
MAPPING THE FORMATION AND PROJECTION
OF FRENCH AND EU STRATEGIC NARRATIVES
ABOUT GLOBAL ENERGY GOVERNANCE

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Abstract

The pressures of climate change, growing energy demand and geopolitical competition make the study of energy policies extremely important for the future of Europe at both the national and supranational levels. This research focuses on the external energy policies of France (one of the EU member states with a distinct energy vision) vis-à-vis the respective policies of the EU. How does France, a powerful nation-state yet an intrinsic part of the EU, formulate its strategic visions in terms of energy and project itself strategically on the national, European and global scenes? Do these projections complement or contradict each other? What is their relation to the formulations and projections of EU external energy policy? To explain the mechanisms behind strategic formulation and projection of external energy policies of an EU member state, and their interactions with energy policy narratives formulated and projected by the EU, this thesis engages with three theoretical models and seeks novel synergies between them. These are constructivism (the macro-level theorisation), strategic narrative theory (the meso-level model) and cascading activation framing theory (the micro-level theory).

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Chapter 1 : Introduction

The pressures of climate change, growing energy demand and geopolitical competition make the study of energy policies extremely important for the future of Europe at both the national and supranational levels. This research focuses on the external energy policies of France (one of the EU member states with a distinct energy vision) vis-à-vis the respective policies of the European Union (EU). How does France, a powerful nation-state yet an intrinsic part of the EU, formulate its strategic visions in terms of energy and project itself strategically on the national, European and global scenes? Do these projections complement or contradict each other? What is their relation to the formulations and projections of EU external energy policy? To explain the mechanisms behind strategic formulation and projection of external energy policies of an EU member state, and their interactions with energy policy narratives formulated and projected by the EU, this thesis engages with three theoretical models and seeks novel synergies between them. These are constructivism¹ (the macro-level theorisation), strategic narrative theory² (the meso-level model) and cascading activation framing theory³ (the micro-level theory).

¹ Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (1994).

Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics* 50, no. 02 (1998).

² Alister Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, vol. 3 (New York; London: Routledge, 2013).

³ Robert M. Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*

1.1 A Global Energy Crisis?

“...And Prometheus, not knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus, man had the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not...”⁴

In our modern world, Prometheus’ stolen fire can be understood as an analogy for energy. Energy is the means by which everything else happens. Yet humanity’s lack of wisdom has resulted in its unsustainable use, which has led us to the climate change crisis.

Climate change is a global threat caused in part by the burning of fossil fuels, which emits carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.⁵ Currently, 80% of the world’s energy is provided by fossil fuels.⁶ As countries emerge their energy demands increase and put pressure on existing energy supplies. This growth is highly unsustainable and there is a high demand to find new solutions to limit gas emissions and increase energy efficiency.

Meanwhile many of the EU’s member states are heavily dependent on Russia’s supply of gas. Here again, lack of political wisdom can cause conflict and crisis. Flipo makes the point that “this fire, or energy, is the means through which human beings are able

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁴ Plato and Reginald E. Allen, *The dialogues of Plato* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

⁵ International Energy Agency, "Energy, climate change environment: 2014 insights," (2014).

⁶ Thijs Van de Graaf, *The politics and institutions of global energy governance* (Springer, 2013).

to exercise greater power over their environment... and over one another.”⁷ His point relates mostly to energy as a means of production and thus of oppression over working classes. However, his notion of power over one another can be expanded to the use of energy in the relationship between international actors. By largely controlling gas supply to Eastern European countries, Russia holds an important political tool, one often described as a “weapon”⁸ to exert pressure on other countries. Therefore, one of the EU’s priorities is to secure its energy market by diversifying the sources of its energy supply.

Finally, the Fukushima disaster in Japan has shaken up the nuclear power industry and many countries are reconsidering using this type of energy. This has disrupted energy policies in France. Nuclear energy represents a 71.6% share of total electricity production (as of 1 January 2018).⁹ It has been an important part of France’s energy policy since the 1979 oil crisis.¹⁰ Gabrielle Hecht theorised the role of nuclear energy in the construction of French identity after the Second World War.¹¹ She argued that the use of nuclear energy is associated with notions of French “grandeur.”¹² However,

7 Fabrice Flipo, "Energy: prometheus bound or unbound? A conceptual approach," *S.A.P.I.E.N.S* 1, no. 2 (2008).

8 Walter Mayr, "Using Russian Energy as a Political Weapon," *Der Spiegel* 9 January 2006.

Karen Smith Stegen, "Deconstructing the “energy weapon”: Russia's threat to Europe as case study," *Energy policy* 39, no. 10 (2011).

Andreas Goldthau, "Rhetoric versus reality: Russian threats to European energy supply," *Energy Policy* 36, no. 2 (2008).

9 Nuclear Energy Agency, "Country Profile: France," <https://www.oecd-nea.org/general/profiles/france.html>.

10 Gabrielle Hecht, *The radiance of France: nuclear power and national identity after World War II*, vol. New (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2009).

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

after Fukushima, politicians pledged to reduce the share of nuclear energy to 50% of the electricity mix.¹³ This was a significant change in French politics. French political elites have historically only put forward pro-nuclear policies.¹⁴ Additionally, Fukushima disrupted France's nuclear industry's prospects for global nuclear energy exports as the predicted "nuclear renaissance"¹⁵ didn't take place.

Thus, the geostrategic importance of energy resources is undeniable and puts energy at the heart of politics today.

1.2 Energy: a Shared Competence

Energy is an increasingly shared competence between the EU's supranational authority and its member states'.¹⁶ Even though energy was not included in the Treaty of Rome and subsequent treaties, the Treaty of Paris established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and a treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community was signed in 1957.¹⁷ However, these treaties were founded on a logic of political integration rather than economic integration. In subsequent years,

13 S. Brouard and I. Guinaudeau, "Policy beyond politics? Public opinion, party politics and the French pro-nuclear energy policy," *Journal of Public Policy* 35, no. 1 (2015).

14 Ibid.

15 Joseph Szarka, "From inadvertent to reluctant pioneer? Climate strategies and policy style in France," *Climate Policy* 5, no. 6 (2006).

16 Frédéric M Marty, "L'Europe de L'énergie: de la concurrence à la solidarité?(The European Energy Policy: From Competition to Solidarity?)," *The European Energy Policy: From Competition to Solidarity* (2016).

J. Bain et al., "A polyphonic marketplace: Images of EU external energy relations in British, French and German media discourses," *Comparative European Politics* 15, no. 1 (2017).

17 Marty, "L'Europe de L'énergie: de la concurrence à la solidarité?(The European Energy Policy: From Competition to Solidarity?)."

the European project became more focussed on the economic dimensions of integration and thus energy was left to the way-side. Member states thus reclaimed authority over their energy policies including in terms of choice of energy mix and international supply agreement, thus fragmenting the European energy landscape.¹⁸ This resulted for instance in France's particular energy mix.

However, the Treaty of Lisbon reintroduced energy as a topic of EU competence. First of all, article 122 evokes the spirit of solidarity between the member states with regard to security of supply. Meanwhile, article 194 defines a number of energy policy objectives including guaranteeing performance of the energy market, security of supply and the promotion of energy efficiency.¹⁹

From 2006, the EU has formulated an external energy policy centred around three goals: sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness.²⁰ Additionally, it identified emerging actors as important energy partners. Thus, this research selected the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as a case study because of their importance to global energy governance. They are also symbolic of a changing world order.

In the beginning of the twenty-first century, the unipolar hold on politics and the world economy that the US enjoyed since the end of the Cold War is waning. Countries like

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

20 European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy," in *COM(2006) 105* (2006),

David Buchan, *Energy and climate change: Europe at the crossroads* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Jale Tosun, Sophie Biesenbender, and Kai Schulze, *Energy Policy Making in the EU: Building the agenda*, vol. 28 (Springer, 2015).

the BRICS are emerging and asserting influence on the international order. This new multipolar world cannot be ignored. Countries in Europe need to take the opportunities presented by the emergence of regional powers so as not to be left behind. Energy is to play a key role in this new world order. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts global energy demand to rise by 30% to 2040.²¹ Much of this demand increase will take place in the BRICS, particularly China and India. These countries are also important markets for France's nuclear energy industry. Meanwhile Russia and Brazil are energy producers of increasing significance.²²

1.3 Theoretical Approach

How then, does the EU form narratives and communicate on its external energy policies, a shared competence? And do these narratives match those of a member state such as France, which has very different energy priorities to the rest of the EU? These are the questions that will be addressed in this research.

Miskimon et. al., who introduced the concept of strategic narratives, state that:

“Political actors attempt to create a shared understanding of the world, of other political actors, and of policy through the use of strategic narratives. The hope for these political actors is that strong narratives will triumph over

²¹ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2016* (Lanham;Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2016).

²² Ricardo Ubiraci and Thais Narciso, "Brazil as an International Energy Player," in *Brazil as an economic superpower?: understanding Brazil's changing role in the global economy*, ed. Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2009).

Stefan Hedlund, *Putin's energy agenda: the contradictions of Russia's resource wealth* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014).

counternarratives, that legitimacy will be strengthened, that power will be heightened.”²³

This research uses the context of external energy policies of the EU and France to analyse the formation and projection of strategic narratives to a domestic audience.²⁴ Miskimmon et. al. argue that actors use strategic narratives in their communications in order to align other actors to their way of viewing the international system (*system* narratives), themselves, other actors (*identity* narratives) and specific policy issues upon which they communicate (*issue* narratives).

Taking a rationalist perspective of constructivism, this research sees political actors as primary agents in the formation of strategic narratives. It hypothesises that the interests and policies of actors will direct the way they frame their strategic narratives. Moreover, looking specifically at the relationship between the EU and one of its member states (France) this research theorises the concept of narrative alignment. It divides the concept into two strands:

- *Internal coherence* is used to describe the alignment between the levels of a single actor’s strategic narratives. This concept is important since this research theorises that narratives with the best alignment between system, identity and issue narratives will be more persuasive and have more resonance.
- *External convergence* is used to describe the alignment of strategic narratives between different actors.

If strategic interests of actors direct the way they form their strategic narratives, and

²³ Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, *Forging the World Strategic Narratives and International Relations* (University of Michigan Press, 2017).

²⁴ Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3.

since France is a member state of the EU, this research also hypothesise that when France has no strategic interest of policy salience with the EU, it will align its strategic narratives to that of the EU's. However, where their interests differ, particularly with regards to nuclear energy, it is predicted that France will put forward energy related narratives different to the narratives formulated and projected by the EU.

Looking more specifically at the notion of formation, this research expects that external energy actors will be framed according to France and the EU's energy policies and interests. It also looks at the role of executive leaders and their own political concerns and argues that strategic narratives will reflect their ideologies and views of energy interests. Following a rationalist logic of constructivism – which will be explained further in Chapter 3, this research assumes the agency of actors in forming their strategic narratives.

This helps link the theory of strategic narratives with Entman's cascade activation theory which is used to explain the projection of narratives at the domestic level. Entman conceives the spread of frames on foreign policy as a cascade with the executive branch of government having the most influence on the frames that are spread to the media.

According to this logic, this research hypothesises that that strategic narratives from executive powers with more internal coherence will resonate more in the media.

However, media are receptive to other actors' narratives including other elites and external actors. Entman argues that an inverse dynamic whereby frames from the media may make their way up the cascade back to the executive level of government. Thus, Entman's cascade allows the observation of the projection of strategic narratives

from government bodies as well as the potential contestation of these narratives.²⁵ Nevertheless, this research hypothesises that French strategic narratives about external energy policies will have a stronger resonance in French newspapers than those of other actors, including the EU.

1.4 A Word on Methods

This research uses the content analysis of two different discourse in order to observe the formation and projection of Strategic narratives at the domestic level. To analyse formation, of France's official narrative on global energy governance, communications by the Ministry of the Environment, Energy and the Sea²⁶, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs²⁷ as well as communications made by the Presidents of the Republic and their Prime Ministers for the period 2009-2015 were analysed. These four entities can be seen to represent what Entman calls the *Administration* in his theory of cascading activation.²⁸ *Administration* should be understood to mean the executive branch of government. For the purposes of this study, the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Environment, Energy and the Sea, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs are seen as the members of the executive branch with the most power to set the narrative on global energy governance.

²⁵ R. M. Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11," *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003).n

²⁶ Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*.

²⁷ In French: Ministère de l'Environnement, de l'Énergie et de la Mer, previously known as: le Ministère de l'Écologie, de l'Énergie, du Développement durable et de la Mer

²⁸ In French: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, previously known as Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes

In order to analyse projection, this study also analyses four French newspapers – Le Figaro, Le Monde, Les Echos and Libération.

Both political communications and news articles were observed one month a year for the years 2009 to 2015 - two weeks prior to UN Conference of Parties (COPs), the week of the conference and one week after the conference. It is assumed that media visibility of energy matters and issues at this period will be heightened.

The methodology used for the content analysis is based on the tried and tested methodology from the international project *The EU through the Eyes of Asia-Pacific*²⁹ led by Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban.³⁰ It draws on both quantitative and qualitative tools in its analysis and outlines formal and substantive features of discourse and narratives.

Entman argues framing can be distinguished from other type of content by its “capacity to stimulate support of or opposition to the sides in a political conflict.”³¹ This capacity, he then states, can be measured by *cultural resonance* and *magnitude*. Cultural resonance describes frame that is noticeable, understandable, memorable and emotionally charged, while magnitude refers to the prominence and repetition of

29 Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, *The EU through the eyes of the Asia-Pacific: public perceptions and media representations*, vol. no. 4 (Christchurch, N.Z: National Centre for Research on Europe, University of Canterbury, 2005).

Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, *The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: media, public, and elite perceptions of the EU*, vol. 6. (London;New York;: Routledge, 2008).

Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland, *Communicating Europe in times of crisis: external perceptions of the European Union* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

30 Also see National Centre for Research on Europe, "Eu Global Perceptions,"

<https://www.canterbury.ac.nz/ncre/research/euperceptions/>.

31 Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*.

the framing. Entman adds that “the more resonance and magnitude, the more likely the framing is to evoke similar thoughts and feelings in large portions of the audience.”³²

The methodology of this study follows that same pattern. Visibility is analysed through the volume of coverage (number of articles containing our key words) and degree of centrality (assesses the prominence of the EU and the BRICS in each article). Sources, focus of domesticity, thematic frames, issues and actors are used to analyse whether stories are understandable to a local audience. Finally, emotional charge is measured through a general evaluation of actors with a range of five options ranging from negative, neutral to positive and a mixed category as well as through the analysis of conceptual metaphors.

However, these categories of analysis are divided into elements of narratives. Miskimmon et al. note that “a narratives requires an actor, an action, a goal or intention, a scene and an instrument.”³³ They also add “Narrative is distinguished by a particular structure through which sense is achieved. This structure is comprised of actors, events, plot, and time; and setting and space.”³⁴ It also goes without saying that narratives require narrators. Molly Patterson and Kristen Monroe argue that “Narrative is especially useful in revealing the speaker's concept of self, for it is the self that is located at the centre of the narrative, whether as active agent, passive experiencer, or tool of destiny.”³⁵

³² Ibid.

³³ Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Molly Patterson and Kristen Renwick Monroe, "Narrative in political science," *Annual Review of Political Science* 1, no. 1 (1998).

Table 1-1: Framework of analysis of narratives

Elements of a narrative	Categories of analysis
Narrator	Source
Actor	Degree of centrality of actors, evaluation of actors, non-state actors
Action	Framing
Goal	Issues mentioned
Instrument	Types of energy mentioned
Event – time	Date, events mentioned
Scene – setting	Focus of domesticity, other dimensions

1.5 Synopsis of Chapters

Chapter 2 elaborates on the context introduced in this chapter. It will start by reviewing literature on global energy governance before evaluating literature on the EU and France’s energy policies. The purpose of this chapter is in part to establish the strategic interest of both France and the EU, including France’s nuclear energy diplomacy and the EU’s three energy priorities: competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. Establishing France and the EU’s strategic interests in energy will assist in assessing their influence in the formation of strategic narratives. Chapter 3 will follow directly on this logic and look at the energy situation of each of the BRICS as well as France and the EU’s energy relations with each.

Chapter 4 will set out the theoretical framework of this research detailing the theoretical background this research is based on. It will explain theoretical innovations and the research questions and hypotheses which direct this study. Chapter 5 will then detail the methods used to carry out this research.

Chapter 6 presents the results from political discourse from France and the EU. It will display the link between strategic energy interests and strategic narratives about external energy in the formation of these narratives. It will also display alignments and misalignments between France and the EU's strategic narratives.

Meanwhile, the projection of these narratives will be observed in Chapter 7, presenting the results from the analysis of French newspapers.

Finally, Chapter 8 will bring all these results together and demonstrate the hypotheses of the research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Scholarship dealing with the energy issue-area in a globalising world is vast and multifaceted. Informed by the logic of the leading research questions and hypotheses, this research will begin with a critical review of the works exploring the concept of global energy governance. The chapter will then focus on the literature dealing with the EU's external energy policies in the context of global energy governance. It will outline the three priorities of the EU in this policy area, namely: competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. The EU's expertise regarding nuclear energy (through the development of Euratom) gets special attention in this chapter since nuclear energy is of strategic importance to France, as discussed above. The chapter then will move to discuss the EU's competences with regards to external energy policies and scholarly reflections on these. The chapter will conclude with review of literature discussing France's external energy policies. It will begin with the works that advocated the importance of nuclear energy to France and linked the development of France's modern national identity to its nuclear programme. The chapter will also engage with the works that argue two factors driving France's energy diplomacy -- the export of its nuclear industry and a wish to stand for sustainability globally.

2.2 Global Energy in A Multipolar World

2.2.1 Global Energy Governance

Global governance is defined by James N. Rosenau as encompassing not just "the activities of governments but it also includes many other channels through which

‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued, and policies pursued.”³⁶ Global governance is used to describe a system under which no one actor is in charge. Multiple actors are involved in decision making and the establishment of rules. Schmitter et. al summarised this establishing that governance comprises “horizontal forms of interaction between actors who have conflicting objectives but who are sufficiently independent of each other so that neither can impose a solution on the other and yet sufficiently interdependent so that both would lose if no solution were found.”³⁷ Thus, global energy governance is characterised foremost by the multiplicity of actors that engage in it, ranging from governments, NGOs and civil societies, corporations and businesses as well as consumers and citizens.³⁸ There is no specific place where global energy rules are made, but rather multiple fora through which actors further their views and interests. Ann Florini et. al. pointed out that there are many forums in which energy governance take place such as: the IEA, OPEP, the G8, the UNFCCC.³⁹ Each have their own purpose and agenda. However, this research will focus on the UNFCCC COPs as energy governance events.

The phrase “global energy governance” emerged in the mid-2000s with the G8 Gleneagles

36 James N. Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-first Century," *Global Governance* 1, no. 1 (1995).p14

37 Philippe C Schmitter, "Participation in governance arrangements: is there any reason to expect it will achieve “sustainable and innovative policies in a multi-level context”?," in *Participatory governance* (Springer, 2002). p53

38 Natalia Chaban and Michèle Knodt, "Energy diplomacy in the context of multistakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS," *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 4 (2015).

39 Ann Florini and Benjamin K Sovacool, "Who governs energy? The challenges facing global energy governance," *Energy Policy* 37, no. 12 (2009).

summit taking on the theme.⁴⁰ It has been widely picked up and has turned out to be a catch-all phrase. It is largely defined as collective actions taken in the view of tackling international energy issues.⁴¹ Andreas Goldthau argues there are four interrelated dimensions that actors aim to address globally when it comes to energy governance: energy markets, security of supply, sustainability and development.⁴²

2.3 The EU's Energy Policy

2.3.1 History of Energy Policy

Energy has arguably been a central part of the European integration project since its first apparition as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. However, the early efforts to integrate the initial six member states' coal and steel markets were primarily to guarantee peace on the European continent.⁴³ The creation of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), whose role was to coordinate atomic research and develop common safety standards, came soon after in 1957. The importance of coordinating energy policies of its member states became clear early on with the High Authority of the ECSC seeking to expand its competences to other types of energy in

⁴⁰ Thijs Van De Graaf and Jeff Colgan, "Global energy governance: A review and research agenda," *Palgrave Communications* 2, no. 1 (2016).

⁴¹ Benjamin K Sovacool and Ann Florini, "Examining the complications of global energy governance," *Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law* 30, no. 3 (2012).

⁴² Andreas Goldthau, *The Handbook of Global Energy Policy* (Hoboken, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2013)..

⁴³ David Buchan, "Energy policy: Sharp challenges and rising ambitions," in *Policy making in the European Union*, ed. Hellen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack, and Alisdair R. Young (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

the wake of the Suez Crisis.⁴⁴ However, scholars argued that failure to find common ground between member states hampered the further development of a community wide energy policy.⁴⁵ To this day, the EU's control over energy policy remains limited. Nevertheless, relevant literature notes three important challenges that have led the Commission to seek further responsibility in the area and have shaped the EU's energy priorities: competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability.⁴⁶ These three policy axes first appeared relatively late in the history of the European project – they were officially announced in the Commission's Green Paper on the EU's energy strategy published in 2006. Importantly, the Green Paper introduced the EU's external energy policy.⁴⁷ These goals are characterised by three important projects for the EU which will be discussed below: the establishment of an internal energy market, diversification of its sources of energy, and reduction of the level of its carbon emissions. Jale Tosun Sophie Besenberg and Kai Schulze argue that the EU has gained authority over these areas of energy policy through a process of agenda setting.⁴⁸

44 Samuel R. Schubert, Johannes Pollak, and Maren Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union* (London;New York, NY;: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

45 Ibid.

46 Buchan, "Energy policy: Sharp challenges and rising ambitions."

Tosun, Biesenbender, and Schulze, *Energy Policy Making in the EU: Building the agenda*, 28..

47 European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,"

N. Chaban, M. Knodt, and A. Verdun, "'Talking with' not 'talking at'? Perceptions of the EU as a global normative energy actor in the eyes of BRICS and EU 'Big 3'," *Comparative European Politics* 15, no. 1 (2017).

48 Tosun, Biesenbender, and Schulze, *Energy Policy Making in the EU: Building the agenda*, 28.

2.3.2 Internal Energy Market

The creation of an internal energy market has long been an ambition of the EU. However, energy is subject to a number of conditions which have made integration into a common market difficult. Samuel Schubert, Johannes Pollak and Maren Kreutler detail how the existence of ‘natural monopolies’, as well as energy’s strategic nature led to the development of national energy giants with control over national energy industries rather than an interdependent supra-national system.⁴⁹ These authors add that different technological choice made by member states has led each country to rely on different types of energy with different political priorities which have further hindered integration.⁵⁰ As Europe’s use of coal decreased in favour of oil and a chain of crises in the Middle East disrupted its supply, the European Commission endeavoured to convince its member states to work on the creation of a common energy market.⁵¹ However, the idea of a common energy market was only brought forward a decade later when the Council argued in favour of it in 1986, giving member states guidelines to try to converge their energy policies.⁵² Two years later, the Commission published a working paper *The Internal Market for Energy*.⁵³ Fikland described this paper, stating that it “envisioned a ‘common carrier’ system for gas and electricity across the members in which any consumer could purchase energy from any supplier across the community, regardless of ownership of the intermediary grid

49 Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union*.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid. p 97

52 Ibid. p149

53 European Commission, "The Internal Energy Market. Commission Working Document," in *COM (88) 238 Final* (1988),

structures.”⁵⁴ Such a project required extensive liberalisation of the energy sector which went against many member states interests. Schubert *et al.* observed that “the so-called common carrier principle [...] proved to be the most contentious point,”⁵⁵ and the path to formulating policy became challenging. The Council finally adopted the Electricity Directive in 1996 and the Gas Directive in 1998. Both directives sought to gradually liberalise both markets by opening up access to energy networks. While the Commission was unable to fulfil its vision of liberalised EU-wide energy market, it lay important ground work for the future of the EU’s energy policy.⁵⁶ The second and third liberalisation packages were adopted in 2003 and 2009 respectively and sought to further reinforce competition in the EU’s energy market. Scholarly commentators noted now the second package, in 2003, required energy companies to separate their energy production from their supply networks by creating subsidiaries for the later and the 2009 package “forced energy companies either to sell their networks outright or to put these networks under entirely independent management.”⁵⁷ Achieving a fully-integrated energy market remains one of the Commission’s top priorities. In 2011, it announced that it sought to complete this project by 2014. However, at the time of the thesis submission (2019), this objective is yet to be fulfilled.

Schubert et al. classify the energy market as an internal policy of the EU,⁵⁸ and it is easy to understand why. However, scholars also argued that creating an internal EU

⁵⁴Per Ove Eikeland, "EU internal energy market policy: Achievements and hurdles," in *Toward a Common European Union Energy Policy* (Springer, 2011).

⁵⁵ Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union*. p106

⁵⁶ Ibid. p114

⁵⁷ Buchan, "Energy policy: Sharp challenges and rising ambitions." p362

⁵⁸ Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union*.

market has important implications for its external policy as well. Richard Young suggested that the EU's effort to guarantee its energy security makes creating a pan-European energy community an element of its foreign policy.⁵⁹ He stated that the EU in its conduct of external energy policies has a choice between a geopolitical approach and a market driven one. In his words, "the rules and regulations of the internal market were certainly presented as the key foundation to the EU's international projection in energy matters."⁶⁰ Young's argument is that member states aim to benefit from both strategies, gaining influence through a European-wide market while pursuing geopolitical goals. Moreover, creating an internal energy market has important implication to the EU's energy security. The Commission's Green Paper on establishing an energy strategy in Europe argues that completing the internal energy market would help ensure the EU's security of supply.⁶¹

Importantly, issues of security of supply have in part contributed to the development of the internal market. For example, the internal energy market package adopted in 2009 followed the second gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Researchers in the field underlined that the package encouraged solidarity and cooperation between EU member states and promoted the internal market as a means to tackle the challenge of energy security.⁶² To conclude, the development of the internal market has been both influenced by external events and is used by the EU as a means to export its

⁵⁹Richard Youngs, *Energy security: Europe's new foreign policy challenge*, vol. 53 (New York;London;: Routledge, 2009).

⁶⁰ Ibid. p 174

⁶¹ European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,"

⁶² Tomas Maltby, "European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism," *Energy Policy* 55 (2013).

preferences externally.

2.3.3 Security of Supply

The EU is largely dependent on external sources of energy in the form of oil, gas, coal and uranium. According to Eurostat, in 2015, 54% of the EU's energy needs were met through imports.⁶³ Schubert *et al.* noted that while the EU's sources of coal and uranium are relatively reliable, the same cannot be said for oil and gas.⁶⁴ Eurostat estimated that, in 2015, the EU imported 88.8% of its oil and 69.1% of its gas. The disruption in the supply of both types of energy sources would have important adverse effect on the EU's economy. The oil crises in the 1970s have led European countries to reduce their dependency on oil in primary energy production. Nevertheless, oil remains the backbone of the transport industry. Szarka pointed how gas has become an essential source of energy in many countries in part due to the said oil crises.⁶⁵ The same author argued that in addition gas is comparatively more environmentally friendly than other fossil fuels. The EU has sought to diversify the source of these imports, yet it remains largely dependent on a handful of producers. In 2016, over 66% of the EU's oil imports came from five countries (Russia, Norway, Kazakhstan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) and oil imports from Russia alone represented 30.9% of the total.⁶⁶ Supply dependence on gas is even more severe, with Russia and Norway accounting

63 Eurostat, "Energy dependence," 2017a, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=t2020_rd320.

64 Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union*. p206

65 Joseph Szarka, "Environmental foreign policy in France: National interests, nuclear power, and climate protection," in *Climate Change and Foreign Policy: Case Studies from East to West*, ed. Paul G Harris (2009).

66 Eurostat, "EU imports of energy products - recent developments," 2017b, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments.

for 39.5% and 34.4% of imports respectively in 2016, followed by Algeria representing 15.1% of imports.⁶⁷

Importantly, the level of dependence on energy imports varies between member states. A report from the European Commission found that smaller member states are the most vulnerable, with Malta and Cyprus almost fully dependent on energy imports with a non-diversified energy mix, relying almost entirely on oil imports.⁶⁸ Other countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Latvia), while having more diversified energy mixes, are heavily reliant on Russia for their gas imports.⁶⁹ This dependence is in large part due to the existing infrastructure which links Russia to Eastern Europe through a network of pipelines. A large majority of the EU's gas is imported through pipelines which means that it is beholden to the transit states and countries supplying gas. While the EU's particular energy relationship with Russia will be discussed further in the following chapter, this chapter stresses that this relationship is central to the EU's concern over energy security. Pierre Bocquillon and Tomas Maltby put forward an idea that the EU's focus on energy security increased after the 2004-2007 Eastern European enlargement.⁷⁰ Likewise, Elina Brutschin pointed out that a coalition of Eastern European countries led by Poland have continuously attempted to upload their preference for a securitisation of the EU's energy policy, with mixed success.⁷¹ Securing supply of energy is one of the priorities

67 Ibid.

68 Magdalena Spooner et al., *Member states' energy dependence: an indicator-based assessment* (2014),

69 Ibid.

70 Pierre Bocquillon and Tomas Maltby, "The more the merrier? Assessing the impact of enlargement on EU performance in energy and climate change policies," *East European Politics* 33, no. 1 (2017).

71 Elina Brutschin, "Shaping the EU's Energy policy Agenda: The Role of Eastern European Countries,"

the Commission outlined in its Green Paper of March 2006 – a challenging priority that is aimed to be tackled through establishing a coherent external energy policy.⁷² Putting the paper against a broader context, it was published straight after the first gas crisis when Russia cut all gas destined to Ukraine, causing disruptions in the supply of EU member states. Similar crises between Russia and Ukraine in 2009 and 2014 have done nothing to reassure European countries of the stability of their gas supply. As mentioned previously, the Internal Energy Market package was adopted a few months after the second gas crisis in 2009, and after the crisis in Crimea, Poland once more called for increased solidarity in the EU's energy policy.⁷³ Thus energy security continues to be an important concern on the EU agenda, one shaped by external events and particularly by the EU's relations with Russia.

2.3.4 Climate Change

In the 1990s, increased concern over climate change and environmental protection paved the way for a new EU energy policy. Indeed, climate change is arguably an area that has driven much of the EU's developments in energy legislation with many scholars arguing that it has been the most powerful motor of EU energy policy.⁷⁴ During a

in *Energy Policy Making in the EU: Building the Agenda*, ed. Jale Tosun, Sophie Biesenbender, and Kai Schulze (London: Springer, 2015).

⁷² European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,"

Maltby, "European Union energy policy integration: A case of European Commission policy entrepreneurship and increasing supranationalism."

⁷³ Brutschin, "Shaping the EU's Energy policy Agenda: The Role of Eastern European Countries."

⁷⁴ Buchan, "Energy policy: Sharp challenges and rising ambitions."

Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union*.

Tosun, Biesenbender, and Schulze, *Energy Policy Making in the EU: Building the agenda*, 28.

number of international conferences in the early 1990s, it was made clear that energy production's significant carbon footprint would need to be cut back to limit the environmental damage.⁷⁵ The Commission took the opportunity to take action, publishing in February 1990 "Guidelines for an environmentally-friendly energy policy."⁷⁶ In 1998, the EU signed the Kyoto protocol which required committed countries to cut back their carbon emissions by 8% by 2012 compared to 1990 levels. To do so, the Commission proposed to double the share of renewable energy (from 6% of the energy mix to 12%) as well as increasing the use of biofuels (by 5.75%) and improving energy efficiency (by 1% annually) by 2010.⁷⁷ The Commission has sought to take on a leadership role in the fight against climate change, taking advantage of the US' refusal to partake in international agreements such as the Kyoto protocol.⁷⁸

As pointed out by Schubert *et al.*, the EU's ambition to lead the efforts against climate change have an internal and external component.⁷⁹ In order to effectively take leadership in international climate change negotiations, the EU would need to lead by example, and to do so would require a transformation of its member states' economies to reduce their environmental cost. In January 2007, the EU proposed to further increase post-Kyoto protocol ambitions with three important binding targets: unilaterally reduce carbon emission by 20% compared to 1990 levels by 2020 (with an option to increase this target to 30% if an ambitious international agreement was

Francesc Morata and Israel Solorio Sandoval, *European energy policy: An environmental approach* (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012).

⁷⁵ Buchan, "Energy policy: Sharp challenges and rising ambitions."

⁷⁶ Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union*.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Buchan, "Energy policy: Sharp challenges and rising ambitions."

⁷⁹ Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union*.

made); increasing its share of renewables by 20% by 2020; and improving energy efficiency by 20% by 2020.⁸⁰ More broadly, these targets are parts of the EU's 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.⁸¹ To reach these targets, the Commission introduced the 2020 climate and energy package that was adopted in January 2008. It included: a revision of the EU's 2003 emission trading scheme (ETS) directive; targets for sectors not included in the EU ETS (like transport, agriculture, services, small industry, food industry and buildings); and a directive on the promotion of renewable energy including binding targets for member states.⁸² By 2013, the EU had made significant progress, almost achieving the reduction of emissions and increase in renewables targets.⁸³ Building on the 2020 package, in October 2014 the EU adopted further targets to be reached by 2030: reducing emissions by 40% (from 1990 levels); increasing by 27% the share of renewables; and improving energy efficiency by 27%.

Meanwhile, the EU sought to take leadership of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (also known as the Conference of Parties (COPs)) with mixed success. Literature commented how the EU sought an international agreement on climate change with binding emissions reduction targets for all parties to replace the Kyoto protocol ending in 2013, but failed to make other actors see eye to eye.⁸⁴ Bertil Kilian and Ole Elgström argued that the COP15 in

80 Pantelis Capros et al., "Analysis of the EU policy package on climate change and renewables," *Energy Policy* 39, no. 3 (2011).

81 Simona Bigerna, Carlo Andrea Bollino, and Silvia Micheli, *The sustainability of renewable energy in Europe* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2015).

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 Charles F. Parker, Christer Karlsson, and Mattias Hjerpe, "Assessing the European Union's global

Copenhagen, “where expectation were high of a decisive breakthrough in climate change negotiations, ended in what is generally described as a fiasco.”⁸⁵ Charles Parker, Christer Karlsson and Mattias Hjerpe concluded that the image of the EU’s climate change leadership suffered as a result.⁸⁶ For example, a study based on interviews of elites in China and India found that interviewees regarded the failure of Copenhagen as proof of the EU’s weakening global leadership.⁸⁷ Drawing on survey data, Parker and Karlsson found that recognition of the EU as a leader in the field of climate change declined from the COP14 in 2008 Poznan to the COP15 in Copenhagen a year later, passing from 62% to 46%.⁸⁸

Kilian and Elgström explained this decline in EU external perceptions by three leadership shortfalls from the EU.⁸⁹ Firstly, they argued, the EU failed to act as a unified actor and was unable to negotiate as a block. Secondly, the EU’s directional leadership, and its bid to lead by example, was undermined by a lack of ambitious reduction targets. Finally, they argued that the EU lacks structural power in climate negotiations, not being one of the major players upon which the fight against climate

climate change leadership: from Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement," *Journal of European Integration* 39, no. 2 (2017/02/23 2017).

85 Bertil Kilian and Ole Elgström, "Still a green leader? The European Union’s role in international climate negotiations," *Cooperation and Conflict* 45, no. 3 (2010).

86 Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, "Assessing the European Union’s global climate change leadership: from Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement."

87 Karine Lisbonne-de Vergeron, *Chinese and Indian views of Europe since the crisis: New perspectives from the emerging Asian giants* (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2012).

88 Charles F. Parker and Christer Karlsson, "The European Union as a global climate leader: confronting aspiration with evidence," *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 17, no. 4 (2017).

89 Kilian and Elgström, "Still a green leader? The European Union’s role in international climate negotiations."

change relies like big emitters such as the US and China.

Parker *et al.* pointed out that “the EU made a comeback with 50% of participants recognising the EU as a leader in Durban (2011) and, regaining the top spot by a slight margin, with 51% in Doha (2012).”⁹⁰ In a later paper they also highlighted that while the EU’s leadership continued to be recognised at similar level in 2013 and 2014, the US overtook the EU as the most recognised leader in 2014. Finally, they noted that “in Paris, at the COP21, the EU’s leadership recognition dropped significantly to 41% while the leadership recognition of the US soared and the EU was even eclipsed by China.”⁹¹ Importantly, they also found that over the same period, perceptions of leadership by European respondents was significantly higher, fluctuating between 75% in 2008 and 61% in 2015. So, like in many other sectors,⁹² the EU’s self-perception as a climate change leader does not match that of external partners.⁹³

Parker *et al.* also analysed the EU’s leadership during the UNFCCC climate

90 Parker and Karlsson, "The European Union as a global climate leader: confronting aspiration with evidence."

91 Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, "Assessing the European Union’s global climate change leadership: from Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement."

92 Peter Ryan, Natalia Chaban, and Martin Holland, *The EU through the eyes of Asia - volume ii: new cases, new findings* (GB: World Scientific Pub Co Pte, 2009).

Chaban and Holland, *Communicating Europe in times of crisis: external perceptions of the European Union*.

Chaban, Knodt, and Verdun, "'Talking with' not 'talking at'? Perceptions of the EU as a global normative energy actor in the eyes of BRICS and EU 'Big 3'."

93 Kilian and Elgström, "Still a green leader? The European Union’s role in international climate negotiations."

Lisbonne-de Vergeron, *Chinese and Indian views of Europe since the crisis: New perspectives from the emerging Asian giants*.

Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, "Assessing the European Union’s global climate change leadership: from Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement."

negotiations and conclude that the EU was most successful in setting the agenda but had less influence over the final outcome of negotiations, often being overshadowed at that time by China and the US. Nevertheless, the EU was able to “transcend its agenda setting success”⁹⁴ during the COP 21 in Paris and forge an alliance with the US and China in order to achieve a universal deal to limit the impact of climate change.

Importantly, Parker *et al.* noted that France’s recognition of leadership rose during the COP21 in Paris, going from 1.9% in 2014 to 8.1% in 2015, and point out that this increase matches a drop for the EU’s leadership from 48% in 2014 to 42% in 2015. They argued that this is largely a cost of “being a complex actor that represent 28 states in this issue area.”⁹⁵ Nevertheless, the EU was able to have a common message at the COP 21 and thus speak with one voice. They add: “The EU’s climate policy has served to strengthen a common identity among member states and to establish the EU as a credible unified actor in the eyes of the world.”⁹⁶

2.3.5 Nuclear competences

As mentioned, nuclear power was one of the early areas of integration with the creation of an institutional framework to govern it in 1957 (Euratom.) Gregoire Mallard noted that the integration of nuclear power was in line with Jean Monnet’s vision, for whom it would be beneficial to take away national authority over strategic sectors and place them under the control of a new community institution.⁹⁷ However, due to lack of

94 Parker, Karlsson, and Hjerpe, "Assessing the European Union’s global climate change leadership: from Copenhagen to the Paris Agreement."

95 Ibid. p249

96 Ibid. p250

97Grégoire Mallard, "L'Europe puissance nucléaire, cet obscur objet du désir," *Critique internationale*,

investment from member states, this vision was never entirely fulfilled. Today, nuclear power does not appear as one of the EU's priorities and as Buchan stressed, "all key nuclear power decisions are national and are likely to stay so for a long time."⁹⁸

Nevertheless, Euratom has acquired important competences over the years. From its inception, Euratom had a non-proliferation agenda, requiring member states to inform the Commission of any nuclear investments, as well as a body of inspectors to supervise both civil and military installations in Europe. Euratom also oversees a common market for nuclear material, making sure of regular and equitable access to fissile materials between member states. It also sets important safety standards to protect those working in reactors against radiation. However, Buchan notes that Euratom "has no role in setting safety standards for the design or operation of reactors, when for the population at large the risk of radiation exposure comes from faulty reactor design or operation."⁹⁹ In 2007, the Commission established the European High-level Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management regrouping all member states' national regulators in the hope of producing "a common approach in its two areas of responsibility."¹⁰⁰

One of the most important responsibilities of Euratom is research. More specifically, it finances a common research centre tasked with improving nuclear fission safety. Euratom is also an important part of the international research project ITER, aimed at developing nuclear fusion.

Finally, the Commission is able to sign cooperation agreements with third countries

no. 1 (2009).

⁹⁸ Buchan, *Energy and climate change: Europe at the crossroads*.p166

⁹⁹ Ibid. p172

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.p173

such as the US, Canada, Ukraine or Japan through Euratom. These agreements must be approved by the Council as the areas of responsibility of Euratom.

It's important to highlight this EU competence in terms of nuclear energy since, as we will see, the EU has little visibility in France as a nuclear actor.

2.3.6 Shared competence and issues of coherence

According to David Buchan, the development of the EU's energy policy has largely been "organic," often relying on its "legal competence from economic and environmental parts of the EU treaties to justify proposing and passing energy measures."¹⁰¹ Energy finally became a formal competence of the EU's after the reform of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in Lisbon in 2007.¹⁰² Article 194 of the TFEU brings together the three goals of the EU in terms of energy, competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability:

In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment, EU policy on energy shall aim, in spirit of solidarity between member states, to:

- *ensure the functioning of the energy market;*
- *ensure security of supply in the Union;*
- *promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy;*
- *promote interconnection of energy networks.*¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p7

¹⁰² Morata and Sandoval, *European energy policy: An environmental approach*.
Buchan, *Energy and climate change: Europe at the crossroads*.

¹⁰³ "Article 194.1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union," (2012),

Importantly however, there is an area over which the EU does not have any control. Namely, it is about member states' right to choose from different energy sources. As such, while the EU has an increased oversight on energy policies, member states retain control of their domestic energy mixes, and this arrangement leads to a multi-governance of energy. This also means that the EU and its member states' interest may diverge. Previously discussed research argued the level of dependence on external energy sources varies between member states while different energy sources involve different dynamics of geopolitics.¹⁰⁴ De Jong and Schunz observed that while the Lisbon Treaty aimed to increase the coherence of the EU's external energy policies, it has been unable to live up to expectations.¹⁰⁵ Herranz Surralles argued that since the late 2000s, the EU has sought an increased role in energy diplomacy. However, in practice, the result has been what she calls "a hybrid mode of EU external energy policy":¹⁰⁶ while the European Commission has pushed for an external energy policy that has the outlines of an active energy diplomacy, in practice, energy policy is divided. At the EU level, a general approach to energy governance with at the member-state level active energy diplomacies.¹⁰⁷

104 Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union*.diplo

105 Sijbren De Jong and Simon Schunz, "Coherence in European Union External Policy before and after the Lisbon Treaty: the cases of energy security and climate change," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 17 (2012).

106 Anna Herranz-Surrallés, "An emerging EU energy diplomacy? Discursive shifts, enduring practices," *Journal of European Public Policy* 23, no. 9 (2016). p15

107 Ibid.

2.4 France - National Energy Priorities

2.4.1 A French Technological Identity?

Each country in the EU has chosen different paths and have different priorities in terms of energy. Some choose to move away from nuclear energy, others seek through renewable energies to diversify their energy mix. France's attachment to nuclear energy makes it an interesting case. As we will discuss further, images of nuclear energy are closely linked to images of the French national identity. This makes France an EU country of particular interest.

France is a particular energy actor and is different from other actors in the EU. Its energy mix is still focussed on nuclear energy and in fact France generates half of the EU's nuclear power.¹⁰⁸

Whereas other countries in Europe – and Germany specifically -- have decided to move away from nuclear energy, the political situation in France regarding nuclear is more complex. Sarah Wiliarty, who analysed the differences between nuclear power in France and Germany, argued that the two countries have a similar energy situation with high technological capabilities, high energy demands and a shortage of natural energy reserves.¹⁰⁹ However, the two countries have very different approaches to nuclear energy. For Wiliarty, the main reason for these differences is in the structure of the French and German political systems. She concludes that “the German state is

¹⁰⁸ Mycle Schneider, "France's great energy debate," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 69, no. 1 (2013).p27.

