing
Muslim groups can act as pressure groups to appropriate land and resource distribution from the government for Muslim communities, they will have opportunities to implement, not only Shariah economics but also Shariah environmental law.

Llewelyn is also aware of a common disparagement of the very word Shariah law in the context of Western civilisation (2003:186), as it conjures unreasonable restrictions and harsh punishments. Furthermore, the greatest challenge to establishing Shariah environmental law in a contemporary Muslim world, according to Llewelyn, is the wide gap that separates the environmentalists and scientists from Islamic law. According to him, “the origin of this gap is the progressive marginalisation of the fuqaha that has taken place throughout the Muslim world over the past century or so” (Llewelyn, 2003:236). Interestingly, Llewellyn echoes precisely the statements of respondent Kyai Munhanif from pesantren An-Nur Fatmah, and evokes what respondent Abdul Gofar from Hidayatullah Balikpapan said about that matter. Llewellyn argues that the gap between the Islamic Shariah environmental law and the environmentalists must be bridged through the creation of a network of people concerned about environmental law in Islam, including fuqaha and ulama as well as environmental activists, lawyers, economists, social scientists, educators and others (p.236-240). They should initiate the compilation of sources and references to environmental laws. He highlights the flexibility of Shariah to different places and times. For that, training materials on environmental issues should be designed for fuqaha and ulama. Only then can ijtihad occur (both Sardar and myself assert the need to reopen the gate of ijtihad). According to Llewelyn (2003), ijtihad cannot occur through hypothetical discussion; it requires real problems for which solutions are proposed, tested, and as they succeed or fail, progressively refined (p.238). His proposition, in fact, corresponds closely with what I envision to occur on a global world-level if it is organised by the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as chairman of the NU, Kyai Said Aqil Siradj, suggested (see 5.7).

Cognitive transformation must begin with the present conditions. The outcome of rational reform imbued with a developmentalism paradigm brought about by the state and modernist Muslims such as are teaching in Muhammadiyah’s schools, contributed to the weakening of the ‘reflexive heart’s’ ability to think about the self in interconnection with the surrounding world, and to recognise the animate qualities of the earth. For that reason, to the already modernised Muslims, Shariah approaches are more conceivable than metaphysical approaches. On the other hand, while the traditionalist pesantren might not be as suitable for modern-day life-skills requirements, their education system possesses features to nurture intuitive ‘sustainability-literacy’. Moreover, by not denying different orders of reality, and not excluding all other possibilities of knowing, their
education system prepares the students to be aware of the sacred and metaphysical foundations of knowledge, hence, to have potential to contribute to Muslim’s reconstruction of knowledge project(s). Ultimately, reconstruction should be able to create intellectual space for pious Muslims to view the world in correspondence with their beliefs, where they can:

1) Learn that humans are not independent and separated individuals
2) Look at the phenomena of nature as the portents or signs (ayat) of God
3) View divine law as different from convenient agreement between humans
4) Look at the Universe not as a single level of reality – the spatio-temporal complex of matter and energy - but as having higher levels of reality
5) Look at humans as theomorphic beings
6) Understand that knowledge extends in hierarchy from an empirical and rational mode of knowing to the highest form of knowledge, which is, al-`ma’rifah (unitive knowledge)
7) Study philosophy that is wedded to spiritual experiences, not a philosophy that is synonymous with logic, nor a mental play or discipline that does not transform one’s being spiritually, which - from an Islamic point of view - is meaningless and ‘dangerous’

However, the research shows that the grass-root thinkers such as traditionalist kyai, the Hidayatullah and an-Nadzir’s leaders did not seem to have contributed to the debates on reconstruction of knowledge so far. They are, nonetheless, more prepared to take the tasks of murabbi to ‘relevantise’ sustainability education for the Muslim society at large. For that, they themselves need sustainability education initially. Besides the information technique of education to bring about cognizance of the complex socio-ecological crisis at hand, they themselves need personal encounters with teachers to obtain the inside view of the relocalisation ‘game’. They need to observe how the undertakings have been done and how judgments around sustainability are being made by the actors. For that purpose, they need to visit and do participatory observations in green-intentional communities already established in the Western world; for example, such as GEN and Findhorn’s ecovillages, and the many grass-root relocalisations initiatives that I found in New Zealand such as Lincoln Envirotown Trust, St Albans Transition Town, Lyttelton sustainable community, Nelson Transition, Dunedin Transition, Biological Husbandry Unit of Lincoln University, Succession Training by John King and Telford Organic Training, and so forth.

These green alternative communities are not available in Indonesia. Beforehand, preparatory classes on relocalisation would be necessary in Indonesia for the participants. Considering the JIL cases previously mentioned, two significant issues emerge. The countries where the education funding is from is going to be a matter of careful consideration by the Muslim audiences or recipients of the programme, and the institution that organises the funding in Indonesia must necessarily have no linkages with SEPILIS movements. Nowadays, with many pesantren running English language teaching intensively, their youths and young adults will be ready to participate in an overseas programme for relocalisation. As they are seeing, watching, doing, and thinking about relocalisation
they will become familiar with it. Only then, will they be able to translate the notion of sustainability into the Muslims’ own worldview and disseminate the ideals of relocalisation in Muslims’ own ‘faith-language’ and sensibility. Thereby, a sweeping relocalisation movement within the Indonesian Muslim societies toward less-unsustainable ways of living can be envisaged. Given the envisaged programme is purely pragmatic and far from advocating SEPILOS as the thesis stated explicitly, no chance of resistance can be expected from the traditionalist and revivalist (or Islamist) group’s leaders to the new ideas that the participants will bring home. Once the traditionalist leaders including the kyais in Bahtsul Masail of the NU (discussion group on the fuqaha) are made aware of the magnitude and enormity of the problems on a global scale, they will be called to implement Islam. By implementing Islam as a ‘religion of law’ in its true place, the organization will perform much more impactful services to society than they have been doing so far when they merely ameliorate the victims of environmental disasters.

