The Evolution of Cooperation on Bougainville

A study of the theory of cooperation and the Bougainville peace process during the decade 2001 – 2010

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

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Dedicated to the memory of my grandparents, Ken and Zola Wallace

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Abstract

Between 1988 and 1998, Papua New Guinea and Bougainville were engaged in a violent and destructive civil war, resulting primarily from the economic and environmental consequences stemming from mining on Bougainville, as well as historic economic, ethnic and political cleavages. A ceasefire in 1998 set into motion the Bougainville peace process. This thesis aims to test the theory of cooperation, developed by Robert Axelrod, and attempts to locate evidence of his characteristics of successful cooperation within the Bougainville case. By analysing ten years of data sourced from the Papua New Guinea *Post-Courier* daily newspaper, using a qualitative content analysis method, this research found considerable evidence of Axelrod's characteristics of cooperation. As a result, cooperation between the Papua New Guinean National Government and the then-newly formed Bougainville Government, has made considerable progress towards establishing a sustainable and lasting peace.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Research focus

Bougainville province, now the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, is an island region off the eastern coast of Papua New Guinea. Despite being geographically a part of the Solomons Archipelago, politically Bougainville falls under the jurisdiction of Papua New Guinea. The Bougainville crisis was a complex and deeply-rooted conflict centred primarily upon the Panguna copper mine. The Panguna mine was the largest open-cast mine in the world, and generating approximately 20% of the revenue of the Papua New Guinea government. However the mining operation caused extreme environmental destruction, with the Bougainville people accusing the Bougainville Copper Limited mining company of failing to adequately compensate people for their land, and for the unfair distribution of mining revenues. Beginning in 1988, Bougainville was embroiled in a decade-long war with Papua New Guinea, labelled the most severe conflict in Oceania since the end of the Second World War. As a result of the fighting over 67,000 people (40% of the population) were internally displaced, and between 15-20,000 Bougainvilleans were killed.

Numerous attempts were made to secure a lasting peace, and to bring the militant Bougainville factions and the Papua New Guinean government together to reconcile. These attempts ultimately succeeded in securing a permanent ceasefire, and the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement. The question now becomes: how can cooperation successfully develop, in a world without central authority, and where the parties involved have an incentive to defect? The primary focus of this research is to test the work of Robert Axelrod on the Bougainville case. Axelrod, in his work *The Evolution of Cooperation*, empirically determined the parameters, or characteristics, most common amongst

cooperatively-successful strategies in a simulated environment. The primary research question of this thesis is:

- *Are the characteristics necessary for the development of successful cooperation, as identified by Axelrod, present in post-crisis Bougainville, and if so, to what extent?*

The Bougainville case is also governed by certain parameters of broader game theory, relating to the nature of the interaction between parties and the duration of this interaction. The effect of these parameters are the focus of the secondary research question of this thesis:

- *As time progresses, do we see more cooperative behaviour being demonstrated between actors, or do they experience an increased incidence of defective, non-cooperative behaviour?*

To test these research questions a detailed coding frame was developed, using qualitative content analysis, to identify Axelrod's characteristics of successful cooperation in the news media. This required analysing more than 1,300 articles from the Papua New Guinea *Post-Courier* daily newspaper, sourced from editions dating from 2001 to 2010. The articles are analysed for instances of cooperation or non-cooperation, and categorised according to the coding frame, in order to answer the primary and secondary research questions.

Structure of thesis

Chapter two presents in depth the details of the Bougainville case study, specifically addressing the causes and course of the Bougainville crisis, and the burgeoning stages of the peace process.

Chapter three presents a literature review, and is divided into two sections. The first section covers the seminal work of Robert Axelrod in the field of cooperation theory, and details his work in establishing the most desirable characteristics for facilitating successful cooperation. The second section outlines specific aspects of game theory relevant to this research, including specific dynamics of the Bougainville case.

Chapter four outlines the methodology used to isolate the characteristics of cooperation identified by Axelrod in the Bougainville case. This involves using a qualitative methodology known as qualitative content analysis, to analyse and code ten years of articles sourced from the Papua New Guinea *Post-Courier* daily newspaper.

Chapter five presents the findings and analysis of the qualitative content analysis. This chapter identifies the extent to which the Axelrod characteristics of cooperation are present in the Bougainville case. Chapter five also presents a time series analysis of the prevalence of defective behaviour.

Chapter 2: Bougainville

This chapter provides a general overview of the island of Bougainville, followed by a detailed description of the events leading up to, and those which unfolded during, the Bougainville Crisis.

The island of Bougainville, in the Solomon archipelago (Fig. 1), was among the earliest inhabited areas of the Pacific, with evidence of human inhabitation dating back nearly 29,000 years (Ogan 2005: 48). The Solomon archipelago and Bougainville had been sighted by a number of early European explorers: the Solomon Islands were first sighted by the Spanish explorer, de Mendana, in 1568. The North Solomon Islands were visited by the Dutch explorers, Schouten and Le Maire, in 1616. In 1768, the French explorer, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, sailed the eastern coast of the island which now bears his name (Spriggs 2005: 28). There are few sources of information on the pre-colonial and pre-mining periods of Bougainville: the fact that only one scholar – Douglas Oliver – has attempted anything resembling a general history of the island is testament to the lacunae in research (Griffin 2005: 199). There are a handful of reasons for the neglect of this subject. Prior to the commencement of mining operations on the island, Bougainville was seen as a "backwater" region of negligible consequence, and thus was paid little attention. In addition, the written records in existence are predominantly the works of foreigners, and as such are inherently biased or flawed: this was a hindrance prior to the people of Bougainville learning to record their oral histories in a lasting format (Griffin 2005: 199).

Fig. 1: Bougainville

The gaps in the historical knowledge of Bougainville create a challenge for contemporary studies on the region; without understanding the past it is difficult to comprehend the present and theorise the future. This thesis will rely heavily upon the edited volume of *Bougainville Before the War*, by Regan and Griffin, which amalgamates the original works of Douglas Oliver with contributions from specialists in Bougainville studies, as well as prominent leaders from the area.

The Bougainville Crisis

The Bougainville conflict is a multifaceted and immensely intricate case. The duration and complexity of the conflict is such that thousands upon thousands of pages of text have been devoted to its many aspects. While such a detailed description is not necessary here, it is vital to provide an overview of the events which occurred immediately prior to the outbreak of violence, and of the devastation which ensued.

Establishment of the Panguna Mine

To the wider world the most tangible cause of the Bougainville conflict was the issue of mining. In 1960 the discovery of large copper deposits was made on the island, and after a series of feasibility studies a mining operation was launched. In 1967 a major extraction pit was established at Panguna, in southern Bougainville, and rapidly drew the ire of locals. The mining operation was owned in majority by Cozinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) and functioned locally under the name Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) (Alley 2003: 228).

The establishment of this mine was lauded as being the means by which Papua New Guinea could achieve fiscal independence from Australia, of which Papua New Guinea was a territory. Charles Barnes, Minister of Australian Territories, underlined this in 1970 when he stated:

> "Our obligation is to build the standard of living up for the whole of the territory. And if we're going to build the standard up just on coconuts and cocoa, I'm afraid their future isn't too bright. If we get a few more of these mines, New Guinea will be self-sufficient and in a very good position, so that is our interest mainly. I think the people will eventually see it" (Coles-Janess 1997).

Throughout the 1970s, due to the huge mineral wealth of the island, the Australian Government and CRA were transforming Bougainville into the most advanced and westernised area of the entire South Pacific (Coles-Janess 1997). In spite of the modernisation driven by the activities of the Panguna mine, the local Bougainvillean people grew angry at the financial and environmental issues which it caused. While the mine generated local employment and training opportunities, and provided services and cash-flow injections into the local economy, the mine was also responsible for considerable environmental degradation, insufficient compensation to locals and was generally viewed as another example of indigenous exploitation by outsiders (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 25).

With the advent of mining on the island, and the subsequent frustration of the people, various political options for Bougainville (independence, unity with the Solomon Islands, or remaining with Papua New Guinea) were debated. During the early 1970s the people of Bougainville had begun to demand greater autonomy from the central government, and in 1974 a provincial government was established which encompassed Bougainville, Buka and its associated islands. At the time it became known as the North Solomons Province, but was subsequently referred to as Bougainville. Following the independence of Papua New Guinea

in 1975, the central government extended these same provincial arrangements to the rest of the nation (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 24-25).

Following the commencement of mining in 1967, enabling legislation was passed which allowed for the compulsory acquisition of land for the purposes of mining, and circumvented the need for local consultation (Alley 2003: 228). Many villagers were already concerned with the intentions of both BCL and the Papua New Guinea government, believing that the government "are going to come and take our land away, without permission from us" (Coles-Janess 1997). The identity of the Bougainvillean people, and indeed of wider Melanesia, is derived from an all-encompassing affinity to the land. For the people of Bougainville, land:

> "…is our physical life; it is marriage; it is status; it is security; it is politics; in fact, it is our only world. We have little or no experience of social survival detached from the land. For us to be completely landless is a nightmare which no dollar in the pocket…will allay" (Alley 2003: 227).

The desecration of local land caused heartache and dismay amongst the Bougainvillean people, and endangered their traditional ways of life (Boege 2010: 334). At the height of its operation the Panguna mine covered an area of 400 hectares and produced waste material in the order of hundreds of millions of tonnes (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 25). Much of this land was forcibly acquired from local families and communities, and was left economically useless as a result of the degradation caused by BCL. The local land served the communal imperative of providing a subsistence living for many families: much of the land had been used for gardens, and many waterways which were used for the collection of fish and seafood were left polluted (Alley 2003: 229; Coles-Janess 1997). In reality the land had a

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much deeper value: it served as the "core dimension of their whole social, cultural and spiritual life" (Boege 2003: 334). As a result, while the loss of land was economically detrimental, there were also deep-penetrating psychosocial impacts and damage caused to the societal fabric of the people (Boege 2003: 334).

The mounting frustration and anger at the destruction of their land was compounded by the unfair and disproportionate distribution of mine revenues. During the 17 years it was in operation the Panguna mine was an essential source of income for the Papua New Guinea government, with the mine providing the government with approximately 20% of its annual internal revenue, and approximately 44% of its export earnings (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 25; Alley 2003: 229). In the decade prior to the outbreak of the crisis, 60% of the mine profits went to the Papua New Guinea government; 35% to foreign shareholders; 5% was provided to the Bougainville provincial government; yet only 0.2% of profits were awarded to local landowners as royalty payments[1] (Alley 2003: 229).

Xenophobia

In addition to the issues of mining and the resultant land degradation, there were mounting concerns from the Bougainville people towards those employed by BCL at the Panguna mine. These sentiments were not motivated by the mere fact that these people were employed by the mine, but rather by the *types* of people who were employed. Throughout the construction stage of the Panguna mine more than 10,000 people worked on the mine site: once the mine was opened a workforce of approximately 4,300 worked directly at the site, with many more involved in mine-related enterprises. The majority of these workers were

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[1] There are varying figures relating to the distribution of mine revenues, but they tend to fall within the same range. Initially the Papua New Guinea government received only 1.25% of mine profits, but after their independence this was renegotiated to 20%. However the Bougainvilleans themselves only received 5% of the share earned by the government – i.e. 5% of 1.25%, and later 5% of 20%. This translated as $600 for every $1 million in profit, and later $10,000 for every $1 million in profit (Alley 2003: 229; Ewins 2002: 2).

non-Bougainvillean and hailed from other parts of Papua New Guinea. In addition, there were also a number of foreigners working on the island (Boege 2010: 333). There was growing resentment of the wealth being accumulated by the 'redskins'[2] of mainland Papua New Guinea, who were paid considerably more than local Bougainvilleans, and increased frustration at the presence of the "affluent expatriate mining community" (Renner 2002: 44; Wilson-Roberts 2001: 25). The influx of these foreign workers saw an increase in socially deviant behaviour including alcoholism, rape, robbery, and prostitution, which placed even greater strain upon already taxed social structures (Boege 2010: 335).

The Panguna Landowners Association

In 1979 the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) was formed. This organisation consisted of customary landowners in the areas around the mine site, as well as of the mine access roads and the tailing areas (May 2004: 276). The PLA formed primarily to provide a cohesive body to push for a review of mining compensation agreements. The PLA mobilised what has been labelled 'militant opposition' to BCL: a minor riot in Panguna, as a result of a confrontation between the PLA and BCL, saw BCL attempt to placate local anger through a diversified and enhanced system of compensation (Alley 2003: 229; May 2004: 277).

The new compensatory agreement incorporated the existing methods of compensation plus new forms of payment including a "price indexing formula for recurring payments" (May 2004: 277). Unfortunately the distribution of this compensation package resulted in further dispute: the task of dividing the funds between individuals and community benefit trusts lead to frictions between local clans, each of whom believed they had a case for greater sums of payment (Alley 2003: 229). The inability of the people to satisfactorily divide the

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[2] 'Redskin' is a degrading term used to describe mainland Papua New Guineans. It refers to the reddish hue of their skin, in contrast to the much darker skin colour of Bougainvilleans.

compensation "added to the inter-generational and clan differences" which existed within the PLA (Alley 2003: 229). This disagreement highlighted a growing divide between the older and younger generations of Bougainvilleans: the younger generations resented the presence of BCL on the island and on their land, but also held the belief that older generations had stepped aside and essentially acquiesced to the BCL "takeover" of their property. Many also believed that the older Bougainvilleans had seized and diverted the compensation thus far received to serve their own purposes (May 2004: 277).

Within this chaos and discord, a challenge for the PLA leadership took place. As a result, the New Panguna Landowners Association was formed in 1979, and the advent of the New PLA marked a new era of landowner militancy against BCL and the Papua New Guinea government (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 26; Alley 2003: 230). The New PLA was headed by Perpetua Sereo and her younger cousin, Francis Ona: both were members of the aforementioned 'younger generation' and were severely disillusioned by the existing policies of compensation distribution (Alley 2003: 230; May 2004: 278).

In April 1988, with the support of the Bougainville provincial governor, Joseph Kabui[3], the New PLA released a list of demands which included:

- An environmental compensation claim for 10 billion kina (at the time almost US$10 billion);

- A 50% share in BCL profits;

- Consultation on all new development projects; and

- Localisation of the ownership of BCL within 5 years (Alley 2003: 230).

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[3] Francis Ona was a former employee of BCL at the Panguna mine. He became disillusioned with the mine after his family received scant compensation for their land (Regan 1998: 277). Both Francis Ona and Joseph Kabui would become two of the most prominent figures in the Bougainville conflict, the subsequent peace process, and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.

There was strategic reasoning behind the release of these demands: in making their list of demands intentionally excessive, the New PLA was assured of their rejection. This was intended to, and succeeded in, stirring local animosity towards BCL, and lessening the local standing of BCL amongst the Bougainvillean people (Alley 2003: 230; Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27).

The Beginning of Violence

In early 1988 the atmosphere on Bougainville had begun to shift from one of protest to one of insurgency. In March 1988 a landowner delegation, led by a militant faction of the New PLA, marched on BCL to outline their demands. From the viewpoint of the protestors the compensation offered by the company was not sufficient, and they later staged a series of sit-ins at the mine. These actions not only caused mining operations to halt for several hours, but protestors also robbed the BCL's store of explosives. These explosives were intended to be used in attacks designed to shut down the mine indefinitely: however an appearance by the national minister for minerals and energy managed to halt these attempts (May 2004: 278). Despite the early intervention of the national government the situation rapidly intensified, following a public meeting in November 1988. A report prepared by an external consultancy declared that pollution from the Panguna mine was not responsible for the deaths of fish stocks and flying foxes, which served as popular foods for the Bougainvilleans. At this announcement many locals, including Francis Ona, stormed out in disgust (May 2004: 279).

It was during this time that violent campaigns of sabotage were launched against the mine site, essentially marking the beginning of what would become a decade-long protracted conflict. Within days of Ona irately leaving the public meeting, he and his men armed themselves and robbed the BCL magazine, taking substantial quantities of explosives. Over

the course of the next few weeks the New PLA launched a series of violent attacks against the Panguna mine and its staff: mine installations fell victim to numerous arson attacks; a repeater station was destroyed; power pylons were levelled; and fires were lit at several BCL maintenance outposts. In addition, mine workers who were undertaking repairs at the mine were also threatened by large groups of armed men (May 2004: 279; Wilson-Roberts 2001: 26). In the aftermath of these events it was noted that the attacks were characterised by high levels of professionalism, and many wondered how an essentially ad hoc rebellion could conduct such attacks: it was subsequently revealed that a member of the rebellion, Sam Kauona, was a former Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) soldier and explosives expert (May 2004: 279). As a direct result of the intense and continued campaign of sabotage against the mine, BCL were forced to shut the Panguna mine in May 1989, and it remains closed to this day (Boege 2010: 26).

In June 1989, following the forced closure of the mine, the Papua New Guinea government declared a state of emergency. It was at this time that companies of the PNGDF were deployed to the island: the reaction of the Papua New Guinean government was excessive and "a gross over-reaction": the use of the PNGDF and police forces to crush the uprising with heavy-handed means solidified the desire of Bougainvilleans to gain independence, and escalated the scale and bloodshed of the conflict (Ewins 2002: 3).

The PNGDF were characterised by ill-discipline and the exercising of extremely poor judgement in the course of their duties. The PNGDF committed what have been labelled "appalling and often random human rights violations" (Regan 1998: 277). These atrocities included the rape of local women; physical assaults against villagers; summary and extra-judicial killings; and the burning of entire villages (Regan 1998: 277). These actions

infuriated Ona, who gathered about him a "rapidly expanding group of followers" (Regan 1998: 278). The New PLA morphed into the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), who became the mechanism of militaristic retaliation and resistance against the PNGDF and the central Papua New Guinea government (Ganguly 2003: 12).

Bougainville Revolutionary Army and Secession

The BRA had its initial roots within the context of the issues surrounding the Panguna mine. As BRA leader Francis Ona stated:

> "We see that all Bougainville is on top of one big mine. This has been proven by aerial surveillance that most parts of Bougainville is on top of a large mineral resource. My people want to preserve their land, want to preserve their rights, with this in mind we are standing for independence. Because only through independence will all this mining be under control. If PNG government takes back Bougainville, both the PNG and Australian governments, who have interest in Bougainville on an economic basis, with the mining companies and all this. They will come back and establish those big mines and people's lives will be in danger" (Coles-Janess 1997).

