

**Principled Pragmatism:
Non-Governmental Influence on
New Zealand's Nuclear Disarmament
Advocacy 1995-2000**

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Political Science

Author: Lyndon Burford

University of Canterbury

November 2008

Acknowledgements	i
Declaration of Personal Interests.....	i
Abbreviations	ii
Abstract	iv
Chapter 1: Introduction.....	1
1. Nuclear Free New Zealand	1
2. The Power of Ideas	6
3. The Rise of Non-Governmental Organisations	6
4. Previous Research.....	7
5. Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Crisis	8
6. Conclusion	15
Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework.....	17
1. Introduction.....	17
2. Constructivism: the Power of Values, not the Value of Power	20
Norms-Based Analysis	22
3. The Limits of Rationalism	30
Rationalism in the Nuclear Context	33
Rationalism and Nuclear Free New Zealand.....	35
4. Conclusion	37
Chapter 3: New Zealand Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy 1995-2000.....	39
1. Introduction.....	39
2. The Policy Process.....	39
3. Key International Developments	41
End of the Cold War.....	41
Indefinite Extension of the NPT.....	41
Chinese / French Nuclear Testing	43
The Canberra Commission Report.....	44
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.....	45
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests	46
4. New Zealand Policy Initiatives.....	46
International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion	47
New Zealand-South Africa Memorandum of Cooperation.....	50
The New Agenda Coalition.....	50
The 2000 NPT Review Conference	53
5. Conclusion	58
Chapter 4: New Zealand NGO Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy	60
1. Introduction.....	60
2. Domestic NGO Advocacy	62
National Consultative Committee on Disarmament.....	62
Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control.....	63
Response to Renewed French Nuclear Testing.....	65

New Zealand Parliamentary Motion on Nuclear Disarmament	67
NGO Influence on the New Zealand Labour Party	68
3. Transnational NGO Advocacy	70
The World Court Project	73
Abolition 2000	76
The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention	78
The Middle Powers Initiative	79
4. Conclusion	84
Chapter 5: Discussion	86
1. Introduction	86
2. Insights Offered by Norms Theory	89
Policy Influences on Norm Leaders	94
3. Efficient / Permissive Causes of State Behaviour	96
4. Developments in the New Millennium	100
5. Contemporary Challenges for New Zealand NGOs	104
6. Conclusion	106
Chapter 6: Conclusion	108
1. Introduction	108
2. Strengths of New Zealand Disarmament NGOs	109
3. New Zealand Leadership on Nuclear Disarmament	112
4. A Nuclear Weapons Convention	115
5. Policy Recommendations	124
Track II Exploration of a Nuclear Weapons Convention	124
Further Development of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones	127
International NGO Internships	128
NGO Representatives on NPT Delegations	129
6. Future research	130
Nuclear Disarmament Norm Development in New Zealand	130
Norm Leadership	130
Critical States	130
The Role of the Media	131
7. Reality versus Realism	132
8. Conclusion	134
Appendices	136
1. Interviewees	136
2. NGO Membership	136
3. PACDAC Minutes	137
4. NGO Representatives on Government Delegations	137
5. New Zealand-South Africa Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control (1996)	137
Bibliography	138

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank all of the passionate, principled citizens around the country who helped to make New Zealand a nuclear free nation. Your inspiration and dedication have left the generations of today and tomorrow with a more hopeful vision for the future. Especially, I would like to thank Kate Dewes, Rob Green, and Alyn Ware for your support, generosity and encouragement with my work and studies, and for your dedication to the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. A huge thank you also to my whole family, for all your love, support, and patience. You have helped to make me who I am today. Thank you also to my supervisor, Tanya Ogilvie-White. You are quite simply the best, most encouraging teacher I've ever had. It has been a pleasure to learn with you.

I am grateful to all the people who agreed to be interviewed for this research - your input has been much valued and appreciated. Additionally, I wish to thank the Disarmament Division at New Zealand's Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade, which made every effort to facilitate requests for materials for this research. This thesis was made possible in part by scholarship grants from the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust and the University of Canterbury.

Finally, to all the many people in New Zealand and around the world who have dared to hope for a more peaceful world; who have dared to dream that humanity is capable of greater things; and who have dared to believe that that they can make a difference; my heartfelt praise and thanks. *He tangata, he tangata, he tangata e...*

Declaration of Personal Interests

From mid-2005 to December 2007, I collaborated with and intermittently worked part time for Kate Dewes and Rob Green at the *Disarmament & Security Centre*, a specialist branch of the *Aotearoa-New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies*. In 2006, I also conducted a four week internship at the Wellington office of *Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*, which is coordinated by Alyn Ware.

Abbreviations

A2000	Abolition 2000
Article VI	The portion of the NPT dealing with nuclear disarmament
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CPS	Centre for Peace Studies (Auckland University)
CSS	Centre for Strategic Studies (Victoria University, Wellington)
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DSC	Disarmament & Security Centre, Christchurch (specialist branch of the Peace Foundation)
EU	European Union
FA&D	Foreign Affairs and Defence
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
GRACE	Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (US)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IALANA	International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice (UN)
ICNND	International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (co-chaired by Australia and Japan)
IPB	International Peace Bureau
IPPNW	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
IR	International Relations
ISAB	International Security Advisory Bureau (US State Department)
ISC	International Steering Committee
LCNP	Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy
MAPW	Medical Association for the Prevention of War (Australia)
MCI	Main Committee One (of the NPT RevCon)
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand)
MP	Member of Parliament
MPI	Middle Powers Initiative
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCCD	National Consultative Committee on Disarmament
NGO	Non-governmental organisation

NMD	National Missile Defense (US)
NPT	(Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPTREC	NPT Review and Extension Conference (1995)
NSA	Negative security assurance
NWFZ	Nuclear weapon free zone
NWS	Nuclear weapon state
PACDAC	Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control
PMA	Peace Movement Aotearoa ¹
PNND	Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (formerly <i>Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament</i>)
PrepCom	Preparatory Committee (to an NPT RevCon)
RevCon	Review Conference (of the NPT)
SANA	Scientists against Nuclear Arms (New Zealand)
SNI	Seven Nation Initiative
UN	United Nations
UNA	United Nations Association
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WHA	World Health Assembly
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
WCP	World Court Project
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

¹ *Aotearoa* is the name of New Zealand in the language of its indigenous Maori people.

Abstract

The 1987 *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act* is arguably the most comprehensive national ban on nuclear weapons in the world. It prohibits nuclear weapons and nuclear powered vessels from the country's land, sea and airspace, and has made New Zealand a flag bearer for the international nuclear disarmament community. New Zealand's non-governmental movement played a decisive role in creating and maintaining the nuclear free law. This is indicative of a recent transformation that has seen a much broader set of actors influencing the course of international relations than was historically the case. Furthermore, with its inherent rejection of power politics, nuclear freedom suggests that international relations are more susceptible to influence from ideational concerns than was traditionally thought possible.

This thesis assesses the influence of principled, non-governmental advocacy on New Zealand nuclear disarmament policy from 1995-2000, focusing on the work of New Zealand-based organisations and individuals. A process-tracing methodology is applied to determine the pathways through which new understandings about nuclear disarmament were developed and diffused both nationally and internationally. This allows for identification of the key sources and transmitting agents of these ideas, thus controlling for potential sources of influence not relevant to this study. Analysis reveals that despite diminished public attention during the research period, non-governmental advocacy demonstrated a relatively high degree of influence on New Zealand government policy, particularly via transnational initiatives. This transnational non-governmental activity is also shown to have contributed tangibly to international normative and political developments in nuclear disarmament.

The elimination of nuclear weapons is increasingly seen in international circles as an urgent, feasible and desirable goal. Analysis of contemporary developments leads to the conclusion that the only credible means of achieving this goal is to begin by outlawing nuclear weapons. With its strong disarmament credentials and respected moral voice, New Zealand is well placed to lead the exploration of a potential abolition framework. The expertise of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament movement in this realm, as demonstrated by its role in the development and advocacy of the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, indicates that the government would benefit greatly from meaningful collaboration with the non-governmental sector in this task.

Chapter 1: Introduction

*“Recounting the history of nuclear arms control and disarmament without referring to the anti-nuclear movement is like telling the story of civil rights legislation without referring to the civil rights movement.”*¹

~ Lawrence S. Wittner
(Author, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*)

1. Nuclear Free New Zealand

The 1987 *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms control Act* banned nuclear weapons and nuclear powered vessels from New Zealand’s land, sea and airspace.^{2, 3}

The Act made it illegal for any New Zealand citizen or permanent resident working for the government - including the armed forces - to manufacture, acquire, possess or control nuclear weapons - or aid anyone else to do so, anywhere in the world. This comprehensive rejection of nuclear weapons was the result of widespread public engagement, education and protest by peace and disarmament⁴ groups and sympathetic politicians over several decades. In 1986, at the peak of the political debate over the nuclear free policy, there were 350 active, local-area peace groups around New Zealand, most of which were involved in the campaign for nuclear free legislation.⁵

¹ Lawrence S. Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Since 1971*, ed. Martin Serwin, vol. 3, Stanford Nuclear Age Series (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

² New Zealand House of Representatives, *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act*, 8 June 1987 [cited 23 June 2006]. Available from http://www.legislation.govt.nz/libraries/contents/om_isapi.dll?clientID=88998&infobase=pal_statutes.nfo&jump=a1987-086&softpage=DOC#JUMPDEST_a1987-086.

³ The term *nuclear free*, and all its derivatives, refer exclusively in this thesis to the prohibitions placed by the Nuclear Free Zone Act on nuclear weapons, related activities and nuclear powered vessels within in the New Zealand sphere of control. The Nuclear Free Zone Act does not prohibit nuclear technologies or materials used for medical or research purposes, nor land-based nuclear power generation, the development of which remains legally possible although unlikely in New Zealand, due to public opposition.

⁴ In the present context, unless otherwise stated, *disarmament* refers to the permanent, irreversible and verifiable dismantlement or destruction of *nuclear weapons*. Actions which stop short of this, such as removing nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles, but stockpiling both components, can be thought of as *partial* disarmament measures.

⁵ Helen Clark et al., *Peace Is More than the Absence of War / Photographs by Gil Hanly* (Auckland: New Women's Press, 1986), 110-115.

The nuclear free law entrenched a policy instigated in 1984 by the newly-elected Labour Government. Then-Prime Minister David Lange quickly became the international voice of nuclear free New Zealand. In 1985, he was invited to argue the case that *'Nuclear Weapons Are Morally Indefensible'* at the prestigious Oxford Union debate. Here, Lange proclaimed:

*"A system of defence serves its purpose if it guarantees the security of those it protects. A system of nuclear defence guarantees only insecurity. The means of defence terrorise as much as the threat of attack."*⁶

This was enormously controversial. Clements writes, *"The debate endeared Lange and New Zealand to the peace movement worldwide, but sent shockwaves through allied foreign ministries."*⁷ New Zealand's nuclear free policy made it the first ever Western-aligned country to reject nuclear deterrence.⁸ The Western nuclear weapon states (NWS)⁹ and their non-NWS allies viewed this as a threat to international peace. It was said to undermine the West's collective security bargain, which focused on the Western 'nuclear umbrella' as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. New Zealand's allies thus claimed that by rejecting nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, it was making nuclear war more likely. The nuclear free policy led to the United States (US) declaring the New Zealand-US arm of the ANZUS defence pact 'inoperative' in 1986.¹⁰ Maintaining the nuclear free policy and securing its passage into law therefore demanded of the government considerable courage and resilience in the face of enormous opposition internationally and serious efforts by New Zealand's own Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) to undermine it.

Nevertheless, there was a clear majority of public support for nuclear freedom within New Zealand, creating a strong democratic mandate for the policy.¹¹ A mass, grassroots anti-nuclear movement had developed among a broad cross-section of ordinary New Zealand

⁶ David Lange, 'Nuclear Weapons Are Immoral', Paper presented at the Oxford Union Debate, Oxford University (1 March 1985).

⁷ Kevin P. Clements, *Back from the Brink: the Creation of a Nuclear-Free New Zealand* (Wellington: Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1988), 138.

⁸ Nuclear deterrence relies on the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD). MAD assumes that in order to 'deter' other countries from launching a nuclear attack, it is necessary to demonstrate the ability to retaliate with a devastating nuclear strike which would destroy the aggressor state.

⁹ France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

¹⁰ ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) was the key New Zealand defence alliance from 1951 to 1985.

¹¹ Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 138-39.

citizens: workers, teachers, doctors, lawyers, clergy, mothers, Maori,¹² unions, engineers, activists, artists, scientists and academics. They believed that advocacy of international nuclear disarmament was the only rational and moral policy option for New Zealand. Strong public support was generated through initiatives such as the 'Peace Squadron' campaign to stop nuclear warship visits,¹³ peace education run by the Foundation for Peace Studies (the Peace Foundation) in schools around the country, and the nationwide campaign creating local-area nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs).¹⁴ By 1984, thanks to persistent public education and outreach by non-governmental¹⁵ advocates, 61% of New Zealand's population was living in locally-declared NWFZs.¹⁶ Three of the four main political parties responded by adopting nuclear free policies prior to the election that year,¹⁷ which was triggered by rebel Member of Parliament (MP) Marilyn Waring announcing she would support the nuclear free private member's bill before the parliament at that time.¹⁸ At 93.7%, the election recorded the highest voter turnout in New Zealand history and was won convincingly by the Labour Party which campaigned strongly on its nuclear free policy.¹⁹ Those who were not strong supporters of the policy initially were shocked by the aggressive 'megaphone diplomacy' of the US when the policy was instigated, generating greater support for the nuclear free stance.²⁰ By 1987, 72% of New Zealanders lived in locally-declared NWFZs, with five of the now six major political parties having adopted nuclear free policies before the election that year.²¹

¹² Maori are the indigenous people of New Zealand.

¹³ Tom Newnham, *Peace Squadron: the Sharp End of Nuclear Protest in New Zealand* (Auckland: Graphic Publications, 1986).

¹⁴ This was launched around in the late 1970s by the Home Base Pacific Pilgrimage group. It was quickly picked up by the Christchurch Peace Collective and then developed nationally by the Christchurch-based New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee, run by Larry Ross.

¹⁵ The phrase *non-governmental* encompasses a wide range of actors, from religious, ethnic, or professionally-based groups and collectives, human rights advocates to traditional peace and disarmament movements, among others. The most common characteristic assigned to such groups is their not-for-profit nature and pursuit of social or environmental goals for principled or ethical reasons. This thesis uses the term almost exclusively to denote not-for-profit New Zealand organisations and individuals that have sought to influence government nuclear disarmament policy.

¹⁶ Larry Ross, "Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones in New Zealand [Wall Chart]," (Christchurch: New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee, 1984).

¹⁷ Kate Dewes, *the World Court Project: the Evolution and Impact of an Effective Citizens' Movement*. (Ph.D. Thesis, University of New England, 1998), 151.

¹⁸ For more details, see Robert. E White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: 1984 - New Zealand Becomes Nuclear Free* (Auckland: University of Auckland: Centre for Peace Studies, Working Paper no. 7, 1997), 14.

¹⁹ Elections New Zealand, *General Elections 1853-2005 - Dates & Turnout*, 2008 [cited 22 September 2008]. Available from <http://www.elections.org.nz/record/resultsdata/elections-dates-turnout.html>.

²⁰ Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 138-39.

²¹ Dewes, *The World Court Project*, 153.

New Zealand's nuclear freedom exemplified the functioning of a strong, participatory democracy.²²

For much of the period from 1945-1984, New Zealand had tacitly supported the nuclear weapons policies of its great power allies, and for the most part, had left the issue of strategic planning to them. New Zealand was:

*"...an unquestioning supporter of Western security concepts based on adversarial alliance systems such as NATO, the South East Asian Treaty Organisation and ANZUS. The threatened use of nuclear weapons was implicit in these alliances as a necessary but legitimate weapon for the defence of Western values."*²³

Historically, principled stances had been taken on the nuclear issue, particularly under the Labour Governments of Prime Ministers Walter Nash (1957-60) and Norman Kirk (1972-75).²⁴ However, these were swept aside by incoming governments less inclined to question the policies of New Zealand's great power allies. The actions of the 1984-1990 Lange-led Labour Government were therefore a watershed for anti-nuclear advocates. By entrenching the nuclear free policy in law, it ensured that the ban would be permanent and enforceable.

By the early 1990s, support for nuclear freedom was almost ubiquitous among the New Zealand public, generating a profound flow-on effect on domestic politics. The main conservative party (the National Party), originally a vehement opponent of the nuclear free policy and under whose leadership previous anti-nuclear initiatives had been scuttled, adopted the policy immediately prior to the 1990 general election in keeping with "*...the will of the people.*"²⁵

²² Kate Dewes, "Participatory Democracy in Peace and Security Decision Making: the Aotearoa/New Zealand Experience," *Interdisciplinary Peace Research* 5, 2 (October/November 1993).

²³ NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

²⁴ Nash, although he dispatched a frigate in 1957 to assist with monitoring of UK atmospheric tests (based, he said, on a commitment made under the previous government), subsequently made good on his election promise to 'oppose all further tests of nuclear weapons.' In 1959, New Zealand voted for a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for an end to nuclear testing. Kirk greatly intensified opposition to nuclear testing. In 1973, along with Australia, New Zealand took France to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over its atmospheric testing in the Pacific. On the domestic front, the Kirk government imposed a 'Danish' style nuclear free policy. This stated New Zealand's intention to be nuclear free, but stopped short of introducing a rigorous ban on them, opting instead to trust that no such weapons were brought into the country by New Zealand's nuclear allies. See: Dewes, *The World Court Project*, 142-143.; White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: 1984 - New Zealand Becomes Nuclear Free*, 8.

²⁵ New Zealand Press Association, "What the Nats Said..." *Peacelink* 80 (April 1990).

Today, the Nuclear Free Zone Act is more entrenched than ever.²⁶ Nuclear freedom has become an aspect of contemporary New Zealand national identity,²⁷ signalling the country's independence and registering it as a principled, moral voice on the international stage. Since the mid-1990s, in coalition with like-minded states and under both National and Labour-led Governments, New Zealand has promoted rapid progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament with the core aim of eliminating nuclear weapons. This policy is based on the broad, bipartisan consensus in New Zealand that multilateral nuclear disarmament is a universal good.²⁸

The aim of the present research is not, therefore, to analyse the merits of this assumption. Rather, given the influential role that non-governmental actors have played historically in New Zealand's nuclear disarmament policy process, the aim is to assess when and how New Zealand-based non-governmental advocacy influenced government policy in this field between 1995 and 2000. The value of such an investigation lies in identifying the collaborations between government and non-governmental actors that most effectively advanced the common goal of both groups: the elimination of nuclear weapons. This enables the development of sound policy advice regarding how New Zealand could most productively work towards this goal today.

²⁶ The one exception to the broad bi-partisan support for the Act comes from the ACT Party, which currently has five of the 122 seats in Parliament. For discussion of the various parties' positions, see Robert E. White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: Twenty Years On* (Auckland: University of Auckland: Centre for Peace Studies, Working Paper no. 15, 2008), 23-32.; Caroline McDonald and Geoff Randall, private interview with author. Wellington, 15 September 2006.

²⁷ Andrea Reitzig, "In Defiance of Nuclear Deterrence: Anti-Nuclear New Zealand after Two Decades," *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 22, 2 (April – June 2006).

²⁸ This assumption is increasingly supported by a wide range of international actors, including several formerly ardent supporters of nuclear deterrence. See for example, Henry Kissinger et al., "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *Wall Street Journal* (4 January 2007).; Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons* (Stockholm, Sweden: Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006).; Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, *Executive Summary: Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapon*. Canberra: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (August 1996).

2. The Power of Ideas

The values-based approach New Zealand has taken to foreign policy in the field of nuclear security²⁹ stands in stark contrast to traditional realist views of international relations, which have focused on relative power as a means of explaining state behaviour. Nuclear freedom is a rejection of the most powerful weapons ever invented, suggesting that ideas-based concerns can be as politically influential as tangible, material constructs such as military power. As Ruggie noted, “...*the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material.*”³⁰ In addition, the key role that principled non-governmental actors played in the formation of the nuclear free policy - and also in its application during the research period, as described in the subsequent chapters - are further evidence of the power of ideational factors to shape domestic and international politics. The implication of these observations is that traditional realist theories about the motivators of state behaviour provide little insight into New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy. As such, a constructivist framework has been selected as the theoretical basis of this thesis. Constructivist theory responds to the ideational concerns such as values, morals and norms (standards of behaviour) demonstrated in various aspects of New Zealand’s policy behaviour, facilitating a more cohesive explanation of the political realities of nuclear freedom.

3. The Rise of Non-Governmental Organisations

More than ever before, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are now a tangible part of domestic and international political life. In areas as diverse as human rights, environmental degradation, climate change and disarmament, NGOs play a valuable role in helping to develop both the political will to regulate these issues, and practical means of doing so. Recent disarmament initiatives – both nuclear and conventional³¹ - indicate that active cooperation between NGOs and governments can be a strong aid to the realisation of common disarmament goals. Examples related to conventional weapons include the Ottawa Process

²⁹ *Nuclear security* is an umbrella term used to refer collectively to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the safeguarding of sensitive nuclear materials (for example through the imposition of export controls and safeguards).

³⁰ John G. Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52, 4 (Autumn 1998), 879.

³¹ The term *conventional* weapons distinguishes more common, less physically destructive weapons types those categorised as *weapons of mass destruction*, these being biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.

which lead to the 1997 anti-personnel landmines convention³² and the Oslo Process that culminated in the 2008 convention banning the use of cluster munitions.

As described above, the domestic NGO community of the 1970s and 1980s was a core driver for New Zealand's nuclear free policy and law. The mass, highly-visible New Zealand grassroots movement of decades past has declined sharply since the end of the Cold War, however. This is reflected in the current dearth of New Zealand public and media engagement with the issue of nuclear disarmament.³³ Likewise, NGO influence in the field of nuclear security has received very little academic attention in New Zealand in recent years. Addressing the lack of contemporary research in this area, this thesis looks at NGO-government relations from 1995-2000. Much of the research material has come from primary sources, such as interviews with key governmental and non-governmental players³⁴ and official documents from the period. In addition, the vast majority of primary source material related to the research and advocacy of NGOs in the 1990s was kindly made available from the Peace Archive of the Disarmament & Security Centre (DSC) in Christchurch.³⁵

4. Previous Research

Previous research in the area of non-governmental influence on nuclear security policy has come historically from veterans of New Zealand's peace and anti-nuclear movement. These include researchers such as Rod Alley, Kevin Clements, Kate Dewes, Nicky Hager, Elsie Locke, Alyn Ware and Robert White, *inter alia*.³⁶ Most commonly, New Zealand research in the nuclear security field has focused on strategic and inter-state concerns and developments.³⁷ Meanwhile, other researchers, such as Stephen Hoadley,³⁸ have addressed

³² For more on this, see Jody Williams, Mary Wareham, and Stephen D. Goose, eds., *Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security* (Lanham, Maryland, 2008).; Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52, 3 (Summer 1998).

³³ This point is discussed in more detail in later chapters.

³⁴ A complete list of people interviewed for this research is included in the Appendices.

³⁵ For several years, under the guidance of Kate Dewes, the DSC has been developing a wide ranging archive of historical peace-related materials from New Zealand and international non-governmental groups and campaigns.

³⁶ See bibliography for a list of various relevant works by each of these.

³⁷ Dr Robert White of Auckland University's Centre for Peace Studies (CPS), himself a veteran of the anti-nuclear movement (he was a founding member of Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) in 1983) has published four *Nuclear Free New Zealand* working papers through the CPS. These provide comprehensive analysis of New Zealand (and international) policy detail and relevant developments. White's Working Paper no. 9 touches on NGO-related aspects of policy, but his focus is mainly strategic policy analysis. See: White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: Twenty Years On*; Robert E. White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: 1987 - from*

NGO influence on nuclear policy as relates to specific incidences or issues.³⁹ Hoadley has also overseen the creation of an online New Zealand foreign policy archive, which includes a bibliographic section on *Interest Groups and Foreign Policy in New Zealand*. Material cited here indicates, however, that the vast majority of work in the area is at least two decades out of date.⁴⁰ The most recent research relating specifically to New Zealand's nuclear free law was the Masters thesis of Andreas Reitzig, which explored the contemporary politics surrounding the ban on nuclear propelled ships visits to New Zealand.⁴¹ Meanwhile, the present research is most similar thematically to the 1998 Ph.D. thesis of Kate Dewes, which documented the domestic and transnational⁴² work of New Zealand and international NGOs in a seminal nuclear disarmament campaign now known as *the World Court Project* (WCP). The WCP was successful in having the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) elicit an Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons from the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ - also known as *the World Court*).⁴³ Dewes has indicated that there has been little over-arching analysis of the role of NGOs in the creation of nuclear disarmament policy in New Zealand since this time.

5. Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Crisis

The international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation⁴⁴ regime is in crisis. The global strategic environment is marked by steadily multiplying risks of both nuclear proliferation⁴⁵

Policy to Legislation (Auckland: University of Auckland: Centre for Peace Studies, Working Paper no. 8, 1998); Robert E. White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: the Policy in Action* (Auckland: University of Auckland. Centre for Peace Studies, Working Paper no. 9, 1999); White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: 1984 - New Zealand Becomes Nuclear Free*.

³⁸ Hoadley is Associate Professor of Political Studies at Auckland University.

³⁹ Stephen Hoadley, 'Diplomacy, Politics and Nuclear Testing: New Zealand Confronts France 1995-96,' in *New Zealand in a Globalising World*, ed. Ralph Pellman (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005); Stephen Hoadley, 'PACDAC 1991-1996: A Retrospective Review,' in *Nuclear Free New Zealand - the Policy in Action*, ed. Robert E. White (Auckland: Centre for Peace Studies, University of Auckland, 1998).

⁴⁰ See: <http://www.arts.auckland.ac.nz/departments/index.cfm?P=11362>

⁴¹ Andreas Reitzig, *New Zealand's Ban on Nuclear-Propelled Ships Revisited*. (MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 2005).

⁴² The term *transnational* is used here to refer to non-governmental organisations and individuals whose advocacy is directed at both domestic and international audiences, whether governmental or public. Transnational work is distinguished from international activity, which is generated in foreign countries (although this may also impact on New Zealand policy), and domestic advocacy, which takes place mainly within the New Zealand context.

⁴³ Dewes' doctoral thesis is probably the most comprehensive insider's analysis yet written of the process which led to the ICJ Advisory Opinion. Dewes, *The World Court Project*.

⁴⁴ Put simply, *non-proliferation* in the present context refers to efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

⁴⁵ In a general sense, *proliferation* refers to the spread, growth, or expansion of an object or idea. In this thesis, proliferation refers specifically to the spread of nuclear weapons, either horizontally (to new actors) or vertically (increases in existing arsenals). Proliferation can also be understood as the opposite of disarmament.

and nuclear war. The Doomsday Clock, created by experts as a measure of the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe, rests at five minutes to midnight, with midnight signifying Armageddon. At the end of the Cold War, the clock read 17 minutes to midnight.⁴⁶

In total, there are around 26,000 nuclear weapons in the world today.⁴⁷ Although there have been sharp reductions in the Russian and US nuclear arsenals in recent years,⁴⁸ these have been tactical and are in no way indicative of a good-faith commitment to nuclear disarmament.⁴⁹ As was the case during the height of the Cold War, Russia and the US still have thousands of nuclear weapons on high-alert, ready for use within minutes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - which has been expanding rapidly into Eastern Europe since the early 1990s, greatly increasing tension between the West, China and Russia - announced in 1999 that its nuclear weapons were 'essential' and would remain so 'for the foreseeable future'.⁵⁰ In addition, NATO policies regarding the use of nuclear weapons have expanded significantly and now explicitly envisage 'pre-emptive' nuclear first strikes to prevent the use of WMD, as well as the use of nuclear weapons against non-NWS and non-state actors.⁵¹ In response, Russia also expanded its nuclear weapons use policies to include first strike options in 2001.⁵² In 2002, the US pulled out of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, negotiated between Russia and the US to reduce the likelihood of nuclear

Actions such as the development of new nuclear warheads and delivery systems can also be thought of as proliferation even if they take place in the context of an overall reduction in deployed warhead numbers, in that they increase the pool of knowledge related to nuclear weapons, and thus, the potential for future proliferation.

⁴⁶ The Doomsday Clock was initiated by physicists who worked on the Manhattan Project that built the world's first nuclear bomb. It has become "a universally recognized indicator of the world's vulnerability to catastrophe from nuclear weapons, climate change, and emerging technologies in the life sciences." See <http://thebulletin.org/content/about-us/purpose> for details.

⁴⁷ International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, *Nuclear Weapons Today: the Problem is 26,000 Nuclear Weapons*, 16 December 2006 [cited 2 November 2008]. Available from <http://www.icanw.org/nuclear-weapons-today>. Estimates on the number of nuclear weapons vary from source to source, due to the lack of transparency from the NWS with regard to their arsenals. As a result, exact numbers cannot be verified.

⁴⁸ International Institute of Strategic Studies, "The US-Russian Nuclear Balance," *Strategic Comments* 14, 6 (2008).

⁴⁹ In the US case, many of the 'disarmed' weapons have merely been dismantled, but the active components of them, the warheads, have been stored, enabling a return to rapid vertical proliferation should it choose to take this path.

⁵⁰ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, April 1999 [cited 24 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.

⁵¹ In modern political discourse, the group most commonly associated with the term *non-state actor* are terrorists, although the term can also refer to other non-governmental groups such as lobby groups or corporations. In this thesis, the term 'non-state actor' does *not* refer to the non-governmental organisations and individuals whose work is the focus of investigation here.

⁵² Dr. Nikolai Sokov, *Russia's New National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle*, Monterey Institute Center for Non-proliferation Studies, 2004 2001 [cited 30 October 2006]. Available from <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/concept.htm>.

war.⁵³ The US has pushed ahead with its National Missile Defense (NMD), based on the Reagan-era ‘Star Wars’ programme. Russia has responded by restarting its own missile defence programme and China is now expanding its nuclear arsenal. In a clear breach of its legal disarmament obligations, the Bush Administration has applied three times to the US Congress for funding to build a new generation of ‘mini, usable nuclear weapons’ such as the often-cited ‘bunker buster’ bomb. Such weapons, combined with the new, more flexible policies for their use, would greatly increase the likelihood of nuclear war. Fortunately, the Congress has declined to fund their development. Meanwhile, however, the most recent report of the US State Department’s International Security Advisory Bureau (ISAB)⁵⁴ recommended policies that, according to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, “...would increase and deepen military competition and in essence constitute a small Cold War with China.”⁵⁵ In 2007, declassified documents showed that, also in breach of its disarmament obligations, the government of the United Kingdom (UK) is planning to build a new arsenal of nuclear warheads as well as a new generation of nuclear-powered submarines to house them.⁵⁶

The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the world’s preeminent nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaty. It is based on three core agreements or ‘pillars’. First, non-NWS parties to the NPT agree not to acquire nuclear weapons by any means; second, NWS parties agree to disarm their nuclear weapons; and third, all states parties to the Treaty have the ‘inalienable’ right to develop nuclear technology for ‘peaceful’ purposes. The NPT has without doubt helped to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, a vital and laudable achievement.⁵⁷ Conversely however, it has generated very little progress on nuclear disarmament; the vast majority of disarmament commitments made at the 1995 and 2000

⁵³ Missile defence systems encourage nuclear aggression by supporting the idea that a NWS with a missile defence shield might be able to ‘win’ a nuclear war against another NWS due to the supposed ability of the shield to protect the aggressor against defensive nuclear retaliatory strikes. The more confidence a country has in its missile shield, therefore, the more likely a nuclear war becomes.

⁵⁴ This is now headed by Paul Wolfowitz, one of the chief architects of the 2003 Iraq invasion.

⁵⁵ Hans Kristensen, *State Department Arms Control Board Declares Cold War on China*, Federation of American Scientists, 7 October 2008 [cited 21 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/10/isab.php>.

⁵⁶ CND UK, *Secret Plan to Replace Nuclear Warheads - Parliament Misled*, 2007 [cited 15 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.cnduk.org/index.php/press-releases/trident/secret-plan-to-replace-nuclear-warheads-parliament-misled.html>; George Monbiot, ‘We Lie and Bluster About Our Nukes - and then Wag Our Fingers at Iran,’ *The Guardian*, London (29 July 2008).

⁵⁷ There were five NWS when the NPT was signed, which are recognised as such under the Treaty; China, France, Russia, the UK and the US. There are now nine; India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan have joined them, but are classed as ‘unofficial’ NWS, not recognised as such by the NPT.

NPT Review Conferences (RevCons) have been either ignored or broken by the NWS.⁵⁸ Meanwhile, the 2005 RevCon was a total failure; an “*exercise in reality-avoidance*”, with negotiations stymied by “*a small number of states who wanted to keep their own nuclear options as unfettered as possible.*”⁵⁹ Though the NPT remains essential as a non-proliferation tool, its inability to produce tangible disarmament progress, coupled with the increasingly aggressive nuclear policies of the NWS, has created considerable frustration and resentment among many non-NWS undermining political will to maintain their part of the NPT bargain. Analysts are mixed in their perceptions of the impact of such developments on the NPT regime. This has led some commentators to argue the Treaty is “*...sliding towards irrelevance.*”⁶⁰ Meanwhile the CD, the only UN body authorised to negotiate new disarmament and arms control treaties, has been unable to agree to a negotiating mandate, let alone an agenda, since 1997.

The modern international environment is characterised by non-traditional security threats arising from issues such as climate change, environmental degradation, overpopulation, terrorism and intra-state conflict. Nuclear weapons are useless in dealing with any such threats. In the so-called ‘war on terror’, for example, they are “*...not credible against extremist groups that cannot be located.*”⁶¹ Even former US President George W Bush has acknowledged the deficiency of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary environment.⁶² Furthermore, the many billions of dollars spent every year on maintaining nuclear weapons exacerbate contemporary security threats by preventing the allocation of the human and financial resources needed to deal with them effectively.

⁵⁸ Only one of the disarmament measures agreed at the 1995 RevCon has been achieved, and that one only partially; the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been completed but has not entered into force. Of the states whose ratification of the CTBT is required for its entry into force, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have not signed it, while China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the US have signed but not ratified it.

⁵⁹ Egypt, Iran and the US are widely regarded as responsible for the failure of the 2005 RevCon to produce any substantive result. However, as Johnson points out, this oversimplifies the reality of the situation and “*...ignores the complicit role of other delegations and the motivations and deficiencies of other important players.*” Rebecca Johnson, “Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed,” *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 80 (Autumn 2005).

⁶⁰ Julian Borger, ‘US Cannot Deter Nuclear Upstarts’ *The Guardian Weekly*, London (18 October 2006). As argued in subsequent chapters, the NPT is not irrelevant; it remains an essential part of the international nuclear security regime. However, serious reconsideration of its role is needed to ensure its viability and implementation in years to come.

⁶¹ David Krieger and Stanley K. Shienbaum, “Preventing Future Nuclear Catastrophes,” *The Sunflower*, 128, (March 2008).

⁶² ... While nonetheless insisting that it remains essential to US security. See: George W Bush, *Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University*, 1 May 2001 [cited 30 October 2006]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html>.

Despite these considerations, the NWS have maintained and modernised their nuclear arsenals, insisting that they provide them with unique security benefits. This is a constant source of motivation for other states to seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The preeminent international panel of legal, political, academic and military nuclear security experts that comprised the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter, *the Canberra Commission*) acknowledged this when they wrote, “*The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them.*”⁶³ In mid-1998, India and Pakistan both tested nuclear weapons and declared themselves NWS. The two countries have essentially now begun a mini-nuclear arms race, aided in recent months by nuclear cooperation deals with several of the original NWS (more details below). Additionally, India and Pakistan have been waging a low-intensity conflict for several years over the disputed Kashmir region. The potential for this conflict to escalate into a major war, as has happened three times since Indian partition in 1947, therefore has deeply worrying connotations. In 2003, North Korea responded to various US threats by pulling out of the NPT - the only country ever to do so.⁶⁴ In October 2006, it declared itself a NWS after successfully testing a nuclear explosive device. In the Middle East, tension is high and is being exacerbated by nuclear weapons-related issues. Israel, which refuses to sign the NPT or the 1996 Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), is widely acknowledged to have an undeclared nuclear weapons arsenal.⁶⁵ In behaviour reminiscent of its ‘Osiraq Diplomacy’,⁶⁶ Israel has been threatening to bomb Iran in order to stop it from developing nuclear weapons, as many in the West believe Iran is aiming to do.⁶⁷

⁶³ The Canberra Commission and its 1996 Report are examined further in the chapter three. Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, *Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons* Canberra: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (August 1996), 10.

⁶⁴ North Korea cited as explanation for its withdrawal from the NPT its targeting in the pre-emptive nuclear strike policy of the US and its inclusion in the ‘axis of evil’ named by US President George Bush in his 2002 State of the Union address. See: Jean du Preeze and William Potter, *North Korea’s Withdrawal From the NPT: A Reality Check*, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 9 April 2003 [cited 9 September 2007]. Available from <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm>.

⁶⁵ Estimates of its size range from 75 to 400. The US Defense Intelligence Agency estimates the number at between 60 and 80. See: Federation of American Scientists, *WMD Around the World*, 8 January 2007 [cited 5 April 2008]. Available from <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/>.

⁶⁶ In 1981, Israel bombed the Iraqi *Osiraq* nuclear facility based on fears it was being used to develop nuclear weapons. This type of behaviour is deeply destabilising for the entire international community and merely increases motivation to ‘breakout’ of the non-proliferation regime for non-NWS considering such a move. An Iraqi scientist working at Osiraq at the time, for example, claims that prior to the attack, research at the site was “*nothing sophisticated and focused.*” Immediately following the attack, however, researchers received explicit orders to build a nuclear bomb. See: Patrick Jackson, *Israeli Attack ‘Jump-Started Nuclear Programme*, BBC News, 5 June 2006 [cited 27 October 2008]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4774541.stm

⁶⁷ The pronouncements of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have been deeply unhelpful. Although there is some disagreement over exact translations of his words, he has been widely reported as threatening

The proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-state actors is also now viewed as a credible threat, although there is disagreement among experts over the seriousness of the issue. This threat has been brought into focus by factors such as the deterioration of the Russian nuclear infrastructure (particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union)⁶⁸ and the discovery in the early 2000s of a nuclear black market being operated by Pakistan's former chief nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan. Networks run by Khan are known to have transferred dual-use (civilian / military) nuclear technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.⁶⁹

Due to the fact that the same enrichment technology is used to make fuel for both nuclear weapons and power reactors, nuclear weapons proliferation is also a likely side effect of the planned expansion of nuclear energy programmes globally. A recent ISAB report identified 41 states that have expressed interest in developing nuclear energy and acknowledged, "...*the rise in nuclear power worldwide...inevitably increases the risks of proliferation.*"⁷⁰ Former US Vice-president Al Gore has said, "*In the eight years I served in the White House, every weapons proliferation issue we faced was linked with a civilian reactor program.*"⁷¹ The response to this risk from both Russia and the West has been to seek further development of multilateral nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing facilities,⁷² rather than allowing new countries to develop their own. Given the 'inalienable' right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as guaranteed by the NPT, however, there is strong resentment of and resistance to such proposals – particularly from member states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).⁷³ Most recently, the Bush Administration has turned the NPT regime on its head by

repeatedly to 'wipe Israel off the map'. For a balanced summary of the politics surrounding Iran's nuclear programme, see George Monbiot, 'Nuking the Treaty,' *The Guardian*, London (28 July 2008).

⁶⁸ Philip Nice, *Playing Fast and Loose with Megadeath*, *The Trumpet*, 15 April 2008 [cited 15 July 2008]. Available from <http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?q=5025.3312.0.0>.

⁶⁹ Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons*, 38.

⁷⁰ International Security Advisory Board, *Report on Proliferation Implications of the Global Expansion of Civil Nuclear Power*, US Department of State, (May 2008).

⁷¹ Jonathan Freedland, 'Born Again [Interview with Al Gore],' *The Guardian*, London (31 May 2006).

⁷² This idea of multilateral management of nuclear materials was discussed as early as 1946, when the Baruch Plan proposed "*a far-reaching plan for multilateralising all nuclear activities, from mining to final disposal.*" Historically, such plans have come to little, but recent proliferation developments have sparked renewed interest in the concept. These include the discovery of the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market; the 2003 finding of the IAEA regarding Iran's non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards obligations; and North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT the same year. See: Harald Müller, *Multilateral Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Arrangements*, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Paper no. 35), 2005 [cited 25 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No35.pdf>.

⁷³ The NAM is a group of states that were formally independent of the bi-polar allegiance structure during the Cold War. Formed in 1955, the NAM comprises many countries which gained independence during the mid-20th Century. At present, there are 118 NAM members. See: <http://canada.cubanoal.cu/ingles/index.html>

completing a nuclear cooperation deal with India, despite the country not having signed either the NPT or the CTBT.⁷⁴ The Executive Director of the US-based Arms Control Association described the deal as “*a non-proliferation disaster.*”⁷⁵ India now has no incentive to sign the NPT, as it is receiving more support for its civilian nuclear industry than many non-NWS NPT signatories. US claims that the deal strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime are indicative of how little interest it has shown in international law or multilateral institutions under the Bush presidency.⁷⁶

Putting aside this abundance of bad news, there are some positive developments that are cause for hope in the present strategic environment and deserve mention here. The UK deserves credit, having reduced its nuclear arsenal to around 200 missiles based on a single launch platform (its Trident nuclear-powered submarines). It has also reduced the alert status of these missiles, increasing their time-to-fire for ‘from minutes to days’. In collaboration with Norway and a UK-based NGO, the *Verification Research, Training and Information Centre* (VERTIC), the UK has also undertaken preliminary research into verification mechanisms needed to advance nuclear disarmament and has offered to host a conference of NWS to discuss verification issues further.⁷⁷ In late 2003, Libya agreed to dismantle its illegal nuclear weapons programme, developed in part with materials and knowledge gathered through the Khan nuclear black market. Its cooperation with international inspections since that time has increased awareness of the extent and nature of the activities of the Khan network, helping to strengthen future work to uphold the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The end of the Bush Administration and the positive pronouncements of the US President Elect, Barack Obama,

⁷⁴ This deal marks the first reduction in decades of US export-controls on highly-enriched uranium (which can be used as fuel for both nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors), for the sake of encouraging trade with a non-NPT signatory. Ironically, the US is simultaneously making increasingly strident demands that the international community step up non-proliferation efforts, safeguards and controls through mechanisms such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

⁷⁵ Darryl Kimball, *Statement of Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association Executive Director, on the U.S.-Indian Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation*, 1 October 2008 [cited 15 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3363>.

