

FRAMING THE COLOURS OF THAINESS:  
THE EMERGENCE OF YELLOW AND RED THAI IDENTITIES

---

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

in the University of Canterbury

by

Suthida Pattanasrivichian

University of Canterbury

2016

---

---

To my parents, Jim, Na Yai, and Pa O

Thank you very much!

---

## Abstract

This thesis explores the movement of the Yellow and Red Shirts in their early periods. Sondhi Limthongkul created the “Muang Thai Rai Supda” group. This was the initial group of the Yellow Shirts, while the Red Shirts was originally started as the several anti-coup groups.

In a successful social movement the leaders need to ensure long lasting support, thus a large number of participants are vital to enlarge and strengthen the movements. To achieve this, framing becomes a significant tool for the leader to select and highlight effective issues and events, and frame them to resonate with their followers and bystanders. In Thai social movements, frames have been employed into many movements, particularly nationalist frames. Four nationalist symbols the king, nation, religion, and democracy/modernization metaframes have become sources of mobilizing frames which stem from these metaframes.

To understand social movements in Thailand, the cases of Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups were selected for investigation through social movement and framing theories, including the Thai metaframes concept. The questions asked by this research focus on how the metaframes and mobilizing frames of Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups were applied, focused on, and adjusted in their early movements. In addition, the different identities which derived from framing are questioned and explored. To investigate the framing tactics the timeline of the two studied cases are divided into two phases. In each phase, the focus of frames in each group is revealed to see the differences of frames, framing tactics, and the diverse identities of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups.

The results tell that the focus on the metaframes and mobilizing frames of the two groups are different. The movement of Sondhi concentrated on the king, religion, and nation metaframes, while the democracy/modernization and nation metaframes were emphasized by the anti-coup groups. The mobilizing frames that

were mostly used by Sondhi were the king, Somdet Pra Sangkarat, and corruption, while the anti-coup groups concentrated on the anti-coup, anti-amat, and people's democracy mobilizing frames. The problem definition, causal attribution, and moral evaluation functions are heavily focused on in the framing of the two groups. Notably, the two groups enhance the power of the frames by promoting them together as a package, while the culprits were blamed individually for clear and simple recognition.

Another major result of this study is that the different focuses on frames bring about different identities. Sondhi Limthongkul focuses on the three nationalist symbols of the king, religion, and nation, and persuades his participants to protect these symbols. Thus, his identity is focused on being a "true Thai". In contrast, the democracy symbol is emphasized the most in the framing of the anti-coup groups. They demand the restoration of democracy, the 1997 constitution, and the elected government. As a result, the "democratic Thai" is framed as the identity of the anti-coup groups. The different identity of the two groups results from the different focus on the metaframes and mobilizing frames. Framing identity could create strong bonds between the movement and the participants and increase support. The cost of doing so was a deeply rooted sometimes violent conflict based on diverging identities.

## Table of content

	Page
Acknowledgement.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Table of contents.....	iv
List of tables.....	vii
List of figures.....	viii
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter 2 Literature review and methodology.....</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1. Literature review.....	13
2.1.1 Social movement concept.....	13
What are social movements? .....	12
Emergence of social movements.....	15
Participation in social movements.....	16
Leadership in social movements.....	18
2.1.2. Frames and social movements.....	21
2.1.3. Mobilizing frames and Metaframes.....	23
Mobilizing frames.....	23
Metaframes.....	25
2.1.4. The Thai metaframes.....	28
The pre-official nationalism era.....	29
The official nationalism of King Vajiravudh.....	33
The chat idea.....	33
The religion idea.....	36
The king idea.....	40
The origin of democracy in Thailand.....	44
The nationalism of the People’s Party.....	48
The nationalism of Phibulsongkram.....	51
The Seri Thai movement.....	55
The nationalism of Sarit Thanarat.....	57
The 1973 student movement.....	62
Conclusion.....	63
2.2. Research questions and hypotheses.....	65
2.3. Methodology.....	66
The cases.....	67
The case of Sondhi Limthongkul .....	67
The case of the anti-coup group .....	68
Data source.....	69
The case of Sondhi Limthongkul .....	69
The case of the anti-coup group .....	71
Method of analysis.....	72
Mobilizing frames.....	72
Metaframes.....	74
2.4 Structure of the thesis.....	75

<b>Chapter 3 Framing and identity of Sondhi Limthongkul</b> .....	77
Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra in the old days.....	79
“Muang Thai Rai Supda” and the beginning of the news war.....	83
In the first phase at Thammasat University.....	88
1. The corruption mobilizing frame.....	88
2. The monarchy mobilizing frame.....	96
3. The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame.....	102
4. The media control mobilizing frame.....	108
5. The populism mobilizing frame.....	114
6. The Thaksin's police state regime mobilizing frame.....	121
7. The violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame.....	126
In the second phase at Lumpini Park.....	133
1. The corruption mobilizing frame.....	135
2. The monarchy mobilizing frame.....	143
3. The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame.....	153
4. The media control mobilizing frame.....	158
5. The populism mobilizing frame.....	163
6. The Thaksin's police state regime mobilizing frame.....	167
7. The violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame.....	170
The Conclusion.....	178
<b>Chapter 4 Framing and identity of the anti-coup groups</b> .....	187
Thaksin Shinawatra, the mastermind of the Red Shirts.....	188
The decline of Thaksin Shinawatra.....	192
The 19 September 2006 coup.....	193
The formation of the anti-coup groups.....	195
The first phase of the anti-coup groups movement.....	198
1. The anti-coup mobilizing frame.....	198
2. The anti-amat mobilizing frame.....	205
3. The unproductive Surayud Chulanont government mobilizing frame.....	214
4. The people's democracy mobilizing frame.....	220
5. The media control mobilizing frame.....	228
6. The Buddhism mobilizing frame.....	234
7. The Thaksin mobilizing frame.....	236
The second phase of the anti-coup groups movement.....	240
1. The anti-coup mobilizing frame.....	242
2. The anti-amat mobilizing frame.....	247
3. The unproductive Surayud Chulanont government mobilizing frame.....	254
4. The people's democracy mobilizing frame.....	257
5. The media control mobilizing frame.....	266
6. The Buddhism mobilizing frame.....	273
7. The Thaksin mobilizing frame.....	277
The Conclusion.....	283

<b>Conclusion</b> .....	295
Introduction.....	295
Research questions and hypotheses.....	296
Hypothesis 1.....	297
Research question 1 and Hypothesis 2.....	300
Research question 2 and Hypothesis 3.....	302
Hypothesis 4.....	308
Research question 3 and Hypothesis 5.....	315
Hypothesis 6.....	320
Practice and Theory.....	324
Limitations of the study.....	327
Directions for future research.....	328
<b>References</b> .....	331

## List of Tables

<b>Table</b>	<b>Page</b>
1. The study timeline of Sondhi Limthongkul case.....	70
2. The study timeline of the of anti-coup groups case.....	71
3. The focused mobilizing frames of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups.....	308
4. The four function framing tactics in the mobilizing frames of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups.....	314
5. The focused metaframes and personalization tactics of the two groups.....	325

## List of figures

<b>Figure</b>	<b>Page</b>
1. The relationships of the three nationalist symbols of Sondhi Limthongkul....	317
2. The movement goal of the anti-coup groups.....	319

## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction**

Thaksin Shinawatra, a key Thai political figure, has had an influence on Thai politics for a decade. He was a former prime minister and mastermind of the governments which ruled by his relatives and subordinates. Accordingly, those so-called nominee governments had been protested by his rivals such as the Yellow Shirts, elites, royalists, activists, scholars, Democrat Party, business factions, and the middle class.

From the time Thaksin Shinawatra was elected as prime minister in 2001, Thailand's politics have been centred around him and his family. Thaksin was the leader of the Thai Rak Thai Party and the twice elected former prime minister who was accused of corruption and of violations of King Bhumibol's royal supremacy, serious allegations which led to the overthrow of his government. Throughout a decade, the battles between Thaksin and his rivals have caused the deeply rooted and sometimes violent conflicts which have widen into many parts of Thai society. The first major opponent of Thaksin which succeeded in uprooting his government was the People's Alliance of Democracy or the Yellow Shirts. To fight back, the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) or the Red Shirts was established by Thaksin and his supporters. A lengthy battle, as a result, brought about the deaths and injuries of both the Yellow and Red Shirts. The violent fights between the two groups have appeared in major cities, especially in the voting bases of Thaksin Shinawatra. The frequency of the fight increased during the demonstrations of them. To illustrate the conflicts that led them to a long term battle, in this chapter the backdrop of the two rival groups will be provided.

Political life of Thaksin began in the era of the Democrat-led government of 1997-2001. The difficulties in the Asian economies in 1997 led then Prime Minister Chuan

Leekpai and Finance Minister Tarrin Nummanahaeminda to address the crisis with “a pro-liberalization program and by closely following the IMF prescriptions” (Dixon 2004). The government had been criticized hard over their policies while the dissatisfaction was mostly concentrated on the 1998 bankruptcy reforms and the selling of assets that followed the foreign advice. Several factions started to campaign against the foreign economic programs.

During this time, Thaksin saw a chance and formed the Thai Rak Thai Party to challenge the Democrat Party. He announced the “economic nationalist policy” to oppose the Western measures and protect local business. Furthermore, Thaksin promised to relieve the debts of the business factions of the elites (2004). Consequently, he was voted prime minister in 2001 and re-elected in 2005. In Hewison’s view (Hewison 2010) Thaksin was elected because of his alternative policies to the “neo-liberalism” of the Democrat Party that had caused massive dissatisfaction among the public. His most famous campaigns (2010) were a universal health care program, a farmer debt moratorium, and soft loans for the community. He became personally popular among the grassroots. For the middle class, he promised to provide them with more credit for small and medium enterprises. Thaksin was the first prime minister who benefitted from the 1997 constitution in that he could have “a stronger executive and party system”.

Throughout his premiership he ruled the government with toughness which led to authoritarianism and a neglect of human rights (as cited in Hewison, 2010). He used state power to “intimidate, harass or even eliminate those he deemed troublemakers” (Kazmin 2007). Hewison (2010) described Thaksin in the later era thus: “This parliamentary power and evident popularity sent shockwaves through the conservative establishment. The result was that potentially positive developments came to be wound back by a combination of Thaksin’s political flaws and by a conservative reaction against him and his party”. His policy and practices were seen as a threat to elites and royalists who were close to the royal family. Some

acts were considered by this enemies to be intended to undermine the royal power of King Bhumibol.

At that time, Sondhi Limthongkul, a media mogul and former colleague of Thaksin Shinawatra, started to criticized Thaksin and the government on his televised political show "Muang Thai Rai Supda". Allegations of corruptions and violations of King Bhumibol's royal prerogative were levelled at Thaksin and his associates. They had been colleagues for a period of time and ended their good relationships due to business conflicts. This became the motivation of Sondhi Limthongkul to begin his war against Thaksin through his media network. In September 2005 Thaksin responded by terminating the show and stopped it airing on Channel 9, the state-owned television station. The battle between Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra thus began.

The most crucial event that triggered the anti-Thaksin protest was the selling of Shin Corporation to Temasek, a Singapore government investment company, in January 2006. Thaksin was accused of tax evasion and condemned for selling an important Thai company to foreigners. Ultimately, the anti-Thaksin forces formed a movement group, under the leadership of Sondhi Limthongkul and four others. Kasian (2006, p. 35) explained the opponents of Thaksin as a group which ranged from old-time bureaucrats and officers, Thaksin's business antagonists, opposition politicians, conservative technocrats, NGO activists, liberal intellectuals, lawyers, doctors, scholars, students, and general people.

The first major movement to overthrow Thaksin, in February 2006, was undertaken by the Yellow Shirts, or the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD). They (Kengkij and Hewison 2009) were a loose collaboration of two major factions. The first group was the royalists along with some elites and middle classes lead by Sondhi Limthongkul, while the other faction consisted of NGOs, activists, and trade unionists. The five key leaders of PAD or the Yellow Shirts were the media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul, the former Buddhist politician Chamlong Srimuang, the leader

of the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) Pipop Thongchai, Somsak Kosaisuk of the State Enterprise Labour Relations Confederation (SELRC), and Somkiat Pongpaiboon the advisor of the Assembly of the Poor. Their coalition was called “Phanthamit Prachachon Phuea Prachathippatai” or the “People’s Alliance for Democracy,” they claimed the main goal being to protect the King and the nation from Thaksin and his associates.

During the four months of demonstrations in 2006, they (Rojanaphruk 2006) campaigned to oust Thaksin and demanded a second wave of political reform (the first reform occurred after uprising of the people in Bangkok to oust Prime Minister General Suchinda Kraprayoon in May 1992). The group (Pye and Schaffer 2008) was able to assemble participants estimated at 50,000 to 300,000 people. They (Kengkij and Hewison 2009) were parties of businessmen, politicians, and some royalists that had close relationships with the palace-connected individuals. This faction (Pye and Schaffer 2008) were portrayed as “dissatisfied business groups that had lost the political patronage necessary for economic success and the old network of civil servants around the king, who were losing out to the Thai Rak Thai’s takeover of the state apparatus”. Besides, the middle class participants (Kasian 2006) had concern on the modernization plan that Thaksin and his associates might sell Thailand’s assets to foreign investors, which would destroy the country. All of this brought them to take part in the movement of the Yellow Shirts and other movement groups in the late eras.

The Yellow Shirts blamed on Thaksin and his colleagues by serious allegations which primary produced by Sondhi Limthongkul. They, furthermore, demanded the restoration of King Bhumibol’s royal prerogative and intervention by the King to unseat Thaksin and appoint a new premier. During the movement of the Yellow Shirts, Thaksin and his associates were framed as a great threat to Thailand. A serious allegation was levelled by the Yellow Shirts that Thaksin and his colleagues had an evil plan to destroy the monarchy and Somdet Pra Sangkarat, or the High Patriarch. Additionally, the corruptions of Thaksin and his colleagues in schemes

such as the state-owned enterprise privatization, populist policies, and the construction of Suvarnabhumi airport were given as examples to portray the crooked image of Thaksin. These corruptions caused frustrations for the movement participants. The coalition of heterogeneous groups of the Yellow Shirts brought about a unique movement for Thailand. Sometimes they rallied in major places without advance warning, blocking roads and Government House; some of the subgroups produced their own banners, posters, and t-shirts representing their own interests.

The protest of the Yellow Shirts came to an end when the 19 September 2006 coup was staged under the leadership of General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. Thaksin's government was accused of corruption, of creating a split in Thai society, abuse of human rights, nepotism, and infringement of the royal supremacy of King Bhumibol. General Sonthi (Chairat 2009, p. 51) gave the public the reason for the coup thus: "I'd like to say two things about the military coup. First, I received calls for the coup from many people. Second, soldiers are obliged to protect national security, safeguard the nation and uphold loyalty to the monarchy. The military cannot tolerate any leaders who lack or have limited loyalty to the King." Thaksin, who was in New York at that time, went into exile. At this time the anti-coup groups, which some of them later turned to form the Red Shirt group, emerged to protest against the coup.

The origins of the Red Shirts lie in the protest groups that formed after the 19 September 2006 coup was staged. Some of the anti-coup groups joined the movement with some members of TRT party and formed the movement group which called Red Shirts later. However, during this early time, groups of activists, scholars, students, some middle class, and Thaksin's supporters started the protest only one day after the 2006 coup. They called for the restoration of democracy and the 1997 constitution, a new election, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. They (Bhumiprabhas 2007) announced that: "We want to topple the 2007 draft constitution, because it isn't democratic. The CNS must get out, and we'll protest

against anyone who tries to stage another coup". When the members of the Thai Rak Thai party united with the other protest groups, on June 15, 2007, the official Red Shirts group was established under the body of the Democratic Alliance Against Dictatorship (DAAD). Later, in 2009, the name of the group was changed into the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD).

During his premiership, Thaksin had ideas targeted at reducing the poverty of the grassroots and aiding them with social welfare programs. Consequently the Red Shirts regarded Thaksin as the only prime minister who offered them benefits through his populist policies. It is not surprising that he was elected twice with the support of these grassroots. In Hewison's view (2014), Thaksin's policies seemed to challenge King Bhumibol's state welfare which caused the dissatisfaction of the conservative group. Hewison claimed that "the conservatives rejected Thaksin's mix of social welfare and grassroots capitalism and feared his popularity amongst the monarchy's self-claimed rural constituency". In the Red Shirt's views (2014), this appeared to be the main reason for the conservative group, or *amat*, to stage the 2006 coup to overthrow Thaksin Shinawatra. The Red Shirts constructed the idea of the inequality between the elites and the grassroots through their protests. The protest leaders framed themselves and their followers as "*phrai*", or commoners, while their enemies, who suppressed them, were the '*amat*', or the ruling aristocrats. The idea of a class war between the grassroots and the *amat* was constructed to frame their movements.

During the early part of the movement, the prominent leaders of the anti-coup groups consisted of the former Thai Rak Thai Party members Veera Musigapong, Jakrapob Penkair, Nattawut Saikue, and Jatuporn Prompan, the former senators Weng Tojirakarn and Prateep Ungsongtham Hata, the businessmen Wiphu Phalangphattanaphuntai and Nopporuj Vorachitvuttikul, the National Human Rights Commission member Jaran Ditthapichai. The adherents were mainly Thaksin's supporters from the poor in the north and north-east provinces, but also included

the lower class in Bangkok such as taxi drivers and motorcycle-taxi drivers. A description of the Red Shirts' followers (BBC 2012) was given thus:

The red-shirts are formally known as the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD). The focus of many red-shirts' campaigning zeal is former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Members are mainly rural workers from outside Bangkok. But the red-shirt ranks also include students, left-wing activists and some business people who see attempts by the urban and military elite to control Thai politics as a threat to democracy.”

The fights between the Yellow and Red Shirts began since 2006. The anti-coup groups, which some supported Thaksin, attacked the Yellow Shirts as a group that performed the movement to overthrow Thaksin. Thus political messages that produced from this initial Red Shirts were focused on against the Yellow Shirts and some elites. A year after the 2006 coup the People's Power Party, a new party supported by Thaksin, was elected as the government. This came up with the return of the Yellow Shirts in 2008 to remove the so-called proxy prime minister of Thaksin Shinawatra. In November 2008, to put the pressure on the opponents, the Yellow Shirts seized the Government House and Don Muang and Suvarnabhumi airports. The Red Shirts also came out to protect their government, while there were movements from some shadowy groups, still unidentified, to harm the Yellow protestors. This event resulted in the loss of the protestors' lives and tremendous damage to the economy. Shortly after that the Yellow Shirts called off the protests the People's Power Party (BBC 2012) was accused of electoral misdemeanours and was banned by the Constitutional Tribunal. In December 2008, with the support of the military, the leader of the Democrat Party, Abhisit Vejjajiva, became the 27<sup>th</sup> prime minister, leading a coalition government. This caused a severe resentment among Thaksin's supporters which led to the massive protests of the Red Shirts in subsequent years.

The controversial event began when they rallied over 100,000 protesters to gatecrash the ASEAN summit meeting in Pattaya in April 2009. They demanded for the resignation of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. They were at the centre of public

attention again when they occupied central Bangkok from March to May 2010. At that time, they demanded the premier Abhisit Vejjajiva to dissolve the parliament and arrange a new election. This led to the announcement of a state of emergency. The clashes between the Red Shirts and the military at this event (Eimer 2014) caused the death of 90 people which increased a remarkable of the Red Shirts' anger and loathing towards Abisith Vejjajiva and the Democrat Party. Sombat Boon-ngam-anong (Rojanaphruk 2010), an activist who protested the measure of Abisith, expressed his opinion thus: "He has unveiled his real face behind that good-looking face of his. The continued killings show us Abhisit's and the amat's behavior. Thai society is blind and we do not see the real truth. This government is an amat government, which is a brutal, tyrannical regime that sucks people's blood".

At that time, the Yellow Shirts and some supporters of the Democrat Party criticized the movement of the Red Shirts through the media. The major opponents of the Red Shirts were the Yellow Shirts because of their standpoints of "fighting for the King", overthrowing Thaksin Shinawatra and his regime, and supporting the coup and the amat. The Red Shirts viewed the Yellow Shirts as the tool of amat, royalists, and the middle class which conducted protests to assist those groups. Worse, a leader of the Yellow Shirts (Forsyth 2010) once claimed that "the rural voters could not be trusted to vote because they lacked sufficient knowledge and judgment." The class conflicts between the Yellow and Red Shirts had been constructed by the leaders in their early movements.

Because of these political conflicts, Thailand was deeply divided into the Red faction of rural grassroots from the north and the north-east regions that supported Thaksin and the Yellow faction which was the groups of urban middle class, elite, and Democrat Party supporters from the south of the country. This division was portrayed by Haller (2014) as follows:

"After years of conflict, it is noticeable that the color-coded division into red and yellow follows regional, ideological, and class identities: The reds are mostly from lower-income rural populations in the north and northeast and

speaking with a Lanna (northern Thai) or Lao (northeastern Thai) accent. The majority of them favor Thaksin, since they benefitted from his social and economic policies. However, the red shirts are not limited to only farmers, but also include “urbanized villagers” from the lower-middle class. The yellow shirts are mostly members of the Bangkok middle class and Thais from the upper south who support the Democrat Party and perceive Thaksin as a threat to the monarchy, their economic privileges, and their political influence.

While Ockey (2011) pointed to the “deep divisions within families and communities” thus:

The conflict between Red and Yellow runs deep, with each side firmly convinced that it holds the moral high ground, and each side determined that its sacrifices not be in vain. At the heart of the difference is a clash over the nature of democracy.

The contradictory political beliefs, classes and regions of the two groups of Thai people brought about bitter results for Thai society. Doubts about what had prompted them to harm their antagonists have been lingering in people’s minds.

The movement of the two groups are astonishing in terms of rapid formation and stability. They established protests quickly and called them off without difficulty. When they announced further protests, their enthusiastic followers would immediately assemble. Although their groups were established almost a decade ago they were still powerful in terms of mobilizing protests. The numbers of the Yellow followers could be over 100,000 in the crucial protests. However, the strength of the Red Shirts could be seen when they assembled in Bangkok. Hewison (2014) portrayed the solidarity of the Red Shirts on 20 March 2010 thus: “For much of that day, a red shirt convoy wound its way around Bangkok and received remarkable support from the crowds that lined the streets and who responded to red shirt rhetoric about status, class, and electoral democracy. Nothing like this had ever been seen before, not even in the early 1970s when the student movement built alliances with workers and peasants”. It seemed the Red Shirts had performed the largest democratic movement since the 1973 student movement, if not larger. Unlike the

1973 movement, however, this one faces middle class resistance. In this thesis we explore the formation years of the two movements.

Strategies which are used by the two groups to attract and form the huge mass movement must be studied from the beginning of the movement. In terms of the Yellow Shirts, it started from the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul to attack Thaksin Shinawatra. A reason which led him to perform the movement caused from the cancellation of his famous political television show “Muang Thai Rai Supda” from Channel 9 in September 2005. From that time, he continued the live show at Thammasat University and Lumpini Park. Thaksin and his government had been criticized about the corruption of government projects, the populist policies, and the violation of King Bhumibol’s royal supremacy through the show.

Noticeably, his live political talk show was able to attract a high number of audience members such as urban middle class, elites, and general people. During the show, many issues and events were framed to blame Thaksin and his colleagues. Issues that Sondhi selected to frame were engaged with the misconducts that Thaksin and his associates had done to the primary institutions, such as the infringement of the monarchy and the destruction of Buddhism and the nation. As well, nationalism was employed in his framing to construct identity of the group. When the number of audience increased, Sondhi moved the show to Lumpini Park. The movements to oust Thaksin were gradually formed from this point. Ultimately, Sondhi brought his audiences to collaborate with the other anti-Thaksin groups and leaders to formally establish the Yellow Shirts in February 2006.

For the Red Shirts, they originated after Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted from the premiership by the 19 September 2006 coup, led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. Groups of activists, scholars, students, and general people in Bangkok started to anti-coup and called for the restoration of democracy. In the beginning of the movement, the number of protestors was small, most being based in Bangkok. The strictness of martial law in force at that time prevented people from the other

provinces from joining the protest. It is obvious that the anti-coup groups adopted and adjusted the protest tactics of Sondhi Limthongkul and the Yellow Shirts to meet their mobilizing goals. In addition, nationalism was also applied to construct frames with which to attack the coup makers. The movement of the anti-coup groups became fierce when Thaksin and his subordinates activated their movements. Some members of the Thai Rak Thai party such as Veera Musigapong, Jatuporn Phromphan, Jakraphob Penkair, and Natthawut Saikua set up a satellite television station, the PTV (People's Television), to attack the junta. They were prominent in terms of budget, communication tools, and leadership skills. Finally, in June 2007, they collaborated with some anti-coup groups and established a formal movement to overthrow the amat and the coup makers.

The longevity and success of the two mobilizing groups brings about the question of how they created the deep bonds between the followers and the movements, and what tactics the leaders applied to attract the immense numbers of the followers. Furthermore, the initial movements of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups laid the firm foundations for their later movements under the Yellow and Red Shirt bodies. Besides, their succeeded movement tactics and framing have been adopted by subsequent political movements as if an instant formula of Thai social movements.

The early periods of the movements are significant in providing us with an outlook of the mobilizing tactics, used by the two groups at the forefront of the movements. It gives us traces of the underlying motivations which prompt the leaders and the followers to undertake the protests. They were able to attract vast numbers of followers to take part in the movements and rally in the streets. This has been happened by their framing messages which were powerful in persuasion.

Accordingly this research seeks to answer many questions relating to the early period of the two movements. Thus, questions such as: how did the two movements became so large so rapidly? What strategy did the leaders apply to attract and unite their followers that resulted in the longevity of the movements? In what ways were

those strategies used to perform the movements? Did they construct specific messages to attract adherents, and if so, what type of messages were produced? And did they construct their identities to differentiate their groups from others? These questions will be explored and answered in this research.

Furthermore, in the following chapter 2, I will provide a review of the literature which used to examine as a framework of this research. Also, in the latter part of the chapter the social movement theory, the framing concept, and the Thai metaframes will be described followed by the hypotheses, methodology and structure of the thesis in the end of the chapter.

## Chapter 2

### Literature review and methodology

This dissertation is based in the context of social movement studies. This chapter will thus first introduce the concept of social movement and the roles of the framing process in social movement studies. It will then move to the definitions of scholars on mobilizing frames and metaframes as essential instruments for creating large and stable social movements. The following major part of this chapter is a chronological background of the Thai metaframes which were founded on nationalism. It has been broadly applied into Thai political movements for a long period of time. Lastly, the hypotheses of this study will be presented in the next sections, followed by the methodology and structure of the thesis.

#### 2.1. Literature review

##### 2.1.1. Social movement concept

*What are the social movements?*

As stated by Freeman & Johnson (as cited in Christiansen 2009), a social movement is not similar to a stable political party or interest group that intends to access “political power and political elites”. Social movements are “non- or extra-institutional forms of politics” that engage with “organized groups and formal organizations”. They are organized and strategic and concentrate less on distributing goods, which differs from interest groups. Also, a social movement has a common political agenda and “a visible constituency or membership base” with the collective goals, actions, and activities to change “internal or external targets” (Ganz 2009; West 2008). Social movements, besides, differ in levels of organization, forms

of action, and mobilizations in which alliances with other groups are significant for creating success of the movement. Social movements are also defined as a collective action of united people with the collective purposes to challenge the unfair repression of precise ways of life in terms of politics, society, and economics. Furthermore they are performed to “anti-systemic” and against current institutions that have “quasi-anarchist orientation”. They, on the other hand, can be used to promote both democratic doctrines and the benefits of the elites and rulers (Kengki and Hewison 2009; West 2008; Horn 2013).

Opp (2009) added that a social movement is a type of protest group but different in terms of the size, longevity, and degree of official organization, besides, “protest actions may have many other features: they may be more or less organized, they may be more or less regular, and they may be legal or illegal, more or less legitimate, violent and so on”. He (2009) also describes a protest group as “a collective of actors who want to achieve their shared goal, or goals, by influencing decisions of a target”. Social movements can be distinguished from riots, interest groups, mobs, fads or fashion by their organization. Fuller (2014) put that a faction of people that shares a set of beliefs with no collective action has not created a social movement. In sense, social movement groups must have a shared belief and collective action which is organized and strategized.

Morris and Braine (as cited in Morris and Staggenborg 2004) categorize movements into three types. “Liberation movements” are the first type, which are operated by oppressed groups, the second are “equality-based special issue movements” that focus on specific issues affecting some oppressed groups, and the last type are “social responsibility movements” which emerge to change some conditions that affect general people.

### *Emergence of social movements*

Social movements generally occur to oppose governments, elites, and antagonists when these institutions and groups have failed to fulfil a need for reform or revolution. Consequently, social movement actors will assert new values that will be translated into action through political, economic, and cultural mobilizations. Also, social movement participants will “make moral claims based on renewed personal identities, collective identities, and public action” (Ganz 2009; Horn 2013). The establishment of a social movement can be divided into four stages which begin with the emergence and go on to coalescence, bureaucratization, and finally decline.

In social movement formation the emergence (as cited in Christiansen, 2009) is described by Blumer as the “social ferment” stage which focuses less on organization. Christiansen (2009) explains that in this stage some social movement participants may feel unsatisfied on some social issues or situations, but any action to relieve their grievances and frustrations are not taken. They may find solutions by commenting with friends, colleagues, and media, thus strategic collective action does not emerge at this stage.

Stage two is known as the popular stage, or coalescence. Those issues or discontentments are defined as “who and what is responsible”. Hopper (as cited in Christiansen 2009) states that: “Discontent is no longer uncoordinated and individual; it tends to become focalized and collective. This is the stage when individuals participating in the mass behavior of the preceding stage become aware of each other”. This is the time that the leader of the group emerges with the strategies to figure out the problem. Furthermore, it is the time that demonstrations can be employed to express the power of the mass movement. Thus the organized and strategic movements including its prominent leaders are clearly appeared this time.

In terms of the third stage, Christiansen (2009) calls bureaucratization or, as Blumer puts it, “formalization”, which organizations and followers of social movements are expanded. Accordingly they need more specialized and trained staff and an organized strategy to succeed the movement, since only having creative leaders and mass rallies are not sufficient to develop their goals and attract adherents. Furthermore, it is difficult to maintain the enthusiasm of the participants through the continued mobilization (as cited in Christiansen, 2009). Most social movements fail to formalize their organization, because the paid proficient staffs are needed to replace volunteers. Besides, social movement leaders must regularly meet with “political elites” to increase their political power. For the last stage of the movement, the decline or “institutionalization,” is not discussed here since it has not yet occurred in this study.

### *Participation in social movements*

The number of followers has a crucial impact on the success and sustainability of social movements. Lofland (as cited in Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman, 2003) asserts that participants in a social movement are retained with values, beliefs, and emotional commitments, which in turn are fostered and nourished by “a wide range of cultural practices: prayer meetings, rallies, consciousness raising groups, late-night bull sessions, and the like”. Importantly, cultural participation promotes both external and internal participation. Accordingly, it is very important to apply culture into social movements (Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman, 2003, p. 312).

To study participation in social movements, Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman propose “sets of variables as generic determinants of participation” which are described below.

### Ideology

Political ideology (Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 2003) is vital to social movements since it is “the expressed goals” which focus on political, economic, and social change. The interest and agreement of social movements’ members on movement ideology “should be positively related to their post recruitment participation”. Nonetheless, there are many types of member ideology such as general political ideology, beliefs in strategies and goals of their social movement organization, personal beliefs of members, and religious background of members and movements. Thus, “greater participation should result when members’ various ideologies are closer to their social movement organizations’ ideologies”.

### Microstructure

Bonds or ties between members are emphasized in contemporary social-movement theory as a reason for one to participate in a movement. However, it is argued that social movements with national memberships (Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman 2003) have difficulties creating friendship and emotional commitment between participants since they hardly know each other. However, national social movements that develop from local movements can overcome this burden. Members can create friendships which increases post recruitment participation.

### Organizational Perceptions and Communication

Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman (2003) assert that the perception of members toward their movement organization is relevant to their participation. The first perception is legitimacy which is the degree to which members trust their leaders and are eager to support their decisions. The next perception is the member’s assessment of the success of the movement to achieve their goals. The last one is the degree of the member’s loyalty and commitment toward their social movement organizations, which becomes the motivation for them to participate. Communication also becomes a major factor for increasing the participation of members when they have more communication with association leaders and staff members.

### *Leadership in social movements*

From the previous point, it is clear that leadership plays a crucial role in social movements. West (2008) asserts the Weberian concept of two ideal types of leadership. The first type is the *formal leadership* which is found in orthodox political institutions such as government, political parties, formally constituted organizations, judiciary etc. Hierarchies of leadership levels are generally found in this type of leadership. The second type, *informal leadership*, takes place in a different political context that mostly engages with social movements. Nonetheless, West (2008) emphasizes that “*formal leadership* still arises both within movement organizations and in their relations with political institutions”.

Morris and Staggenborg (2004) put that leaders “both influence and are influenced by movement organization and environment”. Some leaders maintain the goals of social movement organization while pursuing their own interests. In contrast, some leaders only work for interests of their organizations. Besides, “different types of leaders may dominate at different stages of a movement's development and sometimes come into conflict with one another”. Ganz (2009) asserts that the “stereotypical charismatic public persona” leadership is needed for social movements, because “social movements are organized by identifying, recruiting, and developing leadership at all levels”. Those who work in this type of leadership (2009) are given various names such as “*leaders, agents, organizers, lecturers, circuit riders, travellers, representatives, or field secretaries*”.

In terms of the social composition of leadership, the leaders (Morris and Staggenborg 2004) are not casually selected as a representative collection from the members. Principally, they must have higher education and social status than their supporters. The reason given that social movement leaders need to have financial resources, flexible schedules, social contacts, and be able to conduct intellectual activities, in order to accomplish crucial tasks, such as the following:

...framing grievances and formulating ideologies, debating, interfacing with media, writing, operating, devising strategies and tactics, creatively synthesizing information gleaned from local, national and international venues, dialoguing with internal and external elites, improvising and innovating, developing rationales for coalition building and channeling emotions.

However, there are leaders that come from the poor and working class. They (Morris and Staggenborg 2004) are not as well represented as the other leaders but they enjoy sharing interests with their class. Despite coming from the lower class, most have a formal university education. Some grow up in “movement families” or gain movement experience from other leaders enabling them to obtain leadership skills.

A successful social movement requires the leaders to have educational capital and hands-on movement experience which can be obtained from universities or, sometimes, an educational forum within the movement. Morris and Staggenborg (2004) give an example of the poor and uneducated people in the civil rights movement that they develop knowledge by joining the “citizenship schools,” which established in the movement. As well, social movement leaders need to learn how to manage the movement, because they have to “assert a public voice and collective identity”. They (2004) must encourage the movement participation by moral persuasion. This tactic is a forceful mean for recruiting followers and authorizing the movement. Ganz (2009) interestingly describes the “prophetic imagination” phrase used by Walter Brueggemann thus:

Leadership in social movements requires learning to manage the core tensions at the heart of what theologian Walter Brueggemann calls the “prophetic imagination”: a combination of criticality (experience of the world’s pain) with hope (experience of the world’s possibility), avoiding being numbed by despair or deluded by optimism. A deep desire for change must be coupled with the capacity to make change. Structures must be created that create the space within which growth, creativity, and action can flourish, without slipping into the chaos of structurelessness, and leaders

must be recruited, trained, and developed on a scale required to build the relationships, sustain the motivation, do the strategizing, and carry out the action required to achieve success.

Relationships between leaders and members are very significant in social movements. A good relationship with the leaders, organization, and other members is the main reason for one to join a movement. Ganz (2009) points out that “a set of peer relationships” helps the members to build strong trust, motivation, and collective action. On the other hand, weak ties expand the access to prominent skills, learning, and information. He stresses both bonds as necessary to create the commitment and understanding that produce a successful movement. This is an important task for the leaders to accomplish.

Some leaders (Morris and Staggenborg 2004), who lack movement experience, develop skills and knowledge from their cultural and political backgrounds. Some learn from their movement's previous organizations. Grievances of individuals and society are used to convince people to join movements which new and inexperienced leaders must understand this “pre-existing opportunity” and use it to create “political and cultural opportunities”.

Nevertheless, a goal of social movements is to appeal to more adherents as well as to sustain and enlarge the movements. To achieve this, the movement (Rucht 1996) requires “resources such as people, money, knowledge, frames, skills, and technical tools to process and distribute information and to influence people”. Thus, mobilization for action (Walgrave and Manssens 2005) requires motivational framing strategies to convince the potential participants that their presence at a protest can dispel the problem. It is essential for the leaders to realize the significance of frames and their persuasive force in social movements. Morris and Staggenborg (2004) explain how leaders engage with mobilizations and framing thus:

Leaders offer frames, tactics, and organizational vehicles that allow participants to actively construct a collective identity and participate in collective action at various levels. In doing so, leaders rely not only on their personal attractiveness and abilities, but also on previous experiences, cultural traditions, gender norms, social networks, and familiar organizing forms.

From the above statement, leaders in social movements have a crucial obligation to create collective actions through framing process. They apply frames to convince participants and construct the collective identity of the groups. Not only do they have their own charismatic personalities, the leaders also employ past experiences, including cultural influences, to conduct the movement. In the following sections the means in which social movement leaders apply cultural traditions to mobilize people through frames and framing process will be examined and explained.

### **2.1.2. Frames and social movements**

The term “frame” (Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p. 3) was first introduced in 1954 by Gregory Bateson in his essay about epistemology and animal behavior.

Subsequently, Todd Gitlin applied the term into his widely used terminology of social movement research. In 1980 Nisbet (2010) interestingly summarizes the usage of frames in various fields of study. According to Nisbet’s explanations, experts apply frames to communicate with their audience and other experts, for example, journalists employ frames to shorten complicated issues into interesting news items, while audiences justify issues and events through frames as an interpretative schema. Thus, frames in communication are applied to unfold a sequence of events and promote particular definitions and interpretations of political issues (as cited in Chong and Druckman 2007).

In terms of social movement studies, “framing” has been used as verb to signify a dynamic occurrence which indicates agency and conflict through reality construction in the work of social movement organizations. Thus, framing is the

process by which movement actors engage in interpretative work to produce and maintain meaning for movement participants and potential supporters, as well as antagonists (Benford & Snow 2000; Hewitt and McCommon 2005). In both the movements and counter-movements, framing (Hewitt and McCommon 2005, p.39) is a “cultural struggle” in which each of the factions must “find ways to counter, combat, and/or reframe the claims of the other”. Whereas Erving Goffman (as cited in Nisbet 2010) terms the meaning of frames as “schemata of interpretation” that is individual interprets the meaning of the occurrences and issues through “cultural beliefs and worldviews”. To do this, those issues and events are framed then placed, recognized, classified, and branded through the framing process of the framers.

The core functions of a frame in social movements are described by scholars. For instance, Van Gorp (2010) provides an explanation that a core function of framing is used to define the problematic issues by indicating the roots of the problem and the consequences through a specific interpretation. Correspondingly, Entman (2004, p.5) gives the definition of framing as being the process of selecting, emphasizing, and connecting some aspects of occurrences or issues in order to raise a specific interpretation, evaluation and/or resolution of that issue or event. Also, this could be seen from Nisbet (2010) that frames help to define the importance and definition of the issues including the responsible agents, the problem, and the resolution of the issue. As a result, frames as part of the culture are used by the movement actors to accomplish the struggle by defining issues as functions and apply them into the movement.

### **2.1.3. Mobilizing frames and Metaframes**

#### ***Mobilizing frames***

Snow and Benford (2000, p.162) put that frames and framing have been used in the operation of social movements for a long period of time. Metaframes are applied to contribute to meaningful events, consolidate experiences, and guide actions, while mobilizing frames similarly act in this interpretative work by clarifying and summarizing the appearances of the “world out there”. From this, social movement actors produce collective action frames, or mobilizing frames, as “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings”. The successful mobilizing frames, furthermore, must be able to counter their rivals’ frames and undermine the arguments of their opponents in order to demobilize their movements. If frames have these capacities, it appears that they are likely to appeal to a greater number of participants (Benford and Snow 2000; Johnston and Noakes, 2005; Hewitt and McCommon 2005).

In terms of the core tasks, mobilizing frames have crucial functions in diagnosing issues and events with a new interpretation. They also persuade potential constituents to mobilize by giving compelling reasons and solutions to the problem. In sum, the important issues and events are defined to convince the support from potential constituents, adherents, and bystanders. In framing, the leaders must specify their identity and opponents by differentiating “we” from “them”. The potential participants must feel that they are responsible as agents, or “we”, to take part in changing their history. On the other hand, their opponents, or “them”, must be blamed as ones who create the injustice that stimulate the mobilizations of “we” (as cited in Noakes & Johnston 2005, p. 6).

In this dissertation, Entman's concept will be used to analyse the frames and framing strategies of Sondhi Limthongkul and those of the anti-coup groups. In

terms of frame analysis, Entman (as cited in Matthes and Matthias 2008) proposes that there are four functions of a frame:

**Problem definition** is the first function that the frame producers must construct to point out the faults of issues and events. Gerhards (1995) explains the details of the functions as a framing strategy to produce effective frames. He puts that the problem must be empirical when appear in public. Thus, the problem of the issue will be blamed on the opposite. Also, he suggests that to make a problem more tangible it must be created to be close to “the individual’s own life-world experience” in order to relate to the daily experience of frame receivers. Another suggestion from Gerhards is to highlight a problem that connects to “universal values or ideological frameworks”. Hence, culture plays a major part in this process. In addition, the problem should have a broad impact on society to make people concern, which leads to the awareness that something is wrong and needs to be solved quickly. Thus, the problem of the issues and relevant actors must be identified in this element or function. The branded antagonists of the frame producers are pointed out as the relevant actors, agents, and culprits who cause the problems.

**Causal interpretation** is the next function to identify the reason of the culprits to cause the problem. Gerhards (1995) indicates that to mobilize effectively, the frame producers must externalize the cause as a broad societal problem, not for individuals, that the public would feel moved to solve the problems. Besides, the agents, or opponents, should be framed as ones whose pursuit of their personal interests caused the problem.

The third function is **moral evaluation** which the agents or opponents (1995) will be judged on their morality and discriminated out of the moral community. This can be done in a positive, negative, or neutral way, and can refer to different targets. Only blaming on the problem and point out to the culprits is not powerful enough, they must be branded or labeled their faults as bad persons. The frame producers

are able to brand their opponent as immoral people, on the other hand the framers can frame themselves as being on the moral side.

***Treatment recommendation*** is considered an important function in social movements. It is involved with offering the solution to the specified problem. This (Benford and Snow, 2000 p.216) could be “a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan”. For Gerhards (1995), he focuses on discrediting the government since social movements in modern societies are mainly involved with the political system, therefore the solution must be derived from the political system and the ruling government. Johnston and Noakes (2005, p.6), however, assert that only proposing a solution is not powerful enough to convince people to act, it must be promoted together with other functions.

### ***Metaframes***

To make a success in a mobilization, the leaders must be able to get people onto the streets, only pointing to the problem and questioning the ethics is not forceful enough to motivate people to take action. Walgrave and Manssens (2005, p. 115) explain in their work that movements with large numbers of participants would not get people into street if they could not achieve motivational framing. Thus, framing in social movements must bring attention to the grievances, unfairness, and suffering which lead to the creation of blame, responsibility, and the solution for these situations. The key to motivate the collective action, according to Snow and Tarrow (as cited in Valocchi, 2005, 54), should resonate with the reminiscent cultural symbols of the potential constituents. Thus, metaframes are engaged in this task.

In social movement the frame promoters construct mobilizing frames in accordance with the metaframes or master frames. The term master frame was created by David Snow and Robert Benford when describing ideal origins of a protest in which

“a master frame is essentially a collective action frame writ large” (as cited in Stanbridge 2002). Master frames contribute a universally powerful set of ideas, cultural symbols, and interpretative packages that resonate with movement actors’ manipulation to promote their specific claims and objectives (Stanbridge 2002; Noakes & Johnston 2005). However, in this study the term “*metaframes*” will be applied in place of “master frames”.

Generally, metaframes and mobilizing frames have both similarities and differences. Mobilizing frames (Stanbridge 2002) are constructed by frame promoters or movement actors to authorize their claims and objectives. They highlight the blame for that event or issue and connect it with the real world to create a specific meaning. Metaframes perform the same task, but at a general level. In addition, Tucker (2011) points out that metaframes and mobilizing frames have comparable purposes with different levels of function. She suggests that mobilizing frames are constructed by social movement activists aiming at recruitment, momentum, and construction of a collective identity. On the other hand, metaframes (2011) are not involved with creating a movement, but regularly pre-exist a movement and can be universally adopted and transferred to other mobilizations. Similarly, Swart (1995) asserts that:

Both collective action frames (mobilizing frames) and master frames (metaframes) provide movement actors with specific schemes of interpretations that construct the legitimacy and goals of the movement. Master frames (metaframes), however, emerge when collective action frames (mobilizing frames) influence the focus and direction of other movements within the same time or space. In other words, master frames (metaframes) are schemes of interpretation that are utilized by a diversity of movements to frame grievances and goals. As such, master frames (metaframes) serve as the connective tissue between movements within a protest cycle.

In his paper, Swart (1995) defines the metaframes concept based on “its resonance with the symbolic and political culture of the frame’s historical context”. He provides the reason the other social movements adopt the previous metaframes that:

They represent successful and culturally potent ideational themes. The resonance of a master frame (metaframes) with the social, cultural, and historical context in which it emerges plays a crucial role in its adoption by other movements. By utilizing a culturally resonant theme or master frame (metaframes) to make their specific historical situation meaningful, movement actors "keynote" these master frames. Other social movements may be drawn to utilize a master frame (metaframes) to organize their own grievances because it has proven successful.

Besides, metaframes (Van Gorp 2010) influence the participants with their "cultural themes" that "make an appeal to ideas the receiver is already familiar with". They are constructed by the "early-riser movements" and then applied by "late-comer movements". It is explained by Noakes (2005, p. 92) that to be successful in movements the movement leaders adopt existing metaframes as cultural values and dominant ideologies and transform them to give a new interpretation to issues and occurrences. This is done to motivate the participation of adherents.

In terms of nationalism, as part of culture, it has been applied as a metaframe in many social movements including in Thai movements. Oliver and Johnston (2005, p.189) explain the usage of nationalism in social movements thus:

*Master frames (metaframes) were introduced to explain the clustering of social movements during cycles of protest...Even broader is the nationalism master frame (metaframes), which can be seen across epochs, regions, and cultures. Intellectuals of specific national movements elaborate ideologies within this frame drawing upon history, culture, and political context; typical actions are glorification of the past, exaltation of the language, drawing boundaries with other national groups, political contention based on national identity, and transcendence or coming to terms with class divisions.*

In Thailand the powerful metaframes have been applied to appeal a high number of participants. Metaframes, as the bigger frames, have been reshaped from Thai nationalism which consisted of the four nationalist symbols of king, nation, religion, and democracy. These nationalist symbols are transformed into the four metaframes: king, religion, nation, and democracy/modernization. Mobilizing frames, as well, are rooted from these metaframes. As a result, identity of the group

is originated from these frames which built on nationalism. In the following sections I will provide the details of the Thai metaframes, as the framework of this research, which will be applied to analyze the framings of Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups in the early periods of their movements.

#### ***2.1.4. The Thai metaframes***

Nationalism is an important part of the movement process for political mobilizations in Thailand. It is employed by the movement leaders to create the metaframes and mobilizing frames. We will see in this chapter that in some movement, nationalism is either wholly or sometimes partially applied depending on the frame promoters, the mobilizing goals, and the participants. Generally, in Thai politics, the frame producers that use the metaframes principally come from the elite classes. This has been so seen since nationalism was initially introduced by King Mongkut, the fourth monarch of Chakkri dynasty. Initially nationalist ideals consisted of the nation, religion, and the king, with democracy being created as a new element after the 1932 revolution. It could be seen to be used in many major political movements including the protests of the Yellow and the Red Shirts a decade ago.

In this chapter, it starts with the emergence of the three primary nationalist ideals: the nation, the religion and the king. This will be described the beginning from the reign of King Mongkut (Rama IV, 1851-1868) to that of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V, 1853-1910), and on to King Vajiravudh's (Rama VI, 1881-1925). Before we trace back into the chronology of Thai nationalism, the concise picture of the early era of nationalism must be provided here. In the next section, furthermore, the democracy ideal will be included and described as the fourth nationalist element. The section begins from the 1932 coup up to the student movement in 1973. In this way the rise

and decline of traditional nationalism, as well as the way the frame promoters employed them in each era by will be examined.

### ***The pre-official nationalism era***

Back in the early Ratanakosin period, in the nineteenth century, the reasons for constructing nationalism derived from imperialism in Southeast Asia. In the era of King Nungklao or Rama III (1787 –1851), he (Barme' 1993, p. 16) realized that the major threats to Siam would derive from Westerners. King Nungklao (Wyatt, 1984, p.180) warned Phraya Sri Suriyawong (Chuang Bunnag) that:

There will be no more wars with Vietnam and Burma. We will have them only with the West. Take care, and do not lose any opportunities to them. Anything that they propose should be held up to close scrutiny before accepting it: Do not blindly trust them.

Threats from the West were evidently seen in the reign of King Mongkut (1851-186); he undoubtedly understood the power of the Western nations at that time. He prepared himself, his close colleagues, and the elites to handle the expansion of colonialism by becoming *siwilai* (civilized). The progress of Western knowledge and practices had been studied throughout the era of King Mongkut. The King was well known for his interest in Western culture, especially in areas such as technology, science and languages. Simultaneously, he developed and changed many “uncivilized” beliefs and practices in Siam to protect the occupation from the West. During that time, the West (Sattayanurak 2000) determined to colonize Asian countries by claiming that these countries were underdeveloped. In addition the Bowring Treaty, signed in the reign of King Mongkut, enabled Siam to gradually move forward on the path of civilization by increasing trade with Western countries. In this way Siam transformed herself to be on a par with the Western countries.

Because of the threats, proto nationalism was originated. King Mongkut constructed a loving feeling toward the nation by writing historical books about Siam in order to

create national pride in the long history of Siam. Besides, the concept of Kingship had been created in order to develop the concept of absolute monarchy. Nonetheless, his famous work was in the reform of Siamese Buddhism when he established the new, rational Thammayut sect which was inherited by his son and successor, King Chulalongkorn or Rama V (1868-1910).

In the reign of King Chulalongkorn, Siam was significantly endangered by imperialism. The King (Connors: 2003, p.34) followed his father's footsteps by modernizing Siam. His most renowned modernization was that of the administrative structure of the Thai nation-state, which he did to defend Siam from imperialism and establish rules to lessen the power of the noblemen. This modernization or technical reforms (Barme 1993, p. 7) were done between 1892 and 1905. Another reason for King Chulalongkorn to reform the country was the menace caused by the elites. The regent Chao Praya Srisuriyawong and his associates were major opponents of King Chulalongkorn in the early period of his reign. When the regent passed away, the King decided to centralize his governing power to secure the throne. Additional occurrence was appeared in the form of a petition calling for a democratic regime (Engel: 1975, p. 18), proposed by a group of the King's brothers: Prince Phittayalap, Prince Naret, and Prince Sawat. They presented the petition to the King in 1887 requesting him to replace the absolute monarchy with a parliamentary system under a written constitution. The statement (1975) indicated that Thailand was a small country with little power that was threatened aggressively by great, powerful countries; therefore, Thailand should follow Japan's path by Europeanizing the government system to protect Siam from European countries. Their main goal was to call for the promulgation of a constitution and the establishment of a parliament, with equal rights for all people under the law.

King Chulalongkorn refused this proposal. In the King's view (1975), this westernization was a drastic change that would not provide beneficial outcomes for Siam. His reply, to those modern thinking princes, was that the parliamentary form

of government was not yet appropriate for the incompetent Thai bureaucracy. It must be reformed before adopting the new system. Siam still lacked adequate wise-men who could draft the new law, besides the Siamese only gave their trust to the monarchs, never to any members of a parliament. In the King's view, the only change needed for Siam at the time was the reformation of the administrative system. Even though King Chulalongkorn agreed to limit royal power (1975), he insisted that the monarchy was the central institution in the Thai society that could not be weakened or restrained by any laws or institutions. For that reason, the king considered that Siam must be profoundly modernized to avoid colonialism and other threats.

The abolition of Phrai, or the slavery system, was the key reformation strategy of King Chulalongkorn to consolidate his power, whilst also changing the systems of taxation and military draft. By doing this he determined to reduce the manpower under the control of the nobles, consequently the political power of the nobility was weakened. King Chulalongkorn, as a result, was able to reform the administration and modernize the country without opposition from the powerful nobles. It is interesting that King Chulalongkorn simultaneously gained the love and respect of the free Siamese and strengthened his ruling power. An important effect of the abolition of the Phrai, or slavery system, was that it laid the foundation for a democratic regime being applied in Siam later. From these observations, it can be seen that King Chulalongkorn applied the nation, democracy, and modernization metaframes to perform his power centralization.

In conformity with King Chulalongkorn's intention to strengthen Siam, the chat or nation idea appeared in this era through some writings of intellectuals. The idea of nation or "chat" was borrowed from the West when the Siamese came into contact with the Europeans in the nineteenth century. It was raised to public when the friction between Siam and France over territorial interests intensified in 1893.

Phraya Phatsakorawong, the leader of King Chulalongkorn's administration wrote an article 'Vajirayan viset,' a 1889 royal journal, by intertwining the nation with the King (Barme 1993, p. 16-17) thus:

It is understood that all the land of the kingdom belongs solely to the king. The king abides by the royal customs established by our ancestors who came together to form a Chat. This gathering of people chose, from one family, a capable man to be the leader of the Chat. This man was very able and intelligent and one the people could rely on to be their protector. This chosen leader guarded both internal and external security and brought happiness to the people. This had not been brought about by the opinion of the majority; rather it had been through the leader's own authority. The people who were organized into the Chat were loyal to him and followed his every advice.

Furthermore, Luang Ratanayati (Barme 1993, p. 19), a British-educated official, wrote an article in the weekly newspaper "Thammasat Winitchai" persuaded the Thai people to oppose colonialism. He invited the people to show gratitude towards the King and Buddhism by protecting the freedom and independence of the Thai race and nation. In agreement with Luang Ratanayati (1993), another reformist intellectual, Thianwan (T.W.S. Wannapho), also stated his standpoint through an article using the British nationalism slogan (God, King/Queen and Country). In his article, he encouraged Thais to love and help secure the nation (chat), the country (prathet), the religion, and the king

Channels (Barme 1993, p.21) that were employed to distribute the messages of the four metaframes were textbooks written by Chaophraya Thammasakmontri and the Royal School. Juthangkun (as cited in Chaithong: 2012, p.3) asserted that during the reign of King Chulalongkorn the content of the royal text books aimed to cultivate values and political ideology in students. They were taught to recognize the power of the modern state and how it was different from the traditional power. Students, besides, were taught to cherish, be devoted to, and be loyal to the national interests and the Thai monarchy. Nonetheless, the Thai government at that time did not purpose to expand the ideas into general education, they were limited to royalty and the nobility. Thai nationalism was gradually established and applied into Thai

society and was later strongly promoted during the reign of King Vajiravudh, the successor of King Chulalongkorn.

### ***The official nationalism of King Vajiravudh***

When King Vajiravudh or Rama VI (1881-1925) ascended the throne, he encountered major challenges with the expansion of Chinese communities in Siam and the instability of his throne. The reason, explained by Ratanapat (1990, p.41), was that the political situations in other countries impacted on the security of King Vajiravudh's power and led him to the formation of official nationalism in Thailand. At the time of King Vajiravudh's reign, revolutions had taken place in many countries with absolute monarchies such as Turkey, and Portugal. However the most significant ones were the overthrow of the Chinese dynasty to form a republican state, in 1911, followed by the Russian revolution in 1917. These revealed to the world that the era of absolute monarchy was on the verge of ending. To prevent this happening in Siam, King Vajiravudh created nationalism to preserve the absolute monarchy and persuade Thai people to love and protect the nation. He also embarked on the nationalist regimen to challenge Westernization and the Chinese. This made him the crucial figure in Thai history (Vella and Vella 1978, p.14) that established official nationalism. Nonetheless, his concept of nationalism (Ratanapat 1990, p. 41) was borrowed from the British Ideology of God, King and Country which was transformed into nation (Chat), religion (Sasana) and king (Phra Mahakasat) which will be explained in the below sections.

#### The Chat idea

During King Vajiravudh's reign, Siam faced two major problems: one from Chinese people in Thailand and the another from the political changes in China and the West that were harmful to the stability of the Thai nation. By this, King Vajiravudh (Ratanapat 1990, p. 113) concentrated on promoting the nation, or Chat, ideology. The Chinese threat came about when the Chinese population in Siam had vastly

increased and become the dominant force in the Siamese economy. The King was dissatisfied that some Chinese in Thailand distinguished themselves from the Thais. He deemed those Chinese came to Thailand to earn money and send it back to China. When they had earned enough money, they would unhesitatingly move back to their home country. The Chinese (1990, p. 116), according to the King's view, thought that they were more civilized than other races. Thailand, therefore, only existed to be cheated and outdone by them.

To create discrimination against the Chinese, King Vajiravudh portrayed them, in his writings, as being similar to the Jews in how they perceived other races and their money-making orientation. For the King (Ratanapat 1990, p.114), the Chinese, and the Jews, faced difficulties integrating with the native people because "No matter what nationality he adopts for the sake of convenience, the Chinese man always remains a Chinaman". For them (1990, p.117), "money is the be-all and the end-all, and they will do anything for the sake of money". Besides, the laziness of the Thais, according to the King, resulted in the shifting of the Thai economy into Chinese hands which was dangerous for Siam.

In addition, Chinese royalist and republican groups in Siam (1990, p. 121) set up schools, newspapers, and hidden political associations to support political change in China which threatened Siam's security. The key activist was Siew Hoot Seng the Chinese newspaper owner who was the major supporter of Sun yat-Sen and Yuan Shih Kai in the Chinese Revolution. The Chinese collected money and sent it back to support the revolution. In Vajiravudh's view, a revolution might happen in Siam and disrupt the institution of the Thai monarchy. During that time the Chinese in Bangkok also sparked off strikes, against the tax policy changes, which caused major turmoil in the capital city. The King confronted the strong sense of Chinese nationalism among the Chinese immigrants in Siam by issuing the 1913 Thai nationality law. It stated that any child born to a Thai parent either in Siam or abroad (Barme 1993, p. 25) was a Thai citizen. This law intended to oppose the Chinese Nationality Act as the solution to transform the Chinese, in Siam, into

Siamese. However Vella (1978, p.193) argued that the Chinese Statement of King Vajiravudh “was made to help Thais realize who they were and what values Thai culture had so that the Thais would stir themselves to save themselves”.

Accordingly the nationalist sentiment of being Thai, while discriminating against non-Thai or Chinese, was created to encourage the Thais to harmonize and protect Siam from Chinese threats. The themes of difference in languages, loyalty to Siam, and the domination of the Siamese economy were constructed and led to discrimination against the Chinese. Nonetheless, Seksan (as cited in Connors 2003, p.38) viewed the underlying logic behind King Vajiravudh’s moves as follows:

By dividing the Chinese into natives and aliens, the Thai state was able to weaken the capitalist class politically and re-establish its political dominance in the relationship with the local bourgeoisie, it was a situation in which capitalism was allowed to grow but not the political influence of the capitalist class.

The adoption of Western culture became another threat to Siam. King Vajiravudh pointed out that some Siamese imitated the Westerners’ lifestyles, because they longed for acceptance and respect from foreigners. King Vajiravudh understood the harm in adopting Western culture that thoughtless acceptance would result in the peril of Thai ways. Furthermore, major civilizing developments made in the eras of King Mongkut and Chulalongkorn had been diminished several traditional Thai arts and crafts to replace by Western style ones. Although, King Vajiravudh applied Western means to enhance Thai national progress and pride, he determined to protect Thai culture from deterioration. He (Vella and Vella 1978, p.176) once stated that:

I don’t at all object to all Western knowledge, for I myself have obtained much knowledge from the West. So I don’t take exception to the point that Westerners have much to offer in the way of techniques and abilities. But I do question that if something is good for Westerners it must necessarily be good for everyone else.

Because of all this, King Vajiravudh created the nation or 'Chat' nationalist idea. Vella explained the meaning of 'Chat' saying that in old Indic 'Chat' meant the origin of birth which was easy to infer as the nation, in the sense of race. In Vella's words (1978, p. 177), "Siam was no longer just a country (prathet thai or muang thai) with a Thai population (chao thai or phonlamuang thai), it was now also a nation (chat thai) with its own identity". To create the Chat idea, The King highlighted the kinship between a man and his nation that a nation was a man's family where each member must live in conformity and union. If one behaved badly toward the nation, he would ruin the nation (his family). Thus, one should love the nation as one's father and mother. As well, the real patriots must love all their companions as if they were their brothers. King Vajiravudh (Vella and Vella 1978, p. 178) emphasized that the Thais had different characteristics to those of the foreigners resulting from Thailand's long history that included Buddhism, the arts, language, literature, and the love for the royal monarchs, all of which encompassed the free spirit of the warriors and the "wild tigers".

He (Vella and Vella 1978 p, 32) formed the Wild Tiger Corps to spread national unity. By being a part of the Wild Tiger Corps one could prove his love toward the nation more than for himself. It was interesting that King Vajiravudh seemed to believe that this group had a major role in spreading nationalistic ideas to the public. While Vella (1978, p, 52) deemed this organization's movement was the first and the last way to successfully distribute an attitude of nationalism to Thai people. Even though the precise result had not been estimated, some of those who joined the corps shared the King's ideas of loving and protecting the three institutions of the king, the nation, and the religion.

### The religion idea

This idea was engaged with protecting Buddhism which has been appeared since the earliest era of Thai history. Theravada Buddhist polities in Southeast Asia (Tambiah 1976, p. 162) had the idea that the King must be dedicated and

subordinate to the religion and frequently act as the political masters to purify the religion. The Thai monarchy and Buddhism (Vella and Vella 1978, p. 214) had been connected to each other in a symbiotic relationship. Thai monarchs must be Buddhists and remain Buddhists all their lives, whereas the Buddhist order supported the state, and the state supported the order. The relationship between the monarchs and Buddhism was described by Thambiah (1976) as follows:

It had been the custom of kings from old times to preserve the Buddhist religion and to further its prosperity. The way of doing this was by keeping cohorts of good soldiers to form an army and by the accumulation of weapons, with the royal power at the head. Thereby he vanquished all his enemies in warfare, and he prevented the Buddhist religion from being endangered by the enemy, as kings have always done.

In the reign of King Mongkut, Buddhism in Thailand (Keyes 1989, p.124) had been radically transformed. He devoted himself, as a monk, to study Buddhist foundations. He attempted to dismiss the traditional rites which hid the authentic messages from the Buddha. Besides, threats from the West were a major problem for Siam during his reign. British imperialism started in Ceylon and Burma, both Buddhist countries. He realized well how much damages the British had done to Buddhism in those two countries, thus it was necessary to create the universal religious image of Siamese Buddhism. The first move of reformation (1989, p.124) was to contact the Sinhalese monks to purify the *Tripitaka*, or the teachings of Buddha. After that the King adopted scientific thoughts from the West in trying to reform Siamese Buddhist principles. Christian missionaries became his mentors, helping him to comprehend Western notions such as science, languages, technology, and theology. The Christian missionaries had developed a good relationship with Prince Mongkut at that time. They encouraged him to become Christian but he resisted to preserve his Buddhist belief.

To be on a par with the Western countries, or to be civilized, eventually, King Mongkut (Thambiah: 1976, p.212) established a new order of "Thammayut", or adhering to the dharma, which was different from the order of the majority of

monks which was 'Mahanikai', or the great order. This was the remarkable strategy of King Mongkut to defend Siam from colonialism. In the Sangha, he assembled monks, who had the same thoughts on eradicating the traditional practices, and asked them to join his new sect. In Mongkut's view, some traditional practices were unreasonable and obscured the real Buddhist principles. His reformation was described by Tambiah as scripturalism, intellectualism, ephemerism, and rationalism (Ibid). During The reigns of King Mongkut and his son, King Chulalongkorn, the number of Thammayut monks increased, especially in northeastern Thailand. In addition, many of the reformations of King Chulalongkorn in areas such as bureaucracy, the military, provincial administration, and slavery abolition were influenced by the Thammayut's principles. It is apparent that Thai kings promoted Buddhism to expand royal virtues, national welfare, and state power (Vella 1978; Keyes 1989).

King Vajiravudh esteemed Buddhism similar to his great predecessors. During his childhood in Britain, he (Vella and Vella 1978, p.214) had received traditional training in Buddhist principles. In his experience some young Thai students were insecure having arguments with Christians on Buddhist subjects because they lacked intensive knowledge of Buddhism. This might have caused him to establish the Buddhist nationalist idea. When he returned to Siam, King Vajiravudh spent four months being a monk. As well, he became Buddhism's prime patron, supporting the order which numerous Buddhist ceremonies were promoted into the royal calendar.

In terms of nationalism, King Vajiravudh stated that a patriotic Thai must be loyal to the King, love the nation, and be a good Buddhist. Being "a good Buddhist" (1978, p.217) was composed of four elements which appeared many times in the King's plays, poems, speeches, and essays. The first element indicated that a good Buddhist must be a moral citizen who helped to strengthen the state, since every Thai citizen was a part of the nation. Thus, one had to behave morally for the benefit of the country because "a good nation is made up of moral people". The next element (1978, p.218) was the belief that a moral state was strong and powerful and able to

compete with any state. King Vajiravudh deemed that sometimes an immoral state might succeed in competition, but sooner or later this immorality would lead to its downfall.

The third element (1978, p.219) was that Buddhism was a better path to goodness than any other religion. For King Vajiravudh, Buddhism was the best religion, without a god demanding obedience or punishing any disobedience. Moreover, Buddha's teaching was about generous actions not commandments. The King did not want to show disrespect to other religions, he wanted to make Buddhists proud of their religion. When some westernized Thais insulted Buddhism as old-fashioned, King Vajiravudh replied that morality had no time and was worldwide. It could be seen that civilization in every country must rely on peace and the order of morality. He (1978, p.221) said, "One's religion is an element in one's nationality. Religion and nation are inseparable. The Thais are fortunate in having a religious faith of such outstanding value, a religious faith that is truly in accord with a high state of civilization".

The last element of being a Buddhist was the will to maintain and protect Buddhism. The King (1978, p.222) asserted that Siam was the last line of defence and fortress of Buddhism, accordingly Thais must be soldiers fighting opponents with the principles of Buddhism. True soldiers must protect the Buddhist state. To justify the use of fighting, the King stated that Buddha understood the necessity of national defense as a moral act. Soldiers, according to Vajiravudh, were moral because they had arms which gave them the right to harm the others. They (1978, p. 223) had to do this moral task to be worthy of receiving trust from others. Thai soldiers sacrificed themselves for the nation and gave a commitment to protect and preserve Buddhism faithfully. The King (Vella: 1978, p. 222) said, "Those who cited the Buddhist injunction against taking life as a proof that military duties were immoral could not be good Buddhists and had only a superficial knowledge of Buddhism".

## The King idea

In Thailand, the monarchy has been the most significant institution, thus the king element of the nationalist idea is emphasized correspondingly. For more understanding, the long history of the Thai kingship including the relationship between the monarchy and Thai people must be provided here.

Thailand, according to Phya Anuman Rajathon (Rajathon 1954), was ruled under a monarchy during the Sukhothai period (1238-1438). The relationship between the King and the people at that time was described, on a stone inscription, as father and children. The King was called by his people "Poh" which meant father, thus "Poh khun" was a "father ruler". Prince Dhani (1947: 93) described the Patriarchal Sukhothai Kingship as being that the monarch was the leader in both battle and in peace times. Besides, he was a respected father all of whose judgments would be accepted by all. People who had troubles and sought the king's support would come and hit a gong, which was hung up in front of the palace, and then presented their petitions to the King. A unique character of the Thai monarchs was explained by Phya Anuman Rajathon (Rajathon, 1954, p.2) thus, "In the formal names of the Kings there appear the words '*Anekchonnikorn samosorn sommot*' which means elected by the people". It could be understood that Thai people would elect their kings to be leaders to protect their lives and secure the land. This Patriarchal Sukhothai Kingship was adopted into the ruling concept of many rulers, for instance, King Vajiravudh and King Prajadhipok who replaced the gong with a gentleman-at-arms, or *tamruad luang*, to accept any writings from the people and submit them to the king. Also, some of the subsequent military rulers after the 1932 revolution claimed their authoritative ruling as being in the patriarchal style.

The notion of Thai kingship was transformed in the succeeding Ayutthaya Kingdom, (1351-1767). Sattayanurak (2000) explained that the beliefs in this period were influenced by the cosmological book "Traiphum Phra Ruang" or "the Three Worlds". It was written by a former king of Sukhothai in 1345 as a reference source for Thai

kings. This book had influence in shaping Siam's cosmological moral origins and its kingship for some periods of time. According to this book, the ruler was considered to be a Ramathibodi, or Avatar of Vishnu on earth. In this regard (Sattayanurak 2000), "It was believed that the royal authority of the king spread in every direction without limitation". In other words, the power of the king was without boundaries.

In the early part of the Ratanakosin era (1782-present), the conceptualizations of state and monarchy were changed in the period of King Nangklao (Rama III, 1824-1851). This could be seen from the book, Nang Nophamat (Lady Nophamat), which said that this world consisted of states of various sizes and that no one state controlled the rest, and there was no absolute royal power that could be spread throughout the world. When Siam started to trade with foreigners, Siamese Kings realized there were other states which were more progressive than Siam.

It is interesting that the era of reason emerged in the reign of King Mongkut. Thai history was written for the first time by King Mongkut (Rama IV). He (Sattayanurak 2000,) wrote *prawatisat thai*, or the History of Thai, using new concepts. He portrayed the kings as "doers" who led the rise of the state, preserved peace and harmony, and widened the scope of progress. He (Sattayanurak 2000) saw the king as a human being, which can be seen from the following:

The Kings could do both good and evil. If there was more good than evil, the man who was king would rule the kingdom with power and kindness and even though occasional serious errors might be made, they could not do away with the good altogether.

King Mongkut (Sattayanurak 2000) described the king as the protagonist who built the country, therefore the phrase of "*phaendin phramahakasat*," or "the kingdom of the king," referred to the king who shaped the kingdom's history. King Mongkut believed that it was the king's obligation to shape history. He was immensely influenced by King Buddha Yodfa Chulaloke (Rama I, 1782–1809), the founder of Bangkok. Accordingly, King Mongkut (Sattayanurak 2000) determined to propagate

the proud sentiment of being descended from the great king. It could be seen from the emphasis he placed on that it was his responsibility to act in the benefit of the kingdom, furthermore as a member of the dynasty the king must enhance the dynasty's prestige and honor.

Nonetheless, the notion of absolute monarchy was expressed by King Mongkut. He started to frame the king's royal supremacy as an absolute power. From his writings (Sattayanurak 2000), all things in the kingdom were possessed by the king, and by this he could provide them to whoever he desired. This idea to centralize ruling power to the king might have been aimed at securing Siam, and his throne, from internal and external harms. It was important for Siam at that time to escape from the threat of imperialism. Revered and intelligent leaders were needed to make the Siamese safe and sound in the era of Western colonialism. Because of this, the Thai King must have a superior character in order to be the central institution of Siam. This could be seen from Jory's view (Jory 2001) that King Mongkut's image was that of the king who maintained Siam's independence from the colonial powers and also was the father of Thai science. Besides, he was also presented as the first 'modern' king who was able to speak, read and write English as well as Latin and French.

As for King Chulalongkorn, he was the most beloved monarch in Thailand who developed various modern projects to resist the colonialism of the West. His purpose (Vella and Vella 1978, p.XIV) was to "Europeanize his country". In his work *Phya Anumarn Rajathon* (Rajathon, 1954, p.5) said there were two great kings of Chakkri dynasty who deserved to be praised. They were King Mongkut and his son, King Chulalongkorn, who had done many things of benefit to Siam. From this, the programs of technological advancement (1978, p.127) were continued by King Vajiravudh with the intention of creating nationalism.

King Vajiravudh's notion of kingship was created using the traditional framework based on the ancient Buddhist theory of kingship. The king or '*Phramahakasat*,' in his meaning, was the 'chief warrior' who was the leader of the Thai people

protecting the nation. The progress of Siam resulted from these wise kings, thus being loyal to the nation, the religion, and the king would lead the country to develop as a modern state (Barme: 1993, p. 29; Vella: 1978, p. 60). In King Vajiravudh's framing, the king was the significant symbol and the visible appearance of the land. The Thais (Vella and Vella 1978, p. 61) had a duty to protect the king. Harming the king was as good as harming the nation and the peace and welfare of the group.

King Vajiravudh (Ratanapat 1990, p. 148) stressed the heroic and valuable actions that the kings had done for Siam by bringing up courageous stories of the great kings in history such as Phra Ruang, Phra Naresuan, Phra Chao Thaksin, and King Rama I, the founder of Chakri Dynasty in 1782 in order to create feelings of gratitude among the Thais. It seemed that King Vajiravudh had a wish to be a great king as his ancestors. Ratanapat (1990) stated that "Vajiravudh was more concerned about the survival of the monarchy than the first two nationalist ideas, namely the country and the religion". For the king, the survival of the monarchy was the outcome of the strength of the nation and Buddhism.