The disorganisation and lack of accountability of the newly-independent Papua New Guinea government were evident in the actions of their troops. The PNGDF went so far as to use helicopters to assault villages from the air and dumped the bodies of militants into the ocean[4] (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 26; Regan 2001: 277). As a consequence of these actions the BRA began to expand their numbers. The BRA, and Ona himself, became a standard around which angry landowners could rally. The then-premier of Bougainville, Joseph Kabui, noted that "the people see Ona as some kind of folk hero and champion of the Panguna land rights cause" (May 2004: 279). The strongest support for the BRA was derived from angry and

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[4] As the crisis raged throughout the 1990s the Australian government kept watch over the situation and took a "neighbourly interest" in seeing its former colony resolve the conflict. However the Australian government received considerable criticism when it was revealed that the PNGDF has used an Iroquois helicopter, provided by the Australian military, to attack Bougainvillean villages from the air (Ewins 2002: 4).

frustrated young men; as a result of limited access to education, and issues surrounding economic growth and job prospects (much of which was remnant of the colonial period), this demographic in particular had few employment or economic opportunities, and these conditions magnetised them towards the BRA, which provided them with both power and status (Regan 1998: 277).

Ona and a close group of advisors soon developed an official ideology for the BRA, and it is within this ideology that we begin to see a shift away from exclusively mining-centric concerns and towards xenophobia and secession (Regan 1998: 278). They determined that the challenges and problems facing Bougainville were the fault of outsiders, namely "BCL, the national government and non-Bougainvilleans generally – together with wealthy Bougainvilleans and the 'white mafia' who controlled the Papua New Guinean economy" (Regan 1998: 277). The ideology of the BRA had broad appeal to the people of Bougainville: it addressed their concerns and anxieties about the rapid changes occurring on the island, promoting the egalitarian way of life, and that by returning to their customary roots they would once again have equality (Regan 1998: 277).

Failed Ceasefire and the Government Blockade

In an attempt to bring about the cessation of hostilities, Prime Minister Namaliu endeavoured to negotiate a settlement including offers of compensation and development assistance (Regan 1998: 277). These offers were rejected outright by the BRA, due in large part to the horrendous conduct of the PNGDF. In March 1990, having failed to quell the hostilities on the island, the Papua New Guinea government declared a ceasefire and withdrew its entire force from Bougainville. The central government subsequently imposed a total blockade of the island, which prevented all goods and services from reaching

Bougainville, patrolling the coastline with ships, and cutting off all government services (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27; Alley 2003: 230).

The imposition of the blockade had an extreme impact on the innocent civilians of Bougainville. In the absence of government provisions there was an increase in local food production to compensate for the decrease in supplies, but it was in the area of health that the impact was most dire: with the government ceasing its provision of medical supplies and preventing the Red Cross from intervening, the "scourge" of tropical diseases returned to the island (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27; Coles-Janess 1997). As a direct result of the blockade thousands of people would lose their lives to illness and malady (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27). The government blockade had an asymmetric impact upon those who had not been involved in the original fighting: what began as localised fighting in central Bougainville over mining issues had dire consequences for the entire island (Boege 2010: 335).

The Fracturing BRA

In an attempt to move towards sustainable civilian governance and the international recognition of Bougainvillean sovereignty, Ona established the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) in May 1990. This was an effort by Ona to remedy his belief that the militaristic government of the BRA would not gain any support or recognition from the international community. The BIG was headed by the self-appointed President Ona[5], and Vice-President Joseph Kabui (Regan 1998: 278). The BIG issued a declaration of independence shortly thereafter, declaring Bougainville to be the independent Republic of Me'ekamui – a gesture which was rejected outright by the Papua New Guinea government (Alley 2003: 230).

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[5] Given his new Presidential status, the BRA was headed by Ona's former lieutenant, Sam Kauona.

Of critical note is that the BIG had very little control over the BRA leadership, and neither the BRA nor BIG exerted much control over the fighters of the BRA (Regan 1998: 278). Since its creation the BRA had lacked the organisation and discipline necessary to truly be a progressive political force on Bougainville. Francis Ona was "more of a philosopher or mystic than warrior, administrator or policy maker", and as a consequence he lacked the capacity to impose unity upon the BRA (Regan 1998: 278). The BRA founders continued to develop the ideology of the BRA, which manifested a deep distrust of all aspects of the 'modern world', from formal education to economic development and medicine (Regan 1998: 278). It is clear from this philosophy that the BRA had no realistic vision for the future of Bougainville, and would ultimately do far more harm than good. In due time the BRA began to fracture into multiple factions, each with their own goals and motives, but universally marked by a capacity for violence.

It was reported that by the early 1990s there were three identifiable factions of the BRA: the original militant PLA and local landowners; members of an anti-government and cultist group; and groups of petty, thuggish criminals (May 2004: 279). The absence of the PNGDF on Bougainville ironically created an increase in violence and destruction. Whereas originally the BRA had been engaged in conflict with the PNGDF, now, without a common enemy, the ethno-nationalist nature of the conflict dissipated (Regan 1998: 278). Many of these fractured elements of the BRA began persecuting groups whom they now perceived as their immediate enemies within Bougainville itself. The wealthy; the well-educated; officials of senior government; non-Bougainvilleans and any person suspected of being in league with the national government faced harassment, imprisonment, torture or execution. The island also experienced an escalation in inter-community conflict: 'wealthy' villages were burned to the ground, and any villagers accused of breaking the 'Standing Orders' of the BRA were

punished (Regan 1998: 278). In the face of this conduct, the breakdown of security on the island, the depraved lawlessness of so many BRA units and the deprivation resulting from the blockade, it is not surprising that what little unity there was on Bougainville became even more tenuous, and support for the BRA rapidly began to fall in many areas across Bougainville (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27; Regan 1998: 278).

Return of the PNGDF

In late 1990 the leaders of the northern island of Nissan placed a request with the Papua New Guinea national government to re-deploy the PNGDF to their island, in order to protect them from the BRA (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27). The Papua New Guinea government approved this request and the PNGDF returned to Nissan and Buka islands where, after engaging the BRA for more than a year, the PNGDF were able to retake control of the area. Shortly thereafter, inspired by the Buka example, Bougainville experienced the widespread formation of militias opposing the BRA. These militias became known as the 'Resistance'[6], and were composed of opponents of the BRA as well as defected BRA fighters (Wilson-Roberts 2001: 27; Alley 2003: 231). The Bougainville conflict was entering what was possibly its most violent and destructive phase. After their successful campaign to retake Buka, and at the request of local authorities, the PNGDF returned to the north and southwest of the main island in 1991-1992. During this time the PNGDF committed many abuses of human rights: though of little comfort to the victims, the PNGDF were more disciplined than during their previous deployment, which in turn made it difficult for the BRA to rebuild their support base (Regan 1998: 279).

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[6] The Resistance were armed by the Papua New Guinea government and the PNGDF, and also received additional funding and equipment from the central government (Alley 2003: 232).

The fighting soon intensified between the PNGDF, the Resistance and the various landowner and criminal factions of the BRA. In addition to these divisions, BRA and Resistance members would often sporadically change allegiances; different units within the BRA and the Resistance would often take to fighting each other over purely local issues, which had no bearing upon the wider context of the rebellion. It is little wonder that, as time progressed, the crisis became eminently more convoluted and the battle frontiers became unclear (Boege 2010: 335). The inevitable toll of human lives and destruction of property reached such an extent that 'care centres' were established across the island (Alley 2003: 231). These facilities were designed to harbour those who had been displaced due to BRA intimidation or because of PNGDF destruction of their homes (Alley 2003: 231). At the care centres security was provided by the Resistance, and, somewhat ironically, by the PNGDF. The conditions within the camps were sub-human, and the continuing ill-discipline of the PNGDF resulted in numerous problems for the refugees. They were fearful of the BRA, resentful of the PNGDF, and the residents ultimately became "the true victims of the conflict" (Regan 1998: 279). It is estimated that by 1997, 67,300 internally displaced citizens, 40% of the population, were seeking refuge within these care centres (Alley 2003: 231).

Escalating Conflict

In the wake of the 1992 national elections, the newly-elected Prime Minister Wingti grew impatient at the slow pace of resolution on the issue of Bougainville itself. The approach of the new administration was to expedite matters through increased military initiatives to retake the Panguna mine and the provincial capital (Regan 1998: 280). The efforts of the PNGDF to free more areas from rebel control resulted in large casualties for both the BRA and PNGDF, and increased suffering for civilians (Regan 1998: 280). As the BRA assault against the advance of the PNGDF and Resistance forces intensified, the number of casualties soared. The PNGDF, still plagued by weak control systems and sub-standard

command, were now under increased military pressure: consequently, the incidences of human rights abuses climbed steeply. The entire island was embroiled in a violent and torturous battle to which a swift or efficient resolution was not possible.

The mid-1990s saw numerous attempts at reconciliation through the enactment of ceasefires, the holding of peace conferences, and the removal of the government blockade. Ona and the BRA opposed the ceasefire and many of the senior leaders from the BRA and BIG did not attend the peace conferences (Regan 1998: 280). In late 1995, however, the BRA and BIG did agree to a meeting which was held in Cairns, Australia. Unfortunately, as these representatives were returning to Bougainville by boat, they were attacked by PNGDF troops. To this day it is not clear as to whether this assault was authorised by the national government (Regan 1998: 281).

The BRA retaliation against the PNGDF was swift and violent, resulting in the national government lifting the ceasefire and resuming military operations. The subsequent massacres of both BRA and PNGDF personnel, and the killing of Bougainville Premier Theodore Miriung by PNGDF troops, fuelled the desperation for progress to be made towards a lasting peace (Regan 1998: 281). With the national elections looming, the pressure for progress led to Prime Minister Chan taking the heavy-handed and short-sighted step of engaging international mercenaries, in the hope of crushing the rebellion on Bougainville (Dorney 1998). In January 1997, Chan signed a secret contract with Sandline International, a private military consultancy based in London and South Africa (Regan 1998: 282). At a cost of 50 million kina ($US36 million), Sandline would provide mercenary troops and high-tech equipment, and train local PNGDF soldiers, to re-enter Bougainville and destroy the BRA while simultaneously re-taking the Panguna mine. The operation faced opposition from the

PNGDF commander, General Singirok, who was both afraid of the high risk to civilian life, and resentful that such money had been spent on an external agent (Dorney 1998). However, before the mercenaries could launch their operation, they were driven out of Papua New Guinea by the PNGDF and their commander. The national government bore the brunt of criticism from external and internal parties, at having dared use such an extreme, external solution to a domestic issue. Because of this backlash, and facing a judicial inquiry, Prime Minister Chan and two additional ministers were forced to stand down[7] (Dorney 1998; Regan 1998: 282).

De-escalation of Violence and the Bougainville Peace Agreement

In the aftermath of the Sandline Affair, the Papua New Guinea government undertook a seismic change in its approach. The acting Prime Minister, John Giheno, declared his support for a negotiated cessation to hostilities, in lieu of a continued military approach. The sentiments expressed by the Prime Minister helped to foster the conditions necessary to facilitate the peace process. The subsequent national election saw Bill Skate elected as Prime Minister: a result which enabled the first steps towards peace to be taken (Regan 1998: 282).

The Bougainville Peace Agreement (the BPA) was an accord signed in Arawa on 30 August 2001. The BPA was signed by the combined assemblies of the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government and Bougainville People's Congress, and the Papua New Guinea National Executive Council (NEC) (Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001: 1). The primary aim of the BPA was to bring about an end to the Bougainville Crisis. The BPA was the

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[7] The Sandline Affair was essentially the 'final straw' and marked the last attempt of the Papua New Guinea government at broad military incursion into Bougainville. The depth to which the Chan administration had sunk, in resourcing external mercenaries, forced both the people and the government to realise that the battle had gone too far, and lasted too long. It was a critical turning point in the course of the conflict, and it is therefore necessary to provide abridged details of the incident. More comprehensive work on the Sandline Affair can be found in Dorney (1998): The Sandline Affair.

culmination of several earlier agreements, and consists of new political arrangements for Bougainville, and other stipulations designed to foster lasting peace through cooperation.

The BPA was built around three pillars. The first pillar relates to *autonomy*. The Agreement:

> "…provides for arrangements for an autonomous Bougainville Government operating under a home-grown Bougainville Constitution with a right to assume increasing control over a wide range of powers, functions, personnel and resources on the basis of guarantees contained in the National Constitution".
>
> (Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001: 1)

The second pillar relates to a *referendum on autonomy*. In referencing a number of the causes and sentiments of combatants during the Crisis, the NEC agreed for Bougainvilleans to have the opportunity to determine their own future political status (BPA 2001: 1). The referendum may be held no sooner than 10 years, and no later than 15 years, after the election of the first autonomous Bougainville Government. The choices of the referendum will include independence from Papua New Guinea (BPA 2001: 1).

The third pillar of the BPA relates to *weapons disposal*. A condition of the autonomy arrangement and deferred referendum on independence was for civilians and former combatants of Bougainville to surrender their firearms and explosives. The weapons disposal plan was to be implemented in stages across Bougainville, with weapons to be stored in secure containers supervised by the United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville (BPA 2001: 2).

Chapter 3: Literature Review and Methodology

Concepts of Game Theory

Game theory is broadly defined as "strategic interaction between players" (Dixit and Skeath 2004: 4-5). As a concept game theory provides a tool for the analysis, and potential resolution, of conflict. Game theory enables the formulation of strategies to address complex challenges and to gain insight into the behaviour of actors in conflicts (Avenhaus 2009: 86-87). This section provides a general overview of concepts relevant to this case study.

Players and Rules

The Bougainville conflict was a complex scenario which consisted of multiple factions interacting with each other towards achieving their desired outcomes. The number of 'players' (or actors) engaged in a scenario is an easily quantifiable aspect of game theory. Players represent actors who are possessed of free will and who make rational choices within the game framework (Brams 2011: 292). Among the most common frameworks are two-player games. A well-known example of a two-player game is the Prisoner's Dilemma. This framework was utilised by Axelrod in his computer simulation tournaments (detailed later n this chapter), as an analogue for testing the success factors of cooperation. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a scenario in which two people, Player A and Player B, are arrested on suspicion of committing a crime. The players are sequestered in separate rooms with no chance to communicate. The police interrogate the suspects separately, telling each that they face a minimum of three years in prison for committing the crime. However, the police then tell each suspect that the know one person has been coerced into committing the crime by the other, and that the jail time will be considerably less for the person who confesses if the other player remains silent. Therefore the question is how each player will respond, knowing that they face considerable jail time if their fellow player defects and betrays them (Dixit and Skeath 2004: 90-91). The decision matrix (Fig. 2) provides an analysis of this situation. If

both players remain silent ('denying' their involvement and therefore cooperating with the other player) each receives three years in prison. If Player A supposes Player B will Confess, then the best decision for Player A is to Confess (10 years in prison is preferable to 25 years in prison). If Player A believes Player B will Deny, then the best decision for Player A is still to Confess (one year in prison as opposed to three). The same logic holds true for Player B, rendering "Confess" as the dominant strategy.

Fig. 2: Decision matrix

		Player B	
		Confess	Deny
Player A	Confess	(**10**, *10*)	(**1**, *25*)
	Deny	(**25**, *1*)	(**3**, *3*)

Multiplayer games, or *n*-player games, are those which involve three or more players, with *n* denoting an abstract number of players. The addition of multiple players introduces higher levels of complexity in player interaction (Colman 1982: 14). Each player, or coalition of players, will have their own unique strategies and preferences which must interact with all other players in the game. *n*-player games possess the capacity for players to divide into factions (Colman 1982: 143).

Of interest to this thesis is a specific type of *n*-player game known as collective action. The preceding section outlined the nature of two-layer, single-shot games, as used in Axelrod's research. As a real-world example, the Bougainville case is comprised of multiple

parties, distilled in to two major cohorts. This enables the research to utilise a collective action approach in testing the validity of Axelrod's findings. Collective action is the scenario of individuals forming groups or factions, with the assumed collective intent to achieve a common goal (Gilbert 2006: 3). In situations of collective action, individuals can coalesce and form *supra-individual* units. Such units consist of individuals possessing commensurate motivations and objectives, or facing similar challenges or conflicts: as such they form a "single moving power" (Gilbert 2006: 12). Supra-individual units in collective action situations serve to, among other things, elicit and enforce cooperation. As McCarthy and Meirowitz argue, in instances of interethnic conflict (as with Bougainville and Papua New Guinea), cooperation is difficult to sustain: when supra-individual units interact, transgressors cannot be singled out for punishment by the other group (McCarthy and Meirowitz 2007: 264). In such situations two potential strategies can support sustained cooperation: the first is known as the *spiral equilibrium.* In this strategy cooperation can be sustained via the threat of group-specific punishment: *all* members of a group are punished if any members have defected. The second strategy is known as the *in-group policing equilibrium:* in this situation there is no cross-group punishment, because each group punishes its own members for defecting against the other party (McCarthy and Meirowitz 2007: 264).

However, games of collective action can result in the collective action problem: that is, the problem of achieving the best outcome for society as a whole when the personal interests of some individuals will lead them to a different outcome (Dixit and Skeath 2004: 631). When individuals take action in an interdependent situation, many are likely to choose strategies which maximise their own short-term benefits, and thus their actions generate sub-optimal or lower outcomes than may otherwise have been possible (Ostrom 2010: 155). There are a range of variables which may lead to the resolution of the collective action

problem, in enabling an outcome greater than the deficient, short-term gain sought by individuals. These include the size of the groups, the heterogeneity of participants, the information available regarding past actions, and whether or not the interaction is likely to be repeated (Ostrom 2010: 157).

Actors, in any configuration, are governed by the rules of the game. In general game theory it is supposed that actors have some understanding of the rules which are the "guides to future courses of action" (North 1990: 66). In many cases these rules are either developed or enforced by institutions (Burns and Roszgkowska 2005). Traditional institutions, in the case of Bougainville, created the rules of the game which enabled a platform for iterative cooperation: without these institutions, new rules would have been necessary at each interaction between players. The rules implemented by institutions can assume a range of forms, from verbal expressions to enforced behaviour and conduct (North 1990: 67). In the case of Bougainville, the rules of the game were a combination of cultural expectations of conduct, honour and community, as well as requirements and regulations implemented by foreign actors contributing to the peace process.

