Democratic Vanguardism

Modernity, Intervention, and the making of the Bush Doctrine

Michael Harland

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Abstract

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 transformed the way in which Americans and their leaders viewed the world. The tragic events of that day helped give rise to a foreign policy strategy commonly referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” At the heart of this doctrine lay a series of propositions about the need to foster liberal democracy as the antidote to terrorism. President George W. Bush proclaimed in a variety of addresses that democracy now represented the “single surviving model” of political life to which all people aspired. In the course of making this argument, President Bush seemed to relate his policies to an overarching “teleology” of progress. This discourse implied that the United States might use force to hasten the emergence of liberal norms and institutions in selected states. With a sense of irony, some commentators soon referred to the Bush administration’s position as “Leninist” because of its determination to bring about the so-called “end of history” today. Yet, surprisingly, these critics had little more to add. This thesis is an attempt to assess in greater depth the Bush administration’s claim to comprehend historical eschatology. Developing a concept termed “democratic vanguardism,” this study investigates the idea of liberal modernity, the role of the United States as a force for democracy, and the implications of using military intervention in the service of idealistic ends. It examines disputes among political theorists, public intellectuals and elected statesmen which help to enrich our understanding of the United States’ efforts under President Bush at bending history to its will.
Introduction

In a speech delivered on 1 June 2002 at West Point military academy in New York State, American President George W. Bush laid out his administration’s vision for a free world. According to the President, “the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance.” The United States, Bush declared, would “defend the peace that makes all progress possible” by using its power to encourage “free and open societies on every continent.” In the context of the “war on terrorism” launched after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, achieving this goal would at times entail the use of armed force.

The Bush administration’s subsequent “National Security Strategy of the United States” and a host of contemporary public addresses, together known as the “Bush Doctrine,” reiterated this ostensible connection between the fight against terrorism and the achievement of a wholly democratic globe. The Bush Doctrine

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2 Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy."
consisted of four pillars. Firstly, the United States would work to consolidate its global pre-eminence and prevent the emergence of a hostile competitor. America had emerged victorious from the Cold War; upholding this hard-won hegemony was now a vital national interest. Secondly, the United States would adopt a policy of “pre-emptive war” against rogue states and their alleged terrorist allies. The events of September 11 demonstrated that America could not contain or accommodate its new enemies. In the future, the best defence would be a strong offence. Thirdly, the Bush administration held that, to protect its citizens, the United States would sometimes need to act unilaterally. Where international agreement could not be found, America would form “coalitions of the willing” to ensure the peace. Finally, the authors of the Bush Doctrine argued that democracy promotion could serve as a weapon in the fight against terrorism. The authoritarian regimes of the Arab Middle East bred violent extremism. Reaching into those nations and actively converting them to representative government would make the United States more secure and promote international stability.4

The last of these four pillars – democracy promotion – stood at the centre of the Bush Doctrine, as it provided a framework through which each of the other aims could find popular justification. American power played a key part in upholding democratic freedom abroad; most nations therefore had an interest in helping to perpetuate the United States’ dominance of international affairs. Pre-emptive wars conducted by the leading Western democracy would undermine rogue governments, and a unilateral posture would give the United States the freedom to topple such regimes when it alone deemed necessary. President Bush effectively summarised the aim of his foreign policies when he stated in his second inaugural speech that America sought to “support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in

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every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”

Bush’s war against terrorism would achieve a victory whenever American advanced the principle of democratic self-determination.

By the time President Bush left office in January 2009, his foreign policy doctrine had come under critique from many quarters. A majority of scholars censured the Bush administration’s invasion and occupation of Iraq from 2003, and raised penetrating questions about the underlying motivations guiding such a policy. Historians, political scientists, diplomats and presidential hopefuls each commented on the origins and legacy of the Bush Doctrine. As time went on, many observers concluded that Bush’s ambitious doctrine had failed on its own terms. In this view, the war in Iraq had demonstrated the pitfalls of “overstretch” and discredited the individuals and organisations that had advocated the strategy of “regime change.” Though interesting in their own right, these issues do not enter substantially into the present thesis. Rather than examine again the story of recriminations and mea culpas over the war in Iraq, this study will instead discuss America’s post-September 11 foreign policies on the level of ideas at which they were conceived and articulated.

In the years following the formulation of the Bush Doctrine, there emerged some noteworthy theoretical critiques of American foreign policy in the war on terrorism. Such studies shone light on previously underrated aspects of Bush’s strategy. Among those penning appraisals of the Bush Doctrine were several academics who considered that, by claiming democracy was the terminus of political evolution, the Bush administration had contributed to a long-running debate regarding the direction and meaning of “history.” Rejecting a “determinist” view, President Bush and his administration seemed to argue that the United States could

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5 Bush, "President Sworn in to Second Term."
actively push other nations towards liberal political life. As one student of American foreign relations claimed, the documents which constituted the Bush Doctrine implied that, with the appropriate application of its influence, the United States might be able to “speed up” the emergence of democracy among Arab states. By proposing that armed force be used to accelerate history towards a “final” form of government, the Bush administration had allegedly become “Leninist” in its attitude towards political transformation. Regime change had now become the route to freedom for some nations.

This was an argument pregnant with implications. With the certainty of historical teleology behind it, the United States sought to overturn the remaining authoritarian polities of the world. Yet, surprisingly, this assertion elicited little subsequent comment. The scholars who engaged with the matter usually dedicated little to it but a few pages of a monograph or essay. Works composed while President Bush remained in office tended to mix theoretical study and contemporary policy analysis in an uneasy combination. Commentary on the latest events in Iraq or Afghanistan would likely attract greater attention than discussion focused on modernity, intervention and the formulation of the Bush Doctrine. Nevertheless, making full sense of the former required more extensive engagement with the latter. As it stood, the critical literature did not satisfactorily assess the full richness of the Bush administration’s vision of progress.

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10 Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along".


The present thesis represents an attempt to address this lacuna. It develops a concept I call “democratic vanguardism” to describe the approach to democracy promotion adopted by the Bush administration after September 11, 2001. The notion of “democratic vanguardism” is based around three propositions. Firstly, it holds that history is teleological. That is, history may be guided by an ultimate “rationale” that can provide greater meaning to everyday political events. Secondly, “democratic vanguardism” implies that history must have an “end.” Eventually, history will culminate with the emergence of a political system beyond which there is no higher form. Finally, and most crucially, the term “democratic vanguardism” embraces an implicit voluntarism, suggesting that powerful liberal states might determine it necessary to improve less “advanced” nations by compulsion. Once they become aware that democracy is the apogee of political evolution, liberal regimes may opt to hurry the flow of international politics to their advantage. Through their efforts, they will make the world “post-historic” in the near term.

This position necessarily entails a linear understanding of political development. Like its vanquished foe, Marxism, liberal ideology offers a comprehensive account of progress. “Liberal modernity” in this case refers to a worldview which accepts democratic politics, free market economics and a culture of egalitarianism and impartial rule of law as the most effective way to organise society.13 As political theorist, Jean-François Drolet has written, liberal modernity

Involves transnational relations between polities and other social actors in the context of open international economic exchange, domestic market relations, the governance of society according to liberal democratic principles, the formal separation between politics and economics and between the public and private spheres, civil societies based on individual and group rights, and the right of collective self-determination.14

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Liberal ideology, according to its proponents, did not spread by happenstance. Economic growth, coupled with the continued advance of science and technology, established the basic prerequisites for democratic breakthroughs. But there was also something else at play. Only liberal ideas could satisfy an individual’s desire for “recognition.”15 Previous teleological views of history were never able to reconcile the state with personal and political freedom.16 Following September 11, bringing the advent of liberal modernity to those still mired in “history” had become nothing short of essential to American national security. Truncated modernity seemed to breed violence and discontent; helping the states caught in this condition surmount the remaining obstacles to freedom would improve the present state of the world.

Such a characterisation of the Bush Doctrine’s intent remains hotly disputed. Scholars continue to debate whether we should take seriously the claims made by President Bush and his administration about promoting democratic government. Thomas Carothers, for instance, once stated that “the democracy rationale” for intervention in Iraq “took on paramount importance only in the months after the invasion, as the other rationales dropped away.”17 As a result, the Bush administration’s calls for political change in the Arab Middle East were “half-hearted at best.”18 America’s policies were beset by a “split personality” in which public officials spoke of the need for free and fair elections, while deepening ties to authoritarian states such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.19 Glenn Perry similarly regarded President Bush’s focus on democratisation as a post-facto “rationalisation”

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16 As chapter two of this thesis notes, philosophers such as GWF Hegel claimed that it was only through the state that one could attain freedom. The idea of ‘liberal modernity’ described here is more consistent with ‘neo-liberal’ thought, which places considerable emphasis on the individual. Thus, while liberal democracy might be vested in a state, the forms of ‘recognition’ it offers to its citizens are distinctly private in character.
18 Carothers, “The Democracy Crusade Myth”.
for regime change in Iraq.\textsuperscript{20} This allowed the Bush administration to dress up a self-aggrandising intervention in idealistic terms.

For some critics of American policy, President Bush’s professed support for Arab democrats was in truth wholly duplicitous in character. Shadia Drury has developed a controversial argument in which the chief architects of the Bush Doctrine were committed to deceit because of their education in “Straussian” thought.\textsuperscript{21} According to Drury, the émigré-American political philosopher Leo Strauss, “dispensed with truth in the political arena and endorsed systematic lying – supposedly out of a love of humanity.”\textsuperscript{22} Strauss purportedly taught his students that only the elite could understand the “greater truths” of politics; for the masses, a “noble lie” was necessary to ensure social cohesion.\textsuperscript{23} In the case of intervention in Iraq, the “noble lie” was that the United States sought to “liberate” the country and bring its people democracy.\textsuperscript{24} So-called “neoconservative” policymakers in the Bush administration thus spoke the language of morality to the public, but apparently maintained an ulterior agenda behind closed doors.\textsuperscript{25} The stated rationales for regime change were therefore not to be taken seriously. Indeed, many critics came to believe that President Bush’s paens to democracy merely served as the rhetorical supplement to the aggressive use of force.

Ardent critics of American foreign policy were not the only ones who downplayed the significance of democracy promotion in the Bush Doctrine. Former Undersecretary of Defence Douglas Feith suggested in his memoir, War and Decision, that the desire to foster democracy was not a chief motivation for

\textsuperscript{22} Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right: 80-1.
\textsuperscript{23} Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right.
\textsuperscript{24} See Danny Postel, “Noble lies and Perpetual War: Leo Strauss, the neocons, and Iraq,” Open Democracy (2003), http://www.opendemocracy.net/faithiraqwarphilosophy/article_1542.jsp. For critical discussion of this controversial claim, see chapter four of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{25} Depending on one’s preferences, this “ulterior agenda” could be anything from a desire to capture Iraq’s oil reserves for American profit, to the neoconservative’s apparent affinity for Israel or the aim of deflecting the public’s attention away from domestic political scandals. Undoubtedly, there \textit{were} material motivations for regime change in Iraq. The point is that such motivations were usually couched in an internally logical and theoretically sophisticated discourse of democracy promotion. Indeed, as chapter six of this thesis makes clear, democracy promotion was often regarded as key to securing America’s material interests in Iraq.
intervention in the Arab Middle East. Feith repeatedly emphasised that the security concerns of the moment dominated planning in the run-up to war in Iraq.\textsuperscript{26} As Feith contended,

Critics have accused the administration of going to war for the sake of a political experiment in Arab democratization. But the primary decision the president faced was not whether democracy could or should flourish in Iraq, but whether the United States could live with the risk that Saddam Hussein might one day threaten to attack us, directly, or through terrorists, with biological or other catastrophic weapons.\textsuperscript{27}

Feith wrote that he “did not doubt that President Bush meant what he said when he spoke high-mindedly of his policies and the unselfish, humanitarian benefits he hoped to achieve. But to my knowledge – and contrary to what many critics have charged – he never argued, in public or private, that the United States should go to war in order to spread democracy” (italics in original).\textsuperscript{28} American actions in Iraq were driven by pressing needs of national defence; the rise of democracy was, in this view, a second-order concern.\textsuperscript{29}

Despite their criticism of the Bush Doctrine, these arguments can be reconciled with the analysis of democratic vanguardism. In this thesis, I consider that for all of the thought-provoking issues such scholarship raises, it tends to overlook some crucial points. Following Andrew Flibbert, Matthew Crosston and Toby Dodge, I regard the Bush Doctrine as the prime “ideational framework” through which President Bush and his foreign policy advisors understood, justified and executed armed intervention in the war on terrorism.\textsuperscript{30} The claim that the United States could


\textsuperscript{27} Feith, \textit{War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism}: 234-6.

\textsuperscript{28} Feith, \textit{War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism}: 234-6.


fight in the cause of democracy served, in this view, as an overarching discursive scheme which shaped administration policy. Ideas possessed a thoroughgoing ability to influence perceptions of reality. They persistently affected the way in which their proponents believed they should act in the realm of international affairs.31

In the case of Iraq, for instance, a host of ideational assumptions suffused the Bush administration’s rationale for intervention.32 Neoconservative intellectuals, prominent in the upper levels of the Bush administration, had long insisted that ideas helped to establish the parameters of the possible in foreign affairs. In President Bush, these claims seemed to have found a powerful ally. Appealing to the idea that democracies do not fight one another, President Bush claimed that a free Iraq would not engage in brinkmanship. With reference to the idea that human rights are sacrosanct, Bush made a case for military action to “save” the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein’s tyranny.33 Finally, President Bush held that the anticipated rise of democracy in Iraq would advance American interests across the Arab region.34 The development of an elected government in Baghdad would prompt substantive political reform from Cairo to Ramallah and Jeddah. All of this would result in a region free of Jihadist violence.35

Each of these propositions was grounded in existing currents of American political thought and international relations scholarship, not the expedients of the moment. Policymakers in the Bush administration articulated a variety of ideas consistent with traditions of American “exceptionalism.” The United States’
historical purpose was to spread and sustain “freedom.” Bush was, in this way, allegedly advancing the vision enunciated by many of his predecessors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. President Bush’s pronouncements also seemed to engage with policy issues that antedated September 11. The two National Security Strategy papers published during his presidency assimilated many of the key claims of “democratic peace theory.” They, and a number of public speeches, likewise contained overtones of Francis Fukuyama’s argument that history would “end” with the triumph of liberal ideology and democratic practices. The Bush Doctrine contained a degree of sophistication unduly maligned by a number of its recent critics.

Agreeing that there is value in taking the Bush administration’s claims seriously, this thesis engages in an interpretive study of “democratic vanguardism” and the Bush Doctrine. It provides an extended critical assessment of theoretical debates and political attitudes that might help to deepen our understanding of recent American foreign policy. This thesis seeks to investigate certain ideas of liberal modernity, the role of the United States as a force for democracy, and the connotations of conducting military intervention in the service of idealistic ends. Building on the literature presently available on this topic, it holds that the Bush Doctrine expressed a teleological understanding of progress which lent normative credence to the use of force for liberal causes. Democratic vanguardism might have ultimately emerged out of the contingency of September 11. Nevertheless, this approach to foreign policy is cohabitant with a number of long-standing debates among academic theorists, public intellectuals and political leaders in the United States.

The Bush Doctrine often spoke to issues much larger than the moment. As a broad and ambitious policy strategy, it connected to enduring philosophical questions regarding the meaning of history, and the likely consequences of its end. The Bush

administration insisted that history contained an overall purpose: the expansion of liberal political freedom, culminating in the global victory of democracy. In some countries, history needed encouragement to ensure that it went in the right direction. This was where the United States could best assist, at times through direct military intervention. President Bush’s proclamations likewise reflected a nationalistic sentiment that portrayed the United States as a “world historical” country whose mission was to foster democracy. Like many prior presidential doctrines, Bush’s strategy contained elements of what some scholars have labelled “practical idealism.” The United States could allegedly use its material power to advance its liberal ideals and national security at once.

But to grasp the full import of the Bush Doctrine’s ideational claims, this thesis also reflects on more proximate issues, such as the role neoconservative principles seemed to play in shaping American foreign policy. Neoconservative intellectuals appointed to the Bush administration – such as Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, David Frum, Abram Shulsky and Paula Dobriansky – had spoken of the need for the United States to use its power in the service of democracy. Though they represented but a handful of foreign policy experts in an administration that employed many specialists, their ideas emerged among the most cogent and convincing in the flurry of National Security Council meetings which following September 11. Never one to play “small ball” with policy, President Bush may have been drawn to the neoconservative’s long-term strategic thinking on the coming battle against terrorism. This is not to say that President Bush or his cabinet were “captured” by a cabal of intellectuals; rather, neoconservative opinions found their moment in a White House determined to protect the United States from the very real possibility of further attacks.

37 See chapters five and six of this thesis for detailed analysis of these individuals and their ideas about promoting democracy.
The group of neoconservatives associated with the Bush administration brought with them a rich ideological heritage. Their predecessors had engaged for decades in discussion about the promise and problems of liberal modernity in the United States. Unlike Drury and those who draw on her work, this thesis does not consider the neoconservative’s ideas mendacious or malevolent. As with the Bush Doctrine, it is important to take the neoconservative’s arguments on their own terms, reconstructing their point of view as best possible. Neoconservative writers often worried that America’s exceptionalist traditions were coming undone. Neoconservatism represented an attempt to restore America’s “classically liberal” political ideas to their alleged former glory. It soon became clear to neoconservative thinkers that the upkeep of America’s founding values necessitated an expansive foreign policy. Before long, a range of neoconservatives argued that promoting democracy abroad would redeem the character of American public life and advance the nation’s interests.

These claims would have few practical ramifications were it not for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. At the intersection of burgeoning voluntarist ideology, American global pre-eminence and tragic circumstance emerged an opportunity to re-fashion the Arab Middle East along democratic lines. Democratic vanguardism, as defined in this thesis, only recently appeared in the flesh. It was a vision of foreign relations decidedly suited to its moment. Francis Fukuyama theorised that history would one day end when everyone had come to accept democracy; in the battle against Jihadist terrorism, passivity had now become unconscionable. The events of September 11 demanded a considered, proactive response. Reviewing the threats their nation faced, influential members of the Bush administration concluded that history required a decisive push in the direction of liberty, and that the United States alone possessed the audacity to push it.
On a cloudless Tuesday morning in mid-September 2001, almost three thousand people lost their lives in the most deadly terrorist attack to occur on the United States’ soil. This atrocity left the nation reeling. Americans quickly sought a coherent program for dealing with acute insecurity. In a series of speeches and policy documents released in 2001 and 2002, the administration of President George W. Bush articulated a grand strategy for fighting the war on terrorism. This strategy soon became known as the Bush Doctrine. America’s new foreign policy platform gained notoriety because of President Bush’s announcement that America had the right to launch pre-emptive wars against rogue governments, and that the United States would act unilaterally if the community of nations failed to stand up to aggression.

Despite these admonitions, the Bush administration still framed the war on terrorism in generally buoyant terms. President Bush and his cabinet argued that encouraging democracy across the Arab Middle East would be the most effective way to win the ideological struggle of the age. In this view, the incumbent authoritarian regimes of the Middle East acted as incubators for terrorism. With few opportunities to express political dissent, a number of young Arabs were allegedly drawn towards radical Islamist groups. Establishing democracy in the Middle East would diminish the appeal of Jihadism by providing those susceptible to its message with a sense of hope. Democracy would become a weapon in the fight against religious violence.
In the years since the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine, these claims have drawn considerable comment from academic critics. As suggested in the introduction to this thesis, an initial wave of scholarship disputed the sincerity of the Bush administration’s assertions, seeing them as essentially a rhetorical cloak for self-interested aims. Others maintained that democracy promotion was but a subsidiary concern of the Bush administration. Yet several authors have gone much further in their critical evaluations of the Bush Doctrine. They have argued that President Bush’s public remarks on the future of democracy were reminiscent of “teleological” accounts of history. The United States claimed to have grasped the underlying logic of history, coming to recognise that democracy would one day conquer the world. President Bush, they noted, appeared to believe that America could serve as the vanguard force for bringing democratic freedom to those purportedly “stuck” in history.¹ Through armed intervention in authoritarian states, America could “push” history toward a liberal conclusion. The implications of this intriguing finding have, however, yet to be fully explored.

The “Freedom Agenda”

In his 2010 memoir, Decision Points, George W. Bush offered some pertinent reflections on his administration’s foreign policy. Assessing the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks on his worldview, the now-former President wrote that “after 9/11, I developed a strategy to protect [the United States] that came to be known as the Bush Doctrine.”² According to Bush, his doctrine made “no distinction between the terrorists and the nations that harbor them.” It took “the fight to the enemy overseas before they [could] attack us here at home,” confronted “threats before they fully materialize[d]… and advance[d] liberty and hope as an alternative to the enemies’ ideology of repression and fear.”³

President Bush placed significant emphasis on the last of these concerns. As he put it, “the freedom agenda, as I called the fourth prong, was both idealistic and realistic. It was idealistic in that freedom is a universal gift from Almighty God. It was realistic because freedom is the most practical way to protect our country in the long run.” The “freedom agenda,” in Bush’s view, was the essence of his doctrine. It was vitally important that America act to thwart attacks by rogue governments and terrorist groups. But the United States also needed to offer a vision of the world beyond the war on terrorism. By nurturing the growth of democracy, the Bush administration could ensure a safer future for all.

This was not how a number of observers had conventionally interpreted the terms of the Bush Doctrine. Many viewed the so-called “freedom agenda” as haphazard at best, while the more cynical among them believed that it was nothing but a rhetorical flourish. Much of the Bush Doctrine, they insisted, was orientated towards maintaining an edge in military capabilities over emerging peer competitors. The concept of “pre-emptive war,” in this sense, provided carte blanche for the “preventive” use of force against regimes which could conceivably threaten the United States’ hegemony in the future. This notion, critics charged, was an affront to established norms of state conduct. Indeed, following the announcement of the Bush Doctrine one academic proclaimed that the world now stood “present at the destruction” of the post-WWII liberal international order.

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5 Bush, Decision Points: 396-7.
And yet the speeches, strategy documents and press releases which together elaborated the Bush Doctrine repeatedly emphasised the need to expand and sustain an international order that was unambiguously liberal in orientation. The language in which President Bush and his administration framed their security concerns made it clear that they believed the advance of democracy one of the most effective ways to promote the national interest. President Bush and his advisors declared that liberal democracies would not stockpile, use or sell weapons of mass destruction. A community of stable democratic nations, moreover, would rally behind American leadership and maintain the peace. It soon became apparent that President Bush saw the war on terrorism as an opportunity to advance elected government across the globe. Indeed, as subsequent discussion suggests, the pursuit of democracy served as the unifying rationale for much of the Bush administration’s post-September 11 strategy.

A series of propositions about the nature and appeal of democracy suffused the Bush administration’s conception of foreign affairs from the outset. President Bush and other senior government officials consistently stated that the desire for freedom was innate to all of humanity. In his inaugural address of January 2001, President Bush championed the universality of freedom. As the newly sworn President explained: “our democratic faith is more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal we carry but do not own, a trust we bear...
and pass along.” The forward march of freedom was not accidental. In a speech two years later, President Bush contended that although “the success of freedom is not determined by some dialectic of history,” international politics did have a discernible direction set by “liberty.” Bush’s foreign policy confidant, Condoleezza Rice, returned to this theme when she opined that

When given a truly free choice, human beings will choose liberty over oppression; the right to own property over random search and seizure. Human beings will choose the natural right to life over the constant fear of death. And human beings will choose to be ruled by the consent of the governed, not by the coercion of the state; by the rule of law, not the whim of rulers.

The United States, Rice explained, would help all nations choose political freedom. Relieved of tyranny, everyone would gravitate towards liberal ideas.

Concomitant with these claims, the Bush administration maintained that the story of freedom would reach its climax with the globalisation of liberal democracy. In his June 2002 speech at West Point, President Bush had declared that “the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity” and equal social, economic and political rights. These “demands of human dignity,” Bush reasoned, were “right and true”

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15 Bush, "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East: Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy."
16 Condoleezza Rice, "Princeton University’s Celebration of the 75th Anniversary of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs," (Princeton University, New Jersey 30 September 2005).
19 Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy." For discussion, see Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford
for “all people, everywhere.” The United States needed to support the spread of this final form of political organisation, to propagate what the President called “the peace that makes all progress possible.” The Bush administration’s September 2002 “National Security Strategy of the United States” expanded the scope of these claims. This document contended that it was America’s primary responsibility to ensure the success of democratic government. As the introduction to the National Security Strategy put it: “the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world.”

President Bush proposed a strategy that was unashamedly sweeping in scope. Bush hoped to see democracy become nothing less than the universal norm. In his second inaugural address in January 2005, the President asserted that

We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.

The United States’ purpose, Bush told his audience, was to encourage democratic ideology and government in each country, “with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” Liberal democracy was not a peculiarity of Anglo-American culture. Nor was it a political system destined to be supplanted by illiberal or authoritarian

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20 Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy."

21 Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy."


23 Bush, "President Sworn in to Second Term."

competitors. Democracy was the single regime type coeval to the human spirit. Democracy was the engine of modern history.  

For its part, the United States government determined that it might sometimes need to place its foot on the putative accelerator. Statements of policy such as the West Point address and second inaugural speech advanced the idea that representative government could potentially be realised through coercive means. Political historian Edward Rhodes contended in a 2003 article assessing the Bush Doctrine that “the new liberal order” envisioned by the Bush administration “will not construct itself.” President Bush counselled activism as he, in Rhodes view, understood that “American power will be key” to building and maintaining a liberal and democratic international system. Consistent with this belief, President Bush stated in his West Point speech that “America has, and intends to keep, military strength beyond challenge – thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”

The 2002 National Security Strategy built on this proposal. It stated that “our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in the hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.” Indeed, the National Security Strategy document stated that “it is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength” in the global order, and to “build and maintain our defences beyond challenge.” Doing so would “assure our allies and friends” while allowing the United States to “dissuade future military competition,” deter potential enemies and defeat any country that attempted to challenge the American-led liberal democratic community.

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28 Bush, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy.”
Among the regions of the world substantially lacking in democratic rule, few were more troubled than the Arab Middle East. The rise of elected government across this area would simultaneously strike a blow against the Jihadist ideologues responsible for September 11 and advance the United States’ economic interests in the Persian Gulf. Repressive governments stifled their citizens’ ability to express political beliefs and offered few avenues for the redress of grievances. This situation encouraged disaffected individuals to support extremist outlooks that engaged in violence. In a speech at the National Defence University, President Bush offered perhaps the most succinct elucidation of this claim when he contended that

Our strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror, especially in the broader Middle East. Parts of that region have been caught for generations in a cycle of tyranny and despair and radicalism. When a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social and economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and other races, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This status quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased, kept in

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32 For critical discussion of this claim, see Hobson, "A Forward Strategy of Freedom in the Middle East: US Democracy Promotion and the 'War on Terror'," 40-1.
a box or bought off, because we have witnessed how the violence
in that region can reach easily across borders and oceans.  35

In the President’s view, “it should be clear that decades of excusing and accommodating tyranny, in the pursuit of stability, have only led to injustice and instability and tragedy.” 36 Such conclusions drew on a speech President Bush had delivered to the National Endowment for Democracy. In that address, the President remarked that “sixty years of Western nations excusing... the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.” 37

President Bush and his cabinet viewed democratisation as among the most valuable antidotes to the problem of Jihadist violence. According to security studies expert Katerina Dalacoura, leading administration members believed that democracy was the “panacea” to terrorism – “something that would put right all troubles.” 38 The 2006 National Security Strategy, for instance, held that “the advance of freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution to the transnational terrorism of today.” 39 This strategy document repeatedly emphasised the ability of liberal democracy to mitigate political violence:

Democracy is the opposite of terrorist tyranny, which is why the terrorists denounce it and are willing to kill the innocent to stop it. Democracy is based on empowerment, while the terrorist’s ideology is based on enslavement. Democracies expand the freedom of their citizens, while the terrorists seek to impose a narrow set of beliefs. Democracy sees individuals as equal in worth and dignity, having an inherent potential to create and govern

35 George W. Bush, “President Discusses War on Terror," (National Defence University, Fort Lesley J. McNair 8 March 2005).
36 Bush, "President Discusses War on Terror."
themselves. Terrorists see individuals as objects to be exploited and then to be ruled and oppressed.40

For most problems associated with authoritarianism and terrorism, the National Security Strategy proposed democracy as the solution.41 According to the strategy paper, “in the place of alienation, democracy offers an ownership stake in society, a chance to shape one’s own future.” Furthermore, “in the place of festering grievances, democracy offers the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the habits of advancing interests through compromises.”42 Promoting democracy in the Arab Middle East served immediate national security needs, while also setting the region on a path to lasting concord.

Debating the Doctrine

The promulgation and practice of the Bush Doctrine generated an extensive critical literature. Writers such as Gary Dorrien, James Mann, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, Francis Fukuyama, Jacob Heilbrunn and Justin Vaïsse each examined the potential association between the political ideology of “neoconservatism” and the formulation of the Bush Doctrine.43 International relations scholars also contributed significantly to this literature, with Tony Smith, Edward Rhodes, Robert Jervis and Stephen Walt publishing evaluations of the Bush Doctrine’s claims and the broader implications of the war in Iraq.44 Arab area specialists, such as Marina Ottaway, Juan

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Within this wide-ranging scholarship, there soon emerged studies of the connection between America’s democratisation strategy and theories of political progress. One group of writers focused upon the discourse of “directional history” allegedly contained in some of the more important speeches and briefing papers produced by policymakers after 2001.\footnote{For a useful overview of the relationship between the idea of directional history and the terms of the Bush Doctrine, see Christopher Hobson, "Beyond the End of History: The Need for a ‘Radical Historicisation’ of Democracy in International Relations," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 37, no. 3 (2009): 634-6. Charles R. Kesler, "Democracy and the Bush Doctrine," in The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq, ed. Gary Rosen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 228-9.} In an article entitled ‘Rage, Hubris and Regime Change’, political scientist Ken Jowitt touched off this debate by suggesting that the Bush Doctrine articulated a normative vision of historical progress that encouraged intervention to promote democracy.\footnote{Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along". For discussion of Jowitt’s position and the claim that the concept of historical teleology underpinned American foreign policy, see Brian C. Rathbun, "Does One Right Make a Realist? Conservatism, Neoliberalism, and Isolationism in the Foreign Policy Ideology of American Elites," Political Science Quarterly 123, no. 2 (2008): 283-4.} Jowitt contended that

Initially, if implicitly, the Bush administration subscribed to the "end of history" thesis that the "rest" of the world would more or less naturally become like the West in general and the United States in particular. September 11 changed that. In its aftermath, the Bush administration has concluded that Fukuyama’s historical timetable is too laissez-faire and not nearly attentive enough to the
levers of historical change. History, the Bush administration has concluded, needs deliberate organization, leadership, and direction. In this irony of ironies, the Bush administration’s identification of regime change as critical to its anti-terrorist policy and integral to its desire for a democratic capitalist world has led to an active "Leninist" foreign policy in place of Fukuyama’s passive "Marxist" social teleology.  

Leaving history to unfold “more or less naturally” in the Arab Middle East now posed an unacceptable risk to the United States. An “activist” policy, however, could inaugurate the process of democratisation today, thereby depriving Jihadist ideology of a breeding ground.

Francis Fukuyama himself soon confronted this burgeoning issue. Fukuyama claimed that policymakers in the Bush administration had appropriated some of the key observations he made in his influential 1992 book, *The End of History and the Last Man*. In his 2007 work, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*, Fukuyama essentially agreed with Jowitt that government officials had taken his typology of historical progress, premised on a gradual process of modernisation, and concluded that through American military agency the arrival of liberal democracy could be “fast-tracked.” As Fukuyama wryly commented, “I did not like the original version of Leninism and was skeptical when the Bush administration turned Leninist.” Fukuyama reiterated his belief, first detailed in the *End of History*, that “democracy in my view is likely to expand universally in the long run.” However, Fukuyama added that “whether the rapid and relatively peaceful transitions to democracy and free markets made by the Poles, Hungarians, or even the Romanians can be quickly replicated in other parts of the world, or promoted through the application of power by outsiders at any given point in history, is open to doubt.”

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48 Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along".
49 Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along". Jowitt, "Setting History’s Course".
50 Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. For full discussion of Fukuyama’s critical response to the Bush Doctrine, see the conclusion of this thesis.
51 Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*: 54-5.
52 Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*: 54-5.
54 Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*: 54-5.
Fukuyama’s conclusions found resonance in the views of critics who linked America’s anti-terrorism strategy to notions of expediting a liberal political order by force of arms. In his book *America the Virtuous*, Claes Ryn offered a critical assessment of what he termed the “neo-Jacobin” spirit of democratisation. Comparing the Bush administration’s approach to that of past democratic revolutionaries, Ryn contended that “the new Jacobin is convinced that he knows what is best for all mankind, and if much of mankind shows reluctance to follow his lead, it is to him a sign that injustice, superstition, and general backwardness or a misconceived modernistic radicalism is standing in the way of progress.” A variation of Ryn’s theme was also present in George Packer’s 2006 book, *The Assassin’s Gate*. Packer posited that, in making their case for regime change in Iraq, “the advocates of the war – many of them – vaguely resembled the vanguardists of earlier struggles.” Packer argued that in their adoption of “big ideas to push history in a dramatically new direction,” some members of the Bush administration appeared similar in temperament to political activists of the Old Left. Adam Quinn, John Ikenberry, Lloyd Ambrosius and Andrew Bacevich likewise alluded to the Bush administration’s “vanguardist” inclinations in their reflections on American foreign affairs after September 11.

Two of the more recent contributions to this literature have provided additional insight on the Bush administration’s apparently teleological understanding of history. In a 2009 article for *Policy Review*, Ken Jowitt reiterated much of his thesis on the “Leninist” character of the Bush Doctrine. The Bush administration

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56 Ryn, *America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire*: 25-6. Tony Smith has expressed similar sentiments, albeit about liberal internationalism, when he described as “voluntarist” the belief that it took the visionary leadership of an individual for democratisation to succeed. For discussion, see Smith, *A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise*: 121-3.
recognised, in Jowitt’s view, that “the possibility of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of those who wanted to end our history called for a very different understanding of how to ensure a liberal end of history.” Terrorists never operated by way of gradualism; why should the United States continue to do so after the events of September 11? Jowitt considered this change of attitude novel in the history of American foreign policy: “the Bush administration’s conflation of a particular agent, the United States of America, and universal processes like globalisation and democratization, speaks to something historically rare and revolutionary.” John Lewis Gaddis, in a 2008 article, referred to this position as “Fukuyama plus force.” Unlike the so-called “Menshevik” approach adopted by previous administrations, the Bush cabinet “wanted to jump-start… history.” Echoing Jowitt, Gaddis concluded that the Bush Doctrine exhibited “Bolshevik” overtones in its impatience with the inchoate unfolding of history.

Together, the above writers agreed that behind the practicalities of the war on terrorism lay larger questions about the character and fate of liberal modernity. In their view, the Bush administration had wagered that democracy represented the pinnacle of political life; and that under specifically American patronage, elected

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60 Jowitt, "Setting History’s Course".
61 Jowitt, "Setting History’s Course". It is possible that Jowitt was over-simplifying here. There have been past instances in American foreign policy where a comprehensive social-scientific worldview has influenced interventionist strategies. Modernisation theory – the pinnacle of American social science after WWII – maintained that post-colonial states would necessarily undergo a process of economic, technological and political evolution parallel to that experienced by the United States. Some policymakers, such as Walt W. Rostow, argued in the early 1960’s that it would be prudent for the United States to use force to hurry modernisation along. Writing in the context of America’s initial involvement in Vietnam, Rostow maintained that the United States could use its overwhelming power to forcibly convert foreign people to democracy and modern economics. The consequences of this over-confident liberalism were plain to see in Vietnam within a decade, and might have served as a cautionary example for policymakers again in 2002 and 2003. For an excellent synopsis on the use of modernisation theory in Vietnam, and the return of several of its themes during nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Michael E. Latham, "Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the Failure of Nation-Building in South Vietnam," Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2006): 27-41.
62 Gaddis, "Ending Tyranny: The Past and Future of an Idea".
government would become accepted the world over. This finding seemed charged with implications worthy of study. Yet most of the publications cited previously have not enquired further into the ideational claims potentially associated with this reading of the Bush Doctrine. Ken Jowitt’s 2003 article, for example, discussed the association between directional history and intervention for one page before moving on to describe at greater length the existing barriers to reform in Arab domestic politics. While Jowitt expanded his argument in his 2009 essay on the issue, the broader meaning of the Bush administration’s vanguardist turn was not always made clear.

The same held true for the books and articles that leaned on Jowitt’s findings. Francis Fukuyama, for his part, examined only briefly the so-called “Leninist” dimension of the Bush Doctrine within the context of his detailed analysis on post-Cold War American foreign policy. In the 194 pages that constitute the text of After the Neocons, only four explicitly take up the issue of using a nation’s armed forces to shift history forward. Similarly, while Andrew Bacevich pointed out in his book, The Limits of Power, that President Bush seemed genuinely convinced that “as the self-proclaimed land of liberty, the United States serves as the vanguard of democracy,” Bacevich typified much of the scholarship on this issue by assigning the theme cursory treatment. Gaddis, Ryn, Packer and Quinn, meanwhile, made only passing mention to the potential relationship between a teleological view of history and the idea of helping others realise democratic government through military intervention.

Democratic Vanguardism
There appears, then, to be no thesis-length study that assesses more thoroughly the intellectual debates contiguous to the Bush administration’s claims about “hastening” the pace of history after September 11. Since 2001, scholars of American foreign

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65 Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along".
66 Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads: chapter two.
67 Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads: 54-8.
policy have certainly made inroads into the topic. But they have yet to engage with the full richness of this issue. The concept of “democratic vanguardism” can provide an analytical framework for elucidating the Bush administration’s approach to foreign relations.

A common dictionary definition holds that a vanguard is the most forward-leaning or *avant-garde* element in thought and practice. A vanguard group, wrote political scientist Roger Scruton, tended to represent “the synthesis of the ‘objective conditions’ of revolution... with the substantive conditions – the understanding of past, present and future that will enable the cogent formulation of policy and tactics.” With the certitude of a comprehensive philosophy of history at hand, vanguardists could claim to see further into the future than most. As David Robertson has written, vanguardism usually denoted a deliberate attempt by a self-appointed minority “to raise the… consciousness of the masses” and guide them toward an ideal political order free of present vices.

As such, most vanguardist thinkers have put forward a belief in purposive progress. In his book, *Modern Revolutions*, John Dunn showed that vanguard organisations have tended to view historical advancement in linear terms. Dunn commented that such groups often “think of the human race progressing more or less steadily towards new heights of civilisation.” Indeed, “the place of the human race in history [means] that a better, juster, (perhaps richer) future lay ahead of it.” From this perspective, history contained an overall rationale inherent within its unfolding. Beginning with primitive societies, humanity had moved consistently towards a more

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sophisticated political life.\textsuperscript{77} History would eventually “end” with the consolidation of a regime in which no further substantive improvements would be necessary.