King Vajiravudh's nationalism had been adopted by the late rulers as the most important and effective ideas to perform mobilizations. In the below sections the democracy idea which came up as the fourth metaframe will be explained.

## ***The origin of democracy in Thailand***

In this section I determine to explore the fall of the king idea and the rise of democracy/modernization nationalist idea as the fourth metaframe. The details of the 1932 democratic revolution will be touched on briefly because the direction of this chapter is focused on nationalism and the metaframes.

The notion of democracy and modernization originally appeared in the eras of King Mongkut and King Chulalongkorn. The reformation, westernization, and Europeanization by the two kings became the foundations of democracy and modernization. Furthermore, the bureaucratic reformation of King Chulalongkorn brought about the changing of political environments in Siam. People's political consciousness was transformed when the King introduced the new system of bureaucracy to them. Eventually it inspired and led some of them to overthrow the absolute monarchy afterwards.

Some might argue that the primary modernization of King Chulalongkorn focused on governmental and administrative reform rather than pushing Siam into a representative political regime. In this regard, the king considered that Thailand was not yet mature enough for a democratic regime. Nonetheless, he said (Likhit: 1992, p. 115), in a meeting of the ministers in 1910, "I will have my son, Vajiravudh, give Thai people a present upon his ascending the throne. That is, I will have him grant a parliament and a constitution". However, King Vajiravudh stated that Thai people were not qualified for democracy, because they lacked political knowledge. He (1992, p. 116) also criticized the dishonesty of the political parties that would bribe people to support them. Even though he built "Dusitthani," the miniature city with an experimental democratic government, some may have seen it as his play thing. Those people, however, could not read his real mind, since the King also created projects (1992, p. 117) that were involved with liberty, freedom, and the

rights of the people, such as compulsory education, the Wild Tiger Corps, and freedom of the press, or the public's voice.

After the death of King Vajiravudh, democracy emerged in Thailand in the reign of his successor, King Prajadhipok or Rama VII (1893-1941), the seventh king of Chakkri dynasty. He was the youngest son of King Chulalongkorn and the younger brother of King Vajiravudh. In the final years of Vajiravudh, the affairs of the monarchy and the country had been in an appalling state. In Suwannathat's words (Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p.73), King Vajiravudh "was generous in not finding fault with his courtiers and favorites. He had never ceased to lavish them with his personal wealth and, often, at the state's expense". This regression of the economy had a huge impact on the administration of King Prajadhipok. To relieve the economic crisis, King Prajadhipok proposed strict economic plans for both the palace and the nation. Many expenses, including some of the nationalism projects of King Vajiravudh, were reduced to balance the budgets. King Prajadhipok set about repairing the damage to the financial condition by implementing significant budget cuts and retrenching the expenses of nine to ten thousand officials. Undoubtedly, the plans caused immense conflicts between the new King and his civil servants and military elites. Furthermore, the King (Thananithichot 2011) improved the liberalization of the absolutist system by reinstating the Privy Council in 1927 and introducing a municipal system. He also set up the Supreme Council to "return to Chulalongkorn's administration" which had been a magnificent time of increasing confidence of the Thai people. Besides, it was a great augmentation to the security of the monarchy.

This Supreme Council consisted of six senior and superior princes. They had a duty to minimize the power of the king, together with making suggestions to the king on how to prevent the sort of unwanted situations that used to happen in King Vajiravudh's era. The Supreme council committee had the style of a parliamentary debate and reflected some of the general public's opinions. Meanwhile, the Privy Council (Suwannathat-Pian: 2003, p.75) turned into a meeting for discussing

unimportant matters. Also, Prince Songkla (Barme, 1993, p.64), a brother of King Prajadhipok, informed Thai students and officials in Paris that the King “will do something that no Thai king has done before, he will give the people a constitution in the manner of other civilized countries”. However, it is interesting that there was no solid indication that King Prajadhipok would renounce his supra-legal status and promulgate the constitution. The King (Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p. 77) seemed to believe in the absolute monarchy which was “very good and very suitable for the country as long as we have a good king”.

This situation led to the increased anxiety of Pridi Phanomyong a Paris-based student lawyer. In 1927 he and his fellow Thai students, including Thatsanai Mitraphakdi and Prayun Phamonmontri, held a series of meetings with a young military officer, Phibun Songkram. The secret meetings (Barme', 1993: 64) concentrated on the crisis in the Thai economy and the lack of hope for political reform. As a result, the formation of the Khana Ratsadon (The People's Party) whose aim was replacing the absolute monarchy with a representative political regime was originated.

Finally, on the 24<sup>th</sup> of June 1932, the People's Party (Barme', 1993: 64) moved against the throne of King Prajadhipok and seized the power of the state without bloodshed. The coup seemed to be very smooth and lacked complexity; however, there was a great build-up of friction and conflict between the Khana Ratsadon and the royalists. According to a British report, the Khana Ratsadon intended to abolish the monarchy forthwith and establish a republic. However, all of Siam's treaties with foreign countries were signed in the name of King Prajadhipok. Any sudden terminations of these agreements, due to the abolition of the monarchy, might cause serious interferences from the West. By this, the coup leaders had to preserve the existence of the monarchy.

An announcement from the People's Party affirmed the reasons for staging the coup that the monarchy had been deceitful, corrupt, and unconcerned about the people's

troubles. From this, the People's Party (Connors: 2003, p. 39) declared the six principles of the group: to maintain the sovereignty of the nation, to provide employment, to formulate a national plan, to have equal rights, freedom, and liberty for all, and to provide full education to everyone. Formally, the role of the monarch was precisely limited by the permanent constitution that was promulgated on December 10, 1932. The monarch (Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p. 83), according to the traditional royal prerogatives, must be the outstanding figure when performing the royal's affairs of the country. King Prajadhipok did not want to be treated as a rubber stamp king for the People's Party since the government refused to fulfil the monarchy's requirements. In the end, on March 2, 1935, King Prajadhipok signed a document of abdication. His nephew, Prince Ananda Mahidol (2003, p.85) became his successor and the second constitutional monarch in Thai history.

After the coup in 1932, Khana Ratsadon or the People's Party determined to retain King Vajiravudh's nationalism and continued to employ it. The reason was to maintain peace, because they could not provide any reasonable alternative explanations for establishing their authority and legitimacy to rule the country. Moreover, the new idea of changing adherence from the King to the Constitution seemed like a novelty to Thai people, especially the peasants. Nithi (2007) assumed that shortly after the revolution it would be difficult for the people to be ruled under a military dictatorship. The Thai were forced to accept and believe in new institutions such as parliament, the prime minister, and even the concept of leadership. The feelings of uncertainty and curiosity of Thai people toward the new regime made Khana Ratsadon decided to continue with King Vajiravudh's traditional nationalism. Nevertheless, the democracy nationalist idea was formally generated this time to counterbalance the significance of the king idea.

Explaining the utilization of nationalism, from the eras of the preceding monarchs, in the authoritarian government of the 1932 coup, Connors (2003, p.38) said, "It was the disciplinary use of nationalism to stave off any challenges to power that

might come from the growing non-royalist fractions of the capitalist class, as well as potential political dissidence". In the following governments, the nation was intertwined with economic development and modernization, and democracy was seen as a component of the modernity package of the elite rulers.

### ***The nationalism of the People's Party***

The focus of the People's Party on nationalism after the revolution was an attempt to make Thai people feel confident with the new constitution co-existing with the monarchy. As the awkward situation continued they realized that the people could not completely trust them. At this point the coup leaders started framing the first constitution as part of the democratization. The Khana Ratsadorn or People's Party (Likhit: 1992, p.121) familiarized Thai people with the coup and democratic ideas through propaganda. They distributed leaflets throughout Bangkok and broadcasted texts on the radio including the six principles that condemned the evil of the monarchy. This had been done to legitimize their coup. Pridi Phanomyong (Stowe: 1991, p.12), a key leader of the Khana Ratsadorn, fully supported a constitutional government and the complete reformation of economic and social structures as concepts for the revolution. His political idea came from Western education and Sun Yat sen's theory of a step-by-step approach to democracy. Accordingly, he intended to establish a republic, whereas some high-ranking military coup makers preferred to retain the presence of the monarchy in Thailand. Nonetheless, within six months of the coup the Khana Ratsadorn eradicated several longstanding bureaucratic departments administrated by the royalists. New units were established to support the governing of Khana Ratsadorn. Some influential royal family members were ordered to leave Thailand. At this time the significance of the monarchy was reduced which meant the king element of the nationalist idea was played down in importance. The democracy metaframe was fully employed to legitimize the authority of the Khana Ratsadorn.

To continue the propaganda, Luang Wichit Watakarn (Barme: 1993, p.104), an important nationalist, was appointed to be responsible for the construction of nationalist sentiments. From 1933 to 1938, the constitution was promoted intensively. Wichit used his work place at the Department of Fine Arts as the base to promote the importance of the constitution. In 1933, he (Barme, 1993: 108) wrote an article explaining the meaning of a charter:

In order to bring about peace, justice for all, prevent oppression, stop the abuse of power and create political order, progressive countries all over the world have set down a law stating the power of government and the people. What is more, this law does not just apply to the government and people, but also the king, the leader of the country as well. This law is called a constitution.

Even though the monarch was under the constitutional law, Wichit encouraged the public to believe that the King had remained as head of the state. He (Barme, 1993, 108) explained:

The King is still the head of the nation. He is the highest personage in the land and nobody may harm or criticize him. He is in charge of Siam's armed services. He uses his power to pass laws recommended to him by the National Assembly, and maintain orders in the Kingdom with the help of the Cabinet. He can initiate meetings of the Assembly. He can close it down and choose new members of the Cabinet. He has the right to impose martial law, and declare war. He has the right to make peace treaties and other forms of legal agreement with foreign powers.

This article convinced people who were in doubt about the constitution and the role of the monarch in political affairs. Barme (1993, p.109) pointed out that Wichit's discourse showed that the constitutional system was the most appropriate regime leading to the most justifiable form of government. In the conclusion of his article, Wichit (Barme, 1993, 109) summarized that:

Let everybody be confident that this constitution will bring progress and happiness to our country. We must make our constitution secure as it is the basis of our nation. Anyone who is in opposition to the constitution is to be

considered an enemy of the nation. Anyone who loves the nation and has hope for the future must comply with the constitution.

In this article the nation metaframe was connected to democracy. Wichit (Barme, 1993, 109) stated that respecting the constitution was part of being in a group or the nation, individuals who opposed the constitution indicated they refused to have a relationship with society. Regarding this, Pridi, Wichit, and the other committee members agreed to promulgate the law on November 5, 1933 as the Act for the Protection of the Constitution. Its goal (Barme, 1993, 110) was to “promote a belief in the constitution, provide protection for its principles, and help the people understand the notions of constitutionalism”.

For the rest of the nationalist ideas, Wichit published an article entitled *latthi chu chat* (Nationalism) to stress the importance of the development of the nation. He wrote about the four essential principles for securing the glory of the nation stating that: “the supremacy of the nation is above all else: support for Buddhism as the national religion; respect for the constitution and the king; total opposition to communism”. It can be seen that the king metaframe was not the first in importance. In his book, “Universal History,” Wichit described the history of Thailand as part of the universal history. Due to Soontravanich (as cited in Sattayanurak, 2010), Wichit’s discourse focused on the history of warfare between Myanmar and Thailand during the Ayutthaya and early Rattanakosin periods. The bravery of and lessons learned by King Naresuan and King Taksin in the independence wars were particularly emphasized, which was definitely borrowed from King Vajiravudh’s nationalism.

In 1936, the Department of the Interior issued the “Manual for Citizens” to help people understand the new democratic system. The first edition (Connors: 2003, p.45) stated that “Siam is no longer an absolute monarchy, but a system of democracy which is described as a government of the citizens by the citizens”. However, a year later, an improved edition told the people to be good citizens by loving the nation, the religion, the king and the constitution. The four metaframes

which were applied in this period concentrated on democracy/the constitution, the nation, the religion, and the king.

### ***The nationalism of Phibulsongkram***

During the era of Khana Ratsadorn, the rise of the military in the group led to the beginning of a military leadership. Field Marshal Phibulsongkram was another prominent coup leader who was the successor to Phraya Bahol, the former military leader of the Khana Ratsadorn. Phibulsongkram had become the premier from December 1938 to July 1944.

Phibulsongkram was famous from creating a different style of nationalism in the late 1930s. By attempting to replace the three ideologies of the nation, the religion, and the king with a leadership cult, Phibulsongkram became the first premier who emphasized the essential roles of the leader. In fact, the leader, in this sense, was him. He claimed that Japan had kept their King, whereas Thailand did not have a suitable ideology to follow suit. Therefore, during World War II, he developed a modern policy in nationalistic and democratic terms. The regime (Connors, 2003, 41) was seen as encouraging xenophobic nationalism by introducing anti-Chinese procedures and promoting Thainess through state decrees or "*Ratthaniyom*". This was viewed by Likhit Dhiravegin (1992, p. 125) as an anti-Chinese administrative policy and a war policy of an alliance with Japan to defend Great Britain and the United States.

Wichit still played an important role in Phibulsongkram's nationalist projects. He was assigned to introduce *Ratthaniyom*, or the state decrees, to the Thai people. The concept was explained by Phibulsongkram (Stowe: 1991, p. 124) saying that it was "similar to the proper type of etiquette observed by all civilized people". Obviously, it was a patriotic code of behavior for Thai people. The standards of behavior involved dressing in modern clothing, eating and bathing manners, and being loyal

to the King, the nation, the Thai flag, and the national anthem. Moreover, the government (Stowe: 1991, p. 12) issued a Cultural Maintenance Act to declare that the Thais had the duty “to practice national customs and promote the prosperity of Thailand by conserving and revising existing customs”. Thak (1974, p.188) put that Phibulsongkram’s nationalism purposed to increase the power of Thai state.

In addition, Wichit proposed to change the name of the country from Siam to Thailand. He (Thak 1974, p.122) reasoned that Siam was named by the leaders of Cambodia and generally adopted by the Chinese and the Europeans, therefore to bond all Thais in the country and abroad in a similar way to Indo-China, British Burma and southern China, the name of the country needed to be changed. Referring to the anti-Chinese sentiments, Likhit (1992, p.125) thought that they were created to oppose the Chinese control over the Thai economy. Because of this, the Laws of Reservation of Occupations were issued in order to reserve some jobs only for Thais. Many Chinese schools were closed and discrimination against people of Chinese origin occurred.

Phibulsongkram’s nationalism, according to Vella (1978, p.269), comprised of four elements: militarism, economic nationalism, chauvinism and cultural nationalism. Although, Phibulsongkram used Vajiravudh’s ideas as a nationalist model in terms of language, historical magnificence, Buddhism, traditional Thai values and anti-Chinese representations, his nationalism was based on militaristic and nationalistic ideas. Nevertheless, Phibulsongkram (Vella and Vella 1978, p.270) forced his program through by the use of fines, threats and assassinations which was dissimilar to King Vajiravudh who relied on voluntarism, persuasion and propaganda.

The metaframes constructed by Phibulsongkram evidently concentrated on the nation symbol, since many programs had been designed to protect Thailand. The reason is Phibulsongkram was an autocratic premier who established the leadership cult in Thailand, therefore the democracy and king metaframes obviously became

less important and replaced by modernization. Throughout his leadership, it was notable that Phibulsongkram (Stowe 1991, p. 128) was an anti-royalist. Many dominant royalists had been forced into exile in Malaya. Between 1939 and 1943, the government embarked on a policy of strengthening the power of the executives. It aimed to manage the expenses of the legislature and the monarchy, which the royal wealth was confiscated to prevent the funds being spent to oppose Phibulsongkram.

The premiership of Phibulsongkram coincided with the early stage of King Bhumibol's reign. From Jory's work (as cited in Fong 2009), "the representations of monarchs virtually disappeared from the Thai political scene between 1930s and 1950s. Phibulsongkram at that time felt no desire to engage himself with the new boy monarch". King Bhumibol once recalled an experience he had with the government of Phibulsongkram, he said: "When I opened my mouth, they'd say 'Your majesty, you don't know anything'. So I shut my mouth. I know things but I shut my mouth". Accordingly, throughout the era of Phibulsongkram, King Bhumibol (Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p.149) had to follow the premier's rules, since the King's opinions were either politely or not so politely pushed aside. Photos of King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit were prohibited to be shown in people's houses and government offices. The monarch's roles were minimized in this era, thus the king metaframe seldom applied in Phibulsongkram's nationalist movements.

Phibulsongkram's thought toward democracy was changed in the later years of his premiership in 1950s. He (Likhit: 1992, p. 140) embarked on a world tour to the United States, Spain, Britain, and some other countries from April to June 1955. During his tour, he had met many prominent leaders such as President Eisenhower, Queen Elizabeth, and also had an audience with the Pope. This experience, according to Likhit, "stirred up a democratic spirit in him". The Hyde Park speech in England (1992, p. 140) was very impressive for him, hence he permitted a Hyde Park-style debate in Bangkok at Sanamluang and in other provinces.

In 1955, Phibulsongkram announced a “New Democracy Policy” to a class of newly commissioned naval officers in order to emphasize his being against the coup d’etat. The democracy metaframe was applied which, in reality, was intended to prevent attacks from Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat and Police Chief Phao Sriyanont(Likhit: 1992, p. 141), the two members of the triumvirate regime who rapidly expanded their power and challenged Phibulsongkram. Accordingly, Phibulsongkram (Ockey: 2002, p.109) manipulated the public debate to attack the government policy in order to gain empathy and support from the people. In the early stages, the Hyde Park debate was the forum for discussing the government's policies and attracted various groups of people. From here, the first protest against the Social Security Act began in 1955. Subsequently, according to Ockey (2002, p.109), “topics began to focus less on policies, but more on personalities, particularly Police Chief Phao, and political reforms, including constitutional reform”. Moreover, many of the speaker’s script writers were claimed to be hired by Phibulsongkram.

Thak (1974, p. 138) said, in his work, that Phibulsongkram ordered his government officials to pay attention to the speakers. After he had been criticized, Phao fought back by hiring speakers to attack Phibulsongkram. Ultimately, the Hyde Park debate became a problem for Phibulsongkram when the anti-government and American protests were growing. He decided to ban all political activities. After he won the the dirty election in 1957, a group of 2,000 students from Chulalongkorn University formed a rally to protest against the government and demand his resignation. Finally, on September 16<sup>th</sup>, 1957, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (Likhit: 1992, 144) staged a bloodless coup while Phibulsongkram and Phao fled abroad ending Phibulsongkram regime in Thailand.

### ***The Seri Thai Movement***

A prominent movement conducted during Phibulsongkram's era was the Seri Thai, or Free Thai movement. It began during World War II when Thailand was occupied by Japan. At that time, the American and British armies (Stowe 1991, p.258) were being secretly assisted by some anti-Japanese Thais. The most prominent of these was the Thai ambassador in Washington, Mom Rajawong Seni Pramoj who was a junior member of a Thai royal family. Seni held a press conference on December 11, 1941 to renounce Phibulsongkram's collaboration with the Japanese since he believed that the United States would ultimately win the war. In this sense Seni's standpoint was similar to Phibulsongkram's in preferring the winning side. His goal (Stowe 1991, p.259) was to "denounce Phibulsongkram's pro-Japanese stance and call on all Thais to unite in fighting for the restoration of their country's independence". Also, America recognized the movement of Seri Thai.

In June 1942, the Free Thai movement headed by Seni Pramoj joined members from twenty-six countries to give an oath in the name of the United Nations. Seni declared, on behalf of all Thais, to collaborate with other factions to conquer the Axis forces. According to Likhit (1992, p.126), Seni wished to liberate Thailand from Japan. The operation started with the participation of thirteen Thai students in a three month course of intensive military training under the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). It was set up by General William Donovan with the blessing of Roosevelt. Most of the Thai students were postgraduates. Pridi, the regent of Thailand at that time, co-operated with the movement by conducting activities in Thailand with the other allies.

According to Wimon (1997, p. 19), a former Seri Thai member, the Seri Thai and anti-Japanese activities emerged after Thailand was occupied by Japanese. The members were based in Thailand, Britain and the United States. He explained that the main goal of the movement was to conduct any kind of activity to prove to the

allies that Thailand was not a party to the Japanese activities. All Thais, from his announcement, refused to support the Japanese invaders and were willing to sacrifice their lives in collaborating with the allied nations in waging war against Japan. He (Wimon: 1997, p. 19) stated that the movement was “the only way to contribute to the preservation of independence, sovereignty, pride and prestige of the nation after the war. The members were confident that the Allies would win eventually”.

According to Boonrod’s memorandum (Boonrod 1997, p. 71), another former Seri Thai member, he was worried about how the Thais felt about them. Some Thais might think the students were seeking benefits from the United States and was just mercenaries. However, he deemed that Thailand was under the control of Japan as a no-freedom state in a similar way to China and Korea. He (Boonrod 1997, p. 71) said: “Japan wanted to expand its areas of influence and domination. If Japan were to win the war, Asia would fall, and Thailand would become only a stooge serving Japan for a long, long time to come”. In view of Wimon (1997, p. 104), the success of this operation resulted in the ending of the war, after which the United States encouraged the allied forces not to examine and treat Thailand as a conquered country.

When Thailand declared war against the anti-Japanese allied powers, the Seri Thai movement applied the nation and democracy metaframes as the key concepts to encourage their members, and other Thais, to react against Premier Phibulsongkram. It was an interesting case of conflicts over the concept of “a good Thai” in which Thai citizens had been encouraged by the elites to protect Thailand and be loyal to the nation. Phibulsongkram believed he protected the country by taking sides with Japan, on the other hand he was considered, by the Seri Thai, as a traitor who supported the evil fascist Japan. Interestingly, the Seri Thai framed themselves as a democratic movement that performed the honorable operation of liberating Thailand from the autocratic Axis which were seen by Phibulsongkram as the traitors. The two opponents each thought they were the ones who were on the

right and moral side. It seemed that the notion of being “a good Thai” in this case was applied differently depending on the creators, operators, and objectives of the plan.

### ***The nationalism of Sarit Thanarat***

When Sarit staged a coup in 1957, he (Likhit 1992, p.144) followed the customary practice in of coup conducts by not assuming power right away but appointing a premier and calling an election. He established the National Society Party to support the stability of the government of Prime Minister Lieutenant General Thanom Kittikachorn. During his premiership, Thanom had struggled with problems from political parties, the military, and financial crisis. In 1958 Sarit staged another coup by claiming the Communist threat. This claim might have been be real or was just an excuse to get rid of his rivals. Sarit and his successors Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapass Charusathian had ruled Thailand for fifteen years. Besides, Sarit (Likhit: 1992, p. 157-159) usually used the Article 17 of the interim Constitution as a measure to diminish the power of his opponents led to the “reign of terror” in Thailand.

Throughout the premiership, the modernization and nation metaframes were applied to his national development. It could be seen from his plans that he aimed to modernize Thailand using knowledge in the three areas of economy, education, and politics. Typically, the modernization metaframe was most used by the leaders who took over the country by coups to gain acknowledgement from the people. For example, Sarit (Srinara: 2011) provided Thailand with the national co-development scheme, while the revolutionary council applied the three nationalist ideologies of the nation, the religion, and the king to mobilize people. Evidently, role of the democracy/constitution metaframe was minimized in Sarit’s era which was similar to Phibulsongkram’s.

The policies of the National Society Party (Srinara, 2011) turned into the foundation for Sarit's political policies which contained the concepts of nationalism and socialism. Nationalism focused on honoring and respecting the nation, the religion, and the monarchical institutions; whereas socialism indicated that the administration of the government would take control of the economy in a way that would be to the benefit of individuals and communal groups. By this, the income and revenue would be shared and collected equally. Accordingly, the nationalism concept of Sarit Thanarat was contained of nation, religion, king, and socialism.

When Sarit required economic support from the United States, he had to change his party's policy because of the anti-socialist policy of the United States. At that time, the United States had expanded their power in Southeast Asia after the end of World War II, since communism had become a major threat in the region. Sarit's nationalist concept (Srinara, 2011) was changed to "nation, religion, king and the benefits of society".

Even though Sarit was influenced by democratic ideas from the United States, he (Thak, 1974, p. 206) intended to restore Thai traditional centrality with the concept of *Lakkhanmuang Thai* or indigenous principles of state. According to Fong (2009), Sarit disagreed when Phibulsongkram followed the Western ideological path. He thought that Western values caused people to desire to destroy each other. He and the Revolutionary Council (Thak 1974, p. 209) announced that:

The major principles of democracy established at that time (1932) were taken from the west, from England and France. Although there were many changes, those changes were made within the framework of Western democracy. Therefore, they were merely minor changes and could not be said to have been "revolutionary". The Revolution of "October 20", although involving changes within the democratic system and not a change from democracy to another system, entails the transformation of the style and type of democracy. That is to say, it encompasses the overthrow of Western democracy and creates a democratic system suitable for the special conditions of Thailand.

Sarit Thanarat established his “Thai style democracy” in 1957 that was different from the Western Democracy in some ways. This “Thai style democracy” regime was not a parliamentary system with any opposition. Most of the members of the administrative and legislative groups were not elected by the people, while the most powerful being the administrative group.

Furthermore, Sarit adopted the Patriarchal Sukhothai regime into his ruling concept. The positive side was he acted as a father who cared for his children; on the other hand, it was combined with a Deva-raja regime which focused on absolutism. Kriangsak (1993: 131) described this old concept as being that the king and his citizens were Buddhists that belonged to the same world, therefore the monarchy had a close relationship with the people. The kings would extend the rights of administration to the public which meant that the people could have political parties, elections, and a parliament. Nonetheless, an elected Prime minister was not necessary in this regime, whereas the king (Kriangsak 1993: 131) must be head of the country to control and maintain a political balance. It is interesting that the opinion of King Bhumibhol toward “Thai style democracy” was in conformity with that of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. The King (Hewison: 1997, p.68) said:

We Thais need not to follow any kind of foreign democracy. We should try instead to create our own Thai style of democracy, for we have our own national culture and outlook and we are capable of following our own reasoning.

Hewison (1997, p.68) explained that King Bhumibhol preferred not to define democracy in foreign terms and that democracy must be customized to correspond with Thai values and customs. Later, this “Thai style democracy” has been adopted into Thai political discourse many times, mostly found in the faction that defend the regime and called for the original Western democracy regime.

When Sarit (1974. p. 162) staged a coup, he acted as a rescuer who got rid of the impurities of the system by eradicating the corruptions of the former government.

He seemed to know how to make use of the king metaframe. After the coup he went to have an audience with King Bhumibol and received a document appointing him as the Defender of the Capital. Sarit (Thak, 1974, p. 164) told the press that “I am the Defender of the Capital and can give order in accordance with the law because it is the royal command”. We can see how King Bhumibol felt toward Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Their close relationship began when Sarit staged a coup.

The king metaframe was a key frame for Sarit, and perhaps for King Bhumibol, to continue sovereignty. Sarit started to form a connection between the monarchy and the other national symbols by changing the national date from June 24 to December 5, the birthday of His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej. In other words, Sarit transformed the king into a symbol alongside the nation and constitution. He emphasized on binding the nation together with the monarchy, thus loving the King as good as loved the nation. Besides, Sarit authorized his regime through the approval of traditional legitimacy or the monarchy. He (Connors 2003, p. 48) gave prominence to the monarchy institution resulted in the rise of King Bhumibol’s roles in Thai society since then. Stithorn (2011, p.259) stated the view that with the strong support of Sarit “the role of King Bhumibol became: a source of the economic and political goals of the regime, the ‘Development King’ as well as a symbol of national loyalties”. In Hanna’s words (as cited Hewison 1997, p.88):

The King and Sarit, surprisingly, hit it off quite well...Sarit seemed to have decided that a popular, indeed even a powerful king might be advantageous to the nation and himself. He removed many of the remaining obstructions, therefore, to the King’s freedom of movement.

The royal family became active in charities, education, organizations, public interest groups, religious groups, and secular ceremonies. Furthermore, the King became interested in development projects in the agricultural sector which earned him the image of “the Development King”. Sarit (Thak 1974, p. 23) allowed the king to give audiences to the private sector; moreover he had a policy to enhance the popularity of the king by sending him abroad to promote the country. The Royal patronage

gave support to the government and private sectors. Connors (2003: 128) believed that in the mid-1970s the status of monarchy was insecure due to the movement of progressive intellectuals. In order to increase its stability, King Bhumiphol Adulyadej was raised to a God-like status by the official palaces and agencies along with being promoted as of head of state.

After the Sarit regime ended, the King increased his involvement with students by doing activities such as the annual presentation of certificates and campus visits, which led to a more approachable image. During Thanom's government, the monarchy (Thak: 1974, p.424) moved closer to the army which could be seen from the number of military activities the king attended in 1963. In Thak's words (1974, p.25), "the monarchy more and more plays the role of legitimizer of political power, supporter/legitimizer of broad regime policies, promoter and sanctioner of intra-elite solidarity, symbolic focus of national unity, and broker for transferring funds from the private sector to the state treasury". In 1964 when Sarit was condemned by Thanom, for his corruptions, King Bhumibol gave his very first press conference to express his opinions and help Sarit from being dishonored by his scandals. Suwannathat-Pian (2003, p.163) wrote that:

By going to the press the king had overcome the limitations put upon him as a constitutional monarch. Since then, His Majesty had given press conference to various foreign correspondents. Though His Majesty often stresses that he is above politics, his accessibility to the media is of political significance...His Majesty is no longer content to act strictly in accordance with the ground rules of a constitutional monarchy and confine himself to action behind the scenes when need arises.

From this, the king metaframe was emphasized by Sarit Thanarat as the vital frame for mobilization, while modernization became the second most important frame. Obviously, the importance of democracy was lessened while Sarit created his "Thai style democracy" to rule the country. In other words, the monarchy (Hewison1997, p.62) was seen as crucial to political stability and as such was the dominant

institution for Thai people and the country. In essence, the King was the nation embodied.

### ***The 1973 student movement***

After the death of Sarit, his paternal dictator legacy was inherited by his successors Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphas Charusathien. The first signs of the discontentment of university students and intellectuals towards the Thanom and Praphas regime emerged when the 1968 constitution was replaced by an interim charter in 1972. This led to the movement of students demanding a permanent constitution from the government. They (Wittayakorn: 1995, p.119) had a major role in the struggle between the people requesting for a parliamentary democracy and the military juntas of Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphas Charusathien.

The historical movement started when one hundred students, intellectuals, and politicians called for a permanent constitution and a parliamentary democracy. They distributed flyers and books about the constitution and democracy which led to arrests by the government. Consequently, the National Students' Center of Thailand (NSCT), which represented university students in Thailand, called for a demonstration with hundreds of thousands of Thammasat students and general public. They held a rally to demand a permanent constitution and the liberation of the arrested students. Wittayakorn (1995, p.122) explained that the motives behind this movement were a combination of various factors such as the disconnected developments in politics and the economy, the unequal distribution of property and income, the agony of living conditions, the monopoly of political power by the military and elite groups, and the expansion of corruption. Furthermore, the rapid growth of education and the media disseminated the idea of a liberal democracy. All of these created a substantial increase of resentment among people. In Likhit's reason, this democratic movement (Likit 1992, p. 197) began when Thanom government allowed The National Students' Centre of Thailand to have mild and

risk-free activities such as a demonstration to protest against Japanese goods, which was supported by the government. On the one hand, in the era of Sarit all political activities were banned, thus the students' activities had become more intensively engaged with politics.

The rally of students and people resulted in a violent crackdown on 14 October 1973 (Suwannathat-Pian 2003; Wittayakorn: 1995). On that day, one thousand demonstrators were injured while seventy were killed. The King (Hewison 1997, p. 96) showed his opposition to the actions of the military dictatorship by opening the palace gates allowing the students to escape from the military's attack. The King could win the students' hearts from this situation. He also went on television to state his grief and shame about the violence. It is interesting that the King evidently supported the student movement. He (Suwannathat-Pian 2003, p. 169) advised Thanom and Praphas to step down and leave Thailand before the intrusion of the communists and the leftist penetration in the country.

We can see from that the movement of students in 1973 focused most on the democracy metaframe, while the king metaframe became the second most important. During their rallies, they always carried photos of the King and Queen. When the government forces attacked them, the students sought shelter at the palace. Thus, King Bhumibol was portrayed as a true constitutional monarch and as a force for democratization which his political role has been continued up to the present time.

## **Conclusion**

This Thai metaframe section is ended with the 1973 student movement with the reason of this study which has not attempted to cover all protest movement just a sampling of some differed types. Besides, this 1973 student movement was considered as the remarkable democratic movement that emerged in the era of neo-

Thai politics. Since the 1932 revolution Thailand has had a constitution and been ruled under a so-called democratic regime, most of the ruling governments came from coups. Therefore, junta governments have ruled Thailand at regular intervals. When the uprising of students and people occurred in 1973, it was the first of a new history of social movements.

Before the 1973 movement, people could not express their frustrations towards the social, economic, and political problems they had faced. The junta, furthermore, had failed to solve the economic crisis which led to a lack of trust from Thais. As a result, university students began to criticize the government and called for a change to the constitution. Likhit (1992, p. 196) claimed that this strategy was applied because the government felt insecure about this issue, and that the students were supported by the Thai people and some of the elites. The major outcome of this movement was the overthrow of the junta government, and their powerful militant group, with them being replaced by a democratic regime and civic government.

In terms of movement framing, the student leaders applied the “true” democracy metaframe to frame issues and events. This metaframe represented the rights of the people and a constitution that provided them with the power to vote for their democratic rulers. The collaboration of students and people to fight for their beliefs originated at this time. Although there were social movements after this which called for democracy, this movement could be considered as the model for many of the later movements which all the nationalist metaframes and all social classes arranged in mobilization. More importantly, this is the first widespread middle class based uprising. The success of the 1973 student uprising has led to their tactics and framing being adopted in the demand for democracy of many movements in contemporary Thai politics, including those of the Yellow and Red Shirts. The two groups performed the unique movements to call for their political regimes resulted in the conflicts between classes, furthermore they applied movement tactics including framing which rooted from Thai nationalism to sustain

the movement. All of this movement will be explored through the research questions and methodology which provided in the follow sections.

## **2.2. Research questions and hypotheses**

From the above literature, the framing perspective and the Thai metaframes provide the framework to the study of Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups, the two opposite social movement groups in Thailand. Thus, to accomplish their movements the two groups apply the metaframes and mobilizing frames that reshaped from nationalism which results in the construction of identity that most appeal followers. Drawing on the previous mentioned literature and how framing is engaged in the social movements, consequently this study seeks to answer the following questions and hypotheses:

H1: In the earliest phases of social movements, as mobilizing frames are being developed, metaframes must be heavily employed.

RQ1: How did the social movement leaders in the early part of the movement employ the metaframes that were built on nationalism to create successful movements? And how did they construct the mobilizing frames?

H2: The most effective metaframes are those focused on identity.

RQ2: What specific metaframes are applied and how are they engaged with the mobilizing frames? In what ways do social movement leaders highlight the problem definition, casual attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation functions of mobilizing frames?

H3: As mobilizing frames develop, successful social movements will focus on certain metaframes and mobilizing frames that appeal to participants.

H4: Successful social movements groups will adjust the focus of frames to appeal participants.

RQ3: Do the frames reshape a collective identity? Do the different social movement groups exhibit different identities? Does the different identity result in conflicts?

H5: Over time, the focus on identity metaframes may reshape the identity of the participants.

H6: In such cases, when social movement groups compete over identity, the potential for conflict increases.

### **2.3. Methodology**

This study explores two cases of political movements in Thailand. The first case is that of the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul, the former leader of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the Yellow Shirts. The anti-coup groups which some of them being the initial movement groups of the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or the Red Shirts, will be examined as the second case. These two protest groups originated at different times, with different types of followers, and different goals. Despite these differences, they shared, or, indeed, borrowed from each other, some characteristics and strategies which make them exceptional and remarkable cases to be explored. The movement group of Sondhi Limthongkul was formed upon the audiences of "Muang Thai Rai Supda" the famous political show, on the one hand the anti-coup groups were a collection of people who assembled to protest the 19 September 2006 coup. The similar goals of the two groups focussed on overthrowing the governments in power so as to

establish their ideal government and political regime. They have been major rivals attempted to attack each other which resulted in deep divisions in Thai society. The purpose of this study is to examine the framing of the two movement groups before they well organized and are recognized as huge mobilizations that drew much attention from the public. The metaframes and mobilizing frames used for the initial movements of the two groups are central to this study.

## **The Cases**

### ***The case of Sondhi Limthongkul***

The first case investigated is the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul. He started framing issues and events to, apparently, attack Thaksin Shinawatra and associates through his political show, "Muang Thai Rai Supda", in 2005. This show became the origin of the Yellow Shirts, whereas Sondhi, the host of the show, changed his role from a journalist to the leader of the famous movement group. The show was terminated from Channel 9 when Sondhi began criticizing Thaksin through the show. The last episode was broadcasted on September 9, 2005. After the cancellation, Sondhi held the show, live, at Thammasat University.

The show had five episodes at Thammasat, later moved to Lumpini Park and continued for another twelve episodes before Sondhi led the demonstration on February 5, 2006.

The contents of the show focused on informing the audiences about current political situations under the administration of Thaksin Shinawatra. During the show at Thammasat University, Sondhi presented issues as a veteran journalist. In addition, condemnations on issues such as populist policies, corruptions, and so forth were made on the show.

When the numbers in the audience increased, the show was moved to Lumpini Park which hosted the last ten episodes (and 2 special rallies) before a major movement in February. In addition, frames that were produced during this time persuaded audiences to participate in movements that with the same issues. The pattern of the show at this time had been transformed in preparations for the future movements, thus some symbolic events and activities were performed. Sondhi also conducted some minor rallies around the park to exercise his “army”.

### ***The case of the anti-coup groups***

The Red Shirts origins as a movement began in 2006 as the anti-coup groups. They emerged as groups of activists, students, scholars, and Thaksin’s supporters against the 19 September 2006 coup. In the early part of the movement, the leaders of the groups came from various factions, although the members of the Thai Rak Thai Party had not yet joined the protests. They all had the same goals of demanding the restoration of democracy and the 1997 constitution; however the call for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra had not yet been obvious.

The protestors in the anti-coup groups were not massive in number because the protest began in Bangkok under strict martial law. They performed the protests in the central places of Bangkok to attract people and media attention. Issues and occurrences that were framed to attack their antagonists were condemnations of the undemocratic 2006 coup, corruption, and the lack of results of General Surayud Chulanont government. Also, General Prem Tinsulanonda and General Sonthi Boonyaratglin were the major targets of their attacks.

During this initial movement, Thaksin activated his movements to attack the junta and refute any accusations through international and local media and expressed his intention to return to Thailand. His subordinates in Thailand set up the PTV (People’s television) to broadcast political news which was banned from airing the programs. Subsequently, PTV started the protest to call for the freedom of

expression. This time the demand for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra was intensified by PTV and Thaksin's supporters. PTV became a frontrunner among the anti-coup groups in attacking the junta and General Prem Tinsulanonda. Later after this, some of the anti-coup groups were joined with the PTV and Thaksin's supporters to form the Red Shirts' movement.

### ***Data Sources***

#### ***The case of Sondhi Limthongkul***

The data sources of the two cases are different since the frame producers come from different backgrounds, thus the channels they applied to disseminate the frames were dissimilar. The first data source for Sondhi Limthongkul's movement is his political show "Muang Thai Rai Supda", of which, Sondhi had his media network, all of the episodes were recorded, transcribed, and uploaded onto the Manager website. This study will examine the frames of Sondhi that were produced in the initial stages of the movement. As the originator of the Yellow Shirts, he was the first to construct the movement frames which were applied through the movements of the group. Furthermore, his political talk show "Muang Thai Rai Supda" had been used as tool to disseminate the frames and the movements.

As previously mentioned, during the early movement of Sondhi Limthongkul and his audiences, he reshaped metaframes and mobilizing frames around the idea of Thai nationalism. Thus, to clearly see the developments and alterations of Sondhi's framings through the movements I have divided the timeline of study into two phases, as per the table below:

<b>The study timeline of Sondhi Limthongkul</b>	
<b>1. The first phase at Thammasat University:</b> 9 September 2005 - 23 October 2005	<b>6 episodes:</b> The last episode on Channel 9 and 5 episodes at Thammasat
<b>2. The second phase at Lumpini park:</b> 28 October 2005 - 5 February 2006	<b>12 episodes:</b> 9 episodes at Lumpini, 1 episode from Wat Pa Ban Tad, and 2 special rally live shows

Table1: The study timeline of Sondhi Limthongkul case

The timeline begins from the last show on Channel 9, which was broadcasted on September 9, 2005, up to the last live show when Sondhi leads the movement as the first and last single leader on February 5, 2006. It is the period before the formal establishment of the Yellow Shirts. The first phase starts from the last show on Channel 9 up to the time that he hosts the final live show at Thammasat University. At this time Sondhi had not intentionally transformed his role into a protest leader, thus he constructs the frames as a journalist. However, when he moved the show to Lumpini, his frames were apparently altered to promote the mass movement. He undertook some major symbolic activities to prepare the audiences for the future protests. Consequently, the frames that he created during this time were determined to stimulate the anger of audience toward Thaksin and his associates.

Another key data source includes a book, *Prakottakarn Sondhi: jak sueseeluang tueng papankor seefa* (Sondhi phenomenon: from a yellow shirt to a blue scarf), written by Khamnoon Sidhisamarn, a former senator, columnist, and right-hand man of Sondhi Limthongkul. This book describes the event after the “Muang Thai Rai Supda” was cancelled in 2005 up to the early movement of Yellow Shirts in 2006. In the book, the author provides an insider's view of the background, personal views, and movement ideas of Sondhi during his movements.

### ***The case of the anti-coup groups***

The primary data source for the anti-coup groups is the Thai-E news website. The reason is that this website contained news and information from the various anti-coup groups from the beginning of the protest in September 2006. This website collected information from other sources such as foreign news, web boards, Thai media outlets, and websites from the other anti-coup groups. The contents cover many topics from a variety of writers including famous scholars, politicians, professionals, and common people. Similar to Sondhi's movements, I have divided the timeline of the anti-coup groups into two phases of movements as per the following table:

<b>The study timeline of the anti-coup groups</b>	
<b>1. The first phase of the movement:</b> 20 September 2006 - 31 March 2007	The day after the coup was staged up to the last movement before the official launch of the PTV
<b>2. The second phase of the movement:</b> 1 April 2007 – 15 June 2007	Begins from the founding of PTV to the last movement before the formal establishment of the Red Shirts

Table 2: The study timeline of the of anti-coup groups case

The first phase of the study begins when the first protest was started a day after the coup was staged from 20 September 2006 to 31 March 2007. In this phase, we can see that their frames were constructed by general people, activists, some scholars, and students in order to oppose the coup and call for the restoration of democracy. On the one hand, the second phase covers the time from the launch of PTV, 1 April 2007, up to the period before the establishment of the Red Shirts in early June 2007.

In this phase the movements and framing were changed when the PTV group was established by some members of the Thai Rak Thai party. However, PTV was prevented from airing which resulted in protests by PTV. Akin to the movement of Sondhi, the intensification of the protest and framing had been changed before the formation of the Red Shirts group.

## ***Method of analysis***

### ***Mobilizing frames***

In this study, the definition of frame by Entman (as cited in Matthes and Kohring, 2008, p. 264) gives a clear picture of the elements in a frame thus: "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described". This framing concept of Entman will be used to analyze each of the mobilizing frames which separated into elements or functions. The reason to separately study each function of a frame is mentioned by Van Gorp (as cited in Matthes and Kohring, 2008, p. 263) that "a frame is a quite abstract variable that is both hard to identify and hard to code in content analysis". Accordingly, identifying the single elements of a frame could "measure a frame in a valid and reliable way" (Matthes and Kohring 2008, p. 263). Matthes and Kohring (2008, p. 263) recommend analyzing a frame by separating it into elements to reveal the pattern of their frames and framing. According to the definition of Entman, a frame consists of the four elements of problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation. In this research I have defined these elements to analyze the mobilizing frames of Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups, as explained in the below sections.

***Problem definition:*** in this study this element or function identifies the definite problem associated with an issue or event that caused the perceived damage. In addition, the culprits, or the agents who caused the problem, will be identified as the target of attack. The identified target may be only one person, or several, however the major culprit must be pinpointed. Thus, any data that indicates the problem and the culprit will be considered.

***Causal attribution:*** this element indicates the cause of the mentioned problem. It (Matthes and Kohring 2008) could be the failure or success of a specific outcome. In the context of this study, the cause is framed by the frame producer to connect the reason to the problem.

***Moral evaluation:*** according to Matthes and Kohring's work (2008), this element can be a positive, negative, or neutral evaluation and can refer to different targets. In this research, moral judgements are applied by the frame producers to brand or label the agents regarding their practices. Their opponents are framed as immoral, while the frame producers can label their own groups as the moral ones.

***Treatment recommendation:*** this last function proposes the solution, or remedy, for the problem. Solutions that are asserted by frame producers could be suggestions to solve the problems or calls for action against their opponents.

An important facet of the framing concept of Entman is that an issue or event can be constructed to be relevant to one or more frames. It is also possible that researchers may not discover all of the four elements in a frame. The frame producers may have considered only utilising those elements which were the most powerful in terms of their mobilizations. Furthermore, some of the movement leaders covered in this study is not activists or skilled social movement leaders, accordingly there are some "imperfect" frames studied in this research.

## ***Metaframes***

Because of the substantial amount of data involved, the four Thai metaframes will be used to examine the information relating to both cases and deduce which of it should be concentrated on in this study. As mentioned before, the Thai metaframes concept consists of four nationalist elements: the king, the nation, religion, and democracy/modernization. Thus the metaframes which were employed by Sondhi Limthongkul, on the one hand, and the leaders of the anti-coup groups, on the other, will be grouped and analyzed using the Thai metaframes concept as explained below:

***The king metaframe:*** data that implies the monarchy, particularly King Bhumibol Adulyadej, issues such as the intention to protect and honor the royal supremacy, or actions that were framed as violations of the King's power fall into this king metaframe.

***The nation metaframe:*** data involved with the security, stability, and prosperity of the country such as the economy, corruption, and unrest events will be considered as engaging with this metaframe.

***The religion metaframe:*** data which is involved with Buddhism or any other religions. This could be monks, novices, laypeople, Buddhist principles and/or rituals.

***The democracy/modernization metaframe:*** data engaged with democratic ideas such as elections, the constitution, democratic regimes, freedom of expression, and human rights. Furthermore, any undemocratic practices are categorized in this metaframe such as the coup and the junta. In terms of modernization, it involves projects and ideas for aiming at modernize and develop the country.

## 2.4. Structure of the thesis

In chapter 1, the reasons for the movements of Sondhi Limhongkul and the conflicts that caused the divisions between Sondhi and Thaksin are described, including the characteristics of the followers of the group. Also, the origin of the anti-coup groups and their followers are explained to emphasize the contrasting outlooks of the two groups. The deep conflicts between the Yellow and the Red Shirts are highlighted to draw questions on how the leaders of the movements constructed their messages to create strained loathing between them. At the end of this chapter, the questions about the movements in the early periods that lead to the objectives of this dissertation are provided.

The concepts of social movement, framings, and Thai metaframes have been described in this chapter 2. The history of Thai metaframes, or nationalism, started in the early period of the Ratanakosin Kingdom of King Mongkut (Rama V). This proto nationalism started with the three symbols of nation, religion (Buddhism), and king in order to protect Siam from colonialism and internal threats. Nationalism was officially promoted in the reign of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) by entwining these nationalist symbols into his plays, speeches, writings, and so forth. After the revolution in 1932 the democracy idea emerged, this nationalist ideology had been sometimes applied by the rulers to challenge the supremacy of the monarchy and king nationalist symbols. The historical periods of nationalism application as the metaframe to perform mobilizations is ended at the student movements of 1973, while in the following sections of this chapter hypotheses, methodology, and thesis structure are detailed.

In chapter 3, the empirical results of Sondhi Limthongkul's frames are explored. The chapter has four parts. The first part starts with the backdrop of Sondhi Limthongkul and the conflicts with Thaksin Shinawatra. The next two parts are the

results of mobilizing frames and metaframes that Sondhi constructed during his early movement period. The last section is the conclusion of the chapter.

Correspondingly, the frames of the anti-coup groups in the chapter 4 are examined. This chapter begins by providing the origin of the protests, which is the 19 September 2006. In the next sections, the analyses of metaframes and mobilizing frames of the anti-coup groups are investigated, while the conclusion of the chapter is provided at the end.

The final chapter integrates and discusses the findings from the previous chapters. In addition the answers to the research questions and the hypotheses are presented in this chapter. Finally, the limitations of the research and suggestions for future research are provided.

## Chapter 3

### Framing and the identity of Sondhi Limthongkul

In the previous chapter, I provided the definitions of nationalism and Thai metaframes as a theoretical framework of this study. Thai nationalism consists of nation, king, religion, and additional, intermittent democracy symbols which have been applied as the influential metaframes in political mobilizations. This is also adopted into the movements of Sondhi Limthongkul against Thaksin Shinawatra. The political movement of Sondhi Limthongkul, the former leader of the People's Alliance for Democracy or the Yellow Shirts, has been outstanding in adopting the robust nationalist sentiments into its political messages. Besides, his long experience as a journalist results in his potency to construct the persuasive mobilizing frames which attracts large numbers of participants.

In this chapter, I focus on the framing of Sondhi Limthongkul as a journalist in the early era of his movement. As a frame producer, Sondhi constructs the notable metaframes and mobilizing frames based on nationalism to mobilize the potential constituents and attack adversaries simultaneously. In terms of the movement, Sondhi Limthongkul is widely recognized as the most significant figure of the Yellow shirts' five leaders. Before turning his role from a media tycoon into the Yellow Shirts' leader, Sondhi hosted his political television show "Muang Thai Raisupda" on Channel 9. In 2005, he started to criticize the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates on major contentious issues such as defective administration, populism, corruption, and the disloyalty to King Bhumibol.

The turning point occurred when Sondhi's popular political television program was unexpectedly cancelled in September 2005. Due to this, he took the show on the road and began to abundantly attack Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates with plenty of "classified information". In relation to this, I believe that the primary

metaframes and mobilizing frames of the Yellow Shirts were originated by Sondhi Limthongkul during his initial movement. The frames were subsequently adopted by the People's Alliance for Democracy or the Yellow Shirts when it was fully formed in February 2006.

My aim in this chapter is to examine the metaframes and mobilizing frames applied by Sondhi Limthongkul. This was apparent that these frames originated from the time he hosted "Muang Thai Raisupda" or "Thailand Weekly" that on Channel 9. To clearly see the developments and alterations of frames, I have separated the timeline of study into two phases. The first phase starts when Channel 9 cancelled his political talk show led him to hold the mobile live show at the Auditorium Hall of Thammasat University in September 2005. In this preliminary era Sondhi Limthongkul framed messages as a journalist, thus the precise messages aimed at political mobilization had not obviously emerged. The second phase of study begins when the show was moved to a larger place, the Lumpini Park, due to the increased size of audience. At this time, Sondhi had changed his role from a journalist to the leader of the anti-Thaksin crusade. His frames had been transformed to provoke the anti-Thaksin movement and prepare for the next intensive movement as the Yellow Shirts.

In this study, I opt to explore the mobilizing frames and its four functions. By doing this, elements of problem definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation of each mobilizing frames are analyzed to reveal the framing process of Sondhi Limthongkul. As well, the four metaframes will be investigated in this chapter.

As these frames were employed to attack Thaksin Shinawatra, the background of Sondhi, in terms of business and his relationship with Thaksin Shinawatra, must be provided here to understand the causes and conflicts that led to the lengthy battle between them.

## **Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra in the old days**

Since 2006, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or the Yellow Shirts has been recognized as one of the major political groups conducting the remarkable movements against Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates. Their movements primarily focused on overthrowing the Thaksin regime and the so-called Prime Minister Nominees of Thaksin. Sondhi Limthongkul is generally known as one of the key leaders of the Yellow Shirts. In fact, it is likely that he has been the most significant leader of this political group which sometimes was powerful in stirring up some governments.

Nonetheless, before the media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul transformed himself into a political movement leader, he was a veteran journalist and multi-millionaire businessman, owning many media and non-media promising businesses. In terms of media business, apart from owning a publishing house under the Manager Group, he owned Asia Inc., a Hong Kong-based regional business magazine, Buzz magazine, and Asia Times a Bangkok-based regional newspaper. Accordingly, he was called "the Asian Rupert Murdoch" by the international press which would perfectly describe his fortune at the time. Sondhi (*Speedy demise for Sondhi's empire*, 2002) talked about his success during Thailand's dramatic economic boom that "I am just a journalist who got lucky". Similar to Thaksin Shinawatra, Sondhi (*'the good old days'*, 2005) moved into the telecom businesses which were criticized as following in Thaksin's footsteps.

The particular causes of conflicts between Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra were hard to define. It is said that they had "a long love-hate relationship". In a news article (*'The Truth about Thaksin, Sondhi'*, 2005), it was revealed that "they were former business partners in telecoms firm International Engineering Company (IEC) and shared everything". A deep rift led to a deadly rivalry in the telecommunications sector which began when Thaksin moved away to start out on his own. Sondhi claimed that before he offered shares in his telecom

company, IEC, to the public in 1992, he allocated Thaksin a 17.5 per cent stake which Thaksin bought at only Bt10 (US\$ 0.30) per share. When the IEC's share price rose up to Bt250 (US\$ 7.5) each Thaksin sold his shares receiving a huge profit of around Bt600 -700 million (US\$ 20,800,000). Thus, Sondhi thought that he owed nothing to Thaksin Shinawatra when Thaksin became Prime Minister and supported some of Sondhi's businesses.

Riding on Thailand's economic boom to become "a lucky journalist", it is ironic that Sondhi's triumph in business faced a downfall due to the Asian economic crisis in 1997. His Manager Media Group (*'New party, old friends aid Sondhi'*, 2002) fell into debt of around Bt 4.7 billion (US\$ 158,000,000), which led him to personally declare bankruptcy on March 17, 2000 under the amended Bankruptcy Act. During the economic crash period of 1997-2000, the government at the time was led by the Democrat party. Sondhi (*The Truth about Thaksin, Sondhi*, 2005) believed that the Democrat government had a policy which allowed foreigners to destroy Thai-owned businesses, including his business. Therefore, it is possible that Sondhi might have blamed this government of being a partial cause of his business losses. As a result, the Democrat government was criticized hard on their economic crisis management by Manager Group's media. Thus, when Thaksin Shinawatra was voted as the premier, he ("The Good Old Days," 2005) was enthusiastically supported by Sondhi and his media networks.

In terms of Thaksin Shinawatra's political life, he was a businessman and the former leader of the Palang Dharma Party. He established his party the Thai Rak Thai party in 1998 with the slogan "think new, act new". Under an image of a smart and successful businessman, not surprisingly, he won the election and became the Prime Minister of Thailand in 2001. Thaksin Shinawatra was the first police officer to become the prime minister of Thailand. McCargo (2005, p.8) portrayed Thaksin's background to entering a political career thus:

Thaksin himself acknowledged that he never envisaged a lifelong career in the police. He saw it as a stepping stone to greater things. In order to advance

himself further, he needed to move beyond bureaucratic connections and gain clout with politicians...Thaksin decided to enter politics in his own right. In view of his considerable wealth, he was courted by various political parties in the early 1990s, including the Democrat party, New Aspiration and Palang Dharma.

Most of his voters (BBC, 2011) were poor people who were fascinated by his policies on “cheap medical care and debt relief”. According to McCargo (2005, p.5), Thaksin promised to run Thailand with his business principles by thinking and acting in fast, decisive, and effective ways (in other words it was a CEO or Chief Executive Officer style). His fast and innovative policy attracted people who were disappointed with the legalistic style of Chuan Leekpai, the former prime minister.

When Thaksin became Prime Minister, during "the good old days" of Thaksin Shinawatra and Sondhi Limthongkul, their alliance was proved by the promotion of Sondhi's colleagues to major positions. For instance, Pansak Viyaratn was promoted as the chief of Thaksin's policy adviser team, Kanok Abhiradee a former head of Sondhi's companies became the President of Thai Airways International. Chai-anan Samudvanija, furthermore, received prominent positions at the Thai Airways International and the Krung Thai Bank, while Somkid Jatusripitak the co-founder of Manager served as the Commerce Minister and, at one time, had been the potential successor of Thaksin. In addition, Viroj Nualkhair had a major role as the president of state-owned Krung Thai Bank which later provided an immense financial assistance to Sondhi Limthongkul. Consequently, Sondhi's debt (*'the good old days'*, 2005), owed to Krung Thai Bank, was reduced from Bt 1.8 billion (US\$ 53,500,000) to just Bt 200 million (US\$ 5,900,000). This (*The Truth about Thaksin, Sondhi*, 2005) provided an opportunity for Sondhi to re-emerge his media empire. He set up Thai Day Dot Com Company to run the Manager Website, English language newspaper, and television and radio programs.

More importantly, Sondhi was given a chance to have a TV political show, “Muang Thai Raiwan or Thailand Daily” on the state-owned Channel 11. The Government Public Relations Department or PRD at that time decided to broadcast eight

different sub-channels under the Channel 11 license, which permitted private companies to operate. They were able to air advertisements similar to the free TV channels. The PRD (*'Channel 11 to hold off on six more sub-channels'*, 2004) made a contract with two companies one of which was Thai Day Dot Com of Sondhi Limthongkul. He invested in two channels, 11/1 and 11/2, which were new satellite TV channels that had split from Channel 11. Sondhi also had permission to run 97.5 FM radio. (These media were turned into a tool against Thaksin Shinawatra later.)

In response, Sondhi applied his media to support Thaksin's government. The relationship between Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra (*'Old views haunt govt critic'*, 2005) could be seen from a quotation from a chapter of Sondhi's book which says that: "PM Thaksin is no saint, please do not be mistaken, but he is the best prime minister our country has ever had". The Manager Media group (Rojanaphruk, 2005) acted as "a cheerleader for the Thaksin government, especially a back-page column written by a few senior editors, mostly Khamnoon Sithisamarn, under the pen name Siang Sao Long". Thaksin himself once said Sondhi and he were former friends. However, later, when Sondhi started ousting Thaksin he denied that he personally knew the premier. Sondhi (Yoon, 2005) said:

It's a misunderstanding to say that I was a close friend of Thaksin. We were only acquaintances. We never went anywhere together. We never even travelled by the same car going places together. The premier used to invite me to Baan Phitsanulok (a governmental guest house) for lunch to seek my views on state affairs. We were never, contrary to what some people believe, and very closely associated. We are only erstwhile friends."

To confirm this point, Sondhi clarified through his mobile live show at Thammasat University that they only had a meeting at Sondhi's house in 2000. Thaksin, on that day, told Sondhi that he was already wealthy; therefore the intention to be corrupt was not in his mind. Thaksin, according to Sondhi, insisted that he had a good determination to serve this country. Thaksin expected Sondhi's assistance to become the prime minister and Sondhi himself (*'Muang Thai Sunjorn 5'*, 2005) agreed, absolutely, to support him.

## **“Muang Thai Rai Supda” and the beginning of the news war**

An early source of friction between Sondhi and Thaksin came when MR Pridiyathorn Devakula, the Bank of Thailand governor, attempted to dismiss Viroj Nualkhair from the presidency of Krung Thai Bank due to the reclassification of loans. The story (*Krung Thai bank: Dept heads blamed for dud loans*, 2004) began when KTB permitted controversial loans for more than Bt 40 billion (US\$ 1,188,000,000) to 14 corporate borrowers. Viroj intended, in particular, to forgive the other debts of Sondhi. As a result, Pridiyathorn signalled Viroj to withdraw from remaining in the Krung Thai Bank presidency for a second term. The reason was given that the central bank (*ktb presidency*, 2004) received only one report from KTB, while there were other projects from reclassified loans remaining. This evidently showed the lack of Viroj’s capability to occupy the position. To protect his colleague, Sondhi applied his media to defend Viroj from the accusations. The conflict started when Thaksin Shinawatra could not protect Viroj from losing his position; perhaps Thaksin avoided intervention in the conflict between Pridiyathorn and Viroj.

To make thing worse, Sondhi’s TV program “Muang Thai Rai Wan” or “Thailand Daily” was limited broadcasting time from every day to only every Friday. Title of the program (Matichon: 2008, p.82) was changed to “Muang Thai Rai Subda” or “Thailand Weekly”. Moreover, his 11 news 1 TV channel was shut down because the Mass Communications Organization of Thailand (MCOT) asked the United Broadcasting Corporation Plc (UBC) to stop broadcasting the channel. Tongthong Chandrangsu, the director of MCOT (Amnatcharoenrit and Intarakomalyasut, 2004) gave the reason that “UBC failed to inform MCOT regarding the introduction of new programming, an omission that had put the pay TV company in violation of its contract”. Therefore, he changed the channel name from “11 news 1” into “ASTV”

(Asia Satellite Television). All of this led Sondhi to a huge loss of income which ultimately, became the breakup point between Sondhi and Thaksin.

The famous “Muang Thai Rai Subda” political talk show started broadcasting on Friday 9 July 2003 and gained widely popularity. Khamnoon Sidhisamarn (2006, p.35), a senator, columnist, and Sondhi’s colleague, explained that, as the host of the show, Sondhi had a unique sense of journalism. From Khamnoon’s view, Sondhi (2006, p.54) criticized and analyzed news with his accumulated knowledge and experience by using simple language with a sense of humour. However, since 2004 Sondhi began to criticize Thaksin hard on several controversial issues through his “Muang Thai rai supda” TV show and the Manager Newspaper.

Issues which Sondhi focused on mainly involved major controversial incidents such as several mega corrupt projects of Thaksin’s government and the appointment of a caretaker of Somdet Pra Sangkarat or the Buddhist Supreme Patriarch in July 2004. Thaksin and his subordinates claimed that the former His Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat was not in good enough health to perform his duties. As a result, an acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat was appointed, with which Sondhi completely disagreed. Apart from Buddhist matters, Sondhi (Khamnoon 2006, p.55) also indicated Thaksin’s objective to expand his political power over the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand. He believed that Thaksin had attempted to employ his henchman in the position of the secretary of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand. In his view, some Muslims requested to remove the Chularatchamontri or the chief of the Muslims from his position. Sondhi also claimed that Thaksin had an idea to establish the Thai Muslim Party as a new political party. In Sondhi’s view, this could lead to an extensive rift among Muslims in Thailand. According to Sondhi’s view, Thaksin might plan to replace the existing spiritual leaders of Buddhists and Muslims with his appointees.

Another disgraceful practice of Thaksin and his subordinates was the dismissal of the Auditor-General Khunying Jaruwan Mentaka. The reason given by Sondhi was that Jaruwan had an obligation to inspect the government’s corruptions. Thus, to

cover their guilt, she had to be removed from her position. Nonetheless, the significance of Khunying Jaruvan Mentaka case was not only relevant to the corruption of Thaksin, but also related to the Royal Supremacy of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the present King of Thailand. Sondhi pointed out that there were some major positions in this country which only the King had authorization to appoint and discharge. Regarding this, the position of Khunying Jaruvan Mentaka as the Auditor-General (Khamnoon 2006, p.55) was considered as being under the King's prerogative. Sondhi accused Thaksin of having an intention to abandon the Royal Supremacy of King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The intensification of Sondhi Limthongkul in criticizing Thaksin Shinawatra was increased and expanded into other parties. On 6 September 2005, after critiquing Thaksin's practices for a period of time, Sondhi, with some technocrats and politicians, held a panel discussion about the prerogative of the King at Thammasat University, which he read the controversial article "the lost sheep" to the public for the first time. Apparently, the monarchy rhetoric was raised to attack Thaksin Shinawatra at that time.

"The lost sheep" story (Khamnoon 2006, p. 56) was originally posted on the Manager Website web board which appeared ninth in the rank of all opinions. Interestingly, Sondhi claimed that this anonymous author used the pseudonym "555" and chose to post this story on September 5, 2005. It seemed too coincidental that all numbers were associated with King Bhumibol, for example, number 5 is his birthdate, while he is the 9<sup>th</sup> King of Thailand. Sondhi brought this story to the public. The article, in essence, was a story of a sheep father and his oldest son. Even though it was not obviously pointed out to be the King and Thaksin, this story could be implying that the father is the current king, King Bhumibol, while the oldest son, or the lost sheep could refer to Thaksin Shinawatra.

The writer told of a father who always provided love and good wishes to his children. He taught them to live a life with no greed according to his principles. However, there was a stubborn and arrogant oldest child who pretended to be decent by wearing "sheep's skin". He attempted to contest the accomplishment of

his father by following the revered father's successful path. Ultimately, he established himself to be the head of the other children. He turned some of them into greedy sheep by showering them with money. Since the oldest son had been supported from the others, he became a tyrant resenting criticism and opposing the father's teachings. To make matters worse, he determined to control the power of the father by forcing him to be under the rules of the house which were, in fact, his rules. Ultimately, the oldest son had become the lost sheep because of his greed for power. In the conclusion, the writer reminded the other children that they were all the children of the father. The author might have wanted to tell the children that they should not follow the demand of the oldest son or Thaksin, but the King.

As aforementioned, the most severe accusation toward Thaksin Shinawatra was the abandonment of the King's royal supremacy. Accordingly, Sondhi chose to read this story, through the show and at a conference, to state his belief to the public, since this story could evidently be portraying Thaksin's actions at that time. According to the lost sheep story, the writer seemed to believe that Thaksin was determined to challenge the King's position of leader of the country. In order to achieve this he tempted the other children, who were his associates and voters, to support him with money, power, and populist policies.

In the views of Sondhi and Thaksin's antagonists, the populism of Thaksin had a very destructive outcome for Thailand. Sondhi gave examples of the government persuading grassroots supporters to borrow village funds; however the grassroots spent the money on luxury goods such as expensive mobile phones, motorcycles, and cars which were sold by Thaksin's companies and his colleagues. Most of the borrowers did not spend the loan on worthwhile things, as a result there was a significant increase in household debts and consumerism among the poor. Sondhi believed that the principles of populism of Thaksin Shinawatra were absolutely opposite to the "sufficiency economy" philosophy of King Bhumibol. From this, Sondhi deemed that Thaksin, who had gained much popularity from the grassroots, might think that he could be the most powerful figure in this country. Kasian (2006,

34), interestingly, described the image of Thaksin, in the eyes of the middle class and some elites during that time, thus:

Thaksin's image as a selfless honest patriot was utterly shattered, they came to see him in a new light as just a greedy little cheat who, as rich as he is, still wants to take the lion's share of the spoils by abusing his privileged status, leaving only crumbs for non-cronies 'like us'. The Prime Minister's typically brash, intolerant and outright rude retorts to any unfavorable comments alienated them further. The tax-free sale of his family's public holdings to the Singapore government's investment arm for a huge profit, along with control of vital national assets such as mobile phone, satellite, TV station and civil aviation concessions and licenses, was simply the last straw."

Things came to an end on Friday 9 September 2005, when Sondhi (Khamnoon, 2006, p. 59) read the lost sheep story again on the "Muang Thai Raisupda" program. This, later, caused wide condemnation of Thaksin from his opponents. Six days later, "Muang Thai Raisupda" faced sudden cancellation by Channel 9. Rewat Chamchalerm the chairman of MCOT which operated Channel 9 (*Ch 9 drops Sondhi for royal references*, 2005) gave the reason that Sondhi was "improperly citing His Majesty the King and the monarchy on several occasions". In reply, Sondhi stated that MCOT and some media outlets in Thailand were acting as "the tools of the government" without considering their commitment to serving the public. In Khamnoon's view (2006, p.61), this prejudiced cancellation subsequently became the start of Sondhi Limthongkul provoking the movement to protect the King's royal prerogative.

At last, Sondhi decided to continue the show by taking his "Muang Thai Raisupda" or "Thailand Weekly" on the road on Friday 23 September, 2005. He (*Libel action: Thaksin takes aim at Sondhi*, 2005) held the live programs at Thammasat University's auditorium hall which attracted audiences of thousands "with hard-hitting attacks on Thaksin and his government". When the numbers in the audiences increased, Sondhi (Khamnoon, 2006, p.108) moved to Lumpini Park which drew more people to attend. When they moved to Lumpini Park, on November 11, the format of the program became a combination of live show, political discussion and

demonstration. Interestingly, it had been developed into a mass movement by one thousand participants afterwards.

### **“In the first phase at Thammasat University”**

This section provides the analysis of frames of Sondhi Limthongkul when he began his first movement phase. He started the mobile political live show “Muang Thai Raisupda Sanjorn” or “Mobile Thailand Weekly” at Thammasat University on Friday 23 September 2005. The show was performed every Friday until the fifth episode and was moved to Lumpini Park afterwards. During the first phase, he constructed seven mobilizing frames which were rooted on the four metaframes. In this section each metaframe will be examined its four functions and finished by the engaged metaframes being applied.

#### **1. The corruption mobilizing frame**

This mobilizing frame was the beginning frame which Sondhi Limthongkul constructed to attack Thaksin and the government. It had been framed since he broadcasted his political show on Channel 9 and sustained through his first movement phase at Thammasat. This frame was one of the major mobilizing frames which were powerful in terms of attacking rivals and attracting audiences. The reason Sondhi focused on this frame was the sudden cancellation of his political show “Muang Thai Raisupda”. After the decision to continue the show through rallies at Thammasat, this frame produced messages to attack Thaksin and his colleagues and portray them as evil politicians.

### **The problem definition function**

The first important function of a frame is problem definition. The social movement actors would specify the problem and the culprit so as to point out to the participants the urgency and seriousness of the problem that needed to be worked out. By this, Sondhi Limthongkul defined the **problem** of this mobilizing frame as “*the mega corruptions of Thaksin Shinawatra and associates*”. The **culprits** of the problem were “*Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates*”. To strengthen his accusation, Sondhi raised many examples of Thaksin’s corruption through the show of which I select the two major cases to present here. These two cases were significant in prompting the detestation of the anti-Thaksin people toward him, and encouraged the audiences to take part in the movement.

The first example to support the accusation was focused on the mega corruption of Suvarnabhumi airport construction. It was a complicated issue with many parties involved. The airport (Osathanont 2007) was plagued by many corruption accusations all through its planning and construction such as the case of the limousine concession, the baggage trolleys, the commercial development project, the duty-free shops, and the cooling system. Thaksin, according to Thanong Khanthong (as cited in ‘*Cracks, leaks, corruption: Thailand’s new international airport off to a rocky start*’ 2007), a senior editor of The Nation newspaper, “wanted the new airport to become a hallmark of his government’s success,” thus: “he rushed the airport through despite warnings that it wasn’t ready for business”. After the opening of the airport, there was a report from Somchai Sawasdeepon the airport’s general manager that more than 100 cracks were detected in taxiways. Regarding to Karen Percy’s report (Percy 2007), Thaksin and his associates were alleged that they favored for many building contracts. As a result, there were several problems of broken toilets, leaking pipes, and cracked tiles.

On the show, Sondhi explained about the background and the epic story of the mega-corruption of Suvarnabhumi airport to the public. In Sondhi’s view, the severe

corruptions seemed far more critical in the era of the former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, particularly Suriya Jungrungreangkit, the former transport minister, was accused frequently on the show about his corruption. For Sondhi, the corruption case of Suvarnabhumi airport was framed as the most outrageous corruption case in Thai history. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) said:

In terms of the Suvarnabhumi airport construction, it can be recognized as the mega-corruption in Thai history. Suvarnabhumi airport is in the top ten of the world best and biggest airport rankings; on the other hand it is labelled as the most shameful airport.

Sondhi explained on the show about the corruption, that to get the jobs the architects must offer bribes to Thaksin's associates. According to Sondhi, this was the corrupt corporate culture in which bribes and dishonest contracts became the norm. Thus, the under table money, around 30 percent of the budget, must be paid to the head of the projects, such as politicians and state officials. As a result, the quality of the construction was reduced since the budgets were given as bribes. Once, Tortrakul Yomnak (as cited in Percy 2007) from the Architects' Association of Thailand revealed, about the quality of Suvarnabhumi airport, that "even though we spent a lot of money on the building of a supposedly the first class, five star airport we have now got three star airport".

The next example of Thaksin Shinawatra's corruption was the state-owned enterprise privatization schemes. The plan of privatization in Thailand (*'Thailand' troubled of EGAT*, 2007) started in 1961, and in September 1998 the government mandated the "Master plan for State Enterprise Sector Reform" to gain economic buoyancy resulting from the Asian financial crisis in 1990s. Thus, around 40 of SOEs had been privatized fully or partially by the government. Thaksin Shinawatra aimed to increase economic efficiency by privatizing the key state-owned enterprises. He (*'Thaksin Pushes Ahead with Privatization of State Firms despite Slump in Markets'*, 2001) claimed that the listed state enterprises could raise 700 billion baht of the stock market's capitalization which would attract the foreign investors. Sondhi

viewed this plan as unproductive by giving examples of failed privatized companies to his audience. For instance, MCOT (MCOT Public Company Limited) which was the earliest privatized company operating in the television and radio businesses. Sondhi's condemnation was that there were no noteworthy changes after the privatization. The administrative board members (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) were still the same group who worked with the same old style but earning higher salaries. However, the privatization of the PTT (PTT Public Company Limited), which conducted energy and petrochemical business, was often criticized hard as another awful example. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4'*, 2005) said:

After the PTT privatization, they appointed their colleagues to occupy administrative positions at the Department of energy. This organization has authority to administrate the PTT directly, thus the oil price in this country is set by these people. They are also the shareholders of PTT. Every time the oil price is increased, they gain a huge profit, as shareholders. The sad thing is people get no benefits from the PTT privatization. Besides, we have to spend more money to buy the overpriced oil which is in contrast to what they promised us before the privatization. We are getting poorer because of this scheme.