Iterative Games

A key consideration of a game framework is its length: does the game consist of a single, isolated move, or are there multiple, repeated moves before the game concludes? As the name implies, a single-shot game is one in which each player has only one move: they do not necessarily have only one *option*, but rather only one chance to *execute* their chosen option (Dixit and Skeath 2004: 23). Iterative, or repeated games, are more complex. A single-shot game will yield a single outcome, whereas iterative games consist of multiple stages and incorporate various strategies, strengths and weaknesses from each actor. While the Axelrod research employed a single-shot framework, the Bougainville case represents a far more

complex, iterative framework. The repeated and frequent engagement across a ten-year period provides a solid test for the applicability of Axelrod's work across different scenarios. A critical aspect of these interactions concerns end-game effects. In single-shot games actors are unlikely ever to interact again, and will therefore seek to maximise their own personal gains without concern for the future (Axelrod 1984: 10). In iterative games the future is extremely important: each actor knows they will be interacting for a period of time (either defined or undefined) and the decisions they make now will have bearing on the future. End-game effects impact specifically upon iterative games of defined length: if actors know that the game will end at move n, their dominant strategy will be to defect at n^{-1}. In this instance, given that defection is imminent at n^{-1}, the dominant strategy is also to defect at n^{-2}. This logic holds true throughout the entire game, creates an echo that essentially makes defection the dominant strategy for the entire game and making cooperation highly unlikely (Axelrod 1984: 10). As such, games of unknown or undefined length hold the best chance of facilitating cooperation.

Infinite Horizon

An infinite horizon situation is defined as "a repeated…game…that has no definite end at a fixed finite time" (Dixit and Skeath 2004: 637). As discussed above, in an iterative game players take alternate turns until the conclusion of the game: however the assumption that a game will take place over a fixed, finite timeframe is often false (Harris 1985: 99). In an infinite horizon game the future is essentially open-ended, with the game being repeated indefinitely (Magill 1981: 679; Corriveau 2012: 112). The central element of infinite horizon is that the end-point of the game is unknown: the "absence of a fixed end-point" effectively removes the capacity of one player to exploit another as the game nears its conclusion, and requires a more dynamic strategic approach than finite, iterative games (Harris 1985: 99).

Fig. 3 represents an infinite horizon scenario. In Fig. 3 the arrow direction represents the progression of time continuing to essentially infinity, denoted by *i*. At this stage of the game a decision, D^1, is made by a player. This decision is subject to the infinite horizon: at the time the decision is made the end-point is not known, and the game is effectively infinite. As time progresses (Fig. 4) a decision, D^2, is made which establishes the end-point at *T*, thereby transforming the game from one of infinite length to one of finite length. The infinite horizon parameter is a core characteristic of the Bougainville case. The time period of our analysis, 2001-2010, is an infinite horizon game: during this timeframe the end-point of the game (i.e. the independence referendum) has not been determined.

Fig. 3: Infinite Horizon pre-endpoint

Fig. 4: Infinite Horizon post-endpoint

The consequences of infinite horizon scenarios are complex and potentially dire: if the decision made at D^1 relied upon a game of significant length, but D^2 rendered the game much shorter, it may have an adverse impact upon the player. The infinite horizon concept highlights the extreme complexity inherent in decision-making, and the difficulty in calculating the impact of a current decision on any future decisions. Such a model is of

particular relevance to areas such as negotiation and peacebuilding, in which a particular outcome is desired, but is not established in time, at the commencement of, or part way through, negotiations.

Shadow of the Future

It has been established that defection is the dominant strategy in most situations. However it is readily apparent that in global politics, cooperation is a reality. So how is cooperation able to manifest in an anarchical system with no central authority and between players who have a logical incentive to defect? One critical reason is known as the shadow of the future. Although evidence suggests that defection, or non-cooperation, is the logical and dominant strategy in single shot games, the chances of cooperation are far greater under iterative game conditions (Parkhe 1993: 799). The simple reason for this is that, in iterative games, there is a future, and with this future comes the very real threat of punishment and retaliation in the face of defection (Bo 2005: 1591). This threat therefore casts a "shadow", an uncertainty on every decision made in the present, and is powerful enough to overcome the short-term temptation to defect: when players see future rewards for cooperation and punishments for defection, they take a longer-term perspective (Van Lange et al 2011: 858; Parkhe 1993: 799).

The shadow of the future is linked with the time parameters of an infinite horizon situation. Players will consciously decide to cooperate because the short-term benefits of defecting are outweighed by the retribution and punishment that may be inflicted at an indeterminate point in the future (Skaperdas et al 1996: 356). Although cooperation can be attained via external force, such as the use of fines or threats of violence, this is not necessary and does not elicit the type of willing and sustainable cooperation that we are examining (White 2003: 151). While the successful emergence of cooperation requires players to place

sufficient value upon their future returns, it also requires an *indeterminate length of interaction* (Heide and Miner 1992: 267). If the future holds sufficient value for players then the threat of future retaliation will hold considerable weight: but in order for this to occur, the length of the interaction must be such that the players do not know when it will end – an infinite horizon. Otherwise, if the length of play is known, endgame effects of defection will unravel cooperation to the extent that defection is the dominant strategy (Heide and Miner 1992: 267). The Bougainville case had a considerable shadow of the future. In being an infinite horizon scenario, due to the undefined timing of the independence referendum, current decisions held incredible weight for the overall peace process. The shadow of the future, with its threat of future retaliation, is sufficient to keep players in line so long as they are not informed of when the interaction will end ahead of time.

Theory of Cooperation

In a world without a central authority, what compels individuals to cooperate? This question has been posited by philosophers, economists, sociologists and political scientists. The human condition contains a natural tendency for selfishness and a desire to look after one's self before helping others. However, in spite of this, the entire foundation of human society is based upon cooperation and reciprocity. The question then becomes: in situations where individuals have incentive to be selfish, how is cooperation able to develop? Each individual will propose a different response to this question, which fundamentally conveys how we approach our social and political relations. Each differing response reflects our willingness to cooperate with others and, in turn, their willingness to cooperate with us (Axelrod 1984: 3). The Hobbesian analysis of the state of nature resulted in the assertion that society was dominated by selfish individuals who rendered life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (Axelrod 1984: 4). The corollary of this analysis is that, in the absence of central

authority, cooperation cannot develop. However the current global geopolitical system, while far from harmonious, demonstrates that it is perfectly possible for cooperation to emerge on many different levels, without enforcement from a central authority.

The concept of reciprocal cooperation is ubiquitous in daily life[8]. Instances of mutual advantage and cooperation are countless, yet why do some interactions result in cooperative, beneficial outcomes, while others yield defection or recrimination? The primary objective of Axelrod's research was to establish a theory of cooperation which could be used to ascertain the factors necessary for cooperation to emerge in a host of environments. If we are able to understand the conditions which allow cooperation to emerge, it will become possible to take the necessary actions to foster cooperation within a specific setting (Axelrod 1984: 6). The theory which emerged is based upon the analysis of individuals who seek to pursue their own personal self-interest, with no meta-authority to compel them to cooperate with one another[9].

Prisoner's Dilemma

The basic problem of cooperation is that the pursuit of self-interest by each party ultimately leads to a poorer outcome for all concerned (Axelrod 1984: 7). In an effort to better understand the mechanics of the situations which demonstrate this property, but to avoid becoming mired by scenario-specific details, Axelrod employed the Prisoner's Dilemma model. This model (detailed in Chapter 4) is a simple two-player, simultaneous

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[8] There are numerous examples of cooperation in daily interactions: how often should we invite our peers for dinner, if they never invite us in return? A news reporter who receives a leaked story gives positive coverage of the source, in the hope of being provided with further stories (Axelrod 1984: 4). The sheer volume of examples of cooperation highlights the importance and applicability of cooperation theory.

[9] "A good example of the fundamental problems of cooperation is the case where two industrial nations have erected trade barriers to each other's exports. Because of the mutual advantages of free trade, both countries would be better off if these barriers were eliminated. But if either country were to unilaterally eliminate its barriers, it would find itself facing terms of trade that hurts its own economy. In fact, whatever one country does, the other country is better off retaining its own trade barriers. Therefore the problem is that each country has an incentive to retain trade barriers, leading to a *worse* outcome than would have been possible had both countries cooperated with each other" (Axelrod 1984: 7).

move game. The game yields four potential outcomes: mutual cooperation; temptation to defect; suckers payoff; and punishment for mutual defection. The points awarded for each outcome are 3, 5, 0 and 1 point respectively (Axelrod 1984: 8). The elegance of the Prisoner's Dilemma lies in its simplicity. Player 1 supposes that their opponent will cooperate. They are then required to decide between cooperating (yielding 3 points) or defecting (yielding 5 points). In this scenario it pays to defect, in order to maximise their own payoff. However suppose they believe their opponent will defect. They now face a choice between cooperating (yielding 0 points) or defecting (yielding 1 point). Therefore it is better to defect if you believe your opponent will cooperate, and it is also better to defect if you believe your partner will defect. While in this scenario Player 1 is best to defect regardless, the identical logic holds true for Player 2. Both parties are led to defection as their best individual move (yielding 1 point) but sacrificing the 3 points that each would have gained had they both cooperated. Individual rationality results in a worse outcome for all than is possible, and therein lies the dilemma (Axelrod 1984: 9).

The simplicity of a theoretical Prisoner's Dilemma scenario adds to its analytical benefit, but it neglects a number of real-world factors which would complicate the analysis. In their theoretical interactions the players are not afforded the ability to communicate or make enforceable threats; there is no way to know what their opponent may do on a given move; there is no way to avoid interacting with the opponent and there is no way to change the opponent's payoffs (Axelrod 1984: 12). The analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma without these factors helps to elucidate some of the more subtle features of the interaction, which may otherwise be lost in the complexity surrounding the decision.

Conditions of Cooperation

Under the conditions specified by Axelrod, words which are not backed by actions are so cheap as to be meaningless (Axelrod 1984: 12). The possibility of cooperation developing is due to the fact that players may meet one another again. The potential of a repeated encounter with the same player means that decisions made today are not made in isolation, and may influence and determine later choices in the game. In this regard the future can "cast a shadow back upon the present", thereby affecting the current strategic situation (Axelrod 1984: 12). In general, however, the future tends to be less important for two reasons: first, players tend to value payoffs less as the time of their attainment recedes into the future. Secondly, there is always a chance that players will not meet again[10] (Axelrod 1984: 12).

The strategies employed by actors, in general, specify which action should be taken in any given situation, with the situation itself dependent upon the history of the game thus far (Axelrod 1984: 14). In terms of strategy it is tempting to believe that there is a single best strategy for any given situation: however the reality is that no best strategy exists independent of the strategy being utilised by the other player. Given the history of a game, a strategy may cooperate following some patterns of interaction and defect after others (Axelrod 1984: 14). In addition the interests of players are not in total conflict. In a game of chess, for example, the objective is to win: a win for the victor automatically means a loss for the opponent. Unlike this zero-sum configuration, in the Prisoner's Dilemma it is not safe to assume that the other player is explicitly out to get you: the best strategy to employ is directly related to the strategy being employed by the other player (Axelrod 1984: 15). It is also of particular importance whether the strategies being utilised leave room for the development of mutual

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[10] While in theory there remains a chance that players will not meet again in the future, this does not hold true for the Bougainville case.

cooperation. This is vital, as you are unlikely to cooperate with your opponent if you have little or no care for future consequences (Axelrod 1984: 15).

The study of cooperative strategies first requires an assessment of the structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma itself. The assessment specifically examined which features of reality the Prisoner's Dilemma framework can and cannot cover. Axelrod identified six key attributes mimetic of real-world scenarios:

1) The payoffs of players need not be at all comparable;
2) The payoffs do not have to be symmetric;
3) The payoffs are relative to one another and do not have to be measured on an absolute scale;
4) The cooperation need not be seen as desirable from the point of view of the rest of the world;
5) There is no need to assume that the players are rational, and may not be necessarily attempting to maximise their reward;
6) The actions of the players are not necessarily conscious choices.

(Axelrod 1984: 17-18)

The framework from which Axelrod derives his ultimate findings is sufficiently broad enough to encompass not only the interactions of individuals, but those of entire nations (Axelrod 1984: 18). The applicability of this model to international affairs provides a tool with which to explore the complex interactions and behaviour of nations: it is not always possible, or necessary, to assume that actions taken by a nation are rational, or in pursuit of a single goal. Rather, their actions are likely the result of an incredibly complex and convoluted system of information and political processes (Axelrod 1984: 18). This exemplifies the applicability of Axelrod's findings to the immensely complex and dynamic case of

Bougainville: the very complexity of reality makes the analysis of an abstract interaction incredibly beneficial in understanding the situation.

The term "evolution of cooperation" is used by Axelrod to label the organic way in which cooperation can manifest in a given environment. The evolution of cooperation borrows from a biological narrative: people are often involved in situations where effective strategies continue to develop and be used, while ineffective strategies are dropped in a survival of the fittest-style environment (Axelrod 1984: x). In order for evolution to succeed, actors require a sufficiently high likelihood of meeting again, so as to regard the future as equally important to, or more important than, the present (Axelrod 1984: 20). Assuming this statement is accurate, cooperation may evolve in three stages:

1) It is possible for cooperation to get started, even in a world of unconditional defection. It is not possible for cooperation to develop if it is attempted only by scattered individuals with virtually no chance to interact with one another. However, cooperation can successfully evolve from groups of individuals who base their cooperation on reciprocity, and who have even a small amount of interaction with one another.

2) A strategy which is based on reciprocity can evolve and thrive in a world where many varying strategies are being tried.

3) Once it is established on the basis of reciprocity, cooperation is able to protect itself from invasion by strategies which are less cooperative.

(Axelrod 1984: 21)

The Need for a New Approach

The Computer Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament (the Tournament) was a series of matches facilitated by Axelrod, in an effort to answer the question of cooperation. As has

already been established, players do not always hold strictly opposing interests; there are opportunities for mutual cooperation which will benefit both parties. However, in the majority of instances, the dominant strategy is to defect, which results in a poorer outcome for all concerned. The Tournament utilised the now well-known Prisoner's Dilemma framework. The Prisoner's Dilemma, given its ubiquity in international and personal affairs, made an ideal framework to analyse. The traits of the Prisoner's Dilemma, namely mutual gains, mutual losses and exploitation, added to its desirability as a test model (Axelrod 1984: viii; 27).

In previous psychological studies, the subjects revealed that in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, the level of cooperation attained and the means of achieving it were dependent upon a range of factors including the attributions of the individual players, the context of the game and the relationship between players (Axelrod 1984: 28). The Prisoner's Dilemma has a prominent history in the field of social psychology, but of equal importance is its applicability as a conceptual model of social processes. The research which existed prior to the Axelrod study was limited: it had relied upon experiments using subjects with no previous exposure to the game, and as such their appreciation and understanding of its strategic subtleties was limited. In addition, although the test subjects may have possessed ample experience of everyday Prisoner's Dilemma situations, they were naturally burdened by their limited capacity to call upon this experience. Furthermore, while the decisions of experienced elites have been studied in natural settings, the results are of limited applicability due to the relatively slow pace of many high-level and international interactions, and the extreme difficulty of controlling for changing circumstances in these environments (Axelrod 1984: 29). Lastly, studies of strategic interaction have typically incorporated variations of the

iterated Prisoner's Dilemma specifically designed to eliminate or overcome the dilemma itself by incorporating changes to the game structure (Axelrod 1984: 29).

Computer Tournaments

Given the severe limitations and subjectivity of the above aspects, a new methodology was needed to discern the means of choosing effectively in a Prisoner's Dilemma scenario. Any new approach would need to understand two specific facts about non-zero-sum game settings. Firstly, that which is effective is dependent not only upon the specific characteristics of a particular strategy, but also upon the nature and make-up of the other strategies with which it must interact. Secondly, any effective strategy must, at any time, be able to incorporate the history of the interactions of the game thus far in making its decisions (Axelrod 1984: 30). The Tournament invited submissions from professional game theorists. Each entrant wrote and submitted a program containing a rule to choose either the cooperative or non-cooperative choice on each move. Each program had access to the history of the game and was permitted to incorporate this history in making their choices (Axelrod 1984: 30). The Tournament was structured as a round robin, enabling each entry to be paired against every other entry, including its own twin, and against a program designed to cooperate or defect with equal probability. The payoffs for each move were the same as in the earlier example (3 points for mutual cooperation; 1 point for mutual defection; 5 points for defecting when your opponent cooperated; and 0 points for cooperating when your opponent defected).

A total of fourteen entries were submitted from a range of disciplines. The round robin was run five times to gain a better estimate of each score. In total there were 120,000

moves made, constituting 240,000 separate choices[11] (Axelrod 1984: 31). Of the entries submitted, the winner was a rule named *Tit For Tat* (TFT). TFT was the least complex rule competing in the tournament, and employed a very simple premise: TFT cooperates on the first move, and thereafter mimics whatever the opposing player did on the previous move (Axelrod 1984: 31). The TFT rule is known to elicit a substantial degree of cooperation between human subjects, and follows a system which is easily understood. Prior to the Axelrod tournament it was known that TFT was a strong competitor, having secured a first-place ranking and a second-place ranking in two previous tournaments. This was known to the participants of the Axelrod tournament, such that many entrants adopted the TFT principle and attempted to build up and improve upon it. Despite their attempts, none of the programs of greater complexity were able to perform as well as the original TFT design.

The subsequent analysis of the results revealed that neither the discipline of the program author, nor the length or brevity of the program itself, had bearing upon the relative success of each rule. It is necessary to delve deeper into the best-and-worst-faring rules to find the conditions which contribute to the success of a rule. In the Axelrod tournament, which consisted of 200 moves per game, a score of 600 points was deemed to be a "very good performance" and is indicative of the score attained by a player in which both sides always cooperated with one another. A score of 200 points is indicative of an encounter in which neither side ever cooperated. The TFT rule achieved an average of 504 points (Axelrod 1984: 33). The analysis of the decision rules found a single attribute distinguished the relatively high-scoring and low-scoring entries. This attribute has been termed *niceness*, or never being the first to defect[12]. The nice entries in the tournament achieved average scores

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[11] For a full account of the tournament, refer to Axelrod "The Evolution of Cooperation" 1994: 27 – 54.
[12] In Axelrod's original analysis, the definition of niceness was relaxed to include rules which will not be the first to defect *before the final few moves* (Axelrod 1984: 33).

between 472 and 504, while those rules which were not nice received, at maximum, 401 points. Of the top-ranking rules, all eight were nice while none of the other entries possessed this characteristic. It is a surprising conclusion that not being the first to defect was a characteristic which, by itself, distinguished the most successful rules from the least successful (Axelrod 1984: 33).

The subset of nice rules excelled in the tournament primarily because, in performing so well with the other nice rules, they were able to markedly increase one another's scores. However when such rules encountered an opposing rule which *did* utilise defection, each had very different response mechanisms. The differing responses played a key role in determining the overall success of each rule. In terms of strategic response, those rules which demonstrated *forgiveness* performed best. Forgiveness can be described as a rule's tendency to cooperate in the moves following an opponent's defection (Axelrod 1984: 36). TFT is categorised as a forgiving rule: it is unforgiving for the move immediately following an opponent's defection, but from thereon it is totally forgiving of that defection. The least forgiving rule, known as *Friedman*, was unyielding: in the face of even a single defection, *Friedman* retaliates with total defection for the rest of the game[13] (Axelrod 1984: 36).

