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“Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries?”

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Table of Contents:

Abstract.	Page 4
Introduction.	Page 5
Definitions.	Page 10
Methodology.	Page 12
Theory.	Page 14
Literature Review.	Page 17
Section One: Regional Security Concerns.	Page 22
Middle East and North Africa.	Page 23
Syria.	Page 23
Rebels' Free Syrian Army.	Page 25
Ukraine.	Page 28
May 2015.	Page 29
Middle East and Africa.	Page 30
Asia-Pacific Region.	Page 32
Analysis Section One: Rewriting the Slate.	Page 33
Section Two: NATO. How effective has Europe's participation been in an already existing integrated multinational military force.	Page 35
Lisbon 2010.	Page 39
Libya.	Page 42
United Kingdom.	Page 46
France.	Page 49
Spain.	Page 52
United States.	Page 53
Analysis of Nations.	Page 56
NATO Summit 2012.	Page 57
Wales Summit 2014.	Page 62
NATO Response Force.	Page 66
Section Two Analysis.	Page 69
NATO Slate.	Page 69
Section Three: A unified and credible European military force. What attempts have been made to construct this?	Page 74
Section 3a: the Pleven Plan.	Page 75

Section 3b: US influence in European security decisions.	Page 82
Section 3c: Intergovernmental defence strategies.	Page 86
Section 3 (a-c) Analysis.	Page 90
Contemporary Security	Page 94
Section 3d. What institutional security bodies and strategies exist within the EU?	Page 94
Lisbon Treaty.	Page 97
EU Battlegroups.	Page 102
No Battlegroup deployment.	Page 113
Section Three Analysis.	Page 113
Divided from the start: The German Question.	Page 113
Summative Analysis.	Page 118
What does the Parliament think?	Page 122
Multiple Personality Disorder.	Page 126
Conclusion.	Page 128
Bibliography.	Page 132

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Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States' militaries?

Like a phoenix rising from the ashes, Europe emerged from World War Two as something akin to a new creation. Gone were the days of aggressive militarism and war, in its place would be civilian power and democracy; or so Europe hoped. The 20th and 21st Centuries have witnessed some of the most barbaric acts in human history; this barbarity has led Europe on a quest to form a truly integrated European defence force with which to bring peace and justice both within its own borders and also to the world. By utilising Jutta Weldes' Constructivism framework, this thesis unravels and exposes the way in which the constructed identities of the European Union and its forbears have driven this quest in the post-war years; it also explores the interface between these identities and the EU's relationship with NATO, the United States, and its own constituent Member States.

Conflict has been a constant companion to humanity since time began; wars and rumours of wars have impacted how the nations of the world have acted throughout the 20th and 21st Centuries. Europe has often been at the epicentre of some of the modern world's most destructive wars; this dubious distinction was a fact of life for Europe for generations culminating in the most destructive war in history, World War Two. The defeat of the Axis powers laid the foundation for what would become the European Union. This new Europe strived to shed its old constructed identity built on militarism and nationalism and create in its place a new pan-European identity in which disputes would be settled through dialogue rather than at the point of a gun. However despite this sincere desire, conflict has remained a very tangible reality on the global scene and for our focus, in Europe. Despite the high hopes for a peaceful new millennium, the 21st Century has been one mired in bloodshed and war; executions once thought lost in the dark ages of history, have vigorously returned with the crucifixions of Christians and other minorities in the Middle East; while sectarian tensions have left millions under constant threat in many parts of the world. It is in this context, that we explore the question *“Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries?”*

In order to answer this question, the thesis will analyse three distinct areas which play a direct role on EU military integration; these three sections will in turn be analysed within the framework Weldes’ Constructivist theory. In Section One, three primary areas are explored; firstly, we will analyse contemporary security threats that are shaping the global security theatre. These security threats are the wider Middle East, Syria, Ukraine and the Asia-Pacific region. These theatres of conflict have been chosen as they not only have a direct impact on European security, but also on global security. The primary purpose of Section One therefore is to lay the foundation from which we can understand, within the context of contemporary realities, the actions and inactions of the EU, its desire to be a credible global actor, and its quest for an integrated military.

The second section focuses on how the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has impacted the drive towards European military integration. It is vital

to explore the way in which NATO has impacted every facet of European security in the post-war years; as we shall see, it is impossible to overestimate American influence. We will examine how the United States has provided important leadership to European military integration, while at the same engaging in divisive actions which resulted in a major European nation leaving NATO for many decades. In order to unpack the considerable role that NATO plays in European defence, we will explore the manner in which four NATO members undertake their commitments to NATO; these nations are Spain, UK, France and the US. These nations have been chosen as they represent a wide spectrum of capabilities within European defence from both sides of the Atlantic. This in-depth analysis of the four nations provides the reader with a direct insight into these actors and is supplemented by a more widely scoped analysis of other NATO and EU member's attitudes towards NATO.

In addition, Section Two analyses how EU Member States have interacted with NATO through the lenses of the conflict in Libya. This analysis will highlight the shortcomings and divisions which plague both NATO and the EU and provide the reader with a real world view of how Europe's attitude towards defence spending over many decades has led to a capabilities shortfall. Libya is also an important frame of reference because it clearly displays to the reader how the EU's new foreign policy strategy following Lisbon would stack up in a real world crisis. Finally, this section explores how the Chicago and Welsh summits have driven both NATO and conversely European security integration strategies.

The third section will explore how post-war Europe has moved progressively towards an integrated military; this section begins with the very first major integration strategy, the Pleven Plan, and exposes how the constructed identities of post-war Europe impacted this strategy. This section then moves on to analyse how, from the Pleven Plan onwards, we see the same constructed identities appearing throughout the literature and it examines how these identities have impacted Europe's drive to be seen as a credible international security actor. This section will analyse in detail the Pleven Plan, Maastricht, Lisbon, EU Battlegroups and the St Malo Declaration. These areas have been chosen as they highlight the fact that the underpinning identities of the European continent compel its elites to seek for a credible integrated military; these areas also

conclusively show the unmistakable role that the US has played within Europe in addition to the ongoing and deeply rooted divisions that are found within the EU and its predecessors. Through access to EU Parliament resolutions taken directly from the source, we are permitted an insight into just how deep and dangerous these divisions are to the formation of a credible integrated military.

Finally, this thesis will compile the information and conclusions that have been made throughout in order to analyse whether the EU can be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States' militaries; this analysis will be conducted through the lens of Weldes' Constructivism. Constructivism enables the researcher to unpack and analyse what is on the European elites 'slates' and the manner in which this informs and underpins their policy and strategic initiatives in order to enable us to effectively answer; *Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States' militaries?*

Conflict: constant evolution.

When one looks back on humanity's history, there remains a noteworthy constant, that of armed conflict. History, tradition and myth are abounding with conflict; these conflicts range from sibling rivalry, such as in the biblical story of Cain and Abel, to the heroic narratives of David or Hercules in Western culture, and to heroes such as Gilgamesh in the East. Intertwined with these mythic heroic narratives that fill the pages of our past and fire our imaginations today, are the stories and records of historical battles from all parts of the world; whether it be an ancient Roman legion ambushed in Teutoburg Forest or the Maori Chieftain Hone Heke fighting the British in the New Zealand Land Wars of the 19th Century, armed conflict has been a constant companion to human civilisation. While this 'companion' status has remained constant in its partnership with humanity, armed conflict, like human society itself, is ever adapting; one merely needs to examine a history book to witness this adaptation. From the first intertribal conflicts involving rudimentary weapons, to the first professional militaries of Rome, to the Dark Ages of Feudal lords on horseback fighting for honour, and the subsequent ebbing and flowing of weapons and strategy

throughout history, armed conflict rarely maintains a constant state before it evolves.

This observation is more keenly made in the contemporary world than throughout most of human history, with a few notable exceptions such as the introduction of gunpowder to the battlefield. While events in the past such as the introduction of the stirrup to the mounted warrior, or the crossbow, which enabled a poorly trained peasant to incapacitate the Medieval super-weapon, the knight, have revolutionised armed conflict, these revolutions were spread out over a considerably longer span of time than the changes we are witnessing today. When we analyse the last century of weapons development, we cannot but come away astounded at the speed of the development and the sheer scope of the expansion we have seen. An example of this can be witnessed in the usage of aircraft; in World War One, aircraft played a very limited role on the battlefield and were not seen as a vital element with which to gain victory. However by the Second World War, aircraft were seen as vital to domination over the enemy. The Battle of Britain was a forceful example of where the RAF successfully fought off the Luftwaffe, and subsequently the German war machine, to turn the tide of battle against the Nazis. Not only did aircraft play a crucial role in and of themselves, but the manner in which they changed the broad spectrum of conflict is of particular interest; because of the speed of aircraft and the large scale destruction of which they are capable, naval battles have been increasingly focussed on the usage of aircraft carriers and this has made the old style of naval warfare essentially obsolete. From World War Two, into the Cold War, air forces would begin to be armed with the most destructive weapons known to humanity, nuclear weapons. The ability to travel vast distances in a short amount of time with destructive ability led in part to a new form of conflict doctrine, Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of MAD, aircraft again evolved to better meet the operational demands of a post-Cold War world and thus was born the age of the drones.

This extremely brief overview of just one aspect of the evolution of conflict, the role of aircraft in war and its subsequent impact on armed conflict, is important to the central question of this thesis, *‘Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries?’*

The factor of evolution and change is a crucial one because future military integration may be neither familiar nor recognisable to the public, to politicians, to decision makers or to other stakeholders. This potential unpredictability however will not be driven by weapon development alone; while weapon development is important, its evolution is itself driven by the realities of specific theatres of conflict that condition and shape both local actors and these actors' defence paradigms.

Contemporary Europe is undergoing a major shift in its geostrategic outlook; security threats are no longer occurring far from its borders but are once again, and increasingly, occurring within the 'European Neighbourhood'. The following section will explore how events in Eastern Europe, Middle East and North Africa are influencing the EU's security. The conclusion of this section briefly spotlights other regions of the globe that also affect the EU's security directly, despite their geographic location, in particular the Asia- Pacific region.

DEFINITIONS.

Before we proceed any further it is important to first define the terms within this thesis.

European Union (EU).

While this may appear to be self-explanatory, it is important to clarify how the phrase 'EU' is used in this thesis. Within this context, the term is used to refer to any action undertaken by the EU itself and never to an action undertaken by a Member State or group of Member States acting outside of an EU mission; for example, the actions of France in Mali do not qualify as an EU operation due to the fact that the French military presence there is acting under the leadership of the French Government and is taking place outside EU superintendence. In other words, in order to be designated as an EU operation, the said operation must be led by an EU appointed command structure operating under direct EU control.

Credible.

According to the Collins English Dictionary the meaning of 'credible' is, "capable of being believed (and) trustworthy".¹ Thus, the term is used in this context to explore whether or not the EU is viewed by the international community as being able to successfully or effectively operate in a given security environment.

International Security.

This is perhaps the most important and complex concept to define; International Security (IS) is a vast and multifaceted field needing an extensive analysis outside the scope of this thesis. It is a very broad topic with interwoven strands from various issues which all influence one another. For example, a drought in the American mid-West can pose a major security challenge to nations in Africa due to rising food prices and the consequent impact this has on public order. As International Security is inherently volatile, its constituent elements are in a constant state of flux; for example, during the early post-war period, IS was largely driven by the MAD doctrine and thus issues such as Climate Change were of secondary importance.

¹ Collins. *Collins English Dictionary Third Edition*. Wrotham: Market House Books, 1992.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the concept of IS changed to meet the new realities of security in the 1990s. When the Twin Towers were attacked, a new era of IS was actuated; international terrorism was now identified to be the major concern and has subsequently driven the way in which the world views IS in a radical new direction. However with the re-emergence of inter-state conflict in multiple theatres around the globe, we are witnessing once again a further turn in what can be considered IS; note that this new direction of IS will be explored in greater detail following the Literature Review.

The fact that IS is so volatile means that there is no international scholarly or political consensus on how to define it or even what constitutes security. For example Wolfers states that national security is an "ambiguous symbol . . . (which) leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel or scientific usage can afford (and therefore) suffers from the absence of a common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualized, and what its most relevant research questions are."² In contrast to this view, Garnett argues that the concept of security was so overdeveloped that it is "so wide in its scope that it is in danger of being emptied of meaning."³ These two statements illustrate the divergence of the arguments surrounding security; Schultze summarises the variance in this way:

"The concept of national security does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimly perceive".⁴

Despite this challenging reality, it is important to ground this thesis in a coherent definition of what constitutes IS and as the subject is one that focuses on military integration, the author has utilised a somewhat traditional definition to security. Walt defines security as "the study of the threat, use and control of military force", especially of "the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war."⁵ It is important to note that while Walt emphasises military power

² Covenant University. "Media uses and Effects". *Covenant University*. April 2014. <http://eprints.covenantuniversity.edu.ng/3806/1/Dr.%20Jide%20Ibietan%206.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2014).

³ Ibid

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

he does concede that this is not the only source of power or the only way to exercise it.

METHODOLOGY.

This paper employs qualitative methodology to examine the question, "*Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States' militaries*"? The exclusion of quantitative analysis is justified due to the focus of this paper, which is the ability of Europe to act as a credible international security actor; the inclusion of quantitative research methods would be of little relevance as the current integration of Europe's armed forces is effectively only existent on paper. Using a quantitative approach to examine an abstract topic such as constructed or competing national identities, needs and ambitions, will not only fail to offer any definitive insights, but in fact may lead the researcher to false conclusions as the subtleties of constructed national or regional identities are seldom expressed in measurable ways.

Qualitative research can be understood as a research strategy that usually foregrounds words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. Human behaviours and identities are not always based on what can be measured, hence the limitations of the quantitative framework. Qualitative methodology allows us to analyse why and how a culture or nation has constructed its identity and the implications that this identity has on its actions. Sandelowski expands on this, "qualitative research is an umbrella term for an array of attitudes towards and strategies for conducting inquiry that are aimed at discovering how human beings understand, experience, interpret, and produce the social world".⁶ This definition of qualitative methodology highlights the strengths and compatibilities of the research technique with both the research question of this report and the theoretical framework within which the data is analysed.

Jutta Weldes' Constructivism has been used to analyse the research data from a theoretical perspective. This theory enables the researcher to analyse collected data

⁶ Sandelowski, M. *Qualitative Research: The Sage Encyclopaedia of Social Science Research Methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2004.

through a theoretical lens that has been developed by an internationally acclaimed academic whose primary purpose is the analysis of constructed identities using qualitative methodology. Weldes' Constructivism is a particularly insightful tool with which to probe the complex interface between European security needs, the proposed integration of European Member States' militaries, and the multiple and conflicting national and pan-European identities.

When using a qualitative technique in research, it is imperative to ensure that the collected data is interpreted correctly and is of an authoritative and relevant nature. While quantitative research has a substantial numerical focus, and is thus more straightforward in its approach, qualitative research is more interested in the subtleties of the data. When analysing the data for this research, the author has focussed heavily on primary resources such as treaties at both the European and Member State level; these include treaties such as the Maastricht and Lisbon and also the St Malo Treaty and Petersburg Tasks. The primary data is not just limited to public treaties but also includes resolutions and comments made within the European Parliament in Brussels; this information was obtained as a result of my employment as a Parliamentary Assistant in 2014-2015. This ability to utilise primary data directly from the European Union Plenary allowed the author a greater insight into the structures of the Union and their quest for a security union.

While primary data is essential to any research, secondary data is often just as vital as it allows the author to access the research of others to gain a deeper understanding of and insight into what the primary data is stating. The data from primary sources is supplemented by secondary works from authoritative authors who provide a broad framework within which to understand and explore the primary data. These secondary sources originate from a wide range of topics and disciplines which do not necessarily have a primary focus on defence; this thesis has used secondary sources that discuss topics as diverse, yet interconnected, as climate and migration, as well as those with a more direct link to the thesis. This has been done so that the arguments made are of a robust nature and speak for the very diverse and multifaceted nature of contemporary security. Additionally, it is to be understood that the usage of secondary resources is vital and advantageous due to the fact that disinformation is an inescapable feature of government documents and statements. This situation may be due either to deliberate attempts to paint a greater picture of a

government or regime to the globe, or it may be employed to deliberately misled and hide the purpose of a strategy. Thus the use of secondary sources allows the author to analyse what experts have stated about any primary source and thus gain a valuable insight into whether or not a primary source is in fact dis-information.

While it is intended that this dual approach will effectively confine the potential limitations of data collection, it is timely to recall that in any qualitative analysis of constructed identities, the researcher faces a number of latent constraints. As outlined above, these constraints can involve the act of dis-information; however, this not the only constraint. With a Union as vast and multicultural as the EU, inevitably the author will encounter literature from a non-English language source; this reality means that primary data may in fact be an inaccurate or impaired translation in regards to, for example, cultural nuances and idiom, or in that particular phrases and subtleties have been lost in translation and in this way have limited or misled the researcher. While this can weaken aspects of an argument taken from a single source, the overall problem can be mitigated through the usage of multiple sources, both primary and secondary, on a certain issue.

THEORY.

Weldes argues that “national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world . . . and the place of the state in it is understood”.⁷ To expand, national interests, from Weldes’ perspective, are not necessarily based on fact but rather on the shared meanings and understandings that state officials place on both historical and contemporary events; while linguistic resources are understood as being utilised to construct national identities. Each of these events and linguistic resources is then “simultaneously given an identity; . . . with characteristics which are sometimes precise and certain, at other times vague and unsettled . . . their importance lies not in their accuracy, but in their provision of warranting conditions which make a particular action or belief more justified”.⁸ This statement by Weldes reinforces the central argument of Constructivism, which is uninterested in whether or not a position or identity is in fact based on objective, verifiable evidence. In

⁷ Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 280.

⁸ *Ibid*, 281-282.

Constructivism, the focus is on how a nation or in fact any political union has arrived at the understandings of their own identity, how they fit into the global scene, and the way in which the elite have come to view who their potential adversaries are on this global scene. Therefore, from Weldes' position, one can argue that people, whether they are the elite or not, act towards objects (including other actors) from the basis of the shared meanings that these objects have.⁹

Weldes further argues that national interests are constructed "through the dual mechanisms of articulation and interpellation, of representations of international politics".¹⁰ Articulation refers to a process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials or linguistic resources.¹¹ Interpellation is a process whereby identities or subject positions are created and concrete individuals are 'hailed' into or interpellated by them;¹² to clarify, Weldes states that "specific identities are created when social relations are depicted, different representations of the world entail different identities, which in turn carry with them different ways of functioning in the world . . . and make possible different interests".¹³

With these characteristics of Weldes' Constructivism, the underlying identity that is driving Europe's quest for security can be explained. It is evident that to account for any state action, it is vital to understand the constructed identities of the state's elites. When we consider that state officials do not conduct foreign and domestic policy from a purely rational or impartial position, but rather from the locus of an individual or community that has its views and opinions coloured and influenced by past and contemporary events, then we can begin to analyse at a deeper level the reasons why and how nations such as the United Kingdom and France have acted in both the past and present, and may act in the future.

One significant component of Weldes' framework is the notion of the 'blank slate'; she observes, "State officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate on to which meanings are written only as a result of interactions among states".¹⁴

Weldes goes on to develop her position by stating, "Instead they approach

⁹ Weldes, Jutta. "Constructing national interests." *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 279.

¹⁰ Ibid, 287.

¹¹ Ibid, 284.

¹² Ibid, 287.

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Ibid, 280

international politics with an already quite comprehensive and elaborate appreciation of the world, of the international system and of the place of the state within it".¹⁵ Therefore, understanding the 'slate/s' which underpin the constructed identity and conflicting identities of the EU and its Member States is vital if we are to meaningfully explore how and why the EU is influenced by its own histories; how these events influence contemporary actions, decisions and policies; and importantly, to posit how Europe's elites might respond to current and future threats to their geostrategic interests.

¹⁵ Weldes, Jutta. "Constructing national interests." *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 280

LITERATURE REVIEW:

The literary world is filled with resources concerning security and warfare. From humanity's earliest ages, conflict has been a constant companion and is therefore a prevalent topic discussed in a variety of literary genre; from the epics of the Iliad and religious texts like the Book of Judges, to contemporary authors such as Martin van Creveld and Moshe Dayan, conflict is found everywhere. This abundance of literature covers a wide spectrum of topics ranging from feminism and war, right through to hard line nationalistic Neo Cons. Perhaps one of the most unique aspects of security and warfare literature is that it is very difficult to get either up to date or accurate information surrounding many aspects of a particular nation's military and future security strategies. To clarify this position, while nations do publish statistics regarding spending and troop numbers, for example, and while governments do make their future planning known to a certain degree, this information must always be taken with the proverbial 'grain of salt'. This cautious approach is necessary as the security arena, and a specific nation's military role in it, is by its very nature a dangerous one. While it is true that for many nations war is a distant reality, the fact remains that even for these nations and particularly for those involved in conflict, there are many actors and agents who are more than happy to sabotage or sell security information. Thus, any formal announcement or presentation by a national government regarding security is likely to contain both undisclosed elements and elements that are there to disguise sensitive information.

This reality is important to highlight as it reminds us to question the credibility of any and all information that is gathered; however, the impact of this reality can be limited by utilising multiple resources from both primary and secondary resources. This combination allows the researcher to gain a more robust and fuller understanding of a global sector where lives are truly on the line.

A Review of the Secondary Resources.

As stated prior, the literary world is filled with resources regarding security; this thesis utilised a wide range of secondary resources from both sides of the Atlantic. These resources include publications such as Jane's Defence, newspaper and media articles, journal articles and academic papers. This dual approach, Europe and the US, enables this thesis to not only analyse what European authors think about

European security, but also what those in the US think. As Weldes' Constructivism is the underpinning theory for this thesis, what state actors think and the attitudes they hold is considered pivotal. In addition, because this thesis has a strong focus on the credibility of a potential European integrated military, it was vital to include the American authors as credibility does not consist simply of what one thinks of oneself but more importantly, of what others think of you and of what they do with those thoughts. The American position was succinctly summarised by Robert Gates when pointed out in a speech in Brussels in 2011 that "the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country ... yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference".¹⁶ It is interesting to note how the American world viewed the European contribution to the Libyan operation; however when we compare the American critique with a European perspective, we find both compatibility and incompatibility. According to the NATO Secretary General in his 2011 Annual Report, "NATO's Operation . . . was one of the most remarkable in (its) history. It showed the Alliance's strength and flexibility".¹⁷ On the other hand, Lt General Ploeger was "quick to acknowledge the contribution of US forces to NATO's success in terms of ISR platforms, refuelling capabilities, and low collateral damage weapons – areas in which he admits that the European NATO states have a weak hand."¹⁸

A Review of the Primary Resources.

As with the secondary resources, the range of primary data is extensive. This thesis utilises Constructivist Theory in order to extrapolate the meaning behind the data; as such, speeches by the elite of the EU and its Member States have been examined in addition to treaties, intergovernmental agreements, regional summits and resolutions from the European Parliament. It must be stressed at this point that NATO documentation is also considered primary. NATO is the largest and most significant

¹⁶ The Economist. 2011. "Libya, Europe and the future of NATO." 10 June 2011.

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/06/libya-europe-and-future-nato> (Accessed 20 May 2014)

¹⁷ Etchells, Anthony. *Reflections on Op Unified Protector*. December 27, 2011. <http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/military-operations/reflections-on-op-unified-protector> (accessed March 1, 2014).

¹⁸ Etchells, Anthony. *Reflections on Op Unified Protector*. December 27, 2011.

<http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/military-operations/reflections-on-op-unified-protector> (accessed March 1, 2014).

transatlantic military alliance and includes the majority of EU Member States; documentation from this alliance has been included in recognition of the significant importance that the organisation has played in shaping both the contemporary and historical understanding of European military integration.

Just as with the secondary resources, the reader is quick to discover that the Anglo-American / French divide is very much evident. Throughout major European treaties such as Maastricht and Lisbon we see continued reference to the divide between these two power blocks such as in the Lisbon Treaty which states;

“The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation”¹⁹

The position that NATO and the US take in the literature is astonishing for its prevalence throughout; this will be explored in greater detail in the following sections. Not only is the existence of an Anglo-American / French divide evident, the EU’s own norms and values are a predominant theme. As the EU claims to be a normative actor we find that these values are interwoven throughout the literature; however, one can come away feeling that these normative values are more decorative than foregrounded or substantial, in many cases they seem to have only been ‘tagged onto’ the end of a given statement in an attempt to reinforce the cherished position of ‘normative actor’. This can be seen in the following words, “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens”.²⁰ On the surface, this statement seems to clearly indicate a desire to promote its normative values on the world stage; yet when compared with EU action and other statements within their treaties, one does come away with the sense that the inclusion of norms and values in the primary literature is nothing more than well intentioned political jargon.

One final important aspect that is found throughout the primary data is the evidence of vague statements and the reoccurrence of calls to take defence seriously. It is little wonder when we consider the considerable sum of money that the US spends on

¹⁹ European Union. "Treaty of Lisbon." *Europa*. December 17, 2007. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF> (accessed January 10, 2014).

²⁰ *Ibid*

defence, that it is less than complimentary about EU military budgets and remains unconvinced that the EU is actually pulling its weight; this commonplace situation becomes far more interesting when we find that the EU and its members also consistently state this same concern. Throughout the literature, there are multiple statements and resolutions calling for the EU Member States to stop making uncoordinated spending cuts and to meet the NATO required spending; and yet at the same time according to the literature, the same cycle is continued year by year and the same calls for cuts are made again and again, often by those who are undertaking the most serious cuts. As noted before, this thesis will be utilising Constructivism to analyse the data, therefore language is key to understanding the constructed identities that are displayed within the primary data; when phrases such as ‘turf war’, ‘disappointed’, ‘regret’ and ‘urgent’ are commonplace throughout the data it becomes clear that there is a major problem occurring within the EU.

Constraints and Limitations.