The suggestion that history might have an “end” can often create confusion. To most people, history refers to the chronological unfolding of events, ranging from those in international affairs to the everyday experiences of individuals and communities throughout the world. The most common objection to the term the “end of history” is that history cannot truly “finish” so long as such events continue to occur. However, if one considers that history might contain an overarching meta-narrative, as portrayed by “historicism”\textsuperscript{78} philosophers such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Karl Marx, it becomes clear that progress requires a conclusion.\textsuperscript{79} For Hegel, history was a rational process where humanity sought to achieve “absolute reason.”\textsuperscript{80} Eventually there would emerge a final state in which all people acquired total understanding of their existence. This would then end the dialectical process that moved history forward.\textsuperscript{81} Marx, meanwhile, argued that communism would set humanity on the path to the end of history because this political system could overcome the class antagonisms that had shaped the rise of civilisation.\textsuperscript{82} All people would then realise the full potential of their “species being.”\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{77} Dunn, \textit{Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to a Political Phenomenon, Second Edition}: 5-7.

\textsuperscript{78} This definition of ‘historicism’ differs from the pejorative connotations it has acquired through the work of theorists such as Karl Popper. Historicism here refers primarily to the necessity of analysing past societies on their own terms – not to the idea of imposing a scheme of ‘positivist determinism’ on history. For discussion, see George Armstrong Kelly, "Politics & Philosophy in Hegel," \textit{Polity} 9, no. 1 (1976): 6. Ted Honderich ed., \textit{The Oxford Companion to Philosophy} (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43-4, 51-2.


\textsuperscript{81} Kojève, \textit{Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit}: x-xii.

\textsuperscript{82} Karl Marx, \textit{A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy}, Collected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977).

These propositions raised a significant question for aspiring vanguard groups: if the end of history would reveal political life in its definitive form, why should those in possession of such knowledge wait by as events slowly unfolded over the course of decades? In light of this realisation, some political organisations adopted a voluntarist attitude to achieving history’s end. Examining this tendency, Roger Scruton contended that “in the context of the theory of historical development, ‘voluntarism’ denotes any view that emphasises... the role of human design and intentions, as against the role of ‘material’ factors emphasised by historical materialism.”

Stressing the will, vision and autonomy of the individual, vanguardists asserted that they alone should direct history towards its conclusion. As such, proponents of vanguardism attempted to attain a “world-historical” role in public affairs.

The notion of vanguardism described here has a controversial past. Proclaiming oneself an objective force of political modernisation could ostensibly give legitimacy to acts of coercion. Reflecting on the authoritarian outcomes of Hegelian and Marxist thought in the twentieth century, political theorist Karl Popper concluded that teleological philosophies of history served as a means to justify tyranny in the cause of “liberation.” Lenin, for example, had devised a thoroughly vanguardist interpretation of Marxism. In his influential 1902 tract, What is to be Done?, Lenin ruminated that “there could not have been social democratic consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from without.” In Lenin’s view, “the history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own efforts, is able only to develop trade union

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86 Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to a Political Phenomenon, Second Edition: 16, passim.
consciousness.” Lenin insisted that the party, as the vanguard of the proletariat, singularly determined the truth and consciousness of the masses. In Popper’s time, this promise of an end to history provided a veneer of theoretical assurance to Stalinism. Justifying itself by reference to Lenin’s idea of a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” Stalinism was allegedly an intermediary between capitalism and communist utopia.

Viewed in this light, the idea of vanguardism understandably possesses a number of negative overtones today. So is it really fair to apply the term to the Bush Doctrine? There are good grounds for employing the notion in a circumscribed manner. Firstly, the authors of the Bush Doctrine sought to foster the consciousness of freedom through intervention. Ryn’s concept of “neo-Jacobinism” has particular salience in this context. In the abstract, the Jacobins aimed to propagate the most vaunted of political principles. This was a group, after all, committed on paper to advancing the “universal rights of man.” The Bush Doctrine likewise sought to enable the conditions through which all people would come to choose democracy. The Bush administration argued that democratic elections would help to eliminate the irrationality, violence and inefficiency inherent to authoritarianism in the contemporary world. Democracy was the wave of the future; and the United States the nation best placed to bring about its full realisation.

Bush and his associates were not literally “Leninist” in any manner. However, Ken Jowitt did not employ the term in the usual way. He utilised the phrase as a playful but nevertheless pertinent extended metaphor. Despite the qualifier “democratic,” the Bush administration’s strategy was decidedly elitist in some important respects. A small group of thinkers – the policymakers who helped to formulate the Bush Doctrine – claimed to grasp the overall rationale of history and determined that only they possessed the capability to hurry it along. A period of “revolutionary violence” (in this case, regime change) might be necessary to foster

89 Lenin, What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement, 5.
*liberal* modernity abroad. An enlightened few would direct the troops into combat for the greater good of humanity. The American Marines, not the Red Army, would bring about history’s true end.

Here lay the essence of “democratic vanguardism.” Cognizant of the ultimate purpose of progress, a self-appointed state agent could forcibly expedite history in foreign countries towards liberal democratic values and institutions. Liberal democracy offered limited government, equality under the law, individual liberty and universal suffrage; in short, “recognition” of the right to “freedom” held by all people.\(^9\) American intercession in authoritarian nations could help bring into being the political ideology and civil society necessary to establish effective representative rule. A democratic revolution would be inaugurated from above.

**Conclusion**

The concept of democratic vanguardism can serve as an aid through which to contemplate the ideas of directional history and democracy promotion associated with the Bush Doctrine. President Bush and his principal foreign policy advisers appeared to express a vision of purposive historical advancement with an end. From this basis, policymakers claimed that in the context of the war on terrorism the tentative unfolding of history in the Arab Middle East required speeding up towards liberal democracy. Freeing Arab populations from brutal and rapacious rulers would weaken the appeal of radical Islam, previously the only outlet for discontent. For President Bush and his administration, armed democracy promotion had become a form of national self-defence.

Judging by the number of books and articles published on America’s democratisation efforts since September 11, this was an especially controversial claim. Initially, much of the analysis on democratic intervention was callow. Over the past decade, however, several prominent academics have penned innovative essays

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assessing the broader issues to which the Bush Doctrine might be related. One of the most promising areas of study focuses on the notion of historical teleology seemingly contained in the documents that comprised the Bush Doctrine. Recent findings on this matter are at best preliminary and incomplete; usually amounting to a brief comment in a monograph or review.

The remainder of this thesis intends to address this gap in the literature. Subsequent chapters lay out a variety of theoretical disputes and political attitudes that might enrich our understanding of the Bush Doctrine. They relate the vanguardist elements of the Bush Doctrine to discussion over the nature and implications of history’s prospective end, and examine aspects of exceptionalist thought and interventionism in past American policy. This method of study may help to expand, corroborate or critique the arguments put forward by Jowitt, Fukuyama, Gaddis, Ryn and their peers.
By framing America’s post-September 11 strategy in term similar to directional accounts of political development, the Bush administration contributed to a series of long-standing debates over the meaning of history. Political philosophers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had explored whether history contained an underlying sense of Telos. They discussed how history might end, and whether the event would live up to expectations. As noted in the previous chapter, Hegel and Marx each developed a systematic account of progress that respectively nominated “reason” and “materialism” as the prime mover of history. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the idea of historical eschatology was often associated with the names Alexandre Kojève and Francis Fukuyama. The former, as we shall see, advanced a particularly influential reading of Hegel in Europe; the latter provided considerable grist to the notion that the adoption of democratic ideology and practice would presage history’s close.

Proponents of democratic vanguardism often suggested that the end of history was a goal worth striving after. The authors of the Bush Doctrine maintained that the spread of liberal democracy would ensure peace between nations and equal “recognition” between citizens and their government. Consistent with Fukuyama’s claims, any disputes that arose within democracies would not reach “historical” proportions. On closer inspection, these assumptions are open to question. Many of
the philosophical authorities on whom Fukuyama leaned expressed scepticism about the desirability of post-historical life. Friedrich Nietzsche, Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève each worried what would happen to society in an age potentially without historical struggle. The satisfaction offered by liberal democracy, they concluded, would likely be transitory. Accordingly, there is good reason to believe that despite what was written in the National Security Strategy and companion documents, liberal democracy was far from the definitive solution to the world’s troubles. Indeed, acting to end history today might generate unforeseen problems of its own.

The Quest for Recognition

On the face of it, the year 1989 seemed to signify the closing of an era of modern world politics. The promise of classless society articulated by Marx and Engels, and attempted by Lenin and his heirs, had been relegated to the “dustbin of history.” One publication above others expressed the spirit of this moment. In the summer 1989 edition of the journal *The National Interest*, Francis Fukuyama declared that the time was ripe to reconsider the concept of an end of history. Such a claim generated a storm of controversy, amplified by the publication in 1992 of a full-length book on the same topic.

Francis Fukuyama suggested that the fall of Europe’s communist regimes heralded the global triumph of liberal democracy.¹ As Fukuyama stated in his 1989 article, “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the cold war, or the passage of a particular era in post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”² Fukuyama admitted that “the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness, and is yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for

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² Fukuyama, "The End of History?,” 161-2.
believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world *in the long run*.³

While nationalist movements, authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism would retain influence in parts of the world, Fukuyama believed that none of these forces could challenge the global legitimacy of liberal democratic thought.⁴

What gave Fukuyama such confidence that liberal democracy was capable of inaugurating the end of history? Fukuyama detailed two “mechanisms” which together accounted for the appeal of the democratic creed.⁵ Adopting a semi-materialist outlook, Fukuyama asserted that the mechanism of modern natural science generated irreversible technological advancements that compelled states to modernise.⁶ As Fukuyama wrote, “what is universal” among developing states, “is *initially* not the desire for liberal democracy but rather the desire to live in a modern society, with its technology, high standards of living, healthcare and access to the wider world.”⁷ Fukuyama maintained that economic modernisation encouraged the pursuit of new goods and ideas. In this way, “liberal democracy is one of the by-products of this modernisation process, something that *becomes* a universal aspiration only in the course of historical time.”⁸

Yet despite its apparent explanatory power, the mechanism of science could not fully account for the pervasive acceptance of liberal democratic principles. According to Fukuyama, people did not only seek material comforts, but also strove

³ Fukuyama, "The End of History?,” 161-2. Fukuyama still maintained in 2010 that this conclusion was “basically correct.” Twenty years after the collapse of communism, no viable universal alternative apparently existed to liberal democratic politics and free market economics. See Francis Fukuyama, "Twenty Years after the End of History," New Perspectives Quarterly (2010): 7. For a critique of this position, see the conclusion of this thesis.


⁵ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*: xii.


⁷ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*: 54.

⁸ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*: 54. For critical discussion of this claim, see Rockmore, *Before and After 9/11: A Philosophical Examination of Globalisation, Terror, and History*: 23.
for recognition of their self-worth.\footnote{Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}: xv-xvii.} Adopting Plato’s idea of a tripartite division of the soul, Fukuyama surmised that \textit{Thymos} – or self-assertive human spiritedness – ultimately underpinned the global spread of democracy.\footnote{Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}: xv-xvii. For further discussion, see Joseph M. Knippenberg, ”Kant, \textit{Thymos} and the End of History,” in \textit{After History? Fukuyama and his Critics}, ed. Timothy Burns (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 1994), 47-8. For discussion of the three components of the soul (\textit{Thymos}, \textit{Eros}, \textit{Logos}) in Plato’s work, see Plato, \textit{The Republic of Plato, Second Edition, Translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay by Allan Bloom} (New York: Basic Books, 1991). Book III, 436 b, 40 a-b, 41 a-b.} Liberal democracy alone could resolve the struggle for freedom, as it was capable of fulfilling the \textit{Thymotic} impulses of all people.\footnote{Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}: 201-2. Peter Augustine Lawler, ”Fukuyama versus the End of History,” in \textit{After History? Fukuyama and his Critics}, ed. Timothy Burns (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 1994), 66-7. Philip Abbott, ”””Big””” Theories and Policy Counsel: James Burnham, Francis Fukuyama, and the Cold War,” \textit{Journal of Policy History} 14, no. 4 (2002): 420-2. Theodore H. Von Laue, ”From Fukuyama to Reality: A Critical Essay,” in \textit{After History? Fukuyama and his Critics}, ed. Timothy Burns (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing, 1994), 24-5.} Fukuyama commented in this vein that The liberal state... is rational because it reconciles... competing demands for recognition on the only mutually acceptable basis possible, that is, on the basis of the individual’s identity as a human being. The liberal state must be universal, that is, grant recognition to all citizens because they are human beings, and not because they are members of some particular national, ethnic, or racial group. And it must be homogeneous, insofar as it creates a classless society based on the abolition of the distinction between master and slave.\footnote{Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}: 201-2.} Given the ability to choose, a majority of people would seek satisfaction of their desires through the democratic values championed, above all, by the United States.

This claim seemed to imply that liberal democracy was the one regime type consistent with human nature. In this view, Hegel had been essentially correct when he mused that “the History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom.”\footnote{Hegel, \textit{Introduction to the Philosophy of History, With Prefaces by Charles Hegel and the Translator, J. Sibree, M.A.} For discussion, see Fredrick Beiser, \textit{Hegel} (New York: Routledge, 2005), 266. Copleston S.J., \textit{A History of Philosophy, Volume VII: Modern Philosophy: From the Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche}: 215-16.} Hegel believed that “freedom” would find expression in the state; the vehicle of its citizens’ collective aspirations. For Fukuyama and other
latter-day Hegelians, “freedom” had instead become synonymous with the individual. The story of communism in the twentieth century revealed much about the natural proclivity individuals had towards political freedom. As Fukuyama wrote in a 1999 article, “socialism foundered because it ran into the brick wall of human nature: human beings could not be forced to be different from what they were, and all of the characteristics that were supposed to have disappeared under socialism, like ethnicity and national identity, reappeared after 1989 with a vengeance.” Marx and his followers, Fukuyama argued, had “assumed a high degree of plasticity” in human nature, believing it possible to foster proletarian consciousness and a “new Soviet man” through transforming the mode of production. This view had altogether failed to take into account the enduring aspiration for Thymotic recognition innate to humanity.

The foremost source of Fukuyama’s findings about the end of history was the scholarship of Franco-Russian Hegelian philosopher, Alexandre Kojève. Fukuyama frequently leaned on Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel as a way of giving credence to his assertion that the desire for recognition lay at the centre of political life. Accepting Hegel’s claim that historical progress was synonymous with the emergence of “absolute reason,” Kojève maintained that civilisation would reach its peak once all people had acquired full and mutual acknowledgement of their consciousness. In *The Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, Hegel had claimed that “reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore,

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presents us with a rational process.” In Kojève’s reading of Hegel, individuals could come to know themselves through interacting with others, and from this become aware of the underlying telos of life.

Extrapolating on Hegel’s meditations, Kojève reasoned that the philosopher’s so-called “master-slave” typology was the key to the struggle for recognition. Kojève developed this interpretation in a series of lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in Paris during the 1930’s. He often noted that Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* had presented history as a series of confrontations between higher and lower orders of individuals. At the beginning of history, two consciousnesses attempted to elicit recognition of their being through risking their lives in battle against one another. Where one consciousness triumphed was in the submission of their opponent out of fear of dying. This person, having given up the fight to preserve his own life, became the slave; he who was willing to sacrifice his life to attain recognition became the master. This relationship then advanced history through the resolution of its internal contradictions over time.

For Kojève, the “master-slave dialectic” would continue so long as there remained systemic inequality in society. Successive forms of government, such as monarchy, feudalism and autocracy were the political manifestations of unsatisfied *Thymos*. In each civilisation, the master could obtain only partial recognition from a

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20 Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History, With Prefaces by Charles Hegel and the Translator, J. Sibree, M.A.*
being he refused to consider fully human. The putative slave, by contrast, began to develop a consciousness independent of the master. Through his labour, the slave produced ideas and materials by which he could objectify his existence. Formulating so-called “slave ideologies,” such as Christianity, the unrecognised consciousness would find solace and eventually grasp the rationale of history.

The struggle to apprehend the meaning of history would reach its close with the emergence of what Kojève labelled the “universal and homogenous state.” In his 1947 book, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojève alleged that he had unearthed Hegel’s vision of history’s end. Kojève ascertained that history had first reached its culmination in 1806. While completing the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel had witnessed the emergence of the original universal and homogeneous state with Napoleon Bonaparte’s victory over the Prussian army at the Battle of Jena. As Kojève wrote,

According to Hegel, it is in and by the wars of Napoleon, and, in particular, the Battle of Jena, that the completion of History is realised through the dialectical overcoming... of both the master and the slave. Consequentially, the presence of the Battle of Jena in Hegel’s consciousness is of capital importance. It is because Hegel hears the sounds of that battle that he can know that History is being completed or has been completed, that – consequently – *his* conception of the world is

31 Rockmore, *Before and After 9/11: A Philosophical Examination of Globalisation, Terror, and History*: 22.
33 Kojève, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*: 44. Hegel was a professor at the University of Jena when Napoleon’s forces invaded the city and defeated the Prussian army in late 1806.
the total conception, his knowledge is the absolute knowledge.\textsuperscript{34}

In Kojève’s view, “History will be completed at the moment when the synthesis of the Master and Slave is realised, that synthesis is that whole man, the Citizen of the universal and homogeneous state, created by Napoleon.”\textsuperscript{35} History would end with the victory of the principles of the French Revolution, as these could allow for the full and mutual recognition of all people.\textsuperscript{36} With history now finished in Jena, all that remained was the global “backfilling” of the ideals of 1789 over the coming centuries.\textsuperscript{37}

Kojève articulated what many believe to be an idiosyncratic reading of Hegel. Critics of Kojève have maintained that the philosopher’s quasi-Marxist leanings coloured his interpretation of the battle for recognition.\textsuperscript{38} At times, Kojève seemed to be importing an undertone of class conflict into the Hegelian dialectic.\textsuperscript{39} Shadia Drury, meanwhile, has suggested that Kojève’s work represented an attempt to meld Hegelianism with existentialism.\textsuperscript{40} True freedom lay in the “negation” of self; in the acceptance of the finitude of life.\textsuperscript{41} At the end of history, humanity might at once achieve absolute reason and the transcendence of its nature.\textsuperscript{42} But however faithful or otherwise Kojève’s elucidation of Hegel, it became a common reference point for contemporary political theorists seeking to understand history’s end.\textsuperscript{43} Kojève could
offer a compelling explanation of the unveiling of reason in history. He suggested that the “backfilling” of history was nearly complete in many parts of the world, with the “Napoleonic Code” now finding resonance in revolutions among former European colonies and in China. Kojève believed that as the ambit of freedom expanded ever-outwards, human consciousness would achieve the totality that Hegel first observed from his study window in the winter of 1806. The Owl of Minerva, as Hegel might say, would soon take flight.

“Men without Chests”

This sanguine vision of history’s end was not, however, without existing and trenchant critics. Philosophers had long expressed concern about what might follow the conclusion of history. In his 1886 book, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche had already questioned whether equal and mutual recognition of consciousness was worth having. To Nietzsche, the struggle for recognition was integral to human nature, giving purpose to history. The end of history would not witness the victory of absolute reason, but rather of nihilism and “herd morality.”

Taking the historicist outlook to its logical conclusion, the so-called “last man” considered all values relative. As Nietzsche’s protagonist,
Zarathustra, mused when reflecting on this phenomenon: “What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?’ thus asks the Ultimate Man and blinks.”

Aware that he stood now at history’s end, the last man eschewed greatness. “Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both are too much of a burden. No herdsman and one herd! Everybody wants the same thing, everyone is the same: whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse.”

Having resolved substantive questions of the good in public life, post-historic people conquered Thymos. Yet this left them unable to strive for meaningful glory outside of history. The last man exemplified the tragedy of self-satisfied existence in its most thoroughgoing form.

Nietzsche feared in particular that modern civilisation had become dominated by “men without chests.” With his admiration for the aristocratic, Nietzsche reasoned that egalitarianism had led to the universal acceptance of “slave ideologies.” The master embraced Christianity as a genuine values-system, thereby shedding the desire for supremacy which had defined his predecessors. Bereft of a persuasive reason to assert their values against others, the men without chests would soon cease to believe in anything of substance. Nietzsche implicitly poured scorn on the teleological schemes of his time, such as socialism, which promised a golden future free of all injustice between classes. Why struggle for this lofty goal, Nietzsche asked, when one would find only emptiness on the other side?

Rejecting the idea of historical eschatology, Nietzsche instead proposed a cyclical notion of time. He claimed that history would repeat itself for millennia

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50 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One: 46.
51 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One: 46. Nietzsche’s solution to the problem of the last man was to will the emergence of Übermenschen (“Overmen”). These figures surmounted post-historical nihilism and asserted anew Thymotic striving for pride and honour. For useful discussion of this issue, see Kaufman, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Fourth Edition: 307-11, 416-17.
52 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One: 45-7.
53 Kirkland, “Nietzsche’s Tragic Realism,” 61-2, 66-7, 72.
57 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One: 47-8.
ahead.\textsuperscript{58} Nietzsche referred to this idea as the “doctrine of eternal recurrence.”\textsuperscript{59} In \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra} the prophet came to realise that all which had come before was doomed to occur again. In light of this knowledge, Zarathustra could either retreat to the comfort of his existing beliefs, or he could embrace the eternal recurrence and thereby consciously affirm his destiny.\textsuperscript{60} Defying Hegel and his students, Nietzsche held that over a long enough period, events would confound the possibility of \textit{telos}.\textsuperscript{61} The path out of the present malaise was not revolution; it was the willing of new philosophers courageous enough to acknowledge being for what it was.\textsuperscript{62}

Nietzsche’s propositions posed a frontal challenge to the idea that history ought to have a conclusion.\textsuperscript{63} Scholars of modern political thought have continued to recognise the import of Nietzsche’s disquieting account. In his preface to Kojève’s \textit{Introduction to the Reading of Hegel}, American political theorist Allan Bloom expressed concern that the citizens of a post-historic society might become less than human.\textsuperscript{64} If Kojève was correct that political life was essentially a quest for recognition, then when history reached its terminus, so too did humanity in a sense. There would no longer be any important goals left to achieve. This, Bloom worried, would lead to the decay of moral and political virtue in the universal and homogenous state.\textsuperscript{65} Bloom shared Nietzsche’s anxiety about the mediocrity of


\textsuperscript{60} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One}; 178-9, 236-8.


\textsuperscript{62} Dannhauser, “Nietzsche,” in ed. Strauss and Cropsey, 830-1.

\textsuperscript{63} Dannhauser, “Nietzsche,” in ed. Strauss and Cropsey, 830-1.


modern life, warning in particular that a loss of striving could result in a rudderless civilisation of self-indulgent individuals.

Bloom’s mentor, the émigré-American political philosopher Leo Strauss, offered comparable sentiments in his writings. For a number of years Strauss engaged Kojève in friendly correspondence about the end of history. In response to Kojève’s reflections on the post-historic world, Strauss advanced two arguments. The first was that history’s close implied an end to the accumulation of knowledge and hence the “death” of philosophy. Strauss maintained that, by being outside of history, philosophers would have no frames of reference through which they could assign meaningful values to past events and their consequences. Accordingly, if Hegel were a spectator at the end of history in Jena, he would not be in a position to comprehend the emergence of absolute reason. Rather, he would become divorced from the categories of thought that could make such a conception possible. The end of history would thus not signify the height of philosophy, but effectively its demise.

Alongside this issue, Strauss posited that no regime type, not even the “universal and homogeneous state,” would provide full recognition to all. In an appraisal of Kojève’s view, Strauss argued that

There are degrees of satisfaction. The satisfaction of the humble citizen, whose human dignity is universally recognised and who enjoys all opportunities that correspond to his humble capacities

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66 For more on Strauss’s philosophy and the influence of his teaching, see chapter four of this thesis.
and achievements, is not comparable to the Chief of State. Only the Chief of State is “really satisfied.” He alone is “truly free.” Did Hegel not say something to the effect that the state in which one is free is the Oriental despotic state? Is the universal and homogenous state then merely a planetary Oriental despotism? For Strauss, history’s end would fail to bring about the attainment of universal recognition, as there would remain persistent inequalities in even the most “truly free” of states. For a majority of the population, the end of history would more likely cultivate dissatisfaction rather than lasting contentment. As Strauss wrote, “it is perhaps possible to say that the universal and homogenous state is fated to come. If the universal and homogenous state is the goal of history, then history is absolutely “tragic”... [i]ts completion will reveal the human problem, and hence in particular the problem of the relation of philosophy to politics, is insoluble.”

In some of his later works, Alexandre Kojève obliquely addressed these critiques of the end of history. Kojève implied that the “universal and homogenous state” might not be the vehicle for historical finality after all. In the second edition of Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojève added a famous footnote in which he offered his fullest explanation of life after history. Kojève initially concluded that post-history would be characterised by “animalism.” This he provocatively defined as the present condition of the United States and Soviet Union. These were countries where crass materialism had replaced historical striving. Following Martin Heidegger, Kojève regarded both countries as the apotheosis of technological tyranny

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74 Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero," in ed. Gourevitch and Roth. See also Grant, Technology and Empire: Perspectives on North America: 91-2.
in the making. The dutiful worker and the bureaucratic administrator were the new last men; the philosopher had become unnecessary. Kojève feared that a similar tendency would arise in Europe were it to fall under the sway of the superpowers. A solution to this apparent dilemma came to Kojève when he visited Japan in the late 1950’s. Kojève claimed that the Japanese had found a way to live outside of history by inventing symbolic quests for recognition. Japanese Noh Theatre, the Tea Ceremony, even the Kamikaze ethos, signified the victory of “meaningless formalism” after history. Kojève now came to believe that the world would not become “animalised” by materialism, but that it would undergo “Japanisation” as post-historic societies elsewhere recognised the need for “pure snobbery.” Humans, as a species defined by their “negating” action in history, would surely disappear. But the resulting last men might be more refined than Nietzsche had anticipated. People could still experience some lowly form of struggle once all of the “big” problems of history had been settled.

Kojève’s conclusions appear unnerving in some respects. If the universal and homogenous state first appeared in 1806, all that has occurred since contained no “historical” import in the Hegelian sense. Political revolutions, world wars and ideological contests in the twentieth century were merely the fulfilment of Napoleon’s victory in Jena. Yet there was good reason to take Kojève’s views with a grain of salt. Like Nietzsche before him, Kojève often adopted a bombastic style designed to shock readers. His texts regularly displayed what Timothy Burns has described as a marked “playfulness and irony” when it came to the philosophy of history. Kojève raised many hypothetical questions, and never really gave any

83 Nichols, Alexandre Kojève: Wisdom at the End of History: 85-6.
definite answer. Indeed, some critics claim that his lectures may have been intended to reveal the underlying absurdity of the teleological view on its own terms. On the surface of it, Kojève seemed a strong proponent of history’s end; but the more one dug, the greater the degree of ambiguity. Perhaps the Owl of Minerva never flew at all.

The End of History and the Last Man was in part a rejoinder to this complex debate. For his case to be convincing, Francis Fukuyama needed to explain why the liberal end of history remained a worthy goal. Fukuyama began by agreeing substantially with Nietzsche that the last man could potentially find his post-historical existence boring and pointless. If Plato was right that Thymos was an integral component of the soul, then the last man ceased to be fully human. In the Hegelian terms Fukuyama preferred, people would negate their own being through overcoming history. Fukuyama gave this concern form when he noted, with Strauss and Bloom, that modern America contained aspects of the degeneration of social virtue about which Nietzsche had warned. Technologically advanced and peaceful though the post-historic world might be, its citizens could still become devoid of substantive values.

While Fukuyama took seriously the implications of this claim, he usually regarded it as overly gloomy. Contra Strauss in particular, Fukuyama maintained that post-historic life could be at once consequential and serene. Modern society had largely abolished Megalothymia; the desire to compel others to recognise one consciousness as superior. Most post-historic people pursued Isothymia – equal and mutual recognition of self-worth. In Fukuyama’s view, capitalism provided outlets

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87 Stoekl, "Round Dusk: Kojève at “The End”.
90 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man: 313-14.

for those in democratic society with significant *Thymotic* impulse.\(^93\) The checks and balances of democratic government limited most instances of *Megalothymia* in politics and foreign affairs. Moreover, recreational activities available in post-historic society, such as endurance sports, allowed for the expression of *Thmos* in meaningful struggle outside of history.\(^94\) Those societies which surmounted history should thus be able to find purposeful recognition that would preclude the growth of nihilism.\(^95\) Humanity would not necessarily become aimless and enfeebled.

Fukuyama thus claimed to have resolved the long-standing dilemma of post-historical existence by suggesting that liberal democracy, unlike any regime before it, could consistently satisfy the longing for recognition.\(^96\) Democracy offered numerous paths to express and resolve differences. The advance of democracy in Fukuyama’s lifetime demonstrated that the universal and homogenous state would ultimately be liberal in character.\(^97\) Such conclusions stood Fukuyama apart from most of his philosophical predecessors, who usually disputed the ability of any one ideology to ensure lasting contentment.\(^98\) Fukuyama’s findings also had obvious prescriptive overtones. Chapter five will make clear the ease at which Fukuyama’s work could serve as a foundation for policymaking. Though he would later criticise the idea, a nascent form of democratic vanguardism was often present in Fukuyama’s most famous work.\(^99\) Fukuyama did not explicitly encourage policymakers to adopt a vanguardist attitude. But, as we shall see, he did provide them with a compelling discourse in which to articulate such aims on their own.

The Bush Doctrine expressed a vision of teleological progress with clear antecedents in Fukuyama’s typology. Fukuyama in turn leaned on Hegelian and

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\(^{93}\) Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*: 315-17.

\(^{94}\) Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*: 319.

\(^{95}\) Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*: 336-8. According to some scholars, such as Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss and his students privately accepted Nietzsche’s conclusion that modern existence was essentially meaningless. Those who recognised this truth were obliged to keep it from the masses by developing ‘noble lies’ that could provide society with an enduring sense of purpose. For further discussion of this controversial concept, debate about its influence on neoconservatism and its consequences (if any) for policymaking, see chapter four of this thesis.

\(^{96}\) Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*: 201-2, passim.

\(^{97}\) Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*: 201-2.


French historicist thought to make his case that democracy would soon conquer the world. Assessing the intellectual lineage of the “end of history” idea provides potentially novel avenues for engaging with the Bush Doctrine’s historical voluntarism. Though the authors of the Bush Doctrine might not have drawn inspiration from *Phenomenology of Spirit* or the Strauss-Kojève correspondence, a number of the conclusions they reached had resonance with some of the key issues discussed in these publications. President Bush and his administration reasoned that the United States was a force for world-historical change, and that an end to history would inaugurate an age of peace and equality. This chapter has explored the past fortunes of historical eschatology, and shown why the idea necessarily remains open to contest.

**Conclusion**

The documents that informed the Bush Doctrine made two normative claims about history: that there is such a phenomenon as *telos*, and that history will end with the victory of liberal democratic thought and practice. This chapter has sought to raise doubts about both of these propositions. It seems that the *episteme* of historical teleology is surprisingly thin. Over a century before President Bush addressed the cadets at West Point, Nietzsche had offered a devastating critique of the possibility of *telos*. For Nietzsche, history was not the realisation of the consciousness of freedom, let alone the fulfilment of materialist dialectics. Rather, it was an experience that people could only grasp in part. Nietzsche was railing against his historicist predecessors; but it is possible to apply some of his critiques to democratic vanguardism, given the outlook’s assumption that historical progress must yield a final regime.

Political philosophers remain divided over whether liberal democracy can bring about an acceptable end to history. Fukuyama adopted Kojève’s Hegel to explain why he believed that democracy would guarantee recognition for all. However, Fukuyama’s repeated invocation of Kojève does not stand up to scrutiny when one considers how often the latter expressed doubts about the post-historical
life. Leo Strauss likewise voiced scepticism about the prospects of post-history, warning that Nietzsche’s last men could become a reality if citizens had nothing left to strive after. Far from inaugurating a halcyon age, the close of history could leave society consumed by a sense of *ennui*. Democracy’s victory, from this perspective, might be fleeting. As subsequent chapters make clear, this was not something that most of America’s political leaders and public intellectuals were willing to countenance. Nevertheless, it is a prospect that poses marked difficulties for the democratic vanguardist idea.
Late in his landmark work, *The Philosophy of History*, Hegel contended that “America is… the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the World’s History shall reveal itself.”¹ By the early nineteenth century, the focus of history was seen to be passing from an Old World wracked by conflict to a New World of possibility. As Hegel wrote, “it is for America to abandon the ground on which hitherto the History of the World has developed itself.”²

Hegel here captured a sentiment articulated throughout America’s political evolution. Among America’s leaders there existed a near-consensus that there was something unique about the United States’ place in the story of human progress. John Winthrop famously declared America a “City on a Hill;” Thomas Jefferson called his country an “Empire of Liberty” almost two centuries later. Presidents as diverse as Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan and, of course, George W. Bush, have each extolled America’s unsurpassed virtue as the leading light of democratic values in the world. Whether appointed by providence or history, the United States was to advance peace and prosperity across the globe.

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¹ Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History, With Prefaces by Charles Hegel and the Translator, J. Sibree, M.A.*
² Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History, With Prefaces by Charles Hegel and the Translator, J. Sibree, M.A.*
This sense of national distinctiveness helped to shape American foreign relations from the outset. As the self-regarding “chosen country” the United States exercised an inimitable role in the international system. America’s vision of republican democracy ostensibly had universal application. Whether the United States should promote this regime type by setting an example with its own political institutions, or by actively intervening in other states, provoked repeated disagreement. Democratic vanguardism, as defined in chapter one, might represent a comparatively recent innovation in American foreign policy strategy. Yet this vision of international affairs did not emerge ex nihilo. It contained echoes of a collection of attitudes derived in considerable part from American exceptionalist thought.

This chapter has two main purposes. The first is to provide a bridge between discussion above on theoretical issues associated with an end to history, and the practical “politics of modernity” in twentieth century America. The idea of American exceptionalism pervades the United States’ self-understanding as a liberal polity and global hegemon. Coming to grips with the key characteristics and implications of this exceptionalist tradition is essential for making sense of American political thought. As chapter four will subsequently show, the ideology of neoconservatism owed much to the notion that American must always remain an exceptional nation.

The second purpose of this chapter is to set the scene for close analysis of the Bush Doctrine. Chapter six will outline how the Bush administration grounded its foreign policy discourse in common exceptionalist troupes, but augmented this with a series of post-Cold War and post-September 11 innovations. This rendered the Bush Doctrine rhetorically consistent with many of its predecessors, but vastly more ambitious in practice. Some past exponents of exceptionalism examined in this chapter – such as Woodrow Wilson – may have expressed messianic goals for America. But it was only with the advent of a unipolar world order after 1991 that the United States could begin to act on these hitherto transient impulses.

Exemplarism and Vindicationalism

America’s political leaders have long grappled with the implications of their country’s professed place in world history. According to authors such as Robert Tucker, David Hendrickson, George Herring and John Kane, the American government has usually sought to frame its foreign policy in the language of “practical idealism.” Defying a simplistic “realist” versus “idealist” dichotomy, the United States typically proclaimed the ability to promote its liberal values and national interests simultaneously. In this view, the advance of American power was good for the world at large. Successive American presidents affirmed that their nation rejected aggrandisement. The United States did not conquer, but rather liberated other nations. Practical idealism was an “ideational framework” that took for granted the alleged benevolence of American power. It has remained a consistent undercurrent in American foreign policy since the early years of the republic.

International relations scholar Jonathan Monten has articulated a useful typology for assessing the fortunes of “practical idealism” across the history of American foreign engagement. Building on the work of historians H. W. Brands and Walter A. McDougall, Monten described two competing trends of thought:

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"exemplarism" and "vindicationalism." Both outlooks judged that America had an obligation to encourage freedom overseas, but disagreed markedly over the means to this end. As Monten put it, ""exemplarism"... conceives of the United States as founded in separation from Old World politics and the balance of power system. It suggests that U.S. institutions and values should be perfected and preserved, often but not exclusively through isolation." The idea of "vindicationalism," meanwhile, "shares this "city-on-a-hill" identity, but argues that the United States must move beyond example and undertake active measures to spread its universal political values and institutions." In short, argued Monten, "one is a strategy organized around the concept of the United States as exemplar, the other around the United States as missionary and evangelist."

America’s relative power position could do much to help explain the fluctuating influence of these contending dispositions. Monten pointed out that when the United States was comparatively weak, its leaders tended to stress the need to remain disengaged from the world. As America grew in strength, however, it

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acquired the means to exert its will abroad, and hence often became more disposed towards intervention. This relationship was by no means deterministic; the United States did not always engage in foreign adventures during periods of buoyancy. With reference to the Progressive Era and the Bush presidency, however, Monten suggested that there existed a noteworthy correlation between national power and heightened international ambition. As discussion below, and in chapters five and six indicates, “vindicationalists” in both instances sought to utilise America’s predominance to help advance idealistic causes.

The Roots of Exceptionalist Thought

The notion of “exceptionalism” assessed in Monten’s typology has deep roots in American political culture. Presidents and civic leaders regularly declared that there was something “different” about the United States. It exhibited from the outset a moral and material condition which stood it apart from Europe. In 1776 the British-American colonists had seemingly realised the most celebrated political principles of the Enlightenment by establishing a republican government that served as an example to the watching world.

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16 Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," 116. During the 1920’s, the United States possessed significant material power and political authority in the international system. Despite this, the nation tended towards non-intervention outside of the western hemisphere.


18 See discussion below on Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. See also section three in chapter six of this thesis.


Political historian James Ceaser has recently suggested that there are two distinct strands of “exceptionalism” in American public discourse.\textsuperscript{21} The first centres on America’s empirical uniqueness among the nations of the world. From the time of its founding, scholars have sought to measure exactly how the United States differs from other countries. Criteria of geography, climate, population and social condition have been used to explain the distinctive characteristics of America.\textsuperscript{22} There is often agreement that, in some important material respect, the United States is genuinely unlike any other nation.\textsuperscript{23} While doubtlessly important, this finding tells observers little about the ideational peculiarities of America’s self-identity.\textsuperscript{24} In this vein, Ceaser has argued that the second strand of “exceptionalism” – the belief in a national “mission” – has captured a larger number of minds.\textsuperscript{25} The United States was defined by its adherence to a set of classically liberal assumptions about politics and human nature. America would not accept the world as it existed. The purpose of the country was to change it for the better. It is this second understanding of exceptionalism which is explored below, and problematised in chapter four.