⁷⁶ US foreign policy under the ‘Bush doctrine’ has seriously undermined confidence in and respect for the global political and legal order, upon which nuclear arms control measures depend for legitimacy. In broad terms, this doctrine encompasses the use of force against countries suspected of harbouring or supporting terrorists; pre-emptive attack against countries considered a threat to the US or its vital interests; the aggressive promotion of democracy, including by force where necessary; and the willingness to take unilateral military action in any of these cases. Its illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a key example of this.

⁷⁷ United Nations Department of Public Information, *‘Contagious’ Doctrine of Deterrence Has Made Non-proliferation More Difficult, Raised New Risks, Secretary General Says in Address to East-West Institute*, 24 October 2008 [cited 26 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11881.doc.htm>.

on the issue of eliminating nuclear weapons, also offer some hope for renewed progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament in the coming years.⁷⁸

6. Conclusion

With the international nuclear non-proliferation regime in crisis, rapid progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament is vital to the long-term survival of humanity. In 1984, New Zealand's principled nuclear free policy made it a flag-bearer for nuclear disarmament advocates around the world; it is a source of hope for the international disarmament community. According to disarmament expert Professor William Epstein, the policy garnered respect and influence for New Zealand in nuclear security matters.⁷⁹ The potential for New Zealand to play a leading role in the drive to eliminate nuclear weapons today should therefore not be underestimated.

This thesis provides critical analysis of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy from 1995 to 2000 and assesses the role that New Zealand-based NGOs - operating domestically or transnationally - played in its development. The aim is to draw conclusions about the efficacy of New Zealand Governmental and non-governmental efforts to advance the international nuclear disarmament agenda, with a view to generating policy advice that will strengthen the work of both sectors, individually and collaboratively.

It is important to acknowledge that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are both vital aspects of nuclear security. They are mutually reinforcing processes and thus, need to be addressed in a balanced and cohesive manner, as New Zealand has suggested for many years. While this thesis recognises the important role that non-proliferation plays in maintaining international security, due to the time and resource constraints associated with Masters-level research, it is not possible to address the issue in this context. Additionally, given that progress in nuclear disarmament necessarily favours the aims of non-proliferation, the latter can be thought of as a subset of the former.⁸⁰ For these reasons, the present research focuses solely on New Zealand's nuclear disarmament policy.

⁷⁸ This is covered in more detail in the conclusion chapter.

⁷⁹ Mike Munro, 'Nuke Policy Aid to World Influence,' *The Dominion*, Wellington (20 August 1991).

⁸⁰ United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, *United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (A/57/124)*, 30 August 2002 [cited 25 June 2007]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/456/87/PDF/N0245687.pdf?OpenElement>, 11.

Chapter two outlines the theoretical and methodological bases for this research. Given the principled, ideational nature of New Zealand's nuclear free policy, a constructivist framework is selected as the most appropriate foundation for the investigation. Chapters three and four examine government policy and NGO advocacy during the research period, respectively. Chapter five draws together the constructivist understandings outlined in the theory chapter with the empirical findings from the government and non-governmental policy chapters. This discussion identifies the most effective strategies for advancing nuclear disarmament adopted by both groups during the research period. Chapter five also analyses the contemporary role and mandate of New Zealand's non-governmental disarmament advocates. The concluding chapter draws on this discussion to identify the key strengths of New Zealand's NGO nuclear disarmament community and suggests ways in which these can be used to complement those of the government sector. The overall findings of the research are reflected in four key policy recommendations designed to help New Zealand maximise its potential for effective nuclear disarmament advocacy in the contemporary environment.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework

“An army of principles can penetrate where an army of soldiers cannot.”

~Thomas Paine
(Philosopher and Revolutionary, 1737-1809)

1. Introduction

For several centuries, sovereign states have been the only actors with the resources, infrastructure and legitimate allegiance to operate at the international level. As a result, they have long been the core, if not the exclusive, focus of international relations (IR) scholarship. However, aided by the revolutions in the transport and communications sectors in the 19th and 20th centuries, as well as developments in human rights, democracy and the rule of law, a whole range of new actors is now capable of engaging at the international level. As a result, influences on contemporary international relations arise from a myriad of sources; the rise of the non-governmental sector is a significant example of this. According to former New Zealand Disarmament Minister, Phil Goff, for example,

*“...Governments have lost their monopoly of international relations and there are new players to be acknowledged and drawn into the search for solutions... NGOs and community groups, linked through the internet and by international media and network [sic] of contacts, are a formidable force – either to push for progress or to hold it back.”*¹

In the disarmament realm specifically, the increasing international influence of NGOs has also been acknowledged. Former New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark has said, for example: *“Civil society organisations are demonstrating that they are more effective than ever. The Ottawa Convention banning landmines was driven by the work of many NGOs which forced governments to tackle what they thought was unachievable.”*²

¹ Phil Goff, 'Speech to the Annual Dinner of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs', The Wellington Club, Wellington (11 May 2001). Goff was New Zealand Disarmament Defence, Trade, and Minister from 2005-2008 and was Foreign Minister from 1999-2005.

² Helen Clark, Address to the *State of the World Forum*, 5 September 2000 [cited 4 June 2008]. Available from <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/address+state+world+forum+new+york>.

The New Zealand Government has acknowledged this reality and over time, has increased consultation and interaction with the NGO community, both domestically and internationally. In the context of nuclear disarmament, this has manifested itself through, *inter alia*, the appointment of New Zealand NGO experts to intergovernmental panels; the inclusion of NGO representatives on government delegations to international meetings such as NPT RevCons; and the implementation of regular NGO-government consultations. Likewise, political theory has responded to the emergence of non-governmental influences by introducing new ‘actors’ onto the political stage, ranging from international organisations at the system level down to individual citizens.

This thesis recognises the ongoing reality of state dominance in international relations by making New Zealand foreign policy the core of analysis. This decision also reflects the reality that, as far as is known at present, states are the only actors that possess nuclear weapons.³ Nevertheless, as Wendt points out, “...statism need not be bound by realist ideas about what “state” must mean.”⁴ The constraints traditionally associated with state-centric analysis are addressed here by exploring and describing *non-governmental* influences on state foreign policy and behaviour.

The first aim of the research is to establish where there has been influence or a causative link between New Zealand-based NGO advocacy and New Zealand nuclear disarmament policy during the research period. The second aim is to assess the value of such influence, both in the eyes of the government and in terms of advancing international nuclear disarmament.

In order to assess NGO influence on government, New Zealand foreign policy behaviour will be compared with the ideas and policies promoted by the NGO community. At the outset, it must be acknowledged that accurately attributing policy influence is a complex and often problematic task, as there is always a range of influences that affect political decision-making. Therefore, in order to account for intervening factors, other potential sources of influence on New Zealand policy are discussed as and when appropriate. These may include, *inter alia*:

³ Concerns have, nevertheless, been expressed by some analysts over the efforts of terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons.

⁴ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992), 424.

- Other states' nuclear policies, diplomacy and behaviour – both like-minded states and those generally unsupportive of nuclear disarmament
- Developments in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Conference on Disarmament (CD)
- The personalities, experiences and personal networks of government-sector individuals, including heads of state, Ministers, Ministry officials and MPs
- International negotiations in related or interdependent foreign policy fields; for example, trade and defence
- The work of international NGOs and individuals

Three main processes are traced in this research in order to assess NGO influence on government policy: first, key international developments affecting or related to nuclear disarmament; second, the development and implementation of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament policy (including a brief examination of the government's decision making process in this field); and third, the domestic and transnational campaigns, initiatives and policies promoted by New Zealand-based NGOs. For international developments, examination covers the entire decade of the 1990s. This provides a strong contextual background for the more narrow analysis of New Zealand Governmental and NGO policies and ideas, which are covered from 1995-2000.⁵ This time frame represents one review cycle of the NPT, an appropriate controlling mechanism given the Treaty's status as the key international agreement governing multilateral nuclear disarmament and arms control.

There is a range of areas in which NGO influence on government policy might be observed. These include *inter alia*: changes in theoretical understandings about the international system, New Zealand's national identity or appropriate role in world affairs; the type and composition of human, organisational, and consultative networks established or maintained over the period; methods of diplomatic operation favoured; and the specific focus or goals of foreign policy. Primary sources for the research included:

⁵ In the case of one NGO initiative, the World Court Project (WCP), which came to fruition during this stated research period, analysis here is broader than this 5-year period. Given that the WCP has had wide-reaching implications for New Zealand foreign policy up to the present day, some examination of earlier developments in the Project are necessary in order to present its influence on government policy in a clear historical context.

- Interviews with NGO and academic experts, ex-Ministers and MFAT disarmament officials
- Advice papers presented to Ministers / NPT delegates by MFAT prior to NPT RevCons, Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) and other international nuclear security meetings
- Official New Zealand papers presented at NPT RevCons and PrepComs and at the UNGA or the CD
- Debriefings submitted by government representatives on return from such meetings
- Relevant NGO and governmental publications from the period
- Minutes from:
 - Government / opposition-party consultations with NGOs
 - The Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC)
 - Meetings of NGO organisations
- Correspondence, reports and position papers passed between NGOs and from NGOs to government

2. Constructivism: the Power of Values, not the Value of Power

As a clear derogation from the power politics anticipated by rationalist analyses, New Zealand's nuclear free policy suggests the possibility of a stronger role for principled, ideas-based politics than has traditionally been accepted.⁶ Nuclear arms-control theorist Emanuel Adler points out that,

“Knowledge relating to arms control cannot be separated from values...Human values affect action by influencing our definition of a particular situation and by directing our choice of relevant “facts” or “interests”. The interdependence of facts and values implies a constant shifting between empirical and normative elements in decision-making.”⁷

⁶ The limitations of rationalist theories in dealing with New Zealand's nuclear free policy are dealt with in more detail later in this chapter.

⁷ Emmanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organisation* 46, 1 (Winter 1992), 108.

Traditional IR theories – particularly in the realist school of thought, which is based on rationalism’s core assumptions - use the international balance of power as a primary means of explaining state behaviour. Power in this sense is traditionally defined quantitatively and in terms of military capabilities. Such theories, therefore, have a very limited ability to explain the political realities of nuclear freedom. As a means of creating security, nuclear freedom draws strength from developing good relations with other countries, rather than relative power over them. Such a policy makes sense only if a country sees trust, goodwill and mutual respect as a feasible outcome of foreign policy efforts, as is the case with New Zealand. Former Prime Minister Helen Clark, for example, who chaired the Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee which drafted New Zealand’s nuclear free legislation, writes:

*“New Zealand has long been at the forefront of international efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons. We, and the many people, organisations and countries which support this goal want to build a world based on peaceful relations between people achieved through trust and mutual respect rather than suspicion and hostility.”*⁸

The challenge, then, is to frame the current research in a way that makes sense of the values and ideas that shape New Zealand policy on nuclear disarmament, as well as addressing the practical or rational factors that mediate the interactions between the New Zealand Government on one hand, and NGOs, foreign governments and international events on the other.

Constructivism presents the most appropriate starting point for this complex task. It places a strong emphasis on ideas and ideas-based phenomena such as norms, values and morals in explaining foreign policy decisions and behaviour, and pays attention to the *processes* that govern interactions between the various stakeholders in foreign policy formation.

A key principle of constructivism is that “...people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that objects have for them.”⁹ In the field of international relations, constructivist theory thus acknowledges the reality that international events and threats are not simply objective ‘facts’. They are interpreted by each country in an entirely

⁸ Green, *The Naked Nuclear Emperor*, Foreword.

⁹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 396.

subjective manner, based on that country's understanding of its identity and place in the world in relation to the identities it assigns to others. This idea is well exemplified by the changing US perceptions of New Zealand's role in the world as a nuclear free nation.¹⁰

Constructivist analysis focuses on how interpretations of the national interest,¹¹ derived from understandings about the identity of self and other, affect what is considered an 'appropriate' response to events and threats. Former New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange expressed this type of understanding in relation to New Zealand's nuclear free policy: "*The whole point of our policy was that it was right for our circumstances. It was our judgement, based on our assessment of what we needed for our security.*"¹²

Norms-Based Analysis

Over the last two decades, the influence of norms on state behaviour has been a key field of constructivist investigation. Norms theory provides a sound macrotheoretical framework for analysis of nuclear disarmament policy drivers for New Zealand. Broadly speaking, a norm is considered to constitute, "...a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity."¹³ There is no objective standard by which to judge 'good' norm from a 'bad' one; all norms are 'good' to the agents that promote them. Adler asserts it is the commonality of beliefs among stakeholders in any given field that legitimises those beliefs. "*On all three levels – epistemic community, domestic political system, and international system - sharing of premises and expectations, or "theories," creates the "evidence" that confirms the validity of norms.*"¹⁴ Conversely, in international affairs, legitimacy of state actions is in part derived from adherence to relevant norms in a given situation. Kratochwil states: "*Norms become the basis for validity claims.*"¹⁵ In the context of New Zealand foreign policy, the broad consensus regarding the positive value of multilateral nuclear disarmament therefore becomes a legitimising factor for investigation of ways of to advance that agenda.

¹⁰ This point is discussed further in later chapters.

¹¹ Discussion of this key IR concept follows below.

¹² David Lange, *Nuclear Free: the New Zealand Way* (Auckland: Penguin, 1990), 117.

¹³ This definition of Finnemore's correlates very closely to the definition of norms adopted by Katzenstein, being: "*collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given identity.*" Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 891.; P. J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York, 1996), 5.

¹⁴ Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation," 107-108.

¹⁵ Friedrich Kratochwil, "The Force of Prescriptions," *International Organization* 38, 4 (Autumn 1984), 699.

Norms exist in all sectors of society and at all levels of political life.¹⁶ Theorists differ greatly, however, on how and when they affect the behaviour of states. From a rationalist viewpoint, which assumes states are inherently self-serving and have fixed identities and thus interests, norms constrain the behaviour of states, but how they do so is dependent on the international distribution of power. Checkel describes how for rationalists, further to this, norms merely “...*facilitate cooperation among self-interested actors,*” without affecting their identities.¹⁷ However, for many years now constructivist research has demonstrated empirically that in fact, norms “...*carry social content and are often independent of power distributions.*”¹⁸ In this sense, it is not simply the distribution of material power that determines compliance with norms, but the prescriptive power they embody. According to Shannon, norms contain not just prescriptive (or proscriptive) elements, but also *parameters*. Both of these are important, as “...*both are vulnerable to subjective interpretation by actors.*” The prescriptive elements of a norm are active in “...*informing actors within an identity what to do (or what not to do)*”, whereas parameters, “...*indicate under what situations the norm’s prescription applies.*”¹⁹

Based on the underlying constructivist assumption that “...*behavior, interests, and relationships are socially constructed, and can therefore change,*”²⁰ norms are also seen by constructivist theorists to play a role in constituting the identities and interests of states.²¹ A norms-based analysis of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament policy and advocacy is therefore useful for at least two reasons; firstly, it responds to the role of intangible, ideational factors in shaping its behaviour in this field. These include the country’s sense of national identity and thus, perception of its place and role in the world. Secondly, it is sensitive to the role that the norm of nuclear disarmament has played over time in *reshaping* that national identity, which in turn has implications for ongoing New Zealand foreign policy behaviour. Inside a normative framework, this thesis uses primary source materials to trace the development of policies, identifying the paths through which new ideas and understandings about nuclear disarmament have been created and diffused, domestically and then internationally. One area in which constructivist norms theorists have been criticised is in

¹⁶ Vaughn P. Shannon, "Norms Are What States Make of Them: the Political Psychology of Norm Violation," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, (2000), 295.

¹⁷ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity," *International Studies Quarterly* 43, (1999), 84.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Shannon, "Norms Are What States Make of Them," 295.

²⁰ Edward Newman, "Human Security and Constructivism," *International Studies Perspectives* 2, (2001), 247.

²¹ Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity," 84.

their relative lack of flexibility around the role of agency in facilitating normative change. Shannon, for example, points out that constructivism's understanding that

*"...states take cues from the social environment to determine how to behave and what interests and identity to claim...ignores the mediating role of agents in receiving and interpreting messages from the environment. The "message" of social structure must be received through the filter of human agency."*²²

In a similar vein, Checkel argues that,

*"While this constructivist scholarship has broadened our understanding of the role played by norms, it...neglects to explore in a systematic manner the mechanisms through which international norms reach the domestic arena. Constructivists fail to specify diffusion mechanisms and thus cannot offer a causal argument, verified through process tracing, of how norms are transmitted to states and have constitutive effects."*²³

This is not to say that either the social structures created by expectations about appropriate modes of behaviour, or the individual agents within those structures, are the exclusive source of policy influence. Rather, *"...choice results from the interaction of agent and structure, whereby motivated yet accountable agents pursue goals with an eye toward what is acceptable according to the prevailing social structure."*²⁴

This thesis provides an analytical balance which responds to this understanding. The macro-theoretical insight offered by norms theory about the role of structure in determining policy is balanced against a micro-level process tracing approach, used to determine the means or *agency* through which the nuclear disarmament norm has been diffused domestically and internationally.

Finnemore and Sikkink's (hereinafter, Finnemore) concept of the *norm lifecycle* is a key construct used to frame analysis here. This posits that a norm goes through three phases of

²² Shannon, "Norms Are What States Make of Them," 297-298.

²³ Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity," 85.

²⁴ Shannon, "Norms Are What States Make of Them," 298.

development: *emergence, acceptance and internalisation*.²⁵ This provides a sound framework for assessing the levels of development of particular norms domestically and in the international community.

The *emergence* stage of the life cycle is characterised by the work of individuals and groups of individuals known as '*norm entrepreneurs*': people who advocate a novel and thus minority point of view. "*Norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms.*"²⁶ Nationally-active entrepreneurs with the support of organisational platforms are said to be critical in the emergence stage, during which, "*...little normative change occurs without significant domestic movements supporting such change.*"²⁷ The ability of norms to constitute new modes of action by states in this early stage is said by Checkel to be contingent on norm *empowerment*:

*"Norm empowerment directs our attention to earlier stages in policymaking, when the issue is not compliance with or the implementation of well-established regime norms, but how they first have constitutive effects."*²⁸

As outlined by Risse-Kappen, this empowerment can occur either through elite-level 'top-down' diffusion of a norm in which "*...popular consensus is a function of elite consensus*"; or grass-roots, 'bottom-up' diffusion, in which "*...the general public has a measurable and distinct impact on the foreign policy-making process.*"²⁹ Checkel notes that the latter has received more attention in norms literature, due in part to the fact that "*...the shaming activities of organizations like Greenpeace or Amnesty International are very much in the public (and scholarly) eye, and undoubtedly play a major role empowering norms.*"³⁰ As discussion below demonstrates, this is indeed the case in the present research area, where empowerment of the norm in New Zealand came strongly through a bottom-up mechanism. Based on the empirical evidence related to public support for the nuclear free policy, this is

²⁵ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895-905.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 895.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 902.

²⁸ Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity," 87.

²⁹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43, 4 (July 1991), 480-481.

³⁰ Checkel, "Norms, Institutions and National Identity," 88.

consistent with Risse-Kappen's assertion that, "*Policy makers in liberal democracies do not decide against an overwhelming public consensus.*"³¹

The second stage of the norm lifecycle, *acceptance*, is characterised by a dynamic of imitation, as "...*norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers.*" The influence of domestic pressures characteristic of the first stage of a norm's development tends to decrease markedly in the second stage. The reasons for which states may conform to the new norm during this stage include, "...*pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem.*"³²

During the process of socialisation among states, a *tipping point* may be reached once a critical mass of states adopts the norm. This leads to a sudden surge in norm adherents, designated a *norm cascade*. There is "...*convincing quantitative empirical support*" for both the tipping point and cascade concepts.³³ Entry-into-force clauses in international treaties indicate recognition of the tipping point concept in the practice of international law. However, there has been little theoretical exploration to date of when and where a tipping point will be reached. Drawing on empirical research, Finnemore presents two hypotheses in this regard: firstly, they are rare before one third of states in the system adopt a norm. Secondly, not all states have equal weighting of influence, so this is a guideline only to the critical mass needed for a cascade to occur. To address this reality, Finnemore introduces the notion of *critical states*. These are states without which "...*the achievement of the substantive norm goal is compromised.*" Which states are critical will vary from issue to issue.³⁴ Unanimity among these critical states is not essential for a norm cascade to occur, but support from some of them is essential. Finnemore argues that the number of states required for the entry into force of a given treaty may serve as a useful proxy for the critical mass in the sector addressed by the treaty.

In the field of nuclear disarmament, there are two clear subsets of critical states whose acceptance of the norm will likely be essential to achieving its goal. The first is made up of the nine countries that currently possess nuclear weapons,³⁵ whose active support for and

³¹ Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," 510.

³² Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895.

³³ *Ibid.*, 901.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan Russia, the UK and the US.

collaboration with any multilateral disarmament treaty will be essential in order to ensure its viability. The second set of critical states includes those that possess the *indigenous capability to produce nuclear weapons*, as well as *any state considered a proliferation risk* by the international community. This categorisation is supported by the entry into force conditions of the CTBT which stipulates not merely the number of states, but also a list of 44 *specific* states, which must ratify it in order for it to enter into force.

The final stage of the norm life cycle is the *internalisation*. At this stage, norms “*acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate.*”³⁶ Institutions have been put in place to support the norm, and conformity with its standards becomes habitual.

The concept of the norm lifecycle will enable the present research to address questions such as:

- How widely is the international norm of nuclear disarmament accepted?
- Can a quantitative value (such as the number of states which have adopted it) accurately reflect the level of support for this norm?
- Is the norm supported by effective international institutions and if so, which of these are most likely to influence further adoption of the norm?
- What mechanisms are most likely to facilitate the implementation of a norm’s objective?

The *lifecycle* concept was developed to structure analysis of the uptake of norms in the international community of states. However, the present research is exploring the behaviour of a norm leader; a state which already adheres to (and in this case, *has internalised*) the nuclear disarmament norm and is actively encouraging others to do the same. Norms theory has not been fully explored in this area. In describing the causative patterns for New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy, the present research will therefore deepen this aspect of Finnemore’s norms framework. The area to be explored can be described by posing the following questions:

- How does norm internalisation affect causative patterns for norm leadership?

³⁶ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895.

- Is norm promotion by a norm leader driven by the same structural logic and characteristics as norm adoption?

A further attribute of norms theory that is useful in the present case is its responsiveness to the *intangible* value of *morality* in foreign policy decision making. Value judgements and normative influence have been an integral part of international relations scholarship and practice for thousands of years, through the exploration of ideas of justice, right and wrong, and a 'good' society.

However, in the mid-20th century, IR scholarship left aside such intangible, ideational concerns for methodological reasons - they are not easily measured.³⁷ The move away from ideas-based analysis was entrenched during the late 1970s and early 1980s as many IR theorists applied economic models to the study of international relations – nuclear strategy is a case in point.³⁸ A serious shortcoming of such an approach is that it removes the human psychological element from politics. *“The result is politics without passion or principles, which is hardly the politics of the world in which we live.”*³⁹

Norms theory takes a holistic approach to understanding behaviour, drawing on a wide range of social science traditions including sociology, philosophy and law. This enables it to identify and respond to the prescriptive aspects of nuclear disarmament advocacy and therefore recommends it to the current analysis. In pressing the case for nuclear disarmament, the *prescriptive* universal value – the 'oughtness' to disarm - underlies much of New Zealand's work. As Goff has said, in practical terms, this means New Zealand *“...has long pressed for international relationships to be governed by a system of international rules and frameworks rather than outcomes crudely depending on the size and relative strength of countries...”*⁴⁰

As noted above, norms theory represents a return to classical ideas about the influence of human psychology, and in particular human morality, on state behaviour. However, in

³⁷ Ibid., 889.

³⁸ The works of other theorists show that this practice was actually pioneered much earlier than the 1970s. Adler, for example, shows that the arms control community in the US was applying mathematical and economic rationalism to nuclear politics as early as the 1950s, while other analysts have detailed the application of economic modelling to political science even earlier. See: Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation," 113-114.

³⁹ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 916.

⁴⁰ Goff, 'Speech to the Annual Dinner of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs'.

contrast to classical realism's understanding of the relationship between human and state behaviour, state identities are no longer seen as static, they are *dynamic*. As discussed by various constructivist theorists, the process of interpreting international events is historically contingent.⁴¹ Learning theory, for example, suggests that just as with humans, states have the ability to learn at complex levels, adapting their identities, interests and behaviour in ways that may over time constitute radical departures from previous positions. The US and USSR demonstrated this when they began cooperating on strategic arms control in the mid-20th century, despite previously being locked into a conflictual security regime.⁴² Likewise, New Zealand's transformation "*from nuclear ally to Pacific peacemaker*"⁴³ provides another real-world example of complex state learning.

The constructivist idea of *reality constraints* is a final concept which is useful in examining New Zealand nuclear disarmament policy and the influence of the NGO movement on it.⁴⁴ According to Weldes, *reality constraints* are the set of 'objective' realities that must be accounted for in the process of interpreting a country's national interests. During the Cold War (and today), the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons on high alert and the concomitant, ever-present threat of nuclear war were examples of these. All nations have to contend with the presence of these missiles in their calculations about what will best serve their national interest. Reality constraints, however, are also subject to change, as the process of massive nuclear stockpile reductions following the end of the Cold War demonstrated. Furthermore, although the weapons themselves may be objective realities, their meaning or significance is entirely subjective, based on perceptions derived in large part from ideas about national identity, as discussed further below.

In the case of New Zealand, a key reality constraint is its size. As a small state with limited financial and diplomatic resources, New Zealand's capability to develop and diffuse policy internationally is often dependent on international institutions and mechanisms or multilateral initiatives, which it supports strongly as a result. The New Zealand Government is therefore unlikely to implement policies advocated by the NGO movement when to do so would

⁴¹ Jutta Weldes, *Constructing National Interests: the United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 97-118.; Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It."

⁴² Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation."

⁴³ Kate Dewes and Alyn Ware, 'Aotearoa/New Zealand: from Nuclear Ally to Pacific Peacemaker', paper presented at the conference, "the Security of the Asia Pacific Region in the Post Cold War Era: Present Condition and Prospects", Nihon University (19 November 2004).

⁴⁴ Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*, 102.

require New Zealand to stand alone in the international community. Instead, it prefers to collaborate with like-minded states in order to promote its policies.

3. The Limits of Rationalism

As Cold War nuclear politics dominated thinking in the mid-to-late 20th century, the theories of neorealism and neoliberalism dominated IR scholarship and practice. Both sought to explain state behaviour through rationalist, quantitative accounts of international relations. As Finnemore points out, these theories could well be termed ‘econorealism’ and ‘econoliberalism’, as it was their application to IR analysis of economic insights and methodologies, derived from behavioural psychology, which gave them their distinctive features.⁴⁵

For rationalists, understanding the international balance of power is central to understanding patterns of state behaviour. This sets up what John H. Herz called the ‘security dilemma’,⁴⁶ which suggests states may be forced to enter into armed conflict against their will, in order to increase their relative power and thus alleviate insecurity. In a system dominated by such thinking, the outcome is that states are constantly fearful of being attacked. This situation and its inherently illogical nature are well exemplified by a statement from Thomas Schelling, a key proponent of nuclear arms control and Nobel Prize winner for his application of economic theory to the understanding of conflict: “*He thinks we think...he’ll attack; so he thinks we shall, so he will, so we must.*”⁴⁷ Considering that any attack with nuclear weapons will likely lead to the devastation of humankind, realism thus asserts that humans can actually behave very irrationally.

The dominant assumption that the Cold war was driven by a purely power-based logic is problematic, however. As Finnemore notes, US foreign policy, particularly in the early Cold War period, was a combination of power and “*legitimate social purpose.*”⁴⁸ Likewise today, the neoconservative ideology that drives US foreign policy relies on a strong moral rhetoric to generate their legitimacy, claiming to advance democracy worldwide in the name of peace, prosperity and human rights.

⁴⁵ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 890.

⁴⁶ Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*, 5 (quoting Herz).

⁴⁷ Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation," 123 (quoting Schelling).

⁴⁸ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 887 (quoting Ruggie).

Realism (as well as other traditions, though to a lesser extent) holds that the concept of the *national interest* is a key analytical tool for explaining state behaviour. *Neorealism* (also known as *structural realism*) in particular asserts that the anarchic structure of the international system dictates that the national interest *must* be defined in terms of the state's power relative to potential adversaries, in order to ensure the security of the state. Weldes summarises the traditional view of national interest well:

*“The absence of a suprastate leviathan places states in inevitable and perpetual competition...As a result, states must necessarily be concerned with their survival. The general content of the national interest is thus determined deductively; it is inferred from the anarchic, self-help character of the international system...Every state, that is, must pursue its national interest “defined in terms of power”, because this is the surest road to security and survival.”*⁴⁹

Some theorists have argued that the concept of the national interest is too generic to be analytically useful, as it may be interpreted to mean anything an analyst or IR practitioner needs it to, in order to support their argument.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, Weldes presents two compelling points in favour of the validity and usefulness of the concept; firstly, the language of *national interest* is that used by political practitioners when interpreting and deciding on foreign policy and behaviour. Secondly, it is the tool used in communicating ideas and decisions about foreign policy to their constituents, and thus in generating legitimacy and support for these policies. As former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has said: *“When you’re asking Americans to die, you have to be able to explain it in terms of national interest.”*⁵¹

The issue at stake, therefore, is not the relevance of the concept of national interest, but rather, its definition. The realist definition of the national interest, drawing on its rationalist roots, is inadequate for at least two reasons. The first of these is that such a definition is indeed “...too

⁴⁹ In this sense, anarchy does not mean chaos, but rather a lack of an over-arching executive government mandated with enforcing the rules regulating state behaviour in the international arena. See: Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*, 5 (quoting Morgenthau).

⁵⁰ For a discussion of these critiques, see *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁵¹ Jack Kelly, *'Amicable Divorce' Could Turn Nasty, Experts Say*, USA Today, 14 February 1996 [cited 22 November 2007]. Available from <http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/bosnia/nov95/nbos093.htm>

broad, too general, too vague, too all-inclusive” to be useful in describing the causes of state action.⁵² All explanations of state behaviour are simplistically attributed to the structure of international society, largely ignoring the myriad of intersecting pressures generated at the individual, group, state or regional levels that may influence state behaviour. Lavoy, for example, argues that nuclear proliferation decisions cannot be explained merely as a response to international security threats, as this would “...not take into account specific political, technical, or psychological factors that affect the day-to-day dynamics of any nuclear weapons program.”⁵³

In his seminal 1992 critique of neorealism, “*Anarchy Is What States Make of It*”, Wendt contested the claim that the anarchic structure of the current international system is the cause of self-interested state behaviour.⁵⁴ He returned to the human psychological causes that classical realists saw as driving state behaviour.⁵⁵ Just as at the interpersonal level, behaviour towards other actors in the international community depends fundamentally on the identities a state assumes for itself and assigns to those others:

*“States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which.”*⁵⁶

Wendt points out that this focus on *identity* and the *process of interaction* does not negate material power as a strong influence on state behaviour. However, “...how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations...that constitute their conceptions of self and other.”⁵⁷ The failure of realism to respond to this understanding limits its ability to account for changes at the systemic level.

The second failing of the realist definition of the national interest is therefore that it mistakenly assumes that all threats exist as objective facts, clearly recognisable as such

⁵² Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*, 6 (quoting Sondermann).

⁵³ Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses," *Non-Proliferation Review* 13, 3 (November 2006), 434.

⁵⁴ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It."

⁵⁵ See for example Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). It should be noted that despite this early development of classical realist theory, Waltz is in fact best remembered for his writings on neorealist political theory.

⁵⁶ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 397.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

viewed from any perspective. In fact, in every situation, the ‘reality’ of a threat is dependent on historical contingencies and the interpretations placed on them by the decision makers of the day, based on the identities assigned to *self* and *other*.⁵⁸ It is for this reason that “...*British missiles have a different significance for the United States than do Soviet missiles.*”⁵⁹

Neoliberalism, with its interest in the *process* of state interaction and learning (as well as the institutions that interaction creates), has a correlation to constructivist thought and goes some way to addressing the structural limitation of neorealism. Nevertheless, for neoliberals there remains an uneasy tension with their rationalist roots, which hold that the identities and interests of states are a ‘given’ and not capable of fundamental change. Neoliberalism has therefore also been unable to formulate a distinctive theory about how change occurs at the systemic level.⁶⁰

Rationalism in the Nuclear Context

Western decision makers during the Cold War relied heavily on the assumption that their Soviet counterparts shared their rationalist understandings about the place and meaning of the national interest in strategic decision-making. Given the limitations, as discussed above, to the objectivity that rationalism sees as underlying threats in the international system, this assumption is of questionable merit. The result of extrapolating on this erroneous assumption was the strict adherence to the theory of nuclear deterrence that governed strategic thinking for much of the second half of the 20th century.

General Lee Butler, former Commander in Chief of the US Strategic Command,⁶¹ has questioned the rationality of projecting US reasoning onto the Soviet leadership. He sees the assumption that the West could correctly interpret the worldview, motivations and criteria upon which Soviet strategic decisions were based as absurd:

“How is it that we subscribed to a deterrence strategy that required near-perfect understanding of an enemy from whom we were deeply alienated and

⁵⁸ Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*, 7-10.

⁵⁹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 397.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 393.

⁶¹ As head of the US Strategic Command from 1992-94, Butler controlled all the strategic nuclear forces of the US Air Force and Navy and was responsible for the maintenance of the US strategic deterrent. He has been an ardent opponent of nuclear deterrence since retiring in 1994.

largely isolated? How could we pretend to understand the motivations and intentions of the Soviet leadership, absent any substantive personal association?...Little wonder that intentions and motives were consistently misread.”⁶²

According to Butler, far from being a rational mode of thinking, nuclear deterrence as a means of securing the national interest makes “*no strategic sense.*” In order to maintain the policy, decision makers are obliged to ignore its often deeply flawed logic.⁶³ While rationality is undeniably a key strategic tool for political decision makers, it is erroneous to assume it has a constant value and meaning among them, or even that its logic will always be adhered to in the highly stressful, emotionally charged environment of nuclear strategising. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, this flawed assumption was debunked by real world experience with nuclear politics. Robert McNamara was US Secretary of Defence during the Crisis and an economist and mathematician by trade. He has this to say about the situation:

*“It was luck that prevented nuclear war. We came that close to nuclear war at the end. Rational individuals: Kennedy was rational; Khrushchev was rational; Castro was rational. Rational individuals came that close to total destruction of their societies.”*⁶⁴

Meeting with Cuban President Fidel Castro for the first time in 1992, McNamara asked the President three questions regarding his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis: 1) Had he known about the Soviet missiles? 2) Would he have recommended their use to the Soviet leader, Khrushchev? and 3) What would have happened to Cuba if they had been launched? Castro’s response astounded McNamara:

*“He said, “Number one, I knew they were there. Number two, I would not have recommended to Khrushchev, I did recommend to Khrushchev that they be used. Number three, ‘What would have happened to Cuba?’ It would have been totally destroyed.” That’s how close we were.”*⁶⁵

⁶² General Lee Butler, “A Voice of Reason,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 54, 3 (May-June 1998).

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Errol Morris, “The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara [documentary film],” (USA: Sony Pictures Classics, 2004).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

In this scenario, Castro was either acting irrationally in the heat of the moment, or he had an entirely different understanding to the US about what Cuba's national interests were in the Crisis.⁶⁶

On both the theoretical and practical levels, another failing of nuclear deterrence is that the set of assumptions and beliefs at the core of nuclear strategy has no basis in real world experience; put simply, no one has ever fought a nuclear war. As a result, the rationality of nuclear deterrence cannot be tested in the real world. When states have no prior experience of a phenomenon, theories structuring their analysis will necessarily be based on abstract propositions and models: *"Because the science of nuclear strategy has no empirical reference points and data banks, it cannot be falsified and is, in this sense, "imaginary."*⁶⁷

Rationalism and Nuclear Free New Zealand

New Zealand's 1987 nuclear free law exemplifies the limitations of rationalism and its underlying assumptions about the causes of foreign policy behaviour. Three issues in particular pose problems for a rationalist account of New Zealand's recent history. Firstly, in direct contrast to realist thinking, the instigation of the nuclear free policy was driven by an understanding that greater military power, when provided by nuclear weapons, would lessen New Zealand's security and chances of survival. Lange argued:

*"The people of New Zealand reached a very straightforward conclusion: that nuclear weapons which would defend them...caused them more alarm than any which threatened them, and accordingly, they deem it pointless to be defended by them."*⁶⁸

The second difficulty posed to a realist interpretation of New Zealand's nuclear free policy is the mechanism through which the country's national interest was determined. Traditional analyses see the national interest as determined in a top-down manner: the anarchic system presents objective threats and creates constraints on policy, which are interpreted at the state

⁶⁶ Alternatively, of course, it is also possible Castro was lying to McNamara, in order to serve some obscure contemporary agenda.

⁶⁷ Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation," 107 (quoting Alker).

⁶⁸ Lange, 'Nuclear Weapons Are Immoral'.

level by the government and state bureaucracy, with the resulting national interest and appropriate policy response then communicated to the public.

However, in the case of New Zealand's nuclear free policy, the national interest was decided in a bottom-up manner, debated and confirmed by the people of New Zealand and passed upwards to the political parties, who responded to overwhelming public pressure by adopting nuclear free policies. Clements, for example, writes that Labour's pursuit of its anti-nuclear policy in 1984 against the advice of both the Ministry of External Relations and Trade (now MFAT) and the Ministry of Defence, "...suggests that the influence of the antinuclear movement on the Labour Party and government policy had never been stronger." ⁶⁹

Meanwhile, opinion at the state and bureaucratic level was decisively split. Although the Labour Party had a strong anti-nuclear policy, officials in the Foreign Ministry were fiercely opposed to the policy. They attempted to undermine it and consistently put pressure on the government to rethink its position.⁷⁰

"Foreign Minister Russell Marshall confirmed at least three instances where Ministry officials included positive references to nuclear deterrence in international Ministerial speeches in order to undermine Lange's position." ⁷¹

The third problem facing a realist interpretation of New Zealand's nuclear free policy is its moral basis. The New Zealand people eschewed nuclear weapons because they believed that threatening other nations with destruction was immoral, unprincipled and not in the interests of the international community or consequently, the country. They sought to articulate a national interest based on the desire to create a more peaceful, secure international environment by working to engender trust, cooperation and mutual respect for commonly agreed modes of appropriate behaviour.⁷²

Despite the inability of rationalist-based theories to explain New Zealand's nuclear freedom, two ideas drawn from realist theory – when modified to function within a constructivist

⁶⁹ Kevin P. Clements, 'The Influence of Individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations on New Zealand Foreign Policy Making, 1943-1993,' in *Fifty Years of New Zealand Foreign Policy Making*, ed. Ann Trotter (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 1993), 131.

⁷⁰ Lange, *Nuclear Free*, 194.

⁷¹ Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 153.

⁷² Clark, *Address to the State of the World Forum*.

framework - can usefully be applied to analysis of the causes of New Zealand foreign policy behaviour: *permissive* and *efficient* (active) causes of state behaviour. In his early, classical realist writings, Waltz (who in fact is best remembered for his neorealist work), talked about the anarchic international system playing a *permissive* causative role in interstate warfare: wars occurred in part because there was nothing in the structure of international society to stop them. He then outlined the idea of active or *efficient* causes which created the stimulus for war.⁷³ In their original context, these ideas applied only to the initiation of war, this being an inevitable policy choice for states when viewed through a realist lens that assumes human 'nature' will always be self-serving and power-hungry. As discussed above, however, New Zealand has demonstrated an affinity with values such as trust and mutual respect. The ideas of *permissive* and *efficient* causes, therefore, when applied more broadly to New Zealand's foreign policy behaviour in general, as opposed to reasons for initiating war, are helpful in explaining the variations between the levels of nuclear disarmament advocacy of the fourth and fifth Labour Governments (1984 -1990 and 1999-2008) and the fourth National Government (1990-1999). Furthermore, when applied in this manner, they are not incompatible with the constructivist notion of *reality constraints*.⁷⁴

4. Conclusion

A constructivist approach has been demonstrated as most appropriate for analysing New Zealand's nuclear disarmament policies and the influence of non-governmental actors on them. Conversely, this chapter has shown that rationalist theories, with their focus on power politics and quantitative analysis of exogenously defined policy drivers, are unable to account for New Zealand's behaviour in this field. Likewise, such theories cope poorly with the complexities of the contemporary international system characterised by the expanding presence and influence of non-traditional actors and ideational concerns. As Kratochwil pointed out in his early exploration of normative influence on state behaviour, "*It is precisely because rule-following involves such terms as "forbidden" and "allowed," "may" and "entitled to" (i.e., deontic components) that a purely positivistic account of rule-following will often be insufficient.*"⁷⁵

⁷³ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*.

⁷⁴ Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*, 102.