Considering the independent roles of the kyais that almost no central leadership of the NU or the government can control (besides, note unlike Muhammadiyah, NU is merely an association of kyai), no serious challenge of resistance to the programme should be expected even in view of the NU’s avoidance of conflict with the government. For the NU constituents and traditionalists in general, the kyais are the real ‘full-time personnel of symbolic universe maintenance’ for the followers. Therefore, mobilization that revolves around the Islamic symbolic universe which the kyais are maintaining is bound to be effective. The revivalists (or reformists, or Islamists), who have a tendency to get into politics and being more Sharia-minded, are apt to grasp an understanding of the crisis through interactional processes they have with the West (see discussion in section 6.3.5). Participatory observations in green intentional communities and grass-root initiatives in the Western world will create concrete and convincing evidences of the growing concern about peak oil and climate change as ‘seeing is believing’. By the same token, a genuine peace making between Islam and the West can be imagined, given that ‘the most important experience of others takes place in the face-to-face situation’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1991:43). Berger and Luckmann’s process of the social construction of what people in collectivity conceive as ‘reality’, and hence, of knowledge that guides their conduct, is able to explain the development of Islam-o-phobia in the West. Under this light, it is worth noting that in the history of the West, Islam was the only ‘other’ known (unlike the history of the Orient), and in Greco-Roman civilisation, people other than themselves are ‘barbarian’ (Nasr, 2001a). By a similar process, the thesis shows that the ‘sins’ of colonialism and the West’s continuing domination of the Muslim world have stigmatised all Westerners as being

200 The very word ‘barbarian’ means simply people other than themselves.
‘immoral’ in the eyes of Muslims in general. The same process also devastated Muslim-Christians relations. If this long-held and institutionalised hatred between the West and Islam and vice-versa is ever to be overcome, I believe that it can be done only by relocalisationists for they are the ones who, as never in history, are aware of the vast interconnected network of earth ecology and thus, realise the need to cooperate with one another in the face of looming scarcity and the threat of calamity.

Finally, I found the interpretive theoretical framework with a constructivist-interpretivist approach was effective in accessing the world of meaning of the people being studied. It provided me with a much deeper understanding of the complex reality of the Indonesian Muslim relations with the state, the West, and modernity. A difficulty in undertaking inquiry within the limited time of a PhD process was felt when a number of new potentials emerged as the research was carried out, for example, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in Chapter 6, and KPPSI in Chapter 8. Similarly, the emergent insight regarding transnational Muslim groups in Chapter 8 would benefit from future research into these findings regarding their potential in the advancement of relocaliation. Given that more than half of the world population lives in urban areas now, further research should focus on the everyday lives of urban Muslim communities, interviewing and observing members as well. Finally, it is worth noting, despite the potential of the Muslim groups in mobilising the Ummah, the thesis demonstrates that Islamic belief has the potential of supporting a fatalistic view of the problems if they are perceived as insurmountable by Muslims. In that situation, the Muslim people can carelessly do nothing, enjoy life, and fall into a situation that Emha’s remark captures best: wis ayo nek bongko, bongko bareng! (let’s go to hell together, then).

*******
**Appendix-1: Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abd</td>
<td>(Arabic) slave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd Allah</td>
<td>Slave of Allah. The Islamic concept of human.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat</td>
<td>an Indonesian word of Arabic origin, meaning the customary law of local ethnic groups, usually but not always distinct from Islamic law. The Dutch made <em>adat law</em> part of Dutch East Indies law, in part as a strategy to isolate and control Islam, and it still has legal standing in Indonesia today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agama</td>
<td>(Ind) religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahl</td>
<td>(Arabic) people, or, family, or, community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahlu-sunnah wal-jama’ah</td>
<td>People of the sunnah of the Prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aisyiyah</td>
<td>The female wing of Muhammadiyah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akhlaq</td>
<td>(Arabic) Ethics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Haq</td>
<td>(Arabic) the Reality, the Ultimate Reality, the Truth, the Absolute. One of the names of God in the Quran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awu-awu</td>
<td>Eastern Javanese slang, means, bullshit, nonsense talk in attempt to please or deceive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayat, ayah</td>
<td>(Arabic) signs, indicators, evidences (of God). In the context of the Quran, ayah is used to mean “verse”, each statement or paragraph marked by a number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayat al-takwini</td>
<td>Ontological signs or ontological Quran, signs in creation. Also known as cosmic Quran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayat al-tadwini</td>
<td>Written signs, or written or composed Quran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayat kawniah</td>
<td>(Ind) ayat al-takwini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayat dauniah</td>
<td>(Ind) for ayat al-tadwini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azas Tunggal</td>
<td>(Ind) Sole basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azas Tunggal Pancasila</td>
<td>The obligation for associations to declare that Pancasila is their only basic principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana</td>
<td>National Board for Disaster Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahasa Indonesia</td>
<td>the Indonesian national language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahtsul Masail</td>
<td>Discussion forum of the <em>fuqaha</em> (experts in Islamic law). From two Arabic words, <em>bahtsu</em>, deliberation, and <em>masail</em>, issue.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bismillah (Arabic) in the name of God (an invocation used by Muslims at the beginning of an undertaking)

BNPB Badan Nasional Pnanggulangan Bencana (National Board for Disaster Management)

Budaya (Ind) Culture

Budi Utomo an early, quasi-nationalist association established in 1908 to encourage awareness of Javanese culture, soon overshadowed by less genteel nationalist organizations

Constructivist is the recognition that reality is a product of human intelligence interacting with experience in the real world. It is recognition of inclusion of human mental activity in the process of knowing reality. As it accepts reality as a construct of human mind, it therefore perceives reality as subjective.

