Social entrepreneurship as a response to disaster:
    An examination of cases following the
February 2011 Christchurch earthquake

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Abstract

This thesis explores how social entrepreneurship develops following a crisis. A review of literature finds that despite more than 15 years of academic attention, a common definition of social entrepreneurship remains elusive, with the field lacking the unified framework to set it apart as a specialised field of study. There are a variety of different conceptualisations of how social entrepreneurship works, and what it aims to achieve. The New Zealand context for social entrepreneurship is explored, finding that it receives little attention from the government and education sectors, despite its enormous potential.

A lack of readily available information on social entrepreneurship leads most studies to investigate it as a phenomenon, and given the unique context of this research, it follows suit. Following from several authors’ recommendations that social entrepreneurship be subjected to further exploration, this is an exploratory, inductive study. A multiple case study is used to explore how social entrepreneurship develops following a natural disaster, using the example of the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand. With little existing theory in this research area, this method is used to provide interesting examples of how the natural disaster, recognised as a crisis, can lead to business formation.

Findings revealed the crisis initially triggered an altruistic response from social entrepreneurs, leading them to develop newly highlighted opportunities that were related to fields in which they had existing skills and expertise. In the process of developing these opportunities, initial altruistic motivations faded, with a new focus on the pursuit of a social mission and aims for survival and growth. The social missions addressed broad issues, and while they did address the crisis to differing extents, they were not confined to addressing its consequences. A framework is presented to explain how social entrepreneurship functions, once triggered in response to crisis.

This framework supports existing literature that depicts social entrepreneurship as a continuous process, and illustrates the effects of a crisis as the catalyst for social business formation. In the aftermath of a crisis, when resources are likely to be scarce, social entrepreneurs play a significant role in the recovery process and their contributions should be highly valued both by government and relevant disaster response bodies. Policies that support social entrepreneurs and their ventures should be considered in the same way as commercial ventures.
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Thank you all, very much,

Andy
1. Thesis Overview

The submission date for this thesis comes one day prior to the fifth anniversary of a major earthquake that shook Christchurch, New Zealand, on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of February 2011. That devastating day is certainly not forgotten. A recent earthquake on the 14\textsuperscript{th} of February 2016 provided Christchurch a timely reminder of the events that have unfolded over the last five years, as the city has slowly recovered and started the process of rebuilding what was lost.

This thesis aims to understand how social entrepreneurship develops following a disaster. It begins with a literature review, which finds that researchers have been unable to agree on a common definition of social entrepreneurship, and that research in the field is currently separated into three distinct schools of thought. It examines the current frameworks for social entrepreneurship, finding general scholarly agreement that social entrepreneurship is a process-based activity. The aims and uses of social entrepreneurship are discussed, before an in-depth examination of the New Zealand context for social entrepreneurship. This includes the far-reaching implications of the Treaty of Waitangi. Social entrepreneurship is found to have received little attention in the government and education sectors.

A multiple case study was used in order to address the research question; “How did social entrepreneurship develop in response to the Christchurch earthquake of February 2011?” The suitability of case study research for examining social entrepreneurship is discussed, before a description of the case sampling and data collection processes, ethical considerations and the provisions made for trustworthiness.

The two case studies are presented as detailed narratives, framed around their mission and activities, before detailed descriptions of the major projects that serve as the outcomes of their efforts. The two case studies are then viewed through the lens of an existing framework for social entrepreneurship, finding that elements of the post-disaster context have resulted in a unique flavour of social entrepreneurship. Not all aspects of the current understandings of social entrepreneurship are supported by the findings.

Concluding the thesis is a discussion of the major themes that emerged from the findings. It presents a model for post-disaster social entrepreneurship, depicting it as a continuous process that is catalysed by a crisis event. The social entrepreneur is found to be adept at recognising opportunities for which their skills can add significant value, and despite being spurred into action by a crisis, the social entrepreneur does not necessarily aim to address the consequences of the crisis with their social mission in the long term.
2. Literature review

2.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to provide a theoretical background to the key concepts that form the basis for this research. It first introduces the different conceptualisations of social entrepreneurship, before exploring the frameworks that aim to depict how social entrepreneurship works. Differences are then drawn between commercial and social entrepreneurship, before a brief introduction to the context for this research; the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand.

2.2. Concepts of social entrepreneurship

An early discussion of this fairly recent field of study stated that “We have always had social entrepreneurs, even if we did not call them that” (Dees, 1998, p. 1). Social entrepreneurs have always existed, all around the world (Roberts & Woods, 2005). Indeed, it has been long recognised that businesses should not exist merely to fulfil their own goals and ends – even Dickens (1854) once wrote that “Political economy is a mere skeleton unless it has a little human covering and filling out; a little human bloom upon it and a little human warmth in it” (p. 555). In the face of industrialised political economies, working out how to incorporate human values was a big challenge at the time. Challenges like these are still relevant – the 2008 Global Financial Crisis raised many questions regarding the impact of lightly regulated markets on society (Crouch, 2011; Nicholls, 2011).

Doing business in the social sector (also termed non-profit sector, or third sector), requires a shift away from the profit-maximising and performance-based business models, to one where it is argued that accountability, transparency, and returns to society ought to be expected (Mair & Sharma, 2012).

Today, social entrepreneurship remains poorly defined, and with a wide variety of competing definitions and conceptualisations it lacks the unified framework necessary to set it apart as a specialised field of study (Choi & Majumdar, 2014). However, this is in part related to the nature of social entrepreneurship, which is highly contextual (Bacq & Janssen, 2011). Recognising that research on social entrepreneurship would benefit from further exploration, Dacin, Dacin and Matear
Literature review

(2010) contended that “recent efforts to delineate social entrepreneurship as a theoretical domain in its own right may be blurring the potential and opportunities that the more general context of social entrepreneurship may hold” (p. 37). Another author quipped that “It turns out that social entrepreneurship is a bit like pornography, at least in the way it eludes ready definition… social entrepreneurship is hard to define, but you know it when you see it” (Keohane, 2013, p. 9).

There are now a variety of different conceptualisations of social entrepreneurship, and several authors have categorised these into research streams. Mair and Martí (2006) identified three streams of researchers; the first of which viewed social entrepreneurship as a management strategy to create social value, or an activity undertaken by the not-for-profit in order to find new funding strategies (e.g., Austin, Stevenson, & Wei-Skillern, 2006; Boschee, 1998). The second stream viewed social entrepreneurship to be a practice used, in cross-sector partnerships, by commercial businesses that have a sense of social responsibility (e.g., Sagawa & Segal, 2000; Waddock, 1988). The third stream viewed social entrepreneurship as a means to solve social problems and catalyse social change (e.g., Alvord, Brown, & Letts, 2004).

The three streams later identified by Choi and Majumdar (2014) are very similar. The first stream they identified considered social entrepreneurship to be an activity undertaken by the not-for-profit, in the search for new business-facilitated funding strategies (e.g., Boschee & McClurg, 2003; Lasprogata & Cotton, 2003). A second stream conceptualised it in much simpler terms, as the formation of businesses intended to serve the poor (e.g., Seelos & Mair, 2005). The third considered social entrepreneurship to involve the use of innovation, in order to solve social problems and bring about social change, regardless of whether business activities were involved or not (e.g., Dees, 1998; Martin & Osberg, 2007).

Bacq and Janssen (2011) grouped streams of social entrepreneurship research not by theme, but by geographic area, and also found three streams. Looking for evidence of a ‘transatlantic divide’, they found two schools of thought in America, the Social Enterprise School and Social Innovation School, and another in Europe, the EMES (EMergence des Enterprises Sociales en Europe) school.

The American Social Innovation School of social entrepreneurship conceptualises it as an activity that involves creating new, better ways to deal with
existing social problems, or to meet social needs (Dees & Battle Anderson, 2006). Elements of this school of thought were incorporated in Dees’ original (1998) article on the meaning of social entrepreneurship, which introduced the role of the social entrepreneur and the activities the social entrepreneur undertakes. Part of this role involved “Engaging in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation and learning” (p. 4). Alvord, Brown and Letts (2004) further developed a conceptualisation of social innovation based social entrepreneurship, arguing that social innovation is “a way to catalyse social transformations well beyond solutions to the initial problems” (p. 262). Hence, a social entrepreneur operating within the American Social Innovation School becomes an activist for social change.

The American Social Enterprise School, however, places more emphasis on business activities, and the generation of income through the course of pursuing the social mission (Bacq & Janssen, 2011). In this school, the role of the social entrepreneur is not as prominent (when compared to the American Social Innovation School), with greater attention paid to collective governance mechanisms (Bacq & Janssen, 2011).

The EMES approach to social entrepreneurship identifies social enterprises as “organisations with an explicit aim to benefit the community, initiated by a group of citizens and in which the material interest of capital investors is subject to limits” (Defourny & Nyssens, 2006, p. 5). In contrast with the American Social Enterprise School, the social entrepreneur in the EMES approach is permitted to take a central role in the organisation, though it is insisted that the entrepreneur is supported by the members who are responsible for the mission of the social enterprise (Bacq & Janssen, 2011). However, similarly to the American Social Enterprise School, the EMES approach requires a high degree of autonomy, as they are founded by the people, and governed by the people (Defourny & Nyssens, 2006).

Comparing these three major schools of social entrepreneurship, and to determine whether there actually was a transatlantic divide, Bacq and Janssen (2011) used Gartner’s (1985) framework for describing new venture creation in order to examine these American and European perspectives. Gartner’s (1985) framework used four dimensions – individual(s), organisation, environment and process, emphasising the multidimensional aspects of new venture creation. This was a suitable framework.
for the study of social entrepreneurship as, like commercial entrepreneurship, it is a multidimensional construct (Mort, Weerawardena, & Carnegie, 2003). Bacq and Janssen (2011) then found there was no clear-cut divide between American and European conceptualisations of social entrepreneurship, noting that even within the U.S., different conceptualisations had emerged. What they were able to determine was that social entrepreneurship involves a process of “identifying, evaluating and exploiting opportunities aiming at social welfare creation by means of commercial, market-based activities and the use of a wide range of resources” (p. 388).

2.3. Attempts to define social entrepreneurship

In his discussion on the meaning of social entrepreneurship, Dees (1998) highlighted one of the most critical issues in the field, that although “the concept of ‘social entrepreneurship’ is gaining popularity, it means different things to different people” (p. 1). The introduction of a definition in his article served to lay a foundation for understanding, by listing the characteristics exemplified by social entrepreneurs, though he admitted it was also “clearly an ‘idealised’ definition”(p. 4). Research on social entrepreneurship had been slow to gain momentum and other authors later agreed that “While the term ‘social entrepreneurship’ is being adopted and used more extensively, its meaning is not widely understood” (Thompson, 2002, p. 412). There was also a “need to conceptualise the concept more clearly, thereby facilitating future practitioners, researchers and funding bodies in developing a consistent body of knowledge” (Mort et al., 2003, p. 77).

Alongside the lack of consensus on how social entrepreneurship should be defined, there is also a lack of understanding of the concept of social enterprise, how it should be defined, and how it is different from social entrepreneurship. Definition and understanding of each of these concepts varies internationally, and many authors have used the terms interchangeably (Peredo & McLean, 2006). In real-world examples, they do not always go hand-in-hand. Thompson (2008) argued that people needed to be clear about the differences between social entrepreneurship and enterprise, because despite their links, their meanings are not bound together in a seamless manner. For instance, it is possible for the practice of social entrepreneurship to occur in organisations that are not social enterprises, and the individual social entrepreneur may
not necessarily be part of a social enterprise, with the social enterprises themselves not always led by the type of person we could consider to be a social entrepreneur (Thompson, 2008).

An often-cited definition of social enterprise describes it as a “business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners” (DTI, 2002, p. 6). These ideas were reinforced by Pearce (2003) who emphasised these organisations must revolve around social aims, supporting themselves though primary activities that involve the trading of goods and services. Thompson and Doherty (2006) later introduced a set of criteria to determine if an organisation can be considered a social enterprise:

- They have a social purpose
- Assets and wealth are used to create community benefit
- They pursue this with (at least in part) trade in a market place
- Profits and surpluses are not distributed to shareholders, as is the case with a profit-seeking business
- “Members” or employees have some role in decision-making and/or governance
- The enterprise is seen as accountable to both its members and a wider community
- There is either a double- or triple-bottom line paradigm
- The assumption is that the most effective social enterprises demonstrate healthy financial and social returns – rather than high returns in one and lower returns in the other. (p. 362)

Other authors’ criteria for social enterprise are largely variations of the same theme. Kaplan (2013), for example, investigated the state of social enterprise in New Zealand and found that social enterprises undertake the following activities:

1. Intent – the fundamental purpose is to address a social or environmental problem, often focusing on the root of a market or system failure rather than the symptom. This purpose is set out in governing documents.
2. Business model – employ business models, skills and tools to develop products and services traded in the marketplace.

3. Profits – reinvest profits to advance the social purpose, as distinguished from standard businesses that are structured to earn profits for owner or shareholder value.

4. Ownership and control – a controlling stake should be held in the interest of the social or environmental mission. This criterion is becoming increasingly complicated because of evolving models of investment based on equity and shareholding.

5. Accountability and transparency – legal forms and requirements vary. Transparent reporting for financial, social and environmental results is essential.

6. Scale – aim to scale what works through growth or replication. (p. 4-5)

The [New Zealand] Department of Internal Affairs (2013) in comparison, offered quite a brief understanding of social enterprise:

- A social, cultural, or environmental mission that achieves public or community benefit;
- a substantial portion of income derived from trade (50 per cent or more, or a demonstrable intention to reach this level); and
- reinvestment of the majority, or all, of profit/surplus in the fulfilment of the organisation’s mission. (p. 5)

These definitions of social enterprise are similar, all agreeing that the organisations revolve around a social purpose, and that profit is reinvested to support the organisation’s mission. The Department of Internal Affairs (2013) included a specific criteria that a social enterprise must derive over 50% of its income from trade, which is not supported by Thompson and Doherty (2006) or Kaplan (2013). Social enterprise aims, of course, to earn a financial as well as social return, and the insistence of a dependence on trade would impact fledgling or growing social enterprise, and possibly deter other social entrepreneurs who are unable to see a rapid path to profitability.
For the purpose of this research, a social enterprise that fits largely within Thompson and Doherty (2006) and Kaplan’s (2013) criteria, will be considered to be a manifestation of social entrepreneurship. It is also important to recognise that social enterprise also lies on a continuum between the pure charity organisation, and the commercial business. Kaplan (2013) illustrated this continuum in Figure 2.1:

Figure 2.1 - Continuum of social enterprise models

Kaplan (2013, p. 6)

Based on Mitchell, Kingston and Goodall (2008, p. 7)

2.4. Frameworks for social entrepreneurship

There are two main frameworks that aim to explain how social entrepreneurship works; one derived from a comparison between commercial and social forms of entrepreneurship (Austin et al., 2006), and the other developed from the observation of social entrepreneurship (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006).

To better understand social entrepreneurship, Austin et al. (2006) investigated the differences between commercial and social entrepreneurship, using commercial entrepreneurship as their starting point. Their comparison was facilitated by Sahlman’s (1996) PCDO framework, originally derived from commercial entrepreneurship (Figure 2.2).
The PCDO framework uses four key elements: people, context, deal, and opportunity. This framework, Austin et al. (2006) said, “captures the key elements that are critical considerations for commercial entrepreneurship, and therefore provides a strong basis for developing a framework for social entrepreneurship” (p. 4). It emphasises the creation of a dynamic fit between the four elements, and highlights their interdependent nature. This means that if one element is changed, the others are affected. It is the entrepreneur’s job to manage these, which typically need to be modified over time to adapt to changing circumstances.

In Sahlman’s (1996) PCDO framework, People refers to those both inside and outside the organisation, who participate in the venture and bring to it their resources (such as their skills, attitudes, knowledge, contacts, goals and values). These are delivered in combinations that form a “resource mix that contributes centrally to success” (Austin et al., 2006, p. 5). Social entrepreneurs, though, face limited resources and are not able to distribute them as easily. In social entrepreneurship, Austin et al. (2006) commented that “Despite many similarities, the nature of the human and financial resources for social entrepreneurship differs in some key respects, primarily because of difficulties in resource mobilisation” (p. 11).

Deal refers to the substance of the exchange, and “who in a venture gives what, who gets what, and when those deliveries and receipts will take place” (Austin et al., 2006, p. 5). In social entrepreneurship, this is not as straightforward with more than
one bottom line at stake. Deals which deliver social value are difficult to measure, and because of this the social entrepreneur is not able to define the deal in such specific terms that can be achieved in a commercial deal. Therefore, the commercial entrepreneur’s deals are completely different to those of the social entrepreneur. “because of the way in which resources must be mobilised and because of the ambiguities associated with performance measurement, the terms of the deals are fundamentally different for commercial and social entrepreneurs” (Austin et al., 2006, p. 14).

Opportunities in the PCDO framework refer to the future vision, and were originally defined by Sahlman (1996) as “any activity requiring the investment of scarce resources in hopes of a future return” (p. 140). This implies a financial return, though the social entrepreneur will seek some form of social return as well. Austin et al. (2006) note that “in practice, the opportunity dimension of the framework is perhaps the most distinct owing to fundamental differences in missions and responses to market failure” (p. 6).

Context refers to factors outside of the entrepreneur’s control that will affect the performance of their venture, and these are numerous. Austin et al. (2006) said these factors include the “macro economy, tax and regulatory structure, and socio-political environment. Economic environment, tax policies, employment levels, technological advances, and social movements such as those involving labour, religion and politics” (p. 5). In social entrepreneurship, they note,

> Although the critical contextual factors are analogous in many ways, the impact of the context on a social entrepreneur differs from that of a commercial entrepreneur because of the way the interaction of a social venture’s mission and performance measurement systems influences entrepreneurial behaviour. (p. 9)

Based on their findings, Austin et al. (2006) introduced a framework for social entrepreneurship (Figure 2.3), a Venn diagram that reflects the overlapping nature of each variable, and which conceptualises social entrepreneurship as an activity focused on the creation of social value.
Weerawardena and Mort (2006), instead of comparing commercial and social entrepreneurship, undertook a multiple case study and based their framework (Figure 2.4) on their investigation and observation of social entrepreneurship practice. Their framework portrays social entrepreneurship as an activity, which includes ‘proactiveness’, risk-taking and innovation as key elements. It also acknowledges that social entrepreneurs face conflicting aims, of achieving the social mission, responding to the external environment and maintaining organisational sustainability. While this model acknowledges the complex situations that social entrepreneurs typically find themselves in, it is also based on assumptions of business-like activities, much like Austin et al.’s (2006) social value proposition framework.

After recognising (like other authors) that social entrepreneurship lacked a coherent theoretical framework, Weerawardena and Mort (2006) introduced their bounded model of social entrepreneurship, based on findings from nine in-depth case studies of Australian socially entrepreneurial non-profit organisations. In their study, social entrepreneurship was defined as “a behavioural phenomenon expressed in a NFP organisation context aimed at delivering social value through the exploitation of perceived opportunities” (p. 25).
Based on the themes emergent from their case studies – environmental dynamics, innovativeness, proactiveness, risk management, sustainability, the social mission and opportunity seeking/recognition – Weerawardena and Mort (2006) derived a series of propositions. These propositions are discussed as follows:

1. Social entrepreneurship is responsive to and constrained by environmental dynamics (p. 28).

The environment factor takes account of the challenges and pressure which come from “changing social and business contexts, competitiveness, and complexity” (p. 27). It is also described as a factor which has the power to constrain the efforts of social entrepreneurs (and the social enterprise), where these changing contexts “may directly impact on the reason-for-being of the organisation” (p. 27). This factor’s perspective focuses on the ways in which changing external environments affect existing social ventures.

2. Social entrepreneurship strives to achieve social value creation through the display of innovativeness (p. 28)

As a response to the dynamic of their external environments, and the increasingly competitive nature of not-for-profit work, non-profit organisations are commonly finding it necessary to “place great emphasis on innovation in all their social value creating activities” (p. 28). In the commercial firm, incremental and
radical innovation has been observed to occur in technical and non-technical forms, with evidence suggesting both can lead to improved performance (F. Damanpour, 1991; Fariborz Damanpour, Szabat, & Evan, 1989; Han, Kim, & Srivastava, 1998). In the social sector, innovation to create social value, or ‘social innovation’, has been defined as “the generation and implementation of new social service ideas for solving social problems manifested at either the product or process level or at the social system level” (Weerawardena & Mort, 2012, p. 93). This appears to be a typology of innovation that includes both technical and non-technical elements, but which supports and enhances the generation of social value.

3. Social entrepreneurship strives to achieve social value creation through the display of ‘proactiveness’ (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006, p. 29).

In the socially entrepreneurial non-profit organisation, there are three reasons to be proactive. These are; 1) for organisational survival, 2) to grow in the market and 3) to better serve that market (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006).

4. Social entrepreneurship strives to achieve social value creation through the display of risk management (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006, p. 29).

A cautious approach is not uncharacteristic for social enterprise, as noted by Weerawardena and Mort (2006) whose study found that “The majority of cases appear to adopt a highly cautious approach in dealing with risk having a clear focus on the survival of the organisation” (p. 29). Commercial entrepreneurs, they say, “have access to multiple sources of funding, such as share issues and bank borrowings” (p. 29), whereas the social entrepreneurs are “heavily constrained in generating funds for their operations” (p. 29). Social or commercial entrepreneurship is not without risk. Social entrepreneurs, it has been said, should carry an “acceptance that there will be some failures, and that these are opportunities for learning.” (Jennings, 2014, p. 10)

5. Social entrepreneurship is responsive to and constrained by the need for organisational sustainability (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006, p. 30).