It is clear that the idea of exceptionalism developed over a long period. Though the phrase itself did not find common usage until the middle of the twentieth century, the sentiment had been present since the beginning of English colonial settlement in North America. As early as the 1620’s, pioneers in America believed that their burgeoning political community would assume a significant role in advancing history.\textsuperscript{26} Prior to landing in America, Puritan leader John Winthrop laid

\textsuperscript{24} Restad, "Old Paradigms in History Die Hard in Political Science: US Foreign Policy and American Exceptionalism," 69.
out a compelling vision of this new society. Aboard the ship, Arbella, Winthrop delivered a lay sermon in which he famously declared that “we shall be as a City Upon a Hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.” Winthrop preached that if the colonists remained pious, they would receive the continual blessing of Providence. Fleeing religious persecution in England, the Puritans had the opportunity to “start over.” The wilderness of America was a figurative Tabula Rasa – a chance to construct a society free from the oppressive weight of the European past.

In his sermon, Winthrop enunciated a theme that would be repeated by the nation’s leaders on innumerable occasions: America was chosen to improve the present state of humankind. Consistent with this assumption, the country’s revolutionaries regarded the events of 1776 as a fundamental “break” in modern history. Ezra Stiles recognised in an article composed during the American Revolutionary War that

Not only Britain, but all of Europe are Spectators of the Conflict, the Arduous Struggle for Liberty. We consider ourselves as laying the foundation of a glorious future Empire, and acting a part for the Contemplation of Ages. America is ambitious of conducting with that Prudence, Wisdom, Counsel and true Greatness, which may com[m]end them to the Admiration of Posterity and the World.

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28 Winthrop, "A Model of Christian Charity, 1630".
32 Rockmore, Before and After 9/11: A Philosophical Examination of Globalisation, Terror, and History: 6-7. Ceaser, "The Origins and Character of American Exceptionalism," 10-11. Ceaser has cautioned against over-emphasising the religious dimension of exceptionalism. Though the language might have some obvious commonality with early Puritanism, the content of modern exceptionalism differed considerably. For a counter to Ceaser’s view, which maintains that exceptionalism has always contained a strong Puritan element, see Deneen, "Cities of Man on a Hill," 29-31.
33 For critical analysis on the historiography associated with this issue, see Onuf, "American Exceptionalism and National Identity," 82-5.
34 Ezra Stiles, "Ezra Stiles to Catharine Macaulay 15 April 1775," in The Boisterous Sea of Liberty: A Documentary History of America from Discovery Through Civil War, ed. David Brion Davis and

The American colonists were the first modern people to strike out against their mother country in pursuit of concepts of freedom, democracy and equality.\footnote{The Declaration of Independence: The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen Colonies of the United States of America," (1776). David M. Kennedy, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” in To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 158-9.} The Declaration of Independence made clear that the United States would support “inalienable” and natural rights common to all enlightened people.\footnote{“The Declaration of Independence: The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen Colonies of the United States of America." (1776). David M. Kennedy, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” in To Lead the World: American Strategy after the Bush Doctrine, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 158-9.} The founding generation understood that this assertion drew a line in the sand.\footnote{“The Declaration of Independence: The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen Colonies of the United States of America.”} The United States government assumed that representative democracy was the only regime type consistent with the universal desire for personal and political freedom.\footnote{See Gordon S. Wood, "Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution." The William and Mary Quarterly 23, no. 1 (1966): 6-7. Compare this assertion to Fukuyama’s claims about democracy and human nature in chapter two of this thesis, and to the views of “third age” neoconservatives in
true, as Gertrude Himmelfarb has explained, that “the American novus ordo saeclorum was a new political order, not a new social or human order,” those who established the American republic nevertheless believed that their country would one day prove pivotal in helping democratic government become the global norm. John Kane has put this idea succinctly: “eighteenth century optimism about human progress was transformed into a national epic that gave... Americans a transcendent purpose. It was an inspiring narrative of a people selected by Providence from the Old World to found a New World of liberty and hope, not just for themselves but for the entire human race.”

No American political thinker better captured this kind of exceptionalist disposition than Thomas Jefferson. In his first inaugural address of 1801, President Jefferson informed his audience that the United States was “a chosen country, with enough room for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generation.” Spared from the warfare of Napoleonic Europe, blessed with abundant material resources and an energetic and innovative population, Jefferson believed that the United States stood poised to achieve lasting greatness. In his writings, Jefferson portrayed the territorial expansion of the United States in romanticised terms. Referring to his country as an “Empire of Liberty,” Jefferson maintained that the future lay in the west. Through the subjugation of nature and the American Indians alike, pioneers could continually push back the boundaries of the union and advance the cause of civilisation.

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44 Kane, Between Virtue and Power: The Persistent Moral Dilemma of U.S. Foreign Policy: 3-4. For further analysis on this theme by the same author, see John Kane, "Democracy and World Peace: The Kantian Dilemma of United States Foreign Policy," Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 3 (2012): 295-6.
Jefferson’s exceptionalist meditations left an enduring mark on America’s national identity. As Darren Staloff has written, Jefferson’s “politics of principles transcended the mundane realm of programs and policies and introduced an idealistic, often otherworldly, character into American political discourse.” Jefferson devised much of the idiom central to American nationalism. His idea of the United States was “progressive, radical, and democratic. It was also, perhaps, and above all, dramatic and imaginative.” Jefferson envisioned America’s future in majestic terms. His portrayal of the frontier, in particular, appealed to a wide variety of educated Americans during the nineteenth century.

Yet Jefferson’s high-minded beliefs also cultivated a sense of lasting tension within the national character. Joseph Ellis has noted that Jefferson often formulated “interior worlds” which allowed him to contemplate the challenges of public life in an “ideal” form. When events in the “real world” undermined his imagined ideal, the President did not become disillusioned. Rather than altering his “expectations in the face of disappointment, [Jefferson] tended to bury them deeper inside himself and regard the disjunction between his ideals and worldly imperfections as the world’s problem, rather than his own.” Ellis’s interpretation of Jefferson might well apply to American exceptionalist discourse writ large. On the world stage, the United States often imagined itself acting munificently and in pursuit of universal ideals. By implication, any error in the execution of its principles merely signified good intentions gone awry. Staloff contended that this attitude has “allowed Americans to sin with a good conscience.” Convinced of its innate virtue as the appointed vehicle of history, how could the United States commit ill against other peoples?

52 Ellis, American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson: 40-1.
55 Staloff, Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding:
“Exemplarism” and the Early Republic

During its first decades of existence, the United States generally subscribed to what Monten has termed an “exemplarist” understanding of foreign relations. America’s leaders sought to remain largely detached from international political entanglements; lest these entanglements corrupt their budding experiment in republican government.  

In addition, America did not possess the material power to shape the wider international order. It thus sought to minimise its association with the empires of the Old World.

America’s first president articulated most clearly the exemplarist mindset that would define the age. In his farewell address, George Washington famously contended that

Nothing is more essential than the permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded… The Nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness, is in some degrees a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interests… Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence… the jealousy of a free people ought to constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.  

The United States, Washington remarked, ought to avoid becoming involved in the realpolitik style of diplomacy practiced in Europe. The departing President told his countrymen that “the great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign Nations, is, in

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359-60. See also Kane, "Democracy and World Peace: The Kantian Dilemma of United States Foreign Policy," 293-4.


extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little Political connection as possible... [it] is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world.”

Washington’s initial successors usually upheld this position. As the chosen nation, the United States was to lead by example. Thomas Jefferson expressed an exemplarist viewpoint when he wrote that Americans should seek to improve their own society before aiding others. Jefferson wished South American revolutionaries success in throwing off Spanish rule; but he did not believe it was in the United States’ interest to intervene and assist the erstwhile republicans. President James Madison adopted a similar posture. America was a country with a mission, to be sure, but it was not the messiah of nations. Other states would come to accept political liberty because of its intrinsic appeal, rather than having the ideology thrust upon them.

The “Monroe Doctrine” of 1823 represented the summation of this exemplarist impulse. President James Monroe’s message to Congress warned European powers against interference in the western hemisphere, and asserted an American sphere of commercial influence. Monroe stated in his speech that

The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not be considered as subjects for future colonisation by any European powers... The citizens of the United States cherish the sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow man on this side... of the Atlantic.

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60 Tucker and Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson: 240-1.
63 Russell, "Madison’s Realism and the Role of Domestic Ideals in Foreign Affairs."
The Americas were now barred from European conspiracy. Indeed, stressed Monroe, “we should consider any attempt [by European states] to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and security.” Madison and Jefferson had endorsed this view prior to its enunciation, with the latter writing to Monroe that America’s “first and fundamental maxim should be, never entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe.”

America’s attempt at separating itself from European power politics in many ways reflected the influence of Monroe’s Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. In a fourth of July message to Congress in 1821, Adams had remarked that “wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will [America’s] heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.” Recalling Washington’s dictum, Adams warned that the United States must not become involved in binding alliances or offensive wars. If the nation succumbed to temptations of grandeur, Adams feared that

She would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force.... She might become the dictatress of the world. She would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit...

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For Adams, as for most government figures in the early nineteenth century, American exceptionalism was twinned with exemplarism: ensuring that the City on a Hill had firm foundations.  

This is not to suggest that the leaders of the early republic were “isolationist” in temperament. The United States never wished to wall itself off from international affairs. While most early presidents had expressed marked wariness about maintaining close relations with Europe, they were quite willing to see the United States establish diplomatic and economic connections within the western hemisphere. As the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine demonstrated, within a generation of the revolution, America sought to exercise sway over its near-abroad. Exemplarists offered a circumscribed vision of the national interest, which implied that other nations would ultimately find their own way to enlightenment. The United States provided a model political order that others could freely choose to emulate.

**The Development of Vindicationalism**

Exemplarism remained a prominent feature of American foreign relations until the mid-nineteenth century. Consistent with Monten’s model, as America’s material power increased, so too did its aspirations abroad. With the continent settled, many political leaders concluded that the United States needed to expand its influence outwards. If America’s founding beliefs were universally valid, it seemed only appropriate that the country should encourage their adoption elsewhere.

The concept later labelled “vindicationalism” gained prominent adherents at the end of a sixty year period of rapid westward expansion. The first great wave of

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73 Restad, "Old Paradigms in History Die Hard in Political Science: US Foreign Policy and American Exceptionalism," 64-5, passim.
75 Restad, "Old Paradigms in History Die Hard in Political Science: US Foreign Policy and American Exceptionalism," 63-5, passim.
American territorial acquisition came with the fortuitous purchase of the Louisiana Territory in 1803.76 Americans had long sought unhindered access to the Mississippi River and Great Plains.77 In search of capital for his wars in Europe, Napoleon decided to divest France of her North American possessions.78 Through attentive diplomacy, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison acquired all French holdings for approximately three cents an acre.79 This purchase more than doubled the size of the United States, unlocking extensive tracts of land for settlement.80

Subsequent presidents continued to pursue continental expansion through treaties and trade-offs. James Madison sought to resolve America’s claim to the Spanish Floridas, which had eluded Jefferson throughout his presidency.81 The doctrine that bore James Monroe’s name appeared to imply that the United States would exercise a degree of hegemony over its southern neighbours.82 For John Quincy Adams, meanwhile, securing the Transcontinental Treaty with Spain established America’s intention to affirm its sovereignty throughout the lands purchased by Jefferson in 1803.83 The cumulative effect of such policies was the

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opening up of still larger regions for settlement, and displacement of the indigenous population in unprecedented numbers.\textsuperscript{84}

By mid-century, Americans had come to describe this march of dominion by the moniker “Manifest Destiny.” First articulated by \textit{Democratic Review} editor John O’Sullivan in 1845, the concept of Manifest Destiny soon provided a durable vision of national purpose.\textsuperscript{85} O’Sullivan explained that no temporal power could halt “the fulfilment of our manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.”\textsuperscript{86} The so-called “laws of history” made inevitable the annexation of Texas by President James Polk.\textsuperscript{87} The acquisition of the Oregon territory and California would soon follow. This would complete the “empire of liberty” envisioned by Jefferson over forty years earlier.\textsuperscript{88}

For O’Sullivan, westward expansion was the harbinger of civilisation. By conquering neighbouring territories, Americans could redeem societies suffering under the weight of their own backwardness.\textsuperscript{89} The “Anglo-Saxon race” was the most refined in the world, with the people of the United States in the vanguard.\textsuperscript{90} During the war with Mexico, America presented newly subject peoples with a choice – civilise or perish.\textsuperscript{91} The march of American-style modernity was non-negotiable, and all were expected to accept the outlook. O’Sullivan made it clear that the United


States must commit itself to a form of paternalism to bring order to the frontier.\textsuperscript{92} Only when all people had learned to be free was America’s task truly complete.\textsuperscript{93}

O’Sullivan’s portrayal of America’s providence at times offered a teleological edge to exceptionalist discourse. In an article entitled ‘The Great Nation of Futurity’, O’Sullivan asserted that the American mission was of grand proportions.\textsuperscript{94} According to O’Sullivan,

We are the nation of progress, of individual freedom, of universal enfranchisement. Equality of rights is the cynosure of our union of States, the grand exemplar of the correlative equality of individuals; and while truth sheds its effulgence, we cannot retrograde, without dissolving the one and subverting the other. We must onward to the fulfilment of our mission – to the entire development of the principle of our organization – freedom of conscience, freedom of person, freedom of trade and business pursuits, universality of freedom and equality. This is our high destiny, and in nature’s eternal, inevitable decree of cause and effect we must accomplish it.\textsuperscript{95}

America, from this perspective, was destined to spread democratic liberties to all.\textsuperscript{96} On some occasions, this would require the use of force to encourage recalcitrant nations along the path to true freedom.\textsuperscript{97}

Consistent with these by-now established attitudes, political “Progressives” began in the 1890’s to articulate a voluntarist understanding of international politics.\textsuperscript{98} Convinced that conflict and inequality could be ameliorated through intervention, proponents of the Progressive view contended that America should use


\textsuperscript{93} Merk, \textit{Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History}: 24-5.

\textsuperscript{94} John L. O’Sullivan, "The Great Nation of Futurity," \textit{The United States Magazine and Democratic Review} 6, no. 23 (1839): 426-30.

\textsuperscript{95} O’Sullivan, "The Great Nation of Futurity," 428.

\textsuperscript{96} Scholnick, "O’Sullivan, The Democratic Review, and Empire, 1837-1840," 133.

\textsuperscript{97} Scholnick, "O’Sullivan, The Democratic Review, and Empire, 1837-1840," 133.

its new-found national power to promote “civilisation” abroad. The exemplarist disposition of the founders was anachronistic; in an age of intensifying international engagement, the United States would fall behind if it remained aloof from the world. America now had to encourage liberal principles among foreign peoples living under tyrannical rule.

The apogee of Progressive foreign policy came with the “Spanish-American war” of 1898. The United States acquired colonial territories in the late 1890’s, coming to possess Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, Wake Island, Hawaii and the Philippines. Progressive intellectuals often celebrated these conquests as the rekindling of Manifest Destiny. Some, such as Josiah Strong, couched their support for intervention in the language of Social Darwinism. America, wrote Strong, had a responsibility to “educate” inferior people in the ways of Anglo-Saxon civilisation. In the terms of “scientific” racism common at the time, the inhabitants of the Philippines and Cuba were “barbarians” who were unfit for self-rule. Only through the benevolent tutelage of American occupation would these people become

100 Wrobel, The End of American Exceptionalism: Frontier Anxiety from the Old West to the New Deal: 56-7.
101 Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776: 309.
capable of achieving freedom. President William McKinley, meanwhile, once claimed that the United States would “civilise and Christianise” the Philippines. President Theodore Roosevelt carried much of this spirit of political Progressivism into the early twentieth century. Roosevelt believed expansionism a righteous and manly pursuit for the greatest of nations. Shortly before assuming the presidency, Roosevelt had expressed concern that with the alleged closing of the frontier in 1893 his countrymen would lose the will to strive for glory. Reminiscent of Nietzsche’s meditations on the fate of the last man, Roosevelt worried that the American people might soon become enervated. As Roosevelt put it in an 1899 address, “a life of slothful ease, and life of that peace which springs merely from the lack either of desire or power to strive after great things, is as little worth of a nation as an individual.” Calling upon his audience to accept a “strenuous life,” Roosevelt held that a disciplined and vigorous citizenry would help America realise world power in the twentieth century.


113 Roosevelt, "The Idea of a Strenuous Life," in ed. Fink, 489. Quinn, US Foreign Policy in Context:
This quest for a “strenuous life” required the projection of American influence into the Pacific. The new frontier lay among island chains strung along America’s trade routes to China. In the view of Senator Arthur Beveridge, the acquisition of the Philippines would open mainland Asia to American commerce. But victory in the Spanish-American war would also provide an opportunity to advance the culture of the Philippines. The Marines would improve the archipelago’s soils, schools and social order, in preparation for eventual independence. The Roosevelt administration and its supporters proposed that America intercede against anarchy to realise enlightened political rule. The pursuit of free trade and free government would improve the state of the world and revitalise the republic.

For Roosevelt, the spread of orderly constitutional regimes was a vital American interest. All countries were required to conform to the liberal political beliefs put forward by the United States. In his 1904 “corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt remarked that “any country [in Latin America] whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters... it need not fear interference from the United States.” Those countries that persisted in their violent ways, however, were an affront to the standards of modernity. They had to be converted to democracy in the interest of security. As

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120 Roosevelt, “Fourth Annual Message to Congress,” in ed. Link and Leary, 72-6. Quinn, US Foreign
the President argued, “chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence that results in the
general loosening of the ties of civilised society, may in America, as elsewhere,
ultimately require intervention by some civilised nation.” The United States,
concluded Roosevelt, might need to assume the role of an “international police
power.” By the early twentieth century, it seemed, America’s quest to redeem
fallen nations had become a truly global enterprise.

The Case of Wilsonian Idealism

In January 1919, American President Woodrow Wilson arrived at the Paris peace
conference with the aim of realising his pledge uttered during WWI to “make the
world safe for democracy.” Wilson laid out to delegates his vision for a liberal
international order wholly free and secured by the rule of law. In practice,
Wilson’s ambitious scheme soon fell on deaf ears. Its principles, however,
reverberated among generations of policymakers. President Wilson renovated the
terms of American exceptionalism. He updated the “vindicationalist” idea for the so-
called “American century.” Most significantly, Wilson devised a rhetorical platform
on which subsequent American leaders have frequently drawn to help justify the
promotion of representative government.

Woodrow Wilson, like most American presidents before him, believed that
his nation’s values exemplified universal truths. Melding aspects of his Progressive

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Roosevelt, "Fourth Annual Message to Congress," in ed. Link and Leary, 72-6. Roosevelt had
elsewhere called on the United States to “speak softly and carry a big stick.” America would eschew
avaricious power politics, but would not be averse to using its influence to ensure civility abroad.
Woodrow Wilson, "President’s War Message, 2 April 1917," in The Diplomacy of World Power:
The United States, 1889-1920, ed. Arthur S. Link and William M. Leary (Edinburgh: Edward
Arnold, 1970), 145.
Tony Smith, "From Woodrow Wilson in 1902 to the Bush Doctrine in 2002: Democracy Promotion
and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations: 2. N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World
Politics: America’s Response to War and Revolution (New York and London: Oxford University
Press, 1967). 1-2. For discussion of the potential relationship between the ideas of Presidents Wilson
and George W. Bush, see section three of chapter six of this thesis.

Wilson placed particular emphasis on the right to liberal democracy.\footnote{Link, \textit{Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies}: 13-14. Smith, \textit{America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy}, Expanded Edition: 87-8.} Elected government, in Wilson’s view, was the most humane, benign and just form of rule. Wilson held that history itself was moving towards the victory of democracy. This prospect he warmly welcomed.\footnote{Herring, \textit{From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776}: 380-1. See chapter six for discussion of Wilson and Bush’s analogous teleological view of progress.} Examining the centrality of democracy to Wilson’s worldview, Arthur Link wrote that the President’s “belief in the inherent goodness of man, in progress as the law of organic life and the working out of the divine plan of history, and in democracy as the highest form of government led him straight to the conclusion that democracy might some day be the universal rule of political life.”\footnote{Link, \textit{Wilson the Diplomatist: A Look at his Major Foreign Policies}: 13-14.} Indeed, explained Link, Wilson put forward the conviction that “a peaceful world community, governed by a universal public opinion and united for
mutual achievement, could only exist when democracy was itself triumphant everywhere.”

America had a central role to play in bringing about the victory of democracy. In his “War Message” to Congress on 2 April 1917, President Wilson stated that

[America has] no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no domination. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but the champions of the rights of all mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Entering WWI had presented the United States with an opportunity to transform the Old World by exporting the republican form of government practiced in the New. As Wilson put it, “we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest to our hearts – for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by… a concert of free peoples.” All of this, intoned the President, would together “make the world itself at last free.”

Through such pronouncements, Wilson carried the spirit of American exceptionalism to rarefied heights. He spoke of the United States’ purpose with a fervour not heard since the time of Jefferson. According to Wilson, “America is a name which sounds in the ears of men everywhere as a synonym with individual

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135 Wilson, "President’s War Message, 2 April 1917," in ed. Link and Leary, 145.
opportunity because a synonym of individual liberty.”139 The world war was nothing short of a struggle between democracy and tyranny.140 Roused from armed neutrality, the United States would work to transform the European political system that had sparked such calamitous hostilities in 1914.141 Wilson argued in a 1916 speech that “because we hold certain ideals we have thought that it was right that we should hold them for others as well as for ourselves. America has more than once given evidence of the generosity and disinterestedness of its love of liberty. It has been willing to fight for the liberty of others as well as for its own liberty.”142

Like Roosevelt a decade before him, Wilson believed that the United States had a special responsibility to uphold liberty in the western hemisphere.143 Countries in that region which failed to adhere to expected standards of political conduct faced American intercession to set them on the “correct” course.144 In his first year in office, President Wilson had written that “the purpose of the United States is solely and singly to secure peace and order in Central America by seeing to it that the processes of self-government there are not interrupted or set aside.”145 Consistent with this statement, Wilson voiced dismay at the coup which had brought General Victoriana Huerta to power in Mexico.146 The example of Huerta compelled Wilson to devise a test of government legitimacy for America’s southern neighbours, in which constitutional democracies were deemed the only appropriate vessel of sovereign authority.147 Revolutionary regimes or military juntas were judged

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139 Wilson, “A New Latin American Policy, 27 October, 1913,” in ed. Link and Leary, 82-6.
146 Wilson, "Our Purposes in Mexico, 24 November 1913," in ed. Link and Leary, 87-9.
dangerous and unrepresentative. It was therefore necessary that they be replaced by liberal governments.148

The Wilson administration repeatedly attempted to put into practice its professed commitment to democracy in Latin America. The Marines twice entered Mexico in pursuit of political change. Wilson sought in the first instance to overthrow Huerta and install a pro-American president in his place.149 In the second case, Wilson aimed to rout a Mexican insurgent leader who had launched a series of raids along the American border.150 Concerns about civil unrest in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic likewise elicited American involvement.151 The President always defined these actions in magnanimous terms.152 Discussing the necessity of removing Huerta, Wilson informed a gathering of Mexican journalists that “when [America] sent troops into Mexico, our sincere desire was nothing else than to assist you to get rid of a man who was making the settlement of your affairs for the time being impossible. We had no desire to use our troops for any other purposes.”153 American intervention was therefore justified by the highest of callings.154

According to Wilson, liberal democracy offered the best route to achieving international harmony. WWI had demonstrated the pressing need for a global order based upon shared principles. At Versailles, Wilson maintained that national self-determination and democracy were twinned.155 When given the opportunity, all

remarkably similar to that put forward in the 2001 ‘Responsibility to Protect’ report. For critical analysis of the liberal internationalist concept of conditional sovereignty, see section three of chapter five in this thesis.
nations would adopt liberal practices. Each would then be able to manage ethno-nationalist disputes which might have previously caused violence. A community of democracies would also act together when faced with international crises, rallying around the concept of collective security. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, democratic states would work to ensure that all countries adhered to international law and punished any transgressors of accepted behaviour. A world essentially absent of war would result. The United States would sustain elected government in every nation, confident that lasting peace lay just over the horizon.

American domestic politics soon intruded upon this lofty vision. Despite passionate lobbying, Wilson failed to gain the Senate’s ratification for American participation in the League of Nations. Leading members of the Republican Party revived the exemplarist concerns of the founding era, warning the President not to become enmeshed in the vagaries of European diplomacy. After two decades of Progressive internationalism, the public mood had shifted. The United States certainly retained considerable material power. Many of its citizens, however, had become leery of wide-ranging foreign involvement. Indeed, by the mid-1920’s, the United States had adopted a stance quite at odds with many of Wilson’s aims.

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Nevertheless, Wilson’s rhetoric resonated for decades after he departed office. Wilsonian language frequently accompanied the United States’ policies of democracy promotion for most of the twentieth century.\(^\text{162}\) This is not to say that subsequent administrations – Democratic or Republican – were necessarily heir to Wilson’s policies; as we shall see in chapter six of this thesis, there remains heated debate over Wilson’s legacy and its connotations for foreign policy practice. For now, it is sufficient to note briefly how elements of Wilsonian discourse influenced the way in which America’s subsequent leaders spoke about their foreign policy aims.

After a brief period of retrenchment from international engagement in the 1920’s and 1930’s, the United States resumed a position of leadership. The challenge of Fascism in Europe and Asia roused the United States to action, and Wilsonian language become commonplace once again. With the onset of WWII, President Franklin Roosevelt spoke of the “Four Freedoms” – political, economic and social rights for all citizens of the world that sounded unmistakably Wilsonian in character.\(^\text{163}\) Roosevelt had served in a junior position in Wilson’s administration, and Progressive ideas had retained some influence among the New Deal Democrats which dominated Roosevelt’s party from the early 1930’s. The defeat of Fascism in 1945 afforded a unique opportunity to build successor institutions to the League of Nations. The United Nations and the Bretton Woods system seemed in some measure to represent the achievement of Wilson’s frustrated ambitions.\(^\text{164}\)

The challenge of Soviet communism during the Cold War also encouraged a resurgence of Wilsonian troupes. As with WWI, this international conflict was cast by America’s leaders as a battle between democracy and tyranny. The strategy of


containment announced by President Harry Truman in 1947 committed the United States to protecting the free world from communist encroachment. America would keep the international community safe so that democracy could flourish.\textsuperscript{165} This position – later referred to as Cold War liberalism – reached its peak early in the administration of President John F. Kennedy. Confident in the superiority of American values and in the ability of the United States to use its power for the greater good, the Kennedy administration tied America’s fortunes to containing communism in South East Asia and the Americas.\textsuperscript{166} Through development aid, international assistance and – when deemed necessary – military intervention, the Kennedy administration would expand the reach of liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{167} It was this open-ended pledge to defend freedom which drew the United States ever deeper into Vietnam, and brought about a crisis in confidence at home from which the ideology of neoconservatism would emerge.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The United States was from its inception a country seemingly committed to advancing political freedom abroad. How best to achieve this goal was often a contentious issue. Drawing upon the same exceptionalist discourse, exemplarists and vindicationalists drew markedly different conclusions about the proper role of the American republic in world affairs. Exemplarists warned of the corrupting influence of foreign entanglement and worried about the deleterious effects of great power responsibility. Vindicationalists, meanwhile, asserted that the nation and world alike would be better off if the United States entered international politics. At each juncture, America’s leaders believed they acted for the benefit of the world, and


considered that most countries would likewise understand the indispensable virtue of their deeds.

The history of American exceptionalism sheds light on democratic vanguardism in two ways. Firstly, it provides context for many of the Bush administration’s claims. The 2002 National Security Strategy noted that the United States “fights, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors human liberty.”\textsuperscript{168} Taken as an expression of exceptionalism, the National Security Strategy had considerable resonance with the public statements of figures including Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Chapter six of this thesis will make clear the way in which the authors of the Bush Doctrine grounded many of their proposals in an existing discourse of American civic nationalism. The Bush Doctrine drew freely from past enunciations of national purpose, while also making some unique contributions of its own.

Secondly, the story of exceptionalism presented here makes apparent the close association between American power and American ideals. Jonathan Monten has maintained that the United States’ international aspirations expanded each time the country augmented its material power through conquest, diplomacy or the opening of new markets. Exceptionalist thought could provide popular justification for action, and was often emboldened by the consequences of intervention abroad. This relationship was not static, however; the President’s personal beliefs usually played a role in determining the exact scope of America’s involvement overseas. This thesis will later apply Monten’s typology to the emergence of democratic vanguardism, suggesting that the United States entered a period of foreign policy vindicalationalism in the years following September 11, 2001. Ideology, insecurity and national power came together in a combination with few antecedents in past American policy.

Public intellectuals in the United States have long debated the meaning of their nation’s “exceptional” inheritance. Unbound by the strictures of political office, writers, journalists and academics often possess greater freedom to analyse what it means to be an American. Following in this tradition, in the middle decades of the twentieth century thinkers associated with the American “New Left” embarked on a comprehensive reassessment of their nation’s founding ideology. Though the United States seemed an exemplar of liberal modernity, being democratic, capitalist and increasingly multicultural, beneath the surface was bubbling discontent. By the second half of the 1960’s, many leftist intellectuals had come to regard their country as deeply flawed and prone to self-righteous excess.

This conclusion aroused the pique of writers who believed that America’s exceptionalist values were still sacrosanct. One group of East Coast intellectuals – often known as “neoconservatives” – quickly emerged as the most spirited defenders of “classically liberal” virtues against those who challenged America’s national ethos. Neoconservatives aimed to reinvigorate a civic ideology they believed was in danger of dissolution. With reference to the philosophy of Leo Strauss, in particular, members of this group confronted the growing anomie of modern liberal thought. Neoconservatives insisted that America’s republican principles were applicable
everywhere. Citizens that again accepted this fact would come to support the promotion of democratic values as the best defence against foreign threats. Such action, in turn, would help to regenerate the moral fibre integral to American republicanism.

Assessing the genesis and development of the neoconservative view is central to making sense of America’s response to September 11. A host of neoconservatives assumed important policymaking positions in the Bush administration; they brought with them an outlook which put morality, exceptionalism and “national greatness” at the heart of American political life. Though there have now been three “ages” of neoconservatism, many of these ideas retain potency. Indeed, the authors who articulated the notion of democratic vanguardism believed it could only succeed if supported by a unified, virtuous and patriotic American citizenry.

Classifying a “Persuasion”

In one of his last print publications, Irving Kristol, the so-called “Godfather” of neoconservatism, opined that “journalists, and now even presidential candidates, speak with an enviable confidence on who or what is "neoconservative," and seem to assume the meaning is fully revealed in the name.” According to Kristol, “those of us who are designated as "neocons" are amused, flattered, or dismissive, depending on the context. It is reasonable to wonder: Is there any "there" there?”

Kristol’s question was indeed apt. Neoconservatism had become a polarising issue after 2001, and caricatures of the outlook were proliferating fast. Such growing enmity required redress. What, exactly, were the tenets of “neoconservatism”? How

had these shaped, and in turn been shaped by, recent American history? What issues animated neoconservatives? Those deemed “neoconservative” by their critics were far from orthodox members of the American right. Unlike members of the “old right,” neoconservatives expressed a generally sanguine political posture. They believed classically liberal values were the bedrock of a healthy society. Scholars of neoconservatism, such as Gary Dorrien, have suggested that neoconservatives aimed to defend the ideas of American republicanism, representative democracy and popular patriotism against the excesses of “late modern” political thought. American liberalism had lost its way in the twentieth century. Neoconservatism could allegedly provide the American people with the tools necessary for ideological and cultural renewal. Kristol once summarised these sentiments by claiming that neoconservatives proposed to “infuse American bourgeois orthodoxy with a new self-conscious intellectual vigor, while dispelling the feverish mélange of gnostic humors that, for more than a century now, has suffused our political beliefs and has tended to convert them into political religions.”

Neoconservatism was not a political movement or a party in the usual sense of the term. With no formal candidates, party meetings or leadership committees, neoconservatism occupied an unusual niche in American public life. Kristol had famously called neoconservatism a “persuasion” in his writings. This phrase, Kristol

7 Kristol, Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead: xvi.
once wrote, “hits off exactly the strange destiny of ideas in American politics.” While political “persuasions” did not conform to a strict line, their members still claimed to stand for “something more explicit than a general ethos.”\(^9\) Kristol’s associate, Norman Podhoretz, usually spoke of neoconservatism as a “tendency” of thought; something slightly less complete than a persuasion.\(^{10}\) Still others held that neoconservatism was a “state of mind,” and frequently inchoate.\(^{11}\) However defined, neoconservatism was a distinctly modern and ultimately American phenomenon.\(^{12}\)

Committed to the proposition that “ideas matter” in political life, neoconservatives sought to bolster a society they saw slouching towards political and moral torpor.\(^{13}\) As historian Colin Dueck has perceptively written, neoconservatism was “a form of intellectual conservatism with a difference: lively, polemical, metropolitan, fully reconciled to the nation’s post-war political order, and with a taste for sectarian combat.”\(^{14}\)

Some of the initial proponents of neoconservatism began their careers within the American Marxian left.\(^{15}\) Historian Joseph Dorman recounts in his book, *In Their
Own Words the lasting effect this political affiliation would have on neoconservatives. Kristol, along with figures such as Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset, all attended the City College of New York during the late 1930’s. They became politically active by joining the Trotskyite movement on campus. In repeated verbal sparring matches with the numerically superior college Stalinists, Kristol and his associates soon came to understand the perversity of “real existing socialism.” They grew increasingly disillusioned with the vanguardist pretentions of the old left, and thus began their long journey towards the “vital centre.” By the late 1940’s, Kristol conceded that he had become a “Cold War liberal”, vigorously anti-communist and committed to the American way of life. To varying degrees, his City College associates would soon follow suit.

The experience of de-radicalisation had two important effects on the nascent neoconservative group. Firstly, it inoculated them against political “utopianism.” Justin Vaïsse has suggested that the neoconservative’s radical past helped to account for their indomitable reaction against the New Left in the 1960’s. Kristol and his colleagues had seen a lofty idea – communism – degenerate into vicious tyranny. Panaceas such as communism bred unrealistic political expectations. Whether by circumstance or design, grandiose ideologies seemed to embrace violence as the solution to present wrongs. The experience of dealing with Stalinists during their college years had left the emerging band of neoconservatives deeply wary of self-

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20 Vaïsse, *Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement*: 23-4. For more on this issue, see section three of this chapter.
22 For discussion on neoconservative reactions to utopianism, see High, "The Recent Historiography of American Neoconservatism," 477-9.
styled revolutionaries that denounced the existing order and preached the millennium.23

Secondly, the City College group’s embrace of the “vital centre” brought them into contact with enduring debates over the character of liberal ideology in America. Kristol, for instance, became interested in the “classically liberal” foundations of the American republic, finding himself drawn to the idea that the United States was the apotheosis of Enlightenment republicanism in action.24 Neoconservatives deemed “traditional” American liberalism an amalgam of Lockean and Aristotelian prudence. This philosophical fusion recognised the rights of man and the need for *Phronesis* in public life. It accepted the Enlightenment precept that all people possessed a capacity for freedom; yet it maintained that discretion ought to determine any actions taken towards helping others realise political liberty.25 In some iterations, classic American liberalism had also intimated that the United States might be a “world-historical” country. This assumption, in particular, suffused neoconservatism from the outset.26 In the view of Michael C. Williams neoconservatives concluded that self-confident leaders, committed to a far-sighted conception of the “national interest,” would lift the spirit of their people and wider world alike.27 Any foreign policy that attempted to eschew the nation’s abiding principles would, neoconservatives believed, find few lasting supporters.28

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23 See section three of this chapter.
25 Homolar-Riechmann, "The Moral Purpose of US Power: Neoconservatism in the age of Obama," 182. Jean-François Drolet has maintained, by contrast, that the neoconservative’s commitment to Enlightenment principles was “subordinated” to a profoundly reactionary social and cultural philosophy. See Drolet, *American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary Idealism*: 6-7. As with most things neoconservative, the group’s attitude towards Enlightenment values was open to contest; but in my view, their attachment to such ideas seemed more genuine than mendacious.
Yet modern American liberalism had nevertheless started to come unhinged. Where Theodore Roosevelt had once unashamedly defended the righteousness of the “American mission,” modern leaders could only equivocate.²⁹ Progressive public intellectuals had formerly celebrated the United States’ Manifest Destiny; their heirs adopted an “adversary culture” committed to questioning America’s founding beliefs.³⁰ Worse still, the public at large was becoming increasingly cynical about their country’s actions abroad.³¹ The notion of “American benevolence” had become an oxymoron for many observers. By the time the socialist writer Michael Harrington allegedly coined the term “neoconservative,” to describe ex-comrades to his right, such figures had concluded that American liberalism itself was beginning to disintegrate.³²

**The Strauss Connection**

How had it come to this? America’s once great liberal tradition was fast fracturing, and there existed few alternative ideologies likely to be accepted by the majority of citizens. Neoconservatives soon claimed that the philosophy of “radical historicism” had swamped contemporary liberalism. Declaring all values essentially equal, the “radical historicists” apparently denied that the American regime was exceptional in any way. The principles expressed by the country’s leaders were not timeless; they represented a distinctly Anglo-American outlook of ephemeral appeal. Radical historicism had caused a profound crisis in confidence among liberal thinkers. This crisis, neoconservatives feared, would soon culminate in thoroughgoing nihilism.³³

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In reaching this conclusion, neoconservatives often relied on the writings of Leo Strauss. In a number of publications, the University of Chicago professor revealed his foreboding that contemporary liberal societies might not possess the faculties necessary to defend their beliefs against relativism. Democracies, according to Strauss, required grounding in commonly-shared attitudes about the inherent virtue of the polity. With no moral compass, liberal regimes faced existential challenges from the far left and right alike. Having fled Weimar Germany as a graduate student, Strauss understood better than most the political consequences of liberal “decadence” and radical philosophy’s will to power. Most self-professed neoconservatives came to express a comparable unease that American liberalism might shortly self-immolate.

Strauss often insisted that republican regimes were losing faith in their previously steadfast principles. In his 1953 book, Natural Right and History, Strauss lamented the decline of modern political thought. He held that, at least since Machiavelli, philosophers had attempted to banish from their works discussion of the

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“final good” in public life. Machiavelli and his heirs had lowered the horizons of political philosophy. Politics had been reduced to a science; concerned more with the function and form of state institutions than the ultimate ends of government. Moreover, with the rise of historicist thinking from the early nineteenth century, the final good of life became inherently qualified in nature. Intellectuals deemed the opinions of each society contingently right for their time and place alone, not as reflections of potentially universal political truths.

