



**Journalism and Risk:**

***The Impact of Boko Haram Attacks on News Content and Journalists' Patterns of News  
Gathering and Reporting in Nigeria (2011-2012)***

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## DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the Almighty God:

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## ABSTRACT

Journalists reporting on conflict have always faced risk in their work. In recent times, the risks have changed to deliberate targeting and systematic killing of journalists by terror groups. Many reporters in Nigeria covering the activities of Boko Haram have been threatened, some had been killed and their news offices bombed by the Boko Haram insurgents because of dissatisfaction with the reports that the journalists disseminate.

This thesis employs the mixed methods of content analysis, discourse analysis and in-depth interview to investigate the impact of Boko Haram attacks on news content and journalists' routine of news gathering and reporting in Nigeria (2011-2012). Ten journalists covering the activities of Boko Haram from both the northern and southern regions of Nigeria have been purposively selected for the interviews. For the content analysis and CDA, 897 and 120 news headlines on Boko Haram have been analysed respectively. These reports are also purposively drawn from the *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* newspapers covering the three selected major periods of attacks on journalists and media offices in Nigeria (2011-2012).

This study finds that in Nigeria, constraints on reporting about terrorism are multi-faceted: they come from the terror groups, the media owners and security agencies/government. The thesis argues that due to terror attacks, journalists have been found to change the way they report the Boko Haram crisis: mostly focusing on related topics about the crisis but not on the nefarious acts of the Boko Haram group itself. The thesis also shows that the headlines represent the security agents/government in positive terms and offer excuses or justifications for their activities, even when these are violent, which could position them as defending the public against Boko Haram.

The research concludes that reporters in the North who are expected to provide first-hand information and on-the-spot reports of the crisis seem to be constrained by direct confrontations from the terror groups, which is due to their proximity to the epicentre of Boko Haram activities. Therefore, while the policy makers in Nigeria are making efforts at ensuring safe reporting environment for journalists covering dangerous zones, special considerations should be made for reporters in the North where the stakes against them are higher, direct and real.

The thesis has confirmed that the reporters covering the Boko Haram crisis lack the requisite security and organisational support from the media owners. The finding also shows that based on the lack of security and organisational support, the reporters covering the Boko Haram crisis have become less committed following perceived personal risks from their reporting. The study concludes that journalists covering dangerous activities of terror groups need to be trained in order to heighten their awareness of what to expect, how to venture into the crisis and how to effectively report on it. The study also demonstrates that reporting by the newspapers on Boko Haram rarely attributes violence to Boko Haram directly. The headlines usually lack agencies for the violent actions. Most often, Boko Haram is not directly connected to the reported violence even in the story paragraphs. The thesis therefore argues that threats and intimidation from the Boko Haram group have engendered evasive techniques that are evident in most crime reporting in Nigeria.



# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction

Journalists reporting on conflict have always faced risk in their work. The nature of conflict has taken varying forms. The media is central to this change, as specific forms of risk have emerged in which journalists or media groups are targeted for the message they disseminate. The risk has gone beyond accidental shooting in war to the journalist being specifically targeted for kidnapping and execution and at times, appearing live on camera and made to play a role in terror narratives as propaganda tools. Media organisations have also become targets of bombings and other forms of attack.

It is against this backdrop that this thesis reviews literatures focusing on the specific risks that have confronted journalists in the past. This forms the background of this study. The literature review further examines new dangers that is, the intentional targeting of journalists globally in the post 9/11, which started following the September 11 attacks and US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The latter focus includes the actions of terror groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria and ISIS in the Middle East. These groups have been noted for targeting and killing journalists covering their activities. According to Ekwueme and Akpan, Boko Haram is fast becoming Nigeria's version of Muslim extremism, maiming and killing those they consider to be infidels (2011:42). The goal of this thesis is to examine the extent of challenges which these new risks pose to journalists in the process of gathering and disseminating news on conflict, particularly through a detailed examination of journalists reporting on the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

In the context of the emerging risks, two important questions arise:

- How do journalists report within the context of risk and fear during conflict, war and terrorism?
- What gaps in the literature can an analysis on reporting on Boko Haram in Nigeria fill?

To proffer answers to these questions, the thesis explores background literature on various risks encountered by journalists who have covered conventional wars. The new risks of killing, bombing and other threats in the terrorism context are then explored. This thesis employs three methods. The first is the analysis of news-texts in selected Nigerian media via content analysis, the second is the analysis on the same news reports through critical discourse analysis, which will be referred to throughout this study as CDA. The third method involves in-depth interviews with journalists reporting on the terror activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Both the content analysis and CDA focus on examining the representation of Boko Haram in two ways. While the first analysis looks at whether journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following Boko Haram's attacks, the second investigates whether there are differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* newspapers over the timeline of the study. These two newspapers have audiences based in the two major geographical regions in Nigeria – the north and south. The *Daily Trust* has its head office located in the north while *ThisDay's* headquarter is based in the southern region.

The In-depth interview in this work aims to obtain first-hand information from Nigerian reporters on the challenges they encounter in the patterns of news gathering and reporting on Boko Haram activities. In addition, the method is used to uncover the extent of support that these journalists receive from their media organisations in terms of training, insurance cover and salary. It is important to investigate these areas of focus in this study based on the various concerns from scholars on the dangerous trend in covering sensitive issues and groups such as Boko Haram.

## **1.1 Background**

This section provides a background on which this study is anchored. It covers three issues which include: Conflict sensitive reporting, Risk in reporting Boko Haram and Newspapers' proximity to or distance

from the epicentre of Boko Haram. The Conflict sensitive reporting focuses on the nature of reporting conditions that pose risk to journalists and thus differs from other forms of reporting. The analysis is important in order to give an understanding on the type of danger that journalists have faced in covering conflicts. War correspondents or specifically, conflict reporters in this case, are often proximate to violence due to the dangerous nature of their profession.

The second issue examines risks in reporting Boko Haram among Nigerian reporters. The specific focus here is on the murder of two journalists from *NTA* and *Channels* television stations in 2011 and 2012 and the simultaneous bombing of *ThisDay* along with *The Moment* and *The Sun* offices in Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) and Kano states in 2012. The analysis of these incidents is important as it specifically addresses the concerns of this thesis and forms the timeline of the study. The analysis further highlights the activities of Boko Haram and its possible linkage with other international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, As Shabab in Somalia and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). These have raised concerns and fear over Boko Haram's allegiance to the international terror groups and its adoption of Al-Qaeda and ISIS's strategy and tactics. The third issue explores the selected the newspapers' geographical closeness to or distance from the focal points of Boko Haram activities in order to gain understanding of the impact of the Boko Haram attacks on the journalists and the news content.

### **1.1.1 Conflict Sensitive Reporting**

In September 2004, the Overseas Press Club in New York hosted a panel discussion by editors who oversee foreign correspondents. Audience at the programme were told, "In the three years since (9/11) terrorist attacks, journalists reporting from abroad have faced sinister new dangers, kidnapping, assassinations, death by friendly fire. Some of our best journalists are literally risking their lives to bring us the news" (Foerstel, 2006: 22). This claim further coincides with Nohrstedt's and Ottosen's (2014:11) views

when they averred that the war correspondent is an endangered species, noting that reporting from armed conflicts has become increasingly dangerous since the early 1990s. In sum, war correspondents have long been vulnerable to violence, due to nature of their beat. Embedded amongst military units, or else unilaterally venturing into war zones, journalists who seek to cover events in conflict areas knowingly place themselves at risk of injury or death by their acts (Crawford 2012: 3).

Citing the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) annual reports, 2,271 journalists and media personnel were killed between 1989 and 2010 while doing their jobs. The highest number of deaths occurred in the 18 months between 2006 and mid-2007, when 227 journalists were killed reporting from Iraq after the US and UK military intervention of 2003. In Syria alone, 27 journalists were killed between 2011 and 2013 (Reporters Without Borders 2014). Foerstel however observes that ‘reporting on war has always been a dangerous business’. However, ‘it is the purposeful targeting of journalists by combatants that is new.’ (2006:23). According to Armoudian (2017:1), the attacks signal a dark era for journalism and a stark departure from previous decades when combatants, at minimum tolerated journalists, treating them as civilians, and often sought their sympathies. Convincing journalists of “our” righteousness and “their” wrongness was part of the information wars that run parallel to the physical wars. Armoudian further asserts: “Rebels, freedom fighters, and others relied upon journalists to tell their stories and relay their grievances and perspectives to the rest of the world in hopes of boosting their legitimacy, gaining international sympathies and persuading audience of the virtue of their causes (2017:1-2). However, Armoudian alluded to the Internet era as one of the factors responsible for change in the pattern of conflicts. She states: “With the new communication technologies, sophisticated fighters no longer need journalists to tell their stories; instead they disseminate their unfiltered messages and frames directly to the public, free from the check of independent journalism. Though the internet also gives voice to oppressed citizens to communicate outside of closed

borders, it has simultaneously empowered groups such as the Islamic State to expand their reach to persuade and terrorise (2017: 2).

Taking a look at the previous decades, combatants in conflicts treated journalists with sympathy and World War II reporters such as Ernie Pyle and Murrow placed themselves in harm's way to bring stories of courage and sacrifice to the home front (Foerstel, 2006). Walter Cronkite and a host of other celebrated correspondents followed in their footsteps. The dangers they faced were, more often than not, accidental. (2006: xiii). Many of the deaths and injury sustained by journalists then were clear instances of unintentional acts. This is evident when Marie Colvin, a 58-year-old Irish-American reporter, was killed by the blast of a rocket in the Baba Amr neighbourhood of Homs, Syria (Di Giovanni, 2015). Colvin was neither a soldier nor an insurgent. She was an American journalist and foreign correspondent for *The Sunday Times*, a British newspaper. In February 2012, at the time of the attack, Colvin was writing on the battleground of Homs, Syria (Tanner, 2015).

This understanding of the war environment made John Burns, Chief Foreign Correspondent for *The New York Times* to express the risks of contemporary reporting, 'We knew we were placing ourselves in the bull's eye of a war'. There is 'a significant risk that you can be killed,' and "when we find ourselves in very difficult situations, it is of our own choosing'. (Allan and Zelizer, 2004:4). This reality suggests the murky environment of war reporting and its implication for journalists. Similarly, Kate Adie (1998, cited in S.Allan and B. Zelizer, 2004:3), the BBC war correspondent notes: "The very nature of war confuses the role of the journalist". As modern war correspondents enter "the surface upon which war is imagined or executed", they become players in the conflicts they cover, essentially unarmed combatants, and thus doubly vulnerable (Thussu and Des Freedman, 2003:4-5). Armoudian succinctly captures this new phenomenon:

*In this new equation, journalists are part of the story, rather than conduits of stories. The harrowing public displays of their deaths are part of the information wars waged by extremists. Designed to*

*horrify and terrify, gruesome public killings of correspondents capture attention, induce grief across the globe, and project a sick form of power. And alongside the rest of their campaigns, extremist groups such as the “Islamic State” persuade potential recruits to join their cause (2017:2).*

This is a clear indication that terror groups have made journalists their targets, thereby making killings intentional. Given the above scenario, it can be asserted that terror reporting connotes danger. Therefore, Foerstel (2006: xiii) concludes that journalists covering these groups have become primary targets. (2006: xiii). Here, modern warfare is tantamount to a war without any form of organisation or orderliness. Foerstel’s description is supported by Hadland (2015:1) as he acknowledged that it is true that ‘killing the messenger’ is nothing new as there has been a steady record of journalists, as messengers, who have suffered for their craft.

Citing the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ 2014), local and foreign correspondents were among the first detainees of the Khmer Rouge in 1975, many Western journalists were held hostage during Lebanon’s civil war in the 1980s and dozens of reporters have been captured by paramilitaries or drug cartels in Latin America in recent years. It does seem, however, that something has changed in the relationship between journalism and conflict. Terry Anderson, Middle East correspondent for the Associated Press, who was captured in Lebanon and held for almost seven years, making him America’s longest-held hostage recalls his experience: “Today, journalists are targeted, which we never were. During most of the war in Lebanon you could go and talk to anyone, including the most radical groups.” (Foerstel, 2006:23). The outcome of such an encounter is that while it was dangerous – you could get beaten or thrown in jail for a while – the presumption was that you were there to tell a story, their story as well as anybody else’s. (Foerstel, 2006:23). While the examples in the past decades are suggestive of the dangerous nature of reporting war and other conflicts, the new phase of violence on journalists is depicted through the systematic targeting and intentional killings of journalists. The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 began the process (Foerstel, 2006:24). This was as a consequence of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Richiardi, 2002). Consequently, this was followed in 2002, with the horrific visual representation of the death

of Daniel Pearl, the *Wall Street Journal* reporter who was kidnapped in Pakistan and publicly beheaded. Based on these incidents, Gowing, therefore, concludes that although media reporting of war has been a dangerous business for a long time, it is now more dangerous than ever (2003:232). The deliberate killings of journalists covering sensitive beats have changed the equation. It is now a continual activity, as multiple attacks in Afghanistan in April 2018 have killed ten journalists (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2018).

After all, the implication of this new phenomenon is that “they (the extremists) generate an eerie silence, as the rash of killings and silence have persuaded journalists and their managers to opt out of covering dangerous territories and groups (Armoudian, 2017:2). After a dozen deaths just within the first 10 years of the twenty-first Century, then Reuters Editor-in Chief, David Schlesinger, called for a new, more cautious approach to danger zone journalism:

*We have to say ‘no’ more often. We have to be prepared to miss the image more often. We have to be ready to lose the shot to avoid being shot. We must be ready to lose some stories to avoid losing yet more lives* (Schlesinger, 2010).

### **1.1.2 Risk in Reporting Boko Haram**

The name Boko Haram originates from Hausa<sup>1</sup> language. In the language 'Boko' means book (especially Western or foreign) while 'Haram' is an Arabic word meaning 'forbidden', 'ungodly' or 'sinful'. If the words are pieced together, 'Boko Haram' literally means 'book is sinful' (Danjibo, 2009:7 and Adesoji, 2010:100). But fundamentally the importance is that Western education or civilisation is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should be forbidden. Thus Boko Haram stands for outright rejection of Western education, Western culture and modern science. Rather it advocates the propagation of strict adherence to Islam in its

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<sup>1</sup> Hausa Language is the most indigenous lingua franca in West and Central Africa, spoken as a first or second language by about 40-50 million people. The home territories of the Hausa people lie on both sides of the border between Niger, where about one-half of the population speaks Hausa as a first language. The Hausas are predominantly Muslims.

purest form. Boko Haram represents the vision and mission of a fundamentalist Islamic movement in Nigeria (Ajayi, 2012). Boko Haram, also known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teachings and Jihad) seeks to Islamise Nigeria by whatever means at its disposal and at whatever human cost. This leads it into the category of terrorism. So far, the dastardly activities of this sect have been confined to the Northern states and the Federal Capital Territory (Ajayi, 2012).

In Nigeria, Boko Haram has threatened and carried out attacks on journalists and media outlets over reporting deemed unfavourable to their cause. Several journalists have relocated from Boko Haram strongholds in Nigeria's northern regions. Others routinely exercise self-censorship (Nkanga, 2014). According to the interviews with journalists by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), "many journalists have resigned their appointments because of fear of being killed," (Nkanga, 2014). Eight Nigerian journalists have been murdered for their work since 1998. Among the most recent victims was Zakariyyah Isa of the state-run broadcaster *Nigeria Television Authority (NTA)* in a killing for which Boko Haram claimed responsibility in October 2011 (CPJ, 2011). About a month before the killing, Boko Haram had issued a statement saying it would attack media organisations for what it described as misrepresentations of its activities (CPJ, 2011). The report states: "Boko Haram perceived cameramen and photographers, particularly those working for state media, as potential spies" (CPJ, 2011). In an emailed statement issued after the killing, Boko Haram spokesman, Abul Qaqa said the militants killed Isa "because he was spying on us for Nigerian security authorities" (CPJ, 2011).

Following Isa's killing in January 2012, Enenche Akogwu of independent broadcaster *Channels TV*, was slain by unidentified gunmen as he interviewed witnesses after bombings blamed on Boko Haram (Nkanga, 2014). According to CPJ's 2012 report, Akogwu had just returned from a police news conference following coordinated bombings by the extremist Islamist group, Boko Haram that left at least 178 people



dead. Kayode Akintemi, *Channels TV* General Manager of Operations described Akogwu as “a very hard-working journalist who travel to some of the most dangerous places in northern Nigeria to get these stories” (CPJ, 2012). The statement is an indication of Akogwu’s doggedness in reporting the activities of the Boko Haram group in its northern enclave.

Shortly after the killing of Akogwu, for the first time, since Boko Haram began a series of deadly bomb attacks, it turned its attention to the media in April 2012. It unleashed a string of coordinated attacks on three media houses in Abuja and Kaduna, killing nine people in the process (Otuchikere et al, 2012). The three media houses attacked by the bombers were the Abuja office of *ThisDay* Newspaper, and *The Sun* and *The Moment* offices in Kaduna which were hit simultaneously by the blasts (Otuchikere, et al, 2012). The Boko Haram group identified deliberate misinformation being peddled about it in Nigerian and foreign media as a major reason for its onslaught on the media (*Premium Times*, 2012).

The spokesperson for the sect, Abul Qaqa stated:

*We have repeatedly cautioned reporters and media houses to be professional and objective in their reports. This is a war between us and the government of Nigeria; unfortunately the media have not been objective and fair in their report of the ongoing war, they choose to take side [sic] (Madunagu, 2012).*

This indicates that the Boko Haram group identifies subjective and unfair reporting of its group’s activities as the major reason for its attacks on the media and its practitioners. Qaqa further explained that *ThisDay’s* “sins are more grievous”, for the newspaper had “once insulted the Prophet Muhammed in 2001 and we have not forgotten. They recently said our Imam executed me which is false. Here I am speaking to you, I am alive and healthy” (Madunagu, 2012). Qaqa warned of more attacks on the media. He states: “We have just started this new campaign against the media and we will not stop here, we will hit the media hard since they have refused to listen to our plea for them to be fair in their reportage” (*Premium Times*, 2012).

Consequently in July 2015, the Boko Haram group had threatened to kill Adeola Akinremi, the Features Editor for *ThisDay*. The death threat was issued after the journalist wrote a piece titled, ‘Why Boko

Haram don't deserve our amnesty'. The editor wrote it after his return from Adamawa State to investigate killings by the insurgents and the plight of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The warning email, suspected to have been written by Boko Haram and published by the *Cable*, reads: "We have seen your hand against us. Inshallah you will die like other infidels that we have captured" (*Daily Post*, 2015). *Daily Post* succinctly described the death sentence passed on Akinremi by the Boko Haram group:

*You have been joining our enemies. You are made yourself their mouth [sic] but we will get you insha Allah. This is a holy mission for Allah, so stop writing against us. You're going too Michika calling yourself a brave journalist, but you're a coward. We will get you. It's your government that talks of amnesty, we are not looking for amnesty. Allah is with us. You're now a walking dead and a prey to the Lions of Islam from the bullet of a passing car or a nearby rooftop* (*Daily Post*, 2015).

The mention of death 'from the bullet of a passing car or a nearby rooftop' indicates a threat of assured death for Akinremi. The reports further warned:

*We are not asking you to repent, because of your error we will use your blood to send warning to others. Those people from America and Europe that are using you against our mission will soon know the truth. Our wounded fighters will never give up. They will return to fight for Allah to get their reward. Your soldier will soon know the truth* (*Daily Post*, 2015).

The invocation of threat in this statement is an indication that the Boko Haram group has unleashed a new war on the Nigerian journalists and the media. Consequent to the death threat, Akinremi now keeps a low profile and has scaled down his writing on issues relating to Boko Haram as he and his family fear a potential attack. He states: "I don't know what can happen anytime, anywhere. I have requested a police report on the update of their investigation. But I have not heard anything yet" (CPJ, 2015). This is a clear indication that journalists reporting on the activities of Boko Haram are operating within the contexts of risks and intimidation.

### **1.1.3 Differences in Newspapers' Locations to the Epicentre of Boko Haram**

In order to explore this aspect of the discussion, this section highlights the two major geographical regions of the north and south in Nigeria, examines some of the agitations of the Boko Haram group and looks into some of the several conflicts the country has been involved in, and the particular roles the media has played in this theatre of conflicts. In the context of this study, this attempt is useful in order to understand the impact of the Boko Haram attacks on the news outlet and journalists whose head office is located close to the Boko Haram insurgents in the north, that is, the *Daily Trust* and also to gain insights into whether the newspaper whose head office is sited in the south (*ThisDay*) – outside the Boko Haram strongholds has been impacted by the group's attacks.

As of Monday, November 26, 2018, based on the latest United Nations estimates, the current population of Nigeria is 197, 808,325 (Worldometers, 2018). In the 36 states and Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria, there are over 500 ethnic groups and over 500 languages spoken. There are eight largest ethnic groups in Nigeria, and they are as highlighted: The Hausa are the biggest ethnic group in Nigeria with estimates of their population reaching 67 million. Hausa make up approximately 25% of the Nigerian population. Yoruba make up approximately 21% of the population of Nigeria, making them the second biggest ethnic group in the country. The third ethnic group is the Igbo people of Nigeria which make up 18.0% of the population, and they are from the south-eastern part of the country. The fourth group is the Ijaw who live in the River Delta area of Nigeria and constitute around 10% of the population of the country. The fifth ethnic group is the Kanuri people who are found in the north-eastern Nigeria and their population is believed to be around 4% of the population (approximately 4,000,000). Since the Fulani War (1804-1808), the Fulani people have been intertwined with the Hausa of Nigeria. This is largely due to intermarriage and the Fulani living among the Hausa population. Fulani and Hausa together make up approximately 29% of the population of Nigeria. Another ethnic group is the Ibibio who are mostly found in the south-eastern Nigeria.

These people have lived in this part of Nigeria for several hundred years. This ethnic group numbers approximately 4.5 million which is equivalent to 3.5% of the population of Nigeria. The eighth group is the Tiv, which only make up 3.5% of the Nigerian population, making them one of the smaller groups within the country. The remaining ethnic groups in Nigeria make up 12% of the Nigerian population. These groups include Ebira, Edo, Gwari, Jukun and Igala, to name a few. The middle belt of Nigeria is well known for its diversity, with many of these remaining groups living in this part of the country. Although Nigeria is rich in her diverse ethnicity, many of these groups mentioned above live segregated from others (World Atlas, 2018).

But the three large ethnic groups account for more than two-thirds of the population: the overwhelmingly Muslim Hausa-Fulani, concentrated in the north (29 percent of the population), and Christian-animist ethnic groups in the south, the Yoruba of the south-west (21 percent), and the Igbo of the south-east (18 percent) (Mapping Digital Media, 2012). In sum, Nigeria is divided into three major ethnic groups – Hausa, (in the north) and Igbo and Yoruba, (in the south). Moreover, the three ethnic groups practice two major religions – Christianity and Islam.

The division between north and south is a defining feature of Nigeria in terms of economics, culture, and politics. Prosperity and economic growth have been largely confined to the south, where the oil is. In the north, the last decade has been one of deindustrialisation, poverty, and growing religious conservatism. Twelve northern states have introduced Sharia law in the past decades, and there has been a spate of attacks by the Boko Haram group, which have drawn vehement responses from the military (Mapping Digital Media, 2012). Boko Haram first announced itself on the Nigerian stage in 2009, following a riot in Maiduguri that killed over 800 people. The group's founder and then leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed while in police custody. Ever since, Boko Haram has killed thousands of Nigerians, with the death toll rising nearly every day (Agbibo, 2014: 41). In apparent frustration at being unable to contain Boko Haram, the Nigerian Federal Government has admitted that the state of insecurity in the country is now worse than during the civil war of

the 1960s. Christian groups in particular have become a major target of the Boko Haram and have as a result threatened to resort to self-help to protect themselves from attack. In panic that the situation could spark off a religious conflict, there has been mass exodus of people from the North to their places of origin (Osumah, 2013: 537).

It is noteworthy to point out that prior to the period of Boko Haram conflict, Nigeria had been involved in several conflicts at both religious and ethnic dimensions. Osumah cited some classic cases which include the Egba Uprising in 1918, the Aba Women's Riots in 1929, and the Kano Riots in 1953. In 1966, the Niger Delta Vigilante under Adaka Boro staged a 12-day revolution against the Nigerian state. Between 1967 and 1970, the Igbo led by Chukwu Emeka Ojukwu revolted against the Nigerian state. In the 1980s, Maitatsine riots, which began in Kano, spread to Bulumkutu in Maiduguri, Jemeta in Yola, and Kaduna. During the last phase of military rule, especially under the Abacha administration, acts of terrorism such as explosions and assassinations became rife (2013: 537).

Furthermore, several religious conflicts and communal clashes began during the last phase of the military regime. Between 1991 and 2000, there were over 30 violent crises and conflicts in different parts of Nigeria. Within this period, Kaduna experienced anti-Sharia riots, which resulted in huge human carnage estimated at around 5000 fatalities and loss of property running into several millions of Naira. The riots precipitated reprisals in Aba and other parts of the Eastern states leading to a further significant loss of life and property. Overall, between 2001 and 2005, approximately 100 conflicts and crises erupted in various parts of the country. Within this period Barkin Ladi, Jos, Bassa, Yelwa- Shendam, Wase, Langtang, and Kanam among other communities were theatres of significant ethno-religious conflict (Osumah, 2013:537).

However, within these crisis periods, it is pertinent to ponder over the role of the Nigerian media given the importance of the media in societies and or democracies. The mass media in Nigeria played the leading role of promoting the political, social and economic aspirations of their tribesmen (Uche, 1989). In addition,

there is a lot of emphasis on the role played by the press in Nigerian politics from the colonial days when politics and journalism were more or less fused together. It has been difficult to separate them (Oso, 2012).

Peter Golding and Philip Elliot summed up the historical process thus:

*Nigerian journalism was thus created by anti-colonial protest, baptised in the waters of nationalist propaganda, and matured in party politics. The separation of politics and journalism has remained incomplete and the dual allegiances of journalists to professional and political goals have created conflicts whose resolution in daily practice underpins much of contemporary Nigerian journalism (Golding and Elliot, 1979: 31).*

In essence, this suggests an interwoven relationship between the mass media and political crises in Nigeria. It is against this important responsibility by the Nigerian media in the nation's affairs, especially during crisis situations that this study examines the impact of the Boko Haram attacks on *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* newspapers based on their different locations: proximity to or distance from the epicentre of Boko Haram activities.

## **1.2 Research Gaps and Objectives**

This study contributes to research on Boko Haram in Nigeria through the adoption of mixed methods – in-depth interview, content analysis and critical discourse analysis. The combination of these methods is not only to gain understanding into the environment of risk that journalists face but to also gain insights into the impact of the risk on news content. Although there have been several studies on Boko Haram in Nigeria, with scholars adopting varied methodologies, most of these employ only one or two research methods. (see Onuoha, 2010; Ajayi, 2012; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Uzodike, U. O & Maiangwa, B 2012; Solomon, 2012; Forest 2012; Aghedo, & Osumah, 2012; Agbiboa, D. E 2013; Okoro and Odoemelan, 2013; Chiluwa, 2017; Ekwueme & Obayi 2012;). Furthermore, most of these studies have paid little or no attention to the examination of the risks that journalists face while covering the activities of Boko Haram.

The first area of this study focuses on the content and language patterns employed in the headline articles of the selected newspapers in representing Boko Haram. The emphasis of the content and language analysis is to determine whether there was change in the way reporters represented Boko Haram following the group's attacks on journalists and media in Nigeria. The focus on this aspect was borne out of the understanding that the journalists covering Boko Haram insurgents are faced with devastating challenges that could most likely impact on the news content. Another focus of the content and language analysis is to gain insights into whether there are differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* newspapers, with audiences of the two newspapers based in the northern and southern regions of the country. Specifically, the examination of the news articles from these two newspapers is based on the different geographical locations of the newspapers' head offices to the Boko Haram insurgents. It is assumed that journalists from these newspapers would have different experiences with Boko Haram – the reporters in the north work in close proximity and easy reach of Boko Haram (since the group has made the northern region their base and stronghold of operations) and reporters in the south work and live outside direct contacts of Boko Haram.

This thesis further contributes to research on Boko Haram through emphasising on the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists. This study aims to provide insights into whether concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram have an impact on the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists. This study also contributes to scholarship in the area of organisational support for journalists. The research seeks to provide understanding on whether provision of essential welfare packages for journalists by media owners in Nigeria enhances their job performance. It is expected that in order to ensure continuous reporting in this dangerous beat, journalists required the necessary support from the media owners. Most of the existing studies conducted on Boko Haram do not look into this issue. For instance, Popoola (2012) in his study of 'Press and Terrorism in Nigeria: A Discourse on Boko Haram' examined the emergence of Boko

Haram in Nigeria and the dangers it posed to press freedom in the country. He employed the case study approach by perusing some documents and historical artifacts. It is clear that the focus of Popoola's study was about the implications of Boko Haram's activities on the practicability of press freedom in Nigeria. Similarly, Okoro and Nnanyelugo (2013) in their study on 'Print Media Framing of Boko Haram in Nigeria: A Content Analytical Study of the *Guardian*, *Daily Sun*, *Vanguard* and *ThisDay* Newspapers' focused on identifying the pattern of frames adopted by Nigerian newspapers in the coverage of Boko Haram insurgency.

Another area that this thesis focuses on is the risks that reporters face while covering the activities of Boko Haram. This is borne out of the understanding that covering a group like Boko Haram which has been identified with violence and terror activities is likely to pose some danger for journalists. Also, the security agencies/government which is involved in addressing the crisis is presumed to constitute another challenge for journalists. This is based on the assumptions that the agencies/government is likely to have its own religious, political and ethnic agenda regarding the crisis. The other area of interest in this study is on the provision of organisational support for journalists to enhance their reporting of the crisis. Most media owners in Nigeria have been noted for their paucity in the provision of welfare packages which include insurance cover, staff training and prompt payment of salary for their staff. Therefore, this thesis identifies that while major risk in reporting on the activities of Boko Haram largely comes from the Boko Haram itself, security agencies/government and media owners are also noted as constituting other forms of challenges. Existing studies to date have not been able to dwell into these important aspects. In consideration of these contributions, the thesis is formulated on three central objectives:

### **Research Objectives**

The objectives of the research can be categorised into three types, namely:

- Boko Haram and media related objective



- Journalist and risk objective
- Methodology objective

### **Boko Haram and Media Related Objective**

As Boko Haram is the main interest of this thesis, this research attempts to show how journalists in Nigeria represent the group following perceived personal risks from the sect. The investigation in this case was carried out in two newspapers, *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* in which their audiences are based in the two main geo-political regions of the country – the north and south. The rationale for this is to provide understanding on the type of language constructions that the newspapers adopted in identifying the major social actor (Boko Haram in this case) and their actions in the headline reports. This section of the research employs qualitative and quantitative analyses.

### **Journalist and Risk Objective**

This aspect of the research is important since journalists are another main focus of the thesis. This study investigates the risks that journalists in Nigeria are facing while covering the activities of Boko Haram in the country. The journalists in this study were categorised into two based on their proximity to or distance from the nerve centre of Boko Haram activities. The study adopts the qualitative analysis in investigating this aspect of the study.

### **Methodology Objective**

This study contributes to knowledge in the area of methodology adopted. The number of studies on Boko Haram that have used the combination of in-depth interview, CDA and content analysis is quite small. In most cases, studies on Boko Haram were found to employ case studies or historical analysis.

### **1.3 Statement of the Problem**

The general statement of this thesis is that in covering the activities of terror groups, journalists are faced with a new set of risks. Specifically, terror groups systematically target and kill journalists. The agenda of this study is to interrogate the ways this violence has posed challenges to reporters in covering the Boko Haram crisis. In addition, the thesis seeks to uncover the impact of the risks on the language and content used in news reports. Generally, journalists reporting on conflicts have always faced danger but in the context of post-9/11 terrorism, the nature of conflict has changed to intentionally attack journalists. The centrality of the media to this change is that specific forms of risks have emerged whereby non-state actors, because of the desire to manipulate the message being disseminated target journalists or media groups.

Specifically, the goal of this thesis is, therefore, to examine the extent of challenges which these risks pose to reporters covering Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. It also seeks to uncover the impact of the risks on news contents about Boko Haram by interrogating the process by which reporters in Nigeria gather and disseminate news on the conflict. The specific goals of the thesis are highlighted in the next section.

### **1.4 Research Goals**

- (1) To examine whether journalists changed their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria.
- (2) To examine whether there are differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust*'s and *ThisDay*'s reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012).
- (3) To examine whether concerns about risk in reporting on Boko Haram have an impact on the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists.
- (4) To examine whether provision for safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by the Nigerian media ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram.

## 1.5 Summary of the Thesis

This thesis opens with an argument that journalists covering conflicts have been known to always be in danger in the cause of their work but in the recent time, the risks have changed to deliberate targeting and systematic killing of journalists by terror groups. In a similar way, journalists covering the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria encounter challenges from the group. Many reporters have been threatened, some had been killed and news offices bombed by the Boko Haram because of the dissatisfaction with the reports that are being disseminated. These incidents have signified the extreme danger that journalists in the country face in covering Boko Haram. This study is situated within the conflict studies scholarship and specifically focuses on risk journalism. In order to provide understanding into these issues, the thesis is divided into eight chapters.

This introductory chapter provides the focus for this study. It discusses the background, the three main issues that the entire thesis is based on. The research gaps, the thesis goals and objectives of the study are clearly formulated in this chapter.

Chapter two of the thesis reviews the various related literatures across the three main themes identified in the study. The study is anchored on conflict sensitive reporting, risk in reporting Boko Haram among reporters in Nigeria and the selected newspapers' proximity to or distance from the epicentre of Boko Haram. Based on the insights from the reviews of these issues, the research questions are formulated. The chapter also identifies the theoretical framework for this study, which is the framing theory.

The research designs and methods in the study are the focus of chapter three. This chapter explains the use of mixed methods in the study. It highlights the rationale for the adoption of mixed methods of both qualitative and quantitative designs. The chapter further explains how each of the three research methods used in the study is tied to the research designs and research questions. While the content analysis uses the

quantitative approach, the CDA employs the qualitative technique to answer research questions one and two. The in-depth interview uses the qualitative design in proffering answers to research questions three and four.

Chapters four, five and six of this thesis focus on data analyses of the research questions. Each chapter is devoted to analysis of the research questions. Chapters four and five provide analyses of the content analysis and CDA data in answering research questions one and two concerning representation of Boko Haram. While chapter six addresses research questions three and four using the in-depth interviews method. The research questions in this case are centred on concerns about risks from Boko Haram and organisational support for journalists.