⁷⁵ Kratochwil, "The Force of Prescriptions," 708.

Norms theory responds well to the role of moral and ideational concerns in motivating foreign policy behaviour. Key concepts drawn from norms theory such as the *norm lifecycle*, *norm entrepreneurs*, *norm leaders* and *critical states*, therefore provide a useful palette with which to undertake a comprehensive discussion of the motivations for New Zealand's advocacy of nuclear disarmament.

In addition, the conceptual pair of *permissive* and *efficient* causes of state behaviour, appropriated from realist theory and modified to function within a constructivist framework, is of value to the present research. The application of these concepts alongside norms-based analysis represents an amalgamated theoretical approach which will shed light on both the psychological factors (norms, values and identity) and processual factors (networks, institutions and international factors moderating the policy-making process and the relationship of NGOs to it) which influenced the evolution of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament policy from 1995-2000.

Chapters three and four examine New Zealand foreign policy behaviour and NGO advocacy of nuclear disarmament, respectively. In chapter five, discussion returns to the theoretical basis of this research, using it as a means to draw together the empirical findings and to assess how these three aspects of the research, when taken together, broaden understanding of the role of ideational and non-governmental influences on state behaviour.

Chapter 3:

New Zealand Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy 1995-2000

*“An internationalist and collective outlook has been a key part of New Zealand’s foreign policy from its beginnings. As a nation with little clout, but with interests and trading lines circling the globe, New Zealand has always sought to speak up for the rights of the weak against the powerful, and for a fair and democratic international order.”*¹

~ Rt. Hon. Don McKinnon
(New Zealand Foreign Minister, 1990-99)

1. Introduction

This chapter describes the New Zealand Government’s international promotion of nuclear disarmament between 1995 and 2000. In this sense, it is assessing New Zealand’s role as a *norm leader*, attempting “...to socialize other states to become norm followers.”² Discussion begins with a brief examination of the disarmament policy decision-making process. This is followed by a discussion of relevant international factors and events which formed the political backdrop to this period and a brief description of how New Zealand perceived and responded to these. Attention then turns to the core focus of the chapter: tangible cases of New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy.

2. The Policy Process

The creation of nuclear disarmament policy in New Zealand involves input from a range of governmental and non-governmental sources. Geoff Randall, the former Director of MFAT’s Disarmament Division,³ described the governmental process as follows; at the most basic

¹ Don McKinnon, 'New Zealand’s Security: 1990 and Beyond', Paper presented at the 32nd Otago Foreign Policy School, Otago University, Dunedin (27 June 1997).

² Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895.

³ Randall was the Director of the Disarmament Division from early 2000 to early 2003. The Division was known as the International Security and Arms Control Division prior to Randall’s tenure as Director. It is now known

level, the Disarmament Division provides advice to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, who decides policy. The process is, of course, more nuanced than this. A range of factors can influence policy decisions, including partisan politics, individual personalities with their unique histories and experiences, international events, institutional factors (the size and type of bureaucratic structures and the speed with which they respond to developments) and NGO advocacy. From the governmental side, the Prime Minister and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence have a key interest in developments in nuclear security and are “...kept in the loop quite deliberately”.⁴ Although the Disarmament Minister has more day-to-day contact with the disarmament portfolio and thus, in theory, more specialised knowledge of it,⁵ the higher international profile and greater political gravitas of more senior Ministers can make them a more effective conduit for disarmament policy in multilateral forums. The Foreign Minister-level New Agenda Coalition (NAC), a key vehicle for New Zealand nuclear disarmament diplomacy since 1998, is indicative of this point.

Doug Graham, the Disarmament Minister from 1990-99, has listed the New Zealand Defence Force, the Ministry of Defence, the New Zealand Radiation Laboratory and the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences as sources of specialist and technical advice.⁶ New Zealand’s Disarmament Ambassador, based in Geneva (the home of the CD), has a strong role in advising the government.⁷ Other governmental sources of information and advice include the Permanent Representatives to New Zealand’s Missions to the UN in New York and Vienna (home of the International Atomic Energy Agency - IAEA) and its representatives in the various countries with which New Zealand has dialogue in this field.

As well as governmental sources of policy input, Graham acknowledged that he “...listen[ed] carefully to the views of interested organisations and members of the public in New Zealand”.⁸ As Lange has acknowledged, this is an aspect of policy influence worthy of consideration:

as the International Security and Disarmament Division (ISED). In this thesis, it is referred to as the ‘Disarmament Division’.

⁴ McDonald and Randall, private interview with author.

⁵ Other ministers’ levels of personal experience in the field may belie this idea. Former Prime Minister Helen Clark, a long-standing nuclear disarmament advocate, might be an example of this.

⁶ Doug Graham, "New Zealand’s Disarmament Policies, Obligations and Legislation," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 5, 6 (November 1996).

⁷ This position was announced in 1996, when New Zealand gained permanent membership of the CD. Career diplomat Clive Pearson was the first Ambassador to be appointed, serving in the post from 1997 until 2002.

⁸ Graham, "New Zealand’s Disarmament Policies, Obligations and Legislation," 5.

*“Successive governments have been helped to be honest or kept honest by the commitment of sincere people who...remain vigilant as the trustees of what has now become a New Zealand characteristic.”*⁹

As discussed in the previous chapter, in practice, NGOs have input into the policy process through regular meetings with MFAT officials, representation on NPT RevCon delegations and constructive correspondence with ministers.

3. Key International Developments

End of the Cold War

Probably the most significant strategic event of the 1990s was the dissolution of the Soviet Union early in the decade, bringing to an end the adversarial East-West Cold War alliance system, which had remained relatively constant for almost half a century. The demise of this structure left states facing the unprecedented situation of a nuclear-armed world without a commonly agreed understanding of the shape or role of its overarching security structures. In 1997, for example, New Zealand Foreign Minister Don McKinnon considered that,

*“The global strategic order is still...in transition from the Cold War...we are all getting used to a more fluid pattern of inter-relationships, and a higher degree of uncertainty in security relations.”*¹⁰

The end of the Cold War gave rise to hope of a ‘disarmament dividend’ to be reaped from reduced super-power rivalry and the end of the nuclear arms race. It also brought with it unprecedented security issues, such as how to safeguard aging Soviet nuclear arsenals and materials.

Indefinite Extension of the NPT

Every five years, the States Parties to the NPT meet to review progress on the Treaty’s implementation. At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC),¹¹ the States

⁹ Dewes, "Participatory Democracy in Peace and Security Decision Making," 81.

¹⁰ McKinnon, 'New Zealand’s Security: 1990 and Beyond'.

¹¹ The NPTREC was held in New York from 17 April - 12 May, 1995.

Parties agreed unanimously to extend its mandate indefinitely and unconditionally, ensuring its continuation as the core international framework for nuclear disarmament and arms control. New Zealand adopted the same position as all the Western-aligned states: support for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.¹² McKinnon dismissed domestic NGO claims that New Zealand was merely following the NWS line, stating that the government had decided on this option after long and careful consideration, based on the judgement that it was “...*the best option for New Zealand’s future security and the best chance for securing further disarmament measures.*”¹³ Disarmament Minister Doug Graham acknowledged that the NPT was not without faults, but reasoned that despite the need for greater progress in the area of nuclear disarmament, a world without a strong, stable NPT would be far less secure.¹⁴

In the New Zealand and international NGO communities, there was broad agreement (with a few notable exceptions)¹⁵ on conditional, ‘rolling’ extensions as the preferred outcome for NPT renewal. Greenpeace International, with New Zealander Stephanie Mills playing a key role as its NPT Project Coordinator, had done extensive research and was advocating a series of 5-year extensions linked to a timetable for progress on specific disarmament steps.¹⁶ NGOs argued that unconditional extension would allow the NWS to act with impunity, without fear of their actions threatening the future of the Treaty. Domestic NGOs held public meetings and corresponded at length with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Disarmament Minister and the Prime Minister, urging the government to change its position.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the

¹² Acronym Institute, *Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Risks and Reckonings; NPT Report No.7: Executive Summary*, ed. Rebecca Johnson New York: (September 1995).

¹³ Don McKinnon, private correspondence with John Hampton (for CND NZ). 17 March 1995.

¹⁴ Doug Graham, "Non-proliferation Treaty Extended Indefinitely," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 3, 11 (May 1995), 51.

¹⁵ In New Zealand, the notable exceptions to the NGO preference for limited, conditional extensions came from the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament New Zealand and Peace Council Aotearoa (which favoured annulment of the Treaty and its replacement with a convention on nuclear weapons) and from iconic New Zealand peace researcher, Owen Wilkes, who supported indefinite, unconditional extension on the basis that uncontrolled proliferation would likely ensue were the treaty annulled. See: John Hampton, 'Time to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons,' *Evening Post*, Wellington (3 February 1995).; Owen Wilkes, Private correspondence with John Hampton, 17 November 1994.

¹⁶ Greenpeace International, *NPT Indefinite Extension Challenged*, 2 May 1995 [cited 12 February 2008]. Available from <http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-oldgopher/9505/msg00002.html>

¹⁷ MFAT records indicate that at a minimum, CND New Zealand, the CPS, Greenpeace New Zealand, NCCD, Peace Council Aotearoa, the Peace Foundation, PMA, the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) and UNA New Zealand were all active in this advocacy of government policy change.

government continued to support this option and New Zealand was among the 103 countries that co-sponsored the proposal for indefinite, unconditional extension.¹⁸

Along with the decision on extension, the Conference agreed on a set of “Principles and Objectives” to guide future nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament work, and on specific measures aimed at strengthening the five-yearly NPT review process, such as increasing the regularity of NPT review meetings.¹⁹

Chinese / French Nuclear Testing

Just days after the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, China tested a nuclear weapon. Although not unprecedented (China had been conducting a series of tests in the years preceding the Conference) this came as a shock to the international community. The unanimously-supported Final Document of the NPTREC urged the NWS to exercise the “utmost restraint” with regard to nuclear testing pending the completion of the CTBT. Opponents of indefinite extension – among them the majority of NGOs – felt vindicated in their concerns that the NWS would treat it as a mandate to exercise their nuclear prerogative with impunity. The New Zealand Government sent a “*very strong message of protest to Beijing.*”²⁰ A month after the Chinese test, France announced that it would conduct several series of underground nuclear tests in the Pacific, thus breaking the moratorium it had observed since 8 April 1992.²¹

While official protest to the French announcement from New Zealand was initially limited to diplomatic expressions of opposition and the curtailing of military ties with the French Armed Forces, public outrage caused the government to reconsider this cautious approach, and diplomatic action was quickly stepped up.²² New Zealand’s subsequent strong protest, along

¹⁸ Doug Graham, private correspondence with Marion Hancock (then-Director of the Peace Foundation). 10 May 1995.

¹⁹ Objectives agreed included: efforts to bring about universal adherence to the NPT and prevent nuclear proliferation; the completion of a CTBT before the end of 1996; the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the CD; and the ‘consideration’ of steps to grant non-NWS negative security assurances via a legally-binding international instrument. Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, *Final Document Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I))*, 1995 [cited 13 August 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/178/16/PDF/N9517816.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁰ Don McKinnon, “Chinese Nuclear Test Condemned,” *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 3, 11 (1995).

²¹ Hoadley, ‘Diplomacy, Politics and Nuclear Testing.’

²² As a clear case of non-governmental influence on government policy, this is discussed in more depth in the following chapter.

with the mass of worldwide public and political protest, led France to stop its tests sooner than expected²³ and shortly thereafter, to accept a zero-yield condition for the CTBT, signed in September 1996.²⁴

The Canberra Commission Report

The *Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons* was established by the Australian Labor Government in 1995. It was tasked with proposing, “...*practical steps towards a nuclear weapon free world including the related problem of maintaining stability and security during the transitional period and after this goal is achieved.*”²⁵

The Commission was made up of world-leading academic, legal, political and military experts.²⁶ In August 1996, the Canberra Commission released its Report, which acknowledged the “*highly discriminatory and thus unstable*” situation facing the world, with the NWS insisting that nuclear weapons made them safe, yet asserting their unique right to possess the weapons. “*For these reasons,*” it said, “*a central reality is that nuclear weapons diminish the security of all states.*” The report confirmed that “*...Any use [of nuclear weapons] would be catastrophic*” and that “*...the proposition that nuclear weapons can be retained in perpetuity and never used – accidentally or by design – defies credibility.*”²⁷ The Commission called for the NWS to commit themselves ‘unequivocally’ to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and for all states to support this goal.

The New Zealand Government greeted the Canberra Commission Report as a major step forward in international dialogue on nuclear disarmament. The idea of eliciting an ‘unequivocal commitment’ from the NWS to eliminate their nuclear weapons drew legal precedence from the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons. It was taken up firmly by the New Zealand Government which first presented the proposal at

²³ Hoadley, 'Diplomacy, Politics and Nuclear Testing,' 114.

²⁴ Miguel Marin-Bosch, 'Getting Rid of Nukes', Paper presented at the Inaugural Erich Geiringer Oration, Overseas Terminal, Wellington (13 November 1996).

²⁵ Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, *Executive Summary*, 3.

²⁶ These included notables such as Robert McNamara (ex-US Secretary for Defence), Michel Rocard (ex-Prime Minister of France), Joseph Rotblat (Nobel Peace Prize laureate and President of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs), General Lee Butler (ex-Commander in Chief of US Strategic Air Command), Maj Britt-Theorin (former Swedish Ambassador for Disarmament and ex-President of both the International Peace Bureau and Parliamentarians for Global Action) and Jayantha Dhanapala (Chair of the 1995 NPTREC and former Director of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research).

²⁷ Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, *Executive Summary*, 7-9.

the 1997 NPT PrepCom, being the first country in the world to call for such a commitment.²⁸ As discussed below, achieving this commitment subsequently became a core policy aim of the NAC.²⁹

NGOs also welcomed the strong language employed by the Commission Report, although some expressed disappointment that it did not provide a draft timeframe for their elimination nor call for negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention (NWC) to guide the process of elimination, similar to the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions which have abolished³⁰ those weapons classes.³¹

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The signing of the CTBT on 10 September 1996 marked the realisation of one of New Zealand's long-term nuclear disarmament goals.³² Motivated, amongst other things, by experiences of French, British and US nuclear testing in the Pacific,³³ New Zealand and Australia had for many years promoted the idea of a comprehensive test ban through a yearly UNGA resolution.³⁴ Although the CTBT has not yet entered into force (the refusal of the US Senate to ratify the Treaty in 1999 was a seriously destabilising blow for the Treaty and for

²⁸ New Zealand, *Proposed Elements for Inclusion in the Report of the Preparatory Committee on its First Session (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3)*, paper presented to the NPT Preparatory Committee, 10 April 1997 [cited 25 October 2008]. Available from <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/2000-PCI-docs/npt-conf2000-pci-3.pdf>

²⁹ It appears New Zealand instigated the policy within the NAC, as none of the papers to the 1997 PrepCom from other soon-to-be NAC countries mention it.

³⁰ To abolish is to *put an end to* something. In the present context, this refers the outlawing and elimination of nuclear weapons. (It is argued here that the latter is not possible without the former). Potential means of achieving this are either via a single, universal, treaty or an equivalent set of mutually-reinforcing, legally-binding agreements.

³¹ A NWC is a legally-binding multilateral treaty for the abolition of nuclear weapons. It maps out all the legal, technical and political considerations to be addressed in order to safely achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world. This idea is discussed in more detail in following chapters.

³² New Zealand participated actively in the final stages of negotiation of the CTBT after it was granted full membership of the Geneva-based CD in June 1996. For many years prior to this, New Zealand had contributed to the Conference as an official observer.

³³ New Zealand servicemen were used as 'nuclear guinea pigs' for several series of US and UK nuclear testing in the Pacific and Australia from 1956-1958. More were also exposed to nuclear fallout when attending, as part of official New Zealand protest, French nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll (Tahiti, French Polynesia) in 1973. These test veterans are still fighting for recognition of their right to compensation from the government today. See: Paul Lewis, 'Servicemen Hope for Compensation,' *New Zealand Herald*, (20 January 2008).; New Zealand Defence Force, *Medallic Recognition for Nuclear Test Veterans*, 18 March 2002 [cited 2 October 2008]. Available from <http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/news/articles/1999-2003/20020318.html> ; UK Ministry of Defence, *Key Events in the UK Atmospheric Nuclear Test Programme*, [cited 23 July 2008]. Available from http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/470D247F-7615-460C-9829-DDAF99F88D39/0/Key_Events.pdf.

³⁴ From 1992 onwards, they were joined by co-sponsor Mexico, which had for many years sponsored its own, parallel resolution annually calling for a test ban.

nuclear security in general), its signing strengthened the norm of nuclear disarmament by further delegitimizing the development of nuclear weapons.

Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests

In April 1998, India conducted a series of nuclear test explosions. These were followed just weeks later by a series of Pakistani tests. The two nations began to mimic the language of the NWS, with Government representatives talking of the necessity of a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. India's action as the instigator of the tests provoked outrage among the international community, including in New Zealand, which recalled its High Commissioner from New Delhi in protest. Foreign Minister Don McKinnon called the tests a "*gross insult*."³⁵ At the 1998 session of the UNGA, New Zealand, Canada and Australia sponsored a resolution deploring the tests and calling on both states to sign and ratify the CTBT.³⁶

4. New Zealand Policy Initiatives

One way in which New Zealand responded to the unprecedented challenges facing the world in this period of international strategic upheaval was through proactive, high-profile advocacy of multilateral nuclear disarmament. The government was involved in two key initiatives in this regard over the mid-to-late 1990s. Firstly, in the face of enormous pressure from the NWS and their allies not to do so, New Zealand voted for a 1994 UNGA resolution calling for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legal status of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In the resulting ICJ case, again facing massive opposition from the NWS, New Zealand argued for the outright illegality of nuclear weapons. The result of the case was the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion that nuclear weapons are 'generally' illegal and that there is a binding legal obligation on the NWS to disarm their nuclear arsenals. The ICJ Advisory Opinion has since then informed and contributed to virtually all aspects of New Zealand's nuclear disarmament advocacy. The second key strand of New Zealand policy in this period was its collaboration in the NAC. Since 1998, New Zealand's policy positions on nuclear disarmament have generally been developed collaboratively with the NAC. As noted above, however, it appears likely that a key strand of NAC policy in the late 1990s - eliciting an

³⁵ Don McKinnon, "Government Recalls New Zealand High Commissioner to India," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 6, 11 (1998).

³⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Nuclear Testing (A/RES/53/77G)*, 4 December 1998 [cited 15 March 2007]. Available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/760/45/pdf/N9976045.pdf?OpenElement>.

unequivocal undertaking from the NWS to eliminate their nuclear weapons - was instigated by New Zealand. To a large degree, NAC diplomacy set the international nuclear disarmament agenda from 1998-2000 in multilateral forums.

International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion

In the context of the present research, the key significance of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the general illegality of nuclear weapons is that it was the direct result of a decade-long NGO campaign, the WCP. This was initiated and then driven to a large degree – both domestically and internationally – by New Zealand NGOs and individuals. Their WCP work and the influence it had on the New Zealand Government are examined in the following chapter. This section examines New Zealand's eventual support for the WCP³⁷ and its diplomatic application of the ICJ Advisory Opinion since its delivery in 1996.

During the 1994 UNGA session, the NWS and their allies vehemently opposed the resolution calling on the ICJ to provide an Advisory Opinion on the legal status of nuclear weapons.³⁸ New Zealand took a principled stand on the issue and voted for the resolution. As one of only two Western-aligned nations to vote in favour of the resolution (San Marino being the other), this was a very significant step to take. It signalled that New Zealand's international advocacy of nuclear disarmament had entered a new, heightened phase.

As the ICJ proceedings began in 1995, the NWS continued to apply great pressure on many states not to take part, or to argue for the legality of nuclear weapons. Undeterred, New Zealand argued for the illegality of nuclear weapons, challenging not just the policies of the NWS but their right even to possess such weapons. New Zealand's submission to the Court was based on two main propositions: firstly, that the NPT had effectively delegitimized nuclear weapons. Secondly, in line with New Zealand's domestic nuclear-free legislation and as the Canberra Commission would reaffirm in its Report a year later, New Zealand argued that nuclear deterrence is fundamentally flawed and therefore increases insecurity rather than diminishing it.³⁹

³⁷ The government refused to support the WCP for eight years prior to voting for the WCP UNGA resolution in 1994.

³⁸ They had successfully opposed similar initiatives the previous year from both the UNGA and the World Health Organisation (WHO). See: Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 293-315.

³⁹ Terence O'Brien, 'Hague Ruling Rewards Anti-Nuclear Initiative,' *New Zealand Herald*, Auckland (22 February 1999).

On 10 July 1996, the ICJ delivered its historic Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. In a split vote of 8-7, the Judges of the Court advised that, “... *a threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.*”⁴⁰

The principles of humanitarian law can be briefly summarised as follows: when defending itself, a state may only use force which,

- a) Is proportionate to the threat or aggression suffered; *and*
- b) Discriminates between combatants and innocent civilians; *and*
- c) Does not inflict long-term environmental damage on the target region.

With any potential use of nuclear weapons necessarily contravening at least one of these legal principles, the Court’s decision reinforced the case of many opponents of nuclear weapons, who argue that any threat or use of nuclear weapons must by the very nature of the weapons be illegal and thus represent a war crime. However, probably the most important aspect of the Opinion from New Zealand’s perspective came when the Court’s Judges stated unanimously: “*There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.*”⁴¹

Although the legal implications of the ICJ Advisory Opinion are the subject of much international debate,⁴² for advocates of nuclear disarmament, it represents a clear vindication of their views. New Zealand sees the case as a great success and has consistently cited the Advisory Opinion as confirmation of the NWS’ obligation to eliminate these weapons and legitimisation of the nuclear disarmament norm. It has particularly highlighted two key legal

⁴⁰ International Court of Justice, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion)*, 8 July 1996 [cited 10 July 2007]. Available from <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocuments/isummaries/iunanaummary960708.htm>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² See for example Kate Dewes and Robert Green, *Aotearoa-New Zealand at the World Court, the Disarmament & Security Centre*, 1999 [cited 7 October 2007]. Available from <http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/books.html>; Richard A. Falk, "Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic Encounter," *American Journal of International Law* 91,1 (1997).; Peter H.F. Bekker, "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons," *American Journal of International Law* 91, 1 (1997).

concepts derived from the Advisory Opinion. The first is the delinking of *nuclear disarmament* from *general and complete disarmament*. New Zealand has argued consistently that the NWS must work to fulfil their NPT-based nuclear disarmament obligations regardless of the lack of progress in general disarmament. To put this in perspective, both preambular paragraph 11 and Article VI of the NPT conjoin the issues, a clustering that has led to, “...Long and inconclusive debates at NPT Conferences over whether nuclear disarmament is conditional upon general and complete disarmament, or whether it should be treated as a separate issue and implemented in isolation.”⁴³

In concluding that the NWS have a binding obligation to disarm their nuclear arsenals *independent* of the obligation of all NPT States Parties to work for general and complete disarmament, the Opinion effectively delegitimized a concept long used as a diplomatic stalling tactic by the NWS.

A second legal application of the ICJ Advisory Opinion by New Zealand was in its ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Here, New Zealand made an interpretive declaration regarding the jurisdiction of the ICC to prosecute war crimes related to the use of WMD. Relying on paragraph 86 of the ICJ Opinion which stated that humanitarian law “...applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future,”⁴⁴ the New Zealand Government argued that the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons meant their use would constitute a war crime and would therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. Citing paragraphs 40-42 of the ICJ Opinion, New Zealand also asserted that the criminal nature of a use of nuclear weapons was universal; it would not be dependent on whether the state in question is acting in defence or aggression.⁴⁵

While strengthening the hand of disarmament advocates, one difficulty facing disarmament advocates is that the ICJ ruling is an advisory opinion only and is not legally-binding on states which do not recognise the Court’s jurisdiction, for example, the France and US. The US has

⁴³ Tanya Ogilvie-White, Ben Sanders, and John Simpson, *Putting the Final Document into Practice: Possible Ways to Implement the Results of the 2000 Review Conference*, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 2002 [cited April 10 2008]. Available from <http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/PPNNstudy.pdf>.

⁴⁴ International Court of Justice, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion)*.

⁴⁵ New Zealand, *Declaration on Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, 2000 [cited May 12 2008]. Available from <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=372&chapter=18&lang=en#EndDec>.

continued to oppose the delinking of nuclear disarmament from general and complete disarmament.⁴⁶

New Zealand-South Africa Memorandum of Cooperation

On 8 August 1996, Prime Ministers Jim Bolger of New Zealand and Nelson Mandela of South Africa signed a broad-ranging *Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control*, mandating close disarmament collaboration between the two countries.⁴⁷ Among other things, it reaffirmed the strong, shared commitment of both countries to achieving a world free of all WMD, called on all countries to ‘promptly’ support the CTBT (still under negotiation at that stage) and committed the two countries to work for the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)⁴⁸ in the CD the following year. The Memorandum also welcomed the completion of the African NWFZ,⁴⁹ the signing by France, the UK and the US of the Protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (signalling the end of nuclear testing in the region) and reaffirmed the objective of creating a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ, a long-time policy goal of the New Zealand Government.

The New Agenda Coalition

Undoubtedly the most high profile and effective aspect of New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy in the second half of the 1990s was its collaboration in the NAC, a group consisting of seven states: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.⁵⁰ The NAC aimed “...to inject fresh momentum and thinking into the nuclear disarmament process”, and “...to encourage the nuclear weapon states to pursue their disarmament obligations with more determination.”⁵¹ The New Agenda was launched by the

⁴⁶ It repeatedly did so, for example, in explaining its ‘no’ vote to the yearly Malaysian UNGA on follow-up actions to the ICJ Advisory Opinion. United Nations General Assembly, *Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (A/RES/51/45M)*, 10 December 1996 [cited 18 April 2007]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/760/51/PDF/N9776051.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁴⁷ The full text of the Memorandum of Cooperation appears in the Appendix.

⁴⁸ By banning any further production of plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), both of which can be used as fuel for nuclear weapons, an FMCT would “...strengthen the nonproliferation regime, reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism, and help lay a basis for nuclear disarmament”. International Panel on Fissile Materials, *Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty*, vol. 3 (Princeton, New Jersey: International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2008), 23.

⁴⁹ This has not yet entered into force.

⁵⁰ Slovenia was also originally a member of the NAC. However, the strong opposition of the three NATO NWS (France, the UK and the US) to the Declaration, along with Slovenia’s keen interest in acceding to the NATO alliance, saw it quickly withdraw its support of the NAC.

⁵¹ Phil Goff, "Address to the UNESCO Culture of Peace Network," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 8, 9 (8 March 2000), 7.

Foreign Ministers of the Coalition countries on 9 June 1998 with the Declaration, “*Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World - the Need for a New Agenda.*” This called on the five official NWS and the then-three ‘nuclear-weapons capable’ states to make an ‘unequivocal’ commitment to “*the speedy, final and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability.*” The NAC asserted the need for immediate, specific action to ‘kick-start’ the stalled nuclear disarmament process, calling for, *inter alia*: the de-alerting and deactivation of nuclear weapons; negotiations on an FMCT; and negotiations on ‘no-first-use’ agreements and negative security assurances (NSAs), the latter being guarantees from NWS that they will not use their nuclear weapons against non-NWS.

The NAC’s consistent calls in subsequent years for an ‘unequivocal commitment’ from the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals were based on the idea that “*...the only complete defence [against their future use] is the elimination of nuclear weapons and assurance that they will never be produced again.*”⁵² This drew legal precedent from the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion and political precedent from the 1996 Canberra Commission Report as well as the New Zealand Working Paper to the 1997 NPT PrepCom.⁵³

Following its 1998 Declaration, there were two key aspects to NAC diplomacy in the late 1990s. The first was its annual UNGA resolution, which is discussed here. The second was the pivotal role that the NAC played in the disarmament negotiations at the 2000 NPT RevCon;⁵⁴ discussion of this follows later in the chapter.

Since 1998, the NAC has introduced a resolution at each UNGA session.⁵⁵ During the research period, as the influence of the New Agenda grew, more states co-sponsored the resolution each year.⁵⁶ In December 1998, the UNGA adopted the first NAC resolution.⁵⁷ The

⁵² New Agenda Coalition, *Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World: the Need for a New Agenda*, (A/53/138), statement presented to the United Nations General Assembly, 9 June 1998 [cited 26 March 2008]. Available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/164/44/pdf/N9816444.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁵³ Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, *Report.*; International Court of Justice, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion).*; New Zealand, *Proposed Elements for Inclusion in the Report of the Preparatory Committee on its First Session (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3).*

⁵⁴ Rebecca Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 46 (May 2000).

⁵⁵ The only exception to this was the UNGA in 2001, when the NAC did not sponsor a resolution.

⁵⁶ There were 34 co-sponsoring states in 1998, 60 in 1999 and 65 in 2000. See <http://disarmament.un.org/vote.nsf> for details.

⁵⁷ United Nations General Assembly, *Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda (A/RES/53/77Y)*, 4 December 1998 [cited 15 April 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/760/45/PDF/N9976045.pdf?OpenElement>.

Western NWS – especially France and the United States - vehemently opposed the resolution, lobbying intensively for delegations from around the world, and particularly among NATO non-NWS, to vote ‘no’ to it.⁵⁸ Despite this strong opposition, the resolution enjoyed unprecedented success. Significantly, the European Parliament had passed a resolution in November calling for all European Union (EU) states to support the NAC and its resolution.⁵⁹ For the first time ever, the NATO non-NWS refused to ‘tow the line’ of their nuclear-armed allies in the UNGA, choosing to abstain rather than vote against the NAC resolution, which passed with a strong majority of 114 votes for, 18 against, and 38 abstentions. When the UK complained the resolution called for measures that were incompatible with its maintenance of a “credible deterrent”, Mexico countered that the New Agenda was not intended to be compatible with nuclear deterrence, as the concept was outdated and inconsistent with the NWS’ disarmament obligations under the NPT.

In 1999, the NAC resolution passed with a slightly smaller, yet still strong majority of 111 votes for, 13 against, with 39 abstentions.⁶⁰ However, the 2000 resolution was another diplomatic coup for the NAC, receiving overwhelming support: 154 votes for, 3 opposed (India, Israel and Pakistan) and 8 abstentions.⁶¹ Crucially, the US, the UK and China all voted in favour of the resolution, while France and Russia abstained. These shifts in the positions of the NWS must be put in context, however. The 2000 NAC resolution mirrored the consensus language of the Final Document from the 2000 NPT RevCon. Removed from the resolution, therefore, were the NAC’s earlier calls for the de-alerting of nuclear weapons and the removal of nuclear warheads from their delivery systems, as well as the paragraph emphasising the importance of NWFZ. Its disarmament aspirations were therefore expressed “*in decidedly more tentative terms.*”⁶² These diplomatic concessions to the NWS were deemed necessary by the NAC to consolidate the steps agreed at the RevCon and maintain disarmament momentum.

⁵⁸ Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise."

⁵⁹ Sharon Riggle, private correspondence with Abolition 2000 caucus, 23 November 1998.

⁶⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda (A/RES/54/54G)*, 1 December 1999 [cited 15 April 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/231/83/PDF/N0023183.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁶¹ United Nations General Assembly, *Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda (A/RES/55/33C)*, 20 November 2000 [cited 15 April 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/561/37/PDF/N0056137.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁶² Editor, "'New Agenda' for Nuke-Free World Gets Wider Support - but Text is Weaker," *Disarmament Times* 23, 4 (Winter 2000).

The 2000 NPT Review Conference

The 2000 NPT RevCon⁶³ was viewed by disarmament advocates the world over as a success. For the first time in a decade, NPT States Parties made “...*substantive agreements in their review of the implementation of nuclear disarmament objectives.*”⁶⁴ The NAC is widely acknowledged as having played a critical role in crafting disarmament commitments and gathering support for the consensus Final Document of the RevCon. Crucially, due largely to NAC efforts, the Final Document included an ‘unequivocal undertaking’ from the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

New Zealand’s main contribution to the Conference came via its work with the NAC⁶⁵ and through the individual influence of its Disarmament Ambassador, Clive Pearson. Pearson played a key role as the Chair of the subsidiary body to Main Committee I (MCI) tasked with negotiating nuclear disarmament language for the Final Document.

The 2000 RevCon took place in a highly unstable international climate: India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 had badly shaken the non-proliferation regime. Relations between the major powers were “*worse than at any time since the end of the Cold War*”, with Russia and China increasingly concerned about US missile defence plans and the expansion of NATO.⁶⁶ The 1997, 1998 and 1999 PrepComs had failed to make any substantive recommendations to the RevCon. Of the four objectives agreed to at the 1995 NPTREC, only one - the completion of the CTBT - had been achieved by 2000. This was only a partial success, however, as the US and 15 other countries whose ratification was required for its entry into force had not ratified the Treaty. Non-NWS were both highly frustrated at the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament,⁶⁷ and concerned about the value of NSAs given by the NWS following the US assertion that the START II treaty would not preclude nuclear retaliation against biological and chemical weapons attacks.⁶⁸ Success at the RevCon therefore came “...*against all expectations*”, as New Zealand’s then-Disarmament Minister Matt Robson put it.⁶⁹

⁶³ The RevCon was held at the United Nations headquarters in New York from 24 April -20 May 2000.

⁶⁴ Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise."

⁶⁵ It also submitted joint papers in cooperation with other State groupings.

⁶⁶ Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise."

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Rod Alley, "Reinvigorating Nuclear Disarmament: the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2000," *New Zealand International Review* 25, 5 (September 2000).

⁶⁹ Matt Robson, "Nuclear Disarmament: Two Initiatives," *New Zealand International Review* 25, 6 (November 2000), 13.

Despite this fractious atmosphere, the NAC came to the 2000 RevCon with a clear plan of action and a “*challenging but do-able bottom line.*”⁷⁰ On the opening day of the Conference, the NAC tabled a joint Working Paper calling again for an ‘unequivocal undertaking’ from the NWS to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and for a wide-ranging and balanced set of practical actions to advance both disarmament and non-proliferation.⁷¹

The Final Document adopted by the RevCon mandated a ‘*Plan of Action*’ for nuclear disarmament which included 13 ‘*Practical Steps*’ based on Article VI of the NPT and the Decision on Principles and Objectives of the 1995 NPTREC. The 13 Steps reflected in many parts language or ideas originating from the NAC.⁷² The ‘*unequivocal undertaking*’ to eliminate nuclear weapons was the strongest reaffirmation so far of the NWS’ commitment to this goal and is regarded as one of the NAC’s key achievements. Another significant achievement was the delinking of *nuclear disarmament* from *general and complete disarmament* for the first time in the context of the NPT review process. This, along with the call for States to acknowledge the ICJ Opinion when presenting NPT reports on disarmament progress, had the additional positive effect of adding political weight to the ICJ Advisory Opinion.⁷³ The NAC also resisted attempts by the NWS (particularly by France) to insert the word “ultimately” – suggestive of postponement - into the text dealing with the commitment to elimination, arguing that nuclear disarmament was not an eventual goal, but a priority obligation for NWS.⁷⁴

The 13 Steps were negotiated largely through two mechanisms; New Zealand played a pivotal role in both. The first was the disarmament-focused subsidiary body to MCI chaired by New Zealand Disarmament Ambassador Pearson, who thus made a decisive contribution to the

⁷⁰ Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise."

⁷¹ New Agenda Coalition, *Nuclear Disarmament (NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3)*, working paper presented to the NPT Review Conference, 24 April 2000 [cited 26 March 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/402/78/PDF/N0040278.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁷² For a comprehensive linguistic and political analysis of the final disarmament text, see Ogilvie-White, Sanders, and Simpson, *Putting the Final Document into Practice: Possible Ways to Implement the Results of the 2000 Review Conference.*; Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise."

⁷³ Ogilvie-White, Sanders, and Simpson, *Putting the Final Document into Practice: Possible Ways to Implement the Results of the 2000 Review Conference.*

⁷⁴ Alley, "Reinvigorating Nuclear Disarmament." Other key elements of the ‘13 Steps’ for nuclear disarmament were a voluntary nuclear testing moratorium pending entry into force of the CTBT and steps by NWS including unilateral reductions, increased transparency, decreased operational status and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in their security policies. For the full text of the ‘13 Steps’, see Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, *Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II))*, 2000 [cited 3 December 2007]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/453/64/PDF/N0045364.pdf?OpenElement>.

RevCon. Johnson, a long-standing and widely respected disarmament analyst, wrote that his role as chair of the disarmament subsidiary body “...*was masterfully executed.*”⁷⁵ The second mechanism was a series of private negotiations between the NAC and the NWS, instigated by the NWS at the end of the third week of the RevCon in an attempt to break the deadlock that had developed in disarmament negotiations. This marked the NAC as a “...*major political player among the non-nuclear countries.*”⁷⁶ In the days that followed, the New Agenda states “...*played a central role in achieving the breakthrough on nuclear disarmament.*”⁷⁷ The NAC-NWS negotiations were nonetheless controversial; the NATO non-NWS resented their security doctrines being negotiated directly with non-NATO countries. Many NAM states, meanwhile, were upset at compromises the NAC made in order to break the deadlock, arguing they had given too much away.

Despite the diplomatic successes of the conference, there were certain aspects of the final document and the manner in which its consensus was constructed that were problematic. Both Pearson and MCI Chairman Camilo Reyes of Colombia avoided seeking consensus language on disarmament, choosing instead to trade off various interests and positions, creating an overall balance of commitments and concessions from States Parties. In the short term, this was essential to secure agreement on a set of disarmament commitments that were not watered down to such a degree as to render them meaningless. However, the interdependent nature of the agreements struck on many issues meant that once the Final Document was agreed, deviation from even one position inevitably threatened a whole range of commitments.⁷⁸ In a similar vein, the absence from the Conference of any discussion of US NMD plans – a decision made by the NWS in private consultations despite fierce opposition to NMD from Russia and China - left a significant issue out of the diplomatic balancing act performed at the Conference. As a result, the finely-tuned equilibrium so carefully crafted at the RevCon was quickly upset when the political gravitas of this initiative was reintroduced into the diplomatic mix.

⁷⁵ Johnson also credits the individual work of Mexico’s Disarmament Ambassador, Carlos de Icaza, whose “*coordination kept the NAC on track through some difficult decisions.*” Johnson, “The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise.”

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ The effect of this trade-off system was particularly apparent, for example, in the language relating to negotiation of an FMCT, which was actually a step backwards from that agreed at the 1995 RevCon. Furthermore, linkages in the language agreed on this issue have also retarded the creation of a subsidiary body to the CD for negotiating nuclear disarmament.

Understanding the Success of the NAC

Three issues deserve discussion to clarify what enabled the NAC to garner such broad support for its revitalised nuclear disarmament agenda. Firstly, the ‘middle-path’ approach of the NAC, which bridges the divide between the two traditional positions adopted on nuclear disarmament, was important for the New Agenda. Secondly, the makeup of the NAC, both geographically and in terms of the nuclear disarmament credentials of its members, also played a role in its success. Lastly, the timing of the initiative was highly relevant, enabling it to capture the world’s attention by offering a much-needed boost to flagging disarmament efforts.

The first factor which contributed to the success of the NAC around the turn of the millennium was the “*balanced and achievable nature*” of its program for disarmament, as the Brazilian Ambassador to the 2000 NPT RevCon put it.⁷⁹ Membership in the NAC placed New Zealand at the forefront of effective nuclear disarmament diplomacy. Although the NAM was often more outspoken in its demands, the NAC proved better able to advance nuclear disarmament negotiations. The NAC aimed specifically to bridge the gap between the more far-reaching, NAM-sponsored position and that of the NWS, a divide that had for many years been unbridgeable, with the intransigence of both groups in multilateral negotiations causing nuclear disarmament to come to a standstill.

This point is best clarified by examining the three broad approaches to nuclear disarmament identified by non-governmental nuclear disarmament experts Merav Datan and Alyn Ware in their book “*Security and Survival: the Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.*”⁸⁰ The first two of these are the *comprehensive* and *incremental* approaches.

The *comprehensive* approach has traditionally been favoured by the NAM and also by many of the world’s NGOs. It focuses strongly on disarmament - as opposed to non-proliferation - although advocates of comprehensive nuclear disarmament argue that non-proliferation is in fact impossible without disarmament, so progress in this realm necessarily aids non-

⁷⁹ Alyn Ware, private correspondence with Kate Dewes and Robert Green, 25 April 2000.

⁸⁰ This outlines a plan for, and discussion of the idea of abolishing nuclear weapons via a NWC. It includes the text of the Model NWC co-authored by Datan and Ware. Merav Datan and Alyn Ware, *Security and Survival: the Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention* (Massachusetts: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, 1999).

proliferation as well. The comprehensive route to disarmament calls for the negotiation of a NWC or an equivalent set of mutually-reinforcing, legally-binding mechanisms to facilitate the abolition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Crucially, it proposes that this be achieved *within a timebound framework*.

The *incremental* approach to nuclear disarmament is favoured by the NWS, who have traditionally been much more concerned with nuclear non-proliferation than disarmament. It promotes a step-by-step process to nuclear disarmament focusing on small, achievable measures which do not challenge the strategic pre-eminence of the NWS. Incrementalists are strongly opposed to the imposition of a timebound framework for nuclear disarmament. Typically, the incremental approach has led to such slow progress in tangible disarmament efforts that by the time the NWS have finished negotiations to dismantle a particular type of weapon, it has already become obsolete.⁸¹

These comprehensive and incremental approaches have traditionally been viewed as mutually exclusive routes to nuclear disarmament, due to the unwillingness of either camp to show flexibility in its negotiating position. This has led to an impasse in negotiations and has prevented the CD from agreeing to a negotiating mandate for over a decade.

