Politicising History

An Historiographical Analysis of the Sino-Tibetan Relationship

This dissertation is submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of BA Honours in History at the University of Canterbury. This dissertation is the result of my own work. Material from the published or unpublished work of other historians used in the dissertation is credited to the author in the footnote references. The dissertation is approximately 9,456 words in length.

Grace Smart

Supervisor: Dr Jane Buckingham

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Abstract

This dissertation compares the historiography of the Sino-Tibetan relationship as written by a number of Chinese, Tibetan and Western historians. The relationship between China and Tibet has been written about extensively, however the highly politicised nature of modern debate has resulted in an inability of historians to reach a consensus regarding the status of Tibet. This dissertation will use the 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet by China as a foundation from which to compare the historiography of the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Chinese Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, and during the Republic of China. This dissertation will also discuss which historiographical schools and modes of thought have influenced historians. Tibetan historians have been strongly influenced by modern Tibetan ethnocentric nationalism, and by Western romanticised constructions of Tibet. Chinese historians have been influenced by a combination of traditional Chinese thought and Marxist thought. The hegemony of Western political ideas has also caused Tibetan and Chinese historians to frame their arguments around Western concepts. Western historians attempt to be objective, however tend to agree with the interpretation of Tibetan historians. This is largely due to the influence of the romanticised image of Tibet in the West, which creates the idea that Tibet is a peaceful and traditional place which has been violated by Chinese aggression.
Glossary

Amban: a high official who represented the Qing Dynasty in Tibet.

Dalai Lama: the highest ranking lama in the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism.

Panchen Lama: the second highest ranking lama in the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism.

Plenipotentiary: a diplomat invested with the full power to act on behalf of their government.
A problem with any scholarship dealing with Sino-Tibetan history is defining what areas are meant by ‘China’ and ‘Tibet’. The boundaries which define the areas that make up each of these nations have changed throughout history. For example, under the leadership of Srongtsen Gampo during the seventh century, Tibet had a military expansionist policy and gained large amounts of territory from China.

The majority of the historiography studied in this dissertation discusses the status of Tibet in relation to debate regarding the 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet by China. Therefore, when referring to ‘Tibet’, this dissertation generally means the area currently known as the Tibet Autonomous Region.

At various times throughout history, Han China belonged to a wider empire, such as the Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the Manchu Qing Dynasty. However, because this dissertation discusses arguments that Tibet has historically belonged to Han China, when referring to ‘China’, this dissertation refers to Han China.
Introduction

The status of Tibet is a globally contested issue which is reflected in the highly politicised and divergent historical interpretations of the Sino-Tibetan relationship. Several extensive histories examine the long and changing relationship between China and Tibet from the seventh century through to the twentieth century. From 1950-1951, China occupied Tibet and signed the ‘Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’, colloquially referred to as the Seventeen Point Agreement. This was the first time in Sino-Tibetan history that Tibet formally and unequivocally became part of the Chinese state.\(^1\) By examining the historiography of the relationship between China and Tibet prior to this event, several periods can be identified as significant for determining the status of Tibet. These include the status of Tibet under each of the Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties, and its status in relation to the Republic of China between 1911 and 1949. The relationship between China and Tibet during these periods has been used by Chinese historians to argue that Tibet has historically belonged to China. Tibetan historians have interpreted the same information to claim that while Tibet has always had a relationship with China, it has remained autonomous.

This dissertation will critically evaluate several Chinese, Tibetan and Western historical sources to establish the main themes in the historiographical debate concerning the relationship between China and Tibet. This will include an examination of work by professional historians as well as historical sources written with explicitly political aims by the governments of China and Tibet. Many of these sources are broad

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histories of Tibet covering its status under the Tang dynasty through to the 1950s, allowing a critical examination of how the same historical ‘facts’ are used in Chinese, Tibetan and Western historiography to verify competing political aims. The Tibetan and Chinese sources that this dissertation will examine have been written in English to appeal to a Western audience and gain support for their version of history. These sources have all been published since the 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet. The main lines of argument made by Chinese, Tibetan and Western historians regarding the status of Tibet have remained relatively consistent since the 1950s. There has been an increase in the amount of material published on the subject due to the influence of the increasing international attention being paid to the modern political situation in Tibet.

While there are many histories written about the relationship between China and Tibet, there is a relative dearth of analysis of the politicisation of these histories. The definitive work on the subject is John Powers’ 2004 book History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People’s Republic of China. Powers conducts a comparative study of Chinese, Tibetan and Western histories, focusing on language and discourse in his interpretation of the historiography. While other academic works examine specific aspects of the historiography, such as the effect of Western imagination on the image of Tibet,2 no other work seeks to continue Powers’ efforts to analyse and compare these contentious histories.

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In 1950, China’s People’s Liberation Army marched into Lhasa in what has been described by different historians as variously a ‘liberation’ and an ‘invasion’.

The contemporary Chinese government stated that they were liberating Tibet from foreign imperialist aggression, which was achieved with the signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement in 1951. This event was a major turning point in the history of the Sino-Tibetan relationship as it was the first time that China definitively exerted sovereignty over Tibet. For many Chinese, Tibetan and Western historians, the interpretation of previous periods of Sino-Tibetan history either legitimises or refutes China’s claim to Tibet, which was exerted during the 1950-1951 occupation. These histories therefore often display a high degree of presentism, which is the interpretation of historical events in terms of modern concepts and ideas.

Chinese historiography has been influenced by a strong hatred of foreign imperialism, which it regards as responsible for both China’s own weakness during the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and for Tibet’s desire to gain independence.

However, Chinese thought has also been influenced by Western thought. Duara argues that twentieth century Chinese intelligentsia were forced to adopt a linear, progressive model of history in order to legitimise their historical claim to Tibet in the modern political climate. Despite a defiance of Western political hegemony, Chinese historians

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readily use Western political concepts of sovereignty and statehood to discuss the Sino-Tibetan relationship, although these concepts were foreign to both China and Tibet prior to the twentieth century.\(^8\)

The adoption of western modes of thought is juxtaposed with the continued influence of traditional Chinese ways of viewing history. Chinese historians are deeply influenced by the irredentist belief that Tibet has always been part of China. This is an effect of the enduring Chinese medieval mentality that China was the centre of the world and that all other nations had a natural urge to be incorporated into the Chinese state.\(^9\) China has a deep respect for its history and ancestors and a long tradition of using history to justify political action.\(^10\) This has influenced the teleological and tendentious viewpoint represented in most Chinese historiography which argues that the 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet by China was a liberation, welcomed by the Tibetan state.\(^11\)

Many Tibetan histories are produced or influenced by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile or are written by wealthy and elite Tibetans who support Tibetan independence.\(^12\) Although presenting a relatively monolithic view of Sino-Tibetan history, these works cannot be relied upon as representative of all Tibetan perspectives. Like Chinese historiography, Tibetan historiography has become more politically charged over time, with recent online sources reiterating that not only was Tibet independent prior to the 1950-1951 invasion, but that the Seventeen Point Agreement is

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9 Richardson, *Tibet and Its History*, p. 188.
10 Ibid, p. 188.
11 Ibid, p. 188.
void under international law and that Tibet retains its independence to this day, although under illegal occupation by China.\textsuperscript{13} Shakya’s 1999 work is milder in his critique of the Chinese, stating that Communist troops in 1950-1951 adopted a policy of appeasement, with the relationship between monks and Communists being quite friendly.\textsuperscript{14} However his work is the exception, with other Tibetan historians painting a stark picture of Chinese wrongdoings.