When forming their organisations, social entrepreneurs are building organisations which are not reliant on grants and donations, but which aim to be self-sustaining businesses. This ensures a degree of long-term financial sustainability, and
when compared to the charity organisation, a lower level of financial risk because survival is not dependent on the whims of external contributors and donors. This degree of sustainability, underpinned by a business model, also makes social entrepreneurship attractive to investors (Lyon & Fernandez, 2012). In addition to (and to support) the commercial component, the social entrepreneur is likely to use a range of other resources, including voluntary of ‘in-kind’ contributions, grants and donations, particularly in the organisation’s earlier stages (Chell, 2007).

6. Social entrepreneurship is responsive to and constrained by the social mission (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006, p. 31).

Despite a focus on the mission, Weerawardena and Mort (2006) found evidence to suggest “that the social mission is not a sacred goal as traditionally has been believed” (p. 30). This is because, they say, of the heavy influence of contextual and environmental factors, meaning that “the role of social mission must be understood within the competitive environment within which the organisations operate” (p. 30). This also reflects that social entrepreneurship is a process which purposely merges ‘opposing’ goals, to deliver social value, and to operate a business which ought to earn a profit. These are not dichotomous aims, though do require social entrepreneurs to manage and balance outcomes.

7. “Social entrepreneurship opportunity identification is responsive to and constrained by the organisational sustainability, social mission, and environmental dynamics” (p. 31)

The social entrepreneur, Weerawardena and Mort (2006) note, seeks out market opportunities that will enable them to create better social value to their clients. This is, however, constrained by the financial viability of the opportunity, with resource constraints that do not always allow these opportunities to be pursued.

A changing external environment often presents challenges for all entrepreneurs, not just those in the social sector (R. Smith, Bell, & Watts, 2014). Weerawardena and Mort’s (2006) case studies identified a range of ways in which the environment can affect social entrepreneurship that do not affect commercial entrepreneurship. The social entrepreneurs in their case studies provided examples; changes in social needs, the broad range of organisations they interact with (including
Literature review

Government), the complexities associated with working in sensitive areas, complex social problems that require a solid understanding of context before they can be solved, and the non-profit industry becoming increasingly competitive. Some of the social entrepreneurs in the case studies saw non-profit organisations needing to become less dependent on Government for funding, with political factors meaning funding may not always be available due to changes between election cycles. Reducing reliance on Government support, and turning to commercial approaches to generate funds, would also allow non-profit organisations to have more flexibility in their operations.

2.5. The entrepreneurial act

Entrepreneurship is typically associated with business, opportunity recognition, and risk. The term ‘entrepreneur’ originated in 17-18th century French economics, referring to someone who undertakes a significant project, shifting economic resources from a lower area of productivity into a higher one, and finds new ways of doing things (Dees, 1998; Mort et al., 2003). In general, entrepreneurs are individuals who create value, moving and arranging the necessary economic resources in order to do so. Literature on commercial entrepreneurship has discussed whether business founding is a necessary condition, with earlier articles suggesting that business founding is the ultimate entrepreneurial act (e.g., Gartner, 1988), but more recent discussions have questioned whether this is enough, without any requirement for sustained entrepreneurial performance, or the behavioural traits and characteristics which have become associated with entrepreneurial activities (Chell, 2000; Mort et al., 2003). In light of the widespread view that entrepreneurs will know an opportunity when they see one, Chell (2000) argued that entrepreneurship is a “process in which the owner-manager’s actions (decisions, choices, etc.) are contextually embedded” (p. 64). She defines an entrepreneurial act as “an attempt to respond to, and thereby change, a set of circumstances (perceived in a positive or negative light) with a view to creating a desired outcome” (p. 71). This definition portrays entrepreneurship as an activity, which can be undertaken in order to solve problems (including social problems), and without any stated prerequisite for ‘business’ to occur, appears to be inclusive of the philosophy of social entrepreneurship.
2.6. Recognising opportunities

While no consensus has been reached on the necessary behavioural patterns and actions to qualify entrepreneurship, there is widespread agreement that opportunity recognition is a central entrepreneurial attribute (Chell, 2007). However, although elements of opportunities may be ‘recognised’, there is argument that opportunities are made, not found (Ardichvili, Cardozo, & Ray, 2003). Ardichvili et al. (2003) contend that entrepreneurs develop their opportunities in a multi-stage process, and that the entrepreneur’s personality traits, social networks, and prior knowledge, foster an ‘entrepreneurial alertness’ to business opportunities. This does not take into account that the entrepreneur often wishes to realise an opportunity despite the fact they may not have all the resources they require at their disposal (Chell, 2007).

What could become an opportunity may appear as a loosely-defined market need, or under-employed resources and capabilities, including new technology that is yet to find a market or application (Ardichvili et al., 2003; Kirzner, 1997).

2.7. Creating ‘social value’

Definitions of social entrepreneurship often refer to activities that aim to create ‘social value’. The creation of social value (occasionally referred to as social wealth), is generally accepted as an aim of the social entrepreneur, however discussions on social entrepreneurship do not enter much detail on what the concept of social value actually means. Social value has been referred to as “stimulation of social change” (Lewis, 2013, p. 812), and the “basic and long-standing needs of society” (Certo & Miller, 2008, p. 267). Corner and Ho (2010) discussed social value creation as “resolving social issues such as generating income for the economically disadvantaged or delivering medical supplies to poverty-stricken areas of the globe and requires innovation just as economic value creation in the commercial sector does” (p. 636). In creating social value, the social entrepreneur addresses social problems and works out ways to generate solutions (Thompson, 2002). Weerawardena and Mort (2006) later provided a conceptualisation of social value creation, which was cited as being “the product of the interaction between innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk management; and subject to the social mission, sustainability, and the operating environment” (Swanson & Zhang, 2010, p. 77).
2.8. Innovation in social entrepreneurship

In the literature on social entrepreneurship, there is general consensus on the significance of innovation processes and outcomes. Joseph Schumpeter, the Austrian 20th century economist, had described entrepreneurs as innovators who drove the ‘creative-destructive’ process of capitalism (Dees, 1998). While Schumpeter (1934) had been referring to commercial entrepreneurship, the same applies for social entrepreneurs in their pursuit of creating social value.

Innovation can be considered to be “the creation of something new rather than simply the replication of existing enterprises or practices” (Austin et al., 2006, p. 2). Innovation in social entrepreneurship can occur in outright invention, or the adaptation of someone else’s novelty to be used to create or distribute social value (Peredo & McLean, 2006). A Schumpeterian view of social innovation in social entrepreneurship, is of the “Creation of newer, more effective social systems designed to replace existing ones when they are ill-suited to address significant social needs” (Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009, p. 523). This social innovation view of social entrepreneurship echoes the ideology of social entrepreneurship as a concept that involves pattern-breaking change (Martin & Osberg, 2007).

2.9. Sustainable development

The terms ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’, as noted by Hart (2005), often have an implied meaning, and that in conversation “one may quickly discover that although the words ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ are being used, the speakers are using them to mean different things” (p. 21). These concepts mean different things to different people, which is unsurprising as there are numerous interpretations, derived from a variety of disciplines to meet different requirements. Frazier (1997) discussed the use and meaning of the concept of ‘sustainable development’, noting that ‘sustainable development’ when defined in environmental terms had a very different meaning to the term when defined in contemporary economic or industrial values, and that sustainable development for the wealthy was unlikely to look like sustainable development for the poor. In any context, the issue of sustainability raises a variety of questions. For example, in the context of natural resources, one has to ask what should be sustained, what level should it be
sustained at, how long should it be sustained for, and who should it be sustained for? (Maser, 1992).

‘Development’, as defined in the World Conservation Strategy in 1980, is “the modification of the biosphere and the application of human, financial, living and non-living resources to satisfy human needs and improve the quality of human life. For development to be sustainable it must take account of social and ecological factors, as well as economic ones; of the living and non-living resource base; and of the long term as well as the short term advantages and disadvantages of alternative actions” (International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), & World Wildlife Fund (WWF), 1980, p. 3). A later view that had a greater concentration on humans was offered by the United Nations Development Programme (1995), which stated in the Human Development Report 1995, that it had “consistently defined the basic objective of development as enlarging people’s choices” (p. 1). There was continued support for this view in the Human Development Report 2014, which reiterated that stance, adding that “Human development involves removing the barriers that hold people back in their freedom to act” (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2014, p. 5).

The UNDP’s stance on human development is one that concentrates on humans’ standard of living, but it is not exclusive of other interpretations of ‘development’ either. Social, ecological, and economic factors all impact on quality of human life and on human development. Regarding sustainable development, the UNDP states that “Sustained progress in human development is a matter of expanding people’s choices and keeping those choices secure” (2014, p. 17). This theme of expansion supports Frazier’s (1997) view of sustainable development, which is about “maintaining the process of growth” (p. 189).

The process of growth is one that involves continuous change. In sustainable development this includes the transition toward sustainable products and processes, and a swing in the balance of priorities, such as the compromise between environmental protection and poverty relief, or the material needs of the present versus those of the future (Hall, Daneke, & Lenox, 2010). The process is also evolutionary. Bagheri and Hjorth (2007) contend that “planning for sustainable development should be ‘process-based’ – rather than ‘fixed-goal’ – oriented” (p. 83). In this view,
sustainable development is not a fixed target that needs to be reached through a series of decisions, but an ideal without a known end point. It is also no longer an issue that revolves around the natural resources, and the environment. Debates about sustainability have grown to incorporate economic and social dimensions as well (e.g., Dempsey, Bramley, Power, & Brown, 2011).

2.10. The role of entrepreneurship in sustainable development

Many have asked, primarily through the lens of environmental sustainability, whether market-based solutions are viable in progression toward sustainable development. Efforts used to support environmental sustainability have typically come from four incentives, through 1) government regulation and control, 2) stakeholder action such as activism, 3) ethical motivation such as corporate social responsibility, and 4) in order to pursue competitive advantage through reduced costs or increased revenue from innovation (York & Venkataraman, 2010). However, the ways in which corporations or entrepreneurs can support sustainable development are not well understood. Research suggests that only a limited number of companies have adopted sustainability at the strategic level (Morrish, Miles, & Polonsky, 2011), and that a company communicating messages of ‘sustainability’ must report their sustainability performance, or their financial performance may suffer (Lourenço, Branco, Curto, & Eugénio, 2012).

Notably, research on the use of entrepreneurship in sustainable development largely excludes social entrepreneurship. As social entrepreneurship generally aims to address social problems and deliver social value, it seems like an activity that is well suited to addressing the many social (and economic) issues of sustainable development. Hall et al. (2010) noted that while social entrepreneurs may, they do not necessarily have to engage in activities that support sustainable development. However entrepreneurship, which is specifically targeting sustainable development, could be motivated by opportunity recognition, or a requirement for social improvement (Hall et al., 2010). Entrepreneurship that is aimed at sustainable development appears to be complementary to social entrepreneurship, however this does not mean it can be considered social entrepreneurship. There is no reason that for-profit corporations cannot engage in entrepreneurship to solve sustainable development problems. This is
the lens through which most research has examined the role of entrepreneurship in sustainable development.

Entrepreneurs, when taking action, can create new markets and not merely capitalise on existing ones (Sarasvathy, 2001). This echoes the Schumpeterian view, which supports innovation and the creative-destructive process, primarily for the purpose of creating new markets and forcing the economic structure to evolve. However, the creative-destructive process is no longer viewed as relevant only to commercial entrepreneurship and the for-profit corporation, with Zahra et al. (2009) and Martin and Osberg (2007) commenting on the role of the innovation process in delivering newer, more effective solutions to social needs.

2.11. The New Zealand background and context

In New Zealand, the social enterprise sector is in its infancy (Grant, 2008; Kaplan, 2013). As of mid-2015, only two notable studies on the New Zealand social economy have been carried out, the first by Kaplan (2013), a visiting Fulbright scholar from the U.S. who wrote the report Growing the next generation of social entrepreneurs in New Zealand, and the second by Jennings (2014), commissioned by the New Zealand Community Economic Development Trust to write Community economic development: Understanding the New Zealand context.

Social entrepreneurship practice in New Zealand is ahead of government policy and academic research, and it was noted by Jennings (2014) who stated that “there is a lack of a policy framework and resource allocation from central and local government, and there has been minimal research carried out in the New Zealand context, compared to overseas” (p. 7). This echoed the views previously expressed by Kaplan, who wrote in a November 2013 email to New Zealand stakeholders, that

My greatest surprise during my fellowship was central government’s disinterest in social enterprise. This reticence was not shared by local leaders. Why isn’t central government analysing opportunities to catalyse social entrepreneurship and innovation in New Zealand? I continue to be perplexed by the lack of openness to promising opportunities. (Jennings, 2014, p. 14)
These issues were despite “a history of not-for-profits with trading operations and a strong alignment with Maori culture and values” (Kaplan, 2013, p. v).

Some progress was made, when on 14 February 2014, the Minister for the Community and Voluntary Sector, Jo Goodhew, announced a $1.27 million investment to be put toward the development of support systems for emerging social enterprises (Goodhew, 2014). At the same time, the New Zealand Government officially acknowledged the importance of the growing social economy, and set out a position statement on social enterprise, which stated that: “The Government, through its agencies, commits to identify any policy barriers to social enterprise growth and to work collaboratively to create an enabling, supportive environment where more social enterprises can grow and attract investment.” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2014).

Jennings’ (2014) report, which had been critical of the Government’s apparent unawareness of the importance of community economic development and social enterprise, had only been completed in the previous month. Some of the specific priority areas identified in Jennings’ (2014) report, such as the “Development of an enabling, supportive and effective policy framework” (p. 14), and “Establishment of a social enterprise investment fund” (p. 14), had been acknowledged in the Government’s position statement. However, the Government’s position statement did not outline what policy action it would take in order to build support for social entrepreneurs, other than to identify barriers. The Ākina Foundation (formerly known as the Hikurangi foundation until May 2014), a registered charity supporting start-up social enterprises, later said the Government had taken ‘positive steps’, but stressed the need for further Government support, in a briefing for incoming ministers following the September 2014 New Zealand General Election (Ākina Foundation, 2014).

Kaplan’s (2013) study of New Zealand’s social enterprise sector noted the unique strengths of the millennial generation, whose diverse networks, technological savvy and a passion for social change allow them to create new products and services aimed to deliver social value. These views are not unique to New Zealand. As the next generation of social entrepreneurs, the importance of millennials was echoed by environmentalist Nicanor Perlas, who gave the talk Innovating the solidarity economy on 25 September 2014 at the National Library of New Zealand, Wellington, while visiting from the Philippines. Perlas discussed that there are young individuals who
cannot see themselves as being part of what they observe to be a ‘damaging’ economic system, and with their behaviour following from their beliefs, there has been a groundswell of new values amongst the youth (Perlas, 2014). One such individual was fellow Filipino Cherrie Atilano, a World Economic Forum ‘Global Shaper’, and co-founder and social entrepreneur of Agricool, an organisation which aims to make agriculture ‘sexy, cool and smart’. Speaking at a talk organised by Ministry of Awesome in Christchurch on 4 February 2015, on a visit sponsored by the Asia New Zealand Foundation, Atilano discussed her aims to uplift the dignity of farmers in the Philippines, putting farmers and not profits first, and using the sustainable impact that can be delivered through entrepreneurship, or ‘Agripreneurship’ (Atilano, 2015). Such was her passion for helping the agricultural community, that Atilano turned down a Fulbright scholarship to study in the U.S., instead staying in the Philippines to support the farmers she was working with at the time, and help to send their children to school (Atilano, 2015).

In the educational sector, social entrepreneurship is a topic which is largely yet to arise. Kaplan (2013) noted the importance of tertiary education, which provides an environment in which to explore identity, values, capabilities and career paths, and where students are able to come together and form multi-disciplinary start-up teams to test prototypes and develop creative, viable business models. Similarly, but simply, the Ākina Foundation (2014) advocated for the use of “Targeted initiatives in the secondary and tertiary education sectors” (p. 10), with the intention to develop young social entrepreneurs. In Jennings’ (2014) interviews with social entrepreneurs, education was a topic discussed by many, with one respondent commenting that “There is a lack of social enterprise training in primary, secondary and tertiary education” (p. 76), and another saying that, “We need some level of significant education in this field. It needs a paradigm shift. This can take place in a revolutionary sense, but can leave behind a lack of understanding – and education can create a bridge” (p. 76). Hence, Jennings (2014) report highlighted the inclusion of social enterprise and community economic development education at the secondary and tertiary level as a priority area for government in her findings.

Jennings’ (2014) report on the context surrounding community economic development in New Zealand was strongly focused on supporting local people and
local economies. Research for the report included interviews with 97 social entrepreneurs and community economic development practitioners, across many cities, small towns and rural areas throughout New Zealand, and involved in a diverse range of trading activities. The report summarised the issues at hand, and provided recommendations to community economic development and social enterprise practitioners, local government, central government, philanthropic organisations and financial institutions, the private sector and academic institutions. Jennings (2014) notes that “A thriving CED [community economic development] and social enterprise eco-system requires a cross-sectoral response” (p. 18). This cross-sectoral response is supported by Kaplan (2013) who recommended the assembly of a diverse social enterprise team within Government, “to propose and develop national policy framework, and create collaborative networks in government, private and community sectors” (p. 51).

2.12. Contextual influences

Despite the limited support available, there are a broad range of activities taking place in New Zealand under the umbrella of social enterprise. Grant (2008) proposed four unique cultural influences shaping New Zealand’s social enterprise, which were the “socio-cultural norms embedded in New Zealand culture; the neoliberal reforms initiated by successive governments during the 1980s… the Treaty of Waitangi… and the impact of and on New Zealanders as international citizens” (p. 9). A culture of ‘Kiwi’ ‘number-eight-wire’ ingenuity has helped New Zealanders to achieve more with less, partly necessitated by geographic remoteness, and because of the absence of entrenched tradition (Campbell-Hunt et al., 2001; Green & Campbell, 2004). The famous ingenuity of New Zealanders is often acknowledged as a source of innovation, leading to competitive or niche opportunities (Grant, 2008). However, the resource constraints that force this ingenuity and innovation are not unique to New Zealand, or entrepreneurship. Lumpkin et al. (2013) pointed out that resource constraints are a feature of all entrepreneurship, and that they are not one of social entrepreneurship’s special features. The challenge faced by social entrepreneurs is more the lack of access to resources, which provides obstacles for social entrepreneurs to overcome (Austin et al., 2006; Lumpkin et al., 2013).
The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, the second contextual influence identified by Grant (2008), left results that were “wide spread and hard hitting” (p. 13). Neoliberalism is the economically-driven political philosophy that supports the dominance of the free market and private enterprise, and the individualism and competition that comes with it (Burkett, 2011). In New Zealand, the reforms were swiftly implemented, unlike those carried out in many other western countries at the time, because of a lack of bureaucracy and structure to buffer the changes (Grant, 2008). Increasing ‘efficiency’ had been a key focus of the reforms, the final wave of which had a strong ‘business’ focus, introducing contract arrangements so that some of the services previously provided by the Government could be opened up to the market (Grant, 2008). This created opportunities for new (and existing) organisations to establish themselves as contractors, providing services such as Maori health and education, as well as other organisations tailored to meet the aims of specific groups (Tennant, Sanders, O’Brien, & Castle, 2006). However, these organisations did not face an easy path, in an environment constrained by uncertainty, further compounded by the need to compete for fixed-term contracts (Grant, 2008). Having to depend on fixed-term funding negatively impacts strategic planning, negatively impacts staff morale, and increases compliance costs (Tennant et al., 2006). The constraints associated with competition for funding often meant these organisations were forced to compromise their core mission activities, with an increasing risk of resource dependency (S. R. Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Stone, 1996). Further compromising the pursuit of mission are the typically government-defined outputs, which are often not aligned with the aims of the organisation (Boston, 2000; Tennant et al., 2006), and processes that are often oriented to meet government reporting requirements, but which overlook the quality of service delivery, and client needs (Grant, 2008). Tennant et al.’s (2006) report on the contracting model in New Zealand noted a “growing distrust and a sense of power imbalance between the state and the (community) sector” (p. 14). In efforts to maintain independence, both financially and politically, Grant (2008) suggests that social entrepreneurship may provide a viable option for these organisations, allowing them to retain their advocacy voice if needed, with sustainable non-government revenue streams meaning they do not have to worry about ‘biting the hand that feeds them’ when speaking out about public policy.
English and Maori copies of the Treaty of Waitangi (Tiriti o Waitangi, in Maori), what is now considered to be New Zealand’s founding document, were signed in 1840 by representatives from the British Crown and Maori chiefs from a number of Iwi (tribal groups). Neither version was an exact translation of the other (Tennant et al., 2006). The British viewed the Treaty to be a mandate for the Crown to govern New Zealand, while Maori understanding was that it assured their continued rangatiratanga (chieftainship or sovereignty) in exchange for British protection (Byrnes, 2006). The English version of the Treaty, for the British, was a means of securing authority over New Zealand with the Maori surrendering their sovereignty and independence, but the Maori version of the document “split the powers of authority into two: kawanatanga (governorship), which went to the British, and rangatiratanga, which was to be retained by Maori” (Byrnes, 2006, p. 2). The historic events of injustice which followed, such as the confiscation of Maori land and the accompanied loss of access to cultural and natural resources, eventually came to be recognised as being contrary to the principles of the Treaty. Debate over the Treaty continues today, and has been “the focus of Maori struggles ever since” (Jones, Pringle, & Shepherd, 2000, p. 367).