This historicist perspective, or “German historical consciousness” as Strauss called it, culminated in the philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. As chapter two of this thesis noted, Strauss had long grappled with Nietzsche’s ominous account of the last man. In his essay ‘Notes on the Plan of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil’, Strauss ascertained that Nietzsche had devised a peculiar form of “life-affirming nihilism” in which the “trans-valuation of all values” was a necessary prelude to willing the Overman. Nietzsche appeared to suggest a way out of the languor of the post-historic society encountered by Zarathustra: the conscious devising of a new system of beliefs. As Strauss put it in an oft-quoted passage,

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Nietzsche’s philosophy teaches a truth that is deadly. It shows us that culture is possible only if men are fully dedicated to principles of thought and action which they do not and cannot question, which limit their horizons and thus enable them to have a character and a style. It shows us at the same time that any principles of this kind can be questioned and even rejected.\footnote{Nietzsche, "Relativism," in ed. Pangle, 25. See also Nasser Behnegar, "Reading What is Political Philosophy?"," Perspectives on Political Science 39, no. 2 (2010): 66-7.}

Nietzsche’s proposal would require a period of disorder that all but the most hardened of thinkers would be unable to tolerate. To will new values, all existing beliefs had to be cast aside.\footnote{Strong, "Nietzsche and the Political: Tyranny, Tragedy, Cultural Revolution and Democracy," 49-50, 60 passim.} Strauss, for his part, could not support Nietzsche’s claim that radical historicism signified a necessary stepping-stone to a genuine “philosophy of the future.”\footnote{Strauss, "Relativism," in ed. Pangle, 25.}

In Strauss’s view, Martin Heidegger had by contrast uncritically accepted Nietzsche’s relativism and therefore embraced nihilism unreservedly.\footnote{Catherine Zuckert and Michael Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American Democracy (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 32-4. Tarcov and Pangle, "Epilogue: Leo Strauss and the History of Political Philosophy," in ed. Strauss and Cropsey, 907-9.} Heidegger sought to challenge the ontology of western philosophy from Plato to the present.\footnote{Zuckert and Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American Democracy, 32-4.} He called into question the assumption that people could consider traditions to be “right” simply because of their longevity.\footnote{Strauss, "An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism," in ed. Pangle, 30-1. For a critical reading of Strauss’s position on the “philosopher of the future”, which suggests that Strauss might have had some sympathy for this idea, see Grant Havers, "George Grant and Leo Strauss: Modernist and Postmodernist Conservatisms," Topia 8 (2002): 98-9.} Strauss argued that Heidegger’s beliefs reflected the growing malaise of late modern thought.\footnote{Smith, Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy, Judaism: 109-13. McAllister, Revolt Against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and the Search for a Postliberal Order: 150-2. Timothy Fuller, "Reflections on Leo Strauss and American Education," in Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss: German Émigrés and American Political Thought After WWII, ed. Hatmut Lehmann (Washington: The German Historical Institute, 1995), 68-9.} If all values were merely inventions of the mind and the moment, then none was really worth defending.
Weimar democracy, according to Strauss, imploded because of such an attitude. Heidegger accepted Nazism as a doctrine of the will to power.\textsuperscript{52} Liberal democracy was weak and decadent; only a new breed of supermen could regenerate a faltering society. For the German émigré Strauss, the slippery slope from radical historicism to the Final Solution was clear.\textsuperscript{53}

In his adopted home of America, Strauss feared that radical historicism was ascendant. Progressive intellectuals of Strauss’s generation had embraced a diluted version of “German historical consciousness” as their pole star.\textsuperscript{54} Responding to this trend, Strauss wrote in \textit{Natural Right and History} that this “would not be the first time that a nation, defeated on the battlefield… has deprived its conquerors of the most sublime fruits of victory by imposing on them the yoke of its own thought.”\textsuperscript{55} According to Strauss, some of America’s leading social scientists had come to accept Max Weber’s claim that scholars should accept the so-called “fact-value” distinction in political life.\textsuperscript{56} Values-neutrality would help to foster a genuine sense of objectivity in the academy. In this vein, writers could construct elaborate theoretical frameworks that spoke of liberal democracy, Soviet communism and Nazism in the abstract language of “rational actor” models. These models implicitly ruled out the possibility that democracy could be superior to any other regime type.\textsuperscript{57}

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\item[56] Strauss, \textit{Natural Right and History}: 42. Leo Strauss, "Social Science and Humanism," in ed. Pangle, 6-7. It could be argued here that Strauss was setting up a straw man. He had (ironically enough) constructed a Weberian ‘ideal type’ in his criticism of modern social science. Aside from Weber (and to a lesser extent Dewey), Strauss did not specify exactly which other scholars or groups he was commenting upon.
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Strauss found this approach to studying modern politics nothing short of repugnant. In his 1963 book *On Tyranny*, Strauss memorably claimed that “a social science that cannot speak of tyranny with the same confidence with which medicine speaks, for example, of cancer, cannot understand social phenomena for what they are. It is therefore not scientific. Present-day social science finds itself in this condition.”58 Weberian values-neutrality, Strauss explained, “necessarily leads to nihilism or to the view that every preference, however evil, base or insane, has to be judged before the tribunal of reason to be as legitimate as any other preference.”59 In the face of relativism, Strauss called for the assertion of probity. Concepts of good and evil had a place in the study of politics and history.60 It was clear that liberal democracy was the “least bad” regime yet constructed by man.61 It was possible to assign meaningful values to past events and their consequences. Humanity did not stand outside of history but confronted anew the “permanent problems” coeval to philosophy throughout the ages.62

Strauss’s sustained critique of liberal modernity generated controversy from the outset. Fellow academics were often unconvinced by Strauss’s so-called “esoteric” reading of great thinkers in the western tradition. In his book, *Persecution and the Art of Writing*, Strauss reasoned that many philosophical treatises contained “surface” meaning, intended for a general audience (and to evade the censors), and a subtext which revealed the unconventional beliefs at the heart of a writer’s outlook.63

With this assumption in mind, Strauss could maintain that Plato was really a democrat, and that Machiavelli, contrary to accepted opinion, in truth taught “evil.”

Most of Strauss’s contemporaries essentially misunderstood the cannon of Western philosophers because they did not read sufficiently between the lines. Strauss’ critics responded by contending that the professor’s hermeneutical method allowed him to manipulate the history of political thought to suit personal preferences. Strauss could thus claim to have “discovered” the deeper truths of intellectual life, and could expound these to a select initiate of students.

Some critics took this line of argument considerably further. They intimat that Strauss and his students privately accepted Nietzsche’s relativist philosophy, but knew that the spread of such a “deadly truth” would do great harm to social stability. Accordingly, Strauss sought to entrench the “noble lie” that American citizens should accept a priori the rectitude of existing values. As Shadia Drury put it, Strauss “dispensed with truth in the political arena and endorsed systematic lying – supposedly out of a love of humanity.” Straussians in academia and government “therefore champion[ed] the immutability of truth, the universality of justice, and the selfless nature of goodness, while secretly teaching their acolytes that all truth is fabrication, that justice is doing good to friends and evil to enemies, and that the only good is one’s own pleasure.” Subsequent works by Anne Norton and Jim George repeated variations of these claims, to the effect that Strauss and his supporters comprehended the utility of appealing to America’s liberal heritage as a “popular myth” to ensure the maintenance of an unquestioning and patriotic citizenry.
The self-styled “Paleoconservative” author, Paul Gottfried, has examined the Straussian recourse to “values-speak” from a broader historical perspective. Gottfried maintained that Strauss’s ideas lacked a broad constituency in the United States. German émigrés such as Strauss brought the debate over the “crisis” of liberalism with them from Europe. America had produced indigenous critics of liberalism; but before Strauss and his students, few had linked their arguments to existential disputes about the very purpose of modernity. Gottfried, for his part, doubted that the “crisis” of liberal thought was nearly as serious as theStraussians made out. Related to this was the tendency, in Gottfried’s view, for Strauss and his followers to claim a monopoly over the meaning of “traditional values.” Rivals of the Straussians could be dismissed as “relativists” because they did not share the group’s perspective on “universal truths.” This tactic, Gottfried noted, was a form of “rhetorical coercion.” Framing debates with their critics as a battle between timeless beliefs and radical historicism allowed Straussians to construct straw men of their detractors, and avoid engaging with the substance of opposing viewpoints. With some justification, this allegation was also made of neoconservatism after it came to prominence within the American right.

Determining the exact relationship between Strauss and neoconservatism is, however, far from straightforward. Shadia Drury has advanced an influential, though far from satisfactory, argument on the connection between these two outlooks. Noting that several neoconservative writers had once studied with Strauss, Drury claimed that members of the persuasion must have enacted what the philosopher preached. In this sense, contended Drury, neoconservatism was an elitist outlook.

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Politics 42, no. 2 (2005): 174-202. For critical discussion of these views and others, see Minowitz, Straussophobia: Defending Leo Strauss Against Shadia Drury and Other Accusers: 3-4, 192-3.
72 Gottfried, Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right: x-ix, xiv-xv.
75 Gottfried, Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right: 52-5, passim.
committed to culture war and deceit. Drawing from the work of Strauss’s former associate, the German legal theorist Carl Schmitt, neoconservatives regarded the so-called “friend-foe” distinction as an axiom of political life. Jean-François Drolet, for instance, has claimed that neoconservatives frequently made recourse to a “symbolic politics of security that places the myth of the undesirable other and the enemy of society at the centre of public policy debate.” The “foe” of American democracy, in this case, was those who sought to break down long-established hierarchies. The American founders, neoconservatives asserted, created a system in which the wise would govern the many. Neoconservatives sought to assume this role in contemporary American life, establishing themselves as the new “ruling class.”

While a potentially alluring account for some observers, this remains an essentially unsound evaluation of Strauss’s influence over the neoconservative viewpoint. A variety of neoconservatives did indeed express some Straussian predilections in their work, as discussed below. However, their frequent invocation of bourgeois principles did not constitute a foil for the pursuit of an ulterior agenda. Strauss’s oeuvre, being frequently opaque and composed over a fifty-year period, could be interpreted in a myriad of ways. Drury and the critics who draw upon her works, such as Drolet, have tended to examine Strauss’s most salacious claims in

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77 Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right: xi-xiii.
78 Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right: 91-6.
80 Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right: 91-6. Rockmore, Before and After 9/11: A Philosophical Examination of Globalisation, Terror, and History: 11-12, 16. For a counterargument, see Minowitz, Straussophobia: Defending Leo Strauss Against Shadia Drury and Other Accusers: 154-5.
81 Postel, “Noble lies and Perpetual War: Leo Strauss, the neocons, and Iraq”.
83 Smith, Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy, Judaism: 2-3, 184-5. There remains debate over whether the writings of the ‘young’ or ‘mature’ Strauss best capture the essence of the philosopher’s view. For some observers, like Drolet, Strauss’s engagement with Nietzsche and Schmitt as a young academic reveals his true colours as a reactionary against liberalism. Smith, however, has rightly suggested that Strauss’s larger and more rigorous mature works exemplify the philosopher’s attitudes towards democracy and the problem of historicism.
isolation. They had good reason to suggest that the philosopher’s hermeneutical methods were problematic. But in the process they devised unconvincing hermeneutical frameworks of their own; reducing Strauss to a profoundly illiberal scholar secretly committed to propagating continental philosophy in the United States. 84 Strauss engaged in a close reading of the greatest critics of modernity; however, there is little convincing evidence that he adopted their views as his own. 85

The same held true for the first advocates of neoconservatism. Most neoconservatives acquired from Strauss a profound and genuine distrust of radical historicism and value-free political analysis. 86 Recognising the corrosive potential of “life-affirming nihilism,” they sought to ground American public life in what they sincerely regarded as the certitude of classical liberalism. 87 Most neoconservatives shared Strauss’s admiration for the American founding – not because of its occasionally aristocratic tone, but owing to the contemporary import of its universal principles. 88 The neoconservative persuasion represented above all an attempt to salvage liberal thought by returning to its allegedly pristine roots. Drolet has referred to this inclination as a form of “reactionary idealism;” but, if anything, it was a type

84 Smith, "Leo Strauss and the Straussianists: An Anti-Democratic Cult?," 180-1.
85 Zuckert and Zuckert, The Truth about Leo Strauss: Political Philosophy and American Democracy: 32-4. For a thorough, but in my view ultimately unconvincing counter to this view, see Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss: 171-7, passim.
87 Portions of the following discussion appear in an original review written for the Australian Journal of International Affairs by the author of this thesis. See Michael Harland, "Book Review, Jean-François Drolet, American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary Idealism," Australian Journal of International Affairs 66, no. 2 (2012): 278-9. Jean François Drolet has contended that while neoconservatives invoked time-honoured concepts of liberal republicanism, these served principally as an “atavistic” ideology concealing an illiberal “will to power.” See Jean-François Drolet, "A Liberalism Betrayed? American Neoconservatism and the Theory of International Relations," Journal of Political Ideologies 15, no. 2 (2010): 89-92. Drolet, American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary Idealism: 6-7, 206-7. I find Drolet’s argument too tendentious to be convincing. It is based on a hermeneutical reading with a lean evidentiary basis. Drolet’s case requires us to accept three questionable assumptions: that Carl Schmitt decisively influenced Strauss’s political beliefs, that Strauss took these illiberal beliefs with him to America and taught them to a generation of students, and that these students put Strauss’s ideas into practice through the ideology of neoconservatism. Each assumption alone is open to debate; together they simply lack veracity. I see little support for a line of intellectual lineage running from German historicism through to neoconservative invocations of classical liberalism. Neoconservatives, in my view, were genuinely concerned about the consequences of radical historicism and believed, however problematically, that the revival of ‘bourgeois virtue’ could stem the appeal of this philosophy.
of idealism whose prime reference point was Washington, not Weimar. In this sense, Strauss provided important philosophical acumen to the neoconservative’s confrontation with late modernity. However, he was not a malevolent spirit guiding his band of followers in their quest for untrammelled power.

**Responding to Relativism**

Many of the writers labelled “neoconservative” did, however, take up much of Strauss’s battle against intellectual relativism. They saw in the rising currents of 1960’s “counterculture,” in particular, a tendency towards the “trans-valuing” of all reputable American values. The counterculture not only invoked many of the leftist aspirations that Irving Kristol and his peers now found anathema; their outlook actually threatened the fabric of bourgeois life. Assessing this problem, Kristol wrote in his book, *Two Cheers for Capitalism* that

> For well over a hundred and fifty years now, social critics have been warning us that bourgeois society was living off the accumulated moral capital of traditional religion and traditional moral philosophy, and that once this capital was depleted, bourgeois society would find its legitimacy ever more questionable.

American liberalism had survived the Depression and helped to defeat Fascism in Europe and Asia. American leaders asserted that democracy was indeed superior to its authoritarian foes. Now it seemed that the greatest enemy of the bourgeois order lay within. According to prominent neoconservatives, most cultural commentators refused to acknowledge the enormity of this issue. The mandarins of the Left

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91 Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism*: 65.


Kristol, by contrast, regarded New Left attitudes as defective:

\begin{quote}
[Modern society] never really could believe that self-destructive nihilism was an authentic and permanent possibility that any society had to guard against. It could refute Marx effectively, but it never thought it would be called upon to refute the Marquis de Sade or Nietzsche. It could demonstrate that the Marxist vision was utopian; but it could not demonstrate that the utopian vision of Fourier... was wrong.\footnote{Kristol, \textit{Two Cheers for Capitalism}: 68.}
\end{quote}

The alleged onslaught of radical historicism had tainted once decent liberal beliefs. Nietzsche and Heidegger did indeed teach a “deadly truth.” Just how “deadly” this could be to American society was only now becoming apparent.\footnote{Williams, "What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory," 311-13. McGlinshey, "Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy," 22.}

Kristol concluded that, if left unchallenged, this proclivity would soon undermine the legitimacy of liberal thought altogether.

Kristol’s neoconservative peers shortly agreed with much of this disconcerting assessment. Many had initially expressed mild ambivalence towards the counterculture, but soon came to reject all for which it stood. Nathan Glazer witnessed the rise of student protests from his post at the University of California in Berkeley.\footnote{Nathan Glazer, "Student Protest in the U S," \textit{Economic and Political Weekly} 2, no. 12 (1967): 601-5.}

As the 1960’s wore on, the confrontation between the New Left and its centrist critics intensified. Daniel Bell likened the student protesters of Columbia University to the utopian socialists of the nineteenth century. They too sought a “revolution” in consciousness, but offered few concrete solutions to present injustice. In practice, they brought about a wave of violence at Columbia that left Bell deeply disturbed. Similarly, Norman Podhoretz rejected the counterculture as it adopted an increasingly anti-American bearing. Podhoretz had initially used the pages of *Commentary* to advance New Left literary conventions. After approximately 1965, however, he realised that the movement had come to deride the “American idea” itself. Students decried “America the Ugly,” or worse still, “Amerika” as a matter of course.

At this point, Irving Kristol offered perhaps the most trenchant analysis of such mounting disquiet. Kristol declared New Left thought roundly harmful to the American republic. The war in Vietnam might have provided a rallying point for discontented youth; but protests were only a symptom of deeper turbulence. Kristol gave typically dramatic expression to this concern:

> One wonders: how can a bourgeois society survive in a cultural ambiance that derides every traditional bourgeois virtue and celebrates promiscuity, homosexuality, drugs, political terrorism — anything, in short, that is in bourgeois eyes perverse?... Our world is

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being emptied of its ideal content, and the imposing institutional
facade sways in the wind.106

Liberalism stood at a crossroads – it could rejuvenate itself by returning to its original
precepts, or it could follow the New Left path to its Nietzschean end.107 There was no
middle ground. After all, reasoned Kristol, the New Left essentially rejected the
“individualist, capitalist civilisation that stands ready to receive them as citizens.”108
This was because “for them... it is not the average American who is disgusting; it is
the ideal American.”109

In large measure, those belonging to what Justin Vaïsse has called the “first
age” of neoconservatism aimed to reaffirm the unparalleled virtue of the “ideal
American.”110 The counterculture, in the neoconservative view, articulated an
impulsive and confrontational doctrine that ought to have no future in America.111
Reflecting on her experiences with counterculture ideology, Jeane Kirkpatrick
explained that the movement’s “passionate rejection – less of what the U.S. did than
of what it was – constituted a wholesale assault on the legitimacy of American
society. I believe this assault became the foundation of the opposing neoconservative
position” (italics in original).112 The neoconservatives were twice disillusioned. They
had rejected their radical roots in favour of “vital-centre” liberalism. Now the
foundations of liberalism had shifted under their feet.113 Neoconservatives thus aimed

106 Kristol, On the Democratic Idea in America: 27-8. See for further analysis Dorman, Arguing the
World: The New York Intellectuals in their own Words: 164-5.
107 See Gertrude Himmelfarb, “Democratic Remedies for Democratic Disorders,” Public Interest, no.
109 Kristol, On the Democratic Idea in America: 27-8. For extended critical analysis, see Jean-François
Drolet, "The Visible Hand of Neo-conservative Capitalism," Millennium - Journal of International
Reactionary Idealism: 35-7, 92.
110 Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement: 76-7. See also Homolar-Riechmann,
Neoconservative Critique of the Liberal University: Postmodernism, Relativism and the Culture
112 Kirkpatrick, "Neoconservatism as a Response to the Counterculture," in ed. Stelzer, 239.
113 Goodman, "Irving Kristol: Patron Saint of the New Right."
to protect what remained of so-called “traditional” American values from their most unworthy of heirs.\textsuperscript{114}

According to the nascent band of neoconservative writers, an excess of liberal idealism had also managed to permeate the heights of government. This strand of thought differed considerably in form and content from the counterculture. However, it too articulated beliefs that often corroded the bourgeois ethos. In the mid-1960’s, President Lyndon Johnson launched what became known as the “Great Society” initiative.\textsuperscript{115} Johnson aimed to tackle issues of crime, poverty and racism in American cities by addressing their underlying social causes. His administration instituted programs which would surmount divisions between classes and rejuvenate urban communities beset by violence.\textsuperscript{116} Social problems were not intractable; previous administrations had simply not tried hard enough to rectify them.

The rising luminaries of neoconservatism believed the Great Society initiative admirable but almost wholly unrealistic. A vanguard of “new class” policymakers had become convinced that, with positivist theories of social science and decent federal funding at hand, they could eradicate most present ills.\textsuperscript{117} Neoconservatives responded that such an attitude ignored the “law of unintended consequences.”\textsuperscript{118} No matter its sophistication, high-minded theory would eventually run up against the intransigence of existing cultural mores. However well meaning ensuing government programs, there was always potential that they might cause more harm than good. Better to err on the side of caution, neoconservatives argued, than to engage in elaborate policy experiments with a high potential for failure.\textsuperscript{119} 

\textsuperscript{119}Wilson, "Forward," in ed. Gerson. vii-viii. See for critical analysis of this position David Greenberg, "Creating their own Reality: The Bush Administration and Expertise in a Polarized Age,"
These assumptions provided the *modus operandi* of the journal, *Public Interest*, founded by Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell in 1965. Early editions of this periodical agreed in the abstract with the need for reform. Soon, however, Kristol and his peers became doubtful about the ability of the government to alter embedded social predilections. As Kristol later reflected, “we considered ourselves to be realistic meliorists, skeptical of government programs that ignored history and experience in favour of then-fashionable left-wing ideas spawned by the academy.” The *Public Interest* before long referred to expansive federal intervention as a form of “social engineering;” an attempt by the government to refashion organic community relations out of ideological fervour.

Kristol and his associates believed it nonsense that any government could transform human nature in this manner. Marxists had once claimed that they would create a “new man;” now America’s own liberal reformers seemed to intimate that they could achieve something similar. This prospect deeply concerned neoconservatives, well schooled from their youthful flirtation with Trotskyism in the history of leftist vanguardism gone awry. The new classes zeal for reform stemmed from what Kristol called “that most profound of liberal passions, the passion of self-righteous compassion.” This “passion… defines[s] the very essence of modern liberalism and... legitimates the liberal exercise of authority over our social and economic life.” Those writing for the *Public Interest* never disputed the potential benefits of reduced crime rates and greater racial harmony. But they were particularly conscious of the gulf between these aspirations and obdurate realities.

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If anything, the neoconservatives who published in the *Public Interest* shared a profound distrust of utopianism. They opposed the new class because its members seemed to downplay the need for prudence in public affairs. Attempts made to rationalise the sources of poverty and crime through conceptual theory ignored their irreducible human causes. Policymakers over-reached because they assumed an imperious attitude. Kristol contended in a prominent analysis of this problem that

> We certainly do have it in our power to make improvements in the human estate. But to think we have it in our power to change people so as to make the human estate wonderfully better than it is, remarkably different from what it is, and in very short order, is to assume that this generation of Americans can do what no other generation in all of human history could accomplish... I cannot bring myself to accept this arrogant assumption. I think, rather, that by acting upon this assumption we shall surely end up making our world worse than it need have been.

Kristol and his coterie seemed to understand, noted Phillip Selznick, a conservative sociologist at Berkeley, that “the most serious forms of evil are created by forces within the human psyche and within groups and communities.” Modern liberals seemed to have forgotten this older, circumscribed view of individuals and society. It was up to neoconservatives to begin the process of re-education.

**Renewing Republican Virtue**

Neoconservatives maintained that, despite the claims of the radical historicists, the American regime did in fact stand for values of lasting import. The founders sought
to establish a republic of virtue, in which well-rounded citizens could realise their full potential in the life of the City. Reacquainting Americans with this aspiration would provide a lasting antidote to the corrosive ideology of the counterculture.

The regeneration of republican virtue relied significantly on restoring faith in American exceptionalism. Citizens needed to trust again that their country embodied universal aspirations. As Kristol contended,

One cannot begin to understand the American people and its history unless one appreciates the extent to which our literature, our journalism, our philosophy, our politics, were shaped by this powerful ideological commitment. One does not exaggerate when one calls it a kind of Messianic commitment to a redemptive mission.

The United States, according to Kristol, “was to be... “a light unto nations,” exemplifying the blessings of liberty to the common man in less fortunate countries, and encouraging him to establish a liberal and democratic regime like unto ours.”

American exceptionalism was not simply a phenomenon of historical interest. It was a permanent expression of the national spirit. Kristol could thus conclude that “in this sense, the United States can be said to be the most ideological of all nations” in its dedication to a credo.

Public acceptance of American exceptionalism would strike a decisive blow against the doctrine of relativism. Citizens who professed anew the self-evident truths of the American Revolution would be much less likely to consider all values equal.

Strauss had once suggested in *Natural Right and History* that America’s republican tradition represented a potent weapon in the struggle against the German historical consciousness. The Lockean philosophy undergirding much of the Declaration of

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Independence and the Constitution embodied liberal modernity in its “youthful” phase. Up until the twentieth century, Strauss believed, the continental critics of modernity had not frontally challenged the American experiment. Reconnecting contemporary Americans with their Lockean heritage would help them to face down the heirs of Nietzsche now emerging in their midst.

The renewal of exceptionalist thought would also encourage the flowering of forward-looking nationalism. Americans would recognise once more that they lived in a “chosen country,” and demand political leaders that reinforced this mood. Kristol sought an America that was “not merely patriotic… but also nationalist.” He argued that “nationalism arises out of hope for the nation’s future, distinctive greatness.” Where student radicals had once denounced “America the Ugly,” a new generation would affirm the righteousness of the republic. Antiwar protesters might be replaced by decent citizens supporting the troops. A few neoconservatives began at this point to imply that a country united at home could potentially pursue policies of “national greatness” abroad. This was a proposition with a bright future ahead of it.

Those of the “first age” of neoconservatism, however, usually expressed scepticism about the efficacy of an activist stance. Strauss had taught that popular nationalism could quickly degenerate into virulent jingoism, potentially harmful to democratic practices. Accordingly, neoconservatives sought to instil Americans with a sense of temperance. Kristol, for one, was wary about the increasingly

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139 West, "Leo Strauss and the American Founding," 159.
140 Kristol, Reflections of a Neoconservative: Looking Back, Looking Ahead: iii. For critical analysis of this claim, see Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism: 6, 28-9.
142 Williams, "What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory," 319. See chapters five and six for further analysis of this issue.
143 Williams, "What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory," 316.
“prophetic” tendencies of government rhetoric. The nation’s leaders needed to be careful that their idealism did not outrun their capabilities. Kristol stressed that even the most well-intentioned individuals and groups were fallible. Excessive patriotic zeal was to be avoided, lest it bring about political disasters.

The health of the American republic, then, necessitated the cultivation of upstanding citizens. Liberal societies required a particularly abstemious demos. As Kristol proposed, “democracy is a form of self-government, and… if you want it to be a meritorious polity, you have to care about what kind of people govern it. Indeed… if you want self-government, you are only entitled to it if that “self” is worthy of governing.” The American regime was the sum total of the national character. The counterculture was particularly harmful to American democracy in this way, because through it, “the people” stopped behaving virtuously. Kristol and his peers hoped that by rejuvenating piety towards republican ideals, the era of liberal decadence would come to a close.

The United States’ democratic regime, by Kristol’s reckoning, ultimately offered its people the prospect of achieving genuine “recognition” of Thymos. Reflecting on a recurring Straussian theme, Kristol noted that

The purpose of any political regime is to achieve some version of the good life and the good society. It is not at all difficult to imagine a perfectly functioning democracy which answers all questions

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151 By the 1980’s, it seemed that conservatism had found success in many of these endeavours. Conservative intellectuals and politicians redefined the parameters of debate, entrenching their neoliberal economic ideology and demands for a return to ‘traditional’ social mores. See Jennifer Delton, "Historians and the Conservative Ascendancy," Salamagundi, no. 168 and 169 (2010): 48-9.
except one – namely, why should anyone of intelligence and spirit care a fig for it?  

Public affairs could uplift the spirit of individuals and communities, providing enduring meaning to everyday existence. It could equip citizens with the tools of social self-improvement; but also with a sense of civic responsibility quite different to the voluntarist attitudes of “social engineering” allegedly common to thinkers on the left. Kristol expressed hope that even if the great struggles of history one day ended, American politics could still offer potentially fulfilling outlets for *Thymos.*

**Virtue and Foreign Affairs**

A “healthy” democratic republic, in the neoconservative view, likewise needed to pursue an ennobled foreign policy. America’s foreign relations were an outward manifestation of the national temperament. So long as public intellectuals and politicians remained faithful to their country’s exceptionalist beliefs, America could conduct itself abroad with confidence.

By the middle years of the post-war era, however, the United States’ foreign policy strategy had started to go awry. American statesmen seemed to be forsaking their world-historical mission to advance freedom, principally because they misunderstood the ideological dimension of the Cold War. Indeed, many policymakers on the left and right alike appeared to embrace a form of value-free relativism with overtones of the “German historical consciousness.” Foreign policy realism encapsulated for neoconservatives the Republican Party’s acceptance of historicist premises. Seeking to manage the alleged decline of America’s hegemonic influence, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger cast aside most concerns of morality in foreign affairs. What mattered most was the international balance of power, not

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152 Kristol, "Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship."
153 Kristol, "Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship."
the ideology guiding each regime. Kissinger and Nixon accordingly sought to ensnare the USSR in an arrangement of “interdependence” through the “linkage” of foreign policy concerns. Thus, while Kissinger negotiated the Paris Peace Accords over Vietnam, his State Department made diplomatic advances towards communist China and sought to maintain the status quo in the Middle East. America and the Soviet Union would essentially negotiate their way towards a form of rapprochement, without regard for serious differences in principle.

Neoconservatives responded to Kissinger’s realist philosophy in two ways. Firstly they contended that, as a nation founded on Enlightenment political principles, the United States could not long sustain a policy that proscribed the role of ideology in defining the “national interest.” The pessimistic worldview associated with realism would only exacerbate disenchantment with American republicanism. This would accelerate the decline of civic virtue. Reviving the original vision of containment, by contrast, would provide a renewed sense of purpose to foreign affairs. The architects of containment, Irving Kristol reminded his readers, understood that the Cold War was essentially about competing ways of life. The American people knew their belief system was superior to communism; but realpolitik deprived them of the means to confirm this conviction through a grand

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strategy grounded in the nation’s liberal identity. America’s natural stance was one of practical idealism; neoconservatives would seek to reconnect citizens with this heritage.

Secondly, neoconservatives maintained that foreign regimes should be categorised in terms of their prevailing ethical outlook, not simply by their relationship to American strategic interests. Totalitarian states, from this perspective, were inimitably evil in character. Neoconservatives may have drawn on their reading of Leo Strauss when formulating this proposal. In his book, On Tyranny, Strauss had disputed Alexandre Kojève’s implied claim that modern dictatorships, such as the Soviet Union under Stalin, were necessary steps in the process of creating the “universal and homogenous state.” This assumption denigrated the suffering of a people under the thumb of despotism. It could be interpreted as a means to strip all urgency from the Cold War. Moreover, it sought to obviate the need to speak of evil as a distinctive category in international affairs. Those among the neoconservatives influenced by Strauss rallied against the apparent instrumentalism of Kojève and his peers. They asserted that the Stalinist vision of modernity was in fact malevolent to the core.

Indeed, neoconservatives believed that the United States faced nothing less than an existential struggle against the forces of darkness. To win the conflict against

165 For more on the differences between realism and neoconservatism, see Rathbun, "Does One Right Make a Realist? Conservatism, Neoconservatism, and Isolationism in the Foreign Policy Ideology of American Elites," 273.
168 Leo Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero," in ed. Gourevitch and Roth, 177.
170 Podhoretz, "Why we were in Vietnam: Whose Immorality?," in ed. Jeffers, 178.
Soviet communism would require unparalleled discipline on the home front. Any failure of nerve would bring about a catastrophic American rout.\textsuperscript{171} Prior to the rise of neoconservatism the “New Right” columnist, James Burnham, had captured this sentiment aptly when he declared the Cold War to be WWIII.\textsuperscript{172} Just as WWII had required national mobilisation and an upsurge of patriotism, so too did the struggle against Soviet communism.\textsuperscript{173} Burnham asserted that WWIII was America’s to lose. If political fatigue overcame the nation, the Soviet enemy would surely seize the advantage.\textsuperscript{174} A defensive policy of containment, moreover, was insufficient; the United States needed to take the battle to communist governments, acting to “roll-back” their influence in the developing world.\textsuperscript{175}

On the surface of it, most neoconservatives sought to distance themselves from Burnham’s fulminations. Yet in practice, the group soon came to advocate a comparable form of “muscular internationalism” as an alternative to the “soft” liberalism then emerging in the Democratic Party to which many neoconservatives still nominally belonged.\textsuperscript{176} The neoconservative-led organisation, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM), proved particularly important in this endeavour. While this group directed significant energy towards combating New Left domestic politics, its manifestoes also emphasised the need to rejuvenate American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{177} The Coalition’s founding document, for example, expressed concern that

\textsuperscript{172} Binoy Kampmark has argued that Burnham’s philosophy influenced the development of neoconservatism. Burnham’s political sectarianism, his Manicheanism and hawkish attitude on American foreign relations all found expression in later neoconservative tracts on the Cold War. While the relationship was not simply linear, there was clearly some degree of overlap here. See Kampmark, “The First Neoconservative: James Burnham and the Origins of a Movement,” 1887-1902, passim.
\textsuperscript{176} Noon, “Cold War Revival: Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on Terror,” 87-8.
\textsuperscript{177} See Vaïsse, \textit{Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement}: 96-8.
The belief that the security of the United States depends upon a stable and progressive world community has been challenged by the idea that the United States must withdraw from its international responsibilities and effect a serious diminution of its own power.\(^{178}\)

The Democratic Party needed to revive the vision of Truman and Kennedy. All it could presently offer in the face of Nixonian Détente was George McGovern’s relativist and semi-isolationist equivocations.\(^{179}\) The Coalition for a Democratic Majority urged Americans to accept again the role of indisputable world leadership, and to recommit to the fight against communism.\(^{180}\)

Around this time, some members of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority sought to infuse American foreign policy with an agenda to promote human rights and democracy.\(^{181}\) Democratic senator, Henry “Scoop” Jackson spearheaded much of this initiative.\(^{182}\) He and his aides – including two graduate students called Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle – contended that trade with the Soviet Union ought to be conditional on its adherence to human rights norms.\(^{183}\) Jackson echoed the views of so-called “second age” neoconservatives when he declared Détente a failure because it downplayed the stark differences between Soviet political doctrine and


\(^{181}\) Portions of the above paragraph and this present footnote appear in an original review by the author of this thesis. See Harland, "Book Review: Justin Vaïsse, \textit{Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement}," 103-7. Vaïsse challenged the views of James Mann and Gary Dorrien, as he argued that neoconservatives had been thinking seriously about democracy promotion at least fifteen years earlier than previously reported. This adds weight to the argument that we need to take seriously what neoconservatives have said about the theory and practice of ‘democratic vanguardism’, as it makes clear that this outlook represented a genuine (albeit at this time largely implicit) ideational framework for their approach to foreign policy. See Vaïsse, \textit{Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement}: 137-41. Cf Mann, \textit{Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet}: chapter 8. Dorrien, \textit{Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana}: chapter 4.


America’s democratic tradition. Attempting to deal with the Soviet Union as a “normal country” implicitly legitimised its totalitarian ways. Proclaiming the right to political freedom universal, however, would place Moscow under real pressure to change or face ostracism.

The CDM sought to impress these views upon America’s first Democratic President elected in over a decade: Jimmy Carter. The Carter administration responded by embracing a strategy significantly at odds with the neoconservative position. While Carter sought to distance himself from the realists by speaking about the importance of “freedom” in international affairs, he did not direct this rhetoric against the Soviet Union with consistency. In a 1977 address, Carter famously claimed that the United States had finally overcome its “inordinate fear of communism.” Members of the Carter administration similarly considered anachronistic the east-west conflict that typified the Cold War. Carter believed that the public sought retrenchment following the war in Vietnam. The United States had badly over-reached, and a period of reappraisal was now in order. Despite being defeated in the 1972 election, some key elements of McGovernism were seemingly back in vogue.

This conception of foreign relations appalled the neoconservatives. American liberalism must still be in crisis, they concluded, if it was so unable to recognise the true nature of the Cold War conflict. Neoconservatives thus became thrice disillusioned. Many members of the persuasion began at this point to shift their political allegiance from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. Jean Kirkpatrick was in the midst of making this transition when she penned her influential ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’ article. Carter’s foreign policy, Kirkpatrick contended, was based around a faulty understanding of modernity itself. The President and his associates seemed to articulate a vision of linear progress wed to a sense of determinism. Carter could talk of the need for enforceable human rights standards, before adding that forces “greater” than the United States would invariably shape the destiny of most countries. America might be a superpower; but it could do little to effect tectonic shifts in the international system.

It was this sense of passivity that led Carter to underestimate Soviet geopolitical advances. The President had harmed America’s national interests in pursuit of a post-containment strategy. Kirkpatrick delivered a damning appraisal of Carter’s policies when she wrote that

In the thirty-odd months since the inauguration of Jimmy Carter as President there has occurred a dramatic Soviet military build-up, matched by the stagnation of American armed forces, and a dramatic extension of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa, and the Caribbean, matched by a declining American position in all these areas. The U.S. has never tried so hard and failed so utterly to make and keep friends in the Third World.

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197 Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," 34.
Carter undermined America’s allies and emboldened the Soviet Bloc. His ambitious human rights program had contributed to the downfall of Somoza in Nicaragua, and the Shah in Iran. Kirkpatrick believed that Carter was uncritical of leftist dictatorships, by contrast, because he thought their revolutionary potential was inherently “progressive” in character. Right-wing autocracies, like the Shah’s, were to his mind reactionary and therefore on the “wrong side of history.”

From the perspective of the late 1970’s, it appeared to some neoconservatives that Carter’s ostensibly soft-headed liberalism had so endangered America’s standing in the world that it too could finish up on the “wrong side of history.” The Soviet Union had expanded its influence to the degree that it now held world conquest to be a feasible goal. Norman Podhoretz waxed apocalyptic about the likely consequences of this ominous change. According to Podhoretz, Carter had embraced the “culture of appeasement” in such a way that he risked bringing about the “Finlandization” of America, if not the entire western world. Transfixed by the ghosts of the Vietnam War, America’s liberal elite had lost all nerve to defend the principles of their forebears. Podhoretz could imagine a time – appropriately enough, the year 1984 – when the United States might become a mere “satrap” of

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198 Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," 34. For discussion of this claim, see Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 78-9.
199 Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," 43-4.
Moscow. The boot of triumphant neo-Stalinism would then crush all that neoconservatives believed dear in life.

According to most neoconservatives, only one political leader in America grasped the true gravity of this struggle: Ronald Reagan. Having participated in the 1976 Republican National Convention on the platform of “morality in foreign policy,” Reagan appeared to speak the language of neoconservatism. While the New Left vacillated and the Old Right held fast to pinched realpolitik, Reagan claimed that the cold warriors of the 1950’s had grasped the essence of the ideological battle against communism. Like many of the neoconservatives Reagan had started out on the political left, identifying himself as a Truman Democrat early in his acting career. Analogous to the neoconservative experience, Reagan became disillusioned with the direction of the left and found himself moving towards the New Right and Barry Goldwater during the 1960’s. Reagan, however, retained a foundational belief of the Cold War liberal view: an America confident in the superiority of its values and willing to use force against its enemies could not only reverse communist gains, it might even liberate Eastern Europe. Neoconservatives heartily agreed with this assessment, and many came to vote Republican.