The main distinction between constructivism and positivism relates to the fact that while positivism argues that knowledge is generated in a scientific method, constructivism maintains that knowledge is constructed by scientists and it opposes the idea that there is a single methodology to generate knowledge.

Constructivist research (1) positions researchers within the context; (2) collects participant-generated meanings; (3) focuses on a single concept or phenomenon; (4) brings personal values into the study; (5) studies the context or setting of participants; (6) validates the accuracy of findings; (7) interprets the data; (8) creates an agenda for change or reform; (9) involves researcher in collaborating with participants

Darul Islam (1948-1962) an Islamic insurgency centered in West Java with chapters in Sulawesi, Aceh and elsewhere

Daurah (Arabic) intellectual training and Islamic workshop

Da’wah (Arabic) the preaching of Islam

DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Mission Council) Founded by former Masyumi leaders after Suharto shut them out of politics, to disseminate Islamic teachings and proselytize among non-observant Muslims

Deep Ecology a school of ecological philosophy. The distinguishing and original characteristics of this school were its recognition of the inherent worth of all living beings regardless of their instrumental utility to human needs, and the use of this view in shaping environmental policies. The word ‘deep’ in part referred to the level of questioning of human’s purposes and values when arguing in environmental conflicts. Deep ecology involves deep questioning right down to fundamental root causes. This school arose from the
contemporary planetary crisis and human dilemma which have prompted people to question the validity of the conception of nature held in modern science. Deep ecology also has given rise to the proliferation of earth and nature-based spirituality (Taylor, B. 2001). The term deep ecology was introduced by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess in 1972 in Bucharest at the Third World Future Research Conference. Unfortunately, due in part to its eco-centrism, some vociferous environmentalists who claim to support the movement have said and written things that are misanthropic in tone, and made this school appear to some as anti-human

Dhikr (Arabic) remembrance, invoking the divine names of God

Dinul Islam (Ind) Indonesian word of Arabic *al-din al-Islam*, religion of Islam

Dzikir See Dhikr

Eco pesantren an Indonesian government program, launched in 2009, that aimed at transforming existing pesantrens into environmental friendly institutions

Ecosocialism a vision of a transformed society in harmony with nature, and the development of practices that can attain it. It is directed toward alternatives to all socially and ecologically destructive systems, such as patriarchy, racism, homophobia and the fossil-fuel based economy. It is based on a perspective that regards other species and natural ecosystems as valuable in themselves and as partners in a common destiny. Ecosocialism shares with traditional socialism a passion for justice. It shares the conviction that capitalism has been a deadly detour for humanity. Capitalism is understood as a class society based on infinite expansion, through the exploitation of labor and the ransacking of nature

Ecotopia an ecologically ideal region or form of society, generally viewed as imaginary

Environmental justice the movement’s response to environmental racism. Environmental racism is the disproportionate impact of environmental hazards on people of color. The environmental justice movement is not seeking to simply redistribute environmental harms, but to abolish them.

Environmental racism See environmental justice

ESC Education for Sustainable Consumption, United Nations Environment Programme

Fana (Arabic) annihilation

Fatah formerly the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. It is a secular Palestinian political party and the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

Fatayat association of NU girls and young women
Fatwa (Arabic) Religious legal opinion
FGD Focus Group Discussion
Fiqh (Arabic) Islamic jurisprudence
Fitrah (Arabic) original nature
Fitnah (Arabic) the spread of falsehood that causes a rift between Muslims
Fuqaha (Arabic) plural of faqih, an expert in Islamic law
Ghaflah (Arabic) forgetfulness, oblivion
Ghibah (Arabic) Gossip
Guided Democracy Period between 1959 and 1965 in Indonesia (during Sukarno’s regime)
Hadith (Arabic) tradition about the word and deed of Prophet Muhammad
Hafiz (Arabic) someone who has completely memorized the Quran
Hajj an annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, and a mandatory religious duty for Muslims that must be carried out at least once in their lifetime by all adult Muslims who are physically and financially capable of undertaking the journey, and can support their family during their absence
Halal (Arabic) lawful
Halqah (Arabic) study circle
Hamas is an acronym of Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah Islamic Resistance Movement) is a Palestinian Sunni-Islamic fundamentalist organization. It has a social service wing, Dawah, and a military wing
Harakat al-jawhari (Arabic) substantial motion, trans-substantial motion
Haram (Arabic) forbidden, illicit, not lawful
Hermeneutics art or science of understanding. Hermeneutical means the process of bringing to understanding
Hizbut Tahrir (Party of Liberation) an international organization founded in Jerusalem in 1953, with a branch in Indonesia since 1983 (see HTI), advocating a pan-Islamic agenda and restoration of the Caliphate, endorses resort to violence by others but is non-violent itself
HTI Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
Hudhuri (Arabic) direct, by presence, without intermediary
Husuli (Arabic) acquired, by thought, conceptual
**IAIN**
Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Islamic Institute), part of the state Islamic university system