The available literature provides an adequately clear view into the murky and contradictory world of European military integration. It is important to note here that despite the considerable amount of literary resources available on this subject, the fact that the author only speaks English has limited this research to that of the English speaking world. This limitation is most strongly felt in the secondary data field, as the author was unable to analyse with any certainty resources from the non-English speaking world. However, this fact is mitigated firstly by the fact that many prominent works have been translated into English, and secondly, and most importantly, the vast majority of primary data is available in English, due to the fact that both NATO and the EU have English as one of their primary working languages. It still must be stressed though that the inability to access French language resources in particular was a limitation; while these resources are often translated into English, the fact remains that cultural nuances may be lost in translation. The fact that all the primary data is available in English makes the comparison of the primary and secondary data considerably easier; as such we are able to view how in both sets of data we see the same recurring themes, the role of the US, the Anglo American French split and the ongoing defence cuts in Europe. All these positions are thoroughly examined in this thesis.

Comparison of Primary and Secondary Data.

When comparing the primary and secondary data, it becomes clear that they both follow similar themes; we see the continued presence of the United States, the conflict between the British and French, the ongoing desire for Europe to be a major world player while at the same time seemingly being unable to fulfil this desire. It is interesting to note just how complementary both the primary and secondary data are to each other; there is an abundance of both positive and negative viewpoints towards European integration and yet in both sides, as we shall see in this thesis, the literature reinforces the same themes.

SECTION ONE: REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS.

Following the destruction of World War Two and the decades of constant anxiety experienced during the Cold War, the nations of the world have worked to become increasingly interconnected at all levels of society. No longer does a mountain or an ocean separate people from one another and thus create fear of the unknown, neither do differences in language and culture prevent people from connecting with one another in ways that would have seemed only a few decades ago to be science fiction. This interconnectedness has led to new interpretations of what constitutes a border and what it means to be a citizen of a nation and also most importantly, how business is conducted in the 21st Century. The interconnected nature of international business and trade is a double edged sword; from one perspective, international trade allows the relatively free flow of goods like oil or natural resources from regions such as the Middle East and Africa, which are rich in these resources, to nations and regions like Europe, who are relatively resource poor in this respect but have an insatiable appetite for fossil fuels. This 'edge of the sword' sees trade facilitating market expansion through the access of raw materials. However the other 'edge' is exposed when some form of instability exists which threatens crucial areas of trade or lines of communication; events which may be geographically isolated now constitute a direct threat to regional and even global security.

This section will analyse four key regions that affect the EU and its Member States' security. These regions are the Middle East, Eastern Europe, North Africa and finally Asia-Pacific. These regions have been chosen due to the impact that they have on European security; areas of concern include the Iranian nuclear debate, the Arab-Israeli conflict, events in Syria and Libya, the rise of China, and finally the crisis in Ukraine. While these sections will only be briefly explored, the dual purpose is to give the reader the opportunity to see in a clear and concise manner the varied and very real threats that are on Europe's border regions and to demonstrate that the EU's border regions are highly volatile.

In addition, these arenas of conflict form the backdrop to our core question: '*Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States' militaries?*' as any potential or simply mooted regional military

integration will not occur in a vacuum. EU military integration will take place under the spotlight of any perceived current or future threat to both a Member State or to the Union as a whole.

Regional conflicts with the potential to impact European security:

The Middle East and North Africa.

With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent restructuring of the region by the victorious Allies of the First World War, the region quickly descended into a century of violence and slaughter. This violence has been driven by multiple and often contradictory interests, these interests could be loosely framed as religious, ethnic, political and nationalistic. Consequently, when the Arab Spring burst onto the world scene in late 2010, many held high hopes for real change in an area that had long suffered under brutal dictatorships. These hopes were initially realised with the relatively non-violent revolution in Egypt, which saw Mubarak peacefully step down. Early optimism was soon smashed as the conflict in Libya spiralled out of control, closely followed by violence erupting in the streets of Syria and in various other arenas such as Bahrain, where the Saudi military helped the government to crush opposition forces. This section will briefly explore how the violence in Syria and Libya and the uncertainties surrounding Iranian nuclear ambitions and the State of Israel are destabilising the region.

Syria.

With the conflict now nearing the end of its fourth year, the EU still maintains that it is taking an active role in the conflict. To date, more than 200 000 people have died and 9 million have been displaced either within Syria or in neighbouring countries in the ongoing conflict and over 1.6 million refugees have escaped the ongoing conflict. Following the bloody repression of anti-government protests in Syria in March of 2011, the EU began to formulate a series of strategies that it viewed would be the most effective at bringing peace to this

troubled land.²¹ The strategies formulated by the EU towards Syria were adopted on 24th of June 2011. These strategies were primarily focussed at “support(ing) a political process that brings a sustainable solution to the crisis”;²² to achieve this change, the EU initially pursued policies that directly targeted Assad’s government in a nonlethal manner. The approach had a triple focus: an arms embargo which included both weapons and equipment that Assad’s forces could utilise in order to violently suppress the protestors; the use of targeted sanctions which included a travel ban and asset freeze; and finally, the cessation of the bilateral cooperation programmes between the EU and Syrian government under the MEDA/ENPI instruments.²³ It is important to highlight that this arms embargo initially targeted both sides of the conflict.²⁴

In March of 2013, France and Britain successfully lobbied to enable EU Member States to openly arm the FSA.²⁵ This successful lobbying however came at the expense of the very purpose of EU foreign policy, that is, to act with a common voice. Of the 28 Member States, it would seem that only Britain and France will play a major role in this particular foreign policy strategy.²⁶ William Hague, then Foreign Secretary of the UK, argued that the strategy of supplying arms to the FSA, via the opposition Syrian National Coalition, was a considerable tool to be utilised by the EU in order to bring about an end to the conflict and the defeat of Assad.²⁷ Despite this grandiose claim, the reality is that after this strategy was officially announced, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia would

²¹ European External Action Service. *Syria*. No Date. <http://eeas.europa.eu/syria/> (accessed August 16, 2014).

²² European Commission. *Towards a comprehensive EU approach to the Syrian crisis: an EU joint communication*. 24 June 2013. europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-596_en.htm (accessed August 12, 2014).

²³ European External Action Service. *Syria*. No Date. <http://eeas.europa.eu/syria/> (accessed August 16, 2014).

²⁴ Comery, James. *One of the most pressing human rights issues in the beginning of the 21st Century is the security and human rights nexus, discuss in the context of the EU with a focus on a specific human rights challenge*. Student Paper, Christchurch: Un Published, 2013.

²⁵ Tisdall, Simon. *EU decision to arm Syria's rebels could prove a gamble too far*. 28 May 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/28/eu-arm-syria-rebels-gamble-too-far> (accessed August 15, 2014).

²⁶ Tisdall, Simon. *EU decision to arm Syria's rebels could prove a gamble too far*. 28 May 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/28/eu-arm-syria-rebels-gamble-too-far> (accessed August 15, 2014).

²⁷ Ibid

deliver advanced S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Assad, regardless of concerns expressed by Israel and other nations.^{28 29}

Rebels' Free Syrian Army (FSA).

With the EU' decision to arm the FSA now firmly established by Member States France and Britain, the question must be asked who exactly are the FSA? The question is especially important for the EU when we consider that two of its most prominent Member States have taken it upon themselves to arm this force; while the question is important, the answer is very complicated as there is no clearly accepted definition of who or what constitutes the FSA. To further confound the issue, those states who have defined this military force often represent them in a way that reinforces their own political and strategic interests in the region. A salient example of this can be found in the way Iran has described the FSA; a senior political figure described them as "extremists, outlaws, saboteurs and terrorists".³⁰ This individual went on to state that the FSA rebels had aligned themselves with foreign mercenaries who share no common ideology apart from their desire to overthrow the government of Assad. While it can be considered relatively easy to dismiss this characterisation of the FSA by Iran as yet another example of extremist ideology, Iran's fears, dismissed by many in the early stages of the conflict as ideologically driven propaganda, are now mainstream understanding. The FSA was unable to fulfil its ambitious promises of regime overthrow; its forces were profoundly affected by a combination of attacks against it by well-resourced jihadist groups and an Assad regime strengthened by the lack of Western intervention and staunch support from Russia and Iran; corruption and internal divisions have also combined to erode the confidence of its fighters. Since the start of this bloody war, Britain and France's 'moderate'

²⁸ Parfitt, Tom. *Russia pushes ahead with arms shipments to Syria*. 22 July 2013. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10195594/Russia-pushes-ahead-with-arms-shipments-to-Syria.html> (accessed August 20, 2014).

²⁹ Comery, James. *One of the most pressing human rights issues in the beginning of the 21st Century is the security and human rights nexus, discuss in the context of the EU with a focus on a specific human rights challenge*. Student Paper, Christchurch: Un Published, 2013.

³⁰ Fars News Agency. *Iran: US, Britain unwilling to see Rebels' crimes in Syria*. 30 July 2013. english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13920508000424 (accessed August 15, 2014).

FSA has in fact joined forces with, or its troops have defected to, Islamist groups like the al al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).³¹

While the issue of jihadists raised by Iran, and also Russia, presents a number of challenging questions, we must not forget that for both these countries it is imperative for their regional goals and, for Iran in particular its national security, to paint the FSA in a manner which legitimises their own involvement in arming and backing Assad's forces. However, it is interesting to note that many within the EU now share the same concerns that both Russia and Iran have always held and this is in fact one of the primary reasons for the initial placement of the arms embargo on both sides of the conflict.³²

The EU was understandably concerned that if it provided weapons to the FSA, these weapons could potentially fall into the hands of extremists.³³ This underlying concern is represented in the way in which the EU struggles to define the FSA and other rebel forces. There appears to be as yet no concrete definition constructed by the EU as to who or what the FSA is, other than what they are not, that is to say they are not pro-Assad and thus, are fighting the pro-Assad forces. While there is no concrete definition of the FSA, what is now known is that, as stated above, within its ranks foreign jihadists, al-Qaeda and ISIS are playing a progressively greater role in the conflict.³⁴ In the early months of the conflict, Professor Ahamad Moussalli, who is an expert on Islamic movements, stated that these rebel groups and their strong links with al-Qaeda would pose a threat to not only Syria, but to the wider region.³⁵ This claim would appear to be a prescient

³¹ Comery, James. *One of the most pressing human rights issues in the beginning of the 21st Century is the security and human rights nexus, discuss in the context of the EU with a focus on a specific human rights challenge*. Student Paper, Christchurch: Un Published, 2013.

³² Rosemberg, Claire. *EU split over Britain, France push to arm Syria rebels*. 22 March 2013. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iC3zpF474plrAVnZbkfOzhITX2xA?docId=CNG.329d8674cd86210178aeb14d0a35ce98.3b1> (accessed August 15, 2014).

³³ *Ibid*

³⁴ Paton Walsh, Nick and Foley, James. *Libyan fighting in Syria symbolizes fears*. 21 September 2012. <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/20/world/meast/syria-libya-fighter/index.html> (accessed August 1, 2014).

³⁵ Paton Walsh, Nick and Foley, James. *Libyan fighting in Syria symbolizes fears*. 21 September 2012. <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/20/world/meast/syria-libya-fighter/index.html> (accessed August 1, 2014).

description of this progressively bloody war, elements of the FSA and other rebel groups have been involved in clashes with Lebanese, Jordanian and Iraqi forces on a number of occasions. These foreign fighters have also played a key role in numerous atrocities committed against civilians in Syrian towns and cities and in particular Shiite, Kurdish and Christian communities.^{36 37}

This reality is intriguing; it would appear that at the behest of its two most powerful Member States, the EU has been jostled into supporting an organisation that cannot be defined, has a significant component of known terrorists within it and has numerous competing ideologies from multiple regions of the globe which all vie for a prominent position and leadership within the FSA. This inability to accurately define and understand a military force while actively supporting them would seem to go against every normative value of the EU, alongside its own regional security concerns. While it is easy to only highlight the role that Britain and France have played in arming the rebels, one must not forget that other Member States are now actively supporting the FSA. Germany for example is providing real time intelligence to the FSA in regards to Syrian military positions and movements; this intelligence can then be used by the FSA to more effectively defend or assault these Syrian forces.³⁸ It is also important to once again reiterate the fact that despite the opposition of many Member States towards directly arming the FSA, many of these same Member States, who are so vocal in their opposition, are in fact responsible for arming the FSA through third party arms transfers which in themselves go against the EU's arms trading laws and procedures. This active participation and collusion by EU Member States calls

³⁶ Shea, Nina. *The Shadow War Against Syria's Christians*. 2 July 2013. <http://www.christianpost.com/news/the-shadow-war-against-syrias-christians-99217/> (accessed August 1, 2014).

³⁷ Comery, James. *One of the most pressing human rights issues in the beginning of the 21st Century is the security and human rights nexus, discuss in the context of the EU with a focus on a specific human rights challenge*. Student Paper, Christchurch: Un Published, 2013.

³⁸ Reuters. *Syria rebels aided by Germany intel ship in fight against Assad forces, report says*. 19 August 2012. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/syria-rebels-aided-by-germany-intel-ship-in-fight-against-assad-forces-report-says-1.459268> (accessed August 15, 2014).

into question the legitimacy of the EU's constructed identity in regards to human rights.³⁹

Ukraine.

What was once deemed by some to be unthinkable is now a very tangible reality, conflict has returned to European soil. The current conflict in Ukraine can be traced back to the protests in the Maidan Square in Kiev, where pro-Western supporters clashed with government forces after the government refused to sign an agreement with the EU. The protestors in Kiev, with what seems considerable Western backing, were able to overthrow the elected government and put in place a new government under President Poroshenko. It must be stressed here that although the current conflict can be seen as a direct result of the Maidan Square protests, the reality is that Ukraine has long been divided along an East–West line. The Western sector has always viewed itself as more European, while the East has retained a very strongly pro-Russian position. However, while there are differences in cultural outlook, it is pertinent to state that these differences are not as entrenched as many within the media would have us believe and as with any nation with a large land mass there will always be differences with the regions.⁴⁰

Despite this reality, the Maidan protests and the subsequent creation of a new government divided the country on an East–West divide. The march to open conflict soon began; in February of 2014, the newly formed Parliament voted to ban Russian as the second official language. Although this was later rescinded, the damage had been done. The anger felt by many in the East at what they viewed as being a Western coup was now being exacerbated by this proposed legislation.⁴¹ Only a matter of days after this vote, pro-Russian gunmen seized key buildings within Crimea and the Russian parliament approved the use of

³⁹ Comery, James. *One of the most pressing human rights issues in the beginning of the 21st Century is the security and human rights nexus, discuss in the context of the EU with a focus on a specific human rights challenge*. Student Paper, Christchurch: Un Published, 2013.

⁴⁰ McLaughlin, Lauren. *The Conflict in Ukraine: a Historical Perspective*. No date given 2014. <http://www.summer.harvard.edu/blog-news-events/conflict-ukraine-historical-perspective> (accessed April 15, 2015).

⁴¹ BBC. *Ukraine crisis: Timeline*. 14 November 2014. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26248275> (accessed April 15, 2015).

force to protect vital strategic assets within Ukraine. This approval was a clear indication from Russia that they would not sit idly by as Ukraine descended into chaos; soon after these events, Russia annexed Crimea.

The annexation of Crimea by Russian forces stunned Europe and the US; until it actually happened, its likelihood had been routinely ridiculed by the intelligentsia as an absurd Sarah Palin proposition.⁴² Arguing whether this annexation was legitimate or not is outside the scope of this thesis; however, the impact that the annexation had on the security of the region very much is. We cannot escape the fact that the occupation of Crimea by Russian forces constitutes the largest land grab in Europe following the end of the Second World War. The conflict has continued on into the present day with what appears to be a stalemate forming in the East; Russian-backed forces have been able to cement their hold on large swathes of Eastern Ukraine, while pro-Western forces have been unable to remove these fighters and each attempt has resulted in considerable civilian casualties. It is interesting to note that no clear solution to resolving this conflict can be seen on the horizon. With each passing month, Eastern European and Caucus States increasingly worry about the potential for a similar conflict to spread to their lands; paranoia about the presence of secret Russian agent provocateurs is now widespread amongst many within these nations, while in Russia anti-Western rhetoric is heating up both on the streets and at senior levels of the Kremlin. This anti-Western paranoia has not been helped by Western imposed sanctions on Russia's elites, while on the other hand continued Russian troop movements in Eastern Ukraine have likewise stoked fear and paranoia in Europe's Eastern regions.

May 2015.

From the moment research for this thesis began to the final week of writing, the globe has undergone considerable upheaval. This section has only briefly touched upon two conflicts, Syria and Ukraine; they were highlighted due to the very real

⁴² Vincent, James. *Sarah Palin predicted in 2008 that Putin would invade Ukraine if Obama was elected*. 4 March 2014. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/sarah-palin-predicted-in-2008-that-putin-would-invade-ukraine-if-obama-was-elected-9167833.html> (accessed April 15, 2014).

security threat that they pose to the EU and the wider region. However, it is important here to briefly explore other areas of concern which also pose a threat to the interface between European and global security.

Middle East and Africa.

As stated prior, the Middle East has been home to almost constant violence for the past century. The 21st Century has seen not only this violence continue but intensify. Groups such as ISIS, who have appeared almost overnight, now strike terror in this region from Lebanon to Yemen. The speed with which ISIS were able to establish a new Caliphate, spanning multiple countries, and without any Western intervention, is phenomenal. While the world has, by and large, stood back and watched, ancient cities and monuments have been reduced to rubble and Christians continue to be crucified and burnt alive; Yazidi men and boys are being slaughtered while their wives and daughters are sold as sex slaves.

Homosexuals are thrown from roofs or stoned to death, while those accused of witch craft are slaughtered. And yet, in general, the world has not acted with any effect. With the start of 2015 we have seen the conflict migrate to Yemen, where Iranian backed Shia are fighting Saudi backed government forces. The conflict has left millions of people without access to water and other provisions while dramatically increasing the chances of full blown interstate conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which have both been vying for control of the strategic waterways on their borders and in the wider Middle East.

The conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been exacerbated by the Saudi and Israeli concerns over Obama's actions and policy direction regarding the Iranian nuclear program. These perceptions have led to an unlikely alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia and also to a very public display by the Israelis of the potential of their capabilities to significantly impair the Iranian nuclear program independently; this occurred in Yemen in late April 2015 when the Israelis detonated one of their new, and previously unknown, state of the art bunker buster bombs. While the Israelis have proved their potential ability to destroy an Iranian nuclear facility, the Saudis have played their hand by utilising their mutual defence treaty with Pakistan, which sees thousands of heavily armed Pakistan soldiers arrive in Saudi Arabia. This alliance with Pakistan has led many

to suspect that if Iran were to obtain a nuclear weapon, that the Saudi regime would quickly acquire their own from Pakistan, and thus start a nuclear arms race in an incredibly volatile region.

The Middle East is not alone in facing incredible turmoil and conflict; following the Arab Spring and the bombing campaign in Libya, North Africa is now home to chronic tribal and regional warfare. Militant Islamist groups have seized entire regions and cities and have imposed strict religious laws similar to those imposed by ISIS elsewhere. These groups who in some cases have now aligned themselves with ISIS have followed in their steps by targeting Christians and other minority groups. These Islamist forces now pose an existential threat to southern European states and claim that they will strike at European cities and towns from their bases in North Africa. Their bold statements are not overstatements but in fact expose very concrete threats; when we consider the distance from many North African ports under their control and the vast numbers of refugee boats arriving in Europe, we see immediately that the threat is viable. The conflict that has arisen from the Arab Spring has led to unprecedented numbers of migrants and refugees heading to Europe; this in and of itself constitutes a thesis topic, but within the limits of brevity it is important to at least raise it. The migrant boats have progressively become a serious security threat to the EU as the conflict which is occurring throughout Africa is driving more and more people to seek refuge within Europe. Many of these people are genuinely seeking a better life for themselves; however there appears to be a rather disturbing trend occurring in these migrant ships. Christians and other 'undesirables' are being thrown overboard by their fellow passengers and militants are believed to be positioning themselves within these refugee groups in order to infiltrate Europe and lay the foundation for future terrorist attacks. The issues briefly outlined here are just the tip of the iceberg in terms of security issues arising out of the Middle East and North Africa; groups such as Boko Haram and the racial uprisings in South Africa all directly or indirectly affect European Security.

To conclude this section, it is important to now turn to the Asia-Pacific region.

Despite the geographic distance between Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, events here have in the past and present had the ability to impact regional security

not only in Europe but also globally. Outbreaks such as ‘Bird Flu’ or Communist revolutions in Vietnam and China have dramatically affected the globe with the repercussions still felt today. Today, the South China Sea has become a potential flashpoint between multiple nations and has witnessed many examples of belligerent actions undertaken by multiple parties. When we consider that today an ever increasing shift of world power towards the East is well under way, we can conclude with some certainty that contemporary and future regional realities here will grow in commensurate importance to global security.

Asia-Pacific region.

Despite being located on the opposite side of the planet, events in this region have the potential to dramatically affect European and global security. This region boasts almost half the world’s population and many of the world’s fastest growing economies.⁴³ Such is the importance of this region that the United States has initiated a massive “Pivot” to the region; this pivot has seen considerable military resources that were once located in Europe moved to the Asia Pacific region. With the growing presence of both US strategic assets and its vocal support for many of the smaller nations in the region, the balance of power appears to be shifting. In addition, the Philippines, Japan and Vietnam have all increased their rhetoric and taken action to further the strength of their claims to the disputed resources in the two seas.⁴⁴ A pertinent example of the uncertainty and potential for conflict in the contested waters is the Philippines; they have stated that their 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty, signed with the United States, will be honoured by the United States if conflict were to erupt with China. On the basis of this confidence, Manila has taken steps to press its claims more vigorously than they would have done if they had not believed they had the backing of the US.⁴⁵

⁴³ U.S. Department of State. *Asia Overview: Protecting American Interests in China and Asia*. March 31, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2011/03/159450.htm> (accessed August 25, 2014).

⁴⁴ Bolton, John. *As China Muscles Into the Pacific, the U.S. Lacks a Strategy*. September 10, 2012. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444273704577637560538194478.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (accessed September 14, 2014).

⁴⁵ Tritten, Travis. *Philippine government gives OK for US to use old bases, newspaper reports*. June 7, 2012. <http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/philippines/philippine-government-gives-ok-for-us-to-use-old-bases-newspaper-reports-1.179790> (accessed August 25, 2014).

However, Washington refuses to comment on how the US would respond to Chinese aggression in the contested waters. Although the US refuses to comment on any potential action, Manila and Washington are both aware of the importance of Filipino ports and airfields to Obama's Pivot.

The South China Sea is one of the world's primary trade arteries with over half the world's merchant fleet (by tonnage) and over five trillion dollars' worth of trade sailing through these sea lanes each year. The region has an abundant fish stock which is vital to many of the area's national economies; with the recent discovery of significant quantities of oil and gas, control of this region has become vital to the national interests of the regional players. The primary competitors for these resources are China; Taiwan; Indonesia; the Philippines; Vietnam; Malaysia and Brunei; each of these states assert overlapping claims regarding land features and the adjacent waters. This potential for a military flashpoint is nothing new; since the mid-1970's, there have been periodical skirmishes in the region which have been primarily motivated by the strategic need to show military and political dominance over the resource rich islands and adjacent seas.⁴⁶

ANALYSIS Section One: Rewriting the Slate.

While this thesis is focussing on European military integration, it is vital to ground any analysis of the topic in the geostrategic climate within which this integration is occurring. Any integration of a region's military does not occur in a vacuum; events and ideals both within the region and outside play an important and vital role in shaping any such integration. This section has overviewed events that are occurring outside Europe; subsequent sections analyse those existing within the EU. It is important to note here that this Section One analysis will be brief as it serves simply as a framework and is not central content; furthermore, while the subject matter covered in this section is important and influential, the issues highlighted here only serve to highlight an aspect of what is on the "slate" of EU decision makers regarding military integration.

⁴⁶ Comery, James. *No Title*. Student Paper, Christchurch: Unpublished, 2012.

From a constructivist perspective the issues that have been raised here come together to constitute one of the foundation blocks upon which the shared meanings and understandings of European elite are constructed. As Weldes states, “national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world . . . and the place of the state in it is understood”,⁴⁷ Weldes further affirms this by arguing, “State officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate on to which meanings are written only as a result of interactions among states”. These two statements are the bedrock of Constructivism and help us to understand just how vital it is to analyse European military integration. The “blank slate” which Weldes refers to in this case is filled with the perceived knowledge that widespread upheaval and conflict are occurring not only on the periphery, as in the case of the Middle East and North Africa, but now also within Europe itself – Ukraine. The reality of significant and currently unstoppable conflict occurring within Europe is shaping the way in which Europe now sees itself in the world; in particular, the idea that EU power and EU normative values are capable of bringing peace to the continent is in the process of shattering. The slate is being rewritten in Europe and the rewriting is further reinforced by the events in the Middle East, North Africa and progressively the Asia Pacific. It is important to note here that while these events have affected what is on the EU’s slate, this does not mean that the EU or its member states will take effective and integrated action to reverse the current descent into war. Rather, the contemporary situation may in and of itself lead to the construction of multiple and conflicting slates, a multiple personality disorder if you will, within the EU which could all too possibly start a process in which the Member States influence what is written one another’s slates in a spiral of confusion and conflict.

⁴⁷ Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 280.

SECTION TWO: NATO.

How effective has Europe's participation been in an already existing integrated multinational military force?

With any analysis of European defence, one cannot ignore the significant position that NATO has played in the shaping and construction of contemporary European strategic thinking. Following the destruction of two World Wars and countless centuries of religious and political strife, Europe alongside the United States (US) formed the North Atlantic Treaty Association in 1949. The formation of NATO was in direct response to the perceptions of Western Europe and the US that a new adversary was growing in the East, that being the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Throughout the Cold War, the primary focus of NATO was the defence of Europe from the unabated fear of an imminent Soviet invasion, which subsequently never occurred. As such, the first official operation conducted by NATO was in fact against Saddam Hussein's regime in the first Gulf War of the 1990s; however, it is important to note that while the first Gulf War was the initial, public and visible operation conducted by NATO, NATO had in the past conducted more covert operations during the Cold war against Communism. One such operation was GLADIO, which infamously saw NATO members conduct themselves in a rather insidious manner on European soil. While operations such as GLADIO are both highly interesting and informative about the lengths that NATO member states went to in order to combat the Soviet Union and Communism, they are of little relevance to our investigation.

