FREEDOM AND EDUCATION: An application of ethics, political philosophy and philosophy of mind to some of the problems associated with freedom in education.

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by

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ABSTRACT

It is generally acknowledged that educating children entails limiting their social freedom, (or liberty), to some extent. The question is, how far can children's liberty justifiably be limited in education, and on what grounds? One approach to this issue adopted in recent educational philosophy involves the idea that development of 'free' persons constitutes a key educational ideal, if not the educational ideal itself. It is argued that children's liberty should be regulated in accordance with the ideal of developing 'free' persons. After arguing in Chapter One that freedom may be construed both as a relationship obtaining between human beings and as a form of personality development, I examine philosophically the connection between children's liberty in education and the development of 'free' persons.

Some educational philosophers identify 'free' persons with rational, (autonomous) persons, and suggest that the development of reason is consistent with - and may actually presuppose - considerable restrictions on children's liberty. In particular, development of 'free' persons may require that children be initiated into the rational disciplines. Given the analysis of "social freedom" which I advance in Chapter Two, this requirement can be seen to constitute a serious curtailment of children's liberty. I argue that there are good reasons for challenging the view that to be a 'free' person consists in being rational, and then advance an alternative account of "free persons". This has quite different implications for the social freedom of children in education from those of the 'rationalist' view. Indeed, I conclude that whereas the 'rationalist' account of "free persons" is well-suited to justifying a considerable degree of unfreedom for children, mine more obviously lends itself to a positive end: namely, suggesting ways in which children may be offered increased social freedom by comparison with much current educational practice.
Introduction

One theme which has been given considerable treatment in recent educational philosophy is that education is centrally concerned with promoting freedom. It is to be expected that educationists should endeavour to link education and freedom in some positive manner. "Freedom" carries strong connotations of desirability. Typically people do not want to be seen as enemies of freedom. Moreover, because "freedom" carries connotations of positive value, any practice which can be shown to promote or at least be consistent with freedom is to that extent likely to meet with favourable response. However any attempt by educationists to show that education promotes freedom has the job ahead of it, since education is often regarded - at least in countries where compulsory formal education is well established - as something in which freedom is more obviously limited than extended. There are constraints upon parents to educate their children and to ensure that they are provided with a wide range of 'attachments' that have become part of our formal education tradition: uniforms, equipment, fees, transportation, field trips, and so on. Teachers too are subject to a good deal of constraint. Restrictions are imposed on what they cover in class, how they cover it, and when. Furthermore the conduct of teachers, extending even to their private life, is restricted considerably by a professional ethic and the demand that teachers present models of 'good living'. Finally, young people themselves - the pupils - are subject to wideranging constraints. In countries like our own they are compelled to engage for a minimum period of 10 years in activities for which they may have no felt interest. Within the school itself they are subjected to a real battery of rules and regulations, to the authority of teachers, and to the various forms of
sanction or punishment which the school upholds. In this discussion it is the freedom of pupils with which I am concerned.

Against this background of apparent unfreedom in education it is hardly surprising that those people committed to education should try and salvage something for the enterprise in respect of freedom. The last decade has witnessed a series of scathing criticisms of 'the jail business' by radical critics of formal education. These have no doubt provided some stimulus to the recent attempts by educationists to show that education and freedom are closely related. The way in which educational philosophers have typically tried to argue a link between education and freedom warrants investigation for it gives rise to a paradox: namely, that education promotes freedom by restricting freedom. The general position under examination here asserts that in order to make people free it is necessary to limit their freedom as pupils. Making people free is seen to consist in the development of autonomy, which is in turn identified with development of rationality and capacity for rational thought, judgement, choice, decision-making and action. If educators are to develop rationality it will be necessary for pupils to be constrained in various ways.

For example, J.P. White (1973) argues that a compulsory curriculum can be justified on the basis of autonomy as a primary ethical value. For White, autonomy is the mode of freedom with which education is centrally concerned. On his view the autonomous person is one who is able to determine for himself, under optimal conditions what his personal Good consists in, and how to set about realising this ideal. The freedom of the autonomous person comprises absence of impediment to genuine choice: choice of an ideal and of means to attaining it.
Impediments to genuine choice include, paradigmatically, lack of relevant types of knowledge, awareness, competence and understanding. Consequently, freedom (autonomy) presupposes possession of these relevant forms of knowledge etc. Such possession is seen as dependent upon participation in various activities. According to White, if a person is genuinely to

"determine himself what the Good shall be for him ...... we must ensure (a) that he knows about as many activities or ways of life as possible which he may want to choose for their own sake, and (b) that he is able to reflect on priorities among them from the point of view not only of the present moment but as far as possible of his life as a whole" (ibid, p.22).

He then argues that for the educator to ensure (a) and (b) amounts to requiring compulsory participation in a certain range of curriculum pursuits. The content of the compulsory curriculum conceived by White can be broken into three groups of activities.

(i) Those which cannot be properly appreciated unless one has actually participated in them. They include using one's native language (communicating), engaging in pure mathematics, engaging in the exact physical sciences, appreciating works of art, and philosophising. Unless one has actually participated in these pursuits one is not in a position to truly evaluate their worthwhileness within, or as, a way of life. Genuine choice of a way of life presupposes an appreciation of these viable options.

(ii) Studies, (like history), which inform the individual of a range of possible modes of life. Not to be familiar with studies of this sort is to be impeded in conceiving a Good for oneself - since one's awareness of the range of possible options is restricted.
(iii) Studies (like economics, political science, career information) which furnish 'practical' understanding and competence crucial for making effective plans by which to realise one's chosen way of life.

On White's argument it is only if we insist upon limiting the freedom of pupils now, by requiring attendance at a compulsory curriculum incorporating these three kinds of activity, that we can give them a maximum degree of autonomy later. "We are right to make him [i.e. the pupil] unfree now so as to give him as much autonomy as possible later on" (ibid, p.22)

Other philosophers, notably Dearden, Hirst, Peters and Scheffler, have defended a fairly traditional form of schooling, compulsion, rules, and authority by appealing to the relationship between "freedom" conceived as rational autonomy - and what have been called the forms of knowledge. They identify the central aim of education as the development of autonomous persons. Autonomy consists in rational thought and action. It is in the proper exercise of his reason - in judging, deciding, or willing rationally - that a person thinks or acts on his own: i.e. is himself (auto) the source of the 'law' (nomos) which guides his thought and activity. His belief and action is his 'own' in the sense that he has worked it over for himself. It has not been imposed on him by others, or merely soaked up second-hand from someone else.

Rationality is conceived by these philosophers as a matter of employing concepts, procedures, tests and standards which humans throughout their intellectual history have devised as tools of thought. These concepts, procedures, etc., are encapsulated within the various
rational disciplines, or what Hirst calls "the forms of knowledge". Hirst defines a form of knowledge as "a distinct way in which our experience becomes structured around the use of accepted public symbols" (1974, p.44). Each form of knowledge has certain central concepts which are distinctively its own. These are related to each other, as well as to further concepts denoting aspects of experience, to yield a distinctive logical structure in terms of which experience can be understood. By virtue of its peculiar concepts and logical structure, each form has distinctive expressions or statements that are testable against experience. Moreover the various forms have developed their own unique skills and techniques for testing their expressions and statements against experience. Hirst argues that there are seven such forms of knowledge: mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, religion, literature and the fine arts, and philosophy. These are subdivisible. (Where two or more distinct disciplines are employed within a rational pursuit defined by its subject matter rather than by a concern to validate any one logically distinct form of expression, Hirst speaks of a field of knowledge - e.g. geography, engineering, education.)

To be rational, then, is to be capable of disciplined inquiry; to be 'on the inside' of the forms of knowledge. This in turn presupposes initiation into public traditions. The relevant kinds of awareness and competence are not innate; they have to be acquired. In other words, rationality is in an important sense a public phenomenon. Concepts, procedures, skills, etc., which govern rational thought and action are public possessions. They have to be acquired from others who already possess them. As far as education is concerned, the crucial point here involves the manner in which it is alleged this acquisition
must take place. Thinking and acting rationally is an art which cannot be acquired simply in words but must be learnt in a tradition. c.f.

"The art of scientific investigation and the development of appropriate experimental tests, the forming of an historical explanation and the assessment of its truth, the appreciation of a poem: all of these activities are high arts that are not in themselves communicable simply by words. Acquiring knowledge of any form is therefore to a greater or lesser extent something that cannot be done simply by solitary study of the symbolic expressions of knowledge, it must be learnt from a master on the job." (ibid, p.45)

This conception of education as initiation into the art of autonomous (rational) inquiry by a master on the job seems to justify a fairly traditional form of schooling: an academic-style curriculum, considerable restriction on pupils' freedom, and recognition of the importance of rules and authority within the educational situation. The basis of the curriculum must of course be the forms and fields of knowledge. Hirst and Peters present the problem of having to choose educational objectives to be served by a curriculum as the problem of having to decide which of the several forms of knowledge and understanding we are concerned with. "The issue of breadth in education as opposed to narrow specialisation is ... surely the issue of whether or not a person is being significantly introduced to each of the fundamentally different types of objective experience and knowledge that are open to men" (Hirst and Peters, 1970, p.66). It should be noted that Hirst and Peters do not thereby commit themselves to the established practice of organising the curriculum into so-called 'school-subjects', e.g. poetry, arithmetic, geography, English and the like. They argue that while human knowledge and experience is differentiated into a number of distinct forms, it does not follow at all "that the best way of developing such knowledge and experience is
to organise a curriculum in terms of these forms" (ibid., p. 69). Curriculum organisation must take into account such things as social demands and psychological factors about learning and motivation, as well as purely philosophical considerations. However the assumption clearly remains that the curriculum will retain its traditional academic - intellectual emphasis.

This commitment to an intellectually oriented curriculum entails considerable restriction on the freedom of pupils. For freedom consists in the absence of constraints to wants. My freedom is limited if I am prevented from doing what I want, or alternatively if I am compelled to do what I want not to do. There is nothing odd in the notion of a child not wanting to engage in rational pursuits or wanting to do something other than engage in such pursuits. To the extent that the child is initiated into the forms and fields of knowledge we limit his freedom. As far as the child is concerned there are meaningful alternatives to rational pursuits: other things he may want to do. In educating him along the lines being considered here, we close these alternatives off from him. Furthermore, we do this over a lengthy period of time and at the expense of a considerable amount of energy and interest. For the relevant learnings and understandings presupposed by the development of rational autonomy involve a lot of time and energy. By and large this wideranging restriction on pupils' freedom is acknowledged by proponents of the present view. Peters, for example, claims that almost by definition an educational situation is one in which constraints are placed on children's wants. An educational situation involves
"essentially a contrived and controlled environment ... such controlled conditions act as general constraints on the wants of children ... This must be the case; for no educator can take the wants of children for granted, part of his business as an educator being the transformation of wants, both in respect of their quality and in respect of their stability. To effect such a transformation a background of constraints on children's wants is necessary" (Peters, 1966, p. 193).

An authority structure is presupposed within the educational situation. This has two aspects. First, there must be some individual or group in authority. Since conditions of order must obtain in an educational setting someone must have the right to lay down and enforce appropriate norms of organisation and behaviour. In societies like our own it is inevitable that initiation into the rational 'forms' will take place principally in schools. But an institution like a school can operate only if there is a system of rules and constraints to regulate the activities of its members - not only within specific learning situations, but within the total context in which the school assumes responsibility for its pupils. The person in authority is the headmaster or the teacher, and pupils are subject to his or her authority. Indeed such subjection is seen as a pre-condition of maintaining circumstances under which education can take place.

In 'Freedom and the Development of the Free Man' (1973), Peters argues that rules established and enforced by persons in authority have educational significance other than merely as means to obtaining order. He suggests that imposing certain restrictions on children's freedom is important if they are to develop an autonomous attitude towards rules. Adopting the Piaget-Kohlberg stage theory of moral development, Peters argues that if children are to attain an
autonomous attitude towards rules they must first pass through the various sequential stages of moral heteronomy. Before the child can perceive rules as alterable conventions governing his social life and properly subject to rational principled assessment, he must first see them as connected with punishments and rewards, and later as ways of maintaining an order which is "authoritatively ordained" (ibid, p.135). Children must pass from an egocentric moral awareness before they attain a principled morality. The practical implication of this is that children have to be exposed to a structure and regulation - commands rules, punishments - if they are to attain moral autonomy.

Secondly, the educational situation presupposes that someone be an authority. Being educated involves being initiated into the forms of knowledge. This is an initiation into an area governed by rules, procedures and standards. There are, for example, correct and incorrect ways of using a concept, right and wrong ways of setting up an experiment, appropriate and inappropriate ways of refuting an argument or hypothesis, and so on. Those being educated are not familiar with what is correct or incorrect and with the norms by which this is determined. By education they obtain the necessary awareness and competence and this requires that someone be entitled to make pronouncements on these matters, to correct mistakes made by students, and to decide what is the best or correct way to proceed. This will be someone who is already 'on the inside' of the forms and fields of knowledge. The teacher is an authority as well as being in authority. Only gradually, as he gains a measure of competence, will the pupil himself become to some extent an authority in the area. Until this time, academic authority rests with the teacher.
Despite the weighting given to rules, coercion and authority, proponents of this account of education nevertheless argue that it is grounded on a conception of freedom as education's central aim. The rationally autonomous individual is a free person. He shapes and rules his own life by determining for himself, through his reason, the content of his beliefs and the nature of his conduct. He is freed from appeal to external authorities on matters of right and wrong, good and bad. Education which is based on the rational disciplines knows "no limits other than those imposed by the nature of rational knowledge, and thereby itself develops in men the final court of appeal in all human affairs" (Hirst, op. cit., p.43). In acting on his reason, the individual is freed from determination by 'alien' forces: e.g., emotions, desires and inclinations. He becomes his own cause rather than an effect of other causes. In these various ways "autonomy" is construed as a genuine sense of "freedom", and is seen to comprise the central aim of education. We are left, however, with the apparent paradox that in order to realise freedom as an aim it is necessary to impose considerable restrictions on the freedom of pupils - both within the educative process and the educative setting.

It is my conviction that this position must be exposed to rigorous philosophical inquiry. I submit the following as grounds for unease with the rationalist view sketched here.

(a) I find disturbing the willingness with which many people relinquish their social freedom. They accept quite uncritically more and more constraints as being necessary for the promotion of their true interests. In some instances it appears that an individual's need for security is satisfied in circumstances where his freedom is considerably
restricted. This phenomenon has been documented and analysed - in rather different ways - by such writers as Erich Fromm and Ivan Illich. Fromm notes the readiness with which whole societies have embraced the leadership of 'strong' personalities - e.g. Hitler, and Mussolini - and the wideranging contraints and demands imposed under such leadership. Illich comments on the eagerness with which the schooled personality submits to the demands, standards and expectations of authorities. c.f.

"They no longer have to be put in their place, but put themselves into their assigned slots, squeeze themselves into the niche which they have been taught to seek .... They do not have to be robbed of their creativity. Under instruction they have unlearned to 'do' their thing or 'be' themselves" (1971, p.40)

I am not trying to suggest that people's interests are never advanced by the imposition of constraints. Obviously in some cases constraints to freedom are necessary if our interests are to be promoted. But perhaps it is possible to be over-impressed by these cases. For it seems as if for many people it is virtually an assumption that without constraints one's interests are not being taken care of.

The evidence provided by my own experience with educationists and particularly teachers, is that two assumptions are deeply entrenched in educational thinking: namely, (i) promotion of pupils' true interests presupposes stringent curtailment of their liberty; and (ii) if pupils are really to be made free by education they must be subjected to a large measure of unfreedom in their formative years. If this kind of thinking is as common in educational circles as I suspect, it should come as no surprise to find many pupils uncritically accepting wideranging constraint as an inevitable aspect of human life.
Equally we might expect that many of them will acquire a dependence on 'authorities' for 'knowledge' of what is in their interests.

The position on freedom in education advanced by Dearden, Hirst, Peters, White, et al., gives sophisticated form to this line of thought. Teachers and teacher trainees within our society are increasingly being exposed to contemporary educational philosophy. It is possible that if the above account of freedom in education goes unchallenged it will have the effect of further reinforcing convictions held by so many teachers: convictions which I hope to suggest are very much open to question. Because I find it disturbing that people accept quite uncritically restrictions on their liberty, I believe it important to investigate arguments which posit extensive pupil unfreedom as an inevitable fact of educational life. Moreover it seems especially important that the position sketched here be investigated. For it not only provides a rationale for wideranging encroachments on the social freedom of youngsters, it also casts this rationale in the very language of freedom - thereby making it that much easier to accept uncritically.

(b) There seems prima facie to be something odd in the idea that freedom consists in thinking and acting rationally. Certainly social freedom, or liberty, does not consist in this. To be at liberty is not to be constrained by others in doing or getting what one wants. However those who identify freedom with rationality are not concerned with "freedom" as a social relationship, but rather as a form of personality or character development. Even so there is something odd about identifying free persons with rational persons. To be a free type of person, at least on a popular conception, implies spontaneity,
'doing one's thing', pursuing whatever want or end one has at the time. Rationality, by contrast, implies a concern for careful deliberation, judgment, weighing relevant considerations, and believing or acting accordingly. This seems to be quite at odds with the idea of being a free type of person. Indeed many philosophers have argued that the significance of rationality is precisely that it checks spontaneous judgment, activity, or self-expression. This apparent tension between "freedom" and "rationality" suggests at least that resistance might be put up against the view that development of free persons presupposes extensive unfreedom for pupils.

(c) There is a strand in contemporary Marxist thought according to which rationality imprisons rather than liberates the consciousness of human beings - at least given the heavily academic view of reason under consideration here. Perception, awareness and understanding, it is argued, are constrained by the conceptual schemes of the forms of knowledge. So far as there are other schemes making possible different kinds of perception and understanding, commitment to rationality is a commitment to confining human awareness within limited bounds. Furthermore it might be suggested that the elaborate arguments advanced by philosophers in support of traditional forms of education are, in effect, simply rationalisations of the existing social and economic order. i.e., schooling which is based on a "forms of knowledge" epistemology has the effect of imprisoning people within a world-view that is advantageous to the power-elites; it confines people within the existing social and economic reality. According to this line of argument, development of rationality does not liberate people. Far from setting them free it functions as an instrument of 'domestication' (cf., Freire, 1972).
(d) There is a well-known danger inherent in identifying freedom with rationality. (This has been given full and clear treatment by Berlin, 1969, in his attack on the notion of positive liberty.) The problem is that any doctrine which equates (or closely links) "freedom" with "rationality" can easily become an instrument supporting extreme authoritarian control - including totalitarianism. There is no necessary reason why this should be. However, the history of ideas reveals that often those theorists who define "freedom" in terms of rationality favour extensive social-political control over the activities of individuals. Plato and Rousseau provide two notable instances of this tendency, in The Republic and The Social Contract respectively. The danger with this position arises when it is assumed that not all people are sufficiently rational. Rationality may then be seen as the preserve of 'experts', the authorities, etc. They know what is most rational, and are thereby in a position to reveal this to those whose reason is not so well developed. One of the grounds for advancing rationality as the supreme ethical value is that the right and the good are seen as functions of reason. So far as a person's action is rational it will be good. So far as his belief is rational it will be right or sound. The concern for rational belief and action then is precisely the concern for right belief and good action. However if not all people are truly rational then not all people can be trusted to determine for themselves what is indeed right and good. If they are to believe rightly and act well it will be necessary for them to be guided by those who are rational.

If "freedom" is equated with rationality, and rationality is seen as the preserve of some group or individual, then a given person's freedom might consist in conformity to the judgments, rules, demands,
or guidelines of his rational 'betters'. One is then truly free when one is obeying rules, or alternatively, freedom becomes the right to do as one ought. For example, it would appear that in Plato's utopian republic most of the people would get their rationality, and hence their freedom, second hand. Similarly, Rousseau's idea that an individual may be forced to be free involves the individual submitting to laws imposed by the Legislator when his own will inclines him to act contrary to the General Will.

Of course this is not what educational philosophers committed to development of rational autonomy have in mind. They want rationality to be developed as far as possible within each individual - so that each may uncover truth and goodness for himself. However, so far as the educational enterprise itself is concerned the situation for the pupil is very much like that sketched in the two previous paragraphs. The pupil can be wrong about his own best interests. If left to his own determinations his beliefs will often be unsound and his action often bad. He becomes free by conforming to the demands of authorities and obeying the rules imposed by his 'betters'. Just what is involved in being freed is obedience, conformity, subjection to constraint. These are necessary parts of the process but there is a risk that the wrong lesson will be learned. Instead of seeing conformity to the demands and rules of authorities as part of a process having independence as its ultimate goal, conformity may be seen as itself the end. Where this occurs - and it is not uncommon - the attempt to develop rational autonomy results in the emergence of adults who have a heavy dependence on authorities. It in no way alleviates this problem to frame one's commitment to rationality as the primary educational value in language of 'freedom'. If anything
this may compound the problem - since the conformists who emerge may nevertheless see themselves as free.

The aim of my discussion is to challenge the paradoxical thesis that in order to develop free persons within education it is necessary to subject pupils to extensive unfreedom. I want to question whether a form of personality or character development which may be denoted by the term "freedom", presupposes a form of education in which authority, compulsion, rules and coercion are central features. My discussion takes the following form.

In Chapter One an attempt is made to distinguish two general ways in which, since the time of Plato, people have answered the question: 'What does human freedom consist in?'. According to the first view to be free consists in not being impeded or prevented by forces around one from doing or getting what one wants. On the second view, freedom is seen to comprise an ideal of character or personality development. To be free is to have attained a certain level or quality of personal development. I suggest that both views have considerable significance in educational thought.

Within the first 'perspective' on freedom, the type of constraint with which philosophers traditionally have been most concerned is social constraint: i.e., impediments to the pursuit of wants presented by the activities and arrangements of human beings. Absence of social constraints constitutes social freedom or liberty. Educationists have long been concerned with issues relating to social freedom in education - particularly with the question of how much social freedom should be extended to pupils. In educational writings the concept of social freedom is often not made especially clear. However it is obviously
important that I get as clear as possible about this notion here. "Social freedom" is analysed in Chapter Two, with special reference to educational considerations.

In Chapter Three attention is shifted to the second 'perspective' on freedom. Several historically influential applications of the concept "free" to some form of personality or character development are traced by way of a background to contemporary accounts of "free persons". The aim of the fourth chapter is to elucidate what contemporary 'rationalist' philosophers of education mean by "a free person": i.e., the rationally autonomous individual.

I then ask (in Chapter Five) what implications commitment to the development of rational autonomy has for the social freedom of pupils. It is suggested, following the arguments of the 'rationalists' themselves, that development of rational autonomy presupposes considerable restrictions on the social freedom of pupils. Some aspects of this restriction are traced. A number of grounds are then advanced for considering the possibility of an alternative view of free persons, as an educational ideal, from that presented by the rationalists. I argue that there are good reasons for attempting to articulate a non-rationalist account of "free persons".

An attempt to make sense of "free persons" along non-rationalist lines is made in Chapter Six. This analysis begins from the idea of human beings as creatures who have wants and needs, rather than primarily as beings who have reason or rational potential.

In the final chapter I ask what implications commitment to the development of free persons (in my sense) as an educational aim has
for the social freedom of pupils. These implications are compared briefly with those of the rationalist position. In addition I sketch some reasons in support of accepting development of free persons, (in my sense), as an aim of education.
CHAPTER ONE

Two Perspectives on Freedom.

Educationists have long disputed the place and importance of freedom in education. Such dispute is especially evident in current educational thought. Disagreement has emerged at various levels. There are, for example, competing views as to how much freedom should be extended to children in education and what the criteria are for determining this. At a more fundamental level there is disagreement over what freedom actually consists in, and whether it is appropriate to regard children as full subjects of freedom or unfreedom. Another important source of dispute relates to the value of freedom: is freedom a good thing in itself, or must its value be assessed in relation to some other good?

The issue with which I am primarily concerned involves the idea that promotion of freedom in the long run - in some sense of "freedom" - is an important criterion, and perhaps the criterion, in accordance with which educators are to determine how much freedom should be given to pupils in the process. At first glance, the idea that the promotion of freedom itself is a crucial consideration in determining how far children should have freedom in education is somewhat perplexing. However I believe we can make good educational sense of this idea if we approach it by reference to what I will call two 'perspectives' on freedom.

I want to suggest that within the wider context of social, ethical, and political debate, Western thought concerning freedom has been shaped by two competing perspectives. Thought about freedom within the narrower sphere of specifically educational debate reflects these
perspectives. Since this idea of two competing perspectives on freedom is not to be found in the literature pertaining to freedom, it requires elucidation. I will begin my discussion by offering a brief account of the two perspectives on freedom and suggesting some of the ways in which they have affected educational thought. It is intended that this brief inquiry should yield a broad structure for subsequent discussion, as well as clarify the idea that freedom itself is a criterion for determining how far children should be given freedom in education.

I submit that two competing perspectives on freedom are evident in Western thought as far back as the Ancient Greeks and can be elucidated by reference to some ideas about freedom which Plato advances in the Republic.

Plato conceives democracy as a form of political organisation characterised by a large measure of liberty for each individual. He claims that in a democracy

"people are free. There is much liberty and freedom of speech, and every individual is free to do as he likes ... This being so, everyone arranges his life as most pleases him.... One is not compelled: to exercise authority or responsibility - even if one is capable of doing so. Neither is one compelled to submit to authority if one wishes not to ..." (1955 edition, section 557, paraphrased).

Plato himself had very little sympathy with this kind of freedom: that is, liberty to do as one likes regardless of what it is that one likes. As far as he was concerned it is not the valuable thing so many people take it to be. Rather it contributes to moral degeneracy.

However Plato also speaks of freedom at a quite different level from that of individual liberty. As is well known, he believed that the individual is the state 'writ small'. Hence for each type of state
there is a corresponding type of character or personality. For example, corresponding to the democratic state is the democratic individual, and to the tyranny the tyrannical individual. According to Plato the democratic individual is morally degenerate, almost totally lacking in self-control. Just as the democratic state provides for free play of the desires and whims of its individual members in an impartial manner, so the democratic individual allows his various passions, desires and impulses to have free and equal play. He is moved to action by whatever impulse governs him at the time. Of the democratic individual Plato says,

"If anyone tells him that some pleasures, because they spring from good desires, are to be encouraged and approved, and others, springing from evil desires, to be disciplined and controlled, he won't listen or open his doors to the truth, but shakes his head and says that all pleasures are equal and should be given equal rights .... (He) lives for the pleasure of the moment. One day its wine, women, and song, the next bread and water; one day its hard physical training, the next indolence and ease, and then a period of philosophic study .... There's no order or restraint in his life, and he reckons his way of living is pleasant, free and happy" (Ibid., section 561).

Plato argues that such a person is not truly free. He may well succumb to the dominance of a master passion and degenerate into a tyrannical character. Plato claims that tyrannical individuals, like democratic individuals, never taste true freedom (see Ibid., sect. 576). The tyrannical character "will hardly be able to call his soul his own because the best elements in him will be enslaved and completely controlled by a minority of lower and lunatic impulses" (Ibid., sect. 577). On Plato's view this individual is in a condition of slavery - for all his freedom from laws, coercion by authorities, and subjection to sanctions. For Plato true freedom consists in self-mastery or self-control such that one's life is governed by reason: desires,
passions, impulses, emotions, are under the guiding control of rationality. Self-mastery is found in the individual in whom "the naturally better element - i.e., reason - controls the worse" (ibid., section 431). That is, the free man is master of himself, in the sense that his 'real self' - which is identified with reason - is free from control and coercion by his 'lower' or 'alien' self - which is identified with desire and emotion. Plato asserts that freedom, like justice, is a principle whose "real concern is not with external actions, but with a man's inward self" (ibid., section 431).

My contention is that these passages from Plato embody two perspectives on freedom. By this I mean that we can distinguish within these passages two rather different standpoints from which freedom may be conceived. From the first perspective freedom is seen as consisting in an external relationship between an individual or a group and other individuals, groups, objects, or forces. To be more precise, my first perspective may be understood as involving the view that to be free consists in not being subject to external constraints. A person's freedom is limited by the presence of constraints or impediments to the pursuit of objects of desire. On this broad conception of freedom a person is made free by removing external impediments. The class of external impediments is very large. It includes imposition of physical force by other people, restriction by natural physical barriers, the operation of laws, penalties, threats and ostracism, and economic conditions. From an historical standpoint it is constraint resulting from practices and arrangements of human beings, (that is, social constraint), that has been at the heart of debates about freedom. It is this sort of freedom, social freedom, which Plato believes
characterises a democracy. Individuals are to a large degree free from laws, sanctions, authoritative demands, and physical intervention to do as they like. In other words, the freedom they enjoy is a freedom from external barriers, (or at least from a particular range of external barriers). In this discussion I shall be very much concerned with social freedom.

From the second perspective freedom is seen as something internal to the individual himself: namely, some desirable mode of existence or being consisting in the absence of certain character or personality conditions which may be characterised as constraints. That is, to be free amounts to being a particular kind of person: indeed it denotes a personality ideal. For Plato the form of personality development which he calls self-mastery is such an ideal.\(^1\) The constraints from which the individual is free are internal constraints imposed by his nature. These consist in the pushings and pullings of appetite and passion. The individual who has acquired self-mastery may be subject to a wide range of external constraints - including social constraints. Nevertheless, on Plato's view he is free. From the first perspective on freedom he cannot be regarded as free. But from the second perspective he can.

In referring to these as "perspectives" I want to convey two ideas. Firstly, they constitute what appear to be different viewpoints or orientations from which to consider the question, "What does human

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1. So is democratic character. But according to Plato democratic character is an undesirable ideal, whereas self-mastery is a desirable ideal. On Plato's view those who conceive democratic character as the ideal of free personhood are mistaken. Freedom really consists in self-mastery.
freedom consist in". In other words, they represent what appear to be quite different ways of 'looking at' human freedom. Secondly, I want to convey the idea that these viewpoints are quite broad or general in nature. Each perspective comprises a general framework or 'sphere of vision' within which the idea of freedom is conceived. But neither yields any one specific, definitive account of "freedom". This is especially apparent in the case of the second perspective. There have been many different and often conflicting accounts presented of "the free person" as an ideal form of personality development. cf., "the rational person", "the autonomous person", "the self-controlling person", "the self-regulating person", and "the psychologically free person". Indeed as Barrow recognises, the existence of varying accounts of "the free person" presents a problem of conflicting ideals. He says,

"If we were to accept the idea of a positive conception (of 'freedom') we should still be faced with the question of precisely what positive conception we ought to adopt as our ideal. Ought we, for instance, to aim at 'realising the personality' or 'setting up the rule of reason'?" (1975, 75).

Similarly, the first perspective is sufficiently general to admit different accounts of what constitutes external constraints upon human freedom. Alternatively, where different types of external constraint are recognised, various corresponding forms of human freedom may be identified: for example, social, political, legal, physical, and institutional freedom, corresponding to social, political, legal, physical, and institutional constraints respectively. All are possible under this one general perspective. Even where writers have focused upon one specific area of concern within this perspective, for example, on social freedom, they have often advanced markedly different accounts of what it means for someone to be free in this sense. cf., MacCallum (1967), Berlin (1969), Benn and Weinstein (1971), and Parent (1974).
I believe that this distinction between two perspectives on freedom can help us make sense of the idea that freedom itself constitutes a criterion for determining the legitimate scope of children's freedom in education. When we say that freedom itself serves as a criterion here we mean freedom as a personality ideal: that is, freedom conceived within my second perspective. When we ask how much freedom children should be given in education we mean freedom from constraint to wants: in particular freedom from social constraint. Hence it might be argued that social constraints to wants ought to be removed or imposed so far as they impede or promote freedom as a personality ideal. This indeed maps out the broad scope of my concern. The discussion which follows is advanced as a philosophical inquiry into the question, "How far should children be given social freedom in education if we want them to develop into free persons?"

Within the evolution of Western thought these two perspectives on freedom have to a large extent emerged in competition with each other. We find some people who maintain that 'true' freedom is freedom from social constraint. Their conception of freedom belongs in my first perspective. Others, like Plato, argue that 'true' freedom is freedom from control by the passions and urges of the appetite. By contrast, their conception of freedom belongs in my second perspective. The existence of competing perspectives on freedom has very important implications for social and political thought about freedom generally, and for educational thought in particular. I want briefly to look at the existence of these competing perspectives in relation to some problems concerning the value of freedom from external constraint - in particular freedom from social constraint.
"Freedom" carries with it strong connotations of positive value.
c.f.,

"Whatever else we believe about freedom, most of us believe it is something to be praised, or so luminously a Thing of Value that it is beyond praise ... Some say that freedom is good in itself quite apart from its consequences" (Feinberg, 1973a, p.20).

However problems arise when freedom is construed as the absence of social constraints. To begin with it is not at all clear that such freedom is a good thing in itself. We tend to think it a good thing to be without constraint and a bad thing to be constrained, but most people are prepared to acknowledge that often constraint is desirable. This is so in cases where absence of constraint results in undesirable consequences, or where such consequences would be avoided if certain constraints were imposed. This poses something of a dilemma. Freedom from constraints is a good thing: sometimes constraints are good.

The problem is that people are free or unfree in respect of a wide range of pursuits not all of which will be 'good' or 'valuable'. People often want things which we do not regard as desirable or worthwhile. In fact we judge many objects of desire to be evil. What this means is that if there is a law against wilfully killing or maiming another person this constitutes a restriction on freedom every bit as much as a law preventing one from offering aid to someone else. Sanctions preventing use of hard drugs or engagement in perverse sexual practices limit freedom to the same extent as measures which outlaw gardening or chess-playing.

Seen from a different viewpoint, I would be free to use hard drugs were there no measures preventing this in just the same sense as
I am free in New Zealand to keep a garden if I so desire. As there are many New Zealanders who want to keep a garden so there are many who want to use hard drugs. Wants are notoriously subjective things. While some objects of desire tend to bring happiness or satisfaction to all affected by pursuit of them, others bring happiness or satisfaction only to those wanting them, and often not even to them in the long run. And frequently the consequence of pursuing a want is harmful to others and/or oneself. A related point here is that if it is a bad thing to be unfree this will be true not only for the person prevented from keeping a garden but also for someone prevented from using hard drugs.

I am suggesting, then, that freedom from social constraint can result in harmful consequences as well as in beneficial consequences. This fact has been employed against the assumption that freedom from social constraint is good in itself. Fitzjames Stephen says here,

"To me the question whether liberty is a good or a bad thing appears as irrational as the question whether fire is a good or a bad thing. It is both good and bad according to time, place and circumstance, and a complete answer to the question, in what cases is liberty good and in what cases is it bad? would involve not merely a universal history of mankind, but a complete solution of the problems which such a history would offer .... We must proceed in a ... cautious way, and confine ourselves to such remarks as experience suggests about the advantages and disadvantages of liberty and compulsion respectively in particular cases" (1967 edition, p. 85).

In addition to arguments against the view that freedom is good in itself, there are also a number of common objections to the assumption that freedom from social constraint is a very significant human good. I will briefly mention four of these. Firstly, if freedom is construed as absence of constraint to pursuit of wants it can easily be trivialised. For example, if I want to use the bathroom but you are
already using it, your occupancy constitutes a restriction upon my doing what I want. Hence it is an infringement on my freedom. However such a restriction hardly seems to involve a significant human evil. Consequently it is difficult to see how the removal of such a constraint would constitute an important human good.

Secondly, some philosophers have suggested that "if, in advocating freedom, we have in mind freedom from various restrictions .... we are putting forward a very dull and uninspiring ideal" (Barrow, op cit., p. 74). Such an ideal would be merely negative - to get rid of restrictions. Would it not be a more inspiring ideal, something more worthy of the name "freedom", these philosophers argue, to conceive of freedom in more positive terms? For example, as

"A positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying ... the development and exercise on the whole of those powers of contributing to social good with which we believe the members of the society to be endowed .... the greater power on the part of the citizens as a body to make the most and best of themselves" (Green, T.H., 1889, p. 371).

There is a third obvious objection to the assumption that freedom from social constraint is a very significant human good. As I have already noted, we sometimes acknowledge that the deliberate imposition of social constraint can be a desirable thing. This is simply because we hold that there are some wants which people should not be allowed to indulge. In at least some cases, then, it is restriction on freedom rather than freedom itself which constitutes a significant human good.

Finally, it has sometimes been argued that people who enjoy wideranging liberty may be very unhappy. Plato argues in the Republic that the democratic character - who thrives under conditions of maximum liberty - is really among the unhappiest of men. Indeed according to
Plato only the tyrannical character is more unhappy (c.f., op. cit., sections 577-580). More recently, Fromm (1960) has spoken of 'the fear of freedom'. He suggests that this condition may explain the readiness with which so many Germans and Italians submitted to Nazi and Fascist domination during the 1930's and 1940's. According to Fromm, many people cannot cope psychologically with a large measure of social freedom. They find it threatening to have to make their own decisions, exercise choice, demonstrate initiative and show responsibility. They prefer to have decisions made for them, to obey orders rather than act autonomously. Such people are quite common. The increased demand for strong leadership in the daily lives of individuals has become a common phenomenon in recent years. Politicians often find it advantageous to project a strong, tough image. Authoritarian cults and sects have found many willing recruits among youngsters in Western nations. Far from valuing freedom, many people

"positively shrink from what they are free to do ... [They] may be unable to tolerate the uncertainty involved in having to make many choices ... and may welcome with relief some more wobblke type of existence" (Peters, 1966, p. 190).

Supporters of social freedom have advanced various counter arguments to these sorts of objections. A line of argument which recurs frequently in educational writings proceeds by denying the charge that the consequences of allowing people freedom may be undesirable. As we have seen, one ground for denying both that social freedom is good in itself and that it constitutes an important human good is that it may have undesirable consequences. Some theorists believe they can retain commitment to social freedom as an important human value by elucidating a distinction between "liberty" and "licence". It is somehow made part of the definition of "freedom"
that the objects of desire in terms of which one may properly be judged free or unfree are good or worthwhile. Similarly, the presence of constraint to pursuits or activities which are not considered worthwhile or desirable does not, on this view, comprise a restriction on freedom. Absence of constraint to undesirable wants amounts to licence, not freedom. It is a human good to be extended freedom, but an evil to be permitted licence. On this view all restrictions upon social freedom are bad, and all impediments to licence good. However I am very doubtful that a genuine distinction between "freedom" and "licence" can be drawn. This matter will be taken up at some length in Chapter Two, but I will introduce the 'distinction' here.

Within educational writings the 'distinction' between "liberty" and "licence" is at least as old as Rousseau. In Emile he informs us that it is of the utmost importance to distinguish instances of liberty from cases of licence. However he is less than helpful when it comes to showing us how to make this distinction. In places he appears to think that it is self-evident, forestalling our search for clarification. c.f., "if such blundering thinkers fail to discriminate between liberty and licence, between a merry child and a spoilt darling, let them learn to discriminate" (Emile, Everyman edition, p.43). Elsewhere his account appears to beg the question. c.f.,

"Shut up a young gentleman and a young peasant in a room; the former will have upset and smashed everything before the latter has stirred from his place. Why is that, unless that the one hastens to misuse a moment's licence, while the other, always sure of freedom, does not use it rashly?" (ibid., p. 56).

"Liberty" here looks like the absence of constraints to worthwhile pursuits, and "licence" like the absence of constraints to undesirable
activity. Unless clear criteria are offered for distinguishing worthwhile pursuits from undesirable pursuits we lack a genuine account of the alleged "liberty"-"licence" distinction. Much of the Emile can be construed as an attempt to provide such criteria.

Among recent educational writings the view that liberty must be distinguished from licence is given perhaps its most forceful statement by A.S. Neill in Summerhill (1968). Neill's distinction between "liberty" and "licence" corresponds to that which he draws between a free child and a spoilt one. The child who is given only liberty emerges as a free individual. By contrast the child who enjoys considerable licence becomes a spoilt individual. The aim of education is the development of free persons. Hence it is critical that children be given liberty and refused licence.

Neill's suggestion for distinguishing one from the other is based on the notion of personal rights. By "having personal rights" he means having one's wants and interests recognised and respected in the actions of others. Where someone is free to act in a manner which damages the wants and interests of others, that person is extended licence rather than liberty. Hence the child whose mother allowed her to stand on Neill's grand piano was given licence. She was also a spoilt child, since she expected to be allowed to act without regard for others' rights outside her home setting. By contrast, in the free home the rights of all members are respected equally. The child is permitted to act as she wants so long as this does not infringe the rights of others. In other words she is at liberty. But where her actions would infringe others' rights constraints are applied. This however does not constitute a restriction on her liberty. It merely curbs licence.
Unfortunately, Neill offers some examples which do not readily appear to fit this analysis. He claims that it is not a curtailment of freedom for a child to have dangerous substances or practices closed off from her c.f.,

"Only a fool in charge of young children would allow unbarred bedroom windows or an unprotected fire in the nursery. Yet, too often, young enthusiasts for self-regulation come to my school as visitors, and exclaim at our lack of freedom in locking poison in a lab closet, or our prohibition about playing on the fire escape. The whole freedom movement is marred and despised because so many advocates of freedom have not got their feet on the ground" (1968, pp. 104-105).

That is, it is licence, not liberty, to leave these options open to children.

I cannot see how these cases can be made to fit the "respect for personal rights" analysis. It could, perhaps, be argued that the point in these examples is not that the child would show disregard for the rights of others by playing on the fire escape or getting into poisons. It is not the nature of the child's activity that would make absence of constraint here into instances of licence. Rather the fact is that if the adults in charge of children did not impose constraints here they would be disregarding the personal rights of children - to safety, health, welfare, etc. However this suggestion simply stretches the analysis to the point where it collapses. Nevertheless Neill believes there is a genuine distinction between cases of liberty and licence and that he can retain social freedom as an absolute value within education.

This line of argument continues to find considerable support among educationists. However as far as the actual emergence of competing
perspectives on freedom is concerned, a second response to the sorts of objections raised above has greater significance. As noted, Plato believed that freedom from social constraint is of dubious value. Indeed, so far as it leads to moral degeneracy it is ethically undesirable. Nevertheless Plato believed that rightly understood "freedom" denotes a human good. It is not, however, a good which has to do with external constraint and relationships between agents, but rather with "a man's inward self". Freedom is valuable because it constitutes a human personality ideal, not because of the space it permits for pursuit of wants.\(^1\) Hence those arguments sketched above against the view that freedom is an important human good, and indeed a good in itself, do not touch the Platonic conception of freedom as an ideal. According to Plato to be rational, and hence free, is part of what it means to live the Good Life. It is only by reason that we discover what is good, says Plato. Virtue is knowledge, and Knowledge is derived from reason (see Chapter Three below). Commenting on the Greek view of the Good Life and the place of freedom within such a life, Hirst says,

"it was held that the achievement of knowledge is not only the attainment of the good of the mind itself, but also the chief means whereby the good life as a whole is to be found. Man is more than pure mind, yet mind is his essential defining characteristic, and it is in terms of knowledge that his whole life is rightly directed" (1974, p.30).

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1. T.H. Green shares Plato's view. c.f.,

"We shall probably all agree that freedom, rightly understood is the greatest of all blessings: that its attainment is the true end of all our efforts as citizens. But when we thus speak of freedom, we should consider carefully what we mean by it. We do not mean merely freedom from constraint or compulsion. We do not mean merely freedom to do as we like irrespectively of what it is that we like" (1889, p.370).
Such is Plato's response to problems relating to value presented by the nature of social freedom. The significance of this response for the emergence of competing perspectives on freedom is clear. By arguing in this way Plato shifts from an account of "freedom" belonging in the first perspective to one which falls within the second. Plato may have been successful in preserving a link between freedom and desirability, but he does this by adopting a quite different view of freedom from that which presents the original difficulties. This move to a different perspective on freedom has split supporters of freedom as a human value into two broad camps. While many people retain the view that freedom 'really' consists in the absence of constraint to human desire - especially social constraint - others follow Plato's lead and insist that 'true' freedom consists in attaining a certain form of personality development. This second viewpoint is quite common among educationists.

Western thought abounds in accounts of "human freedom" conceived as a personality ideal. However the particular accounts themselves vary considerably according to the range of personality or character conditions identified as constraints. The possibility of such variance between accounts has important implications for the view that development of free persons comprises an educational ideal, and perhaps the educational ideal.

Many accounts of "the free person" are based on the idea that constraint consists in the domination of reason by appetite and the passions. According to this view humans attain freedom in virtue of their reason gaining governing control of their lives. Spinoza, for example, adopts Plato's view that a person whose life is controlled by
urges and impulses of appetite and passion is enslaved. He can only emerge from this enslavement by bringing his passion and appetite under the governing control of reason. In *Ethics* Spinoza claims that "a free man is one who lives according to the dictate of reason alone .... he is free who is led by reason alone" (Part iv, Propositions 67 and 68).

Other influential representatives of this rationalist tradition include Rousseau (c.f., *The Social Contract*), Kant, and Idealist philosophers such as Hegel, T.H. Green, and Bosanquet. In *The Social Contract* Rousseau identifies the free person as one whose private will conforms to the General Will. Some scholars argue that for Rousseau the General Will is synonymous with Reason - the Lawgiver being Reason itself personified in a human being. According to Talmon,

"Ultimately the general will is to Rousseau something like a mathematical truth or a Platonic idea. It has an objective existence of its own, whether perceived or not. It has nevertheless to be discovered by the human mind. But having discovered it, the human mind simply cannot honestly refuse to accept it."

Thus even if a person is constrained to obey the General Will,

"he cannot complain of being coerced, for in fact he is being made to obey his own true self. He is thus still free; indeed freer than before. For freedom is the triumph of the spirit over natural elemental instinct. It is the acceptance of moral obligation and the disciplining of irrational and selfish urges by reason and duty" (1955, 40-41).

While they differ somewhat in detail, the views of Kant, Green, and Bosanquet are built upon the same general idea. In *Groundwork* Kant locates human freedom in autonomous willing. He in turn identifies the autonomous will as one which conforms to universal practical reason. The autonomous will is one which makes universal law. This act of making universal law is precisely the exercise of pure practical reason
(see Chapter Three below). Green and Bosanquet argue that to be free is to realise one's true self. This is identified with one's capacity for rationality. Hence when Green claims that freedom as an ideal consists in the positive power or capacity to make the most and best of oneself, he is referring to the realisation of one's natural human capacity to live a life in accordance with the demands of rationality.

Christian doctrine provides an alternative view of what it means to be free. On this account constraint is seen to consist in bondage to sin - in succumbing to the native human tendency toward sinfulness. According to Saint Paul, the Truth sets us free. We are freed from our bondage to sin by the Truth manifested in Christ. To be baptised into Christ is to be baptised into His death. This is death to sin, from which we are raised "to walk in newness of life" (Romans 6:4). The Christian view is similar to that of the rationalists in that bondage to sin is spelled out in terms of control by a 'lower' empirical self comprising passions and desires. "While we were living in the flesh, our sinful passions, aroused by the law, were at work in our members to bear fruit for death" (Romans 7:5). But the "law of the Spirit of life in Jesus Christ has set us free from the law of sin and death" (Romans 8:2). However on the Christian view we are set free not by reason assuming control in our lives, but by our faith in Christ and our practical acceptance of His truth. The free person is the true believer, the one who is 'in' Christ.

According to Feinberg (1973a), Epicurean philosophy presents us with a third account of "the free person": namely, one whose desires and wants 'fit' his circumstances. Such a person is flexible, adapting his will to the demands and dictates of the world. "If you adjust your desires so that you always want to do what you must do, then you can
never be disappointed" (ibid., p.16). Similarly Rousseau claims in Emile that the person who is truly free is one who desires what he is able to do and does what he desires (op. cit., p.48). On this view constraint consists in the tendency to acquire wants which are not 'in tune' with one's circumstances. To be freed from constraint is to be liberated from the misfit between one's desires and one's possibilities.

This is an appropriate point at which to anticipate an important part of my overall argument. I have claimed that in Western thought there exists a range of accounts of "freedom" as a personality ideal. This claim has been supported by a sketch of three broad conceptions of "the free person". Each of these has exerted considerable force within our Western educational tradition. Central to my thesis will be the attempt to formulate an account of "freedom" as an ideal of human development which falls outside the three broad positions just mentioned.

In my discussion so far I have suggested that the notion of two perspectives on freedom is helpful in clarifying the idea that freedom itself - in some sense - is an important consideration in determining how far children should be given freedom in education. Having identified the two perspectives I restated this idea in the following way: freedom construed as an ideal of human development provides a criterion for determining how much social freedom children should have. This led directly to the question which is the subject of my inquiry: namely, 'How far should children be given social freedom in education if we want them to develop into free persons?' I then looked at the existence of these two competing perspectives on freedom against the background of certain problems pertaining to the value of social freedom. It was suggested that there are objections to the view that social freedom is a good in itself, as well as to the belief that it constitutes a very
important human good. After sketching a common counter - in terms of an alleged distinction between "liberty" and "licence" - to a key objection, I argued that a further response to problems of worthwhile-ness posed by social freedom involves a shift to the second perspective on freedom. This, in effect, is to adopt a totally different view of what freedom is. In this way commitment to freedom as an important human good can be preserved in the face of the original objections - but only by adopting a quite different view of freedom from that which poses the problems. It is now widely acknowledged within ethical theory that "freedom" can refer to a desirable form of human development as well as to a relationship between a person and his external world. However there is a considerable range of competing accounts as to what a free person consists in. I want now to consider some theoretical and practical implications for human affairs resulting from the existence of competing perspectives on freedom. At this point I will disregard the variety of accounts of "the free person". The educational significance of the ambiguity of this notion will be taken up briefly at the end of this chapter.

I will consider some of the theoretical and practical implications for human affairs of these competing perspectives on freedom by substantiating three claims.

(i) The history of Western thought about freedom as a primary human good has been characterised by dispute between those embracing a rationalist conception of free persons and those who conceive freedom as absence of social and political constraint. In other words, two competing views of freedom as a key human good have emerged in Western thought: one from within the first perspective and the other from the second.
(ii) Corresponding to this theoretical dispute we find divergences at the level of social-political practice.

(iii) The theoretical and practical trends apparent within the social-political sphere generally are paralleled closely in education.

According to Gerald MacCallum,

"Disputes about the nature of freedom are certainly historically best understood as a series of attempts by parties opposing each other on very many issues to capture for their own side the favourable attitudes attaching to the notion of freedom" (1967, p.313).

That is, given the intense, (although often uncritical and unreflective) commitment to freedom characteristic of Western thought since Greek times, any social-political measure which can be shown to promote human freedom is likely to gain considerable support - or at least is the less likely to arouse opposition or antagonism. Different accounts of "freedom" are consistent with different sets of social and political practices. Hence it is possible for supporters of competing practical arrangements to defend their respective positions by appealing to some conception of freedom which is consistent with their views. As a matter of historical fact, "freedom" conceived as absence of social and political constraint, and "freedom" conceived as rational development, have been used in support of competing social-political arrangements. Roughly speaking, a shift from the first perspective to the second has been seen as corresponding to a shift from a socio-political ideal of laissez-faire individualism to one of authoritarianism and even totalitarianism.

Berlin is one theorist who has offered an analysis of this phenomenon. He speaks of a dispute between proponents of 'negative' and 'positive' freedom. (For the purposes of immediate discussion we may loosely identify my first perspective with 'negative' freedom, and
my second with 'positive' freedom. The relationship between the two classifications and my grounds for preferring talk of competing perspectives will be taken up in Chapter Three.) Berlin argues that "the 'positive' and 'negative' notions of freedom historically developed in divergent directions not always by logically reputable steps, until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with each other" (1969, p.132). Numerous writers have suggested that this conflict is not merely theoretical in nature. Indeed it is apparent at the level of practical life. c.f.,

"Whereas in education Rousseau is the great advocate of the release and freedom of the child from social restraints, in practical matters he is the great advocate of the freedom of the individual through social restraints. Whereas in education Rousseau is the great progenitor of the movement towards self-expression and individual freedom from social restraints, in politics he is the great progenitor, in the Social Contract, of what Professor J.L. Talmon calls 'Totalitarian democracy', i.e., freedom for the individual through the abandonment of all centrifugal and individualistic egoistic desires through permanent submission to the general will" (Bantock, 1965, pp. 92-93).

The idea underlying 'totalitarian democracy' is that by imposing social constraints on the individual, totalitarian societies can and do contribute to the individual's development as a free person - by bringing his private will under the direction and control of reason. Plato, for example, argues for a totalitarian form of political organisation in his republic. I am not suggesting that there is a necessary link between support for freedom as a rationalist personality ideal and adherence to some authoritarian model of social and political control. The claim is simply that as a matter of historical fact, justifications for forms of authoritarianism, including totalitarianism, have been advanced on the basis of a rationalist conception of freedom as an ideal of human development. Such moves are facilitated by
identifying "reason" - i.e., the reason to which individuals must subject their wills - with the reason of philosopher kings, with the Omnipotent state, the General Will, and so on. By contrast, proponents of individualism, free enterprise, and laissez-faire capitalism, appeal to "freedom" conceived as the absence of constraint to individual activity. c.f., Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and the Utilitarian philosophers and economists generally.