In 1975, the New Zealand Government introduced the Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975), which provided for the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal as a means to investigate Maori claims concerning breaches of the Treaty’s principles. Government policy for Maori had evolved in an environment that was moderately receptive to unresolved past injustices, and the Act was a formal recognition that the Government did have obligations related to the Treaty. It followed after persistent efforts by Maori to have their grievances acknowledged (Sullivan & Margaritis, 2000). Yet, while the Waitangi Tribunal had been established in 1975, it was not until 1985 that its jurisdiction was broadened to include claims dating back to 1840, in a momentous recognition of the Maori social justice claims (Jones et al., 2000). Around the same time, policy changes were introduced that included devolving responsibility in social areas to Maori organisations (due to the aforementioned 1980s Government reforms), and measures to protect the Maori language, Te Reo Maori (Palmer, 2007). Former Deputy Prime Minster of New Zealand from 1984-1989, and Prime Minister from 1989-1990, Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC wrote that,
Within the cabinets and caucuses of both National and Labour [the two main opposing parties in New Zealand Government] the policies were tremendously controversial for the basic reason that significant elements of the population were downright opposed to all these developments or uneasy about them. (Palmer, 2007, p. 382)

The significance of the Treaty in the development of New Zealand as a nation has been recognised by successive governments, so that the Treaty’s principles, and the obligations under it, are now a recognised part of the formal process (Grant, 2008). The Treaty’s principles have also become ingrained in New Zealand law, however the statutes which incorporate the Treaty do so “in some form or other, but these do give rise to interpretive differences due to the vague and ambiguous meanings of the Treaty provisions themselves, even before encountering the differences between the English and Maori versions of the Treaty” (Palmer, 2007, p. 383). The Treaty’s influence was evident in the Local Government Act (2002), which in addition to the community well-being measures of social, economic and environmental factors, included Hawkes’ (2001) measure of culture. Culture is significantly important to Maori, and because of this the Act was heralded for encompassing Government obligations under the Treaty (Kaplan, 2013). In what could be viewed as a regressive step, when the Act was amended in 2013, the references to well-being were removed and replaced by an emphasis on the delivery of core services (Jennings, 2014).

A March 2015 summary of Treaty settlements, of which there have been 68, indicates the dollar value of settlements to date varies widely. A settlement of $43,931 was made with the Rotoma Hapu (sub-tribe) in 1996/97, $170m was settled with the Tainui Iwi in 1994/95, and later another $170m with the Ngai Tahu Iwi in 1997/98 (Office of Treaty Settlements, 2015). These cash settlements, in addition to new-found political and economic power, allowed Maori to move increasingly toward building their own organisations during the 1990s (Jones et al., 2000). Many Iwi and Hapu have now accumulated significant asset bases, from which they can draw upon to invest in the development of their future (Grant, 2008).

In Maori culture, the Western concepts of volunteering and philanthropy do not translate easily, with many Maori non-profit organisations established under tribal
systems that recognise Kaupapa Maori, reflecting Maori conventions rather than Western beliefs (Grant, 2008). Kaupapa Maori “literally means the Maori way or agenda, a term used to describe traditional Maori ways of doing, being and thinking, encapsulated in a Maori world view or cosmology” (Henry & Pene, 2001, p. 235). In complete contrast to the Western ‘economy of exploitation’, introduced to New Zealand as a result of British colonisation, Maori culture had traditionally been grounded by an ‘economy of affection’ (Henare, 1994). In Maori society, social economic objectives tend to underpin financial objectives (Reheina, Sisley, & Modlik, 2007). A Maori individual’s tribal association, and heritage, will spur expectations and obligations that are unrecognised in Western conceptualisations of non-profit and community organisations (Tennant et al., 2006). Any concept of Maori enterprise and/or development must consider Maori collective aspirations, including key concepts such as whanaungatanga (kinship), kotahitanga (unity), kaitiakitanga (guardianship) and mana whenua (ownership and control of land) (NZ Institute of Economic Research, 2003). The Iwi overseeing Maori service providers, which operate across a range of sectors including health, education, environmental, tourism and social services, are guided by these belief systems (Grant, 2008). Grant (2008) contends that these organisations are “unique exemplars of social enterprise in New Zealand” (p. 16).

The fourth contextual influence on social enterprise in New Zealand, identified by Grant (2008), is globalisation, and the increasing trend for New Zealanders to become ‘international citizens’. This has influenced New Zealand in many ways. For example, Grant (2008) cites a growing trend for New Zealand youth to emulate Los Angeles gang culture, as ’glamorised’ through rap and hip-hop music, and music videos (Tupuola, 2004). This is nothing new – New Zealand youth gang culture has a history of overseas influence, beginning in the 1960s (Centre for Social Research and Evaluation, 2006). Grant (2008) also cites the ‘global market’, which can be seen in many aspects of commerce education, with the adaptation and adoption of American business models. Aspects of New Zealand’s public policy community planning, and development models, have also been adapted from UK frameworks (Grant, 2008).

For the social entrepreneur, globalisation has been identified as a factor which contributes to rapid change in the environment surrounding the non-profit sector (Mort
et al., 2003). Further contributing are developments in technology, which now provide an unprecedented level of international interconnectivity (R. Smith et al., 2014).

Being from a country with relatively few close neighbours, travel is an important activity undertaken by New Zealanders that has contributed to its culture. The ‘OE’ (overseas experience), has become a rite of passage, typically incorporating travel with employment overseas. These experiences are recognised as having a beneficial influence on personal and career development, as people then have a wider range of experiences under their belt. New Zealanders overseas are often compelled to return home to the ‘Kiwi’ lifestyle, complemented by their global experience, and bringing home a greater skill set and an awareness of opportunities and the global context.

Grant (2008) suggests that New Zealand social enterprise, which could draw on the experience of overseas ventures but retain a fit with New Zealand culture and ideology, may be a way to address the unique challenges and opportunities associated with globalisation. Hawkes (2001) discussed how Australia saw the rise of ‘distinctiveness’ projects around the country, which provided recognition that community needs were specific and unequal, each with unique aspirations, and that communities often saw a desire to be viewed as special, or better. In New Zealand, distinctly ‘Kiwi’ and Maori social entrepreneurship, built up from local culture and serving local needs, may address some of these challenges.

In June 2013, the New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs published a report that investigated the legal structures that are used by, and suitable for, social enterprise. Currently, there is no existing legal structure specifically tailored for social enterprise in New Zealand, though the report states that “a new legal structure was not viewed as an immediate priority by most people interviewed during this report’s development” (Department of Internal Affairs, 2013, p. 4).

2.13. A sequence of earthquakes in Christchurch, New Zealand

The people of Christchurch felt as if they had dodged a bullet, when on Saturday, 4 September 2010, they were shaken awake by an earthquake at 4:35am. It measured 7.1 on the Richter scale, centred 40 kilometres away from the city, and 10
kilometres deep. Although some had been injured, there were widespread feelings of wonder that no lives were lost.

Christchurch had become used to the continuing barrage of aftershocks, but when another earthquake occurred at 12:51pm on Tuesday, 22 February 2011, its inhabitants recognised the significantly greater magnitude of the event immediately. It was a violent rupture, lasting only seconds, but leaving widespread damage in its wake. Measuring 6.3 on the Richter scale, but centred only 10 kilometres away and 5.9 kilometres deep, peak acceleration in the central city had measured 1.88g.

185 people died as a result of the earthquake. Inside collapsed buildings, some survivors required limbs to be amputated before they were freed. 1500-2000 people had been injured, 164 of them seriously. At 11:28am the next day, Minister of Civil Defence, John Carter, declared a state of national emergency, for the first time in New Zealand’s history.

2.14. Chapter summary

The literature review has established that no unifying conceptualisation of social entrepreneurship exists, and that research typically focuses on comparisons with commercial entrepreneurship, or the investigation of social entrepreneurship as a phenomenon. An investigation into the New Zealand context for social entrepreneurship found that local culture, in particular Maori culture, has strongly influenced the development of existing non-profit organisations. It also finds that social entrepreneurship receives little attention from the government and education sectors.

Without a unified theoretical basis for social entrepreneurship research, the research question for this thesis is deliberately exploratory. In order to understand how social entrepreneurship develops following a disaster, it asks;

How did social entrepreneurship develop in response to the Christchurch earthquake of February 2011?
3. Method

3.1. Introduction

This chapter explains the research methods used in order to address the research question presented at the end of the literature review. It begins by introducing the case study as a suitable method for investigating social entrepreneurship, and further explains the usefulness of case study research for the development of theory. The method of case sampling and selection is then described, followed by descriptions of data collection, ethical considerations, the presentation of findings, and provisions for trustworthiness.

3.2. Case study research on social entrepreneurship

In order to understand how social entrepreneurship develops following a disaster, the multiple case study approach will be used. In a broad comment on the usefulness of case study research, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) remark that the multiple case study “typically answers research questions that address ‘how’ and ‘why’ in unexplored research areas particularly well” (p. 26). Given there is limited understanding of how social entrepreneurship develops after disaster, and how it may contribute to post-disaster recovery, a ‘how’ research question has been asked.

Social entrepreneurship, now becoming established as a field of research, is yet to be well understood, and no dominant concept of social entrepreneurship has emerged so far (Choi & Majumdar, 2014). In order to provide a basis for analysis, the literature review features a definition and framework that will be used for interpretation of the case studies.

Most research on social entrepreneurship, as observed by Mair and Martí (2006), is based on the analysis of social entrepreneurship as a phenomenon. The reason for this is a lack of readily available information on social entrepreneurship, especially when compared to the amount of information available on commercial entrepreneurship. This is not simply because little attention has been paid to social entrepreneurship, but because they are not as prevalent – Gras, Moss and Lumpkin (2015) note that “social ventures are more disbursed and rare” (p. 59).
Method

This shortage of readily available information on social entrepreneurship compels researchers to investigate examples comprehensively, studying them in great detail. The case study, then, is well-suited to the investigation of social entrepreneurship, because it provides “rich, empirical descriptions of particular instances of a phenomenon” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). It is well suited to research topics – such as the development of post-disaster social entrepreneurship – in which existing theory is inadequate (Chetty, 1996).

When selecting a research approach, there are several important factors for the researcher to consider. Yin (2009) outlines three major factors that affect the suitability of a research approach:

- The nature of questions to be answered,
- the extent of control over behavioural events, and
- the degree of focus on current, as opposed to past events.

The implications of these factors on research methods has been further described by Yin (2009) in Table 3.1:

Table 3.1 - Choosing a research strategy
(Factors compatible with this research are in bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method:</th>
<th>Form of research question:</th>
<th>Requires control of behavioural events?</th>
<th>Focus on contemporary events?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experiment</td>
<td><strong>How, why?</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Who, what, where, how many, how much?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archival analysis</td>
<td>Who, what, where, how many, how much?</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td><strong>How, why?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case study</td>
<td><strong>How, why?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Yin, 2009, p. 8)
Method

This table reveals there are multiple methods appropriate for asking the ‘how’ research question that forms the basis for this thesis. It then helps the researcher to narrow down the list of suitable methods, by identifying which methods require behaviour to be altered or influenced, and which methods are suitable for studying contemporary or historical events. The research for this thesis aims to investigate the development of post-disaster social entrepreneurship as a phenomenon, and does not require the manipulation of human behaviour. Thus, an experiment is not a suitable method, even though it can be used to address ‘how’ research questions about contemporary events. A historical method, also useful for addressing ‘how’ research questions, is not suitable for this research either as the research topic investigates contemporary events (post-earthquake social entrepreneurship in Christchurch).

The only research method suitable for this research, according to Yin’s (2009) table, is a case study, as these are suited to answering a ‘how’ research question regarding a contemporary event, and do not require manipulation of behaviour.

Case studies are a useful approach for allowing the researcher to gain a deeper and more detailed understanding, of the type typically required in order to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Rowley, 2002). Siggelkow (2007) argued for the persuasiveness of case studies, cautioning against their use for instances where an author believes “not much is known” (p. 21), but supporting them as interesting examples of how A can lead to B, and allowing a reader to see the world, not just the literature. This supports the views of Bartunek, Runes and Ireland (2006), who stress the importance of interesting research, and recognise the importance of empirical research which not only “tests or extends management theory, but also research that develops such theory” (p. 9). Siggelkow (2007) further contended that “research involving case data can usually get much closer to theoretical constructs and provide a much more persuasive argument about causal forces than broad empirical research can” (p. 22-23). These perspectives posit case study research as a method which is best used to build on existing theory, using real-life examples to support persuasive arguments that provide additional illustration for theoretical constructs, particularly when examining causal forces.

Case studies are, as stated by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), the basis from which to develop theory inductively. While a single case study can serve as a distinct
Method

experiment, standing on its own as a unit of analysis, using a multiple case study can allow for replication, contrast, and extension to emerging theory (Yin, 1994). However, while a laboratory experiment isolates phenomena from its context, the case study emphasises the rich contexts in which real-world phenomena occur (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). This emphasis on context supports the suitability of case studies as a method for this thesis, as the research topic explores the impact of a contextual event (the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake) on the social entrepreneurship sector.

3.3. Building theory from the multiple case study

Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) state that theory building from cases is “a research strategy that involves using one or more cases to create theoretical constructs, propositions and/or midrange theory from case-based, empirical evidence” (p. 25). This depicts the case study (and hence the multiple case study) as a process in which case study data must be collected before theory can be developed. On the contrary, Yin (2009) states that “theory development prior to the collection of any case study data is an essential step in doing case studies” (p. 36).

When using case studies to test theory, according to Yin (2009), the researcher must develop theoretical constructs before collecting data. This perspective of the use of case studies depicts the case study as a tool used primarily to test, rather than develop, theory. However, the requirements for these theoretical constructs are simple – they are not expected to be grand or masterful – but are useful to provide a sufficient blueprint for the study (Yin, 2009). The aim for this blueprint, Sutton and Staw (1995) note, is to provide “a [hypothetical] story about why acts, events, structure and thoughts occur” (p. 378). This provides guidance for the case study, determining what data needs to be collected, and how it should be analysed (Yin, 2009).

This research is exploratory in nature, and does not have the benefit of a cohesive base of literature from which to build theoretical constructs prior to data collection. Responding to calls for further exploration of social entrepreneurship (e.g., Hoogendoorn, Pennings, & Thurik, 2010), this research aims to build theory inductively. Siggelkow (2007) supports the use of inductive theory building in areas where limited theoretical knowledge exists regarding a particular phenomenon – such as social entrepreneurship that develops as a response to disaster – and comments,
“inductive research strategy that lets theory emerge from the data can be a valuable starting point” (p. 21).

While a single case study can be useful to illustrate theory, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) argue the multiple case study yields a stronger basis for theory building, with “more robust theory because the propositions are more deeply grounded in varied empirical evidence” (p. 27). A single case study, they say, is useful for providing a rich description of a phenomenon, but using multiple case studies provides a stronger base on which to build theory. This approach offers greater robustness, generalisability and testability, and allows for comparisons which can “clarify whether an emergent finding is simply idiosyncratic to a single case or consistently replicated by several cases” (p. 27).

3.4. Case sampling and selection

Theoretical sampling was used to select the case studies for this research, which were selected based on their ability to illuminate the research topic. When building theory inductively using case studies, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) note that “the purpose of the research is to develop theory, not to test it, and so theoretical (not random or stratified) sampling is appropriate” (p. 27).

Accordingly, in this research cases have been sampled based on their suitability for illuminating the research topic. To be included in the sample, cases had to fulfil a set of criteria. Firstly, a case needed to satisfy Kaplan’s (2013) criteria for determining if an organisation is a social enterprise. These criteria have previously been discussed in the literature review. The reason social enterprises were sought out to be included in the sample was that they are relatively easy to locate and identify, as the manifestations of socially entrepreneurial processes and behaviours. Sampled cases were also required to have developed following the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake – as such, social enterprises operating in the city before the earthquake were not considered due to their incompatibility with the research topic. Sampled cases were also required to be located in Christchurch, and to have addressed the earthquake in some way.

These characteristics were easily observable, making case sampling a relatively straightforward process. The cases that were eventually selected were also based in
different industries, which aligns with best practice concerning theoretical spread (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). Following careful consideration, the following entrepreneurs were invited to participate in this research:

Table 3.2 – Research participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Freerange Press</th>
<th>1. Freerange Press</th>
<th>Barnaby Bennett</th>
<th>Interviewed</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28 November 2014</td>
<td>Transcript</td>
<td>4 February</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>approved:</td>
<td>2015</td>
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</tbody>
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<td>approved:</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3.5. Data collection and sources

Research for this thesis has used a variety of sources, including interviews, participant-observation, direct-observation, documentation and secondary data. Using a variety of sources is supported by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), who stated that “Case studies can accommodate a rich variety of data sources, including interviews, archival data, survey data, ethnographies, and observations” (p. 28). By using several sources of data to explore a phenomenon in its context, using not one but a variety of lenses, multiple facets of the phenomenon can be revealed and understood (Baxter & Jack, 2008). The use of multiple data sources is a strategy that also enhances data credibility (Patton, 1990; Yin, 2009). In the case study, data from multiple sources are not treated as individual sets, but as pieces of a ‘puzzle’, converging during the analysis stage and contributing to understanding of the whole situation (Baxter & Jack, 2008). By allowing a more thorough examination of the case, multiple sources also allow a researcher to become deeply knowledgeable about each case, thus allowing new insights about the topic to emerge (Chetty, 1996).

Social entrepreneurship, as an emergent, contextual and highly multifaceted area of research, would benefit greatly from analysis through a wide variety of lenses.
Method

Shaw and Bruin (2013) note that “social entrepreneurship and social innovation offer numerous possibilities for future areas of research, both in terms of topic and methodology” (p. 743).

Different sources, however, contribute to understanding in different ways. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) commented that “as research incorporates more cases and moves away from everyday phenomena… interviews often become the primary data source” (p. 28). They further contend that “Interviews are a highly efficient way to gather rich, empirical data, especially when the phenomenon of interest is highly episodic and infrequent” (p. 28).

3.6. Ethical considerations

This research involved human participants, and therefore all data gathered from participants was undertaken with approval from the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. A low risk application was submitted, and accepted on the 2nd of October, 2014 (See appendix item 8.3, pg. 126).

Consideration was given to the needs and interests of participants throughout the study. Participants were informed that their participation was completely voluntary, and that they had the right to withdraw from the study at any time. For the information sheet and consent forms provided to participants, please see appendix items 8.1 and 8.2 on pages 123-124.

3.7. Transcription and semantics

In order to facilitate their analysis, interviews were first transcribed. The process of transcription was described by Kvale (2007) as “a translation from one narrative mode – oral discourse – into another narrative mode – written discourse” (p. 93). This is a necessary process, because it “structures the interview conversations in a form amenable to closer analysis” (p. 94). Following an initial verbatim transcription, the majority of repetitions, corrections, false starts, filled pauses, and verbal tics were subsequently removed, with the exception of those which characterised the tone of the topic of discussion. Kvale (2007) notes that the inclusion of apparent speech irregularities are necessary for detailed linguistic analysis, but accepts that a more literary style can “highlight nuances of a statement and facilitate communication of the meaning of the subject’s stories to readers” (p. 98).
Method

Completed transcripts were sent to interviewees, who were asked to review them and provide feedback. These were sent as editable documents, and the interviewees were able to make changes and provide additional feedback. Interview data was not included in any analysis until validated transcripts had been returned.

3.8. Presentation of findings

Each case study was presented individually, and structured as a narrative with discussion that followed the activities that social enterprises undertake. This allowed the reader to first understand how the organisations went about their work, before the narrative culminated with an investigation of the organisations’ major projects, providing interesting and detailed examples of the outcomes of their work. The case studies have been followed by a chapter that highlights the findings and discusses them in relation to existing frameworks and literature.

3.9. Limitations

Using a multiple case study offers many advantages, though at the same time there are some drawbacks. To start, “All case study researchers are conscious of being swamped in data” (Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 2001, p. 8). The volume of data collected during case study research inevitably means that not all information can be included, and Hodkinson and Hodkinson (2001) note that “even the most detailed of those stories is a significant simplification of what we were told” (p. 8). Because of the enormous volume of information collected, it is entirely possible that revisiting the data, or undertaking a new analysis, is likely to uncover new themes or points of interest that had not previously been discussed.

The generalisability of multiple case study findings is also difficult to determine, because the replication of themes between cases does not conclude generalisability. Although Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) comment that the multiple case study can help to “clarify whether an emergent finding is simply idiosyncratic to a single case or consistently replicated by several cases” (p. 27), these conclusions may not transfer to the wider population. It is possible that emergent theory may only apply to the selected cases.
3.10. Provisions for trustworthiness

Case study researchers often need to defend against criticism for being subjective and biased (Siggelkow, 2007). However, Baxter and Jack (2008) note that “Case study research design principles lend themselves to including numerous strategies that promote data credibility or ‘truth value’” (p. 556). In order to support this credibility and improve confidence in this study, the following provisions for trustworthiness have been used:

- The use of multiple data sources allowed for data triangulation, by allowing the researcher to compare data for consistency between sources. This is a “primary strategy that can be used and would support the principle in case study research that the phenomena be viewed and explored from multiple perspectives” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 556).
- The researcher has also allowed for prolonged exposure to the phenomenon under study within its context (including as participant-observer), in order to build rapport with research participants to further clarify understanding of the details of the case.
- Research participants were provided with full copies of interview transcripts, in order to provide feedback and improve the accuracy of data collected. This collaboration ensured that the meaning in data was not lost in the process of transcribing to a literary style.
- The researcher maintained an openness for contrary findings (Yin, 2009).
- The researcher collaborated with their supervisor to check for the correctness of the emerging themes during the process of coding data.

3.11. Chapter summary

This chapter provided an overview of the method used to address the research question. It discussed the suitability of the method chosen to the topic of research, before explaining how cases were selected and their data collected. It has also provided a description of the ethical considerations that were made, the process of transcription and subsequent presentation of findings, the limitations to the research and provisions made to improve trustworthiness.
4. The Case Studies

Two organisations participated in this research, which investigates the development of social entrepreneurship that occurs as a response to disaster. The context for these case studies is Christchurch, New Zealand, following a series of major earthquakes that began during 2010. In February 2011, Christchurch experienced the most significant earthquake of this series, the event that this research focuses on. Data for the case studies was collected between late-2014 and mid-2015.