The discussion of findings and their interpretations are the focus of chapter seven. The chapter outlines the findings from each of the research questions and discusses them in relation to existing research on Boko Haram and conflict studies. Chapter eight concludes the study, provides a brief summary of the thesis and highlights the findings from the study. The chapter also discusses the recommendations of this study for future research.

## **1.6 Concluding Remarks**

This chapter discusses the core issues in this thesis, which sets the agenda for this research. The chapter provides an overview of the three issues covered in this study. The issues are: conflict sensitive reporting, the Boko Haram crisis, and an overview of the proximity to or distance of the newspapers to the epicentre of Boko Haram activities. The chapter discusses the risks that journalists covering conflicts face in the pursuit of gathering and reporting stories. It highlights the changing phenomenon in the coverage of conflicts. The new situation is that journalists have become targets of terror groups which they cover and are being killed by these groups. Such groups include ISIS in the Middle East and Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The chapter further emphasises the risks that journalists in Nigeria encounter while reporting on the activities of Boko Haram. This aspect is the nucleus of this research. Few months after Boko Haram swore allegiance to ISIS, it carried out its first public beheading of a Nigerian soldier, as an indication that it has embraced similar strategies and tactics as the ISIS. Since Boko Haram started its operations in Nigeria, eight journalists have been killed, while others have received warnings and death threats.

This chapter also provides brief descriptions of the Nigeria environment by briefly examining some of the conflicts the country has been involved in prior to the Boko Haram crisis and the role of the media in these conflicts. While this chapter covers all these issues, the next chapter examines in detail the nature of reporting that poses risks to journalists covering conflicts in general. This leads to discussion on the challenges that reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram encounter in terms of threats to life or killings, with brief reviews of the synergy between Boko Haram and other international terror groups. The last area of the literature review focuses on the examination of the differences in locations of the newspapers to the hotspot of Boko Haram activities in the northern region of the country, which is then followed by the analysis of the framing theory as the theoretical framework for this study.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **Review of Relevant Literature**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This study reviews relevant literature underpinning the scope of the thesis. This is necessary in order to provide the framework on which this research is formulated. This thesis covers three themes, which are conflict sensitive reporting, risk in reporting Boko Haram and differences in newspapers' locations to the epicentre of Boko Haram activities.

In order to explore these themes, this research reviews literature across the following areas:

- (i) Conflict-sensitive reporting
- (ii) Risk in reporting Boko Haram crisis among reporters in Nigeria
- (iii) Relevant Studies on Boko Haram
- (iv) Differences in locations of the newspapers to the epicentre of Boko Haram activities
- (v) An overview of the Nigerian media context
- (vi) Theoretical framework
- (vii) Research questions

## 2.2 Conflict-Sensitive Reporting

The kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, the *Wall Street Journal* reporter — which came only weeks after eight reporters were killed while covering the conflict in Afghanistan and a little more than one year before 11 journalists died covering the war in Iraq between March 19 and April 9, when Baghdad fell — was a terrible reminder for journalists around the world of their vulnerability (Nieman Reports 2003). Intentional killing of journalists is still ongoing. At least, 10 journalists were killed on April 30, 2018 in a double suicide bomb attack in Afghanistan capital by the militant group, Islamic State (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2018). Foerstel (2006:49) narrated the experience of journalists covering conflict zones. On Monday, May 1973, Phillip Caputo was kidnapped and tortured in Lebanon as he attempted to cover the conflict there for *Chicago Tribune*. He was reportedly released on May 12, 1973. Since his harrowing experience in Lebanon, Caputo has characterised our era as ‘The Age of Terrorism’. Foerstel further stated that a decade later in Lebanon on March 7, 1984, Jerry Levin, a prominent foreign correspondent for CNN and its Middle East bureau chief stationed in Lebanon, was kidnapped in Beirut and held in brutal captivity for almost a year (2006:54). Following the violence on these two journalists, another still became victim of kidnapping. Terry Anderson became significant as he became America’s longest held hostage – he was in captivity from March 16, 1985-December 4, 1991. He was a U.S. Marine correspondent during the Vietnam War and later an Associated Press (AP) reporter in places such as Tokyo, Johannesburg and Beirut, where he was AP’s chief Middle East correspondent. He was held for 2,454 days (2006:62). In one of his memoirs during his captivity, Anderson writes: ‘I am afraid I’m beginning to lose my mind, to lose control completely. This solitary confinement is killing me’ (2006:66). This is an indication that kidnapping has become a tactic of terror organisations. According to Frank Smyth (2012), who blogs regularly on journalists’ security issues for the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), the kidnapping of journalists for ransom or political gain has occurred frequently over CPJ’s 31-year history. Numerous cases have been reported in nations such as Colombia, the Philippines,

Russia, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Mexico and Somalia. In Afghanistan alone, insurgents or criminal groups from 2007 through 2011 kidnapped at least 20 journalists and media workers. At least two of them died. In the 1990s, the committee's records revealed that leftist guerrillas and rightist paramilitaries in Colombia often kidnapped journalists to coerce news outlets into coverage of their political grievances. In 2006, Brazil's TV Globo aired a home-made video, detailing perceived deficiencies in prison conditions after a local criminal gang kidnapped a station reporter and technician. The two journalists were later freed. While these two journalists and others that were kidnapped earlier were lucky to be freed, others such as Daniel Pearl and Steven Sotloff were not. Giovanni (2015) writes of Sotloff:

*Beheaded on camera by the murderous Islamic State, which had become every journalist's waking fear. Sotloff had spent a year in captivity along with other journalists and humanitarians, including Jim Foley, a much-loved reporter whom ISIS also beheaded.*

With the killing of Pearl and Foley after their captivity, it became apparent that journalists reporting on conflict had entered a new stage of risk: beheading. During the Iraq War, hostages who were not journalists were beheaded on camera. In a similar vein, Nick Berg, an American small-business owner who went to Iraq as an independent businessman to help rebuild communication antennas was beheaded to avenge the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S soldiers. The militants who killed him videotaped the incident and posted it on a radical Islamic Web site. The Islamic State (IS) attained notoriety when it released a gruesome video showing the beheading of Foley. Subsequent beheadings shocked and outraged audiences across the globe when IS murdered Steven Sotloff, David Haines, Alan Henning, and Abdul-Rahman (Peter) Kassig. All the five victims were held in prolonged captivity and each death was accompanied by a grisly, widely disseminated video (Zech and Zane, 2014:2). The beheading videos define victims and opponents of the Islamic State as culpable, as deserving criminals, whether through direct action or complicity. In many videos, the victims "repent and recant". The confessional aspect is part of IS' attempt to control the narrative and legitimise the murders (Zech and Zane, 2014:6).



### 2.2.1 Journalists Embedding in War Zones

Journalists embedding with the military during wartime are often working at heightened levels of risk. Embedding arose because American journalists requested it (Ignatius 2010). The ‘cordial’ relationship between the press and the military, which Paul and Kim (2004: 57) described as ‘relatively amicable’, can be traced back to the World War II period. However, in 1991, during the Persian Gulf War, the levels of access to events were highly restricted, where many reporters were stuck covering the action from the rear in Dhahran or Riyadh. A few managed to travel with the U. S. units into the battle zone, producing vivid reports such as Molly Moore’s *Washington Post* dispatches from the forward outposts of the Marine commander. After the war, U.S. media pleaded that this sort of access be expanded (Ignatius, 2010). Thereafter, a broad implementation of the embedding system occurred during the 2003 Iraq War. Yet Ignatius argues that embedding, whereby journalists are often required to see things from only one side as a condition of doing their job, is “poisonous” and “unprofessional” (Ignatius, 2010). This is an indication that the system of embedding can act against journalists’ work ethics.

In spite of the criticisms in embedding, Idowu (2014) explains some of its importance. He notes that media managers in Nigeria have complained of the military’s unwillingness to embed their reporters in periodic sorties to conflict zones, especially those suffering from incursions by Boko Haram. He states that “unless the military have something to hide, they need to cultivate the media to convey better the challenges of the war and secure the public buy-in without which no war is successfully conducted” (Idowu, 2014). He further notes that many observers have suggested that a mixture of cooperation and tension has historically characterised the relationship between the media and the military in Nigeria (Idowu, 2014).

In a study on *Embed vs. Unilateral Perspectives on Iraq War*, Fahmy and Johnson (2007:100) assert that war coverage was not limited to embeds. News organisations could choose to send non-embedded reporters (unilaterals). However, the military actively discouraged news organisations from sending unilaterals, saying

their safety could not be guaranteed. Fahmy and Johnson state that, “of the 14 journalists killed during the initial stage of the war, nearly all were unilaterals (p.100). Indeed, they were discouraged from approaching the battlefield as they or their vehicle could be mistaken for the enemy. News organisations were then faced with a dilemma. If they agreed to the embed system, they would be required to accept guidelines on reporting in return for improved battlefield access and additional safety. On the other hand, if they sent unilaterals, their reporters enjoyed greater freedom of reporting but had limited access to the troops and were subjected to more danger (p.100). The study concludes that in a war situation, not being embedded with the military would have put more journalists, technicians and crews in further danger as demonstrated by the higher rate of casualties for unilaterals (p.109).

However, Ignatius (2010) describes the situation whereby American reporters typically embedded with U.S. units, spending a week or two with them, and some Arabic-speaking reporters working for the Iraqi or international media, were able, in effect, to embed with the insurgents and report what the war looked like from their side. He argues that such a situation of counter-embedding was dangerous. He cited the horrifying footage of a U.S. helicopter attack in Baghdad in 2007, which showed the deaths of a Reuter’s camera crew and about 10 others.

### **2.2.2 Emergence of New Risk after September 11**

Hezbollah’s early attacks on Americans in Lebanon included journalists, but the systematic targeting of journalists began with the war on terrorism. The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan began the process (Foerstel, 2006:24). Fenton, a former reporter in ‘such harrowing locales as Sierra Leone’, views the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 to have upped the ante on Americans (Richiardi, 2002). He further traces the horrific visual representation of the death of Daniel Pearl, the *Wall Street Journal* reporter kidnapped and then murdered in Pakistan in March 2002, as encapsulating ‘the

extreme danger for reporters working in conflict zones'. Thereafter, *Newsweek* labelled the abduction and murder "the first international acts of terrorism against the United States since September 11" (Ricchiardi, 2002). The attack and the subsequent anthrax incidents created a growing debate and subsequent concern with what is now termed 'urban war corresponding' (Tumber, 2002: 247). The connection of the September 11 event to terrorism, however, validates the first emerging issue in the introductory part of this thesis that highlights that new danger to foreign or war correspondents began after the September 11 terrorist attack (Lisosky & Henrichsen, 2009; Foerstel, 2006; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2014). These scholars provide a nexus between the terrorist attack of September 11 and the new dangers faced by journalists in reporting conflict. Although this may be a very American-centric view of the world, it only seems new to Americans because they lack an awareness of events in other parts of the world.

The realisation that journalists have become serious targets post-September 11 was further captured in an email from Leroy Sievers and the ABC *Nightline* staff to its members following the murder of Daniel Pearl and the shooting at journalists by Israeli forces in the West Bank. The mail restates that covering wars has always been dangerous, but it used to be different. "It just seems that in recent years, our ability to cover these conflicts has been steadily eroded. And the Pearl case shows that terrorists see journalists as simply American targets, and handy ones at that" (Tumber, 2002: 259) although it is not new. For example, one of the first things Indonesian forces did after invading East Timor in 1975 was to capture, and then deliberately killed five Australian journalists (*The Guardian*, 2007).

While the West may be preoccupied with the targeting of its own journalists, in the context of war, the West targets 'enemy' media organisations. Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2014:47) cite the NATO attack on the television building in Belgrade in 1999 during the Kosovo War, and the American attack on Al Jazeera in Kabul in 2001 and Baghdad in 2003 as examples of 'military interference' in journalism. In this context, becoming 'targets of attacks' stands out as a recurring decimal – whether 'military interference' on the media

or other attacks on the journalists from other quarters, the point is journalists have become targets of attack. For the ‘military interference’, Nohrestdt and Ottosen raised some pertinent questions such as: ‘Were the media targeted because of the role they played in informing the global public about the warfare, including potential “collateral damage” such as civilian casualties?’ and ‘What will be the long-term effect for journalism, if journalists and media are to be considered as legitimate targets in modern warfare?’ (p.47).

### **2.2.3 Other Dimension of Risk: ‘Offensive’ News Contents**

This section examines the risks that journalists encounter due to news reports that are considered ‘offensive’ by terror groups. The journalists may not be specifically covering the activities of these groups but have news contents relating to the group. In this context, *Charlie Hebdo* editor, Stephanie Charbonnier, had received death threats in the past and was living under police protection (BBC, 2015). The satirical weekly had courted controversy in the past with its irreverent take on news and current affairs. It was firebombed in November 2011, a day after it carried a caricature of the Prophet Muhammad (BBC, 2015). Four years afterwards, in January 2015, gunmen had shot dead 12 people at the Paris office of the magazine in an apparent militant Islamist attack. The attack took place during the magazine's daily editorial meeting. Four of the magazine’s well-known cartoonists, including its editor, were among those killed, as well as two police officers (BBC, 2015). According to President Francois Hollande, the attack had been a terrorist attack “of exceptional barbarity” (BBC, 2015). Eight months after the attack, the magazine continued to create controversial contents.

A second cartoon depicts what appears to be Jesus next to the drowned boy with the caption: “Proof that Europe is Christian. Christians walk on water – Muslim Children sink”. The images were drawn by artist, Laurent “Riss” Sourisseau, who survived the January shooting despite being hit in the shoulder and has since

become the acting editor of the magazine. Since the attack, Riss had to be chaperoned at all times by armed, plain-clothed police (Harrold, 2015).

However, Williamson (2015) reports that for most of the nine months after the attack, Charlie Hebdo's small team worked out of the offices of the French newspaper, Liberation, and recently moved to a new permanent home. Laurent Joffrin, editor of the Liberation newspaper, explains that the continued security risk still weighs heavy on every member of staff, noting that "the threat against them is very high" (Williamson, 2015).

Specifically, Williamson (2015) describes the threat thus:

*Every Islamist in the world dreams of killing one of those guys. And so they have to live in their apartments with their curtains closed because they're afraid of snipers. They live in the dark. And it's probably going to last the rest of their lives. It shows that those who go on are especially courageous.*

Consequently, Charlie Hebdo's senior cartoonist, Luz – the man who designed the famous green cover of the first edition after the attacks, and columnist Patrick Pelloux had announced they would be leaving the paper (Williamson, 2015). While Luz and the paper's new director, Riss, agreed they were not drawing the Prophet Mohammed anymore, reporter Zineb el-Rhazoui averred that security fears are prompting a change of editorial direction. She succinctly stated:

*I wonder if this is a kind of withdrawal, in order to make the terrorists more serene, and forget us. If it is such a strategy, I believe it's a wrong strategy because when you accept the limits they want to put on you, they will put other limits on you (Williamson, 2015).*

In essence, this narration suggests that conflict journalists could be targets of terror groups in as much as these groups consider the news contents undesirable or provocative. The threats and deliberate attacks by the groups may make reporters, like in the Charlie Hebdo's case, devise evasive strategies of refocusing contents or framing. This could be a means of seeking protection against attacks from the terror groups.

Given the risks that journalists encounter in terms of gathering information and writing news on conflict, it is expected that reporters and their news organisations devise means to ensure safety. One of the hallmarks of safety measures is that journalists concerned for their livelihood self-censor in self-preservation (Armoudian, 2017:102). During the past 10 years, numerous international discussions have focused on the protection of journalists on dangerous missions in today's wars, and making prominent individuals, major press associations, media companies and international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to raise concerns. In addition to this, pragmatic strategies have been proposed to protect journalists covering conflict zones, which include combat training for journalists, protective equipment and identity badge. Although, the scholars no clear comprehensive method to protect journalists has yet to be universally accepted, lack of safety concerns coupled with life-threatening patterns of reporting may traumatise them (Lisosky and Henrichsen, 2009:131).

#### **2.2.4 Journalism and Trauma**

In terms of clinical definitions of trauma, journalists' reportage of the activities of terror groups with its accompanying danger to their life means they may often qualify as traumatised subjects. Ward clarified the concept of trauma in this way:

*The person has experienced an event outside the range of usual human experience that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone, such as a serious threat to his/her life or physical integrity; serious threat or harm to his/her children, spouse, or other close relatives or friends; sudden destruction of his/her home or community; or seeing another person seriously injured or killed in an accident or by physical violence (Ward, 2015).*

Based on the foregoing illustration, it can be asserted that the decision by Akinremi to keep a low profile and scale down his writing on issues relating to Boko Haram after the death threat he received from the group is a sign of trauma. Also, the possibility for a change in the editorial direction at *Charlie Hebdo* after

the killings at the news media can be described as another form of withdrawal syndrome. Cote and Simpson (2000:42) relate these conditions to the way that journalists sometimes feel after seeing dead and injured people and the debris of deadly events. They further explained that journalists become trauma victims simply by doing their work – by visiting scenes of destruction, talking to, and photographing people who have been injured or traumatised. In a similar vein, Armoudian (2017: 138) clarifies this situation:

*But just as journalism can affect politics of life and death, the politics of life and death can affect journalism. The physical and psychological wounds are sometimes debilitating, mentally and physically, and can impair the once-determined journalist when hopes and expectations fade to disillusionments and disappointments.*

Accordingly, the Dart Centre for Journalism & Trauma (2003) argues that reporters, editors, photojournalists and news crews are involved in the coverage of many traumatic events during their lifetimes. They range from wars to terrorist attacks, airplane crashes, natural disasters, fire and murders. All of these events have victims, all affect communities, and all create lasting memories for those tasked with covering them. In support of this account, Ward (2015) observes that journalists, especially reporters who cover conflict and disaster, are as vulnerable to stress and trauma as other professionals, from firefighters and disaster counselors to combat soldiers. He further explains that trauma, when sustained and serious, can affect the performance of journalists, shorten their careers or require sick leave (Ward, 2015). Most needed absences of various durations from the danger zones to recover from their experiences. Some recalibrated their goals from that of change-agent to a still honourable and Herculean role of recorder of history, while others had long relinquished hope that journalism offered change. As noted by Jason Mojica of Vice News, “the work transforms the worker” with a wide range of effects in attitudes, political views, in daily life, and in career options (Armoudian, 2017:139). The ‘transformation’ that Mojica made reference to could be related to what Akinremi and el-Rhazoui felt after their various experiences.

In addition to the traumatic effect on journalists' career, Cote and Simpson (2000) further explain that the strain of trauma can be noticeable, citing the incident after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, when an entire newsroom was hit by the shock waves, as was the staff of the *Daily Oklahoman*. Charlotte Aiken, then a reporter at the newspaper, wrote in 1996: "In the past year, throughout the newsroom, personal relationships have been shaken or ended. Eating disorders and other emotional problems have developed and use of sick time has skyrocketed" (Cote and Simpson, 2000). Therefore, "a trauma programme needs to be part of an organisation's efforts to promote employee well-being and health in the workplace" (Ward, 2015).

Clearly, it seems obvious that journalists should be concerned about trauma when more than 1,200 journalists were killed in the past 10 years of foreign reporting; more than 80 journalists were killed in Iraq since the 2003 war began; journalists may be targets of terrorists, or military units; and the growth of media means more journalists are in the line of danger (Ward, 2015). This is a clear indication that journalists reporting on activities of terror groups or writing on contents that are considered 'undesirable' or offensive by these groups are most likely to develop withdrawal symptoms and other forms of trauma relating to fear. Based on these identified challenges among conflict reporters in general, the following section examines the risks that reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram encounter.

### **2.3 Safety Guidelines for Journalists Covering Crisis Zones**

Based on the above detailed discussion regarding the risks that journalists covering crisis zones are facing in general and, particularly the reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram, it is pertinent to examine some of the safety guidelines by international news organisations and NGOs around the world. This will be useful in order to understand the adequacies of the safety measures and organisational support by the media owners in Nigeria to the reporters covering the Boko Haram crisis. Some of the specific safety



initiatives by news organisations such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the Columbia University's School of Journalism, the Dart Centre for Journalism and Trauma and other international agencies have been exhaustively highlighted in this section.

The BBC provides some guidelines for journalists covering stories on terrorist bomb threats on news location or at the site of an un-exploded bomb (UXB). The guidelines emphasise the need for journalists to be realistic and proceed with caution since the impact of blasts could cause trauma: personal life threatening danger or fear of death for journalists and observers at the site of violent situations (BBC, 2017). The news medium thereby provides some general controls for journalists especially those at the site of terror bombing like the Boko Haram crisis. The controls are as listed below:

- (i) Consider the possibility of a second planned or subsequent explosion which includes identifying anything that could be a risk.
- (ii) Co-operate with emergency services, respect cordons and exclusion zones.
- (iii) Before the bomb explodes, staff (media crews) can only be safe by position or distance and this means outside the predicted blast or fallout area.
- (iv) Staff including cameramen, sound operators and journalists should decide as practical on the best possible elevated position with clear visual access outside the blast or fallout area, if possible using cover.
- (v) Be realistic about what coverage is achievable, you may not safely be able to see the site of the attack.
- (vi) Establish contact with any incident control or local security/police/military command, select a broadcasting position and avoid being put at risk by overhanging or damaged buildings.
- (vii) Keep up-to-date with what is happening or planned to happen, access escape routes and be prepared to evacuate in order to avoid further hazards.

- (viii) Continually reassess the situation. Evacuate if there is hostility to media crews or if media crews are targets of attack.
- (ix) Consider communications and use of satellite phones, walkie-talkies, call-in times, checking-in with news desk and deployers.
- (x) Once the bomb explodes and the fire and emergency services take over, they will establish a cordon and assume health and safety of all staff in this cordon, and police will co-ordinate this.

These above guidelines are specific to journalists and members of the media crews who cover hostile groups and work in dangerous environments. According to the BBC, these activities require the editorial guidelines and contact with the high risk team of news organisations which is charged with high risk environments assessment. In essence, journalists need a higher level of approval to venture into the risky coverage.

Going through the above guidelines, it is clear that the significant roles of news organisations in ensuring safety of the journalists have been emphasised. In addition, the context of bombing in the guidelines is related to the bombing activities of the Boko Haram insurgents, which underscores the importance of these guidelines to the Nigerian context. More importantly, these guidelines will provide insights into the adequacy or otherwise of the support by the media owners in Nigeria to the reporters covering the Boko Haram crisis.

In addition to the above guidelines by the BBC, this study further examines other safety principles collated by a group of freelancers, media and international organisations such as the International Centre for Journalists (ICFJ), the Committee to Protect Journalists, Reporters Without Borders, the International News Safety Institute, the Dart Centre for Journalism and Trauma. The title of the safety principles is: A Call for Global Safety Principles and Practices, and the initiative was agreed upon in 2015 at the Columbia

University's School of Journalism (ICFJ, 2015). The idea is a concerted move to standardise practices and coordinate efforts among governments, media organisations and other international groups to protect journalists who cover armed conflicts, organised crime and corruption. The undersigned groups endorse the following safety principles and practices for international news organisations and the freelancers who work with them. The groups noted that this would be a first step in a long-term campaign to convince news organisations and journalists to adopt these standards globally.

**(a) For Journalists on Dangerous Assignments:**

- (i) Before setting out on any assignment in a conflict zone or any dangerous environment, journalists should have basic skills to care for themselves or injured colleagues.
- (ii) Journalists are encouraged to complete a recognised news industry first aid course which include standards of care and safety for both physical and psychological and carry a suitable first-aid kit. Before undertaking an assignment in such zones, journalists should seek adequate medical insurance covering them in a conflict zone or area of infectious disease.
- (iii) Journalistic in active war zones should be aware of the need and importance of having protective ballistic clothing, including armoured jackets and helmets. Journalists operating in a conflict zone or dangerous environment should endeavour to complete an industry-recognised hostile environment course.
- (iv) Journalists should work with colleagues on the ground and with news organisations to complete a careful risk assessment before travelling to any hostile or dangerous environment and measure the journalistic value of an assignment against the risks.
- (v) On assignments, journalists should plan and prepare in detail how they will operate including identifying routes, transport, contacts and a communications strategy with daily check-in routines

with a colleague in the region or their editor. Whenever practical, journalists should take appropriate precautions to secure mobile and Internet communications from intrusion and tracking.

- (vi) Journalists should work closely with their news organisations, the organisation that has commissioned them, or their colleagues in the industry if acting independently, to understand the risks of any specific assignment. In doing so, they should seek and take into account the safety information and travel advice of professional colleagues, local contacts, embassies and security personnel. And, likewise, they should share safety information with colleagues to help prevent harm.
- (vii) Journalists should leave next of kin details with news organisations, ensuring that these named contacts have clear instructions and action plans in the case of injury, kidnap or death in the field.

**(b) For News Organisations Making Assignments in Dangerous Places:**

- (i) Editors and news organisations recognise that local journalists and freelancers, including photographers and videographers, play an increasingly vital role in international coverage, particularly on dangerous stories.
- (ii) Editors and news organisations should show the same concern for the welfare of local journalists and freelancers that they do for staffers.
- (iii) News organisations and editors should endeavour to treat journalists and freelancers they use on a regular basis in a similar manner to the way they treat staffers when it comes to issues of safety training, first aid and other safety equipment, and responsibility in the event of injury or kidnap.
- (iv) Editors and news organisations should be aware of, and factor in, the additional costs of training, insurance and safety equipment in war zones. They should clearly delineate before an assignment what a freelancer will be paid and what expenses will be covered.

- (v) Editors and news organisations should recognise the importance of prompt payment for freelancers. When setting assignments, news organisations should endeavour to provide agreed upon expenses in advance or as soon as possible on completion of work, and pay for work done in as timely a manner as possible.
  - (vi) Editors and news organisations should ensure that all freelance journalists are given fair recognition in bylines and credits for the work they do both at the time the work is published or broadcast and if it is later submitted for awards, unless the news organisation and the freelancer agree that crediting the journalist can compromise the safety of the freelancer and/or the freelancer's family.
  - (vii) News organisations should not make an assignment with a freelancer in a conflict zone or dangerous environment unless the news organisation is prepared to take the responsibility for the freelancer's wellbeing in the event of kidnap or injury as it would a staffer. News organisations have a moral responsibility to support journalists to whom they give assignments in dangerous areas, as long as the freelancer complies with the rules and instructions of the news organisation.
- In conclusion, the undersigned encourage all staff and freelance journalists and the news organisations they work with to actively join in a shared commitment to safety and a new spirit of collegiality and concern.

The above principles and those of the BBC discussed at the start of this section emphasise the crucial roles of news organisations in providing the requisite employer support in terms of safety training, insurance coverage and general welfare for the journalists covering the hazardous beats. As pointed out earlier, this discussion will be useful in gaining insights into the extent of the organisational support that media owners in Nigeria provide for their reporters who are confronted by attacks and threats from the Boko Haram group.

## 2.4 Risk in Reporting Boko Haram in Nigeria

This section presents an overview of the activities of Boko Haram and the media in Nigeria. It is hoped that the analysis will provide background about the challenges that journalists in Nigeria face while covering the activities of the group. It is also important to note that the entire profile of the Boko Haram group cannot be fully captured in this study. Therefore, this section analyses discourses on the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria as it encompasses threat to journalists and media houses. French President François Hollande described Boko Haram as now a bigger threat than was first portrayed – extending beyond Nigeria and even Africa (Martinez, Meilhan and Karimi, 2014). He further states:

*Boko Haram is an organisation that is linked to terrorism in Africa and whose will is to destabilize the north of Nigeria, certainly, and all the neighbouring countries of Nigeria and beyond that region (Martinez, Meilhan and Karimi, 2014).*

Hollande's description is further buttressed by the US Department of State as it announced the designation of Boko Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and as Specially Designated Terrorists under section 1 (b) of the Executive Order 13224 (U. S. States Department 2013). Boko Haram is a Nigeria-based militant group with links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that has been responsible for thousands of deaths in northeast and north-central Nigeria over the last several years (see Table 1.0 and Figure 1.0), including targeted killings of civilians. Also, operating in Nigeria, Ansaru is a Boko Haram splinter faction that earlier in 2013 kidnapped and executed seven international construction workers (U. S. States Department 2013). Boko Haram's initial stated goal of the abolition of the secular apostate and a return of Sharia fits into the Al-Qaeda strategy (Gourley, 2012:9). In Nigeria, 'the radical Islamic sect, Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad but more popularly known as Boko Haram or 'Western Education is Sin)' has been unleashing mayhem in the country since 2009 ostensibly because of the killing of its leader, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf by the police in that year (Ekwueme &

Obayi 2012:1). This also resonates with the account of Gourley (2012:9) in describing the nature of Boko Haram after the death of its leader. He states:

*Up until 2009, the group's tactics were generally guerilla in nature, striking en masse on police, security, and government facilities before dissipating. After the death of their leader, they spent a brief period of time reconstituting. It is around 2011, with the alleged overtures from AQIM (Al-Qaeda Islamic in the Maghreb) that the tactics shifted to terrorism, favouring civilian targets (the UN building, churches). (see Table 2.1)*

#### **2.4.1 Boko Haram's Attacks on Media in Nigeria**

In regard to Boko Haram's attacks on the media in Nigeria, it began when the sect warned that it would hit more targets, including the media houses. Many Nigerians, including the reporters themselves, were not under any illusion that Boko Haram would not carry out the threat given its notoriety for ruthlessness, meanness and bloodletting. True to this fear, on April 26, 2012, the sect made good its threat, hitting the offices of *ThisDay*, *The Moment* and *Daily Sun* newspapers in both Abuja and Kaduna in well-planned and coordinated bomb attacks, promising the media houses more future attacks (Ekwueme & Obayi 2012:1). With these attacks, many Nigerians believe that the media would be subdued, which is an implication that freedom of speech and other related freedoms would be 'permanently extinguished' (Ekwueme & Obayi 2012:1). The effect of the Boko Haram's attack on freedom of speech is an indication that journalists in Nigeria are impacted negatively Boko Haram.

Prior to these attacks on the media, Ekwueme and Obayi (2012:5) aver that the Boko Haram group had not hidden its disdain and distrust for the Nigerian media. Shortly after its September 28, 2011 threat to deal with the media reporters, the Boko Haram group killed Isa Zakariyyah, a reporter with the Nigerian Television Authority, and Bernard Akogwu, a photographer with Channels Television. The group cited reasons, ranging from lack of objectivity to blasphemy, for the attacks.

In spite of the onslaught on the Nigerian media and its practitioners, Ekwueme & Obayi (2012:6) make recommendations on how the media should respond. The scholars stated that the mass media play huge roles in public perception, acceptance or rejection of criminal behaviour the world over. These scholars further emphasised that:

*The mass media in Nigeria, despite coming under attacks by the Boko Haram sect, can help in building positive and courageous attitudes in the people in response to the sect's threats. This can be done through the ways the media present their reports on Boko Haram attacks. In this respect, choices of words, pictures and the language of the reports become pivotal”* (Ekwueme and Obayi, 2012:6).

Based on the above suggestions, Ekwueme and Obayi (2012:6) recommended that the media in Nigeria embrace (with little modification to the peculiar needs) the six principles developed by the Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Martin E.P. Segliman Committee after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, New York. It is entitled ‘Six Rules for Government and Press on Terrorism: Undercutting Fear Itself’. The authors thereby modified the principles in relation to the coverage of Boko Haram, and they are as follow:

**1. Reduce Helplessness:** Dangers like the one posed by Boko Haram become less fearful when they are presented in a controllable manner. The media should tell Nigerians in specific terms what actions they could take to reduce the danger of Boko Haram attacks. Measures like advising and encouraging the public to report any suspicious movements or unknown new faces to the security operatives and such other actions that will have positive impact.

**2. Blunt Availability:** According to Tversky & Tversky (1973) cited in the report, because evocative images are more available in memory, we tend to over-estimate how frequently they occur. By showing, printing or airing vivid pictures of the victims of Boko Haram attacks, we are unwittingly playing into the hands of Boko Haram as these pictures help in spreading their message of fear. Though



news has to be reported, they should be couched in strong reassuring words and phrases that give the audience confidence and limit the use of gruesome pictures of the victims.

**3. Reframe:** Framing has a lot to do with how people perceive risk and danger. Framing a risk in terms of loss and people are less likely to relate with it but reframe it in terms of gain, they are more inclined to understand the context. Instead of overly stating the number that died in a Boko Haram attack, we may pay more attention to the number that survived it. This will give people confidence that after all, the group's attack is not an unchangeable death sentence.

**4. Tell the Story of Survival:** It does not help if our local media keep on harping only on government's lack of preparedness, ineffectual policies, and success of the Boko Haram raids, the sect's invincibility, among others, that tend to make the people helpless in face of a ruthless enemy. Rather, they should pay more attention to similar situations where the government came out triumphant through diligent and purposeful use of resources.


**5. Preach Courage; It is Contagious:** Just as fear is contagious, so too is courage. Those who preach courage and heroism inspire it in others (Bandura, 1977). Both the government and media should inspire courage and not fear and helplessness when speaking on Boko Haram activities. Hence, those making such announcements (reporters and government officials) should convey a sense of courage and confidence, as it will impact positively on the audience.

**6. Use Safety Signals:** The public should be informed of when threats are no longer expected as much as they should be told when there is a palpable threat. Leaving the public to live in perpetual fear of imminent Boko Haram attacks weaken their resolve to face down the threat. So, the media in collaboration with security operatives should give the people the all-clear signal to relax their anxiety and enable them go about their business when there are no immediate threats.

Meanwhile, as laudable as these principles may sound, Ekwueme and Obayi (2012:6) aver that putting into practice the principles stated above could be a tall order that might entail surrendering some basic rights and professional codes of conduct but it is worth trying. However, the scholars opine that the media can use the news reports to ‘paint a very bad picture of the sect and position them negatively in the minds of the people, particularly those who have sympathy for the sect’. They are of the view that with negative reporting of the Boko Haram group, it could re-educate the populace and make them divulge concrete and vital information about the group to the security operatives. It should however be noted that these modified principles were put forward as suggestions by the scholars, but there is no evidence in the literature that it has been formally adopted as a toolbox by the journalists covering crisis in Nigeria.

Aside from the fact that some of the principles highlighted above might impinge on professional ethics, it could also affect the safety of reporters. However, in spite of the risks, many scholars have noted that a symbiotic relationship exists between the media and terrorism. They are of the view that media and terrorism feed on each other, as terrorists need the media to amplify their message, while the media also need terrorists as a personification of the larger issue although terrorists seem to need the media more than the media need the terrorists. This is because the main goal of terrorists is to instill fear in many people, including those not directly involved in the crisis. In essence, the media provide the platform by which contemporary conflicts are fought (Weimann, 1994; Thussu and Freedman, 2003; and Ekwueme and Obayi, 2012).

**Figure 2.1: Northern Nigerian States in which Boko Haram has Launched Attacks**



Sources: [http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num\\_car=4864&lang=en](http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=4864&lang=en).

