DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN GHANA AND NIGERIA: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL ELITES

A thesis

submitted in fulfilment

of the requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

at the University of Canterbury

By

Peter O. Nwokeke

Supervisors:

Professor Alexander Tan

Assoc.Professor James Ockey

Dr. Scott Walker

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, NEW ZEALAND

2019

Table of contents

iii

Abstract

Despite several approaches to the study of democratic consolidation, launching democracy consolidation in consociational democracies has been considered problematic due to the fragmented nature of such societies which is not conducive to democratic stability. Notwithstanding the logjams confronting democracy consolidation in divided countries, this thesis considers an alternative approach through which the consolidation of democracy can be attained in Africa, particularly in Ghana and Nigeria.

The argument of this work aligns with the views of other scholars like Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and others who believe that political elites play major roles in democracy consolidation and that differing attitude among the political elites can account for democratic outcomes. This thesis aimed at providing a deeper insight of what the political elites in one country do to reach democracy consolidation, and what the elites from another country have done differently to stifle democracy consolidation. Understandings of these differences are obtained through interviews and secondary data analysis, building on the theoretical frameworks on elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence in order to understand how these factors influenced the political elites in polarised societies, such as Ghana and Nigeria.

The choice to compare Ghana and Nigeria emanates from their histories and geographical locations. The two countries are from the West African continent; both are British government colonies, had histories of long military regimes cum counter coups, had various ethnic groups and had their independence almost at the same in 1958 and 1960 respectively. While the political elites in the two countries don't differ in their coherence, their area of difference on democratic consolidation is inherent in elite commitment to democracy.

My appreciation cannot be complete without acknowledging people like Luisa Leo, K.C. Jung, Farid, Jane, Khairu, and Tian for their contributions in reading my thesis as well as sharing their academic ideas with me in our day to day group discussion.

Abbreviations

Alliance for Democracy -AD

Conventional People's party ------------CPP

Provisional National Defence Council-------- PNDC

Interim National Coordinating Committee (INCC)

National Defence Committee (NDC),

International Financial Institutions (IFI),

International Monetary Fund (IMF),

New Patriotic Party (NPP),

National Party of Nigeria (NPN)

Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO)

Social Democratic Party (SDP)

National Republican Convention----NRC

Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC)

Electoral Commission--------------EC

Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice---CHRAJ

Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC)

Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)

Independent Corrupt Practices Commission ---(ICPC)

 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission ---(EFCC).

Most Similar System Design -MSSD

Most Different System Design –MDSD

Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition –GACC

Interim National Electoral Commission –INEC

Malaysian Ringitt- MYR

Economic Affairs- -EA

Ghana Political Parties Programme-GPPP

Serious Fraud Office –SFO

National Anti-Corruption Plan –NACAP

People's Convention Party –PCP

Great Alliance –GA

Center for Democracy Development –CDD

Progressive Alliance-PA

National Electoral Commission –NEC

Resident Electoral Commissioners –RECs

Federal Capital Territory –FCT

Independent National Electoral Commission- INEC

All Progressive Congress-APC

Peoples Democratic Party –PDP

Senior Advocate of Nigeria –SAN

All Nigerian Peoples Party –ANPP

<div align="center">**Chapter One**</div>

Introduction

1.1   Research Focus and Background of the Study

There have been various approaches suggested by the scholars of democratic consolidation on the possible ways of attaining democratic consolidation. Civil society and foreign influence have been considered by some scholars to facilitate democratic consolidation. In the context of this thesis, emphasis is placed on the political elite unity and willingness to compromise on their differences, while in societies with ethnic divisions and fragmented political elites, unity and willingness of the elites to compromise their differences are pre-conditions for consolidation of democracy, Africa in particular.

Despite successful transitions in many African countries, consolidation of democracy has been a huge problem confronting political elites (Van de Walle & Butler, 1999:16; Barkan, 2000: 228-231; Sandbrook, 1996: 70-71). Donor countries have encouraged African political elites through aid to establish democratic consolidation to ensure that these emerging democracies don't fall back into the authoritarian regimes that governed these countries before the early 90s. However, while many African countries struggle to get their democracies on the right path, a few have succeeded. The political elites in these successful countries may have exhibited an attitude conducive to give credence to the existence of the democratic features that made consolidation possible. On the other hand, the expectation people believe that democracy might bring to many African countries, such as Nigeria, after several military take overs has not yielded any meaningful results in consolidating democracy, especially when compared to the giant strides that Ghana, a fellow West African country, has made.

This study is set out to inquire into how political elites have shaped the transition to democratic consolidation in Ghana and Nigeria. This research focuses on the attitude of the

1

political elites, as they are considered by this thesis as the lynchpin through which regimes can attain consolidation. However, this thesis is of the view that the attainment of democratic consolidation cannot be possible where there is elite fragmentation. The thesis argues that the consolidation of democracy is possible when these elites shun their differences and embrace an attitude that would help democracy thrive. Elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence are considered to be the fulcrum of the theoretical framework through which consolidation is possible, especially in emerging democracies in Africa, Ghana and Nigeria in particular. Therefore, it is important to analyse what the political elites in these countries have done to accomplish democratic consolidation, and also how they can serve as a mirror, through which struggling African countries might learn from.

1.2 Research Question

On the basis of the above discussion, this research seeks to answer one major research question: **Why there is variation in the consolidation of democracy in Ghana and Nigeria?**

In investigating and answering this question, this research carefully considers the recent nature of democracy in Ghana and Nigeria. The true importance of this research lies in the hunt for change within the democracies of these countries since transition in the early 90s. This research will investigate how elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence can attain democratic consolidation in ethnically divided societies in Africa, especially in Nigeria. For example, the thesis will look into what the political elites in one country have done to attain democratic consolidation, and what other countries have done differently to stagnate democracy.

1.3 Profiles of Selected Countries

1.3.1 The Ghanaian State

Ghana was the first country in West Africa to be decolonised in 1957 from British rule. It has made its liberal democratic constitution a trademark since the military disengaged from politics. Before this, the post-colonial elites violated many principles enshrined in the country's post-independence constitution by restricting civil liberties, closing down opposition political parties, and not respecting the independence of the judiciary. Ghana's first, second, and third Republics failed due to military coups in 1966, 1972, and in 1981. Describing the situation, Gyimah Boadi (1994) notes that the First Republic stumbled after the 1966 military coup as the constitution was reversed, limiting civil liberties as the Kwame Nkrumah regime adopted a one party system under the Conventional People's party (CPP). Ghana's chequered political path to establishing its liberal democratic constitution came to an end in 1991, when pressures mounted from internal and external sources for a return to constitutional rule. The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), an administrative body created in the regime of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, was initially meant to be a revolutionary body, as it incorporated both civilians and ex-military officers. But the PNDC's actions and functions began to degenerate into malicious infringements on the freedom of expression of the media and civil society groups, who requested for a return to civilian rule. It is noteworthy that this body (PNDC), was intended to focus on transition, but was indirectly working for Rawlings as they tried to stop any media that criticised their actions. Agyeman-Duah (1987:618) states that the PNDC cabinet was made up mostly by civilians who thrived on the 'direct' support of the military. The government thus selected members of this body for top administrative offices in the country. Rawlings claimed that he was reluctant to take power, but that the PNDC created a pathway for him to return to power as demand for civilian rule grew stronger. Agyeman-Duah (1987:619) notes that the Interim National

Coordinating Committee (INCC) was created to carry out the duty of the National Defence Committee (NDC), in order to check other associations and social groups rising against the existing structure.The NDC was empowered to monitor the activities of various bodies created as the country planned to move into constitutional rule. The NDC was established to ensure that the rights of the people are protected; bring to book people that are involved in corrupt activities and as well try to disrupt the revolution geared towards maintaining a collective national discipline where everybody in the country has the equal right to take part in decision-making (Daily Graphic, 1982).

However, domestic agitation for democratic rule grew stronger, as well as global support for democracy through the imposition of 'political conditionalities' on aid recipient countries by the International Financial Institutions (IFI), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and other external donors. Gyimah-Boadi (1994:84) notes that in 1989 the IFI and Western donors' idea to include political conditions (like transparency, accountability, and good governance) as requirements for granting grant loans and development aid which are helpful in making the PNDC to consider transition.

Rawlings, having surrendered to the people's demands, supported a Presidential/ representative general election which he eventually won and became the president, having contested from the platform of National Democratic Congress (NDC). The election of 1992 was fiercely contested the opposition political party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), rejected the outcome on grounds of massive rigging. Gyimah-Boadi (2001) posits that the NPP refused to accept the results of the presidential elections because of alleged irregularities, and then boycotted the next parliamentary elections. In the next election of 1996, the NPP nominated another candidate to challenge the incumbent-Rawlings, who re-contested through the NDC and won the election.

1.3.2   The Nigerian State

After gaining its independence from the British in 1960, Nigeria's First Republic of 1963 was short-lived due to the military incursions into politics. The history of military incursions in Nigerian politics dated as far back as 1966, when the military violently aborted the First Republic that was in the process of creating a road map for Nigerian democracy. The first military coup of 1966 resulted in the outbreak of civil war (Biafran) in 1967, which unfortunately lasted for thirty months.

After the civil war in the early 70s, General Murtala Mohammed carried out another coup against the regime of General Yakubu Gowon. But General Murtala did not last in office, as he was killed February 13th 1976 in an abortive coup attempt led by Lt. Col. Buka Suka Dimka. After his death, his second in command (General Olusegun Obasanjo) took over the mantle of power and drafted a new constitution to put the country back on track for democratic transition. General Obasanjo's quest to return the country to a democratic state was temporarily successful, when his government lifted a ban on politics in September 21, 1978 where five political parties registered and contested for power.

In the Second Republic of 1979 to 1983, the system of government (Westminster system) that was adopted in the First Republic was amended to resemble an American-style Presidential system. The Second Republic saw the end of thirteen years of military rule after the success recorded by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the election under the party flag bearer of President Shehu Shegari in an election of 1979, which many described as violence-prone and involving all forms of electoral malpractices (Ogbeidi, 2010:47; Ugoh,2004:172). The aftermath of the election made some contestants feel that they were cheated of victory, especially when Shehu Shegari was declared the winner by the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), and some went to court to contest the victory.

With regards to the irregularities surrounding the elections, the chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO), Michael Ani, conceded that the process was rigged and stated: "I got the hint that the presidential ballot paper had leaked because it was to be the last election. The papers had already gone out but how it got leaked, I don't know, it was being forged on a very large scale" (Joseph, 1981: 84). The implication of this statement is that presidential ballot papers must have gone into the wrong hands, even before the election was conducted, and that the perpetrators possibly thumb printed those papers beforehand. There is another obvious reason to believe that the 1979 general election was a manipulated process. In the words of Joseph (1981), the announcer of the presidential election results (Frederick Menkiti) was not even a member of FEDECO.

In 1983 the military overthrew the Second Republic, accusing the government of gross misconduct and embezzlement from the treasury. The military returned back to power as democracy became history once again. This time, it was General Muhammed Buhari who truncated the democratic process and removed the elected President. After almost two years in office, another military coup occurred, led by General Abacha and General Babangida.

The Third Republic began in 1989, when a new constitution was drafted under the regime of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (a military Head of State), who assured Nigerians that he had come into power for just four months, after which he would return power to a democratically elected President in 1990. Notwithstanding his promises, he delayed transition until 1993, when he formed two parties, namely; the Social Democratic Party and the National Republican Convention. In Nigeria's previous elections, people were allowed to form their own political parties, but the new political parties formed under the regime of Gen. Babangida were imposed on Nigerians. Babangida's idea of floating his own two parties on Nigerians did not augur well to many Nigerians, and it was challenged on the

6

basis that it would not be helpful in the overall search for sustainable democracy in short and long term processes (Ofeimun, 1989).

Nevertheless, the two political parties went to the poll and Chief Moshood Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) emerged as the winner and waited for the government to hand over power. What made the June 12 presidential election unique was the way in which the election was conducted. Among the scholars who wrote on how free and fair the election was, Ifukor (2010) states that the presidential election of Nigeria in June 12, 1993 will go down in the history for being the most free and fair election ever conducted even though it was aborted by the military as well as bringing in political turmoil and deaths among Nigerians. Despite the generally acclaimed fairness of the election, the military government surprisingly annulled the election. As a result, Moshood Abiola declared himself the President of Nigeria and went into hiding. In 1993, the military regime of Sani Abacha unseated an interim government of Ernest Shonikan, through a palace coup, which looked like an underground plan by Ibrahim Babangida's regime to pave the way for Sani Abacha. Moshood Abiola was captured and thrown into prison. The Fourth Republic started in May 29, 1999 after the death of Gen.Sani Abacha while he was in power. This Republic brought the country onto the path of another transitional journey, under the regime of Abdulsalami Abubaka. The Fourth Republic witnessed the election of yet another retired military general, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo. The selection of Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo by the outgoing military officers was seen by Nigerians as a strategy to compensate the people of Western Nigeria, where the winner of the June 12 election (Moshood Abiola) came from. In summary, Adekanye (2005) describes Nigeria's transition as "pacted democracy" because the retired military officers in collaboration with other principal elites from the north and with the support of the international influence reached an agreement that the ongoing crisis as a result

of the June 12 election in the country can only be resolved if they agree on electing someone from the Yoruba ethnic group.

Therefore, looking at various military regimes that took over power during the processes of transition before 1999, scholars think that none of those regimes brought the transition to a reasonable conclusion. This aligns with the view of Osaghae (2002), who states that successive military regimes in the country see themselves as providing the solution to Nigeria's problems, by restoring stability, saving the nation, and correcting the mistakes of previous regimes.

In chapter one, this research has identified areas of focus; it is important to give an account of each country's background. The concluding chapter addressed the main research question to. After that, the thesis outlines the remaining chapters.

1.4   Plan of the Thesis

Chapter two of this thesis gives cursory details on the research dilemma and outline how this has affected the consolidation of democracy. Also, the history and overview of democracy in Africa are discussed, starting from the post-colonial governments of the two countries. This section also gives a detailed description of the research argument, as well as full details of the research method and design.

Chapter three offers a review of the literature on democratic consolidation, elite commitment to democracy, and elite coherence. It then outlines the theoretical framework and research hypothesis. This chapter aimed at setting out a detailed review of other scholarly works on democratic consolidation, and see if the political elites actually play a key role in the process. The theoretical framework builds on elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy, and discusses some variables like democracy consolidation, consociational democracy, pseudo-democracy, and competitive authoritarianism. These reviews are needed to understand how the consolidation of democracy plays out in other countries, and to see

how elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy can help achieve democracy consolidation in Africa, especially in Ghana and Nigeria. The research's theoretical framework shall be discussed in this chapter as well.

Chapter four analyses Ghana. It focuses on elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence, in order to comparatively analyse the role of the political elite in the consolidation of democracy in Africa. The research builds on indicators mentioned above, in order to understand the role of elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence. All these indicators shall be systematically discussed, especially to reflect the activities of the political elite in Ghana with regards to democratic consolidation.

Like in chapter four, chapter five shall focus on elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence as they affect Nigeria. Some indicators identified in theoretical framework shall be discussed, to see how they played out in the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. The main objective is to discover if the role and influence of the political elites contribute to Nigeria's democratic consolidation. This thesis argues that elite choices determine democratic outcomes. The attitude of Nigerian political elites will be examined, with reference to the data gathered during fieldwork and other important secondary data.

Chapter six summarises the key results gathered in the research and bring the research to a logical conclusion. It reviews the key argument emerging from the indicators, methods, and theoretical framework, and discusses the results from the interview findings, determining if they systematically answer the research question. The main variables which serve as the benchmark for this analysis must reflect the problems and lasting prospects of democratic consolidation in Africa, in particular Nigeria and Ghana. The research provides some recommendations which, if adopted by policy makers, will help address the various problems facing democratic consolidation in the subject countries. This thesis contributes to the

9

existing knowledge on consolidation of democracy as many African countries, like Ghana and Nigeria, work towards consolidating their democracies.

Chapter 2

Research dilemma, Historical Overview, Argument, Method and Design

2.1   The Research Dilemma

The scholarly work by Samuel Huntington (1991:16) for global democratisation (*Third Wave*) came as a shock to many authoritarian regimes in the early 90s. The fear of these authoritarian leaders was because across the globe, few of them had been persecuted, some faced trials and many decided to step down from their positions in order to give room for competitive elections. For example, after watching a televised execution of a friend, Nicolae Ceausescu (Romanian autocratic president), President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, as Democratic Republic of the Congo is known as at the time, conceded to allowing other two parties to stand against his own party in 1993 elections (Huntington, 1991:16). His appeal to opposition forces led many authoritarian regimes in many third world countries, especially Africa, to arrange multi-party elections. Manning (2005:709) agreed that by 1995, almost all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had arranged at least one multi-party election. But while few countries have attained democratic consolidation, many countries still struggle. This study intends to understand why there is difference in democratic outcomes of these countries.

The debate among scholars has been about what facilitates democratisation and its consolidation. Emphasis has been on either the civil society or foreign assistance as facilitating factors (Resnick,2012:4; Levitsky & Way, 2005:22; Carothers, 1999). Other scholars have opined that parties and party-systems' institionalization can facilitate democratic consolidation (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Sandbrook, 1996; Randall & Svassand, 1999). This thesis is in agreement with other scholars such as; (Di Palma, 1990; Higley and Gunter, 1992; Bunce, 2000) who argued that the political elites have major roles to play if a country is to attain democratic consolidation. But while the political elite is one of the important factors that made transition and democratic consolidation possible, scholars

11

have not adequately advanced this area to reflect on the African democratic consolidation literature, especially in Ghana and Nigeria. With this vast gap in the scholarly discourse, this thesis is devoted to analysing systematically the activities of the political elites in democratic consolidation in Ghana and Nigeria.

Over the years, Ghana and Nigeria's rating in the world freedom indices have remained contradictory to each other even when the two countries were victims of military rule before transition. Apart from 1998 when Ghana was rated partly free; since 1999, Ghana's political rights scored within 1, civil liberties scored within 2, and its freedom rating scored within 1.5. Generally, the country has remained free. In the case of Nigeria, since 1999, the country's world freedom index status has remained partly free, even in 2017. Nigeria's political rights were within 4, civil liberties rated 3 and political freedom stood at 3.5 in 1999. In 2017, the country was still partly free with political rights of 3, civil liberties of 5, and its freedom rating in the region of 4. Compared to Nigeria, Ghana has done pretty well because after Ghana's transition in 1992, it took the country until 1999 for the country to change its freedom index from partly free to free. Compare to Nigeria, since 1999 when the country completed its transition, the freedom status of the country has remained partly freely. It took Ghana just six years to reverse its freedom status, but after almost seventeen years, Nigeria has remained in the same freedom status it was at the time of transition.

No doubt, the histories of Ghana and Nigeria are marred by the appearances and disappearances of democracy due to various military takeovers. However, it is pertinent to note that the two countries differ in their paths toward democratic consolidation. For example, among the fifty-four (54) countries in the continent of Africa, Gilbert and Allen (2014:524) describe Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania as countries where democracy is most possible. The legacy that Ghana has achieved in its evolving democracy led Gyimah-Boadi (2009:138) to address Ghana as the 'hope' and 'role

model' for other African countries struggling to consolidate their democracies. Subsequent to the two decades Jerry Rawlings was in power, Ghana has developed into one of Africa's most liberal and vibrant democracies, regaining a position of political leadership in the African continent (Diamond, 2008:253). Other scholars agree with Gyimah-Boadi (2009), that in Africa, Ghana is seen as a model for other aspiring democratic countries in the continent (Ayee, 1997; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Daddieh, 2009; Abdulai and Crawford, 2010; Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012; Gyimah-Boadi, 2015).

The praise Ghana's democracy success has enjoyed may be due to the desire of the political elites to allow the democratic system to work. Gyimah-Boadi (2015:101) rightly observed that the obstacles facing democracy in Africa is the declining commitment to the democratic task from the political elites. He regretted the deplorable state of 'government responsiveness and accountability' (Gyimah-Boadi,2015:101). From his points, it is important to argue that the path the political elites take can determine their democratic outcomes. For this thesis, commitment to democracy encompasses the political elites' ability to ensure that Electoral Commission is giving the necessary autonomy so it can carry out its duty without the influence of anyone; political elites' compliance to the rules and regulations guiding party financing and an establishment of a resilient impartial body to check political corruption.

Ghana has made some positive headway in transforming its democracy, and this is attributed to the political elites who have accepted democracy as the only way of ensuring stability. Over the years, Ghana has continued to consolidate its credentials as an outstanding democratic African country, which has culminated in the holding of national elections every four years since 1992 (Whitfield, 2009). Jockers et al. (2010) demonstrated that the successes recorded in the Ghanaian elections of 1996, 2000, 2004 and, 2008 were responsible for the two transfers of power between the two main opposing parties (in 2000 and 2008). This also

13

reflected on the 'improvements in the performance of Ghana's formal institutions, particularly, the Electoral Commission, the judiciary and security forces'(Jocker et al.2010). It is important to state that the success the Electoral Commission in Ghana has made so far stem from the autonomy the body has enjoyed since 1992. On the autonomy of the electoral commission, the constitution of Ghana spelled out that in performing of its duties the EC is not answerable or under the influence of anyone irrespective of the person's position (Republic of Ghana 1992:39).

In an effort to ensure stability among political parties in Ghana, in 1994 the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) was created by the Electoral Commission (Ayee, 1996; Jeffries, 1998 & Gyimah-Boadi, 1999). Debrah (2011:37) notes that the establishment of IPAC was meant to achieve two primary goals including to diffuse conflict and tension arising from the ruling party and opposition parties, and to ensure that all political parties in Ghana establish a common compromises on the rules of the electoral game. The importance of IPAC in promoting understanding between the ruling party and the opposition is discussed by Jeffries (1998:197) who opined that Rawlings' government went into dialogue with the opposition party on how to manage elections in Ghana through the help of IPAC. In order to build consensus among political parties, the EC meet with party representatives on monthly basis (Jeffries, 1998:197). This is possible to help in cementing the understanding of the ruling party and the oppositions in Ghana. It is reasonable to deduce that the understanding and willingness of the political elites to tolerate themselves and commitment to democracy are built by the Electoral Commission through IPAC. This atmosphere could be due to a certain level of coherence and commitment to democracy to which the elites in Ghana had become accustomed to, which largely promoted the country's democratic stability. The autonomy of the Electoral Commission is derived from the Constitution of Ghana which stipulates that once a member is appointed, the person keeps his or her position for life and

cannot be dismissed by anyone except the person is incapacitated due to ill-health or on gross misconduct of office (Republic of Ghana 1992:27). It looks like the post-colonial elites in Ghana knew from the beginning where they wanted to go, and made some useful political calculations that would take them in the direction they envisaged.

Once the military in Ghana decided on a transition to civilian rule, the first thing the government did was to constitute a committee representing all the geo-political zones, tasked with drafting a new constitution for the emerging democracy. Linz and Stepan (1996) suggest that democracy is consolidated if actors "play to the rules". To this end, Ghanaian political elites demonstrated such commitment to the emerging democracy. There have been several significant developments in the history of Ghana's democracy to suggest the commitment of the elites. Take for instance, recent study on party financing in Ghana by Nam-Katoti et al. (2011) resulted in two contrasting views. According to them, there is dispute between party executives and the civil society with regards to party financing. Party executives are in support that political parties receive their funding from the state and the civil society criticised that state funding of parties will bring about political corruption among politicians but party executive refused to concede to their claim(Nam-Katoti et al.2011:90).

However, majority of the interview respondents in Ghana believed that public financing has helped in improving democratic consolidation in Ghana. In structuring of democracy in Ghana, the elites has promoted an independent Electoral Commission, equitable party-financing, an unbiased anti-corruption commission, and this thesis is of the view that all these are possible hence a certain level of coherence and commitment among political elites in Ghana. In other words, available literatures suggest that CHRAJ (The Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice) responsible for crime control has been successful in winning public trust. This is mainly due to its readiness to bring to justice

any government officer who engages into corruption (Bossman, 2006; Short, 2015). CHRAJ created in 1994 has ever since handled over 127 corruption cases (Bossman, 2006:4). The results so far show that Rawlings (1993-2000) and Kufuor (2001-2008) have complied with the two-term presidential limit as stipulated in the 1992 Constitution. Since the 1996 elections, a candidate that has lost an election has readily accepted the result of the election and conceded defeat, with a congratulatory message to the winner (Abdulai and Crawford, 2010). Ghana's level of democratic consolidation is evident in the country's expansion of political freedom, regular free and fair elections, the gradual institutionalisation of constitutional bodies, and peaceful alternation. However, the politics of Ghana before this period are characterised by incessant military take overs, and the unwanted ferocious competition among the political elites for public office, which undermined the unity and cohesiveness of the elites.

It is unfortunate that some countries in Africa, like Nigeria, have not fared well when it comes to moving its democracy forward. Addressing the situation of democracy in the most populous country (Nigeria) in the continent, a scholar posits:

> In Africa's most populous country, the promise of democratic reform was squandered in the early 2000s by a combination of gross electoral fraud, rising levels of political violence and criminal penetration of politics and a relentless effort by President Olusegun Obasanjo and his supporters to amend the constitution to permit him to run for a third term… The democratic spirit survived in Nigerian society, but it was sorely disillusioned, and it lacked a democratic state and political class to give it room to grow (Diamond 2008:70-74).

For example, the electoral body that has fared well in Ghana is struggling in Nigeria. Agbaje & Adejumobi (2006:31) observes the autonomy and capacity of the electoral commission in Nigeria has been suspect and the endless renaming and restructuring of the body from successive governments are confusing. According to them, few factors are

highlighted to impinge the autonomy of the electoral commission in Nigeria, including the arrangement and the manner through which members of the commission are appointed, legal outline through which those members derive their powers (Agbaje & Adejumobi, 2006: 31). Kurfi (2005) reckons that since these members of the commission are direct appointees of the federal government of Nigeria, there is a possibility that these members would be vulnerable to the manipulations of the president. In such circumstance, it is doubtful that the electoral commission can conduct a free and fair election.

Many scholars are of the view that the Nigerian transition election of 1999 was massively rigged right from the onset, and that the outcome did not represent the will of the people, and that the electorate ignored the flaws in the processes because they were bent on getting rid of military rule (Ihonvbere, 1999; Mustapha, 1999; Enemuo, 1999). Even after that, nothing has actually changed with regards to violence in Nigerian elections. In the general elections of 2011, Bamgbose (2012:209) reported several cases of electoral violence and irregularities in some states in Nigeria. It is unfortunate that the political violence and irregularities that many expected to stop after transition elections still reared their ugly head in subsequent Nigerian elections. In the 2007 Nigerian general elections, Collier and Vicente (2014) reported that within two days of the elections, over three hundred (300) people were killed as a result of electoral violence.

In his study of Nigerian democracy since the country's independence, Lewis (2011:61) adjudges Nigeria's political history to be a failure. This is due to ethnic polarisation, violence and electoral misconduct in the First Republic; massive corruption, factionalism, and flawed elections in the Second Republic; and the toppling of an elected civilian government in the Third Republic. Voting was marred by disorganisation, misconduct, fraud and violence in the 2011 elections witnessed 'divisive communal politics' with 'corrosive violence' in some polling stations, all these pose challenges to the Fourth

17

Republic of Nigerian democracy (Lewis,2011:61-62). Describing the state of democracy in some countries, including Nigeria, one scholars argues:

> Some countries such as Nigeria…occupy an ambiguous or disputed space between democracy and overt authoritarianism. They have a multiparty electoral system, with significant opposition. They have some space for civil society and intellectual dissent. However, individual and associational freedoms are under such mounting pressure, or elections are so riddled with fraud, or the arenas of political opposition and competition are so constrained and intimidated by the domineering power of the incumbent, that it is difficult to call the systems democratic, even in the minimal sense (Diamond,2008: 26).

The political elites are yet to accept the rules. Elections, which are seen by some scholars and many Africans as one of the essences of democracy, have lost their substance in Nigeria. Civil society groups in Nigeria are yet to assume their primary function of regulating the activities of the ruling elites, because in some cases they are not given the needed freedom to operate. With regards to elections, Gyimah-Boadi (2015) notes that the use of a ballot box, which has been generally accepted as the only means through which a political power gets its legitimacy, has been severely weakened by 'violence and conflict that so often accompany the electoral process' and that political elites, in most cases, see elections as do-or-die affairs, campaigns are often hostile and fierce. Still focusing on elections in Africa, Omotola (2010) notes that the post-independence African nationalists have engaged in all forms of electoral violence, like "assassinations, attempted assassinations, confinement, battering, arson, looting, political thuggery, destruction and damage of property". In most of these elections, other stake holders have suffered from unnecessary stifling from the ruling elites. Therefore, as some of these elections were organised by leaders who reluctantly did not want to leave office, one would expect that these elites might sabotage the process. Of course, when an incumbent organises election where he is one of the contestants, the chances of the process going in his favour could increase and this has been a case in most African

countries. For instance, scholars such as Joseph (1997:62), Carothers (1997), and Brown (2005:184), posit that ruling elites agreed to: give opposition parties a chance for competition, but did not allow them to win; gave the independent press freedom to work, but not actively; gave its civil society groups the right to function, but not successfully; accepted that elections be conducted, but did not provide the opportunity to dislodge the ruling political party. On the other hand, political elites who participate in malicious displays with impunity have not been restrained by democratic constitutions, and in many parts of Africa, the media and civil society operate under the constant threat of closure or severe restriction (Gyimah-Boadi,2015).

Though Nigeria has fared well in its economy looking at its status as one of the highest crude oil producers in the world but Lewis (2011:61) notes that despite Nigeria's economic status, the country still lag behind due to 'institutional weakness, poor infrastructure, rent-seeking, and corruption'. It is on this note that this thesis intends to also look at the anti-corruption agencies established by the political elites and see attempts these agencies made to control corruption in Nigeria. In his inaugural speech to Nigerians when he was elected the president in 1999, President Obasanjo promised that his new regime would fight corruption. He recognised that the greatest calamity that faced military rule in Nigeria was their inability to prevent and check corruption even when it was obvious to everyone (Adebanwi & Obadare, 2011:190). It was on this backdrop that the government of President Obasanjo deemed it necessary to establish two anti-corruption agencies including the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) in 2000, and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2003. However, it does not mean that other previous regimes in Nigeria have not made attempts in checking corruption but Riley (1998:142) argued that their efforts were 'largely ineffectual'. Yet, the new established anti-corruption agencies by the Obasanjo regime did not live up to the expectation. Scholars

described EFCC as an agency established to paying lip service to combating corruption due to the dictate of the president or as 'inquisitorial' aggressive campaign of selective prosecution'.(Jason, 2005; Reef, 2007:1). Under this circumstance, it is not possible to accept that government is really serious about fighting political corruption and other related vices and it is still worrisome to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. Another problem facing Nigerian democracy which this thesis intends to address is party-financing. While scholars have highlighted the importance of money to political parties (Ilo, 2004:23; Anyadike, 2014), it also prevent the chances of smaller parties winning elections. With regards to curtailing big man's party and small man's party in Nigerian's democracy, there has been effort to regulate and monitor party-financing. Research shows uneven finance between the party that is led by the ruling government and the party from the opposition (Kura,2011; Centre for Social Justice, 2015). Maybe, this situation is likely to create envy which may result in political violence, which of course, not well for Nigerian democratic consolidation.

2.2   African Democracy: Historical Overview

The African states were affected by the obvious challenges to the authority of the majority of world's incumbents, which happened during the time that Eastern European countries surrendered to competitive politics. The rebirth of competitive politics created protest against the one-party model in many African countries. Examples of such countries were Benin, Madagascar, Kenya, and Ghana, which all had successful elections in the late 90s (Gyimah-Boadi,1998). Before this period, Africa was known as a continent of autocrats, dictators, military governments, and one-party states where the economic situation was in decline. The situation of African states was described by Bratton and Van de Walle (1992) who reason that the living condition was very bad for civil servants and other government workers as well as graduates who could not afford a job, while many without a job live in

abject penury. Autocratic rule in Africa was very bad for the civil servants in particular because salaries are delayed or are not paid at all.

However, political experts argue that there was greater political space for voluntary associations due to the fact that African states had become very weak, both politically and economically, especially when recalcitrant leaders began to lose their positions as transition loomed (Kasfir, 1998). This situation, however, created the impetus for popular demand of systemic change and the rejection of one-party states in Africa. The masses reasoned that the poor economic situation in the continent originated from the embezzlement and mismanagement of African economy by the ruling elites, and that the large national debts were the creation of the national leaders. It was easy for the protesters to mobilise the citizens who were in abject poverty against the state, using corruption among the ruling elites as their strategy, the protesters believing that the lack of accountability among African leaders was responsible for the economic decline (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992).

In 1990 and 1991, demand by many for change in a system of government grew stronger due to deepening economic hardship which they blamed on their nationalist leaders (Bratton & Van de Wall, 1992:424).This movement became popular in the mid-90s when the new era broke the previous form of leadership succession in Africa, thereby allowing a pattern where the electorates voted out sitting presidents in eleven countries, and also ,'three more turnovers' where the sitting presidents declined to contest (Bratton,1998:53-54). This was remarkable because the old-guard political leaders were unable to survive true democratic contests (Bratton,1998). The clamour for democratisation came about because democracy was adjudged to bring about economic growth, with many scholars supporting this view (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005; Persson and Tabellini, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2014). Chabal (1998) notes that some groups argue that democracy will bring about a free market

economy that could trigger economic growth. Some see democracy as the only means through which necessary development can be fostered. Gerring et al. (2005), supported the link between democracy and economic development, reasoning that a good relationship between the elites and electorates was necessary for good economic policy, the economic situation playing an important role in the voting choices of the masses. So, it seems that the new politicians are largely going to face some economic problems, and any government capable of improving the economy is likely to gain the support of the masses that were bent on making away with authoritarian regimes that brought hardship on them.

According to Ekeh (1975), these problems are "the backwardness of the African past, the lack of contributions by Africans to the building of Africa and inter-tribal feuds". The colonialists may have claimed that their presence in Africa was to help civilise or develop Africa, but clearly their reason for being there in the first place was to help their empires flourish. Ake (1973) draws on the distinction posited by colonialists: "a people too weak to protect them, and a people strong and generous enough to offer protection; a people who were uncivilised or even just less than humans and a people who were civilised and willing to lift those who were primitive to the pale of civilised community". According to Ake (1973), these unequal characteristics justified a heavy battering on the liberties, resources, and living conditions of the colonised. Africans were blessed with mineral resources and other essential goods, but their primitive nature, claimed colonialists, could not give them the insight to harness the resources they were endowed with.

However, it is unfortunate that Africa's transition was established in the context of a poor economy, a highly factionalised weak dominant class, and a weak small working class, and was without an institutionalised structure capable of resolving conflicts (Adedeji, 1993; Ihonvbere, 1999: 347). In seeking a new regime, Ihonvbere (1996:347) notes that Africans desired stability, industrialisation, development, and practical and viable institutions that

22

would be responsible for resolving conflicts that democracy promised. Before transition in African countries in 1990s, the continent is known as a place where changes are made in government through coups, conflicts or other forms of violence. The more recent transition give the masses the political right to choose the best candidate, from various contestants that would represent them. It also give them the right to go to the poll at regular basis to elect new leaders.

During some of the early 1990s transitions in African countries, civic groups were restricted from organising, as post-colonial leaders and post-independence military elites reasoned that they might pose a challenge to their regimes. Bratton (1994) notes that the priorities of the African ruling elites before transition were mainly to build one-party and military regimes. Despite this, they were unable to discourage independent organisations from emerging through a strong civil society, even when some elites sought to undermine them. For instance, some elites made some civil society groups part of the governing parties, while other leaders banned them completely. Yet all these manipulations could not make voluntary associations succumb to the whims and fancies of the ruling elites. Rather, these civic groups served as a substitute recognised mechanism for governance, as they provided ordinary Africans with a channel through which they could express their political interests. Nevertheless, the gains that accrued during the transition regimes included widespread societal inclusion in decision-making, freedom of association, and freedom of speech, which was never tolerated in previous regimes.

The preference for one-party systems by post-colonial elites was not just intended to rebuff opposition to their positions, but to also reinforce political instability in piecing together disparate populations under unified post-colonial states. The struggle for competitive democracy was not given legitimacy, as many autocratic leaders felt that such a move could undermine their official impunities. In reality, they had made so much money while

23

remaining in power, and conceding this would have been way too difficult for them. Nevertheless, African ruling elites of this period like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who also master-minded a single party system, claimed that a single party was not a good system, especially when it was not close to the people. This *de facto* kind of power control by a small group of elites, clique or ethnic based who possessed ruling authority accounted for the impoverished nature of the African economy and promoted the continuous quest for democratic transition. For this reason, Ake (1993:240) points out that the quest for democratic government in Africa was a result of the bitter experience of have high expectations about independence and post- independence plans dashed, which ended in painful disappointment, largely due to poor leadership and structural constraints.

Nzongola-Ntalaja (2006) agrees that nationalist leaders showed a commitment to democracy, economic development, and the spirit of Pan-African solidarity. But they then started serving their narrow interests, which resulted in authoritarian rule and corruption, which invariably made them ignore the principles of liberal democratic regimes that had been established at independence. The predicament Africa had at the time stemmed from the inability of the nationalist leaders to promote democracy, and the dashed expectations of the people, which hampered the legitimacy of post-colonial leaders (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2006). In his view, Ajayi (1982) notes that the post-colonial leaders were preoccupied with how to retain power, without identifying a clear ideology or goals for the new government. Because of this, many interest associations began to see the military as a more effective substitute for the post-colonial elites. Nzongala-Ntalaja (2006:13) points out that "the democracy movement in Africa today is a social protest against the failure of the neo-colonial state to live up to the people's expectations of independence, including the fulfilment of their basic human needs". Democracy was expected to solve the problems of poverty, reduce human

right abuses, and bring about development. But early democracy dividends could not deliver. Describing the nature of democracy that Africans witnessed, a scholar posits:

> Totally indifferent to the character of the state. Democratic elections are being held to determine who will exercise the powers of the state as if it has no implications for democracy. But its implications are so serious that elections in Africa give the voter only a choice between oppressors. This is hardly surprising since post-colonial Africa largely retains the colonial state structure that is inherently anti-democratic, being the repressive apparatus of an occupying power. Unchangingly, this structure has survived, reproduced and [been] rejuvenated by the legacy of military and single party rule. So what has been happening now by way of democratisation is that self-appointed military or civilian leaders are being replaced by elected dictators (Ake 1993:4).

Like many other third world countries, the demand for democratic rule among African countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria, was not just for mere transitions. It was also about forcing accountability among the ruling elite, and ushering in political liberalism. Stressing the importance of a democratic government, Carothers (2002) notes that transition elections will accord the new elites democratic legitimacy, and also hopes they would restore popular participation and enforce accountability among the elites to their citizens. According to Lonsdale (1986), "political accountability, or public morality, is the chief end of political freedom". It is from this point that it became very important for there to be a political cleansing among the post-colonialist leaders who subjected the African states to abject poverty.

In order to correct the political problems introduced by the nationalist leaders, armies in Africa started overthrowing nationalist governments, promising to bring about order, reduce mismanagement and, in a short time, return the country to civilian government. The issues that the military came to address ranged from economic crisis, unbearable poverty, exploitation, regional/ethnic disunity and relegation, political suppression of opposition,

maladministration, foreign interference, personal and corporate interest protection, and so on (Gutteridge, 1975; Baynham, 1992; Adeshina, 1999; Lugman and Omede, 2011). For instance, discussing why the military took power during the first military coup in Nigeria in 1966, Joseph (1987) reports that Major Nzeogwu who led the first coup in Nigeria reckoned in his speech that coming into power was to stop the civilians he described as enemies due to the way they involved in all kinds of impunities, make development difficult due to bribes they take as well as play ethnic politics which has made the country more divided.

As a consequence of such an assertion, with open-arms, many African countries who shared the same fate as Nigerians had from their extravagant nationalist leaders began to welcome military involvement in African politics, with the hope that they would serve as a protective measure, and restore political stability, returning the country to democratic rule as promised. Unfortunately, what was expected to be a corrective measure worsened the situation. African countries not only experienced economic and political woes, but human right abuses became common under the various military regimes. Mindful of the history of incessant military coups, scholars have identified several military interventions to have been huge threats that challenged Africa's democracy (Onwumechili, 1998; Kieh and Agbese, 2004; Lindberg and Clark, 2008). Nevertheless, military rulers cannot be blamed completely, as they managed to fulfil some of their promises, such as returning power to their civilian counterparts, though this happened under the auspices of internal and external pressure. Lugman and Omede (2011) note that despite their achievements, the performances of military regimes were not so different when compared with their civilian predecessors, noting that military regimes in African continents were guilty of the same crimes as their civilian counterparts. This is the reason that many countries across Africa provide proof of the plundering and bad governance associated with military rule.

Given the example of the situation of military regimes in Africa, Joseph (1987: 67-8) reasoned that military involvement in African politics was intended to play curative role to a system already in collapse due to anomalies associated with post-independence politicians. However, the military that was considered as a quick remedy to the already existed problem could not put bad governance to a stop instead extended their stay in power as well as brought more hardship (Joseph, 1987). It was obvious that the armies of many African countries were not ready for democracy, but were largely interested in sharing the political spoils. Having tested the importance of power, the military persisted in remaining in government and consolidate power. As a result, Ake (1994) decries that the continent of Africa thrived on the setting up of a rebranded colonial state that was shaped by personal rule, a one-party system, and military rule, but that his 'form of state cannot be bent to the service of democracy'. An author argues:

> The self-appointed agents of democratisation in Africa are implausible. They are not so much supporting democracy as using it . . . the African elite support democracy only as a means of power, the international development agencies support it as an asset to structural adjustment and western governments support it ambiguously torn between their growing indifference to Africa and their desire to promote their own way of life (Ake 1993: 4).

It is especially disappointing that nationalist leaders, who saw the harsh experiences imposed on the people by the colonialists, could not make amends and instead continued in the same direction. There were injustices and various human right abuses during colonial rule, which necessitated the constant demand to end colonial rule. Ihonvbere (1996) notes that the post-colonialists not only neglected the economy, but violated all established rules guiding politics and its competition in African states. It can be recalled that just after political independence, African leaders rationalised that one-party could help build national unity which would eventually set the pace for economic prosperity. A one-party system was supported because it resembled Africa's traditional forms of democracy, which encouraged

27

consensus building, and was antithetical to the Western form of democracy, which encouraged opposition.

Without any doubt, post-colonial politics was hugely influenced by the colonial experience. On the other hand, the exclusion of the people from government and decision making were wrong approaches taken by African nationalist leaders who saw themselves as equal to their colonial administrators. The political struggle that characterises African politics today stems from the fact that the excluded majority have continued to struggle for inclusion, while those in political positions stifle political space and, by so doing, make the political struggle highly contentious. Therefore, to encourage inclusive or participatory democracy towards consolidation, this thesis argues that the unwillingness of political elites to compromise over their differences ruined every effort to achieving democratic consolidation. Elite compromise, through coherence and commitment to democracy, can foster democratic consolidation in African countries, especially in Ghana and Nigeria.

Nevertheless, in a few cases during the 1990s, post-independence ruling elites have responded positively from societal pressures, in an attempt to providing democratic values and consolidation. However, apart from the success stories recorded in some African countries, the euphoria and hope that arose during transitions have not been reflected positively in some African countries. Irrespective of the vibrant civil society groups across Africa, and the various financial assistance and moral support, building a lasting democracy (that involves the consolidation of democracy) in Africa has remained a nightmare. It looks like some political elites have failed to replicate the efforts made by other political elites in some of the successful countries. This current study is geared towards understanding what led to the different political outcomes in African countries, with regard to democratic consolidation. Given the vast difference between African countries, it is important to

understand whether the historical perspective of some African countries can help identify the divergences and differences in the attitudes of the elites.