Section Two explores the relationship between the EU, Member States and NATO. It does so in order to foreground an already existent European military alliance thus enabling a greater understanding of both historic and contemporary strategic thinking among the Member States. The examination of the relationship also permits an analysis of how this important alliance may impact any future military integration within the EU itself; in addition, it gives us a window into how Europe, and its individual Member States, has and does conduct itself within an integrated military alliance, both strengths and fracture points are revealed. NATO is a powerful military alliance which has involved

itself in internationally significant crises, but as we will see the power base is currently lopsided and the ability and willingness to act is often ill-matched. These are important factors which will inevitably both impact, and be impacted by, any integrated EU military force; an integrated EU military would require the current longstanding relationship with NATO to be profoundly restructured both at a day-to-day operational level and at the more existential level, asking “what is NATO?”

The relationship between two actors as large and diverse as the European Union and NATO is understandably somewhat labyrinthine; however because the interface between them is so central to the key question of this thesis, the relationship will be briefly explored in order to highlight the key aspects. The starting position for the analysis must begin with the fact that NATO was formed prior to the creation of the contemporary EU, and thus the primary focus of the initial treaty was the cooperation between individual NATO Member States. This is important because NATO was not initially designed to incorporate another large multi-national body within the alliance and thus, when an analysis of the EU is undertaken, we discover that the Member States all hold considerable differences in their foreign policy each of which has the potential to impact their interaction with one another and with NATO itself. For example, the Irish constitution is pacifist; in the case of Germany, there exists a sense of national guilt over past crimes; as ex-colonial powers, the UK and France still view their spheres of influence as occurring throughout their now non-extant empires. Understandably, this makes the EU’s ability to speak with a unified voice at the NATO level very difficult and fraught with competing national political agendas. On top of this, the inclusion of another large body, the EU, poses many problems for the smooth operation of an alliance as complex as NATO. The EU’s inclusion within NATO also raises questions that are the primary focus of this thesis, these being ‘what happens when the EU has constructed its own integrated defence force?’; ‘will that nullify NATO, or will it strengthen it?’; and perhaps most significantly, ‘will Western security be enhanced or conflicted?’ These questions and others will prove to be of continued concern to NATO and the EU.

With the advent of the EU, the relationship between NATO and its members has understandably been impacted. The official relationship between the EU and NATO is that in both historic and contemporary contexts the EU views NATO as an essential strategic partnership.⁴⁸ In 2008, General Scowcroft asked the question in relation to the EU, “What is NATO for?” the answer, according to Julian Lindley of the Atlantic Council, is that NATO’s purpose is the same as that of the EU, “to aggregate political, diplomatic and military effect in pursuit of the credible presence of guaranteeing defence and promoting security”.⁴⁹ To clarify this statement, both the EU and NATO aspire to promote stability and security in NATO’s sphere of influence and, one could argue, globally. Both actors co-operate on a number of issues of common interest and aspire to work in conjunction in the management of crises and other shared strategic interests. In many ways these two actors mirror each other’s personalities and identities. First, both call Brussels home; both are large multinational alliances heavily influenced by bureaucracies; both have a large imbalance in terms of economic and military might; both alliances include members that hold vastly different and competing foreign policies and cultures; and finally, both alliances are comprised of nations that profess to be democratic. One could argue that there are many other similarities that exist between these two actors, but for the purpose of this thesis these are the areas of interest that will be explored.

Perhaps the most obvious and mundane of the points above is that both these actors call Brussels home. While technically a number of other cities are of shared importance, Brussels is the most important city as both seats of power of these two institutions lie within very close proximity of one another. One would expect that due to the close proximity of the two headquarters an efficient and fluid dialogue between the two would exist; and yet one would be mistaken for taking this position. Both actors have found it increasingly difficult to communicate with one another; this is due in large part to the lumbering bureaucracies and competing political agendas brought into both

⁴⁸ NATO. *Lisbon Summit Declaration. NATO-EU: a strategic partnership*. 4 December 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm (accessed February 5, 2015)

⁴⁹ Ibid

organisations by representatives of the member states who are often conjointly members of both NATO and the EU.

One highly visible manner in which the EU and NATO conduct dialogue is between the EU Political and Security Committee and subsequently NATO. What is interesting about this dialogue is that when these two actors meet, the agenda is drawn up to deliberately exclude and avoid any reference to military or intelligence issues.⁵⁰ This position is fascinating in its absurdity; the question must be asked, ‘what is the purpose of the meetings?’ To comprehend just how bizarre this situation is it is helpful to focus on just one committee, the EU Political and Security Committee, and consider exactly what its purpose is. This committee meets at the ambassadorial level with the aim of being a preparatory body for the EU Council. The main functions of this committee are “(keeping) track of the international situation and helping to define policies within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction”.⁵¹ The Council Decision of 22 January 2001 “Setting up the Political and Security Committee” section 1(i) states that an additional purpose is to, “provide a privileged forum for dialogue on the ESDP with the fifteen and the six as well as with NATO”. This statement is expanded on in section 2, which affirms that, “The PSC plays a major role in enhancing consultations, in particular with NATO and the third States involved”.⁵² This remit would on the surface seem to indicate that discussing military and intelligence issues with NATO would be well within its scope, and yet this crucial aspect of dialogue with a security actor such as NATO is deemed to be of no relevance.

⁵⁰ Dempsey, Judy. 2010. “Between the European Union and NATO, many walls.” 24 November 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/25/world/europe/25iht-letter.html> (Accessed 20 May 2012)

⁵¹ EEAS. *Structure, Instruments and Agencies*. No Date Given. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/index_en.htm (accessed August 15, 2014).

⁵² Ibid

Lisbon 2010

As we are beginning to see, the relationship between the EU and NATO has long been fraught with difficulties; interestingly, these difficulties all shed light on the question of Europe's credibility as an international actor and the potential impact of an integrated military, which we will see in detail at a later point. Suffice to say here, attempts by both parties have been made in order to address many of the known concerns. While some may look at the numerous problems between the two actors as a valid reason to radically alter or even terminate the relationship, others see the unique potential possessed by these two actors as something that could dramatically alter the world for the better. In 2010, then EU President Herman Van Rompuy stated that, "The ability of our two organizations to shape our future security environment would be enormous if they worked together . . . It is time to break down the remaining walls between them".⁵³ This statement exemplifies the desire of senior EU officials to address the troublesome relationship.

The Lisbon Summit of 2010 was one such attempt to improve the shaky relationship. This two-day summit covered a wide variety of topics, but of primary European interest was the decision to streamline the Alliance's command structure in order to make NATO less cumbersome and more efficient in pursuing its strategic policies. At the time of this summit, this factor alone was crucial (as it is still to this day) largely due to the fact that many of the EU's Member States were feeling the bite of severe budgetary cuts throughout numerous sectors of their domestic economies.⁵⁴ This summit resulted in the issuing of a new 'Strategic Concept' for NATO known as the Lisbon Declaration; this declaration states,

⁵³ EEAS. *Structure, Instruments and Agencies*. No Date Given. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/index_en.htm (accessed August 15, 2014).

⁵⁴ NATO. *NATO Summit paves way for renewed Alliance*. 20 November 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68877.htm (accessed July 10, 2014).

*“We have adopted a new Strategic Concept that lays out our vision for the Alliance for the next decade:(sic) able to defend its members against the full range of threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises; and better able to work with other organisations and nations to promote international stability. NATO will be more agile, more capable and more cost-effective, and it will continue to serve as an essential instrument for peace”*⁵⁵

It is clear from the comments above that this summit placed great emphasis on formulating strategies so that the allies would be able to better manage conflicts, prevent crises and stabilise post-conflict arenas; the statements which follow similarly highlight these aspirations. The Allies accepted that the “promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe, such as the United Nations and the European Union”,⁵⁶ and that “NATO leaders reiterated their commitment to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic Alliance has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of the populations of member countries”.⁵⁷ These declarations from the Lisbon Summit clearly demonstrate that from 2010, NATO was firmly committed to working in partnership with European Union; however, lingering doubts still remained.

For many years, many senior officials have highlighted how both the EU and NATO can be slow in responding to crises. As one commentator put it, ‘NATO has never been very good at doing complex civil-military security, while the EU cannot do big defence, but both are needed.’⁵⁸ This statement, which was made soon after the summit, is grounded upon an inescapable truth which is that both actors are heavily bureaucratized and seen as being strangled by red tape. Examples of the over-regulation and heavy bureaucratic

⁵⁵ NATO. *Operation Unified Protector Lessons for the Alliance*. NATO publication, Lisbon: NATO, 2012.

⁵⁶ NATO. *NATO Summit paves way for renewed Alliance*. 20 November 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68877.htm (accessed July 10, 2014).

⁵⁷ Ibid

⁵⁸ Traynor, Ian. 2010. “Nato summit in Lisbon: the key issues.” 18 November 2010.

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/18/nato-summit-lisbon-key-issues> (Accessed 15 May 2012)

interference that hinder NATO operations are numerous; one merely needs to look at the operations in Afghanistan to see the uphill battle that faced NATO and the EU if they were to achieve the desired outcomes of the Lisbon Summit anywhere other than on paper.

Using Afghanistan as an example, we are able to witness the byzantine nature of the command structure of NATO and the unwillingness, or inability, of European States to work together outside of summits and conferences. EU Member states who participated in Afghanistan each operated under their own national rules of engagement/warfare and also with their own national agendas which often contradicted or in fact worked against the collectives of both NATO and the EU. The following examples are illustrative only: Italian troops in one area would only work 9am-5pm; when on patrol, German troops would not leave their vehicles; the British viewed themselves and the Americans as the only security actors in the region doing anything of. Further highlighting the fragmented and factious relationship on the ground was the fact that in 2010 there was no security arrangement that would allow NATO forces to rescue EU police trainers in Afghanistan. As one NATO diplomat put it, “we often turn a blind eye to the political deadlock back in Brussels”.⁵⁹ Not only did this rigid conformity to formal rules prevent the ground forces from working together in an efficient manner, it also impacted the logistics aspect of the operations. For example, the air-conditioning expenditure of Bagram air base for one week was the same cost as the entire budget of a fully operational NGO hospital staffed by international professionals for a full year.

Bureaucratic obstacles are especially evident when one analyses the EU’s position in the conflict zone; EU missions such as EUPOL Afghanistan actively competed against both NATO and Member States for resources and personnel and thus created conflict within the alliance as well as tarnishing the image of the EU in the eyes of many senior figures.⁶⁰

The is a very brief exploration of a small sample of the problems associated with NATO and the EU’s operations in Afghanistan which helped shape the

⁵⁹ NATO. *Operation Unified Protector Lessons for the Alliance*. NATO publication, Lisbon: NATO, 2012.

⁶⁰ ISIS Europe. “Where are we with the Afghan police force?” *European Security Review*, 2009

increasingly important view within NATO that something needed to be done to address this issue of dysfunction. Thus when the Lisbon declaration was made, many viewed that both NATO and the EU would finally address the lumbering bureaucracies that were hampering their efforts. Not long after the declaration, the world would see just how serious the EU and NATO were.

Libya

2011 redefined the way in which the world viewed the Middle East; many nations were caught off guard by the sudden and often violent revolutions that exploded across the region. The world looked on in horror as the death toll mounted; as of May 2015, the Libyan and Syrian revolutions have been the bloodiest. In response to the massacres in Libya, NATO launched Operation Unified Protector (OUP), which was mandated under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter and more specifically UN Security Council Resolutions 1970, 1973 and 2009. According to the NATO Secretary General in his 2011 Annual Report, “NATO’s Operation . . . was one of the most remarkable in (its) history. It showed the Alliance’s strength and flexibility”.⁶¹ The primary aspect of this operation was the usage of airpower to deliver precision strikes and enforce a no fly zone over Libya.

As with any military operation, a swift and concise victory is essential when considering the human aspect of the conflict. This factor is even more relevant today as the post-war West has constructed and now cherishes an identity which abhors civilian deaths, however unavoidable, and will not tolerate even the death of its own soldiers in conflict. Governmental legitimacy stands or falls over these sensitivities. From this perspective, NATO’s operation can be seen as a success; as there were no admitted ground troops and little prospect of Gaddafi’s troops being able to engage NATO’s airpower, the risk of large-scale alliance casualties was very limited. How then from the perspective of the Lisbon Summit’s major points did the operation run?

⁶¹ Etchells, Anthony. *Reflections on Op Unified Protector*. 27 December 2011.
<http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/military-operations/reflections-on-op-unified-protector> (accessed March 1, 2014).

To begin with, we will analyse how this operation pursued the remit “*NATO will be more agile, more capable and more cost-effective*”. One cannot doubt that the NATO air campaign thoroughly smashed Gadhafi’s forces in its many engagements. OPU was so successful in the eyes of the new government in Libya that NATO was formally asked to continue the mission after the country had been declared by the National Transitional Council to be liberated.⁶² This request was not based on the incredible power that NATO wields alone, but also upon the fact that NATO enjoyed its best ever success rate of avoiding civilian casualties; this success, according to Lt General Ploeger, is due to the enhanced training of forward air controllers and the successful networking of information between pilots and those on the ground in Libya and NATO command centres.⁶³ Libya was also the first major new conflict that witnessed a large scale (for the time) usage of drones or UAVs. The usage of UAVs on the modern battlefield has enabled unmatched levels of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering which, in regards to Libya, enabled NATO to fulfil all three of this section’s points more effectively (agility, capability, cost-effectiveness). This efficiency is largely due to the fact that UAVs are able to remain in flight for long periods of time at no risk to personnel and, in comparison to the astronomical costs of modern day aircraft, at a relatively low cost. However of pivotal interest to the question of European credibility as a security actor, it must be stressed that usage of drones, forward operating air controllers, low collateral damage weapons and the ability to refuel in flight cannot be attributed to NATO as a whole. The vast majority of the specialised equipment that made OPU a success was not European at all, but in fact from the United States. Lt General Ploeger, a European and the Deputy Commander of NATO’s Allied Air Command, was “quick to acknowledge the contribution of US forces to NATO’s success in terms of ISR platforms, refuelling capabilities, and low collateral damage weapons – areas in which he admits that the European NATO states have a weak hand.”⁶⁴ With this in mind, can we really consider the operation to be a NATO success or was it in reality an

⁶² Etchells, Anthony. *Reflections on Op Unified Protector*. 27 December 2011. <http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/military-operations/reflections-on-op-unified-protector> (accessed March 1, 2014).

⁶³ Ibid

⁶⁴ Ibid

American victory? This is a key question; it is apparent from the Libyan experience that the EU cannot currently be described as a credible international security actor. The crucial factors which enabled NATO 'success' in Libya were not European at all but American.

The notion of a European led humanitarian military intervention delivering 'hapless locals' from a barbaric dictatorship was a reasonable fit with post-war European self-understanding; from the beginning, the EU was keen to portray itself as the leader of this soi-disant humanitarian intervention; and leaders from both NATO and European nations would consistently speak of a unified and European-led operation. As we have seen, this was not the case; throughout the operation and in the post-conflict analysis, this campaign has raised questions about the effectiveness of the EU's mission and the affect this has had on its relationship with NATO, despite the ambitious claims made by some NATO and European leaders. The Libyan operation demonstrated how ill-equipped the EU was to deal with the kinds of crises which its member states are so keen to pursue.⁶⁵ While the EU was 'talking tough' and making ambitious claims, the reality is that the EU would have been unable to conduct this operation without the significant input of an often underplayed American role.⁶⁶ In Libya, the EU was unable to be a credible international security actor.

What the Libyan operation has shown is that the EU is still heavily dependent on the US for its ambitious foreign policy and security interests. This affects the relationship between the EU and NATO significantly; while on paper NATO and the EU are mutually complimentary, in reality the American component of NATO is becoming increasingly angered and frustrated by European idleness and complacency towards their own security needs. Robert Gates pointed out in a speech in Brussels in 2011 that 'the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed

⁶⁵ Galbreth, David. 2011. "Lessons from Libya: NATO and the EU." 24 March 2011.

<http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/146/where-now-for-european-security> (Accessed 16 May 2014)

⁶⁶ The Economist. 2011. "Libya, Europe and the future of NATO." 10 June 2011.

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/06/libya-europe-and-future-nato> (Accessed 20 May 2014)

regime in a sparsely populated country ... yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference'.⁶⁷ Following this speech, the Polish Government, which was due to take over the EU Presidency the following month, ambitiously stated that it would push for a bigger, autonomous, EU military headquarters outside NATO and for greater European commitments to promote and pursue its own security needs.⁶⁸ It is interesting to note however, that separated from the world of rhetoric and 2-minute sound bites, and in the real world of conflict, Poland was amongst those countries identified by Gates as failing to live up to its own ambitious goals in the Libyan conflict.

The world watched as Europe struggled to deal with a Third World dictator right on its doorstep; while every member of NATO voted for the Libyan mission, less than a third were able to participate primarily due to the fact that their military capabilities were not sufficient.⁶⁹ The impact that this European failure has had on NATO's perception of European effectiveness cannot be understated particularly because of the consequent implications for its ongoing relations with the EU and, importantly, with a potentially integrated EU force

With this rather bleak appraisal of the EU Member States' contribution to the operation it is now time to turn to the most important points of the Lisbon Declaration, "*able to defend its members against the full range of threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises*".

On the surface it would appear that NATO is more than capable of achieving this. With the success of Libya and any analysis of American, British and French militaries, might one could safely assume that this aspect of the declaration is safe in hand. However as Robert Gates points out, this is just not the substance of the situation; despite the fact that every member of NATO voted for the mission, less than a third were even able to participate. This next

⁶⁷The Economist. 2011. "Libya, Europe and the future of NATO." 10 June 2011. <http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/06/libya-europe-and-future-nato> (Accessed 20 May 2014)

⁶⁸ Ibid

⁶⁹ Ibid

section will analyse four key NATO members, the US and three EU Member States – Britain, France and Spain. These four have been chosen to illustrate and highlight the incredible difference that exists within not only EU Member States but also NATO and thus gives an insight into both the NATO Alliance and the potential of any future European military force. It provides an important framework to the questions, is European military integration possible? Is European military integration desirable?

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom and her armed forces have a long and proud history. Whether fighting Napoleon at Waterloo, sinking the Spanish Armada or repelling the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, the British have always shown great tenacity in the defence of the Realm. Following the end of World War Two, the UK along with the other European colonial powers began to steadily lose much of their supremacy and influence in the world. While the UK retains merely a shadow of its former power, it still remains a significant global strategic player. It is always difficult to measure the relative power of a nation state's armed forces; with varying opinions of what constitutes power and how much of something one needs to be in possession of in order to be deemed powerful, it is difficult to give any definitive position on a nation's military capacity. However, an analysis of a nation's armed forces does yield measurable statistics that can be used to quantify how powerful that nation is within a set of predefined parameters. As this thesis' primary goal is not the analysis of an individual nation's military capabilities, this section has relied on already completed analysis from 'European Geostrategy', 'Janes Defence' and also the popular site 'Global Firepower' for the analysis which follows.

According to European Geostrategy's study, "Audit of Major Powers": the world's fifteen most powerful countries in 2014" which was published on their website on 7th January 2014, the United Kingdom is rated as the second most powerful actor and was given the label of 'Global Power' with a score of

48.6%.⁷⁰ This study defines a global power as being “a country lacking the heft or comprehensive attributes of a superpower, but still with a wide international footprint and means to reach most geopolitical theatres, particularly the Middle East, South-East Asia, East Asia, Africa and South America”.⁷¹ It is interesting to compare this audit to the findings of Global Firepower who have listed the UK as being at number five, behind India, China, Russia and finally the United States.⁷² The latter article states that, “the British will continue to reel in capabilities and spending heading into 2014”.⁷³ What these two studies clearly highlight is the vast differences in analysing power; however, these two studies and others do share useful commonalities.

A clear example of power can be seen in the defence budget; the UK Defence budget has remained around the 3% mark since the late nineties. Since World War Two, the defence budget has seen a generally steady decline with no major dips or rises apart from the period 1950 through to the 1960s which saw a sharp rise in defence spending and then a fall back down to the eight percent mark.⁷⁴ This continued overall decline will place the UK below the minimum NATO spending requirement of two percent by 2017, according to the Financial Times.⁷⁵ It is important to note at this point that the UK Ministry of Defence rejects these figures; however if they are true, they would mean that by 2017 only one NATO member will meet the required two percent of GDP.⁷⁶ This continued decline of budgetary allocation has affected multiple areas of the UK’s ability to operate as an effective international security actor.

⁷⁰ Rogers, James, Luis Simón, and Daniel Fiott. *European Geostrategy’s ‘Audit of Major Powers’: the world’s fifteen most powerful countries in 2014*. 7 January 2014. <http://www.europeangeostrategy.org/2014/01/european-geostrategy-audit-major-powers-worlds-fifteen-most-powerful-countries-2014/> (accessed May 1, 2014).

⁷¹ *Ibid*

⁷² *United Kingdom Military Strength*. 4 January 2015. http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=united-kingdom (accessed February 2, 2015).

⁷³ *Ibid*

⁷⁴ Chantrill, Christopher. *UK Public Spending Since 1900*. No Date Given. http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/spending_history#defence (accessed May 10, 2014).

⁷⁵ Financial Times. *UK defence spending to fall below NATO target says research*. 15 June 2014. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/81907de8-f089-11e3-8f3d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz35eGmj7DE> (accessed July 25, 2014).

⁷⁶ *Ibid*

The budget cuts do however mesh nicely with the widespread societal rejection of using force to solve conflicts. The old legitimations of ‘Empire’ and civilisation’ have long ago been rejected and stripped of their power; as a consequence, few politicians, if any, venture to make a strong case for increased military spending.

Perhaps the most visible change in Britain’s defence force is the Royal Navy; once seen as invincible, it is now barely a whisper of its past glories. However while the UK’s navy no longer rules the waves, it is far from impotent. The Royal Navy is set to receive 33% of the next ten-year defence budget which amounts to 17.4 billion pounds; this will be used to construct surface craft alongside that of the UK’s submarine force.⁷⁷ In 2014, the UK launched the first of two Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.⁷⁸ This launch marks a key milestone for the Royal Navy’s strategy to regenerate its carrier strike ability by 2020. Commodore Jerry Kyd, the Commander of the UK Maritime Task Group, stated in regards to the launch “(this is) a strategically noteworthy date . . . this capability brings you so much military flexibility but also great political choice”.⁷⁹ Commodore Kyd’s statement clearly shows the significant impact that just these two aircraft carriers will have on the ability for the UK to project power on the international stage. It is important to note that both the French and US navies were instrumental in the development of these ships; Admiral Zambellas noted that maritime power projection required a “partnership approach” and that “the extraordinary generosity of [the UK’s] US and French allies is allowing [the UK] to regenerate [its] carrier strike capability”.⁸⁰ While these two new carriers have the potential to greatly impact the ability of the UK to operate globally in an effective manner, it must be pointed out that at present the F 35 aircraft which will operate from these ships are currently behind schedule and appear to be facing endless technical difficulties which have effectively grounded them, not to mention the ballooning costs associated with the program.

⁷⁷ Hoyle, Craig. *IN FOCUS: Balanced budget poses challenge to UK armed services*. 11 February 2013. <http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-balanced-budget-poses-challenge-to-uk-armed-382108/> (accessed March 15, 2014)

⁷⁸ Willet, Lee. “First UK large-deck carrier officially named in Rosyth.” *Jane’s Defence*, 2014: 8.

⁷⁹ Ibid

⁸⁰ Ibid

The expanding costs of the F 35 program have not been of any assistance to the budget cuts faced by the Royal Air Force (RAF) following the financial crisis of 2008 and the predominant focus on land forces during the Afghanistan campaign. However with the drawdown of the conflict in Afghanistan, the RAF is to receive a total of £44.5 billion; that is, 28% of the 10 year budget will be allocated to aviation projects, with combat air programmes including the Eurofighter Typhoon, Lockheed Martin F-35 and unmanned air vehicles to account for £18.5 billion.⁸¹ The RAF, Navy and Army are becoming progressively unified under the strategy known as “Future Force 2020” structure, which was outlined in the current coalition government's Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) of September 2010. This strategy is an attempt by the UK to integrate the three arms of its military into a more homogenous unit that will be better able to conduct operations in the future by utilising small numbers of highly trained and equipped defence personal as opposed to a large cumbersome military.⁸²

France

From the inception of NATO, European nations have been at the heart of the organisation. However, it is important to qualify this statement; not all European nations are members of NATO and throughout its 70-year history, many European nations who are members have not worked towards NATO's ambitions and have at times actively worked against it. Following World War Two, France aspired to be one of the three world powers alongside the US and the USSR; this aspiration had negative impacts on France's relationship with NATO. In the 1960's, Charles de Gaulle announced his decision to pull France out of NATO's integrated military command. For many decades, de Gaulle's decision and the creation of a nuclear *force de frappe* (strike force) were regarded as forming the cornerstone of France's independent defence policy. France viewed NATO as an organisation in which America and the UK

⁸¹ Willet, Lee. “First UK large-deck carrier officially named in Rosyth.” *Jane's Defence*, 2014: 8.

⁸² UK Government. “Fact Sheet 5: Future Force 2020 –Summary of size, shape and structure.” *UK Government*. No Date Given. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62487/Factsheet5-Future-Force-2020.pdf (accessed July 20, 2014).

‘stitched up deals’.⁸³ France maintained this isolationist approach to NATO with varying intensity until 2009 when President Nicolas Sarkozy reversed de Gaulle’s decision and announced France’s full return. While Sarkozy worked towards bringing France back into positive relations, his decision must be understood in the context of France’s continued wish to promote and participate in a European-wide defence force rather than as a reluctant but unavoidable acknowledgement of the supremacy of NATO.