The attitude of these historians has been heavily influenced by postcolonialism and Tibetan nationalism. Tibetan historians argue for independence by conferring agency on Tibetans as key actors in their own history. However Tibetan nationalism has also fostered a sense of nostalgia for traditional Tibetan society. This has also been a response to Western constructions of Tibetans as a naïve people whose history has been arranged by greater powers. The Western infantilisation of Tibet has been appropriated by Tibetan nationalist historians who use the image of a naïve and peaceful Tibet to garner international support.\textsuperscript{15} This use of Western essentialism can be seen in itself as a form of historical agency. Tibetan historians exert their agency by constructing Tibet as a unique, non-Western culture, while also framing the argument for Tibetan independence within Western political terms. Tibetan historians argue that the events of 1950-1951 were an invasion, based on the idea that Tibet was independent from 1911-1949. However, historically Tibet had never needed to explicitly claim its independence because its relationships with its neighbours were on terms of ‘mutually inclusive and

overlapping territorial jurisdiction’ which did not adhere to Western concepts of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{16}

Western historians attempt to adhere to the goal of objectivity idealised by the Western historical discipline. As such, Western historians are far less teleological in their analysis of the status of Tibet and the legitimacy of the Chinese occupation of Tibet.\textsuperscript{17} Western historiography has been split into two major schools of thought, both of which have remained relatively stable over time. One on hand are those historians who support Tibet’s claim to independence and are highly critical of China’s actions in Tibet, and on the other hand are those who attempt to be more even-handed. Historians of the first school argue that Tibet had undoubtedly been operating with \textit{de facto} independence since 1911 and was forced to sign the Seventeen Point Agreement out of necessity.\textsuperscript{18} Historians of the second school attempt to be more favourable towards China in their analysis. Grunfeld states that while the Chinese did not shamelessly coerce the Tibetans into signing the Seventeen Point Agreement, the Tibetans were negotiating from a weak position, enabling the Chinese to control most of the content of the agreement.\textsuperscript{19}

While there are Western historians who are more sympathetic to China than others, none of the historians studied are uncompromisingly pro-Chinese and supportive

\textsuperscript{16} Anand, \textit{Contemporary Tibet}, p. 289.

\textsuperscript{17} Most Western historians discuss only Tibet’s history since 1911 when analysing the nature of the 1950-1951 invasion. T.A. Grunfeld, \textit{The Making of Modern Tibet}, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1996, pp. 78-114.


\textsuperscript{19} Grunfeld, \textit{The Making of Modern Tibet}, p. 113; Goldstein, \textit{The Snow Lion and the Dragon}, pp. 44-46; Smith Jr., \textit{Tibetan Nation}, p. 296.
of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet in the way that several Western historians are staunchly pro-Tibetan. The greater tendency towards a pro-Tibetan analysis is both a reaction against the strongly political and uncompromising conclusions of Chinese historiography and a result of the romanticisation of Tibet. The image of a peaceful Tibet is constructed as an antidote to the Western perception of the violence of Chinese communism.20 This is exhibited in the portrayal of the Chinese 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet in Western historiography. The majority of Western historians describe the military force and power of the Chinese Communists in contrast to the helplessness of the peaceful Tibetans, which left them with no alternative but to sign the Seventeen Point Agreement.21 This romanticised image of Tibet is a legacy of imperial Orientalism in Western thought which constructs Tibet as a counterbalance to Western modernity. This involves the essentialising and infantilising of Tibetans as a highly religious, peaceful and naïve people.22 The romanticisation of Tibet has often described it as if fixed in time and as an antidote to modernity.23 This Western representation has not only influenced Western historiography to be more pro-Tibetan, but has influenced Tibetan historians by constructing an image of Tibet which has then been appropriated by Tibetans as a method for portraying themselves, in order to gain Western political support.

20 Anand, Contemporary Tibet, p. 297.
21 Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, p. 113; Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon, p. 46; Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 296.
This dissertation will examine the historiography of the Sino-Tibetan relationship in terms of the influence of these themes on historians. Chapter One will examine the changing nature of the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Chinese Tang, Yuan and Ming Dynasties. It will demonstrate how Chinese dynastic changes impacted on the level of authority which China imposed on Tibet throughout these periods. It will include an analysis of key themes in the historiography such as Tibetan independence versus subordination, and the role which religion has played in the Sino-Tibetan relationship. Chapter Two will continue to explore these themes, focusing on Tibet’s relationship with China during the Qing Dynasty. This chapter will also examine the role which British imperialism began to play in the relationship during this period. Chapter Three will look at how the Sino-Tibetan relationship was affected by the Chinese Revolution in 1911 and the subsequent conversion of China from an imperial dynasty to a republic. Many Tibetan and Western historians argue that Tibet operated with *de facto* independence during this time. These periods of history are all key to the differing interpretations in the historiography of the nature of China’s occupation of Tibet in 1950-1951.
Throughout the rise and fall of the Chinese Tang, Yuan and Ming Dynasties, a relationship existed between China and Tibet. The nature of this relationship and the way in which it changed is the subject of historiographical debate between Chinese, Tibetan and Western historians. Themes of independence, subordination and mutual influence have emerged in the historiography, with key events becoming focal points for debate concerning these themes. Historians writing on these periods of Sino-Tibetan history since the 1950s have been influenced by modern schools of historical thought. Tibetan historians have been influenced by postcolonialism in their desire to reclaim Tibetan agency and culture as unique and important outside of Tibet’s relationship with China. This has often led to a sense of nostalgia for what Tibetans regard as their Golden Age. Chinese historians argue that Tibet has always been a part of China. This interpretation is influenced both by Chinese Marxism and traditional Chinese thought. Western historians aspire to write objective histories but are strongly influenced by the romanticisation of the image of Tibet in the West.

The theme of mutual influence between China and Tibet is debated in the historiography of the Tang Dynasty. Tibet was an independent monarchy during this period, but was influenced by its relationship with China through a process of cultural exchange. The Tibetan state emerged in the seventh century when King Srongtsen Gampo unified the Tibetan tribes, established a capital at Lhasa and began a process of military expansion. This period is known in Tibetan historiography as Tibet’s Golden Age and was a time when Tibet was a highly martial state. Tibetan historians have

been influenced by postcolonial thought to emphasise Tibetan agency and autonomy throughout history, which has often led them to glorify this period. This is demonstrated in the interpretation of Gampo’s marriage to the Chinese Princess Wencheng in 641. Several Tibetan sources state that China offered Princess Wencheng in marriage to Srongtsen Gampo out of fear of Tibetan military supremacy. Norbu and Turnbull state that the Chinese Emperor initially resisted the marriage alliance, but that Gampo ‘began a military campaign, the might of which quickly persuaded the Chinese Emperor T’ai Tsung to change his mind’. This is supported by several Western historians, who put forward the idea that the Chinese Emperor only agreed to the marriage under threat of Tibetan military force. Chinese historians portray the marriage as a political move by the Tang Emperor to form an alliance with Tibet and bring it into the Chinese sphere of influence. The China Embassy website states that this marriage ‘[laid] the groundwork for the ultimate foundation of a unified nation’.