*Osumah, O (2013). Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle of Internal security.*

The following are the lists of states in the northern Nigeria in which Boko Haram has launched attacks:

- Abuja (Federal Capital Territory)
- Adamawa
- Borno
- Bauchi
- Gombe
- Kaduna
- Kano
- Kogi
- Niger
- Yobe

## **2.5 Relevant Studies on Boko Haram**

There are numerous studies on Boko Haram in Nigeria. Most studies examined the phenomenon, emergence, philosophy and ideological posturing of the group (Onuoha, 2010; Ajayi, 2012; Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012; Uzodike, U. O & Maiangwa, B. 2012; Solomon, H 2012; Forest, J 2012; Aghedo, & Osumah, 2012; Agbiboa, D. E 2013) while a few studies explored the activities of Boko Haram using framing and discourse analysis (Okoro and Odoemelan, 2013; and Chiluwa, 2017). Some scholars investigate the media theme in the study on Boko Haram (Ekwueme & Obayi 2012; Popoola, 2012; Ayedun-Aluma *et al*, 2014). In regards to this thesis, studies on framing and representation of Boko Haram and especially research conducted on the group examining the risks encountered by journalists would be relevant in advancing knowledge. However, other area of studies on Boko Haram would provide insights into the perspectives of scholars about the group.

Specifically related to this thesis is Ekwueme's and Obayi's (2012) study on *Boko Haram Assault on Nigeria: Towards Effective Mass Media Response*. The research examines the whole gamut of the Boko

Haram sect and its attacks, the assault on media houses, government's response, mass media and objectivity and the media and terrorism. The study makes recommendations on how the mass media could be effectively deployed in the effort to stop the sect. The emphasis of the research regarding Boko Haram's attacks on the Nigerian mass media and its practitioners provides some insights into the attacks and their impacts on the journalists.

Closely related studies to this thesis are few selected studies on Boko Haram, which applied different methodological approaches such as case studies and interviews of selected journalists in Nigeria (see Popoola, 2012; and Ayedun-Aluma *et al.* 2014). In Popoola's (2012) study, the focus is about discourse on terrorism with specific reference to the emergence of the Boko Haram in Nigeria and the danger it poses to press freedom in the country. The research argues that the killing of some journalists by the sect has inspired fear in others who now tread cautiously to avoid being eliminated by the group. One of the findings of the study shows that Boko Haram insurgency constitutes a threat to press freedom in Nigeria through the graphic details of the bombings, including the assassination of journalists. Along this line, the paper recommends that media owners in the country should be compelled to provide life insurance cover for all journalists, especially those covering crime, defence and political issues. It further recommends that compensation should be paid to the immediate family members of journalists who die either as a result of terrorist attacks while carrying out their professional duties, or in active service. The similarity between this thesis and Popoola's research is that both focus on the perspective of risks to journalists in the coverage of Boko Haram.

In *Power Raiders and Somnolent Watchdogs: Media (Mis) interpretations of Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria*, Ayedun-Aluma *et al.* (2014) demonstrate that Boko Haram might be historically understood as belonging to a tradition of political-religious activism that promotes the political regime change through subversion and destruction of the extant political order. The study further posits that Nigerian media have shown little understanding of Boko Haram's creative destructive tendencies in reporting the group's activities.

This research is important as it reflects on the paucity of reporting on the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram.

Another significant research in the area of framing of Boko Haram is the study conducted by Okoro and Odoemelan (2013). The research examined the pattern of frames adopted by the Nigerian newspapers in the coverage of Boko Haram insurgency through the content analysis methodology. The study found that Nigerian newspapers reported the Boko Haram insurgency in a predominantly policy frame, by describing government intervention in positive terms. These scholars argued that such positive framings are germane to minimising insurgencies like that of Boko Haram, while on the other hand, coverage which emphasises ethnic and religious frames are negative and are detrimental to peace initiatives in a secular and multi-cultural state like Nigeria. This research paper is important for this thesis as it is one of the very few efforts to analyse the framing of Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, unlike this thesis, the study does not employ discourse analysis and interview methods. This thesis employed a different framing analysis from the study. The positive tone used in the thesis describes actions such as government's efforts towards dialogue with the Boko Haram while the negative tone relates to Boko Haram's reports of attacks and violence.

Another related work is Chilwa's (2017), *The Discourse of Terror Threats: Assessing Online Written Threats by Nigerian Terrorists Groups*. This study applied critical discourse analysis with some insights from pragmatics to analyse the discourse-pragmatic contents of terror threats by two 'terrorists groups' in Nigeria – Boko Haram and Ansaru. The research examined what it termed 'explicit' and 'implicit' threats from seven online publications by these groups written between 2009 and 2012. The study found that terror threats by these groups are intertextually and ideologically related to threats associated with Al Qaeda and global jihad, which also goes further to establish links with other terror groups around the world. The finding also shows that the structure of terror threats is significantly different from the conventional formula for verbal threats.

The similarity of this work with the thesis is in the use of critical discourse analysis. Once again, this study employed one method, whereas this thesis utilises three methods.

## **2.6 Potential Synergy between Boko Haram and International Terrorists Groups**

Given the above scenario, Okpaga, Chijioke and Eme (2012:77) aver that the cycle of violence unleashed by Boko Haram has heightened fears among the populace and international community and that the hostility has gone beyond religious or political colouration. Citing report from Human Rights Watch (HRW), Okpaga, Chijioke and Eme (2012:77) state that about 935 people have been killed since 2009 when the sect began its onslaught on the country. The authors conclude that the security challenge has become a great source of worry since the crisis has shifted to the realm of terrorism. This is described as a global phenomenon where no one is safe.

Expressing the same view, Karmon (2014:74) argues that the watershed event that marks Boko Haram's passage from a purely Nigerian phenomenon to an international jihadist actor was its attack on the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, on August 26, 2011. Karmon (2014) further states that the organisation, "Jama'at Ahlu Sunna li Da'waati li-Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram (BH), rose to international prominence in 2010 and 2011, when it carried out a series of deadly attacks against the Nigerian government and detonated a car bomb at a United Nations building in Abuja, the capital" (p.74). According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, attacks between May and mid-December 2013 killed more than 1,200 people, a figure that does not include insurgents killed during targeted military operations (Karmon 2014:74). The activity of the group is specifically captured by Karmon (2014) who states:

*Boko Haram targets include police stations, government buildings, churches, politicians, newspapers banks, and schools. Tactics include drive-by shootings on motorcycles, the use of improvised explosive devices, and starting in 2010, suicide bombings (p.74).*

From the foregoing, it is suggestive that the strategy and tactics of Boko Haram have strong semblance with the Al-Qaeda group. The American Foreign Policy Council therefore concludes in one of its reports that the potential for Boko Haram to evolve from being a local to a regional or global threat is clear, and there are signs that several Boko Haram factions have already abandoned Nigeria-oriented objectives in favour of embracing transnational militant objectives (2010:2). Following this summation, Forest (2012:77) provides series of evidence of Boko Haram's general alignment with Al-Qaeda on an ideological level, as he states: "the grievances that animate their violent attacks are similar in terms of portraying Western globalisation and the status quo as inherently disadvantaging Muslims." He further explains that both groups promulgate the view that politicians and wealthy elites have destroyed the purity of Islamic societies by allowing vices like prostitution, pornography, and alcohol to corrupt mankind (2012:77).

This explains the ideological mission of Boko Haram as Minteh and Perry (2013:11), who cited Mallam Sani Umaru, the new leader of the group after the death of its leader Mohammed Yusuf. Umaru clarified the meaning of the phrase 'Boko Haram' which suggests that Western civilisation is prohibited, not specifically Western education, and he states:

*Boko Haram does not in any way mean "Western education is a sin", as the infidel media continues to portray us. Boko Haram actually means "Western Civilisation" is forbidden. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that we are opposed to formal education coming from the West, which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader, it includes education but not determined by Western education" (Minteh and Perry, 2013:11).*

In addition, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda members also share a belief in the superiority of governance by Sharia law instead of secular laws, and claim to be defending Islam against Western influences that constrain or prevent Muslims from fulfilling his or her religious duties (Forest, 2012:77-78). In sum, Al-Qaeda's



ideology of ‘think globally and act locally’ is intended to inspire the kinds of attacks against authorities that Boko Haram has become known for (Forest 2012: 78).

Drawing comparative analysis of Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda, Minteh and Perry (2013:14) have found that the locally-based terror group has much in common with Al-Qaeda. Even though Boko Haram operates at a local level in comparison to Al-Qaeda’s international platform, a fundamental driving mechanism for these commonalities largely stems from the ideological vanguard characterising the two groups; one purely based on religious factors geared towards saving the soul of Islam at all costs. Similarly, Gourley (2012: 2) argues that the group had largely been a domestic guerilla movement focused on internal change prior to the August 26, 2011 bombing of the United Nations building, an act that indicated a change in tactical and strategic trajectory. He states further that while verbal overtures were made between the two groups, no official linkage was ever made, and many have discarded Boko Haram as a potential al Qaeda affiliate. Nevertheless, Gourley posits, “Boko Haram is not only an ideal fit for al Qaeda, but is actively in the process of becoming a franchise” (2012:2).

To determine if any potential synergies exist between the two groups, Gourley has drawn certain comparisons and contrasts between the two groups and the various al-Qaeda franchises. He noted that shortly after the attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, Boko Haram was linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Somali Al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab (2012:7, citing Francis, 2011). These concerns are buttressed by documentation that verbal communications have been made between AQIM and Boko Haram.

Gourley, however, suggests that tactical linkages are not enough to draw similarity of activities between the Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda groups. Instead, it is important to determine how each Al-Qaeda franchise acquired its status to determine if Boko Haram is on the same trajectory (2012:7). Szrom and Harnischi have identified some common traits in all Al-Qaeda havens: “underdevelopment, incompetent

governance, and a citizenry disenfranchised by – or disillusioned with – the central government... an environment conducive to Al-Qaeda's presence and operations must also have a history of radical Islamism that Al-Qaeda operatives can exploit." (2012:8-9) Nigeria fits perfectly into Szrom and Harnisch's pattern of Al-Qaeda operating environments, excepting the history of radical Islam (Gourley, 2012:9).

With the ideological component binding or linking Boko Haram to al Qaeda, it is no historical accident to see a common approach in strategy and technique between the two groups. Minteh and Perry succinctly analysed the strategies employed: "Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda have used bombings (suicide and car bombs), targeted assassinations and arson attacks against perceived enemies. On several occasions, the use of cars and suicide bombs has been attributed to both groups. (p.15). Al-Qaeda's first World Trade Centre attempt in 1993 was through a car bomb attack. The same is true for Boko Haram when it used car bombings in both the August 2011 attack on the UN compound in Abuja, and the November 2012 attack on St. Andrew Military Protestant Church at the Jaji Barracks in Kaduna State (2013:15).

Minteh and Perry further pointed out the use of kidnapping as another fundamental strategy for both Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram, stating that over the years, both groups had carried out kidnappings in demand for ransoms, either in the form of money or a political shift (2013:15-16). The scholars noted that, "pressured by increased scrutiny of terrorist money sources and strikes aimed at its financiers, Al-Qaeda in Pakistan has turned to kidnapping for ransom to offset dwindling cash reserves" while "for the first time Boko Haram had similarly carried out kidnappings demanding ransom for the release of all its members or it will execute all the French citizens" (2013:15-16).

In addition, both groups propose the use of arson attacks as another form of strategy. Though Al-Qaeda has not used arson in the past, two issues published in a magazine affiliated to the group have called on western Muslims to use forest fire arson attacks in the US. In the same vein, Boko Haram has set fire to

churches, schools and homes in northern Nigeria, such as the December 2011 arson attacks on churches and schools, including the St. Theresa Catholic Church at Madallah, Suleja, and the First Baptist Church in Maiduguri, Borno State (Minteh & Perry, 2013:16-17).

Therefore, in addition to having a common ideological component, Minteh and Perry have concluded the synthesis of operations of both Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda as having “carried out operations with similar political, economic, and social implications on the global war on terror” (p.18). With their emergence as groups under the same radar of international counter-terrorism forces, both groups “embarked on targeted assassinations of mostly prominent political, community and religious leaders sympathetic or supportive of international forces that toppled the Taliban regime” (p.18).

### **2.6.1 Linkages between Boko Haram and the Islamic State**

The above discussion on the determination of potential synergies between Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda group forms the bedrock in this thesis by identifying common traits between Boko Haram and ISIS. Under its former name Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isis), it was formed in April 2013, growing out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). It has since been disavowed by Al-Qaeda, but has become one of the main jihadist groups fighting government forces in Syria and Iraq (BBC News, August 2014).

IS members are jihadists who adhere to an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam and consider themselves the only true believers (BBC, June 2015). Furthermore, it is averred: “beheadings, crucifixions and mass shootings have been used to terrorise their enemies. IS members have justified such atrocities by citing the Koran and Hadith, but Muslims have denounced them.” (BBC News, June 2015) Based on this, even Al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who disavowed IS in February 2014 over its actions in Syria, warned Zarqawi in 2005 that such brutality loses “Muslim hearts and minds.” (BBC News, June 2015). In her assessment of traits of terrorism in Boko Haram, Greig (2015) captures the group: “Boko Haram has been

wreaking havoc in Africa's most populous country. The Nigerian militants are responsible for a six-year campaign of targeted bombings, assassinations and abductions, killing 50 Friday alone." She further explains that the group's name, which can be translated as "Western Education Is Forbidden," has become infamous for kidnapping hundreds of schoolgirls as well as a vicious insurgency that has claimed the lives of thousands.

Consequently, an international report on the gathered intelligence adds to the growing concerns that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Nigeria's Boko Haram has established direct links. According to the British report, "Intelligence agencies are concerned that what were once symbolic links between ISIS and Boko Haram have now developed into a practical relationship with the Islamic State offering advice on strategy and tactics" (Milmo and Witherow, 2014). Emboldened by the success of ISIS and now seemingly armed with armoured vehicles and artillery, observers said Boko Haram was "beginning to operate more like a conventional army in Borno and the neighbouring north-eastern states of Adamawa and Yobe" (Milmo and Witherow, 2014). It was further noted that Boko Haram's actions in the last six months have frequently mimicked those of ISIS — from punishments such as stoning and beheading of its victims to taking territory and an increasingly sophisticated use of social media that's very much in the ISIS "style" (Milmo and Witherow, 2014). In addition, the alleged similarity of activities used by the ISIS and Boko Haram led people to conclude that there is some connection between the groups after the Nigerian sect leader, Abubakar Shekau, had released the video where he claimed to have captured Gwoza town had become part of Islamic Caliphate (Ejiofor, 2014). It was further suggested that the sect's leader imitated the ISIS tactics, carrying out similar executions, kidnappings and finally attempting to establish caliphate in the seized territories (Ejiofor, 2014).

### **2.6.2 Boko Haram's Allegiance to ISIS**

More recently, Boko Haram, in an audio message purported to be from its leader, Abubakar Shekau, has rebranded, swearing allegiance to ISIS and renaming itself the Islamic State's West Africa Province

(Greig 2015, CNN report 2015). The audio message, according to Cable Network News (CNN), states: “Allegiance to the Caliph of the Muslims, Ibrahim ibn Awad ibn Ibrahim al-Husseini al-Qurashi”, which is another name for ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Subsequently, another audio message by an Islamic State group representative announced that Boko Haram’s pledge had been accepted by the militant group’s leader, and went on to congratulate “our jihadi brothers” in West Africa (Greig, 2015). Significantly, the alliance grants Boko Haram legitimacy in the world of Islamic extremism — a world where recruiting, funding and marketing are as important as in any corporation (Greig, 2015).

### **2.6.3 ISIS’s Strategy of Beheading**

Since Boko Haram’s allegiance to ISIS, the group has set a terrifying new precedent by releasing its first gruesome video of a beheading. The video adopts many of the same style-points as the hundreds of barbaric videos released by ISIS over the last year (Akbar, 2015). According to Zech and Kelly, counter-normative violence, especially beheading, has emerged as a key component of the Islamic State (IS) strategy in Iraq and Syria, and has served to distinguish its ‘brand’ of violence from others in the global jihadi struggle for hearts and minds (2014:1). Although IS currently stands out for embracing beheading as a defining element of their brand, the practice is also widespread in Mexico’s drug war (p.3). From the standpoint of organisational perspective, beheadings distinguish the Islamic States’ brand of violence from that of its Al-Qaeda rivals in Syria, the al-Nusra Front. In addition, beheadings signal to other factions that the Islamic State claims to be the legitimate heir to the broader regional movement (p.7). Zech and Kelly (2014) further succinctly state:

*The Islamic State attained further notoriety when it released a gruesome video showing the beheading of American journalist James Foley. Four subsequent beheadings shocked and outraged audiences across the globe when IS murdered Steven Sotloff, David Haines, Alan Henning, and Abdul-Rahman (Peter) Kassig. All five victims were held in prolonged captivity and each death was accompanied by a grisly, widely disseminated video (2014).*

It is suggestive from the above review that beheading as the main strategy of IS has been mostly welcomed by Boko Haram as it swore allegiance to the group.

Similarly, Tinnes (2014) observed that with the beheading video of U.S. photojournalist James Foley, the Islamic State (IS) initiated a hostage video campaign that received tremendous coverage (p.1). According to Neer and O'Toole, ISIS' violence is premeditated, purposeful, cold-blooded and predatory, and has a sadistic quality to it. "[...] [It] is best described as instrumental violence, and is the type typically preferred and engaged in by psychopaths (Tinnes, 2014:3).

## **2.7 Differences in Locations of the Newspapers to the Epicentre of Boko Haram Activities**

This section examines the differences in locations of the selected newspapers for this study to the hotspot of Boko Haram activities in the north — the *Daily Trust's* head office is located in the northern region, in the centre of the Boko Haram activities and *ThisDay* has its head office in the southern zone, which is outside the reach of the Boko Haram insurgents. The 36 states in Nigeria are distributed within six zones. The zones are further distributed in equal numbers of three each between the two geographical regions of the North and South. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is important to have knowledge of the different regions in the country in order to understand whether Boko Haram attacks would have impacts on the coverage and language of reporting the group based on the newspapers' proximity to or distance from the nerve centre of Boko Haram activities.

The following table presents the six-geopolitical zones and their states in Nigeria.

**Table 2.1: The Six-geopolitical Zones and their States in Nigeria**

S/N	Zones	States	Number of States
1	South-east	Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo	5
2	South-south	Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers	6
3	South-west	Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo	6
4	North-east	Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe	6
5	North-west	Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara	7
6	North-central	Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau and (Abuja Capital Territory)	7
		Total	36

Source: [https://www.academia.edu/14476835/THE SIX POLITICAL ZONES IN NIGERIA](https://www.academia.edu/14476835/THE_SIX_POLITICAL_ZONES_IN_NIGERIA)

According to the Nigerian Press Council (2009), there are over 150 newspapers in Nigeria, among which 20 are regarded as national in terms of coverage, circulation, reach and readership. The table below shows the 20 Nigerian national newspapers currently in operation.

**Table 2.2: The Twenty National Newspapers in Nigeria**

<b>National Newspapers</b>	<b>Place of Publication</b>	<b>Date of Establishment</b>
The Nigerian Tribune	Ibadan	1949
The Punch Newspaper	Lagos	1974
The Guardian Newspaper	Lagos	1983
The Vanguard Newspaper	Lagos	1984
The Champion Newspaper	Lagos	1988
PM News Newspaper	Lagos	1994
This Day Newspaper	Lagos & Abuja	1995
Complete Sports	Lagos	1995
Daily Independent	Lagos	2001
National Mirror Newspaper	Lagos	2006
The Champion Newspaper	Lagos	1988
Business Day Newspaper	Lagos	2001
Daily Independent	Lagos	2001
Daily Trust Newspaper	Abuja	2001
The Sun Newspaper	Lagos/Abuja	2003
Leadership Nigeria	Abuja	2004
National Accord	Abuja	2006
National Mirror Newspaper	Lagos	2006
The Nigerian Pilot	Abuja	2011
The Union Newspaper	Lagos	2013

*(Sources: Inventory of Newspapers and magazines in Nigeria by Nigerian Press Council, 2009, Dragomir & Thompson, 2012, the website of The Union Newspaper)*

## **2.8 The Role, Nature and Composition of Headlines**

The aim of the headline is to present accurate and complete information of the news story quickly and attractively. Modern newspapers are designed to inform, and to inform as rapidly as possible. This purpose led to the development of the news lead – the opening of a story which packs into a paragraph or two all the



essential information contained in the article (Garst and Bernstein, 1961:103). Van Dijk (1988) succinctly expresses this traditional function within his discourse-analytic framework: Each news item in the press has a headline and many have a Lead, whether marked off by special printing type or not. The elementary rule is: Headlines precede Lead, and together they precede the rest of the news item. Their structural function is also clear: Together they express the major topics of the text. That is, they function as an initial summary. The semantic constraint is obvious: Headline + Lead summarise the news text and express the semantic macrostructure.

In addition, Garst and Bernstein (1961:110-111) have identified three characteristics of the headline language, and they are: one, the use of present tense to describe past action, because it provides a sense of immediacy; two, the omission of non-essential words, chiefly articles, which gives the headline telegraphic speed; and three, the use of short words mainly of Anglo-Saxon derivation. In these last two, space requirement is the commanding factor. Also, for each headline, the size and style of type are a given factor and it is the task of the copy editor, therefore, to make the lines fit the space. In sum, headlines must fit and tell the story. The scholars have also noted that:

*Every part of a headline should contain a verb, which may be either explicit or implied. When it contains a subject and a predicate, while it may not make a complete statement, it at least provides an excellent start for one* (Garst and Bernstein, 143-144).

Therefore, the principal purpose of a news headline is to accurately communicate the main idea of the story in precise language. Its other main purpose, of course, is to convince readers to pay attention to the story that follows (Bowles and Borden, 2000). In the same vein, Dor (2003) noted that traditionally, news headlines have been functionally characterised as short, telegram-like *summaries* of their news items. By extension, Bell (1991) and Nir (1993) (Cited in Dor, 2003) have made a distinction between headlines functioning as the abstract of the main event of the story and headlines as promoting one of the details of the story.

However, some headlines do not always summarise their stories. Some headlines *highlight* a single detail extracted out of the story, and other contain a quotation which the editor decided should be promoted to the foreground (Dor, 2003). The fact that headlines do not always summarise but sometimes highlight or quote has been noted by Bell (1991), for example, who makes a distinction between headlines which “abstract the main event of the story” and headlines which “focus on a secondary event or a detail”. Although in most cases, headlines perform such functions in news reports, some news headlines present their readers with fairly complex riddles which neither summarise nor present the detail of the news reports (Lindemann, 1990).

Other schools of thought that do not align with the summary function of headlines but claim that headlines have dual roles include Iarovici and Amel who argued:

*The implicit convention between author and reader regarding the intention of correlating a text to another text as a headline, and regarding the formal marking of this quality by a privileged position, concerns the double function of the headline: a semantic function, regarding the referential text, and a pragmatic function, regarding the reader (the receiver) to whom the text is addressed. The two functions are simultaneous, the semantic function being included in and justified by the pragmatic function. The main function of the headline is to alert the reader (receiver) to the nature or the content of the text. This is the pragmatic function of the headline, and it includes the semantic one. The headline enables the reader to grasp the meaning of the text. The headline functions as a plurality of speech acts (urging, warning, and informing) (Cited in Dor, 2003: 698).*

By extending the dual functions of headlines as semantically-oriented and pragmatic, Andrew (2007: 29) argues that headlines seem to matter on their own but they may convey a different impression than the actual stories they lead. This position is well clarified by Tannenbaum who posits that space limitations make it impossible for headlines to tell the whole story; they inevitably enhance or “play up” some information while suppressing other information (cited in Andrew 2007:29). Andrew further clarifies: “given that one of its main purposes is to attract attention, we expect that a headline typically identifies an aspect of the story that is deemed interesting to the consumer. It follows from this that the nature of information that people receive from the headlines may be distorted from the information in the full text itself (2007: 28). In essence, he states:

*that the memory or impression that news media leave with a person could be different for those who consume all the available information in a story than it for those who only scan the headlines.*

Following this same line of thought, Dor (2003:720) avers that headlines provide the readers with an optimally relevant presentation of their stories highlighting that a good headline helps the reader deduce the maximal amount of contextual effects for the minimal amount of processing effort. He further argues that headlines guide individual readers to those specific stories which would be most beneficial to read in the full version. The implication of this is that readers regularly scan the headlines, and only occasionally stop to read the actual story.

In support of the above argument, Bonyadi and Samuel (2013:8) conclude in their study that:

*the newspaper headlines not only introduced the topic of the editorials but also presented the subjective attitude of the writers (newspapers) toward the topic aiming at influencing and shaping the readers' understanding of the editorial text. This subjective presentation of the news events and news actors were carried out using certain textual and persuasive strategies. The analysis in general revealed that the editorial writers in both newspapers aimed at not only informing the readers of the topic of the editorial, but also expressing the preferred ideology of the papers which was accomplished through using certain persuasive and rhetorical devices.*

This thesis will draw much relevance from the discussion of headlines in this section, which highlights the multiplicity of roles performed by news headlines. These functions include, summarising the text, highlighting the basic part of the story, attracting readers' attention, providing readers with an optimally relevant presentation of stories and guiding readers to the specific stories which would worth their while.

## **2.9 Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework adopted in this study is anchored on the Framing Theory propounded by Erving Goffman in 1974. Framing is not a clearly explicated and generally applicable concept, but only a metaphor that cannot be directly translated into research questions (Brosius and Eps, 1995). In this thesis, the approach to understanding frames is both qualitative and quantitative. By qualitative, this thesis deconstructs the meaning of the headline news reports, emphasising analysis of words and phrases, while the quantitative

aspect is about the type of frames that were used in the headlines. Entman (1993:51) pointedly refers to framing as “a scattered conceptualisation”, with previous studies lacking clear conceptual definitions and relying on context-specific, rather than generally applicable operationalisations. For example, this study focuses on the language analysis or choice of words and phrases that were adopted in the headline reports on Boko Haram in the selected newspapers, while it also emphasises the frequency of usage of such words and expressions. In other words, framing is used in this thesis to explain how the mass media promote a particular definition of an issue through selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration. According to McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997:7), one of the ways to understand the concept of framing is to examine the concept in the light of other theories and concepts in the field of communication, including agenda setting, schema, priming, bias, indexing, and cultivation. As Weaver (2007:144) points out, there are similarities and connections between agenda setting, priming, and framing, but they are not identical approaches. While Price and Tewksbury (1995) regard agenda setting as emphasising story selection as a determinant of public perceptions of issue importance and, indirectly through priming, evaluations of political leaders, framing, on the other hand, is viewed as focusing not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented, and on the ways public problems are formulated for the media audience. For example, reporting on the violent activities of Boko Haram or Niger Delta insurgency in Nigeria is about agenda setting of the media. But if either of the crises is linked to or emphasis is based off religious, political affiliations or ideologies, or reported within the frames of unequal amnesty granted any of the groups, then these could be viewed within media framing perspective.

Priming, as the third connection to the two concepts highlighted above, is defined as a psychological process whereby the media emphasis on particular issues activates in people’s memories previously acquired information (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Similarly, Weaver (2007:145) explains that the consequences of agenda setting for public opinion (sometimes called “priming”) can be traced back at least to the effects of

Watergate news coverage. The concept of priming is obviously not applicable in this study, as this thesis does not measure people's opinion about reports on Boko Haram.

This research emphasises framing as a more relevant approach to understanding *what* constitute the contents of headline reports about Boko Haram, and *how* the language of the headlines and the selected story paragraphs are framed in Nigerian newspapers. The '*what*' and '*how*' of the research were examined through both content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) method. Furthermore, the in-depth interview conducted among the reporters covering Boko Haram in Nigeria in this research provides the contexts of the risk environment that the reporters are working, which could provide reasons for how the reports were framed in certain ways.

In specific terms, framing in this thesis is about focusing, understanding and interpreting words and expressions that are adopted in the headline reports about Boko Haram and the meanings that are implied in the reports. Entman (1993:52) defined framing as the selection of a perceived reality "in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described". In essence, he asserts that the way a problem is framed might determine how people understand and evaluate the issue. McCombs (1997:37) further argues that in the language of the second level of agenda setting, "framing is the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda when a particular object is discussed." In supporting this view, Kenix (2011) points out that media frames are the structure of information. They provide meaning, emphasise areas of importance and organise the narrative of each story. Media frames signal to the reader what is important and also, by default, what is not. Tuchman (1978: ix) posits that mass media actively set the frames of reference that readers or viewers use to interpret and discuss public events. According to Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992:120), "they give the story a 'spin', taking into account their organisational and modality constraints, professional judgements, and certain judgments about the audience". The arguments in

the above definitions align closely with the focus of this research, which examined how the newspaper headline reports on the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria had focused more on violent activities about the group than other aspects of the reports. Moreover, in order to select the frames in this study, the research embarks on analysis of words and expressions adopted in the headlines, which corroborates with the perceptions of social scientists that have long discussed the importance of word choice in survey questionnaire. For example, Fine (1992) conducted a study on the impact of issue framing on public opinion toward affirmative action programmes. He concludes that the way questions are framed in the media, the public will think about that issue in particular way.

Similarly, Tankard et al. (1991) reviewed the literature on framing and noted that the framing metaphor can be examined from several different angles. The researchers broke down media frames into four major dimensions:

- The topic of a news item (what is included in the frame)
- Presentation (size and placement)
- Cognitive attributes (details of what is included in the frame)
- Affective attributes (tone of the picture)

Along the same line as the framing dimensions identified above, Cappella and Jamieson (1997: 47) suggest criteria that a frame must meet. First, a news frame must have identifiable conceptual and linguistic characteristics. Second, it should be commonly observed in journalistic practice. Third, it must be possible to distinguish the frame reliably from other frames. Fourth, a frame must have representational validity (i.e. be recognised by others) and not merely a figment of a researcher's imagination. In this context, Vreese (2005: 54) suggests that the relevant question when working with a deductive approach in framing research is: *what* (which components) in news story constitutes a frame. The most comprehensive approach is offered by Tankard (2001:101) who suggests a list of 11 framing mechanisms as focal points for identifying and measuring news frames:

1. headlines
2. subheads
3. photos
4. photo caption
5. leads
6. source selection
7. quotes selection
8. pull quotes
9. logos
10. statistics and charts, and
11. concluding statements and paragraphs.

In addition, Vreese (2005: 54) further argues that scholars within the empirical approach to measuring frames agree that frames are specific textual and visual elements or ‘framing devices’. This argument thereby corroborates the approach adopted in this thesis about analysing the textual elements in the selected newspapers headlines, which form the focal point of news frames in this study.

Following Iyengar’s (1991) framing typology, this study specifically examined frames in the headlines based on distinguishing episodic and thematic coding categories. In his definition, episodic news frames are event or episode oriented, and they focus on concrete issues, such as a terrorist bombing. In contrast, thematic news frames provide information that contextualises an issue or problem, focusing more on general developments, trends, or conditions that contribute to problems such as surges in welfare dependence or increased terrorist attacks. In a study on framing on influence of television viewers’ attributions of responsibility for political issues, Iyengar found that television’s systematic reliance on episodic as opposed to thematic depictions of political life elicits individualistic attributions of responsibility for national problems

such as poverty and terrorism. Specifically, he notes that these attributions emphasise the actions of private rather than governmental actors (Iyengar, 1996). This scholar further points out that by reducing complex issues to the level of anecdotal cases, episodic framing leads viewers to attributions that shield society and government from responsibility. Confronted with a parade of news stories describing particular instances of national issues, viewers come to focus on the particular individuals or groups depicted in the news rather than historical, social, political or other such factors (Iyengar, 1996:70). He further states that “the essential difference between episodic and thematic framing is that episodic framing depicts concrete events that illustrate issues, while thematic framing presents collective or general evidence” (Iyengar, 1991:14). In the long run, episodic framing contributes to the trivialisation of public discourse and the erosion of electoral accountability (Iyengar 1991:143).

Scheufele (1999) developed a typology that helps to explicate framing as a theory of media effects, which focuses on processes or the links between key variables where outcomes of certain processes serve as inputs for subsequent processes. The four processes are frame building, frame setting, individual-level effects of framing, and a link between individual frames and media frames (i.e., journalists’ and elites’ susceptibility to framing processes). This research is specifically interested in the last aspect of the process, which the author further titled as “journalists as audience”. In this typology, Scheufele posits that it could be expected that journalists, like their audiences, are cognitive misers, meaning that they are equally susceptible to the very frames that they use to describe events and issues. This is particularly related to this research, which seeks to examine how the reporters frame the issue of Boko Haram taking cognisance of the risks they face in covering their beats.

Moreover, previous research actually supported the claim in Scheufele’s framing typology. For example, Rhodebeck (1998:5) argues that, although the process of framing is commonly conceptualised as a



hierarchical process originating from elites, interest groups or mass media, “there is reciprocity in framing that the ‘top-down’ depiction omits. Fishman (1980) demonstrates how news coverage of crimes was framed as “crimes against the elderly” by initially a small number of local media, and how other journalists and news media soon picked up that frame. Fishman labels the phenomenon described here as “news wave”. However, Scheufele (1999) acknowledges that influences of media frames on similar content in other media are a function of many factors (e.g., professional ethics, time pressures, and differential prestige of news sources), and thereby asked:

*Are journalists’ frames of an issue mostly a function of how elites, interest groups, or other sources frame an issue? Or, do journalists themselves interpret issues based on frames conveyed to them by other news sources?*

This is important in order to provide understanding for the perspectives chosen by the journalists in news reports.

### **2.9.1 Framing and Representation**

This thesis employs the concept of framing and representation in research questions three and four of this study. According to Hall (1997:10), representation refers to ‘the embodying of concepts, ideas and emotions in a symbolic form which can be transmitted and meaningfully interpreted’ as signifiers in the context of cultural circuits. In the context of representation, which is an important aspect of analysis in this thesis, this study adopts five different concepts or content categories in identifying Boko Haram, that is, the types of source, label, blame, tone and frame. In this context of representation of Boko Haram, the whole analysis is hinged on how the news are framed in terms of coverage and language used.

Having established the significance of framing in the study, Kenix (2011:10) in the same vein, points out the constitutive power of media. She details how different media, across a broad spectrum of outlets, have framed issues and people with the aim of exposing tensions, differences and similarities that exist within

society. The last part of the sentence, ‘have framed issues and people with the aim of exposing tensions, differences and similarities that exist within society’, is significant to this study. This study aims to examine the way journalists covering the Boko Haram crisis represent Boko Haram (as the major social actor) and their activities in the aftermath of the group’s attacks.