The historical point is simply that in totalitarian and individualistic societies alike freedom is a key value, and justification of specific measures is often based on the claim that they promote freedom, or will supersede other practices which threaten freedom. A case can be made for the claim that different perspectives underlie the accounts of "freedom" which support these justifications. Hence from the standpoint of social-political thought and practice generally, it can be argued that the two perspectives on freedom have been of notable importance. Such issues as state control versus laissez-faire, and collectivism versus private enterprise have been disputed on the basis of competing accounts of what it means to be free (c.f., T.H. Green, 1889). I have suggested that such competing accounts can be accommodated within the two perspectives on freedom identified here.

This, of course, is not a thesis on social and political thought generally. It is obvious however that major trends in wider social and political thought influence educational thought. Indeed until quite recently the best known educational theorists were often people more broadly concerned with social, ethical, and political thought. Thus we find that the accounts of "freedom" investigated in McCallister's *The Growth of Freedom in Education*, include those of
Plato, Aristotle, the Christian Fathers, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Mill, Spencer, and Dewey. These accounts are chosen by McCallister because of their educational importance, but none of these theorists was solely concerned with education. In our own day we find people like Illich, Koestler, Marcuse, and Toffler exercising a significant influence on educational thought, although they are not primarily educationists. Furthermore, it is clear that trends in social and political practice affect educational practice.

How far, then, are the sorts of trends apparent in the social-political sphere generally paralleled within education? In the remainder of this chapter I want to look at some implications of the two perspectives on freedom for educational thought and practice. This will be done by way of elucidating four points which emerge from the educational literature pertaining to freedom.

Firstly, there is ample evidence of dispute within educational thought between those for whom freedom comprises absence of social constraint and those for whom it denotes a rationalist ideal of personal development.

Secondly, we can detect a dichotomy between educationists concerned primarily with development of reason and those concerned with maximising social freedom in education roughly corresponding to an Authoritarianism-Individualism rift. This rift constitutes a central aspect of the distinction drawn between Traditionalist and Progressivist education.

Thirdly, educationists subscribe to a number of competing ideas as to what a free person consists in. That is, we find in education a
range of differing views falling under my second perspective on freedom.

And finally, there is in education the possibility of an interesting relationship between "social freedom" and "the development of free persons".

These four points will now be taken up in turn.

Among those who maintain that freedom comprises a key educational value, some are primarily concerned with promoting social freedom while others are mainly concerned with development of rational freedom. This divergence is well-documented in recent literature. According to Kolesnik,

"Freedom is the guiding principle of Summerhill. Neill .... had an abiding faith in the natural goodness and inherent wisdom of children. He felt that the main goal of life is happiness, so happiness is the main goal of his school. No child at Summerhill is ever required to do anything he doesn't want to do. He is, on the contrary, allowed to do just about anything he pleases with the only stipulation being that he doesn't infringe on the rights of others. This is not to say that there are no rules at Summerhill. In fact, there are many rules, but they are all formulated by the students themselves at their weekly meetings where each student and member of the faculty has one vote.... Class attendance is strictly optional. There is no attendance-taking, no academic requirements, no examinations, no grades" (1974, 56).

The freedom sought here is freedom from rules, regulations, demands, and sanctions imposed on children by the activities and arrangements of other people - e.g., parents, teachers, administrators, and government. In part the demand is for freedom from restrictive measures: that is, rules backed up by effective sanctions which prevent one from doing things one may want to do. In addition freedom is sought from coercive measures: that is, measures which require that pupils do particular things, many of which they will obviously
not want to do. We may call freedom from restrictive and coercive measures imposed by other people "social freedom" or "liberty". "Social freedom" will assume a central place in the conceptual structure of this discussion. Thus of the various kinds of freedom which may be subsumed under my first perspective it is social freedom with which I shall be concerned here.

Turning to the second perspective we find that one conception of freedom as a personality ideal in particular has found support in contemporary educational philosophy. This is "freedom" conceived as rational excellence. The ideal is usually referred to as autonomy (see Chapters Three to Five below). Hirst links it with the notion of a liberal education. According to Hirst there emerged in Greek thought the ideal of a liberal education conceived as a process concerned simply and directly with the pursuit of knowledge. The Greeks

"attained the concept of an education that was 'liberal' not simply because it was the education of free men rather than slaves, but also because they saw it as freeing the mind to function according to its true nature, freeing reason from error and illusion and freeing man's conduct from wrong. And ever since Greek times this idea of education has had its place" (op. cit., 31-32).

Staying within the rationalist framework Hirst provides his own account of "a liberal education". This is based on his analysis of "the forms of knowledge" - these 'forms' being more or less equivalent with the rational disciplines. For Hirst, a liberal education is one that, "determined in scope and content by knowledge itself, is thereby concerned with the development of mind" (ibid., 41). For "development of mind" we may read here "development of reason". Hirst argues that his ideal of a liberal education is precisely an education which sets
people free in virtue of their reason. It "frees the mind from error and illusion, and remains basic to the freeing of human conduct from wrong" (ibid., 43). The freedom which Hirst is most concerned to promote in education is, then, not social freedom. Rather it is rational freedom: freedom of the mind. There is, then, clear evidence that for some educationists the demand for freedom is a call for removal of certain social constraints, whereas for others it represents a concern for development of rationality. But what of the claim that this dichotomy corresponds roughly to that between supporters of Individualist and Authoritarian approaches to education respectively?

Individualism comprises a key value for many educationists concerned with maximising social freedom in education. It is frequently asserted that if pupils are given extensive freedom they will develop along their own unique lines. Furthermore, since many advocates of extensive social freedom for pupils have an optimistic view of human nature, they are convinced that opportunity for maximal individual development will not produce deleterious effects—either on the individual himself or on others. Such a concern with social freedom as a prerequisite of individualism is apparent in the following passage.

"If we want a country in which people will resist the growing pressures to conformity and servility and will vigorously defend their own rights and the rights of others, then we had better begin to give children some real freedom in school—freedom to move, to talk, to plan and use their time, to direct and assess their own learning, to act, and to be treated like sensible human beings" (Holt, 1971, p.114).

On the other hand those who conceive freedom in terms of rational development often appear concerned to justify restrictions on the
liberty of pupils. The idea that development of reason comprises education's central aim is invoked as a consideration which overrides the presumption in favour of social freedom. This is not to say that those educationists committed above all to development of reason are necessarily advocates of authoritarian forms of education - although it is true that many have been. Among contemporary educationists Peters, for example, would probably see himself, like Dewey, as seeking to avoid the excesses of both Traditionalism and Progressivism in respect of social freedom. However the fact remains that where Peters has pronounced on social freedom his emphasis has been negative. That is, he has focused upon instances where development of free persons calls for imposing restrictions on pupils' freedom rather than for extending freedom to pupils. Rationalist accounts of "free persons" are particularly suited to supporting demands for restrictions on social freedom. I will argue for this in a later chapter. Furthermore, I will suggest that the ease and frequency with which educationists appeal to a rationalist view of free persons as grounds for limiting pupils' liberty provides a reason for seeking some non-rationalist account of "free persons".

At this point it should be noted that the rationalist conception of free persons is not the only view of freedom as an ideal of human development enjoying popularity among educationists at present. I want briefly to mention two further accounts of what it means to be a free person which are currently in educational vogue. One, coming from behavioural psychology, equates freedom with being self-controlled. This, however, is not "self-control" seen in terms of will-power or some 'supernatural entity' (c.f., Mahoney and Thoresen, 1974, p.20). The account which is proposed amalgamates social-learning principles
and techniques with the goals of 'humanist' psychologists and educators (see ibid., p.309). On this view "self-control" denotes the ability and disposition of an individual to utilise a set or procedures to direct and manage his actions, both internal and external. c.f.,

'The truly 'free' individual is one who is in intimate contact with himself and his environment (both internal and external). He knows 'where he's at' in terms of the factors influencing both his actions and his surroundings. Moreover, he has acquired technical skills that enable him to take an active role in his own growth and adjustment. He is not a mechanical automaton passively responding to environmental forces. He is a personal scientist - a skilled engineer capable of investigating and altering the determinants of his actions. He is free to exert counter-control in his environment, free from the resignation and inadequacies of a totalitarian existence, and free to draw upon a repertoire of effective behaviours. His happiness and development are not restricted by incapacitating fears and disabilities. Hence the person with more freedom is the one with skills of behavioural self-control" (ibid., pp. 71-72).

In other words, a thesis of determinism is acknowledged, but this is not seen as implying that the individual is necessarily passive - tossed about by forces and influences beyond his control. Rather he can be taught both to identify the environmental contingencies which operate on him, as well as employ skills to counter the control of certain contingencies. The free person is the one who shapes to a maximal extent the contingencies which determine his own behaviour. He is aware of the contingencies operating in his environment. He understands which of these will have effects he wants to avoid and which will have effects he wants to encounter. In the light of this he can put himself in the way of some contingencies and out of the way of others.

A further notion of free persons is yielded by 'humanistic' psychology. This is the idea of a self-actualising or self-realising
individual. As a matter of historical fact rationalist accounts of "free persons" have sometimes been couched in talk of self-realisation (see pp. 36-37 above). However humanist accounts of the self-actualising individual are vastly different from rationalist accounts of self-realisation. According to Kolesnik, a person aiming at self-actualisation,

"strives to become fully himself .... A self-actualising individual is a real, genuine, authentic person, not a shadow of someone else. He is a one-of-kind original, not a reproduction. He is inner rather than outer directed. He is morally and intellectually free. He lives his life in what for him is the richest, happiest, most productive and satisfying way possible. His energies ... are directed toward personal growth, toward the realisation of his unique set of potentialities" (op. cit., 41).

There is no obvious commitment conveyed in this passage to reason as dominant or supreme in human development. Indeed the bias may well be away from reason. Certainly this is the impression given by such influential 'humanists' as Allport, Maslow, and Rogers. Rogers, for example, says,

"I am frequently ... able to take a group, a course, or a class of students, and to set them psychologically free. I can create a climate in which they can be and direct themselves". When this occurs, "curiosity is unleashed. Individuals and groups start to pursue their own goals, their own purposes. They become explorers. They can try to find the meaning in their lives in the work they're doing.... These students become persons living in process, able to live a changing life" (ibid., p.232).

In another passage Rogers conceives freedom as.

"the discovery of meaning from within oneself, meaning which comes from listening sensitively and openly to the complexities of what one is experiencing.... It is the recognition of a person that he is an emerging process, not a static end product". The free person is one who is "deeply and courageously thinking his own thoughts, becoming his own uniqueness, responsibly choosing himself" (ibid., p. 269).
If anything these passages imply the importance of release from demands imposed by rational standards and criteria which are so characteristic of much formal education. This brings me to the final point requiring elucidation here.

The existence of competing accounts of "freedom" as an ideal of human development suggests the possibility of an interesting relationship between "social freedom" and "the development of free persons". Throughout the history of Western education people have argued about how much social freedom pupils should have. They have justified their views in different ways. Some maintain that liberty is simply a good thing in itself. Hence all humans, pupils included, should enjoy as much of it as possible. There is no need to appeal to extraneous considerations in defence of maximising social freedom in education. Others, however, believe that social freedom is to be justified instrumentally. One view is that freedom is a good thing because, or to the extent that, it leads to certain desirable abiding states of mind. It is with this line of justification that my thesis is concerned.

I have suggested that these states of mind are themselves sometimes construed as freedom. Where social freedom is seen as justified in virtue of its leading to desirable states of mind there has often been confusion. This is especially so where these states of mind are covered by the mantle of "freedom". The problem is that "freedom" here is ambiguous. The value assigned to social freedom, and the extent to which it is seen as important in education, vary according to the particular states of mind regarded as constitutive of freedom.

Thus we find some people opposing extensive social freedom in education because they see it as a barrier to the development of free
persons. This might be argued by those who identify "freedom" with conformity to the General Will or the demands of the State, Church, etc. To be a free person on this view would mean to be conforming and perhaps docile. Given this view it seems reasonable to argue that giving extensive social freedom to children will threaten the emergence of free adults. Stringent curtailment of liberty looks a much more plausible preparation for freedom here. A number of present day philosophers who identify "freedom" with rational autonomy also argue that development of free persons presupposes curtailment of pupils' freedom. And according to West, John Stuart Mill is yet another who supports restrictions on social freedom in order that truly free persons may emerge. West's argument is that Mill's demands for extensive constraint upon liberty in education can be explained by his commitment to a rationalist ideal of free persons. He argues that some of Mill's claims "seem to be the words of a philosopher wishing to 'liberate' his fellows into his state of rationality" (West, 1965, p. 138).

By contrast we find people favouring freedom in education on the grounds that it is necessary for the development of free persons. Carl Rogers, for example, advocates extensive freedom from social constraint because then and only then will truly self-actualised individuals emerge. Others again favour freedom on the grounds of its importance to the development of a democratic character, or alternatively, because it will promote anarchistic individuals who will overthrow the existing order where "reason" serves to mask the social reality.

The question, "To what extent must pupils be given - or denied - freedom if they are to develop into free persons?" is, then, ripe for philosophical inquiry. The attempt to clarify "social freedom" and
"free persons" must be at the heart of such an inquiry. The idea of social freedom is discussed in Chapter Two.
CHAPTER TWO

Social Freedom: an analysis.

Those who adopt what I call the first perspective conceive freedom in terms of absence of external constraints to human pursuits. Obviously external constraints may be of different types. Some may be imposed by natural events, as when a flooded river blocks my path or a falling branch traps my leg. Others however are consequences of human activities and arrangements, such as where someone locks me in a cell, or where a law is enacted to prevent one from doing something. Those constraints which are consequences of human activities and arrangements I call social constraints. To be free from this type of constraint is to be socially free. So far as one is subject to social constraint one lacks social freedom. Social constraints, and hence social freedom, may be classified in various ways: legal, moral, political, institutional, customary, and so on.

Social constraint is of particular concern within education. Education necessarily involves interaction between people. The nature of this interaction is such that the freedom of some is frequently restricted by the activities or arrangements of others involved in education. Indeed some measure of social unfreedom would seem to be a necessary pre-requisite for education to proceed at all, particularly in a formal setting. With regard to the social freedom of pupils, Peters claims that education is

"almost by definition ... a situation in which constraints are imposed upon children's wants. To start with, children are compelled to attend school which is not a promising start from the point of view of freedom .... Secondly the conditions under which learning takes place make it imperative that something like the rule of law should be established within an educational situation" (Peters, 1966, 193).
Some of the more difficult and pressing normative issues which educators have to confront concern social freedom - especially the social freedom of pupils. It is widely accepted that restriction of an agent's freedom through imposition of social constraint requires justification. In other words, the presumption is in favour of people having social freedom. The onus of justification is seen to fall on those who would limit social freedom rather than on those who would preserve or extend it. It is also generally acknowledged that in education, as in other spheres of corporate human endeavour, some degree of social constraint is inevitable. These ideas are not incompatible however. To hold that imposition of social constraint requires justification is not to hold that an agent's freedom ought never to be limited by the activities or arrangements of other agents. C.F., "to say that an unfreedom needs to be justified is quite consistent with its being justifiable" (Benn & Weinstein, 1971, p.193). Although there is no inconsistency here, the problems relating to social freedom in education are both numerous and complex. Why, for example, is the onus of justification on those who would limit pupils' social freedom? How far is the popular belief that social freedom is a good thing warranted? To what extent is it justifiable to limit the social freedom of pupils, and on what grounds can restrictions be justified? Any serious attempt to tackle such questions presupposes a clear understanding of what social freedom consists in.

By way of a preliminary to closer analysis I suggest that social unfreedom consists in the presence of constraint to an individual's wants, where this constraint results from the activities and arrangements of other human beings. That is, in talk of social freedom there are three related ideas: "being free or unfree", "constraint resulting
from human activities and arrangements", and "wants". To say that A is free is to say that A is not subject to some constraint. Constraints impede someone's doing, getting, having, etc., what he wants. So any claim about a person's freedom implies reference to some constraint which is either present or absent, and some want which is thereby either constrained or not constrained. Further elucidation of "social freedom", then, involves clarifying these ideas. In the first part of this chapter I will look at the idea of people having wants, and suggest grounds for accepting an account of "social freedom" in terms of "wants". I will then ask when might the activities and arrangements of certain individuals be seen as constraining the wants of others, paying special attention to education.

Freedom and Wants.

I suggest that the idea of persons having wants be understood in relation to their activity or behaviour. There are two sides to this claim. First, to say that A wants X is to say that unless prevented A will pursue X, or is likely to pursue X. It is logically inconsistent to hold both that A wants X, and that given appropriate opportunities to pursue X, A will not do so or is unlikely to do so. According to Hampshire, "'A wants to do X' is indeed equivalent to 'other things being equal, he would do X, if he could'" (1965, p. 36). The qualification, 'other things being equal', draws attention to the possibility of a person having conflicting wants: that is, at any time simultaneously wanting to do things which cannot simultaneously be done. On a given occasion in the absence of constraint, A may want to do X but still not do it - because on this particular occasion he waives X in favour of some competing want which cannot be pursued simultaneously with X. The assumption is that A would have done X if it had not been
for the pressing claims of the competing want. X remains something which A is likely to do if not prevented. To this extent it may properly be regarded as something he wants to do, even though on this particular occasion he failed to do it - notwithstanding the absence of constraint.

The other side to the claim is that wants themselves can be inferred from behaviour. It is not necessary that individuals identify and state their wants in order that we might ascribe wants to them. Indeed it is not even necessary for ascribing wants that individuals be capable of identifying and stating their wants. We may properly ascribe to A a desire to do X on the basis of observing his behaviour, even though A may be in no position to verify our ascription verbally.

The relevant aspects of an individual's behaviour with regard to wants-ascriptions are two-fold, as Hampshire notes. First, it must be possible to detect some purpose in the individual's activity. Unless we can construe his activity as an attempt to do something in particular we have no basis for ascribing a given want to him.

Secondly, an individual's reaction to success or failure in his activity, and to conditions which impede it, is of crucial importance when it comes to ascribing wants to him. Ascriptions of wants are linked logically with evidence of satisfaction-dissatisfaction/pleasure-frustration in the context of a person's activity. That is, our concept of wanting is linked with that of pleasure and pain. Hampshire claims that we may recognise someone's desire to do something in his attempts to do it and in signs of dissatisfaction when he is prevented.
"Desire, even at the most primitive level, is linked not only to behaviour, in an ordinary and non-technical sense of that word, but also to pleasure and pain; 'linked', in the sense that it is a constitutive condition of desiring to do something that the subject, other things being equal, is in some degree pleased when the opportunity of doing it is presented to him, and to some degree pained or displeased, other things being equal, when the opportunity is taken away" (ibid., p. 35).

Hence we may say of the very young child, and indeed of babies, that they want certain things. The baby can be said to want to suck on the breast or to touch his mother's face. The crawler can be said to want to crawl out the door, or the toddler to wander on the road, pull flowers from the garden, etc. Young children may want to play with water, toys, or even with poisons from the medicine cabinet. Older children may want to play with friends down the street, learn to read, and so on. In each of these cases we can infer a want from behaviour. In addition, of course, once children have acquired language they can tell us more or less clearly what they want.

In these examples it is obvious enough what sorts of things might impede an individual in the pursuit of his wants. The breast may be withdrawn, or the baby's hands held away from the mother's face. The door may be closed on the crawler, or the gate on the toddler. The latter may also be punished for pulling flowers. Water, toys, and poisons may be kept from the young child, or he may be prevented from going to the places where they are kept. Parents of older children can keep them at home rather than allowing them to play with friends, and so on.

However a problem faces attempts to analyse "social freedom" in terms of 'wants', and this must be met here. Philosophers distinguish
between actual wants and possible wants. Actual wants are those which as a matter of fact a given individual does have. Possible wants are those which it is conceivable that an individual might have - they consist in the things he might conceivably pursue if not subjected to constraint. Philosophers have asked whether "social freedom" should be spelled out in terms of actual wants or possible wants. The difficulty here is that there are serious problems with both alternatives.

According to the 'actual wants analysis', A is free to the extent that his actual wants are not constrained and unfree to the extent that they are. Any measure which impedes the pursuit of a want which I do not happen to have does not, on this analysis, limit my freedom. The attraction of this analysis is that it does seem odd to think of A being constrained by some measure closing off an option which it is highly unlikely that he would pursue anyway - even though it is conceivable that he could do so. The notion of being unfree does seem to get a stronger grip the more it is concerned with constraints to things that one actually wants to pursue, or is likely to want to pursue.

There is, however, a classic objection to this analysis. This is based on the hypothetical case of the contented slave. Here is someone who is subject to severe restrictions. He cannot, for example, choose who he will work for, when and where he will work, or what sort of work he will do. The decisions which govern his life are made by his master, and he is compelled to act accordingly. But by hypothesis the contented slave does not actually want to do the various things he is prevented from doing: for example, exercising choice, making decisions, framing life plans, etc. None of his actual wants is
constrained. Hence the 'actual wants analysis' denies that the contented slave is unfree. But this is patently absurd.

Moreover this analysis has potentially disastrous educational implications. If we accept that a person is free to the extent that his actual wants are not constrained, it is possible to preserve freedom through extreme forms of manipulation and conditioning. People may be manipulated in such a way that they come only to want the things those individuals holding power want them to want. Under these conditions there would be no need for government to impose constraints on people's actual wants. People would be 'educated' for freedom through programmes of thought and behaviour control. I accept these objections to the 'actual wants analysis' as being compelling.

Some philosophers, appreciating the force of such objections, have suggested that "freedom" be understood in terms of what a person might want rather than what he actually does want.\(^1\) There are obviously some things to be said in favour of this view. For example, let us suppose that at a given point in time an individual has a set of actual wants none of which is subject to social constraint. He is then socially free in respect of all his actual wants. But let us also

\(^1\) Where writers suggest that "freedom" be understood in terms of what a person might want rather than what he simply does want, it is generally intended that the notion of possible wants take in those wants a person actually has. In other words, the class of things I might want includes those things I do want as well as others I possibly could want. However some philosophers, for example, Feinberg, prefer not to incorporate actual wants within the wider class of possible wants. Hence Feinberg suggests that "freedom" be understood in terms of a person's actual and possible wants. But the objections I present to the notion of possible wants of course apply as much to Feinberg's analysis as to accounts which appeal simply to the notion of possible wants.
suppose that at some later date he acquires several new wants to which there already exist social constraints. He is now no longer free in respect of all his actual wants. However, if "social freedom" is construed in terms of actual wants it would seem that we must attribute his loss of overall freedom to changes within him rather than to circumstances obtaining in the world. This seems odd. However this odd conclusion can be avoided if "social freedom" is understood in terms of the wants an individual might have. For the analysis can then accommodate shifts in a person's wants.

Unfortunately there are problems with this position as well. I will consider two of these here. First, once we start talking of social freedom in terms of things a person might want we can easily slip into the same trap confronting the 'actual wants analysis': namely, the idea that freedom is compatible with quite stringent forms of authoritarian control. The difficulty stems from ambiguity in the idea of what people might want. It is possible to identify what a person might want with some particular thing we believe he ought to want. Thus intellectual excellence, ability to serve the State, and faith in God, are all things which a person might conceivably want. An educator, then, could define "social freedom" as absence of constraint to what a person might want, and further define "what a person might want" as intellectual excellence. Given this, it could then be argued that so far as there are no social constraints to the development of intellectual excellence, people have social freedom. Furthermore, it might even be suggested that by exercising various forms of authoritarian control, educators can successfully promote development of intellectual excellence. We have here the notion of forcing people to be free. Since it is odd to think of measures,
even coercive measures, which enable us to achieve our wants as limiting our freedom, it can be argued that coercion toward the end of intellectual excellence in no way constitutes a limitation on social freedom. The pupil is subject to various forms of constraint. But he is nonetheless free, because he is not constrained in respect of what he might want (and indeed should want): that is, attainment of intellectual excellence. Furthermore he is positively helped toward this end by certain forms of coercion.

Many philosophers who propose that "freedom" be understood in terms of possible wants would argue that this completely misses the spirit of their proposal. Rather, they are concerned to avoid the dangers of an authoritarian or totalitarian 'slide' by linking "social freedom" with a wide range of possible wants. Their aim is to keep the idea of wants very wide, so that any attempts to impose restrictive measures are seen to constitute attacks on social freedom. But here, too, there is the danger of a slide. If a person's freedom is to be understood in relation to the things he might conceivably want, and if the idea of what he might conceivably want is very wide, we are faced with the implication that constraints to extremely remote options must be seen as restrictions on freedom no less deplorable than constraints to an individual's actual wants. But this is counter intuitive.

Suppose for some reason it was made illegal to grow peanuts in Te Kuiti. Growing peanuts in Te Kuiti is something which I might conceivably want to do. Hence this hypothetical law prevents my doing what I might want to do. However it seems very odd to think of this as a restriction on my social freedom. Instead, this sort of
constraint makes much more sense against the background of an 'actual
wants analysis' of freedom. That is, the sort of rationale for
imposing such a constraint would seem to presuppose someone's actually
wanting to grow peanuts in Te Kuiti, and perhaps the fact that this
would attack some vested interest. Unless some such background is
presupposed the idea of such a law itself seems bizarre. Furthermore,
it is only in respect of the person who actually wants to grow the
peanuts that the notion of constraint gets a real grip here.

The difficulty with talk about possible wants is that the range
of such wants will be extremely wide unless some limiting criterion is
employed, but any such criterion is likely to provoke criticism. For
whatever criterion one employs, it is likely to rule out at least some
of the options which others wish to see preserved. Nevertheless,
without some such criterion the notion of possible wants will be
hopelessly general. Feinberg, for example, implies that the limits to
what one can come to want or desire are very wide (1973, Ch. 1). He
suggests that the notion of possible wants is bounded only by conceptual
possibility and natural limitations.

"There may be no limit to what we wish as the object of
idle fancies, but not everything wished can be seriously
desired. A five year old might wish that he could walk
on the sun, as an adult might wish that he were young
again, but it is conceptually impossible for anyone who
understands these fanciful objectives to want them to
come into existence. We should think of freedom as
related to actual and possible wants rather than idle
wishes". In addition, "I can lament that I was not born
Winston Churchill, that I am not a mathematical genius
or a potential weight-lifting champion, that I cannot give
birth to a baby, or both be and not be at the same time.
But to characterise these natural limitations as
restrictions on my freedom would be to base a lament on a
platitude. 'To be', wrote Santayana, 'is to be something
in particular'. That I am one thing rather than another
is not so much a restriction on my freedom as a necessary
consequence of my existing at all" (ibid., pp. 8-9).
In other words, there are limits to what I can conceivably want, but these are very wide. Hence Feinberg opts for an analysis which maximises the range of options which can be subject to constraint.

I believe it is possible to steer a course between these alternatives which avoids the compelling objections to which they are open, while at the same time preserving what appears correct in them. The answer lies in acknowledging some facts relating to people's wants and how they are acquired. Four general points can be made by way of introduction.

First, there are certain things which as a matter of fact human beings tend to want once they are aware of them. We can speak here of a broad class of human wants - things which people more or less universally tend to pursue. Some of these, of course, are what we sometimes call human needs. Others include such things as the desire for friendship or company, certain things to call one's own, periods of quiet or solitude, a certain amount of leisure and play time.

Second, there are certain wants which are very common among particular 'groupings' of people - for example, young children as opposed to older children, children as opposed to adolescents or adults, teenagers as opposed to middle-agers, people from one culture as opposed to people from another. With respect to any such grouping we may identify various wants which many or most members of that group tend to want.

Third, there are other things which it is appropriate to think of some members of a given 'group' wanting even though these things are not wanted by most, or even many, members of that 'group'. In other
words, these are minority wants within that 'group'.

Finally, there are some things which it makes no empirical sense to think of certain 'groups' or 'classes' of people wanting - even though there may be nothing logically odd in attaching such wants to these people.

To elucidate these points it is necessary to identify some factors which shape the acquisition of wants by human beings. There are at least three important factors which influence the sorts of wants an individual comes to have: the range of his knowledge and experience; his particular level of development or maturation - cognitive, physical, emotional, moral, etc; and the particular cultural influences to which he is subject. The operation of these factors can be viewed in both a negative and a positive way. They have the negative effect of imposing strict bounds on the sorts of things people can and do want. Their positive effect is that they give rise to certain trends or regular patterns within the wants humans have.

The significance of a person's range of knowledge and experience and his level of development to the acquisition of wants can be seen by comparing the case of children with that of adolescents or adults. Children are subject to conditions which limit their perception of possible objects of desire; conditions to which older people are not subject, or at least not subject to the same extent. Children are simply not aware of certain objects of possible desire. They either do not know of them at all, or else they have no conception of what is actually involved in pursuing them.
In the first place the child's shortcomings here may reflect his lack of necessary experience of, or exposure to options, and his relative lack of knowledge. This sort of limitation is inevitable. In the short span of a child's experience he can only become aware of a certain number of options, and of what it means to do or have such things. Of course older people too are subject to limitations on knowledge and awareness. The difference between children and older persons in this respect is, then, more a matter of degree than some essential qualitative difference. To a considerable extent awareness is a function of age, since it is dependent in large part upon experience and learning opportunities, which in turn are related to age in a significant way. In addition the relative cognitive, physical, emotional, and moral immaturity of the child vis-à-vis adolescents and adults precludes knowledge and understanding of various options. There are certain forms of awareness which are impossible at some levels of cognitive development, and others which are highly unlikely at some levels of physical development. This factor does point to an essential qualitative difference between children and older persons.

Sometimes a close relationship obtains between the knowledge-experience and developmental factors. This can be seen, for example, in respect of physical development. The sexual experience of 6 year olds differs markedly from that of 16 year olds. Consequently their sex-related wants differ accordingly. 6 year olds do not actively pursue sexual relationships, although adolescents often do. This is a result of facts concerning levels of development and related drives, which in turn have an important shaping influence on peer group modelling and learning.
I am suggesting, then, that certain factors which operate during childhood prevent children from becoming aware of various options. Consequently children cannot want these things. Hence it makes no sense to think of their wanting such things. Given the alleged cultural invariance of cognitive, moral, and physical development, the sorts of limitations in question will show considerable universality among children. But just as it is true that there are certain sorts of things which children cannot want, so it is true that there are certain sorts of things which they can want, and moreover which they do tend to want. So we do in fact observe general patterns of wants correlating with childhood as opposed to adolescence and adulthood. There are two aspects here. First, there are certain wants which many or most children tend to have, particularly within a single culture. Secondly, there are certain things which it is appropriate to think of children wanting - even though they may be minority wants - but which it is not appropriate to think of normal adolescents or adults wanting.

The ideas which I have just presented hold equally for divisions or stages within childhood itself as between childhood and adolescence or adulthood. Very young children are subject to greater limitations on their perception of possible objects of desire - in virtue of the extremely limited range of their knowledge and experience, and shortcomings attaching to their level of development - than older children. The interplay between one's level of development and opportunities for certain kinds of learning and experience, mentioned in the above argument, is also apparent within the various stages of childhood.

As the child moves from one cognitive stage to the next his potential for knowledge and understanding alters dramatically. New forms or dimensions of awareness now become available to him.
Correspondingly new kinds of learning situations open up as well. Similarly, with changes in physical development he will experience new drives, needs, and outlets for energy and emotion. These too draw him into new kinds of learning situations, and hence new realms of experience. These factors all contribute to changes in the pattern of his wants. But equally they also give rise to broad trends within particular age or developmental levels.

I want now to comment briefly on the significance of the cultural factor to the formation of wants. Cultural differences inevitably influence the patterns of children's wants to some extent. The same is true for adults' wants. Thus children of a given age or developmental level from a particular culture will acquire some wants which are not characteristic of children in a different culture at the same developmental level. In the same way adults within a given culture acquire certain wants not shared by adults from a different culture. However, despite cultural divisions many wants remain more or less universal. There are numerous wants which adults tend to have regardless of culture, which children of a given developmental level tend to have regardless of culture, and which human beings generally tend to have regardless of both developmental level and culture.

It is worth distinguishing here between a general and a specific level of cultural comparison. For example, children typically want to spend a considerable amount of time playing. But children in Africa will to a certain extent have different specific forms of play from children in, say, Britain or America. Nevertheless we can say here that children universally want to play a good deal. It is the specific way in which this want is pursued or expressed that differs culturally, not the actual want itself.
What is the significance of this discussion for my account of "social freedom"? In particular, how does it help us avoid difficulties posed by accounts of "freedom" in terms of "actual wants" and/or "possible wants"? To recapitulate, the difficulties identified above are as follows.

(i) We often want to say that a social practice or arrangement limits A's freedom to do X even though A may not actually want to do X. The 'actual wants analysis' cannot allow for this.

(ii) In certain cases we would like to say that A is unfree in some respect even though he is not impeded in doing any of the things he actually wants to do by social practices or arrangements. For example, where A's wants have themselves been shaped by others in positions of power. Again, on the 'actual wants analysis' we cannot say this.

(iii) It is possible to interpret "What a person might want" in a way which can lead to extreme authoritarianism in education. I am eager to eliminate the possibility of this interpretation from my analysis.

(iv) Finally, we want to avoid having to maintain that constraints to very 'remote' wants limit freedom as much as, or in the same way as do constraints to actual wants. Where the notion of possible wants is given very wide application we cannot avoid maintaining this. But any limiting criterion we may employ is likely to offend at least some supporters of an analysis in terms of "possible wants".

My suggestion is that these difficulties can be avoided by linking "social freedom" with a notion of typical wants which can be derived from my discussion here. There are two broad components to the class of typical wants as I construe it.
(a) Those things which human beings in general - for instance, regardless of their age-developmental level, cultural background, etc. - tend to want once they are aware of them.

(b) Those things which it is typical for members of a particular age-developmental and/or cultural 'grouping' to want once they are aware of them. The adjective, "typical", can be understood in both a weak and a strong sense in this context.

According to the weak sense, a want is typical so far as it is not odd to think of a person who belongs to a particular 'group' having such a want. Typical wants, in the weak sense, may include minority wants as well as idiosyncratic or highly individual wants which are not reflections of abnormal development.

According to the strong sense, typical wants are those which are especially common within a given age-developmental and/or cultural grouping. Hence we can speak with a fair degree of precision of the typical wants of infants, pre-schoolers, children, teenagers, adolescents, and adults in our society. There are, in other words, various things which many or most children, adolescents, etc., in our society tend to want. N.B. While it is true that we can identify certain wants which people falling under a given grouping typically have, a particular individual belonging to that grouping need not, and almost certainly would not, actually have all or even most of these wants. For example, the desire for sexual encounters is a typical want of adolescents in our culture. We do not think it at all odd if a particular adolescent pursues such encounters. Indeed a high proportion of adolescents appear to do so. However this in no way implies that every adolescent wants sexual encounters. Many do not.
But the fact remains that 'sex' is a typical want of adolescents — certainly in the weak sense of 'typical', but probably in the strong sense as well.

I propose this account of the link between "social freedom" and "wants": to say that a social practice or arrangement comprises a restriction on freedom is to say that it impedes the pursuit of a typical want. It must now be shown how far this suggestion can deal with the problems arising from accounts of 'freedom' in terms of actual and possible wants.

(i) The first problem is illustrated by the case of the contented slave. The slave is content because the things he is prevented from doing are not things he actually wants to do. But we would want to maintain that even though he is content he is nonetheless unfree. This is because the desire to be in control of one's own affairs in ways which slaves are not is a typical want of adults. Exercising some choice over where one works or lives, whom one works for, when and where one travels, and so on, is the sort of thing adults typically want to do — or in the case of oppressed people, tend to want once they become aware of it as something which can be done. Any measure which prevents adults from exercising such choice comprises a restriction on the freedom of adults. It limits the freedom of a particular adult, A, regardless of whether A actually wants the opportunity to exercise this choice. For despite his personal preferences on the matter this is the sort of thing adults typically want to do. By linking "social freedom" with "typical wants" this objection to the actual wants analysis can be overcome.
(ii) A second case where someone may be regarded as unfree even though not impeded in doing any of the things he wants, is where his wants have initially been shaped in accordance with some social, political, or institutional plan. If "freedom" is linked with "actual wants" he cannot be regarded as unfree. But if unfreedom implies the presence of constraints to typical wants he can be seen as unfree. Where we think of people in positions of control shaping an individual's actual wants to the point where there is no need to constrain him, the idea is of the controller closing off from him things which people typically want to do. Unless the controller assumed that certain wants are typical of people like his 'client', and hence that his client is likely to acquire them unless prevented, the idea of closing wants off from an individual's awareness would make little sense. We have here, then, the idea of imposing constraints on people's awareness. This amounts to imposing constraints on typical wants, although not by constraining the pursuit of wants. Rather the constraint is imposed on the individual's becoming aware of, or identifying with, certain wants which people like him in relevant respects typically have.

(iii) The notion of typical wants advanced here makes it impossible to ground certain authoritarian educational practices in an alleged concern for helping pupils attain what they might want. It has been argued that we can identify wants which are typical of individuals at various levels of development. Conversely, we can claim that it is inappropriate to think of a child at a given level of development wanting certain things. The problem in question here stems from the possibility of an educator identifying some ideal outcome with what a child might want, and the child's freedom with opportunity to do what he might want. If this move is made it can then be argued that
coercive measures imposed on the child to help him attain this ideal end do not restrict his freedom - since far from impeding his doing what he might want they make it possible for him to do it.

However the ideal outcome may not be the sort of thing which children at that level of development typically want - in the sense that it is not the sort of thing we can even appropriately think of them wanting. Of course with young children, the sorts of things educators want on their behalf are often things the children themselves are not capable of wanting. In such cases it cannot be argued that coercing a child toward an end is to help him achieve what he might want. It is now open for us to argue what does seem to be true: namely, that measures invoked to push a child toward such an end do limit his social freedom so far as they prevent the child pursuing wants typical of his age or level of development.

(iv) Finally, my notion of typical wants helps us avoid the implication that impediments to 'remote' wants are as much constraints to freedom as are impediments to actual wants. Two categories of 'remote' want can be distinguished.

The first comprises those which cannot properly be regarded as wants of a given individual at all in the light of relevant facts about that individual. For example, it makes sense to think of a 3 year old wanting to eat daisies or suck pebbles. But it is quite absurd to think of 13 year olds wanting such things: or if they do we say they are 'ill' or 'disturbed'.

The second category of 'remote' wants consists in those which are highly individual or idiosyncratic, but not bizarre. For instance, it makes sense to think of a given individual wanting to do such a thing,
but it is not the sort of thing anyone else much wants to do. Growing peanuts in Te Kuiti is perhaps an example of such a want.

Restrictions imposed on wants falling within the first category cannot be regarded as constraints to freedom at all, since these wants are not typical wants - in the weak sense of "typical". For example, "No T.V.!!", is likely to limit the freedom of the 4 year old, but not that of the 4 month old. Similarly, restrictions on underage carnal knowledge are unlikely to limit a 5 year old's freedom, but it is probably different for the 15 year old.

We are reluctant to claim that impediments to the second class of 'remote' wants are as much constraints to freedom as impediments to actual wants. This reluctance can be sustained by appeal to the stronger sense of "typical wants". I would argue that the notion of unfreedom gets a tighter grip the more a social practice impedes pursuit of a want which is typical in the strong sense.

If my argument is sound it overcomes a major hurdle facing attempts to provide an account of "social freedom" based on "wants". But there are other challenges to be met. According to Connolly, (1974), "social freedom" is better understood in terms of "choices" than "wants". He suggests that there are at least three arguments in support of this preference. However I do not believe his challenge can be sustained. The philosophical arguments Connolly offers in support of "choices" over "wants" can be met. Furthermore, there are good educational reasons for actually preferring an analysis based on "wants". I will look at Connolly's arguments one by one.
(i) His first argument proceeds from the following claim. "Before the language of 'freedom' applies, at least two opportunities must be open to an agent; he must be free to do Z or not to do Z" (ibid., 146). Connolly argues that a person can be said to want to do the only thing he is permitted to do - as when he is forced to vote for the candidate he would have voted for anyway. However he cannot be said to choose the only course of action open to him. In addition, because it is possible to make people want to do the only thing open to them it is important to preserve the idea of choice in the definition of "freedom" itself.

I accept the essence of this argument, but believe that my analysis can accommodate the point Connolly is making. Playing is one of the things children typically want to do. Similarly, voting is a typical want of adults. But it is absurd to think of playing or voting, as typical wants, in terms of one single 'option' alone. If we look at playing as something which children typically want to do, we must see it in terms of the whole range of games which children play at. Given the way children are, our notion of playing as a typical want of children cannot be the notion of wanting to play one particular game and that game alone. The same applies for voting. As a typical want of adults it must be understood in relation to the variety of voting responses which would obtain in a population of adults in the absence of artificial restrictions.

(ii) Many people think of wants as being rather like drives. For instance, they are seen as things we acquire more-or-less automatically rather than as things we may consciously form for ourselves. If "freedom" is linked with such a notion of wants it follows that the only level at which our freedom can be restricted is in our pursuit of
wants. However people often identify themselves with certain objects for pursuit only after a process of reflection and deliberation. In other words they come to choose certain options.

This suggests the possibility of restricting people's freedom at a different level from the pursuit of wants. We may, for example, feed a person false information, so that he will come to choose those options we want him to choose rather than those he may otherwise choose. Surely, it is claimed, we limit people's freedom by interfering in such a way with the process by which they identify themselves with certain options. To invoke measures of social control means to limit social freedom. Paradigm methods of social control include the use of such constraints as law, physical force, and confinement. These measures are intended to prevent or dissuade people from doing what they want to do, or compel them to do what they want not to do. But we are well aware of an additional range of social control possibilities. Instead of invoking measures to prevent individuals from doing what they want, it is possible to ensure that they will never come to identify themselves with certain pursuits in the first place.

The educational implications of this are wide-ranging, and at least some of them quite obvious. It is ironic that Rousseau, who is often regarded as the champion of social freedom for the pupil, was well aware of the potential of this form of social control and recommended it to the tutor. c.f.,

"let (your pupil) always think he is master while you are really master. There is no subjection so complete as that which preserves the form of freedom; it is thus that the will is taken captive. Is not this poor child, without knowledge, strength, or wisdom, entirely at your mercy? Are you not master of his whole environment so far as it affects him? Cannot you make of him what you please? His work and play
his pleasure and pain, are they not, unknown to him, under your control? No doubt he only ought to do what he wants, but he ought to want to do nothing but what you want him to do" (op. cit., 84-85).

The objection in question here is that by conceiving "freedom" in terms of "wants" it is easy to overlook this important domain of constraints to human freedom. The answer to this objection is clear. There is nothing in the concept "wants" that implies the impossibility of constraint at the level where one decides which objects one will pursue or reject. This is reflected in ordinary language by concern for the manipulation of wants. On my analysis of "wants", what a person wants to do may be a result of rational deliberation of the highest order. "Wanting X" is perfectly compatible with "choosing X". On my position it is simply not made a necessary condition of having a want that one be capable of rational reflection. Some people may indeed have a mistaken conception of wants of the type Connolly notes. But that in no way counts as a conclusive ground for rejecting an analysis of "freedom" in terms of "wants". After all, it is equally possible that people could have a wrongheaded conception of "choice", such that to link "freedom" with "choice" might be to overlook the whole range of constraints which attach to the pursuit rather than the conception of ends.

(iii) The fact that "choice" presupposes rational reflection whereas "want" does not, underlies a third reason for linking "freedom" with "choice". According to Connolly, one's conception of freedom may be strongly influenced by one's view of the desirable form of human development. He claims that those who adopt the principle of freedom often do so because it provides the space in which persons can both
develop and express the capacities seen as constitutive of the ethical ideal (see op. cit., p. 154). Given this, we might well expect to find someone's concern for protecting opportunity to develop particular capacities showing up in his account of "freedom".

Connolly explains his own preference for an account of "freedom" in terms of "choices" rather than "wants" against this background. He is committed to a particular view of the ethical ideal: namely autonomy. He sees autonomy as essentially a matter of rational development. c.f.,

"A person is autonomous to the extent that his conduct is informed by his own reflective assessment of the situation. He realises that he is enclosed in a system of conventions that shape much of his conduct and tend to limit his self understanding, and he explores routes to render those habits more amenable to self-conscious scrutiny and possible revision. He seeks to translate those conventions and habits, so far as possible, from forces acting upon him into considerations he can choose to accept or modify in the light of this understanding. In Dewey's language, he encourages intelligent reflection to enter into the desires, projects, and practices he endorses. Knowing that the very concepts and beliefs he brings to a reconsideration of past habits reflect in part those habits themselves, he seeks to expose himself to alternative modes of classification in the interests of identifying new angles of vision from which he can view and evaluate his acquired habits" (ibid., p.155).

Having provided this account of "autonomy", Connolly immediately offers an account of "freedom" which not only is congruent with it, but indeed "appeals to the ideal of autonomy for nourishment". c.f.,

"X acts freely in doing Z when (or to the extent that) he acts without constraint upon his unconstrained and reflective choice with respect to Z.... The idea of actual and potential choice replaces that of actual and potential wants ..., because the notion of a choice embodies more fully a reflective or deliberative dimension. Some of my wants might reflect mere habit, compulsive drive, or simple impulse, but, as Aristotle reminds us, the very paradigm of a choice between options involves 'a voluntary act preceded by deliberation'" (ibid., pp. 157-158).
I have two reasons for resisting Connolly's recommendation here that "freedom" be linked with "choice" rather than "wants". In the first place it would be inappropriate for me to accept it on the basis of Connolly's argument given my wider concern in this discussion. Secondly, a number of philosophical and educational problems arise if "freedom" is linked with a conception of choice that has a strong rationality component of the kind Connolly proposes. I will take these reasons in turn.

Connolly seems committed to the view that it is impossible to provide a value-neutral account of "social freedom". Freedom is one of those concepts that are inevitably coloured by one's other values - in particular, Connolly believes, by one's conception of an ideal form of human development. While this view may not be correct, I will assume its truth here for the purposes of argument. Now it is a fact that autonomy - more or less as Connolly conceives it - has been widely accepted as an ethical ideal, and even as the ethical ideal. Furthermore, within contemporary educational philosophy it has been identified as an ideal of freedom: that is, the free person is precisely the autonomous person (c.f., chapters 3-5 below). Indeed some educational philosophers seem to believe that it constitutes the educational ideal.

But for me to accept the recommendation that "freedom" be understood in terms of "choice", for the reason Connolly offers, would be quite inappropriate at this stage of my discussion. I want to leave open the question whether freedom as an ethical ideal must be identified with autonomy. If some other account of "free persons" can be provided, in which rationality is not central, I will want to ask whether it has
stronger claims for recognition as an educational ideal than autonomy. At this point I am not committed to autonomy as an ethical ideal. Neither am I committed to it as a conception of an educational ideal of free persons. Consequently it would be misguided for me to adopt an account of "freedom" grounded in a valuative position I may later reject, for the very reason that it is grounded in this valuative position.

Secondly, to link "freedom" with "choice", and "choice" with "rational reflection and deliberation" has some unfortunate philosophical and educational implications. The problem is that choosing is often construed as a high order human activity, particularly by educationists. Peters, for example, claims that "choice ... is intimately connected with the exercise of practical reason"; that is, with situations in which one seriously asks oneself, 'What ought I to do?' (1966, p.208). For Peters, "to ask oneself seriously" implies that one is prepared to subject one's deliberation to criteria and standards of reason.

The obvious difficulty with asserting a conceptual link between "freedom" and "choice" is that children - especially younger children - are thereby disqualified as possible subjects of freedom, and hence of unfreedom. They are incapable of choosing or deliberating in the required sense. This conclusion might easily be drawn from the following passage.

"The point about children is that they are not yet in a position to exercise freedom of choice in the full sense, because they have not been sufficiently educated in modes of social life to be able to deliberate. The exercise of authority over them, therefore, cannot be an encroachment on their freedom: it is via the exercise of authority that they will be inducted into modes of social life and thus be made capable of deliberating and exercising choice" (Winch, 1967, pp. 103-104).
On its most obvious interpretation this is counter-intuitive. Indeed it offends against our ordinary language sensitivities and plain common sense. It suggests that in compelling children to engage in various educational activities we do not limit their freedom. More generally, this position implies that we do not, for example, limit the freedom of infants and young children to move as they wish by placing them in a playpen or putting them on a harness—since they do not choose to crawl out the door or wander off in the street. If the distinction between "want" and "choice" is to have the discriminative power people like Connolly and Peters invest in it, it must preclude infants and young children, and possibly older children also, from the class of choosers. If unfreedom consists in the presence of constraints to choice, we logically cannot limit the freedom of infants and children. Of course to impose constraints on choices is sufficient for limiting freedom. But common sense and ordinary understanding deny that it is necessary.

Furthermore, it is dangerous from an educational standpoint to assert a link between "freedom" and "choice". If this is done it makes no sense to require justification for limiting children's freedom. There can be no such thing as limiting children's freedom. This difficulty is avoided by linking "freedom" with "wants" in the way I have. We do limit the child's freedom when we close the door on his crawling, take away his noisy rattle, or remove the books he is tearing up. I am committed to the view that we often limit the freedom of young people, and that it is an important educational question as to how far this is justifiable. Many restrictions on freedom are justified—for example, in terms of the child's long term interests, the happiness of all concerned, and so on. But in order to see how far
restrictions on freedom are justified the question must first be allowed to arise. This is precisely what cannot happen if "freedom" is linked conceptually with "choice". But on my analysis, such questions have meaning and point from the earliest times in an individual's life.

So far in this chapter I have suggested that social freedom be understood as the absence of social constraint to wants, and have confronted a number of objections to this proposal. Besides arguing that these objections to an analysis based on "wants" can be met I have suggested that there are positive points to be made in support of such an analysis. In particular, my account leaves open the possibility of asking how far restrictions on the freedom of young people can be justified. This question is largely defined out of existence if "freedom" is conceived as absence of constraint to choices. I believe it is educationally important that this question be raised and given serious consideration. I want now to suggest further advantages of my analysis. These can be demonstrated by exposing a number of problems faced by other accounts of "freedom" which can be avoided by my analysis.

Often those who advance accounts of "social freedom" attempt to link it conceptually with pursuits which they consider worthwhile or desirable. c.f., "No man is free in doing evil" (cited Berlin, 1969, p. 148n). The idea underlying such accounts is that talk of freedom properly arises only when an agent is pursuing something worthwhile or desirable. If one is impeded in the pursuit of such an end one's freedom is restricted. However if prevented from pursuing some undesirable or worthless object one's freedom cannot be said to be limited. This, of course, applies as much to adults as to children. Within educational literature frequent attempts have been made to write
subjective values and preferences into the notion of freedom, by
limiting the range of pursuits in respect of which talk of freedom is
considered applicable.

This manoeuvre has an obvious advantage for certain educators.
If talk of freedom is seen properly to arise only in relation to a
limited range of pursuits, it is then possible for an educator to
impose various restrictions on children's activities without being
seen to limit their freedom. Consequently, here again the prospect of
having to justify restrictions on children's freedom does not arise.
This is a clear advantage to those educators who would impose wide-
ranging restrictions on children. For many of the objects children
want to pursue must be seen as trivial, worthless, or even hostile, in
the light of the ultimate ends of education. However even among
educators who claim to be concerned with promoting children's freedom
as far as possible, the view sometimes arises that it is inappropriate
to talk of unfreedom in respect of restrictions to certain options or
pursuits. This can be illustrated by reference to Rousseau and Neill.
Upon close examination it would seem that their attempts to distinguish
between "liberty" and "licence" depend upon writing their own values
and preferences into the notion of freedom. In Neill's case this has
the effect of preserving certain practices he may wish to adopt from
charges of restricting freedom. With Rousseau it helps create the
impression that he has provided a plausible educational method: give
the child all the liberty or freedom he seeks, but deny him any
licence. Unfortunately this move prompts a number of objections —
both philosophical and educational.

Neill considers a whole range of activities which children
typically want to engage in as having no place in talk of freedom. To
be prevented from doing such things as playing with poisons, playing on the fire escape, kicking on the door or standing on Neill's piano, is not to have one's freedom limited. To be allowed to do such things is to be given licence, not liberty. Neill presents this 'distinction' as though it embodies some obvious conceptual truth. This, however, is very doubtful.

There is clearly a difference in the value connotations of the two terms: "liberty" has connotations of positive value and "licence" of negative value. But both ideas are covered by a single analysis. "Liberty" implies absence of constraint to various wants, and "licence" implies exactly the same thing. It follows then that any distinction between the two must arise from the nature of the wants in question. This is precisely what Neill suggests, although somewhat shakily. He argues that the criterion by which some wants become candidates for freedom and others for licence is the notion of consideration for others' rights. If what I want to do will infringe a right of yours, it is licence for me to be left free from constraint to do it. To impede me is to deny me licence, but not to limit my freedom. This appears to work for such cases as a pupil kicking on Neill's door, or standing on his piano. Neill could be said to have a right not to have his property treated in this way. However it doesn't seem to work for playing with poisons or fooling about on the fire escape—compare the unsuccessful attempt to save Neill's analysis made in Chapter One.