The third approach to nuclear disarmament, pioneered by the NAC in 1998, is the *incremental-comprehensive* route. The *incremental-comprehensive* route represents a middle path, recognising the need to make advances in small, achievable steps (thus allaying some of the concerns of the NWS), but insisting progress must continue beyond these small measures and that the acknowledged goal of all parties must be the total elimination of nuclear weapons (thus creating an incentive for the NAM and other actors favouring comprehensive nuclear disarmament to cooperate in the process). By addressing both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in a balanced and pragmatic manner, treating them as “*essential elements which can and should be pursued in parallel*,”⁸² the NAC bridged the gap between states traditionally aligned with the comprehensive and incremental approaches to nuclear

⁸¹ An example of this is the UK nuclear gravity bomb, WE-177, which was rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War and was already at that point scheduled for retirement. The WE-177 was cited by the UK at the 1999 NPT PrepCom as evidence of their progress in nuclear disarmament due to its having been “*entirely withdrawn from service*.” See: Nicola Butler, “Quotes from the UK at 1999 NPT PrepCom, with Comments,” *News in Review* 6, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (2 May 2000).

⁸² New Agenda Coalition, *Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World: the Need for a New Agenda*, (A/53/138).

disarmament. As a result, it garnered support from a much broader range of states than would have been possible had it focused predominantly on one or other aspect of nuclear security.

The second factor facilitating the success of the NAC was its geographical and political makeup. The Coalition unites countries from all the continents of the world, enabling it to reach a broad cross section of international society through pre-existing regional networks. In addition, the NAC member states each have relatively strong backgrounds in nuclear disarmament; in several cases, they have unique credentials.⁸³ As a result, the NAC was broadly accepted as acting in good faith on nuclear security issues, unlike some of the more strident disarmament advocates or the NWS, who viewed each other as pursuing their own agenda and thus as incapable of negotiating in good-faith.

Finally, the timing of the NAC's launch was an important factor contributing to its success. This came just weeks after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998, reinforcing the NAC's assertion that urgent and progressive disarmament action was needed.⁸⁴ In addition, the NAC's call for accelerated progress on nuclear disarmament responded to the international community's general despondency about the lack of a disarmament 'peace dividend' at the end of the Cold War.⁸⁵

5. Conclusion

New Zealand took a strong, principled stance on international nuclear disarmament in the second half of the 1990s. This was expressed most vocally through two initiatives; firstly, its support for the 1994 WCP UNGA resolution calling for an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legal status of nuclear weapons. New Zealand argued in the ensuing case that nuclear

⁸³ For example, Ireland, which initiated the NAC, was the first state to promote the idea of a global nuclear arms control treaty in 1958, an idea that came to fruition in 1968 with the NPT. South Africa became the only country in the world ever to have dismantled an indigenous nuclear weapons arsenal in 1991. (It acceded to the NPT as a non-NWS on 10 July 1991). Rebecca Johnson, private correspondence with Kate Dewes, 9 June 1998.; Roy E. Horton III, *Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience*, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper no. 27, August 1999 [cited 10 April 2008]. Available from <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/ocp27.htm>.

⁸⁴ Although its launch followed the Indian and Pakistani tests, negotiations on the formation of the NAC predated the tests by several months and were therefore not the catalyst for its formation. The Irish Foreign Minister confirmed this point at the press conference to launch the NAC. Johnson reports that the Irish initiated diplomatic soundings regarding the creation of such a coalition prior to the 1998 NPT PrepCom. Johnson, 'Eight Nation Call for Elimination - Irish Initiative'

⁸⁵ The Brazilian Ambassador to the UN expressed this sentiment when he told the 2000 NPT RevCon, "...the post Cold War window of opportunity was clearly being wasted". Ware, private correspondence with Kate Dewes and Robert Green, 25 April 2000.

weapons are illegal and that nuclear deterrence is fundamentally flawed. The resolution and the ICJ advisory proceedings obliged the NWS for the first time in history to attempt to justify in court the legality of their nuclear weapons and policies.⁸⁶ They failed to do this, and the Advisory Opinion issued by the ICJ stated that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal. Significantly, the Court found unanimously that the NWS have a binding legal obligation to achieve complete nuclear disarmament independent of progress on general and complete disarmament.

The second key New Zealand initiative was its role in the NAC, which generated a new wave of momentum in nuclear disarmament in the late 1990s and succeeded at the 2000 NPT RevCon in eliciting an unequivocal commitment from the NWS to eliminate their nuclear weapons, again independent of progress on general disarmament. This was unprecedented in NPT history and marked the NAC as a leader in effective nuclear disarmament diplomacy. New Zealand's Disarmament Ambassador Clive Pearson played a key role in achieving this outcome.

It is unlikely either of these initiatives would have been possible without the work of New Zealand's NGO community. The following chapter explores how NGO nuclear disarmament advocacy and campaigns in the 1990s affected and in some cases, enabled or empowered the policies described in the chapter.

⁸⁶ The 1973 Nuclear Tests case taken to the ICJ by Australia and New Zealand challenged the legality of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, not the weapons themselves.

Chapter 4:

New Zealand NGO Nuclear Disarmament Advocacy

“If the people lead, the leaders will follow.”

~ Peace movement traditional

“Non-governmental players with principles and ideas can and should be brought more closely into constructive partnerships with government. They have much to contribute.”¹

~ Rt. Hon. Phil Goff
(New Zealand Disarmament Minister 2005-08)

1. Introduction

This chapter fulfils two objectives. First, it describes the nuclear disarmament advocacy (both domestic and transnational) of key New Zealand-based NGOs and individuals from 1995-2000. Second, by comparing this with the New Zealand Government’s promotion of nuclear disarmament (as explored in the previous chapter), it assesses whether and how NGO advocacy influenced New Zealand foreign policy in this field over the research period.

The mass, grass roots non-governmental movement was arguably the core factor generating the political will during the 1970s and 1980s for nuclear New Zealand’s free legislation. By the second half of the 1990s, however, this mass movement had largely dissipated and the level of public engagement, high-profile advocacy and media debate around nuclear disarmament policy had diminished sharply. Nevertheless, a number of NGOs and individuals that sustained their advocacy in this area thus developed expertise, networks and resources in the field. During the research period, they maintained regular engagement with the government at a specialised policy-detail level as well as a degree of public outreach at home and abroad.

¹ Goff, ‘Speech to the Annual Dinner of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs’.

NGO advocacy is examined here in two broad categories: domestic and transnational. Inside these categories, initiatives are discussed in chronological order. Finnemore's norms theory framework holds that domestic forces are a key factor influencing norm adoption during the first stage of the norm lifecycle, after which states will adopt a norm even without significant domestic agitation, based on international pressures. Distinguishing between domestic and transnational NGO advocacy will therefore allow analysis of the relative impact of work at these two levels, enabling assessment of whether this claim can apply to norm *leadership* as well as norm *adoption*. (This discussion follows in chapter five).

The key domestic NGO groupings and initiatives examined here are: first, the National Consultative Committee on Disarmament (NCCD), a government-instigated umbrella organisation set up specifically to facilitate and coordinate NGO policy input to government; second, the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC), possibly the only non-governmental committee in the world with a legislative mandate to advise its government on nuclear security policy;² third, public protest to renewed French nuclear testing in 1995; fourth, the successful campaign to have the New Zealand parliament adopt a unanimous motion on nuclear disarmament immediately prior to the 2000 NPT RevCon; and fifth, the role that NGO expert Kate Dewes played as co-chair of the New Zealand Labour Party's Foreign Affairs and Defence (FA&D) Policy Consultative Committee.

As an introduction to transnational NGO advocacy, the work of three key New Zealand-based NGO experts is outlined: Dewes, Robert Green and Alyn Ware. All three were strongly involved with each of the transnational NGO initiatives examined here. These include firstly, the WCP, a campaign begun and led in large part by New Zealand NGO individuals which aimed to have the UNGA request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the legal status of nuclear weapons;³ secondly, Abolition 2000 (A2000), an NGO network with international and domestic chapters, established at the 1995 NPTREC with the core aim of promoting the abolition of nuclear weapons; thirdly, the drafting and promotion of a Model NWC; and

² The only similar body encountered during this research was the US Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), defunct since 1972. However, this appears to have been more of a governmental advisory board than a non-governmental one.

³ The WCP was also successful in having the World Health Assembly (WHA) request an advisory opinion of the ICJ on the issue of the legality of nuclear weapons. However, the Court decided that this was outside of its jurisdiction in this particular case.

fourthly, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), an international NGO-led forum facilitating high-level dialogue and collaboration between governments and NGOs.

2. Domestic NGO Advocacy

National Consultative Committee on Disarmament

NCCD is the oldest disarmament-focused umbrella organisation for NGOs in New Zealand. It was established in 1977 by the New Zealand branch of the United Nations Association (UNA NZ) at the request of the Government. New Zealand was preparing to take part in the first UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 and sought input from the domestic NGO community. Although the consultative relationship was not formally institutionalised, NCCD continued its work as an independent organisation, coordinating the efforts of disarmament NGOs in order to maintain their input into government policy.

NCCD's 1997-98 annual report indicates membership of 18 organisations, although attendance at its meetings was rarely more than seven to eight people and NCCD-coordinated action was generally reliant on a small group of dedicated individuals.⁴ Despite functioning on extremely limited resources (its annual operating budget in 1998 was \$2,200) NCCD's nuclear disarmament advocacy during the second half of the 1990s can reasonably be described as consistent and proactive. Meeting once a month throughout the period, it monitored domestic and international developments in nuclear security, displaying a good understanding of the strategic concerns and politics of the field.⁵ Although it had ties to organisations around the country, NCCD was a Wellington-based organisation, so its policy input drew mainly on the expertise and resources of NGOs based in the capital. Its location meant it was well placed to engage with Government Ministers (through regular correspondence with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Disarmament) and MFAT disarmament officials (through regular meetings). It pressed the case for greater New Zealand advocacy of nuclear disarmament, specifically through promotion of a NWC, and called for

⁴ A list of key NGOs and individuals affiliated to and involved with NCCD during the research period appears in the Appendix.

⁵ As well as its work in the nuclear realm, the NCCD closely monitored many issues related to other types of disarmament, the arms industry and trade, and defence and security matters.

increased NGO-government collaboration, including more regular NGO representation on NPT delegations.⁶

As well as regular contact with the National-led government and officials, NCCD had a good working relationship with the Labour Party in opposition, in the context of which it also promoted a NWC. Labour Disarmament Spokesperson Dianne Yates MP was an NCCD member from May 1997 onwards and kept in regular contact with the Committee, although she rarely attended its meetings. Likewise, Matt Robson MP, a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committee and future Disarmament Minister, was in regular contact with NCCD and attended its 1997 AGM with Yates on behalf of Labour.

Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control

In recognition of the role that NGOs played in securing the nuclear free legislation, and of the considerable value of NGO experience and expertise in the field of nuclear security, the 1987 Nuclear Free Zone Act mandated the creation of a Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC). Section 17 of the Nuclear Free Act assigns to PACDAC the following statutory responsibilities:

- a) *“To advise the Minister of Foreign Affairs on such aspects of disarmament and arms control matters as it thinks fit;*
- b) *To advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of this Act;*
- c) *To publish from time to time public reports in relation to disarmament and arms control matters and on the implementation of this act.”*⁷

In addition, PACDAC was made responsible for disbursing funds generated by the Peace and Disarmament Education Trust (PADET). PADET was established with \$1.5m in seed funding from the French government’s reparation payment to New Zealand following France’s bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour in 1985. The Trust’s objective is to *“...advance education and thereby promote international peace, arms control and disarmament.”*⁸

⁶ While NGOs had been represented on RevCon delegations since 1985, NCCD and others, including Greenpeace, also advocated (unsuccessfully) for this to be emulated at NPT PrepComs.

⁷ New Zealand House of Representatives, *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act*, Section 17.

⁸ Department of Internal Affairs, *The Peace and Disarmament Education Trust (PADET)*, 2008 [cited 30 July 2008]. Available from http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Trust-&-Fellowship-Grants-

As a non-governmental body with a legislative mandate to advise the government, PACDAC is a tangible mechanism for facilitating NGO engagement in disarmament policy. However, the political nature of the appointment process (Committee members are appointed by the Foreign Minister) means that it is prone to partisan influences. PACDAC is chaired, at least in theory, by the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control.⁹ This position was envisaged, although not explicitly mandated, by the Nuclear Free Zone Act¹⁰ and created soon after the Act became law.¹¹

The first PACDAC, appointed under the Labour Government in 1987, was made up of individuals with “...a long history of working for the nuclear free policy and a commitment to see its integrity upheld.”¹² Conversely, the PACDAC constituted by the incoming National Government following its 1990 election replaced peace movement experts with specialists in the fields of armed forces, strategic and security studies, including several critics of the nuclear free law.¹³ Under National, PACDAC made a deliberate policy change away from multiple small grants to a wide range of grassroots peace and disarmament NGOs towards funding a regime of fewer, larger scale, and generally academic initiatives. As a result, traditional NGOs were treated somewhat unsympathetically, with PADET applications from organisations such as the Peace Council, NCCD¹⁴ and CND repeatedly declined.

Hoadley states that the work of PACDAC at this time was almost entirely occupied with briefings from Government-selected experts and assessing applications for PADET funds. He reports that PACDAC under National “...had almost no impact on policy formation or amendment or execution.” Minutes of PACDAC meetings from the period indicate this was

[The-Peace-and-Disarmament-Education-Trust-\(PADET\)?OpenDocument](#). PACDAC is also now responsible for administering the Disarmament Education UN Implementation Fund. This was established by the government to “...assist New Zealand Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) in implementing the recommendations of the 2002 United Nations’ Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education.” See: Department of Internal Affairs, *Disarmament Education UN Implementation Fund*, 2008 [cited 25 August 2008]. Available from http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Trust-&-Fellowship-Grants-Disarmament-Education-UN-Implementation-Fund?OpenDocument.

⁹ In practice this has been the exception rather than the rule.

¹⁰ New Zealand House of Representatives, *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act*, Section 18(a).

¹¹ White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: the Policy in Action*, 96.

¹² *Ibid.*, 97.

¹³ Hoadley, 'PACDAC 1991-1996: A Retrospective Review,' 103. An exception was Dame Laurie Salas, an NGO peace and disarmament stalwart, long-time member of UNA New Zealand and the first appointee to PACDAC in 1988.

¹⁴ NCCD did receive PADET funding for the production of its six-yearly newsletter NCCD Disarmament Times. See: Desmond Brough, *NCCD Annual Report 2000-2001*, Wellington (2001).

mainly due to the fact that the new Committee provided very little policy advice to the government and likewise sought virtually none from the traditional NGO sector. Rather, PACDAC became a means of promoting and legitimising the policy position of the government, as Committee members “...went back to our constituents better informed about, and probably more sympathetic towards, official initiatives, or absence thereof.”¹⁵

Previous research by Dr Robert White of the CPS has described the failure of PACDAC under National to fulfil its legislative obligation to publish reports on disarmament and arms control and to advise the government regarding implementation of the Nuclear Free Zone Act.¹⁶ Minutes subsequent to July 1998, where White’s research ended, show that this continued to be the case for the remainder of the decade, although there were limited attempts to engage more with NGOs and produce some educational material.

Response to Renewed French Nuclear Testing

The government’s response to renewed French testing in 1995 was influenced strongly by non-governmental protest and activity. NGOs felt that their concerns about the indefinite extension of the NPT were vindicated when the Chinese initiated new nuclear tests only days after the conclusion of the NPTREC, followed shortly thereafter by the French.¹⁷ The issue reignited public opposition to nuclear weapons; Greenpeace collected seven million signatures worldwide for a petition calling for an end to nuclear testing.¹⁸ In New Zealand, anti-nuclear sentiment was much more highly attuned to French testing than to that of the Chinese.¹⁹ Strong public protest was manifest in demonstrations, speeches and articles by

¹⁵ Hoadley, 'PACDAC 1991-1996: A Retrospective Review,' 103-104.

¹⁶ White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: the Policy in Action*. This is in contrast to the original PACDAC. Dewes, a member of the first Committee, writes that the original PACDAC published reports on security-related issues and peace education. It consulted actively with the NGO community, with which Committee members had extensive ties, and was active in debating disarmament policy and advising the government in this regard as per its legislative obligations. Dewes describes it as “...a vital conduit for effective transmission of research and peace movement concerns into the decision-making process” although she acknowledges “...the bureaucracy effectively blocked any real movement on the key issues raised.” Dewes, "Participatory Democracy in Peace and Security Decision Making," 80.

¹⁷ Greenpeace International, *GP Calls Ch N-Test Slap in NPT's Face*, 15 May 1995 [cited 25 March 2008]. Available from <http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-oldgopher/9505/msg00030.html>.

¹⁸ Greenpeace International, *Greenpeace Victories*, 2008 [cited 23 July 2008]. Available from <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/about/victories>.

¹⁹ This was no doubt due in part to remnants of ill-feeling related to the 1985 French bombing of the *Rainbow Warrior*, although Low attributes this to the greater distance from the Chinese tests (indicating less environmental concern in New Zealand) and to New Zealand’s identification as a ‘Pacific’ nation, thus eliciting empathy with the Pacific Islanders most affected by the French tests. See: Peter Low, "New Zealand's Responses to the Last French Nuclear Tests," *Antipodes* 3 (1997). Dewes commented that there was little

NGOs; a consumer boycott of French products; a delegation of fifty mayors, councillors and educators travelling to France to protest and to develop connections with French communities and disarmament groups; and a flotilla of private vessels sailing to Mururoa to protest, amongst other things. This large-scale, spontaneous outpouring of public protest demonstrated the strength of latent public opposition to nuclear weapons.

Initial low-level government responses to the tests, restricted mainly to curtailment of military cooperation with the French, were soon augmented due to public demands for greater action. Hoadley writes: “*The government appears to have been moved by the spontaneous upsurge of criticism of France and advocacy of stronger New Zealand protest actions.*”²⁰ This view is supported by several other academic analysts and by an official government history.²¹ Supplementary government actions taken in response to this public outcry included: a letter from the New Zealand Prime Minister to 90 heads of state, calling for protest to be directed to the French President (recalling the actions of Labour Prime Minister Norman Kirk in 1973); a UN resolution being drafted, calling for an immediate end to French nuclear testing; persuading the ASEAN Regional Forum to call for an end to nuclear tests; the recall of the New Zealand Ambassador to Paris; the dispatch of the navy frigate *HMNZS Tui* to the French testing zone as a sign of protest (again recalling the actions of Kirk); and the application to reopen the ICJ nuclear tests case against France, suspended since 1973.²² As noted earlier, the strength of international protest, including this strong New Zealand action brought about by non-governmental demands, lead to France closing its Pacific testing facility earlier than planned and accepting a zero-yield CTBT.

sense of being able to influence the Chinese government, which also limited attempts to protest the Chinese action. Kate Dewes, private correspondence with author. 13 September 2008.

²⁰ Hoadley, 'Diplomacy, Politics and Nuclear Testing,' 114.

²¹ The Government subsequently listed strong public protest as one of the three factors influencing its decision to take legal action over the tests (naming Greenpeace in particular in this respect), thus confirming that public opinion directly influenced government policy in this case. See: David McCraw, "The National Party's Foreign Policy Tradition," *New Zealand International Review* 21, 4 (July-August 1996), 11.; John Henderson, "The Impact of MMP on Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *New Zealand International Review* 21, 5 (September-October 1996), 3.; New Zealand Government, *A Brief History of New Zealand's Attempts to End Nuclear Testing at Mururoa Atoll through the World Court*, 1995 [cited 23 July 2008]. Available from <http://www.executive.govt.nz/93-96/minister/pm/nuclear/history.htm>.

²² Hoadley, 'Diplomacy, Politics and Nuclear Testing,' 114. In the event, and despite the dissenting opinion of Sir Geoffrey Palmer, New Zealand's Judge ad hoc to the ICJ for the duration of the case, the Court declined to reopen the case on the grounds that the earlier one had related to atmospheric testing, which France had indeed ceased (the 1995 tests were conducted below ground). See: International Court of Justice, *Nuclear Tests Case*, 1974 [cited 24 June 2008]. Available from <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=nzf&case=59&k=6b>.

New Zealand Parliamentary Motion on Nuclear Disarmament

On 23 February 2000, the New Zealand Parliament passed a unanimous resolution calling on all UN Member States to fulfil their obligation to conclude negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament, as per their NPT Article VI obligation, which was reaffirmed by the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion.²³ Introduced by Prime Minister Helen Clark, the resolution was the exact text proposed by WCP initiator Harold Evans in an April 1998 paper he sent to all New Zealand MPs entitled *The Strengths of Unanimity and Good Faith*.²⁴ Speaking in the New Zealand Parliament, MP Peter Dunne, the resolution's key parliamentary backer, acknowledged the NGO roots of the initiative and thanked key individuals involved, including Evans, Chris King and Ian Prior.²⁵ He paid tribute to the moral authority of NGOs and their strong transnational advocacy, citing the work of A2000, IPPNW and the WCP. Similar motions soon followed in Australia (9 March) and Canada (28 March), both citing the ICJ Advisory Opinion, with indications of New Zealand NGO involvement or influence in both cases, specifically through the advocacy of Dewes and Green.²⁶ The New Zealand motion was transmitted to all UN Member States and was quoted by Disarmament Minister Matt Robson in his speech to the NPT RevCon two months later.²⁷

²³ New Zealand House of Representatives, *Motion on Nuclear Disarmament*, 23 February 2000 [cited 5 March 2008]. Available from

http://www.gs institute.org/pnnd/docs/parliamentary_motion_on_nuclear_disarmament.html

²⁴ Harold Evans, *The Strengths of Unanimity and Good Faith* Christchurch: self-published (25 April 1998).

²⁵ Dunne singled out Evans especially, who, he said, "...like water wearing away a stone...has ensured that the issue of international nuclear disarmament remains at the forefront of our consciousness." Peter Dunne, *Parliamentary Motion on Nuclear Disarmament*, 23 February 2000 [cited 13 June 2006]. Available from http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/hansard/han/text/2000/02/23_038.html.

²⁶ On 8 March 2000, Green met with Australian Democrat Senator Lyn Allison, briefing her on the NAC, MPI's position on the NPT RevCon, a NWC (and public opinion polling showing support for it) and on the upcoming Australian Senate debate on the nuclear disarmament motion. The following day, Allison spoke strongly in favour of the motion which was passed by a majority in the Senate, referring to the late-1998 Australian opinion poll commissioned by A2000 affiliates, which indicated a 92% majority in favour of Australia working to abolish nuclear weapons. In the Canadian context, Canadian Senator Doug Roche, the Chairman of MPI, requested that Dewes send him the text of the New Zealand motion in order that he "...adapt it for introduction into the Canadian Senate." This was done, and the Canadian Senate duly adopted the motion on, urging NWS to make an unequivocal commitment at the upcoming NPT RevCon to eliminate their nuclear weapons. See: Australian Senate, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: Motion by Senator Peter Cook*, 9 March 2000 [cited 6 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.aph.gov.au/HANSARD/senate/dailys/ds090300.pdf>; Robert Green, *Australia/Japan Report*, Middle Powers Initiative, (21 March 2000).; Doug Roche, Private correspondence with MPI ISC, 19 February 2000.; Canadian Senate, *Debates of the Senate (Hansard) of Canada: 2nd Session, 36th Parliament, Volume 138, Issue 39* 28 March 2000 [cited 6 August 2008]. Available from http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/chambus/senate/deb-e/039db_2000-03-28-E.htm?Language=E&Parl=36&Ses=2#0.2.W54BJ2.MERRJT.CUH6PH.CV It is worth noting that the Canadian Senate had adopted a motion in April 1999 recommending that the Canadian government urge NATO to begin a review of its nuclear weapons policies, a move also influenced by the ICJ Advisory Opinion. See http://www.gs institute.org/pnnd/docs/canadian_senate_motion_nato_policy.html.

²⁷ Matt Robson, "Address to the 2000 NPT Review Conference," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 46, 9 (24 April 2000), 33.

NGO Influence on the New Zealand Labour Party

Labour's victory in the 1999 general election brought into government several policies which were influenced or enabled by New Zealand NGOs. Labour operates a three-tier process in the development of its key policy document, its election Manifesto. The first tier is made up of regional conferences, allowing input from Party members and the general public; the second is a series of Policy Consultative Committees made up of experts in the various policy fields, responsible for "*initiating, developing and recommending policy*"; the third tier is the Policy Council, made up of MPs and various high-level Party members. The Council is ultimately responsible for deciding policy.²⁸

NCCD and individuals from several of its affiliates, many also affiliated to A2000, were aware of and responded to this policy process in promoting a NWC. Of particular interest here, however, is Dewes' role as Co-chair of Labour's Foreign Affairs and Defence (FA&D) Policy Consultative Committee. Dewes first joined the Labour Party immediately before the general election in 1987, keen "*...to ensure the nuclear free policy was sustained and that it had an international impact.*"²⁹ She served as co-Chair of the FA&D Policy Consultative Committee from 1988-1990 but withdrew her party membership following Labour's election defeat in 1990. In November 1997, Dewes was approached by Labour Party officials to stand again for the Committee and was duly elected, once more as the Committee's co-Chair.³⁰ She held this position until late 2000 when she again withdrew her membership as she "*wasn't happy with being a member of a political party.*" She has not joined any party since, preferring to work in a non-partisan capacity, allowing greater collaboration with all political parties.³¹

Over the last few years of the decade, as well co-chairing meetings of the FA&D Policy Consultative Committee, Dewes met regularly with influential Labour MPs such as Helen Clark, Mike Moore (Labour's Foreign Affairs Spokesperson at the time), Ruth Dyson, Phil Goff, and Richard Northey.³² She advocated the Model NWC, greater implementation of the

²⁸ New Zealand Labour Party, "Labour Policymaking Processes and the Role of the Policy Council and Policy Committees," (1997).

²⁹ Kate Dewes, private correspondence with author, 3 April 2008.

³⁰ David Davies, private correspondence with Kate Dewes, 30 November 2000.

³¹ Dewes, private correspondence with author, 3 April 2008.

³² Northey is also an ex-President of the Peace Foundation.

ICJ Opinion and increased government-NGO collaboration through MPI-type meetings. Her role as co-chair of the Committee often saw her drafting key disarmament policies.

In its 1993 election Manifesto, the Labour Party committed itself to promoting the WCP.³³ In August 1996, Labour leader Helen Clark declared the party's unequivocal support for A2000 and its objectives, a position repeated in its election Manifesto that year.³⁴ In February 1998, Dewes, Green and Ware also met with Clark, encouraging Labour to include the NWC in its next Manifesto.³⁵ In 1999, Labour moved in its election manifesto from implicit support for a NWC (by endorsing A2000) to explicit support for the abolition treaty. It also endorsed the work of MPI.³⁶ The introduction to Labour policy of support for MPI can be traced directly to Dewes, who briefed the FA&D Policy Committee in January 1998 on MPI and its objectives.³⁷

Dewes' tenure as the co-Chair of Labour's FA&D Policy Consultative Committee enabled her to strongly influence the formation of its disarmament policies, which were subsequently transferred into Government. This appointment, however, raises the question of her independence and neutrality as an NGO disarmament advocate. To what degree was Dewes' ability to act as an independent voice promoting NGO positions impaired by her involvement with partisan politics?

From examination of primary sources it appears Dewes was not impeded in this sense. As described below, Dewes maintained her many independent roles in non-governmental disarmament education and advocacy during the research period. She promoted positions within and outside the Labour Party that were consistent with the positions of the NGO

³³ New Zealand Labour Party, *Jobs, Health, Growth: Labour's Manifesto for New Zealand* (Wellington, 1993).

³⁴ Helen Clark, 'Labour's Approach to Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy', Paper presented at the meeting of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Dunedin Branch, University of Otago (9 August 1996).; New Zealand Labour Party, *Labour Manifesto 1996: New Heart, New Hope, New Zealand* (Wellington, 1996).

³⁵ Robert Green, *Report: 6 January - 13 February 1998* Christchurch: World Court Project UK, (13 February 1998).

³⁶ New Zealand Labour Party, *The Future is with Labour* (Wellington, 1999).

³⁷ Kate Dewes, private correspondence with David Davies et al., 29 January 1998. The strong statements of support for NGO activity and policies while in opposition were backed up initially by action in government. For example, following Labour's election win on 27 November 1999, Prime Minister Clark acted in practical ways to support Dewes and Green, writing the foreword to Green's book *The Naked Nuclear Emperor* and hosting its launch at Parliament Buildings in Wellington in 2000. Shortly thereafter, she also supported their application – at her suggestion – to the Lottery Minister's Fund to transport 700 copies of the book to New York for distribution at the 2000 NPT RevCon. Kate Dewes and Robert Green, private interview with author. Christchurch, 3 November 2006.

community and more progressive than the mainstream of the Party.³⁸ Equally, Dewes appears to have maintained a non-partisan, fact-based approach to political and policy developments. In a 1999 letter to Northey, for example, she recommended removing a “*derogatory*” comment from the draft Labour Manifesto that “*...our international voice has lacked conviction*” under the National Government, saying, “*I never thought I would be defending McKinnon on this, but he has moved on this issue and has become a strong advocate for the New Agenda Coalition.*”³⁹

3. Transnational NGO Advocacy

The majority of transnational nuclear disarmament advocacy conducted by New Zealand-based NGOs over the research period came through the efforts of a few key individuals. These included Kate Dewes, Robert Green and Alyn Ware, whose activities are described below, as well as Stephanie Mills, who was Greenpeace International’s NPT Project coordinator for the 1995 NPTREC.⁴⁰

Dewes and Ware have collaborated for almost three decades in a diverse range of peace and disarmament activities, while Dewes and Green have worked together since meeting in 1991.⁴¹ For the latter pair, this includes jointly coordinating the Disarmament & Security Centre (DSC)⁴² since co-founding it as a specialist branch of the Peace Foundation in 1998.⁴³ Discussion here focuses strictly on the nuclear disarmament advocacy of these individuals, although they consider their broader work for peace and non-violent conflict resolution as vital to the development of a world in which disarmament and lasting peace are possible.

Over the period from 1995-2000, these three were collaboratively involved in three key

³⁸ In 2000, for example, Dewes and Green drafted a list of specific initiatives for the Prime Minister to consider addressing in an upcoming interview with the Acronym Institute. They wrote, “*...We have focused on recommending proposals which may be ahead of MFAT and New Agenda Coalition thinking, but which we consider are feasible for you to promote, and reflect the position of the international citizen movement working for the abolition of nuclear weapons.*” Kate Dewes and Robert Green, private correspondence with Helen Clark, 27 January 2000.

³⁹ Kate Dewes, private correspondence with Richard Northey, 10 August 1999.

⁴⁰ Unfortunately due to time constraints, it was not possible to investigate more fully the international advocacy of Mills as Greenpeace International’s nuclear disarmament campaign coordinator. Further research in this area would be helpful.

⁴¹ Dewes and Green were married in 1998.

⁴² www.disarmsecure.org

⁴³ While Dewes and Ware have strong roots in the traditional, grass roots New Zealand peace movement, Green has tended to focus more strongly, although not exclusively, on nuclear disarmament research and advocacy, including alternative security strategies facilitate disarmament.

international nuclear disarmament initiatives: the WCP, A2000 and MPI, serving on the ISC of all of these. All three were also involved in domestic and international advocacy of the Model NWC, which Ware co-authored with Datan.

Dewes is a veteran of the New Zealand peace movement, having been involved in peace and disarmament advocacy since the mid-1970s. A large portion of her time from 1994 to 1998 was spent researching and writing her Doctoral Thesis, *The World Court Project: the Evolution and Impact of an Effective Citizens' Movement*.⁴⁴ Her disarmament experiences and appointments include, *inter alia*: member and South Island Representative for over 28 years of the Peace Foundation;⁴⁵ co-founder and former Steering Committee member of Peace Movement Aotearoa (PMA),⁴⁶ a national NGO networking and information sharing organisation (from the early 1980s onwards); member of the New Zealand Delegation to the third UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD - 1988); former part-time tutor / lecturer in Peace Studies at Canterbury University (1986-97, 1999-2006); PACDAC member (1988-90 and 2000-2007); member of NCCD and the New Zealand chapters of the WCP, A2000 and Greenpeace; member of the ISC of the WCP (1992-96) and MPI (1998-2001); former Executive Member (1992-96) and Vice-President (1997-2003) of the International Peace Bureau (IPB); NGO delegate to the 1995 NPTREC (on behalf of the Peace Foundation); New Zealand Government expert on the UN Study Group on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education (2000-2002); and member of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (2007-).

In January 1991, Robert Green became the first former British Navy Commander with nuclear weapons experience to speak out against them.⁴⁷ From 1991 until the early 2000s, Green was Chair of the WCP UK branch. During the last half of the 1990s, Green split his time between New Zealand and the UK, spending roughly six months a year in each until settling permanently in Christchurch in mid-1999. He attended the 1995 NPTREC on behalf

⁴⁴ This is the most comprehensive insider's examination of the campaign written so far. Dewes, *The World Court Project*.

⁴⁵ With offices in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, this is arguably New Zealand's leading peace research, education and advocacy NGO. It has

⁴⁶ Aotearoa is the name for New Zealand in the language of its indigenous Maori people.

⁴⁷ Green's personal journey from nuclear weapons commander to ardent anti-nuclear advocate was strongly influenced by the brutal 1984 murder of his aunt, anti-nuclear power campaigner Hilda Murrell, near her home in the West Midlands, UK, while preparing a submission opposing a new nuclear power plant. See: Robert Green, "From Nuclear Warrior to Opponent: How the Murder of Hilda Murrell Changed My Life," *Pacific Ecologist*, 12 (Winter 2006).

of the WCP UK and the 2000 RevCon on behalf of MPI.

The DSC is based in Dewes and Green's Christchurch home. In April 2000, the DSC published Green's book *The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence*, with a foreword by then-New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark.⁴⁸ The book critiques nuclear deterrence based on its immorality, illegality and lack of credibility and explores alternative approaches to achieving security. 4000 copies of the book were distributed to MPs, government officials, NGOs and schools in New Zealand and internationally.⁴⁹

Alyn Ware has a long history of transnational peace and disarmament education and advocacy.⁵⁰ He founded the Hamilton Nuclear Free Zone Committee in 1982 and was also a co-founder of PMA. In 1984 he founded the Mobile Peace Van and toured the country introducing peace education into schools, for which he was awarded a UN International Year of Peace Award in 1986. In 1991, he co-founded the Peace Foundation's Cool Schools Peer Mediation Programme which has now been introduced into half of New Zealand's schools. In October 1992, he became the UN Coordinator for the WCP, based in the New York office of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP - the US affiliate of the International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms, IALANA). In this role, he was responsible for "[WCP] lobbying in New York and the coordination of submissions to the ICJ."⁵¹ He was LCNP Executive Director from 1993 to 1999 and remains a consultant for IALANA. Ware has attended every UNGA since 1992 to advocate for key disarmament resolutions and report on developments to the international NGO community. He attended the 1995 NPT on behalf of LCNP and was the official NGO advisor on the New Zealand delegation to the 2000 NPT RevCon.⁵² Since 1996, he has worked on initiatives to implement the ICJ Advisory Opinion, including the annual UN resolutions and the NPT working papers on follow-up to the

⁴⁸ Green, *The Naked Nuclear Emperor*.

⁴⁹ Other DSC publications from the period include the booklets *Pacific Women Speak Out for Independence and Denuclearisation* and *Aotearoa-New Zealand at the World Court*, a summary of New Zealand's legal challenges to nuclear weapons and testing, including the WCP and New Zealand's role in it. These two books have been translated into Japanese and are still being distributed today. Kate Dewes and Robert Green, *Report for the MPI Outreach Committee*, Middle Powers Initiative, (4 October 2000).; Zohl de Ishtar, ed., *Pacific Women Speak Out for Independence and Denuclearisation* (Christchurch, NZ / Annandale, NSW, 1998).; Dewes and Green, *Aotearoa-New Zealand at the World Court*.

⁵⁰ A more detailed record of his personal history of peace and disarmament education and advocacy is contained in Dewes' doctoral thesis. See: Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 277-282.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 277.

⁵² Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, *Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part IV))*, 2000 [cited 14 July 2007]. Available from <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4279524.html>.

Opinion. Since 1998, Ware has been on the IPB Steering Committee and for several years has been an IPB Vice-President. He helped found MPI in 1998 and remains on its Steering Committee today. He has also served on the UN-based NGO Committee on Disarmament and since 2004, has been a member of PACDAC. Ware made a significant contribution to the international nuclear disarmament agenda during the late 1990s through his co-authorship of the Model NWC, which is now an official UN and NPT document.

The World Court Project

The WCP was a near decade-long campaign, initiated and then led to a large degree by New Zealand NGOs and individuals. It successfully sought to have the UNGA elicit from the ICJ an advisory opinion on the legal status of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

In 1986, Harold Evans, a retired New Zealand District Court Judge and member of the Christchurch Peace Collective, initiated the campaign that was to become the WCP. Inspired, *inter alia*, by the nuclear disarmament advocacy of former Irish Foreign Minister Sean MacBride and catalysed into action by a proposal from visiting international legal expert, Richard Falk, Evans wrote an open letter to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia. The letter, with contributions from five other eminent international legal experts,⁵³ called on Australia and New Zealand to use Article 96 of the UN Charter to request an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on the legal status of nuclear weapons.⁵⁴ He was soon joined in the initiative by Dewes, who became co-coordinator of the WCP New Zealand chapter.⁵⁵ Many other domestic NGOs, inspired by the successful public campaign to ban nuclear weapons in New Zealand, began to collaborate with the WCP.⁵⁶ IPPNW New Zealand was a key NGO involved transnationally, generating WCP support in New Zealand and later doing extensive work to convince doctors in other countries to support a World Health Assembly (WHA) request for an Advisory Opinion.⁵⁷ In 1988, Dewes was the first person to promote the WCP among UN delegates during her visit to New York on the New Zealand delegation

⁵³ Richard Falk; Martin Finlay (former New Zealand Minister of Justice who presented New Zealand's case at the ICJ in the 1973 NZ-France Nuclear Tests Case); Edward St John (former President of the Australian International Commission of Jurists); Sir Guy Powles (New Zealand's first Chief Ombudsman and President of the New Zealand International Commission of Jurists); Sir Christopher Weeramantry (former Sri Lankan Supreme Court Judge and later, vice-President of the ICJ).

⁵⁴ Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 117-119.

⁵⁵ Evans and Ware were personal friends, having collaborated for several years through the work of the Christchurch Peace Collective, which often met in Dewes' home.

⁵⁶ Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 117.

⁵⁷ Despite the success of the WCP in convincing the WHA to request an advisory opinion, the ICJ declined to render such an opinion, arguing it was outside its jurisdiction in this case.

to the third UNSSOD. From the late 1980s, Ware was also involved in sounding out New York UN diplomats for potential WCP support.⁵⁸

At a PACDAC meeting in November 1988, the Committee discussed the WCP for most of the day and there was very nearly agreement from the government to support the WCP.⁵⁹ However, with the Australian government unsupportive, the Foreign Ministry firmly opposed and the diplomatic fallout of the ANZUS rift still affecting New Zealand's relations with its former allies, the Labour Government would not officially support the WCP.⁶⁰ Lacking domestic political support, a range of New Zealand individuals travelled abroad and attended foreign NGO meetings to help develop an international campaign. As a result of this promotion, influential international lawyers began to promote Evans' idea through their organisations and British activists began to focus more on the project.⁶¹

Eventually, three major international NGOs - IALANA, IPB and IPPNW - agreed to co-sponsor the WCP and it was launched internationally in 1992. Dewes, Green and Ware were all appointed to its ISC. Meanwhile, the campaign continued strongly on the domestic front. In effect, the WCP was the last high-profile anti-nuclear campaign seen in New Zealand, with advocates eventually collecting 32,000 'Declarations of Public Conscience'⁶² (DPCs) opposing nuclear weapons.⁶³ Government officials have recognised the vital role that the New Zealand NGO community played in bringing about the Advisory Opinion. In presenting arguments to the ICJ in 1995, New Zealand Attorney General Paul East said: "*At the outset, I would like to acknowledge groups and individuals from New Zealand, some of them present here today, who worked so hard and played a major role in bringing this matter before the Court.*"⁶⁴

⁵⁸ Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 278-279.

⁵⁹ Dewes, private correspondence with author, 13 September 2008.

⁶⁰ Prime Minister Lange did, however, write a letter of recommendation for Dewes, which she used to gain access to several key UN diplomats in order to lobby them on the WCP initiative.

⁶¹ Dewes notes that domestic NGOs had already begun to link up with international organisations such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), IPB and IPPNW and were in regular contact with the anti-nuclear Greenham Commons women; however, despite the 1973 NZ-France ICJ Nuclear Testing case, it was not until Falk's visit that domestic NGOs gave serious consideration to the use of international law to challenge all aspects of nuclear weapons. See: Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 112.

⁶² These were gathered in New Zealand and around the world to be presented to the ICJ as 'citizens' evidence' in the upcoming nuclear weapons case.

⁶³ Kate Dewes and Robert Green, "the World Court Project: History and Consequences," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 7, 1 (Fall 1999).

⁶⁴ New Zealand, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Oral Submission)*, International Court of Justice, 1995 [cited 12 February 2008]. Available from <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5937.pdf>

Likewise, Christine Bogle, Director of MFAT's Disarmament Division when the Advisory Opinion was delivered, has explicitly acknowledged the 'special connection' that New Zealand has with it because of its roots in the domestic NGO community.⁶⁵

The WCP resulted in arguably the strongest legal challenge to nuclear weapons in history. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion was a legal watershed in that it decoupled nuclear disarmament from general and complete disarmament and stated that the NWS have a binding legal obligation to conclude negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament.⁶⁶

The WCP demonstrated a model of collaboration between NGOs and like-minded governments that recognises and effectively utilises the strengths and abilities of each. This model was being applied concurrently by the successful 'Ottawa Process' which led to the completion of a convention banning anti-personnel landmines.⁶⁷ It was subsequently replicated in MPI and also applied in the Oslo Process, which culminated with the completion in early 2008 of a convention banning cluster munitions.