**Ibadah**
(Arabic) worship, ritual observance

**Ijmali**
name of a group of Muslim intellectuals interested in reconstruction of knowledge, based in the United Kingdom but also operating in the United States, Europe, and Malaysia, with Ziaudin Sardar as one of the founders

**Ijtihad**
Independent judgment based on Islamic scripture, used to reinterpret Islamic law in the light of contemporary circumstances

**Ikhwan al-Muslimin**
Muslim Brotherhood

**‘ilm al-hudhuri**
(Arabic) direct knowledge, knowledge by presence, intuitive knowledge

**‘ilm al-husuli**
(Arabic) conceptual knowledge

**Imam**
Muslim religious leader

**Imam Mahdi**
In Islam, the rightly guided one, a messianic figure who will appear to restore correct religion

**IMF**
International Monetary Fund, an international organization that was initiated in the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944

**Inclusive democracy**
a form of social organisation which re-integrates society with economy, polity and nature. This is the project for direct political democracy, economic democracy (beyond the confines of the market economy and state planning), as well as democracy in the social realm and ecological democracy.

**Infaq**
(Arabic) Voluntary gift, charity

**Interpretivist**
Interpretivism, also known as interpretivist, involves researchers who interpret elements of the study, thus interpretivism integrates human interest into a study. Accordingly, “interpretive researchers assume that access to reality (given or socially constructed) is only through social constructions such as language, consciousness, shared meanings, and instruments” (Myers, 2013:39). Development of interpretivist philosophy is based on the critique of positivism in social sciences. Interpretivism is “associated with the philosophical position of idealism, and is used to group together diverse approaches, including social constructionism, phenomenology and hermeneutics; approaches that reject the objectivist view that meaning resides within the world independently of consciousness” (Collins, 2010, p.38). Moreover, interpretivism studies usually focus on meaning and may employ multiple methods in order to reflect different aspects of the issue.

In general, an interpretivist approach is based on 1. Relativist ontology, in which reality is perceived intersubjectively based on meanings and understandings on social and experiential levels; and 2. Transactional or subjectivist epistemology, in which approach people cannot be separated
from their knowledge, therefore there is a clear link between the researcher and research subject.

The contrasts between interpretivism and positivism approaches can be summarised as follows:

Interpretivism assumes the nature of reality as multiple and socially constructed; rather than single, tangible and objective

Interpretivism assumes the goal of a research is understanding, with weak prediction; rather than explanation, with strong prediction

Interpretivism assumes the focus of interest is what specific, unique and deviant; rather than what is general, average and representative

Interpretivism assumes that the knowledge generated is meanings-relative (time, context, culture, value, bound); rather than laws-absolute (time, context and value-free)

Interpretivism assumes the Subject-Researcher relationship as interactive, cooperative, participative; rather than rigid separation

Interpretivism assumes the desired information is what some people think and do, what kind of problems they are confronted with, and how they deal with them; rather than how many people think and do a specific thing, or have a specific problem

**Insan**  
(Arabic) human

**Insan Kamil**  
(Arabic) “the perfect man”

**‘Irfan**  
(Arabic) mysticism, esotericism

**Jakarta Charter**  
Alternative to Pancasila from which it differs by its mentioning of the obligation of Muslims to follow Islamic law

**Jama’ah**  
(Arabic) Community

**Jama’a Tabligh**  
See Tablighi Jumaat

**Jama’i**  
(Arabic) collective

**Jihad**  
(Arabic) holy struggle

**JIL**  
Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network)

**Kaffah**  
(Arabic) holistic

**Kampung**  
(Javanese) neighborhood

**Khalifat Allah**  
(Arabic) vicegerent of God

**Khilafah**  
(Arabic) caliphate, the first system of governance established in Islam. It is believed to be the perfect way of ruling the Islamic Ummah. It is worth noting that khilafah was not intended to be a religious authority, as Islam emphasizes the direct link between man and God (*ittisal*)
KPPSI  Komite Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam (Organizing Committee for the Preparation for the Application of Islamic Law) founded in 2000

Kyai, kiai  (Javanese) term for a cleric or scholar (Ulama), including the head of a pesantren

Kitab kuning  Literally, “yellow books”, a defined corpus of scripture and commentary chanted and studied in Traditionalist pesantren. The name derives from the fact that the old books were often printed on yellow-tinted paper

Limits to growth  refers to a debate that, given economic and population growth rise exponentially whereas resource supplies are finite, the growth directly causes environmental decline and could not be sustained forever

MACCA  the Muslim Associations for Climate Change Action

Mad(h)hab  (Arabic) School (of thought) of Islamic jurisprudence

Madrasah  Islamic day school

Majapahit  The last great Hindu-Buddhist state in Indonesia, 13th to 16th centuries, based in East Java but with vague territorial claims extending elsewhere in the archipelago, including the areas now part of Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, the Philippines

Majelis taklim  Islamic study group

Manaqib  (Arabic) Narrative in praise of important religious figures, celebrating their lives, merits and miracles

Masyumi  Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Consultative Council) Japanese-sponsored Islamic umbrella organization created in 1943. It became a political party after independence and was banned by Sukarno in 1960

Madina, or, Medina, society and constitution  a reference to the system of government said to have been established by the Prophet Muhammad after his flight to Medina. The “charter” has been cited as proving that Islam is compatible with pluralism