¹⁰⁹ Sarah Elise Wiliarty, "Nuclear power in Germany and France," *Polity* 45, no. 2 (2013).

more porous to citizen's demands than [...] the French state."¹¹⁰ This tendency towards technocracy in France, especially in the field of energy, has been confirmed by many scholars. Sophie Meritet argued that "the history of energy policy [in France] has always been characterised by a very strong intervention of the state."¹¹¹ France's nuclear energy programme has been led from the start by "technocratic elites"¹¹² rather than by the general public. Tuula Teravainen, Markku Lehtonen and Mari Martiskainen¹¹³ used a classification of states developed by Dryzek *et al.*¹¹⁴ to categorise a state's level of openness to external interests in national decision-making processes. It details four ideal types, namely: *actively* or *passively inclusive* and *actively* or *passively exclusive*.¹¹⁵ The authors specifically described France as *passively exclusive* on account of its government-led nuclear policies.¹¹⁶ This means that France's "long tradition of state-centrism and top-down management together with the general suspicion of organised interests has provided few points of access to non-governmental organisations into policy-making." From a different perspective, when discussing the relationship between scientific communities and society, Sevin Topcu concluded that at least up until the 1970s, France's development of nuclear capacities

110 Ibid.

111 Sophie Meritet, "French perspectives in the emerging European Union energy policy," *Energy Policy* 35, no. 10 (2007).

112 Schneider, "France's great energy debate."

113 Tuula Teräväinen, Markku Lehtonen, and Mari Martiskainen, "Climate change, energy security, and risk—debating nuclear new build in Finland, France and the UK," *Energy Policy* 39, no. 6 (2011).

114 John S. Dryzek et al., "Environmental Transformation of the State: the USA, Norway, Germany and the UK," *Political Studies* 50, no. 4 (2002).

115 Ibid.

116 Teräväinen, Lehtonen, and Martiskainen, "Climate change, energy security, and risk—debating nuclear new build in Finland, France and the UK."

were technocratic in nature, with the programme led by a handful of experts with “homogenous profiles.”¹¹⁷ Robert L. Frost described the development of France’s technocratic energy policies from 1946 to 1968.¹¹⁸

This technocratic lead is exemplified by the nationalisation of production, transport and distribution of electricity and gas with the creation of Electricité de France (EDF) and Gaz de France (GDF)¹¹⁹ in 1946.¹²⁰ Partial competition was introduced in the 1980s under the impulse of the European Commission,¹²¹ however the energy market was opened up for non-domestic consumers only in July 2004 and for domestic consumers in July 2007.

France’s technocratic ambitions led it to develop a nuclear energy industry that exceeds that of any other country in the world. Today, only the US has more nuclear plants than France. Moreover, when calculated per capita, France has far more nuclear energy capacity than anywhere else in the world. For Gabrielle Hecht from the onset, the development of France nuclear industry was linked to ideas of France’s grandeur, or in her words, “the radiance of France.”¹²² The term came to life after a 1948 visit of

117 Sezin Topçu, "Nucléaire: De l'engagement «savant» aux contre-expertises associatives," *Natures Sciences Societes* 14, no. 3 (2006).

118 Robert L. Frost and Annette Sampon, "La technocratie au pouvoir. avec le consentement des syndicats: la technologie, les syndicats et la direction à l'Electricité de France (1946-1968)," *Le Mouvement social*, no. 130 (1985).

119 Now Engie.

120 Andreas Benedictow, Daniel Fjærtøft, and Ole Løfsnæs, "Oil dependency of the Russian economy: An econometric analysis," *Economic Modelling* 32 (2013).

121 Jean-Pierre Angelier, "Electricité et gaz naturel: du monopole public à la concurrence réglementée. Une perspective historique," (2005).

And Nuno Bento, "Le Defi du Deploiement des Nouveaux Resaux Energetiques : Quel Role de l'Etat ?," *Vie & Sciences de l'Entreprise*, no. 190 (2012).

122 Hecht, *The radiance of France: nuclear power and national identity after World War II*, New.

the then French President Vincent Auriol to France's first nuclear reactor. He was reported to have declared: "This achievement will add to the radiance of France."¹²³ The word 'radiance', which is synonymous to greatness, recalls nuclear radiation of course, but also a sense of grandeur in France's history. "The notion referred back to glorious past days, invoking Louis XIV, Napoleon and the heyday of French imperialism."¹²⁴ Hecht studied in depth the relationship between the development of France nuclear energy industry and French national identity. She also argued that technology became a way for France to regain its former status of world leader, after the embarrassment of the Second World War.¹²⁵

French nuclear energy programme started in 1945, when, the then prime minister Charles De Gaulle created the Commissariat de l'Energie Atomique (CEA) in a bid to rebuild France after the devastation of the war. The programme had two objectives. One was to provide a stable energy source for France. The other was to produce weapon grade plutonium in order to develop France nuclear strike capabilities. De Gaulle viewed the latter objective as essential to guarantee France's national security.¹²⁶ Gabrielle Hecht explained that this objective was obvious in the design of the CEA's first reactor built in 1953. A number of features allowed for the rapid extraction of fuel rods which she argues is proof that the reactor was designed to optimise production of weapon grade uranium. Had the reactor been designed for the express purpose of producing electricity, the fuel rods would have been left for as long as possible rather

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Gabrielle Hecht, "Technology, politics, and national identity in France," *Technologies of Power: Essays in Honor of Thomas Parke Hughes and Agatha Chipley Hughes* (2001).

¹²⁵ Hecht, *The radiance of France: nuclear power and national identity after World War II*, New.

¹²⁶ Szarka, "Environmental foreign policy in France: National interests, nuclear power, and climate protection."

than extracted and replaced while the fission reaction was occurring.¹²⁷ Therefore the initial development of nuclear energy, like in the US and the UK, was born from France's strategic national interests.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the 'frenchness' of France's nuclear programme seemed to be primordial. The gas-graphite nuclear reactor, developed by the CEA and EDF was viewed as the quintessential French technology. Whether or not this claim can be made in view of the external expertise that influenced the development of this technology is beside the point. Hecht points out that "there is no such thing as an essential French technological style. Engineers did not make the choices they did because they were French."¹²⁸ Nevertheless, in France it was perceived as quintessentially 'French' and it became a symbol of French national pride.

2.4.2 Perceptions of nuclear energy

While France is arguably a "special case" in the EU in terms of nuclear energy policy, it would be wrong to assume that this is due to a lack of internal contestation of nuclear energy policies. In the 1970s important protests took place in France with large manifestations and at times violent confrontations with the authorities.¹²⁹ However, protests themselves are not necessarily indicative of overall support. This led some scholars to assess the level of support for nuclear energy in France. Sylvain Brouard and Isabelle Guinaudeau compiled longitudinal data on support for nuclear energy in France. They aimed to understand why, unlike in other countries, France had never

¹²⁷ Hecht, "Technology, politics, and national identity in France." P267

¹²⁸ Hecht, *The radiance of France: nuclear power and national identity after World War II*, New.

¹²⁹ Brouard and Guinaudeau, "Policy beyond politics? Public opinion, party politics and the French pro-nuclear energy policy." p 143

gone through a phase-out of nuclear energy until very recently. In order to get such longitudinal data, they used multiple surveys from different agencies and used a “public mood”¹³⁰ indicator in order to deal with the heterogeneity of the data. They found that over the past four decades support for nuclear energy among French people has in fact been mostly below 50%.¹³¹ They found that in the 1975-1987 period, support for nuclear energy averaged at about 55.1%, which they noted was surprising as anti-nuclear protest were strongest around that time. They also found that after the Chernobyl incident in 1986, support dropped significantly (18.8 points over five years). While this trend was reversed in the 1990s, with support increasing slowly, it has never regained its pre-Chernobyl levels and never again gained a majority. What is most surprising is that while there is a sharp decrease of support in 2011, probably due to the Fukushima disaster, there was nevertheless a renewed increase in support for nuclear energy in 2012. Moreover, a study made by the IFOP in April 2016 found that 53% of people surveyed were against the closure of nuclear plants. Only 47% saw it in a positive light.¹³²

Brouard and Guinaudeau found that support for nuclear energy differs depending on the sides of the French political spectrum. They found that, over the whole period of observation, a majority of right wing and far-right-wing voters viewed nuclear energy favourably, while support for this type of energy within socialist and communist parties was on average below 50% and fewer than 30% of green voters supported it.¹³³

¹³⁰ This methodology was developed by Stimson

¹³¹ Brouard and Guinaudeau, "Policy beyond politics? Public opinion, party politics and the French pro-nuclear energy policy."

¹³² IFOP, "Les Français et l'énergie nucléaire," 2016, accessed 19/09/16, http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3370-1-study_file.pdf.

¹³³ Brouard and Guinaudeau, "Policy beyond politics? Public opinion, party politics and the French pro-

They found, however, that support for nuclear energy had declined over the years within all parties' constituencies. The sharpest decline happening in the 1980s.¹³⁴ However, despite this finding, it would appear that political parties were not incentivised to back anti-nuclear policies. The authors concluded in their article that the stability of France's nuclear energy sector could not be explained by strong public support as nuclear energy has had less than 50% support since the end of the 1980s. Brouard and Guinaudeau sought to explain France's continued nuclear policy through different means. They hypothesised that "the disconnection between the preferences of the median voter and the decision of nuclear policy in France could be rendered possible by a low salience of this issue in the public sphere."¹³⁵ To verify this hypothesis, they measured the number of articles published in *Le Monde* about the issue between 1977 and 2012. They found that the visibility of the issue varied greatly over the years but was highest at the end of the 1970s with over 600 articles in 1977. The intensity of coverage peaked once more at the time of the Chernobyl accident with more than article per day. More recently, concerns over nuclear dissemination, global warming, energy costs and opportunities for France's nuclear energy industry have driven media coverage. They found however that the issue "acquired a historical level of visibility in the months following the Fukushima accident and the 2012 presidential campaign."¹³⁶ However, they argued that while the coverage of nuclear energy has fluctuated over the period, the issue has been present in the media routinely, thus negating the hypothesis of low issue salience.

nuclear energy policy." p155

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid. p148

136 Ibid. p 150

They then analysed the effects of France's technocratic lead hypothesising that the issue had been kept off parliamentary agendas.¹³⁷ However, between 1965 and 2006, they were able to "identify 22 laws dedicated to matters of safety of nuclear plants, treatment sites and radioactive waste disposal sites." They concluded that the focus of the laws on the negative aspects of nuclear energy could have given rise to parliamentary debates over the wider issue of nuclear energy.

Finally, they analysed party politics. They argued that the main right-wing party (UMP-Les Republicains) were historically devoted to nuclear energy as a means to ensure France independence. Likewise, the communist party (PC) supported the policy due to their closeness to EDF's main trade union (CGT) and strong ideological beliefs in "the power of science and technology to transform the world."¹³⁸ They argue that opposition to nuclear energy would most likely emanate from the main left wing party (PS). However, due to internal party politics and "the necessity of accommodating the pro-nuclear PC"¹³⁹ the party avoided the issue all together. The authors also pointed out that when Francois Mitterrand, a PS president, was governing in the 1980s, path dependence elements were already at play. The initial investment into the construction of nuclear power plants had already been expended. A change of policy would have negated these investments and thus been very costly. With the ecological movement gaining ground in the early 1990s, the Green Party became increasingly important. Brouard and Guinaudeau argue that the party was the first to break the trend of "issue avoidance and consensus regarding nuclear energy in

¹³⁷ Ibid. p 151

¹³⁸ Ibid. p 158

¹³⁹ Ibid. p 159

electoral competition.”¹⁴⁰ Losing supporters to the ecologists, the PS sought to form a coalition with the Green party at the end of the 1990s. With this new political incentive, the nuclear issue became a point of contention between political parties. In 2007, Ségolène Royal, the PS presidential candidate expressed for the first time an aspiration to reducing the share of nuclear energy in France’s energy mix. In 2012, the issue of nuclear energy was politicised once more and Francois Holland, seeking a coalition with the Green party, promised to reduce the share of nuclear energy by 25% before 2015. The law on energy transition adopted in July 2015 aims to reduce nuclear energy to 50% of the energy mix by 2025 and marks a historical change in France’s energy policy.

Importantly, Brouard and Guinaudeau concluded that “arguments in terms of technocracy, interest groups, path dependency and ‘constraints’ of all kinds cannot fully account for the observed lack of democratic responsiveness”.¹⁴¹ They contended that “this explanation has to be complemented with respect to a neglected variable: party politics.”¹⁴²

In a study of French engineering students’ perception of nuclear energy, Roh Pin Lee and Silke Gloaguen found that the student associated nuclear energy most strongly with four imageries: safety and danger related issues, efficiency, nuclear waste, and costs.¹⁴³ Moreover, it was found that the students were aware of France nuclear history, starting with Charles De Gaulle’s nuclear programme and the development of

140 Ibid. p 161

141 Ibid. p 163

142 Ibid. p 163

143 Roh Pin Lee and Silke Gloaguen, "Path-dependence, lock-in, and student perceptions of nuclear energy in France: Implications from a pilot study," *Energy Research & Social Science* 8 (2015).

nuclear energy during the oil crisis. France was viewed as a pioneer of nuclear energy. Lee and Gloaguen add that due to this history “[students] felt that nuclear technology [was] safer and better controlled in France than in other countries”.¹⁴⁴ Politically their analysis showed two trends. First that the political landscape in France was viewed as unanimously pro-nuclear and the French Green party (Europe Ecologie les Verts) was seen as having very low credibility. Economically, nuclear energy was viewed as a driver of France’s economy and as a way to keep prices of electricity down. The students viewed the media focus on energy as low, however they noted that in the aftermath of Fukushima, the media would often highlight the safety of France’s nuclear energy industry in their coverage. Finally, the students felt that overall, due to the low prices of energy in France, energy as such was not at the forefront of people’s minds. They sensed “a strong feeling of nuclear acceptance in the French population.”¹⁴⁵ Of course, Lee and Gloaguen’s study is focussed on a very particular part of society. Engineering students are more likely to be pro-nuclear. It has been shown that professionals with physics or engineering backgrounds often have favourable views of nuclear energy.¹⁴⁶ Their research however was focussed on the concepts of path dependence and lock-in effects that may constrain energy decisions. The authors argued that young engineering students will be the future decision makers in the energy sector. This is particularly true in a country such as France where engineers and technicians have a strong influence over political decisions relating to

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. p92

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. p 94

¹⁴⁶ R. P. Barke and H. C. Jenkins-Smith, "Politics and scientific expertise: Scientists, risk perception, and nuclear waste policy," *Risk Analysis* 13, no. 4 (1993).

energy.¹⁴⁷ These images however reflected the visions that France has promoted since the end of the Second World War, as noted by Hecht.¹⁴⁸

2.4.3 Climate Change, Renewable Energy and Energy Transition

This chapter has so far demonstrated how France's nuclear energy policy makes it an exception in Europe, and indeed in the world. However, the EU has also exerted its weight in some areas of energy policy in France, and specifically in its use of renewables.

Sustainability is an area where Europeanisation had a strong influence on France. Valerie Lacroix and Edwin Zaccai explained that while in the 1970s, the idea of environmental protection went contrary to the development of the economy and industrialisation, the idea of sustainable development slowly made its way through the minds of politicians in France. Still, the issue of climate change was unheard of in policy making circles.¹⁴⁹ Pierre Bocquillon and Aurelien Evrard noted however that despite being "a latecomer and follower" in international climate conferences, "from the early 1990s onwards France developed the ambition of displaying international climate leadership."¹⁵⁰ Joseph Szarka pointed out that France had reduced its carbon emissions significantly, before other nations. Yet, France was an "inadvertent pioneer"

147 Lee and Gloaguen, "Path-dependence, lock-in, and student perceptions of nuclear energy in France: Implications from a pilot study."

148 Gabrielle Hecht, *The radiance of France: nuclear power and national identity after World War II* (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1998).

149 Pierre Bocquillon and Aurelien Evrard, "French Climate Policy: Diplomacy in the service of symbolic leadership," in *The European Union in international climate change politics: still taking a lead?*, ed. Rüdiger Wurzel, James Connelly, and Duncan Liefferink (New York, New York; London, [England];: Routledge, 2017).

150 Ibid. p100

since the drivers of the policy that helped reduce emission (the choice of nuclear energy) had nothing to do with concerns over climate protection.¹⁵¹ So, without meaning so, France's economy had become one of the world's least carbon intensive. However, Szarka argues that instead of seeking 'climate leadership' during the Kyoto protocol negotiations in 1997 and subsequent EU level negotiations in 1998, France agreed to only stabilise its carbon emissions at 1990 levels. As a consequence, in the mid-1990s, France appeared to merely "rest on its laurels," without seeking to match the tougher targets other countries set for themselves.¹⁵²

In the early 2000s, with increased international focus on climate change, it became unsustainable for France to lag behind. Rhetorically at least, the French government took a stand with President Jacques Chirac famously declaring at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002: "Our house is burning and we look elsewhere."¹⁵³ It soon became clear that France would not meet its emission targets and would in fact emit 10% more carbon in 2010 than in 1990 if it did not implement important changes. Jacques Chirac's government therefore organised in 2003 a 'national energy debate'. According to Joseph Szarka, this debate "drew the predictable (and predicted) conclusion that France needed to extend the life of its nuclear power stations and build a new generation."¹⁵⁴ Two other energy related actions also started appearing in policy at the time. These were aiming at the increase of energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy, two areas of policy which have

151 Szarka, "From inadvertent to reluctant pioneer? Climate strategies and policy style in France."

152 Joseph Szarka, "France's trouble bid to climate leadership," in *The European Union as a leader in international climate change politics*, ed. Rüdiger Wurzel and James Connelly (New York;London;; Routledge, 2011).

153 Bocquillon and Evrard, "French Climate Policy: Diplomacy in the service of symbolic leadership."

154 Szarka, "From inadvertent to reluctant pioneer? Climate strategies and policy style in France." p633

been heavily affected by Europeanisation, according to Bocquillon and Evrard,¹⁵⁵ Nicolas Sarkozy's election in 2007 marked a turn in France's climate change policies. Sustainability, which had been an important topic of the 2007 presidential campaign, was made a policy priority. At the EU level, France agreed to increase the share of renewable energy in its energy mix by 23% (from 1990 to 2020) and integrated this goal in the 2007 law "Grenelle de l'environnement."¹⁵⁶ Bocquillon and Evrard discussed two dynamics of Europeanisation that were active at this time. The first one is vertical Europeanisation, where supporters of renewable energy used the EU's targets to request concrete measures to meet them, using the EU as a legitimising factor. The second one is horizontal Europeanisation, which used the example of other European countries far ahead of France in renewable energy. Compared to other European countries, particularly Germany and Denmark, France's share of renewable energy has remained low. Evrard in fact discovered that the share of renewable energy in the French energy mix has stagnated for the most part over the last 30 years.¹⁵⁷

During France's EU presidency in 2008, Sarkozy made the adoption of the EU climate and energy package a priority, thus changing its position from norm importer to norm entrepreneur. Bocquillon and Evrard argued that "the package embodied domestic environmental and climate commitments and represented an opportunity for the government to position itself at the vanguard of EU climate leadership."¹⁵⁸ They also

155 Pierre Bocquillon and Aurelien Evrard, "Rattraper ou Devancer l'Europe? Politiques Francaises des Energies Renouvelables et Dynamiques d'Europeanisation," *Politique Europeenne* 52 (2016).

156 "LOI n° 2009-967 du 3 août 2009 de programmation relative à la mise en œuvre du Grenelle de l'environnement (1)," (3 août 2009),

157 Aurélien Evrard, "Les énergies renouvelables et l'électricité," *Ecologie & politique*, no. 2 (2014).

158 Bocquillon and Evrard, "French Climate Policy: Diplomacy in the service of symbolic leadership."

concluded that France's position on climate action evolved from being seen as a threat to industrial development to a diplomatic opportunity, one that politicians would often use to legitimise nuclear energy.

Finally, a third shift in France's approach to climate action happened arguably post 2012, under the leadership of Francois Hollande. The Law on the Energy Transition which was adopted in August 2015, introduced the target of reducing the share of nuclear energy to 50% of the energy mix by 2025, which marks an unprecedented change in France's energy policy. This change is in large part a result of the 2012 presidential election which opposed among others Nicolas Sarkozy and Francois Hollande. As discussed earlier in this Chapter, president Sarkozy and his administration had been very supportive of France's nuclear industry, often justifying this choice through the need for independence and the threat of climate change. However, in the aftermath of Fukushima, Francois Hollande made a pact with the green party whereby if he was to win the presidential election, the greens and his own socialist party would form a coalition in the National Assembly, in exchange in part for a reduction in the share of nuclear energy. The Law on the Energy Transition also reiterated goals on the increase of renewable energy and energy efficiency and the reduction of carbon emissions. In essence, while previous governments used climate action as a legitimising factor for nuclear energy, often times trying to upload this preference in international fora such as the UNFCCC COPs and even the EU, Hollande's government made the fight against climate change the centre piece of its external energy policy, moving away from nuclear energy. This attempt at climate change leadership was best illustrated by the 2015 COP21 in Paris: "President Hollande made COP21 one of the landmarks of his term in office towards which national

environmental and foreign policies have been geared.”¹⁵⁹

2.4.4 Perceptions of Climate Action

Importantly, a large majority of French citizens is in favour of climate action. In a survey by Eurobarometer on attitudes towards climate change, 79% of French respondents believed climate change to be a ‘very serious’ problem, and rating it in the top three most serious problem facing the world along with ‘poverty, hunger and lack of drinking water’ (37%) and ‘international terrorism’ (24%) (14% placed it as the single most serious problem facing the world).¹⁶⁰ Meanwhile, when asked who would be responsible for tackling climate change, 53% of French respondents answered national government, followed closely by the EU with 51% and business and industry with 43% (multiple answers were possible).¹⁶¹ This seems to indicate that climate action from both France and the EU would be seen as legitimate. Finally, a large majority were in favour of national targets to increase the share of renewable energy with 52% seeing it as ‘very important’ and 42% as ‘fairly important’.¹⁶²

Bocquillon and Evrard point out however, that attitudes to climate change have varied according to the national and international context. In the build up to the Copenhagen conference in 2009, the Agence de L’Environnement et de Maitrise de l’Energie (ADEME) in a survey conducted by Opinionway found that 28% of French people surveyed thought climate change was the most concerning environmental issue. This

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. p110

¹⁶⁰ Eurobarometer, "Special Eurobarometer 459 - Climate Change Report," 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/support/docs/report_2017_en.pdf.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² Ibid.

proportion dropped to 19% in 2010 and remained low in the next three years, and picked up again in 2014 and 2015 reaching 32% the year of the COP21. ¹⁶³

2.4.5 French energy diplomacy and environmental foreign policy

France's nuclear focussed domestic energy policy influenced aspects of its foreign policy, particularly energy diplomacy. Joseph Szarka argues that "France took on a self-appointed leadership role in promoting the revival, seeking to restore the legitimacy of nuclear power and generalise its use worldwide. Thereby the French nuclear lobby attempted to turn a national exception into an international norm." ¹⁶⁴ This search for a French-led nuclear 'renaissance' has been exemplified by Nicolas Sarkozy who set up in 2008 the Agence France Nucléaire International in order to promote nuclear energy to 'newcomer' states. Its primary purpose is to 'help countries prepare the institutional, human and technical environments needed for the development of a nuclear industry that respects safety, security and non-proliferation conditions and respects the environment.' ¹⁶⁵

In the 1990s, the imperative to reduce industry produced gas emissions emerged. The world saw the development of norms and rules regarding climate change with, for example, the introduction of the Kyoto protocol. In parallel to this, research began to

¹⁶³ Opinionway for ADEME, "Les Représentations sociale de l'effet de serre et du réchauffement climatique," updated October 2015, 2015, http://www.ademe.fr/sites/default/files/assets/documents/opinionway-representation-sociale-effet-de-serre-2015-vague16_1.pdf.

¹⁶⁴ Joseph Szarka, "From exception to norm - and back again? France, the nuclear revival, and the post-Fukushima landscape," *Environmental Politics* 22, no. 4 (2013).

¹⁶⁵ Agence France Nucléaire International, "L'AFNI, une initiative de la France pour accompagner les pays qui souhaitent développer l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire," http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/TNP_DossierPresse_plaquetteAFNIVF.pdf.

put forward arguments about the benefits of nuclear energy for reducing green-house gas emissions thus legitimizing French discourses on nuclear power.¹⁶⁶ While France's policy had originally been driven by concerns of energy security and competitiveness, sustainability became a primary factor in its continued promotion.¹⁶⁷ In the early 2000s France sought persuade the EU and the wider international community to include nuclear energy as a strategy to tackle climate change.

As we will see, both climate change and nuclear energy are major drivers of France's energy diplomacy with emerging countries.

166 Szarka, "Environmental foreign policy in France: National interests, nuclear power, and climate protection." p. 121

167 Ibid. p 122

Chapter 3 : Case Study: Energy Relations with the BRICS

“The degree of competition or cooperation between the dominant and emerging powers depends on the analysis that the protagonists make of their own power and vulnerabilities, respective intentions and of the international conjecture. It is thus a dynamic process that occurs over several decades, in which the change of behaviour of one leads to the adaptation of the other. This process is principally the result of signals and of their interpretations, depending on the non-negligible risk of misperceptions.”

Tanguy Struye de Swieland, 2012, p16¹⁶⁸

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the energy situations in each of the BRICS. These descriptions will provide a good basis for comparison between the energy ‘realities’, as best achieved through a thorough review of literature, and the strategic narratives of France and the EU and the media frames in the written press. It will first explain why BRICS provide a good case study for global energy governance and in particular France and the EU’s external energy policies.

168 Tanguy Struye de Swielande, "From Emerging power to Superpower: A long Way to Go?," in *The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe Can Shape a New Global Order*, ed. Thomas Renard and Sven Biscop (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2012). p16

After painting a picture of the energy situation in each of the BRICS it will describe each country's energy relations with the EU and France, paying particular attention to France and the EU's energy diplomacy efforts. Goldthau defines energy diplomacy as: "the way countries give their energy companies a competitive edge in bidding for resources by using the state's power: consumer countries strengthen their supply situation by diplomatically flanking energy contracts, whereas producer countries use diplomacy to enhance access to markets or reserves."¹⁶⁹

3.2 Why Study the BRICS?

3.2.1 What are the BRICS?

The terms BRICS is the acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The concept started as BRIC, a term coined by a Goldman Sachs analyst Jim O'Neill in 2001, to refer to countries with fast growing economies that were expected to rival other great economies like the US and the EU in terms of global importance. What started as a convenient way of expressing "emerging economies of the world" quickly became a grouping of political importance. The first BRIC summit took place in June 2009 in Yekaterinburg in Russia and the summit has become a yearly occurrence. South Africa was invited to join the grouping in December 2010.

There are many debates around the coherence of the BRICS grouping and whether each country has its place within the concept. Many debate for instance the appropriateness of adding South Africa within the group, as it is seemingly dwarfed by

¹⁶⁹ Andreas Goldthau, "Energy diplomacy in trade and investment of oil and gas," *Global energy governance: The new rules of the game* (2010).

its partners.¹⁷⁰ Others have voiced the opinion that the group should be shortened to BICS as Russia's economy has not performed as well as envisioned in the past decade.¹⁷¹ Likewise, recent events in Brazil have led some to question the country's ability to sustain high levels of growth.¹⁷² Other 'constellations' have been put forward such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) or BRICSAM (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico) with more valid argument regarding the inclusion of different countries.¹⁷³ All of which raise more questions over which countries should be included in this group of emerging powers: if BRICSAM includes Mexico, then South Korea should also be included? What space does that leave the MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey)? etc.¹⁷⁴

While the groupings are relevant and used in different discourses, BRICS remains the most widely used grouping, one that is a symptom of a rising multipolar world order.

3.2.2 The BRICS and the multipolar order

There is little doubt that these five countries are inherently different geopolitically, ideologically and culturally speaking. Despite these differences, the concept should not be dismissed, for what these countries perhaps lack in commonalities they make up in

¹⁷⁰ Francis A. Kornegay and Narnia Bohler-Müller, *Laying the BRICS of a new global order: from Yekaterinburg 2009 to eThekweni 2013* (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2013).

¹⁷¹ Snežina Michailova et al., *Russia: as solid as a BRIC?*, vol. 9, no. 1/2, 2013 (United Kingdom: Emerald Insight, 2013).

¹⁷² Steven M. Helfand and Antônio Márcio Buainain, "How did Brazil go from rising BRIC to sinking ship?," *The Conversation* 15 June 2016, <http://theconversation.com/how-did-brazil-go-from-rising-brid-to-sinking-ship-57029>.

¹⁷³ Andrew F. Cooper and Daniel Flesmes, "Foreign policy strategies of emerging powers in a multipolar world: An introductory review," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 6 (2013).

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

a shared goal: reforming global institutions and shifting global weight to the “Global South”.¹⁷⁵

“The increasingly dense networks between the five countries are based on a common goal: that is to advance the G20 and other new multilateral settings as an international forum and to counter what they perceive as an undemocratic and unjust Western-dominated multilateral world. The BRICS phenomenon should therefore be seen as reflecting a general shift in the international balance of power with the centre of gravity moving from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific area and from the North to the South.”¹⁷⁶

Under-representation of the developing world in multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank is among the top concerns of BRICS. The establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) by BRICS is an important example of counterbalancing of western powers by BRICS. For BRICS the NDB is about mobilising “resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging economies and developing countries, to supplement the existing efforts of multilateral and regional financial institutions for global growth and development.”¹⁷⁷ Many commentators have been sceptical of the achievability of this purpose, many criticising the vagueness of the statement and the lack of a clear

¹⁷⁵ Kornegay and Bohler-Müller, *Laying the BRICS of a new global order: from Yekaterinburg 2009 to eThekweni 2013*.

¹⁷⁶ Stephan Keukeleire et al., *The EU foreign policy towards the BRICS and other emerging powers: Objectives and strategies*, (Brussels: European Parliament 2011).

¹⁷⁷ 2013 BRICS Durban Summit, "Statement by BRICS Leaders on the Establishment of the BRICS-led Development Bank," 27 March 2013, <http://brics5.co.za/statement-by-brics-leaders-on-the-establishment-of-the-brics-led-development-bank/>.

infrastructure and objectives.¹⁷⁸ However, despite the diplomatic language used in their statement, Cooper and Flemes argue that the true purpose of the BRICS NDB is to create an alternative to the World Bank.¹⁷⁹

Andrew Cooper and Daniel Flemes talk about shared “politics of resentment”¹⁸⁰ among BRICS noting that BRICS “relate to the global system with a mutually reinforcing sense of historical grievances and claim to represent the interests of all developing countries.”¹⁸¹ Fabiano Mielniczuk shows through a study of the BRICS’ statements at the opening sessions of the UN General Assembly from 1991 to 2011 that there has been a convergence in their discourses regarding development and the international community. Indeed, he argues that within the last decade, Brazil, Russia and South Africa’s discourses have started to mirror those of China and India with what he identifies as a “move from a liberal–unilateral to a developmental–multipolar set of social claims.”¹⁸² Thus, he argues, creating a state of “discursive alignment”¹⁸³ within BRICS which has enabled their rise in international affairs.

So regardless of debates over the commonalities and differences within the BRICS or indeed on the economic weight and global influence these countries may hope to gain in the future decade, relevant literature finds that that these countries seek to update

¹⁷⁸ Gregory T. Chin, "The BRICS-led Development Bank: Purpose and Politics beyond the G20," *Global Policy* 5, no. 3 (2014).

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Cooper and Flemes, "Foreign policy strategies of emerging powers in a multipolar world: An introductory review." p951

¹⁸¹ Ibid. p 952

¹⁸² Fabiano Mielniczuk, "Brics in the contemporary world: Changing identities, converging interests," *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 6 (2013). p 1087

¹⁸³ Ibid.

and supplement an existing international order. Attention to discourses in previous studies of BRICS justifies a focus of this research on strategic narratives as they seek to influence other's perceptions of a global order and main players within it.

3.2.3 The BRICS and the EU

The BRICS concept is often seen as a powerful example of a changing world order. The power of the US is eroding and its long theorised unipolar hold on international politics in the post-Cold War era is weakened. "Rather than 'laying down the law' in a disciplinary manner, the USA must negotiate and bargain"¹⁸⁴ with these emerging powers which as discussed, have the ambition to change current international institutions. Likewise, the EU must cooperate with these powers and create ties if they are to remain relevant global powers in the future.

Cooper and Flemes argue that "as a result of the relative decline of the United States and the "old West" due to the emergence of new powers [...] one can already witness a shift towards a less transatlantic and less Eurocentric world."¹⁸⁵ They add that these circumstances have created major shifts in which actors are best able to influence global developments and that these changes have added "pressure on Europeans to fill the gaps and to rise to the challenges of both regional and global affairs."¹⁸⁶

In this context of rising multi-polarity in world politics, the study of the relationship

¹⁸⁴ Cooper and Flemes, "Foreign policy strategies of emerging powers in a multipolar world: An introductory review." p947

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Janis A. Emmanouilidis, "Europe's Role in the Twenty-First Century," in *The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe Can Shape a New Global Order*, ed. Thomas Renard and Sven Biscop (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2012). p83

between Europe and emerging actors is crucial. The BRICS are a key part of Europe's global strategy and ambition and the EU has set up strategic partnerships with each of these countries. The European Security Strategy first mentioned the concept of strategic partnerships in 2003 and today, the EU has ten strategic partners, including BRICS. Yet, as Sven Biscop and Thomas Renard note, the concept still somewhat lacks common understanding and clear objectives.¹⁸⁷ As a result, not all of the EU's strategic partnerships are alike. Thomas Renard argues that there are many distinctions between them, some are established or resurgent powers (Canada, Russia, the US and Japan), others are emerging actors (Brazil, India, China, South Africa, South Korea and Mexico).¹⁸⁸ He also divides them between essential partners (the US), pivotal partners (Russia, China, Brazil, India), natural allies (Canada, Japan, South Korea) and regional powers (Mexico and South Africa). Each partnership is different, with varying priorities and frameworks. However, regardless of content, each partnership makes a clear political statement about the importance of these countries to the EU's foreign policy. Together they are an indication of the strategic importance of these countries to the EU. Importantly for this research, EU dialogue with these actors on environmental issues, energy and climate change are some of the most developed aspects of the EU's strategic partnerships with emerging actors.¹⁸⁹ This suggests the

187 Thomas Renard and Sven Biscop, "The European Union as a security actor: Cooperative multilateralism," *Security and Human Rights* 21, no. 1 (2010). p14

188 Thomas Renard, "A Critical Assessment of the EU's Strategic Partnerships," in *The Routledge Handbook of European Security*, ed. Sven Biscop and Richard Whitman (2012).

189 Antoine Sautenet, "The EU's Strategic Partnerships with Emerging Powers: Institutional, Legal, Economic and Political Perspectives," in *The European Union and Emerging Powers in the 21st Century: How Europe Can Shape a New Global Order*, ed. Thomas Renard and Sven Biscop (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2012).

high priority assigned to these issues by both the EU and the BRICS.

3.2.4 The BRICS' role in Global Energy Governance

As discussed in previous chapters, the IEA predict global energy demand to rise by 30% to 2040.¹⁹⁰ Much of this increase in energy demand occurs in emerging countries where economic growth and growing population lead to an increase of energy use. Put simply, energy is an essential enabler of development. It is therefore a crucial issue for emerging countries; one that raises many important challenges for these countries and for the global community. One of the major concerns for emerging countries is securing energy sources. In order to do so they generally turn to fossil fuels as they are the most readily available and affordable source of energy. However, as the reality of climate change sinks in, they have become large markets for low carbon sources of energy as well, such as renewables and nuclear energy. As such, emerging countries have been important markets for global energy companies. Relevant for this research, they have been growing markets for France's energy sector, particularly that of nuclear energy.

The BRICS grouping include both emerging countries with fast growing energy demands (India, China and South Africa) and important energy producer with global ambitions (Brazil and Russia). In either case they are important partners for both the EU and France in terms of energy as they represent much potential. Other studies on EU-BRICS energy relations¹⁹¹ have excluded Russia from their frame of analysis,

¹⁹⁰ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2016*.

¹⁹¹ N. Chaban and M. Knodt, "Energy diplomacy in the context of multistakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS," *Cooperation and Conflict* (2015).

Michèle Knodt, Nadine Piefer, and Franziska Müller, *Challenges of European external energy*

because the relationship between Russia and the EU is materially different to that of other partners. Russia and the EU are interdependent in terms of energy, and thus their relationship is far more complex. However, as will be discussed, the EU and France's interests regarding Russia diverge. France's gas sector is more diversified, including more countries of origin than many other EU countries. Additionally, its economy relies on this source of energy to a lesser extent. Therefore, its relationship with Russia is very different to that of the EU more concerned with Europe's dependence on Russian gas. This important distinction necessarily influences the strategic relationships France and the EU have towards Russia and since this study is tasked with comparing their strategic narratives, Russia presents an important case study for these narratives.

3.3 Brazil

3.3.1 Energy in Brazil


A large share of Brazil primary energy production comes from renewable energy, making Brazil a comparatively clean energy producing actor. Much of this renewable energy is provided by large hydropower plants which account for around 80% of domestic electricity generation.¹⁹² However, concerns about environmental and indigenous rights have constrained the expansion of hydropower in recent years. Therefore, other sectors such as natural gas, oil, wind energy and biofuels are growing and expected to

governance with emerging powers (London: Taylor & Francis, 2015).

¹⁹² Oecd Publishing et al., *World energy outlook 2013* (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2013). p 303

continue to do so.¹⁹³

Figure 3.1: Primary energy consumption by fuel in Brazil in 2017¹⁹⁴



Like in France, the oil crisis in 1973 impacted Brazil's economy heavily. The country had been highly dependent on external oil supplies, importing 80% of its petroleum.¹⁹⁵ Political elites then sought to find ways to better Brazil's energy independence. In the early 70s, France turned to nuclear energy to decrease its dependence on fossil fuels, and besides produce weapon grade uranium for its military program.¹⁹⁶ Brazil on the other turned to two solutions: increasing the domestic oil production and encouraging

¹⁹³ Oecd Publishing, Agency International Energy, and Oecd Publishing, *World Energy Outlook 2013* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013).

¹⁹⁴ Data from BP, "BP statistical review of world energy 2018," 2018.

¹⁹⁵ Anil Hira and Luiz Guilherme de Oliveira, "No substitute for oil? How Brazil developed its ethanol industry," *Energy Policy* 37, no. 6 (2009).

¹⁹⁶ Central Bureau of Information, French Nuclear Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Program - An intelligence assessment, (September 1984).

the production of biofuels created from sugar canes.

In the early 1970s, the government obliged the national energy company, Petrobras, to engage and invest in the domestic exploration and production of oil products.¹⁹⁷ Domestic oil production started to grow in the mid-1980s with Petrobras investing in offshore oil fields. Andre Furtado notes that the domestic production of oil “jumped from the level of 8.4 million tons in 1979 to 28 million tons in 1985.”¹⁹⁸ Moreover, the discovery of large oil reserves offshore allowed the production to surge in the 1990s. By 2006, Brazilian oil production had reached near 90 million tons.¹⁹⁹ More discoveries of offshore oil have been made in the last decade with 63% of the global deep-water discoveries made in Brazil between 2010 and 2014.²⁰⁰ These discoveries have contributed to elevating Brazil’s global energy presence and importance²⁰¹ by making Brazil the world leader in deep water and ultra-deep-water production projects.²⁰²

De Jesus notes that a significant number of bilateral agreements have established cooperation regarding fossil fuels between Brazil and states around the world.²⁰³ He argues that the Brazilian government has used diplomatic tools to support Brazilian

197 Andre Tosi Furtado, "Structural Changes in the Brazilian Matrix," *Terræ* 6, no. 1 (2009). p43

198 Ibid. p45

199 Ibid. p 48

200 Kenneth Rapoza, "How Important Is Brazil To The World's Oil Market?," *Forbes* 15 June 2015, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2015/06/15/how-important-is-brazil-to-the-worlds-oil-market/#1b7dc8db831e>.

201 Ubiraci and Narciso, "Brazil as an International Energy Player."

202 US Energy Information Administration, "Offshore oil production in deepwater and ultra-deepwater is increasing," 28 October 2016, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=28552>.

203 Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, "Lighting the Fire: Brazil's Energy Diplomacy, 2003-2010," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 24, no. 3 (2013). p 504

companies abroad including Petrobras. He points to an increased leadership role in the International Energy Forum (IEF), where energy ministers gather informally to discuss issues relating to the oil and gas industries.

However, since 2014, Petrobras has been implicated in an important corruption scandal when an investigation found bribes had been given by Petrobras to politicians in return for contracts.²⁰⁴ The scandal has led to the bankruptcy of some Petrobras partners as well as the arrest of many Petrobras executives and Brazilian top officials involved in money laundering and fraud.²⁰⁵ It has also led to weakening of Petrobras' and indeed Brazil's international reputations with investors preferring other international companies involved in oil drilling in Brazil.

While discovery of offshore oil reserves has increased Brazil's international standing as an independent and somewhat controversial energy producing nation, its biofuel industry has made it an important and influential energy player. De Jesus points out that while bilateral agreements have been agreed upon in the area of fossil fuels, it's with biofuels that Brazil shine in multilateral settings.²⁰⁶

The origins of Brazil's ethanol policy date back to 1931 when the Brazilian government decided that small amounts of ethanol should be blended into petrol. Daniel Sperling noted that "the number of distilleries producing fuel-grade ethanol increased from one in 1933 to fifty-four in 1945."²⁰⁷ He also states that during the Second World War, with

204 Paulo Sotero, "Petrobras scandal: Brazilian Political Corruption Scandal," 12 July 2017, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Petrobras-scandal>.

205 Rapoza, "How Important Is Brazil To The World's Oil Market?."

206 Santos Vieira de Jesus, "Lighting the Fire: Brazil's Energy Diplomacy, 2003-2010." p504

207 Daniel Sperling, *New transportation fuels: a strategic approach to technological change* (Univ of California Press, 1990). p75.

the relative shortage of petrol, fuel could be up to 40% ethanol in some regions and that in 1966 a rule sought to encourage the use of up to 25% of ethanol towards fuel products. He concludes therefore that by the early 1970s, Brazil already had much experience in producing fuel-grade ethanol from sugar-canes. So, with the added benefit of stabilising the market for sugar cane products, it was an obvious choice of energy source for Brazil to turn to.

In November 1975, the government created the National Alcohol Program (ProAlcool). The policy had the double advantage of increasing independence and providing market growth and stability to sugar producers who were already an important part of Brazil's agricultural economy. ²⁰⁸ Over the next decade, the government sought to provide incentives for the production and use of ethanol as well as the production of alcohol-based cars. ²⁰⁹ Anil Hira and Luiz Guilherme de Oliveira argue that overall, with important investments in research and infrastructure and in providing support for the market, Brazil succeeded in creating a viable industry in the long term. ²¹⁰

Nuclear energy

A small percentage (around 3%) of Brazil's electricity is provided by nuclear energy. But Brazil's nuclear foreign policy has been an important turf for the country to exert its autonomy from other world powers, particularly that of the United States. In the early days, Brazil's nuclear programme was closely linked to the US. In the 1940s, President Getulio Vargas signed an agreement with the US government regarding the

²⁰⁸ Hira and de Oliveira, "No substitute for oil? How Brazil developed its ethanol industry."