Over the course of his first term, Reagan acted on his belief that morality should again define America’s Cold War strategy. He determined that good and evil

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205 See Podhoretz, ”The Reagan Road to Détente,” 448-50. Kaufman, In Defense of the Bush Doctrine: 114-5. For critical analysis of this claim, see Noon, ”Cold War Revival: Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on Terror,” 87-90. Reagan tended to cite Truman, Dulles and Acheson as far-sighted leaders who understood the essence of the Cold War conflict. George Kennan, however, was conveniently left out.
were indeed operative ethical categories in international life. In 1983, the President famously labelled the Soviet Union an “evil empire.”\(^{209}\) The USSR, suggested Reagan, was “the focus of evil in the modern world,” having supported anti-American terrorism and launched a war of aggression in Afghanistan.\(^{210}\) Those living in Soviet states, Reagan insisted, suffered in “totalitarian darkness.”\(^{211}\) The United States, meanwhile, was a “city on a hill,” dedicated to the timeless beliefs enunciated in the Declaration of Independence and committed to seeing other nations live in freedom.\(^{212}\) Most commentators derided Reagan’s rhetoric as dangerous sabre rattling. Neoconservatives, however, welcomed this return of clarity. They applauded the ramping up of the Cold War, and hoped that the USSR would soon realise the futility of challenging America.\(^{213}\)

In practice, the Reagan administration adopted a comparatively activist approach towards containment. It was not enough to work within the confines of the status quo, as had Nixon, Kissinger and Carter. Rather, the United States needed to embrace elements of Burnham’s strategy and seek to roll back the allies of communism.\(^{214}\) The neoconservative national security staffer, Richard Pipes, detailed the essential features of this idea in a paper entitled ‘National Security Decision Directive 75’ (NSDD 75).\(^{215}\) Pipes proposed that Washington should “contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas,” including “geographical regions of priority


concern to the United States.” NSDD 75 explained that the United States must “support effectively those third world states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures,” so as to “weaken, and where possible undermine the existing links” between Third World communist regimes and the USSR.

The neoconservative columnist, Charles Krauthammer, soon termed this strategy the “Reagan Doctrine.” Through this doctrine, the United States would encourage “freedom fighters” to topple communist-leaning government in states such as Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Krauthammer identified three components to the Reagan Doctrine: “anticommunist revolution as a tactic. Containment as the strategy. And freedom as the rationale.” This foreign policy doctrine, wrote Krauthammer, “legitimise[d] challenges by indigenous insurgencies to vulnerable new Soviet acquisitions.” By seizing the initiative, the Reagan administration could potentially hasten the day that all people would achieve elected government. While some neoconservatives, particularly Podhoretz and his associates at Commentary, became increasingly frustrated with Reagan’s conciliatory approach to Moscow over the course of his second term, most still regarded the fortieth President as exemplary of their worldview. Indeed, as time went on, the criticisms levelled at Reagan’s foreign policy compromises were handily overlooked in favour of hagiography.

216 Pipes, "US Relations with the USSR: NSDD 75." For additional analysis of this document and its context, see Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War: 30-1.
222 Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana: 10-12, 14. For critical discussion of the differences between President Reagan and the neoconservative viewpoint, see
In this vein neoconservatives soon maintained that, under Reagan, the United States had finally enacted a foreign policy worthy of its republican heritage. Irving Kristol, for one, surmised that the Reagan Doctrine had helped to restore public faith in America’s enduring historical mission. Kristol now assured his readers that “an active foreign policy inspires confidence in one’s own people and intimidates hostile or neutral opinion elsewhere.” Neoconservatives concluded that Reagan had reinstated matters of principle to their rightful place in American strategy, charting a third way between hard-headed realism and weak-willed liberalism. He had also ostensibly confirmed the Straussian precept that the renewal of civic patriotism was a crucial component in the fight against relativism. By the late 1980’s, Kristol and his colleagues voiced guarded confidence that Americans might at last be capable of overcoming the defining intellectual crisis of their age.

Conclusion

In a sense, the American nation has long embodied an “experiment” in liberal modernity. Committed to a series of propositions about republican government, political morality and the nature of the “good life,” the United States claimed to stand for concepts of trans-historical significance. By the middle of the twentieth century however, a number of young, predominantly left-leaning American intellectuals demurred. Adopting a “radical historicist” mindset, the counterculture undercut the legitimacy of traditional American institutions and ideals. Neoconservatism emerged in opposition primarily to arrest this attempted “trans-valuing” of American values.

Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 82-4.

Noon, "Cold War Revival: Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on Terror," 90-1. Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order: 5, 161-7. Halper and Clarke maintain that neoconservatives usurped Reagan’s legacy. In their view, Reagan’s brand of conservatism was considerably more pragmatic than the neoconservative’s. While it is true that Reagan has been subject to extensive conservative hagiography since he left office (and since his death), Halper and Clarke have also constructed an ‘ideal’ Reagan in their book. For a more balanced appraisal of the Reagan legacy, see Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 37.


Kristol, "A New Foreign Policy Momentum."

Drawing in part from Leo Strauss’s reflections on the “German historical consciousness,” neoconservatives rallied against the diminution of liberal principles. They sought to reaffirm the righteousness of their nation’s founding beliefs, and see them bloom again. A newly revitalised Cold War strategy proved a particularly useful avenue to this end. The pursuit of a principled foreign policy could help to restore public faith in American exceptionalism.

Though a partisan viewpoint, neoconservatism often won the day. The Republican right became increasingly synonymous with neoconservative ideas. The “culture wars” occurring among the American intelligentsia during the 1970’s and 1980’s had a distinctive neoconservative flavour. Kristol, Podhoretz, Bell and Lipset had alerted the American public to the dangers of liberalism without firm convictions. Towards the end of the twentieth century, an increasing number of people seemed to be paying attention to their warnings. But this did not mean that the battle was over. As neoconservatism underwent a generational change at the start of the 1990’s, a new cohort of writers turned their focus more exclusively to matters of foreign affairs. This group sought to reinvigorate American foreign policy for an emerging unipolar age. The time had come for the United States to recognise the full scope of its world-historical calling.
An “Intoxicating Moment:” The Rise of Democratic Globalism

“Americans... have never had it so good” argued neoconservative authors William Kristol and Robert Kagan in a 1996 Foreign Affairs article.¹ “They have never lived in a world more conducive to their fundamental interests in a liberal international order, the spread of freedom and democratic governance, [and] an international economic system of free-market capitalism and free trade.”² Kristol and Kagan advised their peers not to become complacent in a time of American pre-eminence. The United States ought to make the most of the moment, working to ensure that this favourable situation remained consistent with the nation’s overarching security concerns. Washington needed, in short, to adopt a posture of “benevolent global hegemony.”³

This notion appeared a far cry from the original incarnation of neoconservatism. As the previous chapter showed, Irving Kristol and his associates at the Public Interest had once rallied against intervention for “idealistc” causes, going so far as to call such actions “social engineering.” What was it that convinced so-called “globalist” neoconservatives to break with this foundational belief and claim that using American power to advance democratic principles could bring about peace? The close of the Cold War unleashed extraordinary ferment in the realm of ideas. The globalist neoconservatives re-orientated the persuasion after the collapse

¹ Kristol and Kagan, ”Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 22.
² Kristol and Kagan, ”Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 22.
³ Kristol and Kagan, ”Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 20.
of communism, in particular by adopting aspects of Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ thesis and anticipating ways to expedite his findings. As their thought turned to questions of strategy, globalist neoconservative views found credence through scholarship on human rights and democracy promotion produced by an increasingly self-confident “liberal internationalist” academic community.

By the end of the 1990’s, the neoconservatives’ ambitions for American foreign policy had expanded considerably. The period between the opening of the Berlin Wall and the attacks of September 11 was, as one observer aptly put it, “an intoxicating moment” for the intellectuals who came to articulate the democratic vanguardist idea. In a time without great power conflict, it seemed only sensible to press one’s advantage.

**Democratic Realism and the Rise of Globalism**

The neoconservative perspective on foreign affairs was in many ways a product of the Cold War. Proponents of neoconservatism internalised the language of the battle against communism. Indeed, the Cold War often served as an “ideational framework” for members of the persuasion; providing a consistent discourse through which they could understand international politics. As such, the easing of tensions between the superpowers was for most self-described neoconservatives an exhilarating and confusing time. During the 1970’s and 1980’s, neoconservatives were among the strongest supporters of rollback. They had commended Reagan’s hard-line approach towards Moscow during his first term, and hoped for more of the same in his second. With the final breakdown of communism in 1991, however, the *raison d’être* of the neoconservative’s foreign policy doctrine seemed considerably weakened.

The more senior figures among the neoconservatives reflected candidly on this issue. For them, the fall of communism vindicated their beliefs about the perversity of totalitarianism, and raised disconcerting questions about the future of

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their own outlook. Gary Dorrien reported that Norman Podhoretz told him in a 1990 interview that he had stopped writing on matters of foreign policy because he “no longer knew what to think” in lieu of the Cold War. Prior to this time Podhoretz’s magazine, Commentary, had become increasingly uncompromising. Until the end of 1989, Podhoretz continued to insist that the USSR was an imperialist power. Mikhail Gorbachev, he surmised, was a dedicated Leninist who would lull the west into a false sense of security before commencing further acts of expansionism. As Podhoretz’s fellow Commentary writer Patrick Glynn characteristically noted, every allegedly halcyon time past had proven illusory for American policymakers. The end of WWI and WWII did not usher in an era of lasting global peace; the conclusion of the Cold War, in this view, would soon give way to a new period of international competition and instability.

Irving Kristol was similarly concerned about what might follow the Cold War. While Kristol had usually approved of Reagan’s stance towards the Soviet Union, he worried about where the demise of the communist enemy would leave the neoconservatives. In an essay entitled ‘Memoirs of a ‘Cold Warrior’’, Kristol wrote that “looking back on the cold war of the 1950’s against Stalinism, I can at moments feel positively nostalgic for the relatively forthright way it posed unambiguous moral issues.” Kristol reasoned that the struggle against the USSR engendered national resolve. This had allegedly disappeared with the abrupt end of the conflict. Without a major foe, American citizens might lose their focus on matters of foreign affairs.

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12 Glynn, "The Dangers beyond Containment," 15.
14 Kristol, "Memoirs of a ‘Cold Warrior’."
Kristol mused in this context that “with the end of the Cold War, what we really need is an obvious ideological and threatening enemy, one worthy of our mettle, one that can unite us in opposition.” Kristol could have been writing here about both neoconservatism and the United States more generally.

With no immediate threat on the horizon, authors like Kristol soon became lapsed Reaganites. In this vein, Kristol contended that the United States should now adopt a more humble international posture. It was best to keep one’s powder dry in a time of flux, lest the nation squander resources by becoming involved in conflicts among peripheral regions of the world. This position soon acquired the moniker of “democratic realism.” In a 1991 article, for instance, Kristol maintained that the United States ought to tone down the self-congratulatory language which often accompanied the public formulation of foreign policy. Kristol reflected that “none of [the other] democracies thinks of itself as... having a special moral-political mission in the world, as we habitually think we do.” Indeed, “the inspirational rhetoric in which... foreign policy is clothed is itself so peculiarly and parochially American – no other nation talks about foreign policy in this way – that one is bound to be skeptical of its viability.” Attempting to promote liberal values everywhere was impractical for even the most powerful of nations. As it entered the 1990’s, the

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16 Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 12.
17 Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 12.
United States needed to redefine the scope of its national interests, delineating more clearly where its responsibilities would now lie.\textsuperscript{23}

Jeane Kirkpatrick suggested a similar course. The United States, she believed, could again become “a normal country in a normal time.”\textsuperscript{24} Kirkpatrick echoed Kristol’s view when she explained that “there is no mystical American “mission” or purpose to be “found.””\textsuperscript{25} For her, there was “no inherent or historical “imperative” for the U.S. government to seek to achieve any other goal – however great – except as mandated by the constitution and adopted by the people through elected officials.”\textsuperscript{26} The rise of democracy abroad often had tangible benefits for American security. But the United States could not become the midwife to democracy the world over.\textsuperscript{27} The country’s political leaders, Kirkpatrick advised in an address to the American Enterprise Institute, needed to cast aside “the illusion that we can solve all the world’s problems, cure all the world’s ills.”\textsuperscript{28} This would entail “forswearing the illusion that we are strong enough or wise enough or good enough to do so,” and accepting a reduced vision of the nation’s vital interests.\textsuperscript{29}

It soon became clear that this attitude was primarily generational in character. Neoconservatives who came of age at the height of the Cold War believed that its closing created an opportunity to reduce America’s commitments in the world. For the neoconservatives who had only recently entered the Beltway – the “Young Turks” of the persuasion – this stance was inadequate.\textsuperscript{30} Having won the fight against communism, this new group of writers argued, the United States ought to propagate

\textsuperscript{23} For discussion of this issue with reference to the aspirations of Wilsonian internationalists at the end of the Cold War, see Kristol, \textit{Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea}: 216-17.
\textsuperscript{30} Kirkpatrick, "The United States and the World: Setting Limits".
democracy still further. Critics soon referred to this outlook as “democratic globalism.” 31 The American Enterprise Institute scholar, Joshua Muravchik was among one of the more prominent advocates of this view. In his 1991 book, Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny, Muravchik proposed that “with the collapse of [communism], democracy gains new normative force in the global Zeitgeist. Rulers and subjects alike will find it harder to escape the idea that democratic behavior is right behavior.” 32 In short order, liberal democracy had become the only legitimate means by which leaders could govern their people. The United States, Muravchik believed, now needed to work towards fostering a wholly democratic world. As Muravchik argued, “advancing the democratic cause can be America’s most effective foreign policy in terms not merely of good deeds but of self-interest as well.” 33 In this way, the 1990’s offered “the opportunity of a lifetime. Our failure to exert every possible effort to secure [democracy] would be unforgivable.” 34

The 1991 Gulf War confirmed for Muravchik the centrality of American power in the post-Cold War world. Muravchik applauded President George H. W. Bush’s willingness to employ military force to defend America’s interests. In an article published at the outset of Operation Desert Storm, Muravchik noted that “during the past two years… a bipolar world has become unipolar. A global rush toward democracy and free markets has spelled a huge victory for America on the ideological plain. Now, in the gulf war, our ideological supremacy is being matched by a demonstration of America’s refurbished military capability.” 35

35 Muravchik, "At Last, Pax Americana."
American action, Muravchik claimed, would leave Saddam Hussein cowed and assure Saudi Arabia and Israel. Victory against Iraq would also demonstrate for American voters that it was the Republican Party which was willing to fight for the greater good of international security. Muravchik dryly commented that a majority of Democrats, still wary of authorising the use of force some sixteen years after the end of the Vietnam War, opposed President Bush’s policies. For the time being, those of the political centre-left refused to embrace the globalist cause.

A variety of globalist authors soon sought to build upon Muravchik’s ideas in an effort to establish viable foreign policy platforms for future presidential candidates. In his 1996 book, *Freedom Betrayed*, American Enterprise fellow Michael Ledeen insisted that the United States should “support democracies, old and new, and... democrats wherever and whenever we can.” America, Ledeen claimed, needed to “pledge to the people of the world, friend and foe alike, that we will do our very best to complete the global democratic revolution” unleashed by the end of the Cold War. Ben Wattenberg, meanwhile, held that the United States should adopt a posture he termed “neo-Manifest Destinarianism.” Writing in response to Kristol and Kirkpatrick, Wattenberg proclaimed that “America ought to wage democracy. But we ought never forget that there are many chambers in the palace of democracy. We ought to wage democracy generally, and democracy American-style specifically.”

What exactly would constitute a policy of “waging democracy?” Democratic globalists seemed initially unsure. Some, such as Muravchik and Wattenberg, believed that the National Endowment for Democracy represented the ideal...
instrument for encouraging reform.\textsuperscript{43} Ledeen, for his part, admonished the United States for not forcing more dictators from office; however, his policy prescriptions for achieving this goal were often vague.\textsuperscript{44} Eventually, a number of democratic globalists came to endorse the views of relative newcomers to the debate, William Kristol and Robert Kagan. Having spent their formative years in the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations, Kristol and Kagan deemed “regime change” the most effective strategy for transforming America’s adversaries.\textsuperscript{45} Writing in the \textit{National Interest}, Kristol and Kagan acknowledged that while the “idea of America using its power to promote changes of regime in nations ruled by dictators rings of utopianism,” in truth it was an “eminently realistic” policy option.\textsuperscript{46} This was because there was “something perverse [in] declaring the impossibility of promoting democratic change abroad in light of the record of the past three decades.”\textsuperscript{47} The Third Wave of democratisation was far from ebbing, and the clamouring for freedom only grew in strength. Accordingly, concluded Kristol and Kagan, “with democratic change sweeping the world… is it “realistic” to insist that no further victories can be won?”\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{44} Ledeen, \textit{Freedom Betrayed: How America led a Global Democratic Revolution, Won the Cold War, and Walked Away}: 148-50, passim.
\textsuperscript{45} Robert Kagan and William Kristol, "The Present Danger," \textit{The National Interest}, no. 59 (2000): 66-7. The examples of regime change in Granada, Panama and Eastern Europe loomed large for Kristol and Kagan. America employed force in two of these instances, and utilised economic pressure and moral suasion to open the Iron Curtain. These were all lessons which could be applied to rogue states in the 1990’s.
\textsuperscript{48} Kagan and Kristol, "The Present Danger," 67. For critical analysis of this position, see Falk, "1989 and Post-Cold War Policymaking: Were the “Wrong” Lessons Learned from the Fall of Communism?," 301. Noon considered the neoconservative’s invocation of Cold War history dubious. He referred to their selective reading of the past as “reductive and dramatic.” See Noon, "Cold War Revival: Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on Terror," 77.
History’s Penultimate Moment

As the 1990’s progressed, democratic globalism became the dominant form of neoconservatism. Democratic realists were few in number; they published only sporadically on foreign relations and their ideas seemed discordant in a time of triumphalism. Through the American Enterprise Institute and the *Weekly Standard* in particular, democratic globalists were able to disseminate their opinions widely. Globalists were soon calling on the United States to use its new-found power to propagate democracy wherever it could.

On the face of it, the globalist viewpoint seemed firm. The events of the years 1989 to 1991 confirmed what globalists, as with most neoconservatives, believed about the appeal of liberal political freedom. Yet for the first time, leading neoconservative authors lacked a congruent *normative* framework in which to develop these thoughts further.49 Without a sense of conceptual clarity paralleling that once provided by ideas like anti-communism or totalitarianism, globalists had limited recourse to innovative theoretical precepts when setting out their position on post-Cold War foreign affairs.

A solution to this dilemma inadvertently came from within the ranks. As chapter two detailed, Francis Fukuyama saw in the collapse of communism a premonition of the coming “end of history.” Liberal democratic politics and capitalist economics, by Fukuyama’s reasoning, would allow recognition of humanity’s deepest longings for freedom.50 Fukuyama explicitly disavowed a “mechanistic” understanding of modernisation, preferring only a semi-materialist view of progress.51 Building on earlier accounts of “modernisation theory” by the likes of Seymour Martin Lipset and Daniel Bell, Fukuyama appeared to tell the globalists that they were right to support the spread of democracy.52 Over a long enough period, the

50 See chapter two of this thesis for detailed discussion of this claim.
52 Drolet, *American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary Idealism*: 132-4. Drolet places particular emphasis on the connection between democratic globalism and earlier iterations of modernisation theory. In his view, the discourse of modernisation had two effects on the
entire world would come to accept this values system. Globalists found Fukuyama’s book especially persuasive, and adopted a range of its propositions as their own.\textsuperscript{53}

At several points in \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}, Francis Fukuyama paused to consider some of the implications of his argument. One of the more prominent among his suggestions was that the connection between “recognition” and liberal democracy had an important repercussion for the conduct of international politics.\textsuperscript{54} Fukuyama claimed that if democracy could satisfy \textit{Thymos} within states, it would likely do the same between states. Fukuyama wrote that:

\begin{quote}
If the advent of the universal and homogeneous state means the establishment of rational recognition on the level of individuals within one society, and the abolition of the relationship between lordship and bondage between them, then the spread of this type of state throughout the international system should imply the end of the relationship of bondage between nations as well – that is, the end of imperialism, and with it, a decrease in the likelihood of war based on imperialism.\textsuperscript{55}
\end{quote}

States that no longer struggled for recognition would become “post-historical” in outlook. Thus, “a world made up of liberal states... should have much less incentive for war, since all nations would reciprocally recognise one another’s legitimacy.”\textsuperscript{56}

A variety of potential policy prescriptions flowed from this claim. For instance, bringing warring authoritarian regimes to the negotiating table was no longer enough; the regimes themselves needed to democratise for conflict to end. Unelected governments could not be trusted to guarantee personal and political rights for all their citizens; only liberal democracies could truly do that. Most significantly, dictatorial rulers were not only abhorrent, they were now a minority on the

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\begin{itemize}
\item globalist outlook: it provided normative assurance that history was, indeed, moving in a linear direction towards democracy, and it put forward a ‘minimalist’ view of democracy in which elections were deemed the cornerstone of the democratisation process.
\item Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}: 245.
\item Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}: 245.
\item Fukuyama, \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}: xx.
\end{itemize}
empirically “wrong side of history.” As such, noted Fukuyama, “the United States and other democracies have a long-term interest in preserving the sphere of democracy in the world, and in expanding it where possible and prudent.” Indeed, to enhance American national security, it might be necessary at times to intervene in the “historical” world. Fukuyama opined in a particularly striking sentence that “if democracies do not fight one another, then a steadily expanding post-historic world will be more peaceful and prosperous.”

Fukuyama’s work was well received among fellow neoconservatives. The democratic globalists had found an ally in an intellectual who could satisfactorily explain the gradual advance of freedom. Over the course of the 1990’s, however, some among the globalists increasingly adopted what Ken Jowitt has termed a “Leninist” attitude towards Fukuyama’s account of progress. In June 1997, William Kristol, Gary Schmitt and Thomas Donnelly established a small but influential think-tank called “The Project for a New American Century” (PNAC). Building on the ideas laid out the previous year in Kristol and Kagan’s article ‘Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, PNAC advocated an internationalist strategy for an American people increasingly unconcerned with foreign affairs. The very success of the United States, Kristol and Kagan believed, had left its political leaders “adrift.” In this time of evident disquiet, the nation required a president in the mould of Theodore Roosevelt; someone that would celebrate America’s virtues and confidently advance its abiding interest in a liberal world order.

57 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man: 280.
59 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man: 280.
60 See Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along". Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 89-90.
The Project for a New American Century’s Statement of Principles aptly captured the scope of these aspirations. The document emphasised, among other things, the necessity of a foreign policy “that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities.” The Statement of Principles considered that the United States must “strengthen our ties to democratic allies and... challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values.” Further, PNAC held that the United States must assertively “promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad” through a “neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military strength and moral clarity.” This strategy would “accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”

Resting on one’s laurels was not an option; with the Soviet Union gone, now was the time to capitalise on America’s position. Democratic realism was redundant in an era of emerging “benevolent hegemony.” Only a foreign policy that aimed at the total defeat of tyranny would now do.

Members of PNAC did not, however, call on the United States to overcome tyranny in one swoop. America might begin by rolling back weakened rogue states, and then perhaps work towards liberalising a nation such as China in two or three decades hence. At the top of PNAC’s list of countries ripe for “assisted” democratic revolution was Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Seven years after the end of the Gulf War, PNAC signatories expressed regret that President Bush senior had not ordered American troops to march on Baghdad. Saddam remained a threat to American

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65 Project for a New American Century, "Statement of Principles."
66 Project for a New American Century, "Statement of Principles."
67 Project for a New American Century, "Statement of Principles."
interests, and efforts by the United Nations to contain and disarm the dictator had come to little.\textsuperscript{71} In January 1998, project members sent a strongly worded letter to President Bill Clinton calling for regime change.\textsuperscript{72} The letter insisted that “current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and... we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{73} Replacing the Ba’athist regime with a pro-American democratic government would ensure that Iraq no longer threatened its neighbours or the interests of the United States.\textsuperscript{74}

Deposing Saddam Hussein was also a responsibility that came with global hegemony. Modern-day “exemplarists” on the left and right often invoked John Quincy Adams’ warning that America ought not to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. Kristol and Kagan replied that if the United States failed to act, the monsters would only become more audacious.\textsuperscript{75} Kristol maintained in an article defending this view of international affairs that

\begin{quote}
It would be nice if we lived in a world in which we didn’t have to take the enemies of liberal democracy seriously – a world without jihadists who want to kill and clerics who want to intimidate and tyrants who want to terrorize. It would be nice to wait until we were certain conditions were ripe before we had to act, a world in which the obstacles are trivial and the enemies fold up. Unfortunately, that is not the world we live in. To govern is to choose, and to accept
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{72} Project for a New American Century, "Letter to President Clinton on Iraq."
\textsuperscript{73} Project for a New American Century, "Letter to President Clinton on Iraq."
\textsuperscript{74} Project for a New American Century, "Letter to President Clinton on Iraq." See also David Wurmser, \textit{Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein} (Washington: The AEI Press, 1999). 2, 8, 59-61. For a critical appraisal of PNAC’s advocacy, which maintains that regime change by way of American invasion was not the intended goal at this time, see Pietro S. Nivola, "Thoughts That Count?,” in \textit{Crisis of Conservatism – The Republican Party, the Conservative Movement, and American Politics after Bush}, ed. Joel D. Aberbach and Gillian Peele (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 291-20. Nivola’s argument was consistent when it comes to the neoconservative’s preference for regime change by proxy in the late 1990’s. But he did not seem fully cognizant of the extent to which the attacks of September 11 decisively tipped the scales in favour of direct intervention.
\textsuperscript{75} Kristol and Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," 31.
responsibility for one’s choices. To govern is not wishfully to await
the end of history.\textsuperscript{76}

Aware of history’s overarching teleology, the United States could not sit by and let
the status quo persist. Sometimes a dose of voluntarism was required.\textsuperscript{77} Using force
to advance democratic modernity was not only morally sound; it would bring greater
security to the United States.\textsuperscript{78}

With this idea in mind, some of Kristol’s associates claimed that America was
nothing less than an insurgent force for political change. In a series of columns
penned in 2001, Michael Ledeen took PNAC’s vision of “neo-Reaganite”
internationalism to its conclusion. Ledeen stated in his most prominent piece on this
theme that the American people

\begin{quote}
Should have no misgivings about our ability to destroy tyrannies. It
is what we do best. It comes naturally to us, for we are the one truly
revolutionary country in the world, as we have been for more than
200 years. Creative destruction is our middle name. We do it
automatically, and that is precisely why the tyrants hate us, and are
driven to attack us.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

Ledeen was among the most forthrightly “neo-Jacobin” of the globalists. He called
on the United States to channel its revolutionary dynamism in the cause of systematic
regime change throughout the Middle East.\textsuperscript{80} According to Ledeen, the “terror
masters” in Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian Authority would soon come to
understand America’s zeal for freedom.\textsuperscript{81} The United States would make the Middle
East safe through implanting democracy at the point of a gun. Ledeen concurred with Richard Perle and David Frum that this policy had paid dividends in Europe and Japan after WWII. With sufficient will, such a strategy would likewise succeed among Arab nations. Ledeen essentially demanded that the United States “speed up” history. By adopting a vanguardist policy, the nation would sooner realise its founding aspiration of consolidated global liberty.

In the democratic globalist view, Francis Fukuyama had correctly identified the trajectory of political modernity; convincingly showing why democracy lay in everyone’s future. He did not, however, seem to appreciate the full import of his conclusions. Hegelian-style gradualism would mean accepting the existence of an untenable “historical” world when one knew that, with the suitable application of its influence, the United States could change the situation for the better today. A strategy of democratic vanguardism, globalists suggested, was a necessary corollary to Fukuyama’s thesis. By adopting such a policy, America’s leaders might realise what Fukuyama could only gesture at.

There was also a deeper reason for connecting Fukuyama’s scholarship with policies of interventionism. In the final chapters of *The End of History and the Last Man*, Fukuyama discussed the likely character of “post-historic” life in the United States. He seemed to suggest that without a shared sense of national purpose, discord might grow among the populace. While Fukuyama had dismissed Strauss’s more dispiriting claims on this issue, he nevertheless finished his book on a somewhat ambivalent note. The more sophisticated among the globalist readers of *The End of History* recognised the significance of Fukuyama’s concerns. Their solution to this apparent quandary was straightforward. An America willing to use its hard power to

85 See chapter two, section two in this thesis.
“end history” in presently non-democratic states would discover a renewed sense of mission in the world.\textsuperscript{87} Civic patriotism would receive a helpful boost, as Americans came together for the common cause of “freedom.” As chapter six will show, this goal of rehabilitating “national greatness” found its moment with the advent of the war on terrorism.

**“Foreign Policy Fusion?”**

The case of Francis Fukuyama and the *End of History* pointed towards a broader post-Cold War intellectual phenomenon. As democratic globalism developed over the course of the 1990’s, it became increasingly suffused with a series of cogent theoretical assumptions about democracy and the maintenance of a lasting liberal order. Neoconservative think tanks and journals had earlier asserted, with Fukuyama, that liberal democracy signified the apogee of political evolution. Beyond this, the neoconservative’s normative certitude still appeared at times apprehensive.

Several observers have recently argued that democratic globalism matured owing to a remarkable confluence of foreign policy doctrines.\textsuperscript{88} There was a perceptible “fusion” between the democracy promotion discourses of the neoconservative right and some of the leading figures of centre-left international relations academia in the United States.\textsuperscript{89} At first glance, this “fusion” might seem at odds with the temperament of neoconservatism. Proponents of neoconservatism had rallied for decades against “liberals” in the United States. The neoconservative

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\textsuperscript{87} See Kristol and Brooks, "What Ails American Conservatism?" Brooks, "A Return to National Greatness: A Manifesto for a Lost Creed."


outlook was frequently defined as a riposte against the New Left; this animus would not disappear out of expediency.

In truth, neoconservatives were not opposed to liberalism per se, but to liberal relativism. For them, the problem lay with liberal thinkers allegedly reluctant, by dint of their radical historicist beliefs, to make substantive value judgements and defend their point of view against illiberal alternatives. There would be no quarter with the left so long as Nietzsche remained its philosophical touchstone. After the end of the Cold War, it became clear that many proponents of “liberal internationalism” now eschewed the radical historicist conceit. By claiming that democracy was the single best regime type, and expressing a renewed willingness to fight for this conviction, “liberal hawks” spoke in terms which heartened many neoconservatives. Liberal international relations theorists endorsed a values hierarchy with democratic ideology explicitly on top.\(^9\) An influential element of the liberal intelligentsia had thus come to acknowledge the importance of “universal truths” in foreign affairs.

Like neoconservatives, liberal internationalists often found the close of the Cold War an exhilarating and confusing time. For those among the liberal internationalists schooled in Wilsonian thought, this was also a period of great opportunity. Now might be the moment to realise Woodrow Wilson’s thwarted ambition of a democratic world order.\(^91\) Inderjeet Parmar and Christopher Hobson have argued that, from approximately 1989, a number of liberal students of foreign affairs adopted a more expansive view of democracy’s future prospects.\(^92\) Parmar has written that “intellectual developments... internal to the concerns of liberal internationalists coinciding with the end of Cold War superpower military

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\(^91\) For a good summary of the scope and character of this ambition, see Geoffrey Hawthorn, "Liberalism since the Cold War: An Enemy to Itself?," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 145.

competition created the conditions for a globally assertive American internationalism that wanted to put some muscle behind the push for democracy and human rights.”

Among the critics appraising this alleged development, few were as pugnacious as Tony Smith. Though Smith had once penned an article entitled ‘In Defense of Intervention’, he now aimed to expose what he labelled the “imperialist” turn of centre-left international relations scholarship. In his 2007 book, *A Pact with the Devil*, Smith wrote that

To become capable of seizing the times of the post-Cold War era, mainstream liberal internationalism needed to revise its doctrine so as to be relevant to a new era. Such an undertaking soon came to mean leaving behind the relative restraints of liberal hegemonism. What was called for was a new action-orientated ideology capable of expressing the new self-confidence of liberals everywhere and of engaging state power on their behalf. In a word, liberalism as a doctrine had to mature from hegemonism to imperialism in the sense that concrete ideas were required to be put forward as to how the world was to be changed.

In Smith’s account, a number of “neo-Wilsonian” academics began to call for a more forward, engaged, and demanding foreign policy for democracy promotion than their predecessors had dared to imagine. American policymakers

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had long believed that democratic governments encouraged friendly relations. Since the late 1980’s, liberal theorists had purportedly unearthed significant evidence to support this claim. “Activist-minded” liberal think tanks in Washington, meanwhile, determined that the desire for democracy was universal and that existing democracies should develop new and more assertive strategies to see the regime type advance. Smith reasoned that, through their studies, liberal internationalist researchers and practitioners had provided globalist neoconservatives with much of the foreign policy “gravitas” they previously lacked. 

Smith’s book unleashed considerable controversy. Those he deemed “liberal internationalist” repeatedly denied that their ideas provided weight to democratic globalism or the policy of regime change. Anne-Marie Slaughter, a leading proponent of liberal internationalism, contended that she and her colleagues expressed none of the interventionist beliefs Smith attributed to them. In Slaughter’s view, Smith misleadingly “fashion[ed] a whole intellectual movement – neoliberalism – largely from a semantic desire to create a parallel with neoconservatism.” Liberal thought had not undergone anything like an “imperialist” turn. Liberal internationalists remained dedicated to establishing a more secure world through international cooperation. As such, noted Slaughter, Smith “conflated the military adventurism of American conservatives with broad international efforts to build a law-based world that preserves peace, prosperity and human rights.” When neoconservatives spoke

of the need to foster democracy, they generally ignored the probabilistic restraint undergirding all serious liberal scholarship on the topic. Instead, they cherry-picked liberal ideas which supposedly buttressed their existing agenda.104

Slaughter here likely overestimated the degree of daylight between liberal and neoconservative deliberations on the issue of intervention. Certainly, liberal internationalists stood apart from neoconservatives with their devotion to multilateral institutions and international law. Even so, a number of liberal writers studying human rights, democratisation and the norms of state sovereignty had since the early 1990’s become increasingly comfortable with the prospect of using coercion in support of high-minded goals. 105 Previously speculative discussion about democracy’s progress now gained a voluntarist edge, with scholars beginning to recognise the practical import of their theoretical findings. Perhaps intellectuals could now help to guide policymaking in a more thoroughgoing manner than before.106

The development of the so-called “democratic peace theory” provides an instructive example of this phenomenon. In its early iterations, democratic peace theory was largely provisional in character. Building on Immanuel Kant’s long-standing proposition that republican regimes would not initiate wars against one another, Michael Doyle contended in a two-part article published in 1983 that “even though liberal states have become involved in numerous wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.”107 This claim rested on “preliminary evidence... [which] appear[s] to indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states.” 108

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Democracies, Doyle surmised, were likely the most peaceable of all present regime types.

Doyle’s peers soon gathered empirical data for this alluring hypothesis. Figures such as Bruce Russett developed quantitative study methods for assessing the role of regime type in determining a state’s bellicosity. Russett and his associates determined that there existed very few, if any, historical instances of two or more stable democracies launching wars of aggression against each other. What could explain this noteworthy phenomenon? According to one group of scholars, the institutional restraints of democracy prevented the quick resort to violence. A leader beholden to their electorate would face ejection from office if he or she authorised an unpopular war. Furthermore, the legislative or judicial arms of government could put up roadblocks that would slow the drive towards war. A second version of democratic peace theory, by contrast, placed greater emphasis on normative factors. States that expressed “shared values” would be less likely to go to war over matters of ideology. When two liberal democratic nations disagreed, they would settle their differences through compromise instead of cruise missiles. Democracy fostered habits of negotiation and tolerance; a border dispute between two established democracies would likely find resolution at the United Nations or a similar international body. Whichever explanation for the persistence of democratic

peace proved more convincing, by 2001 Bruce Russett and John Oneal could claim wide-ranging empirical verification of Kant’s famous proposal.115

Yet if democratic peace theory had indeed become what Jack Levy once described as “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in international relations,” there were surely policy ramifications to follow.116 Since democracy facilitated lasting peace, it seemed reasonable to conclude that it was in the national interest of existing democratic states to encourage democracy’s growth whenever possible.117 Accepting this idea, democratisation scholar Larry Diamond opened a 1994 article with the declaration that only a wholly-democratic world order could secure peace and an international regime of collective security.118 Diamond flatly stated that “democratic countries do not go to war with one another.”119 Accordingly, working to “consolidate democracy” across the globe needed to become a priority for liberal states.120 Or as democratic peace scholars Margaret G. Hermann and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. maintained, “promoting the spread of liberal democratic institutions [is] consistent with the underlying logic of democratic peace.”121 Indeed, contended Hermann and Kegley, “interventions by democracies intended to protect or promote democracy have tended to lead to an increase in the democraticness [sic] of those target’s political regimes.”122 These findings, they deduced, “provide support for intervention as a tool of democratisation.”123

117 For a critical appraisal of this claim, see Christopher Hobson, "Democracy as "Civilisation"," Global Society 22, no. 1 (2008): 89-90.
123 Hermann and Kegley, "Democracies and Intervention: Is There a Danger Zone in the Democratic Peace?,"
What began as a speculative proposition had now become increasingly axiomatic for many. Democracies did not fight each other: therefore, the vigorous promotion of democracy always advanced the peace. Not all democratic peace theorists readily accepted this conclusion, with some questioning their peers’ methodology and raising pertinent concerns about the role of resurgent nationalism in contributing to conflict between democratising nations. Russett, for his part, later attempted to show that his research was not intended to inform policy deliberations; this was in itself another contestable claim. Nevertheless, the so-called “action-orientated” proponents of the theory now held that, having uncovered the best path to international amity, liberal governments were obliged to see democratic regimes spread. Non-democratic governments were “ontologically threatening” to liberal states, their very existence an affront to the “civilised” standards of the so-called “international community.” Paradoxically, the pursuit of peace in some cases necessitated a liberal war. Democratic peace theory could, in this way, provide a “social scientific” rationale for international violence in the cause of enabling the vote.


126 See Bruce Russett, "Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace," International Studies Perspectives 6, no. 2 (2005): 395-408. Russett’s claim that democratic peace theory was not prescriptive evinced a degree of naivety: surely such an alluring proposition would help to frame foreign policy, particularly because it claimed to have uncovered a ‘scientifically verifiable’ manner through which the democratic world could achieve lasting security. For critical analysis on this point, see Moses, "Liberal Internationalist Discourse and the Use of Force: Blair, Bush and Beyond," 49, fn 11.
127 For critical appraisal of the voluntarist implications of democrat
Notwithstanding their embrace of an “activist” version of democratic peace theory, most liberal internationalists still accepted that there was a significant obstacle to realizing a truly secure liberal world: government-sanctioned political violence inside nations. With the Cold War over, the problem of repressive and “failed” states came to the forefront. Dictators such as Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic repeatedly employed armed force to suppress ethnic minorities within their borders. Nations such as Somalia and Haiti, meanwhile, fell into anarchy. In light of these developments, a range of liberal thinkers soon concluded that the “international community” ought to intercede in cases of ethnic cleansing, civil war and attempted genocide. Saving others from the rapaciousness of their rulers, some believed, would be consistent with the so-called “just war” tradition. For those of a cosmopolitan outlook, nations needed to act when members of the emerging “global society” succumbed to civil conflict. As the 1990’s unfolded, the question of how liberal countries should use their influence to aid foreign peoples became one of the most contentious among international relations scholars.