The downstream effects of the WCP have had a fundamental impact on New Zealand foreign policy and behaviour and furthermore, have helped to shape international events, strengthening the hand of governmental and non-governmental nuclear disarmament advocates globally. The Canberra Commission's call for an unequivocal commitment from the NWS to eliminate their nuclear weapons was derived from the delinking of nuclear disarmament from general disarmament in the ICJ Advisory Opinion.⁶⁸ This was followed by a nearly identical call from New Zealand in its Working Paper to the NPT PrepCom in 1997.⁶⁹ This idea then made its way, apparently via New Zealand advocacy, into NAC policy, which as discussed earlier, had a profound effect on the outcome of the 2000 NPT RevCon. Randall therefore observed that echoes of the WCP, "...*didn't just reverberate in*

⁶⁵ Christine Bogle, Paper presented at the seminar, 'A Celebration - 10 Years of Nuclear Free Legislation', University of Auckland: Centre for Peace Studies /Aotearoa New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies (7 June 1997).

⁶⁶ International Court of Justice, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion)*.

⁶⁷ For more on the Ottawa Process and its outcome, see Williams, Wareham, and Goose, eds., *Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security*.; Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines."

⁶⁸ Johnson, "The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise."

⁶⁹ New Zealand, *Proposed Elements for Inclusion in the Report of the Preparatory Committee on its First Session (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3)*.

Wellington, they also had a decisive impact on the Canberra Commission's work and conclusions, which was the start point, I think, for the NAC."⁷⁰

Abolition 2000

Despite the dismay of many NGOs at the indefinite, unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995, the formation of the Abolition 2000 network (A2000) at the NPTREC had a significant positive impact on the NGO nuclear disarmament community.⁷¹ This coalition of NGOs and individuals from around the world noted that the issue of nuclear weapons abolition was not on the official agenda of the NPTREC. Following a two-day NGO caucus in which Dewes, Green, Mills and Ware participated, A2000 issued a joint statement calling, *inter alia*, for the conclusion by the year 2000 of "...a nuclear weapons abolition convention."⁷² Ware was instrumental in including the call for a NWC in the A2000 Statement; it had been absent from a weaker document circulated by Washington-based organisations for sign-on by NGOs.⁷³ Ware subsequently co-convened the international A2000 *NWC Working Group*, while Green convened a group on *Overcoming Nuclear Threats / Legal Issues*.⁷⁴

During the late 1990s, A2000 was very active internationally and in New Zealand, functioning as a decentralised network of organisations working independently and collectively for the vision of nuclear weapons abolition. The network has grown to over 2000 members, with 39 New Zealand based affiliates.⁷⁵ Aided by the communications revolution and the rapid expansion of the internet in the mid 1990s, it became a key international NGO information-sharing network.

In December 1995, a New Zealand chapter of A2000 was formed, supported strongly by IPPNW New Zealand and its IPPNW Research and Education Trust. It incorporated

⁷⁰ McDonald and Randall, private interview with author.

⁷¹ Although initially known as the 'Abolition Caucus', the network soon came to be known by the name "Abolition 2000".

⁷² Abolition 2000, *Abolition 2000 Statement*, April 1995 [cited 18 February 2008]. Available from http://www.abolition2000.org/site/c.cdJIKKNpFqG/b.1316717/k.8870/The_Abolition_2000_Statement_English.htm#footnotes.

⁷³ Alyn Ware, private correspondence with author, 13 August 2008.

⁷⁴ Abolition 2000, *Working Groups and Conveners [2000 NPT Review Conference Media Pack]*. (April 2000).

⁷⁵ Abolition 2000, *Membership List*, 2008 [cited 15 June 2008]. Available from <http://www.abolition2000.org/site/c.cdJIKKNpFqG/b.1316671/>. This number takes into account those listed on the A2000 website. However, it is not clear how many of these organisations are still active in nuclear disarmament advocacy.

membership from many different organisations⁷⁶ and had branches in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. A2000 New Zealand was led by Ian Prior of IPPNW and John Murray, with the Erich Geiringer Memorial Oration being a core aspect of its work.⁷⁷ In 1996, the inaugural Geiringer lecture was delivered by former Mexican Ambassador to the CD, Miguel Marin-Bosch. In 1997 the lecture was delivered by General Lee Butler, the former Commander in Chief of US Strategic Command responsible for all US nuclear forces (1992-94), who since retirement had become a strong nuclear disarmament advocate.⁷⁸ These visits to New Zealand by high-profile international figures generated interest in media and government circles, helping to raise the profile of A2000 and of the nuclear abolition cause.

In 1997 and 1998, organisations affiliated with A2000 commissioned a series of public opinion polls around the world on the issue of nuclear disarmament. The results were unambiguous: large majorities of those polled in Australia (92%), Belgium (72%), Canada (93%), Japan (78%), Norway (92%), Russia (61%), the UK (87%) and the US (87%) supported the elimination or abolition of nuclear weapons.⁷⁹ This created a strong resource for campaigners using democratic principles to promote nuclear disarmament. At the 2000 NPT RevCon, A2000 presented to the Chair a petition calling for the negotiation of a NWC, signed by more than 13,200,000 people worldwide.⁸⁰ These campaigns demonstrated that A2000 was “...an excellent grass roots motivating call,” useful for demonstrating to governments “...the strength of citizen support for the abolition of nuclear weapons.”⁸¹ It increased the connections between domestic NGOs and their international counterparts, improved their effectiveness and enabled large numbers of NGOs to respond to international developments quickly and in a coordinated manner.

⁷⁶ The Auckland branch of A2000 New Zealand, for example, represented CPS, Engineers for Social Responsibility, IPPNW, Pax Christi, the Peace Foundation, SANA and WILPF. Marion Hancock, private correspondence with Don McKinnon. Auckland, 21 March 1997.

⁷⁷ Geiringer was a prominent, long-time New Zealand anti-nuclear advocate, author and member of IPPNW. He was also the “primary initiator of the [WCP] WHO resolution”. See: Dewes, *The World Court Project*. xxiii.; Erich Geiringer, *Malice in Blunderland: an Anti-Nuclear Primer* (North Ryde, NSW: Methuen 1985).

⁷⁸ Ian Prior and Helen Smyth, eds., *New Zealand in the New Millennium: a Conversation with Ourselves* (Wellington, 2000).

⁷⁹ Abolition 2000, *People Worldwide Want Nuclear Abolition*, 1998 [cited August 27 2008]. Available from http://www.abolition2000.org/atf/cf/%7B23F7F2AE-CC10-4D6F-9BF8-09CF86F1AB46%7D/poll_worldwide.pdf.

⁸⁰ The overwhelming majority of these were collected in Japan.

⁸¹ Alyn Ware, private correspondence with Alice Slater, 14 July 1999.

The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention

Building on the formation of A2000 at the NPTREC around a nuclear weapons abolition agenda; the ICJ Opinion calling for complete nuclear disarmament; and the strongly-supported 1996 Malaysian UNGA resolution calling for a negotiations leading to the completion of a NWC,⁸² Ware, along with Merav Datan, gathered together an international committee of non-governmental experts in the field of nuclear disarmament and drafted the Model NWC. Completed in 1997, the Model NWC lays out all the legal, political and technical requirements to achieve and maintain a nuclear weapon free world via an abolition treaty. Using networks developed through years of disarmament advocacy at the UN, including for the WCP, Ware helped to arrange for Costa Rica to present the Model NWC to the UNGA in November 1997.⁸³ It was then published with a full exposition on the idea in the 1999 book *Security and Survival: the Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention*.⁸⁴ The Model NWC was revised and updated a decade later, being republished in 2007 in the book *Securing Our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention*.⁸⁵ The revised Model NWC was jointly presented to the UNGA and NPT PrepCom in 2007 by Costa Rica and Malaysia.

The Model NWC created by these NGO experts represented a large step forward in international consideration of abolition. Prior to the Model NWC, the idea of nuclear weapons abolition was talked about in abstracts internationally, as no one had drawn up a framework to consider the issue comprehensively. The NWC drafted by Datan, Ware et al has been endorsed by the UN Secretary General as a potential model for nuclear weapons abolition and circulated to all UN member states as “*a good point of departure*” for beginning discussions on abolition.⁸⁶

⁸² United Nations General Assembly, *Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (A/RES/51/45M)*. This passed with 115 votes for, 22 against, and 32 abstentions.

⁸³ Costa Rica, *General and Complete Disarmament (A/C.1/52/7)*, paper presented to the United Nations General Assembly, 31 October 1997 [cited 2008 15 August]. Available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/334/78/img/N9733478.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁸⁴ Merav Datan et al., *Securing our Survival (SOS): the Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention* (Cambridge, MA: International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 2007); Datan and Ware, *Security and Survival*.

⁸⁵ Datan et al., *Securing our Survival*.

⁸⁶ United Nations Department of Public Information, *Contagious' Doctrine of Deterrence Has Made Non-proliferation More Difficult*.

The Middle Powers Initiative

Complementing A2000's public outreach work and grassroots appeal is the more specialised, high-level work of MPI,⁸⁷ which serves as "...a platform for [NGO] engagement with diplomats, officials and politicians and can help to move them closer to the abolition position."⁸⁸ MPI was the 'brainchild' of former Canadian Senator and Ambassador for Disarmament, Hon. Douglas Roche, and is made up of NGO and governmental-sector experts from around the world.⁸⁹ Roche and Ware co-drafted the IPB Assembly resolution proposing the creation of MPI in November 1997⁹⁰ and the initiative was launched internationally in March 1998.⁹¹

MPI was based on the WCP model of NGO-government collaboration that had recently achieved unprecedented success with the delivery of the ICJ Advisory Opinion and the successful campaign to create a convention banning anti-personnel landmines.⁹² MPI deliberately incorporated key WCP organisations such as IALANA, IPB and IPPNW,⁹³ as well as key WCP individuals; Dewes, Green and Ware were members of the MPI ISC from its inception.⁹⁴ Individuals from the governmental sphere involved with MPI during the research period included Roche, US Senator Alan Cranston,⁹⁵ ex-US President Jimmy Carter and ex-US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. General Butler collaborated to a limited degree and UN Ambassador for Peace, Michael Douglas, used his media profile to support the Initiative. MPI's original plan was,

⁸⁷ www.middlepowers.org

⁸⁸ Ware, private correspondence with Alice Slater, 14 July 1999.

⁸⁹ Robert Green, private correspondence with Jo Valentine, 11 February 1998. Roche was appointed to the Canadian Senate in September 1998 and served until 2004, when legal age restrictions forced his resignation from the Senate. He chaired MPI from its inception in 1998 until 2008.

⁹⁰ Ware, private correspondence with author, 13 August 2008.

⁹¹ In its present form, MPI's key initiative is the *Article VI Forum*, which brings together one-to-two times a year high-level governmental and expert non-governmental representatives from many countries to discuss ways in which the two sectors can cooperate to progress the nuclear disarmament agenda. Although Dewes and Green have ceased their official MPI work, Ware is still involved today as a member of its ISC.

⁹² The 'Ottawa Convention' was completed in 1997.

⁹³ Other key NGOs involved with MPI included the International Network of Engineers and Scientists, the State of the World Forum (SOWF), the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, the Global Security Institute, Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and towards the end of the decade, the Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE). PGA has since moved on to focus on small arms and thus no longer co-sponsors MPI, while the SOWF is now defunct. Although GRACE was not initially a co-sponsor, GRACE Director Alice Slater was involved from the outset as a member of the ISC.

⁹⁴ Green, 'MAPW Newsletter Report'; Middle Powers Initiative, *Aide Memoire for Meetings with Irish and Swedish Foreign Ministries* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1998).

⁹⁵ D-California; Cranston was a strong advocate of a nuclear arms freeze during the Cold War.

“...to launch an intensive, carefully focused and coordinated campaign to facilitate the forging of a new coalition of leaders of influential middle power governments with good track records in nuclear disarmament from every continent, independent of the Cold War Blocks. These leaders, emulating the example of the Six-Nation Initiative in the 1980s, would then press the NWS leaders to make an unequivocal commitment to complete nuclear disarmament.”

96

The formation of the NAC a few months after MPI's inception therefore “...forged the coalition envisaged by the MPI.”⁹⁷ With the initial stage of its plan completed a year sooner than anticipated, MPI quickly turned its efforts to supporting those of the NAC and encouraging both international civil and political society to do the same. Although MPI did not advocate for a NWC, due to the reluctance of Western NAC members to promote the idea,⁹⁸ the New Zealand-based ISC members continued to promote a NWC in their individual capacities.

MPI dispatched 11 ‘high-level delegations’ from July 1998 to November 2000, making a total of 24 visits to the capitals or UN Missions of key NAC or NATO / Western aligned states, including Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. These delegations often included Dewes, Green and Ware and on occasion, were led by Green. They engaged with media, presented papers at conferences and met with top government disarmament officials. The delegations were often received by senior ministers, foreign ministers and on occasion, by Prime Ministers.

The New Zealand-based individuals on the ISC made a significant contribution to MPI's work. All three were on its six-member Editorial Committee. Green and Dewes played a key role in advocating strong MPI engagement with both Australia and Japan, arguing that as key US allies, decision makers in these countries should be lobbied alongside European and North American governments. Of the three New Zealand-based individuals, Green took on the greatest workload and responsibility in MPI's functioning during the research period, including chairing its Strategic Planning Committee. In this role, he organised and facilitated

⁹⁶ Middle Powers Initiative, *Aide Memoire for Meetings with Irish and Swedish Foreign Ministries*.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Discussion of this point follows in chapter six.

a Strategy Consultation in February 1999 at the Rockefeller Foundation in New York,⁹⁹ as well as initiating and co-authoring the discussion paper for a long-term strategy planning meeting. This took place in a retreat format from 20-22 July 2000 in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada¹⁰⁰ and consolidated MPI's links to key NAC governments. Attendees included Dr. Darach MacFhionnbhairr, Director of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs; Director of the MFAT Disarmament Division, Geoff Randall; and former Swedish Disarmament Ambassador and then-President of IPB, Dr. Maj-Britt Theorin (who was also a member of the MPI ISC and Member of the European Parliament at the time). Randy Rydell, the Senior Political Affairs Officer at the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, also attended.¹⁰¹

Green was the lead author of several key MPI publications, including its core briefing book, *Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: the Middle Powers Initiative* published in September 1991. This book “...highlights the deepening nuclear weapons crisis, discusses the feasibility and desirability of rapid nuclear disarmament, and explores the role that middle power governments, supported by civil society, can play in advancing such a goal.”¹⁰²

Green also lead-authored MPI's position paper on NATO nuclear weapons policy, entitled *Rethinking NATO's Nuclear Policy*. Published in June 2000, this challenged the 1999 NATO assertion that its nuclear weapons would remain 'essential' into the foreseeable future,¹⁰³ arguing this policy was in contravention of the ICJ Advisory Opinion, ignored the Canberra Commission report and public opinion in NATO states, provoked proliferation and was in conflict with the unanimous commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons at the 2000 NPT RevCon.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Doug Roche, Letter of Recommendation for Kate Dewes and Rob Green, 2 February 1999.

¹⁰⁰ Robert Green, *WCP UK, Report: 6 April - 3 July 2000*: World Court Project UK, (3 July 2000).

¹⁰¹ Middle Powers Initiative, *Long-Range Strategy Planning Meeting: Pugwash, Nova Scotia, July 20-22, 2000: List of Participants* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 2000).

¹⁰² Robert Green, *Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: the Middle Powers Initiative: a Briefing Book*, First ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Middle Powers Initiative, 1998), 9. *Fast Track* has been translated into Japanese, German, Russian and Finnish. See: Middle Powers Initiative, "Program Report: Fiscal Year 2000," (30 June 2000). Over 10,000 copies have been printed and it has been distributed to diplomats, government officials and elected representatives around the world, including to all members of New Zealand's Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, MFAT disarmament officials and to most high schools in NZ. See: Dewes and Green, *Report for the MPI Outreach Committee*.

¹⁰³ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*.

¹⁰⁴ *Rethinking NATO Nuclear Policy* evolved from Green's book *The Naked Nuclear Emperor*. It was sent, *inter alia*, to the Foreign Ministers of all NATO states prior to an MPI delegation, which included Green, visiting key NATO capitals in October 2000. The paper was produced at the behest of Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who approached Roche for MPI support in encouraging Canada to advocate a review of

Dewes and Green visited Japan several times over the late 1990s, often independently and sometimes specifically on MPI work, but always promoting support for the NAC and the ideas and network that MPI was developing, as well as a NWC. Dewes had a strong public profile in Japan due to an NHK TV¹⁰⁵ documentary on her role in the WCP, which won a top Japanese documentary award in 1997.¹⁰⁶

Ware took on two key roles in MPI; the first was as lead MPI representative at the UNGA each year. In promoting support for the NAC in this forum, MPI drew on the skills, institutional knowledge and governmental and NGO networks Ware had developed as the key WCP advocate and facilitator based at the UN in New-York. MPI's work in this forum was effective in influencing other governments to support the NAC. Randall wrote in 2000, "...the *New Agenda* got very wide support in the First Committee...MPI assistance with that has been very helpful." ¹⁰⁷

Ware's second key MPI role was in initiating and driving the development of *Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament* (PNND).¹⁰⁸ This international network of parliamentarians collaborates across partisan lines to generate political will for nuclear disarmament. Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA) had previously done work in this area, with New Zealanders Kennedy Graham¹⁰⁹ and Nick Dunlop, as former Presidents of PGA, playing key roles in this regard. Although PGA's initiative had lapsed, PNND was initially developed as an MPI/PGA collaboration. In 2001, when MPI became independently responsible for the initiative, Ware was made PNND Global Coordinator (a position he still holds today). PNND has developed online and print resources

NATO nuclear weapons policy in light of the ICJ Opinion, amongst other things. Roche, private correspondence with MPI ISC; Middle Powers Initiative, *Rethinking NATO's Nuclear Policy: a Position Paper by the Middle Powers Initiative* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 2000).; Middle Powers Initiative, *NATO Tour: 5-13 October 2000: Summary Report* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 2000).; Doug Roche, private correspondence with Robert Green and Kate Dewes, 5 February 2000.

¹⁰⁵ NHK is one of Japan's nation-wide public broadcast networks, with an audience of many millions.

¹⁰⁶ The award led to repeated screenings of the documentary, a book version of the film (which featured the DSC, established shortly after the film's release) and subsequent invitations from Asahi Shimbun (in 1998) and NHK (in 2000) for herself and Green to speak at conferences in Japan. See: Robert Green, *Draft Japan Report* Middle Powers Initiative, (19 October 1998).; Green, *Australia/Japan Report*. Asahi Shimbun is one of the highest-circulation papers in Japan with a daily readership of over eight million.

¹⁰⁷ Geoff Randall, private correspondence with Hiromichi Umebayashi, 8 November 2000.

¹⁰⁸ Prior to 2007, this was known as the *Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament*.

¹⁰⁹ Kennedy Graham is a former New Zealand diplomat and Representative at the United Nations and a nuclear disarmament analyst. See: Kennedy Graham, *National Security Concepts of States: New Zealand* (New York: Taylor & Francis; United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research, 1989).; Kennedy Graham, *The Planetary Interest: A New Concept for the Global Age* (London: UCL Press, 1999).

and has hosted seminars and conferences around the world promoting nuclear disarmament among parliamentarians and diplomats.¹¹⁰ In New Zealand, 51 MPs are currently PNND members, drawn from the Green, Labour, Maori, National and Progressive political parties. National MP Nick Smith is the Chair of the New Zealand branch of PNND.¹¹¹

Additional to Randall's endorsement, Clark specifically cited the valuable work of MPI in her first international speech as Prime Minister in 2000: "*The Middle Powers Initiative is the newest network supporting the New Agenda governments, and it has a wealth of expertise and experience in the field of nuclear disarmament.*"¹¹² Later, in 2001, Foreign Minister Goff also explicitly endorsed its work at the annual dinner of the New Zealand Institute for International Affairs.¹¹³ These endorsements were echoed by the Canadian, Irish and Swedish Foreign Ministers.¹¹⁴ It can therefore reasonably be argued that MPI advocacy has influenced governmental thinking on nuclear disarmament policy in New Zealand and internationally.

Finally, on a human level, MPI played an important role in reinforcing and affirming the work of individual NAC diplomats, officials and ministers. Randall noted, "*...in human nature, good deeds need rewards, and it's helpful to have good policies reinforced by public advocacy that supports it.*" MPI therefore played an effective role in "*reinforcing the good that's in people.*"¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ Alyn Ware and Devon Chaffee, *Parliamentarians and Nuclear Weapons* (Wellington: Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, 2002).; Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, *Highlights & History*, 2008 [cited 18 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.gs institute.org/pnnd/pubs/HighlightsandHistory.pdf>.

¹¹¹ Since its launch in October 1999, its initial membership of 131 MPs in 46 countries has grown to over 500 members from more than 70 countries. See: Middle Powers Initiative, "Program Report: Fiscal Year 2000."; Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, *Homepage*, 2008 [cited 18 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.gs institute.org/pnnd/>.; Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, *Members 2008* [cited 18 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.gs institute.org/pnnd/members.html#AotearoaNZ>.

¹¹² Clark, *Address to the State of the World Forum*.

¹¹³ Goff, 'Speech to the Annual Dinner of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs'.

¹¹⁴ Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, wrote, "*...MPI has taken significant steps to assist governments in advancing the nuclear disarmament agenda. Your focus on promoting synergy between like-minded governments, parliamentarians and civil society to work together for nuclear disarmament is commendable and should be intensified.*" The Foreign Ministers of Ireland and Sweden wrote "*...the Middle Powers Initiative, co-sponsored by seven major international non-governmental organizations, has a wealth of expertise and experience in the field of nuclear disarmament.*" See: Middle Powers Initiative, *Report 2000* Massachusetts: (Winter 2000), inside back cover.; Green, *Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons*, inside cover.

¹¹⁵ McDonald and Randall, private interview with author.

4. Conclusion

Despite the low level of New Zealand media and public attention on nuclear disarmament in the latter half of the 1990s, a small community of New Zealand NGOs and individuals remained active in domestic and transnational nuclear disarmament advocacy. They acted through initiatives such as the WCP, A2000, development and promotion of a NWC and MPI. Domestically, specialist organisations and individuals - coalescing for the most part under well established or umbrella organisations such as A2000, NCCD and the Peace Foundation - engaged regularly with Ministers, MPs and government officials. Two examples of influence on government policy from domestic activity have been identified. These were the heightened government response to renewed French nuclear testing in the Pacific in 1995 and the unanimous adoption of a Motion on Nuclear Disarmament by the New Zealand Parliament in February 2000. The former indicated the strength of latent public opposition to nuclear weapons, regardless of the lack of general public attention on the issue. The latter, however, received little media or public attention, indicating that influence on government policy was based not on electoral pressure, but on the inherent value of idea and principles being promoted by the non-governmental community.

Transnationally, the WCP and the resultant ICJ Advisory Opinion created a tangible and ongoing source of non-governmental influence on New Zealand foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, the downstream effects of the WCP informed aspects of the 1996 Canberra Commission report and played a role in the formation and work of the NAC, demonstrating the ability of NGOs to influence international developments in nuclear disarmament discourse and diplomacy.

MPI demonstrated the capacity of NGOs to anticipate international developments and generate and implement rational strategies for influencing their course. Modelled on the WCP, MPI promoted cohesion between convergent governmental and NGO nuclear disarmament efforts, amplifying effective outcomes for both. This helped to maintain pressure for nuclear disarmament in governmental circles that did not always follow public opinion on the issue. MPI's work was commended by senior government Ministers in several states widely-respected for their principled disarmament advocacy, including Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden.

The following chapter builds on these empirical findings, examining their significance for broader, theoretical understandings about the role of non-governmental actors and their ideas in shaping international relations.

Chapter 5: Discussion

“Limits to the arms race were possible where the political will existed to impose those limits. In New Zealand there was will and opportunity.”¹

~ Rt. Hon. David Lange
(New Zealand Prime Minister 1984-1990)

1. Introduction

New Zealand’s nuclear free law, instigated by a Labour Government, resulted from a mass, grass roots citizens’ movement that mobilised strongly and campaigned nationwide. Since 1987, the Nuclear Free Zone Act has been a tangible representation of the moral stance which the people of New Zealand took and “...*the platform on which New Zealand’s involvement in Disarmament and Arms Control issues...was based.*”² Non-governmental advocacy and principled ideas about appropriate foreign policy behaviour were therefore key factors in the emergence and institutionalisation of the nuclear disarmament norm at the national level.

In 1990, the opposition National Party adopted the nuclear free policy. Historically, National’s foreign and security policies had reflected realist thinking and concentrated on “...*the protection of New Zealand’s basic national interests and emphasizing the importance of good relations with allies.*”³ This meant a strong focus on great power alliance – including, if necessary, with NWS. This fact, combined with the strong international opposition to the nuclear free policy from New Zealand’s traditional allies, indicates that the driver for National’s policy reversal was again, domestic public opinion - informed in large part by the strong NGO movement supported by sympathetic media and politicians. When National announced the policy shift, their foreign policy spokesperson, Don McKinnon, acknowledged the role of the NGO movement in shaping National’s decision, saying that New Zealand had probably the strongest peace movement in the world and conceding, “I

¹ Lange, *Nuclear Free*, 116.

² Bogle, 'Paper presented at the seminar, 'A Celebration - 10 Years of Nuclear Free Legislation'.

³ David McCraw, "New Zealand's Foreign Policy Under National and Labour Governments: Variations on the "Small State" Theme?," *Pacific Affairs* 67, 1 (Spring 1994), 25.

*fought against it but I don't mind being beaten on this issue because ultimately the will of the people will prevail."*⁴

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the quasi-obsessive focus on nuclear deterrence began to subside and other issues vital to humanity, such as climate change, environmental degradation and humanitarian concerns, emerged from the shadow of the nuclear umbrella. Unfortunately, this shift in focus led to the mistaken perception worldwide that the nuclear threat had receded. Concurrently, as signalled by National's policy shift, the nuclear free policy was becoming internalised in the New Zealand psyche, developing a 'taken for granted' status domestically. The confluence of these and other related factors brought about a rapid decline in domestic public and media engagement with the issue of nuclear disarmament in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, despite the diminishing grass roots movement and National's traditionally conservative, realist view of New Zealand's role in world affairs, the National Government took an independent, principled foreign policy stance in the mid-to-late 1990s. In their support for the WCP UNGA resolution, their arguments in favour of the illegality of nuclear weapons in the subsequent ICJ hearings and their world-leading role in the NAC, the National Government was "*...doing much more than going along for the ride.*"⁵

Chapter four outlined several key nuclear disarmament initiatives of the New Zealand NGO community that were either developed or came to fruition from 1995-2000, and which clearly influenced New Zealand foreign policy or behaviour. These were grouped into domestic and transnational campaigns.

The two domestic cases of influence – the heightened official response to resumed French nuclear testing in the Pacific in 1995 and the unanimous parliamentary resolution in 2000 - were based on short-term, high-profile demonstrations of public or political support for nuclear disarmament. The heightened government response to French testing was due to a spontaneous, mass outpouring of public protest, indicating the strength of latent opposition to nuclear weapons in New Zealand. Important as New Zealand's actions were in contributing to

⁴ New Zealand Press Association, "What the Nats Said..." 3.

⁵ Robert Ayson, "Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World? New Zealand and the Quest for Global Nuclear Disarmament," *International Journal* 55, 4 (Autumn 2000), 535.

the international political will for the closure of the nuclear test site and achievement of a zero-tolerance CTBT, these developments were driven by the mass of international protest, of which New Zealand's voice was but one among many. In the case of the parliamentary resolution, the idea was adopted by politicians on its merit and without great public attention, although there was a small downstream effect internationally, facilitated by the transnational networks of NGO individuals. A significant distinction between NGO influence in these cases and that resulting from the transnational campaigns was that the domestic initiatives did not influence government thinking or policy in the long-term.

The key transnational initiatives examined, including the WCP, A2000, the Model NWC and MPI, demonstrated a strong and longer-term influence on the direction and levels of New Zealand Government nuclear disarmament advocacy (this is particularly true of the WCP). In several cases, these NGO initiatives also advanced the international nuclear disarmament norm and had a lasting, tangible impact on the discourse and politics surrounding it.

The bulk of the WCP was a transnational campaign, led in large part by New Zealand individuals. Although it collected 32,000 DPCs in New Zealand, this was far from levels of public support seen in earlier NGO campaigns,⁶ suggesting a diminished level of electoral influence on government foreign policy decision making with regard to norm leadership in this case. It was not until the New Zealand Government saw that the WCP resolution was likely to succeed - due to strong NGO collaboration with foreign governments - that it finally decided to support the initiative. The downstream effects of the WCP included the ICJ Advisory Opinion with its unanimous assertion of a binding legal obligation to complete nuclear disarmament independent of general disarmament; the consequent call from the Canberra Commission for an unequivocal commitment from the NWS to eliminate their nuclear weapons, followed by similar calls from New Zealand and then the NAC; and the contribution of these factors to the success of the 2000 NPT RevCon.

A2000 was formed at the 1995 NPTREC, at which New Zealander Mills played a key role as the head of Greenpeace International's NPT project and Ware did likewise, by introducing the

⁶ In 1963 for example, a CND New Zealand petition calling for government support for a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ was signed by 80,283 people, making it the second largest petition in New Zealand history at the time. According to Locke, the largest was the petition calling for universal women's suffrage, which came into effect in New Zealand in 1893. See: Elsie Locke, *Peace People : a History of Peace Activities in New Zealand* (Christchurch: Hazard Press, 1992), 180. In 1983, 50,000 people attended an Auckland protest against a US-nuclear ship in port during Hiroshima Day. See: Clements, *Back from the Brink*, 117.

NWC idea to the NGO abolition statement. Out of the A2000 initiative evolved the international team of NGO disarmament experts that drafted the Model NWC, co-led by Ware. Organisations such as NCCD, A2000 and their many affiliates promoted the NWC domestically. Transnationally, Dewes, Green and Ware promoted it via their ongoing engagement on the ISCs of the WCP and A2000. Strong NGO influence on Labour's foreign policy was shown by its explicit endorsement - in opposition and in government - of the WCP, A2000 and MPI. Labour also endorsed the NWC as the best means to achieve its goal of nuclear abolition in its 1999 Manifesto, and during its early period in government.⁷ The introduction of the idea of and Model NWC to New Zealand Government policy, the UNGA and the NPT process was a paradigm shift in domestic and international discourse on nuclear weapons abolition.

Finally, MPI created a support mechanism for the NAC, helping to facilitate New Zealand's effective international nuclear disarmament advocacy. Endorsed by the New Zealand Prime Minister and the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden, MPI built strongly on the WCP model of NGO-government collaboration. Ware's development of PNND under the auspices of MPI has created a non-partisan international political forum through which it is possible to maintain domestic and international pressure for nuclear disarmament. This is of great value in a period when media and public attention are low and there has thus been little electoral motivation for MPs to pursue the issue.

2. Insights Offered by Norms Theory

Norms theory holds that domestic forces influence norm adoption by states during the first stage of the lifecycle, norm *emergence*, while in the latter two stages, *acceptance* and *internalisation*, international factors play the dominant role in determining behaviour. Finnemore also asserts that domestic norms function in much the same manner as international norms, despite the obvious differences in governance structures and mandates between the two.⁸ Likewise, dismissing the lack of a "*suprastate leviathan*"⁹ as an inhibiting factor for normative influence, Kratochwil states that "...in neither the domestic nor the

⁷ By 2002, this enthusiasm for abolition had been watered down and was replaced by a commitment to "*Promote and take a lead in negotiations to prohibit all nuclear weapons and provide for their elimination under strict and effective international control.*" See: New Zealand Labour Party, *Labour Party Policy: Disarmament and Arms Control*, 2002 Election (Wellington, 2002).

⁸ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 893.

⁹ Weldes, *Constructing National Interests*, 5.

*international arena does the lack of sovereign command or will appear to be disabling for the existence of rules and norms that have prescriptive force.”*¹⁰ These assertions generate several questions regarding the present investigation:

- What is the status of the nuclear disarmament norm in New Zealand?
- What is its status internationally?
- How do the answers to these questions affect New Zealand’s role as an international norm leader in this field?
- Likewise, what do they tell us about how NGOs can most effectively advance and support the implementation of nuclear disarmament?

The Norm of Nuclear Disarmament in New Zealand

In New Zealand, the norm of nuclear disarmament has been strongly internalised – the final stage of a norm’s development. Along with what is probably the strongest anti-nuclear weapons legislation in the world, New Zealand has had a bipartisan consensus since the mid-1990s on a policy of actively seeking the elimination of nuclear weapons. In late 2007, White reported that no major party intended changing the nuclear free law.¹¹ The likelihood of this remaining the case into the future was strengthened by the September 2008 announcement of imminent New Zealand-US free trade negotiations.¹²

Finnemore argues that once internalised, norms “...acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate.”¹³ New Zealand’s experience reflects this expectation. Nuclear freedom has become an aspect of New Zealand national identity and thus represents an almost unquestioned value of the New Zealand people. As a result of norm internalisation, domestic public interest in the issue is almost invisible.¹⁴ Contributing to the

¹⁰ Kratochwil, "The Force of Prescriptions," 702-703.

¹¹ As noted earlier, the ACT Party (5 MPs at present) is the only Party that supports a change at present. See White, *Nuclear Free New Zealand: Twenty Years On*, 23-29.

¹² Brian Fallow, *Goff Predicts Free-Trade Deal May Be Better than Australia's*, 24 September 2008 [cited 4 June 2008]. Available from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10533795. Negotiations on such a trade deal were previously said by detractors of the nuclear ship ban, such as the National and Act Parties, to be very unlikely without first amending the nuclear free legislation to remove the ban. See: New Zealand National Party Taskforce, *The Relationship between New Zealand and the United States*, May 2004 [cited 5 December 2007]. Available from [http://www.national.org.nz/files/2004%20-%20US-NZ%20Taskforce%20-%20Final%20-%20\(3%20May%2004\)1.pdf](http://www.national.org.nz/files/2004%20-%20US-NZ%20Taskforce%20-%20Final%20-%20(3%20May%2004)1.pdf).

¹³ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 895.

¹⁴ Following the 2000 NPT RevCon, for example, NCCD noted with dismay that, “...Despite the high-powered delegation with the Minister included and the role of New Zealand in both the New Agenda Coalition and in

lack of public focus on nuclear disarmament is the common perception that to a large degree, the Government is following the correct policy line on the issue. Caroline McDonald, a former Director of MFAT's Disarmament Division, articulated this idea, saying, "*When I talk to NGOs these days, there's a feeling that we're all essentially aiming in the same direction.*"

¹⁵ The public may also believe it has already won its victory on this issue,¹⁶ and has little ability to influence the NWS, who have the ultimate response-ability for disarming.

These observations suggest that once a norm has been internalised at the national level, domestic advocacy will be limited in its effect on government policy for two reasons. First, there is little domestic electoral influence to inform decision making due to a reduction in proactive domestic advocacy. Second, internalisation suggests that the government is likely to promote policies broadly acceptable to the general public. The implications of these conclusions for NGO advocacy are likewise twofold. Firstly, NGOs are more capable of influencing their own government's policies through transnational advocacy following domestic internalisation. Secondly, in such a case, the value of their ideas must truly stand alone as NGOs can neither bargain nor coerce in international forums.¹⁷

As a small state which tends to rely on international law and institutions in the conduct of its diplomacy, New Zealand has long called on legal precedents in its nuclear disarmament advocacy.¹⁸ Realism would interpret this merely as New Zealand maximising its influence in the absence of traditional sources of power. In the context of nuclear disarmament, this misses the point, however. New Zealand is not *accepting* nuclear freedom because it has no alternative. The Western NWS and their allies *want* New Zealand to be defended by nuclear weapons. New Zealand is rejecting realist-based power as represented by nuclear weapons by proactively *choosing* for nuclear freedom.

What was striking in the case of the WCP is that, faced with enormous pressure from the world's most powerful and influential states to oppose the WCP and comparatively limited

the contribution by Pearson, [the RevCon] received no publicity here." See: National Consultative Committee on Disarmament, 'Meeting Minutes (11 May 2000)'.

¹⁵ McDonald and Randall, private interview with author.

¹⁶ This point was hinted at by O'Brien in his interview.

¹⁷ This is meant by way of comparison to the domestic setting, where strong public opinion translates into electoral bargaining power.

¹⁸ Kate Dewes, "Legal Challenges to Nuclear Weapons from Aotearoa-New Zealand," *British Review of New Zealand Studies* 12 (1999/2000).; Goff, 'Speech to the Annual Dinner of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs'.

domestic pressure to support it, a traditionally realist-minded New Zealand Government took a *moral* stance on the issue. Norms theory would therefore suggest that New Zealand was complying with the norm for reasons related to its self-assigned identity.¹⁹ In other words, once it became likely the WCP UNGA Resolution would indeed pass, New Zealand's decision to support it was driven by a desire to maintain New Zealand's standing as a 'good international citizen', dedicated to upholding international law and supporting multilateral institutions. In the absence of alternative explanations for National's out-of character support for the WCP, this is an appealing proposition. It does not satisfactorily explain, however, why the National Government would support the WCP, while the strongly anti-nuclear Labour Government had refused to. This issue is discussed in more depth below (see *Efficient / Permissive Causes of State Behaviour*).

The norm of nuclear disarmament internationally

Although the status of the nuclear disarmament norm in the international arena is a highly complex issue, Finnemore's norms framework provides a practical means of analysing it in a methodical manner. Clearly, the norm has not reached the third stage of internalisation, as nuclear disarmament is a fiercely contested political and strategic topic. Several things indicate, however, that a key second stage process of *norm cascade* has occurred: the near-universal ratification of the NPT;²⁰ the unanimous commitment at the 2000 NPT RevCon to eliminate nuclear weapons; and the vast majority of states that have signed the CTBT, which with its zero-yield threshold for nuclear explosions further delegitimizes any nuclear weapons development.²¹ Thus, the prescriptive value of the norm has been recognised by a series of precedent-creating legal agreements and political commitments.

However, it would appear that the second stage characteristic of *institutionalisation* has occurred only weakly. Finnemore follows sociologists March and Olsen in their definition of an institution as "*a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations.*"²² Clearly, the beginnings of an

¹⁹ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 904.

²⁰ 188 of the world's 192 recognised states have ratified the NPT, which created a legal precedent for the disarmament norm by prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to States Parties without them and committing those who already had them to disarm.

²¹ The CTBT has been signed by 178 states and ratified by 144. Of the states whose ratifications are required for its entry into force, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have not signed the Treaty, while China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, and the US have signed but not ratified it. The key NWS continue to use laboratory simulations to refine their nuclear warhead technologies.

²² Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 891.

institutional framework for nuclear disarmament have been constructed. In addition to the NPT and CTBT commitments discussed above, the first UN resolution in 1946 called for the elimination of nuclear weapons.²³ The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty signalled for the first time in a legally binding international agreement that the spread of nuclear weapons is unacceptable, thus strengthening the prescriptive norm of nuclear disarmament.²⁴ Several bilateral US-Russia agreements have also strengthened the precedent for the norm, including the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties (START I -1991; START II - 1993) and Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT - 2002).

The 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion strengthened and clarified the legal norm by delinking nuclear disarmament from general and complete disarmament and affirming the obligation to total nuclear disarmament.²⁵ The 1996 Canberra Commission Report also reinforced the political norm for nuclear disarmament by debunking the purported logic of nuclear deterrence and calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons as the only certain way to avoid nuclear war. Finally, the creation of many national and regional NWFZs again indicates that a large majority of the world's states have adopted the norm and created institutions to regulate it.²⁶ Nevertheless, these legal and political agreements offer little more than an outline of the aspirations of the international community. There are no commonly agreed, tangible mechanisms to structure work towards eliminating nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the institutional structures that have been created in many cases have not been ratified or are ignored by critical states. Plainly speaking, there remains a large gap between the words and deeds of the NWS.

Discussion here has made clear that the prescriptive elements of the nuclear disarmament norm have been unequivocally laid out in forums such as the UNGA, ICJ, NPT, Canberra Commission and WMD Commission. Nevertheless, these have not been matched by clearly

²³ United Nations General Assembly, *Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problem Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy (I(1))*, 24 January 1946 [cited 14 February 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/52/IMG/NR003252.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁴ The PTBT was signed by 123 states including Russia, the UK and the US.

²⁵ Protestations by critics that the Advisory Opinion was counterproductive in that it did not outright declare nuclear weapons illegal miss the point entirely. Until 1996, the NWS had never had to defend the legitimacy of their nuclear weapons in court. As long as the legitimacy of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and the weapons themselves, were never challenged, they could never be abolished. From a constructivist point of view, this is a core relevance of the WCP.

²⁶ As at March 2008, 112 states had signed NWFZ treaties covering Africa, Antarctica, Latin America, Central Asia, South East Asia and the South Pacific. Sergio Duarte, *The Future of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Maintaining their Relevance and Expanding their Scope*, 7 March 2008 [cited 6 July 2008]. Available from http://disarmament.un.org/docs/HR_Annexy_07032008.pdf

defined ‘parameters’²⁷ for how and when they are to be enacted. When such ‘wiggle room’ is left open, “...oftentimes, norms are what states (meaning state leaders) make of them.”²⁸ In the absence of political will from the (critical) NWS to define clear parameters for the achievement of nuclear disarmament, tangible progress towards the substantive goal of the norm remains minimal. (This issue is addressed in the following chapter).