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

exploitation of Brazilian uranium. Daniel Fledes argues that Brazil's leaders intended to supply the US with uranium in return for a technological transfer.²¹¹ Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus notes that the Baruch plan, proposed at the UN in 1947 by the US and which intended to eliminate nuclear weapons while allowing for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, was heavily criticised by Brazil's representative at the UN Atomic Energy Commission, Alvaro Alberto. He argued that "in practice, [the Baruch plan] guaranteed the US a monopoly on technology and nuclear materials in the West."²¹² However, the US government was reticent to let nuclear technology proliferate.²¹³

Alvaro Alberto would later become in the 1950s the leader of Brazil's nuclear research programme newly created under the national research council (Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas, CNPq). In this capacity, he proposed a diversification of international partners in the field in order to reduce Brazil's dependence on the US. It's around this time that Alvaro Alberto was allowed to send a delegation to Europe, particularly, France and West Germany to negotiate on nuclear cooperation. In West Germany, Alberto successfully negotiated for the delivery of ultracentrifuges build for uranium enrichment. However, the UK and the US, still occupying part of Germany, intercepted and banned the delivery.²¹⁴ In the mid-1950s with a new administration, Alberto was forced to leave office at the CNPq. This ushered a new phase of compliance with the US's foreign policy. In 1955, Brazil signed two agreement with the US. "One aimed at

²¹¹ Daniel Fledes, "Brazil's Nuclear Policy: From Technological Dependence to Civil Nuclear Power," *German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Papers* (June 2006).

²¹² Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, "In the search for autonomy: Brazil's foreign policy on nuclear issues (1940-2011)," *Global Change, Peace & Security* 24, no. 3 (2012).

²¹³ Fledes, "Brazil's Nuclear Policy: From Technological Dependence to Civil Nuclear Power."

²¹⁴ Santos Vieira de Jesus, "In the search for autonomy: Brazil's foreign policy on nuclear issues (1940-2011)."

strengthening the cooperation in development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and established the cooperation in construction and operation of research reactors. The other established a joint program for research and investigation of natural uranium fields in Brazil.”²¹⁵

As mentioned, the oil crisis of the 1970s deeply affected Brazil’s economy and deepened the need for the country to find alternative energy sources. Nuclear then became an important strategy to achieve energy independence. Ernesto’s Geisel’s government sought to do just that. Brazil’s first nuclear reactor, Angra 1 was built by the American nuclear energy company Westinghouse. The reactor was started in 1971 under the US’s Atoms for peace program,²¹⁶ and entered commercial operations in 1985. However, as noted by Fledes, Brazil was unable “to free itself from the technological dependence from the US.”²¹⁷

In 1975, the government signed a cooperation agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany on the peaceful uses on nuclear energy. The agreement provided for eight nuclear plants to be built in Brazil with German technology.²¹⁸ Fledes argues that Washington was still reticent to see nuclear technology being transferred to Brazil. He notes that both the Ford and Carter administrations threatened the West German government with economic sanctions. Fledes points to Brazil’s intention to allow a transfer of technology to other developing countries as the main reason for

²¹⁵ Ibid. p.369

²¹⁶ Nathan E Hultman et al., "Factors in low-carbon energy transformations: Comparing nuclear and bioenergy in Brazil, Sweden, and the United States," *Energy Policy* 40 (2012).

²¹⁷ Fledes, "Brazil’s Nuclear Policy: From Technological Dependence to Civil Nuclear Power." p12

²¹⁸ World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Brazil," (April 2017).

Washington's reticence.²¹⁹ "On the one side the U.S. government feared the destabilization of the international system and a reduction of its global dominance. On the other side well developed commercial interests came into play, since the U.S. delivered 90% of the reactors traded on the world market at the end of the 1970s."²²⁰ The U. S. insisted that the Brazilian government ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Economic difficulties in Brazil along with internal pressures in West Germany led the Bonn government to impose a moratorium on the agreement to postpone it for four years.²²¹ In the end after much delay, Angra II commenced commercial operations in 2000.²²² Angra III which is still under construction, is now through a series of acquisitions under the direction of the French company Areva. It is important to note that unlike in other BRICS countries, the Areva contract for Angra III is not a result of French nuclear diplomacy but a consequence of Siemens' nuclear business merging with Framatome in 2001 which later became known as Areva.²²³ However, Areva halted the construction of Angra III in 2015 due to difficulties securing the necessary funding.²²⁴

219 Fletes, "Brazil's Nuclear Policy: From Technological Dependence to Civil Nuclear Power."

220 Ibid. p13

221 Ibid.

222 World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Brazil."

223 Areva., "Project file: ANGRA 3 Nuclear Power Plant," 2013, http://www.areva.com/mediatheque/liblocal/docs/Clients/Project-profile/AREVA_ProjectProfile-Angra3-14112013.pdf.

224 Areva, "Brazil: Areva temporarily reduces activities in the Angra 3 project," 26 June 2015, <http://www.areva.com/EN/news-10551/brazil-areva-temporarily-reduces-activities-at-the-angra-3-project.html>.

Energy diplomacy

As previously mentioned, offshore oil discoveries have increased Brazil's status as a global energy player. However, it is Brazil's renewable energy that remains at the centre of its energy diplomacy efforts. Sybille Roehrkasten argues that "the high share of renewables in the Brazilian energy mix and its international pioneering in transforming the transport sector constitute two important sources of soft power in international relations."²²⁵

Today, Brazil is one of the largest ethanol-fuel producing countries, only preceded by the US.²²⁶ Brazil's ethanol industry has become a platform for the country's strategy to become a leader in global energy governance. Roehrkasten highlights that President Lula de Silva made the promotion of biofuels one of Brazil's top priorities in foreign policy, noting that he "engaged in highly visible ethanol diplomacy."²²⁷ She adds that since Lula's departure from office, this policy has continued but with lower visibility. This renewable energy soft power is further enhanced by concerns over climate change, an issue that Andréa Freire Lucena and Murillo Machado Santos argue has emphasised in its energy diplomacy particularly in promoting biofuels.²²⁸

Brazil has been particularly active in promoting biofuels in the Global South,

²²⁵ Sybille Roehrkasten, "Brazil: Long Tradition of Renewables-Based Energy Supply and Ethanol Diplomacy," in *Sustainable Energy in the G20* (2016). P29

²²⁶ Aline Ribas and Roberto Schaeffer, "Brazil-EU Energy governance: Fuelling the Dialogue Through Alternative Energy Sources," in *Challenges of European external energy governance with emerging powers*, ed. Michèle Knodt (Burlington, VT;Farnham, Surrey, England;: Ashgate, 2015).

²²⁷ Roehrkasten, "Brazil: Long Tradition of Renewables-Based Energy Supply and Ethanol Diplomacy."

²²⁸ Andréa Freire Lucena and Murillo Machado Santos, "Brazil: a world energy superpower?," *Meridiano 47 - Journal of Global Studies* 16, no. 152 (2015).p39

Roehrkasten, "Brazil: Long Tradition of Renewables-Based Energy Supply and Ethanol Diplomacy."

particularly in African countries. Africa is particularly attractive to Brazil's ethanol industry for two important reasons: geography and history. Geographically, many African countries have the right type of climate to grow sugar cane. Coupled with the availability of land in Africa, this represents an opportunity for Brazil which is unrivalled in the South American and Asian continents.²²⁹ Moreover, Brazil has important historical and cultural ties to Lusophone countries in Africa such as Angola and Mozambique, due to a shared colonial history.²³⁰

3.3.2 EU Brazil energy relations

Diplomatic relations with the EU began in the 1960s and were further deepened with Portugal and Spain's accession to the EEC in 1986.²³¹ In 1992, the Framework Agreement for Co-operation brought the EU and Brazil together with the basis for a legal framework.²³² Finally, in 2007, the strategic partnership was established between Brazil and the EU. Aline Ribas and Roberto Schaeffer point out that since then, the trade relationship between Brazil and the EU has grown, with the EU becoming Brazil's most important trading partner.²³³

Multiple dialogues and forums on energy have been established between the EU and

²²⁹ Stravos Afionis et al., "Unpacking Brazil's Leadership in the Global Biofuels Arena: Brazilian Ethanol Diplomacy in Africa," *Global Environmental Politics* 16, no. 3 (2016).

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ribas and Schaeffer, "Brazil-EU Energy governance: Fuelling the Dialogue Through Alternative Energy Sources."

²³² Hultman et al., "Factors in low-carbon energy transformations: Comparing nuclear and bioenergy in Brazil, Sweden, and the United States."

²³³ Ribas and Schaeffer, "Brazil-EU Energy governance: Fuelling the Dialogue Through Alternative Energy Sources." p188

Brazil, including the EU-Brazil Regular Energy Policy Dialogue between the Commission's DG energy, the EEAS, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Mines and Energy. At the first EC-Brazil Regular Energy Policy Dialogue, the parties agreed on three objectives: (1) an exchange of knowledge and experience on best practice in the area of energy policy, particularly regarding energy security, competitiveness and sustainability; (2) a dialogue on the future of oil and biofuel technologies; (3) and a dialogue on "possible strategies for the development of a secure and sustainable energy."²³⁴

Sustainable and renewable energy has been an important aspect of the dialogue between the EU and Brazil, however, in practice cooperation between the two in this area has been challenged, particularly for biofuels. Indeed, EU-Brazil relations have been impacted by the development of EU standards on biofuels. Rhetorically, the EU argues that these standards have been implemented due to concerns regarding the sustainability of biofuel production.²³⁵ However, in practice, these standards have been branded as protectionist rules by Brazil.²³⁶ Stavros Afionis and Lindsay Stringer note in fact that "the normative power perspective is largely unable to explain why an actor so keen on promoting the environmental sustainability of international biofuels trade, actually impedes imports of biofuels that are far more efficient compared to

²³⁴ European Commission, "EC-Brazil Regular Energy Policy Dialogue, Terms of Reference," (5 July 2007 2007).

²³⁵ Stavros Afionis and Lindsay C. Stringer, "The environment as a strategic priority in the European Union–Brazil partnership: is the EU behaving as a normative power or soft imperialist?," *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 14, no. 1 (2014).

²³⁶ Stavros Afionis and Lindsay C. Stringer, "Promoting biofuels in developing countries through trilateral cooperation: Brazilian perceptions of the European Union and the United States in biofuels governance," *SRI Working Paper No. 82*. (May 2015).

their heavily subsidized domestic counterparts.”²³⁷

3.3.3 France- Brazil energy relations

For two countries that share a border (through the French department of French Guyana), a stronger relationship in the field of energy could be expected. Bilateral cooperation between Brazil and France in the field of energy is limited. In 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy and Silvio Lula signed an action plan for their strategic partnership for increased political dialogue, economic and commercial cooperation and cooperation on issues such as defence, sustainable development, space, education and nuclear energy. The two countries declared that they share similar visions in term of sustainable development and climate change. However, tangible partnerships are lacking. As discussed, Brazil has developed large capacities in terms of renewable energy. It has a large hydro-energy industry, it has developed capacities in terms of biofuels like sugarcane ethanol, all of which make it one of the cleanest energy producing countries in the world. In addition to this Brazil has shown much potential with regards to offshore oil extraction. Yet France has made few efforts to promote its own energy industry in the country, certainly not at the same level as with other BRICS actors such as Russia and China.

Interestingly, parallels can be drawn between Brazil’s promotion of its biofuel industry and France’s promotion of nuclear energy. Both industries were developed in their respective countries around the same time and for the same reason, namely reducing dependence on external imports of fossil fuels. Today both countries seek to promote


²³⁷ Afionis and Stringer, "The environment as a strategic priority in the European Union–Brazil partnership: is the EU behaving as a normative power or soft imperialist?." p61

these industries externally in order to give their domestic industry a competitive edge and take a leadership role in international energy negotiations. To do so they both draw on the threat of climate change to justify their policies.

3.4 Russia

3.4.1 Energy in Russia

Figure 3.2: Primary energy consumption by fuel in Russia in 2017²³⁸



Russia energy sector has been described as a pillar of its economy.²³⁹ With a strong reliance on energy exports, Russia's economy is very vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity prices, particularly oil prices.²⁴⁰

²³⁸ BP, "BP statistical review of world energy 2018."

²³⁹ International Energy Agency, *Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries: Russia 2014* (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2014).

²⁴⁰ Michael Bradshaw and Richard Connolly, "Barrels and bullets: The geostrategic significance of Russia's oil and gas exports," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 72, no. 3 (2016).b

Gas and oil export dependence

Russia is the biggest energy producer of BRICS. According to the US Energy Information Administration, Russia was the third biggest oil producer in 2018 and second largest producer of gas in 2017.²⁴¹ Additionally, according to BP statistics, Russia was the largest energy exporter in 2017.²⁴² This makes Russia one of the most important energy players in the world.²⁴³ However, Russia's economy is highly dependent on the prices of fossil fuels. Andreas Benedictow et. al. demonstrated that, between 1999 and 2008, Russia's economic growth was closely tied to increasing oil and gas prices.²⁴⁴ Reversely, oil prices decline in 2008 and 2014 adversely affected Russia's economy.²⁴⁵ The high importance of energy to Russia's economy means that energy decisions are made at the highest levels of government.²⁴⁶ This is demonstrated by the role that state-owned energy companies play in energy production. The oil company Rosneft produces nearly 50% of the country's oil and Gazprom 75% of gas production.²⁴⁷ It is also exemplified by the role of President Putin who generally make key decisions in the sector.²⁴⁸

This economic dependence on hydrocarbon exports means that the Russian system is in dire need of reform.

²⁴¹ Energy Information Administration, "Russia."

²⁴² BP, "Country Insight - Russia."

²⁴³ Tatiana Mitrova, "The geopolitics of Russian natural gas," (2014).

²⁴⁴ Benedictow, Fjærtøft, and Løfsnæs, "Oil dependency of the Russian economy: An econometric analysis."

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Mitrova, "The geopolitics of Russian natural gas."

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

²⁴⁸ Gazprom, "Nord Stream and South Stream strengthening ties between Russia and Europe," news release, 26 March 2014.

Nuclear energy

First of all, it should be noted that, historically, the USSR was a strong actor in nuclear energy since the 1950s, a heritage that should not be underestimated.²⁴⁹ However this chapter will focus on nuclear energy in the modern Russian state.

In 1998, the Russian Government approved the 'Program for the Development of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation in 1998-2005 and for the period up to 2010.' According to this program, 16 new reactors were to be put online by 2010. The aim of the program was to create the conditions for a move towards large-scale nuclear energy development and to contribute to the Russia's energy security. It also mentioned the importance of expanding exports of nuclear technologies to other countries.²⁵⁰

In 2007, the Russian government created the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom to oversee all things nuclear, including medical radiation, atom bombs, submarine propulsion and, of course, energy.

Despite the initial failure of the Russia's nuclear ambitions, in 2007, Rosatom planned the construction of over 30 reactors by 2020.²⁵¹ In 2014 these predictions were reduced, but Rosatom still expected the construction of 12 reactors by 2020. In fact, only three new reactors were completed after 2010.²⁵² In 2017, Russia had 35 reactors in operation and 9 reactors under construction on its territory.²⁵³ Moreover, Rosatom

249 Tatiana Kasperski, "Une transition vers plus de nucléaire ? Analyse comparée des politiques énergétiques russe et ukrainienne," [A transition to more nuclear power? Comparative analysis of Russian and Ukrainian energy policies.] *Revue internationale de politique comparée* 24, no. 1 (2017).

250 Ibid.

251 Ibid.

252 Ibid.

253 Ibid.

is involved in the construction of reactors outside Russia's borders in Iran, Turkey, Belarus, China and India.

Kasperski argues that this nuclear revival in Russia conveyed an attractive image of its technological greatness, including its international reach through an aggressive export policy for nuclear technologies in other countries. This image was well inscribed in a state nationalism that the Kremlin promoted in the 2000s and that mobilized a vision of a glorious Soviet past, as well as images of a modern, technologically advanced and even Westernized Russia in the present and future.²⁵⁴ This argument is highly reminiscent of the Hecht's argument on the role of nuclear energy in the identity and development of the modern French nation.²⁵⁵

3.4.2 EU Russia Energy relations

It should be noted that the energy relationship between the EU and Russia is quite complicated and merits a thesis of its own. This section can only summarise a multifaceted energy relationship. As mentioned in the previous chapter, many EU member states have a high dependence on Russian gas supply.²⁵⁶ This dependence governs the relationship between Russia and the EU.

Interdependence between Russia and the EU gradually developed from the 1970s around the first major agreements with specific EU member states (Austria 1968, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1973, Italy and Finland in 1974). Through Gazprom, which holds a monopoly exports to Europe, Russia supplied almost 40% of EU imports

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Hecht, *The radiance of France: nuclear power and national identity after World War II*, New.

²⁵⁶ Magdalena Spooner et al., *Member states' energy dependence: an indicator-based assessment*.

in 2018.²⁵⁷ Additionally, 30% of the EU's oil supplies and 34% of its coal is imported from Russia.²⁵⁸ Conversely, two-thirds of Russia's total gas exports are destined to the EU.²⁵⁹ As mentioned, since Russia's economy is reliant on hydrocarbon exports, the EU energy market is a determining factor of Russian economic growth.²⁶⁰

From 2006 to 2009, conflictual gas relations with its neighbours -- through which gas destined to the EU transits (Belarus and Ukraine) -- complicate the relationship between Russia and the EU.²⁶¹ These complications culminate in 2014, at the time of Russia's annexation of Crimea which caused the diplomatic isolation of Russia, through the use of economic sanctions from the EU. Russia then launched a counter-manoeuve to establish an anti-Western front. In May 2014, Beijing and Moscow announced the signing of an agreement of a record \$ 400 billion for gas supply contract.²⁶² Another consequence of the conflict in Ukraine is the cancellation of the South Stream project.²⁶³

Finally, Russia and the EU conflict over issues of competition in the energy market. For the EU, energy must be managed by a market-based competition regime. However, Gazprom's monopoly over the transit of gas to Europe led to an investigation of the company by the EU commission.²⁶⁴

257 Catherine Locatelli and Mehdi Abbas, "Interdépendance complexe et hybridation des modèles institutionnels nationaux: le cas des relations énergétiques UE-Russie," (2019).

258 Ibid.

259 Ibid.

260 Ibid.

261 Julien Vercueil, "La Russie et l'Union Européenne. Une relation nécessaire, mais non suffisante," (2017).

262 Ibid.

263 Ibid.

264 Locatelli and Abbas, "Interdépendance complexe et hybridation des modèles institutionnels

3.4.3 France Russia energy relations

Russia and France cooperate in the use of mineral oil, gas and in the fields of innovation in energy and energy efficiency.²⁶⁵

On February 10, 2003, Russia and France signed a 'Joint Declaration for Russian-French cooperation in the energy sector,' in which both countries expressed their intention to deepen relations in this area. They expressed interest in attracting investment by French companies in extraction and production of hydrocarbons in Russia.²⁶⁶

On 18 November 2011, during then French prime minister Francois Fillon's visit to Moscow, Russia and France agreed on a declaration of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, in which both countries expressed that nuclear energy is an essential component in the strategies both countries. They mention the need for dialogue on energy in the spirit of strengthening the protection of the environment, improvement of the international nuclear security regime.²⁶⁷

The participation of the French energy companies in Russian energy projects are important pillars in economic relations between the two countries. GDF Suez and EDF have both been involved in the pipeline projects Nord Stream and South Stream. The French oil company Total and the Russian independent gas company Novatek signed a deal recently on extraction of liquefied natural gas in the Arctic, giving Total a 10%

nationaux: le cas des relations énergétiques UE-Russie."

265 A Jatkina, A Bykova, and Veronika Mikhailovna Rostovtseva, "La coopération de la Russie et de la France dans la sphere de lenergie" (paper presented at the Linguistic and cultural traditions and innovations: a collection of materials of the XIV International Scientific and Practical Conference, Tomsk, November 12-15, 2014 — Tomsk, 2014., 2014).

266 Ibid.

267 Ibid.

stake in a plant.²⁶⁸

In June 2012, a memorandum was signed between the Russian company Rosatom and the French agency for management of radioactive waste (ANDRA) in order to develop cooperation between the two countries in order to improve technologies on the treatment of radioactive waste.

3.5 India

3.5.1 Energy in India

National Energy Policy

The most significant trend affecting India's energy sector is the country's rising demand for energy. India's energy demand is rocketing with energy use almost doubling from 2000 to 2015, the country has been responsible for a 10% increase in global energy demand.²⁶⁹

This trend has affected India's energy policy which is faced with three important challenges, namely energy access, energy security and fighting climate change.²⁷⁰

In 2013, India became the world's third largest producer of electricity, behind Japan and Russia.²⁷¹ Yet, energy consumption per capita remains far below the global

²⁶⁸ Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, "Total signs deal to take stake in \$20bn Novatek Arctic LNG project," *Financial Times* 6 March 2019.


²⁶⁹ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015* (London;Paris;: Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2015).

²⁷⁰ International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues* (London;Paris;: Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2015).

²⁷¹ Lata Tripathi et al., "Renewable energy: An overview on its contribution in current energy scenario of India," *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 60 (2016).

average, with many areas in energy poverty. The IEA estimates that almost a quarter of India's population does not have access to energy.²⁷² This is the major challenge India is facing in terms of energy, and indeed economically, since energy access is indisputably related to development.²⁷³ As India strives to provide energy access to its entire population, its energy consumption is expected to continue to rise rapidly.

*Figure 3.3: Primary energy consumption by fuel in India in 2017*²⁷⁴



However, with rising energy demand comes the challenge of finding energy sources to meet this demand. This imperative has led to an increased dependence on energy imports (oil, coal and natural gas). The IEA notes that from 1990 to 2009, “as total energy imports increased from 34 Mtoe to 236 Mtoe, India’s import dependence

²⁷² International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

²⁷³ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015*. p427

²⁷⁴ BP, "BP statistical review of world energy 2018."

increased from 11% to 35%.”²⁷⁵ However energy imports tend to be unreliable. Price fluctuations or supply disruptions can have an important negative impact on India’s economic policy and energy access. India seeks therefore to increase its national energy production and diversify its energy mix.

Accounting for 7% of total global emissions, India was the world’s fourth largest emitter of carbon dioxide in 2015 behind China, the US and the EU. ²⁷⁶ The country’s emissions continue to grow with a 5.1% increase in 2015, compared with 2014. ²⁷⁷ With an energy mix highly dependent on fossil fuels and rising energy demand, this trend is likely to continue and India will likely overtake the EU by 2020. ²⁷⁸

While Indian politicians and public opinion accept the existence of climate change and its negative impacts, priority is given to growth and development. At UN Climate change conferences, India is generally opposed to any binding agreements on cutting carbon emissions, taking the view that India is less responsible for carbon emissions than developed countries and that the country needs to develop and industrialise. ²⁷⁹ Nevertheless, India ratified the Paris agreement in October 2016 and pledges to make efforts to cut back the rate at which its emissions are increasing. ²⁸⁰ With a strong

²⁷⁵ International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

²⁷⁶ Jos G.J. Olivier et al., *Trends in global CO₂ emissions: 2016 Report*, ed. PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and European Commission Joint Research Centre (2016).

²⁷⁷ Ibid. p30

²⁷⁸ Ibid. p30

²⁷⁹ International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

²⁸⁰ BBC News, "India ratifies Paris climate agreement," 2 October 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37536348>.

dependence on fossil fuels, particularly coal to provide energy to the country, this will go through diversifying its energy sources towards more carbon neutral sources like renewables or nuclear energy.

Meeting demand with fossil fuels

As mentioned, India's energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels, with 44% of India's primary energy mix supplied by coal, 23% by oil and 6% by natural gas.²⁸¹ The share of fossil fuels in India's energy mix has risen steadily as the population moves to urban centres and reduce consumption of biomass, traditionally used for cooking.

Coal

India's economic growth since the 1990s has been largely powered by coal.²⁸² A resource that the country holds in large quantities. In 2010, it was estimated that India had the third largest reserves of coal and was the third largest producer and consumer of coal in 2011, after the US and China.²⁸³ Moreover, the IEA predicts that it will surpass the US and become the second largest consumer by 2025. So, coal due to its availability and affordability will continue to be the backbone of Indian growth for the next couple of decades at least.

With energy security one of the country's priorities, India has sought to increase its domestic production of coal. James Goodman qualifies India's coal policy as a 'coal rush.'²⁸⁴ In 2015, the Indian government announced a plan to increase the country's

281 International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015*. p 431

282 J. Goodman, "The 'climate dialectic' in energy policy: Germany and India compared," *Energy Policy* 99 (2016).

283 International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

284 Goodman, "The 'climate dialectic' in energy policy: Germany and India compared." p18

coal production from 603 million tonnes to 1.5 billion tonnes by 2020.²⁸⁵ While the IEA's predictions seem to put in doubt the achievability of this policy, it illustrates well India's energy thirst and endeavour to satiate it with coal.

There are however a number of challenges faced by the coal industry in India. The Coal India Limited (CIL), India's biggest player in the coal mining industry, produces about 80% of India's domestic coal.²⁸⁶ However, this big state-owned company is deemed to have low productivity in part due to low availability of modern mining equipment and infrastructure. Moreover, the quality of domestic coal reserves is low, which affects the efficiency of coal power plants and structural impediments have slowed the expansion of the coal production industry in India.²⁸⁷

In part due to these challenges, imports of coal have risen in order to meet the growing energy demand. The country is one of the biggest importers of coal and the IEA expects it to become the largest importer by 2020.²⁸⁸

Oil and Natural Gas

India's third largest energy source after coal and biomass is oil. While India has some oil reserves, with proven reserves of 5.7 billion barrels in 2014, the country is heavily reliant on imports, largely from the Middle East and Africa.²⁸⁹ As discussed, this dependence on imports is a severe weakness for India and with demand for oil

²⁸⁵ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015*. p514

²⁸⁶ International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

²⁸⁷ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015*.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. p519

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

increasing this dependence will continue to rise.

However, while natural gas only represents 6% of India's energy mix, reserves are in a much healthier state with 7.9 trillion cubic meters recoverable resources from conventional and unconventional extraction.²⁹⁰ Important discoveries in the early 2000s raised expectations, but recent production numbers have not met projections.²⁹¹ As production of older gas fields stagnates, these new discoveries were predicted to compensate the decline, but the government was obliged to review its projections. Consequently, while over a quarter of India's total gas supply is imported, imports are predicted to rise significantly.²⁹²

Fossil fuels are expected to continue to play an important role in India's energy mix. However, due to concerns for the country's energy security and preventing climate change, India seeks to diversify its sources of energy further.²⁹³

Increasing capacity through nuclear energy and renewable energy

Renewable Energy

In 2014, renewables accounted for 28% of India's energy mix, however this figure tends to be skewed by the wide-spread use of biomass as cooking fuel.²⁹⁴ Nevertheless, growth in the sector is expected to take the share of renewables up to 40% of India's

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Madhura Joshi and Swati Ganeshan, "India-Eu Energy Relations: Towards Closer Cooperation?," in *Challenges of European external energy governance with emerging powers*, ed. Michèle Knodt (Burlington, VT;Farnham, Surrey, England;: Ashgate, 2015).

²⁹⁴ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015*.

energy mix by 2040.²⁹⁵

Solar power

In 2009, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM) policy planned to reach 20GW solar power capacity by 2022. This policy has been the starting point for an important momentum in solar energy development in India.²⁹⁶ The goal was subsequently increased to 100 GW by the Modi government in 2015. Despite this policy, solar energy still represents a more than negligible share of India's total energy mix, amounting to less than 1%.

In the future however, India could use solar energy to phase out of fossil fuels as well as increase its energy security and reduce its gas emissions. The country has an important potential for solar energy with many regions favourable for solar technologies.²⁹⁷ The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy in India notes that solar energy is the most secure source of energy by virtue of its availability.²⁹⁸ In the short term at least, newly installed capacity will help meet rising demands.

The goal of the JNNSM was to make India a world leader in solar energy, including encouraging domestic production of low-cost solar panels.²⁹⁹ In order to develop manufacturing in India, the JNNSM requires that solar PV projects use Indian

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Komali Yenneti, "The grid-connected solar energy in India: Structures and challenges," *Energy Strategy Reviews* 11-12 (2016).

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, "Mission Document: Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission: Towards Building Solar India," (2009).

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

components. However, this policy has been heavily criticised by those who think that there should be a learning period for India to produce high quality equipment at competitive prices and that the domestic content policy will slow down expansion of solar capacity due to a bottle-neck effect. Others argue that the rule goes against the WTO rules. American solar companies particularly have voiced their disagreement with the policy. ³⁰⁰

Wind power

In 2015, India had the fourth most installed wind capacity in the world behind China, the US and Germany, and overtaking Spain. The country has currently 26GW wind power capacity and aims to reach 60GW by 2022. ³⁰¹ The recent push for wind energy could also place India in the top three wind energy markets by 2022. ³⁰² A number of estimates have been made about the potential for wind energy, but the latest estimates by the National Institute of Wind Energy are assessed to be the most reliable by the IEA. ³⁰³ They place India's onshore wind potential from 102GW to 302GW. ³⁰⁴ This means there is much potential for wind energy in India.

³⁰⁰ International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

³⁰¹ Global Wind Energy Council, "Global Wind Report Annual Market Update 2015," (2016).

³⁰² Sanjay Kumar Kar, "A Short Review of Wind Energy Progress in India," *Current Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports* 3, no. 3 (2016).

³⁰³ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015*.

³⁰⁴ Kar, "A Short Review of Wind Energy Progress in India."

Nuclear Energy

India has a long history with nuclear energy. Atomic research began before independence was won and while India remained open to foreign assistance, particularly from the US and Canada, it built its first indigenous research reactor as early as 1956.³⁰⁵ Its first commercial reactor, built with US assistance started commercial operations in 1969.³⁰⁶

In 1974, following a nuclear bomb test, the US and Canada stopped assisting India's nuclear program and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) placed restrictions on India obtaining nuclear fuel, technology and expertise.³⁰⁷ Moreover, India has remained outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), taking the view that the regime, instead of helping to eradicate nuclear weapons, maintained the status-quo, allowing Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to retain their nuclear armaments while prohibiting others from obtaining them.³⁰⁸ This decision however had the effect of excluding India further from the global nuclear community.³⁰⁹

India's nuclear program, designed by Dr. Homi Bhabha, the first Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has a three-stage strategy designed to utilise thorium, present in large quantities in India.³¹⁰ The first stage entailed the construction of mainly

³⁰⁵ A. Vinod Kumar, "India's nuclear energy renaissance: stuck in the middle?," *Journal of Risk Research* 17, no. 1 (2014).

³⁰⁶ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2015*.

³⁰⁷ Vinod Kumar, "India's nuclear energy renaissance: stuck in the middle?."

³⁰⁸ A. Vinod Kumar, "Between Idealism, Activism, and the Bomb: Why did India reject the NPT," in *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty: origins of the nuclear order*, ed. Roland Popp, Liviu Horovitz, and Andreas Wenger (Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY;: Routledge, 2017).

³⁰⁹ International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) fuelled with natural uranium. It is currently the most completed step of the three-stage program.³¹¹ The second stage involved building Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) which not only produces more fissile material than it uses, but, through indigenous technology, could be used to convert thorium into uranium.³¹² In the long-term India aims to deploy thorium-based power plants. However, the feasibility of this project remains challenged.³¹³ India remains committed to the program however, having much more secure resources of thorium than of uranium.

Despite the restrictions placed on the country, “India remained steadfast in its resolve to develop nuclear power technologies and achieved several notable successes.”³¹⁴ India’s indigenous nuclear program is well regarded around the world particularly its thorium-based reactor expertise.³¹⁵ Siegfried S. Hecker, Professor at Stanford University and emeritus director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, wrote about India’s nuclear program: “Constrained by sanctions, India developed most of its nuclear energy capabilities indigenously, especially its excellent nuclear R&D; the extent and functionality of its nuclear experimental facilities are matched only by those in Russia and are far ahead of what is left in the US. I believe India has the most

311 Vinod Kumar, "India's nuclear energy renaissance: stuck in the middle?."

312 Ibid.

313 International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

314 R. B. Grover, "Opening up of international civil nuclear cooperation with India and related developments," *Progress in Nuclear Energy* (2016).

315 Maseeh Rahman, "How Homi Bhabha's vision turned India into a nuclear R&D leader," *The Guardian* 1 November 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/nov/01/homi-bhabha-india-thorium-nuclear>.

technically ambitious and innovative nuclear energy program in the world.”³¹⁶

In July 2005, US President George W. Bush and India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an agreement under which the US would assist India in accessing global nuclear trade in return for “India’s commitment to separate its civilian and nuclear facilities, and put the civilian facilities under IEAE safeguards.”³¹⁷ In September 2008, the NSG lifted its restrictions on India³¹⁸ and India signed a Safeguards agreement with the IAEA in February 2009.³¹⁹

Vinod Kumar point out that India’s “return to the non-proliferating mainstream and participation in global nuclear commerce seemed promising at first glance, especially as it entailed uninterrupted access to fissile materials, new generation reactor technologies, rapid expansion of nuclear power generation and the liberty to export its nuclear know-how – all of which were expected to initiate tremendous growth of India’s nuclear energy industry, and in the process create a renaissance of sorts.”³²⁰

Today, India counts 22 operational reactors with a nuclear energy production capacity of 6.7GW.³²¹ Despite India’s long history with nuclear energy, the share of nuclear energy in India’s total energy mix is limited, representing less than 2%.³²²

Since the NPR waiver, India has proved to have a hunger for uranium, making

316 Siegfried S. Hecker, "Adventures in scientific nuclear diplomacy," *Physics Today* 64, no. 7 (July 2011).

317 Vinod Kumar, "India’s nuclear energy renaissance: stuck in the middle?."

318 Ibid.

319 International Atomic Energy Agency, "India Safeguards Agreement Signed," 2 February 2009, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/india-safeguards-agreement-signed>.

320 Ibid.

321 BBC News, "India will build 10 new reactors in huge boost to nuclear power," (18 May 2017),

322 Government of India and Ministry of Power, "Executive Summary Power Sector," (April 2016).

agreements with France, Russia, Kazakhstan, Canada, Australia and mineral rich African countries for the import of uranium. ³²³ Along with these agreements was “the promise of initiating a sweeping expansion of the nuclear energy sector in the country,” ³²⁴ by building new power plants with foreign support. Thus, six projects have been announced including projects led by Areva, Westinghouse, General Electric-Hitachi and Rosatom. Yet, with India remaining an exception under the NPT, many countries remain reticent to allow transfer of technology to India. In this, France has been an exception. ³²⁵

There have been however some remaining challenges to India’s nuclear program. Post-Fukushima, public sentiment towards nuclear energy has been increasingly negative with growing concerns over the safety of nuclear plants. At times, construction of power plants and uranium mines have been delayed due to protests from local populations.³²⁶

3.5.2 EU-India relations

India was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the EEC in the 1962.

In 2004, India and the EU became strategic partners and signed a Joint Action Plan in 2005. Already then, energy figured as one of the strategic sectoral dialogues with the EU recognising that India’s energy policy was “based on overstretched domestic

³²³ Vinod Kumar, "India’s nuclear energy renaissance: stuck in the middle?."

³²⁴ Ibid. p50

³²⁵ Ibid. p53

³²⁶ International Energy Agency, *Understanding Energy Challenges in India: Policies, Players and Issues*.

coal production.”³²⁷ The Commission then proposed to work with India in diversifying its energy mix and collaborating on best policy practice. The Joint Action Plan and the EU- India Energy Panel that has met every year since 2005, established three working groups in the following domains: (1) Energy efficiency and renewable energies; (2) Coal and clean coal conversion technologies; (3) Fusion energy including India’s membership in ITER.³²⁸ Despite not being part of the NPT, India became an ITER partner in 2005. Like many other partners, India’s contribution to the project is in the form of components manufactured in India.³²⁹

The Joint Work Programme on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change was adopted during an EU-India Summit in 2008 and was further enhanced in 2012 and 2016. This work programme includes initiatives to collaborate in areas such as off-shore wind farms, clean coal technologies, smart grids and more generally on energy security, safety and sustainability.³³⁰

It is also important to note that dialogue on the environment has also been at the forefront of EU-India relations.

³²⁷ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee - an EU-India Strategic Partnership {SEC(2004) 768}, (16/06/2004).

³²⁸ Council of the European Union, "The India-EU Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan," (7 September 2005).

³²⁹ Shazia Aziz Wülbers, *The Paradox of EU-India Relations: missed opportunities in politics, economics, development cooperation, and culture* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011).

³³⁰ Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration for Enhanced Cooperation on Energy between the European Union and the Government of India, (New Delhi 10 February 2012).

3.5.3 France Bilateral Energy relationship with India

After the NSG restrictions were lifted, Nicolas Sarkozy took the opportunity to initiate nuclear energy diplomacy with India in September 2008, when Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh visited France. Together they signed an Agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation. Soon after, the first import of natural uranium arrived in India from Areva.³³¹ During Sarkozy's visit to India in 2010, Areva and NPCIL signed a General Framework Agreement and an Early Works Agreement for the implementation of EPR reactors in Jaitapur.³³² Finally, two memorandums of understanding were signed between Areva and two Indian companies (L&T, Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd.) during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit in April, 2015.³³³

3.6 China

3.6.1 Energy in China

China and Global Energy Governance

China is the world biggest energy consumer (23% of global energy consumption) and producer (19% of global energy supply) in the world.³³⁴ It also the largest importer of oil, of coal and the largest emitter of carbon dioxide.³³⁵ It goes without saying that this places China at the centre of all discussions about global energy governance. Domestic energy trends in China deeply affect the world's energy trends. For instance,

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Government of India and Ministry of External Affairs, "India – France Relations," 2015, accessed 15/09/2016, 2016, http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/France_2015_08_31_en.pdf.


³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ International Energy Agency, "China's Engagement in Global Energy Governance," (2016).

³³⁵ Ibid.

the US Energy Information Administration reports that in 2014, “China’s oil consumption growth accounted for about 43% of the world’s oil consumption growth.”³³⁶

*Figure 3.4: Primary energy consumption by fuel in China in 2017*³³⁷



The IEA points to an increased awareness of the importance of global energy governance by the Chinese government noting that “in recent decades, China’s position in global energy governance has shifted from that of outsider to insider, follower to influencer, its presence and influence increasing gradually.”³³⁸ Looking at China’s energy policy framework, they note that global energy governance was first mentioned in the 12th Five-year energy plan (2010-2015) and has since been a feature

336 US Energy Information Administration, "China," 2015, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/China/china.pdf.

337 Data from BP, "BP statistical review of world energy 2018."

338 International Energy Agency, "China's Engagement in Global Energy Governance." p7

of China energy policy. This is a clear sign that China seeks to engage in international energy cooperation not just through bilateral arrangements but also through multilateral frameworks. The IEA points out that growing interdependence between China and the rest of the world as well as an evolution of China's view of its global engagement and the nature of the global order have contributed to China's growing leadership in global energy governance. ³³⁹ Tracing China's engagement in international energy frameworks they assert that at a time when China was completely energy independent, the country kept itself isolated from the international community, however with increased demand of energy and therefore increased dependence on imported sources of energy, China has become an important voice and influence in global energy governance. ³⁴⁰

However, there remains some challenges to China's involvement in global energy governance. The IEA itself admits that China does not "fully accept the existing global energy architecture." ³⁴¹ In fact, while China established co-operation with the IEA in 1996, it is not a member of the organisation. Gaye Christoffersen notes that China is reluctant to join the IEA due to the requirement of holding a 90-day reserve of oil which would force China to disclose petroleum data to the IEA. ³⁴² So, while China has had an increased involvement in international energy frameworks, it continues to mistrust institutions that it views as serving western interests rather than the international

339 Ibid.

340 Ibid.

341 Ibid. p12

342 Gaye Christoffersen, "The role of China in global energy governance," *China Perspectives* 2016, no. 2 (2016).

community.³⁴³ Christoffersen argues that China's current domestic energy governance does not allow it to work well within energy institutions created by the West. Moreover, criticism from established institutions such as the IEA have not been met favourably in China. Calls from the IEA to take more responsibility in reducing carbon emission were rejected for instance on the grounds that China owes the world no responsibility regarding its energy consumption.³⁴⁴ So, despite increased involvement in global energy governance, China's relationship with existing structures remains strained. Nevertheless, China recognises the need to have a structure governing energy relation and wishes to have a leading role in global energy cooperation. Thus, Christoffersen argues that "Chinese energy diplomacy has [...] concentrated on constructing an alternative energy governance structure in the BRICS organisation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and in Central Asia through the Silk Road Initiative."³⁴⁵

China and Climate Governance

China has been a member of the UNFCCC from the beginning, taking part in all the climate change negotiations. Like India it has always refused take responsibility for global carbon emission and therefore has resisted the establishment of binding targets to cut down on emissions. In 2009, at the Copenhagen conference, China was held largely responsible for what has been dubbed: "the failure of Copenhagen."³⁴⁶ At the time, the

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid. p19

³⁴⁵ Ibid. p15

³⁴⁶ Lucy Hornby and Christian Shepherd, "China learns lessons of past failures ahead of Paris climate talks," *Financial Times* 29 November 2015, <https://www.ft.com/content/480e813a-8f81-11e5-a549->

US attempted to make an international fund to help developing countries with the challenges of climate change conditional on a binding agreement on the reduction of emissions. ³⁴⁷ China refused to commit to targets and was generally uncooperative, arguably trying to undermine Barack Obama's climate leadership. ³⁴⁸ By contrast, China's action during the Paris agreement was met with largely positive responses and has been regarded as one of the leaders in the negotiations. ³⁴⁹ This has been a significant shift in China's foreign policy and climate policy.

As the IEA report argues, China has come to the realisation that its domestic energy interests align with global objectives in energy security and sustainable development. ³⁵⁰ As such, China's role in energy and climate governance has changed significantly over the years.

Since 1995, China has known important peaks in energy demand, however with many energy intensive industries on the decline and a slowing of economic growth, the rate of demand growth has reduced in recent years. ³⁵¹ In effect China energy demand will continue to grow but a slower pace.

China's most important challenge today regarding energy policy is sustainability. In recent years, smog and haze has been an important environmental issue worrying the

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³⁴⁷ John Lee, "How China Stiffed the World in Copenhagen," *Foreign Policy* 21 December 2009, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/12/21/how-china-stiffed-the-world-in-copenhagen/>.

³⁴⁸ Mark Lynas, "How do I know China wrecked the Copenhagen deal? I was in the room," *The Guardian* 22 December 2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas>.

³⁴⁹ Shannon Tiezzi, "China Celebrates Paris Climate Change Deal," *The Diplomat* 15 December 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/china-celebrates-paris-climate-change-deal/>.

³⁵⁰ International Energy Agency, "China's Engagement in Global Energy Governance."

³⁵¹ Ibid.

Chinese public and sparking the Chinese government into action on sustainability. ³⁵²

With the 12th Five-Year Plan, the government made transitioning to low carbon energy sources a major goal for the 2011-2016 period. ³⁵³ While the 11th Five-Year Plan had the goal of reducing China's energy intensity, the 12th plan goes further with a target of reducing by 17% the country's carbon intensity over the period. ³⁵⁴

Fossil Fuels

Coal remains the backbone of China's energy mix, but with an ongoing diversification policy, the share of coal in China's electricity production has stagnated and the IEA expects nuclear energy and renewables to meet the country's rising energy needs in the future. ³⁵⁵

China is largely self-sufficient in natural resources, with vast coal resources. However, with energy consumption increasing rapidly in the early 2000s, China went from a major coal exporter in 2003 (second to Australia) ³⁵⁶ to a net coal importer by 2009. ³⁵⁷ Likewise, domestic oil production in China is expected to stagnate with the largest oil fields in the country reaching the peak of their production, leading to an increased

³⁵² X. Tang et al., "Dilemmas for China: Energy, Economy and Environment," *Sustainability* 7, no. 5 (2015).

³⁵³ International Energy Agency, "China's Engagement in Global Energy Governance."

³⁵⁴ Jun Li and Xin Wang, "Energy and climate policy in China's twelfth five-year plan: A paradigm shift," *Energy Policy* 41, no. 1 (2012).

³⁵⁵ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2016*.

³⁵⁶ Tang et al., "Dilemmas for China: Energy, Economy and Environment."