Now the whole problem with trying to establish a genuine distinction on these grounds is that people will differ as to when someone's rights are being infringed, or when some activity is unduly
dangerous or contrary to the actor's own interests. Furthermore, such disagreement will probably emerge whatever criteria are seen to mark the distinction between "liberty" and "licence". Any particular application of the 'distinction' is, then, likely to be relative to the values viewpoint of the person applying it. Indeed there is a strong suggestion in Summerhill that "liberty" ultimately denotes what Neill personally considers desirable absence of constraint, and "licence" undesirable absence of constraint. Conversely, restrictions on freedom consist in barriers to pursuits which Neill approves of, or at least does not object to. If it is maintained that talk of freedom cannot properly arise in the context of those pursuits which signify potential cases of licence, it seems unavoidable that the very meaning of "freedom" itself must to some extent be determined by the particular values and preferences of whoever is employing the term.

We can see this again in Rousseau. In the Emile he argues that persons are unhappy to the extent that their desires outstrip their means for realising them. Education has a vital role to play in alleviating unhappiness. Rousseau argues that we must give children liberty but deny them licence. He makes the 'distinction' between liberty and licence in terms of a further distinction between genuine human desires and mere wishes. Genuine human desires are needs which are defined by man's essential nature. They comprise the desires man has in the state of nature. Mere wishes, by contrast, are what Rousseau calls "caprices". They are artificial, superfluous desires which humans acquire when they enter a civil existence. To allow a child freedom is to withhold constraint to the pursuit of objects of genuine desire or need. To limit freedom is to impede the pursuit of needed objects. Conversely, failure to impose constraint on the pursuit of caprices is to allow a child licence. To the extent
that a child is given licence the imbalance between his wants and his powers flourishes, and the alleviation of unhappiness is thwarted. Consequently it is crucial that a child be denied licence. But this does not infringe his freedom.

In this Rousseau seems to have provided us with an answer to an important question of educational method: namely, how far and when should children be allowed freedom? His answer is that children should never be denied freedom - that is, liberty. Any restriction on their freedom is unwarranted. Equally children should never be allowed licence. But it is very doubtful that Rousseau has provided us with a tenable answer to the question of freedom in education. Unless a precise account can be provided of "human needs" or "genuine human desires", different educators will observe different educational practices in the constraint of children - some of which, given Rousseau's position, must necessarily be wrong. The problem here is that it is doubtful whether in all cases we could determine which practices are indeed correct. The difficulty stems from the ideas in terms of which Rousseau defines "freedom". On his view talk of freedom only properly arises in the context of pursuits which involve genuine human desires. Then and only then does it make sense to speak of allowing children freedom, or imposing (unwarranted) restrictions on their freedom. It is inevitable that dispute will arise over what constitutes genuine human desires, or needs, as opposed to artificial desires or capricious wishes. Value-free accounts of these ideas simply cannot be provided. Each of them includes a significant valuative component. One is unlikely to regard as a capricious wish some pursuit which one values. However someone else who does not approve of this same pursuit may regard it as a paradigm instance of caprice. Consequently, subjective values and
preferences will inevitably be written into accounts of "freedom" so long as it is seen as part of the meaning of "freedom" that it implies reference to a restricted range of human pursuits: namely, those which are grounded in human need.

There are strong philosophical and educational reasons for discouraging the view that freedom is to be conceived in terms of a restricted range of pursuits, where this is likely to result in people imposing subjective values and preferences on the meaning of "freedom". Some of these reasons are as follows.

(i) As with defining "freedom" in terms of rational choice, this flies in the face of ordinary language and common understanding. Most people would regard kicking on the headmaster's door or playing with poisons as undesirable activities. But measures aimed against pupils doing such things are properly understood as limitations on liberty to do them. It is wrong to say that questions of freedom do not arise because the activities in question can only be considered as instances of licence, not liberty. On this matter Berlin recommends Bentham's view. In response to such claims as "freedom is not freedom to do what is irrational, stupid or wrong", Berlin says.

"On this Bentham seems to me to have said the last word: 'Is not liberty to do evil, liberty? If not, what is it? Do we not say that it is necessary to take liberty from idiots and bad men because they abuse it?'" (op. cit., p. 148n).

(ii) If value-impregnated accounts of "freedom" are accepted, what are essentially substantive questions of considerable importance may reduce to trivial or meaningless talk. For example, "should children be allowed freedom?", becomes in effect, "would it be a good thing
to leave children to do what is good?" Similarly, "to what extent should children be allowed freedom?", becomes "to what extent would it be good to allow children to do what is good?" In this way Neill's conviction - based on his Summerhill experience - that freedom works, is robbed of much of its impact. If freedom is identified with liberty as opposed to licence, the claim that children who are given freedom generally develop into desirable sorts of people looks like the claim that children who are allowed to do what one considers worthwhile generally become people who act in a manner which one values.

Alternatively, substantive questions may be misconstrued as conceptual questions, and from an educational standpoint this could be disastrous. Barrow shows this very clearly with reference to Neill's use of the liberty-licence 'distinction'. c.f.,

"On this view, 'liberty' is desirable freedom, whereas 'licence' is undesirable freedom. The problem of freedom is thus very simple to solve and the limits easy to define. We should ideally provide unlimited liberty and no licence" (op. cit., 80).

The answer to such questions as "how far should pupils be allowed freedom?", would appear in this context to involve conceptual inquiry - that is, "What does 'freedom' mean?", which is to ask, "to what sorts of options does talk of freedom apply?" Unfortunately for this view of things many educators will have differing beliefs about the nature and range of options to be covered by talk of freedom. We are left then with the question of whose beliefs are correct. This, of course, is essentially the question of how far children should be allowed freedom. Hence the conceptual inquiry leads nowhere. Educators who seek answers to substantive questions in purely
conceptual inquiry are destined either to disappointment or delusion.

(iii) If "freedom" is somehow linked with "desirable or worthwhile pursuits", a proliferation of persuasive definitions and endless disputes about which is the proper account of "freedom" will inevitably result. Even though I have considered only two attempts to distinguish "liberty" from "licence" here, it is clear that these two accounts are significantly different. To this extent theorists who have sought to provide value-neutral definitions of "freedom" have acknowledged a genuine problem. However it is now widely accepted that a pure, value-neutral account cannot be provided. But the objection under consideration here can be largely met without committing oneself to providing a value-neutral analysis. What is required is that as far as possible subjective values and preferences be expunged from one's account of "social freedom". I have suggested here a major source of such unwarranted intrusion of subjective judgment into the notion of social freedom.

(iv) A problem of particular educational interest here is that on some value-laden accounts of "freedom" children may be disqualified as serious subjects of freedom. The same problem has already been seen to arise where "freedom" is linked conceptually with "choice". Children are notoriously incapable of perceiving their long term interests, or looking ahead to see the consequences in the long run of pursuing various wants. Education must pay serious attention to long term development and growth. If "freedom" is taken to refer to a class of options which are valued on long term or ultimate educational grounds, then with respect to many of their wants the idea of restricting children's freedom by imposing constraints could not arise.
But if this idea cannot arise, neither can that of requiring justification for restrictions on children's freedom.

My own view is that we must ask to what extent it is justifiable to limit the freedom of young people. We impose on the freedom of human beings whenever we impede their doing what they want, regardless of what it is that they want. The question is, "To what extent is this warranted?" The answer may be provided in terms of such values as the development of autonomy, promotion of one's long term interests, self-actualisation, and so on. I take this to be the correct approach. But it is ruled out if "freedom" is defined in terms of long term interests or some ethical ideal.

This accords well with at least some influential thought about freedom. Mill, for example, in his essay On Liberty, does not deny that children can properly be considered full subjects of freedom. He sees quite correctly that children can be given or denied social freedom. Instead Mill denies that a general presumption in favour of giving children complete freedom in self-regarding matters should apply. This is because Mill doubts that children are competent to use their freedom wisely - that is, in their real interests. He does not deny it on conceptual grounds - that is, by employing a concept of freedom which makes it odd or impossible to consider children full subjects of freedom. For Mill social freedom has instrumental value. It is good because it makes possible a range of valuable outcomes. However Mill believes it is unlikely that these instrumental advantages will accrue from extending freedom to children on the same terms as adults. The beneficial exercise of freedom presupposes qualities and capacities which Mill thinks children do not possess. Furthermore, if
children are given freedom on the same terms as adults they may never get into a position from which they can realise the true benefits of freedom.

My analysis of "freedom" in terms of "typical wants" avoids the philosophical and educational objections which I have just outlined. The things that humans, or particular groupings of humans, typically want can be evil, stupid, trivial, and dangerous, as well as desirable and beneficial. Hence on my view we can think of freedom being restricted in respect of undesirable or worthless pursuits. As noted, this conforms with ordinary language and common understanding. By thus eliminating an unwarranted intrusion of values into the definition of "freedom", my analysis minimises the possibility of substantive questions being misconstrued as conceptual matters. It also leaves minimal scope for unproductive arguments about the true meaning of "freedom", or the proliferation of persuasive definitions of the concept. Finally, it requires that we recognise young people, including the very young, as full subjects of freedom. Hence no artificial bounds are imposed on when we might appropriately seek or expect justification for restrictions on freedom in education.

Freedom and Constraint.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are various types of external constraint to human pursuits. However discussion of freedom in education is obviously concerned with one class of constraint in particular: social constraint. In general terms social constraints are those which are consequences of human activities and arrangements. The question to be addressed here then, is: how and when can human practices and arrangements be said to constrain the pursuit of wants?
Human activities and arrangements can constrain a person's pursuit of wants in two ways: by restraining him from doing or getting something, and by actually compelling him to do or get something. To restrain a person is to impede or prevent his pursuit of some want. Given that there are things people typically want to do, restraints consist in measures which make it burdensome or impossible to do such things. Restraints take different forms. One obvious form involves limiting a person's ability to move - movement often being a necessary means to a desired end. By way of direct physical force, or through imposition of physical barriers such as walls, chains, and handcuffs, an agent may be held back, pinned down, confined within a restricted space, or have his limbs immobilised. In preventing a person moving in certain ways or outside of a given area, other agents limit his capacity for action, and hence his freedom to act. Not all restraints involve the use of physical force or barriers. People can be restrained by the removal of other necessary means to desired ends. A person may be restrained from killing someone by the removal of his weapons. Children may be restrained from drawing on the walls by having their crayons and pencils taken away. In addition, laws and rules backed up by a system of sanctions or punishments, also serve to restrain people's activities.

To compel a person, on the other hand, is to require or force him to do something he might otherwise omit. Many laws operate in this way - for example, those compelling an individual to pay his taxes, educate his child, register for military training or service, keep his animals under strict control, and so on. These are the sorts of things it is typical for people to want not to do. Compulsion, then, infringes wants not by preventing their pursuit, but by making people do what
they want not to do. The use, or threatened use of physical force can be employed as an instrument of compulsion as well as restraint - for example, when a bouncer compels one to leave a club. Assault, or the threat of it, is a further means of compelling someone to do what he may otherwise omit.

Whether employed as an instrument of restraint or compulsion, the use of physical force and the imposition of physical barriers are obvious forms of constraint. Indeed the model instance of the unfree person is one who cannot move, can only move within a limited space, or else is forced to move in a manner contrary to his desire. Hobbes actually went so far as to define unfreedom solely in terms of impediments to motion. The link between ability to move in a certain manner and pursuit of wants is quite obvious. But there is a further reason why imposition of physical barriers and the use of physical force are so readily recognised as paradigm forms of constraint. This is because they can prevent pursuit of wants in the strongest possible sense: that is, they can make it impossible for a person to do as he wants. In such cases an individual who is unfree to X is in the strict sense unable to do it. The shackled prisoner confined within his cell has no choice as to whether he will walk in the street or go to the pictures. It has been made impossible for him to do these things. Of course various social arrangements and practices other than the use of physical means can make certain pursuits or activities impossible. For example, if it is made a necessary condition of being married that this be performed in a church, then it is impossible to be married in, say, a private home or a registry office. This kind of example is significant here insofar as people often assume - and perhaps are encouraged to assume - that it is a necessary condition of
being educated that this is done in a particular way: for example, in a school, via the disciplines, etc.

However not all paradigm forms of social constraint make it impossible for a person to pursue some want. There are some human practices and arrangements which comprise model cases of social constraint, but which, in a sense, still leave an individual with some choice over whether or not he will pursue his want. In other words, if A is unfree to do X it is not necessarily the case—and indeed it is not even generally the case—that A has been made unable, in the strict sense, to do X. This is so where one's freedom is restricted by laws and sanctions, rules and punishment, threats, intimidation, and similar measures. Oppenheim, (1961), covers all such instances of constraint under the notion of punishability—A's unfreedom to do X here consists in someone's making it punishable, though not impossible, for him to do X. There is a sense here in which A is left with a choice. Many people decide to break the law, disobey rules, ignore threats, and withstand intimidation. Such decisions may be based on beliefs that, say, detection is unlikely, the benefits from doing X will outweigh the unpleasantness of punishment, or the other party is bluffing. Alternatively, A may decide to do X in the face of laws or threats out of sheer determination, malice, jealousy, or desperation. In these cases we can say that A is actually able to do what he has been made socially unfree to do.

This suggests a problem facing the analysis of "social freedom": namely, when does some social practice or arrangement which makes pursuit of X more difficult or unattractive than it would otherwise be, comprise a constraint to pursuit of X? How 'strong' or 'difficult-
making! does it have to be to count as an infringement on freedom? At one end of the scale there are those measures which effectively prevent or force certain forms of activity. That is, it is made impossible to do otherwise. These measures constrain in the strongest possible sense. At the other end are social measures which make pursuit or omission of X just slightly less attractive or more difficult than it would otherwise be. The difficulty is in deciding at what point between these extremes we are prepared to talk of constraint to wants. Accepting that there are cases where people are still able to do - and hence may decide to do - what they are unfree to do, we want to know just when the point of unfreedom is reached. To use Oppenheim's terminology, what we want to know is when a social arrangement or practice can properly be said to make a pursuit punishable. On Oppenheim's view, I make you unfree to do (or omit) X so far as I make you unable to do (or omit) X, or make it punishable for you to do (or omit) X. c.f.,

"With respect to Y, X is free to do x to the extent that X is, with respect to Y, neither unfree to do x nor unfree to abstain from doing x. The relationship obtains, provided Y does not do any of the following: (a) prevent X from doing x; (b) make it necessary for X to do x; (c) make it punishable for X to do x; (d) make it punishable for X to refrain from doing x." (ibid., 111).

It is important for me to ask just when the point of punishability, and hence unfreedom, is reached. For the great majority of constraints which apply in education are of a type which do not make children unable to do what they are nevertheless unfree to do. Feinberg suggests a possible reply to this problem by distinguishing between legal and sociological unfreedom (1973a., pp. 17-18). Wherever there is a law prohibiting or requiring X, those who are subject to that law are
legally unfree to do or omit X. This is so regardless of how severe or weak the sanctions supporting the law may be, or how likely it is that offenders will be detected. To know whether A is legally unfree to do X we have only to ascertain whether there is a law against doing X, and if so whether A is subject to that law. The answer will be absolute. There are no degrees of freedom or unfreedom from the legal perspective. One is either free or unfree. With regard to formal education we may extend this legal model to take in the various rules imposed on pupils in educational institutions.

Feinberg argues that a person can be sociologically free to do what he is legally unfree to do. Whether or not a person is sociologically free has to do with such matters as how compelling the punishment or sanction is, how high the chances of detection are, and how likely it is that one will be prosecuted if caught. Judgments of sociological unfreedom are, then, "subject to a different kind of confirming or disconfirming evidence" from judgments of legal unfreedom (ibid., p. 17). As an example of this distinction in operation Feinberg suggests that within New York State people are legally unfree to play poker for money in private homes. That is, there is a law against it. However the police are largely indifferent to this law and people can break it with little or no risk of detection. We may say that from the legal standpoint playing poker for money in private homes is punishable, but from the sociological standpoint it is not. So on this matter New Yorkers are sociologically free to do what they are legally unfree to do.

Unfortunately this distinction is of little help in determining within an educational context which pursuits are indeed punishable, and
hence in respect of which pupils are unfree. In the first place we do not typically find a 'gap' between the existence of laws or rules and the policing of them in educational settings. By and large those with authority in education insist that rules be met, and effectively punish breaches of these rules. Schools do not have the vast number and range of rules characteristic of our legal system. To this extent they are in a better position to enforce those rules they do have consistently and efficiently. Furthermore, many instances of unfreedom in education have nothing at all to do with formal laws and rules. Hence the distinction between legal and sociological unfreedom has limited applicability. c.f., the case of young children where it may not even be appropriate to control their activity with rules. Even with older children, educators are often required to limit freedom in circumstances where it makes little sense to think of some rule applying. In addition the notion of sociological unfreedom really only raises anew the question of when some pursuit can be seen as punishable. Precisely what we want to know is when a rule and sanction can be regarded as 'effective', or at what stage the chance of detection reaches 'constraining point'. It doesn't help here to be told that people are sociologically free - although legally unfree - so long as the rule and sanction is not compelling or intimidatory. We want to know what counts as "compelling" or "intimidatory". What is needed is some criterion or measure - not a distinction of the type offered.

I would suggest that an action is punishable, and hence one is unfree to perform it, whenever the consequences or threatened consequences of performing it may reasonably be expected to limit that action in typical groups of people affected, and where there is reason to believe that these consequences will actually occur. To say that a
penalty may reasonably be expected to limit an action is to say that we would expect it to dissuade a normally prudent individual in typical groups of people affected, from performing that act. For example, threatening to turn off the T.V. may limit the 5 year old's activity but not the 15 year old's. We can build up a conception of normally prudent persons by observing the sorts of risks people are prepared to take, the degree of hardship, discomfort, or pain they are prepared to tolerate for a given end, and so on. Similarly, if the consequences in question have regularly occurred in the past under similar circumstances, there is reason to believe that they will occur in this particular instance.

Young people are subjected to wideranging constraint in education. They are compelled to engage in certain activities and restrained from engaging in others. They are required against their desires to observe certain standards of speech, dress, behaviour and etiquette. This applies in both formal and informal educational settings. In the remainder of this chapter I will look at one particular aspect of constraint in education. This is the requirement that children engage in various rule-governed pursuits. I am especially concerned with this aspect of constraint in education because it has been argued that participation in certain rule-governed pursuits is a necessary condition of becoming a free person. I want to ask how far the requirement that children engage in these pursuits can be seen as a restriction on their social freedom.

In recent years the concept "education" has been much disputed among educational philosophers. However they agree that education is linked conceptually with purposeful attempts to transmit knowledge and
understanding. They also typically accept that there is a logical link between educating someone and making him more rational, although there may be room for disagreement as to whether this is the educator's primary task. It seems to follow from this that educational activity must, to a greater or lesser extent, involve attempts to initiate children into what have been called rule-governed pursuits - that is, pursuits in which there are established procedures, standards of validity, correctness, and propriety, criteria for determining error, and so on. Without some such notion as "rule-governed pursuits" it is difficult to make sense of "transmitting knowledge and understanding" and "making people more rational".

Rule-governed pursuits may be classified in various ways. For my purposes we may distinguish those which are crucially linked with a rather academic conception of rational thought and action from those which are not. The former group includes what we may loosely call the academic studies: mathematics, history, physics, philosophy, classics, foreign languages, geography, and the rest. To be initiated into these is to be made aware of the various norms and criteria peculiar to them. It involves coming to understand what it means to think, say, historically - how to determine what is relevant, weigh evidence, construct an argument, test an hypothesis, from an historical standpoint. Also included in this first group are rule-governed pursuits which are not themselves academic studies, but are presupposed by participation in such studies. Language and literacy are examples here. To be taught a first language and to be made literate are not so much a matter of becoming rational as being put in the way of necessary means to becoming rational - through them one is introduced to a conceptual scheme, given access to bodies of evidence, or to facts relevant to making certain
judgments, and so on. But not all rule-governed pursuits can be seen as ways to promoting rational thought and action in this academic sense. For example, the various human cultures have their own established norms and standards governing such activities as eating, dressing, courting, conversing, hunting, and celebrating. These kinds of activities comprise a second broad group of rule-governed pursuits.

A number of educational philosophers have argued that initiation into the first group of pursuits is necessary for becoming a free person. At the same time it would appear that requiring children to engage in these pursuits limits their social freedom. Some of the attractiveness, if not the plausibility, of educating people for freedom is lost if this very education presupposes serious curtailment of children's liberty. But perhaps it is not an infringement of children's liberty to require that they engage in these academic-cum-rational pursuits. This is what Winch seems to assume in the passage quoted earlier (see above, p. 79). The question then is whether required participation in rule-governed pursuits does limit children's freedom. How far can the requirement that children be initiated into rule-governed activities be seen to constrain typical wants of children? In what follows I limit discussion to pursuits falling within the first group identified above.

Among the earliest systematic interactions between educator and child are those concerned with teaching language. The child finds himself in a setting where other people use verbal language. In time he begins to 'vocalise' - imitating sounds, babbling. From this time other agents are intent on shaping his verbal behaviour toward mastery of the native tongue. In other words they progressively
initiate him into the rule-governed activity of speaking a language. To what extent might this be seen to limit a typical want of children, and hence infringe their social freedom?

A possibility here is that it prevents the child from being someone who is without language and this is something children typically want. However it can be argued that being without a language is not a thing a human being may intelligibly be said to want. Therefore it cannot be a typical want of children. This can be argued on the grounds of what it means to be human. Some human beings lack a human conceptual scheme. Most often this is a consequence of severe mental retardation which prevents transmission of such a scheme. In other cases it may be the result of gross negligence, as with 'attic' or 'closet' children. They have been kept alive but given no contact with other human beings. Whatever the cause there are some individuals beyond infancy who have human form but lack a human conceptual scheme. Consequently they lack the very basis for thought and communication. This prompts the question, 'How far do we regard such individuals as human?'

A case can be made for the view that outside of a strictly biological context our concept of being human is not purely descriptive. It has some valuative content. It is often seen as part of what it means to be human that one be able to think and act in certain ways, or at least to have the potential to do so. But this rules out those individuals who lack a human conceptual scheme. Even if we are reluctant for various reasons to admit such content into our concept of being human, it must surely be part of what it means to live a human life. To live a human life means more than simply
having a human form which is 'alive' in a medical or biological sense. It is at least to live a social life - to be in contact with shared ideas and beliefs. (N.B. One does not have to be in physical contact with shared ideas and beliefs however. c.f., hermits.) A precondition of this is that one have a human conceptual scheme, if only a limited one. An individual cannot acquire such a conceptual scheme entirely on his own. It requires initiation into a (public) language. Consequently if one is to be said to live a human life, which subsumes the notion of having genuine human wants, acquiring a language would seem to be presupposed. The idea of someone living a human life but wanting to be without language is a conceptual absurdity. Hence the idea of an educator constraining a want by teaching a child language is unintelligible. It follows that in transmitting language to children educators cannot be said to restrict their freedom.

Against this it might be argued that even before infants are introduced to language they are capable of forms of interaction and communication with those close to them. For example, they express wants and exhibit signs of satisfaction and pleasure. May they not be said to be living a human life in my terms, and yet in no way have been introduced to language? Moreover, have they not already got some rudiments of a human conceptual scheme? - c.f., Piaget's theory of cognitive development. An obvious reply here is that we surely make our appraisal of the baby's living a human life as much on the basis of what we anticipate as on what we actually observe. To observe normal development in an infant is to note that, in relation to what humans are capable of at that age, this infant is up to par. But if that level of infant activity and 'understanding' were all he would ever be capable of, we would have reservations about the extent to which he
might subsequently be said to live a *human* life.

Schrag, (1972), considers a second argument for the view that teaching language constrains children's wants. He advances the following example.

"Child: 'I wanna pookie'.
Mother: 'You mean I want a *cookie*'.
Child: 'I wanna pookie'.
Mother: 'I'm sorry, I can't help you. I can't understand what you're saying. You must tell me what you want. If you want one of these, say, 'I want a *cookie*'.
Child: 'I wanna *cookie*'.
Mother: 'O.K. *Here*'.
Here the mother made an utterance punishable for a child" *(ibid., p. 560)*.

Schrag asks whether we might not think of the child here as wanting to communicate by using his own word for "*cookie*". If so, to the extent that his mother requires him to use a different word - one from public language - by making it punishable for him to use his own word, she constraints his want and thus limits his freedom. Schrag rejects this suggestion. The problem is that it makes no sense to think of children wanting to communicate by using their own words. The idea of wanting to communicate using one's own words is a conceptual absurdity, in the same way that wanting to draw square circles is. "*To communicate*" means to use a shared language. And this implies "getting it right". In this example the mother does not constrain a want so far as the child seeks to communicate the desire for a *cookie*. If one seeks to communicate one is thereby logically committed to getting the words right. The mother's action must then be seen as facilitating a want of the child, not impeding one. However if we do not assume that a child
wants to communicate in a given case, then so far as his use of an
idiosyncratic 'word' is made punishable it makes sense to think of
his freedom being restricted. For in this case making the vocalisation
punishable would amount to shutting the child up, or simply preventing
him from making a particular sound which he would otherwise have made.
Babbling is, of course, a typical want of infants.

A third argument can be advanced which casts doubt on the
meaningfulness of conceiving initiation into language as an infringement
of a child's social freedom. This argument begins from the fact that
babbling is a typical want of infants. In shaping a child's verbal
behaviour the educator constrains the child's babbling. To teach a
child to speak is to consciously limit the range of sounds and sound
combinations he is permitted to utter. Only certain sounds and
combinations are permitted: namely those which are words. Further-
more, only particular words can be used in particular contexts:
namely those which are appropriate. As Schrag notes, the child is
coerced to make appropriate vocalisations.

"In the case of learning how to speak, the parents must
punish vocalisations that do not communicate or fail to
adhere to the 'rules' of the language ... The coercive
measures used .... are usually mild and subtle, but that
does not make them any the less coercive" (ibid., pp. 559-562).

The idea of an infant wanting to emit meaningless sounds is
perfectly intelligible. But, while the infant can be said to want to
babble, can he be said to want to babble rather than learn to speak?
It might be suggested that the idea of the infant wanting to babble is
meaningful in one sense but not in another. It is meaningful in the
sense that a child wants to babble so far as he will babble unless
prevented. We may limit this want by putting a dummy in his mouth, or
by 'shutting him up' in some other way - for example, by giving him threatening looks. To the extent that we shut a babbler up we must be said to prevent his doing what he wants. Hence we must be seen as limiting his freedom.

The question now arises as to whether we limit the freedom of a babbler by teaching him to speak: by shaping his babbling, under coercion, into genuine speech. Here it would seem that we cross over from a meaningful to a meaningless sense of an infant wanting to babble. Changing a babbler's behaviour by shaping his vocalising into speech is not a matter of shutting him up. That is the last thing we aim at. Hence we cannot be said to limit the infant's desire to babble as opposed to being silent. What, then, could we be seen as limiting?

One reply here is that we limit the child's desire to be a babbler rather than a speaker of language. In other words, the notion of wanting to babble being invoked here is that of wanting to babble rather than speak. It has been argued that this is an unintelligible want (see ibid). The idea of an infant wanting to babble rather than learn a language is the idea of a child in effect 'saying': 'Given what is involved in babbling and in speaking, I want to continue babbling thank you'. Thus presented, the 'want' is patently absurd. The very notion of this want presupposes the idea of the wanter having an appreciation of what speaking a language involves: what it means to speak as against babble. Such appreciation cannot be innate. We are incapable of the kind of awareness in question here without actually having been initiated into language. Given the facts about language transmission, in most cases this means having been initiated into verbal language.
On this argument, then, the idea of constraining a typical want by 'leading' a child out of babbling and initiating him into language is unintelligible. For it is the idea of constraining a meaningless want. N.B. It is not just that the child cannot frame this desire to be a babbler rather than a language speaker because he is still young. It is equally unintelligible to think of keeping an individual without language until he is 25 and conceiving his wanting to speak rather than babble. The point has nothing to do with age. Instead it is a point about the necessary conditions of more or less consciously formulating the desire to babble rather than speak: that is, that one have already been introduced to verbal language.

There is a danger in employing this argument here. The idea of wanting contained within it, and hence linked with talk of an infant's freedom, comes uncomfortably close to the notion of choosing which, I have argued, must not be seen as necessarily linked with "freedom". (1) But even setting aside this difficulty I am not sure that the argument tells the whole story. The argument to this point is that teaching a child to make appropriate vocalisations does not limit his freedom because:

(a) it does not amount to shutting the child up - hence it does not constrain his desire to babble in the meaningful sense of that desire;

(b) it does not constrain a meaningful want - since the desire to babble rather than speak is meaningless here.

1. While it is not necessary for being unfree that some object of choice be constrained, it is sufficient. Although they are not identical, "wants" and "choices" overlap - as noted above (see p. 76).
Unfortunately I doubt that these exhaust the possibilities here. The point surely is that the infant would continue to babble rather than speak unless language users intervened, in the same way that he would continue to mess his nappies rather than use a pot or toilet unless others intervened. Given my account of "typical wants" these cases must be seen as typical wants of infants. However the fact that they are typical wants of infants but not of children and adolescents is essentially a function of the way infants are treated by educators. That is, their vocalising and defaecating behaviours are deliberately shaped by educators using coercive measures, because adults do not believe that the desired changes in behaviour will occur more or less naturally - as functions of natural development and maturation.

When we shape a child's verbal behaviour we are not in effect saying: 'Make the right sounds or make no sounds at all'. Condemning the child to silence is not an alternative here. Neither do we normally conceive the child's babbling as indicative of a (perverse) desire to continue babbling rather than get on with speaking. Instead we are, in effect, saying: "It is important that the child learn to speak. But he will continue to babble or engage in idiosyncratic 'speech' unless we shape up his verbal behaviour. Hence we must infringe against his typical behaviour in the interests of promoting a crucial form of human development". In other words, my analysis of "social freedom" in terms of "typical wants" suggests that initiating children into language may not be completely immune to the charge of imposing on their social freedom. This would set me in opposition to people like Schrag who argue that teaching language is a privileged case: immune from charges of restricting freedom.
Whether or not educators restrict the freedom of infants by shaping their vocal behaviour is a matter to be determined by weighing the relative strengths of the sorts of arguments presented here. However even if we decide that initiating children into language does not limit their freedom, it would be wrong to conclude from this example that educators do not infringe children's social freedom by initiating them into other rule-governed pursuits. Schrag hints at this by comparing initiation into language with another form of learning which occurs at roughly the same time in a child's life. This is initiation into accepted eating practices. When parents teach children to eat in the proper manner they clearly constrain typical wants of children. Eating with fingers and squashing food into a mess before eating it are things youngsters typically want to do. That is, they tend to do these things if not prevented. So far as teaching children to eat properly involves making such typical behaviours punishable, parents constrain children's wants - assuming that the child is not already intent on learning how to eat properly. Hence teaching children to eat properly can clearly be seen as a restriction on their freedom.

To conclude this chapter I will ask how far the requirement that children become literate and engage in academic studies can be said to limit their freedom. In this context we may distinguish between requiring a child to engage in various rule-governed pursuits, and requiring a child who is engaged in such pursuits to meet standards and criteria inherent in them. This distinction is helpful in illuminating the points at which requirements imposed on children by educators can be said to limit their freedom (c.f., Schrag, op. cit.).
In what sense can a pupil engaging in reading, arithmetic, or science be considered unfree? Schrag distinguishes between certain 'restrictions' inherent in the educative process, and restrictions implicit in compelling an individual to learn certain subjects. In the educative process an educator is involved in getting pupils to understand what it means to do, say, maths or science, and to become capable of doing them. Initially the pupil is ignorant of the criteria and standards which define these pursuits. It is the role of the educator to establish such awareness. To this end certain restrictions and demands must be made on pupils. These shape particular responses and behaviours on the part of the pupils. But does this limit freedom? There is a sense in which it does not.

Part of what it means to learn to do arithmetic is to learn how to arrive at a correct answer. It is conceptually absurd to claim that a pupil has learned to do arithmetic but rarely gets a correct answer or bothers to pursue one. There are correct answers in arithmetic. There are also correct or valid ways of proceeding. It is a simple arithmetical truth that 2 plus 2 does not make 7. A child cannot meaningfully want 2 plus 2 to make 7. Similarly in reading, the symbol 'CAT' cannot be read as 'DOG'. As far as the child learning arithmetic is concerned, there is no alternative to writing '4' as the response to '2 plus 2 = ?'. In reading there is no alternative to reading 'dog' as 'dog'. The child who is doing arithmetic is not constrained by the teacher's coercive requirement that '4' be understood as the answer to '2 plus 2 = ?'. Seen in the context of engaging in arithmetic, a child cannot meaningfully want to give '7' as the correct answer to '2 plus 2 = ?'. This is parallel to claiming that a child who is engaged in communication with others cannot want to use his own word for 'cookie'.
If an individual is to participate in some such activity he logically must proceed in a given manner. Since at first he is not aware of the appropriate manner, he must accept restrictions imposed by the teacher. He must come to make the correct responses via coercion and correction. To insist on certain responses and not others being made, and certain procedures rather than others being adopted, is part of what it means to initiate children into the rule-governed pursuits of education. The established nature of a given pursuit limits what people can meaningfully want in the context of engaging in that pursuit. The child cannot preserve his freedom in doing maths by advancing his own answers in place of the right ones. This is because he cannot want to engage in this pursuit on his own terms. To engage in the pursuit is to accept the terms written into the very nature of the pursuit itself - that is, procedures, standards of truth, and so on. In accepting and acting upon the authoritative demands made by teachers - who are academic authorities imposing demands on the basis of this authority - the pupil who is engaging in reading or maths does not suffer a loss of freedom. He is not impeded in doing anything he could intelligibly be said to want to do.

Two points are of interest here, the second being crucial to my analysis. First, in some educational pursuits there may be room for genuine dispute about the precise rules, norms, and standards defining the activity. Where this applies it is possible that talk of limiting freedom may have some point. "Doing art" or "writing poetry" may not be as precisely defined as "doing geometry" or "writing French". What criteria govern "painting a picture" or "writing a poem"? While some things clearly cannot count as painting pictures or writing poems, there is room for dispute on finer points. Take for example a child painting
a simple landscape - sky, trees, house, and street. Suppose the child paints the sky red and the trees pink, and that the teacher points out that the sky should be blue and the trees green. Does this requirement limit the child's freedom? A proponent of creative or spontaneous art might claim that there is a restriction on freedom here. Part of what it means to paint, he might argue, is to express your feelings or impulses of the moment: to do whatever comes over you. If this is what the child is doing he should be encouraged in this. To require certain stylised responses is to restrict the possibility of advancing genuine alternatives. That is, it prevents a child doing in paint what he can meaningfully want to do. On the other hand a proponent of a more traditional conception of art may claim that part of what it means to learn to paint is to learn to get the colours right. If a child wants to paint this commits him - though he may not be aware of it - to wanting to get the colours right. To require that he do so is not, then, to limit his freedom.

How far one is prepared to entertain talk of freedom and unfreedom in such contexts will depend on the theoretical or valuative framework one adopts in respect of art, poetry, music, and the like. However to the extent that "education" is linked with "development of rationality", educational activities must necessarily be governed by some rules which establish criteria for the application of reason in that area. These rules will, of course, be utterly independent of the subjective preferences of individuals. N.B. It might then be questioned how far an utterly spontaneous form of art or poetry is educational.

Secondly, and importantly, questions of restraint and compulsion arise. We have seen that it makes no sense for the individual who is
engaging in arithmetic to want to give '7' as the appropriate answer to '2 plus 2 = ?'. His freedom is not infringed by the requirement that certain responses and procedures he observed - so far as we see him under the description, "engaging in arithmetic". However while there are no alternatives within the rule-bound activity of arithmetic, there clearly are genuine alternatives to doing arithmetic. The child can meaningfully want not to do arithmetic, or want to do something other than arithmetic. Once this is acknowledged it becomes apparent that there is a sense in which requiring a child to engage in certain pursuits in an appropriate manner does restrict his freedom.

This requirement can be seen either as imposing restraint on a child or subjecting him to compulsion. To see the requirement that a child do arithmetic as a restraint is to acknowledge that it prevents his doing something else that he wants to do - for example, watch T.V., play with his toys, sail a boat, or play cricket. Children typically want to do all sorts of things that they are restrained from doing by the requirement that they become literate and engage in academic studies.

Seen from a different angle, the requirement that a child do arithmetic may constitute a compulsion. In other words, it forces him to do what he wants not to do. Doing arithmetic is the sort of thing children typically want not to do. Or is it? There is a possible snag here. It may be argued that the child cannot properly be said to want not to do arithmetic, (or science, etc.), until he understands what arithmetic is. Hence it makes no sense to speak of limiting his freedom until the point at which he appreciates what it is to do arithmetic and subsequently decides that he wants not to do it. If stringent criteria
for understanding what it is to do arithmetic are imposed, the child will require considerable experience of doing arithmetic before he can be said to want not to do it.

I do not accept this argument. On my account of "wants", to say that A wants not to do arithmetic is simply to say that unless forced to do it he will not, or probably will not do it. But even if this account of "wants" is set aside, it is still odd to argue that an individual cannot be said to not want X until he has a thorough appreciation of X through considerable experience of it. It seems odd to say that until a woman has actually had a baby, attended a birth, tried to raise an infant, etc., she cannot properly be said not to want to have a baby. Avoiding arithmetic is something children would typically do if they were not otherwise compelled. Even without a sophisticated awareness of what arithmetic really involves, it makes sense to think of children seeing that activity under aspects which incline them to avoid it - for example, it's boring copying down figures and having to keep them in tidy lines, it's painful when the teacher constantly disapproves of my answers, etc. Given that it makes sense to say that doing arithmetic is something children can meaningfully be said not to want, the requirement that they nevertheless do it involves a compulsion.

Children can be said to want not to do things like maths, reading, and science. They can also be said to want to do all sorts of things rather than maths and reading. To the extent that they are compelled to do maths, or restrained from doing other things they want by the requirement that they do maths, they are unfree. They may be compelled by law, threat of punishment, welfare action, and so on. In the case of
compulsory formal education, the point at which one can most obviously and clearly talk of unfreedom is the point at which it is made compulsory to engage in certain activities, or punishable not to engage in them; not the point where teachers make impositions which are necessary for initiating pupils into various forms of knowledge and awareness. To require pupils to do maths is to limit their freedom, in a way that requiring a person involved in doing maths to adopt an appropriate procedure does not.

This is important when considering arguments such as that cited earlier from Winch. To repeat,

"The point about children is that they are not yet in a position to exercise freedom of choice in the full sense, because they have not been sufficiently educated in modes of social life to be able to deliberate. The exercise of authority over them, therefore, cannot be an encroachment on their freedom: it is via exercise of authority that they will be inducted into modes of social life and thus be made capable of deliberating and exercising choice. A child is obviously not in a position to choose to do this or that until he has learned how to do this and that" (loc. cit., pp. 103-104).

Winch is correct if by "exercising authority" he means exercising academic authority: that is, making requirements by which individuals participating in a rule-governed activity come to learn what it means to master that activity. This is a necessary condition of initiating pupils into educational pursuits. However, if "exercising authority" includes compelling children to engage in academic studies, Winch's position is badly mistaken. It is obviously not necessary for wanting not to do maths that one already understand what it involves. To require children to do maths limits their freedom. This charge cannot be avoided by the claim that in teaching them maths we ultimately put
them in a position to choose whether or not maths is for them - and hence extend their range of effective alternatives, thereby extending their freedom of choice. In forcing them to do maths we may extend the range of effective choice at some future time. But this involves limiting their social freedom now.
CHAPTER THREE

Freedom as 'the free person'.

'Negative' and 'positive' freedom and the two perspectives.

The discussion now shifts to the second perspective on freedom: with freedom conceived as some ideal of personality development. To say that a person is socially free is not to say anything much about the sort of person he is. A child is socially free to play with his friends when he is not impeded or prevented from doing so by the activities of other people, for example, his parents, his friends' parents, teachers, or by social arrangements such as rules or laws. This is to state facts about the situation in which the child finds himself. True, it implies something about children: that playing with friends is the sort of thing children typically want to do. But more importantly, it draws attention to the way the world is in relation to such a want. However to call someone a 'free' person is to say something very positive about the person himself. It is to say that he has certain attributes, qualities, or capacities which are desirable or valuable.

Before investigating certain accounts of "the free person" it is necessary to examine a claim made in Chapter One (p. 40 above). There it was suggested that the first perspective on freedom is roughly synonymous with what has often been called the 'negative' concept of freedom. On the other hand, the conception of freedom which has most often been referred to as 'positive' freedom consists in a particular ideal of human character or personality. Hence 'positive' freedom belongs within the second perspective. We must ask what is this distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' freedom? Moreover, if a
distinction of this type already exists in the literature, why posit an alternative or further distinction – that is, between perspectives – here?

It has often been argued that there must be two concepts of freedom. According to one concept, to say a person is free is to say that he is not subject to constraints or impediments. To be free is, then, to be free from some condition; to be without something. If a person is unfree he can be made free by the removal of the impeding condition. Accordingly this conception of freedom has been dubbed 'negative' – consisting in the absence or removal of some condition, rather than referring to some positive act or bestowal. We can be free from, or subject to, all sorts of impediments. I can be free from commitments which would impede my studies, free from a workload which would impede my having a holiday, free from a law against walking my dog on the beach, and so on.

The concept of social freedom might be regarded as a form of negative freedom. To be socially free is to be free from a particular class of constraints. However, not all the constraints we may be free or unfree from are social constraints. To be free from a headache is not to be free from a social constraint. It follows that 'negative' freedom cannot be exactly the same thing as social freedom; at least on the general characterisation of 'negative' freedom offered here. It is true that from an historical standpoint it is social constraint, or the sub class of social constraints called political constraint, which has been of greatest concern to writers on freedom. Not surprisingly 'negative' freedom has often been equated with social or political freedom, (absence of coercion). c.f.,
"the 'negative' sense (of freedom) is involved in the answer to the question 'What is the area within which the subject — a person or group of persons — is or should be left free to do or be what he is able to do or be without interference by other persons?'" (Berlin, op.cit., pp. 121-122).

We find both a 'wide' and 'narrow' conception of negative freedom in the literature. On the wide conception to be negatively free is simply the idea of being free from constraint; any sort of constraint. On the narrow conception it is to be free from constraints due to arrangements made by other people. If by "constraint" we understand "barriers or impediments to wants", each of these conceptions of negative freedom can be incorporated under my first perspective.

Obviously those who would argue that there must be two concepts of freedom do so on the grounds that 'negative' freedom cannot account for all the cases in which we wish to ascribe freedom or unfreedom to an individual. One line of argument for the view that there must be a second concept of freedom — a 'positive' concept — is revealed by Feinberg. Some writers argue that we can be free from constraints (social or non social) to some want, Z, but yet not be free to do Z. "Hence, they conclude, 'positive freedom' (freedom to ...) is something other than the absence of constraint" (Feinberg, op. cit., p. 12). It is some positive power, some capacity, or some positive opportunity which is created; to be free consists in the presence of some condition rather than in an absence. For example, the man who has the ability to do Z is to this extent free to do Z. But an ability is a positive characteristic, not something to be understood in terms of the absence of constraint. Likewise, we may remove impediments to obtaining an education, say, without actually providing an opportunity to be educated. This is one line of argument for the view that since not all ascriptions of freedom
can be understood on the 'absence of constraint' or 'freedom from' model, there must be a further concept of freedom.

Other lines of argument for this conclusion are to be found in the literature. A person may be free from constraints - for example, social constraints - to his wants and yet be regarded as unfree in an important, and perhaps more fundamental sense. For example, a man may be free from constraints to his desire to drink or gamble. But suppose these desires spring from impulses, passions, or cravings which he is unable to control. Can we not then say that he is a slave to these impulses; that he is socially free, yet subject to the constraining influences of his animal nature? If so, to call a person "free" may be to ascribe some positive quality to him; to say that he leads a life in which he is in control of his base urges, animal impulses, etc. To be positively free, on such a view, consists in the presence of some governing or controlling power which enables an individual to avoid the constraining influence of unwanted forces.

Or again, the emphasis may be on achieving or doing something worthwhile. On a purely 'negative' conception of freedom one may be free to do all sorts of worthless or undesirable things. But if freedom is some desirable state, it must refer to something of positive value being attained. Thus "'Positive liberty' men ... commonly say of 'negative liberty' men that they are being 'just negative': liberty to them must consist in fulfilling the proper object of the good life" (Crick, in Laslett and Runciman, 1967, p. 196).

Each of the ideas advanced in the previous three paragraphs can be found within the account of 'positive' freedom advanced by T.H. Green. c.f.,
"If I have given a true account of that freedom which forms the goal of social effort, we shall see that freedom of constraint, freedom in all the forms of doing what one will with one's own is valuable only as a means to an end. That end is what I call freedom in the positive sense: in other words, the liberation of the powers of all men equally for contributions to a common good ..."

According to Green, if we understand "freedom" rightly,

'We do not mean merely freedom from constraint or compulsion. We do not mean merely freedom to do as we like irrespectively of what it is that we like. We do not mean a freedom that can be enjoyed by one man or one set of men at the cost of a loss of freedom to others. When we speak of freedom as something to be so highly prized, we mean a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something that we do or enjoy in common with others" (1889, pp. 370-371).

Elsewhere Green argues that common to all theories which imply that 'positive' freedom is in some sense the goal of all moral endeavour is the view "that there is some will in a man with which many or most of his voluntary actions do not accord, a higher self that is not satisfied by the objects which he yet deliberately pursues" (1948, p.18). Man attains 'positive' freedom when his wants or pursuits are in accordance with his 'higher self'. In Green this higher self is identified with man's reason. Man's 'positive' freedom consists in committing himself to the pursuit of those ends prescribed by reason; by freely bringing one's pursuits under the government of one's 'higher self'.

The ideas sketched so far are intended to suggest one reason why I prefer to speak of two perspectives on freedom rather than two distinct concepts of freedom: 'negative' and 'positive'. This is because 'negative' and 'positive' freedom do not appear to denote two precise ideas. Each term has been used in various ways in the literature. The problem is especially acute for 'positive' freedom. Indeed this one
term has been used to denote radically different ideas. For example, T.H. Green and Erich Fromm (1960) both talk about 'positive' freedom. But there is a tremendous difference between the ideas which they deal with under that term. Even where writers appear to be concerned with a similar central idea — as perhaps in the accounts of 'positive' freedom provided by Kant, Green and Bosanquet (1) — very important differences emerge. These in turn may give rise to significantly different implications at a practical moral, social, or political level.

The point is that no single account of the alleged two concepts of freedom has been advanced in the literature. This is not to say that such an account cannot be advanced. Further argument would be necessary to establish that point. But given the evidence of the literature as it stands, one might conclude that rather than there being two concepts of freedom, there may be upwards of half a dozen. This is precisely what H.J. McCloskey (1965) has argued. He suggests that there are at least two concepts of 'negative' freedom and four of 'positive' freedom. The 'negative' concepts he calls "non-interference unqualified", and "non-interference with the enjoyment of one's rights". The four 'positive' concepts are "self-determination", "reasonable self-determination", "opportunity to enjoy one's rights" and "opportunity to seek one's self-perfection". While he seems to have some reservations as to whether "non-interference unqualified" is a genuine concept of freedom, he offers arguments for the claim that the remaining five concepts are indeed genuine, distinct concepts of freedom. If he is correct, McCloskey

1. I have in mind here Kant's position in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Green in his lecture 'On the different senses of "freedom" as applied to the will and to the moral progress of man', and Bosanquet in his Philosophical Theory of the State.
has established that 'negative' and 'positive' freedom do not denote two distinct concepts of freedom. They are more like umbrella terms covering five or more different ideas.

I prefer to talk of two perspectives on freedom rather than 'positive' and 'negative' freedom partly to avoid the gross ambiguity which accompanies the 'distinction' between these ideas in the literature. The so-called distinction between the concepts of 'negative' and 'positive' freedom has no settled referent. In addition, by speaking of perspectives on freedom instead of so many distinct concepts of freedom it is possible to avoid philosophical difficulties which must be confronted in defending a thesis of distinct concepts of freedom. Becoming entangled in these difficulties does not contribute to settling the issues I am concerned with here and would distract attention from my primary concern. There is for example the whole problem of what it means to have two (or six, etc.) concepts of X. Just what constitutes a criterion or criteria for individuating concepts is a key concern in philosophy of language. It is well outside the scope of my inquiry. The question of how many concepts of freedom there are, and what they are, is not one that I have to tackle. I am concerned simply with elucidating what I take to be an important educational question.

I have a further reason for backing off from the thesis that there are two or more distinct concepts of freedom. Recently Gerald MacCallum and Joel Feinberg have argued strongly that all freedom can be conceived on a single conceptual model. That is, there is just one concept of human freedom. According to MacCallum our use of the concept "freedom" is intelligible only if reference is made to each of three terms or variables. He says:
"Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, becoming, or not becoming something. Such freedom is thus always of something (an agent or agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become something; it is a triadic relation. ... Whenever reference to one of these three terms is missing in such a discussion of freedom, it should be only because the reference is thought to be understood from the context of the discussion" (loc. cit., p.314).

If correct this demolishes the argument that one may be free from all constraints to some want, Z, but yet not be free to do Z. To be free is to be free to as well as free from. According to Feinberg the reason why this is not clear to those who argue in favour of distinct concepts of freedom is that the notion of constraint is often artificially limited. In particular it is limited to what Feinberg calls external positive constraints (1973 a., pp. 12-13). If we acknowledge the entire range of things which can intelligibly be regarded as constraints we simply could not argue that one might be free of all constraints to doing or being something and yet not be free to do or be that something. For example, "if constraints are restricted to external factors, (that is, factors impinging on the agent from outside him) then the chronic alcoholic and the extremely ill man in a coma are both free from constraints to go about their business; but of course, neither is free to do so" (ibid., p.13). We must admit internal conditions - for example, one's physical or mental state - as constraints to wants. In addition Feinberg distinguishes between positive and negative constraints. Negative constraints are lackings or absences - for example, lack of money, skill, strength, or knowledge. These can "quite effectively prevent a person from doing, or having, or being something he might want" (ibid., p.12). Once we recognise such negative conditions as constraints, arguments for the view that positive
opportunities or abilities are not created by the removal of constraints collapse. According to Feinberg, such things as inability and lack of opportunity are every bit as much constraints as is interference by other agents with an individual's activity.

According to MacCallum and Feinberg, formulations of freedom as some positive human quality or the pursuit of some worthwhile objective can also be accounted for on the single-concept-analysis of "freedom". They concede that it makes sense to speak of an ideal of freedom such as autonomy, control over one's appetite or lower self, "the fulfillment of the proper object of the good life", etc. But, they argue, to maintain that such freedom is different in kind from absence of constraint is simply to misunderstand what one is talking about. To think of 'positive' freedom as being different in kind from 'negative' freedom may just be the result of blurring matters of value and concept. On their view, someone who identifies 'positive' freedom with control over one's appetite is not drawing attention to the presence of some capacity or end-state which can be understood independently of the notion of constraint. He has simply placed an emphasis on a particular outcome which he values. In so doing he has directed attention away from the fact that this outcome must itself be seen in relation to the absence of constraining influences, and it is precisely this which makes it intelligible to speak of control over one's appetite as a form of freedom. To invoke the triadic schema, $X$ is free from the domination of his appetite to live a life characterised by the guiding control of reason. Taking as an example 'positive' freedom conceived as self-direction, Feinberg says:
"Putatively distinct 'concepts' of freedom frequently turn out to be different estimates of 'the importance of only one part of what is always present in any case of freedom' - the importance of one class of subjects as opposed to another, or of one class of desires as opposed to another. I think the point of calling individual self-direction freedom may be to emphasise the overriding importance of one particular kind of desire or option, namely, to decide for oneself what one shall do. Even wise and benevolent external direction is a constraint to the desire ... to decide for oneself. Hence there is point in calling the absence of that constraint (or the presence of self-direction) 'freedom' (op. cit., p. 16; the reference in the passage is to MacCallum, op. cit., p. 318).

Thus on MacCallum and Feinberg's view it is mistaken to see individual self-direction, or alternative formulations of 'positive' freedom, as conceptually distinct from the absence of constraint. For example, someone who asserts that only the individual whose reason is in control over appetite is free, is arguing that people may be rid of constraints to their desires and yet not be 'truly' free. If properly understood this is simply to say that the advocate of this position does not value the mere absence of constraint to desires. He values something else, for which he employs the term "freedom". But it does not follow that what he values cannot be understood in terms of absence of constraint. Indeed, MacCallum and Feinberg argue, it is only because the idea can be understood in terms of absence of constraint that it is intelligible to speak of it as freedom.