In the tournament, even expert strategists did not give sufficient weight to the merits of forgiveness. A variation of TFT, known as *Tit For Two Tats* (TFTT)*,* was given to contestants as an exemplar program: unbeknownst to them, this rule would have won the tournament had it been submitted, which it was not. TFTT improves upon TFT by not punishing isolated defections: it is a more *forgiving* rule. The inability of experts to grasp the importance of forgiveness highlights the fallacy of expecting greater gains as a result of being

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[13] Forgiveness was a key factor in distinguishing between nice rules. TFT was the most forgiving nice rule and scored the highest. Friedman was the least forgiving nice rule, and scored lowest (Axelrod 1984: 36).

relatively less forgiving than TFT: in reality, there were substantial gains to be made from being even *more* forgiving (Axelrod 1984: 39).

The criticality of forgiveness is yet again demonstrated in the context of echo effects. An echo effect is the consequence of a decision reverberating throughout the entire game, and essentially making the outcome dependent upon that specific move. Fig. 5 shows the consequences of creating an echo. In this game TFT faced a rule known as *Joss,* a rule which always defects following a defection from its opponents, but also defects 10% of the time after its opponent *cooperates* (Axelrod 1984: 36). This minor, exploitative variation of TFT had a catastrophic effect on the overall game. Both rules cooperated until the sixth move, when Joss chose one of its probabilistic defections. TFT retaliated with a defection, and so on, thereby creating an echo back and forth between the players (Axelrod 1984: 37). However on the twenty-fifth move, Joss once again chose one of its probabilistic defections, to which TFT retaliated. The consequence of this new echo saw both players defect on every single move after the twenty-fifth: a single defection triggered a series of recriminations and counter-recriminations, rendering the 200-move game essentially decided at move six (Axelrod 1984: 37).

Fig. 5: Echo effect

Illustrative Game Between Tit for Tat and Joss

moves	1 - 20	11111	23232	32323	23232
moves	21 - 40	32324	44444	44444	44444
moves	41 - 60	44444	44444	44444	44444
moves	61 - 80	44444	44444	44444	44444
moves	81 - 100	44444	44444	44444	44444
moves	101 - 120	44444	44444	44444	44444
moves	121 - 140	44444	44444	44444	44444
moves	141 - 160	44444	44444	44444	44444
moves	161 - 180	44444	44444	44444	44444
moves	181 - 200	44444	44444	44444	44444

Legend: 1 Both cooperated
2 Tit For Tat only cooperated
3 Joss only cooperated
4 Neither cooperated

The analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma tournament yielded interesting results concerning how to function and cope in a situation of balanced power. However, as has already been noted, the efficacy of a given strategy is dependent not only upon its own characteristics, but upon the other strategies with which it interacts. Given this condition, the results of a single tournament are not conclusive, and a second round was held[14] (Axelrod 1984: 40). The tournament was held in much the same format as the first round, with the exception of the end-move. The second round had a 0.00346 probability of ending on any given move, as opposed to the finite and pre-set 200-move structure of the first round. This alteration served to eliminate end-game effects: since nobody knew when the last move

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[14] The second tournament attracted 62 entries from six countries. In total there were 3,969 ways in which the 63 rules were paired, and in contrast to the 120,000 moves in the first round, the second round resulted in over one million moves (Axelrod 1984: 43). The scale and robustness of the tournament enforces the validity of the tournament results.

would come there was no longer a strategic advantage to be gained by exploiting your opponent and defecting in the final few moves (Axelrod 1984: 43).

The concept of niceness was once again a property which distinguished winners and losers: over half the entries were nice, indicating that entrants had learned from the first round and evolved their strategies accordingly. Yet again, there was a significant correlation between niceness and how well a rule performed: of the top fifteen rules, fourteen were nice (Axelrod 1984: 44). In the second round the nice rules themselves were differentiated by how quickly and how reliably they *retaliated* to an opponent's defection. By immediately punishing the opponent for their defection, as TFT does, a rule demonstrates that it is not to be trifled with: were it to be lenient in punishing the defector, the defecting rule may take increasing advantage of the rules' relaxed nature (Axelrod 1984: 44).

In an effort to test the robustness of the TFT strategy, and ultimately the aspects which make it so successful, Axelrod constructed a series of hypothetical tournaments to test TFT in a variety of environments. The hypothetical tournaments were underpinned by an evolutionary narrative: unsuccessful strategies would be unlikely to be used, or to progress, to future tournaments. Axelrod analysed what would happen over a series of tournaments if the most successful rules became an increasingly large part of the environment, and the less successful rules became less so (Axelrod 1984: 48). In this simulation the better a strategy performs the greater its representation in the environment, and those rules which achieve the least, or have less desirable traits, begin to 'die off'. This process accurately simulates the survival of the fittest paradigm. In the simulation, by the fifth 'generation' the lowest ranked entries had fallen to half of their original size; the middle-ranking entries sustained their size; and the top entries increased. By the fiftieth generation those rules in the bottom third had all

but disappeared; much of the middle third had begun to decrease; and those rules at the top continued to increase. In this simulation TFT possesses the superior characteristics necessary to thrive in the hypothetical evolutionary scenario, and is the most prevalent rule at the conclusion of the simulation (Axelrod 1984: 51).

Tit For Tat Superior Attributes
Throughout the tournament series the TFT rule has shown itself to be superior to all its competitors, with its record of success being described as "very impressive" (Axelrod 1984: 53). The rigorous and robust testing environment solidifies the validity and reliability of Axelrod's findings, and although Axelrod noted that there is no best rule independent of the environment, TFT can be labelled a "very robust rule", based on its empirical successes: it performs well in a range of environments, and against a wide variety of opponents (Axelrod 1984: 53).

As a strategy TFT also benefits from its own *clarity*: it is a non-complex rule which, once encountered, is easily recognised and understood, and its non-exploitability is readily apparent. While exploitation can be intermittently beneficial, TFT sacrifices this capability: across myriad environments and interactions the dangers of exploitation are many, while there are far greater gains to be made in being non-exploitable and clear. None of the entries in the tournament succeeded in exploiting the exploitable without paying a high price with other, less exploitable rules (Axelrod 1984: 54).

The cooperative success of TFT can be condensed into four characteristics: niceness; retaliation; forgiveness; and clarity. "Its niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble, its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is tried,

its forgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation, and its clarity makes it intelligible to the other player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation" (Axelrod 1984: 54).

Methodology

Research Questions

The previous chapters have outlined the complexity of the Bougainville crisis and eventual ceasefire, and have presented the seminal work of Axelrod and the characteristics of successful cooperation. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the methodology used to answer the research questions of this thesis.

The ultimate goal of the parties involved in the Bougainville crisis, and the subsequent period of restoration, was to undertake action which would foster sustainable, long-term peace. Cooperation, as the foundation of sustainable peacebuilding, is integral to this process. The primary research question of this thesis is:

- *Are the characteristics necessary for the development of successful cooperation, as identified by Axelrod, present in post-crisis Bougainville, and if so, to what extent?*

In addition to this, as time progresses it is logical in ordinary circumstances to expect defection to manifest as the endpoint of interaction nears. However, given the state of infinite horizon on Bougainville during this time, and the considerable shadow of the future, it can be hypothesised that, as time progresses, we will see an increase in cooperative behaviour. Therefore the secondary research question of this thesis is:

- *As time progresses, do we see more cooperative behaviour being demonstrated between actors, or do they experience an increased incidence of defective, non-cooperative behaviour?*

Data Sample and Process of Collection

The primary research question concerns the presence of Axelrod's aspects of cooperation in the Bougainville context. However given the isolation of Bougainville there are few longitudinal sources of data capable of answering this question. The most reliable and comprehensive dataset available was the *Papua New Guinea Post-Courier* newspaper. The *Post-Courier* was accessed via physical copies and digital articles. The newspaper editions from 2001 to mid-2005 were available as full physical editions through the Macmillan Brown Library. The later editions were available on the EBSCOHost database: however the database only contained digital articles and not full editions of the newspaper. The initial data collection stage involved manually searching through approximately 1,500 newspaper editions for articles pertaining to the Bougainville conflict and peace process. In this stage of the data collection process all such articles were recorded, to ensure no material was overlooked. These articles were photocopied and stored in chronological order. The second stage involved searching the EBSCOHost database through a further 1,500 articles. The terms "Bougainville", "Bougainville conflict", "peace", "Bougainville peace", "peace process" and "Bougainville crisis" were entered into the search engine, for the period August 2005 to December 2010. The final count was 1,363 pages of articles sourced from more than 3,000 newspaper editions.

Qualitative Content Analysis

The method of analysis used in this thesis is qualitative content analysis (QCA). QCA is a method of systematically and objectively analysing and describing cases or situations

(Elo et al 2007: 108). QCA is a tool used to test established theories by distilling a potentially enormous dataset into a range of discrete categories (Elo et al 2007: 108). These categories, contained within a 'coding frame', represent a condensed dataset and are used to prove or disprove the central research questions. QCA is a method for generating valid and replicable findings from qualitative data (Elo et al 2007: 108). The strategy behind a coding frame can be generally described as being either inductive or deductive. An inductive coding frame is driven by the *data*, with the categories of coding being derived from the data itself. A deductive frame, is used for testing existing theories. In a deductive frame, the categories of coding are built based on existing knowledge, and are targeted specifically to the theory being tested. This research has utilised a combination of both inductive and deductive strategies to create the coding frame.

Variables and Sub-variables

The coding frame is structured in terms of main categories (variables) and sub-categories (sub-variables) (Schreier 2012: 58-61). The coding frame, as a means of differentiating between the material and different meanings within the material, requires accurate and clear variables. The main categories are defined as "the aspects about which you would like to know more" (Schreier 2012: 59): that is, they are the central, high-level variables which we are seeking to identify within the data. The main categories of this frame were generated using a deductive strategy, and were derived from Axelrod's theory of cooperation outlined in Chapter 3. The main categories in the coding frame are: *Niceness, Forgiveness, Retaliation* and *Clarity.* In addition to these main categories, there are two categories designed to capture the data necessary to answer the secondary research question. These categories are *Demonstrates Cooperative Behaviour* and *Demonstrates Uncooperative*

Behaviour. These two categories are essentially frequency counts of the four primary categories, capturing the cooperative and uncooperative behaviour chronologically.

Within each main category are sets of sub-categories, designed to reduce the vast quantity of data into condensed, discrete subsets to provide meaningful analysis and summation. The sub-categories of the coding frame essentially represent what is *said* in the data about the main categories (Schreier 2012: 61). The sub-categories in this research were generated using a combined deductive and inductive approach. This was necessary to produce an exhaustive range of sub-categories, because while certain sub-categories were obvious from the outset, other sub-categories became apparent as the analysis process was conducted. The full range of sub-categories are listed in the finalised coding frame (Appendix 2).

Structural Requirements for Coding Frames

Coding frames vary in complexity depending upon the number of main categories and sub-categories required. As such the complexity of a coding frame largely depends on the research question, which will in turn influence the number of categories that are required to answer it. The complexity of a coding frame can range from simple (one main category and a group of sub-categories) to high (several main categories and multiple levels of sub-categories) (Schreier 2012: 63; Bryman 2001: 186). The coding frame used in this research is of medium complexity: a range of six main categories supplemented with a series of sub-categories.

In QCA a coding frame must satisfy a range of criteria to ensure its reliability and validity. These criteria are: unidimensionality; mutual exclusiveness; exhaustiveness; and saturation (Scherier 2012: 75-78).

i. *Unidimensionality*: each dimension of a coding frame should consist of only a single dimension. That is, each dimension contained within a frame should capture only *one* part of the material, to avoid duplicating or mixing data.

ii. *Mutual exclusiveness*: sub-categories within a coding frame must mutually exclude one another. Within a given main category, a unit of coding must only be able to be assigned to a single sub-category.

iii. *Exhaustiveness*: a coding frame is exhaustive if every unit of coding is able to be assigned to a sub-category within the coding frame. The exhaustiveness requirement is critical for ensuring a robust coding frame: for the frame to be robust *every* unit of data must be considered, and ensuring that all units are placed within a sub-category achieves this. For this reason a "miscellaneous" category is often added to coding frames, to capture irrelevant or residual material.

iv. *Saturation*: the saturation requirement states that coding fames must be constructed so that the coding frequency for each category equals 1 or higher: that is, each category and sub-category must be used at least once.

The construction of the coding frame itself follows an established process. The first stage in this process is the selection of the data. The selection stage is pivotal as it determines

which material is relevant and which is irrelevant (Schreier 2012: 81; Bryman 2001: 182). The selection strategy used in this research was to breakdown the data by topic, which is a useful approach if the data consists of long documents from a narrow range of sources. To undertake this process a secondary coding frame was developed, which contained only two categories: *Relevant Material* and *Irrelevant Material*. This initial coding process reduced the more than 1300 pages of data to a set of relevant documents only. The dataset was examined thoroughly for relevant and irrelevant material, and sorted manually. At the completion of this process the *Relevant Material* category contained 779 pages of articles, and the *Irrelevant Material* category contained 584 pages of articles. The relevant material was retained in chronological order, with each article numbered accordingly.

The second step in the process is to determine the structure of the frame and to generate the categories. As previously noted, the main categories in this coding structure were generated using a deductive strategy and making use of the existing theory to create the categories. Once the structure has been established and the categories have been identified, the final stage is to establish specifically what each category means. The definitions of each category represent the rules for assigning data to those categories. If the rules of coding are not explicit, it will be more difficult to accurately allocate data to each category (Bryman 2001: 186). Furthermore this will severely reduce the replicability of the research.

In defining a category it is necessary to assign a name, a description and an example to each category. The category names provide a label of what each category contains. Category names must not be onerously long, and will most likely be established during the generation stage of the coding frame. The description of each category describes the features

of that category. This is a description of the units of data which belong, and do not belong, in each category (Schreier 2012: 96). Once again, these descriptions need to be sufficiently clear for the research to be repeated. An additional method of defining the categories is to allocate examples to each category. An example of a unit of coding will help to overcome any unclear or abstract aspects of the description. These examples are generally taken directly from the data used to create the coding frame. When combined, names descriptions and examples create a thorough and reliable method of allocating units of data within the coding frame.

Segmentation

Segmentation is the process of dividing data into smaller, more manageable units for coding. Segmentation serves three critical functions: first, it ensures that you have taken into account all of your data, by requiring that all units are placed within a dimension of the coding frame. Second, it ensures a clear research focus; and third, it allows for comparison of the coding either across points in time or between two different coders, thereby ensuring reliability (Schreier 2012 126-133; Bryman 2001: 186). Segmentation consists of three main types of units. The first are units of analysis: these are synonymous with units of sampling, and refer to the units which you are using for your research: in this research, newspaper articles are the unit of analysis. Units of analysis are comprised of units of coding: these are the smaller blocks that make up the units of analysis, and are what you seek to interpret against your coding categories. Lastly, there are context units: in segmentation, as you are essentially dissecting your data, it is important to retain a measure of context around the units of coding. Context units are a portion of the surrounding information, which enable you to maintain the wider context from which the segment of data was sourced.

In undertaking the segmentation process, it is necessary to choose criteria in order to determine where one unit ends and another begins. This research uses a formal criteria. Formal criteria make use of the inherent structure within the data (words, sentences and paragraphs) to determine the size of each unit (Schreier 2012: 134). Each newspaper article is able to be broken down and coded based on the formal criteria, and allocated to a dimension of the coding frame. Once the criteria for segmentation has been established, the next step is to proceed with applying the criteria and segmenting the data. It is imperative to clearly identify the beginning and end of all units. It is also essential to number all units of coding consecutively, to that the data can be tracked and referenced. The segmentation process for this research applied a formal criterion to 779 pages of newspaper articles, resulting in 1,028 units of coding. The data was coded and assigned to the coding frame in two phases, across a six month period. The dual coding process resulted in a coefficient of agreement of 97%.

Chapter 4: Analysis

As has been outlined in Chapter 2, Bougainville as a region has experienced considerable upheaval in recent decades. The violent bloodshed formally came to an end with the 2001 signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, and later the enacting of the Bougainville constitution. The subsequent years have been occupied predominantly by actions intended to establish Bougainville as a successful, autonomous region, prior to a vote for independence expected to take place between 2015 and 2020. In Chapter 3, we saw a detailed outline of the work undertaken in cooperation theory by Axelrod, which is ultimately condensed into the four characteristics of cooperation shared by successful cooperative strategies. Chapter 3 also covered selected important design aspects of the Bougainville crisis. As it is an infinite horizon situation with a considerable shadow of the future, the uncertainty of future interactions would likely cause the Bougainville and Papua New Guinean parties to be more considerate in their conduct, and not allow short-term gains of defection to outweigh the potential for either cooperation, or on-going recriminations.

The actors studied in this research have been broadly grouped into two categories: "Papua New Guinea" and "Bougainville". These two categories refer primarily to the Papua New Guinea NEC and the interim and later autonomous government of Bougainville, as these were the parties most likely to have engaged in the peace process. However given the nature of the Bougainville conflict, additional parties are also contained in these two categories, primarily on the Bougainville side. The Bougainville category includes the Bougainville People's Congress, the Autonomous Bougainville Government, the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, the Bougainville Resistance Force, Me'ekamui, as well as other individuals and minor groups who have engaged in the peace process. This categorisation is primarily relevant to Codes 1.1 and 1.2, which explicitly address defections between or

within these two actors. At its highest level the coding frame takes into account all interaction between all parties in furthering the goal of a peaceful Bougainville, and includes parties not explicitly classified as Papua New Guinea or Bougainville (for example, the UNOMB).

Primary Research Question

The primary research question of this thesis is:

- *Are the characteristics necessary for the development of successful cooperation, as identified by Axelrod, present in post-war Bougainville, and, if so, to what extent?*

It is important to note that this research is designed to identify specific instances of Axelrod's characteristics of cooperation, and the overall trend of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour: it has not sought to identify direct causal relationships between these instances.

Niceness

Niceness, in general, is the characteristic of not being the first to defect. The coding frame encompassed this trait (Codes 1.1 – 1.3), but it was expanded to include "olive branches" or an obvious intent to cooperate, as well as unclear defections (Table 1).

Niceness had the highest coding frequency of all four characteristics, with 538 data points (45% of the total coding frame). The detailed breakdown of these codes is:

- 'Papua New Guinea the first to defect': n=35 (7% of the niceness codes);
- 'Bougainville the first to defect': n=99 (18% of the niceness codes);

- 'No defection, cooperated on an issue': n=197 (37% of niceness codes);

- 'Olive branch/commitment to cooperate': n=168 (31% of niceness codes);

- 'Unclear defection or criticism against opposing actor: n=39 (7% of niceness codes).