Policy Influences on Norm Leaders

By the mid-1990s, NGO advocacy was attempting to influence New Zealand’s promotion of nuclear disarmament - its work as a *norm leader* - as the country had already adopted and internalised the norm of nuclear disarmament. Did a different causative logic therefore apply to New Zealand’s norm leadership than was the case with its norm adoption?

There was a clear distinction between the norm leadership of the fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) and that of the fourth National Government (1990-1999). The Labour Party has a history of strong consultation and collaboration with NGOs²⁹ and a tradition of comparatively idealistic and morally-based foreign policy stances.³⁰ However, following the NGO-led drive to adopt the nuclear free policy in the 1980s, the Labour Government did not become a strong norm leader and refused to support the WCP. The nuanced international position taken by the Labour Government at the time stopped short of calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Lange told the CD in 1985:

*“We do not say...do as New Zealand does. All we say is that when the opportunity is given to any country to pursue a serious and balanced measure of arms control, then that country has a duty to all of us to undertake that measure.”*³¹

²⁷ Shannon, "Norms Are What States Make of Them," 295.

²⁸ Ibid., 293-294.

²⁹ This has been reflected in the choice of non-governmental representatives appointed to NPT RevCons and other disarmament delegations (see appendix for a full list of these).

³⁰ In its 1993 election manifesto, for example, Labour promised to, “...Pursue foreign affairs policy objectives that are in the interests of the New Zealand and international community as a whole, particularly of the powerless and disadvantaged...” With regard to public engagement with foreign policy, it went on to say, “A country’s international relations policy is an expression of its ideals, and of its people’s values, as well as their interests. Labour’s international relations policy has always stressed the human factor- the overriding interests of people as a first priority.” See: Norman Kirk, "New Zealand: A New Foreign Policy," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 23, 6 (1973).; New Zealand Labour Party, *Jobs, Health, Growth: Labour's Manifesto for New Zealand*.; New Zealand Labour Party, *Labour Manifesto 1996: New Heart, New Hope, New Zealand*, 161.; New Zealand Labour Party, *The Future is with Labour*.

³¹ Lange, *Nuclear Free*, 117-118.

Meanwhile, New Zealand diplomats took pains during this period to assure their foreign counterparts that the nuclear free policy was ‘not for export,’ a line that sought to minimise what they saw as the political damage the policy was doing. According to Lange, this was in fact selling the policy short, as “...without its accompanying invitation to look for alternatives to deterrence, [the policy] became a nonsense.”³²

In contrast to this cautious approach from the Labour Government, the fourth National Government became one of the world’s leading disarmament advocates between 1995 and 2000, as described in this thesis. Why did the National Party, previously a strong opponent of the policy, become such a prominent norm leader in government, while its predecessor, the strongly anti-nuclear Labour Government, was so non-definitive in its norm promotion?

Although New Zealand’s proactive promotion of nuclear disarmament in the mid-to-late 1990s appears anomalous viewed from the perspective of domestic politics, as predicted by norms theory, the causes of its norm leadership during the period appear to have been largely international, not the least being transnational NGO advocacy. From a norms perspective, this observation would seem to suggest that the second-stage characteristic of international pressures driving policy was true for norm promotion as well as norm adoption. Before any claim could be made as to the validity of this causative pattern however, this conclusion would require further empirical testing through investigation of norm leadership among other states in which norms have been internalised. (Additionally, this observation aside, there are several significant and divergent domestic and international factors which also influenced the policy choices made by the Labour and National Governments; see *Permissive and Efficient Causes of Behaviour*, below).

Extrapolating further on the understandings offered by norms theory about structural causation patterns, the inability of mass domestic pressure to move US and UK nuclear disarmament policy could be accounted for at least in part by the assertion that a norm cascade and (admittedly weak) institutionalisation indicate the second stage of norm development has been reached internationally.³³ However, there were several very important

³² Ibid.

³³ Ware, for example, has noted that in the 1980s large domestic protests movements in London and New York, amongst other cities, did not seem to produce tangible results in terms of facilitating nuclear disarmament.

domestic counter weights to this public pressure to consider, such as the strength of the military sector as a cultural, political and economic force in the US; attachment to the strategic doctrine of nuclear deterrence as a mutually-agreed means of avoiding nuclear war with the Soviets in the absence of nuclear disarmament progress; and fear of Soviet exploitation of any perceived weakness due to disarmament initiatives, to name but a few.

Analysis has shown that the states yet to adopt the nuclear disarmament norm form a minority. Moreover, several critical states *have* adopted and now adhere to the norm, including one former (unofficial) NWS, South Africa. Crucially, however, the majority of those yet to adopt the norm are ‘critical states’. Constructivist theory would suggest that progress on nuclear disarmament depends on these critical states converging on shared understandings about the value of nuclear disarmament in achieving national and international security. Given that these are the states with response-ability for realising tangible disarmament progress, the achievement of a numerical norm cascade thus far appears to have been irrelevant in this case. This leads to the conclusion that norms theory provides a good macro-framework for describing patterns of influence based on levels of analysis. In other words, it tells us *how* influence occurs. However, in assessing *why* certain policy options were chosen over others, the theoretical conceptual pair of *permissive* and *efficient* policy drivers, appropriated from realist analysis³⁴ and renovated to function inside a constructivist framework, provides useful insight into policy motivators.

3. Efficient / Permissive Causes of State Behaviour

In keeping with the constructivist idea that aggressive behaviour is a choice, not an inevitability, the scope of the concepts of efficient and permissive causes has been broadened to encompass explanations of state behaviour in general, as opposed to their narrow realist application in describing merely the reasons for initiating war. Discussion thus far has detailed what can be termed *efficient* causes of New Zealand foreign policy with regard to nuclear disarmament: those that created the impetus for pro-action. This has demonstrated that these efficient causes were ideational rather than self-interested or power-based, deriving

See: Alyn Ware, 'NGO and Government Cooperation in Setting the Disarmament Agenda: The Impact of the 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion.', in *Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security*, ed. Kenneth Rutherford, Stefan Brem, and Richard Matthew (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

³⁴ Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*.

from a principled, moral understanding about the need to act in the interests of all of humanity, or for reasons related to national identity, which at any rate is related to the former in this case. Clark has said, for example, “*We [declared New Zealand nuclear free] because of our belief in the immorality of nuclear weapons and because we knew that nuclear war would be a catastrophe for our planet.*”³⁵

Prior to internalisation of the nuclear disarmament norm in New Zealand, the main efficient policy driver was domestic electoral pressure created by a mass, grass roots disarmament movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Following internalisation, the key efficient driver was pressure generated by (mainly) transnational NGO campaigns such as the WCP, A2000, NWC development / advocacy and MPI, along with international developments such as the Canberra Commission and the NAC, which were in part generated by the downstream effects of NGO advocacy.³⁶

The following section examines the *permissive* and *non-permissive* factors which variously allowed for the domestic internalisation of the norm; prevented strong norm leadership by the anti-nuclear Labour Government; and then permitted uncharacteristically proactive norm promotion by a traditionally realist-leaning National Government. Permissive factors contributing to norm adoption included New Zealand’s small size (particularly relevant in the domestic setting / adoption stage); its geostrategic location; and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, bringing an effective end to the Cold War. Conversely, New Zealand’s small size played a non-permissive role in the international arena with regard to its norm promotion, as did the block alliance structure of the Cold War during the late 1980s.

At 4.2 million inhabitants, New Zealand is a relatively small country in global population terms. Its open, egalitarian social structures make it easy for members of the public to meet and engage personally with politicians and officials, enabling average citizens to play a greater role in policy development than might be expected in a larger state. As Dewes notes, New Zealand has an “*active, responsive democracy.*”³⁷ Former US Ambassador to New Zealand, Anne Martindale, said of the country: “*New Zealand is a profoundly democratic*

³⁵ Clark, *Address to the State of the World Forum*.

³⁶ As discussed previously, this pattern of causation corresponds with the expectations of norms theory.

³⁷ Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 117. New Zealand could in fact be described as the oldest fully functional democracy in the world, being the first country in the world to grant women the vote in 1893.

country, one where the opinions of the citizens are given high importance.”³⁸ Primary documents and first hand accounts show that during the research period, members of the NGO nuclear disarmament community enjoyed good access to senior government officials, and on occasion, to government ministers.³⁹ This mirrors the picture painted by Dewes of NGO experiences under the Labour-led government in the 1980s.⁴⁰ Domestically, therefore, New Zealand’s small size was a permissive factor which helped to facilitate a strong, participatory democracy, leading to the adoption of the nuclear disarmament norm. In addition, whether as a result of, or indicative of, a strong respect for the principle of equality, there is also an innate belief in the concepts of fairness and justice in the New Zealand psyche. This is demonstrated by the fact that New Zealand consistently registers the lowest levels of corruption in the world.⁴¹ This may also have helped to bring about a foreign policy representative of the ‘will of the people’.

Internationally, factors related to New Zealand’s geo-strategic location played a permissive role in the adoption and implementation of the nuclear free policy. New Zealand is uniquely situated, surrounded on all sides by what McKinnon has called “*the largest moat in the world*”, with at least 1600 kilometres of ocean separating it from its neighbours in any direction.⁴² Its closest neighbour, Australia, is also its closest ally and shares a strong historical and cultural bond with New Zealand. Aside from the colonisation of the country by European settlers in the 19th century, no military force has ever invaded NZ.⁴³ The widely-shared assessment within New Zealand is therefore that there are no traditional military threats to the country’s sovereignty or territorial integrity. This can be seen as a permissive agent, allowing New Zealand to decide that the presence of allied nuclear weapons was in fact a threat to, rather than a guarantor, of its security.⁴⁴ This position is aptly summed up by the common NGO assertion that ‘nuclear weapons are nuclear targets’. By allowing nuclear-

³⁸ Clark et al., *Peace Is More than the Absence of War*, 59.

³⁹ Brough, *NCCD Annual Report 2000-2001*.

⁴⁰ Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 105.

⁴¹ According to Transparency International, New Zealand has ranked among the least two corrupt countries in the world for the last 5 years in a row. See: Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index, 2002-2007* [cited 12 September 2008]. Available from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007/faq. Conversely, while it is not appropriate to delve deeply into the issue in this context, the treatment of the indigenous Maori people of New Zealand by historical and contemporary governments tells a different story about ideas of fairness and justice in the New Zealand psyche.

⁴² McKinnon, 'New Zealand's Security: 1990 and Beyond'.

⁴³ The closest it has come to aggression was during the closing stages of World War II when Japanese forces battled for control of Melanesia and attempted a submarine-launched attack in Sydney Harbour.

⁴⁴ Lange wrote in 1990, “...*deterrence in the South Pacific was more than dangerous, it was absurd.*” See: Lange, *Nuclear Free*, 29.

armed ships to visit New Zealand, the country became a nuclear target, thus diminishing its security. This concept was reaffirmed by the Canberra Commission in 1996.⁴⁵

The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 was a crucial permissive cause for New Zealand's norm leadership in the 1990s. It signalled a fundamental turning point in world affairs, as the decades-old Cold War 'block' mentalities quickly began to diminish in relevance. The resulting "...higher degree of uncertainty in security relations"⁴⁶ was offset by the perception of new opportunities to move towards rapid nuclear disarmament. In this environment, the National Government perceived a genuine opportunity to progress a goal which they had previously eschewed due to the assumed need to maintain a strong US nuclear deterrent to counter the Communist threat.

In contrast to its role as a permissive factor for norm adoption, in the international arena, New Zealand's small size played a strong, non-permissive role, hindering New Zealand's norm leadership in the 1980s and in the late 1990s. As a small country with a limited resource base, New Zealand understands that it must act in concert with other nations to achieve major foreign policy goals. Disarmament Minister Goff, for example, has said: "*On our own we have limited impact. In a group of like-minded and equally determined countries we can and will make a difference.*"⁴⁷ As a result and despite a strong public mandate, during the late 1980s many Foreign Affairs bureaucrats and officials (whose job it is to maintain good relations with friends and allies) were vehemently opposed to the nuclear free policy and tried to undermine it.

During the latter stages of the research period, the fortunes of the NWC in New Zealand policy demonstrated a similar pattern. After forming a coalition government in 1999, Labour's years of promoting a NWC from the opposition benches were suddenly confronted with the international reality constraint of New Zealand's small size. The NAC had propelled New Zealand to the forefront of international debate on nuclear disarmament, but its Western-aligned members opposed promotion of a NWC for political reasons.⁴⁸ The incoming Labour Government therefore risked derailing the NAC if it maintained proactive support for a NWC.

⁴⁵ Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, *Report*, 7.

⁴⁶ McKinnon, 'New Zealand's Security: 1990 and Beyond'.

⁴⁷ Phil Goff, "Nuclear Disarmament Ginger Group Delivers Communiqué," *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 9, 3 (14 September 2000).

⁴⁸ See Chapter Six for further discussion of this point.

The value of plurilateral diplomacy was judged more important than the NWC in this case, and despite the personal support of successive Disarmament Ministers, the idea of a NWC, or abolition more generally, have not been advocated under the fifth Labour Government.

4. Developments in the New Millennium

The international community has not made substantial progress on any major nuclear disarmament initiatives since 2000, and indeed in several areas, has regressed. In that time, New Zealand's norm leadership has also been somewhat muted. This low-level norm leadership since 2000 can be explained in part by the extremely non-permissive international environment that has developed since two pivotal events early in the third millennium and in part by domestic political factors.

Key international factors which have retarded nuclear disarmament progress and dampened New Zealand's enthusiasm for norm leadership were the election of US President George W. Bush in 2000 - bringing to power with him key neoconservative theorists and politicians - and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (hereafter, 9/11).

The personality and beliefs of individual leaders can greatly influence government policies, as New Zealand's domestic experience has shown historically.⁴⁹ As discussed in the introduction to this research, the imposition of the so-called 'Bush doctrine' post 9/11 has strongly impacted on international events. This interpreted the US national interest as best being met by a unilaterally-driven policy framework which often incorporated military force and saw US interests as eclipsing, if not actually unrelated to, those of other countries. Bush acknowledged the failings of nuclear deterrence in the contemporary security environment,⁵⁰ yet despite the emergence of nuclear terrorism as an increasingly realistic threat, this acknowledgement did not lead to an interpretation of US security as being enhanced by nuclear disarmament. Rather, the policy focus under Bush shifted sharply onto non-proliferation and counter-terrorism, with disarmament becoming a non-issue. In 2005, *Guardian* journalist Julian Borger wrote:

⁴⁹ This has been strongly apparent in the shifts in New Zealand's nuclear weapons policies that accompanied the election as Prime Minister of Norman Kirk in 1972 (strongly anti-nuclear) and then of Robert Muldoon in 1975 (strongly pro-nuclear).

⁵⁰ Bush, *Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University*.

*“The Bush administration wants global counter-proliferation strategy to focus exclusively on preventing more countries acquiring nuclear weapons. It is seeking to play down the importance of reducing the stockpiles of the established nuclear powers, as it has plans to overhaul its own arsenal and develop new weapons.”*⁵¹

As the world’s sole superpower, most influential and most heavily nuclear-armed nation, US policy is a reality constraint with which other nations must contend.⁵² The sense of hope that filled nuclear disarmament advocates in the months that followed the 2000 RevCon was therefore soon tempered by new reality constraints. The entrenchment of US - and thus, NATO - nuclear weapons policy has had a restraining effect on New Zealand policy since 2001. The former head of MFAT’s Disarmament Division, Caroline McDonald, described the post 9/11 environment thus: *“We’re now in a period where it’s hard yakka to make progress on nuclear disarmament; the international environment is hard going...”*⁵³

The success of the NAC at the 2000 NPT RevCon was a highpoint for New Zealand nuclear disarmament diplomacy – arguably its greatest ever accomplishment, particularly given the key role that New Zealand’s Disarmament Ambassador played at the RevCon. At the 2005 RevCon, however, the spat between NAC-member Egypt and the US over the wording of the conference agenda was one of the key factors frustrating the work of the RevCon. The discord this generated among the NAC meant it was unable to reproduce its earlier success and has led to a period of internal friction and subdued advocacy from the Coalition. From 2000-2008, New Zealand has continued to promote its traditional nuclear disarmament initiatives such as a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ and entry into force of the CTBT. In 2007 and again in 2008, New Zealand also took the lead on the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, co-sponsoring a resolution with Chile, Nigeria Sweden and Switzerland on the issue.⁵⁴ However, the present New Zealand Government has given nuclear disarmament advocacy a low priority, as evidenced by the serious conflicts of interest that faced the immediate past Disarmament Minister, Phil Goff.

⁵¹ Julian Borger, 'Road Map for US Relations with Rest of World,' *the Guardian*, London (27 August 2005).

⁵² To a lesser, but nonetheless significant degree, the same is true of all the NWS.

⁵³ McDonald and Randall, private interview with author.

⁵⁴ Phil Goff, *New Zealand Leads Call to Take 1000s of Nuclear Weapons off High-Alert [Press Release]*(17 October 2007).

From 2005-2008, Goff held the Ministerial portfolios for Corrections, Defence, Disarmament and Arms Control and Trade, as well as that of Associate Finance Minister. Assigning the Defence and Disarmament portfolios to the same Minister created a clear conflict of interests, as demonstrated by two of Goff's Ministerial engagements. In May 2006, he opened an NCCD disarmament conference; in October the same year, he attended the annual conference of the New Zealand Defence Industry Association, the purpose of which is to facilitate the development and exports of New Zealand's arms-related industries.⁵⁵ In addition, Goff's simultaneous tenure at the head of the Trade portfolio (a crucial one for New Zealand, given its overwhelmingly export-driven economy) means disarmament issues were seldom, if ever, on the agenda in his bilateral meetings⁵⁶ and very rarely featured in his ministerial press releases.⁵⁷ This conflict of interests between Goff's Trade and Disarmament portfolios was acknowledged by former Disarmament Minister Marian Hobbs.⁵⁸ O'Brien, meanwhile, noted that the Foreign Ministry was very reluctant to address this issue.⁵⁹

The acknowledgement of power politics (particularly as described here in relation to Bush Administration policies) and of self-interested behaviour (in New Zealand prioritising trade – and even weapons trade - over disarmament) as explanations for the international disarmament malaise since 2000 might be argued to undermine the constructivist basis of this thesis. In fact, this is not the case. Such acknowledgements do not legitimise the interpretations placed on events by governments as objectively correct; rather, they help analysts to understand states' security concerns and the rationale behind their decisions. The underlying constructivist contention that the calculation of national interest is subjective and historically contingent remains true. The decision post 9/11 to focus on non-proliferation rather than disarmament represented one out of many possible interpretations of the US national interest, not recognition of an inherently reality. The US could equally have interpreted 9/11 as an indication that nuclear weapons were unable to deal with the modern

⁵⁵ The NCCD Convention was '*Threats to Peace and Security: The Way Forward*' (13 -14 May 2006 at Think Tankz convention venue, Wellington); the New Zealand Defence Industry Association meeting was its annual conference, the 'Defence Industry Forum' (17-18 October 2007 at Te Papa, the National Museum of New Zealand, Wellington).

⁵⁶ "...How often does the issue of nuclear disarmament appear on the bilateral agenda for discussions between Mr Goff and the Foreign Secretary of the UK or the US Secretary of State, or Foreign Minister of France, or China. Never." Terence O'Brien, private interview with author. Wellington, 14 August 2007.

⁵⁷ Of less immediate importance to foreign policy behaviour, but important in terms of personal experience for Goff are his family ties to the US military – he has three nephews serving with the US Armed Forces, and recently lost a fourth, killed in action in Afghanistan.

⁵⁸ Marian Hobbs, private interview with author. Wellington, 13 September 2006.

⁵⁹ O'Brien, private interview with author.

security environment, characterised by non-traditional security threats and a globalised system of interconnected, interdependent states. Such a perspective would have led to the conclusion that US national interest lay in stronger multilateral approaches to security and reinforcing the mandate of international organisations, institutions and norms. Game-theory analyst Roger Meyerson has indeed reached such a conclusion through statistical analysis of strategic deterrence. He finds that, “...a great power’s use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force.”⁶⁰ Nevertheless, despite such constructivist notions, the practical reality is that all the NWS still rely strongly on realist understandings of international relations. As discussed in chapter two, to ignore this fact would be to ignore political reality in the name of theoretical cohesion, which is both disingenuous and counterproductive.

Constructivism does not, therefore, describe the rationale for choices made by realist-minded policy makers. Rather, it offers as a starting point the reality that short-term, self-interested behaviour is a choice, not an inevitability. Identities and concomitant interests remain fluid, as demonstrated aptly by the US attitude towards New Zealand in recent years. 20 years ago, New Zealand’s nuclear free policy was interpreted by the Western NWS and their allies as a threat to the security of the Western world. Now, it is seen as a useful diplomatic tool for negotiating with nuclear weapons proliferators such as North Korea, indicating that it enhances international security.⁶¹

Constructivism’s importance therefore lies in demonstrating that alternative interpretations of identity, interest and appropriate foreign policy are possible and indeed, over time, inevitable. This goes a long way to legitimising the exploration of alternative means of achieving international security without resorting to violence or the threat of it, particularly through the use of nuclear weapons. Crucially, given the ‘imaginary’ nature of nuclear strategy,⁶² alternative means of addressing international security concerns can and should be explored collaboratively by non-NWS and non-governmental actors.

⁶⁰ Roger B. Meyerson, *Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: a Game-Theorist’s Perspective*, the Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007 [cited 5 September 2008]. Available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub823.pdf>

⁶¹ Dan Eaton, ‘Peters and Rice to Meet,’ *The Press*, Christchurch (3 November 2006).

⁶² Adler, “The Emergence of Cooperation,” 107.

5. Contemporary Challenges for New Zealand NGOs

There are several unprecedented issues facing the non-governmental community in New Zealand, raising questions about its role in the contemporary political environment and its relationship to the New Zealand Government. First, in the absence of a strong grass roots movement, where does the domestic NGO community derive its mandate from and should it rightfully continue to influence government policy? Second, how does the issue of funding affect the functioning of NGOs? Third, should the government be supporting civil society in this sector and if so, how can the government best do this without compromising democratic principles or the independence and innovation of NGOs?

A Popular Mandate

Can NGOs still claim to act in the name of ‘the people’ when the public appears largely disinterested in nuclear disarmament? For several reasons, it is reasonable to assert that there is a mandate for ongoing NGO influence on nuclear disarmament policy and that there is a democratic logic to the government committing human, financial and political capital to the issue.

As noted previously, the 1984 election had the highest voter turnout in New Zealand history⁶³ and was won in a landslide by Labour, which campaigned strongly on its nuclear free policy. Internalisation of the nuclear disarmament norm is itself a strong democratic mandate for NGO influence. The lack of public debate on the issue does not indicate a lack of support for actions to promote nuclear disarmament; conversely, it indicates an abundance of public support.⁶⁴ The massive public reaction to renewed French testing in 1995 was indicative of this.

During the research period, the NGO advocates that were active in norm promotion, and those who remain so today, were for the most part veterans of the New Zealand peace movement with extensive networks running through it. As a result, although the general public are not

⁶³ Elections New Zealand, *General Elections 1853-2005 - Dates & Turnout*.

⁶⁴ Randall acknowledged this, saying “...there remains such a broad consensus about the Nuclear Free Zone Act in the New Zealand parliament and about the policy generally. If MPs don’t think there’s public interest in this, why do they forgo the political opportunities of talking about change?” McDonald and Randall, private interview with author. For its part, the National Party has twice commissioned reports which supported repealing the ban on nuclear ship visits and yet on both occasions, has quickly shelved the report and the issue in deference to public opinion. See: Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, *The Safety of nuclear powered ships [The Somers Report]*, ed. Sir Edward Somers (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 1992).; New Zealand National Party Taskforce, *The Relationship between New Zealand and the United States*.

actively engaged, many of those who led the campaign for a nuclear free New Zealand, the WCP and have advocated a NWC still collaborate with each other, ensuring a degree of peer review of policy advocacy and behaviour. Given the calls from the domestic and international NGO movement since prior to the 1995 NPTREC for a treaty to abolish nuclear weapons, advocacy of a NWC also draws legitimacy from long historical precedent.

Government Funding of NGOs

The issue of funding and particularly, of government funding for NGOs, is an important consideration. It deserves far greater attention than is possible to commit to it here, but must be discussed briefly nonetheless. As noted above, the public implicitly supports the work of NGOs in this sector. As a result, the main question to be asked relates not to the legitimacy of government funding for NGOs⁶⁵ but to whether the fact of receiving money from government trusts inhibits their ability to work independently and thus diminishes the effectiveness of such funding in achieving its goal of strengthened overall policy. It can be inferred from the present research that historically speaking, it has not undermined this goal.⁶⁶

Firstly, government trusts such as PADET and more recently, the Disarmament Education United Nations Implementation Fund, are administered by PACDAC, which is made up of non-governmental individuals. The appointment of PACDAC members by the Minister of Foreign Affairs introduces a partisan element to the process, but does not give the Minister the ability to manage its funding decisions directly. At any rate, past experience with PACDAC has shown that under National-led Governments, support for traditional disarmament NGO activity declined sharply – diminishing the relevance of this line of questioning during the research period and potentially, under future National-led Governments. Furthermore, although under Labour-led Governments funding for NGOs has been more forthcoming, its presence or absence has not impeded them from researching and advocating independent policy positions well in advance of those taken by the government and MFAT, as demonstrated in chapter four.

Secondly, discussion here has found a high level of expertise and foresight among New Zealand's NGO nuclear disarmament advocates, as demonstrated through the WCP, A2000,

⁶⁵ Of course, the relative merits of policy prioritisation and concomitant funding levels can be argued, as they can in any field of government endeavour.

⁶⁶ This is not an uncontested claim. Bob Rigg, for example, the former Chair of NCCD, recently commented that *"I am convinced that for peace activists dependence on government money is the kiss of death."*

the Model NWC and MPI. In several of these instances, NGOs have shown not just an understanding of international political considerations, but an incisive ability to circumvent these in order to advance the prospects for nuclear disarmament. This indicates that it is in the interests of the New Zealand Government to support the work of the NGO community.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly with regard to funding, it must be remembered that all work by New Zealand NGOs in this realm is done on a not-for-profit basis and furthermore, the majority of it has been, and continues to be, voluntary. It is the passion and principles of NGO actors which has driven their work. In most cases, when NGOs have received government funding it has covered costs only, although often, even these have not been fully covered. When there has been no money available, the work has been done regardless, in spare time and using personal financial resources.

6. Conclusion

Norms theory's clear categorisation of stages of normative development is useful in describing how the development and diffusion of ideas shapes the conduct of international relations. Analysis here has shown that the drivers for New Zealand's nuclear disarmament norm leadership during the mid-to-late 1990s were largely transnational. This suggests that norm leadership may adhere to the same causation patterns that norms-theory asserts drive norm adoption during the second stage of a norm's development (though this assumption requires further empirical testing).

Despite the strength of norms theory in this macrotheoretical sense, the concept of norm cascade as a measure of norm strength appears to be of limited value in the case of nuclear disarmament. Although a cascade has occurred, the majority of states yet to adopt the norm are critical states who inhibit the international community from realising or even moving decisively towards its goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

To strengthen micro-analysis, the concepts of efficient and permissive causes of state behaviour have also been applied to New Zealand policy. From their narrow, realist application, these have been broadened to encompass explanations of state behaviour in general, thus becoming consistent with the core constructivist idea that self-interested power politics is a choice, not an inevitability. These concepts help to explain why New Zealand's

norm promotion was muted under a strongly anti-nuclear government in the 1980s, yet strong during the late 1990s under a conservative government previously opposed to the nuclear free policy. They also offer insight into why New Zealand has failed to take a strong norm leadership role post-2000.

By offering insight into identity, perceptions and the role these play in the process of threat creation, constructivist understandings empower states to choose more proactively for peace. In the context of nuclear politics, this is a key idea with the power to influence the course of disarmament negotiations. Through the application of ideational frameworks in policy analysis and decision-making, it may be possible to plan actively for peace, rather than hoping for peace and planning for war.

Chapter 6:

Conclusion

“In the 21st Century, as the ever-expanding exchange of peoples, cultures and trade across nations helps to ease nationalistic prejudices, and as the shibboleths of the Cold War subside, it is time to abolish nuclear weapons and make the world a safer place for all peoples.”¹

~ Rt. Hon. Helen Clark
(New Zealand Prime Minister 1999-2008)

1. Introduction

Over time, New Zealand has played a notable role in the international drive to eliminate nuclear weapons. In the late 1960s under Prime Minister Nash and (more stridently) in the early 1970s under Prime Minister Kirk, New Zealand took a lead role in condemning nuclear testing internationally. Under Prime Minister Wallace Rowling in 1975, New Zealand also promoted the creation of a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ at the UN.² In the 1980s, its nuclear-free policy and law entrenched the country’s identity as an independent minded nation and challenged the global nuclear ‘security’ paradigm. In the mid-1990s, New Zealand’s nuclear disarmament advocacy moved to a new level with its support of the WCP and arguments for the illegality of nuclear weapons at the ICJ, challenging the right of any nation to possess the weapons for any reason. New Zealand’s work with the NAC at the turn of the millennium was a driving force for the international nuclear disarmament agenda and placed New Zealand among the world’s leading nuclear disarmament advocates.

Today, there is bipartisan domestic support for New Zealand’s nuclear free law and agreement between the government and NGO sectors on the broad aim of eliminating nuclear weapons. The two groups disagree, however, on the best means of achieving this goal. In light of historical NGO influence, as described in this thesis, on government policy and international nuclear disarmament discourse, this concluding chapter asks:

¹ Robert Green, *the Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence* (Christchurch: Disarmament & Security Centre, 2000), Foreword.

² Dewes, *The World Court Project*. 148-49.

- What has the present research revealed about the unique attributes and strengths of New Zealand's NGO community?
- How can these attributes best be used to facilitate New Zealand's work towards the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons?
- What are the differences between contemporary NGO and governmental ideas on how best to advance this goal?
- How can the New Zealand Government enhance its advocacy of nuclear disarmament?

The chapter begins with a discussion of the strengths of New Zealand's NGO disarmament movement and a critical examination of recent New Zealand nuclear disarmament advocacy. Following this, the politics surrounding the idea of the NWC are examined, in response to the fact that this is a key initiative advocated by the NGO movement worldwide, and that the NWC is supported in principle by New Zealand and other like-minded governments. Finally, policy advice arising from these discussions is offered, and suggestions are made regarding useful directions in future research.

2. Strengths of New Zealand Disarmament NGOs

Analysis of the cases examined in this thesis reveals several key strengths in the local NGO disarmament community.³ These include *institutional memory*; *political neutrality*; *innovative thinking*; and advocacy of *principled, moral policies with a strong rational basis*.

Institutional memory can be described as a strong understanding, historical knowledge and experience of a political or social field. The longevity of New Zealand's NGO nuclear disarmament advocates has enabled them to develop strong institutional memory in their field. This adds significant value to the pool of knowledge and experience available to the government, as recognised by the creation of PACDAC in 1987. Ogilvie-White, an academic expert who currently advises the MFAT Disarmament Division, writes: "*New Zealand's small Disarmament Division has benefitted enormously over the years, from consultations*

³ Certain of these may be replicated in NGOs in other sectors, or in other countries, but the scope of investigation of the present research limits its ability to suggest broad conclusions about the value or place of NGOs more widely. As such, conclusions drawn here pertain solely to the NZ context.

with [NGO] disarmament and non-proliferation experts, who have fed ideas into the policy process."⁴

The Disarmament Division at MFAT is short staffed and, as with all sections of the Ministry, is constrained by its staff rotation policy.⁵ This inevitably impacts on diplomats' knowledge of the highly specialised vocabulary of disarmament affairs, which "...has to be so precise for a UN resolution."⁶ It also impacts, amongst other things, on their knowledge of historical disarmament developments relevant to New Zealand policy.⁷

Institutional memory also gives NGO experts practical advantages in disarmament promotion internationally. Ware is a case in point; he has attended every UNGA session since 1992 and as a result, has probably the best understanding of any New Zealander regarding UNGA disarmament processes, personalities and political affiliation lines. O'Brien, himself a former New Zealand Permanent Representative to the UN, says of Ware "...he knows more about disarmament than the Disarmament Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Right across the board, and understands...the dynamics of how it works and what's doable, what isn't."⁸ Such long-term engagement has also enabled New Zealand NGOs and individuals to develop extensive governmental and non-governmental networks around the world. As a supplementary source of information to that provided by intergovernmental links, these networks can play a useful role in helping New Zealand assess levels of international support for potential policy initiatives.

⁴ Tanya Ogilvie-White, 'Promoting Non-proliferation and Disarmament: New Zealand, the New Agenda Coalition and the Seven Nations Initiative', Paper presented at the Seven Nation Initiative seminar 'the Nuclear Challenge', FLASCO, Santiago (5 September 2008).

⁵ The Disarmament Division maintains around six full time staff. As a small country, New Zealand requires its diplomats to be generalists, competent in variety of different policy areas, a policy which inevitably has its disadvantages as well as benefits. This generally sees staff serving on one portfolio for 2-3 three years before being transferred to a different portfolio. Former nuclear desk officer at MFAT's Disarmament Division, Susannah Gordon, noted "...there's a constant tension in foreign affairs between the advantages of having generalists and the disadvantages of the 'churn'." Susannah Gordon, private interview with author. Christchurch, 2 November 2006.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ During an interview for the current research, for example, Dewes referred to an August 1996 Memorandum of Cooperation signed between New Zealand and South Africa. When asked for a copy of the document, the Director of the Disarmament Division was not aware of its existence. This is not intended as a criticism of the extremely hard working Disarmament Division. It is merely indicative of the benefits accrued by NGOs through the longevity of their engagement in the field of disarmament advocacy. See: New Zealand and South African Governments, *Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control* (8 August 1996) (in Appendix).

⁸ O'Brien, private interview with author.

A second strength of disarmament NGOs in New Zealand is their general practice of *political neutrality*.⁹ They can therefore develop good working relationships across the political spectrum, as PNND and NCCD have demonstrated.¹⁰ Their record of non-partisan, values-based advocacy has conferred on them a high degree of moral authority, as confirmed by New Zealand MP Peter Dunne.¹¹ Due to strong NGO influence on government policy, this moral authority has over time become a trait identified with New Zealand as a country.¹²

As exemplified by the WCP and the NWC, a third unique value of New Zealand's NGO community is its role in innovating and exploring ideas that the government may be unable to because of political, financial or human resource constraints. NGOs can develop ideas through their formative phase, and 'sound out' potential collaboration partners in track II diplomatic forums.¹³ Once policies have been adopted by government, NGOs can continue to build and maintain support for initiatives through advocacy in like-minded states, either via foreign NGO networks or directly with governments.

Finally, NGO advocacy is important for maintaining consistent, principled nuclear disarmament policy. As experienced under the fourth Labour Government, Foreign Affairs officials, whose job it is to maintain good working relations with other countries and who have to balance political ideals with trade interests, will far sooner bend to political pressure and relinquish principles in order to ease relations with the great powers. Conversely, historical policy disputes between NGOs and MFAT show it is often the NGO community that has the moral courage and political conviction to continue advancing the issue of nuclear disarmament in the face of international adversity. Unencumbered by mixed diplomatic demands, NGOs are free to speak on principle and focus solely on the desired disarmament goals. As they continue to do this, they can raise awareness of vital disarmament issues and may embolden more states to speak out on these.

⁹ This comment does not apply more broadly to other non-governmental sectors, nor necessarily to foreign disarmament or arms control NGOs. However, it is generally true for most New Zealand NGOs in this field.

¹⁰ At the individual level, Dewes' advocacy of nuclear disarmament inside Labour's FA&D Policy Consultative Committee was also indicative of this point.

¹¹ Dunne, *Parliamentary Motion on Nuclear Disarmament*.

¹² Joanne Black, 'Time to Talk,' *the Listener*, (9-15 July 2005), 15.

¹³ Track II inter-governmental processes are non-official and thus, non-binding. They often supplement Track I (official) dialogue or negotiations and are used to develop or discuss potential new initiatives without governments having to commit to them publically. Typically, track II processes involve government officials rather than Ministers or Ambassadors, and often include a range of academic, military, scientific, or non-governmental experts in the relevant field.

3. New Zealand Leadership on Nuclear Disarmament

At the 2007 and 2008 UNGA sessions, New Zealand played a key disarmament role in lead-sponsoring a resolution calling for the dealerting of nuclear weapons.¹⁴ In 2008, New Zealand also took a principled stance inside the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) against the US-India nuclear cooperation deal.¹⁵ These are highly commendable initiatives. Nevertheless, New Zealand's policy output in nuclear disarmament since 2000 has generally been less proactive than its previous work in the field. Most noticeably, the Labour Government's promise of leadership on nuclear weapons abolition has failed to materialise during its nine years in office. Furthermore, New Zealand's policy line has grown less balanced over this time, following the international shift towards a counter-terrorism and non-proliferation focus. This has, to a degree, undermined New Zealand's moral authority in nuclear disarmament matters. O'Brien, for example, observed that, "*On non-proliferation, we're quick to talk out, name names; we never make a statement about the US or UK. The Trident decision didn't elicit a beep out of this government, when it should have expressed our disappointment publicly.*"¹⁶

Although the NAC's contribution was somewhat improved in the 2007 and 2008 NPT PrepComs,¹⁷ the Coalition has generally been less cohesive or effective over the last few years, particularly at the 2005 RevCon and in the proceeding period. In her 2005 RevCon report, Johnson wrote that the NAC "*...had collapsed in all but name before the review conference started.*" Egypt's uncompromising behaviour at the RevCon exemplified this point. Although it "*...appeared to have a more constructive regime-building motivation*" than the other two countries widely blamed for causing the failure of the Conference (Iran and the

¹⁴ The principal co-sponsors of the resolution were Chile, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland. At time of publishing, the 2008 resolution had been passed by the UNGA First Committee, but not by the Plenary. United Nations General Assembly, *Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems (A/RES/62/36)*, 5 December 2007 [cited 26 October 2008]. Available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/465/93/pdf/N0746593.pdf?OpenElement>; United Nations General Assembly, *Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems (A/C.1/63/L.5)*, October 2008 [cited 26 October 2008]. Available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N08/554/45/pdf/N0855445.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁵ Ironically, the NSG was set up in response to the first Indian nuclear test explosion in 1974. Its purpose is to strengthen export controls on the trade in sensitive, dual use nuclear technologies (those with both civilian and military applications). For more information, see <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/history.htm>.

¹⁶ O'Brien, private interview with author.

¹⁷ Rebecca Johnson, *2008 NPT PrepCom Adopts Report but not Chair's Factual and Balanced Summary*, 9 May 2008 [cited 9 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/08pc07.htm>; Rebecca Johnson, "Back from the Brink? The 2007 NPT PrepCom Report," *Disarmament Diplomacy* 85 (Summer 2007).

US), Egypt's actions weakened the NAC and have diminished the Coalition's influence. Johnson went as far as to question the continued viability of the NAC as an effective vehicle for disarmament policy.¹⁸ The decision of South Africa to join the Seven Nation Initiative (SNI) a few months after the 2005 RevCon reflects this concern.¹⁹ Nevertheless, New Zealand has stuck with the NAC and MFAT has tended to avoid answering questions regarding its internal difficulties and future direction.

As discussed in chapter five, factors beyond New Zealand's control that have affected its willingness or ability to push the abolition agenda include the non-permissive international environment for disarmament during the US Administration of George W. Bush (this may also account in part for Egypt's intransigence at the 2005 RevCon), and the need for New Zealand to work in coalition with other like minded states. These points aside however, Goff and Clark, both highly experienced politicians, were no doubt perfectly aware of how damaging Goff's conflicting portfolio interests as Disarmament, Defence and Trade Minister might be on New Zealand's nuclear disarmament leadership.

New Zealand's strong, moral voice and innovative diplomacy made it a flag bearer for the nuclear disarmament movement in decades past. Today, the international community urgently needs principled, pragmatic and trustworthy leadership and a return to a forward looking and comprehensive nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. In 1998 the NAC declared:

*"The maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons will require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments."*²⁰

Serious consideration must be given to what such a framework will look like if it is ever to be achieved. While it is laudable to aim for the elimination of nuclear weapons, achieving this goal will be impossible without outlawing the weapons in order to establish a common

¹⁸ Johnson, "Politics and Protection."

¹⁹ This group also includes Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania and the UK. It was based on "an effort to promote consensus after the divisive 2005 NPT Review Conference" and seeks to respond "...to the acute challenges confronting the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime."

<http://www.7ni.mfa.no/About/About.htm>

²⁰ New Agenda Coalition, *Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World - the Need for a New Agenda*, (A/53/138).

prescriptive understanding that there is no legitimate reason to possess them. Abolition encompasses precisely this global prohibition and should therefore be reinserted into government policy statements regarding nuclear disarmament. While New Zealand hesitates even to mention abolition at present,²¹ the UN Secretary General has called explicitly for exploration of potential abolition frameworks and noted that the Model NWC, which he has circulated to all UN Member States, is an obvious starting point for such work. Additionally, influential US non-proliferation expert George Perkovich, the Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has instigated research in the field of nuclear abolition and called for more. In a 2008 Adelphi Paper entitled *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*, co-authors James Acton and Perkovich conclude “...a prohibition of nuclear weapons must be pursued today to prevent nuclear competition tomorrow.” The pair recommends that NWS and non-NWS should work to facilitate,

*“...an international collaboration of government-affiliated and independent think tanks to explore the conditions necessary for the secure prohibition of nuclear weapons. Governments could encourage private foundations to initiate such a project by making available relevant nuclear-weapons and arms-control experts and military strategists to inform and appraise the deliberations of analysts from think tanks and academia. Going further, governments could then invite participants in such a collaboration to present their conclusions to NPT review meetings, national governments, the Conference on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly.”*²²

Given that the NWC represents the most comprehensive exploration to date of an abolition model; that it is the instrument advocated by the NGO community both in New Zealand and internationally; and that the New Zealand Government supports the NWC in principle, it deserves detailed discussion here.