In presenting their arguments MacCallum and Feinberg reveal a problem attaching to many attempts to distinguish a 'positive' concept of freedom from 'negative' accounts. I believe my two perspectives approach avoids this problem. The difficulty arises when it is argued that only one of these conceptions of freedom - the 'positive' one - is the true or real concept of freedom. According to MacCallum, when advocates of 'positive' freedom argue that this is what freedom really
or truly consists in, they confuse important issues and draw attention away "from precisely what needs examining if the differences separating philosophers, ideologies, and social movements concerned with freedom are to be understood" (op. cit., p. 312). In effect they attempt to settle substantive issues about what sorts of constraints are justifiable or unjustifiable, important or unimportant, and/or what sorts of ends people ought to pursue, by an appeal to conceptual argument. In effect they argue that since "to be free" really means such and such, we must conclude that many arguments about freedom are not arguments about freedom at all. Hence the normative demands based on these arguments can be ignored, as far as concern for freedom goes. Such arguments encourage us to believe that the nature of philosophical investigations of freedom are to be construed as conceptual rather than normative. That is, the real philosophical work to be done is to establish the true meaning of "freedom". But on MacCallum's view this is a delusion.

MacCallum seems to be concerned to give arguments about freedom the widest possible scope. If we try to close off the bounds of talk about freedom we may lose contact with many important substantive issues, and the various viewpoints advanced on these issues. What is important when people disagree about infringements on human freedom is not so much whether they have captured the true essence of the meaning of "freedom", as the substantive positions they hold: their views about what is important in human life and how the pursuit of worthwhile ends may be closed off by the operation of various barriers; how these barriers might be removed; whether they should be removed, etc. MacCallum favours the view that "freedom" has very wide application. If we accept with MacCallum and Feinberg that the 'three variable schema' constitutes the necessary and sufficient conditions for using "freedom",
and admit the wideranging values that can be assigned to the different variables, we have a concept which can be used to raise many normative issues. This ensures that the issues concerning freedom will be approached in the proper way: as substantive issues which are not to be defined out of existence, or 'settled' on conceptual grounds.

I believe that my two perspectives approach preserves what is important and valuable in the MacCallum-Feinberg position, while avoiding problems to which I think their position is subject. I think the great strength in their position is that they are prepared to admit a wide range of issues and ideas under talk of freedom. In appreciating that "constraints" may be widely understood, that human beings may be subject to different sorts of constraints, and that there may be considerable dispute about the relative significance of different sorts of constraints upon different sorts of objective, action, or outcome, they provide an analysis which places emphasis on normative discussion, and makes it difficult to define away important and interesting questions in the name of 'true' or 'real' freedom. However I think that the same claims can be made with equal force on behalf of my approach. From the second perspective we are invited to discuss the form of human development we most want to encourage, in terms of personality conditions which may be regarded as constraints to a desirable quality of life. The first perspective opens up in all its breadth the question of how far external constraints must be removed or imposed if people are to live the Good Life. In addition my approach makes it clear that freedom from external constraint and freedom from various forms of personality constraint both have a place within a conception of the Good Life, and that their relative claims must be assessed.
Moreover the two perspectives are very flexible. Constraints upon desires may be social or non-social, legal, political, etc. in nature. We can then delineate various specific areas of concern within one very general 'subject area' - constraint upon desire. I am not, however, committed thereby to talking about different concepts within this perspective. The two-perspectives view is simply a device which enables me to focus attention on one aspect or another. Similarly, under the second perspective I can admit any of the common accounts of 'the free man' - for example, Kantian autonomy, Green's self-realisation, Fromm's positive freedom, and so on - as well as other possible accounts not yet formulated. Once again I do not have to talk of different concepts within this perspective. Neither must I hold that the ideas which can be incorporated under one perspective are conceptually different from those which can be incorporated under the other.

This however suggests a possible source of controversy in the MacCallum-Feinberg position. Anyone who claims that there is a given number of concepts of X must be prepared to advance some criterion or set of criteria for individuating the several concepts of X, or on the basis of which one admits various uses of X under the one concept. MacCallum and Feinberg argue that there is just one concept of freedom, consisting in a triadic relation (see esp. MacCallum, op.cit., p. 327, and Feinberg, 1973a, p. 14). Hence they must be prepared to defend the claim that all the uses of 'freedom' possible under the 'three variable schema' are indeed instances of the same concept. The lengths which they must take to defend this claim make me wonder how much point is served by maintaining that there is just one concept of freedom. Given the extremely wide range of ideas that can be encompassed under talk of freedom, it seems reasonable on at least some occasions to ask just what
one such idea has in common with another. C.f., for example, "being free from heteronomous control by one's desires to act on a maxim which one can will universally", and "being free from a shortage of petrol to go on a long drive in the country". MacCallum and Feinberg will reply that in each case there is a common (triadic) relation involved. Some agent or other is free from some constraint or other to do something or other. I am not convinced by this answer.

(a) On the one hand the initial difficulty may simply re-emerge at a different level. That is, we may accept the common formal structure of propositions about freedom. But we may doubt that the same concept of constraint or the same notion of an end-state applies in each case.

(b) Alternatively, the concept of human freedom is readily trivialised. Feinberg himself acknowledges that almost anything can be made out as a constraint to some desire or other (ibid, p. 16). I may be constrained by the bluntness of my teeth from chewing my fingernails. On the MacCallum-Feinberg analysis we are invoking the same concept of human freedom here as when we complain that a child is constrained by compulsory education laws from deciding how we will spend a good deal of his time and energy. In some ways this seems a little odd.

I want a framework which will allow us to see normative issues relating to freedom in education for what they are, to formulate such issues as clearly as we can, to suggest ways of addressing these issues, while at the same time being able to avoid philosophical difficulties which will divert attention away from the task at hand. With this in mind, and for the sorts of reasons sketched above, I have adopted my two perspectives approach to freedom in education. I turn now to an investigation of some historically and educationally significant accounts of freedom as an ideal of human development.
The second perspective in Greek thought

Plato was not alone among the Ancient Greeks in applying the notion of freedom to some mode of character or personality development. At least four views of what constitutes "a free person" can be detected within Greek thought.

(a) What Plato calls 'democratic' character.

(b) The free person as one who remains true to his self.

(c) A person possessing characteristics considered appropriate for an individual of free legal status.

(d) One who is free in virtue of his reason being the controlling influence in his life.

There is ample evidence that (b), (c), and (d) constituted ethical ideals in Greek thought. While Plato himself denied strongly that "democratic" character comprises an ideal, it nevertheless seems that within common thought it was regarded as a desirable form of personality development. Indeed it was probably its attractiveness to many people that led Plato to attack it so strongly (c.f. Republic, section 561). I will look at each of these ideas of the free person in turn, giving special emphasis to the fourth. The idea that a person attains freedom by the development of his rationality is a dominant theme in contemporary educational philosophy.

Plato defines a 'democratic' character in terms of the distinction he draws between necessary and unnecessary desires. Necessary desires are those which we cannot overcome through self-discipline since their satisfaction is essential to our well-being as humans. By our very nature we are compelled to satisfy them. In effect necessary desires
are needs: for example, for such food as is necessary to promote health and strength. By contrast, the desire for "a more varied and luxurious diet" than is necessary for health and strength and which, besides, may be "physically harmful and damaging to the Intelligence and self-control" is unnecessary (see Republic, section 559). Unnecessary desires are all those which can be overcome if attempts to ensure this are begun early. Satisfaction of such desires is either of no real benefit to us, or else may actually do us harm.

The 'democratic' character gives equal play to necessary and unnecessary desires. He establishes what Plato calls "a kind of equality of pleasures", giving the desire of the moment full sway until it is satisfied. He then allows the complete satisfaction of some other desire before moving on to yet another. In this way all desires "have their fair share and none is under-privileged" (ibid, section 561). If such a person is told that some pleasures spring from good desires and should be promoted, while others spring from evil desires and should be controlled, he simply replies that all pleasures are equal and must be given equal opportunity for satisfaction.

"In fact he lives for the pleasure of the moment. One day its wine, woman, and song, the next bread and water; one day its hard physical training, the next indolence and ease, and then a period of philosophic study. Next he takes to politics and is always on his feet saying or doing whatever comes into his head. Sometimes all his ambitions are military, sometimes they are all directed to success in business. There's no order or restraint (1) in his life, and he reckons his way of living is pleasant, free and happy" (loc. cit., section 561).

Such a character is distinguished by its degree of versatility and spontaneity. The individual combines many diverse pursuits,

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1. That is, inner order or restraint, as opposed to restraint or order imposed from without, for example, by laws, sanctions etc.
dispositions, traits, etc., within his life. He experiments with all sorts of things. This versatility makes such a mode of character seem very attractive to the ordinary, uncritical intelligence. Like Plato's democratic society, it is a mode of development which has boundless possibilities, endless variety, and for this reason many people are drawn (unreflectingly, says Plato) toward it, and adopt it as an ideal.

A second conception of free persons to be found in Greek thought links "freedom" with the preservation of one's individual personality. According to Pohlenz (1966), a dominant theme in Classical Greek tragedy drew on a primitive notion of inner freedom: namely, the idea that a person might be judged free in respect of his inner attitude toward Fate. The basis of Greek tragedy, says Pohlenz, consists in "the painful feeling of the Greeks that their innate urge to master their lives comes up against the opposition of external powers which determines what happens" (op. cit., p. 55). They believed that each person has his fate, but that even in the face of events bearing down on one, and over which one has absolutely no control, one may nevertheless remain in an important sense master of one's fate, and hence free. This freedom, or mastery over one's fate, consists in a person remaining faithful in what he does to his core self. One's core self is one's distinctive individual personality, it comprises one's core beliefs, convictions, principles and ends. These essentially define one as oneself. In this we find the beginnings of the notion of one's real self.

A person always retains the potential to preserve his individual personality - his core self - in the face of external determining forces, even if it costs him his life. Inner freedom here derives from the strength to act in accordance with one's own judgments - that is,
judgment based on one's core convictions, beliefs, and principles — rather than to passively bend in the direction of one's fate. For an example, Pohlenz appeals to Sophocles' Ajax. As presented by Sophocles, Ajax was quite unable to do or approve any act which conflicted with his own nature and sense of honour.

"Nobody will say that you ever uttered a word not coming from your very self', Sophocles has the chorus say when it hears of Ajax' decision to die, and nobody knows better than Ajax himself that he must take that decision just because he is Ajax, because his own personality will not let him lead a life of shame. He is destroyed by his own nature. That is his tragedy. Even so, he remains a free man, himself determining his fate" (ibid., p. 52.)

One's inner freedom then consists in one's attitude when confronted by one's fate. The hero of Classical Greek tragedy is confronted by the external threat of Fate. He cannot escape the destiny that is coming to him. An individual may be defeated physically by Fate, but he may nevertheless preserve in the struggle that which is most important. The tragic hero is not completely defenceless in the face of Fate. He has something within himself with which to do battle. This is the power to decide for himself how he will accept Fate — which in the Tragedies is death, often with suffering. He may accept it freely and embrace it within his own scheme of action. This is the path taken by Eteocles. He is under his father's curse and knows what his destiny will be. Nevertheless he departs for a civil war which he knows will bring his death. Others have pleaded with him not to go to war. But Eteocles is, by his own personality, committed to preserving his native city. In addition, his honour as a soldier will not permit him to avoid the war. The audience is supposed to see Eteocles as choosing his action, and thus as shaping his own destiny — even though this is seen ultimately to be determined by Fate; by his father's curse.
His choice is a manifestation of his own personality, his core self. His demise is determined by his father's curse. But Eteocles incorporates the inevitable course of events within his own life plan. He goes to war - and to his fate - freely. "In deciding to go to his death he fulfills himself. Physically he is destroyed but what he saves is not only Thebes [his native city] but his true self as well" (ibid, p. 53).

According to a third view in Greek thought the free person is one who possesses certain characteristics regarded as appropriate to the individual of free legal status. During the Homeric period there emerged a conception of the free individual as one who is not a slave (ibid, pp, 4-5). As a purely descriptive term denoting legal status, "free" came to refer to the possession of rights by an individual. A free man possessed legal rights. He was entitled to certain things by law, as a "full-fledged member of (his) political community" (Feinberg, 1973b, p. 151). A slave, on the other hand, had no legal rights including the right to direct his own affairs. He might however enjoy considerable freedom from social constraint to wants: for instance if his master allowed him to pursue many wants or subjected him to a minimum of coercion. What the slave lacked was legal entitlement. Whatever liberty from coercion he enjoyed as a matter of fact, he was entitled to none as of legal right. His liberty was mere privilege; subject always to withdrawal - however arbitrary - by his master (c.f., ibid.).

In time this use of "free" was extended in such a way that it came to denote an ethical ideal. C.S. Lewis claims that "Words which originally referred to a person's rank - to legal, or economic status and the qualifications of birth which have often been attached to these - have a tendency to become words which assign a type of character and behaviour. Those implying superior status can become terms of praise" (1967, p. 21. See also Feinberg, 1973b, p. 153).
For the Greeks to call a man "free" in this derived sense was to say that his behaviour, his manner, qualities of character, etc., were such as a freeman displayed. Feinberg provides an account of the qualities comprising "freedom" as well as criteria for evaluating competing accounts of "the free person" in this sense (c.f., ibid., pp. 153-158). He notes that there will inevitably be competing accounts of the free person. "Proposed definitions of the free man are understood by one and all to be attempts to appropriate the phrase for one set of contestable moral conceptions as opposed to others (ibid., p. 154).

The educational significance of this use of "free" is worth noting. One question concerns the extent to which we might try to promote the character or behaviour traits of the free man as part of an educational ideal. According to Feinberg, the free man has nothing to fear, he has an easy and unaffected dignity, genuine pride and self-respect, is deliberate, self-relian, self-sufficient, self-confident, natural and open in his dealings with others, and secure in his sense of worth and feeling of safety (ibid., pp. 153-156). While Feinberg suggests that these are natural virtues of the free man, there is nothing logically odd in conceiving them as virtues to be developed in young people. Historically, of course, a good deal of educational effort has been spent on aspects of 'good breeding' - the characteristics deemed 'natural' for a particular social group have nevertheless often been regarded as needing to be cultivated among the young. Typically they have stood alongside the development of cognitive/intellectual skills as part of a composite educational ideal. But seen in this way they are still an important aspect of an educational ideal.

There is a further characteristic attaching to the person of free legal status which has been of great importance to education. The Greeks
recognised that in addition to character and behaviour traits appropriate to the free man, there were certain appropriate interests, activities or occupations. The notion of a freeman undergoes slight modification here. In Greek times a freeman might have been a tradesman. But some freemen, such as tradesmen, might be said to be "economically enslaved by the struggle for subsistence" (Lewis, op. cit., p. 126). Their activities consequently had instrumental value first and foremost — means to the end of livelihood. By contrast Aristotle speaks of certain activities as being done for their own sake. These were leisure activities. The individual who was free economically as well as legally had leisure time. Hence leisure activities were regarded as appropriate to a man of free and secure status. c.f., "Only he who is neither legally enslaved to a master nor economically enslaved by the struggle for subsistence, is likely to have, or to have the leisure for using a piano or a library. That is how one's piano or library is more liberal, more characteristic of one's position as a free-man, than one's coal shovel or one's tools" (Lewis, ibid).

This extension of the original ideal yields the idea of a liberal art, or more generally, a liberal education. In Book VIII of his Politics, Aristotle asks after the origin of music within Greek education and its significance for education.

"Concerning music a doubt may be raised - in our own day most men cultivate it for the sake of pleasure, but originally it was included in education, because nature herself ... requires that we should be able, not only to work well, but to use leisure well; for as I must repeat once again, the first principle of all action is leisure. Both are required, but leisure is better than occupation and is its end; and therefore the question must be asked, what ought we to do when at leisure? ..... It is clear ... that there are branches of learning and education which we must study merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and these are to be valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are useful in business are to be deemed necessary, and exist for
the sake of other things. And therefore our fathers admitted music into education, not on the ground either of its necessity or utility, for it is not necessary, nor indeed useful in the same manner as reading and writing, which are useful in money-making, in the management of a household, in the acquisition of knowledge and in political life ... There remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in leisure .... It is evident, then, that there is a sort of education in which parents should train their sons, not as being useful or necessary, but because it is liberal or noble" (cited ibid.).

We have here the notion of a liberal education - pursuits engaged in for their own sake rather than for their instrumental benefits. In more modern terms, it is the sort of education a gentleman or an aristocrat might provide for his son. Indeed both aspects of development under consideration here - development of appropriate character traits and interests or pursuits - combine in a famous account of an education befitting the sons of gentlemen. This is the educational programme proposed by Locke in Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Locke claims that any gentleman who cares for the education of his son wants to see developed in him the following qualities: virtue, wisdom, breeding, and learning (ibid., para. 134). Of greatest importance is virtue, which consists in developing a proper conception of God - "such as the creed wisely teaches" - a commitment to truth, and a good-natured disposition (ibid., para. 139). Second comes wisdom. "To accustom a child to have true notion of things, and not to be satisfied till he has them; to raise his mind to great and worthy thoughts; and to keep him at a distance from falsehood and cunning, which has always a broad mixture of falsehood in it; is the fittest preparation of a child for wisdom" (ibid., para. 140). Wisdom is important because no-one is able to disguise his cunning from all people. Once a cunning or deceitful person is discovered to be so others avoid and distrust him and join together to oppose and defeat him. Ultimately then his deceit
is an impediment. By contrast a wise and open man is not impeded by other people and can set about his business without inhibition. Of good breeding, Locke says it consists (negatively) in avoiding firstly, "a sheepish bashfulness", and secondly, "a misbecoming negligence and disrespect in our carriage". To avoid this an individual must be trained not to think meanly of himself or of others (ibid., para. 141). It is worth noting the overlap between Feinberg's account of the characteristic virtues of the free-man and Locke's attributes of a gentleman.

Locke's position on the significance of learning is somewhat ambiguous. In places he suggests that what is to be learned must be considered in terms of its usefulness. cf., "Can there be anything more ridiculous than that a father should waste his own money, and his son's time, in setting him to learn the Roman language, when, at the same time he designs him a trade, wherein he, having no use of Latin, fails not to forget that little which he once brought from school ..." (ibid., para. 164). This hardly sounds 'liberal'. But for the most part the tone is different. c.f.,

"To conclude this part (of the treatise) which concerns a young gentleman's studies, his tutor should remember that his business is not so much to teach him all that is knowable, as to raise him in a love and esteem of knowledge; and to put him in the right way of knowing and improving himself" (ibid., para. 195).

Learning is in an important sense for Locke to be its own end - something to be loved and esteemed; and something inseparable from the growth and development of the individual as an end in himself. Elsewhere Locke claims that he regards a gentleman's serious employment to be study. This will call for relaxation and refreshment. For this reason Locke would have his young gentleman learn a trade: something which will offer
exercise for the body, "unbend the thought, and confirm the health and strength" (ibid., para. 203). Locke recommends gardening and working in wood as a carpenter, joiner, or turner, "these being fit and healthy recreations for a man of study" (ibid., para. 204). The point of the trade is wholly 'liberal'.

From "free" as a status-associated virtue word we may derive the notion of a liberal education as an education appropriate for a free-man or gentleman - i.e., someone with the opportunity to pursue various activities for their own sake rather than for their utility. This conception of a liberal education must be marked off from a further possible conception of a liberal education: namely, that which is intended to set a person free. The idea of an education which in some sense 'liberates' an individual can be approached by considering the fourth idea of a free person to be found in Ancient Greek thought. This is the idea of a person who has inner freedom through his reason.

The Greeks gradually evolved an ethical ideal based on the idea that a person attains freedom by bringing his life under the governing control of reason. I will look briefly at two stages in the growth of this idea.

(i) Socrates and the emerging notion of inner freedom.

The dangers inherent in ascribing particular ideas to Socrates are well known. In what follows I appeal to the authority of the distinguished Classical scholar Max Pohlenz. It would seem that Socrates did not talk explicitly of inner freedom as an ethical ideal so much as help lay the foundations for subsequent talk of this nature. He builds on the theme expressed in the Tragedies that there is some aspect of
human existence which is higher and more important than the physical aspect. This is the beginnings of the idea of a moral personality, the belief that this constitutes man's true or real self, and that it is in respect of this self that an individual is to be regarded as free or unfree. It is Socrates' account of man's real self - his moral personality - which is of most importance to my discussion.

Socrates rejected the growing subjectivism, relativism and scepticism that emerged with Sophist teaching. He denied that those things which individuals merely perceive subjectively as their good and subsequently strive for, really constitute their good. For Socrates the Good is an objective value. Hence it is independent of the subjective impressions and desires of individuals. It comprises a value which is above the individual's perception of what is good. Hence it is above the individual himself, so far as he identifies himself with his subjective perception. The moral worth of the individual is determined in relation to this objective Good, for it comprises the moral standard of action. It is the supreme duty of the individual to become conscious of the Good as the only proper guide to action, and to seek knowledge of Good as far as he can. This, according to Socrates, is the proper attitude to life. It involves precisely the attempt to realise one's moral personality.

A person realises his moral personality by caring for his soul. For Socrates,

"the soul is not only the vehicle of life and consciousness: but it is that which makes a man into a thinking and acting personality .... man possesses something which raises him not only above the external world but also above the body and constitutes essential being. The Socratic 'soul' is nothing other than the true self of man" (Pohlenz, op. cit., pp. 65-66).
This agrees closely with the view of the tragic poets. They had some conception of an integrating force holding the various human organs— for example, heart—and functions—for example, desire—together. This 'force' gives rise to distinctive actions, plans, pursuits, dispositions, etc. This is man's self. It is what makes a physical mass a person. It comprises man's ultimate reality. On Socrates' view the worth or quality of an individual is to be judged by the quality of his soul—how well it has been 'cared for'. In other words man's worth, and indeed his true good, consists not in the successful pursuit of material 'worldly' goods, or pleasure and satisfaction. Rather it consists in an inner eternal good: the state of his soul.

It would seem that for Socrates man's soul consists in his reason. A person cares for his soul through pursuit of truth: knowledge of Good or virtue. It is clear that for Socrates as much as for Plato pursuit of knowledge of Good is exclusively a rational or intellectual affair. Man's reason alone can reveal knowledge of true virtue. Guidance by desire or passion cannot lead a person to his true good. Socrates maintained that knowledge of Good necessarily issues in virtuous action; there is no 'gap' between knowledge of Good and good action. "Whoever knows what is good for him simply cannot fail to strive towards it and orient his whole activity in that direction" (ibid., p. 66). Humans realise their moral personality through rational inquiry after Good. The individual who attains knowledge of Good has realised his true self. He leads a life of virtue.

This wholehearted pursuit of knowledge of Good is what Socrates means by caring for the soul. In caring for the soul man preserves his real self, and hence his actions, purposes, intentions, etc., from
contamination by passions, desires, urges and impulses. By failing to care for the soul one runs the risk that it may be overwhelmed by one's 'lower' self. Where this occurs one's life is 'led' by the demands of passion and desire, and the real self (= reason) is not free to serve its proper function of moving man to virtue. It is not my intention here to ascribe to Socrates any clearly defined conception of inner freedom. However, bearing in mind the sorts of metaphors which abound in Plato's writing - being in bondage to desire, or enslaved by the passions, - it would be a natural consequence of Socrates' view to think in terms of the real self being subject to or free from impediment or subversion by elements of a lower self.

(ii) Plato, inner freedom and self-mastery.

Greek thought generally was in agreement with Socrates that knowledge is the sine qua non of right action, that direction of one's life should be controlled by reason. However Socrates' belief that knowledge of good inevitably results in good action was widely rejected by his contemporaries. According to prevalent Greek opinion reason is constantly opposed by other forces in the soul in determining action. Socrates himself had no conception of a well-informed reason having to battle against other motives for the right to determine action. But the predominant image of a person acting virtuously was that of an individual having power over himself - possessing a self-control or self-mastery in which reason prevails over desire and passion. c.f.,

"The idea that a man must master the lusts of the flesh, that he must be stronger not only than money and possessions but also than sensual appetites and sexual desire, that it is unworthy of a man to be slave of his belly, these are basic principles of popular Greek ethics" (ibid., p. 67).
It is against this background that Plato articulates an ethical ideal of freedom through self-mastery. He shared Socrates' conviction that virtuous action is an inevitable consequence of knowledge of good. However he also shared the popular view that reason must withstand competing motives within the soul if it is to determine action. Plato faced three problems.

1. To make coherent the idea of one being master of oneself.

2. To argue for the claim that virtuous action flows inevitably from knowledge of virtue.

3. To resolve the apparent contradiction within the idea that good action presupposes self-mastery but that it flows inevitably from an informed reason.

In the Republic Plato presents a theory which tackles these problems. It is a theory which recognises conflicting motives within the soul, but which invests reason with the capacity for domination over antagonistic 'lower' motives, so that reason possessed of knowledge necessarily yields virtuous action. Plato distinguishes the soul's real existence in a non-material realm from its earthly existence when it is attached to a human body. In its original, real existence the soul consists purely of reason. But while it is housed in a human body it takes on two further aspects, appropriate to its attachment to a material entity. During this period the soul becomes a tripartite entity comprising appetite, spirit and reason.

"The sensual appetites ... are the lowest layers of the soul's life which have to do exclusively with the material needs arising from its being attached to the body. Together they constitute the desiring part of the soul, the epithymetikon. This is quite separate from the thymos which embraces the higher manifestations of the soul—like fortitude and the sense of justice. High above both, however, is the logistikon, the intellect ..." (ibid., pp. 93-94).
Against this conception of the soul Plato can make sense of the notion of self-mastery. There are different aspects of the soul, one of which is more important or more 'real' - 'higher' or 'better' - than the others. Self-mastery consists in this 'true' or higher part, (the real self) being in control of the others: reason governing spirit and appetite. N.B. Plato refers to reason as "the inner man" (Republic, section 589). Self-mastery is the desirable form of human freedom. Here the inner man is free from control and subversion by 'alien' forces which would push him toward corrupting material ends. Inner freedom is freedom of reason: freedom of the inner man to point the individual toward right action and personal fulfillment, by revealing man's essential nature and its affinity to an eternal, non-material realm.

Plato's argument for the claim that virtuous action flows inevitably from knowledge of virtue can be derived from his view as to how inner freedom is attained. This view has obvious but crucial educational significance. Freedom of reason presupposes a rigorous intellectual training which has as its ultimate objective vision of the Good. According to Plato it is only through such training that knowledge of Good can be attained. What is called for is an education which converts the soul from "the twilight of error to the truth", by means of "a climb up into the real world (the non-material world of the Forms) which we shall call pure philosophy" (Republic, section 521).

A person's soul must be drawn away from the ordinary world of change and error to the world of reality and truth. This presupposes a programme of study which prepares the soul for, and disposes it to, active pure thought. (1) The objects of pure thought are abiding, not

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1. This programme follows the elementary stage of education which, for Plato, comprises physical, literary, and musical training, followed by military service. It is very much grounded in the sensible world. However a high degree of competence in such study is seen by Plato as evidence of fitness for engagement in higher study.
fleeting and subject to change like the objects of sense and desire. The study programme consists in five mathematical studies - arithmetic, plane geometry, solid geometry, astronomy and harmonics - followed by Dialectic. Dialectic differs from the Mathematical studies in that it alone proceeds by challenging its own assumptions, "so that it may rest firmly on first principles (ibid., section 533). It approaches closer to true knowledge because it aims at establishing first principles from which deduction can proceed to certainty. In this certainty resides the essential nature of each particular thing focussed upon. That is, it reveals the various Forms, and ultimately the Form of the Good itself.

Knowledge of virtue, then, consists in revelation through dialectical inquiry of the Form of the Good. What is especially important here is the nature of the inquiry which leads to knowledge of virtue. It involves a learning programme which progressively 'frees' reason from the senses - it is an inquiry based on pure reason. In other words, an individual who can truly be said to have attained knowledge of virtue is one who has, through the very programme which leads him to this knowledge, been trained to free his reason from intrusions of spirit and appetite which cloud objective inquiry. Hence there can be no conflicting motive confronting reason once knowledge of Good is attained. In this state of awareness the soul is, as Socrates believed, a unity. It has attained in the course of its earthly existence its original true nature - that of pure reason. In bringing his soul to this purity of being an individual attains self-mastery. Self-mastery and realisation of one's true self amount to the same thing. At this point there is no 'gap' between knowledge and action. They merge in the self-realised, self-controlling individual - the person who has attained inner freedom. Freedom on this view comprises not simply an ethical ideal, but the ethical ideal. It
constitutes man's 'true' level of existence - it brings him to what he 'really' is, and hence to what he ought to be. Attainment of the ideal presupposes a rigorous, intellectually-oriented education aimed at the highest possible level of rational development. The Greeks not only bequeathed us an ethical ideal of rational inner freedom. From Plato and Aristotle in particular the Western world inherited an intellectualist educational tradition. During the subsequent history of educational thought, this intellectualist bias has often been seen as inextricably linked with a conception of rational freedom as the desirable form of human development.

The idea that freedom comprises the ethical ideal and consists in actualisation of man's essentially rational nature has been restated many times since Plato's day. The supporting metaphysic and details of the position may vary to some extent from one account to another, but the educational prescriptions remain the same: education is primarily concerned with development of reason through participation in a range of intellectual pursuits. Before turning to what I see as a present day exemplification of this position I want briefly to note one further account of rational freedom as the ethical ideal.

Kantian freedom through the exercise of pure reason.

A view of what it means for human beings to be free is central to Kant's ethical position in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. The freedom which Kant believes can be ascribed to human beings in virtue of their reason is freedom from natural necessity. Natural necessity characterises the behaviour of all non-rational entities and much of the behaviour of human beings. Everything in nature can bring about effects. A falling rock may produce the effect of a dent in a car.
We may say then that the causal action of the rock consists in producing a particular effect - it brings about a certain event. Likewise a billiard ball striking another and pushing it into the pocket acts causally on the second ball. But a feature of all such causal actions is that the cause in each case is itself the product of some prior cause - of which it is the effect. Each cause then is the consequence of something other than itself. According to Kant natural necessity is

"the property of being determined to activity by the influence of alien causes ... (it is) a heteronomy of efficient causes; for every effect (in nature) is possible only in conformity with the law that something else determines the efficient cause to causal action" (Kant, 1969 ed., pp. 97-98).

To say that events in the world fall under natural necessity is to say that nature is a continuous 'flow' of causes and effects. Given that something exerts a causal influence over something else, it in turn has been acted upon by a preceding cause.

For Kant natural necessity is manifested in the causal action of all non-rational entities, and therefore of animals as much as inanimate objects. "Even on the level of the higher animals Kant conceives of a dog as moved to pursuit by the sight or smell of a rabbit" (Paton, 1967, p. 209). The laws of nature include for Kant psychological as well as physical laws. The difference between the causal action of the dog and that of a rock or billiard ball, says Paton, consists in the fact that the dog is moved by 'ideas' as well as by physical forces. Ideas include data and objects of sense - images, smells, sounds - as well as physiological drives - hunger, sex, etc. The dog's behaviour then is to a certain extent under psychological rather than physical laws. But these are equally laws of natural necessity. The causal action of inanimate objects and animals alike is heteronomous: determined by something other than the object or animal itself.
Kant acknowledges that the action of rational agents like human beings may also be heteronomous, and so to this extent human action would also seem to fall under natural necessity. Nevertheless he does recognise a difference between the heteronomous action of animals and that of human beings. Human action, unlike that of animals, is shaped by reason as well as by physical forces and ideas of sense and imagination. But this does not mean that heteronomous human action is not under natural necessity. Paton claims,

"it is an empirical fact that men have a power to rise above immediate sensuous impressions and impulses through concepts of what is useful or harmful in a remoter way. This remains an empirical fact even if the reason which thus prescribes laws for action is itself determined in turn through influences from elsewhere" (ibid., p. 210).

What this means is that humans can conceive of objectives, ends, goals, long term consequences, etc., which may be incompatible with pursuit of an object of immediate desire or inclination. Through reason a person may avoid acting on the immediate desire or inclination, in the interests of the more remote goal. But the shaping influence of reason on action is here determined by something other than reason itself: namely, some desire, object or inclination, etc., which as such belongs to the empirical order - the order of natural necessity. Similarly, reason enters human action to determine efficient means of pursuing a goal, or to frame principles of prudent action. But here too the use of reason is applied - the rational principle of action is conditioned - by an empirical want, desire, preference, aversion, etc.

The difference between the action of animals and human beings is that the behaviour of animals in accordance with ideas of sense or need is determined or necessitated by the idea in question. Animal behaviour,
in Kant's phrase, is "pathologically determined". There is no reflection upon the object of sense in terms of remoter or incompatible ends. Action on such motives is never 'chosen' by animals. But Kant says it is different for human action. Human action is "never pathologically determined or necessitated by sensuous motives: it is always merely affected or influenced" (ibid., p. 215). c.f., Kant, op. cit., p. 119). Therefore, the heteronomous action of human beings is not quite the same as that of animals. There is an element of 'choice' which we see as lacking in animal behaviour. But the human action in question is heteronomous nonetheless.

According to Kant human beings are capable of exercising pure reason, of both a theoretical and a practical kind. The distinction between practical and theoretical reason has been made as follows.

"Sometimes, in thinking, we are trying to solve a practical problem, a problem of what to do, a problem that we can symbolise as a question of this general form that we ask ourselves: 'What is to be done?' Sometimes, on the other hand, our thinking is directed to the solution of a theoretical problem, a problem that we can symbolise as a question of this general form that we ask ourselves: 'what is the case?' (Edgeley, 1969, p. 13).

The respective roles of reason in addressing these questions are called its 'practical' and 'theoretical' applications. We exercise pure reason when nothing other than rational laws or norms determine our action, judgement, or deliberation. On the theoretical side this comprises all the intellectual activity we call ratiocination: following the rules of inductive or deductive inference; logic and scientific method, mathematical calculation, etc. Pure practical reason consists in determining oneself to action solely in accordance with the Moral Law - a formal 'embodiment' of rational criteria. The exercise of pure practical reason Kant calls "autonomous willing".
This capacity of humans for exercising pure reason is at the very heart of Kant's conception of the ethical ideal. In Kant's mind it constitutes the source of the supreme worth of individuals as ends in themselves and worthy of respect. According to Kant, so far as humans conceive themselves as exercising pure reason they must see themselves as transcending natural necessity. He seems to be saying that if we allow our reason to reflect on the nature of its own activity or processes we necessarily conceive of purely rational activity as being essentially different from other events or occurrences in the world. Hence we necessarily conceive our own purely rational activity as different in kind from occurrences falling under natural necessity. The underlying idea is quite simple. With regard to theoretical reason Kant says, "We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as being consciously directed from outside in regard to its judgments" (op. cit., p. 101). This is because a reason which was aware of such external influences could not regard its judgments as determined by reason, but would have to see them as determined by temporal, causal factors of a kind with events under scientific laws. But this could not be conceived as a rational judgment in the way that we do conceive of rational judgments. When, for example, we reason syllogistically, reason must, "if it is to be reason at all ... regard itself as the author of its own principles independently of external influences" (Paton, op. cit., p. 218). For if every conclusion to a syllogism is completely determined by previous mental events, and admits no rational appreciation of a relationship between premisses and conclusion independent of temporal succession, "there can be no difference between valid and invalid inference, between reasoning and mere association, and ultimately there can be no truth" (ibid.). When we reason syllogistically we necessarily see ourselves as
following laws of logic rather than being determined to a particular conclusion in accordance with natural necessity.

The intellectual activity we call ratiocination would be pointless if we assumed that our deliberations and judgments are heteronomously determined - that is, determined by something other than our own reason. We simply could not continue with ratiocination if we took seriously the notion that our inferences are determined. To take this idea seriously would mean 'cognitive suicide'.(1) Hence it is a necessary presupposition of a rational being reflecting upon his theoretical reasoning that he is free: not determined by causes external to his reason.

The same sort of argument applies for pure practical reasoning. Kant argues that rational beings, and rational beings alone, have a will. They are conscious of the operation of laws or regularities in the universe. They have the ability to conceptualise such relationships as those between cause and effect, act and consequence, etc. They are also conscious of themselves as behaving beings whose behaviour can be seen to bring about certain results in the world. That is, they can conceive of their behaviour as the cause of particular events, and can perceive regularities obtaining between what they do and the effects which follow a particular action. Moreover rational beings are able to conceptualise their desires, aims, purposes, responsibilities, and the like. They are aware of what they hope to attain or avoid through their action. As a consequence of these forms of consciousness and conceptual powers rational beings are able to regulate their behaviour in accordance with what Kant calls principles. These are ideas which embody some end to be attained through action - satisfying a desire, avoiding harm to

1. The argument was put to me this way by Professor James Flynn, University of Otago.
someone else, preventing discomfort — or which refer to some quality to be manifested in one's action — for example, consistency, honesty, concern for others' feelings. Kant speaks here of the capacity of rational beings to act on principles. In simple terms this is just to say that a rational being can perceive an act under some description and determine to act under that description. The capacity of human beings to identify themselves with certain ends, aims, or standards of action, and to decide to act in accordance with these, is what Kant means by having a will. To will is to decide upon some course of action (see Korner, 1972, p. 131). It is to see a piece of possible behaviour under some description and to decide upon it under that description.

Kant distinguishes two broad ways in which a person can decide upon a course of action. He can decide to do X partly or largely on account of some object of volition. This is the case when a person acts on the basis of an inclination, determines to satisfy a desire or need, pursue an object of pleasure, avoid social sanction, and so on. He wills in accordance with an object of volition. It is because of the nature of the object in question that he decides upon the particular action. This is not pure practical reasoning but applied or conditioned reasoning. A component other than reason or reasonableness itself enters into the conception of an action and the decision to perform it. Kant says that a person who wills in this way grounds his action on a material maxim: a principle of action which has particular content or 'matter' in virtue of its reference to a desired object, intended result, or whatever.

By contrast a person can act on the basis of what Kant calls a formal maxim: a principle of action which has no particular content since it does not contain reference to an object of volition. For Kant
a formal maxim is to be understood in terms of reason alone. He seems to believe that if the principle in accordance with which a person acts has no material content – includes no reference to an object – it must consist in purely rational considerations. A maxim which does not 'command' action in accordance with some particular end or objective can only be one which demands reasonableness of action. That is, the 'goal' of action is Reasonableness itself. Reason enters determination to act as the very end of action itself, rather than in the conditioned or applied manner involved whenever someone acts on a material maxim. c.f.,

"He (i.e., Kant) appears to hold that if the maxim of (an) action is a formal maxim (not a material maxim of satisfying one's desires), it must be a maxim of acting reasonably - that is of acting on a law valid for all rational beings as such independently of their particular desires" (Paton, 1969, p. 21).

On Kant's view this is the domain of morally good action: action performed in accordance with a law seen as binding on all rational beings as such, regardless of their particular inclinations, desires, ends, and all other such 'empirical' considerations. (By "empirical considerations" I mean aspects of human existence extraneous to reason.) He claims that so far as morally good action is concerned it cannot consist in action conforming to any particular law. By "a particular law" he means a principle of action incorporating a specific object of volition. He asserts that the only alternative is for the will to conform to Universal Law. From the moral point of view it is Universal Law which must function as the principle governing all willing. "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law" (ibid.). In other words, morally speaking I must only will the sort of action which I could rationally - that is, consistently, impartially,
universally - will all persons in the same circumstances as myself to perform.

To will in accordance with Universal Law - The Moral Law - is to determine action on the basis of purely formal demands of Reason. This parallels arriving at a theoretical judgment entirely on the basis of rules of logical inference or other procedures established by reason alone. According to Kant, so far as we see our willing as grounded on the purely formal maxim which is Universal Law, it is logically impossible to conceive our action as falling under natural necessity. Universal Law is as much a law of reason as are the rules of logical inference. If Kant is correct in holding that reason must, if it is to be reason at all, regard itself as the author of its own principles independently of external influences, this will hold true for pure practical reason as much as for theoretical reason. Hence,

"the rational agent as such must in action presuppose his rational will to be the source of its own principles of action and to be capable of functioning in accordance with these principles" (Paton, op. cit., p. 219).

This is a presupposition of our very concept of our own rational activity. So far as we see ourselves as acting purely on rational considerations we must conceive our action as free from causes external to our own rational nature. Our concept of acting in accordance with a rational law is of something different in kind from acting in accordance with a law of nature.

Kant argues that if when we reflect upon our own exercise of pure reason we cannot but conceive of ourselves as free, then so far as we are concerned we are free in the exercise of pure reason: practical or theoretical. This is the heart of the metaphysic underlying Kant's
conception of freedom as the ethical ideal. For in the exercise of pure reason a person is "raised above the stream of events which we call nature ..... and it is this freedom which arouses Kant's veneration" ([ibid.], p. 77). The person who acts in accordance with Universal Law is no longer at the mercy of his own natural instincts and desires. He obeys the formal law which is the product of his rational will rather than being pushed and pulled by desire. He is free. One who deliberates and makes theoretical judgments in accordance with rational law is no longer the victim of prejudice, delusion, partiality, superstition, or any form of imposed belief. He too is free. For Kant the source of man's unique worth is his potential, in virtue of his reason, to place himself beyond the rest of the universe.

What we have here is a conception of freedom as the ethical ideal consisting in moral and intellectual autonomy. That is, the person who acts in conformity with the Moral Law or reflects in accordance with laws of logical inference, the procedures of science, etc., acts or judges in accordance with a law (nomos) which he prescribes to himself (autos). It is his own self, identified with his reason, which constitutes the source of the action or belief which he arrives at by the exercise of pure reason - since it provides the sole grounds upon which his action or belief is determined. In other words, the individual is himself the cause of his action and judgment to the extent that it is purely rational.

Kant would seem to have exerted a strong influence on the thought of a number of contemporary educational philosophers who identify development of rational autonomy as the central aim of education. I turn now to an investigation of this idea.
CHAPTER FOUR

Personal Autonomy as an Educational Aim.

In recent years educationists have made frequent mention of an educational ideal which has an obvious terminological link - via Kant - with the ethical tradition of rational inner freedom. This ideal is known as personal autonomy. It will become apparent, however, that one particular conception of personal autonomy shared by a number of Anglo-American educationists has more than a mere terminological link with rational inner freedom. Indeed this influential account of "personal autonomy" is embedded firmly in the rationalist tradition sketched in Chapter Three.

Contemporary statements of educational aims typically include reference to development of autonomous individuals. Commitment to autonomy is an important part of the overall theme pervading the Report of the Committee on Secondary Education in New Zealand (Towards Partnership, 1976). The Report notes,

"We believe that the education provided in our secondary schools should be based on and exemplify the values of: mutual concern; individuality; co-operation; autonomy; adaptability; quality" (ibid., p. 2).

It is made clear that the Committee is concerned with both the autonomy of individual schools within the wider national context, (what we may call institutional autonomy), and autonomy of the individual person (that is, personal autonomy). With reference to the latter the Report asserts, "without autonomy freedom does not exist and responsibility cannot be exercised. Schools should help students to become independent and autonomous" (ibid., p. 4).
Similar sentiments have been expressed in Britain. Dearden claims that although the Report of the Plowden Committee on primary education offers only "a meagre and unsystematised statement of aims", it is nevertheless "implicitly advocating personal autonomy. This is so in its reference to discovery, being creative, and 'being oneself!'" (1968, pp. 52-53). The Report claims that the Briton of the future will "need the power of discrimination and, when necessary to be able to withstand mass pressure" (Plowden Report, para. 496 cited ibid.). It is further suggested that schools try to provide a suitable environment for children, "to allow them to be themselves and to develop in the way and at the pace appropriate to them... (school should place) special emphasis on individual discovery, on first hand experience and on opportunities for creative work... A child brought up in such an atmosphere at all stages of his education has some hope of becoming a balanced and mature adult and of being able to live in, to contribute to, and to look critically at the society of which he forms a part" (ibid., para. 505).

But just what is meant by this personal autonomy which for many people comprises not simply an educational aim, but the central aim of education? (c.f., Kaufman, 1973, p. 46). While there is wide agreement that promoting autonomy is a key educational concern, there is typically little attempt made in reports of the type mentioned here to elucidate what it means to be autonomous. Moreover, educational writings abound with conflicting views of what autonomy consists in. Some psychologists, for example, speak of autonomy as something of which the very young child is capable. Obviously such a conception of autonomy cannot also be that of an educational ideal. Instead, it may find a place in, say, a principle of 'respect for autonomy' which is to be observed in child-rearing and educational practice. c.f.,
"The sense of autonomy blossoms as the child of two or thereabouts experiences his power of doing and deciding that comes with his wealth of budding abilities". With reference to toileting, it is suggested that this is "indeed an area where the sternest of parents has a hard time forcing the child and where the child can retain his autonomy under severe pressure... The opposite of a healthy sense of autonomy is a sense of shame or worthlessness. These negative feelings creep in when the youngster cannot choose enough and act independently enough, when the results of his choices and actions are disastrous and when adults use shaming as a method of control. Because the young child is vulnerable to shaming, adults may use it as a discipline technique, not realising its dangers for personality development" (Smart and Smart, 1967, pp. 175-176).

In sharp contrast, other educationists imply that autonomy presupposes a level of cognitive development which is not reached until adolescence, and indeed in some cultures is never reached at all (c.f., Peters, 1973). Between these poles we find "autonomy" being used in educational writings as a synonym for such notions as independence, a sense of agency, individuality, and deciding for oneself.

In Towards Partnership we find no statement of what it means to be autonomous. Is it merely assumed then that we know clearly what is meant? Given the abundance of competing usages to be found, this would be an unwarranted assumption. It is implied in the passage from Towards Partnership cited above (p. 155) that there is some logical link between "autonomy" and "freedom", and between "autonomy" and "the exercise of responsibility". However the relationship between these ideas is not specified. "Autonomy" is also mentioned in the same line as "independence". The suggestion here is that these are distinct ideas, but that they somehow belong together. Autonomy is included in a list of educational values which also includes individuality. This implies that "autonomy" and "individuality" refer to different personal qualities. But in what does their difference consist? Kaufman has
actually suggested that what some people refer to as individuality might be precisely the ideal of autonomy. He mentions Mill's account of autonomy as an ethical ideal in *On Liberty*, noting that "Mill calls it individuality" (op. cit., p. 50). This is not meant to suggest that I think autonomy and individuality are the same thing, or that Mill's account of "individuality" is the same as that which is to be found in ordinary thought, (if indeed we do share a common concept of individuality). However I suspect that the two ideas are often blurred in educational thought. No doubt they are sometimes simply equated. My own belief is that both concepts are sufficiently vague and ambiguous to warrant elucidation when advanced as distinct educational aims - as they are in *Towards Partnership*.

Unfortunately the task of elucidating an educational ideal of autonomy is not straightforward. There is dispute among philosophers at the most fundamental level over the content of the ideal. The dominant view - shared at least in broad detail by a number of philosophers, educationists and social scientists - assumes that personal autonomy is essentially a function of human reason. That is, humans have the capacity for autonomy in virtue of their rational nature. Development of autonomy is a matter of developing reason. However Walker (1976) challenges this basic assumption of the dominant view. He proposes instead that personal autonomy be conceived essentially in terms of human wants. In other words, personal autonomy is in some way a function of man's empirical nature - his 'faculty' of desire - rather than his reason. This marks a dispute over the 'essence', not the finer detail, of autonomy.

The possibility of such a fundamental dispute may be seen as a consequence of at least two factors. First, the etymology of "autonomy"
imposes only very general demands to be met by accounts of the idea. These demands can be met equally by radically different accounts. The noun "autonomy" and its adjective "autonomous" derive from the Greek auto, meaning "self", and nomia, meaning "law" (or more generally, "rules and standards"). Put together these root terms convey the notion of someone's being a law to himself, or being himself the source of the law, rules and standards in accordance with which he lives. c.f., Gewirth (1973, p. 40). It is generally acknowledged that any adequate conception of personal autonomy must account for both aspects of the idea: the 'autos' and the 'nomos'. There must be reference to some law or standards governing aspects of a person's existence, where the law or standards in question are in some sense the agent's own, or self-imposed. As we have seen, this is certainly the force of Kant's account of 'autonomy of the will': the Moral Law, in accordance with which man is to will his actions, is seen as a law which each individual may give to himself through his practical reason.

Both Walker and his opponents explicitly recognise the significance of both the 'autos' and the 'nomos' for a complete analysis of "personal autonomy". But they disagree radically on how these ideas are to be spelled out. (Walker also claims that there is disagreement over where the emphasis should be placed. According to him the rationalists emphasise the nomos. But he believes the weight should be placed on

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1. Note also that this notion of something's being itself the source or basis of the law in accordance with which it functions is what the Ancient Greeks meant when they applied the concept to the political circumstances of the city state. C.S. Lewis claims that this was probably the original application of the idea of autonomy (op. cit., p. 124). For the Greeks a city state was autonomous when, having gained its independence from the rule of an external sovereign power, (in this case, Persia) it governed or determined its activities according to its own legislation.
the *autos*: the self.) Dearden, who represents the rationalist viewpoint, asks, "Is it, then, that as a datable occurrence I must myself (autos) have consented to be bound by a rule (nomos)? Or must I myself have originated the rule?" (1972, p. 449). Elsewhere he claims that the autonomous person is one whose thought and action reflect independence of outside authorities, being based instead on his reason. That is, the autonomous person does not think or act as he does because prescribed or directed to by others. Rather he critically assesses the truth of things for himself, and makes decisions and frames purposes in the light of a set of values which he can himself appreciate (c.f., Dearden, 1968, p.46). Again, Dearden says that a person is autonomous,

"to the degree that what he thinks and does cannot be explained without reference to his own activity of mind .... that is to say, the explanation of why he thinks and acts as he does .... must include a reference to his own choices, deliberations, decisions, reflections, judgments, plannings or reasonings" (1972, p. 453).

Dearden, then, seems well aware that there are two aspects to being autonomous. The 'autos' is acknowledged by reference to the ownership of one's activity of mind, and the necessity of appreciating oneself the set of values underlying one's decisions and purposes. The 'nomos' is implicit in the idea of testing the truth of things for oneself - since such an assessment presupposes some standard or set of criteria for establishing rationally what is true. This same awareness is reflected in general accounts of "autonomy" advanced by other writers. According to Benn,

"The autonomous man is the one who, in Rousseau's phrase, 'is obedient to a law that he prescribes to himself', whose life has a consistency that derives from a coherent set of beliefs, values, and principles, by which his actions are governed. Moreover, these are not supplied to him ready-made.... they are his, because the outcome of a still-continuing process of criticism and re-evaluation" (1976, p. 124).
For Peters, the autonomous individual is one who adopts a code of conduct or a way of life that is his own rather than one dictated by others. Such a code emerges as a consequence of subjecting rules and procedures to reflection and criticism in the light of principles (c.f., Peters, 1973, pp. 123-125).

While the etymology of "autonomy" requires that one give meaning to an 'ownership' condition and a 'rule', 'standard' or 'law' condition, it nevertheless leaves wide scope for the sort of content to be provided. Having noted that "autonomy" means "setting one's law for oneself", Gewirth claims that "the obvious questions here concern the natures of the 'self' which sets the law and the 'law' which is set thereby" (Gewirth, op. cit., p. 40). In asserting that the autonomous person must be subject to reason rather than, say, his emotions, Barrow adopts the prevalent view that the 'self' of autonomy is the rational self (op. cit., p. 131). Gewirth concurs in this, adding that the law set thereby is the rational law (op. cit., p. 41). However as we have already seen, man has often been recognised as an embodiment of different 'selves' - rational, emotional, appetitive - each of which imposes its own 'law' or 'demands' on the person. As far as I know Walker is the only educational philosopher to propose an account of personal autonomy as an ideal in terms of some non-rational 'self'. But so far as a 'self' and a corresponding 'law' can be articulated coherently, there is nothing in the etymology of "autonomy" to disqualify such an account.

The second factor contributing to this fundamental dispute between Walker and various rationalist philosophers of education is the absence of any precisely defined concept of autonomy in ordinary language. Dearden suggests that a difficulty confronting attempts to develop an
account of "personal autonomy" is to even know what would count as having succeeded in the attempt, because ordinary usage provides no clear guidelines for analysis. "On the contrary," says Dearden, "what one is doing is attempting to formulate a concept of something still rather vague and inchoate, but nevertheless implicit in a variety of educational innovations and changes" (1972, p. 453).

So far as the concept "autonomy" is to be found in ordinary usage it is no more than a synonym for being independent or self-governing - usually with reference to a state or some other political or social unit. The whole point about an educational ideal of personal autonomy is that it involves the attempt to give an ethical embodiment to this simple idea of being independent or self-governing - to invest it with some positive ethical content. It is precisely this ethical embodiment that is missing in ordinary language and has to be provided in the analysis of autonomy as an educational ideal. Quite simply, the concept of personal autonomy is not an ordinary language concept. It denotes an ethical ideal, and we are faced here with the possibility that coherent yet radically different accounts of this ideal might be provided.

As a matter of fact, philosophical accounts of an educational ideal of personal autonomy have overwhelmingly been accounts of a personal autonomy based on reason. (c.f., Barrow, 1975; Benn, 1976; Dearden, 1968, 1972, 1975; Feinberg, 1973a, 1973b; Frankena, 1973; Gewirth, op. cit.; Kaufman, op. cit.; Peters, 1965, 1973; Strike, 1972; Telfer, 1975). However there are nevertheless important points of disagreement among those who are in general agreed that autonomy is a function of human reason.
One of these concerns the relationship between personal autonomy and moral goodness. It is widely accepted that "education" is a value-laden concept. Valuative content is built into the concept in at least two ways. First, it has often been argued that the activities and processes of education have to meet certain normative criteria before they qualify as educative. Second, the outcomes or products of educational activity are necessarily imbued with positive value. It is the second of these aspects which is pertinent here. It is a common claim that part of what it means to be an educated individual is that one is in some sense a 'good' person; one is the better for having been educated. In other words, part of what is meant by 'education' is reference to processes of human improvement - an intention to develop individuals who are in some sense 'good'.