Of the total number of *niceness* data points (n=538) 68% refer to instances of cooperative behaviour, while 32% refer to non-cooperative behaviours.

Table 1: Niceness coding

Code:	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
1.1: Papua New Guinea first to defect	6	8	5	4	0	1	2	1	3	5
1.2: Bougainville first to defect	14	20	4	5	13	15	6	11	5	6
1.3: No defection from either actor	40	28	33	33	25	12	4	4	10	8
1.4: Olive branch / commitment to cooperate	16	14	14	15	15	20	18	18	16	22
1.5: Unclear defection	1	1	0	0	3	17	1	5	2	3

Forgiveness

Forgiveness (Table 2) is the characteristic of being willing to forgive an isolated defection. Actors who display forgiveness, while forsaking short-term gain, tend to perform better as their willingness to let bygones be bygones can foster ongoing cooperation, as opposed to on-going recriminations.

Forgiveness had a coding frequency of n=67 (6% of the total coding frame). In Axelrod's original work forgiveness was identified in the "moves after another player has defected" (Axelrod 1984: 36). As such the coding frame considered both immediate forgiveness (Code 2.1) and forgiveness demonstrated before another move was made between actors (Code 2.2), typically within the following seven days. Immediate forgiveness accounted for 87% of the forgiveness codes, while delayed forgiveness accounted for 13%.

Table 2: Forgiveness coding frequency

Code:	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
2.1: Immediate forgiveness	9	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	7	6
2.2: Delayed forgiveness	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0

Retaliation

Retaliation (Table 3) is the tendency of an actor to defect immediately following a defection from an opposing actor. Retaliatory strategies run the risk of mutual recriminations, however the can also be an effective means of deterring an actor who may try to test how much defection they can get away with, as retaliatory rules cannot be easily taken advantage of.

Retaliation had a coding frequency of n=55 (5% of the total coding frame). Axelrod defined retaliation as occurring *immediately* following a defection, however in a similar manner to forgiveness, retaliation was captured whether it occurred immediately following a

defection (Code 3.1) or in the following days (Code 3.2). Retaliation that was delivered immediately accounted for 93% of the retaliation codes, while delayed retaliation accounted for 7%.

Table 3: Retaliation coding frequency

Code:	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
3.1 Immediate retaliation	0	4	2	4	6	0	0	4	3	2
2.2: Delayed retaliation	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0

Clarity

Clarity (Table 4) refers to an actor who operates in a consistent manner during the course of an interaction, or an actor who acts in accordance with prior statements or conduct. If actors behave in a clear manner, each party knows what they can likely expect prior to entering negotiations: this enhances the likelihood of cooperation manifesting by reducing underhanded or duplicitous conduct.

Clarity was the second-most frequent code, with a coding frequency of n=402 (33% of the total coding frame). The detailed breakdown of these codes is:

- 'Actor acted in a manner consistent with prior conduct': n=115 (29% of total clarity codes);

- 'Opponent comments on an actor behaving in an unclear/misleading manner': n=2 (0.5% of clarity codes);

- 'Actor unable to discern approach of opponent prior to taking action': n=1 (0.2% of clarity codes);

- 'Actor clearly outlines view on an issue/intended conduct moving forward': n=284
(71% of clarity codes).

Of the total set of clarity data points, an overwhelming 99.3% relate to clear, discernible conduct, with only 0.7% relating to unclear behaviour.

Table 4: Clarity coding frequency

Code:	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
4.1: Acted in a manner consistent with previous conduct	24	20	17	12	10	14	8	4	3	3
4.2: Opponent comments on actor behaving in an unclear manner	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0
4.3: Opponent unable to discern opponent's behaviour prior to acting	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4.4: Actor clearly outlines their intended future conduct	43	45	34	19	27	21	15	22	20	38

Discussion

The Axelrod characteristics are present to a significant extent within the data. As shown in Table 5, 1,028 examples of the characteristics of cooperation occurred across the decade of data, with an average of 1.40 instances per article.

Table 5: Frequency count

Year	Article count	Cooperation characteristics count
2001	76	159
2002	108	143
2003	72	109
2004	69	98
2005	106	103
2006	87	101
2007	47	55
2008	57	71
2009	47	96
2010	61	93
TOTAL	715	1,028

The presence of the characteristics necessary for successful cooperation is reflected in the considerable progress made towards peace during this time, further enforced by the overwhelming presence of positive *Niceness* and *Clarity* characteristics. During the ten-year period covered in this research, Bougainville achieved a number of milestones. The year 2001 recorded the highest incidence of "cooperation – no defection" coding, which may correlate with the successful signing of the BPA during that year[15]. The signing of the BPA was a "significant event" and signified a "lasting end to violence and hostilities, and the dawning of a new era that will see [Bougainvilleans] run their own affairs"[16].

The monumental signing of the BPA facilitated further important steps in establishing peace on Bougainville, most notably the creation of the Bougainville Constitution, the coordinated disposal of weapons, and the election of the first Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG). The Bougainville Constitution commenced development with

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[15] "*Unanimous support from House for B'ville*" , Author Unknown, (24/01/2002), p.1, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (078)

[16] "*Sir Mekere's pledge to work for fruits of deal*", Oseah Philemon, (31/08/2001), p.2 Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (056)
"*Key to deal with House*", Oseah Philemon, (31/08/2001), p.5, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (054)

"unanimous support"[17] from the NEC in 2002, and was officially presented to the NEC by the Governor of Bougainville in 2004. The Constitution paved the way for the election of the inaugural ABG, with former premier Joseph Kabui elected as President in June 2005[18]. The third pillar of the BPA, the disposal of weapons, also made substantial progress during this decade. Several thousand weapons were surrendered to the UNOMB during this time, primarily in the early stages of the process[19].

While the decade 2001 – 2010 saw a number of ground-breaking milestones, there were also numerous instances of defection, or uncooperative behaviours. These defections occurred across a range of areas and contexts. These ranged from procedural and legislative defections involving the respective political parties[20], to more serious matters involving weapons offences. The disposal of weapons on Bougainville, as a pillar of the BPA, was the paramount concern for the leaders of both Bougainville and the Papua New Guinea NEC. The continued use of weapons on Bougainville, in armed robberies[21] or stockpiled by groups of criminals[22], cast a great deal of doubt on the ability of Bougainville to self-govern[23].

There were further examples of defection and uncooperative behaviour demonstrated between the Bougainville parties, primarily concerning Francis Ona. The self-proclaimed "king" of Me'ekamui frequently changed his attitude towards the peace process, from

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[17] "*Unanimous support from House for B'ville*" , Author Unknown, (24/01/2002), p.1, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (078)

[18] "*President Kabui!*", Gorethy Kenneth, (6/06/2005), p.1, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (350)

[19] "*Panguna wants peace*", Eric Tapakau, (18/06/2003), p.7, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (195)

[20] "*B'ville leaders angry*", Oseah Philemon, (23/10/2003), p.3, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (221)

[21] "*Peace threat: Major robbery smashes Siwai no weapons claim*", Gorethy Kenneth, (30/03/2004), p.1, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (260)

[22] "*ABG members irked by guns*", Author Unknown, (19/03/2007), p.5, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (504)

[23] "*B'ville trade of guns for drugs a worry*", Author Unknown, (14/01/2009), p.6, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (597)

offering his support[24], to demanding that foreign parties leave Bougainville[25]. Members of Ona's Me'ekamui faction also established militarised roadblocks to secure his "No-Go-Zone" near Arawa[26]. As evidenced in this analysis, while there were a number of instances of defective, uncooperative behaviour, the overwhelming majority of data points represented cooperative behaviours.

Secondary research question

The secondary research question of this thesis is:

- *As time progresses, do we see more cooperative behaviour being demonstrated between actors on Bougainville, or do they experience an increased incidence of defective, non-cooperative behaviour?*

During the decade covered in this study, Bougainville experienced a state of infinite horizon. The duration of the "game" was unknown, as the endpoint (the deferred independence referendum) had not been given a specific date. As such, no move is necessarily the final move, and the consideration given to the effects of a current move on future interactions can lead to more cooperative behaviour than may be expected in a finite scenario (Myerson 1991: 308). This uncertainty, the shadow of the future, can foster stable cooperation if it is sufficiently large: that is, the importance of the next interaction between the same players must be great enough so as to render defection an untenable, or unprofitable,

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[24] *"Ona backs peace"*, Gorethy Kenneth, (21/01/2003), p.6, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (171)

[25] *"Aussies Out: Reclusive Ona tells AAP: Not welcome in B'ville"*, Gorethy Kenneth, (23/03/2005), p.1, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (315)

[26] *"Boxes flown into avoid roadblocks"*, Author Unknown, (23/05/2005), p.5, Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (343a)

decision (Axelrod 1984: In being framed by these parameters, Bougainville is an ideal setting for cooperation to evolve and develop. There is no doubt that the parties in question will continue to interact, as they have no alternative. They also know that it will be a decade or more before any determination is made in the timing of the independence referendum. Given the very fertile grounds that Bougainville provides for cooperation, the question becomes whether defective behaviour manifested as time progressed, or whether cooperation was able to gain a foothold.

In the ten years from 2001 to 2010, there were 851 instances of cooperative behaviour and 177 instances of non-cooperative behaviour identified in the dataset. As discussed in the primary research question, the number of instances of cooperative behaviour versus non-cooperative behaviour is likely reflective of the level of progress made in achieving a lasting peace through cooperation. In the case of the secondary research question, both cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour, ostensibly, decreased in prevalence as the decade drew on (Table 6 and Table 7). A closer analysis shows this decrease is due to a lower number of units of analysis from 2007 onwards. By comparing the number of units of analysis with the number of identified instances of cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour, as a ratio, we get a more accurate representation of the findings.

Table 6: Cooperative behaviour

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Instances of cooperative behaviour	138	113	100	83	86	67	46	53	86	79
Units of analysis	72	98	65	62	105	89	48	61	48	63
Instances per unit	1.9	1.15	1.5	1.3	0.8	0.75	0.95	0.9	1.8	1.25

Table 7: Non-cooperative behaviour

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Instances of non-cooperative behaviour	21	30	9	15	17	34	9	18	10	14
Units of analysis	72	98	65	62	105	89	48	61	48	63
Instances per unit	0.3	0.3	0.14	0.24	0.16	0.38	0.19	0.3	0.21	0.22

In the early years of the decade (2001 – 2004) there were a series of triumphant

accomplishments, with the signing of the BPA and the Bougainville constitution. The

enormous effort required to achieve these monumental successes is reflected in the data: the

high level of cooperative behaviour and the low level of non-cooperative behaviour

demonstrated during this time is readily observable. Following this, in 2005 the successful

election of the first Autonomous Bougainville Government, though not without issue, marked

a major milestone for the people of Bougainville. However, following the euphoria of these

accomplishments, Bougainville moved into a new operating environment. Following the

enacting of the BPA, the people of Bougainville faced an incredible number of challenges on

the road to securing sustainable peace: the necessity to cooperate in in the lead-up to the

aforementioned autonomous elections, to cooperate in implementing and executing a

weapons disposal framework, as well as the day-to-day challenges of unifying ex-combatants with one another and the civilian population as a whole. The data reveals the high level of cooperation which took place during this time, interspersed with non-cooperative behaviour: however for every example of non-cooperative behaviour, there were four instances of cooperation. The analysis has shown no evidence of an increase in non-cooperative behaviour as time progressed.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This thesis has provided insight into the capability of previously-warring actors to cooperate with the aim of securing a mutually beneficial outcome. Cooperation represents a core element of successful, sustainable peacebuilding. In order for peace to be achieved, parties who have been in conflict must first demonstrate a willingness to come together and work to resolve the causes of their conflict. The Bougainville crisis was a complex, multifaceted conflict with roots in economic, ethnic and political tensions. While the genesis of the war was the behaviour of the Panguna mining operation, the pre-existing divisions catalysed the crisis and led to region-wide devastation.

The overwhelming presence of Axelrod's characteristics of cooperation, *Niceness, Forgiveness, Retaliation* and *Clarity*, provides the foundation for a broader method of conflict resolution. That is, if we can quantify the specific characteristics required to foster cooperation, these can be developed and nurtured in other instances of peacebuilding to achieve desirable, mutually beneficial outcomes. Of the four characteristics of successful cooperation, *Niceness* and *Clarity* represented the majority of occurrences in the data, at 78%. *Niceness*, not being the first to defect, and *Clarity*, conducting yourself in a clear and consistent manner, proved to be highly beneficial and highly successful during the initial decade of the Bougainville peace process. If these conditions can be emulated elsewhere, it may prove valuable to the development of sustainable peacebuilding in other spheres of war and crisis.

There was no evidence present in this study to show that as time progressed, defective behaviour increased in frequency. Unlike in the case of finite games, the Bougainville crisis took place within an infinite horizon setting. This meant that every future move could potentially be the last, therefore every current move carries considerable weight and uncertainty. This uncertainty, if powerful enough, can overcome the temptation to defect for short-term gain. The data showed that, in the vast majority of instances, this temptation to defect was overcome and cooperation slowly emerged and successfully began to evolve.

There are certain limitations to this research. The focus of this study is limited to the first decade following the signing of the Bougainville Peace Agreement. This discrete timeframe was imposed on the research for practical reasons of managing the volume of data involved. It was determined that a ten-year scope of reference would provide sufficient data for analysis, with more than 3,000 editions of the Papua New Guinea *Post-Courier* issued during that time. In being reliant entirely upon qualitative data sourced from newspapers, there is also the possibility that interactions, conflicts or defections were either not reported or overlooked by reporters. However, in the ten years covered, the volume of articles and the number of occurrences of the characteristics of cooperation would not indicate a deficit in reliable, comprehensive data.

This research has served to illustrate the real-world applicability of Robert Axelrod's theory of cooperation, on the case of the Bougainville crisis. During the course of this study Bougainville and Papua New Guinea made immense progress towards sustainable peace, enabled by the successful and measurable development of cooperation. The presence of Axelrod's characteristics of cooperation correlates with the achievements made towards

lasting peace for the people of Bougainville. If these conditions are reproduced, in other

regions of conflict and crisis, they may serve to generate genuine and sustainable peace.

Appendices

Appendix 1: List of Papua New Guinea Post-Courier newspaper articles

Article no.	_Title_	_Author_	_Date of publication_	_Page no._	_Publication_
001	Minister visits B'ville	Author Unknown	5/01/2001	_4_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
002	B'ville talks take on positive step	Author Unknown	8/01/2001	_2_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
003	Talks on B'ville must continue	Author Unknown	8/01/2001	_10_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
004	A B'ville mother's plea for peace	Peter Kili	16/01/2001	_5_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
005	B'ville leaders hope for breakthrough in Kokopo meeting	Peter Kili	23/01/2001	_5_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
006	Breakthrough on B'ville referendum	Author Unknown	29/01/2001	_1_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
007	B'ville to decide own future in next decade	Donald Otto	29/01/2001	_2_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
008	Kabui calls BRA leaders to discuss weapons disposal	Peter Kili	31/01/2001	_6_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
009	Sticky' points keep peace talks in limbo - Momis	Author Unknown	1/02/2001	_3_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
010	Skate: let's go regional	Author Unknown	1/02/2001	_3_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
011	NEC approves referendum plan	Author Unknown	2/02/2001	_4_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
012	B'ville talks go well	Author Unknown	21/02/2001	_4_	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
013a	Bougainville peace-building tops	Author	28/02/2001	_5_	Papua New

	agenda	Unknown			Guinea Post-Courier
013b	Weapons hinder vote: MP	Author Unknown	28/02/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
014	BRA reaffirms support for weapons disposal	Peter Kili	2/03/2001	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
015a	B'ville fears suspension	Author Unknown	6/03/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
015b	Deal on arms disposal	Author Unknown	6/03/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
016	Peace talks re-start in capital city	Author Unknown	9/03/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
017	Chew it over together for the sake of our future	Anthony Siaguru	9/03/2001	*11*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
018	Dialogue on weapons disposal must continue until an agreed and practical plan is produced: PM	Mekere Morauta	13/03/2001	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
019	Ona asks for help	Peter Kili	20/03/2001		Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
020	Ona call for help raises hopes	Author Unknown	21/03/2001	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
021	B'ville talks to be moved to island outside city	Author Unknown	28/03/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
022	B'ville to get one-off grant for new govt	Peter Niesi	4/04/2001	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
024	Minister upbeat on autonomy package	Peter Niesi	9/04/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
025	Ona to take Rio Tinto to court	Author Unknown	11/04/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
026	BRA, Resistance sign arms plan	Author Unknown	7/05/2001	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
027	B'ville weapons disposal	Peter Niesi	7/05/2001	*3*	Papua New

					Guinea Post-Courier
028	Peace committee gives nod for weapons removal plan	Peter Kili	10/05/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
029	B'ville leaders rally behind Minister Avei	Author Unknown	11/05/2001	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
030	Arms disposal plan	Author Unknown	14/05/2001	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
032	Haku people make peace on Buka island	Peter Kili	15/05/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
033	Autonomy talks set	Peter Niesi	22/05/2001	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
034	Key Ona adviser arrives for talks	Oseah Philemon	24/05/2001	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
035	Key adviser arrives	Oseah Philemon	24/05/2001	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
036	B'ville talks focus on defence issue	Peter Niesi	28/05/2001	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
037	Self-rule hopes up	Peter Niesi	29/05/2001	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
038	Deal for autonomy in Bougainville close	Author Unknown	29/05/2001	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
039	B'ville pact for signing	Peter Niesi	1/06/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
040	B'ville not on agenda	Author Unknown	14/06/2001	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
041	Ona gains support	Peter Kili	21/06/2001	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
042	No riot squad for B'ville	Peter Niesi	26/06/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
044	B'ville assembly accepts treaty	Author	6/07/2001	*5*	Papua New

		Unknown			Guinea Post-Courier
045	Cabinet queries minor details	Author Unknown	10/07/2001	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
046	Bougainville: the facts	Author Unknown	13/07/2001	*16*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
047	Kabui sure of autonomy pact signing	Author Unknown	16/07/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
048	Avei off to Buka to finalise settlement pact	Author Unknown	17/07/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
049	Stand-off over renewed talks	Peter Kili	18/07/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
050	Officials to start drafting agreement for autonomy	Author Unknown	19/07/2001	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
051	Bougainville arms plan hits a snag	Peter Kili	26/07/2001	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
052	House debate on autonomy	Author Unknown	29/08/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
053	Make autonomy work, says Avei	Ruth Waram	30/08/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
054	Key to deal with House	Oseah Philemon	31/08/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
055	Marching to autonomy	Author Unknown	31/08/2001	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
056	Sir Mekere's pledge to work for fruits of deal	Oseah Philemon	31/08/2001	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
058	Money goals for autonomy	Ruth Waram	31/08/2001	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
061	Historic signing	Oseah Philemon	31/08/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
062	Avei urges united push	Author	4/09/2001	*5*	Papua New