²¹ None of the 24 official papers with New Zealand input presented to the 2007 and 2008 NPT PrepComs - including the NAC papers - mentions the word abolition.

²² James Acton and George Perkovich, *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* (London: Routledge / International Institute for Strategic Studies; Adelphi Paper 396, 2008), 110-111. For a more concise exposition on this idea, see also George Perkovich, 'Taking Nuclear Disarmament Seriously', Paper presented at the conference, Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo (26 - 27 February 2008).

4. A Nuclear Weapons Convention

Several senior New Zealand ministers, diplomats and MPs support developing the NWC idea further.²³ Nevertheless, despite their support for the NWC in principle, politicians and officials supportive of the nuclear weapons elimination have seldom, if ever, engaged publicly with the NWC on its merits. According to Ogilvie-White, the reluctance of some non-NWS to unite behind the NWC is based not on its contents, which “*in principle are morally irreproachable,*” but on perceptions of the politics surrounding it.²⁴

Government representatives have given several reasons why New Zealand does not promote the NWC. First, they see it as an alternative to the NPT and therefore argue it will undermine the Treaty. Second, they say Indian and Iranian attempts to associate themselves with the NWC undermine its credibility as a disarmament framework. Third, Ministers and officials assert that the time is not yet right to start discussions on a NWC, arguing that a focus on it at this critical point for the NPT could undermine that Treaty. The merit of these concerns must be assessed, in order find creative ways of addressing them and advancing nuclear abolition, which is the only credible means of eliminating nuclear weapons.

The NPT and an NWC

“*The fundamental argument against the NWC,*” according to Randall, is that it would “*...confuse international law by appearing to supplant the deficient NPT.*” On this point, McDonald commented: “*Our weight has come down on the side of what can we achieve within the NPT rather than giving the impression of abandoning it and trying to find an alternative route. Like the NWC for example.*”²⁵

These comments reflect a key point that policy makers, analysts and many NGOs the world over have yet to grasp, and that NWC advocates have not highlighted effectively in the past. Ware, a lead author of the NWC, argues that the NWC is not intended to replace the NPT, but

²³ These include former Prime Minister Jim Bolger (1990-1997), former Disarmament Ministers Matt Robson (1999-2002) and Marian Hobbs (2002-2005), ex-New Zealand Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Michael Powles (1996-2000), and National MP Nick Smith, the current chair of PNND New Zealand.

²⁴ Tanya Ogilvie-White, "A Cloak for Proliferators? The Suspicions that Impede a Nuclear Weapons Convention," *Global Dialogue* 8 1-2, Special Issue "Nuclear Perils" (Winter/Spring 2006).

²⁵ McDonald and Randall, private interview with author.

to strengthen and implement it.²⁶ Costa Rica, which introduced the NWC to the UNGA and the NPT processes, argues that the Model NWC incorporates disarmament steps from the 1995 and 2000 NPT RevCon Final Documents and expands on them, “...in order to explore the additional elements that would be required to achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world.”²⁷

Randall commented that a NWC would be unlikely to attract universal ratification, saying that even if most non-NWS agreed to it, some critical states might not and it would thus be flawed as “...you can’t bind states to agreements to which they are not parties.”²⁸ This logic could equally be applied to the NPT. Crucially, the four states which are not members of the NPT at present are all critical states that possess nuclear weapons.²⁹ Without universal adherence, the NPT will never be a viable abolition or elimination framework. There are only two options for reaching NPT universality. First, the non-official NWS disarm and accede to the NPT as non-NWS. Based on the strategic logic applied by the NWS, as long as the official NWS show no signs of a genuine, good faith commitment to multilateral disarmament within the NPT framework, the likelihood of this is virtually zero. The second option is that the NPT be amended to recognise the four additional NWS and include them in its disarmament obligations and negotiations. Again, the likelihood of this is basically zero. The original five NWS have veto rights on amendments to the treaty and the non-NWS would vehemently oppose any further recognition of the newer NWS based on their nuclear weapons capabilities.³⁰ Furthermore, the recent US-India nuclear deal has shattered any possible incentive for India or Pakistan to join the NPT.³¹ This all leads to the conclusion that while

²⁶ For an excellent discussion of this point and of the politics surrounding the NPT/NWC relationship, see Alyn Ware, *a Nuclear Weapons Convention and the NPT: Is it a Diversion or an Enabler?* Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace, (August 2008).

²⁷ Costa Rica, *Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.17)*, working paper presented to the NPT Preparatory Committee, 1 May 2007 [cited 15 September 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/327/68/PDF/N0732768.pdf?OpenElement>.

²⁸ McDonald and Randall, private interview with author.

²⁹ India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan

³⁰ Under Article VIII.2 of the NPT, amendments “*must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.*”

³¹ India now has access to the most advanced civilian nuclear technologies in the world from the three leading suppliers, France, Russia and the US, without having to accept any of the disarmament commitments imposed on NPT NWS signatories. (Following the US lead, France and Russia have quickly completed their own nuclear cooperation deals with India). In response, Pakistan has recently concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with China, under which China will aid Pakistan in the construction of two new nuclear power plants. See: Associated Press, *China to Help Build 2 Pakistan Nuclear Plants*, International Herald Tribune, 18 October 2008 [cited November 4 2008]. Available from <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/18/asia/AS-Pakistan-China-Nuclear.php>

the NPT is essential as a non-proliferation tool, it will never become universal without an accompanying, non-discriminatory abolition framework, and will therefore not be capable in and of itself of facilitating the elimination of nuclear weapons.

A further concern expressed by Randall was that the NWC will undermine the NPT by creating, “...a very large exit through which NWS and threshold states and those who have nuclear weapons outside the NPT would be delighted to march and wave goodbye to the rest of the world as they did so.”³²

As Ware rightly points out, the idea that the NWS parties will use NWC negotiations as an excuse to pull out of the NPT holds little weight. The NWS understand the enormous value of the NPT in terms of achieving their non-proliferation goals. As noted by Rublee, a non-proliferation norms theorist, despite the frequent warnings in the 1960s that the number of NWS could reach 20 within a few decades, “...for almost four decades, almost all states in the international system chose to forgo nuclear weapons, and in some cases, even gave them up.”³³ If they were to renounce the NPT themselves, however, the NWS would have no ongoing mechanism to legitimately demand adherence to the non-proliferation norm. Maintaining the political will to safeguard this relatively high historical level of compliance with the norm would thus become much harder. As Rublee points out, “...containing ‘outlaw states’ may become a lot more difficult if the NPT no longer exists to define what ‘outlaw state’ means.”³⁴ Given their fixation on the non-proliferation agenda and the rapidly escalating proliferation threats of recent years, renunciation of the NPT by the NWS is therefore extremely unlikely.³⁵ Randall’s argument also holds little credence with regard to the non-official NWS. These four are members of neither the NPT nor the CTBT, and thus have no further ‘to march’ away from the non-proliferation regime. Meanwhile, the threshold states are far more likely to abrogate the NPT’s non-proliferation norm if the Treaty continues to produce no progress on nuclear disarmament, than if the NWS show signs of genuine intent to disarm by beginning discussions on an abolition treaty.

³² McDonald and Randall, private interview with author.

³³ Maria Rost Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness," *International Studies Review* 10 (2008), 421.

³⁴ Maria Rost Rublee, "Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime", 445.

³⁵ Ware, *a Nuclear Weapons Convention and the NPT*.

Randall argues that the NPT, for all its deficiencies, does bind the NWS to rules that they are obliged to meet and can be held accountable to. While the former is true, the latter is not. The NPT says *nothing* about mechanisms and processes for achieving disarmament. As a result, other than a generalised commitment to eliminate their nuclear weapons, there is nothing to hold the NWS accountable to in NPT meetings. Nevertheless, as Perkovich and Acton state, it is abundantly clear that the vast majority of the world's non-NWS believed they were achieving a sincere commitment by the NWS to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons in ratifying the NPT.³⁶ This perspective was affirmed in the unanimous conclusion of the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion and recognised by the unanimous Final Documents of the 1995 and 2000 NPT RevCons. Without good faith efforts by the NWS to move urgently towards this goal, there is no motivation for the non-NWS to uphold their portion of the tripartite NPT bargain. Without disarmament, the non-proliferation portion of the Treaty will also fail.

The fundamental argument in favour of a NWC, then, is that the NPT *is* deficient. If the goal of the NPT was to reach the heights of nuclear weapons elimination, its designers should have made realistic allowances for how this was to be achieved, including by abolishing nuclear weapons. However, the NPT was not intended by its most powerful signatories to fulfil this purpose. Trying to force it into that role now is illogical and ineffective, as proven by 40 years of NWS opposition to, and effective obfuscation of, their disarmament commitments under the NPT. Multilateral discussions on an abolition treaty are the only way to approach the elimination of nuclear weapons effectively.

The task of the international community today is to build the house of nuclear abolition on the foundation stones of the NPT. In any house, the walls of one room form the boundary of the next one. The floor of the upstairs room defines the ceiling of its downstairs neighbour. Likewise, each portion of the abolition regime will play a role in defining the shape and scope of its other constituents. The interconnected and interdependent nature of each component means that they must be planned collectively from the outset, to ensure cohesion in the overall plan. Just as it makes no sense to build a house one room at a time, it makes no sense to build an abolition framework one agreement at a time. The result of such an approach is an incremental nuclear disarmament process which does not start with the outlawing of nuclear weapons as its fundamental basis. The NWS are happy to facilitate such a process, as it has

³⁶ Acton and Perkovich, *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*, 109.

led to no serious consideration of elimination nor rigorous definition of the parameters of the nuclear disarmament norm, thus allowing them the ‘wiggle room’³⁷ to continue claiming they have the right to possess nuclear weapons.

India, Iran and the NWC

Some states genuinely committed to the idea of nuclear weapons elimination claim the effectiveness of the NWC as a nuclear abolition treaty is undermined by its being too closely associated with Indian and more recently, Iranian nuclear diplomacy.³⁸ However, based on the historical facts related to the development and promotion of the Model NWC, it is difficult to see a rational basis for this purported association. Neither India nor Iran coined the term ‘*nuclear weapons convention*’ or the concept of a comprehensive convention outlawing the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Likewise, neither country was involved in the creation of the Model NWC, nor its introduction to the UN or NPT forums.³⁹

The UN resolution which has set the framework for a NWC was first submitted by Malaysia in 1996 in order to respond to and implement the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion, which is a core of New Zealand and NAC disarmament advocacy. This resolution has been adopted by the UNGA every year since then and is co-sponsored by a range of countries including many of those that participated in the ICJ case from the NAM, the Pacific, the West and Latin American countries. As Ware points out, “*Yes, [India and Iran] vote in favour [of the Malaysian resolution], but so do 123 other countries.*”⁴⁰

Malaysia’s 1996 resolution was followed in 1997 by a Model NWC, drafted by international NGO experts and introduced to the UNGA by Costa Rica. A revised version was jointly submitted to the NPT and UNGA in 2007 by Costa Rica and Malaysia. Nevertheless, Ogilvie White argues that India has claimed to be the father of the NWC concept since the mid-

³⁷ Shannon, "Norms Are What States Make of Them," 293-294.

³⁸ Ogilvie-White, "A Cloak for Proliferators."

³⁹ In 1988, India submitted to the UN the Rajiv Gandhi Plan for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons and the Achievement of a Non-Violent World Order. This included general provisions for nuclear disarmament and development of a security system not reliant on nuclear deterrence. India also submitted a more specific resolution to the UN which proclaimed the illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and attached a draft treaty on the prohibition of use. While these were significant initiatives, they were not the basis for the subsequent development or promotion of a NWC by international civil society or the UN.

⁴⁰ Alyn Ware, private correspondence with author, 9 November 2008.

1990s.⁴¹ Conversely, after 17 consecutive years of attendance at the UNGA, Ware states “*I have never seen India arguing at the UN that they are the father of the NWC.*”⁴² On the issue of NWS supporting the NWC, he argues, *China talks up the nuclear weapons convention in just about every disarmament policy speech it makes. India and Iran rarely mention it.*⁴³

Regardless of these facts, due to its nuclear weapons tests and refusal to sign the NPT or the CTBT, many Western states claim India’s disarmament rhetoric is duplicitous and its support of the NWC undermines the viability of the Convention. This is reflected in patterns of support for the NWC among the NAC. Although all NAC members support the NWC in principle and vote for the yearly Malaysian UNGA resolution calling for negotiations on a NWC, the Western NAC states (plus South Africa, a latecomer to the NAM in 1994) have blocked its promotion by the Coalition and do not co-sponsor the Malaysian resolution. Conversely, the NAM members of the NAC do co-sponsor it.

According to Ogilvie-White, some states supportive of elimination believe the NWC is being used as a ‘moral shield’ to minimise international political pressure, allowing India greater scope to develop nuclear weapons unhindered. It is difficult to see, however, what India needs a ‘moral shield’ for today. In the course of negotiations on the US-India deal, it has not stated that it will refrain from further nuclear tests⁴⁴ and unlike the other official NWS, has not signed any legally-binding commitment to disarming its nuclear weapons. Yet these facts have not stopped the US from granting it privileged access to advanced US and in effect, French and Russian, nuclear technology. Indeed, as Ware points out, if India had indeed been championing the NWC strongly, the US would almost certainly have rejected a nuclear cooperation deal.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, concerns over Iran’s credibility as a nuclear disarmament advocate have been raised since it admitted in 2003 to developing an undeclared uranium enrichment capacity for several years. Despite over 3000 person-days worth of inspections of its nuclear facilities by

⁴¹ Ogilvie-White, "A Cloak for Proliferators."

⁴² Ware, private correspondence with author, 9 November 2008.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Arms Control Wonk, *Will India Test Again?*, 23 June 2008 [cited November 6 2008]. Available from <http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1924/will-india-test-again>.; PTI, *Nothing Prohibits India from Carrying out N-tests: Sibal*, 8 September 2008 [cited 20 September 2008]. Available from <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/002200809081841.htm>.

⁴⁵ Alyn Ware, private correspondence with author, 11 November 2008.

the IAEA,⁴⁶ there is still much debate over whether or not it is actually seeking to develop nuclear weapons.⁴⁷ Ogilvie-White argues that, “*Consequently, the concept of an NWC, which in principle is irreproachable and should be held up as a moral beacon, has become tainted by its association with states that have a reputation for diplomatic duplicity.*”⁴⁸

A key argument used by the New Zealand Government against exploring the NWC idea is, therefore, that it would mean associating itself with Indian and Iranian disarmament diplomacy and that this is not viable, as they will not act in good faith and cannot be trusted. Yet India and Iran’s self-interested behaviour merely reflects that of the NWS, whose duplicitous diplomacy has been deeply detrimental in many disarmament forums. As Lange once said, “*The world of international diplomacy is founded on hypocrisy and deeply rooted in deceit, and there are none better at practising it than India and the US.*”⁴⁹

The US has yet to ratify the CTBT and continues to conduct ‘sub-critical’ and simulated nuclear weapons tests. Despite insisting vehemently in January 2000 that its NMD programme posed no threat to the ABM Treaty,⁵⁰ the US withdrew from the Treaty in 2002, demonstrating a lack of good faith or credibility.⁵¹ It has consistently undermined international disarmament negotiations, as evidenced by its withdrawal from negotiations on a biological weapons convention inspection protocol after six and a half years of negotiations;⁵² its obstructive behaviour during the multilateral review of the Millennium Development Goals in 2005;⁵³ its reservation to the chemical weapons convention (CWC) refusing to allow international verification of chemical samples taken on US soil, along with its undermining of

⁴⁶ This figure was given in Iran’s statement to the 2008 NPT PrepCom. See: Iranian Government, *Statement by H.E. Mr. Ali Reza Moaiyeri to the NPT Preparatory Committee*, 29 April 2008 [cited 4 November 2008]. Available from <http://www.un.org/NPT2010/SecondSession/delegates%20statements/Iran.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Whatever the case, the obsessive focus on Iran’s possible intention to develop nuclear weapons ignores the ‘elephant in the room’ that none of the Western states want to talk about: Israel’s nuclear weapons. These, coupled with the insistence of the NWS that nuclear weapons provide a unique deterrent force, is a constant motivator for Iran to seek a nuclear weapons option for itself, not any inherently immoral Iranian characteristic, as the Western NWS suggest.

⁴⁸ Ogilvie-White, "A Cloak for Proliferators."

⁴⁹ Hank Schouten, 'India’s Nuclear Tests Inevitable, Says Lange,' *Evening Post*, Wellington (18 May 1998).

⁵⁰ Middle Powers Initiative, *Report from the Atlanta Consultation on the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty* Atlanta, Georgia: Carter Center / Middle Powers Initiative, (26-27 January 2000).

⁵¹ BBC, *America Withdraws from ABM Treaty*, 13 December 2001 [cited 5 October 2007]. Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1707812.stm>.

⁵² Jonathan B. Tucker, "Strengthening the BWC: A Way Forward," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 78 (July/August 2004).

⁵³ Borger, 'Road Map for US Relations with Rest of World.'

the independence of the CWC secretariat,⁵⁴ and its refusal to sign the anti personnel and cluster munitions conventions. For its part, the UK's duplicitous statements regarding its illegal plans for its Trident nuclear force also show a lack of good faith in unclear matters. Meanwhile, Russia and France have expanded their nuclear-use policies, and China is expanding its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the NWS have shown equally disingenuous behaviour regarding conventional weapons, enlisting their proliferation as supposed justification for the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament. This is both illogical and duplicitous; in 2007, the top five conventional arms exporters in the world were all NWS; the US, Russia, France, the UK and Israel.⁵⁵

New Zealand claims to promote a balanced disarmament and arms control agenda. Yet if concerns over duplicitous disarmament diplomacy were applied even-handedly, it would suggest that it is not possible to collaborate with any of the NWS on an abolition framework. If France, the UK or the US, for example, were to begin discussing the feasibility of a NWC, would New Zealand then say that it could not explore the idea with them? This is clearly not an option. The reality is that India is now a NWS and Iran, a critical state. Thus, while genuine disarmament advocates wish to avoid reinforcing perceptions about the value of nuclear weapons by conferring any additional status on these countries, their cooperation will be essential in the development and implementation of any plan for nuclear abolition. Accordingly, creative ways of incorporating them into abolition discussions *must* be found. Conversely, freezing them out of abolition talks is counterproductive and again, plays into the hands of the NWS.

The Right Time for a Nuclear Abolition Treaty?

It is erroneous and counterproductive to suggest that there will 'one day' be a better time to explore an abolition framework. In 1997, McKinnon wrote that the government did not favour pressing for a NWC "*at this stage*", as it "*would inevitably produce a stalemate....The last thing we want in the NPT context is a paralysis like that afflicting the CD.*"⁵⁶ Despite the collapse of the 2005 NPT RevCon and the failure of the NWS to fulfil the great majority of

⁵⁴ Bob Rigg, *The Evisceration of a Disarmament Body*, 27 April 2007 [cited 3 June 2008]. Available from http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-wmd/multilateral_disarmament_4567.jsp

⁵⁵ This is measured in US dollar value of exports. See: Paul Holtom, Mark Bromley, and Pieter D Wezeman, 'International Arms Transfers,' in *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: Summary* (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008), 15.

⁵⁶ Don McKinnon, private correspondence with Susanne Menzies-Culling, 2 April 1997.

disarmament commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 RevCons, politicians and officials are still using this same logic more than a decade later.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, the CD has been deadlocked for eleven years, in large part due to its consensus rule and NWS intransigence. Proliferation risks are increasing, not decreasing, and will continue to do so without immediate progress towards nuclear abolition. As proliferation risks increase, they progressively magnify the complexity of any potential abolition framework. Action must be taken now to begin to institutionalise a comprehensive, legally binding abolition framework while it is still possible.

A new permissive environment for this task is developing internationally. Many high-profile former proponents of nuclear deterrence in the US now explicitly and vocally support rapid moves towards eliminating nuclear weapons.⁵⁸ The President Elect of the US, Senator Barack Obama, has declared: *"I will not authorize the development of new nuclear weapons...and I will make the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide a central element of U.S. nuclear policy."*⁵⁹ Since early 2007 (and despite its decision to rebuild and renovate its Trident nuclear arsenal), the UK has led among the NWS in terms of disarmament measures. It has derailed its nuclear missiles, joined the SNI to investigate multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives and helped develop a 'disarmament laboratory' to investigate verification methods necessary to advance disarmament towards abolition.⁶⁰ In addition, Australia - a key New Zealand and US ally - has also joined the SNI and has recently thrown its weight behind consideration of new nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures by convening, with Japan, the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND).⁶¹ ICNND co-Chair, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, has called for an abolition-type treaty system⁶² and reportedly

⁵⁷ McDonald, for example, said, *"We felt that there was some danger in holding up plan b before plan A was exhausted. And despite the outcome, we're still not convinced that plan A [the NPT] is exhausted."* McDonald and Randall, private interview with author.

⁵⁸ These include Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz. The campaign by led by these four men has been dubbed the "Hoover Initiative", after the Hoover Institute where they first enunciated their ideas about the urgent need to eliminate nuclear weapons. See: Henry Kissinger et al., "Toward a Nuclear-Free World," *Wall Street Journal* (15 January 2008).

⁵⁹ Susan Cornwell, *Election Breathes New Life into Nuclear Debate*, Reuters, 3 November 2008 [cited 4 November 2008]. Available from <http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE4A25C820081103>.

⁶⁰ The latter has been done in collaboration with Norway and the UK-based NGO *Verification Research, Training and Information Centre* (VERTIC).

⁶¹ The ICNND is modelled on the highly successful Canberra Commission and includes preeminent military, political, academic and technical experts from a range of countries. It is co-chaired by Evans and former Japanese Foreign Minister, Yoriko Kawaguchi.

⁶² International Crisis Group, *New International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Gareth Evans to Co-Chair; Interview with Gareth Evans on ABC Radio National Breakfast Program*, ABC Radio Australia, 10 June 2008 [cited 27 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5482&l=1>

stipulated that he would only appoint Commissioners who believed that abolition was possible. As noted earlier, in October 2008, the UN Secretary General called for exploration of potential abolition frameworks and specifically endorsed the NWC.⁶³ Perkovich has also called for Track II exploration of an abolition framework.⁶⁴ This upsurge of political will for nuclear weapons elimination and abolition must be seized upon and turned into decisive action before the present window of opportunity closes.

5. Policy Recommendations

Two policy initiatives are recommended through which New Zealand could best utilise its moral authority, as well as the strengths of the NGO disarmament community, in order to advance nuclear disarmament. First, it should engage like minded states and NGOs in track II exploration of an abolition framework to compliment the NPT, using the NWC as a starting point for the task. Second, New Zealand should increase its promotion of NWFZs by promulgating the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Act as a model for ‘full-scope’ national legislation banning nuclear weapons, and by helping to establish a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Secretariat mandated to facilitate greater collaboration between regional NWFZ.

Track II Exploration of a Nuclear Weapons Convention

New Zealand should take a leading role in developing a coalition of like-minded states to convene a study group of political, military, scientific and NGO experts to explore the possibilities for an abolition process, based on the NWC model.⁶⁵ Such a bold move would allow genuinely committed diplomats and politicians to develop a sense of ownership of the abolition process, which in turn would increase their personal motivation and their likelihood of committing personal time, energy and political capital to it. (PNND is a good place to begin seeking appropriate political support transnationally). All of the progress made in multilateral disarmament since 1996 has occurred outside of the CD: negotiation of the landmines and cluster munitions conventions would not have been possible inside the

⁶³ United Nations Department of Public Information, *Contagious' Doctrine of Deterrence Has Made Non-proliferation More Difficult*.

⁶⁴ Acton and Perkovich, *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*.

⁶⁵ It is in the interests of all involved to include NGO experts in such an undertaking. This proposition, supported by Perkovich, would address an omission in the makeup of the ICNND. Furthermore, having drafted, then promoted the Model NWC for over a decade, many already have extensive experience in considering practical abolition issues.

forum.⁶⁶ Likewise, a nuclear weapons abolition treaty can only be achieved by initiating a negotiating process that is not bound by the diplomatic strategies of the NWS or by the consensus rule of the CD. It is in the interests of all involved to include NGO experts in such an undertaking. Having drafted, then promoted the Model NWC for over a decade, many already have extensive experience in considering practical abolition issues. Their inclusion in such an undertaking is supported by Perkovich and would address an omission in the makeup of the ICNND.

In the late 1990s, the NAC put nuclear weapons elimination on the international agenda, proving that proactive cooperation by likeminded states with good disarmament credentials could resist even the collective condemnation of the NWS. Such a coalition is therefore entirely capable of putting abolition discussions on the international agenda, particularly in light of the permissive international environment that is currently developing. It is in the area of agenda setting that New Zealand has historically had the greatest impact and where future efforts can be most fruitful.⁶⁷ Equally, concerted diplomatic efforts by such a coalition are also capable of effectively counteracting the political damage that Western states claim has been done to the NWC by India and Iran's support of it. In this light, New Zealand collaboration with countries that took a similarly principled opposition to the recent US-India nuclear deal (such as Ireland, Norway or Austria, *inter alia*) would be particularly effective.

Potential partner-states for such an undertaking could be sought through three different mechanisms. First, a NAC-ICNND collaboration; New Zealand could propose that one of ICNND's four planned meetings prior to the 2010 NPT RevCon be devoted to abolition discussions, or that one of the seven research centres affiliated with the ICNND conduct NWC discussions or research to feed into the ICNND process.⁶⁸ In addition, the newly-created Aotearoa-New Zealand Peace and Conflict Studies Centre at Otago University could be approached to host such a meeting or be involved in related research.⁶⁹ The second

⁶⁶ While they have not been signed by various critical states, some of these have indeed signed them, and as a result, strengthened the norms against both weapon types, increasing pressure for those still outside the conventions to subscribe to them.

⁶⁷ O'Brien, private interview with author.

⁶⁸ As Vice President of Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which is an ICNND-accredited research institute, Perkovich would be a strong and credible candidate for hosting such investigations. For a full list of ICNND-accredited research centres, see <http://www.icnnd.org/arc.html>.

⁶⁹ The Director of the Centre is Kevin Clements, author of a comprehensive history of New Zealand's path to nuclear freedom and Director of the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland from 2003-2008. See: Clements, *Back from the Brink*.

possibility is a NAC-SNI collaboration; the membership of South Africa in both coalitions would help to facilitate such an undertaking. SNI member Norway may also be supportive given its work with the UK and UK-based NGO *VERTIC* on disarmament verification. As a third option, drawing on the pool of states represented by the above groupings, as well as those who co-sponsored the 2007 and 2008 nuclear-weapons-dealighting resolutions in the UNGA, New Zealand could bring together a new coalition of states to host discussions.

Such an endeavour need not undermine the NAC, as demonstrated by the dealighting resolution NZ has sponsored for the last two years at the UNGA, and by South Africa's involvement in the SNI. Indeed, given their co-sponsorship of the Malaysian NWC resolution, strong support for such an initiative would be likely from Brazil, Egypt and Mexico. Furthermore, such a move would be consistent with previous NAC support for and statements on the idea of abolition via a NWC.⁷⁰

In any major endeavour, a framework of specific goals and targets is essential to its timely completion. The CTBT was successfully completed in part because the international community discussed and then set a realistic target for its completion; likewise the landmines and cluster munitions conventions. The two most highly-accredited international nuclear disarmament panels ever established, the Canberra Commission and the WMD Commission, both asserted that timetables would be essential to achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons.⁷¹ A credible set of draft timeframes could be drawn up by engaging high-level former military, scientific and strategic nuclear weapons experts now in favour of elimination or abolition.

While it would probably not be possible to draw the NWS into such discussions in the first instance, the idea that this undermines the value of the initiative is unfounded. If serious discussions of an abolition framework were started, the outcry that would inevitably ensue from the NWS would quickly belie any suggestion that they lacked significance. Merely

⁷⁰ New Agenda Coalition, *Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World: the Need for a New Agenda*, (A/53/138).; Irish Government, *Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World: the Need for a New Agenda: Glossary*, 9 June 1998.

⁷¹ Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, *Report*, 15.; Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons*, 109.

discussing an abolition framework is a powerful catalyst for change, forcing the NWS to defend their indefensible policies in public once more.⁷²

In 1984, New Zealand's nuclear free policy did almost nothing to change the international balance of power. New Zealand was criticised by international leaders, who argued the policy "...has not reduced by one the number of nuclear weapons in the world."⁷³ Nevertheless, despite leaving the entire Western nuclear deterrent intact, from one day to the next New Zealand was said to have drastically altered the international strategic balance. Such is the power of ideas.

Regardless of the likely reluctance of the NWS to engage initially in discussions on an abolition framework, recent developments in the US and UK (as discussed above) indicate there is potential to draw these NWS into discussions in the near future, which would provide incentive for the remaining NWS to participate. As a means of political defence against any initial political backlash from the NWS, collaborating governments or NGOs active in the field should commission a new series of public opinion surveys asking a question such as, "*Should [New Zealand] take a leading role in commencing discussions on a treaty to abolish nuclear weapons?*"⁷⁴

Further Development of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

In 1980s New Zealand, the creation of local-area NWFZ was an essential means of establishing and entrenching the norm of nuclear disarmament. They were a symbolic way of quantifying and publicising the widespread opposition to nuclear weapons. As in New Zealand, at the international level, the significance of NWFZ is not just in the strategic limitations they place on NWS, it is in their symbolic rejection of nuclear weapons, a point reaffirmed by the 1995 NPT and repeatedly by the NAC.⁷⁵ Two specific actions are recommended with regard to the promotion of NWFZs.

⁷² This point was clearly evident in the ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Case. The NWS knew a strong statement of illegality would deeply undermine the purported legitimacy of their nuclear arsenal and policies. As a result, despite not recognising the jurisdiction of the ICJ, both France and the US, among other NWS, felt obliged to participate by presenting evidence to the Court. The same logic applies to the NWC and is why the NWS are so opposed to it.

⁷³ Lange, 'Nuclear Weapons Are Immoral'.

⁷⁴ For NGOs, this would be a good idea regardless of progress on abolition discussions. The most recent public opinion polling data on this issue is around a decade old.

⁷⁵ Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, *Final Document Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I))*, 10.; New Agenda Coalition, *Towards a Nuclear Weapons*

First, New Zealand should promote the 1987 Nuclear Free Zone Act as a model for ‘full-scope’ nuclear disarmament and arms control laws. This would interest nations looking to embed their regional NWFZ treaty obligations in national legislation, or to develop single-state NWFZ to strengthen the international norm against nuclear weapons.⁷⁶ Second, New Zealand should pool resources with other States Parties to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty⁷⁷ and create a small, permanent secretariat, mandated to develop and enhance ties with other NWFZ. This would compliment the work of the analogous Latin American Secretariat based in Mexico,⁷⁸ and would facilitate achievement of New Zealand’s long term goal of a Southern Hemisphere NWFZ.

The following section turns to policy advice based on the second focus of this research: NGO-government relations. The decline in the strong, grassroots movement of decades past has diminished opportunities for young New Zealanders to gain experience in nuclear disarmament advocacy. It is in the interests of the New Zealand Government (and humanity more generally) to ensure that the NGO community has the necessary institutional support to continue to innovate through transnational research and advocacy. There are two immediate ways that the government can and should do this: first, it should establish regular international internships for young New Zealanders in UN disarmament institutions or transnational disarmament NGOs; second, it should increase NGO representation on government delegations to NPT PrepComs and RevCons.

International NGO Internships

Young New Zealanders must be supported to develop international experience and networks in the field of nuclear security. To this end, PACDAC should seek to establish and institutionalise international internships for young New Zealanders lasting 6-12 months. Using PADET funding, such placements could be developed either in UN disarmament

Free World: the Need for a New Agenda, (A/53/138). As Reitzig notes, New Zealand’s nuclear free law “...was designed not only to keep nuclear arms and nuclear propulsion reactors away from New Zealand but also to make a contribution to the international nuclear disarmament agenda.” See: Reitzig, “In Defiance of Nuclear Deterrence: Anti-Nuclear New Zealand after Two Decades,” 136.

⁷⁶ Practical action to support this idea could be as simple as posting a PDF copy of the Nuclear Free Zone Act on the MFAT Disarmament Division website and advertising the fact in track I and II diplomatic meetings.

⁷⁷ Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

⁷⁸ The *Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean* (OPANAL). <http://www.opanal.org/index-i.html>

institutions or transnationally-active NGOs with proven track records of high-quality disarmament monitoring, research and advocacy. In the NGO realm, organisations such as PNND, IPPNW and WILPF would all make excellent hosts for internships. They have strong backgrounds in nuclear disarmament, are transnationally active and have pre-existing institutional structures through which to ensure accountability.⁷⁹ In the UN environment at present, there are former New Zealand diplomats in key positions in the Geneva branch of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) and in the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).⁸⁰ PACDAC should approach these people to investigate the possibilities for internships in their respective institutions.

NGO Representatives on NPT Delegations

NPT meetings provide a prime opportunity for young New Zealanders to develop experience of multilateral nuclear security negotiations and processes. New Zealand should broaden NGO engagement with the NPT process by appointing two NGO individuals to the New Zealand PrepCom delegation each year and ensure that from now on, two are appointed to each RevCon delegation as well, as was the case for the first time in 2005.⁸¹ Each pair should include one younger, less experienced delegate and one NGO veteran. In addition to the training opportunities for young New Zealanders in this forum, experienced NGO disarmament advocates can add great value to governmental delegations, for many of the reasons already discussed. On this matter, O'Brien says,

*"I'm all for NGO representatives on government delegations... disarmament is an obvious area where we should be utilising the experience of the NGO representatives...[it] is one...area in which the expertise in the non-governmental area is at least as good, if not better, than in the government."*⁸²

⁷⁹ In addition, the domestic branches of these organisations would ensure there is a support network to foster the ongoing participation of interns in peace and disarmament related work upon return to New Zealand.

⁸⁰ Tim Caughley, New Zealand's former Disarmament Ambassador, is the Director of the Geneva ODA Office. John Borrie a former New Zealand diplomat, is a Project Manager at UNIDIR.

⁸¹ This is not unprecedented in international circles. Last year, Australia included two NGO representatives on its NPT PrepCom delegation, as did Ireland the year before. There are diplomacy courses at universities in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch from which candidates for these positions could be drawn, in addition to the NGOs most active in youth participation at present such as IPPNW and WILPF.

⁸² O'Brien, private interview with author.

6. Future research

Nuclear Disarmament Norm Development in New Zealand

Traditionally, IR scholarship has drawn a distinction between domestic and international politics.⁸³ Despite this historical distinction, Finnemore argues that, “*Domestic norms...are deeply entwined with the workings of international norms.*”⁸⁴ Future research should seek to identify the various players, roles and processes that brought the nuclear disarmament norm to internalisation in New Zealand, or in other countries. This may help IR scholars and practitioners identify analogous actors and processes internationally and thus increase opportunities to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda.

Norm Leadership

Further research into influences on norm leadership in countries that have already internalised the nuclear disarmament norm would be valuable. This would enable more definitive conclusions to be drawn about the applicability of the norm life cycle’s ideas about foreign policy causation to the behaviour of norm leaders, as well as to norm adoption. Such research could also be undertaken in conventional weapons fields.

Critical States

As discussed earlier, the cooperation of ‘critical states’ is essential to advancing nuclear disarmament. There have been several instances of genuine norm adoption by critical states, including Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and now potentially, the UK. Research into policy motivators for disarmament norm adoption in these and other critical states, including the role

⁸³ This was based largely on the assumption that the anarchic nature of the international system distinguishes it fundamentally from the domestic setting, in which there is a recognised executive authority with an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with laws and other norms. In the international setting, the UN Security Council, with its mandate to ensure international peace and security, comes closest to such a role, but is often hindered by the competing perceptions of national interest among its five permanent members – the NWS - all of which have veto rights over any decisions or declarations of the Council.

⁸⁴ In this regard, she cites research by prominent legal scholars at the University of Chicago which indicates that even domestically, “*Making successful law and policy requires an understanding of the pervasive influence of social norms of behaviour... The processes through which these legal scholars claim that norms work domestically -involving norm entrepreneurs, imitation, ‘norm cascades,’ and ‘norm bandwagons’ - are entirely consistent with the research done on norms by scholars in IR and suggest that IR norms research might also learn from domestic analogies.*” Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 893.

of agency in the adoption process, would deepen understanding of how to draw the NWS into an abolition process.⁸⁵

The Role of the Media

The Canberra Commission stated,

*“There is no doubt that, if the peoples of the world were more fully aware of the inherent danger of nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use, they would reject them, and not permit their continued possession or acquisition on their behalf by their governments, even for an alleged need for self-defence.”*⁸⁶

Disturbingly, the public is *not* aware of the catastrophic threat posed daily by nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament is a field heavy with technical jargon and complex politics. Media reporting of the issue therefore requires a significant human and economic investment from media outlets. Unfortunately, in the profit-driven enterprise of mainstream media publishing in New Zealand, as elsewhere, where “...advertisers are the real customers of a commercial media organisation, not its readers, viewers or listeners,”⁸⁷ such coverage is almost entirely absent. This feeds a self-reinforcing spiral of low public engagement and low public knowledge which constantly raises the bar for engagement for both the public and media publishers. The overall effect is the ‘dumbing down’ of the public, discouraging people from engaging in an aspect of international life vital to the survival of humanity.

Without an active, informed citizenry, democracy does not function. The ‘dumbing-down’ of citizens the world over with regard to nuclear dangers – amongst many other things - therefore raises wide-reaching questions. They cover such fundamental issues as the appropriate role and responsibilities of the media in maintaining a healthy and responsive democracy and where the limits lie in terms of capitalism’s ability to serve democracy. Further research, both in New Zealand and abroad, could therefore usefully explore these

⁸⁵ An example of this in a related field would be Germany and the UK’s support for a landmines abolition treaty in 1997.

⁸⁶ Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, *Report*, 7.

⁸⁷ Bill Rosenberg, *News Media Ownership in New Zealand*, 10 January 2008 [cited 9 September 2008]. Available from <http://canterbury.cyberplace.org.nz/community/CAFCA/publications/Miscellaneous/mediaown.pdf>.

areas and attempt to articulate appropriate mechanisms for ensuring effective public education on nuclear disarmament and other such vital matters.⁸⁸

7. Reality versus Realism

The core understanding of realist thinking is that power alone is the ultimate guarantor of security. Internationally, adherence to this assumption has long maintained a negative, self-perpetuating cycle of fear, mistrust and violence that prevents true human security by undermining recognition of and respect for common institutions and norms. Nuclear weapons have taken realism's ideas about the utility of military power to their logical extreme. At this extreme, humanity has found that the ultimate destructive force is almost inevitably linked to self-destruction, and thus is useless as a defence mechanism. Recorded history has never seen a greater military power than the US today and yet, despite its overwhelming military superiority, it feels deeply insecure. As Lange said in 1985, "*Europe and the United States are ringed about with nuclear weapons, and your people have never been more at risk.*"⁸⁹ Unless humans can summon the creativity and courage to find another way of co-existing that is not reliant on force as the guarantor of security, it will likely cease to exist. This should be kept in mind when governments - New Zealand's included – are deciding policy priorities.

While the focus of this discussion is political, there is in fact a much larger issue at stake. Through its projection onto the interactions of states, the essence of human nature is being debated. Realism contends that fear-based, self interested and aggressive behaviour merely reflects 'human nature'. According to this understanding, this type of behaviour will therefore never change. In fact, this is not human nature, it is human *habit*.

Human history has shown that people have the ability to evolve past fear and aggression into modes of thinking and behaving based on humanism, altruism, mutual respect and trust. A fundamental point about normative understandings of international life is that people respond to prescriptive cues as well as material ones; "*Empirical research documents again and again how people's ideas about what is good and what "should be" in the world become translated*

⁸⁸ The 2002-2003 UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education was an excellent example of the type of research that needs to be done. It is to be applauded and should be updated and republished regularly. See: United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, *United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (A/57/124)*.

⁸⁹ Lange, 'Nuclear Weapons Are Immoral'.

into political reality."⁹⁰ The abolition of slavery, the development of international and humanitarian law, and universal suffrage are but a few of the many examples of this evolution.

At its limit, constructivist thought suggests two key innovations in political reasoning. Firstly, there exists the potential for a fundamental transformation of the international system. If states are "*collectivities of individuals,*"⁹¹ the international system is a 'collectivity of states'. As with the nature of national identities and interests, the international structure inside which relations between states occur is constantly being modified by the content of these interrelations. Wendt therefore suggests that: "*Transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations of structure.*"⁹²

Secondly, in the 'imaginary' realm of nuclear strategy, where "*...strategic concepts and heuristics developed by political scientists can become even more influential than would normally be the case...*"⁹³ the ability of non-governmental experts to shape national and international understandings and 'interests' is more apparent than in other areas. The inference to be drawn, therefore, is that principled and rational NGO advocacy can and does contribute not just to the remoulding of national identities and interest, but also to the re-shaping of the international system.

The NGO-government collaborations examined in this thesis are proof of this point. In the 1970s and 1980s, NGOs were told that the dream of a nuclear free New Zealand was idealistic, nonsensical and even dangerous. Regardless, New Zealand's nuclear free law is source of hope among the international nuclear disarmament community. In the 1980s and 1990s, New Zealand NGOs were told that the idea of challenging nuclear weapons in the World Court was unrealistic and counterproductive. Yet disarmament advocates around the world now rely on the ICJ Advisory Opinion in making their case for eliminating nuclear weapons. Today, NGO disarmament advocates are told the goal of nuclear weapons abolition is idealistic and unrealisable. Yet a model for abolition already exists in the NWC and a surge

⁹⁰ Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," 916.

⁹¹ Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," 397, footnote 21.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 393.