This notion is ambiguous however. Two distinctions must be acknowledged. There is firstly the distinction between having acquired certain capacities and actually being disposed to exercise these capacities. It might be argued that an educated person is not merely one who has acquired certain desirable capacities but who actually employs them on at least some occasions when it is appropriate to do so. On the other hand there is the distinction between moral and non-moral goodness. It is possible that for some educators the 'goodness' of the educated person is merely goodness in some non-moral sense - for example, good at doing science, applying research findings, appreciating literature, uncovering means to ends, and so on. However many educationists assume that an educated person should also measure up to standards of moral goodness. They would deny outright that a competent applied physicist who uses his expertise and knowledge solely for his own selfish ends, or for destructive purposes, had attained the ideal of being educated.
He would somehow have failed to integrate his knowledge and expertise into an appreciation of the wider reality in which human well-being is of paramount importance.

In this vein Gewirth explicitly identifies moral goodness among the aims of education. But he sees that this poses a problem for those who also perceive autonomy as an educational aim. The difficulty is that autonomy and moral goodness seem to be antithetical to one another, hence there is a contradiction involved in advancing both as educational aims. c.f.,

"if autonomy consists in choosing one's own standards because they are one's own, then this rules out accepting certain standards because they are morally right or good. To be autonomous, on this view, is to be independent of any standards outside oneself, while to be morally good is rather to accept certain objective standards from outside oneself - 'outside' in the sense that, so far as concerns morality, not anything that one thinks, wants, or chooses is right; rather, the relevant criteria are independent of what one may happen to think, want, or choose. Hence, it would seem to be logically impossible to achieve both autonomy and moral goodness, so that to espouse both of them as aims of education is to involve oneself in a contradiction" (Gewirth, op. cit., pp. 39-40).

Gewirth however believes that both moral goodness and autonomy are important educational aims. Accordingly he attempts to reconcile them. He offers an account of "autonomy" such that "autonomy can be positively and indeed necessarily related to moral goodness" (ibid., p. 41). His argument is that autonomy can be accepted as an educational ideal if the 'self' and the 'law' can be spelled out in terms of the very kind of rationality which can "ground or justify what is morally right" (ibid., p. 42). Gewirth's point is that autonomy can be identified as an educational aim because the rationality on which it is based is the very rationality which, on his argument underlies moral goodness.
By contrast, Dearden sees no need to establish a positive link between "autonomy" and "moral goodness". Indeed he takes issue with Kant's attempt to make autonomy inseparable from moral goodness. c.f., "Kant wished to define autonomy in terms of acting on self-legislating moral laws, but surely a criminal could present a fine example of autonomy in action" (1972, p. 456). Dearden presumably has in mind here those criminal acts which are morally as well as legally wrong.

Dearden seems to assume that while there is no necessary link between "autonomy" and "moral goodness", at least they are not incompatible. Hence they can logically exist as distinct educational aims. He recognises that autonomy is not the only ethical ideal, suggesting,

"however we may value autonomy, and however important a part of a person's dignity it may be, it clearly is not the only thing that matters, as was made evident in commenting on Kant in connection with morality. Without morality, for instance, the more autonomous an agent is the worse he is likely to be. Great criminals are markedly autonomous men" (Ibid., p. 461).

Thus on Dearden's view, while autonomy based on reason is an educational aim it is nevertheless compatible with morally bad activity. Consequently, so far as moral goodness comprises part of the overall educational ideal it is something to be aimed at in addition to autonomy. Barrow expresses unhappiness with the disjunction between Dearden's conception of autonomy and moral goodness. He notes that on Dearden's position "there is no suggestion that moral rectitude or an ability to produce the right answers is written into the concept of personal autonomy" (Barrow, op. cit., p. 135). Barrow's reaction to this disjunction in Dearden's position recalls an assumption underlying some of those positions examined in Chapter Three: namely, that undesirable actions are a consequence of not thinking or reasoning well enough, or 'purely enough' (Kant).
According to Barrow it is not sufficient for a desirable ideal of autonomy that a person merely thinks things out for himself and acts accordingly. The rationality in virtue of which an individual attains autonomy has its own special standards. These standards must be met before an individual's thought, judgment, belief, and activity can properly be judged autonomous. Barrow argues that it is not our ideal of autonomy that a person merely has to opine and act as he sees fit ... it is not enough that people should simply think for themselves; ideally they should also think well, which is to say, consistently, logically, with due regard to the facts of the matter and so on .... It therefore seems that to make the concept of autonomy an acceptable ideal, we have to define further the vague phrase 'think for oneself' and add a (further) necessary condition to the concept of autonomy. An autonomous person, besides thinking authentically, must also think well..... It may well be argued that in adding this necessary condition of autonomy I am stretching the meaning of the term unduly. That is to say it may be argued that it is unreasonable to claim that being autonomous means thinking for oneself and thinking well. The answer to this is that it makes no significant difference to my argument: we can either say that autonomy means this and is a desirable ideal, or that it does not involve the idea of thinking well and is not a desirable ideal. My only concern is to argue that it is desirable that people should think for themselves provided that they do it well, and not otherwise" (ibid., pp. 137-138).

Although the view is not stated explicitly, Barrow implies that if people reason well, and if "reasoning well" is made part of the concept of personal autonomy, such problems as that of the autonomous but immoral individual will not arise. That is, autonomy can be made into a desirable ideal, because the reasoning which characterises the autonomous individual is precisely the sort of reasoning which yields sound moral judgments and morally acceptable activity. What is required is that the individual's reasoning conform to criteria or standards of rationality: consistency, impartiality, concern for
relevance, etc. If an individual's thought does not meet these standards it cannot properly be judged autonomous, regardless of how authentic it may be. The same applies to action grounded in authentic thought.

Barrow and Dearden are agreed in general that autonomy is bound up with human reasoning. It is in virtue of a person's rational activity - his thought, reflection, judgment - that he is autonomous. However they differ on significant details of the content of "autonomy". While the nature of this disagreement will have important implications for such issues as justifying autonomy as an educational ideal, it need not concern us here. Despite the fact that such disagreement occurs, it is possible to provide a general account of rational autonomy which meets my purposes here without distorting the position which prevails in educational philosophy. The important thing as far as I am concerned is that development of rational autonomy has been equated with development of free persons: the 'free' person is the rationally autonomous person. The question is whether we can glean from contemporary educational philosophy a coherent general account of "autonomy" which can meaningfully be construed as a conception of free personhood. I believe this can be done.

The notion of personal autonomy based on reason.

As noted, "autonomy" is made up of two component ideas: "autos" and "nomos". In the literature the autos is usually acknowledged by reference to the 'ownership' condition of autonomy. The nomos is commonly referred to in terms of some law, set of rules, norms or criteria, or some code which is recognised by the individual. With reference, firstly, to the ownership, (or as it is sometimes called,
the 'authenticity') condition, it is held that the beliefs, thought, tastes, and actions of the autonomous individual are in some significant sense his 'own'. Frankena, for example, claims that an autonomous person is "capable of judging, acting, and thinking on his own in art, history, science, morality, etc." (op. cit., p. 30). Referring to Frankena's claim, Kaufman says,

"We must clarify the idea of ownership that is at work here as well as in most other discussions of autonomy. For, in a trivial sense, any action someone performs is his own just in virtue of the fact that it is his action. Clearly something special is intended when ownership is attributed in order to convey that the action, judgment, or thought is autonomous" (op. cit., p. 46).

If we focus on the autos, the autonomous individual can be marked off from the heteronomous individual. This distinction between autonomy and heteronomy has been met already in reference to Kant. It remains to be seen here what contemporary writers have made of it.

Secondly, with reference to the nomos, it is held that there operates in the autonomous individual - and the heteronomous individual as well for that matter - some organizing, integrating factor which regulates, governs, or determines what an agent believes, prefers, decides upon, and does. If we focus on the nomos, then, the autonomous individual can be marked off from the anomic ('without a nomos') individual. Both the autonomic and the heteronomic have, by definition, a nomos: some code, body of criteria or set of standards, in accordance with which they regulate their theoretical and practical activities. The anomic individual, by contrast, lacks such an integrating factor. This clearly establishes the importance of stressing both aspects of autonomy. Without reference to some nomos we may be left with the idea of an individual whose beliefs and actions in some
sense express himself, but where this is a merely anarchic or anomic self. On the other hand, without reference to an autos we may simply have the idea of an individual who acknowledges some regulating standards within his life, but where these are in no sense an expression of himself.

Those for whom the ideal of personal autonomy is based on man's capacity for rational excellence attempt to spell out these two component ideas in terms of human reason. I will begin by looking at the content given to the nomos.

The autonomous person bases his thought and action - that is, the theoretical and practical aspects of his life - on some 'law': a set of standards, rules, or norms. He is, then, unlike the individual who is sometimes described as 'anomic'. "Anomie" is usually applied with reference to someone's practical life: that is, with regard to determining how one will act. Feinberg speaks of anomie in terms of a person's inability to order his desires, purposes, and ideals, into some hierarchy of importance, urgency, or worthwhileness. He distinguishes the individual who possesses a hierarchy of wants and aims from one who does not. The former has a basis for settling 'disputes' or 'claims' between competing desires or purposes in a situation where he may pursue either one or the other. He 'identifies himself' with the want or aim which ranks higher in his hierarchy and governs his activity accordingly. Of course such a person is not necessarily autonomous, since his hierarchy may simply be borrowed. But whether autonomous or heteronomous he is not anomic.

Feinberg considers by contrast the individual who has no hierarchy of wants, purposes, and ideals whatsoever. Such a person "would be a
battlefield for all of his constituent elements, tugged this way and that, and fragmented hopelessly" (1973a, p. 14). Lacking any ordering force with respect to his wants and goals, the anomic individual may be overwhelmed in situations where he has a large measure of social freedom. c.f.,

"When he may 'do anything he wants', his options will overwhelm his capacity to order them in hierarchies of preference. He will therefore become confused and disoriented, haunted by boredom and frustration, eager once more simply to be told what he must do" (ibid., p. 15).

Benn likewise construes anomie in terms of an individual's practical life. The anomic individual makes no attempt to live consistently. His actions have an air of 'spontaneity' about them. It is not that he is 'driven' or 'impelled' to act by some irrational wish or aversion, or an uncontrollable drive. Rather he simply "acknowledges nothing as a reason for doing otherwise. Caring about nothing he sees no point in controlling the inclination of the moment" (Benn, 1976, p. 124). Under normal conditions, Benn's anomic individual merely acts unreflectively on whim, recognising no overriding considerations for doing one thing rather than another. He retains his agency. He just fails to organise his activity under an integrating principle. Benn suggests, however, that in certain circumstances the anomic individual may surrender his agency, breaking down into 'heterarchy or psychosis, since he has no firm conception of himself as a personality of a particular kind with its characteristic principle of integration" (ibid.).

We may want to extend the notion of anomie to a person's theoretical life as well. Anomie in thought and belief might be construed as a condition in which an individual lacks standards or
principles governing thought and belief. The anomic 'thinker' may recognize no criteria for establishing truth or reasonable belief, or see no particular point in bothering about truth. Any assertions he makes will be mere statements of prejudice, expressions of ideas he 'feels comfortable with', or something equally arbitrary. Similarly he may acknowledge no criteria for organising or integrating any beliefs he may espouse. The anomic believer-thinker won't be bothered about inconsistencies or incompatibilities within his belief structure, or tensions in his thinking. He may not even be aware of them. There would be no such thing as a theoretical issue for him. The content of his mind would be the consequence of whim, arbitrary circumstance - for example, of hearsay - and the like. It is not as if he adopts certain beliefs, or thinks the way he does, on the authority of someone else. This would be to have at least some standard against which to assess his beliefs, or a means to determining what to think.

On the account of "autonomy" under discussion here, the 'law' in accordance with which an autonomous person governs his thought and action is characterised by its rational nature. Benn, for example, claims it is a defining characteristic of the autonomous individual that his life "has a consistency that derives from a coherent set of beliefs, values, and principles, by which his actions are governed" (ibid., p. 124). That is, within a context where there are various beliefs, values, and principles available to an individual in accordance with which he might lead his life, (and hence, in a sense 'define himself'), he adopts a set which because of its internal consistency lends an overall quality of consistency or integration to his life. To use current jargon we might say that he is a 'together' person; although the 'togetherness' of one such individual may differ considerably from that of another, depending
on the specific content of their respective nomoi.

However on Benn’s account the nomos of the autonomic is rational not just in the minimal sense of being coherent and consistent. According to Benn, the nomos of the autonomic is his own precisely because it is the outcome of "a still-continuing process of criticism and re-evaluation" on the part of the individual himself (ibid., p. 124). He evolves his particular nomos by virtue of rational inquiry into and reflection upon the various beliefs, rules and values to which he is exposed. A defining characteristic of the autonomous person is that he recognises rational norms and criteria as constituting proper grounds for evaluating beliefs, rules and values. In our society the variety of beliefs and values to which we are exposed do not all fit together as a coherent whole. The autonomous person is "alive to, and disposed to resolve by rational reflection and decision" incoherences in the complex tradition into which he has been inducted (ibid., p. 128). In this way he arrives at a 'code' or law' on the basis of which he regulates his activity.

Benn's is essentially an account of autonomy within a person's practical life. That is, the individual actively creates a nomos of his own in accordance with which he governs his activity. Educationists have been especially concerned with one particular aspect of autonomy within a person's practical life. This is moral autonomy. A number of writers see the emergence of moral autonomy as the culminating stage of moral development. Peters, following Piaget and Kohlberg, adopts the view that individuals pass through hierarchical stages in their conception of rules. The final stage is that of autonomy. The morally autonomous person recognises those rules which govern activity impinging on human interests as being social conventions which are alterable
rather than irretrievably 'fixed' or 'given'. Rules can be criticised on rational grounds, and should be "accepted or rejected on a basis of reciprocity and fairness" (Peters, 1973, p. 130). Development of the capacity and disposition to reflect rationally on rules "is the main feature of the final level of moral development" (ibid.). Appreciating that social rules are alterable, the autonomous person subjects them to scrutiny in the light of principles. In so doing he "gradually emerges with his own code of conduct". This, says Peters, is the Kantian conception of autonomy, "in which the 'subjective maxims' of the individual are subjected to critical examination in the light of principles such as those of impartiality and respect for persons" (ibid.).

Within educational literature it is Kohlberg who has done most to articulate a conception of autonomy in terms of self-imposition of rational moral 'law', and to advance empirically-based suggestions concerning the development of rational autonomy. On Kohlberg's position, autonomous persons are those who have attained the highest or most 'adequate' stage of moral thought and judgment. Kohlberg calls this the stage of universal ethical principle orientation. The morally autonomous person acts on the basis of a 'law' which consists of abstract, general principles rather than precisely defined rules. The validity of these principles is not grounded in the authority or power of some person, group, or deity. Instead their validity is seen to flow from the very nature of rationality itself. The view is distinctively Kantian. According to Kohlberg and Gilligan the autonomic thinks and acts in terms of

"ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. Instead, they are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons" (1971, p. 1068).
In other words, the autonomous person does not base his moral judgment and action ultimately on particular rules which have precise content. Rather, his ultimate appeal in moral situations is to principles of a general and abstract nature. Of course he develops or adopts rules of thumb to operate with in the majority of situations in which he finds himself. But where it is appropriate to assess the moral propriety of a conventional rule he is able and disposed to do so. His moral awareness is principled rather than rule-bound. Moral judgments, says Kohlberg, are judgments about what ought to be done rather than what is required or laid down conventionally or by tradition. Genuine moral judgments are universal in nature: "the claim of principled morality is that it defines the right for anyone in any situation" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 185). The principles of true morality flow directly from the formal principles of reason which, by definition, are universally applicable. In Kohlberg, then, we find a clear assertion that the practical nomos of an autonomous person is a rational nomos.

However recent accounts of autonomy as an educational ideal have not been concerned simply with a person's practical life, but also with his theoretical life. As Dearden notes, autonomy is manifested in a person's thought as well as his action. It is true that in many cases thought and action are inseparable. c.f., Barrow's concern for 'thinking well', which is based in large part on his concern that persons act well. But people can be said to think and judge autonomously where there is no concern whatsoever with determining action, but simply with establishing truth or reasonable belief. Philosophers of education have paid special attention to autonomous thought within what Peters calls 'public traditions' or 'forms of life', for example, 'science, history, mathematics, religious and aesthetic appreciation" (Peters, 1965, p. 103).
What has been said about the 'law' in accordance with which an autonomous person regulates his thinking - including his thinking within established public traditions?

Having argued that the autonomous person not only thinks or reasons for himself but also thinks well, Barrow claims that there remains the 'enormous question of what the standards of good thinking are and who decides them' (op. cit., p. 138). Both aspects of this question are important for a rationalist conception of autonomy. Having posed the question Barrow himself says little in answer to it. He acknowledges that there are frequent disputes of a sophisticated nature about the adequacy of particular acts of thought - for example, 'whether ... Marxism represents a well-thought position or whether the argument for utilitarianism in this book is to any extent sound' (ibid.). Beyond this he claims only that there are certain formal standards of reasoning - for example, coherence, consistency, and relevance - that we can and do agree upon; that in the realm of value judgments we can distinguish between arguments that deserve to be considered seriously and those that are quite inadequate; and that in general we can distinguish between good and bad thinking in science.

Scheffler offers a rather more comprehensive account of the nomos which governs autonomous thought. Initially this is spelled out in terms of a Kantian conception of reason: a matter of abiding by general rules and principles. Autonomous pure thought is grounded in reason, and reason

"stands always in contrast with inconsistency and with expediency, in the judgment of particular issues. In the cognitive realm, reason is a kind of justice to the evidence, a fair treatment of the case, in the interests of truth ..... reason is always a matter of treating
equal reasons equally, and of judging the issues in the light of general principles to which one has bound oneself.... The concepts of principles, reasons, and consistency thus go together and they apply both in the cognitive judgments of beliefs and the moral assessment of conduct. In fact, they define a general concept of rationality" (Scheffler, 1967, pp. 129-130).

At a general level of discussion, then, the 'nomos' of autonomous thought can be seen to consist in the purely formal criteria of reason. That is, it is at bottom the same 'law' on which the morally autonomous agent ultimately grounds his own code of conduct. However Scheffler argues that a more concrete and substantive account of the 'theoretical nomos' can be advanced in relation to educational pursuits.

Scheffler claims that the operative principles of thought and rational judgment are, at a given point in time, "much more detailed and specific than a mere requirement of formal consistency" (ibid., p. 131). The point is that the demands of formal consistency are spelled out in a detailed, concrete manner in the various evolving rational traditions which have emerged throughout human existence. Thus there are "concrete rules governing inference and procedure" in science, history, art, maths, literature, religious studies, and so on.

"These concrete rules and standards, techniques and methodological criteria evolve and grow with the advance of knowledge itself; they form a live tradition of rationality" in such realms as science, mathematics and history (ibid., p. 132).

In other words, at any time within any public tradition of thought there exist rules, norms, and criteria, in accordance with which those engaged in a given tradition establish what counts as being relevant, appropriate or conclusive. Hence at a more specific level of discussion the 'nomos' of autonomous pure thought might be said to consist in the rules or criteria governing procedure in a given field of thought.
This completes my discussion of the rationalist view of the nomos by which an autonomous person regulates his thought and conduct. The question which must now be considered is whether, and how, an individual can be said to give himself this regulating 'law'; or alternatively, in what sense can he be said to arrive at his own beliefs, judgments, and modes of conduct on the basis of his rational nomos? This involves elucidating the second component of the concept 'autonomy': the autos.

An initial problem confronting proponents of a rationalist account of autonomy is to make sense of the idea that an individual provides for himself, or is himself the source of, the rational nomos. For it would seem that it is only if the individual can be seen in a significant sense to be himself the source or giver of the nomos that his thought and action can in turn significantly be described as 'authentic' or his 'own'. The problem is whether a rationalist position can make any significant sense of this. The difficulty is that the reason which defines the rational nomos seems, in obvious respects, to be independent of a person himself. In what I have already said, "reason" has been presented either in terms of purely formal criteria, or in terms of public rational traditions of inquiry in which these formal criteria have been given substance. It does not seem possible that reason, thus understood, can be construed as a part or an expression of a person himself. Rather, it would seem that reason consists in utterly impersonal standards to which a person's thought and action might be subject. I will begin my investigation of the 'ownership' condition by considering some arguments for the view that on a rationalist account a person cannot significantly be regarded as the source of his nomos. These arguments must be met if the rationalists are to provide a coherent account of "autonomy".
One general line of argument draws on the fact that a rational mind is not something which emerges or springs naturally from 'within' a person in the way that teeth and hair do. Provided a person is given adequate food and shelter, various forms of development occur naturally — without necessary guidance or stimulation from other people or the physical world. But the development of reason is not like this. There is no essential rational nature which emerges in its own time without substantial nurturance. The development of reason is a complex process in which experience of and interaction with the physical and social environments are of central significance. A mind which is capable of operating in accordance with rational norms and standards is in large part a function of a person's experience - his interaction with his world, including his social world. Consequently we cannot speak of an individual's rationality as if this were something which is in no way attributable to influences within his milieu. Therefore, it might be argued, we cannot think of the rational nomos as something of which 'the person himself' is the source, in virtue of his reason. His rationality itself has been shaped by processes occurring from 'without', including social processes. Does it not seem, then, that a person's reason is in some part a function of his interaction with other people? In which case, how can we speak of a person's reason, and hence any nomos yielded by that reason, as his 'own' in any significant sense? What are the grounds for this argument, and how strong is it? I will consider three ways in which this position might be argued.

(1) Evidence from developmental psychology relates directly to this matter. It might be thought that Piaget, for example, holds to some notion of an essential human rationality so far as he believes that the human mind has a distinctive structure which is shaped to some degree by
biological factors. However at the heart of Piaget's theory is the claim that development of cognition - which is the unfolding of this distinctive structure of mind through several hierarchical stages - is crucially dependent upon the individual's experience with the world. C.f., "Psychological structures form the basis for intellectual activity and are the product of a complex interaction between biological and experiential factors" (Ginsburg and Oppen, 1969, p. 17). According to Piaget the human being, like other species, inherits two general tendencies: organisation and adaptation. In other words, the human tends to organise his thought and behaviour and to adapt to his environment. But his specific responses, his intellectual reactions, are not inherited - even though the various psychological structures which produce these reactions display characteristics which are universal: for example, the particular forms which these structures take at different ages independently of cultural variations. Accordingly, Ginsburg and Oppen draw attention to Piaget's distinction between structures and tendencies, noting that while organisation and adaptation are inherited they are tendencies rather than intellectual structures. Furthermore, "the particular ways in which an organism adapts and organises its processes depend also on its environment and its learning history" (ibid., p. 19)

The details of the sequential development of cognitive processes; and the explanation of universal patterns of cognition at various stages of development do not concern me here. I am concerned only with the fact that the development of a rational mind is not a matter of some inner 'essence' of an individual emerging independently of environmental influences, or the forms of experience to which he is subjected.
(ii) Further evidence of the importance of experiential factors in the development of reason is offered by cases of children raised in isolation or under extreme conditions of social deprivation (see Schmidt, 1973, pp. 26-37). The evidence presented by 'feral children' suggests two things. First, 'feral man' lacks cognitive capacities typical of human beings. Schmidt mentions the case of Victor, the Wild Boy of Aveyron, whose capture and return to civilisation was described by Itard in the late 18th century.

"Contrary to the expectations of those who took literally the notion of natural development, Victor did not speak a natural language - he spoke not at all; he grunted and trotted like an animal and bit and scratched those who opposed him. Itard tells us that his senses were 'extraordinarily apathetic. His nostrils were filled with snuff without making him sneeze. He picked up potatoes from boiling water. A pistol fired near him provoked hardly any response though the sound of cracking a walnut caused him to turn round'" (ibid., p. 27).

Secondly, absence of normal social experience greatly limits and retards the development of cognitive functions when finally the individual returns to a human environment.

Studies of instances of extreme social deprivation during the early years of life support the claim that development of mind is crucially dependent upon interaction with a social environment. In the case of Isabelle, cited by Schmidt, it was found that

"when her intelligence was first tested via the Stanford-Binet scale at the age of 6½ years, her mental age appeared to be about 19 months. All items involving language were, of course, failed. In the place of normal speech she made a croaking sound" (ibid., pp. 32-33).

However Isabelle was given complex and sustained remedial treatment for her gross physical and cognitive abnormalities. This was very successful suggesting that if such programmes are properly conceived even
extreme social deprivation can be compensated for to a large extent (c.f., ibid.). Nevertheless the central claim is supported; namely, that development of mind is a function of appropriate forms of experience and interaction with the world.

(iii) Within philosophy a view has emerged - strongly influenced by Wittgenstein's later work - that meaningful activity, and hence rational activity, is 'rule-governed' (c.f., Winch, 1957). The important point here is that according to this view, capacity for rational reflection and judgment is of necessity a matter of initiation, rather than something which is innate. It is a matter of coming to understand the relevant rules. This is something which presupposes a social context, and indeed a particular type of social context. c.f., "Rational character and critical judgment grow only through increased participation in adult experience and criticism" (Scheffler; op. cit., p. 131).

Benn makes reference to this general idea when he considers the claim that perhaps we cannot ultimately distinguish autonomous from heteronomous individuals on a rationalist position. For it is indeed a precondition of rational thought and action that one possess not only a set of criteria on the basis of which to make judgments, but also a conceptual scheme with which to grasp issues, alternatives, and the need for decision or judgment in the first place. How, asks Benn, could a person come by such criteria and such a conceptual scheme, unless he learned them in the first instance from people around him? Does this not mean that anyone's rational nomos is inevitably derived from others, not only in the sense that he has to be initiated into an awareness of rational criteria, but more fundamentally, that his very appreciation of options and issues, his perception of facts, and his interpretation of
data, are all conditioned by a conceptual framework which has been imposed on him by other people?

These lines of argument suggest that the development of rationality is crucially dependent upon experience of and interaction with the world. Reason does not just 'pop out' of a person in the manner of teeth, hair, and the like. Therefore, it is argued, rational activity is not to be regarded as an expression of some essential rational nature of the individual - an expression of some 'pure' entity belonging distinctively to that person himself. Dearden and Scheffler draw attention to a second sense in which the rational nomos might be considered something independent of a person himself. A defining feature of the rational nomos is that it conforms to criteria which are in a significant sense independent of an individual's wants, needs, and interests. This is made clear by Scheffler's metaphor of reason as a kind of justice: a characteristic of justice being impartiality. The individual who is making a rational judgment appeals to formal principles which preclude a partial treatment of his own case (c.f., supra., pp. 175-176).

The same point is made by Dearden. He claims that when we genuinely engage in rational activity - for example, choosing, deciding, reflecting and deliberating - we appeal to relevant considerations of the particular case. These considerations yield reasons for choosing, believing or deciding upon one thing or another. However it is not 'up to us' as to what constitutes a relevant consideration. Instead this is a matter of criteria which are dependent on the nature of the particular case; "that is, on what it is that we have to decide upon" (Dearden, 1972, p. 458). In other words, whether or not something constitutes a relevant moral consideration for doing X is not a function of how we feel at the time,
or what we most want to do in the particular instance. Or to use another example, the criteria for judging the effectiveness of a finance minister's fiscal measures are independent of our personal feelings about the minister himself. This all poses a problem which Dearden presents as follows.

"The adequacy and appropriateness of the criteria to be employed will depend on the nature of the case ... But if that is so, then the criteria appropriately to be employed will be independent of our particular wishes or purposes in the matter. In fact, the best reasons of all for a particular opinion or choice may be compelling ones. But if the criteria that one ought to employ are determined independently of one's wishes by the nature of the case, and if the reasons identified by reference to such criteria may even be compelling, where then is the autonomy?" (ibid., p. 458).

There appears then to be a fundamental sense in which the rational nomos is not an expression of the individual himself. After all, are not our wants, needs, and interests among the deepest expressions of our personalities, our very selves? The criteria of reason require us to make some judgment in which our wants, needs, and interests are given no special place. Each case is to be judged on its merits, and the merits are determined on the basis of impersonal formal criteria. Walker suggests that on the rationalist account the autonomous person is subject to reason, and in an important sense this reason is independent of the person himself: so far as 'he' comprises his own wants, needs, and interests. (c.f., Walker, op. cit., p. 5). This, after all, is precisely the force of Kant's moral position. When employed in a moral context rational criteria might positively require denial of self (= wants, needs, and interests). As we have seen, the traditional response here is that the 'self' thus denied is not the self of autonomy: that is, it is not one's real self.
Various replies to these lines of argument are open to proponents of a rationalist account of "autonomy". Firstly, they might argue it is not damaging to their account that the rationality constitutive of autonomy emerges only as the result of a developmental process in which certain kinds of experience and interaction are of crucial importance. After all this seems equally to be true of man's 'empirical self': his wants and interests. If anything at all is constitutive of a person himself it is his wants and interests. But these too presuppose a person's having experience of the world and interaction with other people. It is true that human beings possess drives and needs which can intelligibly be regarded as innate. But, as we have seen, they also possess innate tendencies crucial to the development of cognition. Might it not be argued that these innate tendencies stand to the development of reason in much the same relationship as needs and drives do to the development of wants and interests? In addition there is an intimate connection between an individual's wants and his social-cultural milieu.

Furthermore, it is no valid objection that rational judgment presupposes a conceptual scheme of our world which is to some extent a function of our particular social milieu. Benn claims that without such conceptual equipment a human being would hardly be a person at all - autonomous or otherwise. According to Benn, our distinction between the autonomous and the non-autonomous is not a distinction between those persons whose conceptual schemes and criteria of judgment are in no way a consequence of social experience and others whose concepts and criteria have been thus influenced. Rather, says Benn, the distinction is between character types all of which are subject to these conditions. Indeed, it is necessary for his autonomy that a person be capable of rational choice, and for that he needs criteria and a conceptual scheme for grasping the issues. How could he come by them unless he learnt them in
the first instance from the people about him? Someone not so equipped would not be free, able to make nothing of himself, hardly a person at all. To be autonomous one must have reasons for acting, and be capable of second thoughts in the light of new reasons; it is not to have a capacity for conjuring criteria out of nowhere" (1976, p. 126).

In other words, a baseline of normal social experience is presupposed by the concept of rational autonomy. Indeed, rationalists might argue, it will be presupposed by any viable concept of autonomy since it is a presupposition of personhood itself.

A second reply is found in Dearden's response to a difficulty facing rationalist accounts which he himself poses: namely, how can we speak of a person's thought and action as his 'own' if it is not up to the individual himself to decide what count as adequate and appropriate criteria for rational judgment, choice, or decision. As we have seen, Dearden notes that whether or not something constitutes a relevant consideration in a given case is quite independent of what the individual might happen to think, want, believe or prefer. Dearden's reply is that while the criteria which are relevant to one's judgments are established independently of one's particular wishes in the matter, this in no way infringes one's autonomy. This is because these criteria are not

"so to speak, self active ... it yet remains to the agent to employ these criteria and to govern his activity of mind by reference to them, and it is in this self-government that his autonomy lies!" (1972, p. 459).

That is, Dearden believes that in an important sense it is up to the individual whether he thinks consistently rather than inconsistently, appeals to relevant rather than arbitrary considerations, treats evidence impartially rather than in a biased manner, and so on. The autonomous individual is not one whose thought and action just happens
to conform to rational standards. On Dearden's view he is one who actually defines himself in a given way. He positively identifies himself with 'the rational way', and thus the quality reflected in his thought and action is one which he has imposed upon it, but which he may well not have. To put it another way, it may not be up to the individual himself to determine what the standards of reason are, or what reason establishes in respect of some issue. However on Dearden's view it is up to the individual to determine to put his thought and action under the scrutiny of reason - and this is what is important. The image of the autonomous person is not for Dearden one of a passive onlooker, having his thought and action 'pushed to and fro' by criteria and considerations which he is powerless to influence or shape because they impinge on him from 'without'. Rather it is the image of a person who believes that the good life is a life lived in accordance with reason, and who willingly embraces rational standards because of the quality of life - practical and theoretical - which they afford. This is a kind of life with which he actively identifies himself and makes his own.

Let us assume for the sake of argument that these counter-arguments are successful: that they adequately protect the rationalist from the charge that his account makes no sense of the individual being the source of the nomos. We may now look more closely at the 'ownership' condition. What is the nature of the 'ownership' involved in autonomy? This question may be addressed initially by describing how rationalists have drawn the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy. The heteronomous person is one whose thought and actions are governed by other people, in that he adopts or accepts ideas, beliefs, demands, opinions, and tasks to which he is exposed without subjecting them to personal scrutiny. According to Dearden,
"this would be so when, consciously or unconsciously, he is passive or submissive toward compulsion, conditioning, indoctrination, expectations of an authority unfounded on his own recognition of its entitlement" (1972, p. 454).

In Benn's terms the distinction is between the individual "who simply accepts the roles society thrusts on him, uncritically internalising the received mores", and someone who is committed to a "critical and creative conscious search for coherence". The autonomous person "does not rest on the unexamined if fashionable conventions of his subculture when they lead to palpable inconsistencies" (1976, p. 126). Rational investigation is necessary if the individual is to forge for himself a coherent, integrated personality and way of life out of the complex tradition into which he is inducted.

The nomos of the heteronomous individual could be rational - for example, if it was supplied by a philosopher king. But it would nevertheless be one which the individual adopts ready-made. Any rational quality it may have is in no way attributable to the critical assessment of the individual himself. By contrast, the autonomous individual does not accept something as being true or right simply because it is the done thing, is demanded by others, or is presented to him by someone he happens to admire. He has an alternative basis of authority on such matters - the rational inquiry he engages in for himself when it is appropriate to do so. Committed as he is to rational values, he is on the look out for inconsistency, bias, arbitrariness, and incompatibility, in thought and action alike. The autonomous person departs from beliefs, expectations, and values of others if he finds them rationally unacceptable. Moreover, if asked why he thinks and acts as he does he may offer a quite different answer from that open to the heteronomous person. His thought and action is his 'own' in the sense that he has
shaped it in accordance with criteria which he acknowledges as appropriate for this task. Other possible bases of opinion, belief, and action - for example, group pressure, social convention, public consensus, convenience - are rejected as inappropriate criteria for determining what is true or what ought to be done. Having accepted the proper authority of reason, it is still necessary for the individual to engage in rational evaluation himself if he is to attain autonomy. In this consists the ownership of his thought and action. The autonomous person can evaluate the criteria themselves as far as this is possible, and weigh up criteria to come to his own judgment or decision when the issue is not clear cut (for example, whether it is proper to strike).

Those theorists who identify attainment of moral autonomy as the ideal of moral education give further sense to the notion of an autonomous person's action being his own. Proponents of moral education seek a programme which is free from charges of indoctrination of moral beliefs and values, and conditioning of moral behaviour. They see in the notion of an autonomous principled morality a way around such charges. It is argued that once we speak of a principled morality it is possible to distinguish between the form and the content of morality. If moral education is conceived as initiation into the form of moral thought, the most serious charges of indoctrination and conditioning can be avoided; indoctrination and conditioning being most obviously bound up with the inculcation of moral content.

So far as ownership of a moral position is concerned, the point is that one who has command of the form of morality is not thereby necessarily driven to a specific moral code. Two morally autonomous individuals may well differ on precisely what action should be performed
in a particular situation, or which principle should be given greater weight where a conflict between principles arises. Given that such genuine differences are possible, we can give further sense to the claim that the specific answers arrived at are the agents' own. This is not simply in the sense that they are not answers imposed by others. Rather it is that the form of moral inquiry and decision does not necessitate particular answers in many cases. Autonomous persons disagree about abortion and euthanasia: but they are nonetheless autonomous. Data is open to different, yet reasonable interpretations. Principles can be ordered in different, yet defensible hierarchies. Specific considerations - harm caused to A, the happiness of B, cost in terms of resources, etc. - may rationally be assigned different weightings by different individuals. These variables make possible different answers to particular issues - although in many cases autonomous moral agents will agree as to what is right and good. Just as the possibility of consensus implies a meaningful notion of rational decision, so the very possibility of divergence gives rise to a meaningful notion of ownership. The autonomous agent engages in moral inquiry which may lead him to a distinctive answer or stance.

Much the same can be argued for theoretical pursuits. Peters and Frankena suggest that the autonomous person thinks on his own in art, history, science, etc., once he has become aware of - has been 'initiated into' - what is involved in thinking scientifically or historically. Once he has grasped the form of historical thought it is open for him to establish the content of an historical position for himself. In other words, capacity to think scientifically or historically does not limit one inevitably to a particular body of ideas, set of 'truths', commitments, etc: even if it does preclude
accepting certain claims - for example, conclusions to fallacious arguments and findings of bogus experiments.

Finally, proponents of autonomy based on reason may claim that in identifying the good life as a life lived in accordance with reason, an individual admits a foundation on which he can actively create a distinctive personality. A life in which reason is central will be characterised by its integrated, coherent quality. But an infinite range of beliefs, values, goals, and interests, and combinations of these, are possible within the formal bounds of coherence and consistency. Recognising his environment as providing a rich source of material from which to forge a personality, the autonomous person sets about this task by seeking a rational construction out of the possibilities open to him. Those principles, values, beliefs, and goals which he accepts because they are reasonable, and the activities he engages in accordingly, constitute his personality. So far as these are shaped by his own critical inquiry and rational assessment, the autonomous person can be seen as the author of his personality (c.f. Benn, 1976).

Rational autonomy as an ideal of freedom.

It remains finally to consider how far rational autonomy can appropriately be seen as an ideal of freedom. What sense does it make to conceive of the autonomous person as a free person? What are the sorts of constraints or impediments from which the autonomous person can be seen as freed in virtue of his own rational activity?

Contemporary rationalists are much less inclined to speak of competing 'selves' or factions within a person than were some of their
philosophic ancestors. Hence we find little or no explicit talk about a real self being free from bondage to a lower or alien self. However something of this metaphor persists in current writings in the guise of a mental health component of autonomy. Dearden, for example, claims that a form of heteronomy

"Would consist in a person's being governed by factors which are, in a sense, in himself, but which are nevertheless external to his activity of mind. Examples of this sort of heteronomy might include the various forms of psychosis and perhaps also neurosis, together with physiologically based addictions and derangements" (ibid., p. 454).(1)

Someone in this condition might be conceived as subject to constraints in that he is prevented from assessing accurately or realistically what is the case, and/or from acting on the basis of such an assessment. The image of such a person is of someone in the grip of an influence over which he is powerless. He is prevented from doing what we expect people minimally to be capable of doing. When we think of the autonomous agent in contrast to the person driven or impelled by irrational wishes, aversions, and compulsions, the metaphor of unfreedom clearly gets a grip.

1. Compare also,

"The autonomous person does not possess what I shall term obstructive traits. Obstructive traits are whatever traits a person might have acquired which result in the inability of the individual to apply whatever evaluative skills and attitudes he may possess in actual choice and action. Paradigmatically obstructive traits are neurotic and psychotic tendencies ... which induce defensiveness, a tendency to distort or reject painful information, an unrealistic self-concept, or a mistaken assessment of one's needs, or which otherwise prevent a person from performing an adequate act of evaluation. The lack of such deficiencies is close to what is commonly termed mental health" (Strike, 1975, pp. 189-190).
But what of someone who simply lives his life in accordance with the dictates of desire, inclination, and spontaneous impulse, rather than being driven along by the sorts of irrational tendencies which characterise the mentally ill? The rationalists seem obliged to hold that such a person is heteronomous. Even if a person's wants, inclinations, and preferences could be regarded as his own in some sense, they would nevertheless fall under Dearden's notion of "factors which are, in a sense, in himself, but which are .. external to his activity of mind" (ibid.). Consequently they must be regarded as heteronomous causes of belief or action. One's wants and preferences comprise reasons for doing something, but not necessarily compelling or even adequate reasons. Often there will be stronger reasons for going against one's wants and preferences than with them. Certainly to simply act in a given way because one wants or prefers to, or believe something because it is comfortable, is contradictory to Dearden's notion of determining thought and action in accordance with one's own activity of mind. To think or act for such reasons is to be determined by an 'outside' cause.

Similarly, Peters claims that for action to be autonomous it must be 'authentic'. That is, there must be "some feature of a course of conduct which the individual regards as important, which constitutes a non-artificial reason for pursuing it" (1973, p. 124). Peters includes as 'artificial reasons', "extrinsic reasons provided by praise and blame, reward and punishment, and so on, which are artificially created by the demands of others" (ibid.). However, given that the autonomous person is one who thinks and acts in accordance with the weight of rational deliberation, then to think and act simply on the basis of wants, preferences, and inclinations
must be to do so for artificial reasons. Hence it is to fall under the control of a heteronomous cause.

We can make sense of autonomy as a kind of freedom here by appealing to a traditional metaphor of inner freedom. The autonomous person is free in virtue of his reason triumphing over the constraining influence of desire, impulse, prejudice, inclination, etc., in the determination of belief, values, and action. So while present day rationalists do not talk explicitly of a higher self which may be free from or subject to the control of a lower self, something of this idea must be at least implicit in their thought to the extent that they conceive rational autonomy as a kind of freedom from internal causes.

Where the notion of autonomy as a kind of freedom is made explicit is in relation to freedom from controlling influences that are external rather than internal to the individual. The autonomous person is a free person in the sense that his personality or character is not primarily a product of 'outside' controls: established practice, prevailing opinion, conventional values, and so on. He is free in that his thought and action is not imposed by his milieu - at least beyond the minimum of initiation into a socio-cultural tradition necessary for personhood. He is not 'glued up' by a socialisation process that prevents his questioning received or prevailing beliefs, values, and rules (c.f., Benn, 1976, p. 128). The autonomous individual may be subjected to considerable influence and pressure from his social environment, but he is not passive in the face of this. His mind is 'free' in respect of his rational, critical disposition: free from determination by opinions, beliefs, and norms which do not measure up against rational scrutiny; free to determine the content of his
thought and to shape his action in accordance with criteria which he has made his own. Through this freedom of mind he attains freedom of personality.

On the above view, emergence into autonomy is essentially a matter of emergence into rationality. So far nothing specific has been said here about the nature of reason and the conditions of its development. This task will be taken up in the next chapter, with a view to examining the relationship between development of reason and the social freedom of those 'undergoing' education aimed at development of rational autonomy.
CHAPTER FIVE

Rational autonomy and the development of reason.

Ever since Greek times there has been a dominant concern in Western thought with rationality as an aim of education. Plato laid the foundations of this rationalist educational tradition in his Republic. He argues that justice in the state and in the individual comprises the supreme ethical end. The whole point of education is, for Plato, to bring about justice. On his view the attainment of justice at both levels is inseparable from the development of reason. A necessary condition of justice in the state is that there is government by the wise - that is, the most rational. Similarly, it is a necessary condition of justice in the individual that reason govern spirit and appetite. While the details of Plato's educational position have often been rejected in subsequent thought and practice, his basic assumption has seldom been challenged: that education is essentially concerned with the development of reason. This is not to say that there have been no deviations at all from this view, but to suggest that so strong has been the commitment to rationality that alternative conceptions of education's central objective are just that: deviations. This commitment prevails in contemporary educational thought, and nowhere more so than in philosophy of education.

However it is far from clear what rationality consists in or how it develops. Views about the development of rationality are shaped by one's conception of rationality. One especially influential view of the nature and development of reason has emerged in recent philosophy of education. Hirst, Peters, Scheffler, and John White, in particular have done much to articulate this view of reason and its significance for education.
The general position they espouse has been widely accepted among contemporary philosophers of education. Indeed for many the soundness of this position would seem to be beyond question. Because of its powerful influence within recent educational thought I refer to it here as the 'standard' account. As far as my discussion is concerned the special significance of the standard account relates to the social freedom of pupils, for according to this view, the development of reason presupposes considerable restriction on liberty. Having defined autonomy in terms of rationality, proponents of rational autonomy as a key educational aim explicitly recognise that its development presupposes curtailing the social freedom of pupils in various ways (c.f., Peters, 1973; Dearden, 1968, 1972, 1975). They have therefore, an argument for limiting the liberty of pupils.

This present chapter falls into two main parts. In the first I will outline this influential account of rationality and consider one implication for the development of reason: namely, the necessity of certain forms of learning, understanding, and competency, for becoming rational. I will then suggest what follows for the social freedom of pupils if development of rationality conceived along the lines of the standard account, is accepted as an important educational aim. In the second part of this chapter I will sketch some grounds for considering a possible alternative conception of free persons as an educational ideal: one in which being free does not consist wholly, or even largely, in being rational - whether in the standard sense, or any other sense of "rational". Then in Chapter 6 I will construct an alternative conception of free persons as an educational ideal. I will not challenge here the position held by most proponents of rational autonomy regarding the nature and development of reason, although I believe the rationalist
position is open to question on this score too. Instead I will challenge their belief that development of free persons is primarily a matter of developing rationality. In my view a more plausible account of "free persons" can be provided than that which identifies freedom with rational autonomy. The argument in the second part of this chapter is advanced in support of this conviction.

Rationality: the standard account.

According to the standard account, rational belief and behaviour involves applying rules, tests, standards, and procedures, which are of a shared or public nature. These rules, tests, and the like are encapsulated within various public traditions. Awareness of them is not innate, and hence must be acquired through initiation into the public traditions in which they are embodied. Consequently, development of reason presupposes appropriate forms of learning.

Peters claims that we can conceive rational behaviour and belief as behaviour and belief which is

"Informed by general rules. It is behaviour and belief for reasons - and for reasons of a certain kind. Rational behaviour and belief spring from the recognition, implicit or explicit, that certain general considerations are grounds for action or belief" (1974, p. 121).

When we say that a person's belief is rational we mean that he has sufficient grounds to warrant his belief and that his grounds are of the right sort. In other words, "A's belief about X is rational", implies that there are considerations which are relevant and sufficient for establishing truth - or at least warranted belief - in respect of X, and A has based his belief on these considerations. Similarly, when we describe someone's behaviour as rational we imply that there are
considerations which establish appropriate behaviour in a given situation and that the individual has behaved in accordance with these considerations. In Peters' view the sorts of considerations which are relevant to determining truth or rightness in a rational manner are distinctively general considerations. The question is, what does Peters mean by "general considerations", and how does this relate to his claim that we can understand rational behaviour and belief as "informed by general rules"?

I find Peters' use of "general considerations" rather vague, hence errors of interpretation are possible here. I would suggest that depending on the decision in question, certain kinds of considerations are relevant. For example, when we are considering the moral value of an action or some proposed measure, considerations of human good and harm are relevant in a way that considerations of who gets some benefit, or who it is that does the harmful act, are not. In judging a given act to be morally wrong because it causes a good deal of human misery, one 'transcends the particular'. The act is judged morally wrong not because it is committed by some particular person, or because it harms a particular person, or because some particular person says it is wrong, but because it is the sort of act which causes harm to human beings. The doers of the action or recipients of the harm could be anyone at all without it making any difference to the judgment. Similarly, in assessing the soundness of a company policy or deciding what policy to adopt, considerations of returns on capital outlay would be relevant. In appealing to this criterion the company does not base its judgment or decision on particular considerations: for example, particulars of identity - the manager believes it should be done; or particulars of time - it is the policy now. To give another example, appeal to logical
validity is relevant in assessing a philosophical argument as a basis for belief in a way that appealing to the identity of the person who has advanced the argument is not. According to Peters, appeal to general considerations such as these is necessary for rational belief and behaviour. This is because relevance constitutes a norm of rationality, and considerations which are relevant to determining what is true, correct, or to be done, are general rather than particular in nature.

Peters' claim that considerations which are relevant to establishing what is right or true are general in nature, is bound up with the further claim that we can understand rational behaviour and belief as informed by rules. He holds that what counts as a relevant ground for believing X or doing Y is a matter established by rules. c.f., In reasoning,

"inferences made in choosing or forming an opinion, and arguments to justify one's action or beliefs, all tacitly invoke rules which mark out general considerations as relevant grounds" (Peters, 1974, p. 121).

Clearly, so far as we claim that a person's belief or behaviour falls short of rationality because it is not based on, say relevant considerations, we imply that there is some objectivity concerning what is and what is not relevant. That is, in relation to a given matter 'the relevant' can be distinguished from 'the irrelevant' with a fair degree of objectivity. This in turn implies the existence of criteria or guidelines for making the necessary distinction. These, says Peters, consist in rules.

Unfortunately this point is not clearly specified, hence some interpretation is required. To begin with, there are rules governing the meaning of concepts: to have grasped a concept, we are told, is to
have grasped the rules governing its application. Another way of putting
this is to say that in grasping a concept we learn to recognise what is
relevant to the proper use of that concept. Considerations of weight
but not of colour, temperature, shape, or sex, are relevant to the
proper use of the concept "heavy" or "heavier". Consequently our beliefs
and judgments about which objects are heavy or heavier are grounded upon
the general consideration of weight. To acquire our conceptual and
categorical schemes is to acquire something which is public or shared.
Anyone who appeals to colour or sex as criteria governing the use of
"heavier" can be judged as using the concept incorrectly. He fails to
meet public standards of usage. The publicity of language is the very
source of its objectivity - the rules of usage are public rules giving
objectivity to judgments of relevance established on conceptual grounds.

There is a whole further dimension to this idea of public criteria
which lend objectivity to determining what is relevant. In the first
place human beings participate in a wide range of practical pursuits
about which there is agreement concerning ends, procedures, and standards
of attainment: for example, cooking, building, farming, child-rearing,
enGINE-maintenance, and soil conservation. We may construe such pursuits
in terms of rules. That is, so far as there is public agreement about
the nature, or point and purpose, of a given activity, we may understand
this activity in terms of so many rules defining and governing
participation in that activity. Hence to appreciate what it means to
engage in a given pursuit is to appreciate the rules which define
participation in it. For example, in the case of soil conservation rules
defining the activity commit one to such things as reducing or preventing
erosion and retaining or restoring mineral balance and soil texture.
These are nothing other than general considerations which are relevant
to a rational assessment or determination of behaviour and beliefs relating to soil conservation. Besides such technical forms of pursuit, this model has been applied to moral endeavour: to the attempt to lead a moral life. For many people the pursuit of moral goodness is defined in terms of certain principles: utility; respect for persons; non-interference; justice or fairness; and equality. If this view is accepted, then the principles in question—or, 'rules' in a broad sense of the term—map out considerations which are relevant to rational appraisal and determination of behaviour and beliefs from a moral standpoint.

In addition humans engage in various theoretical pursuits of a public nature. Peters speaks of public traditions enshrining impersonal content and procedures (1965, p. 103); critical traditions which have emerged as man has attempted to make meaningful, and discover the truth about, his world. These critical traditions, or "systematic developments of reasoning" (Peters, 1974, p. 126), are exemplified in the academic disciplines: for example, science, history, philosophy, and mathematics. Philosophers such as Peters, Hirst, and Scheffler, conceive of these traditions of inquiry as rule-governed. To engage in scientific investigation is to follow those rules—principles of procedure, evaluation, and testing—which define "doing science"; "those principles by means of which evidence is to be interpreted and meshed with theory" (Scheffler, 1967, p. 132). To know what it means to do history is to be familiar with the public principles of historical inquiry. These principles, in governing procedure in science or history, function as objective criteria by which relevant considerations are established in these realms. The considerations in question are perfectly general in nature: appeal to a general law in the case of
science; the promotion of human good or harm in the case of morality; harmony of colour in art; strength of imagery in poetry and music; and so on.

According to Peters rationality has a public dimension not only in the sense that there are rules which mark out certain general considerations as relevant grounds. Rational deliberation involves what Peters calls the internalisation of public procedures, (or procedures of a public tradition), as well as the consideration of alternative points of view. If our ascriptions of rationality are to be objective we must have some way of assessing the strength or adequacy of the grounds on which belief and behaviour are based, and of settling disputes based on competing assumptions or different bodies of evidence. On Peters' view it is the existence of public procedures which makes this possible. The various critical traditions which man has evolved incorporate methods and tests by which evidence is evaluated, claims scrutinised, and theories assessed. We can, for example, distinguish valid from invalid forms of inference and apply this to people's thinking - whether within some established discipline or field of academic inquiry, or within ordinary thought about everyday topics. The procedure of hypothesis-testing employed in science can be utilised in everyday affairs. To give an instance, it is unreasonable to insist that the engine miss stems from a faulty sparking plug if no test has been run on the plugs, (especially if, say, there is a visible crack in the distributor case). Engine faults are traced by making an educated guess as to the cause and then employing the appropriate test.

In addition it is necessary to challenge one's own belief and practice by entertaining competing assumptions or points of view, and
advancing counter examples. On Peters' view a disposition to do such things is integral to developed forms of reasoning. One has not proceeded far toward holding rational beliefs if one has never considered possible counters to one's beliefs and played them off against each other. Peters claims that

"developed forms of reasoning, which involve criticism and the production of counter examples, can best be understood as the internalisation of public procedures and the different points of view of others. The individual who reasons in this developed sense is one who has taken a critic into his own consciousness, whose mind is structured by the procedures of a public tradition" (1974, p. 124).