		Unknown			Guinea Post-Courier
063	Somare expresses doubts on vote	Author Unknown	5/09/2001	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
064	Bougainville peace gives special meaning to anniversary	Moi Avei	13/09/2001	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
065	Slowness irks B'ville leader	Peter Niesi	14/09/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
066	B'ville agreement on track	Author Unknown	26/09/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
067	Disposal kick-started	Peter Niesi	7/12/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
068	Avei ready to lobby for support	Peter Niesi	10/12/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
069	B'ville MPs call for help with Bills	Author Unknown	14/12/2001	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
070	Arms disposal firm	Author Unknown	20/12/2001	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
071	Force to withdraw from Bougainville	Robyn Sela	31/12/2001	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
072a	Program to restart	Author Unknown	7/01/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
072b	B'ville 3yr strategic plan ready	Author Unknown	7/01/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
073	Weapons disposal gets promoted	Author Unknown	11/01/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
074	Ex-combatants agree to weapons disposal	Author Unknown	15/01/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
075	B'ville govt vote to face the test	Peter Niesi	16/01/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
076	Amnesty for B'ville goes before	Robyn Sela	17/01/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea

	court				Guinea Post-Courier
077	B'ville vote delay was tactical	Author Unknown	23/01/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
078	Unanimous support from House for B'ville	Author Unknown	24/01/2002	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
079	B'ville gets vote	Author Unknown	24/01/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
080	Bougainville leaders happy	Author Unknown	25/01/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
081	Peace on Bougainville	Anthony Siaguru	25/01/2002	*11*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
082	PNG soldiers recalled, 'evacuated' from Bougainville	Author Unknown	1/02/2002	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
083	No more delays in B'ville aid project - EU	Author Unknown	1/02/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
084	Warning on autonomy	Susuve Laumaea	1/02/2002	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
085	No decision to withdraw army	Author Unknown	4/02/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
086	Troops to stay says Sir Moi	Author Unknown	5/02/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
087	Schools - true road to Bougainville peace	Gorethy Kenneth	7/02/2002	*11*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
088	UN budgets for arms disposal	Author Unknown	8/02/2002	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
089a	B'ville will not break away, says Governor	Wesley Bunpalau	14/02/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
089b	Momis: Give us funds	Author Unknown	14/02/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
090	Ona slotted in 'big plan'	Peter Kili	15/02/2002	*3*	Papua New

					Guinea Post-Courier
091	Concerns at rate of weapons disposal	Peter Niesi	15/02/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
092	Onus on B'ville people: Sir Moi	Author Unknown	22/02/2002	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
093	More guns in	Author Unknown	6/03/2002	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
094	More weapons locked away	Peter Niesi	6/03/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
095	B'ville, Solomons hold talks to end violence	Author Unknown	8/03/2002	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
096	PNGDF reduces troops in Buka	Peter Niesi	12/03/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
097	Bana leads disposal	Peter Niesi	13/03/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
098	Peace agreement a right move	Author Unknown	15/02/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
099	Sir Moi seeks support for Bougainville vote	Author Unknown	20/03/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
100	Parliament to vote for B'ville Bill	Author Unknown	25/03/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
101	US court rejects B'ville lawsuit	Author Unknown	26/03/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
102	Strong lobby for B'ville bills	Author Unknown	26/03/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
103	Weapons disposal on Bougainville: trading guns for peace	Noel Sinclair	26/03/2002	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
104	Government to vote for bills, Bougainvilleans challenged to keep working at weapons disposal	Author Unknown	26/03/2002	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
105	Bills on B'ville passed	Peter Niesi	28/03/2004	*1*	Papua New

					Guinea Post-Courier
106	House ends term with B'ville peace	Author Unknown	28/03/2002	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
107	955 weapons contained in B'ville	Author Unknown	5/04/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
108	Triple joy for B'ville people	Author Unknown	5/04/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
109	More guns surrendered after B'ville law passed	Author Unknown	8/04/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
110	No chance' of BCL re-opening mine	Ruth Waram	11/04/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
111	Peace seekers in B'ville race	Author Unknown	15/04/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
112	Kabui told: 'stop patronising'	Author Unknown	17/04/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
113	B'ville weapons disposal encouragement	Author Unknown	16/04/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
114	Resistance force VIPs out of official vehicles	Gorethy Kenneth	19/04/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
115	Bougainville 'mistake'	Author Unknown	22/03/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
116a	Weapons disposal boosted	Author Unknown	14/05/2002	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
116b	Leaders visit capital for talks	Gorethy Kenneth	14/05/2002	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
117	BRA assures peaceful elections	Gorethy Kenneth	4/06/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
118	B'ville polls face renewed threat	Author Unknown	6/06/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
119a	Slow arms disposal irks peace-	Author	11/06/2002	*2*	Papua New

	maker	Unknown			Guinea Post-Courier
119b	Pay claim hits B'ville voting	Gorethy Kenneth	11/06/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
120	Buka poll still in doubt	Author Unknown	12/06/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
121a	Poll disruption threat 'lifted' in Bougainville	Gorethy Kenneth	13/06/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
121b	No go zone' extended	Author Unknown	13/06/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
122	B'ville peace body agrees on new aims	Author Unknown	14/06/2002	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
123	Bougainville polling hit by delay	Noel Sinclair	17/06/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
124	Bougainville poll peaceful	Gorethy Kenneth	19/06/2002	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
125	Peace monitor chief to leave Bougainville	Gorethy Kenneth	19/06/2002	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
126	2000 miss out in B'ville	Gorethy Kenneth	20/06/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
127a	Ona creates new friction	Author Unknown	24/06/2002	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
127b	Caritas quits Bougainville	Gorethy Kenneth	24/06/2002	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
128	Arms disposal key to effective peace	Author Unknown	24/06/2002	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
129	Thousands miss out in Bougainville poll	Gorethy Kenneth	25/06/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
130	Villagers defy Ona's 'no go zone' to vote	Gorethy Kenneth	25/06/2002	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
131	Rebuilding Arawa after B'ville	Gorethy	27/06/2002	*11*	Papua New

	crisis	Kenneth			Guinea Post-Courier
132	B'villeans work on new constitution	Gorethy Kenneth	18/07/2002	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
133	Kabui seeks Ona's hand	Gorethy Kenneth	19/07/2002	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
134	B'ville unionists outline scheme	Author Unknown	25/07/2002	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
135	Bougainville family to return after 12-year exile	Gorethy Kenneth	5/08/2002	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
136	Momis appeals for B'ville unity	Gorethy Kenneth	16/08/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
137	Kauona back to help out in Bougainville	Author Unknown	19/08/2002	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
138	Delay for B'ville	Author Unknown	19/08/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
139a	Buka puts up K1000 reward for firebugs	Gorethy Kenneth	20/08/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
139b	Judiciary may pull out of Bougainville	Eric Kone	20/08/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
140	Panguna mine on agenda	Peter Niesi	22/08/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
141	Barter listens to Bougainville	Gorethy Kenneth	26/08/2002	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
142	B'ville autonomy set to go	Author Unknown	3/09/2002	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
143	Peace-building 'national priority'	Author Unknown	3/09/2002	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
144	Weapons disposal lagging behind: Barter	Peter Niesi	4/09/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
145	The man behind rebuilding Arawa	Author	5/09/2002	*16*	Papua New

	town	Unknown			Guinea Post-Courier
146	Barter: peace-building a priority	Peter Barter	5/09/2002	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
147	The Peace monitors	Wayne Jackson	5/09/2002	*18*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
148a	Arms for lasting peace	Author Unknown	5/09/2002	*28*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
148b	Autonomy set to go	Author Unknown	5/09/2002	*28*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
149	UN: Lawlessness threat to peace	Gorethy Kenneth	13/09/2002	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
150	Momis gets chance	Author Unknown	17/09/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
151	B'ville ex-combatants sign weapons disposal pact	Gorethy Kenneth	17/09/2002	*43*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
152	Bougainville gets K325,000 grant	Author Unknown	20/09/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
153	B'ville constitution to be ready in January	Author Unknown	23/09/2002	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
154	B'ville program	Author Unknown	11/10/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
155	1600 guns collected in Bougainville	Author Unknown	15/10/2002	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
156	Governor appeals for calm in Buka	Author Unknown	17/10/2002	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
157	Peace keeping questions	Jerry Singirok	18/10/2002	*11*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
158	B'ville wins UN praise for arms deal	Gorethy Kenneth	22/10/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
159	Peace and guns do not mix	Author	29/10/2002	*10*	Papua New