Ma’rifah, Ma’rifat-Allah  (Arabic) Unitive knowledge, union with God

(neo) Marxist ecologist those who aims to revise Marxism to make it bring about environmental vision. Their ideas of conflict sociology were applied to capital/state/labor/environmental conflicts instead of only labor/capital/state conflicts over production. Neo-marxist ecologist generally do not take the trouble to prove the orthodox theory wrong. However, they accept, prima facie, that the ecologists are right, i.e. that ultimate limits to growth imply immediate and significant, rather than distant, impediments to human development even under socialism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minangkabau</td>
<td>an ethnic group indigenous to the Minangkabau Highlands of West Sumatera, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minarchism</td>
<td>a right-libertarian political philosophy which advocates for a minimal state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimal state</td>
<td>used to describe a limited, functional government that ensures an ideal free society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRI</td>
<td>Ma’had Rabitah al-Islamiyah. Association of pesantren education under NU, Nahdlatul Ulama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUI</td>
<td>Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama), established by the government to explain government policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murabbi</td>
<td>a concept in Islamic pedagogy that refers to a person who possesses the knowledge, then he or she processes and interprets the information gathered from the surrounding world through their action. Murabbi is not only knowledgeable and wise but also pious, kind, and considerate, a person who combines a life of learning with a life of virtue, and hence a perfect and an ideal person to learn from. Murabbi is based on the understanding that one needs more than intellectual ability to comprehend the knowledge in text, but rather one needs time to personalise it by living it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mushalla</td>
<td>Small prayer house or room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslimat NU</td>
<td>Women’s branch of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mursyid</td>
<td>(Arabic) master, in Sufi order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nafs</td>
<td>(Arabic) soul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Hobbesian</td>
<td>generally refers to a belief that the only way to secure civil society is through universal submission to the absolute authority of a sovereign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Malthusian</td>
<td>generally refers to people with the same basic concerns as Malthus, who advocate population control programs, to ensure resources for current and future populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Age</td>
<td>a broad movement characterized by alternative approaches to traditional Western culture, with an interest in spirituality, mysticism, holism, and environmentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Order</td>
<td>The period between 1965 and 1998, Suharto’s regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Watchman State</td>
<td>a model of minimal state. A form of government where the government's responsibilities are so minimal that they cannot be reduced much further without becoming a form of anarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NKRI</td>
<td>Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia - Indonesian national unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyai</td>
<td>(Javanese) term for the wife of a kyai, also a female Islamic teacher or scholar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition/Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orang</td>
<td>(Ind.) human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientalist</td>
<td>study of the Orient, especially by Westerners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagar</td>
<td>(Ind) fence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAS</td>
<td>Pusat Amanat Referendum Rakyat Sulawesi (Centre for Trusteeship of the Sulawesi People’s Referendum), founded in 2000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancasila</td>
<td>The five principles of Indonesia’s national philosophy, in the preamble of its constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peak Oil</td>
<td>the hypothetical point in time when the global production of oil reaches its maximum rate, after which production will gradually decline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengajian</td>
<td>(Ind) 1) Qu’ran recitation, 2) Islamic study group, religious lecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PII</td>
<td>Partai Islam Indonesia (Islamic party of Indonesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKB</td>
<td>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party), political party related to the Nahdlatul Ulama. Founded July 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia), banned in 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKS</td>
<td>Prosperous Welfare Party, inspired by Muslim Brotherhood ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planas PRB</td>
<td>Indonesian National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pondok</td>
<td>(Ind.) term used interchangeably with pesantren, or pondok pesantren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-modernist</td>
<td>refers to a person who engages in various movements or ideas that emerge as reactions to modernism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatist</td>
<td>a person who has commitment to useful knowledge and always focuses on practice rather than merely metaphysical ‘truths’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priyayi</td>
<td>Javanese elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qada</td>
<td>(Arabic) divine decree, pre-ordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadar</td>
<td>(Arabic) destiny, predestination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiyamah</td>
<td>(Arabic) Islamic eschatology of the end of the world, the final assessment of humanity by Allah, consisting of the annihilation of all life, resurrection and judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quran</td>
<td>The central religious text of Islam which Muslims believe is the verbatim words of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rasul</td>
<td>(Arabic) the Prophet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratu adil</td>
<td>The “just king, or, queen” of Javanese mythology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Redemptionist a person whose social and environmental action was driven by psychological dissonance between a sense of their own values and ethical standards and the behaviour that people are forced to adopt through participation in consumer-capitalist society

Religious ecologist a person whose studies of ecology aims to retrieve, re-examine and reconstruct human-earth relations that are present in all world religions

Relocalisation a radical green political movement through the creation of, or transforming the existing communities into, less-unsustainable communities which are largely self-sufficient, with self-local governance

Riba (Arabic) usury

Rida (Arabic) the fact of being pleased or contented, a stage in Sufism

Sadaqa, shodaqoh (Arabic) Voluntary charity, alm

Sage a profoundly wise person

Salah (Arabic) prayer, especially formally ordained and ritual prayers

Santri (Javanese) Literally a religious student, but used by Clifford Geertz in his typology to designate a class of strictly observant Muslims, including merchants, landowners and clerics, both Traditionalists and Reformists

Scientia sacra Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s works refer to none other than the ultimate science of ‘the Real’. It is knowledge that “lies at the heart of every revelation and is the center of that circle which encompasses and defines tradition” (Nasr, 1989:130). The source of this knowledge is Revelation and Intellection (Intellectual intuition which involves the illumination of the heart and mind and the presence of knowledge of immediate and direct nature which is tasted and experience (see al-‘ilm al-huduri’))