Furthermore, Kitzinger (2007:134) notes that any representation of reality involves framing. He cites the example of taking a photograph as literally ‘framing’ the scene – freezing an image of a moment in time, from a particular perspective. Through the viewfinder one selects the focus, decide what to foreground and what to leave in the background, and exclude some aspects of the scene from the frame altogether. The resulting photograph, he explains, does not show the whole of the landscape; it necessarily ‘frames’ a particular view. While Kitzinger’s explication provides some clarification on what representation means, it further points out the connection between the concepts of framing and representation in this study.

### **2.9.2 Conflict Studies: The Context of Media Framing**

This study is anchored on Framing Theory, which is strongly connected to conflict reporting. Media framing, also known as the “second level of agenda setting” (McCombs, 1992), is a mechanism of influence in which journalists employ a frame of interpretation in presenting an issue to the public. This is related to this study in the sense that based on Boko Haram’s attacks on journalists and the media in Nigeria, the reporters might frame the Boko Haram as the actor of the violent attacks. In other words, media coverage is characterised by an active construction, selection and structuring of information to organise a particular reality in a meaningful manner for the public (Gamson1992; Goffman, 1974). This argument is given support by Jasperson & El-Kikhia (2003:114), who affirm that the selection of particular attributes of a story gives important information about the perspective of the media source. These perspectives can make the selected attitudes salient and shape public opinion differently in political contexts with varying coverage. They further

argue that a limited set of media messages could lead to a narrow range of activated attitudes in the collective public opinion.

In this regard, analysis of framings adopted in some studies on conflicts will be useful in establishing the relationship between media framing and conflict reporting. For instance, in the Persian Gulf War, researchers argued that the technical and military language frame the war in a way that made dissent more difficult and discouraged democratic debate (Allen et al. 1994). In this context, Jasperson & El-Kikhia (2003:114) explain that the language of war and coverage of dissent reinforced the suppression of opposition views. Patriotic themes were repeated, and experts and reporters used euphemisms and metaphors alike to characterise the military operations.

In a similar context in the study of 'CNN and al Jazeera's Media Coverage of America's War in Afghanistan', Jasperson & El-Kikhia (2003) examine the comparative use of frames by CNN and al Jazeera in stories about the war in Afghanistan. The research sought to understand how the reporters on CNN and al Jazeera Television frame the war on Afghanistan from their unique perspectives. They examined the similarities and differences that were observed in the nature and number of frames used by each media outlet in the stories analysed. The researchers argued that the selection of stories and the use of frames provide reasonable evidence of the variation in war coverage in the two channels. The study resonates with this thesis in its use of thematic frames although this research applied both thematic and episodic frames.

Many studies on framing examined how mass media have framed conflict news, focusing on the types of frames, similarities and differences in framing, labels or words, and the type of tone adopted in news reports (see Fornaciari, 2012; Kolmer, 2009; Kothari, 2010; Lee, Maslog and Kim (2006). Some of these studies found differences in the sub-topics emphasised in the coverage, the tone of the coverage of the opposing sides and the volumes of news devoted to allies or supporting media outlets. While some of the

studies found most news articles were predominantly episodic, portraying the government as mainly responsible, others found individual biases and motives of the journalists and their sources significantly influenced the coverage. This thesis briefly examined some of these studies to understand their perspectives and how they are related to this research.

Some of the scholars that have adopted framing as the theoretical approach in their research on conflict include Fornaciari (2012) whose work is on Al Jazeera English (AJE) and the BBC. He examined the frames adopted in the Egyptian revolution in 2011. The research identified five frames, and these are attribution of responsibility, conflict, human interest, economic and morality. The study found that AJE and the BBC had similar tendency to focus on the first two frames although the BBC was also somewhat likely to use the human interest frame. The research further found that most news articles were predominantly episodic, portraying the government as mainly responsible. The study concludes that AJE and the BBC tended to provide slightly different versions of reality. The similarity of this work to this thesis is in the use of episodic framing approach, although the contexts of the framing are different. Unlike the study, this thesis identifies the episodic frames as specific events of violence such as killing, abduction, suicide bombing and related ones.

Similarly, Kolmer (2009) adopts framing approach in the study on Iraq war, which investigates the similarities and differences in the framing of the war in TV news programmes in five countries. Despite some differences among networks within countries, the study reveals major lines of cross-national difference in the subtopics emphasised in the coverage, the tone of the coverage of the opposing sides, and the volume of news devoted to the allies (the United Kingdom and the United States). The study concludes that the reporting of the war was conditioned by the national and international contexts in which the news was produced. The cross-country comparisons raise serious questions about the credibility and impartiality of TV news in the

reporting of the war. Although this study selected different countries as samples, its adoption of framing analysis in the conflict aligns with the approach in this thesis. This further provides support for the argument that framing is significant and relevant in the studies on conflict (see Kothari 2010; Lee, Maslog and Kim 2006; Baysha and Hallahan 2004). For instance, the framing of Darfur conflicts in *New York Times: 2003-2006* by Kothari (2010) examines how *New York Times* reported the Darfur conflict in Sudan. The study found that in the interviews with four *New York Times* journalists, the individual biases and motives of the journalists and their sources significantly influenced the coverage. The in-depth interview method employed in the study is significant to this research. In this thesis, the journalists covering the Boko Haram were interviewed concerning the challenges they encounter in the cause of covering the Boko Haram crisis.

Similarly, Lee, Maslog and Kim (2006) investigate the news coverage of the Iraq War and the Asian conflicts by eight newspapers to compare the framing of two different levels of conflicts – international and local. The findings showed discrepancies in the ways the newspapers deployed war journalism and peace journalism framings. Although these scholars employed framing analysis but it is not the same framing approach that is being used in this thesis. However, it shows the relevance of using framing approach to studies on conflict.

Based on the analysis above, it can be argued that most studies on conflict employed different approaches of framing in understanding conflicts. It is therefore logical to conclude that Framing Theory is the most relevant theoretical framework in this research.

## **2.10 Research Questions**

As clearly indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the literatures were reviewed around major issues regarding conflict sensitive reporting. It specifically explores studies on Boko Haram and the Nigerian media, conflict studies, and risks that journalists in Nigeria encounter while covering the activities of Boko Haram

group in the country. The literatures also focus on examining the differences in locations of the two sampled newspapers to the hotspot of Boko Haram activities, in terms of proximity to or distance from the focal centre of the activities of the insurgents in the north. These bodies of literature that were reviewed have drawn insights from the research questions that were formulated. The literature therefore provides insights for the adoption of the qualitative and quantitative research approaches in this thesis. Therefore, the first two research questions have been answered both quantitatively and qualitatively using content analysis and CDA respectively. While the last two research questions are answered qualitatively through the use of in-depth interview research method.

This chapter has reviewed a number of literatures that can help introduce important concepts and theories. The research questions provide insights for the literature. Research Question 1 (Did journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria?) informs the literatures on conflict-sensitive reporting, Boko Haram's attacks on journalists and media in Nigeria, Boko Haram's linkage with international terrorist groups and Boko Haram's adoption of ISIS's strategies of beheading inform the formulation of this question. For Research Question 2 (Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012?), this provides understanding to the literatures on risk in reporting Boko Haram based on the differences in locations of the two newspapers' head offices to the epicentre of Boko Haram – *Daily Trust* has its head office in the north while *ThisDay's* head office is based in the southern region of the country. In Research Question 3 (Do concerns about risks in reporting Boko Haram have an impact on how journalists conduct their reporting?), the literatures on conflict-sensitive reporting detailing the dangerous reporting environment with specific reference to the risks in covering Boko Haram are relevant to the question. In Research Question 4 (To what extent do provision of safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by the Nigerian media enhance continuous reporting on Boko

Haram activities?), the aspects of the literature on risk in reporting Boko Haram, safety guidelines for journalists covering dangerous zones, Boko Haram's linkage with international terror groups, Boko Haram's adoption of terror strategies, and traumatic experience by journalists arising from attacks are also relevant.

## **2.11 Concluding Remarks**

This chapter reviews literature based on the three issues covered in this thesis: conflict-sensitive reporting, risk in reporting Boko Haram, and the differences in the newspapers' locations to the epicentre of Boko Haram. Each of these areas has sub-areas which were separately reviewed. The chapter reviews several issues relating to conflict-sensitive reporting, specifically as journalists have been currently targeted, attacked or deliberately killed in the performance of their job. It further provides insights into the risks that journalists covering the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria are facing. These literatures are tied to the concerns in research questions 1 and 2 of this study.

This chapter also examines literatures on incidents of Boko Haram's attacks and threats to the journalists and media organisations in Nigeria. It further discusses the potential synergies between Boko Haram and the international terrorist groups such as ISIS, differences in locations of the selected newspapers' head offices to the stronghold of Boko Haram activities. Hence, this study argues that Boko Haram is likely following the paths of ISIS and Al-Qaeda when it swore allegiance to ISIS in 2015 and carried out its first beheading. These reviews are related to the Research Question 3 of the study. The aspects of the discussion on safety guidelines for journalists covering conflict, insurance, remuneration and organisational support relate to the ideas in Research Question 4.

Based on the concepts generated in the literature, this study is anchored on Framing Theory. The numerous Boko Haram's attacks and intimidation of the reporters covering this group in Nigeria inform the

rationale for the adoption of the theory. It is assumed that the reporters would frame and identify the group in a way that would reflect Boko Haram as the agents of the violence.

The next chapter focuses on the discussion of the three methods that were adopted in analysing the data in this study. The thesis employs mix methods, using qualitative and quantitative research designs. The in-depth interview, content analysis and CDA were applied in answering the four research questions in the study. While the in-depth interview selected 10 journalists in Nigeria covering the activities of Boko Haram in the country for interviews, the content analysis and CDA drew data from *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* headline reports. The chapter also provides rationale for the selection of each of the methods.



## CHAPTER THREE

### Research Method and Design

This chapter examines the research methods and design adopted in this thesis. It explains in detail why this study adopted the mixed methods research. In specific terms, the chapter explains how the three research approaches are used in the study – content analysis, critical discourse analysis and in-depth interview– are designed. These three methods were applied in proffering answers to the four research questions in this study.

The chapter further provides justifications for their selection.

#### 3.1 Research Design

This study adopted both qualitative and quantitative research designs of mixed methods in the sampling process and data analysis involved in the research. According to Onwuegbuzie & Collins (2007: 290) the sampling process involves seven distinct steps. They are enumerated as follow:

- (a) determine the goal of the study, which is to understand complex phenomenon such as the Boko Haram threats to and attacks on journalists
- (b) formulate the research objectives – which is, exploration or seeking insights into the impact of Boko Haram’s violence on reporters and news reporting
- (c) determine the research purpose, which in this case, is seeking to expand the breadth and range of research on Boko Haram’s violence by specifically examining whether journalists changed their news content or reporting techniques when reporting on Boko Haram when they perceive personal risks from their reporting.
- (d) determine the research question(s)

- (e) select the research design
- (f) select the sampling design
- (g) select the sampling scheme

The research design adopted in this study is sequential and uses multilevel samples for its qualitative and quantitative components. In the qualitative component, samples were drawn for the in-depth interview and Critical Discourse Analysis, which will be referred to as CDA throughout this chapter. In the quantitative aspect, samples were drawn for content analysis. For the in-depth interview, using stratified purposeful scheme, the research drew samples from the reporters representing each of the two geo-political strata of northern and southern regions in Nigeria. In each stratum, a purposeful sample of reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram was further selected. At the level of the CDA and content analysis, through stratified scheme, the thesis drew samples, (that is, the newspaper articles) from *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay*. The two newspapers have national coverage but *Daily Trust* has its head office located close to the nerve centre of Boko Haram activities in the north while *ThisDay's* head office is based in the south. This was followed by a purposeful sample of news articles on Boko Haram within the timeline of the study (2011-2012), which totalled 897 for content analysis and 120 for CDA.

In addition, the study incorporates some stages in Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie's (2003) seven-stage data analysis process for mixed methods. The stages are:

- (a) *Data reduction* involves reducing the dimensionality of the qualitative data from the in-depth interview via exploratory thematic analysis, whereby responses from the interviewees are classified according to identified themes, and the quantitative data via descriptive statistics of frequency count, percentage and cross tabulation.

- (b) *Data display*, which involves describing pictorially the qualitative data through charts and graphs while the quantitative data involves tables and graphs, which are adopted in the methodologies for this study.
- (c) *Data transformation* (which is optional) wherein, quantitative data are converted into narrative data that can be analysed qualitatively (that is, qualitized) and/or qualitative data are converted into numerical codes that can be represented statistically (quantitized).
- (d) Data correlation
- (e) Data consolidation
- (f) Data comparison
- (g) *Data integration*, which involve the quantitative data (data for content analysis) being correlated with the qualitized data (the CDA). It is pertinent to note that the data for content analysis and the CDA in this study are drawn from the same data source, that is, newspaper articles. Therefore, the analyses of the two are correlated.

The thesis adopted only three of these analytical processes based on their relevance to the study. They are: (a) data reduction, (b) data display and (g) data integration.

In the foregoing explanation, it is clear that this thesis employs both qualitative and quantitative designs on all the four research questions. Specifically, the qualitative component of the study is carried out on all the four research questions through the methodologies of in-depth interview and CDA while the quantitative design applies to only research questions (1) and (2) which are operationalised through content analysis methodology at the first stage in the analysis before the textual analysis. The application of both qualitative and quantitative research designs to the research questions provides justification for the mixed methods. The rationale for the method is discussed extensively in the following section.

### 3.2 Justification for Mixed Methods

This study adopts mixed methods, which according to Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004:17) is formally defined as the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study. As the third research paradigm, Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004:17) contend that mixed methods research is an attempt to legitimate the use of multiple approaches in answering research questions, rather than restricting or constraining researchers' choices (i.e., it rejects dogmatism). This is done by labelling, categorising, deciding and interpreting the data within a framework of established natural language definitions (Krippendorff, 2004:137).

Broadly, as noted in the section above, the study adopted three research methods of content analysis, CDA and in-depth interview. The first method employed in the thesis is the content analysis, which provides answers to two research questions. The first question investigates whether journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria. The second question explores whether there are differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012).

The second method employed in this study is the CDA. In the same way as the content analysis, the method is used to provide insights into the two research questions stated in the paragraph above. The only difference between the content analysis and the CDA is that while the content analysis provides quantitative findings, the CDA presents qualitative answers. In the CDA, the specific grammatical parts that form the focus of this analysis are the noun phrases (which identify the language used to identify the major social actor or the participant,) and verb phrases (which determine the actions performed by the major social actor) in the headline reports. Boko Haram is identified as the major social actor in this thesis.

The study also employed the in-depth interview as the third methodology. The method is used to investigate two research questions: one explores how concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram have impact on the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists. The second interview research question investigates the extent which provision of safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by media owners in Nigeria ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram. In these cases, interviews among reporters covering Boko Haram are considered appropriate. In doing this, qualitative design is employed since qualitative methods are highly appropriate if the purpose is to learn from the participants in a setting or a process the way they experience it, the meanings they put on it, and how they interpret what they experience. The researcher needs methods that will allow for discovery and do justice to their perceptions and the complexity of their interpretations (Atieno, 2009:16).

The use of mixed research is necessary because neither research methods can singularly offer a sufficient understanding of the research problem (Creswell, 2003; Sobowale, 2008; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 1998). By combining these two approaches, it is hoped that the research will overcome some of the criticisms of the CDA and in-depth interview. According to Sriwimon and Zilli (2017:7), CDA as a conceptual framework for discourse analysis, has been criticised, especially for selecting and using only a small number of texts, in some cases even just one or two, which has led to concerns regarding the representativeness of the texts selected, and limitations and difficulties in making any generalisable conclusion. However, this research limits this criticism by selecting and analysing a large sample over the timeline of the study. More so, Atieno (2009:17) notes that the in-depth interview as a qualitative method is limited in scope given that “its findings cannot be extended to wider populations with the same degree of certainty that quantitative analyses can generate. This is because qualitative findings are not tested to discover whether they are statistically significant or due to chance”. This research has overcome this concern by applying the quantitative approach of content analysis, which enables findings to be more representative. It is expected that combining the

findings from both qualitative and quantitative approaches will provide much depth and elaboration to the study.

The following table presents the research questions and their alternative hypotheses as they relate to the research methods and designs. The content analysis and CDA are adopted for research questions 1 and 2 employing both the quantitative and qualitative designs while the in-depth interview method, using the qualitative design, is applied to the research questions 3 and 4.

**Table 3.1 Research Questions, Alternative Hypotheses and Applicable Research Methods**

Research Questions	Research Hypotheses	Research Method	Research Design
<p>1. Did journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria?</p>	<p><b>Hi:</b> Journalists changed their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria.</p> <p><b>Ho:</b> Journalists did not change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria</p>	<p>(a) Content analysis</p> <p>(b) Critical Discourse Analysis</p>	<p>(a) Quantitative</p> <p>(b) Qualitative</p>
<p>2. Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in <i>Daily Trust</i>'s and <i>ThisDay</i>'s reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012)?</p>	<p><b>Hi:</b> Notable differences identified in the representation of Boko Haram in <i>Daily Trust</i>'s and <i>ThisDay</i>'s reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012).</p> <p><b>Ho:</b> No notable differences identified in the representation of Boko Haram in <i>Daily Trust</i>'s and <i>ThisDay</i>'s reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012).</p>	<p>(a) Content analysis</p> <p>(b) Critical Discourse Analysis</p>	<p>(a) Quantitative</p> <p>(b) Qualitative</p>
<p>3. Do concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram have impact on the patterns</p>	<p><b>Hi:</b> Concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram influence the patterns of news</p>	<p>In-depth Interview</p>	<p>Qualitative</p>

of news gathering and reporting by journalists?	gathering and reporting by journalists. <b>Ho:</b> Lack of concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram does not influence the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists.		
4. To what extent do provision of safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by media owners in Nigeria ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram?	<b>Hi:</b> Safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by media owners in Nigeria ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram. <b>Ho:</b> Lack of safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by media owners in Nigeria hinder continuous reporting on Boko Haram.	In-depth Interview	Qualitative

### 3.3 Research Methods and Justification

This section explains how each of the selected methods was used to answer each of the research questions and alternative hypotheses in them. In the context of mixed research, Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004) asserted that what is most fundamental is that research methods should follow research questions in a way that offers the best chance to obtain useful answers. In order to achieve this, the authors (2004:137-138) recommended simulation of hypothesis testing, which addresses a text's presuppositions, implications, and omissions over and above its explicit meanings while these propositions function similarly to a set of hypotheses about what a text tells the coder, who records his or her judgement of each textual unit in



categories. Both scholars further affirmed that answering such questions is the qualitative analogue of testing statistical hypotheses (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004:138). This thesis therefore analysed each of the research questions by providing a set of alternative hypotheses aimed at proffering answers to them. The subsequent sections examine in detail each of the research methods used in this thesis and their justifications.

### **3.4 Content Analysis and Justification**

In this study where communication texts, specifically newspaper articles on Boko Haram activities in Nigeria were systematically studied and analysed to determine patterns of representation of Boko Haram over the timeline of the study and in the selected newspapers, the use of content analysis is important. Content analysis has been defined as a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Berelson, 1952; GAO, 1996; Krippendorff, 1980; and Weber, 1990). Krippendorff (1969) offers a broad definition of content analysis as, "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (p.14) is a research technique used to make replicable and valid inferences by interpreting and coding textual material. By systematically evaluating texts (for example, documents, oral communication, and graphics), qualitative data can be converted into quantitative data. In this study, the news texts that are nominal items have been converted into numbers using frequency, percentages and cross tabulations for analysis. In analysis, coding is usually required. The data produced by coding has been described as a useful starting point for analysis, since they reveal some interesting patterns of meaning across texts (Richardson (2007:197).

#### **3.4.1 Priori and Emergent Coding**

In content analysis, there are two approaches to coding data that operate with slightly different rules. These are priori and emergent coding (Stemler, 2001). With priori coding, the categories are established prior to the analysis based upon some theory. Professional colleagues agree on the categories, and the coding is

applied to the data. Revisions are made as necessary and the categories are tightened up with the review of the sample (Weber 1990 in Stemler, 2001). Conversely, Stemler (2001:3) stated that in emergent coding, categories are established following some preliminary examination of the data. In this study, the researcher applied the emergent coding. The steps involved in this type of coding are clearly explained in the section on validity, reliability and inter-coder reliability.

In this study, content analysis and CDA addressed research questions 1 and 2. They are listed as follow:

Research Question 1: Did journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria?

Research Question 2: Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012)?

### **3.4.2 Selected Newspaper of Study and Rationale for Selection**

In Nigeria, there are over 150 newspapers, most of which are not daily publications and are regional in coverage and circulation (Mapping Digital Media in Nigeria, 2012; Nigerian Press Council, 2009). There are approximately 20 daily newspapers, which have national coverage, circulation and readership in the country (Nigeria Press Council, 2009; Adeyanju & Okweri, 2005; Mapping Digital Media in Nigeria, 2012). The researcher selected two of the national newspapers for this study, and they are: *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust*.

The selection of the two newspapers was based on certain unique characteristics that qualify them for selection in this study. They both have online versions for online readership and this is important because Nigerian audiences are now conscious of reading online versions of newspapers. Although there are no exact data about circulations of print media in Nigeria, research shows that there is a competitive print media

landscape (Mapping Digital Media Nigeria, 2012). Data from the *All Media and Products Survey 2010* indicate that many of the national dailies in Nigeria tailor their editions according to the different regions. The South West region (which includes Lagos State) has the largest number of newspaper readers per capita while the North West has the smallest, followed by the North Central region (Mapping Digital Media Nigeria, 2012).

*ThisDay* is one of the national newspapers and has its head office in Lagos with branch offices in Abuja and Kaduna. It is published as a national newspaper and has grown to become a contemporary media powerhouse in Nigeria. With a daily circulation of 100,000, the newspaper is a market leader for innovation, breaking exclusive news both in politics and entertainment. *Daily Trust* is the dominant daily in northern Nigeria, and as a counter to southern-dominated media, *Daily Trust* has grown to become a credible platform for alternative views on Nigerian issues. It is specifically located in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory of the nation, with a branch office in Lagos State. There are other newspapers in the north, but they do not have national coverage and circulation. In contrast, these other newspapers are largely regional in orientation and circulation compared to the *Daily Trust* (Mapping Digital Media Nigeria, 2012).

### **3.4.3 Sample and Sampling Techniques for Content Analysis**

In this study, the entire content of *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* over twelve months (from the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July, 2011 to 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2012) was selected as the sample for analysis. These periods form the timeline of attacks, which represent the three major periods of attacks on journalists and media houses in Nigeria, the three months before and after the attacks. In this thesis, these are the ‘specific periods of time relating to important discursive events, which are connected to the issue in question’ (Sriwimon and Zilli, 2017). Details of these periods are provided in the CDA section under this sub-heading. The timing of these events is important in proffering answers to research question one of this study since the content analysis and CDA methods were

applied to the question. The important events in this study are the three periods of attacks on journalists and media. Although, the specific period of time of the attacks is between October 22, 2011 to April 26, 2012 but the study selected the three months before and three months after for collecting and analysing data. This is done in order to understand whether journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period after the attacks. These periods were categorised into four phases. Details of these phases are also provided in the CDA section of the thesis. The four identified phases were cross-tabulated against the two selected newspapers in order to determine the percentage distribution of each of the newspapers within each of the phases (see Table 3.2).

Following the criteria mentioned above, the researcher selected the online versions of *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* for the purpose of this study, because they were more accessible. The articles from both newspapers were selected from AllAfrica.com, a website that aggregates news produced primarily on the African continent about all areas of African life, including politics and culture<sup>2</sup> (AllAfrica.com). The search results on “Boko Haram” within this timeframe produced 327 articles from *ThisDay* and 570 from *Daily Trust* totalling 897, which became the sample for this analysis.

The following table presents the distribution of *Daily Trust*'s and *ThisDay*'s headline reports within the timeline of attack on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria (2011-2012).


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<sup>2</sup> These were available in both English and French and produced by AllAfrica Global Media, which has offices in Cape Town, Dakar, Lagos, Monrovia, Nairobi, and Washington, D.C. It is the successor to the African News Services

**Table 3.2: Distribution of *Daily Trust*'s and *ThisDay*'s Headline Reports within the Timeline of Attack (2011-2012)**

			Newspapers		
			Daily Trust	This Day	Total
<b>Timeline of Attack</b>	Phase	Count	113	31	144
	1	% within Timeline of Attack	78.5%	21.5%	100.0%
	Phase	Count	152	71	223
	2	% within Timeline of Attack	68.2%	31.8%	100.0%
	Phase	Count	160	120	280
	3	% within Timeline of Attack	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%
	Phase	Count	145	105	250
	4	% within Timeline of Attack	58.0%	42.0%	100.0%
Total		Count	570	327	897
		% within Timeline of Attack	63.5%	36.5%	100.0%

**Figure 3.1: Distribution of *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* Headline Reports within the Timeline of Attack (2011-2012)**



#### 3.4.4 The Unit of Analysis and Content Categories

In the content analysis and CDA, the units of analysis are the headlines on news stories, articles/column writings and editorials, mentioning Boko Haram. The rationale for selecting headlines is based on the fact that initial summaries, such as headlines in the news, have the crucial function of expressing the topic highest in the macrostructure hierarchy, and therefore, the (subjectively) most important information of a news report (Van Dijk, 1988b). Moreover, Chilwa (2012) acknowledges that headlines and their overlines have pragmatic contents and can be analysed as texts, especially as illustrated in Bell's (1998) single-sentence story. This position is well illustrated in Van Dijk's (1995:22) argument that headlines in newspapers, taken as prominent expressions of the overall meaning or gist (semantic macrostructure) of a

news report in the press, form a special discourse category that is probably more likely to express or convey ideological ‘content’ than, for instance, the number of commas in a text. This means that headlines are the most valued content of a news report. In addition, Van Dijk (1995:10) pushed this argument further when he stated that topics or quotations patterns in news reports may reflect modes of access of various news actors or sources to the news media, whereas the content and form of a headline in the press may subtly influence the interpretation and hence the persuasive effects of news reports among readers. The variables considered as content categories within the headlines are five and they are: the type of source, label, blame, tone and frame. These content variables are important as they are the indicators for understanding how the headlines framed the representation of Boko Haram. They are important in answering the questions for the content analysis and CDA. Each of these variables was reviewed in turn. Although none of these five categories on its own provides sufficient evidence to support a case for change or difference in the representation of Boko Haram, the combination of all the five variables can generate substantial evidence.

These categories and the most frequent options within each (based on a review of the sample) are highlighted below:

**Source** – This refers to who is sourced in the statements in the headlines:

- Boko Haram
- Security agents
- Journalist
- Citizen
- Government
- International
- Anonymous

- Other

**Label** – This describes how Boko Haram is described in the headlines:

- Collectivised
- Functionalised
- Nominalised
- Personalised
- No labels

**Blame** – This is who is responsible for attacking or defending between Boko Haram and security agents in the headlines:

- Boko Haram attacking
- Security agents defending
- Boko Haram defending
- Security agents attacking
- Neutral References

**Tone** – This involves how words, phrases or expressions in the headlines are described in relation to Boko Haram and security forces. They can either be negative, positive or neutral:

- Negative
- Positive
- Neutral



**Frame** – This refers to how events or issues in the headlines are described. The issues can either be episodic or thematic frames. Episodic frames describe specific incidents while thematic frames describe issues in general context:

- Episodic frames about Boko Haram
- Episodic frames about security agents/government
- Thematic frames about Boko Haram
- Thematic frames about security agents/government
- No Frames

### **3.4.5 Coding of Material**

This study focused on coding or assigning attributes to specific units of analysis mentioned in the section above. In this case, individual words and clauses in the headlines were marked. According to Richardson (2007:197), “the data produced by coding do provide us with a useful starting point for analysis, since they reveal some interesting patterns of meaning across texts. In order to organise the coded data, this study used the statistical software package Statistical Packages for Social Science (SPSS). The software enabled the use of frequency count percentage and cross tabulations in analysing the data.

Specifically, coding was done on the 897 news headlines in the two newspapers. The variables for analysis were broadly grouped into five content categories, which were explained in the section on unit of analysis and content categories above. In all the five variables, twenty-seven (27) different coding categories were considered.

The following table presents the coding categories adopted in the study and their definitions that were applied in the analysis.

**Table 3.3: Code Book Instruction for Content Analysis**

<b>Coder:</b>		
Koiki		1
<b>Story Identity</b>		
Newspaper headlines:	<i>Daily Trust</i> <i>ThisDay</i>	1
		2
Year:	2011	1
	2012	2
Phase:	Phase I	1
	Phase II	2
	Phase III	3
	Phase IV	4
Month:	January	1
	February	2
	March	3
	April	4
	May	5
	June	6
	July	7
	August	8
	September	9
	October	10

November	11
December	12

1) **SOURCE** – Who is responsible for statements in the headlines

- Boko Haram: Statements credited to Boko Haram members/ leaders/spokesperson/other names assigned to Boko Haram
- Security agents: Statements credited to military/police/JTF (Joint Task Force)/SSS (State Security Service)/DSS (Director Security Service)
- Journalist: Summarised reports/statements by journalists in Nigeria
- Citizen: Statements showing names of individuals/religious groups/organisations in the private sector in Nigeria
- Government: Statements credited to persons/officials/organisations in Nigerian public sector (such as, ministries, state/house of assemblies, judiciary,etc)
- International: Statements showing names of persons/organisations/ agencies based outside Nigeria
- Anonymous: Statements in quotes but not showing names of any sources
- Other: Statements different from the ones identified above and are clearly labelled as ‘opinion’, ‘editorials’, ‘columns’ ‘analysis’ ‘interview’, etc.

(2) **LABEL** – References to how Boko Haram is described or named in headlines

- Collectivised: addressing Boko Haram as a group such as terrorist/ Islamic sect/extremist/ militant group
- Functionalised: references to Boko Haram in terms of what they do or according to their roles (as bomber/ kidnapper/gunman/ killer, etc.)
- Nominalised: references to Boko Haram according to the popular names it is known by such as Boko Haram/Jamaa’ tul Ahlu Sunna Lidawaati li Jihad/ Yusuffiyah.
- Personalised: Identifying Boko Haram as representing a certain particular person (as spokesperson/ sponsor/ leader etc.)
- No labels: headlines with no label about Boko Haram

(3) **BLAME** – References showing who is responsible for attack/threat or responding to attack/defending between Boko Haram and security agents

- Boko Haram attacking: started violent actions such as killings, shootings, kidnappings, bombings, issuing threats etc.
- Security agents defending: responding to Boko Haram attacks, right to defend itself and the public, fighting terror, high troop morale etc.
- Boko Haram defending: responding to attacks from security agents, resisting (resistance), high morale among members, etc.
- Security agents attacking: actions unjustified (disproportionate), costs too high, tactics mis-directed, criticism of tactics, etc.
- No blame for attacking: attacking/fighting not referenced to any side - neither Boko Haram nor security agents is to blame for the actions
- No attack: no references to actions about attacks or fighting

(4) **TONE** – Words, phrases or expressions in the headlines showing negative, positive or neutral descriptions of violence.

- Negative: Words/phrases/ expressions showing issues relating to killing, bombing, gun shooting etc.
- Positive: Words/phrases/expressions showing issues relating to dialogue, amnesty, cooperation etc.
- Neutral: words/ phrases/expressions that are neither positive nor negative

(5) **FRAMING** – how events/ actions are described in the headlines as either episodic or thematic frames:

Episodic frames are specific incidents (such as bombing, killing, etc.)

Thematic frames are general or broad issues or actions (such as, insecurity, violence, terrorism etc.)

- Episodic frames about Boko Haram: specific actions/events about Boko Haram (e.g. killing, bombing, attacking, gun shooting etc.)
- Episodic frames about security agents/government: specific events about security agents/government (such as defending, arresting, attacking, etc.)
- Thematic frames about Boko Haram: general issues/events about Boko Haram (such as insecurity, violence, etc.)
- Thematic frames about security agents/government: general issues/events about security agents/government (such as dialogue, security, tolerance etc.)
- No Frames: Issues that are neither about Boko Haram nor security agencies/ government

### 3.4.6 Validity, Reliability and Inter-coder Reliability

This research adopted Krippendorff's Alpha to calculate the degree of agreement between the researcher and the research assistant in the coding exercise in order to ensure validity and reliability of the data. Krippendorff's Alpha is a measure of inter-rater agreement, measuring how much raters (labellers, coders) agree on labels assigned to items. It operates on different levels of measurement which are nominal, ordinal and interval. In limited cases, it is identical to Fleiss' Kappa, but Krippendorff's Alpha is applicable to a wider range of problems and can deal with missing entries, as it does not require the same number of raters for each item (Eggink, 2012). This implementation takes a matrix of observations and the desired level of measurement as input and computes Alpha. Results have been verified against an existing SPSS macro.

In applying this method, the researcher subjected the coding scheme to a preliminary test by conducting a pilot coding of 50 headlines in the selected two Nigerian newspapers. The researcher and the research assistant independently reviewed the materials and came up with a set of features that formed a

checklist. Then, both the researcher and the assistant compared notes and reconciled the differences that showed up on the initial checklists. Then, the researchers used the consolidated checklist to independently apply coding on 15 per cent of the 897 headlines, that is, 135 headlines. And lastly, the researcher checked the reliability of the coding. At the end of the exercise, the researcher separated some categories that were initially fused together in order to make them clearer and easier for coding. After the inter-coder reliability test, the researcher coded all the headlines sampled. The book instruction that was generated is hereby included as Table 3.3.

The following table shows the results for the intercoder reliability test on each of the content categories in the study.

**Table 3.4: Specific Reliability Coefficient for each Content Categories**

Content Categories	Reliability coefficient
Source	0.849
Label	0.977
Blame	0.969
Framing	0.94
Tone	0.965

**3.4.7 Categorisation of Research Questions for Content Analysis and CDA**

**Research question 1:** Did journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria?

**Research question 2:** Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust*'s and *ThisDay*'s reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012)?

In question (1), news headlines regarding the Boko Haram crisis in the sampled newspapers were content analysed to examine whether journalists changed their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period before and after major attacks by Boko Haram on journalists. This involves coding the content of the news headlines, and the content categories that were examined for representation were: source, label, blame, framing and tone. It is assumed, in this regard, that changes in representation, especially in the period immediately after attacks, are adding evidence to perceived risk from journalists reporting on Boko Haram.