For Sondhi, this privatization plan was beneficial to only a handful of people, especially some politicians and their associates, while the general public suffered from the on-going increased oil price. The result of this scheme was absolutely different from the promise given by Thaksin that the privatization would provide a chance for Thai people to get cheap oil, in fact people had to pay a higher price for oil. Besides, Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4'*, 2005) believed that the government proposed Singaporean candidates to be the shareholders of those privatized state-owned enterprises. Moreover, some politicians in the government deposited their money into Singaporean banks to avoid inspection of the sources of the money. In turn, the government allowed Singapore to conduct various businesses in Thailand, especially in the banking sector. As a result, almost all the financial system of Thailand has been under the control of Singapore owing to the betrayal of the nation by Thaksin Shinawatra and his cronies.

### **The causal attribution function**

In this function, Sondhi Limthongkul stated the **cause** of the frame that *Thaksin and associates had done the corruptions for their personal benefit*. Here, Sondhi alleged the government collaborated with Singapore to trade on Thailand's assets. In the view of Sondhi, Singapore overpowered the financial system of Thailand, he (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) said:

Most of the foreign investors in Thailand are now from Singapore. They are supported by this government. The reason is some politicians in this government are the clients of Singapore banks. Those banks are regulated under Singapore banking law to prohibit disclosing the name of the clients. It is the purpose of this government to do advantageous things for Singapore....We may not realize that, at the present time, our financial system is under the control of Singapore, a small country with three million population. Worse, we have mischievous politicians who act as traitors. They rely on these foreign investors to trade our country through the state-owned enterprise privatization scheme.

It can be seen that during his live show at Thammasat University, Sondhi concentrated on attacking the state-owned enterprise privatization scheme which, with regards to his claim, were conducted under ambiguity. This was a crucial example for Sondhi to represent Thaksin and his associates in ways of corruption. According to Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005), this government determined to privatize some major state-owned enterprises which would result in them getting a large sum of money. Thus, every energy section, such as PTT and EGAT, (Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand) would be considered to be privatized first. Another cause of this corruption mobilizing frame (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) was revealed thus:

The state-owned privatization scheme has been done to increase GDP rates. This results in added value of the share market which leads to increased price of stocks. We have to know that most of shareholders are what we call 'nominees' from abroad, particularly from Singapore. That country is a very famous destination for Thai politicians to deposit money so as to shelter their names and bank accounts from corruption investigations. This is the major

reason for this government to enthusiastically placate the Singapore government.

The reason of privatization was interestingly connected with Singapore which could explain the situation of Thai financial and where Thai politicians “keep” their secret money.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In terms of **moral evaluation**, *a greedy mind* was stated by Sondhi as the motivation behind the corruption of Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues. Furthermore, they were branded as *plunderers* who allowed Singaporean investors to take control of Thai privatized state-owned enterprises. From an episode of his political talk show at Thammasat University, Sondhi (*‘Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4’*, 2005) gave a definition of a new type of crooked politicians in Thaksin’s government thus:

I think this government is very poor. If they are rich enough, they must stop being corrupt. It is interesting that these politicians graduate from overseas universities, thus they are supposed to apply their knowledge to develop this country. On the other hand, they disguise themselves under brand name clothes, drinking expensive wine, and silently robbing us by getting 10 percent of commission fees from every governmental project.

In relation to the corruptions of Thaksin Shinawatra, Sondhi (*‘Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4’*, 2005) pointed out his usage of political authority as prime minister to benefit his personal interests:

Mr. Thaksin, you cannot deny that you have become wealthy by politicization. After which, you have been voted to be the ruler of this country. Thus, you must abandon your businesses including any personal benefits. Conversely, your son has had business contracts with your government. You are in the position of the prime minister; you have to cut off yourself from all personal benefits. It appears that you are unable to do so. You can’t verify to the public that your position is not advantageous to your businesses. Besides, you have an absolute authority to issue any laws that are useful to your businesses and to eliminate your business competitors as well. Hence, when you are criticized by the public on the involvement of your

political power in your personal interests, you can't entirely defend these accusations.

Sondhi pointed out how Thaksin helped his family in its involvement in corruption. It was interesting at that time that Thaksin had the image of a family man which was "new" and unusual in Thailand. Generally, Thai male politicians were widely known for their "unfaithful husband" practices. Thaksin, in contrast, portrayed himself through media as a caring father and husband. When Sondhi branded him a greedy politician who had done anything necessary to support his family's corruption, it was a surprise to many.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

This process is about suggesting the solution to the problem and predicting its possible effects. In this function, the solution provided by Sondhi Limthongkul, at this time, was not performing the protest, instead he remained in his role as a journalist. However, the solution for solving the corruption of Thaksin was not asserted, he just suggested a solution to the staff of EGAT who were opposed to the pending privatization, since EGAT was the next target of this government. A majority of the EGAT workers had unwaveringly withstood the privatization. Thus, they became key supporters of Sondhi Limthongkul and, afterwards, became a major faction that participated in the movement of Yellow Shirts. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) encouraged the resistance of the EGAT workers on the privatization scheme. He offered them, and the public, to *hold a referendum* and thus heartened the workers of EGAT to fight the wicked plan. Another solution was *putting pressure on the EGAT administrators to stop the plan*.

### **The metaframes**

According to this corruption mobilizing frame, we can see that it was related to the nation, modernization, and democracy metaframes. In terms of the nation metaframe, Sondhi repeatedly described the performance of Thaksin and his

colleagues as the plunderers who sold the nation by corruption. The state-owned enterprise privatization scheme and Suvarnabhumi airport construction were raised as examples of the accusation.

Furthermore, the accusations of Sondhi about the privatization scheme and the connection with Singapore were constructed under the modernization metaframe. Thaksin's ideas to develop the Thai economy by privatization and foreign trading, in Sondhi's view, seemed too modern and unsuitable for Thailand. Interestingly, it was framed as the negative side of modernization.

In terms of the next metaframe, Thaksin government had not allowed the public to participate in the previous privatization process. The Thai people, consequently, were not able to examine the process or the performances of these organizations because they were not transparent. Therefore, to protect the other state-owned enterprises, a referendum must be conducted before this government starts any action. The democracy metaframe was applied this time when Sondhi proposed a solution to hold a referendum before the privatization of EGAT, which was the democratic solution. Interestingly, Thaksin was portrayed as an undemocratic prime minister who was never concerned about public opinion toward his projects.

The corruption mobilizing frame was a significant frame that proved powerful to motivate people to have faith in Sondhi's movements. It was an early frame being produced by Sondhi, which was useful for general people and his audience who were not really concerned on the monarchy and religion matters. This frame could draw attention for those people who felt their national assets, paid for by their taxes, would be traded and used by crooked politicians. Besides, this corruption mobilizing frame is universally acknowledged, particularly among middle classes, which other countries were able to understand.

From messages he framed in this corruption mobilizing frame, it is indicated that Sondhi framed Thaksin as traitor who privatized the state-owned enterprises to

benefit Singapore, also he and his associates benefitted from corruption on Suvarnabhumi airport construction.

## **2. The monarchy mobilizing frame**

Similar to the corruption mobilizing frame, Sondhi Limthongkul started employing this monarchy frame since he hosted the TV show at Channel 9. At that time, Thaksin and his colleagues were alleged to have violated King Bhumibol's royal supremacy. The issue became serious when Thaksin and his subordinates appointed some major officials which triggered disappointment, for some, especially the positions that engaged with King Bhumibol. During the show at Thammasat University, Sondhi connected some contentious issues of Thaksin with the violation to the King's royal supremacy. Those issues were distributed to public via his media and became one of the serious allegations that attracted people who to protect the monarchy from Thaksin and associates. As a result, the monarchy mobilizing frame became the most powerful frame that used to appeal the followers and the general public which ultimately contributed a remarkable success in recruiting a high number of participants.

### **The problem definition function**

The **problem** in this monarchy mobilizing frame was constructed as *the disloyalty of Thaksin Shinawatra to the monarchy institution, in particular King Bhumibol Adulyadej*. Sondhi indicated the **culprits** of this frame as *Thaksin Shinawatra and his subordinates*. He emphasized on the three main issues to point out the abuses of Thaksin Shinawatra toward King Bhumibol.

The first example presented by Sondhi was the news that Thaksin Shinawatra performed the Buddhist rite as the head of an event in Wat Phra Kaew Temple (the

Temple of the Emerald Buddha), the nation's holiest place. Sondhi (*Waning fortunes for populist PM?*, 2005) affirmed his allegation by showing a photo of Thaksin dressed in a casual outfit sitting on the King's reserved seat praying for peace in the deep south of Thailand. Sondhi said (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005):

I haven't accused the premier without evidence. I bring news from the Bangkokbiz newspaper published on 11 April 2005. Moreover, I have received a letter from Professor Rapee Sagarik showing his concern toward this news. From his letter, he said when he saw this news on television: he could not believe his eyes. Thaksin was conceitedly performing as the head of the Buddhist rite at Wat Phra Kaew. He has been voted, by many Thai people, to be the prime minister, thus he should act modestly and thoughtfully... However, I (Sondhi) said to Professor Rapee that Thaksin might not realize this. He might be deceived by his subordinates who do not have accurate knowledge about royal traditions. Because of this, I would say to everyone that I forgive him for his irresponsible action. However, after I revealed this incident the premier defended it saying that he just wanted to do "a normal merit in a temple". I think he misses the point. There are thousands of temples in Thailand for doing merit; on the other hand he determines to hold the event at Wat Phra Kaew a reserved place for the monarchs.

The second example of Thaksin in abandoning the King's power was the appointment of the caretaker of Somdet Pra Sangkarat or Supreme Patriarch of Thai Buddhism. With regard to the substantial relations between the King and the former Somdet Pra Sangkarat or Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, I consider individualizing this issue as another prominent mobilizing frame. Thus the details of the issue will be examined in the next frame. I, however, will provide a brief explanation here. Throughout the show, Sondhi had indicated that Thaksin was unfaithful to the King by appointing Somdet Phra Buddhacharya as the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat in place of Somdet Phra Nyanasamvara. Thaksin's subordinate, the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm gave the reason that Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was seriously ill and was unable to perform his duties. Sondhi viewed this appointment as being done in an inappropriate manner by Thaksin and his colleague who did it without a formal royal permission from King Bhumibol.

The next example of Thaksin's disloyalty was the discharge of Khunying Jaruvan Maintaka, the Auditor-general of the kingdom of Thailand, from the position and then immediately offering the position to Visuth Montreewat. Sondhi believed that Khunying Jaruvan was removed from the position because of her investigation of Thaksin government's corruption. According to Sondhi, Khunying Jaruvan had a full obligation to scrutinize every state organization, which she discovered the corruption of Nevin Chidchob, a close colleague of Thaksin. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) described that:

This government loathes Khunying Jaruvan Menthaka for the reason that she has not complied with their commands. According to her duties, she is responsible for monitoring the transparency of all governmental departments. For instance, the Para rubber tree project in which some local state officials sell low quality trees to farmers in the northeast region of Thailand. In order to inspect this corruption, she sends her officials to thoroughly count the numbers of Para rubber trees which causes difficulties for those corrupt local state officials. Moreover, she continues to inspect the other governmental projects and finally discovers the corruption of Suvarnabhumi airport.

As a result, they plan to eliminate Khunying Jaruvan. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) deemed that this case indicated the disloyalty of Thaksin and his subordinates, in particular Thongthong Chantarangsu who was accountable for this. According to Sondhi, there are some major positions in this country which are appointed and discharged by the King included the position of Khunying Jaruvan Menthaka. Besides, Jaruvan herself claimed that she had not received the royal permission from the King to resign, thus she would ignore the discharge and hold on to this position.

### **The causal attribution function**

At this time, the cause of Thaksin Shinawatra's disloyalty had not been specified directly. Issue which engaged with the defamation of monarchy was highly controversial in Thailand. This might lead to legal trouble for Sondhi if he made allegations against Thaksin without proof of evidence. What he implemented was to

make gestures and support them with information. Issues that Sondhi concentrated on were the discharge of Jaruwat Menthaka, the ombudsman, and the appointment of acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. Thongtong Chantarangsu, a Thaksin subordinate, was blamed by Sondhi that he concealed the information of the appointments from the public. Thongtong, in response, refuted and claimed that as a servant of King Bhumibol he could not reveal the details about the discharge of Jaruwat Menthaka and the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. This enraged Sondhi. He (*'Reng kae Sangkarat sorn'*, 2005) defended his claims in the first episode of the live show thus:

I insist that my claims are absolutely true. Dr. Thongtong also claims that the discussions and suggestions between the government and His Majesty the King cannot be revealed to public. No one could comment on this. This is the barrier that has been built up to block us from knowing the truth. We are confused by the hidden information. I ask him, as a journalist, about the case of Jaruwat Menthaka. That's because the government had offered a new candidate to replace Khunying Jaruwat, while it has been a while that His Majesty the King has not approved this candidate yet. When I asked Thongtong about this, he claimed that it isn't appropriate to talk about it.

From the above speech Sondhi attempted to signal that *Thaksin and his subordinates abused King Bhumibol's royal supremacy by citing the royal etiquettes to cover the truth from the public.*

### **The moral evaluation function**

As well, branding function was not evidently done in the first movement phase. Sondhi Limthongkul avoided openly labelling Thaksin as being unfaithful to the King. A number of libel lawsuits by Thaksin against him might hinder his making allegations against Thaksin directly. Instead, he (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) laid the blame on the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm a Thaksin subordinate as *an unfaithful person* on the second show:

It appears that the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm is responsible for organizing the merit event at Wat Pra Kaew. I never blame the premier

because the one who must be blamed is Mr. Vissanu. He's supposed to give the premier good advice. According to the royal customs, if we were in the past, their heads would be cut off because of their actions.

In contrast, Sondhi Limthongkul (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) **framed** himself as *one who was wholeheartedly loyal to the King*. His willpower to fight for the King was stated when he defended Thongtong Chantarangsu's comment thus:

Mr. Thongtong speaks as if he knows everything, but he can't answer my questions. Besides, he had a meeting with the principal private secretary of His Majesty the King. He asked the secretary whether I have been appointed by His Majesty the King to investigate the appointment case, which was denied by the principal private secretary. This is unfair for me, a common person, who has no opportunity to meet up with the principal private secretary. Am I doing the wrong thing being loyal to the King? It seems like I walk on a street and see a photo of His Majesty the King dropped on the ground. Then I spot someone determines to step on the photo; I stop him, grab the photo, and warn him that this is a photo of a revered person. He can't destroy it. I think I do no wrong for doing this, but it appears that the one who is loyal to the monarchy becomes the one who is in the wrong.

From his above statement, he was a common loyalty one attempted to protect King Bhumibol from any disgrace which brought about by Thaksin and his colleagues.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

In this function, it is noticeable that Sondhi provided two types of remedy which he gave, firstly, to Thaksin Shinawatra and, secondly, to his audience. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) **suggested** Thaksin to *act on the following four issues*:

Today, a friend of mine came to see me. He suggested that I have a talk with Mr. Thaksin. I told him I have nothing to say to him. If I have to see him, I would suggest to him to solve these issues: 1) he should stop his family and colleagues from being corrupt, 2) if he is really loyalty to the monarchy, he should not perform anything that violates the King's royal supremacy, 3) he must find a solution for the case of Khunying Jaruvan Maintaka the Auditor-general, and 4) he should not confuse Thai people about the position of His

Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat. If he is able to amend these issues, Thai people and I would have no doubts about his loyalty.

Besides, Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005) also **encouraged** his audience to *show the loyalty to the King*:

There is the only thing we can do to show our loyalty to His Majesty the King. On the coming Thursday and Friday we should express our love and loyalty by hanging yellow flags at home or in your cars. In case you do not have flags, you can use anything yellow to show that we are on the same side. I think yellow represents pureness. It is the colour of dharma and the King. In addition we can use the sticker "We will fight for the king". To express our frustration and grief we'll show it through the yellow colour and do it unendingly.

This symbolic solution was interesting since it was the beginning of them in wearing yellow shirts which later was called the Yellow Shirts by the press and public.

### **The metaframes**

The framing of the monarchy mobilizing frame was rooted from the king metaframe, the most significant nationalist symbol. In terms of Sondhi's framing, he pointed to the three main cases engaged with the infringement of the King's royal prerogative such as the performance of Thaksin as the head of the Buddhist rite at Wat Phra Kaew, the discharge of Jaruwat Menthaka, and the appointment of acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. Even though he did not directly allege that Thaksin was disloyal to the King, those issues could lead people to doubt on the practices of Thaksin and his colleagues.

Throughout the show the King's concerns towards the well-being of his people, his royal development projects, and his philosophy of a sufficiency economy had been raised to remind the devotion of King Bhumibol to the Thais. Sondhi, together with Sarocha, his co-host, wore t-shirts with the slogan "We will fight for the King" and paid homage to the King by singing the royal anthem at the end of the show. To create a bond with his audience, Sondhi started an activity expressing love and

loyalty to the King by inviting the audience to wear yellow shirts, decorate their cars or houses with yellow flags and “We’ll fight for the king” stickers. Later, this activity was developed in terms of patterns and the increase number of crowds.

In the first phase of the movement, Sondhi’s messages on the monarchy were constructed to point out the faults of Thaksin and his subordinates. He had not accused them of disloyalty to King Bhumibol, but implied this to the audience by framing. Furthermore, the monarchy, particularly King Bhumibol, was framed as an extremely respectable figure who was bullied by Thaksin and his colleagues. Also, Sondhi portrayed himself as a loyal journalist who attempted to protect the King, but was intimidated by those “disloyal people”. This seemed to increase the royalists sympathy toward Sondhi’s movement.

### **3. The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame**

As aforementioned, the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat or Supreme Patriarch by Thaksin Shinawatra and his subordinates was raised as a significant issue by Sondhi Limthongkul. This frame intended to mobilize secular Buddhists as well as monks. Sondhi showed much evidence to support his blaming that this appointment was made through intrigue. Furthermore he insisted that Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, the 19th Somdet Pra Sangkarat of Thailand, was in good enough health to perform his duties. Therefore, the attempt by Thaksin to replace him with Somdej Buddhacharya (generally known as Somdej Kiaw), the abbot of Wat Saket, would cause a schism in the Thai Buddhist realm.

#### **The problem definition function**

The **problem** of this mobilizing frame was *the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat or Somdej Buddhacharya to replace the former Somdet Pra Sangkarat*

*Nyanasamvara*. The key **culprits** were *Thaksin Shinawatra* and, to some extent, the Deputy Prime Minister *Vissanu Krue-ngarm*, who were responsible for this appointment. Sondhi (*'Reng kae Sangkarat sorn'*, 2005) said, on the last episode before his show was cancelled from Channel 9, that:

I believe in the declaration of the prime minister that he is entirely loyal to His Majesty the King. However, sometimes the premier and his subordinates have performed some irresponsible acts which lead to doubts about their loyalty. The appointment started on January 13, 2005 which Somdej Buddhacharya from Wat Saket was appointed as the caretaker of Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara for 6 months. After this, the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm claimed that Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara had a serious illness and was unable to perform his duties as Somdet Pra Sangkarat. The point is the medical team of Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara had never announced that His Holiness could not perform his duties. This is the reason that Luang Ta Maha Bua intervenes the government about this appointment.

Sondhi repeated this issue many times in his show. He opposed the claim of the government that His Holiness Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara was unable to accomplish his duties because of his illness. Sondhi said, in the fourth episode at Thammasat, that His Holiness was 92 years old, thus it was impossible for him to walk briskly, but he could perform his Buddhist rites every day. Moreover, on His Holiness's birthday he allowed people to have an audience in which he was healthy enough to bless them.

The next accusation was the violation of the royal supremacy. Sondhi made this frame to have more powerful persuasion by engaging it with the three prominent figures: King Bhumibol, Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara, and Luang Ta Maha Bua. In terms of King Bhumibol, Sondhi framed the appointment of acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat as relevant to the abandonment of the King's royal supremacy. According to the preceding Thai ecclesiastic law, the position of Somdet Pra Sangkarat was nominated by the Supreme Sangha Council and formally appointed by the King. But in this case, Thaksin and Vissanu had not offered the nominee for the appointment to the King for his consideration.

Also, Luang Ta Maha Bua an influential forest monk who had a close relationship with Sondhi Limthongkul resisted this appointment. The sermon of Luang Ta Maha Bua (*'Luangta Maha Bua'*, 2005) criticized Thaksin and his government as "wicked, corrupt, power-hungry, and greedy". The severe accusations of Luang Ta, from his famous sermon, indicated that Thaksin had an intention to be the president of Thailand. The opposition of Sondhi and Luang Ta Maha Bua was responded to, by Thaksin, with libel suits. However, Thaksin decided to sue only the Manager Newspaper and Sondhi Limthongkul for publishing the robustly-worded sermon by Luang Ta Maha Bua. To avoid criticism from the well-regarded monk's followers, Thaksin (*'Defamation Lawsuits'*, 2005) excluded Luang Ta Maha Bua from the suit.

### **The causal attribution function**

In the last episode of "Muang Thai Raisupda" aired on channel 9, Sondhi (*'Sondhi chur nayok chongrakpakdee'*, 2005) made this observation:

We've talked about this issue before. But I urge the premier to show his loyalty by amending all the wrong practices. I do not want to see him being misunderstood by the whole of society. Since family members of the premier's wife have been the followers of Somdet Kiaw from Wat Saket, it might be perceived that the premier has his own Somdet Pra Sangkarat, but because His Majesty the King has His Holiness Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, this is completely immoral and misbehaving.

Sondhi signalled that Thaksin had an intention to appoint his own Somdet Pra Sangkarat which in Sondhi's framing, this position, in Buddhism, is the King of the monks. In Thailand the political and Buddhist realms are connected and influence each other, therefore Sondhi might deem that *Thaksin Shinawatra attempted to expand his political power over the Sangha Council Committee through his appointed Somdet Pra Sangkarat*. Thus, the abandonment of the King's royal supremacy was constructed in this frame. To strengthen the accusation, a sermon of Luang Ta Maha Bua was published in Sondhi's newspaper with Luang Ta's view that Thaksin had made an obvious effort to "control the Buddhist clergy and usurp royal authority". The monk (*Luangta Maha Bua*, 2011) stated that "I feel Thailand is now under a

dark influence. Bad people are in power and good people are being dominated. Not only ordinary people but also monks are now in trouble".

The movement of Luang Ta to oppose this replacement had some background. A news article written by a monk claimed that Luangta Maha Bua, the famous forest monk of Thammayut sect, accused Somdet Buddhacharya (Somdet Kiaw) who was nominated by Thaksin as the tyrant who "masterminded the power game behind the policy of the Ecclesiastical Council". Mettanando Bhikku (2005), who wrote this article, pointed out that Somdet Kiaw had a close affiliation with the Mahanikaya Sect, which was widely known as the sect of Dhammakaiya temple. Somdet Kiaw was alleged by Luangta Maha Bua to be "not only not qualified for the position of Supreme Patriarch - as he has ambitiously abused his power in paving his way to the highest post in the feudalistic hierarchy of Thai monks - but is also not qualified to wear the yellow robe". By this, we will clearly see the conflicts between Luangta Maha Bua and Somdet Kiaw which motivated Luangta Maha Bua to entirely support the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul to stop this appointment.

### **The moral evaluation function**

Sondhi was not obviously branded Thaksin Shinawatra, but implying it to the audience. Through a show at Thammasat, Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) asked Thaksin Shinawatra about his problematic disloyalty, which was raised thus:

I'd like to ask the premier one question. On the birthday of His Holiness, Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, which was widely known by the public, the premier did not go to consecrate him. I don't know what kind of business was very important and caused him to be so busy he did not have time to have an audience with His Holiness. From my observation, it has been two years in which the premier has not met His Holiness; while the major figures in this country would have an audience to bless His Holiness every year.

From this message, it could be **implied** that *Thaksin was not loyal to Somdet Pra Sangkarat* because he had not paid courtesy to Somdet Pra Sangkarat on his birthday.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

In this function, Sondhi offered the **solution** to the prime minister to *restore the Somdet Pra Sangkarat position to Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara*. He (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) said on his political show that:

Once, you said that His Holiness Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara was critical ill, but so far he is healthy. To stop the misunderstanding among Thai people about whom the real one is, would you return him to be the one and only Somdet Pra Sangkarat?

In relation to the infringement of King Bhumobol's authority, Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) **suggested** *the government to offer the appointment to the King for his consideration* thus:

The present His Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was the former custodian of His Majesty the King when he ordained as Buddhist monk. It is clearly seen that they have had a close and lengthy relationship. By courtesy of royal tradition, this government should report the illness of His Holiness Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara to the King and wait for his consideration before taking any actions.

The tradition, claimed by Sondhi, was explained on the show that before 1992, the commission of the appointment of Somdet Pra Sangkarat belonged to the King. After the new laws, the Sangha council and the government have authority over the appointment. The King has the duty to acknowledge and provide his signature on approval (Ibid).

### **The metaframes**

The metaframes being applied in this the Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame were the religion and the king metaframe. The religion metaframe in this frame was applied when Sondhi attacked Thaksin and his subordinates on the appointment of Somdet Pra Sangkarat and the movement of Luang Ta Maha Bua. He insisted that Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara was in good enough health to perform his tasks by displaying recent video clips of His Holiness conducting his duties. This appointment, in Sondhi's framing, would cause turmoil in the Thai Buddhist dominion.

In terms of the king metaframe, Sondhi focused on framing the close relationship between King Bumibhol and Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara, who was the former mentor of King Bhumibol. In Sondhi's claims, the government must inform the King about the appointing situation and await for the King deliberation before appointing Somdet Kiaw. Therefore, the actions of Thaksin and Vissanu Krue-ngarm were framed by Sondhi, and some people, as a serious abandonment of the King's prerogative. Besides, he implied that Thaksin himself was not loyalty to Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara by skipping the courtesy call on Somdet Pra Sangkarat's birthday.

From this mobilizing frame, Sondhi framed some functions such as the causal attribution and moral evaluation vaguely to avoid legal charges from Thaksin. Also, he had no clear evidences of Thaksin's disloyalty. Nonetheless, another interesting thing from his framing is he began to connect Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara and King Bhumibol by their lengthy relationships from the past. This was done together with the monarchy mobilizing frame.

#### 4. The media control mobilizing frame

In this first phase of the movement, this mobilizing frame was focused on two aspects of media censorship. The first issue was framed around the restriction by the Thaksin government of the media in general, while another was the curb on Sondhi's media network included his political show "Muang Thai Raisupda". Kavi Chongkittavorn (*Southeast Asian Media Struggle to be Free*, 2002), a senior journalist, portrayed the situation of the Thai media during the ruling of Thaksin's government thus:

Thailand's Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who came to power in 2001 with an overwhelming majority, has restricted freedom of expression in Thailand as never before. During the first year of his reign, his modus operandi has ranged from the removal or reshuffling of talk-show hosts to the suspension of television and radio programs unfriendly to government. Through the prime minister's control of huge advertisement budgets from state-run institutions and enterprises, as well as his personal network of companies and affiliates, only media that support the government have been awarded large chunks of advertising and incentives. This situation enables the government to spin news and to confuse and control the Thai media. The absence of critical political coverage, something unusual for the Thai media, demonstrates the extent of the present government's control. It is leading to so-called "media apartheid," under which only pro-Thaksin media outlets will prosper. These actions contravene the country's 1997 constitution, which guarantees freedom of expression in government and public media and prevents the government from interfering with all forms of media.

#### The problem definition function

The **problem** of this mobilizing frame was *the media control of the Thaksin government*, whereas the **culprits** of this problem were indicated as *Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues*. To strengthen his accusation, on his political live show Sondhi explained the critical situation of press freedom. According to Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005), Thailand was becoming "a society of darkness" in which good people were threatened through laws and orders by the

state. People had had their ears and eyes closed from news and information due to the the inability of state media to inform society of the truth. He (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4'*, 2005) said:

So far our mass media are prohibited from doing their work. There are only the ASTV satellite television network and some newspapers such as Manager, Matichon, Bangkokbiznews, and Thai Post that complete their duty by revealing the truth to society, whereas the other media outlets focus on producing ridiculous news.

Another example of Thaksin's media monopolizing was the takeover of famous newspapers in 2005. This process had been done through Paiboon Damrongchaitham, GMM Grammy's owner, who had a close connection with Thaksin Shinawatra. GMM Media, a subsidiary of GMM Grammy, demanded (*Media giant retreats from bid to take over publisher'*, 2005) to buy Matichon Plc the publisher of Matichon, Prachachart, and Khao Sod newspapers, and the Post Publishing Plc which was the publisher of the Bangkok Post and Post Today dailies. If this plan succeeded, GMM would become the largest publishing house with five daily newspapers. This was condemned by the Thai Journalists Association, the Thai Broadcast Journalists Association and the Economic Reporters Association as an attempt to concentrate media ownership which would "bode ill for the public's right to know". In fact, Thaksin and his family became a shareholder of Thailand's only independent television station or iTV in 2002. Also, this action of Thaksin (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4'*, 2005) was criticized by Sondhi as an effort to monopolize the media which was a serious malpractice in terms of journalism ethics.

As a major antagonist of Thakisin, the freedom of Sondhi Limthongkul to disseminate his news was curbed. Legal actions were used to attack Sondhi, other journalists, and activists who had opposite views. Sondhi Limthongkul and Sarocha Pornudomsak his co-host of the "Muang Thai Rai Sapda" (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4'*, 2005) were filed with two libel suits which demanded compensation of Bt 1,000 million for Thaksin Shinawatra. Sondhi was sued from his critics on the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. Interestingly, Luangta Maha Bua

was sued together with Sondhi because of his sermon. The monk compared Thaksin to Thewathat or Devadatta who had committed a great sin against the Buddha. This sermon (Luangta Maha Bua 2005) was published on the Manager Daily on 27 September 2005 and distributed via Luang Ta Maha Bua's community radio stations. Consequently Thaksin decided to sue both Sondhi and Luangta Maha Bua. However, he sued only the Manager Daily and Sondhi Limthongkul and excluded Luangta Maha Bua.

Another means of blocking ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2*', 2005) claimed by Sondhi was that Thaksin and his subordinates sent their men to intervene in his live show. There was a group of hundred young men held a rally at his office and attacked him with offensive speech. Sondhi ('*Mob naksuksa mai sab sangkad pratuang Sondhi*', 2005) revealed that each man was paid Bt 300 (US\$ 9) per day by the order of "a guy with thick lips," which was the designation of Nevin Chidchob, a scandalous politician who supported Thaksin at that time.

### **The causal attribution function**

The **cause** of the media control was constructed by Sondhi Limthongkul as *an effort by Thaksin to block criticism and investigation from the press*. Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5*', 2005) explained that:

Regarding the honest warning from Luangta Maha Bua and I, The premier fights back by attacking me through his state television program. He announces that whoever acts as his opponent will be considered as an enemy of his interests. Consequently, I would say that I am willing to disagree with him and oppose his personal interests. I insist to protect our national assets beyond everything.

According to Sondhi, it seemed that Thaksin viewed Sondhi and his other opponents as enemies, thus the purpose of the measures to control the media was to stop them.

Through the show, Sondhi explained to his audience about the libel suits which Thaksin, and his team of lawyers, used to stop him from denouncing Thaksin. He (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005) said, in the third episode:

This week I'd like to begin the show by talking about the libel suits from the premier. He announced his rights to take a legal action against me. Accordingly, I will explain this story. Firstly, Mr. Thongthong Chandrangsue, Mr. Rewat Chamchalerm, and Mr. Mingkwan Sangsuwan announced that the reason to cancel my show from Channel 9 was that I unnecessarily mention His Majesty the King throughout the show. Thus, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is supposed to sue me with the lese majeste charge. On the other hand, he files me with a libel suit saying that I defame him. It does not involve the lese majeste charge, as they claim. The reason for this is Thaksin's legal team determined to stop me criticizing the premier. However, according to the constitution laws, I have the right, as a journalist, to criticize him.

Sondhi pointed out that some ethical media, including his Manager media, had done their duty by criticizing Thaksin and his government. As a result, Thaksin was distressed and vented his anger on him by cancelling his show followed by blocking his media networks. Sondhi (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5'*, 2005) warned Thaksin that: "His situation at moment is very critical. The more the prime minister attempts to block the media, the more his end is approaching, any minute now".

### **The moral evaluation function**

Sondhi **framed** Thaksin, on his media control, as *a dictatorial prime minister and a greedy capitalist*. To illustrate his accusation, Sondhi (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4'*, 2005) told his audience that:

Shortly after he returned from travelling abroad, the premier claimed that he knew nothing about the cancellation of "Muang Thai Raisupda". He said it was done by the MCOT committee board. I acknowledge the decision of the board, but somehow this is really unfair to me. They should rather tell me straightforwardly that "Mr. Sondhi, the premier cannot tolerate your criticism of his performances". If they did so, I would stop criticizing him. Conversely, they claim that I defame the monarchy; therefore they must

cancel my TV show. When I fight back to protect my pride and honour, they sue me for Bt 1000 million compensation.

Moreover, Thaksin, according to Sondhi, viewed that the Thai mass media are operated under the concept of capitalism. Thus, the buying and selling of media outlets were in accordance with the principles of capitalism. Sondhi (*'Perd chak muang thai rai supda san jorn'*, 2005) responded to the premier's view thus:

I agree with the premier that media outlets are now facing a hard time. However, I must explain the true objective of this take over plan which may, or may not, involve the premier. According to capitalism, if the Bangkok Post, the Nation, and Matichon are bought and merged, the number of audiences would be increased immensely. As a consequence, the choices of the readers and sponsors would be limited, since these newspapers are controlled by one monopolizing owner. In terms of journalism ethics and norms, these newspapers must produce contents in conformity with the policies of the advertisers and owner. Hence, the news contents would be directly regulated by those capitalists. For me, the idea of capitalism might work well in some countries like the U.S., since American people understand their rights well. On the other hand, Thailand has many different circumstances from the U.S. We have inequalities in classes and economy. Capitalism is the merciless ideal for an unequal and impaired society as it destroys the poor while embraces the rich.

It is interesting that Sondhi attacked the capitalism of Thaksin. The *greedy mind of a capitalist* was framed in this mobilizing frame.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The **solution** to this frame was *inviting the audience to distribute "the truth" to the public by creating networks of knowledge*. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005) encouraged his audience as below:

We ought to create a network. When they close our eyes we must find a way by suggesting to our friends to watch "MuangThai Raisupda" and introducing them to read these reliable newspapers: the Manager Daily, the Bangkokbiz, Matichon, the Thaipost, Kom Chad Luek, and Kaosod. Other means to disseminate the truth can be done through community radio stations, distributing DVDs, CDs, "Muang Thai Raisupda show" books, buying ASTV satellite dishes, and buying "We will fight for the king" t- shirts. This is the

way to create the freedom of the press which might be powerful enough to attract some popular news media to report our news to society. Protesting is not our goal. We only demand the freedom of the press.

At this stage, this could be the only solution for Sondhi to provide the knowledge and information from his show through these various networks. He might not have had a plan to lead the movement at that time. The important thing for him was continuing his business, attacking Thaksin, and protecting himself from legal actions. Nonetheless, this solution could help him to call for freedom of expression, and he could sell a huge number of his products simultaneously.

### **The metaframes**

This mobilizing frame was directly built on the democracy metaframe since Thaksin controlled the press freedom. During Thaksin's era Thailand had the 1997 constitution, which provided for the freedom of press, Thaksin seemed to have his own agenda on retaining his political power and family business. This led to widely criticism from the media; on the one hand he had "little tolerance of the criticism aired in a free press". Chris Baker (as cited in Cumming-Bruce, 2005) viewed the media situation thus: "There is absolutely nothing but the government view on electronic media. The talk shows are all ministers and officials. There is no discussion. It's really bleak". While Sopon Ongkara (2005) a senior editor at the Nation said that it was a year of living dangerously in Thailand. This was the dirty war of Thaksin against the press and critics. Taken together, the actions of Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates to control the media, including Sondhi's show, were framed as an action against the constitution and democracy.

From the discourse of Sondhi, he portrayed Thaksin with a dictatorial leader image, while Thaksin came from elections, in conformity with a democratic regime. Nonetheless, Sondhi seldom praised the democracy claimed by Thaksin. As well, he began to criticize the capitalism which was used in the United States of America which he said increased greed and inequality. Anti-American and anti-Western

democracy was constructed and related to Thaksin Shinawatra, the greedy capitalist.

## **5. The populism mobilizing frame**

Populism was a major political platform used by Thaksin Shinawatra to receive the popular vote from rural people. Since Thaksin became the Prime Minister, he (Hewison 2010, p. 120) had been personified as “a populist savior of the poor”. Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party created policies, combined with a U.S. style political campaign and use of a corporate marketing strategy as an electoral platform, to appeal voters, such as soft loans for local communities, a 30 baht universal healthcare program, and a farmer debt moratorium. In 2005 Thaksin (Pasuk and Baker 2010, p.66) was attacked hard by the press and public over his failure to take measures on the violence in the southern provinces of Thailand, the government’s corruptions, the government support for his family businesses, and the privatization of state enterprises. In response he announced more populist policies during his second election campaign such as “an extension of the village funds, more sports facilities in urban areas, cheaper phone calls, more cheap housing, lower taxes, more investment in the universal health scheme, a nationwide scheme of irrigation, and a deadline for the end to poverty”.

Anek Laothamatas (cited in Pasuk and Baker 2010, p.62), a political scientist, gave his view on Thaksin’ policies thus “we must deal quickly with Thaksin-style populism before another economic crisis arises and destroys the nation completely”. While Ammar Siamwala(cited in Chanikarn 2013), a TDRI honorary researcher, thought that “though the populist policies pushed the country's democracy forward, they cast a shadow over Thai politics because voters only cared about what they would be given in return for votes”.

From this Thaksin Shinawatra and his populism was criticized hard by the middle classes, some scholars and media outlets, particularly Sondhi Limthongkul. He saw this policy as the cause of household debt and corruption. Sondhi, furthermore, pointed out that this policy was contradictory to the "sufficiency economy" philosophy of King Bhumibol. A pillar of the King's philosophy (*Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy*, no date) is moderation, which means "sufficiency at a level of not doing something too little or too much at the expense of oneself or others, for example, producing and consuming at a moderate level".

### **The problem definition function**

The **problem** of this populism mobilizing frame was defined as *the populist policy that caused the huge debts and consumerism of the poor*. The **culprit** was *Thaksin Shinawatra*. Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4*', 2005) explained the impacts of Thaksin's populism on Thailand thus:

These populist projects, such as the agrarian debt relief scheme, village funds, and loans at low interest rates for small businesses scheme, lead to the rocketing of public debt. Recently, TDRI announced the cost of living expenses of Thai people of which 17.7 percentages are the cost of transportation and mobile phone bills. It shows the uneconomical expenditures of Thais. We will see that young students, poor farmers, and even factory workers own mobile phones. Horribly, the need to have modern and expensive mobile phones leads to the prostitution of some students. An interesting point is while most Thai people are falling into huge debt, this year AIS, a telecom operator of Shin Corporation, earned the highest profit among Thai companies. Moreover, our Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is ranked in 14<sup>th</sup> place on the list of the richest men in the world. Interestingly, Thai people are in trouble with household debt, because this rich prime minister persuades us to fall into debt then create measures to reduce the debts later. I am curious how the premier became such a super-rich guy. We should look to him as our role model and follow his example to become as rich as him.

The unnecessary spending of the poor was blamed on Thaksin's populism, while the unusual wealth of Thaksin and his mobile phone company was questioned. Furthermore, Sondhi described the many aspects of the damaging results of

Thaksin's populism. He (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5'*, 2005) used the example of the village funds project, which caused the public debt, thus:

In terms of the village fund debts, about 98 percent of the loans from the village funds have been repaid by debtors. They did not reveal the truth that 70 percent of the money lent has been spent on luxury goods such as motorcycles and mobile phones. As a result, the borrowers have no money to pay off the debt. Thus, it is necessary for them to borrow money from moneylenders with high interest rates of 10-20 percent. This means that the borrowers must pay interest to both the moneylenders and the village funds. It is clear that this village fund is absolutely unsuccessful in reducing the problem of the poor borrowing money from loan sharks. On the other hand, it seems the number of borrowers has increased. Worse, if the government determined to demolish the moneylender networks, it would result in the crash of the village funds.

Thaksin's populism (Pisit: 2011) was named "Thaksinomics" with the primary goal of circulating money to the rural people who hardly received any financial support from central government. Thus, the poor ultimately became the major voters for Thaksin Shinawatra. On the show, Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4'*, 2005) stated to his audience that the budget source for populism was from taxes, paid by the middle classes, and the national budgets.

Last week there was news about a new household debt policy which will be declared to public as another strategy of this government. From my observation, the premier typically announces a new extravagant policy when his popularity has dropped. It sounds good for Thais to have a new populist policy, but the point is these budgets come from our taxes. I don't mind to see them dump their personal money on the populist policies to boost their popularity. But it turns out to be that they spend on our taxes and national budget to increase their popularity among their voters.

The anger and dissatisfaction of the middle class toward Thaksin, and the behavior of the poor that was created, was what prompted them to eagerly join Sondhi's movement afterwards.

### **The causal attribution function**

Sondhi defined the **cause** of the populism frame as *an effort by Thaksin Shinawatra to receive popularity from voters by populism and to distract attention away from his scandalous corruptions*. Accordingly, Thaksin seemed to disregard the effects of his populism. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5'*, 2005) explain that:

The premier constantly announces new projects to divert people's attention from his malpractices such as corruptions, the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat, and the abandonment of the King's royal prerogative. This government always uses the tactic of throwing money to shut up the mouths of their critics. Another tactic is promoting senseless chauvinism which leads to severe turmoil in this country. The last one is creating dreamy mega-projects to fool people.

This policy finally becomes a two-sided coin for the government. The premier does not deliberate over this policy. He just wants to provide the funds to stimulate consumerism among the public. He forgets the fact that these funds are spent on buying things not building up businesses as it's supposed to be.

This project finally comes to an end. On the surface it has good image but, in reality, people borrow money from the loan sharks to repay the village funds. People become a football which is kicked back and forth between the moneylenders and governmental village funds. This type of economy is called *Eua-Arthorn economy* (generosity economy) because money is poured on everything. When the government's votes are low, they throw money at their voters to increase their popularity. When they have difficulties from news about corruption, they create fanciful mega projects to distract the public's attention. I would say that this exactly describes a self-destructive economy.

The above statement could specify every populist cause used by Thaksin to appeal for votes. During Thaksin government, there were several *Eua-Arthorn projects* which Thaksin had created to provide funds, houses, and taxi cars for the poor. In Sondhi's view, Thaksin and his TRT spent money on these projects to buy voting. Thus, money became the solution for to solve problems.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In terms of the moral function, Sondhi **framed** Thaksin as *greedy, selfish, and a liar*. Thaksin, according to Sondhi, was one who would do anything to gain popularity from voters, even if his populism might lead the nation into difficulties (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5'*, 2005):

This government is broke. They do not have any money left. They fool people with trillion baht mega projects to portray a dependable image. Thaksin always says money is just paper, therefore he can use his magic, making as much as he wants. This is the only government in Thai political history which demolishes our monetary saving system. They steal children's savings from the Government Saving Bank, while the bank itself is transformed from a national saving source into a money source for the premier to spend on increasing his vote ratings through his populism.

Another greedy side of Thaksin was revealed by Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4'*, 2005) thus:

Nowadays the premier owns many businesses which reward him with a fortune, such as money lending business and mobile phone company. His businesses tempt people to fall into debt by promoting the use of mobile phones and money borrowing. On the other hand, he convinces people to reduce debts by borrowing money from his populist funds. The premier is much wealthier now. He should stop being greedy. Once he told me that he was done with making more money, because he had plenty of it. He even promised that he would not be involved with any corruption.

Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) also claimed Thaksin Shinawatra thought of his voters as foolish poor people. He claimed on the second episode of his show that: "The government rarely promotes good education for them so as to fool the grassroots easily. Furthermore, some people who borrow money from the village funds never realize that they have to pay back the lent money. They believe that this government gives them free money".

### **The treatment recommendation function**

In this frame, to solve the overspending of Thaksin, Sondhi proposed *the sufficiency economy philosophy of King Bhumibol as a solution*. He viewed populism as a defective idea resulting in growing consumerism among Thais. For him, the King's concept was the finest way for Thais to cope with economic crisis and consumerism, while Thaksin's economic policy focused on increasing the GDP rates and disregarding the declining morality. Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3*', 2005) criticized that:

The prosperity of our society is not based on the GDP rates. We may get an increase of GDP at a rate of 12 percent, but we still have a critical problem of teen pregnancy. I know that we cannot resist the need for modernization, but we can define our meaning of modernization. Similar to the thoughts of His Majesty the King, we must build our nation to have a sufficient ability to stand on our own legs. I think the premier wants Thailand to be a wealthy nation; on the other hand our norms and moralities will be progressively destroyed. If we develop and modernize our country by following this path, we should rather live scantily in a moral society in way we are supposed to.

From this mobilizing frame, we will see that Sondhi opposed the populist policies. He thought of these policies as a means of corruption and only benefitting Thaksin and his associates by obtaining popularity. The worse thing about Thaksin's populism from Sondhi's viewpoint was the growth of consumerism among the poor. Furthermore, the collapse of national budget security would be the end result, since it was transformed into a budget source for populism.

### **The metaframes**

This mobilizing frame was promoted in accordance with the modernization, nation, and monarchy metaframes. In terms of the modernization metaframe, Sondhi attacked the economic policies and businesses of Thaksin and his colleagues. Thaksin's notions, in the view of Sondhi, were based on capitalism which led to the increase of consumerism. Sondhi, thus, strongly opposed to the modernizing ways of Thaksin Shinawatra.

In contrast to the populism, Sondhi proposed that Thais solve their economic problems by following the philosophy of "sufficiency economy" of King Bhumibol. Thus, the monarchy metaframe was constructed to devalue the populism of Thaksin and, simultaneously, honour the King's finer concept. During this early movement, he did not focus much on the principles of the sufficiency economy, but we could see some traces from a part of his talk show. He raised some worthy advice on development by King Bhumibol to instruct Thaksin and his audience which was, in essence: Thailand should build on her own strengths, in terms of economy, until she is capable of relying on herself. According to Sondhi's framing, the need to borrow money from the international monetary funds to create mega projects and populist policies was not in conformity with the King's sustainable development concept. In relation to the nation metaframe, Sondhi stressed that populism was a defective policy that led to the destruction of the finance, morality, and economy of Thailand. Moreover, Thaksin seemed not care to find sustainable ways to develop Thailand. What he had done, according to Sondhi, primarily focused on gaining popularity from voters. Nonetheless, the opposition for Thaksin Shinawatra, to this social welfare, was the middle class who felt they were unfairly treated by Thaksin. The middle class pay taxes, while the rich avoided them. Hewison (2010, p.126) summarized the populism of Thaksin as follows:

...it was said that middle-class taxes kept corrupt politicians in power through policies that appealed to poor voters, while allowing Thaksin and his cronies to get wealthier. Worse, these politicians stayed in power by buying the votes of the ignorant and poor masses. Worse still, these corrupt politicians then continued to support the lazy poor, making them lazier still. Some of the more radical activists called for a tax revolt against the TRT government. While social welfare has continued, there is a deep suspicion among the middle class.

From all of this, we can clearly see that Thaksin's populism, according to Sondhi, caused severe problems to the security of Thailand's economy and morality which could be classified under the nation metaframe.

This mobilizing frame was produced to frame the greedy side of Thaksin as wicked politician. It was also framed to emphasize on King Bhumibol's wisdom in creating the finer economic policy. Sondhi clearly show his negative thoughts toward capitalism from the West. Furthermore, to gain more support from his middle class audience he began to frame the inappropriate money spending of the poor given by Thaksin and the government, the money that paid by the working hard middle class. As a result of this framing, the discontentments among the middle class were amplified and drew more audience to join the live show.

## **6. The Thaksin's police state regime mobilizing frame**

Throughout the premiership, there had been severe criticism about the "Thaksin regime". It was regarded from some people as "the police state" regime that concentrated on controlling, investigating, and eliminating antagonists. From Chitlaoarporn's work (Chitlaoarporn, no date), he explained that the independent polity of the 1997 constitution allowed Thaksin to act as an autocratic prime minister, while government organizations were turned into tools to serve his regime. He also summarized the characteristics of Thaksin's police state regime saying that Thaksin was "using the law to further the aims of the TRT, destroying the political examination system; using methods of political repression, using populist policies to increase support; changing the bureaucratic structure; using independent polity to intimidate opponents". Besides, "these subtle deviations from democratic government make it difficult to scrutinize how the government of Thaksin has behaved".

Sondhi Limthongkul started criticizing the police state regime of Thaksin through his show. He condemned the policy of Thaksin in sending the police to the southernmost provinces. Also he claimed that he had been intimidated by Thaksin's police to stop his "Muang Thai Raisupda" political talk show, while his audiences

were prevented from participating in the live show. This act was done under the concept of police state regime.

### **The problem definition function**

During the show at Thammasat University, Sondhi Limthongkul identified the **problem** of this frame as *the police state regime of Thaksin Shinawatra*. The **culprit** of this frame was *Thaksin Shinawatra*, a former police officer who became Prime Minister. Sondhi gave examples of the unrest in the southernmost part of Thailand to portray how Thaksin's administration used nepotism by sending his police colleagues to solve the turmoil. Sondhi (*'Perd chak muang thai rai supda san jorn'*, 2005) said,

This prime minister is a former policeman, thus he has numerous police colleagues. When he becomes the premier, it implies the rise of the police force in his era. Regarding the unrest in the southern provinces, Police Lieutenant General Thawatchai Julsokhon, the Commissioner of Provincial Police Region 9, is in charge of the southern provinces area. This policeman reports to his superior that the separatists in the south are just crappy hooligans, for that reason this area should be under the management of the police force. In accordance with this report, military force is withdrawn and ultimately replaced by the police.

The defects of the police system and morality were raised through the show. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005) referred to the lack of response by the police in solving his cases, moreover the upset feelings of common people towards Thai police was framed to create the discontented sentiment:

So far many people are enthusiastic to report to the police the malpractices of this government, such as the appointment of acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. The response from the police to this case upset the people since they just kept prolonging the case. I would say that the Thai police are good at surviving every situation. They perform their duty in accordance to the leader's wishes. In this case, I am sure that they will sweep this case under the carpet. I bet that when we have a new prime minister these police will solve the case quickly. If this government decide to take legal action against me, those police would come to investigate me immediately."

Furthermore, Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005) also provided more details about the libel charges brought by Thaksin and his subordinates, which were presented in a police style, thus:

His subordinates declared that while I held the show at channel 9, I defamed the king which resulted in the cancellation of the show. The Prime Minister himself denied his involvement, but he sued me with a defamation charge from the show broadcasted on 9 September 2005. Moreover, he sued me as an agent of the government not the prime minister. I would say that this is the real style of police.

To further emphasize how Thaksin and his police subordinates troubled him, in the second episode of his show Sondhi welcomed his audience and announced that someone had sent a group of men to protest against him at his office. Moreover, some senators (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005), who were in his audience, were harmed after the show ended.

### **The causal attribution function**

Sondhi stated the **cause** of this mobilizing frame as *attempts by Thaksin to stop everyone criticizing him and acting as his opponents*. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5'*, 2005) thought Thaksin sought to halt him from revealing the truth or information to public because the premier could not tolerate critics. He said:

The Prime Minister keeps saying that he wants to transform Thailand into a "knowledge society". How can we become such society when he controls the freedom of media? He must provide liberty to the media by freeing the dissemination of news and information. He said we must have diversity in society. He must acknowledge the difference of opinions; conversely he cannot consent to this...

In terms of the struggle for the righteousness, it is hard to see brave ones standing firm and fighting against the state, because the ruler would apply state apparatus to eliminate them. For me, I used to be scared, and then I decided to fight back. Accordingly, I challenge this government to take legal action against me. I believe that at the end of the battle the noble will always be the winner. Mr. Prime Minister, I am really concerned about you. I always warn you that your true self is revealing to the public. Most media have not

found out your faults yet, it is only me who knows you very well. This is the underlying reason that explains his loathing towards me.

The fear of the truth would be revealed to the public was framed as the reason for Thaksin to take legal and illegal actions, to attack Sondhi and other opposition media.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In this function Sondhi applied dharma from Buddhism to explain the actions of Thaksin Shinawatra and those police subordinates who bullied him. He **called** Thaksin *a dictator*. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5'*, 2005) said:

I feel empathy for those policemen to act according to the command of their superiors. So far we are at the beginning of the battle; we must endure a great deal of hardships. It looks as if the unrighteous faction would win over us; however in the end the righteous people will completely win every battle.

Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005) told his colleagues and audience to tolerate the evil measures of Thaksin since in the end they, as the dharma and moral faction, would gain victory.

For Mr. Prime Minister, anyone who has diverse thoughts from him would be considered as an opponent to his benefits. If so, I am willing to be his obstacle to oppose him and protect our nation's assets perpetually. I would like to inform any dictators, including those junky people who are using evil methods to destroy me, I will conquer them by peace and tranquility. They can do anything to me, because I never fear them

...In every battle, I never cross the lines. I never want to become an influential politician. What I need is to stand at this point where everyone can see me any time. I insist upon my standpoint to reveal the truth to public at all times.

This labeling was done in two ways. Sondhi framed Thaksin as a dictator who bullied him with state power, he framed himself as the victim. Besides, he started to label his movement as the moral forces which were defending the country from the evil forces, Thaksin and his associates.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

For this function, Sondhi did not offer a definite solution. Instead, he (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5*, 2005) used a sermon from Luangta Maha Bua and His Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat to warn Thaksin that:

Luang Ta Maha Bua always says to let things go. One day the Prime Minister will be punished by his bad karma, which nobody escapes. I quote a message from His Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat to warn the premier that life is really short, but it is very important. In this life we have many paths to choose. We can do good or bad, thus we must carefully decide on our paths.

The solution implied to stop doing bad and turned to do good which might mean stop harassing him.

### **The metaframes**

This Thaksin police state regime mobilizing frame had been promoted along with the nation and democracy metaframes. It could be seen that Sondhi accused Thaksin of being an autocratic leader ruling the country with his police state regime. This police style was explained by Rowley (2006) that Thaksin applied his attitudes of business tycoon to Thai politics which were aggressive, obsessive, and ruthless as in the “new management ideology”. In addition his notions of administrative power were centralized, authoritarian, and primarily antagonistic to democratic governance. Hence, the military and defense forces were included in his political administration through the war on drugs scheme and the crackdown in the south.

From this, we will see that the Thaksin regime or, Thaksin police state regime, was contradictory to the foundation of democratic ideology. He violated freedom of expression and brutally abused human rights. However, it was interesting that Thaksin himself seemed to believe that he was a democratic premier who allowed opposition factions to express their views. For him, Thailand was his company, while its citizens were his employees. Other factors were the inability of Thaksin to

distinguish his business interests from the interests of the whole nation; his populism was also branded as the cause of the collapse of Thai economy.

## **7. The violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame**

This mobilizing frame was presented on every episode of the Muang Thai Raisupda political talk show to reflect the serious problem of the violence in the south of Thailand, particularly in Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and parts of western Songkhla province. Since 2004, these southern border provinces of Thailand (Pathan and Tweedie, 2013) have suffered violent incidents of bomb attacks and assassinations which have left nearly 10,000 injured and 5,600 dead. These incidents of unrest have a long history of being against a highly centralized state, and are seen as an indigenous ethno-nationalist conflict which began in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

According to the UNICEF situational analysis (Suwannarat, 2004, p. 11), the violence originated from the differences of religions, culture, and the discrimination from the majority Buddhist population against the southern Muslim population. In the history of the independent Malay Muslim kingdom of Pattani, these three provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat were part of this kingdom. It was defeated and turned into provinces in 1786 by Prince Surasi, the brother of King Chulalongkorn or Rama VI. The aboriginal Malay sultans (Suwannarat, 2004, p. 12) were replaced by Bangkok-appointed bureaucrats. The local people were required to pay taxes, while Thai law was enforced including the study of Thai language in primary education. The Muslims (*Violence in southern Thailand*, 2003) did not acknowledge the Buddhist bureaucrats resulting in the rebellion and resistance across the region. From 1950s to 1960s, more than 60 armed groups operated in the southernmost area. The aggressions (Suwannarat, 2004, p. 13) had continued but were lessened by the 66/2523 policy of General Prem Tinsulanonda in the 1980s.

However, the violence flared again when Thaksin Shinawatra became the prime minister in 2004. He countered the violence with armed forces and declared an emergency decree to increase the power of the forces in the area. He cracked down hard on suspected insurgents which made the situation worse. During his term, more than 2,500 drug suspects were murdered as were Muslims at the historic Krue Sae mosque and other places. The human rights situation, according to Vanida Tantiwittayapitak, worsened after Thaksin came to power (cited in Bhumiprabhas and Tangwisutijit, no date). His opponents, such as activists and community leaders, were killed and the Muslim lawyer, Somchai Neelaphaijit, disappeared in 2004. Vanida, a famous human rights worker, said that in the old days, the opponents of the government would be labeled as communists and eliminated, but in Thaksin's era, they (cited in Roberts 2004) turned into "drug dealers" and "terrorists". Former Senator Jon Ungphakorn (2004) said that: "The extreme right-wing patriotic movement is, I believe, being supported by the government itself because it deflects issues from the prime minister and the army. It is extremely dangerous for the entire country". Certainly, the worse situations in the south became an issue being framed by Sondhi, although his proposed solution may have been no better. This mobilizing frame was set up to undermine the image of Thaksin as the premier.

### **The problem definition function**

In the first phase Sondhi Limthongkul framed the **problem** as *the negligence of Thaksin Shinawatra to create peace in this region which led to the increased number of the unrest incidents*. Therefore, the agent or the **culprit** of this frame was *Thaksin Shinawatra*. In the third episode of his show, Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5*', 2005) described the losses thus:

Since January 2004, before the two marines were killed, we see that each week around twenty four people were killed. The whole picture of dead people from January 2004 to September 2005 reflected the uncommonly high number of incidents of violence. It could be assumed that the terrorists or the separatists are striking back against the measures of the government. Some may argue this is a typical fight by the terrorists against the serious

measures of the government. What I am going to point out is since January 2004 this government, under the ruling of Thaksin Shinawatra, has not succeeded in improving the unrest. The most concerning point is the premier announces himself to be the only one who is responsible for this problem. But he does not specify a deadline, the duration of time, or any particular measures to accomplish the stopping of the unrest. Generally, when someone offers himself to do something, he must state the exact deadline including what he would do if he fails to achieve the goal.

The numbers of dead people in each year was raised through the show to stress on the losses of innocent people. He determined to portrayed the image of unreliable premier included the failed strategy to reduce the violence in the south.

Furthermore, the unprofessional plans of Thaksin were pointed out to devalue Thaksin, the former police and businessman who turned to be the prime minister.

### **The causal attribution function**

In reality there are various factors relevant to the unrest incidents in the southernmost provinces of Thailand. However, Sondhi framed the **causes** as *the nepotism of Thaksin in supporting his police colleagues to accomplish the incident and the mistaken foreign policy of Thaksin with neighboring countries such as Malaysia and Singapore*. Moreover, he made the accusation that *Thaksin was terrified of those separatists*; since he hardly ever went to inspect the situations in the southern provinces. Sondhi (*'Perd chak muang thai rai supda san jorn'*, 2005) provided the background to the unrest, which involved many factors including the unsuccessful measures of Thaksin Shinawatra to relieve the problems, he said:

If we look back to the past, we would see the balance of power between the major groups in the south of Thailand. When the police started to manage this region, they did not share the interests of the other groups. Therefore, those groups decided to take back their power and interests by hiring some other groups to start the turmoil. The aim of those groups is to become peace makers by stopping the chaos. Unfortunately, this prime minister only believes in the information reported by his police subordinates which led him to dismiss many senior deputies. As a result, there is no permanent chief responsible for dealing with the insurgence. Some of agents report the ongoing situation to Nevin Chidchob (Thaksin's major colleague).

Nevin himself is from the northeastern region. He does not have enough potency or background knowledge about the southern provinces. He becomes a politician who is in authority for this unrest problem. By nature of the people from the south, in particular Muslims, they do not like Esarn people (people from the northeastern part) because of their different lifestyles. Therefore, the violence has been developing and increasing which leads to the intervention of international factions, especially Malaysia.

The above statement indicated that Thaksin, a former policeman, supported his police colleagues to manage the unrest, with no concern about the interest of the nation. As a result, the efficiency of the governmental agencies in the south was ruined by Thaksin's nepotism led to the situation worsening.

Sondhi framed the benefits between Thaksin with the Singapore government caused the conflicts among Thailand and Malaysia, the neighbouring country. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005) criticized Thaksin government's foreign policy that:

So far we can justify that Malaysia is totally involved with this problem. In terms of the violence in the south, we cannot only focus on the three southern provinces. We must consider the geo-political situation of Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Malaysia is a Muslim country with a combination of Chinese and Indians; basically they have had some conflicts with Singapore. Conversely, Thailand chooses to have a close relationship with Singapore instead. We allow the Singapore army to rent out the air force airports in Udonthani and Karnchanaburi provinces for fifteen years. Besides, Thaksin allows them to practice gun shooting in Khon Kaen. All these areas are restricted, even Thai people cannot trespass, but Singapore is allowed to occupy our air sovereignty. How come the prime minister announced that he would not let Thailand lose an inch of terrain to other countries? We are too close to Singapore both in terms of economy and supremacy. Singapore almost controls Thai economy. If I were the prime minister of Malaysia, I would consider utilizing the three southern provinces of Thailand as a buffer for Malaysia.

An example, from Sondhi, about Thaksin's attitude to the insurgence of the three border provinces was drawn when the premier did not go to the funerals of brutally killed militants. He thought Thaksin might be worrying about his safety. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2'*, 2005) said:

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announced, at the state office, that he never feared the insurgents, that this land would not be separated by the liberal movement. He would go to the south to 'clean' every violent incident. However, on Thursday 22<sup>nd</sup>, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn went to participate in a militant's funeral in Naratiwat province, while the prime minister accompanied the deputy prime minister of China in Chiangmai. Moreover, on Monday 26<sup>th</sup> Queen Sirikit, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, and Princess Chulabhorn Walailak had a sojourn at the Thaksin Palace in Naratiwat, the premiere, again, did not go there. He chose to stay in Bangkok. Nonetheless, before he gets mad at me and allows his subordinates to take revenge, he must consider himself first. In Bangkok he seriously criticizes the separatists, but he does not go to the south to eliminate them. Actually, he could go there safely, with his official aircraft and 4,000 guard soldiers, to prove that he has a real determination to solve the violence in the southern provinces.

Sondhi did not straightforwardly say that Thaksin feared those separatists; however this function effectively portrayed Thaksin as a fainthearted premier. Furthermore, Sondhi honored what he believed were the important roles of monarchy to work out the poverty and violence in the southernmost provinces.

### **The moral evaluation function**

From the Asia foundation report (Burke 2013), people from the south have been treated unfairly by the government. Even though they have received development projects and budgets from the government in the last few decades, "the rewards have been spread unevenly and inequalities have increased. Many people in the area feel that they are effectively second-class citizens". Similarly, Sondhi (*'Perd chak muang thai rai supda san jorn'*, 2005) **framed** Thaksin as *the essentialist*. He said:

I have been warning the premier since we aired the show on Channel 9. Do you remember? I said this country has various ethnic groups, whether he likes all of them or not. Even though he does not like some, they must be treated fairly as Thais. On the other hand, the premier considers everything based on his attitudes. If he does not like a group of people, they would be abandoned.

Thaksin, according to Sondhi, was a prime minister who was born in Chiangmai, a province in the north of Thailand. On the other hand, people from the south support the Democratic Party, the opposite party to Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party. Due to different political views, this implied that Thaksin discriminated against people from the south due to regions and voting records.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

Sondhi Limthongkul offered the **solution** for the violence that *Thaksin should reconsider the foreign policy with neighboring countries, especially Malaysia*. He suggested Thaksin should have a formal meeting with the Malaysian prime minister to find a solution and consensual agreement to make peace in the southernmost area of Thailand. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5'*, 2005) said:

The three southern provinces are significant to Thailand politically and economically. Even though we have differences in terms of religion, lifestyle, and culture, we are all Thais. We must make people in the south agreeably united with all Thais. Economically, the territory of these three provinces, according to the law of sea conventions, expands over half of the gulf of Thailand which includes the petroleum resources under the sea. Accordingly, these natural resources are the main reason for Malaysia to remain involved in the problem. As I mentioned, we must solve problem carefully, with wisdom and intelligence.

Sondhi pointed out that Malaysia might determine to separate the southernmost area of Thailand so as to take over the petroleum sources. According to Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 5'*, 2005), Malaysia involved with the unrest incidents in Thailand. He said:

We must use both carrot and stick. We must provide people in the south with justice. It is true that we lost two naval marines; on the other hand they have lost thousands of their families and friends too. Are we brave enough to acknowledge our fault in the past? Do you remember the teacher of the Malaysian prime minister? He has many famous students such as kings from Middle East. He gave honorable opinions about the Takbai incident, which are acknowledged by many Muslims in the south. He pointed out that even though this government is the key culprit of Takbai incident, Muslim-Thais

should forgive them and forget about the hardship and grief of the past. I think this is promising for the establishment of peace in this area. But unfortunately, nobody pays attention to continuing this peace making progress.

Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 3'*, 2005) also provided another solution by offering peace talks with the Malaysia prime minister.

We should define the true problem and discuss it with the Malaysia prime minister by asking him about the real dilemma. I think we might say that we will not allow Singapore to rent out our airports and consider the Malaysian prime minister's response. We should try to do this. Moreover, the unrest in the south should not be examined by the terrorism definition. Political science perspectives must be applied into the operation as well. We must consider the inter-relationships between Thailand and Singapore, Singapore and Malaysia, and Malaysia and Thailand. If Malaysia enthusiastically cooperates with us, those insurgents would not be able to be exiled in Malaysia.

Interestingly, Sondhi connected Singapore and Malaysia with this mobilizing frame. He suggested Thaksin to stop providing advantages to Singapore and improved relationships with Malaysia instead.

### **The metaframe**

It is interesting that Sondhi Limthongkul framed this mobilizing frame with a different perspective. Altogether he applied the nation metaframe with this framing to spotlight the apparent destruction of Thaksin Shinawatra in administration. He believed that Thaksin considered only his personal interests with Singapore, overlooking the security and sovereignty of the nation. This contrasted with the Malaysian prime minister who had acted in his country's best interests. For Sondhi, Thaksin was a real plunderer who traded the national assets to Singapore. Another blame was the division of the nation which caused by Thaksin. From his voting policy, it led to both division of the far south from the nation, and the division of people in Thaksin's thinking.

Another metaframe used was the king frame. In some parts of the frame he compared the monarchy's work to relieve the incidents of unrest with that of Thaksin. Apparently, the monarchy had no fear of going to the southern provinces, while Thaksin sheltered himself in Bangkok. The different images of the two sides were constructed into Sondhi's frame to honor the monarchy and disgrace Thaksin. The problems of this frame portrayed Thaksin as an irresponsible leader who never cared for people's lives. Also, it was constructed to create dissatisfied feeling among the military toward Thaksin, a former police officer. From this, Sondhi hoped for Thaksin to resign, if he could not fulfill the promise to relieve the unrest.

### **“In the second phase at Lumpini Park”**

From the sixth episode of “Muang Thai Raisupda Sanjorn” or “Mobile Thailand Weekly”, the show was relocated from Thammasat University to Lumpini Park. The reason was announced in the fifth show that the auditorium hall at Thammasat was reserved for other activities. Accordingly, they could not host the show the next week. Nevertheless, this may not be the only reason for Sondhi Limthongkul to move the show to Lumpini Park, a larger place. It is likely that Sondhi gained some confidence that he could continue his live shows or movements at the larger Lumpini Park.

Examining more closely his frames in the first phase, we can see traces of situations or events occurring at that time, which had impacts on his framing and movements. A reason (Khamnoon 2006, p. 113) that Sondhi decided to move the show to Lumpini was due to the numbers in the audience having greatly increased, nonetheless Khamnoon (2006, p. 99) revealed that since the first episode of the mobile live show, a group of famous people had attempted to persuade Sondhi to start a mass movement by associating his audience with theirs. Sondhi declined their offer by stating his standpoint as being a journalist. Nonetheless, people who convinced

Sondhi to start the movement had good connections with Thai elites such as Prasong Soonsiri a former head of the Thai National Security Council, Ekkayuth Anchanbutr a political activist and businessman, and Prapan Koonmee an experienced political activist. Most of them were Thaksin's rivals. During the first phase at Thammasat, this group carried out a protest at Sanamluang located near Thammasat, but only a handful of people joined them. According to Khamnoon (2006, p. 204), once they attempted to invite Sondhi's audience to join which failed. Khamnoon gave an interesting opinion of Sondhi that he refused to start the movement, but was willing to support and announce the movement of this group. Sondhi and Khamnoon agreed that they needed "friends" and experienced activists to lead the protest. They knew that Sondhi and his ASTV staff had no skills to undertake mass movements.

This alliance could have boosted the confidence of Sondhi Limthongkul that he could sustain the movement at Lumpini. He realized he was supported by a powerful group of famous and wealth people. Furthermore, some of them had good connection with the palace and elites. Conducting the movement with the support in terms of money and power seemed possible. Another key factor was the increased number of his audience. Sondhi pointed out on the show that his audience in many provinces had expanded. He could sell more products which might give him confidence financially. What he and his supporters needed was suited for starting a mass movement. It is possible that the second phase of the movement had to wait for an audience that was large enough to perform large and effective movements in the future. This needs for commitment could be seen developing in the first phase, as his audiences were enthusiastic to follow activities such as wearing yellow shirts and lighting candles. This was a promising sign that these audiences could become loyal potential participants for the coming protest. Besides, during this waiting he might have gained additional support from those powerful supporters, since Khamnoon (Khamnoon 2006, p. 203) revealed that Sondhi had had several meetings with them during the first phase. It is likely that they prepared the future mobilization through the meetings.

To prepare for the effective movements, the pattern of the show had been noticeably transformed, with the creation of symbolic activities to create a connection between Sondhi and his audience. Just sitting and talking about news was not enough attractive; the host of the show must have acting skills to entertain the audience similar to most television shows. Khamnoon Sidhisamarn (2006, p. 87), a senator, columnist, and Sondhi's thinker, explained that this time the show was designed to be the combinations of political debate in the hall, an outdoor show, and a broadcast television program (2006, p. 108). However, the alteration of the show's pattern and content had been developed to give this a degree of encouragement. The seven mobilizing frames which had been constructed since Thammasat were retained and applied into the show at Lumpini, but some were highlighted and raised in significance to appeal the potential participants. Throughout the duration of the show at Lumpini Park, the monarchy and corruption mobilizing frames, as well as the king, nation, and democracy metaframes were amplified and linked to almost all the issues. In particular the monarchy and king metaframes were emphasized throughout the show.

### **1. The corruption mobilizing frame**

This frame was retained in the second phase which this time focused on the privatization of state owned enterprises. The reason was that part of his audiences was state owned enterprise staff, particularly from EGAT. Interestingly, some of EGATT staff became the security guards for the show. Sondhi also criticized other negative sides of privatization such as the expensive oil price, the lack of potency in administration, and the corruption of Thaksin's colleagues in privatizing state owned enterprises. During that time, Thaksin's family and his close colleagues were condemned harshly for their alleged corruption. His issues were chosen to attract state owned enterprise staff and general people who suffered from the continual increase of oil prices. On the other hand, Thaksin and his associates were said to

gained huge benefits from corruption. Hence, the corruption mobilizing frame became one of the major frames that drew attention from the public. Some key issues remained and were developed with new empirical evidence to support his claims. Sondhi claimed that he was given evidence such as video clips, news, and official documents from some state officials and state-owned enterprise officials who had suffered from the crookedness of Thaksin Shinawatra.

At that time an important movement of Sondhi Limthongkul and his audiences was occurred and engaged with this corruption mobilizing frame. Sondhi announced on the 11<sup>th</sup> episode to call for transparency by appointing himself as “*Yam Fao Pandin*” (the guardian of the country). The Yam Fao Pandin group was set up on the 13<sup>th</sup> episode (23<sup>rd</sup> December 2005) and recruit the members to protect Thailand from corruption and media control. It was the initial movement of Sondhi and the audience which would be developed as the Yellow Shirts afterwards.

### **The problem definition function**

Sondhi identified the **problem**, at this stage, as *the betrayal of the nation by Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates*. The **culprit**, nonetheless, was considered in the main to be *Thaksin Shinawatra*. Examples in this frame were the same as those he presented at Thammasat which were supported by official documents to prove the reliability of the accusations. Nonetheless, the privatization of state owned enterprises was emphasized as the major misconduct of Thaksin in his treachery of the national interests. Sondhi (*‘Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8’*, 2005) said:

While Suvarnabhumi Airport construction is represented as the largest scale of corruption we have had this country, the EGAT privatization scheme of this government is the biggest national betrayal. After the privatization of EGAT, a significant number of stakes were sold to foreign investors, in a similar way to those of PTT. It’s interesting that the government promised to the public, before the privatization, that 70 percent of shares would be owned by the government. Conversely, it appeared last week that only 51 percent of shares were held by the government. Where have the rest gone?