The case studies are presented individually, as a unique narrative that begins with a short introduction to their early origins. The narratives are then organised by the activities that social enterprises (as the manifestation, or outcome of social entrepreneurship) are understood to undertake by Kaplan (2013). The organisation’s purpose and social mission are discussed, followed by their supporting business model and associated financial income, their ownership structures, and decision-making models. The case studies then explore each organisation’s main projects, providing detailed examples of the work they undertake.

Findings from the case studies, and any comparisons between them, are saved for the following chapter.
4.1. Case study 1: Freerange Press

Of the two organisations presented as case studies in this thesis, the Freerange Press is unique for being the only one that originated before the 2011 earthquake. With origins in Melbourne dating back to 2007, the ultimate goal of the Freerange Press had originally been to produce 12 themed journals that focused on global contemporary issues such as politics, art, design, pirates, life for an urbanised humanity, and the general themes of the city.

When founder and central figure of the Freerange Press, Barnaby Bennett¹, first aspired to create a publication during his undergraduate studies, it was something he and his peers had discussed but did not manage to start. He said that “When we were undergrads we had talked about starting a magazine as a student body and never got round to it” (Murray, 2014). Later, it occurred to him that a publication could be used to maintain social ties, saying that “at Global Studio in Vancouver I realised there was just this enormity of interesting people out there and I was trying to find an excuse to keep us all in touch” (Murray, 2014). He added that “As time has gone on, the model has changed a bit and it’s grown into more of a conventional publishing house” (Murray, 2014).

In 2011, the earthquake on February 22nd in Christchurch drew the attention of the Freerange Press, which then went on to investigate the new issues faced by

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¹ The time and effort contributed by Barnaby Bennett during the research for this case study is gratefully acknowledged. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations in this case study are from Barnaby Bennett directly.
Case study 1: Freerange Press

Christchurch during the on-going recovery process. It worked on highly important projects which initially captured the ‘transitional’ nature of projects that arose in the city post-disaster, in the 2012 book *Christchurch: The Transitional City Pt. IV*, and later published thoughtful critique, intelligent conversation, and the range of possibilities surrounding the rebuild of central Christchurch, in the 2014 book, *Once in a Lifetime: City-building after Disaster in Christchurch*.

4.1.1. **Purpose of the organisation:**

Bennett is not from the Canterbury region, but said “my grandparents lived there for decades and my father grew up there, so I have spent a lot of time in the city and have a connection to the place” (Rowden, 2013). At the time of the February 2011 earthquake, however, Bennett had a connection to many places. While living in Melbourne, he began his PhD studies at Sydney – on the emergence of temporary and transitional architecture in Christchurch following the September 2010 earthquake – just one week before the February 22nd Christchurch earthquake. His girlfriend had also moved to Wellington, and he recalled that “the first half of 2011 was crazy, I was sort of travelling between four cities.” For many people outside of the Canterbury region, the earlier earthquake on September 4, 2010, had not received nearly as much attention. Bennett said, “I wasn’t living there at the time and I think I probably shared a similar feeling to anyone that wasn’t there, that it was a passing curiosity” (Murray, 2014). Outside Canterbury, the September 2010 earthquake had not been taken seriously, because of the miracle that nobody had died, and Bennett commented, “I think that people in the city felt they’d dodged a bullet” (Murray, 2014).

Following the February 2011 earthquake, and owing to his interests in “aid and development and sort of, architectural point-of-view, post-disaster stuff”, Bennett decided to move to Christchurch from Australia, recalling that “after about six months I was like ‘Man, this is amazing there, I’ve got to go back, go back to New Zealand and live in Christchurch.’”

Although the events in Christchurch have shaped the development of the Freerange Press, it has largely stayed true to its original values. At its heart, Bennett said, the overarching aims of the Freerange Press are to promote informed debate about the important issues of our time, especially those related to urban environments and living in cities, but at the same time, to make those conversations fun, and
accessible to all people without the requirement of any prior knowledge or understanding of jargon. None of its journals are ever discipline-based, but intentionally merge a variety of disciplines so that different people with different voices can discuss an issue from a range of perspectives. This is carried through the books as well, and Bennett said, “we expect you to be intelligent but not have any previous knowledge coming into it.”

4.1.2. The business model:

A business model is something the Freerange Press has had to adopt over time. The original concept for the Freerange Press involved producing journals that were contributed to, edited and designed, for free. These would be made available online, free of advertising, for anyone to download, and without charge. Bennett said,

One of the shifts that’s happened with Freerange, which is quite interesting, is we originally called it Freerange because we wanted it to not involve any money to begin with, it was just going to be ‘Let’s put some articles together, someone can graphic design it, make a PDF, send it out for free.’

After completion of the second issue of the Freerange Press Journal, in 2009, Bennett looked at the readership statistics and realised it was receiving little attention, saying “And I watched, like a hundred per cent of people would look at the cover, and then you get down to page six and it’s down to about ten per cent.” This prompted a decision to branch out into producing physical books, not as a replacement for the online editions, but simply so that they could be consumed as a physical product as well. Regarding the online editions, Bennett said “And I just realised that we were producing and designing this really beautiful thing, and no-one was really consuming it online. It deserved more than that.”

Printing the books also meant the Freerange Press had to become a financial operation, although print runs were small, and the books themselves were relatively cheap, Bennett said,

So we found a printer that prints them really cheap in Wellington, which is great, so they cost about $4 each to print, in really small runs,
so we print about fifty at a time. So it keeps the risk down. But inevitably, then you have to open a bank account, and you have to start invoicing, you know, and it sort of turns into a financial operation that that point.

At the time, and largely due to the small scale of the operation, it was a fairly easy model, with the main appeals at the time being “we don’t have to do the painful advertising work, we don’t have to do fundraising, and we don’t have to write fundraising applications.” This meant the Freerange Press could focus on its various projects, Bennett said, “It was to be as pure as possible about doing the work towards what we wanted to do, rather than doing work to achieve something over here.”

As an organisation, the Freerange Press has never been required to fundraise for its survival, and has no intentions of doing do in the future. Bennett said “We haven’t gone ‘Oh, we need this money to survive’, we try to keep it really light in terms of what we do, but we will fundraise for specific projects.” One example is the book *Once in a Lifetime: City-building after Disaster in Christchurch*, which required $28,000 to be raised in order to make the project viable, but Bennett said this was not much of a challenge, “because we could go ‘This is for this particular project and it’s really important’, and so, for that amount of money it was actually reasonably easy to pull together.”

A recent development of the Freerange Press business model has been the introduction of *Harvest*, a new academic publication, which carries the tagline ‘Fresh scholarship from the field’. Part of the reason for this, Bennett said, is “There’s a bit of a revenue stream doing academic books in Australia. The universities there have a bit more money and they get, you know, academics always get cred when they publish stuff.” With the original run of 12 journals coming to an end, *Harvest* represents not only a future focus of the organisation (alongside the individual projects it elects to undertake), but also a way for the organisation to make an income. The Freerange Press described *Harvest* as,

its academic imprint dedicated to examining the social and political life of architecture and contemporary cities. It offers a new academic focus and an infrastructure for an engaged community of researchers and
Case study 1: Freerange Press

writers to pursue independent, insightful and affective publishing.
(Freerange Press, 2015)

Despite the financial considerations that come with producing *Harvest*, the new publication will stay true to the values that guide the organisation;

Harvest supports accessible publishing. This includes print, digital and other media formats, Creative Commons licensing, and affordable products and services (from editing through to distribution). These tactics reflect our dedication to an informed, motivated and cooperative community of readers and allow the authors to choose a framework that best suits their purpose. (Freerange Press, 2015)

4.1.3. Financial income

In October 2014, shortly less than two years since the Freerange Press was formalised as a legal co-operative, it had earned $122,000 in revenue. This was mainly earned through sale proceeds from the projects on Christchurch. The Freerange Press’ main expenditure was on printing, though in that period they also donated $17,000 to local causes such as the Pallet Pavilion, Gap Filler, FESTA, Agropolis and the City Mission. A further $15,000 was spent on wages, and $5000 was paid as tax. In this period there was a surplus of $5000, but as the Freerange Press is a non-profit co-operative, any surpluses must be donated or put toward new projects.

Regarding individual projects, Bennett said, “We go in being pretty confident that we’ll break even on each thing.” Financial profit has never been one of the organisation’s aims, and operating expenses are low. The Freerange Press currently has just one part time employee, who works one day per week. Bennett said his line regarding the business model the Freerange Press uses is “Let’s be editorially radical and financially conservative.”

4.1.4. Ownership, control, decision-making and accountability

The Freerange Press has a legal structure that does not yet match the way it operates, and the way in which decisions are made. It is something yet to be worked out, which is one of the organisation’s goals for 2015. The legal structure for the
Freerange Press was formalised in December 2012, when it was registered with the Companies Office as Freerange Co-operative Limited. However, Bennett said the present challenges are to,

work out how to actually expand the legal co-operative, cause at the moment, you know a co-operative is legally defined as …It’s something either for buyers or sellers to collectively join together …because they get collective benefit from working together.

In a survey of its wider stakeholders, that was one of the aspects of the Freerange Press that drew people to it. Bennett commented that

the interesting thing is what people thought they could gain from something like Freerange is access to other people, talented people, and people with skills and knowledge that they might be able to work with. So it’s a really nice thing, it’s not a co-operative based on getting cheaper prices, or something, it’s …hopefully a co-operative that’s really based on being able to work with other good people, which is really nice.

At present, legally, the Freerange Press has six directors and seven shareholders forming the board of the organisation, though Bennett said they are “effectively the same group”. The core group of people leading the organisation have largely been Bennett’s friends and acquaintances, and he said,

they’re all people I have known for various years, and so when we formalised [and registered with the companies office as Freerange Cooperative Limited] …I just put the call out and said ‘Look, we need people to sign up for this’, in some ways it’s a bit symbolic, but you know it is a proper board.

Some of the group, who became parents, or were based overseas and did not feel particularly “gelled into it”, were replaced as time went on.
Underneath the core group, there are the “first mates”, a group of 20-30, the group who Bennett said provide “…informal sort of support and help, and we’ll email out semi-regularly and go ‘this is what we’re thinking of doing next, what do you guys think?’” The core group uses Loomio to have conversations with that group quite often.

Loomio is another New Zealand co-operative social enterprise, which produces software to improve decision making. Their software tools, launched in 2012, were inspired by the decision-making protocols in place within the Occupy movement, which empowered all to participate actively. The co-founders of Loomio recognised that “When groups meet in person, typical dysfunctional behaviour reduces the value of diverse perspectives. Loud voices often prevail. People in positions of authority dominate; imbalances of power derail participation” (Kaplan, 2013, p. 34). This software allows for a democratic decision-making process, and “combines discussion and decision-making so on-line dialogue leads to clearly agreed outcomes. It is easy to follow the conversation and to weigh in on a preference once a decision is proposed” (Kaplan, 2013, p. 34).

When Loomio is being used for the Freerange Press, the conversations are framed around a single topic, and when they have developed enough that the group will be able to make a decision, anyone in the group can decide that it is time to make a group decision. Bennett said that,

all discussions are framed around an original question, like ‘what do we think the theme for the next Freerange should be?’ And then someone will say ‘what about this?’ And someone will go ‘Oh, I was thinking about this’, and then you can talk for however long. And then, anyone within that discussion can go ‘Okay, let’s make a resolution’, and so I’ll go ‘Okay, I reckon this is going really well, the water one sounds really good, I’m happy with that, everyone else?’ And you go, ‘We’ve got two days to vote on this’, and at that point you can have a time limit for that resolution, and then you can just vote yes or no. So it’s a conversation with specific time limits on specific resolutions, which is really nice.
Case study 1: Freerange Press

There is then a wider, more distributed group of roughly 1500 people that the Freerange Press engages with. These are the people who engage with the organisation on social media such as Facebook, and who are on the e-mail list. The Freerange Press makes an effort to open itself up to a broad range of people, and Bennett said that “one thing I’ve tried really hard with Freerange is to keep it open to as many different types of disciplines and people as possible …it’s always something that purposely merges a whole lot of disciplines together.”

Figure 4.1 – Freerange Press organisation

When the Freerange Press is able to work out how to expand the legal co-operative, to include the wider group, Bennett said, “that’s when the membership will actually legally match the sort of informal thing that it is at the moment.” He added, “But, it’s sort of working, it functions fine like it is at the moment.” One of the ideas the Freerange Press has been considering with memberships, is that members could contribute to the co-operative with their time, instead of money. In this model, members would contribute a set number of hours per year, which then goes into a pool and has to be ‘spent’ over the year and used to support the projects. Under this scheme, Bennett said,
you just put down your skills, you know whatever they are … and then someone can go ‘I’ve got this project for someone with five hours free’, you can utilise it, or you can offer it, we’ve not quite worked it all out.

Participatory budgeting is something the Freerange Press aims to do in future, an idea that came up following the success of *Once in a Lifetime*. Bennett said, “because of this last *Once in a Lifetime* book going reasonably well, hopefully we’ll have like ten grand that’s unassigned next year.” This would devolve part of the decision making around budgeting to the wider groups, and allow decisions to be made via consensus rather than by a small group acting on behalf of the interests of everyone else. Bennett said the Freerange Press would ask, “Here’s the ten grand, where do we think it should all go?” This would be facilitated by co-budgeting software, which is being developed by the Enspiral Foundation, another New Zealand social enterprise, which defines itself as “a bold experiment to create a collaborative network that helps people do meaningful work” (Enspiral, 2015). In future, it is hoped that this participatory model could also be used to decide where time and human resources were spent as well as financial resources, with Bennett saying, “so we’re going to try and work with that, and hopefully we can put time on that as well. But we’ll see.”
4.1.5. Projects on Christchurch

4.1.5.1 Chur Chur (2011)

Figure 4.2 – Front cover of Chur Chur

Chur Chur was the first Christchurch-related publication for the Freerange Press, and one that the editors at the Freerange Press had hoped to pull together quickly. Inevitably, Bennett recalled that it was delayed and only published “about three or four months after the quake … which took too long.” The motivations to publish this book were simple, with the group forming the Freerange Press comprising mainly of New Zealanders, but located in Melbourne at the time of the earthquake. Immediately after the earthquake, Bennett said,

we were like ‘S**t, okay we’re over in Melbourne’, and one of the editors of Chur Chur’s family is from Christchurch, she grew up in Christchurch, and her family were here, so she was really like ‘F**k, what can we do? So, well we run a press, should we try and publish something?’ And we just thought the simplest thing we could do was give space to people who were in Christchurch to tell stories about what’s happened, and not the sort of dramatic, like, earthquake, you
know, ‘I was in town and saw this stuff’, because I think they ended up… those stories always have a space anyway.

In a departure from their traditional free, online model of publication, *Chur* was printed and sold as physical copies. In order to do this, the Freerange Press had to raise $4000, and 500 books were printed, half of which were sold (for $10 plus postage from the Freerange Press online store), and half of which were given away. The sponsor, Architects for Humanity, allowed the Freerange Press to donate the sale proceeds to the Pallet Pavilion, a transitional architecture project made from used wooden pallets, which functioned as a community space and a venue for events. This book was produced in a similar format to the previous Freerange Press Journals, as a special issue, and that familiarity made it relatively easy for the book to be produced.

4.1.5.2 Christchurch: The Transitional City Pt. IV\(^2\) (2012)

Figure 4.3 - Front cover of *Christchurch: The Transitional City Pt. IV*

After he relocated to Christchurch, Bennett became friends with a like-minded group of people, numbering “about fifteen”, all doing work on “transitional stuff.” The group began to have regular meals together, and the conversations during those meals

\(^2\) ‘Pt. IV’ in the book title refers to the ‘fourth transition’ of Christchurch City.
can be credited to a number of projects that later emerged. One, for example, was FESTA, the Festival of Transitional Architecture, which has become an annual public event in Christchurch that aims to engage with the city, by “exploring urban regeneration through large scale collaborative projects and urban interventions” (FESTA, 2014). The next Freerange Press project on Christchurch emerged from those conversations as well.

*Transitional City* is a catalogue of projects that arose in the two years following the beginning of the series of earthquakes and aftershocks in Christchurch, which was in September 2010. Most of the projects it covers are simple, novel concepts, and the spirit of the book is largely one of opportunity, though some of the projects it covers such as *185 Empty Chairs*, and *Flowers on Road Cones*, serve as reminders of the enormous losses. For the most part, what it depicts are,

realisations of simple ideas: a place to play sport, a theatre production, a shop, a bar. But they bear witness to a profound time in this city’s history: in the threads that link the whakapapa of these projects are remarkable lessons to be discovered.

(Parker & Bennett, 2013, p. 5)

The original ideas that developed into this book had been simple. The conversation between the group at the time, Bennett recalled, was “Let’s do a publication, let’s archive this stuff that’s important.” However for practical reasons, he had other ideas, saying “No, there’s not enough time to get like a hundred projects together, it’s crazy”, instead arguing for something more familiar and in line with the work the Freerange Press had previously been doing, “a series of essays which articulate what this movement is about.” The rest of the group were more upbeat about the short time frame in which they intended to publish the book, in time to launch with FESTA in October 2012.

And I think it was one of those books where it was like, it was actually only the small time frame that made it possible, because if you go to people with too much time, like, ‘Can you give us some material?’ People would never get around to it, but if you go ‘Look, we’re really
Case study 1: Freerange Press

sorry, we’ve only got three weeks to get it together but we need this, this, this and this,’ then people tend to jump to it quite quickly.

A team of sixteen collected the data, a further three editors took the lead, and one more person laid out the graphic design.

The point of the book was to record the temporary, ‘transitional’ projects that arose in response to the earthquakes. Things appeared and disappeared quickly, and they were often easy to miss. In the project, the term ‘transitional’ has been used fairly broadly, under aims to include as many projects as possible within the defined criteria. These criteria, Bennett stated in an interview with the Christchurch City Library, were:

- It needed to be a project that happened in a specific time and place, so no organisations, institutions, or people, just projects
- It needed to have happened post-quake
- It needed to be temporary in some manner (in a loose definition as everything is ultimately temporary)
- It needed to be open to the public

(Robertson, 2013)

200 books were produced in the first print run, and they sold out in nine days, before they were even delivered to retail stores. In the second run, 1000 were produced, and then later another thousand in the third run. In 2013, a third edition was published, which added another 50 transitional projects.

_Transitional City_ was not intended to be a serious book, nor one intended for any particular audience. Bennett explained,

For the most part in this book we just wanted to let people find their own narratives and stories and to create a field of different ways of viewing the post-quake scene. This is the reason we didn’t put the projects into any sort of ordering system like categories, or timelines, or authors. However, we have our own views on some projects and some of the processes so yes we did have a little bit of fun with the inclusion of some entries. But I’d like to think this is just another story in the
book, not the reason we did it which is really a much simpler idea of presenting the remarkable works of so many different people in such a short time (Robertson, 2013).

4.1.5.3 Once in a Lifetime: City-building after Disaster in Christchurch (2014)

The idea to produce *Once in a Lifetime: City-building after Disaster in Christchurch* came about at the same time as that for *Transitional City*, Bennett said,

It was pretty much that conversation I was talking about before, about the first *Transitional City* book, when we were like ‘Should this be an intelligent, sort of written discussion on the issues that are happening in Christchurch at the moment, or should it be a really beautiful collection of projects that, you know, summarise the time?’

With *Transitional City* out of the way, there was still a desire to produce that other, written discussion on Christchurch. Bennett said that, “I think it was really important we did that. It was a really important book. But there was still a sense that we hadn’t done this other book.” As Christchurch progressed in the on-going recovery and
rebuilding, there remained the opportunity to craft how the central city would be rebuilt, and the editors explained they felt,

    a bit of desire to shift the discussion away from being about, like, this sort of thing that happened after the quake, to being about quality urban environments. So city-making, or city-building is the term we introduced there to go, ‘Look, this is the stuff that’s always happening in a city and these are the conversations that could always be happening.

    Contributing toward the motivation to produce Once in a Lifetime, was a shift in the mood regarding the recovery in Christchurch city. As the people of Christchurch began to realise the scope, reality and time-frame of the rebuild situation, the four editors of the book, Bennett, Dann, Johnson and Reynolds (2014), noted a change in the mood of the city, and explained their reasons for producing a collection of essays, saying,

    In late 2013, the editors of this book felt that what had been a fairly widespread optimism about the rebuild – for both the official plans and the unofficial activities and development – was steadily wearing away. This seemed to be the occasion to examine whether we, collectively as a city, might be missing our chance to make this new city the best representation of our shared values, to make the most of this awful situation. (p. 23)

    The editors further stated,

    A central motivation for this book is our shared belief that argument, debate and discussion are a necessary and important part of city-building. A disagreement doesn’t always represent an obstacle in the way of progress; disagreements and controversy, if managed carefully, can lead to better, more thorough and more creative outcomes. (p. 25)
Once in a Lifetime focused its scope to discussion of the issues of the central city, but in its 55 essays offer a very diverse range of perspectives. Bennett said that, “It’s probably the strength but also the weakness of that book I guess, that it’s so many different disciplines and so many different angles coming in about the city.” Essays were grouped not by discipline or topic, but by the underlying themes; 1) Making plans, 2) Selling the plan, 3) Rewriting the rules, 4) Considering the common good, 5) Thinking big, 6) Acting small, 7) Meeting in the middle, 8) Building back better, 9) Reimagining recovery (Reimagining Recovery had also been the working title of the project). To a degree, what tied the narrative together was the ‘Blueprint’, the Government/CERA-led master plan for the future of the central city. When the editors began work on Once in a Lifetime, Bennett said, their angle was “We want this to be the book that sits on the table of the new CERA minister when they come in”, following the 2014 New Zealand General Election. In the event there would be a new minister, it was hoped they might ask themselves, “Okay, what do I do here?” and turn to Once in a Lifetime for advice. Bennett described it as “sort of a manual about what’s gone right, what’s gone wrong, and different possibilities. So, the book was always a bit of both, of serious critique, we thought there was a real absence of serious, essay-length critique.” On the lack of critique, he further stated,

it just blows my mind that in a forty billion dollar rebuild process, we seem to be the only ones publishing anything serious about the rebuild. So that was a real driver and like, frustration that drove it for us.