SEPILIS Or SIPILIS. An abbreviation, stands for SECULARISM, in a sense of restricting Islam within the limits of individual-God relations; PLURALISM, in a sense of denying religious truth, hence, relativism; and LIBERALISM, in a sense of judging religion by the use of freedom of thinking and relegating revelations

Shallow ecology/ Shallow green the contrast of deep ecology, characterized by its short-term approaches to environmental issues. The shallow approach stops before the ultimate level of fundamental change, often promoting technological fixes (e.g. recycling, increased automotive efficiency, export-driven monocultural organic agriculture) based on the same consumption-oriented values and methods of the industrial economy

Shariah (Arabic) divine law; lit.the clear, well-troden path to water. The word used to refer to Islamic law

Shia one of two major denominations of Islam. Sunni-Shia split lies in the schism that occurred when the Prophet (peace be upon him) died, leading to disputes over succession to the Prophet as a caliph of the Islamic community that spread across various part of the world. Shia are the ones who believe
that leadership should stay with the family of the Prophet, and therefore the Shia is the partisan of Ali (a cousin of the Prophet), whereas the Sunni accepted leadership of the companion of the Prophet. Therefore, Sunni-Shia conflict reflects modern power struggle, not theological schism.

Shirk (Arabic) ascribing partners to God

Shodaqoh a form of Islamic charity

STTP Sekolah Tinggi Penyuluhan Pertanian (Agriculture Instructor College)

Sunna(h) Words and deeds of the Prophet

Sunni one of two major denominations of Islam. The word "Sunni" in Arabic comes from a word meaning "one who follows the Sunna (traditions of the Prophet)". For more detail, see Shia

Surah Chapter of the Qur’an

Surau (Ind.) small mosque

Survivalists a person whose social and environmental action was driven by the perceived need to prepare for the conditions of scarcity, which they anticipate will result from peak oil, climate change and looming ecological collapse.

Syeikh/sheikh a leader in a Muslim community or organization

Tablighi Jumaat A puritan fundamentalist group with Sufi roots founded in India in 1927, active recently in Indonesia and in many other Muslim countries

Tahlil Repeated chanting of the confession of faith

Takdir (Arabic, Indonesian, Javanese) predestination, fate

Takdzim (Arabic) Respect

Taqlid (Arabic) to follow, imitate

Tasawuf (Arabic) Islamic mysticism (Sufism)

Tawasul see Wasila

Tawhid (Arabic) absolute unity of God. The fundamental principle and forte of the Islamic tradition. It includes the idea of the unicity of the Godhead as well as the principal unity of all Being in both its transcendental and immanent modalities

Tarekat Javanese, Thariqah. It can mean sufi order, or simply, tasawuf

Thariqah (Arabic) Sufi order or brotherhood; lit. narrow path

Tradisi (Ind) Tradition
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transcendent</td>
<td>beyond or above the range of normal or physical human experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition</td>
<td>in the context of peak oil and climate change that demands emission reduction, transition refers to the process needed to change present ways of living to less carbon-intensive lives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transition town</td>
<td>a movement that seeks to address concerns about the impending impacts of the combined threats of oil depletion and climate change on the economies and well-being of communities. It is founded on four key assumptions: (1) that life with dramatically lower energy consumption is inevitable, and that it’s better to plan for it than to be taken by surprise; (2) that our settlements and communities presently lack the resilience to enable them to weather the severe energy shocks that will accompany peak oil; (3) that we have to act collectively, and that we have to act now; (4) that by unleashing the collective genius of those around us to collectively and proactively design our energy descent, we can build ways of living that are more connected, more enriching and that recognize the biological limits of our planet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformative</td>
<td>a series of learning objectives corresponding to cognitive (head), psychomotor (hands) and affective (heart) domains of learning that facilitate personal experience for participants resulting in profound changes in knowledge, skills and attitudes related to enhancing ecological, social and economic justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulama</td>
<td>(Arabic) Religious scholar, see also “kyai”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ummah</td>
<td>(Arabic) Global Muslim community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahabi</td>
<td>The form of Islam that is puritanical and favoring a literal interpretation of scripture and early tradition. It is the state religion of Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahyu</td>
<td>(from Arabic wahy) revelation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wakaf</td>
<td>(Arabic) An Islamic endowment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali</td>
<td>(Arabic) The trusted, Saint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wali songo</td>
<td>(Javanese) the Nine Wali. Nine saints, teachers and holy men, who established Islam on Java and are still revered today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrior</td>
<td>a person who shows or has shown great vigor, courage, or aggressiveness, as in politics or athletics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasila</td>
<td>Islamic understanding of intercession, to draw near spiritually to what one seeks after</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wirid</td>
<td>Litany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakah, zakat</td>
<td>(Arabic) mandatory alms, poor-tax</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Zikir

See Dzikir
Appendix-2: Indonesia’s Oil and Gas situation

Figure-1
Indonesia’s increasing oil consumption vs. decreasing oil supply

Source of data: BP Statistical Review 2013
Oil resource in Indonesia is approximately around 7,924 Mtoe and “proven up” only for 23 year, natural gas 8,410 Mtoe, “proven up” 50 year and coal 94,844 Mtoe, “proven up” 80 year based on current production level in 2012. Compare with world's resources of fossil fuel, Indonesia position is categorised as non-rich fossil fuel country. Proven oil reserve Indonesia is 0.2% of total world under Vietnam and India countries (BP Statistical Review 2013). Proven gas reserve is rank no 14 in the world and proven coal reserve is 18 positions in the world. Total coal reserves in Indonesia were more than 161 billion ton in 2012. Indonesia has various range of coal quality, from low rank, lignite, to high rank bituminous. Thermal coal makes up 6.7% of the total coal reserves and low rank coal share was 35.7% in 2012. Most of coal reserves in Indonesia are located in Kalimantan and Sumatera. More than 98% of coal reserves are located in those locations.