Another example showing the corruption of Thaksin's family was a plan to buy a squadron of jet fighters from Russia. The plan belonged to Interior Minister Kongsak Wantana, whose wife was a close friend of Pojaman Shinawatra, Thaksin's wife at the time. Sondhi claimed that from this purchase Kongsak would earn a 10 percent commission fee, or Bt3.5 billion (US\$ 104 million), even though the Royal Thai Air Force committee rejected this Russian-made jet fighter squadron because it (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 11*, 2005) had too large a body for the standard of the RTAF

A key corruption which Sondhi attempted to magnify involved a sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, Monthatip Kowitcharoenkul. The accusation by Sondhi was that she ordered a Royal Thai Air Force C-130 aircraft to transport her friends from Bangkok to her house-warming party in Chiang Mai. A copy of official document was shown on the show. He called this incident "Tung Yai Digital" to frame the similarity to the event that caused the uprising of the student movement in 1973 (This historic uprising happened when a group of military personnel used an official aircraft to transport movie stars to hunt animals in Tung Yai Naresuan national reserve park). Sondhi compared the 1973 incident with Thaksin's sister's case by stating that this country was under the control of a powerful clan similar to the junta in the 1970s. With a huge amount of money and political power, members of the Shinawatra family could do everything. When their faults were discovered by public, they responded by keeping silent, on the one hand, according to Sondhi, they attacked their antagonists hard with legal actions and filthy intimidations, as they had done to him at that time.

### **The causal attribution function**

In regard to the **cause** of the problem, Sondhi identified the cause of the corruption as *the need of the Shinawatra family to be corrupt for their own benefit*. The sell of Thaksin to Singapore government was revealed which caused resentment in the opposite factions. The tax-free sale happened in January 2006 (*Thailand's Thaksin Freeze Ou't*, 2007) when Thaksin sold his family's public holdings, in Advanced Info

Service Plc (AIS), to the Singapore's Temasek Holdings for nearly 74 billion Baht, which involved the disposal of a national asset to a foreign country. However, this issue was not much focused on at that time since it only happened a few weeks before Sondhi started his "Goo chart movement" (saving the nation) on 4-5 February 2006. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 15'*, 2006) explained about this sale on the show, briefly, thus:

Mr. Thaksin determined to sell Shin Corp several months ago since he realized his potential downfall. He was afraid that in the near future his assets might be seized by a court order. To pave the way for his breaking away, he decided to sell it. There have been lots of rumours that he offered his company to various countries, only Singapore bought it under their agreements. I would say that this prime minister is a plunderer who allows Singapore to occupy Thailand's assets. According to the royal speech given by His majesty the King on his birthday, the premier got mad when the King suggested to him to adopt the philosophy of sufficiency economy into his policies. But on January 28, 2006, he was obviously jolly and even sang a song in an interview, the reason was that he could sell his Shin Corp to Singapore during New Year season. He went to Singapore with his children to sign the documents of the sale and held a press conference. The worst thing is he hasn't paid taxes for this sale at all. The director-general of the Revenue Department, who is his man, had recently declared that this case was an exception. Hence, there was no need for Thaksin to pay tax for this almost \$1.9 billion stake sale.

Another example was the loophole from the 1997 constitution which allowed Thaksin and his colleagues to be corrupt. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6'*, 2005) said,

This latest 1997 constitution was drafted to be the best constitution that Thailand ever had. It would be even better if we had a moral leader as well. Unfortunately, we've had a crooked leader who takes advantage of the loop holes of this constitution to be corrupt. It has been proved over the last 4-5 years that we must be more careful about any laws that are issued. We can't trust politicians and we cannot believe that the rich will never be corrupt. These corrupt politicians apply this constitution to claim that they are elected by people, but they buy the votes. They also spend the national budget and our taxes on million or trillion baht projects to get voted again.

It seemed Sondhi viewed this 1997 constitution as the tool that provided Thaksin the opportunity for corruption. Furthermore, the claim of Thaksin that he was elected by people to be the democratic prime minister, according to Sondhi's view, was used to legitimize his malpractices.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In this frame, Sondhi **labelled** Thaksin as *a liar, plunderer, and the problem of the nation*, whereas Sondhi and his participants **framed** themselves as *the moral faction who attempted to protect the national interests*. Sondhi's thoughts ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8*', 2005) about Thaksin and this government were that: "This government never keeps their promises. Those words are them lying through their teeth. Hence, we must not believe all their stories". *The corrupt family* was frequently framed when Sondhi hosted the show at Lumpini which referred to Luang Ta Maha Bua and Former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun's words about the corruption situation. Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 11*', 2005) said,

Do you remember about what was said by Luang Ta Maha Bua? He used to say that Thailand has been eaten and dilapidated by corruption. Besides, another former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun expressed his regretful sentiment towards the corruption of this government saying that it has systemically expanded into every faction. As I said, it is the mega corruption, especially by this mega corrupt clan.

We can see that Sondhi mentioned the related views of the respectful persons to stress on his moral movement.

To describe the shallow thoughts of Thaksin in reducing poverty, Sondhi compared King Bhumibol's philosophy with Thaksin's procedures. He attacked the "mobile Cabinet meetings", of Thaksin and his colleagues, which took place in some rural areas. Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 14*', 2005) criticized this on the 14th episode of the show thus:

This prime minister is the problem for this country, since he disapproves of the ideal of sufficiency. At the Art Samat district, he employs the plan to eliminate poverty, which is in contrast to His Majesty the King's ideas. Thaksin goes there and interviews local people about their incomes. His solution to the poor is to suggest to them to get more income. On the other hand, the philosophy of His Majesty the King to solve the poverty starts by considering our extra expenses for each month. We must reduce the excessive expenses until it reaches the balance point between income and expenditure. We don't need to get more money to pay for those excessive expenses, which is the premier's solution. His Majesty the King never encourages us to increase the growth of GDP rates.

The King's principles had been framed by Sondhi to imply the ignorance of Thaksin Shinawatra, while Sondhi framed himself and his audience as the good people who were protecting Thailand from greedy politicians.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The recommended **solution** to this mobilizing frame was *applying the sufficiency economy philosophy of King Bhumibol as the Thai economic policy*. Sondhi applied the King's birthday speech and Pramote's article in his framing. He honoured the King's philosophy as the finest means to eradicate the corruption that occurred under the governing of Thaksin Shinawatra. He said on the 12<sup>th</sup> episode of the show (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 12'*, 2005) that:

As I said before, we are spending immense budgets on improper things. According to the principle of sufficiency economy, our expenses should be consistent with our earnings, we should not overspend. His Majesty the King also stated that if everyone has faith in this principle, we should follow it. This philosophy is really functional for Thailand. His Majesty the King realizes the difficulties our country faces in the future, since our neighbouring countries such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and China focus on capitalism. They are competing in the search for new energy resources. At the moment, we buy power from Myanmar, while China in turn buys energy from us. Ultimately, we will end up with exasperating competition. To follow the principles of capitalism, we must work hard so as to gain more materials, but happiness. We don't feel satisfied in life anymore. The sufficiency economy philosophy of His Majesty the King is the only way to give us the true meaning of happiness.

In Thailand the King's speeches, on his birthday, have been followed by Thai people and adopted as honourable messages. His messages sometimes referred to major issues in Thailand at that time which described by McCargo (2005, p. 501) that: "the King acted as a didactic commentator on national issues, helping to set the national agenda, especially through his annual birthday speeches". Sondhi also implemented the King speech into his frames since the messages seemed useful to his agendas.

Another solution was the formation of the "Yam Fao Pandin" army. This was the beginning of Sondhi's movement in this early time. He encouraged his audience to be active in the army of "Yam Fao Pandin". He (Khamnoon, 2006: 104) announced on the 13<sup>th</sup> episode that:

I would like to invite everyone to participate in the "Yam Fao Pandin" army. We have the four main obligations to accomplish: (1) to demand the transparency in public and government administration, (2) to protect the freedom of the media, (3) to support the political reform, and (4) to endorse the power of the middle classes.

This concept was applied as an obligation of the group and became part of the Yellow Shirts's objectives. However, the last obligation was fascinating since Sondhi demanded to increase the role of the middle class in Thailand. Most of his audiences appear to be middle class; possibly he wanted to challenge Thaksin and his colleagues who were elites and their voters who comprised the majority rural poor. Thus, to do battle with them the suffering and grievances of the middle class must be raised to stimulate the disappointments of Sondhi's audiences. The conflicts between classes were applied in this mobilizing frame.

### **The metaframes**

Sondhi constructed the corruption mobilizing frame based on the nation, king, modernization and democracy metaframes. The nation metaframe was employed to create the sentiment of patriotism among his audience to protect Thailand from corruption. In the second movement period Sondhi labeled Thaksin and his family

as a corrupt clan. He framed many corrupt issues of this family which he claimed would lead to the eventual destruction of the nation. This nation metaframe was effective to arouse the sense of love toward Thailand. At that time, the major audience was staff of state owned enterprises which had had conflicts with the government on the privatization scheme. Consequently, this metaframe was useful for Sondhi to attract them to resist privatization to protect both of personal and national benefits. In terms of the general audience, Sondhi framed them as the middle class which was being intimidated by Thaksin and the poor or Thaksin's voters. The framing of the middle class dissatisfaction was just begun; hence it was not precisely seen as the key motivation for them to participate in the later movement. However, the formation of the "Yam Fao Pandin army" was underpinned by the nation metaframe. Sondhi set up the four obligations which directed the audience to protect the nation from Thaksin's corruption. This worked successfully in attracting and recruiting a larger audience, who saw this form of protection of the nation as inherent to their sense of Thai identity.

The next important frame was the king metaframe. In this second movement period Sondhi connected King Bhumibol to his framing which had been done in this corruption mobilizing frame. To attack Thaksin, an example from Art Samart district was presented to the audience. According to Thaksin's plan, this event (Pasuk and Baker: 2008, p. 67) was held to allow local people and officials to offer petitions to Thaksin. The tour was held at Art Samat district in Roi-et province in January 2006 and was set up as a "reality show" to eradicate poverty. It was broadcasted live on television. On this live show, Thaksin did many homely activities such as "dressing in a pakoma (common man's lower cloth); being transported on a village tractor (i-taen); riding a motorbike down a dusty village street; and accepting flowers from toothless old ladies". Sondhi criticized Thaksin's solution as a wasteful activity created to gain more popularity from the grassroots, because the plan to eradicate the poverty was not effective and sustainable. Consequently, the finer philosophy of King Bhumibol was proposed in order to undervalue Thaksin.

## 2. The monarchy mobilizing frame

This mobilizing frame had been raised as one of the most important frames during this second phase. Sondhi realized well about the love and loyalty of the Thais toward King Bhumibol, accordingly he emphasized on framing the honors and benefactions of the King. As previous mentioned, Sondhi started framing this monarchy mobilizing frame since he had the show on Channel 9. Shortly before the cancellation, he joined in a seminar at Thammasat to distribute the concept of the King's royal prerogative to the public. The "lost sheep" story was read in the seminar led to the escalation of the doubtful loyalty of Thaksin and his colleagues. During the show, Sondhi performed activities to show the respect to King Bhumibol. Nonetheless the major event that motivated him to focus on this framing was King Bhumibol's birthday.

On 4<sup>th</sup> December 2006 the King gave a royal speech on his birthday which advised Thais, and perhaps Thaksin, to live in moderation. After this, Pramote Nakornthab, a prominent political science professor, and Manager Columnist, wrote an article to stress on the King's speech. The King, according to Pramote's article, seemed concern on the defects of Thai democracy, the denial of Thaksin Shinawatra of public criticism, the corruptions, the misguided economic policy or populism, and the inattention of this government to his sufficiency economy principle. Counted by Pramote, the King stressed and repeated on his philosophy twenty three times during his speech. Pramote (2005) concluded that the King encouraged Thai society to follow his principle, not only Thaksin and the government; all Thai people must adopt this philosophy to protect the country from all calamities.

It is interesting that Sondhi activated his actual movement due to this special event. He attempted to imply that the King referred to Thaksin's misconducts through his speech. This was used as a sign for Sondhi to trigger the movements which might be claimed that it was done in accordance to the King's speech. In consequence, Sondhi

intensified the anger of the audiences and royalists through this monarchy mobilizing frame. The significance activity during this time was the intention of Sondhi Limthongkul to return this country to King Bhumibol and support the the extra-constitutional royal powers of the King through the “Rajprachasamasai principle” .

### **The problem definition function**

This time, the **problem** of this monarchy frame was constructed as *the plan of Thaksin and his colleagues to abandon the royal prerogative of King Bhumibol*. Sondhi provided evidence to support his claims, as he had done in the previous episodes. To support the allegation, an action of Thaksin’s subordinate in Chiang Mai province was mentioned. Sondhi (*‘Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 7’, 2005*) said:

I would like to show you a t-shirt that is made by Thaksin’s supporter in Chiang Mai. He is MP Pakorn Buranapakorn from Chiang Mai. This t-shirt has a slogan “We love Thaksin”, he makes wristbands too. When I heard about this I really felt downhearted. I want to believe that this action does not involve with the premier. It seems like MP Pakorn determines to convince the public to believe that Chaing Mai people completely support the premier.

This example seemed to deepen the anger among the royalists, since 2005 and 2006 were the years that Thai people had a celebration of King Bhumibol’s life events. The King turned 82 in 2005, while in 2006 there were the sixtieth anniversary celebrations of the King’s accession to the Throne. In that period of time, Thai people wore yellow T-shirts and silicon wristbands printed with the slogan “We love the King”. The significance of the yellow color was that it is associated with Monday, in Thai tradition, which is the day the King was born on. However, it could be said that Sondhi and his audiences were the earliest group that wore the yellow shirts to honour the monarch. After his television program was cancelled from Channel 9, he continued the show and wore a white and yellow t-shirt with the slogans “We will fight for the King” and “We love the King”. He persuaded the audience to show loyalty to the King by using yellow flags and stickers, and wearing yellow t-shirts. The numbers of people wearing yellow shirts and wristbands with

the slogan was greatly increased and spread to the public. Hence, the action of MP Pakorn to support Thaksin with the similar t-shirts and wristbands was, inevitably, considered by some people, including Sondhi, as a sign of disloyalty by comparing Thaksin to King Bhumibol.

In the 8<sup>th</sup> episode, Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8'*, 2005) reminded people of the actions of Thaksin when he performed the Buddhist rite in Wat Phra Kaew. This time, he supported his claim with more reliable evidence of photos and official documents. He explained to the audience that:

Regarding Thaksin's performance in the hall of Wat Phra Kaew, people who are loyal to His Majesty the King are going to charge the prime minister with the lese majesty law. This place has been reserved as a place for members of the Chakri Dynasty; in particular the position where Thaksin sat, as the head of the event, was reserved as the sitting position for the King. Evidently, he was not conscious of what the appropriate manners were. His subordinates eventually had a press conference to defend the action saying that they had held this event legally. They insisted that on April 8<sup>th</sup> they had sent a letter to the Office of His Majesty the King's Principal Private Secretary asking for permission from the King. From my information, before this event was staged, there were many meetings of committees. The conclusion from the meetings was that the head of this event was His Majesty the King, whereas the premier was just a participant. On the other hand, Mr. Vissanue had not offered a formal invitation letter to His Majesty the King. Instead, it was the premier who became the head of the event.

The next serious accusation was framed in episode eight. Sondhi claimed that Thaksin plotted a plan to isolate the King from Thai people. This plan was called "the tyrannical strategy of Thaksin Shinawatra". Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8'*, 2005) described this plan as follows:

At this time, in response, they determine to shut my mouth by legal actions. A policeman accused me with committing lese majeste, and the two Thai Rak Thai MPs went to the Central Investigation Bureau to accuse me of committing lese majeste and rebellion against me. According to the charge, I've become "the riot". As a riot I will reveal, to everyone, "the tyrannical strategy", the evil plan to separate the King from the people. Please concentrate on this; this could be the last time for me to publicly talk about this topic. We must be careful and deliberately consider this strategy. We

should not let them conduct this plan. The people of the King must realize that there are some movements at the moment, from some factions, committing the malpractices to abandon the royal prerogative. While someone who is disloyalty attempting to act as an equal to the King.

This plan seemed stirred up the furious of his audience and the royalists. Sondhi might deduce this plan when Thaksin's subordinates denied revealing the information about the appointment of the acting Somdet Phra Sangkarat to him. This new blame surprised the public that this prime minister had the evil plan to harm their esteemed monarch.

### **The causal attribution function**

This time, Sondhi Limthongkul identified the **cause** of this mobilizing frame as *an effort of this government, in particular Thaksin Shinawatra, to violate the royal prerogative of the King*. According to Sondhi, if this tyrannical strategy was accomplished, the King would have been limited in his royal power. In episode eight, Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8'*, 2005) explained that:

Mr. Thongthong said this government has had interactions with His Majesty the King regularly. By referring to the royal tradition from British, he claims that subjects which are discussed between the King and the government must not be revealed to the public. In other words, reference to the King, by the general public, shows inappropriate manners. I totally disagree with this idea. His Majesty the King is different from the Western Kings. He has undertaken several valuable developments for this country for, at least, the last 60 years. Any attempts to isolate the King from his people are absolutely immoral. The aforementioned claim by Mr. Thongthong would be acceptable if we were governed by the ethical government. On the other hand it would be appalling if we were ruled by the immoral government. The King would be restricted in his rights and be unable to freely help his suffering people from troublesome. This would be happened as a result from the "tyrannical strategy" of this government to isolate the King from his people.

Sondhi connected this plan to Thongthong's interview. He concluded that the government planned to report the King's news to the public, which would lead to the separation of the King from the people. According to Sondhi, this was the plan of Thaksin and colleagues to abuse the King's royal supremacy.

### **The moral evaluation function**

Sondhi **framed** Thaksin as the *unfaithful prime minister who attempted to act as an equal to the King*. The accusation was described in episode eight when Sondhi guided the audience to give an oath to protect King Bhumibol from Thaksin. In part of the vow, he labelled Thaksin Shinawatra as immoral leader. Consequently, people were longing to protect the treasured King, since King Bhumibol had untiringly devoted himself to develop and lead this country for 60 years. On the other hand Thaksin Shinawatra was an egotistical and conceited leader who was the representative of the greedy capitalist groups.

Thaksin, according to Sondhi's branding, undertook several malpractices to violate the King's royal supremacy. Thaksin and his capitalist colleagues had attempted to issue a new law to demolish the Thai traditional democracy (this will be explained later). Besides, they (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8', 2005*) plotted an evil plan to isolate the King from his people to control the power of the King. This time Sondhi straightforwardly branded Thaksin as disloyalty. He might have confidence to fight back with supports from the powerful political activists and the royalists.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The solution of this monarchy mobilizing frame has been a breakthrough for contemporary Thai political movements. It became the instant answer for many political movement leaders as "the finest solution" to solve the dead end nature of political conflicts in Thailand. Sondhi proposed *the concept of "Rajprachasamasai" as the **solution** to stop the government of Thaksin Shinawatra from committing corruption and violating the King's royal supremacy*. Sondhi referred this concept to Mom Rajawongse (M.R.) Kukrit Pramoj, a former prime minister and prominent royalist. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8', 2005*) put that:

Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj, our great philosopher, offered a concept of conformity between the King and the people which was called the “Rajprachasamasai” principle. Regarding this concept, any actions with a predisposition to isolate the King from the people are absolutely inappropriate.

This concept was proposed in the 8<sup>th</sup> episode which was the beginning step of Sondhi Limthongkul to start the movement. This activity might be his plan to test the extent of the audience’s love toward King Bhumibol before the protest started. Moreover, his standpoint and agenda of the movement was announced this time. According to Khamnoon, this movement had two stages. The first one was leading the audience to give an oath to restore King Bhumibol his royal prerogative. After this, they planned to collect signatures to offer to the Head of the Privy Council, General Prem Tinsulanonda.

Sondhi lead the audience to give the vow in front of the photo of King Bhumibol. He declared to do the battle to restore the King his royal prerogative. The oath (*‘Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8’*, 2005) was announced by Sondhi that:

His Majesty the King, I am Sondhi Limthongkul. I am here to give a vow, with all my might, to fight serenely to return His Majesty the King the Royal Prerogative which in conformity with the principles of the constitution. Accordingly, His Majesty the King would have an absolute royal authority to provide us a new leader to reform the politics and establish new political organizations through the amended constitution. As a result we would have the stability of the democratic government with the King as Head of State. This could stop wicked people conducting corruption and bring people peace and contentment.

I am here today to give my vow and collaborate with every faction to return Thailand to His Majesty the King in order to establish the solidarity in this country. His Majesty the King would have the royal supremacy to rule this country together with the people in conformity with the *Rajprachasamasai* principle, a Thai traditional rule of law which is a form of democracy with the King as Head of State.

The notion of Rajprachasamasai principle, raised by Sondhi, had been created by the elite in the early era of the Thai kingdom as part of the Thai kingship concept. In a

writing of Phya Anuman Rajathon (1951, p. 2), he asserted the meaning of the traditional Thai kingship that in the earlier periods the Thais had experienced several hardships such as poverty, natural disasters, and wars. So as to survive, they must have a leader who can protect their lives and provide them serenity and unity. Accordingly, the King was elected to be their leader to protect them from sufferings and enemies. This Thai kingship concept had been appeared in part of the King's name that was "*Anekchonnikorn samosorn sommut*" or "elected by the people". From the definition of Phya Anuman Rajathon, Thai kings were elected by the people to rule the country, which was the democratic mean to elect the leader. However, in reality Thai monarchs had to struggle hard with the members of their royal family and powerful officials to become the King. In the real lives of some Thai monarchs, the concept of "*Anekchonnikorn samosorn sommut*" seemed diverse from the explanation of Phya Anuman Rajathon.

This concept was brought back in 11 December 1971 by Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj. Sondhi Limthongkul (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8'*, 2005) told the audience that Kukrit transformed the principle of "*Anekchonnikorn samosorn sommut*" into "*Rajprachasamasai*". It was the combination of *Raja+pracha+som+asai* to describe the role of the monarchs in Thai politics. Nonetheless, the "*Rajprachasamasai*" concept was transformed again in 1973 by a political-science professor Chai-anant Samudavanija to offer the solution after the uprising of the students in October 1973. He asserted the alternative definition of "*Rajprachasamasai*" as "the joint-ruling between the monarchy and the people through the House of Representatives". Chai-anant (Supalak, 2008) pinpointed it as the essential concept for Thai people that had no faith in political institutions and dishonest politicians.

Sondhi Limthongkul brought up this concept as the solution to stop Thaksin from abandoning King Bhumibol's royal prerogative. Sondhi's movement and his concept were supported by some famous aristocrats and royalists such as Professor Pramote Nakornthap and Chai-anant Samudavanija, his Manager Columnists and

respected advisors. During the campaign of Sondhi on the monarchy issue, Pramote also wrote an article to explain the meaning of the royal prerogative in the Manager Newspaper. He cited the case of Jaruwat Menthaka to portray the misconduct of Thaksin's government in violating King Bhumibol's royal prerogative. In the article, Pramote (Pramote 2006) provided the background of "*Rajprachasamasai*" concept, which actually was named by King Bhumibol in 1958. Also, the King gave the characterization of the concept that "the King and the people are interdependent". In terms of the royal prerogative, Pramote provided the definition of Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramoj that:

I would like to propose the middle path of the Rajprachasamasai principle which allows the King to rule this country in association with the people. According to this concept, the King and the people would have more administrative power than in a democratic regime. The reason is the King and the people have sincere good wishes and regard towards each other. If this country were ruled by love and care of the King and the people, Thailand would become the land of peace, serenity, and civilization as everyone wish.

More backdrops was given in the article, in that the concept of "*Rajprachasamasai*" had been established since ancient times, for instance, in the Sukhothai period it was called *Pho Khun* or patriarchal king (father rules, children ruled). In the Ayudhya Kingdom it was *Devaraja* which was the combination of Buddhism and Bramahnism, and it was named "*Anekchonnikorn samosorn sommut*" in the Rattankosin period. An interesting point about the power of the King was that in past times Thai people relied on the support and protection of the King. When the absolute monarchy was overthrown by the military and civil bureaucrats in the 1932 revolution, a constitutional monarchy was established. Pramote believed that the supremacy of the King, to protect the people and relieve their difficulties, has been curbed since that time.

He referred to the British monarchy saying that the extra-constitutional power of the British Monarch was accepted as part of the royal prerogative. This power could be used by the monarch in times of crisis. Pramote condemned the present day Thai

politics that Thailand has not been able to establish the firm democracy since the political leaders never have faith in the monarchy and the people. Hence, the constitution has been created to limit the rights of the King and the people to participate in the political arena. This, according to Pramote's writing, could be seen from a phrase in the constitution that "the King is above politics and under the constitution".

In terms of the character of the royal prerogative, Pramote explained the first criterion that appeared in the constitution that: "The King can do no wrong". He identified that any action made by the King was always legitimate with no wrongdoing at any point. To illustrate this meaning, he gave an example of Thai royal custom of when the King ordered a royal command. Traditionally, there must have a person, who could be either the Prime Minister or another state official acted as the signatory responded to the royal command. When the royal command process was completed, nothing could be changed. For the next criterion, Pramote explained that "The Royal Prerogative remains a significant source of constitutional law which is largely immune from scrutiny by the courts". He pointed out that when the royal command was ordered and completed, the court had no right to oppose the enacted royal command. In other words, any confutation toward the royal command of the King, which led to the deterioration of the royal prerogative, should not be done. For that reason, if one insisted to bring up the royal command, to re-consider the legitimacy in the court, it could be considered as an intention to violate the royal prerogative. The writing of Pramote (Pramote 2005) determined to explain the action of Thaksin and his colleagues in the dismissal of Khunying Jaruwan Menthaka from the Auditor-general post. It was indicated the act of Thaksin, concerning this matter, as inappropriate and absolutely violating the royal prerogative of King Bhumibol.

### **The metaframes**

This monarchy mobilizing frame was based on the king and democracy metaframe. Even though this mobilizing frame emphasized on the King and the royal prerogative, it was also involved with the democracy. Sondhi announced in the show that he would do everything to protect King Bhumibol and return to him the royal supremacy. By this, the King should play a major role during the critical political situation. Sondhi and his colleagues believed that the authority of the King had been abandoned by both the constitution and politicians, which had been done through a democratic regime. To solve the crisis resulting from the defective administration of Thaksin Shinawatra, Sondhi proposed the concept of *Rajprachasamasai* which was considered by him, and some scholars, as the traditional form of Thai democracy. From this concept, the King and the people would rule the country together, with love and compassion, by being dependent on each other.

Nevertheless, Pramote declared that a democratic regime, with the King as Head of the State, had the same objective with the *Rajprachasamasai* principle in terms of participatory democracy. The King and the people would have both authority and participation in accordance with the concept of a democratic regime (Pramote 2006). Thus, it could be explained that Sondhi proposed his concept of democracy, based on traditional Thai Kingship, to remain which would secure the King's and the monarchy's power in Thailand. On the other hand, the Western style of democracy, which was used by Thaksin Shinawatra, was rejected by Sondhi and his group.

### 3. The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame

This mobilizing frame was produced to support the monarchy frame and creating the image of moral movement of Sondhi Limthongkul and his audiences. The event which occurred and had an impact on this frame was the fully support from Luang Ta Maha Bua. Thus, Sondhi engaged the monk into this frame included King Bhumibol to create his moral movement image. However, this frame had a lessened significance in this second phase since Sondhi turned to focus on the other mobilizing frames, which were more powerful in terms of mobilization. Issues involved with this mobilizing frame had not been significantly changed, but emphasized on the close relationships between King Bhumibol and Somdet Phra Nyanasamvara.

#### **The problem definition function**

The **problem** of this mobilizing frame was *the appointment of acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat to replace Somdet Phra Nyanasamvara* which was identical to the framing in the first phase. The main **culprit** was, again, indicated to be *Thaksin Shinawatra* as the key agent, but this time Sondhi also stridently attacked *the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm*, who was in charge of this appointment.

Sondhi insisted that Somdet Phra Nyanasamvara had good health to accomplish his duties as Somdet Pra Sangkarat. Several evidences, such as official documents, photos, and video clips, were used to support his arguments. In this frame, Vissanu was accused of being deceitful in the appointment process by misinforming the public, including hiding the truth from Queen Sirikhit. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6'*, 2005) put that:

This is a very serious case, but this government disregards this action. Why is this so critical to us? I must say that to enact the royal decree, Mr. Vissanu had a royal meeting with Her Majesty Queen Sirikhit so as to assert, to her, that His Majesty King Bhumibol has agreed to the appointment of Somdej Kiaw to act in place of Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. I would say that this is

his determination to abandon the prerogative of the King. At the moment, the disciples of Luang Ta Maha Bua are bringing a charge against Vissanu Krue-ngarm of committing lese majeste.

It seemed that Vissanu, as alleged by Sondhi, determined to deceive Queen Sirikhit that King Bhumibol approved of this appointment. Thus, Vissanu was guilty of committing lese majeste by deceiving both the King and Queen. The movement of Luang Ta Maha Bua and Sondhi were consonant which was presented through the frame.

### **The casual attribution function**

While hosting the show at Lumpini Park, Sondhi Limthongkul had not, obviously, mentioned the fundamental reasons behind this appointment. When he was at Thammasat, he made implications about the intention of Thaksin to act in ways comparable to King Bhumibol by appointing his own Somdet Pra Sangkarat. According to Sondhi, Thaksin might need to expand his political power into the Thai Buddhist realm for the personal interests of himself and his associates.

The hidden agenda of Thaksin was revealed in Khamnoon's book. He and Sondhi assumed that the purpose of Thaksin in promoting Somdet Kiaw was that this monk had a close relationship with Pojaman's family. Furthermore, Khamnoon (2006, p. 82) claimed that Thaksin desired to gain more votes by assisting Somdet Kiaw, since the monk was involved with Phra Dhammakaya Temple. Khamnoon (2006, p. 82) portrayed that the Thai Rak Thai Party of Thaksin Shinawatra was supported by Phra Dhammakaya Temple, led by the abbot Phra Dhammachayo. In 1997, this temple faced difficulties due to the reduction of both followers and donations. Political power was needed for them to survive their impaired situation. As a result, the network between Thaksin Shinawatra "the King of political marketing" and Phra Dhammachayo "the King of religious marketing" was created to achieve their mutual interests. It must be noted that Phra Dhammakaya Temple had a huge number of devoted followers all over Thailand. Hence, wholesale voting from them, for Thaksin's party, was not far from Thaksin's expectations.

Nonetheless, during that time the former Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was the primary figure in eliminating “the abnormal practices” from the Thai Buddhist dominion. The teachings and practices of Phra Dhammachayo and his Phra Dhammakaya Temple were investigated and judged as committing corruption and not being in accordance with the Buddha’s principles. In Khamnoon’s view (2006, p. 82), to accomplish the plan of Thaksin and Phra Dhammachayo, a new Somdet Pra Sangkarat, that is Somdet Kiaw, must be appointed to be the King of Thai Buddhist realm.

### **The moral evaluation function**

The **label** of *the liar* was given to the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm, while that of *the sinner* was given to Thaksin, according to the sermon of Luang Ta Maha Bua. An example was presented by Sondhi (*‘Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 7’*, 2005) thus:

Mr. Vissanu authorizes this appointment by referring to the illness of Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara, without the approval from His Holiness’s medical team. He claims that the Sangha Supreme Council of Thailand has a resolution to appoint an acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. On the other hand, Somdet Polklang from Chana Songkram Temple argues that on that day he was there with Vissanu. It is he who suggests to Mr. Vissanu to carefully study the law and regulations before having a meeting with the council, which means that this appointment is not approved by the council. Conversely, Mr. Vissanu announces to the public that the Sangha Supreme Council has agreed to this appointment and that it is also approved by Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. Unfortunately, Mr. Vissanu doesn't know that I've got a document of Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. From this document, we will see that His Holiness signs his signature and then crosses it out which indicates his disagreement to the appointment. This is evidence which demonstrates that what Mr. Vissanu has done is completely committing falsification.

The long and congenial relationship between King Bhumibol and Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was described through the show. To reinforce his claim, Sondhi explained that when the King ordained as Buddhist monk his mentor, during

his monk-hood, was Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. Interestingly, Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6'*, 2005) stressed on the bond between the King and Somdet Nyanasamvara in this frame thus:

Apparently, both His Majesty the King and Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara were born to rule this country as Kings. The secular kingdom has been ruled under the throne of His Majesty King Bhumibol, while Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara is determined to rule the Buddhist kingdom as His Holiness Somdet Pra Sangkarat.

The intention of Sondhi to emphasize on the King and Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara's connections could be understood as his attempt to intensify the fault of Thaksin and Vissanu. This message was selected and highlighted to persuade his participants to protect both Buddhism and the King, the two primary institutions. They were convinced to have faith on the duty and rightfulness, as a moral force, to protect the revered figures.

According to the support of Luang Ta Maha Bua, Sondhi authorized his legitimacy to conduct the "moral movement". Sondhi announced that Luang Ta Maha Bua **framed** his actions as *dharma actions* in hosting the show, and providing information to the public. Thus, as a *moral person*, he (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6'*, 2005) never feared the intimidations of Thaksin and his associates. He had been protected by tens of thousands of blessed forest monks under the leadership of the esteemed Luang Ta Maha Bua.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

When hosting the show at Lumpini Park, Sondhi did not propose another solution for this frame. He had said, since the show was held at Thammasat University, that Thaksin should stop appointing the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat to prove his loyalty toward King Bhumibol.

Nonetheless, on the 9<sup>th</sup> episode of the show (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 9'*, 2005) an invitation letter from Luang Ta Maha Bua to Sondhi Limthongkul and Thaksin Shinawatra was recited. The monk invited them to go to Wat Pa Ban Tard in Udon Thani province to make reconciliation. Even though this proposal of Luang Ta Maha Bua was not asserted as a precise solution for this Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame, Sondhi accepted the invitation. The subject of the letter was described on the show thus:

I've just received a letter from Luang Ta Maha Bua invites us to see him for building peace. In the letter, it was written: Dear Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. I am aware of the situation between your Excellency and Mr. Sondhi Limthongkul which might cause severe hatred and discord in our society. The security and amity of Thailand, a country of Buddhism, could be affected by this. The undesired destructions should be avoided. I would like to invite your Excellency to have a meeting at Wat Pa Ban Tard, Udonthani province to establish peace and serenity in this country.

For me (Sondhi Limthongkul), I'm willing to accept the invitation, but the premier may not have time to come. If I could meet him there, I would ask him the same old questions. I really want to know his answers to the questions I've asked him before.

This could imply that the **solution** of this frame was to *ask for the solution from Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister*. Only the former premier could work out this problem.

### **The metaframes**

The religion and king metaframes were involved with this mobilizing frame. Even though Sondhi posited the importance of every religion in Thailand, Buddhism was principally focused on to mobilize his Buddhist followers. Sondhi engaged with famous monks and framed himself as a moral force supported by those forest monks. He realized that the religion frame was effective to draw the attention from Buddhists. Besides, a major reason that many monks and lay people were activate in this movement came from a verdict of Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara. Khamnoon

explained that Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara had the duty in eliminating “the abnormal practices” from the Thai Buddhist dominion. It appeared that Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara did not approve of the teachings and practices of the Dhammakaya Temple, which were seen as not conforming to the teachings of Buddha. Most of Sondhi’s supporters agreed with the verdict of Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara. When Sondhi pointed out the connections of Thaksin, Somdet Kiaw, and Dhammachayo from the Dhammakaya Temple, his supporters were eagerly to join the movement to get rid of these “abnormal practices”. Also, King Bhumibol was touched upon through the king metaframe. The relationship between the King and Somdet Pra Nyanasamvara was tied in to solidify the blame as Sondhi had done in the first phase.

#### **4. The media control mobilizing frame**

In this second phase, Sondhi had encountered a worse situation of media censorship. He was allegedly attacked many times by groups of young men who he claimed were ordered to attack him by Thaksin’s subordinates. It happened when he performed the live show at Lumpini Park. At that time, the show would occasionally be interrupted. Sometimes, a group of men would be sent to disturb the audience by throwing firecrackers into them, attacking them with offensive speech, and threatening Sondhi Limthongkul’s security. Furthermore, the show and his media networks had been blocked by both legal and illegal means. It was removed from the broadcasting schedules of the local cable TV networks. Some policemen also charged him with legal accusations to bar him from conducting the movement, while Thaksin and his lawyer team continued the legal action. However, there was a significant event on the 10<sup>th</sup> episode. Sondhi suddenly hosted the show from Wat Pa Ban Tard, Udon Thani. He told his audience that he was hunted by some people; fortunately he escaped and was under the protection of Luang Ta Maha Bua. Sondhi

declared his battle with Thaksin Shinawatra on the show. Accordingly, this mobilizing frame was constructed to show the grievances of Sondhi Limthongkul caused by Thaksin.

### **The problem definition function**

The **problem** in this mobilizing frame was constructed as *the intention of Thaksin to silence the media*. Thus, the **culprit** was *Thaksin's cabinet*. According to Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8*', 2005), Thaksin viewed him and some media outlets as opponents. Sondhi said:

This government decides to silence the media that criticize their mega projects. The government does not want people to hear my voice. In fact, the owners of some media outlets also support this government. When the government dissatisfies, they typically use state-owned television to attack the opposite factions and convince people to support those mega projects.

In terms of his media, Sondhi pointed to the rights as a journalist which in accordance with the 1997 constitution. He ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 10*', 2005) attacked Thaksin's subordinate who curbed his freedom of speech thus:

How could Mr. Phumtham Wechayachai (the Deputy Transport Minister) block us from our basic rights? According to the 1997 constitution, in sections 39 and 40, as Thai people we have freedom to receive news and information. Besides, as a journalist, I have the right to express my opinions and make speeches as well. You accuse that I am destroying democracy; on the other hand, it is you who abolishes democracy by stopping us from exercising our basic rights.

Sondhi said Thaksin had made a mistake by cancelling his "Muang Thai Raisupda" show from Channel 9. According to Sondhi, most of his audiences were normal laid back Bangkokians who were ignorant about political situations. Generally, they would watch their favorite TV shows and go to bed around 11 p.m. every day. Occasionally, they might complain about minor issues, resulting from some policies of the government, with their colleagues. When this program was cancelled, they were irritated. Hence, they started wondering about the reason of the cancellation. They wanted to know what Sondhi had done that led to the termination of their

favorite show. When Sondhi had the mobile live show, the government continued to intimidate him. For that reason, these frustrated people wanted to know the truth and ultimately became his regular audience, which was the reason for the upsurge in numbers. Sondhi (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 9, 2005*) stated that the more the government threatened him, the more the people came to support the live show.

### **The causal attribution function**

Sondhi (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6', 2005*) explained the **cause** of media control on the sixth episode saying that *Thaksin and the government were afraid of the information revealed by Sondhi*. He said:

As I said, our society is covered by darkness. Those devils harm us by camouflaging themselves in the dark. The only thing to dispel them is by lighting candles. I am the first one who lights the candle of my knowledge. This will be followed by thousands of people. This is a reason for them to severely intimidate me. My tactic works well, so they are afraid of it.

According to the Nation newspaper, they (*Team to tackle Sondhi threa't, 2005*) reported that the Thai Rak Thai Party had arranged “a special team to try and stall Sondhi Limthongkul’s plans to bring down the government”. The government was anxious that Sondhi might prompt the audience to file a petition to the King for a new interim constitution, which might lead to the overthrow of the government. Thus media control became the measure to stop Sondhi for the further movements.

### **The moral evaluation function**

Likewise the first phase, he **framed** this government as *devils attempting to hide their malpractices* such as corruption, the abandonment of royal prerogative, and the failure of their administrative policy. Accordingly, he also **framed** himself and his audience as *the ethical ones helping this society by lighting candles of knowledge to drive away those devils*. Thus, the candle of dharma metaphor had been emphasized again through this mobilizing frame. According to Sondhi, Thai media,

which should act as a mirror to reflect the truth and lead society on the right paths, did not accomplish their duty. On the other hand Sondhi identified himself as a decent journalist who dared to fight this malevolent government.

In the 11<sup>th</sup> episode (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 11'*, 2005), he told the audience that he had been transformed into a journalist purposed to protect the primary institutions of nation, religion, and king. He was not anymore the old Sondhi who had done both good and bad. During the show, he asked the audience to forgive him for his past mistakes. He would devote himself to perform his journalism roles, and refused to have any position in a government as a reward. In episode twelfth, he (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 12'*, 2005) re-stated his position as a journalist, who was a representative of the people, fighting for what was right. Sondhi stressed that he was just a patriotic Thai who love this country, similar to his audiences.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

When the show was hosted at Thammasat, the **solution** of the media control frame was recommended as *expanding the networks of information*. The metaphor of “Tian Hang Tham” or lighting the candle of dharma was raised as one of the movement's symbols. Similarly, this solution also applied into the frame during this second movement period. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6'*, 2005) said:

In this darkened society, I have to be brave and speak the truth as a journalist. This is the mean to light up our society. If all of you can relate to this, please cooperate by igniting your candles to distribute the truth to your colleagues. This is the only way to scare and drive out those devils. They have intimidated me by several means because they are scared by our candle lights. Our strategy is really effective, since they are facing difficulties. If we keep doing this, in the end we will have a transparent society.

Another **solution**, furthermore, was *the decision of Sondhi to sue Thaksin and his subordinates*. This idea came up when the Public Relations Department stopped relaying satellite feeds from ASTV 1; accordingly the local cable TV network had to

stop broadcasting the show. However, this could not bar the audiences from other provinces. Those local residents in major cities (*'Modern media subverts Sondhi ban'*, 2005) such as Phuket, Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, and Hat Yai declined to surrender. They gathered people to watch the show via open air projectors. Besides, according to Sondhi's accusation, some policemen and politicians had made efforts to stop him by charging him and his co-host, with various allegations, in many provinces. With the support of Luangta Maha Bua, Sondhi decided to sue them back. He also invited the audience in Bangkok and other provinces to protect their rights and freedom. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 9'*, 2005) said:

According to the constitution, we have the right to receive news and information through any form of media such as television, radio, newspapers, and websites. When this government blocks the media, we can sue them through the Administrative Court. The first defendant is the government, while the second one is the cable TV operator. If everyone loves me and the freedom of expression, we must not compromise with them.

This solution was offered to the audience by encouraging them to follow his show and sue the government for blocking the show. This solution was framed as beneficial for the people to fight for their freedom; as well Sondhi could disseminate his show and other products without control.

### **The metaframes**

This media control mobilizing frame was shaped from the democracy metaframe since the Thaksin government curbed the freedom of speech and expression of Sondhi Limthongkul, the audience, and other media outlets. This practice of the government was completely against democratic regime. According to Suwat Apaipak, the lawyer of Sondhi Limthongkul, he (Escobar, 2005) said: "this is the first time that a prime minister has sued a newspaperman in the history of democracy in Thailand." Obviously, the 1997 Thai constitution gave more freedom of speech than its predecessors, but Thaksin also filed other media, such as the Bangkok Post, Matichon and Prachachat Turakij, with lawsuits for defamation. The Bangkok post

defined this incident as “an unprecedented threat against their constitutional right to free expression”.

While the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA) was concerned about press freedom in Thailand under this government. Executive director of SEAPA Roby Alampay gave his insight saying that “Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra should take the blame for this dismaying portrayal of Thailand as a country where the press is suddenly under a dark cloud”. The Asia Times Online described Sondhi taking his show on the road as “an expanded exercise in participative democracy”. It is interesting that Thaksin had often announced to the public that he came from election and was voted in by the people. In a nutshell, he was the democratic prime minister. From Sondhi’s framing, Thaksin was a dictator who demanded to control critics from the media. This was not a true democratic means as he claimed.

## **5. The populism mobilizing frame**

At Lumpini Park, this mobilizing frame had not been focused on as much as the corruption and monarchy frames. However, it was raised to attack Thaksin when King Bhumibol gave a speech on his birthday. As I mentioned in the previous frames, the King’s speech was analyzed that the King seemed to disagree with Thaksin projects including his populism. The philosophy of sufficiency economy was suggested by the King as the way to solve the economic crisis. The important point of this frame is the solution function, as Sondhi asserted the King’s philosophy and attacked Thaksin’s populism.

### **The problem definition function**

The **problem** of this frame was *the use of populism as the vote winning policy of Thaksin and his party*. The main **culprit** of this frame was *Thaksin Shinawatra*.

Populism was hardly referred to by Sondhi during this second phase. He only pointed out the problem of populism on the day he led his audience as the solo leader of “Muang Thai Raisupda” movement, on February 5, 2006. He (*‘Muang Thai wan goo chat’*, 2006) said to his followers that:

While we’re getting poorer, they’re becoming richer. This is the era of Thaksinomics. He buys the grassroots with money. When they have money, he sells them his mobile phone products. The grassroots are supposed to spend the village funds on their own businesses; on the other hand they spend it on excessive stuff. Thaksin and his colleagues claim to eliminate the poverty by giving money to the poor. He hasn’t solved the problem following His Majesty the King’s concept. His populism is the policy created to increase his votes. He fools the people into voting for him with this populism.

This message was repeated the one in the first phase. However, he condemned on the grassroots’s spending which caused the dissatisfaction from his middle class audience.

### **The causal attribution function**

From the twelfth episode, the **cause** of this frame was *Thaksin and his associates create populism to gain votes from the poor*. Sondhi (*‘Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 12’*, 2005) criticized Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai party thus:

I don't think his policy is the new one. It has been done before by the other leaders. Thaksin just copies those ideas to make himself wealthier, while we are getting poorer. We are the middle class who are used to support his prosperity. He is only good at promoting populism and buying his votes with our taxes. This strategy has been used in America, England, France, and so forth. Hence, we are fooled by him to believe that this government is contributing new things to this country. In my view, they are just the government that only thinks about gaining huge interests.

The cause of the problem was focused on vote buying. At that time, the next election was nearly approach, thus Thaksin began to produce new populist projects to attract his voters. Accordingly, Sondhi criticized this strategy through this frame and in some frame.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In terms of moral judgment, Sondhi **framed** Thaksin and his government as **greedy ones** who only concentrated on their interests. The populist policy, which had several disparities to the philosophy of sufficiency economy of King Bhumibol, was drawn to the attention of the public. At this time Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 12'*, 2005) connected the King's ideas with this mobilizing frame thus:

Our society has gone mad now; our leader is leading us to become economic slaves. He does not help us to stand on our own feet. Certainly, this doesn't cause him trouble, because this government gets 10-20 percent of commission fees from their mega projects. Thus, they are able to support their children to study abroad, while we have to work hard to pay debts. What the premier has done is in complete contrast to the philosophy of sufficiency economy of His Majesty the King.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

Similar to some previous frames, the ideals of King Bhumibol were tied into this frame. Sondhi raised *the sufficiency economy philosophy as the finest treatment for curing the defective economy and morality*. On a show he criticized Thaksin's populist projects that needed huge budgets, while the Thai economy at that time was going slumped. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 12'*, 2005) said:

The premier expects huge foreign investment in the subways and mega projects. He proudly announces that he can invite the foreign investors to give Thailand a chance to have the first project ever. He also states that his government is willing to spend a huge national budget for those projects since they will never hold-up the advancement of the country. Besides, He also said that he does not feel tired of being criticized. From the premier's words; we need to understand his mental illness. His Majesty the King just gave us a royal speech advising us to live on the moderate needs, following the philosophy of sufficiency economy. On the other hand the premier insists to continue his projects.

It seems we have different viewpoints in terms of developments. For Thaksin, development is about high rise buildings, the lottery project,

entertainment complexes, casinos, and his failed OTOP project. On the one hand, my definition of development is to concentrate on developing mind and soul. For me, the indication of the true development could be perceived from the honesty of politicians, the solidarity of the country, the contentment of the family, good education, the freedom of the press, and the participation of people in administration. It is apparent that the premier and I have completely opposite notions of development.

The above statement was referred to the King's philosophy. The development definitions which mentioned by Sondhi were framed to point put the greedy mind of Thaksin. Alternatively, his development was drawn from King Bhumibol's philosophy which was applied to attack Thaksin and make himself an image non-greedy journalist.

### **The metaframes**

Obviously, the nation, king, and modernization metaframes were involved with this mobilizing frame. Regarding the nation metaframe, the populism was the destructive policy which ruined the stability of the economy including the morality of the Thai people. This populism, according to Sondhi, was the political platform used by Thaksin to gain votes from the grassroots, while the middle class paid their taxes to spend on this policy. Sondhi viewed Thaksin as the greedy leader which could do everything to gain votes, while with his voters spent money, given by Thaksin, with no troubles. They, thus, were people who might destroy Thai economy; consequently conflicts between the classes had been created.

The king and modernization metaframes were engaged when Sondhi opposed Thaksin's modernization which was founded on capitalism. He labelled this populism as the defective policy which encouraged the growth of consumerism among people and led to the increase of household debt. Accordingly the best remedy was the King's sufficiency economy idea.

## 6. The Thaksin's police state mobilizing frame

This frame was promoted together with the media control mobilizing frame because the dictatorship of Thaksin to control the media and administrate the country with police style. However, this frame determined to attack the police which was prominently promoted to take major positions. This frame was not paid attention to focus, but there was an event, the assassination, which was happened with Sondhi Limthongkul before he hosted the 10<sup>th</sup> episode. It became the turning point for Sondhi to fight Thaksin and the colleagues. During the second period, Sondhi had been harassed by some policemen and sometimes by groups of men, which was supported by Thaksin's policemen.

### The problem definition function

The **problem** in this frame was *the intimidation of the people by the immoral police*. The **culprits** were *Thaksin Shinawatra and his police subordinates*. According to Sondhi, Thaksin gave the police power to threaten Sondhi, some of his famous audience, and the opposition media outlets. The dangerous situation got worse when Sondhi and Sarocha had to escape and hold the show at Wat Pa Ban Tard Temple under the protection of Luangta Maha Bua. It happened on episode 10 when Sondhi suddenly broadcasted the show from Udonthani province. The mastermind of this plan was implied to a woman which could be Pojamarn Shinawatra, Thaksin's wife. He (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 10'*, 2005) told the audience that:

A woman demands those police to get rid of me. You can guess who she is. Today, several police and a group of young men are hanging around this area. They attempt to stop me from hosting the show. So far the most important thing is the security of our lives. I think those young men plan to interrupt us by many evil means which I don't know whether those police would protect us or not. They may let those men intimidate us. Actually, those police are paid their salaries from our taxes. They're supposed to maintain justice by protecting us; conversely they don't accomplish their police fundamental duty. Thus, they are not the real police, just men wearing police uniforms to assist the immoral politicians.

Sondhi (*Policeman sues media tycoon for lese majeste*, 2005) revealed a wicked plan of someone, in the police, who attempted to please Thaksin by demanding legal action be taken against him. This policeman was Colonel Samniang Loujiangkham, the deputy commander of the Yasothon provincial police. He stated his accusations saying that Sondhi “had gone too far in his fierce criticism of Thaksin's government” and also “had made an inappropriate comparison between His Majesty the King and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra”. Sondhi (*‘Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6’*, 2005) raised one of the King’s speeches to warn those police. He said everyone had a specific responsibility which one should try to accomplish, but those police had disregarded the obligation to protect the people and maintain justice, as policemen. They had become the subordinates of the corrupt politicians, carrying out their evil commands.

### **The causal attributions function**

For the **cause** of this frame, Sondhi claimed that *Thaksin and a woman, which might be Thaksin’s wife, determined to stop him from critiquing them*. To do this, they instructed the police in many provinces to charge Sondhi with legal actions and to exert police power against him. Sondhi (*‘Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 10’*, 2005) explained the reason for this:

The worst action is from a police friend of the premier. He commands the police in every province to accuse me of defamation. My dear fellows, this procedure has been done to get rid of me, the leader of the people’s movement. They think that if they can eliminate me, the people movement will be stopped. Besides, Thaksin doesn’t want to come to see Luangta Maha Bua at Wat Pa Ban Tad Temple. Accordingly, he demands his subordinates to arrest me a day before the meeting day.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In this frame, Sondhi **labelled** those police as *the politician’s police*. He (*‘Muang Thai wan goo chat’*, 2006) attacked them thus:

You must know how immoral these police are. On the way here, our participants are blocked and investigated by the evil tactics of those police. Are they evil? When our colleagues held a demonstration in Khon Kaen province, those police forced them to stop speaking by turning off the microphone and spoke in a bad manner to the leader of the protest. Ladies and gentlemen, these are the malpractices of the police in the era of Thaksin Shinawatra. This is the era of police state which is far worse than in the past. The police can do anything. They take part in many organizations which results in having authority to intimidate us, the innocent people.

*The greed of the Thai police* ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8*', 2005) was constructed that:

I would say here that I'm not ambitious to have any political position. My goal is to be a guardian, protecting and retaining social justice in this country. We don't need nepotism, which allows the police to do anything to intimidate people who have opposing views. Thai police can do anything to gain power and money.

Sondhi's view toward police was unfavorable. In the later movement, the police become one of major opponents of the Yellow Shirts and other anti-Thaksin movements. He was successfully framed bad image of the police in Thaksin's era.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

At this time, Sondhi, himself, had not proposed the solution for this frame. He just told the audience that his team of lawyers would fight back at those police with legal actions. However, he also said that one day they would certainly receive a punishment as a result of doing bad karma.

### **The metaframes**

The democracy metaframe was combined into this mobilizing frame. The police force, under the rule of Thaksin Shinawatra, was accused of being the force that served Thaksin and his colleagues, while the common people were intimidated by them. Obviously, the dictatorial aspect of the police state was contradictory to the

principles of a democratic regime, especially when blocking Sondhi, and other media, from doing their duty as the press. Besides, they were attacked by legal and illegal measures to stop them from criticizing the government. This completely abused the freedom of expression that a democratic regime would allow.

## **7. The violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame**

In the second movement period this mobilizing frame had been retained, but was lessened the importance. Some issues that being used as examples to attack Thaksin Shinawatra were changed to engage with the monarchy. At Thammasat University, this frame had been involved with the inability of Thaksin to relieve the unrest incidents. In the second phase Sondhi connected this frame with the monarchy. He compared the role of the monarchy with that Thaksin Shinawatra in solving the unrest incidents, especially Queen Sirikit who was more concerned about reducing the difficulties of local people in the southernmost area.

During the movement at Lumpini Park, there were some events in the severe unrest in the south, including a report from the Washington Post about the CIA black-site prisons in Thailand, the new national election, and news of the monarchy going to the south to support the local people during the violence. This was applied into the framing of Sondhi to construct the irresponsible image of Thaksin and honour the sacrifice of the monarchy.

It is noticeable that this frame had been retained and presented to the public during the show at Lumpini Park. However, the importance of this mobilizing frame was decreased, which could be seen by the fewer number of mentions during the show at Lumpini Park. Alternatively, this frame was associated with the efforts of the monarchy, in comparison with the deficiency of Thaksin Shinawatra, to resolve the unrest. Sondhi seemed to emphasize the outshining roles of the monarchy, particularly the Queen, the monarchy's network, and of General Prem Tinsulanonda.

They teamed up to relieve the southern problem in accordance with the King's purpose.

### **The problem definition function**

Sondhi stated the **problem** of this frame as *the nepotism and negligences of Thaksin Shinawatra*. The **culprit** of this frame is *Thaksin Shinawatra*. Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8*', 2005) gave the background, of the south before the Thaksin era, to the audience:

This southern region, before 2004, was a moderately peaceful land, though it was not completely contented and serene. There were many diverse groups, which avoided disturbing each other. Around 20-30 years ago, this land was under the management of the military who knew every single detail of those groups. One day, there was an egotistical one (Thaksin) who came up with the idea that the Thai police are able to complete everything in this country. Consequently, he cancelled the sequential projects which had been done under the command of military, and, in order to support his police colleagues, he replaced the military with them. Those police finally promoted other dreadful subordinates, from which stemmed the increase of troubles among local people.

Furthermore, the premier convinces people to trust him by proposing several approaches to relieve the violence. Sometimes he announces that he will take immediate action to get rid of the problem. Sometimes he promises to solve the problem and guarantee the outcome by challenging people to stop electing him if he could not achieve the goals of these schemes. However, the deadline and his responsibility for the failure of the approaches have never been confirmed to the public. It means that he does not want to have full responsibility for this issue.

The message gave the brief details of the three southern provinces in the past. Sondhi encouraged the audiences to believe that under the management of the military the situations was generally reaceful. After that, he pointed to what he believed to be the mistake of Thaksin, replacing the military with the police. That police force, according to Sondhi, was incompetent, corrupt, and untrustworthy, and they were Thaksin's subordinates. In Sondhi's framing, Thaksin and his police increased the troubles to this land.

In terms of Thaksin's plan, Sondhi focused on placing the responsibility on the premier in case the scheme failed. Interestingly, Sondhi demanded the resignation of the premier. If Thaksin resigned from the post, this would be a great news for Sondhi. He might stop conducting the movement and return to his normal life. In Sondhi's mind, he might not be certain about the power and resources to perform the mobilization.

### **The causal attribution function**

In this function, the **cause** was specified that *Thaksin was scared of being assassinated by the separatists*. Besides, Sondhi thought Thaksin was paying more attention to running the vote winning campaigns in his voter bases, while the last accusation was that Thaksin's foreign policy was pro-American. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6'*, 2005) asserted an example to support his claim thus:

The premier must admit that he is a trouble maker who creates the crisis in the southern region. I have evidence, which is a timeline of his previous speeches and actions.

In 2001-2002, he viewed the insurgence in the southern region as a common crime; as a result, he dissolved the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center and promoted his police colleagues to resolve the situation.

In 2003, he called those separatists common thieves.

In 2003, he was an accomplice to the unrest incidents, because he was not trying to stop the kidnapping and killing incidents.

In 2003, he permitted the U.S. to arrest Hambali (Riduan Isamuddin) in Thailand.

In 2003, he sent the Thai military to participate in the Iraq war.

In 2004, he ignored the investigation of the case of Somchai Neelapaijit (a Thai Muslim-lawyer and human rights activist) who was kidnapped and killed. In addition, when he was asked by journalists about the progress of this case, he got frustrated.

In 2004-2005, he was foul-mouthed and intimidated some Muslim international organizations, and recently he suggested the secretary of the Muslim World League to step away and go back to re-read the Quran.

In 2004, he announced that he would go to the south and spent 3 months there, but he only stayed there for a short period of time, with thousands of guards...

...A few days ago the unrest increased significantly, but the premier has not gone there. He chose to promote his vote winning campaigns. To make matters worse, when he went to the south, he announced to the local people that he would not provide budgets to people who did not vote for his party.

Once, on the 8<sup>th</sup> episode of the show Sondhi presented news from the Washington post about the locations of U.S. "black-site prisons" in some countries. The Washington Post (Priest, 2005) reported one of the CIA black-site prisons was in Thailand. It was reported that 30 major terrorism suspects "have been held under the highest level of secrecy at black-sites financed by the CIA". In mid-2002, "the CIA had worked out secret black-site deals with two countries, including Thailand and one Eastern European nation". This incident occurred when Thaksin was the prime minister. Sondhi (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 7*, 2005) considered it as an underlying cause affecting the upsurge of insurgent incidents in the south. He said:

In 2004, the Asia Times Online, which is a reliable news source of prominent agencies such as CIA, FBI, MI5, and MI6, reported news about the black-site prisons in some locations such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Thailand. Once, I talked about Udonthani airport and the buying up of land in Udonthani to build the VOA radio station. If they really want to build a small radio station, they do not have to buy such a huge amount of land. Asia Times Online reported the news that it was a possibility that one of the black-site prisons may be located here. Nonetheless, I wonder why a wealthy country like the U.S. chooses Thailand as a place to operate terrorist investigations. Why do they not take these terrorists back to the U.S. or Pakistan?

We, Thailand, should not be involved with this operation. We have enough troubles in the south caused by our Prime Minister's bad mouth. We do not want to be attacked by those terrorists, as the U.S.'s supporting country. I am much concerned about this...Our Prime Minister is opening up our country to international terrorism. The violence in the south will develop from domestic to international level. Because of this, he must responsible for any severe

unrest incidents which may be undertaken by these international terrorist organizations in the three southern provinces.

Thaksin, according to Sondhi, did not apply diplomatic means to handle Muslims and the terrorists. Thaksin's foul mouth had been criticized from opposition groups as potentially damaging, which could cause conflicts between Thailand and international organizations. Sondhi also highlighted this point. Furthermore, in this mobilizing frame Sondhi attack the relationships between the U.S. and Thaksin. He disagreed when Thaksin sent the Thai military to Iraq to support the American army. He reckoned Thailand might be marked as the enemy of the international terrorists. Thaksin, again, was branded as a trouble maker.

The anti-America sentiment was encouraged as America was portrayed as the ally of Thaksin; consequently the nation nationalist symbol was applied to frame the messages of Sondhi Limthongkul. During his early movement, the U.S. was the only Western country that was being framed as a greedy country seeking advantages from Thailand linked to the framing of the corruption of Thaksin and his colleagues. When the Yellow Shirts were formed, the leaders including Sondhi set up many issues which involved with other Western countries. This is the origin of the xenophobic sentiment toward the U.S. and some Western countries in Thailand.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In this second period, the southern provinces were framed as abandoned by Thaksin. The reason came from the coming election that these provinces were not Thaksin's voting base. Thaksin made his election campaign trips to all areas except the southern provinces. Accordingly, Sondhi **framed** Thaksin as *a greedy prime minister who divided Thailand*.

For Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 7*', 2005), Thaksin was not ruling this country as the Prime Minister of Thailand, but as the leader of the Thai Rak Thai party who only cared about his votes. Sondhi said:

As an executive of the AIS Company, the premier is good at promoting campaigns. Thus, those marketing tactics are adapted into his political strategies. For instance, his voters would be rewarded with good promotions, such as borrowing money or allocated budgets, if they vote for his party. Accordingly, people have no choice; they have to vote for his party's candidates. It is clearly seen that he is really drunk with power.

In this framing function, it was Sondhi who began to portray the discrimination of Thaksin. The reason is, in the early movement, his audience were Bangkokians and some middle class from major cities, particularly people from the south. On the one hand, the majority of Thaksin's voters were the poor from the north and northeastern region. Accordingly, Sondhi convinced his audience to believe that people from the south were not Thaksin's voters and alleged that they would not get an equal share of the budget. This emotive strategy was used to create anger toward Thaksin in his audience, since part of them were people from the southern provinces.

Another **accusation** was constructed by comparing the intention to relieve the unrest incidents between Thaksin and Queen Sirikhit. Sondhi (*'Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6'*, 2005) said:

I would like to ask why the premier spent his time at Uthaithani, Singhburi, and Pichit province to run his vote winning campaigns, while Her Majesty the Queen went to the south and spent a month there to assist her people. Does he really care for the plentiful deaths of the local people and the military? Does he really see the devotion of the Queen to resolve the insurgency? By this, he must acknowledge that he is the real cause of the violence in the three southern provinces.

Similar to some previous frames, Sondhi applied the monarchy into this framing. This branding was produced to highlight Thaksin as irresponsible and cowardly as premier. Conversely, Queen Sirikhit, an elderly lady, showed her concern and love to her people by visiting them in the area of unrest. Later, Queen Sirikhit became a significant figure for the Yellow Shirts. We would see Sondhi's frames which involved with the Queen in his future movement.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The **solution** of this frame was proposed for Thaksin Shinawatra. He suggested Thaksin to *resolve the incidents in accordance with the principles of King Bhumibol, Queen Sirikit, and General Prem Tinsulanonda*. Sondhi ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6*', 2005) recommended that:

In 2004, Her Majesty Queen Sirikit sojourned to Narathiwat and spent around two months there. For 2 years, she gave around 8 speeches and writings to the public. In her speeches, she explained to the public that most Thais are nice and kind, but the trouble makers are a new kind of Muslim she has never seen before. She implored Thai people to harmonize and be tolerant towards the brutal acts of those agitators. Moreover, she sent a letter to show her sorrow and support to the family of a cruelly killed teacher... His Majesty the King suggests us to solve the problem with the principles of understanding, accessibility, and development, and Her Majesty the Queen advises us to understand and empathize with the southern people. Conversely, our prime minister rudely scolds the separatists. He has daily conflicts with Malaysia and the OIC secretary. He does not care to go to the insurgent areas, but goes on vote winning campaigns in other provinces instead. He is such a sharp-tongued person. Some say that he is not brave enough to go the south, because he fears assassination by those separatists.

The principles of King Bhumibol to understanding, accessibility, and development have been adopted at least in a name by the governments to solve the problems in Thai society for many years including in the southern provinces since 1980s. In this frame, Sondhi not only focused on King Bhumibol, Queen Sirikit was another figure engaged in Sondhi's framing. In his framing, her ways of solution were based on generosity and reasonableness. She did not discriminate between Thais and Muslims. This was compared with Thaksin who was fainthearted.

Also, the work of General Prem Tinsulanonda the head of Privy Council on solving the southern provinces problem was praised by Sondhi Limthongkul through his early movement. He ('*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 14*', 2006) said:

Recently, General Prem Tinsulanonda went to the south because he cannot sit idly by while the severe violence there is continuing. In fact, he went there

to make peace in the area, by the royal command of His Majesty the King. Gen Prem warned the army and the police force to serve the monarchy. They should collaborate to resolve the unrest as the army of His Majesty the King not as the army of any politician.

General Prem Tinsulanonda employed aspects of the strategy of the King to work out the problem. He was the premier for almost decade in 1980s, the era that the unrest was reduced. Sondhi highlighted that at that time Prem had warned the army to serve only the monarchy on the show. He framed this with this mobilizing frame. Sign of conflicts between Prem and Thaksin might clearly start from this time, leading to the overthrow of Thaksin Shinawatra in the next year. Consequently, Prem was considered as the head of the movement by Thaksin's faction.

### **The metaframes**

The king metaframe became vital to this mobilizing frame followed by the nation metaframe. It was referred to in the past works of the monarchy in the southern provinces. Sondhi did not honour only King Bhumibol, Queen Sirikit and General Prem Tinsulanonda were also included since in his framing they have had significant roles in alleviating problems in the southern provinces.

The king metaframe was applied to gain supported by honoring the royal family and Prem Tinsulanonda and also to decrease the trustworthiness of Thaksin. This framing ultimately gave Sondhi supports from some royal family members and the network monarchy when he began the formal movement. During his early movement, it could be seen that the royalists and some elites were part of his audience. This metaframe was used to attract them. Besides, Thaksin's failed strategies, exaggerated by Sondhi Limthongkul, seemed to not just reflect the failure of his policy but in Sondhi's framing, highlighted the monarchy's work in the south. The distrust of local people, the views of the palace and the network of the monarchy and its attitudes toward Thaksin's approaches was constructed, while the questionable loyalty of Thaksin to the monarchy was frequently pointed out by Sondhi on the show.

As for the nation metaframe, Sondhi framed it with populism and the relationship of Thaksin with the U.S. The security and solidarity of Thailand was raised, especially when Thaksin showed his support for the U.S. by sending military to Iraq. The CIA's black-site prison in Thailand which was revealed by the Washington Post was also framed to blame on Thaksin. Sondhi alleged that Thaksin had opened up the country to the invasion by international terrorism. Moreover, the unrest incidents in the south would be made worse because of the premier's apathetic foreign policy.

Another serious accusation had been made through the show when Thaksin conducted his vote winning campaigns. Sondhi said the royal family members went to the south, Thaksin, on the other hand, was visiting his voting strongholds. In Sondhi's framing, Thaksin determined to discriminate by campaigning only for his voters, while ignoring people in the insurgence in the south. Thaksin announced that he would primarily provide budgets to his voters' provinces. Thus, Sondhi accused actions of Thaksin, as being the riot that attempted to divide the country, which was against the laws from the 1997 Constitution.

### **The Conclusion**

As aforesaid, in the previous sections, Sondhi Limthongkul is forced to begin the movement by the unexpected cancellation of his political show "Muang Thai rai Supda" from Channel 9. The given reason, from the chairman of MCOT, is that Sondhi "improperly cited His Majesty the King, and the monarchy, on several occasions". It is interesting that as Sondhi alleged that Thaksin Shinawatra and associates had a lack of loyalty to King Bhumibol, he is also accused of disloyalty and this allegation leads to the termination of his political show. The tough denunciations with which Sondhi bombards the governing of the former premier, Thaksin Shinawatra and his government seems to be the reason behind this. Inescapably, a huge loss in terms of income and pride, as an experienced journalist, befalls Sondhi. Accordingly, he decides to take his live show to Thammasat

University on September 23<sup>rd</sup> 2005. When the numbers in the audience increases, Sondhi relocates the show to Lumpini Park where the mass movement of “Muang Thai rai Supda” takes place and develops progressively.

Throughout the initial movement of Sondhi Limthongkul as a sole leader and journalist, he concentrates on attacking Thaksin and associates about several issues, but some key issues are repeatedly mentioned. Accordingly, I determine to group the key messages produced by Sondhi into seven mobilizing frames, while the metaframes are examined together. From here, the main ideas of each frame, which were constructed at Thammasat and Lumpini, will be summarized below.

From the beginning of the movement at Thammasat University, Sondhi creates seven mobilizing frames aimed at attacking the misconducts of Thaksin and his government. They are principally focused on the controversial topics of corruption and the violations to the royal prerogative of King Bhumibol, while the other problems are concentrated subsequently.

Sondhi begins constructing **the corruption mobilizing frame** as the first frame to identify the greed and practices of betrayal of the nation of Thaksin Shinawatra and his government. Evidently, the ***problem and culprits*** is pinpointed at *the mega corruptions and the betrayal of the nation by Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates*. Sondhi stresses on some crucial examples such as the corruption of Suvarnabhumi airport construction, the state-owned enterprise privatization schemes, and the corruption of Thaksin’s family. These cases represent the complicated norms of Thai corruption, while the privatization is used to explain the betrayal of Thaksin by allowing Singapore to control the Thai economy through the privatizations. The relationship between Singapore and Thaksin which benefits his personal interests was mentioned. This frame has ***highlighted the self-interest and materialistic nature of Thaksin to “trade” Thailand for his own benefit***. Besides, his family is framed as *a corrupt family that needs to rule Thailand*. Sondhi suggests the ***solutions*** of *holding a referendum for the EGAT privatization and applying the sufficiency economy*

*philosophy of King Bhumibol to relieve the Thai economy.* The latter solution is interesting since it is engaged with the King's economic concept, which contrasts, extremely, with the capitalism of Thaksin. Thus, the modernization, nation, and king metaframes are applied into this mobilizing frame. Sondhi seems oppose to the modern developmental concept of Thaksin which could lead the country to the ruination of morality. Consequently, the King's philosophy is praised in this frame to undervalue Thaksin's capitalism.

The second mobilizing frame, **the monarchy mobilizing frame**, is one of the most significant frames. It is constructed and framed simultaneously with the corruption frame. The monarchy issue becomes a reason for Channel 9 to cancel Sondhi's "Muang Thai rai Supda" show. In response, Sondhi employs the monarchy to produce a powerful frame to strike back. This works very well in creating an immense sentiment of loathing towards Thaksin. Throughout this framing, Sondhi identifies subtle issues to allege the malpractices of Thaksin and his associates in abusing the royal prerogative of King Bhumibol. To contrast with the unfaithful image of Thaksin, the generosity and devotion of the monarchy to Thailand are highlighted.

The **problem** is framed as *the disloyalty of Thaksin Shinawatra and this government to the monarchy, particularly King Bhumibhol*, while the **culprits** are pointed out as *Thaksin Shinawatra and his subordinates*. Interestingly, Sondhi does not specify clearly that Thaksin commits the violations of the King's power; he primarily attacks the subordinates of Thaksin instead. Thus, Thaksin is **implied** as *one who seemed to act as an equal to the King*. The examples are: the inappropriate action of Thaksin Shinawatra of being the head of the Buddhist rite event in Wat Phra Kaew Temple, the appointment of Somdet Phra Buddhacharya as the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat in place of Somdet Phra Nyanasamvara, and the discharge of Jaruwat Menthaka, the ombudsman. Sondhi supports his allegations with a series of official letters and photos. Nonetheless, this frame becomes the most forceful frame in terms of persuasion, since Sondhi constructs Thaksin as one who attempts to challenge King

Bhumibol, in terms of love from the people, as the prominent figure in Thailand. Apparently, this allegation makes Thai people seriously furious with Thaksin.

The treatment, to solve the problem, suggested by Sondhi, is changed from time to time. When he hosts the show at Thammasat, Sondhi just *suggests to his audience to show their loyalty to the King by using yellow things such as flags, t-shirts, wristbands, and stickers*. However, in the last phase of the movement the next fascinating *solution* proposed by Sondhi is *to return the King's royal prerogative in accordance with the principles of "Rajprachasamasai"*. Throughout the live show, Sondhi threw suspicion on the actions of Thongtong Chantarangsu to stop Sondhi and the press to involve with matters relating to the King. Sondhi comes to the conclusion that Thaksin and his associates have an evil plan to isolate King Bhumibol from the people. This was called the "tyrannical strategy to separate the King from his people". Accordingly, he offered the concept of "Rajprachasamasai" as the solution to stop the government of Thaksin Shinawatra from doing corruption and violating the King's royal supremacy. The "Rajprachasamasai" concept, from the definition of Pramote Nakornthap (Nakornthap, 2006), allows the King to rule this country in association with the people, where the King and the people are interdependent. Sondhi leads the audience to give a vow to return, to the King, his royal power in ruling Thailand.