While it was a driver of the book, that frustration – as well as the general frustrations that arose concerning the rebuild of the central city – was not its major theme. On the tone of the book, Bennett commented,

we didn’t want it to be negative …so as you go through the book, we tried to work really hard to open it up as you go along, so while there’s critique, there’s also possibilities of different ways of thinking, or doing things… we didn’t want to list a whole lot of projects that we think should happen.
One of the most satisfying aspects of this project for Bennett is that the book was able to provide a platform for a variety of writers (including academic writers), who were not well known and might not otherwise have gained the attention. The project was able to “put a whole lot of writing on a stage that’s treated quite seriously and respectfully.” The inclusion of work from several high-profile (local and international) individuals helped to elevate the project’s status as well. Recognising the value of the work former Prime Minister of New Zealand, and current Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, Helen Clark, wrote in her foreword that “This constructive critique of the recovery process in Christchurch gives insights from an urban setting, and is very useful to those who now, or in the future, must respond to disasters in cities” (Clark, 2014, p. 6).

Despite his disbelief that “we seem to be the only ones publishing anything serious about the rebuild,” Bennett did not view the project as a race to be the first to critique. He commented, “inevitably being who we are, if someone else had done it, we would probably think it should be done a better way or a different way.”

4.1.6. A concluding note

This case study has provided a detailed description of the Freerange Press’ social mission, the activities it undertakes in pursuit of that mission, and some of the outcomes of those activities; the projects that addressed the Christchurch earthquake. It is discussed in greater detail, in relation to literature, in Chapter 5.
4.2. Case study 2: Space Craft Systems (WikiHouseNZ)

Formed officially in July 2012, by co-founders Martin Luff\textsuperscript{1} and Danny Squires, Space Craft Systems is a limited liability company functioning as a social enterprise, and is working to develop the WikiHouse platform in New Zealand. WikiHouse is a global, open-source hardware project, with chapters located all around the world. It is working to develop sustainable housing solutions, with designs that can be downloaded from the Internet for free, and used by anybody with access to machinery that can cut shapes out sheets of plywood. Space Craft Systems blends its own version of the WikiHouse (illustrated in Figure 4.5), a response to post-earthquake Christchurch, with a range of wider issues that affect housing in New Zealand and overseas.

Figure 4.5 - Step 4 of WikiHouse assembly: Raising of structural frame

(Space Craft Systems, 2014, p. 7) – WikiHouse (www.wikihouse.cc)

\textsuperscript{1} The time and effort contributed by both Martin Luff and Danny Squires during the research for this case study is gratefully acknowledged. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations in this case study are from Martin Luff directly.
4.2.1. Purpose of the organisation:

The beginnings of Space Craft Systems are rooted in the aftermath of Christchurch’s February 2011 earthquake, with Luff saying, “the origin really got triggered by the February earthquake.”

Luff and Squires had been involved in different projects following the first, September 2010 earthquake, but the bigger scale of the February 2011 earthquake, and the greater damage and destruction – to people and to buildings – motivated the both of them, independently, to look for better solutions. Luff said, “the February earthquake was the one that kind of changed everything again, mainly because of the number of people that got killed.” At the time, Luff and Squires had not met, though they shared an interest in better building solutions and housing, and this would later draw them together to join forces. Luff said there were “a few of us who were looking at better solutions, especially around how do we build back better, the physical infrastructure of our city, how do we build this back better?”

Luff and Squires knew of each other through social media such as Twitter, but it was some time before they met, shortly after the TEDxEqChCh conference in May 2011. This was the first TEDx conference (an independently organised TED conference, for Technology, Entertainment & Design) organised for Christchurch, and the first TEDx conference that focused on a single theme, which was ‘Reimagining the future of Christchurch.’ When they met a week afterward, Luff and Squires began discussing how they could “make a difference by addressing the underlying human needs for housing that exist around the world” (WikiHouseNZ, 2015).

Squires had trained as an architect, and also had skills in urban planning and sustainability. Luff originally trained as a product and industrial designer, and after working in industrial design for a short time, he became involved in construction work and later went on to work in digital projects with “a whole lot of other stuff in between.” Reflecting on his work in construction, he said that it involved a lot of restoration work, saying “I got exposed to a really broad range of construction techniques, not just the contemporary stuff, but a whole load of stuff that went back centuries.” In the early stages of Space Craft Systems, Squires had been working in digital fabrication, which involved laser cutting, and Luff was working on web design and development. Luff said that when they began working together,
Danny and myself wanted to concentrate on the housing as much as anything, but also look at a system that could also meet other needs, and we felt we had the skills to do something, therefore we should do something.

Luff grew up in London, where after the Second World War, a lot of temporary housing was built to replace buildings that had been destroyed. He said that in London, there was all these pre-fab houses that had all been built immediately post-war, there was something like sixty-thousand of them that got built, and of course there was a need for those to be built, there was an urgent need, because so many houses had been lost.

Having witnessed these ‘temporary’ buildings in London, which had inevitably become somewhat permanent, he was concerned about a similar situation in Christchurch, saying,

And so we were very concerned that the solutions that were being put in place, temporary solutions, could become long-term solutions. And they weren’t very good quality …I could also see that a lot of these things, which are done in a lightweight way, or a poor quality way, because they’re supposedly temporary, end up there thirty years later, you know, or forty years later.

The quality of post-disaster temporary construction was only one of the issues that Luff and Squires looked into. The earthquakes had raised a number of issues, but most importantly, were the issues of how buildings performed during the earthquakes, and how that performance affected people. Luff said,

other than, I think two people, everybody else in the February earthquake was killed as a result of a failure in a building… So even the people who were killed in those two buses, you know, they got crushed by bits of building.
Another issue associated with buildings in post-earthquake Christchurch was not related to the performance of the buildings themselves, but the fact they became stranded in ‘red zones’, residential areas where the land was deemed to be too damaged, or no longer suitable for housing, or where there were other hazards such as the risk of rocks falling from above. In these areas, “perfectly good buildings became stranded assets.”

Beyond the context of the earthquakes in Canterbury, Luff and Squires identified problems related to housing in wider New Zealand as well. For example, there are a large number of houses that were built to poor standards, leaking in wet weather. Luff said, “we have this forty billion dollar plus problem around leaky house syndrome, and so there’s so much of our housing stock that urgently needs replacing because it just wasn’t built well enough.” In addition, there are issues spurred by population growth, and a building industry that currently is not, Luff said,

able to meet growth in Auckland, for example, so the house prices are going up and up and up, way ahead of inflation, and it’s becoming increasingly difficult for whole sectors of our community to even think about the possibility of getting into the housing market.

These issues are not unique to New Zealand. Luff said that “on the global level, there’s just a monumental need for large quantities of much better quality housing that, you know, is affordable.”

Architect and urban designer, Professor Rob Adams\(^2\), outlined a predicament faced by humans regarding the future of urban development. Luff recalled,

he gave this quote that stuck in my mind, he said if the current vectors held true – and I might be paraphrasing him slightly – we’ve basically got to put as much urban development on the surface of the planet as we currently have, in about forty to fifty years.

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\(^2\) Director City Design at the City of Melbourne, and Vice Chair of the Urbanization Council of the World Economic Forum.
This predicament means the need for sustainable housing is becoming a matter of urgency. Luff added,

So the time scale is unbelievable; it’s taken us a few thousand years to get to what we currently have. That rate of development is actually taking place, right now, but the way it’s being done, is by people who don’t have the tools to do it well. So what results is slums, favelas, and we’re not immune to that in New Zealand. If we don’t do something about this soon, we’re going to see that sort of development here as well.

And, although Luff had said that “the origin really got triggered by the February earthquake,” these other environmental issues delivered a push as well. Luff said,

So that’s what kicked it off really, us seeing those wider problems and feeling that we had skills to do something about it, and nobody else seemed to be doing something about it, so we felt we should at least try.

This focus on sustainability extended to the organisation’s response to post-earthquake Christchurch. It stated,

We believed there was a responsibility to ensure that the subsequent reconstruction of Christchurch and Canterbury doesn’t just build back that which has failed before and that which cannot take us forward sustainably, but instead to grasp this opportunity to re-imagine what could be and to build back better. (WikiHouseNZ, 2015)

In the very early beginnings, before Space Craft Systems (and WikiHouseNZ) was formed, Luff said “the first thing we looked at was just, well, let’s scour the world for ideas which might meet the need. What might be the best possible solution to these issues?” Luff and Squires spent several months researching appropriate solutions.

In August 2011, the Christchurch City Council hosted the International Speaker Series, during which a number of experts from around the world visited and spoke
about their own experiences in rebuilding and redeveloping cities and communities that had suffered disasters. At this event, Luff said,

we were able to actually speak directly, face to face, with some of the best people in the world around this, in particular people like [James] Timberlake\(^3\), who have done some really interesting work around affordable, high quality kit-built or prefab [pre-fabricated] structures.

That month, the pair also discovered WikiHouse through Twitter. Luff said,

Roger Dennis\(^4\) sent a tweet out, and both Danny and I picked up on it, and that was about WikiHouse, which at that point was only about two months old [as a physical product]. So that’s where both of us first started thinking about the potential of WikiHouse. We kind of sat on that for a while, and then Danny in particular came back and said, ‘This looks like it’s got so much potential.’ At that stage we could see it was just potential, but it look like it’s got the potential to meet all those requirements that we’d set. And that’s where the origins of WikiHouseNZ started.

Today, Luff said, WikiHouseNZ are guided by “a set of three core values of our own, and eight aspirational statements (Table 4.1), and that guides everything else that the company does.” These core values are, a) adaptable design, b) empowering people, and c) protective environment (Space Craft Systems, 2014).

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\(^3\) Founding partner of the Philadelphia-based architecture firm KieranTimberlake.

\(^4\) Innovation expert and founder of the Sensing City Trust, which helps stakeholders to understand how data can inform decisions on city management.
Case study 2: Space Craft Systems (WikiHouseNZ)

Table 4.1 – Space Craft Systems’ aspirational statements

- Revolutionise standards of efficiency and performance in NZ residential buildings
- Demonstrate the total life-cycle cost of home ownership
- Mitigate negative impact of current construction practice and create restorative environments for learning
- Create and sustain an agile enterprise that values and is accountable for delivering socially, environmentally and economically
- Enable users to build only what they need when they need it, change it when they want
- Lower the barriers of entry to assets that safeguard people, their interests and the environment
- Empower communities and individuals to better help themselves and each other
- Establish an open platform for local and global collaboration – to support fair partnerships and meaningful work

(Space Craft Systems, 2014, p. 5)

4.2.2. The business model:

Space Craft Systems’ business plan is constantly evolving, Luff said, “it’s an agile business plan, it’s quite fluid – it keeps changing.” The organisation has investigated three revenue streams, although with the core product (the WikiHouse) still in its development phase, these revenue streams largely remain to be engaged with.

The first revenue stream is from consultancy, using the knowledge and expertise that Space Craft Systems accumulates over time, to help other organisations. To a small degree, Space Craft Systems has done this already. Following an initial round of philanthropic funding that got the organisation and its project off the ground, the organisation was able to earn some revenue from a learning partnership with a large company. Luff said that “in terms of money we could use, it wasn’t strictly
funding, so we had a revenue stream, with a learning partnership with a large international banking and insurance corporation.” There are aims to engage with this revenue stream again in future, Luff said, “we think there’s definitely avenues to be able to get some revenue from that.”

Secondly, there is another potential revenue stream that will come from “actually putting buildings on the ground”, both from the manufacture of those buildings, and from their assembly. What makes the WikiHouse different from ‘traditional’ housing construction, is that the homeowner or community the building is being constructed for will be able to get involved, to push progress forward, and contribute to an ‘open value chain’. This concept is yet to be tested, but Luff explained,

the idea of the open value chain, is at all the stages of building a building and even the stages after that – post-occupancy evaluation of the building – that people should be able to contribute into that chain, whatever skills they have within the community or as individuals.

This means that a homeowner, or community, will be able to choose whether they want to put their own time and effort (‘sweat equity’, as Luff puts it) into the construction, or pay for the services of having that work done by Space Craft Systems. This gives people more control, Luff explained,

So the idea is that by being involved in that whole value chain, then they’re the drivers of what comes out of the other end – as opposed to someone like a property developer being the driver for example – so they’re never disengaged from that whole process of producing a building. But there’s also opportunities to contribute sweat equity, in order to reduce the amount of capital that they need to put in. And we’re not quite sure how much people will be able to do, or what to do at the different stages, but essentially we’re setting up an organisation that can do everything if you don’t want to do it for yourself, and then we’ll charge people for the bits we do. So that’s putting buildings on the ground, and there will be revenue out of the manufacturing of those.
The third potential revenue stream will be earned through licencing and franchising, Luff said,

once we’ve developed a system for production then we have a way to scale rapidly. We don’t want to control the whole of production – so that’s why we think we’ll have a franchise system. …and some of the revenue from that will come from the supply chains that we can also tie in to our revenue systems.

At present, these broad ideas remain to be tested, but the ultimate business aims are to earn revenue from the production of buildings, and cater to market segments that the building industry is not currently able to serve. Luff said that the future “vision for the organisation, is to produce large quantities of these buildings, but probably addressing markets we don’t think the current building industry is addressing, or can address, or has a product for.”

4.2.3. Financial income

Space Craft Systems was initially, in its early days, was supported solely by its co-founders, Luff and Squires. Luff said,

essentially in the early days, Danny and I funded it, really. There was no one putting anything else in, so it was funded primarily by the time we put aside, in terms of our voluntary efforts, but also in some cases we did put some money in, not much – we didn’t have a lot.

The first financial contribution from outside the organisation came in the form of philanthropic funding, from the local owner of a number of natural health supplement stores. Luff said,

And he could just see the potential of that vision, so that was philanthropic funding from [philanthropist] David. And essentially the way that came through was in segments, so he said ‘Well I’ll give you a starting segment, I don’t have to see a return on this other than you
Case study 2: Space Craft Systems (WikiHouseNZ)

progressing the project, but what I’d like to see is let’s get some full-size pieces out the door, let’s see if it actually stacks up!’

This funding allowed Luff and Squires to begin work on building a proof of concept, which they later took in May 2013 to the Makertorium expo at Te Papa Tongarewa (Museum of New Zealand), the first national expo on the new ‘Maker’ movement. The Maker movement celebrates independent inventors, designers and ‘tinkerers’, and combines their passions with open-source learning, contemporary design and powerful new technology like 3-D printers (Voight, 2014). Simply put, the Maker movement is a technology-based variety of do-it-yourself culture. After demonstrating their proof of concept, Luff said,

Then there were some subsequent chunks [of money], that allowed Danny and I, bit by bit, to start first of all just by taking some expenses back, and then bit by bit we got onto a living wage towards the end of that funding.

The next financial input to Space Craft Systems (and first revenue to be earned) was from a learning partnership with a large banking and insurance corporation, which Luff said allowed them to “spend some more money pursuing some additional funding.”

The third injection of cash, and second round of philanthropic funding, came in the form of a $300,000 grant announced in May 2015, from the Rātā Foundation (known then as the Canterbury Community Trust), which had established a new social enterprise fund. It was the first fund in New Zealand to specifically target social enterprise. Luff said,

Traditionally they’d always funded charities or not-for-profits, and they were interested, if they could get a better return from organisations that, once they were kick-started, could become financially self-sustaining and grow faster, or become more self-sustaining faster than charity or not-for-profit.
The total value of Rātā Foundation’s social enterprise fund was $2,500,000, and had been established as a special response to the earthquakes. Chief Executive of the Foundation, Louise Edwards, said “There was [social] need in the community, but there were also commercial opportunities for community groups” (Harvie, 2014). It was, said Luff,

“a big learning exercise for us, and them.” Social enterprise, [Louise] Edwards said, “is quite a buzzword internationally and it’s something that hasn’t really developed in New Zealand and we felt there may well be more opportunities in Canterbury and we wanted to offer incentives. (Harvie, 2014)

Of the thirty eight applicants for funding, eight were shortlisted, and the selection process spanned several months. Luff said,

one team dropped out during that time, one team didn’t get funded, so it was six projects that got approved for funding, and then there were still some further hurdles. But eventually there was just two social enterprises in the new model that got funded out of that, which was us, and Fab Lab. So we’re both limited liability companies, with a constitution that makes a social enterprise, or a set of values that makes us a social enterprise.

4.2.4. Ownership, control, decision-making and accountability:

The names Space Craft Systems and WikiHouseNZ are often used interchangeably, and though they are joined at the hip, they are two different organisations. Luff explained,

The first thing to understand is there’s two different organisations, one is Space Craft Systems, and the other is WikiHouseNZ. And, Space Craft Systems is a limited liability company, which is a social enterprise, and is developing the WikiHouse platform in New Zealand. And then WikiHouse is a global, open-source hardware project.
The WikiHouse Foundation is registered in the United Kingdom, and acts as the central hub and authority for the global WikiHouse project. The foundation sets the overall direction for the whole organisation, and beneath, are the WikiHouse chapters, including WikiHouseNZ. These chapters are founded by people all around the world, who agree to the WikiHouse constitution, and in pairs, adopt a WikiHouse chapter licence. In the WikiHouse constitution, chapters are described as “open-membership groups consisting of individuals and/or businesses collaborating. They may organise events, prototypes and meetups, but they are not trading entities in themselves” (WikiHouse Foundation, 2015).

WikiHouse chapters have a degree of freedom in the way they contribute to the overall project. Luff said,

the only thing that’s controlled, if you like, within the project is the name, WikiHouse, and you have to meet a certain number of requirements that you sign up to in the WikiHouse chapter constitution document, which conform to the requirements and values for WikiHouse as a global project.

Although yet to be implemented, there are plans for the WikiHouse Foundation in future to establish another level in its organisation, called WikiHouse provider. In addition to helping develop the WikiHouse project, this level will also be authorised produce the WikiHouse too. Luff said,

We’re thinking about setting up a second level, which hasn’t been implemented yet [WikiHouse Provider] but essentially we’re functioning as that second level. And that will be an authorised, some sort of authorised WikiHouse production facility, so it’s not just that these guys are now authorised to use the name as WikiHouse and they’re also contributing to the overall global project, but they also have a certain level of quality, whereby you can trust the output that they’re producing, and they can actually produce and monitor the production of WikiHouses and their assembly.
Globally, there are currently “around about eighteen to twenty Chapters, around the world at the moment.” As the organisation grows, there is a greater requirement for leadership and governance, with Luff adding,

the two most active in terms of iterating the system is New Zealand and the UK. Some of these chapters have representation on the Foundation, and that’s still being formed as the governance… we’re still kind of thrashing out how that works.

When this is formalised, and the WikiHouse Foundation governance involves people from selected chapters around the world, it will be their responsibility to guide the global organisation, which currently comprises of approximately 500-600 people (WikiHouseNZ, 2015). The new governance structure, Luff said, “will hold collectively, the underlying principles and values of that project in making sure that the other teams comply with that.”

Within New Zealand, there are also plans to further establish the structure of the WikiHouseNZ chapter, which will then be the overarching organisation all of New Zealand. Luff said that “the longer-term view is that hopefully there will be a WikiHouse Christchurch, and WikiHouse Auckland, and WikiHouse various other places, and they’ll come under WikiHouse New Zealand.”

When explaining how the Space Craft Systems contributes to the WikiHouse project, Luff said,

Danny and myself are the co-founders of WikiHouseNZ, which is the umbrella organisation for the whole of New Zealand at the moment, for developing WikiHouse, but then we are also co-directors and founders of Space Craft Systems Limited, which is the social enterprise that’s developing WikiHouse here in New Zealand… and we share our I.P. [intellectual property] back into the whole WikiHouse project, and develop, but at the same time we’re an entity that gives a certain level of assurance around certain standards and quality. And we’ll be the commercial organisation if you like, but a social enterprise that delivers the actual product on the ground, at a certain level of quality.
The governance structure that has been established to help Luff and Squires lead Space Craft Systems includes “an advisory board, and a set of other secondary advisors, which we’re putting in place now, as well as a risk and audit committee.”

Although Luff and Squires are the sole directors of Space Craft Systems, they aim to make all decision-making a democratic process, aiming to have most decisions made by consensus. Luff said,

so myself and Danny hold the liability for the company, as directors, so ultimately in some ways we have the final say on certain decisions, but as much as possible try and make that democratic within the organisation. And the way that’s done is, we have a series of different meetings during the week, so there’s a meeting for business strategy, and there’s a meeting for governance, most weeks… business strategy and business management meetings happen every week… the other main one is the sprint planning meetings for research, design and development.

When making decisions, Luff said, “It’s a combined form of democratic and consensus decision making within those meetings usually. So ultimately, the people in the organisation.”

Sometimes, a decision is not made by consensus but delegated to a person who has the most expertise in a particular area. The decision making structure in Space Craft Systems, Luff said, is

not typically hierarchical, it’s a very flat decision making and management structure, and if there’s a particular task that needs to be done, then generally we’d look within the team, or our network first of all – ‘who’s got the greatest expertise in here, that can give us guidance?’