Since the African transitions in the 1990s, ruling elites and the opposition have had one political culture in common. The political elites have played politics of acrimony and hardly cared about the fundamental principles guiding elections. This kind of culture makes the elites show less empathy towards the democratic process. Elites sometimes do not maintain a general agreement on the rules of the game, tolerate the position of the opposition, or embrace an open and transparent electoral process. Nzongala-Ntalaja (2006), thinks that this kind of political culture is a consequence of opportunism, which takes precedence over democratic principles, as most leaders have failed to hold to accepted agreements after negotiations. For instance, John Jerry Rawlings failed to honour the electoral principles in the Ghanaian general presidential elections of 1992, which led to the opposition party's boycott of the subsequent parliamentary elections. Several other countries have also violated democratic principles, largely in order to consolidate the interests of the ruling elites against the opposition. In an attempt to outsmart other elites, politicians have used their ethnicities as benchmarks for political portfolios, and this has jeopardised politics of national unity.

Transition in Africa came with suspicion among the elites, which increases the importance of elite compromise if democracy is to survive. Despite the fact that post-independence elites in Africa have failed to establish liberal democracy in most of Africa, some African elites have made giant strides towards democratic consolidation. While this work considers that several other factors have contributed to the low level of democracy in Africa, it maintains that the major problem facing democracy in Africa is the role of the elites. In a divided society like Africa, democracy can thrive only when the political elites design a structure capable of turning the fragmented societies in Africa into stable

29

democracies. This thesis argues that this is achievable when there is elite coherence and commitment to democracy.

2.3   Research Argument

The central argument of this thesis is that differing attitudes among political elites in Africa can explain a good deal about democratic outcomes. This argument aligns with several other scholars who have debated at length on the importance of political elites in a democracy, starting from the scholarly works of Mosca and Pareto. Addressing the nature of elites and how they come into political limelight, Mosca (1923/1939:51) refers to them as tiny minorities that outwit groups of majorities by using influential factors, by means of material, intellectual, or even moral superiority over the governed. According to Mosca (1939) "in all societies, from less developed to the most advanced, there is a class that rules and a class that is ruled.... the class that rules is few, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed at and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent" (p.50). In his words, Pareto (1916/1935) describes political elites as the most talented and deserving individuals, who use their unrestricted mobility as their main feature of political rule in a society, in order to force, persuade and enjoy special advantages over others, from their inherited wealth or family connections. Their wealth and family connections make them stand out among others, and this makes them influence certain issues, even though such issues may be against the public's interests. Still focusing on the political elites, Bunce (2000: 709) argues that "if political leaders, for various reasons, are understood to be the founders of democracy, then they also often function, after that initial breakthrough, as its sustainers or its underminers". The argument from Bunce (ibid) maintains that the elites actually play a large role in democratic outcomes, as their actions could either promote or hinder the processes. Diamond (1999) identifies the elites as the most crucial group in democratisation, and specifies that consolidation includes two factors: norms

and behaviour. He places these two factors into three main levels of consolidation: elites as the top decision makers; the intermediary level (parties) as the organisations; and movements as the last level which consist of the masses (Diamond, 1999). According to him the highest level are made up of "the country's elites, top decision makers, organisational leaders, political activists and opinion shapers in politics, government, the economy and society" (Diamond, 1999 p:66). In agreement with Diamond's view on the elites, Bunce (2000) posits that "democracy is understood to be a by-product of elite actions, which are understood in turn to be a by-product of larger social forces". In his view, "elites are seen as summarisers of long-term developments and as well, serve as the representatives of larger social forces" (Bunce, 2000:708).

However, the arguments from scholars about the possibility of democratic consolidation through external assistance and civil society group are not made in isolation. This is because some countries have democratised and consolidated through civil society, foreign influence or aid. The thesis supports the bulk of transition and consolidation literatures that favour discussion of democracy as an instrument brought about by the elites. The reason for this stand is because the elites are always the ones that take responsibility of whatever happens in a society and takes blame for whatever goes right or wrong in day-to-day country's political outcomes. The attitude that the political elites exhibits accounts for how unsuccessful or successful democracies become. The question is, what is the link between the political elites and democratic consolidation? The importance of elites in the consolidation of democracy is illustrated in the work of Diamond (1999), who sees elites as the lynchpin in consolidating democracy in developing nations like Ghana and Nigeria.

In his seminal paper, Rustow (1970:356) argues that democracy "is acquired by a process of conscious decision at least on the part of the top political leadership… A small circle of leaders is likely to play a disproportionate role". Huntington (1984) notes that

31

"democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been instituted by mass popular action. Almost always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against oligarchy" (212). In the words of Rustow (1970): "Democracy, like any collective human action, is likely to stem from a large variety of mixed motives. … In so far as it is a genuine compromise it will seem second best to all major parties involved… What matters at the decision stage is not what values the leaders hold dear in the abstract, but what concrete steps they are willing to take" (357).

In the Latin American countries of Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Colombia the political elites showed a commitment to establishing and maintaining democracy (Hartlyn, 1988; Peeler, 1985; Mainwaring, 1989). These political elites decided to commit to democracy as they had some misunderstandings and divisions in the past which were likely to jeopardise the political elite's relationship. For this reason, the political elites considered that for them to effectively work together in getting democracy right, there was a need to compromise and develop ways of institutionalising a structure capable of preventing democracy from decaying. Mainwaring (1989) notes that commitment from the political elites and established institutions makes democracy more likely to survive in difficult times. Commitment to democracy in the words of Bratton and Mattes (2001:448) refers to both intrinsic and instrumental commitment to democracy which they maintain is necessary for democratic consolidation. According to them, when people support democracy intrinsically, their commitment to democracy is 'for better or worse' where such regime has the potentials to endure a fragile political regime notwithstanding economic problem and social disturbance. When citizens support democracy instrumentally, that means, such commitment is conditional and they are likely to withdraw their support if democracy fails to provide them with some dividends (Bratton and Matt, 2001: 448). However, whether intrinsic or instrumental, nobody ever does something just for doing sake. People always have mixed

motivations for doing things and instrumentalism probably is one reason but not the only reason. If it is instrumentalism, people can develop networks, skills, experience and cooperation despite reasons. All these inculcate coherence among the political elites no matter whether the starting point is instrumentalism or not.

This thesis agrees that other factors, external or internal, can make some recalcitrant political elite leaders succumb to democracy, but this does not apply to all cases. This is because some ruling political elites or authoritarian leaders might ignore whatever pressure is asserted on them. For example, some political elite leaders like Biya of Cameroon have experienced a great deal of internal and external pressures for full transitions in their countries, yet they have failed to succumb to such pressures. However, there are cases where such pressures might make the political elite initiate a transition, such as Ghana, where the military regime and civilian governments of Jerry Rawlings and the international agencies and civil society played dominant roles.

Many scholars have proposed theories of democratic consolidation and noted how countries in Southern America have successfully used consociationalism to build a strong commitment to democracy, which results in democratic stability. By consociationalism the thesis means a state with various internal divisions comprising of ethnic, language and religious differences, where no single division is large enough to form a government, and elites from those divisions manage to create a stable government after compromising on their differences. This thesis argues alongside (Berman, 1998; Branch & Cheeseman, 2008; Lindemann, 2008) that the problem confronting African democracy has been the acrimony resulting from fragmentation among the elites who hold close to their ethnic groups. African countries are ethnically diverse which made them vulnerable to conflict as the elite live in suspicion and fear due to inherited and ugly experiences from the past, such as the civil war, like in Nigeria in the late 1960s. For this reason, Lindemann (2008:1) describes Sub-Saharan

33

Africa as doomed states where violent conflict is almost unavoidable. Problems associated with ethnic diverse, elite fragmentation, and conflict may put the elites at loggerheads with regards to which ethnic group controls the government, especially when each elite holds unto its ethnic cleavage and in this situation, democracy suffers. Various researchers have written much about how other factors have facilitated democratic consolidation, no scholar has considered the impact of the political elites to democratic consolidation through elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence. So, there is limited research in this area, especially as no scholar has been able to establish what role the political elites in Africa have played towards the consolidation of democracy. While this thesis is in agreement with the various theoretical studies on democratic consolidation, it deviates a little to cover the loophole other scholars have neglected with regards to the role of the political elites in African democratic consolidation. This thesis argues that if there is elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy, it will boost the chances of democratic consolidation, especially in ethnically divided countries such as Ghana and Nigeria.

The research gap links with the ongoing scholarly debate on democratic consolidation where answers diverge. However, there are two distinguished points of agreement. Majority of the scholars who have written about democratic consolidation ask the same kind of question and support their answers with similar type of proof. The question they seek to provide an answer for is not how democracies come into existence but how democracy in existence can be consolidated. The proof scholars have provided through various scholarly works, all consist of recent information on this topic. While these scholars have proposed and explained ways through which democratic consolidation can be actualized, like the study about elite commitment to democracy in the Latin American countries where the elites commit to ensuring democratic stability and consolidation, none of these scholars recognised the importance of the political elites toward democratic consolidation in Africa, especially, in

Ghana and Nigeria. It is on this backdrop that this thesis has identified a gap and seeks to close it.

The study intends to address the existing gap in the democratic consolidation literature. So, the thesis examines how elite coherence (coalition/alliances, tolerance) is being used by the African political elites to promote social relationship and compatibility among fragmented political elites. It analyses how their relationship through alliances and tolerance have enhanced their coherence which is necessary for democratic consolidation. The study also looks at how elite commitment to democracy can promote democratic consolidation. The rationale is that the political elite may have not shown the needed commitment that would make some institutional and structural factors to flourish and allows for democratic consolidation. To this effect, electoral commission, party-financing and anti-corruption are the benchmark used for this analysis to measure political elite commitment to democracy. Finally, the study explores and explains how the combination of elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy can help facilitate democratic consolidation.

Having stated this, the next section discusses the approach taken to tackle the research problems.

2.4   Research Method and Design

2.4.1   Method of Data Collection: Interviews and Semi-Structured interviews

This research makes use of interviews because the thesis intends to get detailed, complex information from the respondents. However, this kind of data collection does not give respondents any opportunity to look for already existing answers, though existing answers may be correct, it can be misleading at the time as some of the data analysis already existed online. It is important to use interviews to understand the actual feelings of the respondents. Another reason why this research considers interviews to be preferable to any other method of data collection is that interviews help the researcher gather both verbal and non-verbal queues from respondents, as body language can actually show when a respondent is interested or uncomfortable while reacting to semi-structured interview questions.

However, this kind of research is capital intensive. As this research compares two West African countries (Ghana and Nigeria), the research quest for well-informed answers incurred personal costs in an attempt to get the right interviewees. The size of the sample this

thesis wants to cover can be a problem too. It would take a lot time to key down the data gathered. Interviewing government officials, serving and none serving military officers, or other top ranked officers, was very problematic as some of them would not allow direct quotations. In such situations, respondents can be assured that their names would not be cited, and that symbols would be used to identify them.

In this research, semi-structured interviews are used. A semi-structured interview of this type is important because it fosters understanding about how the individual views a given set of problems. Semi-structured interviews are generally organised around a set of established open-ended questions, with other questions likely to emerge as the discussion between the interviewer and respondents goes on. Semi-structured, in-depth interviews are the most used interview style when conducting qualitative research, be it with an individual or a group of people (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006). Alvesson and Deetz (2000;194) note that semi-structured interviews are most common when it comes to all qualitative research methods. This is the reason Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) reckon that gathering information is much easier and more effective using semi-structured interviews. It helps to unfold unknown 'facets of human and organisational behaviour' (Qu and Dumay, 2011). According to Cohen and Crabtree (2006), semi-structured interviews help the interviewer determine the direction of the discussion, which helps provide reliable comparable qualitative data.

Cohen and Crabtree (2006) note that jotting notes while respondents give information can be difficult, due to the interviewer's inability to concentrate. Taking notes in such a situation results in poor note taking, and will distract from effective understanding between the interviewer and respondent.

The kind of question that this research used while conducting the interviews was open-ended. According to Granato (2002), "asking open-ended questions encourages a source to open up topic areas you might not have considered". Pelto and Pelto (1978) note that the various dimensions of data derived from open-ended questions allows a researcher an understanding of organisational patterns, that is empirically in existence under the course of study.

In this kind of data collection, it is not important to interview everyone in the state to be able to reach a valid finding, but a sample of the subset of the population in the two countries, especially as they are both diverse. In conducting the interviews the thesis

36

considered balancing it so as to reflect the views of the minorities in both countries. The interviews were largely open-ended to enable the generation of ideas on the differences between how elites operate and behave, with regards to democratic consolidation in the two countries. The thesis used a quota sampling method, where it was able to decide the number and characteristics of the people it would interview. In this regard, twenty-five (25) politically-informed personalities in each country were carefully selected for an in-depth interview in order to uncover salient areas of the teething problems that this study seeks to examine. Each appointment lasted between 30 and 45 minutes, and answers were given in English, the official language of both countries. Information was gathered using a tape-recorder.

Notwithstanding several secondary materials online, this thesis believes that interviews will help uncover what elites do. The elite interview is considered above everything else because there is a need to hear from the horse's mouth, from the elites themselves. In their definition about elites, Higley and Burton (2006) identify them as 'people who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially'. The significance of interviewing the elites in this research is because they are in a position to give accounts of their actions and inactions. In every society some people speak for others, and because the elites have the knowledge, political status and power to stand on behalf of others, this thesis considers them appropriate for interview. By the political elite, this thesis refers to those who can influence popular decisions, because of the position they occupy or because they are endowed intellectually. The political elites in this sense include traditional rulers, current and past government officials, party leaders, election official, members of the civil society group, university lecturers, lawyers, retired military officers, and serving military officers.

Traditional rulers in Africa played a prominent role during the colonial era. They served as the link between the local people and the White men. They are a symbol of authority and are well respected because of their royalty. Their initial role of representing

their people during colonialism still affects day-to-day activities in their communities, as they remain spokesmen in their communities and command obedience. Government officials in both Nigeria and Ghana run the government and understand it better than others, because of this interviewing them was useful. Meanwhile, civil society groups are known for their strong opposition to the ruling government and they have served as government watchdog in order to advance public opinion. Because civil society groups represent the interests of the public, their inclusion in the interviews in Ghana and Nigeria is necessary. The university lecturers are academicians and their wealth of knowledge singled them out as elites that understand politics and are able to shape the views of others. In African political context, especially in Ghana and Nigeria, university lecturers serve as political advisers and consultants to the politicians. By this standard, the thesis referred to them as the political elites. The thesis argues that in Africa, during elections or in times of political discussions, some of these lecturers are called upon to debate on political matters in the national television channels and by doing so, they are in effect, impacting on political consciousness of the politicians and the citizens. Some of the retired army officers were the ones who relinquished political power to the civilians and as such had a stake in the democracy in Africa. So, it is important to ask for the opinions of the retired military officers when democracy matters are discussed. It is believed that the ideas of all the participants interviewed in this research will reflect the general opinions of Nigerian and Ghanaian citizens regarding democratic consolidation in their countries, as they have remained pivotal in the political activities of the two countries.

2.4.2 Sampled Countries Selection Procedure

The conditions for selecting the two postcolonial states for comparative study was informed by the understanding that Ghana and Nigeria are both located in the West of Africa. Nationalist leaders in both countries achieved independence after being colonised by the British..

The two countries are similar in that each has experienced a series of military coups. Boafo-Arthur (2008), highlights the various military interventions in Ghana, occurring in 1966, 1972, 1978, 1979 and 1981, as well as in Nigeria in 1966, 1975, 1983, 1985 and 1993. They also share some similarities in their electoral systems. The two countries have an electoral body responsible for conducting elections. The two countries have both made use of secret and open balloting. The systems of government in both countries have been presidential with representative governments. In this regard, people elect their lawmakers, who are in return accountable to them. In both countries, there are the upper (The Senate) and the lower (House of Representatives) chambers that are elected to serve for a tenure of four years, and are constitutionally entitled for another four years in a re-election.

Notwithstanding the similarities between Ghana and Nigeria, the two countries have experienced differences in how successfully they have undergone attempts to consolidate democracy. While Ghana has had three turnovers since 1992, Nigeria has managed just one in 2015.

Figure 1 Case Selection in Comparing Nigeria and Ghana

Dimensions of comparison

Similarities between Nigeria and Ghana

- ❖ English speaking countries
- ❖ West African countries
- ❖ British colonies
- ❖ Military rule with short civilian regimes
- ❖ Counter military coups
- ❖ Presidential system of government

Difference between Nigeria and Ghana

Democratic Consolidation

One of the primary assets of the case study is its ability to provide in-depth analysis. It gives details on issues researchers witness when studying cross-unit analysis. A cross-unit case can satisfactorily explain the reason for consolidating democracy in a country, a case study of the same country will explain the specific reason for its occurrence, but will also give a detailed analysis. When such occurrences take place, the ways they happened, and the factors that led to such occurrences, can also be examined.

2.4.3 Research Design

In order to avoid producing data that is unclear, this thesis intends to use the "Most Similar System Design" (MSSD). In a comparative research method, there are two types of system designsthe "most similar system design (MSSD) and the "most different system design" (MDSD) (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Landman, 2003). In contrasting MSSD and MDSD, scholars posit:

> The most similar system design is based on a belief that a number of theoretically significant differences will be found among similar systems and that these differences can be used in explanation. The alternative design, which seeks maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems, is based on a belief that in spite of intersystemic differentiation, the populations will differ with regard to only a limited number of variables or relationships (Przeworski and Teune,1970)

In a social enquiry of two countries, MSSD compares political systems that are identical in their features, so that the differences between the two countries can be eliminated while highlighting other features. This comparative method is important for this thesis because the two case study countries share almost everything in common, and the idea here is to understand what led to the differences in democratic consolidation. In the works of John Stuart Mill (1843), "method of difference" MSSD recognises basic differences between two similar countries, which explain the differences in the political outcome under examination. Scholars are of the view that the number of explainable variables that emerge can be reduced so as to achieve explanation during empirical analysis (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Hopkin,

40

2002; Landman, 2003). Hopkin (2002:254) notes that when some variables are held constant, this does not necessarily mean that they are the cause of the difference between them. For this reason, Hopkin (2002:254) concludes that: "There will always be enough difference between cases to over-determine the dependent variable". On the other hand, Theda Skocpol (1979), in her research on why revolutions occurred in China, Old Russia and France, provides a good example of Most Different System Design (MDSD). In this comparative method, it helps to reduce variables by disregarding irrelevant systemic factors, that is, where there are evidences of similar relationships between dependent and independent. In this situation, the systemic differences can be ignored.

However, the appropriate comparative design method for this thesis is the MSSD as the aim is to understand the areas of difference between the two cases. In this work, I want to know how and why democratic consolidation occurs.. The two countriesthis research is comparing must have had transitions, and conducted at least two elections in their political histories since transition. This study is about the political elite, and understanding what the elites in one country have done to achieve democratic consolidation, and why elites in another country struggle to do the same. The thesis is interested in understanding the level of elite coherence, looking at indicators like alliances/coalitions and tolerance. Other indicators, like electoral commission, party financing, and anti-corruption, will be used to understand the level of elites commitment to democracy in both countries. All these indicators shall be used to explain differences in democratic consolidation between Ghana and Nigeria.

In comparing the elites in the two nation-states of Nigeria and Ghana, and their respective plural societies with regard to democratic consolidation, we are in effect dealing with a continuous and dynamic historical process that has various manifestations across time and space. It is imperative to note that there is evidence that demonstrates, beyond reasonable doubt that the two countries vary significantly in the behaviour of the political elites towards democratic consolidation. This is viewed within the context of how democracy fares in the two countries under study. While the elites of the two countries share similar national characteristics, the differences between them remain quite profound and are manifested in their democratic outcomes.

41

2.4.4 Conclusion

The concluding chapters have carefully addressed the research focus and the backgrounds of the two country's cases as it affects democratic consolidation in Africa, Ghana and Nigeria for example. It also discusses the main research question which as well as the detailed profiles of the two countries and the research plans. The problem that this thesis seeks to solve was also discussed in the concluding chapter. The chapters also cover the historical overview of democracy and democratic consolidation in Africa, especially in Ghana and Nigeria. The argument of the thesis, the method and research design is discussed in the concluding chapters. In the next chapter, this research shall look into some review of literatures on democratic consolidation, elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence. It will also discuss how some important variables from the theoretical framework can be measured.

<div align="center">**Chapter Three**</div>

Rethinking Democracy Consolidation via Elite Commitment to Democracy and Elite Coherence

3.1   Introduction

This chapter reviews the literature on democratic consolidation, focusing on elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence, in order to understand how the connection between these two factors can promote democratic outcomes. As many African countries, during their times of transition into democracy battled military regimes amidst ethnic polarisation, this research argues that with elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence, democracy would be consolidated in emerging democracies like Ghana and Nigeria. After reviewing literature on democratic consolidation, literature on elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence shall be considered further. It is from these two factors that the theoretical framework for this research is developed.

Democratisation has four stages: the decay of the autocratic regime; transition; consolidation; and the maturation of a democratic political order (Shin, 1994: 143). This thesis is interested in one stage, consolidation. These two stages according to Huntington (1992) are the most closely examined topics among scholars of democratisation. However, the main concern of this thesis is to understand what makes democratic consolidation possible in countries, and why some countries struggle to consolidate. The processes that drive this change in these stages, as Huntington (1992) points out above, arise from the preferences of elites, pressures from the masses or civil society groups, as well as the impact of external pressures. On this backdrop, it is necessary to consider the various approaches in the democratic consolidation literature, and then understand how political elites can use elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy to achieve democratic consolidation in Africa, especially in Ghana and Nigeria.

3.1.2 Democratic Consolidation

This thesis has argued alongside other scholars that for democracy to be consolidated, the political elites have huge roles to play (Higley & Gunther, 1992; Burton et al.1992; Gunther et al. 1995). This does not mean that democratic consolidation is dependent on political elites alone, so it is important to study other factors.

Scholars have debated on what factors facilitate democratic consolidation. While few scholars have seen the civil society or foreign assistance as facilitating factors (Resnick, 2012:4; Levitsky & Way, 2005:22; Carothers, 1999). Other scholars have argued that parties and party-systems' institutionalisation can facilitate democratic consolidation (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Sandbrook, 1996; Randall & Svassand, 1999). Before further discussion on democratic consolidation, it is important to understand what authors mean by democratic consolidation. Consolidation of democracy is likely when several conditions exist, "a free and lively civil society", an independent and valued political society, an existence of rule of law, a strong state bureaucracy, and an institutionalised political society (Linz & Stepan, 1996:7). In other words, scholars observe:

> A robust civil society, with the capacity to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state can help transitions get started, help resist reversals, help push transitions to their completion, help consolidate, and help deepen democracy. At all stages of the democratisation process, therefore, a lively independent civil society is invaluable (Linz and Stepan,1996:9).

Linz and Stepan's (1996) postulation on civil society wonders whether there are factors that make civil society groups strong in one country, and weak in another, or whether civil societies in countries can be completely independent. For Diamond (1994:15) "Consolidation is the process by which democracy becomes so broadly and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down. It involves behavioural and institutional changes that normalise democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty". To

44

both Linz and Stepan (1996), the factors they consider as necessary for consolidation are effective where no antidemocratic forces stand in the way of democratic survival. One puzzle is to capture what Diamond (1994) refers to as the "process", because the word process connotes something ongoing. So at what stage will democracy reach an end point or will it be a perpetual process of no return? Clarifying this concept, Linz and Stepan (1996:6), highlight three important aspects to consider when analysing whether a regime could be deemed consolidated: behavioural, attitudinal, and constitutional(1996). The behavioural aspect states that no political actor or group of persons embark on any selfish attempt to create a nondemocratic regime or resort to violence or foreign intervention to overthrow the democratic regime. The attitudinal aspect stipulates that the regime is consolidated when the generality of the people are in consent and show their strong belief that democratic means are the most appropriate way of governing a society, and where anti-government alternatives are meagre or isolated from pro-democratic forces. Finally, the constitutional aspect states that the regime is consolidated when the government, together with the whole country's nongovernmental forces, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict through the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (Linz and Stepan, 1996:6). In other words, a regime that commands legitimacy among the citizens, is supported and respected and as a matter of fact, commands compliance and obedience among the citizens, is consolidated.

Among other theories of democratic consolidation, emphasis has also been placed on party institutionalisation (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Randall & Svasand, 2002:6). Scholars like Lewis (1994) and Diamond (1989) highlight the importance of institutionalisation. Scholars actually mean that a certain level of organisation is important in individual parties. This will help parties behave and a culture that will make them relate to other parties against been violent. It is on this backdrop that the work of Zmerli, et al.(2007), reason that mutual

trust is the engine of every political process. According to them, political trust can flourish where social trust emanates from mutual reciprocity which encompasses social participation and helps build political institutions which in turn constitute the necessary conditions that enhance efficient government (Zmerli et al., 2007). This is because democratic consolidation includes transforming individual cultural values and building political institutions.

From the minimalist point of view, Linz (1990:158) argues that *"a consolidated democracy is one in which none of the major political parties or organisations, interests, forces, or institutions consider that there is no any alternative to the democratic process to gain power, and that no political institutions or group has a claim to veto the actions of democratically elected decision makers"*. It seems Linz is advising that in a democratic system, gaining political power must come through the process of election and any other means contravenes the democratic process.

Diamond (1999) discusses two conditions that are required to consolidate democracy. First, it will take place only where all the major actors in politics agree to follow the rules of the democratic process. Second, democracy consolidates if the elites, parties and other interest groups believe that the democratic system is legitimate, and accept it as the only form of government. The cornerstone of Diamond's (1999) proposition is that the ruling party, oppositions, and the common people must accept the system as the best form of government, believe in it and respect the laws. Consolidation takes time and the processes come in stages, as asserted by Carothers (2002) who posits that it is "a slow but purposeful process in which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state institutions, the regularisation of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new democratic "rules of the game". Schedler (2001), who termed "behavioural consolidation" notes that the behavioural aspect receives widespread support among scholars like Diamond (1999:65-72), Linz and Stepan (1996:5-6), and

Gunther et al. (1995:7). By antidemocratic behaviour, authors refer to those actions that negate the full compliance of democratic behaviour, or what Schedler (2001) sees as leaving "democratic consensus" to accommodate "antidemocratic behaviour" through resorting to "the use of violence, rejection of election and transgression of authority". According to these theorists, violence subverts the core values of democracy which require that all actors should play according to the rules. Schedler (2001) warns that politically motivated violence, such as incessant assassination of political opponents, infringement on individual liberty, political intimidation of the electorate and opponents, attempts to overthrow elected members, and riots, are evidence that democracy is far from consolidation and falls short of behavioural conditions. With regards to rejection of elections, Diamond (1995:65) advises on the need to "conform to the written and unwritten rules of the game" in a representative democracy as these give credence to accepting the basic principals that promote 'free and fair competitive elections'. When these conditions are respected, Linz and Stepan (1996) argue that the three related conditions would guide the newly emerging democrats in their attempt to consolidate democracy. If everyone develops the attitude that democracy is the best form of government and has come to stay, then there is a need to stick to the rules guiding it. If this perception is valued, there is a tendency for democratic values to be respected.. Therefore, when everyone exhibits the habit of respecting the fundamental values of democracy, no person or group of persons can go contrary to the rules enshrined in the constitution. No one will take laws into their own hands by creating a government of the few which opposes democracy or makes the transitional regime breakdown.

Przeworski (1990) suggests that democracy can only survive where all major political actors have a stake in it. This demands that 'no major political actors violate basic democratic rules anymore' (Schedler 2001:72), as any negative attitude might put democracy at risk. Schedler (2001) advocates for normative elements to guide the attitudes of actors. These

include democratic legitimacy and non-instrumental basic support for democracy by the elites and the electorates. Schedler (2001) is emphasising the importance of legitimacy for a newly emerging democratic government and the need for the people's support. When a democratic government is deemed legitimate by the people, both the electorates and the elites will respect and obey the general decisions taken by the government. This normative element guide will help mediate and transform any conflicting outbreak between democrats and non-democrats in a consensus manner to permit democratic interests (Schedler 2001:75-80). Gunther et al. (1995) agree that democracy can be consolidated if a democratic consensus is established which permits all politically significant groups to hold fast to democratic rules of the game. Diamond (1999) concurs that obedience to the law, the constitution, and acceptance of the common norms of political conduct, all help democratic consolidation. If the constituted authorities that guide the conduct and behaviour of individuals are respected, and people become afraid of going contrary to them, this would help stimulate democratic consolidation.

For Valenzuela (1992), democracy consolidates when the actors see non-corrupt means of election as the only way in which a government can be created and not controlled by the state policies. No government policy should influence the decisions of the electorate during elections, or use a government institution like the electoral body to subvert electoral outcomes. He deems democracy to be consolidated when both legislative and other governmental bodies are fairly elected, are properly established without limitation, and when political elites and the electorates expect that the regime will last into the foreseeable future. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) see consolidated democracy as involving a general acceptance of rules, that in return guarantees political participation and political competition. This means that the candidates selected by the citizens will help further the interest of the

48

electorates and create rules that protect the citizen's social, economic, and political rights/ against resorting to none-democratic attitude.(Linz & Stepan, 1996).

Arguably, these rights have not been achieved anywhere in Sub-Saharan African countries, where elected elites often turn their backs on the electorates once they are declared victorious at the polls. In Africa, irrespective of Linz and Stepan's (1996) warnings against creating a non-democratic regime, it can be argued that about 70percent of elections since transition periods were hijacked and manipulated by some elites. Laakso (2007) notes that in the competitive elections held in Africa after the second elections, transition remains difficult because democratic participation is undermined by authoritarian rule and political suppression. Therefore, in recent times, election rigging has become a norm among African political elites.

In a minimalist view, Huntington (1991) considers democracy to be consolidated when two government turnovers have occurred, especially, when an opposition party has defeated the incumbent and in the subsequent election, the incumbent defeats the opposition party. From a maximalist school of thought, Beetham (1994) warns that winning political office is not the yardstick, but that losing it and accepting defeat is, as the ruling elites and their supporters must prepare to uphold and respect the rules of the game against power continuation. Beetham (1994) argues that this is challenging because there is a possibility of having elections that reach a certain level of electoral minimum standards, but where power transfer may not occur because voters are bent on voting for one political party, like the cases of Botswana since independence, and Japan and Italy for over fifteen years (Beetham, 1994:130). He summed up that "democracy is consolidated when a government that has itself elected in a free and fair contest is defeated at a subsequent election and accepts the result" (ibid.). The maximalist perspective received criticism from Linz and Stepan (1996) for

expanding a definition of democratic consolidation to include many features that are important when improving the general quality of democracy.

Literature on elite pacts and democratic consolidation focuses on the adherence to the rules of the game by the competing elites during the processes (Rustow, 1970; Dahl, 1971; Higley, & Moore, 1981; Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Burton, 2006). These scholars consider unity among the political elite to be a major role consolidating democracy, especially in making the elites compromise on their differences in an attempt to achieve democratic consolidation.

So far, scholars have debated over the conditions necessary for democratic consolidation. Consolidation of democracy, we are told, is when democratic principles are strongly entrenched in such a way democracy survives any situation and also incapable of reversal or breakdown. Old and recent literatures on democratic consolidation favour three types of explanation. One of these, proposed by Diamond (1999) connects democratic consolidation to two factors, norms and behaviour. A second explanation dwells on the need to institutionalise political parties and party-systems (Mainwaring & Scully, 1995), a third explanation is supported by a long line of authors including Linz and Stepan (1996) and Diamond (1999), who stress that the civil society influence determines democratic consolidation. Of course, Higley and Gunther (1992), Burton et al. (1992), Gunther et al. (1995), also study how the elite brought about democratic consolidation in Southern European and Latin American countries. Some of these explanations are compatible with each other, though they may also be held independently. To reconcile the argument on what facilitate democracy consolidation, This thesis supports the bulk of literature that favours the political elites. While some scholars suggest party system institutionalisation and other suggest involvement of the civil society. On top of these facilitating factors, the political elites stand out. Diamond (1999:65) is on point when he defines democratic consolidation as "the

process of achieving broad and deep legitimation" across class, ethnic and other boundaries. A new normative commitment to democratic procedures is internalised so that the actor "instinctively conforms to written (and unwritten) rules of the game even when they conflict and compete intensively"(Diamond, 1999). While scholars have written extensively on democratic consolidation and how it comes about, particularly in Southern Europe and Latin American countries, there is scant scholarly work on how political elites in Africa help in democratic consolidation, especially in Ghana and Nigeria. In the African context, elites are those who command influence in the society, including the military elites, party leaders and politicians, academic lecturers, and religious and traditional leaders. These elites build government structures and determine whether they are to function properly or not. They also form political parties, where they compete for the peoples' votes. Elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy are used in this research to uncover how the political elites in Africa, especially in Ghana and Nigeria, transform non-democratic regime to democratic consolidation.

In his seminal book, *Groups in Conflict,* Horowitz (1985) notes that the greatest serious ethnic conflicts will arise in countries where there is ethnic domination of the major ethnic groups against the ethnic minorities. Several scholars (Huntington, 1997; Moynihan, 1993) have written extensively on the relationship between ethnic divisions and occurrences of political violence. With regards to a workable democracy in conflict-prone or divided societies, Reilly (2001) in his book, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management,* discusses a number of divided societies like Sri Linka, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Northern Ireland, Estonia, some European countries, North America and Australia. He finds that an electoral system that encourages bargaining between conflictual political actors endorses wide-ranging political parties, and gives political competitors room to attract votes from various ethnic cleavages are a condition for easing communal political

51

competition among politicians in divided societies. This paragraph is important because it shows the likely danger countries that are ethnically divided could face if the political elites in those countries fail to compromise their differences. So, if political elites settle their differences, they are likely to form political parties that represent various ethnic groups and by so doing, create a goivernment that embodies national look as well as reduce political rancour among ethnic groups.

However, for post conflict and ethnically divided societies to continue to work together, elites must learn to reconcile their differences and show trust in one another, in order to tolerate each other despite their rivalry. The needed unity is what allows the country to withstand further conflicts and at the same time binds the elites together. Kymlicka (1996) is of the view that for a certain level of unity to be assured, people who live under collective political institutions must organise themselves in such a way that they can share a mutual national uniqueness. If a country or society must march forward as one entity, especially in societies with ethno-cultural diversity, there is a need for such societies to undergo the process of political re-organisation, which must promote national unity in place of the ethnic diversity already in existence.

This is true in Africa, where there are incidences of conflicts, wars, and political violence. With regards to ethnic fractionalisation, scholars discuss the primitive nature of ethnic divisions and conclude that these hinder sustained political stability in states (Huntington, 1997; Moynihan, 1993). For instance, Whitfield (2009:629) gives an example of the ethnic perception with regards to two major political parties in Ghana (NDC and NPP) where the former is referred as the Nkrumahist, and is perceived among Ghanaians as ethnically and socially inclusive, populist and left-wing. The NPP is perceived by Ghanaians as followers of the Danquah/Busia, who are elitist, ethnically exclusive, comprised of the Ashanti and Akyem sub-groups of the Akan tribes, liberal-democratic, and right-wing

(Whitfield, 2009). In a situation like this, it is possible that the political elites who identify as either a populist left-wing or a liberal democratic right-wing are likely to cleave unto his or her own ethnic group. This kind of elite fragmentation might create politics of 'us and them' which might not be good for democracy.In their study, *Democratisation, Sequencing and State failure in Africa,* Branch and Cheeseman (2008:1) identify elite fragmentation as one of the factors that promotes crisis in the region. Fragmentation of the political elites in Africa is a result of the policy of 'divide and rule' established in the ex-British colonies and the presence of ethnicity and inter-elite competition in Africa, because the political elites in the region are fragmented along ethnic identities (Osaghae, 1991:50). This situation is likely to make political elite coherence very difficult. Nevertheless, Brown (1993:112) believes that elite cohesion brings about political stability. It is on this basis that this thesis focuses on how coherence among elites in divided and fragmented societies, such as Nigeria and Ghana, can help facilitate democratic consolidation, despite the notion that democracy is characteristically difficult in societies with deep ethnic divisions. In the next discussion, this thesis shall review what it is meant by cohesion. It shall also discuss how elite coherence and democratic commitment can help facilitate democracy consolidation in ethnically divided societies with fragmented elites such as Ghana and Nigeria.

3.1.3 Elite Cohesion: Empirical Review

Literature on the concept of cohesion is not new. There have been various research approaches on the subject. "Coherence has to do with the degree of consensus within the organisation on its functional boundaries and on procedures for resolving disputes that arise within these boundaries" (Randall & Svasand, 2002:10). One major problem facing most researchers with regard to this concept is reaching an agreement on an acceptable definition and measurement (Duncan, 1979:180; Gibbs & Martins,1964:7; Zander, 1979:433; Siebold, 1999:6; Mudrack, 1989:39; Bollen & Hoyle, 1990:480-481). This point is highlighted by

53

Mudrack (1989:38-39), who posits that "no definition of cohesiveness has become a generally accepted standard, and no uniformity has characterised the measurement or the operationalisation of the construct". Siebold (1999: 5-6), notes that notwithstanding the misunderstanding among scholars with regard to the concept of cohesion and measurement, scholars still agree that cohesion is a concept that is apparently easy to understand as an abstract, but difficult to comprehend in the concrete.

The debate about the concept of cohesion resolves around a disagreement in the literature over whether cohesion is unidimensional or multidimensional (Cota et al.1995:573). A multidimensional approach to cohesion is centred on two dimensions describing cohesiveness from a primary point of view as cohesiveness of most groups, and the secondary dimension view which maintains that cohesiveness is applicable to specific types of groups (Cota et al.1995). The unidimensional approach is influenced by Festinger, Schachter and Back's (1950) scholarly work. According to them, group cohesion was "the total field of forces which act on members to remain in the group"(Festinger et al.1950:164). They also identify two main factors that bring about group cohesiveness including the attractiveness of the members and their readiness to help the group reach their goals (Festinger et al. 1950). This hypothesis is criticised by Lott and Lott (1965), who doubt that attraction to a group is the same thing as cohesion.

With no widely accepted definition of cohesion, scholars have provided their own theoretical definitions of the concept. Following the definition of cohesion by Festinger et al. (1950), Mudrack (1989:41) deduces that cohesiveness is a result of forces that act on members to remain in a group, or those that attract membership to a group. In their work, Bollen and Hoyle (1990:482) define cohesion as a "perceived cohesion that encompasses an individual's sense of belonging to a particular group and his or her feelings of morale associated with membership in the group". One important thing about these definitions is that

54

each definition emphasises the individual's connection to the group, and the ability to remain in the said group to achieve a certain goal. For this thesis, cohesion connotes political elite congruence.

Though Weinstock (1999) notes that the relationship between cohesion and unity is somewhat different, he maintains that it is difficult to see a cohesive society that is not united. Cohesion, according to him, is a demanding goal which is not as important as an attempt to achieve unity, but warns that when cohesion is instantiated, it is likely to bring about unity, that is, there is a correlation between cohesion and unity (Weinstock, 1999). According to Weinstock (1999), unity is an ongoing yearning in the minds of the people in a given society to keep living under the same political institutions, and is without any desire to split the bonds holding political affiliation together. On the other hand, cohesion connotes the extent to which members of the society share broader ethical standards or a religious, cultural and/or ethnic identity above and outside their political philosophies (Weinstock, 1999). Noting the importance of cohesion as it affects to a country, Osaghae (1999) posits that "national cohesion is a process of constructing a *we-ness* or a sense of belonging amongst members of different groups in a polity, through the regulation and reconciliation of differences as well as competing interests and demands". The primary aim here, according to Osaghae (1999) is to establish an all-embracing national community which reduces loyalty to competing ethnic, racial, regional and religious communities.

With reference to the unity and national cohesion that Weinstock (1999) and Osaghae (1999) talk about, another scholar holds a contrary veiw and describes the polarised nature of Africa as:

> ...political divisions would increasingly fall along ethnic or regional lines, heightening tensions and, ultimately, threatening national unity. The volcano of ethnic or clan strife remains dormant throughout much of subsaharan Africa. But it could erupt - as it has in recent years in

Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan - should ethnicity become the leading factor in the struggle for power (Lancaster 1991:158)

Before the third wave of democracy many African countries had civil wars, one problem that generated these wars was ethnicity. Ake (1993: 1) reasons that ethnicity is remarkably a big problem in the African continents and it results in challenges towards developmental projects, political instability and weak national identity. African countries are arguably the most divided and most conflict vulnerable in the world, the African continent being home to many ethnicities with different languages. Ghana and Nigeria account for over three hundred and fifty (350) ethnic groups between them. These ethnic divides have resulted in different forms of crisis, be it economic or political. Ake (1993:6) decried that democratisation built on ethnic struggle for power might unleash ethnic conflict which will not be good for democracy. The chronic instability that emanates from the deep divisions among these ethnic groups poses a huge challenge for the political elites as they attempt to achieve democratic consolidation after successful transitions in the two countries. The elites in Nigeria and Ghana are faced with the challenge of implementing a democratic system capable of national integration, that is also truly representative of all the ethnic groups, and then consolidating it, that is, creating a democracy that is not vulnerable to collapse.

This work reckons that a successful consolidation of democracy is achievable in countries where the political elites have found a way to settle their differences and show their commitment to democracy by supporting government structures and institutions. This entails the formation of elite solidarity and common national integration, which is the fulcrum for elite cohesiveness in search of consolidation of democracy. Coherence among the elites is important in democracy because through coherence, all factions of the elite can settle their differences. Bollen and Hoyle (1990) see cohesion to mean individual sense of belonging. Festinger (1950) argues that group cohesion enable members remain in a group. According to

56

Anderson in Janda (1980) coherence is "the degree of congruence in the cultural orientations of various individuals and groups comprising an organisation" the degree of congruence referred to in this definition reflects the attitude and behaviour of the political elites especially in fragmented societies.

People cannot have a sense of belonging if they are not tolerated or remain in a group where they are not recognized or tolerated. Living in harmony or agreement requires that individuals are willing to tolerate others no matter the person's origin and before they agree to coexist, they have already decided to agree on their differences. Based on the definitions, this research defines coherence as the ability and willingness of the fragmented political elites to form government of alliances/coalitions and tolerance to help them tackle political problems even when they remain in opposition. When there is political elite coherence, Sartori (1995) notes that it "tames" politics of aggressive logjam into nonviolent rivalry, which promotes an elite settlement. Huang and Higley (1998) note that where this does not exist, elites are likely to disagree about some governmental institutions, and may engage in a harsh political rivalry with a winner-takes-all attitude. This of course does not promote democratic consolidation. This is why scholars like Friedrich (1942), Schatschneider (1975), Crick (2005), and Lijphard (1968) maintain that conflict reconciliation is important to democracy. Considering the history of ethnicity and elite fragmentation in Africa, this thesis argues that elite coherence is necessary for democratic consolidation in Africa, Ghana and Nigeria in particular. In the next chapter, the thesis discusses literature on commitment to democracy.

3.1.4 Commitment to Democracy: Literature Review

Few theories have been advanced on why people chose to show commitment to democracy. Scholars are of the view that democratization promotes living standards, supports the growth of the private sector, develop the urban middle class and increases the level of

57

education (Linz 1988; Lipset 1960; Lipset and Schneider 1987). On the other hand, Almond and Verba (1963) , Easton (1965, 1975), Wildavsky (1987), Eckstein (1988), Inglehart (1990) are of the view that democratic tradition is paramount in societies where there is a high level of communal trust, tolerance of diversity, political interest and willingness for political participation.