In this regard, 10 different coding options were used, which could be categorised into two different categories:

(i) Journalists changed their representation of Boko Haram when they perceived personal risk from their reporting

- Discernible change in sourcing
- Discernible change in labeling
- Discernible change in blaming
- Discernible change in tone
- Discernible change framing

(ii) Journalists did not change their representation of Boko Haram when they perceived personal risk from their reporting

- No discernible change in sourcing
- No discernible change in labeling
- No discernible change in blaming
- No discernible change in tone
- No discernible change in framing

In line with the description above, research question (2) involves content analysis of news headlines using the same content categories explained in the paragraph above to determine whether there are changes in representation of Boko Haram in *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* newspapers. If a notable difference in the way Boko Haram is represented occurs between these newspapers, then it could be argued that the two newspapers have different representations of Boko Haram.

For this question, 10 coding options were provided within two alternative hypotheses:

(i) Notable differences in representation of Boko Haram between *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* during the period of Boko Haram attacks

- Notable difference in sourcing
- Notable difference in labeling
- Notable difference in blaming
- Notable difference in tone
- Notable difference in framing

(ii) No significant differences in representation of Boko Haram between *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* newspapers during the periods of Boko Haram attacks

- No notable difference in sourcing
- No notable difference in labeling
- No notable difference in blaming
- No notable difference in tone
- No notable difference in framing

### **3.5 Critical Discourse Analysis and Justification**

In this section, the concept, research design and justification for the use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in this study will be discussed. According to Hansen and Machin (2013: 115), CDA allows a more systematic analysis of texts and language. In particular, since this aspect of the study is focused on analysing news texts on the activities of Boko Haram, then CDA was considered necessary. Guided by linguistic expertise, CDA can reveal more precisely how speakers and authors use language and grammatical features to create meaning, to persuade people to think about events in a particular way, sometimes even seek to manipulate these people while at the same time concealing their own intentions. Key here is the notion of language and this is particularly the focus of this aspect of the study.

In addition, Hansen and Machin (2013: 115) expatiate that CDA offers the promise of showing exactly what features of language, what language choices, have been used to accomplish particular kinds of communicative aims. In this instance, the emphasis is on ‘language choices’. The authors further noted that CDA draws on a form of linguistics inspired by the work of Halliday (1978) initially developed by a critical linguists such as Kress (1989) and Fowler (1987). They explained that Halliday was interested in the way that researchers code events in language. These choices shape the way that reality is represented. For example, it is important which terms are used to describe people. Why might someone want to emphasise that a soldier is a ‘father’ and ‘husband’ but not do the same for the enemy? How does this coding of events in language shape how the world appears? Specifically, this analysis focuses on the language use in representing Boko Haram in news texts.

Furthermore, Matheson (2005:16-17) explains that there are two types of conventions that are useful in analysing news language: journalistic and wider social conventions. Journalistic conventions about such things as how a text should begin and end, what readers are thought to be interested in, what they should



know and when a news story can claim something is true. The wider social convention, which the news depends on and which it sometimes helps shape, are about such things as what people are like, what words mean, what is natural and common-sensical, who gets to speak in society and what is real. In this thesis, both conventions can be related to how the headlines are framed to represent the Boko Haram group within the social context of the reported violence. Matheson further explains that by analysing news language within the approach sketched above, it is possible to uncover the social base of the news (2005). The CDA analysis in this study therefore focuses on how Boko Haram members are named or labelled in the news texts and the type of language that are used to identify their actions. Consequently, the aim is to reveal what kinds of social relations of power are present in texts both explicitly and implicitly (Van Dijk, 1993: 249). In this thesis, this refers to how the journalists have framed the news texts (whether implicitly or explicitly) to identify Boko Haram in connection to the crisis.

### **3.5.1 Transitivity in CDA**

The paragraphs above outlined how language can be used in representing social actors. In this study, Boko Haram is the main social actor. Based on this, it is important to point out the role of transitivity in this case. Richardson (2007:54) states that, 'the study of transitivity is concerned with how actions are represented; what kind of actions appear in a text, who does them and to whom they are done' – in short, the '*who* (or what) does *what* to *whom* (or what)'. As such, transitivity forms the heart of representation, describing the relationships between participants and the roles they play in the processes described in reporting. Hence, in this part of the study, the emphasis is on the individual words and phrases used in the selected headlines. Central to the study of transitivity is the realisation 'that in producing texts there is a range of choices to be made, and every text which has been produced could have been produced differently' (Richardson 2007:54). These are choices about how to represent an event's participants (using referential and predicational

strategies) and choices about how the event itself is represented, as reflected in the principal verb of the clause. Therefore, choices of words and phrases that are adopted in describing the social actors and their actions among all the alternative choices show the representations that are ascribed to them. In this study transitivity provides a focus for analysing the emphasis individual words and phrases used in the selected headlines about attacks by Boko Haram.

In addition, (Simpson 1993:88) noted that choices are made through semantic processes expressed by clauses, and have three potential components. These are:

- (1) *Process* itself, which will be expressed by the verb phrase in a clause.
- (2) The *participants* involved in the process. These roles are typically realised by noun phrases in the clause.
- (3) The *circumstances* associated with the process are normally expressed by adverbial and prepositional phrases.

In relation to the research questions that addressed the CDA methodology, this study applied number (1) and (2) of the choices in the analysis. In other words, the headlines are examined through the CDA to determine the choice of words and expressions that are made concerning the process (which can be actions such as killings, bombings, dialogue, amnesty and related ones) and participants in the text (Boko Haram as the main actor and security agents/government as other actors).

### **3.5.2 Procedure for Data Analysis in CDA**

In carrying out the CDA, this study followed some of the analytical patterns recommended by Wodak and Meyer (2009: 8) to focus on these points: specific political units (region, nation state, international union); specific periods of time relating to important discursive events, which are connected with the issue in question; specific social and especial political actors; specific discourses; specific fields of political action;

and specific semiotic media and genre. In addition, this thesis employed some of the criteria prescribed by Floarin (2013), as a discourse toolbox. Floarin identified ten methodological points for discourse analysis: (1) Establish the context, (2) Explore the production process, (3) Prepare your material for analysis, (4) Code your material, (5) Examine the structure of the text, (6) Collect and examine discursive statements, (7) Identify cultural references, (8) Identify linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms, (9) Interpret the data and (10) Present your findings. There are many points of overlap between Floarin's description of method, and that of Wodak and Meyer.

This study draws on both of the above methods to explain the procedure in data gathering and analysis in this research. For example, following Wodak's and Meyer's recommendation, the 'specific political units' were narrowed down to reports about the Boko Haram issue from media sources that are produced in Nigeria but also reach both local and international audiences. Hence, only English Language texts about Boko Haram's topic were used as the data.

The 'specific period relating to important discursive events' in the study describes the events of Boko Haram attacks, and specifically, the attacks on journalists and the media organisations in Nigeria between October 2011-April 2012. Detail about this particular period of events is provided in subsequent section under this sub-heading. Next, the 'specific social and political actor' for this study is Boko Haram, and how Boko Haram as a social actor is framed or identified or the way the actions of Boko Haram is represented. This means the keyword considered in selecting the news articles is Boko Haram.

### **3.5.3 Sample and Sampling Techniques for CDA**

In order to analyse using transitivity as outlined by Richardson above, 120 headlines were selected for the CDA from a total of 897. In this method, verb phrases and noun phrases were analysed to determine how the actions and actors were expressed respectively in the headlines. Purposive selection narrowed the 897

articles down to a number of samples that responded to the two research questions for this methodology. Research question 1 emphasises change in representation of Boko Haram following the Boko Haram attacks. So, the headline reports were selected from phases 1 and 4 (representing periods before and after attacks) which have been previously explained in the content analysis section. For research question 2, which focuses on differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting, the two newspapers were selected.

The breakdown of the 120 selected samples is as follow:

- 80 headlines selected for the Research question 1 (8 headlines from phases 1 and 4 within the five content categories)
- 40 headlines selected for the Research question 2 (8 headlines from the two newspapers within the five content categories)

The 80 headlines for research question 1 are selected as follow:

- 8 headlines each from phases 1 and 4 of the source category
- 8 headlines each from phases 1 and 4 of the label category
- 8 headlines each from phases 1 and 4 of the blame category
- 8 headlines each from phases 1 and 4 of the tone category
- 8 headlines each from phases 1 and 4 of the frame category

The 40 headlines that were selected in answering the research question 2 are as listed:

- 4 headlines each from *Daily Trust* and *This Day* of the source category
- 4 headlines each from *Daily Trust* and *This Day* of the label category
- 4 headlines each from *Daily Trust* and *This Day* of the blame category
- 4 headlines each from *Daily Trust* and *This Day* of the tone category

- 4 headlines each from *Daily Trust* and *This Day* of the frame category

The research further selected headlines from each of the five content categories identified in this thesis (the type of source, label, blame, tone and frame). The five content categories are used to understand how Boko Haram was represented, which is a key concept in the CDA analysis in this study. The following are the brief explanations of the content categories:

- Source: Who is responsible for statements in the headlines?
- Label: References to how Boko Haram is described or named in the headlines
- Blame: References showing who is responsible for attack/threat or responding to attack/defending between Boko Haram and security agents
- Tone: Words, phrases or expressions in the headlines showing negative/ positive/neutral constructions
- Frame: how the events/ actions are described in the headlines as either episodic or thematic frames

#### **3.5.4 The Specific Period of Time Relating to Important Discursive Events**

This aspect is important to this study as it concerns the period of analysis in this research, which dwells on Research question 1. The specific period relating to important discursive events in the study describes a series of Boko Haram attacks on media and journalists between October 2011 and April 2012. The attack started with the killings of Isa Zakarriyah of the *National Television Authority* (NTA) on October 22, 2011 and that of Enenche Akogwu of *Channels Television* on January 21, 2012. These were followed by the April 26, 2012 bombing of *ThisDay* offices in Abuja and Kaduna, along with *The Moments* and *The Sun* newspapers which occupied the same premises with the *ThisDay* in Kaduna.

The three sets of attacks, without any prior calculation, were separated by a three-month's interval.

They are as follow:

Attack I – October 22, 2011 (Boko Haram's killing of Isa Zakarriyah of the  
*National Television Authority (NTA)*).

Attack II – January 21, 2012 (Boko Haram's killing of Enenche Akogwu of  
*Channels Television*).

Attack III – April 26, 2012 (Boko Haram's bombing of the *ThisDay*, *The  
Moment* and *The Sun* Offices).

Based on these attacks highlighted above, the period of analysis begins three months (or 100 days) prior to the first attack and ends three months after the last attack. The selection of 100 days before and after the attacks is intended to provide enough room to understand the overall patterns of reporting during the stable or no-attack periods. The research further identified a period following each attack for analysis. These periods were codenamed phases and analysed as Phase I, II, III and IV. The phases are highlighted as follow:

Phase I:        Period before the first attack (July 22, 2011 to October 21, 2011)

Phase II:       Period following the first attack (October 23, 2011 to January 20, 2012)

Phase III:      Period following the second attack (January 22, 2012 to April 25, 2012)

Phase IV:      Period after all the attacks (April 27, 2012 to July 26, 2012)

It is pertinent to note that the content analysis applied all the four phases in the analysis while the CDA applied only phases 1 and 2. As already mentioned in the previous section on content analysis, these phases are relevant to research question one, which focuses on uncovering whether journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and

media organisations in Nigeria. The CDA focuses on Phase 1 (the period before the attacks) and Phase 4 (after the attacks), which are considered appropriate in answering the question. The reason is that the research question did not dwell on examining changes after each attack. Most especially, as each of the two phases that were analysed clearly denotes periods before and after the three attacks, which succinctly respond to the research question. More importantly, examining changes in representation using these two phases would be easier to interpret than examining changes in all the four.

### **3.6 In-depth Interview and Justification**

The in-depth interview is used in this study in order to achieve the overall defined objectives of the study. According to Jensen (2012:270), the in-depth interview, especially with their affinity to ordinary conversation, have been described as choice instruments for tapping the perspectives of users (and other communicators) on media. By ‘tapping the perspectives of users’, Jensen draws attention to creating understanding about the point of view of subjects. In specific term, in-depth interviewing is a qualitative research technique that involves conducting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, program, or situation (Boyce and Neale, 2006:3).

Similarly, in-depth interview as in the case of everyday conversation, researchers as communicators, must tease out the meanings and implications of what other people – and they themselves – say (Jensen, 2012: 270). In this study, the in-depth interview method is the most appropriate technique to investigate the risks reporters in Nigeria believe they are encountering in newsgathering and reporting on the activities of Boko Haram. This is based against the background of a lack of safety and welfare packages by media owners for news workers in Nigeria.

Given the above focus, interviewing reporters covering Boko Haram is necessary since all interview statements are actions in a context, arising from the interaction between (or among) interviewer and interviewee(s). Interview discourses are, in a strong sense of the word, 'data'. They become sources of information through analysis, and of meaning through interpretation. (Jensen, 2012:270). This approach enables the selected Boko Haram reporters to comprehensively dwell on and provide contextual responses to questions that the researcher carefully and comprehensively asked from them. These questions cover the issue of reporters' safety within the framework provided by the news organisations and other agencies involved in protecting journalists and ensuring their welfare. At the end of the interview, the research critically analyses and interprets the responses which become his source of information. The following are the lists of questions the respondents were asked:

1. Could you please introduce yourself in detail? Your educational background and professional experience in conflict/crime reporting in Nigeria.
2. What are the challenges confronting you in gathering news on the activities of Boko Haram as an embedded journalist (under military protection) or unilateral (not under military unit)?
3. What are the challenges in reporting or writing news stories on the activities of Boko Haram in the face of threat or violent acts to journalists by the Boko Haram group?
4. What effects do the threat or violent acts of the Boko Haram group have in the discharge of your professional duties as a reporter covering Boko Haram, and how has it shaped your professional experience?
5. What are the common reactions or complaints that reporting on Boko Haram usually generate among reporters in the country covering the group's activities?
6. What are the other challenges you confront in discharging your professional duties aside from Boko Haram's threat and violent acts while reporting on the group's activities?
7. In the face of threat and danger to life, what are the factors that encourage or discourage you from reporting on the Boko Haram activities?
8. What is the influence of Nigeria and other African states declared War on Boko Haram in reporting on the activities of Boko Haram?



9. Have specific protocols or safety procedure being put in place by the media organisation you work for?
10. What strategies do you adopt in managing the issue of safety and security in your practice?
11. What strategies do you adopt in managing other challenges involved in reporting Boko Haram group in Nigeria?
12. Follow up questions as demanded by the situation.

Therefore, the in-depth interview aims to provide insights into the risks Nigerian reporters face in gathering information and reporting on the activities of Boko Haram insurgents within the framework of safety that the news organisations are to provide.

### **3.6.1 Population, Sample and Sampling Technique**

Discussions of sampling in qualitative research tend to revolve around the notion of purposive sampling. This type of sampling is to do with the selection of units (which may be people, organisations, documents, departments, and so on), with direct reference to the research questions being asked (Bryman, 2016:407-408).

The UK National Centre for Research Methods (NCRM) provides a series of brief but valuable answers from seasoned methodologists and early career researchers to the thorny question of ‘how many interviews are enough in conducting a piece of qualitative research?’ (Baker *et.al*, 2012:3). In proffering a similar answer to the question, Guest *et.al*. (2006:59) in their own studies argue that guidelines for determining non-probabilistic sample sizes are virtually nonexistent. They further elaborated that purposive samples are the most commonly used form of non-probabilistic sampling, and their size typically relies on the concept of “saturation,” or the point at which no new information or themes are observed in the data (Guest *et. al.*, 2006:59).

However, Alan Bryman, another co-contributor to the NCRM paper, noted that researching until saturation is achieved is a challenging approach because ‘it forces the researcher to combine sampling, data collection, and data analysis, rather than treating them as separate stages in a linear process’ (Baker *et.al.*, 2012: 5). Although the idea of saturation is helpful at the conceptual level, it provides little practical guidance for estimating sample sizes, prior to data collection, necessary for conducting quality research (Guest *et.al.*, 2006:59).

Thus, while many experts agree that saturation is ideal, some give numerical guidance. For example, Adler and Adler advise graduate students to sample between 12 and 60, with 30 being the mean; and Ragin’s suggests that a glib answer is “20 for an M.A. thesis and 50 for a Ph.D. dissertation’ (Baker *et.al.*, 2012). In the conclusion of their study, Guest *et.al.* (2006:78) suggested that for studies with a high level of homogeneity among the population "a sample of six interviews may [be] sufficient to enable development of meaningful themes and useful interpretations".

This study therefore employed a stratified purposive sampling scheme technique to select ten (10) reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram, who granted interview sessions for this study. By stratified purposive sampling, the samples were drawn from reporters representing or reporting in any of the two geographical strata of the North and South regions in Nigeria. The research further selected a purposeful sample of reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram from each stratum (Table 3.5). This is important in order for the research to be representative. Since the research does not seek to sample research participants on a random basis, it therefore employs this technique to sample participants in a strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions that are posed. In this case, the reporters covering Boko Haram were identified through their bye-lines.

Since news organisations in Nigeria do not have a specified tagged beat for Boko Haram reporting, the reporters for the interviews were drawn from crime/ security and political beats. The lack of specified beats for Boko Haram reporting by the news media in Nigeria poses challenges to providing a sampling frame of journalists that would fit the criteria. Therefore, the reporters interviewed for this research were selected based on identifiable and specific forms of criteria. They include the following:

- i. **Reporting on Boko Haram as the current beat:** Individual journalists selected were (as at the time of interview) specifically reporting on Boko Haram or writing on issues of Boko Haram in newspapers and television stations in Nigeria.
- ii. **Full time employment:** All the reporters interviewed were officially employed by any of the newspaper organisations or television stations in Nigeria as a full time staff.
- iii. **Five years of experience in reporting:** All the reporters included in the interview have had in the minimum, five years of work experience for newspaper (s) or television station (s) in Nigerian environment. But not necessarily five years of reporting on Boko Haram due to the sensitive nature of its report, which can make reporters to be moved or deliberately refrained from reporting on the issue.
- iv. **Journalism training:** All the reporters included in the interview were professionally trained and certified journalist in journalism or mass communication or through short courses in journalism. Such a qualification or certificate includes a Bachelor of Arts or Science (B.A/B.Sc.), Higher National Diploma (HND), National Diploma (ND), Diploma, Post Graduate Diploma, Advanced Diploma, ordinary certificate etc.

Due to the sensitivity of the Boko Haram issue, identities of the respondents and those of their news organisations cannot be revealed in this thesis or anywhere else<sup>3</sup>. As such, pseudonyms are used to identify

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<sup>3</sup> The University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (UC HEC) ensures all conditions for protecting respondents anonymity in the interview is complied with. Afterward, the approval was granted (Appendix I).

the respondents (Table 3.5). The research used structured questions format (Appendix II) for the interviews which were conducted using Skype and Mobile Voip call (both Internet-assisted mediums) since they are both more cost and labour effective than travelling to Nigeria to conduct the interviews. All the interviews were conducted in the offices of the selected Boko Haram reporters with the help of research assistants based in Nigeria who helped facilitate the interviews by ensuring the technology was functional. Each interview session lasted for an average of one hour. The researcher single-handedly conducted and transcribed the interviews into texts.

The following table presents the names that were assigned to the interviewed reporters in this study, their years of experience in journalism and the regions covered in Nigeria.

**Table 3.5: Selected Boko Haram Reporters, their Professional Status and the Regions Covered**

S/N	Assigned names	Years of experience in journalism	Region
1	Reporter A	14	Northern
2	Reporter B	7	Northern
3	Reporter C	19	Southern
4	Reporter D	21	Northern
5	Reporter E	11	Southern
6	Reporter F	21	Southern
7	Reporter G	19	Northern
8	Reporter H	8	Southern
9	Reporter I	7	Northern
10	Reporter J	12	Southern

### **3.6.2 Data Analysis for the In-depth Interview**

Thematic analysis was adopted in analysing the data in this in-depth interview. Bryman (2016) explains that thematic analysis is the basis for a generic approach to qualitative data. He identified and explained the following steps: (1) Reading through at least a sample of the materials to be analysed (2) coding the materials by giving names to what are usually small portions of text (3) elaborating many codes into themes through writing summaries of what is meant by the codes/themes in the form of memos, and providing names for the codes and themes (4) evaluating the higher-order codes or themes by searching for sub-themes or dimensions among the codes (4a) giving names or labels to the themes and their sub-themes. The names are considered concepts (5) examining possible links and connections between concepts and/ or how the concepts vary in terms of features of the cases (6) writing up the insights from the previous stages to provide a compelling narrative about the data by tying the themes to the research question(s) and to the literature that relates to the research focus (6a) Justifying the themes, stating why they are important and significant by drawing the themes' interconnections with each other and their implications.

### **3.6.3 Categorisation of Research Questions for In-depth Interviews**

This section demonstrates how questions were categorised into themes and sub-themes in order to proffer answers to the interview questions.

**Research question (3):** Do concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram have an impact on the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists?

In order to proffer answers to the question above, responses from the reporters are analysed for references regarding concerns about risks confronting them while reporting on Boko Haram activities. For this question, if it can be demonstrated that reporters change the ways in which they gather or write news about

Boko Haram due to threat and attack they or their colleagues have received from Boko Haram, then it can be argued that the threat or attack did play an important role in influencing the way reporters conduct their reporting.

In relation to this question, two main alternative hypotheses were considered, and six different options were used in the categories:

(A) Concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram influence the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalist:

- i. Boko Haram's threats to journalists lead to news gathering and reporting expressions that suit the group.
- ii. Problem of access to credible information about the crisis (due to both Boko Haram and security agencies claim of being on top of the crisis)
- iii. Mistrust of security agents for journalists leads to insecurity

(B) Lack of concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram enhances the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalist:

- i. Boko Haram's threats to journalists do not affect news gathering and reporting expressions that suit the group.
- i. No problem of access to credible information about the crisis
- ii. Trust for journalists

**Research question (4):** To what extent do provision of insurance cover, safety training and remuneration of journalists by Nigerian media owners ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram?

This question involves analysing responses from the interviewed Boko Haram reporters on challenges regarding safety training, insurance cover and remuneration to assess if there is evidence of these provisions by the Nigerian media. If comments of the reporters can indicate that reporters are provided with these provisions while reporting on Boko Haram, then such measures can enhance reporting on Boko Haram activities, and if reporters lack these organisational provisions, it can affect reporting on Boko Haram.

For this question, six choices were made which fall broadly into two categories:

(A) Safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by the Nigerian media ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram activities

- i. Provision of job insurance cover for reporters
- ii. Provision of safety and security training
- iii. Good remuneration and regular salaries to motivate reporters

(2) Lack of safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by the Nigerian media do not ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram activities.

- i. Lack of job insurance cover for reporters leads to non-commitment
- ii. Lack of safety and security training
- iii. Poor remuneration and irregular salaries discourage reporters.

### **3.7 Concluding Remarks**

This chapter discussed and justified the three research methods adopted in the thesis, which are content analysis, critical discourse analysis and in-depth interview. It outlined the whole process of data collection, which includes defining the population of study, study sample, sampling techniques, research

instruments, and data analysis. The need to properly understand, identify and explain the keywords and /or themes in relation to the research questions in each of the research methodologies is paramount in understanding the rudiments in the data analysis. The next chapter presents analysis and interpretation of findings to research question one, which seeks to understand whether journalists changed their news content when representing Boko Haram after the group's attacks on journalists and media in Nigeria.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### **Analysis of Change in News Content when Representing Boko Haram in the Period Following the Boko Haram Attacks on Journalists and Media Organisations in Nigeria**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the data analysis and interpretation of findings to research question one; using content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA). Research question one asks:

Did journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria?

This chapter draws on two methodologies to answer the question: First, using content analysis; this research engaged in correlation analysis using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences) between each of the content variables (the type of source, label, blaming, framing and tone) and each of the four phases in the study. Second, the study employed the CDA methodology to examine the language used between each of the content variables of source, label, blame, tone and framing and, and the relevant phases in the study. These content variables are the indicators of understanding how the headline reports frame the representation of Boko Haram.

Following Simpson's analytical framework that was exhaustively discussed in the methodology chapter of this study, the CDA part of this thesis focuses on analysis of the participants (Boko Haram as the main social actor in the study) and processes (actions of the Boko Haram members) in the selected samples. Specifically, the CDA focused on analysis of how words and expressions that were employed in representing

Boko Haram were constructed in the periods before (in Phase 1) and after the Boko Haram attacks (in Phase 4).

However, it is important to note that only two phases (that is, phases 1 and 4) are considered appropriate in providing clear and coherent answers to the research question. The reason is because Phase 1 signifies the period before the attacks while Phase 4 indicates period after the attacks; and these are the periods that could most clearly show potential change. Moreover, the findings from the analysis of the two phases were clearer than the findings from all the four phases when the researcher initially carried out pilot testing of the analysis on the four phases. Therefore, phases 1 and 4 form the focus of analysis in this section for both methodologies.

As mentioned in the methodology chapter, all the 897 news headlines in the sample were content analysed, while only 80 headlines were purposively selected for the CDA in this chapter. Each of the grouped eight headlines was selected from the two newspaper samples in the study (one from *Daily Trust* and the other from *This Day*). In addition, each of the two newspaper headlines was selected within each of the four months that made up a phase in the study. The rationale for selecting the headlines in this way is to ensure representation of the samples in each of the phases in the study.

## **4.2 Findings from Content Analysis – Source Category**

This section analyses and presents findings in the source category, which is the first of the content variables identified in this study. As shown in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1, the study found that journalists (or specifically, the journalists covering Boko Haram) constitute the highest source in reporting on Boko Haram than other sources that were identified.


The following table shows the timeline of Boko Haram attacks on the reporters and media and the type of source used in reporting the Boko Haram crisis. The four phases represent the timeline of the attacks while the type of source describes who is responsible for statements in the headlines.

**Table 4.1: The Timeline of the Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Source**

Who is sourced	Boko Haram	Count	Timeline of Attack				Total
			Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	
			5	3	5	1	14
		% within Timeline of Attack	3.5%	1.3%	1.8%	0.4%	1.6%
	Security agents	Count	1	1	13	7	22
		% within Timeline of Attack	0.7%	0.4%	4.6%	2.8%	2.5%
	Journalist	Count	106	157	196	155	614
		% within Timeline of Attack	73.6%	70.4%	70.0%	62.0%	68.5%
	Citizen	Count	8	10	14	29	61
		% within Timeline of Attack	5.6%	4.5%	5.0%	11.6%	6.8%
	Government	Count	5	19	12	17	53
		% within Timeline of Attack	3.5%	8.5%	4.3%	6.8%	5.9%
	International	Count	1	4	8	4	17
		% within Timeline of Attack	0.7%	1.8%	2.9%	1.6%	1.9%
	Anonymous	Count	2	6	9	12	29
		% within Timeline of Attack	1.4%	2.7%	3.2%	4.8%	3.2%

Other	Count	16	23	23	25	87
	% within Timeline of Attack	11.1%	10.3%	8.2%	10.0%	9.7%
Total	Count	144	223	280	250	897
	% within Timeline of Attack	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Figure 4.1: The Timeline of the Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Source**



This finding suggests that in spite of the challenges that journalists covering the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria are facing, the reporters are determined in articulating discourse on Boko Haram crisis.

While journalists accounted for 68.5% of sources, the ‘other’ sub-category was second represented 9.7 per cent. Interestingly, this ‘other’ section is similar to the ‘journalist’ sub-category because most of the contents in this category emanated from journalists. For example, ‘editorial’, and ‘features’, are written by journalists, while ‘opinion’, ‘comments’ ‘document’ can also be written by journalists or some individuals who write for newspapers. The implication of this finding could mean that in spite of the risks involved in reporting on Boko Haram, journalists in Nigeria are still committed to covering the crisis. Although the interviews suggest they were often forced to cover Boko Haram by editors against their will due to lack of job opportunities in the country.

Based on the findings above, this thesis further examines whether there was change in the representation of Boko Haram following the group’s attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria. This is the focus of the research question in this chapter. This analysis compares journalists as a source in phases 1 and 4. The finding shows a significant decrease in how frequently journalists were sources in reporting on Boko Haram after attacks on them. As reflected in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 in Phase 1, journalists accounted for 73 per cent, while in Phase 4, they represented 62.0 per cent of sources. This finding suggests that after the Boko Haram attacks, journalists reduced the volume of coverage on Boko Haram.

Having examined the data using the content analysis, the following section analyses the selected headlines using the CDA. The analysis is carried out on each of the content categories. As explained in the methodology chapter, analysis of each of the content categories provides evidence for change in representation of Boko Haram. The following section analyses the language used in the source category.

### **4.3 Findings from the CDA – Source Category**

This section presents analysis in the Source category. This describes who is responsible for statements in the headlines. This aspect of the study is focused on Phases 1 and 4. While Phase 1 represents period before

Boko Haram's attacks, Phase 2 describes period after the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media offices in Nigeria. In each of the phases, eight headlines were selected.

#### **4.3.1 CDA Findings before the Attacks – Source Category**

In this section, eight headlines were selected for analysis. These headlines were selected from the source category within the two newspapers – *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay*.

- (i) **JTF Patrol Team Escapes Explosion in Maiduguri** (*ThisDay*, 22 July 2011)
- (ii) **Nation's Image Damaged By Boko Haram** (*Daily Trust*, 2-Jul-11)
- (iii) **Presidential Panel On Security in the North East** (*Daily Trust*, 9-Aug-11)
- (iv) **Borno – Facing the Boko Haram Challenge** (*Daily Trust*, 16-Aug-11)
- (v) **Adamawa Gun Attack – the Untold Story** (*Daily Trust*, 29-Aug-11)
- (vi) **Abuja Blast – Death Toll Hits 23** (*ThisDay*, 29 August 2011)
- (vii) **Boko Haram – Obasanjo's Host Killed After Talks** (*ThisDay*, 18 September 2011)
- (viii) **Boko Haram –Isa, NTA Cameraman, Killed for Spying** (*ThisDay*, 25 October 2011)

Analysis of the headlines above focused on transitivity, which describes the relationship between participants (identified by noun phrases) and the roles they play in the processes (the verb phrases) described in reporting. This section outlines how the verb phrases and the noun phrases were constructed in the headlines to represent Boko Haram.

This study found that in the first phase of representation, prior to the attacks on journalists, the headlines used action words or verb phrases to describe violent actions in both explicit and implicit ways. By explicit expressions, it means words or phrases used to clearly describe the specific violent action, such as

killing, bombing, kidnapping, gun shooting, explosion, and so on while implicit constructions refer to words or phrases that describe violence or actions in broad terms, such as damaged, terrorism, insecurity, and so on. At the same time however, the agencies responsible for the violent actions were not indicated in the headlines that had noun phrases when the violence was explicitly described, but whenever Boko Haram was named as the subject in the headlines, the acts of violence were not clearly stated. Starting with the verb phrases: in headline (i) ‘escapes explosion’ is a clear depiction of violence act; in headline (ii) ‘image damaged’ this depicts some form of destruction. The noun phrase in sample (iii) ‘Presidential panel on security’ – connotes an insecure or threatening situation; and (iv) ‘Facing the Boko Haram challenge’ – it signifies a form of confrontation from the Boko Haram group. The noun phrase in headline (v) ‘Adamawa Gun Attack’ – explicitly indicates violence while the headline (vi) ‘Death Toll Hits 23’ explicitly indicates killing and violence. Lastly, in headlines (vii) and (viii), the verb phrases: ‘killed after talks’ and ‘killed for spying’ both clearly denote acts of violence and death. These headline samples from the Phase 1 of the study’s time periods were cast to explicitly and implicitly construct violence and danger.

Moreover, in the analyses of how participants in the headlines were constructed, the result shows that whenever Boko Haram was named in the headlines, violent and dangerous situations were indicated but whenever the headlines lacked agency or did not mention Boko Haram, the violent actions were more explicit. Examples of headline samples that named Boko Haram in violent actions and issues are: (ii) **Nation's Image Damaged By Boko Haram** and (iv) **Borno – Facing the Boko Haram Challenge**. It is clear that these two headlines named Boko Haram and used the verb phrases ‘image damaged’ and ‘facing the Boko Haram challenge’ to reference unpleasant situations. Other similar headlines in this grouping are in samples (vii) **Boko Haram – Obasanjo's Host Killed After Talks** and (viii) **Boko Haram – Isa, NTA Cameraman, Killed for Spying**. They referred to Boko Haram by naming the group in the subject heads. From the way the headline is cast, it points to Boko Haram as being responsible for the killings. Headline (iii) **Presidential**

**Panel On Security in the North East** is different from the four samples discussed above because it does not name Boko Haram, does not use a verb phrase but a noun phrase. The headline points to some elements of insecurity in the North-east.

Headline samples (i), (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) explicitly point to violent situations but do not name Boko Haram or attributed agency for the violence. The headlines only featured the victims or would-be victims that were involved in the attacks. For instance, in headline (i) **JTF Patrol Team Escapes Explosion in Maiduguri**, the subject in the headline is the Joint Task Force (JTF) Patrol Team, which is a para-military group in Nigeria charged with the responsibility of fighting Boko Haram along with the security agencies. In this case, JTF is pictured as the would-be victim. Also, in headline (v) **Adamawa Gun Attack – the Untold Story** – Adamawa (one of the northern states in the country) is pictured as the place where the violence had occurred. Similarly in (vi) **Abuja Blast – Death Toll Hits 23**, Abuja, the country’s capital is identified as the site of the violence.

To extend the headline analysis, this study examines the leads or story paragraphs associated with the headlines that did not attribute agency, in order to determine whether persons responsible for the violent actions in the headlines were identified in the body of the stories. The results show that the violent actions indicated in the headlines were attributed to Boko Haram members in the story paragraphs. Below are the headlines and their accompanying story paragraphs:

**JTF Patrol Team Escapes Explosion in Maiduguri** (*ThisDay*, 22 July 2011)

**Adamawa Gun Attack – the Untold Story** (*Daily Trust*, 29-Aug-11)

**Abuja Blast – Death Toll Hits 23** (*ThisDay*, 29-Aug-11)

*Federal Government confirmed yesterday that the death toll in last Friday's attack on the UN House in Abuja had risen from 18 to 23. [emphasis added]*



*He said such portends serious danger to the country: "There has yet to be any coordinated response by the security forces in the country. It is unprofessional and incompetent for our security agencies to surrender to this omnibus **Boko Haram** as the only clue to every security challenge. What that means is that even foreign interest can enter Nigeria today and wreak havoc and issue a statement in the name of **Boko Haram** and we will bury our dead and life continues." Also, an umbrella organisation of all Nigerians residing in North and South America, Nigerians in Diaspora Organisation in the Americas (NIDOA), has condemned the attack. [emphasis added]*

#### **Boko Haram – Obasanjo's Host Killed After Talks** (*ThisDay*, 18 September 2011)

*Two days after he received former President Olusegun Obasanjo who was in Maiduguri to broker peace over the bombing attacks by **Boko Haram**, the terrorist **group** yesterday killed Babakura Fugu, the in-law of the slain leader of the Islamic fundamentalist group, Mohammed Yusuf. [emphasis added]*

#### **Boko Haram – Isa, NTA Cameraman, Killed for Spying** (*ThisDay*, 25 October 2011)

*Barely 48 hours after the killing of a Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) cameraman, Zakariyya Isa, and the widespread condemnation of the act, **Boko Haram**, that has claimed responsibility for the killing on Monday said it took the action because the deceased was a spy for the security agencies. [emphasis added]*

The findings in these story paragraphs clearly suggest that the Boko Haram group was responsible for the reported violence. In sum, the findings demonstrate that Boko Haram was differently named in both the headlines and story paragraphs in Phase 1, (before the attacks on journalists). In the headlines, Boko Haram was either not named or not clearly connected to the violent actions but was clearly identified as being responsible for the violence in the story paragraphs.