In some cases, it may also be a subcontractor from outside the organisation who is best suited to make a particular recommendation, including paid subcontractors, “because they're the most experienced person”. An example of this might be a decision where
an engineering or a legal opinion is required, and Luff and Squires would “then accept their decision or make a decision based on their advice.”

On a weekly basis, Luff and Squires aim to have an online meeting with one of the global co-founders, though Luff admits “it rarely works out that way.” He says, “on a weekly basis we try and meet via Skype, which one or more of the other global co-founders, usually one, which is Alistair Parvin, he was one of the two original co-founders.” Because of the international nature of the WikiHouse project, internet-based tools are used heavily, not only to communicate, but also produce work and make decisions. Luff explained,

there’s discussion channels such as Slack\(^5\), and e-mail that we have with the other people on the foundation, and we also have documents, live-editable documents that we can comment on or make amendments to, so documents tend to be generated as a group amongst the people who form the Foundation. So that’s at the highest level, so decision-making [in the WikiHouse Foundation] I guess, is a combination of discussion with them, and then production of documents that we all help to collaboratively author.

Leadership within the WikiHouseNZ work teams changes often, because “everybody swaps places at different times.” Luff said,

So, someone might be taking the lead on a particular task, and be making the decisions, so the rule we have within our task management system is that anybody can put tasks into the system, and they have to give them as best a description as they possibly can, so each one comes with a specification.

Based on the information provided in the task management system, someone in that team can decide if they want to take it on. Then, Luff said,

\(^5\) Slack is a cloud-based messaging system which can be used to facilitate team collaboration
Once they’ve decided to take the lead on it, then the authority passes to them on that particular task. So they may delegate sub-tasks, or parts of it to other people, but basically they have the say on getting that task delivered. They’re running that task. They will quite often need to come back to someone in the organisation, to say how they’re actually going to deliver on that, and get some feedback on their proposal.

This system of task-management is not without its trade-offs, Luff said,

so what we’re trying to do here is identify people who can already do that task… but also give the opportunity to anybody else that wants to partner with them, or work on a sub-task, so that they have the opportunity to learn those skills as well.

This is typically done informally, raised in meetings or using online tools. Luff explained,

As much as possible, we’ll also bring things back to one of those meetings, or in a lot of cases, to try and minimise the meetings, the discussion takes place inside our online management tools, either the discussion platform we have [Slack], or the task management system [Asana]. So a number of things get thrashed out on the fly, remotely. People are actually speaking to people in, you know, the [online equivalent of] classic water-cooler type meetings, where you co ‘Okay, this needs to be done, it didn’t get done last week, who wants to do this?’

The organisation’s progress would not have been possible without its base of volunteers, affectionately nicknamed ‘WikiTeers’. Through the year, WikiHouseNZ run a ‘meetup’, weekly breakfast meetings at a central Christchurch café, on Tuesdays. At least one of the co-founders, Luff or Squires, is generally present, as well as a group of dedicated regulars. There are often newcomers who come to learn more about the project, and get a feel for the organisation.
Volunteers are introduced into the organisation in a moderately structured way. Generally, anyone interested in participating is encouraged to visit the weekly meetup, as a starting point. From then, Luff said,

if people come along for a couple of times and they really, they definitely want to be committed to the project, then we usually give them a few tasks, to see if they come back with a few results, and if they do they can progress into our system. And the first stage of that is signing a contributor agreement – our volunteer agreement – and that agreement covers things like expectations on both sides.

So it’s expectations about us trying to look after them, and giving them access to education, and such like, but there’s also expectations on their side – that they comply with safety regulations – but also that everything they contribute, they retain copyright on, but they also license it back to the project.

Volunteer contributions are then licenced back into the WikiHouse project, under the terms of an agreement that also dictate they cannot be removed from the WikiHouse ‘Commons’, where the designs are stored and available for everyone – They cannot decide, Luff said, “oh no, no, I want to close up the I.P. I contributed and shut it away.” In the WikiHouse project, open collaboration means that all contributors must “licence that copyright very freely with everybody else, and then we also require them to do the same in return.”
Case study 2: Space Craft Systems (WikiHouseNZ)

4.2.5. The WikiHouse project

The global WikiHouse project is working to design and produce an open-source construction set, which can be manufactured using subtractive three-dimensional (3-D) printing techniques (Figure 4.6). The open-source model, which largely developed following the rise of global Internet connectivity, means that designs are publicly accessible under a free licence. The term ‘open-source’ originally referred to a variety of computer software, from which the underpinning ‘source code’ was freely available for anyone to use or modify. In recent years, the open-source model has grown to encompass hardware and technology design in addition to software. As an open-source hardware project, the WikiHouse design is freely available for anyone to download off the Internet, to modify, use or create.

Figure 4.6 - Manufacture and construction of the WikiHouse structure

(Subtractive 3-D printing involves beginning with a solid block of material and cutting pieces away to achieve the final shape – as opposed to additive 3-D printing where objects are built from scratch as successive layers of material – under computer
numerical control (CNC). Being open-source, the WikiHouse designs can be downloaded by anyone off the Internet and used to manufacture parts. To produce a WikiHouse, a person would need a supply of raw materials, in this case, enough sheets of an appropriate grade of plywood, and a CNC router to cut the plywood into the required shapes. A single sheet of plywood can be cut into many parts, reducing wastage as much as possible.

Assembling a WikiHouse is comparable to putting together flat-packed furniture – albeit on a much larger scale – with individual components are relatively small and easy for an individual person to handle. The current full-sized 23m² prototype fits easily into a standard cargo van (Figure 4.7), and has been transported, reconstructed and dismantled, several times (Figure 4.8). Squires explained,

We’ve taken a lot of really clever engineering ideas emerging in New Zealand over the last five years, and actually put them into the WikiHouse platform, to create what now is currently a structure spanning five metres, using ordinary off the shelf plywood sheets that are two-point-four by one-point-two metres. So there’s quite clever engineering tricks that enable you to do that and of course it can all be packed down within an hour and put in the back of a van, moved to
another site, then reassembled with a few volunteers in a few hours.

(Morton, 2014)

Although WikiHouse is a global project, chapters around the world have taken different approaches to the design. While this may sound counter-productive, what it meant was that teams working on different designs could also learn from each other’s angle. Luff explained,

we were kind of working in parallel [the New Zealand and United Kingdom chapters] in those early days, but it was interesting that essentially our system deviated quite significantly, and the two systems were being developed in parallel, and it’s interesting that more recently they’ve converged.

Figure 4.8 – WikiHouseNZ prototype after reconstruction – 23 March 2015

These approaches, sometimes divergent, meant that different WikiHouse chapters were able to incorporate design elements that responded to their surrounding environments, rather than taking a one-size-fits-all approach for the project on a global scale. Standing in a WikiHouseNZ prototype, Squires explained,

This is quite an unusual shape for a house, but it’s all based on scientific passive design principles that the digital fabrication allows us
to incorporate into the design. So it doesn’t have to be a rectangular box. We have the large glazed north facing wall there, then the roof rakes back at a 45 degree angle, which is the optimum angle for solar power generation in Christchurch. That angle can be adjusted to suit wherever in the world you are, your optimum angle is. Then the large roof that rakes down to the back, and is south facing, becomes the rainwater harvesting roof because that’s where the most weather comes from in our environment here in Christchurch, and in New Zealand generally. But it also acts to deflect the cold southwest wind over the building, so you have a lovely warm, sunny place to sit out the front on the north face. (Morton, 2014)

WikiHouse is not the first project to investigate a digitally fabricated house. The closest precursor to the WikiHouse, Luff said, was a project started by Professor Lawrence Sass, from the Department of Architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). There are strong parallels that link the projects. Describing the ‘Instant Shelter’ design, Sass (2007) explained that “This entire shelter can be manufactured on site from (1) a stack of plywood, (2) a CNC router (Gantry arm and table only), (3) a rubber mallet, (4) a crowbar, and (5) a computer” (p. 299). Luff said,

I think they started the research in 2004, or 2005, around about that sort of time. And Hurricane Katrina hit during the period when they were developing it, so it became tied in with that, partly because they recognised that not only were they going to test it out – could you do a digitally fabricated house? Which is what WikiHouse is, and they were using plywood for most of the structural elements, the same way as we are, and it was all slotted together, so there were lots of parallels.

Heavily influenced by the Maker movement its technologically-driven, do-it-yourself culture, WikiHouse uses and takes advantage of an emerging practice known as distributed manufacturing. Luff said,
in our particular case we’re tapping into this movement called distributed manufacturing – some people refer to it as the third industrial revolution.

The distributed manufacturing model decentralises the production of products, and is closely related to the open-source hardware model. Instead of producing goods in one central location and shipping them to destinations around the world, distributed manufacturing supports the production of goods at the destination instead. With the right materials and equipment (including and not limited to CNC cutters and 3D printers), distributed manufacturing centres can be used to make a wide variety of things. Luff explained,

for example, not too long ago, that [traditional] means of production was getting increasingly centralised. So large entities with large industrialised plants would have massive control over the way the physical objects in our world are produced, and with a lot of leverage. And, it would be tightly controlled by a limited number of organisations with large numbers of resources that the average person couldn’t possibly even think about starting to replicate. Whereas now, a lot of that equipment to produce physical objects of various different scales, including WikiHouse’s case, full scale buildings, and the entire built environment is becoming accessible to the ordinary person, at the first level, on a neighbourhood basis.

The distributed manufacturing movement draws influence from recent Internet-based trends, which have made media production accessible for many. Luff explained,

And so there’s a big shift now. Over the last ten years or so, we saw the democratisation of the means of production of media, so everybody now has access to YouTube, or they can write their own news blog, and they have equal status, you know, if they attract attention, then they have an equal voice in some respects to some of the major news outlets. So everybody has a voice... so the means of production of things like
cultural communications, and those sorts of things have been opened up significantly, I would say, through things like the Internet. Now, we’re starting to see this with physical production, it’s getting opened up in the same way.

With the rise of the ‘Fab Lab’ (fabrication laboratory), manufacturing facilities are becoming available to people at a community level. Notably, Fab Lab Christchurch was the only other recipient of social enterprise funding from the Rātā Foundation, announced in 2015. The concept of a ‘Fab Lab’ is the by-product of an educational outreach programme, from the Center for Bits and Atoms at MIT (Barthelemy, 2014). Fab Lab’s involvement with education means that school students can get hands-on experience, in which they imagine, design, prototype, reflect and iterate physical objects. This provides a valuable educational experience. Students are not the only group that see the appeal. For inventors, a Fab Lab can offer a “technical prototyping platform for innovation and invention, providing stimulus for local entrepreneurship” (Fab Foundation, 2015). As of August 2015, over 500 Fab Labs exist around the world.

Initiatives that support distributed manufacturing, like the Fab Lab, are an integral part of the WikiHouse organisation’s vision for the future. They are also gaining momentum. In a WikiHouse vision for the future, Luff explained,

So in each neighbourhood what you’re starting to see is things like Fab Lab’s springing up, and later on down the line actually, you potentially could actually be on a personal basis. So it might be that in your garage, at the back of your house, you have a manufacturing machine that could produce all sorts of different things. And this is changing the whole landscape of production now, so no longer is tightly controlled by a limited number of corporations and companies.

New ways of manufacturing houses

So we wanted to look at changing the way or the quality of how our housing’s built, so it goes up in a temporary timeframe, but becomes a
permanent, adaptable solution that can be reconfigured and reused over the longer term – and by longer term we’re looking to five generations or so. So, the temporary solution often becomes the permanent. We wanted to overcome that by having a solution that covers both bases. (Morton, 2014)

4.2.6. A concluding note

This case study has provided a detailed description of Space Craft Systems’ social mission, the activities it undertakes in pursuit of that mission, and the outcome of those activities – WikiHouseNZ. It is discussed in further detail, in relation to literature, in Chapter 5.
5. Findings

5.1. Introduction

This chapter frames the case studies around an existing conceptualisation of social entrepreneurship from the literature. It investigates the factors that have constrained the social entrepreneurs’ efforts, and the activities they have undertaken in pursuit of their mission that operate within those constraints.

5.2. A facilitating framework

In order to facilitate a deeper understanding of the case studies in relation to the research topic, Weerawardena and Mort’s (2006) bounded framework of social entrepreneurship (Figure 2.4, page 12) will be used to frame the case study findings. Weerawardena and Mort’s (2006) framework was developed from their investigation of social entrepreneurship practice, whereas other frameworks (e.g., Austin et al., 2006) were developed from comparisons made between commercial and social entrepreneurship. Therefore, these findings about post-disaster social entrepreneurship are being compared with the themes of ‘mainstream’ social entrepreneurship, and not those of commercial entrepreneurship which have simply been adapted. Using this framework as a lens through which to view the case studies, will allow for comparisons to be drawn with social entrepreneurship that has not been formed in response to disaster.

5.3. Environment:

The ways in which environmental factors affect social entrepreneurship are not to be underestimated, with changing dynamics that “may directly impact on the reason-for-being of the organisation” (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006, p. 27). Social entrepreneurship exists to change the environment in some way, through the creation of social value, or the stimulation of change, both of which are activities aimed to benefit wider groups that lie outside the organisation. First, though, the environment has been observed to shape the development of social entrepreneurship.

The Freerange Press, which originated from a personal project started in 2007, was originally an informal Melbourne-based organisation that aimed to produce a
limited run of 12 Freerange Journals. More recently, founder Bennett said that “the model has changed a bit and it’s grown into more of a conventional publishing house.” Bennett is not from Christchurch, and had not lived in Christchurch, though family meant that he had a “connection to the place.” This, and his interests in “aid and development and sort of, architectural point-of-view, post-disaster stuff”, undoubtedly contributed to his decision following the February 2011 earthquake, to “go back to New Zealand and live in Christchurch.”

Bennett’s urge to contribute in some way, and his curiosity and willingness to explore the environment of a city reeling from natural disaster, led to a major change in the Freerange Press that saw it become a legal co-operative in 2012. Its post-earthquake projects show that it has been responsive to changes in the environmental context, with evolution between these projects serving as examples of its responsiveness. Transitional City displayed an awareness of Christchurch’s rapid pace of change, taking advantage of a passing opportunity to create a book that captured the spirit of “transitional stuff”. It was compiled in only a few weeks, and primarily with the use of volunteers’ contributions. It was a spontaneously produced book that focused on temporary (transitional) projects, which appeared and disappeared quickly, and were easy to miss. Preserving these, with photographs and descriptions, allowed the Freerange Press to “archive this stuff that’s important.” The following year, the Freerange Press editors perceived changes Christchurch’s mood on the rebuild, writing in Once in a Lifetime that “In late 2013, the editors of this book felt that what had been a fairly widespread optimism about the rebuild … was steadily wearing away” (Bennett et al., 2014, p. 23).

Patience in Christchurch was beginning to wear thin, and as the recovery dragged on, and frustrations arose between the population and local and central governments. There was an opportunity to open up a conversation about the rebuild, and fill a gap where, Bennett said, “we thought there was a real absence of serious, essay-length critique.” He added,

it just blows my mind that in a forty billion dollar rebuild process, we seem to be the only ones publishing anything serious about the rebuild. So that was a real driver and like, frustration that drove it for us.
In *Once in a Lifetime*, the editors stated,

> A central motivation for this book is our shared belief that argument, debate and discussion are a necessary and important part of city-building. A disagreement doesn’t always represent an obstacle in the way of progress; disagreements and controversy, if managed carefully, can lead to better, more thorough and more creative outcomes.
> (Bennett et al., 2014, p. 25)

What makes this project great is that it was facilitated by the Freerange Press’ overarching aims, which are to promote informed debate about the important issues of our time, and especially those related to living in cities, and urban environments. It is a good example of the amount of influence that the external environment had on the Freerange Press; the book (and indeed *Transitional City*) is a direct response to it.

Space Craft Systems have crafted their own response to the environmental context, in the form of new building solutions and designs. The two case studies here, though, went about addressing the environment in very different ways. The Freerange Press worked on (in addition to its Freerange Journal) projects that primarily focused on – and evolved with – the changing mood of Christchurch City. Space Craft Systems have engaged not only with local environmental issues, but national, and international contexts as well. The quality of buildings, after all, is an issue that affects people all around the world.

Functioning as a chapter of the international WikiHouse organisation, Space Craft Systems are positioned to tackle problems that lie across much broader horizons than Christchurch alone, though that does not mean the organisation doesn’t have a distinctly ‘New Zealand’ flavour, or that it is not sympathetic to the range of issues that affect Christchurch buildings. Initially, it was the performance of the buildings themselves, during the February 2011 earthquake, that pushed Luff and Squires to start looking into the ways in which building production and design could be improved.

The February 2011 earthquake affected Christchurch enormously. As a result of the earthquake, a 185 people died in and around buildings. Luff commented,
other than, I think two people, everybody else in the February earthquake was killed as a result of a failure in a building… So even the people who were killed in those two buses, you know, they got crushed by bits of building.

Here, at the most extreme end of the scale, building failures had caused loss of life. It should not come as a surprise then, that Luff said the origins of Space Craft Systems, “really got triggered by the February 2011 earthquake.” The scale of damage, physically and psychologically, was much worse than that of the first September 2010 earthquake, and Luff said the February 2011 earthquake “was the one that kind of changed everything again, mainly because of the number of people that got killed.”

This was the major event that led to Space Craft Systems’ eventual formation, but in the aftermath of the earthquake, there were also a lot of other issues that started to become apparent. Countless buildings, containing businesses as well as homes, were damaged beyond repair and needed to be demolished. Some houses teetered over cliff tops, others sat underneath, in good condition, but uninhabitable due to risk of rock fall from above. Some suburban areas sat on land, which, regardless of the state of the houses atop them, was no longer suitable to be lived on. These were situations where, Luff said, “perfectly good buildings became stranded assets.”

Wider New Zealand faces problems associated with buildings as well, and not because of earthquake. The weather tightness of buildings has been an ongoing issue, and Luff explained that “we have this forty billion dollar plus problem around leaky house syndrome, and there’s so much of our housing stock that urgently needs replacing because it just wasn’t built well enough.” New Zealand also has issues with housing supply, which is failing to meet the demand driven by an increasing population. Presently, the country’s building industry is unable to, Luff said, meet growth in Auckland, for example, so the house prices are going up and up and up, way ahead of inflation, and it’s becoming increasingly difficult for whole sectors of our community to even think about the possibility of getting into the housing market.
This problem is not unique to New Zealand. Globally, Luff said, “there’s just a monumental need for large quantities of much better quality housing that, you know, is affordable.” Taking stock of all this, Luff said that “Danny [Squires] and myself wanted to concentrate on the housing as much as anything, but also look at a system that could also meet other needs.”

In Christchurch, however, the situation was clear. Having observed post-war, temporary building solutions in his native London, Luff said,

And so we were very concerned that the solutions that were being put in place, temporary solutions, could become long-term solutions. And they weren’t very good quality …I could also see that a lot of these things, which are done in a lightweight way, or a poor quality way, because they’re supposedly temporary, end up there thirty years later, you know, or forty years later.

Perhaps though, it was a combination of local and wider environmental issues that spurred Luff and Squires on. Space Craft Systems, while formed in the aftermath of Christchurch’s earthquakes, does not address only post-earthquake Christchurch issues specifically, as for example, the Freerange Press has done with its books. Summing up the reasons he and Squires started, Luff said,

So that’s what kicked it off really, us seeing those wider problems and feeling that we had skills to do something about it, and nobody else seemed to be doing something about it, so we felt we should at least try.

Both of these case studied are linked by a common theme – they both responded to the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. They are also found to be strongly engaged with the environment, aiming to change aspects of it, with tight links between the environment and their social mission.

5.4. Innovation:

The requirement for innovation has different levels of prominence in these case studies. They take different approaches, and largely, this is because of the differing nature of the work that each of them do. The Freerange Press, to start with, is a
publishing company. It produces online content, journals, and physical books, and does not stand out as an innovator even though academic literature suggests that innovation is a defining dimension of the socially entrepreneurial non-profit organisation (Nicholls & Cho, 2006; Peredo & McLean, 2006). In the non-profit organisation, Weerawardena and Mort (2012) have observed that efforts to innovate are targeted at two main areas; 1) capital raising, and 2) service delivery.

The original model for service delivery in the Freerange Press was simple, in which the aim was, Bennett said, “Let’s put some articles together, someone can graphic design it, make a PDF [read-only computer document], send it out for free.” This was not innovative, and it did not work either – Bennett said that in 2009, “like a hundred per-cent of people would look at the cover, and then you get down to page six and it’s down to about ten per-cent”. Nor was innovation the solution to this problem. While reluctant to do so, the Freerange Press had no option but to respond to demand and begin producing books and sell physical copies of the Freerange Journal – a traditional, non-innovative approach, in this case, was more appropriate.

In contrast with the Freerange Press, Space Craft Systems have emphasised innovation, functioning as the New Zealand chapter of the global WikiHouse project. The need for innovative approaches is rooted in the organisation’s aspirational statements (Table 4.1, page 63), which include aims to (1) Revolutionise standards and efficiency and performance in NZ residential buildings, (3) Mitigate negative impact of current consumption practice, and (8) Establish an open platform for local and global collaboration.

For Space Craft Systems, an emphasis on innovation is necessary because of the scale of what it wants to achieve. Supporting this is research that argues, “social enterprises need to foster innovation as a response to the challenges they are facing” (Chell, Nicolopoulou, & Karataş-Özkan, 2010, p. 488). The drive to innovate, however, is not easy and not without its drawbacks. Luff said,

We are icebreakers - at the bleeding edge rather than the cutting edge. So in a lot of what we’re doing, there’s not too many people, or in some cases there’s no one, who’s gone before us. So that means that actually, in some respects it’s quite risky, really. Because a lot of what we’re
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doing is pioneering, and that always takes much more effort than the people who will come after us, once we’ve forged away to do that.