In 710, the Tibetan King Tride Zhotsan echoed Gampo’s marriage alliance when he married the Chinese Princess Jincheng. The cultural implications of Gampo’s and Zhotsan’s marriages to Chinese princesses have been remarked on by several historians in a debate over the mutual influence of Tibet and China. Both princesses brought in their dowries numerous books and fabrics and were accompanied by Chinese experts in arts, crafts and science. Chinese histories emphasise the influence of this influx of

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Chinese culture into Tibet and argue that it began the process of Tibetan unification with China.\textsuperscript{30} This Chinese interpretation is influenced by traditional Chinese thought which reflects the medieval belief that China was the centre of the world and that neighbouring barbaric peoples could not help but be pulled into the orbit of Chinese cultural superiority.\textsuperscript{31} Tibetan historians maintain that a two-way cultural exchange existed between Tibet and China. The fourteenth Dalai Lama emphasises Tibet’s differences from China despite this relationship:

Tibetans are a distinct and separate race. Our physical appearance and our language and customs are entirely different from those of any of our neighbours. We have no ethnological connection with anyone else in our part of Asia.\textsuperscript{32}

Statements such as these reflect the influence of modern Tibetan ethnocentric nationalism on Tibetan historians.\textsuperscript{33} Tibetan historians emphasise the unique cultural identity of Tibet since the Tang Dynasty in order to prove the longevity of Tibetan nationalism. This is to provide legitimacy in the context of modern Tibet’s struggle for independence.\textsuperscript{34}

Buddhism is also a significant area of Tibetan culture which historians examine for evidence of mutual influence with China during the Tang Dynasty. The theme of mutual cultural influence during the Tang Dynasty is also debated in the historiography

\textsuperscript{31} Powers, \textit{History as Propaganda}, pp. 32-36; Smith Jr., \textit{Tibetan Nation}, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{34} Anand, \textit{Geopolitical Exotica}, p. 84.
with regards to Buddhism. The Chinese princesses Wencheng and Jincheng were both Buddhist and influenced Tibetan culture through the propagation of the religion.

Because Buddhism has come to be regarded as a defining feature of Tibet in Western thought, Chinese historians strongly emphasise the Sino-Tibetan religious link as a way of sinicizing one of Tibet’s defining characteristics. Suo and Wang state that it was under Princess Wencheng’s influence that Srongtsen Gampo became a great Buddhist scholar and advocated Buddhism for Tibetans.\(^{35}\) However Tibetan historians are careful to discuss the influence of India on Tibetan Buddhism and to show that Tibet adapted aspects of both Chinese and Indian Buddhism in its adoption of the religion.\(^{36}\) Just as Chinese historians emphasise the link between China and Tibetan Buddhism, so Tibetan historians try to downplay this aspect of history in order to reclaim Buddhism as a unique feature of Tibetan culture. This religious debate has implications for Tibetan and Chinese historians who often portray Tibet in such a way as to garner support from the West for their historical viewpoint. Tibetan Buddhism has been spiritualised in Western literature to the point where Tibet has become a counter-image to Western modernity and power.\(^{37}\) The romanticisation of Tibet has influenced Western thought since European explorers entered the region during the Middle Ages.\(^{38}\) Geographic and political isolation has caused the image of Tibet in the West to be essentialised as a peaceful, religious, traditional place which is a panacea for Western modernity.\(^{39}\) For this reason, Chinese historians emphasise the cultural subordination of Tibet to Chinese

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\(^{36}\) Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, pp. 36-39.


\(^{39}\) Rinpoche discusses the phenomenon of essentialising Tibet. Rinpoche, *Imagining Tibet*, p. 385.
culture as a way of historically linking China with this positive image of Tibet in the West. Tibetan historians emphasise the uniqueness and separateness of Tibetan culture from China in order to historicise their national identity.

The theme of independence versus subordination is discussed in the historiography of the Yuan Dynasty in the context of Tibet’s submission to the Mongol Emperors. In the early-thirteenth century, Genghis Khan established the Mongol Khanate north of China and began to expand his power in Asia. In 1253, the monk Phagpa, the nephew of the leader of the influential Sakya Buddhist sect, visited Kublai Khan, who accepted Phagpa as his religious teacher and established him as the ruler of Tibet, creating what came to be known as the priest-patron relationship. This relationship worked on the basis of spiritual guidance from Tibet in exchange for political support from the Mongols. The establishment of Phagpa as the political leader of Tibet was the first time that a religious lama had held temporal power in Tibet. The priest-patron relationship between Kublai and Phagpa established the accepted model for future Tibetan-Mongol relations. Tibetan historians have pointed out that it was a unique relationship which cannot be understood on Western political terms. Tibetan historians argue that Tibetan religious authority gave them the opportunity to exercise influence on the Mongol Emperors through the priest-patron relationship. While it is accepted in Tibetan, Chinese and Western historiography that Tibet was subordinate to the Mongol Emperors, Tibetan historians maintain that this was not the same as being subordinate to China. Despite evidence of mutual influence between Mongol Emperors and Tibetan religious leaders, Chinese historians still stress the submission of Tibet to China during this period. Jing argues that the Yuan Emperors exercised Chinese

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40 Richardson, *Tibet and Its History*, p. 39.
sovereignty over Tibet through administrative measures such as appointing officials, levying taxes and taking censuses.\textsuperscript{42} This is a reflection of Confucian values, which stress the ‘mutual interdependence’ of any political relationship, but state that every relationship is also hierarchical.\textsuperscript{43} This means that even if Tibet and Mongol-ruled China exerted a mutual influence on each other, Tibet remained subordinate to China. Western historians generally support the Tibetan view that Tibet was subordinate to the Mongols but maintained a unique relationship which kept it autonomous from Han China. Richardson points out that Tibetan submission to Mongol power was confirmed before the Mongol domination of China was completed in 1279, proving that the Tibetan-Mongol relationship was independent from Han China.\textsuperscript{44} Many Western historians also point out that Tibet’s relationship with the Mongols was not solely religious as Tibet was also subject to military and political domination.\textsuperscript{45} Smith states that the Yuan Dynasty was sinicized to a large degree and that many Tibetan clerics served as religious officials in Han China, which provides a basis for the Chinese claim that a relationship was established between Tibet and Han China during this period.\textsuperscript{46} Western historians value impartiality, however there is a tendency in the Western historiography to support the Tibetan viewpoint. This is due to the attraction of the mystical image of Tibet propagated in Western literature and the desire to counterbalance what is regarded as an aggressive Chinese viewpoint.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{42} Jing W., \textit{100 Questions About Tibet}, Beijing, Beijing Review Press, 1989, pp. 4-6.
\textsuperscript{44} Richardson, \textit{Tibet and Its History}, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{46} Smith Jr., \textit{Tibetan Nation}, p. 97.
\textsuperscript{47} Barnett, \textit{Imagining Tibet}, p. 379.
The Ming Dynasty overthrew the Yuan Dynasty in 1368 and began a period of ethnic Han Chinese rule in China. Religion remains the basis of the discussion of Tibetan independence from China during the Ming period. Tibetan historians maintain that when Mongol authority ceased, Tibet regained its independence.\(^{48}\) Chinese historians argue that the Ming Dynasty inherited rule over Tibet from the Yuan Dynasty, although the Chinese historians Liu and Shen admit that the Ming Emperors did not exercise the same level of political control over Tibet as had been present under the Yuan Dynasty.\(^{49}\) Many Western historians argue that while the Ming Dynasty did maintain aspects of Tibetan governance on paper, and through superficial measures such as confirming titles of religious leaders, this did not mark any real authority or influence over Tibet.\(^{50}\) The Tibetan-Mongol relationship was maintained even after the fall of the Yuan Dynasty. In 1642, Gusri Khan invaded Tibet and established the fifth Dalai Lama of the Gelugpa Sect as supreme religious and temporal leader of Tibet. This is of both political and religious importance to Tibetan history. Both Tibetan and Western historians argue that the establishment of the Dalai Lama as ruler of Tibet was brought about by Mongol power exhibited through the ongoing priest-patron relationship.\(^{51}\) Tibetan historians argue that the fifth Dalai Lama established diplomatic relations with the Chinese after assuming power in Tibet, portraying Tibet and China as equal states.\(^{52}\) However Chinese sources focus instead on the fact that the Dalai Lama and other

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\(^{48}\) Free Tibet, ‘Tibet’s History’ [http://freetibet.org/about/tibets-history#Timelinepre1900](http://freetibet.org/about/tibets-history#Timelinepre1900), (accessed 17 June 2015); Central Tibetan Administration ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’.