³⁵⁷ International Energy Agency, "China's Engagement in Global Energy Governance."

dependence on imports. ³⁵⁸ Finally, imports for natural gas have been increasing to meet the rapidly growing gas demand.

Renewable energy

As discussed, sustainability is one of the major challenges to China's energy policy. Therefore, the use of renewable energy is an important part of the country's energy policy.

China has established renewable energy programs since the mid-1990s however, renewable energy really became a policy issue in 2005 with the introduction of the Renewable Energy Law (REL). ³⁵⁹ The REL set important rules for the development of renewable energy. For instance, it requires that the government set a goal for the growth of renewable energy in its energy policy. ³⁶⁰

Currently, China's proportion of renewable energy in its energy mix remains below the global average. ³⁶¹ Based on IEA statistics, renewable energy represents 23% of China's electricity production, with hydro representing 81% of these renewables. ³⁶²

Despite this, China has become a world leader in terms of renewable energy generation

³⁵⁸ Tang et al., "Dilemmas for China: Energy, Economy and Environment."

³⁵⁹ Zhang Peidong et al., "Opportunities and challenges for renewable energy policy in China," *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 13, no. 2 (2009).

Feng Wang, Haitao Yin, and Shoude Li, "China's renewable energy policy: Commitments and challenges," *Energy Policy* 38, no. 4 (2010).

³⁶⁰ Wang, Yin, and Li, "China's renewable energy policy: Commitments and challenges."

³⁶¹ D. H. Zhang et al., "Present situation and future prospect of renewable energy in China," *Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews* 76 (2017).

³⁶² International Energy Agency, "Statistics: China," 2014, <http://www.iea.org/statistics/statisticssearch/report/?year=2014&country=China&product=ElectricityandHeat>.

along with the European Union. ³⁶³ Whereas a decade ago, Chinese renewable energy in electricity supply represented only 1.2% of the global total, it now represents around 17% of it. ³⁶⁴ China's has put important effort in increasing its renewable energy capacity. In 2015, China's wind energy capacity additions represented half of the global total, it overtook Germany as the country with the most solar PV capacity and its solar thermal capacity represents around 70% of the global total. ³⁶⁵

Nuclear Energy

In parallel to its renewable energy policy, China has also been seeking to increase its nuclear energy capacity. Currently, nuclear energy represents only 4% of China's electricity production, however, the 13th Five-Year Plan expects this share to rise to 10% by 2030.

While China developed nuclear technology for military purposes in the 1960s, China has been a relative newcomer to nuclear energy with its first civil reactor coming online in 1994. ³⁶⁶ However today the country counts 57 reactors either in operation (37) or under construction (20). ³⁶⁷ While other countries have been deterred from pursuing nuclear energy programs by the Fukushima accident, the Chinese government's plan seem to have gone forward unhindered.

³⁶³ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2016*.

³⁶⁴ Zhang et al., "Present situation and future prospect of renewable energy in China."

³⁶⁵ International Energy Agency, *World Energy Outlook 2016*.

³⁶⁶ F. Fiori and Z. Zhou, "A study on the Chinese nuclear energy options and the role of ADS reactor in the Chinese nuclear expansion," *Progress in Nuclear Energy* 91 (2016).

³⁶⁷ International Atomic Energy Agency, "Country Statistics: China," <https://www.iaea.org/pris/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=CN>.

3.6.2 EU-China Energy relations

The EU dialogue with China on energy is one of the most developed of the BRICS with many agreements, summits and working groups set up between the two partners.

Energy discussions between the EU and China began in 1981 when the Commission sent a delegation from DG Energy to China.³⁶⁸ The China-EEC Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the first official agreement mentioning energy as an area for cooperation, was signed in 1985. In 1994, the China-EU Energy Conference was set up between DG Energy and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and brings together energy businesses and experts from Europe and China every few years. DG Energy and MOST have also set up a working group connecting government officials and experts from both side every year since 1995.³⁶⁹

So, EU-China cooperation over energy matters has featured in their relationship for many decades. However, in the last decade, the two have intensified this aspect of their relationship. In 2005, the EU signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China's primary policy maker in the area of energy.³⁷⁰ The MoU created the Strategic Dialogue on Energy and Transport Strategies which set up a dialogue between DG Energy and the National Energy Administration (NEA), one of the top bodies in China for the creation and implementation of energy policies.³⁷¹

368 Zha Daojiong and Suet-Yi Lai, "China-EU Energy Governance: What Lessons to be Drawn?," in *Challenges of European external energy governance with emerging powers*, ed. Michèle Knodt (Burlington, VT;Farnham, Surrey, England;: Ashgate, 2015).

369 Ibid.

370 Ibid.

371 Ibid.

There are many other dialogues set in place around energy between China and the EU. The main topics of discussions are the development of renewable energies and energy efficiency, sustainability, energy security and urban development.

These dialogues have resulted in concrete partnerships between the EU and China, such as initiatives for research, training, and technology transfer.³⁷²

However, this idyllic picture of energy relations has been somewhat over-shadowed by trade controversies in the EU.

3.6.3 France Chine Energy relations

The bilateral energy relationship between France and China is focussed around two main areas of cooperation, nuclear energy and climate change.

Nuclear energy cooperation between France and China dates back three decades with the signature in 1982 of an agreement between the French Commission of Atomic Energy (Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives (CEA)) and the Chinese ministry for nuclear industry. Following this, French nuclear reactors were built in China initiated by the Daya Bay reactors in 1994. More recently, French energy actors have been contracted to build EPR technology reactors for the Taishan nuclear power plant currently under construction in the Guangdong region.

Beyond this industrial partnership, the two countries also enjoy a strong partnership in research and development, with the creation of laboratories shared by CEA and Chinese research institutes and the exchange of Chinese researchers and engineers who have studied in one of the CEA's research centres.

³⁷² Ibid.

During a state visit by the Chinese Prime-minister to France in July 2015, the two countries reiterated their willingness to establish a durable partnership in the area with the signature of a joint declaration on the deepening of Franco-Chinese cooperation in nuclear energy.

Coming up to 2015, climate change took a central role in the bilateral relations between France and China. With the COP21 taking place in Paris in December 2015, France took a leadership role in trying to get China to accept more ambitious targets in the fight against climate change.³⁷³ The two countries have a partnership in developing energy efficient urbanism in China with for example the ADEME and the FFEM financing a program on “energy efficiency and sustainable development in construction in China.”³⁷⁴


3.7 South Africa

3.7.1 Energy in South Africa

373 https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_web_final_1-1.pdf p29

374 http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/France_Chine_BAT_Light18_10_2010.pdf p 15

Figure 3.5: Primary energy consumption by fuel in South Africa in 2017³⁷⁵



Dependence on Coal

South Africa's coal reserves make it one of the biggest producers of coal in the world and one of the top net exporters.³⁷⁶ A large portion of all coal used in African countries is of South African sources. The country has taken advantage of this geological feature and uses coal to produce approximately 71% of its primary energy³⁷⁷ and around 90% of its domestic output.³⁷⁸ Many have ascribed South Africa's dependence on coal to path dependence.³⁷⁹ The reserves of coal in the country have allowed South Africa to

³⁷⁵ Data from BP, "BP statistical review of world energy 2018."b

³⁷⁶ International Energy Agency, "Key World Energy Statistics," (2016).

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ International Energy Agency, "Africa Energy Outlook," (2014).

³⁷⁹ Agathe Maupin, "South Africa - EU Energy Governance: Tales of Path Dependency, Regional Power and Decarbonization," in *Challenges of European external energy governance with emerging powers*,

provide its citizens low cost electricity for many years and well as self-sufficiency and independence. Until 2008, South Africa had the cheapest energy prices in the world.³⁸⁰ However, constraints on infrastructure has driven electricity prices up. Electricity prices provided by the state-owned utility company Eskom, tripled from 2005 to 2014.³⁸¹ Eskom has been obliged to buyback electricity from high-intensity users who were therefore paid to scale back production.³⁸²

Moreover, this dependence on coal has its drawbacks on sustainability, which has led South Africa to seek alternative sources of energy such as renewable energy, gas and nuclear energy.

Renewable energy

In 2009, at the Copenhagen Conference, South Africa pledged to reduce its carbon emissions by 34% by 2020 and 44% by 2025. In 2011, the SA Department of Energy (DoE) launched the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Program (REI4P), an initiative aimed at increasing the renewable energy capacity of SA by 17.8GW by 2030.³⁸³ Its objectives are threefold: the reduction of SA's carbon

ed. Michèle Knodt (Burlington, VT; Farnham, Surrey, England;: Ashgate, 2015).

Lucy Baker, Peter Newell, and Jon Phillips, "The Political Economy of Energy Transitions: The Case of South Africa," *New political economy* 19, no. 6 (2014).

S. Scholvin, "South Africa's Energy Policy: Constrained by Nature and Path Dependency," *Journal of Souterhn African Studies* 40, no. 1 (2014).

³⁸⁰ Baker, Newell, and Phillips, "The Political Economy of Energy Transitions: The Case of South Africa."

³⁸¹ International Energy Agency, "Africa Energy Outlook."

³⁸² Baker, Newell, and Phillips, "The Political Economy of Energy Transitions: The Case of South Africa."

³⁸³ David Richard Walwyn and Alan Colin Brent, "Renewable energy gathers steam in South Africa,"

intensity, creating additional energy capacity and creating opportunities for development.³⁸⁴ The policy had some success in opening up the market to new providers in a short time frame and producing renewable energy at competitive rates.³⁸⁵

Gas

Potential reserves of shale gas have opened up the possibility of using gas as an alternative to coal. The South African government issued exploration license to a number of national and international companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, Falcon Oil and Gas and Bundu Gas & Oil.³⁸⁶

Nuclear energy

South Africa has two nuclear reactors which generate around 5% of its energy needs.³⁸⁷ The power plant, build by Framatome (now Areva), came online in 1984. In 2006 the government of South Africa decided to increase its nuclear capacity to meet its energy needs. The Nuclear Energy Policy planned to build six new nuclear power plants by 2030. Westinghouse and Areva which were both short-listed for South Africa's plans.

Renewable & sustainable energy reviews 41 (2015).

384 Ibid.

385 Ibid.

386 Bruno G. Pollet, "Current energy landscape in the Republic of South Africa," *International journal of hydrogen energy* 40, no. 46 (2015).

Wendell Roelf, "South Africa may award first shale gas exploration licenses by end-Sept," *Reuters* 15 May 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-shalegas-idUSKCN18BoWE>.

387 World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in South Africa," Update June 2017, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/south-africa.aspx>.

However, in 2008, South Africa pulled out from either bid due to financing issues. ³⁸⁸ Since then South Africa has been courted by many international nuclear energy companies such as Rosatom with which the government signed an agreement in September 2014. ³⁸⁹ That same year, South Africa signed nuclear cooperation agreements with France and China and similar agreements exist with the US and South Korea. In 2015, the government renewed its call for bids for the construction of nuclear power plants. Westinghouse, Rosatom, SNPTC, KEPCO and Areva/EDF were all invited to make proposals. There are no official decisions from the South African government at the time of writing.

3.7.2 EU-South Africa Energy relations

The EU is recognised in South Africa as a potential partner to overcome the energy challenges it faces. Bilateral energy cooperation between the EU and South Africa takes place within the framework of the Strategic Partnership through an energy dialogue forum. The EU has recognised South Africa's need for infrastructure and in 2013, ahead of the EU-South Africa summit, approved a financial assistance program for infrastructure development. ³⁹⁰ The EU is also interested in assisting South Africa in a path towards sustainability and has helped in the creation of clean coal working group and has provided financial assistance to carbon storage projects. ³⁹¹

³⁸⁸ Ibid.

³⁸⁹ Ibid.

³⁹⁰ Maupin, "South Africa - EU Energy Governance: Tales of Path Dependency, Regional Power and Decarbonization."

³⁹¹ Rahman, "How Homi Bhabha's vision turned India into a nuclear R&D leader."

3.7.3 France-South Africa Energy Relations

President Francois Hollande and President Jacob Zuma signed in 2014 a nuclear cooperation agreement with an important focus on energy. As has been discussed, for South Africa, France and more particularly Areva/EDF are important potential partners in building new nuclear capacity. For France, energy is seen as a facilitator of development in South Africa. ³⁹²

3.8 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to establish the energy policies and situations in the BRICS and their energy relationships with the BRICS. By focussing in the EU and France's energy diplomacy efforts, this chapter contextualises the interests that the EU and France have in their external energy policies aimed at the BRICS. This will help contextualise the strategic interests that – it is hypothesised – will guide the formation of France and the EU's strategic narratives. This theoretical perspective will be explained in the following chapter.

³⁹² Ambassade de France à Pretoria, "Les relations économiques entre la France et l'Afrique du Sud", <http://www.ambafrance-rsa.org/Relations-economiques,1416>.

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework

4.1 Introduction

Constructivism is the broad theoretical approach adopted in this research on a macro-level. The first part of this chapter will detail this approach starting with the assumptions of the way international relations are governed. This discussion is crucial to delineate the ways this research conceives international system in which state actors interact with other non-state actors (including supranational ones). In particular, the section will specify how the research is informed by a constructivist understanding of state identity, a concept of central importance in this study. Its relation to the so-called supranational identity will be also considered.

The second and third parts of this chapter will then detail the theories of strategic narrative³⁹³ and cascading activation framing³⁹⁴ – the meso- and micro-level theories respectively.

In the concluding section, this chapter elaborates how both theories are synergised innovatively and propose a new explanation in understanding how states form narratives about their own identity, that of other actors and the nature of the international scene itself. In the former model, a key concept of *strategic narrative* guides this research. Strategic narrative is defined here “representations of a sequence of

393 Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3.

Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin, "Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power," *Media, War & Conflict* 7, no. 1 (2014).

Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, *Forging the World Strategic Narratives and International Relations*.

394 Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*.

events and identities, a communicative tool through which political actors - usually elites - attempts to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political objectives.”³⁹⁵

The theory postulates the three levels of strategic narratives (*identity, issue and systemic*) and argues three phases in the narrative cycle (*formulation, projection and reception*). Strategic narratives theory is the main theoretical lens through which France’s formulations and communications of global energy governance are analysed vis-à-vis the EU’s formulations and communications. Strategic narratives may be directed to external and/or domestic audiences. It is the *domestic* dimension in the life-cycle of a narrative which is in the main research focus here.

The latter theory of cascading activation contributes another key concept – the one of *framing*. Framing is defined in this analysis as the selection of “some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”³⁹⁶ By conceptualising the spread of frames and ideas about foreign policy through society as a cascading activation, Entman proposes that higher levels of government administration have the most independence and power in shaping and spreading these frames. He also prescribes a special role to mainstream media in activating and disseminating these frames.

The thesis argues an innovative synergy between these two theoretical models. In the

395 Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle, *Forging the World Strategic Narratives and International Relations*.

396 Robert M. Entman, "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (1993).

most recent revision of his theory, Entman argues that “framing research [offers] critical insights into the influences of communication on consciousness, behaviour and power.”³⁹⁷ As such, Entman’s theory on cascading activation framing helps conceptualise the ways in which strategic narratives formulated and projected by the government and ruling elites are projected through the media to the public.

This research asks:

- 1) How is a strategic policy area of external energy relations formulated and communicated at the domestic level of an EU member state (case of France)?
- 2) How do the EU’s narratives about global energy governance (communicated by French opinion-makers) relate to France’s narratives in the same issue-area?

This analysis hypothesises that the EU’s particular energy interests and policies will direct the way the EU frames and projects itself as a *sui-generis* international energy actor (**H1**). It is logical to expect that France’s energy concerns and energy policies will resonate with the EU’s energy positions, including parallels between France’s and the EU’s narratives of global energy governance and relations with global energy actors (**H2**). France, after all, is an EU member state.

However, as has been discussed earlier, France is a particular energy actor within the EU. It has distinct interests and priorities in this issue-area, often different to other EU countries. This underlines an expectation that there will be areas of external energy

³⁹⁷ Robert M. Entman and Nikki Usher, "Framing in a Fractured Democracy: Impacts of Digital Technology on Ideology, Power and Cascading Network Activation," *Journal of Communication* 68, no. 2 (2018).

policy in which France's national interest will differ from the interests of the EU as a whole. Respectively, this may trigger France-specific energy-related narratives different to the narratives formulated and projected by the EU (**H3**).

This research also hypothesises that France's local concerns and self-visions will frame France's strategic narratives on relations with external energy actors (**H4**). Here, official state actors will seek to frame other actors in a way that legitimates their foreign policy actions in the eyes of national constituencies. In addition, French narratives on external energy policies will be heavily influenced by the political concerns of the elected leaders of the country (**H5**). Changes in ideology at the higher levels of government may impact visions of France's key interests in global energy governance. For example, leaders with a stronger market focus are likely to view France's interests in shale gas differently to environmentally driven leaders.

Once formed, strategic narratives with the strongest internal coherence will resonate more when projected in France's local media (**H6**). Finally, French strategic narratives will resonate more in French local newspapers than EU strategic narratives and frame the presentation of external energy actors (**H7**).

4.2 Macro-level Theoretical Approach: Constructivism

The overarching theoretical approach for this research lies within the realm of constructivism. Constructivist outlook, which developed in international relations (IR) theory in the late 1980s-early 1990s, was a reaction to the dominant realist and liberal thought paradigms. As a point of distinction, theories within a broader constructivist approach postulate that states' interests are socially constructed and that they need to

be interpreted as “consequences of collective meaning.”³⁹⁸

This ontological approach has been increasingly popular in IR. It also has gained many followers within European integration studies. Much work in IR has conceptualised the relationship between international actors to be driven almost entirely by material forces, such as power and interests.³⁹⁹ However, the works of Michel Foucault on the knowledge/power nexus,⁴⁰⁰ Antonio Gramsci on hegemony⁴⁰¹ and Max Weber’s differentiation between power and authority⁴⁰² have paved the way for a new conceptualisation of the structure of international politics,⁴⁰³ one that puts emphasis on the social construction of international relations. In 1989, Nicholas Onuf, coined the term “constructivism”. Having doubts about the centrality of anarchy in the international system, Onuf argues that “we construct worlds we know in a world we do not”⁴⁰⁴ and that states themselves operate in a constructed world. The theory was then taken up by Alexander Wendt, who argued that this new conception has for goal to “reclaim power and interest from materialism by showing how their content and

398 Ben Rosamund, "New Theories of European Integration," in *European Union Politics*, ed. Michelle Cini (2007).

399 Alexander Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, vol. 67 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

400 Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, *Power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980).

401 Antonio Gramsci and David Forgacs, *The Gramsci reader: selected writings, 1916-1935* (New York: New York University Press, 2000).

402 Max Weber, *Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology*, vol. 2 (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).

403 Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998).

404 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of our making: rules and rule in social theory and international relations* (Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 1989). p38

meaning are constituted by ideas and culture. ⁴⁰⁵ Likewise, John Ruggie argues that “ideational factors have normative, as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place.” ⁴⁰⁶

Since then, constructivist works have shown that identity and norms play an important role in states’ conduct of foreign policy. Important for our research, this theoretical approach has been used increasingly in EU studies offering explanations to events and phenomena to explain the phenomenon of a supra-national entity, not for seen by realist and liberal thinkers. The end of the Cold War particularly challenged these theories and revealed their shortcomings to accurately predict the behaviour of states – and supranational entities -- in the post-modern era.

One of the major criticisms that have been made of constructivism is a lack of clear definition. Indeed, given the multiplicity of approaches which have been described as constructivist, there is little agreement within the field about what it entails specifically. ⁴⁰⁷ It is therefore important that this research list the assumptions it makes in order to define the strand of constructivism it places itself under.

4.2.1 Reflexive and rationalist poles

This analysis shares one particular maxim of constructivism -- “the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on

⁴⁰⁵ Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, 67. p371

⁴⁰⁶ John Gerard Ruggie, *Constructing the world polity: essays on international institutionalization* (New York;London;: Routledge, 1998). p33

⁴⁰⁷ Maja Zehfuss, "Constructivism in International Relations," *Cambridge University Press* (2002). p6

dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.”⁴⁰⁸ According to the Checkel, constructivist thought makes two assumptions about how international politics work: “(1) the environment in which agents/states take action is social as well as material; and (2) this setting can provide agents/states with understandings of their interests (it can ‘constitute’ them).”⁴⁰⁹ The first assumption, he explains, means that while there are some material truths within our environment, these are necessarily given meaning through socialised interpretation. The second reflects the interactions between structures and agents theorised in constructivist thinking as mutually constitutive. These two assumptions inform this research.

Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Antje Wendt draw on the constructivist theorizing in IR and analyse them in relations to European integration.⁴¹⁰ They argue that constructivist approaches “bridge the gap” between rationalist and post-modernist theories. They add that different approaches within constructivism may relate to rationalist and reflexive approaches to a certain degree, but, essentially, all of them “share a research interest in the influence of soft institutions such as ideas, norms, and rules on the one hand and/or sociological factors, such as identity, discourse, and language, on the other.”⁴¹¹

408 Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (London and New York Routledge, 2005). p 90

409 Checkel, "The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory." p 326

410 Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen, and Antje Wiener, *The social construction of Europe* (Thousand Oaks, Calif;London;: SAGE, 2001).

411 Antje Weiner, "Constructivism and Sociological Institutionalism," in *Palgrave Advances European Union Studies*, ed. Michelle Cini and Angela K. Bourne (Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).p 43

4.2.2 Identity in constructivism

Central to the ideas of constructivism in IR is the concept of identity and since primary unit in international relations are states, *state identity*. These identities in constructivism are formed by social structures. Alexander Wendt defines identity as “a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor’s self-understandings.”⁴¹² He argues however that identities are formed both internally and externally since interaction with other actors will also define identity. He then argues that states are actors in which individuals generate a shared identity. Wendt distinguishes two types of state identity. Corporate identity is that which a state places upon itself. He explains that it refers to state’s “constituent individuals, physical resources, and the shared beliefs and institutions in virtue of which individual function as a “we.””⁴¹³ By comparison, social identities are formed through interaction with other actors, be they domestic or external. Perceptions of the “Other” and potential demarcations between “Self” and “Other” can give us information about how an actor sees itself.⁴¹⁴ It is assumed that perceptions and images of international relations and partners will influence the behaviour, policies and actions of actors. As Emanuele Castano, Sacchi and Gries argued, images and perceptions are the “key to interpreting the action.”⁴¹⁵ Likewise, Siamak Movahedi argues that, “images and perceptions of other nations provide the basic framework within which the conduct of international relations and conflict resolution takes

412 Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, 67. p67

413 Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State."

414 Iver B. Neumann, "Self and other in international relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (1996).

415 Emanuele Castano, Simona Sacchi, and Peter Hays Gries, "The Perception of the Other in International Relations: Evidence for the Polarizing Effect of Entitativity," *Political Psychology* 24, no. 3 (2003).

place.”⁴¹⁶ It is therefore important to understand the perceptions of these actors in order to understand what might be the impact of their actions and how these are interpreted.

Constructivist research assumes that the identity of states is variable, and depends on particular social or political contexts.⁴¹⁷ This assumption is particularly important for this research since it is primarily concerned France’s identity with regards to energy plays a role in how France portrays itself as an actor in global energy governance domestically and internationally. Moreover, identity also plays an important role in the way actors define their interests. Unlike a rationalist understanding where interests are defined by the material world, constructivists see them defined by a state’s conception of its identity. As such interests along with identity can change over time. Wendt argues that “interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests.”⁴¹⁸

The definition of interests based on identity has important implications for the formation of collective identities. Wendt conceptualises identification on a continuum from positive to negative. Negative identification with another actor will elicit a more self-interested response. By comparison, positive identification, one where an actor will perceive similarities with another actor will generate more collective action.⁴¹⁹ This rationale is used to then explain the formation of supra-national entities such as the

416 Siamak Movahedi, "The Social Psychology of Foreign Policy and the Politics of International Images," *Human Affairs* 8 (1985).

417 Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory."

418 Wendt, *Social theory of international politics*, 67.

419 Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State."

EU, where individual states may put aside perceived self-interests for the benefit of the collective.

The process through which states take on norms and practices is identified by Bearce and Bondanella as international socialisation.⁴²⁰ International socialisation theories have looked extensively at how the political actors of member states are influenced by norms and practices at the European level. Socialisation is defined by Checkel as: “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community. Its outcome is sustained compliance based on the internalization of these new norms. In adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequence to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions”⁴²¹ Checkel emphasises the importance of understanding the macro-micro level linkages within socialisation. He points out that while much focus has been placed on micro-level analysis to analyse socialisation empirically, the question of how socialisation on the micro level interacts with the macro level is of value.

4.3 Meso-Level Theory: Strategic Narratives

4.3.1 Strategic Narratives and Constructivism

Strategic narratives is one of the theories within a constructivist tradition that “examines how political actors use narratives that address actors’ inter-subjectivity

⁴²⁰ David H. Bearce and Stacy Bondanella, "Intergovernmental Organizations, Socialization, and Member-State Interest Convergence," *International Organization* 61, no. 4 (2007).

⁴²¹ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (2005).

and subjectivity (conception of self) strategically in pursuing foreign policy goals.”⁴²² In doing so, the authors of the theory (Miskimmon, O’Loughlin and Roselle) attempt to conceptualise the role of narratives in larger theoretical debates about the construction of order in international relations. ⁴²³ They argue that strategic narratives are useful in understanding the construction and changing nature of identity in international relations as well as the behaviour of actors.⁴²⁴ To them, “actors work to frame their own character and that of others, by selecting and highlighting some facets of their history or actions in order to promote a particular interpretation and evaluation of their character.”⁴²⁵

Strategic narratives both structure the behaviour of actors at the same time as they are conceptualised by them. Thus, strategic narrative theory places itself clearly at the theoretical junction of reflexive and rationalist thinking.⁴²⁶ However, different works give more or less weight to the agent or the structure depending whether they take a more rationalist or reflexive point of view. From a reflexive perspective, structures such as narratives impose meanings and identities on agents. Rationalist studies focus on the agent’s ability to select and create characterisations. ⁴²⁷

Theoretically, this study is primarily concerned with the two phases in the life-cycle of the strategic narrative -- *formation* and *projection*. Strategic narratives are created by

⁴²² Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3. P31

⁴²³ Ibid. p1

⁴²⁴ Ibid. p32

⁴²⁵ Ibid. p5

⁴²⁶ "Strategic Narratives Methods and Ethics," in *Forging the World*, Strategic Narratives and International Relations (University of Michigan Press, 2017).

⁴²⁷ Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, *Strategies for research in constructivist international relations* (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2007). p 66

political actors in order to influence the structure of international relations. The research can be placed therefore in the latter group. However, strategic narratives also address the other end of the spectrum since narratives once received, seek to constrain other actors understand of the world. Laura Shepard argues that strategic narratives therefore address both rationalist and reflexivist perspectives arguing that “at the ‘thin end’, of the spectrum are highly rationalist approaches, which presuppose a rational actor working with language to attain a particular outcome, and at the ‘thick end’ of the spectrum are post- structural approaches, which investigate the ways in which the actors and their structural contexts are co-constituted through discourse.”⁴²⁸

Finally, as discussed by Thomas Risse, while the distinction between the rationalist and reflexive perspectives are theoretically useful, they are by nature ideal types. Indeed, he argues that “the controversies [between the two theoretical poles] mainly focus on how far one can push one logic of action to account for observable practices and which logic dominates a given situation.”⁴²⁹ Actors in the real world will necessarily be influenced by both their rational choice as well as guided by rules and norms. The theoretical model for this research will include variables with both rationalist and reflexive aspects.

4.3.2 Phases and types of strategic narratives

Miskimmon et al. propose a set of concepts related to the notion of strategic narratives. First, they conceive it as a tripartite process of *formation*, *projection* and *reception*:

⁴²⁸ Laura J. Shepherd, "Ideas/matter: conceptualising foreign policy practice," *Critical Studies on Security* 3, no. 3 (2015/09/02 2015). p334

⁴²⁹ Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics," *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (2000). p 3

- *Formation*: is the process through which strategic narratives are shaped by political actors. The process of formation can be viewed differently according to the theoretical spectrum which was just discussed. For the purposes of this research, formation is assumed to be based on an actors' strategic goals and interests and is the initial expression of these.
- *Projection*: is the stage at which strategic narratives are spread through the media to the public. It is also the stage at which they can be contested within the media. ⁴³¹
- *Reception*: is the stage at which both internal and external audiences receive the narratives and their response to them.

Additionally, Miskimmon et al. identify three different types of strategic narratives: *system* narratives, *identity* narratives and *issue* narratives.

- *System narratives*: are narratives about the international order. Miskimmon et al. believe that order in international relations is created through system narratives because order is given meaning through narratives. This recalls much of the constructivist thinking which emphasises the social construction of international relations. They argue that "the construction of narratives of order by political actors provides a compelling explanation of how orders emerge and

430 Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3.

431 Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle, "Introduction."

are maintained, as well as their demise.”⁴³² When talking about energy issues, global energy governance is the international order under which decisions are made. As discussed, when reviewing the literature about energy, the concept of global energy governance encompasses many definitions but for the purpose of this research, global energy governance encompasses all forms of collective regulation of energy. These regulatory actions can emanate from governments, as well as the private sector.⁴³³ The aim of this research is therefore to identify the ways in which the French government communicates on issues which relate to global energy governance and analyse the ways in which order is conceived in that system.

- *Identity Narratives*: Miskimmon et al. argue that “actors are given meaning to themselves and others by narrative.”⁴³⁴ Identity narratives are closely linked to the theorisation of identity in constructivism. Generally speaking, identity narratives set out an actor’s values and interests.⁴³⁵
- *Issue Narratives*: refer to narratives about policy issues. Miskimmon et al. argue that “they are strategic in the sense of seeking to shape the terrain on which policy discussions take place.”⁴³⁶ In the case of this research, the issue at stake is energy. Issue narratives about energy can encompass narratives on energy prices, on energy sustainability, energy security, etc. While this study is

432 Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3. p60

433 Cécile Kérébel and Jan Horst Keppler, "La Gouvernance Mondiale de l'Energie," *Ifri* (2009).

434 Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3. p7

435 Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle, *Forging the World Strategic Narratives and International Relations*.

436 Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3. p. 7

mainly concerned with the external dimension of energy policies, the domestic political scene will be considered as well in order to understand France's issue narratives about energy.

4.3.3 Strategic narratives aimed at a domestic audience

Importantly, strategic narratives are “as a means for political actors to construct a shared meaning of the past, present and future of international politics to shape the behaviour of domestic and international actors.”⁴³⁷ Therefore, the difference between strategic narratives and other types of narratives is that strategic narratives aim at changing or at least influencing the behaviour of others. They also have two targeted audiences, a domestic audience and an international audience. This research is concerned foremost with strategic narratives on external relations intended for domestic audiences.

Barbara Farnham argues that foreign policy-makers are constantly concerned with the “acceptability” of their policies to the domestic public.⁴³⁸ Miskimmon et al. argue further that not only is domestic context important in foreign policy, but policy seek to shape people's understanding of that context through strategic narratives. As such, domestic- focused strategic narratives aim at aligning narratives about international scene with domestic interests in order to legitimise domestic and external policies to a domestic audience.

Indeed, Miskimmon et al. argue that “strategic narratives cannot outstrip the domestic

437 Ibid. p 2

438 Barbara Farnham, "Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 3 (2004).

will in engaging with third parties, which is further complicated by their diffusion in the media.”⁴³⁹ While strategic narrative theory talks about communication and reception of strategic narratives, they mainly look at the spread of narratives internationally and their contest to establish world order in the minds of people. However, it does not provide us with a good frame of analysis for the spread of strategic narratives internally. Entman’s cascading activation theory, detailed below, is useful in analysing the spread of these narratives domestically. It theorises the way highest levels of the imaginary “cascade” -- government – is able to influence framing of foreign policy in communications with elite and in the media. It also prescribes a central role to mainstream influential media in spreading frames that feed the narratives.

4.3.4 Narrative alignment

Scholarship on strategic narratives has recently focussed on the concept of alignment of narratives.⁴⁴⁰ Chaban, Miskimmon and O’Loughlin postulate that “alignment between system, policy and identity narratives increases opportunities for persuasion and influence.”⁴⁴¹ This form of alignment will be described as internal coherence, as it requires for all three levels of a narrative to be consistent with one another. Miskimmon and O’Loughlin showcase this type of alignment in “Russia’s narratives of

⁴³⁹ Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3. p61

⁴⁴⁰ Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, "Russia’s Narratives of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric World," *Politics and Governance* 5, no. 3 (2017). ; Ben Wellings et al., "Narrative Alignment and Misalignment: NATO as a Global Actor as Seen from Australia and New Zealand," *Asian Security* 14, no. 1 (2018).

⁴⁴¹ Natalia Chaban, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin, "The EU's Peace and Security Narrative: Views from EU Strategic Partners in Asia," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 55, no. 6 (2017).

Global order” and argue that “Russia’s strategic narrative of the international system is underpinned by its identity narrative and this plays out in how it narrates its policy preferences.”⁴⁴²

They also use the term alignment to compare Russia’s narratives to the West’s by focusing on the divergence between the strategic narratives of Russia, the EU and the US. This type of alignment has also been observed by Wellings et al. who compared the strategic narratives of NATO from Australia and New Zealand. Their study shows that the division into types of narratives – system, identity and issue – is useful in analysing alignment. They point out that “although there was significant alignment of system narratives around the notion of a rule based global order, Australian and New Zealand identity narratives diverge over specific issues.”⁴⁴³

This research will also analyse alignment between the different phases of strategic narratives, particularly formation and projection. It will be argued that strategic actors, in our case the French government and the EU Commission, frame their own narratives about the world, in alignment with their own strategic interests, in order to influence the views of domestic actors. In other words, actors “seek to set the terms of the debate, affect the process of thinking about and deciding on a policy and how to guide how policies play out.”⁴⁴⁴ In doing so, they use narratives about the external reality, framing it in order to legitimise internal narratives and policies. This logic may

442 Miskimmon and O’Loughlin, “Russia’s Narratives of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric World.”

443 Wellings et al., “Narrative Alignment and Misalignment: NATO as a Global Actor as Seen from Australia and New Zealand.”

444 Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3. p8

seem self-evident; however, this research seeks to use empirical data in order to outline the ways this alignment of strategic interest and communication takes place.

Further, analysing the alignment between the stages of communication of narratives allows an observation of their resonance, as they are picked up – or not – by other actors. Central to this research will be an observation of how narratives emerge in the media during the phase of projection. To do so this research will use Robert Entman's cascading activation theory as a micro level theory in order to observe the spread of strategic narratives.

4.4 Communication through Media Ecologies: Cascading Activation Theory

4.4.1 Integrating strategic narratives and cascading activation theories

One of the major theoretical innovations of this research is proposing synergy between strategic narratives theory and cascading activation theory by Robert Entman.⁴⁴⁵ Integrating these two theories enables an analysis of the mechanisms behind the spread of strategic narratives domestically. According to Entman, top level political executives have a higher power to influence activation of ideas and frames about issues of foreign policy and international relations that are spread to society through the media. Entman argues the communication of frames as a stratified structure where some actors have more power to initiate the spread of ideas through a metaphorical cascade

⁴⁴⁵ Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*.

to media organisations and the public.⁴⁴⁶ According to his conceptual framework, the top levels of the executive branch of government have the most independence in choosing how to frame international events and “the highest probability of having their thoughts become part of the general circulation of ideas.”⁴⁴⁷ He identifies five different levels within the cascading: (1) *the administration* by which is to be understood the executive body of government, (2) *other elites* which include other members of government, experts and ex-officials, (3) *the media*, journalists and news organisations, (4) their *news frames*, and (5) *the public*. He also argues that the inverse dynamic whereby frames from the public or from the media make their way up to the administration, is also possible but with more difficulty.

This is an important point where strategic narrative and cascading activation theories fit together. While both give much agency high level political actors to influence others, it still leaves room to analyse the thoughts of other actors. With changing communication environments, it is increasingly difficult for states to impose their narratives over those of others actors within society. It is therefore crucial in our analysis to not overshadow the ability of other international and domestic actors to communicate their own narratives. Robert Putnam argues that “a more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy and international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, interest groups (both economic and noneconomic), legislators, and even public opinion and elections, not simply executive

446 Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11." p420

447 Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*. p9

officials and institutional arrangement.”⁴⁴⁸ This research aims to understanding the relationship between domestic and international levels in the conduct of states and how they play a role in reaching foreign policy objectives.

Entman’s theory therefore allows an observation of the projection of strategic narrative by government bodies to their domestic public as well as potential contestation of the dominant national framing.

4.4.2 Frames as narrative snapshots

Entman’s most famous theoretical contribution is on the concept of framing which he defines as the selection of “some aspects of a perceived reality and [the construction of] messages that highlight cognitive and linguistic connections among them in ways that promote an interpretation favourable to their political interests and policies.”⁴⁴⁹

Thus, the concept of framing is closely related to strategic narratives since they are used to disseminate “interpretations that favour [an actor’s] interests or goals.”⁴⁵⁰ The major difference between the two is the notion of temporality. Strategic narratives include a sequence of events and aim to construct impressions of the past, present and future. By contrast, frames are snapshots used in narratives about particular events or issues.

Entman argues that frames “can be distinguished from the rest of the news by their

⁴⁴⁸ Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (1988).

⁴⁴⁹ Sean Aday, Robert M. Entman, and Steven Livingston, "Media, Power and Us Foreign Policy," in *The Sage Handbook of Political Communication*, ed. Holli A. Setmeko and Margaret Scammell. (Sage, 2012). p329

capacity to stimulate support or opposition to the sides in a political conflict.”⁴⁵⁰ This ability, he argues, can be identified through two measurements, *magnitude* and *cultural resonance*. Magnitude is the ability of a frame to reach large portions of audience and is distinguished by *prominence* and *repetition*. Meanwhile, he argues that “frames that employ more culturally resonant terms have the greatest potential for influence.”⁴⁵¹ Culturally resonant frames are *noticeable, understandable, memorable* and *emotionally charged*.

4.5 Theorising the Role of the EU

France is a member state of the European Union and therefore cannot be conceptualised outside of this paradigm. The EU has its own vision on foreign policy and energy policy. The question is therefore to what extent does France’s self-visions match those set out by the EU. By distinguishing differences in the strategic narratives on energy of France and the EU part of this thesis aims to identify how the EU projects its own strategic narratives within member states and how narratives created and projected by member states resonate or clash with the EU’s narratives. In doing so, this research aims to identify the ways in which the EU’s narrative about global energy governance may be used strategically by member states. One theoretical innovation of this model is that it allows us to identify how the EU fits into cascading activation theory. As mentioned, cascading activation theory has never been used to trace the communication of a supranational actor. Miskimmon argued that “the EU has relied

⁴⁵⁰ Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*. p6

⁴⁵¹ Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11."

on strategic narratives since its inception to the present day.”⁴⁵² However, due to its hybrid nature, its ability to find a unified message is hindered. Using the example of the euro crisis, Miskimmon asked the question: “who narrates?” the EU’s message. While representatives of EU institutions invariably communicate on the EU’s issues, the narratives they present can be contradicted by member state officials who present their own narratives. The aim of this research is therefore to understand the relationship between strategic narratives formed at the EU’s supranational level and the member state level.

Today, with the EU facing numerous crises it is of paramount importance to understand how the EU communicates to domestic publics. Kratochvíl et al. argue that while academics have often questioned whether the EU is a *legitimate, attractive or recognized* actor, few studies have focussed on the EU’s ability to frame internal debates about foreign policy.⁴⁵³ They divide these characteristics into four different foci in academic debates. Studies dealing with internal governance of the EU, seen from the EU they argue are concerned with the EU’s *legitimacy*. Those dealing with internal governance viewed from the outside look at the EU’s *attractiveness*, and those looking at EU external policies viewed externally are studying whether the EU is a *recognised* actor. However, they see an academic deficit in the area of EU external policies viewed from within the EU, an area that they call *framing*. This is the main area of focus of their study. They look at the Commission’s ability to influence the EU’s

⁴⁵² Alister Miskimmon, "Finding a unified voice? The European Union through a Strategic Narrative Lens," in *Forging the World, Strategic Narratives and International Relations* (University of Michigan Press, 2017).

⁴⁵³ Petr Kratochvíl, Petra Cibulková, and Michal Beník, "The EU as a 'Framing Actor': Reflections on Media Debates about EU Foreign Policy," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, no. 2 (2011).

foreign policy, particularly in area where member states do not agree among each other. They point out that while the role of the Commission in external policies is clear on issues where member states agree, such as EU negotiations with Russia or environmental negotiations, the Commission can still influence the choices available to member states. In those cases, they argue that where debates within member states refer to the EU as the main actor, it would be “fairly difficult for the national political elite to pursue a national policy that would starkly contradict the EU’s position.”⁴⁵⁴ While this research does not contradict this trend, it seeks to understand the EU’s ability to place itself at the centre of a debate within a member state and trace how resonant are the EU’s frames and narratives of external energy governance vis-à-vis frames and narratives in the same issue-area formulated and projected by a member state.

4.6 Conclusion

Thus, this research’s primary aim is to theorise the narrative alignment between different levels of strategic narratives (internal coherence) and between different actors (external convergence).

It also seeks to observe the formation and projection of strategic narratives by integrating this theory with cascade activation theory. Through this model and through the observation of narrative resonance in the media, this research seeks to analyse contestation of strategic narratives in the media.

The next chapter describing this research’s methods will detail the ways this research

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid.

will achieve these goals.

Chapter 5: Methodology

5.1 A theoretical note

Before explaining the methodological underpinnings of this research, it is useful to restate its theoretical foundation. This research is informed by three interacting theoretical approaches: Constructivism (macro-level), Strategic Narratives Theory (Meso-level) and Cascading Activation Framing Theory (micro-level). These approaches in turn inform the logic and arsenal of methods used for this research.

5.1.1 Constructivism

At the macro level, this research takes on a constructivist perspective that supposes the socially constructed nature of international relations. Philosophically, constructivism assumes that knowledge can never be objective and is necessarily achieved through the prism of human experience. Wilfred Carr argues that: “the aspiration to achieve a purely rational understanding is illusory, that human understanding is never simply ‘given’ in any perception or observation but is always ‘prejudiced’ by an interpretive element that determines how perceptions and observations are understood.”⁴⁵⁵ Thomas Risse and Antje Wiener follow this argument and specify that constructivism brings together a variety of epistemological perspectives, which essentially “share the ontological concerns about social understandings and systems of meanings.”⁴⁵⁶ Additionally, this research uses a mixed

⁴⁵⁵ Wilfred Carr, "Philosophy, Methodology and Action Research," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 40, no. 4 (2006).

⁴⁵⁶ Thomas Risse and Antje Wiener, "'Something rotten' and the social construction of social

method approach, bringing together quantitative and qualitative insights. For indeed a constructivist approach must necessarily value individual's experiences and perceptions, which can best be observed through qualitative data. At the same time, quantitative approach helps reduce the interpretative bias and thus increases the validity of the research.

Central to the ideas of constructivism is the mutual constitution of agency and structure which places the theoretical approach at a middle ground between rationalist and reflexivist perspectives.⁴⁵⁷ Reflecting on this 'middle ground' methodological position, this research is firstly concerned how individual members of government communicate their interests in global energy governance. This part of the analysis seems to move to the rationalist perspective on the methodological continuum -- whereby actors are assumed to have a certain level of agency over the way they communicate their strategic narratives. Discourse and the way policy makers engage in it are two main points of interest of this thesis. Contemplating the role of discourse, Thomas Diez asks whether its role is to "positively enable particular policies or whether it works through constraining the policies that can be meaningful and legitimately pursued."⁴⁵⁸ He concludes that the latter is more convincing and that "the analysis of foreign policy discourses should therefore be refocussed away from their positive shaping of particular policies towards the way in which they work to set the limits of policy and how this setting of limits is performed by actors engaging in a struggle over foreign policy."⁴⁵⁹ So, if discourse has

constructivism: a comment on comments," *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 5 (1999). P776

457 Antje Wiener, "Constructivism: The limits of bridging gaps," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 6, no. 3 (2003). P254

458 Thomas Diez, "Setting the limits: Discourse and EU foreign policy," *Cooperation and Conflict* 49, no. 3 (2014). P319

459 Ibid. p331

the power to establish the limits of legitimacy in foreign policy, policymaker will likely use it strategically to set limits that are most useful to their policy goals.