The king and democracy metaframes are employed to construct these messages when Sondhi announces to return the power to King Bhumibol and offers the alternative democracy, "Rajprachasamasai" concept. This concept is different from the Western-style democracy, since the prime minister must be appointed by the King. If this approach were accepted by King Bhumibol, Thaksin would be deposed and a new leader would be provided by the King. Sondhi and some associates insist that "Rajprachasamasai" principle contribute the participatory democracy with the King as Head of the State. The King and the people would share both authority and participation in accordance with the concept of a democratic regime (Nakornthap, 2006).

The next mobilizing frame is constructed around the appointment of acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. **The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame** attracts the massive numbers of Buddhists and forest monks to support Sondhi's movement. The **problem** is *the nomination of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat or Somdej Buddhacharya to replace the former Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara*, while the **culprits** are *Thaksin Shinawatra and the Deputy Prime Minister Vissanu Krue-ngarm*.

Similar to the monarchy mobilizing frame, Sondhi does not accuse Thaksin directly. He implies that *Thaksin Shinawatra attempts to expand his political power over the Sangha Council Committee through his appointed Somdet Pra Sangkarat*. In terms of **moral framing**, Sondhi has not identified clearly that Thaksin is disloyal to the King and Somdet Pra Sangkarat, while the **solution** is *to return the position of Somdet Pra Sangkarat to Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara*. This mobilizing frame is engaged with the religion and king metaframes, since Sondhi constructs this frame around the appointment of Somdet Pra Sangkarat and links it with the violation of King Bhumibol's royal prerogative.

Sondhi implies that Thaksin might want to have his Somdet Pra Sangkarat whilst the King has Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. Apparently, this frame is connected to the conflicts of Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara, Luangta Maha Bua, and Phra Dhammachayo the abbot of Phra Dhammakaya Temple. By this, we will see that famous monks are included into this frame, while he also frames the close connection between King Bhumibol and Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. Accordingly, followers of Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara, Luangta Maha Bua and Thai people who are loyal to the King are eager to join the movement to protect King Bhumibol and Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara from the intimidations of Thaksin and his associates. The moral force to protect the two "Kings" is constructed to persuade moral Buddhists to participate.

During the governing of Thaksin Shinawatra, the media restriction becomes an issue that falls into the category of abuse of people's rights. The freedom of expression is

controlled by Thaksin's measures since Sondhi is a major opponent who applies the media networks to attack the former premier and his companions. Thus, the blockage of media freedom is framed as **the media control mobilizing frame**. He primarily focuses on the termination of his show from Channel 9 and the lawful and unlawful operations that Thaksin employs to stop him from hosting the live show.

During that time, he is harassed by groups of police and young men. Also the freedoms of the other media outlets that have opposite views to Thaksin are curbed. In this frame, the **problem** is *the media control of the Thaksin government*, whereas the **culprits** are *Thaksin Shinnawatra and his colleagues*. They are **framed** as *the dictatorial and greedy capitalists intend to block criticism and investigation from the press*. Accordingly, the **treatment** proposed by Sondhi is to *ask the audience to distribute "the truth" to the public by creating networks of knowledge*. He invites the audience to buy his products and support the other ethical media, as well as his Manager media. Accordingly, lighting the society with the dharma candles, or knowledge, later becomes one of the major symbolic activities of Sondhi Limthongkul and the Yellow Shirts. Thus, the democracy metaframe is engaged to illustrate the dictatorial image of Thaksin on the media control.

The populist policies of Thaksin are also constructed as **the populism mobilizing frame** to create a discontented feeling in the middle class to this policy. In Sondhi's framing, Thaksin spends the middle classes's taxes on these policies which are only beneficial to the grassroots and the government. Thus, this frame attracts the middle class, particularly Bangkokians. The **problem**, constructed at Thammasat, is that *the populist policy causes the huge debts and consumerism of the poor*, while at Lumpini Park it is framed as *populism as a vote winning policy of Thaksin and his party*. However, the **causes** are not dissimilar, since Thaksin is condemned over his corruptions and abandonment of the King's power; according to Sondhi, he promotes his new populist projects to *receive popularity from voters and to distract public attention from his scandalous corruptions*. Thus, they are **labeled** by Sondhi as *greedy, selfish, and false*, and Thaksin is also **framed** as *the problem of the nation*. The

populism, according to Sondhi, was the political platform of Thaksin's government to gain votes from the grassroots, while the middle class are abused by having to pay more taxes to support the projects. Sondhi suggested *the sufficiency economy philosophy of King Bhumibol as a solution* to relieve the economic problems caused by the populism. The nation, modernization, and king metaframes are involved with this mobilizing frame. In Sondhi's view, populism is based on the capitalism, a modern concept which promotes consumerism and household debts. Worse, Thaksin also encourages the poor to borrow village funds that some of the borrowers spend on needless things. Many mega projects of Thaksin, furthermore, are funded by the national budget and taxes paid by the middle class. Accordingly, this would lead, eventually, to the collapse of the Thai economy since Thaksin determined to borrow money from international financial organizations to carry out the policies. All of this causes Thailand to fall into a huge debt rut. For Sondhi, The sufficiency economy concept of King Bhumibol is the finest solution to solve the debt problem and the decline in the morality of the people. Thus, the king metaframe is applied to contrast to the greedy image of the materialistic government of Thaksin.

The sixth frame is **the Thaksin's police state mobilizing frame** which criticized the dictatorship of "Thaksin regime". In Sondhi's movement, he frames the **problem** of this frame as *the dictatorial police state regime of Thaksin Shinawatra* which focuses on the rise of Thaksin's police colleagues. Examples are raised to highlight the ineffective and autocratic nature of the police force in Thaksin's era. The violence in the southernmost provinces is given as an example to show the nepotism of Thaksin in promoting his police colleagues, which ultimately brings calamities to the local people. Another example is framed around Sondhi's security. He had been legally and illegally harassed by the police. He told his audience that someone orders the police to intervene in his live show. Consequently, the **cause** of this frame is *the fear of Thaksin that the truth be revealed by Sondhi, thus he stops everyone from criticizing him*. Thaksin is **framed** as *the dictator*, while his police are *the politicians' police*. In this mobilizing frame, Sondhi had not proposed a solution. The democracy

metaframe is engaged to support the accusation that Thaksin and his police intimidate the common and innocent people. It absolutely violates the principles of democratic regime.

The last frame is **the violence in the southernmost provinces mobilizing frame**. In the beginning, Sondhi creates the **problem** as being *the negligence of Thaksin to relieve the unrest*; however in the second phase he constructs the problem as *the nepotism and negligence of Thaksin that cause the violence*. The **causes** of the ineffectiveness are framed as *the nepotism of promoting the police and Thaksin focussing on his vote winning campaigns in his voters' provinces*. Accordingly, Thaksin is **framed** as *the greedy politician*. The **treatment** of this frame is created as *applying the principles of the King to relieve the problem*, moreover Sondhi also suggests to Thaksin to follow the footsteps of the palace and General Prem Tinsulanonda in calming the situation. Accordingly, the king metaframe is connected to this mobilizing frame. The monarchy and the head of Privy council, General Prem Tinsulanonda, become the only ruling group that devote themselves to the southern conflicts. The nation metaframe is applied to emphasize the destruction of the south by the ineffective ruling of Thaksin Shinawatra. Also, Thaksin is framed as one who divided the country from his policy.

In sum, the movements of Sondhi Limthongkul and his audiences is separated into two phases. Sondhi constructs seven mobilizing frames and four metaframes which have been employed in every phase. The concentrated mobilizing frames in the first movement session are the corruption, monarchy, and Somdet Pra Sangkarat which similar to the second session. The monarchy becomes the most important frame among these three frames. The most important metaframes in the first movement period are focused on the king, religion, and the nation. However, the democracy metaframe is highlighted in the second phase of movement when Sondhi offers the principle of "Rajprachasamasai" to solve the crisis cause by Thaksin and associates. This concept is a type of democracy which Sondhi and some royalist propose to challenge democracy of Thaksin.

In the first phase Sondhi, as a journalist, frames issues and events to attack Thaksin and associates, on the one hand his framing is changed later since he begins the role as the movement leader. He demands to protect the country, the monarchy, and religion by ousting Thaksin. Accordingly, frames are transformed into persuading the audiences to participate in the movement to eradicate Thaksin and his associates. This is evidently happened in the second phase of the movement at Lumpini.

These seven mobilizing frames are, later, adopted into the mobilization of the People Alliance for Democracy, or the Yellow Shirts, since the leaders, and their followers, are similar factions with shared movement purposes. Sondhi becomes the key leader of the Yellow Shirts which most of the mobilizing frames are derived by him. It is interesting that the pattern of mobilization, including his frames, have been adopted and imitated by later political movements, including the Red Shirts, the key opponents of Sondhi Limthongkul.

The seven mobilizing frames which rooted from Thai nationalism resulted in the construction of group identity. Although the precise identity cannot be seen in the early movement, Sondhi originates the initial identity of his movement. *Thus, they are a group of Thais which loyal to the king, nation, and religion. They are willing to sacrifice themselves to protect the key symbols of Thailand. Apparently, the major enemy of them, in their minds, of the nation is the disloyalty and greedy group of Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates.*

In the next chapter, the mobilizing frames of the Red Shirts or the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) will be examined and compared, in terms of the framing process, with the frames of Sondhi Limthongkul.

## Chapter 4

### Framing and the identity of the anti-coup groups

In this chapter the anti-coup groups and their frames will be examined following the same method of Sondhi's frames. Certainly, Thai nationalism plays the crucial role in the framing process of the anti-coup factions. Traditional Thai nationalism, as mentioned previously, mainly consisted of nation, religion and king elements. After the so-called 1932 democratic revolution of the People's party, democracy was asserted as the fourth nationalist element. Throughout the promotion of nationalism, by the rulers, it is interesting that the king metaframe is sometimes supplemented with the democracy, while the democracy is occasionally substituted by the modernization metaframe. Up to the present time, these nationalist symbols have been employed to perform the social movements in Thailand including the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul in his early periods. The initial political movement of Sondhi Limthongkul, the former leader of the Yellow Shirts, is examined in the previous chapter. However, it needs to be stressed that throughout the framing process of the anti-Thaksin movement, the king and the religion are respectively emphasized as the most powerful metaframes to appeal to the potential constituencies. Accordingly, in this chapter it is my purpose to examine the frames of the anti-coup groups whose construction are build on nationalism which the democracy/modernization metaframe was heavily promoted as the most significant metaframe.

The beginning of the anti-coup protest activates when the elected Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, is ousted by the 19 September 2006 coup. Thaksin's supporters believe that the coup group robs them of their democracy and also of their democratic prime minister. The coup makers and amat, or the old power

group, and the Yellow Shirts are turned to be their key enemies. The messages of the anti-coup groups are purposely created to attack the coup makers and counter frames of the Yellow Shirts, simultaneously the anti-coup groups apply their frames to appeal to the supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra. The unique metaframe, mobilizing frames, and the identity of the anti-coup groups are emerged as a result.

In the beginning parts of this chapter, I provide the backdrop of Thaksin Shinawatra, the mastermind of the Red Shirts, to describe his life before becoming the popular prime minister of the grassroot. Additionally, the downfall of his political career will be explained to give more understanding about the causes of his loss. After this, brief details about the occurrences of the 2006 coup and the protests of the anti-coup groups will be described. In the last, and biggest, part, the study of the mobilizing frames and metaframes are examined in two separate phases of the movements which the framing tactics and the developments of frames will be provided here.

### **Thaksin Shinawatra, the mastermind of the Red Shirts**

Thaksin Shinawatra (Thak 2007), the 19<sup>th</sup> prime minister of Thailand, was born into a Sino-Thai family in 1949. His father was a progressive man who was confident to explore new technologies and ideas. Apart from the family silk trade, he showed Hollywood movies in his movie houses and had a BMW automobiles and European motorcycles dealership in Sankamphaeng, Chiang Mai province. Thaksin's father, eventually, turned to be a politician and took a seat in parliament. By this, it was no surprise that he had an utmost influence on Thaksin's life.

When Thaksin entered the police cadet academy, he was given the nickname "Meo" by friends as he was from Chiang Mai, a northern province. His fair skin endeared him to the Hmong hill tribesmen. Thak (2007, p. 54-55) described Thaksin's "country boy" image thus:

Although his autobiography claims that he was proud to be a country boy, he was taking a liberty with this label. His attempts to show a rag-to-riches story, a country boy making good, is disingenuous. Thaksin did this to distinguish himself from other political rivals during the 2001 election. He explained that because he was a country boy, he understood the needs of fellow provincial folk. In fact, Thaksin's family was well-to-do, so he never experienced the hard life of a villager or farmer. He was a rather privileged member of the elite from Thailand's second largest city.

It was interesting that Thaksin applied his country boy childhood to create the image of a down-to-earth politician, perhaps he wanted to have the look of an ordinary and approachable premier for his middle class and grassroots voters. Thaksin (McCargo 2011, p. 296) received a doctoral degree in Criminal Justice in the United States and was married to Pojaman Damaphong who was “an extremely astute financial and personnel manager who effectively ran his business and political back offices for decades”. Pojaman, in the eyes of her rivals, was seen as Thaksin’s brain. She (*Pojaman Shinawatra, an influential woman, 2013*) knew well how to do business and negotiate with high ranking officials and state. As well, Sondhi Limthongkul (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 10, 2005*) claimed that she was behind the assassination attempt on him. Thakasin, according to Thak (2007), had a “police mentality” which “shades his policies toward dissidents and enemies of the state”. Thus police manoeuvres had been used to solve national problems, when he became the premier.

After complete the degree, Thaksin returned to Thailand and occupied a position as the deputy director of the Police Intelligence Center. The turning point of his career (Thak 2007) occurred when he realized that being an ideal police officer was “unproductive” for him. Since he had a good understanding of the police bureaucracy, he established a computer company with his wife and bought IBM computers to be rented, with government allowances, by his squad and the other police units. His rental business was fruitful to enable him to resign from police work to assist his wife in Shin Computers. Thaksin, according to Thak (2007), was one who had no concerns about the conflict of interest laws, and his wealth had derived from government concessions.

Thaksin started his political career by being an apprentice of Prida Patthanathabut, a friend of his father, in the office of the Prime Minister. Thaksin's duties, as described by Kasian Tejapira (2006, p. 25), were "collecting money from some big army figures, borrowing from certain ministers and distributing the money to MPs and ministers whose hand or vote the government needed". It seemed his apprentice life provided him connections and knowledge in the monetary system of national politics. This was fruitful for him afterwards.

In the early part of the 1990s, Thaksin Shinawatra became a foreign minister of the Palang Tham party, or the moral force of Chamlong Srimuang, in the government of Chuan Leekpai. However, he (McCargo and Ukrist 2005) was appointed to be the head of the Palang Tham party in 1995. In that year, he took part in the government of the Barharn Silpa-archa and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh which was viewed by Chamlong Srimuang, who was seen by the public as "Mr. Clean", as an association of "money politics". Remarkably, Palang Tham's 11 years of political credit, which had been constructed by Chamlong, was destroyed by Thaksin. The party's popularity declined and it was defeated in the 1997 election, ultimately Thaksin decided to leave Palang Tham to form his own party (McCargo 2011; McCargo and Ukrist 2005).

Thaksin founded the Thai Rak Thai party in 1998, which was supported by numerous famous academics, businessmen, and activists. He (Kazmin 2007) offered himself to eradicate "money politics" and replace it with a new deal for the neglected poor people. The establishment of the party (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2005) coped well with the liberal reforms of the 1997 constitution including the dissatisfaction of people with corruption, "money-based electoral politics," and "low quality politicians". TRT was the first political party in Thailand that was elected on the merits of its political platform, while the old style Thai politicians (Anek, 2007, 88) would create the bond between them and their supporters with money and cronyism. At that time, Thaksin Shinawatra desired to gain votes from the people

who had suffered from the economic policy of the Democrat government. To do so, an electoral platform was produced to show the differences between his party and the Democrats which stressed on relieving the country's financial problems. Even though the most outstanding policies of the Thai Rak Thai were targeted at the poor, the rich also were included. These two aspects of the voting campaign were explained by Ockey (2003) thus:

Two aspects of that policy, both responses to the Asian financial crisis, are noteworthy. First, the Thai Rak Thai party proposed to set up a Thai Asset Management Corporation to take over bad debts. Since many leading entrepreneurs were deeply in debt, this policy had widespread appeal. While the policies to assist the rural poor received more publicity, the establishment of the Thai Asset Management Corporation to assist the rich was actually more costly. Secondly, the Thai Rak Thai party promised preferential treatment for domestic entrepreneurs. This second promise allowed the party to seek support from entrepreneurs who would otherwise have been in competition with each other, and might have chosen to support competing parties. Thus, Thai Rak Thai was able to consolidate the support of many financiers who had previously supported other parties. This second policy also provided the cement that held the entire policy platform together: nationalism. The IMF and its policies became the enemy, and promotion of Thai interests in business and in the countryside became the rallying cry.

Evidently, the disposition of nationalism to oppose the IMF's restrictive package during the Thai economic crisis was applied into his voting campaign. He (McCargo 2011) proposed an alternative way to release the economic problems of the low income groups whilst insisting upon retaining the potential of Thailand in global competition. He also promised to lead Thailand to become a developed country according to the concept of a developmental state. In essence, he would restore to Thailand its national pride and economy. In McCargo and Ukrist's view (2005), Thaksin created the "nationalistic advocacy of a mix of local expertise and high technology".

Thaksin combined the modernization and the nation metaframes into his economic policy and vote winning campaign. He realized that the time had come when people were longing for someone to help them secure their fragile finances. After his triumph, the debt forgiveness program for farmers was initiated to relieve their

hardship. Moreover, Thaksin's government started to pump billions of dollars into the rural areas, to stimulate consumption, through village funds. It is said that this measure had "a knock-on effect for the whole economy, fuelling a boom in household spending" (Szep 2011). Accordingly, from 2001 to 2004 he received immense popularity from both the business faction and the rural poor.

### **The decline of Thaksin Shinawatra**

In 2001, during his first term of premiership, Thaksin Shinawatra (McCargo 2005) was accused of assets concealment by the Constitutional Court; he denied all the charges. He was finally acquitted of this distressing situation, since people regarded him as the most popular and suitable prime minister at that time. In his second term in 2005, a series of condemnations gradually came from academics, the press, and NGOs. His populist policies, the corruptions, the state-owned enterprise privatizations, the failed measures to relieve the violence in the south, the media control, and his rejection of critics became his crucial mistakes. When he was criticized about his human rights abuses, Thaksin (Phongpaichit and Baker 2005) once said "democracy is just a tool, not our goal". All of this led to the deterioration of his popularity among Bangkokians, the middle class, businessmen, and the elite.

It is interesting that in his first term of premiership he focused on helping the rich by having the government buy up all the debt of companies in trouble, but later he was deserted by some of them. Thus, in the second term he started to promote policies aimed at supporting the rural poor to retain his popularity. Numerous of the so-called populism policies had been announced to attract people in the countryside. Also, Thaksin (Pasuk and Baker 2008) changed the slogan of TRT to "the heart of TRT is the people" to attract the poor. Thaksin (2008) promised several projects, funded by spending the entire 100 billion baht central fund, for the poor such as getting rid of poverty within three years, giving free laptops for students, free cows for farmers, cheap school fees, training programs for the poor,

cheap phone calls, cheaper housing and so forth. The policies (Wehrfritz 2008), which aimed to receive votes from the poor, had been called “Thaksinomics” or Thaksin’s economics. It is noticeable that in his second term the modernization metaframe of Thaksin shifted its focus from the business groups and some middle class to the grassroots. Besides, the democracy metaframe had been applied to frame Thaksin as the one and only democratic prime minister who provided the grassroots with several benefits. He might be the only ruler who offered a better quality of life to them. Thaksin’s image, furthermore, was manipulated as a down-to-earth premier by doing activities with the common people. This time, the ideas of modernization and democracy were used to gain popularity from the grassroots, the largest voting group of Thaksin.

In 2005, Thaksin's government was stirred up when the media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul started to criticize Thaksin and his government on the famous political television show “Muang Thai Rai Subda”. (The details and information about the battle between Thaksin and Sondhi were already explained in the previous chapter). Ultimately, on 9 February 2006, the People’s Alliance for Democracy or the Yellow Shirts was formed under the leaderships of the media tycoon Sondhi Limthongkul, the former leader of the Palang Tham Party and Bangkok governor Major General Chamlong Srimuang, well known activist Phiphob Thongchai, university lecturer and the leader of the Assembly of the Poor Somkiat Pongpaiboon, and Somsak Kosaisuuk the leader of State enterprise labour union. The PAD's, or the Yellow Shirts', main goal was to overthrow Thaksin Shinawatra and his regime under the theme of “Goo Chart” or redeeming the country.

### **The 19 September 2006 coup**

The resistances opposing Thaksin continued for months. Thaksin (Pongsudhirak 2008) responded by dissolving parliament in February 2006 and holding an election which was boycotted by the Democrat party and the other opposition parties.

Nonetheless, one day after Thaksin announced his triumph, he had a meeting with King Bhumibol. After the meeting (Montesano 2009), he announced to the public that he would not become the prime minister. The King's intervention (Funston 2009) became apparent when he told the newly elected judges that "the one-party election was not democratic" and called for the judiciary to find a solution to the "mess". Thaksin (2009) struck back by claiming that he was threatened by a "charismatic individual outside the constitution" which referred "either to the royal institution or someone closely associated with it". Ultimately, Thaksin was toppled by the army in 19 September 2006.

This coup was interesting in that, while performing the operation, the soldiers and tanks displayed yellow ribbons, the color of King Bhumibol and the Yellow Shirts. From this, this coup was seen by many as being endorsed by King Bhumibol. Some academics viewed this coup (Charoensin-o-larn 2009) as the battle between "the network monarchy" and the network of Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin was seen as a great threat to the royal power of King Bhumibol. Thus (*There Wasn't Any Choice*, 2006):

A group of military commanders, elites and blue-bloods close to King Bhumibol, led by coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratklin and former prime minister and retired General Prem Tinsulanonda, who heads the Privy Council, knew Thaksin would win the next election, so a coup became the only option for getting rid of him.

General Sonthi Boonyaratglin the leader of the coup referred to his group as the Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy (CDR). He (Charoensin-o-larn 2009) announced his intention, regarding the coup:

I'd like to say two things about the military coup. First, I received calls for the coup from many people. Second, soldiers are obliged to protect national security, safeguard the nation and uphold loyalty to the monarchy. The military cannot tolerate any leaders who lack or have limited loyalty to the King.

It was interesting that Gen. Sonthi (*We did it for the people: Sonthi 2006*) said, in an interview with a foreign correspondent, that: "There had been a lot of vote buying during the previous election. Most of the people were not satisfied with this situation. They had called on the military to do something about it. We did it for the people of Thailand". While he (Wiseman and Chitrada 2006) refuted the involvement of King Bhumibol with the coup: "I am the one who decided to stage the coup," he said. "No one supported me".

After the coup, a list of names of royalists, to become the interim prime minister, had been proposed. Finally, Privy councilor General Surayud Chulanont was approved by King Bhumibol to receive the premier post. The monarch gave a royal speech (*Thailand's King Endorses the Coup 2006*), on his birthday in December 2006, about the military-appointed government saying that:

Some of you may have come out of your retirement in order to salvage the country... Do your job in the best way you can even though you may face some criticisms... Old people who have experience can use their experience to help other people... People who have no experience can make the country go bankrupt.

### **The formation of the anti-coup groups**

The 19 September coup was described by Chairat Charoensin-o-larn (Charoensin-o-larn 2009) as "not really a *coup d'état* but rather a *coup de grâce*. This is because the coup was launched without bloodshed, and it effectively ended a lengthy period of political turmoil". Not everyone eagerly acknowledged it. Only one day after the coup, eighty people, led by activist Sombat Boon-ngam-anong, began the initial anti-coup protest under the name of "the September 19 Network Against the Coup" (Sombat Boon-ngam-anong aka "bor gor lai jud" was a long-time NGO activist who initially activated the anti-junta protest). A statement (Bhumiprabhas and Rojanaphruk 2006) was declared condemning the actions of the CDR (Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy) saying that "Abolishing the Constitution, harassing the media and putting an end to independent agencies are

regarded as acts of abolishing parliamentary democracy. This act will lead to the same outcome as of previous coups".

During that time, members of the Thai Rak Thai and their allies kept silent while the civilian groups started the protests. "The Saturday Voice Against Dictatorship," one of the active groups set up a speaker's corner at Sanam Luang and held a meeting every Saturday. The demonstrators of this group were portrayed as common, middle class people with no political backgrounds, thus their speeches to oppose the coup makers were barely supported by difficult political theories. They (No Red Shirts in Bangkok 2011) claimed that sometimes they were insulted by some skillful activists from "the September 19 Network Against the Coup group" led by Sombat Boon-ngam-anong. These two major groups performed their demonstrations with diverse objectives. The movements of "the September 19 Network Against the Coup group" were focused on attacking the coup. On the other hand, members of "the Saturday Voice Against Dictatorship" were Thaksin's supporters and their messages sometimes referred to the virtues of Thaksin. Nonetheless, in the early movement they had an agreement to avoid talking about Thaksin, because they could not guess the other groups' views toward the exiled premier. Moreover, most media outlets included some people seemed greatly opposed to Thaksin Shinawatra, so, by openly supporting Thaksin they might be accused of being paid to make the protests.

In their third meeting "the Saturday Voice Against Dictatorship" started to show their support toward Thaksin Shinawatra and TRT by attacking the coup makers about the overthrowing of Thaksin and his government. To avoid being accused of disloyalty to the King, the protest groups (2011) wore yellow shirts and headbands written "Love the King, dislike Prem" and "CDR, get out!" It was obvious that they separated King Bhumibol from the coup makers. General Prem Tinsulanonda was believed to be the mastermind of the 19 September 2006 coup and was attacked hard by these groups. Throughout the early movement, these anti-coup groups had not been supported by the TRT politicians. They (2011) sold their own

merchandise: VCDs, and the weekly newspaper “the Serichon” to finance themselves. As well, the live demonstrations were disseminated via websites and community radio stations with simple technology. Later, some members of the Thai Rak Thai party began their movement as the PTV group which finally collaborated with the other protest groups. Various factions were combined to form a strong political movement group, known as the Red Shirts. It could be seen from a part of the Red Shirts’ declaration (*Who Are We? Red Shirts* n.d.) that:

The Red Shirts roots are in the various groups who protested against the military coup in 2006, such as the Federation for Democracy back in 1992, the Saturday Voice Against Dictatorship, 19th September Group, PTV Group and Ex-Thai Rak Thai members. These groups protested against the military coup of 19 September 2006 and have gradually grown from small gatherings to large protests. The red colour was first adopted in 2007 as a symbol against the 2007 constitution which was drafted by the 2006 coup makers.

In terms of framing, the anti-coup groups applied the democracy metaframe from the beginning of the protests. The coup makers were blamed as the dictators who took away the people’s democratic government led to the destruction of the country economically and politically. It was noticeable that the nation metaframe became the second most important frame for them. The king and the religion metaframes were concentrated on to a lesser degree. In this chapter, I will explore the frames employed by the anti-coup groups. The number of frames and the four functions of each mobilizing frame will be shown in the sections below. In this study, I chose the Thai E-News Website as the source to study the frames of the anti-coup groups since this website contained a variety of information about the protest groups. To see the whole picture of the framing, I will separate the periods of movement into two phases. The first phase begins from the first day of the protest in September 2006 to February 2007 when the PTV group was established, and the second phase will be from that point until the Red Shirts were formally established in early June 2007.

## **“The first phase of the anti-coup groups movement”**

In the initial movement period, the anti-coup groups were a coalition of activists, scholars, students, and ordinary people. Their primary messages were focused on opposing the coup, the coup makers, and condemning the loss of democracy. As they were from different backgrounds, the mobilizing frames in the first phase had been diversely constructed into two main directions. Some factions concentrated on calling for democracy, whereas some supported the return of Thaksin Shinawatra and his party. Covered in this chapter are the seven mobilizing frames which consisted of the anti-coup, the anti-amat, the unproductive Surayud government, the people’s democracy, the media control, the Buddhism, and the Thaksin mobilizing frames. In addition, the metaframes will be explored in the last part of each mobilizing frames.

### **1. The anti-coup mobilizing frame**

The anti-coup mobilizing frame was originated when the 19 September 2006 coup was staged. As aforementioned, the anti-coup protests had taken place one day after the toppling of the Thaksin government. The protestors were factions of ordinary people, students, and activists from Bangkok. Apart from those groups, Thaksin’s supporters also participated to support the reinstatement of Thaksin Shinawatra. However, calling for the return of Thaksin became a minor priority in this early stage. The anti-coup groups started the protest in the Royal plaza, Thammasat University, and some major places in Bangkok to signify their democratic movements. The reason was those domains, particularly the Royal plaza and Thammasat University, had been major arenas for democratic movements in the history of Thai political movements.

### **The problem definition function**

In this mobilizing frame, the anti-coup groups framed **the problem** as *the severe damage to Thailand in terms of democracy, economy, and the prestige of King Bhumibol Adulyadej resulting from the 2006 coup*. The **culprits** were *the CNS, the old power group or amat, and its network*. This time, the protestors determined to attack the whole coup group. The accusations were primarily attacking the destruction of Thailand's democratic regime, therefore, denial of the military government and their laws had been constructed. The collapses of the Thai economy and the damage to the King's honor were respectively created to accuse the coup group. A work of Phichit Likhitchasombun (2007), a lecturer from Thammasat University, highlighted the undemocratic nature of the coup. It was posted on the Thai E-news website and said that:

The discourse of "the malevolent Thaksin regime" has been used as a reason to do the coup. In truth, the abolition of the "Thaksin regime" is in addition to the "democratic regime." We can see that the old power group tears up the 1997 constitution to establish their dictatorial regime. Besides, some right-wing scholars also regard this coup as a last resort and solution to eliminate the tyrannical Thaksin regime. For them, this coup becomes the most proficient political reform to clean up Thai politics. They never viewed this coup as an undemocratic means which abolishes Thai democracy.

To strengthen the reliability of the blame, the website often referred to the opinions of scholars, especially Phichit Likhitchasombun and some lecturers from Thammasat University who seemed to oppose the coup. Those opinions sometimes were published in other sources which were re-posted on Thai E-news. They used the views of scholars to support their frames similar to the movements of Sondhi Limthongkul and the Yellow Shirts.

Another damage caused by this coup was the recession of the Thai economy. It was blamed on the appointed premier General Surayud Chulanont and General Sonthi Boonyaratklin the head of the coup makers. At this time, the two figures, according to the anti-coup groups, were disapproved of by democratic countries because of their tyranny. A view, from the Pantip web board (*Ratthapraharn art tam hai*

*konkrung shuad rotfaifa'* 2007), was chosen to be published on Thai E-news website. It was about the refusal, of the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, to lend Thailand the money to develop the transportation system because of the 19 September coup. Furthermore, this news also claimed that some countries decided to suspend their investments because of the uncertain situation in Thailand. In a sense, the downfall of Thailand's economy absolutely resulted from the 19 September coup.

The last accusation was pointed towards the act of the coup group in violating King Bhumibol's esteem and royal power. This was because, initially, the coup group (*'Thailand: No Elections for a Year'* 2006) had been named "the Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM)". They were criticized for involving the monarchy with the coup which led to doubts about the King's role in the coup. A few days later, the name was changed into "the Council for Democratic Reform" (CDR). It is interesting that the anti-coup groups engaged the King with this frame, which was similar to Sondhi's framing strategy. Opponents were accused of disloyalty.

A view from a former senator (*'Prachachon sudton yun nangsue kormorchor yud arng taharn praracha'* 2006) was published to demand General Sonthi Boonyaratklin to stop involving the 19 September coup with the King. His accusation was that General Sonthi had performed many undemocratic actions such as accomplishing the coup and demolishing the 1997 constitution. General Sonthi, furthermore, continually announced that he was the soldier of the King, according to the accusation, led to the public's perception that his dictatorial moves were endorsed by the King.

Additionally, a group of people declared a statement indicating the malpractices of the coup group. This group (*'Naklongtoon sudton triam fongsarnpokkrong au padetkan aukpai'* 2007) asserted that the elimination of the 1997 constitution, promulgated by King Bhumibol, and the appointment of the military government were acts which completely violated the King's royal prerogative.

### **The causal attribution function**

In this function, the **cause** of the problem was given that *the coup and the junta government was unacknowledged by democratic countries, particularly by the ASEAN countries*. An article on Thai E-News referred to the ASEAN meeting in the Philippines which General Surayud attended and was treated as a “fool.” In the article the author (*‘Surayud tuatalok nai asean langrang kotbat asean’* 2007) claimed that:

This meeting had an agreement to deny any coup which was conducted in any of the ASEAN members since the standpoint of ASEAN is to promote solidarity. Thus, this announcement seems like Surayud was slapped by the ASEAN community. It is clearly seen that Thailand and Myanmar are directly impacted by this agreement. Besides, every country has a consensus to deny a coup by dictators.

In the anti-coup media’s view, the junta government was not accepted by the other countries, while another **cause** of the decline of the Thai economy was asserted that *his government had applied a mistaken financial policy which resulted in the hesitation of the other countries to invest in Thailand*. Besides, some countries (*‘Samapan prachattippatai pramern 4 deun’* 2007) might stop investing altogether and move to another country since they did not trust in the potency of this government. In addition, the internal damages of farmers from flooding were pointed out to illustrate the carelessness of the government.

### **The moral evaluation function**

Obviously, in this mobilizing frame the coup makers were **called** *tyrants, rioters, robbers, fake heroic knights, crooked dictators, and accused of disloyalty to the King*. In an article from the Serichon Newspaper (The Serichon 2007), it was explained that:

The coup makers attempt to give many honorable reasons to rob this country. It is amusing to see that they fool themselves and the whole world as if everyone is senseless. Undoubtedly, this coup will never be approved by democratic countries. The good governance concept in administration is

referred to by these dictators to authorize the coup and ruling. Are they confident that they are truly moral?

In addition, the coup group's corruption was criticized on the Thai E-News website (*'Kormorchoe kinmuang'* 2006) thus: "After several efforts to terminate the antagonists, CNS acts like the heroic knights who defeat the villains. They cover their immoralities under noble masks; on the other hand they are the worst and greediest rulers ever".

The next accusation was directed at the infringement of King Bhumibol's royal power. The former, early, name of the coup group and some actions of Gen Sonthi which involved the King were framed. The anti-coup groups gave the reason that the coup makers led the public to understand that the King had authorized this undemocratic coup, which could be seen from an article (*'Thattae ratthapraharnthai'* 2006) thus:

When the coup had been staged, yellow and blue were used to represent the colors of the coup's army. Furthermore, the last part of the coup group's name had the phrase "the King as head of the state" which brings up the assumption, for the international community, that the monarchy supports this coup.

It has been widely known in Thailand that yellow is the color of King Bhumibol, while blue represents the color of Queen Sirikit. Accordingly, the coup makers, in the anti-coup groups' point of view, purposed to relate the monarchy with the 19 September coup which completely defamed the monarchy.

An anti-coup group, "klum prachachon phoo rak prachathipatai" or "the people who love democracy," labeled themselves as a loyal group. From their declaration (*'Talang kao klum poo rak prachathippatai'* 2006), they protested against the coup to call for democracy and "protecting and restoring the honor and virtuousness of King Bhumibol Adulyadej".

This framing tactic to label their rivals as immoral, while framing themselves as moral, were applied to legitimize their movement and protect the group from charges. This also appeared in the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

In the beginning of the anti-coup group's movement, they called for democracy. Thus, the **solution** in this frame was *demanding the restoration of democracy*. To achieve their resolution, they persuaded people to participate in the protest every weekend. When the number of participants increased, the goals of the movement were added to with the demand for a new national election, restoration of the discarded 1997 constitution, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. An article in the Serichon newspaper (The Serichon 2006) was written to invite the readers to join the movement thus:

Our primary goals are bringing back our 1997 constitution and our democratic leader. We, the people, must not be terrified by those tyrants who claim the approval of His Majesty the King. Our strategy in fighting with this tyrannical regime is called 'lighting the torch to catch the thieves'. Thus, we must discover the real culprits behind the coup. Please help us by inviting a massive number of people to participate in this movement, and do not forget that we have an appointment to catch the thieves every Saturday.

This "lighting the torch to catch the thieves" tactic imitated the strategy of Sondhi Limthongkul in providing public news and information about the coup. The truth and the thieves would be visible through their torches or information. Literally, they wished to reveal the mastermind of this coup which they implied to be General Prem Tinsulanonda.

Also, "the people who love democracy group" pleaded with people to join the movemen. The leader of the group (*'Talang kao klum poo rak prachathippatai'* 2006) announced that: "I would like to invite all Thais come out to call for our basic human rights...to get rid of the immoral group from Thailand...we must bring back our democratic regime...This is the battle between democratic factions and tyrants".

Regular demonstrations were the means for the anti-coup groups to distribute messages to their followers in Bangkok, while the websites and community radio programs were used to live broadcast the protests. Evidently, the grassroots protesters were able to receive the framing messages and the movements via these

communications. In this early time the anti-coup groups needed to increase the number of participants from outside Bangkok, including rural grassroots and some people from overseas.

### **The metaframes**

In this anti-coup mobilizing frame, the democracy, nation, and king metaframes were relevant. The democracy metaframe was the most substantial frame, whereas nation and king were emphasized as the next most significant.

The democracy metaframe was applied when the anti-coup groups attacked the coup makers as robbers who had stolen Thailand's democracy. They were named tyrants to underline the dictatorship of the coup group, while the 19 September coup was framed as an undemocratic means to occupy Thailand. As a result, the democratic regime was demolished. The anti-coup groups offered the restoration of democracy to Thailand as the solution. From their framing, Thaksin was the democratic prime minister who was justified to be the Thai leader. Unfortunately he was robbed of his premiership by the dictatorial coup makers.

Also, the nation metaframe was applied to frame the destructive outcomes of the coup and the actions of coup makers. According to the anti-coup groups, the coup makers proclaimed themselves as heroic knights who redeemed the country from Thaksin and his regime. However, they were labelled as fake knights and crooked tyrants who staged a coup for their own benefit, consequently Thailand met disapproval from democratic countries. Foreign investors also suspended their investments because of this situation. This brought devastation to the Thai economy, thus the nation metaframe was applied to accentuate the damage the coup caused to the nation.

However, the king metaframe was employed when the anti-coup groups accused the coup makers of being the ones who defamed King Bhumibol and ruined his honor, since the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra was approved by the King. Thus overthrowing this government and eliminating the constitution, which was

signed by the King, was definitely illegitimate and infringed the royal power of King Bhumibol. The anti-coup groups also focused on the former name of the coup group which was “the Council for Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM)”. The coup group was blamed that they engaged the King with the coup. In the anti-coup groups’ framing, the coup group's purpose, behind the original name, was to take advantage of King Bhumibol.

## **2. The anti-amat mobilizing frame**

This mobilizing frame was created when the 2006 coup was staged. The anti-coup groups undoubtedly realized the head of the coup makers was General Prem Tinsulanonda the head of Privy Council, who had agitated before the coup was enacted. He gave speeches to the army to be loyal to King Bhumibol. Even Thaksin Shinawatra mentioned that he was threatened by “a charismatic figure” who was not identified but assumed to be either King Bhumibol or Prem Tinsulanonda. When the Thaksin government was overthrown, some of the anti-coup groups which supported the former premier activated this frame.

The amat (aristocrats) or the old power group has been identified as one of the major opponents of the Red Shirts. They framed the conflicts between them into political discourses, thus faults and calamities, which the amat had done to them, were constructed as influential mobilizing frames. Nevertheless, the background of the amat was clearly explained by Duncan McCargo as “the network monarchy” in 1980s era (McCargo 2005). He said,

The main features of Thailand’s network monarchy from 1980 to 2001 were as follows: the monarch was the ultimate arbiter of political decisions in times of crisis; the monarchy was the primary source of national legitimacy; the King acted as a didactic commentator on national issues, helping to set the national agenda, especially through his annual birthday speeches; the monarch intervened actively in political developments, largely by working through proxies such as privy councillors and trusted military figures; and the lead proxy, former army commander and prime minister PremTinsulanond, helped determine the nature of coalition governments,

and monitored the process of the military and other promotions. At heart, network governance of this kind relied on placing the right people (mainly, the right men) in the right jobs. Allocation of key posts was the primary role of the lead proxy, Prem.

McCargo described the network of Prem as “the network monarchy,” while in the eye of Thai people Prem (Nanuam 2009) has his close subordinates widely known as “Luk Pa” or “Papa’s children” network.

This framing of the anti-coup groups was remarkable since they created a new discourse to call Prem’s network as “amat,” while Prem's regime was named “amatayathipatai”. Anek Laothamatas (1988) provided the explanation about the original characterization of “amatayathipatai” thus:

Between 1932, the year the absolute monarchy was overthrown, and 1973, when the country's longest-ruling military regime was toppled, Thailand was, in a sense, a bureaucratic polity. During most of this long period, the country was under the rule either of military governments or of elected governments that relied heavily on the support of the armed forces. Most of the premiers and cabinet ministers of both types of government were active or retired military and civilian bureaucrats. Unlike the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Latin America, however, the Thai bureaucratic polity operated among docile, politically inert social groups or classes, leaving decision-making authority in the hands of small elite of bureaucrats. Autonomous, organized political activities of non-bureaucratic groups - students, workers, peasants, businessmen - were minimal and affected the policy of the state mainly in an informal and particularistic manner.

From the framing of the anti-coup groups, Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues were the opponents of Prem in terms of power and benefits. Accordingly, Thaksin was attacked by “a charismatic figure” and his network. When the anti-coup groups activated the protests, Prem and his conservative power group, or amat, were framed as tyrants who forcefully abused the rights of people or grassroots. The anti-coup factions named the regime of Prem as “*amataya**PREM**athipatai*” which was a combination of amat+Prem+thipathai (aristocrat+Prem+regime). This cleverly tied up General Prem with the amat group and the 19 September coup.

### **The problem definition function**

In this mobilizing frame, the **problem** was *the power and benefits monopolization of the amat which destroyed Thai democracy*. The **culprit** of this problem was indicated to be *the old power group, or amat*, and its networks. From the anti-coup groups' framing, the members of the amat were the Privy Council committees, Premier Surayud Chulanont, some militants, bureaucrats, technocrats, businessmen, journalists, and some right-wing scholars. According to the anti-coup groups, Prem demanded his networks to fulfil his desires in obtaining power and wealth. As a result, Thai democracy had been demolished by Prem and his network. The anti-coup groups also alleged Prem as one who took advantages of being in the inner circle of King Bhumibol to gain fortunes. An example from the writing of Pichit (2007) was used to support the frame. Pichit gave an explanation of the excuses used by the amat to stage the coup thus:

“Thaksin's regime” discourse is created by some right-wing political scientists. Their conservative standpoints are bended to oppose democracy, capitalism, and globalization. Consequently, Thaksin, his colleagues, and the Thaksin regime are criticized, blamed, and attacked strongly, by the old power group, for demolishing the Thai democratic regime. Thaksin and his regime have been blamed as the culprits. On the other hand, this conservative group is the real agent who has been destroying Thai democracy for a long time.

It is interesting that the work of Pichit was often cited by some of the anti-coup groups, particularly Thaksin's supporters, to construct the battles between the tyrannical amat and democratic Thaksin factions. Additionally, an article from Thai E-News (*'Taharn namdee chae saprang patiwat puepaktong'* 2006) described the connection between Prem and his network. It said:

The coup makers staged the coup for their personal benefits. Obviously, there were many factions intermingled in this coup. In the list of names, Prachai Leophairatana was the leader of Thai petrochemical Industry (TPI), while The Democrat Party and Sanoh Tientong were from political factions. The representative of the business groups was Sondhi Limthongkul along with the Kasikorn Bank and Bangkok Bank groups. In terms of the amat, the key members were Prem Tinsulanonda, Surayud Chulanont, and Prasong

Soonsiri. It was noticeable that all of them determined to oust Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from his position. Obviously, Surayud Chulanont was the planner who acted under the instruction of Prem Tinasulanonda. Funds for the coup were raised from these people.

There had been some preparations 7 to 8 months before conducting the coup, while some plans, such as the movements of the PAD and a petition to appoint Abhisit Vejjajiva to be Prime Minister, had been activated. Nonetheless, these plans failed. The 19 September coup, accordingly, became the last and absolute resort for them to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra.

From the previous statements, the anti-coup groups illustrated how this amat group committed the coup in terms of plot, collaborators, and budgets. General Prem Tinasulanonda was suspected as the head of the coup group, whereas his subordinates assisted him in demolishing the government of Thaksin Shinawatra.

Another disputed accusation toward Prem Tinsulanonda and his network was about their disloyal practices which violated the King's power. The anti-coup groups did not pinpoint, directly, how Prem and his amat network dishonored King Bhumibol's royal supremacy. Instead, an article written in 1987 by Mom Rajawongse Kukrit Pramroj the former prime minister was re-published on the Thai E-News website. In this article Kukrit criticized Prem when he held the premiership in 1980s. Prem, according to Kukrit's accusation, disclosed King Bhumibol's private conversation, without permission, about "Thai style democracy" to the public. In Kukrit's article (*'Colum soi suanplool'* 2006) which was originally published in 1987, he wrote:

I have heard news that His Majesty the King had an informal dialogue with some Chiang Mai journalists about difficulties in adopting the Western-style democracy into Thailand. From that news, it was claimed that His Majesty the King suggested a solution by transforming Western democracy into "Thai style democracy.

...I do not understand why Prime Minister Prem Tinasulanonda seems excited about the thoughts of His Majesty the King's on Thai style democracy. Furthermore, Prem demands his subordinates and mass media to disseminate the King's words to the public. He stresses that the whole of society must be aware of this. It makes me curious about his declaration of being extreme loyal to the King...In my view, distributing the King's personal

dialogue to the public is completely inappropriate. In doing so, the whole conversation of His Majesty the King must be distributed, not just a sentence which is what Prem has done. Only His Majesty the King thoroughly comprehends the accurate meaning of his “Thai style democracy.” So, how can Mr. Prem precisely read the King’s mind?

I assume that he may need to sustain his own style of Thai democracy by applying His Majesty the King’s words to hold on to his premiership. He does not want to be suspected on any issues. Nobody can criticize him when he occupies the prime minister position. As the premier, he is not responsible for paying any of his costs of living, and being respected by people. According to his needs, Premier Prem eagerly adopts the King’s thoughts about Thai style democracy to verify his practices as being in conformity with His Majesty the King’s view.

Everyone in this country must keep in mind that the status of His Majesty the King, in this country, is above everything. He must not be used by anyone...The government of Premier Prem Tinasulanonda must stop taking advantage of His Majesty the King’s words to support their actions and protect them from any guilt over things they have done.

The anti-coup groups made use of the respectful and honored image of Kukrit to imply the ‘hidden intention’ of Prem. Kukrit had a good image among most Thais since he was a junior member of the royal family and former premier. In this re-posted article he wrote about “Thai style democracy” which was framed as the autocratic regime being used by some Thai rulers including Prem.

During this early movement, the anti-coup groups did not concentrate on the concept of “Thai style democracy”, although they began to connect Prem with this dictatorial concept. “Amatayathipatai” usually referred to the regime of Prem at that time. From this article, the anti-coup groups framed Prem and “Thai style democracy” to highlight Prem’s dictatorship and his malpractices toward King Bhumibol. Factually this type of democracy (Thak 2007) was initially mentioned by Marshall Sarit Thanarat, a former authoritarian premier, to legitimize his dictatorial regime. The anti-coup groups emphasized the resemblance of Prem’s regime to Sarit’s, while the anti-coup groups’ democracy was framed as the real democratic regime.

### The causal attribution function

In this mobilizing frame the head of Privy Council, General Prem Tinasulanonda, was blamed as the key person who masterminded the coup to overthrow Thaksin Shinawatra's government. The anti-coup groups explained the **reasons** behind the coup that *the amat determined to take over the ruling power, while another reason involved the popularity of Thaksin Shinawatra among the grassroots. It was claimed by some scholars, and the anti-coup groups, that Thaksin became a great threat for the monarchy and the amat since he was voted for by a massive number of voters from rural areas. Thus, getting rid of Thaksin and his associates became the remedy for these elites.* However, Prem's movements to oppose Thaksin had begun months before the 19 September coup. At that time, General Prem Tinsulanonda (*'Military Coup in Bangkok'* 2006) had dressed in military uniform to give a speech warning the army to be loyal to King Bhumibol rather than to the government of Thaksin Shinawatra. In some foreign news media, Prem and his network (*'There Wasn't Any Choice'* 2006) were alleged to be:

...a group of military commanders, elites and blue-bloods close to King Bhumibol, led by coup leader General Sonthi Boonyaratklin and former prime minister and retired General PremTinsulanonda, who heads the Privy Council. For months, the royalists have seen Thaksin as a threat to the power that King Bhumibol, and those surrounding him, have acquired during six decades on the throne.

Pichit's article was used by the anti-coup group again to explain the reason of amat to perform the 2006 coup. It (Likhitkijsomboon 2007) was clarified thus:

The real goal of the conservative group and the right-wing intellectuals is to demolish the democracy regime. They camouflage their true objective by portraying Thaksin and his colleagues as tyrants, plunderers, and unfaithful to the King. Also, chauvinism is applied to arouse people to attack Thaksin and his associates. Thaksin's regime is used to mobilize people to overthrow that regime; on the other hand the old power group determines to destroy democracy and the constitution. Accordingly, a dictatorial regime is re-established by this conservative group.

This frame was constructed to convince the readers to think that the “Thaksin regime” was just a constructed discourse by the amat to portray an evil image of Thaksin and his policy. It was applied as an excuse to legitimize the coup and to establish the amat regime or “amatayathipatai” which was rule by Prem. Another article (Serichon 2006) which was written by an anti-coup author was used to support this blame. It said:

The coup makers claim themselves to be a group of moral people performing a moral mission in exterminating the corrupt government of Thaksin Shinawatra. They demolish the “Thaksin regime” in order to take up in all major governmental positions. In doing so, they unite with scholars, technocrats, politicians, bureaucrats, and business groups to establish an “amat regime”. Furthermore, the amat’s goal is to suppress the people so they are “second class citizens”. Worse, their opposition factions would be alienated and prevented from participating in any political activities.

The framing strategy of the anti-coup groups thus began framing the divide as a class conflict. The old power group or amat was framed as the upper class determined to suppress the people, or grassroots, and make them their inferiors. The anti-coup groups began to illustrate the amat as enemies of the people or grassroots. They challenged each other by promoting their different types of democracy.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In this function, the anti-coup groups focused on the oppressive attitudes of the old power group towards the common people. The old power group was **portrayed** as *the suppressive conservative group which pretended to be moral*. Also, they were **called** *the democracy destroyers and a disloyal group*. Again, the work of Pichit (2007) was re-posted on the Thai E-News that:

This old power group is a group of people that shares the same thoughts in opposing westerners. They attack Western democracy, saying it is a deceptive and vicious regime because they believe in elitism and a privilege system. Thus, this country must be ruled by “the moral leaders.” Apparently, in their minds the moral leaders are the wealthy, well-educated, and noble people.

It is interesting that the views of Pichit towards the coup makers had been used to construct some movement discourse of the anti-coup groups, particularly when they attacked amat. In this moral branding function they framed amat as an elite group that aimed to demolish the democratic regime, because this Western style of democracy allowed anyone to be elected as the leaders. On the one hand, amat, as framed by the anti-coup groups, believed that only the elite were eligible to rule the country. The old power group was gradually framed as the superior class with an oppressive attitude in intimidating the inferior class. They saw themselves as the cream of the crop who deserved to be the rulers. Another example (*Talangarn kabuan thap prachaconn'* 2006) of moral branding was constructed on the abuse of people's rights that:

This country belongs to all Thais, not just one privileged group. Those amat and their tyrannical network have never changed their true oppressive nature. They overpower people with their tyrannical *"amatayaPREMathipatai"* regime to prohibit the liberty, human rights, and voices of people. Worse, the right of people to elect their leaders has been taken away by amat.

Even though the old power group, or amat, was the target of attack, General Prem was the main culprit. He had been framed as the major enemy of the the anti-coup groups and the Red Shirts for almost a decade. They (*Sarupkao robsapda jak soonkao chaoban bangsai'* 2006) also published a news story to portray Prem's practices of disloyalty to the King. It was small news about a local radio program which routinely broadcasted the King's speeches. After the coup, the King's speeches were replaced by Prem's. The author claimed that the change was demanded by the CNS. Doubts about the inappropriate action of Prem and CNS were competently constructed to convince people to believe that Prem and his network purposed to be comparable with the King.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

During this early movement, Thailand was under the rule of the martial law. There was a small number of protesters, thus the anti-coup groups could not apply a hard-hitting strategy at this time. Nevertheless, a **solution** of this frame was constructed

as getting rid of the amat group and General Prem Tinsulanonda by means of protest. Accordingly the anti-coup groups invited people to participate in their peaceful protests every weekend at the Royal plaza, Thammasat University, and the centre of Bangkok. An announcement of a protest group, “the People’s army” (*Talangkarn kabuan thap prachaconn’ 2006*), said that one of their goals was to terminate the old power group or amat. They declared that:

A virtuous power of patriotic people will never be defeated by any tyrant or amat. Consequently, the “amataya**PREM**athipatai regime” will be crushed swiftly by our patriotic people’s movement. We must believe in democracy. Do believe that our absolute victory will come shortly. Those liars will experience the agonizing finale soon.

The anti-old power groups also attempted to oust General Prem Tinsulanonda from the position of head of the Privy Council. The leader of the White Doves group (*Gannam kloom pirabkao’ 2006*) announced that Prem must resign from the position since he defamed King Bhumibol’s honor by conducting the coup.

### **The metaframes**

Evidently, this mobilizing frame was primarily constructed using the democracy and king metaframes. The amat, or old power group, was alleged to be the key group that conducted the 19 September coup, for that reason they were framed as the democracy destroyers. The amat, in the framing of the anti-coup groups, was the major enemy of the people. The nature of this superior group was illustrated as oppressive; therefore the common people were suppressed as their inferiors.

The anti-coup groups focused on attacking General Prem Tinsulanonda. They accused Prem of being the head of the coup group. The anti-coup groups claimed that the amat made up the accusations against the Thaksin regime as an excuse to get rid of Thaksin and his associates through staging the coup. By this, they could establish their “amataya**PREM**athipatai” which was the regime of Prem Tinsulanonda. This regime, according to the anti-coup groups, was the dictatorial regime established to seize Thailand. At this early stage, the anti-coup groups had not intensely attacked Prem and his network.

The king metaframe was applied to allege amat of defamation of King Bhumibol's honor. Moreover, they were accused of applying the King's power to the benefits of their associates. In the anti-coup groups view, amat took advantage from being close to King Bhumibol which was a seriously inappropriate practice. Accordingly, the anti-coup groups demanded Prem to resign from the president of the Privy Council position.

### **3. The unproductive Surayud Chulanont government mobilizing frame**

This frame was constructed when General Surayud Chulanont, a prominent member of the Privy Council, was appointed and approved by King Bhumibol as the interim prime minister. It triggered dissatisfaction among the protest groups because it was undemocratic. Besides, Surayud had a close relationship with General Prem, thus in the anti-coup groups' view he was amat. The policy results of the amat government were attacked to contrast them with Thaksin's. After the honeymoon period of the bloodless coup, critics of the junta government appeared. The anti-coup groups focused on condemning faults such as corruption, denunciation of the international society, the lack results of the military government, the unrest situations in Thailand, and the vague economic philosophy. The anti-coup groups pinpointed the ineffective and corrupt image of the Surayud government to contrast with the productive and innovative Thaksin Shinawatra government.

#### **The problem definition function**

In this mobilizing frame, the **problem** was *the damage, to Thailand, caused by the government of Surayud Chulanont*. The **culprits** in this frame were *General Surayud Chulanont and his government*. Obviously, corruption had been highlighted as a severe allegation to disgrace the clean image of the amat government. In the anti-coup groups' view, Surayud Chulanont, the leader of the government, had had a good reputation as an unsullied and respectable Privy Council member. It is

interesting that, after taking the premier position, Surayud, his family, and colleagues were alleged on their unusually fortunes. The anti-coup groups criticized that the amount of assets and liabilities of the ministers and their partners had risen after they were ministers. It is not surprising that Surayud and his wife, Colonel Khunying Chitrawadee, were attacked on their increased assets. In an anti-coup groups' news (*'Raikarn ped kong koosomrot kong nayok'* 2006), it was written that:

The total assets of Surayud and his wife are 65,566,363.11 Thai baht. The people have differing views about this. Some criticize, some feel envy, and some say the premier keeps preaching to people to be economical according to the sufficiency economy philosophy, but he is the one who can't do it.

Throughout the premiership, General Surayud Chulanont was accused of unlawfully owning forest reserve land in Yaithiang Mountain of Nakhon Ratchasima province. This issue had been escalated on the Thai E-New website.

The next example was the rejection of the interim government by the international society and Thai people. The anti-coup groups claimed that the Surayud government was illegal and undemocratic and was not acknowledged by democratic countries. Furthermore, Surayud and his colleagues did not have enough knowledge and experience to govern Thailand; as a result the economy was severely declined. News from the anti-coup group reported that Surayud was disregarded by China government, since he was the "robber" prime minister. On the one hand Thaksin was wholeheartedly welcomed as a genuine and authorized leader. The anti-coup groups also claimed that Surayud Chulanont was loathed by people from Chiang Mai province (*'Kon Chiang mai chingchang Surayud'* 2006), since he robbed the premier position from Thaksin Shinawatra. Apparently Chiang Mai is the hometown and voting base of Thaksin and his party.

Another example, in this early period, was the lack of results of the interim government. The recession of economy and the unrest in the southernmost provinces were constructed as the major flaws of the Surayud government. In the framing of the anti-coup groups, Thaksin's accomplishments were obviously greater than the junta government's. Thus, the junta's lack of skills in administration and

economics was highlighted. An article (*'Ja tooptamlai kwam churmun kong pratedthai'* 2006), written by the anti-coup groups, criticized Surayud for delaying some projects created by the Thaksin government. It was framed as frustrating the hopes of voters of Thaksin who received benefits from the projects.

In addition, the junta's ineffective and vague economic idea was criticized from some anti-coup scholars and journalists as part of the Thai economy's recession. They believed in capitalism of Thaksin. Oppositely the self-sufficiency economy philosophy of King Bhumibol was claimed as the economic policy of the amay government. The concept was condemned by the anti-coup groups due to the imprecise application of the philosophy. In their view, the philosophy was redefined by the amat which was not given the certain and practical approaches. To devalue the concept, they compared the efficiency of the capitalism used by Thaksin with the self-sufficiency economy philosophy of the junta. An article from the Serichon newspaper (The Serichon 2007) criticized the economic concept of the junta thus:

Many economists regard the "Thaksin regime" as using the same notion of capital globalization which has been adopted by many countries. The efficiency of capitalism has been proved by its winning over several challenging ideologies such as communism and even the thrilling concept of a self-sufficiency economy...Certainly conflicts of diverse economic ideals lead to the 19 September coup, conflicts of which Thaksin Shinawatra is only a part. The war between the ideas of capital globalization and anti-globalization has been continuing in Thailand for a period of time. The long history of capitalism in Europe has proved itself, by its advantages and proficiency, to be the finest idea of economic development. We must admit that we cannot turn back to live like a submissive farmer as we used to do in the agricultural society.

This author viewed the concept of King Bhumibol as an old-fashioned idea. For him, this concept became a hindrance for modern economic development, while the finer capitalism, or "Thaksinomics", concept used by Thaksin has been approved by many modern countries.

Another anti-coup writer (*'Tapom mai aou sedtakitporpiang version surayud'* 2007) condemned on the self-sufficiency economy philosophy that Surayud convinced people to follow. The author thought Surayud was unable to apply the correct and

genuine concept of King Bhumibol into his ruling. Because of this, Surayud and his government made public misunderstandings about the King's philosophy which resulted in the disgrace of King Bhumibol.

Furthermore, during the premiership of Surayud, there were several severe unrests that occurred in the southernmost provinces as well as blasts in Bangkok. The anti-coup groups claimed that bad news of the unrest situations in the south were extensively distributed online. In their view, the situations had shifted into the warfare, on the other hand the junta neglected to solve the crisis. Furthermore, the junta attempted to control the news to maintain their popularity among the Bangkokians. In the anti-coup groups' opinion, the junta (*'Klasae kao paktai tuam internet'* 2006) was at risk of losing the southern areas to the separatists. In addition, the many bombs in Bangkok were seen, by the anti-coup groups (*'Rai ngarn karn raberd tee krungthep'* 2007), as the plot to put the blame on Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues.

### **The causal attribution function**

The **causes** of the destruction were mainly framed on *the incompetence of the government of Surayud Chulanont*. An analysing article from Newsweek International, by George Wehrfritz (2008), was re-posted on the Thai E-News website. In the article the causes were considered:

The return to normalcy promised by the junta leaders has failed to materialize, and policy blunders, persistent coup rumors and a recent spate of unsolved bombings have heightened uncertainty. The problem may be that the generals are simply inept and their Western-trained technocrats past their prime. But a close look at the economic agenda of Surayud Chulanont, Thailand's interim prime minister, suggests something else is at work. Since his appointment last October, the former general has introduced measures to halt the Westernization of Thai society, downsize the role foreigners play in the economy and maximize "happiness," not growth, as he put it. Surayud's blueprint draws inspiration from the country's highest authority: 79-year-old King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the world's longest-reigning monarch. His Highness has long advocated "sufficiency" in Thai life, meaning humility, simplicity and living within one's means. Others have a different name for it: "Buddhist economics."

.....Sufficiency proponents include conservative generals uncomfortable with one-person, one-vote democracy; nationalists eager to reduce the role of foreign businesses in Thai markets; and the Bangkok elite, which is unhappy with the way Thaksin mobilized poor farmers into a sturdy electoral base. By linking new policies to the monarch, who under Thai law is inviolate, these powerful groups have managed to ward off virtually all debate. "Sufficiency is multi-layered: it's a philosophy, a way of life, a potential policy platform and context for the [Sept. 19] coup" says political scientist Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University. "But the government's effort to convert it from concept to policy has been very problematic."

The English article was used to legitimize the accusation of the anti-coup groups on the amat government. They intended to show that the policy of the amat government was critiqued by the foreign correspondents. From this statement, it is obvious that the inexperienced government and the economic idea were the main root of the Thai economy's recession. The junta's measures, supposedly inspired by King Bhumibol's philosophy, to stop Westernization were questionable.

### **The moral evaluation function**

At this time, the anti-coup groups **framed** Surayud Chulanont as *the robber prime minister*. He robbed the position from Thaksin Shinawatra, thus Surayud government was *the illegal government*. Corruption was also blamed on Surayud and his associates. The anti-coup groups did not label them with a specific name, but cynically mocked the Surayud government on their so-called economical lifestyle. The anti-coup groups' accusations about the corrupt projects of the military government (*'Rattaban tuen arng chai 2500 lanbaht piang pue tung ronnarong hai kon chon lerk len huai'* 2006) were reported in an article on the Thai E-News website thus: "This illegal government poured a huge budget of 2,500 million Thai baht to campaign people to stop playing the illegal lottery. It is the 5 year project that indicates the intention of this government to profit from the budget."

Also, Surayud's underperformance to end the turmoil in the south and Bangkok was caused by his inability to protect Thai people from threats. It was noticed in an article (*'Surayud sarapab tor lok muslim wa prathed thai rangkae chao thai muslim'*

2006) that Surayud put on an act as a nonviolent and peace-loving person, similar to Prem Tinsulanonda, to remain in his premiership without end. Furthermore, Surayud told Al Jazeera news that the unrest in the southernmost provinces was rooted in the officials and the poor level of education. Accordingly, the anti-coup groups attacked Surayud over his casting blame toward the officials in the critical areas. Surayud admitted during the interview that Muslims in the south were unfairly treated by the officials, according to the anti-coup groups' framing, Surayud triggered revenge from international Muslim terrorists. This accusation was repeated the tactics that Sondhi Limthongkul had used to attack Thaksin Shinawatra about the southern turmoil.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The **solution** in this frame was offered *as the restoration of democracy and the demand for Surayud to quit his position*. The chairman of Confederation for Democracy, Weng Tojirakan, and Sant Hatirat, the chairman of Foundation for Democracy Heroes, demanded Surayud to step down from his position, since he violated the Forestry Act of 1941 and Reserved Forest Act of 1964 by having a private house in a forest reserve. His flawless image was questioned by Weng (*'Call for Surayud to quit over forest retreat'* 2006) thus: "If he thinks that running the country needs high ethics and morality, then he must quit because what he did was unlawful". They also called for the termination of the Special Operation Centre, established by the Council for National Security, because of the waste of the huge budget.

### **The metaframes**

This mobilizing frame was constructed under the democracy, nation, and modernization metaframes. In terms of the democracy metaframe, this government was seen as the product of the coup makers, thus Surayud Chulanont was the robber who robbed the ruling power from Thaksin Shinawatra. In terms of the nation metaframe, he was framed as an unproductive and corrupt premier. He caused Thailand damage by being a dictatorial premier, since democratic countries rejected

him. Besides, his lack of economic skills led to the decline of the Thai economy. His inattentiveness was blamed for the inability to resolve the unrest in the south and the bomb blasts in Bangkok. The anti-coup groups pinpointed it as the destruction of the Thai economy and security of the southern people.

Furthermore, the modernization metaframe was applied to portray the conservative image of Surayud and the government. The anti-coup groups condemned the old-fashioned notion of the sufficiency economy of the government as outdated when compared with the capitalism of Thaksin Shinawatra. This led to the ineffective administration of the government.

#### **4. The people's democracy mobilizing frame**

The frame was created to mobilize the protesters after the 2006 coup was staged. The democracy of the people concept was primarily framed to persuade Thaksin's supporters and the general people more generally respectively. The discarding of the 1997 constitution was seen as the loss of people's or grassroots' rights. Additionally Thaksin Shinawatra, which perceived as the premier of the grassroots, was toppled. All of this brought about the movement of the people to call for democracy. It is interesting that when the anti-coup groups started to protest they called themselves "the people" and sometimes "the grassroots." The amat, or the old power group, were constructed as their crucial enemies. The class conflicts were created.

In the beginning of the protest there were many groups of protestors that came up to oppose the coup, typically they set up agendas and activities based on their objectives. Some demanded the restoration of democracy and the 1997 people's constitution, some intended to overthrow the coup makers and the amat group, and some preferred the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. By this, the 19 September coup was the cause of the loss of the people's democracy; consequently the anti-coup groups demanded the coup groups to restore "the people's democracy." However,

the anti-coup groups gave descriptions of their people's democracy which involved the following themes: the 1997 people's constitution, the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra, the national elections, and the rights of people to protest.

### **The problem definition function**

The **problem** in this mobilizing frame was *the loss of the people's democracy by the 19 September coup*. The **culprits** of this frame were pinpointed as *the coup makers, the junta, the old power group and its network, such as the Yellow Shirts, some right-wing scholars and the media that supported the coup*.

It is misleading to say that movements of the anti-coup groups at this time determined to support the return of Thaksin Shinawatra since there were some factions that predominantly demanded the restoration of a democratic regime, accordingly, they had diverse goals. The primary framing issues in this frame were engaged with the removal of the 1997 people's constitution and the elected government of Thaksin. When the protest began, the country was under the control of the martial law, thus the freedom of expression was restricted.

The movement group (*'Talang kao klum poo rak prachathippatai'* 2006) insisted upon the restoration of the 1997 people's constitution drafted by the elected Constitutional Drafting Assembly. They explained that during the drafting process the members of the CDA were elected from each and every group of Thai people. Thus, the 1997 people's constitution could not be replaced by the autocratic 2007 constitution of the junta. The values of the 1997 charter were described in an article as follow:

The previous 1997 constitution was particularly drafted to prevent future coups, in addition it was approved that sovereign power belonged to the Thai people. According to Section 63, it was written that *"No person shall exercise the rights and liberties, prescribed in the Constitution, to overthrow the democratic regime of government, with the King as Head of the State, under this Constitution or to acquire the power to rule the country by any means which is not in accordance with the modes provided in this Constitution."* ...By this, the attempts of the CNS to legalize their sovereignty by common law cannot be accepted; since the constitutional law has far greater precedence

than common law developed by judges. Thus, every law and order issued by the CNS has no legal effect because of the contradiction to the cast-off 1997 constitution.

It was clearly seen that the anti-coup groups applied this news to deny the junta's constitution and the junta government. They pointed out to the democratic of the 1997 constitution which was written to defend the future coups. In terms of the constitution, the junta announced the formulation of a new constitution and arrangement of a new election, but the anti-coup groups' mistrust toward the draft was highlighted. For them, the possibility of obtaining a genuinely democratic constitution was evidently slim, since it was created by the dictators.

The most contentious issue of the junta's constitution was the method of selecting the premier. It caused a broad argument when the drafting process was set to start. The anti-coup groups, such as activists, scholars, members of Thai Rak Thai party, and Thaksin's voters, started to oppose the non-elected premier idea which would further the regression of Thai democracy. A Thai Rak Thai legal professional, Pongthep Thepkanchana (*'Elected prime ministers best, top political parties say'* 2007), insisted that "the head of a government must be an elected member of Parliament". In his view Thai democracy would move backwards as a result of a new charter which permitted the prime minister to be either elected or appointed. In terms of the election, an article was written saying that the coup makers decided to cut some budgets for the next year's election (2007) because they could not confirm the definite date of the national election. The anti-coup groups (*'Sanyan jak padetkarn maimae karnluektung nai pee nee'* 2007) believed that the coup group determined to extend their time in power.

Even though the movements of the anti-coup groups calling for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra had not been seriously undertaken at this time, there were some voices from his voters, showing their support toward Thaksin, reported on their media. The call for Thaksin's reappearance was escalated when he gave interviews to international media outlets. Thaksin (*'Siangriak ha prachattipattai jak thaksin dung kun rui'* 2007) expressed his need to return to Thailand which,

according to the anti-coup groups' news, would be warmly welcomed by a massive number of people. In an interview, Thaksin said the coup makers ousted him from the position, worse; they overthrew the popular government which was voted for and supported by the Thais.

In an article from The Times (as cited in '*Thailand: Thaksin's Giant Shadow*' 2007), it was translated and re-posted by the anti-coup groups which was described that:

Thaksin presided over a deeply divided nation. Even as the citified middle class rallied for months to dislodge him from office, rural masses clung to a leader whose populist policies were seen as evidence of his devotion to the poor. If general elections were held today, Thaksin might very well win, courtesy of a silent majority rising up from their paddies and mountain villages. Just ask rice farmer Mukda Phardthaisong, who lives in Nakhon Ratchasima, part of the country's impoverished northeast. "If Thaksin were to run again, I would want him to be our leader because he gave more attention to grassroots people than to the middle class or government officers," she says. "Poor people are not important for the new government".

This article was translated to show the love and loyalty of the grassroot towards Thaksin, also the disregard of the junta government to them was mentioned. The amat government was portrayed as the elite who never paid attention to the people. Class conflict was engaged in this frame.

### **The causal attribution function**

At this stage, the anti-coup groups had not identified the definite reason for the coup makers to demolish the people's democracy, perhaps it was too early in the movement. Because of this, accusations were generally levelled at the 2007 draft charter and the undemocratic drafting process. An article cast suspicion on the reliability of the 2007 Constitutional Drafting Assembly.

The members of the 2007 Constitutional Drafting Assembly were notified by someone to elect Prasong Soonsuri to be the chairman. It happened after a meeting of General Prem Tinasulanonda, Prasong Soonsuri, and some key CNS members. Apparently, this voting result, already anticipated by public, means that the CNS empowers the Constitutional Drafting Assembly. Thus, we cannot expect a democratic constitution from them.

The anti-coup groups (*'Sanyan jak padetkarn maimae karnluetung nai pee nee'* 2007) alleged that the intention of the amat, in empowering the CDA, was to remain in power. Another intention was the suspension of the national election. It was seen by the anti-coup groups that the coup makers were concerned about Thaksin's popularity among his voters.

The tyrants' tactic, as analyzed by a political observer, is that they plan to dissolve the Thai Rak Thai party. Besides, the national election will never be held as long as the TRT still have popularity. Thaksin is still unwaveringly favored by the rural people, certainly he will be re-elected in the next election.

This reason indicated the fear of loss of the coup makers, accordingly the dictators would take any actions to prevent Thaksin and the people to get close to democracy.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In this mobilizing frame, the agonies of the people, caused by the elite, the old power group, and some middle class in Bangkok, were constructed to portray the evil side of those three groups. Thus, the old power group was **framed** as *the dictatorial group which determined to suppress the grassroots*. Undoubtedly, the 19 September coup was viewed, by the anti-coup groups, as a tool of the elite and middle class to obtain power; apparently the people, Thaksin Shinawatra, and the democratic regime became great burdens. Consequently, all means that lead to democracy must be eliminated. An example showing exactly this was the abandonment of the common people's rights to participate in the drafting process of the 2007 charter. A view of a political science professor Michael Nelson (*'Soodtai ja mee tae konkungthep kloomleklek kian rattathamnoon'* 2007) was reported on the Thai E-News website:

Despite the long and cumbersome process of selecting the drafters, their composition is very predictable, that is, Bangkok-based high-level bureaucrats and academics... As a consequence, you will have a tiny group of elite Bangkokians writing a constitution, and then ask the rural majority to approve it in a referendum... It is not about a very limited black/white question, but about a document so complex and difficult that only such elite

people were deemed to be in a position to write it... Although there will be public hearings and a lot of PR about the process and the product, one might wonder on what sort of understanding ordinary voters will base their decision.