All the above are ingredients for democracy which largely account for various reasons why citizens are committed to democracy. What is commitment? Commitment is a complex phenomenon. Many scholars have written on this subject and employed different meanings, but for this thesis, it will provide some working definitions by a few scholars. For Kanter (1968) commitment is seen to be a process through which individual interests become devoted to carrying out socially organized patterns of behaviour which are seen as rewarding those interests, as articulating the nature and needs of the person. Kanter's definition of commitment resembles Parson and Shils' concept of "institutionalization": "the integration of the expectations of actors in a relevant interactive system of roles with a shared normative pattern of values."(Talcott & Shils, 1962:20). The conception of commitment here connotes that actors are not just committed because of their attachment to the norms but involves other areas of social life. Kanter's definition shows that individuals get committed to a course of action because they have basic needs motivating their involvement. In his view:

> Commitment of actors to group solidarity, to a set of social relationships, (cohesion commitment) involves primarily their forming positive cathectic orientations; affective ties bind members to the community, and gratifications stem from involvement with all the members of the group. Solidarity is high; "infighting" and jealousy low. A cohesive system can withstand threats to its existence; members "stick together." Commitment of actors to uphold norms and obey the authority of the group (control commitment) involves primarily their forming positive evaluative orientations (Kanter ,1968).

According to Gaubatz (1996) "a state makes a commitment to a course of action when it creates a subjective belief on the part of others that it will carry through with a certain course of actions. Commitments may be trivial and involve doing things that are clearly in one's interest to do. The more interesting commitments are those that bind the state to take some set of actions that do not look to be in its narrow self-interest as an international actor".

What about commitment to democracy? This question has been considered by a few authors. For example, Lijphart (1977) is of the view that a political elite's strong commitment to democracy can help overwhelm otherwise opposing conditions in building democracy. He argued the unresolved characteristic feature that explains the early democracies in Latin America found in Venezuela, Colombia and Costa Rica is the commitment of political elites to creating and preserving a democracy (Hartlyn 1988; Peeler 2014; Levine 2015). After prolonged acrimony in those three countries, the political elites decided to reconcile their differences for their survival; as such, they constructed an institutional framework capable of sustaining the democracy above everything else.

In their study about eight East European countries on citizen's commitment to democracy, Evans and Whitefield (1995) see commitment to democracy from two perspectives, namely economic and political contexts. From their two approaches, similar to this thesis is commitment to democracy from a political context. In their evaluation of the level of democracy support in the countries under study, four factors are considered; "the degree to which constitutional arrangements were in place; the level of institutional conflict between branches of government; especially president and parliament; the development of the party system; and the number and outcome of elections (Evans and Whitefield, 1995:495). Their research is different from mine, while they studied citizen's commitment to democracy, this thesis is interested in political elites' commitment to democracy. Mainwaring

(1989) believes "this elite commitment and the resulting institutional arrangements made democracy possible despite formidable obstacles".

Scholars believe that political actors show commitment to democracy in two ways, through intrinsic and instrumental rationality (Bratton and Matts, 2001; Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013). The term (intrinsic) connotes that people see democracy as the best form of government and decide to commit to. In such a situation, political actors will ideally commit to sustain democracy because they see it as the best form of political regime. Democracy is intrinsic when the political freedoms and equal rights that it embodies are valued as an end in itself and democratic commitment has the capability to withstand a fragile political regime amidst economic meltdown and social conflict (Bratton and Matts 2001). Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2013) are of the view that the political elites express commitment to democracy in their desire to embark on policy which may hurt their personal interest, hence their willingness to defend the competitive regime. This is referred to as a 'normative preference for democracy'(Mainwaring and Perez-Linan,2013:126). On the other hand, when an actor's commitment to democracy is instrumentally based, that means they see the regime as a means to other ends. In this regard, elites pursue their own policy preferences which may make or mar democratic consolidation in those societies (Bratton and Matts, 2001). This thesis argues that the political elites may have either an intrinsic or an instrumental commitment to democracy. Therefore, it is important to understand which kind of commitment makes democracy thrive, and which undermines it. Elite may be committed to democracy in order to ensure its survival or they are committed to democracy because they want to protect their selfish interest. This could explain why democracy succeeds in one country and fails in another. For this thesis, commitment to democracy by the political elites intrinsically is operationalized through political elite's ability toward ensuring the credibility and autonomy of the electoral commission, adhering to the rules and regulations guiding

party financing as well as showing unbiasedness in their efforts to combatting corruption. All these, according to this thesis are necessary for democratic consolidation. This contrasts instrumental commitment where political elites place their commitment to democracy as determined by what they are likely to extract from democracy which shows signs of negative commitment that results in pseudo-democracy. However, this work deviates from Reilly's stand on 'election' but intends to see how cohesion and democratic commitment can stimulate democratic consolidation.

My decision to consider certain institutions over others stems from the importance of those selected. While other institutions and structural arrangements are important, electoral commissions, party-financing and anti-corruption institutions are most appropriate to measure elite commitment to democracy. Research shows the importance of elections and how useful elections can be in changing the government and electing new leaders (Schumpeter, 1947: 270; Sandbrook, 1988; Dahl, 1991). When elections are executed in the right manner, it is likely to be considered legitimate by the citizens. When they are wrongly conducted, they are likely to cause crisis or political upheaval. In the centre of whether or not an election is conducted the right way, is the electoral commission, established by the political elites. For democracy to reach consolidation, the electoral commission of the country must be allowed to enjoy a certain level of independence. African democracy is prone to incessant election rigging and this looks like a similar problem facing most African countries. Democracies in Africa, especially in Nigeria seem to be struggling because in most cases the electoral commissions work under the influence of political godfathers. Hoffmann (2010) recounts on how the financial ability and political connections of Chris Uba of Anambra state of Nigeria determined the electoral outcome in the 2003 general elections. It is not possible that Uba could do this without collaborating with the electoral body. Elections conducted under this guise end up producing incapable leaders that are answerable to their political godfathers. An

autonomous electoral commission is important for the conduct of free and fair elections, which will help many fledgling democracies in Africa to consolidate, Nigeria and Ghana in particular.

The political elites are of the view that the independence of the electoral commission boasts the popular confidence to elections. This correlates some cases and regional studies that demonstrate that when the electorate lack the full confidence that elections in their country are free and fair, this would reduce their levels of electoral franchise (Bratton and Van de Wall, 1997; McCann and Dominquez, 1998; Zovatto and Payne, 2003; Birch,2008), and in a worst case scenario lead them to mass demonstration (Pastor, 1999; Eisenstadt, 1999, 2002; Schedler, 2002; Birch, 2008). On this ground, this thesis maintains that when the political elites are committed to democracy, they are likely to show such commitment through institutionalisation of an independent electoral commission.

Among other factors, electoral conduct in particular, has been used by electoral observers all over the world to measure the level of electoral fairness as well as the integrity of the electoral body. Scholars are of the view that an independent electoral commission is pivotal for a successful electoral administration (Mozaffar, 2002; McCoy and Hartlyn, 2006; Lopez-Pinto, 2000; Birch, 2008). Therefore, the appointment of members responsible for this task is important as that will show the readiness and willingness of the political elites towards ensuring a free and fair election. In few cases, the electoral body has been used as an instrument through which incumbents or wealthy candidates win elections. To ensure the autonomy of the electoral commission, the political elites need to implement laws that would uphold its integrity and allows the body conduct elections without any interference. While it is easy for some political elites to institute a weak electoral commission which they can be able to manipulate, it is also possible that some political elites have decided otherwise, hence making a level playing field for all contestants. However, this thesis shares the views of

62

scholars like; Lehoucq (2002) and Birch (2008) who reason that independent electoral commissions are one of the major institutional developments that help democracy succeed and fail in countries. It is on this ground that this thesis argues that the political elites are committed to democracy when they implement laws that give autonomy to the electoral commission and allows it to conduct free and fair elections. In addition, political elites are able to arouse popular confidence in elections as well as produce a legitimate government. The aforementioned factors accruing from an electoral commission's autonomy are conditions for democratic consolidation.

Like the electoral commission, party financing is considered as one of the ways through which political elite commitment to democracy can be analysed. The issue of money has been a problem in African democracy. The party that has too much of money will use it and gain an undue advantage against other political parties. Meanwhile, a party that does not have enough money will be under the influence of the dominant party. This results in one party dominance during elections, as the party with financial power is likely to engage in vote buying which can determine political outcomes. Since democracy connotes politics of the majority, it is important for the political elites in Ghana and Nigeria to establish strong rules about party financing and financial regulations. When every party contesting in an election is giving equal rights, the political playing field will not only be competitive, it will command equality between every candidate and help the best candidate to win. Party financing will also help reduce political corruption. Like Aiyede (2008) argues, political corruption undermines the effectiveness of development and poses a serious threat to good governance. Some African politicians steal government funds and, in order to accumulate more money, associate themselves with political godfathers who sponsor them. When these sponsored candidates get elected into political positions, they may steal to pay the godfathers back. So, strong financial

regulation that commands the obedience of the political elites would help reduce corruption among political elites.

Considering the fact that money could lead to scandal and corrupt activities among political contestants, the political elites have realised that state party financing can be a strong framework to measure elite commitment to democracy. The reason for equitable distribution of money among political parties is to give every political party a fair chance at winning elections. This thesis is of the view that if parties are not funded by the state, it may hinder democratic processes as well as frustrate democratic consolidation. Political elites have considered how damaging it can be when there is inequality in party financing. Moreover, the amount of money invested by wealthy politicians in the electioneering processes is likely to hinder politicians without strong financial base to contest against them. Fobih (2016) notes that without party financing, less financial privileged parties and their rights to shaping public opinion may cease to exist. On this backdrop, party financing is argued as one of the essential elements in achieving democratic consolidation and also assist emerging democracies from being used as an avenue for fund-raising among wealthy politicians or dominant political parties. The need for this is to protect credible candidates who would have performed better if elected. Due to the huge amount of money involved in elections, states have considered the importance of providing subsidies to parties. Scholars (Booth and Robbins, 2010: 632; Arthur, 2017) emphasise on the need for subsidies for emerging democracies, stating that state subsidies can be lawfully used to support weak political parties or oppositions. Other supporters (Nam-Katoti et al., 2011:94) are of the view that state subsidies do not only create a level playing field for politicians but also make ordinary parties to attract support from the people even when there are dominant parties .The political elites see equitable party financing as a strong institutional framework which does not only give a voice to political parties but also promote party competition which is necessary for democratic consolidation.

Anti-corruption is considered a strong commitment to democracy by the political elites, because the agency serves as a watch dog in checking the accesses of the members of the electoral commission and political elites that associate themselves on political corruption. In Africa there is inequality between the rich and the poor, and the rich are not necessarily rich because they work very hard, but because they embezzle government funds. African countries remain underdeveloped, and this may be due in part to the money some politicians have looted. If something is not done, this problem might persist. So, anti-corruption will not only expose and recover stolen monies from government officials but it will make politicians shew with caution in an attempt to involve in political corruption. This research believes that if the political elites can commit to democracy through giving maximum support to the electoral commission, party-financing and anti-corruption efforts, African democracy will improve a great deal.

The political elites' commitment to democracy through anti-corruption measures can be seen in their desire to building a strong anti-corruption agency to curb corrupt practices, especially within the offices of political leaders. Meagher (2005) agrees that when corruption abounds, anti-corruption agency has always become an instrument of remedy or reduce it to a minimal level. Though corruption can be seen in all works of life; be it a private corruption where some individuals engage in immoral behaviours, such as scamming or duping others of their possessions. The worst form of corruption which this thesis intends to build upon is the corruption against the state by those working for the state. This falls within political corruption and the culprits in this form of corruption are the political elites. The political office holders use positions entrust in their hands by the masses to milk state resources and public goods dry. This thesis reasons that it is unethical for few government officials to use resources meant for the public to their own personal aggrandisements. While this tricky acquisition of state resources does not only impoverish the African states, it also makes

65

development in these states impossible. It is on this ground that this thesis considers anti-corruption measures for curbing corruption practices. This thesis further analyses how democratic consolidation can be actualised by the political elites through checking the excesses of politicians who engage in corrupt activities against the states they are suppose to protect. Meagher (2005) observes that political leaders' attempt at instituting an anti-corruption agency comes with mixed feelings as it is not very clear what their real intentions and 'expectations' are. So, when political leaders institute genuine anti-corruption agencies, they are in essence bent on fighting corruption to a standstill. Also, when political elites are genuine in taking measures against corruption practices, in essence, they are fighting against themselves since they are the ones associated with political corruption. Therefore, the instituitionalisation of corruption agencies is to their detriment. The quest by the political elites to ensure a politically corrupt free society and their unalloyed commitment to democracy via anti-corruption agencies are conditions for democratic consolidation.

Major scholars have theorized about democracy to understand those important factors that help countries to achieve democratic consolidation, especially in Europe and Latin American countries (Lipset, 1959; Dahl, 1971). Their studies found that democracy is more likely to succeed in countries with economic buoyancy, where national unity allows for tolerance of different ethnic divisions, where there is a diversified social structure with a dominant middle class. Amidst all these factors considered, democratic consolidation, socio-economic conditions were given more importance as Lipset (1959) shows that the more well to do a nation, the more chance democracy is establishes in a such system. Other studies have shown that democracy flourishes in an environment where the leaders are supportive of democracy. Linz and Stepan (1978) show that democracy is successful where the ruling elites and the opposition groups are committed to the implementation of democratic principles, which are capable of giving credence to democratic arrangements. The notion is that

democracy is likely to fail if the political elites are unable to establish those factors that conditioned effective and promising democracy. It is also important that the transiting elite must embrace those characteristics which will be useful in taming ethnic divisions that might result in societal crisis. In ethnically divided societies, elections might produce a populist leader who may gain support of ethnic voters through manipulation (Snyder (2000). In such a situation, the system could suffer further factionalism and this could be a threat to the success and survival of democracy and its consolidation. Based on this, it becomes necessary to discuss few hypotheses with reference to elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy.

3.1.5   Theoretical Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1.

High levels of elite coherence combined with a high level of commitment to democracy are necessary to consolidate democracy

Hypothesis 2

A low level of elite coherence as well as a high level of commitment to democracy is conducive to consociational democracy

Hypothesis 3

A high level of elite coherence combined with a low level commitment to democracy is necessary to pseudo democratic regime

Hypothesis 4

A low level of elite coherence and a low level of commitment to democracy are conducive to competitive authoritarianism.

3.6   Summary of Literature and Theoretical Reviews

This chapter has reviewed various theoretical approaches of democratization, democratic consolidation, elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy. Various hypotheses are constructed in line with the discussions as well. In the early stage of this

chapter, this thesis carefully set out how regime on transition reaches consolidation and deviated at some point. This thesis views democratic consolidation from different perspective- elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy is a condition for democratic consolidation. The next discussion shall highlight some important concepts from the theoretical framework followed with the understanding of some conceptual variables and their measurements.

3.2   Democratic Consolidation: Conceptual Definition

Scholars like O'Donnell (1996) and Schedler (2001) are at loggerheads especially in agreeing to acceptable measurement of democratic consolidation as it is characterized as "inconsistent" and "empirically untraceable". Guillermo O'Donnell (1996a, 1996b) contradicts the views of many other scholars who believe in regime consolidation. According to O'Donnell, measuring consolidation can be "confusing" and "inconsistent" as it relies on "unwarranted generation" which is "casually drawn" with "empirical untraceable" that results in unreliable indicator of "extreme ambiguity".

As a matter of fact, it is difficult to operationalize this variable or as Schedler notes "once we resolve the question of how to define democratic consolidation, we run into the even more intricate problem of how to observe it" (Schedler, 2001: 67). Building on his argument, "the way political actors handle instances of alternation in government constitutes an excellent indicator of their democratic commitment".

However, for the purpose of this research, we shall operationalize democratic consolidation building on the work of Huntington (1991) which considers democracy to be consolidated when there are "two turnover tests" According to him, democracy is consolidated when political party that wins in the first election, contested again and loses to an opposition party and the same opposition party contests election again and loses to the

party it previously takes power from and transfers power freely back to the party that wins in the first election (Huntington,1991).

 From the above perceptions of democratic consolidation, it is obvious that this concept is very slippery and one must be cautious using it as any single approach to measure it might attract some criticisms. By this means, using African countries, Ghana and Nigeria as benchmarks, this work will measure democratic consolidation from the views of Samuel Huntington.

However, the reason for using Samuel Huntington's theory of two two turn over tests is because all indicators of democratic consolidation are flawed. Take for instance, Resnick (2012); Levitsky &Way (2005); Carothers (1999); Mainwaring & Scully (1995): Sandbrook (1996); Randall and Svassand (1999) proposed for civil society/ foreign assistance and political party's institutionalization respectively as benchmarks for measuring democratic consolidation. Therefore, finding appropriate indicators for measuring democratic consolidation is not an easy one. According to O'Donnell (1996) and Schedler (2001), measuring democratic consolidation can be "confusing" and "inconsistent". For the purpose of this thesis, Samuel Huntington's "two turnover test" is more appropriate as it reflects on the elite commitment to democracy. This is because the highest sign of elite commitment to democracy is their willingness to turn over power. For instance, in the early period of transition in Africa, one of the problems facing African democracy at the time was whether the incumbent would accept defeat at the poll. As observed by Bratton (1998) in *Second Elections in Africa,* African incumbents actually accepted the external norm for "competitive elections" but this was in a way to hope they would find a means to manipulate the electoral process. Bratton's view depicts the nature of African political elites at the time of democratisation processes as well as reinforces their unwillingness to leave their political positions. So, when they decided to turnover power to the extent of accommodating two

69

turnover tests as Huntington postulated, this show huge improvement on the side of the political elites and it displays their commitment to democracy. It does not matter whether the turnover of power is once or twice but what matters is whether the leaders are accustomed to doing so.

This work will consider the level of unity among competing actors, understand if democracy has been recognized by the competing actors as the only game in town as well as see election as the only means of changing the government.

3.2.1   Pseudo Democracy: Conceptual Definition

This concept can be referred to as illiberal democracy, also called a partial democracy, low intensity democracy, empty democracy, or hybrid regime, in which the governing system organizes elections at intervals but the citizens have restricted knowledge about the events going on by those who perform real governmental functions because there is no civil liberty. In pseudo democratic regimes, the government deploys strategy to contain the opposition and its single dominant party is largely an avenue to attract support for the government.

 In this system, there is high level patronage because dominant parties can use state resources to satisfy the elites who in turn give support through mobilizing voters from their communities for the ruling party. The government also wants the support of the masses and will carry out major projects that are likely to promote the interest of the people who return this favour by giving the government the necessary support to succeed. In this kind of system, Diamond (2002) notes that the regime is neither obviously democratic nor conservatively authoritarian. Pseudo democracies promote some elements of democracy but these elements are not systematically practiced or adhered to.

Therefore, political contestation in this type of regime is not open, free or fair. This ensures that the ruling party is not displaced in an election even though the electorate no

70

longer have confidence in the ruling government. Diamond (2002) observes that despite the difficulty surrounding the victory of opposition parties in this type of regime, through serious opposition mobilization, unity, skill and heroism, the opposition is capable of victory in a democratic election in a pseudo democratic regimes. Examples of recent and old pseudo democratic single party dominated regimes countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Japan Taiwan, Mexico, Senegal and South Africa. Among those countries above, Malaysia and Singapore remain contemporary pseudo-democracies.

In his study of Malaysia, Case (2004) identifies Malaysia as one of the strong pseudo-democracies where the ruling government is always controlled by single dominant party and though the system allows for a multi-party system, it does not accord the same resilience enjoyed by dominant parties to other parties. In pseudo-democracies, government in most cases neglects civil liberties as well as using coercion to command obedience from the people. Before the 1999 elections the Malaysian government began to limit civil liberties in such a way as to claim control over the media which persistently condemned the opposition. Case (2001) notes that Mahathir did not just limited civil liberties and manipulated the electoral processes in Malaysia but also launched a media attack which he used to suppress the opposition and accused it of attempting political disorder and national violence. This helped the Barisan Nasional Front to win 55 percent of the total votes cast. For this reason, scholars have warned that in order to leave a level playing field, government under a dominant single party should endeavour to loosen up on civil liberties. Among these scholars is Solinger (2001) who argues that governments must cease restrictions on civil liberties and encourage elections where parties can fiercely compete to make electoral outcomes very "uncertain".

71

3.2.2 Competitive Authoritarianism: Conceptual Definition

This kind of regime became famous after the Second World War. This type of regime spread to many countries in Africa and to the old Soviet Union under the tutelage of single-party rule. A few countries became competitive authoritarian states because democracy broke down as their elected heads of states used plebiscites to consolidate their hold on power after manipulating the playing field. Many striking examples of countries in this category are from Latin America. Among such autocrats in Latin America are Venezuelan President Hugo Chaves, who conducted a series of elections and referenda so as to assume control over the state's resources which in return, was instrumental in the politics of the country playing out the way Chaves wished. In this kind of regime, formal democratic institutions exist but are used as an instrument for gaining access to power.

In competitive authoritarianism or electoral authoritarianism, elections are held at intervals but these elections do not meet the democratic standards of individual freedom and fairness. The outcome of elections conducted under this system always favours the incumbent leader. The incumbent in this system has a strong-hold on political activities in such a way that elections organized serve characteristically authoritative functions and the government institutions only exist to consolidate the interest and chances of the incumbent. This explanation is clearer in the concept of competitive authoritarianism by Levitsky and Way. They argue that in achieving and performing their political functions, incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes disregard normal democratic processes in such a way that the regime fails short of ingredients democratic value is known for (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Democratic principles are in place but incumbents overlook them to achieve their goals which are always authoritative and against the constitution or they amend the constitution to suit their whims and caprices. The early 90s, many countries were under this

kind of regime, among them, Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic, under the regime of Vladimir Putin of Russia, Peru under Alberto Fujimori etc.

Schedler (2015) ; Levitsky and Way (2002) observe that while parties organize frequent elections to elect the chief executive and members of the national assembly in competitive authoritarianism, they also disrupt the principles of liberal democracy such as freedom and fairness to serve the interest of autocratic leader instead of safeguarding the "elections". Competitive authoritarianism encourages regular elections which is usually free from massive fraud but allows the incumbent to abuse state resources. In most cases opposition is tolerated but to a certain degree so long it does not stop the incumbent from rigging electoral outcomes. Describing the kind of elections that exist in competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way (2010.7)note that elections are often marred in the form of voter list' manipulation as was the case of the Dominican Republic in 1994, stuffing of ballot of boxes in the case of Ukraine in 2004, alteration of election verdicts and results as in the case of Belarus, Cameroon and Gabon or in the form of intimidation of political opponents like the cases in Cambodia, Kenya and Zimbabwe where opposition parties are not allowed to campaign in some regions .

Levitsky and Way (2010) describe this kind of regime as one where basic civil liberties exist to some extent but are threatened in practice. While it allows for the freedom of opposition groups to function, give the independent media freedom to operate, and allows the opposition to hold public meetings and demonstrations as well as criticise the government. These civil liberties can be violated at will as are the cases in Belarus and Cambodia where opposition members were arrested and in some cases these opposition members are killed as in Cambodia, Haiti, Kenya and Zimbabwe or where independent media are shut down completely like the cases in Russia and Zimbabwe (Levitsky and Way,2010:8).

3.2.3 Consociational Democracy: Conceptual Definition

In his work titled '*Consociational democracy*' referring to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, Lijphart (1969) argues that Switzerland and Austria are expected to show signs of instability because the two countries are highly fragmented as subcultures are inherently divided due to ethnic divisions yet the two countries show some level of stable democracy. According to Lijphart (1969) "consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy".

This system is feasible in a polarised society of ethnic, racial, religious and regional divisions which by nature are relatively antithetical to stable democracy. The theory of consociational democracy was propounded in the late sixties by Arendt Lijphart (1969) to illustrate the possibility of stability in ethnicised society. According to Lijphart (1969) consociational democracy disrupts the attitude of majoritarianism but does not disconnect much from democratic normative theory. This encompasses the ethical basics of democracy and its institutions. All the principles of democracy exist in this system but it face the problem of uniting the fragmented actors. Elites here thrive to promote common understanding that could make democracy work despite their differences.

This system is successful where; the elites are capable of accommodating different 'interests and demands' amidst their subcultures; they have the capacity of bringing divided elites together for collective action; where this collective action reflects their commitment to maintain the system to ensure improvement of its cohesion and stability and all things being equal, elites understand the dangers associated with political fragmentation. The norms that promote inter-elite cooperation are firmly created when they do not represent a deliberate departure from competitive responses to political challenges and Lehmbruch (1974) reasons that these norms can be instrumental in the part of "political socialization of the elites and

thus acquire a strong degree of persistence through time". The degree of elite coherence with associated level of democratic commitment is cross-sectionally shown below:

3.3 Theoretical Framework

Figure 2. Elite Coherence and Democratic Commitment

	High coherence Elite	**Low Coherence Elite**
High Demo Commitment	Consolidated democracy	Consociational democracy
Low Demo Commitment	Pseudo-democratic regime	Competitive Authoritarianism

Source: Author's compilation (2018).

The diagram above shows the relationship between elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy. The importance of this figure is to highlight how democratic consolidation and other variables can be achieved. The figure places high coherence and low coherence elite on the top corner and places high democracy and low democracy commitment in the left side of the diagram. The figure reveals that when there is high elite coherence and high elite commitment, democratic consolidation is most possible. In the same vein, when there is elite low coherence and high democracy commitment, the result is consociational democracy. However, if there is high elite coherence and low elite commitment to democracy, the system of the regime becomes pseudo-democratic in nature. Finally, if there is low elite coherence and low elite commitment to democracy, the regime becomes a competitive authoritarianism.

3.3.1   Elite Coherence: Conceptual Definition and Measurement

Like Anderson in Janda (1980) discussed earlier, coherence means congruence among people in a state. The degree of congruence referred to in this definition reflects the attitude and behaviour of the political elites especially in fragmented societies. Scholars generally

75

agree that when the elites are fragmentally structured, they exhibit little or no coherence (Ruostetsaari 1993:332; Higley et. al., 1981; 2001). With this in mind, it would be hard to imagine that opposition political parties would mingle with the incumbent political party. Like Janda (1980) observes coherence to mean congruence, this means agreement or harmony. For elite congruence to take place elite must be willing to corporate and implies elites' ability to tolerate themselves. Despite their differences, the political elites were able to form Alliances/coalitions and tolerance to help them achieve government of national unity. This is evidence on how fragmented political elites exhibited coherence that largely influenced elections of 2000 in Ghana and the recent, 2015 elections in Nigeria. Tolerance encompasses recognition and respecting the rights of others and this will give political elites that sense of belonging which Bollen and Hoyle (1990) in their discussion of cohesion in the earlier chapter. Political elites that ignore their fragmented nature are able to tolerate other political elites from opposing camps. The ability of elites to agree on certain issues as well as compromise on their differences raises the level of their coherence. In most societies, we have the ruling political elites and the opposition political elites who are fragmentally structured and their agreement on the rules governing democracy stem from their level of coherence.

Measurement

To better understand the nature and degree of congruence among political elites in Ghana and Nigeria, the cohesion index developed by Stuart A. Rice (1928) is used as a method of measurement. The index is calculated as:

$$\text{Index of Cohesion} = \frac{\left|N\,Yes\ -\ N\,No\right|}{\left|N\,Yes\ +\ N\,No\right|} = \left|\%\,Yes\ -\ \%\,No\right|$$

where N Yes = Number of "Yes" and N No is the number of "No" responses. The data used in calculating the index score is extracted from the conducted interviews in Ghana and

Nigeria to access the degree of coherence among the political elites in achieving democratic consolidation irrespective of their differences at the time of transition. The behavioural factors such as alliance/coalition and tolerance are used to measure the degree of coherence among political elites in this study for considered countries.

Table 1 Coherence Index

Degree of Coherence	Division (Support vs. Opposition)	Estimated Index
Completely Cohesive	100 – 0	0.90 – 1.0
Highly Cohesive	90 – 10	0.70 – 0.89
Somewhat Cohesive	80 – 20	0.50 – 0.69
Not Cohesive	70 – 30	0.30 – 0.49
Divisive	60 – 40	0.10 – 0.29
Highly Divisive	50 – 50	0.0 – 0.09

Source: Janda (1980, pp. 119)

The categories of coherence reported in Janda (1980) are shown in the table below. For instance, an index measure ranging between 0.7 and 0.89 indicates high coherence through tolerance and alliance among political elites.

Using the aggregate responses from the interview, the average degree of coherence is calculated for Ghana and Nigeria as follows:

Table 2 Coherence Index Indicating Tolerance and Alliances/Coalitions.

Interview Questions	Ghana			Nigeria		
	Yes	No	Coherence Index	Yes	No	Coherence Index
Is there tolerance among the political elites in your country?	22	3	$\dfrac{(22-3)}{(22+3)} = 0.76$	21	4	$\dfrac{(21-4)}{(21+4)} = 0.68$
Is there coalition or alliance among political parties in your country?	23	2	$\dfrac{(23-2)}{(23+2)} = 0.84$	22	3	$\dfrac{(22-3)}{(22+3)} = 0.76$
Average Coherence Index						$\dfrac{0.68+0.76}{2} = 0.72$

		$\dfrac{(0.76 + 0.84)}{2} = 0.80$		

Source: Author's computation (2018)

The estimated coherence indices indicate that there is high degree of agreement and compromise to differences among political elites in Ghana and Nigeria for achieving democratic consolidation. The variation in the political elites' search for democratic consolidation in the two countries is while the political elites are committed to democracy through building strong institutional structures, the political elites in Nigeria are not.

3.3.2   Elite Commitment to Democracy: Operational Definition and Measurement

Operational Definition

The commitment of the elite to democracy can be conceptualized as the political elite making the important choices and policy-decisions on the grounds of the advancement of institutional or structural factors that support democracy, and they become habituated to acting that way. This similarly implies the process through which the political elites show support for democracy, especially to ensure that the system does not roll back to an authoritarian regime. Gunther, Montero and Torcal emphasized that when democracy gets the necessary support, it helps in democratic stability which is the engine room for a sustainable democracy (Gunther, Montero and Torcal, 2004:1).

Measurement

Elite commitment to democracy can be measured by looking at the electoral commission's independence, the presence of party financing and its regulation, the presence of anti-corruption, and the autonomy the agency enjoys. Having seen election as a major factor that improves democracy and to guide against the political elites misusing election against their political opponents, it becomes apparent that the elites create a body devoid of being influenced by anybody to administer the electoral body. One of the important reasons

why the Electoral commission should be given independence is to ensure a credible and effective election. For example, electoral independence allows the institution flourish without fear or favour. When the electoral commission is effectively independent, no ruling party can have an undue advantage over other political parties in elections, non-rigged elections are able to be conducted, and equality is given to citizens to vote and be voted for. On the other hand, party financing helps give life to political parties, as a lot of resources is required to make political parties function properly. Research suggests that to enhance a competitive political system, there is a need to finance political parties (Nassmacher, 2003; Ayee et al., 2007). Other scholars believe that amidst resource shortages, democracy can improve when there is sustainable and equitable distribution of party financing (CDD, 2005a; Nam-Katoti et al., 2011). Their assertions underscore the importance of party financing and why it is important to use it to measure political elite commitment to democracy. This thesis shall examine the party financing in both Nigeria and Ghana, and see whether the political elites comply with the rules and regulations guiding party financing. Furthermore, in order to consider political corruption among political elites, the thesis shall examine the presence of anti-corruption offices, understand the mode of appointment of their members, and see how this impacts their performance and autonomy. When an anti-corruption agency is established with the necessary freedom to function, it becomes a tool through which corruption can be fought. Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000: 37-39) advise that people in a democratic system should strongly shun corruption. Being defiant to corruption is likely to work if certain people do not have influence over the anti-corruption body. This thesis shall consider whether there is an established fraud office, and whether there is tenure of office among the commissions' members.

3.3.3 Independent Electoral Commission: Conceptual Definition and Measurement

The management and administration of the Electoral Commission can be influenced by the structure of electing the commission board members, tenure, mode of appointment and membership formation. These factors determine the independence of the Electoral Commission from the ruling government. The selection process of the members that manage the affairs of the Commission can dictate the influence of the President in controlling the electoral process in its favour. This can as well be regarded as "Electoral Commission Autonomy" and has been widely discussed in literature. For instance, Dworkin (1988:14) describes autonomy as an individual rationality to make a knowledgeable decision without being influenced or forced by any other person. Also, Debrah (2011:28) conceptualised the autonomy of the Electoral Commission as the ability of the governing members to critically analyse issues using facts and draw unbiased insights in other to have abundant feasible options. In the context of this thesis, Electoral Commission independence is defined as the self-awareness and self-regulation of the administration members of the Commission in making critical decisions that favours the people using all available information and actionable insights. In turn, this will help to increase the Electoral Commission integrity and earn the confidence of the people that trust the body to conduct free and fair election to promote democratic consolidation. In agreement, Goodwin-Gill (1994:80) notes that an attempt to getting election problems resolved does not depend on just the competency of the independent and impartial authority but the timing through which decisions are made on time to avoid delay of electoral results.

On this basis, this thesis measures the independence of the Electoral Commission using the highlighted three factors (tenure of office, appointment and membership structure) to ascertain the level of autonomy in Ghana and Nigeria. This thesis looks at the tenure granted to the members of the Electoral Commission in Nigeria and Ghana as this can help

give members of this body the confidence that their job is secured despite election outcomes. The appointment of members can determine the outcome of the elections too. If the appointment is not seriously examined, somebody (such as the president) may appoint loyal members and in such situation, electoral conducts might be influenced. Membership structure needs to be examined. This is because, as this is the body that conducts election in countries with ethnic diverse, membership structure needs to be equitably selected to avoid ethnic bias. However, this type of approach helps to determine the autonomy of the governing body of the Electoral Commission in both countries as shown below:

Table 3 Tenure, Appointment &Membership Structure of E C.

Country	Tenure	Appointed By	Membership Structure
Ghana	Unlimited	President in consideration of the parliamentary recommendations	7 (1 Chairman, 2 Deputy Chairmen, and 4 Other members)
Nigeria	Limited and can be terminated anytime at the discretion of the president	President	13 (1 Chairman and 12 other National Commissioners

Source: Author's Compilation (2018).

https://www.google.co.nz/search?q=electoral+commission+in+ghana&rlz=1C1GGRV_enNZ751NZ751&oq=electoral+com mission+in+&aqs=chrome.4.69i57j69i60j0j69i60j0l2.20383j0j1&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8#.

https://www.google.co.nz/search?rlz=1C1GGRV_enNZ751NZ751&ei=ykdZW-u-Gs7p-Qank7awAg&q=electoral+commission+in+nigeria&oq=electoral+commission+in+&gs_l=psy ab.

In the table above, this thesis has shown the structures of the Electoral Commission in Nigeria and Ghana. While the members of the Electoral Commission in Ghana has an unlimited tenure of office that gives the members the confidence that their job is secured, the members of the Electoral Commission in Nigeria do not enjoy such right as their positions can be terminated at any time. Another structure shown on the table is the mode of appointment. The appointment of the Chairman, two-deputy chairmen and four other members of the commission in Ghana is by the president on the advice of the committee set up in the parliament to scrutinize them before final approval. This is different in Nigeria where the chairman and the twelve National

Commissioners are direct appointees of the president. While the membership of the Electoral Commission in Ghana is made up of one chairman, two-deputy chairman and four other members, Nigerian Electoral Commission in comprised of one chairman and twelve other National Commissioners. There is a possibility that the Electoral Commission chairman might work in favour of the president that appoints him. In such situation, the electoral body is likely to compromise in Nigeria.

3.3.4 Party Financing: Conceptual Definition and Measurement

Party Financing Measurement

Some scholars consider the best form of party financing to be the old form, where mass parties finance their parties (Katz, 1997). This kind of contribution is generated through membership fees and donations that members render to their own parties. Parties that raise money this way are likely to be less dependent on state subventions. However, scholars that argue for state subventions see public funding as an ideal form of achieving equal competition among political parties as well as promote the effectiveness of multiparty democracy (Lewis, 2017; Van Biezen, 2003). A study by Mietzner (2007: 241), shows that the African region has the lowest level of state financing in the world, as 44 percent of democracies in this region offer public funds to political parties.

This thesis is interested in two important questions with regards to party financing. First, does the ruling party have more access to finance than the opposing parties? Second, is the state regulation guiding party financing and spending of political parties efficient and effective? By state regulation of political parties, this thesis refers to the party financing mechanism which is under the control of public law or the constitution. In advanced democracies, political finance regulation is prioritised to ensure that parties are not hijacked by major donors. Biezen and Kopecky (2007: 239-240) suggest that public regulation of party

financing is needed for promoting transparency in party financing, especially in countries where corruption is apparent and rampant.

For the purpose of this thesis, the degree and presence of uneven party financing is measured using 'rules about party financing' to understand the extent to which political parties adhere to the state' rules on party financing. The thesis will also see if there is a state subsidy on parties, and whether parties get equal shares. Access to the media is also important when measuring public financing, as this determines if one political party is given a free run on media when compared to others. The thesis shall also see if there is transparency on the rules about party financing.

Olarinmoye (2006; 2008) believe that elections are usually undermined by political parties and politicians through the illegal use of money, physical force and governmental patronage deployed through political agents. Under such circumstances, one can believe that political parties are not adhering to state rules on party finance regulations. For the benefit of this thesis, party financing can be measured looking at the rules about party financing, state subsidy, access to media and transparent donations/financing.

Table 4 Party Financing Measurement

Measures	Ghana	Nigeria
Rules about party financing	Highly constitutionalised	Fairly constitutionalised
State subsidy	Fairly provided by the state	Poorly provided by the state
Access to media	Medium/average access	Low access
Transparent donations/financing	Highly transparent and accountable	Fairly transparent but not accountable
Overall	Highly regulated and structured	Fairly regulated and structured

Source: Author's (2018). Other sources: Nam-Katoti et al.(2011), Ukase, (2015).

Transparency in party financing in both Ghana and Nigeria is assessed using some selected measures (such as party financing rules, state subsidy, media access, and transparent donation), as documented in the interview in the two countries. Evidence gathered from the country case studies used highy to demonstrate the solidity of the percentage given, fairly means that something exist but not in fullness. Poorly and low means there is state subsidy and media access by political parties in Nigeria but not enough to compare with Ghana. As shown on the table above, the rules guiding party financing in Ghana constitutionally exist and are highly regulated, more so than its counterpart West Africa country, Nigeria.

On the average across other party financing measures, Ghana out performed Nigeria. Financing of elections are highly transparent and well-regulated in election fairly exist in Ghana compared to Nigeria where transparency and rule of law guiding the financing of parties are not transparent. With regards to complying to the rules guiding party funding in Ghana, Nam-Katoti et al.(2011) note that Political Parties Act of 2000 (Article 23) mandated that 75% of Ghanaian citizens, firms, partnerships or enterprises are able to make any kind of contribution to political parties. Their study reveals that all parties rely on the contributions of their members for party financing even though their contributions are not enough (Nam-Katoti et al. 2011). Compare to Nigeria, Ukase (2015) notes that various laws have been propounded with regards to campaign/ party financing but these are yet to yield any meaningful results especially as political parties continue to sabotage the processes.

3.3.5 Anti-Corruption: Conceptual Definition and Measurement

Corruption can be defined as the abuse of entrusted political power for private gains. It can take various forms depending on its costs to the society (Transparency International, 2017)[1].

---

[1] https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define

It consists of acts committed at a high level of government that distort policies enabling political elites to benefit at the cost of public resources. Similarly, some notable scholars such as Uslaner (2005), De Graaf (2007) and Rothstein (2009) view corruption as a behavioural norm among political elites to use government resources for personal gain and to oppress the opposition. Corruption has become a serious political and economic problem in most developing countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, and has been accepted as a means by political leaders to enrich themselves. The high level of corruption has prompted most of these countries to institute anti-corruption bodies (such as Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC) in Ghana, and Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in Nigeria. The anti-corruption agencies are entrusted with the responsibility of independently prosecuting political elites or individuals that mismanaged or embezzled government funds for personal use. The establishment of these anti-corruption agencies is to provide surveillance in the form of checks and balances as well as encourage accountability by the political elites. Yet, if these agencies are not adequately empowered to perform their functions effectively, it can hinder democratic commitment which is a concern to democratic consolidation according to this thesis.

In determining the effectiveness of the anti-corruption agencies in both countries, this thesis measures its efficiency using four factors (serious fraud office, mode of appointment, composition of membership, tenure of office) to establish the level of political elites' commitment towards combatting corruption in the two countries.

Table 5 Anti-Corruption Measurement

	Ghana	**Nigeria**
Serious Fraud Office	Yes	Yes
Appointment of the Executive Members	By the President	By the President
Composition of the Executive	One Commissioner and Two Deputy Commissioners	One Chairman
Tenure of Office	Permanent	Dismissible at anytime

Source: Author's Compilation (2018), https://www.google.co.nz/search?rlz=1C1GGRV_enNZ751NZ751&ei=3mpZW_ngF9Xs-QaRv7SQAw&q=chraj+ghana&oq=CHRAJ&gs_l=psy-ab.1.2.0l10.32377.42769.0.49491.30.13.0.0.0.0.261.1534.2-7.7.0....0...1c.1.64.psy-ab..24.6.1306...0i13i30k1j0i13i5i30k1j0i131k1j0i3k1j0i67k1j0i131i67k1j0i10k1.0.5Upb_BHatOM#.

The table above shows that in both countries, the political elites are serious in combatting corruption for establishing anti-corruption agencies. The mode of appointment of the chief executive of the agencies in the two countries is the president. In Ghana, the chief executive is composed of three persons, chief commissioner and two deputy commissioners. In Nigeria, there is one chairman. While the tenure of the office of the CHRAJ members in Ghana is permanent, members of the EFCC in Nigeria can be removed at any time.

Here, various definitions have been provided for the key concepts from the theoretical framework. The thesis has also given a detailed discussion on the key variables, elite coherence and elite commitment. While elite coherence discusses and measures elite alliances/coalitions and tolerance, elite commitment discusses and measures electoral commission, party-financing and anti-corruption.

In the next chapter, this research will discuss how this thesis hopes to analyse this topic building on elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy leading to democratic consolidation and see if some contextual factors that form the indicators of elite coherence and commitment to democracy can explain the attitude of the political elite towards consolidation of democracy in Africa, especially, Ghana and Nigeria.

Chapter 4

Resilient Coherence and Ethical Commitment to Democracy: Experience of Ghana Political Elites on Consolidation of Democracy.

4.1 Elites Commitment to Democracy through Electoral Commission

Introduction

This chapter shows how the elites in Ghana and Nigeria have worked towards consolidating their democracies, by looking at the Electoral Commission (EC), party financing, and anti-corruption. These factors give democracy its potency, and are important should countries like Ghana and Nigeria want democracy to survive in their countries. An analysis of the electoral commission, party financing and anti-corruption may analyse whether or not the elites in Ghana and Nigeria are committed to democracy. Scholars suggest that the choices these elites make determine the success, or breakdown, of democracy (Malloy 1987; O'Donnell et al. 1986; Lopez-Pinto 1987).