Antje Wiener when describing the rationalist pole of constructivism states: “While this approach still works with the positivist assumption of exogenous interest formation on the basis of material resources, its novel reference to ideal factors is distinct from the research practice of the rationalist pole.”⁴⁶⁰ It should be further noted that while these individual ideas of interest which this research focuses on are assumed to be based on material resources, they are necessarily based on individual’s perceptions of the material world. Individuals are expected to make decisions and define interests and identities based on what they prioritise and deem important.

As such, this research follows Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane’s argument that ideas or beliefs are based on interpretations of the ‘real’ world.⁴⁶¹ It supposes that identities in international relations are ever changing, and self-interests, rather than ordained by material structures are constantly re-defined based on actors’ normative understanding of these material structures.⁴⁶² Therefore, as stated by Maja Zehfuss, “in order to appreciate the influence of identities and/or norms it is necessary to explore intersubjective meaning and grasping the influence of changing practice, rather than empirically validating explanations of independent mechanisms, become central.”⁴⁶³ As such, this research’s methods aim to investigate a variety of discourses which may

460 Wiener, "Constructivism: The limits of bridging gaps." P260-261

461 Judith Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Policy Social Science Research Council . Committee on Foreign, *Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

462 Maja Zehfuss, *Constructivism in international relations: the politics of reality*, vol. 83 (Cambridge, UK;New York,: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

463 Ibid. p4

give informed insights into the way actors define and communicate about their self-interest.

For, if interests and identities are not fixed, but ever evolving, the flux of interests and identities pre-supposes that different actors may have different views on what these are, leaving room for argumentation and persuasion. In the words of Thomas Risse, “arguing and truth-seeking behaviour presuppose that actors no longer hold fixed interests during their communicative interaction but are open to persuasion, challenges and counterchallenges geared toward reaching a reasoned consensus.”⁴⁶⁴ This argument is seen to highlight, once again, the role of communication in international relations, a role which can be theorised through strategic narratives.

5.1.2 Strategic Narratives

In the 1960s, social sciences went through what some describe as a “narrative turn.”⁴⁶⁵ Christopher Fenton and Ann Langley argue that this narrative turn is the symptom of moving “away from inquiry aimed at establishing universal relationships among abstract concepts and towards the understanding of how human beings make meaning, constructing experience, knowledge, and identity through narrative.”⁴⁶⁶

Miskimmon et al. further developed this view and suggested that “actors reflexively work with discourse to construct narratives with the instrumental aim to influence the

464 T. Risse, ““Let’s argue!”: communicative action in world politics,” *INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION* 54, no. 1 (2000).

465 Mona Livholts and Maria Tamboukou, *Discourse and narrative methods* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2015).

466 Christopher Fenton and Ann Langley, “Strategy as practice and the narrative turn,” *Organization studies* 32, no. 9 (2011).

opinions of others.”⁴⁶⁷ In other words, actors communicate in a strategic way in order to reach short- term and long-term goals based on their perceptions of their own self interests. They differentiate discourse and narrative by the latter’s temporal dimension. They argue that discourse is the essence of a narrative, however the narrative is structured temporarily by actors.⁴⁶⁸ Likewise, Onega and Landa define narratives as “the semiotic representation of a series of events meaningfully connected in a temporal and causal way.”⁴⁶⁹

Miskimmon et al. identify three different levels of narratives, *system* narratives, about the nature of the international order; *identity* narratives about the actors themselves, their nature, their goals and values; and *issue* narratives aimed at shaping the political terrain surrounding a particular problem.⁴⁷⁰ The three levels of narrative are intrinsically connected and narratives take on more importance and impact when all three levels are in alignment. In order to test the alignment of the narratives on different levels, this research identifies elements of a narrative and uses categories of analysis in order to observe and analyse each of these elements. This is further described in the data analysis section of this chapter.

This research seeks to observe the narratives and test their alignment between different levels within the domestic energy policy and information flows. The circulation and alignments of the narratives is argued to inform international

467 Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3. P7

468 Ibid. p12

469 Susana Onega Jaén and José Ángel García Landa, *Narratology: an introduction* (London: New York, 1996).

470 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, *Forging the world: strategic narratives and international relations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017).

communications and policies in the energy field. Such a two-tiered perspective is largely understudied in the energy policy studies (that tends to overlook the narratives dimension) as well as strategic narrative theory literature (that typically focuses on narratives within international relations system). Keeping in mind the cyclical nature of the narratives – from formulation to projection and communication, and finally to receptions and back to formulation,⁴⁷¹ this research singles out local influential media across political continuum to track how formulated by the French government energy-related policies -- both of domestic and external nature -- are communicated to the domestic audiences on the background of systemic, identity and issue-specific narratives. With mass media discourses shifting to the focus of this investigation, this research employs Entman's Cascading Activation Framing theory that proposed analytical paradigm to operationalise the analysis of media.

5.1.3 Cascading Activation Framing Theory

The role of the media as an opinion shaper has been recognised by Walter Lippman originally published in 1922.⁴⁷² At first, scholarly responses were critical, with Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet,⁴⁷³ and later Joseph Klapper concluding that media had very little effect on public opinion.⁴⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Lippmann's ideas continued to inspire many scholars. In 1963, Bernard Cohen concluded that the media was an effective tool to prescribe to the public what to think

⁴⁷¹ Miskimmon et al., *Strategic narratives: communication power and the new world order*, 3.

⁴⁷² Walter Lippmann, *Public opinion* (New York Macmillan, 1927).

⁴⁷³ Bernard Berelson, Hazel Gaudet, and Paul F Lazarsfeld, *The people's choice: How the voter makes up his mind in a presidential campaign* (Columbia University Press, 1968).

⁴⁷⁴ Joseph T Klapper, "The effects of mass communication," (1960).

about.⁴⁷⁵ In the 1970s, Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, showed that the media was able to set the agenda of a campaign by shaping the political reality and increasing the visibility of some issues over others.⁴⁷⁶ Later, Robert Entman's defined the concept of framing as the selection of "some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation"⁴⁷⁷, thus establishing a basis for how the media influences the public. All of these works and many more show that the media has power over the perceptions of both the elites and public opinion.

Entman's Cascading Activation Framing Theory serves a useful model to map how an actor's message on a strategic policy issues (often with external dimension) is communicated to domestic publics. Entman's theory proposes an explanation how strategic narratives – and frames of actors that constitute these narratives ⁴⁷⁸ -- may be projected and spread to the public throughout the media. The theory also argues that media serves a 'pump' that delivers public's reactions to the projected frames and narratives "up" the cascade, providing an insight into public's reception in the life cycle of the narratives.

As discussed in *Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework*, according to Entman, the higher ranks of the executive government may direct the way foreign policy issues (including external energy policy) are framed and transmitted to the public. The spread of these

⁴⁷⁵ Bernard Cecil Cohen, *The press and foreign policy* (Princeton,: Princeton University Press, 1963).

⁴⁷⁶ Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁸ Chaban, Miskimmon, and O'Loughlin, "The EU's Peace and Security Narrative: Views from EU Strategic Partners in Asia."

frames is metaphorically compared to a cascade where information flows from the higher administration of government through other elites and the media down to their audiences. This flow of information and spread of influence may work particularly effectively in France, where historically and traditionally, the executive establishment has had a strong influence over the media. Raymond Kuhn confirms this view -- “an unequal power relationship between the media and the executive has existed throughout the Fifth Republic and to a significant extent still continues today.”⁴⁷⁹ In addition, as explained in the literature earlier in the thesis, France energy policies have had a strong technocratic lead in particular. These conditions justify the application of Entman’s theory outside of an American context, where it was originally conceived.

This research is concerned with the strategic narratives of energy in the global context, and specifically in the context of emerging powers of BRICS. This research focus means that the analysis included only those media communications that referenced the BRICS international actors. As explained in the theoretical framework, the external conduct of energy policies is the subject under study, and more particularly, communications about said policies. Both Strategic Narratives and Cascading Activation theories have a strong focus on foreign policy. Entman theorised the spread of frames about foreign policy issues and strategic narratives and they may be used to influence both domestic and foreign actors, look at the conduct of international relations by actors.

5.2 Research Design and Choice of Methods

⁴⁷⁹ Raymond Kuhn, "The media and the executive in France: An unequal power relationship," *European Journal of Communication* 28, no. 2 (2013).

Focussing on the issue of French energy policy, and specifically on external energy policy towards the BRICS, this research analyses the flows of political communication through diverse identity-specific lenses. Reflecting on France's identity as a sovereign state, this research traces external energy policy narratives formulated and projected by the French executive branch. Reflecting on France's identity as an EU member states, this research looks into projections and communications by the European Commission in this issue- area. These two lenses allow to trace official formulations and projections. Reflecting on France's identity as a liberal democracy with free media, this research examines how French mainstream influential press across political continuum communicated the narratives about French external energy policy – in general, and in relation to BRICS. Here, we are dealing with the communication phase investigating the way in which the official messages are then picked up by the leading media and the way in which they are presented. The analysis also links the communication phase to the reception among the audience. Ultimately, this research compares narratives (and constituting then frames) in formulation, projection and communication phases. Analysing this transition from formation to projection/communication of strategic narratives is seen the key in understanding the circulation of the narratives within a given society.

The starting point of this research was the international project: 'External images of the EU as a Normative Energy Power: BRICS vis-à-vis the EU (EXIE)'.⁴⁸⁰ The project questioned whether the EU was recognised, framed and communicated as a global energy governance actor by leading media in the emerging countries such as the

⁴⁸⁰ Chaban, Knodt, and Verdun, "'Talking with' not 'talking at'? Perceptions of the EU as a global normative energy actor in the eyes of BRICS and EU 'Big 3'."

BRICS. Essentially, it also compared external views (from BRICS) vis-à-vis internal views (inside the EU members state). Specifically, the project analysed media images of the EU and BRICS as energy actors in the “big three” EU member states - the UK, Germany and France. ⁴⁸¹ Media data collected for the French segment of the EXIE formed a part of the datasets utilised by this research.

France provides a valid case to examine and compare the flows of communication on external energy policy both on the EU Member State (national) and EU (supra-national) levels. Chapter 2 “Literature Review” detailed how France’s energy policies heavily focused on nuclear energy appear distinctly different from respective policies of the rest of the EU member states (and even from other countries in the world). This exceptionalism, in a way, provides a firm methodological ground to examine how these differing energy policies and interests may influence the formation of distinct strategic narratives in France, binding domestic and external perspectives on the process of global energy governance.

This research is delimited to France’s narratives on global energy governance in relation to BRICS. Indeed, other international relationships could have been selected for this study, including the United States or countries of the Middle East. However, given that this methodology requires individual coding of political communications and newspaper articles, the inclusion of the US as a case study would have made this impossible without selecting a sample of collected material to analyse. Indeed, while the US does not appear in this study, it was nevertheless coded when present in the material gathered. While not being a specific code word for this research it was

⁴⁸¹ Bain et al., "A polyphonic marketplace: Images of EU external energy relations in British, French and German media discourses."

nevertheless the most mentioned actor in the analysed material. This means that if it had been selected as a keyword, the dataset would have been unmanageable for one coder alone. This, however, does not diminish the validity of this research. As emerging actors, the BRICS have an important role to play in global energy governance and present important challenges and opportunities to both the EU and France in their conduct of their external energy policies. They represent a diverse group of energy exporters (Russia, Brazil) and importers (China, India, South Africa) and their interests in nuclear energy make them interesting case studies in France's self-perceived global energy role. As such, the thesis dissects the narratives and framing of the relationship between the EU, France and BRICS.

Respectively, this analysis engages with two types of empirical evidence: policy documents (produced by French executive bodies as well as by the EU) and French media (influential press across political continuum).

The first hypothesis of this research concerns the way local energy interests may impact the formation of narratives about energy relations with the BRICS. Review of the relevant literature detailed in Chapters 2 and 3 established what strategic energy interests France and the EU held with regards to the BRICS. Chapter 2 described France and the EU's local energy policies in their historical contexts while Chapter 3 described the "energy realities" in each of the BRICS and the bilateral relations they entertain with France and the EU. While these reviews map the EU's and France's internal and external energy concerns, the following analysis will focus on the political communications formulated and projected by the European Commission and France's executive branch reconstructing the formation and communication of narratives on their respective energy relations with the BRICS. The comparison between the "energy realities" for all actors involved and the French and EU strategic narratives will allow

this research to test Hypothesis 1.

The second hypothesis relates to the first as it aims to compare France's and the EU's strategic narratives observed in these political communications. It anticipates that France's framing of internal and external energy policy -- and of other energy sector actors in Europe and in the world -- will differ from the EU's framing. Chapter 2 has already established that France's and the EU's interests in the energy domain differ on some aspects, particularly when it comes to nuclear energy as well as their energy relationship with Russia. Respectively, this research assumes that strategic narratives formulated and projected by France (an EU member state) and by the EU will differ based on their differing interests.

The third hypothesis formulates the prediction around the projection of these narratives in local (French) media. It expects that French media will communicate France's strategic narrative on global energy governance in a prominent and locally resonant way in contrast to less prominent and engaging strategic narratives of the EU as a global energy actor.


To summarise, theoretical models selected for this research informed the research design and the logic of the methods. To reiterate, a constructivist lens favours a mixed methods approach and justifies the use of discourse from selected individuals as an empirical evidence. Both Strategic Narratives and Cascading Activation Framing theories justify a focus on meaning when attempting to understand and explain foreign policy and external relations. Both theories provide models to explain the influences of executive establishment, not only on the conduct of international relations in general, and energy ones in particular, but also on formation and projection of narratives and meanings that provide a story of past, present and future. These theories also emphasise the role of the media in spreading ideas about foreign policy

– and external energy relations -- to the general public.

5.2.1 Data Collection to Analyse External Energy Governance

The main hypothesis of this study concerns the way the EU and France’s local energy concerns and policies impact France’s narrative on global energy governance. Roselle et al. noted that “if one chooses to focus on political actors’ formation of strategic narratives, careful process tracing, textual analysis., and interviews may allow one to understand the domestic political pressures evident when studying policy narratives, or how national or international narratives constrain how political actors conceive the realm of the possible.”⁴⁸²

The two data sources used in this research correspond to the two narratives processes discussed above, formation and projection. It is important to understand these as progressions rather than static stations. Formation of Strategic Narratives is the process through which narrators, in our case political leaders, make an interpretation of domestic and international interests and frame their communications into strategic narratives. The process of projection on the other hand is the act of communicating these narratives and the way these are then picked up and spread by the media.



⁴⁸² Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin, "Strategic narrative: A new means to understand soft power."

Period of analysis

This research focussed on periods of analysis from 2009 to 2015. It chose to examine coverage during the ‘peak’ periods: one month of coverage around the United Nations’ Climate Change Conventions (UNFCCC). The UNFCCCs were chosen as the focal point for the analysis as these important summits feature extensive and intensive attention to the themes of energy governance, an otherwise uneven subject of discussion in international relations. These conferences are also an important reference when politicians, media and public interests intersect. Due to the summits’ theme on climate change, it is logical to expect that debates originated within them and instigated by them in various discourses around the world may be biased towards sustainability. As discussed by Chaban *et al.*, “the distinctive feature of energy relations as having a strong ‘nexus quality’: energy as a policy field is an almost classical cross-cutting issue, standing in very close connection to climate policies.”⁴⁸³ This is particularly true of the EU and France’s energy policies in recent years, both of which have important sustainability goals. And while using the UNFCCC’s as peak periods of observation may indeed raise the visibility of sustainability issues, these issues are central to the political debates on energy taking place in France and at the EU level.

This research explores the evolution of the strategic narratives on energy governance in France between two landmark UNFCCCs -- Copenhagen in 2009 and Paris in 2015.

⁴⁸³ Chaban, Knodt, and Verdun, "'Talking with' not 'talking at'? Perceptions of the EU as a global normative energy actor in the eyes of BRICS and EU 'Big 3'." p14

Both of these conferences have served the background to key political debates on energy in France, and internationally. As discussed in Chapter 2 Literature Review, the outcome of the Copenhagen conference of 2009 was largely perceived as a failure for the EU. Importantly for this research, the EU's ability to lead in the UNFCCC international negotiations was critically challenged and criticized.⁴⁸⁴ By contrast, the Paris conference of 2015 has been hailed as a success by many observers. Both France and the EU were viewed as having a limited but positive influence on this outcome.⁴⁸⁵

Data collection strategy

The data was collected following a set of key words. These included actors (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and types of energy (energy, oil, gas, coal, fossil, nuclear, biofuel, solar, wind, hydro, tidal, renewable, thermal and biomass). Since much of the data was in French these search terms were also translated accordingly.

Data collection for political analysis

To analyse the strategic narratives about energy governance in France and at the EU level, this research analyses political communications by the executive branches of both actors between 2009 and 2015. In France, this means the presidential position and the governmental ministries. Communications by the Ministry of the Environment, Energy and the Sea⁴⁸⁶, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs⁴⁸⁷ as well as

⁴⁸⁴ Bocquillon and Evrard, "Rattraper ou Devancer l'Europe? Politiques Françaises des Energies Renouvelables et Dynamiques d'Europeanisation."

⁴⁸⁵ Bocquillon and Evrard, "French Climate Policy: Diplomacy in the service of symbolic leadership."

⁴⁸⁶ In French: Ministère de l'Environnement, de l'Énergie et de la Mer, previously known as: le Ministère de l'Écologie, de l'Énergie, du Développement durable et de la Mer

⁴⁸⁷ In French: Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, previously known as Ministère des Affaires Étrangères

communications made by the Presidents of the Republic and their Prime Ministers for the period 2009-2015 were analysed. These four entities can be seen to represent what Entman calls the *Administration* in his theory of cascading activation.⁴⁸⁸ It must be noted that Entman's description of administration is particularly focussed on the American context. He notes, "The president and top advisers enjoy the most independent ability to decide which mental associations to activate and the highest probability of moving their own thoughts into general circulation."⁴⁸⁹ Understanding *Administration* as the executive branch of government, this study defines the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Environment, Energy and the Sea, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs as members of the executive branch with the most power to set the narrative on global energy governance and France's place and identity in it.

Communications from the executive branch were gathered through the archival website, *Vie Publique*,⁴⁹⁰ which is under the authority of the Legal and Administrative Information Directorate of the French government, and records all communications by members of the French government including speeches, press releases and interviews in the media.

At the EU level, the Commission stands as the executive power. Communications by EU Commission were gathered through its website.⁴⁹¹ However, it should be noted that the archives kept by the Commission are more limited than France's. Specifically,

et Européennes

488 Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*.

489 Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11."

490 "Vie publique," <https://www.vie-publique.fr/>.

491 "News," EU Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/news/index_en.

they do not include the records of the interviews with executive figures. The interviews, however, were seen as valuable and rich sources of evidence about narratives, as these are typically more spontaneous than pre-prepared speeches or thoroughly checked press releases. As such, the interviews entered the sample in the French case.

Table 5-1: Total volume of political communications

	Press Releases	Interviews	Speeches	Total
The EU	42	0	29	71
France	3	36	37	76

Communications were analysed using qualitative interpretative analysis. The volume of political communications also allowed for the use of an additional data analysis through the programme NVivo. One important feature of the programme is its ability to quantify the use of word in documents. This further enhances the reach of analysis for policy documents and adds to the validity of this study. From this, word clouds of the most used words were produced and are presented in Chapter 7 (policy results).

Data collection for media analysis

For this research, four newspapers were chosen for analysis based on their reputation,

their circulation and their political leanings: *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde*, *Les Echos* and *Libération*. All four of these newspapers figure within the top 10 of national newspapers. *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* are the two top newspapers in France both in terms of circulation and reputation. ⁴⁹² *Le Figaro* has the highest circulation in France with over 300 000 paid subscriptions in 2017. Its editorial stance is generally more right-wing whereas *Le Monde* is generally viewed to be more centre-left leaning. It is followed closely by *Le Monde* with over 280 000 paid subscriptions that same year. ⁴⁹³ *Les Echos* is a financial newspaper and was chosen as the issue of energy is of particular interest to business communities. It has the fourth highest circulation with over 128 000 paid subscriptions in 2017. Finally, *Libération* is the seventh most read national newspaper with around 75 000 subscriptions in 2017.

While some argue that the readership of mainstream newspapers is for ever decreasing in favour of new types of media, these outlets (increasingly embracing the online editions) continue to influence opinions. Leading national reputable papers continue to be read by the national elites and thus “can affect leaders’ strategic calculations and activities.” ⁴⁹⁴

Importantly, while the number of paid subscriptions may be low each of these newspapers have websites which are widely accessed. In January 2018 for example, the websites *LeFigaro.fr* and *LeMonde.fr* were accessed over 118 million times and 98 million times respectively, of which 100 million and 78 million visits were made from

⁴⁹² Rodney Benson, "What makes for a critical press? A case study of French and US immigration news coverage," *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 15, no. 1 (2010).

⁴⁹³ L'Alliance pour les chiffres de la presse et des medias, "Classement Acpm-Ojd Des Sites Fixes Et Mobiles Grand Public Janvier 2018," <http://www.acpm.fr/Chiffres/Frequentation/Classement-des-Sites/Classement-Unifie-desSites-GP>

⁴⁹⁴ Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11."

a French address.⁴⁹⁵

Additionally, subscriptions to *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro* and *Les Echos* were all on the rise in 2017.⁴⁹⁶ This is largely due to the fact that these newspapers have retained a good reputation for objectivity and good reporting. In an era of fake news and media bubbles, the French public trusts these sources over other digital media to give them unbiased news.

Table 5-2: Total volume of media articles by publication

Le Figaro	Le Monde	Les Echos	Libération	Total
301	325	452	142	1220

5.2.2 Approaches to data analysis

This research uses content analysis of political communications and press articles, using the tried and tested methodology from the international project *The EU through the Eyes of Asia-Pacific*⁴⁹⁷, and one of its sub-project EXIE.⁴⁹⁸ This research uses two sources of discourse, political communications and media articles, comparing narratives and frames created by both.

The EU perceptions methodology draws on both quantitative and qualitative

⁴⁹⁵ L'Alliance pour les chiffres de la presse et des medias, "Classement ACPM-OJD des Sites Fixes et Mobiles Grand Public Janvier 2018," 2018, accessed 09/03/2018, <http://www.acpm.fr/Chiffres/Frequentation/Classement-des-Sites/Classement-Unifie-des-Sites-GP>.

⁴⁹⁶ Marina Alcaraz, Presse: première hausse en dix ans pour les quotidiens *Les Echos*, https://www.lesechos.fr/12/04/2018/lesechos.fr/0301553147385_presse--premiere-hausse-en-dix-ans-pour-les-quotidiens.htm

⁴⁹⁷ Holland, Martin, and Natalia Chaban. 2008. *The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: Media, public and perceptions of the EU*. Vol. v.v. 6. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis

⁴⁹⁸ Also see EU External Perceptions, <http://www.euperceptions.canterbury.ac.nz/>

measurements in its analysis and outlines formal and substantive features of discourse and narratives. The approach chosen for this research is the one most consistent with Miskimmon's et. al.'s Strategic Narratives Theory.

Narratives require narrators. Molly Patterson and Kristen Monroe argue that "Narrative is especially useful in revealing the speaker's concept of self, for it is the self that is located at the centre of the narrative, whether as active agent, passive experiencer, or tool of destiny."⁴⁹⁹

Table 5-3: Framework of analysis of narratives

Elements of a narrative	Categories of analysis
Narrator	Source.
Actor	Volume of coverage of state actors; Degree of centrality of state actors; evaluation of state actors; other non-state level actors.
Event – time	Date; events mentioned.
Scene – setting	Focus of domesticity; Other dimensions of news articles (politics, economics etc...).
Action – Goal	Thematic framing; Issues mentioned
Instrument	Types of energy mentioned.

499 Patterson and Monroe, "Narrative in political science."

Formal features include:

-*sources* of each article and communications are recorded when available. Some press articles for example remain anonymously written and at times political communications are not ascribed a source other than the institution it came from. However, in most case the sources are clearly stated. For press articles, the sources are classified according to whether they are local correspondents or agencies or if they are from external sources and the names of the journalists are recorded when available. As detailed above, sources will give an indication of the narrator for global energy narratives.

- *the volume of coverage* for both key actors and key terms detailed above. The volume is assessed simply by the number of articles or communications in which they are mentioned. The volume of coverage for each actor will indicate their visibility in speeches and reporting in France of the period of observation.

-*the degree of centrality* of actors and of energy. This concept was developed by Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland in their seminal word on public perceptions and media representations of the EU in the Asia Pacific region.⁵⁰⁰ This feature assesses

⁵⁰⁰ Chaban and Holland, *The EU through the eyes of the Asia-Pacific: public perceptions and media representations*, no. 4.

whether they are a major, secondary or minor focus of articles or communications. For example, in an article that focusses solely on Chinese efforts to build renewable energy, China and energy will both have a major degree of centrality. In an article that describes collaboration between France and India with a paragraph talking about nuclear energy, France, India and energy have a secondary focus. Finally, in an article that explains global efforts to tackle climate change that mentions multiple actors including Brazil in passing and makes a brief mention of the energy sector, Brazil and energy are of minor focus.

-*the evaluation of actors*, using a scale of five options from positive to negative, this feature makes a note of the way actors are portrayed. Additionally, in order to better assess the judgement made of each actor, evaluations include a qualitative instrument in the form of conceptual metaphors. Developed by George Lakoff, conceptual metaphors usually link an abstract subject with a concrete one.⁵⁰¹ To describe it, Lakoff uses the metaphorical concept of *Time is Money*. He explains that in everyday language we often link the two concepts to express that time is a valuable and finite commodity like money. We use words like “spend”, “invest”, “give”, “have”, “lose”, etc. express this concept. The reason for analysing conceptual metaphors is that they often betray emotive bias on subjects since “people frequently employ metaphors to make sense of the world and communicate their individual conceptions to others by contrasting new experiences against existing knowledge.”⁵⁰² So, metaphors often give an interpretation of actors and their actions that can give an indication of the

501 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, "Conceptual Metaphor in Everyday Language," *The Journal of Philosophy* 77, no. 8 (1980).

502 Chaban and Holland, *The European Union and the Asia-Pacific: media, public, and elite perceptions of the EU*, 6. p 65

evaluation made by the narrator of their subject.

-the non-state actors to take note of what non-state actors and individuals are mentioned. This may include government officials, businesses or civil society actors. This is an important tool since, as discussed in the literature review, energy governance is engaged in by a multiplicity of actors.

-the focus of domesticity, whether the actions described in articles and communication take place locally (in France), in another EU member state, at the EU level, in a third country or at a global level. This will give an indication of the setting of narratives about global energy governance.

-the issues and events mentioned likewise makes a note of the topics related to energy that are mentioned such as energy efficiency, sustainable development or the Copenhagen conference. This allows a broader view of the context in which energy is mentioned.

-the types of energy mentioned, is simply taking note of what kinds of energy are mentioned in communications and articles, or if energy was mentioned in general only. This is conceptualised as the tool through which actors engage in global energy governance and the narratives of it.

Substantive features allow to take note of things that are not necessarily written textually in a communication or article. These features are more dependent on the researcher's own point of view of course but they are a necessary tool to understanding the sub-text, what is not written down but is expected to be understood. They include:

-the thematic framing of actors, referring to whether actors' energy actions fit the EU tripartite mould of competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability or if their actions are framed in other terms.

-Other dimensions involves making a note of the context in which energy is mentioned, be it political, economic, social, etc.

Additionally, the use of word frequency clouds was made for the analysis of political communications. Word clouds have been shown to be an effective supplementary research tool and help increase the validity of findings.⁵⁰³ They have been used in this way here.

5.3 Conclusion

Going through element of narratives, the next two chapters will present the results from content analysis of France and EU political communications and French newspapers.

⁵⁰³ Carmel McNaught and Paul Lam, "Using Wordle as a supplementary research tool," *Qualitative Report* 15, no. 3 (2010).

Chapter 6: Narratives of Global Energy

Governance in French and EU policy discourse

6.1 Introduction

This chapter will present the results from the policy discourse of the European Commission and the French executive branch of government. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the formation of strategic narratives in both discourses. France and the EU's external energy policies and interests towards the BRICS have been traced in Chapters 2 and 3. It has been hypothesised that these interests would drive the framing of external energy and external energy actors in France and the EU's political discourses. The chapter also aims to compare the two discourses and examine areas of alignment and misalignment between the two actors' narratives. This chapter will therefore go through the elements of narratives (Actors, action, events, setting, instrument) present in both discourses in order to deduce the strategic narratives presented in these communications.

6.2 Context

Figure 6.1 French communications word frequency cloud and Figure 6.2: EU Communications word frequency cloud illustrate structural similarities how external

In summary, the communications by executive branches from France and the EU are comparatively similar – they feature important cross-cutting themes and highlight the profile of the executive decisions, actions and actors in understanding of the issue of external energy.

Yet, beyond these general structural and thematic similarities, there is a number of differences between the two discourses. There are significant divergences particularly around strategic issues such as the importance and diversity of partners as well as a differing weight given to particular types of energy and issues. The divergent policy outlooks lead to the diverging narratives about global energy governance formulated at the French and EU executive levels. This chapter aims to trace these differing narratives and show the different ways they frame external energy policy for the EU and one of its leading member states. At this point, it is useful to revisit the elements of the narrative discussed above.

6.3 Sources and Narrators

The first element of a narrative is the *narrator*. The narrators are responsible for the formation of the narratives and are therefore assumed to have a certain level of agency over the way they communicate strategic narratives (a perspective arguably informed by a rationalist approach).

Thomas Diez, looking at discourse and the way policy-makers engage in it, asks “whether the role of discourse is to positively enable particular policies or whether it works through constraining the policies that can be meaningful and legitimately

pursued.”⁵⁰⁴ He concludes that the latter is more convincing and that “the analysis of foreign policy discourses should therefore be refocussed away from their positive shaping of particular policies towards the way in which they work to set the limits of policy and how this setting of limits is performed by actors engaging in a struggle over foreign policy.”⁵⁰⁵ Importantly, he highlights the role policy-makers play in setting the limits of legitimacy in foreign policy. Therefore, the question: “Who speaks?” is as crucial as the question: “What are they speaking about?”

Answering the questions “Who speaks?”, this thesis identifies a number of narrators in France and the EU (Table 2). As detailed in Chapter 5 Methods, the policy discourse analysis in this research focusses on the communications of executive members of the French government and European Commission, namely ministers and commissioners. Following Entman’s cascading activation framing theory, this analysis assumes that the executive levels of government have the most power to influence framing of external policies.⁵⁰⁶ Table 6.1 lists narrators and displays differences in communications output between the EU and France (the data were collected from two different institutional/governmental websites, see Chapter 5 Methods. for more details).

504 Diez, "Setting the limits: Discourse and EU foreign policy."

505 Ibid.

506 Entman, *Projections of power: framing news, public opinion, and U.S. foreign policy*.

Table 6-1: Framework of analysis of narratives

	EU	France
President	14	22
Vice President - Prime Minister	5	17
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy - Foreign Affairs Minister	6	20
Energy and Environment	15	17
Other ⁵⁰⁷	31	0

Importantly, there are two administrations over the period of observation for both France and the EU. Nicolas Sarkozy was replaced by Francois Hollande after the 2012 election in France and Jose Manuel Barroso’s commission was followed by Jean Claude Juncker’s commission in 2014.

At times, the issue-areas of energy and environment in France were assigned to one

⁵⁰⁷ One strong difference is in the category “other”. While each ministry in France has its own communication structures, the Commission has a more streamlined unified system. The European Commission publishes on its website a number of press releases that are simply attributed to the Commission without a listed author.

ministry's portfolio, and at other times they were the responsibility of two distinct ministries. Bocquillon and Evrard point out that in 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy merged four different ministries into one, creating the Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and Planning (MEEDDAT), "so as to rebalance inter-ministerial relations in favour of environmental issues."⁵⁰⁸ In the period of analysis in this thesis, the ministry was headed by Jean Louis Borloo in 2009. However, already in 2010 there was a change -- the Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Planning was created (headed by Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet) alongside the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Digital Economy (headed by Eric Besson). Yet, from 2012, under Francois Hollande, the issue- areas were merged once again within a newly created Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy (headed by Ségolène Royale). Periods when the ministries were merged were the periods when the notion of sustainability took the foreground in policy discussions. To trace ebbs and flows in the architecture of the French executive bodies responsible for handling energy matter is thus important. The perturbations reveal the position, internal links and political priorities of the narrators and thus may help explain the change in the content of policy narratives formulated by the executive level institutions. The distinctions of narrative between the two administrations that this chapter will seek to highlight reveal the level of agency actors have over the framing of their strategic narrators, an important component of this research. By comparison, there are fewer structural evolutions to the DG Energy between the two Commission leaderships.

It is not only institutions/government who are the generic narrators. Individual narrators do have their own views and priorities, which often transpire through policy

508 Bocquillon and Evrard, "French Climate Policy: Diplomacy in the service of symbolic leadership."

communications. For example, Joseph Szarka points out that Nicolas Sarkozy and his Prime Minister Francois Fillon strongly and vocally championed nuclear energy.⁵⁰⁹ Under the same administration, Ministers of Energy and of the Environment had a stronger focus on renewable energy and sustainability. For example, Jean Louis Borloo, head of that ministry from 2007 to 2010, was on a personal mission to help African countries access renewable energy.⁵¹⁰

6.4 Events and setting

Tracing the dynamic of executive communications on external energy over seven year, we observe some differences between the EU and France (Table 6.2). There is a lower volume of communications by the EU in 2011 and 2012. This is perhaps is related to the EU's preoccupation with the Eurozone debt crisis, which likely distracted decision-makers' attention away from issues of global energy governance. This finding proves that settings and events are the key elements to craft and disseminate policy-relevant narratives, as well as to analyse and understand them in a systematic way.

509 Szarka, "From exception to norm - and back again? France, the nuclear revival, and the post-Fukushima landscape."

510 Energies pour l'Afrique - Un Projet de Jean Louis Borloo, <http://www.energiespourlafrique.org/>.

Table 6-2: Number of communications each year

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
From the European Commission	7	15	5	4	18	12	6
From French ministries	22	9	9	9	6	10	14

One such key event was the UNFCCC COP in Copenhagen in 2009. Even though it was a climate change focused event, it bore a direct relevance to external energy policy discourses, and specifically in terms of relating energy matters to the discussion on sustainability. To remind the readers, all communication analysed below had a direct focus on energy, thus they entered the sample. In these communications, in 2009, France attached a high importance to the UN COP in Copenhagen while contextualising it within a wider vision of its energy-focused discourse. As seen in Figure 6.1, *Copenhagen* is the 27th most used words in French communications on external energy policy with 202 mentions. Comparatively, the word does not appear in the most used 100 words in EU respective communications.

In France, the conference in Copenhagen was first presented as having great potential and later as being a major disappointment. The EU was framed by French politicians as having major responsibilities ahead of Copenhagen. Jean Louis Borloo, asked in an interview about what role the EU had to play in the upcoming negotiations, responds:

“The European Union is the only real organisation in the world, until now,

that has made a commitment for a massive reduction [of emissions]. So, I understand the EU needs to be supported in this endeavour, with 27 members, it isn't so easy. But, when one is at Copenhagen, one understands that, honestly, if there wasn't the European commitment, I think there would be great difficulties in Copenhagen.”⁵¹¹

Overall, on the issue of climate change at Copenhagen, France aligns itself with the EU's position. In his speech in China focussing on the summit, Francois Fillon declared: “Of course, France, like the European Union, would have wished for the agreement in Copenhagen to go further.”⁵¹² The EU was portrayed as a largely positive actor that will be trying its best in the negotiations. It is important to remember that by 2009, France has made a commitment to lead in the fight against climate change. Since Sarkozy's 2007 election, the issue of combating climate change has been central to many policy debates. Perhaps unsurprisingly, during its EU presidency in 2008, France made sustainability one of its priorities. The alignment between France and the EU's stances on sustainability is of significance for this analysis.

While the summit ended with a disappointed France, the responsibility for the failure was delegated by French narrators largely to the US and China. When asked by a journalist if Barack Obama lacked character in the negotiations, Jean Louis Borloo replies:

“...no, I don't know. But essentially, an American emits four times more

511 Jean-Louis Borloo, "Interview de M. Jean-Louis Borloo, ministre de l'écologie, de l'énergie, du développement durable et de la mer, en charge des technologies vertes et des négociations sur le climat, à France-Inter le 11 décembre 2009, sur les enjeux de la conférence de Copenhague sur le réchauffement climatique.," news release, 11 December 2009.

512 François Fillon, "Déclaration de M. François Fillon, Premier ministre, sur la coopération nucléaire entre la France et la Chine, à Pékin le 21 décembre 2009.," news release, 21 December 2009.

greenhouse gas than a French person, and the commitment, the difference between the French and American commitment, the American commitment is seven times less than that of the French, and more generally, five times less than the Europeans. So, in reality, the difficulty of Copenhagen is the obstruction by the American Congress preventing President Obama from going further.”⁵¹³

He later adds:

“...no but, what is the reality here? Having a voluntary agreement, so no one is summoned, people come voluntarily to try to build an agreement. Europe comes with its level of ambition for reduction, of 20-30%, in a unified manner. Does Europe have the means to impose that on China? The answer is no. No one has the means to impose to anyone in this type of meeting. And even less to a country of 1.4 billion that says: “Me, I need to have 8% growth per year, I’m willing to reduce the growth of my carbon intensity but not my economic growth.” So, no one is able. Not Europe any more than anyone else.”⁵¹⁴

This interpretation of the Copenhagen outcomes highlights the visibility of political themes in the external energy discourse. In 2014, President Hollande reviews what happened at Copenhagen a year before the Paris conference. He declares:

“We still have to convince the world. It isn’t easy because the world is

513 Jean-Louis Borloo, "Interview de M. Jean-Louis Borloo, ministre de l'écologie, de l'énergie, du développement durable et de la mer, en charge des technologies vertes et des négociations sur le climat, à RMC le 21 décembre 2009, sur le bilan du sommet de Copenhague.," interview by Jean-Jacques Bourdin, *RMC*, 21 December 2009,

514 Ibid.

*multiple. Let's start with the two big emitters China and the United States. They weren't the most enthusiastic at Copenhagen. It is probably what explained the failure, even if the biggest emitters [...] always hide behind the smallest to argue that it shouldn't go too far, and that it could affect the growth of the global economy..."*⁵¹⁵

Such a portrayal of the US and China is significant since globally, the US and China's leadership in the Copenhagen negotiations was more widely recognised than the EU's.⁵¹⁶ However, by 2015, at the COP21 in Paris, China's role was perceived as reversed. Laurent Fabius, Foreign Affairs Minister declares during a press conference:

*"China, I think it has been recognised by all, has played up to now an extremely positive and important role in seeking success for the COP 21. China is the first carbon emitter in the world, the Chinese president and the Chinese government are extremely committed to the fight against climate change."*⁵¹⁷

In contrast to French communications, the EU's official communications that referenced external energy matters in the same time period mentioned Copenhagen in a marginal way. In the run up to the conference, it is briefly mentioned in a press release about the 12th EU- China Summit. President Barosso briefly referenced the COP:

515 François Hollande, "Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur la lutte contre le dérèglement climatique, à Paris le 1er décembre 2014.," news release, 1 Decembre 2014.

516 Parker and Karlsson, "The European Union as a global climate leader: confronting aspiration with evidence."

517 Laurent Fabius, "Déclaration à la presse de M. Laurent Fabius, ministre des affaires étrangères et du développement international, sur la Conférence de Paris pour le climat, au Bourget le 4 décembre 2015.," news release, 4 December 2015.

*“From this EU-China Summit we intend to send a strong message on our shared determination to face and overcome together global challenges. Only a week before the Copenhagen UN conference on Climate Change we will stress the need for an ambitious and global result, which includes structures to finance mitigation.”*⁵¹⁸

At the time, EU communications made no predictions or judgements on the outcome of the UN COP in Copenhagen. Only in 2015, in the build-up of the UN COP 21 in Paris, EU climate Change Commissioner, Miguel Arias Cañete reflected on Copenhagen:

“But before, let us step back and look at what happened at the Copenhagen conference in 2009. Why did Copenhagen fail? For three reasons: First, because the world was not ready. Second, because many countries were not willing to commit. And third, because all those countries not willing to commit managed to sharply divide the developed and the developing worlds and create two opposite blocks. Indeed, in Copenhagen the story was about countries against countries, developed versus developing, them and us.”⁵¹⁹

He later comments on the involvement of the BRICS and the EU in the negotiations:

“Without major developing countries emitters such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa or Indonesia, we simply cannot fix the climate. In Copenhagen, Europe was criticized for not being in the room where deals were crunched. A sentiment of frustration, and even political humiliation, was present in many European delegates. In the face of this, the European Union only had

⁵¹⁸ IP-09-1835

⁵¹⁹ Miguel Arias Cañete, "Historic Climate Deal in Paris: Speech by Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete at the Press Conference on the Results of Cop21 Climate Conference in Paris," news release, 14 December 2015.

one option: wipe the tears, get its act together and keep pushing. But pushing creatively, strategically.”⁵²⁰

These examples point to one striking difference between the EU and French executive communications. French officials openly – and rather emotionally -- acknowledge the fact that the conference did not reach the Europeans’ expectations whereas, European officials appear to avoid communicating about it and when they do, they mostly do so in a neutral way. However, it must be stressed one more time that the communications gathered in this research are only those that explicitly mentioned energy issues. More communications about the UN COPs have been released by both actors, but they are not in the focus of this analysis. Yet, here lies the second important conclusion: the different level of communication on the UN COP *with* references to energy in this analysis may indicate that French officials more readily associate energy issues with climate change. Word frequency analysis shows us that while the word “climate” is the third most mentioned word in EU communications, with 385 mentions, the words “climat” and “climatique” are respectively mentioned 407 and 366 times in French communications. The words “emissions” and “sustainable” appear more often in French communication than in European ones. These associations are important to understand the context within which issues of global energy governance are communicated by executive discourses. Generally, the EU’s communications on external energy were often focussed on relations with third countries. Communications on summits with third countries -- such as China, Ukraine, Russia or India -- are often the context within which energy is mentioned by the European Commission narrators. This is confirmed by table 6.3 below.

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

Table 6-3: Focus of domesticity in French and EU political communications (2009-2015)

	Local	EU general	Member states	3 rd country	Global
EU commission	0	18	1	31	18
French executive	24	0	0	22	30

6.5 Actors and actions

We now shift to the analysis of the next key element in the narrative structure – actor and its actions. Table 6.4 displays the similarities and differences between French and EU communications in the visibility of actors. Unsurprisingly, political actors – the discourse producers and narrators -- place themselves at the centre of the action. France has a more pronounced self-focus, with a larger share of communications where it is presented as a major actor. In contrast, many of the EU’s communications on global energy issues deal with summits between EU actors and third countries. In those communications, the EU is presented to be on an equal footing with other actors, rather than a solo lead. This explains why the EU enjoys a role of a secondary actor in a large portion of its own communications.

Table 6-4: Visibility of Actors in French and EU political communications (2009-2015)

EU				France			
	Major	Secondary	Minor		Major	Secondary	Minor
Brazil	0	2	10	Brazil	0	7	11
Russia	0	17	17	Russia	0	4	15
India	0	3	16	India	0	10	23
China	0	7	30	China	0	20	32
SA	0	0	10	SA	0	0	8
France	0	1	6	France	51	22	1
EU	36	31	0	EU	1	14	12

6.5.1 Russia

In EU discourse

Table 6-4 shows that the EU's official communications afford a certain degree of prominence to Russia compared to other BRICS, often presenting the country as a secondary actor when it comes to external energy matters. This framing demonstrates that over the period of observation, the EU had closer energy relations with its neighbour to the East compared to other emerging actors. The EU has also placed more

importance on this actor in its communications. Moreover, the EU employed a diversity of thematic frames when talking about Russia that included all framing categories outlined in Chapter 5: Methods: *politics, economics, competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability*. Arguably, this multifaceted framing points to a complex nature EU-Russia energy relationship as reflected by official discourse.