In the above statement, Nelson explained how the Bangkokian elites controlled the Thai polity through the 2007 draft charter, which illustrated the conflict between the classes. In this mobilizing frame, we see that the anti-coup groups applied writings from scholars to strengthen their accusation. Again, the view of Thai scholar Phichit Likhitkitchasombun (The Serichon 2007) was posted on Thai E-News to describe the troubles of the grassroots caused by the coup group, thus:

The 1997 constitution helps the middle and lower classes realize their democratic awareness. When the 19 September coup occurs, they are powerfully impacted. For the grassroots, their rights, freedoms, and sovereignty are completely stolen. Also, the benefits, which they received from the populist policies of Thaksin Shinawatra, are demolished. That's why they entirely resist this coup. Those dictators have made a major mistake by overrating their power. So far the middle and lower class are fully awake to recognize the real agents who intervened in the establishment of Thailand's democracy. Thais are forced, heartlessly, to choose between "the Thai style democracy" which is the authoritarian regime of the amat and "the people's democracy" created by the people.

It is interesting that Phichit started to differentiate democracy types. He brought back the notion of Thai style democracy, by which the totalitarian regime of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the former dictatorial premier, was known. Phichit attempted to point out the similarity between the Sarit regime and Prem's. Furthermore, his message noticeably began to frame the conflicts between the grassroots and the old power group. It was adopted by the anti-coup groups to construct messages in this mobilizing frame. In addition, the anti-coup groups framed the amat as a conservative dictatorial group which enjoyed insulting the people or the grassroots. From the anti-coup groups' view, the people's movements (*'Prachathipatai maimee wan klod jak modlook padetkarn'* 2006) this time were far greater than was estimated by the old power group. It was interesting that the class conflict inspired by those scholars was brought up by the anti-coup group leaders to create the movement messages afterwards.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The **solution** for this frame was to *demand the restoration of democracy and the 1997 people's constitution*. In addition, a *mass gathering to make peaceful protests every weekend in Bangkok* was proposed as another means. The protests were characterized as the "people's movement". The anti-coup groups (*'Prachathipatai maimee wan klod jak modlook padetkarn'* 2006) denied an accusation that they were hired, by Thaksin, to protest. They insisted that they were a group of people that demanded the restoration of democracy and liberty.

As mentioned before, Thailand, at that time, was under the regulation of the martial law; media and political activities were curbed because of this. During that time a group of university teachers (The Serichon 2006) made a statement against the control of freedom of expression that:

As a commemoration of the constitutional day, we would like to declare our standpoints on the people's liberty that:

We insist the government respects the liberty of citizens to express opinions by speeches, writing, printing, publicizing, and any other means.

We insist the government respects the liberty of citizens to conduct anti-coup demonstrations.

We insist the government respects the liberty of citizens to peacefully assemble without arms.

This statement was posted on the website of the anti-coup groups to support their movements. Later, opinions of this group of scholars was referred to by the anti-coup groups and the Red Shirts to convince the public that they were on the same side.

An article on the Prachathai web board (*'Plai meena prawattisat tong jaruk'* 2007) encouraged people to protest in March 2007. The author said this would be the perfect time for the people to get rid of the dictatorial regime and to restore a democratic regime. He also invited people to do the demonstration to protect the

nation, demand for the restoration of democracy and the 1997 constitution, and express their frustration towards the measures the coup makers took against Thaksin. According to this author, in the end streams of people from the north, south, central, and east would effortlessly sweep the coup makers, who destroyed the nation, out of Thailand.

### **The metaframes**

The metaframe being applied in this mobilizing frame was democracy. The anti-coup groups activated their movements under the name “the people’s movement” to call for “the people’s democracy”. They demanded the restoration of democracy and of the “1997 people’s constitution”. To restore the people’s democracy, the anti-coup groups started demanding the re-establishment of the 1997 constitution, a new national election, the right to do political activities, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. They attacked the 2007 draft charter (*‘Prachachon prom lookhue hak rattatammanoonmai mai tong mk jak karn luektung’* 2006) as being undemocratic and would lead to the uprising of people to against it, thus:

An uprising of the people would happen if the premier did not come from an election. Many voices criticized this new constitution on its similarities to the 1991 tyrannical constitution of the National Peacekeeping Council...How many times have we struggled for democracy? How many lives have been lost? Why do they still draft this dictatorial constitution to serve their power-hungry minds? The 1997 constitution was the best constitution ever, because it was drafted by people from every group, not by a group selected by tyrants, elites, and the amat.

Obviously, democracy was the main metaframe being employed in this framing and movements.

Also, the inequality between the elite and the grassroots was framed. The anti-coup groups determined to increase the intensity of the argument by framing the class conflict between the amat and the grassroots. The people, according to their framing, were insulted by the amat as an unintelligent and shortsighted class which must be ruled by the more enlightened and intelligent group. The people had been

taken advantage of, by the oppressive old power group, for long periods of time. Because of this, the 19 September coup was definitely the tool for the old power group to remove all benefits and rights of the people given by their democratic government. To restore their rights and benefits, the anti-coup groups or the people would start the movement to call for democracy from the old power group or amat.

## **5. The media control mobilizing frame**

The frame was triggered when the junta began to control the distribution of Thaksin's interviews in Thailand. Furthermore, some websites and community radio stations of the anti-coup groups were banned. Accordingly, the anti-coup groups started to attack the acts of the junta on censorship and the opposition media who allegedly had so-called unethical journalistic practices. This frame was constructed similarly to Sondhi Limthongkul, because the anti-coup groups realized the power of media, which were used in the movement of the Yellow Shirts. When Thaksin gave interviews to foreign media and intended to broadcast it, the junta barred it, including on the community radio stations that supported Thaksin.

### **The problem definition function**

In this frame, the anti-coup groups constructed problem to concentrate on *the unfair and favoritism measures of the coup group on media censorship*. The anti-coup groups thought their media, which published news about the coup and the mobilizations, was restricted by the junta, while news of Thaksin Shinawatra from international and local media was banned. On the other hand, the media of Sondhi Limthongkul and some other media outlets, which were seen as supporting the coup, were given business opportunities and freedom. An article in the Serichon newspaper (The Serichon 2007) written:

At this time, we are living in a one-sided communication society. Media outlets cannot publish viewpoints opposite to the government. If they do so, they would become the trouble makers that intervene in the building of

peace and harmony. The CNS also manipulates the mass media to produce peaceful and harmonious news about Thailand to claim that there are no conflicts of beliefs and ideas amidst Thai people.

In addition, the media of the anti-coup groups such as websites, radio programs, and some print media were curbed (*'Sathanee withthayoo took book kuenwan'* 2006). It was reported that the radio equipment of a community radio station was removed by the order of the military government. The radio station claimed that they presented the pure voices of the grassroots to protect the nation; however they were treated unfairly by the government. Also, a radio program hosted by a veteran Thai Rak Thai politician, Veera Musikapong, was stopped two months after the coup was staged. Furthermore, when the anti-coup protests began, they (*'Weera Musikkapong remton jad raikarn jannee'* 2006) claimed that their websites were fiercely attacked by hackers.

When Thaksin gave an interview to CNN in Singapore, it was, undoubtedly, barred from being broadcast in Thailand. This brought fury and frustration among his supporters. The anti-coup groups reported condemnations from other countries on the media restriction. The opinion of CNN correspondent Dan Rivers on the censorship (*as cited in 'Pabpoj thai toktum soodkeed nakkao CNN chae tor'* 2007) was re-published on Thai E-News website:

CNN's signal into Thailand is being blocked whenever our exclusive interview with deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is broadcast... The military junta had promised to lift martial law by the end of 2006 – but now we're in 2007, and martial law remains in place, CNN is being censored, local TV stations are self-censoring their output and there is a growing climate of anger, trepidation and fear...especially in the CNN office, where anonymous, threatening calls keep coming!

This CNN correspondent often reported news that was in conformity with media of the anti-coup groups. Accordingly, this article was used to support the frame.

Regarding the unfairness of the junta, the anti-coup groups claimed that Sondhi Limthongkul and his allies were given more freedom. It is clearly seen that during the movement of the Yellow Shirts in 2006, the Manager Media of Sondhi

Limthongkul was used as a crucial tool to attack Thaksin Shinawatra. Furthermore, other media outlets such as the Nation groups, Matichon, Bangkokbiz, and Post Today were seen as allies of Sondhi Limthongkul supporting the junta. Thus the injustice practice of the junta was condemned by the protest groups.

### **The causal attribution function**

In the early period of the movement, Thailand was under the control of martial law by which mass media was firmly restricted. At this time, the martial law and bias of the junta were alleged as the **reasons** to censor the movement's media. An article from the Serichon newspaper (The Serichon 2007) published that:

Thailand has had two coups. The first coup was done by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin to seize power from the elected government, while the second one was accomplished by Sondhi Limthongkul to occupy the media domains. In the past, Sondhi applied his media to overthrow the government of Thaksin Shinawatra. So far he has been given a chance to host his political television program on a state television station. He also appoints himself as “Yam Faopandin” (the guardian of the nation)...because of this, Thailand has been distorted by such wicked thoughts of him which sometimes causes us dreadful fatigue in the morning.

It seemed that Sondh Limthongkul, the former leader of the Yellow Shirts, was attacked most by the anti-coup groups when he was given a chance to host his television show on Channel 11, because he was seen as the junta’s spokesman.

### **The moral evaluation function**

At this time, the accusations of media restriction in this frame were constructed around two issues. The first one was constructed when the coup makers banned the media which reported Thaksin’s interviews, while the second was framed around the discrimination in favor of the opposing media outlets, particularly Sondhi Limthongkul and his media allies.

The anti-coup groups’ media posted news of Dan Rivers, the CNN international correspondent, interviewed Thaksin from Singapore. The juntar banned this interview broadcast. Accordingly, the acts of the coup makers caused critics from

Dan Rivers thus (*as cited in 'Pabpoj thai toktum soodkeed nakkao CNN chae tor'* 2007):

We interviewed Thaksin in Singapore, where he also met a senior politician. Our interview threw his visit to Singapore into the limelight – now the military regime in Thailand is furious with the Singaporeans – they've cancelled an official visit of the Singaporean foreign minister and cancelled a civil service exchange program, because they dared to have a meeting with the deposed prime minister of Thailand...oh and because they didn't prevent CNN from interviewing him there too. The Singaporean Ambassador has also been summoned to government house here for a reprimand. It's not quite war, but it's certainly a jolly angry spat. It's ironic that the undemocratic, authoritarian junta here in Thailand is trying to take the moral high ground with Singapore – itself not exactly a paragon of freedom.

The sour relationship between Singapore and the junta was raised through this news control. It seemed the protest groups intended to show the public that the conflicts between Thailand and Singapore, were created by the amat government, the interview of Thaksin was just a small matter.

From the news report of the anti-coup groups (*'Ngarmna suetangchat prjab padetkarn censor CNN'* 2007), the CNS attempted to stop broadcasting news about Thaksin and his political colleagues. Martial law, furthermore, was applied to give the authority to the army to censor the media and bar any protests. On the one hand, Sondhi Limthongkul received permission from the junta to host his political show on Channel 11.

Consequently, he was **framed** by the anti-coup groups (*'Poojadkarn jak sue klaipan klaipen wattanatham hang kan kleadchang'* 2006) as *the master of news spinning who divided society by his media*. An anti-coup author claimed that Sondhi found every chance to portray Thaksin as an evil person, using impolite words. Sondhi, he claimed, would not hesitate to twist the truth about Thaksin. Anyone who was Thaksin's friend would be labeled as a bad person. The opposition media such as the Nation, Matichon (this newspaper seemed support the Yellow at that time, but turned to support the Red later), and so forth were framed as unethical media for reporting bad news about Thaksin and the protests. Two famous news anchors from

the Nation group (*'Kanok lae theera team nation art done sae'* 2007) were criticized about their practices thus:

The news program hosted by Mr. Theera and Kanok might be banned from airing since the popular rating is plunging. This is because of their unfair and unethical attitudes. They are famous for their imbalance and lack of ethics which causes disharmony in Thai society.

To fight back, journalists who supported Thaksin started to disseminate positive news of Thaksin and attack the junta, the amat, and the opposed media. Taveevoot (*'Thammai nak kao mai thamnatee truadsob'* 2007) wrote thusly:

Last night I had a dinner with my journalist colleagues from the Nation, Manager, and Post Today. The discussed topic was why they admired the coup group so much. The insiders reveal that, since the coup has been done, these journalists are bought already, while some of them are threatened. They also dislike Thaksin so much that they aren't concerned about journalism ethics when reporting news about Thaksin. Another reason for them to support the coup group is that they hope that the coup group would reform Thai politics by getting rid of Thaksin and replacing him with the Democrat politicians. They obviously support this party, like most Bangkokians.

He portrayed the opposition media as fainthearted, biased, and greedy, since they did not attempt to criticize the junta. Some journalists, according to his accusation, also supported the Democrat party to become the next government. This strategy imitated Sondhi's by employing experienced journalists to attack rivals through framing, which was followed by the establishment of Thaksin's media.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The **remedy** of this mobilizing frame, for the anti-coup groups, was *calling for the freedom of expression*. The anti-coup groups re-distributed the views of media professionals on censorship as the solution. For instance, news of a group of scholars held a symposium was posted on the Thai E-news. This conference was organized by the Campaign for Popular Media Reform (CPMR). The chairperson of the group, Ubonrat Siriyuwasak (Rojanaphruk 2006), was well known for her scholarly work. In the symposium she talked about the media control situation thus:

"The people's media has been shut down for the moment...They must return basic rights as soon as possible...The heart of democracy is rights and liberty."

In synchronization, the anti-coup group media (*'Perd jodmai samakom poosuekao tangprated yapidsue'* 2007) posted an open letter from the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Thailand that was sent to General Surayud Chulanont. The letter explained that the media censorship in Thailand had become "media threatening". They asked Surayud to free the press and insisted that the interview of Thaksin by CNN should not be barred from airing in Thailand. It seemed the condemnations from the professional media organizations had been used to support the movement of the anti-coup groups. Besides, they (*'Sathanee witthayoo took book kuenwan'* 2006) pressured the junta by writing petitions to inform the international journalist organizations about the current media censorship situation. This became a tactic that used by the anti-coup groups when they intended to reveal the evil side of the junta to the world.

### **The metaframes**

In this mobilizing frame the media censorship was framed with the democracy metaframe. The restrictions of the media to publish news were seen as media threatening practices. Certainly, the junta was framed as violating the principles of democracy. The situation became worse when Thaksin's interview by CNN was banned from broadcasting in Thailand which brought about condemnation from the international journalist organizations. From this, the anti-coup groups' tactic was to report the critiques from the international media agencies. They were seeking the support from international media organizations by writing the letters to inform them of the situation.

The drawback of the press censorship, for the coup makers, was framed involving the nation metaframe. Even though the anti-coup groups had not clearly specified the worst results to the nation, their view was that the practices of the junta caused condemnation from democratic countries. This could lead to a bad image for Thailand in the eyes of the international community.

## 6. The Buddhism mobilizing frame

From the beginning of the anti-coup movement, this was the least important mobilizing frame. Nonetheless, it was constructed to attack the junta when the unrest in the southern provinces flared. Some Buddhists in the south asked for help from the government. The anti-coup factions seized the chance to raise religious issues to legitimize the junta actions; this was similar to the Yellow Shirts' movement tactic of engaging morality with framing.

### The problem definition function

The anti-coup groups constructed the **problem** as *the inattentiveness of the junta to protect Buddhism*. There was news of some Buddhists, from the southernmost provinces, that were threatened and harmed by the RKK group of separatists from Pattanee. A threatening announcement from the RKK (*'Baiplew komkoo thai poot won'* 2006) was published thus:

The Thai Buddhists in these areas are not permitted to search for resources or hunt animals in the land of Fadoni Muslims. The Thai Buddhist employees must pay 500 Baht fee to the Muslims at the mosques every month. For one who pays money, he must hang green clothes in front of the house so as not to be injured by the RKK army. Every Friday, the Thai Buddhists must stop working and drinking alcohol, according to the teaching of the prophet Muhammad.

Thus the anti-coup groups pointed out the losses of the Thai Buddhists resulted from the Muslim separatists.

The next issue was framed around the process of constitutional drafting which the Buddhism and the King issues were brought up. The example was from the Thai E-News website. They (*'Sanyan antarai wa rattatammanoonmai'* 2007) published a letter from the Rector of Mahachulalongkornrajavidyalaya University (MCU), a famous Buddhist university. The open letter was sent to Premier Surayud Chulanont to declare the rector's concern toward the interim 2007 constitution. According to the rector, this constitution did not contain section 9 which said that "The King is a

Buddhist and Upholder of religions.” He also worried about articles involved with possible changes to the Sangha administration which would cause the Buddhist realm confusion and calamities.

### **The causal attribution function**

The anti-coup groups had not directly given the cause of the problem for this frame, but there was some news (*‘Paktai yang por meewang kamnan jaising hang krongpeenung prom su’ 2006*) that criticized the unrest in the south saying that the junta did not pay attention to resolve the problem since they spent time talking nonsense on TV. This might indicate that *the junta focused on holding onto power and neglected to solve the serious problems.*

### **The moral evaluation function**

Obviously, the junta was **framed** as *power hungry and stupid*. An interview of General Surayud, about the southern problems, was criticized hard. In the interview with Aljazeera news Surayud admitted that the cause of the problem came from the unjust practices of local officials. Because of this, the anti-coup media (*‘Surayud sarapab tor lok muslim wa prathed thai rangkae chao thai muslim’ 2006*) **labeled** Surayud as *stupid*, since it might cause anger among the Muslim terrorists around the world and lead them to escalate the violent situations in Thailand.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The anti-coup groups did not offer a solution in the first phase of the movement. They just published some short news about the Buddhist movement; nonetheless this movement would be emphasized more strongly in the second phase.

### **The metaframes**

The religion metaframe was involved in this mobilizing frame. The anti-coup groups determined to construct the inattention of the junta to Buddhism and the hardship of the Thai Buddhists in the southernmost area that were threatened by the RKK

group. In this very early movement, the anti-coup groups had not directly constructed the conflict frame between the RKK Muslims and the Thai Buddhists in the south. Later, in the second phase, this frame was radically transformed to escalate the negligence of the coup makers to protect Thai Buddhists on some major issues.

## **7. The Thaksin mobilizing frame**

This mobilizing frame occurred when the junta controlled news of Thaksin and banned him from returning to Thailand. This frame was promoted together with the people's democracy mobilizing frame. This was because some of the anti-coup groups supported the return of Thaksin; accordingly they produced messages to call for his return. Nevertheless, Thaksin's politicians stayed silent and undertook no political activities. On the one hand some voices of Thaksin's followers were aired to express their admiration toward Thaksin and his party. The banning measures from the CNS to censor news about Thaksin, including preventing him from returning to Thailand, stirred up anger among Thaksin's voters. Because of this, this frame was constructed to propagate news about the movements of Thaksin and his followers in order to sustain the popularity of Thaksin and attack the measures the CNS employed to deal with Thaksin. Benefits given by Thaksin were framed to remind the voters of his bigheartedness to the grassroots. However, during the first movement this mobilizing frame was not emphasized, because the protest groups had not yet formed a movement organization.

### **The problem definition function**

The anti-coup groups framed the **problem** as *the unjust practices the dictators had used to intimidate Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues*. The examples were the censorship of news about Thaksin, the allegations toward Thaksin and his family, the removal of Thaksin's Thai passport, and the banning of Thaksin from returning to Thailand. Apparently, the **culprits** in this frame were *the CNS*. The anti-coup

groups ( '*Ngao tamuen tee tod yao kong thaksin*' 2007) posted an article from Time magazine which described the actions of the CNS thus:

The generals are trying to inoculate themselves against the Thaksin effect. Last September's military takeover was initially greeted with little public disapproval—even among Thai supporters of democracy—yet the junta has repeatedly warned the local press not to report on Thaksin, lest the coverage inflame public sentiment. A recent CNN interview with the former PM was blocked from Thai airwaves. Nor are foreign governments exempt. When Thaksin met last month with Singapore's deputy Prime Minister, Thailand angrily canceled a set of diplomatic meetings between the two countries. A few days later, CNS leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin intimated that Singapore might be eavesdropping on Thailand's leaders through its ownership of Shin Corp., which runs a Thai mobile-phone operator. (Formerly controlled by Thaksin's family, Shin was sold last year to Temasek Holdings, the investment arm of the Singaporean government, for \$1.9 billion.)

The measures of CNS to withdraw Thaksin's passport and prevent him from returning to Thailand were viewed, by an anti-coup writer, as evil acts to bully the powerless former prime minister. The anti-coup groups ( '*Chatwua sanlangkad hen eka binpad kor tokjai*' 2007) also condemned the defensive measures of the CNS to bar Thaksin from going back to Thailand. At that time, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin ( '*Prachachon penlan prom um thaksin kao thai*' 2007) announced a few conditions when Thaksin expressed that he might return to Thailand. The first condition was Thaksin would be charged immediately when he arrived in Thailand, the next was the prohibition of massive numbers of people to welcome him at the airport, and the last one was the ban of every form of mass movement. Regarding this, General Sonthi ( '*Sonthi, Thaksin take war of words to foreign media*' 2007) told a Japanese newspaper that: ""We will not stop him if he wishes to return, but I don't think he will be able to return, because of the ongoing corruption investigation against him." The CNS also launched a program to oppose Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates. The spearhead of the campaign was the Council for National Security (CNS) assistant secretary-general Saprang Kalayanamitra. The CNS wanted to "improve the political system so as to ensure that the rogue Thaksin regime could not regain power." Saprang ( '*Traitor' used to describe Thaksin*' 2007) attempted to convince

local officers and politicians, particularly in the north-eastern provinces, that "Civil servants should know they are dispensing duties on His Majesty's behalf, so they are not supposed to allow themselves to become henchmen for rogue politicians." He also stressed that the return of Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues would lead to the collapse of the three pillars of society - the nation, religion, and the monarchy.

### **The casual attribution function**

The **reason** for the CNS to intimidate Thaksin was framed as *the fear of the CNS toward the enduring popularity of Thaksin*. We must admit that after taking power the coup makers' popularity among Thais generally dropped. An analysis from Time magazine ('*Ngao tamuen tee tod yao kong thaksin*' 2007), which was re-published on the anti-coup groups' website, explained that:

Thaksin makes the CNS very nervous," says Ukrist Pathmanand, associate director of the Institute of Asian Studies at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University, who has co-written a book about the ousted leader. "I don't believe he will stay out of politics. I could see him returning when people begin to think that the leaders who followed him have failed. He could be seen as the best alternative to the CNS." Indeed, the CNS, which says it overthrew Thaksin to restore national unity and prevent a violent showdown between his supporters and detractors, is looking less than bulletproof. Sonthi and CNS-appointed interim PM Surayud Chulanont have promised fresh elections by year's end. But just four months after the coup, local polls show that the Thai public is wearying of military rule.

Views of scholar who had a positive image were used in this frame to support the messages. They described the coup maker as dictators who attempted to intimidate Thaksin and his voters, while the popularity of the junta among Thais was significantly reduced.

Thaksin's supporters also revealed information that Thaksin desired to return to Thailand to bring about national reconciliation (Ibid). Another article ('*Chatwua sanlangkad hen eka binpad kor tokjai*' 2007) taunted the anxious reactions of the CNS toward Thaksin's activities, such as playing golf in Bali, shopping, and visiting friends in China. The author said that the CNS was distressed because Thaksin might be behind the movement's plan.

### **The moral evaluation function**

The anti-coup groups **portrayed** those generals as *the dictators who intimidated Thaksin by using unproven charges to get rid of him*. News from the anti-coup groups' website (*'Farang rem mong game ok teekao nao polthai ha let sairai thaksin'* 2007) said that:

The Thai generals could not completely remove Thaksin. They can only charge him with unproven accusations. On the other hand, Thaksin can definitely retain his popularity. The true color of the coup makers is revealed by the change from the democratic military to dictatorial military.

To strengthen the accusation, the anti-coup groups (*'Wela yakun fai tee dai puenpai mak teesud chana'* 2007) insisted that: "The old power group teamed up with the other networks to attack Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai Party. They constructed those nationalist sentiments to eliminate Thaksin. They are afraid that Thaksin might return and be welcomed by massive numbers of people."

Furthermore, they disseminated Thaksin's denial of the accusations. Thaksin used an interview with NHK to defend himself against the charges, which was posted on the Thai E-News website (*'Siangriak ha prachatippatai jak thaksin dung kun ruei'* 2007):

An investigation has been launched in Thailand by the National Counter Corruption Commission and the Assets Examination Committee into alleged corruption during the Thaksin administration and the suspected accumulation of wealth by the Thaksin family. Asked about such allegations, Thaksin said: "I believe in my innocence. It's a one-sided allegation without reasons...If [the case] is brought to court--maybe by international standards--I can prove my innocence easily.

Thaksin also framed news about himself through the interview pieces from international and local media. He found chances to communicate his intentions and defend the junta's allegation; simultaneously he could keep in touch with his Thai supporters through this framing.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

In this early movement period, the anti-coup groups offered the **solution** which was *calling for the return of Thaksin*, but it was not a major goal of the movement at this time.

### **The metaframes**

The democracy metaframe was clearly applied into the messages of this mobilizing frame. The unjust charges and measures from the dictators to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra were framed to exaggerate the maliciousness of the CNS. The censorship of news about Thaksin was condemned as a violation of a democratic regime.

Besides, the popularity of Thaksin among his supporters was framed by the nation metaframe; these people needed the return of Thaksin to rule the country which would lead to the improvement of the economy and their quality of life.

Nevertheless, later this frame would have gained increased persuasive power for the mobilizations when the supporters of Thaksin cooperated with other factions to oust the junta and demand the return of Thaksin.

## **“The second phase of the anti-coup groups movement”**

In the second period of the movement groups that became the core of the movement supported the come back of Thaksin Shinawatra, while the PTV station started the protest. This time Thaksin’s supporters began to support the movement by joining the PTV. The news of the station was disseminated among the anti-coup groups and Thaksin’s voters of which might stimulated their hope to bring Thaksin back to Thailand. As well, the other groups that called for democracy continued their movements, but did not fully collaborate with Thaksin’s supporters’ factions. In this second phase the groups that demanded the return of Thaksin will be the focus since they would turn to be the Red Shirts afterwards. The establishment of the PTV boosted the confidence to perform extensive mobilization, since the members of the television station were former TRT politicians. They had huge budgets, were skilled

persuades, had lots of voter support, and were backed by the wealth of Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues.

Thaksin had expressed his goal to return to Thailand which seemed possible when the popularity of the junta among some Thais declined. It was the right time for him and his supporters to perform movements. The movement of Thaksin was done together with the movement of the leaders of TRT. Those politicians visited their voting bases to remind the voters about the benefits given by Thaksin and TRT. They sought to inspire hope in the grassroots for the return of Thaksin; accordingly the strong movement of the voters was necessary to accomplish this. The anti-coup groups were confident in their power to sustain the movement in this second period. As a result, the faction that supported Thaksin collaborated with the PTV to attack the junta and call for the return of Thaksin and his party.

In terms of the mobilizing frames, the anti-coup factions produced seven mobilizing frames which focused on some aspects of the various issues and frame functions. In the first phase of the framing, the anti-coup, anti-amat, people's democracy, and Thaksin mobilizing frame were primarily concentrated on. In this second phase the same numbers of mobilizing frames were remained, with the four previously mentioned frames still being powerfully persuasive. Nonetheless, the anti-coup groups changed their tactics by focusing on attacking individuals using only some functions.

The timeline of the second phase ran from March to June 2007. It started when the anti-coup groups established the PTV television station and ended when the anti-coup groups formed the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), or the formal Red Shirts. During this period, we will see changes in the anti-coup groups' framing process, in which all of the mobilizing frames were retained, but some functions were transformed. An important action was the Thai Rak Thai Party establishing the PTV station to be the mouthpiece for Thaksin and the party. When PTV was banned from airing programs, however, the producers who were TRT members started to form the protests. The PTV turned into a leading protest group

that was supported by experienced politicians and activists. Apparently, the movements of the anti-coup groups, at this time, were well planned and supported by huge budgets, and they had skillful leaders and speechmakers. This led to more concise and persuasive messages for mobilizing their followers in the second phase movement.

## 1. The anti-coup mobilizing frame

In the second phase of the movement, the anti-coup mobilizing frame was minimized in its significance, since the coup had been staged many months ago. Nonetheless the coup group still remained as the protest focus. The anti-coup groups called for the restoration of democracy and the return of Thaksin which they blamed on the coup and so resistance to the junta was significant in mobilization. They changed tactics to attack individuals. Rather than pointing out the undemocratic nature of every coup maker, in this second phase the leader of the CNS, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, became the main target of attack.

### The problem definition function

In this second phase the coup had been staged over six months, thus the anti-coup groups framed the **problem** of this mobilizing frame as *the evil attempts of the coup makers to remain in power*. The accusations were supported by citing the interim constitution of the junta and the measures to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues. Also, the coup makers were accused of disloyal practices toward King Bhumibol. The malpractices of the coup group were examined by a Thammasat university law scholar Worachet Pakeerat. His view was applied into the framing of this mobilizing frame. In his speech (*'Hok duan rattaprahan kao tor pai kong prated thai'* 2007) about the situation of the 19 September coup and the future of Thailand, he viewed the coup as an illegal act without foolproof reasons. As a result, some major and unfavorable impacts on the Thai legal system took place. He said:

When comparing this draft charter with the previous constitutions, this draft produces new laws. Besides, the knowledgeable and skillful drafters of this draft have gained abundant experience from the preceding coups. By this, the amnesty bill in this charter is drafted to allow the coup makers take no responsibilities for their actions. According to this, the coup makers find a legal way to accomplish their goals which is very far beyond their usual weapons and army forces. They also claim the morality to stage a coup and abandon the former constitution. This could cause a major confusion and conflict of authority between moralities and laws.

The protest groups also posted Worachet's view toward the Constitutional Tribunal which had been set up by the junta's interim constitution. The Tribunal was questioned on their authority to consider the fraudulent cases of Thaksin Shinawatra, the Thai Rak Thai Party, and the Democrat Party. The analysis of Worachet seemed perfect for the anti-coup groups to attack the bad and undemocratic practices of the coup makers in regard to Thaksin and his colleagues.

After the court's verdicts the anti-coup groups posted some foreign news which criticized the undemocratic results of the Constitutional Court. A statement from the EU president (*'EU okronglaew pranam tulapadetkarn yub pakkarnmuang mai pen tham'* 2007), which evidently opposed the verdicts, was published on the Thai E-News website. It said that the EU president was upset by the regression of Thai democracy when the CNS eliminated their antagonists through the Constitutional Court. An article from the Asia Sentinel (*'Thaksin's Party's Over in Thailand'* 2007) was used to support the anti-coup groups' accusation thus:

While Thaksin can justly be blamed for interfering with independent constitutional bodies during his tenure, the rulers that replaced him have gone even further by overthrowing an elected government, manipulating the justice system, rewriting the constitution, sending soldiers to television stations and enforcing ex post facto laws. Now they've wiped Thaksin's party off the map and banned 111 of the Party's executive members from running in an election for five years the harshest possible punishment. Although the blatantly political decision has profound ramifications for the Thai political landscape, it was simply the culmination of a series of rulings over the past year that skirted or completely ignored the law.

The above views from the foreign media were applied to construct the disapproval and condemnation, from other democratic countries, toward the CNS. These tactics had been applied to acquire credibility and acknowledgement about their blames from the public.

### **The causal attribution function**

The practices and measures of the coup group were **framed** as *their intention to remain in the power*. This time, the anti-coup groups often supported their accusation using foreign news. An article from the Asia Sentinel (*'Thaksin's Party's Over in Thailand'* 2007) was published on the anti-coup media in which the author pinpointed the reason to ban Thaksin and his colleagues from political activities. It said that:

The Constitutional Tribunal's decision to dissolve the party — finally revealed after the judges read the ruling for an excruciating nine hours — was just one part of the plan to remove Thaksin from the political scene. The rest of the job belongs to those drafting the new constitution, which aims to limit the powers of the executive and expand the role of non-elected senators and judges to ensure that a reincarnation of Thaksin doesn't rise from the ashes...

The main goal of the coup-makers, of course, was to cut the legs off Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai, the party he founded in 1998 as a personal vehicle to carry him to the premiership. TRT stormed to power with a win in the 2001 general election and became the only party in Thai history to complete a full term in office...The real winners, however, are the military, judiciary and royalist elites who saw Thaksin as a threat to their traditional power base. With Thaksin gone, they can safely fade into the background once again and pull the strings from behind the scenes. Thaksin had egged them out into the open, and he paid the price.

In essence, the junta eliminated Thaksin and his associates through the Constitutional Tribunal since the popularity of Thaksin among his voters had not declined. Moreover, the junta was afraid of the recent movements of Thaksin and the TRT, which would cause the uprising of Thaksin's supporters to prevent the junta from staying in the power. It is interesting that the anti-coup groups spread news from sources that backed their views, which became known among them as

trustworthy sources afterwards. The reason is the Thai mainstream media were under the regulation of martial law and some, according to the anti-coup groups' framing, backed the coup makers.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In the **accusations** of the anti-coup groups, the coup group was framed as *the tyrants who robbed Thailand's democracy*. News from the anti-coup groups' website ('*Koomue suksa mob tan padetkarn*' 2007) portrayed the coup makers' actions thus:

This theft group overthrew the people's democracy. They seized the ruling power by depicting themselves as honorable heroes who protected this country from dishonest people; on the contrary they desire to occupy Thailand. Worse, they affront the common people as foolish and short-sighted, while they praise themselves as moral and prudent rulers who are leading Thailand with decent and highly regarded wisdoms. In fact, they absolutely cause huge dispute and hatred among Thais.

From the above statement, the anti-coup groups portrayed the coup makers as an evil group determined to hold on to power endlessly. The people were suppressed, so as to be their unintelligent inferiors. This accusation had been constantly applied into the frames of the anti-coup groups in both the first and second phase of movements. Another **label** was *the devils that hold the sacred books*. The anti-coup groups thought of the coup group as malicious people pretending to be moral. This branding was alleged in an article on the Thai E-News website ('*Thaksin teesakna surayud borihan prated mai pen laew pan*' 2007):

The government might be able to deceive some people by saying this coup is legitimate. They claim that it has been done in accordance with the sacred book they hold. On the other hand, they are "the devils that hold the sacred book". What they actually do is thieve the people's power, which is strongly condemned by all democratic countries.

This labeling was constructed to portray the conflicting image of the coup makers, since they gave the reason for conducting coup as to save Thailand from the corrupt Thaksin government. On the other hand, their malpractices were far worse which being done under the mask of good people.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

In the second period of the movement, the anti-coup groups offered the **solution** as *getting rid of the coup makers and restoring democracy*. This time the PTV group, some of which were members of Thai Rak Thai, participated in the movements, thus certain objectives and strategies were established to effectively overthrow the coup makers, junta government, and amat. From the Pantip web board (*'Koomue suksa mob tan padetkarn'* 2007), a view was re-posted on the Thai E-News,

These dictators must not have a place in Thailand anymore. To become the rulers, they robbed the people's constitution. We must stop this malevolent group from destroying our country. All of them must be brought to a people's court for a hearing and judgment on their faults. Besides, we must reform our bureaucracy and army to function for us, the people. And lastly, we must restore freedom, liberty, and egalitarianism into Thailand.

Moreover, an anti-coup writer (*'Sanyan antarai tung thai tung chat'* 2007) invited all Thai people, from all groups, to protect and secure the existence of the monarchy which had been threatened by the coup makers. However, the writer did not propose a specific strategy and means to protect the monarchy.

### **The metaframes**

This mobilizing frame was framed involving the democracy metaframe. It was applied when the anti-coup groups labeled the coup makers as the dictatorial group that robbed democracy from the Thai people. However, this time the anti-coup groups also attacked the verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal on Thaksin's cases. For them, the Tribunal was an illegitimate product of the junta interim constitution. Thus it was believed, by the anti-coup groups and some foreign media, that this was an undemocratic and immoral strategy to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates. The true goal of the coup group, according to the anti-coup groups' framing, was to remain in power. To restore Thai democracy, the solution was offered that the coup makers must be expelled by the people.

## 2. The anti-amat mobilizing frame

In the first phase of the movement, the old power group, or amat, led by General Prem Tinsulanonda, Chief of the Privy Council was constructed as the group which destroyed Thai democracy and the expansion of the economy. Also, this group had the main goal of establishing their authority in order to enrich their personal prosperities. In this second phase, the frame started to run in chorus with the forming of the fiercer movements. This time, General Prem Tinsulanonda, as the head of the old power group, became the key target of the anti-coup groups' attacks. This mobilizing frame was created and became convincing when Thaksin and the party were barred from politics. Furthermore, this frame was a significant frame in this second period since Thaksin's supporters planned to stimulate a movement to get rid of Prem and amat. They paved the way for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra.

### The problem definition function

The **problem** in this frame was shaped as *the undemocratic demand of the old power group to seize power from the new power group of Thaksin Shinawatra*. In the anti-coup groups' view, Thaksin was a new powerful group that had emerged to challenge the popularity and supremacy of the amat. Both groups contested with each other in terms of economic ideas and popularity. The **culprits** of the frame were *the old power group, or amat, headed by General Prem Tinsulanonda*. In Pichit's view ('*Rabob prachattippatai kong puangprachamahachon*' 2007), the 19 September coup was a tool used by the old power group to gain the ruling power. He said,

The 19 September coup had arisen to overthrow the popular prime minister elected by a massive number of the middle and lower classes. This conservative group does not realize that Thailand is inseparably tied up with globalizing capitalism, more importantly the poor are more aware of their democratic rights, which is a result of the 1997 people's constitution. Thus, the old power group has made many mistakes because of their lack of knowledge and understanding of a modern economy. They hinder the progress of the Thai economy with their bureaucratic capitalism. They also deny any economic competition. Getting rid of modern capitalists (such as

Thaksin and his colleagues), in order to dominate Thailand, is the goal of this conservative group.

For them, the lower class is their perpetual labor of production. Worse, the sufficiency economy concept of His Majesty the King is applied into the junta's administrative policy, but they cannot explain the definition and usage of the idea clearly. Because of this, the concept is viewed by the business sector as an ineffective and conventional idea that rejects globalization.

Pichit's views were borrowed and adopted into this mobilizing frame, since the anti-coup groups needed to portray the dictatorship of amat that suppressed the people. The conflicts between the old power group and the lower class were highlighted. In the opinion of the anti-coup groups, the grassroots had been taken advantage of by the old power group for ages, moreover Thaksin's government, which was elected by this lower class, was abolished. Thus, in the eyes of the grassroots the amat brought about their severe hardships. General Prem Tinsulanonda was specifically alleged to be the leader of the 19 September coup; consequently he became the stand out target for the anti-coup groups. It was said, in an article of the anti-coup groups' media (*'Polsatuen jak koranee mob PTV'* 2007), that:

It is clearly proved that General Prem Tinsulanonda is the most significant figure of the coup makers. When the anti-coup protest began, the junta, the army, and the PAD attacked the protestors with legal and illegal actions in order to maintain the decent image of Prem. Unfortunately, his clean-handed and noble image is already shattered in the eyes of Thai people.

A view of Pichit (*'Rabob prachatippatai kong puangprachamahachon'* 2007) was put that:

To take down the crowd-pleasing government of Thaksin Shinawatra, the old power group cut back the budgets of Thai Rak Thai's projects including cancelling some important populist projects. They also allege Thaksin and his companions with accusations about Suvarnabhumi to paint the image of a corrupt government. To make things worse, they plan to dissolve the Thai Rak Thai party and ban the people from participating in the movements.

Nonetheless, the serious accusation of the anti-coup groups was framed about the attempts of Prem to engage King Bhumibol with the 19 September coup. This was

seen from in an article of the anti-coup groups (*'Sanyan antarai tung thai tung chat'* 2007) that said:

A few hours before the coup took place, General Prem desperately attempted to have an audience with His Majesty the King, but the King rejected his attempt. Actually, Prem realized the disapproval of His Majesty the King, since the King preferred to solve the nation's conflicts by democratic means. It was futile for Prem to change His Majesty the King's mind. Consequently, he completed his plan arbitrarily by coup. The chiefs of the army were ordered to have an urgent audience with His Majesty the King that night.

Interestingly, the frame raised the disagreement between the coup group and King Bhumibol which led to the accusation of violation to the King's royal supremacy. In the anti-coup groups' framing, Prem's misconducts were immoral and inappropriate for being head of the Privy Council.

### **The causal attribution function**

The **reason** for the old power group to overthrow Thaksin Shinawatra was framed as being *Thaksin and his associates were a great threat to the power of the old power group*. In a sense, these two groups were enemies that challenged each other in terms of benefits, ideals, and popularity. This blame was supported by a written in English article of Pichit Likitkijsonboon (2007b). His work was used to describe the reasons of amat to overthrow Thaksin thus:

Mr. Thaksin's huge popularity among the urban and rural lower class is perceived as a serious political threat to the royalists. The rural poor have always been regarded by the royalists as their most important political assets. For decades, the royalists have painstakingly built up their strong political base among the rural population which was effectively used to fight off the communist threat in the 1980s and to countervail elected politicians. Mr. Thaksin's trespassing on the royalists' political base in the countryside is thus seen as an unforgivable crime to the royalists.

Mr. Thaksin's globalization policy and "pro-poor" measures have also aroused anger and hatred among diversified groups of opposition which include some sections of the urban middle class, the right-wing, conservative intelligentsia and university lecturers, old business interest groups and

cartels, dinosaur politicians, most of Thailand's print media, and anti-trade NGOs. Some of these, such as old business families and cartels and the royalists themselves (known as "the old rich"), stand to lose under Mr. Thaksin's pro-trade, liberalization policy while some others are simply ideologically against capitalism and globalization either from the right, such as the ultra-nationalist groups and royalist conservative intelligentsia, or from the left, such as anti-trade NGOs, and former leftist activists and academics with their rejection of electoral politics. This assortment of anti-globalization groups have found their saviour in the royalist power and rallied around the royalist institution and personality to overthrow the Thaksin government. The Thai anti-democratic, anti-globalization coalition has been formed.

From the above statement, the challenge to gaining support from the lower classes was the reason for the old power group to get rid of their political opponents such as Thaksin and his acquaintances. His portrayal of "evil" of the amat was repeatedly employed in this second period. Besides, this analysis of Pichit seemed based on the concept of Duncan McCargo (2006) about the network monarchy. Pichit avoided saying the names of the royalists. During this initial movement with uncertain purposes, leaders, budgets, and strategies the anti-coup groups were unable to specify their rivals. The lese majesty law and martial law also played a major role in controlling their framings.

### **The moral evaluation function**

In this frame, the amat, or old power group, was **called**, by the anti-coup groups, *the fake saints and antediluvian group*. The "fake saints" (Nak Boon Jai Bap) was applied when the amat and the coup makers staged the coup claiming ethical reasons. The framing was outline on the Thai E-News website (*'Rabob prachattippatai kong puangprachamahachon'* 2007), that:

The conservative group strips off their saint masks to disclose their true ugly dictatorial faces. This 19 September coup brought up the conflicts between "the conservative right-wingers" and "the new capitalists, the lower class, and the democratic intellectuals". It awakens us to the real culprits that obstruct the progress of our democracy.

From the above statement, amat were framed as dictators and enemies of the democratic regime, the capitalists, and the grassroots or the people. The ideal of claiming themselves as being “moral or good people” had been used since the 2006 coup and continued into other political movements. It is mostly used by the movement of the middle class that support the monarchy and the Democrat party.

When the Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai cases were being considered by the Constitutional Tribunal, the anti-coup groups viewed it as a one-sided intimidation that the amat operated to get rid of Thaksin. Pichit’s analysis (2007b) about the old power group’s motive was re-posted on the website thus:

Their immediate objective is to prevent Mr. Thaksin from returning to power by various “corruption investigations” and political persecution to destroy his credibility and popularity among the masses. On the economic front, they arouse economic nationalist sentiment to abolish and reverse the economic liberalization and reform measures implemented by Mr. Thaksin, to keep in place all the protection and privileges of the old business and royalist interests and domestic cartels.

On the political front, they want to replace the highly democratic 1997 Constitution by a new one which will create numerous small and weak political parties, a parliament of a fragmented House of Representatives dominated by a powerful, royalist Senate appointed from the bureaucracy, and hence, a coalition government and a weak, puppet prime minister while the core of the state power remains in the royalists’ tight grip.

In short, their political and economic model is Thailand of the early 1980s in which the royalist power had complete control of all the political institutions through the military and bureaucracy covered up by a thin crust of parliamentary “democracy”. The motive of the royalists and its middle class-intelligentsia supporters is backward-looking and reactionary.

The image of an antediluvian group portrayed the amat as an old-fashioned faction purposed to rule Thailand by overthrowing political enemies and suppressing the rise of the lower class. The anti-coup groups, particularly Thaksin’s supporters, considerable emphasized on this issue to create the frustration and anger of the grassroots. The precised rivals of the people must be created to motivate the grassroots participants, thus this moral framing was important at this stage.

Notwithstanding, General Prem Tinsulanonda was the primary target of attack. It was appeared in an article (*'Kwam naijai kong kon hadyai'* 2007):

He has been praised and respected by the southern people for thirty years; on the other hand he has done many evil things... In the late night of the coup day, he brought the coup group to have an audience with his Majesty the King, while the King's health was not in a good condition...So far the Thai people now realize who the mastermind of the 19 September coup is. I am not surprised why so many people determine to oust him from the chief of the Privy Council. Getting rid of him is as good as getting rid of the ugly ideals of aristocracy.

Prem was accused of being disloyal by taking advantage of King Bhumibol. An allegation (*'Sanyan antarai tung thai tung chat'* 2007), referring to General Prem's action when he was the premier in the 1980s, was that:

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1981, a group of young militants led by Major General Manoonkrit Roopkachorn staged a coup to overthrow the government of General Prem Tinsulanonda. To protect himself, Prem invited King Bhumibol and Queen Sirikit to stay in Korat province. He announced this through a radio station to fool people in to understanding that he was fully supported by the monarchy. Evidently, the monarchy had been used by General Prem Tinsulanonda to overcome the coup. This was extremely inappropriate manners, but he seemed unconcerned about this as long as it could help him to escape the risky situation...Accordingly, this past event could be reminiscent of the 19 September coup.

In the anti-coup groups' view, the old power group led by General Prem Tinsulanonda took advantage of King Bhumibol to benefit their interests. However, when the anti-coup groups started forming the official group, they started accusing Prem with serious allegations about his personal life and sometimes called him with discourteous names.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The **solution** of this mobilizing frame was *ousting the old power group and General Prem Tinsulanonda*. The movement aimed at toppling General Prem by collecting signatures for a petition. The petition would be offered to King Bhumibol who had authority to appoint and dismiss the members of the Privy Council. In an open letter

from the Saturday Voice for Democracy group (*'Konwansao yun deeka tod prem'* 2007), led by Wiphu Phalangphattanaphuntai, the reason was given thus:

According to our campaign to collect 100,000 signatures for a petition to His Majesty the King, we have a goal to depose General Prem Tinsulanonda from his position as the head of the Privy Council. General Prem has been involved in many political activities; moreover he is the head of the 19 September coup that overthrew the government of His Majesty the King. This misconduct of General Prem Tinsulanonda leads to the critical defamation of the King.

However, the PTV group, which was led by some members of Thai Rak Tai, distanced themselves from the signature campaign, even though the campaigners (*'Sonthi mulls response to campaign'* 2007) claimed that Jatuporn Prompan, the leader of PTV, gave his signature but withdrew it. Later, when the anti-coup groups collaborated, the PTV changed their standpoint to fully support the ousting of General Prem Tinsulanonda from his position.

### **The metaframes**

In this frame, the promoters applied the democracy and king metaframes into its framing. General Prem Tinsulanonda and the conservative group, according to their framing, overthrew the democratic government of Thaksin Shinawatra and destroyed Thai democracy. The class conflict between the old power group and the grassroots was framed to show the undemocratic practices of the amat. The anti-coup groups framed the nature of the amat as being a mean and evil group that took advantage of the lower class by overpowering them.

The king metaframe, became the second most significant frame in constructing the disloyal image of Prem Tinsulanonda and his subordinates. With regards to the 19 September coup, they were portrayed as an unfaithful group that conducted the coup to demolish the government of the King. Besides, this old power group convinced the public to believe that the coup was approved by the King. On the other hand, the King, according to the anti-coup groups' framing, disagreed with this

unconstitutional coup. The malpractices of the old power group were framed as a violation of the King's royal prerogative.

### **3. The unproductive Surayud Chulanont government mobilizing frame**

In this second phase, Surayud was not the major target for the anti-coup groups, since he had decided to leave the premiership after the next election. As a result, the target of the confrontation was shifted to Sonthi and Prem instead. The anti-coup groups still constructed Surayud as an unproductive leader who was not acknowledged by other democratic countries. According to the anti-coup groups, Surayud and his government definitely caused damages to Thailand.

#### **The problem definition function**

The **problem** constructed in this frame focused on *the ineffective and unpopular government of Surayud Chulanont*. An article, written in English by Pichit Likitkijksomboon (2007b), described the dissatisfaction over the economic outcomes from Surayud's work thus:

The military junta has suffered several scandals, including appointment of its generals to the top positions in various lucrative state enterprises, a 33% increase in the military budget which is the largest in modern Thai history, their spending of government and state enterprise budgets on their salaries and perks and the expansion of the secret military agency and its secret budget, and so on. On the other hand, the military-appointed government has never gained serious popularity and has also suffered from a series of economic policy mistakes by following anti-investment measures such as the 30% reserve requirement for foreign fund inflow, the more stringent foreign business law, anti-foreign retail business law, and violation of foreign companies' patent rights by issuing compulsory licenses on pharmaceuticals. The government's little credibility was further weakened by security failures resulting from the worsening of the violence in the South and the New Year Eve's bombings. Consumer and investor confidence has plummeted to historical lows with sharp drops in consumption and investment spending, causing an abrupt slowdown in the Thai economy in 2007 with the expected

GDP growth of only 3.8%, the lowest since the 1997 financial crisis and the lowest in ASEAN and East Asia.

The protest groups attempted to portray the financial damages caused by this amat government as a legitimate reason to oust them. The unproductive Surayud government was tied up with the coup and amat to show the inefficiency in their administration.

The unrest in the southernmost provinces was another fault that was framed. According to the anti-coup groups, Surayud and his army paid small attention to relief the turmoil. An article of the protest groups was written that the army was unfortunately ruled by Surayud and Sonthi, and had lost lives in the southern violence. They were sent to the unrest areas to protect the people's security; however they were abandoned by their power hungry superiors. The author (*'Wai alai dae robpiset'* 2007) suggested General Surayud send his son to the south so as to experience a loss similar to his subordinates.

### **The causal attribution function**

This time, the anti-coup groups gave a short reason for Surayud's lack of administrative results. They (*'Wai alai dae robpiset'* 2007) **claimed** that *Surayud spent his time on retaining his power and neglected to work on the nation's problems.* Also an accusation (*'Thaksin teesakna surayud borihan prated mai pen'* 2007) was constructed, around the condemnation from other countries towards Surayud's dictatorial government, that the democratic countries insulted him and rejected cooperation with the tyrannical prime minister. Accordingly, he humiliated Thailand.

### **The moral evaluation function**

When Surayud said to the public that his duty as premier was obstructed by the former powerful group, which indicated Thaksin and his colleagues, Thaksin responded by saying it was Surayud's fault. Surayud, according to Thaksin, did not know how to rule and progress this country, but Surayud laid the blame on

Thaksin and the others. Moreover, Surayud, according to the anti-coup writer (*'Thaksin teesakna surayud borihan prated mai pen'* 2007), was scared to admit that he was rejected by other countries. He enjoyed being prime minister, and had no concern for developing the country. Because of this, he became *the unpopular and unwanted premier* in the eyes of Thai people.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

In terms of the **remedy**, the anti-coup groups did not offer the solution to oust Surayud directly. *They included Surayud with Sonthi as the same target for opposition; accordingly ousting Sonthi and Surayud would be done simultaneously.* Pichit (2007b) convinced the anti-coup groups to overthrow the dictators and the constitution. He analyzed the situation and was used in the movement frame of the anti-coup thus:

Thailand is heading towards a cataclysm with several potential triggers. Despite Prime Minister Surayud's firm assurance that the new constitution will be promulgated in September and a new election held in December 2007, few people take his words seriously. Mass protests against the coup may spread and result in clashes and violent suppression. The Constitutional Court's ruling due at the end of May could also trigger mass unrest and violence if the court orders the dissolution of Mr. Thaksin's highly popular Thai-Rak-Thai Party on the charges of illegal conduct during the run up to the April 2006 election. The new constitution must pass a referendum due in July or August and this is another landmark of severe conflict and protests. The friction between the military junta, which wants to impose draconian measures against Mr. Thaksin and the anti-coup movements, and the Surayud government, which refuses to cooperate on the matter, may result in a second coup by either the military junta itself or the royalist supporters of the Surayud government.

Nonetheless, Surayud himself announced that he and his government would finish their tasks, as the interim government, in October 2007 and start the process for the election in December. This might be the reason for the anti-coup groups to subdue their attack on Surayud Chulanont.

### **The metaframes**

The nation and modernization metaframes were employed in this mobilizing frame when the anti-coup groups accused Surayud of being an inefficient prime minister. He was constructed as the dictator who was dismissed by the international society. Accordingly, Thailand missed out on the chance to have business relations with other democratic countries which hindered the progress of Thai economy. Moreover, the coup, martial law, the violence in the south, and the unrest from the blasts in Bangkok led to the situation of insecurity impacting on foreign investments. In a sense, Surayud, and his unproductive government, slowed down and damaged the development of the country in many ways.

### **4. The people's democracy mobilizing frame**

The second phase of the movement was significant in terms of recruiting participants and expanding budgets. This frame was strengthened by focusing on the losses of Thaksin and the TRT from the verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal. The verdicts were given that Thaksin Shinawatra and another 111 leading members of TRT were barred, for five years, from politics. TRT was found guilty of paying two small parties to run in elections to avoid rules on single candidate polls. Thus, TRT's crimes, according to the judges (Wong-Anan 2007), were "very dangerous to democracy" which led to the dissolution of the party. As mentioned previously, the movements of the protest groups were combined with the two primary goals of opposing the 19 September coup and supporting Thaksin Shinawatra. During this time, the protest factions began to work in partnership. They collaborated in demonstrations and ultimately united as a formal mobilizing group. The movement of the anti-coup groups had been activated every so often since the Constitutional Tribunal started considering the allegations, of breaches of electoral laws, against Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai.

The anti-coup protesters, consequently, demanded the resignations of General Surayud Chulanont, Sonthi Boonyaratglin, and Prem Tinsulanonda. They rejected the interim charter of the junta and called for the bringing back of the 1997 people's constitution. The anti-coup groups constructed their mobilizing frames with more purposeful and forceful meanings to arouse the feelings of the demonstrators. Interestingly, this time the "people's revolution" discourse was used in the mobilizations.

### **The problem definition function**

In this frame, the **problem** was framed as *the democracy of the people that was taken by the immoral coup group with their undemocratic means*. The examples in this problem were the attempts of the tyrants to convince, and sometimes force, people to vote for the undemocratic draft charter, while the charges on Thaksin and his party were framed as unfair and unreasonable accusations from the junta. In the anti-coup groups' framing, their rights to have the people's constitution and an elected government were overthrown by the coup group; seemingly their liberties and preceding democracy had vanished.

In a demonstration at Sanamluang a movement leader (*'Raingarn sod satanakarn 3-6-07, 2007*) attacked the junta saying that the tyrants plotted to steal sovereignty from the people, accuse Thaksin with unreasonable charges, dissolve the Thai Rak Thai party, and determine to remain in power. While an article from the Thai E-News website (*'Padetkan sang paemaidai dernna patiwatprated pen padetkarn temtua' 2007*) reported on the forceful measures the junta employed to coerce people to vote for the interim constitution. For instance, the village leaders and the local army were obliged to convince their villagers to approve the charter by any means, even with weaponry. In addition, the people were stopped, by the local officials, from participating in the movements.

The anti-coup groups published an article, analysing the Constitutional Tribunal's verdicts, from the Asia Sentinel (*'Thaksin's Party's Over in Thailand' 2007*) which said:

While Thaksin can justly be blamed for interfering with independent constitutional bodies during his tenure, the rulers that replaced him have gone even further by overthrowing an elected government, manipulating the justice system, rewriting the constitution, sending soldiers to television stations and enforcing *ex post facto* laws. Now they've wiped Thaksin's party off the map and banned 111 of the Party's executive members from running in an election for five years the harshest possible punishment. Although the blatantly political decision has profound ramifications for the Thai political landscape, it was simply the culmination of a series of rulings over the past year that skirted or completely ignored the law.

The **culprits** in this mobilizing frame (*'Thaksin's Party's Over in Thailand'* 2007) were framed as *the Bangkok elites, royalists, and military* which could be seen from this:

With Thai Rak Thai dissolved, the Bangkok elite succeeded in pushing Thaksin and his allies from power, more or less permanently. Neither Thaksin nor his party leaders can participate in an election for five years, a lifetime in politics. Other Thai Rak Thai members can still form a new party, but it will likely be a relatively small player. The next government looks set to be governed by either the Democrat Party, which was absolved of all charges yesterday, or Banharn Silpa-Archa, leader of the slippery Chat Thai party, which always looks to join any government to collect the spoils of power.

The elite and the middle class in Bangkok who were believed by the anti-coup groups to be the group that overthrew Thaksin were framed as enemies of the people or of Thaksin's voters. The Democrat party was attacked as the major rival of the Thai Rak Thai party. This framing pointed out the specific opponents of the anti-coup groups and Thaksin's voters.

The anti-coup groups publicized a judicial analysis (*'Hok duan rattaprahan kao tor pai kong prated thai'* 2007), by Thammasat university law academic Worachet Pakeerat, of the 19 September coup and its impacts on the Thai legal system. It was explained:

According to criminal law, a coup d'état is illegal, since it abolishes the conception of the Legal State. The Legal State can be established only in democratic countries which allow people to have freedom and liberty. Accordingly, it is a big fat lie when the coup makers promise people freedom and liberty. After the coup had been done, we have the Conventional

Constitution (CC) to draft the new charter. It is interesting that the CC members have gained much experience from the previous coups. Thus, the undemocratic flaws of this draft are concealed under the democratic surface. The coup group realizes that they cannot control the people by arms and force, as it used to be. Instead, they exercise their power through this law mechanism. The example is the Constitutional Tribunal, set up to have authority to dissolve a political party.

In Worachet's view, the 19 September coup makers were different from their predecessors. They were skillful and knew how to control people through the legitimate 2007 constitution. However, the most controversial clause in the draft, for the anti-coup groups, was the amnesty for the coup groups which enhanced the chances of there being future coup makers. Furthermore, General Sonthi Boonyaratklin also announced he would become a politician after the draft was passed by the referendum. According to the 2007 constitution, General Sonthi would not have any guilt associated with conducting the coup. He could start his new career smoothly as an innocent politician. The next debated clause in the draft was pointed out by Worachet (*'Hok duan rattaprahan kao tor pai kong prated thai'* 2007) thus:

When I deliberately consider the 2007 draft constitution, I've found a concerning point about the premier appointment. In this draft, it allows us to have appointed prime ministers. When I look back into our past, we have had a prime minister who hadn't come from an election. We couldn't criticize and scrutinize him throughout his eight years of premiership. Besides, in 1992 when a coup was staged, we had an appointed prime minister which led to a major uprising of people to oust him.

The other disputations with the draft were the rights of the Supreme Court to intervene in the executive and legislative power, and that the appointed senators could hold power over the elected government. All of this led to the conclusion that the interim constitution was undemocratic. Speaking of the junta's 2007 draft constitution, Worachet (*'Hok duan rattaprahan kao tor pai kong prated thai'* 2007) expressed the view that:

The referendum becomes a strong selling point of the interim constitution; on the other hand the uncustomary and unconstitutional writing process is

barely acceptable. People are told that turning away this charter may lead the country to a crucial political crisis. Besides, one who denies the draft would be branded as a traitor who retards the reconciliation and development of the nation. In fact, it is stated in the draft that one has the right to either reject or approve the draft. From the name list of the drafters, we can predict how the actual constitution would be. They are not embodied from every group; certainly this constitution would be beneficial to only some groups.

In Worachet's opinion, this draft charter was a problematic constitutional law. Hidden advantages would result for the coup group and their networks, while the common people would be abandoned.

The analysis of Worachet was applied to this frame to explain the undemocratic organizations set up by the junta government. Consequently their achievements were untrustworthy and tyrannical. This finally became the reason for movement to solve this "problem" and restore the people's democracy.

### **The causal attribution function**

In the second movement phase, the **cause** was framed as *the attempts of the junta to get rid of the power of Thaksin Shinawatra and the grassroots through the interim constitution*. A work of Pichit Likitkijsomboon (2007b) was posted on the Thai E-news to explain why the coup makers removed Thaksin and replaced the 1997 constitution.

They want to replace the highly democratic 1997 Constitution with a new one which will create a numerous small and weak political parties, a parliament of a fragmented House of Representatives dominated by a powerful, royalist Senate appointed from the bureaucracy, and hence, a coalition government and a weak, puppet prime minister while the core of the state power remains in the royalists' tight grip. In short, their political and economic model is Thailand of the early 1980s in which the royalist power had complete control of all the political institutions through the military and bureaucracy covered up by a thin crust of parliamentary "democracy". The motive of the royalists and its middle class-intelligentsia supporters is backward-looking and reactionary.

When the verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal toward Thaksin and his party's cases came out, the anti-coup groups were deeply disappointed. They began framing

the protest messages to attack the Tribunal and oust the coup makers. A view from an Asia Sentinel's journalist ('*Thaksin's Party's Over in Thailand*' 2007) was posted through the anti-coup media:

The main goal of the coup-makers, of course, was to cut the legs off Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai, the party he founded in 1998 as a personal vehicle to carry him to the premiership. TRT stormed to power with a win in the 2001 general election and became the only party in Thai history to complete a full term in office.

The Constitutional Tribunal's decision to dissolve the party — finally revealed after the judges read the ruling for an excruciating nine hours — was just one part of the plan to remove Thaksin from the political scene. The rest of the job belongs to those drafting the new constitution, which aims to limit the powers of the executive and expand the role of non-elected senators and judges to ensure that a reincarnation of Thaksin doesn't rise from the ashes.

....Although the powers that be were able to eliminate Thaksin, his legacy won't quickly be erased. Political parties will have to take the interests of poor upcountry voters much more seriously from now on. **Moreover, his popularity is - or at least was - second only to the king's.** In five years, when the ban expires, Thaksin may just well be the most popular politician left standing in the country.

The anti-coup factions employed this news to provide the reason for the junta to eliminate Thaksin and to prevent him from returning to Thai politics. Interestingly, this article pointed out the popularity of Thaksin and compared it with King Bhumibol. It seemed this article was used to claim that the elite plotted to prevent him from being elected by his voters. The popularity of King Bhumibol among his people might be challenged by Thaksin.

### **The moral evaluation function**

The anti-coup groups **labeled** the CNS as *thieves who robbed the people's democracy; therefore the interim constitution and the Constitutional Tribunal created by the coup makers were branded as the illegal and undemocratic inventions of the tyrants.* In the anti-coup groups' framing, the Constitutional Tribunal was "*the robber Constitutional Court*" appointed by the coup makers. The verdicts of the court were definitely untrustworthy, since it was created to steal the justice and democracy

from Thai people. An article of the anti-coup groups (*'Kloom tortan padetkarn pue prachattippatai talangkarn pranam tulakarnjone'* 2007) was written that said:

This group of thieves uses force and the army to overthrow the people's constitution. They also create the discourse that portrays themselves as the national heroes protecting Thailand. Definitely, this has been done to claim their authority and acknowledgement to occupy this country. They insult the grassroots, divide society, and brainwash all Thais.

While the view of Pichit (*'Mue pakpuak sai yaipai kwa lae puakkao klubma lenngarn rao'* 2007) was applied to express that:

The constitution of the CNS is illegitimate, because it is inherited from the old bureaucratic system under the lead power of the military. Politicians turn to be their puppets. This 2007 constitution gives the ruling power to the amat and elites. It allows people to vote and establish the government, but the real power belongs to the amat.

In terms of the constitution, the CNS was attacked for the persuasive measures used to gain the constitutional votes. In a statement of an anti-coup group (*'Talangkarn kloomprachathai maiaou padetkarn'* 2007), it was described that:

The coup group propagandizes people to show their loyalty to His Majesty the King by voting for the 2007 draft charter. His Majesty the King never stated his viewpoint toward the draft, thus different standpoints toward the draft would not violate the royal supremacy of His Majesty the King. The tricking act of the CNS would result in the severe defamation to our revered King and impairs our democratic regime with the King as Head of State.

The next view on the Thai democracy situation was given by Ukrit Mongkolnavin, a law professor and former veteran politician. He was curious about the direction of the country (*'Ukrit chamlae roojakmai nititham'* 2007):

What types of political regime do we need? So far we're talking about different views. We've been told that Thailand must be governed under a democratic regime, good governance, and the state of law. On the other hand, the CNS seem not understand the true meaning of democracy. It has been a year since the coup was conducted, but they cannot change people's thoughts. They taught people an undemocratic lesson by staging the coup. How can they expect democratic practices from the people?

They must thoroughly understand what democracy is. The sovereignty must be possessed by the people. The people must come first, on the other hand some groups act as superiors. People have the right to choose what is right or wrong for their future. We shouldn't look down on them. They have far more knowledge than us in many things.

From Ukrit's statement, the powerful amat, or the old power group, overpowered Thai people in terms of rights and liberty. Besides, Thai people, or the grassroots, were seen as unintelligent and had to be ruled by the more intellectual amat.

From the examples in this moral branding function, the framing highlights the wicked and immoral image of the coup makers and amat. Their constitution and the Constitutional Tribunal were branded as the tools of the dictators to remain in power, while the people lost their sovereignty they had from the 1997 constitution. This type of branding appeared in almost every frame of the anti-coup groups in this second phase of the movement. The period they planned to activate the strong mobilization.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

In the second phase, the solution of this mobilizing frame was *calling for the restoration of the 1997 people's constitution and the people's democracy, and ousting the tyrants*. The intensity of the protest increased when the PTV station was banned from broadcasting in March, before the Constitutional Tribunal gave its verdicts on Thaksin and TRT's charges in May. All of this brought up substantial movements, calling for democracy, by the anti-coup groups and Thaksin's supporters.

Some of the anti-coup groups collected signatures for a petition to dismiss General Prem and the CNS, some encouraged the general public to reject the junta's interim constitution and restore the 1997 people's constitution. The anti-coup groups published the anti-coup scholars' viewpoints and suggestions. An opinion of Worachet was posted on the Thai-E news suggested the junta to bring back the 1997 constitution and amend some articles. In Worachet's view (*'Hok duan rattaprahan kao tor pai kong prated thai'* 2007), every faction should be involved in the discussions and negotiations until they reached a consensus in order to bring peace

and harmony to Thai society. Whereas Pichit (*'Mue pakpuak sai yaipai kwa lae puakkaao klubma lenngarn rao'* 2007), a scholar who supported the movement, advised the protestors to work on the mobilizing campaign with the three objectives of rejecting the junta's draft charter, overthrowing the amat, and restoring the 1997 people's constitution. He said: "It is the people's obligation to repudiate the 2007 constitution and demand the more proper 1997 constitution. The people's voice is the most powerful force which must be heard."

### **The metaframes**

The democracy, nation, and king metaframes were applied into this mobilizing frame. The democracy metaframe was the most important since the raised issues were involved with the restoration of the 1997 constitution and the verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal. In the anti-coup groups' views the CNS robbed the ruling power from the democratic government, thus any laws and organizations originated by these thieves were considered as the unlawful products of the dictators. Thus, the draft charter and the Constitutional Tribunal were condemned forcefully while the anti-coup groups invited people to turn down the 2007 draft constitution. The draft charter was criticized for the limited public participation in the drafting process, the controversial clauses on the selection of prime ministers, the amnesty for the coup makers, and the advantages written into the constitution that were beneficial to the elites. At the same time, the anti-coup groups demanded the restoration of the 1997 constitution which, for them, was the most democratic having been originated by all factions of Thais, truly the constitution of the people.

When the cases of Thaksin and TRT were judged by the Constitutional Tribunal, the anti-coup groups were upset with the undemocratic verdicts that banned Thaksin and 111 leading members of TRT from political activities, followed by the dissolution of the TRT party. For the anti-coup groups, the tribunal was established to get rid of Thaksin Shinawatra from Thai politics. It could be seen that the verdicts became a prompt stimulation for Thaksin's supporters to form the immense protests. It was interesting that the anti-coup groups framed their movements as

“the people’s revolution” which was established to overthrow the amat regime and re-instate a democratic regime in Thailand.

The people’s movement was also framed with the nation metaframe, since the people are a part of the nation. They believed that they had the right to vote for their government, as well as the right to receive benefits similar to the other groups of people. The unequal and unfair practices that the coup makers did to the grassroots were framed to start the class conflict. The grassroots, or the people, in the anti-coup groups’ framing, were insulted and bullied by the superior amat and the elites. The lower class had been taken advantage of for years. Moreover their elected government of Thaksin and the 1997 people’s constitution were taken by the coup makers. After this period, the class conflict was applied as an important issue in the mobilization of the anti-coup groups.

The role of the king metaframe was played down in significance in this movement-specific frame. The protest groups engaged King Bhumibol in the frame just once when they claimed that the junta government of General Surayud Chulanont tricked people into believing that the interim charter was supported by the King. They, according to the anti-coup groups, wanted the Thai people to express loyalty to the King by approving on the draft charter. Unquestionably, the junta (*‘Talangarn kloomprachathai maiaou padetkarn’* 2007) was framed as an unfaithful government that defamed the honour of King Bhumibol.

## **5. The media control mobilizing frame**

In the second phase of the movement, some of the anti-coup media had been censored, since it was the channel used to gather the protestors. Furthermore, the CNS intended to block Thaksin from communicating with his supporters and encouraging them to start an uprising. At that time, the members of the TRT activated the movements by visiting their voting bases and establishing the PTV. The “People Television’s Station” or PTV (*‘Three more to quit TRT’* 2007) was

formed by the three TRT members: Veera Musiga-pong the party executive, Jatuporn Promphan the deputy spokesman, and Natthawut Sai-kua. They resigned from the party to establish a media company to broadcast cable TV programs. Even though Chaturon Chaisang, the Thai Rak Thai Party's caretaker leader, denied the involvement of the party with PTV, it was seen that PTV was expected to be the TRT mouthpiece to challenge the CNS.

However, before the launch, the Public Relations Department (PRD) warned that the PTV operation could be against the law. The director of PRD (Srivalo 2007) explained that:

“PTV was in a similar situation to ASTV (a service of Thai Day Dot Com Company, part of Sondhi Limthongkul's Manager Group). The operator of ASTV has filed a criminal lawsuit against the PRD, alleging it abused its state powers when it questioned ASTV's legal status”.

This was the spark for TRT and Thaksin's supporters to originate the intensive movement calling for the freedom of expression.

### **The problem definition function**

In this second phase, the anti-coup groups framed the **problem** as *the undemocratic actions and double standards of the junta on media censorship*. Examples were raised to highlight the practices of the junta toward the anti-coup groups' media. The strengthening of media control was significantly increased when Thaksin Shinawatra started his movements by giving interviews to the international and local media on his plans and future in politics. The interviews were brought up and distributed through his supporting media, while, undoubtedly, these community radio stations and websites had been banned from airing the interviews. The media censorship scheme had been carried out by a collaboration between the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (MICT), the Royal Thai Police, CAT Telecom Public Company Limited, and TOT Public Company Limited. It was reported that many radio stations and websites, such as FM 87.75 Taxi Community Radio, [www.19sep.net](http://www.19sep.net), [www.19sep.org](http://www.19sep.org), Saturday Voice ([www.saturdaylive.org](http://www.saturdaylive.org) and

saturdayvoice.no-ip.info), Hi-Thaksin, and the online telecast of PTV television (www.ptvthai.com) were temporarily blocked.

To highlight the concerns from international organizations, some foreign news that criticized the censorship by the CNS was re-posted on Thai E-News (*'Suetangchat teekao tualok lung jaonatee koddan pid satanee wittayoochumchon'* 2007) thus:

The Reporters Without Borders condemned the military government's closure, yesterday, of three community radio stations - Confidante, Taxi Driver Community Radio and Saturday Voice Against Dictatorship - just hours after they broadcast an interview with deposed prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The authorities have also charged them with violating national security. "The closure of the three radio stations and the warning to some 3,000 other local stations are utterly reprehensible," the press freedom organization said. "The government does not do itself any favors with this kind of authoritarian intervention, which violates free speech. The three stations must be allowed to resume broadcasting at once."