⁹³ Tanya Ogilvie-White, "Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate," *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall 1996), 44.

of political will for disarmament in critical states suggests greater hope for its realisation than ever before. It is time to learn the lessons of history.

In working at the political / ideational level and seeking to demonstrate that alternatives to nuclear weapons-based security strategies are possible, NGOs as norm entrepreneurs and New Zealand as a norm leader are best equipped to contribute to the resolution of the current nuclear disarmament crisis. Greater collaboration between these two in order to put nuclear weapons abolition firmly on the international agenda is therefore in the interests of both, as well as the in the interests of humanity as a whole.

8. Conclusion

In dealing with the truly existential crises facing humanity today, progressive, long term strategies are needed to ensure short-term human survival. The only rational choice left to policy makers is to dare to believe that a world free of nuclear weapons is possible, and then do something *practical* to make it happen. Former UK Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett has written: “*Believing that the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons is possible can act as a spur for action on disarmament. Believing, at whatever level, that it is not, is the surest path to inaction.*”⁹⁴

New Zealand’s strong, moral leadership in the drive to eliminate nuclear weapons has made it a flag bearer for the international nuclear disarmament movement. With humanity balanced on the nuclear knife-edge, its principled leadership is today needed more than ever. It is time to move from nuclear free New Zealand to a nuclear free world. Bold and decisive steps towards the abolition of nuclear weapons must be taken by genuine nuclear disarmament advocates. New Zealand has the political and non-governmental expertise, the necessary credentials and the right networks to take these steps. There is overwhelming domestic support for such action and a window of opportunity internationally. New Zealand must pick up the white flag of nuclear abolition once more and wave it high.

⁹⁴ Margaret Beckett, *For a Nuclear-Free World*, Jerusalem Post, 27 June 2007 [cited 27 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=1182409649548&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>

...dare to hope, dare to dream, dare to believe...

Appendices

1. Interviewees

Non-Governmental

- Dr Kate Dewes (ONZM), Co-coordinator, Disarmament and Security Centre, Christchurch; Member, Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to the United Nations Secretary General
- Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Retired), Co-coordinator, Disarmament and Security Centre, Christchurch
- Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; Director, the Peace Foundation (Wellington Office)
- Dr. Robert White, Former Director, Centre for Peace Studies, University of Auckland; founding member, Scientists Against Nuclear Arms
- Peter Wills, former Chair, Greenpeace New Zealand; former researcher, Centre for Peace Studies, University of Auckland

Governmental

- Susannah Gordon, former Nuclear Desk Officer, Disarmament Division, MFAT
- Hon. Marian Hobbs, former New Zealand Disarmament Minister; Co-President, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
- Caroline McDonald, former Director, Disarmament Division, MFAT
- Terence O'Brien, former New Zealand Permanent Representative to the United Nations; Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies, Wellington
- Geoff Randall, former Director, Disarmament Division, MFAT

2. NGO Membership

NCCD

From 1995-2000, NCCD membership included, *inter alia*:

Aotearoa-New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies (the Peace Foundation); Campaign Against Land Mines; Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Wellington; Caritas; Conference of Churches of Aotearoa New Zealand; Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, New Zealand; International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, New Zealand (IPPNW); National Council of Women; New Zealand Federation of University Women; Pacific Institute of Resource Management; Peace Council of Aotearoa New Zealand; Quaker Peace and Service; and the United Nations Association of New Zealand.

Regular attendees at meetings at various times over the period included: Derek Wilson (Chair, 1995-97; Pacific Institute of Resource Management); Des Brough, (Chair, 1998-2001; World Peace Council); Jennifer Coote (Secretary; New Zealand Federation of University Women; since 2000, of *Graduate Women*); Dame Laurie Salas (Deputy Chair; National Council of Women; UN Association of New Zealand); Llewellyn Richards (Treasurer 1997-2000; Quakers Peace and Service); John Urlich (Treasurer, 1995-96; Peace Council Aotearoa); John Head (Campaign Against Land Mines; UN Association of New Zealand); Maureen Hoy

(WILPF); Edwina Hughes (PMA); Kathleen Loncar (WILPF), responsible for the summaries of *Disarmament Times*, the newsletter of the New York-based UN NGO Committee on Disarmament, which were distributed with NCCD minutes; Christine Lesley (CND Wellington); and Gwenda Sutton.

IPPNW

Key figures involved with IPPNW over the research period included, *inter alia*: Ian Prior, Erich Geiringer, George Salmond, Robin Briant and Robin Halliday.

3. PACDAC Minutes

Minutes for the following PACDAC meeting dates, released under the Freedom of Information Act, are available on request: 13 March 1995, 10 July 1995, 27 November 1995, 18 March 1996, 25 November 1996, 20 August 1997, 13 November 1997, 13 March 1998, 10 July 1998, 13 November 1998, 26 February 1999, 16 July 1999, 19 November 1999, 4 February 2000, 6 April 2000 and 23 November 2000.

4. NGO Representatives on Government Delegations

Labour-led governments appointed peace movement individuals to various international delegations and panels such as: the 1985 NPT RevCon (Kevin Clements); the 3rd UNSSOD in 1988 (Kate Dewes); the PTBT Amendment Conference (Gerald Coates, Engineers for Social Responsibility); 1990 NPT RevCon (Rod Alley); the 2000 NPT RevCon (Alyn Ware); the UN Study on Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education in March 2001 (Kate Dewes); and the 2005 NPT RevCon (Dr Nick Wilson, IPPNW - Julia Johnstone of Canterbury University also attended). In 1995, the National Government appointed Associate Professor Stephen Hoadley to the NPT RevCon delegation.

5. New Zealand-South Africa Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control (1996)

(Overleaf)

PK TOF : ISAC/BC / 7

MEMORANDUM OF COOPERATION ON DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

On behalf of our Governments and people we reaffirm the strong commitment of South Africa and New Zealand to achieving a world free of all weapons of mass destruction. We are pleased at the close cooperation between our two countries in the various international disarmament and non-proliferation fora which will increase now that we are both full members of the Conference on Disarmament.

We also reaffirm that, following the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) text through multilateral negotiations, our Governments intend to sign the Treaty at the earliest opportunity. Our delegations to the Conference on Disarmament will work actively to support the Chairman of the negotiating committee in his endeavour to resolve the difficulties which the Conference is presently considering with regard to the Treaty. We call on all other countries to give their prompt support to the Treaty. Looking ahead, we confirm that our Governments will work for the commencement next year of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Further steps are needed in the programme to bring the world closer to the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. We note that all parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have committed themselves to that goal, a commitment which was explicitly recognised in the recent Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In that context, the process of reviewing the NPT which commences next year provides a means for promoting the full implementation of the Treaty and the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament which were agreed at the time of the indefinite extension of the Treaty in May 1995.

We welcome the opening for signature on 11 April 1996 of the Pelindaba Treaty creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa and agree that it represents a milestone for the African continent. In the Pacific region, the end of nuclear testing had been marked by the signature of the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga by France, the United Kingdom and the United States. We affirm the objective of achieving a southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons. Our Governments will work together with other like-minded countries with a view to developing increased cooperation between existing or prospective nuclear-weapon-free zones, which with the addition of Antarctica cover more than 50 % of the earth's landmass.

As State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), South Africa and New Zealand reaffirm our Governments' full support for the Convention. We call on the United States and the Russian Federation, as the major declared possessors of chemical weapons, as well as other states to ratify the Convention at the earliest opportunity. In addition, we look forward to the imminent 65th ratification, which will trigger entry into force and implementation of the Convention.

The Governments of South Africa and New Zealand also reaffirm our commitment towards strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) by establishing a verifiable compliance regime for the Convention. To this end our Governments will work together with other like-minded countries with a view to conclude successfully the ongoing negotiations in the BWC Ad Hoc group.


We share the international community's concern at the build up of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate requirements of self defence. To this end we welcome the achievement of the Guidelines for International Arms Transfers which was agreed to at the 1996 Session of the


United Nations Disarmament Commission. We also call for a greater focus on conventional arms in all disarmament fora. All of the member states of the United Nations are also encouraged to actively participate in and support the UN Arms Register. In view of the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel land mines to civilians, we call for the world wide elimination of anti-personnel land mines. In alleviating this suffering we are committed to reinforcing international cooperation for mine-clearance and the development of national capacities for mine clearance in mine infested countries. We also support the development of effective demining and land mine detection capabilities.

We will continue to cooperate in various international arrangements dedicated to the non-proliferation of dual-use equipment and technologies which could be used in the development of weapons of mass destruction, and in discouraging any destabilising build-up of conventional weapons.

Given the many interests our two Governments and peoples share in this area, we agree that periodic consultations should take place between our Governments on issues relating to disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Signed at Cape Town on this ^{8th} day of August 1996.


NELSON R MANDELA
President
For the Government of the
Republic of South Africa


JB BOLGER
Prime Minister
For the Government of
New Zealand

Bibliography

- Abolition 2000, *Abolition 2000 Statement*, April 1995 [cited 18 February 2008]. Available from http://www.abolition2000.org/site/c.cdJIKKNpFqG/b.1316717/k.8870/The_Abolition_2000_Statement_English.htm#footnotes.
- , *Membership List*, 2008 [cited 15 June 2008]. Available from <http://www.abolition2000.org/site/c.cdJIKKNpFqG/b.1316671/>.
- , *People Worldwide Want Nuclear Abolition*, 1998 [cited August 27 2008]. Available from http://www.abolition2000.org/atf/cf/%7B23F7F2AE-CC10-4D6F-9BF8-09CF86F1AB46%7D/poll_worldwide.pdf.
- , *Working Groups and Conveners [2000 NPT Review Conference Media Pack]* (April 2000)
- Acronym Institute, *Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Risks and Reckonings; NPT Report No. 7: Executive Summary*, Edited by Rebecca Johnson, New York, (September 1995)
- Acton, James, and George Perkovich, *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons* (London, Routledge / International Institute for Strategic Studies; Adelphi Paper 396, 2008)
- Adler, Emmanuel, 'The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control,' *International Organisation* 46, 1 (Winter 1992), 101-145.
- Alley, Rod, 'New Zealand and the World Court Project', in *The Domestic Sources of International Relations: Cases from Australia, New Zealand and Oceania*, ed. Rod Alley (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), 23-51.
- , 'Reinvigorating Nuclear Disarmament: the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference 2000,' *New Zealand International Review* 25, 5 (September 2000), 11.
- Arms Control Wonk, *Will India Test Again?*, 23 June 2008 [cited November 6 2008]. Available from <http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1924/will-india-test-again>.
- Associated Press, *China to Help Build 2 Pakistan Nuclear Plants*, International Herald Tribune, 18 October 2008 [cited November 4 2008]. Available from <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/18/asia/AS-Pakistan-China-Nuclear.php>
- Australian Senate, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference: Motion by Senator Peter Cook*, 9 March 2000 [cited 6 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.aph.gov.au/HANSARD/senate/dailys/ds090300.pdf>.
- Ayson, Robert, 'Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World? New Zealand and the Quest for Global Nuclear Disarmament,' *International Journal* 55, 4 (Autumn 2000), 531-544.
- BBC, *America Withdraws from ABM Treaty*, 13 December 2001 [cited 5 October 2007]. Available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/1707812.stm>.
- Beckett, Margaret, *For a Nuclear-Free World*, Jerusalem Post, 27 June 2007 [cited 27 October 2008]. Available from http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?apage=2&cid=1182409649548&pagename=JP_ost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
- Bekker, Peter H.F., 'Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,' *American Journal of International Law* 91,1 (1997).
- Black, Joanne. 'Time to Talk.' *The Listener*, 9-15 July (2005), 14-19.
- Bogle, Christine, Paper presented at the seminar, 'A Celebration - 10 Years of Nuclear Free Legislation', University of Auckland: Centre for Peace Studies /Aotearoa New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies (7 June 1997).

- Borger, Julian, 'Road Map for US Relations with Rest of World.' *The Guardian*, London (27 August 2005).
- Borger, Julian 'US Cannot Deter Nuclear Upstarts ' *The Guardian Weekly*, London (18 October 2006).
- Brough, Desmond, *NCCD Annual Report 2000-2001*, Wellington, (2001)
- Bush, George W, *Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University*, 1 May 2001 [cited 30 October 2006]. Available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html>.
- Butler, General Lee, 'A Voice of Reason,' *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 54, 3 (May-June 1998).
- Butler, Nicola, 'Quotes from the UK at 1999 NPT PrepCom, with Comments,' *News in Review* 6, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (2 May 2000).
- Canadian Senate, *Debates of the Senate (Hansard) of Canada: 2nd Session, 36th Parliament, Volume 138, Issue 39*, 28 March 2000 [cited 6 August 2008]. Available from http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/chambus/senate/deb-e/039db_2000-03-28-E.htm?Language=E&Parl=36&Ses=2#0.2.W54BJ2.MERRJT.CUH6PH.CV
- Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, *Executive Summary: Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons*, Canberra: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (August 1996)
- , *Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons*, Canberra: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, (August 1996)
- Checkel, Jeffrey T., 'Norms, Institutions and National Identity,' *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999), 83-114.
- Clark, Helen, Address to the *State of the World Forum*, 5 September 2000 [cited 4 June 2008]. Available from <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/address+state+world+forum+new+york>.
- , 'Labour's Approach to Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy.' Paper presented at the meeting of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Dunedin Branch, University of Otago (9 August 1996).
- Clark, Helen, Sonja Davies, Fe Day, Yvonne Duncan, Hilda Halkyard-Harawira, Tamsin Hanly, Karen Mangnall, Kathleen Ryan, Pauline Thurston, and Alyn Ware, *Peace Is More than the Absence of War / Photographs by Gil Hanly* (Auckland, New Women's Press, 1986)
- Clements, Kevin P., *Back from the Brink: the Creation of a Nuclear-Free New Zealand* (Wellington, Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press, 1988)
- , 'The Influence of Individuals and Non-Governmental Organizations on New Zealand Foreign Policy Making, 1943-1993', in *Fifty Years of New Zealand Foreign Policy Making*, ed. Ann Trotter (Dunedin, University of Otago Press, 1993), 111-132.
- CND UK, *Secret Plan to Replace Nuclear Warheads - Parliament Misled*, 2007 [cited 15 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.cnduk.org/index.php/press-releases/trident/secret-plan-to-replace-nuclear-warheads-parliament-misled.html>.
- Cornwell, Susan, *Election Breathes New Life into Nuclear Debate*, Reuters, 3 November 2008 [cited 4 November 2008]. Available from <http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE4A25C820081103>.
- Costa Rica, *General and Complete Disarmament (A/C.1/52/7)*, paper presented at the United Nations General Assembly, 31 October 1997 [cited 2008 15 August]. Available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/334/78/img/N9733478.pdf?OpenElement>.
- , *Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.17)*, paper presented at the NPT Preparatory Committee, Vienna, 1 May 2007 [cited 15

- September 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/327/68/PDF/N0732768.pdf?OpenElement>.
- Datan, Merav, Felicity Hill, Jürgen Scheffran and Alyn Ware, *Securing our Survival (SOS): the Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention* (Cambridge, MA, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, 2007)
- Datan, Merav, and Alyn Ware, *Security and Survival: the Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention* (Massachusetts, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, 1999)
- de Ishtar, Zohl, ed. *Pacific Women Speak Out for Independence and Denuclearisation*. Christchurch, NZ / Annandale, NSW: the Disarmament & Security Centre, WIPLF, Pacific Connections, (1998).
- Department of Internal Affairs, *Disarmament Education UN Implementation Fund*, 2008 [cited 25 August 2008]. Available from http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Trust-&-Fellowship-Grants-Disarmament-Education-UN-Implementation-Fund?OpenDocument.
- , *The Peace and Disarmament Education Trust (PADET)*, 2008 [cited 30 July 2008]. Available from [http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Trust-&-Fellowship-Grants-The-Peace-and-Disarmament-Education-Trust-\(PADET\)?OpenDocument](http://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Services-Trust-&-Fellowship-Grants-The-Peace-and-Disarmament-Education-Trust-(PADET)?OpenDocument).
- Dewes, Kate, 'Legal Challenges to Nuclear Weapons from Aotearoa-New Zealand,' *British Review of New Zealand Studies* 12 (1999/2000).
- , 'Participatory Democracy in Peace and Security Decision Making: the Aotearoa/New Zealand Experience,' *Interdisciplinary Peace Research* 5, 2 (October/November 1993), 80-108.
- , *The World Court Project: the Evolution and Impact of an Effective Citizens' Movement*. Ph.D. Thesis, University of New England, (1998).
- Dewes, Kate, and Robert Green, 'The World Court Project: History and Consequences,' *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 7, 1 (Fall 1999), 61.
- Dewes, Kate, and Robert Green, *Aotearoa-New Zealand at the World Court*, the Disarmament & Security Centre, 1999 [cited 7 October 2007]. Available from <http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/books.html>.
- , private interview with author. Disarmament and Security Centre, Christchurch, 3 November 2006.
- , *Report for the MPI Outreach Committee: Middle Powers Initiative*, (4 October 2000)
- Dewes, Kate, and Alyn Ware, 'Aotearoa/New Zealand: from Nuclear Ally to Pacific Peacemaker.' Paper presented at the conference, "The Security of the Asia Pacific Region in the Post Cold War Era: Present Condition and Prospects", Nihon University (19 November 2004).
- du Preeze, Jean, and William Potter, *North Korea's Withdrawal From the NPT: A Reality Check*, Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, 9 April 2003 [cited 9 September 2007]. Available from <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030409.htm>.
- Duarte, Sergio 'The Future of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Maintaining their Relevance and Expanding their Scope.' Paper presented at the seminar, *Preparing for 2010: Striking a Balance between Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Nonproliferation*, Annecy: Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, 7 March 2008 [cited 6 July 2008]. Available from http://disarmament.un.org/docs/HR_Annecy_07032008.pdf.

- Dunne, Peter, *Parliamentary Motion on Nuclear Disarmament*, 23 February 2000 [cited 13 June 2006]. Available from http://rangi.knowledge-basket.co.nz.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/hansard/han/text/2000/02/23_038.html.
- Eaton, Dan 'Peters and Rice to Meet.' *The Press*, Christchurch (3 November 2006).
- Editor, 'New Agenda' for Nuke-Free World Gets Wider Support - but Text is Weaker,' *Disarmament Times* 23, 4 (Winter 2000), available from <http://disarm.igc.org/DisarmTimes/Dt1200.htm>.
- Elections New Zealand, *General Elections 1853-2005 - Dates & Turnout*, 2008 [cited 22 September 2008]. Available from <http://www.elections.org.nz/record/resultsdata/elections-dates-turnout.html>.
- Evans, Harold, *The Strengths of Unanimity and Good Faith*, Christchurch, self-published (25 April 1998)
- Falk, Richard A., 'Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic Encounter,' *American Journal of International Law* 91,1 (1997).
- Fallow, Brian *Goff Predicts Free-Trade Deal May Be Better than Australia's*, 24 September 2008 [cited 4 June 2008]. Available from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10533795.
- Federation of American Scientists, *WMD Around the World*, 8 January 2007 [cited 5 April 2008]. Available from <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/>.
- Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,' *International Organisation* 52, 4 (Autumn 1998), 887-917.
- Fitzsimons, Jeanette, *Nuclear-Free Legislation - 20th Anniversary*, 12 June 2007 [cited 1 November 2008]. Available from http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/1/2/5/48HansD_20070612_00001019-Motions-Nuclear-Free-Legislation-20th-Anniversary.htm.
- Freedland, Jonathan, 'Born Again [Interview with Al Gore].' *The Guardian*, London (31 May 2006).
- Geiringer, Erich, *Malice in Blunderland: an Anti-Nuclear Primer* (North Ryde, NSW, Methuen 1985)
- Goff, Phil, 'Address to the UNESCO Culture of Peace Network,' *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 8, 9 (8 March 2000), 6-7.
- , *New Zealand Leads Call to Take 1000s of Nuclear Weapons off High-Alert [Press Release]*, (17 October 2007)
- , 'Nuclear Disarmament Ginger Group Delivers Communiqué,' *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 9, 3 (14 September 2000), 84-86.
- , 'Speech to the Annual Dinner of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs.' The Wellington Club, Wellington (11 May 2001).
- Gordon, Susannah, private interview with author. Canterbury University, Christchurch, 2 November 2006.
- , 'Non-proliferation Treaty Extended Indefinitely,' *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 3, 11 (May 1995), 51.
- Graham, Doug 'New Zealand's Disarmament Policies, Obligations and Legislation,' *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 5, 6 (November 1996), 4-8.
- Graham, Kennedy, *National Security Concepts of States: New Zealand* (New York, Taylor & Francis; United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research, 1989)
- , *The Planetary Interest: A New Concept for the Global Age* (London, UCL Press, 1999)
- Green, Robert, *Australia/Japan Report: Middle Powers Initiative*, (21 March 2000)
- , *Draft Japan Report Middle Powers Initiative*, (19 October 1998)

- , *Fast Track to Zero Nuclear Weapons: the Middle Powers Initiative: a Briefing Book* First ed. (Cambridge, Mass., the Middle Powers Initiative, 1998)
- , 'From Nuclear Warrior to Opponent: How the Murder of Hilda Murrell Changed My Life,' *Pacific Ecologist*, 12 (Winter 2006).
- , *The Naked Nuclear Emperor: Debunking Nuclear Deterrence* (Christchurch, Disarmament & Security Centre, 2000)
- , *WCP UK Report: 6 April - 3 July 2000*, Christchurch: World Court Project UK, (3 July 2000)
- , *WCP UK Report: 6 January - 13 February 1998*, Christchurch: World Court Project UK, (13 February 1998)
- Greenpeace International, *GP Calls Ch N-Test Slap in NPT's Face*, 15 May 1995 [cited 25 March 2008. Available from <http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-oldgopher/9505/msg00030.html>]
- , *Greenpeace Victories*, 2008 [cited 23 July 2008]. Available from <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/about/victories>.
- , *NPT Indefinite Extension Challenged*, 2 May 1995 [cited 12 February 2008. Available from <http://archive.greenpeace.org/majordomo/index-oldgopher/9505/msg00002.html>]
- Hampton, John, 'Time to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons.' *Evening Post*, Wellington (3 February 1995).
- Henderson, John, 'The Impact of MMP on Foreign Policy Decision-Making,' *New Zealand International Review* 21, 5 (September-October 1996), 2-5.
- Hoadley, Stephen, 'Diplomacy, Politics and Nuclear Testing: New Zealand Confronts France 1995-96', in *New Zealand in a Globalising World*, ed. Ralph Pellman (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 110-118.
- , 'PACDAC 1991-1996: A Retrospective Review', in *Nuclear Free New Zealand - the Policy in Action*, ed. (Dr.) Robert White (Auckland: Centre for Peace Studies, Auckland University, 1998), 103-104.
- Hobbs, Marian, private interview with author. Bowen House, Wellington, 13 September 2006.
- Holtom, Paul, Mark Bromley, and Pieter D Wezeman, 'International Arms Transfers', in *SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: Summary*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2008).
- Horton III, Roy E., *Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience*, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper no. 27, August 1999 [cited 10 April 2008]. Available from <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/ocp27.htm>.
- International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, *Nuclear Weapons Today: the Problem is 26,000 Nuclear Weapons*, 16 December 2006 [cited 2 November 2008]. Available from <http://www.icanw.org/nuclear-weapons-today>.
- International Court of Justice, *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion)*, 8 July 1996 [cited 10 July 2007] Available from <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iunanaummary960708.htm>.
- , *Nuclear Tests Case*, 1974 [cited 24 June 2008]. Available from <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=nzf&case=59&k=6b>.
- International Crisis Group, *New International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: Gareth Evans to Co-Chair; Interview with Gareth Evans on ABC Radio National Breakfast Program*, ABC Radio Australia, 10 June 2008 [cited 27 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5482&l=1>

- International Institute of Strategic Studies, 'The US-Russian Nuclear Balance,' *Strategic Comments* 14, 6 (2008), 1-2.
- International Panel on Fissile Materials, *Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty* Vol. 3 (Princeton, New Jersey, International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2008)
- International Security Advisory Board, *Report on Proliferation Implications of the Global Expansion of Civil Nuclear Power*: US Department of State, (May 2008)
- Iranian Government, *Statement by H.E. Mr. Ali Reza Moaiyeri to the NPT Preparatory Committee*, 29 April 2008 [cited 4 November 2008]. Available from <http://www.un.org/NPT2010/SecondSession/delegates%20statements/Iran.pdf>.
- Irish Government, *Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World - the Need for a New Agenda: Glossary*, 9 June 1998.
- Jackson, Patrick, *Israeli Attack 'Jump-Started Nuclear Programme'* BBC News, 5 June 2006 [cited 27 October 2008]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4774541.stm
- Johnson, Rebecca, 'The 2000 NPT Review Conference: A Delicate, Hard-Won Compromise,' *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 46 (May 2000).
- , *2008 NPT PrepCom Adopts Report but not Chair's Factual and Balanced Summary*, 9 May 2008 [cited 9 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/08pc07.htm>.
- , 'Back from the Brink? The 2007 NPT PrepCom Report,' *Disarmament Diplomacy* 85 (Summer 2007).
- , 'Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed,' *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 80 (Autumn 2005), retrieved 20 October 2008 from <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd80/80npt.htm>
- Katzenstein, P. J., ed. *The Culture of National Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, (1996).
- Kelly, Jack, *'Amicable Divorce' Could Turn Nasty, Experts Say*, USA Today, 14 February 1996 [cited 22 November 2007]. Available from <http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/bosnia/nov95/nbos093.htm>
- Kimball, Darryl, *Statement of Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association Executive Director, on the U.S.-Indian Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation*, 1 October 2008 [cited 15 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3363>.
- Kirk, Norman, 'New Zealand: A New Foreign Policy,' *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review* 23, 6 (1973).
- Kissinger, Henry, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and George Shultz, 'Toward a Nuclear-Free World,' *Wall Street Journal* (15 January 2008).
- , 'A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,' *Wall Street Journal* (4 January 2007).
- Kratochwil, Friedrich 'The Force of Prescriptions,' *International Organization* 38, 4 (Autumn 1984), 685-708.
- Krieger, David, and Stanley K. Shienbaum, 'Preventing Future Nuclear Catastrophes,' *The Sunflower*, 128, (March 2008), available from http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2008/02/22_krieger_sheinbaum_future.php.
- Kristensen, Hans, *State Department Arms Control Board Declares Cold War on China*, Federation of American Scientists, 7 October 2008 [cited 21 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/10/isab.php>.
- Lange, David, *Nuclear Free: the New Zealand Way* (Auckland, Penguin, 1990)
- Lange, David 'Nuclear Weapons Are Immoral.' Paper presented at the Oxford Union Debate, Oxford University (1 March 1985).

- Lavoy, Peter R., 'Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses,' *Non-Proliferation Review* 13, 3 (November 2006), 433-454.
- Lewis, Paul, 'Servicemen Hope for Compensation.' *New Zealand Herald*, (20 January 2008).
- Locke, Elsie, *Peace People : a History of Peace Activities in New Zealand* (Christchurch, Hazard Press, 1992)
- Low, Peter, 'New Zealand's Responses to the Last French Nuclear Tests,' *Antipodes* 3 (1997).
- Marin-Bosch, Miguel, 'Getting Rid of Nukes.' Paper presented at the Inaugural Erich Geiringer Oration, Overseas Terminal, Wellington (13 November 1996).
- McCraw, David, 'The National Party's Foreign Policy Tradition,' *New Zealand International Review* 21, 4 (July-August 1996), 8-11.
- , 'New Zealand's Foreign Policy Under National and Labour Governments: Variations on the "Small State" Theme?,' *Pacific Affairs* 67, 1 (Spring 1994), 7-25.
- McDonald, Caroline, and Geoff Randall, private interview with author. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 15 September 2006.
- McKinnon, Don, 'Chinese Nuclear Test Condemned,' *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 3, 11 (1995), 53.
- , 'Government Recalls New Zealand High Commissioner to India,' *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 6, 11 (1998), 28.
- , 'New Zealand's Security: 1990 and Beyond.' Paper presented at the 32nd Otago Foreign Policy School, Otago University, Dunedin (27 June 1997).
- Meyerson, Roger B., *Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: a Game-Theorist's Perspective*, The Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007 [cited 5 September 2008]. Available from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub823.pdf>.
- Middle Powers Initiative, *Aide Memoire for Meetings with Irish and Swedish Foreign Ministries* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998)
- , *Long-Range Strategy Planning Meeting: Pugwash, Nova Scotia, July 20-22, 2000: List of Participants* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000)
- , *NATO Tour: 5-13 October 2000: Summary Report* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000)
- , 'Program Report: Fiscal Year 2000,' (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 30 June 2000).
- , *Report 2000*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Winter 2000)
- , *Report from the Atlanta Consultation on the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty*, Atlanta, Georgia: Carter Center / Middle Powers Initiative, (26-27 January 2000)
- , *Rethinking NATO's Nuclear Policy: a Position Paper by the Middle Powers Initiative* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2000)
- Monbiot, George, 'Nuking the Treaty.' *The Guardian*, London (28 July 2008).
- , 'We Lie and Bluster About Our Nukes - and then Wag Our Fingers at Iran.' *The Guardian*, London (29 July 2008).
- Morris, Errol, 'The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara [documentary film].' (USA: Sony Pictures Classics, 2004).
- Müller, Harald, *Multilateral Nuclear Fuel-Cycle Arrangements*, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Paper no. 35), 2005 [cited 25 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No35.pdf>.
- Munro, Mike, 'Nuke Policy Aid to World Influence.' *The Dominion*, Wellington (20 August 1991).
- National Consultative Committee on Disarmament, 'Meeting Minutes (11 May 2000).'
- New Agenda Coalition, *Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World - the Need for a New Agenda*, (A/53/138), 9 June 1998 [cited 15 April 2008]. Available from

- <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/164/44/pdf/N9816444.pdf?OpenElement>.
- , *Nuclear Disarmament (NPT/CONF.2000/WP.3)*, paper presented at the NPT Review Conference, New York, 24 April 2000 [cited 26 March 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/402/78/PDF/N0040278.pdf?OpenElement>.
- New Zealand, *Declaration on Ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, 2000 [cited May 12 2008]. Available from <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=372&chapter=18&lang=en#EndDec>.
- , *Proposed Elements for Inclusion in the Report of the Preparatory Committee on its First Session (NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/3)*, paper presented at the NPT Preparatory Committee, New York, 10 April 1997 [cited 25 October 2008]. Available from <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/2000-PCI-docs/npt-conf2000-pci-3.pdf>.
- , *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Oral Submission)*, International Court of Justice, 1995 [cited 12 February 2008]. Available from <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5937.pdf>
- New Zealand Defence Force, *Medallic Recognition for Nuclear Test Veterans*, 18 March 2002 [cited 2 October 2008]. Available from <http://medals.nzdf.mil.nz/news/articles/1999-2003/20020318.html>
- New Zealand and South African Governments, *Memorandum of Cooperation on Disarmament and Arms Control*, (8 August 1996)
- New Zealand Government, *A Brief History of New Zealand's Attempts to End Nuclear Testing at Mururoa Atoll through the World Court.*, 1995 [cited 23 July 2008]. Available from <http://www.executive.govt.nz/93-96/minister/pm/nuclear/history.htm>.
- New Zealand House of Representatives, *Motion on Nuclear Disarmament*, 23 February 2000 [cited 5 March 2008]. Available from http://www.gs institute.org/pnnd/docs/parliamentary_motion_on_nuclear_disarmament.html
- , *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act*, 8 June 1987 [cited 23 June 2006]. Available from http://www.legislation.govt.nz/libraries/contents/om_isapi.dll?clientID=88998&infobase=pal_statutes.nfo&jump=a1987-086&softpage=DÖC#JUMPDEST_a1987-086.
- New Zealand Labour Party, *The Future is with Labour*, (Wellington, 1999).
- , *Jobs, Health, Growth: Labour's Manifesto for New Zealand*, (Wellington, 1993).
- , *Labour Manifesto 1996: New Heart, New Hope, New Zealand*, (Wellington, 1996).
- , *Labour Party Policy: Disarmament and Arms Control, 2002 Election*, (Wellington, 2002).
- , 'Labour Policymaking Processes and the Role of the Policy Council and Policy Committees,' (1997).
- New Zealand National Party Taskforce, *The Relationship between New Zealand and the United States*, May 2004 [cited 5 December 2007]. Available from [http://www.national.org.nz/files/2004%20-%20US-NZ%20Taskforce%20-%20Final%20-%20\(3%20May%2004\)1.pdf](http://www.national.org.nz/files/2004%20-%20US-NZ%20Taskforce%20-%20Final%20-%20(3%20May%2004)1.pdf).
- New Zealand Press Association, 'What the Nats Said...' *Peacelink* 80 (April 1990).
- Newman, Edward, 'Human Security and Constructivism,' *International Studies Perspectives* 2, (2001), 239-251.
- Newnham, Tom, *Peace Squadron: the Sharp End of Nuclear Protest in New Zealand* (Auckland, NZ, Graphic Publications, 1986)

- Nice, Philip, *Playing Fast and Loose with Megadeath*, *The Trumpet*, 15 April 2008 [cited 15 July 2008]. Available from <http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?q=5025.3312.0.0>.
- Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, *Final Document Part I: Organization and Work of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I))*, 1995 [cited 13 August 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/178/16/PDF/N9517816.pdf?OpenElement>.
- Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, *Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Part IV))*, 2000 [cited 14 July 2007]. Available from <http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4279524.html>.
- , *Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II))*, 2000 [cited 3 December 2007]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/453/64/PDF/N0045364.pdf?OpenElement>.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *the Alliance's Strategic Concept*, April 1999 [cited 24 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.
- O'Brien, Terence, 'Hague Ruling Rewards Anti-Nuclear Initiative.' *New Zealand Herald*, Auckland (22 February 1999).
- , private interview with author. Le Beaujolais, Wellington, 14 August 2007.
- Ogilvie-White, Tanya, 'A Cloak for Proliferators? The Suspicions that Impede a Nuclear Weapons Convention,' *Global Dialogue* 8, 1-2, Special Issue "Nuclear Perils" (Winter/Spring 2006), 32-43.
- , 'Promoting Non-proliferation and Disarmament: New Zealand, the New Agenda Coalition and the Seven Nations Initiative.' Paper presented at the Seven Nation Initiative seminar 'The Nuclear Challenge', FLASCO, Santiago (5 September 2008).
- Ogilvie-White, Tanya 'Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,' *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall 1996), 43-60.
- Ogilvie-White, Tanya, Ben Sanders, and John Simpson, *Putting the Final Document into Practice: Possible Ways to Implement the Results of the 2000 Review Conference*, Moutbatten Centre for International Studies, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 2002 [cited April 10 2008]. Available from <http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/PPNNstudy.pdf>.
- Perkovich, George, 'Taking Nuclear Disarmament Seriously.' Paper presented at the conference, Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Oslo (26 - 27 February 2008).
- Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, *Highlights & History*, 2008 [cited 18 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.gs institute.org/pnnd/pubs/HighlightsandHistory.pdf>.
- , *Homepage*, 2008 [cited 18 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.gs institute.org/pnnd/>.
- , *Members* 2008 [cited 18 August 2008]. Available from <http://www.gs institute.org/pnnd/members.html#AotearoaNZ>.
- Price, Richard 'Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,' *International Organization* 52, 3 (Summer 1998), 613-644.
- Prior, Ian, and Helen Smyth, eds. *New Zealand in the New Millennium: a Conversation with Ourselves*. Wellington: IPPNW & IPPNW Education and Research Trust, (2000).
- PTI, *Nothing Prohibits India from Carrying out N-tests: Sibal*, 8 September 2008 [cited 20 September 2008]. Available from <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/002200809081841.htm>.

- Reitzig, Andrea, 'In Defiance of Nuclear Deterrence: Anti-Nuclear New Zealand after Two Decades,' *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 22, 2 (April – June 2006), 132 – 144.
- Reitzig, Andreas, *New Zealand's Ban on Nuclear-Propelled Ships Revisited*. MA Thesis, University of Auckland, (2005).
- Rigg, Bob, *The Evisceration of a Disarmament Body*, 27 April 2007 [cited 3 June 2008]. Available from http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-wmd/multilateral_disarmament_4567.jsp
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas 'Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,' *World Politics* 43, 4 (July 1991), 479-512.
- Robson, Matt, 'Address to the 2000 NPT Review Conference,' *New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Record* 46, 9 (24 April 2000).
- , 'Nuclear Disarmament: Two Initiatives,' *New Zealand International Review* 25, 6 (November 2000), 13-15.
- Roche, Doug, Letter of Recommendation for Kate Dewes and Rob Green, 2 February 1999.
- Rosenberg, Bill, *News Media Ownership in New Zealand*, 10 January 2008 [cited 9 September 2008]. Available from <http://canterbury.cyberplace.org.nz/community/CAFCA/publications/Miscellaneous/mediaown.pdf>.
- Ross, Larry, 'Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones in New Zealand [Wall Chart].' (Christchurch: New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee, 1984).
- Ruble, Maria Rost, 'Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,' *International Studies Review* 10 (2008), 420-450.
- Ruggie, John G., 'What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,' *International Organization* 52, 4 (Autumn 1998), 855-885.
- Schouten, Hank, 'India's Nuclear Tests Inevitable, Says Lange.' *Evening Post*, Wellington (18 May 1998).
- Shannon, Vaughn P., 'Norms Are What States Make of Them: the Political Psychology of Norm Violation,' *International Studies Quarterly* 44, (2000), 293-316.
- Sokov, Dr. Nikolai, *Russia's New National Security Concept: The Nuclear Angle*, Monterey Institute Center for Non-proliferation Studies, 2004 2001 [cited 30 October 2006]. Available from <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/over/concept.htm>.
- Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, *The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships [The Somers Report]*, Edited by Sir Edward Somers, (Wellington, New Zealand Government, 1992)
- Television New Zealand, *Kiwi Support for No Nukes Eroding*, 25 May 2008 [cited 5 July 2008]. Available from <http://tvnz.co.nz/view/page/1796694>
- Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index, 2002-2007* [cited 12 September 2008]. Available from http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007/faq.
- Tucker, Jonathan B. , 'Strengthening the BWC: A Way Forward,' *Disarmament Diplomacy*, 78 (July/August 2004), retrieved 5 August 2008 from <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd78/78jbt.htm>.
- United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Key Events in the UK Atmospheric Nuclear Test Programme*, [cited 23 July 2008]. Available from http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/470D247F-7615-460C-9829-DDAF99F88D39/0/Key_Events.pdf.
- United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, *United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (A/57/124)*, 30 August 2002 [cited 25 June 2007]. Available from

- <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/456/87/PDF/N0245687.pdf?OpenElement>.
- United Nations Department of Public Information, '*Contagious' Doctrine of Deterrence Has Made Non-proliferation More Difficult, Raised New Risks, Secretary General Says in Address to East-West Institute*, 24 October 2008 [cited 26 October 2008]. Available from <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11881.doc.htm>.
- United Nations General Assembly, *Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (A/RES/51/45M)*, 10 December 1996 [cited 18 April 2007]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/760/51/PDF/N9776051.pdf?OpenElement>.
- , *Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems (A/RES/62/36)*, 5 December 2007 [cited 26 October 2008]. Available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/465/93/pdf/N0746593.pdf?OpenElement>.
- , *Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems (A/C.1/63/L.5)*, October 2008 [cited 26 October 2008]. Available from <http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N08/554/45/pdf/N0855445.pdf?OpenElement>.
- , *Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problem Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy (1(1))*, 24 January 1946 [cited 14 February 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/52/IMG/NR003252.pdf?OpenElement>.
- , *Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda (A/RES/53/77Y)*, 4 December 1998 [cited 15 April 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/760/45/PDF/N9976045.pdf?OpenElement>.
- , *Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda (A/RES/54/54G)*, 1 December 1999 [cited 15 April 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/231/83/PDF/N0023183.pdf?OpenElement>.
- , *Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda (A/RES/55/33C)*, 20 November 2000 [cited 15 April 2008]. Available from <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/561/37/PDF/N0056137.pdf?OpenElement>.
- Waltz, Kenneth N., *Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1959)
- Ware, Alyn, 'NGO and Government Cooperation in Setting the Disarmament Agenda: The Impact of the 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion.' in *Reframing the Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security*, ed. Kenneth Rutherford, Stefan Brem and Richard Matthew (Westport, CT, Praeger, 2003).
- , 'Nuclear Disarmament: Views and Efforts of NGOs.' Paper presented at the 19th United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues in Sapporo, Sapporo City (27-29 August 2007).
- , *a Nuclear Weapons Convention and the NPT: Is it a Diversion or an Enabler?* Aotearoa Lawyers for Peace, (August 2008)
- Ware, Alyn, and Devon Chaffee, *Parliamentarians and Nuclear Weapons* (Wellington, Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament, 2002)
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons* (Stockholm, Sweden, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, 2006)

- Weldes, Jutta, *Constructing National Interests: the United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999)
- Wendt, Alexander, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It,' *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992), 391-425.
- White, Robert E., *Nuclear Free New Zealand: 1984 - New Zealand Becomes Nuclear Free* (Auckland, University of Auckland, Centre for Peace Studies, Working Paper no. 7, 1997)
- , *Nuclear Free New Zealand: 1987 - from Policy to Legislation* (Auckland, University of Auckland, Centre for Peace Studies, Working Paper no. 8, 1998)
- , *Nuclear Free New Zealand: the Policy in Action* (Auckland, University of Auckland, Centre for Peace Studies, Working Paper no. 9, 1999)
- , *Nuclear Free New Zealand: Twenty Years On* (Auckland, University of Auckland, Centre for Peace Studies, Working Paper no. 15, 2008)
- Williams, Jody, Mary Wareham, and Stephen D. Goose, eds. *Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security*. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield (2008).
- Wittner, Lawrence S., *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Since 1971* Edited by Martin Serwin Vol. 3, *Stanford Nuclear Age Series* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003)