This historic antipathy and ambivalence of France towards NATO is a clear example of how any military alliance containing multiple nations with independent foreign policies is at risk of internal division and even fracturing. Although there is a discernible European identity under construction, national identities, pride and ambitions are still profoundly influential. Were a smaller nation to act in this manner, one could easily dismiss its actions as effectively irrelevant to the overall scheme; however when a nation as powerful as France acts in this manner, it is important to take note and analyse the contemporary French Military.

For many decades, France has always placed a great emphasis on its independent defence capabilities; as a consequence, France’s military expenditure has always remained one of the highest in the world. However, as with many other Western nations and in particular European nations, France’s military is facing continued cutbacks. Between 2014 and 2015, the government will cut 7,500 defence jobs with that number set to increase to more than 34,000 by 2019, (note following this report the number of troops to be cut has been slightly scaled back).⁸⁴ This is a staggering number; when we consider that the total number of active defence personnel is around the 230,000 mark, we realise that this cut of 34,000 will see nearly 15% of current personnel lose their jobs. This shredding of defence spending will have stark

⁸³ The Economist. 2009. “Back to the fold.” 12 February 2009. <http://www.economist.com/node/13109550> (Accessed 15 May 2012)

⁸⁴ Tran, Pierre. *France Scales Back Military Job Cuts by 7,500*. 2015 January 2015. <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2015/01/22/france-personnel-cut-security-terrorist-le-drian/22156917/> (accessed April 10, 2015).

implications on France's ability to operate successfully on the international stage, not to mention the serious impact that this will have on morale within the French military and also on the French economy as these 34,000 troops will need to find gainful employment of some sort within the civilian market.

The effects on morale are not merely a hypothetical assumption; in May 2014, France's four top Generals threatened to resign if any further cuts were made to defence.⁸⁵ According to the London Telegraph, the Generals warned that "any more cuts – beyond those approved in a five-year defence budget in December – would torpedo France's ability to undertake operations in places like Mali and the Central African Republic".⁸⁶ These warnings came to light after Jean-Yves Le Drian, the French Defence Minister, stated that the cuts would result in "very grave military consequences" and leave France's terrestrial army "under-equipped and rapidly unable to conduct new operations".⁸⁷ The Defence Minister further warned that the military was close to "near exasperation" as a result of the substantial cuts. The dire consequences that have been laid out by the Generals and Defence Minister do not paint a good picture for the future of French defence. It must be stated here though as a matter of context that, generally speaking, whenever defence cuts are made Generals are often quick to condemn any such move as being akin to a national emergency; however in this case, the scale of these cuts would seem to bear witness that French defence may very well be set back decades as, according to the Generals, the training received by defence personnel is already substandard and new programs for contemporary and vital weapons platforms such as drones and satellite programs will be scrapped.

What does this mean for French involvement in NATO? It would be reasonable to posit that these budget cuts will result in a less able and less willing French involvement in NATO operations at the very time when a well-

⁸⁵ Samuel, Henry. *French military heads threaten to resign over 'grave' defence cuts*. 23 May 2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/10852165/French-military-heads-threaten-to-resent-over-grave-defence-cuts.html> (accessed June 15, 2014).

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Ibid

resourced and competent French military is urgently needed as NATO and the EU face increasing levels of violence on their immediate borders.

What does this mean for Europe as a credible actor on the international stage? With one of the biggest actors in the EU shredding its military spending, it is unrealistic for the EU to contemplate forming a credible integrated force at this stage.

Spain

When one thinks of the Euro crisis, Spain is often one of the first countries to be called to mind. Spain, alongside a number of other European nations, has borne the brunt of the financial crisis. With 50% youth unemployment and wide-spread cutbacks throughout multiple government sectors, it is little wonder that defence has seen considerable cutbacks. In 2014, the defence budget was cut by 3.2% (7.77 billion US\$),⁸⁸ these cuts are part of an overall downward trend in Spanish defence budgets which have seen, since the crisis in 2008, an astounding 32% drop.⁸⁹ However, despite these cuts Spain is set to spend 60 billion on its defence budget between 2010 and 2015; it is important to bear in mind that this figure is less than 1% of GDP and considerably lower than the 2% mark that is required by NATO. These budget cuts, as with the other nations mentioned, strike at the heart of Spain's ability to operate in an increasingly destabilised world and one in which many non-Western nations are now rapidly closing the gap or even surpassing the West in terms of military hardware. Although the cuts in military spending will have a profound impact, Spanish politicians are not quick to persuade their constituents to reverse the trend. For many Spaniards still reeling from the fallout of the financial crisis, cultivating an expensive national 'European' identity seems a frivolous luxury; their focus is jobs for Spaniards, health care for Spaniards; a future for Spaniards.

Perhaps the greatest visible indicator of Spanish defence cuts is that of the decommissioning of 18 naval ships over the past few years; perhaps the most

⁸⁸ Jane's Defence. *Spain Defence Budget Cuts*. No Date 2014. <http://www.janes.com/article/27658/spain-cuts-2014-defence-budget-by-3-2> (accessed July 20, 2014).

⁸⁹ Ibid

iconic was the decommissioning of the aircraft carrier *Príncipe de Asturias*, which will seriously limit the ability for Spanish forces to operate effectively and globally. While the process of decommissioning ships is routine and often necessary in order to ensure that a nation's naval forces remain competitive and relevant to contemporary issues by replacing some (if not all) with more up to date vessels, this is not the case with Spain. Currently the construction of new ships has been placed on hold, with no confirmed start date for construction.⁹⁰ However in balance, it is necessary to point out that the Spanish navy has received two US Destroyers, with another two set to be acquired in 2015. This restructuring of the Spanish Navy reflects an overall trend within the Spanish military of attempting to cut costs considerably by eliminating single purpose and high cost detachments and weapons systems such as airborne units and replacing them with multipurpose units and weapons systems.⁹¹ While it is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss military strategy, it is important to highlight the problem with this approach. We can consider the Spanish approach in this way – if a law firm specialising in one area of law had, overnight, to incorporate multiple other areas of law with fewer personnel and on a lower budget, how well would we expect that law firm to do on the open market? This reality is not just limited to Spain; as we have seen in both France and the UK, major cost cutting exercises are underway which have the potential to severely limit the professionalism of these forces. Again we are forced to ask, are the EU's ambitious plans to form an effective integrated fighting force realistic within the current economic and political context.

United States.

The United States is today the unquestioned sole military superpower on the planet. The US has the ability to successfully operate anywhere in the world with overwhelming force. As stated prior, the US is the real backbone of the

⁹⁰ Jane's Defence. *Spain Defence Budget Cuts*. No Date 2014. <http://www.janes.com/article/27658/spain-cuts-2014-defence-budget-by-3-2> (accessed July 20, 2014).

⁹¹ Ing, David. *Spanish military to be hit by further cuts*. 8 January 2014. <http://www.janes.com/article/32170/spanish-military-to-be-hit-by-further-cuts> (accessed April 10, 2014).

NATO alliance and it can readily be argued that the US is what makes this alliance an actual credible global strategic actor. While many may correctly point out that the United States lost in Vietnam and arguably also in Afghanistan and Iraq, this in no way reflects on the power of the military, but rather on domestic politics and the rules of warfare that the US chooses to abide by. US dominance is a result of the post-war Military Industrial Complex, which is perceived as either the epitome of all that is wrong in America or a great patriotic institution found throughout the States. In order to understand the sheer scale of the US defence budget it is first necessary to analyse the total global expenditure (barring the US). The total global military budget in 2012 was \$652 Billion (US), while the US alone had a declared budget of \$682 Billion.⁹² At this point, it is of relevance to state that the total actual global figure will be much higher as many prominent nations are loath to reveal true statistics, however these two figures do serve to clearly show the great gap between the US and the rest of the world. The US dominance is additionally evident at sea; the US Navy currently boasts 19 Aircraft carriers compared to 12 others globally.

This position of sole dominance is changing however; there are rapid advances in the Chinese military and there is a subsequent rapid rise of military spending in the South-East Asian region, as outlined in Section One. These factors combine to challenge the unquestioned power of the US. It is important to note, that there is little to suggest that China will be on an equal footing with the US in the next few years; however, the gap is quickly closing especially within cyber warfare capabilities. As stated prior, the South-East Asian region is rapidly expanding its military capabilities at a time when the West is dramatically reducing its defence budgets. The US is not exempt from this trend. The Pentagon is facing a staggering one trillion dollar cut to its budget over the next ten years.⁹³ While one can argue that this is both necessary and

⁹² Kelley, Michael. *American Military Dominance In One Staggering Chart*. 27 February 2014. <http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-defense-spending-by-country-2014-2> (accessed March 25, 2014).

⁹³ Reuters. *Budget cuts to slash U.S. Army to smallest since before World War Two*. 24 February 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-usa-defense-budget-idUSBREA1N1IO20140224> (accessed March 20, 2014).

practical, when we consider the withdrawal from both Iraq and Afghanistan, this figure still remains staggeringly high. Chuck Hagel, the former Defence Secretary, stated, ““We ... face the risk of uncertainty in a dynamic and increasingly dangerous security environment . . . budget reductions inevitably reduce the military's margin of error in dealing with these risks, as other powers are continuing to modernize their weapons portfolios.”.⁹⁴ This statement, made in early 2014, clearly foregrounds the current fears of many within the US and globally; when we consider the ISIS onslaught in the Middle East, alongside the on-going conflict in Ukraine and the tense situation in the South China Sea, it is easy to understand the concern expressed in Hagel’s speech. The military budgets underlie a new strategic reality for the US which is that the US will no longer be able to adequately respond to multiple conflicts at once, instead the US will need to focus on a smaller highly trained military. This position will significantly affect the ability of NATO to operate on the global scene; as a consequence, the EU’s ability to fulfil its geostrategic goals will also be affected, even if the full integration of the member states’ militaries is achieved. Chuck Hagel’s statement above also highlights the fact that the gap between the technologically advanced US military and other potentially or actually hostile actors is being gradually eroded. This is exemplified in the Chinese military’s development of weapons that are designed to neutralise US Aircraft carriers and thus create area denial to the US; this example alone should be of concern to US law makers, to NATO members and also to the EU. Within this dual setting of retrenched US military spending and consequent capacity alongside the growing capabilities of ambitious new actors, it is hard, given all the constraints outlined above, to envisage an integrated European military being able to act effectively and credibly and alone.

The proposed cuts to the US Army will see its numbers fall below that of World War Two. The Army is currently around 520,000 troops; the proposed

⁹⁴Reuters. *Budget cuts to slash U.S. Army to smallest since before World War Two*. 24 February 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-usa-defense-budget-idUSBREA1N1IO20140224> (accessed March 20, 2014).

cuts would see this number shrink to between 440,000 and 450,000.⁹⁵ This is clearly a significant drop in personnel; however when one views the cuts in the light of technological advancements in robotics and drone usage, this number may not be so significant over the course of a decade. For example, the Army is developing driverless trucks that are essentially autonomous and tanks and other armoured vehicles that replace crew members with computers. It is also important to briefly point out that the US has for a long time utilised Private Military Contractors to fulfil a variety of roles within the military. It is therefore premature to make a definitive argument about this drawdown without competent analyses of the contemporary force structure of the US military, which is not the purpose of this thesis.

Despite these cutbacks, the US still remains the dominant force within both NATO and on the global scene and is therefore incredibly significant to world politics.

Analysis of Nations.

This analysis has highlighted a widespread trend cost cutting throughout the Western nations' militaries. This cost cutting has intensified an already ubiquitous problem found within NATO – that being an unwillingness to meet the 2% requirement of GDP on defence. This factor alone raises many questions in regards to the question, “*Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States' militaries?*” If EU Member States are currently unwilling or unable to take their responsibilities under NATO seriously, then why would any state or non-state actor be expected to take any future declarations emanating from these Member States seriously? It can be contended that this unwillingness to take defence seriously can in part be attributed to the large US military presence in post-war Europe; European governments have been lulled into a false complacency, someone else has always ‘stepped up’. Whenever NATO has conducted military

⁹⁵ Reuters. *Budget cuts to slash U.S. Army to smallest since before World War Two*. 24 February 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/24/us-usa-defense-budget-idUSBREA1N1IO20140224> (accessed March 20, 2014).

operations in Yugoslavia or Libya for example, it has been the United States and not Europe which has provided the key weapons systems and intelligence that enabled the successful outcomes of these operations. Europe has been able to utilise the high cost resources of the US in order to conduct its own hard power policies, while at the same time criticising the US for spending considerable sums of money on the very defence which Europe depends on in order to conduct its operations. As stated previously, every Member State in NATO voted for action in Libya and yet less than a third could participate. Those that did participate were in many instances utterly dependent upon the United States to re-arm them and provide critical intelligence, air to air refuelling and precision munitions. With the continued budget cuts, how less able is the EU Member States' ability to operate independently of the US going to be? When this acute question is asked within the recent contexts of the downing of the Malaysian airliner and continued hostility on Europe's immediate border and sphere of influence, another question is raised: Is Europe going to be relegated to a secondary actor by the very nations who are in desperate need of a credible security actor to assist them?

These questions and others have plagued aspects of the EU and Member States for a number of years; as such, the dwindling defence budgets have led both the EU as a whole and Member States individually to begin earnestly looking for ways in which the EU can remain a credible security actor on the global scene.

The next section will analyse how the EU and Member States are attempting to address these problems and others, and how these attempts are pushing the EU to an inevitable integrated European defence force.

NATO Summit 2012.

This summit was the focus of widespread protests from many thousands who were angry about both the war in Afghanistan and climate change. These protestors actually succeeded in hacking into both the Chicago police and NATO websites while the protestors were on the streets. This successful hacking must have been of particular embarrassment to NATO as cyber security and what is referred to as 'smart defence' were being discussed at this

summit. While these protests were underway, this summit's focus centred around three primary themes: "the Alliance's commitment to Afghanistan through transition and beyond, ensuring that the Alliance has the capabilities it needs to defend its population and territory . . . ensure(ing) that the Alliance has the capacity to deal with the challenges of the 21st century . . . and it will strengthen NATO's network of partners across the globe".⁹⁶ These three overall themes were further explored by the discussions surrounding smart defence, which can be understood as "greater prioritisation, specialisation and cooperation, into a long-term capability strategy".⁹⁷ In their approach to addressing smart defence, the summit was focussed around three major components (alongside the three major themes) these being:

"First of all, a tangible package of multinational projects to address critical capability shortfalls. Secondly, longer-term multinational projects that include missile defence, Alliance Ground Surveillance and air policing. Finally, the NATO Summit will agree strategic projects for 2020, covering areas such as Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and air-to-air refuelling".⁹⁸

The first point, "*a tangible package of multinational projects to address critical capability shortfalls*" is in direct response to firstly, the events in Libya, which were discussed earlier, and secondly, to the fact that the capabilities short fall is of an on-going concern to NATO, especially when we consider the substantial cutbacks that have occurred within European defence sectors, and which were explored earlier in this section. This first point lies at the heart of NATO's Force 2020 strategy, this strategy's aim is "to ensure that NATO retains and develops the capabilities necessary to perform its essential core tasks collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security – and thereby to play an essential role promoting security in the world".⁹⁹ This strategy would appear to be of most concern to NATO leadership as just after

⁹⁶ NATO. *NATO Summit*. No date given. <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/topics/en/NATO-summit.htm> (accessed March 10, 2014).

⁹⁷ *Ibid*

⁹⁸ *Ibid*

⁹⁹ NATO. *Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*. 20 May 2012.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed January 15, 2014).

this statement the declaration states “We must meet this responsibility while dealing with an acute financial crisis and responding to evolving geo-strategic challenges”.¹⁰⁰ This rather emphatic statement, when viewed in the light of the severe cutbacks outlined earlier, has either fallen on deaf ears or the statement was made prematurely. One must question why statements such as this are made when it is clear that many members and specifically European members are unwilling and/or unable to fulfil these statements. Statements such as “the significance of sharing responsibilities, roles, and risks to meet the challenges North-American and European Allies face together”¹⁰¹ seemed to have fallen on deaf ears with the continued mass cutbacks of defence budgets. It is little wonder, to reiterate, that Robert Gates pointed out in a speech in Brussels in 2011 that “the mightiest military alliance in history is only 11 weeks into an operation against a poorly armed regime in a sparsely populated country ... yet many allies are beginning to run short of munitions, requiring the US, once more, to make up the difference”¹⁰² and that following this speech, the Polish Government, which was due to take over the EU Presidency the following month, stated that it would push for a bigger, autonomous EU military headquarters outside NATO and for greater European commitments to promote and pursue its own security needs.¹⁰³

It would appear that the first point of this summit, while valid, has not been well implemented; how then is the second point being implemented? The second focus point was “*longer-term multinational projects that include missile defence, Alliance Ground Surveillance and air policing*”. For the purpose of this thesis we will focus on the air policing aspect of this point. Following the annexation of Crimea, Eastern European nations were understandably concerned that similar actions might occur again; this was especially the case for nations such as Latvia which has a large Russian minority within its borders. To help alleviate concerns, NATO members

¹⁰⁰ NATO. *Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO Forces 2020*. 20 May 2012.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87594.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed January 15, 2014).

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² The Economist. 2011. “Libya, Europe and the future of NATO.” 10 June 2011.

<http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2011/06/libya-europe-and-future-nato> (Accessed 20 May 2012)

¹⁰³ Ibid

initiated a number of air policing missions in the region. These missions saw combat aircraft from a number of nations participate in air policing missions over the Baltic States, Poland and Romania; currently, the nations who are on patrol are Poland, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Canada and France.¹⁰⁴ This mission has been an on-going rotation for the past ten years, according to NATO, “NATO member states have taken turns sending fighter aircraft to police the airspace of the Baltic States as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania do not have fighter jets of their own. NATO’s air-policing mission protects the safety and integrity of Alliance airspace on a 24/7 basis and Allies take up the patrols for a four-month rotation”.¹⁰⁵ It is interesting to note that following the crisis in Ukraine, additional jets have been allocated to this mission. This on-going mission would appear to fulfil the requirements of this focus point.

The final focus point that was raised, “*NATO Summit will agree strategic projects for 2020, covering areas such as Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and air-to-air refuelling*” will be analysed in depth in the final section of this report, and therefore will not be covered here.

From this brief analysis of the 2012 Summit, it is clear that the European members of NATO are still divided in terms of the capabilities and the political will to act in a decisive manner. When we combine this analysis with that of the brief overview of the NATO members, we are left wondering to what extent the Summit’s primary focus points have actually been adhered to. The focus point of “*a tangible package of multinational projects to address critical capability shortfalls*” would appear to have been completely ignored; in fact, one could argue that many nations are actually working against this notion. While it is possible to argue that it is in fact the severe cutbacks at the national level which have led the EU Member States to work in collaboration together on defence projects (something which will be explored in the next section), one is still left with a real doubt about the willingness of many European NATO members to take seriously their stated commitments to upholding a required level of GDP spending as well as addressing the

¹⁰⁴ NATO. *Allies enhance NATO air-policing duties in Baltic States, Poland, Romania*. 29 April 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109354.htm (accessed May 19, 2014).

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

capabilities short falls that have been prevalent throughout NATO for many years. Regardless of what one thinks about US foreign policy, the fact remains that for many years the United States has consistently stated that Europe needs to spend more on defence in order to shore up the gross imbalance in both capabilities and expenditure that is found throughout the Alliance. In 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry strongly urged NATO members in Europe to bolster their defence spending in light of the ongoing destabilisation of Ukraine and the increasingly hostile (in the US view) actions of Putin. Kerry stated that “We cannot continue to allow allied defence budgets to shrink . . . together we have to push back against those who try to change sovereign borders by force.”¹⁰⁶ Despite this recent statement and the fact that the ongoing crisis in Ukraine continues to be played out right on the EU’s immediate border, it is unlikely that any radical change in defence spending can be expected. As stated prior in this report, for many years the US and larger allies have contributed more than 70% of NATO military spending and only a handful of members actually meet the requirement of the 2% GDP mark. European members of NATO on average only spend 1.6% of their GDP on defence (2013)¹⁰⁷, and this number is set to fall with the ongoing cuts in the poorer members’ nations, and particularly when we consider the considerable cuts that are underway within France, this figure can only go down.

While the practice of European NATO members cutting defence spending make an integrated and credible force extremely difficult to envision in the near future, it also greatly angers political leaders within the US; in 2011, Former Defence Secretary Robert Gates, in a scolding final speech at Brussel said, “I am the latest in a string of U.S. Defence Secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defence spending.”¹⁰⁸ Even European leaders in NATO can see the ‘writing on the wall’; last September, NATO Secretary

¹⁰⁶ Watson, Ben. *Kerry: NATO Members Must Increase Military Spending*. 29 April 2014. <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/04/kerry-nato-members-must-increase-military-spending/83425/?oref=d-river> (accessed July 15, 2014).

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said, “European nations can, and should, do more, to match America’s commitment.”¹⁰⁹ And yet despite these continued stinging rebukes from the US, penetrating self-diagnosis from some European leaders, and empty promises to amend their ways from others, nothing has actually changed in fact, it is possible to argue that not only have the European members of NATO not increased their spending and consequent ability to participate in NATO, they have in fact gone even further backwards in both spending and NATO participation.

At this juncture, the question is asked, should the EU be taken as a credible global security actor, or even further, should EU Member States be taken as credible international security actors. In the author’s opinion, the EU should not be considered as such, while Member States such as the UK and France are moving away from their remaining, but eroding, credibility. To further move along this line of thinking, we recall that the EU has made many ambitious statements which emphasise its intention, willingness and determination to uphold human rights and to protect vulnerable people around the globe. But can we really consider the EU a “normative actor” when it is clearly unwilling and unable to stand up for human rights in conflict zones around the world and even in its own backyard? Where was the EU in Mali? Where is the EU security force in Eastern Ukraine? Why have we not seen the deployment of the EU Battlegroups that were set up for just these types of events? These questions will be investigated in Section Three.

Wales Summit 2014.

The concerns that have been raised so far in this section were still very much in evidence when the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales was held in September of that year. These same issues were in fact being amplified by the annexation of Crimea by Russian forces and the continuing conflict in Ukraine, not to mention the unprecedented levels of barbarity in the Middle East. With such unparalleled violence taking place in Europe’s sphere of influence, it was vital that this conference successfully addressed these concerns.

¹⁰⁹ Watson, Ben. *Kerry: NATO Members Must Increase Military Spending*. 29 April 2014. <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2014/04/kerry-nato-members-must-increase-military-spending/83425/?oref=d-river> (accessed July 15, 2014).

The following analysis of the 2014 Summit will focus on three primary areas of interest identified in the official declaration; firstly, the adaptation measures and the components required to ensure that the Alliance can fully address the security challenges it might face and the way in which the Wales Summit has approached these tasks; secondly, the statements surrounding the issue of Russia's illegitimate annexation of Crimea and the implications this has on Eastern Member States; and finally, the issues surrounding Member State expenditure.

As we explored earlier in this paper, the speed at which Russian forces were able to successfully annexe the Crimea caught many Western observers off guard. For many years, it had been assumed that the Russian military was incapable of successfully launching such an operation and yet, not only had Russia successfully annexed Crimea, but they had done so with a level of speed and coordination that defied all previous assumptions regarding their capabilities. NATO members understood that the Crimean operation had caught them off guard and they needed to act with credibility.

One of the potentially pivotal policies to come out of Wales was the stated goal of enhancing the NATO Rapid Response Force (NRF).¹¹⁰ This NRF is designed to be deployed and operational in only a matter of days. As a result of Wales, the NRF would include the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), a new Allied joint force that would be able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO and European territory, such as Ukraine¹¹¹. To expand on the purpose of the NRF and subsequently VJTF: the NRF's primary function according to NATO is to "provide a rapid military response to an emerging crisis, whether for collective defence purposes or for other crisis response operations. The force gives NATO the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world. The NRF is based upon a rotational system were nations commit land, air, naval or special forces units to the Immediate Response Force for a

¹¹⁰ NATO. *Wales Summit Declaration*. 5 September 2014.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed December 28, 2014).

¹¹¹ *Ibid*

twelve-month period.¹¹² In theory, the NRF allows NATO to have a very visible presence potentially anywhere in the world at very short notice, and thus is a very powerful tool to be utilised.

Where the Welsh conference has significantly impacted the NRF is that the Member States agreed to conduct short-notice exercises to analyse how effective and ready the NRF is at any particular time. In conjunction with these tests there were plans drawn up to establish an appropriate command and control presence and some on location force enablers in the territories of eastern Allies at all times; there were to be contributions from Allies on a rotational basis, focusing on planning and exercising collective defence scenarios. If required, they will also facilitate reinforcement of Allies located at NATO's periphery for deterrence and collective defence.¹¹³ This proposed action can be clearly understood as sending a straightforward and unambiguous message to Putin about any further push eastward and would seem to indicate that NATO is taking proactive action towards what many Members view as unacceptable Russian aggression on Europe's borders. This proactive stance can be clearly seen in the statement from the NATO Declaration, Article 23, "The Alliance does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. But we cannot and will not compromise on the principles on which our Alliance and security in Europe and North America rest".¹¹⁴ These words, along with the military build-up on the eastern borders of the EU, clearly demonstrate that NATO is not only willing to talk tough on Russia, but also it would appear that they are more than willing to physically back up their assertions.

Before we move to the next issue, it is important to briefly update the action surrounding the NRF; in February of 2015, NATO leadership unequivocally stated that their path to ensure the success of the NRF is making good progress and that NATO has "increased the presence of land, maritime and air forces in

¹¹² NATO. "The NATO Response Force." *NATO*. October 2013.
http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_10/20131018_131022-MediaBackgrounder_NRF_en.pdf
(accessed March 15, 2014).

¹¹³ *Ibid*

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*

the eastern part of its territory. These Assurance Measures initiated in May last year are continuing through 2015, as planned. They demonstrate Alliance resolve and solidarity”.¹¹⁵ This statement clearly indicates that NATO is taking the threat from Russia seriously and has acted accordingly. Finally, it is important to note that France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom are to assume the role of a framework nation for rotations of this force in the coming years. It is interesting to note that Spain is amongst those members who have volunteered and could be an indication of a willingness to participate within NATO by the Spanish.