This analysis begins with the Ghanaian case. Because the two cases (Ghana and Nigeria) focus on similar factors, a general introduction for each of the three factors (the EC, party financing, and anti-corruption) shall be made in the Ghanaian chapter. Here this research talks about the Electoral Commission (EC), which is a legal framework and institution through which elections are conducted, especially in emerging democracies. With this in mind, it is important to ensure that the electoral body which manages and regulates democratic elections is autonomous and impartial. For the EC to be considered legitimate by the people, it must show credibility in managing elections. This would give the government emerging from such elections the needed legitimacy to be accepted by the people, as well as making leaders responsible in performing their duties. So, this chapter questions, to what

extent have the elites in Ghana and Nigeria used the electoral commission to foster democratic consolidation?

This research deals with two important issues. First, whether the electoral commission is given the needed autonomy to discharge its duties, without any undue political influence. Second, whether the electoral commission has the independent capability to allow the citizens of Ghana and Nigeria to enjoy their civic and political rights, without the interference of political elites.

4.1.2 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Ghana via the Electoral Commission

Before the 1992 presidential elections, one of the key problems facing the polity was ensuring that the electoral commission organised a credible election while ensuring that there was a level playing field for all competing parties. The reason behind this key problem is further discussed by Jeffries and Thomas (1993:332) who note that a regime where the incumbent is one of the contestants during an election, it is possible that the processes of such election might go in his favour as he is likely to make the rules guiding the electoral competition to suffocate the chances of the opposition. This was why the elites in Ghana deemed it important to establish an electoral commission that would be independent, to enable it to discharge its electoral duties without fear or favour. When Ghana had its first transition elections in 1992, it was the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) that conducted the elections. As those elections witnessed various irregularities, which eventually led to the boycott of the subsequent parliamentary elections by the opposition political parties, it became obvious that a new beginning was needed. This led to the establishment of the EC in accordance with the Electoral Commission Act (Act451) of the Ghanaian Constitution. The EC is made up of seven members, comprised of the chairman, two deputy chairmen, and four other members. These officers enjoy unlimited tenure in office. The Ghanaian Constitution specifies that when the members of the EC are appointed, they will

not be dismissed by anyone unless a member dies or is incapacitated due to ill-health (Republic of Ghana 1992:27). The body responsible for nominating the members of the EC of Ghana is the office of the president. To ensure that members are not selected due to bias by the President, a committee is set up in the parliament to examine every member nominated by the President. Article 46 of the Ghanaian Constitution of 1992 clarified the autonomy bestowed on the EC: *Except as provided in this Constitution or in any other law not inconsistent with this Constitution, in the performance of its functions the EC shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority* (Republic of Ghana 1992:39)

In an interview, with regard to the impact of the EC on the consolidation of democracy in Ghana, and how he rates the EC a university lecturer in Ghana responded:

> The success that the Ghanaian democracy has enjoyed since 1992 was due to the autonomy the government gave to the Electoral Commission as well as the kind of people appointed to stir the affairs of the commission. The Interim National Electoral Commission that conducted the 1992 presidential elections was established to doom the polity but the emergence of Electoral Commission and its independence is the reason Ghanaian democracy has not suffered major electoral issues compare to other African countries." In a similar vein, a retired member of the Electoral Commission stated: "Apart from the Electoral Commission that has enjoyed a high level autonomy in discharging it duties, the Ghanaian people and government have given them so much that rigging election[s] to favour a particular person or party is never considered by the commission as the commission's prime responsibility at all time is to uphold the trust and confidence repose on them by the people of Ghana." (Interview, University lecturer1, Accra, May 2013).

In highlighting why the Ghanaian Electoral Commission has been a huge success to the country's democratic consolidation, scholars like Debrah (2011) and Omotola (2013) have their opinions. For Debrah (2011: 25) *"the making of the electoral process transparent, fostering agreement on the rules of the game and asserting its autonomy in relation to the performance of its mandates."* Another view that validates the claim that the electoral

commission in Ghana has impacted democracy consolidation is from Omotola (2013) who reasons:

> "Ghana's Fourth Republic has a reputation for having a reasonably high degree of institutionalisation in election administration. Its electoral and democratic success stories have largely been associated with the autonomy-enhancing institutional design and leadership of the Electoral Commission of Ghana (ECG), which engender a degree of public confidence and trust".

As the university lecturer pointed out above, the electoral commission in Ghana has been the reason the country's democracy has not experienced reversal from the democratic processes in recent times. In the 1992 parliamentary elections, the opposition political parties boycotted the elections for the reason that the electoral commission was working for John Jerry Rawlings and his party-NDC. For them to participate in the future elections, the opposition parties demanded for electoral reforms that could give the Electoral Commission a certain level of independence. On this ground, the government created an electoral commission devoid of the influence of anyone. In order to appease the acrimony that has existed since 1992 parliamentary election boycott, the electoral commission according to (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Whitfield, 2009) created inter-party advisory committee which responded to making sure that parties settle their discrepancies for the success of future elections. After this period, the Electoral Commission made sure that in subsequent elections, starting from the 1996 general elections, there must be a level playing field for all political parties. Evidence showed that the elections of 1996 had limited irregularities compared to the 1992 elections. Furthermore, the autonomy or independence of the Electoral Commission, Ayee (1997) notes that the Electoral Act of 1993 was designed to uphold the independence and autonomy of the Electoral Commission. To elaborate the provisions from the Act to the Electoral Commission, Jeffries (1998) notes that from the Act, the Commission is not going to be subject to the control or authority of anyone; the members of the commission are given

a security of tenure of office once appointed but can only be dismissed on reasons of infirmity or insanity only when it is established by an independent medical board; the commission's fund will come directly from the Consolidated Fund; though the appointment of members have presidential influence, they are also done on the advice of the Council of State who are partly elected and appointed. This thesis reasons that the argument from the case analysis stem from this aforementioned information about autonomy the Electoral Commission has enjoyed which enabled it conduct a credible, free and fair elections. The electoral independence ensures that the electoral processes are not unduly influenced by anyone as witnessed in the 1992 Presidential elction which led to the boycott of the parliamentary elections by the oppositions.

In a similar scenario, one civil society group member confirmed that:

> Ever since the Ghana Electoral Commission caught itself in the web of election irregularities in 1992, subsequent elections have been minimal and if you compare what we have in Ghana to other African countries, you will know that Ghana is far ahead. This is because the government has done well in providing the necessary tools for the commission to be successful, especially allowing the commission the independence to function and decide electoral outcomes which other African countries have seen as herculean task (Interview, civil society activist1, Accra, May 2013).

However, despite the fact that the 1996 general elections were successful, accusing fingers were pointed at the ruling party for using state media and resources to gain the upper hand over other political parties. The election outcomes were given the seal of approval from opposition political parties that accepted the result and gave their support to the ruling party, but insisted on restructuring the electoral body for future free and fair electoral conduct.

On the government effort to ensure a popular consensus, on the ways to improve the transparency of the electoral body, it became a matter of urgent attention for the ruling

political party and the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which allowed the electoral commission to adhere to opposition parties' request for their members, to be included as representatives on the EC. For example, in the event of the inauguration of the EC, the opposition political parties requested the inclusion of party representatives in the new EC, arguing that their inclusion would help achieve free and fair elections (Oquaye 1995; Gyimah-Boadi 1999; Debrah 2011).

The EC actually responded to this clarion call from the opposition political parties, to the dismay of some of respondents who reasoned that by accepting this request, the then Ghanian President (Rawlings), was actually digging his grave before future elections. Some respondents applauded Rawlings's deep sense of commitment to making democracy survive in Ghana. For example, a retired army general who served under the Rawlings' administration stated:

> We never believed that Rawlings actually wanted to give power to the civilians. But, the moment we saw changes in the electoral body in 1993 which largely made the electoral competition quite open, then we began to understand that Rawlings meant business with Ghanaian democracy and the chances of other party wrestling power from the incumbent government increased (Interview, Retired army general1, Kumasi, May 2013).

The respondent was satisfied with the amendments in the electoral body, noting:

> Rawlings'stance on these amendments made the major opposition party (NPP) [believe] that the ruling party (NDC) was committed to Ghanaian democracy." He also stated that, "Rawlings's party's endorsement and acceptance of the outcomes of the presidential elections of 1996 was because they started to believe in the system with the hope that his party's chances of winning election was not too far"(Interview, Retired army general1, Kumasi, May 2013).

In its effort to sustain credible elections in Ghana, the EC formed the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) in March 1994, to encourage consensus among the opposing

political parties. In an interview conducted by Debrah on Ghana on the reason behind the foundation of IPAC, Paul Boateng and Lawrence Sarpong (EC members) who responded to Debrah note that the establishment of this body meant to achieve two primary goals: 'to diffuse conflict and tension arising from the ruling party and opposition political parties and ensure that all political parties in Ghana establish common compromises on the possible rules of electoral game' (Debrah, 2011:37) One of my respondents, Civil society activist, in the interviews, with regard to the importance of the IPAC in ensuring party understanding, stated:

> IPAC worked like a miracle because of its effort in promoting unity, which is at play among all political parties in Ghana and the elites in particular, as it was easy to reach a compromise through dialogue, hence the presence of IPAC as every political party has resorted to IPAC for fairness and justice. The Electoral Commission for its effort in using IPAC in settling some heinous conflicts confronting ruling parties and their oppositions in Ghana since IPAC inauguration in 1994 (Interview, Civil society activist2, Ashanti, May 2013).

These success stories have placed the IPAC as a framework for building trust and confidence among the political elites, with regard to managing election conduct. They have also provided an avenue through which political parties and other stakeholders can deepen their confidence, and trust the Electoral Commission (Ninsin 2006:64). Political elites' involvement in the IPAC has enabled them to easily reach consensus on the rules of the game, and encouraged them to be committed to democracy, resolving to accept elections as the only legitimate means of affecting an alternation in Ghanaian politics (Ninsin 2006; Frempong 2008). However, as stated above, electoral institution deficiency has been a serious problem for emerging democracies, especially when looking at other neighbouring African and Latin American countries. The trust the people of Ghana have in the electoral process is commendable, compared to the broad distrust in Latin American countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile. Irregularities, including a lack of clear rules, imbalanced media

access by the parties, registration issues, and vote-buying, have hindered smooth electoral processes in the continent (Carreras and Irepoglu 2013). A member of one community leader in Ghana stated:

> The constitutional independence to the Electoral Commission in Ghana has given the people the right to cast their votes during elections without fear or favour, hoping that their votes would count in changing the government and believing that the Electoral body will always deliver without bias (Interview, Traditional leader1, Volta Region, May 2013).

The successes of the EC are obvious in its numerous elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and both elections in 2016. Apart from the transition elections of 1992, which resulted in a brief rift with opposition parties threatening to boycott further elections, elections in these years were generally accepted.

4.1.3 Elite Commitment to Democracy and Party Financing

Introduction

Scholars generally describe political parties as a foundation through which a fledgling democracy enjoys a certain level of stability, where the majority organisational base of political parties forms the government, and a viable minority of the opposition becomes an alternative government (Kelly and Ashiagbor, 2011; Gyampo, 2015). Boafo-Arthur (2003), and Chibber and Kollman (2009) reason that the heart and soul of democracy is political parties, because of their functions in government formation, the raising of future national and state leaders, as well as serving as a watchdog to the ruling government when in opposition.

Democracy is expensive to run. To avoid corruption from creeping into the political system, elites have worked to establish a modal through which parties can be financed. Ilo (2004:23) argues that money is very important to the events of any political party. Eme and Anyadike (2014) note that limited finances will handicap a political party and make it

94

irrelevant. Unlimited access to finances gives a particular party an undue advantage over other political parties, and turns the whole process into an auction where a party with the highest financial capacity wins. Election campaigns and political party organisations require a lot of money, and mounting regulations on how to administer these would reduce inequality among candidates and one-party dominance in elections. It would be unfair for parties with a wealthy support base to be competing with political parties with less financial advantage. These wealthy political parties, if not properly checked, might end up using their strong resource base to grab votes across the country, hence the importance of party financing.

Scandals associated with the illegal financing of political parties have been common in new democracies, especially, in Latin America, Southeast Asian countries and Sub-Saharan African countries. Party financing scandals have destroyed the reputation, credibility and legitimacy of democracy in some countries. For instance, as late as 1974, party financing was unregulated in Italy to such an extent that the elites, on several occasions, diverted public money into party accounts. This gave elites opportunities for dubious party-funding (Pujas and Rhodes, 1999). African countries are not alone in this struggle, especially as the corrupt financing of political parties, particularly campaign financing, has become more predominant ever since the re-emergence of multiparty politics in the early 90s. Multiparty system has created a democratic circle that promotes inter-intra political competition. This has necessitated opportunities for scandalous political financing, which poses a threat to the continent's emerging democracies (Mwangi, 2008). Scholars who debate about party spending have always contended that inequalities in the financial capabilities of political parties could distort political competition, as the wealthiest parties always claim victory. If these parties are not properly regulated, it is hard to have a level playing field for competing political parties, and this has a negative consequence for equal political participation.

95

Research shows that party spending is correlated with positive electoral outcomes (Fisher, 1999).

Consequently, 88 per cent of countries in Latin America officially recommended direct public financing of political parties. As early as 1928, Uruguay introduced public financing into their body polity. Second to Uruguay was Costa Rica in 1949, then Argentina (1957 indirect and 1961 direct) and Peru (1966 indirect and 2003 direct). Direct public funding in Nicaragua followed in 1974 and in Mexico in 1977 www.idea.int/sites/default/files/.../funding-of-political-parties-and-election-campaigns.pd. Countries like the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Canada, Germany, and post-communist Eastern Europe, also have systems that support public funding. African countries, such as Lesotho, Mali, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Botswana receive some funding from the state (Gyampo,2015), while there is less in countries from the Caribbean, Asia, and Pacific regions (Doorenspleet, 2003). Research still shows that campaigning and party financing come with scandals and controversies, especially in Botswana and South Africa, where donations to political parties from both private and foreign bodies are not subject to any state regulations. As a result, dominant (ruling) political parties have regular advantages over opposition political parties, which in turn stifles the chances of these oppositional parties winning (Doorenspleet, 2003: 182).

Therefore, this research is interested in understanding the degree and presence of uneven party-financing, a political party's access to finance, and financial regulation. In the interview questions, there are two principal questions. First, does the ruling party have more access to finance than the opposition parties? Second, is the regulation guiding the financing and spending of political parties effective and efficient?

4.1.4 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Ghana via Party-Financing

96

As far back as the early 70s, Gyimah-Boadi (1979) decried the lack of clear guidelines through which political parties were funded in Ghana and that the four Republican constitutions in Ghana had failed to draw a clear guideline with regards to party funding. This led to a situation where political parties generated revenue for the party through individuals or parastatals (Gyimah-Boadi, 1979). On this background, Article 55, section 3 of Ghana's 1992 Constitution enshrined political parties in Ghana as being shaped to the political will of the people, designed to help spread information on socio-economic and political ideas, and help candidates who want to assume political positions in elections. The 1992 Political Parties Law, for instance, stipulates that:

> every political party shall within 60 days after the issue to it of a final certificate or registration submit to the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) — a written declaration giving details of all its assets and expenditure, — including all contributions or declarations, whether in cash or in kind made or to be made to the initial assets of the party by its founding members in respect of the first year of its existence (Party Law, 1992).

It was on this backdrop that the Political Parties Law of 1992 initially stipulated that the maximum amount to be contributed to political parties by individuals should stand at just GHc 200,000. But this figure raised controversy among political parties, because of the level of inflation in Ghana and high exchange rate which crippled Ghanaian Cedies at the time. According to one respondent in Ghana:

> Party financing created serious controversy when it was first introduced in Ghana. This was because the economy was so bad that the inflation in Ghana reduced our currency to nothing. So people requested that the amount (GHc 200,000) was too small especially as elections and campaign run into millions of Ghanaian Cedies and that if government insisted on this amount, it implied its desire to influence elections in Ghana because the government can use state resources against helpless opposition political parties. However I must confess that financial imbalance is never a problem in Ghana's election since the 1996 general elections, because it is hard to notice that one

party enjoys more access to money than other political parties as I am sure if this exists, opposition parties will not tolerate that. I think the government is trying to give every political party the same right; of course, this can be the reason behind the various alternations that have taken place in Ghanaian democracy since 1992 (Interview, Traditional head 2, Kumasi, May 2013).

Ayee (1993) notes that the PNDC subsequently requested an amendment to the Law through the INEC, which set the limit to what individuals, can contribute to parties. After much deliberation, the amount was fixed at GHc 1 million, which was not satisfactory to political parties as they wanted between GHc 10 million and GHc 20 million.

The requirement needed for each political party to enjoy this benefit, involves having party branches in the various regions of Ghana, and in no less than two-thirds of the districts. Therefore, achieving this goal is considered difficult due to the fact that the campaign logistics run into billions of Ghanaian Cedies. This made political parties that were trapped as a result of having not much access to enough money; rely on individual contributions (Ayee, 1993). Like in other African countries, Ghanaian political parties rely on the donations of Ghanaians for party funding, particularly, the opposition political parties in the 1996 general elections. Relying on individual contributions is not seen as a good idea and for three key reasons according to Ayee (1993) who warns that: Firstly, contributions may affect policy-making by making parties alter their policies and administrative decisions to fit the interest or demands of the big donors. Secondly, "control over party funds by a few people may affect the internal power structure of power within a political party." Lastly, "the high cost of campaign may give undue influence over political recruitment to the big donors" (Ayee, 1993:251-252). From the first point, that is, allowing some people to determine a political party's financial situation may breed corruption because the big men who contributed for the well -being of parties are likely to ask for a return of their investments. In some cases, these big men may influence the government in power to make policies that will protect the interest

of heavy financiers. In the second point, this is true in a party sponsored by certain individuals. When some policies are taken by the government and maybe, does not represent the interest of the populace, then, it favours the interest of the sponsors to the detriment of the party leadership and ruling government.

According to Key (1964) "hijacking" the administration of the party by big donors will not only make the leadership of the party become entertainers but it will also make members loose interest in the party and conversion of members to the party very difficult. In the last point, the high cost of campaign may dwarf the chances of a better candidate. In a party where two people are to run for a particular office, there is a possibility that members of such party will consider nominating a candidate capable of paying for the campaign bills. To recoup the money that these politicians spent in the elections, candidates might engage in vote buying from the people, which is antithetical to democracy. In the end, one political party has undue advantage over other parties, especially when the party in question controls the government as an incumbent and makes the political field unplayable for opposition political parties. In his response to the ways through which political parties in Ghana have had even party financing and having party branches in Ghana, he posited that:

> In recent years, political parties in Ghana have been able to respond positively to the demand of having party offices in all the regions in Ghana. In the initial stages, it was difficult for parties to perform this task, but I think government subventions to parties have made this possible in Ghana. This is why the recent clamour for the public financing of political parties in Ghana is a welcomed development to many Ghanaians, because through which, the gap between the ruling political party and the oppositions would be reduced drastically (Interview, Civil society activist1, Accra, May 2013).

This research supports the last respondent who highlighted the chances of opposition amidst party financing. It is true that when parties have access to fund, respect the rules and regulations guiding party funding, the chances that any party can win in the election is

possible. The call for public funding for political parties in Ghana, according to Sakyi and Agomor (2016), came about because two political parties, the National Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), found it very hard to fund their operations through private sources. The case is slightly different when a particular party controls the government, because that party will use the state apparatus during elections. A serving party leader responded:

> It is important to point out that this country has been working so hard since the military relinquished power to measure up with advanced democracies. We considered how damaging uneven party financing can be to Ghanaian democracy and various governments in this country have worked to ensure that this problem is addressed positively. I must commend Ghanaian politicians for working in accordance with the regulations guiding party spending during campaigns and elections, as this has reflected on the democracy on ground today. This government will not lose focus stabilising party-financing which reflect the popularly ongoing public financing. In the election that got this government into power, I can remember vividly that NDC,my party, gave us and the opposition political parties' even financial assistance and I cannot deny the opposition party because they gave us the same right when John Kufour was in power (Interview,Party leader1, Kumasi, May 2013).

What the Minister has spoken about regarding Ghana is the very opposite to the cases in Malaysia, and some countries in Latin America, where state resources and state media are used to finance campaigns, especially when the ruling parties take these advantages to sustain their clientelistic networks. Take for instance, before Malaysia's 2013 election, the regime of Prime Minister Najib Razak spent a total of MYR 58 billion (Malaysian Ringitt) on salary augmentation in support of his populist policies, where workers received MYR 500 salary increase cash vouchers (Welsh, 2013). The abuse of state power can come in various forms, like the case in Venezuela where the media was used for partisan purposes. In a 2012 election campaign, Venezuelan President (Hugo Chavez) enjoyed 60 hours of airtime, as 47 television networks gave him an average of 47 minutes of coverage every day, while the opposition

100

party candidate (Henrique Capriles) had just 3 hours and 30 minutes and was allowed just 3 minutes a day (Garay and Salcedo-Albaran, 2012). Another twist in abusing the resources of a state comes from the extraction of donations through deductions from the public servants.

There are cases in both Nicaragua and Bolivia where ruling parties have made legislations that subject civil servants to mandatory salary deductions in order to support government parties. El Diario (2011) notes that the former Vice Minister of Mining in Bolivia enforced a 10 per cent deduction from civil servant wages in order to finance the campaign of the Movimiento Al Socialismo Bolivia (MAS). In Nicaragua one quarter of public servant salaries were deducted (Alvarez, 2010). Using state resources in this way negatively impacts opposition parties in elections, because it leaves them financially stifled. Because of this, opposition political parties in Ghana requested that states subsidise party financing (Ninsin, 2006). Ninsin (2006: 17-18), argues that political parties in Ghana support state funding of political parties, especially when those parties are not the ruling party. From 1992 to 2000, when NPP was an opposition party, it vehemently supported state funding of political parties. When NPP became the ruling party, the previous ruling party NDC, now in opposition to NPP, collaborated with other parties to promote state funding of political parties. It looks like state funding of political parties does not favour the incumbent party, but that it could also be used to cripple opposition political parties during elections.

In line with Ninsin's (2006) argument, a university lecturer from Ghana states:

> The reason why public funding has gathered momentum in Ghana is because both opposition and ruling parties have used it to unsettle either government in power. So, it has become a popular slogan in Ghanaian politics and each government has worked to ensure that parties are given equal opportunities. Compare our country with other African countries and you will see that Ghana is a unique case where party financing and regulation are effective and efficient. While parties with access to finance have continued to win elections in other countries, the case of

> Ghana is different because before the 2000 general
> election, NDC was the ruling party but in the election
> proper, NPP, which was the opposition, defeated NDC's
> candidate. The same thing was reflected in the elections of
> 2008 where opposition parties won. (Interview, University
> lecturer2, Accra, May 2013)

Ghana's Public Funding of Political Parties Bill was arranged through the Economic Affairs (EA) and the Ghana Political Parties Programme (GPPP), during John Kufour's regime. The bill was completed in 2008, when it was handed over to the President after two years. Both John Kufour and Evans Atta Mills showed great commitment towards ensuring that the bill passed into law in 2010. One primary concern was whether the political elites and Ghanaians would welcome the bill and be willing to support it. The importance of promoting multiparty politics and the development of democracy in Ghana necessitated the need for public financing of political parties (Arthur, 2016). For (Sakyi et al. 2016: 73; Arthur ,2016), public financing of political parties helps manage the influence that individuals with private money may have over politics. Arthur (2016) maintains that introducing a system where political parties can get assistance through public funding encourages and ensures a party-centred, rather than a candidate-centred, approach to electoral campaigning.

However, in Ghana, the law provides just two ways through which political parties can receive funding from the public: free airtime through the state-owned media, which political parties enjoy when presenting their programmes and campaign messages, and free vehicles made available to political parties during elections, depending on the number of candidates each political party fields in the election. These provisions were made possible by the Supreme Court of Ghana, which legally enforces this responsibility (Magolowondo et al.,2012). So far, research shows that the only sources through which the public finances political parties in Ghana come via indirect support, which does not involve taxing their incomes, but does involve the direct support of vehicle allocation from the Electoral Commission to political parties involved in elections (Gyampo, 2015).

102

4.1.5 Elite Commitment to Democracy and Anti-Corruption

Introduction

In regards to corruption, scholars have started with a definition of the concept. This thesis will build on the definition of corruption by Samuel Huntington, who posits that corruption happens when government officials serve their interests by displaying certain behaviours that are antithetical to accepted norms (Huntington, 1989). Scholars such as, Rothstein et al. (2005), Uslaner (2005), and Rothstein (2009) argue that corruption is a sticky phenomenon that remains in systems where it occurs. Rothstein et al. (2005) provides a reason for why corruption is regarded as a sticky problem, reasoning that the status quo has been persistent in paying for bribes or demanding a bribe.

The rationale here is that everyone in the system seems to be culpable of this action. So if some people improve their behaviour, it will not be easy to get everyone behaving in the same way. Reacting to this argument, Myrdal (1968) posits that the ordinary low level officer would reason like in a society where people thrive on corruption, he is not supposed to be only innocent one among (Myrdal, 1968:409). While this thesis agree that corruption is sticky when it occurs in a system, it strongly believes that 'no condition is permanent' with regards to tackling systematic corruption. A country that wants to fight corruption must adopt strong structural reforms capable of bringing corruption to a standstill. It is on this backdrop that this research builds on the work of Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000:37-39), who suggest that a system with a democratic culture should be defiant of corrupt behaviour.

Fortunately, Ghana and Nigeria are among the countries in Africa where democracy has been in practice since the 90's, and as such, should have success stories on anti-corruption crusades, especially when Singapore and Hong Kong, under authoritarian regimes, have success stories on fighting corruption. For the purpose of this thesis, serious fraud

office, appointment of the executive body, composition of the executive and tenure of office are considered to either mar or promote the objectives and effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies in Ghana and Nigeria.

4.1.6 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Ghana through Anti-Corruption.

Several legislative acts in Ghana forbid at any attempt made by office holders to use their offices to make private gains, to the detriment of the public. The Customs and Exercise and Preventive Service (1993) (Management Law, PNDCL 330), the Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act584), the Financial Administration Act, 2003 (Act654), and the Internal Audit Agency Act 2003 (Act 658). In the year 2000, the Political Parties Law (Act 574) was adopted to ensure that all political parties and their office holders in Ghana complied with the legal procedure that demanded the declaration of personal assets, sources of funds, liabilities, and expenditures in the national Gazette, especially with regards to elections.

Anyone found to have defrauded the government in these assets declaration would be disqualified in the election or expelled from office. There is also a Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663), which promotes transparency in government procurement, and ensures that due process is followed, especially when awarding government contracts. The massive money laundering in the mid-2000s among politicians in the continent, facilitated the passage of the Anti-Laundering Law Act, 2008 (Act749) in Ghana. This Act was designed to stop people (especially politicians) from the illicit transfer of money looted in their countries to foreign accounts. Instant punishment of a fine of 5,000, or a custodial sentence of 12 months to 10 years, is to be given to offenders for such an offence.

However, these Acts would not be effective if there were no institutions to enforce them. Since the mid-1990s, there have been various international anti-corruption creativities (Kaufmann, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1998; Onuigbo & Eme, 2015), and in recent years,

African countries have developed approaches created upon national and local action such as anticorruption agencies, public inquiries, inspector-general systems, legal and quasi-legal trials, complaints procedures, and public awareness campaigns (Heidenheimer, LeVine and Johnston, 1989; Onuigbo & Eme, 2015). The key factor responsible for assessing the effectiveness and sustainability of such approaches is the commitment of the political elites to act effectively in combatting corruption (Klitgaard, 1997; Onuigbo & Eme, 2015).

It is on this backdrop that several anti-corruption institutions emerged in March 13, 2001, under the umbrella of the Ghanaian Anti-Corruption Coalition (GACC). GACC is a unique cross-sectoral grouping of public, private and civil society organisations (CSOs), with the vision of projecting a new Ghana devoid of corruption, where transparency, accountability, integrity and tolerance are upheld. The motive for the creation of this coalition body stemmed from the fact that corruption had become prevalent and common, and Ghana required an integrated approach to fighting corruption. In this regard, Johnston and Kpundeh (2004) warn that such a social coalition does not thrive everywhere and to be successful, such an action requires a functioning state, rather than states under dictators; a patriotic leader with intent to serve is more capable of turning things around than unpatriotic leaders who are bent on exploiting their societies. There is a consensus among literature on corruption that anti-corruption reforms are bound to fail when there is no strong political will to enforce those reforms (Williams and Doig, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2000; Pope and Vogl, 2000; Abdulai, 2009). The political will in this context refers to the government's genuine interest and agenda to combat corruption. Johnston and Kpundeh (2004) again state that for social coalition action to function, there must be an orderly environment because social action coalitions cannot be effective in a socially disintegrated environment. This is because if an environment guarantees civil liberties, freedom of association and organisation, and freedom of expression it gives the people the security to oppose governmental corruption (Isham et al.1997).

105

In the Ghanaian constitution of 1992, two institutions that investigate corruption were created. These were the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), while CHRAJ does not have the power to directly tackle corruption, the constitution of Ghana allows the chairman and his two deputies to have tenure of offices as accorded the the judges in Ghana. Short (2015) observes that all the Ghanaian stakeholders in the fight against corruption unanimously adopted a policy for fighting corruption in a ten-year plan (2015-2024), under the umbrella of the National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACAP).

The Ghanaian government's effort to fight corruption has received some criticism because the (CHRAJ) responsible for checkmating corruption are lacking prosecutorial autonomy, as investigations for prosecution are in the office of the Attorney General. In his article, '*Has CHRAJ been an anti-corruption failure'* Kofi (2013) notes that during Kufour's regime, CHRAJ investigated a cabinet minister for conflict of interest and corruption, but was stopped by the court that such a move was unconstitutional, citing that CHRAJ had no constitutional powers to carry out investigations into corruption on its own without prior complaint. On the misunderstanding between the court and CHRAJ with regards to investigation another scholar observed that:

> The total absence of clear legal standards to regulate how the Attorney-General generally exercises its prosecutorial discretion, especially in cases involving alleged political corruption or abuse of office, is unhelpful to CHRAJ's work and arguably also violates the spirit of Article 296 (a & b) of the Constitution. At a minimum, where the Attorney General rejects a CHRAJ request for prosecution, the Attorney General must be required to provide written reasons that shall be made public (Prempeh (2010: 62).

In the history of Ghana, laws enacted to fight corruption date as far back as the First Republic in 1960, when The Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) was geared to look into passive bribery, the exploitation of public offices, extortion, and the use of public office to

enrich oneself. This means that any form of corruption in Ghana is condemned and in the face of Ghanaian law, taboo.

In his political manifesto and promise as he assumed his position as the leader of the key opposition party that would dislodge Gen. Rawlings, neoliberal President J. A. Kufuor declared "Zero Tolerance for Corruption", in an attempt to run a clean government bereft of corruption. The sincerity of Kufour's government on an anti-corruption programme was evident in his first two years. His government demonstrated its genuine commitment in fighting corruption, as the regime repealed the criminal and sedition laws in July 2001, which over the years posed a huge threat to media freedom, and were used in prosecuting a sitting minister who caused financial loss to the government (Abdulai, 2009). President Atta Mills, who succeeded Kufour, also promised to continue with the zero tolerance to corruption that his predecessor initiated. The President pledged to fight corruption by first challenging all government appointees to declare their assets within seven days of their appointment, compared to the pre-existing six months. Unfortunately, this instruction was never enforced (Global Advice Network, 2013). President John Mahama, who took over after the death of Atta-Mills, has not made any effort towards fighting corruption. In the 2012 Afrobarometer survey, 30 per cent of the surveyed households were of the view that the government of Mahama showed a lackadaisical attitude towards fighting corruption. Evidence from the 2015 Afrobarometer compiled by Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi (2015) note that during his campaign to become the president of Ghana in 2012, former president Mahama made strong assurances to curb corruption, investigate and reprimand corrupt officials who associated in corruption from the prior administration. However, Mahama's government could not deliver the promised political and economic goods. However, this indicates that previous administrations were genuine in fighting corruption, especially when each government maintained that

elected candidates must declare their assets. This cannot be credited to some other African countries, where the elites don't declare their assets.

The impact anti-corruption agencies have had in Ghana cannot be ignored. For example, as at 2006, Bossman (2006) noted that ever since CHRAJ was created in 1994, investigate over 125 corruption cases have been completed in Ghana. These included some high profile investigations, such as corruption cases against ministers of state and other high profile government officials, which eventually led to the resignation of these government workers. Bossman (2006) confirmed that one of the investigations conducted between 1995 and 1996, during Rawlings's tenure, looked into the illegal acquisition of assets and was the breakthrough that created the commission's reputation as a transparent and credible anti-corruption institution in Ghana.

Since the early days of its establishment (1995) the CHRAJ has managed some important investigations. There involved high profile government officers who illegally amassed wealth, alleged corrupt officials, including Mr. Osei-Wusu, the Minister of Interior, Mr. Adjei-Marfo, who worked in the office of the President, Mr. Victor Obeng, who served as an Adviser to President Jerry John Rawlings, and Mr. Ibrahim Adam, the Minister of Agriculture. Most of these culprits were caught after various findings by CHRAJ. Short (2015) posited that the government tried to reject their findings as they are contained in a White paper, a procedure forbidden by the law establishing CHRAJ. But CHRAJ held close to its verdicts, which led to the official resignation of these public officers.

Amidst the establishment of anti-corruption agencies in Ghana, the tenure of office given to members of the anti-corruption agency matters most, as their official tenure accords them the right of permanent appointment. Because of this, it is possible to argue that members of anti-corruption agencies will deliver when they know their place in office is secured. However, this connotes a certain level of autonomy among the members of the anti-

108

corruption agencies in Ghana. For example, the CHRAJ's ability to adhere to its verdicts on criminal issues without the influence of anyone stems from the institution's tenure of office, granted to the institution by the government. This long term tenure has guaranteed the CHRAJ's autonomy. For instance, once anyone is appointed a member of the CHRAJ in Ghana, that person retains that position for life. For any gross misconduct to result in the Presidential dismissal of an executive member of the CHRAJ, a five man committee would look into the case before a decision could be taken. It can be argued that anyone who has a permanent position is likely to deliver in the crusade against corruption compared to anyone whose position is fragile and likely to be dismissed at any time. The successful execution of projects in combating corruption is the result of the anti-corruption body in Ghana being free to handle corrupt cases, allowing it to fight against corruption at its own discretion. It is the autonomy granted to this body that enables it to prosecute high profile government officials. This is one area where the anti-corruption body (CHRAJ) in Ghana has excelled and this shows that the political elites in this country are committed to democracy.

4.2 Elite Coherence through Coalition/Alliances

Introduction

According to Gabriel Almond's (1966) theory of the political system, of crosscutting cleavages, it is possible to predict that countries like Ghana and Nigeria, with plural cultures and divisions, will show a high level of instability. But these countries are not unstable despite the visible fragmentation surrounding their politics before and after transitions. The reason is according to some scholars, like Fatton (1992), Samatar (1997, 1999), Ake (1967, 2000) and Svanikier (2007), African political elites form a more multi-dimensional viewpoint, and in the process accepted the critical role they play in attempts to bring about regime change and stability. It is important to point out here that the cohesiveness inherent in some African countries is a result of the shared interest in democracy among the elites. The

question is, what actually made the elites coherent in the first place? For the benefit of this thesis, the research will answer the aforementioned question, looking at negative incentives like ethnicity fear of war and sanctions which were prominent in making Ghana and Nigerian political elites to show a high level of cohesion.

In the period of 1980 to 1990, coalition formation was common among countries with emerging democracies in Europe, Latin America, and recently, African countries. The studies by Neto and Magar (2000), established that in Latin American states, half the cabinets in the 80s and 90s emerged through multi-party appointments, where their main reason for co-operation was to trade off policy ideals in order to share the spoils accrued from political positions. This is what Oyugi (2006) referred to as an 'opportunistic' kind of coalition. It is important to look at some theories that explain coalitions, as this affects democratic consolidation, and then use it to explain the approaches inherent in African democracies, especially Ghana and Nigeria.

Coalition theory concentrates on size principle and policy-based approaches (Laver, 1986). The size principle approach connotes the importance of governments enjoying parliamentary majorities, as it reflects the outcomes of the last elections, where the seat possessed by each parliamentarian gives him bargaining power in the coalition. However, in recent times, this approach has been reformed due to the nature of minority governments in Western Europe (Strom, 1990). On the other hand, the policy-based approach connotes that elites, through their parties, form coalitions to address a fundamental policy question which relates to a country's politics, to ensure governmental stability (Pridham, 2002). It is from this view on government stability that this thesis can take off, to understand why coherent African political elites first venture into an alliance/coalition. Alliances or coalitions can take place within the opposition and other parties, or by the ruling party and other parties, depending on the situation. The alliances and coalitions common in most African states take

110

place before elections as the elites use that opportunity to maximise their chances of winning elections, either to consolidate sharing the spoils or in an attempt to promote political stability.

The idea of forming alliances or coalitions by the elites before and after elections, amidst ethnic-divisions and political rivalries, indicates how cohesive the elites are. This shows the ability of the elites to reach a compromise and build national unity in emerging democracies, which in return strengthens the possibility for democratic consolidation. With regards to African elites, who are by nature ethnically oriented and, hold sway over their ethnic groups, it is difficult to predict if they will manage alliances in such circumstance. The ability to unmask this ethnic stigma connotes that they are willing to form alliances, which impacts democratic consolidation. The thesis aims to find out what the elites in Ghana and Nigeria did to create an enabling environment, where the opposing elites get accommodated to advance the consolidation of democracy against African traditional one-party system that is dominant in nature. Elite coherence shall focus on two major interview questions: (1) Is there tolerance among the political elites? (2) Is there coalition or alliance among political parties?

4.2.1 Coalition /Alliances through Elite Coherence in Ghana

Before 1996, Ghana had a long history of elite disunity, due to the existence of traditional political divisions between Danquah/ Busia (right-wing) and Nkrumah (left-wing). While Danquah/Busia's ideology is based on political and economic liberalism like the West, Nkrumah is more socialist and anti-imperialist. In the eyes of many Ghanaians, the Nkrumahist tradition represents ethnical and social inclusiveness, a broad-based majority and is left-wing. On the other hand, the Danquah/Busia tradition is seen as elitist, ethnically limited, principally Ashanti and Akyem sub-groups of the Akan), liberal-democratic, and right-wing (Svanikier,2007; Whitfield, 2009). NPP is perceived to be dominated by Ashanti

111

people, and during elections the sub-groups of the region have always been a stronghold for the NPP. In the same scenario, the NDC has been perceived as a Ewe or Northern party. According to Nugent (2001), Rawlings, who is a native of the Ewe community, referred to the Ewe populated Volta region as his World Bank because of the number of votes he received from the region during elections. These two traditional political parties from Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah have a deep seated hatred for each other, and the affiliation of members to these two groups determines voting behaviour and electoral outcomes. One of the respondents during an interview argued:

> The maturity the two traditional groups Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah in Ghana have exhibited to progress democracy in Ghana remains the reason why we have had successes in our democracy. For example, Danquah/Busia represents New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the People's Convention Party (PCP), the brainchild of Convention People's Party (CPP). The Danquah/Busia and Convention People's Party are two opposing groups yet they were able to form a strong alliance (Great Alliance) that stood against the ruling party of NDC in the 1996 general elections. Despite the deep hate that had existed between the two groups in the early 60s, they managed to negotiate a means for settling their differences which largely smoothed grounds for the NPP's victory in the general elections of 2000, and put our democracy into its first alternation of power where the opposition Party (NPP) defeated the incumbent party (NDC) (Interview, Party leader2, Accra, May 2013).

In the events that led to the elections of 1996, NPP and the People's Convention Party (PCP), formed an alliance. Before this they were in opposition to each other, and both opposed to the ruling party National Democratic Congress (NDC), headed by John Jerry Rawlings. One of the reasons that led NPP and PCP to form an alliance under the Great Alliance (GA) in 1996 was Rawlings' popularity. On this note, a retired military Major argued:

> Frankly, as at 1996, we were shocked when NDC was declared the winner in the general elections of 1996. Many

were afraid that Rawlings might become another terror like Idi Amin of Uganda because in his regime as the Military Head of States attempted coups were carried out but none succeeded and as he remained to win elections under successive civilian governments. Ghanaians feared that a terror had emerged in their polity. You know before the elections of 1992 and 1996 Rawlings had established himself in Ghanaian politics, bought over some major civil society groups as well as controlled the Media. Hardly would you see anyone talking about negative things in the Press against Rawlings, of course, this showed the level at which Rawlings had dominated the political system. Even before the elections of 2000, where external forces were telling Rawlings to step down, and also respect the constitutional regulations in Ghana for just two tenure of office for the president, there was anxiety across Ghana that Rawlings might pick a successor who may eventual wins the election. It was miraculous when the power of alliance worked against Rawlings and his party-NDC. You can recall that the Great Alliance surfaced in the 1996 general elections but failed to make any meaningful impact in those elections but was stronger in 2000 when NDC was dumped to the delights of many Ghanaians (Interview, Retired Army Major2, Ashanti, May 2013).

On the other hand, some authors reasoned that the political elites from Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah reacted against Rawlings because they began to feel a sense of shared destiny, from what they went through under Rawlings's AFRC/PNDC, which unleashed human violations and persecution on them (Svanikier, 2000: 132). In his response, a member of Center for Democracy Development (CDD) in Ghana argued:

The alliance that was formed by the opposing political parties in 1996 was emotional in nature. Even at their differences, they managed to form an alliance because of the anger in their hearts against the ruling government. Under the governments (military/ civilian regimes) of John Jerry Rawlings, people were brutally treated especially when you are in the opposition party. It was this very reason that in 1996 political elites from different orientations came together to stop Rawlings's re-emergence but this was not possible because the Progressive Alliance under the ruling political party was more strong than the Great Alliance under the NPP(Interview, Civil society activist1, Accra, May 2013).

113

Another interesting motivation for this alliance was instigated from the earlier alliance Rawlings's NDC had with two other parties, the NCP and Eagle, in 1992. The PCP, which is descended from Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which tapped the ideology of Danquah/Busia's United Party, reasoned that if NDC could form an alliance and win, they could do the same. While alliances were pivotal in 1996, proven by the one between NDC and two other political parties, it was unusual to see Nkrumah and Danquah/Busia loyalists unite for a common goal. These two parties, PCP and NPP, established common ground for co-operation in 1996, largely to unseat the incumbent government of Rawlings, who had being in office for fifteen years. A community leader member discussed this further:

> Under the Progressive Alliance, NDC won the elections of 1996 and major other alliances formed at the time, which were significant as they showed evidence that democracy had come to stay in our country. Take for example, Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah loyalists have been rivals over the years, and as a result it was unthinkable that these two opposing sides could ever share anything in common. But because they wanted Ghanaian democracy to work out, they buried their political differences so that they could achieve a promising democracy, hence the formation of the Great Alliance. Though this alliance did not live up to expectations, it proved to the whole world that Ghanaians did not play politics of rancor but were willing to show readiness to compromise on their differences. Yes, it is true that the alliance did not work out in 1996 but this was the reason NPP emerged winners in the run-off elections of 2000 (interview, traditional leader2, Kumasi, May 2013).