Josiah Strong and fellow Social Darwinists was likewise positivist and couched in the language of enlightenment and liberation. Hobson and Moses have both convincingly shown that democratic peace theory serves as a modern-day civilisational standard. Non-democratic states have objectively ‘failed’ to live up to expected conduct, and hence war for democracy becomes a ‘civilising mission’.


This debate over the issue of “humanitarian intervention” gained a new dimension with the publication of the “Responsibility to Protect” report in 2001. Composed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the report maintained that sovereign authority should be redefined as “responsibility.” What went on inside nations mattered to the wider world. The report’s authors, an eminent group of liberal academics and international lawyers, contended that “where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and if the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the responsibility to protect.” ICISS members recognised that this doctrine would provoke controversy in some quarters. They were particularly careful to outline when and how the idea of a Responsibility to Protect would induce intervention. States could only intervene as a “last resort”; they needed “just cause” and “right authority” to abjure the sovereignty of another government. Moreover, intervening parties were to commit to a “responsibility to rebuild” following the end of hostilities. The ICISS aspired to redefine the parameters of humanitarian intervention, and thus ensure no future “misuse” of the concept.

137 Implicit in the idea of the Responsibility to Protect (or ‘R2P’) was an attempt to discard the phrase ‘humanitarian intervention’ altogether. The more astute among proponents of R2P had recognised that the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ was something of a misnomer. Any serious military intervention brought with it the likely prospect of civilian deaths – a decidedly anti-humanitarian outcome for liberal-minded foreign policy practitioners. Recasting this action as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was supposed to alter the discourse, moving it away from deliberations over force to questions of justice, international norms and right authority. But it ended up being a high-brow rationale for what was essentially a form of liberal imperialism.


143 For some representative publications which critically assess the idea of a Responsibility to Protect, see Amitai Etzioni, “Sovereignty as Responsibility,” Orbis 50, no. 1 (2006): 71-85. Joelle Tanguy,
A “corollary” to the Responsibility to Protect soon followed. According to Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, the “international community” also had a “duty to prevent” non-democratic nations from acquiring or using Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).\textsuperscript{144} Saddam Hussein had once employed these deadly armaments in an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Kurds; and it seemed only a matter of time before he or another dictator would attempt something similar.\textsuperscript{145} States that “lacked internal checks on power,” wrote Feinstein and Slaughter, posed a “unique threat” to their people and the wider world because they could not be trusted to maintain WMDs peaceably.\textsuperscript{146} Feinstein and Slaughter noted that

The responsibility to protect is based on a collective obligation to avoid the needless slaughter or severe mistreatment of human beings anywhere – an obligation that stems from both moral principle and national interest. The corollary duty to prevent governments without internal checks from developing WMD capacity addresses the same threat from another source: the prospect of mass murder through the use of WMD, which have a destructive potential far beyond the control of any attacker.\textsuperscript{147}

This idea was “not a radical proposal,” claimed Feinstein and Slaughter, because “it simply extrapolate[d] from recent developments in the law of intervention for humanitarian purposes.”\textsuperscript{148} As such, only nations that eschewed WMDs for potentially offensive use \textit{and} remained committed to liberal human rights norms

\textsuperscript{145} Feinstein and Feinstein and Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent," 137-8.
\textsuperscript{146} Feinstein and Feinstein and Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent," 137-8.
\textsuperscript{147} Feinstein and Feinstein and Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent," 151.
\textsuperscript{148} Feinstein and Feinstein and Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent," 151. For additional discussion see Anne-Marie Slaughter and Allen Johnson, "A Values-Based Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World: An Interview with Anne-Marie Slaughter," \textit{Democratiya} 10 (2007): 152-4.
would meet the new requirements of state sovereignty.\textsuperscript{149} The “R2P,” as it became
known, had lowered the bar for intervention in the “historical world.” It provided a
versatile justification for acting with force out of the “moral imperative” of halting
violations of liberal human rights norms.

Neoconservatives of a democratic globalist disposition soon came to accept
most of these liberal internationalist principles, with one significant qualification.
Proponents of the globalist outlook generally dismissed the idea that collective action
by the “international community” could help to foster lasting democratic societies:
only the decisive exercise of American hard power would allow full realisation of
that goal.\textsuperscript{150} Indeed, America’s unipolar position created an international political
environment favourable to the use of intervention as a way of securing democracy.\textsuperscript{151}
Unlike many of their liberal internationalist counterparts, globalist neoconservatives
were more willing to acknowledge the continued centrality of hard power in foreign
affairs.\textsuperscript{152} The “neo-liberal” goal of constructing a “rules-based” international system

\textsuperscript{149} For critical analysis on this point, see Moses, ““We Are the World:” Cosmopolitanism, Neo-
Conservatism, and Global Humanity” 6.
\textsuperscript{150} Perle and Frum, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror; 239. Joshua Muravchik, "The
American Leadership: A Challenge to Isolationism: 1-3, 5. For critical analysis of the
neoconservative’s antipathy towards international law and United Nations-sponsored
multilateralism, see Jean-François Drolet, "Containing the Kantian Revolutions: A Theoretical
Analysis of the Neo-Conservative Critique of Global Liberal Governance," Review of International
referred to this position as a “neo-Nietzschean” understanding of international relations.
Neoconservatives, in his view, were well aware that the United States had served as the conscious
“values-creator” of the present liberal order. In this way, they implicitly acknowledged the historicity
of the liberal democratic ideology they claimed to be promoting. While neoconservatives would
likely bristle at Drolet’s argument, his insistence that members of the group tacitly understood the
socially constructed nature of international norms is an interesting claim that deserves further
exploration. See Drolet, American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary
Idealism: 190-1, passim.
(Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 2010). Cooper, Neoconservatism and American
Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 100-1.
assessment of this point, see Aaron Rapport, "Unexpected Affinities? Neoconservatism's Place in IR
Movement: 228-9. Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 13-
14, 112-14.
implicitly downplayed the central place of American hegemony in maintaining stability. In a sense, democratic globalism contained unmistakable echoes of the tradition earlier labelled “practical idealism.” Lofty principle alone could not suffice as a framework for policy. The pursuit of power as an end unto itself usually lacked appeal among the voting public. Brought together, however, and the United States could advance its material and strategic interests by actively encouraging liberal ideology in other countries.

With this idea in mind a range of neoconservatives asserted that, under specifically American aegis, the democratic peace would spread. Joshua Muravchik was among the first of the globalists to endorse democratic peace theory when he stated in Exporting Democracy that “the more democratic the world, the more peaceful it is likely to be. Various researchers have shown that war between democracies has almost never occurred in the modern world.” Citing the works of Bruce Russett and Jack Levy, Muravchik commented in his subsequent book, The Imperative of American Leadership, that the democratic peace thesis possessed undeniable empirical grounding. Democracies were always pacific in their dealings with one another; and there seemed mounting evidence that they would not act out of avarice towards any other government. As such, Muravchik claimed that “a [democratic] state should compromise some of its goals or interests rather than resort to war, especially if it is dealing with states that are willing to behave in a like

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manner."\textsuperscript{159} Democratic governments would usually side with the United States and quickly share its interest in sustaining a liberal world order.\textsuperscript{160}

Muravchik again established a foundation on which subsequent globalists could build. Among Muravchik’s colleagues, few advanced the concept of democratic peace more stridently than Natan Sharansky. A former Soviet dissident-turned Israeli politician, Sharansky’s personal trajectory was distinct from most so-called “third-age” neoconservatives.\textsuperscript{161} Nevertheless, his views usually meshed well with those of his Republican peers in Washington. Sharansky often defended the idea of democratic peace as a truism of contemporary international life.\textsuperscript{162} In a 2001 essay, Sharansky contended that “the logic of why democracies do not go to war with each other is ironclad. When political power is a function of popular will, the incentive system works towards maintaining peace and providing prosperity.”\textsuperscript{163} Drawing upon both the normative and institutional hypotheses that attempted to explain why democracies did not act aggressively, Sharansky held that popularly elected governments externalised their propensity for compromise in their foreign relations.\textsuperscript{164} Authoritarian polities, conversely, projected their violent pathologies onto their neighbours.\textsuperscript{165} With the Arab Middle East in mind, Sharansky reasoned

\textsuperscript{159} Muravchik, \textit{Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America’s Destiny}: 8-9.
\textsuperscript{161} Sharansky’s political development paralleled more closely that of the Israeli “neo-Revisionist” right. But as Ilan Peleg and Paul Scham have suggested, this movement itself possessed a variety of commonalities with American neoconservatism. Both were highly nationalistic, believed force played a decisive role in foreign affairs, and held that democracy could advance peace in the Arab Middle East. See Ilan Peleg and Paul Scham, "Israeli Neo-Revisionism and American Neoconservatism: The Unexplored Parallels," \textit{Middle East Journal} 61, no. 1 (2007): 73-6.
that “the democratic world must export freedom... not only for the sake of people who live under repressive regimes, but for the sake of our own security. For only when the world is free will the world be safe.”

Neoconservatives of a “democratic realist” outlook likewise echoed much of this sentiment. While they continued to caution the United States against idealistic excess, they often acknowledged the correlation between democracy and peace. Jeane Kirkpatrick proposed that “it is enormously desirable for the United States and others to encourage democratic institutions.” This was because “democratic institutions are not only the best guarantee that a government will respect the rights of its citizens, they are the best guarantee that a country will not engage in aggressive wars. Democratic institutions are the best arms control plan, the best peace plan for any area.” While Kirkpatrick still insisted that “it is not within the United States’ power to democratize the world,” Washington “can and should encourage others to adopt democratic practices.” Even Charles Krauthammer endorsed the democratic peace, urging in particular that the United States support freely chosen governments to bolster its strategic advantage.

Many neoconservatives likewise came to accept the linkage made by liberal scholars between human rights and the advance of American national security. Neoconservatives associated with the Coalition for a Democratic Majority had long highlighted the abuse of human rights abroad, especially in the Eastern Bloc. During the 1990’s, this existing current of thought found commonality with liberal internationalist calls for a more robust doctrine of humanitarianism. Paul Wolfowitz

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167 Kirkpatrick, "A Normal Country in a Normal Time," in ed. Harries, 160-1. Kirkpatrick’s views on democracy promotion contained a notable shortcoming. In her 1979 article ‘Dictatorships and Double Standards’, Kirkpatrick has insisted that traditional autocracies were much more likely candidates for democratisation than totalitarian states. The dismantling of Eastern European communism from within put paid to this argument. Kirkpatrick subsequently claimed that her thesis might not have been applicable to all circumstances, and that it was not predictive in any case. But this still suggested that the democratic realists had great trouble letting go of their Cold War mindsets on democratisation.
171 See discussion of Scoop Jackson and the CDM in the previous chapter of this thesis.
pointed out in a chapter published in Kristol and Kagan’s 2000 volume, *Present Dangers*, that “nothing could be less realistic than the version of “realism” that dismisses human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy.”¹⁷² Citing his experiences while serving in the Reagan administration, Wolfowitz explained that when South Korea and the Philippines underwent democratisation, instances of political violence and extra-legal detention markedly declined in the two countries.¹⁷³ Wolfowitz acknowledged that while a principled foreign policy had cost America in the past, particularly under Jimmy Carter, “what is more impressive is how often promoting democracy has actually advanced other American interests.”¹⁷⁴

The relationship between human rights and American national security gained further salience for neoconservatives when they confronted the recurring humanitarian crises in the Balkans from 1992.¹⁷⁵ A number of American congressional leaders, including several prominent Republicans, had opposed intervention in southeastern Europe because it fell outside of the “national interest.”¹⁷⁶ The globalists who wrote for *The Weekly Standard* insisted by contrast that ending suffering within other nations was fundamentally America’s interest.¹⁷⁷ In a June 1999 article commending the air war over Kosovo, William Kristol and Robert Kagan pointed out that decisive intervention “demonstrated... that American power, even when less than artfully applied, is a potent force for international stability, peace and decency.”¹⁷⁸ Humanitarianism was a fine principle; but to be truly effective in practice, it required American leadership. Kristol and Kagan had

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¹⁷⁵ Cooper, *Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis*: 57-8. Hawthorn, "Liberalism since the Cold War: An Enemy to Itself?,” 151. For a critical appraisal of the neoconservative’s support for humanitarianism, see Ryan, "Bush’s “Useful Idiots”": 9/11, the Liberal Hawks and the Cooption of the “War on Terror”;” 676-8.


formerly noted that Serbian aggression in Bosnia came to a halt when the United States and its NATO allies launched a determined bombing campaign.\(^{179}\) As regime type shaped the character of a state’s foreign policy, only the fall of Milosevic would ensure lasting stability.\(^{180}\) Kagan wrote at the outset of NATO’s involvement in Kosovo that “the United States has a vital strategic interest in the stability of Europe, and an abiding moral interest in preventing genocide and ethnic cleansing on a continent that in this century gave us two world wars and the Holocaust.”\(^{181}\) Ending humanitarian disasters today could serve regional security goals in the longer-term.

Around this time, some neoconservatives began to comment on the degree of convergence between their position and that of centre-left foreign affairs specialists.\(^{182}\) Norman Podhoretz, now *Commentary*’s “editor at large,” found himself siding with “liberal hawks” such as Anthony Lewis, Madeline Albright and Richard Holbrooke over the war in Kosovo.\(^{183}\) With reference to Slobodan Milosevic’s record of violence, Podhoretz opined that “I find it hard to quarrel with the emerging idea that the principle of sovereignty should no longer embrace the right of political leaders to butcher their own people.”\(^{184}\) Podhoretz was appalled by the indifference of Republican Party “realists” towards human rights abuses. In cases of premeditated state violence against ethnic or religious minorities, leading democratic nations had


an obligation to act. Kristol, Kagan and Muravchik reached similar conclusions. Muravchik believed that humanitarianism ought to become a part of the Republican Party’s foreign policy platform, while Kristol and Kagan insisted once more that American global hegemony carried with it global responsibilities. These writers tended to agree with influential liberal politicians of the time, such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, that humanitarian intervention was an idea whose moment had arrived.

From this perspective, it was of little surprise that democratic globalists would often frame their advocacy for regime change in Iraq in humanitarian terms. Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant second to none, they repeatedly emphasised; surely America and likeminded allies had a “responsibility to protect” Iraqis from his continuing repression. William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan cast their argument for action in this very manner. When asked in an interview “is there anyone you can think of... [that] the Bush administration has not convinced that going into Iraq is necessary who should and can be convinced?” Kristol and Kaplan replied:

Liberals. Not liberals at The Nation or The American Prospect, who can always be counted on to favor tyranny over anything that strengthens American power, however marginally. But liberals who supported the American interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo – humanists, in short. For if ever there was a humanitarian undertaking, it is the liberation of Iraq from a tyrant who has jailed, tortured, gassed, shot, and otherwise murdered tens of thousands of his own citizens.

Kristol and Kaplan believed that a democratic Iraq would not repress its own

188 For discussion of this important point, see Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 60-1.
190 Lopez, "Closing In: A Conversation with Lawrence Kaplan and Bill Kristol on Iraq".
people or seek non-conventional weapons. Installing an elected government in Baghdad would finally end Saddam’s belligerence. Prominent liberal scholars such as Thomas Weiss, John Ikenberry and Anne Marie Slaughter have subsequently claimed that the neoconservative’s invocation of humanitarian concerns over Iraq was essentially duplicitous. Indeed, Slaughter still insisted in a 2009 essay that in the case of Iraq “armed invasion on humanitarian grounds was not justifiable under any current version of the responsibility to protect doctrine; nor was it ever advanced as a rationale for the invasion by the Bush administration” and its neoconservative supporters.

Yet democratic globalists had been speaking favourably about humanitarian intervention for almost a decade prior to regime change in Iraq. They did not discover and co-opt the principle out of mere convenience in early 2003. Neoconservatives seemed to accept the key claims of the Responsibility to Protect, aside from the doctrine’s emphasis on United Nations-sponsored action. Most concurred with Feinstein and Slaughter that authoritarian states with WMDs were a prime security

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191 Lopez, "Closing In: A Conversation with Lawrence Kaplan and Bill Kristol on Iraq". For further discussion on the brutality of Saddam Hussein and the need for regime change, see Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, The War Over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), chapter one. For analysis of the commonalities between the neoconservative and liberal hawk position in the year immediately prior to intervention in Iraq, see Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons: 248-9.


194 Slaughter, "Wilsonianism in the Twenty-First Century," in ed. Ikenberry, 102. Slaughter’s conclusion is all the more astonishing as senior figures of the Bush administration frequently defined intervention in precisely these terms. Indeed, President Bush argued in his 2010 memoir that “I didn’t see how anyone could deny that liberating Iraq advanced the cause of human rights,” as his actions had led to the fall of a most brutal despot. Rice, Cheney and Wolfowitz made much the same argument while in office. The Bush administration’s interventionist discourse was clearly grounded in the language of humanitarianism, despite Slaughter’s best efforts to claim otherwise. See Bush, Decision Points: 248.


Notwithstanding their continued disagreements with the remaining radical historicists on the left, democratic globalists had come to see much promise in the “hard” liberalism espoused by “neo-Wilsonian” foreign policy academics.\footnote{Jacob Heilbrunn, "Where Have All the Neocons Gone?," American Conservative 8, no. 1 (2009): 6-9. Wolfson, "Humanitarian Hawks? Why Kosovo but Not Kuwait," 29-30, 39-40.} A range of liberal scholars had realised anew the need for a “values-based foreign policy” which would make the world safe through democracy.\footnote{Slaughter and Johnson, "A Values-Based Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World: An Interview with Anne-Marie Slaughter."} “Second-age” neoconservatives had once claimed, with Scoop Jackson and the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, that all people desired freedom and that democracy represented the most humane regime yet devised.\footnote{See chapter four, section four.} The theoretical innovations made by liberal scholars after 1989 served to advance and codify existing neoconservative views on these issues.\footnote{Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order: 18-19.} Democratic globalists could now meld the allegedly “scientific” findings of liberal international relations theory with their belief in the need for continued American primacy. A safe and peaceful world was near, neoconservatives insisted, if the United States employed its unmatched military power in the cause of
democracy. 203

Conclusion

Neoconservatives, wrote Irving Kristol, were once roundly sceptical of political “programs that ignored history and experience in favour of... fashionable left-wing ideas spawned by the academy.”204 In the years between the demise of communism and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, democratic globalists cast aside most of their predecessors’ reservations on this score. Members of the globalist group helped to reinterpret speculative political thought for interventionist ends. Desiring the clarity that defined their Cold War, democratic globalists saw in Fukuyama’s thesis a promising account of the emerging world order. Similarly, democratic peace theory and the Responsibility to Protect doctrine could be interpreted as guidelines for armed action. Hawkish liberal writers, in particular, offered neoconservatives a discourse of interventionism considerably more sophisticated than any they could have generated alone.

By the turn of the Millennium, a political persuasion that was once suspicious about the role of positivist social science in policymaking had become emboldened by just this phenomenon. Such a change in attitude might appear in some ways paradoxical. Many of the globalists’ proposals for American foreign policy sounded uncannily like a form of international “social engineering.” In his critical study of neoconservatism, examined more fully in the conclusion of this thesis, Francis Fukuyama wrote that globalists had convinced themselves that a “benevolent hegemon” would act differently to powerful states past.205 It could be trusted to use its influence for the common good. The United States would not be “forcing” an alien ideology onto other nations; when given the choice, all people would of course adopt liberal values. The practical significance of these assumptions would soon become apparent.

205 Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads: 111-12.
The Perfect Storm: September 11 and the coming of the Bush Doctrine

War has played an integral part in shaping the American psyche. From Bunker Hill to Gettysburg and Normandy, American commanders and statesmen have performed heroic actions which continue to resonate in popular memory. And yet, Americans are not a uniquely belligerent people. When war is thrust upon the country, its citizens usually accept the burden with reluctance. Reflecting this tendency, interventionist foreign policy doctrines discussed in previous chapters often had trouble sustaining their appeal among the public. Roosevelt’s “muscular internationalism” ran out of steam towards the end of his term, while Wilson’s insistence that America join the League of Nations was voted down by the Senate. Even the Reagan Doctrine became more circumspect as time went on; winding up as relations improved between the superpowers. Given the choice between quiescence and activism, most Americans seemed likely to opt for the former.

How, then, did the Bush administration convince many citizens of the need for open-ended intervention in the cause of democracy half a world away? The Bush Doctrine was the product of a very specific Zeitgeist. Out of office for much of the 1990’s Republican policymakers, including neoconservatives, expressed growing unease about the direction of American foreign policy. They feared, as one prominent Republican put it, that “weakness was provocative” to America’s enemies.¹ And then

there came the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Americans now demanded a clear, proactive strategy to fight Jihadism.

It was here that a confluence of ideology, personnel and circumstance occurred. Neoconservative policymakers appointed to the Bush administration could chart an ambitious and well-refined course forward: the use of regime change to bring political liberty to nations dominated by despotism. This proposal found a receptive audience in President Bush and his senior cabinet members. The United States had been struck at the apex of its global power: now was the moment to employ this unparalleled influence to forcibly reorder the countries deemed culpable for fostering or abetting terrorism. The premier rogue state of the Arab world, Iraq, was soon in American gun sights for these reasons. September 11 created a “perfect storm” from which the policy of democratic vanguardism and the invasion of Iraq was the strongest of squalls.

“A Day of Fire”

In his January 2005 second inaugural address, President Bush reflected on the circumstances that brought about the “Bush Doctrine.” Bush’s strategy represented in part a response to an era of missed opportunities; of chances lost to shape American national security for the better. Speaking on the steps of the Capitol Building, Bush mused that after the collapse of communism America had entered “years of relative quiet, years of repose, years of sabbatical – and then there came a day of fire.”

Why did the President believe that the time immediately prior to his first election in 2000 had been characterised by a false sense of security? Many of the individuals who attained cabinet or deputy secretary positions in the Bush administration had spent the 1990’s repeatedly warning about American aloofness towards allegedly marginal threats. Bush’s Vice-President, Dick Cheney, and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, had become increasingly concerned in their years out of office that fecklessness empowered the nation’s adversaries. Rumsfeld

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2 Bush, "President Sworn in to Second Term."
explained in his 2011 memoir *Known and Unknown* that “a decade of hesitation and half-measures had undermined our national security. The incoming administration needed to give the country strategic direction and build up our defenses and intelligence capabilities.” Rumsfeld maintained that President Clinton and his advisors lacked a suitably cogent program for shaping post-Cold War international affairs. Having outlasted the Soviet Union, America’s leaders were content to cash in the “peace dividend.”

Rumsfeld’s associates in conservative think tanks had previously voiced similar concerns. In a 1993 article, Paul Wolfowitz dissected the apparent shortcomings of President Clinton’s approach to foreign relations. Wolfowitz contended that “a sense of confusion about defining and pursuing centrally important national interests is the most troubling aspect of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy at the first-year mark.” Clinton had meant well – and Wolfowitz agreed in principle with the need for some form of international involvement in Somalia and Haiti – but his leadership style often lacked the decisiveness required to manage the complexity of the post-Cold War world. Foreign policy, Wolfowitz observed, was not like social work. Not all international crises required American intercession.

Wolfowitz was previously involved in two policymaking processes which helped to shape his views on American foreign relations in the 1990’s. In the first case, Wolfowitz oversaw the writing of a “Defence Policy Guidance” paper for the George H. W. Bush administration. As the Director of Policy Planning in the State


6 For an appraisal of this idea, see Cooper, Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis: 109-10.
Department, Wolfowitz was responsible for conducting studies on the long-term aims of American strategy. The Defence Policy Guidance paper originally contained proposals for preventing the emergence of any hostile power in Eurasia, advancing a ballistic missile defence program, and expanding America’s military presence in the Middle East.\(^{10}\) When leaked to the media, these proposals drew considerable rebuke from politicians and academics alike. Wolfowitz had the chief authors of the document, Zalmay Khalilzad and I. Lewis Libby, soften the language of their proposals while retaining many of their key claims.\(^{11}\) Ultimately, Clinton’s election to the presidency halted the implementation of the guidance paper’s recommendations. Nevertheless, many observers suspect that Wolfowitz and his peers never entirely gave up on their plans.\(^{12}\) Indeed, some critics have claimed that the Defence Policy Guidance paper presaged a number of ideas later articulated in the Bush Doctrine.\(^{13}\)

Wolfowitz’s office also contributed to the Bush administration’s deliberations over launching the First Gulf War. Contrary to later accounts, Wolfowitz and his neoconservative associates never advocated regime change in 1991.\(^{14}\) But they did view the Gulf War as a test case of America’s willingness to defend the so-called “new world order” which followed the demise of communism in Eastern Europe.\(^{15}\) The coalition arrayed against Saddam Hussein included the moribund Soviet Union; an unthinkable partner in combating aggressive third-world dictators only a few years before. The course of the conflict demonstrated the utility of President Reagan’s arms

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build-up during the 1980’s. Iraq may have possessed the fourth largest army in the world; however, the United States’ was the most effective. The relative ease of the victory over Iraq – the ground war to liberate Kuwait lasted but one hundred hours – seemed to confirm that the United States military had overcome its post-Vietnam aversion to fighting large-scale land battles. One of Wolfowitz’s most persistent critiques of the subsequent Clinton administration was that it overlooked a central lesson of the Gulf War: international aggression must be met by a firm and devastating American response. As the decade progressed, this would become something of a mantra among neoconservatives.

The First Gulf War demonstrated that one of the challenges America would face in the 1990’s came from a burgeoning nexus of rogue states and political extremism. Iraq represented a new breed of international troublemaker: a relatively weak country nevertheless prone to brinkmanship and willing to sponsor violence against American interests. In the neoconservative view, while the Clinton administration expressed public concern about the threat of rogue states, it usually did little of lasting significance to address the problem. As the previous chapter showed, the Project for a New American Century had since 1997 emphasised the need to confront Saddam Hussein. Project signatories, including Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, David Frum and Peter Rodman, concurred that present American policy was on the verge of failure. David Wurmser, a close associate of

Perle, had gone so far as to label the United States “tyranny’s ally” for failing to fashion a clear scheme to remove Saddam Hussein.²² Like Kristol and Kagan at the Weekly Standard, this group of former policymakers called for a vigorous response against the enemies of freedom.²³

Over the course of the 1990’s, it became increasingly clear that these enemies had assumed a variety of unexpected forms. Republican hawks were accustomed to thinking of America’s adversaries as states – much as had been the case during the Cold War. It took some years of adjustment for them to appreciate the threat of terrorism.²⁴ The terrorist attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 introduced the world to Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. Based in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, Al Qaeda had emerged at the vanguard of a new Jihadist international.²⁵ Leading members of the group had committed themselves to striking the “far enemy” – the United States – as “retribution” for the country’s long-time involvement in the politics of the Arab Middle East.²⁶ The Clinton administration offered what its critics considered a lacklustre response to Al Qaeda’s provocations. Clinton launched a series of missile strikes against Bin Laden’s training camps after the East African bombings and his administration treated captured terrorists as


²⁴ See Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order: 33-5. Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism: 150-1. Falk, by contrast, has argued that neoconservatives never overcame their state-based understanding of international affairs. The war on terrorism quickly evolved into a war against rogue states which supported terrorism. See Falk, "1989 and Post-Cold War Policymaking: Were the “Wrong” Lessons Learned from the Fall of Communism?,” 296-7.


criminals, not hostile combatants.\textsuperscript{27} Such policies, Republicans writers believed, would only bolster the audacity of this foe.\textsuperscript{28} By the 2000 presidential election, these concerns had become implicitly embedded in the Republican campaign script. Candidate Bush and his chief foreign policy advisor, Condoleezza Rice, put forward a vision of “American internationalism” distinct from what they characterised as Clinton’s eight years of irresolute management.\textsuperscript{29} While Bush suggested that the armed forces would only be used to fight and win necessary wars, he also made clear that his administration would seek to reverse the perception of American weakness.\textsuperscript{30} Al Qaeda’s attack on the \textit{USS Cole} in Yemen shortly before the election only reinforced the need for a new direction in policy. Clinton did not respond with military force against those who killed seventeen American servicemen.\textsuperscript{31}

In an apparent confirmation of the incoming administration’s commitment to “American internationalism,” from early 2001 Bush’s Vice President and Secretary of Defence hired a range of neoconservative policymakers. Most prominent among them were Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith in the Defence Department; Richard Perle and David Frum in advisory and speechwriting roles; and I. Lewis Libby, Abram Shulsky, Peter Rodman, Zalmay Khalilzad, Paula Dobriansky, Eliot Abrams


\textsuperscript{28} See discussion on the sources of terrorism in Project for a New American Century, "Letter to President Bush on War on Terrorism." See also Robert W. Tucker et al., "One Year On: Power, Purpose and Strategy in American Foreign Policy," \textit{The National Interest}, no. 69 (2002): 11-12. As it turned out, a Democratic administration led by President Barack Obama would eventually assassinate Osama Bin Laden in a raid in Pakistan in May 2011.


\textsuperscript{31} See Coll, \textit{Ghost Wars}: 537-8.
and David Wurmser as policymakers variously assigned to the National Security Council, State Department, Vice President’s office and Pentagon.\textsuperscript{32} Though relatively small in number in a government that employed hundreds of specialist advisors, these figures brought with them a series of ideas which cohered especially well with the tenor of the new administration. Neoconservatives had long spoken of the “squandered decade” during Clinton’s tenure; now they hoped to shape policy in a meaningful way under Bush.\textsuperscript{33}

Only nine months after President Bush assumed office, unforeseen events intervened. On September 11, 2001, close to three thousand people were killed by Al Qaeda in the first act of aggression against the American mainland since the war of 1812. The government and the wider nation were in shock.\textsuperscript{34} A host of questions immediately confronted the President: What had motivated these attacks? How had federal agencies been unable to prevent these strikes? Was just this the beginning of a series of terrorist acts, some potentially involving weapons of mass destruction?\textsuperscript{35} President Bush felt a sense of personal failure. American lives were not lost on the battlefield; they were lost in the sky, the office and the street.\textsuperscript{36} September 11 had given the nation a new day of infamy.\textsuperscript{37}

President Bush may well have initially been bewildered by the attacks of September 11. Those he selected for high office in his administration were not.\textsuperscript{38} The

\textsuperscript{32} See Dorrien, \textit{Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana}: 142-3. Timothy Lynch, by contrast, has argued that the neoconservative’s influence cannot not be reliably measured in terms of the number of personnel appointed to the administration. See Lynch, “Did Bush Pursue a Neoconservative Foreign Policy?,” in ed. Morgan and Davies, 127-9.


\textsuperscript{38} Rockmore, \textit{Before and After 9/11: A Philosophical Examination of Globalisation, Terror, and History}: 4-5.
events of that day confirmed their fears about the deficiencies of American policy under the previous administration. The attacks proved that the United States still had enemies that could not be contained or appeased; they had to be destroyed.\textsuperscript{39} They pointed to a systemic intelligence failure on the part of the CIA, FBI and NSA, which did not “connect the dots” and thwart the hijackers.\textsuperscript{40} The Clinton administration’s wavering policies towards the rise of Al Qaeda, in particular, had heightened the group’s aspirations. Years of negligence had blown back upon the United States; now, if ever, was the time to reconsider the way the nation approached matters of foreign affairs.\textsuperscript{41}

In the days and weeks after the attacks, those of a neoconservative outlook within the administration came to offer the most compelling explanation of Al Qaeda’s actions, and the clearest path forward.\textsuperscript{42} President Bush was asking searching questions about the nation’s vulnerabilities.\textsuperscript{43} Neoconservative advisors could point most effectively to the inadequacy of recent anti-terrorism tactics, suggesting to the President that he break with these now-discredited approaches.\textsuperscript{44} Rumsfeld and Cheney believed that the United States had squandered an opportunity to secure its national interests during the 1990’s; their advisors’ views frequently dovetailed with this conclusion.\textsuperscript{45} National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, for her part, became something less of a realist in the months following September 11.\textsuperscript{46}


\textsuperscript{43} Bush, \textit{Decision Points}: 137, 228-9.


\textsuperscript{46} Mann, \textit{Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet}: 315-16. See also Marcus Mabry,
Realist theory traditionally placed states at the centre of international affairs, and thereby played down the dangers posed by terrorist organisations. Yet it was the latter which had caused America great injury. Previously fractious communities of policymakers found unexpected common ground when it came to fighting terrorism. The need for decisive action acquired great significance for the Bush cabinet as a whole.

None of these developments meant, as a number of critics have subsequently claimed, that the Bush administration was “hijacked” by a “neoconservative cabal.”

As was the case prior to the attacks, the prime shapers of foreign policy remained Condoleezza Rice, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell. None of them was a “neoconservative” in the sense defined in earlier chapters. Rather, the interpretation of the attacks offered by neoconservatives at the second and third tier of the administration served to add weight to the emerging post-September 11 stances of the principals. At this crucial juncture, the convergence of views briefly became the norm. Cheney and Rumsfeld could now point out to the President that in a new and unprecedented threat environment, equivocation would only hearten the enemy.
The worst response to the attacks, in their view, would be to follow the path taken by President Clinton in 1998 and 2000. Their associates Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis Libby and Abram Shulsky could act as “force multipliers” of this outlook. Neoconservatives possessed no “secret agenda” for the President. Instead, in the wake of the attacks, they provided timely advice to Bush and their immediate superiors as the White House sought to comprehend what had occurred and chart a route forward.

Policy planners were soon considering the shape of America’s fight against terrorism. In November 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz brought together a group of Republican foreign policy intellectuals to establish a conceptual scheme for the coming battle. Calling themselves “Bletchley II,” after the name “Bletchley” used by the organisation which broke the German secret codes of WWII, this group produced a paper entitled “The Delta of Terrorism.” The Bletchley II study stated that Jihadist terrorism had become a threat comparable to Soviet communism during the Cold War. Poverty was not the prime source of terrorism; rather the culture of Arab authoritarianism fostered this violence. For example, the

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55 If anything, their viewpoint was extremely transparent. Neoconservatives had been publishing their opinions on issues such as Iraq and the need for decisive American leadership for several years prior to September 11. A glance through the pages of the *Weekly Standard*, *Commentary* or *The Wall Street Journal* made clear exactly what these individuals believed and why. See Lynch, "Did Bush Pursue a Neoconservative Foreign Policy?," in ed. Morgan and Davies, 136-7.
59 Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War Part III*: 83-4. See also Cooper, *Neoconservatism and*
Ba’ath Party in Iraq had resorted to employing Jihadist rhetoric in an effort to appeal to young, discontented Sunni Muslims. The rulers of the Palestinian Territories and Libya were pursuing similar rhetorical strategies, as were Wahhabist preachers in the Gulf States. An obvious solution to this dangerous mix of Pan-Arab nationalism and Islamism was to “drain the swamp” by encouraging democracy where there was presently only repression and extremism.  

The “Delta of Terrorism” paper impressed President Bush and his chief advisors. This study eschewed the usual explanations of terrorist activity, which tended to link such violence to economic inequality and long-standing grievances against Israel and the United States. Bush had promised that he would be a “transformational” president; now he could work to improve global security by fighting radicalism. Americans would not accept “business as usual,” such as further “pin-prick” missile strikes and the arrest and trial of a small number of Al Qaeda members. They demanded a wider-ranging, unambiguous strategy. Some of the key normative ingredients of this nascent policy were already in place. Bush had spoken of the universal desire for freedom in his inaugural address in January 2001 and elsewhere prior to September 11. His administration employed several individuals already convinced that democracy promotion was the most effective way to advance American interests and the peace. Experience had shown that the United States could successfully employ its power in pursuit of liberation and the upkeep of human rights. September 11 availed a unique opportunity to redouble America’s commitment to defending these ideals.

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*American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis*: 91-3. Cooper argues that Bernard Lewis played a large part in shaping the neoconservative’s understanding of terrorism and Arab politics.

59 Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War Part III*: 83-4. This strategy was not ‘pre-packaged’ and merely awaiting a moment of crisis, as some observers claim. But it did represent an effective melding of several long-standing neoconservative concerns into a cohesive policy not previously articulated in this manner.


62 See section one of chapter one and section three of chapter five of this thesis.

“Our Mission and Our Moment”

President Bush essentially began the public formulation of his new strategy on the day Al Qaeda struck. Seeking to reassure a fearful and angry nation, Bush declared that from September 11 onwards, “the United States will make no distinction between the terrorists and those who sponsor them.”\(^{64}\) Al Qaeda had attacked the heart of “freedom,” but Americans would not cower to the group’s ideology. While Bush did not use the word “war” in his initial addresses, it was becoming clear that the United States would soon employ force against those responsible for the atrocities.\(^{65}\) As Bush later explained in his memoir, he had discovered the “purpose” of his presidency on that fateful day: to bring the terrorists to justice and promote democratic government.\(^{66}\)

A fuller picture of this strategy emerged two weeks after the attacks. Addressing a special joint session of Congress, President Bush laid out the terms of the “war on terrorism.”\(^{67}\) With a nod back to Ronald Reagan, Bush expressed a posture which equated America with selfless good and the nation’s opponents with abject evil.\(^{68}\) The United States was targeted because of what it believed; not because

\(^{64}\) George W. Bush, “Statement by the President in his Address to the Nation,” (Washington, The White House 11 September 2001). For discussion on the formulation of this statement, see Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*: 170-1.


\(^{66}\) Bush, *Decision Points*: 151.


\(^{68}\) Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." For an appraisal of Bush’s Manichean predilections, see Justin Rex, "The President’s War Agenda: A Rhetorical View," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (2011): 106-7. It could be argued that President Bush’s Manichean view reflected his well-known religious convictions. Certainly, Bush’s speeches contained religious imagery – the “day of fire” comment in the second inaugural address being one of many potential instances of religious overtones in the Bush administration’s public rhetoric. But accurately measuring the degree that Bush’s personal religiosity influenced his foreign policy outlook is an extremely difficult task. An account that focuses on the historical record of debates
of anything it did. Countries with an ambiguous relationship to radicalism now had a decision to make: “you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Those which sided with the terrorists set themselves up as potential targets for intervention. A new war had commenced between “freedom and fear,” and all knew where the latter outlook led: to “history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.” The war on terrorism would begin in Afghanistan, but continue well beyond there. Terrorists and rogue states the world over were now on notice: the United States deemed them the enemies of civilisation. Speaking to all Americans, Bush maintained that through the attacks, “we have found our mission and our moment” early in the new century.