The 2014 Conference set out, in no uncertain terms, the NATO view towards the annexation of Crimea. NATO and its members strongly objected to and condemned the occupation and annexation of Crimea by Putin. Unsurprisingly, Crimea and the wider conflict in Ukraine played a major role in the discussions and policy formulation at the Wales Summit. The opening statement from the official declaration clearly indicates how serious NATO is regarding Ukraine,

*“We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Wales at a pivotal moment in Euro-Atlantic security. Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”*¹¹⁶

This statement, unlike many that have been made by NATO and the EU is actually being implemented; implementation measures include continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, on a rotational basis. These will provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation.¹¹⁷ It is important to recall here that these measures are not just limited to EU Member States but also include a number of non-EU states such as Azerbaijan and Georgia. The success of these measures is yet to be fully realized; as with any conflict, it is

¹¹⁵ NATO. *Statement by the NATO Defence Ministers on the Readiness Action Plan*. 15 February 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_117222.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed March 9, 2015).

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ NATO. *Wales Summit Declaration*. 5 September 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed December 28, 2014).

difficult to predict the outcome. However, it would be reasonable to suggest here that if NATO had not undertaken these new measures then the tensions in the region would have been exacerbated as the eastern member states of the EU and NATO would have felt even more vulnerable than they already do. However, it is also pertinent to state that these measures while reassuring, do in fact point to the very real prospect of a heavily militarized eastern border of the EU; this is a reality which the EU did not envisage.

Finally, we look briefly at the financial declarations made at the Welsh Summit. NATO leaders once again called upon its members to halt any further reductions in defence spending. Sadly, as highlighted frequently throughout this thesis, this statement is as effective as a broken record and is therefore easily dismissed. Europe has shown no signs of reversing the downward trend of its defence budgets and, as highlighted earlier, apart from a few exceptions it would seem that despite the pledge made at the Summit this trend is set to continue even in the face of the rapidly deteriorating security situation on Europe's periphery.

NATO Response Force.

With any discussion concerning European defence integration, one cannot ignore the major role that NATO plays. While Europe has developed on paper its own independent Battlegroup initiative, NATO has also constructed its own rapid deployment force - the NATO Response Force (NRF) and more specifically the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF).¹¹⁸ The NRF "is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed".¹¹⁹ To expand, the NRF would appear to be very similar to the EU's Battlegroup strategy; however, the primary difference is the size and scope of the NRF. The NRF is currently comprised of three elements; first, a command and control element from the

¹¹⁸ NATO. *NATO Response Force*. 23 February 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm (accessed March 9, 2015).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*

NATO Command structure; secondly, the Immediate Response Force, which is a joint force of around 13,000 high-readiness troops provided by Allies; and thirdly, a Response Forces Pool, which can supplement the Immediate Response Force when necessary.¹²⁰ The size of the NRF means that this force can not only deal with small scale issues as can the Battlegroup, but it also forms a formidable fighting force for regular combat missions and is one of the driving forces behind the transformation of NATO.

The Immediate Response Force has:

- A brigade-sized land component based on three Battle Groups and their supporting elements.
- A maritime component based on the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group (SNMCMG);
- A combat air and air-support component.
- Special Operations Forces.
- A chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence task force.

Before use, the force will be tailored (adjusted in size and capability) to match the demands of any specific operation to which it is committed.¹²¹

The NRF was first announced at the Prague Summit in 2002, General James Jones described the NRF in this way, " NATO will no longer have the large, massed units that were necessary for the Cold War, but will have agile and capable forces at Graduated Readiness levels that will better prepare the Alliance to meet any threat that it is likely to face in this 21st century."¹²² The capabilities of this new force were tested in a number of major high profile exercises, the most prominent being Steadfast Jaguar in 2006. Steadfast Jaguar was conducted on the Cape Verde Islands in June of 2006 and was specifically chosen due to the challenging location. With the success of this demonstration, the NRF was subsequently deployed in a number of theatres. Since then, NATO has "agreed that the NRF will be at the core of the Connected Forces

¹²⁰ NATO. *NATO Response Force*. 23 February 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm (accessed March 9, 2015).

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Ibid

Initiative in order to maintain NATO's readiness and combat-effectiveness".¹²³ This was an important step, as it shows that NATO is constantly analysing how the NRF can be adapted and changed to better suit the current geopolitical climate.

As with the Battlegroup, the NRF is formed on a rotational basis of 12-month periods for which NATO members provide resources and personnel; this rotational aspect of the NRF, and Battlegroup initiative, provides great flexibility and allows the States to make contributions in line with their own strategic interests. It must be stressed here that as with the Battlegroup strategy, this aspect seems reasonable on paper; however, the reality is that only a few Member States have the operational capacity to actually contribute. Nevertheless the way the NRF is generated and composed has been adjusted twice, in 2008 and 2010. This was to provide a more flexible approach to force generation, thereby facilitating force contributions which were being hampered by the enduring high operational tempo arising from Iraq, Afghanistan and other missions. To further support force generation, Allies have set themselves voluntary national targets for force contributions.¹²⁴

Perhaps the greatest strength that the NRF provides is that it is a very visible mechanism, and is both a great deterrent to would be aggressors and also a very visible assurance to NATO members and allies. This visibility has been displayed on a number of occasions such as in the Olympic Games in Athens and in disaster relief in both Pakistan and also in the US after Hurricane Katrina. In response to the unrest and conflict in Ukraine, NATO acted and created the VJTF. The VJTF was established at the Wales Summit in September of 2014 and is designed to further increase the speed at which NATO can react to events on its borders.

¹²³ NATO. *NATO Response Force*. 23 February 2015. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm (accessed March 9, 2015).

¹²⁴ Ibid

SECTION TWO: Analysis.

This section has explored the very complex realities that exist within NATO and how these have impacted the relationship between the EU, the US and the Member States. This information allows us to analyse what is on the slate, or the slates, of the concerned parties and how these slates impact the EU drive towards military integration. To begin with we will analyse the role that NATO plays on the EU's slate.

NATO slate.

NATO, much like the EU, is a product of post-war Europe and thus any Constructivist analysis must begin here. As explored earlier in this section, NATO was constructed to guarantee the peace of Europe by countering threats emanating from the looming power of the Soviet bloc. As Weldes argues, “national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the intersubjective and culturally established meanings with which the world... and the place of the state in it is understood”.¹²⁵ From a Constructivist perspective then, the national interests of NATO were established and grounded upon the threat of a perceived Soviet invasion. This construct determined that NATO, right from its inception, was designed to counter a regular military invasion with large scale armed forces and thus needed to establish a complex hierarchy. This hierarchy remains in play to this day, despite the fact that no Soviet invasion ever occurred and that the threats faced by NATO today are not from a national military, but rather from non-state actors such as ISIS. The effect that this hierarchy has played on the EU's slate will be thoroughly explored in the next section, however it is important to briefly mention here that the hierarchical structure of NATO and the way in which the EU has attempted to construct its own independent military seem to have a correlation in that the actions undertaken by NATO at a command and control level are imitated by the EU and its predecessors.

When analysing the hierarchy of NATO one cannot escape the role that the US and the UK have played in this. As this section has discussed in great detail,

¹²⁵ Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 280.

the US and its UK partner have been at the forefront of NATO since its inception, so much so that the French government at one stage referred to NATO decisions as ‘stitched up deals’. This attitude by the French can be understood from a Constructivist perspective as being a result of as Weldes argues, “specific identities (which) are created when social relations are depicted, different representations of the world entail different identities, which in turn carry with them different ways of functioning in the world . . . and make possible different interests”.¹²⁶ This position which Weldes argues is one of the dual mechanisms from which national interests are formed, in this case interpellation. From a Constructivist perspective it would appear clear that the UK and the US had constructed their own view of the world which saw them, and not Europe, as the bedrock of European security, while the French viewed NATO as nothing more than an Anglo-American alliance designed to steer Europe in a direction antagonistic to its own constructed identity. This identity driven division within NATO has played a considerable role in the policy formulations of not only the three members mentioned here, but also the wider EU. Weldes argues that, “State officials do not approach international politics with a blank slate on to which meanings are written only as a result of interactions among states”.¹²⁷ Weldes’ position is clearly exemplified in the way these three actors have interacted with each other and more importantly the impact that these interactions have played within the largest European military alliance in history. For decades, the hostility between the Anglo-Americans and the French fuelled the fires of discontent and thus produced a slate for all parties of distrust and in many cases resentment. As is common knowledge, in the Anglosphere world the French military are held in little regard and are seen as cowards. This widespread disdain is a clear example of just how the slate impacts not only the elites, but also the general public.

One cannot underestimate the power of the slate which informs the decisions made by elite. It was only in 2009 that the French returned to NATO after many decades of absence following De Gaulle’s decision to withdraw from

¹²⁶ Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 279.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 280.

NATO's integrated military command and pursue its own independent military action. This independent action is seen today when French troops operate independently from both the EU and NATO in operations such as the paratrooper attack on Boko Haram in 2015. The split has been referred to in this paper many times and we have seen that it has not just been limited to NATO operations but has in fact played a major role in shaping the integration debate since its inception; this issue will be thoroughly examined in the Section Three.

In Section One, the term 'multiple personality disorder' was briefly employed to describe European and NATO actions undertaken on the global scene; while on the surface, it would appear that the relationship between the UK, US and France seem to display many clear 'symptoms', it would be misleading to make this assumption too sweepingly. It would be a mistake because the reality is somewhat more complex. Within the context of NATO, we recall that France was not a member for many decades; so despite the fact that all parties' slates were heavily affected by the antagonism, this cannot simply be considered a case of multiple personality disorder as France was not a member of the NATO 'body' at all. Thus in this context, France was not a competing personality indwelling the body but rather an opponent in a separate, but closely related, body. However in relation to the integration of Europe's military, France was and is a member of that body and its dislocation is of great concern. Whatever the 'diagnosis', nothing seems to indicate an effective operational European integration taking place in the foreseeable future.

Returning once more to the Anglo-American leadership, the importance of this partnership within NATO cannot be stressed enough; as stated earlier within this section, at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 the importance of a Euro-Atlantic alliance was understood to be vital to the security of Europe. The statements made in this regard can be forcefully argued to have been derived directly from Member States' own slates; as highlighted earlier in this section, only a handful of the EU Member States actually meet the required two percent of GDP to be a Member of NATO and yet they still benefit from being NATO members. This reality, in and of itself, is an important aspect to bear in mind when understanding the EU's slate. For decades, the slate has been constructed

upon the knowledge that the US will intervene in a crisis on the European continent; this knowledge has been backed up on a number of occasions such as in the Balkans where Europe was incapable of acting independently and required the Clinton government to intervene, and more recently in Libya.

Following the Lisbon Treaty, violence in Libya erupted. Europe's slate had just undergone a considerable shakeup. As stated earlier in this section, Lisbon was a perceived massive stepping stone in the quest to address a number of concerns, especially in light of the long history between Europe and NATO. One of the foundational statements made as noted prior in this thesis was "We have adopted a new Strategic Concept that lays out our vision for the Alliance for the next decade: (sic) able to defend its members against the full range of threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises". The resolve of this vision would soon be tested in full view of the world in Libya. The Libyan intervention was from the beginning a US and UK led initiative; as pointed out earlier, many European nations were in support of this operation and yet few were able to participate, and those that were able to participate, were only able to do so with American leadership and supplies. This reality goes back to the points made earlier concerning American hierarchy within NATO and is a classic example of Weldes' position which argues in relation to the importance of linguistic resources "simultaneously given an identity; . . . with characteristics which are sometimes precise and certain, at other times vague and unsettled . . . their importance lies not in their accuracy, but in their provision of warranting conditions".¹²⁸ The importance of Weldes' words here is that the linguistic resource employed to write on one's slate does not actually have to be correct in a factual sense. Only months prior, the EU had boldly claimed that they had a new strategic concept which could deal with any threat and yet this boastful new world conquering strategy struggled against a third world dictator in a sparsely populated country on Europe's doorstep.

When analysing the Libyan debacle from a Constructivist perspective, one can clearly see that while an updated slate was constructed at Lisbon, it was not

¹²⁸ Weldes, Jutta. "Constructing national interests." *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 281-282.

long before this slate was revealed to be completely overly ambitious. It also revealed that the writing on the US slate concerning many of its 'partners' in Europe was not at all unfounded; that is that the Europeans do not take defence seriously and are incapable of acting independently.

While Section Two has analysed how NATO has impacted European integration, the next section will discuss how Europe has attempted to create its own independent European military integration and just how the American hierarchy within NATO has impacted this process.

SECTION THREE: a unified and credible European military force.

What attempts have been made to construct this?

The statements made and the positions established in the previous section are not new. Since the foundation of what became the European Union, European nations have been crippled by military weakness. In the early post-war years, the entire European continent was effectively a pile of rubble following the destruction of two world wars; within this context of devastation, military debilitation is understandable. This section explores how the EU and its post-war predecessors have attempted to create a unified and credible European military force.

The first part of this section (3a) will analyse an early forerunner of the contemporary notion of an integrated EU military force, the Pleven Plan. This plan was formulated by the French in October of 1950 and aimed to combine military units from the Member States into an integrated European army under the direction of the council of Member States' ministers. The Pleven Plan envisaged a European Defence Community (EDC), which would follow the example of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This concept meshed nicely within the emerging, still fragile, European identity in which it was envisaged that pan-European co-operation in multiple fields would lead to peace and prosperity for all. Following the trauma of two world wars within the living memory of millions, mutual co-operation and a pan-European approach to security was widely accepted at all levels.

The second section (3b) examines how in the early years of European integration, NATO and the United States played a significant role in shaping the strategies undertaken by European nations towards defence and how this role would impact not only the strategic thinking of the time, but also contemporary defence policies and attitudes of the Member States. This examination is vital as the early reliance on American leadership for defence and the reluctance to create a supranational body that could potentially be in competition with NATO was, in the early post-war years and is still to this day, seen as a sensitive topic.

The third section (3c) focuses on intergovernmental defence strategies conducted by Member States, specifically the St Malo declaration made by the UK and France. The focus on this treaty gives the reader a clear insight into how Member States are approaching both their own and regional security and defence; it also shows how these treaties integrate, if at all, with other Member States' strategies and also the CSDP and other EU institutions.

The fourth (3d) section analyses what institutional bodies and strategies exist within the EU. The main focus of this section will be the EU Battle Groups strategy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This focus allows us to analyse how contemporary EU institutional attitudes and strategies are constructed towards defence and security, and how these strategies relate to those of the Member States.

The final section (3e) seeks to address the question of why the EU Battle Groups' strategy, and other strategies and declarations such as the Helsinki Headline Goal, not only remain unmet, but appeared to have been ignored all together. This section addresses the question in the context of contemporary conflicts and how both the EU, including its Member States and the US have acted. These clearly fit the prerogatives of the strategies and declarations made by the EU and yet both have been resoundingly ignored by the EU as a whole; in fact, it has been left to the individual Member States to formulate their own positions outside of a coherent EU response. What then do these examples mean for the EU as a credible security actor; and more importantly for this thesis, what do these examples mean for EU military integration?

Section 3a: the Pleven Plan.

Following the defeat of the Axis powers, Europe lay in ruins; tens of millions had died, national infrastructure on the continent lay in ruins and the horrors of the Holocaust were beginning to be revealed. The two world wars had effectively eviscerated Europe's manpower and resolve to pursue military adventurism; this widespread weakness however needed to be addressed as the new threat rising in the East banished any hope of peace. The threat from the East led Europe, under American leadership, to construct the NATO alliance as outlined in the previous section; at the same time however, the first tentative

steps towards an integrated European military force were being taken by the French. On the 24th of October 1950, French Defence Minister René Pleven proposed to establish a European Defence Community; his proposal would come to be known the Pleven Plan.¹²⁹ This plan took its inspiration from French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman's strategy of the European Coal and Steel Community. The ECSC was formalised after the Treaty of Paris in 1951; it was signed by West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg with the aim of creating a common market for coal and steel among the Member States. This strategy was vital as in the early post-war period the massive reconstruction program underway on the continent meant that both these materials were in high demand. It was hoped that through ECSC integration to "make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible".¹³⁰ Schuman's aspiration can be argued to lie at the heart of the proposed Pleven Plan.

The Pleven Plan envisaged the creation of a European Defence Community that would act in a similar manner to the ECSC. The plan would see the creation of a European Army under the command of a European Defence Minister who would answer to EDC, and they in turn would be accountable to the European Parliament.¹³¹ This force would be funded by a common budget which would include an armament and equipment procurement program; it is interesting to note that from the very earliest inception of this strategy, it was proposed that any potential European force would be placed at the disposal of the Atlantic Treaty and would operate in accordance with the mandates and strategies outlined under the treaty¹³². The concept of collective security was gaining traction at this period in history; the Western response to the Korean War was being hailed as a success, as stated in the opening remarks made by Pleven in his address to the National Assembly on the 24th of October 1950.

¹²⁹ NATO. *The French Proposal*. No Date Given.

http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/#/en/encyclopedia/accesion_of_greece_turkey_and_germany/ways_of_integrating_germany/the_french_proposal/ (accessed July 25, 2014).

¹³⁰ European Union. *The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950*. No Date Given. http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm (accessed March 10, 2014).

¹³¹ *Ibid*

¹³² *Ibid*

*"Ladies and gentlemen, the ideal of collective security has just achieved a victory in Korea which marks an historic advance in the efforts of the free nations to create in the world conditions of security such as to discourage any aggressive designs".*¹³³

The Pleven Plan not only sought to bring together soldiers of the Member States acting together for common goals, but also to take these national soldiers and “achieve a complete fusion of the human and material elements which make it up under a single European political and military authority”.¹³⁴ This army would be considered a truly European force, answerable only to the European Parliament and not to any Member State; or would it? To answer this question it is necessary to briefly outline the mechanics of how this proposed European army would work. At the senior level, a Minister of Defence would be appointed by the participating governments and would possess responsibilities set out by the European Assembly. The powers vested in this position would be similar to that of a national defence minister, such as implementing directives from the council and acting as a channel between the European Community and outside nations. It was understood that this minister would operate within a common European budget and would be responsible for overseeing the implementation of existing international obligations and the negotiations of new engagements on the basis of those received by the Council of Ministers.¹³⁵ As stated previously, the Minister would also hold the responsibility of pursuing an armaments and equipment program. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Minister would be responsible for obtaining from the Member States the “contingents, the equipment, the armaments, and the supplies due from each state to the common army”¹³⁶

It is interesting to recall at this juncture that individual nations would still possess their own independent militaries alongside those that were to be committed to the European army, “participating states which currently have

¹³³ “Text of the Pleven Plan (Excerpt from Address to National Assembly) 24 October 1950.” *Fransamaltingvongesusau.com*. No Date Given. <http://www.fransamaltingvongesusau.com/documents/dl2/h6/2.6.1.pdf> (accessed July 9, 2014).

¹³⁴ *Ibid*

¹³⁵ *Ibid*

¹³⁶ *Ibid*

national forces at their disposal would retain their own authority so far as concerned that part of their existing forces which was not integrated by them into the European army".¹³⁷ This fact is interesting when considered alongside the following statement,

*"Conversely, the European Minister of Defence might with the authorization of the Council of Ministers, place at the disposal of a participating government a part of its national forces comprised in the European force, for the purpose of meeting requirements other than those of common defence."*¹³⁸

This statement would seem to indicate that, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, the European Army could potentially be used by national governments to suit their own agendas, even those that may potentially run counter to the notion of common defence. An example of this could be the deployment of this army by the French in Indochina or North Africa. This reality, especially in the post-war period which saw the old Colonial powers lose vast areas of their empires to nationalist uprisings, would make any potential pan-European army a political bargaining tool to be employed by the most powerful countries such as France. To expand, as the European military is dependent on contributions from Member States, a nation such as France could withhold or withdraw its forces and funding if its demands were not met and by so doing nullify any potential for a credible European army. While this may seem unlikely, we must remember that France withdrew from NATO for a number of decades over what it saw as alliance where "the British and Americans stitched up deals" and thus seriously weakened the European component of NATO. Would a similar reaction have occurred if Member States refused to assist France in its costly and unsuccessful wars in Asia and Africa? Any answer to this question is of course purely speculative, but it does highlight the vulnerabilities of any alliance which allows the potential usage of European troops to further the geostrategic goals of a single member.

¹³⁷ "Text of the Pleven Plan (Excerpt from Address to National Assembly) 24 October 1950." *Fransamaltingvongesusau.com*. No Date Given. <http://www.fransamaltingvongesusau.com/documents/dl2/h6/2.6.1.pdf> (accessed July 9, 2014).

¹³⁸ *Ibid*

The hypothetical question above, while simply a theoretical possibility, needs to be grounded upon the proposed relationship that the EDC was intended to have with NATO. It must be stressed that the Pleven Plan and subsequent EDC was never intended to be a purely independent force structure; it was always to be strongly related to the “Contractual Agreements” of Bonn, otherwise known as the 1952 Treaty on Germany,¹³⁹ which sought to provide the Federal Government of West Germany “full power over its domestic and foreign affairs”.¹⁴⁰ While many commentators link the Pleven Plan and EDC with the ECSC, the fact remains that the EDC was not to remain autonomous, but was in fact to be closely linked to NATO. While statement made by the French Defence Minister regarding the Pleven Plan stressed the importance of the role that a proposed European Defence Minister would play, we must realise that any European force would have come under the power of the NATO Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, who was an American. This would have meant that if the Pleven Plan had come to fruition, the first contemporary European military would ultimately have answered to an American. The American Journal of International Law states that the Supreme NATO Commander would be “empowered to satisfy himself that the European Defence Forces are organised, equipped, trained . . . (so) they are ready for use, at the disposal of the Supreme NATO Commander”.¹⁴¹ The author goes further and outlines that during a time of war that the EDC will be subservient to NATO command.

This role that NATO would have played if the Pleven Plan had been initiated poses yet more questions about the notion that this would have been a truly European army. With the reality that the EDC would be under the authority of NATO command and the fact that NATO was dominated by the United States and UK, neither of whom were members of the fledgling European Community, we ask three important questions; firstly, could this European

¹³⁹ Kunz, Josef L. “Treaty Establishing the European Defence Community.” *The American Journal for International Law Vol 47, Number 2*, 1953: 275 - 281.

¹⁴⁰ Archibald Cary Coolidge, Hamilton Fish Armstrong. “The German Question.” *Foreign Affairs, Volume 33*, 1955: 177

¹⁴¹ Kunz, Josef L. “Treaty Establishing the European Defence Community.” *The American Journal for International Law Vol 47, Number 2*, 1953: 275 - 281.

military have been considered anything more than a tool to be utilised by non-Member States? Secondly, with French attitudes towards NATO progressively becoming more strained, how could this proposed plan have been effectively implemented when the EDC would have been effectively led by two non-Member States from which the French were progressively moving away in terms of trust and cooperation? Thirdly, what role would West Germany have played in this pan-European force? It is important to remember that just five years prior to the first proposal of the Pleven Plan, the Wehrmacht had conducted a brutal occupation in the Member States of the proposed European army. This question, unlike the previous two, can be answered with a degree of legitimacy that does not rely on speculation.

The question of what to do with post-war Germany was a pressing issue, no more than in the realm of defence. Many European nations had fought two world wars with Germany in the space of only half a century. Despite this difficult relationship with Germany, Europe and the US knew that in order to ensure the security of post-war Europe from the looming threat of Communism, West Germany must be included. While one can see the value of including West Germany in the ECSC, it is an entirely different matter to include them militarily. While today the crimes of the Wehrmacht and SS have grown stale in the collective memory of many in the West, throughout the early years of the 1950s, the crimes were still very present in the collective psyche of Europe and also manifest in the widespread physical devastation. Yet despite this, to counter the new threat rising from Stalin's Russia, it was considered that West Germany must be included in defence.

The German question, in regards to defence, had two potential paths to resolution; first, the path of the Bonn Agreement or secondly, the path of the Pleven Plan. It is interesting to note that the French played a considerable role in the pursuit of both these strategies. On the 26th of May 1952, The Allied-German Contractual Agreement was signed in Bonn; the purpose of this treaty, as stated earlier, was to provide the Federal Republic full power to oversee its domestic and foreign affairs once the EDC came into effect.¹⁴² This position

¹⁴² Archibald Cary Coolidge, Hamilton Fish Armstrong. "The German Question." *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 33, 1955: 177

understandably caused many nations to question the wisdom of the policy direction, none more so than the French. This opposition can be understood to be a key reason why the French wanted to create a European army in which German forces could participate, but with the key caveat that there would be no West German national army. This position however, was strongly challenged by the British. The UK's attitude towards the rearmament of Germany was strongly grounded in a NATO approach and in fact the UK's approach to a combined European army followed a similar vein. On the 29th of November 1950, Anthony Eden, the Conservative Foreign Secretary, stated that he had "no time" for a European army and that "Europe is not enough, it is not big enough" and instead advocated for an 'Atlantic Confederate Force' under NATO command;¹⁴³ as a consequence, the British strongly countered not only French proposals for the rearmament of Germany through the Pleven Plan, but the Pleven plan in its entirety. It is interesting however that despite the UK's unwillingness to support or merge its forces with any potential European army, the UK was still willing to support the creation of one. It is important to add that while the UK was not even a member of the proposed EDC, it could still wield such significant influence over members; thus the notion that the EDC and Pleven Plan would for the foreseeable future be subservient to NATO is reinforced.