The WikiHouse serves as a clear symbol of the focus on innovation, targeted at improving (or revolutionising, in WikiHouseNZ terms) the service delivery of New Zealand’s buildings. The organisation is developing a building platform that sits far more in line with product design than current building designs and standards, with the vision of a future where houses can be shipped and assembled like flat packed furniture. Innovation, though, is not limited to products or services alone. Rising to challenges means the socially entrepreneurial organisation needs to “include innovation in outlook, behaviours, strategy and operations” (Chell et al., 2010, p. 488).

The vastly different emphasis on innovation in these organisations goes to show that a high level of innovation is not a necessary factor for successful social entrepreneurship. However, there is the possibility that the context of post-disaster Christchurch contributed to this. Following the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, many of the required needs were basic in nature. Parts of the city, for instance, did not have running water. Residents forced out of damaged homes required shelter. The need for innovation was not urgent in all areas of life – and perhaps what the city needed was a light-hearted book of transitional projects, or a thorough conversation about how to rebuild the city.

5.5. Proactiveness

In the socially-entrepreneurial non-profit organisation, Weerawardena and Mort (2006) say there are three reasons why social entrepreneurs would want to be proactive; 1) for organisational survival, 2) to grow in the market, and 3) to better serve the market. These case studies have fulfilled each of these reasons, although to different extents.

The Freerange Press, for instance, decided in 2009 that it needed to supplement its online-based Freerange Journal with printed hardcopies, because “no-one was really consuming it online.” Doing this meant the organisation was then able to serve its market more effectively, giving a choice of form factor, with the printed copies available for people who prefer to read and own physical books. Adding the option of a new way to consume the journal would undoubtedly have had beneficial effects, with
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the resulting increase in consumption contributing to market growth, and in turn organisational survival.

In a reluctant but necessary compromise, the Freerange Press realised it needed to become “a financial operation at that point.” Although the adoption of a financial model was slightly at odds with the values the organisation initially stood for, and meant an increased workload, it laid the foundation for future projects that did have a financial basis. This includes the upcoming journal, *Harvest*. The new journal will have an academic focus, because, Bennett said, there is “a bit of a revenue stream doing academic books in Australia.”

In financial terms, Space Craft Systems has been much more proactive, and has demonstrated a proactive approach to safeguarding medium-term organisational survival. This was demonstrated by the organisation’s willingness to put its mission to the side while applying for the Rātā Foundation’s new social enterprise funding. This was the first fund in New Zealand to specifically target social enterprise, and it had been established in response to the Christchurch earthquakes. It was also an experiment – the Rātā Foundation were investigating whether the social enterprise can deliver a better social return, and reach a self-sustaining stage more quickly than the charity or not-for-profit.

Supported by this funding, Space Craft Systems are working on development of the WikiHouse. Development of the WikiHouse in itself is a proactive step – when the design is ready to be marketed, revenue from WikiHouse will contribute to organisational survival, market growth, and a better served market. When the project reaches this stage of maturity, the organisation has already identified the revenue streams it aims to engage with (having already earned income from one of the three it has described).

These case studies show that proactive behaviour has been targeted at organisational survival, and to better serving the market. Neither organisation has undertaken activity specifically targeted at market growth. This may be an indicator that proactive behaviours targeted at other areas occupy the majority of the social entrepreneur’s resources, leaving little left to be used for the pursuit of growth. Alternatively, the organisations may not yet be at a stage in their life cycle where organisational growth becomes an aim.
5.6. **Risk management:**

In these case studies, aversion to risk – and in particular aversion to financial risk – has been a recurring theme. Risk-taking has long been associated with entrepreneurship, although the social entrepreneur needs to balance risk with organisational sustainability and preservation of the mission. The social entrepreneur, Jennings (2014) says, should carry an “acceptance that there will be some failures, and that these are opportunities for learning” (p. 10). However, the social entrepreneur will also need to be mindful of the size, scale and implications of taking on risk.

While Weerawardena and Mort’s (2006) model focuses primarily on financial risk, there are a variety of different risks that are faced by non-profit organisations. These other types of risk include governance, operational, external and regulatory or compliance risks (Charity Commission, 2010). In Christchurch, it should be noted, there is now the ever-present risk of another aftershock or earthquake.

A core strategy in the Freerange Press, Bennett said, was “Let’s be editorially radical and financially conservative.” Financially, the organisation aims to “keep it really light in terms of what we do”, with conservative expectations of its projects meaning it can “go in being pretty confident that we’ll break even on each thing”. To make the projects on Christchurch viable, the organisation raised project-specific funds, saying, “This is for this particular project and it’s really important”, and minimising its own financial exposure for the production costs of its book projects. Although there is a lack of evidence in the case study to show the Freerange Press has taken active steps to manage its ‘other’ risks, its reluctance to step out on a limb and undertake projects without external financial support has demonstrated the organisation has an approach aimed at minimising its own risk and financial exposure.

Space Craft Systems require a more balanced approach to risk management, with a wider range of risks to consider. Unlike the Freerange Press case study, there did not appear to be a strong aversion to any singular type of risk. Some of the wider risks that Space Craft Systems need to consider, for example, revolve around the ownership of intellectual property. People who make contributions to the WikiHouse project retain copyright over their contributions, and then licence those back to the project. For the WikiHouse project to succeed, open collaboration is necessary, and there are safeguards in place to ensure that contributions cannot be removed from the
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Commons, and contributors cannot decide, Luff said, “‘oh no, no, I want to close up the I.P. I contributed!’ and shut it away.” Open collaboration is reciprocal, Luff said, and people “licence that copyright very freely with everybody else, and then we also require them to do the same in return.”

There is also an element of external risk associated with the dependence on external philanthropic funding, unlike the Freerange Press which only raised funds to support specific projects, without any dependence on funding for survival. However, while this has contributed to Space Craft Systems’ organisational risk, it has lowered the financial risk to co-founders Squires and Luff, who said,

in the early days, Danny [Squires] and I funded it, really. There was no one putting anything else in, so it was funded primarily by the time we put aside, in terms of our voluntary efforts, but also in some cases we did put some money in, not much – we didn’t have a lot.

Both of the organisations appear to have successfully managed risk, largely through avoidance. This strategy appears to have been suitable, without any major risk-associated failures to date.

5.7. Organisational sustainability:

Some aspects of these case studies have shown the organisations to be at odds with each other, in their approaches to organisational sustainability. From the start, Space Craft Systems’ aims have necessitated a long-term view, as they are great enough for this time frame to be necessary. The Freerange Press on the other hand, was originally envisioned by Bennett to be a journal with a finite amount of issues.

Sustainability is not an issue that was originally on the Freerange Press’ radar, with the organisation initially formed after Bennett “realised there was just this enormity of interesting people out there and I was trying to find an excuse to keep us all in touch.” With these relatively casual roots, it took some time for the Freerange Press to turn its attention to the future, and the sustainability of the organisation.

The earthquake in Christchurch, and Barnaby Bennett’s subsequent shift to the city from Melbourne, was a major influence in the Freerange Press becoming ‘official’ and registering as a legal co-operative entity. The post-disaster context in Christchurch
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had aroused Bennett’s interests in “aid and development and sort of, architectural point-of-view, post-disaster stuff”. The city’s ‘earthquake problems’, to which the Freerange Press began paying a lot of attention, gave the organisation a new, much broader focus. With the scope widened past the boundaries of the next Freerange Journal, the organisation had not only widened its workload, but its aspirations as well.

With the run of Freerange Journals now completed, and the projects on post-earthquake Christchurch under its belt, upcoming project Harvest stands out as the most sustainability-oriented activity to date. Unlike the limited number of Freerange Journals, and the projects on Christchurch, Harvest is future-oriented and specifically aimed at generating a revenue stream from academic publishing.

Efforts to sustain non-profit organisations do not only come from within, with Space Craft Systems currently reliant on philanthropic and grant funding for support. With their core product (WikiHouse) still under development, the organisation does not yet have a physical product to sell. This means, of the three revenue streams the organisation has identified, two remain to be engaged with – revenue from the manufacturing and construction of WikiHouse, and franchise and licence revenue from other WikiHouse providers, using Space Craft Systems’ production methods. So far, the organisation’s only independently earned revenue has come from a learning partnership with a large banking and insurance corporation. Sensibly, with the intention to benefit organisational sustainability, the co-founders used the revenue from this partnership to “spend some more money pursuing additional funding.” With the organisation now financially supported by the Rātā Foundation, these efforts have proved to be worthwhile.

Boschee and McClurg (2003) argue that the non-profit organisation is only entrepreneurial when it is self-sustaining through earned income, noting that “innovation can take a non-profit only so far. It’s one thing to design, develop and implement a new program - and quite another to sustain it without depending on charitable contributions and public sector subsidies” (p. 1). Perhaps it is too early to make these claims of Space Craft Systems, with the WikiHouse still under development.

With the organisation’s core product still being developed, self-sustainability is not something that can be aimed for in the meantime, with philanthropic funding
supporting the organisation through this stage. Space Craft Systems will need to reach self-sustainability as soon as is possible. Boschee and Mcclurg (2003) are very critical of the social entrepreneur that relies on funding, saying, “It allows them [social entrepreneurs] to congratulate themselves for being “entrepreneurial” without ever seriously pursuing sustainability or self-sufficiency” (p. 2).

5.8. Social Mission

It is generally agreed that the primary purpose of the social venture is to pursue and achieve the social mission, so it is not surprising that pursuit of mission has been a strong theme for these case studies. In their article, Weerawardena and Mort (2006) met a social entrepreneur from one of their case studies who stated, “we are deeply committed to being an organisation that focuses on its mission as our first priority. Financial performance for us is secondary, very important but secondary, to achieving our mission” (p. 30). Their article recognised that financial performance receives different levels of emphasis across different socially entrepreneurial organisations, with different organisations finding their own levels of balance between the relatively opposing objectives of earning income and delivering social value.

The sentiment expressed in that social entrepreneur’s comment was echoed by Bennett, who said that the work undertaken by the Freerange Press “was to be as pure as possible about doing work towards what we wanted to do, rather than doing work to achieve something over here.” Rather than work to apply for fundraising, the Freerange Press directed its efforts toward the mission, instead of its finances. The Freerange Press is fortunate to have developed a model that is not dependent on having sustainable cash flows – as opposed to other socially entrepreneurial organisations where, for example, there are dependents who require continuous support – and it is fortunate to have the freedom to focus primarily on its social aims.

Owing to reasons of sustainability and practicality, the Freerange Press has been required to make compromises to its mission over time. Its first compromise was the introduction of printed, physical copies of the Freerange Journal, to supplement the online equivalents that almost nobody was reading. The original vision for a free, online mode of service delivery was defeated by a lack of consumption. As a consequence, the second compromise was the introduction of a financial model, a
necessary step associated with the print and sale of physical journals. Bennett said that in the beginning, “we originally called it Freerange because we wanted it to not involve any money to begin with.” In later years, while the Freerange Journal remained free for online consumption, other projects (e.g. Transitional City and Once in a Lifetime) were not available for free online, with only physical copies available for sale.

Although it is a publishing company, the Freerange Press does not appear to have placed great emphasis on its business operations. This contrasts with literature, which suggests a great need for business skills in non-profit and social entrepreneurship (Dees, 1998; Emerson & Twersky, 1996; Hynes, 2009; Roberts & Woods, 2005; Seelos & Mair, 2005; Viviers, Ractliffe, & Hand, 2011). However, business aims are often at odds with social aims, and in order to sustain their organisation a social entrepreneur is often required to compromise, striking a balance between ‘mission and money’. The Freerange Press has been relatively fortunate in this regard, without a significant dependence on incoming cash flow, the organisation has been able to direct more effort toward mission than money. Because of the small scale of the operation, Bennett said, “we don’t have to do the painful advertising work, we don’t have to do fundraising, and we don’t have to write fundraising applications.” Bennett was clear about this level of balance when saying, “It was to be as pure as possible about doing the work we wanted to do, rather than doing work to achieve something over here.”

Space Craft Systems’ approach to the social mission has been more balanced, and more closely linked to its survival. Unlike the Freerange Press, the organisation has been unafraid to distribute its efforts wherever necessary, at one stage spending time and money applying for funding, with revenue allowing Luff and Squires to “spend some more money pursuing some additional funding.” Applying for funding from the Rātā Foundation was a time-consuming process that spanned several months, narrowing down an initial group of thirty-eight applicants down to just two that were finally granted funding. The organisation has displayed a keen awareness of the importance of organisational survival in its pursuit of mission.

The organisation has also been, in contrast with the Freerange Press, clearer in communicating its mission as well. Its aims are articulated clearly and specifically,
though this may be due in part to the organisation’s relationship with the international WikiHouse project. To an extent, Space Craft Systems does not have complete freedom to plot its own course – with this largely tied to the central WikiHouse Foundation, based in the UK, which sets the direction for the global organisation. Some international chapters (including WikiHouseNZ) have representation on the foundation, with Luff and Squires recognised as global co-founders. The global WikiHouse Foundation is currently in the process of establishing a governance structure, which Luff says, will “hold collectively, the underlying principles and values of that project in making sure the other teams comply with that.”

Space Craft Systems’ long term aims will benefit from the stability that comes with being part of an international organisation. The length of time it will take to fully develop the WikiHouse means there may be an increased likelihood for the organisation to stray from its path. This does not mean that changes in course are strictly negative outcomes – the Freerange Press, for example, has been required to alter its aims to ensure survival, a highly important factor.

Both of the case studies have demonstrated a level of balance in their pursuit of mission, constrained by the need to manage other priorities such as organisational survival. The themes that accompany the pursuit of mission are also highly related to those of proactiveness, risk management and organisational sustainability – all activities that can directly impact the mission, and the ways in which the social entrepreneur is able to go about pursuing the mission.

5.9. **Opportunity seeking**

The social entrepreneur, according to Weerawardena and Mort (2006), seeks out opportunities to create and deliver ‘enhanced’ social value to both existing and potential customers. They add that “opportunity seeking behaviour goes hand in hand with the financial viability of the opportunity and the need to consider the sustainability of the organisation.” (p. 31) Social entrepreneurs (and commercial entrepreneurs, alike) often want to take advantage of opportunities available, but do not always have the resources they need to do so (Chell, 2007). Notably, Weerawardena and Mort (2006) do not depict opportunity seeking as an individual
element in their bounded framework for social entrepreneurship, instead depicting it as an activity embedded in the dimension of organisational sustainability.

Both of the organisations in the case studies has uncovered opportunity following the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, although neither appear to have engaged actively in opportunity seeking, as part of an ongoing behaviour intended to create and deliver enhanced social value. Opportunity recognition has also followed from the social entrepreneurs’ existing skills and backgrounds, suggesting a process of opportunity recognition where opportunities are recognised in relation to existing capabilities, rather than a process in which the social entrepreneur first identifies a social need before seeking the resources and capabilities to develop that opportunity.

5.10. Chapter summary

This chapter has looked at the case studies through the lens of Weerawardena and Mort’s (2006) bounded framework for social entrepreneurship. It has found the social entrepreneurs in the case studies to be highly responsive to their environmental contexts, with aims to stimulate change in their environments. Innovation was not found to be as important as literature often suggests, as some social missions do not require the use of innovation to affect social change. The social entrepreneurs were found to be the most proactive when undertaking activities to support organisational survival. They did not make a proactive effort to grow in the market, although it is possible that they may do so at a later stage in the organisational life cycle. Both organisations managed risk, in particular financial risk, primarily through avoidance. Only one of the organisations was self-sustaining – with Space Craft Systems supported by a social enterprise fund while they develop their product. Both organisations however, have new revenue streams lined up that they will be able to engage with in future. They have earned revenue already. The social mission was a central element of both organisations’ activities, though the ‘mission and money’ balance was slightly different between organisations. The organisation that was yet to reach the self-sustaining status placed more emphasis on the pursuit of funding. Finally, neither organisation appeared to engage in opportunity-seeking as an on-going activity aimed at creating or enhancing the delivery of social value.

The implications from these findings are discussed in the following chapter.
6. Discussion

6.1. Introduction

Concluding the thesis, this chapter presents a discussion of the major research findings in relation to literature. It introduces a framework for post-disaster social entrepreneurship, depicting it as a process catalysed by crisis. Implications from the research findings are explained, followed by the limitations of the research and recommendations for future research.

6.2. Role of the social entrepreneur

In any conceptualisation of social entrepreneurship, it is important to recognise the human elements and drivers behind it. Humans are the creators and drivers of socially entrepreneurial organisations, which are not as autonomous as some literature may suggest. The case studies detailed in this thesis are a very human response to a disaster – the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch – after which the social entrepreneurs behind the two organisations felt highly compelled to use their skills and do something, and to try to help.

Not all authors have integrated these human elements in their conceptual frameworks of social entrepreneurship. The importance of people, their passion and persistence, appears to be missing from Weerawardena and Mort’s (2006) framework. The narrative of their case study findings recognises the entrepreneur, and while the authors also identify that the types of people joining such organizations are a “different breed of people” (p. 31), their framework largely conceptualised social entrepreneurship as a unique combination of behaviours operating within a set of constraints. Their behaviour-driven framework does not, like some other examples (e.g., Austin et al., 2006), include any resources the organisation has available. While useful for describing how social entrepreneurship operates within its constraints, the framework gives insufficient attention to the whims of the social entrepreneurs who plot a course for these organisations and steer them along.

Human resources were not forgotten in Austin et al.’s (2006) framework, which positioned people as a central element and resource. Their framework portrayed social entrepreneurship as an activity focused on the aim of delivering a unique social
value proposition. In social entrepreneurship, they note, “People’s skills, attitudes, knowledge, contacts, goals, and values provide the resource mix that contributes centrally to success” (p. 5). This acknowledges the close relationship between the entrepreneur and the organisation, and the authors also recognise that in entrepreneurship, “Changing people often requires a different deal” (p. 5). These frameworks aim to explain how social entrepreneurship works, but still fail to explore why social entrepreneurs do the work they do.

Social entrepreneurs not only bring their skills and personal attributes to their organisations, but a range of other resources too, or access to them. These are often, however, somewhat limited. Literature on non-profit and social entrepreneurship often emphasises the extent of resource constraints – even though these can affect the commercial and social entrepreneur alike – with the social entrepreneur likely to rely on a broader mix of income, investments and donations, to finance production (Lumpkin et al., 2013). The role of resources in the entrepreneurial organisation has been interpreted in different ways. For example, Stevenson and Jarillo (1990) proposed that, “An entrepreneurial organisation is that which pursues opportunity, regardless of resources currently controlled” (p. 23). This perspective prioritises the opportunity, failing to acknowledge the practical requirements for achieving the opportunity. This view is not afforded for social entrepreneurs, who often have to make do with what they have. That does not mean the social entrepreneur is ineffective at gathering resources – rather, they are highly adept at mobilising under-utilised resources and using them to make a difference (Thompson, Alvy, & Lees, 2000). A social entrepreneur’s effective use of resources supports Schumpeter’s (1934) views of the entrepreneur, as an agent of change who innovates by forming new resource combinations. His views on innovation now form the theoretical basis for a growing amount of social entrepreneurship literature (Newth & Woods, 2014).

Evidence from the case studies does not exclusively support either of these perspectives, with examples supporting each. Space Craft Systems, for example, began work on their version of the WikiHouse lacking the means to prototype and test the design. Both case studies, though, depict social entrepreneurs bringing resources with them, including (and not limited to) the human elements identified by Austin et al. (2006); skills, attitudes, knowledge, contacts, goals, and values. It is the use of these
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resources that allowed the organisations to start, and gain momentum. The social entrepreneurs in both case studies formed organisations in fields that they had skills, knowledge and experience in, but in which there were also opportunities to create social value. The resource-constrained, ‘make-do’ approach to resources in social entrepreneurship is best described by Corner and Ho (2010);

In the case of social value creation, effectuating entrepreneurs would try to shape and create a solution to a social need based on resources at hand rather than trying to predict what the ideal solution would be and assemble resources to manifest it. (p. 638)

Studying responses to a crisis situation, or a disaster such as the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, can help us to understand why social entrepreneurs may rise to the act. Disasters can change the ways that people interact, after which community solidarity and altruism (unselfish behaviour intended to benefit others) is frequently seen, and people join together and help one another through the recovery (Solnit, 2009). Altruistic behaviour, however, has received little attention in existing frameworks for social entrepreneurship.

Most authors agree that there will be an influx of altruistic behaviour following a disaster, although they are also quick to point out that this rush of post-disaster volunteer activity is often short lived (Pardess, 2005). In Christchurch, many people discontinued volunteering when the demand for relief had diminished (Yanicki, 2013). Later, the surge in post-earthquake community solidarity had dissipated too – Campbell (2014) interviewed a Christchurch resident, who said,

well, we are all a bit more relaxed again now, so I know that when we used to have a lot more get-togethers during the earthquakes and that [has] sort of stopped now. We have sort of gone back to just being normal. (p. 98)

Yet, the people behind the organisations featured in this thesis have not returned to a pre-disaster state, and their organisations remain. The scope of their aims has broadened, and although they were formed (Space Craft Systems) and formalised
(Freerange Press) in response to the February 2011 earthquake, they now address issues and deliver social value across broader areas that are not necessarily earthquake related. The Freerange Press is now moving into academic publishing. Space Craft Systems’ building designs will be useful internationally.

Social entrepreneurship, when compared with commercial entrepreneurship, can at first appear to be an expression of altruism. Tan, Williams and Tan (2005) attempted to define the ‘social’ in social entrepreneurship in altruistic terms. Dees’ seminal (1998) article suggested that social entrepreneurship is motivated by compassion, however later literature maintained that any mechanism that may link compassion to social entrepreneurship remains poorly understood (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin, 2009; Zahra et al., 2009). Miller, Grimes, McMullen and Vogus (2012) later argued that most literature on social entrepreneurship focused on defining it and differentiating it from commercial entrepreneurship, and largely overlooked the motivational antecedents behind it. They then stated, “compassion provides the impetus to act where a more rational approach might not” (p. 631).