It is worth noting how Peters' emphasis on the public features of reason - rules and procedures - enables him to account for other important characteristics of the rational person. For example, part of what we mean by rational belief and behaviour is that it is not arbitrary. Reason, says Peters, is opposed to any form of arbitrariness. For Peters the escape from arbitrariness is made possible by those public rules and procedures which provide an objective basis for criticism and evaluation. Some considerations can flatly be dismissed as irrelevant, and those beliefs and actions based upon them in turn dismissed as arbitrary and unreasonable. In other cases belief and behaviour can be charged with arbitrariness because no attempt has been made to assess the weight of evidence, truth of generalisations, or the validity of assumptions or inferences employed, by the use of tests and methods publicly acknowledged as appropriate for this purpose.

"Science is the supreme example of reason in action not just because of the opportunities for criticism which it provides, but also because of the agreement in judgments which it permits by means of its testing procedures. These guarantee objectivity and the escape from arbitrariness" (Peters, 1972, p. 61).
One final point. There is a common tendency to regard rationality as being purely a cognitive affair, a matter simply of possessing certain intellectual abilities: for example, to infer, demonstrate, and abstract. However one of Peters' main concerns in advancing his account of the nature and development of reason is to insist that in addition to the abilities aspect there is also an affective or attitudinal aspect to rationality. c.f.,

"Integral to the life of reason are a related set of norms with a range of correlative attitudes and concerns. What marks off rationality, as a level of life distinct from the non-rational, the irrational and the unreasonable, is the continual influence and interaction of these norms and concerns" (Peters, 1974, p. 125).

On Peters' view we must see certain attitudes as partially constitutive of rationality. The use of reason is not simply a matter of exercising certain abilities, for Peters claims that attention must also be drawn to the importance of specific motivations which accompany the abilities operating at this level of life (1972, p. 75). In addition to rational abilities there are, then, the 'rational passions': "passion" in the philosophical sense of some psychological factor that provides an inducement to act.

Peters argues that the use of reason is quite inexplicable without reference to these attitudes and concerns. (1) The overarching concern is for truth. Fully developed rationality, says Peters is characterised

1. c.f., "Without the attitude of impartiality, for instance, the individual could not concentrate on relevant considerations and counteract his inclination to favour his own point of view or that of someone to whom he might be attracted. He could not disregard the promptings connected with time, place and identity which, it has been argued, are among the main features of reason. For to use one's reason is to be influenced by this type of passion" (Peters, 1972, p. 63).
by an active inquiring and critical spirit - a determination to get at the truth. This general concern for truth encompasses a number of more specific attitudes and concerns. One such concern is for consistency, or the avoidance of contradiction in thought and action. The rational person feels compelled to remove any tensions that may exist between particular beliefs or sets of beliefs which he holds, as well as between beliefs already held and new (conflicting) evidence that comes to light. In addition he is concerned to derive only such conclusions as are consistent with the premisses on which his inferences are based. At the level of action there is, for example, a concern that appropriate means be adopted for the pursuit of chosen ends, and that one's behaviour be in accordance with rules and principles one acknowledges as proper guides to action. Other characteristic 'passions' include a concern for relevance, an attitude of impartiality, concern for clarity - for example, in stating and testing assumptions - and a concern for honesty - for example, in appraisal or interpretation of evidence (see ibid., pp. 75 - 76).

**Social freedom and the development of reason.**

While the above is at best a sketch of some aspects of the 'standard' account of rationality it is adequate for my immediate purpose: to consider what commitment to the development of rationality might mean for the social freedom of pupils. It has been shown that according to a number of influential educational philosophers, to think and act autonomously amounts to thinking and acting rationally. There is a tendency in current philosophy of education to equate the ideal of a free person with being an autonomous person. To the extent that development of autonomy is equated with development of rationality,
and the development of free persons with the development of autonomous persons, it follows that development of free persons consists in development of rational persons. To ask what commitment to development of rationality might mean for the social freedom of pupils is, then, to inquire into the relationship between "freedom" in the social sense and a notion of freedom conceived as a personality ideal. Assuming the standard account of rationality, I will argue that while development of rationality as a key educational aim is at least consistent with making some concessions to the social freedom of pupils, it nevertheless commits educators to severely curtailing pupils' liberty. Given the standard account of rationality, there are two aspects of rational development to be considered: development of the abilities integral to the life of reason, and development of the attendant attitudes and concerns.

Development of rational abilities.

I will begin by mentioning some ways in which commitment to development of rational abilities is either consistent with extending certain forms of social freedom to pupils, or at least involves preserving their freedom in significant ways.

Firstly, it is analytic that commitment to developing rational capacities is incompatible with indoctrination or any form of manipulation intended to place some belief or behaviour beyond inquiry or assessment by the victim. Indeed it is incompatible with any attempt to impose arbitrary limits on the pupil's conception or investigation of available options - whether of belief or behaviour. To impose restrictions on a person's conception of available options is to limit his social freedom (c.f., Ch. 2 above, pp. 75-76). This argument extends
also to limiting his capacity for investigating the range of available options. Hence commitment to rationality presupposes commitment to preserving a pupil's social freedom in these respects. The argument accounts for any form of manipulative teaching technique - from developing fear in pupils, to distortion of facts and elimination of relevant evidence in texts.

Secondly, development of rational skills would seem to be closely linked with allowing pupils generous opportunities to exchange ideas, criticise, and dispute points. Indeed if attempts to develop rationality in education are to be effective, it may be necessary to extend such opportunities beyond the limits often permitted in actual classroom practice. Pupils typically want opportunity to exchange ideas, air views, and be exposed to critical interchange, but are often denied this - for example, because of the exhaustive demands imposed on the teacher's time by a syllabus.

It might also be argued that development of rational abilities is consistent with opening up a much wider range of information sources and curricular activities than are typically available to pupils. c.f., how far are pupils permitted to study and discuss 'controversial authors' - for example, Mao or Marx - in courses within New Zealand schools, let alone positively encouraged to do so? Pupils often want to read material and engage in theoretical pursuits which fall outside an existing curriculum or syllabus. Hence to open up the range of information sources and curricular activities in accordance with pupils' interests would be to enlarge their freedom in education. However, while ample opportunity to exchange ideas, discuss, and criticise, does seem to be closely linked with development of reason, provision for a wide curriculum and extensive range of information sources may not be. That is, the
important thing may be the opportunity to exchange ideas and discuss, not the opportunity to do this within a wide curriculum and an extensive source of information and ideas. I can see nothing logically amiss in the idea of developing reason - at least on the standard view - through rigorous pursuit of a narrow curriculum. Nevertheless, development of rational abilities is compatible with 'freeing up' the curriculum and syllabus in the sorts of ways mentioned here.

Thirdly, it has been argued that development of rational abilities is consistent with, and indeed actually enhanced by, giving pupils genuine opportunities to experiment with alternatives. According to Strike, one characteristic of an environment which promotes rational autonomy is the provision of 'choice points': occasions where the individual is presented with a range of alternatives which are challenging yet manageable. They range widely, from simple problems for the young, to "free space for personal exploration and experimentation with different lifestyles for older adolescents and adults" (Strike, 1975, p. 190). The rationale here is derived from Mill: "The capacity for sound judgment, like any other skill, requires practice" (cited ibid.).

While Strike himself would probably wish to see a wide range of alternatives offered for experimentation by pupils, this may not be necessary. It might well be argued that the need to give pupils genuine opportunities to experiment with alternatives can be met within the narrow bounds of the traditional curriculum: c.f., which novels will I study, what period of history, which area of physics? As a matter of fact, proponents of the standard account of rationality are typically committed to the traditional curriculum as the way to rationality.

These are, then, some respects in which development of rational abilities is at least consistent with extending significant forms of
liberty to pupils. But of more interest to me here is the question of how far development of rational abilities calls for restrictions on the social freedom of pupils. An important point to be noted immediately is that proponents of the standard view are necessarily opposed to a conception of reasoning as the operation of mind in accordance with its own innate principles. Peters suggests that it is easy to conceive of reasoning as "the operation of a private gadget", or "the flowering of some inner potentiality" (1974, p. 124). Similarly, Hirst refers to a common tendency to regard the processes of rational thought as natural activities of the mind. That is, the mind is seen as a machine which by its very nature enacts processes of rational thought - for example, induction, deduction, abstraction - on ideas conveyed by the senses, "thereby building new ideas from what is given" (Hirst, 1974, p. 23). Of course such views are untenable if one admits the public dimension of rationality stressed in the standard account. Hirst notes that this is untenable and draws attention to the educational implication of his position.

"We must .... reject the notion that the mind naturally carries out certain mental activities according to the canons of valid reasoning, as if logical principles were laws of psychological functioning. The question of the development of the rational mind is not a question of the strengthening or habitualising of certain patterns of mental functioning. It is rather a question of developing a recognition that one's beliefs and one's arguments, the outcomes of thought, must satisfy important public tests. ... To say one has reasoned something out is not to describe a particular sequence of mental occurrences, it is to say that one has achieved in the end a relationship between propositions which satisfies the public criteria necessary for giving reasons. What is more, these standards that define the achievements of reason are certainly not natural possessions of mind. They have to be learnt, usually by dint of considerable hard work. The development of rationality is, therefore, not dependent on the exercising of particular mental processes, but is dependent on coming to recognise that there are tests of validity for one's arguments and tests of truth for one's beliefs" (ibid., pp. 24-25).
The obvious implication for education is that development of reason presupposes initiation into public traditions of theoretical and practical reasoning: that is, into rule-governed pursuits, theoretical or practical, where critical standards, tests, and procedures are 'writ large'. This has been construed as a demand for initiation into what Peters calls 'worthwhile activities', and Hirst "the forms of knowledge". To put it bluntly, the development of persons who are 'free' in virtue of being rationally autonomous is seen to presuppose a heavy engagement in what is essentially a traditional intellectual curriculum. In the light of my argument in Chapter 2 we can note some implications of this for the social freedom of pupils. I will look at three such implications here.

To begin with, the pupil must acquire a whole range of concepts and learn a specialised language associated with the critical traditions into which he is being inducted. This is an aspect which has been played down by some educational philosophers. For example, when Peters writes on the development of rational autonomy in 'Freedom and the Development of the Free Man', he makes only a very brief reference to conceptual requirements. This is in terms of "the categorial apparatus which is definitive of being a rational being or a chooser" (Peters, 1973, p. 128). This 'apparatus' involves the categorial concepts of "thinghood", "causality", "means-ends", and the like. But clearly much more than this is involved in, say, rational reflection on rules, which is Peters' central concern in this paper. There is for example, a range of concepts utilised in moral inquiry at the level Peters has in mind which simply are not part of the conceptual equipment of those not on the inside of moral discourse (c.f., the ideas expressed and the concepts employed by a Kohlbergian 'stage sixer'). The same is true of
mathematics, the sciences, literature and philosophy. An integral part of learning to reason in maths or philosophy consists in mastering the special concepts involved in these pursuits.

However it might be argued that acquiring the concepts involved in the public traditions of rationality is essentially a matter of acquiring language - that is, grasping the rules for the application of words or symbols - and hence may not properly be conceived as a restriction on pupils' liberty. As noted in Chapter Two, there are arguments which suggest that it is mistaken to conceive initiation into language as an infringement of an individual's social freedom. Might not some such argument apply here? - in which case, if a pupil's freedom is restricted by his initiation into public traditions of rationality it cannot be in respect of the conceptual component. Clearly the grounds of the arguments advanced in Chapter 2 do not apply in the present context. Firstly, it is not true that without the specialist concepts of the rational traditions a person cannot live a human life. Secondly, it is perfectly intelligible that someone might frame the desire not to acquire the concepts involved in science, philosophy, and morality, without already possessing these concepts. The situation is rather different here from that where an infant is being taught his native language. It is odd to think of a child who has no language whatsoever conceiving a desire to remain without language. For possession of the very concepts involved in conceiving a desire to remain without a language presupposes already having a language. However it is not necessary for framing a desire not to acquire the language of maths or science that one already possess this language. To put it positively, a person can frame and express a want not to learn such specialised languages without already understanding them.
To compel a child to acquire the language of maths is to impose a social constraint and hence to limit liberty. In accordance with the distinction drawn in Chapter 2, the constraint consists in compelling the child to learn the conceptual scheme, not, say, in preventing him from using the terms in his own way or expressing the ideas in his own terminology. It is not a restriction of anyone's freedom to correct his use of "fulcrum", "acid", "mass", or "counterpoint". Neither does it limit freedom to insist that the concept of the quantity of matter contained in a body be expressed by "the mass". When it comes to communication it is a matter of using symbols correctly. However it does restrict the pupil's freedom to require that he learn the conceptual schemes involved in various public traditions of rationality, since this is something children often want to avoid.

Secondly, initiation into "worthwhile activities" is not just a matter of acquiring the appropriate terminology and conceptual equipment. In addition there are the various public tests, procedures, and criteria to be mastered. A pupil involved in doing a scientific experiment or evaluating a novel is required to proceed in one way rather than another, employ specific tests in given situations, or to appeal only to certain criteria as grounds of evaluation. In other words, he may do some things but not others, employ some tests but not others, appeal to some criteria but not others. The requirement of the teacher may be supported by a reason. The question is whether in requiring pupils to proceed in a particular way, or in giving reasons for employing one test rather than another, a teacher limits a pupil's freedom.

The argument is the same as that for acquiring the appropriate 'language' of a discipline. Learning the language and learning the
procedures are just different components of the one enterprise: participation in a "worthwhile activity" or "form of knowledge". A pupil engaged in proving a theorem does not have his freedom limited by the demand that he proceed in a given way rather than in a manner of his own devising. To repeat, so far as a person is engaging in proving theorems the idea of wanting to try on some alternative method of his own is meaningless. To employ one's own method means that one is no longer proving the theorem.

However it is different if the pupils' idiosyncratic moves represent a preference not to engage in the activity at all. To require him to adopt certain procedures rather than others must now be given a different description. It is now a matter of compelling him to do something - make moves in geometry - which he does not want to do. Requiring the pupil to state axioms and make inferences is to limit his freedom, when seen under the description either of making him do something which it is typical for children to want to avoid, or of closing off from him other activities which children typically want to engage in. Once again it is not necessary to know how to prove theorems, or what is involved in making moves in geometry, to want not to participate.

The same point is reflected in the case of a teacher giving reasons for proceeding in a given way, thereby shaping pupil behaviour. In one instance the reason given for doing this rather than that may be in terms of the nature of the activity: that is, if you do that you will not control variable X and this must be controlled if the hypothesis is to be falsified. The force of this reason does not limit the freedom of anyone doing science. However in a second case the reason for doing this rather than that may be couched in terms of a teacher's power, or his right to punish: for example, when a pupil expresses a desire not to do
science. Questions of freedom automatically arise here since the requirement to do this/not do that must now be seen under a different description from "procedure in accordance with what it means to do science". The teacher has forfeited the rationale which renders questions of freedom meaningless in the context of doing science. There are, in other words, things children typically want to do rather than engage in activities required by a teacher on pain of punishment or through the exercise of power.

Finally there is the question of the whole range of unfreedoms created by the fact that certain conditions must obtain if the pursuit of rational skills is to proceed within an institutionalised setting. Given the operation of various factors in our society, it is inevitable that for practically all children initiation into the rational traditions must take place in schools. But an institution like a school can only perform its pedagogical function if there is a system of constraints to regulate the activities of its members within learning situations.

**Development of attitudes and concerns.**

Proponents of the standard account of rationality stress that initiation into public traditions of reason is a necessary condition of the development of abilities integral to rationality. Given their stress on the public dimension of reason they are driven to this position. The point is that given the analysis of "rationality" advanced by Peters, the philosopher is in a position to advance substantial claims about the development of rational abilities. However the matter is not so clear-cut when it comes to establishing the conditions under which the rational passions develop. There seems to be rather less of a
substantial nature that philosophers can say here. It would appear to be more the job of the psychologist. Indeed the question of what is presupposed in the development of the appropriate attitudes and concerns is scarcely raised by philosophers. Among contemporary philosophers of education Peters has paid the matter most attention.

In 'The Development of Reason', Peters offers a philosophical critique of Piaget's attempt to account for the motivational aspect of reason in terms of man's primitive dispositions to assimilate and accommodate. However Peters' major achievement here is negative rather than positive - he makes a number of objections on philosophical grounds to Piaget's thesis. While in a more positive manner he points to a number of philosophical difficulties which an adequate theory would have to account for, he makes no attempt to state what is required educationally for the development of the rational passions. Elsewhere, however, he is a little more positive. In 'Reason and Passion' he gives the impression that participation in rational pursuits is highly conducive, if not indispensable to a full development of these attitudes and concerns, although the foundation of such development is established prior to any engagement in disciplined study. He notes Ryle's account of those "disciplines" and "scruples" which characterise the level of thinking Ryle calls "intellectual work". According to Ryle, a person's thinking is subject to 'disciplines' when, for example, he strives to avoid personal bias, checks his facts thoroughly, aims for clarity and precision in presenting arguments, listens seriously to criticism, and so on. In such cases, says Ryle, a person's thinking "is controlled... by a wide range of quite specific scruples" (1972, p. 41). The quality of thinking with which Ryle is concerned is "the thinking which it is the business of schools and universities to train and stimulate. Students
there are being trained and stimulated to think like good mathematicians or good historians or good philosophers." (Ibid., p. 38). Ryle, then, links the development of attitudes and concerns integral to such high level thought with initiation into the disciplines. Peters describes this as a very good account of the development of rational passions. He suggests however that the development of these scruples through engagement in the disciplines builds on an attitudinal base which already exists. c.f.,

"surely these 'scruples' are more precise articulations of the more generalised passions which begin to exert an influence when reasoning of a less precise sort gets under weigh, when children's curiosity leads them to ask for explanations, when their early delight in mastery gradually takes the form of the determination to get things right, and when primitive constructiveness passes into the love of order and system. When children become concerned about what is really there, when they learn to delay gratification with realistic thought about the future, passions are beginning to take hold of them which later become more precisely differentiated in the distinct disciplines" (1972, pp. 76-77).

In other words, the effect of learning to participate in disciplined inquiry can only be beneficial as regards development of the rational passions. At the least it serves to "articulate more precisely" the passions inherent in lower level reasoning. But more positively it may maintain and strengthen a motivation for 'proper thinking' which could otherwise have subsided. That curiosity and determination to get things right which is a characteristic of many children often disappears in relation to thought by adulthood, when individuals become engulfed by competing pressures and concerns.

Finally, in 'Freedom and the Development of the Free Man', Peters explicitly acknowledges the importance of imposing certain restrictions on the social freedom of children if they are to develop an autonomous attitude toward rules. By an autonomous attitude is meant a concern
and disposition to reflect upon and evaluate rules in accordance with rational principles when it is appropriate to do so (c.f., Peters, 1973, p. 124). The rules in question are those which govern one's social life - and hence limit one's social freedom - not the rules constitutive of rational or disciplined inquiry. Adopting the Piaget-Kohlberg stage theory of moral development, Peters argues that if children are to attain an autonomous attitude toward rules they must first pass through the various sequential stages of moral heteronomy. Before the child can perceive rules as alterable conventions governing his social life and properly subject to rational principled assessment, he must first see them as connected with punishments and rewards, and later as ways of maintaining an order which is authoritatively ordained (ibid., p. 135). Children must pass from an egocentric moral awareness, through a conventional moral awareness before they attain a principled morality - which is partially defined by certain attitudes.

The practical implication of this is that children have to be exposed to a structure of authority and regulation - commands, rules, punishments - if they are to attain moral autonomy. In other words, they must be subjected to relevant unfreedoms - in the home, neighbourhood, and at school. Peters endorses the practice of Public schools which, "at their best", embody characteristics of the different stages of moral development in their general control system and the motivational assumptions supporting it (see ibid., pp. 134-135). However these practical recommendations are essentially based upon the findings of empirical research. They are not established on philosophical grounds; they do not follow necessarily from the standard analysis of "rationality". This must be kept in mind when considering the extent to which development of rationality presupposes restrictions on social freedom.
But even if we concede that philosophers are not in a position to say very much about the development of those attitudes and concerns integral to the life of reason and the implications of such development for the social freedom of pupils, it is nevertheless clear that given the above account of "rationality", development of reason does presuppose serious curtailment of liberty. This is in respect of the forms of learning which logically must be engaged in if one is to understand and meet the public standards of rational thought and action. It is not so much that children must attend school and submit to its distinctive control system and authority structure while pursuing a given curriculum over several years. No doubt the initiation could proceed in less institutionalised ways, thereby freeing the child from one particular system of constraints. The point is that the relevant learning and understanding must take place if reason is to develop, that this involves a lot of time and energy regardless of how and where it is undertaken, and that to require this form of engagement infringes against things children typically want. Development of reason presupposes wideranging constraints on wants independently of the specific context in which the necessary learning and understanding is fostered.

This is perhaps not too surprising if one recalls the origin of the rationalist conception of the free person. Precisely what Socrates and Plato were looking for was an ethical and educational ideal to counter what they saw as the widespread abuse of liberty coupled with ever increasing demands that the scope of personal liberty be extended far beyond what they regarded as justifiable limits. Their ideal of a free person was one who could check his pursuit of desires, who had an inner discipline based upon reason. To learn to be free becomes a matter of learning to discipline one's pursuit of desires. This process might well
be aided initially by imposing constraints to wants from without - at least common sense would intimate this. Indeed there is something paradoxical in the notion of encouraging development of self-discipline by encouraging young people in their natural tendency to do as they want. The point of identifying the 'real' self with reason was originally to throw into disrepute the 'lower' self which cries out for as much liberty as it can get for its realisation.

The rationalist ideal considered.

The claim that a key aim of education is to develop free persons is open to the charge of ambiguity. While people may agree that the development of free persons comprises an important educational end - if not the educational end - it is possible that they hold very different views about what constitutes a free person. This parallels a problem which has already been met in relation to talk of social freedom. I have noted that many attempts have been made to distinguish "liberty" from "licence", or 'true' freedom from what is not 'really' freedom. It was argued that these are probably little more than reflections of the values and preferences held by those advancing the 'distinction': "liberty" being used to denote those absences of constraint approved by the speaker, and "licence" those which he considers undesirable or unwarranted. This manoeuvre is a consequence of the assumption that social freedom is a great good. Most people do not want to be seen as enemies of freedom. But at the same time there are various restrictions on human activity which these same people wish to see imposed or maintained. Attempts have been made to alleviate this tension by building a normative position into the definition of "freedom". Now it would appear that something similar goes on when people talk about freedom comprising a personality ideal. Given the common assumption that freedom constitutes a desirable form of
human development, it becomes a matter of filling in the content of "freedom" with certain personality characteristics which one considers valuable. Naturally there will be some variance between people's values here. Consequently among those who maintain that education's central end is to produce free persons, agreement may be more apparent than real - due to the existence of radically different conceptions of free persons.

A fairly common reaction to the resulting ambiguity of the ideal is to ask which conception of the free person is the correct or real one. If it could be demonstrated that there is a single proper account to be given of "free persons" and that all other accounts are distortions or mere attempts at persuasion, the problem of ambiguity would be solved. However I doubt that this can be done - for essentially the same reason as has recently been advanced against the possibility of locating the true meaning of political-social freedom. It is a popular view among philosophers these days that liberty is best understood as a relation between different variables. To say that a person is free is to say that he is not subject to some constraint upon a want. Any attempt to define liberty in terms of a specific class of constraints or wants on the grounds that this captures the true or real meaning of liberty is taken to reveal a misunderstanding of the concept. Any want at all may be the subject of constraint. And any form of constraint attributable to human convention or contrivance can limit one's freedom.

The same seems to me to be true of "freedom" as a personality ideal. That is, to hold an ideal of free persons is to think in terms of constrained and unconstrained personalities or characters. The range of constraints and the modes of realisation or actualisation may be diverse - yielding very different accounts of the ideal, all of which are
intelligible as conceptions of the free person. For those who emphasise
the rational side of man, subjection to desires and emotions comprise
constraints to the expression or realisation of human personality and
awareness. Alternatively, those who emphasise the feeling and desiring
side of man would see subordination to reason as a constraint to self-
realisation or self-expression. The question to ask here is not, "Who
has captured the true concept of free persons?", but rather, "What are
the grounds for preferring one mode of personal development to the
other?" Moreover, it is not simply a matter or conceiving constraints
in terms of the traditional conflict between emphasis on the head as
opposed to the heart and belly: man as cognitive being, vs. man as
conative or appetitive being. The forms of inner constraint may be
conceived in terms of some wider ideal: e.g., the overthrow of
capitalism. For example, a Marxist might conceive of free persons as
those with a certain kind of awareness - they are not restricted by the
myths which imprison capitalist mentality. They see beyond the
rationalisation of capitalist institutions, through the mask spread
over reality by capitalist epistemology, and so on.

The immediate significance of this is clear. We are faced with
the possibility of competing conceptions of the free person which may
be advanced as ideals to be attained through education, and with no
basis for upholding one in particular as the proper conception. In other
words we cannot simply assume that rational autonomy is the only version
of "freedom" as an educational ideal. As a matter of fact, the great
weight of recent educational literature outside philosophy of education
proclaiming an ideal of 'free' development calls for something quite
different from the traditional emphasis on rationality and the practices
typically seen as necessary for development of reason. Given the
intensity and urgency of these pleas for a shift in emphasis away from commitment to a rational freedom, it behoves us to look at the rationalist ideal from a critical standpoint. Does it warrant the supreme value ascribed to it by many educationists? In the remainder of this chapter I want to sketch three grounds for withholding commitment to the rationalist account of "free persons" as denoting an educational ideal. First, it makes sense to think of a person being rational and yet unfree in important respects. Secondly, it can be argued that development of reason along the lines proposed in the standard account is actually enslaving rather than liberating. Finally, strong challenges can be presented to traditional lines of justification of rational autonomy as an ethical and educational ideal. I will take these in turn.

1. An individual may be rational and hence free in respect of a particular range of constraints, and yet be 'gummed up' because in the grip of a different set of constraints. Moreover for all his rationality the constraints to which he is subject may present severe impediments to the realisation of a personality ideal. Calling the rationally autonomous person 'free' directs attention to a range of constraints to which he is not subject: for example, domination by impulses, aversions, wishes, and desires; being captive to powerful and perhaps debilitating emotional states; being in the grip of prejudice or ignorance, (in the sense of being impressed by irrelevant considerations or invalid arguments, unable to detect inconsistencies and logical slips, or not even caring about truth); being manipulated or controlled by the beliefs, opinions, or demands of others. I agree that the more a person is subject to these sorts of constraints the less we would be inclined to regard him as having realised an ethical ideal. My point is that he may be free from these sorts of constraints and still fall short of an ideal of human
development which we may call "freedom" - because he is subject to other important forms of constraint. The overall picture presented by his condition may be such that we describe him as unfree, even though rational. This is obviously so if we attach great value to freedom from a range of constraints to which a rational person might nevertheless be subject. The constraints from which one might be considered liberated through reason are not the only constraints which can stand in the way of realising an ideal of human development. Moreover, according to some writers they are not even the most important constraints to be free from (see Marx, Fromm, Maslow, Rogers, Freire, and Illich).

Surprisingly enough, Plato offers a framework within which we can make sense of the idea that a person may be rational and yet unfree. He conceives of human nature in terms of three active elements or drives: reason, spirit, and appetite. These move us to activity - they are the motive forces behind the various pursuits we engage in. Reason moves us to the pursuit of truth and rightness. So far as one's life is spent in the attempt to discover truth and right, to avoid error in belief and action, one is moved by reason. Spirit moves us to mastery, success, or victory. It provides the necessary courage, determination, indignation, and the like, for achieving ends, overcoming barriers, and removing sources of grievance. Appetite moves us to enjoyment, pleasure, or satisfaction. It comprises both instinctive and acquired desires and tastes which demand satisfaction, and in the satisfaction of which we experience enjoyment, pleasure, or relief.

Plato's breakdown of human nature is not as important here as his thesis about the relationship between the different elements in a truly developed personality. For Plato the ideal form of human development,
and hence the aim of education, consists in what he calls "justice". Justice in the individual requires that spirit and appetite be in due subordination to reason, and also that each element of the personality be performing its own function in harmony with the others. It is this second aspect, the preservation of harmony or a balance, which is of interest to me here. Justice requires that a proper balance be maintained between the various drives - no one element may prevail at the expense of the others. Plato speaks of keeping all three in tune, (the harmony metaphor). The individual who maintains the right balance between reason, spirit, and appetite, "will in the truest sense set his house in order, and be his own lord and master and at peace with himself" (Republic, section 443). If the balance is lost the result is disunity within the individual, the loss of inner peace and mastery.

Of course Plato's particular fear was that either spirit or appetite might prevail at the expense of reason. He doesn't seem to consider the possibility that reason itself could get out of step. The point I want to suggest is that reason might indeed prevail at the expense of, say, the satisfaction of desires or of emotional release, to the point where tensions and frustrations develop and come to exert a constraining influence (possibly severe) within the individual's life. This seems to me to be a very real possibility, logically and empirically. Just as the drive to pleasure or the determination to succeed may get out of hand and result in frustration, inner conflict or tension, guilt feelings and the like, so too the concern for truth and justification might assume a disproportionate role in a person's life and bring with it a whole range of personality constraints. It will not do here to object that the rationally autonomous person will necessarily keep his concern for truth and justification within appropriate bounds - that is,
that someone who permits this concern to get out of hand is not really rational at all. I can see nothing in the idea of rationality outlined above to imply that the pursuit of justification for belief and action, the concern for truth and right, cannot become an over-dominating affair which prevails at the expense of other aspects of personal growth and fulfillment. As we have seen, the autonomous person is one whose beliefs, opinions, choices and decisions are his own because they measure up against his rational scrutiny. But surely there is nothing in this notion to suggest that the autonomous person necessarily strikes a balance between his rational, passionate and appetitive 'lives', and is thereby free from frustration, dissatisfaction, emotional blocks, or feelings of insecurity. I will suggest two possibilities here.

An exaggerated concern that one's actions be rationally justified may result in unduly denying oneself the satisfaction of wants. This is a strong possibility where someone distrusts desires as motives for action and has adopted a rigorous concern for rational appraisal. While it is important in many cases that we do evaluate our wants as grounds for action this is not always so. The result of subjecting all or most of one's wants to rational scrutiny may be that one misses important (legitimate) opportunities for want satisfaction. For example there is often an important time factor in the pursuit of wants, and by the time we have rationally evaluated some want as a ground for action the chance to satisfy it may be gone. The result of persistent denial of wants in this way may be the growth of frustration, or feelings of bitterness and resentment. It does not require an elaborate or devious psychological story to make sense of such inner conditions as powerful constraints to the realisation of a human ideal.
A second possible consequence of reason assuming too dominant a role is that one may lose the capacity for spontaneous or easy behaviour, becoming increasingly inhibited or 'gummed up' in situations in which one finds oneself. There are at least three forms that this could take.

(i) One's capacity to interact easily or comfortably with other people may be impeded if one is unduly concerned that talk and behaviour measure up to rational standards. The result of unnecessary reflection or deliberation before one speaks or acts in company may range from inappropriate seriousness to a 'clumsiness' of manner. In any case considerable discomfort in social interaction is likely to accrue. Given the importance we attach to social behaviour and discourse, such inhibition or discomfort can be construed as a significant form of personal unfreedom.

(ii) A loss of necessary spontaneity in decision-making or simple everyday activity may accrue. Many of the choices or decisions we have to make in our daily lives do not call for careful consideration or reasoned reflection. The appropriate action or alternative comes to us automatically. However it seems possible that the deliberative approach which accompanies an appropriate rational concern could spill over into contexts where it is counter-productive. In such cases a person may become cramped in his approach to uncomplicated situations where action, choice and decision should be more or less spontaneous.

(iii) Finally, it makes sense to think of reason encroaching on the domain of emotion, as when a person tries to cope at an intellectual level with a situation which calls for an emotional response. Alternatively it is not uncommon to hear of people who view emotional displays with disapproval or contempt because of the significance which they attach to
conditions of rational appraisal or response. Seeing emotional commitment and response as something which clouds judgment and encourages prejudice, they fail to appreciate that there is nevertheless an important domain within the lives of human beings where emotion must be given play. In other words, they maintain a calm, dispassionate approach in situations which call for some emotional response. A possible outcome here is the suppression of necessary emotional release. We are well aware nowadays that emotional tension may exert a powerful constraining influence in a person's life. We speak of people being tied in knots by pent-up emotions: unable to interact comfortably or even peaceably with others whom they should be close to, ill at ease with themselves, and in some cases even 'blocked' or impeded in their activity. The metaphor of being 'bound up' is particularly apt in such contexts.

Sometimes it is because people simply take rationality too seriously that they allow reason to get out of step with other aspects of personal development. They identify themselves too much with reason at the expense of emotion and desire. However I suspect that the imbalance is often a result of an individual's education: either because he has never been encouraged to develop emotional responses or give expression to his appetitive drive, or because his appetite and emotions have been actively suppressed by educators in the belief that they are obstacles to desirable forms of development: for example, rational development. It is this educational reality that makes it so important to recognise that the development of reason does not in itself constitute the only, or perhaps even the most important, form of 'free' development.
2. The above argument suggests that a person may be rational and yet unfree - because he is in the grip of a certain range of conditions which come between him and the realisation of an ideal mode of life or being. Nonetheless it is widely agreed that development of reason is at least one necessary aspect of the development or realisation of free persons, even though on its own it may not be sufficient. However there is a more damaging line of argument than this to the claims of reason as constitutive of human freedom. Put simply it is that initiation into rational pursuits and the development of a rational awareness along the sorts of lines proposed by Peters, is positively enslaving. It prevents rather than facilitates the development of truly free persons. There are several variations to this line of argument.

Part of what writers like Neill, Maslow and Rogers mean by "free persons" is that they are spontaneous, creative people - not necessarily producers of unique and great works, but creative "in the sense of being able to see things freshly, transcending accepted and conventionbound ways of seeing things" (Schmidt, op. cit., p. 51). Rogers suggests that a characteristic of the free person is that he has a sensitive openness to the world, having trust in his own ability to form relationships with his environment (c.f., 1969, p. 290). Such a person is one for whom the 'right' answers, understanding, and knowledge are not ultimately a matter of conformity to truth criteria established in disciplined modes of inquiry, but more a function of a personal meaningfulness which is to be understood in terms of meeting or satisfying the individual's deepest needs. His orientation to the world is not bound by procedures, assumptions, and conceptual schemes defined by rule-governed traditions of rationality. The acclaimed virtue of such a rational orientation
toward the world is precisely that it is objective and impersonal. It is a conventional approach to thought and action - conventional in the sense that it follows certain conventions rather than in the sense of being customary or typical, which it is not.

On the Maslow-Rogers view the free person has an orientation to the world, an approach to thought and action, which is subjective and personal. He is one giving expression to the unique self which he is in the process of becoming or actualising - a matter of effecting a harmony between his own needs (his self) and his environment. This attempt to attain a balanced satisfaction of needs is necessarily a subjective and personal affair, hence it cannot be bound or restricted by conformity to objective and conventional criteria. Meaningful expression of feeling, for example, will not always be attainable via the grammatical sentence, traditional conventions of art, or acknowledged forms of rhyme and metre. Even the very language of established forms of thought may be barriers to expression, awareness, and understanding. So far as one's conception of valid thought and right action is that of conformity to objective criteria, procedure, and norms, one is restricted - even prevented - from realising oneself. One is to that extent unfree because closed off from necessary conditions of attaining one's highest, or 'true' form of development. One's self is imprisoned within artificial boundaries imposed by the norms of reason.

It is not that one should never be confronted with publicly accepted standards of truth and norms of procedure in inquiry. Rather, the danger is seen to consist in the significance typically attached to these standards and norms, to a life lived primarily under their demands, and in the manner in which the child is brought into contact with them.
It is the attempt to pass on knowledge, truth, right action, meaningfulness, relevance, and validity as entirely an objective and impersonal affair, to divorce learning and inquiry from the individual's wants and needs, and to construe man as essentially a rational being whose highest form of development consists in rational excellence, that poses the educational danger as far as Rogers is concerned.

It seems to me that Rogers and Maslow would have to argue, though they tend not to argue, that when one attempts to define the ethical ideal, or to spell out the most significant form of free development, in terms of rationality, one adopts an unacceptable metaphysic. They would advance this argument whatever the particular conception of rationality may be which is conceived independently of a person's wanting, needing, and feeling self, and which is advanced as the essence of a developed human nature. Rogers, for instance, would appear to embrace a metaphysical position more like that of Hume than, say, Plato or Kant. That is, man is essentially a conative being whose rational excellence consists in the capacity of reason to facilitate the satisfaction of desires and needs. (Reason as slave of the passions.) c.f.,

"Man's behaviour is exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity towards the goals his organism is endeavouring to achieve" (Rogers, 1969, p. 291).

Rogers does value rationality, but he has a very different view of the nature and purpose of rational activity from someone like Peters.

I would suggest, then, that competing accounts of free development as an ethical ideal may assume different metaphysical underpinnings. In the light of this it is important in education to remember that meta-
physical positions are notoriously contentious and that the 'proof of
the metaphysical pudding' may well be in the 'educational eating'. It
is worth noting here that the conception of free persons embraced by
people like Maslow and Rogers is much more obviously compatible with
what are often called 'progressive' educational practices than is
"freedom" conceived as rational autonomy. Whatever we ultimately make
of this challenge to the rationalist position, the claim that develop-
ment of reason, conceived along the lines of the standard account,
comprises more of a threat than a contribution to free development can
certainly be articulated along the above lines.

The argument I have just presented is grounded in a very different
ethical position from that held by rationalists. For Maslow and Rogers,
freedom is not purely or even primarily a freedom of intellect. Develop-
ment of reason may subvert the development of a free person because it
presents impediments to a freedom in respect of wants and emotions. The
dispute here involves two very different ethical positions. However
there is an interesting variation to the argument that development of
reason along the lines of the standard account enslaves rather than
liberates people. This comes from within a rationalist ethic itself.
It is possible that someone who does conceive free persons primarily in
terms of an intellectual freedom might still argue that development of
rational autonomy on the model of Peters, Hirst, et al, actually impedes
the attainment of an intellectual or rational freedom. Two types of
argument may be advanced here: one conceptual, and the other based on
certain facts relating to prevalent educational practice. I will take
the conceptual argument first.

Peters' most explicit statement of how reason is to be developed
occurs in his paper 'Education as Initiation' (1965). Adopting Oakeshott's
terminology (see Oakeshott, 1962) he speaks of inherited public
traditions of reason which have their own distinctive 'languages', (the
customary procedures and standards defining the tradition), and their
own distinctive 'litteratures', (the attainments so far of people
working within these traditions). As a matter of educational practice,
development of reason involves initiating pupils into the 'language'
and 'litterature' of these inherited traditions. The initiation must meet
criteria of "voluntariness and wittingness" (Peters, 1965), otherwise
initiation would amount simply to indoctrination, or something similar,
which is incompatible with any defensible notion of a free mind. The
objective is to make the pupil an autonomous speaker of the various
'languages'. Now on this view the paradigm case of the free mind would
be presented by the scientist or historian working toward his own theses
within the established framework of procedures and standards adopted by
his predecessors. c.f.,

"The view I am recommending is that the conduct of the
scientist may properly be called 'rational' in respect of
its faithfulness to the traditions of scientific inquiry"
(Oakshott, op. cit., p. 103).

It is not clear to me that this is the only possible conception of
a free mind - one free to arrive at answers by way of traditional
standards and methods of reasoning. I would have thought that theorists
like Feyeraband see themselves as being in favour of the development of
free minds - the capacity for autonomous inquiry - and yet precisely
what they demand is a measure of freedom from traditional methodologies
and standards of reason. Kaufman claims that

"from the point of view of an autonomous person, prevailing
standards and practices, even if they happen to go by the
name of 'reason', are themselves the very sorts of things
that should be detached and, in some culturally non-profound
sense, examined" (1973, p. 53).
Academics are justifiably concerned to protect our rational heritage from an onslaught by 'cranks'. But it does not follow from such a concern that we must therefore only aim at promoting capacity to operate within established frameworks of inquiry. Were it not for autonomous thinkers in Kaufman's sense there might never have been a relativity theory of physics, a Marxist approach to history, or the Copernican Revolution in science.

On a further tack, Kaufman takes seriously Frankena's suggestion about the possibility of discovering "new forms of life, thought and action, new traditions, if you will, besides those we already have and include in our curricula" (cited ibid., p. 54). It is far from obvious that this is compatible with attainment of autonomy in the sense under consideration here. Indeed it is a necessary truth that so far as one wants to produce autonomous speakers of the various established rational languages, one is opposed to the development of autonomous minds in the sense which interests Kaufman. Development of reason in accordance with Peters' view is hostile to the development of free minds in the alternative sense presented by people like Kaufman. To attain Peters' aim is to deny Kaufman's contrary one.

A second argument here is based on facts relating to typical educational practice. It is not obvious what Peters would admit within his 'language' and 'literature' of inherited rational traditions. Would he, for example, admit a Marxist approach to historical explanation, and the literature of Marxist thought? Would existentialism fall within the compass of philosophy? Whatever Peters' answer to such questions might be, it is clear that schools (and universities often) have typically a very conservative interpretation of 'the rational traditions' - Indeed
not even all of the forms of knowledge acknowledged by Hirst are offered at New Zealand state schools: c.f., moral and religious inquiry. Kaufman claims that

"even when the traditional language and literature do contain outstanding examples of autonomous inquiry, the very processes of educational selection are likely to be influenced by gut-level cultural biases unless deliberate effort is made to avoid their impact" (ibid., p. 53).

I think it is fair to say that in New Zealand schools such an impact is apparent.

A side effect of curriculum conservatism is that we would probably not have competent teachers in some areas even if the scope of investigation were opened up - c.f., here the disquiet attending moves to introduce moral inquiry into secondary schools. If part of what we mean by "having a free mind" is that one's theoretical and practical deliberation is not unduly limited by the narrowness of one's educational experience, then given the facts concerning curriculum scope and emphasis, one might well argue that our commitment to the development of reason has the practical effect of impeding the development of free minds. Furthermore, the conservatism apparent in our approach to rational studies often has the effect of reinforcing a narrowness of mind which is a common side-effect of earlier socialisation and educational experience. To quote Kaufman again,

"The best way to educate for autonomy lies, then, not in rejecting traditional works but, at least in part, by carefully selecting from among them those works most likely to help a student win through to autonomy; that is, selecting those that pose the most thoughtfully radical challenge to prevailing modes of thought, feeling, and judgment" (ibid.).

This is precisely what we do not do under a model of educational practice which seeks a buttress in the rationalist tradition espoused by many contemporary philosophers of education.
There is a third version of the argument that development of reason along the lines of the standard account actually enslaves rather than liberates people. This derives from the considerable body of recent 'radical' literature impinging on education. People like Illich, Freire, and Marcuse appear committed to an ideal of free persons which presupposes the attainment of a particular quality of consciousness, awareness, and imagination. "Freedom" requires awareness of the dehumanising effect of dominant institutions of industrialised society - an awareness which breeds commitment to action toward a different way of life. In addition it requires imagination by which we may conceive of possible alternatives as goals to work toward, or which stimulates improved conceptions of an alternative social reality. Rationality, in a narrow sense, might be seen to constitute a powerful impediment to attainment of the necessary quality of imagination and awareness. I will try, briefly, to give some sense to this claim.

Firstly, the rational traditions present reality as essentially something to be discovered rather than evaluated and changed. The object of scientific inquiry is Nature - eternally unchanging. Critical inquiry in the aesthetic and moral domains also typically has the discovery of 'truth' as its object: c.f., "which interpretation is the most accurate?", "Which theory of morality involves least contradiction?". By and large, works of art, interpretations of such works, and moral theories, are rarely adopted within education as tools against which to evaluate the world in which one lives. It is much more common for these to provide in themselves the focus for criticism and evaluation.

Next, rational inquiry is seen to demand subjection to an impersonal, abstract authority - an authority 'outside' the individual. Peters talks of "taking the critic within" as a cardinal rational virtue. A problem
here is that we can become over-sensitive to the critic within; a condition which readily produces a stultifying effect on thought. One's vision may become increasingly microscopic as intense effort is made to avoid error, counter-example, contradiction, and incoherence.

In addition, rational inquiry would appear to be largely confined within conceptual frameworks intrinsic to the various rational traditions. These impose a particular and distinctive world-view, thereby restricting one's perception of reality within defined limits. To deny that one's perception of reality is not thereby constrained would involve denying that alternative world-views are possible. This is not an easy view to defend. According to Marcuse,

"The new sensibility and the new consciousness which are to protect and guide... reconstruction [of social conditions and relationships], demand a new language to define and communicate the new 'values' (language in the wider sense which includes words, images, gestures, tones)" (1969, pp. 32-33).

The other side of this coin is that many of us may require liberation from the conceptual frameworks of reason in order to conceive new values.

It may be argued that these features of reason have a tendency to protect the status quo. Critical inquiry is narrowly channelled. We end up assessing other people's arguments, theories, and explanations, checking for internal consistency and logical validity. I do not want to suggest that these are trivial matters. They are not. Any pursuit of truth, right, and good must pay attention to such matters. What I am suggesting is that we often tend to see such concerns as the ultimate end of inquiry. In so doing we may get bogged down a whole step away from the level of awareness and commitment required for freedom: for example, freedom from unquestioning commitment to institutions which deny and violate claims for fulfillment of the human organism (c.f., Marcuse, p. 27).
We are confronted with the uses to which the fruits of reason have been put in, say, applied science. These include warfare, protection of class interests, surveillance of individuals, supersonic travel, nuclear energy. Here are applications which cry out for evaluation. But the narrow kind of rationality fostered in so much contemporary education, including philosophical ethics, is not well-suited to performing this evaluative task. Certainly it is not the scientist's job qua scientist to do so. In the absence of effective evaluation, existing practices continue without systematic or elaborate opposition. And often where there is opposition, it is hampered by a limited conception of viable alternatives - itself quite possibly a by-product of our dominant emphasis in education upon development of an academic kind of rationality. "The most daring images of a new world, of new ways of life, are still guided by concepts, and by a logic elaborated in the development of thought, transmitted from generation to generation" (ibid., p. 29).

3. I turn now to my third and final ground for withholding commitment to the rationalist account of "free persons" as denoting an educational ideal. This involves arguing that strong challenges can be presented to traditional lines of justification of rational autonomy as an ethical and educational ideal. Three approaches to the justification of rational autonomy as a key ethical and educational ideal - and for many people it is the ideal - recur in Western thought. The first is that in the exercise of rational judgment a person is being truly human; he is fulfilling himself because realising his natural function as a human being. Secondly, the importance of rational autonomy has been argued on the grounds that moral excellence consists essentially in being autonomous. Finally, it has been argued that the exercise of autonomy is such an important source of human satisfaction and happiness as to warrant
accepting the growth of personal autonomy as the aim of education. Significant challenges can be advanced against each of these attempts at justification.

The first approach goes back to Greek ethics.\(^1\) In Greek thought the notion of goodness was commonly related to that of function. Something is good to the extent that it performs its function well. This idea is part of our ordinary thinking today. A good axe is one which chops wood effectively, a good rifle is one which shoots accurately. This idea works well enough for the valuation of things which have established uses. We extend it quite happily to animate entities when we have some particular role in mind. Hence we ascribe goodness to Joe as a sheepdog, to Nell as a carthorse, and to Mr. Brown as a dentist. We have rather more difficulty, however, when we think of dogs, horses, and humans independently of a particular role. That is, what is the function of a dog, horse, or human being \textit{per se}? So far as we consider them as ends in themselves we baulk at the notion of their having a function, in the sense of being useful relative to someone's purposes. Moreover, the question, "What is the use of a man just as man?"\(^2\), seems odd - a point which did not escape the Greeks.\(^2\)

According to Taylor, the Greeks held that there are such things as good persons and that this goodness is somehow related to their function as persons. They avoided the above sorts of difficulties and oddities attaching to talk of 'function' by advancing a different notion of human function from that of mere usefulness. The function of human beings \textit{qua}

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\(^1\) The account here borrows from Taylor, (1970), Chapter One.  
\(^2\) Certainly it did not escape Aristotle.
human beings became for the Greeks a matter of distinctiveness or uniqueness. The question, "What is the function of a man, simply considered as a man?", assumed in Greek thought the form: "What is distinctive of human beings simply as human beings?" (c.f., Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 7). For the Greeks it was man's reason which distinguishes him from the rest of nature. Man's distinctive function *qua* man is, on the Greek view, the exercise of reason. They conceived of the good life for man as a life lived under the demands of one's reason. This is precisely the life of the autonomous person according to the conception of autonomy outlined above. The equation of human function - or 'essential humanity' - with reason has subsequently dominated Western thought. As we have seen, in Kant's view it is man's capacity to give himself the Moral Law by his reason which requires that he be treated as an end in himself. The distinctively rational nature of man is an idea deeply ingrained in educational thought today. To opt out of the rational way of life is widely acknowledged as 'falling down on the job' as a human being. Taylor suggests that "to describe man as rational but without goodness, or as noble and good but bereft of reason, would seem to most men today paradoxical" (*ibid.*, p. 8). Rational autonomy has, then, been justified as an ethical ideal - even as the ethical ideal - on the grounds that in living such a life a person realises his function as a human being: he is truly being a person.

An objection may be raised here. There is no unnecessary reason why distinctiveness should be made the condition of "human function", and hence the criterion of living the good life. It might just as plausibly be argued that since our bodies are constructed par excellence for the experience of pleasure, man's function consists in the pursuit of pleasure. There is undeniably a drive to pleasure operating in human
beings - a fact well appreciated by Plato. The ironic thing about talk
of man's distinctiveness, and hence his function, in terms of his
rationality is that in most people a drive to reason and truth is
conspicuous by its absence - hence the need to educate them. Of course
the existence of this fact does not on its own destroy accounts of
"function" in terms of rationality. It merely suggests that on one
particular account man's function consists in something he has
relatively little inclination toward.

The pursuit of pleasure is not distinctive to human beings since
other animals experience and pursue it. But to repeat, there seems no
necessary reason why pursuit of pleasure is ineligible as a candidate
for man's function simply on the grounds that this pursuit is not
distinctive of human beings. The supporting argument here is quite
simple. Let us suppose that rationality may not be distinctive of human
beings. Would it be true that if we found another species of rational
being the good life for man would no longer be a life lived under the
demands of one's reason, because of this fact? That is, would it be true
that because reason is not distinctive of man the good life for man is
therefore not a life of reason? This would be a very odd thing to argue.
If the good life for man does consist in a life of reason it cannot be
because reason is distinctive of man. This is not to say that one cannot
adopt a metaphysical position in which man's function is related to his
rational potential. But if one does adopt such a position it must be
recognised for what it is: namely, a particular metaphysical position
which is in competition with other metaphysical positions. A rationalist
metaphysic has neither an exclusive nor a prior right to our support.
We should at least consider alternative metaphysical positions, and
accounts of ethical and educational ideas consistent with them.
Many theorists argue that the capacity for moral judgment and morally good action is essentially a matter of rational autonomy, hence the development of moral competence is a matter of developing autonomy. Occasionally they attach some significance to the role of attitudes and sentiment within moral judgment and decision making. But even when this is admitted, they nevertheless present moral awareness and sound moral judgment as being primarily a rational affair, calling for high level rational skills. This view is common among educationists caught by the Piaget-Kohlberg approach to morality and moral development. Because of the widespread commitment to this view, it is important to recognise that alternative positions have been advanced. If an alternative account of moral development in which development of autonomy is not paramount is preferable, one common justification of rational autonomy as a key ethical and educational ideal is thereby undermined (c.f., Frankena, and Gewirth, op. cit.). Rousseau and Hume, for example, provide accounts whereby the foundation of moral judgment and action is located in emotion or feeling rather than reason; where the emphasis in moral judgment and decision making is placed on the possession of relevant feelings rather than high level rational skills.

In *Emile*, Rousseau takes the precept, "Do unto others..." which he clearly conceives as the essence of moral goodness, and provides it with a thoroughly non-rationalist foundation. c.f.,

"The precept 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you' has no true foundation but that of conscience and feeling; for what valid reason is there why I, being myself, should do what I would do if I were someone else, especially when I am morally certain I shall never find myself in exactly the same case; and who will answer for it that if I faithfully follow out this maxim I shall get others to follow it with regard to me? The wicked takes advantage both of the uprightness of the just and of his own injustice; he will gladly have everybody just but himself. This bargain, whatever you may say, is not greatly to the advantage of the just. But
if the enthusiasm of an overflowing heart identifies me with my fellow creatures, if I feel, so to speak, that I will not let him suffer lest I should suffer too, I care for him because I care for myself, and the reason of the precept is thus found in nature herself, which inspires me with the desire for my own welfare wherever I may be. From this I conclude that it is false to say that the precepts of natural law are based on reason only; they have a firmer and more solid foundation. The love of others, springing from self-love, is the source of human justice" (Emile, pp. 196-197).