The issue of West Germany was but one of many problems which ultimately caused the downfall of the Pleven Plan and the EDC; it is thought provoking to observe that despite the significant role that the French played in the initial stages of promoting these concepts it was the French Parliament, specifically the Gaullists, who ended any hopes of seeing a combined European military in the mid-20th Century. It is one of history's many conundrums that a French strategy to create a supranational European army would fail due to fears from French Government officials that France would lose too much of its own sovereignty in the process; and thus, a French strategic plan would fail to be ratified by the French Parliament. It must be stressed here nevertheless that the failure of the EDC and Pleven Plan was not just due to the French Parliament;

¹⁴³ Gifford, Chris. *The MAKing of Eurosceptic Britain*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008.

the death of Stalin and the unwillingness of the UK to enter into any such European army led many to question the validity of a European army in conjunction with NATO.

Section 3b: US influence in European security decisions.

The failure of the Pleven Plan as outlined above can be understood to have resulted from multiple factors which culminated with the French Government voting its demise. The prospect of an independent European force, while intriguing and attractive to a number of European leaders, would ultimately fail due to the reliance on and leadership of the United States in post-war Europe and also because the UK was more closely related to the US than it was to its European neighbours. Both these realities are vital to understand if we are to explore the foundation for contemporary security thinking in Europe. It is quite understandable that the topic of American leadership both in the past and in contemporary Europe was and remains a sensitive topic; Paschal Bruckner puts it this way, “Neither France, nor Italy, nor Germany could forgive America for having liberated them from the Nazi and fascist yokes.... The little American cousin had surpassed her European elders in vigour, power and creativity. It is hard to forgive assistance when it shows up such weakness”.¹⁴⁴ And yet, one cannot ignore this issue. Following the war and the destruction to both civil and military power, Western Europe was heavily dependent on an American guarantee for defence. Western Europe was in no position to counter the Soviet aggression on its borders without a considerable number of American troops stationed throughout Western Europe. The signing of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty cemented both US leadership and a dependence on US military resources in the region for many decades to come. It is important to recall that it was Western European nations who pushed for American leadership and the continued presence of a vast number of US personnel within Western Europe. In contrast, the US had initially expected Western European countries to progressively take control of their own security and by so doing free up large numbers of its own military thus enabling the US

¹⁴⁴ Bruckner, Pascal (Translated by Beer, William). *The Tears of the White Man: Compassion As Contempt*. New York: The Free Press, 1986.

to avoid spending a considerable amount of its defence budget each year being the sole credible security actor in the region.¹⁴⁵ This US desire for Western Europe to undertake greater responsibility was undermined by the on-going escalation of conflict between the East and West, and in particular the Korean War. As such, the escalation in conflict saw the upgrade of the 1949 treaty to what we now know as NATO.

The formation of NATO changed the security landscape of Europe forever. This alliance, which was examined in the previous section, witnessed the first integration of European armed forces in peace time for many years; however, it also contained a considerable American presence. One cannot underestimate the role that the US played in these early years of NATO, and in fact the role it plays even today. This substantial American presence was not just limited to significant quantities of troops but also, and most importantly, it brought with it leadership. Every single NATO Supreme Allied Commander has been an American; this fact is due to the requirement that this role must be filled by a member of the US military who is either a four-star general or admiral. This continuation of American leadership in NATO speaks volumes about the way that arguably not only the US but also wider Europe views its role to be in both NATO and collective European security. This situation is further highlighted when we examine the nationalities of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander; there has never once been a French deputy or in fact a deputy from any other nation apart from the UK and Germany, with the UK playing the dominant role. With these two facts alone, it is no wonder that the French for many decades viewed NATO as being a club where the US and UK “stitched up deals”. American leadership though derives once again from the early years of post-war Europe.

The overarching and foundational US leadership in Europe in the early years effectively enabled the US to manage large aspects of what could be considered uniquely European affairs. This dependency of Western Europe on

¹⁴⁵ Keukeleire, Stephan, and Kolja Raube. “Common Security and Defence Policy: Development, Added Value, and Challenges.” In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, by Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, 63. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 2012.

the US greatly restricted Western European nations' national and foreign policies and thus significantly influenced the way in which European defence integration was conducted.¹⁴⁶ As one author puts it, "practically every proposal was, and still is, reviewed (by) . . . "What do the Americans think" test".¹⁴⁷ This statement clearly highlights the great importance that the US plays both today and in the past. With this reality, it is little wonder that French plans for European military integration, that went contrary to the wishes of the US and UK, ultimately failed; the US was just too indispensable to defence for Europe to ignore its interests. As such, any attempt by European nations to integrate any initiatives towards collective defence not only had to satisfy Member States' political wills, but most importantly the might of Washington. Within this reality, the French position regarding the Pleven Plan and its perceived loss of sovereignty and dignity becomes understandable. The relationship between France and the US had for many years been at best cold, and thus French anxiety over loss of sovereignty and the tarnishing of national glory are justifiable. This is particularly so when considering that if a united European army had been formed, the US would have played an immense role in all aspects of not only French but all European national economies and foreign policies. This rather substantial claim can be supported by reference to the nature of modern warfare; any person interested in politics will have at some stage come across the term, 'Military Industrial Complex' (MIC). This term refers to the realities of industrialised warfare; for example, coal and steel production would be considered part of the MIC as they can be used for military purposes, and are in fact vital to successful campaigns. Hence, we can understand the French reluctance to be subsumed into an MIC controlled by the United States.

This reality of US ubiquity and dominance would therefore constitute a great intrusion to all aspects of the emerging European Union. The newly formed

¹⁴⁶ Keukeleire, Stephan, and Kolja Raube. "Common Security and Defence Policy: Development, Added Value, and Challenges." In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, by Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, 63. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 2012.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid

ECSC would have theoretically come under partial control of the US if the creation of a combined European army of the Pleven Plan had occurred. This statement might seem a little alarmist, but when we consider a few realities of industrialised warfare it becomes a more substantive claim. If the Pleven Plan had been initiated, the subsequent leadership position that the US would have held due to its role in NATO and the subservience of the Pleven Plan to NATO command would have allowed the US to either directly or indirectly push policies on domestic coal and steel production along with other manufacturing sectors to align with its own strategic principles and not those of the host nations. The US would have theoretically been able to do this due to the proposal for a combined European armaments program, something which requires coal, steel and manufacturing. As this armaments program would have ultimately fallen under a NATO Allied Supreme Commander, an American not a European would have wielded considerable power in both military and civil policies in multiple European countries. This reality in the early post-war period underlies why no combined European army was ever constructed, and at the same time highlights the considerable role that the US played in post-war Europe.

The role that the US has played within European security cannot be denied; it was the US and not Europe that provided the bulk of the forces during the Cold War and today, it is the US and not Europe that still provides the bulk of the forces in 'European' actions. As mentioned in the previous section, it was the US and not the EU who led the intervention in Libya, it was also the US and not Europe who led the air strikes and intervention against Serbia, a nation that is within geographic Europe. Whether one agrees with American foreign policy or not is irrelevant, the fact remains that as in the past Europe is still dependent upon American leadership and resourcing when conducting large scale military operations. This attachment can be seen to have originated in the early vulnerability of the post-war period and has continued on to the present day.

European dependency however is beginning to face a major disruption; as China grows in the East, the US is now moving its attention to Asia and the Pacific. As noted in the previous section, the US is cutting its military abilities

considerably to the point that, as noted in Section Two, it will be only able to operate on a large scale in one conflict zone. This new strategic view of the US known as the 'Pivot' would identify exactly what the US views as comprising its own strategic interests. It is of extreme importance that this Pivot is occurring at the same time as instability in Europe's geographic neighbourhood is exploding, whether that instability be the Islamic State or events in Ukraine or North Africa. This US Pivot will greatly affect future European defence integration.

Section 3c: Intergovernmental defence strategies.

The failure to implement a common army or indeed a common foreign policy in the 1950s would set off a cascade of ramifications that are still felt today. The indecision and political wrangling surrounding both the notion of defence and the best way to achieve it led to the position that any discussion towards military integration was now taboo. These political sensibilities would influence the direction that Europe would take in a very significant manner; in the 1970s, when the European Community initiated the first informal cooperation in regards to a common foreign policy within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), it was made manifestly clear that the direction that any common foreign policy would take would be through 'civilian power'.¹⁴⁸ However, the fact remained that despite this pledge of being an exclusively 'civilian power' the European Community lacked any credible crisis management instruments with which to implement this 'civilian power'. The notion of foreign policy through civilian power was soon challenged by the realities of what a number of commentators labelled an "uncivil world". Following the declaration in the 1970s, the world witnessed multiple conflicts flaring up throughout the globe; whether in Asia, Africa or the Middle East, the European Community was unable to respond with any form of credibility or effectiveness in any of these regions which desperately needed the intervention of a security actor. It is important to note at this point that there are completely valid and even compelling arguments as to why

¹⁴⁸ Keukeleire, Stephan, and Kolja Raube. "Common Security and Defence Policy: Development, Added Value, and Challenges." In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, by Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, 65. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 2012.

Europe should not have intervened in some of these regions; further, it is not the purpose of this thesis to make a moral argument about the validity of foreign intervention *per se*. However, when the bloodshed and violence is occurring on the border of the European Community and is in fact part of Europe, Yugoslavia, this becomes an entirely different matter.

The military impotence displayed by Europe to the world was a wakeup call, and the fact that neither NATO nor Washington was willing to get involved in the early stages effectively neutralised any form of European response; as established earlier in several places, Europe has been consistently unable to operate in any theatre without US support. Not until tens of thousands of civilians had died did NATO act, and even then it was once again an American led coalition dealing with once again a European aggressor. The conflict in Yugoslavia and other areas made it impossible for the Member States to continue to ignore the military dimensions of security when negotiating the new Treaty of Maastricht and the new Common Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP). However even as the impotence of Europe as a security actor on the global stage had been broadcast all over the world, there still existed divisions and uncertainties within Europe about how to proceed.

The Maastricht Treaty was signed on the 7th of February 1992 and covered a wide range of areas. One of the milestones of this treaty was that it addressed the need to create a common foreign policy within the community, “to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy”.¹⁴⁹ This statement plainly indicates that for the first time in many decades, Europe would pursue a credible common foreign and defence policy and also the ability to act as an effective global security player. This creation of the CFDP was, in the view of the treaty, an important way of promoting and affirming the identity of Europe on the global scene. Article B clearly states that the Union is “to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common

¹⁴⁹ European Community. “The Maastricht Treaty.” *Euro Treaties*. No Date Given. <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2014).

foreign and security policy”.¹⁵⁰ This new willingness to be active on the global scene as a credible international security actor is outlined in “Title V Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy”.

Title V’s objectives focus on safeguarding the common values, interests and independence of the Union; strengthening peace at both the regional and international level in accordance with the principles of both the UN Charter and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter; the promotion of international cooperation; and finally, the promotion of democracy and human rights globally.¹⁵¹ These stated objectives were then to be pursued by two main strategic thrusts; firstly, the establishment of systematic cooperation between Member States and then, the gradual implementation, in accordance with the treaty, of joint action in areas in which Member states have shared interests. These objectives would appear to be reasonable to pursue, and if successfully implemented could be understood as laying the groundwork for an integrated and credible military force; as such, it is important to analyse in greater detail how these objectives were to be pursued.

To begin with we will analyse the first strategic plan, “establishing systematic co-operation between Member States in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J.2”.¹⁵² Article J.2 has three primary points, first that Member States will consult and inform each other within the Council on foreign and security policy which is deemed to be of general interest with the aim of ensuring a more unified approach to the matter at hand. Secondly, whenever the Council deems it necessary it shall define a common position which the Member States will conform to; and thirdly, Member States will coordinate their actions with other international bodies.¹⁵³ These strategies were to be then taken in accordance with the strategies laid out in the second aspect of the pursuit of the objectives, “by gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the Member States have

¹⁵⁰ European Community. “The Maastricht Treaty.” *Euro Treaties*. No Date Given. <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2014).

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*

¹⁵² *Ibid*

¹⁵³ *Ibid*

important interests in common”.¹⁵⁴ Article J.3 goes into great detail in regards to the implementation on how any joint action would proceed. To summarise, the Council would hold the power to decide what matters would be decided to be ‘joint actions’. This section also includes how these joint actions would be authorised and by what manner they would be decided upon; for example, when the Council is required to act by a qualified majority the article outlines the steps and majorities that need to be established before the joint action can be undertaken. It is interesting to note that this section enables Member States to act alone if the situation makes it imperative to act; the Member State merely needs to inform the Council on any such action.

This provision for independent action highlights the underlying and fundamental weakness of the Maastricht Treaty in regards to defence and also foreshadows the problems inherent in the construction of an integrated European military force today; if a Member State wishes to act unilaterally, it can do so by merely stating that immediate action is imperative and thus pursue its own foreign policy without any regard to the provisions outlined in the Treaty. This factor was not alone in the demise of the initial CFSP; once again Europe was divided about the best path towards integration. Nations such as France and Germany were interested in pursuing a common defence approach, other nations who were more predisposed to the Atlantic treaty or who were neutral actors were more interested in minimal changes at best. The Maastricht Treaty did attempt to alleviate these concerns through section J.4 of the Treaty; however, it is clear that nations such as the UK were merely paying lip service and making token gestures of support towards a credible common security.¹⁵⁵ To elaborate, while nations like the UK may have given the Treaty its support, they had not made available to the EU the resources and instruments that it would need in order to achieve its desired role in the world. It is little wonder then that after the Balkans had once again spiralled into

¹⁵⁴ European Community. “The Maastricht Treaty.” *Euro Treaties*. No Date Given. <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2014).

¹⁵⁵ Keukeleire, Stephan, and Kolja Raube. “Common Security and Defence Policy: Development, Added Value, and Challenges.” In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, by Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, 63. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 2012.

violence that Europe was once again looking incompetent on the world stage as it was unable to operate independently without the US and thus further discredited not only the EU but its new 'pillar' the CFSP.

Section 3(a-c) Analysis.

Before we proceed further, it is important to analyse the information that has been set out thus far in light of the primary focus of this paper, "*Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States' militaries*"?

Section 3a focussed on the initial steps that were undertaken within Europe to formulate a credible and unified armed forces of Europe. As detailed earlier, the main thrust of this strategy occurred under the Pleven Plan and the way in which this plan's initiatives would have worked in conjunction with NATO. The underlying factors that prevented the Pleven Plan from being properly implemented would clearly appear to be the presence and competing national identities of the Member States themselves. This is understandably an inflammatory statement; however when we look for reasons for the failure of this plan, it is immediately apparent that the internal political ambitions of individual Member States; their competing foreign policies; and most importantly, the way each state saw itself, both in terms of identity and role; and the way in which each state identified who its friends and rivals were would appear to have coalesced to seal the fate of the Pleven Plan before it had even been announced. Reasons for this apparently inescapable failure can be found in multiple aspects of both the Pleven Plan and the wider political atmosphere of the day. Perhaps the greatest reason that Pleven failed was that it enabled the Member States to possess their own national armies and foreign policies while at the same time requiring these same nations to then contribute a significant portion of their military resources to a combined European army. Further undermining any possible success of the Pleven Plan was the byzantine nature of NATO and the fact that the European organisation would ultimately come under the control of the United States, if the proposed command structure were had been followed through. In addition to this reality, the role that the UK was able to play in influencing the ultimate failure

of this plan, despite the fact that the UK was not even a member, shows the clear weakness and susceptibility of the proposed alliance to, arguably, foreign powers. While taking the position that the UK was a foreign power may be a stretch, the point remains that two non-Member States, the US and UK were able to successfully discredit and destroy a military integration plan which ran counter to their own strategic outlooks with apparent ease. This outside meddling was not the only problem, when we consider that the French Government voted against the very plan which had been instigated by the French Government we see a clear example of the weakness of the integration position at this time.

When we consider these facts in light of the question, “*Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries*”, it would be reasonable to state that a combined European military in the 1950s would have not been a credible security actor largely due to the existence of dissension, distrust and competing national identities along with the ability for non-Member States to effectively dismantle the Plan with apparent ease. These factors combine to demonstrate, without a shadow of doubt, that even if the Pleven Plan had been implemented it would have not only failed to act in any form of decisive manner, but would have ultimately imploded under pressure from the internal incoherence and division with which such an alliance would have been plagued.

These political machinations can be understood in the context of what was happening to the empires of post-war Europe. A number of the nations, such as the UK and France, were in the process of rapidly losing large swathes of their once global empires in very quick succession; as a consequence, any proposed strategy by one of these former colonising powers would have been viewed by both internal members and external states with a deal of scepticism and thus undermined the credibility of the proposed army on the international scene.

The role of the United States that has been outlined is undeniable; how then does this role influence the thesis question? As stated prior, because Europe was and remains unable to act effectively without America, the “what do the Americans think test” has always been and still remains pivotal in policy and

strategy construction; put very bluntly, little has changed. This American test is an incredibly important aspect of any discussion concerning an integrated approach to European security. This significant reality, whether viewed as positive or negative, is an undeniable fact. The US is the sole remaining superpower today and European defence is still underfunded and is still racked by competing national identities and ambitions. In reference back to the Pleven Plan, it is interesting to note that the Pleven Plan, which called for a combined European military, ultimately still placed this military under the leadership of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, an American. This trend has continued, as we have seen in previous sections where Europeans have looked to the US and also the UK for leadership in contemporary security actions such as the Balkans and Libya. This significant US role could even go so far as to change the thesis question by adding the caveat “*Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries’ without American leadership?*”.

This hypothetical caveat, while interestingly controversial and valid, is extraneous. Our purpose is to understand the key questions surrounding the ability for Europe to be seen as an independent security actor which is free to act on its own merits and not depend on the leadership of the US. It is important to note that the EU has many times declared its intention to work with other international bodies and not to operate as a solely independent actor; however, this position should not be interpreted to include the *inability* of the EU to act on its own, but simply as a desire to act in a non-unilateral manner.

To conclude the analysis of this section we shall turn our attention to the Maastricht Treaty. On the basis of the information provided earlier, it would appear that not much changed between the early post-war period Pleven Plan through to the Maastricht Treaty in regards to a common defence ability. Once again, we witness political corrosion in action by Member States; once again it is the UK and France. It seems reasonable to argue that while both these actors were happy to adopt the new pan-European ‘we’re all in this together’ paradigm at the level of talk-fests, they were in fact still strongly wedded to their old colonial identities in which they ‘knew better’ and should be listened

to with special attention. Their former identities had provided states like France and the UK with power and glory; they now struggled to acknowledge that these were slipping from their grasp and that any new global influence they might look forward to must be structured differently and be shaped by new and challenging constraints. Did these former colonisers really trust their new European friends? Did they respect them? Were they willing to work with them, or even with each other? It appears not.

As with the Pleven Plan, this new Maastricht Treaty was solely dependent upon Member States providing the European Union with the personnel and equipment to conduct 'EU' foreign policy, and once again this did not occur. In fact it caused the initial stages of the contemporary EU to appear weak and inefficient in regards to constructing and implementing a credible foreign policy. As with the time period surrounding the Pleven Plan, once again the US had to step in and provide leadership to Europe in the Balkans conflict. This inability to conduct a credible security response to the conflict in the Balkans so soon after the Maastricht Treaty, which as discussed earlier was meant to address these considerable short fallings, has been described as merely 'bad timing' for the EU. This conclusion of 'bad timing' however is not a satisfactory answer to the realities laid out so far; war is generally never 'good timing' for those it is declared upon or for those who are required to act. It is for this very reason that nations and empires for millennia have always maintained a credible deterrent to outside aggressors, whether it was a professional army like the Roman legions or the man at arms of the Middle Ages.

This lesson appeared to have been lost on continental Europe, who seemed for most of the latter half of the 20th Century to be content with a wall of American and British forces separating them from the Soviet Union; this was with the marked exception of France, which was in the process of pursuing its own national defence programs. Therefore it comes as no surprise that following the initiation of the Maastricht Treaty, most of Europe was ill prepared to conduct a credible and timely response to the violence in the Balkans and thus undermines the validity of Europe's claims of being a serious actor, even in its own neighbourhood. Despite officially making steps towards

integrating and establishing a credible European defence force, the fact remained that despite this much vaunted integration, Europe still could not act and once again had to rely on the US to lead them. This recent history highlights and reiterates that simply because a Treaty exists and is embellished with many ambitious statements regarding defence integration, its mere existence does not actually or necessarily contribute to any form of measurable improvement and thus potentially requires the core thesis question of this paper to be answered in the negative.

This position while valid is not the last word on European military integration, the next section will explore how following the Maastricht Treaty the EU has taken steps to address the serious concerns outlined so far in this paper.

Contemporary Security

Section 3d. What institutional security bodies and strategies exist within the EU?

The signing of the Treaty of Maastricht set in motion a relative revolution in the way the new Europe, which was in the process of being created, would be viewed and would view itself. In the space of a very few short years, Europe had gone from eschewing any form of common military integration to signing the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty can be considered one of the first major stepping stones in the quest for Europe to break the polarization in regards to defence in which it had been gripped for nearly half a century, that being the conflict over whether European military integration should occur as an Atlantic solidarity strategy or a purely European initiative. While the immediate aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty and the savage conflicts that erupted in the Balkans once again showed the incompetence of any European response, the intriguing outcome of this apparent incompetence was for a renewed push for greater European integration from two unlikely allies.

Europe's impotence in Kosovo led to the realisation amongst many European nations that something needed to be done, and done quickly. The primary drivers of this new view were the United Kingdom and France, two nations who had been 'at logger-heads' for decades over how European military

integration should occur. Ongoing high level dialogue between the Franco-British governments led to the Saint-Malo Declaration which provided the political basis for the establishment of the contemporary CSDP. It is important to note that many commentators have labelled this declaration as “less (of) a shared vision than a compromise between two opposing views on European security”.¹⁵⁶ This is an important statement to consider as it once again shows the fragility that is evident within the European Union towards any form of military and foreign policy integration.

The Saint-Malo Declaration was made on the 4th of December 1998; this declaration was the outcome of an important Franco-British summit that, arguably, for the first time received agreement from both the British and French on how Europe could move towards an effective common security policy. The declaration stated that “The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage” and that the “Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.¹⁵⁷ These statements seem to indicate a strong commitment by both parties to the creation of an independent European military free from the political will of the Member States, as laid out in the Pleven Plan. It is interesting to note however that the declaration does not end there and includes a rather interesting reference,

“In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a

¹⁵⁶ Keukeleire, Stephan, and Kolja Raube. “Common Security and Defence Policy: Development, Added Value, and Challenges.” In *The Foreign Policy of the European Union*, by Federiga Bindi and Irina Angelescu, 63. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute, 2012.

¹⁵⁷ UK and French Government. *FRANCO-BRITISH SUMMIT JOINT DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE*. 4 December 1998. <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html> (accessed March 10, 2014).

modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members."¹⁵⁸

This emphatic statement concerning European commitments to NATO seems to be quite divisive when we consider the era in which it was made. It is important to remember that at the time of this declaration France still held a rather hostile view of NATO and one cannot help but think that the inclusion of this statement was a reflection of purely British sentiment towards NATO and also an expression of Britain's persuasive powers; and, to a certain extent, it questions the strength of the two nations' commitment to upholding this declaration. This concern is further reinforced in the statement by the inclusion of two sentences; first, "The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states" and secondly, "The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected".¹⁵⁹ These two statements would appear to be intentionally designed to address the deeply ingrained division between the parties, and yet the declaration gives no clear mandate as to how such differences should be resolved. This situation is further complicated when we further analyse the NATO aspect of this speech, the declaration states, "the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary (NATO) duplication".¹⁶⁰ In sum therefore, this declaration can be understood as being intended to create a European military capability in conjunction with Member States' contributions to NATO without any duplication. However, the question of how the dual requirements for independence and avoidance of duplication would be implemented is puzzling; if Europe were to create a military force independent from NATO; its very existence would necessarily entail the duplication of multiple aspects of the NATO command and control mechanisms. This factor is further complicated by, as mentioned prior, France's less than positive attitude towards NATO at this time.

¹⁵⁸ UK and French Government. *FRANCO-BRITISH SUMMIT JOINT DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE*. 4 December 1998. <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html> (accessed March 10, 2014).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰ Ibid

Despite these concerns, this Declaration showed that regardless of the obstacles of conflicting points of view, rival ambitions and competing national narratives, at least in theory, a credible European military force could be established. However as with the Pleven Plan, the Saint-Malo Declaration requires the EU to be dependent upon individual Member States to provide the troops and equipment for any potential EU operation, and in this way the real power still lay in the hands of each Member State and not with the EU institutional bodies that would be responsible for implementing any EU strategy. This is an important point when we consider the question of this thesis, “*Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries*’. As with the Pleven Plan, the Saint-Malo Declaration’s proposed military is utterly dependent upon Member States’ contributions and goodwill; in other words, Saint-Malo envisages an integrated and dependant European military, rather than one that, while integrated, is actually independent in that it is not beholden to Member States to provide the raw materials and personnel for its existence and operational effectiveness. While this insistence on integration with dependence continues, there can never exist a credible European military due to the fact that every time this proposed military wants to act it must first be staffed and equipped by not only willing but also capable Member States.

Lisbon Treaty.

This continued dependence upon Member States to provide prompt military assets to any proposed European operation was a great ‘thorn in the side’ of potential European military intervention; how then could this problem be ameliorated?

The attempt to answer this important question came with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty on the 13 December 2007 and entered into force on the 1 December 2009. The Lisbon Treaty addressed a wide range of issues including giving more power to the Parliament and the increased importance of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, a position that was created in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Finally, the Treaty also laid the

groundwork for the creation of the European External Action Service in 2010 and the CSDP.

The primary focus of the Lisbon Treaty was to "complete the process started by the Treaty of Amsterdam and by the Treaty of Nice with a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Union and to improving the coherence of its action".¹⁶¹ This opening declaration showed the apparent willingness of the EU to address many of the on-going issues within the Union, none more so than those found within foreign policy and security. The Treaty contains a number of important new provisions related to the CSDP, including a mutual assistance and a solidarity clause; the creation of a framework for Permanent Structured Cooperation; the expansion of the Petersberg tasks; and the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The principles of the Union's external action are set out in Article 21 and are described as those which "have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations and the Charter of international law."¹⁶² It is intended that the Union will conduct policy in this area by defining general guidelines and adopting decisions (the latter incorporates the previous distinction between common strategies, common positions and joint actions).