#### **4.3.2 CDA Findings after the Attacks – Source Category**

This section analyses and presents the findings from the following selected headlines in the period following Boko Haram's attacks. The headlines were selected from the source category within the two newspapers – *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay*. The following eight samples were selected:

- (i) **Police Beef Up Security Around Media Houses in Lagos** (*Daily Trust*, 27 April 2012)
- (ii) **Boko Haram Kills Lecturer** (*ThisDay*, 28-Apr-12)
- (iii) **Boko Haram Kills Two Prison Wardens in Borno** (*This Day*, 5-May-12)

- (iv) **Vigilante Leader Seeks Withdrawal of Military From Streets** (*Daily Trust*, 14 May 2012)
- (v) **Army Moves Against Terrorism** (*This Day*, 2-Jun-12)
- (vi) **Boko Haram – Senate Fingers External Influence** (*Daily Trust*, 20 June 2012)
- (vii) **Boko Haram Insurgency – Beaming the Searchlight On Nigerian Media** (*Daily Trust*, 24-Jul-12)
- (viii) **Shehu of Borno Unhurt As Five Die in Maiduguri Blast** (*This Day*, 14-Jul-12)

In this phase, it was found that all the sampled headlines employed action words or verb phrases that connote or denote violence. Starting with headline (i): ‘beef up security’, denotes reinforcement of security, then ‘kill’ in headlines (ii) and (iii) denote taking life, while “seeks withdrawal of military’ in (iv) indicates that the situation was already tense to have brought military on to the streets. In headline (v), the verb phrase ‘move against’ in the context implies military action, which could cause violence or deaths, while headline (vi) ‘beam the searchlight’ in this context connotes danger for the Nigerian media as the Boko Haram insurgency signifies violence already. The word ‘die’ in the last sample clearly denotes violence. This analysis shows that the action words in the headlines were phrased connotatively and denotatively to suggest violence.

Moreover, analysis of subjects in this phase finds that when Boko Haram’s name was not featured in a headline, specific acts of violence were reported, whereas when Boko Haram was named, only general issues bordering on insecurity were reported. Let us consider the following headlines with no mention of Boko Haram: (i), **Police Beef Up Security Around Media Houses in Lagos**, (iv) **Vigilante Leader Seeks Withdrawal of Military From Streets**, (v) **Army Moves Against Terrorism** and (viii) **Shehu of Borno Unhurt As Five Die in Maiduguri Blast**

However, as in the phase 1 examples, analysis of the above-listed headlines through their story paragraphs shows that Boko Haram was directly linked with the violence:

### **Police Beef Up Security Around Media Houses in Lagos** (*Daily Trust*, 27 April 2012)

*The police in Lagos have beefed up security network around media houses and sensitive corporate organisations within the metropolis. Police authorities also said they will hold area commanders and their divisional police officers (DPOs) in charge for any attack on the organisations.* [emphasis added]

*The directive may not be unconnected to the bombing of the Abuja office of ThisDay by suspected members of Boko Haram sect.* [emphasis added]

### **Vigilante Leader Seeks Withdrawal of Military From Streets** (*Daily Trust*, 14 May 2012)

*The Commander General of Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN), Alhaji Ali Sokoto has said there cannot be peace in communities with soldiers roaming the streets.* [emphasis added]

*Sokoto, who spoke with newsmen in Kaduna at the weekend, called on the Federal Government to withdraw military men from the streets and **dialogue with the Boko Haram sect.*** [emphasis added]

### **Army Moves Against Terrorism** (*This Day*, 2-Jun-12)

*The high command of the 82 Division of the Nigerian Army has intensified capacity building of officers to adequately equip them to **tackle the Boko Haram menace and other contemporary security challenges facing the nation*** [emphasis added]

### **Shehu of Borno Unhurt As Five Die in Maiduguri Blast** (*This Day*, 14-Jul-12)

*A 15-year-old suicide bomber yesterday afternoon attacked the central mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State, killing five people.*

*He urged Nigerians to **continue to provide information that would quell the activities of the Boko Haram sect to security agencies** even as he called on those responsible for these murderous acts to have a rethink and accept dialogue.* [emphasis added]

In the paragraphs above, the passages in bold attribute to the Boko Haram members the violence identified in the story paragraphs.

This study found that the language constructions employed in Phase 4 of this study suggest that the sub-editors chose to either mention Boko Haram or avoided naming Boko Haram in casting headlines about violence. Some of the headlines do not directly attribute violence to Boko Haram while others do. Although this attribution is evident in the accompanying story paragraphs. Overall, analysis of the two phases in the source category presents different language patterns (see Table 4.2). Comparing the two periods of the source

analysis, this research found slight differences in the representation of Boko Haram by the reporters covering the activities of the group.

Specifically, in the period following Boko Haram’s attacks on media groups in Nigeria, this study found that Boko Haram was mostly identified in relation to general issues about insecurity, while the group’s name was elided in reports on specific violent incidents. The findings of the CDA resonate with the findings in the content analysis, which provide evidence of change in the representation of Boko Haram prior to and following the group’s attacks on media.

The following table shows the language patterns in source analysis and their possible implications in the periods before and after the attacks on journalists and media offices in Nigeria. The type of source describes who is responsible for statements in the headlines.

**Table 4.2: The Language Patterns in the Source Analysis**

<b>Phases</b>	<b>Patterns</b>	<b>Implications</b>
<b>Before the attacks</b>	Boko Haram was either not named or not clearly connected to the violent actions in the headlines but was specifically identified as being responsible for the violence in the story paragraphs.	This could imply that the newspaper headlines did not clearly name Boko Haram in connection to the violence in the headlines but provided details of the group’s connection in the lead or body texts.
<b>After the attacks</b>	Most times, when Boko Haram was named in headlines, general issues bordering on insecurity were reported; but other times, whenever Boko Haram was not named, specific acts of violence were reported. In other few instances, Boko Haram was named directly in violent actions.	This could suggest that the sub-editors chose to focus more on the issues of insecurity and violence than identifying Boko Haram in the violent actions.

#### **4.4 Findings in the Content Analysis – Label Category**

This section presents findings from the label category of the content analysis method. Table 4.3 and figure 4.2 show that ‘No label’ category ranked higher than the ‘Nominalised’ version. By nominalised label, it refers to the names that are popularly used in identifying Boko Haram such as, Boko Haram, Jamaa’tul Ahlu Sunnah and Yusuffiyah. Since the focus of this analysis is on the type of label used in identifying Boko Haram, then nominalised label is examined. The study found that nominalised label ranked highest among all the identified labels.

The following table shows the timeline of the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media and the type of label adopted in identifying Boko Haram. The four phases represent the timeline of the attacks while the type of label describes how Boko Haram is named in the headlines.

**Table 4.3: The Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Label**

Type of label		Timeline of Attack				Total
		Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	
Collectivised	Count	24	5	8	20	57
	% within Timeline of Attack	16.7%	2.2%	2.9%	8.0%	6.4%
Functionalised	Count	5	14	19	13	51
	% within Timeline of Attack	3.5%	6.3%	6.8%	5.2%	5.7%
Nominalised	Count	55	83	133	77	348
	% within Timeline of Attack	38.2%	37.2%	47.5%	30.8%	38.8%
Personalised	Count	4	7	4	2	17
	% within Timeline of Attack	2.8%	3.1%	1.4%	0.8%	1.9%
No labels	Count	56	114	116	138	424
	% within Timeline of Attack	38.9%	51.1%	41.4%	55.2%	47.3%
Total	Count	144	223	280	250	897
	% within Timeline of Attack	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%


The analysed data already revealed that reports on Boko Haram named or labelled Boko Haram mostly by nominalised name which include: Boko Haram, Jamaa'tul Ahlu Sunnah Li dawwati Li Jihad or Yusuffiyah.

In a further analysis of whether there was a change in the type of label employed within the phases, this study found that a significant reduction in the volume of nominalised label employed in identifying Boko Haram between phase 1 and 4 in this thesis (from 38.2 per cent at Phase 1 to 30.8 per cent at Phase 4). It is important to note that this is due to 'No label' being used more. In the period following attacks, journalists increased the 'No label' (from 38.9 per cent before the attacks to 55.2 per cent after). This could imply that with no frames increased, perhaps journalists did not want to seem like they are taking sides. Also, with the decline in the nominalised label, it could be suggested that journalists have more interests in other topics such as the government's perspectives about resolving the crisis.

This reflects that the reports were reduced in the way it named Boko Haram using any of the group's popular names. This finding can be interpreted as the consequences of intensified attacks on the reporters in the country, cumulating with the last attack on the simultaneous bombing of targeted media houses in the country.

It is important to note that naming (or labeling) is one of the core elements in representation, which is an important pointer to the way stories are framed in the media. In this case, the use of nominalised label whereby Boko Haram was named in the headlines clearly indicates whom the report is all about. But if the reports suddenly avoid naming Boko Haram or used or other names in the headlines which readers are not familiar with, then it can be inferred that the reports tactically distanced itself from the reported violence. This type of evasive constructions could suggest that the reports exhibit signs of caution in framing the violence.

**Figure 4.2: The Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Label**



#### 4.5 Findings from CDA –Label category

Following on from the content analysis findings that reports on Boko Haram identified Boko Haram mostly by nominalised names such as: Boko Haram, Jamaa’ul Ahlu Sunnah Li dawwati Li Jihad or Yusuffiyah, analysis of the language use in this section focuses on the nominalised section of the label category. The analysis focused on Phases 1 and 4, as in the previous section. Below are the discourse analyses in the two phases:

##### 4.5.1 CDA Findings before the Attacks – Label Category

This section analyses and presents findings from the following headlines in Phase 1 of the label category.



- (i) **Amnesty International to FG – Stop Random Killings in Borno** (*Daily Trust*, 27-Jul-11)
- (ii) **Borno – Facing the Boko Haram Challenge** (*Daily Trust*, 16-Aug-11)
- (iii) **Abuja Blast – Death Toll Hits 23** (*ThisDay*, 29-Aug-11)
- (iv) **Trade Union Urges FG to Deal With Boko Haram** (*Daily Trust*, 30-Aug-11)
- (v) **State Security Unveils the Boko Haram Bomb Factory** (*ThisDay*, 7-Sep-11)
- (vi) **Bombings – Representatives Summon Security Chiefs** (*Daily Trust*, 16-Sep-11)
- (vii) **Six Boko Haram Suspects Arraigned Over Bombings** (*ThisDay*, 1-Oct-11)
- (viii) **Bomb Explodes Near Shehu of Borno's Palace** (*ThisDay*, 24-Jul-11)

The analysis of the above headline samples shows that whenever Boko Haram was identified by its popular label of Boko Haram, acts of violence were clearly expressed, but whenever Boko Haram's name was omitted, the newspaper reported issues relating to violence.

Examples of headlines that identified Boko Haram by its popular label of Boko Haram in connection to acts of violence can be found in headline samples: (ii) **Facing the Boko Haram Challenge** – in this case, the expression connotes a dangerous situation caused by the Boko Haram; (iv) **Trade Union Urges FG to Deal With Boko Haram** – the federal government (FG) is called upon to deal with Boko Haram. In this case, Boko Haram is mentioned by using its popular label (Boko Haram); (v) **State Security Unveils the Boko Haram Bomb Factory** – in this case also, Boko Haram is also connected to the action of violence regarding the bomb factory; and (vii) **Six Boko Haram Suspects Arraigned Over Bombings** – the popular label of Boko Haram is also used in connection to the bombings.

Other examples of headlines that explicitly described violent actions but did not mention Boko Haram or any agency for the violence include: (i) **Amnesty International to FG – Stop Random Killings in Borno**, the phrase ‘random killings’ suggests violent actions in Borno – one of the strong enclave of Boko Haram activities. Not Boko Haram or any group was connected to the violence; (iii) **Abuja Blast - Death Toll Hits 23** – In this case also, Boko Haram does not feature in the killing which happened in Abuja – the capital and seat of power in Nigeria; while in (vi) **Bombings – Representatives Summon Security Chiefs** – the responsibility for the bombings is not attributed, and in (viii) **Bomb Explodes Near Shehu of Borno's Palace** – in this case, Boko Haram was not mentioned in the explosion which occurred in Borno (the hotbed of attacks by Boko Haram)

In the story paragraphs that accompany these analysed headlines above, the name of Boko Haram is mostly cited in the reported violence. In the story paragraphs below, the name of Boko Haram and the expressions around it have been emphasised in bold to highlight how the group was connected to the reported violence:

**Amnesty International to FG – Stop Random Killings in Borno** (*Daily Trust*, 27-Jul-11)

*Amnesty International's report signed by Tawanda Hondora, its Deputy Director for Africa said, "The Nigerian authorities must immediately put a stop to unlawful killings by security forces. At least 23 people were killed by police following a bomb blast on Saturday in the north-eastern city of Maiduguri.*

*"The bomb, allegedly set off by the Islamist group Boko Haram, went off in the Budum market in central Maiduguri and injured three soldiers. [emphasis added]*

**Abuja Blast - Death Toll Hits 23** (*ThisDay*, 29-Aug-11)

*Federal Government confirmed yesterday that the death toll in last Friday's attack on the UN House in Abuja had risen from 18 to 23.*

*He said such portends serious danger to the country: "There has yet to be any coordinated response by the security forces in the country. **It is unprofessional and incompetent for our security agencies to surrender to this omnibus Boko Haram as the only clue to every security challenge.*** [emphasis added]

**Bombings – Representatives Summon Security Chiefs** (*Daily Trust*, 16-Sep-11)

*The House of Representatives yesterday passed a resolution summoning all security chiefs over the incessant bombings and the general insecurity in the country.* [emphasis added]

*Resuming from a six-week recess, the lawmakers adopted a motion by Patrick Ikhiariale (PDP, Edo) **on the recent bombing of the United Nations Building in Abuja by members of the Boko Haram sect.*** [emphasis added]

**Bomb Explodes Near Shehu of Borno's Palace** (*This Day*, 24-Jul-11)

*There was apprehension Saturday evening in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital when another bomb exploded close to the palace of Shehu of Borno Abubakar Ibn Umar Garbai El-kanemi, leaving three soldiers wounded.* [emphasis added]

*The explosive, which was believed to have been thrown by the dreaded Islamic fundamentalists, **Boko Haram sect** was targeted at the patrol vehicle of the Joint Task Force on surveillance duty at Budum junction, a distance of about 500 metres from the monarch's palace.* [emphasis added]

From the constructions about Boko Haram in the body paragraphs above, it is evident that the Boko Haram sect was directly connected to the details of violence in all the four samples except in the paragraphs of the first headline, **Amnesty International to FG – Stop Random Killings in Borno**, which remotely connected the killings by the security forces to the bombing by Boko Haram few days earlier. Clearly, the findings show that when Boko Haram was identified by its popular name of Boko Haram in the headlines, acts of violence were clearly stated. Also, when Boko Haram's name was not featured, the sub-editors cast headlines that were only related to violence but not directly to violent reports. It can be inferred from the findings that the newspapers found evidences of violence that were clearly connected to Boko Haram in the period before the attacks on journalists and media in Nigeria.

#### 4.5.2 CDA Findings after the Attacks – Label Category

This section presents findings from the headlines in the Phase 4 of the study. This phase describes the period after the Boko Haram attacks on the journalists and media in Nigeria. Below are the selected eight headlines.

- (i) **They Can Bomb Our Offices But They Can't Bomb Our Resolve!** (*This Day*, 27-Apr-12)
- (ii) **Mark to Boko Haram – No War Yields Positive Result** (*Daily Trust*, 30-Apr-12)
- (iii) **Christian, Muslim Group Condemns Attack On Media** (*Daily Trust*, 1-May-12)
- (iv) **Fear Not, Jonathan Pleads As Boko Haram Strikes Again** (*This Day*, 1-May-12)
- (v) **Boko Haram Again Warns Media** (*Daily Trust*, 5-Jun-12)
- (vi) **Boko Haram Doing Islam More Harm Than Good, Says Shettima** (*This Day*, 18-Jul-12)
- (vii) **Five Imams, Five Other Clerics Abducted in Madalla** (*Daily Trust*, 20-Jul-12)
- (viii) **Five Killed in Maiduguri** (*This Day*, 2-Jun-12)

The samples above show that the newspaper used admixture of explicit and implicit verb phrases to express the actions of violence. The headlines that used explicit words to describe the violence did not indicate agency or mention Boko Haram as responsible for the violent actions while the headlines that did not describe the violent actions clearly featured the name of Boko Haram.

Examples of the headlines that described explicit cases of violence which did not indicate the agency for the actions or name Boko Haram include: (i) **They Can Bomb Our Offices But They Can't Bomb Our Resolve!**- the verb 'bomb' in the expression denotes specific acts of violence but those responsible for the attack were not indicated; (iii) **Christian, Muslim Group Condemns Attack On Media** – the verb phrase 'condemns attack' confirms that certain violent actions had taken place but the perpetrator(s) of the attack was not named; (vii) **Five Imams, Five Other Clerics Abducted in Madalla** – the verb phrase – 'five other

clerics abducted’, signifies a clearly defined act of violence committed in one of the towns in the northern region but the agency responsible for the act was not indicated; and in (viii) **Five Killed in Maiduguri** – the verb ‘killed’ denotes a clear-cut violence and in similar cases like the other samples in this group, Boko Haram or the agency for the action was not mentioned. This finding can then imply that the sub-editors did not identify Boko Haram or any group to the reported violence.

Conversely, Boko Haram was clearly mentioned in the headlines that pointed to or connoted violence by mostly using vague and unspecified expressions. These are in samples: (ii) **Mark to Boko Haram – No War Yields Positive Result** – the verb phrase, ‘no war yields positive result’ points to consequences of war in general and the statement was directed at Boko Haram; (iv) **Fear Not, Jonathan Pleads As Boko Haram Strikes Again** – Jonathan’s appeal with regards to Boko Haram’s action points to violence; (v) **Boko Haram Again Warns Media** – Boko Haram’s warning connotes unpleasant action; (vi) **Boko Haram Doing Islam More Harm Than Good, Says Shettima** – the expression suggests negative acts by the Boko Haram. The constructions in these samples show that Boko Haram was connected to the reported violence or dangerous activities.

In order to uncover who was indicated as the perpetrators of the violent actions in the headlines that had no agents for their actions, it was necessary to examine the story paragraphs of the headlines. The story paragraphs clearly show that although no one was connected to the violence in the headlines but Boko Haram was clearly featured in the violent stories. The following headlines and their accompanying paragraphs were considered:

(i) **They Can Bomb Our Offices But They Can't Bomb Our Resolve!** (*This Day*, 27-Apr-12)

*Terrorists launched simultaneous bomb attacks on the offices of THISDAY in Abuja and Kaduna Thursday, but the newspaper issued a statement last night maintaining that it remained committed to its founding principles: democracy, free enterprise and social justice. [emphasis added]*

***Boko Haram last night claimed responsibility for the attacks**, according to an online report. They also said they were going to attack more media houses except favourable reports were published about their activities, according to the website. [emphasis added]*

**(ii) Christian, Muslim Group Condemns Attack On Media** (*Daily Trust*, 1-May-12)

*The Christian and Muslim Youth Peace Initiative of Nigeria has condemned the coordinated bomb blasts in Abuja and Kaduna offices of Thisday, Sun and Moment newspapers. [emphasis added]*

*We further use this medium to call on the **Boko Haram sect to follow the path of peace** by respecting the sanctity of lives as enshrined in our holy books. [emphasis added]*

**(iii) Five Imams, Five Other Clerics Abducted in Madalla** (*Daily Trust*, 20-Jul-12)

*Four imams of some mosques in Madalla town in Suleja local government area of Niger State are still missing since their alleged abduction in the last eight months now, Daily Trust can now reveal. [emphasis added]*

*Again, a resident of the area, one Babayo Sani was arrested by operatives of the State Security Service **for buying a house from a mother of a young man alleged to be a member of the Boko Haram Islamic sect.** [emphasis added]*

**(iv) Five Killed in Maiduguri** (*ThisDay*, 2-Jun-12)

*Five persons were reportedly killed in parts of Maiduguri metropolis, Borno State between Thursday and Friday, according to residents of the town. Some of the residents who spoke on the condition of anonymity, **claimed that the assassins are likely men of the notorious Boko Haram sect.** [emphasis added]*

In the story paragraphs above, the phrases around Boko Haram provide evidence that Boko Haram was identified in the reported violence.

In reference to the research question one, this study found slight changes in the way the reports labelled Boko Haram prior to and following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media. To some extent, the language patterns adopted in identifying Boko Haram were different in the periods prior to and after the Boko Haram attacks but the implications of the findings are similar in their meanings and imports. (see Table 4.4)

Moreover, the findings for both the content analysis and CDA are similar. Both methods have identified changes in the way the journalists represented the Boko Haram group in the period before and after the group’s attacks on the journalists and media.

The following table shows the language patterns in the label analysis and their possible implications in the periods before and after the Boko Haram attacks. By the type of label, it describes how Boko Haram is identified in the headlines.

**Table 4.4: The Language Patterns in the Label Analysis**

Phases	Patterns	Implications
<b>Before the attacks</b>	Whenever Boko Haram was identified by its popular label of Boko Haram, acts of violence were clearly expressed, but whenever Boko Haram’s name was not mentioned in the headlines, the newspaper reported issues relating to violence.	This could mean that the newspapers found evidences of violence that were clearly connected to Boko Haram in the period before the attacks on journalists and media in Nigeria.
<b>After the attacks</b>	Headlines that described explicit cases of violence did not feature Boko Haram or the agency responsible for the violent actions. Also, Boko Haram was clearly mentioned in the headlines that pointed to or connoted violence by mostly using vague and unspecified expressions.	This type of evasive constructions could suggest that the newspapers were being cautious in the way they framed the violence in connection to Boko Haram.

#### **4.6 Findings from Content Analysis – Blame Category**

In this section, this study presents analysis and findings of the blame category through the methodology of content analysis. In a general overview of the finding in this section, this study found that reporters covering Boko Haram in Nigeria published headlines that mostly featured issues that had no blame for wrongdoing, which means that neither Boko Haram nor the security agents in the country was blamed for any crime (see Table 4.5 and figure 4.3). This category is followed by ‘no attack’, which had 34.0 per cent and described headlines with topics that had nothing to do with violence.

The implication of these findings means that the sub-editors in these newspapers mostly allocated no attacks or crimes against Boko Haram, which is quite unbelievable considering the group’s established record of using violence and terrorism. This finding suggests that the newspapers clearly created distance from reports that may be considered unfavourable by the Boko Haram. The findings can suggest that the sub-editors in these newspapers adopted this framing based on their perception of Boko Haram as a group that is capable of violence and as a possible way to avoid being targeted for attack by the group.

The following table shows the timeline of the Boko Haram attacks on the journalists and media offices in Nigeria and the type of blame adopted in identifying Boko Haram. The four phases represent the timeline of the attacks while the type of blame describes who would be attributed blame for the violence between Boko Haram and the security agencies.



**Table 4.5: The Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Blame**


Who is blamed	Boko Haram attacking	Count	Timeline of Attack				Total
			Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	
	Boko Haram attacking	Count	21	31	48	33	133
		% within Timeline of Attack	14.7%	13.9%	17.1%	13.2%	14.8%
	Security agents defending	Count	10	18	37	19	84
		% within Timeline of Attack	7.0%	8.1%	13.2%	7.6%	9.4%
	Boko Haram defending	Count	3	0	1	1	5
		% within Timeline of Attack	2.1%	0.0%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%
	Security agents attacking	Count	4	1	10	7	22
		% within Timeline of Attack	2.8%	0.4%	3.6%	2.8%	2.5%
	No blame for attacking	Count	47	90	92	118	347
		% within Timeline of Attack	32.9%	40.4%	32.9%	47.2%	38.7%
	No attack	Count	58	83	92	72	305
		% within Timeline of Attack	40.6%	37.2%	32.9%	28.8%	34.0%
Total		Count	143	223	280	250	896
		% within Timeline of Attack	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Moreover, based on the focus of the analysis in this section which attempted to uncover the type of constructions that the reporters covering the Boko Haram in Nigeria adopted in ascribing blame for the violence during the period of the study, this research thereby focused on the variables or sub-categories of blame that were identified at the data sorting stage. At the stage, it was found that the sub-categories of ‘Boko Haram attacking’ and ‘Security agents attacking’ were relevant in this analysis. Therefore, the study found that headline reports that blamed Boko Haram for attacking accounted for 14.8 per cent representing 133 headlines while those that blamed security agents for attacking had 2.5 per cent representing 22 headlines (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3).

This could mean that perhaps security agents were blamed less because they committed less violence. In general, it could be that many stories did not assign blame because the articles were not about acts of violence, but rather other topics related to Boko Haram, such as who their leaders are, or how they govern and so on. The sub-editors founded an easy avenue for identifying the group with violence, which could influence the public’s perception of the group.

Specifically, with regard to the research question which aims at uncovering whether there was change in the representation of Boko Haram following the group’s attacks on journalists, this study found reduction in the frequency of headlines blaming Boko Haram after the attacks. Before the attacks, 14.7 per cent of the headlines were reduced to 13.2 per cent after (Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3). This finding could mean that in the before period, perhaps the media only covered attacks but after, they covered other types of stories about Boko Haram due to more interests in learning about the group.

**Figure 4.3: The Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Blame**



#### 4.7 Findings from CDA – Blame Category

In this section, the study presents analysis and findings from the CDA methodology focusing on blame category. Eight headlines were selected from the sub-categories of ‘Boko Haram attacking’ and ‘security agents attacking’ from phases 1 and 4 of the research periods were selected.

Based on the selection criteria, the following headlines were considered:

##### 4.7.1: CDA Findings before the Attacks – Blame Category

- (i) **JTF Kills Boko Haram Member** (*Daily Trust*, 24 -May- 12)

- (ii) **Nation's Image Damaged By Boko Haram** (*Daily Trust*, 27-Jul-11)
- (iii) **One killed in clashes with Islamic sect in Nigeria's northern Borno State** (*Daily Trust*, 4-Aug-11)
- (iv) **Gunmen Open Fire On Maiduguri Police Station** (*ThisDay*, 5-Aug-11)
- (v) **UN Building – Boko Haram Names Bomber, Abul Barra** (*Daily Trust*, 2-Sep-11)
- (vi) **Soldiers Kill Suspected Islamist in Adamawa** (*ThisDay*, 3-Sep-11)
- (vii) **Four Boko Haram Men Charged Over UN House Bomb Blast** (*ThisDay*, 17-Sep-11)
- (viii) **Six Boko Haram Suspects Arraigned Over Bombings** (*ThisDay*, 1-Oct-11)

In Phase 1 of this analysis, this research found that the verb phrases used to express actions in the headlines dwelt on issues of crime and violence. More so, the verb phrases used both broad and specific phrasing to identify violent actions in the headlines. In specific terms, whenever Boko Haram was named in violent activities, the actions were expressed indirectly. But whenever the security agents were involved in any act of violence, the actions were explicitly constructed. The following are the headlines that implicitly expressed violence whenever Boko Haram was identified, they are: (i) **Nation's Image Damaged By Boko Haram** – the verb phrase ‘image damaged’ points to negative and unpleasant action in which Boko Haram was involved. (iv) **UN Building – Boko Haram Names Bomber, Abul Barra** – in this case, the name of Boko Haram was connected to the action of bombing; (vi) **Four Boko Haram Men Charged Over UN House Bomb Blast** – the verb phrase ‘charged over UN House Bomb blast’ signifies that violent action took place, and Boko Haram was identified in connection to the blast; (vii) **Six Boko Haram Suspects Arraigned Over Bombings** – the verb phrase ‘arraigned over bombing’ is similar to the expression in sample (vi) above. It also indicates that violence had actually taken place and members of the Boko Haram were identified over the bombings; (ii) **One killed in clashes with Islamic sect in Nigeria's northern Borno State** – the verb

‘killed’ is a clear signifier of violence. Boko Haram or ‘Islamic sect’ (another label for Boko Haram) was connected to the killing. (iii) **Gunmen Open Fire On Maiduguri Police Station** – ‘open fire’ in the expression implies violence. The analysis on label which was carried out in the section above shows that gunmen are usually used to refer to Boko Haram.

On the other hand, the headlines that identify the activities of security agents in attacks include: (i) **JTF Kills Boko Haram Member** and (v) **Soldiers Kill Suspected Islamist in Adamawa** – in these cases, ‘kill’ signifies an explicit act of violence. Also, Joint Task Force (JTF), a para-military group in Nigeria and soldiers were specifically identified as the perpetrators of the killings in both headlines. The explicit phrasing of the violent actions carried out by the security agents and clear identification of the victims of the violence, which is Boko Haram, suggests that the violence was clearly attributed to the security agents not Boko Haram and showing Boko Haram as the victim of the violence.

In order to understand whether the assigned names (Islamist and gunmen) used in the headlines actually referred to Boko Haram, the accompanying story paragraphs of the headlines were examined. This analysis shows that the assigned labels or names referred to Boko Haram in the story paragraphs. Although Boko Haram was not specifically mentioned or attributed violence in the headlines but in the body paragraphs of the headlines, it is evident that Boko Haram was directly connected to the attacks.

In the following story paragraphs, the name of Boko Haram is emphasised in bold to highlight its connection to the violent activities that were expressed in the headlines:

**One killed in clashes with Islamic sect in Nigeria's northern Borno State** (*Daily Trust*, 4-Aug-11)

*A taxi driver was killed yesterday in an exchange of fire between members of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and those of the **Boko Haram** sect shortly after a bomb explosion at Gomari Junction in Maiduguri yesterday. [emphasis added]*

### **Gunmen Open Fire On Maiduguri Police Station** (*This Day*, 5-Aug-11)

*About the same time a bomb exploded killing two persons, gunmen believed to be members of **Boko Haram** Thursday attacked a police station in Maiduguri, Borno State. [emphasis added]*

### **Soldiers Kill Suspected Islamist in Adamawa** (*This Day*, 3-Sep-11)

*Soldiers yesterday shot dead a suspected Islamist and wounded another in Song, Adamawa State, an army spokesman has said.*

*Idu said one of the gunmen suspected of belonging to the notorious **Boko Haram** sect was killed in the shootout while the other was shot and captured. [emphasis added]*

These story paragraphs show that the assigned labels or names refer to Boko Haram. Although, Boko Haram was not named for the attacks in the headlines but the violence was attributed to the group.

#### **4.7.2: CDA Findings after the Attacks – Blame Category**

The selection of headlines in this phase followed the same pattern as in Phase 1 of the blame category. Eight headlines were purposively selected based on the criteria identified in the study. Below are the samples:

- (i) **How Suicide Bomber Hit ThisDay Office** (*Daily Trust*, 27-Apr-12)
- (ii) **Boko Haram Kills Lecturer** (*ThisDay*, 28-Apr-12)
- (iii) **JTF Raids Bomb Factory, Kills BUK Terror Suspect** (*Daily Trust*, 2-May-12)
- (iv) **Gunmen Hit Potiskum Cattle Market, Kill 34** (*ThisDay*, 4-May-12)
- (v) **Maiduguri - Residents Flee Hot Spot for Fear of JTF Excesses** (*Daily Trust*, 5-Jun-12)
- (vi) **JTF Kills Four Suspected Boko Haram in Kano** (*ThisDay*, 24-Jun-12)
- (vii) **Boko Haram Kills Nine Construction Workers** (*ThisDay*, 3-Jul-12)
- (viii) **Boko Haram Tarnishing Nigeria's Image – Anyaoku** (*Daily Trust*, 12-Jul-12)

In this phase (after Boko Haram attacks), the analysis shows that Boko Haram was attributed violence through a combination of explicit and implicit language, while security agencies were shown to be responsible for the violent actions through explicit constructions only.

Few of the headlines clearly identified Boko Haram as being responsible for violent actions by specifically naming Boko Haram in the actions. These include: (ii) **Boko Haram Kills Lecturer** (vii) **Boko Haram Kills Nine Construction Workers** and (viii) **Boko Haram Tarnishing Nigeria's Image – Anyaoku** – the actions of killing and ‘tarnishing Nigeria’s image’ are in the negative and were attributed to Boko Haram.

However, in some headlines, instead of identifying the Boko Haram by its popularly known name of Boko Haram, alternative labels were used to identify the group in connection to the reported violence. These are reflected in headlines: (i) **How Suicide Bomber Hit This Day Office** – Suicide bomber is used as a label for Boko Haram while the act of hitting *ThisDay* Office connotes violent action; and (iv) **Gunmen Hit Potiskum Cattle Market, Kill 34** – in this case, the noun ‘gunmen’ does not clearly refer to Boko Haram, this is only evident in the analysis of the story paragraphs on label which was discussed above. Also, both the action words ‘hit’ and ‘kill’ are indicative of implicit and explicit violent actions respectively. The language used in the sampled headlines above shows that Boko Haram was indirectly attributed violence.

In comparison, the headlines featured the security agencies in connection to the violence through the use explicit language. This is evident in samples: (iii), **JTF Raids Bomb Factory, Kills BUK Terror Suspect** – the two verbs ‘raid’ and ‘kill’ clearly suggest violent actions in which the JTF (a security agency) was clearly involved in. The victim of the attack is identified as the Bayero University Kano (BUK is in the northern region) terror suspect. Already, the analysis on label has shown that terror label refers to Boko

Haram; (vi) **JTF Kills Four Suspected Boko Haram in Kano**. The clear mention of the JTF in the act of killing explicitly shows that the security agency is directly attributed the violence against Boko Haram.