Having detailed the conditions of his emerging doctrine, President Bush spent the next several months elucidating how the United States would win the war. As chapter one made clear, Bush was soon discussing American policy in broadly liberal terms. President Bush explained to Americans how the promotion of democracy would help the United States overcome terrorism. In his 2002 State of the Union Address – often known as the “Axis of Evil” speech – President Bush argued that “all fathers and mothers, in all societies, want their children to be educated, and live free from poverty and violence. No people on Earth yearn to be oppressed, or aspire to among Republican foreign policy strategists over the past two decades has a much firmer empirical foundation.

70 Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.”
71 Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.”
servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.”75 The longing for freedom, Bush reasoned, was something intrinsic to all people.76

In some instances, however, certain groups of people might not be able to realise liberal political freedom alone. Where no democratic alternative could arise indigenously, the United States needed to assist.77 President Bush maintained that his government would “take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values [of freedom] around the world... because we have a greater objective than eliminating threats and containing resentment. We seek a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terror.”78 Proclaiming that “this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty,” President Bush concluded that the United States had been “called to a unique role in human events.”79 As the leading proponent of liberal democracy, the United States has a responsibility to use its influence in the cause of political reform.80

By June 2002, President Bush had introduced a teleological element into the struggle between liberty and terrorism. Only the United States possessed the power and authority to bring history to its liberal conclusion.81 In his West Point speech, Bush insisted “wherever we carry it, the American flag will stand not only for our power, but for freedom. Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favours human liberty.”82 Chapter one previously showed that Bush went on to label America’s liberal ideals the “single surviving model” of political life in the twenty-first

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76 Khan, "Forcing Them to be Free: Bush’s Project for the Muslim World," 1-2.
77 Khan, "Forcing Them to be Free: Bush’s Project for the Muslim World," 7.
78 Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address."
82 Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy."
Without mentioning Fukuyama by name President Bush made it clear that he essentially agreed that, with the collapse of communism, liberal democracy had become the sole regime type towards which all people would invariably aspire. Bush informed his audience that “America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish. We wish for others only what we wish for ourselves – safety from violence, the rewards of liberty, and the hope for a better life.”

President Bush maintained that diplomacy, economic incentives and the expansion of civil society could help to encourage democracy in many areas of the world. When it came to executing the war on terrorism, however, the Bush administration revealed a distinctive vanguardist tendency. Noting that “the United States possesses unprecedented – and unequalled – strength and influence in the world,” the authors of the September 2002 National Security Strategy considered that “this position comes with unparalleled responsibility, obligation and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to create a balance of power that favours freedom.” The National Security Strategy had elsewhere stated that, in light of the threat of terrorism, the United States needed to adopt an anticipatory posture of self-defence. In cases where a tyrant or his extremist allies might potentially harm the democratic world, the United States would have to use force to surmount impending dangers. It was a short step from this claim to the realisation that the expansion of democracy by preventive war could be the nation’s most effective defence against terrorism.

83 Bush, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy.”
85 Bush, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy.”
87 Dunne and Mulaj, "America after Iraq," 1288.
“Post-historic” nations, after all, would not launch wars of aggression or support terrorist groups. As it developed, the Bush Doctrine appeared increasingly reliant on a simplified vision of democratic peace as a conceptual key. The March 2006 National Security Strategy gave much prominence to the idea of democratic peace:

Governments that honour their citizens’ dignity and desire for freedom tend to uphold responsible conduct towards other nations, while governments that brutalise their people also threaten the security and peace of other nations. Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.

The National Security Strategy document asserted that “peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.” The conversion of America’s enemies into democracies would mitigate the danger they currently posed. President Bush posited in a May 2003 speech that “the expansion of liberty throughout the world is the best guarantee of security throughout the world. Freedom is the way to peace.” This claim found strong support from neoconservatives within the administration, and from centre-left foreign policy writers in some of Washington’s leading think tanks. Against the backdrop of national insecurity brought about by September 11, it had become all the more necessary to realise the promise of democratic peace.

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95 George W. Bush, "President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East: Remarks by the President in Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina," (Columbia, South Carolina 9 May 2003).
Contrary to the claims of foreign policy “realists,” the advent of democracy in the Arab Middle East would allegedly work to improve American strategic interests.\(^9\) Dictatorships only contributed to the growth of violence; a Middle East made free through American intervention would reject Jihadism in favour of cooperation with its liberal brethren in the West. Democracies, after all, habitually resolved their differences without reaching for a gun. Condoleezza Rice suggested in a 2008 article assessing the “national interest” during the Bush years that the President had adopted an updated form of “practical idealism.”\(^9\) The United States was clear-headed about its interests and ambitious about how best to achieve them.\(^9\) Elected Arab governments would generally bandwagon behind the United States and act to uphold its oil interests in the Gulf.\(^9\) There would still be political disagreements, to be sure, although these would not rise to the level of “historical” conflict which had defined all previous eras. Fostering democracy through intervention seemed to offer great promise for success in the war on terrorism.\(^1\) Acting with force in pursuit of democracy abroad would also benefit the political “health” of the American republic. The authors of the Bush Doctrine generally accepted the view that an ennobled foreign policy required the backing of a unified and nationalistic population.\(^1\) For some months following September 11, a sentiment of “national greatness” came to pervade America’s public consciousness. In their collective grief, communities rallied together and a spirit of bi-partisanship briefly took hold in Washington. Republican commentators had been calling for

\(^9\) Rice, "Rethinking the National Interest," 25-6.
\(^1\) “The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002,” 15-17. See also Rice, "The Promise of Democratic Peace." Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington: 326-8. Rice’s explicit endorsement of democratic peace indicated just how much the Secretary of State’s views had changed since September 11. Rice the realists might have been sceptical about the claims of democratic peace theory; Rice the ‘American internationalist’ seemed to have embraced them wholeheartedly.
exactly this form of “elevated patriotism” for several years prior.\textsuperscript{102} In a 1997 article, William Kristol and David Brooks expressed concern that, without a compelling reason for international engagement, Americans might soon find comfort in what Theodore Roosevelt had once called a “life of slothful ease.”\textsuperscript{103} During the Clinton years, some Republican leaders started to express “exemplarist” criticisms of America’s actions in foreign countries.\textsuperscript{104} Patrick Buchanan and his supporters articulated a pinched vision of “blood and soil nationalism” that seemed to deny the world-historical character of the “American mission.”\textsuperscript{105}

This attitude could only have a corrosive effect on civic virtue.\textsuperscript{106} A jaded and disengaged population would have little interest in global leadership. Brooks noted that “democracy has a tendency to slide into nihilistic mediocrity if its citizens are not inspired by some larger national goal. If they think of nothing but their narrow self-interest, of their commercial activities, they lose a sense of grand aspiration and noble purpose.”\textsuperscript{107} Censure of American exceptionalism was again becoming the norm in some quarters.\textsuperscript{108} The self-evident truths of the American founding once more came under withering scorn, with a new generation of radical historicist intellectuals redoubling the attack on “traditional” values begun by their forebears.\textsuperscript{109}


\textsuperscript{103} Kristol and Brooks, “What Ails American Conservatism?,” 10.


\textsuperscript{106} Brooks, “A Return to National Greatness: A Manifesto for a Lost Creed.”

\textsuperscript{107} Brooks, “A Return to National Greatness: A Manifesto for a Lost Creed.”

\textsuperscript{108} Brooks, “A Return to National Greatness: A Manifesto for a Lost Creed.”

\textsuperscript{109} Brooks, “A Return to National Greatness: A Manifesto for a Lost Creed.” Brooks had in mind the post-structuralist turn in the humanities, alongside the movements for ‘multiculturalism’ which came to fore in the late 1980’s. Despite the obvious heterogeneity of these groups, Brooks and other neoconservatives lumped them together as a monolithic ‘enemy’ in the ‘culture war’.
In this context, calls for the renewal of national greatness sounded anachronistic, if not potentially insidious.\footnote{Brooks, "A Return to National Greatness: A Manifesto for a Lost Creed."}

In the neoconservative view, Al Qaeda put paid to the historicists’ intellectual malaise. The terrorist group’s assault on the United States restored an ardent sense of purpose across the nation.\footnote{For critical discussion of the ‘9/11 culture’ which emerged in the months after the attack, see Nicolaus Mills, "Run-Up: The Road to Iraq," \textit{Dissent} 56, no. 2 (2009): 16-17.} An outpouring of unity not seen since WWII soon resulted. \textit{Weekly Standard} writer Tod Lindberg opined that America’s reaction to the attacks reinstated a measure of the heroic to civic life.\footnote{Tod Lindberg, "Valor and Victimhood after September 11," in \textit{The Weekly Standard: A Reader}, 1995-2005, ed. William Kristol (New York: Haper Perennial, 2005), 257-68.} In the years shortly before September 11, “American heroes” had come to consist largely of celebrities and corporate elites.\footnote{Tod Lindberg, "Valor and Victimhood after September 11," in ed. Kristol, 267-8.} Heroism, in short, had become another victim of late-modernity. Now heroism meant confronting hijackers on a doomed aircraft, or rescuing strangers from smouldering rubble.\footnote{Tod Lindberg, "Valor and Victimhood after September 11," in ed. Kristol, 268.} In a time of crisis, the true American spirit was again revealed.\footnote{Tod Lindberg, "Valor and Victimhood after September 11," in ed. Kristol, 268.}

Lindberg accepted that the restoration of public heroism carried with it some potentially troubling connotations. Nietzsche had repeatedly called for a reassertion of the heroic in his writings. However, he usually had in mind a much older, aristocratic understanding of the idea.\footnote{Kaufman, \textit{Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist}, Fourth Edition: 307-11. Because he willed a new system of values, Nietzsche’s Overman would be superior to all of his contemporaries. This did not cohere well with liberal democratic thought.} Lindberg for his part acknowledged that “heroism is famously problematic in democratic societies, where egalitarian impulses as well as the bourgeois fear of a violent death drastically circumscribe the desire to, for example, pursue glorious victory on the battlefield and conquer the world.”\footnote{Lindberg, "Valor and Victimhood after September 11," in ed. Kristol, 268.} Indeed, wrote Lindberg, for those thinkers who had reflected on the nature of heroism, “a hero is someone who has proved by his deeds his superiority to others, and this is
obviously problematic to us.” Heroism belonged to a pre-liberal age; today the struggle for greatness had become a decidedly unpopular activity.

Yet September 11, in Lindberg’s view, had confirmed a specifically American variant of heroism which could be at once egalitarian and life-affirming. This was the heroism of acting for the greater good of the nation. As Lindberg claimed, “the vision of a genuinely democratic sort of hero became clear [on] September 11 and after. This kind of heroism has been with us since the nation’s beginning, but it is perhaps easier to see given the volume of it to which we have recently been exposed.” Everyday Americans could be “heroic” by defending their liberal principles. Supporting the President in his quest to spread democracy would show that liberal values could outlast fanaticism by appealing to the desire for freedom common to all peoples.

Here was an alluring new weapon in the “culture war” Republicans had been waging against radical historicists on the left since the 1970’s. An upsurge of single-minded patriotism would at last give lie to the notion of “America the Ugly.” As chapter four showed, Leo Strauss and Irving Kristol believed that the revival of “classically liberal” virtue would help Americans surmount the corrosive philosophies of late-modernity. Brought together by the attacks, Americans could engage in a form of “self-overcoming;” not in pursuit of the transvaluing of all values, but in an effort to reinvigorate their commitment to the ideals which underpinned their nation. After the events of September 11, the time for relativism was over. James Ceaser put it this way: Bush had issued a frontal challenge to Nietzsche and his American students. The German philosopher had questioned all

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120 Victor David Hanson, "What Are We Made Of?,” National Review 11 September 2001. For criticism of Hanson’s position and that of likeminded neoconservative intellectuals, see Montgomery, “Savage Civility: September 11 and the Rhetoric of ‘Civilisation’,” 61.
121 Heilbrunn, They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons: 290-1.
122 See section four of chapter four.
values, while the forty-third President sought to rehabilitate the “politics of good and evil” in public discourse.125

In the view of its supporters, the Bush Doctrine had called Americans to “duty” in two senses. It encouraged Americans to accept an expanded role overseas, and advocated the expression of public patriotism in the cause of national revitalisation. Americans had been brought back to the world.126 Rallying behind a President on a mission to defeat Jihadism, the American people had found that striving sentiment seemingly lost with the closing of the Cold War.127 Out of the trauma of September 11 emerged a focused sense of rage conducive to supporting an expansive program of foreign intervention.128

A New Doctrine for a New Era?
The Bush Doctrine was a cogent, serious attempt to deal with international threats in the post-September 11 world. But did it represent a break from much that had come before, or was it largely consistent with long-standing traditions of American foreign policy? Depending on where one stood, this was a significant question. Establishing the paternity of President Bush’s vision of foreign affairs would help to confer or deny it legitimacy as a grand strategy.129

On this basis, some commentators sought to affirm the Bush Doctrine’s continuity with the past. Robert Kagan proposed that the President’s strategy signified nothing more than the latest expression of America’s founding commitment

128 For critical analysis on the emergence of a new ‘foreign policy consensus’ around this time, see Tucker et al., "One Year On: Power, Purpose and Strategy in American Foreign Policy," 5-6. For a critique of the militaristic nationalism which followed September 11, see Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism: 4. Mills, "Run-Up: The Road to Iraq," 15, 18.
to fight for freedom.\textsuperscript{130} The United States’ reaction to September 11 drew frequently from the posture of “muscular internationalism,” perhaps most associated with Theodore Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{131} Like Roosevelt, Bush articulated a steadfast faith in America’s ability to lead through the demonstration of strength. President Bush and his advisors also recognised that the preservation of peace relied on the spread of the nation’s liberal values.\textsuperscript{132} According to Kagan, the aspirations laid out by President Bush could have been uttered by any number of presidents past; even harking back to Thomas Jefferson in the early nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{133} As such, Bush’s position was America’s natural rejoinder to the attacks of September 11.\textsuperscript{134}

Kagan’s argument generated a series of critical responses. George Packer, for instance, accused Kagan of historical reductivism. Kagan aimed to ground the Bush Doctrine so deeply in “tradition” that to dispute its claims would make one essentially “anti-American.”\textsuperscript{135} Packer accepted that President Bush appealed to a variety of antecedents when making his case for action. Had he not leaned on existing discourses of American exceptionalism, his proposals might have lacked authority. But this did not imply that Bush’s position was contiguous with over two centuries of American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{136} Ronald Steel and David Rieff made similar points. Both

\textsuperscript{130} See Kagan, \textit{Dangerous Nation: America’s Place in the World from its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth Century}: 4-7. For a similar treatment of this topic by a scholar outside of the neoconservative persuasion, see Owens, "The Bush Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of Republican Empire," 24-5, 37-9. For a critique of this view, see Cooper, \textit{Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis}: 52-3.


\textsuperscript{134} Kagan, "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, c. 1776," 23-4. For a convincing counter to this position, which holds that the Bush Doctrine \textit{at once} relied on some existing discourses of exceptionalism while adding its own unique contribution, see Quinn, \textit{US Foreign Policy in Context: National Ideology from the Founders to the Bush Doctrine}: 5.


agreed that the authors of the Bush Doctrine drew on American history to help bolster their position. Bush understood that previous presidents had reacted to crises by affirming the values of American exceptionalism. Rieff, in particular, believed that Bush hewed closely to the ideology of some leading Democratic presidents when framing his doctrine. The President’s embrace of democratic peace theory, and his assertion that the nation’s values and interests could be one, was inconsistent with a “conservative” understanding of foreign relations. If anything, the Bush Doctrine had more in common with centre-left foreign policy thought than conventional Republican Party views.

Since the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine, this contention has proven one of the most divisive. Assessing the documents that together formed the Bush Doctrine, a number of critics quickly appended the label “Wilsonian.” With his frequent paeans to democracy, President Bush’s policies seemed analogous to his predecessor in the Oval Office almost ninety years before. Prominent Wilson scholar, Lloyd Ambrosius, has commented that Wilson and Bush seemed to share a comparable teleological view of modernity.

Wilson, as noted in chapter three, believed democracy the best political order and sought to promote it against the forces of reaction and revolution in Europe. Bush, as noted above, couched America’s war on terrorism in decidedly teleological terms. Perhaps tapping into millennial themes present in American political thought since the time of John

Winthrop, both presidents believed that the United States was a force for historical progress.\textsuperscript{144}

Ambrosius emphasised at this point, however, that the two presidents used different means to encourage history forward.\textsuperscript{145} While it was clear that “Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush appealed to historic American ideals to justify their new policies,” reaching remarkably similar conclusions about the redemptive quality of democracy, too many scholars “have exaggerated historical continuity” between the strategies adopted by each president.\textsuperscript{146} Unlike historians John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Kennedy, two writers who published prominent analyses of the Bush Doctrine upon its release, Ambrosius regarded it too simplistic to label President Bush’s position “Wilsonian.”\textsuperscript{147} The Bush administration’s predilection for pre-emptive war and its proposals for maintaining American hegemony had no precedent in Wilson’s thought.\textsuperscript{148} President Bush might have sounded “Wilsonian” when speaking in the abstract about freedom, but his actions belied much of that ideology.\textsuperscript{149}

Observers of a liberal internationalist disposition took this argument further.\textsuperscript{150} According to John Ikenberry, the Wilsonian outlook was traditionally defined by a commitment to multilateralism, international institutions and collective security.\textsuperscript{151} The Bush Doctrine appeared to downplay the importance of all these notions.\textsuperscript{152} While Ikenberry conceded that “Bush wanted [his policies] to be seen

\textsuperscript{145} Ambrosius, "Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush: Historical Comparison of Ends and Means in their Foreign Policies," 509.
\textsuperscript{146} Ambrosius, "Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush: Historical Comparison of Ends and Means in their Foreign Policies," 509.
\textsuperscript{147} Ambrosius, "Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush: Historical Comparison of Ends and Means in their Foreign Policies," 509. See also Gaddis, \textit{Surprise, Security and the American Experience: 89-90.}
\textsuperscript{148} Ambrosius, "Woodrow Wilson and George W. Bush: Historical Comparison of Ends and Means in their Foreign Policies," 509.
\textsuperscript{149} Leffler, "9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy," 1057-8.
\textsuperscript{150} Ikenberry, "Introduction: Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration and the Future of Liberal Internationalism," in ed. Ikenberry, 10-12.
\textsuperscript{151} Ikenberry, "Introduction: Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration and the Future of Liberal Internationalism," in ed. Ikenberry, 10-12.
\textsuperscript{152} Ikenberry, "Introduction: Woodrow Wilson, the Bush Administration and the Future of Liberal Internationalism," in ed. Ikenberry, 10-12. For critical analysis of this position, see Hancock, "Woodrow Wilson Revisited: Human Rights Discourse in the Foreign Policy of the George W. Bush
ostensibly as part of America’s historic commitment – reaching back to Wilson – to advance the cause of freedom and democracy worldwide,” the President’s advocacy of forcible regime change contravened a major tenet of the Wilsonian view.\textsuperscript{153} Similarly, Thomas Knock contended that Wilson practiced a more circumspect foreign policy than Bush.\textsuperscript{154} While Wilson had pursued regime change in Mexico early in his first term, he quickly became aware of the need for prudence.\textsuperscript{155} Wilson allegedly intervened with reluctance in the Caribbean basin after this time, and usually sought a quick exit.\textsuperscript{156} In practice, concluded Knock, Wilson aimed to promote reform through shrewd negotiation rather than the unilateral exercise of American power.\textsuperscript{157}

A comparison of Wilson and Bush raised interesting academic questions about where to place the latter’s views along a conventional ideological spectrum. It did not, however, address the potentially innovative character of the Bush Doctrine on its own terms. As Tony Smith has advised, “to leave the impression that the Bush Doctrine” was simply a continuation or aberration of Wilsonian thought was “to ignore the dynamic new framework for policy the administration was presenting, an ideology... that must be grasped in its own right.”\textsuperscript{158} Separated by the better part of a century, Wilson and Bush would surely possess divergent views on the best way to


\textsuperscript{156} Knock, ““Playing for a Hundred Years Hence”: Woodrow Wilson’s Internationalism and his Would-be Heirs,” in ed. Ikenberry, 32-4. For a contrasting, and in my view, more accurate account of Wilson’s predilection towards intervention in the western hemisphere, see Quinn, "“The Deal:” The Balance of Power, Military Strength and Liberal Internationalism in the Bush National Security Strategy," 50.

\textsuperscript{157} Knock, ““Playing for a Hundred Years Hence”: Woodrow Wilson’s Internationalism and his Would-be Heirs,” in ed. Ikenberry, 32-4.

\textsuperscript{158} Smith, \textit{A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise}: 50.
realise democracy in other countries. Debate over the Wilsonian foundations of the Bush Doctrine was, in this way, something of an exercise in hair-splitting. In Smith’s view, subsequent presidents would always interpret concepts like “multilateralism” and “democratisation” in their own idiosyncratic manner. These policy options were not the exclusive purview of Wilsonians. It seemed more important to assess the ideas expressed in the Bush Doctrine in the context of their time, rather than scour American history for specific precedents ad infinitum.

Jonathan Monten’s typology of American foreign relations, detailed in chapter three, can here offer the most convincing account on the material and ideational context which helped give rise to the Bush Doctrine. The terrorist attacks of September 11 provided the spark for another “vindicationalist” moment in American foreign relations. Most of the conditions required for foreign policy vindicalionalism appeared again in the decade prior to September 11. Since 1991, the United States had attained unprecedented international influence. The First Gulf War confirmed the centrality of American strength to global security, and the armed forces subsequently became more active than any time during the Cold War. American “soft power” had likewise expanded to the degree that the nation’s popular culture was fast becoming everyone’s culture. In a very real sense, Washington had achieved a degree of Pax Americana with much of the world’s consent.

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Pre-eminence of this nature required an internationalist ideology to match. President Clinton, for his part, could never quite articulate a suitably comprehensive outlook to define the age. The United States was a superpower lacking a new mission. An informal coalition of democratic globalists and liberal hawks believed they could offer it one. These groups articulated a markedly "action-orientated" understanding of America’s purpose during the 1990’s. They maintained that the United States needed to employ its military power to advance political freedom. The existing democratic world stood at the end of history; now was the time to encourage the remaining holdouts over the final obstacles to modernity. By 2001, this attitude had helped to bring about what Smith called an ideological “witch’s brew” especially conducive to justifying armed intervention to establish liberal democracies.

September 11, from this perspective, brought the brew to boil. The combination of American superpowerdom, voluntarist ideology and unexpected circumstances resulted in a strategy with few peers. Understood as such, the Bush Doctrine embodied a decidedly modern response to the crisis of the time. The

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166 Jervis, "Understanding the Bush Doctrine," 381.
170 See section three of chapter five
events of September 11 served as a moment of clarity for American policymakers.\textsuperscript{175} Had Al Qaeda’s planning of the attacks been uncovered and halted in the early stages, American policymakers might not have launched a “war on terrorism.”\textsuperscript{176} Without the input of the democratic globalists in 2001 and 2002, American foreign policy might have continued to lack a consistent “pillar of purpose.”\textsuperscript{177} Without the vast resources of America’s armed forces behind it, the credibility of the Bush administration’s claims to unilateralism might have been more limited.\textsuperscript{178} With the attacks, however, the enunciation of the Bush Doctrine was seen as a reasonable and readily applicable response to insecurity.\textsuperscript{179} Like foreign policy Progressivism a century before it, the Bush Doctrine encapsulated a view distinctively suited to its moment.\textsuperscript{180}

That democratic interventionism emerged as a central element of the Bush Doctrine was hardly surprising in retrospect. The spirit of the 1990’s was one of lofty optimism about democracy’s present expansion and future greatness. “Democratic vanguardism” was increasingly in the air.\textsuperscript{181} Now, in a time of national trauma, a group of policymakers had become determined to put this idea into action. The Bush administration was not unique in issuing a clarion call for democracy; most recent presidents had at least aspired to see the regime type prosper. However, the normative assumptions undergirding Bush’s particular foreign policy outlook had been greatly strengthened by the findings of liberal international relations theory in

\textsuperscript{175} Mills, "Run-Up: The Road to Iraq," 16-17. Nuruzzaman, "Beyond the Realist Theories: “Neo-Conservative Realism” and the American Invasion of Iraq," 250.
\textsuperscript{176} In 1995, intelligence agencies stopped a nascent Al Qaeda plot to destroy ten aircraft over the Pacific Ocean; the revelation that Al Qaeda had commenced planning for such an ambitious operation did not cause any marked change in American foreign policy at the time. It is conceivable that had the planning for September 11 been intercepted early on (say 1999), the response would have been quite different to that adopted in late 2001.
\textsuperscript{177} Smith, A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise: 11-14.
\textsuperscript{180} Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy," 143-4. For a countervailing view, which argues that the Bush Doctrine was not a suitable response to terrorism in an increasingly globalised security environment, see Patman, "Globalisation, the New US Exceptionalism and the War on Terror," 963-4.
\textsuperscript{181} See Hawthorn, "Liberalism since the Cold War: An Enemy to Itself?," 146-8.
post-Cold War form. Empirical studies conducted by the nation’s leading international relations specialists had proven that encouraging democracy would be America’s most effective national security policy in the twenty-first century.

The Bush Doctrine thus embodied a signal departure from most previous declarations of American intention. Monten noted that “where the Bush Doctrine… diverge[d] from tradition… is in the particular vehemence with which it adhere[d] to a vindicationist framework for democracy promotion, in which the aggressive use of U.S. power is employed as the primary instrument of liberal change.”

Roosevelt, Wilson and Reagan might have privately hoped to use America’s power to foster liberty the world over. For Bush and his administration, this was no mere desire. Having suffered an attack on the continental United States, members of the Bush administration surmised that to secure the homeland they needed to redouble the fight for democracy overseas. With its professed aim of “ending tyranny” everywhere, and significant means to work towards this goal, the Bush Doctrine stood virtually alone in the history of American foreign relations.

Towards Regime Change

As with “vindicationalist” moments past, the unveiling of the Bush Doctrine presaged an increased willingness to engage in military action for high-minded goals. The authors of the Bush Doctrine claimed that in the post-September 11 world the greatest threat to the peace lay at the intersection of radicalism and rogue nations. The leaders of rogue states could not be made to alter their behaviour through negotiation. By dint of being authoritarian, they remained a menace to American

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182 See section three of chapter five.
185 For useful discussion of this claim, see Logevall and Osgood, "The Ghosts of Munich: America’s Appeasement Complex," 24-5. The role Détente played in laying the ground for the end of the Cold War raises important questions about the veracity of this assumption. It is not surprising that the most vocal neoconservative opponents of Détente have attempted to maintain their cognitive consistency over the ineffectiveness of negotiating with America’s enemies; to change their tune now would suggest that they might have been mistaken all along.
security. However, there was one lasting solution to this impasse: the forcible transformation of such dictatorships into democracies. In practice, “democratic vanguardism” necessitated the use of bombs and bullets to enable ballots.

In the post-Cold War world, one dictatorial government caused trouble like no other: Iraq under Saddam Hussein. The Ba’athist ruler in Baghdad had been a thorn in the side of American foreign policy since the end of the Gulf War in 1991. Saddam Hussein repeatedly defied the United Nations sanction regime; exporting oil on the black market and importing technology potentially destined for a reconstituted weapons program. His army violated the no-fly zones established in 1991, and sought to provoke crises with allied nations enforcing these provisions. Conditions within Iraq, meanwhile, were grim. Saddam had retained his hold on power through ethnic cleansing and state terror. His government had become increasingly nepotistic and unpredictable. Iraq was the poster child of rogue nations.

In this context, leading figures in the Bush administration believed they had inherited a faltering Iraq policy. By 2001, Saddam actively sought to end the UN sanctions and re-establish trade links with Europe and Russia. Donald Rumsfeld recounted in Known and Unknown that he and his staff periodically tabled proposals to revamp administration strategy towards Iraq. A National Security Council meeting in July 2001 discussed the concerns Pentagon officials had about this country. In Rumsfeld’s view, however, little of substance came from these

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190 Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir: 368-70. See also Clarke, "The Diplomacy that led to War in Iraq," in ed. Cornish, 30-1.
193 Rumsfeld, "To Condoleezza Rice, RE: Iraq."
Despite the presence in government of several figures that had previously advanced a proactive stance towards Iraq, President Bush and his senior advisors initially gave little serious thought to toppling Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{195} The events of September 11 initiated a marked re-think of this position. The attacks heightened as never before the administration’s global threat perception. Once manageable problems quickly acquired a greater sense of urgency.\textsuperscript{196} President Bush ordered administration principals to revisit assumptions made about the dangers posed by rogue states.\textsuperscript{197} This matter came to light in a National Security Council meeting at Camp David on 15 September 2001.\textsuperscript{198} Richard Clarke, Bush’s first director of counter-terrorism, claimed in his book Against All Enemies that Rumsfeld and his Pentagon deputies pushed for a strike against Iraq as part of America’s initial response to September 11.\textsuperscript{199} In his 2004 work, Plan of Attack, Bob Woodward similarly held that the Pentagon’s civilian leadership had repeatedly emphasised the need to confront Iraq. Colin Powell and his State Department aides, Woodward noted, had not expected to discuss this prospect at a meeting principally focused on Al Qaeda and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{200} 

Memoirs recently published by administration officials paint a more nuanced picture of deliberations. They stress that, while the issue of Iraq was indeed viewed under a different light soon after September 11, talk of action against the nation remained vague at this time.\textsuperscript{201} Bush has commented in Decision Points that “at one

\textsuperscript{201} See Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir: 359-60. Rex, "The President’s War Agenda: A Rhetorical View," 107-8.
point [in the 15 September meeting] Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz suggested that we consider confronting Iraq as well as the Taliban.”202 Bush acknowledged Wolfowitz’s concerns about Saddam Hussein’s past links to terrorism, and agreed in general that a change of government would likely improve security in the Gulf. Rumsfeld, Bush recalled, added that “dealing with Iraq would show a major commitment to anti-terrorism.”203 Other officials in the meeting were not so sure. Colin Powell, for one, pointed out that “going after Iraq now would be viewed as a bait and switch... we would lose the UN, the Islamic countries, and NATO. If we want to do Iraq, we should do it at a time of our choosing. But we should not do it now.”204 Douglas Feith’s memoir, War and Decision, Rice’s No Higher Honor, Rumsfeld’s Known and Unknown and Cheney’s In My Time have offered a similar narrative.205 While the issue of Iraq entered the debate, few at the meeting dwelt on the question for long.

This initial debate had, however, planted a seed. On 29 September 2001, President Bush asked Rumsfeld’s department to review the “off the shelf” contingency plan for Iraq.206 The results were not heartening. Any intervention would essentially constitute a re-run of the First Gulf War, requiring several hundred thousand troops for what would likely be a lengthy military operation.207 Bush advised Rumsfeld to “be creative” with his updated strategy; going so far as to take the secretary aside following a November 2001 meeting to ask in private about progress on this issue.208 President Bush, so it appeared, had started to develop an interest in establishing a connection between Iraq and his newly-launched “war on

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203 Bush, Decision Points: 188-90. Rumsfeld noted in his memoir that he found Wolfowitz’s proposal interesting, but ultimately agreed with the President that for the time being, America needed to focus its attention on Afghanistan. See Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir: 359-60.
204 Bush, Decision Points: 190. See also DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell: 348-9.
terrorism.” As his public addresses cited above indicated, the President understood from the outset that this conflict would involve something more than limited military action against a stateless enemy.

John Lewis Gaddis has suggested that, towards the end of 2001, the Bush administration’s perception of the Iraq problem changed once more. The United States scored a rapid and impressive victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan. In a matter of months, the mullahs were on the run and the country began to construct a democratic government. Neoconservatives inside and outside of the Bush administration had long claimed that the decisive use of American firepower could bring about regime change in the most unlikely of nations. Events in Afghanistan, in their view, proved the validity of this assumption. In addition, Rumsfeld’s “revolution in military affairs” had enhanced the reach and lethality of the armed forces. After a somewhat shaky start, President Bush and his war cabinet had achieved an important victory against Jihadism. The “lessons” of the Afghan war had applicability to future theatres in the war on terrorism. Philip Zelikow, formerly an aide to Condoleezza Rice, has reflected on the Bush administration’s growing sense of confidence at this moment: “it was quite a combination, the wartime atmosphere of decisiveness and initial success against an evanescent and potentially catastrophic threat. It was a potent compound of anxiety mixed with a measure of growing hubris.” Perhaps “Phase Two” of the conflict would involve intervention against more entrenched regimes after all.

The example of Afghanistan also reinforced for Bush and likeminded advisors another important point: authoritarian regimes were serial abusers of their

212 Gaddis, "Ending Tyranny: The Past and Future of an Idea".
citizens’ human rights. The Taliban had imposed a brutal vision of Wahabbi Islam across Afghanistan; small wonder they supported the killing of Americans by fellow extremists. As the Bush administration brought public attention to the issue of Iraq, the President repeatedly highlighted the analogous (albeit secular-minded) depredations of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In his January 2003 State of the Union Address, Bush made clear his disgust of Saddam’s brutality:

> Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained – by torturing children while their parents are made to watch. International human rights groups have catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock, burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills, cutting out tongues, and rape. If Saddam’s government did not represent the face of evil, Bush intoned, “then evil has no meaning.” The 2002 National Security Strategy had made numerous references to the importance of upholding human rights the world over. Americans, more than most, subscribed to the belief that there were certain inalienable rights to personal liberty which no ruler could take away. And yet here was a clear case of systematic abuse which President Bush believed ought to shock the conscience of free people everywhere. Something had to be done to end the terror the Iraqi people faced every day.

To make matters worse, the Iraqi government had also encouraged terror outside of its borders. Saddam Hussein had previously used chemical weapons in his war with Iran during the 1980’s. Intelligence estimates supposedly implied that, if Saddam were left unchecked, he would soon seek to turn this wrath against the

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220 Bush, "President Delivers “State of the Union”.” See also Bush, Decision Points: 248.
United States. Iraq likewise played host to a range of organisations designated as terrorist groups by the American government. Indeed, President Bush claimed he had seen evidence that leading Al Qaeda operatives were given refuge by Saddam Hussein following the fall of the Taliban. Saddam aimed, perhaps, to utilise these terrorist proxies to strike America or close allies such as Israel. Invoking the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence, Condoleezza Rice grimly warned that if the United States failed to take action the “smoking gun” would soon come in the form of nothing less than a “mushroom cloud.”

Given the magnitude of the threat America now ostensibly faced, the Bush administration gave increasing weight to the idea of forcibly converting Iraq into a democracy. Bush commented in a February 2003 speech to the American Enterprise Institute that “the current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom… by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions.” Democratic countries did not abuse their own people or fund terrorists. Moreover, democratic statesmen did not pursue WMDs for offensive purposes. They generally

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225 Bush, "President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat: Remarks by the President on Iraq." Realist scholars again emerged as the strongest critics of this view. They contended that a dictator as intent on maintaining power as Saddam Hussein would be unlikely to pass WMD technology to terrorist groups over which he had little control. See Schmidt and Williams, "The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists," 207-8.

226 Wolf Blitzer, "Interview with Condoleezza Rice," (CNN Late Edition 8 September 2002).


228 Bush, "President Discusses the Future of Iraq." For discussion of President Bush’s claims about regime change in the months leading up to war, see Clarke, "The Diplomacy that led to War in Iraq," in ed. Cornish, 36.
subscribed to international treaties prohibiting the possession of certain munitions.\textsuperscript{229} The source of the present threat did not lie in Iraq’s grievances against fellow Arab nations or the United States. It existed because of the very nature of Saddam’s tyrannical rule.\textsuperscript{230}

Leading figures in the Bush administration maintained that ending Saddam Hussein’s reign and establishing democracy in Baghdad would also provide inspiration to reformers across the region. Critics soon referred to this idea as the “democratic domino effect.”\textsuperscript{231} President Bush informed Americans that democracy in Iraq would “light the way for others, and help transform a troubled part of the world.”\textsuperscript{232} Indeed, “the victory of freedom in Iraq” would cause a wave of democratic change to sweep the Middle East.\textsuperscript{233} Countries adjacent to Iraq would face public pressure to reform; liberal political freedom would soon become contagious. Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz reiterated the President’s claim on this score, with the latter arguing that “success in Iraq would demoralize those who preach doctrines of hatred and oppression and subjugation. It would encourage those who dream the ancient dream, the ageless desire for freedom.”\textsuperscript{234} Comparable to Eastern Europe in 1989, the demise of autocracy would bring about a new dawn for the Arab people.\textsuperscript{235}

Viewed in this light, a strategy centred upon democratic vanguardism had considerable merit. Returning to the definition developed in chapter one, democratic vanguardism embodied the notion that, cognizant of the ultimate purpose of progress,

\textsuperscript{229} Bush, "President Discusses the Future of Iraq." Bush, "President Sworn in to Second Term." This conclusion clearly recalled Feinstein and Slaughter’s claim, examined in chapter five, that only democratic countries could be trusted to possess weapons of mass destruction.
\textsuperscript{231} Greg Miller, "Democracy Domino Theory “Not Credible”", \textit{Los Angeles Times} 14 March 2003.
\textsuperscript{230} For critical appraisals of this claim, see Falk, "1989 and Post-Cold War Policymaking: Were the “Wrong” Lessons Learned from the Fall of Communism?," 300. Whitehead, "Losing ‘the Force’? The ‘Dark Side’ of Democratization after Iraq," 230-1.
a self-appointed state agent could forcibly accelerate the emergence of liberal democratic norms and institutions in a foreign country. The Bush administration framed the 2003 invasion of Iraq largely within this discursive scheme. Iraq, some administration officials intimated, was a “historical” state which endangered the peace in the “post-historical” world.\footnote{Smith, \textit{A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise}: 92-6. Packer, \textit{The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq}: 56-8.} “Ending history” in Baghdad would resolve this persistent problem once and for all.\footnote{Smith, \textit{A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise}: 95-6. For a slightly different take on this issue, see Haass, \textit{War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars}: 234-5.} Hastening the arrival of elected government would clear away the political malaise conducive to terrorism, and bring to a close Iraq’s hostility towards American allies and interests.\footnote{Clarke, “The Diplomacy that led to War in Iraq,” in ed. Cornish, 36. Miller, “Explaining Changes in U.S. Grand Strategy: 9/11, the Rise of Offensive Liberalism, and the War in Iraq,” 49-50, 54-5.}

It seems that Ken Jowitt, Francis Fukuyama and John Lewis Gaddis made a valid point: the so-called “Leninist” approach to managing history had returned in the form of democratic regime change. From 1993 to 2000 the Clinton administration possessed the ability to shape the Middle Eastern political environment through the use of American hard power. It usually chose to let the forces of economic and technological globalisation work their way through the Arab region. The United States reaped the tragic consequences of this passive approach on September 11.\footnote{See Jowitt, "Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change: The Urge to Speed History Along". Gaddis, \textit{Surprise, Security and the American Experience}: 76-7, 90-1.} Rejecting what Gaddis has called the “Menshevik” attitude towards progress, members of the Bush administration insisted after September 11 that they would act presently in the cause of political modernity as well.\footnote{See Gaddis, "Ending Tyranny: The Past and Future of an Idea". Gaddis, \textit{Surprise, Security and the American Experience}: 90-1.} The achievement of liberal democracy under American sponsorship had delivered great dividends in other parts of the world. The same would hold true if the United States employed its considerable influence in the cause of elected government among Arab countries.\footnote{Bush, "President Discusses the Future of Iraq." For critical discussion of this claim, see Heinze, "The New Utopianism: Liberalism, American Foreign Policy, and the War in Iraq," 118-19.}

The future belonged to democracy; why wait for the forces of history to align perfectly in the Arab world before making a move?