Along the same lines, Ayee (1997) blamed the opposition parties' loss of the 1992 and 1996 elections, on the power of incumbency. The opposition elites were unable to form a united front capable of dethroning Rawlings, even at the merger (Great Alliance) between NPP and PCP. A university lecturer noted:

> Alliances through political elites' unity have become a norm in Ghanaian politics since 1992.The two previous

elections, especially the elections of 1996, showed how much an alliance can swing votes to parties. Before the general elections, other political parties were not happy with the ruling party because of what happened in the previous elections, where other parties boycotted the parliamentary elections. Yet, for the sake of unity, other parties managed to form an alliance (Progressive Alliance) with NDC. In these 1996 elections, two alliances were formed, the Progressive Alliance for NDC and the Great Alliance for NPP. The Progressive Alliance emerged victorious in the elections, because they had a good understanding with the parties that they formed the alliance with, and this counted in the electoral outcomes. NPP was defeated in that election because it looked like the parties that formed that alliance still had some areas of discrepancies which affected their chances in the election.. When they reconciled their differences in the 2000 general elections, they were able to emerge victorious at the poll. Political alliances I can say have really progressed our democracy (Interview University lecturer3, Accra, May 2013).

The ability of political elites to compromise on their differences was instrumental when opposition parties won the presidential election in 2000. In this election, only one alliance (Progressive Alliance) was formed, compared to the previous election of 1996, which pitched two alliances (the Progressive Alliance and the Great Alliance) against each other. The election was conducted twice to ascertain which party won. In the first election, no party was able to reach the required figure (50 % +1) to be considered the winner, so a run-off election was organised. The elites from different oppositions groups irrespective of ethnic affiliation, mobilised support for NPP which was strongly opposed to the incumbent party (NDC) at the time. The second election favoured NPP. This result was significant for the country's democracy, because an opposition party dislodged an incumbent party. In the 1996 elections, there was a merger that did not play out between Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah groups due to their fundamental differences. But in the 2000 run-off elections, which eventually brought the NPP into power, those differences were set aside as oppositions

groups unanimously voted against the incumbent party. According to one political party stalwart:

> Alliances among opposing political parties in Ghana have shown the level of understanding and co-operation that exists between political elites from different ethnic groups. Even in their differences, elites of these political parties have found common ground for interactions. The run-off elections of 2000, where the first election failed to present a candidate remains an example of where alliance was decisive. In that election,no candidate wins with over 50%, so a run-off election was organized to determine which party to win. It was through an alliance formed by Danquah/Busia and Nkrumah political elites that gave NPP victory over NDC (Interview, Party leader3, Sunyani, May 2013).

Apart from the alliances formed by the elites in Ghana, both the elites from the two opposing political parties, NDC and NPP, have shown politics of inclusiveness in their administrations and governments. Elischer (2008) observes that though the leadership of NDC favoured the Western and Northern regions in terms of appointments, there were cross-cutting cleavages across ethnic lines. This was despite the fact that John Jerry Rawlings handpicked a candidate from his geographical location (West) as his successor during the 2000 elections. In an attempt to reinforce the politics of communal existence among the political elites in Ghana, a NDC stalwart noteed:

> I will not deny that there is no coalition or accommodation of opposing parties in our country. I can vividly remember that our members were involved in the government of John Kuffour of whom we remained strong opposition to. When the government of the NPP assumed power in 2000, it carried out the popularised inclusive policy which opened avenue for politics of compromise and cooperation. To enhance common representation of all elites irrespective of political affiliations, the government of NPP has appointed members of opposition political parties which include the appointment of P.V Obeng, who was a former member of PNDC/NDC, into the public service. Another notable appointment was the former member of PNDC/NDC (Joyce Aryee) as the Chief Executive of the Ghanaian Chamber of Mines. These

116

> appointments were carried out even at the mounting
> differences between the two rival political parties
> (Interview, Party leader4, Volta, May 2013).

This act of mutual cooperation and compromise of elite differences has exhibited a high level of coherence towards establishing democratic consolidation in Ghana. Of course, the relative relationship that has existed between the different elites in Ghana has been reflected in the country's democracy; when the two major political parties have produced the president of the country, either neither of the parties have challenged the election outcomes at the court, or when they do it has been resolved peacefully. In the next discussion, we shall talk about how elite tolerance sustains democratic consolidation.

This thesis can deduce that the cohesive nature of Ghana's elites is reflected in the various alliances that have taken place in the country since 1992, mainly because those elites are like-minds in their quest for democratic consolidation. Laver and Schofield (1998) and Riker (1962) hold that most African coalitions are interested in seeking political positions, rather than pursuing policies. This thesis disagrees with this notion because the political elites in Ghana have pursued alliances to advance elite coherence, which is spot on the country's consolidation of democracy. So, It does not matter whether it is ruling elites against the opposition, or opposition elites against the ruling elites. Instead, the alliances have resulted in a relatively cohesive atmosphere among the elites, which promote stable democratic outcomes.

4.2.2 Elite Coherence through Tolerance

Introduction

A necessity of democracy is the readiness of different ethnic groups in a country to recognise and respect the rights of other groups who do not share the same political affiliation, or hold different views in a political process. When citizens tolerate the rights of others, it goes a long way in securing the rights of all and reinforces democratic values and

117

democratic citizenship. As Sniderman et al. (1989: 25) argued, "The more tolerant citizens are of the rights of others, the more secure are the rights of all, their own included; hence the special place of political tolerance in contemporary conceptions of democratic values and citizenship." So, for democracy to be considered balanced, Frempong (2008) notes that all political players must have a certain level of cooperation to enable them compete effectively. If democracy is to be effective, Diamond et al. (1995:19) notes that democracy must be legitimate, opposition political parties must be tolerated, parties must be willing to compromise with other political opponents, there must exist cooperation among all competing political opponents, there must be fairness in political positions and partisan identification, and there must be civility of political discourse and efficacy that promotes participation, emanating from the norm of political equality.

If tolerance entails allowing others their rights in democracies, for the benefits of this thesis, this research looks at the extent to which the political elites in Ghana and Nigeria have tolerated the opposition political parties. It will also consider their relationships with other opposing groups, like the media and civil society groups. This thesis shall find out if civil society and the media have enjoyed the maximum right to express their views, with regards to how democracy has been practiced in these countries, and whether the ruling governments in the two countries are willing to accommodate the constructive views of these groups, be it negative or positive. Keller (1999) describes the characteristics of the civil society as an autonomous association created upon a civic agenda, born as civic organisations, but moved by circumstances to engage in politics. They might demand constitutional reform, government accountability, their human and political rights, and an end to official corruption (Keller, 1999).

118

4.2.3 Elite Coherence through Tolerance in Ghana

In interviews conducted in Ghana, on tolerance among the elites and political parties, the results show that Ghanaian elites seem to show tolerance to opposing political elites. While 22 out of 25 respondents agreed that there is high level of tolerance in Ghana, only 3 respondents held a contrary view.

One of the respondents (a university lecturer) who held a contrary view about the high level of tolerance among the political elites in Ghana, reasoned that:

> There is a high level of intolerance in Ghana especially as the parties still practice the so called attitude of the 'winner takes it all' syndrome. For example, first, the opposition political parties are ineffective in Ghana, Secondly, the government has not tolerated the civil society, maybe, because of their critical manners which of course, help democracy consolidation in advance countries. So, the political elites in Ghana must endeavour to collaborate other opposing views." In a similar view, a media member posited: "how can one talk about tolerance among the political elites in Ghana while since transition there has been ethnicity problems and divisions in the politics of this country especially between the Ewe tribe and Akan tribe, which are the two strongest tribes where the two major political parties in Ghana have their stronghold. We will need to break these divisions and then argue that the political elites in this country have a high level of tolerance. Many have talked about tolerance in our politics but I shall not subscribe to that until acrimonies between these two tribes ceased to exist (Interview, University lecturer4, Cape Coast, May 2013).

One of the respondents thought there was a high level of tolerance among the political elites in Ghana:

> There is a high level of tolerance due to the competitiveness the political parties have engaged into over the years, that has resulted in the opposition political party asserting its authority, which enables it to capture power many times in Ghana. Added to that, our organisation, the Centre for Democracy Development and other civil society groups, have enjoyed maximum tolerance from the elites. As a matter of fact, the political elites have sensitive attitudes towards the civil society and

119

this is why they try to co-opt our group (Interview, Civil society activist3, Tamale, May 2013)

In a similar vein, another respondent argued:

> Ghana's democracy would not have been this positive without the understanding the politicians have shown so far. I must commend them for showing positive tolerance to other opposing views. Lack of tolerance among political elites has been a bane on democracies in African continent. Their efforts in the establishment of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee is worthy of emulation by other struggling democracies in Africa because this body has helped the opposing political elites and parties to remain peaceful through working on possible means to settle opposing views, and the result is obvious in many general elections where the two major political parties have had various alternations. Apart from 2008 where we had some misunderstanding between parties, since 1996, defeated parties have gone home and congratulated the winning parties and, of course, this kind of tolerance cannot be found in some African countries (Interview, Party leader5, Bolgatanga, May 2013)

Still on the issue of political elites' tolerance in Ghana, a community leader who is also a

staunch member of NPP, posited:

> Over the years, Ghana has proved to the world that they have matured in every aspect of their democracy and the issue of political tolerance has been in existence since 1996, even though the incumbent was still in power after what some of us saw as a scam in the election of 1992 which we boycotted. Opposition political parties have enjoyed maximum tolerance from the various ruling parties since transition. Since 1996, there has been equal access to political campaign resources which was absent in 1992 where opposition parties were starved of the government media. Recently, the government has allowed for freedom of private media. On the other hand, the elites have shown tolerance to the civil society. After all, Afro barometer supports my view that the elites in Ghana have tolerated the civil society (Interview, Traditional leader3, Cape Coast, May 2013).

In a similar view, a former retired Retired Army general agreed that:

> The opposition political parties are not facing any restrictions especially during elections. There is freedom among opposition political parties where they enjoy free

media, free association and the two turn overs are an example that opposition parties are allowed to muscle with the incumbent political party. Tolerance is all about live and let live. It is not about our different ethnicities but the culture of playing politics with less bitterness, so that unanimously Ghana would build a democracy worthy of emulation. Good a thing our political players understand this and so far, I have no regret that we left political arena for the civilians (Interview, Retired Army General3, Accra, May 2013).

From the interview answers, this thesis found that some respondents used the post-election crisis of 2008 in Ghana to argue that the political elites lack tolerance. It is important to shed a little light on that election. Before 2008, NPP had succeeded itself in power in the elections of 2004. So, in the elections of 2008, it looked like NPP which was the opposition party to NDC between 1992 and 2000, was becoming a dominant party because it had ruled from 2000 to 2008. Therefore, the new election was seen by many as a test to ascertain the maturity of Ghanaian politics, and see if the political elites could maintain, or even consolidate, their own record of elite tolerance and unity. Therefore, the elections of 2008 came amidst several controversies, like the anxieties and tensions from the opposition party (NDC) which claimed that the voters' register in the Ashanti Region, supposedly a NPP stronghold, was bloated. The NDC requested the IPAC's urgent attention in looking into the issue, threatening to contest the outcome of the elections if IPAC failed to address their concerns. Another concern was about the People Amendment Bill which conformed with the Peoples Law of 1992 (PNDC LAW 284), and was tabled in 2004 by NPP for amendment so it could give voting rights to Ghanaians of the diaspora in the elections. However, this idea was refuted by NDC who threatened to contest the election results should the NPP go ahead on passing the bill into law (Asante, 2013). However, despite these differences during the 2008 election Gyimah-Boadi (2009) notes that the electoral playing field was not only level, but that the government tolerated all the competing parties as they pursued their campaign objectives without the interference of any opposing elite. The outcome of the 2008 election

was significant in Ghanaian politics, as it marked another turn-over test which Samuel Huntington describes as important to consolidated democracy.

The institution that the Electoral Commission, with the help of donors, established to ensure peace and tolerance within the various opposing political elites and parties was the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC). It was formed in March 1994, mainly to address any would-be or existing controversy that could deter democracy. This recognised political institution (IPAC), set out the rules for how various elites and their parties could compromise on the political game within the institution's framework. The reason for establishing the IPAC, was to allow for elite interactions during and after elections, and to resolve the negativity that surrounded elections, like the 1992 parliamentary elections which resulted in the boycott of the subsequent elections and the post-election crisis in 2012. Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah (2012: 7) highlighted the importance of IPAC, in that through IPAC the opposition parties succeeded in negotiating for transparency mechanisms in Ghanaian elections, the inclusion of more polling station vote counting, and the use of transparent ballot boxes in elections, where party agents were allowed to represent their parties at polling stations. These agreements were reached by the political elites and the Election officials. The implementation of the various reforms, as suggested by the elites through the IPAC, was instrumental in curtailing voter fraud and improved the relative reliability of Ghanaian polls. There are communication links through which members of the elites interact, especially when they want to push or defend their interests during decision-making (Higley and Gunter, 1995). The goal of this elite interaction can be said to have been achieved in Ghana, going by the various problems which could have undermined degenerated the country's democracy but were handled peacefully by the IPAC. One respondent who talked about the impacts of the IPAC in Ghana's politics noted:

> The politics of Ghana are on the right track today because
> of the establishment of the IPAC. When we talk about

tolerance among opposing elites in this country, commendation shall be given to donor countries who through our Electoral Commission established the IPAC, which has been responsible for resolving crisis and sustaining peace among the political elites and parties. The establishment of IPAC has served as a unifying factor among politicians in this country and the outcomes of few elections in Ghana show that the political elites tolerate themselves hence the turn overs between main opposition parties (Interview, Civil society activist4, Kumasi, May 2013).

Ghana's democracy accommodated various actors in their agenda for peace and unity through the IPAC. In its monthly meetings, IPAC has representatives from the country's political parties, the electoral commission of Ghana and, in some cases, extends invitations to the country's key donor players. This could bring everyone onto the same page and promote a wide-ranging campaign for unity. In this meeting, the Electoral Commission that discharges the functions of the IPAC narrates its activities with the political parties and raises any activity from the parties that negates IPAC modus operandi and in return, political parties will raise their own concerns to the Electoral Commission which finds a way to address their concerns amicably.

However, despite the deep hatred confronting the ruling government and the opposition elites, the immediate impact of the IPAC in stabilising peaceful co-existence among political actors came after the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, where the cohesive relationship that the IPAC established for the elites was responsible for the general acceptance of the 1996 election verdicts and the re-election of John Jerry Rawlings. The general mood following the election of 1996, the declaration of Rawlings as the president, and the acceptance of the result by the opposition parties, confirmed the fact that the contending political elites had agreed upon the basic rules of electoral politics (Ninsin 1998: 194).

In the midst of the mistrust that surrounded the elites and their parties in the 2000 elections, the IPAC did not deter the promotion of confidence-building among the key players in regulating the behaviour and the actions of the political elites. It could be argued that in the 2000 elections, the incumbent political parties (NDC) which had ruled twice, took into consideration the advice from the IPAC, which supported politics of tolerance and accommodation of opposition political parties. For instance, in Ghana's 2000 elections, the country overcame the first hurdle that countries must overcome to be considered consolidated, which O'Donnell (1996) describes as power alternation between competing political rivals.

The framework reached by the IPAC representatives for future elections materialised during the 2000 elections, because for the first time since the country's transition, an opposition party (NPP) overcame the incumbent party (NDC) in a transparent election. This resulted in the first power alternation, which invariably set the path for consolidated democracy in Ghana. The unique thing that happened was that John Evan Atta Mills, the ruling NDC's presidential candidate for the 2000 elections, conceded defeat to the NPP candidate John Kuffuor with warm congratulations. Mills also participated in the inauguration of the new President, curtailing ethnic and political strains and promoting national unity (Gyimah-Boadi 2001; Asante 2013). Ninsin (2006: 64) notes that the IPAC became a framework for building trust and confidence among the political class, with regards to conducting elections. It also became a platform that has promoted deep trust towards the Electoral Commission. Events of the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2004 indicated a serious controversy over the creation of 30 additional constituencies for the elections and increasing the parliamentary seats from 200 to 230. These actions provoked yet more mistrust by the elites, but the IPAC rose to the occasion and restored confidence among competing actors.

Unfortunately, the relationship of the elites went sour during the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections, as the results were contested, as they were in 1992. The event that led to the mistrust was a report from the New Patriotic Party (NPP), which accused the government of conspiring with the electoral officers and manipulating the electoral results, as well as the Electoral Commission side-lining the IPAC when major reform decisions about the 2012 elections were taken (Asante,2013). Against this background, the opposition party (NPP) contested the outcomes of the results. The actions of the Electoral Commission looked like ground work to the elections for the New Patriotic Party in the elections. However, The National Democratic Congress reclaimed their verdicts in court, and John Dramani Mahama was made President, despite the charges heaped on his party by NPP. It is important to note that even amid controversy the opposition party resorted to the court for justice, instead of using political violence.

4.3   Chapter Summary

Discussions so far have shown that the political elites in Ghana possessed a high level of democratic commitment and a high level of elite coherence. The elites of Ghana, in the interviews conducted, responded that in relation to commitment to democracy, the electoral body is given independence and autonomy, both of which are evident in the many successful elections in the country. The unlimited tenure of office granted to the members of the electoral commission shows that the political elites in the country are determined to giving the body the needed independence to function without any interference. In the area of party financing, rules about party financing, state subsidy, access to media and transparent donations/financing are used to measure the transparency of party financing. Ghana scored 14 percent out of the available 16 percent and this indicate a high level of political elite commitment to democracy. The interview responses in Ghana are in agreement with the results from the measurement. With regards to anti-corruption, serious fraud office, mode of

appointment, composition of membership, tenure of office are used to measure the effectiveness, fairness and unbiasedness in the prosecution of corrupt political elites and other political offenders. In this regards, the political elites in Ghana fared well too.

Elite coherence is discussed, looking at alliances/coalition and the tolerance that exists among the political elite which has largely helped in promoting understanding and agreement to compromise their differences. In the discussion about the level of party alliance/coalition, 23 out the 25 interview respondents were of the view that alliances had not only formed a means of interaction for political parties, but that alliances have helped the development of Ghanaian democracy. With regards to tolerance, 22 respondents out of the 25 interviewed agreed that there is a high level of tolerance among the political elites of Ghana.

Looking at the level of elite commitment to democracy exhibited by the Ghanaian political elites, and the level of elite coherence, Ghana's democracy can be said to be consolidated, especially as the country has had four turnovers, which this thesis uses to measure democratic consolidation.

Chapter 5

Coherence in a Degenerated Commitment to Democracy: The Case of Nigerian Political Elites and Consolidation of Democracy.

5.1 Elite's Commitment to democracy in Nigeria through Electoral Commission.

A history of Nigeria's democracy would be incomplete if the electoral commission's role in the 1993 presidential elections was overlooked. This is because the election organised by the electoral commission at the time, remains the best in Nigerian history. Before this election, many Nigerians had become tired of military rule and sought to put a stop to it. Meanwhile, Nigeria's first transitional electoral body, the National Electoral Commission (NEC), was established under the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida. The chairman of the Commission was Prof. Humphrey Nwosu, who introduced a candidate nomination process tagged option A4 formula where candidates for elections were selected from the grassroots. This meant that a candidate was qualified to contest in a general election if he won from the grassroots, then went on to the national level. Two candidates contested for the seat of president in 1993 election namely; Alhaji Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Convention (NRC) and MKO Abiola, of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). While Ghana in its 1992 presidential elections successfully transitioned from authoritarian rule, Nigeria in 1993 did not manage a successful transition. However, scholars are of the view that the 1993 presidential elections were the fairest, most honest, and most credible election that the electoral body has conducted in the history of Nigerian elections (Rotimi and Ihonvbere 1994, 672; Lewis 1994, 326; Ekanade and Odoemene 2012: 76-77).

Referring to the 1993 presidential elections and the impact of the electoral commission, a staunch member of Alliance for Democracy (AD) in Nigeria argues:

> Nigerian democracy would have been stabilise by now if
> the past and current Electoral Commissioners followed the

steps Prof. Humphrey Nwosu took under the umbrella of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and conducted the most fair and honest elections in Nigeria. This was election organised under the supervision of a military regime yet it was remarkable in the ways Prof. Nwosu handled the whole processes. Yes, this commission does not enjoy the kind of autonomy and independence accrued to other Electoral Commissions in advanced democracies yet it was able to arrange credible elections for Nigerians. I think what transpired in the remarkable nature of that election was the unique way the commission members handled it. They showed commitment and dexterity in their attitude at ensuring a rig free election. Compare to the recent electoral commission, you will agree with me that even though the commission does not enjoy independence and autonomy, the members appointed to shoulder the responsibility for fair, honest and free elections are not responsive to this course but have from time to time shown lackaidecical attitude towards the task. Though autonomy and independence are necessary but free and fair elections are dependent on the members of the electoral commission because they have the power to disqualify any member who involves in vote rigging or electoral malpractices (Interview, Party leader1, Lagos,June,2013).

Still focusing on the 1993 presidential elections, it can be deduced that the difference between the 1993 presidential election and the elections in contemporary Nigeria is the formation of political parties. In the previous elections before the 1993 elections, individuals formed political parties whereas the two political parties that contested for presidential position were heavily manipulated by the military ruling elites with the support of the people. The recent formation of political parties in Nigeria by the elites has not involved the citizens. It is reasonable to argue that the 1993 presidential election was free and fair because the elites supported it. They were not ready to allow anything to disrupt the processes, especially as the political elites felt that the people were getting tired of military rule and wanted it to end at all cost. Since subsequent élections in Nigeria after the 1993 presidential elections, INEC have not been able to live up to people's expectations, especially in relation to transparency and credibility (Anifowoshe and Babawale, 2003; Lewis 2004; Kurfi 2005; Agbaje and

Adejumobi, 2006). The question that comes to mind is why has the INEC fallen short of it constitutional functions?

Compared to the effort made by the Electoral Commission in Ghana, where the Electoral Commission enjoys a high level of autonomy and neutrality, which has enabled fair and efficient elections, the Nigerian INEC (Independent National Electoral Commission) has not measured up. This is because the INEC officials are answerable to the President. While the seven members of the Electoral Commission in Ghana are appointees of the President, with the Ghanaian Parliament scrutinising them before they could take up their duties, the appointment of the INEC's chairman and the Nigerian twelve national commissioners, are in the hands of the President, with endorsement of the Senate. The Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) in Nigeria for the thirty-six states of the Federal Republic, and one allocated for the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja are all direct appointees of the President. The President also guarantees the funding of the body through the Ministry of Finance who is also an appointee of the President. It was on this backdrop that a former INEC chairman in Nigeria argued:

> My friend, I must tell you here that while I was the INEC boss I sincerely worked to protect my reputation as a good citizen of this country that enjoys good governance and pure democracy. The problem I had at the time was that when I gave out orders, somebody somewhere is countering those orders and when that person is seen by my INEC commissioners as someone more powerful than I am, they are likely to fault my orders. See, it is not that we cannot say something and stand by it but you should also know that the majority of the politicians we have in this country are capable of anything. These men can kill anyone who stands in their way to political positions and as INEC officers; we have children and wives who do not want to loose us to untimely deaths. In this country, nothing is real. If the government tells you tomorrow that they have given independence or autonomy to the Electoral Commission, I tell you that such existed only on Nigerian newspapers. But in practice, it is not true at all. One thing I must let Nigerians know is that I regretted

assuming the position of INEC boss because it made me
compromise my reputation (Interview, Election officer1,
Port Harcourt, June 2013).

From what the former INEC boss said, it can be seen that the Independent National

Electoral Commission in Nigeria has not enjoyed the needed autonomy to supervise or

conduct elections in Nigeria, because structural factors have hindered its ability to act as a

neutral body. Another respondent from the opposition party-All Progressive Congress (APC)

said:

Our party is not losing elections because we are not
capable of competing or challenging the ruling party but
because the electoral body is bias in handling elections in
this country. They are not to blame though because the
ruling government has made them an instrument for
winning elections. For an opposition party to start
competing and winning elections in this country,, there is
the need to restructure the electoral body, especially,
granting it the needed independence that would make the
electoral body discharge their duties without being
influenced by the President who appointed its members.
Of course the constitution of this country is clear on this
autonomy question for the commission, yet in practice, it
is not possible because the president controls the body,
and finances it through the Federal Ministry of Finance
who is also an appointee of the President (Interview, Party
leader2, Kano, June 2013)

Based on what this staunch APC member reasoned, it appears that the President will

influence the decisions of the electoral body during elections. On the other hand, the

President might appoint people who are loyal party members and are always ready to work in

his favour. The President, in order to gain the upper hand in elections, may wish to reward the

chairman and RECs of the thirty-six states in Nigeria and because these appointees want to

keep their jobs, they are likely to obey any instruction from the President. The reaction of

respondents with regards to the capability of the Electoral Commission in Nigeria was

negative. They affirmed that the inability of the body to conduct credible elections is external,

that is, the INEC is not to be blamed completely for the irregularities in elections, but the system. According to a former party leader in the government of Chief Olushegun Obasanjo:

> The irregularities in elections stem from the structure of the INEC which is structured in such a way it could play to the whims and caprices of the forces behind its formation. You cannot expect the members of the commission to give election verdicts that contradicts the interest of those that brought them in such position. My concern is that Nigeria is not learning from advanced democracies where the electoral commission has a high level of autonomy that enables it discharge its duties without fear or favour (Interview, Party leader3, Owerri, June 2013).

He bemoaned the capacity of the body to conduct free and fair elections when it lacks autonomy and is funded completely by the government. This research reasons along line the former party leader the deplorable state of the EC in Nigeria as the commission lacks the capacity for managing a free and fair elections. For someone who worked with the ruling party under president Obasanjo to say this about EC he and his boss (Obasanjo) once controlled, then, the electoral commission in Nigeria may be worse than he reckoned.

In order to bridge this relationship between the President and the electoral body, Nigeria has enacted some electoral acts, like the one of 2006. But this move has not done much to neutralise the power relationship between the executive arm and the Electoral Commission in Nigeria. In his observation, Lewis (2003) notes that in 1999, the elections conducted in Nigeria witnessed widespread manipulation. This sapped the trust and confidence people had in the INEC's credibility, as a neutral body. Some of the problems facing the commission were: "erratic funding, poor logistics, and wrangling over the electoral framework hindered the work of building an effective electoral system for a huge, crowded, diverse, and highly complex country. Problems accumulated from early 2002, when it became clear that the Commission was not ready to stage the local-government elections" (Lewis, 2003).

131

In a similar vein, the 2003 and 2007 Presidential elections were arguably the worst elections INEC has conducted. The two elections were not just non-credible but blatantly fraudulent; as almost all observers described it as the worst they had witnessed anywhere. The election of 2007 was a calculation of the outgoing President Obasanjo to impose his successor on Nigerians when his plot for a third term failed. With the help of the INEC Chairman (Prof. Maurice Iwu) who President Obasanjo nominated, the election was rigged in favour of the incumbent political party- Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). When the election observing team decried that the election was rigged, INEC was furious, claiming that the observation team were over-stepping its boundary. INEC stated that "election observation is different from election monitoring" and maintained that the power to monitor elections in Nigeria is permitted constitutionally to the Independent National Electoral Commission (Abuja: INEC,2007). One of respondent in Nigeria said the elections in Nigeria were a one man show:

> Immediately the President appoints his INEC chairman, election rigging starts, and anyone who the President appoints for that position must promise to deliver for the President and whoever he wants to emerge successful in elections organised under this guise must win." This ugly situation will not happen if the people are to elect INEC chairman and other members, give them life-time tenure where no one has the discretion to remove them from the office. It is unfortunate that men of integrity are made electoral commission's boss and they suffer the humiliation of destroying their reputation, because they want to satisfy the interest of the person that appointed them into the position. Our electoral body has suffered because there is no autonomy that would at least neglect the directions or influences of the cabals (Interview, University lecturer1, Lagos, June 2013).

The longitivity of tenure for electoral officers may be crucial here. Especially, as witnessed in Ghana, the members of the Electoral Commission seem to enjoy a certain level of job security. No member of the Electoral Commission can be dismissed from their duties by anyone, members only lose their positions due to health related issues or death. Compared

to Nigeria, INEC officials come and go, and in some cases, are dismissed for no reason. Another respondent, with regards to electoral commission, noted:

> The idea of the President funding INEC through the Ministry of Finance is wrong because it would make them work in favour of President's instruction.. Members of the electoral body will not welcome anything capable of making them to lose their job. If the Independent Electoral Commission must function independently, Nigerians have to decide on how the commission's members are to be selected, elected and paid to avoid the influence of the commission by anyone. If this is not tackled, the body must always be answerable to the President and I am afraid, election malpractices will be permanent in this country. We have tried to protect the interest of the people and guide their votes but my brother; you will not understand the kind of pressure we are as INEC officers. The problem is that Nigerians fail to look at the bigger picture each time there is election rigging or failed elections but they blame INEC officers for incompetency (Interview, Civil society activist1, Uyo, June 2013).

This is true when compared to Ghana, where the government funds the Electoral Commission with the approval of the elected members of the Parliament. Notwithstanding, the Independent National Electoral Commission has managed six elections in 1993, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. The outcome of most of these elections have been contested in the tribunal, as candidates who think the elections were rigged resort to court to seek to reclaim stolen mandates.

5.1.2 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Nigeria Through Party Financing.

In Ghana, donations from individuals and public support have been sources for political party financing, despite the recent calls for public financing. Likewise, Nigerian political parties, since 1999, have relied on individual donations and government annual subsidies to political parties for party financing, especially during elections. This move for state subventions by the National Assembly in Nigeria replicates party financing policies, in many countries in the Asian region, where states subsidise financing for political parties.

Research shows that the most generous funding regimes are from North-East Asia. In total, eight countries, Indonesia, Japan, the Maldives, Mongolia, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Timor-Leste, regularly give state subsidies to political parties (www.idea.int/sites/default/files/.../funding-of-political-parties-and-election-campaigns.pd.).

However, lack of adherence to party financing regulations and illegal funding of political parties, through the use of state and administrative resources, have become a concern in Nigeria and other countries. As a result, scholars have suggested that monitoring and supervising political party financing have been a global problem due to the complexity of monitoring political parties'excesses (Pinto-Duschinsky,2004). Various researches conducted in the United States, Canada, Germany and Italy have shown there have been problems in financing political parties across countries (Alexander, 1989; McSweeney, 2000; Palthiel, 1989; Saalfeld, 2000; Ciaurro, 1989).

The 1999 Nigerian Constitution, section 228(c) empowered the National Assembly to provide an annual grant disbursement to political parties through the Independent National Election Commission (INEC). This Commission also has the constitutional responsibility to oversee the monetary standing of political parties, conduct an annual examination, audit the funds of political parties, and publish a report for public information. In reaction to this, a respondent from one prestigious University in Nigeria argued:

> Yes, the Nigerian constitution was clear on party financing with regards to the financial regulation of political parties and politicians. As usual, this country and its political players hardly conform to the rules guiding financial regulations during campaigns and elections. See, regulation of the amount of money a particular party can spend, or a politician can spend, is not visible in a system where the winner takes everything and the loser looses everything. No law in this country can be strong enough to stop politicians from buying votes and influencing voters with money for their votes. This norm is so strong that when you weigh parties financially, it would be easy to

predict the electoral outcomes and Nigerians have formed the habit of going with the party with strong financial capability. Of course, this is because people believe that it is good to milk politicians dry when they are hunting for their votes, with the hope that these politicians will not remember them when they assume political positions (Interview, University lecturer2, Enugu, June 2013).

Thus the influence of money in Nigerian politics, and the inability of political parties to adhere to the legal framework governing party financing, characterises Nigerian politics with a winner-take-all mentality. Losing elections in Nigeria is like being ostracised completely from politics. To avoid being in this situation, individuals and parties have endeavored to succeed in elections by all means possible. Politics in Nigeria have been dominated by the elites who have the financial ability to influence elections, to the detriment of many Nigerians. In their research into how political parties in Nigeria financed their activities from 1999 to 2007, the Centre for Democratic Research and Training revealed that the political activities in the country had been hijacked by men with financial influence. Within the period under examination, it is understood that parties with financial muscle outsmarted other financially weak political parties during elections, through financial manipulation (Centre for Democratic Research and Training, 2008: 89).

In 2003, a coalition of civil society organisations reported that during the primary elections, PDP, ANPP, UNPP and NDP were involved in the "widespread bribery of delegates with sacks stuffed with money to influence their votes" (The Transition Monitoring Group, 2003). Money politics has been a bane to the development of the country's political system. The laws about party financing and regulation are not effective, seemingly because there is a weak political culture, and a lack of a strong institutional framework to regulate how political parties are financed and to limit election expenses. Take for example, on the regulation of political party financing, the Independent Nigerian Electoral Commission is charged with the responsibility of checking the activities of parties with regard to finance.

135

Ukase (2015:10-11) posits that though section 225 sub section 2 of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria empowered the INEC the responsibility of regulating political party's finances in Nigeria, INEC has not been playing this role since Nigerian transition in 1999. Democracy preaches equality, but in the case of Nigeria, unequal access to resources, and unregulated campaign financing are responsible for the uneven political playing ground. The gap between the poor and the rich in Nigerian politics has enabled politics of godfatherism, which perpetuates unequal expenditure during elections. Explaining the role of the godfathers with regards to party-financing, a party leader posits:

> It is not possible to regulate how money is spent during elections in Nigeria because there are classes of individuals in Nigeria, some are rich, some very rich, some poor and some very poor. A rich man may want to contest an election, but for him to win he needs a very rich man (godfathers) who will help him work into the corridor of power. The situation in Nigeria does not give the best candidate the chance to win, but allows a candidate with a very rich godfather to win so long as he can bribe his way through. The majority of elections conducted in this country have gone in favour of candidates with a strong support base of the godfathers, and in this situation it will be very difficult to regulate party-financing in this country (Interview, Party leader4, Jos, June 2013).

With regards to the politics of godfatherism which have characterised Nigerian politics, a popular traditional leader argues:

> Nigerian politics have become an investment by the godfathers who have their political godsons all over the country and they (godfathers) expect all their godsons to deliver at the poll. The godfathers don't invest their money to allow their godsons to loose elections. The kind of money they shell out during elections could even make them shed blood, especially if someone dares stand in their way. With these godfathers struggling to deliver their candidates, electoral rules guiding party-financing are likely to bend, which of course, are the ways of life in Nigerian politics (Interview, traditional leader1, Ibadan, June 2013).

136

However, the electorate has not helped matters. They trade their votes for candidates with financial muscle, without considering the implications on the country's democracy. When money is placed above everything else, the chances of electing a credible candidate is hampered. It appears to be the electorate no longer believes in the manifestos of political parties, as those promises are not fulfilled once the parties are elected. It is against this backdrop that politicians and their parties have entered into reckless spending, which sometimes results in electoral violence. During the election of 1999, civic groups decried the large amount of money political elites were donating to political parties. Observers of Nigerian democracy have unanimously linked party financing to corruption, which has been endemic to the country's democracy. This has affected the chances of consolidating democracy.

In order to curtail the problems associated with party financing in Nigeria, the National Assembly has passed several Electoral Acts. This includes the Acts of 2002, 2006 and 2010 (and some amendments), which guided the conduct of the 2003, 2007, 2011, and the 2015 general elections. It was only the 2015 general elections that did not witness a new Electoral Act, as the Independent National Electoral Commission relied on the 2010 Electoral Act. Unfortunately, these Acts could not reduce or regulate illegal party finance. In the history of Nigerian democracy, the 2015 general elections were unique because before these elections, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) had been in power for four tenures (16 years). This time, the elections were highly contested because the opposition parties formed a strong coalition under the platform of All Progressive Congress (APC). This included some key members of the ruling party who decamped to APC, while some party members stepped aside, perhaps because they were having issues with their party or the ruling government. The two major political parties, PDP and APC, as well as twenty-six other political parties, were involved in accumulating resources for the elections. This occurred despite the INEC warning

137

that the Electoral Act of 2010 was designed to monitor the activities of all the political parties. However, the figures observed in the fund raising of 2003 and 2015 elections by the political parties leave room for thought, as to whether these political parties considered those rules regulating a political party's spending. The tables below show that the political parties listed did not obey the rules guiding party financing and expenditure, as shown in the donations made by individuals to political parties. The tables show the Electoral Acts of 2006 and 2010 mapped out the financial limitation of each position. In the 2003 election alone, the table shows some selected individual donations by some party members. There is also another table describing the list of campaign expenditures of Peoples Democratic Party and All Progressive Congress for the 2015 general elections in Nigeria.

In order to justify the interviews on party financing in Nigeria, it is important to draw from the experience of other scholars. The survey conducted in Nigeria by Aluaigba (2009) in 2007, suggested that most political parties in Nigeria are starved with money from the government instead their revenues come from individuals. He bemoaned the inefficiency in monitoring and regulating party financing by the Independent National Electoral Commission, lack of internal democracy and political godfathers as reasons why corrupt activities hinder party-financing in Nigeria (Aluaigba, 2009). In a similar reaction, Nwatarali and Dim (2015) observed that during their interview with the INEC chairman in Nigeria, he confirmed that the electoral commission has not done much in monitoring and regulating party financing rather the commission has established capable staff members empowered with the responsibility of monitoring elections and party financing in the future.

Table 6 Electoral Act on Legal Limit for Party Expenses in Nigeria

2006 Electoral Act	Party Financial Limit In Nigerian Currency	2010 Electoral Act	Party Financial Limit In Nigerian Currency
President	500 million	President	One billion
Governorship	One hundred million	Governorship	Two hundred million
Senatorial Candidate	Twenty million	Senatorial Candidate	Forty million
House of Reps	Ten million	House of Reps	Twenty million
State Assembly	Five million	State Assembly	Ten million
LG Chairman	Five million	LG Chairman	Ten million
Councillors	Five hundred thousand	Councillors	One million

Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria Electoral Acts of 2006 and 2010 (Modified) , Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electoral Act 2010 and Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electoral Act 2006

Table six shows the presence of electoral acts on the legal limit on the amount of money every political position is allowed to spend on campaigns and elections in Nigeria. Take for instance the 2006 electoral acts, which placed a financial limit of five hundred million naira (Nigerian currency), for those vying for the position of the President. People vying for governorship positions were supposed to raise up to a hundred million naira, senatorial candidates were tasked to raise twenty million naira, and members going for positions in the house of representatives were to raise ten million naira. Meanwhile the state house of assembly members and local government chairmen were allowed up to five million naira respectively.

These figures were improved in the 2010 Electoral Acts. The financial limitation for anyone contesting for the position of the President was placed at one billion naira, double of what it was in 2006 electoral acts. The same amendment was made on the financial regulation of governorship candidates who were then tasked to raise two hundred million naira. Also under these new regulations, senatorial candidates and members for the House of Representatives were to raise forty million and twenty million naira respectively, and

members of the State House of Assembly and local government chairmen were to raise ten million naira apiece.

Table 7 Selected Donations to Individual Party Candidates in the 2003 Elections

Candidates	Positions	Political Party	Amount (Nigerian Currency
Obasanjo/Atiku	President	PDP	#5.5 billion
James Ibori	Governor	PDP	#2.3 billion
Bola Tinubu	Governor	AD	#1.3 million
Bukola Saraki	Governor	PDP	#160 million
Great Ugboru	Governor	AD	#200 million
Lucky Igbenedion	Governor	PDP	#500 million
Ghali Na'Abba	House of Reps.	PDP	#150 million
Chibodum Nwuche	House of Reps.	PDP	#500 million

Source; Kura, S. Y. B. (2011). Political Parties and Democracy in Nigeria: Candidate Selection, Campaign and Party Financing in People's Democratic Party. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, *13*(6), 268-298

Table seven shows evidence that the political elites in Nigeria defy rules and regulations guiding party financing. The individuals listed on the table alongside their donations show that some parties are more dominant than others. For example, before the Nigerian general elections of 2003, the President and his deputy donated over five billion naira to their party PDP. Some other candidates vying for governorship and House of Representatives' positions made huge donations to PDP. AD chieftain, Bola Tinubu made a cash donation of over one billion naira, while a governorship aspirant from AD donated two hundred naira to the party. These donations are above the estimated figure allowed to be raised by a party in any of those positions.

Table 8 List of Campaign Expenditure by Presidential Candidates of the PDP and APC in 2015 Elections

Reason for the Expenditure	Peoples Democratic Party	All Progressive Congress
Campaign and Rallies	#1,280,374,879.00	#671,062,200.00
Billboards	#473,160,000.00	#190,380,000.00
Electronic Media Campaign	#532,100,000.00	#410,050,000.00
Electronic Media Advert	#3,988,822,125.00	#1,064,706,850.00
Print Media Campaign	#2,475,228,301.00	#579,647,687.00
Total	**#8,749,685,305.00**	**#2,915,846,737.00**

Source: Centre for Social Justice,2015 or Guardian, March 12, 2015.

The table highlights the gigantic expenses made by two political parties, PDP and APC. The figures listed refer to campaigns, rallies, billboards, electronic media advert, and printed materials, and they show that each party spent huge amounts on just campaigning. While the PDP spent over a total of eight billion naira, the APC, the opposition party at the time, spent over two billion naira. With this evidence, it looks like the two parties went contrary to the rules guiding party financing.

Comparatively, in an attempt to regulate political party finances, both the Electoral Commission in Ghana and the Independent National Electoral Commission in Nigeria, have requested that political parties provide reports on their activities. In Ghana, it is uncommon for political parties to fail to meet this task, but the information rendered is always incomplete as the reports do not account for all those that contributed to the party. That is, the financial standing of the parties is not fully disclosed to the public. In Nigeria's case, the only thing that is made available to the public is a summary as parties rarely file their reports on a regular basis. In 2011, out of 23 political parties, only 2 filed their annual reports (IDEA, 2016). According to IDEA (2016) there is little control of the party finances by the Electoral Commission in Ghana. Evidence shows that political parties' accounts in Ghana have not been investigated or audited as at 2011, as the Electoral Commission lacks the capacity to

sanction any party that violates the law, even though several violations have occurred (IDEA, 2016). Compared to Nigeria, there is evidence of weak enforcement because the Independent National Electoral Commission suffers from capacity constraints. This has large effects on any active oversight of political finances; even when there are obvious signs of violations, the Commission fails to investigate or imposed sanctions (IDEA,2016).

The cost of politics in Nigeria is the reason why the elites have sabotaged every effort to implement policies to regulate party financing. Parties in Nigeria have become money making machines. For instance, before someone becomes a party's flag bearer in elections, that person should first and foremost support his party financially. Parties start making money for their campaigns by selling forms to members who have indicated an interest in running. The gigantic prices placed on party positions are evidence as any credible member who does not have the money to buy the forms will not stand a chance of nomination, no matter their popularity. The money spent on form purchasing is an entrance and has no direct bearing on what every candidate is likely to spend during elections. Therefore, the political elites in Nigeria show limited commitment to democracy as politicians always fight to win political positions, not minding if they violate rules guiding party financing.

5.1.3 Elite Commitment to Democracy in Nigeria through Anti-Corruption.

Some scholars believe that corruption, in the form of misappropriation, bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, and money laundering, in Nigeria partly resulted because of the failures of the first (1960–66) and second (1979–83) republics (Obuah,2010). Since 1975, there have been various crusades against corruption, ranging from the confiscation of illegally acquired assets by Nigerians under Murtala's regime, the establishment of a code of conduct for public servants under Shehu Shagari's regime, a war against indiscipline during Buhari's/Idiagbo regime, and Babaginda's ethical and social mobilisation crusade. It was against these backdrops that Nigeria, under a democratically elected government, initiated

142

two anti-corruption commissions: the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).One remarkable thing about these crusades against corruption was that, apart from the civilian regime of Shehu Shegari that was truncated in a military coup led by Gen.Buhari, other anti-corruption crusades took place during military regimes. However, this discussion is limited to Nigeria after its transition.