\(^{50}\) Richardson, *Tibet and Its History*, p. 38; Smith Jr., *Tibetan Nation*, p. 103.


\(^{52}\) Free Tibet, ‘Tibet’s History’.
religious leaders were allowed to pay tribute to the Ming Emperors. Yannian Dai et al. justifies the Chinese position by stating that from the time of the fifth Dalai Lama, it has been the practice for all Dalai Lamas to have their titles conferred on them by the central Chinese government. In addition, some Chinese sources argue that successive Chinese governments have patronised Buddhism to strategically control the Tibetan people. Li states that the Yuan government ‘found the warlike Tibetans a difficult people to rule, and resolved to reduce them to a condition of docility through the influence of religion’. This stance on religion shows the influence of Marxist thought on Chinese historiography, as Marxism views religion as a form of social control which would be abandoned once the masses were educated and exposed to scientific thought.

Chinese and Tibetan historians both seek to portray the creation of the position of Dalai Lama in a strategic light. By arguing that the Dalai Lama is subject to the Chinese government, Chinese historians claim the most powerful symbol of Tibet as subordinate to Chinese authority. Tibetan historians attempt to distance the establishment of the Dalai Lama from Chinese history in order to build on the image of Tibetan uniqueness. This demonstrates the influence of the West on the Sino-Tibetan debate. The Dalai Lama has become a powerful symbol of Tibet in Western thought during the twentieth century. Since the fourteenth Dalai Lama’s exile from Tibet in 1959, he has come to personify the image of Tibet in the West. For this reason, and in order to garner support from the West, both Chinese and Tibetan historians construct

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54 Lobsang and Yun, Tibet: Myth vs Reality, p. 23.
55 Suo and Wang, Highlights of Tibetan History, pp. 68-71.
56 Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, p. 19.
58 Anand, Geopolitical Exotica, p. 54.
their interpretation of the origin of the Dalai Lama’s legitimacy and power in a way which associates the position with either China or Tibet. Anand refers to this as a ‘strategy of internationalization’.\textsuperscript{59} Tibetan historians have been particularly successful in equating Buddhism with Tibetan identity. The majority of Western historians support the Tibetan viewpoint on this issue, demonstrating the influence of the romanticisation of Tibetan religion on Western historical thought.

Themes of independence, subordination and mutual influence have been debated in Chinese, Tibetan and Western historiography of the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Tang, Yuan and Ming Dynasties. Key events and ideas, such as the nature of the Mongol-Tibetan priest-patron relationship and the importance of religion and culture, have become focal points for historiographical debate. Tibetan historiography of these periods has been affected by postcolonial and nationalist historiography which stress the strength and uniqueness of Tibetan identity and culture. Chinese historians have been influenced by a juxtaposition of traditional Chinese thought and Chinese Marxism. In addition, Chinese historians make claims of involvement in establishing the origins of Buddhism and the Dalai Lama in Tibet, as a way of claiming China’s influence on a unique aspect of Tibetan culture and historically linking Tibet to China. The influence of the romanticisation of Tibet in Western thought often draws Western historians to support the Tibetan viewpoint. The historiographical debates discussed in this chapter are used by Chinese and Tibetan historians to prove the longevity of their interpretation of the Sino-Tibetan relationship. For Chinese historians who wish to legitimise the 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet, these periods of history are used to prove that Tibet has always been under Chinese influence. For historians who argue for modern Tibetan

independence, the historiography proves that while Tibet has had a long relationship with China, it has historically been an independent state. This debate continues to be exhibited in the historiography of the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Qing Dynasty.
Qing Dynasty

During the period of the Qing Dynasty, from 1644 to 1911, Chinese authority over Tibet strengthened. The debate concerning whether Tibet was independent or subordinate during this time continues in the historiography. Key themes in the historiography of the Qing Dynasty include the extent of Qing power and governance in Tibet, as well as the impact of the introduction of British imperialism to the region. Qing military aid to Tibet provided China with a foothold to strengthen their presence in Tibet and enact reforms concerning the governance of Tibet. British imperialism also affected the Sino-Tibetan relationship, particularly through the signing of international conventions. The discussion of the role of religion in the Sino-Tibetan relationship is also carried through from the historiography of earlier dynasties. The source of the Dalai Lama’s power in Tibet is also strongly debated by Tibetan and Chinese historians since the origin of this powerful symbol of Buddhism and temporal authority provides a key source of legitimacy for Tibetan independence.

A key theme in the historiography is increasing Chinese control over Tibet during the Qing Dynasty and how this relates to whether Tibet is regarded in current debate as independent from or subordinate to China. One way in which the Qing increased their presence in Tibet was through military aid. Several times throughout their rule, the Qing government sent troops to support Tibet against foreign invasion. While this military aid was sent at the request of Tibetans, historians debate whether the Qing government took advantage of their subsequent position in Tibet to enact reforms and tighten control over Tibet. The Qing government sent troops to Tibet in 1717 in response to a Tibetan request for help against an invasion by Dzungar Mongols, and
again in 1791 in response to a Gurkha invasion.\textsuperscript{60} Li states that these military excursions enabled the Qing government to increase its control over Tibet and that it not only exercised sovereignty over Tibet but actively ruled through the new Lhasa government, which it established in 1720.\textsuperscript{61} While Tibetan historians agree that the military aid was requested, \textit{Free Tibet} argues that the Qing government took advantage of Tibetan instability following the Dzungar invasion to take control of Tibet.\textsuperscript{62} This suggests that Tibet saw itself as an independent state requesting help from its ally, while Chinese historians often view this military aid as a legitimate means by which China came to exercise sovereignty over Tibet.\textsuperscript{63} In order to stress Tibetan autonomy, several Tibetan historians downplay the role of the Qing troops in driving out the Dzungars. Shakabpa states that the Dzungars were already ‘on the run from Lhasa’ before the arrival of imperial troops.\textsuperscript{64} The \textit{Central Tibetan Administration} also argues that although the military expeditions allowed the Qing to exert some authority over Tibet in the aftermath of crisis, this influence did not last.\textsuperscript{65} Western historians differ in the degree to which they argue that Qing influence was exerted following military expeditions into Tibet. Goldstein argues that although the Qing Emperor did want to control the Tibetan leadership, he was not actually interested in absorbing Tibet into China.\textsuperscript{66} This demonstrates a lesser degree of presentism in Western historiography. While Tibetan and Chinese historians are often highly presentist, analysing historical events in the context of the modern Sino-Tibetan relationship, Goldstein attempts to explain what the aims of the Qing Emperor may have been without being influenced by an attempt to

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{60} Grunfeld, \textit{The Making of Modern Tibet}, pp. 44-45.
\bibitem{61} Li, \textit{The Historical Status of Tibet}, p. 37.
\bibitem{62} \textit{Free Tibet}, ‘Tibet’s History’.
\bibitem{63} Li, \textit{The Historical Status of Tibet}, p. 40.
\bibitem{64} Shakabpa, \textit{Tibet: A Political History}, p. 139.
\bibitem{65} Central Tibetan Administration, ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’.
\bibitem{66} Goldstein, \textit{The Snow Lion and the Dragon}, p. 14.
\end{thebibliography}
justify Tibet’s current status. Goldstein describes the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Qing Dynasty as one of ‘passive hegemony’, with the Qing protecting Tibet in exchange for Tibetan rulers acting in Qing dynastic interests.\(^67\) However Chinese historians argue that Qing control was far more substantive than the term ‘passive hegemony’ suggests, with the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet allowing the Qing to enact reforms in the governance of Tibet.