This account squares nicely with much of our ordinary moral experience. In what is probably the great majority of cases, doing the morally right thing is not a matter of careful deliberation, gathering and weighing evidence, and considering a range of possibilities. Most often good moral action is simply the outcome of a commitment to considering the interests of others, rather than appealing purely to one's own wants as a basis for action. Now Rousseau has to tell a much less complicated, (and more plausible) story to explain such commitment than does, say, Plato or Kant. Human sympathy is not a rare phenomenon - though perhaps more rare than we may desire. Given the sort of thing that sympathy is, we can easily appreciate why someone possessed of sympathy considers the interests of others and, accordingly, acts well toward them. It is not so easy to accept explanations in terms of perceiving the Form of the Good, or being filled with awe and reverence upon discovering the Moral Law.

It is important to note that Rousseau's account does not mean that reason has no part at all to play in the moral life. In some cases a moral decision will be better or worse depending on one's ability to take account of relevant facts, weight evidence accurately, and so on. However if something like Rousseau's account is accepted it places the educational emphasis in a different place from a position more like Kant's. Moral education or development will primarily be concerned with
the development of human sympathy and co-operation - extending self-love outward - rather than with the improvement of reasoning à la Kohlberg. This naturally has important implications for educational practice, and indeed for the social freedom of pupils.

I want finally to challenge the claim that the exercise of rational autonomy is such an important source of human satisfaction as to justify its development as a key educational ideal. Unfortunately the two objections I have in mind would benefit from a more detailed development than space permits here. Firstly, while on some accounts of "personal autonomy" it may be true that its exercise is a major source of human satisfaction, I am far from convinced that this argument holds for the intellectualist conception of autonomy under consideration here. In its mostly highly developed forms, the exercise of rational autonomy consists in arriving at beliefs and modes of action which one accepts as justified on the basis of rational deliberation, or in accordance with rational criteria. To a large extent the satisfaction which accrues from exercising such autonomy is intellectual in nature. The individual engages in the battle to uncover truth and right, and so far as he succeeds in attaining some victories he derives intellectual satisfaction. He experiences delight at the achievement of a tidy proof or a knock-down argument, at locating the source of error in an inference, or in arriving at a coherent overall position. I am not asserting that this is the only kind of satisfaction which might accrue from the exercise of rational autonomy. For instance, a different kind of satisfaction might derive from applying the fruits of one's rational deliberations to the practical world, thereby adding material benefit or comfort to one's own life, or improving the lot of other people, or adding to the esteem in which one is held by others. However I suspect
that by and large the satisfaction or sense of fulfillment experienced will be intellectual.

My objection here is that many people may gain little in the way of satisfaction from an education aimed primarily at development of rational autonomy, because they do not find satisfaction in the forms of achievement which such autonomy affords. They may prefer to simply absorb a good proportion of their beliefs, opinions, values, and practices from others, if this enables them to get on with a life of action or engross themselves in a time-consuming cause other than pursuit of truth. Ideally they would think at least sometimes through for themselves and engage in evaluative inquiry under certain circumstances. But for them, preparation for a fulfilling life might be hampered rather than facilitated by an education aimed primarily at the development of rational autonomy.

A second and related objection is that when it seems most plausible to think of the exercise of autonomy being a source of satisfaction, the autonomy which is exercised does not always strike one as the sort of thing which demands rigorous initiation into rational traditions as its prior condition. When Mill claims that "in proportion to the development of his individuality, (for which we may read "autonomy"), each person becomes more valuable to himself", he is not thereby committed to the development of rational autonomy - at least along the lines being considered here. In the same paragraph Mill says,

"It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it, and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified and animating" (1962 edn., pp. 120-121).
A person's individuality may consist in his having and expressing beliefs, opinions, values, and goals which he has arrived at on the basis of sophisticated rational inquiry. However it may equally consist in a life of spontaneous activity and creative endeavour which is to no significant extent based on serious rational deliberation or reflection. We can properly speak of that which is individual in a person without implying that it is an expression of a developed rationality. Dearden, having suggested that the exercise of autonomy will be a source of considerable satisfaction, argues as follows:

"The accomplishment of what we want or intend, under the description embodied in the intention, is necessarily a satisfaction, and our satisfaction is the greater the more there is of what we intend in what we accomplish. Empirical substantiation of this is abundantly available in human action from the earliest years. Even the youngest children enjoy 'doing it for themselves' and resent being 'bossed'. They want to be fully present in their action as agents, rather than to be simply the executors of the will of others. As well as feeling satisfaction in the exercise of autonomy, there is also a pride, which is an emotion characteristically felt towards something which can be seen as an accomplishment of our own" (Dearden, 1972, p. 460).

This rings true. The important source of satisfaction derives from the experience or perception of oneself as author or originator of one's achievements. However this does not presuppose, but indeed negates, the model of rationality and education upheld by many proponents of rational autonomy. It must negate this model if young children are capable of experiencing the sort of satisfaction in question. Giving the 'rational nomos' to oneself is one sense in which a person may escape being "the executor of the will of others". But it is not the only sense. Such liberation and the sense of satisfaction it brings would seem to be very much the outcome envisaged in the educational positions advanced by, say, Neill and Rogers.
While I have not addressed the question of how far and in what way social freedom is a good thing, it is a fact that in societies like our own people value freedom highly and will often go to great lengths to avoid coercion. In many cases they believe that liberty is as valuable to young people as to adults. Hence it is an evil to limit the freedom of young people — although, as in the case of adults, it may sometimes be a necessary evil. The presumption, however, will be in favour of allowing all people, children included, as much social freedom as can be justified. Given the extent to which development of rational autonomy, (along the lines examined here) limits the freedom of pupils, to adopt rational autonomy as the central educational ideal is hostile to something which many people see as a crucial component of the good life. Taking this common, but unexamined, commitment to social freedom along with the arguments advanced in the second part of this chapter, I submit that there is justification for considering the possibility of an alternative conception of free persons comprising an important aim — if not the central aim — of education. In the following chapter I will attempt to articulate an alternative educational ideal of free persons.
CHAPTER SIX

Toward an alternative view of 'free' persons.

As we have seen in Chapters Three to Five, philosophers conceiving freedom as a desirable form of personality development often see this as consisting in some form of rational excellence. However the possibility I want to consider in this chapter is whether an ideal of free persons might be articulated in terms of wants and emotions rather than reason.

A rationalist bias dominates contemporary philosophy of education. Someone reading in this area might be excused for gaining the impression that there has never been any serious attempt to articulate an ideal of free persons which does not consist essentially in being rational. Mention of an alternative possibility is almost non-existent. Indeed the prevailing mood of recent educational philosophy is hostile to the assumption that a non-rationalist alternative might be possible. The educated person has been largely defined in rationalist terms. For Peters, an individual who has been educated possesses knowledge and understanding, cognitive perspective, and is committed to the standards of rational inquiry. For Peters, then, it is an analytic claim that rational values lie at the very heart of what it is to be educated, and hence of what it is for something to be an educational process or activity. Because the link between the ideal of an educated person and rational values is conceptual it cannot be broken, for example, by appeal to metaphysical or valuative grounds. Peters' view has been extremely influential in recent educational philosophy, and where philosophers identify freedom as a key educational ideal they often treat the central place of rationality in the idea of free persons as beyond question. It is this conviction that I want to challenge here.
As a matter of historical fact there is a long-established tradition of thought about freedom as a human personality ideal in which the emphasis is not on rationality. Indeed this alternative position has possibly an even longer history than that of its rationalist counterpart. There are intimations of this other ethical view of freedom in my sketch of the hero of Classical Greek tragedy (see Chapter Three). The tragic hero achieves freedom by remaining true to his own personality - his 'self' - in the face of Fate. His judgment, willing, and action remain an expression of his core self even in the face of overwhelming opposition or the most adverse circumstances. In other words, his core self continues to provide guidance and direction for his life and to be expressed and fulfilled in his action. Since he is not controlled by external influences, he is free. On this ancient account of "the free individual" there is no suggestion that free action, judgment, or decision is essentially rational because there is no concern to identify an individual's core self with rationality. Kaufman's account of "the core self" is illuminating here. According to Kaufman,

"a person's core self is that constellation of relatively deeply rooted, important dispositions, knowledge of which helps us to anticipate and explain his actions over a relatively extended stretch of his total behaviour" (Kaufman, op. cit., p. 49).

Rationality was not a central concern in the Classical tragedies. However freedom was - freedom as a personality ideal. The tragedians addressed at length the problem of how, if at all, the individual could live his own life or be free given the determining power of Fate. In achieving freedom, in realising himself rather than succumbing to external forces, the tragic hero was seen to attain the highest end of which human beings are capable. But this was not seen to consist in rational excellence. Similarly, as noted in Chapter Three, Plato
was aware that many of his fellow Athenians were committed to a non-rationalist view of freedom as an ethical ideal. Plato refers to this as the notion of democratic character. He responded to its popular appeal by arguing that democracy, while a coherent notion, does not denote a worthwhile ideal of human development. According to Plato, it refers to a mode of development which appeals only to unreflecting individuals. However it would seem to be true that for many Greeks at the time democracy was seen to constitute an ideal personality type.

Philosopher and layman alike acknowledge reason as a key aspect of human nature. It has been widely regarded as the defining feature of human nature: reason is what marks man off from the rest of nature. In exercising his reason man frees himself from certain forms of control or influence to which other animals are subject.

Reason, however, is not the sole component of human nature. Humans have wants or desires as well as reason. Taylor claims that while psychologists and metaphysicians may hold different theories as to how this fact of human nature is to be explained and understood, the fact itself is beyond dispute.

"It is more obvious that men are .... conative beings than that they are rational ones. There are men whom one might genuinely doubt to be rational, but it is doubtful whether anyone has ever seen a living man whom he suspected had no needs, desires, or wants. Such a man would be totally inactive and resemble a statue more than a man" (Taylor, op. cit., p. 120).

Besides having wants humans also experience emotions. They feel angry, happy, anxious, peaceful, jealous, loving, sad, and so on. Taylor might well have added that it is doubtful whether anyone has ever seen a living man whom he suspected felt absolutely no emotion. Such a person would also surely resemble a statue more than a man.
We may, then, see man under the description of a rational being, since this is an indisputable aspect of human nature. But he may also be seen as a wanting and feeling being. Throughout the history of ethics it is the view of man as a rational being that has overwhelmingly been taken as the basis of accounts of the desirable form of human development. In philosophy, those who link a view of the ideal form of human development with man's status as a possessor of wants and emotional states have always been a minority. My intention here is to try and offer a corrective to what I perceive as the excessive concern of educational philosophy with rational development. Perhaps if we begin from this second view of man, as a wanting and feeling being, we may end up with an alternative conception of "free persons" to that presented by rationalist philosophers of education. This is the possibility I will explore in this chapter.

Metaphorical uses of "freedom".

Philosophers have often noted that use of the term "freedom" to denote a condition or type of human personality is metaphorical. T.H. Green claims that

"every usage of the term to describe anything but a social and political relation of one man to others involves a metaphor ...... Reflecting on their consciousness, on their 'inner life' (i.e., their life as viewed from within), men apply to it the terms with which they are familiar as expressing their relations to each other" (1948, p. 3).

Similarly, Feinberg, in spelling out what is meant by talk of autonomous individuals, refers to that "elaborate parapolitical metaphor which since the time of Plato has so coloured our conception of the human mind" (1973a, p. 15). The extended use of "free" and "freedom" to capture a quality of personality or a level of personality development gets a grip
by analogy with social-political circumstances and relationships in the world 'outside' the individual: the existence of rules, regulations, penalties, relationships of control, coercion, compulsion, etc. To offer an account of "free persons" requires, then, at least that one give metaphorical force to the idea that constraints are absent within a human personality.

Metaphorical uses of "freedom" in relation to types or conditions of personality get a grip by analogy with the following notions in particular. (1)

(i) The autonomous state. An autonomous state is one which is independent of governing control by another state. It is self-governing or self-determining. A state which is a colony of another lacks autonomy: it is not the maker of its own laws, the director of its own statehood.

(ii) A free society. By this is meant a society where individuals are left to go about their own affairs without hindrance (by controls, regulations, compulsions, etc.), so long as their activities do not limit the like freedom of others. Commitment to a 'free' society is grounded in the hope that people will set about forging satisfying lives for themselves in harmony with one another - will find ways to promote their own good or happiness without impinging on the attempts of others to promote theirs. Opportunity to forge a satisfying way of life for oneself, free from pushing and pulling by authorities, regulations, and other people generally, constitutes a supreme value for supporters of a free society. The ideal breaks down to the extent that encroachments occur - where incompatibilities and conflicts arise between individuals and groups within the society; when fulfilling the goals or wants of

1. This has been suggested to me by Dr. Ivan Snook, Education Department, University of Canterbury.
one person or group means thwarting or impeding fulfillment for others. At this point constraints may be seen as necessary to preserve the possibility of individuals effectively pursuing their own good.

(iii) Socially free individuals. This is the idea of individuals who are free in the sense that nobody is impeding them in getting what they want.

I will consider in turn the analogies yielded by these three ideas as a method of working toward an alternative account of "free persons".

1. The analogy with the autonomous state.

Firstly, the notion of an autonomous state yields by analogy that of an autonomous individual. Earlier discussion has suggested the nature of the analogies involved in a rational autonomy. At least three analogies may be identified.

(a) Reason is set over against other aspects of human nature and is identified as the 'true', 'real', or 'higher' self of the person. When reason has governing control over the appetite and the passions the individual's self governs: the person is self-governing, or autonomous.

1. One point worth noting here is that while the notion of an autonomous individual is usually spelled out as a personality ideal I can see nothing in the literal sense of "autonomy" which necessitates this. There is nothing in the idea of an autonomous state to suggest that it is a good thing for states to be autonomous, or that the style of governing must be good or beneficial. Uganda is an autonomous state. So was Nazi Germany. So long as a state makes its own laws, frames its own policies, directs its own affairs, it is autonomous - regardless of the quality of its laws and policies, or the desirability of the affairs it directs. By strict analogy it would seem sufficient for being an autonomous person that one's beliefs, values, decisions, goals, and the like be relatively free from determination or controlling influence by others - at least in the sense that one does not believe, value, or act as one does just because others behave or act in this way, expect one to, or pressure one to. On this view of autonomy there is no need for the thought and action of the autonomous person to be 'good'. However in the philosophical and educational literature, where "autonomy" does generally refer to something considered valuable, the notion of judgment, belief, or action being one's own is often spelled out in such a way that it is good judgment, sound belief, and desirable action.
(b) According to a Kantian line of thought, rational explanations (for example, of a person's actions) are logically distinct from causal explanations. So far as we see ourselves as acting in accordance with pure reason we logically cannot construe our actions as heteronomously caused - that is, as being the effect of some causal antecedent external to ourselves. Through the exercise of pure reason the individual in some sense 'puts himself beyond' causation by something outside himself. In this case the rational agent is his own cause, which is to say that he is self-determining.

(c) So far as one's beliefs, values, and conduct are rational, one has worked them over for oneself on the basis of impersonal criteria and standards. To this extent one cannot be said to be the product of another's will, unlike the conditioned or indoctrinated individual. By analogy with political circumstances, one is not the 'puppet' of some other power.

While virtually all contemporary accounts of 'autonomy' as a personality ideal are conceived within a rationalist framework, I can see prima facie no necessary reason for this. In the first place there is no necessary reason why the 'true' self should be identified with rationality. I take it that a metaphysic like Hume's would entail that something other than reason constitutes the real self of persons. At any rate it is not unintelligible to identify the self with wants or desire. If this move were made, autonomy could be seen to consist in government by one's wants rather than one's reason. Of course so far as one is defending this view of autonomy as a desirable ideal, it will probably be necessary to qualify in some way the wants that constitute the self. Surely, many people will ask, it can't be any wants at all
that constitute the self. The prevalent conception of human wants is that they are not to be trusted as ultimate determiners of action, for many of our wants would have undesirable effects, if acted on.

One theorist who has acknowledged this sort of challenge against moves to identify the governing self with wants, (or needs and impulses, as he variously calls them), is Carl Rogers. Rogers distinguishes between the genuine or deepest wants of the person and those wants and impulses which are expressions of an inward defensiveness rather than the self. The deepest wants of persons always lead toward growth, that is toward something positive. But to be aware of one's deepest wants and to build one's life around satisfying them requires that one be free from the pseudo-wants which arise from defensiveness, many of which do result in undesirable consequences. An individual who has been freed from his inner defenses and is open to his 'true' wants, Rogers calls a "fully functioning individual". Of such a person Rogers says, "his reactions [i.e., his efforts to express or satisfy his wants] may be trusted to be positive, forward-moving, constructive" (1961, p. 194, parentheses mine).

The rationale is that the fully functioning human being is open to the wide range of his real wants while the defensive individual is narrowly restricted by his preoccupation with meeting the threat of a particular set of circumstances. Moreover, he can see this range of wants in perspective and in their relationship to one another. Striving as it does for a maximum satisfaction of genuine wants, (that is, maximum expression, realisation, or actualisation of self), the fully functioning human organism naturally preserves a balance within the satisfaction of competing wants. c.f.,
"The only control of impulses ... which would prove necessary is the natural and internal balancing of one need against another, and the discovery of behaviours which follow the vector most closely approximating the satisfaction of all needs" (ibid., p. 195).

For example, we do not have to concern ourselves with socialisation of the fully functioning person because one of his deepest wants is for affiliation and communication with others. Awareness of this as one of his wants will naturally counter balance forms of want-satisfaction which have morally undesirable consequences. In the conduct of such a person the tendency is toward what we call 'good' values - toward living in increasing harmony with oneself and others.

Although this position is open to criticism, it shows that an account of "autonomy" as an ethical ideal based on identification of self with wants is at least as coherent as accounts which identify self with rationality. Consequently, if it is to be rejected as an account of an educational ideal it must be shown by argument to be inadequate or undesirable. If coherent alternatives to "rational autonomy" as accounts of "free persons" are possible, then rationalists cannot simply assume, as I believe they often do, that the basis of autonomy in reason is beyond question.

There is a second ground on which we may challenge the tendency of educational philosophers to assume that "autonomy" must be conceived within a rationalist framework. There is clearly an important link between wants and action. Indeed it is often regarded as a logical or necessary connection. Given that there is a close link between wants and action, might it not be argued that an individual's action is autonomous to the extent that the related wants are his own? So far as it is analytic that what a person does is what he wants to do, and so
far as his wants are his own, we might say that in a significant sense this individual is the originator of his action: he is self-determining, and hence autonomous. He is not governed from 'abroad'. Indeed we might go even further and suggest that so far as a person's character is a function of his wants, the individual whose wants are his own is to this extent the maker of his character, the author of his personality, analogous to the autonomous state which shapes its character through its own legislation, policy-making, and so on.

The question here is what sense, if any, it makes to say of a person's wants that they are 'his', or his 'own'. In a trivial sense all my wants are mine. My desire to go to the movies this afternoon is my desire, not yours: it is within me rather than you. At this level of talk, to say of someone's wants that they are his own is simply to say, "A's wants are A's wants". Of course the same can be said of reason: c.f., my reasons. This clearly is not the level we are concerned with here. We do want to make important distinctions relating to a person's wants, for example, between those wants which are very much reflections of social forces impinging on him and those which are far less directly or obviously the effects of such forces. Alternatively, we may want to distinguish between those wants with which an individual associates himself most closely and those which are peripheral or even antagonistic to his self-concept or ego-ideal. However there are considerable difficulties facing attempts to elucidate the idea of an individual's wants being his own.

One approach to making this distinction might be to identify those wants as an agent's own which are not the consequence of interaction between the individual and his environment, particularly his social environment: that is, wants 'which cannot be sufficiently explained by
socialisation or by histories of reinforcement" (Strike, 1975, p. 184). This approach presupposes some innate, natural self having wants which are distinctive or fundamental to it. Moreover, wouldn't this natural self have to be largely unique to the individual rather than a generalised natural self shared by all persons, some native human self? If it were the latter, then the wants of autonomous individuals would be all more or less the same. This would tend necessarily toward a high degree of uniformity between the actions of different autonomous individuals. This is an idea we do not readily associate with people being autonomous. Typically we think that so far as individuals are autonomous there is at least the possibility— even the likelihood— of significant divergence in conduct as a consequence. This possibility is ruled out if the natural self has generalised or universal form.

What then of the notion of innate individual selves: of 'native' rather than environmentally determined wants? The weight of evidence goes against entertaining this idea. The studies of 'feral man' suggest that humans surviving outside of a normal human environment do not possess 'native' wants expressive of a basic individual self. Their wants are either the basic wants of animal life generally, (biological and physiological needs), or the wants of the particular species they have survived among (c.f., the Wolf children). Strike discounts the possibility of wants which are more than just products of interaction with the environment and which would have significance for an ideal of personal autonomy. He says,

"Unfortunately it would appear to be the case that, other than some very basic drives which are obviously physiologically based, almost all human wants, values and needs are acquired as the result of some socialisation process."

We cannot distinguish within the human personality between a 'social' self
with its environmentally determined wants, and a 'natural' (Strike calls it 'real') self with its native wants.

"Unhappily the personality turns out to be a bit like an onion. One merely peels off one socially acquired layer after another. What is left is either nothing or something not very interesting. Thus the viability of the real me analysis of autonomy ... depends on the ability to make a non-existent distinction [i.e., between 'social' and 'real' selves]. The preponderance of modern scholarship seems to support an environmentalist position" (ibid., p. 187, parentheses mine).

The idea of a self possessing wants which are in some sense its own rather than mere products of the environment with which the individual interacts, has made a considerable impact on educational thought since the time of Rousseau. It would be cavalier to dismiss this notion without making some attempt to counter the kind of attack mounted by Strike. A distinction between some real or natural self with its distinctive desires and an artificial self with its array of non-natural desires is often imputed to Rousseau. This distinction seems to underlie such crucial claims within Rousseau as, "Oh, man! Live your own life and you will no longer be wretched" (Emile, p. 47, emphasis mine). Moreover, it is fundamental to Rousseau's account of the development of 'truly' free persons. But whether or not this distinction can support a coherent notion of autonomous individuals depends on how Rousseau spells it out. (N.B. In what follows I appeal only to the Emile. Page references are to the Everyman edition.)

Rousseau's account of wants which are a person's own can be broken down into two steps. First, he distinguishes between natural and non-natural desires. (Rousseau uses "desires", "wants", "wishes" and "needs" more or less interchangeably.) And secondly, he suggests that it is natural desires which may be identified as a person's own desires.
Typically Rousseau refers to non-natural desires as artificial desires. Occasionally, however, they are given a more pejorative description, as when Rousseau challenges prospective tutors to study carefully the speech and gestures of children as yet incapable of deceit, so as to be able to discriminate between those desires which come from nature and those which spring from perversity (p. 35). Natural desires are those bestowed on man by Nature, and as such are expressions of man's real self (c.f. p. 47, p. 157). Two essential characteristics of natural wants are that they are the same for all people, (p. 157), and can be satisfied by the natural powers of each mature individual. Rousseau claims here that nature gives man "only such desires as are necessary for self-preservation, and such powers as are sufficient for their satisfaction". All the rest lie "stored in his mind as a sort of reserve, to be drawn upon at need". (p. 44). Desires which are not true needs, which can only be satisfied with the help of others, Rousseau calls caprices. While children, lacking the full development of their natural powers, cannot meet all their natural wants unaided, these nevertheless remain natural wants.

Artificial desires have two main origins according to Rousseau. The first of these is the human faculty of imagination. With the 'awakening' of imagination an individual's wants are developed far beyond those necessary for self-preservation — unless the stimulus of imagination is controlled by the parent or tutor:

"As soon as (man's) potential powers of mind begin to function, imagination, more powerful than all the rest, awakes, and precedes all the rest. It is imagination which enlarges the bounds of possibility for us, whether for good or ill, and therefore stimulates and feeds desires by the hope of satisfying them" (p. 44).

These desires of imagination are not a function of man qua man. They will vary from person to person according to the direction taken by
individual imaginations. The second origin of artificial desires consists in social influences. Two aspects stand out here.

(a) A person may form various desires out of a concern for what other people think of him, or the expectations they have of him. When speaking of the forms of learning a young person might engage in, Rousseau distinguishes between a natural drive to learn certain things and a socially induced motive to learn. He says,

"Always distinguish between natural and acquired tendencies. There is a zeal for learning which has no other foundation than a wish to appear learned, and there is another which springs from man's natural curiosity about all things far and near which may affect himself" (p. 130).

Boyd presents this distinction as being between urges coming from nature and those coming from a regard for what others think (1956, p. 71).

(b) Artificial wants arise with an individual's aspiration to some station in social life or his location within a social rank, occupation, class, etc. Rousseau urges us to "fit a man's education to his real self, not to what is no part of him" (p. 157). Within "that which is no part of him" Rousseau includes social rank, status or calling, and the tastes, needs and wishes attaching to a given social position, or arising from social experience and intercourse.

So much then for a sketch of Rousseau's distinction between natural and artificial wants. What evidence is there that Rousseau identifies a person's own wants with natural wants, and how far could his position support a coherent notion of personal autonomy? The following passages are representative of many throughout Emile, and strongly suggest that Rousseau equates the individual's own wants with natural wants. Firstly, Rousseau claims that under conditions of proper environmental control imposed by the parent or tutor, the young child will be
"Entirely occupied in getting the best he can out of his environment with a view to his present welfare, and you will be surprised by the subtlety of the means he devises to get for himself such things as he can obtain, and to really enjoy things without the aid of other people's ideas. You leave him to be master of his own wishes, but you do not multiply his caprices" (p. 85, emphasis mine).

The child's own wishes, then, are those which are related to self-preservation in that they have "a view to his present welfare", and whose satisfaction correlates closely with the extent of his native powers. This is essentially Rousseau's notion of natural wants as spelled out on page 259 above. Elsewhere Rousseau speaks of the child's own activities, and links this notion explicitly with the idea of natural wants. c.f.,

"Nature provides for the child's growth in her own fashion and this should never be thwarted. Do not make him sit still when he wants to run about, nor run when he wants to be quiet. If we did not spoil our children's wills by our blunders their desires would be free from caprice. Let them run, jump, and shout to their heart's content. All their own activities are instincts of the body for its growth in strength; but you should regard with suspicion those wishes which they cannot carry out for themselves, those which others must carry out for them. Then you must distinguish carefully between natural and artificial needs, between the needs of budding caprice and the needs which spring from the overflowing life just described" (p. 50).

The question is whether this account of a person's own wants can support a coherent ideal of autonomous persons. Can it meet the sorts of objections raised by Strike? Strike's argument, it will be recalled, is that we cannot distinguish between natural and social selves, and consequently between native and acquired wants: at least, any distinction that might be made will prove not to be very interesting as far as an educational ideal of autonomy is concerned. c.f., "What is left [after the various socially-acquired layers of wants, needs and
values are peeled away] is either nothing or something not very interesting" (loc. cit., p. 187). Rousseau's argument, by contrast, is that man indeed has a real self with its distinctive wants, and it is with this real self and a man's own wants that education must be solely concerned. How does Rousseau's position stand up under examination?

To begin with, Rousseau simply does not tell us enough about man's real self and his natural wants. "Natural man" as described by Rousseau has puzzled philosophers ever since Emile was published. Is it man in some pre-social state, or man understood in purely biological terms, or man living in relatively unsophisticated circumstances away from the social mainstream? The conception of man's natural wants will differ somewhat according to which conception of natural man is assumed. Even Rousseau's most specific statements here prove much too vague to be informative. Compare the passage cited above:

"To begin with [nature] gives him [i.e. man] only such desires as are necessary for self-preservation and such powers as are sufficient for their satisfaction. All the rest she has stored in his mind as a sort of reserve to be drawn upon at need" (p. 44).

To what does "all the rest" refer? - other powers, other desires, or both? If it refers to other desires, then what are these in addition to those required for self-preservation? Furthermore, what constitutes self-preservation? Is this a purely descriptive notion? If not, then to what extent can the range of desires deemed necessary for self-preservation differ according to the subjective or normative content which different people write into 'self-preservation'? Unfortunately, to define "natural wants" in terms of "natural powers", that is, as those wants which can be satisfied by the natural capacities of the
individual, does not help much. There is an obvious sense in which the natural powers of individuals differ. This might support the claim that consequently natural wants may differ between individuals. Rousseau, however, asserts that natural wants are the same for all people. Neither does it help if Rousseau is taken to mean that even if there are differences in 'natural' power between individuals all individuals have sufficient natural power for self-preservation. This is plainly false. Any attempt to preserve the thesis that the natural power of human beings is sufficient for self-preservation will throw the weight back on the meaning of 'self-preservation'. And Rousseau has no clear analysis to offer here. The obvious problem is that the key concepts in Rousseau's position are open to subjective definition and to impositions of personal values. Clearly something more concrete is required.

It could, however, be argued that to demand an account of man's real self and his own natural wants which will stand up to close philosophical scrutiny is to miss Rousseau's point. Perhaps rather than assuming that these notions refer to something specific we should look at them more in relation to Rousseau's wider concern: to propose a form of education which would bring man closest to happiness or at least keep him as far removed as possible from unhappiness. Conceiving of happiness as a function of the 'fit' between a person's desires and his capacity to satisfy them, Rousseau stressed the importance of keeping desires as basic as possible. The notion of basic human wants, even if it is a bit vague, serves as a measuring stick. The more one's desires approximate to genuine human needs, the more likelihood there is of attaining a match between desire and ability to satisfy desire, and hence of attaining a happy state. This move, however, faces difficulties if basic wants are regarded as a person's own.
Obviously the more 'basic' an individual's wants the more they will approximate wants which are characteristic of the species man. Typically, however, "own" functions as an individuating concept. We use it in contexts where a property, quality, or characteristic belongs to someone in particular rather than to people generally. So far as 'natural' wants are possessed by people generally, "own" cannot perform its individuating function when applied to 'natural' or 'basic' wants.

"Own" is sometimes used to convey the notion of personal effort, achievement, or responsibility - c.f., "it's his own work". However, this use of "own" also breaks down in the context of Rousseau's discussion. So far as the 'natural' wants of human beings are innate they are not a consequence of personal effort or responsibility. They are just 'there' as it were. But maybe there is a further possibility. It might be suggested that human beings typically do not identify themselves solely or primarily with minimal or basic desires - wants which might plausibly be met to a considerable degree by the individual's own capacities. The desires that an individual human being sees as characteristic of himself may be quite elaborate. Given the kind of environment many humans live in it seems a 'natural' tendency of people to acquire a range of very sophisticated wants. Given this fact about human beings perhaps it is some sort of personal achievement, a consequence of effort or responsible choice, for a person to embrace a range of simple or minimal wants rather than following the tendency toward more sophisticated desires. Could it not be said of someone that he has made the more basic ('natural') wants of men his own: has identified himself with them? This seems to make sense.

The problem so far as Rousseau is concerned is that in his educational scheme the pupil could not be said in any significant sense to make this
range of 'natural' wants his own. Rousseau, of course, is well aware of the human tendency to develop elaborate wants which cannot be met without the aid of others. For this reason he advocates that the tutor exercise a strong control over the child's environment. So it is impossible to speak of the pupil making these natural wants his own. Emile cannot be said to identify himself with a given range of desires. Rather it is the tutor who, through elaborate control of Emile's environment which masquerades as the operation of natural necessity, identifies Emile with certain wants.

It is difficult to see how Rousseau's position can support talk of a person's wants being his own, and hence talk of personal autonomy as an educational ideal. The whole educational scheme proposed by Rousseau looks much more conducive to heteronomy than autonomy. Perhaps this should be expected, for while Rousseau is concerned with the development of free persons, this is not freedom in the sense of autonomy. Rather it is a freedom which comes from maintaining a balance between desires and personal capacities: a freedom consisting in maximum independence of others; a self-sufficiency which preserves the individual from disappointment, as well as from the forms of vice and depravity which Rousseau sees as the result of dependence upon men (Emile, pp. 44-50). Attainment of this kind of freedom in no way requires that the individual's wants be his own. Rousseau, then, has not helped us to articulate the idea of an individual being autonomous to the extent that his wants are his own.

A second source from which help might come in elucidating the idea of wants which are a person's own is the work of humanist psychologists like Carl Rogers. They are very much committed to the
notion of a person's real self with its constitutive wants, needs, and feelings. Rogers, reflecting on the experience of many clients in the therapeutic relationship, considers that each of them is raising one basic question.

"Below the level of the problem situation about which the individual is complaining... lies one central search... At bottom each person is asking 'Who am I really? How can I get in touch with this real self, underlying all my surface behaviour?" (Rogers, 1961, p. 108).

Rogers sees it as the essence of his role as counsellor-therapist to put the client in touch with his real self. If 'the real self' can be articulated in a philosophically acceptable way it may be possible to identify a range of wants which could be acknowledged as the individual's own.

It is precisely writers like Rogers whom Strike has in mind when he presents arguments against the 'real self analysis' of autonomy. I want to argue here that Strike's attacks largely miss the mark as far as Rogers' position is concerned but that, nevertheless, Rogers' account of the real self is philosophically unsound. In particular, it does not yield an acceptable account of the 'ownership' of wants.

Strike advances two major arguments against the 'real self analysis' of autonomy as an educational ideal. First, he suggests that autonomy, understood as the expression of the real me, cannot comprise an educational ideal because it is consistent with an anti-intellectual stance.

"Any .... method of teaching rooted in an assumption that education is a matter of initiating students into public standards and values is likely to be regarded by proponents of the real me as holding that values and standards should come from 'without' rather than from 'within' and thus will be a kind of illegitimate influence. It is at this point when the doctrine of the real me can become anti-intellectual. A preference for values or standards rooted in the self over public values or standards is easily
operationalised in a preference for opinions, values or standards which are 'sincere', 'genuine', or expressions of 'how one really feels' over those which are true, reasonable, or otherwise in accord with public criteria" (op. cit. p. 186).

My criticism of this challenge is that in the absence of any supporting argument it simply begs the question with which, I have suggested, we must be concerned: namely, the validity of the rationalist or intellectualist account of "freedom" as an educational ideal. Despite his obvious sympathy with certain themes from humanist psychology, Strike remains within the mainstream of educational philosophers and writes as if the central place of rationality in an ideal of "free persons" is beyond question. Any dispute with Strike will involve a disagreement about values, but my immediate concern is whether the idea of a real self having its own wants is intelligible, not whether it constitutes an educational ideal.

As we have seen, Strike does question the intelligibility of "the real self" as analyzed by Rogers, but his challenge has limited force. According to Strike, proponents of a real self analysis of autonomy maintain that the real me is to be distinguished from that part of my personality which has been influenced by social forces and processes. There are some wants, needs, and values which are part of a "socially induced and, thus, inauthentic self", and wants, needs, and values "which are in some way fundamental to the self", that is, the real self. (ibid., p. 187). Conceiving the real self in this way Strike has little difficulty in dismissing it as unintelligible.

However I'm not convinced that this is what proponents of a real self analysis of autonomy are necessarily committed to. Rogers, for example, does hold that barriers to expression or realisation of the real
self are social in origin. But it does not follow from this that the
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Nevertheless, grave problems remain when we try to make sense of
what Rogers means by someone's wants, emotions, or feelings, being his
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often the problem of meaning is simply pushed one step back - the burden
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self are social in origin. But it does not follow from this that the real self is what remains only after all socially influenced layers of personality are peeled away. If I understand him correctly, Rogers is not saying that the real self is what remains after layer upon layer of socially acquired traits, tendencies, and beliefs are removed, but rather that it is what emerges when the various layers of defenses, facades, masks and inhibitions are removed. Defenses, facades, masks, and inhibitions may be seen as the products of social influences. But this does not imply that the real self can in no part be the consequence of interaction with one's social environment. There is no reason to believe that the class of socially induced aspects of personality is identical with the class of defenses, facades, masks and inhibitions.

Nevertheless, grave problems remain when we try to make sense of what Rogers means by someone's wants, emotions, or feelings, being his own, or some piece of behaviour being really a part of himself. All too often the problem of meaning is simply pushed one step back - the burden of definition placed on some term or phrase as much in need of clarification as 'ownership' itself. For example, Rogers claims that in the attempt to discover his own self within the therapeutic relationship the client "learns how much of his behaviour, even how much of the feeling he experiences, is not real, is not something which flows from the genuine reactions of his organism, but is a facade, a front, behind which he has been hiding" (1961, pp. 109-110, emphasis mine). Or again, "when he fully experiences the feelings which at an organic level he is .... then he feels an assurance that he is being a part of his real self" (ibid, p. 111). It does not help us any to be told that those wants which are a person's own are those which are "genuine reactions of his organism", or those which "at an organic level he is".
While I am convinced that Rogers has something important to say, it is disappointing and frustrating to read, page after page, statements like the following. Rogers speaks of a client experiencing a feeling in an "all-out kind of fashion". He then says:

"What I have gradually learned from experiences such as this, is that the individual in such a moment, [i.e. of experiencing a feeling, want or need in an all-out kind of fashion] is coming to be what he is. When a person has, throughout therapy, experienced in this fashion all the emotions which organismically arise in him, and has experienced them in this knowing and open manner, then he has experienced himself, in all the richness that exists within himself. He has become what he is" (ibid., p. 113, parentheses mine).

Rogers is well aware that he is struggling to elucidate the notion of a person discovering his real self or elements of this self such as his wants or emotions. He pleads that the phenomenon of discovering one's real self is something "which I think it is quite difficult to get across in any meaningful way" (ibid., p. 111). Doubtless it is difficult. But from a philosophical standpoint we must, I think, judge Rogers' attempt to be largely unsuccessful. He helps us little in elucidating the idea of wants which are one's own.

So far, then, we lack a clear account of what it is for a person's wants to be his own, and we are still without a coherent account of "autonomy" based upon the notion of wants. But there are other lines which might be pursued in an attempt to articulate the idea of an individual's wants being his own. One which has been investigated in the present context arises out of recent philosophical work done on the notion of higher and lower order wants (see Walker, 1976). According to Frankfurt (1971), human beings have what may be called first order wants. These are simply desires to do something. In addition humans may also have second order wants. As Frankfurt puts it,
"besides wanting ... to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are" (ibid., p.7).

Equally we might add that they are capable of wanting to be, in their preferences and purposes, more or less as they are. In other words, to have the wants one wants to have may require a change in one's first order wants, but this need not be so. Whereas the possession of some first order wants is probably an inherent part of being human, (that is, can we conceive of a human who entirely lacks desire to do, get, or have something or other?), it may not be a necessary part of being human that one possess second order wants.

If this distinction between first and second order wants is indeed coherent, it could perhaps be argued that those of a person's first order wants which he actually wants to have may be characterised as his own. Conversely, those of his first order wants which he wants not to have, but nevertheless has, might be said to be not his own. In other words, they may be seen as expressions or manifestations of an alien self. Without pursuing this line of argument in any depth, it is not difficult to foresee a number of difficulties which would have to be faced in attempts to elucidate a notion of autonomy in terms of first and second order wants. Besides the question of whether we can indeed make sense of the idea of wanting to want something, these difficulties include the following.

(i) What would we say concerning all those wants which a person actually has, but towards which he has no higher order attitudes whatsoever? - particularly those first order wants which it might seem odd or inappropriate to think of someone either wanting to want or not wanting to want: for example, wanting to get some sleep, have a drink, or use the bathroom.
(ii) If second order wants are possible, may not third, fourth, ... nth order wants also be possible? If so, why identify a person's own wants with his second order wants rather than, say, his third or fourth (c.f., Walker, op. cit.).

(iii) Perhaps a person's second order wants may be heteronomously determined, in which case the idea of A having second order wants brings us no closer to making sense of an autonomy based on wants. Assuming that it makes sense to think of my wanting to have a desire to play the violin, might not this second order want simply be the consequence of my friend convincing me that I should acquire a wish to play violin?

I do not intend to follow this line of inquiry any further even though an account of autonomy based on wants, if such is possible, might well hold different implications for the social freedom of pupils from those of rational autonomy. There are at least three reasons for abandoning this line of inquiry and pursuing some other line.

(a) Walker and others have pursued the present line already, more capably than I could.

(b) It is possible that a person's wants could be his own and yet we might still wish to say that in an important sense he is not a free person.

(c) There are other metaphorical extensions of "freedom" (besides an extension of "the autonomous state") yet to be explored.

I turn now to the second analogy mentioned earlier.

2. The analogy with the 'free' society.

"A free society" yields by analogy the idea of an individual being free to the extent that his various wants are in harmony, that is, are
not incompatible or hopelessly in conflict with one another. A free society is one where individuals are allowed to pursue their own ends, to forge their own 'good life', whatever it may be, so long as they do not impede the like efforts of others. Consequently, the essential condition of a free society is that there be relative harmony between the goal or end-directed activities of the various members within that society. So far as this notion of a free society is concerned, it is not necessary that its members actually succeed in forging a good, happy or satisfying life for themselves. The crucial thing is that they have the opportunity to try. Apart from a commitment to offering this opportunity, the essential condition of free societies is that there be minimal interference between one individual and another in the pursuit of personal goods. As noted earlier, the model of a free society breaks down when disharmony arises between the ends and pursuits of individual members - when to realise the goals of one person means to thwart those of another. Where this occurs we may speak of jostling, interference, and hindrance between members of that society. In turn such circumstances may produce confusion, frustration, and possibly disorientation - as when preventing interference by others rather than overcoming challenges to goal satisfaction, becomes a major end in itself, thereby alienating the individual from his ends, goals and interests. Under such conditions it may be necessary for authorities to impose restraints and compulsions (laws, regulations, sanctions) so as to restore sufficient order to once again provide some 'space' within which individuals can move toward attaining their personal goods.

How does this translate into some idea of freedom as a personal quality or characteristic? The analogy can be seen most clearly if we
focus on disruptions to freedom. The picture of a free society breaking down is one of conflict, confusion, and frustration between individuals who embody competing or incompatible goals. In other words there is tension, competition, incompatibility, between internal components of the society each of which is pressing for realisation or fulfilment. Analogously there may be tension, competition, incompatibility between various wants which an individual has. When two or more of these wants simultaneously press for satisfaction, or when satisfying one want means preventing satisfaction of another, the result may be frustration, confusion; and ultimately, disorientation within the individual. Neely suggests that the condition of having incompatible desires - that is, desires which conflict in that they cannot (logically or, more usually, empirically) both be satisfied - is very common, if not universal (Neely, 1974, p. 39). Most of us experience at least some conflict between wants. However in some cases this condition can become quite severe, and here at least it may be apt to speak of the individual as 'unfree'.

Some degree of frustration is inevitable whenever incompatible desires vie for satisfaction. The more an individual's conflicting desires crave satisfaction the more intense the frustration. Part of what is meant by 'A wants to do something' is that A is to some extent 'pained' or 'displeased' (other things being equal) when the opportunity of doing it is not open, or is removed (see Chapter Two). A person's efforts to avoid such 'pain' must necessarily prove futile whenever those wants pressing for satisfaction are incompatible. That is to say, the individual must inevitably be frustrated in some measure. He is restricted by the internal inconsistency of his 'wants'pool'; prevented from framing some plan or course of action which will meet his wants.
People who experience incompatibility between their wants especially between wants to which they attach considerable importance often speak of themselves as being torn in different directions (c.f., *ibid*). The more a person experiences incompatibility between wants he regards as important the more he will be torn in different directions and the more confused his inner life will be. This inner confusion may be reflected in outwardly confused behaviour or activity, as when it becomes impossible for him to frame any coherent plan of action whatsoever. Extremes of this condition can amount to a total dis-orientation of the individual, whereby he loses his agency altogether. Neely claims that where an individual is torn between alternatives because his significant wants are incompatible, he is "less a free agent than he might be because he is less a single agent. Rather, he is two (or more) agents competing against each other" (*ibid*). The problem in severe cases is that the individual may be incapable of determining who he really is: that is, with which of his (incompatible) wants he identifies himself. A human being in this condition is robbed of his agency. He is prevented from acting by the very nature of his wants. This, it might be argued, amounts to unfreedom in a fundamental sense.

At any rate the further we get from a relative harmony within a person's pool of wants, the further we get from the idea of an individual who can give 'free play' to his wants on the 'understanding' that they will 'take their fair share', or 'keep their rightful place' when it comes to seeking satisfaction. (c.f. Plato's account of the 'democratic' character). Consequently, the more necessary it will be for some order or regulation to be imposed on his want-satisfaction, if he is to avoid lapsing into what Feinberg calls a state of anomie (Feinberg, 1973a, Ch.1). Here at least the analogy with "a free society" is clear enough:
a society which can allow its members to go about their affairs without hindrance (from laws, regulations, sanctions) on the understanding that in pursuing their various goals individuals will not impede or conflict with one another.

Given that the metaphor of unfreedom gets a grip on the sort of condition referred to here, the question remains as to whether absence of the constraints in question comprises a worthwhile or desirable ideal. In other words, is it enough for a desirable ideal of freedom that an individual's wants be 'together', 'not glued up', 'not jostling each other', or incompatible with each other, and hence that he not be frustrated, confused or disoriented? There is an obvious problem here: one which parallels criticism of the free society as a desirable political ideal. It is no part of the notion of a free society as construed here that the ends, goals, and pursuits of individuals be of a particular kind. So far as A's efforts to promote his 'good' as he sees it do not interfere with the like efforts of others, the nature of his 'good' is of no consequence to the free society. It might well be something which others deem worthless or even undesirable. Herein lies a ground for criticism of the free society - its failure to encourage, or even enforce, pursuit of worthwhile ends (c.f., Plato's critique of democracies). Similarly, there is no reason why wants which are 'together' or in harmony must be ethically good. If it is seen as a necessary part of a desirable educational ideal that 'ethically good' wants be promoted among children, then to this extent freedom in the present sense may fall short of being such an ideal. It will all depend on the quality of the wants children acquire. Either it would have to be written into "freedom" that only certain sorts of wants count, or else
a further condition would have to be added to the notion of free persons to yield a desirable educational ideal.

There is, however, a more immediate question to be faced. Might we not conceive of a person whose wants are in relative harmony and yet whom we can still in some significant sense describe as "unfree"? This possibility is suggested by a tendency within common usage of the concept "social freedom". Some writers have argued that disputes about what really constitutes social freedom are often more properly understood as disputes about what kinds of social constraint it is most important to be free from. In other words, people are inclined to inject their particular values and concerns into the meaning of "social freedom", advancing their account as the real concept of social freedom. Perhaps something similar occurs when people use the concept "freedom" to denote a personality ideal so that different accounts of what it means to be a free person reflect different value positions. Some focus on unreasonableness or irrationality as the personal constraint which it is most important to be free from. Others focus on constraints to personal growth presented by passive acceptance of values, wants, beliefs and goals, and urge the individual to forge and realise his own goals and values. Others again may be most impressed by the inner confusion associated with disharmony between an individual's wants and suggest that freedom consists in the absence of such conflict. Now so far as there remain certain 'inner' conditions - personality conditions - not yet mentioned in this discussion, but which might intelligibly be construed as impediments to the desirable functioning of a human being, there is the possibility of advancing a further account of "free persons".
3. The analogy with "socially free individuals".

The possibility I want to suggest here begins with two contrasting images of a human life. The first picture is of a person who knows clearly what he wants, (for example, he can state his wants, these statements remain consistent over a period of time, he seeks opportunities to engage in activities consistent with attaining these wants and is frustrated if these opportunities are removed, and so on), whose wants are relatively harmonious or 'together' and within the bounds of his capacities, and who displays ease and efficiency of activity in pursuing his wants. His activity 'flows' - his plans are perfectly in tune with the nature of the want or wants being pursued, and they are put into effect in a positive manner. The result is the ready attainment of goals and ends, and movement onto new projects or higher levels of achievement.

By contrast we may picture an individual whose wants, so far as he is clear about them, are 'together' and seemingly within his capacity range, but who appears cramped, tentative, and perhaps even inhibited in his pursuit of them. He doesn't seem to really 'get going' - his activity gives the impression of being 'held back', despite the absence of external constraints. In extreme cases there may actually be a discrepancy between a person's stated wants or objectives and his actual activity, despite repeated avowals of those wants. Such a person fails completely to 'get going', while nevertheless maintaining his wants. He appears somehow or other to have been rendered quite powerless to act in accordance with his stated desires. In other instances an individual may consistently get bogged down at the start of an enterprise, maybe returning again and again to a fresh beginning, but never progressing significantly beyond this
point. Yet a further image is of a person whose activity doesn't 'flow'. He makes tentative moves in the direction of attaining some want or goal but these lack force and authority - perhaps they seem to lack conviction - and in the end amount to no more than a few faltering steps toward his end. Even where wants are eventually attained, this attainment may reflect a gross inefficiency of effort: extremely high investment of energy, determination, and concern relative to the returns yielded. Indeed the route to achievement may have involved a degree of confusion, frustration, disappointment and anxiety quite out of proportion with the likely value of realising the want. I want to suggest that the more generally this inability to 'get going', this 'cramped style' and inefficiency of effort characterises an individual's life, and the more apparent it is that this is a consequence of certain factors intrinsic to his own personality, the more apt it is to describe this individual as unfree. That is, we have the picture of someone whose activity is restricted or impeded, who is seemingly prevented by conditions intrinsic to his own personality from functioning at anything like the level we believe or expect him to be capable of. This is analogous to the individual who, knowing what he wants is impeded in getting it by conditions extrinsic to him: in particular, by activities and arrangements of other people.

What sorts of personality factors or conditions might conceivably limit an individual's capacity to live a life characterised by ease and efficiency of action built around the pursuit of wants? Obviously this question could be turned into a major philosophical inquiry in its own right. Moreover any extended inquiry would probably benefit from a consideration of theories and data from psychology, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis. This however is not the place for an extended discussion.
Nevertheless I think the philosopher might advance quite briefly a number of suggestions which have at least a prima facie plausibility. There are certain feelings, attitudes, and emotional conditions which, a priori, look to be in tension with what I have called "ease and efficiency of action". Certainly they are logically compatible with the 'cramped', restricted quality of human activity sketched above. I offer the following as possibilities here.

(i) A fear of failure to attain one's wants or goals, or alternatively to measure up to certain standards of achievement/attainment which one accepts as important.

(ii) Doubts, anxiety over the worth or propriety of one's wants; suspicion or distrust of one's wants as constituting an acceptable basis for action.

(iii) Certain forms of 'emotional incompetence'.

I will consider these in turn.

**Personal unfreedom and fear of failure**

Some link between the constricted level of life just mentioned and fears of failing in one's pursuit of wants can, I think, be established. Typically part of what we mean by someone's having a fear of failure is that he will tend to avoid situations in which his inability may become apparent or his shortcomings show. An individual may very much want to do or be something, but at the same time have a strong fear of failing in the pursuit of that want. Once again we have the picture of a person simultaneously drawn in two directions. On the one hand, so far as he can properly be said to have a want he will (other things being equal) seek opportunities to satisfy or realise it. But so far as he has a fear
of failing to attain it he will be relieved to avoid such opportunities (that is, other things are not equal in this case.) This is not simply a matter of an individual being impeded by conflicting wants in the sense considered earlier. Rather, what we have here is a conflict between a given want and a feeling, or an emotional state, which is inconsistent with pursuit of that want. (Strictly speaking a want is not an emotion.) This picture of a person drawn in different directions by a want and a contrary emotional state is perfectly consistent with the metaphors of 'cramped', 'tentative', 'inhibited' activity. Indeed there is something logically odd in the notion of a person setting about pursuing a want in a positive, uninhibited manner when he is plagued by the fear that he will fail to achieve it.

Personal unfreedom and doubts about one's wants as a proper basis for activity.

Here also I believe some link can be established between a quality of life to which various metaphors of restriction are apt, and a particular personality condition. Reference has been made on several occasions to the conceptual link which obtains between the notion of a person's wants and that of his activity or behaviour. One of our main grounds for ascribing given wants to an individual is the nature of his activity: where he channels his effort, the goals which persist over time, and so on. As noted here, there may be circumstances in which people's avowed wants are at variance with their activity - for example, because they can't 'get going'. However this does not affect the claim that there is a logical link between A's activity and A's wants.

This logical relationship has a point of interest here. Just as we acknowledge particular patterns of activity or behaviour as grounds
for ascribing particular wants, so too we acknowledge a given quality of activity as grounds for making claims about, say, how a person holds his wants or how he feels toward them. It makes sense to infer from the fact that a person's activity or pursuit of apparent ends is very tentative or hesitant, that he may have doubts about the propriety of his wants. Our claim may be mistaken and the person in question may offer an alternative account of his hesitation. But the original claim is nevertheless intelligible: among the grounds for claiming that someone, A, is anxious or doubtful concerning the propriety of his wants as a basis for action, is the observation that A is unable to pursue his ends positively, or with conviction.

As a matter of empirical fact some people do have doubts, or become anxious, about the propriety of trusting their wants as guides to action - even those wants they hold strongly. An individual may doubt whether certain of his wants are legitimate. He may even feel guilty about some of his wants, but retain them nonetheless and make some moves toward satisfying them. Alternatively he may see his wants as in tension with what he takes to be his duty, or else with what he sees as the just or reasonable expectations of others. A person who is in such a state of doubt or anxiety may be contrasted with another who has a basic trust in his wants as an appropriate guide to action and who for the most part determines to act on his wants. Again our very ascription to a person of a basic trust in his wants as comprising a suitable basis for activity may be grounded on the positive, uninhibited manner with which he sets about end-directed activity.