Like President Kufour, who came into power and promised zero tolerance of corruption, President Obasanjo was aware of the decades of systematic corruption that had engulfed the country. He was also aware of the various political regimes, and the negative effects those regimes had on Nigeria's economic survival, and decided to reinforce the prevailing anti-corruption laws. Similar to Ghana, Nigeria embraced anti-corruption reforms which established all-inclusive legal frameworks, under several acts: the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act No.5 of 2000, which resulted in the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC); the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Gen. Obasanjo's first bill was the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, which he sent to the National Assembly for deliberation. It was signed into law in June 2000. Once this Act was established, like the CHRAJ in Ghana, which was established to look into various forms of human right violations and other corruption-related cases, the ICPC was charged with the responsibility of receiving and investigating reports of corruption, educating Nigerians about corruption and how to fight it, and prosecuting lawbreakers.

However, in Ghana the Attorney General is able to interfere with the prosecutorial powers of the CHRAJ. The 2000 Act against corruption in Nigeria bestowed on the ICPC the power to prosecute offenders, where the Attorney General does not have the power to interfere in the powers of the anti-corruption body. After the establishment of the EFCC Act in 2002, Ogbeidi (2012) notes that in 2003, another anti-corruption commission was

143

established under EFCC designed to address the request from the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). FATF named Nigeria among twenty-three non-cooperative countries that appeared to frustrate the efforts of the international community on fighting global money laundering. Unlike the ICPC, the government of Nigeria charged the EFCC with the responsibility of looking into Nigerians, in various sectors that live above their incomes.

While the CHRAJ and EOCO in Ghana have the constitutional rights to investigate the president and other top government officials, the Nigerian EFCC, among other challenges, has to face claims of chief executive immunity, where the president, vice president, state governors and their deputies, cannot be arrested or prosecuted even in a clear indictment. The legal defense counsels of some of these state governors have interpreted the provisions in the 19999 Constitution, subsections 308(1) and 308(2) where this immunity clause is enshrined, to give complete immunity. This includes serious criminal acts that require immediate prosecution, and this make it impossible for deputy governors, governors, the vice president and the president to face prosecution while still in office. Obuah (2010) considers this immunity absurd, largely because it contradicts the basic reason for prosecuting corrupt members of government who have stolen and plundered the economy of Nigeria. He also reiterated that despite immunity under subsection 308(1), the provisions under the civil law enshrined in subsection 308(2) stipulates that governors can be prosecuted, Obuah (2010) also decries the significant delays, frustrations, and waste of resources as another challenge facing the EFCC in Nigeria.

Given the prosecution recorded in Nigeria so far, it looks like the EFCC has not handled issues relating to corruption equally. Apart from the Attorney General, who antagonised CHRAJ and other anti-corruption bodies in Ghana with regards to prosecution, we did not see where the chief Eexecutive tried preventing or influencing the constitutional functions of

144

Ghana's anti-corruption bodies. However, the case is different in Nigeria. It looks like the EFCC handled the cases of former governors, Alamieyeseigha and Dariye of Bayelsa state and Plateau state differently. A good example of the type of prosecution by an anti-corruption body on public officers who are no longer friends with the President Obasanjo can be derived from the words of Inikoba and Ibegu (2011). According to them, Alamieyeseigha (then governor of Bayaser state) had strong relationship with president Obasanjo in his first tenure but their relationship grew sour when Alamieyeigha started agitating for resource control and also was a loyalist to the Vice President Atiku who was at the time having problem with President Obasanjo on grounds that Atiku wanted to contest for the seat of president in 2007, defying all pleas from Obasanjo who wanted to run for the third time in 2007(Inikoba & Ibegu, 2011). So, president Obasanjo decided to use EFCC to hunt anyone who wishes to run for the presidency or supports any other person over himself.

However, Alamieyeseigha is dealt with through EFCC because he was perceived as an opposition to president Obasanjo (Inokoba and Ibegu,2011:289). This is the case where the president appoints the chairman of the anti-corruption without granting it a strong tenure of office. Like in Ghana where the executive members are appointees of the president with a permanent tenure of office, the executive of the anti-corruption body in Nigeria has no such right and this made them live at the mercy of the president who can dismiss them at any time. Unlike in Ghana, where the Chairman and two deputies enjoy permanent tenure of office, the EFCC Chairman in Nigeria can be dismissed at any time by the president. For instance, by the end of 2007 the government granted Nuhu Ribadu study leave and on his return, Ibrahim Lamorde had replaced him in an interim capacity. Scholars believed that the removal of Nuhu Ribadu has political undertone. According to (Adeniyi, 2011; Mikai,2016) "the removal of Malam Nuhu Ribadu as chairman of EFCC by President Yar'adua is due to Ibori's corrupt scandal which manifest the political interference of the political elites against combating

145

corruption". Maybe, this was an attempt to stop him against investigating Ibori further on his corruption cases. Then Farida Waziri, in May 2008, was appointed to replace Lamorde, who was later re-appointed on 23 November, 2011 by President Goodluck, who dismissed Waziri. Currently, the position is occupied by Ibrahim Magu. Under these circumstances, it appears that these chairmen are likely to be vulnerable to the President who appoints them so they can be considered for future appointments. Also, the inconsistencies in their appointment could lead to abuse of their position since the appointment does not last. Ekpo et al. (2016:69) note that a onetime EFCC chairman, Mr. Ibrahim Lamorde was dismissed in November 9, 2015 from the office by president Buhari on account of diverting one trillion naira (Nigerian currency) recovered from looters.

In Ghana, the Attorney General always counters the decisions of the CHRAJ, especially by questioning its legal standing in investigating and prosecuting offenders. This is the same scenario in Nigeria, where the EFCC is not able to enforce its decision without recourse to the traditional judicial process. It has become the norm for defense attorneys to frustrate both substantive cases and financial cases, or delay proceedings brought to the Anti-corruption commissions. Ribadu (2004b), once the EFCC Chairman and now the governor of Kaduna state, notes where a request by an Attorney to truncate an anti-corruption case is not granted, which is when the defense Attorneys accuse the judges of bias and request that the case be transferred to other judges, which might favour their clients.

Table 9 Comprehensive List of all the EFCC Chairmen / CHRAJ Commissioners

Number	Name	Country	Duration in the office
1.	Emile Short	Ghana	1993-2010 (Retired)
2.	Nuhu Ribadu	Nigeria	2003- 2007
3.	Ibrahim Lamorde	Nigeria	2008 (Acting Chairman)
4	Waziri Farida	Nigeria	2008-2011
5	Lauretta Lamptey	Ghana	2011-2015 (Dismissed)
6	Ibrahim Lamorde	Nigeria	2011-2015
7.	Whittal Joseph	Ghana	2015 till date
8	Ibrahim Magu	Nigeria	2015 till date.

Author's Compilation (2018) , see other sources in those links below.

The table identifies a few members who have occupied anti-corruption positions in Nigeria and Ghana, in order to show the duration anti-corruption commissioners in both countries. From the table, evidence shows that Emile Short assumed the position of CHRAJ commissioner in 1993 until she retired in 2010. She was in the office for over seventeen years. Her successor Lauretta Lamptey came into office in 2011 and was dismissed in 2015 for a gross misconduct. Whittal Joseph, who replaced Laurretta, has been in the office since 2015 and may keep ahold of the position for a longer period of time. Comparatively, the table shows that Nigerian chairmen can assume this position and get fired the next day. No chairman of EFCC in Nigeria has held the position for over five years. Commissioners are replaced and changed in Nigeria, as it pleases the President. This situation may affect the performance of the body, compared to the longer tenure that the commissioners in Ghana enjoy, which accounts for the agency's stability and autonomy.

In spite of the shortcomings facing the anti-corruption bodies, there are some notable achievements. While the CHRAJ and the EOCO have made some remarkable achievements in Ghana, the achievements of EFCC and ICPC are seen from divergent views. Some believe that EFCC and ICPC have done well. According to Sowunmi et al. (2010), few Nigerians are

of the view that the EFCC has made a positive impact on its fight against corruption, not just their ability to apprehend and investigate corrupt individuals but as well as arraign corrupt government staffs, politicians and private persons in court. On the contrary, many disagree, suggesting that the anti-corruption bodies are just paying lip-service to the rules. From the scholars who disagree that EFCC has made impact in curbing corruption, Lewis et al.(2002) and Folarin (2009) believe that Nigeria's image, with regards to corruption, has been significantly worse in the international society than locally. Folarin (2009) notes that some of the achievements the local media report with regard to EFCC impact on eradicating corruption are not really true but mere propaganda. Other scholars, Kew (2006) and Adeyemo (2006) criticise EFCC for not observing the rules, unless administering a case that would frustrate an opponent. According to another scholar:

> The question is not whether we should wage a war against corruption or not, my quarrel is that the fight should be waged within the context of the constitution … This is what the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) under Nuhu Ribadu did not appreciate, perhaps, because Obasanjo did not believe in the constitution. Hence, the commission was viewed as an instrument of vendetta. It was so selective that if you were a friend no matter how corrupt you may be, nobody would touch you, and if you were an enemy, real or imaginary, the commission would go after you (Nwabueze, 2008).

This thesis supports scholars who are of the view that the Nigerian government has not done well in reducing corruption through anti-corruption agencies. It appears that corruption cases are heard every day in Nigeria and that people, government officers in particular, are often in the net of the anti-corruption bodies involved in exonerating him or herself from corrupt charges. Inikoba and Ibegu (2011) point out that the EFCC in Nigeria hunts political opponents or enemies of President Obasanjo, this is because the body lacks the autonomy to make certain fundamental decisions on its own. This thesis believes that there is serious fraud in the mode of appointment, composition, and tenure of office in Nigeria's

EFCC body, compared to Ghana. The Nigerian anti-corruption agency is lagging behind its Ghanian counterpart. The commitment of the Ghanaian political elite in combating corruption is shown in the permanent tenure granted to the members of the country's anti-corruption agencies. This is different in Nigeria, where appointment does not come with any tenure of office, that is, members can be dismissed at any time by the President.As scholars have pointed above, because the Nigerian anti-corruption agency lacks the independence to execute its functions, it is ineffective. On the above backdrop, this thesis argues that the political elites in Nigeria do not show high levels of commitment to democracy by combating corruption, compared to their Ghanaian counterparts.

5.2 Elites Coherence in Nigeria

Introduction

Like Ghana's political elites, Nigeria's political elites turn from divided to coherent due to some negative incentives. This is because Nigerian elites were confronted with the fear of war and sanctions, and chose to erase these memories of war and avoid more sanctions by seeking for national integration. This move of restoring national unity could be the reason why the military in Nigeria considered relinquishing power to the civilian government. Before 1999, when the PDP evolved out of the calculations of the elder statesmen tag G-34 selected from the different ethnic groups and which also, are pivotal in making sure that Gen. Abacha failed in his attempt for self-succession. These groups of elites considered the unity of the country and decided to work cohesively, especially when the country had survived a civil war that lasted for three years where millions of Nigerians lost their lives. In their study about the civil war in Nigeria, Akresh et al. (2012) note that the Biafra war, fought between 1967 and 1970, revealed that several generations of Nigerians, especially women, still carry the stigma of their exposure to war. Apart from the issue of war, Nigeria has been sanctioned in the past over human right violations orchestrated by the regime of Gen. Sani Abacha.

149

Notable, among these human right violations were the executions of Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other Ogoni members, which gave Nigerian states pariah status, which hampered the country's trade relationships (Falola and Heaton, 2008).

Against this backdrop, the travails of the political elites have been to sustain the unity of the country, even at the triple traps of religious cum ethnic hatred, unprecedented corruption, and a high level of military domination which brought mayhem to the country's economy before transition. According to Uwazuruike (1997), if democracy is to survive there is need for inter-ethnic harmony, which will enable democrats to succeed in the unplanned power struggle with authoritarian types. This calls for the need to start from the beginning, especially to resolve deep seated crisis through an early compromise. To address this, elites came up with a kind of structure that could represent the interest of all nationalities: rotational government, power-sharing, as well as the unreserved solidarity shown in the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), which dominated the politics of Nigeria until 2015, when the opposition power formed a strong alliance and captured power from the incumbent PDP. In the next discussion, this thesis shall talk about how the elites engage in a relationship.

In contrast to Ghana, Nigerian elites see the power sharing arrangement as one of the factors that would bring stability into their emerging democracy, during the early days of the transition.

The elites in Nigeria have made every effort to structure a Nigeria in which every citizen can have equal right, this is particularly to avoid ethnic advantage that characterised Nigerian politics since independence in 1960. This was the reason the political elites considered zoning formula system, power sharing and rotational presidency. These structures were considered by the political elites to give every ethnic group in Nigeria a sense of belonging. Therefore, the designs of the countries' electoral systems and constitution have

often reflected incentives that promote elite integration and national unity. A striking evidence of power sharing in Nigeria comes from state creation. The rationale behind state creation is to give identity to ethnic societies, in an attempt to correct imbalances against some minority states who may feel marginalised by the bigger tribes of Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo. It is assumed that when allocations are shared, bigger ethnic groups are likely to quash the minor ethnic groups, and if more states are created, these minority groups are likely to be given a new state. This will invariably give them the upper hand during state allocation. As at 1996, the politics of state creation eclipsed to 36 states from the 3 regions created at Nigerian independence in 1960.

5.2.1 Elite Coherence through Coalition /Alliances in Nigeria

Like in Ghana, where the elites used alliances to overcome deep seated hatred between Nkrumah and Danqua/Busia's supporters, the framers or the so-called G-34 elder statesmen of Nigeria created a multi-party coalition under the umbrella of Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP). Though some alliances worked out during the transition, the first move to bring every ethnic group under the umbrella of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) by the political elites in Nigeria was remarkable. According to a Lagos based civil society activist:

> Before 1999 presidential elections, many never believed there would be a common ground for Nigerian politicians to agree on certain issues. It was surprising how the political elites under PDP gathered all core politicians from different ethnicgroups to form their party. This particular move was the strongest coalition ever to be witnessed in Nigeria. Before this time, there were problems resulting from the June 12 election that was annulled, people of Niger Delta were campaigning for resource control and the South East were talking about marginalisation, but amidst all these problems the elites through coalition, united every ethnic group and this is the reason for the understanding the Elites in Nigeria have. They understood that unity among ethnically divided elites in Nigeria is one thing that can engineer democracy and

151

> this they fought to settle as early as 1999 (Interview, Civil
> society activist, Lagos2, June 2013)

In 1999, while ANPP and AD were seen to represent the interests of some Northern and Western ethnicities, the PDP was seen as a party for all Nigerians because it had strongholds in every part of Nigeria except in the West. This was particularly true in 1999, when the people were not happy that Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, who eventually won the election, was working for the cabals who by conviction annulled the June 12 Presidential elections won by MKO Abiola, a fellow westerner. According to a respondent who reasoned:

> In the 1999 Presidential elections, you can see that elites
> in Nigeria used the first transition elections to come
> together and reconcile their various differences. Though
> there are two strong political oppositions, but the
> collaboration of different ethnic groups into the umbrella
> of PDP was a strong indication that there was no rancour
> among the elites from different ethnic group in the
> country. Even though there might be some problems the
> ability of the political elites to overlook them showed a
> huge commitment by them to settle their differences and
> push our democracy to a certain level. Yes, June 12
> aftermaths must have created apathy in some Nigerians,
> especially people from the Western part of Nigeria who
> were against our party (PDP) because they felt we were
> working for those who truncated The June 12 Presidential
> election's result.But in subsequent elections, these
> aggrieved parties reconciled with the ruling party for our
> democracy to be sustained (Interview, Army general1,
> Abuja, June 2013).

Despite President Obasanjo not being accepted by his own Yoruba people, other ethnic nationalities from other regions in Nigeria threw their support behind his candidacy. From this the thesis can deduce that the national solidarity Obasanjo received by almost all the elites in Nigeria could be to promote stability and peace in the Western region of Nigeria whose people have shown displeasure with the way MKO Abiola's victory was cancelled even when the election is regarded as the most peaceful election Nigeria has ever conducted in its history. A civil society activist confirmed this in an interview:

The unity and understanding that the political elite in Nigeria share in spite of various oppositions are because they (Elites) realised that disunity and their inability to compromise on their differences are responsible for the crisis Nigeria's democracy is facing. The civil war, incessant military coups and election crisis and rigging, especially, the June 12 made Nigerian politicians to have a common ground to dialogue on their differences and so far, this has yielded some positive outcomes. Look at some of our elections and the way our politicians reconcile their differences to ensure nothing goes wrong for our democracy. In 2003, when President Obasanjo was coming for his second term, like in 1999 when the people in the West did not vote for him but formed strong alliance with PDP and elected him even when their party (Alliance for democracy) was an opposition political part. (Interview, Civil society activist3, Abuja, June 2013).

In 2003, the number of political parties that contested increased this time from 3 political parties to 30 registered political parties. This time PDP became adopted/included many ethnicities in Nigeria. According to the All Nigerian Peoples Party's (ANPP) chieftain in Lagos State:

After the elections of 1999, people realised that the military was serious about democracy and began to form parties. Many political parties were formed and contested in the elections but the PDP made a difference because the party had been grounded in all the states in the country. It was easy for PDP to sweep the poll because other political parties could not dialogue for a strong alliance. The problem was that some retired army officers and other civilians were in the running and ego could not let them reach an agreement on a possible way of getting rid of ruling party. Recently, ANPP and AD are considering merging in the presidential elections of 2015, I am sure that this merger might rewrite the political history of this country. People are saying that the merger will not work and I keep asking them why it won't work especially as political parties are no longer playing ethnic politics. Politicians in Nigeria at the moment are more accommodative compare to our independence politicians who were more or less ethnic oriented (Interview, Party leader5, Benue, June 2013).

153

This is why Kendhammer (2010:50) notes that PDP's ruling coalition cuts across ethnic and religious lines to integrate not only elites from the largest ethnic groups – the Hausa and Fulani (North), the Yoruba (West), the Igbo (East) – but also those from minority groups that have been agitating for autonomy and protection from the federal government, to prevent them from being dominated by major ethnic groups. The popularity of PDP increased in 2003 when South-Western Nigeria, which did not vote for President Obasanjo in 1999, formed a last minute alliance with PDP. In the said election, there was no presidential aspirant from the Alliance for Democracy (AD), as the region voted massively for the PDP. In response to the alliance between AD and PDP, a staunch All Nigerian Peoples Party's member argued:

> The possibility that my party would win in 2003 became slimmer when we saw the moves between PDP and Alliance for Democracy (AD) to form alliance. While we were busy campaigning in the North and in the Eastern part of the country, with the hope that Alliance for Democracy, a party from the West where Obasanjo comes, would field a candidate for the presidential elections, they were actually having underground plans to vote massively for President Obasanjo. In our party, we believed that Obasanjo, who was the flagbearer of PDP, and any candidate AD fielded would split votes from the West and our massive votes from the North where our party holds sway and the scramble we make from other minority groups will help us win the election. Unfortunately, the people of the West who did not vote for Obasanjo in 1999, this time, gave him sympathy votes and our party could not measure up at all(Interview, Party leader6, Benin, June 2013)

It looks like All Nigerian Peoples Party was thinking that ethnic politics would be at play in 2003 presidential elections. From the last respondent, they made the northern part of Nigeria and the east their political strongholds but this was altered by PDP who was busy uniting all the ethnic groups through alliance especially from the Yoruba ethnic group which was against Obasanjo in 1999 presidential election.

154

5.2.2 Elite Coherence through Tolerance in Nigeria

Available data from my interviews show that there is a high level of tolerance among the political elites in Nigeria. Their views look valid, when examined alongside what scholars have written about the opposition and ruling political parties. Take for instance, Ghana, where the government gives opposition political parties access to political campaign resources, and in some cases free media. Likewise, in Nigeria, the opposition political parties are given yearly support, especially during the election period. They are given the freedom to campaign, use government media, and enjoy access to political debate with the ruling political party. In reaction to this, one of the respondents observed:

> If you ask me, I will say there is nothing like the oppositions in Nigerian democracy because you hardly notice any bridge between the opposition and the ruling party. This could be mainly because the so called opposition political parties have good relationships with the ruling party, and as such have the freedom to do whatever they[deem] very useful to them. Sometimes people talk about ethnicity, but the way the political elites tolerate themselves in this country, you would hardly see that Mr. A or Mr. B are from different tribes in Nigeria, yet they work collectively as one entity. The politics of Nigeria have gone beyond intolerance as we witnessed in the early these of our independence in the 1960swhere political parties were built ethnic origins which made politicians at the time fend for their state of origins. This is a time when a Yoruba man will not tolerate an Igbo President or a Hausa man tolerating a Yoruba man as the President. At this period, NPN, NPP and UPN never tolerated themselves but in recent years, political parties have given themselves room for positive competition devoid of hatred and rancor (Interview, Traditional leader2, Owerri, June 2013).

In a similar response, to whether the elites tolerate the opposition in Nigerian politics, an academic Professor reckoned that:

> The power structure in Nigeria is built in such a way that it is hard for someone to recognise who are the ruling elites and who the opposition elites are. For example, the elites in Nigeria whether in the ruling party or in the opposition

have always found a way of coming together, they recycle from time to time and this is why you see a lot of party switching and carpet-crossing among Nigerian politicians. There is nothing wrong among the political elites in Nigeria because they have a common understanding among themselves. Anytime you hear that one political elite is in loggerheads with other political elites, know that the problem will not last but is a mere misunderstanding that can be settled behind closed doors. Their tolerance is evident in the way PDP and APC members switched allegiances with parties (Interview, University lecturer3, Lagos, June 2013).

According to a former Army General in the Nigerian, with regards to the tolerance among the political elites:

I regret the system of democracy in Nigeria today because the Nigeria the departed military regime craved for is different from what is on the ground today. The first attempt at restoring democratic government in 1993 failed because my fellow Army officers were greedy and refused to relinquish power even when there was agreement in the barracks to leave the scene for the civilians. I frown at my fellow Army officers who are still in the corridors of power today as this was not our plan,, but I am sure the quest for more money is dragging them back to power. With regards to tolerance, there is no problem at all when it comes to their relationship with other elites. For one particular elite to succeed in making more money in this country, he must collaborate with other elites and this will continue to give the political elites in this country that extreme sense for tolerance (Interview, Army General2, Lagos, June 2013).

Like in Ghana, where the elites were sensitive about the civil society groups and wished to co-opt them, the political elites in Nigeria have a profound regard for civil society too.

According to one Nigeria's famous activist:

The truth is that the political elites in Nigeria carry everyone along and this is evident in the way they have allowed for Press Freedom, in such a way so we can say whatever we deemed to write about. This is why we have craved for democratic government all these years. The democracy we have got today is the type that gives every hook and cranny that sense of belonging unlike the one we had in the early days of independence that was characterised with a high level of intolerance due to ethnic

politics. With the way the political elites tolerate themselves in this country, it is easy to predict that Nigerian democracy is on the right path. I applauded our politicians for creating a system where parties are no longer ethnic based but parties identify everyone from the six geo-political zones. Yes, in some cases, we have seen parties gone to court as this is expected but such situation has not degenerated into a serious misunderstanding or warrant any political unrest in the country. I never believed that the ruling party would allow for a situation where elections would be thrown open with the opposition, and in some cases the oppositions have won elections under this situation, yet the political elites did not give up on tolerance even though it went against them in some cases (Interview, Civil society activist4, Warri, June 2013).

In a related scenario, another respondent in Nigeria, a university lecturer posited:

In 2007 presidential elections again, almost eighteen political parties contested, but this time, President Obasanjo, who won 1999 and 2003, stepped down due to constitutional limitations on tenure of office and Late. President Umaru Yar'Adua won the election in a highly controversial manner, which would have resulted in a serious crisis across the country. But the oppositions tolerated the result because we wanted our democracy to survive. I will tell you here that our ruling party is not greedy; this is because you will never hear cases where opposition parties are suffocated by the PDP. I will score the political elites in this country a strong point when it comes to promoting unity and understanding, which has been reflected in their level of tolerance since 1999. Look at the way politicians change parties and the way the new political parties they run to accepted them. If you are not in the winning party today, you may be in the winning party tomorrow and this understanding has given political elites that sense of oneness which made their day to day interaction possible (Interview, University lecturer4, Port Harcourt, June 2013).

According to the last respondent, who is a member of the opposition party and for him to speak with such respect with regard to the ruling party, it shows the level of understanding between ruling party and the opposition. It shows that the elites in Nigeria do not see themselves as enemies especially when they are free to swap parties from time to time. Like

the respondent right put, party switching is common among Nigerian politicians and this has helped in building this spirit of oneness among them.

5.3 Summary

In the case of Nigeria, it would be impossible for one to think of elite cooperation, especially when the divisions are marked by cultural and religious differences. The later can be said to be responsible for the instabilities suffered by those regions where these factors are visible. Therefore, in the quest for establishing a representative democracy, Nigerian political elites have worked to create that sense of belonging to everyone. In the early days of independence, under a federation, they structured the country around power-sharing and zoning. This was an attempt to give each state in the country a sense of belonging.

In recent times, elite coherence has been inherent in party coalitions and alliances, irrespective of their religious and ethnic affiliations. This thesis highlighted cases where political parties, in an attempt to win elections, clamoured for the support of other political parties through alliances or coalitions. However, we have noticed elite fragmentations in Nigeria, but even then the elites have been cohesive enough that differences did not lead to crisis or chaos. Since 1999, Nigerian elites have made various alliances, and party-switching has happened in such a way that it is hard to say that one party is truly an opposition. The names of the parties change, but the politicians are always the same. When PDP was in power, there were members of AD and APC who were in Goodluck Jonathan's administration, and now that APC is in power there are PDP members who are in Buhari's cabinet. With the above examples, this thesis is of the view that coherence is high among the elites in Nigeria. But, this is not enough to state that Nigerian democracy has reached consolidation. This is because there is a low level of elite commitment to democracy. In a situation where the elites are cohesive, but not committed to promoting electoral independence, adhering to party financing, regulations and upholding the autonomy of the

158

anti-corruption agencies, the consolidation of democracy can be difficult as this hybrid form of democracy is likely to promote a pseudo-democratic system.

Compared to the alliances witnessed in Ghana's transition election, where the NDC's Progressive alliance won the Presidential elections of 1992 and 1996, the alliances established by the elites of All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD) in 1999 were unable to deliver at the poll, maybe because PDP was a party with a national base party. Ghana's steady alliances and alternations have resulted in peaceful outcomes in its elections. While coalition/alliances and tolerance in Ghana have resulted in more turnovers, conforming to what Huntington considers democratic consolidation. Nigerian democracy has managed just one turnover after five general elections. The steady transformation in the democracy of Ghana stems from the way the elites institutionalised the parties. These major parties have long standing history, and elections have become highly competitive as elites strive to perform better each time they win elections. Nigerian elites are not loyal to their political parties, and this is why there are many incidences of defections in Nigerian politics. When the elites begin to jump around to the ruling party, it may make the opposition weak. This is not good for Nigerian democracy, as the opposition may bring the best out of the ruling party. However, this party-switching still supports the idea discussed above, that it is possible to switch parties in Nigeria because the ideologies formulated by party elites are identical, and this reinforces their understanding and cooperation.

Chapter 6

6.1 Conclusion

This research set out to answer one major research question, that is, to determine the extent that the political elites in Ghana and Nigeria had contributed to democratic consolidation. The main argument aligns with a range of scholarly work, among others, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels and Max Weber, who advanced the argument that the elites play important roles in society and that for government to function properly, the role of the elites is the key. On this backdrop, this research argues that the political elites facilitate democratic consolidation in African countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria. The argument is that the differing attitude among the political elites in Ghana and Nigeria can explain democratic consolidation in the two countries. To achieve democratic consolidation, the thesis tries to understand how ethnically divided societies with fragmented elites can develop elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy to achieve democratic consolidation.

There has been a debate among scholars on what facilitates democracy and democratic consolidation. While some scholars have suggested that democratic consolidation is a result of foreign influences and civil society (Resnick, 2012; Carothers, 1999; Linz and Stepan, 1996; 2001; O'Donnell et al.1986; and Diamond, 1997). Another school of thought has proposed that the political elites help create democratic consolidation (Mainwaring, 1989; Hartlyn, 1988; Peeler, 1985; Rustow, 1970; Karl, 1986; Diamond, 1999; Bunce, 2000 Linz, 1990; Huntington, 1992; Valenzuela, 1992; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Gunther et al. 1995; Schedler, 2001). This thesis took same position among scholars who support that the political elites facilitate democratic consolidation.

This thesis uses two cases of Ghana and Nigeria which were at the time of transition ethnically divided with fragmented elites. In this situation, a stable playing field that thrives

160

on elite unity could not have been possible to promote democratic consolidation. This thesis used elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence approaches to understand how countries like Ghana and Nigeria can attain democratic consolidation despite its original state. The idea about elite commitment to democracy is that, for democracy to reach consolidation the elites are supposed to build those factors that could allow democracy developed. It is not only building them but create enabling environment to sustain them, so it can be able to regulate the behaviours of the political elites in a polity. On the other hand, elite coherence to democracy emphasises on the need for elite compromise and understanding to ensure a level playing field. The idea is that when the elite have common understanding, have easy compromise to their misunderstanding, they are likely to create politics where every ethnic group will have a voice and a sense of belonging. This will not only reflect in elites' good interaction but will also promote their drive towards respecting those principles or structures that make democracy thrive. The behaviour of the political elites in Ghana particularly reflects the behaviours of those elites that prompted scholars to see the elites are facilitators of democratic consolidation. Of course, some scholars (Schedler, 2001; Diamond, 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996; Gunther et al. 1995) in the consolidation literature also discussed behavioural consolidation. In this thesis behavioural attributes are considered through tolerance, alliances/coalition.

The research methods used in this study included mixed techniques. The thesis used interview data and secondary data to further support the empirical data in various parts of the thesis. Twenty-five persons in each country responded to some in-depth questions and their responses provided data in answering the research question. Added to this, secondary data were used to support responses from the respondents as well as to validate their answers. As Ghana and Nigeria are two West African countries with a lot of similarities, we reasoned that a Most Similar System Design (MSSD) would best fit to understand the difference in

democratic consolidation. With the aim of the research to find out what led to democratic consolidation in the two countries, the thesis disregarded all areas of uniformity in search of areas of difference. For example, similarities like English speaking countries, West African countries, British colonies, military rule with short civilian regimes, counter military coups and presidential system of government are eliminated so as to better understand the areas where the two countries differ. The research considered two areas (elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence) to understand how these explain the behaviour of the elites towards consolidating democracy in the two countries.

A theoretical framework was developed to determine the degree of elite commitment to democracy and elite coherence. The table was developed to reflect four types of regimes. The idea was to see how they differ on structural, institutional (party financing, independent electoral commission and anti-corruption) and behavioural (coalition/alliance and tolerance) variables to analyse political outcomes in Ghana and Nigeria. Both dependent and independent variables are measured. For example, elite coherence which the thesis defined as the "degree of congruence among political elites in Ghana and Nigeria" is measured by cohesion index and interviews conducted in both countries in relation to alliance/coalition and tolerance, to understand the degree of coherence among the elites in the considered countries. Elite commitment to democracy , electoral independence, party financing rules , regulations and permanent tenure of the anti-corruption agencies as well as interview answers are used to measure the independence of the electoral commission, party financing and anti-corruption agencies in Ghana and Nigeria.. Secondary sources are used to validate various findings. From the empirical chapters, we have discussed and observed that several factors, such as institutional, structural and behavioural factors are at play as they affect consolidation of democracy in Ghana and Nigeria. However, while the political elites in both countries were similar in behavioural factors, the countries diverged on the institutional and structural factors. From the analysis it appears that democracy is

162

successful in Ghana because there were high levels of elite coherence and elite commitment to democracy. These two factors shaped the foundation of Ghana's democracy which has resulted in three government turnovers sufficient to meet the criteria that this work considers as a condition for democratic consolidation.

Efforts to integrate the elites in Nigeria and Ghana are considered to be necessary for both countries. For instance, the elites in Ghana built a strong elite coherence to regulate their own activities, and to ensure mutual cooperation and understanding. This is evident in the number of successful coalitions and alliances, despite the history of enmity between Nkrumah political tradition and Danqua/Busia tradition. As offspring of these traditional political parties, the elites of NDC and NPP, for the sake of consolidating democracy, overlooked their differences. Through peaceful co-existence they have turned the hostilities inherent in Ghanaian political history into one of the most stabilise democracies in Africa, where elites strive to shun to ethnic divisions in search of understanding and tolerance. Considering the high level of commitment elites have for democracy, and the cohesiveness found in their answers to the interview questions, this thesis argues that Ghana has reached the level of democratic consolidation.

Democracy is a process and the democracy in Ghana that was designed by the political elites could not deliver in the 1992 presidential elections. The Electoral Commission at the time gave John Jerry Rawlings the upper hand in the elections. This resulted in the opposition political parties boycotting the subsequent parliamentary elections. It was from this reason that ruling political party in Ghana at the time began to think of affecting changes that could transform the politics of the country. However, over the years, the political elites in Ghana have managed to develop a stable democracy after establishing strong institutions capable of restoring integrity in the country's democracy. In recent years, the Electoral Commission has begun to gain influence in Ghana's elections in such a way that the results

163

led to the three government turnovers between the ruling party and the opposition. The information gathered showed that the Electoral Commission keeps improving in every election in Ghana and has as well displayed a certain level of transparency in conducting elections. From the analytical chapters, we found that one of the successes Ghana's democracy has enjoyed was the constitutional independence given to the Electoral Commission. The commission did not just have autonomy but was accorded longer tenure of office for its members. It can be argued that this has given members of the commission confidence in discharging their duties without fear and bias. However, from the interview responses of the elites in Ghana, the confirmed that the Electoral Commission in Ghana has a high level of independence.

Conversely, Nigeria's Independent Electoral Commission has not fared well like her Ghanaian counterparts. While the Ghanaian Electoral Commission has conducted three successful turnovers since 1992, the Nigeria Independent Electoral Commission has managed one turnover in 2015 since the 1999 transition elections. The reason for the failure to measure up like the Commission in Ghana is because the Electoral Commission in Nigeria is answerable to the Chief Executive (the President) who also appoints them. While the Electoral Commission members are given longer tenures, their counterparts in Nigeria can be dismissed at any time as it pleases the Chief Executive. In such circumstance, these officers work to satisfy their bosses to the detriment of quality elections and this can affect democracy consolidation. It can be argued that election manipulation and other related violence is because the Electoral Commission is not transparent instead it gives some political elites the upper hand over others. Elites' responses with regards to the independence of the Independent Electoral Commission in Nigeria showed less trust for the INEC.

Another area the political elites showed commitment to democracy was through party financing. From the responses gathered through interviews organized in Ghana and Nigeria,

164

we found that political elites in Ghana stick to the rules and regulations guiding party-financing more closely than the elites in Nigeria. In the case of Ghana with regards to party-financing, the ruling political party and opposition have almost equal expenditure during elections as this thesis did not observe too much inflow of cash during elections by the ruling party as witnessed. Compared to the case of Nigeria, from the two tables in the Nigerian chapter on the list of individual donations to parties in the 2003 elections and the campaign expenditure by the presidential candidates of PDP and APC in the 2015 election, this thesis found uneven expenditure by the two parties. For example, the cash generated by members of the ruling party (PDP) before the 2015 general elections was four times higher compared to the cash raised by the main opposition party, APC. During elections, the elites from the ruling political parties in the two countries used state resources against the oppositions and this has reduced competition in those countries. However, using state money against the opposition in elections is more widespread in Nigeria elections compared with Ghana. The edge the political elites in Ghana have over Nigeria is that the elites in Ghana comply with the rules and regulations guiding party financing.

Beginning two years after Ghanaian independence in 1958, in an attempt to eradicate corruption, the political elites formulated acts that could protect public funds against corruption and among these a number of legal Acts were adopted, including; in 1993, Customs and Excise and Preventive Service (Management Law,PNDCL 330) , The Audit Service Act, 2000 (Act584) Financial Administration Act, 2003 (Act654), and the Internal Audit Agency Act 2003 (Act 658). After all stakeholders endorsed the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in 1992, it became responsible for prosecuting offenders in Ghana. When President J.A Kufuor came into power, he declared "zero tolerance" against corruption and from all indications he was sincere with his declaration. While many have criticized anti-corruption bodies for paying lip service to the

fight against corruption, many have also argued that the presence of donor assistance in Ghana has helped anti-corruption bodies to regain the potency which yielded democratic consolidation.

Like Ghana, Nigeria's efforts at eradicating corruption are evident in the establishment of an inclusive legal framework including the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act No. 5 of 2000, Economic and Financial Crime Commission (Establishment) Act No. 5 of 2002, Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2007 and Public Procurement Act of 2007. The Acts respectively gave birth to the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Fiscal Responsibility Commission (FRC) and Public Procurement Commission (PPC). However, while the anti-corruption body in Ghana enjoys the constitutional right to prosecute anyone including the President of Ghana, the anti-corruption body in Nigeria does not have the power to prosecute the important position holders like the President or state governors who have immunity. Criticisms levelled against EFCC are that it has become an instrument of the ruling political party used against the opposition. The results show that Ghana has fared better in countering corruption than Nigeria.

On the behavioural factors, the evidence from the analytical chapters shows that the political elites in both countries have a high level of coherence when looking at alliances/coalition and at tolerance. There is little difference here as the political elites in the two countries displayed the same behaviour. The impact of the behavioural factors adopted in this research was significant as it helps to unearth how fragmented elites in divided societies can attain agreement on their areas of differences through elite cohesion. For political actors to have a fair political playing field, actors must accept politics as the only game in town and this is a reflection of the attitude the political elites in Ghana and Nigeria showed when their countries were in transitional states. Secondly, when the elite design

166

institutions, structures and allow them to function, it is likely to create a stable environment that can provide conditions for democratic consolidation. Strong institutions supported genuinely by the political elites are capable of creating an enabling environment for democracy to thrive. Democratic consolidation is difficult in Nigeria because some institutions are created by the political elite to serve their own personal interest against the interest of all.

The results from the analysis indicate that in Nigeria, the electoral commission did not have the needed independence to conduct elections, corruption is high, political corruption in particular, party financing is uneven and financial regulation is ineffective compared to Ghana with its better institutional factors. There is a high level of elite coherence in both countries. This implies that there is more political elite commitment to democracy in Ghana compared to Nigeria, even though both countries' elites have a high level of coherence in achieving democratic consolidation.

The weakness of this study is the lack of available data to study about political elites' attitudes towards achieving democratic consolidation in countries. For example, to research about democracies in the world, there are the indices of democracy, such as the World Freedom Index to help understand political rights and civil rights. Yet such indices do not show the attitude of the political elites in countries towards achieving democratic consolidation. To solve this problem, this thesis considers interviewing the elites in Ghana and Nigeria, especially, as they are the facilitators and promoters of democracy. So, the strength of this study is its ability to meet the elites for interviews, especially to understand what makes democratic consolidation possible in both countries. It is believed that elite interviews are crucial as they are able to give good quality information about the political events in their countries. Getting elites to disclose information about their countries is noteworthy. However, selection of the elites as the basis for getting information is another

167

weakness as this raises a question mark on the generalizability, especially as it is a two-case study. The thesis drew strength because the generalizability concern allows for thorough focus on process and on the attitudes of the elites. This research set out criteria for what constitutes democratic consolidation in the two African countries of Ghana and Nigeria. The two countries represented consolidated and pseudo democracies, thereby leaving two other areas in the theoretical framework for further study. The two other areas that need further study are consociational democracy and competitive authoritarianism. This research is not in a position to predict what the outcome of these two areas would be. Therefore, finding countries that can suit these areas of research would be important for future researchers.

Mindful of the limitation of this study, further research shall concentrate on cross national research on the political elites' attitude to democracy. It hopes that additional case studies would help to highlight the process in other countries which are useful in solving difficulties in generalization. Schofield (1993) notes that the possibility of considering too many case studies in a qualitative research are crucial for easy generalization. However, future research can look into other fifty-two countries in Africa, especially French speaking countries including Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'ivoire, Morocco and Senegal. It hopes that further research will help expand this topic as well as help researchers to understand whether there are cases in African democracy with competitive authoritarianism and consociational democratic system. The findings from future research in this area would go a long way in validating the results gather from the political elites' interview in this thesis.

Bibliographic References

Abdulai, A. G. (2009). Political will in combating corruption in developing and transition economies: A comparative study of Singapore, Hong Kong and Ghana. *Journal of Financial Crime*, *16*(4), 387-417.

Abdulai, A.G., Crawford, G. (2010). Consolidating democracy in Ghana: progress and prospects?, Democratization, 17:1, 26-67, DOI: 10.1080/13510340903453674.

Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). A theory of political transitions. *American Economic Review*, 938-963.

Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2014). *Democracy does cause growth* (No. w20004). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Adebanwi, W., & Obadare, E. (2011). When corruption fights back: democracy and elite interest in Nigeria's anti-corruption war. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *49*(2), 185-213.

Adedeji, A. (1993). *Africa within the world: beyond dispossession and dependence*. Zed Books.

Adejumobi, S. (2000). Elections in Africa. A Fading Shadow of Democracy? International Political Science Review. No.21 (59) SAGE Publications.

Adekanye, J.B. (2000). Retired Military as an Emergent Factor in Nigeria . Ibadan: Heinemann.

Adekanye, J. B. (2005). *Reforming the character of civil-military relations for democratic governance in Nigeria after 1999* (No. 8). The Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lagos.

Adeniyi, O. (2011). *Power, Politics and Death: A Front-row Account of Nigeria Under the Late President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua*. Prestige.

Adeshina, R. A. (1999). *Military in politics: comprehensive strategies for ending military rule in Africa*. Heinemann Educational Books.

Adetula, V., Kew, D. & Kwaja, C. (2007). Assessing Democracy Assistance. United Nations Project Report.

Adeyemo, A. (2009). Paris, gains of a decade of democracy. *This Day Newspaper*, 25.

Adeyemo, W. (2006). Striking the right chord. Tell Magazine, 8, 24-26

Adeyi, E. M. (2008). Funding of Political Parties and candidates in Nigeria: Analysis of the past and present. *Money and Politics in Nigeria*, 29.

Adiele, E.A (1991). Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State. Vol.24, No.4. pp.13-29.

Africa Confidential, (1990). Africa: The roots of reform. Vol.31, No.15.

African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (Arusha, 1990), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, E/ECA/CM.

Afrobarometer press release, 14 March 2006. See www.afrobarometer.org/ results/PressReleaseNigeriaTermLimits.pdf

Afrobarometer, *Summary of results-Ghana*, 2012.
Afrobarometer, *Summary of results-Ghana*, 2012.
Agbaje A. Adejumobi, S. (2006). Do Vote Count? The Travails of Electoral Politics in Nigeria. African Development, Vol.XXXI, No.3. pp 25-44.

Agbakoba, O. (2011), "Understanding Constitutional Zoning, Power Rotation" The Punch, June 10.

Agbo, A. (2009). A Catalogue of Failures. Tell Magazine, June 8,2009, P.37.

Agyeman-Duah, B. (1987). "Ghana, 1982-6: The politics of the PNDC". The Journal of modern African studies, 25(4), 613-642.

Agyeman-Duah, B. (2008). *Ghana governance in the Fourth Republic*. Digibooks Ghana Limited.

Aidoo, T.M. (2006). The Context and Provenance of Democratization in Ghana, 1990-1992.

Aiyede, E. R. (2008). The role of INEC, ICPC and EFCC in combating political corruption. *Money and politics in Nigeria*, 39-52.

Aiyede, E. R., & Aregbeyen, O. (2012). The cost of the 2011 general elections in Nigeria. *Journal of African Elections*, *11*(1), 136-152.

Ajayi, J. A. (1982). Expectations of independence. *Daedalus*, 1-9.