Politics was the most important thematic framing category for Russia in the EU's executive communications. This is largely due to the fact that many of the communications about Russia centre on specific political summits. For example, communications about the EU-Russia summit appear in 2010 and 2011. These communications often have a secondary focus on energy while primary attention goes to political interactions. At times, energy topics are granted political importance on their own. A gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine having disrupted the supply of gas to a number of European countries in 2009 was one of such occasions where energy issues crossed into hard politics. It was also a time where the EU sees itself as having a larger role in the conduct of external energy policies. Commissioner in charge of energy in 2009, Andris Piebalgs in a speech on "energy in a global environment" given in Japan, argues that:

"This new-found solidarity in energy policy is an important change. It came to the fore earlier in the year during the Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. You will remember that this disrupted gas supplies to large parts of eastern and central Europe. As a result, the EU took the unusual step of mediating to resolve a dispute between two third parties. It did this because Member States recognised that the EU would only have a real

*impact if it worked together in solidarity.*⁵²¹

The issue of Russia-Ukraine energy transit conflict remained an important one for the EU after 2009. In 2010, energy – and more specifically, gas – was discussed by those EU communications that focussed on the Russia-Ukraine Summits. These communications demonstrated, among other things, the geopolitical importance of energy. The EU framed itself as a mediator between the two neighbours conflicting over energy: “The Council welcomed the trilateral gas accord of 30 October 2014 mediated over the course of the last eight months by the European Union, and acknowledged the support of the United States and other parties in this achievement.”⁵²² However, in acting as an intermediary between Russia and Ukraine, the EU also communicated it also acted in securing its own energy supplies.

Russia’s moderately high visibility in the EU’s communications on external energy matters is indicative of the importance of Russia to the EU’s energy stability. *Competitiveness* and *security of supply* are also prominent framing categories in this case. In a key-note speech at the EU-Russia 10th anniversary of high level conference EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council for Energy, the then Commissioner for Energy, Gunther Oettinger talked about what he called “the Europeanization of energy policy.”⁵²³ He argues that Europe faces a number of energy challenges that would be too imposing to be tackled by individual member states and talks about the relationship between the EU and Russia.

This strategic importance of Russia to the EU is further highlighted in 2014 by multiple

⁵²¹ Andris Piebalgs, "Energy in a Global Environment," news release, 8 December 2009.

⁵²² European Commission, "Joint Statement Eu-US Energy Council," news release, 03 December 2014.

⁵²³ Günther Oettinger, "Keynote Speech Given at the Eu Russia 10th Anniversary High Level Conference Eu-Russia Permanent Partnership Council for Energy," news release, 22 November 2010.

statements from the Commission following an announcement by Russia that it would cease the South Stream project.⁵²⁴ In these statements, Energy Union Commissioners Maros Sefcovic speaks alongside ministers and representatives from EU member states (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Romania and Slovenia) and they stress that “the EU must remain strongly committed to integrating Central and South-Eastern European gas markets and diversifying gas suppliers.”⁵²⁵ The mention in this context of diversifying gas supply only highlights the structural dependence the EU member states have towards Russia gas exports.

The Commission also underlines the interconnectedness of the energy markets between Russia and the EU member states drawing attention not just to the importance of Russia as an energy supplier for European countries but also the importance of the European market for Russia’s companies.

Russia is the EU’s most important single supplier of energy products, accounting for over 23% of the EU consumption of gas and 30% of its total crude oil consumption. In turn, Russia’s economy remains highly dependent on the export of energy raw materials, with the EU as its most important destination. In 2010 63% of Russia’s exports consisted of crude oil, oil products and natural gas. The EU accounts for 88% of Russia's total oil exports, 70% of its gas exports and 50% of its coal exports.⁵²⁶

In 2011 and 2012, when EU communications about external energy are low, EU-Russia summits continues to be a backdrop for energy discussions. In 2013, the communications indicate a shift in the conversation with Russia, following the launch

⁵²⁴ European Union, "Joint Press Statement by Ministers and Representatives of Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Romania and Slovenia and Vp Sefcovic," news release, 09 December 2014.

⁵²⁵ Ibid.

⁵²⁶ European Commission, "Eu-Russia Summit " news release, 15 December 2011.

of the EU-Russia Year of Science 2014. In these communications, Russia is framed as a “natural scientific partner”⁵²⁷ to the EU. Overall, the EU’s communications in this analysis mentioned nuclear energy in fifteen communications, and five of them mentioned nuclear as an area of cooperation with Russia. This cooperation includes political cooperation such as dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, nuclear safety strategies and R&D projects such as nuclear fusion through the ITER programme. As such, the EU frames Russia not only as a supplier of fossil fuels, but also an important partner in the field of energy science, and nuclear energy in particular. By comparison, discussions about Ukraine-Russia relations drop in visibility from 2011 to 2013.

In French discourse

France’s executive communications that deal with external energy focus less on Russia. When they do cover Russia, they often portray it as a minor actor. On those rare occasions when Russia is directly connected to energy issues, French communications frame it within the context of its relations with Europe: “it’s the inauguration of the Nord Stream pipeline in Germany that highlights the interests shared by Europe and Russia in terms of energy, and particularly in terms of energy security.”⁵²⁸ It seems that French executive communications deliver a message that Russia does not hold direct importance to France’s conduct of energy governance. Yet, France’s official communications do recognise Russia’s role in warranting stability of

527 "Launch of the Eu-Russia Year of Science 2014," news release, 22 November 2013.

528 François Fillon, "Déclaration de M. François Fillon, Premier ministre, suivie de questions - réponses sur le renforcement de la coopération bilatérale entre la France et la Russie, la crise de la zone euro, la situation en Syrie et la sécurité nucléaire, à Moscou le 18 novembre 2011.," news release, 18 November 2011.

the EU's energy market.

6.5.2 China

The biggest energy concern about China that transpired from the analysis of both the EU's and France's communications is sustainability. This category of framing is the most associated with China in the two discourses. Both France and the EU view China's action on reducing its carbon emissions as integral part of fighting global climate change. In a speech to the European Parliament, Miguel Arias Cañete, Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, declared:

“the EU only accounts for 10% of global emissions today. At least all the major and emerging economies must also come forward by the first quarter of 2015. The US and China announcement earlier this month should show that the EU's call is being answered by key players and hopefully will incite others to follow suit.”⁵²⁹

This comparison between the EU's and China's carbon emissions is a leitmotiv in France's communications. Natalie Kosciusko-Morizet declares in an interview in 2009: “Because there is only one planet, because a tonne of carbon emitted in China has exactly the same impact on the climate as 1 tonne emitted by the European Union.”⁵³⁰

⁵²⁹European Commission, "Speech at the Ep Plenary “2014 Un Climate Change Conference Lima”,” news release, 26 November 2014.

⁵³⁰ Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, "nterview de Mme Nathalie Kosciusko-Morizet, ministre de l'écologie, du développement durable, des transports et du logement, à Europe 1 le 9 décembre 2011, sur l'état d'avancement des négociations sur le changement climatique à la conférence de Durban.," interview by Brice Toussaint, *Europe 1*, 9 December 2011,

She adds on the EU:

“The European Union in terms of climate change is extremely virtuous, it has action programmes, France fulfils its engagements towards climate change and international aid [...] But if you look at the gas emission represented by Europe, its 11% of global emissions. So even doing its work, and Europe will do it, it committed itself to do so. You understand, 11% of global emissions won't change the world, and so we need every other country to commit, even if at different levels [...] in the fight against climate change.”⁵³¹

The use of words like “virtuous” is hardly innocent. It betrays the pride and significance the French actors place in the EU’s commitments to reducing carbon emissions. In this we can see an important narrative alignment between France and the EU, where their positions on sustainability and climate change is used to place themselves in a good light compared to their emerging partners. This is a narrative that is shared at the EU level, Andris Piebalgs, EU energy commissioner argues that “we are equally affected by the emergence of China and India as major energy consumers and the structural changes in the global energy market that this is bringing about.”⁵³² As such, both the EU and France talk of coming to China’s aid to find sustainable ways to meet its energy demands.

For the EU, cooperating with China on sustainable urbanisation seems to be a priority, particularly in 2013, when a number of communications centred on this subject. In this case, the EU renders the message that is not a ‘teacher’ or ‘saviour’, but a counterpart who is willing to learn from China: Subsequent Energy Commissioner

⁵³¹ Ibid.

⁵³² Piebalgs, "Energy in a Global Environment."

Gunther Oettinger states “I am here because I hope we will be able to learn from each other: if there are solutions that work in China we should see if they can work in Europe – and vice versa.”⁵³³

In contrast, France’s official communication focus heavily on nuclear energy. In a speech following the signing of an agreement between French nuclear companies EDF and Areva and China’s own CGNPC, Francois Fillon declares:

*“France is the country where nuclear is the most important in the world. China is the country building the greatest number of nuclear reactors. These choices assure us a strategic position, at a time when nuclear energy is in a renaissance. A strategic position in terms of environmental responsibility. Nuclear is a powerful source of energy that produces no carbon emissions. It is today the best way to marry economic growth to which both China and France are attached, and at the same time the fight against climate change.”*⁵³⁴

This statement makes it clear how France frames nuclear energy as contributing to the fight against climate change. While France is presented an obvious leader, China is portrayed as lagging behind on sustainability which is declared to be a way to achieve “*environmental responsibility.*” Francois Fillon then continues:

“A strategic position also, in terms of know-how. Nuclear energy demands imperatively excellence. Excellence at every level: in the conception, in the construction, in the exploitation, and all the way until the dismantling of

533 Günther Oettinger, "Smart City Subforum," news release, 21 November 2013.

534 Fillon, "Déclaration de M. François Fillon, Premier ministre, sur la coopération nucléaire entre la France et la Chine, à Pékin le 21 décembre 2009.."

installations. This excellence cannot be acquired in a day: for us it is the result of experience that certifies the seniority of our commitment in this sector.”⁵³⁵

And then he adds: “For France, it is an honour and we are proud to have been able contribute to China’s mastery of nuclear energy, through a partnership that was initiated almost 30 years ago.”⁵³⁶

Thus, not only is France the purveyor of sustainability to China, but it also brings its *excellence* and *experience* to Chinese nuclear endeavours. Interestingly, the reason behind the need for excellence is never mentioned.

France also talks, but to a lesser extent, of helping China towards sustainable development through renewables. Francois Fillon answers a question on the subject in a press conference and declares:

“The totality of interventions in China by the French Agency for Development integrates the fight against climate change as a priority. [...] French companies and particularly groups such as Schneider Electric, like GDF Suez, like Veolia or like EDF, which are groups that have recognised expertise throughout the world in terms of energy efficiency, are developing their presence on the Chinese territory; and on their side, we have noticed Chinese investments in sectors like solar energy or wind power.”⁵³⁷

Over time however, China becomes a leader in renewable energy in its own right. At a

535 Ibid.

536 Ibid.

537 Ibid.

press conference in 2014, Laurent Fabius, Foreign Affairs minister declares:

“What has been less noticed is the fact that China has set itself extremely ambitious targets in terms of renewable energy which has made China the biggest market for and biggest production of renewable energy. China, through a vision that is part of its tradition, transformed a challenge into an opportunity.”⁵³⁸

6.5.3 India

France has more communications mentioning India than Russia (Table 6.4). This is in large part due to the fact that, for France, India is a more important energy partner than Russia. French communications on external energy frame India in similar terms to China, particularly regarding its need for sustainability. Still there is one difference – there is more emphasis of India in terms of *security of supply*. This is, in part, a result of President Sarkozy’s visit to India and the subsequent agreement between the two countries on nuclear cooperation which was frequently discussed in the French communications in 2010. Importantly, many of these communications are intended for the Indian public as well as French audiences. A couple of communications were released jointly with the government of India. Some were declarations made by President Sarkozy in front of Indian public and French communities in India and his interview to the *Times of India*. A diverse pool of target audiences suggests that the narrative on France as a leader in nuclear energy field is intended not only for the domestic public in France, but for international audiences as well.

⁵³⁸ Laurent Fabius and Martine Aubry, "Conférence De Presse Conjointe De M. Laurent Fabius, Ministre Des Affaires Étrangères Et Du Développement International, Et Mme Martine Aubry, Maire De Lille, Représentante Spéciale Du Ministre Pour Le Partenariat Pour Le Chine, Sur Les Relations Franco-Chinoises, À Paris Le 25 Novembre 2014.," news release, 25 November 2014.

In French communications about nuclear energy India, two important themes appeared: sustainability and India's right to nuclear energy. Like with China, nuclear energy was framed as an instrument to help India add to its energy capabilities without increasing its carbon emissions. However, French communications also strongly asserted India's right to nuclear energy following the lifting of restrictions on the import of nuclear materials and expertise. Arguably, the communications succeed in skilful linking of the concepts of sustainability, security of supply and right to nuclear energy. Nicolas Sarkozy during his visit to India alluded to these aspects, declaring:

“We have signed agreements in terms of nuclear with two EPR, two first reactors on a list of six, which means that French nuclear technology will be powerfully present in India. And in the name of what, refuse a democratic country the right to access this clean source of energy that is nuclear energy? And how can we say to our Indian friends: ‘fight against pollution, preserve environmental balances, and at the same time we forbid you access to the cleanest energy source, namely nuclear energy.’ If we want the Indians to participate to the equilibrium of the planet, we need to give them the means of this participation. And I am pleased that all of the French nuclear sector has won these great achievements.”⁵³⁹

Clearly outlined in this statement is the notion of *rights* associated with nuclear energy. Remarkably, France introduces itself as the defender of these rights numerous times. It also frames itself as a saviour of India in this context:

539 Nicolas Sarkozy, "Déclaration Devant La Communauté Française, De M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président De La République, Sur Les Relations Entre La France Et L'inde, À New Delhi (Inde) Le 6 Décembre 2010.," news release, 6 December 2010.

“France, you know it, was the first advocate (lawyer) of India in the world on the question of nuclear energy. We were the first to act to get India out of its isolation that it was in since 1998 and to allow it to cooperate with others in this domain. We did it because India has always behaved irreproachably in terms of non-proliferation and because India needs civil nuclear energy, which is a clean source of energy, for its development.”⁵⁴⁰

It seems the French official discourse around nuclear energy in developing countries goes one step further in India than in China. In China, as discussed above, France was bringing nuclear energy and thus assisting in the country’s sustainable development. In India, the narrative is of France who has come to the aid of India by helping it against the international community to open up its access to nuclear resources and technology. That is not to say the French politicians are completely unaware of India’s traditions and expertise in nuclear energy field. In another declaration in India, President Sarkozy states:

*“We are lucky that France and India are united by links going back to the beginning of the 20th century, when was conceived the first laws on nuclear and quantum physics. We are lucky that pioneers like Doctor Sarabhai for space or Doctor Homi Bhabha for nuclear, kept with their French counterparts privileged ties. It is thanks to these visionaries that I can come here, to Bangalore, to salute the excellence, Mister President, of our collaboration.”*⁵⁴¹

540 "Déclaration De M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président De La République, Sur La Coopération Franco-Indienne, À Bangalore (Inde) Le 4 Décembre 2010.," news release, 4 December 2010.

541 Ibid.

Importantly, while this statement acknowledges India's expertise in nuclear energy and space exploration, Sarkozy simultaneously put a claim for France's part in India's success.

French official communication does mention other types of energy in relation to India. For example, India's search to increase the share of renewable energy in the country. However, those were often very brief, passing mentions within larger contexts. They did not have the same intensity of focus as nuclear energy. Nuclear energy was often featured as *the* central subject of relations between France and India. It is little doubt that without it, India would have been less visible in France's political communications.

In contrast, in the observed period, the EU's official communications referenced India in the context of external energy highly infrequently. India was presented as an actor in a minor focus of attention and rarely in a wider context of energy.

6.5.4 Brazil and South Africa

Finally, both Brazil and South Africa have little visibility in EU and French communications. They both got mentioned as minor actors in most cases. Only few of these mentions linked them directly to the subject of global energy matters but rather to the issues of sustainability and climate change.

Brazil appeared a little more in the French communications due to Francois Fillon's visit to the country in 2011 and Dilma Rousseff's visit to France in 2012. Unlike China and India, Brazil was presented as an example of an emerging country fighting against climate change. In 2009, at a press conference, Nicolas Sarkozy declared: "Emerging countries must, like Brazil, commit to reducing global emissions by 50% by 2050, to

reach peak emission as soon as possible, and make quantified commitments.

Only two French communications explicitly referred to Brazil in the context of energy during Dilma Rousseff's visit to Paris. These communications stated that energy is sector in which Brazil and France should cooperate further and listed potential areas to deepen relations. In a joint statement, Francois Hollande and Dilma Rousseff outlined:

“The French and Brazilian Presidents, sharing the objective of a sustainable and diversified energy mix, feel that the energy sector offers great opportunities for a bilateral partnership. They highlight the quality of partnerships developed in the area of nuclear energy and commend the dialogue between the CEA and the la Commission nationale de l'Energie nucléaire (CNEN).”⁵⁴²

The two presidents then further detailed cooperation in the nuclear energy sector, mentioning cooperation between EDF, GDF Suez and Areva on the one hand and Electronuclear and Electrobras on the other as well as the cooperation over the completion of the nuclear reactor Angra III.⁵⁴³ The statement then continued:

They highlight the quality of industrial cooperation for electricity production, particularly hydroelectric and wind power production, and highlight the advantages of joint research of new technology in bioenergy for the promotion of sustainable development and fight against climate change. They invite companies to establish industrial partnerships and joint investments in offshore oil exploitation. They wish to encourage

⁵⁴² François Hollande and Dilma Rousseff, "Déclaration Conjointe De M. François Hollande, Président De La République Française, Et De Mme Dilma Rousseff, Présidente De La République Fédérative Du Brésil, Sur Le Partenariat Stratégique Franco-Brésilien, À Paris, Le 11 Décembre 2012.," news release, 11 December 2012.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

industrial partnerships and joint investments in the development of Brazil's solar energy sector.⁵⁴⁴

The energy section of the press statement concluded with the information about the partnership between EDF and Eletrobras in Africa and South America mentioning more particularly a hydro-electric project in Mozambique and a project of interconnection between French Guyana and Brazil. It is important to note that this reference to energy relations between Brazil and France in French communications appeared only during Dilma Rousseff's presidential visit. On a more sour note, and as mentioned in previous chapters, cooperation over the Angra III reactor was halted in 2014 because of financial difficulties. One might assume that France's lack of enthusiasm in discussing energy cooperation with Brazil may be linked to these issues. Finally, South Africa appeared very little and is never discussed directly in the context of energy but rather as an interlocutor during the UN COPs.

As is clear in Table 6.4, the visibility of Brazil and South Africa in EU communications is very low, as they are mostly mentioned as minor actors alongside other merging actors. As such there are no salient frames or narratives associated with these countries in EU discourse.

6.5.5 The EU

Sustainability is one of the major frames the EU uses to present itself along with politics. As mentioned, the political framing is associated with a large number of summits which are the focus of the EU's communications. Sustainability on the other hand is due to the mention of the EU's targets to reduce carbon emissions. EU

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid.

Commissioner Andris Piebalgs explains how the EU seeks to reduce emissions by compelling member states to increase the share of renewables in their energy mix and increase energy efficiency:

“Member States endorsed new targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2020, rising to 30% in the framework of an international climate change agreement, and to increase the share of renewable energy in energy consumption to 20% by 2020, up from around 7%. They also called for a cut in 20% in energy demand by 2020. These objectives have become known as the 20-20-20 agenda.”⁵⁴⁵

The mention of member states makes it apparent that they are willing to take part in policy making and setting objectives on sustainability. However, Piebalgs adds: “A year ago, the EU adopted a historic package of legislation to make the greenhouse gas emissions and renewable energy targets binding on the whole EU.”⁵⁴⁶ By mentioning binding targets, he also establishes the EU’s authority. Sustainability is an area where the EU aims to take a leadership role, both over member states as the previous quote shows but also at a global level. Piebalgs argues:

*“The EU has already made its weight felt in the global climate change debate and is an important partner for energy consumers and producers across the world. All in all, the EU has a unique capacity to help the world shift towards a more sustainable and secure energy path.”*⁵⁴⁷

Security of supply is also an important frame for the EU with discussions of energy

⁵⁴⁵ Piebalgs, "Energy in a Global Environment."

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

security. Talking about the EU's role in global energy, Piebalgs argues that "The EU has been at the forefront of policies to tackle energy security and climate change head-on."⁵⁴⁸

Even when it talks about all three of its energy policies categories, it places sustainability in first position. For example, a communication about the EU's 2050 energy roadmap begins thus: "The EU has set itself the goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 80%- 95% below 1990 levels by 2050. The Roadmap explores how this goal can be achieved while at the same time improving the competitiveness and the security of supply."⁵⁴⁷ As previously mentioned, security of supply is an often-used thematic frame when discussing relations with Russia. Gas supply is paramount to EU countries' security of supply. When this gas supply is threatened by Russia's cancellation of the construction of the South Stream project, the EU reinforces the need to diversify its sources. VP Šefčovič declares "We will now intensify our work with the Member States of the Central Eastern Europe and South-East Europe on the interconnection of the European markets and diversification of gas supplies." He adds "These are the objectives of the future Energy Union, which is a priority of the new Commission." These examples highlight the way the EU presents its three primary objectives as interconnected; sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness are all used in conjunction with each other.

Discussion on the EU's internal energy market is also an example of the interrelation of all three goals in EU discourse. One press release in 2015 on the progress made on the internal energy market quotes Canete:

"The Energy Union is starting to take shape. A lot of progress has been

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid

*made in these few months but we should now move to full scale delivery of all actions needed. This will be my focus in 2016: presenting the legislation to make our electricity market work better, to further increase the share of renewables, to bring down our energy consumption and to ensure security of our gas supply. With this, the EU's energy system will be stronger and all conditions will be set for the EU's transition toward a low-carbon energy system."*⁵⁴⁹

He then goes on to discuss the role the EU will play at the UN COP 21 in Paris.

These quotes indicate how the Energy Union, which is arguably primarily an internal policy, is framed within the international goals of security of supply and sustainability. It also highlights how the competitiveness frame has less implications for the EU's external energy policy. It is above all a goal for the EU's internal market rather than an issue of competition with other external actors. This is an important distinction between the EU and French discourse. For France, competitiveness is an issue largely associated with its nuclear energy industry which is in competition with that of other countries.

France frames the EU primarily in terms of sustainability. It presents the EU as a leader in the fight against global climate change and places itself within this European umbrella.

However, the discussion on the EU's policies is not limited to sustainability. In a communication by foreign Affairs Minister Laurent Fabius, talking about industrial development in France he argues:

"It does not depend only on France. It is also essential that the action of the European

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Union further supports industry. It is not a question of laying blame on Europe, but of overcoming the shortcomings of European policies in this area. All EU actions should be evaluated in terms of competitiveness. It should equip itself - as we propose – of a common energy policy.”⁵⁵⁰

By adding the “as we propose” he makes asserts that rather than a policy ‘download’ from the EU level to the domestic level, the internal energy market is a French policy preference ‘uploaded’ to the EU level.

6.5.6 France

France presents in terms of sustainability and competitiveness. Sustainability is often linked to France’s role in the COPs. However, it is not the only context of discussion for sustainability. In a communication about international negotiations and France's positions on biodiversity and climate change, Minister of the Environment Delphine Batho announces:

“Competitiveness remains a dimension of this debate, but it is not the only one: we have to reconcile the ecological objective of the fight against global warming and the economic objective of preserving the purchasing power of households whose energy bill are increasing. We must also take into account the issues related to the security of our supplies and the reduction of our trade balance deficit. All these parameters must be discussed.”⁵⁵¹

550 Laurent Fabius, "Déclaration De M. Laurent Fabius, Ministre Des Affaires Étrangères, Sur La Politique Industrielle De La France Et Sur La Diplomatie Économique, À Paris Le 6 Novembre 2013.," news release, 6 November 2013.

551 Delphine Batho, "Déclaration De Mme Delphine Batho, Ministre De L'écologie, Du Développement

This quote reflects the three thematic frames of sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness and addresses their inter-connectedness. Thus, it mirrors the EU's own narrative on sustainability. It should be noted that the rest of her communication refers heavily to the EU's policies such as emissions targets.

However, France does not see itself solely in as a recipient of sustainability narratives but also as a leader in Europe in its own right. Discussing the law on energy transition in an interview on French media, Environment Minister Ségolène Royale states: "This new French energy model [...] has served as a reference, not only to Europe, but also, for example, during COP21."⁵⁵²

Additionally, as has been seen in the case of Fillon's speech during his visit to China France's nuclear energy is portrayed as a means to attain sustainability. Likewise, competitiveness frames for France are closely associated to nuclear energy.

6.6 Instruments

The final element of the narrative structure is the *object* or *instrument* used to perform an action. In the context of global energy governance, types of energy can be viewed as the tool through which actors engage with other actors. As has been discussed, types

Durable Et De L'énergie, Sur Les Négociations Internationales Et Les Positions De La France À Propos De La Biodiversité Et Du Changement Climatique, À L'assemblée Nationale Le 28 Novembre 2012.," news release, 28 November 2012

552 Ségolène Royal, "Interview De Mme Ségolène Royal, Ministre De L'écologie, Du Développement Durable Et De L'énergie, À Itélé Le 15 Décembre 2015, Sur Les Leçons Des Élections Régionales, Les Débats Autour De Nouvelles Façons De Faire De La Politique Et L'accord Conclu Lors De La Conférence De Paris Sur Le Climat.," news release, 15 December 2015.

of energy can be more or less associated with different actors since the tool and the action are inescapably related. Thus, as shown in Table 6.5, gas is the type of energy most mentioned in EU communications, and a type of energy closely associated with Russia. Similarly, nuclear energy is the most mentioned type of energy in France with India and China framed as important markets for French nuclear industry in the French official communications.

Furthermore, the way each actor portrays each type of energy is revealing in itself. This section now turns to discuss the framing of the types of energy in two discourses of political communication.

Table 6-5: Visibility of energy types in EU and French political communications (2009-2015)

	Oil	Gas	Coal	Fossil	Nuclear	Solar	Wind	Other Renewables
EU	7	20	2	4	11	4	3	22
France	23	9	16	15	35	13	11	57

6.6.1 France

French communications focus strongly on nuclear energy, particularly in communications from President Sarkozy and his Prime Minister Francois Fillon. In fact, there is a strong division in the way Sarkozy's government discusses nuclear energy and the way President Hollande does. As discussed in previous chapters, their two respective parties campaigned for two opposing decisions regarding the role of nuclear

energy in France's energy mix. Hollande's socialist party wanted to see a reduction of the share of nuclear from 75% to 50% of the energy mix. Sarkozy on the other hand argued against this change. This important distinction in their energy policies is translated in the way they discuss energy. Overall, nuclear energy is mentioned throughout French communications on external energy 221 times. However, it is mentioned 174 times by Sarkozy's administration versus 46 times by Hollande's. This is clear evidence that nuclear energy was at the centre of Sarkozy's government's external energy policies.

Importantly, both Francois Fillon and Nicolas Sarkozy often invoked the historical context in which nuclear energy was developed in France to justify their policies. To do so, they instrumentalised past presidents and their actions and placed themselves in the continuity of these decisions. For example, Francois Fillon in a speech on France-China relations in 2009 declared:

*"Truthfully, 40 years ago, when the general de Gaulle and later Georges Pompidou decided on the French electronuclear programme [...] they didn't do it because the market demanded it, they did it because at that moment they had the political will to provide our country of instruments, industrial tools, energy tools, that we continue to benefit from today, and that are a source of prosperity in France and in Europe."*⁵⁵³

This leitmotiv of General de Gaulle, instigator of France's greatness, is summoned by Sarkozy and Fillon a total of eight times.

553 François Fillon, "Déclaration De M. François Fillon, Premier Ministre, Sur Les Grandes Orientations De La Politique Économique Et Sur Les Relations Bilatérales Entre La France Et La Chine, À Pékin Le 22 Décembre 2009.," news release, 22 December 2009.

In this, we see how political psychology impacts the way in which political leaders talk about their policies and thus impact their narratives. The filiation with General de Gaulle is characteristic of many members of Sarkozy and Fillon's party, Les Republicains, party which in an earlier life was founded by partisans of de Gaulle. After many rebrandings, the party continues to claim this lineage.

Francois Fillon asserts his political allegiance to de Gaulle's ideas and refer to himself as "gaullists." In fact, Francois Fillon explains this assumed filiation in a speech about investment projects in the town of Saint Dizier and European integration:

"And we⁵⁵⁴ are *gaullists* who have been able, I think, who have tried at least, to renew *Gaullism*, that is to say, inspire ourselves from a way of acting, inspire ourselves by a life ethic to adapt it to a situation that General de Gaulle never knew. And I say this because our *Gaullism*, [...], isn't a posture, it isn't simply words that that sound good "to do like" General de Gaulle. It is an inspiration of principles, a way of life, a way of conceiving public engagement that we have tried to adapt to a completely new situation."⁵⁵⁵

His words highlight the imprint that General de Gaulle presidencies and persona have left on the psyche of many of France's political class.

Interestingly, Sarkozy has in the past rejected this idea of continuity with de Gaulle and claimed not to be a *Gaullist*. As pointed out by Gino Raymond, Nicolas Sarkozy

554 Speaking of himself and Francois Cornut-Gentille, Maire of Saint Dizier at the time and member of the UMP (now les Republicains).

555 François Fillon, "Déclaration De M. François Fillon, Premier Ministre, Sur Les Grandes Orientations De La Politique Économique Et Sur Les Relations Bilatérales Entre La France Et La Chine, À Pékin Le 22 Décembre 2009.," news release, 22 December 2009.

declared in an interview in June 2008:

*“Me Gaulist? It’s not that simple. The General de Gaulle was a great man in June 1940, and later in 1958. In the first instance he gave us our honour back, in the second instance he gave us a constitution. But afterwards? What was his balance sheet? Let me laugh. What has he done exactly, apart from hanging on to power that was escaping his grasp? And frankly, it’s about time we were done with this legend.”*⁵⁵⁶

He no doubt later realised the power of the myth of de Gaulle in summoning ideas of French grandeur since he cites de Gaulle as an example in four of the communications gathered. These two examples illustrate the duality of narratives, between agency and structure and how politicians can use both in forming as well as repeating certain narratives.

In 2011, at a time when they were campaigning against Francois Hollande, Sarkozy and Fillon also summon the memory of socialist president Francois Mitterrand, pitting his legacy against the socialist party’s decision to reduce the share of nuclear energy. When asked about the Greens and Socialist Party’s decision on nuclear by a journalist, Francois Fillon declares:

“I remind you that when Francois Mitterrand was President of the Republic, the development of French nuclear continued in a climate that was a climate of consensus and that contributed to give France important competitive assets. So, it’s also a break with this period and with this sense

⁵⁵⁶ Gino Raymond, "Sarkozy-De Gaulle: Recycling the Resistance Myth," *French Cultural Studies* 24, no. 1 (2013).

of responsibility that Francois Mitterrand has embodied at the time."⁵⁵⁷

Likewise, Sarkozy in a speech asserts:

*"If George Pompidou and Valery Giscard d'Estaing made the major decision on our current nuclear energy capabilities, I'd like to point it out, because it's true that 40 of the 58 nuclear reactors were linked to the grid under Francois Mitterrand's two terms and that Francois Mitterrand himself launched the construction of 13 of these reactors. One recognises a man of State by his ability to place himself beyond partisan interest to make choices for France. President Mitterrand never put in question the industrial and nuclear heritage of his predecessors, because he was concerned with energy independence."*⁵⁵⁸

It seems every president of France's 5th Republic can be instrumentalised to prove the legitimacy of a government's action. Doubtless, the memory of war hero and defender of France's grandeur general de Gaulle is the most powerful one used, however invoking figures from the opposite political party adds to claims of by-partisan credibility.

These examples clearly show how historical figures of France's political class are used by right wing politicians to justify the choice of nuclear energy and place it as one of France's great achievements. In some cases, this rationale goes further into placing

557 Fillon, "Déclaration De M. François Fillon, Premier Ministre, Suivie De Questions - Réponses Sur Le Renforcement De La Coopération Bilatérale Entre La France Et La Russie, La Crise De La Zone Euro, La Situation En Syrie Et La Sécurité Nucléaire, À Moscou Le 18 Novembre 2011."

558 Nicolas Sarkozy, "Déclaration De M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président De La République, Sur La Politique Énergétique De La France Notamment En Matière D'énergie Nucléaire, À Pierrelatte (Drôme) Le 25 Novembre 2011.," news release, 25 November 2011.

France above the rest of Europe in terms of energy policies. Francois Fillon, in a speech about France's economy declares:

*"50 years ago, France chose to develop electronuclear capabilities. Today these capabilities insure us competitive electricity prices. There, for once, we are better than most European countries and that including our German friends. And most of all, it insures us a real energy independence. We do not rely entirely on gas pipes between Russia and Germany or solely on oil imports."*⁵⁵⁹

He also adds a comment about the competitiveness of energy in France on the European scale at a time when energy prices were on the rise. ⁵⁶⁰ The quote highlights France's friendly rivalry with Germany and in some sense, the country's inferiority complex compared to its neighbour. It also shows how politicians perceive France's energy policies compared to the rest of Europe and emphasise two arguments used to justify the choice of nuclear energy: competitiveness and independence.

Additionally, as has been discussed in France's nuclear relations with China and India, the use of nuclear is justified through the argument that it is low in carbon emission, an attribute that allows the French government to qualify nuclear energy as "clean." So, for the French government under Sarkozy, nuclear energy can be promoted under a holy trinity of competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability.

That is not to say that Sarkozy's government did not talk of other types of energy. Also prominent were renewables. However, unlike nuclear energy, they are often mentioned in

⁵⁵⁹ François Fillon, "Déclaration De M. François Fillon, Premier Ministre, Sur L'avenir De L'industrie Automobile Française Et Le Financement Des Entreprises, À Sablé-Sur-Sarthe Le 25 Novembre 2011.," news release, 25 November 2011.

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid

an external context, without France as a direct actor. For example, at the time of the Copenhagen UN COP, Jean-Louis Borloo talks about the concept of a green fund, whereby developed countries would provide others with aid to develop renewable energy. France places itself within a coalition of developed countries but is not at the centre of the action. Moreover, when renewables were discussed in the local context, they often appear alongside nuclear energy. For example, Fillon listed renewable energy along with fourth generation nuclear reactors as sectors of the future to be invested in. Likewise, Sarkozy declared in a speech in 2009:

“The CEA has a technological know-how beyond compare in nuclear energy, but it allows us also, and it is less known, to appear in the top ranks of research globally in the solar energy, biofuels and energy storage. Tomorrow, I want it to deepen further this direction in favour of other low-carbon energies. Because it is about respect the government’s commitment to absolute parity in the research effort between nuclear energy and renewable energy. The CEA will therefore become the Commission of Atomic Energy and of Alternative energies (CEA2)”⁵⁶¹

That is the important distinction between Sarkozy’s government and Hollande’s. Renewables until 2012 were somewhat of a secondary focus, often being overshadowed by nuclear energy. By contrast, the development of renewables became the centre of Hollande’s government’s energy policies and communications about global energy governance followed suit. For example, whereas Sarkozy and Fillon justified the choice of nuclear energy through the argument that it brought France

⁵⁶¹ Nicolas Sarkozy, "Conférence De Presse De M. Nicolas Sarkozy, Président De La République, Sur Les Priorités Financées Par L'emprunt National, À Paris Le 14 Décembre 2009.," news release, 14 December 2009.

independence, Hollande makes the same claim about renewables. In 2014, he declared:

“We are recognised as a world power. But if we look more closely, there is a weakness, we are dependent on our sources of supply of energy. France dedicates 65 billion euros in hydrocarbon imports every year. It’s the equivalent of our trade deficit. Diversifying our sources of supply, consuming less energy, producing renewable energy, means restoring our trade deficit and reinforcing our influence in the world, it means not being reliant on a few supply sources.”⁵⁶²

Thus, there is a shift in the narratives over time where the means to achieve independence, both in terms of energy, but also politically, goes from nuclear energy to renewables energy and energy efficiency. Importantly, Hollande’s makes a self-proclamation of France as a world power, a concept that has historically been tied to France’s nuclear capabilities. Here again we see a shift of narrative away from nuclear towards renewables.

Finally, like Sarkozy and Fillon before him, Hollande used the memory of past presidents in order to justify his policies. In an interview on climate change and the Paris conference, Francois Hollande declared: “To paraphrase General de Gaulle, I would say that everyone will be ecologist or the world will no longer be.”⁵⁶³ And he mentions other past presidents later in the same interview:

562 François Hollande, "Déclaration De M. François Hollande, Président De La République, Sur Les Efforts En Faveur De La Protection De L'environnement, À Paris Le 27 Novembre 2014.," news release, 27 November 2014.

563 "Interview De M. François Hollande, Président De La République, Dans "L'express" Du 24 Novembre 2015, Sur La Lutte Contre Le Dérèglement Climatique.," news release, 24 November 2015.

“There is in the environmental field a French tradition. The President Valery Giscard d’Estaing was one of the first leaders to bring together, at the beginning of the 1970s, a conference around the Club of Rome report that questioned the dogma of growth at all costs. This awareness was then shadowed by the oil crises. Later, Francois Mitterrand personally committed himself in the preparation of the Rio conference. [...] Then, Jacques Chirac, sensitive to the calls of Nicolas Hulot, pronounced a speech at the summit of Earth in Johannesburg, in September 2002: “Our house is burning and we’re looking elsewhere.” This sentence is still in all our memories. [...] Finally, Nicolas Sarkozy was the instigator of the Grenelle de l’environnement.”⁵⁶⁴

To conclude, the focus on renewable energy is different between Sarkozy’s government and Hollande’s, however the context within which it is mentioned is often similar. Renewable energy is linked to the fight against climate change, both abroad and domestically. Often mentioned in tandem with energy efficiency, it is portrayed as an industry in development that creates jobs. Finally, fossil fuels are presented to have a bad reputation -- they do not enjoy the same kind of focus as nuclear and renewables. They are framed to contribute to pollution and demand extra expenses.

6.6.2 The EU

For the EU’s external energy communications, mentions of energy types are low (Table 6.5). One can argue this is due to the nature of the EU for which energy can’t really be defined as a tool in the same way as it is for its member states. Energy is not a product

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

that the EU can export or import in the same way that member states do. Nevertheless, the EU still aims to have a voice on energy governance throughout its member states. Moreover, energy remains a tool for other actors that interact with the EU. And so, since Russia received much visibility as a strategic energy partner for the EU, gas is one of the most visible types of energy mentioned in EU communications. The most pressing issue for the EU with regards to gas is security of supply, a concept that appears often in relation to the type of energy. For example, in 2009, a press release on the EU's gas supply after the Ukraine-Russia gas crisis argues: "The crisis also showed the vital role of gas storages and reverse flows as short-term crisis response. Therefore, the Commission suggests a common infrastructure standard to ensure the infrastructure for the security of supply."⁵⁶⁵ However, the issue of security of supply does not appear only in the context of relations with Russia. In a press release on the 2012 EU-US energy summit the issue is also one of the EU's priorities: "the meeting will discuss EU/US co-operation to enhance energy security through the diversification of gas and oil supply sources and routes. This year there is also a focus on the regulatory frameworks that encourage more efficient use of energy sources."⁵⁶⁶

Finally, renewable energy is the other type of energy that the EU mentions the most. This is in part due to the role renewable energy targets play in reducing EU member states' carbon emissions. However, the EU also portrays itself as a leader in this type of energy. In a statement following the 14th EU-India Summit in 2010, EU Commission President Barroso affirms:

⁵⁶⁵ European Commission, "Gas Coordination Group Discusses the Gas Supply Outlook and the Emergency Preparedness in the Eu " news release, 14 December 2009.

⁵⁶⁶ "2012 Eu-US Energy Council to Meet in Brussels, 5th December 2012," news release, 4 December 2012.

*“We can do even more to exploit the enormous possibilities of green and clean technologies together, to the benefit of our citizens and businesses. I am in particular thinking about the potential of cutting-edge solar energy, on which European companies are world leaders.”*⁵⁶⁷

Renewable energy is a topic on which the EU and France seem to meet each other most strongly with climate change and economic growth both drivers of their development. A press release about the Energy Union states: “Renewable energies and energy efficiency are creating local jobs in Europe, requiring new skills.”⁵⁶⁸ Likewise a press release about the third Africa EU-Summit argues that “Renewable energy is emerging as a fundamental requirement for addressing the challenges posed not only by climate change, but also by the need to increase economic growth.”⁵⁶⁹

In comparison to France, nuclear energy only has a small role in the EU’s discourse on global energy governance. Unlike France, it is not a narrative of competitiveness that is presented in relation to nuclear energy but primarily one of neutrality but also of safety. A press release on the Roadmap 2050 answers a question on the role of nuclear in the EU’s strategy. It states: “The EU Commission and the Roadmap 2050 is neutral on the question whether or not Member States should use nuclear power. It does not give a recommendation or a forecast on the future development of nuclear energy in Europe.”⁵⁷⁰ Likewise Piebalgs in his speech on energy in a global environment states: “It remains the case that Member States take the decision at a national level whether

567 "Eu-India Summit in 10 December 2010 in Brussels," news release, 8 December 2010.

568 European Commission, "The Energy Union on Track to Deliver," news release, 18 November 2015.

569 European Commission, "3rd Africa Eu-Summit 29/30 November, Tripoli," news release, 24 November 2010.

570 "The Commission's Energy Roadmap 2050."

to use nuclear power or not.”⁵⁷¹ He adds however that new rules adopted by member states “make the EU the first major regional actor to apply legally binding safety standards based on the "fundamental safety principles" of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the obligations of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.”⁵⁷²

6.7 Strategic narratives presented in French and EU discourse

Having detailed the different narrative elements and their portrayals in French and EU discourse, the different levels of strategic narratives can be presented and compared.

Table 6-6: Strategic narratives in EU and French political communications

	EU Strategic Narrative	French Strategic Narrative
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⁵⁷¹ Piebalgs, "Energy in a Global Environment."

⁵⁷² Ibid,

<p>System Narrative</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global energy governance is largely dominated by states with bilateral relations the main background of external energy discourse • Fight against global climate change as a worldwide goal • Cross-cutting nature of energy with politics and economics serving the major themes • Energy as a competence shared between the EU and member states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global energy governance is largely dominated by states, with bilateral relations focussed on energy diplomacy • Fight against global climate change as a worldwide goal • Energy as a competence primarily held by member states, but shared with the EU on some issues particularly regarding sustainability
<p>Identity Narrative</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU's three main energy goals (<i>sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness</i>) are inter-related. • <i>Sustainability</i> is portrayed as the EU's primary goal • It is followed by security of supply 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Before 2012, France presented as a competitive nuclear energy actor • After 2012, France is a leader in energy transition both globally and at the EU level • The EU viewed as a leader in sustainability EU priorities (<i>sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness</i>) all

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both the goals of sustainability and security of supply can be achieved through the creation of an EU energy market 	<p>presented in the French political discourse</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> France is a competitive nuclear energy actor
Issue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EU competitiveness in renewable energy The EU is a leader in <i>sustainability</i> able to impose Dependence on gas from Russia binding targets on EU member states Strategic importance of Russia as an energy partner China as a large carbon emitter that needs help to develop more sustainable forms of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Competitiveness in nuclear energy exporting China as a large carbon emitter that needs help to develop more sustainable forms of energy. independence achieved through Security of supply and energy Under President Sarkozy's nuclear energy leadership this goes through the Sustainability achieved through development of nuclear energy low-carbon nuclear energy in China Use of nuclear energy heavily India is a major market for anchored in historical context France's nuclear energy
Narrative	<p>energy</p>	<p>industry. France frames itself as a saviour and advocate for</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> India's nuclear energy policies

System Narratives

Table 6.6 shows that there is a relatively strong external convergence between the system narratives of the EU and France. There is a strong alignment in the perception of climate change as a worldwide goal.