To begin with, we will very briefly look at what exactly the Petersberg tasks are and how they relate to the Lisbon Treaty. The Petersberg tasks were defined in June 1992 at Hotel Petersberg near Bonn and they cover a wide range of topics including humanitarian and rescue missions, conflict prevention crisis management and a number of other interrelated issues. Petersberg formed an important foundation upon which the Lisbon and

¹⁶¹ European Union. "Treaty of Lisbon." *Europa*. 17 December 2007. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF> (accessed January 10, 2014).

¹⁶² *Ibid*

Maastricht Treaties would base their visions of a European military force and thus are an important step towards how Europe envisaged its role as a security actor.

For the purposes of this thesis we will only analyse the relevant sections of the Lisbon Treaty; we will begin with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The goal of the CSDP is to enable the Union to take a proactive role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of international security.¹⁶³ Its aim is to provide the EU with a comprehensive approach towards crisis management drawing on both civilian and military assets at a time when military assets are dwindling and the need for the pooling of resources is critical to the success of any mission. Perhaps the most important aspect of the CSDP was the inclusion of a progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This policy has the ultimate aim of providing common Union-wide defence. However, it must be pointed out that this goal of creating a common defence policy remained simply that, a goal. When we look carefully at the text we discover,

*The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.*¹⁶⁴

Once again, we see a very visible divide between Member States who favour a European approach and those that see the way forward as being framed in an Atlantic approach. This dual system once again reminds us of the previous attempts to create a European defence force; nations such as the UK do not see their security and hard foreign policy from a solely European perspective, while other nations such as France, who have a more conflicted view of NATO, are more eager to see the realisation of a European defence force.

¹⁶³ EEAS. *Security and defence - CSDP*. No Date Given. <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/> (accessed January 10, 2014).

¹⁶⁴ Europa. *Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - TITLE V*. No Date Given. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12008M042> (accessed January 10, 2014).

While one could argue that this is rather a bold statement based on only one section of the Treaty, the reality is that we see time and time again a very opaque message being delivered in the Lisbon Treaty towards collective security. For example In Section 3A of the Treaty it states,

*The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.*¹⁶⁵

This is a rather startling position to take in comparison to the NATO Treaty which guarantees the protection of all its Member States by stating that an attack on one state is an attack on all states; the Lisbon Treaty however, quite clearly states that "national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State".¹⁶⁶ This statement, when taken in isolation, would seem to indicate that national security remains the sole role of the Member State; however Article 42.4 of the Treaty states,

*"If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation".*¹⁶⁷

On the surface, Article 42.4 would appear to offer the same protection and guarantees that NATO does under Article 5 of its Charter, but does it? To begin with, there are currently three Member States of the EU that are

¹⁶⁵ European Union. "Treaty of Lisbon." *Europa*. 17 December 2007. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF> (accessed January 10, 2014).

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*

constitutionally neutral, Ireland, Austria and Sweden, and who therefore would either not act or be able to act due to military incapability or political unwillingness. How does this impact the understanding and implementation of the requirement to provide ‘aid and assistance by all the means in their power?’ Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, why is there specific reference to NATO commitments? These commitments pose intriguing hypothetical scenarios that in the current climate are not entirely inconceivable; we could ask: what would happen if Turkey militarily attacked Cyprus? EU Member States would be required by the Lisbon Treaty to defend Cyprus from the Turkish attack, and yet Turkey is a NATO member. As a consequence, how would the EU's NATO members react? Alternatively, we could pose an even more likely scenario: what would the EU's reaction be to a repeat of the Falklands War; would Spain and Portugal come to the assistance of the British, or would they express unwillingness to become involved in a conflict that is deemed to be irrelevant, or at worst, would they agree with the Argentinian argument that British sovereign territory is in fact Argentinian?

While these two hypothetical scenarios are just that, hypothetical, they do underline a very real and worrying issue surrounding the concept of European security. What would Europe do in a situation framed by acute conflicts of commitment? The EU and Member States are obliged to defend the territorial integrity of each of its Member States and yet we have witnessed time and again that Europe has been unwilling to assist its close neighbours, such as Ukraine and the Balkans, despite claiming in Article 2.5, for example, of the Lisbon Treaty that,

*“In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security . . . and the protection of human rights”.*¹⁶⁸

Where are the values and security that the EU is providing to these nations? Why should the citizens of the Falklands or Cyprus expect the EU to act when it has not done so in the past for other nations within Europe or within the

¹⁶⁸ European Union. “Treaty of Lisbon.” *Europa*. 17 December 2007. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF> (accessed January 10, 2014).

European neighbourhood? Questions like these, which remain unanswered, undermine the credibility of Europe's ambitions to be an effective actor in international security. This inability to act in a decisive and cohesive manner was instrumental in the creation of the "EU Battlegroups", which were created as a result of the doctrines outlined in the Lisbon Treaty; so what then are the EU Battlegroups and are they a final realisation of a truly European military?

EU Battlegroups.

The various attempts by Europe to construct a credible and viable European military following World War Two, and have all meet with apparent failure. This failure, as discussed throughout this thesis, has been shown to lie, in part at least, in the unwillingness and inability of the Member States to consistently contribute large numbers of their personnel and resources to any proposed integrated European military. This incapacity has been displayed on multiple occasions over the past few decades and has, at times, made the EU to look like a shambolic and divided actor unable to get its own house in order when confronted with fast paced regional security concerns and therefore, one which has had to rely on the United States in order to act. The Battlegroup strategy has attempted to address this reality.

For many years, the EU has declared itself to be a global actor that is ready to undertake its share of responsibility for global security; this clearly remains an aspirational goal only. However on the 1st of January 2007, the EU Battlegroup concept officially reached full operational status.¹⁶⁹ The concept of the Battlegroup has been present for many years within European security thinking; however it was not until the 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting, that a rapid response force was identified as constituting an important aspect of crisis management.¹⁷⁰ As a result, the Helsinki Headline Goal of 2003 assigned to the Member States the requirement of being able to successfully provide rapid response elements to the Union in a short space of

¹⁶⁹ European Union External Action. "EU Battlegroups." *European Council of the European Union*. April 2013. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014).

¹⁷⁰ Ibid

time. In what can be considered the first autonomous EU-led military operation, Artemis showed that in theory that Europe could conduct a military operation at a great distance from Europe with relative success. It must be noted here that Operation Artemis was a Police training mission and is arguably not a valid example of what the Battlegroups were ultimately designed for; however, many commentators view that this operation can be understood as a litmus test for effective operations by the EU in a hostile zone.

Operation Artemis became the reference model to be used for the further development of the Battlegroup concept; thus the Headline Goal 2010, which was delivered in 2004, set out new objectives to be achieved by the Member States in light of the lessons learned from Artemis. French and British leaders were determined not to allow the lessons learned in Artemis to go to waste and thus officially put forward the Battlegroup concept in 2004 as part of the 2004 Headline Goal. The Battlegroup concept is regarded as an important aspect of any implementation of the defence aspects of the 2003 European Security Strategy.¹⁷¹ The idea of developing such a concept was initially discussed at a bi-lateral Franco-British summit in Le Touquet on 4 February 2003 and was further reinforced on the 24 November 2003. At that meeting the two countries referred to the need, building upon the precedent of the French-led autonomous EU Operation Artemis, for "credible Battlegroup sized forces" – of about 1,500 soldiers each with appropriate transport and sustainability– to be created so as to strengthen the EU rapid reaction capability to support United Nations' operations.¹⁷² This move towards the Battlegroup concept echoed what had been previously discussed in St Malo in 1998,

“the potential scope of ESDP should match the world-wide ambition of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and should be able to

¹⁷¹ Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union. “The EU Battlegroups.” *Europarl*. 12 September 2006. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006eubattlegroups_/091006eubattlegroups_en.pdf (accessed March 5, 2014).

¹⁷² *Ibid*

*support effectively the EU's wider external policy objectives to promote democracy, human rights, good governance and reform".*¹⁷³

On the 24th of November 2003 the UK and France further stated,

*"Our two countries now wish to build on these first steps in crisis management operations in two areas: the relationship between the EU and the UN in the field of crisis management; and further work on capability development. ... we now propose that the EU should build on this [operation Artemis] precedent so that it is able to respond through ESDP to future similar requests from the United Nations, whether in Africa or elsewhere."*¹⁷⁴

Following these high level Franco-British discussions, the proposals outlined were quickly endorsed by Germany in February 2004 and on the 10th of February were submitted to the Political and Security Committee which, in turn, asked for the Military Committee's opinion on the technical aspects of the concept (February 18, 2004). It subsequently gained further support at the Brussels informal defence ministers and Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting, on the 5th and 6th of April 2004. This support enabled an ambitious target of 2007 to achieve the first operational Battlegroups with early expectations ranging from between six and ten.

Today the Battlegroup concept, according to the European External Action Service, "provides the EU with a specific tool in the range of rapid response capabilities, which contributes to make the EU more coherent, more active and more capable. This concept enables the EU to respond rapidly to emerging crises with military means, taking into account the size and capabilities of the Battlegroups on stand-by".¹⁷⁵ What then are the basic features of a Battlegroup?

¹⁷³ Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union. "The EU Battlegroups." *Europarl*. 12 September 2006. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006eubattlegroups_/091006eubattlegroups_en.pdf (accessed March 5, 2014).

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid*

¹⁷⁵ European Union External Action. "EU Battlegroups." *European Council of the European Union*. April 2013. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014).

*A Battlegroup is the minimum militarily effective a credible and coherent, rapidly deployable force package capable of stand-alone operations or for the initial phase of larger operations. It is based on combined-arms, battalion-sized force, reinforced with combat-support and combat service-support elements. In their generic composition, but depending on the mission, Battlegroups are about 1 500 personnel strong.*¹⁷⁶

To expand, a Battlegroup is the maximisation of assets to achieve a predefined goal through the usage of all assets available. This includes specialists such as IT, armoured vehicles and a whole range of both lethal and non-lethal options available to a 21st Century military. These new Battlegroups aimed to address the shortcomings of the Previous European Rapid Reaction force by advocating for smaller more deployable forces as opposed to the tens of thousands previously called for.¹⁷⁷ To achieve this Battlegroups would be based upon four key concepts;

1. Stand-alone Battlegroup-size forces (around 1,500 strong, including Core Battalion, Combat Support and Combat Service Support with appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and disembarkation assets).
2. Battlegroups formed with contributions from one or more member states (yet open to participation by third parties).
3. Battlegroup formations deployable within 10 days following a Council decision and able to sustain operations for 30 days (extendable up to 120 days if appropriately resupplied).
4. Battlegroups designed to operate within the typical UN Chapter VII mandates to restore international peace and security (although conceivable also for such operations as the evacuation of EU citizens).¹⁷⁸

These four key concepts would enable the EU to effectively provide a military force that was readily available and employable, that is being able to operate in

¹⁷⁶ European Union External Action. "EU Battlegroups." *European Council of the European Union*. April 2013. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014).

¹⁷⁷ Barcikowska, Anna. "EU Battlegroups – ready to go?" *Institute for Security Studies*. November 2013. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_40_EU_Battlegroups.pdf (accessed March 5, 2014).

¹⁷⁸ Ibid

a professional and effective manner in all zones of conflict. In addition, it is intended that the Battlegroups will also be highly flexible and have a high level of survivability in that they will be able to operate successfully in challenging zones while attaining minimal disruptions through issues such as casualties. The Battlegroup initiative drew initial commitments from 22 EU Member States, in addition to Norway, which would generate a total number of 13 Battlegroups. In addition to these commitments, a number of Member States offered additional resources such as a multinational and deployable Force Headquarters (France), a Sealift Co-ordination Centre (Greece), a water purification unit (Lithuania), and a medical group (Cyprus).¹⁷⁹

Perhaps what is most striking about the proposed Battlegroups was that they would act in unison with NATO. The Battlegroups were designed so that they could act with a NATO Response Force (NRF), which has essentially the same function as a Battlegroup; however the NRF are designed with the ability to operate in high intensity conflict, whereas due to the size of the Battlegroups they are more appropriate for dealing with smaller scale conflict (but are more deployable due to their size).

One of the most challenging aspects of the Battlegroup strategy is the ability to be deployed within 10 days; this is a mammoth undertaking when we consider the considerable size and scope of the logistics involved in moving 1500 people plus all their equipment and food and so on to any location in the world. To achieve this goal, a Battlegroup must have pre-identified and committed forces and assets available at any given time which must be sustainable for a period of between 30 - 120 days. This rapid deployment requires the usage of strategic lift and logistics. A similar pattern of challenges exists in the Battlegroup strategy as has been identified throughout this paper; there exists a considerable shortfall in the availability of key enablers, in particular strategic air lift, and the Member States are committed to finding the

¹⁷⁹ Barcikowska, Anna. "EU Battlegroups – ready to go?" *Institute for Security Studies*. November 2013. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_40_EU_Battlegroups.pdf (accessed March 5, 2014).

necessary enablers for each Battlegroup.¹⁸⁰ In an attempt to address this very apparent shortfall the Headline Goal 2010 includes a number of objectives to improve this shortfall these objectives are:

1. To implement by 2005 EU joint coordination in strategic lift (air, land and sea) as a step towards achieving full capacity and efficiency in strategic lift by 2010.
2. To transform (in particular for airlift) the European Airlift Co-ordination Cell into the European Airlift Centre by 2004 and to develop (between some member states) a European airlift command by 2010.
3. To complete by 2007 the establishment of EU battle groups, including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and disembarkation assets.
4. To acquire the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008.¹⁸¹

It is important to note here the important role that the Member States play in the Battlegroup strategy. It is the responsibility of the individual Member States to provide a Battlegroup 'package' which entails the resources and personnel to a Battlegroup. There is currently no fixed structure to what these 'packages' must include, this allows for flexibility in what a Member State provides. For example, if a nation has a highly skilled medical unit then they can provide this as part of the package. Alternatively, a nation such as the UK could acceptably provide an amphibious force to a Battlegroup. The process by which these packages are offered is decided during the six-monthly EUMS-chaired Battlegroup Coordination Conferences (BGCC). The planning horizon of the BGCC is six years and is divided into three different levels of commitment connected with the years ahead from the BGCC.¹⁸² It is important

¹⁸⁰ Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union. "The EU Battlegroups." *Europarl*. 12 September 2006. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006eubattlegroups_/091006eubattlegroups_en.pdf (accessed March 5, 2014).

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*

¹⁸² European Union External Action. "EU Battlegroups." *European Council of the European Union*. April 2013. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014).

to clarify that while a nation may offer its resources to a Battlegroup, these packages must meet agreed upon military standards.

"Standards and criteria embodied in the Battlegroup concept and the Battlegroup preparation guide form the basis for Member States to develop specific instructions to ensure coherence between the constituent parts of the Battlegroup package, taking into account the principle of multinationality".¹⁸³

These standards are essential; as modern Western militaries are professional and employ the usage of technology that is highly lethal, it is important that participating packages meet the required standards before being allowed into a Battlegroup. These standards are not just concerned with ensuring a tank, for example, is fully operational but also and perhaps more importantly it means that personnel who are part of any package have received the right standard of training to successfully operate within a Battlegroup. This training is the sole responsibility of the Member State; as such it would appear that certain nations would provide more able resources than others. Finally, prior to any deployment of a Battlegroup, it must be certified; this certification is achieved once again by the participating Member States and is overseen by the EU Military Committee in line with established EU agreed procedures. Once a Battlegroup has been certified then a Commander, who is appointed by the Council on a case by case basis, will be assigned.¹⁸⁴

In light of the fact that any potential Battlegroup will consist of multiple nationalities, the concept of Interoperability is vital. Interoperability is a very complex subject; however in its most basic form, Interoperability is the ability of one set of forces to communicate and operate with another.¹⁸⁵ This is not a new concept, whether it is through flags and trumpets of the ancient era to modern satellite communications, the premise would appear to be similar; and

¹⁸³ European Union External Action. "EU Battlegroups." *European Council of the European Union*. April 2013. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/91624.pdf (accessed January 10, 2014).

¹⁸⁴ Ibid

¹⁸⁵ Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union. "The EU Battlegroups." *Europarl*. 12 September 2006. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006eubattlegroups_/091006eubattlegroups_en.pdf (accessed March 5, 2014).

yet contemporary Interoperability is considerably more complex than that. Contemporary Western militaries are highly integrated and require considerable levels of Interoperability to succeed; for example, soldiers in a tank need to be able to communicate with an aircraft, while said aircraft needs to be also able to be able to communicate with forward observers, who in turn are in contact with the HQ, who is often in contact with Naval vessels. This scenario is complex in itself and becomes even more so when different militaries with different equipment and protocols attempt to operate together. Therefore Interoperability has become a key objective for modern armed forces and is crucial for multinational forces. NATO has led the way in overcoming European and Transatlantic difficulties of Interoperability by developing agreements on military standards and procedures known as STANAGS which form the basis for Member States Interoperability strategies.¹⁸⁶ Despite this, even at an early stage, there were expected to be significant problems for the Battlegroups, in particular for the actual interaction of military units from different member states which might not be familiar with training and working together. It is also important to briefly note that the difficulties surrounding Interoperability are not just limited to communication, but also just as importantly the usage of technology and resources such as tanks within the Battlegroup.

We have established that the concept of Interoperability is vital to the ability of any modern military to act in a cohesive manner; however, there is an even more vital aspect of military capability that needs to be addressed, that of the financial backing of any military force. The phrase ‘an army marches on its stomach’ is as broadly true today as it was in antiquity; to achieve this vital aspect of security, the EU initiated the Athena mechanism. The Athena mechanism handles "the financing of common costs relating to EU military operations under the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP). It operates on behalf of the 27 EU member states who contribute to the financing

¹⁸⁶ Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union. "The EU Battlegroups." *Europarl*. 12 September 2006. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006eubattlegroups_/091006eubattlegroups_en.pdf (accessed March 5, 2014).

of EU military operations".¹⁸⁷ The Athena mechanism was established in 2004 and was reinforced in the 14th May 2007 Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP which sort to establish "a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications."¹⁸⁸ The purpose of introducing Athena is due to the fact that any military operations undertaken by the CFSP are not covered by the European Budget; therefore, any proposed action is funded by the Member States. As a consequence, Athena provides a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs relating to these operations. It is important to note that this mechanism has a legal capacity and relates to two types of operations, EU Military Operations, and military support actions; the latter is a Council-backed or mandated decision that supports a third party state which is not under the authority of the European Headquarters.

The primary function of this mechanism is to manage the financing of common costs for any operation; for example, this includes transport, infrastructure and fuel. Athena is managed and directed by an administrator who acts under the authority of a Special Committee which is comprised of representatives of the Member States contributing to an operation.¹⁸⁹ It is important to note that according to Protocol Number 22, Denmark does not participate in the decisions and actions of the Union in relation to defence.¹⁹⁰ In addition to this committee, Athena is comprised of three management bodies which are under the authority of the Special Committee, these are:

1. The Administrator who represents Athena's permanent executive authority, draws up any draft budget and submits it to the Special

¹⁸⁷ European Council. *Athena - financing security and defence military operations*. No Date Given. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/athena/> (accessed September 1, 2014).

¹⁸⁸ Europa. *The mechanism for financing military operations (Athena)*. No Date Given. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33281_en.htm (accessed October 15, 2014).

¹⁸⁹ European Council. *Athena - financing security and defence military operations*. No Date Given. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/athena/> (accessed September 1, 2014).

¹⁹⁰ *The mechanism for financing military operations (Athena)*. No Date Given. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33281_en.htm (accessed October 15, 2014).

Committee, and ensures the proper implementation of the committee's decisions;

2. The Operation Commander who carries out duties on behalf of Athena in relation to the financing of the common costs of the operation which s/he commands. In particular, the Operations Commander must send the Administrator proposals for the "expenditure – operational common costs" section of the budgets and, as authorising officer, implement the appropriations relating to the financing of the operation.
3. The Accounting Officer who keeps the accounts for Athena and is responsible for proper implementation of payments, collection of revenue and recovery of amounts established as being receivable.¹⁹¹

How then is Athena financed by the Member States?

Annex I to the Decision lists the common costs of operations borne by Athena whenever they are incurred (certain mission expenditure, costs related to storing materials, etc.).

Annex II to the Decision lists the common costs relating to the preparatory phase of an operation borne by Athena.

Annex III to the Decision lists the common costs which can be borne by Athena during the active phase of operations (the establishment of headquarters, transport costs, salaries of locally hired personnel, etc.).

Drawing up the budget

Each year, the administrator proposes the draft budget for the following year to the Special Committee by 31 October at the latest. The budget is drawn up with the support of each operation commander for the "operational common costs" section, it must include: This budget must include appropriations to cover the costs incurred in ongoing operations and in preparing for or completing an operation; it also must include a forecast of the revenue which will be required to cover expenditure.

¹⁹¹ *The mechanism for financing military operations (Athena)*. No Date Given.
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33281_en.htm
(accessed October 15, 2014).

1. The appropriations to cover the common costs incurred in preparation for, or further to, operations.
2. The appropriations to cover the operational common costs for on-going or planned operations;
- 3, a forecast of the revenue to cover expenditure.

In the case of EU Military Rapid Response operations, flexible early financing procedures are provided for to attain the level of the reference amount set by the administrator.¹⁹²

The Athena mechanisms are a potential step forward towards providing a common financial resource for Battlegroups, however it must be stressed that these mechanisms are highly dependent upon Member States contributing to the financing of any proposed military excursion and thus leaves the viability of any mission unknown due to the ever-changing political manoeuvring of the Member States. This concern is addressed later in the thesis.

A further key element in overcoming Interoperability problems for deployment of multinational forces will be the pre-deployment training. Whilst the Member States have not been able to agree an EU level Standard of Training for Multinational Battlegroups, they have agreed to improve Interoperability within each individual multinational Battlegroup through training at the national level. The HG 2010 adds that the Member States are committed to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria for national forces committed to the Headline Goal in the field of deployability and in the field of multinational training.¹⁹³

¹⁹² *The mechanism for financing military operations (Athena)*. No Date Given.
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/l33281_en.htm
(accessed October 15, 2014).

¹⁹³ Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union. "The EU Battlegroups." *Europarl*. 12 September 2006.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/091006eubattlegroups_/091006eubattlegroups_en.pdf (accessed March 5, 2014).

No Battlegroup deployment.

Looking at the relatively new strategy of the Battlegroup it would appear that the EU finally had a credible military option which could be effectively utilised to counter gross human rights abuses and other serious international problems that the EU had in the past been unable to address. Yet we once again, we see to date the failure of the EU to act in a decisive and credible manner. Despite being in existence since the 1st of January 2007, not a single Battlegroup has ever been deployed although there have been multiple occasions in which deployment could have occurred. Why has the EU once again failed to act despite having what would appear to be a well-balanced strategy?

The answer to this question would seem to lie once again in the inability for the Member States to act in a coherent manner and is explored in the following analysis.

Section Three: Analysis.

With the march towards a unified EU military well and truly underway, as laid out in this section, it is time to analyse the positions that have been explored in this section from a Constructivist perspective. To begin with we will analyse how the post-war European continent approached the issue of military integration.

Divided from the start: The German question.

One cannot doubt that the widespread and cataclysmic destruction and enormous loss of life, both civilian and military, profoundly influenced what was on the slate of the post-war European nations and even the United States. It is little wonder then that the question of Germany was controversial in regards to formulating the initial steps necessary for military integration and was a key debating point within the Pleven Plan put forward by the French. It is interesting to note here that, as with NATO, the discord over what to do regarding Germany was between the Anglo-American world and that of the

French. It is of little wonder that the issue surrounding Western Germany and collective defence was a thorny one. Let us not forget that nations like France had until very recently been occupied by the Wehrmacht, while a nation such as the US had only suffered on its periphery, such as in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. Therefore, the slate from which the elite in France were working would have been fundamentally different to that of the US. The French slate was deeply inscribed with suffering, humiliation and internal divisions which extended to hatred and the exacting of personal revenge. It is important to point out here in balance that the UK had also suffered considerable pain and loss through the agency of the German war machine, it would be expected that their own slate would have been affected by such terrible tragedies as the blitz; and yet, they still advocated for the US position over the issue of Germany. With reflection one could posit that whether or not a nation was occupied, like France, or free to fight, like the UK and the US, made the pivotal difference in the post-war slates.

The answer to this apparent conundrum can be understood to reside in Weldes' argument concerning national interests and how they are constructed. Weldes states, "specific identities are created when social relations are depicted" and that "national interests are social constructions . . . (from) which the world . . . and the place of the state is understood".¹⁹⁴ From these two statements we can begin to understand why there is such a disparity between the UK and France; it is a well-known fact that the UK and the US even to this day have a 'special relationship' status with one another. Despite fighting a violent war of independence with each other, the UK has constructed its slate upon the depth of its interrelationship with the US and consequently sees its interests as supporting its previous colony-turned-powerhouse to achieve not only American security but also its own. It is interesting to note regarding the American War for Independence that while the French were one of the key allies with whom the Patriots fought the British; it is with the British that America has aligned itself with. This reality further reinforces Weldes' argument regarding the fact that social constructions are based on perceptions

¹⁹⁴ Weldes, Jutta. "Constructing national interests." *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 280.

of reality and do not have to be based on reality itself. We could assume in this context that the conflicting events which France experienced during the first half of the 20th Century had a greater effect on its slate than did the events of the American War of Independence.

While the outcome of the Plevan Plan and the issues surrounding Germany are now history, as we look at the march towards a unified European military from a Constructivist perspective, we can see that the slates of the competing nations were already deeply inscribed, right from the beginning. As we have seen, these entrenched views have been difficult to uproot. Before we move on, it is interesting to witness just how fluid a nation's slate can be; at times the writing on the slate seems to deep and permanent, like carving in stone, while at other times the slate is filled with only faint chalk marks which are easily erased. The Plevan Plan, as explored earlier in this section, was a plan developed and promoted by the French government only to be voted against and thus destroyed by the French government itself due to concerns regarding sovereignty. This reality clearly shows that while Weldes is correct in pointing out that the elite base their decisions upon their own constructed slate, this author believes that she does not take into consideration strongly enough the fact that in democratic societies multiple slates can exist within a nation's elite and thus, within a fluid system such as democracy where changes to the elite occur on a regular basis, the content on a national slate can be very fluid and impermanent.