		Unknown			Guinea Post-Courier
160	Women want support	Author Unknown	1/11/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
161	There is no price for peace, Sir Peter tells Bougainvilleans	Author Unknown	1/11/2002	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
162	Minister appeals for input from Ona	Peter Niesi	4/11/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
163	Tell world about peace on B'ville	Author Unknown	4/11/2002	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
164a	Disgruntled open trunks	Author Unknown	7/11/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
164b	Momis critical of ex-combatant payments	Fabian Gatana and Lester Hakalitis	7/11/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
165	Gun stump	Author Unknown	20/11/2002	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
166	Critical stage for B'ville process	Author Unknown	22/11/2002	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
167	B'ville's slice	Author Unknown	4/12/2002	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
168a	Leaders question withdrawal	Gorethy Kenneth	20/12/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
168b	PNGDF departs B'ville	Beverly Puton and Mouzinho Lopez	20/12/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
169	B'ville gets K10m	Author Unknown	27/12/2002	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
170	B'ville constitution almost done	Gorethy Kenneth	6/01/2003	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
171	Ona backs peace	Gorethy Kenneth	21/01/2003	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
172	Mekamui in fallback role	Gorethy Kenneth	22/01/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
173	B'ville leaders asked to do more for peace	Author Unknown	6/02/2003	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
174	B'ville draft up for review	Author Unknown	7/02/2003	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
175	Still a lot to do, says Momis	Gorethy Kenneth	19/02/2003	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
176	Leaders sign joint pact	Watson Gabana	19/02/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
177	Ona asked to join peace process	Author Unknown	21/02/2003	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
178	Draft constitution	Author Unknown	10/03/2003	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
179	Women plead: Stop 'labelling' in B'ville	Author Unknown	11/03/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
180	BRA warns Ona	Gorethy Kenneth	12/03/2003	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
181	Call to reconcile	Gorethy Kenneth	18/03/2003	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
182	UN told of progress in B'ville	Author Unknown	4/04/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
183	Second draft of B'ville law ready	Author Unknown	4/04/2003	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
184	Adamant about B'ville deadline	Author Unknown	14/04/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
185	No excuses, Ona is told	Peter Niesi	17/04/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
186	Security to be gauge	Author Unknown	22/04/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
187	B'ville seeks 80 guns	Author Unknown	29/04/2003	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
188	Former BRA secretary in appeal	Author Unknown	5/05/2003	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
189	Good progress on autonomy	Author Unknown	19/05/2003	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
190	Bougainvilleans: Chance to have final say	Author Unknown	21/05/2003	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
191	B'ville restoration not moving ahead	Gorethy Kenneth	29/05/2003	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
192	Reconciliation on the cards for Ona, Kabui	Author Unknown	5/06/2003	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
193a	Consultation integral for progress	Author Unknown	12/06/2003	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
193b	Drafting notes for autonomy	James Fraser	12/06/2003	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
194	Aust, NZ transition team for Bougainville	Author Unknown	13/06/2003	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
195	Panguna wants peace	Eric Tapakau	18/06/2003	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
196	Barter: Aim is to get sustainable peace	Author Unknown	19/06/2003	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
197	Historic delivery	Author Unknown	25/06/2003	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
198	B'ville, UNDP in new move	Eric Tapakau	27/06/2003	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
199	Be wary of B'ville autonomy	Nagovis Toroana	27/06/2003	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
200	PMG out	Author Unknown	1/07/2003	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
201	PMG true friends, says Barter	Author Unknown	1/07/2003	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
202	Kabui's call for a change in attitude	Author Unknown	10/07/2003	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
203	UNOMB verifying guns disposal	Author Unknown	17/07/2003	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
204	UNOMB to present arms report	Peter Barter	24/07/2003	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
205	Stage two completed	Author Unknown	30/07/2003	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
206	Progress under close scrutiny	Author Unknown	31/07/2003	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
207	Final approach on weapons	Author Unknown	7/08/2003	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
208	B'ville autonomous govt formally launched	Author Unknown	12/08/2003	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
209	Barter says autonomy arrangements in place	Author Unknown	14/08/2003	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
210	Stage set for critical meet	Author Unknown	21/08/2003	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
211	B'ville concern	Author Unknown	28/08/2003	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
212	New law sets fresh challenges	Author Unknown	28/08/2003	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
213	New constitution ready in a week	Author Unknown	11/09/2003	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
214	Constitution has also changed	Author Unknown	18/09/2003	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
215	Celebrating World Peace Day	Author Unknown	25/09/2003	*20*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
216	Governance high on agenda	Peter Barter	2/10/2003	*27*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
217	Hurry up with draft - Momis	Author Unknown	3/10/2003	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
218	Momis still holds same view	Barnabas Orere	7/10/2003	*11*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
219a	Ministers to attend meeting	Peter Barter	9/10/2003	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
219b	Election delays 'unacceptable'	Author Unknown	9/10/2003	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
220	B'ville awareness	Author Unknown	17/10/2003		Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
221	B'ville leaders angry	Oseah Philemon	23/10/2003	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
222	Peace progress push	Author Unknown	23/10/2003	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
223	Destroy all guns	Peter Barter	30/10/2003	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
224	Second draft before Government	Peter Barter	13/11/2003	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
225	Peace urged among leaders	Author Unknown	18/11/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
226	BNC receives second draft for 'constitution'	Author Unknown	20/11/2003	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
227	Calls to destroy weapons	Author Unknown	27/11/2003	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
228	Momis commends Budget	Author Unknown	1/12/2003	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
229	Bougainville trauma queries	Author Unknown	4/12/2003	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
230	Weapons destruction date to be discussed	Author Unknown	17/12/2003	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
231	High-powered B'ville meeting	Author Unknown	18/12/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
232	Buka onto stage three	Lester Hakalits	29/12/2003	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
233	BBT departs Bougainville	Gorethy Kenneth	30/12/2003	*25*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
234	Policing for development	Author Unknown	31/12/2003	*25*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
236	Panguna joins peace process	Gorethy Kenneth	5/01/2004	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
237	UN mission extended	Gorethy Kenneth	5/01/2004	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
238	Report considered carefully	Author Unknown	7/01/2004	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
239	Pentanu backed by B'ville interim govt	Author Unknown	9/01/2004	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
240	UN staying on in Bougainville	Author Unknown	9/01/2004	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
241	B'ville talks on	Author Unknown	21/01/2004	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
242a	Law and order is 'vastly improved'	Lester Hakalits	21/01/2004	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
242b	Elections at end of year	Author Unknown	21/01/2004	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
243	UNOMB welcomes B'ville constitution	Author Unknown	30/01/2004	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
244	142 arms destroyed	Author Unknown	2/02/2004	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
245	Issues pending on B'ville govt	Gorethy Kenneth	5/02/2004	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
246	Call for update on constitution	Gorethy Kenneth	18/02/2004	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
247	BRA chief's guns cut, dumped at sea	Gorethy Kenneth	23/02/2004	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
248a	Tanis: Govt is not serious	Gorethy Kenneth	24/02/2004	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
248b	Peace advances	Gorethy Kenneth	24/02/2004	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
249	Big hurdle cleared	Author Unknown	26/02/2004	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
250	PNG Govt farewells peace ambassador	Matrom John	1/03/2004	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
251	Bana declared weapons-free area	Author Unknown	1/03/2004	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
252	Leaders upset	Gorethy Kenneth	5/03/2004	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
252a	Boycott threat for new govt elections	Gorethy Kenneth	10/03/2004	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
253a	Kabui in support of Aust deployment	Gorethy Kenneth	16/03/2004	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
253b	Masiria sworn in as minister	Author Unknown	16/03/2004	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
254	Leaders question use of B'ville grant	Gorethy Kenneth	18/03/2004	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
255	Ex-combatants criticise B'ville administration	Gorethy Kenneth	18/03/2004	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
256	Probe grant use: Barter	Author Unknown	19/03/2004	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
257	Probe use of B'ville grants'	Author Unknown	23/03/2004	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
258	BRA, resistant forces destroy 124 weapons	Gorethy Kenneth	23/03/2004	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
259	B'ville passes assembly law	Gorethy Kenneth	29/03/2004	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
260	Peace threat: Major robbery smashes Siwai no weapons claim	Gorethy Kenneth	30/03/2004	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
261	Shadow cast over Bougainville peace	Author Unknown	30/03/2004	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
262	Leaders call for probe into grant diversions	Author Unknown	1/04/2004	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
263a	Akoitai's push for action on K5m misuse	Gorethy Kenneth	14/04/2003	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
263b	Poll for autonomous govt expected at end of year	Author Unknown	14/04/2004	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
264	Call for new administrator for B'ville	Author Unknown	15/04/2003	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
265	Watchdog returns to Buka after 15 years	Blaise Nangoi	20/04/2004	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
266	BRA weapons dumped	Author Unknown	20/04/2004	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
267	Peace process making progress	Author Unknown	21/04/2004	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
268	B'ville govt still on track	Author Unknown	26/04/2004	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
269	More guns destroyed	Author Unknown	27/04/2004	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
270	BRA leaders' reconciliation 'vital' for weapons disposal	Gorethy Kenneth	27/04/2004	*24*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
270a	Law and order under control	Author Unknown	28/04/2004	20	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
271	Weapons disposal on track	Oseah Philemon	28/04/2004	5	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
272	Constitution right on track	Aloysius Laukau	5/05/2004	18	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
273	New members sworn in	Aloysius Laukau	12/05/2004	27	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
274	Kieta to destroy guns	Gorethy Kenneth	9/06/2004	25	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
275	Push to extend UNOMB stay	Author Unknown	30/06/2004	23	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
276	UNOMB gets six months extension	Author Unknown	1/07/2004	4	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
277	MP 'lauds' UN input	Beverlly Puton	13/07/2004	21	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
278	Constitution's final draft close to reality	Author Unknown	14/07/2004	23	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
279	Arms trade threatens	Gorethy Kenneth	27/07/2004	3	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
280	Governor lauds completion of constitution's final draft	Author Unknown	29/07/2004	17	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
281	Barter: Island in final stages of transition	Author Unknown	4/08/2004	27	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
282	Arms disposal a lesson for PNG	Author Unknown	11/08/2004	23	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
283	PM: Be flexible on deadline	Gorethy Kenneth	18/08/2004	19	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
284a	Oria gets rid of its last weapons	Author Unknown	25/08/2004	23	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
284b	Tanis in appeal	Author Unknown	25/08/2004	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
284c	UN ultimatum for disposals	Author Unknown	25/08/2004	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
284d	No certification, no poll	Aloysius Laukau	25/08/2004	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
285	Progress in arms disposal	Gorethy Kenneth	1/09/2004	*30*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
286	Kabui's non-political call	Oseah Philemon	15/09/2004	*54*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
287	1985 arms destroyed	Author Unknown	15/09/2004	*55*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
288	52 weapons destroyed in Buin	Gorethy Kenneth	22/09/2004	*29*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
289	PNG offers plan	Author Unknown	5/10/2004	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
290	UN: B'ville poll 'out'	Gorethy Kenneth	7/10/2004	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
291	94.4% of weapons destroyed	Author Unknown	13/10/2004	*29*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
293	Jesus' meets massacre rebels	Peter Niesi	20/10/2004	*35*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
294	Countdown on arms disposal	Eric Tapakau	24/11/2004	*30*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
295	Peace effort taking step forward	Beverlly Puton	8/12/2004	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
296	UNOMB extends mission	Eric Tapakau	29/12/2004	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
297	Optimism for B'ville elections	Author Unknown	5/01/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
298	Sir Peter calls for imitative and responsibility	Author Unknown	5/01/2005	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
299	Official handover ceremony in Arawa	Gorethy Kenneth	12/01/2005	*26*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
300	A new era dawns over Bougainville	Author Unknown	17/01/2005		Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
301	Full steam ahead	Author Unknown	17/01/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
302	Unite, work together - Momis	Gorethy Kenneth	18/01/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
303	Offices set for election	Gorethy Kenneth	26/01/2005	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
304	Landowners take over school	Author Unknown	31/01/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
305	No role to transfer powers	Beverly Puton	9/02/2005	*18*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
306	Peace 'under threat'	Gorethy Kenneth	10/02/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
307	School in chaos	Gorethy Kenneth	14/02/2005	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
308	Tension in Hutjena eased	Beverly Puton	15/02/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
309	Groups B'ville meeting 'fruitful'	Author Unknown	21/02/2005	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
310a	Funding may delay elections	Author Unknown	23/02/2005	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
310a	Weapons disposal vital	Author Unknown	23/02/2005	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
311	Chaos warning	Author Unknown	1/03/2005	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
312	O'Neill's warning on chaos	Author Unknown	1/03/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
313	Dr Imako appointed new Buka General Hospital chief executive	Romalus Masiu	16/03/2005	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
314	B'ville election preparations on track	Author Unknown	21/03/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
315	Aussies Out: Reclusive Ona tells AAP: Not welcome in B'ville	Gorethy Kenneth	23/03/2005	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
316	Religion to hinder voting for Tasmans	Beverly Puton	23/03/2005	*19*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
317	Bougainville Constitution Determination	Author Unknown	23/03/2005	*20*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
318	Ona's letters received	Gorethy Kenneth	23/03/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
319	Ona tells Aussies they are not welcome	Author Unknown	23/03/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
320	Bougainvilleans committed to peace - Momis	Gorethy Kenneth	24/03/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
321	Ona demands AFP move out of Buka	Gorethy Kenneth	30/03/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
322	Out!	Author Unknown	30/03/2005	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
323	North Bougainville chiefs to back autonomous polls	Author Unknown	5/04/2005	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
324	Ona offered leadership	Author Unknown	7/04/2005	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
325	Police in B'ville 'can act' on illegal arms	Author Unknown	8/04/2005	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
326	Bougainville ready for historic elections	Romalus Masiu	12/04/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
327	B'ville crisis blames	Author Unknown	13/04/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
328	Expats 'causing' B'ville instability	Beverly Puton	13/04/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
329	Writs issue set for island polls	Gorethy Kenneth	13/04/2005	*25*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
330	Kauona: I'm not interested in politics	Gorethy Kenneth	14/04/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
331	B'ville enters an historical moment	Gorethy Kenneth	15/04/2005	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
332	Eyes on B'ville	Alex Rheeney	18/04/2005	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
333	Tanis puts hands up to be president	Author Unknown	18/04/2005	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
334a	130,000 eligible to vote	Gorethy Kenneth	20/04/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
334b	First Me'ekamui nominee	Gorethy Kenneth	20/04/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
335a	Momis goes for presidency	Author Unknown	21/04/2005	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
335b	Kabui misses nomination	Author Unknown	21/04/2005	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
336	Campaign begins on B'ville	Author Unknown	26/04/2005	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
337	Kabui party attacked	Gorethy Kenneth	3/05/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
338a	Outrage at Kabui attack	Romalus Masiu	4/05/2005	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
338b	Me'ekamui assured on reconciliation	Author Unknown	4/05/2005	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
339	Barter: Do not see Bougainville as model	Author Unknown	6/05/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
340	Independence still to come	Romalus Masiu	11/05/2005	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
341	B'ville elections start next week	Gorethy Kenneth	13/05/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
342	Observers set for polls	Author Unknown	18/05/2005	*24*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
343a	Boxes flown into avoid roadblocks	Author Unknown	23/05/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
343b	Taking charge	Author Unknown	23/05/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
344a	Poll papers sink	Gorethy Kenneth	25/05/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
344b	Election on schedule	Author Unknown	25/05/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
344c	ENB voters turned away	Annette Sete	25/05/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
344d	Ona tones down opposition	Author Unknown	25/05/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
345e	Common Roll not updated	Author Unknown	25/05/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
345	Buin roadblock, only hiccup to election	Author Unknown	31/05/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
346	B'ville president known tonight	Gorethy Kenneth	1/06/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
347	Preparations in place for inauguration event	Gorethy Kenneth	1/06/2005	*32*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
348	A dawn is breaking in Bougainville	Author Unknown	2/06/2005	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
349	Kabui in big lead	Gorethy Kenneth	3/06/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
350	President Kabui!	Gorethy Kenneth	6/06/2005	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
351a	Kabui announces interim cabinet	Gorethy Kenneth	6/06/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
351b	Momis to court	Author Unknown	6/06/2005	*2*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
352	Bougainvilleans have last say in results	Author Unknown	7/06/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
353	So what is the next step for the Bougainvillean leadership?	Author Unknown	7/06/2005	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
354	Momis should accept defeat at polls	Author Unknown	8/06/2005	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
355	Chiefs call for Ona, Kabui to reconcile	Romalus Masiu	8/06/2005	*24*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
356	Ona invited to main ceremony	Author Unknown	9/06/2005	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
357	Polls writs returned	Author Unknown	10/06/2005	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
358	B'ville's new era	Gorethy Kenneth	15/06/2005	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
359	Bougainville charts way for PNG	Peter Niesi	15/06/2005	*11*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
360	Guests arrive for event	Beverly Puton	15/06/2005	*19*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
361	Let all lean from Bougainville crisis	Author Unknown	16/06/2005	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
362	Economy is main B'ville priority	Author Unknown	17/06/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
363	No mine yet	Author Unknown	20/06/2005	2	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
364	Hopes soar on new Govt	Author Unknown	22/06/2005	22	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
365	Tough stretch ahead for President Kabui	Gorethy Kenneth	22/06/2005	23	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
366	B'ville says thanks to UN observers	Romalus Masiu	24/06/2005	1	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
367	B'ville 'exploration' nod	Eric Tapakau	24/06/2005	2	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
368	B'ville cabinet sworn it	Beverly Puton	24/06/2005	8	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
369	Ona: No, no	Gorethy Kenneth	1/07/2005	1	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
370	Let me run B'ville government'	Gorethy Kenneth	1/07/2005	2	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
371	Bougainville, an international peace legacy for the UN	Romalus Masiu	1/07/2005	11	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
372	Ona into gold	Gorethy Kenneth	4/07/2005	1	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
373a	Ona lays down conditions for 'talks'	Author Unknown	4/07/2005	2	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
373b	UN mission winds down in B'ville	Author Unknown	4/07/2005	2	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
374	Progress: Ona and Kabui need to talk	Author Unknown	4/07/2005	10	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
375	Bougainville Govt not for sale: Kabui	Gorethy Kenneth	7/07/2005	7	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
376	Official: UN mission on B'ville a success	Author Unknown	8/07/2005	5	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
377	Appointment of ministers queried	Romalus Masiu	13/07/2005	20	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
378	Momis halts petition	Gorethy Kenneth	19/07/2005	4	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
379	Ona is dead	Romalus Masiu	25/07/2005	1	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
380	Me'ekamui, B'ville govt tussle for leader's body	Gorethy Kenneth	26/07/2005	3	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
381	Self-made king leaves legacy	Lloyd Jones	26/07/2005	11	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
382	Ona body stays put	Author Unknown	27/07/2005	3	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
383	BCL funds order	Dominic Krau	29/07/2005	2	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
384	Farewell to a brave man	Author Unknown	1/08/2005	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
385	Central Bougainville chief is acting head of Me'ekamui following death of Ona	Author Unknown	3/08/2005	20	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
386	National day sought	Author Unknown	31/08/2005	18	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
387	Govt heavies back in Bougainville	Author Unknown	9/09/2005	2	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
388	B'ville joins rest of PNG to celebrate	Gorethy Kenneth	19/09/2005		Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
389	A voice for peace	Author Unknown	5/10/2005	21	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
390	Bougainville no go for mining	Author Unknown	5/10/2005	5	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
391	B'ville sets sights on China	Author Unknown	13/10/2005	8	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
392	BCL ordered to pay K7.9m	Author Unknown	18/10/2005	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
393	Peace on agenda	Author Unknown	19/10/2005	*18*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
394	Panguna mining talks	Author Unknown	25/10/2005	*25*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
395	Peace and unity call	Author Unknown	2/11/2005	*24*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
396	Key supervisory body meeting	Author Unknown	9/11/2005	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
397	ABG members urges calm	Author Unknown	11/11/2005	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
398	Threat to peace	Author Unknown	16/11/2005	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
399	B'ville to get K38.8m	Author Unknown	16/11/2005	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
400	Deal with China	Author Unknown	28/11/2005	*39*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
401	ABG decentralising power	Author Unknown	21/12/2005	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
402	Akoitai cautions on mine deals	Author Unknown	3/01/2006	*37*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
403	Briefly	Author Unknown	6/01/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
404	Cuban help for B'ville	Author Unknown	9/01/2006	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
405	UN support for Bougainville peace	Author Unknown	16/01/2006	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
406	Criminals spoil B'ville elections	Author Unknown	17/01/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
407	Peace reigns in town	Author Unknown	18/01/2006	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
408	Resistance forces: We're not involved	Author Unknown	18/01/2006	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
409	B'villeans told to be patient over claims	Author Unknown	18/01/2006	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
410	UN to raise funds for B'ville govt	Author Unknown	24/01/2006	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
411	Making peace their own way	Author Unknown	3/02/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
412	Leader urges support	Author Unknown	6/02/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
413	Peace, unity big concern on border	Author Unknown	7/02/2006	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
414	Bougainville to generate own tax revenue	Author Unknown	21/02/2006	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
415	Panguna revisit mooted	Author Unknown	3/03/2006	*41*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
416	BCL decision gets support	Author Unknown	7/03/2006	*24*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
417	Former resistance boss calls for fair, honest deal	Author Unknown	8/03/2006	*25*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
418	ABG pays up K50,000	Author Unknown	8/03/2006	*25*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
419	One f B'ville's key peace architect	Author Unknown	10/03/2006	*35*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
420	Mine review for Panguna welcomed	Author Unknown	31/03/2006	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
421	Kabui scoffs at mine talk	Author Unknown	3/04/2006	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
422	B'ville has K300m fishing potential	Author Unknown	5/04/2006	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
423	Constitution to be put to test	Author Unknown	5/04/2006	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
424	BRF want payment now	Author Unknown	6/04/2006	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
425	Veterans: BCL land is ours	Author Unknown	6/04/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
426	Kabui welcomes Americans	Author Unknown	12/04/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
427	BCL posts record profit	Author Unknown	3/05/2006	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
428	MP remind Parlt of dead	Author Unknown	3/05/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
429	B'ville future on land	Author Unknown	5/05/2006	*43*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
430	Briefly	Author Unknown	16/05/2006	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
431	Affirming peace, unity	Author Unknown	17/05/2006	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
432	Government back B'ville peace push	Author Unknown	17/05/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
433	B'ville to set new policies	Author Unknown	17/05/2006	*30*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
434	ABG move may lead to armed conflict	Author Unknown	17/05/2006	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
435	Support for BCL review	Author Unknown	18/05/2006	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
436	Peace call in B'ville	Author Unknown	19/05/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
437	B'ville police fret over peace deal	Author Unknown	23/05/2006	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
438	New Zealand wants peace process to continue	Author Unknown	24/05/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
439	Re-open mine, says Hannett	Author Unknown	24/05/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
440	Visit strengthen ties with province	Author Unknown	24/05/2006	*18*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
441	No mining policy	Author Unknown	1/06/2006	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
442	ABG defends Canada trip	Author Unknown	7/06/2006	*42*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
443	Bougainville set to celebrate first anniversary	Author Unknown	13/06/2006	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
444	Mine to stay closed	Author Unknown	13/06/2006	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
445	Kabui: We're not dealing with crooks	Author Unknown	14/06/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
446	Re-opening mine would start war	Author Unknown	14/06/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
447	ABG calls for key functions	Author Unknown	16/06/2006	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
448	Bougainvilleans celebrate day	Author Unknown	19/06/2006	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
449	ABG leaders honoured	Author Unknown	20/06/2006	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
450	B'ville women praised	Author Unknown	20/06/2006	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
451	Panguna mine still an issue	Author Unknown	21/06/2006	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
452	Army to destroy 3400 weapons	Author Unknown	23/06/2006	7	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
453	United Me'ekamui defiant on Panguna	Author Unknown	26/06/2006	9	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
454	When peace has higher calling	Author Unknown	27/06/2006	12	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
455	Leaders told to maintain B'ville peace	Author Unknown	3/07/2006	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
456	ABG in breach of mine law	Author Unknown	3/07/2006	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
457	Please address regions issues	Author Unknown	12/07/2006	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
458	Smuggling of firearms a concern	Author Unknown	13/07/2006	8	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
459	B'ville to gain big in budget	Author Unknown	18/07/2006	7	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
460	Ex-combatants bemoan delay	Author Unknown	19/07/2006	19	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
461	Ona's legacy still lives	Author Unknown	4/08/2006	25	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
462	ABG considers palm oil	Author Unknown	10/08/2006	19	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
463	Bougainvillean miners slam secret talks	Author Unknown	24/08/2006	38	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
464	Business slowly returning to Panguna area	Author Unknown	24/08/2006	35	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
465	Panguna landowners not part of delegation	Author Unknown	30/08/2006	29	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
466	Women vital to peace	Author Unknown	1/09/2006	38	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
467	ABG pledges support	Author Unknown	5/09/2006	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
468	Greater autonomy the way forward	Author Unknown	21/09/2006	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
469	Revised budget passed	Author Unknown	26/09/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
470	House backs mine opening	Author Unknown	3/10/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
471	Call to surrender firearms	Author Unknown	5/10/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
472	Panguna owners funded	Author Unknown	12/10/2006	*29*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
473	Chiefs demand arms clean-up	Author Unknown	17/10/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
474	Leaders urge new B'ville	Author Unknown	17/10/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
475	Concern raised on weapons	Author Unknown	20/10/2006	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
476	Freezing of ABG account forced	Author Unknown	19/10/2006	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
477	Legal threat over freeze	Author Unknown	23/10/2006	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
478	Peace pact paves way	Author Unknown	1/11/2006	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
479	Armed force warns ABG	Author Unknown	6/11/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
480	MP: New groups threatening peace process	Author Unknown	13/11/2006	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
481	B'ville set for 2007 budget	Author Unknown	16/11/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
482	ABG requests transfer of mining powers	Author Unknown	21/11/2006	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
483	Panguna set to reopen	Author Unknown	11/12/2006	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
484	Call for peaceful	Author Unknown	15/12/2006	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
485	NZ praised for peace efforts	Author Unknown	15/12/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
486	ABG praises budget effort	Author Unknown	20/12/2006	*20*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
487	Peace still in limbo	Author Unknown	22/12/2006	*33*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
488	Peace, unity urged	Author Unknown	27/12/2006	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
489	Govt reaffirms B'ville support	Author Unknown	29/12/2006	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
490	Claims culture must end	Author Unknown	2/01/2007	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
491	B'ville still a priority	Author Unknown	4/01/2007	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
492	Mining dept sets priority	Author Unknown	18/01/2007	*22*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
493	B'ville given top priority	Author Unknown	23/01/2007	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
494	B'ville pushes for fifth region	Author Unknown	25/01/2007	*43*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
495	Leader calls for reconciliation	Author Unknown	31/01/2007	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
496	BCL told to pay taxman	Author Unknown	6/02/2007	*27*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
497	B'ville weapons disposal vital	Author Unknown	9/02/2007	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
498	New Zealand's TMI Pictures to film Bougainville peace process	Author Unknown	14/02/2007	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
499	Unity call on B'ville	Author Unknown	21/02/2007	9	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
500	BCL posts profit in 06	Author Unknown	27/02/2007	25	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
501	ABG defends business talks in Ord River	Author Unknown	2/03/2007	53	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
502	Expulsion won't affect aid to region	Author Unknown	7/03/2007	5	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
503	ABG pulls out of Panguna mine talks	Author Unknown	12/03/2007	3	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
504	ABG members irked by guns	Author Unknown	19/03/2007	5	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
505	Ord River boss visits Buka	Author Unknown	21/03/2007	3	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
506	Guns on B'ville an obstacle	Author Unknown	28/03/2007	8	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
507	BCL plans to return	Author Unknown	2/04/2007	3	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
508	Call for ABG to abide Constitution	Author Unknown	8/05/2007	5	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
509	B'ville women urged to be mediators	Author Unknown	8/05/2007	15	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
510	BCL works on plan for Panguna	Author Unknown	10/05/2007	31	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
511	Challenge to do away with firearms	Author Unknown	17/05/2007	5	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
512	Momis decries growth failure	Author Unknown	6/06/2007	*30*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
513	Talks promised for B'ville mining	Author Unknown	11/06/2007	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
514	ABG may opt to use own powers	Author Unknown	13/06/2007	*29*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
515	Call to promote peace in Bougainville	Author Unknown	15/06/2007	*59*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
516	Peace process a success story: Kabui	Author Unknown	15/06/2007	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
517	Bougainville elections hailed peaceful	Author Unknown	9/07/2007	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
518	Kabui seeks Rio Tinto audience	Author Unknown	8/08/2007	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
519	BCL lifts six-months profits	Author Unknown	14/08/2007	*29*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
520	ABG complies with powers	Author Unknown	16/08/2007	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
521	Kabui pleased with Somare	Author Unknown	20/08/2007	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
522	Rio Tinto seeks review of decision	Author Unknown	22/08/2007	*25*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
523	Bougainville MPs urged to work with ABG	Author Unknown	10/09/2007	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
524	Milestone for B'ville	Author Unknown	14/09/2007	*38*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
525	B'ville needs chieftains	Author Unknown	19/09/2007	*18*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
526	ABG not ready for opposition: Sohia	Author Unknown	28/09/2007	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
527	Miners urged to observe rules	Author Unknown	2/11/2007	7	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
528	Kabui makes plea for peace with all	Author Unknown	29/11/2007	13	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
529	B'ville community leaders petition ABG	Author Unknown	4/12/2007	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
530	PNG, NZ ministers meet	Author Unknown	5/12/2007	3	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
531	Peace ceremony plan	Author Unknown	11/12/2007	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
532	Positive feedback for peace	Author Unknown	18/12/2007	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
533	Reconciliation vital to peace	Author Unknown	19/12/2007	9	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
534	Peace bid set for ex-rebels	Author Unknown	19/12/2007	16	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
535	Weapons disposal in the spotlight	Author Unknown	20/12/2007	9	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
536	BCL shareholders support takeover	Author Unknown	28/12/2007	47	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
537	Focus on peace and guns	Author Unknown	31/12/2007	9	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
538	Peace pact may be disrupted	Author Unknown	7/01/2008	5	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
539	The Panguna dilemma	Author Unknown	10/01/2008	12	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
540	Conflict likely between authority and B'ville	Author Unknown	25/01/2008	24	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
541	PM stresses on peace	Author Unknown	25/01/2008	5	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
542	Panguna mine doomed	Author Unknown	6/02/2008	*29*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
543	Kabui threatens to resign as ABG President	Author Unknown	8/02/2008	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
544	Panguna chief gags mine talks	Author Unknown	11/02/2008	*26*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
545	$US90m land value for B'ville	Author Unknown	18/02/2008	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
546	Kabui urged to protect rights	Author Unknown	28/03/2008	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
547	Meekamui concerned	Author Unknown	3/04/2008	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
548	Powers already with ABG	Author Unknown	8/04/2008	*29*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
549	ABG needs help	Author Unknown	21/04/2008	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
550	Chan, Kabui to reconcile	Author Unknown	29/04/2008	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
551	B'ville on recovery trail	Author Unknown	1/05/2008	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
552	Ona wary on ABG talks	Author Unknown	12/05/2008	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
553	Bougainville mine push	Author Unknown	12/05/2008	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
554	Shareholders of BCL back mine restart	Author Unknown	16/05/2008	*25*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
555	Bougainville wants BCL back	Author Unknown	22/05/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
556	Leaders mourn	Author Unknown	10/06/2008	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-