However, the nature of relations between states are somewhat different. For the EU, without any resources to export directly, political bilateral relations with 3rd countries are the background for energy discussions. However, energy discussions are rarely the central topic of discussion. For France, bilateral relations are an opportunity to pursue energy diplomacy and agree on energy export contracts with other countries.

Moreover, while they both view energy as a shared competence between the EU and member states, they each perceive their roles in it differently. This narrative has implications for both system and identity narrative since it relates to the way they view the international order in which energy decisions are made but also their role in it.

Identity narrative

On identity narratives, there are narratives that are in alignment between the two actors and others that are not. Their views on sustainability are in a similar vein and France repeats the EU's narrative strongly when mentioning the EU. It sees, the EU as a leader in sustainability and shares a similar view on the interconnectedness of competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. Views of China as a negative actor in the fight against global climate change are overall in alignment. Both see themselves as having a role in helping China reduce its carbon emissions.

However, under president Sarkozy's leadership China's need for sustainability is also framed as an opportunity for France to export its nuclear energy. Additionally, India

is framed as a market for nuclear energy.

France does not share the same level of concern for Russia's energy policies as the EU, while it recognises the strategic importance of Russia to the EU's energy security as a whole it does not portray itself as threatened by it.

Issue narratives

Issue narratives are the area where French and EU narratives diverge the Most France issue narratives are largely focussed on nuclear energy. This changes over time with President Hollande's leadership focussing more on energy transition and renewables, however this is a narrative that does not appear strongly in communications about external energy policies and relations.

6.8 Conclusion

The EU has two strong narratives: its leadership in sustainability and its need for energy security. France recognises the EU's leadership in sustainability and largely aligns its narratives to the EU's in this area. However, the narrative of energy security is far less obvious in French discourse. France on the other hand has a narrative about nuclear energy where its system, identity and issue narrative align strongly. By comparison, the EU remains neutral on nuclear energy. This tends to show that strategic interests do indeed direct the way strategic narratives are formed.

This chapter addressed the formation of strategic narratives in the EU and France. The next is concerned with the projection of these narratives in French mainstream newspapers.

Chapter 7: Narratives of Global Energy

Governance in French Newspapers

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter established the strategic narratives formed and spread by the French and EU executive branches of government. The purpose of this chapter is to present the narratives appearing in the French mainstream newspapers, leading and prestigious opinion forming voices of the nation. This chapter will discuss each element of narrative -- as established in Chapter 5—applying them to the analysis of the media texts. It will first discuss narrators, observed through the analysis of news sources of each article collected. Then, looking at the events discussed prominently in each period of observation, the chapter will establish the temporal context within which external energy policies were discussed in the French newspapers across political continuum. The scene is established through the analysis of the focus of domesticity – i.e. whether the main events of each article have relevance to and immediate involvement of the French actors (either elites or general public). Actors and their actions are discussed together since the two are inseparable from the other. In this regard, this chapter will also discuss the visibility and degree of centrality of each state actor as well as the thematic frames and evaluation used to present them to the news audiences. The chapter will also briefly discuss the presentation of non-state actors in the coverage. This chapter will summarise the ways energy types -- which are categorised un the rubric of “instruments “used in the narrative analysis -- are portrayed in the newspaper coverage. In conclusion, this chapter will establish what

main *system*, *identity* and *issue* narratives appeared in the French leading news media coverage observed in this research.


7.2 Narrators

There are, arguably, two narrators for each press article written and published. The first is obviously the news author who writes the piece, whether the journalist chooses to put their name to it or not. The second is the media source itself – a medium that publishes the article. Perhaps, this argument may sound somewhat controversial, since the act of making a narrative available is not the act of narration in itself. However, media organisations through the collective process of selecting, editing and publishing articles take part in shaping the narrative that appear in their publications. Therefore, in this chapter, both direct sources of articles as well as publications where these articles were published are identified as narrators.

Figure 7.1 shows how French leading opinion-setting media outlets observed in this analysis rely, almost exclusively, on local correspondents and news agencies. Despite the alleged crisis of the press around the world, this profile of news sources is not surprising and indicative of the French prideful culture of journalism and press agenda-defining tradition in the society. Many articles in the sample were written by correspondents who are based in foreign countries long-term. Others are written by journalists sent specifically to foreign countries when particular events or stories are taking place. While this latter observation may seem mundane, it does indicate a certain level of importance French newsmakers assign to particular countries and events as they need to justify the resources invested. While newspapers do not always make a note of where their journalists are based, a quick look at the sample discussed

in this thesis shows that *Le Figaro*, *Le Monde* and *Les Echos* each have at least one foreign correspondent in Russia and China. For example, a total of 29 articles are written by *Les Echos*' correspondent in Beijing, likewise, 17 are written by *Le Monde*'s Moscow correspondent. In addition, *Le Monde* sent a journalist to each of the COPs that took place overseas during the period of observation and *Les Echos* had a special correspondent at the Copenhagen conference. Finally, and perhaps unsurprisingly, *Les Echos* and *Le Figaro* each had journalists reporting from India in 2010 during Nicolas Sarkozy's presidential visit to the country. It is logical to suggest that journalists who are appointed to cover certain events/stories are some sort of experts in the subject that they report on. Yet, the editorial choice of a local, French, journalists to report from foreign locations also comes with a particular perspective. Almost all stories relating to global energy governance published by the three leading French newspapers were filtered through the prism of the local focus. This invites the first critical reflection of this chapter: while French journalists pride themselves in being just and neutral in their reporting, a French point of view seems to dominate their outlook and news production.

Figure 7.1: News Sources of the observed sample from the selected French Newspapers Coverage




Foreign sources of the news are often comprised of experts and renown public figures. In 2009, *Le Figaro* published an article by Gazprom CEO, Alexei Miller, who commented on an agreement between EDF and Gazprom to cooperate on the South Stream project. In 2011, *Le Figaro* published an article written by Javier Solana, former EU official, as well as an article by Angel Saz-Carranza, an academic. These commentators talked about the climate conference in Durban and the need for a new system of global energy governance. In 2015, *Le Monde* published a piece by author Naomi Klein and Professor in Glaciology Jason Box commenting on the COP21 in Paris. Articles written by international journalists and the reprinted by the French newspapers came from highly respected newspapers such as the *Financial Times* or *The Economist*. Arguably, the top status/expertise of these foreign contributors adds to the overall messages sent by the leading French newspapers -- only proven foreign top experts on a topic get published.

Figure 7.2 displays the number of articles analysed each year for each publication. It

shows that issues related to global energy are often more present in the business-oriented *Les Echos* than in other three sources (those are more popular in their coverage). Not only the *Les Echos*' numerous articles discussed energy from both political and economic angles, but they also analysed topic of energy in depth (more so than the other mainstream newspapers in this study). In 2009, articles in the context of the Copenhagen conference contributed to a high volume of articles related to energy. While the number of articles on energy matters dropped for the two other publications in 2012, *Les Echos*' numbers went up. That year, many economic discussions in France were linked to energy. Recurrent topics in *Les Echos* in 2012 included reports about shale gas extraction in the US and Gazprom's activities (including the launch of the South Stream project). Both these topics may have important repercussions for investors in the energy sector, and thus it is predictable that the *Les Echos* featured this news more prominently than other three publications.

Figure 7.2: Volume of coverage of energy matters by three selected French

newspapers (2009-2015)



Each newspaper had particular features to its coverage of energy matters. These caveats will be referenced to throughout this chapter. Importantly, these peculiarities set outlet- distinct contexts in which global energy governance is discussed. The is not to say that events don't happen externally of the media but each publication discusses and attaches more or less importance to each event.

7.3 Context - Events

Figure 7.2 is the first illustration that reporting on external energy-related events

fluctuates over the years. This section details the most significant events reported each year and the ways they are reported on. Some recurring events or ongoing situations appear throughout this analysis and allow for an analysis of the evolution of the narratives over time.

7.3.1 2009

As was discussed in the previous chapter, the French government attached a high level of importance to the COP in Copenhagen in 2009, with many official communications discussing it. It was clear that ahead of the conference there were strong expectations on world leaders to strike the accord and high hopes for the successful conclusions of the conferences. *Le Monde's* editorial on the 7th December 2009 - reprinted in 54 newspapers around the world -- concludes:

The politicians in Copenhagen have the power to shape history's judgment on this generation: one that saw a challenge and rose to it, or one so stupid that we saw calamity coming but did nothing to avert it. We implore them to make the right choice.⁵⁷³

However, the outcome of the conference was framed as a failure, particularly for the EU. On its front page, *Le Monde* publishes:

While the EU appeared, before the Copenhagen summit, as the good student of the fight against global warming, its marginalization in the final stretch of the discussions - the text was negotiated between the United States, China, India, South Africa and Brazil - was all the more spectacular. Some, like France, seem to blame the EU, unable

573 "A Copenhague, Faisons Triompher L'optimisme: Cinquante-Six Journaux Lancent Un Appel Commun Aux Chefs D'état De La Planète," *Le Monde* 7 December 2009

to be heard. Others believe, on the contrary, that it is the desire of the Heads of State and governments to put themselves forward that has weakened Europe.⁵⁷⁴

Other newspapers share the sentiment that while the EU showed ambition and good will during the negotiations, it was side-lined by major powers who had other agendas. Gabriel Gresillon from *Les Echos* writes: “And the goodwill of the EU, ready to propose a reduction of 30% of its greenhouse gases, was of no use against China intractable on its sovereignty and Barack Obama who came without real proposals.”⁵⁷⁵ In *Le Figaro*, Alain Barluet argues that “Europe is virtuous but powerless.”⁵⁷⁶

Other energy-related events got reported rather systematically. The situation in Iran with its nuclear programme for example was one of the most visible energy events. The Iran crisis is a good example to show the cross-cutting nature of energy topics. Actors in articles focussing on Iran take a range of political actions (such as high-level meetings and agreements) as well as economic actions (e.g. sanctions) to deal with energy in the context of security and military issues. Articles about Iran’ nuclear programme also highlighted the geopolitical importance of energy and often framed actions in the energy field in this context. The issue of nuclear proliferation was presented as an issue to be debated, argued and controlled by the international community. Among the BRICS, Russia and China were more visible in the reportage on the Iran crisis (more so than Brazil, India and South Africa). However, *Le Monde* did make a note of Brazil’s

574 "Après L'échec De Copenhague : L'Europe Qui Pleure, L'OPEP Qui Rit," *Le Monde* 24 Décembre 2009

575 Gabriel Gresillon, "Climat : les Etats-Unis et la Chine au banc des accusés," *Les Echos* 21 December 2009.

576 Alain Barluet, "La «diplomatie climatique» a dessiné un nouveau monde," *Le Figaro* 21 December 2009.

effort to raise its profile on the issue. It reported on Iranian President Ahmadinejad's visit to Brazil and noted that the then President of Brazil Lula hoped to play a mediator role in the crisis.

Also present in the coverage were energy diplomacy events with France in the spotlight of media attention. In late November, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin visited Paris. He came to sign and oversee agreements between Russia and France. One of the most prominent agreements among them focussed on the EDF's involvement in Gazprom's South Stream project. *Le Figaro* noted then that energy was one of the essential portfolios of the 14th intergovernmental seminar between the two countries, which was noted to be "by nature" economic and commercial.⁵⁷⁷ Arguably, the reportage on Russia's energy diplomacy in France (both in *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde*) exposed a particular frame -- Europe's energy dependence on Russia. Other articles talked about the EDF the systematically talk about rival project -- the Nabucco pipeline. The two pipeline projects were framed in those articles as a contest, with France's support for South Stream reported as potentially undermining the Nabucco project. Writing in *Le Monde*, Jean Michel Bezat states: "Like Germany and Italy, France sees no contradiction between a presence in two projects [North Stream and South Stream], which will increase its dependence on Russian gas, and its support to the European Nabucco pipeline project."⁵⁷⁸ Equally conflictual frame was given to issue of the gas transit through Ukraine. It got mentioned in articles about Putin's visit. In the same article, Bezat writes "the European Union no longer wishes to be taken

⁵⁷⁷ Frédéric de Monicault and Fabrice Nodé-Langlois, "EDF et GDF Suez dans les tubes de Gazprom," *Le Figaro* 27 November 2009.

⁵⁷⁸ Jean Michel Bezat, "Paris et Moscou mènent une realpolitik de l'énergie," *Le Monde* 25 November 2009.

hostage by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.”⁵⁷⁹ As will be discussed later, the metaphorical image of the *war* was frequently used by newsmakers when they covered Russia in the context of energy. This image has intensified when relations between Russia and Europe have deteriorated in the subsequent years.

Around the same period, a delegation led by the Chinese Commerce Minister was also in the French capital to sign contracts, including the ones in the field of energy. These articles focused on economic aspects of relations and were much less political in nature than the news focussing on the Russian visit. Energy -- and more particularly nuclear energy -- often appeared as a secondary focus in those news items. At that time, France’s EDF, China’s nuclear energy company CGNPC and the Chinese Commerce Minister were expected to sign and confirm a 2007 cooperation agreement for the construction of two EPR nuclear reactors in Taishan. In the following month, the French PM, Francois Fillon, visited China furthering France’s energy diplomacy and this visit was widely reported by the French media. While articles about the visit focussed on a wide array of economic agreements, nuclear energy occupied a very visible position in the respective reportages. Often mentioned alongside Fillon (the leading French political actor) are EDF’s CEO Henri Proglio and Areva’s President Anne Lauvergeon (prominent leaders of the business circles in France).

7.3.2 2010

In the 2010 period of observation, one of the big energy events for France was President Sarkozy’s visit to India. Energy featured as a major theme of articles reporting this visit Sarkozy was on a mission to promote an important nuclear energy

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid.

agreement. An initial bi-lateral agreement on the construction of two EPR nuclear reactors in Jaitapur by Areva was made in February 2009. Sarkozy took part in negotiating the terms of this deal which concerned not only the construction of reactors, but also the supply of nuclear materials including uranium. The articles reporting this negotiation stressed extensively the price of the nuclear contract -- 7 billion euros – highlighting by this impressive amount the competitiveness of France’s nuclear industry. But all was not well for France’s nuclear giant Areva. Cracks started to show. Some reporters wrote that the sale might be the end of a dark period for Areva, others pointed out that the contracts remained in negotiations. The delays in the construction of the EPR reactors elsewhere started making into the news.

Le Figaro and *Les Echos* each published multiple articles about Sarkozy’s visit to India, with the nuclear energy contract presented as either a major or secondary focus. In contrast, *Le Monde* published in the same period only one article about the presidential visit to India presenting a somewhat different view of the contracts. This article pointed out that the Indian press does not pay the same attention to the nuclear contracts. When the Indian media do look into them, they express some concerns over the safety of the reactors of the new generation. To be fair, this concern over nuclear safety was also picked up by *Le Figaro* - it reported on a Greenpeace protest against this deal in Jaitapur.

Finally, the French newspapers reported Prime Minister Fillon’s visits to Moscow to promote a range of economic contracts. Among them was an agreement between the French company Alstom and the Russian hydro-electrician RusHydro.

7.3.3 2011

On 11 March 2011, an earthquake and tsunami in Japan caused the most important nuclear disaster of the last decade. This date does not feature within the period of observation in this study, but the media fallout from the event lingers throughout 2011 and beyond. One of the main consequences of the Fukushima disaster is exacerbating Areva's difficulties in confirming export contracts for its technologies.

Interviewed by *Le Figaro*, the new president of Areva, Luc Oursel, remained confident. He declared that before Fukushima, his company hoped to see an increase of nuclear energy from 390 gigawatts (GW) globally to 690 GW in 2030. He claimed that since the incident, they had reviewed those numbers to 590 GW. He lists ongoing construction contracts for EPRs in the UK, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Czech Republic, noting however that contracts with China and India have been suspended. He did not mention increasing delays in the construction of these EPRs. Yet, the media commentators were less optimistic. *Le Figaro* worried about potential job cuts in France, predicting losses between 1000 and 2700 jobs. This is despite the assurances from Minister of the Economy, Francois Baroin, that there would be no job losses. *Le Monde* reported on seismic risks in the Indian region of Jaitapur, highlighting the risk for future nuclear accidents. Looking externally, *Les Echos* is critical of Areva's plans of selling 10 new reactors to China in the following five years, pointing out that leadership change in China could slow down any industrial contracts. The Fukushima events and French reaction to them coincide with an important political shift in France. The Socialist Party, led by Francois Hollande, is campaigning on the notion of energy transition and a reduction of nuclear energy in France. Indeed, while Hollande has declared his support for the construction of the EPR in Flamanville, a political agreement between the PS and the Greens detailed the closure

of 24 plants and the end to the exploitation of recycled uranium (MOX).

Le Monde and *Le Figaro* came with distinctly different ways of reporting on this political issue. *Le Monde* explored the possibility of transitioning entirely away from nuclear energy. It reported on the safety risk of the EPR and the delays and costs of the construction site in Flamanville. In contrast, *Le Figaro* was more critical of Hollande's political decision and reported on the government's hopes to rescue Areva. Discussing the Socialist Party's decision to partly transition away from nuclear energy, Frederic de Monicault writes in *Le Figaro*: "(The) UMP⁵⁸⁰ stigmatizes an 'irresponsible' decision that jeopardizes an entire sector of industry. In this context, for the government there is no question of Areva pulling back on the reins in France."⁵⁸¹ While reports in both newspapers remained largely neutral in their tone, the two outlets transpired their respective political positions through the framing and choices of the voices commenting on the issue.

7.3.4 2012

In 2012, a visit from Dilma Rousseff, the then president of Brazil, raises her country's visibility in the French media. The coverage focussed explicitly on messages of political friendship and economic ties, leaving energy matters on the margins of the visit. This framing was in a stark contrast with the coverage of the previous political visits (of Russian officials to France and of French officials to India). Those reports dedicated much attention to the issues of energy diplomacy.

⁵⁸⁰ The Union for a Popular Movement, Centre right party in France since re-named Les Republicains.

⁵⁸¹ Frédéric de Monicault, "Areva ne supprimera pas d'emplois en France," *Le Figaro* 23 November 2011.

As Russia launches the construction of its pipeline, South Stream reappears in the news coverage. However, in the 2012 reports, Russia's actions were viewed with more suspicion than previously. In *Les Echos*, Benjamin Quenelle warned: "Russia is tightening its embrace on Europe a little more." The metaphorical image expresses both the sense of a friendly embrace yet a suffocating grip. Meanwhile, an investigation by European Commission into Gazprom's potentially uncompetitive practices elicited comments from Russian officials. They were reported bearing Russia's threatening message of consequences for Europe if the company was to be sentenced. In doing so Russia was presented as "regaining the upper hand" in a power play with Europe.⁵⁸² In parallel, multiple articles discussed the north-east route linking Europe to Asia through the Arctic. *Le Monde* in particular dedicated a long article about this navigational route. With climate change lengthening the season of sailability, the route has been increasingly used as an alternative to the Suez Canal. These climatic opportunities were presented as beneficial to Russian companies such as Gazprom exporting hydrocarbons from the Yamal peninsula. The author thus pointed out the profitability of climate change for Russia.

7.3.5 2013

In late November 2013, alongside the UN climate conference, Warsaw hosted the World Coal Summit. Irony was not lost on French newspapers. Articles in that period focussed on the viability of carbon capture to reduce emissions, particularly putting into question the cost of these technologies. Yet, the news acted as a reminder that

⁵⁸² Benjamin Quenelle, "L'UE enquête sur Gazprom, Moscou hausse le ton," *Les Echos* 22 November 2012.

Poland's energy mix is highly dependent on coal and that the country can sow division in the EU's climate change agenda.⁵⁸³ Around the same time, a number of articles was published regarding pollution in China linked to the use of coal. These articles generally discussed the Chinese government's response including shutting down factories, controlling traffic and reducing output goals of heavy polluting industries such as steel. However, they also described daily lives of people living in industrial towns in China and the effects of pollution on their health. These reports have succeeded in presenting a human-interest story about the use of coal.

As mentioned earlier, 2011 was a critical year for Areva. The company was faced with the consequences of the Fukushima disaster and delays in the construction of its third-generation reactors. In 2012, only one article focussed on Areva's nuclear energy programme in the period of observation. It once again reported on Areva's failure to meet construction deadlines and attract new clients and orders. Yet, in 2013, things started looking more positive with a contract to finish the construction of a nuclear reactor in Brazil. It is noted that these reactors are not EPRs and that instead of a new contract, it is the continuation of a contract signed by Siemens and suspended in 1986.⁵⁸⁴ A few articles additionally pointed out that emerging countries continued to consider and secure nuclear energy supply to meet increasing energy demands. Some observers however noted that Areva faced competition, particularly from the Russian company Rosatom.

⁵⁸³ Laure Noualhat, "Un sommet du charbon assombrit celui du climat," *Liberation* 17 November 2013.

⁵⁸⁴ It should be noted that the project was suspended once more by Areva in 2015 and not yet completed.

7.3.6 2014

The G20 meeting in Brisbane in November 2014 was the background for some discussions about energy. Two themes appeared alongside it -- the issue of climate change and ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia. A number of articles mentioned the G20's first time engagement in fighting climate change and detailed many countries' position on the subject. India's position was described as lukewarm. Articles mentioned that while the country had promised to reduce the carbon intensity of its GDP, the country was unwilling to sacrifice its economic development. Nevertheless, its decision to develop solar energy and halt imports of coal from Australia were assessed positively by the French media. India's ability to act on the threat of climate change was at time weighed against China's, arguing that China has more means to act. With that said, China's engagement was noticed in a positive light. Ahead of the G20 meeting at the APEC meeting, President Xi Jinping made an agreement with the US aiming at reducing emissions. One journalist in *Le Monde* wrote that it was difficult for reluctant countries such as Australia and Saudi Arabia to resist the inclusion climate change in the G20's final statement when faced with a united front from the US and China.

However, the most discussed topic regarding the G20 was Russia's conflict with Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea which took place earlier in the year. Once again, energy was portrayed as a geopolitical instrument used by Russia to further its strategic interests. Strategic interests that are seen to go further than Ukraine. One article detailed Angela Merkel's concern over Russia's actions. It mentioned: "Russia would seek to use the money from gas to force Belgrade to come closer to Moscow's positions. The construction of the South Stream pipeline is an economic pressure instrument on

the whole region. Bosnia-Herzegovina but also Bulgaria are under this menace.”⁵⁸⁵ The prevalence of war and conflict metaphors is to be noted here, particularly since the gas pipeline not only described as an instrument of influence but also as a weapon. Tensions between Russia and Europe are discussed beyond the context of the G20 and so are metaphors of war. Talking about sanctions between Russia and Europe, Dominique Fache’s article in *Les Echos* is rife with metaphors of gambling (with death) and war (specifically, the cold war). His introducing sentence reads:

*“Between the game of bluff of gas negotiations and the Russian Roulette speculating on the rounds in Vladimir Putin’s barrel, [...] the least we can say is that we are nearly reaching zero degrees in our relations with Russia.”*⁵⁸⁶

The rest of the article was as rich in metaphors about Russian-European relations: consider “energy weapon”, “gas conflict” or “arm wrestle.”⁵⁸⁷ Other articles used similar metaphors, yet with less intensity and density.

In early December 2014, Vladimir Putin and Alexei Miller, President of Gazprom, announced the end of the South Stream project. Putin was reported to blame Europe, declaring “if Europe does not want to realise it, then it will not happen”⁵⁸⁸ and “since the European Union has adopted a negative position, preventing the project from coming to fruition, we will find other clients. It is up to our European friends.”⁵⁸⁹

585 Nicolas Barotte, "Angela Merkel s'inquiète pour les Balkans," *Le Figaro* 17 November 2014.b

586 "Energie : du poker menteur à la roulette russe," *Les Echos* 21 November 2014.

587 Ibid.

588 Veronique Le Billon et al., "South Stream : pourquoi Moscou stoppe son projet," *Le figaro* 02 December 2014.b

589 Marie Jégo, "Vladimir Poutine abandonne le gazoduc « South Stream », " *Le Monde* 02 December 2014.

Importantly, articles in all French newspapers under observation portrayed it as a political failure for Putin. Jean Michel Bezat in *Le Monde* wrote:

“Wasn’t South Stream launched in 2007 to nip in the bud the Nabucco pipeline project defended by the European Union? And wasn’t it Brussels, menacing to sanction member states that were willing to welcome a part of the pipeline, that turned the situation to its advantage and forced Putin to throw in the towel?”⁵⁹⁰

Other journalists pointed out that in fact the project had been blocked by the European Commission which disagreed with the monopoly Gazprom would hold on the use of the pipeline.⁵⁹¹ The EU was presented as a secondary actor in these articles. Some articles, as was shown, viewed the cancelling of South Stream as the EU’s victory. Others reminded their audiences of the EU’s needs for energy security. On this subject however, Budget Commissioner Kristalina Georgieva was quoted in two articles saying: “Russia’s decision to stop South Stream and the way this has been decided confirms how much the diversification of sources of supply is important for Europe.”

⁵⁹²

One thing that was blamed for Russia’s decision to abandon South Stream was falling oil prices. Articles argues that with its economy dependant on the export of hydrocarbons, Russia was affected by the drop in prices. It would no longer be able to continue an expensive project such as the South Stream. Some articles claimed that some in the higher echelons of the Russian government saw the US and Saudi Arabia’s

⁵⁹⁰ Jean Michel Bezat, "Gazprom : baisse de pression pour le géant russe," *Le Monde* 03 December 2014.

⁵⁹¹ Billon et al., "South Stream : pourquoi Moscou stoppe son projet."

⁵⁹² Ibid.

hand in declining oil prices as a way to weaken Russia. H el ene Desp ic-Popovic in *Liberation* noted: “like with every setback, leaders in Moscow, even at the highest level, favour conspiracy theories.”⁵⁹³ In her article titled, “The Kremlin with clay feet”,⁵⁹⁴she described brittle state of affairs for Putin faced with western sanctions.

It was clear however that predictions made in 2011 about fracking came to pass. Production of shale gas in the US did indeed disrupt the global economy with oil prices falling 40% from spring to autumn 2014.⁵⁹⁵

7.3.7 2015

With the COP21 taking place in Paris, the most discussed topic in the 2015 period of observation was climate change. In fact, 43.9% of articles that referenced energy in 2015 mentioned climate change. Comparatively, during the 2014 period of observations, less than 20% of articles with energy references mentioned it. This was despite fears that the 13th of November terror attack in Paris and its aftermath would overshadow the climate conference. With climate change so prominent, the newspapers initiated prolific discussions about renewable energy and development of new possible applications. Many articles on energy envisioned what the future may look like, both in terms of technological innovations but also in terms of the effects of climate change.

With the launch of the International Solar Energy Alliance during the summit, India

593 H el ene Desp ic-Popovic, "Russie, le Kremlin aux pieds d'argile," *Liberation* 21 November 2011.

594 Ibid.

595 Rabah Arezki and Olivier Blanchard, "The 2014 oil price slump: Seven key questions," *VoxEU*, January 13 (2015).

took a position of leadership in climate negotiations. Joel Cossardeaux commented: “India will federate the solar energy demand of the South.”⁵⁹⁶ For French journalists, this position of leadership means standing up to developed countries regarding their climate responsibility. The reported commented that the narrative regarding the duty of developed countries to reduce their emissions to a higher degree than developing countries was prevalent in all climate negotiations, but this position of leadership was usually reserved to China.

Finally, oil prices in 2015 remained low. Whereas in 2014, this drop in prices was attributed to the development of shale gas, in the 2015 reportage it was seen as a strategy from oil producing countries, and in particular Saudi Arabia. Fabrice Node-Langlois argued:

“Saudi Arabia assumes responsibility for letting prices go. It wants to preserve its market share and hopes that its competitors will end up closing their wells and freeze their investments in shale gas deposits in the US, deep-sea oil in Brazil or Russia’s far North – that are only profitable above 50, 60 maybe even 80 dollars a barrel. By comparison, Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries like Iraq, possess giant deposits, with easy access, where a barrel can be extracted for 20 dollars if not less.”⁵⁹⁷

So, while oil prices were generally seen by journalists as an economic indicator, they took on a political dimension when prices were seen as being manipulated or when their fluctuations have a particular impact on countries. More will be discussed on this

596 Joel Cossardeaux, "L'Inde lance son alliance en faveur du solaire," *Les Echos* 01 December 2015.

597 Fabrice Node Langlois, "Le pari hasardeux de Riyad sur le prix de l'or noir," *Le Figaro* 24 November 2015.


later in this chapter.

This chapter will move on to briefly discuss the *setting* of the articles analysed – another key element in the narrative analysis.

7.4 Scene – Focus of Domesticity

In addition to a *temporal setting* discussed in the previous section, narratives also include a *scene*. The analytical concept of the *focus of domesticity* allowed this research to systematically evaluate the category of the scene. The concept led to establish whether the action in each article takes place locally (in France), in the EU (either in a member state other than France or at a more general EU level), or outside Europe in a specific country, or at a global level. *Figure 7.3* shows that global energy reporting by the three French newspapers concentrated largely on actions presented to take place externally. This is hardly surprising since this research is concerned with *global* energy governance. However, it tends to show that journalists see an interest for world news among readers. Finally, a global positioning of actors also betrays France's self-perceptions of being a global leader and taking charge in global events. France was observed as an actor in 22.8% of articles which located the reported action in third countries and 28.2% of articles in a global setting. Additionally, even when France as a country was not mentioned, local non-state actors may still be in the reportage in some capacity. The patterns in assigning domesticity to the reports on energy was largely similar in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. In contrast, *Les Echos* had a different profile with 38.9% of articles reporting actions in third countries.

Figure 7.3: Focus of Domesticity in the observed French Newspapers (2009-2015)



In local, French-specific coverage, China was by far the most cited external actor, appearing in 63.9% of articles that focussed on local French energy-related events. For the majority of these mentions, China appeared as a minor actor. However, when China was presented as a major or secondary actor in the article that had a local, French 'hook', China most often appeared as a competitor to France in the area of solar energy, an investor into local French renewable energy sector, or a France's customer of nuclear energy. More on this will be discussed further in this chapter. The other BRICS were typically discussed in a more 'distant' mode -- in the third country context or in the articles that talked about energy matters on the global level.


7.5 Actors and Actions

7.5.1 Visibility

Looking at actors and their actions in the media coverage, the first indication of their perceived importance to the topic of global energy governance is their visibility. Visibility is assessed through two means: volume of coverage – the number of times an actor is mentioned – and degree of centrality. Through the degree of centrality, this research assesses whether the actor mentioned was a major focus of the article, secondary, mentioned on equal footing to other actors in an article or minor, a fleeting reference often just a sentence or within a list of actors. Figure 7.4 presents both the volume of coverage and the degree of centrality of the BRICS as well as the EU and France in the French newspapers observed.

Strikingly, China is the most mentioned actor, followed by Russia. It is important to note however that the proportion of stories that presented Russia as a major actor was higher than stories that reported China as a main actor. There are 142 major China articles representing 19.6% of all articles mentioning China. In comparison, there are almost as many major Russia articles (138) representing 28.6% of articles mentioning Russia.

Figure 7.4: Visibility of Actors in French Newspapers (2009-2015)




Following Russia, France is the third most visible actor in the observed sample. This marks a significant difference between the media discourse representations of the global energy matters and the executive power’s discourse. As discussed in the previous chapter, political narrators (French and EU executive branches) placed themselves at the centre of the actions discussed. Within the media discourse, however, France and the EU are placed third and fifth in terms of visibility respectively. It should be noted that French actors were often mentioned without the direct mention of ‘France’, making the country more present in the coverage than would appear in Figure 6.1 French communications word frequency cloud. India is the fourth most mentioned actor, just ahead of the EU. There is a distinction with the French political communications which placed India as the third most visible actor after France and China and ahead of Russia. The volume of coverage of the EU is low. However, it is worth noting that the proportion of major (19.8%) and secondary (39.7%) is relatively

high. As in the political executive communications observed in the previous chapter, Brazil and South Africa are the least visible actors.

7.5.2 Thematic Framing

As discussed in Chapter 2 (literature review), the EU established three priorities for its external energy policies, namely: competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. Part of this research sought to establish whether news coverage in France about global energy governance would match these priorities. In other words, this chapter traces whether the leading newspapers in France frame the issues of global energy governance within those frames. The analysis detailed below shows that energy could be framed within a political or economic context, outside of these categories. As discussed earlier in this chapter, types of energy can be economic indicators (e.g. oil prices) or can be the subject of political negotiations (e.g. nuclear negotiations with Iran). Figure 7.5 presents the list of the thematic frames detected in the coverage of global energy governance matters in France and distribution of thematic frames for each actor in the focus of this analysis.

Figure 7.5: Thematic Framing of Actors in French Newspaper Coverage



As shown in Figure 7.5 the most predominant thematic framing for China in media coverage was *sustainability*. This recalls results from the previous chapter where issues of sustainability were also dominant in political communications of both France and the EU. With the COPs taking place during the period of observation, this is not surprising. A large proportion of thematic frames of sustainability came with minor profiles in the news texts. These are not immaterial since China is often noted in passing as one of the world’s biggest polluters, often grouped with the US and India. When looking specifically at articles where China was cast as a main actor, the proportions of Competitive (40), Security of Supply (44) and Sustainability (40) frames becomes rather balanced.

It is also worth noting that *economics* was a more prominently used thematic frame for China than *politics*. While China was present in negotiations of some political nature (such as negotiations with Iran), on the whole it is presented by stressing its economic might more than its political power.

Russia was largely portrayed as a competitive to France actor in the global energy field.

This is largely linked to its position as an energy producer and exporter. Importantly, the prevalence of the competition frames remains when looking specifically at articles where Russia is a main actor. As was seen in the section ‘Events;’ above, the Russian gas company is often framed as an agent of Russian energy in French media and is closely associated to the framing a competitiveness. In an article about Gazprom’s acquisition of a German company’s gas storage facility, Jean-Michel Gradt wrote in *Les Echos*: “Gazprom continues push its pawns in Europe, a zone where the Russian giant seeks to impose its domination on imports.”⁵⁹⁸

While much of Russia competitiveness in energy is focussed on Europe, Russia’s eastern contracts were also observed. Looking at a deal between China and Russia for the construction of oil and gas pipelines between the two countries, Massimo Prandi wrote that it will be “a contract that would allow Russia to diversify its sales outside of Europe.”⁵⁹⁹ He later adds that “China could quickly become the main market for Russian oil.”⁶⁰⁰

Importantly, it should be noted that proportionally Russia is framed more as a *political* actor than China. These frames are often observed in the coverage of Russia’s actions towards Ukraine. As has been discussed, gas is often portrayed as an instrument of pressure in Russia’s international politics.

Much like China, India’s framing in French media is largely centred around sustainability. Once again, the COPs may influence the prevalence of *sustainability* issues in the observed coverage. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that India is

598 Jean Michel Gradt, "Gazprom renforce ses positions en Europe," *Les Echos* 14 November 2012.

599 Benjamin Quenelle, "Moscou et Pékin négocient le prix du gaz naturel," *Les Echos* 22 Novembre 2010.

600 Ibid.

the country most associated with this type of framing. It is often pointed out that India ranks third in terms of global carbon emissions behind China and the US. Yet, some articles point out that per capita, India's carbon emission are below the global average. The situation in India is seen as an example of the tension between reducing carbon emissions and allowing for development through the democratisation of access to energy. For example, an article in *Le Monde* argued: "India, third global polluter, defends its right to development." It continues: "India, whose growth exceeded that of China in 2015, still has 300 million poor people who do not have access to electricity."⁶⁰¹ The article as a whole, focusses on India's position at the COP21 and claims that the biggest challenge in the conference are divisions between North and South. China and India have displayed similar positions regarding the responsibility of developed countries to tackle climate change. Yet, while this position in China is at times seen as hypocritical since China's development is portrayed as almost complete, it is better understood from India. Thus, India is portrayed as a more legitimate leader of developing countries.

Like China, India's *sustainability* framing can be somewhat misleading. When controlling for the degree of centrality of India in news articles, *security of supply* (25) becomes a more important frame in articles where India is a main focus and *sustainability* (14) is less often used. India's rising demand for energy is often mentioned and with it its ambitions in increasing the share of renewable energy in its energy mix. However, it is not renewable energy that is most associated with India's security of supply framing, but nuclear energy. President Sarkozy's visit to India in

⁶⁰¹ Simon Roger and Julien Bouissou, "COP21 : l'opposition Nord-Sud, clé des négociations," *Le Monde* 30 November 2015.

2010 to promote cooperation between India and France appears prominently in the media coverage observed, and with it, India's demand for nuclear energy. Fabrice Node Langlois writes in *Le Figaro* at the time: "Nicolas Sarkozy reminded us of it, the Indian giant's thirst for energy is colossal."⁶⁰²

Brazil's framing indicates that *sustainability* is a dominant framing overall. Yet, in articles where Brazil was reported as a main actor, *competitiveness* was Brazil's most used frame above *sustainability*. *Competitiveness* frames for Brazil refer to the country's oil resources offshore. Anne Feitz writes: "Thanks to the discovery of giant deposits off its coast, Brazil could become one of the future oil heavyweights of the planet in the not too distant future."⁶⁰³

South Africa's *security of supply* and *sustainability* media frames relate to the reality of its dependence on coal and its attempts to diversify its energy mix both through renewables and nuclear energy. Sophie Bouillon in *Liberation* summarized this: "At the Durban Summit, South Africa is showing its willingness to reduce its CO₂ emissions. But its urgent electricity needs require massive use of fossil fuels and nuclear energy."⁶⁰⁴ She later added, "South Africa is a case study to illustrate the energy paradox of emerging countries. Like its fellow BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China), South Africa is a glutton that urgently needs abundant and affordable energy."⁶⁰⁵

The EU was the actor least framed according to the energy trifecta (*competitiveness*, *security of supply* and *sustainability*) with *economic* and *political* frames taking a

⁶⁰² Fabrice Nodé-Langlois, "Une puissance atomique forte de vingt réacteurs et maîtresse de sa propre filière," *Le Figaro* 06 December 2010.

⁶⁰³ Anne Feitz, "Le Brésil, futur poids lourd pétrolier de la planète," *Les Echos* 13 November 2013.

⁶⁰⁴ Sophie Bouillon, "Climat : Pretoria va au charbon," *Liberation* 30 November 2011.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

larger share of its framing. This is significant since these categories come from the EU's own vision of its external energy policy. Of these categories, *competitiveness* was the frame least used. For the EU, competitiveness goes through establishing an integrated EU energy market. While there is no doubt this is covered in French newspapers, rarely in association with the BRICS and therefore does not appear much in the observed news coverage. It is fair to say that it is therefore not viewed as an instrument of foreign policy for the EU in the eyes of French media. The EU investigation into China's alleged dumping of solar panels in Europe was most often the topic of discussion under which the EU is framed in terms of *competitiveness* of energy. This is in part due to reporting on China's response to the investigation which accuses the EU of subsidising its solar energy industry.

The EU's security of supply was most often put into question in relation to its dependence on Russian gas. This has been discussed earlier in this chapter. The *sustainability* framing had most to do with the EU's role in the COPs.

Political summits such as EU-Russia summits or negotiations on the fate of Iran's nuclear programme account for much of the *political* framing of the EU. Meanwhile *economic* frames appear with stories mentioning the effects of oil prices on the EU's economy.

Along with Russia, France has the highest proportion of *competitiveness* framing. With many articles focussing on France's energy market this is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, France takes pride in the competitiveness of its energy. This is best displayed in 2012 in articles discussing a world barometer for the quality of energy. In the study by KPMG and the Choisel Institute France ranked 9th overall and came in

first position in terms of competitiveness of energy.⁶⁰⁶ *Les Echos* introduced the subject in the following way: “We will not deny our pleasure to see France for once, ranked first in the world in a record of competitiveness.”⁶⁰⁷ It adds: “it should be pointed out that this performance is linked to our “important nuclear fleet”, inconvenient but essential truth.”⁶⁰⁸ Likewise in *Le Figaro*, Fabrice Node Langlois writes: “This gold medal is ‘the consequence of a large nuclear fleet;. The result of this barometer of ‘the energy competitiveness of states’ [...] will not fail to fuel the debate on the energy transition that is to be kicked off Thursday. It will strengthen the defenders of the atomic park of EDF and make tense those who want to reduce the weight.”⁶⁰⁹ These quotes are also a reminder of the politicisation of nuclear energy from 2011 onwards which will be discussed further in this chapter.

However, it should be noted that nuclear energy figures prominently in France’s relations with other actors such as India and China where France’s competitiveness in nuclear energy is employed to help these countries reach their rising energy demand. Alain Barluet in *Les Echos* writes:

“Paris does not hide that cooperation in nuclear power is one of the ‘main beams’ of its partnership with India. In Bangalore, on Saturday, the President recalled the enormous energy needs of India. He also cited the example of France (which draws 80% of its electricity from the atom) and

606 KPMG and Institut Choiseul, "L'Institut Choiseul et KPMG présentent la 4ème édition du Choiseul Energy Index, le baromètre mondial de la compétitivité énergétique des Etats," (12 February 2016).

607 Favilla, "Le fee ne peut pas tout," *Les Echos* 29 November 2012.

608 Ibid.

609 Fabrice Node Langlois, "La France numéro un mondial pour son électricité," *Le Figaro* 26 November 2012.


stressed that the two countries share the belief that nuclear provides ‘an unparalleled response’ to the challenge of energy security.”⁶¹⁰

France’s second most visible Frame is sustainability. This is largely associated with the COPs and in particular the COP21 in Paris in which France is portrayed as having a leadership role.

7.5.3 Evaluation

While the above framing helps establish the nature of each actors’ actions that were picked up in French newspapers, this research also seeks to assess the evaluation made of these actions. Figure 7.6 presents the evaluation of each actor.

Figure 7.6: Evaluation of Actors in French Newspaper Coverage



While overall the coverage remains largely neutral, China has one of the highest

610 Alain Barluet, "Nicolas Sarkozy mise sur le nucléaire civil en Inde," *Le Figaro* 06 December 2010.

proportions of negative coverage along with Russia. China's lack of sustainability and high levels of pollution are often the targets of these critiques. Much of this negative coverage is about China's continued use of coal as an energy source. In an article titled "China, ailing from its coal", Patrick Saint-Paul writes: "In the Shanxi region, coal continues to reign, in spite of Beijing's pledge in favour of the climate. The paradox of China's development model has reached its height: though this industry is a health malediction, it is also a benediction for corruption and the job market."⁶¹¹

Additionally, China's stance in climate negotiations is not always seen in a positive way.

Reports are often mentioning China's high rate of atmospheric pollution and carbon emissions. As was mentioned earlier in the 'Events' section of this chapter, the pollution resulting from coal consumption adds to also a negative evaluation for China. The EU's investigation into China's solar panels was also presented as a point of contention in French newspapers. Anne Feitz in *Les Echos* writes: "Brussels has opened anti-dumping and anti-subsventions investigations. The Chinese have rolled over Europe's [solar] industry."⁶¹²

Portrayed as resource hungry, China's territorial claims in the South China sea were not introduced positively in the French media. In *Le Figaro*, an article titled "South China Sea, Beijing positions its pawns in the oil war" discussed a quarrel between Vietnam and China regarding oil exploration in disputed waters.

There were fewer positive mentions of China than of other BRICS. When the positive evaluations surfaced, many of these related to economic opportunities for France in China.