From 1720 onwards there was a permanent Chinese presence in Tibet, however the degree to which the Qing Dynasty exerted either real or symbolic authority is debated by historians. Smith argues that although the Qing did exert control, they differentiated Inner Asia from China in terms of administration,\(^68\) and despite claims by contemporary Chinese historians, Tibet ‘did not thereby become a part of China. Tibet remained a distinct nation’.\(^69\) Formal Chinese influence in Tibet did increase during the Qing Dynasty. Following the expulsion of the Dzungar Mongols in 1720, the Qing established a Tibetan government which included the office of *Amban*, a high official who represented the Qing Dynasty in Tibet. Chinese historians argue that this proves the strength of Qing administration over Tibet, however Tibetans argue that the administration of Tibet actually remained in the hands of the Tibetans, and that the *Amban* did not exercise real authority.\(^70\) The Qing Dynasty also enacted reforms in 1793 under the ‘29 Article Regulations Concerning the Administration of Tibet’. Key points of the reforms were that the *Ambans* were raised to a status equal to the Dalai Lama and held authority over Tibet’s foreign affairs. The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and the

\(^{67}\) Ibid, p. 14.
\(^{68}\) Smith Jr., *Tibetan Nation*, p. 145.
\(^{69}\) Ibid, p. 148.
highest Tibetan officials had to be confirmed by the Qing government and Tibetan troops were put under the command of the Qing.\textsuperscript{71} Zhong states that these reforms governed Tibet’s administration for over 100 years.\textsuperscript{72} While Western historians generally agree that these reforms marked the high point of Qing authority in Tibet, they argue that this influence declined throughout the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{73} Chayet considers that these reforms were not fully successful as the Qing government was often unable to enforce them because of its declining power.\textsuperscript{74} The \textit{Central Tibetan Administration} also argues that the regulations were only suggestions, which the Tibetan government could choose whether or not to adopt.\textsuperscript{75} Several Chinese historians agree that Qing power declined in the nineteenth century, blaming this weakening of the Qing state on the influence of British imperialism in China and Tibet.\textsuperscript{76}

A key theme in the historiography of the Qing Dynasty is the influence which British imperialism had on the Sino-Tibetan relationship. The way in which imperial Britain interacted with China and Tibet in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries has influenced perceptions of the status of Tibet by Tibetan, Chinese and Western historians. The influence of Marxist thought on Chinese historiography has contributed to their criticism of British imperialism. Marxism holds that imperialism is a function of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{72} Zhong Z., \textit{China's Tibet}, Beijing, China Intercontinental Press, 2001, p. 17.
\item \textsuperscript{73} A.Chayet, ‘The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)’, in A. Blondeau and K. Buffettrille (ed.), \textit{Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions}, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2008, p. 23; Grunfeld, \textit{The Making of Modern Tibet}, p. 49; Goldstein, \textit{The Snow Lion and the Dragon}, p. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{74} Chayet, \textit{Authenticating Tibet}, p. 33.
\item \textsuperscript{75} Central Tibetan Administration, ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Jing, \textit{100 Questions About Tibet}, p. 17; Li, \textit{The Historical Status of Tibet}, pp. 59-61; Liu and Shen, \textit{Tibet and the Tibetans}, pp. 46-47.
\end{itemize}
capitalism at its highest form, which primarily benefits the state and the bourgeoisie. Many Chinese historians hold the view that Britain was conspiring to disrupt China’s unity with Tibet by promoting Tibetan independence. However Liu and Shen are also critical of the Qing government’s response to British imperialism, stating that China failed to protect Tibet. Suo and Wang agree that China’s ‘capitulationist policy’ was to blame for British interference in Tibet. Tibetan historians are more forgiving of British imperialism because they are able to use British interactions with Tibet to demonstrate that Tibet was operating as an autonomous state. The fourteenth Dalai Lama writes that by signing the 1904 Lhasa Convention with Britain, Tibet ‘had made a formal international agreement as a sovereign power’. This is a highly presentist interpretation which analyses Anglo-Tibetan interactions in the light of modern Tibet’s desire for independence. Western historians’ analysis of imperialist actions tends to accept less critically the history of Western imperial dominance in both China and Tibet. For example, Grunfeld, Goldstein and Smith all describe events brought about by British imperialism with little attempt to analyse the impact on Sino-Tibetan relations other than to discuss the shift from Chinese sovereignty to suzerainty.

The events which are most commonly discussed in order to highlight the impact of imperialism on the status of Sino-Tibetan relations are the 1904 and 1906 Lhasa Conventions resulting from the Younghusband Expedition. In 1903 the British launched an expedition into Tibet headed by Colonel Francis Younghusband, which Jing refers to

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80 Suo and Wang, *Highlights of Tibetan History*, p. 128.
as ‘a full-scale military invasion of Tibet’. Free Tibet also calls the mission a ‘temporary invasion’ while Western sources refer to it only as a ‘mission’ or ‘expedition’. The expedition faced military resistance from Tibetans on a number of occasions, when the poorly armed Tibetans were easily defeated by British weapons.

The British pressed through to Lhasa to find that the Dalai Lama had fled and so negotiated the ensuing 1904 Lhasa Convention with Tibetan representatives. The main purpose of the treaty was to grant trading rights to the British in Tibet. However the treaty also included a clause restricting Tibet’s ability to negotiate with any foreign powers. Grunfeld argues that this amounted to Tibet becoming a protectorate of the British Empire. This also posed a threat to what China regarded as its sovereignty in Tibet, because it was unclear whether Britain meant to use this clause to exclude China from negotiating with Tibet. While the Qing Amban was consulted on the signing of the Convention, on orders from Beijing he did not actually sign it. Some modern Chinese historians state that the lack of Chinese signature meant that the treaty was not legally effective. However Liu and Shen state that the Ambans did not sign because they had no real power to control the Tibetans or prevent the negotiations. Tibetan historians use the Lhasa Convention as proof that Tibet was operating as a sovereign power by negotiating international agreements on its own terms. This causes some Tibetan historians to appear supportive of British imperialism, a position which may not reflect the opinion of contemporary Tibetans. Following the signing of the 1904 Convention,

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83 Jing, 100 Questions About Tibet, p. 23.
84 Free Tibet, ‘Tibet’s History’; Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 156.
85 Powers, History as Propaganda, pp. 80-82.
87 Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 159.
88 Suo and Wang, Highlights of Tibetan History, p. 128.
89 Liu and Shen, Tibet and the Tibetans, p. 49.
90 Gyatso, My Land and My People, p. 57.
Britain and China continued to negotiate and signed the Anglo-Chinese Convention in 1906 which ratified the 1904 Lhasa Convention. It also agreed that Britain would not interfere in Tibetan politics if China prevented other foreign powers from interfering. Chinese historians see the 1906 Convention as a British acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. However the fourteenth Dalai Lama writes that by signing the 1906 Convention and ratifying the 1904 Lhasa Convention, China was accepting that Chinese power in Tibet had ended. Western sources state that the 1906 Convention recognised Chinese suzerainty, a weaker term than sovereignty, indicating that Tibet would retain internal autonomy. Smith states that the Tibetans could have argued for independence based on the 1904 Convention, however the 1906 Convention ‘relegated Tibetan affairs once again to a concern of China’.