Ajayi, K. (2007). Election administration in Nigeria and the challenges of the 2007 elections. *The Social Sciences*, *2*(2), 142-151.

Ake, C. (1967). *A theory of political integration*. Homewood, Ill: Dorsey Press.

Ake, C. (1973). Explaining Political Instability in New States. The Journal of Modern African States, Vol.11, No.3. pp. 347-359.

Ake, C. (1978). *Revolutionary pressures in Africa*. Zed Books.

Ake, C. (1991). Rethinking African Democracy. *Journal of democracy*, *2*(1), 32-44.

Ake, C. (1993). The unique case of African democracy. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 239-244

Ake, C. (1993). What is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa?. *Transformation*, (22).

Ake, C. (1994). Democratization of Disempowerment in Africa. Malthouse Press Ltd.

Ake, C. (2000). The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Akresh, R., Bhalotra, S., Leone, M., & Osili, U. O. (2012). War and stature: growing up during the Nigerian Civil War. *The American Economic Review*, *102*(3), 273-277

Albert, I. O. (2005). Explaining 'godfatherism'in Nigerian politics. *African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de Sociologie*, *9*(2), 79-105.

Alexander, H. (1989). American Presidential elections since public funding, 1976-84. *Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s*.

Alfa, M., & Marangos, J. (2016). An empirical appraisal of the role of money in Nigerian politics. *International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies*, *9*(1), 65-88.

Almond, G. A. (1956). Comparative political systems. *The Journal of politics*, *18*(3), 391-409.

Aluaigba, M. T. (2009). FINANCING POLITICAL PARTIES IN AFRICA: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE, 1999-2008. *Researcher: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, *22*(2).

Álvarez, L. (2010) 'Roberto Courtney: Bono sólo abona a la ilegalidad de Ortega' [Roberto Courtney: Bonuses Only Pay the Illegality of Ortega], El Nuevo Diario, 4 May, available at http://www.elnuevodiario.com.ni/nacionales/73687

Alvesson, M., & Deetz, S. (2000). *Doing critical management research*. Sage.

Amaratunga, D., Baldry, D., Sarshar, M., & Newton, R. (2002). Quantitative and qualitative research in the built environment: application of "mixed" research approach. *Work study*, *51*(1), 17-31.

America. Stanford,CA; Standford University Press.

America. Stanford,CA; Standford University Press.

Amoah M (2003). 'Nationalism in Africa. Ghana's Presidential Election', Rev Afri. Pol. Econ. 30(95): 149-156

Amoah, M. (2009). The most difficult decision yet: Ghana's 2008 Presidential elections. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, *3*(4), 174.

and Peter Calvert (eds) The Resilience of Democracy. London: Frank Cass. P129.

Anders, U (2002). Globalization, Democratization and Civil Society in Southeast Asia. Observations from Malaysia and Thailand. In C.Kinnvall and K. Jonsson (eds).Globalization and Democratization in Asia.London: Routledge.pp. 149-164.

Anebo, F. K. (1997). Voting Pattern and Electoral Alliances in Ghana's 1996 Elections. *African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique*, 38-52.

Anifowose, R. and Seteolu, D. (2004), "The State Politics and Economy Under the Obasanjo Government, 1999 – 2003", UNILAG Journal of Politics, Vol. 1 (1), pp. 38 – 57.

Annan, K. (1998). The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa: Report of the secretary-general (No. S/1998/318). New York: United Nations.

Arriola, L R. (2013). Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Arriola, L. R. (2009). Patronage and political stability in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*.

Arthur, A. Goldsmith (2001). Donors, Dictators and Democrats in Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 39, No.3.

Arthur, P. (2009). Ethnicity and electoral politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic.*Africa Today*, *56*(2), 45-73

Arthur, P. (2010). Democratic consolidation in Ghana: The role and contribution of the media, civil society and state institutions. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *48*(2), 203-226.

Arthur, P. (2016). Political Parties' Campaign Financing in Ghana's Fourth Republic: A Contribution to the Discourse. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 0021909616654298.

Arthur, P. (2017). Political Parties' Campaign Financing in Ghana's Fourth Republic: A Contribution to the Discourse. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, *52*(8), 1124-1140.

Asante, R. (2013). Making democracy work? Quasi-public entities and the drama of elections in Ghana. *Journal of African Elections*, *12*(2), 56-74**.**

Asare, S. K., & Kwasi Prempeh, H. (2010). Amending the Constitution of Ghana: Is the imperial president trespassing?. *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, *18*(2), 192-216

Attah, M. O. (1987). The national language problem in Nigeria. *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines*, *21*(3), 393-401.

available at http://bridgetwelsh.com/2013/04/buying-support-najibscommercialisation-of-ge13

available at http://bridgetwelsh.com/2013/04/buying-support-najibscommercialisation-of-ge13

Avritzer, L. (2009). *Democracy and the public space in Latin America*. Princeton University Press.

Awopeju, A., Adelusi, O., & Oluwashakin, A. (2012). Zoning formula and the party politics in Nigerian democracy: A crossroad for PDP in 2015 presidential election. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, *2*(4), 11-19.

Ayee, J. R. (1993). Financing of Political Parties in Ghana: An Exploratory Study. *L_/ i5^ jLtVc_e»-5i^ aJvil'S2J} j*, 246..

Ayee, J. R. (1996). Elite Consensus and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana: The Inter-Party Advisory committee (IPAC). *The*, 157-166.

Ayee, J. R. (1997). The December 1996 general elections in Ghana. *Electoral Studies*, *16*(3), 416-427.

Ayee, J. R. A. (1997). Ghana's 1996 General Elections: A Post-mortem. *AAPS Occasional Paper Series*, *1*(1).

172

Ayee, J. R. A (1998). "Elite Consensus and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana: The Inter-Party Advisory committee (IPAC)", in J. R. A. Ayee, ed, The 1996 General Election and Democratic Consolidation in Ghana. Accra: Gold-Type Ltd, pp. 157-166.

Ayee, J. (2000) Ghana: the continuing search for cures in the fight against corruption, in: K. R. Hope & B. Chiluko (Eds) Corruption and Development: Lessons from Country Case Studies, pp. 183–197 (London: Macmillan Press).

Ayee, J. (2002). The 2000 general elections and presidential run-off in Ghana: an overview. *Democratization*, *9*(2), 148-174.

Ayee, J. R. (2008). The evolution of the new patriotic party in Ghana. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, *15*(2), 185-214.

Ayee, J. (2014). Assessing the progress of Democracy and Good Governance in Africa, the Ghanaian case.

Ayee, J. R., Anebo, F. K., & Debrah, E. (2007). Financing political parties in Ghana. *Report of the Consortium for Development Partnerships*, 1-44.

Ayoade, J. A., & Akinsanya, A. A. (Eds.). (2012). *Nigeria's Critical Election: 2011*. Lexington Books.

Baltzell, E. D. (2011). *Philadelphia gentlemen: The making of a national upper class*. Transaction Publishers.

Bamgbose, J. A. (2012). Electoral violence and Nigeria's 2011 general elections. *International Review of Social Sciences and Humanities*, *4*(1), 205-219.

Banfield, E. C. (1967). The moral basis of a backward society.

Banks, A. M. (2008) 'Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges and Opportunities', William and Mary Law Review, Vol. 49 (4), 1043-1069

Bariledum, K. (2013). Political elites and the challenges of national development: The Nigeria experience. *European Scientific Journal, ESJ*, *9*(31).

Barkan, J.D. (2000). Protracted transitions among Africa's new democracies; Democratization, 7(3).

Barkan, J. D. (2012). Democracy assistance: what recipients think. *Journal of Democracy*, *23*(1), 129-137.

Bawn, K., & Rosenbluth, F. M. (2003). Coalition parties versus coalitions of parties: how electoral agency shapes the political logic of costs and benefits.Riker, W. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalition. New Haven: Yale University Press

Bayart, J. F. (1993). The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (trans Mary Harper, Christopher Harrison & Elizabeth Harrison).

Baynham, S. (1992). Civil-military relations in post-independent Africa. *South african Defence review*, *3*.

Beamer, G. (2002). Elite interviews and state politics research. *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, *2*(1), 86-96.

Beetham, D. (1994). Conditions for democratic consolidation. *Review of African political economy*, *21*(60), 157-172.

Bell, D. (1969). The Power of the Elite Reconsidered. In: Domhoff G.W, Ballard H.B (eds). C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite. Boston: Beacon Press.

Berman, B. J. (1998). Ethnicity, patronage and the African state: the politics of uncivil nationalism. *African affairs*, *97*(388), 305-341.

Birch, S. (2008). Electoral institutions and popular confidence in electoral processes: A cross-national analysis. *Electoral Studies*, *27*(2), 305-320.

Bishin, B. (2009). *Tyranny of the minority: The subconstituency politics theory of representation*. Temple University Press.

Boafo-Arthur, K. (1998). The International Community and Ghana's Transition to Democracy', in Ninsin, K. (eds)., Ghana: Transition to Democracy. Dakar:CODESRIA.

Boafo-Arthur, K. (2003). Political Parties and Democratic Sustainability in Ghana, 1992-2000. *African political parties. Evolution, institutionalisation and governance*, 207-38.

Boafo-Arthur, K. (2007). *Ghana: One decade of the liberal state*. Zed Books.

Bogaards, M. (1998). The favourable factors for consociational democracy: a review. *European Journal of Political Research*, *33*(4), 475-496.

Bogaards, M. (2014). Electoral alliances in Africa-what do we know, what can we do?. *Journal of African Elections*, *13*(1), 25-42.

Boix, C. (1999). Setting the rules of the game: the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies. *American Political Science Review*, *93*(03), 609-624.

Boix, C. Stokes, S. (2003). Endogenous Democratization. World Politics

Bollen, K. A., & Hoyle, R. H. (1990). Perceived cohesion: A conceptual and empirical examination. *Social forces*, *69*(2), 479-504.

Bonilla, F. (1970). The Failure of Elites. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press

Boone, C. (1990). The making of a rentier class: Wealth accumulation and political control in Senegal. *The Journal of Development Studies*, *26*(3), 425-449.

Bossman, A. (2006, November). The Anti-Corruption Mandate of Ghana's Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ). In *United Nations Conference on Anti-Corruption Measures on Good Governance and Human Rights, Warsaw* (pp. 8-9).

Booth, E., & Robbins, J. (2010). Assessing the impact of campaign finance on party system institutionalization. *Party Politics*, *16*(5), 629-650.

Bowler, S., Donovan, T., & Karp, J. A. (2002). When might institutions change? Elite support for direct democracy in three nations. *Political Research Quarterly*, *55*(4), 731-754.

Branch, D., & Cheeseman, N. (2008). Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. *African Affairs*, *108*(430), 1-26.

Bratton, M. (1989). Beyond the state: Civil society and associational life in Africa. *World politics*, *41*(03), 407-430.

Bratton, M. (1994). International versus Domestic Pressures for Democratization in Africa. Working Paper on Political reform in Africa. No.12.pp.10.

Bratton, M. (1994). *Civil society and political transition in Africa* (pp. 51-81). Boston, Mass.: Institute for Development Research.

Bratton, M. (1998). Second elections in Africa. *Journal of Democracy*, *9*(3), 51-66.

Bratton, M., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2015). Political risks facing African democracies: Evidence from Afrobarometer.

Bratton, M., & Van de Walle, N. (1992). Popular protest and political reform in Africa. *Comparative politics*, 419-442.

Bratton, M., & Van de Walle, N. (1994). Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa. *World politics*, *46*(04), 453-489.

Bratton, M. Van de Wall, N. (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa, Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bratton, M., & Mattes, R. (2001). Support for Democracy in Africa: intrinsic or instrumental?. *British Journal of Political Science*, *31*(03), 447-474.

Brierley, S. (2010). Ghana Country Report. *Center for Social Science Research*.

Brierley, S. (2012). Party unity and presidential dominance: parliamentary development in the fourth republic of Ghana. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *30*(3), 419-439

Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2000). Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: an analytic framework. *Public Administration & Development*, *20*(3), 239.

Brown, A. (2000). Transitional Influences in the Transition from Communism, Post Soviet Affairs, Vol.16, No.2.

Brown, D. (1993). The search for elite cohesion. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 111-130.

Browne, O., Fadakinte, M.M. (2002). Transition Politics in Nigeria 1970-1999. Malthouse Press Limited.

Brunner, Markus & Daniel Stroux (1999), 'Nigeria's flawed transition. A step towards genuine democratisation?', Focus Afrika, No. 14, Hamburg: Institut fir Afrika-Kunde

Bunce, V. (2000). Comparative democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations. Comparative Political Studies, Vol.33 No.6/7 pp.703-734.

Burnell, P. (2003). Legislative-executive relations in Zambia: parliamentary reform on the agenda. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *21*(1), 47-68.

Burnell, P. (2008). From evaluating democracy assistance to appraising democracy promotion. *Political Studies*, *56*(2), 414-434.

Burnell, P. J. (2000). *Democracy assistance: international co-operation for democratization* (Vol. 5). Psychology Press.

Burton, M., Gunther, R., & Higley, J. (1992). Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe: an overview. *Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, 323-48.

Butler, D., & Ranney, A. (1994). *Referendums around the world: The growing use of direct democracy*. American Enterprise Institute.

Cabal, C. (1998). A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Vol.74. No.2. Wiley-Blackwell Publishers.

Cammack, P. (1990). A critical assessment of the new elite paradigm. *American Sociological Review*, 415-420.

Carothers, T. (1997). 'Democracy without Illusions', Foreign Affairs, Vol.76, No.1, pp.85–99

Carothers, T. (1999). Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Carothers, T. (2002). The end of the transition paradigm. *Journal of democracy*, *13*(1), 5-21

Carreras, M., & İrepoğlu, Y. (2013). Trust in elections, vote buying, and turnout in Latin America. *Electoral Studies*, *32*(4), 609-619.

Carron, A. V. (1982). Cohesiveness in Sport Groups: Interpretations and Considerations. *Journal of Sport psychology*, *4*(2), 123-138.

Carter Center (1999), Observing the 1998-1999 Nigeria Elections, http: / / www.CarterCenter.org/ documents/1152.pdf, 10 June 2003.

Cartwright, D. (1968). The nature of group cohesiveness. *Group dynamics: Research and theory*, *91*, 109.

Casas, K. and Zovatto, D. (2004) 'Financiamiento político en Centroamérica, Panamá, República Dominicana y México' [Political Finance in Central America, Panama, Dominican Republic and Mexico], in De las normas a las buenas prácticas [From Norms to Good Practice]. San José: International IDEA, OAS.

Case, W. (2001). Malaysia's resilient pseudodemocracy. *Journal of Democracy*, *12*(1), 43-57.

Case, W. (2004). New uncertainties for an old pseudo-democracy: the case of Malaysia. *Comparative Politics*, 83-104.

Centre for Democratic Development (2005a). Political Party Financing in Ghana, CDD-Ghana Research Paper No. 13, CDD, Accra, Ghana

Chhibber, P., & Kollman, K. (2009). *The formation of national party systems: Federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States*. Princeton University Press.

Ciaurro, G. F. (1989). Public financing of parties in Italy. *Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s*, 153-171.

Clark, J. F. & Gardinier D. E. (1997). Political Reform in Francophone Africa. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Cohen, D., & Crabtree, B. (2006). Qualitative research guidelines project.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford economic papers*, *56*(4), 563-595.

Collier, P., & Vicente, P. C. (2014). Votes and violence: evidence from a field experiment in Nigeria. *The Economic Journal*, *124*(574), F327-F355.

Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. Vol.41. No.1 48-76

Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. Vol.41. No.1 48-76

Commonwealth Secretariat: Election Observer Group (1999), The National Assembly and presidential elections in Nigeria, 20th and 27th February 1999. Report, London: Commonwealth Secretariat.

Constitution Review Commission. (2009). Consultative Review of the Operation of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Accra: Constitution Review Commission.

Cota, A. A., Dion, K. L., & Evans, C. R. (1993). A reexamination of the structure of the Gross Cohesiveness Scale. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *53*(2), 499-506.

Cota, A. A., Evans, C. R., Dion, K. L., Kilik, L., & Longman, R. S. (1995). The structure of group cohesion. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *21*(6), 572-580.

Crick, B. (2005). *In defence of politics*. A&C Black.

Crouch, H. (1979). Patrimonialism and military rule in Indonesia. *World Politics*, *31*(04), 571-587.

Daddieh, C. K. (2009). The presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana, December 2008. *Electoral Studies*, *4*(28), 642-647.

Dahl, R A. (1958). "A critique of the ruling elite model." American Political Science Review 52:463-9

Dahl, R. A. (1971)."Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. *New Haven*.

Dahl, R.A. (1989). Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Daloz, J.-P.(1999). Le (Non-)Renouvellement des Elites en Afrique Subsaharienne. Bordeaux: Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire.

Dawisha, K. Parrot, B. (1997). The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Debrah, E. (2005). The electoral process and the 2000 general elections in Ghana. *Liberal democracy and its critics in Africa: political dysfunction and the struggle for social progress*

Debrah, E. (2011). Measuring Governance Institutions' Success in Ghana: The Case of the Electoral Commission, 1993-2008, African Studies, 70: 1, 25-45, DOI: 10.1080/00020184.2011.557573.

Decalo, S. (1992). The Process, Prospects and Constraints of Democratization in Africa. African Affairs, Vol.91, No. 362. Pp. 7-35

De Graaf, G. (2007). Causes of corruption: Towards a contextual theory of corruption. *Public Administration Quarterly*, 39-86.

Denzin N. K. and Lincoln S.Y (2005) *The Sage Hand Book of Qualitative Research,* London: Sage Publications Ltd, p. 10.

Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). *Handbook of qualitative research*. Sage publications, inc.

De Soysa, I. (2000). 6. The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?..

Diamond, L. (1982). Cleavage, conflict, and anxiety in the second Nigerian Republic. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 20, No.4.

Diamond, L.(1994). Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation. Journal of Democracy, Vol.5 No.3.

Diamond, L. (1997). 'Prospects for democratic development in Africa', paper presented to the University of Zimbabwe, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, Democratic Governance Project. p. 24.

Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. JHU Press.

Diamond, L. (2002). Election Without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes. J. Dem. Vol.15.

Diamond, L. (2002). Free and Fair ? The Administration and Conduct of the 1983 Nigerian Election. In: AA Akinsanya, GJ Idang (eds.): Nigerian Government and Politics: 1979-1983. Calabar: Wusen Publishers.

Diamond, L. (2002). Thinking about hybrid regimes. *Journal of democracy*, *13*(2), 21-35.

Diamond, L. (2008). The democratic rollback: the resurgence of the predatory state. *Foreign affairs*, 36-48.

Diamond, L. (2008). The spirit of democracy.

Diamond, L. (2008). The State of Democracy in Africa.˙ Paper Presented for a Conference on Democratization in Africa: What Progress Toward Institutionalization. Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, February

Diamond, L.(1997). Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, L., J.J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (1989). Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Diamond, L, Linz , J and Lipset S. (1995). Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. Boulder & London: Lynne Reinner.

Diamond, L., Kim, B. (2000).Consolidating Democracy in South Korea. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner.

DiCicco-Bloom, B., & Crabtree, B. F. (2006). The qualitative research interview. *Medical education*, *40*(4), 314-321.

Dietrich, S., & Wright, J. (2015). Foreign aid allocation tactics and democratic change in Africa. *The Journal of Politics*, *77*(1), 216-234.

Dike, V. E. (2005). Corruption in Nigeria: A new paradigm for effective control. *Africa Economic Analysis*, *24*(08), 1-22.

Di Palma, G. (1990). *To craft democracies: An essay on democratic transitions*. Univ of California Press.

Dode, O.R. (2010). Political parties and the prospects of democratic consolidation in Nigeria: 1999 – 2006. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 4(5), pp. 188-194.

Dogan, M. Higley, J. (1996). Political Crisis and Elite Replacement: How regimes aren born. Paper presented at the International Confrence in Regime Change and Elite Change, El Paular, Spain.

Dogan, M., & Higley, J. (1998). Elites, crises, and regimes in comparative analysis. *Elites, crises, and the origins of regimes*, 3-28.

Domhoff, G. W (1967). Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall

Doorenspleet, R. (2003). Political parties, party systems and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance*, *169*, 169-87.

Dornhoff, G. W. (1970). The higher circles: The governing class in America.

Draft Constitution of the Republic of Charm, 1992.

Duncan, M. G. (1979). A New dictionary of sociology.

Dunning, T. (2008). *Crude democracy: Natural resource wealth and political regimes* (Vol. 7). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dworkin, G. (1988). *The theory and practice of autonomy*. Cambridge University Press.

Easton, D. (1965). *A framework for political analysis* (Vol. 25). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British journal of political science*, *5*(04), 435-457.

Eckstein, H. (1988). A culturalist theory of political change. *American political science review*, *82*(3), 789-804.

Eisenstadt, T. A. (1999). Off the streets and into the courtrooms: resolving postelectoral conflicts in Mexico. *The Self-Restraining State: Poser and accountability in new democracies. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner*, 83-103.

Eisenstadt, T. A. (2002). Measuring electoral court failure in democratizing Mexico. *International political science review*, *23*(1), 47-68.

Ekanade, Olumide, and Akachi Odoemene. "Challenges of democracy and the (de) memorialisation of the June 12, 1993 elections in Nigeria." *International Journal of African Renaissance Studies-Multi-, Inter-and Transdisciplinarity* 7.1 (2012): 73-93.

Ekeh, P.P (1975). Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statements. Comparative studies in society and history, vol.17, No.1. pp.91-112

Ekekwe, E.(1986). Class and State in Nigeria. London: Longman.

Ekiert, G., Kubik, J. (1998). Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany,Hungary,Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93. World Politics, vol.50, No.4.

Ekpo, C. E., Chime, J., & Enor, F. N. (2016). The irony of Nigeria's fight against corruption: An appraisal of President Muhammadu Buhari's first eight months in office. *International Journal of History and Philosophical Research*, *4*(1), 61-73.

El Diario (2011) 'Ex Viceministro denuncia "diezmo" obligatorio para candidatos masistas' [Ex Vice-minister Denounces the 'Ten Per Cent' Obligation for Independent Candidates], El Diario, 23 September, available at http://www. eldiario.net/noticias/2011/2011_09/nt110923/2_02plt.php

Elaigwu, J. I. (2007). *The politics of federalism in Nigeria*. Adonis & Abbey Pub Limited.

Elischer, S. (2008). Do African parties contribute to democracy? Some findings from Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum*, 175-201.

.Eme, O. I., & Anyadike, N. (2014). Political financing in Africa: A comparative study of Kenya and Nigeria: Proposal for reform. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, *5*(27 P1), 22.

Eme, O. I., Oji, R. O., & Nwoba, H. A. (2014). Political Party Funding in Nigeria: A Case of Peoples Democratic Party. *Nigerian Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, *2*(11), 1-18.

Emmanuel, N. (2010). Undermining cooperation: donor-patrons and the failure of political conditionality. *Democratization*, *17*(5), 856-877.

Encarnación, O. G. (2002). Venezuela's" civil society coup". *World policy journal*, *19*(2), 38-48.

Enemuo, F.C. (1999). 'Elite solidarity, communal support, and the 1999 presidential election in Nigeria. Issue, special issue 'Transition in Nigeria", African Studies Association, 27, 1, pp.3-7.

Erdmann, G., & Engel, U. (2007). Neopatrimonialism reconsidered: Critical review and elaboration of an elusive concept. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *45*(1), 95-119.

Esckstein, H. (1975). Case Studies and Theory in Political Science. *Handbook of Political Science*, *7*.

Essien-Udom, E. U., Coleman, J. S., & Rosberg, C. G. (1966). POLITICAL PARTIES AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN TROPICAL AFRICA.

EU (2000), Communication from the Commission on the EU election assistance and observation, Brussels: 04 October 2000; (2000a), Synthesis report, phase three, 28 August 2000 http: / /europa.eu.int/ comm/ europeaid / evaluation/ reports / acp / 951518_synth.pdf, 03 March 2003; (2003), EU will observe Parliamentary, Presidential & States' Elections in Nigeria, IP/03/327, Brussels: 03 May 2003; (2003), EU Election Observation Mission.

European Union Election Observer Mission (EUEOM) (2007). EU's Final Report on April 2007 Elections, The Punch, 23,24 and 27 August, pp. 1,2 and 4.

Evans, G., & Whitefield, S. (1995). The politics and economics of democratic commitment: Support for democracy in transition societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, *25*(4), 485-514.

Falola, T., & Heaton, M. M. (2008). *A history of Nigeria*. Cambridge University Press

Farazmand, A. (1999). The Elite Question: Toward a Normative Elite Theory of Organization. Sage Publication: Vol.31. No.3.

Fatton, R. (1992). *Predatory rule: State and civil society in Africa*. Rienner.

Fawole, A. (2005). 'Voting Without Choosing: Interrogating the Crisis of Electoral Democracy in Nigeria', in Tukumbi Lumumba-Kasongo, ed., Lineral Democracy and its Critics in Africa: Political Dysfunction and the Struggle for Social Progress, Dakar: CODESRIA

Federal Republic of Nigeria: The 1999 Constitution (Amended).

Federal Republic of Nigeria: The 1999 Constitution (Amended).

Federal Republic of Nigeria: The 1999 Constitution (Amended).

Federal Republic of Nigeria: The 2002 Electoral Act.

Federal Republic of Nigeria: The 2006 Electoral Act (Amended)

Federal Republic of Nigeria: The 2010 Electoral Act (Amended).

Festinger, L., Back, K. W., & Schachter, S. (1950). *Social pressures in informal groups: A study of human factors in housing* (Vol. 3). Stanford University Press.

Fisher, J. (1999). Party expenditure and electoral prospects: a national level analysis of Britain. *Electoral Studies*, *18*(4), 519-532..

Fisher, J., & Eisenstadt, T. A. (2004). Introduction: Comparative Party Finance: What is to be Done

Fobih, N. (2016). *Political parties and democratic development in Ghana: From transition to consolidation and beyond*(Doctoral dissertation).

Folarin, S. F. (2009). The anti-corruption war in Nigeria: a critical appraisal of the role of the ICPC and EFCC. *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Financial Crimes*, *1*(2), 14-36.

Folson, K. G. (1993). Political Parties and the Machinery of Democratic Government. *L_/ i5^ jLtVc_e»-5i^ aJvil'S2J} j*, 12.

Frempong, A. K. (2008). Innovations in electoral politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic: An analysis. *Democratic Innovation in the South. Dakar/London: CODESRIA*, 183-204.

Frempong, A. K. D. (2012). *Electoral Politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic: In the Context of Post-cold War Africa*. AKD Frempong..

Frempong, A. K. D., & Ayee, J. (2001). Deepening Democracy in Ghana: Politics of the 2000 Elections.

Frempong, A. K. D. (2001). Ghana's Election 2000: The Ethnic Undercurrent. In *Deepening Democracy in Ghana: Politics of the 2000 Elections*, vol. 1, edited by Joseph Ayee. Accra: Freedom Publications.

Friedrich, C. J. (1942). The new belief in the common man.

Gabriel, A., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture: political attitudes and Democracy in five nations. *The Sence of Civic Competence*, 136-185.

Gandhi, J & O J Reuter. 2013. 'The Incentives for Pre-Electoral Coalitions in NonDemocratic Elections'. Democratization 20(1).

Gandhi, J., & Lust-Okar, E. (2009). Elections under authoritarianism. *Annual review of political science*, *12*, 403-422.

Garay, L. J., & Salcedo-Albarán, E. (2012). *Narcotráfico, corrupción y Estados: cómo las redes ilícitas han reconfigurado las instituciones en Colombia, Guatemala y México*. Debate., Corruption and States: How Illicit Networks Have Reshaped Institutions in Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico]. Bogotá: Random House Mondadori.

Gatmaytan, D. B. Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy Judicial Review of Constitutional Change: Defending Constitutions with Constitutionalism.

Gaubatz, K. T. (1996). Democratic states and commitment in international relations. *International Organization*, *50*(01), 109-139.

Gerring, J., Bond, P., Barndt, W. T., & Moreno, C. (2005). Democracy and economic growth: A historical perspective. *World Politics*, *57*(03), 323-364.

Giddens, Anthony 1975 The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies. New York: Harper Torchbooks

Gibbs, J. P., & Martin, W. T. (1964). *Status integration and suicide: A sociological study*. University of Oregon books.

Gilbert, L. D., & Allen, F. (2014). Democracy and Good Governance: The Missing Link in Nigeria. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, *5*(16), 524.

Gill, G. (2000). The Dynamics of Democratization, Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process. Macmillan Press, London.

Glaser, B., Strauss, A. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategic for Qualitative Research, Chicago: Aldine Press..

Global Advice Network, Business Anti-Corruption Portal – Ghana Country Profile, 2013.

Global Integrity/The Center For Public Integrity (2004): An Investigative Report Tracking Corruption, Openness and Accountability In 25 Countries,

Goodliffe, J., & Hawkins, D. G. (2006). Explaining commitment: States and the convention against torture. *The Journal of Politics*, *68*(2), 358-371.

Goodman, P. S., Ravlin, E. C., & Schminke, M. (1987). Understanding groups in organizations.

Goodwin-Gill, G. S. (1994). Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union). *Google Scholar*.

Graham, L. (1999). Redefining the Portuguese Transition to Democracy, in Higely and Gunther (eds).

Granato, L. (2002). Newspaper Features Writing. Sydney; University of New South Wales Press Ltd.P.24.

Grugel, J. (1999). Contextualizing Democratization: The Changing Significance of Transnational Factors and Non-State Factors. In J.Grugel, (ed).Democracy without Borders. Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies. London: Routledge.pp.1-22.

Grugel, J. (2002). Democratization, A Critical Introduction. Palgrave Press, China.

Gryzamala-Busse, A. (2007). Encouraging Effective Democratic .East European Politics and Societies.

Gunlicks, A. B. (1998). Land constitutions in Germany. *Publius*, 105-125.

Günther, R., Gibert, J. R. M., & Puhle, H. J. (2007). Introduction: intermediation, information and electoral politics. In *Democracy, intermediation and voting on four continents*(pp. 1-28).

Gutteridge, W. (1975). *Military regimes in Africa* (Vol. 11). Methuen;[New York]: distributed in the USA by Harper & Row Publishers, Barnes and Noble Import Division.

Guy, M. "Preface: Democratic Transition in Africa. Issue: A Journal of Opinion.

Gyampo, R. E. V. (2015). Public funding of political parties in Ghana: An outmoded conception?. *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, *38*(2).

Gyimah-Boadi, E. & Asante R. (2006). Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Public Sector Governance in Ghana. In *Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance,* edited by Y. Bangura. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gyimah-Boadi, E., & Brobbey, V. (2012). Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Ghana. *Freedom House. Available: https://freedomhouse. org/sites/default/files/Ghana*.

Gyimah-Boadi, E., & Prempeh, H. K. (2012). Oil, politics, and Ghana's democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, *23*(3), 94-108.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1979). Financing Political Parties in Ghana. In *International IDEA Conference–Towards Sustainable Democratic Institutions in Southern Africa* (p. 300).

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1994). Ghana's Uncertain Political Opening. Journal of Democracy, Vol.5. No.2. pp.75-86. Hopkins University Press.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1998). The rebirth of African liberalism. *Journal of Democracy*, *9*(2), 18-31.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1999). Institutionalizing credible elections in Ghana. *The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies*, 83-122.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2001). A peaceful turnover in Ghana. *Journal of Democracy*, *12*(2), 103-117.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2009). 'Another step forward for Ghana'. *Journal of Democracy* 202.

Gyimah-Boadi, E.(2001). A Peaceful Turnover in Ghana. Journal of Democracy Vol.12 (2) pp.103-117. John Hopkins University Press.

Gyimah-Boadi, E., & Yakah, T. (2012). *Ghana: The limits of external democracy assistance* (No. 2012/40). WIDER Working Paper.

Haber, S., & Menaldo, V. (2011). Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse. *American political science Review*, *105*(01), 1-26.

Haber, S., & Menaldo, V. (2011). Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse. *American political science Review*, *105*(01), 1-26.

Habib, A. (2005). State-civil society relations in post-apartheid South Africa. *Social Research*, 671-692.

Haerpfer, C.W., Bernhagen, P., Inglehart, R.F., Welzel, C. (2009). Democratization. Oxford: University Press.

Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (1995). *The political economy of democratic transitions*. Princeton University Press.

Hanson, G. (1996). Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor Supported Civic Advocacy Programs. *USAID Evaluation Highlights*, *56*.

Hartlyn, J. (1988). *The politics of coalition rule in Colombia*. Cambridge University Press.

Hasty, J. (2005). The pleasures of corruption: Desire and discipline in Ghanaian political culture. *Cultural Anthropology*, *20*(2), 271-301.

Hatchard, J. (1998). 'Perfecting imperfections': developing procedures for amending constitutions in Commonwealth Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *36*(3), 381-398.

Haynes, J. (1999). The Possibility of Democratic Consolidation in Ghana' in Peter Burnell

Haynes, J. (2003). Democratic consolidation in Africa: the problematic case of Ghana. *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, *41*(1), 48-76.

Haynes, J.(2004). Religion and Democratization in Africa. Vol.11, No.4. DOI: 10.1080/1351034042000234530.

Heeger, G. A. (1974). *The politics of underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan.

Heller, P. (2009). Democratic deepening in india and south africa. *Journal of Asian and African studies*, *44*(1), 123-149.

Heidenheimer, A. J., Johnston, M., & Le Vine, V. T. (Eds.). (1989). *Political corruption: A handbook*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers

Henkin, L. (1998). Elements of constitutionalism. *REVIEW-INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS*, 11-22.

Hermens, F. A. (1941). *Democracy or anarchy?: a study of proportional representation* (Vol. 1). Johnson Reprint Corp..

Higley, J., & Burton, M. (2006). *Elite foundations of liberal democracy*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

Higley, J., & Gunther, R. (1992). *Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Higley, J., & Moore, G. (1981). Elite integration in the United States and Australia. *American Political Science Review*, *75*(3), 581-597.

Higley, J., & Moore, G. (2001). Political elite studies at the year 2000: introduction.

Higley, J.& Burton, M. (1989). The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns. American Sociological Review 54(1)

Higley, J. & Gunther, R. (1992). Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Higley, J., Burton, M. G., & Field, G. L. (1990). In defense of elite theory: A reply to Cammack. *American Sociological Review*, *55*(3), 421-426.

Hoffmann, L. (2010). Fairy godfathers and magical elections: understanding the 2003 electoral crisis in Anambra State, Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *48*(2), 285-310.

Hood, J.S. (2004). Political Development and Democratic Theory-Rethinking Comparative Politics. M.E Sharpe, New York.

Horowitz, L. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Horowitz, D. L. (1990). Comparing democratic systems. *Journal of Democracy*, *1*(4), 73-79.

Horowitz, D. L. (1993). Democracy in divided societies. *Journal of democracy*, *4*(4), 18-38.

Horowitz, D.L. (2003). Electoral System: A Primer for Decision Makers," Journal of Democracy 14 (4): 115-127.

Howard, M. M., & Roessler, P. G. (2006). Liberalizing electoral outcomes in competitive authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*,*50*(2), 365-381.

Huang, T. I., Lin, T. M., & Higley, J. (1998). Elite Settlements in Taiwan. *Journal of Democracy*, *9*(2), 148-163.

Hughes, J. (1997). Sub-National Elites and Post-Communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya and White. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.49, No.6.

Hughes, T. (2005). Ghana: A donor success story. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, *12*(2), 75-93.

Human Rights Watch interview with Festus Keyamo, Lagos, February 21, 2011

Hunter, F. (1953). Community power structure A study of decision makers.

Hunter, F. (1959). *Top leadership, USA* (p. 4). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven,,

Huntington, S. P. (1984). Will more countries become democratic?. *Political Science Quarterly*, *99*(2), 193-218.

Huntington, S.P (1991). Democracy's third wave. Journal of democracy, 2(2), 12-34.

Huntington, S. P. (1993). *The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century* (Vol. 4). University of Oklahoma press.
Huntington, S.P (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? Political Science Quarterly, 99(2). Pp.193-218.

Huntington, S.P (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Shuster.

Hyden, G. (2006). African Politics in Comparative. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ibrahim J (2006). "The Rise of Nigeria's Godfathers", BBC Focus on Africa Magazine, London.

Ibrahim, J. (2007). Nigeria's 2007 Elections: The First Path to Democratic Citizenship, Special Report No. 182. United States Institute of Peace. Available at http.//www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr182.html.

IDEA (2000), 'Democracy in Nigeria: Continuing dialogues(s) for Nation Paper No. 22; Maastrich, ECDPM, June 1997; available at http:// www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/pubs/ wp22_gb.htm, 10 June 2003; (1997), 'Code of conduct for the ethical and professional observation of elections. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance', Stockholm.

IDEA's country reports on political parties: Wiafe-Akenten, Charles, Ghana: Country Report Based on Research and Dialogue with Political Parties (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006), available at http://www.idea.int/parties/upload/Ghana%20laid%20out.pdf;

Idowu, W. 0. (I999). 'Citizenship, alienation and conflict in Nigeria', Africa Development 24, 1-2: 31-55.

Ifeanacho, M. I. (2009). Democratization and national integration in Nigeria. *Bangladesh e-Journal of Sociology*, *6*(1), 54.

Ifukor, P. (2010). "Elections" or "selections"? Blogging and twittering the Nigerian 2007 general elections. *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, *30*(6), 398-414.

Ihonvbere, J. O. (1996). Where is the third wave? A critical evaluation of Africa's non-transition to democracy. *Africa Today*, *43*(4), 343-367.

Ihonvbere, J. O. (1997). Democratization in Africa: Challenges and Prospects. In Issues and Trends in Contemporary African Politics, ed. G. A. Agbango, 287-320. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.

Ikelegbe, A. (2001). The perverse manifestation of civil society: evidence from Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *39*(01), 1-24.

Ikubaje, J. (2011). The Changing Roles and Contribution of Civil Society Compmfdrafrica.ning. Com/xn/detail/118285; Blogpost:23668.

Ilo, U. (2004). Political finance regulation in Nigeria: the legal framework. *Political Finance and Democracy in Nigeria Prospects and Strategies for Reform, for Law and Social Action (CLASA), ed. O. Ndubisi*, 24-42.

Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), *2007 General Elections: Guidelines for Election Monitoring and Observations* (Abuja: INEC, 2007), 2, 11

Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton University Press.

Isham, J., Kaufmann, D., & Pritchett, L. H. (1997). Civil liberties, democracy, and the performance of government projects. *The World Bank Economic Review*, *11*(2), 219-242.

Jackson, S.M (1999). Issues in the Dating Violence Research: A Review of the Literature, Aggression and Violent Behaviour. Pp 233-247.

Janda, K., Berry, J., Goldman, J. (1997). The Challenge of Democracy. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Janos, A.C. (1994). Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe: Strategies of Post-Communist Politics, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.8, No.1.

Janos, A.C. (2001). From Eastern Empire to Western Hegemony: East Central Europe Under Two International Regimes, East European Politics and Societies, Vol.15, No.2.

Jarstad, A. (2006). The logic of power sharing after civil war. *Oslo: Center for*.

Jason, P. (2005). The Making of Olusani Abachanjo.

Jason, P. (2005). The Making of Olusani Abachanjo.

Jean-François, B. (1989). L'Etat en Afrique: la politique du ventre. *Paris, Fayart*.

Jeffries, R. (1998). The Ghanaian elections of 1996: towards the consolidation of democracy?. *African affairs*, *97*(387), 189-208.

Jeffries, R., & Thomas, C. (1993). The Ghanaian elections of 1992. *African Affairs*, *92*(368), 331-366.

Jensen, N., & Wantchekon, L. (2004). Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa. *Comparative political studies*, *37*(7), 816-841.

Jewell, M. E., & Whicker, M. L. (1994). *Legislative leadership in the American states*.

University of Michigan Press.

Jockers, H., Kohnert, D., & Nugent, P. (2010). The successful Ghana election of 2008: a convenient myth?. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *48*(1), 95-115.

Johnston, M., & Kpundeh, S. J. (2004). Building a clean machine: anti-corruption coalitions and sustainable reform.

Joseph, R. (1997). 'Democratization in Africa After 1989: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives', Comparative Politics, Vol.29, No.3, pp.363–382

Joseph, R. A. (2003). Africa: states in crisis. *Journal of Democracy*, *14*(3), 159-170

Journal of Democracy 233.
Journal of Democracy 233.
Jumbo pay: Executive, Legislature Taking Nigerians for a ride-Ex Senators, others", in The Punch Newspaper Volume 683, No.1513 of Saturday, 25th December, 2010.

Kadushin, C. (1966). "The friends and supporters of psychotherapy: on social circles in urban life." American Sociological Review 31:786-802

Kamrava, M. (1993). Politics and Society in the Third World. London and New York: Reutledge.

Kanter, R. M. (1968). Commitment and social organization: A study of commitment mechanisms in utopian communities. *American sociological review*, 499-517.

Karl, T. L. (1986). Democracy by Design: The Christian Democratic Party in El Salvador. *The Central American Impasse*, 195-217

Karl, T. L. (1995). The hybrid regimes of Central America. *Journal of democracy*, *6*(3), 72-86.

Karl, T.L. (1990). Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America. Comparative Politics, Vol.23, No.1.

Kaufmann, D. (1997). Corruption: the facts. *Foreign policy*, 114-131.

Kasfir, N. (1998). Civil society, the state and democracy in Africa.*Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *36*(2), 123-149.

Keller, E.J. (1999). Political Institutions, Agency, and Contingent Compromise: Understanding Democratic Consolidation and Reversal in Africa. The National Political Science Review

Keller, S. I. (1991). *Beyond the ruling class: strategic elites in modern society*. Transaction Publishers.

Kelly, N., & Ashiagbor, S. (2011). Political parties and democracy in theoretical and practical perspectives. *New York: NDI, USAID. Google Scholar*.

Kendhammer, B. (2010). Talking ethnic but hearing multi-ethnic: the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria and durable multi-ethnic parties in the midst of violence. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, *48*(1), 48-71.

Kew, D. (2006). Nigeria. In S. Tatic (Ed.), Countries at the crossroads. New York: Freedom House

Key, V. O. (1964). Parties, politics and pressure groups.

Klitgaard, R. (1997). Cleaning up and invigorating the civil service. *Public Administration and Development: The International Journal of Management Research and Practice*, *17*(5), 487-509.

Knack, S. (2001). Aid dependence and the quality of governance: cross-country empirical tests. *Southern Economic Journal*, 310-329

Knack, S. (2004). Does foreign aid promote democracy?. *International Studies Quarterly*, *48*(1), 251-266.

Knight, B., & Hartnell, C. (2001). Civil Society-Is it Anything More Than a Metaphor for Hope for a Better World?.

Koch, J. L. (1979). Effects of goal specificity and performance feedback to work groups on peer leadership, performance, and attitudes. *Human Relations*, *32*(10), 819-840.

Kpessa, M. W., & Atuguba, R. A. (2013). Grounding with the people: Participatory policy making in the context of constitution review in Ghana. *J. Pol. & L.*, *6*, 99.

Kubicek, P. (2002). "Civil Society, Trade Unions and Post Soviet Democratization: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.54, No.4

Kubik, J. (1994). The Role of Decentralization and Cultural Revival in Post-Communist Transformations. Communist and Post- Communist Studies, Vol.27, No.4

Kuenzi, M. Lambright, G. (2005). Party System and Democratic Consolidation in Africa's Electoral Regimes, Party Politics 11 (4): 423-446.

Kumado, K. (1993). The Constitutional Framework of Democracy. *Political Parties and Democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic*, 53-62.