611 Patrick Saint Paul, "La Chine malade de son charbon," *Le Figaro* 7 December 2014.

612 Anne Feitz, "Guerre ouverte dans le solaire photovoltaïque," *Les Echos* 19 November 2012.

Efforts in sustainability did not go entirely unnoticed in the French media. An article discussing China's increase in wind power capacity brought together both of these themes: "The Chinese market makes Western wind power actors salivate."⁶¹³

Figure 7.6 shows the evaluation of Russia in the French media coverage. As discussed earlier in this chapter, media portrayals of Russia have evolved over time with Russia being viewed increasingly as a threat for Europe. The European Commission's investigation into Gazprom and the termination of the South Stream project were firmly linked by the media writers to themes of suspicious moves by Russia. Additionally, falling oil prices and western sanctions in the context of Russia-Ukraine conflict invited media in France to question Russia's ability to balance its books.

With the climate negotiations taking place during the period of observation, Russia's presence in the COPs has also been criticised. Laurence Caramel in *Le Monde* write: "Where has Russia gone? Since the beginning of the negotiations the third most polluting country in the world has been literally invisible."⁶¹⁴ After describing Russia's lack of involvement in the Copenhagen conference, she concluded: "Given the energy waste of this major oil and gas producer, Russia has enormous margins for energy savings and could do much better. But the political will is not there."⁶¹⁵

On the positive side, some articles argue that Russia's economic power is underestimated and that France should seek to develop commercial links with Russia.

613 Emmanuel Grasland and Gabriel Gresillon, "Les Investissements Massifs De La Chine Suscitent La Convoitise Des Fabricants Occidentaux " *Les Echos* 12 December 2011.

614 Laurence Caramel, "La délégation russe aux abonnés absents," *Le Monde* 17 December 2009.

615 Ibid.

For example, in an article about French investments into Russian energy companies, the CEO of Total was quoted: “Vladimir Putin wants to bring in foreign companies. [...] In this way, the Russians don’t hold everything, on the contrary, it is about winning together.”⁶¹⁶ It should be noted that the majority of ‘positive’ and ‘between positive and neutral’ articles (45) were published in 2009 (26) during Putin’s diplomatic visit to France to various contracts.

India, along with South Africa, was the actor with the most neutral coverage (Figure 7.6). India’s opposition to binding targets on the reduction of carbon emissions on the grounds of development was at occasionally presented from a negative standpoint in the observed French newspapers. Its dependence on coal was also occasionally seen in a negative light. However overall, the four French newspaper featured very few criticisms of India regarding its energy policies. Yet, there were only a few positive mentions of India. Its economic development and power were occasionally lauded, as a reminder that India should be counted as a “great power.”⁶¹⁷

Within the BRICS Brazil was the country the least negative in the reportages. Its willing attitude in the COPs earned it a few positive mentions and newspapers did recognise its economic power and the fact that thanks to offshore oil supplies, the country is set to become an “oil heavy weight.”⁶¹⁸ Meanwhile, South Africa’s coverage was neutral for the most part. Its dependence on coal and resulting pollution earn it a few negative mentions.

The EU was the most positive actor along with France. This evaluation was most

616 Fabrice Nodé-Langlois, "Les groupes français misent sur le gaz russe," *Le Figaro* 28 November 2009.

617 Dominique Moïsi, "L'Inde, puissance incontournable," *Les Echos* 30 November 2009.

618 Feitz, "Le Brésil, futur poids lourd pétrolier de la planète."

typically in the reports on the EU's role in the COPs, leadership role foremost. Overall, the EU was presented to be making a positive contribution to the fight against climate change and described often as an example to follow. The metaphor of a "good pupil" is one that was recurrent for the EU in this area.

As discussed, France's competitiveness is a point of pride in France and newsmakers generally assigned positive evaluations to France when it was concluding partnerships with other world powers such as China, Russia or India in the energy field. And echoing and paralleling the findings of the political discourse analysis, media reports framed France as a saviour towards emerging countries. For example, Yann Rousseau writes: "The French Prime Minister has proposed, yesterday, a proliferation of cooperation to help China reduce its emissions of pollutants gases."⁶¹⁹

In terms of leaders of the respective states, Russian President Putin was the most reported (63 articles). This visibility was definitely raised by his visit to France during the period of observation. Yet, he was also presented as a statesman whose decisions may impact global energy relations (e.g. his position on energy prices discussed above). Indian and Chinese leaders have received comparable level of visibility, with Indian leaders being slightly more visible (15 mentions of President Singh and 15 mentions for President Modi vis-à-vis 8 mentions of President Xi Jinping, 4 mentions of President Hu Jintao and 9 mentions for Premier Wen Jiabao). President Singh was reported to participate in the negotiations with France on the sale of nuclear reactors in India. In these news texts, he was presented as the primary target of France's energy


⁶¹⁹ Yann Rousseau, "Fillon veut aider la Chine à « décarboner » son économie," *Les Echos* 22 December 2009.

diplomacy. Additionally, he also visited the US to discuss cooperation on nuclear energy. This was reported by the French media. President Modi's appeared in the reports about the launch of the International Solar Energy Alliance during the COP 21 in Paris. In comparison, there were fewer events during the period of observation where Chinese leaders took a visible role in exercising energy policies.

7.5.4 Non-State Actors

This research has been focussed so far on state actors and their actions. However, it also paid attention to the appearances and framing of non-state actors. This helps give a wider picture of the system narratives present in the media in France. Figure 7.7 shows that businesses and international organisations were the most cited among these actors.

Figure 7.7: Visibility of State vs. Non-State Actors in the French Newspapers (2009-2015)



Among business actors, several French companies are referenced frequently in the

sampled news on energy affairs in the global context: EDF has 98 mentions, Areva 88, Total 51 and GDF-Engie 42. High visibility sends readers the message of salience of these French companies in the energy matters – global as well as domestic. For example, EDF appears frequently in the articles that have a local French “hook” (43), but it is also reported in the news about South Stream due to its association with the Russian company Gazprom and the Italian company ENI in the project. Appearance of a French company in such news “anchors” local actors in international contexts, arguably raising local readers’ interests towards international news. Also, it shows to the readers that French business actors are capable and recognised international players on their own accord. Specifically, Areva appeared in articles that set energy reportage in a global context (28) as well as in countries outside Europe (28). This is due to its role as the purveyor of France’s primary energy export – nuclear energy. In addition, it was often reported as a beneficiary of France’s energy diplomacy towards emerging countries.

In the reportage of BRICS non-state energy actors, a Russian company Gazprom was by far the most visible energy company (64 mentions). This chapter has detailed the coverage of Gazprom above. Here it should be noted that the company was typically referred to as “the giant Gazprom”⁶²⁰ -- a descriptor that in many articles was used to render the image of threat emanating from a global energy actor in geographical proximity to France. Other visible Russian energy companies included Rosneft (16) and Rosatom (12).

620 Natalie Nougayrède, "Paris veut dialoguer avec Moscou sur les questions politico-militaires," *Le Monde* 26 November 2009.

Quenelle, "Moscou et Pékin négocient le prix du gaz naturel."

Patrick Saint Paul, "Berlin durcit le ton contre Poutine," *Le Figaro* 14 November 2012.

In the reports about China, China General Nuclear Power Group (CGNPC) was the most visible energy company (23 mentions). This is followed by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) with 12 mentions.


Companies from the other BRICS countries do not share similar visibility. India's nuclear energy company Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) received only three mentions in the observed periods. This is despite its collaboration with Areva on the construction of nuclear plants in India. For Brazil, Petrobras was mentioned eight times and Electronuclear once. South African companies were not visible in the analysed texts collected over five years.

Among international organisations, the United Nations (UN) was the most visible non- state actor (169 mentions), but its visibility is largely due to the COPs as a timeframe for observations. In this context, the UN was portrayed more often as an actor in combatting climate change rather than global energy actor. International Energy Agency (IEA) was mentioned 52 times. It often comes as a reference/source of energy data and observer of energy trends. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEP) was mentioned 33 times. Since none of the key actors observed in this research are members of the OPEP (although some are oil producers), the visibility of the OPEP in the energy- related reportage is indicative of the centrality of oil to the discussion on global energy. OPEP has a significant role in the conduct of energy policy since their decisions directly affect other countries' internal and external policies. The effect of oil prices on Russia's economy have been discussed earlier in this chapter.

7.6 Instruments

To finalise the mapping of narratives in French newspapers, the analysis moves to the presentation of different *types of energy*, conceptualised in the narrative structure as the *instrument* through which actors pursue their external energy policies. Figure 7.8 presents the visibility of each energy type in French newspapers

Figure 7.8: Visibility of Energy Types in French Newspapers Coverage



Oil was the most reported type of energy. As discussed previously, oil prices are often used as a key economic indicator thus its frequent reference. Oil prices also have a global impact on economies and this often attracts media attention. Several reports in the sample specifically discussed the influence of the falling oil prices on the economies of Russia and China; other articles mentioned them in brief. Oil was also frequently used by journalists as a point of reference for other types of energy.

Gas was largely associated with Russia's foreign policy towards Europe/the EU and the EU's eastern neighbours. In these reports, gas was often compared to "weaponry" adding to the image of threat when Russian energy policy is reported.

The third most visible type of energy was nuclear energy. Nuclear energy is France's

primary tool in its conduct of external energy policies, particularly under President Sarkozy's leadership. In the narratives put forward by his government, nuclear energy was framed as a competitive type of energy necessary to meet rising demand in emerging countries and help them reduce their carbon emissions. This narrative is repeated in the news coverage. Yann Rousseau in *Les Echos* wrote: "François Fillon has welcomed a nuclear cooperation allowing France and China 'to be at the forefront of global ecological responsibility.'"⁶²¹ There is also a temporal dimension associated to the framing of nuclear energy. This is similar to the patterns traced in political communications. Talking about the decision to move away from nuclear energy, François Vidal writes: "it would create a breach in the energy independence of France wanted by General de Gaulle, preserved since then with intransigence by all successive governments."⁶²²

Importantly, portrayals of nuclear energy evolve over time due to a number of inputs. The first impact was the disaster in Fukushima. It illuminated with new intensity the dangers related to this type of energy. The second input was Areva's financial difficulties as a result of the Fukushima disaster as well as ongoing delays in the construction of its lead reactor, the EPR. The third factor was the political decision by the socialist party to reduce the share of nuclear energy in France's energy mix. Together they have influenced how media presented the nuclear energy issue -- specifically putting into question the choice of prioritising nuclear energy over other types of energy. Media reports started to point out more systematically that nuclear

621 Rousseau, "Fillon veut aider la Chine à « décarboner » son économie."

622 "La politique énergétique de la France mérite mieux," *Les Echos* 21 November 2011.

energy “is not unanimous.”⁶²³ Construction projects were judged in comparison to the situation in Fukushima, with seismic risks evaluated. The predicted ‘nuclear renaissance’ was put into question by journalists. Nevertheless, emerging countries of BRICS were still presented to remain France’s primary targets and markets in nuclear energy field: the newspapers reported abundantly how China, India, Brazil and even South Africa all make the choice to build nuclear reactors.

Gas and oil were both associated with the detrimental impact they have on climate change. Yet it was coal that was framed as the main culprit. Coal was often described in the reports as the energy type to move away from. It was heavily associated with atmospheric pollution in China in the French newspapers observed.

Metaphors of revolution are often used in conjunction with renewables,⁶²⁴ and they are generally seen as the key to responding to climate change. Gregoire Allix writes: “the deployment of renewable energies, key to the fight against climate change, is progressing rapidly when the negotiations stagnate.”⁶²⁵ Particularly with solar energy there are often references to the future and innovations that will make this source of energy more competitive. So, while it is recognised that renewables are necessary in combatting climate change, there is a consensus that they are not enough to meet global energy demands efficiently.

While shale gas and other unconventional energy types are initially near invisible with only one mention in 2009 and in 2010, the subject starts to appear more frequently from 2011 to reach 24 mentions in 2014. Articles that mention this type of energy need

623 Pascal Colombani, "Le gaz grand gagnant de la nouvelle donne," *Le Figaro* 05 December 2012.

624 Jean Pierre Farandou, "L'énergie solaire devient compétitive," *Les Echos* 08 December 2014.

625 Grégoire Allix, "Derrière l'inertie des diplomates, une vive compétition économique," *Le Monde* 27 November 2010.

to initially introduce what they are to their audience. Two countries are of interest to these articles: the US and Poland. The US is the country where shale gas has taken root and has become an increasingly strong alternative to oil imports. So much so that shale gas is seen as having the potential to “disrupt global markets.”⁶²⁶ Poland on the other hand is the European country with the highest potential for the exploitation of non-conventional gases, along with France. However, unlike France where popular concerns for the environment have led the government to cancel exploration permits, Poland seeks to use these resources. Articles note that indeed shale gas has the potential to change Europe’s relationship to Russia by reducing the “old continent’s energy situation.”⁶²⁷ Nevertheless, there are some articles that look at China hopes for shale gas production, arguing that the country may have the largest reserves in the world.⁶²⁸

7.7 Strategic Narratives in French Newspapers

By analysing each element of narratives presented in the French newspapers, this research can now piece together the main narratives presented. These are to be divided in three types: system narratives, identity narratives and issue narratives.

626 Emmanuel Grasland, "L'essor du gaz non conventionnel a bouleversé le marché Mondial," *Les Echos* 15 December 2009.

627 Ibid.

628 Gabriel Gresillon, "Gaz de schiste : le grand bluff de Pékin," *Les Echos* 29 October 2013.

Table 7-1: Strategic Narratives in French Newspapers

<p>System Narratives</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global energy governance is a cross-cutting issue where economic and political interests have a role to play. • States are the major actors of global energy governance. • This means that countries with the most economic and political weight are more visible and their external energy policies have a bigger impact. • Businesses are also present however they are often portrayed as an extension of the state’s action. The “nationality” of energy companies is often referred to and state’s energy diplomacy plays a major role in helping them secure contracts across borders. • International organisations are for the most part observers. The UN is a facilitator for negotiations; however, states are the main actors in these. Only the OPEP can have a major influence on the conduct of global energy governance. • Demand for energy in emerging countries will continue to grow in future decades, making them primary markets for all types of energy. • Global climate change is never put in question in the coverage and is instead a problem that needs to be addressed through global energy transitions and helping emerging countries reduce their carbon emissions.
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<p>Identity narratives</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • France’s identity narrative is closely associated to nuclear energy and its competitiveness. However, post 2011, this is put more into question. There are however no strong competing narratives presented. France is also framed in terms of sustainability but no types of energy are presented as an instrument used to achieve it. • The EU is a negligible energy actor. However, the strongest narratives associated to it is as a market regulator, its dependence on Russian gas and its leadership in the COPs. • China is the most visible actor, however its issues with sustainability give it a somewhat negative image. It is often described as energy and resource hungry. • While it is less visible, India’s thematic coverage resembles closely that of China with sustainability and security of supply being major frames. • Of the BRICS grouping, Russia is the country which is portrayed as having the most influence on energy affairs. On the flip side it is also the country on which fluctuations in the energy market has the biggest impact. • Brazil and South Africa are comparatively absent from the coverage of global energy governance. • China, India, Brazil and South Africa are all presented as markets for France’s nuclear energy industry.
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<p>Issue Narratives</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Before 2011, nuclear energy is framed as a response to the three main thematic frames of energy. It's an instrument of competitiveness for France to help emerging countries achieve security of supply and sustainability. However, this narrative is put into question with issues raised over the safety of nuclear energy post-Fukushima, political debates introduce themselves in the coverage and Areva's competitiveness is put into doubt. • The EU's dependence on gas from Russia also one of the major issue narratives. Gas is then portrayed in terms of competitiveness and security of supply but also as a political tool and associated with weaponry metaphors. • Emerging countries' efforts towards sustainability are major concerns and viewed as essential in tackling global climate change. In that view their use of coal and resulting pollution is viewed largely negatively. Meanwhile transition towards renewable energy is seen positively. • Domestically, from 2012 onwards, France has a strong narrative of energy transition, reducing the share of nuclear energy in France's energy and increasing the share of renewables. However, this is a minor issue in the coverage of external energy policies and the BRICS don't appear seem to appear as actors in local discussions of this transition.
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	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Oil prices are a major global economic indicator and its impact on Russia, China and the EU's economies is discussed in the coverage. This economic impact is a tool used by OPEP nations making it also a political tool. Moreover, occasional mentions of oil embargoes further this image as a political tool. However, without specific analysis of coverage of OPEP and more generally Middle Eastern countries, these narratives remain secondary.• Likewise, shale gas and unconventional energies are seen as having a revolutionary impact on energy markets. However, without analysis of the US as an energy actor, more exact narratives cannot be established.• Discussions about Iran's nuclear programme display the issue of nuclear proliferation. This is an issue where members of the security council +1 are the most visible actors negotiating to find a solution.
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7.8 Conclusion

Three narratives come out as the most powerful due to the narrative alignment between the different levels of narrative. The first is the impact that emerging countries and in particular China and India, have on global climate change and sustainability. At the system level, they have a large role to play in limiting global

carbon emissions, which is one of the major goals of global energy governance. Individually, they are strongly associated with the issue of sustainability, their dependence on coal is criticised and their efforts to develop renewable energy are for the most part lauded.

Russia's external energy policies and in particular gas policies also feature a strong narrative quality. Russia is a strong energy player and uses gas exports to exert influence on other actors. This narrative was particularly strong in 2014, at the height of the Ukrainian conflict, when President Putin cancelled the construction of the South Stream pipeline meant to transport Russian gas to Europe without transiting through Ukraine.

Finally, prior to 2011, the French government's narrative about nuclear energy is presented in the French newspapers. This narrative is one of a competitive French nuclear energy industry exported to emerging countries (China and India) to help them meet their rising energy demands and reduce their carbon emissions. However, all of these narrative elements are put into question after Fukushima. First of all, France's competitiveness in nuclear energy is tested with Areva's inability to export its EPR technology and ongoing delays in its construction. The expertise of other actors in nuclear energy, such as Russia, Japan and the US become more recognised. While the predicted nuclear renaissance comes to a halt, emerging countries continue to be markets for nuclear energy, however, other actors are strong competitors in meeting this demand. Finally, the safety of nuclear energy is challenged by Fukushima and thus can no longer be viewed as sustainable.

The next chapter will bring together these results with the results from political communications. It will discuss the projection narratives formed by the French and EU executives to a domestic audience through newspapers in France.

Chapter 8: Discussion

8.1 Introduction

Previous two chapters identified and assessed narratives on external energy matters formulated and projected by executive branches of the French government and the EU (political discourses) as well as by French leading newspapers (media discourse). In combination, the two chapters answered two questions: How is a strategic narrative formed and projected at the domestic level of an EU member state (case of France)? And how do France and the EU's narratives about global energy governance relate and differ? The answers to these research questions helped to test six hypotheses (see Chapter 4).

The first hypothesis predicted that an actor's interests will frame the narrative this actor forms about a particular policy issue. This hypothesis will be addressed in the first section of this chapter (with a special focus on the EU). Final discussion around the first hypothesis will demonstrate the link between the EU's interests and policies in energy field with its strategic narratives on global energy governance. The discussion aims to illuminate the first stage in the life-cycle of a strategic narrative, namely *formation*. The chapter will then discuss the findings in relation to the concept of *internal coherence* of strategic narratives. As explained in Chapter 4, *internal coherence* is an alignment between the system, identity and issue narratives of a single actor. In the following section, this chapter will elaborate the notion of *external convergence* of narratives (in this case, between France and the EU) and address the initial expectation that France, as a member state of the EU, will align its narratives with the EU's narratives (hypothesis 2). The alignment of narratives between two actors is what is

referred to as *external convergence*.

The discussion around the third hypothesis will address the issue of narrative *misalignment*. It will dissect whether a member state's interest differs from that of the EU, the member state – in this case France – will formulate a different strategic narrative.

The fourth and fifth hypotheses are in place to look deeper into the process of *formation*. The fourth hypothesis predicts a links between an actor's interests in energy and the way it frames external energy actors in its strategic narratives. The fifth hypothesis suggests a role possessed by elected leaders in the formation of strategic narratives. The final two hypotheses are applied to understand the *projection* of France's and the EU's narratives in the French media. This research predicts that strategic narratives with strong *internal coherence* will have more resonance in the media vis-à-vis other narratives with weaker *internal coherence*.

Lastly, the thesis hypothesises that strategic narratives projected by France have more resonance in the French media than the strategic narratives projected by the EU.

8.2 Formation

The *formation* of strategic narratives in this research was defined as the way political leaders shape their narratives according to their strategic goals and interests. The EU and France's energy policies were detailed in Chapter 2 and their relations with were presented in Chapter 3. This next section will therefore compare these policies and goals to the discourses analysed in Chapter 6 in order to test the first hypothesis of this research (on the *formation* of strategic narratives).

8.2.1 EU Interests and policies

This research hypothesised that the EU's particular energy interests and policies would direct the way it frames and project itself as an international energy actor (see Chapter 4). Reviewing the EU's energy policies (Chapter 2), this research outlined the EU's three energy priorities: competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. These themes were introduced in the Commission's 2006 green paper on the EU's energy strategy.⁶²⁹ Attached to each of these themes is an area of the EU's energy policy.

The Energy Union

The creation of an EU-wide internal energy market is the policy associated with competitiveness. As discussed in Chapter 4, the energy market is above all one of the EU's *internal* policies.⁶³⁰ This is confirmed by results in Chapter 6 which show the absence of *competitiveness* framing in the EU's discourse on *external* energy relations. This is not to say that the internal energy market does not figure in the EU's communications on global energy governance. Richard Youngs highlighted that by helping the EU achieve better energy security, this policy could also be viewed as a component of its external energy policy.⁶³¹ Empirical results have indeed confirmed this argument -- the EU's energy union was framed as a means to achieve energy security. Moreover, within internal energy market, EU member states are encouraged to increase the shares of renewable energy in their energy mixes, and priority assigned

629 European Commission, "Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy,"

630 Schubert, Pollak, and Kreutler, *Energy policy in the European Union*.

631 Youngs, *Energy security: Europe's new foreign policy challenge*, 53.

to this type of energy is a component of the EU's external sustainability policy. The renewable energy target is often portrayed in EU political discourse as a way to lead by example in fighting global climate change. To conclude, this research did not trace an overarching competitiveness narrative at the EU level. Rather, the creation of the energy market – one of the EU's primary policies regarding competitiveness -- is framed as a tool to achieve the EU's other two goals: sustainability and security of supply.

Sustainability and leadership in fighting global climate change

Analysis of the European Commission's communications showed that *sustainability* was the most important frame used in relation to external energy policies. In this discourse, the EU placed itself in a position of leadership in fighting global climate change. This is claimed to be achieved through renewable energy and energy efficiency targets. As commented in Chapter 2, a number of scholars have argued that sustainability and the efforts made in tackling climate change have been a major drive of the EU's energy policies. As discussed in Chapter 6, *sustainability* is often the framing that precedes *security of supply* and *competitiveness*: the latter two objectives are achieved through the implementation of the first. In its communications, the EU portrayed its member states as willing to set binding sustainability targets for themselves. These targets were used, in EU political discourse, to showcase the EU's ability to lead by example in climate change negotiations. China was one of the main external actors in the EU's discourse, and it was framed mostly in terms of *sustainability*, both as a country with high carbon emissions and for its efforts to limit them. High visibility of renewable energy and images of the EU's proclaimed competitiveness in this area further fed into this narrative.

Energy security

Security of supply was the second most prominent frame of the EU behind *sustainability*. This framing was most visible when the EU's energy relations with Russia were discussed (one of the dominant threads within the EU's political discourse). Since 2009, the Russia- Ukraine gas conflict has been the background to discussions on some EU countries relying strongly on Russian gas. The EU framed its role as a mediator in the conflict. However, it also solidified the framing of Russia as a partner of strategic importance. Russia was the most visible external energy actor in EU political discourse in the EU's narratives on global energy.

The analytical tool of the three frames helped to demonstrate that the EU's narratives on external energy projected through EU communications are largely consistent with the EU's stated priorities and policies in this issue-area.

However, this analysis added two more categories of frames: *politics* and *economics*. The EU's discourse on its energy relations with Russia highlighted that energy is often framed as a part of a wider political discussion. EU discourse on the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014 emphasised that energy can itself be a subject of geopolitical debate. On the other hand, energy can be framed as an economic indicator or a driver of development and growth. These additional framing categories highlighted that political and economic frames can be used to narrate energy issues and conflicts around them. For instance, the EU's mediation between Ukraine and Russia can be used not only to resolve a violent conflict between the two countries, but also address the gas dispute between the two countries affecting EU countries.

In summary, empirical analysis confirmed the link between the EU's strategic interests and the *formation* of its strategic narratives (**H1**).

8.2.2 Narrative alignment: *internal coherence*

Table 8-1 presents the summary of the EU's strategic narratives about global energy governance analysed in observed the European Commission's communications. A quick reminder here -- *system* narratives describe narratives about international order (in this case energy governance); *identity* narratives pertain to the way actors present themselves and others – it sets out actors' values and interests; and *issue* narratives relate to specific policy areas.

Chaban et al. argued that strategic narratives with the best coherence between *system*, *identity* and *issue* narratives are expected to have the biggest persuasion impact on other actors.⁶³² Following this logic, the empirical analysis revealed coherence between the two most powerful EU narratives -- *sustainability* and *security* of supply.

Table 8-1: Summary of the EU's Strategic Narrative about Global Energy Governance

<i>System</i> Narrative	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Global energy governance is largely dominated by states with bilateral relations the main background of external energy discourse• Fight against global climate change as a worldwide goal• Cross-cutting nature of energy with politics and economics serving the major themes
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632 Chaban, Miskimmon, and O'Loughlin, "The EU's Peace and Security Narrative: Views from EU Strategic Partners in Asia."

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Energy as a competence shared between the EU and member states
<p><i>Identity</i> Narrative</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU's three main energy goals (<i>sustainability, security of supply</i> and <i>competitiveness</i>) are inter-related. • <i>Sustainability</i> is portrayed as the EU's primary goal • It is followed by security of supply • Both the goals of sustainability and security of supply can be achieved through the creation of an EU energy market • The EU is a leader in <i>sustainability</i> able to impose binding targets on EU member states • Strategic importance of Russia as an energy partner
<p><i>Issue Narrative</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU competitiveness in renewable energy • Dependence on gas from Russia

8.2.3 Narrative alignment: *external convergence*

Chapter 4 argued that in addition to *internal coherence*, alignment could also take place between the narratives of different actors. This was described as *external convergence*. In that light, this research hypothesised that France as a member state of the EU would parallel the EU's narratives in its own discourse, especially in the areas

where its own strategic interest did not differ from the EU's. Chapter 6 detailed structural similarities between France's and the EU's political discourses.

8.2.4 France 'downloading' the EU's Energy priorities

Empirical analysis of French policy discourse explicated a strong *external convergence* with the EU's narratives on *sustainability*. This is not surprising. As discussed in the literature review section of this thesis, the EU has exerted a strong influence on France's energy policy in areas of sustainability. Bocquillon and Evrard in particular pointed out this Europeanisation of France's energy policies.⁶³³ The implementation of renewable energy targets within the Loi Grenelle de l'environnement in particular is understood as the adoption of the EU level policy.⁶³⁴ Policy results showed that France often aligned itself with the EU's position with regards to fighting global climate change. The EU's renewable energy targets for example were often presented as putting the EU in a position of leadership in the UN COPs.

France's energy situation is often characterised by its independence. With nuclear energy meeting a large majority of its energy needs, France is less reliant on fossil fuels than other European countries.⁶³⁵ Additionally, its energy imports are generally more diversified than other EU member states. It is fair to conclude that security of supply is above all an EU priority and not directly part of France's energy policy. Nevertheless, *energy security* is a frame that does appear in French political discourse when

633 Bocquillon and Evrard, "Rattraper ou Devancer l'Europe? Politiques Françaises des Energies Renouvelables et Dynamiques d'Europeanisation."

634 "LOI n° 2009-967 du 3 août 2009 de programmation relative à la mise en œuvre du Grenelle de l'environnement (1),"

635 Simon Beck, Evelyne Misak, and David Mombel, "Conjoncture énergétique. Quatrième trimestre 2018," (2019).

discussing Russia-EU energy relations. Further, this frame is often used in discussions about the EU's energy policies. This is indicative of yet another alignment between France's and the EU's narratives.

Competitiveness was a frame much used in the French political discourse (in relation to nuclear energy in particular). Here, it is important to comment on the framing of EU energy competitiveness policies in the French discourse. Indeed, the energy union is presented not only as a favoured energy policy but as a French policy preference 'uploaded' to the EU level.

Overall, France strongly mirrored the EU's policy objective and the interrelations between the themes of *sustainability*, *security of supply* and *competitiveness*. This, arguably, shows the *external convergence* of narratives between France and the EU. As such, this research's second hypothesis stating that France's narratives of global energy governance would mirror the EU's narratives was confirmed (**H2**).

However, France does have particular energy interests that differ from the EU's interests. This concerns nuclear energy foremost. In this instance, France's narratives differ from those ones of the EU (see Table 8-2 for the comparative summary).

Table 8-2: Summary of France's Strategic Narratives about Global Energy Governance

<p><i>System Narrative</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global energy governance is largely dominated by states, however international negotiations figure more prominently • Fight against global climate change as a worldwide goal • Energy as a competence primarily held by member states, but shared with the EU on some issues particularly regarding sustainability
<p><i>Identity Narrative</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Before 2012, France presented as a competitive nuclear energy actor • After 2012, France is a leader in energy transition both globally and at the EU level • The EU viewed as a leader in sustainability • EU priorities (<i>sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness</i>) all presented in the French political discourse • France is a competitive nuclear energy actor • China and India markets for nuclear energy,

	<p>an opportunity for French nuclear energy actors</p>
<p><i>Issue Narrative</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Competitiveness in nuclear energy exporting • Security of supply and energy independence achieved through nuclear energy • Sustainability achieved through low-carbon nuclear energy • Use of nuclear energy heavily anchored in historical context

8.2.5 Narrative misalignment: the radiance of France

As repeatedly stated throughout this research, France's nuclear energy policies make France unlike other EU member states. This energy preference prescribes France different priorities and strategic interests when it comes to the conduct of external energy policies. France's visions are somewhat different than the EU's visions. Empirical analysis showed the EU's narrative framing the use and benefits of nuclear energy in a largely neutral light. The EU associated itself mostly with the overseeing the safety of nuclear reactors in this narrative. In contrast, France's narratives about nuclear energy are much more positive and multileveled. Formulated on different levels, they presented strong *internal coherence*, with *system*, *identity* and *issue* narratives aligning. As seen in Table 8-2, France's nuclear energy narrative goes along the following lines: France engages in energy diplomacy with other states to sell nuclear energy, an industry in which it is the most competitive actor. Additionally, nuclear energy can help emerging countries with energy security – since it provided France with energy independence – and sustainability as well as fight against global climate change. This is due to the fact that nuclear is a low carbon energy. While not unchallenged, this narrative remains one of the strongest narratives presented by the French executive discourse. As such, this analysis supports the third hypothesis -- France's different energy interests trigger different energy-related narratives to those formed and projected by the EU (**H3**).

Analysis of the policy discourse in Chapter 6 showed that China was the most visible external energy actor in both the EU's and France's respective discourses. However, thematic frames showed that the actor was presented differently. Whereas both actors framed China in terms of challenged *sustainability*, France also saw China as a market

for nuclear energy. In this relationship, France placed itself in the position of saviour, helping China achieve “environmental responsibility”⁶³⁶ through the use of nuclear energy. Therefore, France’s strategic interests framed its relations with external actors (**H4**). This is further demonstrated by the difference in visibility assigned to Russia and India in EU and French political discourses. In the EU’s political discourse, Russia was the second most visible external actor after China; India came third. This reflected the strategic importance of Russia in the EU’s conduct of energy policies. In contrast, in the French discourse, India was the second most visible external actor, ahead of Russia. As a market for nuclear energy, India has more strategic importance to France and thus features more prominently in its narratives. The French executive discourse asserted India’s rights to nuclear energy and framed France as an advocate for that right.

Finally, this research hypothesised that France’s strategic narratives about external energy would be influenced by the political concerns of elected leaders of the country (**H5**). The literature review in Chapter 2 highlighted the fact that political change in France in 2012 created a shift in energy policies particularly with regards to nuclear energy. Szarka argued that under President Sarkozy’s leadership, France sought to exports nuclear energy and gain competitiveness in the industry.⁶³⁷ However, the 2012 election of President Hollande introduced a partial transition away from nuclear energy with the goal to reduce the share of nuclear energy from 75% of the French energy mix to

636 Fillon, "Déclaration de M. François Fillon, Premier ministre, sur la coopération nucléaire entre la France et la Chine, à Pékin le 21 décembre 2009.."

637 Szarka, "Environmental foreign policy in France: National interests, nuclear power, and climate protection."

50%.⁶³⁸ Results detailed in Chapter 6 confirmed this hypothesis. From 2009 to 2011, under President Sarkozy's administration, nuclear energy was mentioned much more often than between 2012-2015 under President Hollande. Moreover, President Sarkozy and his Prime Minister contextualised the use of nuclear energy with mentions of great political figures such as President De Gaulle and President Pompidou. Using temporal narrative elements, they thus reinforced their narrative of nuclear energy as a source of energy independence and competitiveness. Comparatively, under president Sarkozy's leadership, renewable energy was a secondary focus. Conversely, President Holland's communications on nuclear energy are reduced and, although with less frequency, renewable energy is placed in a historical context. So political leaders' perceived strategic interests will determine the narratives formed by executive leads in France. It should be noted that President Hollande's decision to move away from nuclear energy was the result of a political agreement between his political party (the PS) and the Greens. This was demonstrated by Brouard and Guinaudeau and discussed in Chapter 2 of this research.⁶³⁹ However, the Fukushima disaster and possible inside knowledge of Areva's subsequent inability to further export nuclear energy competitively may have influenced this decision. This is speculation however; media coverage of nuclear energy post-Fukushima made these major themes.

This chapter has so far addressed hypotheses relating to the first stage in the life-cycle of strategic narratives – *formation*. It was observed through the lens of political executive communications. This chapter will now address the second stage in the

638 L'Obs, "'François Hollande veut une transition énergétique massive'," *Le Nouvel Observateur* 4 April 2012.

639 Brouard and Guinaudeau, "Policy beyond politics? Public opinion, party politics and the French pro-nuclear energy policy."

narrative cycle: *projection*.

8.3 Projection

8.3.1 Narrative resonance: *internal coherence*

This research conceptualised the spread of strategic narratives through the lens of the cascading activation framing theory.⁶⁴⁰ Once formed within the executive branch of government in France and the EU, these narratives are then projected and spread to the media. This research hypothesised that strategic narratives with the strongest *internal coherence* would resonate more when projected to the media (**H6**). In other words, narratives with sound alignment between system, *identity* and *system* narratives would be picked up more frequently and more prominent by the media. A summary of the narratives circulated by the media is presented in Table 8-3.

Table 8-3: Summary of Narratives presented in French Newspapers (2009-2015)

System Narratives	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Global energy governance is a cross-cutting issue where economic and political interests have a role to play.• States are the major actors of global energy governance.• Demand for energy in emerging countries will continue to grow in future decades, making them primary markets for all types of energy.
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640 Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11."

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fight against global climate change as a worldwide goal
<p>Identity</p> <p>Narratives</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • France as competitive nuclear energy actor • The EU is a negligible energy actor. However, the strongest narratives associated to it is as a market regulator, its dependence on Russian gas and its leadership in the COPs. • China as negative sustainability actor and in need of security of supply • India mirrors China's framing • Russia is competitive energy actor • China, India, Brazil and South Africa are all presented as markets <p>for France's nuclear energy industry.</p>

<i>Issue narrative</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-2011, nuclear energy as instrument of competitiveness, security of supply and competitiveness. Narrative loses coherence after 2011. • EU dependence on Russian gas • Post-2012, coverage of France’s energy transition is limited. • Oil prices are a major global economic indicator • Shale gas and unconventional energies are seen as having a revolutionary impact on energy markets. • Discussions about Iran’s nuclear programme
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The narrative with the strongest *internal coherence* in the French discourse was the narrative about nuclear energy before 2012. Results from the newspaper analysis in Chapter 7 demonstrated that this narrative resonated strongly in the French media. France was presented as a competitive actor in nuclear energy with markets in emerging countries and nuclear energy was placed in the historical context and legitimised through frames of energy independence and sustainability. Importantly, these are also all the elements of the strategic narrative presented by the French political executive discourse. This research thus found evidence that narratives with strong *internal coherence* have strong resonance and are picked up more often by other actors.

Post-2012, this narrative in political discourse is weakened. France’s competitiveness in the industry is put in question, and members of the government no longer make links between nuclear energy and security of supply and sustainability. This was reflected in the media discourse -- coverage of nuclear energy focussed almost solely on Areva’s difficulties. France, once framed as the leader in the industry, was now

presented to be confronted with a growing number of competitors from other countries.

In comparison, under President Hollande's leadership -- and a dominant narrative of energy transition -- renewable energy was put forward. However, without a strong *identity* narrative associated with renewable energy, the *internal coherence* of this narrative was more fragile. In the media observed, there was less resonance of the energy transition narrative. The narrative was doubtfully present in the domestic coverage of energy matters, however in relation to the BRICS its visibility was limited. This showed one more time that narratives with strong *internal coherence* have more resonance and are projected more easily to the media. This chapter will now analyse the resonance of externally converging narratives.

8.3.2 Narrative resonance: external convergence

This research hypothesised that France's strategic narratives would resonate more strongly in French newspapers than the EU's (H7). However, media results show that this hypothesis was confirmed only partially. Indeed, narratives about Russia as an energy actor and the EU's dependence on gas had relatively high visibility in the French newspapers observed. In political discourse, Russia was more visible in EU communications than in French ones. Conversely, India, an important part of France's narrative about nuclear energy was more visible in French political communications than in the EU's communications. However, in the French media coverage, Russia had more visibility than India. This can be explained in different ways. Firstly, while India remains a market for France nuclear energy industry throughout the period of observation, France's energy diplomacy towards India was largely concentrated in 2010. In comparison, coverage of the construction and cancellation of the South Stream

pipeline is an ongoing topic in the observed coverage. Secondly, Russia's higher media visibility may be a consequence of its proximity or importance compared to India. Westerståhl and Johansson have argued that these factors may have a causal link in the visibility of international events in the media.⁶⁴¹ Finally, stories about South Stream often feature the local hook of EDF's involvement in the construction of the pipeline. This finding means that dominance of France's strategic narrative over the EU's cannot be confirmed and would require further study.

8.4 Implications of this research

An important aspect of this research was the relationship between strategic narratives from the EU and its member states. Miskimmon argued that "the formation, projection, and reception of the EU strategic narrative is complicated by the hybrid nature of the institution—reflecting both supranational and intergovernmental aspects, which frustrates efforts to speak with a single European voice in international affairs."⁶⁴² As an intergovernmental entity, the EU's positions tend to be the most common denominator between member states. This makes the EU's communication less reactive to international events. Miskimmon stated that "the EU has often been slow or reluctant to explicitly set out a strategic narrative."⁶⁴³ This was in part displayed in the difference in nature of political communications from the EU and France. French politicians are interviewed in French media on a near daily basis, allowing them to

641 J. Westerståhl and F. Johansson, "Foreign news: news values and ideologies," *European Journal of Communication* IX, no. 1 (1994).

642 Miskimmon, "Finding a unified voice? The European Union through a Strategic Narrative Lens."

643 Ibid. p91

communicate on day to day events and voice opinions. The observed EU communications were for the most part press releases and speeches at political summits.⁶⁴⁴ Arguably, with a more streamlined communication structure, the EU was able to communicate one coherent message, but this message tends to be less immediate.

Focussing on the concept of *narrative alignment*, this research has shown that member states formulate their narratives in alignment to the EU's where they have no other interest at play. This was particularly visible in France's narrative about *security of supply*. Energy security is not a priority for France. Nevertheless, the French government communicates on the EU's *security of supply*, recognising for instance the strategic importance of Russia to the EU's energy market. Further, the EU's narrative can be used to further France's strategic interest. Under president Hollande in particular, the EU's policies and narratives are used to justify France's energy transition. However, where France's interests differed from the EU's -- in particular with regard to nuclear energy -- its narrative differed significantly from the EU's. Particularly before 2012, France's narrative was strongly focussed on nuclear energy and its exportation to emerging countries. It should be noted that France's narrative does not directly contradict that of the EU since it has stated its neutrality on the use of nuclear energy. Moreover, it uses the stated goals of the EU (competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability) to justify the use of nuclear energy. Nevertheless, with the link between interest and the formation of strategic narratives empirically established, this research shows how a strategic narrative on a policy area such as external energy is formed at the EU level and the domestic level of an EU member state.

⁶⁴⁴ That is not to say that EU commissioners don't communicate individually with the media.

Using Entman's cascading activation framing theory⁶⁴⁵ to conceptualise the way strategic narratives are projected, this research also sought to establish where a supranational entity such as the EU can be placed on the cascade. In other words, how would the EU's strategic narratives be projected to the domestic level of a member state? By analysing the *external convergence* of strategic narrative between France and the EU, this research showed that at least some of the EU's narratives are picked up by member state officials and then projected at the domestic level. Moreover, the results also show that the resonance of the EU's narratives was not weaker in the media than the member state's. However, results for the last hypothesis remain inconclusive and it is fair to say that more research in this regard is needed.

8.5 Further research

This research has focussed on EU member state, France, which has displayed different interests in the conduct of external energy policies to other member states and the EU as a whole. As such, it provided a good case study for the role of interests in the formation of strategic narratives and on *alignment* and *misalignment* of narratives between the EU and its member states. The results of this research can be tested and further analysed in the conduct of a similar study using data from more member states. Miskimmon addressed the issue of multiple narratives emanating from the EU and its member states, analysing the narratives projected by Mario Draghi and Angela Merkel on the euro crisis.⁶⁴⁶ In this light, future analysis could explore projections by leaders

⁶⁴⁵ Entman, "Cascading activation: contesting the White House's frame after 9/11."

⁶⁴⁶ Miskimmon, "Finding a unified voice? The European Union through a Strategic Narrative Lens."

from multiple member states which have with competing interests.

Taking a rationalist perspective of constructivism, this research conceptualised the role of executive leaders as the impulse of strategic narrative. Leaders have been portrayed as being driven largely by their perception of their own interests. Using logic from Entman's cascade, this research analysed only the narratives emanating from government officials. However, in liberal democracies, oppositions have a role in spreading competing narratives. This has been somewhat addressed in the analysis of communications from two different French administrations. However, analysing the fractured nature of democracy in the US, Entman revised his cascading activation framing theory to better reflect the ideological divide operating in American politics. In this cascade, the administration no longer holds primacy over the spreading of frames. Rather, this position is divided between democratic party elites and republican party elites whose communications are spread to mainstream media but also to liberal and conservative media close to their own ideology, and directly to their public through social media. This research focussed therefore on a minor part of this cascade -- the projection of narratives from the executive branch of government to the mainstream media. However, future research could take on this revised cascade which better captures modern media ecologies to analyse the spread of strategic narratives.

8.6 Conclusion

This research asked two questions: how are strategic narratives on the topic of global energy governance aimed at a domestic audience formulated and projected in an EU member state? And how does a member state (France) align – or not – its strategic narratives to those of the EU? This chapter, by addressing the seven hypotheses made

in this research, has answered these questions. Formation of narratives at the EU and member state level is primarily driven by interests and policies. Member states will align their strategic narratives with the EU when their interest matches that of the EU or when no other interest competes with the narrative. However, narratives will become misaligned when member states have policies that do not match the EU's priorities.

On projection, strategic narratives with internal coherence between the different levels of narratives have more resonance and are picked up more frequently by other actors such as journalists. Finally, there appears to be no stronger resonance of a member states strategic narrative than the EU's in the media. This result cannot be entirely confirmed since other variables may be at play.

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