Total primary energy demand (excluded traditional biomass in household) is estimated to have increased by 1.1% in 2012 from 212.2 Million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 2011. Oil still dominates the primary energy mix. Oil's share was accounted for 48% of the overall primary energy demand, whereas coal and gas was accounted for 27% and 20% respectively in 2012. The share of renewable energy in primary energy demand (excluded traditional biomass in household) reached 5% in 2012 from 3% in 2011.
Appendix-3: Deforestation, Natural and Man-made Disaster Statistics in Indonesia

Table-1
Indonesia’s Deforestation Rate
(Compiled from Mongabay 2005 and Department of Forestry Indonesia 2010).

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% forest cover to country’s land area</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure-3
Indonesia Disaster Statistic Occurrence and Death Toll (1815-2012)
Source: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (national council on disaster management)
Figure 4
Proportion of Disaster Occurrence per Category (1815-2012)
Source: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (national council on disaster management)
Appendix-4: Brief summary of Earth Summits

The Kyoto Protocol (named after the Japanese city where it was concluded in 1997), is an international agreement to address global warming and delay climate change. It aims to reduce the total greenhouse gas emissions of developed countries (and countries with economies in transition) to 5 per cent below the level they were in 1990. Different countries have different targets they have to achieve. According to the UNFCC website, the Protocol "recognises that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, and places a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities'. The United States (under former President George Bush) and Australia (initially, under former Prime Minister John Howard) did not ratify the Kyoto treaty. According to Stern (2006), their decision was based on the lack of quantitative emission commitments for emerging economies. Australia, under former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, has since ratified the treaty, which took effect in March 2008.

In 2007, the climate conference was held in Bali, Indonesia. The conference aimed to draw a "Bali roadmap" that initiated a two year process of negotiations designed to agree on a new set of emissions target to replace those of the Kyoto Protocol. The UN conference in Bali too was composed of deadlocks. The EU had pressed for a commitment that industrialised nations should commit to cuts of 25-40% by 2020, a bid that was implacably opposed by a bloc containing the US, Canada and Japan. It saw tempers rising to boiling point and a number of emotional moments when the UN's top climate official Yvo de Boer was in tears after being accused by China of procedural irregularities, a direct intervention of the UN Secretary-General and the Indonesian President to appeal to the countries to make a final deal, a seemingly recalcitrant United States holding the entire meeting to ransom. "But as this global warming is an issue which affects the whole humanity, whole planet earth, we must have co-ordinated and concerted efforts to address this issue," Mr Ban Ki-moon of the UN said. While delegates were anxious to make a deal and catch aeroplanes home, the US delegation announced it could not support the amended text. A chorus of boos rang out. And a member of Papua New Guinea's delegation told the US: "If you're not willing to lead, please get out of the way." Shortly after, the US delegation announced it would support the revised text after all.

The document coming out of the meeting, the "Bali roadmap", contained text on emissions cuts, the transfer of clean technology to developing countries, halting deforestation and helping poorer nations protect their economies and societies against impacts of climate change such as rising sea levels and falling crop yields.

The roadmap set the parameters and aims for a further set of negotiations to be finalised by the 2009 UN climate conference to be held in Denmark. The final text does not mention specific emissions targets, but does acknowledge that "deep cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve the ultimate objective" of avoiding dangerous climate change. It also says that a delay in reducing emissions will make severe climate impacts more likely. Delegates agreed on a framework that could allow richer nations and companies to earn "carbon credits" by paying for forest protection in developing countries. "We need to find a new mechanism that values standing forests," said Andrew Mitchell, executive director of the Global Canopy Programme, an alliance of
research institutions. "Ultimately, if this does its job, [deforestation] goes down to nothing." Mr Mitchell said the only feasible source of sufficient funds was a global carbon market. Environmental groups and some delegates have criticised the draft as being weak and a missed opportunity. "This deal is very disappointing," said Tony Juniper of Friends of the Earth. "We said we needed a roadmap, but this conference has failed to give us a clear destination."

Following the Bali roadmap, the summit in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009 that aimed to address the defining challenge of our times also documented more failure than success.

Appendix-5: Syi’ir Tanpo Waton*

**In Arabic:**
I seek forgiveness from Allah, the Lord of all creatures
I seek forgiveness from Allah, for all my transgressions
O Lord, grant me beneficial knowledge (ilm nafi‘)
And guide me to perform good deeds

O the Prophet of Allah, peace be upon you
O you who have high dignity and elevated degree
O you the leader whose love embraces the neighbor
O the beloved of God, the most generous one.