Similar to the previous frames, the anti-coup groups employed critics from the foreign media to support their movement and put pressure on the junta.

Nonetheless, the critical point, which led to a big protest, emerged when the satellite television channel PTV was banned from broadcasting.

A former Thai Rak Thai Party member Jatuporn Promphan announced the launch of PTV or People's Television satellite TV on March 1, 2007. This satellite channel, according to Jatuporn (*'Jatuporn insists to launch satellite TV on March 1'* 2007), would be for serving the people not for political purposes. The objective of PTV was claimed as "a small candle shedding the light of truth". The programs (*'PTV to go on air Wednesday'* 2007) would be put on the internet and aired via satellite.

Apparently, this was similar to ASTV in terms of the concept and strategy. Double standards of the junta were cited, by the PTV founders (*'Two stations, same path, clashing agenda'* 2007), since ASTV was allegedly acting against the law, but allowed by the junta to broadcast its program on Channel 11. Hence, the PTV should be treated on a par with ASTV.

When PTV failed to launch, Nattawut Saikua the PTV executive (*'PTV says 'CAT attack' ruined debut'* 2007) asserted that "the PTV management has fully complied with the laws, yet the broadcast is being blocked without justification." Besides, "he was disappointed that the authorities were treating supporters of the former ruling party as second-class citizens". Also, *General Saprang Kalanamitr, a junta leader and chairman of CAT Telecom*, was alleged, by Jatuporn, to be the **mastermind**.

"Although the inaugural broadcast was blocked by authorities, management will fight on and not back down even if they take our lives," Veera announced.

### **The causal attribution function**

From the anti-coup groups' framing, the **cause** of the junta's media control was indicated to be *the fear of truth*. An article's writer (*'Bot wikrao satannakan kanmuang'* 2007) reckoned those dictators were afraid that their immoral and tyrannical practices would be disclosed by the anti-coup media. It was written thus:

A while ago, the tyrants feared the return of Thaksin Shinawatra and his colleagues, also they do not want the people realize how evil they are. Thus, they control the media. But people are ultimately awakened when they experience many troubles from the junta's ruling. The increase of living costs leads them to be illuminated to the awfulness of the coup.

When Thaksin began to confront the CNS, he visited some countries and gave interviews to both Thai and foreign media. Certainly, his news was barred from being broadcast in Thailand. Noppadon Pattama, the chief counsel of Thaksin, told the news organizations that Thaksin was ready to interview in person, by telephone, teleconference, and internet. Furthermore, many newspapers and television stations showed the intention to interview him. From the Nation newspaper (*'Thaksin rumoured to have rented satellite'* 2007), news about Noppadon and Thaksin was published thus:

Thaksin was bound for London in March where his news media appearances would be limited for the comfort of the government and the CNS. Thaksin's appearances will be sparing and refrain from criticising the government, he said. Noppadon said recent interviews had not been initiated by the former prime minister. In past weeks, Thaksin has appeared on CNN and interviews

with him have been published in the Asian Wall Street Journal, Newsweek, The Economist and Time. Noppadon said Thaksin would never criticise His Majesty the King, as claimed by the CNS. He is a loyal subject and one whose marriage was blessed by His Majesty.

Nonetheless, the reaction to the PTV operation (*'Thailand's military government censors satellite TV station'* 2007) was explained thus:

Top military leaders had earlier indicated that they would not interfere with PTV's news broadcasts if the station abided by rules it has imposed on state-controlled television stations, including a ban on broadcasting any news footage or interviews that feature Thaksin. The government has on several occasions blocked news spots that featured footage of Thaksin, including reports from international news broadcasters CNN and BBC.

The cause of the media ban at this time was framed as the fear, of the CNS, of Thaksin's movements that complemented the growth of the anti-coup protests. As a result, any media which had a tendency to support Thaksin and the anti-coup movements were strictly controlled. The anti-coup groups and Thaksin's supporters convinced the public to believe that their movement had power to stir up the junta, as a result the junta attempted to control them.

### **The moral evaluation function**

As the censorship by the military government continued, the anti-coup groups regarded it as a malevolent action. The CNS was **framed** as *the evil dictator who was motivated to unethically attack the media of the opposing camp*. Some news from the anti-coup groups (*'Bueng luk pia tanon rajdamnern'* 2007) showed that the government attempted to charge the media operators and demonstrators with lese majeste so as to prohibit them from using the media as a channel to conduct mobilizations. Another example, to support the allegations of undemocratic practices of the coup group, was the censorship of news about Thaksin. An article from Thai E-News (*'After Shock tee satuenjai kon thai tunglok'* 2007) described that:

Streams of people from everywhere phoned in to radio stations expressing their love for Thaksin Shinawatra. They also demanded the re-broadcast of Thaksin's interviews. As a consequence of broadcasting Thaksin's live interview, those two radio stations' broadcasts were stopped immediately

with no explanations. Rumour has it that they were scrutinized and ordered to stop broadcasting permanently by police and officials from the Public Relations Department (PRD).

Some of the anti-coup groups which supported Thaksin attempted to show the love of Thaksin's voters towards the former premier, on the one hand the junta was the dictators that tried to bully them through several measures. In terms of the PTV, the major channel to disseminate mobilizing news from Thaksin and his supporters, it was seen as threat to the junta. The operator of PTV (*'Defiant PTV to go ahead with telecast'* 2007) insisted that the television station was "truly people's television" which "would help steer Thailand to becoming a society that respected the rule of law." He said:

In the past, the channels of communication that served the nation were limited, and we saw no hope for the future. If a station that helps people constructively exchange views exists, it will help the country maintain its democracy. PTV was not set up to become an enemy or a threat to anyone. I do not like threats either. PTV is offering a choice to the people so the people won't be forced to close their ears and eyes by having to watch only certain channels. It will truly be the people's channel, and we will ensure people's participation in owning the station by issuing stock.

Jatuporn framed this movement as a mean to establish democracy in Thailand, furthermore PTV was the "people's channel" not a threat to the government. Interestingly, it was the station of the grassroots, while ASTV was supported by the middle class and the junta at that time. Nonetheless, the PTV station later was at the forefront of the attack to try to oust General Prem Tinsulanonda and the junta.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The **solution** to the media censorship was *ousting the tyrannical coup makers* which were similar to other mobilizing frames. When PTV was barred from operating, the TV producers announced they would hold live a program at the Royal plaza. They accused the government of having double standards by allowing ASTV to air on Channel 11. Natthawut Saikua the PTV executive (*'PTV rally 'won't be stopped'* 2007) announced that during the demonstration he would reveal some information about the coup makers. The PTV station chairman, (*'Full gear police fail again to end PTV protest'* 2007) Veera Musigapong, planned to attack the "suspicious role" of General Prem Tinsulanonda together with airing their grievances about being blocked from

broadcasting. Also, they produced the 100,000 VCDs which uncovered the coup networks. Chatuporn Phromphan (*Prem had 'no role in coup' 2007*) said:

We're now coordinating with various alliances to join the anti-CNS protest as one team. We're not afraid about being arrested or having our stage demolished, because we haven't broken the law. They can arrest us whenever they like, but if the government and the CNS try to do anything to prevent us from airing our views they themselves will become the defendants in the eyes of society. The people won't put up with it.

Nonetheless, the goals of the protestors changed when the verdicts from the Constitutional Tribunal revealed that Thaksin was banned from politics and TRT was dissolved. This time they were fully committed to ousting all the coup makers and paving the way for the return of Thaksin. This time the PTV rallies (*'Street protest: PTV plans April 27 mass rally to demonstrate against coup' 2007*) were supported by taxi drivers, students, and leading campaign groups such as the Philap Khao Group, the September 19 Network, and the Saturday Anti-Coup Group.

### **The metaframes**

The democracy metaframe became significant in this mobilizing frame. The censorship, by the CNS, of the pro-Thaksin websites, radio stations, and PTV television station were framed as a violation of democracy. In the anti-coup groups' view, the liberty and rights of people to follow any media was limited by the dictatorial practices of the junta. When Thaksin's live interviews were banned, grievances of Thaksin's supporters were distributed through the anti-coup media. Besides, the PTV station, which was founded to act as the mouthpiece of Thaksin and his supporters, was blocked from being launched. All of this led to big protests calling for the freedom of expression for the anti-coup groups and Thaksin's supporters. In the early movement, Veera Musigapong, Jakraphob Penkair, Natthawut Saikua, and Jatuporn Phromphan, the vanguard of PTV, announced that they did not purpose to overthrow the CNS. They stated that they required equal treatment with ASTV. However, PTV was upset by the Constitutional Tribunal's results; they mobilized their supporters to demand the resignation of Gens Sonthi Boonyaratglin and Prem Tinsulanonda and called for the return of Thaksin

Shinawatra. It could be seen that PTV's movements were allied with the other groups ultimately forming a united group to attack the CNS.

## 6. The Buddhism mobilizing frame

During this second phase, the violence in the southern provinces increased. Many Buddhists were harmed. The anti-coup groups used these events to attack the leaders of the CNS. In this frame, the attack was shifted to General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and General Surayud Chulannont as the leaders of the country and former chiefs of the army. The main issues focused on the troubles for Thai Buddhists resulting from the violence in the southernmost provinces. The inattention of the government to relieve the problem was highlighted. Interestingly, the religious views of General Sonthi, as a Muslim, were framed as the cause to abandon the Thai Buddhists and the army in the south. Also, the movement of some monks against the 2007 constitution had become another example used to portray the immorality of the CNS.

### The problem definition function

The **problem** in this frame was *the negligence of the junta to maintain Buddhism and protect the Buddhists in the southern provinces*. The **culprits** were *the CNS*, but this time they personalized it by attacking *General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and General Surayud Chulannont*. Some groups of monks and Buddhists participated in the anti-coup protests. It was interesting that those Buddhist groups demanded for a clause to recognise Buddhism as the national religion (*'Raingarn satanakan karnchumnum kong kloompitak poottasasana' 2007*).

The next example to support the anti-coup groups' accusation was about the losses of life and possession of the Buddhists from the southern turbulences. The grievances of Thai Buddhists being tormented and assassinated by the separatists were published. An example was a declaration by, a Thai Buddhist group in the southernmost province, that announced:

We are the Thai Buddhists from the three southern provinces. We are here to demand that the government be responsible for finding measures to protect our lives and possessions. We have been brutally threatened and killed by those separatists; on the other hand the government shows no attention to guarding us. Worse, our protest is distorted by some wicked media outlets. This critical, national problem needs to be solved immediately. Nonetheless, our troubles are regrettably abandoned by the government.

This framing was similar to Sondhi Limthongkul's frame when he attacked Thaksin, nonetheless the anti-coup groups focused on the different religious views that caused the conflicts between Muslims and Buddhists in the southernmost areas.

### **The causal attribution function**

In terms of the Buddhist issues, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, as the leader of the coup, was accused of his inattention to the security of Buddhism, and Thai Buddhists, in the southern provinces. General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was strongly condemned about the deaths of several military personnel and local people in an incident of unrest. *A critical **accusation** about his religious views as a Muslim was emphasized to indicate his inattention toward Buddhist matters.* It can be seen from an article ('*Raingarn satanakan paktai*' 2007) that:

General Sonthi might view the deaths of his military as a normal situation. These serious crimes could result from his inattentiveness or his attitude of "making friends with thieves" or his religious views as a "Muslim." That's why he never feels remorseful for the loss and grief of his Thai people and the Thai Buddhists.

This blame was interesting since the supporters of Thaksin were mainly Buddhists from the northern and northeastern provinces; on the one hand some of the Democrat party's voters and General Sonthi were Muslims. Accordingly, conflicts between Muslims in the south and Buddhists were employed to undermine them. Furthermore, some of the anti-coup protesters were from the northern and northeastern provinces, where there were some negative attitudes toward Muslims and people from the south. Thus this framing seemed effective to convince some of Thaksin's followers.

### **The moral evaluation function**

The CNS were **framed** as *sinnners* (khon bap) when they declined to follow the request of a monk group that came to protest the junta. An anti-coup author raised an example to support their accusation that when a group of senior monks demanded to give a letter to the CNS, they were insulted by many rude acts. The headline of this news item defined this practice of the CNS as committing a sin. According to the accusation, the monks had been waiting for hours before they were declined a meeting. The situation was portrayed (*'Prasong samhao tor pra pooyai eektang sairai kloompoochumnum'* 2007) that:

This is too much for us. Our fellow Buddhists wanted to have a meeting with the constitution drafters. They just wanted to ask the council to put a clause into this constitution recognizing Buddhism as the national religion. However, they had been made to wait in the sun, which is awful for some elderly monks. Moreover, they are accused of being hired by a political party to make the protest. This is a very bad accusation.

The junta was portrayed as sinners that failed to protect Buddhism in Thailand. Furthermore their rude practices toward these monks were inappropriate. This is far stronger than the framing of Sondhi's because the former Yellow Shirts leader emphasized the violence in the south and avoided the controversial subject about Muslims and Buddhists.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The **treatment**, in this mobilizing frame, was to *restore morality to politics*. This could be seen from the making of amulets or "Jatukham Rammathep". Even though the anti-coup groups determined to appeal to the followers with the supernatural, the name of the amulet and the benefits of it could express the intentions of the anti-coup groups. At that time Jatukham Rammathep amulets were very popular in Thailand as some Thais believed that it would bring the owner prosperity and protect them from bad luck. It was interesting that this special model of Jatukham Rammathep was called "prab kabot" or "coup defeat".

The maker (*Jatukamramathep roon prabkobot* 2007) revealed that it was made to protect Thailand from the evil coup, and that they had a magical power to change the coup makers' minds. He said the magical power would make the coup makers return the ruling power to the people, set the national election date, and bring back the 1997 people's constitution. Besides, Buddhism and the honour of King Bhumibol would be protected by the power of this Jatukham Rammathep. The protest leaders determined to give their participants the amulets in the demonstrations. This was certainly a wise strategy to appeal more to those protestors who had faith and reflected the goals of the movements at the same time.

### **The metaframes**

The religion metaframe was applied into this framing. It was emphasized when differing religious views received unequal treatments. The CNS, particularly General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, was framed as a negligent leader who was not sincere about maintaining the security of the Thai Buddhists. Interestingly, his religious views, as a Muslim were raised as a cause of the inattention to protecting Thai Buddhists from being assassinated by Muslim separatists. The anti-coup groups framed General Sonthi, Premier Surayud, and their associates as ones who lacked the determination to protect the Buddhists.

Another issue, to blame the CNS for, was the movement of some Buddhist groups. These groups were both lay people and monks. They (*Raingarn satannakan chumnum kong kloom pitak poottasasana* 2007) demanded the putting of a clause in the constitution identifying Buddhism as the national religion. They collaborated with the anti-coup groups for this movement. When their offer was rejected by the junta, the anti-coup groups pinpointed the junta as sinners.

## 7. The Thaksin mobilizing frame

In the second phase of movement, this frame became a powerful one to arouse the grief and anger of Thaksin's supporters toward the junta, since it was framed on the losses of Thaksin, his family and the Thai Rak Thai party in terms of assets and political life. The verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal were a significant occurrence that stimulated Thaksin's supporters to focus on this mobilizing frame. Besides, the popularity of the junta declined, which was the right time for Thaksin and his subordinates to carry out a strong movement to oust the junta and bring Thaksin back to Thailand. This frame, hence, was one of the most powerful frames which was employed to recruit more participants in this second period before the formation of the Red Shirts.

### The problem definition function

The **problem** in this frame was constructed as *the misconducts of the dictators in eliminating Thaksin and his colleagues*. Definitely, the **culprits** were *the CNS, the old power group and their networks*. The examples to support the accusation were focused around the verdicts from the Constitutional Tribunal toward the election fraud charges. The anti-coup groups published news, from the Asia Sentinel (*'Thaksin's Party's Over in Thailand'* 2007), on their website to show the foreign media's opinion towards Thaksin's cases. It said:

It was billed as "Judgment Day" in Bangkok, but Wednesday's decision by a military-installed court to dissolve ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's party and ban its executives from political activity for five years was in the works well before the army seized power last September... While Thaksin can justly be blamed for interfering with independent constitutional bodies during his tenure, the rulers that replaced him have gone even further by overthrowing an elected government, manipulating the justice system, rewriting the constitution, sending soldiers to television stations and enforcing ex post facto laws. Now they've wiped Thaksin's party off the map and banned 111 of the Party's executive members from running in an election for five years the harshest possible punishment. Although the blatantly political decision has profound ramifications for the Thai political landscape, it was simply the culmination of a series of rulings over the past year that skirted or completely ignored the law.

Another news piece from the Financial Times (*'Thai ban blunders'* 2007) was posted:

Although there were no immediate signs of serious unrest, time will show that the tribunal's decision was foolish and unjust. It does no credit to the generals who have already stumbled badly during their brief period in power, and will do little to foster a revival of Thailand's once-vibrant democracy. Perhaps it was inevitable that Mr Thaksin himself would be banned, but there was scant reason to dissolve his party and exclude 111 of its leaders from politics for five years. Invoking the rule of law to demand acceptance of the decision is absurd, given that the army casually took the law into its own hands when it seized power.

As mentioned before, this time Thaksin and his supporters employed the international media as a tool to disseminate their frames to supporters and people around the world. They intended to defend themselves from accusations of the junta and recruit more supporters. This could be seen from the above statements. Also, Thaksin hired Michael Goldberg, the Chair of the International Dispute Resolution Section at Baker Botts LLP, to publish a statement (*'Statement on AEC Assets Seizure'* 2007) declaring his standpoint thus:

Despite all of Dr. Thaksin's efforts, the junta is committed to finding means to circumvent any rule of law to persecute Dr. Thaksin, his family, his friends and his business activities. The junta's attacks on Dr. Thaksin amount to an arbitrary interference with his privacy and his family, his private property, his business interests as well as his honour and reputation which are abhorrent to the principles of international justice.

It should also not be overlooked that, since overthrowing Thailand's civilian government and abrogating Thailand's 1997 constitution, the coup leaders have continually resorted to the most outrageous accusations against Dr. Thaksin: in January 2007, hours after a series of bombings rocked Bangkok, before any investigation could begin, the military accused Dr. Thaksin of ordering the attacks. After days of being called to task for these accusations, the coup leaders backed down from their accusations and affirmed that there was no evidence of Dr. Thaksin's involvement.

This statement only explained Thaksin's feelings of being intimidated with no comments on the details of the verdicts from the Tribunal or the accusations against him. Thaksin used the service of this company to defend himself from the junta and

the later government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, the leader of the Democrat party. These framing tactics have been used by the Red Shirts' movement to effectively explain their situation to other democratic countries.

### **The causal attribution function**

The **reason** for the junta to overthrow the Thaksin government was given that *the tyrants viewed Thaksin, Thaksin regime, and his associates, as threats which must be removed*. News from the Asia Sentinel (*'Thaksin's Party's Over in Thailand'* 2007) was posted on the anti-coup website explained that:

The real winners, however, are the military, judiciary and royalist elites who saw Thaksin as a threat to their traditional power base. With Thaksin gone, they can safely fade into the background once again and pull the strings from behind the scenes. Thaksin had egged them out into the open, and he paid the price.

The above statement was in accordance with an article written by Tavivoot Chulavachana (*'Taveevut kui kub nakkolayut saiklang cheewit thaksin tok yoo nai antarai'* 2007), a journalist who supported Thaksin. He described the reason behind the acts of the CNS thus:

In views of a political strategist, these people demand to take Thaksin's assets and his life, because they cannot rely on the Democrat Party to help them to reach their goals. If they can stop Thaksin, they can control Thai politics and become the powerful faction in Thailand. For someone, Thaksin is a burden to gaining money and power.

We can see that in this second phase Thaksin's supporters used professional media to distribute news and movements of the groups. It was a good chance for them to make the world realize the dictatorship of the junta through international media. Simultaneously they also established their media, supported by huge budgets and experienced journalists and politicians. This worked effectively for their framing tactics.

### **The moral evaluation function**

This function was separated to **brand** the junta as *the evil tyrants who robbed the ruling power from the elected government of Thaksin*, on the other hand Thaksin was **portrayed** as *the innocent exiled premier who was unjustly bullied by the old power group and its network*. Thaksin had done this by giving interviews and showing up on the anti-coup media. He framed himself as the beaten one. This could be seen from a speech he gave to his supporters which said (*Thaksin ron jodmai tung konthai penhuang lae korhai aodton* 2007):

Recently, I've been unfairly bullied by many allegations. This has been done to my family as well. We're really in trouble. We've created many useful projects for this country. We are loyal to the King and the nation. When we've been unethically treated like this, my fellows feel sorry for us. I'm really appreciated your concerns. I never fear these charges, because I know I do no wrong. I'm ready to return to prove my innocence, but I don't want to cause the country turmoil. So, I chose to make peace by living abroad alone, far from my family. When everything is settled, I will return to serve Thailand and the monarchy again. I'm concerned about this undemocratic government which has decreased the confidence from other countries for investments. We all know that economic problems have a major impact on our grassroots. Many parents have to work harder to support their children, since my scholarship scheme was cut off by this government. I'd like to ask everyone to be patient on this.

Thaksin at this time started to frame himself as a victim of the dictators. He communicated with his supporters through local media, while reminding them of his past projects and funds he used to provide to his voters. This was done to arouse the frustration of the voters. Moreover, news from the Reuters (Wong-Anan 2007) was translated and posted on the Thai E-news to express the feeling of some grassroots about Thaksin that:

I feel sorry for him. He was ousted in a coup and accused of cheating the country and there's no truth in it," said Chei Taepin, a 75-year-old noodle soup vendor who said he knew Thaksin, 57, when he was at primary school in San Khamphaeng. Chei, like others, reckons the charges brought against Thaksin's wife and her brother this week are a proxy case against the charismatic billionaire who won two landslide elections on the back of massive support in the rural heartlands. "They are afraid of him returning to

politics. They can't defeat him politically, so they have to come up with all sorts of allegations," said Chei, who hangs a huge campaign poster of Thaksin wearing an outfit worn for royal functions in his shop.

This article portrayed how his voters felt about Thaksin, while Thaksin attempted to show his unconcerned attitude about the allegations. This function was used to frame the loyalty of the voters toward Thaksin, which could cause the junta anxiety about the movement of these supporters.

### **The treatment recommendation function**

The anti-coup groups' **solution** was *calling for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra and democracy, while ousting the junta at the same time*. It is interesting that a rumour about a plan to assassinate Thaksin was distributed. An anti-coup writer (*'Taveevut kui kub nakkolayut saiklang cheewit thaksin tok yoo nai antarai'* 2007) suggested Thaksin to have more security guards to protect him and his family. Also, he should create connections with international media and human rights organizations for helping him to reveal the evil and unjust nature of Thai justice. This suggestion from "a strategist" later became a strategic model for the movement of the anti-coup groups. When they wanted to seek attentions from other countries, the anti-coup groups would invite international organizations to investigate, observe, and perhaps intervene in their problems. The objective of this tactic was to distribute their grievances to the international community.

The protest toward the Constitutional Tribunal, and ultimately the CNS, was proposed as an absolute means to end the problems. Shortly before the verdicts of the court were revealed, Thaksin Shinawatra showed himself to the public by giving interviews to three community radio programs. He encouraged his supporters to fight against the tyrants, as well as telling them of his wish to return to Thailand. Veera Musigapong, a former deputy leader of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party - who was banned by the Tribunal order - and PTV leader (*'Thai politics ban sparks protests'* 2007), announced his plan to oppose the Constitutional Tribunal, which was reported on CNN news thus: "This is a fight by the people who are rejecting the

judiciary's power. As someone who was personally affected (by the ruling), I am not accepting the decision of the tribunal which was set up by the coup leaders and their illegitimate power.”

When Thaksin and his factions started to strike back at the CNS, his supporters responded to his desire to return to Thailand by staging protests to oust the CNS, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, General Prem Tinsulanonda, and to turn down the tyrannical 2007 draft constitution. A leader of PTV, Jatuporn Phromphan (*‘Street protest: PTV plans April 27 mass rally to demonstrate against coup’ 2007*), declared the mobilizing goals thus:

The convergence of events in May and the following months could spell the end of military control. These include the debate leading to the referendum on the new constitution, the court verdicts on two cases of electoral fraud punishable by party dissolution, and the litigation involving Thaksin and his family members, he said. "From May onward, conditions will be ripe to sway the public to oppose the government and the Council for National Security," he said, adding that it was inevitable that Thaksin would end his exile in London in order to fight the charges against him in person.

From this time, the verdicts from the Constitutional Tribunal prompted the anti-coup groups and some of the TRT members to collaborate the movement in order to oppose the CNS forcefully.

### **The metaframes**

The democracy and modernization metaframes were applied into the framing process of this mobilizing frame. In terms of democracy metaframe, the anti-coup groups and Thaksin framed the measures, to block the anti-coup media and the return home of Thaksin, as dictatorial actions. The unjust verdicts from the Constitutional Tribunal to ban the TRT and 111 of its leading members from politics for five years were considered as undemocratic strategies to remove Thaksin and his regime from Thai politics. Obviously, it was framed as a plan of the CNS and amat to get rid of their major political enemies.

This time, the modernization metaframe was used to construct an image of the modern, intelligent, and devoted Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin

activated the movement by reminding his supporters of the many projects he had done in the past. It was the time for him to remind his supporters of the glory times when he was in the premiership, on the other hand the junta were portrayed as conservative and dictatorial, and of being disapproved of by other countries.

## The conclusion

The initial movement of the anti-coup groups in this study was started by the gathering of a collection of anti-coup groups to protest against the 19 September 2006 coup. No different from the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul, they created mobilizing frames to oppose the tyrannical government. Nonetheless, the frames of the anti-coup groups were mainly applied to attack the junta and demand for the restoration of democracy. This changed when the supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, such as the grassroots and TRT politicians, decided to join the movements. Thus, additional frames were constructed to focus on calling for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra and the overthrow of the coup makers and amat. I intend to summarize all of the seven mobilizing frames and the metaframes in the lower sections.

**The anti-coup mobilizing frame** was created as the first frame of the anti-coup groups. Since, in this early time, the protestors came from various groups, such as ordinary people, activists, students, and scholars, their framings were diverse and inconsistent in terms of goals and contents. This could be seen by the problem being indicated, in this first frame in the first phase, as *the severe damages to Thailand resulting from the 2006 coup in terms of democracy, economy, and the prestige of King Bhumibol Adulyadej*. On the other hand, in the second phase of the movement, the anti-coup groups' framed the problem as *the intention of the coup group to remain in power*. The *coup makers, the amat, and the other networks* were the **culprits** of this frame, while the **reason** to stage a coup was given that *Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates were the major antagonists of the coup group in terms of benefits and economic ideas, as a result Thaksin must be get rid of to pave the way for them to remain in power*.

The coup makers were **framed** as *tyrants, rioters, robbers, fake heroic knights, crooked dictators, and people disloyal to the King*. The anti-coup groups accused the coup makers of staging a coup that resulted in the destruction of Thai democracy, and of robbing the premiership from the elected Thaksin. However, this coup group defamed the honor of King Bhumibol by leading the public to understand that the coup was endorsed by the King. As the solution to this problem, the anti-coup groups proposed the **treatment** of *calling for the restoration of democracy, demanding a new national election, the restoration of the discarded 1997 constitution, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra*. Obviously, the metaframes which were engaged in this mobilizing frame were the democracy, king, and nation metaframes. In the anti-coup groups' view, this coup overthrew the democratic government of Thaksin and diminished the most democratic 1997 constitution. All of this led to the loss of democracy in Thailand. Moreover, the king metaframe was applied to portray the coup group as a disloyal group that violates the King's royal supremacy by overthrowing the government, which was approved by the King, and involving the King with this coup.

The next major mobilizing frame of the anti-coup groups was **the anti-amat frame**. It was aimed at attacking the chief of the Privy Council, General Prem Tinsulanonda, and his network monarchy. The anti-coup groups believed that Prem and his network held the power in Thailand, in terms of economy and politics, for a long time. When Thaksin Shinawatra became the popular elected prime minister, he was seen as the major opponent of the amat. Thaksin challenged the amat with his modern economic policies and down-to-earth image. He was the only premier who provided many benefits to the abandoned grassroots; accordingly he became the most popular premier, which was considered a great threat to the amat. On the other hand, the amat were framed, by the anti-coup groups, as the major enemy of Thaksin, the anti-coup groups, and the grassroots. Thus, the **problem**, in this frame, was constructed as *the destruction of Thai democracy by the monopolization of power and benefits by the amat*. In the second phase, the anti-coup groups' framed the problem as *the mandate of the old power group to seize power from the new power*

*group of Thaksin Shinawatra, while the **culprit** in both phases was framed as the amat. The **reasons** for the amat to stage a coup were constructed as the amat determine to take over the ruling power from Thaksin since he is elected by a massive number of rural people. Thaksin became a great threat for the monarchy and the amat. Thus, the amat were **framed** by the anti-coup groups as fake good people, the democracy destroyers, and the oppressive group.*

Apparently, in this mobilizing frame General Prem Tinsulanonda became the key target of attack since he was the head of the amat. He, furthermore, was accused of taking advantage of being the head of the Privy Council; because of this he was unfaithful to the King. According to the anti-coup groups, his practices were inappropriate for the head of the Privy Council, thus they **demand**ed to oust Prem from his position by collecting signatures for a petition to offer to the King. Besides, they invited people to take part in the protests to get rid of Prem and his network. The metaframes which were employed in this mobilizing frame were those of democracy and king. In terms of the democracy metaframe, Prem was the head of the coup group that demolished Thai democracy, besides the amat wanted to suppress the people, or grassroots, and make them their inferiors. To continue their plan, the amat overthrew the democratic premier and government, while the grassroots' right to have their elected government was removed. All of this indicated the dictatorial practices of the amat. The king metaframe was applied to portray a disloyal image of the amat in applying the close relationship with the King to enrich their plans.

The next mobilizing frame was that of **the unproductive Surayud Chulanont government**. During the first phase, Surayud was condemned hard on his unskillful governing, corruptions, and the undemocratic premiership which led to the disapproval of many democratic countries. Thus, the **problem** was framed as *the damages to Thailand caused by the ineffective and unpopular government of Surayud Chulanont*. The **culprits** were definitely *Surayud Chulanont and his government*. The anti-coup groups determined to attack Surayud since he was close to General Prem, furthermore he had the image of an honest Privy Councillor who worked for King

Bhumibol. Hence, attacking Surayud and his associates with corruption accusations seemed to be an effective way to ruin their clean image. The anti-coup groups defined the **cause** in this frame as *the incompetence and inattention, to solve the nation's problems, of the government of Surayud Chulanont*. The regression of the Thai economy caused by the lack of experience in administration was highlighted. The government of Surayud claimed that it was following the sufficiency economy concept of King Bhumibol, on the other hand this concept was condemned by the anti-coup groups because the ambiguity in its application led to the decline of the Thai economy.

In this frame, the anti-coup groups **framed** Surayud Chulanont as *the robber prime minister* while his government became *the illegal government*. In terms of the solution, the anti-coup groups did not offer an particular means to get rid of Surayud. The anti-coup groups' claimed that it looked as if Surayud had some conflicts with General Prem and General Sonthi, which seemed good for anti-coup groups. Accordingly, the attack towards him was restrained. The metaframes which were applied into this framing were those of modernization and the nation. The anti-coup groups attempted to portray Surayud's government as conservative and his sufficiency economy concept as old-fashioned which led to the overall deterioration of the Thai economy. On the other hand, capitalism, which Thaksin employed as an economic policy, was in accordance with other countries' concepts. Thus, the modernizations of Thaksin, based on capitalist ideas, were framed as the best notion to expand the growth of the Thai economy. The king metaframe was employed when the anti-coup groups deemed that this government adopted the King's concept as their policy but could not identify how to apply this notion successfully. As a result, the King's concept was viewed, by other countries, as an ineffective and conservative concept that led to the disgracing of the King's honor.

In the next mobilizing frame, the anti-coup groups styled their movement as the people's movement calling for democracy which was turned into another major frame. In this **people's democracy mobilizing frame**, the anti-coup groups defined themselves as the people, or the grassroots, who were fighting against the amat and

undemocratic factions to restore the democracy of the people. The **problem** in this frame was constructed as *the loss of the people's democracy due to the 19 September coup*. The **culprits** were indicated as *the coup makers, the junta, the old power group and its network such as the Yellow Shirts, some right-wing scholars and the media that support the coup*. They were **viewed** by the anti-coup groups as *the tyrannical thieves that robbed the people's democracy*, while their appointed organizations, such as the government and the Constitutional Tribunal, were branded as *illegal and undemocratic products of the dictators*. The **cause** of this frame was indicated as *the attempts of the junta to get rid of the power of Thaksin Shinawatra and the grassroots*. In this frame, the anti-coup groups framed the old power group and its networks as ones who robbed their democracy by overthrowing their elected government and the premier. Besides, the 1997 people's constitution was demolished by this 19 September coup and replaced by the dictatorial interim constitution.

The protests of the anti-coup groups became stronger when the Constitutional Tribunal gave the verdicts on the cases of Thaksin and the TRT. Obviously, the anti-coup groups were very upset and frustrated with the verdicts. As a result, the anti-coup groups began their people's movement and portrayed themselves as the grassroots that were intimidated by the old power group and the middle class. Definitely, class conflicts were applied into this mobilizing frame. The **solution** was proposed as *demanding the restoration of the 1997 people's constitution, a new election, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra*. The metaframes involved in this frame were those of democracy and the king. Definitely, the democracy metaframe was applied when the anti-coup groups began their movement. The class conflict was combined into this frame to stimulate the frustration of the grassroots. The king metaframe was involved when the anti-coup groups alleged that the junta claimed that this charter was approved by the King. Thus Thai people must vote for it to show their loyalty to the King.

**The media control** became another major issue for the anti-coup groups. The **problem** in this frame was *the unfair measures and favoritism of the coup group regarding media censorship*. The **culprits** were *the coup groups and some state*

*organizations*. At the beginning of the protest, the anti-coup groups' media were curbed in reporting news about Thaksin, while some websites and community radio stations were blocked when they aired interviews with Thaksin. The **cause** of the media censorship was portrayed as *the fear of truth of the coup group*. In the anti-coup groups' framing, the coup group determined to hide the truth which was distributed by the anti-coup groups. They did not want the general public to be aware of their dictatorial malpractices, besides they feared the lasting popularity of Thaksin among his supporters. If news of Thaksin was disseminated to his voters, a calamity from the protest might be a result which would disturb their power. The coup makers were **framed** as the *evil dictators*, moreover the media that supported the junta, such as the Manager of Sondhi Limthongkul, the Nation, Matichon, and Bangkokbiznews were also branded as unethical media. Sondhi Limthongkul was attacked hard as a major target of the anti-coup groups. He was labeled as *the master of news spinning*. The **remedy** was, certainly, *calling for the freedom of press*. Interestingly, they sent a letter to inform the international journalists of the censorship in order to put the pressure on the junta. This later became the tactic for the anti-coup groups to seek support and intervention from the international community. The metaframe engaged in this frame was that of democracy. During this time the members of the TRT established the PTV station to air their news. Apparently, it became the mouthpiece for the TRT, Thaksin, and the anti-coup groups. When PTV was blocked by the junta, it led to the movement to call for freedom of expression. Thus, the media censorship measure of the junta evidently violated democratic principles.

The Buddhism issue was framed as **the Buddhism mobilizing frame**, since the anti-coup groups determined to encourage Buddhists to support their movements. Nonetheless, this frame was not raised as a major mobilizing frame. The **problem** was framed as *the inattentiveness of the junta to protect Buddhism*. The **culprits** were *the junta* with the focus on General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. The anti-coup groups intended to condemn the ineffective plans of the junta to relieve the unrest incidents in the southernmost provinces. News of the killing of Buddhists and army

personnel in the south were reported, while the religious view of General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, as a Muslim, were claimed to be suspect. Another issue was the movements of groups of monks and their followers. They participated in the protest to demand the junta to recognize Buddhism as the national religion in the new constitution. Evidently, this offer was rejected by the junta since it might cause troubles between Buddhists and the followers of different faiths. It is interesting that the anti-coup groups did not give a clear cause of the problem in this frame, perhaps religious views were a controversial subject. The **solution** in this frame was offered as *restoring morality into Thai politics*, since they viewed the junta and the Yellow Shirts as immoral. The metaframe applied in this framing was that of religion which could be seen when they highlighted the hardships of Thai Buddhists in the southernmost provinces. In the anti-coup groups' framing, the government seemed not to care about protecting the lives and possessions of the Thai Buddhists. Thus, the different religious view of General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, as a Muslim, is questioned by the anti-coup groups.

The last mobilizing frame was **the Thaksin mobilizing frame** which principally framed to attract Thaksin's supporters. This frame had been constructed to inform people of the movements of Thaksin and the evil practices of the CNS and amat against him. The suffering of Thaksin was constructed and disseminated to his supporters. The **problem**, in this frame, was *the immoral practices of the dictators in intimidating Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates* and the **culprits** were *the CNS and amat*. The **cause** was framed that the CNS and amat *viewed Thaksin as their great enemy, thus Thaksin and his Thaksinomics must be got rid of*. Because of this, the anti-coup groups **framed** the CNS and amat as *the dictators that robbed the ruling power from the democratic premier*, while Thaksin was portrayed as *the innocent exiled premier who is bullied by the amat and its network*. In this frame, the examples to show the intimidation of the amat were focused on the censorship of news about Thaksin, his being banned from returning to Thailand and the corruption allegations towards him, the Thai Rak Thai party, and his family. Interestingly, Thaksin also applied himself into the frame through the anti-coup

media. For example, Thaksin told his followers of his need to return to Thailand and of the difficulties he received from the bullies. His followers seemed to have empathy for him, some even announced they would do anything to bring him back to Thailand. The major situation that triggered the anger of the anti-coup groups happened when the Constitutional Tribunal gave a verdict to dissolve the TRT, freeze Thaksin's assets, and ban him from any political activities. Accordingly, the movement to call for the return of Thaksin was activated and offered as a **treatment** for this frame. They *demand the return of Thaksin Shinawatra*. It seemed the frustration of the anti-coup groups toward the verdicts of Constitutional Tribunal led to the mistrust of the justice system, which was consolidated in the later movements when the Red Shirts group was formed.

The democracy /modernization metaframe was applied into the anti-coup groups' framing. During the movement, the success of Thaksin in developing Thailand was constantly referred to by anti-coup groups. His modern economic policy and his persona as a global leader were employed into the movement messages to remind the grassroots of his potency, while the democracy metaframe was applied to frame the unjust verdicts of the Constitutional Tribunal, which were accused of being undemocratic and coming from an undemocratic and illegal organization appointed by dictators, and the practices of the CNS to threaten Thaksin and his TRT.

Taken together, the movements of the anti-coup groups, which have been separated into two phases, help us to see the alterations of the frames in each period. They created seven mobilizing frames which were used in both the first and the second phase. Some frames were emphasized as powerful frames, while some had their significance minimized. The frames that were most powerfully applied were: the anti-amat, the anti-coup, the media control, the people's democracy, and the Thaksin mobilizing frames. These five frames were concentrated on in the second phase when the anti-coup groups activated the fierce protests; in addition the protest groups changed the attack on to individuals in order to construct a precise enemy. Accordingly, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was chosen as the main culprit in the anti-coup mobilizing frame, while General Prem Tinsulanonda was presented as the

head of the amat and the mastermind of the 2006 coup. General Surayud Chulanont, was condemned hard in the first phase, but he was less focused on in the second phase of the movement. The reason was he expressed his standpoint to have a national election and had no intention to take part in a future government. On the other hand, General Sonthi had been the key person in demanding many measures to get rid of Thaksin and his associates, while General Prem continued to be seen as the major enemy who was behind the plans to overthrow Thaksin.

An interesting thing about the framing of the anti-coup groups is that some frames were combined to create “a package of accusations”. For example, they combined the anti-coup and the anti-amat mobilizing frames to associate the issues with the culprits, or enemies. Besides, they promoted the anti-amat, people’s democracy, and Thaksin mobilizing frames together to attract Thaksin’s supporters. This was the tactic to bring to prominence specific issues and enemies; besides they could create the frame of the frustrations and grievances of the grassroots from these packages. In terms of the metaframes, the anti-coup groups concentrated most on promoting that of democracy, while the modernization frame became the second most important. This can be explained by the leaders, and the followers, receiving benefits from a democratic regime. The leaders of the anti-coup groups came from various factions such as politicians, scholars, and activists, but they all believed in a democratic regime that gave rights, equal opportunities, and political careers to them. Equivalently, the followers, who were mostly the grassroots and some middle class, were also given benefits by their elected government which they hardly ever had from other governments. Thus, they were all enthusiastic to protest and call for the return of their benefits and the premier under the movement of the people’s movement to call for democracy.

Additionally, the modernization metaframe was applied into the movements. The leaders of the protest intended to point out the importance of capitalism, the projects of Thaksin, and the modern style of development of both Thaksin and his government. All of this was created to mark the differences between Thaksin and

the conservative and old-fashioned amat, Surayud government and sufficiency economy concept. Apparently, Thaksin and his government outsmarted the dictatorial and conservative factions of the coup makers.

Accordingly, the identity of the anti-coup groups was constructed around the democracy and modernization nationalist ideas. The followers and the movements were framed as the movements of the grassroots, which were suppressed by the amat. Their goal was to fight the old-fashioned tyrants and restore democracy to Thailand. *They were a modern group of people who called for a modern democratic regime that allowed the people to have the right to vote for a democratic government. A government that ruled this country with modern economic policies and brought people an autonomous life as equals to the other classes.*

Taken together, the movements of the anti-coup groups had been separated into two phases to help us see the alterations of frames in each period. Seven mobilizing frames were created which were used in both the first and second phases. Some frames were emphasized as important frames, while the significance of the others was minimized. By far the most focused on frames were the anti-amat, the anti-coup, the media control, the people's democracy, and the Thaksin mobilizing frames. These five frames were concentrated on in the second phase when the anti-coup groups activated the fierce protests; in addition the protest groups changed the focus of attack to individuals in order to construct a precise enemy for them. Accordingly, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was chosen as the main culprit in the anti-coup mobilizing frame, while General Prem Tinsulanonda was represented as the head of amat and the mastermind of the 2006 coup. General Surayud Chulanont was condemned hard in the first phase, but was less focused on in the second phase of the movement because of his standpoints of quitting the premiership, setting up a national election and showing no intention to take part in any future government. On the other hand, General Prem had been remained the major enemy of the anti-coup groups. He created the plan to overthrow Thaksin, while General Sonthi was framed as Prem's puppet that completed the plan to get rid of Thaksin and his associates.

An outstanding framing of the anti-coup groups was that they consolidated some frames as “a package of blames”. For example, the anti-coup and the anti-amat mobilizing frames were connected and promoted as a package associated with the issues and culprits, or enemies, whereas the anti-amat, the people’s democracy, and the Thaksin mobilizing frames were tied together to specifically appeal to the attention of Thaksin’s supporters. This was the tactic to which brought to prominence specific issues and enemies that could be easily recognized. Furthermore, these packages of frames were potent in illustrating the inequality, frustrations, and grievances of the grassroots that were caused by their enemies.

The anti-coup groups concentrated on promoting the democracy metaframe the most. The leaders of the anti-coup groups came from various factions such as politicians, scholars, and activists. However, they shared a belief in a democratic regime that provided rights, equality, opportunities, and a bright future in a political career to them. Simultaneously, the followers of the groups were mostly the grassroots, and some middle class who had been given rights and benefits by the Thaksin government. They were all enthusiastic to join the protest, under the movement of the People’s Movement to Call for Democracy, calling for the return of their popular premier, and lost benefits.

Modernization was applied into the movements as the second most important metaframe. The protest leaders intended to point out the prominence and value of capitalism, and the populist policies and modernization projects of Thaksin and his government in developing Thailand. This was framed to contrast with the conservative and old-fashioned amat, the Surayud government, and the sufficiency economy concept.

Accordingly, the identity of the anti-coup groups was constructed around the democracy and modernization nationalist ideas. The followers and the movements were framed as the movement of the inferior grassroots that had been suppressed by the amat. *In essence, they were a modern group of people who called for a modern*

*regime of democracy that allowed them the right to vote for a democratic government. The elected government would rule this country with a modern economic policy and bring people an autonomous life equal to the other classes."*

## Conclusion

### Introduction

In this dissertation I have investigated the movements of the “Muang Thai Rai Supda” group, which was the initial Yellow Shirts led by Sondhi Limthongkul, and the anti-coup groups, with some groups later joined together as the Red Shirts group. It is believed that in successful social movements the leaders need to seek ways to enlarge and solidify their support. Having high numbers of participants is crucial to the longevity of the movements. To accomplish this goal, framing becomes a key strategy of the social movement leaders to select the right issues and events and frame them in ways that resonate with the participants and bystanders. Every frame in social movements is built on metaframes, the large frames that are a part of culture. These powerful and persuasive frames are associated with identity. Correspondingly, social movement leaders in Thailand reshape the metaframes that are linked to the Thai identity. These metaframes have been applied heavily in social movements to recruit supporters. The key identity frames in Thailand consist of nation, religion, king, and democracy/modernization. Nevertheless, identity can be reformed to meet the needs of each political crisis. This can be seen from the initial Yellow and Red Shirts movements. They performed effective movements by relying on metaframes and mobilizing frames which were formed from nationalist symbols. These mobilizing frames, which were rooted in the metaframes, were developed over time and resulted in the different focus of identity of the two movement groups. Because of this, intensive conflicts between the different identities (a quasi-ethnic conflict) have taken place in Thailand.

## Research questions and hypotheses

In terms of background, Sondhi has a masters degree from Utah State University, while his family owned a Chinese newspaper. It is not surprising that he became a journalist and owned a media empire. This background was beneficial for his framing when he decided to oppose Thaksin. As a journalist and businessman, who later became a social movement leader, Sondhi initially activated his framing under the role of journalist. His framing in the early period, particularly in the first movement phase, is close to the framing definition of Entman (1993, p.50). He framed his messages, as a journalist, by selecting and highlighting the important issues and events that pointed out the faults of Thaksin Shinawatra and his government. He (Khamnoon, 2006, p.203) did not have the goal of protest when he moved the show to Thammasat, although some groups persuaded him to start the protest. However, framing became an important movement strategy for Sondhi to catch the attention of his audience and the public. It was also possible that he needed the audience to maintain his business, since the cancellation of his famous TV show had led to a loss of income. During the show, he invited the audience to follow his news media and support his products. Moreover, wishing to lay the blame on Thaksin and associates was another reason why effective metaframes and mobilizing frames were necessary for him. The movement in the second period was focused on organising for protest. Apparently, Sondhi had gained confidence from strong support from his audience, elites, royalists, activists, politicians, and the public. Sondhi employed framing tactics to construct mobilizing frames. This time he decided to protest organising a movement to oppose Thaksin and his subordinates. He could recruit more supporters from these frames which ultimately resulted in the establishing of the Yellow Shirts.

**H1: In the earliest phases of social movements, as mobilizing frames are being developed, metaframes must be heavily employed.**

In this study the early periods of the initial Yellow and Red Shirts are examined to find out how they undertook their movements which, in turn, laid the firm foundations for their later movements. Definitely, framing played a major role in their movements. To create framing messages, both groups applied metaframes and mobilizing frames which were built on Thai nationalism. In this section the details of the metaframes and mobilizing frames of the two movement groups will be explained below to answer research question 1, hypothesis 1, and hypothesis 2 respectively.

To explain hypothesis 1, the alterations of Sondhi Limthongkul's framing over time must be examined, as he was the major initial movement leader. Sondhi started the movement when his popular political show "Muang Thai Rai Supda" was cancelled from Channel 9 in September 2005 which resulted in his tough condemnation of Thaksin and the government. After the termination of the show, he decided to carry on with it in the form of a live political show at Thammasat University and later at Lumpini Park. The beginning of a major social movement group, the Yellow Shirts, started here.

During the early movement, Sondhi Limthongkul transformed nationalism into the metaframes. The four nationalist symbols of king, nation, religion, and democracy were reshaped into the king, nation, religion, and democracy/modernization metaframes. The seven mobilizing frames, which stemmed from the metaframes, were applied into his political show for specific mobilizing goals.

A massive audience was necessary for Sondhi, since his political show "Muang Thai Rai Supda" was terminated by Thaksin's subordinates. He had lost of income, while his future was not certain. When he decided to continue the show, he moved it to Thammasat University. It was a challenging situation for him to gain both money and an audience at that time. The need to appeal to a larger audience was greater for

those reasons. Accordingly, the metaframes and mobilizing frames emerged from this point to complete his movement. Performing the protest was not in his mind at this early stage.

In the early phases Sondhi did not know for certain which issues should be framed as the “right frames”. He primarily emphasized framing the misdeeds of Thaksin and his subordinates. The frames, however, evolved over time as they were adjusted to match the audience’s interests. Since he had the show on Channel 9, the frames that Sondhi had applied were the king, religion, nation, and democracy metaframes including seven mobilizing frames. Those frames were focused on to differing degrees. It is obvious that during the movement Sondhi focused most on the three metaframes and some of the mobilizing frames that involved King Bhumibol, Somdet Pra Sangkarat, and the corruption of Thaksin, while the importance of the democracy/modernization metaframe was lessened. Sondhi realized that the practices of Thaksin which allegedly violated the King’s royal supremacy could stimulate strong reactions from the audience, which could be seen from the show and web board of the Manager website (Sondhi’s media). In addition the issues involving Somdet Pra Sangkarat received much attention at the same time, while the corruption of Thaksin and his colleagues caused frustration amongst his audience.

The pattern of framing changed when he moved the show to Lumpini Park, where the numbers in the audience increased. Sondhi thought to lead the group as the solo leader before collaborating with other factions as the People’s Alliance of Democracy. Accordingly, he had to find the “right frames” to attract the audience. In the last period of the movement at Lumpini Park, Sondhi still focused on the three main metaframes, while the democracy metaframe was asserted to present another type of Thai democracy. The metaframes were applied heavily within the development of the seven mobilizing frames and framing tactics. A turning point came on episode 10 (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 10*, 2005), when he broadcasted the show from Wat Pa Ban Tard, Udonthani province. He claimed that he had been hunted and had just escaped from an assassination attempt. He knew who the mastermind of the plan was. He announced and was supported by Luang Ta

Maha Bua, he would overthrow the Thaksin government, thus framing a strategy at this stage was necessary for Sondhi to form the protest. Also, the forceful frames used to recruit “the future Yellow Shirt members” were a crucial part of his success.

In terms of the anti-coup groups, their frames had a different perspective from Sondhi's, right from the beginning of the movement. Sondhi started framing as journalist, while the anti-coup groups began with a variety of groups such as activists, scholars, students, and general people. Some anti-coup activists and scholars had previously joined the Yellow Shirts' movement, hence their adopted tactics included frames used by the Yellow Shirts movement. They produced more specific frames to appeal to the participants, whilst employing some framing strategies of the Yellow Shirts.

Similar to Sondhi's movement, the anti-coup groups applied the four nationalist symbols as metaframes, and constructed seven mobilizing frames. In the early movement, they activated the movement by protesting the 2006 coup, which focused on the democracy and nation metaframes. They rebuked the “evil” and “dictatorial” sides of the 2006 coup, as they sought to recruit participants who valued democracy. Apparently some of the mobilizing frames imitated those of the Yellow Shirts. The frame promoters had to adjust the mobilizing frames to fit with their participants.

In the second phase, the intensity of the movement increased when PTV collaborated with the other anti-coup groups to form the better organised group. The metaframes and mobilizing frames were heavily used to recruit more participants. Thaksin's supporters, which were the grassroots, became major participants. Consequently, the framing tactics were changed to frame issues around Thaksin Shinawatra. His past works and achievements, and the harassment he suffered at the hands of the junta, were communicated to his voters. This was all done in order to call for the return of Thaksin, which needed to be supported by the masses.

We can see that both the groups of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups had to rely heavily on metaframes in their mobilizing frames to achieve their goals, especially in the early days of the movements. The mobilizing frames had been constantly developed through the movement periods while the metaframes were being densely applied simultaneously to achieve the mobilizing goals.

**RQ1: How did the social movement leaders in the early part of the movement employ the metaframes that were built on nationalism to create successful movements? And how did they construct the mobilizing frames?**

**H2: The most effective metaframes are those focused on identity.**

The movement significances of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups was the application of metaframes which remodelled from Thai nationalism. Many of the past Thai political movements operated with nationalism. However, the metaframes that were employed by Sondhi Limthongkul and the anti-coup groups were effective and skillfully applied, which was proved by their later powerful movements under the bodies of the Yellow and Red Shirts. This is because they are educated and understanding on the power of media and its messages. Sondhi, nonetheless, must be regarded as the first of these leaders who employed nationalism to conduct his movements and disseminated them through his media networks. Those tactics were later imitated and adjusted by the anti-coup groups.

Not only did he adopt nationalism into his social movement, Sondhi also transformed the four nationalist symbols by using them as metaframes. This resulted in the collective identity of his “Muang Thai Rai Supda” movement group. In the movement of Sondhi Limthongkul he developed seven mobilizing frames, based on the four metaframes, to communicate with his audience. Primarily, he provided the audience of “Muang Thai Rai Supda” with the faults of Thaksin Shinawatra and associates. Sondhi selected and framed the major issues and occurrences involved with the misconducts of Thaksin. He understood his audience, thus he chose the four metaframes and seven mobilizing frames which effectively appealed to his audience.

As mentioned previously, framing is an important mobilization resource for creating successful social movements. Sondhi framed messages with nationalism to effectively mobilize his factions. Nevertheless the success of his movement came from the identity which was formed through those frames. This benefitted him for recruiting more audience, participants, and bystanders. an identity could create bonds among him, the audience, and the “Muang Thai Rai Supda” movement. Ganz (2009, p.6) explained that good relationships are the main reason for members to join social movements. Furthermore, the member ideologies, such as “general political ideology, beliefs in strategies and goals of their social movement organization, personal beliefs of members, and religious background of members and movements”, that are close to those of the social movement organization are the reasons that connect the member to the movement (Cohn, Barkan, and Halteman, 2003, p. 315). Consequently, the leaders of social movement groups must achieve in creating this close relationship.

Sondhi had a degree in History which helped him to realize the importance and power of nationalism in persuasion. Furthermore he understood that the nature of those middle class Bangkokians and elites, which he identified as his audience. As Sondhi claimed on the show, these audiences were usually not inclined to participate in any political activities. They routinely followed his show, went to bed early, got up in the morning, and went to work. Until one day they discovered that their favorite political show was terminated with no appropriate explanation from the government. This made them upset and curious about the real reason behind this. They participated in his show at Thammasat which were the majority of his audience. In the end they turned into the major followers when the Yellow Shirts was formed. Among the crowds that showed up regularly at the live shows there were well-known technocrats, scholars, politicians, activists, lobbyists, journalists, and businessmen. Some of them were elites, royalists, and Thaksin’s opponents who had the shared goals of opposing Thaksin. They intended to overthrow Thaksin to sustain the strength of the three primary institutions of the monarchy, religion, and the nation. Consequently, the effective metaframes produced by Sondhi were

focused on constructing an identity that matched the belief and culture of these types of people. The metaframes of Sondhi created to construct identity focused on love and respect towards the king, nation, and religion.

This was similar to the anti-coup groups since they adopted strategies and metaframes used by Sondhi and the Yellow Shirts and applied them into their movements. However, the effective metaframes of the anti-coup groups focused on different nationalist symbols. According to the findings in chapter 4, they concentrated on democracy symbols, or the democracy/modernization metaframe. This was the collective identity or Thainess of the anti-coup groups, the various groups of people who shared the same belief in democracy. The anti-coup groups were different from Sondhi's movement group. Some came to protest based on their high opinion of democracy, while some were Thaksin's supporters. Thus, the metaframe that was used on to powerfully appeal to the high numbers of protestors was democracy; this democracy metaframe was applied to create the identity of the group.

**RQ2: What specific metaframes are applied and how are they engaged with the mobilizing frames? In what ways do social movement leaders highlight the problem definition, casual attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation functions of mobilizing frames?**

**H3: As mobilizing frames develop, successful social movements will focus on certain metaframes and mobilizing frames that appeal to participants.**

Throughout the movement of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups, the four metaframes and seven mobilizing frames had been employed. Some frames were more focused on, while some were regarded as less significant. This could be seen from the findings of both groups. As I mentioned in previous chapters, the movements of Sondhi concentrated on protecting the three major nationalist symbols. Hence, the

most focused metaframes were king, religion, and nation respectively, while democracy/modernization was added and focused on in the second phase.

It can be seen that the nation or Thailand was regarded by Sondhi as the prime goal that he sought to protect. The king nationalist symbol was the most concentrated on, while the religion was the second most important symbol. They were developed into the most important frames which were effective in terms of motivation.

The king metaframe, as the most significant metaframe, had been employed since Sondhi had his show on channel 9. This metaframe was effective in persuasion because of the love and respect of Thai people toward King Bhumibol. When Sondhi framed Thaksin and his colleagues as a group of disloyal people that had intentions to violate the King's supremacy, it outraged many people.

Not only select was it necessary to important issues to produce the right frame, framing strategy was vital. As explained in the chapter 3, Sondhi stressed the significance and benevolence of King Bhumibol. He also devalued Thaksin's image and framed him as disloyal, attempting to challenge the King's power. The moral branding became an important function in his mobilizing frame by legitimizing his movement as "the loyal force of the King". Simultaneously, he promoted the king metaframe through messages, activities, and symbols to strengthen its persuasive power. Throughout the show, Sondhi wore yellow shirts, and sometimes a white shirt with the "We'll fight for the King" slogan. He also invited his audience to wear yellow shirts every Friday to show their loyalty to the king, which ultimately became the symbol of the Yellow Shirts movement. Once, he led the audience to pay respect to the statue of King Vajiravudh, which was located near the hall in Lumpini Park. This was how he stressed his frame and identity of the group. In this way the "disloyal practices" he accused Thaksin and subordinates of were felt, by his audience, to be critical misconduct.

The second most important metaframe was religion. Sondhi (Khamnoon, 2006, p. 55) alleged that Thaksin and his subordinates planned to destroy both Buddhism and Islam. Thaksin was blamed for wrongly appointing the acting Somdet Pra

Sangkarat and the secretary of the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand. Sondhi, however, focused on Buddhism, particularly the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat. This issue involved important figures in Thailand. Sondhi determined to engage King Bhumibol, Somdet Pra Sangkarat, and Luang Ta Maha Bua to emphasize the damage that Thaksin did to those respectful and esteemed figures.

In every movement phase the nation metaframe was promoted by focusing on the corruption of Thaksin and his associates that caused the destruction of the Thai economy. Moreover, the populism of Thaksin was also framed to show an increase of materialism and a decrease of morality among the grassroots. It is interesting that the dissatisfied feelings of the middle class toward the grassroots were constructed through this metaframe. Sondhi pointed out that Thaksin spent the taxes, which were paid by the middle class, to gain votes from the grassroots. The grassroots, according to Sondhi's framing, were deceived by Thaksin to take out loans. However the grassroots spent the loan money on luxury goods. This metaframe and some of the mobilizing frames were produced to frame a class conflict.

The democracy/modernization metaframe was applied to attack the Western style democracy of Thaksin. It was concentrated on in the second phase of the movement when Sondhi proposed the "Rajprachasamasai" principle, as a new democratic regime. The principle was explained that the King rules the country by associating with the people. This principle was seen by the royalists as being similar to a democratic regime with the King as the Head of State. In episode eight Sondhi gave a vow to return to King Bhumibol his royal prerogative and presented this principle to the audience at Lumpini Park. This metaframe was entwined with the king metaframe to emphasize the significance of the "Rajprachasamasai" principle and the vow. This metaframe was focused on when Sondhi initiated his movement to get rid of Thaksin.

In terms of the mobilizing frames, Sondhi produced seven mobilizing frames and employed them throughout the two movement phases. However, as with the metaframes, he focused more on some frames more than others. Those mobilizing

frames were clearly developed from nationalism. Thus, the monarchy and Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frames were embedded in the king and religion metaframes. The corruption was promoted as the third most important mobilizing frame which was rooted in the nation metaframe. The certain frames were effective in accentuating the faults of Thaksin and developing the loyalty of the audience toward nationalist symbols.

In each mobilizing frame Sondhi would emphasize the problem, culprits, cause, moral branding, and solution, albeit in different degrees. As well, he focused on stressing the problems, repeating the important frames in both phases, providing new examples, and supporting his accusations with reliable evidence.

The framing techniques of the anti-coup groups mostly resembled Sondhi's. In the early movement, the anti-coup groups employed the four nationalist metaframes. Also, seven mobilizing frames were developed from this. Likely participants were a major consideration for the anti-coup groups to select the proper frames. They were activists, scholars, students, and some Thaksin supporters. The leaders of the groups had to produce frames to appeal to potential supporters who valued the democratic regime and to Thaksin's supporters. Similar to Sondhi's movement, the second period was significant since it was the time to motivate and prepare the followers to take part in protest. The frames at this time were co-produced by the PTV, a group of Thaksin's politicians.

Nationalism was central to the four metaframes, which were parallel to Sondhi's. However, they focused on calling for the restoration of democracy. The democracy/modernization metaframe became the frame most concentrated on with the nation next, then king, and finally religion. An interesting point about the framing of the anti-coup groups was that the frame promoters were from different groups. Most of them were general people who had no skills in framing, thus some of the messages were diverse and lacked cohesion. Nevertheless they shared the same goals of demanding the restoration of democracy and the 1997 constitution, a new election,

the freedom of expression, and the return of Thaksin Shinawatra. All of this was framed with the democracy metaframe.

The grievances of the participants were disseminated through the democracy metaframe in which the elected premier and the government, which had provided benefits and rights to them, had been overthrown. Democracy became the most important nationalist symbol to be promoted and protected by the anti-coup groups. In addition, it was used to portray undemocratic practices of the coup makers led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the government of Surayud Chulanont, the amat of General Prem Tinsulanonda, and the other factions such as the Yellow Shirts and the Democrat Party. Those factions were called tyrants, dictators, and democracy robbers who had stolen democracy from the people by getting rid of the elected Premier Thaksin Shinawatra, dissolving the elected Thai Rak Thai party, and discarding the 1997 people's constitution.

Sometimes the leaders of the groups applied the modernization metaframe to praise the results and benefits that Thaksin had provided to develop Thailand. They determined to compare Thaksin to the old-fashioned image of amat. This modernization metaframe had been focused on in both phases of the movement to remind the grassroots of the benefits they had received from the policies of Thaksin and his party. In the first phase of the movement, they applied this metaframe to attack the government of Surayud. The economic policy, which the junta claimed they adopted from the sufficiency economy philosophy, was compared to the capitalism of Thaksin. Certainly, many modernization projects of Thaksin were praised as raising Thailand's prosperity, while slump of the Thai economy suffered under the rule of the junta was portrayed through this modernization metaframe. This frame was most focused on in the second phase when Thaksin expressed his desire to return to Thailand. He needed the support from his voters to bring him back.

The next effective metaframe was the nation metaframe. It was used to characterize the lack of results of the Surayud government and the damages from the 2006 coup.

This metaframe was employed and focused on in both phases. The coup was portrayed as undemocratic and was unacknowledged by democratic countries. Accordingly, they limited business with Thailand. Besides the disappointing economic administration skills of the Surayud government had caused major destruction to the nation. To boost motivation, the nation and modernization metaframes were synchronously promoted.

In terms of the mobilizing frames, the anti-coup groups produced seven mobilizing frames which the anti-coup, the anti-amat, and the unproductive government of Surayud Chulanont were principally promoted. The three frames were created in conformity with the democracy/modernization and nation metaframes. The anti-amat mobilizing frame, however, was concentrated on most in the second phase since the anti-coup groups attack General Prem and his amat as the masterminds behind the coup. Besides the TRT party was dissolved and 111 TRT politicians were barred from politics for five years, the anti-coup groups started to fiercely attack the amat, particularly General Prem, as the ones who had ordered these actions and verdicts.

We can see that both Sondhi and the anti-coup groups applied the same tactics of focusing on certain frames that effectively and powerfully appealed to their participants. The results were growth in the number of followers. It can be seen from the table below what the specific frames each group employed.

<b>The focused mobilizing frames</b>			
<b>Sondhi Limthongkul</b>		<b>The anti-coup groups</b>	
<b>Phase 1</b>	<b>Phase 2</b>	<b>Phase 1</b>	<b>Phase 2</b>
The corruption mobilizing frame	The monarchy mobilizing frame	The anti-coup mobilizing frame	The anti-amat mobilizing frame
The monarchy mobilizing frame	The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame	The anti-amat mobilizing frame	The people's democracy mobilizing frame
The Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame	The corruption mobilizing frame	The media control mobilizing frame	The Thaksin mobilizing frame
The media control mobilizing frame	The media control mobilizing frame	The unproductive Surayud Chulanont government	The anti-coup mobilizing frame

Table 3: The focused mobilizing frames of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups

**H4: Successful social movements groups will adjust the focus of frames to appeal participants.**

In this study, we find that the movement groups of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups adjusted the focus of frames to increase effectiveness movements. Sondhi Limthongkul adjusted the focus of frames and synchronously promoted them to increase the power of the frames, attract the attention of participants, and achieve movement goals.

The second phase of the movement was an important moment for Sondhi. As revealed by his colleague, Khamnoon Sidhisamarn (Khamnoon, 2006, p.203), during hosting the show at Thammasat, some activists and opponents of Thaksin had

persuaded Sondhi to undertake a protest. He had turned down the offer. Thus, in the first phase Sondhi focused on showing the problems caused by Thaksin and his colleagues. This function was significant in making people realize the bad sides of Thaksin, while the causal attribution was not always directly identified in every frame. The moral evaluation function was very important for Sondhi's framing. He created an enemy by turning the frame into good versus evil. This function was effective since he pointed out the "evil" practices of Thaksin, which helped his followers to clearly recognize the alleged faults of the culprits. In contrast to the misconduct of Thaksin, Sondhi portrayed himself as a journalist who sacrificed himself to protect the nation, king, and Buddhism. In terms of the treatment function, Sondhi did not propose clear and concrete solutions in every frame. In some social movements, frame promoters asserted the solution as performing mobilization. However, Sondhi did not invite his audience to protest against Thaksin in the first period at Thammasat. He encouraged his audience to follow the show and support King Bhumibol by wearing yellow shirts. The reason is he was not ready to lead the protest, since he was just a journalist with no experience in leading a movement. He realized that as an individual he had no money or political power to get rid of Thaksin. Besides, he had been attacked by legal and illegal measures. Sondhi, perhaps, focused on survive his business by hosting the show and selling his products.

When he decided to lead the movement in the second phase, his framing was altered to prepare the audience for the future movement as the Yellow Shirts. The support from the audience and royalists was deemed sufficient for him to lead a protest movement. Accordingly, he decided to lead his audience and collaborate with other factions. This time, Sondhi focused on certain powerful frames and shifted the focus of those frames.

The problem and culprit definition remained the most important functions in the second phase. This framing tactic of Sondhi was employed to indicate the misdeeds of Thaksin to the nationalist symbols. Sondhi claimed that personal benefits for Thaksin and his colleagues were the main reason behind the acts. In terms of the

moral branding function, it remained as another significant way to portray the evil image of Thaksin. Sondhi intentionally concentrated on this function in the second period, because he prepared to carry out the protest. Consequently, he needed to construct his rivals as evil-minded while framing himself and his groups as a moral force with moral obligation to protect the country by “getting rid of” those wicked people. This moral function supported by Luang Ta Maha Bua, the revered monk.

An interesting change in the second phase is that he attempted to associate King Bhumibol with the solutions. This was because he had begun to start the protest. Accordingly, the sufficiency economy concept of the King was proposed as the solution in most of the mobilizing frames. Also, the “Rajprachasamasai” principle was proposed as a strategy for overthrowing Thaksin Shinawatra. When Sondhi decided to activate the protest seek the intervention of King Bhumibol in phase two, he stressed the intention of Thaksin and his subordinates to attempt to be comparable to the King. Some evidence was used to support the accusations.

The metaframe focus was shifted and done with symbolic activities to stimulate the loyal sentiments of the audience. Two major activities involved with the king metaframe had been performed during this second phase. The first activity (Khamnoon, 2006, p.146) was a rally to show loyalty by leading the audience to pay respect to the nearby statue of King Vajiravudh (Rama VI). This mini rally was performed to “check” the reaction from the government which resulted in suspicions from the media and Thaksin’s subordinates that Sondhi might trigger the protest. The second performance was giving an oath event. This was done in the eight episode to protect King Bhumibol from Thaksin and restore the King his royal prerogative. Sondhi also asserted the principle of “Rajprachasamasai” as a new democratic regime to bring Thailand out of the crisis caused by Thaksin and the government. This activity was promoted in accordance with the democracy metaframe to oppose the western democracy of Thaksin. Thaksin had always claimed that he had been elected in conformity with democratic principles Sondhi challenged it by proposing a Thai style democracy.

Obviously, the focuses of the king and democracy metaframes were changed and promoted together in the second phase. Sondhi stressed that the power of the King was limited by Thaksin and his associates, accordingly Sondhi announced that they were a loyal group of people which would sacrifice themselves to protect King Bhumibol from Thaksin Shinawatra. Furthermore, they would fight to restore to the King his royal prerogative. Sondhi did not explain how to discharge Thaksin from the position of prime minister at this stage, thus it could be viewed that he demanded to rely on the King's power to complete his goal. The vow to return power to the King can be seen as a mean to authorize the movement to overthrow Thaksin Shinawatra.

Sondhi also associated the king metaframe with that of religion. It is interesting that Buddhism was highlighted in Sondhi's movements. To emphasize the connection between King Bhumibol and Somdet Phra Sangkarat, he framed that Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was the mentor of King Bhumibol when the King ordained as Buddhist monk. They, furthermore, had had a long and close relationship since they were both, as claimed by Sondhi, Kings. According to Sondhi's framing, King Bhumibol was the King of the secular world and Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara was the King of spiritual world. Thus, the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat indicated an intention to violate the royal supremacy of both King Bhumibol and Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara. In this framing, Thaksin and his associates were framed as a group of disloyal and immoral people who had committed a great sin against the two consecrated figures.

Through the religion metaframe and Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frame, Sondhi framed himself as a close devotee of Luang Ta Maha Bua. He also claimed that he had had a private audience with the former Somdet Pra Sangkarat Nyanasamvara who watched his political show regularly. By framing the connection between himself and the respected monks Sondhi could give himself the image of a reliable and honorable leader. Accordingly the Buddhist audience, who esteemed Somdet Pra Sangkarat and Luang Ta Maha Bua, was increased. At the same time,

some elite followers of the two revered monks became a magnet to attract more participants to join the protest against the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat.

In terms of the anti-coup groups, the shifts in the mobilizing frame focus were found in the problem, causal, and solution functions. They were framed differently in each phase. For example, in the anti-coup mobilizing frame the problem was the many aspects of damage caused by the 2006 coup, on the other hand in the second phase the problem was changed to be the goal of the coup makers to remain in power. The culprits of the problem changed in the second movement period. The culprits were attacked individually. For the other functions, the anti-coup groups applied the same tactics as Sondhi in framing. Mobilizing frames constructed the personal interests as motivating the junta and amat to stage the coup. This happened in both movement phases. The anti-coup groups did not change the focus of moral branding. For the treatment function, they stated in the early movement that their solutions for the problems were calling for democracy and the return of Thaksin, through protest. The overthrow of the amat was asserted in the last movement period before they set up the Red Shirts.

The reason for the shift of the frame focus stemmed from the diversity of groups. They came from a variety of backgrounds which resulted in diverse and uncertain framing. However, they shared the same goal of overthrowing the coup makers and the amat. The collaboration of some anti-coup groups and the PTV had an impact on the framing of the anti-coup groups in the latee era. The change of the frame focus can be seen in the second phase since they aimed to recruit more supporters from Thaksin's voters and supporters.

As aforementioned, the movement of the anti-coup groups in the initial era had not a great impact on the coup group and the Surayud government, since the protest groups had not united with the members of the Thai Rak Thai party. Thus, in the first phase of the movements, they performed the protests using simple tactics and media. When the PTV group joined the other groups, the protest were intensified. In

the second phase the PTV and some members of the TRT were the leaders of the protest along with the other groups. They brought a huge budget and skilful techniques into the movements. As a result, effective and powerful messages, framed by professionals, were produced to attack the junta.

In the late period of the movement some of the anti-coup groups collaborated with PTV and established the Red Shirts, while some other groups continued their own movements. Before the Red Shirts formed, however, some anti-coup groups realized that they needed support from PTV, who had resources, skills in persuasion, and connections with the political elites and voters. Accordingly they held demonstrations together, as the PTV group gradually solidified their roles as the key leaders. The movement changed to focus on calling for the return of Thaksin Shinawatra, restoration of democracy, and overthrowing amat who were the major enemy of Thaksin. Framing this time was performed under the democracy/modernization and nation metaframes.

The anti-coup groups expected the TRT voters to be the main followers of the movement. Not only did they frame issues involved with Thaksin, they applied other tactics to recruit more of Thaksin's voters. At that time, Thaksin began his moves from abroad by giving interviews to international media agencies in order to defend himself against the accusations of the CNS. To communicate with his supporters in Thailand, some websites and community radio stations broadcasted his interviews and his movements. Accordingly, he could frame messages and send them to his supporters directly. Thaksin explained to the international media that he desired to go back to Thailand as a normal person. He did not want to be involved with any political activities. This gave hope to his voters and might be a reason for the increase of protesters. Thaksin and the anti-coup groups changed the focus of the frame's content to call for his return and get rid of amat. At this time Thaksin became a frame producer convincing his supporters to undertake the movement. From this, the number of supporters calling for his return to Thailand increased.