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557	Heart attack takes leader	Author Unknown	10/06/2008	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
558	Bougainville to continue on	Author Unknown	11/06/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
559	Tributes flow in for Kabui	Author Unknown	11/06/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
560	Me'ekamui set to reconcile	Author Unknown	23/06/2008	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
561	Bougainville leader supports mining authority	Author Unknown	24/06/2008	*29*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
562	Kabui's death unites sworn enemies	Author Unknown	24/06/2008	*14*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
563	B'ville president by March	Author Unknown	26/06/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
564	B'ville govt in big mess: Businesses	Author Unknown	30/06/2008	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
565	Uproar in B'ville parlt	Author Unknown	16/07/2008	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
566	ABG in charge of review	Author Unknown	16/07/2008	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
567	Crisis experience to be…	Author Unknown	30/07/2008	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
568	BCL starts evaluating Panguna re-opening	Author Unknown	31/07/2008	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
569	Mine sensitivities are crucial	Author Unknown	4/08/2008	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
570	BCL cautious of mine re-opening	Author Unknown	6/08/2008	*27*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
571	Weapons rife in Wisai	Author Unknown	7/08/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
572	Mining tussle to B'villeans	Author Unknown	8/08/2008	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
573	Panguna people pledge to reconcile	Author Unknown	12/08/2008	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
574	No reconciliation	Author Unknown	22/08/2008	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
575	PLA to continue peace, reconciliation awareness	Author Unknown	27/08/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
576	ABG must put B'ville first, says Semoso	Author Unknown	17/09/2008	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
577	Weapons a problem	Author Unknown	20/10/2008	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
578	Leaders to meet	Author Unknown	9/10/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
579	Weapons-free district	Author Unknown	23/10/2008	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
580	Reconciliation key to B'ville development	Author Unknown	27/10/2008	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
581	Mining office to be set up in AROB	Author Unknown	4/11/2008		Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
582	Kauona to contest leadership	Author Unknown	7/11/2008	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
583	ARB urged to choose the right leader	Author Unknown	10/11/2008	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
584	Five vie for B'ville presidency	Author Unknown	13/11/2008	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
585	Unity not on island!	Author Unknown	26/11/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
586	B'villeans set to vote a leader	Author Unknown	2/12/2008	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
587	B'ville Copper keen to reopen Panguna mine	Author Unknown	2/12/2008	*27*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
589	Panguna to be part of election process	Author Unknown	10/12/2008	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
590	Don't make empty promises calls	Author Unknown	19/12/2008	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
591	Forget differences	Author Unknown	22/12/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
592	Panguna unity	Author Unknown	22/12/2008	*1*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
593	Panguna unity in doubt	Author Unknown	23/12/2008	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
594	No names on list, most eligible voters miss out	Author Unknown	24/12/2008	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
595	Tanis is ABG leader	Author Unknown	29/12/2008	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
596	Tanis sworn in as president	Author Unknown	7/01/2009	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
597	B'ville trade of guns for drugs a worry	Author Unknown	14/01/2009	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
598	ABG President meets Grand Chief Somare	Author Unknown	30/01/2009	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
599	Panguna meet not achieved	Author Unknown	30/01/2009	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
600	The dreams and illusions	Author Unknown	10/02/2009	*16*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
601	Onus on ABG to deal with arms sales	Author Unknown	12/03/2009	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
602	ABG president happy with progress	Author Unknown	12/03/2009	*11*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
603	Landowners oppose outside interests	Author Unknown	13/03/2009	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
604	Tanis on peace mission in Buin	Author Unknown	23/03/2009	9	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
605	Me'ekamui vows to lay down arms	Author Unknown	24/03/2009	7	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
606	Peace key to B'ville future	Author Unknown	9/04/2009	10	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
607	BCL eyes restart of mining ops at Panguna mine	Author Unknown	21/04/2009	31	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
608	Bougainville works at economic self-reliance	Author Unknown	23/04/2009	10	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
609	ABG to benefit from funds	Author Unknown	27/04/2009	5	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
610	ABG appoints peace minister	Author Unknown	7/05/2009	12	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
611	Leader called for genuine peace	Author Unknown	20/05/2009	15	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
612	Bougainville copper deal to be reviewed	Author Unknown	25/05/2009	3	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
613	Govt willing to help ABG	Author Unknown	15/06/2009	19	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
614	B'ville achieves a lot	Author Unknown	17/06/2009	8	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
615	Leaders meet with Nat Govt	Author Unknown	21/07/2009	6	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
616	Funding high on PNG, ARB agenda	Author Unknown	22/07/2009	7	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
617	ABG awaits power transfer	Author Unknown	24/07/2009	21	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
618	BCL profit up in six months	Author Unknown	10/08/2009	*28*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
619	B'ville heading for economic growth	Author Unknown	13/08/2009	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
620	PNG sitting on bomb	Author Unknown	21/08/2009	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
621	ABG needs to free weapons for peace	Author Unknown	31/08/2009	*21*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
622	Peace structure, plan launched	Author Unknown	31/08/2009	*19*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
623	ABG in need of funds	Author Unknown	2/09/2009	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
624	B'ville members see funds woe	Author Unknown	2/09/2009	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
625	Reconciliation going on	Author Unknown	17/09/2009	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
626	Work together for peace	Author Unknown	28/09/2009	*16*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
627	President hands off policy on Panguna	Author Unknown	8/10/2009	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
628	Landowners welcome BCL visit	Author Unknown	9/10/2009	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
629	B'ville elections in March 2010	Author Unknown	12/10/2009	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
630	Arms stop move	Author Unknown	29/10/2009	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
631	Call to work together	Author Unknown	29/10/2009	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
632	Panguna to benefit ABG and national Govt	Author Unknown	3/11/2009	*33*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
633	B'ville progress	Author Unknown	4/11/2009	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
634	Peace finally reigns	Author Unknown	9/11/2009	*16*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
635	Peace reviewed	Author Unknown	23/11/2009	*19*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
636	ABG queries peace pact breach	Author Unknown	26/11/2009	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
637	Bougainvilleans urged to maintain peace	Author Unknown	11/12/2009	*18*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
638	ABG projects left to waste	Author Unknown	14/12/2009	*19*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
639	ABG to query PNG govt	Author Unknown	15/12/2009	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
640	Power transfer to ABG soon	Author Unknown	17/12/2009	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
641	B'ville autonomy in for study	Author Unknown	18/12/2009	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
642	B'ville future in review	Author Unknown	18/12/2009	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
643	Referendum for B'ville set to roll	Author Unknown	18/12/2009	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
644	B'ville to settle issues	Author Unknown	11/01/2010	*10*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
645	Me'ekamui meets Momis	Author Unknown	3/02/2010	*8*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
646	ABG in final meet	Author Unknown	25/02/2010	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
647	ABG wants govt to transfer powers	Author Unknown	2/03/2010	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-

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648	B'ville to get powers	Author Unknown	5/03/2010	*18*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
649	B'ville referendum on path	Author Unknown	8/03/2010	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
650	ABG to get own taxes	Author Unknown	18/03/2010	*35*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
651	Panguna mine still closed: ABG	Author Unknown	19/03/2010	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
652	Me'ekamui and ABG do deal to work together	Author Unknown	19/03/2010	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
653	Economic policy sets path for autonomy	Author Unknown	22/03/2010	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
654	Me'ekamuis set to vote	Author Unknown	31/03/2010	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
655	Ex-BRA commanders make peace in Buin	Author Unknown	31/03/2010	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
656	Call for good leaders	Author Unknown	12/04/2010	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
657	People to decide on ABG referendum	Author Unknown	23/04/2010	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
658	Untitled	Author Unknown	23/04/2010	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
659	Warning on guns out	Author Unknown	29/04/2010	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
660	B'villeans told to vote wisely	Author Unknown	7/05/2010	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
661	Panguna sitting on time bomb	Author Unknown	10/05/2010	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
662	Me'ekamui general stands ground	Author Unknown	17/05/2010	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
663	Mine a threat to community	Author Unknown	18/05/2010	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
664	Momis has big plans	Author Unknown	10/06/2010	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
665	Tanis leaves ABG on unsavoury terms	Author Unknown	17/06/2010	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
666	Landowners want Tanis	Author Unknown	22/06/2010	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
667	B'ville far from independence	Author Unknown	25/06/2010	*3*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
668	Committee tables controversial 'Kabui Model'	Author Unknown	28/06/2010	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
669	B'ville state of economy riles leaders	Author Unknown	28/06/2010	*16*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
670	B'ville economy has potential	Author Unknown	30/06/2010	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
671	President outlines action plans for Bougainville	Author Unknown	12/07/2010	*9*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
672	Momis to focus on problem areas	Author Unknown	19/07/2010	*18*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
673	Bougainville Govt discusses issues on mining in region	Author Unknown	20/07/2010	*16*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
674	Arms disposal plans lacking	Author Unknown	28/07/2010	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
675	B'ville not ready for referendum: Momis	Author Unknown	29/07/2010	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
676	Bougainville far from self-reliance	Author Unknown	2/08/2010	*42*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
677	ABG plans to raise local revenue	Author Unknown	3/08/2010	*30*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
678	BCL to meet over Panguna mine	Author Unknown	4/08/2010	*23*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
679	Referendum to be trialled	Author Unknown	9/08/2010	*44*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
680	Blueprint for weapons disposal	Author Unknown	12/08/2010	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
681	BCL agreement to be reviewed	Author Unknown	12/08/2010	*12*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
682	Rio Tinto lawsuit heard in the US	Author Unknown	23/09/2010	*5*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
683	Panguna mine answer to reviving economy	Author Unknown	30/09/2010	*24*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
684	B'ville shows the way	Author Unknown	30/09/2010	*24*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
685	Human rights vital: UN team	Author Unknown	14/10/2010	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
686	ABG ask for fund release	Author Unknown	18/10/2010	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
687	PM and Momis hold deep talks	Author Unknown	27/10/2010	*30*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
688	Increasing firearms worry police chief	Author Unknown	28/10/2010	*20*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
689	ABG group off to China	Author Unknown	28/10/2010	*20*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
690	European group wants Panguna mine re-opened	Author Unknown	29/10/2010	*46*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
691	MP wants Panguna mine re-opened	Author Unknown	2/11/2010	*30*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
692	Mining company probe	Author Unknown	8/11/2010	*7*	Papua New Guinea Post-

					Courier
693	Panguna needs to be reopened	Author Unknown	10/11/2010	*17*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
694	New mine for B'ville	Author Unknown	11/11/2010	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
695	Momis returns from China	Author Unknown	15/11/2010	*20*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
696	Arms disposal plan	Author Unknown	15/11/2010	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
697	B'ville misses out - again	Author Unknown	18/11/2010	*4*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
698	B'ville awaits yearly grants	Author Unknown	26/11/2010	*46*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
699	Panguna gets the nod	Author Unknown	29/11/2010	*6*	
700	Leaders in a new era for Panguna mine	Author Unknown	30/11/2010	*39*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
701	Panguna to be reopened	Author Unknown	2/12/2010	*26*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
702	BRA's stand on mine reopening	Author Unknown	13/12/2010	*13*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
703	Bougainville signs MOUs with China	Author Unknown	13/12/2010	*6*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
704	Rising prices boost B'ville mine hopes	Author Unknown	29/12/2010	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier
705	Miners hope to restart Bougainville gold and copper mine	Author Unknown	29/12/2010	*15*	Papua New Guinea Post-Courier

Appendix 2: Coding Frame

Main Category	Sub-Category	Description	Example
1. Niceness			
	1.1 Papua New Guinea first to defect	An instance of defection in the agreed principles of the peace process on the part of Papua New Guinea.	*"The withdrawal of security forces on the island [by the National Government] is contradictory to an agreement, which states that PNGDF should be present on the island when weapons are collected".* [0082]
	1.2 Bougainville first to defect	An instance of defection in the agreed principles of the peace process on the part of Bougainville.	*"Polling for Bougainville will go ahead this Saturday after a faction of the Resistance Force lifted threats to stop the elections in the province".* [0121]
	1.3 No defection from either actor	Both Bougainville and Papua New Guinea successfully cooperate to achieve a positive outcome or make progress in the peace process.	*"Much has already been done – the leaders of both PNG and Bougainville are to be congratulated for their efforts in achieving the peace process and starting the implementation work".* [0175]

	1.4 Olive branch / commitment to cooperate	One party expresses intent to work / cooperate with the other party, likely in an effort to elicit reciprocity.	*"The next stage of the constitution as it stands is that we are still working on some funds from the National Government…we know the money is coming, but we don't know, we have to wait".* [0170]
	1.5 Unclear defection	A defection takes place, but it is unclear who has defected first.	*"Bougainville leaders are hoping for a 'formal breakthrough' in the deadlocked peace talks with the National Government, [when they resume] this Thursday".* [0005]
2. Forgiveness			
	2.1 Immediate forgiveness	One party immediately forgives a defection on the part of the other party, generally at their next interaction.	*"Mr Kabui described the successful vote as a 'victory for peace' ad 'a win-win for the PNG Government and Bougainville' after the 'momentary hiccups' of the last-minute amendment".* [0080]
	2.2 Delayed forgiveness	One party forgives a defection on the part of the other party within a relatively short timeframe, usually within the following seven	*"When former Prime Minister Sir Julius was elected into Parliament as the New Ireland Governor, Mr Kabui asked for an apology from him after the Sandline and Bougainville crisis incident".* [0550]

		days.	
3. Retaliation			
	3.1 Immediate retaliation	One party immediately retaliates against a defection on the part of the other party, generally at their next interaction.	*"The people of Bana have pulled down the "No Go Zone" sign post. In retaliation, Mr Ona has imposed a blockade of all medical, school and store goods".* [0127]
	3.2 Delayed retaliation	One party retaliates against a defection on the part of the other party within a relatively short timeframe, usually within the following seven days.	*"'Several serious incidents against my staff over recent weeks have led to the indefinite suspension' Mr McMahon said. 'I feel sad that the suspension has occurred but the program cannot continue unless there is confidence in the safety of staff and property'".* [0127]
4. Clarity			
	4.1 Acted in a manner consistent with previous conduct	A party engaged in the peace process behaves in such as a way that is consistent with their previous conduct, agreements or propositions.	*"In making this appeal, I repeat the National Government's long-standing invitation to Francis Ona".* [0177]

	4.2 Opponent comments on actor behaving in an unclear manner	A party deviates from their previous course of action or statement of intentions.	*"The UN Secretary General's representative in Bougainville, Tor Stenbock, said he only signed the letters presented to him by Francis Ona…as 'being received'. Mr Stenbock made it clear that his signature was not to endorse independence, as portrayed by the people who accompanied Mr Ona".* [0318]
	4.3 Opponent unable to discern opponent's behaviour prior to acting	A party makes a move or decision without a clear understanding of the intended response or action of the opposition.	*"'I am still waiting for a written assurance from the Resistance Force chairman Hilary Masiria even though they verbally assured that there shouldn't be any problems from the forces'".* [0120]
	4.4 Actor clearly outlines intended future conduct	A party definitively states their expected approach, plan or other expectation of the peace process, or expresses their expectations of the opposition.	*"Bougainville Affairs Minister Moi Avei said yesterday Parliament must show…unity…in coming together in Arawa to design the [Bougainville Peace] Agreement. And for their part, the Bougainville leadership must know promote the agreement in the widest possible manner so that their people understand its content and take it as their own".* [0062]
5. *Demonstrated Cooperative Behaviour*			
	5.1 Frequency count for instances of cooperation		
6. *Demonstrated Uncooperative Behaviour*			

	6.1 Frequency count for instances of non-cooperation	
7. Miscellaneous		
	7.1 Sundry category for all miscellaneous data	

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