Kurfi, A. (2005). *Nigerian General Elections, 1951-2003: My Roles and Reminiscences*. Spectrum Books.

Kvale, S., & Brinkmann, S. (2009). Interview: Learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing. *Det kvalitative forskningsintervju. Oslo: Gyldendal akademisk*.

Kymlicka, W. (1996). Social unity in a liberal state. *Social philosophy and policy*, *13*(01), 105-136.

Laakso, L. (2007). Insights into electoral violence in Africa. *Votes, money and violence: political parties and elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 224-52

Lancaster, C. (1991). Democracy in Africa. *Foreign Policy*, (85), 148-165.

Landman, T. (2008). *Issues and methods in comparative politics: an introduction*. Routledge.

Lane, D. (1997). Transition under Eltsin: the Nomenklatura and political elite circulation. *Political Studies*, *45*(5), 855-874.

Langer, A. (2009). Living with diversity: The peaceful management of horizontal inequalities in Ghana. *Journal of International Development*, *21*(4), 534-546.

Laver, M. (1986). Between theoretical elegance and political reality: Deductive models and cabinet coalitions in Europe. *Coalitional behavior in theory and practice: An inductive model for Western Europe*.

Laver, M., & Schofield, N. (1998). *Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe*. University of Michigan Press.

Leff, N. H. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. *American behavioral scientist*, *8*(3), 8-14.

Lehmbruch, G. (1974). A non-competitive pattern of conflict management in liberal democracies: the case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon. *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies*, 90-97.

Lehoucq, F. E. (2002). Can parties police themselves? Electoral governance and democratization. *International Political Science Review*, *23*(1), 29-46.

Lemarchand, R. 1998. Ghana's Electoral Commission provides regional model. African Voices: A Newsletter on Democracy and Governance in Africa 7(1) (Winter/Spring): 2-3, 6

Leonard, D. K., & Straus, S. (2003). *Africa's stalled development: international causes and cures*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Levitsky, S. R., & Way, L. A. (2012). Beyond patronage: Violent struggle, ruling party cohesion, and authoritarian durability. *Perspectives on Politics*, *10*(04), 869-889.

Levitsky, S., & Loxton, J. (2013). Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes. *Democratization*, *20*(1), 107-136.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. *Journal of democracy*, *13*(2), 51-65.

Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war*. Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, S., Way, L.A. (2006). Linkage versus Leverage: Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change. Comparative Politics. Vol.38, No.4.

Levitsky, S.,Way L.A. (2005). International Linkage and Democratization. Journal of Democracy: Vol.16. pp.20-34

Lewis, P. (2003).Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime Peter Lewis Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 3, pp.131-144. Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.2003.0054.

Lewis, P. M. (1994). Endgame in Nigeria? The politics of a failed democratic transition. *African Affairs*, *93*(372), 323-340.

Lewis, P.M.(1999). Nigeria: An End to the Permanent Transition. Journal of Democracy. Vol.10. No. 1. Pp.141-156.

Lewis, P. M. (2011). Nigeria votes: More openness, More conflict. *Journal of Democracy*, *22*(4), 60-74.

Lewis, P., Alemika, E. E., & Bratton, M. (2002). *Down to Earth: changes in attitudes toward democracy and markets in Nigeria* (No. 20). Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA).

Lijphart, A. (1968). The politics of accommodation. Berkeley.

Lijphart, A. (1968). Typologies of Democratic Systems. Comparative Political Studies 1 (April): 3-44.

Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational democracy. *World politics*, *21*(2), 207-225..

Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the comparative method. American political science Review, 65, 682-693.

Lijphart, A., & Aitkin, D. (1994). *Electoral systems and party systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945-1990*. Oxford University Press.

Lindberg, S. I., & Zhou, Y. (2009). Co-optation despite democratization in Ghana.

Lindberg, S.I (2006). Democracy and Elections in Africa. Hopkins University Press.

Lindemann, S. (2008). *Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter?: A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London school of economics and political science (LSE). Development studies institute (DESTIN).

Lindsay, D. M. (2008). Evangelicals in the power elite: Elite cohesion advancing a movement. *American Sociological Review*, *73*(1), 60-82.

Linz, J. J. (1988). Legitimacy of democracy and the socioeconomic system. *Comparing Pluralist Democracies*, 65-113.

Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1978). *The breakdown of democratic regimes: Europe* (Vol. 2). JHU Press.

Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. C. (1996). Toward consolidated democracies. *Journal of democracy*, *7*(2), 14-33.

Linz, J.J & Stepan, A (1996). Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post- Communist Europe. Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore..

Linz, J.J. (1990). 'Transition to Democracy', Washington Quarterly, Vol.13.p.158.

Linz, J.J. (2000) Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political man: The social basis of modern politics.

Lipset, S. M. (1987). *The confidence gap: Business, labor, and government in the public mind*. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, S. M. (1997). Some social requisites of democracy. *Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization: A Collection of Readings*, *1083*, 37.

Lipset,S.M. (1959). "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", American Political Science Review, No.53.

López-Pintor, R. (1987). Mass and elite perspectives in the process of transition to democracy. *Baloyra, ed., Comparing New Democracies*, 79-106.

López-Pintor, R. (2000). Electoral management bodies as institutions of governance.

Lott, A. J., & Lott, B. E. (1965). Group cohesiveness as interpersonal attraction: A review of relationships with antecedent and consequent variables. *Psychological bulletin*, *64*(4), 259

Luqman, S. A. K. A., & Omede, A. J. (2011). THE FALTERING PROSPECT OF CRAFTING STABLE CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN AFRICA'S EMERGING DEMOCRACIES. *Institutional Journal of Politics and Good Governance*, *2*(2.3).

Lynch, G., & Crawford, G. (2011). Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: an assessment. *Democratization*, *18*(2), 275-310.

Lyons, T. (1997). "The December 1996 Elections in Ghana", Unpublished Paper.

Maeda, K. (2010). Two Modes of Democratic Breakdown: A Competing Risks Analysis of Democratic Durability. The Journal of Politics. 72(4). Pp.1129-1143.

Magolowondo et al. (2012). Regulating Political Party Financing: Some insights from the Praxis. www.idea.int/sites/.../regulating-political-party-financing-insights-from-praxis.pdf.

Mahdavy, H. (1970). The patterns and problems of economic development in rentier states: the case of Iran. *life*, *1000*(1).

Mainwaring, S. (1989). *Transitions to democracy and democratic consolidation: theoretical and comparative issues*(Vol. 130). University of Notre Dame, Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies.

Mainwaring, S., Scully, T. (1992). "Party System in Latin America." Paper for the 1992 Latin American Studies Association Meeting, Los Angeles.

Mainwaring, S. Scully,T. (1995). Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin

Mainwaring, S., & Pérez-Liñán, A. (2013). Democratic Breakdown and Survival. *Journal of Democracy*, *24*(2), 123-137.

Makumbe, J. M. (1998). Is there a civil society in Africa?. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, 305-317.

Malena, C., & Finn Heinrich, V. (2007). Can we measure civil society? A proposed methodology for international comparative research. *Development in Practice*, *17*(3), 338-352..

Malloy, J. M. (1987). The politics of transition in Latin America. *Authoritarians and democrats: Regime transition in Latin America*, 235-58.

Manning, C. (2005). "Assessing African party system after the Third wave. Party Politics, 11(6). 707-727.

Markoff, J. (1996).Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge.

Markovsky, B., & Lawler, E. J. (1994). A new theory of group solidarity. *Advances in group processes*, *11*, 113-37.

Marx, K. (1975). "On the Jewish Question." Edited Works.London.

Mattes et.al. (2000). "Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in South Africa: An Initial Review of Key findings of the South African Democracy Barometer."

Mattes, R., & Bratton, M. (2007). Learning about democracy in Africa: Awareness, performance, and experience. *American Journal of Political Science*, *51*(1), 192-217.

McCann, J. A., & Domınguez, J. I. (1998). Mexicans react to electoral fraud and political corruption: an assessment of public opinion and voting behavior. *Electoral studies*, *17*(4), 483-503.

McCoy, J., & Hartlyn, J. (2006). Election processes in Latin America: historical legacies and proximate causes. In *Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the America Political Science Association, Philadelphia* (Vol. 13).

McSweeney, D. (2000). Parties, corruption and campaign finance in America. *Party Finance and Political Corruption. L.*

Meagher, P. (2005). Anti-corruption agencies: Rhetoric Versus reality. *The Journal of Policy Reform*, *8*(1), 69-103.

Merriam (2002). Qualitative Research in Practice. Example of Discussion and Analysis, San Francisco, CA: Jossy Bass.

Michels, R. (1966). Political Parties. Free Press: New York.

Mietzner, M. (2007). Party financing in post-Soeharto Indonesia: between state subsidies and political corruption. *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, *29*(2), 238-263.

Mikai, I. K. (2016). *Corruption and Nigerian Political Economy*. UUM Press.

Mill, J. S. (1963) 'Tocqueville on Democracy in America, vol. I', in Himmelfarb. G., eds., Essays on Politics and Culture, Massachusetts: Gloucester, 173-213.

Mill, J.S. (1862) Considerations on representative government. Norrköping: Föreningens boktryckeri.

Miller, J., & Glassner, B. (1997). The 'inside'and the 'outside': Finding realities in interviews. *Qualitative research*, 99-112.

Mills, C. (1956). Wright: The power elite. *New York*.

Mills, C.W. (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mills, C.W. (1956). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.

Moehler, D. C., & Lindberg, S. I. (2009). Narrowing the legitimacy gap: Turnovers as a cause of democratic consolidation. *The Journal of Politics*, *71*(04), 1448-1466.

Mohammed, M. (2011). Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Africa: A comparative study of Ghana and Nigeria. Master Thesis.

Montinola, G. R., & Jackman, R. W. (2002). Sources of corruption: A cross-country study. *British Journal of Political Science*, *32*(1), 147-170.

Moore, G. (1979). The structure of a national elite network. *American Sociological Review*, 673-692.

Moreno, J. L., & Jennings, H. H. (1938). Statistics of social configurations. *Sociometry*, 342-374.

Morlino, L. (2004). What is a 'good'democracy?. *Democratization*, *11*(5), 10-32.

Morrison, D. G., & Stevenson, H. M. (1972). Integration and instability: Patterns of African political development. *American Political Science Review*, *66*(03), 902-927.

Morse, Y. L. (2012). The era of electoral authoritarianism. *World Politics*, *64*(1), 161-198.

Morehouse, S. M. (1998). *The governor as party leader: Campaigning and governing*. University of Michigan Press.

Mosca, G. (1939). The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Moynihan, D. P. (1993). Pandaemonium. Ethnicity in international politics. *VRÜ Verfassung und Recht in Übersee*, *27*(1), 66-67.

Mozaffar, S. (2002). Patterns of electoral governance in Africa's emerging democracies. *International Political Science Review*, *23*(1), 85-101.

Mozaffar, S., Schedler, A. (2002) The Comparative Study of Electoral Governance. International Political Science Review 23(1), 5-24.

Mr Justice Nwokedi, the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission, in an interview with the press said: "We have been 30years under the army without respect for anything called a constitution, and by now, we have lost a sense of constitutionalism." Quoted in S. Bakoji, "Whither the 1999 Constitution?" PostExpress, 23 May,1999.

Mudrack, P. E. (1989). Defining group cohesiveness: A legacy of confusion?. *Small Group Behavior*, *20*(1), 37-49.

Mustapha, A.R. (2009). 'Nigeria Since 1999: A Revolving Door Syndrome or the Consolidation of Democracy?'. In: Mustapha A.R., Whitfield L. (eds). Turning Points in African Democracy. Suffolk and Rochester: James Currey.

Mutfang, T. (2003), "The State civil society and Government in Nigeria". A post 1960 synopsis" in Aboh, O.S. (ed), Geographies of citizenship in Nigeria, Zaria, Tanga publishers

Mwangi, O. G. (2008). Political corruption, party financing and democracy in Kenya. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *46*(2), 267-285..

Myrdal, G. (1968). Asian drama, an inquiry into the poverty of nations. *Asian drama, an inquiry into the poverty of nations.*

Nam-Katoti, W., Doku, J., Abor, J., & Quartey, P. (2011). Financing political parties in Ghana. *The Journal of Applied Business and Economics*, *12*(4), 90.

Ndegwa, S. N. (2001). A decade of democracy in Africa. *Journal of Asian and African studies*, *36*(1), 1-16.

Neto, A., & Magar, E. (2000). Veto Bargaining and Coalition Formation: A Theory of Presidential Policy-Making with Application to Venezuela. In *conference of Latin American Studies Association. Miami*.

Nikitin, A., & Buchanan, J. (2002). The Kremlin's civic forum: Cooperation or co-optation for civil society in Russia?. *Demokratizatsiya*, *10*(2), 147.

Ninsin, K. A. (2006). *Political parties and political participation in Ghana*. KAS.

Ninsin, K. A. (Ed.). (1998). *Ghana: Transition to democracy*. African Books Collective.

Nnadozie, U. (2007). History of elections in Nigeria. *In Jega Attahiru & Ibeanu, Okechukwu (eds) Elections and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria. Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA).*
Nnamani, C. (2003). *The godfather phenomenon in democratic Nigeria: Silicon or real?*. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA).

Nohlen, D. (1996). Electoral Systems and Electoral Reform in Latin America. In Lijphart, A. Waisman, C.H. (Eds.) Institutional Design in New Democracies: Eastern Europe and Latin America. Westview Press. Boulder, CO.

Nugent, P. (2001). Winners, losers and also rans: money, moral authority and voting patterns in the Ghana 2000 election. *African Affairs*, *100*(400), 405-428.

Nwangwu, C., & Ononogbu, O. A. (2016). Electoral laws and monitoring of campaign financing during the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, *17*(4), 614-634.

Nwatarali, E. O., & Dim, N. U. (2015). Investigating the Financial Income Streams of Political Parties in Nigeria. *International Journal of Innovation, Management and Technology*, *6*(5), 358.

Nwokoma, I.N. (2004). "Power, Political Parties and Socio-Economic Welfare in Africa: The Case of Nigeria's Fourth Republic", UNILAG Journal of Politics, Vol. 1 (1), pp. 58 – 81.

Nwomeh, D. (2005), "Pluralism, Party System and National Integration", Nigerian Forum Vol. 25 (9-10), pp. 273 – 290.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2006). Democratic transitions in Africa. *The Constitution*, *6*(1), 1-19.

O'Donnell, G. (1992). Transitions, continuities, and paradoxes. *Issues in democratic consolidation: The new South American democracies in comparative perspective*, 17-56.

O'Donnell, G. (1994). Delegative democracy. Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, pp.55-69.

O'Donnell, G. (1996). "Illusion About Consolidation" Journal of Democracy. 7(4): 34-51.

O'Donnell, G. A. (1996). Illusions and conceptual flaws. *Journal of Democracy*, *7*(4), 160-168

O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C., & Whitehead, L. (1986). Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 4 vols. *Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University*.

Obi, A. (2005). 'DP versus MDD', Daily Sun Newspaper, Lagos, 14 November, pp. 56.

Obi, C.(2007). Democratising Nigerian Politics: Transcending the Shadows of Militarism 'Briefings'. Review of African Political Economy, Vol.34:379-84.

Obi, C. (2011). Taking back our Democracy? The Trials and Travails of Nigerian Elections Since 1999, Democratization, 18:2, 366-387

Obi, C.I. (2004) Nigeria: Democracy on Trial. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. ISSN 1652-9847 ISBN 91-7106-543-1.

Obi, C.I. (2008). International Election Observer Missions and the Promotion of Democracy: Some Lessons from Nigeria's 2007 Elections. South Africa Journal of Political Science.

Obiorah, N (2005). 'Financing Democracy: Key Issues in Political Party and Election Campaign Funding in Nigeria'. Paper presented at an IFES seminar on the Draft Electoral Bill, Abuja.

Obuah, E. (2010). Combatting corruption in Nigeria: the Nigerian economic and financial crimes (EFCC). *African Studies Quarterly*, *12*(1), 17.

Oduro, F., Mohammed, A., & Ashon, M. A. (2014). A dynamic mapping of the political settlement in Ghana.

Ofori, R. (1993). The elections controversy. *Africa Report*, *38*(4), 33

Ogbeidi, M. M. (2012). Political leadership and corruption in Nigeria since 1960: A socio-economic analysis. *Journal of Nigeria Studies*, *1*(2).

Ogowewo, T. I. (2000). Why the judicial annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is imperative for the survival of Nigeria's democracy. *Journal of African Law*, *44*(2), 135-166.

Ohman, M. (2016). The State of Political Finance regulations in Africa. www.idea.int/sites/default/files/.../the-state-of-political-finance-regulations-in-africa.pd.

Ojo, E. O. (2009). Federalism and the search for national integration in Nigeria. *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, *3*(9), 384.

Ojo, E. O. (Ed.). (2006). *Challenges of sustainable Democracy in Nigeria*. J. Archers.

Ojo, J. (2012). Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria. J.deojong.blogspot.com/../civil society-and-democratic.html.(PANA): www.panapress.com/civil-society-group-slams-Nigerian-govt.

Okanlawon S. (2006). 2007: Fears over fragmentation of Opposition. The Punch, June 8, 2006, P. 38

Okpanachi, E., & Garba, A. (2010). Federalism and constitutional change in Nigeria. *Federal Governance*, *7*(1), 1-14.

Ololajulo, B. O. (2016). 'Eating with One Spoon': Zoning, Power Rotation and Political Corruption in Nigeria. *African Studies*, *75*(1), 153-169.

Olsen, E.M. (1993). Socio-political Pluralism. In: Olsen E.M., Marger N.M (eds). Power In Modern Societies. Boulder: Westview Press.

Olukoshi, A. (1999). State, conflict, and democracy in Africa: the complex process of renewal. *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa, Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner*.

Omotola, J. S. (2013). The Electoral Commission of Ghana and the administration of the 2012 elections. *Journal of African Elections*, *12*(2), 34-55.

Omotola, J. S. (2010). Ghana defies the odds again: the 2008 elections and the consolidation of democracy. *Politeia*, *29*(1), 42-64.

Omotola, J.S. (2010). "Explaining electoral violence in Africa's new democracies". Africa Journal on conflict Resolution, 10(3).

Omotola, J.S. (2005a), "Violence Against Democracy in Nigeria", Paper Presented to the Seminar Series of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria, 7th December.

Omotola, J.S. (2006b). What is the Concept of Democracy good for? A view from Nigeria. Paper Presented at the National Conference on Democracy and Development in Nigeria,Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Ilorin, Nigeria.

OND, L. D. (2002). Thinking about hybrid regimes. *Journal of democracy*, *13*(2), 21-35.

Osaghae, E. E. (1991). A re-examination of the conception of ethnicity in Africa as an ideology of inter-elite competition.

Osaghae, E. E. (2002). Youth Generational Ethnicity in Nigeria. In *a conference on 'Youth Policy and the Policies of Youth in Africa', Program of African Studies, Northwestern University*.

Osaghae, E. E. (2010). The limits of charismatic authority and the challenges of leadership in Nigeria. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *28*(4), 407-422.

Osumah, O. & Ikelegbe, A. (200). The Peoples Democratic Party and Governance in Nigeria, 1999- 2007. Journal of Social Science, vol.19. No.3. pp. 185-199

Otite, O. (1990). *Ethnic pluralism and ethnicity in Nigeria: with comparative materials*. Shaneson.

Ottaway, M., & Carothers, T. (2000). *Funding virtue: civil society aid and democracy promotion*. Carnegie Endowment.

Onuigbo, R. A., & Eme, O. I. (2015). Analyses of Legal Frameworks for Fighting Corruption in Nigeria: Problems and Challenges. *Kuwait Chapter of the Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, *5*(3), 1.
Oquaye, M. (1995). The Ghanaian Elections of 1992--A Dissenting View. *African Affairs*, *94*(375), 259-275.

Oyovbaire, S. E. (1983). Structural change and political processes in Nigeria. *African Affairs*, *82*(326), 3-28.

Oyugi, W. O. (2006). Coalition politics and coalition governments in Africa. *Journal of contemporary African studies*, *24*(1), 53-79.

Paden, J. N. (1986). Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto: values and leadership in Nigeria.

Paltiel, K. Z. (1989). Canadian Election Expense Legislation 1963–1985: A Critical Appraisal or Was the Effort Worth It?. *Contemporary Canadian Politics (Scarborough: Nelson, 1987)*, *228*, 1963-1985.

Pareto, V. (1916/1935). The Mind and Society. A Treatise on General Sociology. New York: Dover.

Pastor, R. A. (1999). The role of electoral administration in democratic transitions: Implications for policy and research. *Democratization*, *6*(4), 1-27.

Putnam, R. (1993). Making Democracy Work: civic traditions in modern Italy. *ISBN– 10*, *978069*, 1037387.

Patton, M.Q. (1983). Qualitative Evaluation Methods, Berely Hilla, London: Sage Publication Inc.

Peeler, J. A. *Latin American democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela* (No. 321.8 P374l). Raleigh, US: North Carolina State University, 1985.

Pelizzo, R., & Stapenhurst, F. (2012). Parliamentary oversight tools: A comparative analysis. Oxford, UK: Routeledge

Pelto, P., Pelto, G. (1978). Anthropological Research: The Structure of Inquiry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp.54.

Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2006). *Democracy and development: The devil in the details* (No. w11993). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Peterson, D. (1993). "Africa's Rocky Ascent," Freedom Review 24:17

Pinkney, R. (1994).Democracy in the Third World. Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc.

Pinto-Duschinsky, M. (2002). Financing politics: A global view. *Journal of Democracy*, *13*(4), 69-86.

Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty Democracy © International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2007

Pope, J., & Vogl, F. (2000). Making anticorruption agencies more effective. *Finance and Development*, *37*(2), 6.

Posner, D. N., & Young, D. J. (2007). The institutionalization of political power in Africa. *Journal of Democracy*, *18*(3), 126-140.

Potter, D. (1997). "Explaining Democratization", in Democratization, by Potter, D., Goldblatt,D., Kiloh,M.,Lewis,P.(ed). Polity Press in Association with The Open University Press.

Prempeh, H. K. (2008). Presidents untamed. *Journal of Democracy*, *19*(2), 109-123.

Prempeh, K. (2010). *Reforming the constitution of Ghana for a new era: Averting the peril of a constitution without constitutionalism*. Ghana Center for Democratic Development.

Prewitt, K., Stone, A. (1993). The Ruling Elite. In: Olsen M.E., Marger M.N (eds). Power in Modern Societies. Boulder: Westview Press.

Pridham, G. (2002). Coalition behaviour in new democracies of central and eastern Europe: The case of Slovakia. *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, *18*(2), 75-102

Przeworski, A. (1988). 'Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts,' in Constitutionalism and Democracym, (eds) Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad. Cambridge University Press..

Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market. Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.

Pujas, V., & Rhodes, M. (1999). Party finance and political scandal in Italy, Spain and France. *West European Politics*, *22*(3), 41-63.

Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital.*Journal of democracy*, *6*(1), 65-78.

Putnam, R. D., Leonardi, R., & Nanetti, R. Y. (1994). *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton university press.

Qu, S. Q., & Dumay, J. (2011). The qualitative research interview. *Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management*, *8*(3), 238-264.

Rae, D. W. (1967). *The political consequences of electoral laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ragin, C. (1987). The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative Methods. Berkeley: University of California.

Randall, V., & Svåsand, L. (2002). Political parties and democratic consolidation in Africa. *Democratization*, *9*(3), 30-52.

Rawlings Chairman's Anniversary and New Years Message". HomeFront, vol. 10, no. 1, January 1991, p. 5

RAWLS, P. O. Vincent Stephen Kabuk.

RAWLS, P. O. Vincent Stephen Kabuk.

Reef, M. S. (2007). 'Nigeria: the coup against Nuhu Ribadu', Daily Trust 30 December.

Reeher, G. (1996). *Narratives of justice: Legislators' beliefs about distributive fairness*. University of Michigan Press.

Reilly, B. (2001). *Democracy in divided societies: Electoral engineering for conflict management*. Cambridge University Press.

Remi Aiyede, E. (2003). The dynamics of civil society and the democratization process in Nigeria. *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines*, *37*(1), 1-27.

Reno, W. (1999). *Warlord politics and African states*. Lynne Rienner Publishers

Republic of Ghana. 1992. Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992. Accra: State Publishing Corporation.

Ribadu, N. (2004b). Obstacles to Effective Prosecution of Corrupt Practices and Financial Crime Cases in Nigeria.˙ Presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Anti-corruption, National Ethic and Values. Available at www.efccnigeria.org.

Ricard, J. (1998). The Ghanaian Elections of 1996: Towards the consolidation of Democracy? African Affairs. Volume 97, No. 387. Oxford University Press.

Richard, J. (1991). Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the second republic. Idadan: Spectrum Books Ltd

Richards, T. J., & Richards, L. (1994). Using computers in qualitative research. *Handbook of qualitative research*, *2*, 445-62.

Riker, W. H. (1962). *The theory of political coalitions*. Yale University Press.

Riley, S. P. (1998). The political economy of anti-corruption strategies in Africa. *The European Journal of Development Research*, *10*(1), 129-159

Rist, R.C. (1982). "On the Application of Ethnographic inquiry to Education: Procedure and Possibilities" Journal of Research in Science Teaching,

ROBEY, J. S., TAAGEPERA, R., & SHUGART, M. S. (1991). Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems.

Robinson, M., & Friedman, S. (2005). Civil society, democratisation and foreign aid in Africa.

Rodney, W. (1972). How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Tanzania Publishing House.

Rodrik, D., & Wacziarg, R. (2005). Do democratic transitions produce bad economic outcomes?. *The American economic review*, *95*(2), 50-55.

Roeder, P.G. (1999). Peoples and States After 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions. Slavic Review, Vol.58, No.4.

Roett, R. (1999). *Brazil: Politics in a patrimonial society*. Greenwood Publishing Group

Roger, S. Neo, S. John D (2005). Leadership Change and former Presidents in Africa (Unpublished).

Rose-Ackerman, S. (1998). Corruption and development. In *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1997* (pp. 35-57). Washington DC: World Bank.
Rose-Ackerman, S.(1999). *Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform*. Cambridge university press.

Rose-Ackerman, S. (2013). *Corruption: A study in political economy*. Academic Press.

Rosenau, J.N. (1969). "Toward the Study of National-International Linkage", in Rosenau, J.N (ed). Linkage in Politics: Essay on the Convergence of National and International System. New York: The Free Press.

Ross, C. (2000). Federalism and Democratization in Russia: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.33, No.4

Rothchild, D., & Foley, M. W. (1988). African states and the politics of inclusive coalitions. *The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa*, 233-264.

Rothchild, D., & Roeder, P. G. (2005). Dilemmas of state-building in divided societies. *Sustainable peace: power and democracy after civil wars*, 1-26.

Rothchild, D., & Roeder, P. G. (2005). Dilemmas of state-building in divided societies. *Sustainable peace: power and democracy after civil wars*, 1-26.

Rothstein, B. (2009). Anti-corruption: A big-bang theory.

Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. M. (2005). All for all: Equality, corruption, and social trust. *World politics*, *58*(1), 41-72.

Rotimi, A. O., & Ihonvbere, J. O. (1994). Democratic impasse: remilitarisation in Nigeria. *Third World Quarterly*, *15*(4), 669-689.

Rousseau, J. J. (1971) The social contract and Discourse on the origin and foundation of inequality among mankind. New York: Washington square press.

Rousseau, J. J. (1994) Om Samhällsfördraget – eller Statsrättens grunder, Stockholm: Natur & Kultur.

Rueschemeyer, D. Stephens, E.H, Stephens, J.D. (1992). Capitalist Development and Democracy. University of Chicago Press.

Ruostetsaari, I. (1993). The anatomy of the Finnish power elite. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, *16*(4), 305-337.

Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to democracy: Toward a dynamic model. *Comparative politics*, *2*(3), 337-363.

Saalfeld, T. (2000). Court and parties: Evolution and problems of political funding in Germany. *Party Finance and Political Corruption*, *89*.

Saati, A. (2015). *The Participation Myth: outcomes of participatory constitution building processes on democracy* (Doctoral dissertation, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Umeå universitet).

Sakyi, E. K., & Agomor, K. S. (2016). State Funding of Political Parties in Ghana: Exploring the Views of Card-Holding and Non-Card Holding Party Members. *African Social Science Review*, *8*(1).

Saliu, H.A. and Omotola, J.S. (2006), "Political Parties and the Quest for Political Stability in Nigeria", Paper Presented at the Zaria Conference on: Humanities in the 21st Century: Prospects and Challenges, Ahmadu, bello University, Zaria, 10 – 14

Samatar, A. I. (1997). Leadership and ethnicity in the making of African state models: Botswana versus Somalia. *Third World Quarterly*, *18*(4), 687-708.

Samatar, A. I. (1999). An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership, and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development.

Sandbrook, R., & Barker, J. (1985). *The politics of Africa's economic stagnation*. Cambridge University Press.

Sandbrook, R. (1988). "Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist Revisionist Perspective." Canadian Journal of African Studies, 22(2).

Sandbrook, R. (1996). Transition Without Consolidation: Democratization in Six African Cases. Third World Quarterly. Vol.17, No. 1. Pp.69-87.

Sandholtz, W., & Koetzle, W. (2000). Accounting for corruption: Economic structure, democracy, and trade. *International studies quarterly*, *44*(1), 31-50.

Sartori, G. (1995). How far can free government travel?. *Journal of democracy*, *6*(3), 101-111

Savun, B., & Tirone, D. C. (2011). Foreign aid, democratization, and civil conflict: how does democracy aid affect civil conflict?. *American Journal of Political Science*, *55*(2), 233-246.

Scarrow, S. E. (1997). Party competition and institutional change: The expansion of direct democracy in Germany. *Party Politics*, *3*(4), 451-472.

Schattschneider, E. E. (1975). The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist\'s View of Democracy in America.

Schedler, A. (1998). What is Democratic Consolidation? Journal of Democracy. 9(2). Pp.91-107.

Schedler, A. (2001). Measuring democratic consolidation. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *36*(1), 66-92.

Schedler, A. (2002). The menu of manipulation. *Journal of democracy*, *13*(2), 36-50.

Schedler, A. (2002). The nested game of democratization by elections. *International Political Science Review*, *23*(1), 103-122.

Schedler, A. (2009). Electoral authoritarianism. *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource*.

Schedler, A. (2009). Electoral authoritarianism. *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource*.

Schedler, A. (2015). Electoral authoritarianism. *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource*.

Schofield, J. W. (1993). *Increasing the generalizability of qualitative research*. Open University Press.

Schraeder, P.J. (1994). Elites as Facilitators or Impediments to Political Development? Some Lessons from the "Third Wave" of Democratization in Africa. Journal of Developing Areas, Vol.29, No.1.

Schumpeter, J. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Row.

Schumpeter, J.A. (1947). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York: Harper.

Seel, B. (2016). Developing International Norms of Political Finance: Prospects for Increased Compliance in Ghana. *Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L.*, *23*, 351.

Semana (2006) 'Pasando el sombrero' [Passing the Hat], Semana, 10 March, available at http://www.semana.com/wf_ImprimirArticulo.aspx?IdArt=93081

Shija, W.F (2008). The Secretary General's File. In: Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Secretariat, UK First Reading, 14 May.

Shin, D. C. (1994). On the third wave of democratization: A synthesis and evaluation of recent theory and research. *World politics*, *47*(1), 135-170.

Short, E. F. (2015). Empowering Ghana's Anti-corruption Institutions in the Fight Against Corruption.

Siebold, G. L. (1999). The evolution of the measurement of cohesion. *Military Psychology*, *11*(1), 5.

Simbane, A. (2002). Minority and Power Sharing in Nigeria. *NISER Monograph Research Ibadan*.

Simmel, G., & Wolff, K. H. (1950). *The sociology of george simmel* (Vol. 92892). Simon and Schuster.

Sin, T. C., & Wells, J. (2005). Is democracy the only game in town?. *Journal of Democracy*, *16*(2), 88-101.

Sklar, R. L., Onwudiwe, E., & Kew, D. (2006). Nigeria: completing Obasanjo's legacy. *Journal of democracy*, *17*(3), 100-115.

Skocpol, T. (1979). State and Social Revolution: A comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. New York. Cambridge University.

Smah, O. S. (2008). Money Politics and Electoral Violence in Nigeria. *Money and Politics in Nigeria, International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES), Nigeria*, 65-84.

Smith, D.A (2002). Consolidating democracy? The structure underpinnings of Ghana's 2000 elections. Journal of Modern African Studies,40,4. Pp. 621-650. DOI 101017/S0022278X02004044.

Sniderman, P. M., Tetlock, P. E., Glaser, J. M., Green, D. P., & Hout, M. (1989). Principled tolerance and the American mass public. *British Journal of Political Science*, *19*(1), 25-45.

Snyder, J. L. (2000). *From voting to violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict* (p. 37). New York: Norton.

Solinger, D. J. (2001). Ending One-Party Dominance: Korea, Taiwan, Mexico. *Journal of Democracy*, *12*(1), 30-42.

Spencer, G. (1982). "Methodological Issues in the Study of Bureaucratic Elites" in Robert Burgess (ed). Field Research: A Source Book and Book and Field Manual, London: George Allen & Unwin, pp.23-30.

Stapenhurst, F. (2011). Legislative oversight and curbing corruption: Parliamentarianism and presidentialism revisited (unpublished thesis). Canberra, Australia: Australian National University

Statement released by the Campaign for Democracy quoted in "Whither the 1999 Constitution?" by Sukuji Bakoji in PostExprss 23 May,1999.

Steen, A. (2012). Elite and mass confidence in new democracies-towards congruence? The baltic states 1992-2007. *Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung*, 127-147.

Stepan, A. (1990). On the Risk of a Democratic Opposition; Journal of Democracy 1 (2) 41.

Stephens, J. D. (1987). *Democratic transition and breakdown in Europe, 1870-1939: A test of the Moore thesis*. Helen Kellogg Inst. for International Studies, Univ..

Stevens, D., Bishin, B. G., & Barr, R. R. (2006). Authoritarian attitudes, democracy, and policy preferences among Latin American elites. *American Journal of Political Science*, *50*(3), 606-620

Steves, F. (2001). Poland and the International System: External Influences on Democratic Consolidation. Communist and Post-Communist Studies.

Steves, F. (2001). Poland and the International System: External Influences on Democratic Consolidation. Communist and Post-Communist Studies.

Strauss, A.L, Corbin, J. (1998). Basic Qualitative Research: Technique and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, London: Sage Publication.

Strøm, K. (1990). *Minority government and majority rule*. Cambridge University

Suberu, R. (2001). Federalism and ethnic conflict in Nigeria.

Suberu, R. T. (1990). Federalism and Political Instability in Nigeria. *Plural Soc*, *19*, 23.

Suberu, R.T. (2007). Nigeria's Muddled Elections. Journal of Democracy, vol,18 No.4, DOI:10.1353/jod.2007.0079.

Svanikier, J. O. (2007). Political elite circulation: implications for leadership diversity and democratic regime stability in Ghana. *Comparative Sociology*,*6*(1), 114-135.

Svensson, J. (2000). Foreign aid and rent-seeking. *Journal of International Economics*, *51*(2), 437-461.

Talcott, P. and Shils, E.A. (1962). Towards a general theory of action. New York, Harper and Row.

Teorell, J. (2010). Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tester, K. (1992). *Civil Society. London and New York:* Routledge

Teune, H., & Przeworski, A. (1970). The logic of comparative social *New York* inquiry. .

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree, 1999.

Therborn, G. (1977). The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy. *New Left Review*, (103), 3.

Tilly, C. (1984). Big Structure, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons, New York: Russel. Sage Publicatiobn.

Tilly, C., & Wood, L. J. (2015). *Social Movements 1768-2012*. Routledge.

Tocqueville, A. D. (1969). Democracy in America, edited by JP Mayer, translated by George Lawrence. *Garden City, NY: Anchor.*

Tordoff, W. (2002). *Government and politics in Africa*. Indiana University Press.

Tripp, A. M. (2000). Political reform in Tanzania: The struggle for associational autonomy. *Comparative Politics*, 191-214.

Truman, D. 1965. The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf.
Ugoh, S. (2004). Electoral violence in Nigeria. *Journal of Politics*, *1*(1).
Un, K. (2006). State, society and democratic consolidation: The case of Cambodia. *Pacific Affairs*, *79*(2), 225-245.

Useem, M. (1986). *The inner circle: Large corporations and the rise of business political activity in the US and UK*. Oxford University Press.

Uslaner, E. M. (2005, November). The bulging pocket and the rule of law: Corruption, inequality, and trust. In *Conference on the Quality of Government: What it is, how to Get it, Why it Matters* (pp. 17-19).

Uwazurike, C. (1997). The search for stability in Post Civil War Nigeria: On the prospects of the rotational presidency idea. *Dialectical anthropology*, *22*(3), 265-302.

Van Biezen, I., & Kopecký, P. (2007). The state and the parties: public funding, public regulation and rent-seeking in contemporary democracies. *Party politics*, *13*(2), 235-254.

Van de Walle, N. (2003). Presidential and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party System. Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.41,No2.

Van de Walle, N. (2009, June). The democratization of political clientelism in sub-Saharan Africa. In *American Political Science Association annual meeting, Toronto* (pp. 3-6).

Wahab, H., & Assensoh, A. (2008). A historical-cum-political overview of ghana's national health insurance law. *African and Asian Studies*, *7*(2-3), 289-306

Wahman, M. (2011). Offices and policies–Why do oppositional parties form pre-electoral coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes?. *Electoral Studies*, *30*(4), 642-657.

Wahman, M. (2013). Opposition coalitions and democratization by election. *Government and Opposition*, *48*(1), 3-32.

Walker, J. L. (1966). A critique of the elitist theory of democracy. *American Political Science Review*, *60*(02), 285-295

Walraven, K. (2000). 'Of Canvassing and Carnival: Some Reflections on the Political Economy and Culture of Democratic Politics in Africa', paper presented at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Nashville Tennessee, Nov 16-19.p36.

Waylen, G. (1994). Women and Democratization: Conceptualizing Gender Relations in Transition Politics. World Politics, vol.46, No.3.

Weber, M. (1946) ìPolitics as a Vocation,î in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, New York: Oxford University Press.

Weber, M. (1978) Economy and Society, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Welsh, B. (2013). Buying Support—Najib's 'Commercialisation'of GE13. *Malaysiakini*.

Weinstock, D. (1999). Building trust in divided societies. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, *7*(3), 287-307.

Whitfield, L. (2009). 'Change for a better Ghana': Party competition, institutionalization and alternation in Ghana's 2008 elections. *African Affairs*, *108*(433), 621-641.

Who wilI win?" West Africa, October 26-November 1,1992, p. 1816

Widner, J.A. (1991). The 1990 Elections in Cote d'Ivoire. Issue: A journal of Opinion..

Wildavsky, A. (1987). Choosing preferences by constructing institutions: A cultural theory of preference formation. *American Political Science Review*, *81*(01), 3-21.

Williams, R., & Doig, A. (2004). A good idea gone wrong? Anti-corruption commissions in the twenty-first century. *Bergen: The Christian Michelsen Institute*.

Wolf, Z.R. (2012). "Ethnography: The Method" in Patricia L. Munhall (ed). Nursing Research: A Qualitative Perspective, Kevin Sullivan. Pp.318.

Wraith, R., & Simpkins, E. (1963). *Corruption in developing countries*. Allen and Unwin.Routledge..

Yayoh, W. K. (2006). Resurgence of multi-party rule in Ghana, 1990-2004: a historical review. *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, (10), 125-147.

Yayoh, W. K. (2006). Resurgence of multi-party rule in Ghana, 1990-2004: a historical review. *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, (10), 125-147.

Young, Crawford. 2002. *Ethnicity and Politics in Africa.* Boston: Boston University African Studies Center

Young, I.M. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Yun, F. (2004). Taiwan: No Civil Society, No Democracy. In Civil Society and Political Change in Asia. Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space, (ed). Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford University Press.

Zander, A. (1979). The psychology of group processes. *Annual review of psychology*, *30*(1), 417-451.

Zinecker, H. (2009). Regime-hybridity in Developing Countries: Achievements and Limitations of New Research on Transitions. International Studies Review, Vol.11.

Zmerli, S., & Newton, K. (2008). Social trust and attitudes toward democracy. *Public opinion quarterly*, *72*(4), 706-724.

Zmerli, S., Newton, K., & Montero, J. R. (2007). Trust in people, confidence in political institutions, and satisfaction with democracy. *Citizenship and involvement in European democracies: A comparative analysis*, *17*, 35-65.

Zolberg, A. R. (1967). Patterns of National Intergration. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *5*(04), 449-467.

Zovatto, D., & Payne, M. (2003). Trends in electoral participation in Latin America. *Paper preparado per il*.

Online Links

http://www.afrobarometer.org/files/documents/summary_results/gha_r5_sor.pdf

https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/nigeria

https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice...and-corruption/...corruption/ghana

https://www.modernghana.com/news/.../has-chraj-been-an-anti-corruption-failure.htm
. www.4uth.gov.ua/usa/english/politics/freedom/freedom3.htm

www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/sub-saharan-africa/ghana/snapshot.aspx

www.chrajghana.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/nacap.pd

Appendix: Selected Elite interviews in Ghana, organizations and locations.

S/N	Assigned Names	Names of Organizations/ Professions	Locations
1	Civil Society Activist	Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD)	Accra
2	Civil Society Activist	Member of National Endowment for Democracy	Ashanti
3	Civil Society Activist	Labour and Trade Union	Tamale
4	Civil Society Activist	African Centre for Peace Building (AFCOPB)	Kumasi
5	Anonymous	Traditional Leader	Kumasi
6	Anonymous	Traditional Leader	Cape Coast
7	Anonymous	Traditional Leader	Volta Region
8	Anonymous	University of Cape Coast	Cape Coast
9	Senior Lecturer	University of Ghana	Accra
10	Senior Lecturer	Ashesi University	Accra
11	Senior Lecturer	University of Ghana	Accra

12	Anonymous	Party Leader	Kumasi
13	Anonymous	Party Leader	Accra
14	Anonymous	Party Leader	Sunyani
15	Anonymous	Party Leader	Volta Region
16	Anonymous	Party Leader	Bolgatanga
17	Anonymous	Retired Army Major	Accra
18	Anonymous	Retired Army Cornel	Kumasi
19	Anonymous	Retired Army General	Ashanti

Selected Elite interviews in Nigeria, organizations and locations.

S/N	Assigned Names	Names of Organizations/ Professions	Locations
1	Anonymous	Election Officer	Rivers State
2	Anonymous	Army General	Abuja
3	Anonymous	Army General	Lagos

4	Anonymous	Party Leader	Lagos
5	Anonymous	Party Leader	Kano
6	Anonymous	Party Leader	Owerri
7	Anonymous	Party Leader	Jos
8	Anonymous	Party Leader	Benue
9	Anonymous	Party Leader	Benin
10	Anonymous	Traditional Leader	South East
11	Anonymous	Traditional Leader	South West
12	Civil Society Activist	Centre for Democracy and Development.	Abuja
13	Civil Society Activist	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta	Warri
14	Civil Society Activist	Nigeria Labour Congress	Akwa Ibom
16	Civil Society Activist	Oodua Peoples Congress	Lagos

210

17	Senior Lecturer	University of Lagos	Lagos
18	Senior Lecturer	University of Port Harcourt	Rivers
19	Senior Lecturer	University of Lagos	Lagos
20	Senior Lecturer	Enugu State University of Science and Technology	Enugu