**In Javanese:**
I begin this reciting
with Allah’s name in praising
which has given us bless and gratification
day and night without any consideration
do not learn a mere Sharia so-so
in where you only fluent in speak, read and write
but in the end all you have is a mere regret
but in the end all you have is a mere regret

many whom memorized Quran and Hadith
but liking to consider else as infidel filth
their own infidelity often out of concern
that their heart and mind still filled with stain
that their heart and mind still filled with stain

easily seduced by lustful egoism
in the sparkling and glittering of worldly hedonism
full of envious jealousy of others richness
that is why their heart full of stigma and darkness
that is why their heart full of stigma and darkness

o my brother please do not lose this reminder
the obligatory to learn with all its order
for thickening our faith and Tawhid
as the best provisions in pronouncing the death creed
as the best provisions in pronouncing the death creed

the most pious people is the most kindhearted
because their knowledge is well-established
doing the Thariqah until revealed the Ma‘rifah
and finally arriving at the absorbing Haqiqah
and finally arriving at the absorbing Haqiqah

The Timeless Quran is a noble revelation

---

201 *Shariah, Thariqah, Haqiqah* is known as the three hierarchical paths that one takes to reach the Ultimate Reality
though unwritten but readable in pronunciation
that is the teaching of clear-sighted teacher
and have this implanted inside your chest deeper and deeper
and have this implanted inside your chest deeper and deeper

after it embedded in your minds and hearts
it will obsess your bodies and innards
The Miracle of The Prophet (Quran) become a guidance
as a entering doorway of the faith radiance
as a entering doorway of the faith radiance

In Allah The Most Exalted
we must day and night approached and asked
with all of our tiraka \(^{202}\) and effort
and not to forget zikr and suluq \(^{203}\)
and not to forget zikr and so suluq

our life will be tranquil and peaceful
which is a sign of our beliefs and faithful
forsaking the unbearable incidence
with a consciousness of Allah’s providence
with a consciousness of Allah’s providence

with friends, brothers and neighbours fellow
live harmoniously without fuss and row
this is the Sunna of The Noble Prophet
Prophet Muhammad our adviser and leader
Prophet Muhammad our adviser and leader

let’s do this with all our ability
Allah that will raise our degree and nobility
even though considered physically low and humble
but spiritually we will be seen as high and noble
but spiritually we will be seen as high and noble

and when finally come the time to die
our spirits and souls will not lost and stray
Allah will laud us to His paradise
and our corpse will remain intact and our shroud will stay flawless
and our corpse will remain intact and our shroud will stay flawless

The second paragraphs in Arabic repeated

***

* Translated by Reapmeaning (2014)

The author of the hymn is not known. While people believe Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) composed it, others claim Gus Nizam from Pesantren Darul Safa Wal Wafa, Sidoarjo, East Java, is the author. The hymn was made popular right after Gus Dur passed away, so there was no way to confirm whether he was the true author. Gus Nizam was reported to have made statement that he had no problem if the hymn he composed is being popularized under the name of Gus Dur.

202 Javanese of practising Thariqah
203 Journey of the mystics in Sufism
Appendix-6 Photos

Fig 6.1 Pesantren Riyadhul Jannah, Pacet, Mojokerto, East Java

Fishpond for Agribusiness class. Riyadhul Jannah has organic farm as well

‘Fenceless-pesantren’. The village behind Riyadhul Jannah

Practical entrepreneurship class. Riyadhul Jannah has confectioneries, minimarts and restaurants

Fig 6.2 Pesantren An-Nur Fatmah, Trawas, Mojokerto, East Java

Kyai Munhanif, Ibu Nyai (his wife) and myself

In-depth interview with Kyai Munhanif
6.3 A picture of the Traditionalist’s families living in Surabaya city:

A classroom at an-Nur Fatmah. “All of them came from poor families. Not only do I have to teach them, but also feed them” (Munhanif)

A villager of Trawas and the firewood from nearby forest

6.4 Urban santri education: At-Taqwa Primary School, in Surabaya city

Attending Thariqah Naqshabandiyah gathering at Masjid Akbar (12/28/2012)

“Islamic education in Indonesia is now so well institutionalized that, in contrast to the pattern of the 1950s and 1960s, all Muslim citizens receive basic (and state-mandated) training in the tenets of their faith” (Hefner, 2013:49)
Young urban observant Muslims. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Indonesian authorities lifted the ban on wearing the veil in public schools. The veil was promoted in particular by da’wah (preaching of Islam) activists belonging to the groups known as Usroh and Tarbiyah who were inspired by Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimin) (Hefner, 2013)

6.5 Pesantren Hidayatullah, Depok, Jakarta (West Java)

List of education services. From pre-school to a college

The 3 hectares enclave

The house where Sodiq and his family lived

The fenced-enclave becomes a safe playground for children
“Hidayatullah is a community of students” (female leader, Reni). At university she was interested in Usroh and Tarbiyah, then, joined Hidayatullah.

6.6 ‘Campus’ of Pesantren Hidayatullah Balikpapan, East Kalimantan

The headquarter in Balikpapan

Network of pesantren across the archipelago

Female student section

Female prayer room
Female *pengajian* when I was asked to explain about my research

Female *murabbi*, Mulkiyah, and Hidayatullah’s vision of education: “creating Quranic generations”

Girl classroom

Sewing classroom

Botany laboratory

Female prayer congregation at night
New female student dormitory.
As more space and facility improvement needed, permanent building appeared

In contrast,
Housing in the first ‘campus’.
The Reforested Woods

Food stalls

Living in nature

Having break

The Reforested Woods
6.7 An-Nadzir Community, Gowa, South Sulawesi

“We are preparing our children in four skills: reading-writing, number, farming and trading -besides knowledge of Islam” (Rangka)
“Abah [father, referred to Rangka] tells us if the buyer bargain too hard that means they don’t have enough money, so we just have to give it away with whatever price they like” (respondent Hasbi)

Casual clothes for working time, Abdullah Rifai is a Papuan ethnic

Robe and turban for evening time. After in-depth interview with Lukman Bakti
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Thariqah (Sufi orders) names, legitimate ones by Nahdlatul Ulama criteria


UNESCO: Education for sustainable development


UNTERM: Community Development