<b>The four function framing tactics in mobilizing frames</b>		
	<b>Sondhi Limthongkul</b>	<b>The anti-coup groups</b>
<b>Problem definition/ culprits</b>	Most concentrated/ individualize the culprits by targeting at Thaksin	Most concentrated and adjust the problem in each phase/ individualize the culprits by targeting General Prem, Sonthi, Surayud
<b>Casual attribution</b>	Connect with personal interests	Connect with personal interests
<b>Moral evaluation</b>	Label Thaksin and associates as disloyal and immoral factions, on the other hand frame themselves as a moral force	Label the amat and the coup makers as dictators, frame themselves as suppressed grassroots or people
<b>Treatment recommendation</b>	Propose the Rajprachamasai principle and self-sufficiency economy philosophy of the King as the best solutions	Demand democracy through protest and modernization is the best economic policy

Table 4: The four function framing tactics in the mobilizing frames of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups

**RQ3: Do the frames reshape a collective identity? Do the different social movement groups exhibit different identities? Does the different identity result in conflicts?**

**H5: Over time, the focus on identity metaframes may reshape the identity of the participants.**

In this research, identities of the participants of the two groups are linked to the metaframes. However, this study focuses on the early movement of the two groups when the genuine and developed identities of the Yellow and Red Shirts had not yet appeared. We can only see the early signs of identity from their framings and some of their activities. Identities resulting from their frames in these early periods may have differences to those from the time when the stable Yellow and Red Shirts formed.

In terms of Sondhi Limthongkul, identity was constructed from the four metaframes transformed from nationalism. When he found its power in recruiting the audience, he focused on it. The identity metaframes had been employed since Sondhi hosted the show on channel 9. The highlighted issues were engaged with the corruption of Thaksin and his misdeeds in the appointment of the acting Somdet Pra Sangkarat, the discharge of the Ombudsman, and some disloyal acts toward King Bhumibol. Nonetheless corruption was the primary focus, while the other issues were grouped and framed as infringement on King Bhumibol's supremacy.

The signs of identity were found in many speeches of Sondhi Limthongkul, but were obviously seen when he announced his intention to oppose Thaksin Shinawatra in the first episode of his show at Thammasat thus ('Perd chak *Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 1*', 2005):

"My philosophy in this war is fighting as a journalist with no succumbing to any power. As a journalist and devoted Thai, I determine to inform this

society of the truth. Everyone please keep in mind that our nation is composed of two major elements: the King and religion, not by any populist policy. If the religion is impaired, consequently the King's supremacy will be undermined. On the other hand, if the King's power is lessened, the strength of religion will be declined. As a result, our nation will fall apart.

Every religion is the soul and spirit of our society. The King, more importantly, is our last guardian who is able to protect us from the immoral leaders. If the King is turned into a political rubber stamp, in the end this country will be traded and bargained by these greedy politicians. Furthermore, we cannot rely on the constitution which was created by those politicians who are under the control of the political parties owned by greedy capitalists. As a result, this country will be effortlessly sold to foreign investors similar to our state-owned enterprises. This means their cronies can occupy any major position, besides anyone can become the shareholders of the privatized enterprises. If this situation comes true, we will have nothing left not even our spirits and souls. **If we share the same thoughts, we are all responsible to join this untiring battle to protect our monarchy and religion the two strong pillars which support the existence of our nation."**

In the speech, Sondhi persuaded the audience to be part of his movement to protect esteemed nationalist symbols. He pointed out the significance of this nationalism and claimed on obligation of every Thai to sacrifice their lives to sustain these nationalist symbols. This nationalism was adopted from King Vajiravudh, however, Sondhi altered it and it applied into his framing. King Vajiravudh presented his traditional nationalism, mentioned in chapter 2, that among the three symbols, the King was put in the most important position. Furthermore the nation and the religion or Buddhism must be loved and protected by all Thais. Sondhi Limthongkul asserted his new type of nationalism. From this speech, he connected and prioritized three nationalist symbols.

Sondhi explained that the monarchy and religion were connected, and that they supported and relied upon each other. They must be preserved and balanced in their power. The stability and strength of the monarchy and religion symbols brought about the strength, security, and existence of the nation. It is clear in the speech that **the king and religion were balanced its importances to preserve**

**the nation. This was framed to mobilize the audience through the his movement.**




Figure 1: The relationships of the three nationalist symbols of Sondhi Limthongkul

From the above statement, we can see that Sondhi declared he would protect two major institutions, which appeared as the primary elements of traditional nationalism. His followers must love, and be willing to sacrifice their lives to protect, the King, the religion, and the nation from their enemies or “the other group”, who were, apparently, the greedy politicians and pro-constitution capitalists such as Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates.

In terms of the anti-coup groups, they adopted framing tactics from Sondhi and the Yellow Shirts. Accordingly their frames were also focused on identity. In the first period they employed the four metaframes from nationalism similar to Sondhi’s, however they focused mostly on the democracy/modernization metaframe. The king and religion were concentrated on the least.

At first, the anti-coup groups attempted to show their loyalty toward King Bhumibol since they recognized the power of this metaframe. Some leaders who supported Thaksin, besides, realized that Thaksin was suspected, by the public, about his loyalty to the King. Thaksin and his factions were allged on the abuse of King Bhumibol's royal power. The king metaframe was minimized in its role in the second phase when the anti-coup groups started to attack the amat and General Prem Tinsulanonda. According to the anti-coup groups, Prem, who was in the inner circle of King Bhumibol, had performed movements to overthrow Thaksin. It is interesting that before the 2006 coup Thaksin and some associates revealed that there was "a charismatic figure" who plotted a plan to get rid of him. They did not point out who he was, but some people believed that they implied King Bhumibol. Thus the king metaframe was not an effective frame for them to recruit people who against the monarchy, elite, and amat. Although the nationalism of King Vajiravudh was applied as metaframes in the early period, the anti-coup groups emphasized the nation, king, and religion respectively. The added democracy metaframe ultimately became the most important frame. Framing of the groups was proritized differently from King Vajiravudh, since the king metaframe was not given primary of focus in their movement.

Consequently democracy became the most suitable metaframe to bring back Thaksin and fight against the amat. The identity of the anti-coup groups was constructed based primarily on the democracy/modernization metaframe. However, the frame producers, in a similar way to Sondhi, did not stress the importance and relationships of the nationalist symbols. They only focused on calling for the restoration of democracy and the 1997 constitution, a new election, and the return of Thaksin, while they framed themselves as "the democratic people," which can be seen as "the nation."




Figure 2: The goal of the anti-coup groups

From the above chart, we can see that the anti-coup groups undertook “the people’s movement” to call for “the people’s constitution” and ultimately achieve “the people’s democracy”. However their people’s democracy was included Thaksin Shinawatra since he was viewed as both symbol and as the democratic prime minister in Thailand. However I argue that, before joining the protest, most of the anti-coup participants had had a similar identity to the participants of Sondhi Limthongkul's. They had the love feelings toward the king, religion, and nation symbols. They were continually transformed by the identity metaframes when participated in the movements. However the true identity of them was apparently appeared when the Red Shirts established which completely different to the Yellow Shirt's.

**H6: In such cases, when social movement groups compete over identity, the potential for conflict increases.**

This hypothesis is involved with the hypothesis 5, which I previously answered. The different identity of the two groups had been constructed, as a result the conflicts between two groups started. In terms of Sondhi, his identity was highlighted in the importance of the king, religion, and nation institutions and the Thais must sacrifice themselves to protect them. His followers must love and sacrifice their lives to protect the King, the religion, and the nation from their enemies or “the other group” who were, apparently, greedy politicians and capitalists such as Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates. Nonetheless, the establishment of the “Yam Fao Pandin” or “The guardian of the nation army” of Sondhi Limthongkul was an apparent mean to originate the unique identity of the group.

This group was the origin of the Yellow Shirts with a specific identity. Sondhi (Khamnoon, 2006: 104) explained the objectives of the “Yam Fao Pandin army” thus:

“I would like to invite everyone to participate in the “Yam Fao Pandin” army together. Even though in the future this tyrant might disappear from this country we still have four main obligations to accomplish: (1) to demand the transparency of every government in administration, (2) to protect the freedom of the media, (3) to support political reform, and (4) to empower the middle classes.”

The above four obligations were added as the practical tasks of the group, while the love toward the nation, religion, and king nationalist symbols were indoctrinated through frames. The last mission, however, was very interesting, since it clearly stated they were the middle classes who were highly involved with politics. Traces of the democracy metaframe were seen in the obligations of “The Yam Fao Pandin army,” but were not concentrated on at this early stage. From the oaths and the Yam Fao Pandin army, it could be seen that Sondhi created a strong sentiment to oppose his enemies, who were not only Thaksin Shinawatra and his associates, but also

some other opponents. Apparently, they sacrificed themselves to protect the king (King Bhumibol), religion (Somdet Pra Sangkarat), and nation (the security and prosperity of Thailand) from the evil politicians. When those major figures were engaged in the framing of Sondhi, the criticisms of Thaksin's misconduct were amplified. The participants of Sondhi's group felt their esteemed symbols had been harmed, as well as their lives, and that those symbols were important enough for them to sacrifice themselves to protect. In addition the threats that intended to destroy their loved symbols were framed as evil, greedy, and sinful, which led to the belief that these malevolent threats must be got rid of.

The Thainess proposed by Sondhi recognized him and his participants as the "true Thais" (we or us), and their enemies were viewed as the "unThai" (the others or them). The "true Thais" identity, from the framing of Sondhi, was composed of being loyal to the king, nation, and religion symbols as a "good Thai". One who sacrificed to preserve these institutions must join the "moral force" (Sondhi's movement) to oppose those "unThai", the people who intended to destroy the Thai nationalist symbols; i.e, the Thaksin faction. This is the character of the "true Thai" Thainess, or the identity of Sondhi and his participants, that was shaped by the four metaframes.

For the identity of the anti-coup groups, frames of the anti-coup groups were obviously constructed to attack the coup makers and the Yellow Shirts, who cooperated in overthrowing the Thaksin government. The participants of the anti-coup groups were primarily the grassroots included some middle class, whereas the leaders of the protest were politicians, activists, and scholars. Their enemies were framed as being the amat, elites, royalists, and the middle class.

To against those upper class rivals, the anti-coup groups carried on the sentiments of injustice and unequal status. They framed themselves as the grassroots that had been gained rights and advantages from the Thaksin government. It was the first time they had realized the rights and empowerment to choose their own paths through the 1997 people's constitution. When the democratic government of Thaksin was demolished by the 2006 coup, all benefits and rights were taken away

by the junta and amat. The losses and grievances of the grassroots were well understood by the leaders of the anti-coup groups who were Thaksin's supporters, activists, and the TRT politicians. They had faced the disappearances of democracy and political power caused by the 2006 coup. Accordingly, the restoration of democracy was the only means for the groups to regain their rights and benefits.

The constructed identity of the group was "the people" and "democracy". They identified themselves as "the people" who undertook the movement to call for the "people's democracy". Interestingly, the definition of their democracy was different from the "Rajprachasamasai" principle of Sondhi Limthongkul. The democracy concept of Sondhi resided with the King and the people; nonetheless the King would be the one who exercised his power, which would be given by the people. Interestingly, in the "Rajprachasamasai" principle only the kings were the rulers. On the other hand, the democracy of the anti-coup groups was Western-style democracy in which people have the right to vote and elect their leaders.

During this early movement, the anti-coup groups adopted views from scholars to support accusations and produced frames. Some works of Phichit Likhitkitchasombun were applied into the identity framing of the anti-coup groups. They posted a view of Phichit which described the identity of the groups, thus (Serichon, 16-22 January 2007 p.12):

The 1997 constitution helps the middle and lower classes realize their democratic awareness. When the 19 September coup occurred, they were powerfully impacted. For the grassroots, their rights, freedoms, and sovereignty are completely stolen. Also, the benefits, which they received from the populist policies of Thaksin Shinawatra, were demolished. That's why they entirely resist this coup. Those dictators have made a major mistake by overrating their power. So far the middle and lower class are fully awake to recognize the real agents who intervened in the establishment of Thailand's democracy. They are forced, heartlessly, to choose between "the Thai style democracy" which is the authoritarian regime of the amat and "the people's democracy" created by the people".

The above statement portrayed the movement of the anti-coup groups as the people or the grassroots who were woken up by the 2006 coup. They realized that their major enemies were the coup makers, amat, and the Yellow Shirts. The anti-coup groups thought of themselves as a suppressed class that had been intimidated by the elites, the amat, and the urban middle class. Previously they had had the chance to elect their government, which had provided benefits and equalities to them, but this right and the resultant prosperity had been robbed by those middle classes and the amat. Furthermore, their beloved and down-to-earth premier was unjustly bullied by these dictators. Their people's democracy had been demolished in only one night. Those dictators robbed the people's democracy and forced them to be ruled by "the Thai style democracy" of amat. Consequently, those dictatorial elite and the Yellow Shirts must be got rid of to restore their democratic government and the rights and benefits which resulted from the Thaksin government.

From this, the identity of the two groups was antagonistically framed so as to compete with the rivals who destroyed their loved and protected nationalist symbols. This led to the deep conflicts between the two identity groups which, in turn, led Thailand into quasi-ethnic conflicts.

## Practice and Theory

This study draws attention to the areas where social movement theory and framing theory need to extend in order to examine the content of the metaframes, the mobilizing frames, the strategies applied, and the identities. The following sections will suggest and argue about which aspects of social movement framing theory should be more focused on and will also develop new views.

In the study of social movement framing theory the framing tactics are important in framing issues, especially the metaframes which are reshaped from nationalism. The movements of Sondhi and of the anti-coup groups applied nationalism into their movements where the four nationalist symbols were employed as metaframes. It is in line with Swart's argument (1995, p.468) that metaframes are successful and culturally potent ideational themes which resonant with "the social, cultural, and historical context". They are used in "to make specific historical situations meaningful" (Stanbridge: 2002, p.532; Noakes & Johnston, 2005, p.10).

Even though Sondhi and the anti-coup groups applied the four nationalist symbols as metaframes, they had a tactic to amplify the efficiency by connecting them with famous figures. In the framing of Sondhi, for instance, the king, religion, nation, and democracy metaframes were represented by King Bhumibol, Somdet Pra Sangkarat, Thailand, and the "Rajprachasamasai" principle respectively. The anti-coup groups focused on the democracy/modernization metaframe which was represented by Thaksin Shinawatra and his populism/capitalism. This tactic was fruitful for their framing, because they could connect the esteemed figures, that were respected and loved by their participants, into the frames. This could arouse the feelings, in the participants, that they were protecting real people, not just abstract symbols. This framing tactic should get more intention in the study of metaframes and social movements.

<b>The four metaframes</b>	<b>Sondhi Limthongkul</b>	<b>The anti-coup groups</b>
King	King Bhumibol	Early period King Bhumibol
Religion	Somdet Pra Sangkarat	-
Nation	Thailand and self-sufficiency economy philosophy	Thailand and “the people”
Democracy/modernization	Rajprachsamasai/ anti-capitalism	Thaksin Shinawatra/ capitalism

Table 5 The focused metaframes and personalization tactics of the two groups

In social movements, mobilizing frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings” which specify the important issues and events by convincing the support to mobilize from the potential constituents, adherents, and bystanders (Benford and Snow, 2000, p.614; Johnston and Noakes, 2005, 2; Hewitt and McCommon, 34, 2005). In each mobilizing frame (Entman, 2003, p, 53) there are four functions of problem definition, casual attribution, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation. This study demonstrates that focus on the problem definition, causal attribution, and moral evaluation functions increases the appeal of those frames.

In the case study of Sondhi, he framed by emphasizing the functions of problem definition, culprits, causal attribution, and moral evaluation, while the solution was less important for his movement. He intended to reveal the faults of Thaksin and the culprit, for each problem, was primarily indicated as Thaksin. The causes of the problems were framed as personal interests to highlight greedy images (Gerhards 1995, p. 231). Also Sondhi focused on the moral branding function to legitimize his movement as a moral force and brand Thaksin as immoral. Since religion was focused on as the second most important metaframe, a moral image of the

movement was needed. As the movement was anti-democratic, morality became even more important.

For the framing of the anti-coup groups, they focused on the problem function and adjusted it to be appropriate to altered situations and participants. In some mobilizing frames they addressed the problem as one thing in the first phase, but changed it in phase 2. As well, culprit identification was a tactic that proficient in the framing of the anti-coup groups. They pointed out the culprits as a group in the first phase and identified the culprits as individuals in the second phase instead. This strategy made their framing uncomplicated and easy for their followers to recognize the key culprits, which was similar to that of Sondhi Limthongkul. The solution functions of the anti-coup groups were calling for democracy and the return of Thaksin by protesting. Performing protests in public places, which is what the anti-coup group did right from the start, should be included in the solution function of the framing theory of social movement groups.

The overall tactics that the social movement framing theory should develop is focusing on certain frames. Both the movements of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups produced a number of frames, but a few of those frames were concentrated on. The most important frames were linked with the key nationalist symbols which resulted in the construction of collective identity. The leaders of the two cases grew their numbers of participants through effective frames which were powerful in persuasion. They, furthermore, promoted frames as a package. For example, Sondhi synchronously promoted the king and religion metaframes, the same as the collective promotion of the monarchy and Somdet Pra Sangkarat mobilizing frames. Likewise, the anti-coup and the anti-amat mobilizing frames were jointly promoted in the movement of the anti-coup groups.

## **Limitations of the study**

This research has some limitations not different from all studies. There are two major issues that have had an impact on the results and scope of this thesis which are the capability to access the data sources and the timeline of the study.

The study set up to examine the social movements of Sondhi Limthongkul and of the anti-coup groups in their initial periods, before the establishment of the Yellow and Red Shirts. However, I encountered difficulty in accessing the data sources of the anti-coup groups. The reason is that Thailand had a coup, led by the Thai army Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, which staged on May 22, 2014. At the moment, the civilian government of Yingluck Shinawatra, the youngest sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, was replaced by the junta government. The martial law was announced after the coup, which led to the terminations of some media. This includes the ban of the "thaienews.blogspot.com" which is the data source to study the anti-coup groups's information. Some of the electronic newspapers collected in this website could not be accessed, consequently some aspects of the anti-coup groups' movement in the early period are excluded. Moreover, information from other sources was limited due to the martial law. An interesting point is the information of the anti-coup groups was broadly produced and distributed to public when they activated the movements under the Red Shirts body from 2009. This could be seen through many means of media; on the one hand the information of their early era movement was scarcity. From this, the scope and result of this research have been obstructed and uncompleted by political situations.

As well, the timelines of the study becomes a limitation of this research since I decide to examine only the beginning of the movements, which is the strength of this research. Hence the ultimate identities of the two groups are not fully examined and revealed in this research.

Of the metaframes, which are reshaped from the four nationalist symbols, the application of democracy metaframe in the case of Sondhi Limthongkul was touched upon in this study.

Although this study encountered some limitations, as indicated above, the central argument holds. The findings of this research have revealed important factions of the early movements of the Yellow and Red Shirts. Also examined in this study is how the metaframes and mobilizing frames are employed by the two groups to construct collective identities. The results of this study reveal the beginning of a new Thainess identity of the Yellow and Red Shirts that has caused the long and deep conflicts between them for the last decade.

### **Directions for future research**

The focus of this research is to understand how social movement groups in Thailand undertake the movements through framing and collective identity.

Appealing to a high number of participants in the early periods is necessary for the longevity and stability of social movement organizations. Thus the leaders of the groups applied metaframes and mobilizing frames to recruit participants. As a result, the identities of the groups originated from those frames. This thesis, however, only study the formations of the movements in the initial periods. There is a need for more investigation in order to understand the developments of the framing and the identities of the groups throughout the mobilizing process. The absolute identity of the two groups when they established the Yellow and Red Shirts should be deliberately examined in the future research.

Although this research focused on the powerful metaframes and mobilizing frames, which were reshaped from nationalism, the identities of the groups in their early periods was examined. However there are some areas that need to be more emphasized. In framing theory, metaframes are a part of culture and are employed to construct new meanings of the issues, while mobilizing frames are specific for forming social movements. This study has shown, however, that effective frames are constructed based on cultural ideas so as to resonate with the experience of participants. Also, the selections of effective frames and functions strengthen the

persuasive power of the frames. In future research the shifts of the framing as a tactic to appeal to more participants, should be focused on.

Lastly, the study could be further strengthened by focusing more on the collective identities. The Thai social movement cases provided the result that collective identity was a crucial part in appealing to participants and in creating conflicts. The continuity of identity construction, however, was not examined in this thesis since the timeline of study is limited to the beginning period of the movements.

Accordingly, the development of later identities of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups, as the Yellow and Red Shirts, are not investigated. Thus examination of the development of the identities from the beginning periods up to the final stages of the movements could provide insight into the alterations and tactics used by the leaders over that time. This needs to be studied further in the future social movement research. Also, survey research of the participants should be conducted to clearly understand other aspects of identity of the two groups.

This thesis demonstrates clearly the value of focusing on the very earliest phases of new movements, when metaframes are heavily used and mobilization frames are being developed. The development of persuasive frames which attract a large number of participants as a major key to achieve movement goals are examined closely in this study.

This thesis also demonstrates successful movements produce frames which focus on a specific identity, ideology (nationalism), and significant figures. From the cases of Sondhi and the anti-coup groups, it is clear that metaframes and mobilizing frames which were rooted in nationalism could be applied to construct group identities. The diverse identities of the two movement groups resulted in a strong bond between the movement and the participants, while the opposition groups were framed as their rivals, or even enemies, with different identity, as the “others”. Important figures, that are respected and loved by participants, are also effective symbols, as leaders convince their participants to protect their beloved figures from

the abuse of the opposition groups. Furthermore adding important figures personalises the grievance, where complaints about policy or corruption or ideals do not.

Thus, an effective formula to achieve a successful social movement consists of framing, identity, and significant figures. This have been employed by Sondhi Limthongkul, the anti-coup groups, and later, it seems, by the Yellow and Red Shirts, and by other movement groups up to the present time.

## References

- After Shock tee satuenjai kon thai tunglok (After Shock that affect all Thais)* (2007) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/after-shock.html> (Accessed: 30 June 2014).
- Amnatcharoenrit, B. and Intarakomalyasut, N. (2004) *Thailand: UBC complies, drops channel*. Available at: <http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=12552> (Accessed: 6 March 2013)
- Baiplew komkoo thai poot won (Thai Buddhist are threatened)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_18.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_18.html) 12/18/2549 02:51:00 (Accessed: 18 July 2014).
- Barmé, S. (1993) *Luang Wichit Wathakan and the creation of a Thai identity*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- BBC (2011) *Profile: Thaksin Shinawatra*. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13891650> (Accessed: 2 June 2013).
- BBC (2012) *Profile: Thailand's reds and yellows*. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13294268> (Accessed: 17 May 2015).
- Barkan, S.E. (2011) *Sociology: Comprehensive Edition*. Available at: <http://2012books.lardbucket.org/books/sociology-comprehensive-edition/s24-03-social-movements.html> (Accessed: 8 January 2016).
- Beaumont, P. (2009) *Thailand flies Asian leaders to safety as Thaksin Red Shirts storm summit*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/12/thailand-protests-cancel-asia-summit> (Accessed: 19 July 2015).
- Benford, R. D. and Snow, D. A. (2000) 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26(1), pp. 611–639. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611.
- Bhikkhu, M. (2005) *Monastic feud could lead to a schism*. Available at: <http://www.buddhistchannel.tv/index.php?id=70,854,0,0,1,0> (Accessed: 14 August 2013)

- Bhumiprabhas, S. and Rojanaphruk, P. (2006) *Activists to hold anti-coup gathering*. Available at: [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/09/22/national/national\\_30014320.php](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/09/22/national/national_30014320.php) (Accessed: 17 August 2014)
- Bhumiprabhas, S. (2007) *Groups opposed to the coup gather some momentum - The Nation*. Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Groups-opposed-to-the-coup-gather-some-momentum-30036921.html> (Accessed: 16 May 2015).
- Bhumiprabhas, S. and Tangwisutijit, N. (no date) *Human Rights: 'Country becoming like a police state'*. Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/HUMAN-RIGHTS-Country-becoming-like-a-police-state-64731.html> (Accessed: 14 June 2013)
- Binson, B. (1997) 'Memorandum by Boonrod Binson: Concerning the Mission in China', in Wiriyawit, W. (ed.) *Free Thai: personal recollections and official documents*. Bangkok: White Lotus Co Ltd, pp. 61–75.
- Bot wikrao satannakan kanmuang (Political situation analysis)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post\\_2403.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post_2403.html) (Accessed: 4 September 2014).
- Bueng luk pia tanon rajdamnern (The hidden reason on Rajdamnern closure)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_08.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_08.html) (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Burke, A. (2013) *The Right Kind of Development: Building Peace in Thailand and Beyond | In Asia*. Available at: <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2013/06/12/the-right-kind-of-development-building-peace-in-thailand-and-beyond/> (Accessed: 13 August 2013)
- Call for Surayud to quit over forest retreat* (2006) Available at: [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/12/30/politics/politics\\_30022906.php](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/12/30/politics/politics_30022906.php) (Accessed: 12 May 2014)
- Chaithong, W. (2012) *Kwamkid tang karnmueng nai babrean radub achivasuksa lae technikusksa: suksa jak tuayang bab rean dan sangkomsad [Political ideas in vocational education text books]* [White paper]. Available at: <http://images.toarm.multiply.multiplycontent.com> (Accessed: 11 August 2012)
- Chaloemtiarana, T. (2007) 'Distinctions with a Difference: The Despotic Paternalism of Sarit Thanarat and the Demagogic Authoritarianism of Thaksin Shinawatra', *Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 19(1), pp. 50–94.

- Chaloemtiarana, T. (1974) *The Sarit Regime, 1957-1963: The Formative Years of Modern Thai Politics* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Cornell University, New York, The United States of America.
- Channel 11 to hold off on six more sub-channels* (2004) Available at: [http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary\\_0286-21732942\\_ITM](http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-21732942_ITM) (Accessed: 15 June 2013).
- Charoensin-o-larn, C. (2009) 'Military Coup and Democracy in Thailand', in Funston, J. (ed.) *Divided Over Thaksin: Thailand's Coup and Problematic Transition*. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Chatwua sanlangkad hen eka binpad kor tokjai (The fear of the dictators)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_6393.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_6393.html) (Accessed: 30 May 2014).
- Chitlaoarporn, C. (no date) *The Modern Police State of the Government of Thaksin 2001 – 2006*. Available at: <http://www.ballchanchai.com/?cid=1947642> (Accessed: 14 June 2013)
- Chong, D. and Druckman, J. N. (2007) 'Framing Theory', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10(1), pp. 103–126. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054.
- Christiansen, J. (no date) *Four Stages of Social Movements*. Available at: <https://www.ebscohost.com/uploads/imported/thisTopic-dbTopic-1248.pdf> (Accessed: 24 May 2015).
- Ch 9 drops Sondhi for royal references* (2005) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/r17.php> (Accessed: 2 February 2013).
- Cohen, E. (2012) 'Contesting discourses of blood in the "red shirts" protests in Bangkok', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, 43(02), pp. 216–233.
- Cohn, S. F., Barkan, S. E. and Halteman, W. A. (2003) 'Dimensions of Participation in a Professional Social-Movement Organization', *Sociological Inquiry*, 73(3), pp. 311–337.
- Colum soi suanploo mue 20 pee tee laew (An article Soi suanploo, 20 years ago)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/20\\_27.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/20_27.html) (Accessed: 16 June 2014)

- Connors, M. K. (2006) *Democracy And National Identity in Thailand (Studies in Contemporary Asian History)*. Rev. and updated ed. edn. Copenhagen: University of Hawaii Press.
- Cracks, leaks, corruption: Thailand's new international airport off to a rocky start - USATODAY.com* (2007) Available at: [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/travel/news/2007-01-29-bangkok-airport\\_x.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/travel/news/2007-01-29-bangkok-airport_x.htm) (Accessed: 29 December 2013).
- Cumming-Bruce, N. (2005) *Thaksin accused of 'dirty war' on media*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/world/asia/24iht-thai.html?pagewanted=all&r=1> (Accessed: 8 January 2014)
- Cunningham, P. J. (2012) *Red and Yellow: Thailand's Future in Check and Balance* 赤シャツ黄シャツ--タイ王国の将来、突いたり躲したり | *The Asia-Pacific Journal*. Available at: [http://japanfocus.org/-Philip\\_J\\_-Cunningham/3786/article.html](http://japanfocus.org/-Philip_J_-Cunningham/3786/article.html) (Accessed: 17 May 2015).
- Defamation Lawsuits: Luangta Bua escapes PM's legal wrath* (2005) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/r24.php> (Accessed: 26 January 2013)
- Defiant PTV to go ahead with telecast* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/headlines/Defiant-PTV-to-go-ahead-with-telecast-30027825.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Dhammasakiyo, A. (2004) 'A Modern Trend of Study of Buddhism in Thailand: King Mongkut and Dhammayutikanikaya', in the international conference on *Exploring Theravada Studies: Intellectual Trends and the Future of a Field of Study*, August 12-14, 2004, the Asia Research Institute at National University of Singapore.
- Dhani, N. (1947). The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy [Lecture notes]. Available: [http://www.siam-society.org/publications/JSS/jss\\_index\\_1941-1950.html](http://www.siam-society.org/publications/JSS/jss_index_1941-1950.html) 9 Accessed: 15 July 2012)
- Dhiravegin, L. (1992) *Demi democracy: the evolution of the Thai political system*. 1st edn. Singapore: Times Academic Press, Singapore.
- Dixon, C. (2004) 'Post-Crisis Restructuring: Foreign Ownership, Corporate Resistance and Economic Nationalism in Thailand', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 26(1), pp. 45-72.

- Dobson, C. (no date) *Social Movements: A Summary of What Works*. Available at: <http://www.citizenshandbook.org/movements.pdf> (Accessed: 24 May 2015).
- Editorial, R. (2011) *Analysis: A Thaksinomics renaissance in Thailand*. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/30/us-thailand-election-economy-idUSTRE75T0SW20110630> (Accessed: 29 July 2015).
- Eimer, D. (2014) *Thai red shirts leader says 'It's time to get rid of the elite'*. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/10606562/Thai-red-shirts-leader-says-Its-time-to-get-rid-of-the-elite.html> (Accessed: 17 May 2015).
- Elected prime ministers best, top political parties say* (2007) Available at: [http://nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/16/politics/politics\\_30024211.php](http://nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/16/politics/politics_30024211.php) (Accessed: 14 May 2014)
- Engel, D. M. (1975) *Law and kingship in Thailand during the reign of King Chulalongkorn (Michigan papers on Southeast Asian)* Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan.
- Entman, R.M. (2003) *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U. S. Foreign Policy*. 1st edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Entman, R.M. (2007) 'Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power', *Journal of Communication*, 57(1), pp. 163–173.
- Escobar, P. (2005) *Thaksin meets the press - in court*. Available at: [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast\\_Asia/GK02Ae01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GK02Ae01.html) (Accessed: 17 August 2013)
- EU okronglaew pranam tulapadetskarn yub pakkarnmuang mai pen tham (EU alleges the court's verdict about the TRT dissolution)* (2007) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/06/eu.html> (Accessed: 25 July 2014).
- Farang rem mong game ok teekao nao polthai ha let sairai thaksin (Foreigners knows a Thai general militant blames on Thaksin)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_7376.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_7376.html)1/19/2550 12:04:00 (Accessed: 30 June 2014).
- Fong, J. (2009) 'Sacred Nationalism: The Thai Monarchy and Primordial Nation Construction', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 39(4), pp. 673–696. doi: 10.1080/00472330903077030.

- Forsyth, T. (2010) 'Thailand's Red Shirt Protests: Popular Movement or Dangerous Street Theatre?', *Social Movement Studies*, 9(4), pp. 461–467. doi: 10.1080/14742837.2010.522313.
- Fuller, T. (2011) *In Thailand, Support for King Grows Bellicose*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/24/world/asia/in-thailand-support-for-king-grows-bellicose.html?pagewanted=al> (Accessed: 24 June 2015).
- Full gear police fail again to end PTV protest* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/headlines/Full-gear-police-fail-again-to-end-PTV-protest-30030063.html> (Accessed: 30 June 2014).
- Funston, J. (2009) 'Introduction', in Funston, J. (ed.) *Divided Over Thaksin: Thailand's Coup and Problematic Transition*. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Ganjanakhundee, S. (2008) *Thailand politics, news analysis, The People's Alliance for Democracy*. Available at: [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/11/06/politics/politics\\_30087729.php](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/11/06/politics/politics_30087729.php) (Accessed: 4 September 2013)
- Gannam kloom pirabkao pra kad yuen nangsue hai pa la okk yennee (Leaders of the white dove group force Prm to resign from the post)*(2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_3502.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_3502.html) (Accessed: 5 September 2014)
- Ganz, M. (2009) 'Leading Change: Leadership, Organization, and Social Movements', in Nohria, N. and Khurana, R. (eds.) *Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice: A Harvard Business School Centennial*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, .
- Gerhards, J. (1995) 'Framing dimensions and framing strategies: contrasting ideal- and real-type frames', *Social Science Information*, 34(2), pp. 225–248.
- Glassman, J. (2010) 'From reds to red shirts: political evolution and devolution in Thailand', *Environment and Planning A*, 42(4), pp. 765–770.
- Groups opposed to the coup gather some momentum - The Nation*(2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Groups-opposed-to-the-coup-gather-some-momentum-30036921.html> (Accessed: 28 June 2013).
- Haller, E. (2014) *In the Name of the People? Political protests in Thailand and the underlying conflict*. Available at: <http://www.boell.de/en/2014/01/29/name-people-political-protests-thailand-and-underlying-conflict> (Accessed: 17 May 2015).

- Hewison, K. (1997) 'The Monarchy and democratisation', in Hewison, K. (ed.) *Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation (Politics in Asia)*. New York: Routledge, pp. 58–74.
- Hewison, K. (2010) 'Thaksin Shinawatra and the reshaping of Thai politics', *Contemporary Politics*, 16(2), pp. 119–133.
- Hewison, K. (2014) 'Considerations on inequality and politics in Thailand', *Democratization*, 21(5), pp. 846–866.
- Hewitt, L. and McCommon, H. J. (2005) 'Explaining suffrage mobilization: balance, neutralization, and range in collective action frames', in Johnston, H. and Noakes, J. A. (eds.) *Frames of protest: social movements and the framing perspective*. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 33–52.
- Hok duan rattaprahan kao tor pai kong prated thai (Six months after the coup: the next steps of Thailand)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post\\_21.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post_21.html) (Accessed: 26 July 2014).
- Horn, J. (2013) Available at: <http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/4/document/1401/FULL%20REPORT.pdf> (Accessed: 24 May 2015).
- Into the south* (2013) Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2013/06/2013626115439264456.html> (Accessed: 13 August 2013).
- Jackson, A. P. (1997) 'Withering Centre, flourishing margins Buddhism's changing political roles', in Hewison, K. (ed.) *Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation (Politics in Asia)*. New York: Taylor & Francis, pp. 58–74.
- Ja tooptamlai kwam churmun kong pratedthai paituengnai (How long have they destroyed Thailand?)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_19.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_19.html)12/19/254909:14:00 (Accessed: 4 June 2014).
- Jatukamramathep roon prabkabet pralaimung ruam prabkabet (Jatukamramathep are prayed by ten thousands of monks)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_7897.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_7897.html) (Accessed: 8 July 2014).
- Jatuporn insists to launch satellite TV on March 1 - The Nation* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Jatuporn-insists-to-launch-satellite-TV-on-March-1-30027697.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

- Johnston, H. and Noakes, J. A. (eds.) (2005) *Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective*. 1st edn. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Jory, P. (2001) 'The King and us: Representations of monarchy in Thailand and the case of Anna and the King', *International Journal of Cultural Studies*, 4(2), pp. 201–218.
- Kanok lae theera team nation art done sae (Kanok and Theera from the Nation may be fired)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_2778.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_2778.html) (Accessed: 30 May 2014).
- Kazmin, A. (2007) 'A Setback for Thai Democracy: The Rise, Rule and Overthrow of Thaksin Shinawatra', *Asian Affairs*, 38(2), pp. 211–224.
- Keyes, C. F. (1986) *Thailand, Buddhist kingdom as modern nation-state*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Kitirianglarp, K. and Hewison, K. (2009) 'Social movements and political opposition in contemporary Thailand', *The Pacific Review*, 22(4), pp. 451–477.
- Klasae kao paktai tuam internet (News from the southern provinces floods over the internet)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post\\_27.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post_27.html) (Accessed: 4 July 2014).
- Kloom tortan padetkarn pue prachatippatai talangkarn pranam tulakarnjone (The Thai Democratic Rights Body brands the constitutional Court as Robber Court)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/06/blog-post\\_02.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/06/blog-post_02.html) (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Kon Chiang mai chingchang Surayud paitiaw tam hai duedron (Chaing mai people hate Surayud who causes them troubles from his trip)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_9717.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_9717.html) (Accessed: 19 September 2014).
- Konwansao yun deeka tod prem tampai duai kwam jonrakpakdee (Prem is dispelled aby a group which claims on their loyalty to the King)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_3104.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_3104.html) (Accessed: 24 June 2014).
- Koomue sukxa mob tan padetkarn (The anti-coup handbook)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post\\_6564.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post_6564.html) (Accessed: 25 July 2014).

- Kormorchoe kinmuang (CNR occupies Thailand)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post\\_2458.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post_2458.html) (Accessed: 23 June 2014).
- Kwam najjai kong kon hadyai (A thought from Hadyai peple)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_3480.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_3480.html) (Accessed: 18 July 2014).
- Krung Thai bank: Dept heads blamed for dud loans* (2004) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/KRUNG-THAI-BANK-Dept-heads-blamed-for-dud-loans-104997.html> (Accessed: 6 March 2013)
- KTB presidency | Game finally over as Viroj is blocked | Pridiyathorn formally ends affair after ex-president fails to throw in the towel* (2004) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/ktb-presidency-%7C-Game-finally-over-as-Viroj-is-blo-107278.html> (Accessed: 14 June 2015)
- Laothamatas, A. (1988) 'Business and Politics in Thailand: New Patterns of Influence', *Asian Survey*, 28(4), pp. 451–470.
- Leeahtam, P. (2011) *Thailand's economy vulnerable to populist politics*. Available at: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/08/08/thailands-economy-vulnerable-to-populist-politics/> (Accessed: 11 September 2013)
- Libel action: Thaksin takes aim at Sondhi* (2005) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/r23.php> (Accessed: 2 February 2013)
- Likhitkijksomboon, P. (2007a) *Pichit Likhitkijksomboon: kwam chuarai kong watakam rabobThaksin (Pichit Likhitkijksomboon: an evil discourse about Thaksin regime)*. Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/02/blog-post.html> (Accessed: 29 July 2015).
- Likhitkijksomboon, P. (2007b) *19 September 2006: A Royalist Coup*. Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/19-september-2006-royalist-coup.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Luangta Maha Bua* (2011) Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/religion-obituaries/8296853/Luangta-Maha-Bua.html> (Accessed: 25 February 2013)
- Luangta Maha Bua ted ruang 'Devadatta yang roo tod' (Luangta Maha Bua sermons of 'Devadatta accepts his mistakes')* (2005) Available at: <http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000132593> (Accessed: 29 January 2013)

- Lub Luang Luek Panthamitr Prachaon pur Prachathippatai (The inside story of the People's Alliance for Democracy)*. (2008). Matchon Publishing House, Bangkok: Thailand
- McAdam, D. (1996) 'The framing function of movement tactics: Strategic dramaturgy in the American civil rights movement', in McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., and Zald, M. N. (eds.) *Comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, pp. 338–355.
- McCargo, D. (1998) *Chamlong Srimuang and the new Thai politics*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- McCargo, D. and Pathmanand, U. (2005) *The Thaksinization of Thailand*. United States: University of Hawaii Press.
- McCargo, D. (2005) 'Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand', *The Pacific Review*, 18(4), pp. 499–519.
- McCargo, D. (2005) *Thaksinization of Thailand*. Copenhagen S, Denmark: NIAS Press.
- McCargo, D. (2006) 'Thaksin and the resurgence of violence in the Thai South: Network monarchy strikes back?', *Critical Asian Studies*, 38(1), pp. 39–71. doi: 10.1080/14672710600556429.
- McCargo, D. (2011) 'TOXIC THAKSIN? THAILAND'S TROUBLESOME EX- PREMIER', *Representation*, 47(3), pp. 295–306.
- Media giant retreats from bid to take over publisher - SEAPA – Southeast Asian Press Alliance* (2005) Available at: <http://www.seapa.org/?p=3317> (Accessed: 5 March 2013)
- Meyer, D.S. and Kretschmer, K. (2006) in Bryant, C.D. and Peck, D.L. (eds.) *21st century sociology: a reference handbook*. Thousand Oaks, [Calif.]: SAGE Publications, pp. 540–548.
- Military Coup in Bangkok* (2006) Available at: <http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/military-coup-in-bangkok/> (Accessed: 18 August 2014).
- Mob naksuksa mai sab sangkad pratuang Sondhi (Student mob protests Sondhi)* (2005) Available at: <http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000134306> (Accessed: 30 July 2013)

- Modern media subverts Sondhi ban* (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/r15.php> (Accessed: 22 October 2013)
- Montesano, M. J. (2009) 'Political Contests in the Advent of Bangkok's 19 September Putsch', in Funston, J. (ed.) *Divided Over Thaksin: Thailand's Coup and Problematic Transition*. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Morris, A. D. and Staggenborg, S. (2004) 'Leadership in Social Movements', *Snow/Social*, pp. 171–196. doi: 10.1002/9780470999103.ch8.
- Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2: Sondhi perd sarak kunyingaor chae nongnguhao apimahakong* (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 2: Sondhi reveals the mega corruption of nongnguhao airport and the network of Khunying Pojamarn*) (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000134583> (Accessed: 3 February 2013)
- Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4: Perdpong sentang ruay Thaksin-chaepraeroop rathvisahagij plonchat mahoran bab ngueb* (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 4: expose the wealthy ways of Thaksin by state- enterprise privatization*) (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000141971&Page=3> (Accessed: 3 February 2013)
- Muang Thai Sunjorn 5: Sondhi yan mai kuey hai Thaksin chuay puey kuey hai hoon 400 lan* (*Muang Thai Sunjorn 5: Sondhi insists never receive helps from Thaksin, but give him THB 400 million stocks*) (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000145720> (Accessed: 14 June 2015)
- Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 6: Sondhi yuei Thaksinopothisat tuang auo pratedthai kuen ma* (*Sondhi sneers 'Thaksinopothisat' and announces to bring back Thailand*) (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000149369> (Accessed: 27 September 2013)
- Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 7: Sondhi chae trakul shin ting hoon nung san larn sor tream pen nok* (*Sondhi reveals Shin family leave 100 billion stocks to flee overseas*) (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000153109> (Accessed: 9 July 2013)
- Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8: Sondhi nam tawaisud kuen praracha amnart dae nailuang* (*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 8: Sondhi gives a vow to return the*

*King his royal supremacy*) (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000156691&Page=2> (Accessed: 16 July 2013)

*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 9: Sondhi chae tungyai digital perpong yean ping naina tor ror tor (Sondhi exposes Tungyai digital case and Yean Ping, the agent of TRT)* (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000160039> (Accessed: 22 August 2013)

*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 10: Sondhi chae naiying yoo buanglang sarapad vichaman plook palang borisut ruk tor artham (Sondhi claims Pojamarn attacks him with dirty tricks. Persuades poor power fighting with immoral people)* (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000163388> (Accessed: 14 July 2013)

*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 11: Sondhi perd pong ngarb 3,500 larn sue kruang bin khablai Russia jang ratthaban tangtak (Sondhi reveals THB 3,500 million corruption on buying Russian squadrons while the government is penniless)* (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000169650> (Accessed: 14 June 2013)

*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 12: sondhi tud kad thanong chae pon kormun maew fun kamrai ka ngern baht (Sondhi abandons Thanong who provides Maew information benefits to baht selling)* (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000172796&Page=2> (Accessed: 17 September 2013)

*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 14: Sondhi sudthon rathaban kongchat ruam kabuan lorm thamneab kub Thaksin (Sondhi dispels the corrupt government of Thaksin by rallying to the Government House)* (2006) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9490000005264> (Accessed: 18 July 2013)

*Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 15: Sondhi lun see kor pork or nam palang mahachon check bill maew (Sondhi announces on leading the mass to overthrow Thaksin on February 4th)* (2006) Available at:  
<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9490000008729> (Accessed: 25 August 2013)

*Muang Thai wan goo chat: Sondhi sub maew mod kwam chorbtham-jabjuang nailuang lai rob (Muang Thai goo chat day: Sondhi announces Thaksin must resign from his violations to the King)* (2006) Available at:

<http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9490000015836> (Accessed: 17 June 2013)

*Mue pakpuak sai yaipai kwa lae puakkao klubma lenngarn rao (When the leftists support the rightists to attack us)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/blog-post\\_8826.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/blog-post_8826.html) (Accessed: 17 July 2014).

*Naklongtoon sudton triam fongsarnpokkrong au padetkan aukpai (Investors demanded to dispel the dictators by the court's order)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_5731.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_5731.html) (Accessed: 19 July 2014).

Nakornthap, P. (2005) *Jodmai perd panuk tung sarn ratthathammanoon kor tor ngor lae wootthi sapa (An open letter to the Constituional Tribunal, Senate, and State Audit Commission)*. Available at: <http://www.manager.co.th/Daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000137638> (Accessed: 26 September 2013)

Nakornthab, P. (2005) *Rawang luem praracha damrat: tha mai rawang muang thai tai (Do not abandon the King's speech: Thailand might be failed)*. Available at: <http://www.manager.co.th/Daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000167857> (Accessed: 6 July 2013)

Nakornthap, P. (2006) *Rajprachasamasai okard nai nueng pun pe (Rajprachasamasai, one in a million chances)*. Available at: <http://www.manager.co.th/Daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9570000002147> (Accessed: 16 January 2013)

Nanuam, W. (2009) *Amatahaeng pa Prem: Jakpatiwat 19 kunyayontuengjudjob 'Thaksin.'* (immortalPrem: from the 19 September coup to the end of Thaksin. Bangkok: The Post Publishing Public Company Limited.

*New party, old friends aid Sondhi* (2002) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/New-party-old-friends-aid-Sondhi-58371.html> (Accessed: 14 May 2013)

*Ngao tamuen tee tod yao kong thaksin (The long bold shadow of Thaksin)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/02/blog-post\\_03.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/02/blog-post_03.html) (Accessed: 25 July 2014).

*Ngarmna suetangchat prjab padetkarn censor CNN (CNN reveals the censorship of dictators)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_5353.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_5353.html) (Accessed: 25 June 2014).

- Nisbet, M. C. (2010) 'Knowledge into action: Framing the debates over climate change and poverty', in Angelo, P. D' and Kuypers, J. A. (eds.) *Doing News Framing Analysis: Emperical and Theoretical Perspectives*. New York: Taylor & Francis, pp. 43–83.
- Noakes, J. A. (2005) 'Official frames in social movement theory: the FBI, HUAC, and the communist threat in Hollywood', in Johnston, H. and Noakes, J. A. (eds.) *Frames of protest: social movements and the framing perspective*. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 89–111.
- (no date) Available at: <http://davaotoday.com/news/2007/05/24/thailand-military-backed-government-censors-internet/> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Ockey, J. (2002) 'Civil society and street politics: lessons from the 1950s', in McCargo, D. (ed.) *Reforming Thai politics*. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, pp. 107–123.
- Ockey, J. (2003) 'Change and Continuity in the Thai Political Party System', *Asian Survey*, 43(4), pp. 663–680.
- Ockey, J. (2010) 'Red democracy, yellow democracy: political conflict in Thailand', *New Zealand International Review*, 35(6), pp. 8–12.
- Old views haunt govt critic* (2005) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/r50.php> (Accessed: 30 January 2013).
- Oliver, P. E. and Johnston, H. (2005) 'What a good idea! Ideologies and frames in social movement research', in Johnston, H. and Noakes, J. A. (eds.) *Frames of protest: social movements and the framing perspective*. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 185–203.
- Opp, K.-D. (2009) *Theories of political protest and social movements: a multidisciplinary introduction, critique, and synthesis*. New York: Taylor & Francis.
- Osathanont, P. (2007) *Corruption 'could stem back to Thaksin'*. Available at: [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/31/national/national\\_30025570.php](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/01/31/national/national_30025570.php) (Accessed: 29 December 2013).
- Pabpoj thai toktum soodkeed nakkao CNN chae tor (Thai's image drops when the CNN correspondent blames)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_1010.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_1010.html) Posted (Accessed: 30 July 2015).

- Padetkan sang paemaidai dernna patiwatprated pen padetkarn temtua (Dictators demand to change Thailand into totalitarian country)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_17.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_17.html) (Accessed: 30 May 2014).
- Paktai yang por meewang kamnan jaising hang krongpeenung prom su (A local leader from the south ready to fight with the separatists)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post\\_7177.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post_7177.html) (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Pathan, D. and Tweedie, P. (2013) *New Round of Talks Gives Hope for Peace in Thailand's South | In Asia*. Available at: <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2013/06/19/new-round-of-talks-gives-hope-for-peace-in-thailands-south/> (Accessed: 13 August 2013)
- Percy, K. (2007) *Bangkok airport problems expose corruption*. Available at: <http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2007/s1839398.htm> (Accessed: 29 December 2013)
- Perd chak muang thai rai supda san jorn: sondhi pluey that tae Thaksin (The opening of Muang Thai Rai Supda Sunjorn 1: Sondhi reveals the true face of Thaksin)* (2005) Available at: <http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000130828&Page=2> (Accessed: 14 June 2013)
- Perd jodmai samakom poosuekao tangprated yapidsue (The journalism associations from abroad offers the letter on the media censorship)*(2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_8264.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_8264.html)1/19/255003:26:00 (Accessed: 15 July 2014).
- Philosophy of Sufficiency Economy* (no date) Available at: [http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat\\_english/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=4103&Itemid=293](http://www.chaipat.or.th/chaipat_english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4103&Itemid=293) (Accessed: 13 September 2013)
- Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. J. (2005) "Business Populism" in Thailand', *Journal of Democracy*, 16(2), pp. 58-72.
- Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (2008) 'Thaksin's populism', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 38(1), pp. 62-83.
- Phumhiran, C. (2013) *Thaksin's populist policies blamed for rifts in society - The Nation*. Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Thaksins-populist-policies-blamed-for-rifts-in-soc-30207381.html> (Accessed: 24 June 2013)

*Plai meena prawattisat tong jaruk (A new event will happened by March)*(2007)  
Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_25.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_25.html)  
(Accessed: 18 August 2014).

*Pojaman Shinawatra, an influential woman* (2013) Available at:  
<http://www.positioningmag.com/content/%E0%B8%9E%E0%B8%88%E0%B8%A1%E0%B8%B2%E0%B8%99-%E0%B8%8A%E0%B8%B4%E0%B8%99%E0%B8%A7%E0%B8%B1%E0%B8%95%E0%B8%A3-%E2%80%9C%E0%B8%AB%E0%B8%8D%E0%B8%B4%E0%B8%87%E0%B8%9C%E0%B8%B9%E0%B9%89%E0%B8%97%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%87%E0%B8%AD%E0%B8%B4%E0%B8%97%E0%B8%98%E0%B8%B4%E0%B8%9E%E0%B8%A5%E2%80%9D> (Accessed: 15 January 2016).

*Policeman sues media tycoon for lese majeste* (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/r22.php> (Accessed: 9 August 2013)

Polletta, F. and Jasper, J. M. (2001) 'Collective Identity and Social Movements', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27(1), pp. 283–305. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.283.

*Polsatuen jak koranee mob PTV (PTV mob and its impacts)* (2007) Available at:  
[http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post\\_24.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post_24.html) (Accessed: 8 August 2014).

Pongsudhirak, T. (2005) 'The Thaksinization of Thailand. By Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 27(2), pp. 327–330. doi: 10.1355/cs27-2i.

Pongsudhirak, T. (2008) 'Thailand Since the Coup', *Journal of Democracy*, 19(4), pp. 140–153.

Porta, D. Della, Diani, M. and Prof Dr Donatella Della Porta (1998) *Social movements: an introduction*. 1st edn. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

*Poojadkarn jak sue klaipan klaipen wattanatham hang kan kleadchang (Manager media creates culture of hatred)* (2006) Available at:  
[http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_2418.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_2418.html) (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

*Prachachon penlan prom um thaksin kao thai (Millions of people are ready to help Thaksin return to Thailand)* (2007) Available at:  
[http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_38.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_38.html) (Accessed: 12 July 2014).

*Prachachon prom lookhue hak rattatammanoonmai mai tong mk jak karn luektung* (People will be uprising if the premier does not come from elections) (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post\\_8153.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post_8153.html) (Accessed: 14 June 2014).

*Prachachon sudton yun nangsue kormorchor yud arng taharn praracha* (People give a petition to CNS to stop claiming themselves as the King's army) (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post\\_4634.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post_4634.html) (Accessed: 18 July 2014).

*Prachathipatai maimae wan klod jak modlook padetkarn* (Democracy is not given by the tyrants) (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post\\_3520.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post_3520.html) (Accessed: 30 June 2014).

*Prasong samhao tor pra pooyai eektang sairai kloompoochumnum wa rubngern* (Prasong blames the monks are hired to do the movement)(2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_5089.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_5089.html) (Accessed: 15 September 2014).

*Prem had 'no role in coup' - The Nation* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/headlines/Prem-had-no-role-in-coup--30030174.html> (Accessed: 30 June 2014).

Priest, D. (2005) *CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons*. Available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html> (Accessed: 23 November 2013)

*PTV rally 'won't be stopped' - The Nation* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/PTV-rally-won-t-be-stopped--30029947.html> (Accessed: 23 June 2014).

*PTV says 'CAT attack' ruined debut - The Nation* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/headlines/PTV-says-CAT-attack-ruined-debut-30028308.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

*PTV to go on air Wednesday - The Nation* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/headlines/PTV-to-go-on-air-Wednesday-30027804.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

Pye, O. and Schaffar, W. (2008) 'The 2006 anti-Thaksin movement in Thailand: An analysis', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 38(1), pp. 38–61. doi: 10.1080/00472330701651945.

*Rabob prachatippatai kong puangprachamahachon (The democratic regime of the people)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post\\_15.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/03/blog-post_15.html) (Accessed: 15 June 2014).

*Raikarn ped kong koosomrot kong nayok pooporpiang (Diamond's lists of the humble premier's wife)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_9507.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_9507.html) (Accessed: 29 July 2014).

*Raingarn karn raberd tee krungthep (Bomb news from Bangkok)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_02.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_02.html) (Accessed: 7 July 2014).

*Raingarn satanakan karnchumnum kong kloompitak poottasasana (A report on the demonstration of the guardians of Buddhism)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_2293.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_2293.html) (Accessed: 24 June 2014).

*Raingarn sod satanakarn 3/6/07 (Live report)* (2007) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/06/030607.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

*Raingarn satannakan chumnum kong kloom pitak poottasasana (A report on the demonstration of the guardians of Buddhism)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_2293.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_2293.html) (Accessed: 14 September 2014).

*Raingarn satanakan paktai (A report on the southern provinces)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_6332.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_6332.html) (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

Rajathon, P. A. (1954). 'Kingship in Siam' [White paper]. Retrieved August 20, 2012, from [www.siam-society.org](http://www.siam-society.org) website: [http://www.siam-society.org/pub\\_JSS/jss\\_archive.html](http://www.siam-society.org/pub_JSS/jss_archive.html)

Ratanapat, N. (1997) *King Vajiravudh's Nationalism and Its Impact on Political Development in Thailand*. Doctoral thesis. Michigan.

*Rattaban tuen arng chai 2500 lanbaht piang pue tung ronnarong hai kon chon lerk len huai (The illegal government spend huge budget to stop people from playing lotto)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_2006.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_2006.html)12/16/2549 09:12:00 (Accessed: 29 June 2014).

*Ratthapraharn art tam hai konkrung shuad rotfaifa (Bangkokians may not have a new service of BTS because of Coup)* (2007) Available at:

[http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_08.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_08.html) (Accessed: 12 September 2014).

*Reng kae Sangkarat sorn Sondhi yam-chee argoo thoi wan suk songdarn (Sondhi forces the government to solve the high patriarch appointment-also Paiboon steps back avoiding double wars)* (2005) Available at: <http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000127135&Page=1> (Accessed: 2 February 2013)

Roberts, J. (2004) *Thaksin stokes further conflict in southern Thailand*. Available at: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2004/11/thai-n26.html> (Accessed: 16 September 2013)

Rojanaphruk, P. (2005) *The days of cheerleading*. Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/dec3.php> (Accessed: 30 January 2013)

Rojanaphruk, P. (2006) *People's Alliance for Democracy vows to oust PM; second wave of reform*. Available at: [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/02/10/national/national\\_20000652.php](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/02/10/national/national_20000652.php) (Accessed: 10 July 2015).

Rojanaphruk, P. (2006) *TV as shackled as in Thaksin days - The Nation*. Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/TV-as-shackled-as-in-Thaksin-days-30016005.html> (Accessed: 15 July 2014).

Rojanaphruk, P. (2010) *Some red shirts advocate peaceful struggle - The Nation*. Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Some-red-shirts-advocate-peaceful-struggle-30129971.html> (Accessed: 17 May 2015).

Rowley, K. (2006) *The Downfall of Thaksin Shinawatra's CEO-state | Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability*. Available at: <http://nautilus.org/apsnet/0634a-rowley-html/> (Accessed: 5 October 2013)

Rucht, D. (1996) 'The impact of national contexts on social movement structures: A cross-movement and cross-national comparison', in McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., and Zald, M. N. (eds.) *Comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, pp. 185–204.

*Samapan prachattippatai pramern 4 deun lang rattapraharn deekun rue laewlong (The democratic association estimates the results from the coup after the 4 month passes)* (2007) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/4.html> (Accessed: 19 July 2014).

- Sanyan antarai tung thai tung chat (A dangerous sign to Thailand)* (2007) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/190949-50550.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Sanyan antarai wa rattatammanoonmai jamai banyad hai pramahakasat song pen poottamamka (The new constitution indicates the King may not be Buddhist)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/02/blog-post\\_7062.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/02/blog-post_7062.html) (Accessed: 28 July 2014).
- Sanyan jak padetkarn maimiee karnluektung nai pee nee (No election this year, the tyrant says)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_8015.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_8015.html) (Accessed: 12 September 2014).
- Sarupkao robsapda jak soonkao chaoban bangsai (News from Bangsai news agency)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_2006.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_2006.html) 12/16/2549 09:12:00 (Accessed: 15 June 2014).
- Sathannee wittayoo took book kuenwan (The radio station was investigated last night)* (2006) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/9275.html> (Accessed: 23 September 2014).
- Sattayanurak, A. (2000) 'The Intellectual Aspects of Strong Kingship in the Late Nineteenth Century', *Journal of the Siam Society*, 88(1 & 2), pp. 72–95.
- Schneider, C. (2005) 'Political opportunities and framing Puerto Rican identity in New York city', in Johnston, H. and Noakes, J. A. (eds.) *Frames of protest: social movements and the framing perspective*. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 163–181.
- Serichon* (2007) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/12-18-2550.html> (Accessed: 18 July 2014).
- Siangriak ha prachatippatai jak thaksin dung kun ruei (Call for Thaksin is increasing)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_26.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_26.html) 1/26/2550 09:54:00 (Accessed: 23 August 2014).
- Social Movements: Evolution, Definitions, Debates and Resources* (no date) Available at: <http://socialmovements.bridge.ids.ac.uk/sites/socialmovements.bridge.ids.ac.uk/files/07.%2020.%20Social%20Movements.pdf> (Accessed: 24 May 2015).

*Sondhi chur nayok chongrakpakdee sataban pramahakasad kernroi tae turn sati bangrueng tee laloey (Sondhi believes in Thaksin's loyalty to the monarchy but he might abandon something)* (2005) Available at: <http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9480000123263> (Accessed: 3 February 2013)

*Sonthi mulls response to campaign - The Nation* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/headlines/Sonthi-mulls-response-to-campaign-30030799.html> (Accessed: 19 July 2014).

*Sonthi, Thaksin take war of words to foreign media* (no date) Available at: [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/02/09/politics/politics\\_30026393.php](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/02/09/politics/politics_30026393.php) (Accessed: 30 July 2015).

*Soodtai ja mee tae konkungthep kloomlek lek kian rattathammanoon (Only a small group of Bangkokians write the constitution)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_6383.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_6383.html) (Accessed: 30 June 2014).

*Southeast Asian Media Struggle to be Free* (2002) Available at: <http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/article/101370/Southeast-Asian-Media-Struggle-to-be-Free.aspx> (Accessed: 7 January 2013)

*Speedy demise for Sondhi's empire* (2002) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/Speedy-demise-for-Sondhis-empire-58470.html> (Accessed: 3 August 2013)

Srinara, T. (2011). *Kan songserm udomkarn chat sasana pramahakasad [The promotion of nation, religion and the king ideologies]*. Available at: <http://www.kpi.ac.th>. (Accessed: 14 August 2012).

Srivalo, P. (2007) *PTV debut 'illegal' - The Nation*. Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/PTV-debut-illegal--30027444.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2015).

*Statement on AEC Assets Seizure -- HOUSTON, June 12 /PR Newswire UK/ --* (2007) Available at: <http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/statement-on-aec-assets-seizure-153721595.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2015).

Stowe, J. A. (1991) *Siam becomes Thailand: a story of intrigue*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

*Street protest: PTV plans April 27 mass rally to demonstrate against coup - The Nation* (2007) Available at:

<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Street-protest-PTV-plans-April-27-mass-rally-to-de-30031865.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

Stürmer, S., Simon, B., Loewy, M. and Jörger, H. (2003) 'The Dual-Pathway Model of Social Movement Participation: The Case of the Fat Acceptance Movement', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 66(1), pp. 71–82.

*Suetangchat teekao tualok lung jaonatee koddan pid satanee wittayoochumchon (International press disseminate news of the radio community station ban)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/blog-post\\_4328.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/blog-post_4328.html) (Accessed: 30 July 2015).

*Surayudh tuatalok nai asean langrang kotbat asean yee chat ratthapraharn (Surayudh is discriminated by ASEAN members from the coup)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_15.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_15.html) (Accessed: 19 July 2014).

*Surayud sarapab tor lok muslim wa prathed thai rangkae chao thai muslim (Surayud confesses to Muslims that Thais really bully Thai Muslims)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_2006.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_2006.html)12/16/2549 09:12:00 (Accessed: 29 June 2014).

*Sarupkao robsapda jak soonkao chaoban bangsai (News from Bangsai news agency)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_2006.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_2006.html)12/16/2549 09:12:00 (Accessed: 15 June 2014).

Suwannarat, G. (no date) *CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE IN THAILAND'S SOUTHERNMOST PROVINCES: UNICEF SITUATION ANALYSIS*. Available at: <http://www.unicef.org/thailand/ArtSouth.pdf> (Accessed: 13 January 2016).

Suwannathat-Pian, K. (2003) *Kings, Country and Constitutions: Thailand's Political Development 1932-2000*. 1st edn. United Kingdom: ROUTLEDGECURZON.

Swart, W. J. (1995) 'THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE IRISH QUESTION: Master Frames, Cycles of Protest, and "Master Frame Alignment"', *The Sociological Quarterly*, 36(3), pp. 465–481. doi: 10.1111/j.1533-8525.1995.tb00448.x.

Szep, J. (2011) *Analysis: A Thaksinomics renaissance in Thailand*. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/30/us-thailand-election-economy-idUSTRE75T0SW20110630> (Accessed: 29 May 2015).

*Taharn namdee chae saprang patiwat puepaktong prom ngab eek punlan (Saprang did a coup for his interest, a good militant says)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_25.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_25.html) (Accessed: 12 June 2014).

*Talang kao klum poo rak prachathippatai (An announcement of a democratic group)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post\\_01.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/blog-post_01.html) (Accessed: 25 September 2014).

*Talangkarn kabuan thap prachaconn (An announcement from the people's army)* (2006) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/10/blog-post.html> (Accessed: 13 September 2014).

*Talangkarn kloomprachathai maiaou padetkarn (An announcement of Prachathai group)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/07/blog-post\\_7956.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/07/blog-post_7956.html) (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

Tambiah, S. J. (1976) *World conqueror and world renouncer: a study of Buddhism and polity in Thailand against a historical background*. 1st edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

*Tapom mai aou sedtakitporpiang version surayud (What if I did not want Surayud's sufficiency economy policy)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/02/blog-post\\_5300.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/02/blog-post_5300.html) (Accessed: 29 September 2014).

*Taveevut kui kub nakkolayut saiklang cheewit thaksin tok yoo nai antarai (A strategist says Thaksin is in danger)* (2007) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/06/blog-post.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

*Team to tackle Sondhi threat* (2005) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/r41.php> (Accessed: 14 August 2013)

Tejapira, K. (2006) *Toppling Thaksin*. Available at: <http://newleftreview.org/II/39/kasian-tejapira-toppling-thaksin> (Accessed: 14 June 2015)

*Thai ban blunders* (2007) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/06/thai-ban-blunder.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).

*Thailand: No Elections for a Year* (2006) Available at: <http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/thailand-no-elections-for-a-year/> (Accessed: 5 June 2014).

*Thai politics ban sparks protests* (2007) Available at: <http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/cnn-thai-politics-ban-sparks-protests.html> (Accessed: 30 May 2014).

- Thailand's King Endorses the Coup* (2006) Available at:  
<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/thailands-king-endorses-the-coup/?pfstyle=wp> (Accessed: 14 August 2014).
- Thailand's military government censors satellite TV station - Committee to Protect Journalists* (2007) Available at: <https://cpj.org/2007/03/thailands-military-government-censors-satellite-tv.php#more> (Accessed: 13 August 2014).
- Thailand's Thaksin Freeze Out* (2007) Available at:  
<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/thailands-thaksin-freeze-out/>  
(Accessed: 25 August 2013)
- Thailand: Thaksin's Giant Shadow* (2007) Available at:  
[http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/02/blog-post\\_03.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/02/blog-post_03.html) (Accessed: 29 July 2014).
- Thailand' troubled of EGAT* (2007) Available at:  
<http://www.asialaw.com/Article/1971489/Search/Results/Thailands-Troubled-Privatization-of-EGAT.html?Keywords=soe> (Accessed: 14 January 2013)
- Thaksin Pushes Ahead With Privatization Of State Firms Despite Slump in Markets* (2001) Available at:  
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1004296887367227600.html> (Accessed: 31 January 2013)
- Thaksin ron jodmai tung konthai penhuang lae korhai aodton (Thaksin suggests his supporters to be patient)* (2007) Available at:  
[http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/blog-post\\_1030.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/blog-post_1030.html) (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Thaksin rumoured to have rented satellite* (2007) Available at:  
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Three-more-to-quit-TRT-30027335.html> (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Thaksin's Party's Over in Thailand* (2007) Available at:  
<http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/thaksins-partys-over-in-thailand/>  
(Accessed: 24 July 2014).
- Thaksin teesakna surayud borihan prated mai pen laew pan (Thaksin attacks Surayud on his unskilled premiership)* (2007) Available at:  
[http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_4827.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_4827.html) (Accessed: 25 July 2014).

- Thammai nak kao mai thamnatee truadsob (Why do journalists avoid investigation?)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_1861.htm](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_1861.htm) (Accessed: 13 September 2014).
- Thananithichot, S. (2011) *Changes in Patterns of Political Participation and Engagement in Thailand, 2001-2007*. Doctoral thesis. Department of Political Science, University of Utah, The United States of America.
- Thattae rathapraharnthai sahed chak samkan lae karnsuebtod amnad padetkarn (The truth about the Thai coup, the reasons, important scenes, and dictatorship)* (2006) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post\\_8724.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/12/blog-post_8724.html) (Accessed: 8 July 2014).
- There Wasn't Any Choice* (2006) Available at: <http://www.asiasentinel.com/politics/there-wasnt-any-choice/> (Accessed: 29 July 2015).
- The Truth about Thaksin, Sondhi* (2005) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/nov29.php> (Accessed: 12 April 2013).
- Thousands of protesters lay siege to Government House* (2006) Available at: [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/01/14/headlines/data/headlines\\_19657935.html](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/01/14/headlines/data/headlines_19657935.html) (Accessed: 22 July 2015).
- Three more to quit TRT - The Nation* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Three-more-to-quit-TRT-30027335.html> (Accessed: 6 May 2014).
- 'Traitor' used to describe Thaksin* (2007) Available at: [http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/02/08/politics/politics\\_30026284.php](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/02/08/politics/politics_30026284.php) (Accessed: 25 June 2014).
- Two stations, same path, clashing agenda - The Nation* (2007) Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Two-stations-same-path-clashing-agenda-30028157.html> (Accessed: 30 June 2014).
- Ukrit chamlae roojakmai nititham (Ukrit asks the junta about the state of law)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post\\_8787.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/04/blog-post_8787.html) (Accessed: 30 July 2014).
- Valocchi, S. (2005) 'Collective action frames in the gay liberation movement, 1969-1973', in Johnston, H. and Noakes, J. A. (eds.) *Frames of protest: social*

*movements and the framing perspective*. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 53–67.

Van Gorp, B. (2007) 'The Constructionist Approach to Framing: Bringing Culture Back In', *Journal of Communication*, 57(1), pp. 60–78.

Van Gorp, B. (2010) 'Strategies to take subjectivity out of framing analysis', in Angelo, P. D' and Kuypers, J. A. (eds.) *Doing news framing analysis: empirical and theoretical perspectives*. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 84–109.

Vella, W. F. and Vella, D. B. (1986) *Chaiyo!: King Vajiravadh and the Development of Thai Nationalism*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

*Violence in southern Thailand* (2013) Available at:  
<http://www.trust.org/spotlight/Thailands-southern-violence/?tab=briefing>  
 (Accessed: 13 August 2013)

Vliegthart, R. and Walgrave, S. (2012) 'The interdependency of mass media and social movements', in Semetko, H.A. and Scammell, M. (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Political Communication*. Sage Pubns, pp. 387–398.

*Wai alai dae robpiset (RIP to the army)* (2007) Available at:  
[http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/blog-post\\_12.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/05/blog-post_12.html) (Accessed: 30 September 2014).

Walgrave, S. and Manssens, J. (2005) 'Mobilizing the white march: media frames as alternatives to movement organizations', in Johnston, H. and Noakes, J.A. (eds.) *Frames of protest: social movements and the framing perspective*. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 113–140.

*Waning fortunes for populist PM?* (2005) Available at:  
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/a7.php> (Accessed: 7 February 2013)

*We did it for the people: Sondhi* (2006) Available at:  
[http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/25/politics/politics\\_30019940.php](http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/11/25/politics/politics_30019940.php) (Accessed: 15 June 2013).

*Weera Musikkapong remton jad raikarn jannee (Weera Musikkapong started hosting the radio progema this Monday)* (2006) Available at:  
<http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2006/11/fm-935mhz.html> (Accessed: 19 June 2014).

- Wehrfritz, G. (2008) *The Economics of Thailand's Thaksin is Catching On*. Available at: <http://www.newsweek.com/economics-thailands-thaksin-catching-88109> (Accessed: 29 July 2015).
- Wela yakun fai tee dai puenpai mak teesud chana (Who get many bunch of friends is the winner)* (2007) Available at: [http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post\\_2085.html](http://thaienews.blogspot.co.nz/2007/01/blog-post_2085.html) (Accessed: 28 September 2014).
- West, D. (2008) 'Informal Public Leadership: The Case of Social Movements', in 'Hart, P. and Uhr, J. (eds.) *Public leadership perspectives and practices*. Acton, A.C.T.: ANU E Press.
- Who Are We? » Red Shirts* (no date) Available at: <http://thairedshirts.org/the-movement/who-are-the-red-shirts/> (Accessed: 22 September 2014).
- Wiriyawit, W. (1997) 'Interview with Wimon Wiriyawit', in Wiriyawit, W. (ed.) *Free Thai: personal recollections and official documents*. Bangkok: White Lotus Co Ltd, pp. 99–104.
- Wiseman, P. and Chitrada, R. (2006) *USATODAY.com - Thai coup leader delays elections for a year*. Available at: [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-19-thailand\\_x.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09-19-thailand_x.htm) (Accessed: 29 July 2015).
- Wittayakorn, C. (1995). *Panyachon: Chonshunnam nai lok yuuk khomulkaosan*. Bangkok, Thailand: Mingmitr publishing.
- Wong-Anan, N. (2007) *Thai ex-PM barred from politics for 5 years*. Available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/05/30/uk-thailand-idUKBKK14714020070530> (Accessed: 12 May 2014).
- Wyatt, D.K. (1984) *Thailand: A short history - David K. Wyatt - hardcover*. United States: Yale University Press.
- Yoon, S. (2005) *Thaksin-Sondhi 'deal' would smack of public betrayal*. Available at: <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/specials/sondhi/a21.php> (Accessed: 3 February 2013).
- Zald, M. N. (1996) 'Culture, ideology, and strategic framing', in McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D., and Zald, M. N. (eds.) *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.