The idea of a person having doubts or being anxious about the legitimacy of his wants as a basis for action is perfectly coherent. Furthermore, there is a logical connection between an 'inner state' of
such doubt or anxiety and a particular quality of activity: hesitant, tentative, uneven. It is part of our very notion of such anxiety or doubt that it may inhibit behaviour directed at the attainment of wants. Consequently such states or personality conditions may be conceived as constraints.

Personal unfreedom and limitations in emotional awareness

The final suggestion I want to advance here rests on a philosophical thesis concerning the relationship between emotion and behaviour. The general line of argument derives from Wittgenstein, but the specific ideas here have been adopted from Kenny (1963). Kenny claims that emotion concepts stand on 3 struts: circumstances, symptoms, and behaviour. For example, the concept "fear" has meaning in respect of: (a) fearful circumstances; (b) symptoms of fear; (c) action taken to avoid what is feared. It is within contexts where all or some of these factors obtain that we learn the various emotion concepts as part of our shared language, and indeed that we learn appropriate emotional responses. Similarly it is only against some or all of them that ascriptions of particular emotions can properly be made. "In the standard case, which is both the paradigm for learning and the most easily intelligible, all these factors will be present" (ibid., p. 67).

Embracing this Wittgensteinian view of emotion concepts, Kenny argues that emotion words have two (related) uses: to describe feelings and to explain action. c.f., "We feel fear, and we also act out of fear; love is not only a sentiment, but also a motive of action" (ibid., p. 76). On his view these two uses of the various emotion concepts are bound up with each other. Feelings may be identified as feelings of a particular emotion through their connection with motivated behaviour (c.f. ibid.,
p. 38). According to Kenny, this logical connection between a certain form of motivated behaviour and a particular emotion is mediated by the notion of wants. c.f.,

"One emotion differs from another because of the different sort of things it makes one want to do. Fear involves wanting to avoid or avert what is feared; anger is connected with the desire to punish or take vengeance on its object. Love, of one kind, is linked with the desire to fondle and caress the loved one, and shame with the desire to conceal whatever it is that makes one ashamed. These connections are not contingent: a man who was unaware of them would not possess the concept of the emotions in question" (ibid., p. 100).

On the basis of these ideas I want to suggest a link between certain possible limitations in an individual's emotional awareness or competence, and the 'cramped', 'hesitant'; 'ineffectual' quality of life alluded to here. I propose that there are two forms of limitation.

(a) Confusion within someone's emotional experience. The individual is unable to differentiate clearly or accurately between emotions. We see this phenomenon in extreme form in babies and infants. Often they literally don't know whether to laugh or cry. They have a good deal of learning to undergo before discriminations are fined-up. However it seems quite possible that many people beyond infancy - including adults - have limited ability to define and discriminate emotional experience in any reasonably precise way.

(b) The second condition consists in emotional 'desensitivity': a limited or reduced capacity to feel, or to be moved by emotions. This is not so much a matter of accurate definition/discrimination of the emotions one does feel, as a matter of simply being open to experiencing feelings. Some theorists argue that man has increasingly ignored the feeling aspect of human life, to the point where the simple ability to feel is now greatly diminished.
In recent literature from psychotherapy we can find statements which link what I have here called "confusion" and "desensitivity" with a personal unfreedom. c.f.,

"One of the most serious problems of modern man is that he has desensitised himself to all but the most overwhelming kind of emotional response. To the degree that he is no longer capable of feeling sensitively, to that degree he becomes incapable of the freedom of choice that results in a relevant action." (Perls, 1973, p. 84).

I believe we can make some philosophical sense of this type of claim given the logical connection, posited above, between behaviour, wants, and emotion.

Confused, tentative, uncertain behaviour may be linked with confusion and uncertainty about wants. We often say of a 'ditherer' that he dithers because he doesn't know what he wants. But it might now be further suggested that this very confusion or uncertainty about wants can be linked logically with confusion or uncertainty within a person's emotional experience: we may ascribe inability to discriminate between emotions on the basis of perceived confusion about wants. In other words, we may suggest a logical chain running between hesitant/confused behaviour, confusion about wants, and emotional 'confusion'. A further argument may be produced in respect of a limited or reduced capacity to feel. If it is part of our concept of some emotion that in addition to describing a feeling it also marks out a motive of action, then to the extent that one's capacity for feeling emotion is reduced, one's 'direction' for activity is correspondingly diminished. A logical link may be posited between vague, tentative, confused activity and the lack of adequate direction for that activity.
I am acutely aware that there is a lot more to be argued on these matters, but for my immediate purposes it is sufficient if the arguments make sense. For they will prompt a number of educational 'implications' to be taken up in the final chapter - 'implications' which have important bearings on the social freedom of pupils. In part it will be the significance of these 'implications' which dictates how far the line of argument sketched in the last part of this chapter warrants further investigation.

All that remains to be done in this chapter is to link the discussion of the last few pages explicitly with talk of "freedom" as a form of personality development. This link can be forged by making clear the analogy with the social concept of freedom, the idea of an individual who is free in the sense that nobody is impeding him in getting what he wants.

It was argued in Chapter Two that human beings can limit the freedom of others in two broad ways.

(i) By placing barriers or obstacles in the way of someone's attempt to pursue a want. Given that A already knows what he wants, he is unfree so far as his attempts to do or get it are impeded by the activities of others.

(ii) By interfering with an individual's want-formation, for example, by manipulating his wants, or distorting the facts on the basis of which his wants are formed.

In either of these contexts we have no hesitation in saying that certain agents are imposing constraints on the activities of others, and that the freedom of these others has been restricted. Analogously we can
make sense of the idea that a person is unfree so far as he is subject
to the limiting conditions sketched in recent pages. Fears of failing
to attain one's goals or of measuring up to standards of achievement
which one regards as important, along with doubts or anxiety about one's
wants as a justifiable basis for action, may be construed as barriers
or obstacles to the pursuit of wants. They may be seen as 'alien'
forces analogous to the 'alien' activities of other people who frustrate
one's activity in opposing the attainment of desires. Indeed in some
cases it may be appropriate to conceive of the standards of attainment
which an individual upholds, or the doubts he has about his wants, as
comprising 'internalised others': influences no less limiting of
freedom than if the 'others' in question were physically constraining
his pursuits of wants. The two emotional conditions mentioned can be
seen as constraints by analogy with social processes which interfere
with a person's want-formation. Inability to experience emotions
accurately or clearly is logically at odds with clear perception or
formulation of wants. Reduced capacity to feel must close a person off
from a whole range of possibilities for want-formation. I would argue,
then, that there is at least as much warrant for using the concept
"freedom" in relation to the sorts of personality conditions I have
mentioned here as there is in respect of the conditions marked out by
rationalist philosophers of education.

One further comment is in order before advancing from this analysis
of "the unfree person" to an account of "free persons". In addition to
those personality factors which I have just examined, relative disharmony
between an individual's various wants might also plausibly be linked with
the cramped, restricted quality of human activity sketched above. The
notion of incompatible wants drawing a person in different directions is
perfectly consistent with 'cramped', 'tentative', or 'inhibited' activity. Indeed the fact that a person is indecisive or 'fumbling' in his activity could constitute grounds for the assertion that he is experiencing conflict between two or more incompatible wants. In other words, the account of "unfreedom" which I am proposing trades on analogy with both the idea of an unfree society and that of an individual who is unfree in the sense that someone is impeding his getting what he wants. To summarise, I would suggest that the more a person is subject to

- disharmony within his pool of wants,
- fear of failure,
- doubts about his wants as a proper basis for activity,
- confusion within his emotional experience and/or emotional desensitivity,

the more apt it is to describe him as "unfree".

Given this account of "unfreedom" I submit that the following conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient for being a free person.

(a) A high degree of harmony between the various wants the individual has.

(b) Confidence in one's capacity to attain one's wants/ends or to measure up to standards of attainment which are personally significant.

(c) A basic trust in one's wants as constituting a proper or appropriate basis for activity.

(d) Relative sensitivity to feeling, and capacity to differentiate between emotions with considerable clarity and accuracy.
If this is an acceptable account of what constitutes a free person, it follows that so far as we intend to educate for free persons we are committed to:

(a) ensuring as far as possible that there is harmony between the various wants the individual acquires;

(b) developing in the youngster confidence in his own ability to obtain his wants/ends or to meet standards of attainment which he regards as important;

(c) promoting in each person a basic trust in his wants and ends as offering a proper basis for activity;

(d) ensuring that individuals are open to feeling and capable of discriminating emotions clearly and accurately.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Education, freedom, and free persons.

My main concern in this chapter will be to address the question: "What are the implications for children's social freedom if development of free persons constitutes an educational ideal?" However it cannot merely be assumed that development of free persons does constitute an educational ideal. Whatever is said about the implications for children's liberty of aiming at development of free persons, the question remains as to what grounds there are for accepting this form of development as an educational ideal. While I do not propose to deal with this question at length, I want to acknowledge its importance within the context of my discussion. Clearly, if development of free persons does not comprise an educational ideal, my discussion of its implications for children's liberty in education will automatically lose whatever practical import it may have. I am confident, however, that a good case can be made for free persons as an educational ideal, and will sketch a couple of lines which might be pursued in support of this conviction. But I must stress that this is only the sketch of a possible justification. A more elaborate treatment of this matter must wait for another time.

It is not difficult to envisage challenges to the view that development of free persons is the very essence of educational endeavour, or even that it is an important concern in education. A first line of support for development of free persons as an educational ideal involves defusing some likely challenges. One fairly obvious challenge stems from the belief that the ideal of an educated person is crucially bound up with development of rationality, and that my account of an ideal of free persons does not
allow for this. This could be argued on two types of ground.

(i) Conceptual. Development of reason lies at the very heart of what it means to be educated. The claim that the ideal of an educated person is tied centrally to the notion of being rational expresses an analytic truth.

(ii) Ethical. The desirable form of human life is a life lived under the guidance of a well-developed rationality. Given the central place of rationality within the ethical ideal it thereby assumes centrality within the ideal of an educated person. On this view, identifying educational values is not a matter of unravelling the concept "education" in the way that it seems to be for, say, Peters. Rather it is a matter of framing an ideal of human development and spelling out educational values in terms of this.

Against (i) I would urge precisely the position inherent in (ii): namely, that it is a mistake to argue the central place of reason within the ideal of an educated person on conceptual grounds. It seems to me that such accounts of the concept "education" as that offered by Peters feed off our ethical tradition. That is, it is because our mainstream ethical heritage embraces a rationalist ideal of human nature that rational values have dominated Western educational thought from the time of the Greeks. It is this domination that gives the Peters position what plausibility it has. But this does not make elucidation of the educational ideal an analytical investigation. There is nothing logically odd in advancing an account of the educational ideal in which rationality is not central. To attack (or defend) any such account would involve substantial ethical argument.
The argument against (ii) rests on the claim that to acknowledge free personhood as an ethical ideal is not to assert that it is the only ethical ideal. Hence development of freedom can have a place within some overall ideal of an educated person without itself exhausting that ideal. Consequently my account of free persons as an educational ideal in no way precludes development of rationality as an educational aim. My concern is not to oust rationality from the ideal of an educated person but to challenge the dominance of reason within educational thought. It may be that freedom should be balanced by rationality. Freedom may be an ethically desirable characteristic without being sufficient to warrant an overall positive appraisal of the activity, behaviour, or expression in which a person 'freely' engages. Indeed the very basis for withholding unqualified approval in a given case may be the lack of reasonableness inherent in the agent's activity.

A second line of support for an educational ideal of free persons is more positive. In broad terms it involves articulating a conception of human nature and arguing from this toward an ideal form of human development. One obvious problem here is that some philosophers would almost certainly dispute that this is even a viable way of setting about establishing an ideal. However support for such an approach can readily be found in the philosophical literature, (see, for example, Taylor, op. cit.). Certainly it is difficult to see how one could argue toward an ideal of human existence without assuming at least some account of human nature. Aside from questions relating to procedure, the task of articulating a view of human nature and arguing from this to a definite ideal of human development is itself a major undertaking. In particular one's account of human nature will require stringent argument since the various views touted here are notoriously controversial. Clearly, the
ethical ideal one ends up with will only be as defensible as the grounds supporting one's view of human nature. I believe that the following line of inquiry has possibilities.

Philosophers frequently assert that the essence of man's nature consists in his reason. It is an undeniable fact that humans are born with the potential for rational development, and that most realise this potential in at least some measure. To locate the essence of man's nature in the realisation of this potential is, however, to assert a metaphysical position which is contestable and in need of justification. There are further undeniable facts about human nature which, I would want to argue, are at least as significant to a conception of the desirable form of human life as the fact of human rationality. First, it is a fact that humans have wants and needs. Second, it is a fact of human nature that humans experience pleasure and pain, satisfaction and disappointment, fulfillment and frustration.

As we have seen, there is an intimate link between the notion of wants and those of pleasure and pain. The same is true, I would argue, in the case of "needs". A person is pleased to be put in the way of getting what he needs, and pained if the opportunity for meeting a need is taken away. The general thesis here can be extended beyond the notions of pleasure and pain to take in similar concepts like satisfaction and disappointment, fulfillment and frustration. That is, other things being equal, to the extent that a person is given the opportunity to get what he wants he will be satisfied, and perhaps fulfilled. Conversely, to the extent that this opportunity is denied he will be disappointed or frustrated. Furthermore, the more efficiently a person can identify, pursue, and attain his wants, the more satisfied and fulfilled he will be, other things being equal.
Although it may require some arguing, there appears to be a tight connection between the ideas advanced in the previous paragraph and a conception of what constitutes the desirable form of human life. That is, an integral part of the desirable form of human life must surely be the experience of satisfaction rather than disappointment, fulfillment rather than frustration, pleasure rather than pain. It is a life where wants are attained rather than thwarted. This is not to say that the ideal of human existence is just a matter of maximising want-satisfaction. It is simply to draw attention to an aspect of the Good Life which is often swamped by ethics of duty, self-denial or austerity, or else lost amid demands for pursuit of intellectual excellence, spiritual purity, and the like.

If this line of argument is sustained, it would suggest an important link between the desirable form of human life and the development of free persons in my sense. For on my view the free person is one whose pursuit of wants is characterised by ease and efficiency of action. His want-directed activity 'flows'. He is not frustrated by conflicting wants, inhibited by fear of failure or doubts about the propriety of his wants, or thwarted by an inadequate conception of his wants due to defects of emotional awareness. To this extent his life will be characterised by satisfaction rather than disappointment, fulfillment rather than frustration, and pleasure rather than pain. In short, the life of a free person is one of success rather than failure in the pursuit of wants. This, I would argue, is an integral aspect of the desirable form of human life. Hence development of free persons can properly be acknowledged as an educational ideal. I want now to consider some possible implications for the social freedom of young people if educators aim to develop free persons in something like my sense.
Social freedom and the development of free persons.

Again it must be acknowledged that what follows is in no way an exhaustive treatment of the matter under consideration. Indeed the question of how to promote development of free persons is largely an empirical one. Hence any final account will depend on facts and considerations which the philosopher is in no position to uncover. I intend simply to take the four conditions of educating for free persons proposed in Chapter Six and suggest briefly a number of practices which appear consistent with meeting these conditions. Obviously only a small range of possible practices can be considered here. I will then comment on implications of these practices for the social freedom of young people, making at various points comparisons with the rationalist position outlined in Chapters Four and Five.

Ensuring as far as possible that there is harmony between the various wants the individual acquires.

There are at least two things an educator might do which are consistent with the idea of ensuring as far as possible that there is harmony between the various wants the individual acquires. These, however, have very different implications for the social freedom of young people. They are, respectively, encouraging children to clarify their wants, and promoting harmony between wants by use of manipulation and conditioning.

(a) Encouraging children to clarify their wants.

One factor which may contribute to incompatibility or tension between various wants an individual has is a limited conception or awareness of his wants: what they are and what their attainment involves. Sometimes we are not aware of what a given want commits us to until we
attempt to satisfy it. Only then may we find that to realise this want will involve jeopardising another (or others). By then it may be too late to avoid considerable frustration or confusion. In some cases it may be impossible to know in advance that satisfaction of a given want will involve jeopardising others. However, in other cases possible conflicts can be noted in advance, and subsequently alleviated or avoided, if some effort is made to clarify one's wants.

Clarifying one's wants can refer to various things. It may be a matter of determining just what it is that one wants: identifying the goals or ends one intends to pursue, locating necessary steps to attaining an end, or perhaps simply determining what will give one pleasure or contentment at a given moment. A second aspect of clarifying a want is to ascertain what will be involved in satisfying it. Thirdly, the demands of satisfying a given want can be examined in relation to other wants one has, or in relation to one's existing plans or schedules for want-satisfaction. Finally, clarifying one's wants can be an exercise in establishing the priority of competing wants: how important is it that I pursue this want given that I also want X and Y and have limited resources available for satisfying them?

Presented like this there would seem to be both an ability and a dispositional component to clarifying one's wants. Identifying clearly ends or means to ends, ascertaining what is involved in satisfying a given want, relating these demands to those of one's other wants, are the sorts of things which a person may or may not be able to do. Our everyday experience is that some people can do them better than others. Moreover it is likely that some individuals might do them better than in fact they do, if they were given appropriate forms of encouragement,
opportunity and training. As regards the dispositional component, an individual may have the abilities which would enable him to clarify his wants in various ways, but not be disposed to do so. Perhaps he has a very strong sense of what it is his duty to do, and sees little purpose in sorting out what he himself wants to do and what this might involve.

I want to suggest the possibility that certain child-rearing practices may enhance both the ability and disposition to clarify one's wants. Ultimately this would have to be assessed by empirical test. However the following two suggestions have considerable plausibility.

(i) Ability and disposition to clarify wants may be enhanced if parents, teachers, and other educators offer children encouragement and opportunity to express and 'explore' their wants. Often the question, "What do you want?" is merely a prelude to a prompt, and perhaps somewhat arbitrary, "Yes, you can", or "No, you can't". In many cases this is quite understandable given pressures of time. However, "What do you want?" might equally be used to introduce a quite different experience. At a simple level it might challenge the child to consider whether X will indeed satisfy what it is that he lacks. It may be an invitation to consider possible consequences of doing or having X at this particular time, or to consider the advantages of pursuing X rather than Y. At a more sophisticated level it may prompt some discussion - do my friends share this want; is it the sort of thing children used to want, (for example, when Dad was young); are there other things which it might be better, easier, more convenient to have or do; how do my wants compare with those of children in other cultures and circumstances?
This is not intended to sound like a philosopher over-indulging or patronising children. Nor is it an attempt to turn, "What do you want?", into an invitation for so much abstract, intellectual discussion. I simply want to note that there are ways which we often overlook by which children might be encouraged to consider their wants, explore them, and entertain other possible objects of desire which may not otherwise occur to them. If children come to see wants largely as things which parents and teachers either permit or refuse, there is little obvious incentive for them to work towards harmonising their wants, ordering their pursuit along lines of optimum satisfaction, or looking ahead to longer term pursuits. Want-satisfaction may seem to them a fickle affair, dependent on the moods or whims of others, as Locke and Rousseau pointed out long ago. Children may indeed retain such a passive orientation towards wants beyond childhood, perhaps throughout their lives. I am suggesting that children be encouraged to form a different conception of wants: as possessions which partially define them as distinctive persons, over which they have some power of determination, and in relation to which their lives can run more or less smoothly and satisfactorily. If he conceives wants in this way an individual may be disposed to seek clarification of his wants where it seems appropriate to do so, in the interests of a superior quality of life. And if he is given opportunity as a youngster to 'explore' various wants in a serious way, we might reasonably expect his ability to clarify wants as an adult to be heightened. (c.f., the assumption that giving children opportunity to explore poetry heightens their ability to appreciate and understand poems.)

(ii) Ability to clarify wants may be enhanced by offering extensive opportunities for children to pursue their wants. Educators claim that
they do not limit children's pursuit of wants unreasonably. They often see such limitations as necessary given their perception of a child's true interests. What I am proposing is that one reason for giving children more scope than is usual to pursue wants is that it may increase their ability to clarify wants. Such extended opportunity provides valuable forms of experience in sorting out wants, and it gives them a 'feel' for different forms of satisfaction. This may aid development of a sense of priority among various wants, for some give more satisfaction than others, or have greater benefits over a period of time.

One reason why some people experience so much incompatibility between their wants may be that as children they failed to acquire a personal awareness of conflict emerging between various wants and the frustration attending such conflict, as well as some appreciation of the sorts of wants which in combination are likely to produce tensions. Opportunity to pursue many wants is likely to promote such an awareness in children. But if children are given only limited opportunity to pursue their wants, they may come to believe that the only source of conflict involving their wants rests in a conflict between wills - their will versus that of others with the power or authority to restrict their activity. Furthermore, experience in pursuing a wide range of wants will make the individual aware of what is involved in realising them. Such awareness may be of considerable practical value in future attempts to sort out one's wants.

(b) Promoting harmony between wants by use of manipulation and conditioning.

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(b) Promoting harmony between wants by use of manipulation and conditioning.

My investigation in this chapter will inevitably be somewhat tentative. This is well illustrated by the fact that a radically different
position from the one just sketched might be adopted in respect of promoting harmony between a person's different wants. This alternative is in direct contrast with the idea of enabling individuals to clarify their wants by offering them extensive opportunities to explore and pursue wants. It seems that the aim of minimising incompatibility and tension between the wants a person comes to have is consistent with his wants being shaped or determined by someone else using techniques of manipulation or conditioning. Educators are often in a position to claim justifiably to know that certain wants are not in a child's interests. Their claim is based on facts about their own experience, knowledge, and capacity to make various kinds of judgment, which do not obtain in the case of children. Similarly, they may be more aware of conflicts likely to develop within children's wants than are the children themselves. Furthermore, they could be in a position to prevent such conflicts emerging, by ensuring that a child acquires certain wants but not others. The mechanics of this need not concern us here, but the following considerations seem important:

(i) The wants a person has can be modified and determined by some other person or persons;

(ii) For B to manipulate or condition A's wants may be a very efficient way of ensuring a high degree of harmony between the various wants A comes to have.

(iii) This alternative approach has very different implications for the social freedom of young people from those of the practices suggested for enabling children to clarify their wants. Encouraging children to explore and pursue wants involves extending them social freedom. By contrast, ensuring that people acquire certain wants and not others will
typically be as much a restriction on their social freedom as is preventing their doing what they want. The educational method proposed by Rousseau in Emile is of interest here. He advocates shaping children's wants in order to minimise frustration resulting from unsatisfied or unsatisfiable wants. So far as his practical proposals are sufficient for realising his aim, they will in turn be sufficient for minimising incompatibility within an individual's pool of wants. Precisely what Rousseau advocates is rigorous manipulation of children's wants. (See Ryan, 1975, for an analysis of the sorts of techniques Rousseau would have the tutor employ with a view to shaping the pupil's wants.)

2. Developing within the youngster confidence in his own ability to attain ends and meet standards.

While fear of failure may inhibit an individual's activity to the point where we regard him as unfree, it may not be sufficient for "freeing a person" simply to ensure that this particular fear is absent. A person can lack a fear of failing without necessarily having a positive attitude toward his own capacity for successful activity. However it is the notion of such a positive attitude that seems more obviously linked with "ease or efficiency of activity", and hence, I suggest, with "being a free person". There are at least two things that the educator might do in order to enhance an individual's confidence in his own ability to attain his wants and measure up to standards which are personally significant.

First, the educator may adopt a broader conception of the range of educational pursuits than that which is commonly held. Typically the bounds placed on what count as genuine educational pursuits are rather
tight. Within recent educational philosophy the tendency has been to confine educational activity largely to pursuits in which concern for truth is 'writ large'. This academic bias extends to the classroom level as well. Other options may be available but they are not typically accorded the same emphasis or importance as the disciplines: they are not compulsory, not examinable, are available only once a week, are offered only to the 'less able', or do not really count as qualifications.

As a consequence performance in the more academic pursuits is seen to define educational ability. Given the central place of formal education in children's lives and the tremendous significance attached to it in societies like our own, the young person's conception of his overall ability to succeed may well be determined by evaluation of his ability in educational pursuits. Experience of failure in education may be linked with fear of failure in wider spheres of the individual's life. Conversely, experience of success in education may be linked with a positive attitude toward one's ability generally.

I want to suggest that the idea of adopting a broader conception of significant educational pursuits from that which typically prevails is consistent with reducing personal fear of failure, and indeed with enhancing positive attitudes in individuals toward their own ability. To extend the range of what counts as a genuine educational pursuit increases the possibility of individuals following educational interests in areas where they have relative strength. This is consistent with increasing the likelihood of positive evaluation on the part of individuals of their capacity to succeed in 'important' or 'worthwhile' activities. Experience of success in education is consistent with developing a positive attitude toward one's ability to attain ends generally. This is
not to suggest that we should be completely laissez-faire about what is to count as a genuine educational pursuit. One can maintain that the typical academic emphasis is unduly narrow without implying that any activity at all should be seen to have educational worth. I would argue however that the question of just how far beyond the rational academic pursuits one's conception of worthwhile educational activities should extend ought to be considered carefully by anyone committed to development of free persons.

A second task educators may perform in order to help a child develop confidence in his own ability to attain ends and meet standards of success, is to encourage him to adopt an appropriate set of personally significant standards of attainment. It seems plausible that the closer the fit between a person's abilities and the standards of attainment with which he identifies, the more likely he is to develop confidence in his ability to measure up to those standards. Certainly we might reasonably expect a person who has adopted standards beyond his capacity for attainment to acquire a negative attitude toward the particular activity. There are at least two ways in which educators might help young people adopt standards of attainment which are appropriate given their individual capacities for attainment. The first is essentially negative. The educator should avoid as far as possible projecting his own standards or levels of attainment onto the pupil. People frequently find upon reflection that what they thought were their own standards are really projections of someone else, often an educator. Children are acutely sensitive to the demands and expectations of parents and teachers, and this sensitivity is positively encouraged. In many cases it is necessary for the child to submit to authoritative demands and standards imposed by educators if he is genuinely to engage in an activity at all,
(c.f., Chapter Two above). But this is not the same thing as an educator handing on a conception of success and failure generalisable to all or many spheres of activity - for example, always strive for perfection, a high degree of originality, superiority, or optimal efficiency.

The danger here is that standards simply absorbed by the child from an educator may be quite inappropriate for her. Often where this occurs the educator does not intend a young person to take on the standards he espouses. But the child's self-perception may be damaged nevertheless. Given the difficulties involved in determining what appropriate standards of achievement for another person might be, the safest course is for the educator to do all he can to avoid projecting his own standards onto the pupil.

The problem for the educator is how to avoid passing on his own standards without abdicating his role as an educator, since there are many activities which presuppose certain standards. Here it will be necessary for the educator to distinguish instances where certain standards of attainment must be met for genuine participation in an activity, from those where the child can find her own level and yet still properly be regarded as participating in a particular activity. Having made this distinction the educator may then give the child opportunities to find her own level in appropriate instances, and accept it for what it is: a true expression of her ability, having worth or value at least in virtue of its being her best. On the present argument it would be open for the educator to insist that a child do better than she in fact does if it is clear that she is performing below her potential. There may be other grounds for discouraging this on the part of the educator, but the present argument does not provide them.
A second, and more positive, suggestion is that the educator provide ample opportunity for children to engage in relatively 'open-ended' pursuits. For some human pursuits there are very precise specifications of what counts as "getting it right" or "getting it wrong", and which are independent of the beliefs, wishes, feelings, or interests of those who engage in them. Mathematics and science are model cases of such pursuits. By contrast there are other pursuits where the criteria for getting it right or wrong are not as sharply or comprehensively defined, or where perhaps they are very much related to the beliefs, wishes, feelings, or interests of those who engage in them. Composing free-form verse, producing an 'abstract' art piece, and writing to a friend are activities in which the criteria for successful participation are comparatively general and fluid. In the case of leisure pursuits and exercises in self-expression, such as playing guitar for relaxation or writing poetry for release of feeling, the criteria for success are largely tied to the wishes and feelings of those taking part.

Activities in the second broad category seem particularly suitable for encouraging the individual to formulate an appropriate set of personal standards of attainment. To begin with, where there are very explicit criteria governing successful engagement in an educational activity, it is easy for children to mistake the 'authority' of the activity itself, (for example, a discipline) for the authority of a person, (for example, a teacher). Successful participation would then be seen as a matter of meeting standards which originate with the educator. Once this basic confusion arises it is conceivable that a child might look to the educator for standards to govern activities generally. However, to give children plenty of scope to engage in more
'open-ended' pursuits is at least to give them opportunities to see that there exist serious activities where standards of attainment are largely independent of the educator, and indeed of other people. It must be a central concern of anyone educating toward freedom that children learn this lesson. Of course, to engage in such activities as playing guitar for relaxation or writing poetry to express one's feelings, is to impose one's own criteria of successful participation on one's activity. A person engaging in such pursuits has a chance to define success within the bounds of his own ability and strengths. He does not have this opportunity to the same extent within pursuits where there are precise specifications of what counts as "getting it right or wrong", and which are independent of the wishes, feelings, and interests of those taking part.

3. **Promoting within the individual trust in his wants and ends as offering a proper basis for activity.**

Here again there are severe restrictions on what the philosopher can suggest, but three suggestions seem to fall within his scope. The first concerns the importance of educators adopting as far as possible a positive attitude toward children's pursuit of their wants. To tell a child that he must not act on a given want is to say that, at least in these circumstances, this want is not an acceptable basis for action. In other words, what he wants to do is not what he ought to do. The more frequently a child is told he must not act on his wants the more he is in effect told that his wants do not comprise an appropriate guide to activity. There is indeed something odd about the idea of expecting a child to acquire trust or confidence in his wants if he is continually told that he is not to act on them. Conversely, it is not at all odd to suppose that a child who is often positively
encouraged to pursue his wants might develop such trust or confidence in his desires as grounds for action. That is, the idea that educators adopt as far as possible a positive attitude toward children's pursuit of wants seems consistent with promoting a trust in one's wants in a way that adopting a negative attitude is not.

It is possible to sketch some of the things that adopting a positive orientation toward children and their wants might mean in practical terms.

(i) Some instances where an educator denies a child's wants may reflect mere contrariness or an unbending commitment to being 'firm'. That is, in the particular case there may be nothing wrong with what the child wants, but the educator isn't prepared on this occasion to permit the child what he wants, whatever it is. He believes, rather, that it is very important to impress his authority on the child, and thinks that refusing the child's want on this occasion will be an effective means to this end. Part of what is meant by educators adopting a positive attitude towards children's pursuit of wants in the interests of developing free persons, is that they will try not to frustrate wants out of mere contrariness, or the wish to appear 'firm' or in 'control'.

(ii) Any adult who is seriously committed to development of free persons will probably have to put up with some inconvenient consequences of children's activity in return for progress toward free-personhood on the part of his charges. While there will always be some wants which children should not be allowed to pursue, wants are often frustrated because the consequences of a child's action will bring some small inconvenience or irritation to the educator. The recommendation here
is that educators make some sacrifices in terms of convenience to allow children more of their wants than they might otherwise get.

(iii) In some instances where wants are refused because undesirable consequences are possible or likely, the chances of these consequences occurring could be removed with a little effort on the educator's part - for example, by operating on the environment in some way. This is a simple truth which some educators already acknowledge. Where this effort is taken it is then possible to permit the child his wants with impunity. Again this involves a form of inconvenience, a demand for effort, which those committed to development of free persons may have to accept.

A second way in which educators may enhance a child's trust in his wants and ends as guides to activity involves exposing 'unwarranted' instances of guilt or anxiety over wants. Often the guilt or anxiety an individual experiences in respect of some want derives from a mere prejudice or preference of an adult and not, say, from a demonstrable moral truth. That is, an individual may have been told or had it impressed on him that wanting X is wrong, where the fact is no so much that there is anything demonstrably wrong with X, but simply that a particular adult doesn't approve of it. The contrast here is between a thoroughly 'subjective' morality and a more objective morality. Possible examples of wants which may be inadmissible on a subjective morality include various activities related to sexuality: for example, masturbation, pre-marital sex, and reading 'sex manuals'. For some educators even such wants as listening to the radio, watching T.V., going to the cinema, and wearing certain forms of clothing (for example, bikinis), are wrong.
Now we might want to argue that in the case of these examples and others which could be provided, it is far from an objective moral truth that it is wrong or wicked to desire such things. As we know, these are precisely the sorts of things young people often want. Even so, if a child has come to feel that it is wrong to want these things but still wants them, this is obviously consistent with failure to develop trust in his wants as grounds for activity. So far as an individual's lack of trust or confidence in his wants can be linked with the arbitrary subjective morality of an educator, we might say that it is unwarranted. The same could be argued for any guilt or anxiety he may experience over them.

This suggests a possible task for the educator. To expose evaluations of children's wants which are based on prejudice or mere subjective preference for what they are may be to enhance a youngster's confidence in his wants as a basis for activity. For an educator to provide opportunities for youngsters to discover instances where an adult has evaluated their wants arbitrarily may, then, be to help free them up. It may be to reveal that much of the anxiety or lack of confidence they experience over their wants is groundless - that they might reasonably place greater trust in their wants as directors of activity. However for an educator to provide these sorts of opportunities is not without its hazards.

(1) It would involve the educator making difficult judgments - often moral judgments: for example, "X is the sort of want which young people could be, or often are, anxious about, but there is no good reason for them to be anxious". Making such a judgment may place him in conflict with other educators: for example, teacher versus parents.
(ii) It would probably expose him to various difficulties attaching to moral discussion among young people. Presumably a central technique of exposing arbitrary evaluation of wants is to attack such evaluation through moral discussion. But how this should proceed is notoriously controversial.

(iii) For some cases the final test of a want might be to act on it and observe the consequences. In this the educator, as an agent having responsibility, could put himself at risk - for example, if unexpected and undesirable consequences resulted.

The third thing educators may do in this general area of contributing to children developing trust in their wants and ends is to help them find appropriate ways of pursuing their wants. One reason why a person may lack trust in his wants is because pursuing them in the past has sometimes, and perhaps often, caused harm or brought hurt to other people. However these unfortunate results may have less to do with the wants per se than with the manner in which they were pursued, or the circumstances in which they were pursued. If an educator is in a position to help young people find more appropriate ways of pursuing their wants, to do so may be in the long run to enhance children's trust in their wants as a proper basis for activity.

4. Ensuring that individuals are open to feeling and capable of differentiating clearly or accurately between emotions.

I would prefer to avoid suggesting what this fourth aspect of freeing people might imply in practical educational terms. In the first place there is considerable work involved in even clarifying what it means to be open to feeling, or able accurately to discriminate
emotions. I simply am unable to undertake this work in sufficient depth here to feel comfortable making positive suggestions. Besides, there would be limited point in my advancing a series of "a priori types of of hunches", as Peters calls them. For many such hunches have already been advanced by educationists, and some have found their way into educational practice.

Strong claims are made in support of encounter group experience - or 'sensitivity training' - and various forms of psychotherapy as means of enhancing people's capacity to feel. It is also argued that encounter groups open individuals up to a wider spectrum of feeling than they might otherwise have come into contact with. The desire to open individuals up more to the feeling dimension of human life has prompted demands for various changes in socialisation practices. It has been traditional among many parents in our culture that children should be encouraged to minimise expression of feeling, or at least to avoid expressing a certain range of feelings: for example, aggression is (perhaps) appropriate for boys but not girls; girls may express pain or sadness but boys should not. By contrast we now find widespread support for the view that children should be encouraged to express their feelings openly and honestly, whatever these feelings are.

Philosophers of education also note various ways in which educators might enhance the capacity for accurate identification of emotions. According to Peters, "many claim that this ability is encouraged by taking part in games and drama, as well as by literature" (1970, p. 198). John Wilson uses the symbol "autemp" to denote ability to know what one's emotions are and describe them accurately (1967, pp. 192-217). He does not systematically address the question of what methods might be used to
increase autemp in children. However he intimates that the following sorts of activities and aids may be helpful here: history, literature, mime, drama, acting out various roles, discussion of particular case histories of other people (taken from, for example, books and films), music and the arts, 'psychological documentary' films and tape-recordings with subsequent discussion (see ibid, pp. 409-413).

My belief is that at the present time education would probably benefit more from some reliable empirical evidence which substantiates or refutes those hunches which have already been advanced, than from further attempts to add to the list. The main point I want to argue here is essentially a negative one: namely, that while initiation into the rational traditions may help promote openness to feeling and ability to identify one's emotions, there is no necessary link between freeing up feelings and emotions and initiating people into the forms and fields of knowledge. I propose to argue this point by addressing just the link between participation in the various forms of rational inquiry and ability to discriminate emotions.

The claim that there is an important (if not intimate) connection between initiation into rational forms of inquiry and capacity for accurate and clear identification of emotions might be defended on two grounds.

(a) Studies like literature, the fine arts, history, religion, and philosophy provide us with forms of awareness, knowledge, and understanding which enhance the ability to identify emotions reliably. This argument stems from the view that emotions are basically forms of cognition; and indeed forms of cognition which are not innate, but rather the consequence of certain forms of learning experience. According
to Peters there is a logical link between "emotion" and "making an appraisal". c.f.,

"Emotions have in common the fact that they involve appraisals elicited by external conditions which are of concern to us or by things which we have brought about or suffered ......
My thesis, however, about the appraisals involved in emotion is not that they provide very valuable evidence as to what the distinct emotions are; it is rather that these different appraisals are largely constitutive of the different emotions. By that I mean that at least a logically necessary condition for the use of the word 'emotion' is that some kind of appraisal should be involved, and that the different emotions must involve different appraisals" (1970, p. 188).

To make an appraisal is to see something (an object, event, situation, etc.) under some description. The appraisals constitutive of emotions involve "seeing situations under aspects which are agreeable or disagreeable, beneficial or harmful in a variety of dimensions" (ibid).

The important point here is that the ability to make such appraisals is learned rather than innate. It presupposes that one has undergone certain forms of learning. This point is implicit in Kenny's account of acquiring the various emotion concepts (see Chapter Six). We learn what it means to experience some given emotion in contexts where some or all of the 'struts' on which emotion concepts stand are present or portrayed. Central to this learning process is learning to appraise circumstances or situations: for example, we learn what circumstances are properly appraised as fearful rather than, say, dangerous, and so on.

Obviously a number of the forms and fields of knowledge - particularly history, literature and the arts - can assume a very important role in the learning process on which rests this ability to appraise situations from the emotional point of view. They may present us with elaborate portrayals of a situation, along with actual appraisals
of that situation by characters or commentators, and possibly comments on the various characters' appraisals. To this extent they provide sophisticated contexts in which we can sharpen our conception of different emotions and, perhaps, even extend our emotional repertoire, by making explicit the aspects under which particular situations can or should be seen.

(b) Secondly, it might be argued that initiation into disciplined inquiry can free an individual from conditions which may impede accurate appraisal of a situation, and hence distort emotional response. Peters notes that lack of concern for truth or objectivity may show up as failure to base one's appraisal of situations on well-grounded beliefs. (see ibid., p. 197). Instead one's appraisal may be based on irrelevant or false beliefs: for example, or what one wants to see in a situation rather than what is really there. However part of what it means to be initiated into rational inquiry is that one acquires a concern for truth and objectivity. The more generally this concern is diffused throughout one's life the less likely it is that one's emotional responses will be subject to distortion. Here, then, is a case for the significance of initiation into forms and fields of knowledge as a corrective to confusion within emotional experience.

There is a variation on this argument. Peters speaks of emotional sincerity and insincerity. A person is emotionally insincere or dishonest to the extent that he tries to present a false impression of his emotions or to conceal what they really are. As such he may be insincere toward himself as well as others. Often, says Peters, one has some strong motive for being insincere: for example, fear, shame, or the feeling associated with the authentic emotion one expresses (ibid,
p. 199). Under such a motive one may succeed in deceiving oneself as
to the nature of the emotion one experiences in a given situation. This
is a not uncommon form of failure to identify emotion accurately. At
the behavioural level this may be manifested in inappropriate action -
which clearly has implications for personal unfreedom. To free a
person up in this regard is to develop or restore honesty and sincerity
as guiding principles in his cognitive life.

Honesty and sincerity are, of course written into Peters' view of
rationality and the pursuit of truth. The individual who is genuinely
engaged in rational inquiry is, by definition, consciously striving to
avoid being dishonest or insincere in his observation, deliberation and
assessment. Consequently, initiating a person into rational inquiry
entails getting him committed to honesty and sincerity.

However these very arguments suggest that any link between rational
pursuits and the capacity to identify and discriminate emotions
accurately cannot be a necessary one. We may concede that the capacity
in question presupposes certain forms of learning, and that initiation
into the disciplines can provide sophisticated opportunities for such
learning to take place. But it is a simple fact that individuals can
and do undergo the relevant learning experiences without formally
engaging in the disciplines. It seems much more obviously a 'folk'
sphere of learning. c.f., people can and do acquire the grammar of their
language without formally engaging in Grammar. This acquisition may be
the more sharp and sophisticated for having engaged in the formal pursuit,
but there is no necessary reason why a high degree of competence in
grammar cannot be acquired via the informal process of learning one's
language.
Precisely the same thing can be argued for development of honesty, sincerity, and a concern for truth and objectivity. Many parents would see it as a concern of primary socialisation to foster commitment in their children to honesty and sincerity. Just how widely these virtues come to pervade a child's life will depend in part on facts relating to his socialisation. But there is nothing logically odd in the idea that a person may be honest and sincere with himself about his emotions without having undergone initiation into the disciplines. Similarly, respect for truth and objectivity may emerge out of one's interpersonal relationships and dealings, or the everyday activities in which one is involved.

**Implications for the social freedom of young people**

It was argued in Chapter Two that to limit someone's social freedom is to impose constraints on his wants: to prevent or impede his pursuing objects of desire. Constraints are imposed on a person whenever he is restrained from pursuing what he wants to pursue, or is coerced to do what he prefers not to do. It makes no difference that the objects of his wants may be risky, foolish, or undesirable, or that coercing him to do certain things may be reasonable or desirable. His freedom is limited nonetheless. Conversely, so far as we alleviate or remove constraints to a person's pursuits of wants, or avoid imposing them in the first place, we extend social freedom to that person.

Given this analysis the thrust of my argument in this concluding chapter is that if children are to develop into free persons they require considerable social freedom in education: educators should relax constraints on children's pursuits of wants, and reduce certain forms of coercion prevalent in education. The suggestion that educators adopt as
far as possible a positive attitude toward children's pursuit of wants is, in effect, a demand for relaxation of restraint - even to the point where educators themselves make concessions to offset possible unwanted consequences of children's activity. But it must be recognised that this is a demand for relaxation of restraint and not for complete absence of restraint. Development of free persons is consistent with employing various criteria for imposing constraints: for example, avoiding harm, as opposed, say, to minor discomfort to others, or preserving the health and safety of the child. Similarly, adopting a positive attitude toward children's pursuit of wants, in the sense sketched above, is consistent with limiting liberty in accordance with such criteria. However for educators to adopt a positive attitude toward children and their wants would be to reduce restraint considerably by comparison with much current educational practice.

The same presumption in favour of relaxing restraint is evident in the recommendation that educators help children find appropriate ways of pursuing their wants in cases where genuine problems are posed less by the wants themselves than the attempt to realise them. Educators often find it more convenient to limit a child's freedom than to seek some way of preserving this freedom while avoiding undesirable consequences. For an educator genuinely concerned with promoting development of free persons, to act in accordance with mere convenience is either to act arbitrarily, or to base his action on an irrelevant consideration.

But against this it might be claimed that my argument can also be used to limit rather than extend the social freedom of children in education: harmony within a person's pool of wants might be enhanced by deliberately shaping his wants through manipulation and conditioning.
It is impossible for educators to avoid influencing children's wants in certain ways, and there are some cases of influence which we would not want to describe as restrictions on the child's freedom, (see Chapter Two). However there are also cases of deliberate influence which constitute paradigm forms of constraint. These include forms of manipulation and conditioning which might well be employed to enhance harmony between the various wants an individual acquires. Although a skillful manipulator could observe Rousseau's advice and, in his manipulation, preserve the form or appearance of freedom, he must nevertheless be seen as restricting the child's liberty.

The reply to this challenge is obvious enough. Promoting harmony between wants is just one aspect of developing a free person. And as I've suggested there are other possible approaches to fostering this harmony than through manipulation and conditioning. The problem with manipulation and conditioning is that it is likely to conflict with other aspects of developing free persons: for example, encouraging the child to clarify his wants, frame his educational interests in areas where he feels he has relative strength, and find an appropriate standard of attainment for himself through participation in 'open-ended' activity. Here the emphasis seems clearly to be on avoiding or minimising manipulative influence. Given the importance of these aspects of developing free persons, and given that there are other possible approaches to harmonising wants, we might reasonably insist that manipulative procedures be avoided in favour of those more obviously consistent with attaining the overall end. It was argued only that manipulation and conditioning may be a very efficient way of ensuring a high degree of harmony between the wants someone acquires; not that it is a necessary means to this limited end.
Some of the practical suggestions for developing free persons advanced here relate to the curriculum. Here too the implication is that children's social freedom will be extended rather than restricted.

(i) The recommendation that educators adopt a broader conception of the range of educational pursuits than is commonly adopted has quite clear implications for children's liberty. The more narrow the view of what counts as genuine educational activity the more probable it is that children's wants will be infringed - simply because there is less scope for children to exercise preferences within education. Conversely, the wider the conception of genuine educational pursuits, the fewer limitations there will be on children exercising preferences and manoeuvring between options in accordance with their wants. Given that much educational practice is based on a rather narrow view of genuine educational pursuits, my position supports an increase in children's liberty within education.

(ii) In suggesting that children be provided with ample opportunity for engagement in 'open-ended' pursuits, I open up the possibility of children's wants significantly shaping the way in which a curriculum is worked out in practice. This would seem to follow from my view that in certain activities the criteria for 'getting it right', that is for successful participation, are to a considerable extent related to the wants of those who engage in them. There is, then, a close link between extending to children the opportunity for engagement in these sorts of activity and extending them social freedom. Shaping one's activity in accordance with one's wants is part of what is meant by successful participation in such a pursuit.
(iii) A large degree of informality and individuality within education is likely to accrue from any serious attempt to engage pupils in 'open-ended' activities. This may expand children's liberty in other ways from that just mentioned under (ii). One possibility here is that children may be less confined in terms of time and space. Traditional forms of schooling typically require that the teacher act as academic authority, often for quite large numbers of pupils, and that several subject areas be covered within a given time span. The practical consequence of this is the typical classroom period situation: children sitting at desks, doing much the same thing at the same time, shifting to a different location and/or a different kind of activity at a pre-arranged time. Where there is just one teacher for numerous pupils, an emphasis on activities where the teacher alone has academic authority, and where several subject areas have to be covered within a given duration, it is almost inevitable that pupils will suffer quite severe confinement in terms of time and space. Detailed timetabling is the common response to the demand that a range of subject areas be covered. But while it may be administratively and pedagogically effective it clearly constrains pupils' wants. For example, they may want to continue with a given activity when the bell rings. As regards spatial confinement, this is often not merely within classroom, laboratory, or gymnasium walls, but also at a desk. This arrangement is defended on various grounds: it avoids clutter, provides each individual with his own defined space in which to work, and minimises movement thereby preserving conditions under which learning can take place.

The position seems significantly different with a shift toward more 'open-ended' activity. There is no longer the same need for the teacher to act as a focal point in the learning process, because it is no longer
appropriate to conceive him as the academic authority. Given this it is possible that a different conception of the conditions under which learning takes place may operate. The idea of detailed timetabling so that a range of disciplines receive adequate coverage seems out of place with that of freeing people up by offering them plenty of scope for activity in which they set their own standards and decide when the activity is at an end. Hence there may be less need to regulate time than under a more traditional-styled curriculum. Furthermore, there may not be the same obvious need for close spatial confinement as on the traditional model. So far as confinement in time and space impedes children's pursuit of wants, a shift away from tightly disciplined activities is consistent with increased social freedom for pupils: given facts about typical teaching practices.

(iv) I want to argue that there is no necessary link between "developing free persons" and "initiation into the disciplines", despite possible appearances. I have already argued this in relation to developing the ability to discriminate emotions. However it might be suggested that initiation into rational pursuits has crucial importance for other aspects of becoming a free person. In particular it might be claimed that there are forms of awareness, understanding, and knowledge associated with disciplined inquiry that may assist greatly in clarifying one's wants - for example, by helping one locate means to ends, or to determine what is involved in satisfying a given want, construct and compare schedules for want-satisfaction, and so on.

However any suggestion of a necessary link here can easily be dispelled. First, we may concede that information and skills acquired in the course of being initiated into the disciplines may be helpful in, say,
clarifying wants. But to show that something is helpful here is not to show that it is necessary. There may be other skills and information, acquisition of which does not depend on initiation into the disciplines, that are equally helpful in clarifying one's wants.

Secondly, I would suggest that it is quite inappropriate to associate acquisition of those skills and awarenesses most obviously helpful in clarifying wants with being initiated into the disciplines. A person can get a long way in exploring and clarifying his wants if he can read, write, count, employ means-end reasoning, and knows how and where to seek information. To think of initiation into the disciplines in terms of furnishing these sorts of skills, or providing useful facts relating to one's wants, is to distort the very idea of such initiation. For it is essentially concerned with fostering a sophisticated and rather academic kind of rationality. To focus on acquisition of facts, sharpening means-end reasoning, and the like is to draw attention away from the very nature of the enterprise.

We may usefully distinguish here between "initiation into the disciplines" and "training in literacy and fact-finding". The latter has an unashamedly functional role. The skills and awarenesses it affords are precisely those which are indispensable for clarifying one's wants. And it in no way distorts this notion of a basic training to link it with promoting ability to clarify wants. This is merely one of a number of ends for which it may serve as a means. Other abilities involved in clarifying wants may be developed to a high level with no formal training at all: for example, constructing means-end models, framing plans or schedules for satisfying wants. Initially these capacities emerge out of the ordinary experience of the child. However there is no suggestion
whosoever that refinement of these practical modes of reasoning require participation in the disciplines.

The considerations raised here support the claim that there is no necessary link between "developing free persons" and "initiation into the disciplines". If such a link cannot be established in relation to clarifying wants or discriminating emotions, it is difficult to see how it would be established in relation to any of the remaining conditions of becoming a free person. Given that there is no necessary link here, two broad implications for the social freedom of pupils can be noted.

(a) To the extent that education is concerned with development of free persons there is no need to require children to engage in the disciplines. As argued in Chapter Five, such a requirement constitutes a serious curtailment of children's freedom. Participation in rational pursuits involves considerable time and effort. Moreover there are alternatives to this form of activity into which children would often prefer to channel their time and energy. But on my position, to become a free person does not presuppose having one's liberty curtailed by the requirement that one engage in the disciplines.

(b) On the rationalist position there is a tight link between the development of autonomy and learning within a school setting. In societies like our own, certain facts make it inevitable that initiation into the various rational traditions must take place in schools. These facts include assumptions about the education and training necessary to provide 'experts' fitted for teaching the disciplines, and economic considerations which govern the availability of such 'experts' along with other resources deemed essential for successful teaching. However the school requires an elaborate system of constraints to regulate the
behaviour and attitudes of its clientele if it is to perform its pedagogical function successfully. Hence on the rationalist position the child is not simply required to participate in rational pursuits. Given the fact that this will typically involve schooling, he is also subjected to an authority and power structure and a wide range of social constraints.

But as I have already suggested, (see pp. 318-320), the kinds of learning presupposed by my account of becoming a free person may be considerably more informal than those proposed by rationalists. There simply does not seem to be the same need for the kind of 'expertise' presumed necessary for teaching the disciplines. To this extent there is not the same strong contingent link between school learning and becoming free. Consequently on my position it is not necessary for the child to be subjected to the school's distinctive system of authority, power, and constraints in order to become a free person. He will, of course, still be subject to those constraints governing the more informal learning situations in which he will be involved. Nevertheless we might reasonably expect this to constitute a gain for him in terms of social freedom.

There is considerably more that could be said concerning the relationship between social freedom and the development of free persons. But further possible implications of my position will not be considered here. Enough has already been argued to warrant the claim that there is a significant difference in emphasis between the rationalist position and my own. Rationalists see their account of "free persons" as supporting quite stringent restrictions on the freedom of young people. Some, such as Peters, acknowledge that there is a presumption in favour of extending liberty to human beings, but argue that development of free (autonomous)
persons is one consideration in accordance with which educators may override this general presumption and impose various constraints on children. It sometimes appears as though much of the motivation behind rationalist accounts of "the free person" is precisely to justify a considerable degree of social unfreedom for children in education. By contrast, my account of "free persons" may be employed in a more positive manner, to suggest ways in which children might be offered increased freedom in education. So I end up with quite the opposite view to that established by the rationalist position. Rationalists emphasise that education promotes freedom (free persons) by restricting liberty. On my view, education promotes freedom by extending liberty.
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