The importance of religion to historical debate concerning the Sino-Tibetan relationship is continued in the historiography regarding the Qing Dynasty. Religion is important to the discussion of the status of Tibet because it is a symbol of the unique Tibetan identity, which differentiates it from China and emphasises Tibetan independence. Chinese historians attempt to portray Chinese Emperors as the creators of Buddhism’s important status in Tibet as a way of historically linking Tibet to China. Jing states that:

To better manage Tibet, the Qing Dynasty’s central government ordered the seventh Dalai Lama to take charge of the region’s administration in 1751. It is evident, therefore, that both the title and the political and religious powers of Dalai Lama were granted by China’s central government.

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91 Lobsang and Yun, Tibet: Myth vs Reality, p. 28.
92 Gyatso, My Land and My People, p. 68.
93 Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 162.
94 Jing, 100 Questions About Tibet, p. 13.
As previously discussed, Marxist thought opposes religion, believing it to be a form of mind control for the masses.\footnote{Karl Marx describes religion as ‘the opium of the people’. K. Marx, \textit{Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right”}, trans. A. Jolin and J. O’Malley, London, Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 131.} This is reflected in the Chinese historiography, with Chinese historians often mentioning that the Qing Dynasty only used Buddhism as a political tool to control the Tibetans and prevent them from becoming militant.\footnote{Liu and Shen, \textit{Tibet and the Tibetans}, p. 42.} However Marxist thought also states that time should be allowed to educate the masses, and under this consideration, the Chinese Communist Party allows religious freedom.\footnote{Ch’en, \textit{History in Communist China}, pp. 158-159.} In this way, China reconciles the need in Chinese historiography to claim ownership of Buddhism and the Dalai Lama in order to legitimise their rule in Tibet, and the opposition to religion which stems from Marxist thought.

The 1793 reforms established regulations that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama should be approved by the Qing Emperor. The \textit{China Embassy} website states that this practice officially established the political and religious status of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama in Tibet.\footnote{The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand, ‘The Consistent Stand Taken by the Successive Chinese Central Governments towards the Sovereignty over Tibet after the Revolution of 1911,’ http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/zt/zgxz/xzfz/t39515.htm, (accessed 9 June 2015).} However, Tibetan historians argue that the establishment of the temporal and spiritual power of the Dalai Lama had existed since the time of the fifth Dalai Lama, who claimed his power not through the Qing government but with the help of the Mongol, Gusri Khan.\footnote{Norbu and Turnbull, \textit{Tibet: Its History, Religion and People}, pp. 249-250; Central Tibetan Administration, ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’.} As previously discussed, Western historians tend to agree with Tibetan historians on the source of the Dalai Lama’s legitimacy and power. There is a fascination with Tibetan Buddhism in
the West and the more the Chinese try to appropriate the origins of Buddhism, the more the West clings to a mythologised image of Tibet.100 The visit of the Dalai Lama to Beijing in 1653 has also been the subject of current debate concerning the role of religion in determining the nature of the relationship between China and Tibet. Li voices the opinion of many Chinese historians when he states that the visit was an act of submission by the Dalai Lama to the Qing Emperor.101 However the Emperor journeyed outside of the capital to meet the Dalai Lama, which Tibetan historians argue proves that the two leaders were meeting as equals.102 Western historians are more divided in their interpretation of the event. Grunfeld states that it is unclear how contemporary Tibetans and Chinese regarded their relationship, while Goldstein states firmly that the meeting did not indicate political subordination by the Tibetans.103

The historiography concerning the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Qing Dynasty displays similar themes to that of the Tang, Yuan and Ming Dynasties. The question of whether Tibet was independent from or subordinate to China continues to be debated through the representation of key events such as the 1793 reforms in Tibet and the signing of the 1904 Lhasa Convention. A new theme which emerges in the historiography of the Qing Dynasty is the impact of British imperialism. While Britain was simply acting in its own imperial interests, the manner in which it interacted with both China and Tibet in relation to trade has been used by Chinese and Tibetan historians to debate Tibet’s status. The role of Buddhism in Tibetan identity continues to be a key theme in the historiography because of its importance to international

100 Rinpoche, Imagining Tibet, p. 385.
101 Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, p. 35.
102 Central Tibetan Administration, ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’.
perceptions of Tibet today. The historiography of the Qing Dynasty is important to modern debate about the status of Tibet, because this period marked a high point of Chinese authority in Tibet. While historians debate the degree to which Tibet maintained a level of autonomy, the Qing Dynasty did exercise authority over the governance of Tibet through the position of *Amban* and the enacting of administrative reforms. This Chinese authority was to be significantly affected by the fall of the Qing Dynasty in the 1911 Chinese Revolution.
Republic of China

In 1911, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown in the Chinese Revolution and the Republic of China was established. This had massive implications for the nature of the Sino-Tibetan relationship. Many Tibetans regarded Tibet as having been subordinate to the Qing Dynasty, rather than to Han China, and that following the Revolution, Tibet was able to reassert its independence. The historiography dealing with the period from 1911 to 1949 is characterised by greater agreement between historians. Due to the greater availability of primary sources, the sequence of events during this period is less disputed. However the interpretation of these events in the historiography is politically nuanced, focusing on issues such as what constitutes a declaration of independence and by which actions a country is deemed independent. While the interpretations of Western and Tibetan historians are influenced by an ideology of nationalism, China’s claim to sovereignty over Tibet is founded on the right of imperial conquest. Ethnocentric nationalism has had a strong influence on Tibetan historians, who foreground the agency of the Tibetans in their dealings with China and imperial Britain. However Tibetan historians often fall into a nostalgia for traditional Tibetan society. While several Western historians argue that Tibet was independent during the Republic, they have often romanticised Tibet and essentialised it as a naïve nation. Chinese historians have been influenced by Marxism in their scepticism of Western imperialism, but remained adamant in their atavistic claims that Tibet is an integral part of China.

Tibetan and Western historiography of the republican period has been influenced by Tibetan ethnocentric nationalism. Following the Chinese Revolution in 1911, Yuan Shi-kai issued a statement that he was restoring the thirteenth Dalai Lama’s titles. However the Dalai Lama made the reply that he was not seeking confirmation from the
Chinese government, as he intended to exercise spiritual and temporal authority in Tibet.\textsuperscript{104} The Dalai Lama issued a proclamation in 1913 which outlined the history of the Sino-Tibetan relationship in terms of the priest-patron model in order to prove Tibet’s independence from China.\textsuperscript{105} Tibetan historians consider that these two actions by the Dalai Lama amounted to a Tibetan declaration of independence.\textsuperscript{106} Tibetan historians have been influenced by an ethnocentric nationalism to regard Tibet’s right to independence in 1911 as a result of their separate national identity from China.\textsuperscript{107} Many Western historians support Tibet’s claim to independence, however do not as readily accept that the Dalai Lama’s actions constituted a declaration of independence. Shakya and Blondeau state that despite it being clear to Tibetans that the Dalai Lama was proclaiming independence, Tibet’s lack of understanding of the global political climate meant that they failed to achieve international recognition of their status as an independent nation.\textsuperscript{108} The hegemony of Western ideas in the modern political climate has influenced the arguments of both Tibetan and Chinese historians, who have been forced to make their arguments regarding the status of Tibet within this framework. For Western historians, it is important that Tibet achieved international recognition in order to become truly independent. However, as discussed in the introduction, Tibet had never previously considered the need to formally proclaim its independence from China.