In addition to the headline analysis, this study further examined the story paragraphs of the headlines that did not indicate agencies for the acts of violence. This is in order to uncover who was responsible for the reported violence. As in previous examples, Boko Haram was more directly blamed for violent actions in the story paragraphs than in the headlines. The following are the body paragraphs with the words Boko Haram emphasised:

**How Suicide Bomber Hit ThisDay Office** (*Daily Trust*, 27-Apr-12)

*A news website, Premium Times, last night claimed to have spoken to a purported spokesman for **Boko Haram** claiming responsibility for the attacks yesterday. [emphasis added]*

**Gunmen Hit Potiskum Cattle Market, Kill** (*ThisDay*, 4-May-12)

*It was a day of rage as at least 34 persons were reportedly killed in Potiskum, the commercial capital of Yobe State, during a siege on its popular cattle market by bandits. [emphasis added]*

*Another version had it that the attack was by **Boko Haram** who probably came to rob the market to get money to fund their insurgency. [emphasis added]*

The finding in the story paragraphs suggests that although, the reports did not directly associate Boko Haram with violence in the headlines but shows that Boko Haram is directly connected with the attacks in the story paragraphs. This further emphasised Boko Haram's capacity for violence.

The following table shows the language patterns in the blame analysis and their possible implications in the periods before and after the attacks on the journalists and media. The type of blame focuses on who would be attributed blame for attacks between Boko Haram and security agents.



**Table 4.6: The Language Patterns in the Blame Analysis**

<b>Phases</b>	<b>Patterns</b>	<b>Implications</b>
<b>Before the attacks</b>	<p>Whenever Boko Haram was named in violent activities, the actions were expressed indirectly. But whenever the security agents were involved in any act of violence, the actions were explicitly constructed showing Boko Haram as the victim of the violence.</p>	<p>This suggests that the actions of Boko Haram clearly depict violence while the violent actions by the security agents seem to be justified against the Boko Haram.</p>
<b>After the attacks</b>	<p>Boko Haram was ascribed violence using a combination of explicit and subtle language, while security agencies were clearly attributed violence against Boko Haram.</p>	<p>This suggests that while both Boko Haram and security agents were featured as carrying out violent actions, the violent actions of the security agents were justified as defending the public against Boko Haram.</p>

Overall, this analysis found that Boko Haram and the security agents were identified in different ways before and following the periods of attacks on the media group in Nigeria. The language patterns that were employed during the two periods are highlighted in Table (4.6). This study also found significant changes in the way Boko Haram was blamed for attacks in the two periods of the study.

#### **4.8 Findings from Content Analysis – Tone Category**

The findings in this section show that overall, in all the phases, the headlines on negative tone ranked highest among all the other variables in the group (Table 4.7 and Figure 4.4).


The results further show a significant increase in the number of headlines with negative tone from 41.3 percent before attacks to 51.2 per cent after attacks. It also shows that after attacks, while there is significant increase in negative reports, positive and neutral tones were on the decline. The positive tone in the headlines accounts for 25.2 per cent and neutral tone had 23.6 percent (see Table 4.7 and Figure 4.4). The following section examines some samples using the CDA methodology.

The following table shows the timeline of the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media offices in Nigeria and the type of tone adopted in identifying Boko Haram. The four phases represent the timeline of the attacks while the type of tone describes words, phrases or expressions in the headlines showing negative/positive/neutral descriptions of violence.

**Table 4.7: The Timeline of the Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Tone**

			Timeline of Attack				Total
			Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	
<b>Type of Tone</b>	Negative	Count	59	104	125	128	416
		% within Timeline of Attack	41.3%	46.8%	44.6%	51.2%	46.5%
	Positive	Count	47	63	101	63	274
		% within Timeline of Attack	32.9%	28.4%	36.1%	25.2%	30.6%
	Neutral	Count	37	55	54	59	205
		% within Timeline of Attack	25.9%	24.8%	19.3%	23.6%	22.9%
<b>Total</b>		Count	143	222	280	250	895
		% within Timeline of Attack	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Figure 4.4: The Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Tone**



#### **4.9 Findings from CDA– Tone Category**

Based on the research question stated at the beginning of this chapter seeking to proffer answers to whether journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram following the Boko Haram attacks, this section focuses on how words and expressions in the headlines were constructed to reflect the change. The headlines were categorised into three: positive, negative and neutral, and were selected from phases 1 and 4 of this study.

##### **4.9.1 CDA Findings before the Attacks – Tone Category**

In this section, the headlines were selected from the negative and positive tone sub-categories. The negative tone describes words/phrases/ expressions showing issues relating to killing, bombing, gun shooting

and so on, while the positive identifies words/phrases/expressions showing issues relating to dialogue, amnesty, co-operation etc.

In the Phase 1 (before the attacks), two headlines were selected from the two newspaper samples across the four months that made up the phase. Below are the selected headlines:

- (i) **Nigeria: Bomb Explodes Near Shehu of Borno's Palace** (*ThisDay*, 24-Jul-11)
- (ii) **Nigerian Islamic sect threatens to attack Kano State** (*Daily Trust*, 30-Jul-11)
- (iii) **Nigeria army boss seeks help of foreign agencies against Islamic sect** (*Daily Trust*, 2-Aug-11)
- (iv) **UN Blast Suspects Arrested** (*ThisDay*, 30-Aug-11)
- (v) **Islamic sect reportedly plans bomb attack in Nigeria's Enugu State** (*Daily Trust*, 2-Sep-11)
- (vi) **State Security Unveils the Boko Haram Bomb Factory** (*ThisDay*, 7-Sep-11)
- (vii) **Terrorism – FG to Intensify Inter-Agency Cooperation** (*Daily Trust*, 5-Oct-11)
- (viii) **Gombe – Four Killed As Gunmen Attack Mobile Police** (*ThisDay*, 17-Oct-11)

Analysis of the samples shows that verb phrases were employed in the headlines to signify positive and negative actions. While the negative verb phrases referred to actions by Boko Haram, the positive verb phrases were constructed to refer to actions performed by security agents/government. These verb phrases that signify negative actions and also referred to Boko Haram are in headlines (i), (ii), (v) and (viii). For instance, in headline (i) – **Nigeria: Bomb Explodes Near Shehu of Borno's Palace** – ‘bomb explodes’ is a clear indication of violence. Although Boko Haram was not named in the headline, the accompanying story paragraphs clearly show Boko Haram’s connection with the explosion:

*The explosive, which was believed to have been thrown by the dreaded Islamic fundamentalists, Boko Haram sect was targeted at the patrol vehicle of the Joint Task Force on surveillance duty at Budum junction, a distance of about 500 metres from the monarch's palace.*

In sample (ii) **Nigerian Islamic sect threatens to attack Kano State** – the verb ‘threaten’ connotes violence as it means stating one’s intention to take hostile action against someone in retribution for something done or not done. The headline identifies the Nigerian Islamic sect (another name for Boko Haram) being responsible for the threat. In headline (v) **Islamic sect reportedly plans bomb attack in Nigeria's Enugu State** – the verb phrase ‘plans bomb attack’ clearly signifies intended violence. In addition, Again, the subject the noun phrase, ‘Islamic sect’ in the headline is a direct reference to Boko Haram. This is evident in the first paragraph of the headline: *Members of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) have alerted the nation on plans by the Muslim sect Boko Haram to bomb Enugu.* [emphasis added]

The last headline in the group; (viii) **Gombe – Four Killed As Gunmen Attack Mobile Police** – the verb ‘killed’ clearly describes an explicit act of violence. In this case, Boko Haram was not directly mentioned by its popular name or any of the labels that are used for the group’s identification.

However, the story paragraphs of this headline clearly link Boko Haram with the killing:

*A police officer and three civilians were in the early hours of Sunday killed when unknown gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members attacked 34 Squadron Mobile Police Base along Dukku Road on the outskirts of Gombe metropolis.* [emphasis added]

The analysis above shows that the Boko Haram group was clearly represented in negative lights. This type of identification is expressed through the negative significations that were found in the reports. This finding suggests that the newspapers show disapproval for the activities of Boko Haram.

Furthermore, examples of headlines with positive tone which featured security agents/government as participants are in headlines (iii), (iv), (vi) and (vii). Starting with headline (iii) **Nigerian army boss seeks help of foreign agencies against Islamic sect** – the verb phrase ‘seeks help’ is an indication of helplessness. By considering the phrase within the entire context, it connotes a positive action for the security agencies since the Nigerian army needed foreign agency to combat the Islamic sect (also known as Boko Haram), which were reported to be causing violence in the country. Although asking for help is not a particularly positive action either – as it suggests the Nigerian army are not capable of acting against Boko Haram on their own; (iv) **UN Blast Suspects Arrested** – in this context, to arrest suspects involved in the negative action such as bombing is regarded as a positive action. Although the particular agency responsible for the arrest is not named in the headline, the story paragraphs identify the Police as responsible for the arrest:

*Security agencies have made some arrests in connection with last Friday's blast at the United Nations House in Abuja, the Inspector General of Police (IG), Alhaji Hafiz Ringim, has said. [emphasis added]*

In headline (vi) **State Security Unveils the Boko Haram Bomb Factory** – the expression of unveiling the Boko Haram bomb factory by the security agency connotes a positive act since the action could stall the violent intentions of the Boko Haram group, and (vii) **Terrorism – FG to Intensify Inter-Agency Cooperation** – the verb phrase ‘to intensify inter-agency cooperation’ shows the entire context in a positive tone which signifies that the federal government (FG) aims for greater cooperation rather than friction or violence. The findings from this analysis suggest that through the use of positive choice of words, security agents/government were represented in positive ways.

Overall, the findings in this phase suggest that Boko Haram group was represented through expressions that signify destruction and showed a capacity for violence while the security agents/government were identified through choice of words that connotes positive actions such as combating Boko Haram whose actions had been perceived as negative.

#### 4.9.2 CDA Findings after the Attacks – Tone Category

The headlines in this section were selected from the two newspapers within the categories of positive and negative. This follows the same pattern that was employed in Phase 1 of the tone category. Therefore, the following eight headlines were selected:

- (i) **Police Beef Up Security Around Media Houses in Lagos** (*Daily Trust*, 27-Apr-12)
- (ii) **U.S. – It's an Attack On Free Speech** (*ThisDay*, 27-Apr-12)
- (iii) **Suicide Bombers Target Police Commissioner – 11 Killed in Jalingo Attack** (*Daily Trust*, 1-May-12)
- (iv) **JTF Raids Bomb Factory, Kills BUK Terror Suspect** (*ThisDay*, 2-May-12)
- (v) **Mark to Boko Haram – Please, Accept Dialogue** (*Daily Trust*, 12- Jun-12)
- (vi) **Governors Insists On State Police, Seek Special Fund for Security** (*ThisDay*, 26-Jun-12)
- (vii) **Jonathan – We Will Tackle Insecurity Head On** (*ThisDay*, 3-Jul-12)
- (viii) **State of Emergency – Two Weeks After, Residents Unsure of Fate** (*Daily Trust* 14-Jul-12)

In the headline samples listed above, verb phrases were employed to denote positive and negative tones in the headlines. The sub-editors identified the security agents/government officials through the use of words and phrases that signify positive actions. The headlines with negative phrasing did not attribute agency for the actions they described, but clearly associated Boko Haram with the violence reported in the story paragraphs. Therefore, Boko Haram was represented as being responsible for the negative actions.

Examples of headlines with positive verb phrases that were employed to describe security agents are (i) **Police Beef Up Security Around Media Houses in Lagos** – the verb phrase ‘beef up security’ denotes some form of safety measures being put in place; (v) **Mark to Boko Haram – Please, Accept Dialogue** – Mark is the Senate President of Nigeria at this period. The expression denotes a positive action especially



coming from the Senate leader. Proposing dialogues is expected to pave way for peace but it could also be seen as a weak action; (vi) **Governors Insists On State Police, Seek Special Fund for Security** – the act of seeking funds for security implies that the governors are committed to peace which connotes a positive action; and (vii) **Jonathan – We Will Tackle Insecurity Head On** – the expression about tackling insecurity in this sense also connotes a positive action.

The language adopted in the samples could imply that the sub-editors framed the violence perpetrated by the security agents and Boko Haram differently. While Boko Haram was framed in negative ways, the security agencies/government was framed in positive lights.

Furthermore, examples of headlines with negative verb phrases that did not attribute agency for the actions are in headlines (ii), (iii), (iv) and (viii). In headline (ii) **U.S. – It's an Attack On Free Speech** – the verb ‘attack’ in this case is about physical attacks on newspapers. Although, this headline is not directly about attack though – it’s about the symbolism of the attack. The subject is the U.S and the meaning of the expression is about condemnation. However the accompanying story paragraphs identified Boko Haram as the perpetrator of the violence. The paragraph below is an extract from the story:

*United States has condemned the bombing of THISDAY newspaper offices in Abuja and Kaduna by the **Boko Haram sect**, describing it as an attack on free speech. [emphasis added]*

Similarly in headline (iii) **Suicide Bombers Target Police Commissioner – Killed in Jalingo Attack**, - the two verbs ‘target’ and ‘killed’ emphasised clear negative actions which were carried out by suicide bombers. As in previous analysis of the story paragraphs in this study, ‘suicide bomber’ in the headlines usually refers to Boko Haram. The story paragraph below is from this headline and makes this connection clearer:

*Jalingo, May 01, 2012 (Daily Trust/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX) – The Taraba State Police Commissioner had a close shave yesterday when three suicide bombers riding motorbikes rammed into his convoy in Jalingo, causing an explosion that killed at least 11 people. [emphasis added]*

*No group claimed responsibility for the Jalingo attack, but it bears semblance with strikes carried out by the **Boko Haram** sect. [emphasis added]*

Moreover, in headline (iv) **JTF Raids Bomb Factory, Kills BUK Terror Suspect**– while the verb phrase ‘raids’ refers to a rapid surprise attack on an enemy by troops, aircraft, or other armed forces, it clearly signifies negative action which was carried out by the security agents. Its combination with the action of killing clearly signifies violent actions.

This construction is notable in that the previous two samples above attributed negative actions to Boko Haram with no excuse or justifications, but in this case, the negative action carried out by the JTF (one of the security agencies) was justified. The justification is implicit in labelling the victim as a ‘terror suspect’. The use of the terror label has negative connotations as identified in the analysis in the label category.

The adoption of negative language with justifications in this way could indicate that the newspapers seem to provide positive identifications for security agents even while they carried out negative and violent actions. This contrasts with representations of Boko Haram, whose negative actions were not credited with any excuses or justifications. Boko Haram was framed purely as a group known for violence.

Further, in the headline (viii) **State of Emergency – Two Weeks After, Residents Unsure of Fate** – the verb phrase in this headline ‘unsure of fate’ describes a state of uncertainty, but the headline is vague about what caused the emergency situation. The body paragraphs of the headlines clearly report that Boko Haram was involved in the actions leading to the negative situation. Below are the excerpts from the story:

*Troops still maintain grim presence in the 15 local government areas under emergency rule weeks after its expiration, even as curfew remains in place in the affected states. [emphasis added]*

*True enough, St. Finbarr's Parish which was bombed by suspected **Boko Haram** members in March is located in Rayfield in Jos South. COCIN Headquarters which was bombed earlier in February is situated in the heart of Jos North. [emphasis added]*

In sum, this analysis demonstrates that Boko Haram was identified in negative tone while the security agents were represented in positive tone in both the headlines and body of the stories. The study further shows that while positive verb phrases referred to security agents/ government officials, headlines with negative constructions did not attribute agency for the actions but Boko Haram was clearly identified as the agent responsible for negative actions in the story paragraphs. This shows that Boko Haram was represented in negative ways.

The following table shows the language patterns in the tone analysis and their possible implications in the periods before and after the attacks on journalists and media. The type of tone describes words, phrases or expressions in the headlines showing negative/ positive/neutral descriptions of violence.

**Table 4.8: The Language Patterns in the Tone Analysis**

Phases	Patterns	Implications
<b>Phase 1</b>	Boko Haram group was represented through words and phrases that signified destruction and a capacity for violence while the security agents/government were identified in positive topics relating to security, amnesty, cooperation and dialogue.	The reports suggest that Boko Haram was identified as a purely negative group while security agencies/ government officials were represented as a positive entity.
<b>Phase 4</b>	Positive expressions were employed in referring to security agents/government officials. Headlines with negative constructions did not attribute agencies for the actions they described, but in the story paragraphs Boko Haram was explicitly identified as being responsible for the negative actions.	Boko Haram was represented as a group capable of fomenting violence while the security agents/government was clearly pictured in positive lights.

With regards to the research question regarding change before and after the Boko Haram attacks, this study found that the reports represented Boko Haram differently in the two periods before and after the attacks. The analysis also finds (Table 4.8) that prior to the attacks on the journalists and media, Boko Haram was represented through constructions that signify destruction and a capacity for violence, while the security agents/government in the country were identified in positive lights.

In contrast, in the period following the Boko Haram attacks, headlines with negative constructions did not attribute agency for the actions they described, but explicitly identified Boko Haram as being responsible for the negative actions in the story paragraphs. The reports also identified the security agents/government in positive terms and offered excuses or justifications for their activities, even when these were violent, which could position them as defending the public against Boko Haram. It is pertinent to note that the meanings and imports of their implications in both periods are the same.

#### **4.10 Findings from Content Analysis – Frame Category**

It is important to note that in this section only the sub-categories that are related to the research question in this chapter are the focus of this analysis. Therefore, the sub-categories of ‘no frames’, ‘episodic frames about security agents/government’ ‘thematic frames about security agents/ government’ were discarded. The two sub-categories that are relevant in this analysis are: the ‘episodic frames about Boko Haram and ‘thematic frames about Boko Haram’. The reason is because since Boko Haram is the focus of this thesis in general, the research seeks primarily to uncover how Boko Haram was represented or framed by the two newspapers. By episodic framing, it means that the reports focus on specific events of killing, bombing, gun-shooting by Boko Haram while the thematic emphasises events in broader contexts, such as security, terrorism, dialogue, solutions to the Boko Haram crisis.

Given the above selection criteria, this study found that the episodic frames about Boko Haram ranked higher than the thematic frames. The episodic frames accounted for 28.4 per cent, the thematic frames had 6.5 per cent (Table 4.9 and Figure 4.7). This shows clear wide margins between the two frames. This finding suggests that reports on Boko Haram focused more on issue-based than general or broad contexts. This could imply that the media coverage is strongly based towards an episodic interpretation of Boko Haram in which the news depicts social issues such as the Boko Haram crisis as limited to events only and not placed in a broader interpretation or context which could engender greater understanding of the issue. In other words, the public are largely presented with acts of violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram group rather than the underlying problems, possible grievances, and solutions to the crisis.

This study found that there was a significant decline in headlines with episodic frames about Boko Haram following the group's attacks (from 32.2 per cent before attacks to 22.5 per cent at after attacks). But it is also pertinent to note that 'no frames', that is, issues that were neither framed as episodic nor thematic increased after the attacks, which was then followed by increase in the episodic frames about Boko Haram. This particular finding could imply that perhaps by avoiding frames, the newspapers seem not to align to any side between Boko Haram and security agents/government officials.

The following table shows the timeline of Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media offices and the type of frames adopted in identifying Boko Haram. The four phases represent the timeline of the attacks while the type of frames describes how events/ actions are described in the headlines as either episodic or thematic.


**Table 4.9: The Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Frame**

			Timeline of Attack				Total
			Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3	Phase 4	
<b>Type of Frames</b>	Episodic frames about Boko Haram	Count	46	60	92	56	254
		% within Timeline of Attack	32.2%	26.9%	32.9%	22.5%	28.4%
	Episodic frames about security agents/govt.	Count	39	54	77	55	225
		% within Timeline of Attack	27.3%	24.2%	27.5%	22.1%	25.1%
	Thematic frames about Boko Haram	Count	9	12	18	19	58
		% within Timeline of Attack	6.3%	5.4%	6.4%	7.6%	6.5%
	Thematic frames about security agents/govt.	Count	9	0	0	2	11
		% within Timeline of Attack	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%	1.2%
	No frames	Count	40	97	93	117	347
		% within Timeline of Attack	28.0%	43.5%	33.2%	47.0%	38.8%
<b>Total</b>		Count	143	223	280	249	895
		% within Timeline of Attack	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

#### 4.11 Findings from CDA – Framing Category

This section presents the analyses and findings from the CDA methodology in the framing category for the two periods (before and after attacks). The selection of headlines in the two periods followed the same selection pattern as in the content analysis section above. The headlines were selected from the sub-categories of ‘episodic frames about Boko Haram’ and ‘thematic frames about Boko Haram’.

**Figure 4.5: The Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks and the Type of Frame**



##### 4.11.1: CDA Findings before the Attacks – Framing Category

The headline samples were selected from the Phase 1 category which represents the period before the attacks. Below are the headlines that were considered:

- (i) **Nigeria: Suspected Islamic sect member killed in Borno State** (*Daily Trust*, 27-Jul-11)
- (ii) **Christ Apostolic Church Says Boko Haram is Seed of Discord** (*Daily Trust* 26-Jul-11)

- (iii) **Gunmen Open Fire On Maiduguri Police Station** (*ThisDay*, 5 August 2011)
- (iv) **Boko Haram is an Offshoot of Taliban, Says Yuguda** (*ThisDay*, 16-Aug-11)
- (v) **Boko Haram and the U.S. Counter-Terrorism Partnership** (*Daily Trust*, 13-Sep-11)
- (vi) **Obasanjo in Secret Visit to Boko Haram Family** (*ThisDay*, 16-September 2011)
- (vii) **Six Boko Haram Suspects Arraigned Over Bombings** (*ThisDay*, 1-Oct-11)
- (vii) **Boko Haram – Why We Won’t Listen to Sultan** (*Daily Trust*, 4 October 2011)

This analysis of how Boko Haram was framed shows that in the episodic frames, whenever the popular name of Boko Haram (the nominalised label) was employed, violent actions were mostly not clearly expressed. However when any of the assigned names of Boko Haram was used, violent actions were explicitly described. In all, the episodic framing about Boko Haram mostly framed the group implicitly in connection to the violence.

Examples of the episodic framing about Boko Haram where the popular name of Boko Haram (that is, Boko Haram) was employed include headlines: (vi), **Obasanjo in Secret Visit to Boko Haram Family** – ‘in secret visit’ is a noun phrase which suggests benign activity related to Boko Haram; (vii) **Six Boko Haram Suspects Arraigned Over Bombings** – the verb phrase ‘arraigned over bombings’ shows that the Boko Haram was explicitly connected to the violent action of bombings; and (viii) **Boko Haram – Why We Won’t Listen to Sultan** – In this case, the specific action of the Boko Haram group is highlighted by their refusal to listen to the Sultan (the head of the Muslim community in the North). This shows that the episodic framing about Boko Haram identified Boko Haram with the crisis mostly using implicit language.

The study also analysed other samples in the group using the assigned names of Boko Haram, these are: (i) **Nigeria: Suspected Islamic sect member killed in Borno State** – the verb ‘killed’ depicts violence and shows that Islamic sect member (also identified as Boko Haram in the previous analysis of the story



paragraphs) was killed in Borno; and (iii) **Gunmen Open Fire On Maiduguri Police Station** – the verb phrase ‘open fire’ signifies that gunmen (another label for Boko Haram) did the shooting. The analyses of the story paragraphs in label category found that these assigned names in the two headlines actually referred to Boko Haram but this is not necessarily evident when reading only the headlines. Based on this, it can be argued that the headline reports clearly stated the violence and indirectly framed Boko Haram using its assigned names.

Meanwhile, analysis of the headlines in the category of thematic frames about Boko Haram reveals that the thematic frames presented broad descriptions about Boko Haram that were not directly related to any specified violence. For instance, in headlines (ii) **Christ Apostolic Church Says Boko Haram is Seed of Discord** – the verb phrase ‘is seed of discord’ pictures Boko Haram as causing disagreement or friction; (iv) **Boko Haram is an Offshoot of Taliban, Says Yuguda** – the construction compares Boko Haram to Taliban, which is an Islamic fighting force in Afghanistan and a threat to its government and (v) **Boko Haram and the U.S. Counter-Terrorism Partnership** – the usage of the word ‘counter-terrorism’ in conjunction with Boko Haram connects Boko Haram with terrorism. In these examples, the thematic frames did not directly associate Boko Haram with violence but implicitly presented the group in violent contexts.

The findings therefore imply that even in episodic framings that are meant to provide specific details such as naming of agencies responsible for violence, the reports were constructed in ways that avoided direct identification of Boko Haram in violent activities. Also, the thematic frames typically focused on broad issues that were not related to violence.

#### **4.11.2: CDA Findings after the Attacks – Framing Category**

The headlines in this section were selected from the sub-categories of episodic and thematic frames. Below are the samples that were selected:

- (i) **As Gunmen Fire On Worshippers...Two Profs, 17 Others Killed in BUK (Bayero University Kano) Attack** (*Daily Trust*, 30-Apr-12)
- (ii) **Mark to Boko Haram – No War Yields Positive Result** (*Daily Trust*, 30-Apr-12)
- (iii) **Boko Haram Threatens Daily Trust, the Guardian, Others in New Video** (*Daily Trust*, 2-May-12)
- (iv) **CAN – 1,000 Lost to Boko Haram Attacks** (*This Day*, 25-May-12)
- (v) **Boko Haram – U.S Mulls Broader Designation** (*This Day*, 23-Jun-12)
- (vi) **Boko Haram Insurgency – Beaming the Searchlight On Nigerian Media** (*Daily Trust*, 24-Jul-12)
- (vii) **Jonathan – Boko Haram Not Behind Plateau Crisis** (*This Day*, 18-Jul-12)
- (viii) **SSS – Northern Communities Shielding Boko Haram** (*This Day*, 26-Jul-12)

The findings in this phase are not so different from those found in Phase 1 above. The analysis shows that after the attacks in episodic framing about Boko Haram, verb phrases that explicitly described violence were employed when any of the assigned names of Boko Haram was adopted as the agency responsible for the violence. Also, verb phrases that implicitly described violence were mostly employed when Boko Haram was identified by its popular name of Boko Haram. In essence, the episodic framing in this analysis mostly adopted implicit expressions to focus on the violent actions by the Boko Haram.

The following is the example of verb phrases in the episodic framing that explicitly described violence when any of the assigned names of Boko Haram was adopted: (i) **As Gunmen Fire On Worshippers...Two Profs, 17 Others Killed in BUK (Bayero University Kano) Attack** – In this headline, the verb phrases ‘fire on’ and ‘killed in’ are direct references to acts of violence. Also, ‘gunmen’ is one of the labels assigned to Boko Haram, as shown elsewhere in this study.

The headline samples in the episodic framing that implied violence when Boko Haram was identified by its popular name of Boko Haram are: (iii) **Boko Haram Threatens Daily Trust, the Guardian, Others in New Video** – The headline details specific acts of threat as the core. Also, ‘threaten’ as a verb indicates an intention to take hostile action against (someone) in retribution against something done or not done. The act connotes violence; (iv) **CAN – 1,000 Lost to Boko Haram Attacks** – in this case, the verb phrase ‘lost to’ imply death or destruction and is rather a weak verb in this context but clearly links Boko Haram to the violence; and (vii) **Jonathan – Boko Haram Not Behind Plateau Crisis** – President Jonathan’s expression here absolves Boko Haram of complicity in the Plateau crisis – a state in the northern Nigeria. But the phrasing points to the incidence of violence in Plateau State (one of the states in northern Nigeria known as one of the flashpoints of crises). It is evident from the analysed samples that after the Boko Haram attacks, most of the headlines in the episodic frames implicitly framed Boko Haram in relation to the violence.

Meanwhile, in the thematic framing about Boko Haram, this analysis revealed that verb phrases signify implicit descriptions of violence connected to Boko Haram. These instances were featured in headlines (ii) **Mark to Boko Haram – No War Yields Positive Result**; Mark’s (Senate President) statement to Boko Haram is an advice against the consequences of war, and this has deeper contexts; (v) **Boko Haram – U.S Mulls Broader Designation** – the verb phrase in this case describes how the US contemplates other labels for Boko Haram, (vi) **Boko Haram Insurgency – Beaming the Searchlight On Nigerian Media** – here, the construction is about Boko Haram targeting of the Nigerian media; (viii) **SSS – Northern Communities Shielding Boko Haram** – the State Security Services’ (SSS) expression of protecting Boko Haram by the Northern communities is symbolic with deeper contexts. In all, the issues that were addressed in these samples provide deeper contexts about Boko Haram, which are likely to provide readers with greater depth and understanding than the issues expressed in the episodic framing.

Overall, the findings in the content analysis suggest that there was a decline in headlines that describe episodic or specific issues about Boko Haram such as killing, bombing, gun-shooting after the attacks. By having reduction in episodic framing, it suggests that the newspapers were reducing their emphasis on topics that the Boko Haram would prefer. While the findings in the CDA also indicate that the representation of Boko Haram changed after the attack: in the period before the attack, through episodic framing, the newspaper adopted more of the popular names of Boko Haram in reporting violence but in the period after the attacks, assigned names of Boko Haram were mostly used in identifying the agents that were responsible for the violent actions. Conversely in the thematic framing (which addressed issues that were not directly related to violence), the findings in the content analysis show a slight increase after the Boko Haram attacks. While the findings in the CDA suggest that representation of Boko Haram remains the same for the two periods as deeper contexts relating to underlying problems, possible grievances, and solutions were reported. Also, most of the episodic reports were implicitly constructed.

The following table shows the language patterns in the framing analysis and their possible implications in the periods before and after the attacks.

**Table 4.10: The Language Patterns in the Framing Analysis**

Phases	Patterns	Implications
<p><b>Phase 1:</b> Episodic frames about Boko Haram</p>	<p>Whenever the popular name of Boko Haram (the nominalised label) was employed, violent actions were mostly not clearly expressed. However, when any of the assigned names of Boko Haram was used, violent actions were explicitly described. In all, the episodic framing about Boko Haram mostly expressed violent actions implicitly.</p>	<p>This implies that even in episodic framings that are meant to provide specific details such as direct naming of agencies responsible for violence, the reports were mostly constructed in ways that avoided direct identification of Boko Haram in violent activities.</p>
<p>Thematic frames about Boko Haram</p>	<p>The language emphasised broad descriptions of issues about Boko Haram that were indirectly connected to the violence.</p>	<p>This implies that the reports dwelt on other topics outside violence but had broader contexts about issues relating to Boko Haram.</p>
<p><b>Phase 4</b> Episodic frames about Boko Haram</p>	<p>Language that explicitly described violence was employed when any of the assigned names of Boko Haram was adopted as the agency responsible for the violence. Also, verb phrases that implicitly described violence were mostly employed when Boko Haram was identified by its popular name of Boko Haram.</p>	<p>By indirectly naming Boko Haram as agency for violent actions signifies that the newspapers were being cautious.</p>
<p>Thematic frames about Boko Haram</p>	<p>The issues that were addressed in this period were not about acts of violence but had broader contexts.</p>	<p>The newspapers focused on issues with greater depths about Boko Haram but outside violent reports.</p>

It is pertinent to note that the language patterns identified above shows different interpretations but their implications are the same in their imports and meanings. Regarding the framing, this study found some differences in the way the reports framed Boko Haram. Also, the study found a significant decline in the episodic framing of Boko Haram after the group's attacks and a slight increase in the thematic framing, which signifies that the newspapers focused less on issues that the Boko Haram would prefer. The headlines also implicitly framed Boko Haram by adopting the assigned names of the group in connection to the violence.

#### **4.12 Concluding Remarks**

This chapter analysed and provided answers to research question one, which asked whether journalists change their representation of Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria. In doing this, the chapter used content analysis and CDA. While content analysis focused on the quantitative aspect of the analysis, the CDA dwelt on qualitative analysis.

These two research designs were adopted in the selection of the data set for the analysis, that is, selection of the news headlines on Boko Haram in order to answer the research question. In the content analysis, SPSS was employed to analyse cross tabulations on variables identified in the study. The first set of variables is the content categories: the types of source, label, blaming, tone and frame. The second variable is the timeline of attack (phases 1 to 4). But in specific regards to the research question in this chapter, only phases 1 and 4 were the focus of the analysis. In the CDA method, the same selection and analytical process just as in the content analysis were applied for qualitative analysis focused on language, to understand how words and expressions around Boko Haram and the actions in the selected headlines were constructed.

Having analysed and provided answers to the research question one, the following chapter presents analysis of findings for the second research question which seeks to proffer answers to the question: {Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *This Day's* reporting over the

timeline of the study (2011-2012)?} The two research designs of content analysis and CDA were also adopted in the analysis. While the content analysis examined 897 news headlines, the CDA analysed 120 headline reports.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### **Analysis of Differences in the Representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *This Day's* Reporting over the Timeline of the Study (2011-2012)**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents analysis and interpretation of the data in this study concerning research question two. This thesis proffers answers to the research question through the content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) methods. These two methods were also adopted in answering research question one in chapter five of this thesis. The research question in this chapter is aimed at uncovering whether there are differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study. The research question is stated:

#### **Research Question 2**

Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *This Day's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012)?

Through the content analysis method, the data were analysed by carrying out a correlation analysis using SPSS between the two variables of the content categories and the selected newspapers in this study. The content categories identified in this study are five: type of source, label, blame, tone and framing. The two newspapers selected as samples are The *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay*. The CDA methodology engages in critical examination of the language used in the headlines by examining how the noun and verb phrases were constructed. Eight headlines were purposively selected from each of the two newspaper types. They were analysed across each of the content variables. The rationale for this selection was to achieve uniformity. By uniformity, the headlines followed the same selection pattern in all the content categories.



## 5.2 Findings from the Content Analysis – Source Category

The analysis in this section reveals that in both *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting, journalists ranked highest amongst all the other identified sources, such as the government, security agencies and Boko Haram itself in reporting on Boko Haram (Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1). The implication of this finding could be that journalists in Nigeria are still determined to provide their views and perspectives about the group's activities in spite of the various challenges that they claimed to have been facing.

Furthermore this study found that journalists from *ThisDay* ranked higher than their counterparts from *Daily Trust* in reporting on Boko Haram. This could imply that the reporters from *ThisDay* are under less direct threat because their head office is located outside the stronghold of Boko Haram activities in the north.

The following table presents newspaper headline reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* newspapers and the type of source that report on Boko Haram. By source, it refers to who is responsible for statements about Boko Haram in the headlines.

**Table 5.1: Newspaper Headline Reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* and the Type of Source**

			Newspapers		
			<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>ThisDay</i>	Total
<b>Who is Sourced</b>	Boko Haram	Count	10	4	14
		% within Newspapers	1.8%	1.2%	1.6%
	Security agents	Count	17	5	22
		% within Newspapers	3.0%	1.5%	2.5%
	Journalist	Count	327	287	614
		% within Newspapers	57.4%	87.8%	68.5%
	Citizen	Count	53	8	61
		% within Newspapers	9.3%	2.4%	6.8%
	Government	Count	42	11	53
		% within Newspapers	7.4%	3.4%	5.9%
	International	Count	12	5	17
		% within Newspapers	2.1%	1.5%	1.9%
	Anonymous	Count	22	7	29
		% within Newspapers	3.9%	2.1%	3.2%
	Other	Count	87	0	87
		% within Newspapers	15.3%	0.0%	9.7%
	Total	Count	570	327	897
		% within Newspapers	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The following section presents the qualitative analysis of the source category using the CDA.