The reality of multiple and potentially conflicting slates both within the European region and also, just as importantly, within the various states shows quite clearly how difficult the task of creating a unified European military actually is. Each of these identities has constructed its own slate from which they make their decisions, while simultaneously influencing each other's slate; all these interfaces in turn lead to a continuously evolving European slate. While this reality should be expected on the global scene, it takes on a more important aspect when it is present in a single entity such as the slowly emerging body that would become European Union. The reality of this single entity containing multiple personalities competing for control of that entity has set it on a long path of confusion and inaction; the condition continues to make

any attempts to form a unified military fraught with difficulty. This difficulty is even more complicated when we consider an outside presence both wielding considerable power over this body while simultaneously enjoying good relations with one of the identities and greatly angering another; I speak of course the United States.

It is undeniable that in the early post-war years the US played a significant role in shaping the way Member States, and Europe as a whole, understood and shaped their identities in regards to defence. When we look at the Pleven Plan and other prototypes explored in this thesis, we see that the US has consistently played a leadership role. From a Constructivist view, it is clear that in the early days that the slates of Europe were in many ways defined by the US, whether it was in a positive manner such as in the UK, or in an increasingly hostile manner as in the case of the French. This important role was fundamental in shaping the Pleven Plan; let us not forget that if the Pleven Plan had been established, that it would have been an American and not a European who would have led this force. When we compare this early leadership role that the US played with more contemporary events such as those laid out in Section Two, it is fascinating to witness that the European slate is still very much influenced by American leadership and is still, for all intents and purposes, incapable of acting on a scale such as required in Libya or the Balkans without American supervision. As explored earlier in Section Two, Europe has needed the US to lead them in security actions in areas that are geographically within Europe's sphere of influence; one could strongly argue that despite claims of possessing the ability to act independently, the EU and its members slates have a similarity to that of post-war Europe and are still subject to the "what do the Americans think" test.

The influence of the US upon the slates of the EU and its members has not gone unnoticed; as we explored earlier in this section, the UK and France have in the past attempted to ameliorate the situation of European inability in regards to security. The Saint-Malo declaration clearly stated that "The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage" and that the "Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide

to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”.¹⁹⁵ These statements would seem to indicate that both the UK and France viewed that the burgeoning European dream of Union was woefully incapable of acting in a credible manner on the international scene regarding security. From a Constructivist view we can understand that at the time of this declaration, both parties had already constructed a view towards what would become the EU, and it is clear that this view was that Europe did not and would not possess the necessary characteristics to adequately address this issue of being a credible actor on the international stage. This constructed slate would appear to be a prime example of what Weldes states as the process of ‘articulation’, that is the process through which meaning is produced out of extant cultural raw materials and linguistic resources. One is not surprised that both the UK and France’s slates would view the European project as being incapable of credible common security as late as the 90s.

However, as with many attempts to create a credible European military, the Saint-Malo declaration was a failure. This failure once again can be understood from and attributed to competing ideologies and conflicting slates. The fact remains that between Europe’s two most powerful military actors there remains a large chasm regarding their constructed identities and the role of the US. This recurring theme of the Anglo-American/French divide lies at the heart of the slate and constructed identity that Europe has collectively constructed for itself and is a major stumbling block for any progress towards a credible European military.

This ongoing divide has been a consistent companion of the European project right through to contemporary times. In the final and summative analysis for this thesis, the author will tie together all the historic actions with the modern attempts to create a credible European military and will answer the thesis question, “*Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries?*”

¹⁹⁵ UK and French Government. *FRANCO-BRITISH SUMMIT JOINT DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN DEFENSE*. 4 December 1998. <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html> (accessed March 10, 2014).

SUMMATIVE ANALYSIS:

With the contents of the historic slate now firmly established in the previous sections, it is now time to analyse the contemporary security approach. For this summative analysis we will begin from the Maastricht Treaty as this treaty can be understood to be the first major European treaty concerning itself with a unified military. Maastricht can also be considered to be a major milestone in the construction of the contemporary EU. The Maastricht Treaty was a pivotal point in regards to how Europe was beginning to view itself from a security perspective and it is clear that the constituent elements on Europe's slate, regarding military incompetence, were beginning to shape the elites' actions. As explored earlier in Section Three, the treaty contains a considerable amount of language describing how Europe would assert itself on the international stage through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy. It is interesting to note however, as previously stated, that while the Maastricht Treaty appeared to dedicate a considerable level of resourcing to the establishment of a common defence policy, when we analyse the language a bit closer, this does not actually seem to be the case. The treaty clearly states that there would be an "eventual framing of a common defence policy".¹⁹⁶ The word 'eventual' is a very important one as it reveals that fact that while Europe wanted to create a common defence policy it was not prepared, for a variety of reasons, to commit itself to actions that would see this taking place immediately. Further, it also demonstrates, when taking into consideration Europe's many slates that 'eventually' merely indicated a desire or an aspirational goal; Europe wanted to resource a common defence policy but knew from past experience that it was an unlikely proposition. Thus Europe's policy makers used an ambiguous time frame which allowed Europe to convince itself and others that it was about to take action, but at the same time protected itself from the division and conflict that acting on the decision would have entailed.

With the important emphasis on 'eventual' action, it is surprising that this treaty held many ambitious goals such as "to assert its identity on the

¹⁹⁶ European Community. "The Maastricht Treaty." *Euro Treaties*. No Date Given. <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2014).

international scene . . . through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy”.¹⁹⁷ One could be forgiven for believing that this statement should also have finished with the caveat ‘eventually’. With such amorphous language, it is of no surprise that little visible progress was made in the pursuit of a common defence policy; this is a prime example of how ‘articulation’ and the use of linguistic resources can inform us of exactly what is on the slate. In the case of Maastricht, it would appear that while the notion of common defence was existent on European nation’s slates, the slates were so deeply conflicted that it was not seen as vital enough to national interests to require real action. Before we progress to the Lisbon Treaty, it is important to point out that the Maastricht Treaty, as all the treaties before, was still dependent upon the good will of the member states to provide the resources from which to be able to act. Thus, any European military would have not been answerable to Brussels but in fact to multiple personalities within the body, all of whom have their own divergent slates and constructed identities which vie for position and with which they would seek to influence the body.

The Lisbon Treaty is the last major treaty to be enacted by the EU and, just as Maastricht and countless other major and minor treaties before it; Lisbon has attempted to lessen the concerns surrounding common security. As explored in Section Three, the CSDP was a major factor in this treaty. The linguistic resources utilised in this Treaty resemble those of Maastricht; statements such as “contribute to peace, security . . . and the protection of human rights”¹⁹⁸ are found throughout. Once again, as in Maastricht and other treaties, we see that the language used shows that a real desire to act regarding security does exist on the slates of European nations; however, the lack of actual action casts doubt on how highly prioritised that desire is. While one can take a pessimistic outlook regarding Lisbon, it is important to note that unlike Maastricht, in which the linguistic resources were at times vague, Lisbon references to security were proactive in that the EU would “(ensure) the territorial integrity

¹⁹⁷ European Community. “The Maastricht Treaty.” *Euro Treaties*. No Date Given. <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf> (accessed March 1, 2014).

¹⁹⁸ European Union. “Treaty of Lisbon.” *Europa*. 17 December 2007. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF> (accessed January 10, 2014).

of the state . . . safeguarding national security” and “it shall contribute to peace, security . . . and the protection of human rights”.¹⁹⁹ While the language used here is proactive, it still remains vague in terms of what exactly this constitutes and thus the reader is left wondering, in the light of previous inaction, exactly what if anything the EU would do.

The role of the Member States has been an important one from the very inception of the European project. As in previous analyses, we have witnessed just how divided the Member States are regarding common defence, and in particular the UK and France. Concern about the impact of these divisions is very much evident within the treaty. Lisbon clearly states “the Union . . . shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence of . . . member states which see their common defence realised in (NATO)”.²⁰⁰ These words are clearly intended to make room for the aspirations and security policies of nations such as the UK; in this way, they underline the fact that despite EU claims to be working towards a common defence program, the reality is that the Member States themselves do not believe that a unified credible European military can currently exist due to the fact of competing identities and ambitions within the Member States. This divide between the Member States would appear to play an additional role in shaping what is on the slates of European Member States and the EU as a body. Every treaty contains this important caveat regarding NATO, and this seems to indicate that the summative constructed defence identity of the EU is that it is a divided actor with no common defence identity.

This is rather a robust claim but it is reinforced by the fact that despite the numerous pledges by Europe to have a common defence policy, the fact remains that they do not have one now, nor have they ever had one, nor do they seem to know how to move out of this morass. As explored in earlier sections, events in Syria and Libya substantiate this claim. The EU was unable to agree whether it should arm Syrian rebels; in Libya, the EU Member States were unable to agree whether or not they should attack, and those that did

¹⁹⁹ European Union. “Treaty of Lisbon.” *Europa*. 17 December 2007. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF> (accessed January 10, 2014).

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*

agree to attack were incapable of doing so in a sustained manner without American leadership and support. Let us not forget that following the Lisbon Treaty in which the EU made many public statements about its commitments to a common foreign policy, the EU struggled to overthrow a third world dictator. From a Constructivist perspective what does this mean? One could clearly argue that the EU is delusional in regards to its claims of a common security policy, and that this notion of ‘common action’ is in and of itself a social construction created by the elites of the EU to display to the world that it is the new ‘normative actor’. One could also argue that this constructed identity of being the world’s conscience and moral teacher has links back to the old colonial glories of many of the Member States’ histories, during which time they garnered power and wealth while instructing the ‘ignorant savages’ living in these far flung colonies. As Weldes states regarding constructed identities, they are “simultaneously given an identity . . . with characteristics which are sometimes precise and certain (and) at other times vague . . . their importance lies not in their accuracy but in their provision of warranting conditions which make a particular action or belief more justified”.²⁰¹ Therefore we can posit that the consistently vague statements made by the EU regarding common security are nothing more than a comforting constructed identity which is believed by a number of elites; believed, but not enough to be acted upon.

While this inability to act can once again be seen to be a product of the division between the Member States, it is also this same EU inability to act which has influenced the Member States’ own stances regarding collective security. This inability to act is exemplified by the EU Battlegroup strategy. As explored earlier in Section Three, the battlegroup strategy is an attempt by Europe to have a credible common security arm and yet, as we have seen for the past 70 years, Europe cannot and does not act. Despite being in existence now for a number of years, during which many tumultuous events have taken place on the EU’s doorstep, not a single Battlegroup has ever been deployed; during this same time period, a number of NATO rapid reaction forces have

²⁰¹ Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 281-282.

been deployed. Once again we are left wondering if Europe is incapable of acting without American leadership. Is the EU's constructed identity so insecure and disaggregated that without American leadership it cannot act alone? Or is it an example of a multiple personality disorder, in which the EU 'mind' has multiple conflicting identities each vying for supremacy at the expense of the other personalities present? Or finally, is the political will simply not there to enact the ambitious claims laid out in the Treaties? To answer this final question, we will let the EU Parliament speak for itself by analysing its own legislation.

What does the Parliament think?

So far in this thesis, we have read and analysed various primary and secondary resources and then used these resources to formulate an argument about the EU and its beliefs and actions towards military integration. While the information and arguments put forwards are important and enlightening, what the EU Parliament actually says about itself is even more so. The statements below are taken from a resolution published on September 12th 2013. The very first item under general considerations states;

*“Notes with increasing urgency the EU’s insufficient capacity to respond to international crises in a timely and efficient manner, in spite of its long-standing commitment to preserving peace, safeguarding human rights, preventing conflicts”*²⁰²

These words are then reaffirmed in consideration 3,

*“Notes with regret that recent military operations in both Libya and Mali have demonstrated the lack of progress toward a truly Common Security and Defence Policy and stresses the need for more coordination and cooperation at the European level, if the EU is to be taken seriously as an effective and credible world actor”*²⁰³

²⁰² European Parliament. *European Parliament resolution on 12 September 2013*. 12 September 2013.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0381&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0205> (accessed March 1, 2015).

²⁰³ Ibid

These two statements serve as examples only. The fact that linguistic resources such as ‘regret’, ‘urgency’, ‘insufficient’ and ‘to be taken seriously’ have been used by the EU to talk about its own common defence policies underpins what has been argued here as being on the EU and its Member States’ slates. When we consider that these words have been carefully and skilfully chosen to be put into official record, we must surely find ourselves wondering at just how the constructed identity of the EU could have rendered it so profoundly incapable in regards to acting as a credible security actor. We recall at this point, that the current level of incapability has been preceded by decades of discussion and treaty formulation. When one’s own parliament, which is arguably the most vital component of the constructed identity of a regional body, uses language such as this to describe EU’s own action, or lack of action, it is little wonder Member States like Britain choose to steer their own course. It is also unsurprising that the US holds the EU in such contempt; after all, if they do not believe in themselves, it is only natural that others have the same attitude.

The resolution quoted above goes further in its condemnation of the body by stating its “grave concern at the continuing and uncoordinated cuts in national defence budgets”.²⁰⁴ This was clearly an issue in 2013 and yet despite making this resolution, the very Member States who agreed to the carefully constructed linguistic resource have not only continued their uncoordinated cuts, but have in many cases deepened them. This reality begs the question, should anyone, either within the EU or outside, care what constructed identity the EU has towards being an international security actor? An easy answer to this question is ‘no’; as has been documented throughout this thesis, the EU and its predecessors say one thing while in the process of turning around and doing the exact opposite. The commitments to previous and current military alliances are ignored, while paying lip service to their commitments on the international stage. However, the more reasonable answer would be ‘yes, we

²⁰⁴ European Parliament. *European Parliament resolution on 12 September 2013*. 12 September 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0381&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0205> (accessed March 1, 2015).

should care what the EU says and does'. The European Union is a vast region with a large population base and huge trading power. It is also the home and cradle of Western civilisation. What happens there affects us all.

The resolution quoted above adds further to the woes of a credible European mission by stating in regards to EU Battlegroups that it;

*“deplores the fact that the concept has not yet proven its utility as a rapid reaction instrument in operations, and that without substantial modifications any agreement on deployment appears unlikely; considers that the situation in Mali is a missed opportunity for the first use of EU battlegroups”*²⁰⁵

Once again we see language such as ‘deplores’ and ‘unlikely’; it cannot be stressed enough at this point that these resolutions are carefully constructed linguistic resources, they have not been thrown together hastily or carelessly; hence, they clearly reveal what is on the slate of the EU and constitute a clear indication of how this constructed identity views itself. As Weldes states, “national interests are social constructions . . . (from) which the world . . . and the place of the state in it is understood”.²⁰⁶ From this resolution alone we can see that while the EU would like to see itself as an international actor, in reality it understands that it is not. It is fascinating to read in this resolution that despite the very long and documented history of inaction and blatantly empty commitments, this resolution states in section 24 that “(the EU) Welcomes the renewed commitment of the Member States to the level of ambition of the battlegroups concept and the pledge to plan contributions on the basis of regularly recurring commitments in order to avoid gaps in the battlegroup roster in the future”.²⁰⁷ This statement is made despite the fact that only a few sentences earlier the resolution highlights that “Council and EEAS (needs) to increase the flexibility and usability of the battlegroups, which have,

²⁰⁵ European Parliament. *European Parliament resolution on 12 September 2013*. 12 September 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0381&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0205> (accessed March 1, 2015).

²⁰⁶ Weldes, Jutta. “Constructing national interests.” *European Journal of International Relations*, 1996: 280.

²⁰⁷ European Parliament. *European Parliament resolution on 12 September 2013*. 12 September 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0381&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0205> (accessed March 1, 2015).

however, produced little tangible result to date” and that it “takes the view that the reviewed ATHENA mechanism for common costs of military operations still does not take adequately into account the specificities of the battlegroup concept”.²⁰⁸ This quotation further reinforces the abject failures of the EU to form a credible military capability.

It is important to highlight that these statements have not been cherry picked to back up the author’s arguments. On the 12th of September 2013, the prognosis was much the same; one of the many resolutions published on that day stated that the European Parliament “regrets the fact, however, that the EU Member States have been imposing severe cuts in national defence budgets . . . may entail serious consequences for the (Union)”.²⁰⁹ This position was expanded upon in a further resolution in which the European Parliament, “regrets . . the situation . . . (as) one of duplication, overlap, waste of resources and turf war among EU bodies and institutions”.²¹⁰ The term ‘turf war’ is an important one as it clearly demonstrates that the EU, through the use of carefully considered language, has compared the Member States and EU bodies to nothing better than street gangs engaged in futile and debilitating fighting over resources. This is a startling comment, and yet this is precisely what the EU is stating; there is no reason to pretend the resolution meant something other than the bald facts as stated. The EU specifically chose to employ this phrase, and just as specifically as it chose not to employ a more refrained phrase such as ‘difficulties’. How can the EU be taken seriously regarding military integration when it describes its own members as acting no more wisely or circumspectly than street gangs?

The question must be asked, what actual concrete steps have been taken by the Member States? As of May 2015, there still has not been a single Battlegroup deployment and budget cuts are still gouging military effectiveness. These

²⁰⁸ European Parliament. *European Parliament resolution on 12 September 2013*. 12 September 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0381&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0205> (accessed March 1, 2015).

²⁰⁹ European Parliament. *Maritime dimension of the common security and defence policy*. 12 September 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0380+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> (accessed March 1, 2015).

²¹⁰ Ibid

internally contradictory messages of confidence, self-criticism, ambition and inaction seem to be symptomatic of the EU's history of integration; the symptoms are found at both the EU level and that of the Member State. These symptoms of internal contradiction and disaggregation could be quite arguably understood and explained as a case of regional 'multiple personality disorder'.

Multiple Personality Disorder.

Definition: As defined by Psychology Today, Multiple Personality Disorder can be understood as "a severe condition in which two or more distinct identities, or personality states, are present in—and alternately take control of—an individual. The person also experiences memory loss that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness".²¹¹

To take the position that the EU suffers from Multiple Personality Disorder does, on the surface, seem highly controversial; and yet when applied to the EU regarding security, we come to a startling conclusion.

Let us begin with the first aspect of this 'disorder'; a "severe condition in which two or more distinct identities, or personality states, are present" can be clearly viewed to be present within the EU. This thesis has shown throughout that there exist two highly competitive and conflicting major viewpoints or identities, within the EU, these being the UK and France. It has become abundantly clear throughout that these two conflicting personalities have a history of attempting to influence the body at the expense of the other personality. In fact, they also often attempt to gain dominance over the other micro and macro identities found within the body, for example the constitutionally pacifist states. This conflict has become so critical that the EU itself has described the relationship as being akin to turf warfare. We can take this position further when we consider the role of the US, especially in the early years. The US was an identity both within the body and without; this identity held major sway over the direction of the body in the post-war years and this dominance can still be felt today. This 'inside-outside' personality has

²¹¹ European Parliament. *European Parliament resolution on 12 September 2013*. 12 September 2013. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0381&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0205> (accessed March 1, 2015).

been able to influence numerous other identities within the body to act in accordance with its desires, while at the same time being able to anger and divide those identities within the body who disagree with its vision.

The second aspect of Multiple Personality Disorder, “alternately take control of ...an individual” is once again manifested in the conflict between the UK, France and the US. No other identity within Europe has been able to direct the body as much as these identities have; it must be stressed here that while other personalities within the body do have marginal power, the power which the UK, France and the US wield cannot be underestimated. These power plays for control of the body have been extensively explored in this thesis; we see that the French identity has viewed NATO as a place where the other identity, Britain, in conjunction with the foreign entity, the US, plan and scheme for dominance of the European body. We have also seen how the French identity planned to unite the smaller identities to follow its own vision for the body; in this way we have witnessed these two powerful identities struggle for power while the ‘inside-outside’ entity attempted to influence the outcome.

The final aspect of the disorder, “The person also experiences memory loss that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness” can be witnessed in the continued declarations made by the body. The EU continues to make bold assertions concerning its role in the world, while forgetting that it has made these same bold assertions in the past without ever following through. This memory loss extends to each of the multiple identities within the body; these identities, when they join together in collective discussion at the Parliament, or at the body’s ‘mind’ if you will, boldly claim that they will not cut defence spending and any defence spending that is cut will be made in a structured format along with all the other co-dependent identities. However outside the Parliament, these same identities seem to forget these promises year on year, and continue to make cuts in an uncoordinated manner. This forgetfulness is not just limited to discussions within the European body; these same identities make the same promises in NATO and once again they forget or they choose to ignore these promises and the dysfunctional and debilitating cycle continues on.

This summative analysis has now conclusively examined the data that has been collected; we turn now to concisely answering the thesis question, “*Can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States’ militaries’?*”

CONCLUSION:

To answer this question let us briefly review each section.

Section One: the primary focus of this section was to put any potential military integration into the context of what is happening globally. As was outlined, military integration does not occur in a vacuum; therefore, this section provided a framework in which to contextualise the strategies and policies pursued by the EU towards military integration. To clarify, while Section One does not directly answer the question, it is fundamental to that answer. The complex nature of the conflicts, their potential to impact the world economy, and their volatility all combine to present the West, and for our interest the EU, with as yet unfathomable perplexities. These unfathomable perplexities suggest that within current constraints, European military integration would not lead to European credibility in the contemporary security environment.

Section Two: The second section provides us with a depth of insight into the thesis topic. Throughout this section, we explored the various NATO strategies and summits; alongside this, we examined a number of NATO member states militaries, both European and American; and finally, we analysed how NATO members conducted themselves in Libya. This section provided a clear example of how an already existing European military alliance conducted itself in recent times and how European members within this alliance acted in accordance with the requirements of this organisation. It became clear that with few exceptions the European members did not take their role within NATO seriously and in fact had a long and clearly provable history of ongoing defence cuts which resulted in not only falling below the required threshold of GDP spending, but also in failing to be able to act without American leadership. Throughout this section, we witnessed inter-member conflict to the extent that the French were absent from the alliance for the majority of NATO’s existence; we also saw that other nations were more than happy to sit

behind a wall of American and British troops during the Cold War. This reality led to resentment from all sides towards one another and thus growing distrust amongst the members.

Section Two also highlighted how decades of uncoordinated defence cuts have led to the inability of large numbers of the alliance members being unable to conduct themselves in a credible manner within Europe's immediate sphere of influence; as stated several times, without American leadership and weapons platforms and ammunition in Libya, the greatest military alliance in history would have been unable to overthrow a third world dictator right on its doorstep. Even with American leadership and support, the alliance was shown to be severely fragmented in terms of power and ability. Despite the clear shortfalls of the European members during this campaign, the same members continued to cut their defence spending. This combination of factors leaves many to wonder if Libya was to be replayed today, how many European nations would even show up?

In regards to the thesis question, what does Section Two tell us about whether the EU can be a credible security actor without integration? Section Two clearly shows us that Europe, as it stands, is incapable of acting in a credible manner with integration; this is due to the considerable gap between Member States' defence abilities, intentions, internal pressures and ambitions.

Therefore in light of the question 'can the EU can act on the international stage', we conclude that it could not act as a unified body under current circumstances and within present constraints. However, it is entirely reasonable to expect the UK or France to be able and willing to act either independently or in conjunction with other Member States. This however could not be considered to constitute an official EU action, despite the fact that it would be highly reasonable that any such mission would receive the EU's blessing. In addition, individual actions undertaken or led by the UK or France could in no way be construed as an integrated European military force.

How then does Section Three influence this thesis question? Section Three explored various ways in which the EU and its predecessors attempted to construct a truly independent European military. From the post-war Pleven

Plan to the current Lisbon Treaty, we see that in terms of linguistic resources the EU has given this issue much attention. Despite this considerable attention, the fact remains that the EU has yet to integrate its member's militaries. The EU has put to paper numerous policy announcements such as the Battle Group strategy and yet these still remain in the theoretical. Institutions such as the CSDP have, in theory, made steps towards this goal but once again we see that disagreements amongst Member States and other European institutions have effectively hamstrung any attempts to create a credible integrated military. The inter-fighting amongst Member States and European Institutions has reached such a crescendo that in 2013, the European Parliament described the relationship as a "turf war".

This turf war has been evident throughout the thesis, and led to the conclusion that the EU is suffering from Multiple Personality Disorder. The fact that it can be readily demonstrated that the EU is clearly suffering from this disorder brings into serious question the ability of the EU to act as an integrated, credible security actor. Throughout this thesis, there has existed only one actor which has consistently been in a leadership position regarding European defence, the United States. The fact that a non-European nation has played, and continues to play, such a prominent role in European defence for so many decades is, in and of itself, is a cogent example of Europe's inability to act in a unified and credible manner independent of the US. It must be reiterated here that even with American leadership Europe has been incapable of acting credibly because of its internal disputes, lack of resources and policies which remain unimplemented.

With this information in mind, the question must be asked "can the EU be a credible international security actor without the integration of the Member States' militaries?" The answer to this question is 'no'; it is 'no', but with the caveat that that this does not mean that independent EU Member States cannot be credible on the international stage – but that is not our question. The UK and France have both demonstrated the ability to act in a credible manner on the international stage independently of the EU, but this reality bears us no closer to answering the question.

So we ask the question from a different perspective, if the EU were to integrate its members' militaries tomorrow would it be credible? Again the answer would almost certainly be 'no'; there is no clear, defined and believable strategy for present and future military integration; members are in a self-described turf war with one another and there is no overall established or proven European command for this integrated force. Under current conditions, and within today's constraints, an integrated military would simply be a shambles and could be predicted to implode shortly after its first deployment due to political infighting in Brussels, inadequate resourcing, and internal turmoil.

The fact remains that the EU has possessed a platform upon which to formulate a credible integrated military through the Battlegroup strategy for many years, and yet has been incapable of doing so. This reality clearly demonstrates that with or without military integration one cannot, at this juncture, view the EU as a credible security actor.

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