Social entrepreneurs, however, do not always act compassionately, or even rationally. Mair and Martí (2006) contended that “although social entrepreneurship is often based on ethical motives and moral responsibility, the motives for social entrepreneurship can also include less altruistic reasons such as personal fulfilment” (p. 38). Further, they claim that social entrepreneurship is not the only form of entrepreneurship that can have altruistic outcomes. Supporting their claim that altruism is not a characteristic that should be associated with social entrepreneurship alone, they refer to Venkataraman (1997), who stated,

[commercial] entrepreneurship is particularly productive from a social welfare perspective when, in the process of pursuing selfish ends, entrepreneurs also enhance social wealth by creating new markets, new industries, new technology, new institutional forms, new jobs, and net increases in real productivity. (p. 133)

One should not assume that Venkataraman’s (1997) reference to ‘selfish ends’ is purely about financial gain. Entrepreneurship is instead driven by the pursuit of opportunity, a vision, or as Martin and Osberg (2007) put it, psychic reward;
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The truth is that entrepreneurs are rarely motivated by the prospect of financial gain, because the odds of making lots of money are clearly stacked against them. Instead, both the [commercial] entrepreneur and the social entrepreneur are strongly motivated by the opportunity they identify, pursuing that vision relentlessly, and deriving considerable psychic reward from the process of realizing their ideas. (p. 34)

Findings from the case studies in this thesis initially make it difficult to support these arguments. The social entrepreneurs from both organisations described feeling compelled to help, because they had skills they believed would deliver some value to others in the post-earthquake situation. However, as their organisations evolved, the initial altruistic motives that contributed to starting the ventures appeared to dissipate. Miller et al. (2012) offer a possible explanation for these changes; the weighting of prosel [selfish] and prosocial [altruistic] motivations may vary over time. Specifically, as the enterprise moves through stages of the organisational life cycle, priorities and motives are likely to change. For example, and individual’s decision to engage in social entrepreneurship may be motivated by compassion and a desire to alleviate others’ suffering, but as income, reputation, and/or other self-oriented benefits grow, the entrepreneur’s motives or the enterprise’s motives may evolve, potentially resulting in mission drift. (p. 632)

Social entrepreneurs have to manage the constant tension between the opposing aims of the social mission and organisational survival, in a balance of ‘mission and money’. This balancing act brings with it the risk of drifting off course, where the social entrepreneur “may become so internally focused on procuring resources to support their organisation’s growth that the paths to creating social value may become blurred” (Austin et al., 2006, p. 17). Termed ‘mission drift’, this is the situation in which the organisation, caught up in the pursuit of sustainability, loses sight of the mission and enters “a process of organisational change, where an organisation diverges from its main purpose or mission” (Cornforth, 2014, p. 4). Social entrepreneurs that staunchly avoid mission drift, however, can come to face other problems in doing so.
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For example, Newth and Woods (2014) commented that “Concerns about mission drift will lead to a perception of novelty being superfluous to core operations and a risk to organizational efficiency and efficacy” (p. 200).

6.3. Crisis and catalyst

The February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, a natural disaster, could be classified as a crisis – something which can be described as a low-probability event, that is sudden and high-impact, and in which the case, effects, or means of resolution may be unclear (Hills, 1998; Pearson & Clair, 2012). For existing organisations in the city, the effects were enormous; any business based in the Central City Red Zone (not to be confused with the Residential Red Zone), for example, lost access to their premises (if still standing), or had premises that were subsequently demolished. Crisis or disaster situations like this, and their effects on existing businesses have been investigated by many authors. Few however, have investigated how these situations can, in either commercial or social entrepreneurship, lead to opportunity development and business formation as this research aims to do.

Research on crisis situations, in the field of crisis management, has largely focused on how organisations handle the three distinct phases of a crisis: crisis prevention, crisis response, and recovery from the crisis (Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005). However, these phases are not relevant to the case studies in this thesis. This research investigates social businesses that were formed as a response to the crisis, so at the time of the crisis, there was no organisation for which to make crisis prevention, response and recovery plans.

Following natural disasters, social entrepreneurs have been observed to fulfil particular roles. After Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2010) observed that social entrepreneurs played three key roles, in order to;

a) help to solve the collective action problem associated with deciding to return and rebuild
b) organise and engage in outreach, activism and advocacy on behalf of their communities
c) directly assist in rebuilding efforts and provide essential services. (p. 153)
Discussion

Having discussed that social entrepreneurship is not purely an expression of altruism, one must ask why social entrepreneurs may take up these roles. The outward, community-oriented focus of these roles suggests compassion for others. Indeed, the case studies in this thesis had compassionate roots – the best expression of which was the Freerange Press’ first project *Chur Chur* – but these roots were also associated with the pursuit of a specific mission, a notion omitted from Chamlee-Wright and Storr’s (2010) description of the social entrepreneur’s roles after disaster. For the social entrepreneur, responding to a disaster may be as much a compassionate response, as a decision to pursue a newly highlighted opportunity.

Definitions of entrepreneurship (both commercial and social) often refer to opportunity recognition, which is a central entrepreneurial attribute (Chell, 2007). For example, Mair and Martí (2006) view social entrepreneurship as a “process involving the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to catalyse social change and/or address social needs” (p. 37). It is unclear whether this description is suitable for environments undergoing rapid change, such as in Christchurch following the February 2011 earthquake. Did social entrepreneurs pursue opportunities following the earthquake, or did the earthquake present opportunities to them, which could be taken advantage of? The social entrepreneurs behind both case studies attributed the origins of their current organisations to the February 2011 earthquake, and it is likely that if the earthquake had not occurred, these organisations would not exist as they do today.

Ardichvili et al. (2003) contend that opportunities are made, not found, and therefore attention should be paid to opportunity development, not opportunity recognition. They emphasise that opportunity development is process, and that an opportunity recognised does not automatically lead to the formation of a business, stating, “The need or resource ‘recognized’ cannot become a viable business without this ‘development’” (p. 113). This means that simply recognising an opportunity is not enough, and that in order to take advantage of it, an entrepreneur needs to add value to the opportunity through a process of development.

Case study evidence suggests that the post-crisis social entrepreneur seeks and develops opportunities that are matched to their personal qualities, which are their “skills, attitudes, knowledge, contacts, goals, and values” (Austin et al., 2006, p. 5). By
applying their personal qualities to the opportunity, and drawing from the resources they have available to them, the social entrepreneur is able to transform the opportunity into one which has a unique flavour, and one which creates value not only for themselves but also their community.

6.4. Sustaining the mission

Developing an opportunity, and transforming it into a business is one thing, but managing to sustain that business is another. The aim to generate a self-sustaining business is a fundamental aspect of social entrepreneurship, and requires the demonstration of behaviours that contribute to survival. As previously discussed, the social entrepreneur needs to balance the opposing aims of ‘mission and money,’ and consider the risk of mission drift if this balance is not struck. This does not mean that mission drift is a negative outcome which must be avoided at all costs – instead it is often necessary to ensure business survival, but it is up to the social entrepreneur to decide what extent of drift may be appropriate for their organisation. Dacin, Dacin and Matear (2010) asked, “to what extent might social entrepreneurs subjugate their social mission to their profit mission in order to achieve sustainability?” (p. 52). Newth and Woods (2014) suggested that some extent would be necessary, calling efforts to avoid mission drift a threat to organisational efficiency, thus deeming it to be a necessary compromise.

Even though it is agreed that the primary purpose of a social business is to pursue the mission, Weerawardena and Mort (2006) caution that “the role of social mission must be understood within the competitive environment within which the organisations operate” (p. 30). This statement has a few implications. The mission needs to be relevant to the environmental context – there is little point in pursuing a social mission for which there is no need. That said, social entrepreneurs often address the needs of the marginalised members of their communities, so it would be wrong to construe a lack of market demand or business viability for the lack of a social need. The competitive environment for social entrepreneurship is market based, where social and commercial entrepreneurs compete alike for market share in their industries. This is very different for the competitive environment in which the charity operates, where different charitable organisations compete for a share of the limited amount of funding
available. Social entrepreneurs also need to adapt to the changing circumstances of the environment, and recognise that a changing context “may directly impact on the reason-for-being of the organisation” (Weerawardena & Mort, 2006, p. 27).

A changing environment – or indeed a crisis or natural disaster – often highlights new opportunities. This research has focused on opportunities that were highlighted by a crisis, but has also observed the ways social entrepreneurs to respond to opportunities uncovered by more gradual environmental changes. Like Weerawardena and Mort (2006), this research has not found opportunity recognition to be a distinct function of social entrepreneurship as a process, finding instead that on-going opportunity recognition is embedded in an organisation’s efforts to adapt to surrounding environments, and its aims for sustainability. However, although this means opportunity recognition runs as a concurrent activity in the social business, it does not mean the social entrepreneur aims to develop all recognised opportunities.

Sustaining the business, and thus sustaining the pursuit of the social mission, requires social entrepreneurs to be realistic about risk and capability. Although some authors assert the entrepreneur should not let limited resources dictate their capabilities (e.g., Dees, 1998; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990), Weerawardena and Mort (2006), and indeed this research, find resource availability to be a very real issue - social entrepreneurs have very constrained resources, and use them judiciously, pursuing opportunities carefully. Inevitably, this constrained resource base heightens the social entrepreneur’s stance on risk management, as any failures become increasingly unaffordable.

6.5. A framework for post-crisis social entrepreneurship

Based on theory that emerged throughout the course of this research, Figure 6.1 presents a framework for the development of social entrepreneurship that is catalysed by a crisis situation. This framework supports existing literature that conceptualises social entrepreneurship as a continuous process (e.g., Chell, 2000; Dees, 1998; Weerawardena & Mort, 2006), illustrating the effects of a crisis on different elements of the process of social entrepreneurship.
In the development of social entrepreneurship after a crisis, the crisis has overarching effects. The crisis has been observed in this research to trigger an initial altruistic response from the social entrepreneur, although simply having good intentions is not enough for the social entrepreneur to begin delivering social value. Following the crisis, opportunities were highlighted that caught the attention of social entrepreneurs who, in their altruistic state, were able to recognise their potential and begin the process of developing those opportunities into business cases that would later be able to deliver social value.

As a result of a crisis, however, resource availability can be a major issue. This is particularly true when the crisis is a natural disaster, after which trying to secure a location to work from, or even to procure daily living essentials, can pose a challenge. A natural disaster may not diminish all resources, however; social entrepreneurs have demonstrated skills in mobilising communities, and have been observed to use a surge of post-disaster community altruism and solidarity to their advantage.

The amount resources a social entrepreneur is able to mobilise directly influences the extent of their capabilities, and the pace at which they are able to develop opportunities into viable social value creating businesses. Case study data
found the social entrepreneur to significantly increase their rate of progress following the injection of, for example, financial resources.

This framework depicts business sustainability as the primary aim and outcome of the process of social entrepreneurship, a stage that occurs when the opportunity has been successfully developed into a social value creating business. For the social entrepreneur, maintaining a sustainable, self-sufficient business also ensures they are able to continue pursuing their social mission, delivering enhanced social value.

Once the stage of business sustainability has been reached, though, it does not signify ‘completion’ of the social entrepreneurship process. A social entrepreneur is then required to engage in behaviour that reinforces the sustainability of the business, and hence the mission. This feedback loop allows the social entrepreneur to reconcile their personal attributes, such as their attitudes and values, with the on-going outcomes of their business. This reconciliation means the social entrepreneur is able to monitor the degree of mission drift that occurs in the course of business-sustaining activity. Failing to monitor organisational outcomes and compare them to the personal drivers behind them, can also pose the risk that environmental developments or changes may render the social mission irrelevant. Therefore, the social entrepreneur needs to continuously adapt their social mission and business operations to the changing social needs of their surrounding environment.

6.6. Implications

The intention for this research was to develop an understanding of how social entrepreneurship can develop as a phenomenon following a disaster. On the basis of the cases that have been presented in this thesis, social entrepreneurship has the potential to play a significant role in community recovery after disaster.

An interesting finding from the research was the nature of the social mission chosen by social entrepreneurs when responding to a crisis. The social entrepreneurs featured in this thesis responded to the disaster with altruistic intentions, but as they developed their chosen opportunities, the scope of their aims was broadened and they have now reached a state where their current projects no longer address the consequences of the earthquake.
Discussion

This research found the social entrepreneur’s personal qualities, including their interests, was the most significant influencing factor for the development of opportunities after disaster. These personal qualities incorporate a trait which has encouraged the social entrepreneurs to overcome the collective action problem through the process of developing their opportunities.

This findings from case studies in this research did not support findings from previous research on social entrepreneurship, that observed social entrepreneurs to fulfil certain roles after disaster (Chamlee-Wright & Storr, 2010). Instead, the roles taken up by social entrepreneurs were closely related to their background of industry-specific knowledge and skills. This means that the social entrepreneur, after disaster, does not necessarily address the most apparent social need, but instead finds novel and creative ways to deliver social value framed around their own particular interests.

As a contribution to knowledge this research, with its framework for post-disaster social entrepreneurship, provides new insight into the ways social entrepreneurs, spurred into action by a crisis, then engage in a process of developing opportunities and building their social value delivering businesses. It expands on the current base of social entrepreneurship research, delivering on calls for more exploration of social entrepreneurship as a highly interesting, contextually-based phenomenon.

6.7. New policy perspectives

In New Zealand, social entrepreneurship is beginning to attract attention from a variety of sectors. Not long ago, Kaplan (2013) expressed astonishment at the government’s disinterest in the promise of social entrepreneurship. It was not until 2014 that the government finally announced an investment of $1.27m to be put toward the development of support systems for emerging social enterprises. That year, the Rātā Foundation announced a $2.5m social enterprise fund, which had been specifically established as a response to the Christchurch earthquakes. The Rātā Foundation recognised the lack of social enterprise development in New Zealand, and their social enterprise fund offered incentives to social entrepreneurs, giving them an opportunity to demonstrate the advantages of social entrepreneurship over the charity or not-for-profit.
Discussion

Social entrepreneurs then, are beginning to receive more support from government and philanthropy. During this research, development programs for budding social entrepreneurs have gained momentum, and the term ‘social entrepreneurship’ is starting to become a buzz word used in New Zealand communities. More education on social entrepreneurship is needed, however, for the practice to gain any real traction in New Zealand. Creating awareness in education about the possibilities of social entrepreneurship, can provide tools and knowledge to the individuals who desire to create social value for their communities but do not know how. Social entrepreneurship can offer new solutions to tackle existing social problems, and is dependent on individuals with the spirit for social change.

Two major elements of the social entrepreneurship context in New Zealand need to change. Firstly, it deserves greater support and financial assistance from government. Social entrepreneurship should be regarded as a social investment that has the potential to offer ongoing returns, but which needs seed funding to first grow. Secondly, greater exposure of social entrepreneurship is required in education, including the primary, secondary and tertiary levels. The tools of social entrepreneurship first need to be put in the right hands for it to gain momentum.

6.8. New avenues for exploration

Further exploration of social entrepreneurship that develops after disaster is needed. The limited number of case studies in this thesis may impact generalisability to the population, therefore further research with additional cases would be useful for testing the theory developed in this thesis. Further research could potentially include other cases from social entrepreneurs now operating in Christchurch.

More research is required to understand the mechanism by which a crisis serves as a catalyst for social entrepreneurship. Social entrepreneurs were found to have unique attitudes and abilities to break through collective action problems, and possessed a spirit that was undeterred by the difficulties not only associated with the resource constraints of their organisations, but also the unique context within which they have operated. Social entrepreneurs may not yet be well understood, however the efforts of all social entrepreneurs are to be applauded.

_____________________________________________________________
7. References


References

J. Dann, E. Johnson, & R. Reynolds (Eds.), *Once in a Lifetime: City-building after Disaster in Christchurch*. Christchurch, New Zealand: Freerange Press.


References


References


References


References


References


References


References


8. Appendix

8.1. Participant information sheet

Department of Management, Marketing and Entrepreneurship

My name is Andy Tan, and I am a postgraduate student at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New Zealand, studying toward a Master of Commerce degree. This research will form the basis for my final project, my thesis. You are invited to take part in this study, which investigates the drivers of social enterprise and social entrepreneurship in a post-disaster context.

If you choose to take part in this project, you agree to participate in interviews. They will be scheduled at a time and location at your convenience, and you may be requested to participate in a follow-up interview. These sessions will be informal, but there will be a few predetermined questions, and discussion may go in to some depth. You are free to ask that any sensitive topics be avoided. It would be practical to set aside at least an hour for each session, and you do not face any personal risk for your participation.

Your participation in this research is voluntary, and you have the right to withdraw at any time, without penalty. If you do choose to withdraw, I will do my best to remove any information relating to you, provided this is practically achievable. All interviews will be recorded, and their contents transcribed into computer documents. If you like, you will have the opportunity to review these transcriptions before they are included in the research analysis.

As the researcher I will have access to this data (the interview recordings and transcriptions), as well as my supervisor (Dr. Sussie Morrish). Unless you give prior consent for me to use your identity, you will have confidentiality and anonymity, and your name (and the names of other people in discussion) will be exchanged for pseudonyms during transcription. This data will be stored in locked and secured facilities, in password-protected electronic form, and will be destroyed after five years.

The findings of this study will contribute to my thesis, which will be a public document (available from the University of Canterbury Library), and may also be used for an academic journal article. If you would like to receive a copy of the results, you are welcome to provide me your contact details, email or postal address and I can send this to you upon completion of the project.

If you have any questions about this study at any stage, you are welcome to contact me, or my supervisor.

This project has received ethical approval from the University of Canterbury Educational Research Human Ethics Committee, and participants should address any complaints to The Chair, Educational Research Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).

If you understand and agree to take part in this study, you are kindly asked to complete the consent form. This is to be returned in person, or to my email address, prior to the beginning of interviews.

Many thanks,

Andy Tan
Master of Commerce Candidate

Supervisor:
Dr. Sussie Morrish
Associate Professor of Marketing and Associate HoD
Department of Management, Marketing and Entrepreneurship
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
Ph +64 3 3642987 ext. 6547; DDi +64 3 3642547
sussie.morrish@canterbury.ac.nz
Antecedents to post-disaster social entrepreneurship
Consent form for interview participants

I have received a full explanation of this project, and have been given the opportunity to ask questions.

Should I agree to participate in this research, I understand what is required of me. I understand that my participation is completely voluntary, and I may withdraw from the study at any time without penalty.

Any information or opinion I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher (Andy Tan) and his supervisor (Dr. Sussie Morrish), and unless I give prior consent for my identity to be used, my name and the names of other people I discuss will be exchanged for pseudonyms. The published results of this study will not identify me or my organisation, unless prior consent is given.

I understand that all data collected for this study will be kept in locked and secured facilities, in password protected electronic form, and will be destroyed after five years.

If there are any risks associated with taking part in this study, I understand what these are, and how they will be managed.

I am entitled to receive a report on the findings of this study upon its completion, by providing my contact details, email or postal address.

I understand that I can contact the researcher or his supervisor, for further information or to ask questions.

I understand that if I have any complaints, these can be sent to The Chair, Educational Research Human Ethics Committee, University of Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch (human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz).

By signing below, I agree to participate in this study.

____________________________________  ______________________________________  __________
Name                      Signature                  Date

Please return this form in person, or via email to sussie.morrish@canterbury.ac.nz

Many thanks,

Supervisor:
Dr. Sussie Morrish
Associate Professor of Marketing and Associate HoD
Department of Management, Marketing and Entrepreneurship
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
Ph +64 3 3642987 ext. 6547; DDi +64 3 3642547
sussie.morrish@canterbury.ac.nz

Andy Tan
Master of Commerce Candidate
Antecedents to post-disaster social entrepreneurship
Confidentiality waiver form for interview participants

By signing this form, I agree to the following:

- I allow my name and identity to be used (only) in the research project Antecedents to post-disaster social entrepreneurship.
- I allow the name of my organisation to be used in the research project.
- I understand that any information or opinions I provide, including those which identify other people, will no longer be confidential.
- I understand this form negates the agreement of confidentiality in the prior consent form for interview participants which I have also signed.
- If I ask for any information or opinions disclosed to be kept off the record or confidential, these will be kept confidential and excluded from interview transcripts.
- I am allowed to request my interview transcriptions for review, before they are included in the analysis.
- I understand the results of this research project will be publically available (as a thesis, available from the University of Canterbury Library, or as a published journal article).
- I understand that I can contact the researcher or his supervisor, for further information or to ask questions.

____________________________________  ______________________________________  ____________________
Name                                                                                      Signature                                             Date

Please return this form in person, or via email to [email address]

Many thanks,

Supervisor:
Dr. Sussie Morrish
Associate Professor of Marketing and Associate HoD
Department of Management, Marketing and Entrepreneurship
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
Ph +64 3 3642987 ext. 6547; DDi +64 3 3642547
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Andy Tan
Master of Commerce Candidate

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8.3. Conformation of Human Ethics Committee approval

HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE

Secretary, Lynda Griffioen
Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz

Ref: HEC 2014/68/LR

2 October 2014

Andrew Tan
Department of Management, Marketing & Entrepreneurship
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

Dear Andrew

Thank you for forwarding your Human Ethics Committee Low Risk application for your research proposal “Antecedents to post-disaster social entrepreneurship”.

I am pleased to advise that this application has been reviewed and I confirm support of the Department’s approval for this project.

With best wishes for your project.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

Lindsey MacDonald
Chair, Human Ethics Committee