\textsuperscript{104} T. Shakya and A. Blondeau, ‘Why was the issue of “Tibetan independence” raised early in this century?’, in A. Blondeau and K. Buffetrille (ed.), \textit{Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions}, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2008, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{105} Shakabpa, \textit{Tibet: A Political History}, pp. 246-248; Shakya and Blondeau, \textit{Authenticating Tibet}, p. 43.
\textsuperscript{107} Gyatso, \textit{My Land and My People}, pp. 51-52.
\textsuperscript{108} Shakya and Blondeau, \textit{Authenticating Tibet}, p. 43.
because its traditional relations with its neighbours were based on ‘mutually inclusive and overlapping territorial jurisdiction’.109

The majority of Chinese historians believe that China’s weakness during the period of the Republic of China was to blame for the high level of Tibetan autonomy during this time, but that China has always retained its claim to Tibet.110 In 1912, despite China’s lack of actual authority in Tibet, Yuan Shi-kai issued a statement that the Republic of China was a unified country composed of the five ethnicities of Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan.111 Smith argues that although Tibet under the thirteenth Dalai Lama ‘achieved an unprecedented degree of national unity’,112 the Chinese were not influenced by the same ideal of nationalism as Tibetan and Western historians. For them, China’s claims to Tibet were ‘based upon imperialist rights of conquest’.113 Only Liu and Shen agree with Tibetan historians that the Dalai Lama’s actions were a declaration of independence and that from 1911 to 1949, ‘Lhasa [had] to all practical purposes enjoyed full independence’.114

The influence of postcolonial thought on Tibetan, Chinese and Western historians is clearly seen in their interpretation of the influence of British imperialism on the status of Tibet. As discussed in the previous chapter, Tibet had come under the sphere of influence of the British Government of India during the Qing Dynasty, and was concurrently asserting its independence from both British and Chinese imperialism

109 Anand, Contemporary Tibet, p. 289.
111 Zhang, China’s Tibet, p. 17.
112 Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 226.
114 Liu and Shen, Tibet and the Tibetans, p. 62.
in 1911. Tibetan historians write their history by foregrounding the agency of the Tibetans. In 1914, the Simla Conference was convened between Britain, China and Tibet in an attempt to settle issues concerning the status of Tibet. Shakabpa writes that Tibet ‘[pressed] the British into arranging a tripartite conference’,\textsuperscript{115} giving the impression that the Tibetans were the driving force behind the decision to enter into discussions with China and Britain. Tibetan historians also stress the autonomy of the Tibetan representatives at Simla, who negotiated on equal terms with the Chinese and British plenipotentiaries.\textsuperscript{116} Tibetan historians argue that by participating in the conference, China was accepting the equal status of the Tibetan representative and the power of Tibet to sign international agreements, which they argue are both signs of an independent nation.\textsuperscript{117} China refused to sign the final Simla Convention, however it was signed by Tibet and Britain, which Tibetan historians maintain indicates both that China relinquished their claim to sovereignty and that Tibet was operating as an independent nation by concluding international treaties.\textsuperscript{118}

Chinese and Western historians both argue that the British were the drivers behind the Simla Convention. The consensus among Chinese historians is that the British took advantage of the chaos of revolution in China to exert their influence in Tibet and convince the Tibetans to separate from China.\textsuperscript{119} They also state that China was forced to attend the Simla Conference because Britain threatened to withhold recognition of the new Republic of China and to sign a direct Anglo-Tibetan treaty

\textsuperscript{115} Shakabpa, \textit{Tibet: A Political History}, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{117} Shakabpa, \textit{Tibet: A Political History}, pp. 251-256; Free Tibet, ‘What Is China’s Argument on Tibet?’.
\textsuperscript{118} Shakabpa, \textit{Tibet: A Political History}, p. 256; Gyatso, \textit{My Land and My People}, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{119} The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand, ‘The Consistent Stand Taken by the Successive Chinese Central Governments’.
without consulting China.\textsuperscript{120} The Chinese anti-imperialist perspective is consistent with Marxist thought.\textsuperscript{121} Li agrees that the equal status of the Tibetan representative was insisted upon by the British, not at the behest of the Tibetans themselves, which counters Tibetan claims of agency.\textsuperscript{122} However, Li concedes that the presence of a Tibetan plenipotentiary at Simla did signal a change in the status of Tibet.\textsuperscript{123} Chinese historians argue that the Simla Convention is illegal and void because it was not signed by the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{124}

Western historians are caught between a desire to counteract Chinese historiography which displays a complete lack of agency for Tibetans, and a romantic belief in the naivety of the Tibetans. Shakya and Blondeau argue for Tibetan agency, stating that Tibet organised the Simla conference with Britain.\textsuperscript{125} However Grunfeld and Smith are more sceptical about the extent to which Tibet was able to exercise agency when dealing with Britain. Grunfeld argues that the Simla Convention could indicate a lack of independence because Tibet was unable to oppose the clauses which forced it to give up territory and admit to Chinese suzerainty.\textsuperscript{126} Smith also argues that the Convention was a failure because it did not guarantee Tibetan security and was beneficial only to the British.\textsuperscript{127} Smith and Grunfeld, writing in the 1990s, are more sceptical of Tibetan agency and less supportive of modern Tibetan political goals than

\textsuperscript{120} Suo and Wang, \textit{Highlights of Tibetan History}, p. 151; Smith Jr., \textit{Tibetan Nation}, p. 190.
\textsuperscript{121} Brewer, \textit{Marxist Theories of Imperialism}, pp. 50-55.
\textsuperscript{122} Li, \textit{The Historical Status of Tibet}, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{124} Suo and Wang, \textit{Highlights of Tibetan History}, p. 134.
\textsuperscript{125} T. Shakya and A. Blondeau, ‘How did Britain and the United States interfere with China’s domestic affairs with regard to Tibet in the past?’, in A. Blondeau and K. Buffetrille (ed.), \textit{Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions}, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2008, p. 47.
\textsuperscript{126} Grunfeld, \textit{The Making of Modern Tibet}, pp. 67-68.
recent Western historiography, such as Blondeau and Buffetrille’s 2008 work. This suggests that Western historiography is becoming more pro-Tibetan over time because of the increased attention and politicisation regarding Tibetan nationalism. Many Westerners are influenced by the romanticisation of Tibet and feelings of paternalism. As discussed in the introduction, the infantilisation of Tibet is a construction in Western thought which represents Tibetans as a naïve people who are reliant on assistance from the Western world in order to achieve their independence.