Publicly, the Bush administration continued to insist that war could be avoided if Saddam Hussein agreed to American demands. But with the deployment of over two hundred and fifty thousand troops to the Gulf, the march to regime change had started to acquire its own momentum.\(^{242}\) Bush and his administration had repeatedly emphasised the need to liberate Iraq’s people from Saddam repression and thereby offer hope to an Arab political culture crying out for change. To step back from the brink at this point might have brought into question the assumptions on which the Bush Doctrine was based. While critics still debate exactly when the President made the final decision to invade, events ultimately came to a head in mid-March 2003.\(^{243}\) Presented with an apparent opportunity to assassinate Saddam Hussein and his top generals at Dora Farms, south of Baghdad, President Bush ordered an air-strike early on the morning of 20 March.\(^{244}\) Operation Iraqi Freedom had begun.

**Conclusion**

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the American nation and the President. The loss of so many civilian lives demanded explanation and a clear-eyed response. It was precisely here that the democratic globalists triumphed. Members of this group appointed to the Bush administration provided the most compelling account of the roots of Jihadist terrorism, and argued that the best method for defeating the ideology lay in the spread of democracy.

The “war on terrorism” quickly found resonance in American nationalist discourse. The authors of the Bush Doctrine deftly linked their struggle against Jihadist violence to formative wars in recent American history; most notably to


WWII and the Cold War. President Bush was soon voicing a range of familiar exceptionalist sentiments. The United States was a virtuous nation; those who would cause it harm were evil, and on the wrong side of history. Neoconservatives generally maintained that the “long war” against Jihadism would require unity, discipline and sacrifice from American citizens. Some neoconservatives also believed that through the struggle for freedom abroad the American “culture war” would wind down. Fighting against tyranny would remind Americans of the precious nature of freedom and sideline those who questioned the nation’s ideals.

Globalist neoconservatives convinced their peers that rogue regimes aligned with terrorists were a unique threat to international security. Through the prism of September 11, the intentions of rogue governments appeared all the more ominous. In this context, the problem of Iraq demanded resolution. The democratisation of the country was deemed central to winning the war on terrorism in the Arab world. A “post-historic” Iraq would advance peace and American interests in this most vital of regions. By early 2003, intervention in Iraq had apparently become a necessity. The perfect storm now unleashed a thunderous downpour.
On the final page of *The End of History and the Last Man*, Francis Fukuyama invoked the image of a wagon train progressing westward across the prairie, to signify the progress of states in history.¹ Some of Fukuyama’s wagons were sluggish, some had stopped, and others followed dead-end roads. Yet there remained a number who were about to conquer the final mountain pass and reach their destination.² A decade after Fukuyama penned his book’s closing lines, the administration of President George W. Bush decided that the United States could force the lagging wagons to shortcut their arduous journey. The post-September 11 era demanded action and leadership on the part of Washington. If the spread of liberal democracy offered the prospect of peace and lasting security, why should the world’s only superpower sit idly by? Hastening the advent of history’s end would have salutary effects for the United States and the world at large. It would provide a renewed sense of purpose to a previously wavering superpower and a seemingly detached public. It would likewise help to undermine terror and tyranny wherever they stood opposed to the growth of global freedom.

Previous studies have not dealt more thoroughly with this approach to foreign affairs – which I have called democratic vanguardism – principally because of their brevity. For reasons of space, reader interest or subject expertise, analysis of democratic vanguardism has generally been perfunctory. This thesis has attempted to address this oversight. It has aimed to enrich our understanding of democracy

promotion and the Bush Doctrine by engaging in an extended analysis of theoretical disputes, intellectual persuasions and interventionist policies contiguous to the claims put forward by President Bush and his administration. Consciously or otherwise, the authors of the Bush Doctrine contributed to debates over the purpose of history, the character of liberal modernity and the role of the United States as a proponent of democracy. But the Bush Doctrine was also a foreign policy strategy of a very particular time and place. Only in the context of the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, do the terms of the Bush Doctrine become fully comprehensible. The speeches and policy papers that comprised the Bush Doctrine laid out an “ideational framework” which provided a consistent rationale regarding the use of force for liberal purposes. Intervention in the cause of democracy might have once been considered primarily a moral undertaking; after September 11 it was clear to the Bush administration that America’s national security relied on democracy’s success.

Since the unveiling of the Bush Doctrine, many critics have come to argue that its vision of democracy promotion contained serious shortcomings. At first glance, adopting a posture of democratic vanguardism might have appeared a compelling response to America’s post-September 11 security dilemma. However, far from providing the key to fighting and winning the war on terrorism, the strategy of democratic vanguardism proved troubled in both inception and application. The arrival of democracy in Iraq was supposed to trigger an upsurge of reform that would bring the Middle Eastern wagons over the final pass to modernity. Instead, most of the wagons persisted in their stubborn ways for the rest of President Bush’s term, and the mountain range often remained daunting to cross.3

Proponents of democratic vanguardism cited in this thesis regularly proclaimed the efficacy of an “activist” strategy for achieving representative government. The United States, so the argument went, could ill-afford to let history unfold on its own. In the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, one of the more prominent critics of this claim was none other than Francis Fukuyama. Reflecting on American involvement in Iraq, Fukuyama belatedly challenged much of the neoconservative

view on armed regime change. In After the Neocons, Fukuyama argued that many
democratic globalists had considered that with suitable pressure and incentives,
democracy could be made to emerge practically anywhere.⁴ Fukuyama suggested that
the authors of the Bush Doctrine wished to anoint the United States as the guarantor
of elected government. America now claimed the right to act as the sole guide
through whom all people would ultimately accept liberal values.⁵

This position signified for Fukuyama an affront to the “Hegelian-Marxist”
process of modernisation originally detailed in the End of History.⁶ Democracy, from
Fukuyama’s perspective, was something immanent in history and not easily brought
into being by the will of a great power alone. As Fukuyama viewed it:

One can argue that there is a universal human desire to be free of
tyrranny and a universalism to the appeal of life in a prosperous
liberal society. The problem is one of the time frame involved. It is
one thing to say that there is a broad, centuries-long trend towards
the spread of democracy – something I myself have strongly argued
in the past – and another to say that either democracy or prosperity
can emerge in a given society at a given time.⁷

Fukuyama reiterated that The End of History had proposed a view of historical
progress based upon “weak determinism.”⁸ Certain material factors – such as free
trade and the “mechanism of science” – enhanced the likelihood of democratic
breakthroughs.⁹ First-age neoconservative proponents of “modernisation theory”
such as Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset had stressed the importance of
gradualism in their studies. Societies would evolve towards modernity at markedly
different paces; it was best to let this process follow a natural course.¹⁰ Fukuyama,
for his part, considered that international political actors had a place in helping to

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⁴ Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads: 54-5. Francis Fukuyama, "After
⁵ Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads: 54-5. Fukuyama, State-Building:
⁶ Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads: 54-5.
⁷ Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads: 116.
⁸ Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man: 354.
⁹ Fukuyama, "Reflections on the End of History, Five Years Later," 32. Fukuyama, The Origins of
improve the prospects of budding democracies.\textsuperscript{11} Financial or technical assistance could be offered to those nations struggling to establish viable liberal institutions. But acting to accelerate the unfolding of history in the manner proposed by the Bush Doctrine required a degree of “Solomonic wisdom” which Fukuyama doubted public officials possessed.\textsuperscript{12}

In the course of making this argument, Fukuyama concluded that the idea of establishing democracy through force in a country like Iraq was indeed an updated form of “social engineering.”\textsuperscript{13} Fukuyama held that the reservations once expressed in the \textit{Public Interest} about the unforeseen effects of heavy-handed federal involvement in domestic social issues “should have induced caution” among the democratic globalists.\textsuperscript{14} In a 2005 symposium published in \textit{Commentary}, Fukuyama wrote that

> Even if one accepted the view that the Middle East needed to be “fixed,” it was hard to understand what made us think that we were capable of fixing it. So much of what neoconservatives have written over the past decades has concerned the unanticipated consequences of overly ambitious social engineering, and how the effort to get at root causes of social problems is a feckless task. If this has been true of efforts to combat crime or poverty in U.S. cities, why should anyone have believed we could get at the root causes of alienation and terrorism in a part of the world that we didn’t understand particularly well, and where our policy instruments were very limited?\textsuperscript{15}

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\textsuperscript{11} Fukuyama, "Westernisation vs. Modernisation," 84-6.
\textsuperscript{13} Fukuyama, \textit{After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads}: 86. If this was indeed social engineering, it was of a \textit{neo-liberal} variety. One of the underlying assumptions made in the Bush Doctrine was that democracy was the default condition of society. Top-down American intervention (to remove dictators) and bottom-up demands for freedom would neatly coincide and produce a functioning democracy. John Lewis Gaddis has referred to this idea as ‘free-market thinking applied to politics’ – remove the barriers to freedom, and the best ideology (democracy) will win out. This idea seemed to have informed the Bush administration’s policy of ‘nation-building lite’ in Iraq. But as the first generation of neoconservatives remind us, attempts to forcibly engineer wide-ranging political and social change usually have unexpected – and often tragic – results.
\textsuperscript{14} Fukuyama, \textit{After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads}: 86.
Had globalists acquainted themselves more fully with the writing of their forebears, the insight they gained might have given pause to “expectations for the kind of political transformation that would be possible in the Middle East, by, for example, promoting democracy.”  

Intervention for idealistic reasons, first-age neoconservatives long ago surmised, often had deleterious outcomes for all involved. The original band of neoconservatives had criticised the “new class” precisely because of its excessive faith in the ability of social scientific theory to change the world. Those associated with the “third age” of neoconservatism, by contrast, embraced the alleged panacea of democratic peace as a guideline for policymaking.

Fukuyama continued by arguing that many of his former peers had drawn the wrong “lessons” about America’s world-historical role from the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. Fukuyama proposed in *After the Neocons* that “the rapid, unexpected and largely peaceful collapse of communism validated the concept of regime change as an approach to international relations.” Globalists reasoned that if democracy could arise in Moscow or Warsaw, why not also in Belgrade, or even Baghdad. Yet in Fukuyama’s view “this extraordinary validation” of the Reaganite position actually “laid the groundwork for the wrong turn taken by many neoconservatives in the decade following that has had direct consequences for their management of post-September 11 foreign policy.” According to Fukuyama, William Kristol, Robert Kagan and their colleagues believed that the end of communism demonstrated the centrality of the United States as the instigator of enduring political change abroad. As such, this “belief in the possibility of linking power and morality was transformed into a tremendous overemphasis on the role of

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17 See section three of chapter four in this thesis.  
power, specifically military power, as a means of achieving American national purposes.\textsuperscript{22}

Fukuyama’s critique of democratic globalism struck a chord with many observers of American foreign policy. He purportedly became a voice of reason among a cacophony of polemic over the war in Iraq.\textsuperscript{23} But through it all, he never satisfactorily addressed how \textit{The End of History and the Last Man} itself may have helped to encourage a “vanguardist” attitude towards democracy promotion.\textsuperscript{24} Fukuyama repeatedly pointed out in his 1992 book that the ineluctable growth of democracy would bring about peace and fulfilment. In several decades time, all of humanity might arrive at the conclusion of its lengthy struggle for freedom. However, if democracy was the best answer to the world’s problems, powerful liberal nations surely had an obligation to advance its reach today.\textsuperscript{25}

Democratic globalists often regarded it as derisory to continue engaging in abstract theoretical study about how history might end. Rather, the United States had to seize the day and make it happen.\textsuperscript{26} Fukuyama had unintentionally provided rigor to this mind-set.\textsuperscript{27} His effusive appraisal of the concord that would likely result from democracy’s continued growth resonated among a number of American policymakers flush with confidence after their nations’ victory in the Cold War.\textsuperscript{28} Barry Gewen has noted in an article assessing democratic globalism that

\begin{quote}
There was one misinterpretation of his book for whom Fukuyama had no one to blame but himself. Those not steeped in German philosophy as he was, those of more activist bent, were unlikely to
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[22] Fukuyama, \textit{After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads}: 63. For further analysis of this point, see Robert D. English, "Lessons from the Bloc," \textit{The National Interest}, no. 91 (2007): 81.
\item[26] Cooper, \textit{Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis}: 89-90.
\end{footnotes}
share his timeless perspective. They wanted immediate answers to contemporary problems, and Fukuyama’s book seemed to provide them. Didn’t he say that liberal democracy was expanding everywhere around the world? Didn’t he say that the principles of liberty and equality were intrinsic to the very nature of man? Didn’t he say that liberal democracies rarely if ever went to war against one another, and that democracies had an interest in spreading their values to less-enlightened regions? It was not an unreasonable reading of the book to conclude that the road to history’s end ran through Baghdad.29

Fukuyama’s work implied that the present advance of democracy was not fortuitous, but essentially predictable. Such a claim offered support to attempts at securing an international democratic community.30 Fukuyama’s 1992 book, in the view of historian Timothy Fuller, implied that “American foreign policy should be completed by articulating a specific ethico-theological standpoint and America’s role in the world must have world-historical significance.”31 Indeed, “we cannot grasp fully and explicitly the issue posed by Fukuyama’s thesis unless we see it as a philosophy of history that attempts to be a civil theology” for policymaking.32 Fukuyama had promulgated what Strauss and first age neoconservatives had long warned against: a sweeping political theory with obvious prescriptive implications for action. Given the triumphalist international context in which it was published, it should have come as less of a surprise to Fukuyama that his philosophical musings soon became a call to arms.

With Fukuyama’s End of History in hand, a range of globalist thinkers often maintained that, when permitted to choose, all people would embrace democracy.33

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31 Fuller, "The End of Socialism’s Historical Theology and Its Rebirth in Fukuyama’s Thesis," in ed. Burns, 55.
32 Fuller, "The End of Socialism’s Historical Theology and Its Rebirth in Fukuyama’s Thesis," in ed. Burns, 55.
The collapse of communism and the “third wave” of democratisation had apparently shown that representative government was the default condition of every society. Yet as Edward Rhodes has explained, accepting the philosophy of liberal democracy and the institutions that came with it was “in the final analysis an internal matter within each individual and society.”

The adoption of liberal ideas “happens – or fails to happen – not because a hegemon wills it, but because of organic developments within human consciousness and societal operations, developments that render liberalism’s assumptions plausible and give evidence that its norms will yield the benefits claimed.”

Those advocating the forcible spread of democracy did not seem fully cognizant of the “possibility that humans can be moved by anger, vengeance or pique, and that they are susceptible to demagoguery. In other words, [they] fail[ed] to recognise that the threat to liberal values and liberal institutions lays within as well as outside of us.”

Some societies might decide to forsake their approved political destiny and opt for an alternative path.

For Rhodes, promoting democracy by vanguardist means was oxymoronic in character. Forcing others to be free stood contrary to the principles of self-determination intervening liberal states sought to instil. Indeed, there was little “democratic” – in the participatory sense of the term – about a self-appointed few deciding for the majority in another land what was allegedly in their best interest. Rhodes commented in this vein that the proponents of the Bush Doctrine assumed that newly-liberated people were “free to choose, but only to choose liberalism.”

In Rhodes’ view, however, this was “no choice... whatsoever,” because it failed to acknowledge the potential that a polity might rationally adopt another values

[34] Rhodes, "The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda," 141-2.
system.\textsuperscript{40} As such, Rhodes contended that “by denying the possibility that tastes (or even nutritional needs) may vary across societies, or seasons, or ages of life, crusading liberals blind themselves to the possibility that a menu that offers global diners a single choice is a dictation, not a liberation.”\textsuperscript{41} Concepts such as freedom and democracy could have very different meanings for each society.\textsuperscript{42} To assume otherwise revealed a strong form of ethno-centrism – if not a degree of solipsism – over the innate appeal of America’s particular interpretation of “liberal values.”\textsuperscript{43}

In truth, it seemed quite possible that the United States’ vision of liberal democracy might not represent the “single surviving model” of political order in the twenty-first century. Critics of the Bush Doctrine have noted that it was only in the last 150 years that democratic government became accepted as a suitable regime type for those seeking to modernise.\textsuperscript{44} Christopher Hobson maintained that, up until the second half of the nineteenth century, many intellectuals in western nations believed democracy was anathema to good order.\textsuperscript{45} Democracy meant rule of the masses, or the tyranny of the majority. Democracy only became synonymous with modernity once liberal-minded states acquired hegemonic influence. Rather than viewing democracy as the apogee of political evolution, Hobson called for its “radical historicisation” in international relations scholarship.\textsuperscript{46} Democracy, like any other

\textsuperscript{40} Rhodes, “The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda,” 144-5.
\textsuperscript{41} Rhodes, “The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda,” 144-5. For more on the so-called ‘dictatorial’ character of forcing others into freedom, see Neocleous, “The Police of Civilisation: The War on Terror as a Civilising Offensive,” 155.
\textsuperscript{42} Khan, “Forcing Them to be Free: Bush’s Project for the Muslim World,” 4.
political system, needed to be understood first and foremost as a product of its time and place. It was not an ahistorical values system, ubiquitous to all. Following the collapse of communism, the idea of democracy was reified to the extent that it was considered the one natural political order in the world. But as Ken Jowitt wrote in his 2009 article on the Bush Doctrine, “liberal capitalist democracy is a partisan phenomenon; it addresses and emphasizes only part of the human condition. Far from being universally shared, Western liberalism should be considered an (invaluable) historical anomaly.”

Having existed in its present form for less than two centuries, it remains open to debate whether representative democracy really is the only viable way left to organise a society.

Political developments in Iraq and its neighbours from 2003 to 2008 appeared to give this proposition form. The rise of liberal democracy faced significant challenges from sectarianism and intra-state violence. The military component of regime change in Iraq was a notable success; the Baa’thist government was decisively defeated in a matter of three weeks. But with the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship, anarchy soon prevailed. Faced with an upsurge of violence, many Iraqis sought security with their tribal kin. Adeed Dawisha has suggested that, beginning in 2003, Iraq’s “ethnosectarian identities were reified into fixed political cleavages. Particularistic identities were fused into the concept of parties, so that national issues were now viewed from an ethnosectarian perspective, and sub-

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Tripathy, "Democracy and its Others," 254-5. Neoconservatives and Straussians, naturally, would balk at this proposition. But it seems essential that we avoid making democracy an ahistorical phenomenon. Democratic norms and institutions clearly emerged in a specific time and place; that they have become a predominant way to organise society today does not mean that their underlying values are timeless. For an effective critique of the manner in which neoconservatives and Straussians alike have wielded the idea of ‘timeless values’ as a tool of rhetorical coercion against those who disagree with their outlook, see Gottfried, Conservatism in America: Making Sense of the American Right: 26-7.


Jowitt, "Setting History’s Course".


national concerns would generally define national policy.” The American occupation power, the Coalition Provisional Authority, institutionalised a political system in which sectarian affiliations became the primary manner through which groups conceived of and expressed their interests. Quarrels among religious and minority ethnic groups soon became a hallmark of Iraqi life.

As a result, Iraq’s nascent political institutions were far from those promised at the liberal end of history. The Bush administration struggled to accommodate the demands for elections made by influential religious figures such as Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani of the Shiite establishment. Eventually, Bush and his cabinet acceded to the Ayatollah, belatedly acknowledging that for anything resembling democracy to succeed, the majority sectarian group needed to be on side. Coalition troops, meanwhile, repeatedly faced down the Medhi Army of Shiite firebrand politician Moqtada Al- Sadr. Occupation forces launched raids against Al Sadr in 2004 and 2008, while American embassy staff pushed for his party’s marginalisation in the Iraqi parliament. By the time President Bush left office, a “partial” democracy had emerged in Baghdad. The Bush administration’s so-called “surge” strategy had brought about marked reduction in sectarian violence from late 2007.

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53 Dawisha, “The Unravelling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian Preferences and State Performance in Historical Perspective,” 228. See also Falk, "1989 and Post-Cold War Policymaking: Were the “Wrong” Lessons Learned from the Fall of Communism?.” 304-5.
59 General David H. Patraeus, "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq " (10-11 September 2007). The military component of the ‘Surge’ strategy – increasing combat troop numbers by 30,000 and constructing informal alliances with Sunni tribes against Al Qaeda – yielded promising results in Bush’s final two years in office. The same could not be said of the political component of the
a series of widely publicised elections. But it still lacked robust checks and balances on the power of the state, and had not consolidated the rule of law in a thoroughgoing manner. As such, Iraq was a considerable distance from becoming the “beacon” of liberal democracy that President Bush had vaunted in 2003. Indeed, given the degree of bloodshed that occurred in the country, Iraq became regarded as the example of democratisation to avoid emulating.

Beyond Iraq’s borders, liberal democrats likewise seemed in short supply. During President Bush’s second term, elections in nations near Iraq often brought to power political forces unsavoury to Washington. The “Islamic resistance movement,” Hamas, won a majority in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. It then utilised its mandate to launch attacks against Israel and the Fatah Party alike. This precipitated Hamas’ isolation in the Gaza Strip, and a short, costly war between the organisation and Israel from December 2008 to January 2009. The Shiite political party, Hezbollah, adopted a similar course in neighbouring Lebanon. It too rose to power through the ballot box, before turning its sights towards war against Israel in July 2006. The principal state-sponsor of these two organisations, Iran, sought to expand its influence by proxy into the heart of the Arab world.

Under its bellicose conservative President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Islamic Republic challenged American regional interests and sought for a time to destabilise

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1 ‘Surge’. The Iraqi government continued to be dominated by technocrats, and was ranked as among one of the most corrupt of any post-conflict state.

60 See Falk, "1989 and Post-Cold War Policymaking: Were the “Wrong” Lessons Learned from the Fall of Communism?", 304-5. For another useful account on the problems of incomplete liberal institutions in a democracy, see Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," 39-41.


Iraq. With popular assent, the forces of illiberal reaction appeared to be on the march.

In the year 2011, however, the Arab world began to witness unexpected and unprecedented political change. The authoritarian regimes of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia were dismantled by popular revolution. A civil war erupted in Libya and, with NATO-led air support and covert aid, rebel forces succeeded in deposing Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The governments of Yemen, Bahrain and Syria faced violent street protests, resulting in waves of state-sanctioned repression. Unrest which began with the self-immolation of a Tunisian labourer in December 2010 quickly escalated into a trans-national movement demanding reform. The Arab people, so it emerged, were now pursuing their fundamental right to personal and political liberty. Observers declared the beginning of an “Arab Spring” and speculated on the causes, consequences and wider implications of the political ferment.

The initial revolutions of the Arab Spring presented two challenges for those who still defended President Bush’s approach to democratising the Middle East. The first was a question of causation: did America’s intervention in Iraq contribute to the uprisings of 2011? In her memoir, No Higher Honor, Condoleezza Rice obliquely addressed this possibility. Rice implied that the example of Iraq had captured the imagination of many people across the wider Middle East. The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, Rice wrote, demonstrated President Bush’s long-standing conviction that the desire for freedom lie inside every individual. In her time as Secretary of State, Rice had warned Hosni Mubarak that delaying reform would generate

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dissatisfaction that could one day boil over in political revolt. The upheaval of early 2011, in Rice’s view, showed that Arab citizens would no longer tolerate the denial of liberal political rights. Through its “freedom agenda,” the Bush administration had started a “conversation” about democracy in the Arab world; now the Egyptians and Tunisians were adding their voices.

Rice’s upbeat narrative, however, was far from convincing. As suggested above, most Arab populations regarded Iraq’s democratisation experience as quixotic. Popular perceptions of American-sponsored democracy were generally hostile. Elections in Iraq seemed to bring nothing but violence, corruption and political in-fighting. There was certainly a level of correlation between President Bush’s strident rhetoric on democratic reform and the subsequent Arab Spring two years after he left office. But this did not imply meaningful causation. Like the collapse of communism twenty years before, it would be reductive to conclude that America was the sole, or even the primary agent of change. In any case, the “dominoes” were not falling in the way policymakers had anticipated. Rather than a wave of democratic change radiating outwards from Iraq, the Arab Spring began in far off Tunisia – hardly a high-priority target for democratic transformation in the view of those who authored the Bush Doctrine.

The events of early 2011 also seemed to challenge the Bush administration’s diagnosis of the roots of terrorism. President Bush and senior cabinet members insisted throughout their eight years in office that authoritarian governments helped to foster Jihadism because they allowed no space for public dissent or genuine political participation. Driven by frustration and anger, repressed segments of society were drawn towards terrorist groups as a solution to their woes. The outbreak

74 Anoushiraven Ehteshami and Steven Wright, "Political Change in the Arab Oil Monarchies: From Liberalisation to Enfranchisement," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 83, no. 5 (2007): 916-17.
75 For critical discussion of the potential links between the Arab Spring and the Bush administration’s policies, see Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy, Expanded Edition: 389.
77 See section one of chapter one, and section one of chapter six.
of the Arab Spring showed that this explanation was largely misplaced. Al Qaeda
and its affiliates were remarkably silent as thousands of ordinary people rallied
against long-standing authoritarian regimes. It appeared that the terrorist group was
called off-guard by the spontaneous and decentralised nature of the protest
movements. According to their own propaganda, the “Arab Street” would rally
behind Al Qaeda’s leadership when the time came to remove leaders like President
Mubarak. Instead, most of the protest groups emerged independent of Jihadist
influence or financing. Islamic militancy, on first glance, was not a popular outlet
for discontent after all.

As the Arab Spring progressed, however, two notable exceptions emerged to
this rule: Libya and Syria. As both countries descended into civil war, Islamist
fighters joined the ranks of rebel forces. In post-revolutionary Libya, these fighters
played a destabilising role. It seemed likely that an Al Qaeda-affiliated group was
responsible for the September 2012 attack on the American embassy in the city of
Benghazi. This attack killed four United States citizens, including the ambassador.
Jihadist factions also contributed to violence in the south of the country, where they
established enclaves outside of Tripoli’s control. In the case of Syria, meanwhile,
reports emerged that Jihadists were fighting alongside insurgents seeking to
overthrow the regime of President Bashir al-Assad. A wave of bombings directed
against senior Ba’ath Party members in mid-2012 contained the hallmarks of Al
Qaeda-style attacks once common in neighbouring Iraq. Indeed, evidence suggests

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78 Daniel Byman, "Terrorism after the Revolutions: How Secular Uprisings could Help (or Hurt)
Jihadists," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 3 (2011): 48-54. For a contrasting view, which holds that Al
Qaeda might gain significantly from any disillusionment that follows failed political reforms, see
80 William McCants, "Al Qaeda’s Challenge: The Jihadist’s War with Islamist Democrats," *Foreign
Affairs* 90, no. 5 (2011): 30-2. Marwan Muasher, "What’s next for the Arab Spring?," Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/14/what-s-next-for-arab-
spring/8kqq.
81 Steven Lee Myers, "Clinton Suggests Link to Qaeda Offshoot in Deadly Libya Attack," *New York
Questions About the Potency of Al Qaeda," *New York Times* 18 September 2012, A13. For critical
analysis on the situation in Libya, see Chirstopher S. Chivvis, "Libya's Downward Spiral," *Foreign
that Jihadist groups from Al Anbar province in Iraq crossed the Syrian border to participate in the civil war. Contrary to the narrative put forward by former members of the Bush administration, it appears that only after Arab dictators lost control that Jihadists found a political opening. Anarchy, rather than authoritarianism, may be Al Qaeda’s best recruiting tool.

If we step back from the miniature of recent events and take a longer view, the outbreak of the Arab Spring finds a degree of congruence with existing theories of political modernisation. Recall, for instance, Francis Fukuyama’s observation that “what is universal” among developing nations, “is initially not the desire for liberal democracy but rather the desire to live in a modern society, with its technology, high standards of living, healthcare and access to the wider world.” The first stage of the Arab Spring revolutions, at least, seemed consistent with this type of explanation. Arab states have undergone considerable economic modernisation over the past forty years. Leading Arab governments, such as Egypt, invested in healthcare and programs of social welfare. Though the state apparatus remained authoritarian, it began to deliver reliable public services to its citizens. Added to this, Arab states exhibited a “youth bulge”; a large number of their citizens were under thirty years old, and many were professionally qualified as lawyers, engineers or scientists. These educated middle-class groups were increasingly engaged in the globalising world, trading in ideas and products with Europe, Asia and the Americas. For theorists of modernisation, most of the necessary conditions were present for a democratic breakthrough.

Economic recession and political misrule may have pushed citizens over the edge. The global financial crisis, which began in September 2008, deeply affected

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84 For critical analysis on the place of Al Qaeda in the Arab Spring as a whole, see Daveed Garatenstein-Ross, "Reports of al Qaeda's Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated," Foreign Policy (3 October 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/03/reports_of_al_qaedas_death_have_been_greatly_exaggerated.
85 Fukuyama, After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads: 54.
86 Toensing, "Opinion Editorial: A Year after Tahrir.
Arab nations. Before the recession, there were already a large number of underemployed graduates in countries such as Egypt.\textsuperscript{88} The financial crisis made conditions considerably worse, with the supply of new jobs drying up in some professional industries.\textsuperscript{89} In established democratic states, citizens in this situation could freely pressure their government for redress. Not so in the Arab Middle East. There, street protest or open political opposition could land a person in jail, if not in the hands of the secret police. When protests broke out in Tunisia and Egypt over demands for jobs, political transparency and reform, the incumbent regimes responded in typically heavy-handed fashion. When political unrest reached Libya and Syria, the rulers of these states quickly resorted to the widespread and lethal use of force, touching off armed insurgencies.\textsuperscript{90}

Seemingly reinforcing the argument of Fukuyama and likeminded theorists, protesters relied heavily on the products of technological globalisation to get their message heard. The Arab Spring revolutions witnessed the first extensive use of social media such as Facebook, Twitter and Skype as tools of political mobilisation.\textsuperscript{91} Protesters posted updates about planned demonstrations, tweeted the latest information on police actions, and spoke to foreign journalists over video messaging.\textsuperscript{92} More recently, rebels in Syria have taken to social media to document their war effort against President Assad, uploading battlefield videos on websites such as YouTube. If there was a “domino effect” occurring among Arab states, it was one frequently driven by the laptop and the Smartphone. This is not to say that the incumbent regimes were powerless to stop the use of such technology – many cell phone networks were controlled by the government and could be shut down or blocked at will. Furthermore, the internet was not widely available outside of major

\textsuperscript{88} Saif and Khalek, "Youth in the Middle East and the Job Market." Saikal, "Authoritarianism, Revolution and Democracy: Egypt and Beyond," 532-3.
\textsuperscript{89} Ahmed Masood, "Will Economic Disruption Derail the Arab Spring?," http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/07/will-economic-disruption-derail-arab-spring/6zyo.
cities, initially restricting protests to centres such as Cairo and Tunis. All the same, the proliferation of new communication technology presented a novel challenge to those used to ruling with an iron fist.\textsuperscript{93}

The desire for economic modernisation and political recognition is not, by itself, usually sufficient to secure the gains of a revolution. Fukuyama recently suggested that the road to stable political order has historically been lengthy and rough for many nations.\textsuperscript{94} This appears to be the case in the Arab Middle East as well. Potentially intransient and technocratic political forces soon came to the fore in Egypt. The protest movements of February 2011 did not generate a sustainable political platform; rather the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the ruling party after a contentious presidential election.\textsuperscript{95} The Brotherhood sought to distance itself from Jihadist elements, making clear its opposition to violent anti-American protests in Egypt and the broader Arab region.\textsuperscript{96} Furthermore, the Brotherhood rejected the idea of establishing a theocratic government in Egypt. That said, there remained marked ambivalence over the group’s commitment to \textit{liberal} democracy; particularly whether the party would protect minority religious rights.\textsuperscript{97} Similar questions have been raised about the political orders slowly emerging in neighbouring Libya and Tunisia.\textsuperscript{98} Perhaps these were just the early stages of the uneven but unstoppable movement of Arab political development in the direction of consolidated democracy. Or perhaps, as Rhodes, Hobson and Zakaria suggest, the outcome will be far less satisfactory;

\textsuperscript{93} Harb, "Arab Revolutions and the Social Media Effect."
\textsuperscript{97} Brown, "Egypt’s Ambiguous Transition". Saikal, "Authoritarianism, Revolution and Democracy: Egypt and Beyond." 536-7, passim.
\textsuperscript{98} Muasher, "What’s next for the Arab Spring?"
some form of illiberal or incomplete democracy at best, soft authoritarianism a realistic second.\textsuperscript{99} A decade after September 11, a wave of political upheaval swept the Arab region: but not as a consequence of the Bush administration’s intervention in Iraq. The future is still in play, with the prospects for the consolidation of democracy dulled by political violence and a lack of reliable checks and balances on government power. Nevertheless, those inspired by Fukuyama’s famous thesis have not lost heart. Given sufficient time, they argue, everyone will still find their inner democrat.\textsuperscript{100} The credibility of this position is ultimately tenuous in character. For one, it relies on an uncritical acceptance of Alexandre Kojève’s highly selective reading of political philosophy.\textsuperscript{101} For Kojève, Hegel and Plato allegedly placed the quest for recognition at the centre of the human experience. The struggle for recognition defined the relationship between master and slave; satisfaction would only come when both were free. This aspiration would eventually find political expression in the form of democracy – the most rational and fulfilling “universal and homogenous state.” But it was also quite possible to conclude from Kojève’s interlocutors that political life was about much more than the desire to be recognised.\textsuperscript{102} Indeed, Hegel seemed to contradict Kojève’s later contentions at several points.\textsuperscript{103} If Kojève had misinterpreted the importance of recognition in shaping the norms and institutions of government, Fukuyama’s largely derivative account of modernity became increasingly unpersuasive.\textsuperscript{104}


\textsuperscript{100} For an effective critique of this view, see Beetham, “The Contradictions of Democratization by Force: The Case of Iraq,” 445-6.


\textsuperscript{103} McCarney, The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hegel on History: 91-3.

\textsuperscript{104} Indeed, some critics have maintained that Fukuyama fundamentally misread Kojève because he overlooked the philosopher’s “misanthropic” view of humanity at history’s end. For Kojève,
Even if one accepted that *Thymos* was essential to understanding the character of modern politics, there surely remained multiple routes to achieving fulfilment. Liberal democracy had become a commonplace means to manage *Thymos* by the late twentieth century; but it was unlikely it would forever remain the only one. *Megalothymia* would not totally disappear simply because every individual now possessed the right to vote. There would always remain dissatisfied, discordant individuals determined to upend the established order. Despite Nietzsche’s fears, democracy did not denude everyone’s will to power. Perhaps over the course of decades, Arab states will find their way to a stable form of representative government. Nevertheless, this development might not end all of the ideological disputes that belie the region. As such, it has appeared to some observers that elected government may be much less than the universal remedy to the world’s present ills.

It seems that the efficacy of democratic vanguardism is increasingly in doubt. But this does not mean that America’s leaders have abandoned the strategy’s underlying principles wholesale. Despite his election in 2008 on a platform of “change,” President Barack Obama’s foreign policy has shown notable rhetorical consistency with his predecessor. Describing in his first inaugural address states such as Iran as being on the “wrong side of history,” Obama indicated from the outset that he, like Bush before him, conceived of political progress largely in teleological terms. In the May 2010 National Security Strategy, meanwhile, President Obama

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105 Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*: 441. Fukuyama admitted in some of his earlier works that modern prescription drugs, gene therapy and biotechnological advances have allowed us to change the composition of human nature itself. We can overcome *Thymos*, he noted, by “popping a pill.” Human nature, then, was no longer a constant. See Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle,” 28-31.


opined that “from the birth of our liberty, America has had a faith in the future – a belief that where we’re going is better than where we’ve been.”\textsuperscript{109} The United States, in Obama’s view, had a unique duty to advance freedom. As the President averred, America aimed “not to build an empire, but to shape a world in which more individuals and nations [can] determine their own destiny, and live with the peace and dignity that they deserve.”\textsuperscript{110} While America’s foreign policy has been moderated by President Obama’s multilateralist tone, and by on-going problems of American sovereign debt following the 2008 financial crisis, it is clear that the President still regards the United States as the exemplary proponent of democracy.\textsuperscript{111}

Students of American history will find much that is familiar in this sentiment. American politicians and writers have continually spoken of their nation as “chosen” (be it by secular or divine forces) to encourage liberal governments overseas. The United States was a “city on a hill,” an inspiration to other nations which sought genuine political liberty.\textsuperscript{112} The country’s exceptionalist tradition also brought great responsibility. Whether it was Thomas Jefferson proclaiming an “empire of liberty,” Woodrow Wilson asserting that America would “make the world safe for democracy,” or George W. Bush seeking a “balance of power that favours freedom,” American foreign relations have long contained a vein of “practical idealism.”\textsuperscript{113} While it drew on this tradition, the Bush Doctrine nevertheless established a new precedent with its ambition to “end tyranny” across the globe. American leaders past might have privately aspired to this goal; President Obama and his successors will likely have difficulty fully disavowing it, at least in speech.

From this perspective, the potential for further episodes of democratic vanguardism may well inhere within the character of American foreign relations.

\textsuperscript{112} Nabers and Patman, "September 11 and the Rise of Political Fundamentalism in the Bush administration: Domestic Legitimatization versus International Estrangement?,” 171.
While the Bush Doctrine represented the singular manifestation to date of democratic vanguardism fully formed, its constituent elements remain potent ideational resources for presidents and policymakers.\textsuperscript{114} Neoconservatives and some of their colleagues on the centre-left still contend that the United States is a force for good in the world.\textsuperscript{115} They continue to hold that democracy is the one regime type to which all aspire. And despite significant setbacks in the case of Iraq, some still maintain that coercion might have a place in helping to foster elected government; William Kristol and Michael Ledeen made this especially clear during NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya.\textsuperscript{116} Certainly, the course of events in the decade since September 11 has done much to dent the appeal of democratic vanguardism. But a nation committed to universal political precepts will not likely give up the fight that easily. Or to put it another way, perhaps the leading wagon in the train will eventually right its course and again attempt to persuade the stragglers through the final pass. The question still remains: will the weary travellers be contented with what they ultimately find on the other side?


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