Although whether Tibet achieved full independence during the period of the Republic of China remains disputed, it is generally agreed in the historiography that Tibet operated with autonomy during this time. The thirteenth Dalai Lama ruled Tibet until his death in 1933, during which time he enacted a number of reforms in an attempt to modernise Tibet. Tibetan attitudes towards his governance are complex. The Dalai Lama was aware that Tibet would need to modernise to survive and enacted a number of reforms to prevent corruption and decrease inequality.\(^{128}\) However the influence of postcolonialism on Tibetan historiography has aroused a sense of nostalgia for Tibet’s past before the modernisation and introduction of western technology. Many conservative Tibetans oppose modernising reforms because they cling to the traditional Tibetan lifestyle.\(^{129}\) Norbu’s and Turnbull’s work exhibits a strong postcolonial influence in its blend of fact and legend, with a stated aim of presenting Tibet ‘not with fictions of a romantic Western imagination, but with the reality of the thoughts and beliefs of the Tibetan people themselves’.\(^{130}\) Norbu avoids nostalgia and admits that


Tibet needed reforms. He argues that Tibetans admire the traditional form of government because the acceptance of the absolute rule of the Dalai Lama is an act of faith by Tibetans, which cannot be understood by a modern, Western conception of politics. Western historians are similarly conflicted. Western thought regards Tibet as a traditional place, which it is necessary to improve by introducing Western forms of modernisation. This detracts from the agency and identity that Tibetans can find in their traditional society. However Westerners also romanticise traditional Tibetan society and resist the idea of a modern Tibet. Tibet’s geographic and cultural isolation have allowed it to be constructed in the Western imagination as suspended in time and as a counterbalance to rational Western society. This causes some unease in Western thought at the idea of modernisation in Tibet. Chinese sources do not extensively discuss the governance and reforms of the thirteenth Dalai Lama but instead focus on portraying the negative aspects of Tibetan feudalism in order to justify Chinese interference. Zhang describes the Tibetan system of government as having a ‘decadent, dark and cruel nature [which] hampered social progress, and slowed down the development of productive forces’.

The historiography relating to Tibet during the period of the Republic of China is far more political in nature than the historiography concerning earlier dynasties. However the importance of religion remains central to the historiography. Religion has been intricately linked with politics in Tibet since the fifth Dalai Lama was established as both political and religious leader of Tibet. The thirteenth Dalai Lama died in 1933 which prompted a search for his reincarnation. Historians debate whether the Chinese

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131 Ibid, p. 329.
134 Zhang, *China’s Tibet*, p. 18
government was involved in the selection and appointment of the fourteenth Dalai Lama or whether Tibet acted autonomously. Tibetan historians argue that approval of the reincarnate boy was not sought from the Chinese government because he was selected according to Tibetan tradition. A Chinese delegation arrived in Lhasa for the enthronement ceremony, which Tibetan historians interpret as a carefully timed ploy by the Chinese to claim a role of legitimisation in the ceremony. Chinese historians state that the Tibetan authorities informed the Chinese government that the incarnation had been found and that Chiang Kai-shek issued a decree conferring the title of Dalai Lama upon the boy. Grunfeld agrees that the Tibetan government requested a representative of the Chinese government to officiate at the golden urn ceremony but that by the time they arrived in Lhasa, the reincarnation had already been chosen. Smith argues that the invitation was sent but was understood differently by the Tibetans, who saw it as an invitation to attend the ceremony, and the Chinese, who took it as a request to officiate. The varying interpretations of the selection of the fourteenth Dalai Lama demonstrate the highly contentious nature of even relatively modern events in Sino-Tibetan history. Although all historians agree on who was present for the selection ceremony, they debate the motivations and significance of these events.

The historiography of the Republic of China has been characterised by a greater degree of political interpretation than the historiography of previous dynasties. The issue of whether Tibet was independent between 1911 and 1949 is interpreted by historians within a framework of modern Western political concepts. Tibetan and

135 Central Tibetan Administration, ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’.
137 China Tibet Online, ‘Republic of China (1911-1949)’.
139 Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 241.
Chinese historians have been forced to frame their arguments within this context, despite it being a foreign imposition on traditional Chinese and Tibetan political thought. This demonstrates the influence which Western thought has had on the historiography, as Tibetan and Chinese historians construct their interpretations using political language that appeals to a Western audience. The modernity of Tibet is also a strong influence on the historiography of this period. While most historians recognise the need for Tibet to survive, Tibetan historians are influenced by a postcolonial nostalgia for a traditional past. In addition, Western historians have been influenced by the infantilisation of Tibet to view the modernisation of Tibet as a paternal responsibility of the West. However the stereotyping of Tibet as a traditional and isolated place has caused a sense of unease amongst Westerners confronted by Tibetan modernisation.
Conclusion

In 1950, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army advanced on Tibet in what many Chinese historians refer to as a liberation of Tibet from foreign imperial aggression. Tibetan historians argue that the events of 1950-1951 were in fact an invasion of Tibet by China. While Western historians attempt to balance these two opposing interpretations, the majority tend to come down in favour of the Tibetan interpretation. In 1951, the signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement, which definitively stated that Tibet was a region of China, marked the first time in the history of the Sino-Tibetan relationship that Tibet was formally subsumed into Han China. This event has become a touchstone for debate of earlier Sino-Tibetan historiography, which interprets the status of Tibet throughout history with the aim of either legitimising or refuting China’s 1951 claim to Tibet.

Chinese historians have been influenced in their interpretation by a mixture of traditional Chinese thought, Marxism and Western political thought. The fundamental belief that Tibet is an integral part of China is an argument in Chinese historiography which owes its origins to medieval Chinese thought, which saw China as a superior civilisation which neighbouring states felt drawn towards. This argument has been augmented by Marxist thought, which opposes the British imperialism which China sees as responsible for its fading influence in Tibet during the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Despite an opposition to Western imperialism, Chinese historiography has also been influenced by Western political thought. Due to the hegemony of Western ideas in the modern political climate, Chinese historians structure their arguments for Chinese authority in Tibet around the concept of sovereignty, which is foreign to traditional Chinese political thought.
Tibetan historians are influenced in their interpretation of history by modern Tibetan nationalism. This is formulated around the idea that Tibet’s historically unique ethnicity and culture distinguishes it from China. Tibetan historians emphasise this by foregrounding the agency of Tibetans in their relationship with China and arguing that Tibet has always operated autonomously throughout history. In doing so, Tibetan historiography also focuses on the significance of Buddhism to Tibetan identity. The image of Tibet in the West has also influenced Tibetan historiography. Many Tibetan historians have appropriated Western essentialised constructions of Tibet as naïve, isolated and peaceful in order to gather support from the West. The use of this romanticised notion of Tibet is a form of agency in itself. By purposefully responding to the image of Tibet in the West, Tibetan historians are using history to gain political support for modern Tibetan nationalism.

Western historians often consider themselves to be writing Sino-Tibetan history from the outside. However Western ideas have had a strong influence on Sino-Tibetan historiography and as such, Western historiography is implicated in the debate which it attempts to resolve. Western historians are mainly influenced by the romanticisation of Tibet in Western thought. This has included the infantilisation and essentialisation of Tibet, to stereotype it as an isolated, peaceful and traditional place which has been suspended in time. This has caused Western historians to construct Tibetan culture as an antidote to Western modernity, which has been violated by Chinese aggression. For this reason, most Western historians support the Tibetan historical viewpoint.

This dissertation has shown the contentious nature of Sino-Tibetan historiography. A number of events during the Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, and during the Republic of China, have been debated by historians to argue either for or against Tibetan independence. Sino-Tibetan history has become highly politicised due
to the ongoing debate surrounding the status of modern Tibet. While this dissertation has used the 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet as a foundation for its examination of Sino-Tibetan historiography, ongoing attention should be paid to events in Tibet since the 1950s. The status of Tibet is one which will continue to be debated by historians in the future. The way in which the history of China and Tibet has been written is an example of how current political situations can influence historiography, and how different interpretations of the same historical events can result in widely different versions of the truth.
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