### 5.3 Findings from CDA – Source Category

This section examines the language patterns adopted in the headlines using the CDA. These headlines were purposively selected from the section of journalist as a source in the two newspapers.

#### 5.3.1 CDA Analysis in *Daily Trust* – Source Category

Eight headlines were purposively selected from the source category in *Daily Trust*. By source, it refers to who is responsible for statements in the headlines. *Daily Trust* is the newspaper with audience base in the northern Nigeria. Below are the selected headlines:

- (i) **Country to Work On Terrorism** (*Daily Trust*, 23-Jul-11)
- (ii) **Boko Haram Scare Changes NDA Passing Out** (*Daily Trust*, 11-Oct-11)
- (iii) **Police Inspector Killed On Way to Mosque** (*Daily Trust*, 8-Nov-11)
- (iv) **Boko Haram Suspect's Escape – Police Commissioner Zakari Biu Suspended** (*Daily Trust*, 19-Jan- 12)
- (v) **Suicide Bombers Strike Kaduna Military Bases** (*Daily Trust*, 9-Feb-12)
- (vi) **Confusion Over 'Death' of Abul Qaqa II** (*Daily Trust*, 17-Apr-12)
- (vii) **Kidnapped German Killed in Kano** (*Daily Trust*, 2-Jun-12)
- (viii) **Revealed – Army, Police Rivalry Stalls Talks With Boko Haram** (*Daily Trust*, 23-Jul-12)

The headlines above were examined using transitivity analysis, with specific reference to Simpson's analytical framework, discussed in chapter three of this thesis. Throughout this chapter the CDA analysis focuses on the roles of processes (the verb phrases that describe the action words) and participants (the noun phrases which describe the subjects) in the headlines.

This study found that the sampled headlines above used a combination of implicit and explicit language to report the violence. In some of the headlines that did not include the name of Boko Haram, violent reports were explicitly stated while others that mentioned the name of Boko Haram or any of the assigned names of Boko Haram, violence was either indirectly stated or not stated at all.

To start with, this part of the analysis focuses on headlines in which *Daily Trust* used verb phrases which explicitly suggest violent actions but the name of Boko Haram was omitted. They are in the following headlines: (i) **Country to Work On Terrorism** – ‘to work on terrorism’ denotes unofficial use of violence in the pursuit of political aims. The headline does not specify Boko Haram or the group causing the violence; (iii) **Police Inspector Killed On Way to Mosque** – in this case, Boko Haram or the agent that caused the death was omitted (vi) **Confusion Over 'Death' of Abul Qaqa II** – in the same way as in the samples above, Boko Haram was not mentioned in connection to the death; and (vii) **Kidnapped German Killed in Kano** – this is a clear case of violence in which Boko Haram or the agent for the killing was omitted.

Below are some extracts from the story paragraphs relating to each of the headlines:

**Country to Work On Terrorism** (*Daily Trust*, 23-Jul-11)

*President Goodluck Jonathan and the British Prime Minister David Cameron have agreed to share common agenda on counter terrorism in a bid to flush out security threats facing the two countries. [emphasis added]*

*He stated that the government has already taken decisive steps to address the recent **Boko Haram** insurgence. [emphasis added]*

**Police Inspector Killed On Way to Mosque** (*Daily Trust*, 8-Nov-11)

*Suspected members of the **Boko haram** sect gunned down another security agent in Maiduguri today, following attacks on Friday that left at least 69 people dead. [emphasis added]*

**Confusion Over 'Death' of Abul Qaqa II** (*Daily Trust*, 17-Apr-12)

*There was confusion yesterday over the slain **Boko Haram** spokesman Muhammed Auwal commonly called Abul Qaqa II who was reported to have been killed in Kaduna last week. [emphasis added]*

**Kidnapped German Killed in Kano** (*Daily Trust*, 2-Jun-12)

*German engineer, Raufach Egder, who was kidnapped in Kano on January 26, 2012 was said to have been killed by his captors yesterday during an early morning raid by men of the Joint Task Force (JTF) on a house he was being held in the outskirts of Kano. [emphasis added]*


*Corroborating the statement of the JTF, a source close to the office of the National Security also told Daily Trust last night that the operation was actually not a rescue mission but meant to eliminate top member of the **Boko Haram** whom intelligence revealed were holding a meeting inside the building. [emphasis added]*

From the story paragraphs, it is apparent that the Boko Haram group had some connections with the incidences of violence that were reported in the headlines. But readers of the above headlines would see no obvious connections between the reported violence and Boko Haram, since the name of the group only appeared in the story paragraphs. This analysis suggests that in *Daily Trust*, Boko Haram was indirectly connected to violent actions as the headlines omitted the name of the group in relation to the violent actions but included the name in the story paragraphs.

In some other cases, Boko Haram was explicitly named in headlines which indirectly suggest violent actions. In other words, it can be suggested that since Boko Haram was featured in the headlines in which violent actions were not explicitly expressed, then the readers were given the impressions that Boko Haram was distantly connected to the violence. Examples of such headlines are in: (ii) **Boko Haram Scare Changes NDA Passing Out** – in this case, no specific reference was made to any violence; (iv) **Boko Haram Suspect's Escape – Police Commissioner Zakari Biu Suspended** – suspension of the police commissioner in connection to the Boko Haram suspect does not indicate any violence; (v) **Suicide Bombers Strike Kaduna Military Bases** – the verb ‘strike’ in this context connotes violent action that was carried out by the suicide bombers (one of the labels assigned to Boko Haram); and (viii) **Revealed – Army, Police Rivalry Stalls Talks With Boko Haram** – ‘stalls talks’ in this context could mean an act of impeding dialogue, which does not indicate violence specifically. But Boko Haram was involved in the act.

In sum, the constructions in the analysed headlines show that *Daily Trust* indirectly associated Boko Haram to the reported violence. This could imply that *Daily Trust* chose this form of representation because the newspaper’s head office is located in the same northern region where Boko Haram operates.

**Figure 5.1: Newspaper Headline Reporting in *Daily Trust* and *This Day* and the Type of Source**



**5.3.2 CDA Analysis in *ThisDay* – Source Category**

This section presents analysis and findings from headlines in *This Day* newspaper. Eight headlines from *ThisDay* were selected within the study’s timeline. The following are the selected samples:

- (i) **Nigeria: Bomb Explodes Near Shehu of Borno's Palace** (*This Day*, 24-Jul-11)
- (ii) **Six Boko Haram Suspects Arraigned Over Bombings** (*This Day*, 1-Oct-11)

- (iii) **Pupils Hurt As Blast Hits Islamic School in Sapele** (*This Day*, 29- Dec-11)
- (iv) **Gunmen Kill 10 in Mubi Attack** (*This Day*, 6-Jan-12)
- (v) **Mass Burial for 50 Kano Blast Victims** (*This Day*, 25-Jan-12)
- (vi) **Boko Haram Kills 7 in Borno** (*This Day*, 13-Feb-12)
- (vii) **Three Killed as Explosion Rocks Bauchi** (*This Day*, 13-May-12)
- (viii) **Suicide Bomber Kills 6 At Borno Police Headquarters** (*This Day*, 9-Jun-12)

In the headlines above, all the verb phrases in the headlines were phrased to explicitly signify violence. Specifically, some of the headlines adopted both the popular and assigned names of Boko Haram, especially the functionalised label (names that depict the violent roles of Boko Haram such as gunmen, bomber and related ones). The discussion concerning the type of labels used in the reporting is closely examined in the next section on label analysis. Other headlines adopted phrases that had no agencies for the reported violent actions. Examples of headlines that adopted both the popular and assigned names of Boko Haram in violence that were explicitly stated are in headlines: (ii) **Six Boko Haram Suspects Arraigned Over Bombings** – the verb phrase ‘arraigned over bombing’ signifies that the Boko Haram suspects that is, the identified subjects in the clause, were involved in the bombings; (iv) **Gunmen Kill 10 in Mubi Attack** – the headline clearly expressed that the action of killing was carried out by the gunmen (assigned name of Boko Haram); (vi) **Boko Haram Kills 7 in Borno** – also in this case, Boko Haram is specifically fingered as the perpetrator of the killing and; (viii) **Suicide Bomber Kills 6 At Borno Police Headquarters** – the killing here is also clearly attributed to suicide bomber.

By explicitly identifying Boko Haram in headlines relating to violent reports, *ThisDay* appears to be direct in associating Boko Haram with violence. This could be due to the locations of the newspaper’s head office in the southern Nigeria – outside Boko Haram’s stronghold of activities in the north.

However, to clarify whom the assigned labels in the analysis above referred to, this research further examined the body paragraphs of the headlines. In samples (iv) and (viii), where ‘gunmen’ and ‘suicide bombers’ (both functionalised labels which specify the roles of Boko Haram) were indicated, Boko Haram was conspicuously connected to the reported violence. Below are the story paragraphs in which the name of Boko Haram is in bold in order to see its connection to the violence.

#### **Gunmen Kill 10 in Mubi Attack** (*This Day*, 6-Jan-12)

*A frightening dimension is creeping into the attacks being carried out in the north with 10 people from the eastern part of the country reported to have been killed by gunmen in Mubi, Adamawa State on Friday.* [emphasis added]

*Local residents told the BBC those killed were Igbo residing in the state.* [emphasis added]

*They had been meeting to organise how to transport the body of an Igbo man shot dead by gunmen on motorbikes on Thursday evening.* [emphasis added]

*The local police chief said he believed Islamist group **Boko Haram** was behind the attack.* [emphasis added]

#### **Suicide Bomber Kills 6 At Borno Police Headquarters** (*This Day*, 9-Jun-12)

*It was another sad day in Maiduguri, Borno State yesterday as bomb explosions rocked part of the town resulting in the death of seven persons.* [emphasis added]

*The town had been experiencing clashes between sect members and security operatives. The sources however said they noticed some awkward behaviour in the people and suspected them to be members of dreaded **Boko Haram** sect.* [emphasis added]

By employing the assigned names of Boko Haram or labels instead of the popular names that the group is known by, the newspaper seems to avoid direct association of Boko Haram with violence.

In addition, three of the sampled headlines did not specify the perpetrators of the reported violence (in samples i, iii and v). The body paragraphs of the headlines were examined to show who was responsible for the attacks.

Below are the headlines and their accompanying story paragraphs:

#### **(i) Nigeria: Bomb Explodes Near Shehu of Borno's Palace** (*This Day*, 24-Jul-11)

*There was apprehension Saturday evening in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital when another bomb exploded close to the palace of Shehu of Borno Abubakar Ibn Umar Garbai El-kanemi, leaving three soldiers wounded.* [emphasis added]

*The explosive, which was believed to have been thrown by the dreaded Islamic fundamentalists, **Boko Haram** sect was targeted at the patrol vehicle of the Joint Task Force on surveillance duty at Budum junction, a distance of about 500 metres from the monarch's palace.* [emphasis added]



**(iii) Pupils Hurt As Blast Hits Islamic School in Sapele** (*This Day*, 29-Dec-11)

*Three weeks after an explosion at the Central Mosque in Sapele, Delta State - and tellingly, two days after the bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State which caused 36 deaths - another blast rocked Sapele Wednesday.* [emphasis added]

*A militant group from the Niger Delta claimed responsibility for the attack in an apparent reprisal for the deadly Christmas day bombings by **Boko Haram**.* [emphasis added]

Although the headlines did not mention Boko Haram but the group was clearly connected to the attack in the body of the reports.

The construction around Boko Haram in the story paragraph (iii) is one of the few exceptions since Boko Haram was not directly responsible for the attack. However, because the language was tactically constructed as a reprisal attack for previous violence by Boko Haram, the blame for the church bombing was indirectly attributed to Boko Haram.

**(v) Mass Burial for 50 Kano Blast Victims** (*This Day*, 25-Jan-12)

*The unclaimed bodies of victims of last Friday's **Boko Haram** attacks in Kano State were given mass burial at the Kalebawa village, along Kano-Danbatta road, Tuesday.* [emphasis added]

This headline indicates an explicit violent action but Boko Haram or the agency for the violence was not specified. However, in the accompanying story paragraphs, Boko Haram was clearly connected with the violent actions.

The above expressions in the agentless headlines, (that is, headlines without persons or groups responsible for the reported violent actions) suggest that even when Boko Haram was not mentioned in the headlines, *ThisDay's* reports indirectly connected Boko Haram to violence. In essence, the combination of popular names, assigned labels and agentless phrases to identify Boko Haram in the reports relating to violence suggests some measures of caution.

In sum, the findings provide evidence of clear differences in the representation of Boko Haram in the two newspapers (see Table 5.2). *Daily Trust* adopted a combination of implicit and explicit constructions to describe the violence using both popular names and assigned labels of Boko while *ThisDay's* reporting explicitly identified Boko Haram in the violence using both the popular and assigned names of the group. This implies that *Daily Trust* is more cautious than *ThisDay* in associating Boko Haram to violent actions.

The following table presents the language patterns and their possible implications relating to the type of source that provides reports on Boko Haram. By source, it refers to who is responsible for statements about Boko Haram in *ThisDay's* and *Daily Trust's* reporting.

**Table 5.2: The Language Patterns in *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* – Source Analysis**

Phases	Patterns	Implications
<i>Daily Trust</i>	The headlines were constructed using a combination of implicit and explicit constructions to describe violence while adopting both popular names and assigned labels of Boko Haram in agentless headlines.	It implies that <i>Daily Trust</i> used indirect expressions in describing the violence in relation to Boko Haram because the newspaper's head office and some of its staff are close to direct threats of the group.
<i>ThisDay</i>	The newspaper employed explicit constructions to describe violence while adopting both the popular and assigned names of Boko Haram in agentless headlines.	This could imply that <i>ThisDay</i> employed clear and direct language to report on Boko Haram because it's head office is farther away from where Boko Haram operates.

#### 5.4: Findings from Content Analysis – Label Category

This section focuses on uncovering whether there are differences in the type of labels used in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust* and *This Day*. In this case, only sub-categories that specified labels are the main focus. Therefore, categories that have no label for identification were not considered in this analysis.

The following table presents newspaper headline reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* and the type of label. By label, it refers to how Boko Haram is described or named in headlines. Boko Haram is addressed with labels which include: collectivised, functionalised, nominalised, personalised and no label. Each of these labels is explained in the analysis.

**Table 5.3: Newspaper Headline Reporting in *Daily Trust* and *This Day* and the Type of Label**

		Newspapers		Total	
		<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>ThisDay</i>		
<b>Type of label</b>	Collectivised	Count	34	23	57
		% within Newspapers	6.0%	7.0%	6.4%
	Functionalised	Count	15	36	51
		% within Newspapers	2.6%	11.0%	5.7%
	Nominalised	Count	234	114	348
		% within Newspapers	41.1%	34.9%	38.8%
	Personalised	Count	7	10	17
		% within Newspapers	1.2%	3.1%	1.9%
	No labels	Count	280	144	424
		% within Newspapers	49.1%	44.0%	47.3%
Total		Count	570	327	897
		% within Newspapers	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Figure 5.2: Newspaper Headline Reporting in *Daily Trust* and *This Day* and the Type of Label**




Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2 show that *Daily Trust* employed more nominalised label, which accounted for 41.1 per cent representing 234 headlines than *ThisDay*, which had 34.9 per cent, representing 114 headlines. Nominalised label describes reference to Boko Haram according to the popular names the group is known by, such as Boko Haram, Jamaa’tul Ahlu Sunna Lidawaati li Jihad and Yusuffiyah. The finding shows that sub-editors in *Daily Trust* identified Boko Haram by its popular names which have no emotionally charged meanings attached than *ThisDay*. The nominalised label accounted for 41.1 per cent in *Daily Trust* while it had 34.9 per cent in *ThisDay*. This could suggest that the *Daily Trust* did not want to seem like it is describing Boko Haram in any negative connotations.

Additionally, *ThisDay*'s reporting adopted more functionalised label than *Daily Trust*. While the functionalised label accounted for 11.0 per cent, representing 36 headlines in *ThisDay*, *Daily Trust* had 2.6 per

cent representing 15 headlines. This finding suggests that *This Day's* reports addressed Boko Haram more by functionalised label – names such as, gunmen, suicide bomber, killers, and related ones which clearly depict the actual roles that the Boko Haram group carried out in the reported violent activities than *Daily Trust*. This could suggest that the *ThisDay* is bold and forthright in describing the violent roles that the Boko Haram carried out in the crisis.

In regard to the research question two of this study on whether there are differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012), this finding shows significant differences in the labels adopted by the two newspapers. The implication of this finding could be that since *ThisDay* operates outside the Boko Haram strongholds – in the southern part of the country, it seemed to have the boldness in identifying the group in the exact violent activities it engaged in which their counterparts at *Daily Trust* dared not attempt.

The following section thereby examines the language patterns using the CDA that were employed by these two newspapers in identifying Boko Haram in the reports.

### **5.5 Findings from CDA – Label Category**

Having found in the content analysis above that Boko Haram was identified by the nominalised label in *Daily Trust* than in *ThisDay* and was addressed by more functionalised label (names that depict the roles that Boko Haram carries out in the violent reports) in *ThisDay* than in *Daily Trust*, this section thereby examines the language patterns adopted in the headlines categories of nominalised (names that Boko Haram is popularly known by) and functionalised labels (names which describe the roles that Boko Haram plays in the reports) in each of the two newspapers. The first analysis began with *Daily Trust*.

### 5.5.1 CDA Analysis in *Daily Trust* – Label Category

This section presents analysis and findings in the *Daily Trust* headlines selected from the nominalised and functionalised label categories within the four phases of the study. In each of the phases, two headlines from the two label categories were selected, giving a total of eight headlines for the analysis. Below are the selected samples:

- (i) **NASFAT Urges FG to Dialogue With Boko Haram** (*Daily Trust*, 27-Jul-11)
- (ii) **NAC Condemns Boko Haram Over Latest Killings** (*Daily Trust*, 8-Nov-11)
- (iii) **FG Advised Against Use of Force On Boko Haram** (*Daily Trust*, 25-Jan-12)
- (iv) **Boko Haram Plans More Attacks On Media** (*Daily Trust*, 3-May-12)
- (v) **ANPP Chieftain, Pregnant Woman Killed By Gunmen in Borno** (*Daily Trust*, 26-Aug-11)
- (vi) **Gunmen Bomb Two Banks in Saminaka** (*Daily Trust*, 25-Oct-11)
- (vii) **Suicide Bombers Strike Kaduna Military Bases** (*Daily Trust*, 9-Feb-12)
- (viii) **Gunmen Attack, Rob Three Banks in Taraba** (*Daily Trust*, 28-Jun-12)

The study found that in the headlines that adopted the nominalised labels, (using the popular names of Boko Haram), *Daily Trust* adopted verb phrases which pictured the activities of Boko Haram as having some or no connection with violence. While in the headlines with functionalised labels (which depict Boko Haram's roles in the reports), the newspaper used verb phrases which identified Boko Haram in relation to the violence using a mix of explicit and implied language. Examples of the nominalised labels are in these headlines: (i) **NASFAT Urges FG to Dialogue With Boko Haram** – 'urges FG to dialogue with Boko Haram' indicates peaceful action with Boko Haram; (ii) **NAC Condemns Boko Haram Over Latest Killings** – the act of

condemnation over latest killings indicates violence connected to Boko Haram; (iii) **FG Advised Against Use Force On Boko Haram** – the headline does not picture Boko Haram in any violence rather the federal government warned against such action on the group.; and (iv) **Boko Haram Plans More Attacks On Media** – the verb phrase ‘plans more attacks’ signifies an intention by Boko Haram to attack.

It is evident that in *Daily Trust*, nominalised label of mentioning Boko Haram by its popular name was used in casting Boko Haram as having some or no connection with violence. The names are unemotionally charged and are popularly used in identifying the group. This type of language seems to suggest that the newspaper addressed Boko Haram using inoffensive language.

In addition, examples of headlines with functionalised labels include: headlines (v) **ANPP Chieftain, Pregnant Woman Killed By Gunmen in Borno** – in this case, the verb ‘killed’ explicitly indicates violence by using gunmen – the assigned name for Boko Haram; (vi) **Gunmen Bomb Two Banks in Saminaka** – the act of bombing is a clear case of violence also carried out by gunmen; (vii) **Suicide Bombers Strike Kaduna Military Bases** – in this context, the verb ‘strike’ connotes violence and the suicide bombers are cast as being responsible for it; and (viii) **Gunmen Attack, Rob Three Banks in Taraba** – in this context, the violent actions of the gunmen are clearly indicated by the two verbs – ‘attack’ and ‘rob’.

It can be inferred that in the headlines with functionalised labels, *Daily Trust* identified Boko Haram in violent activities using both explicit and implicit language. By using this type of expression, it shows that the newspaper is being cautious for identifying Boko Haram as the actor in the violent activities. Examining the story paragraphs for these headlines demonstrates that the labels in the analysed samples actually referred to Boko Haram. The following are the story paragraphs from the headlines:

### **ANPP Chieftain, Pregnant Woman Killed By Gunmen in Borno** (*Daily Trust*, 26-Aug-11)

*A 70-year-old chieftain of the All Nigeria Peoples Party, (ANPP) Alhaji Isa Marguba was on Tuesday night shot dead by some unidentified gunmen around Alamdiri ward of Maiduguri. [emphasis added]*

*Also killed in another attack was a pregnant woman, Mrs Yakaka Kaumi who was a senior accountant with the Borno state Ministry of Finance. [emphasis added]*

*In the first incident witnesses said the three **gunmen suspected to be members of Boko Haram** sect raided the residence of late Alhaji Marguba at Alamjeri ward in Maiduguri around 9pm and fired several shots at him before he slumped and died. [emphasis added]*

### **Gunmen Bomb Two Banks in Saminaka** (*Daily Trust*, 25-Oct-11)

*Daredevil gunmen attacked two banks and a police station in Saminaka, Lere local government area of Kaduna State in the early hours of yesterday killing three people, including a police inspector. They also injured two other persons. [emphasis added]*

*Meanwhile, leaders of the **Jama'atu Ahlus Sunnati Lidda'awati Wal Jihad**, also known as **Boko Haram** said that they were responsible for the killing of Zakariyya Isa, a reporter with the Nigeria Television Authority's (NTA) Maiduguri Network Centre. [emphasis added]*

*The group has also **claimed responsibility for Saturday night's multiple attacks on police station and banks in Saminaka**, Kaduna State as well as last week's attack on a Mopol barracks in Kwami, Gombe State. [emphasis added]*

### **Suicide Bombers Strike Kaduna Military Bases** (*Daily Trust*, 9-Feb-12)

*Suicide bombers, one of them disguised in military uniform, targeted two military bases in Kaduna yesterday as another bomb detonated at a busy overpass near a motor park, authorities and witnesses said. [emphasis added]*

*The **Boko Haram** sect yesterday **claimed responsibility for the attacks in Kaduna**, saying they were because of the recent arrests of their followers in the city. [emphasis added]*

### **Gunmen Attack, Rob Three Banks in Taraba** (*Daily Trust*, 28-Jun-12)

*Residents of Wukari in Taraba had a sleepless night on Tuesday, as gunmen suspected to armed robbers raided three commercial banks in the town and carted away large sums of money. [emphasis added]*

*He said that the sound threw the residents, **who thought Boko Haram** gunmen had invaded their area, into **panic**. [emphasis added]*

In the story paragraphs above, the word Boko Haram and some other word constructions around (in bold font) were found to provide evidence that the functionalised labels in the headlines were indeed made to refer to Boko Haram. This finding further suggests that the *Daily Trust* was cautious about associating Boko



Haram with violence through the ways that it identified the group using both the group's popular and functionalised labels in the headline reports – which are usually the first points of contact about stories.

To sum it up, the analysis in this section revealed some interesting patterns (see Table 5.4): In nominalised label which identified Boko Haram by its popular name, *Daily Trust* associated Boko Haram as having some or no connection with violent activities. In the functionalised label which depicts Boko Haram's roles in violent reports, the newspaper represented the group in violent activities using mostly implicit language.

### **5.5.2 CDA Analysis in *ThisDay* – Label Category**

This section presents findings from analysis of headlines in the label category of *ThisDay* using CDA method. The analysis focuses on headlines that adopted nominalised and functionalised labels. The analysis began with the selection of two headlines each from the two label categories within each of the four phases in the study. The following eight headlines were selected:

- (i) **Boko Haram is an Offshoot of Taliban, Says Yuguda** (*This Day*, 16-Aug-11)
- (ii) **Boko Haram Attacks JTF HQ in Maiduguri** (*This Day* 5-Nov-11)
- (iii) **Boko Haram – Army Seeks Public Rejection of Terrorism** (*This Day* 26-Jan-12)
- (iv) **FG, ACF Partner to Tackle Boko Haram** (*This Day* 17-May-12)
- (v) **Gombe – Four Killed As Gunmen Attack Mobile Police** (*This Day* 17-Oct-11)
- (vi) **Gunmen Attack Geidam, Yobe Governor's Village, Kill Four** (*This Day* 28-Nov-11)
- (vii) **Gunmen Shoot SSS Officer in Damaturu** (*This Day* 6-Feb-12)

(viii) **Suicide Bomber Kills 6 At Borno Police Headquarters** (*This Day* 9-Jun-12)

In these headlines, *ThisDay* employed nominalised verb phrases which identified Boko Haram by its popular name in relation to violent activities that were mostly directly expressed. The newspaper also adopted functionalised label in associating Boko Haram to violent reports that were directly stated. The examples of cases in the nominalised labels are in these headlines: (i) **Boko Haram is an Offshoot of Taliban, Says Yuguda** – the relative verb ‘is an offshoot of Taliban’ describes Boko Haram as developing from Taliban, a violent group in Afghanistan. This construction implies that Boko Haram is a violent group which emanated from the Taliban; (ii) **Boko Haram Attacks JTF HQ in Maiduguri** – the verb ‘attacks’ clearly describes violence; (iii) **Boko Haram – Army Seeks Public Rejection of Terrorism** – the context connotes that Boko Haram is connected to terrorism which the public is urged to move away from; and (iv) **FG, ACF Partner to Tackle Boko Haram** – in this context the verb phrase ‘tackle Boko Haram’ implies dealing with or confronting Boko Haram. It connotes dealing with something or persons with disapproving actions. Therefore, it is evident that *ThisDay* identified Boko Haram in relation to violence which was mostly explicitly expressed using the group’s popular name.

Examples of functionalised labels, which depict the roles of Boko Haram in violent reports were found in these headlines: (v) **Gombe – Four Killed As Gunmen Attack Mobile Police** – the verb ‘killed’ is a clear indication of violence; (vi) **Gunmen Attack Geidam, Yobe Governor's Village, Kill Four** – ‘kill’ in this case also specifies clear instance of death in the same way as in headline (v); (vii) **Gunmen Shoot SSS Officer in Damaturu** – the act of shooting is a clear reference to violence; and (viii) **Suicide Bomber Kills 6 At Borno Police Headquarters** – the verb ‘kill’ in this case also specifically indicates violence. These examples, suggest that in the functionalised label that depicted the roles of Boko Haram in violent reports, *ThisDay* directly identified Boko Haram in relation to the reported violent activities. In other words, the newspaper clearly presented the Boko Haram group as perpetrators of the violent actions.

This research conducted a further analysis of the body paragraphs of these headlines with functionalised labels in *Daily Trust* to ascertain whether the labels actually referred to Boko Haram. Below are the headlines with their accompanying paragraphs:

**Gombe – Four Killed As Gunmen Attack Mobile Police** (*This Day* 17-Oct-11)

*A police officer and three civilians were in the early hours of Sunday killed when **unknown gunmen suspected to be Boko Haram members** attacked 34 Squadron Mobile Police Base along Dukku Road on the outskirts of Gombe metropolis.*

**Gunmen Attack Geidam, Yobe Governor's Village, Kill Four** (*This Day* 28-Nov-11)

*The wave of attacks and violence in several North-eastern towns in Nigeria continued over the weekend with the attack on Geidam, the home town of Governor Ibrahim Geidam of Yobe State. [emphasis added]*

*While authorities declined to reveal who they suspect in the attack, **it mirrors other assaults recently carried out by the Boko Haram**. The group has launched a series of attacks against Nigeria's central government over the last year in its campaign to implement strict Sharia law across the nation of more than 160 million people. [emphasis added]*

***Boko Haram claimed responsibility for a November 4 attack on Damaturu**, Yobe State's capital that killed more than 100 people. The group also claimed responsibility for the August 24 suicide car bombing of the United Nations' headquarters in Abuja that killed 24 people and wounded 116 others. [emphasis added]*

**Gunmen Shoot SSS Officer in Damaturu** (*This Day*, 6-Feb-12)

*Gunmen late Sunday shot dead a State Security Service (SSS) officer in front of his house in Damaturu, a resident said. The police confirmed the shooting, but said they were not sure if he was killed, reports AFP. [emphasis added]*

***Damaturu has been hit hard by violence blamed on the Islamist group Boko Haram.** [emphasis added]*

**Suicide Bomber Kills 6 At Borno Police Headquarters** (*This Day* 9-Jun-12)

*It was another sad day in Maiduguri, Borno State yesterday as bomb explosions rocked part of the town resulting in the death of seven persons. [emphasis added]*

*One of the explosions was at the Borno State Police headquarters where a suicide bomber made a dash on it and got six persons killed including two policemen and four civilians. [emphasis added]*

***A police source said the suicide car bomber believed to be a member of the dreaded Boko Haram sect attempted to force his way into the headquarters through the main gate with a car laden with explosives.** [emphasis added]*

The analysed paragraphs show that the functionalised label used in the headlines directly referred to Boko Haram in the story paragraphs. This clearly shows that *ThisDay* actually employed more descriptive identifications of Boko Haram in relation to the group’s roles in the violence than *Daily Trust*.

The following table shows the language patterns and their possible implications relating to the type of label used in representing Boko Haram. By label, it describes how Boko Haram is named in the headlines reporting in *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust*.

**Table 5.4: The Language Patterns in *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* – Label Analysis**

Phases	Patterns	Implications
<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>Daily Trust</i> associated Boko Haram as having some or no connection with violent activities using nominalised label which identified Boko Haram by its popular name. Also, the newspaper represented the group in violent activities using both explicit and implicit language through the functionalised label.	This could suggest that the newspaper was cautious in identifying Boko Haram as the actor in violent activities.
<i>ThisDay</i>	<i>ThisDay</i> employed nominalised label which depicted Boko Haram by its popular name in relation to violent activities that were mostly directly expressed. Also, the newspaper adopted functionalised label in associating Boko Haram to violent reports that were directly stated.	This implies that <i>ThisDay</i> employed more descriptive identifications of Boko Haram in relation to the group’s roles in the violence.

Through the patterns found in the analysis and their implications (see Table 5.4), it can be argued that there are clear differences in *ThisDay's* and *Daily Trust's* reporting in the use of labels that were employed in identifying Boko Haram in the headlines.

### **5.6 Findings from Content Analysis – Blame Category**

This section examines whether there are differences in who was attributed violence between Boko Haram and security agents in the reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay*. The research examined the categories of Boko Haram attacking and security agents attacking to determine how the blame was assigned between the two parties. The rationale for selecting these two categories over the other four in the group is because only these two specified blame, which is the focus of the analysis in this category. The others focused on defending.


As reflected in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.3, it is evident that in *ThisDay's* reporting, Boko Haram was attributed violence more than in *Daily Trust*, while *Daily Trust's* reporting ascribed more violence to security agents than *ThisDay*.

The following table presents newspaper headline reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* relating to who is blamed for attacks between Boko Haram and security agents.

**Table 5.5: Newspaper Headline Reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* and the Type of Blame**

		Newspapers			
		Daily Trust	This Day	Total	
<b>Who is blamed</b>	Boko Haram attacking	Count	60	73	133
		% within Newspapers	10.5%	22.4%	14.8%
	Security agents defending	Count	41	43	84
		% within Newspapers	7.2%	13.2%	9.4%
	Boko Haram defending	Count	4	1	5
		% within Newspapers	0.7%	0.3%	0.6%
	Security agents attacking	Count	15	7	22
		% within Newspapers	2.6%	2.1%	2.5%
	No blame for wrongdoing	Count	185	162	347
		% within Newspapers	32.5%	49.7%	38.7%
	No wrongdoing	Count	265	40	305
		% within Newspapers	46.5%	12.3%	34.0%
	Total	Count	570	326	896
		% within Newspapers	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Figure 5.3: The Language Patterns in *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* – Blame Analysis**



In *Daily Trust*'s reporting, Boko Haram was presented as attacking in headlines which accounted for 10.5 per cent, while security agents attacked in headlines which accounted for 2.6 per cent. In *ThisDay*, Boko Haram was attacking at 22.4 per cent, while security agents attacked at 2.1 per cent. The evidence in this analysis has shown that in both newspapers, Boko Haram was attributed more violence for attacks than security agents. Also, *ThisDay* attributed more blame to Boko Haram than *Daily Trust* did.

The next section discusses the textual analysis of the news headlines, using CDA to examine whether there are differences in the language use in headlines blaming Boko Haram and security agents for attacks in the two newspapers.

## 5.7 Findings from CDA – Blame Category

This section presents the headline analysis and findings in the blaming category from the two newspapers. The groupings on ‘Boko Haram attacking’ and ‘Security agents attacking’ are the focus of the analysis. Below are the selected headlines from *Daily Trust* newspaper:

### 5.7.1 CDA Analysis in *Daily Trust* – Blame Category

This section presents findings from analysis of headlines in *Daily Trust* newspaper using CDA. As noted earlier, the samples were selected from the sections of headlines that referred to either Boko Haram attacking or security agents attacking during the four phases the study covers. Below are the selected samples:

- (i) **One killed in clashes with Islamic sect in Nigeria's northern Borno State** (*Daily Trust*, 4-Aug-11)
- (ii) **Boko Haram – Army Sends 20 Sniffer Dogs to us** (*Daily Trust*, 25-Oct-11)
- (iii) **Gaidam Police Station Bombing – Boko Haram Claims Responsibility** (*Daily Trust*, 29-Nov-11)
- (iv) **Suicide Bombers Strike Kaduna Military Bases** (*Daily Trust*, 9-Feb-12)
- (v) **How Soldiers Killed Three at Kano Filling Station** (*Daily Trust*, 13-Mar-12)
- (vi) **SSS, Soldiers Battle 'Boko Haram' in Zaria** (*Daily Trust*, 9-Mar-12)
- (vii) **JTF Raids Bomb Factory, Kills BUK Terror Suspect** (*Daily Trust*, 2-May-12)
- (viii) **Boko Haram Plans More Attacks On Media** (*Daily Trust*, 3-May-12)

The study found that *Daily Trust* employed verb phrases which implicitly and explicitly described Boko Haram and security agents in connection to the reported violence. The verb phrases that were employed in attributing violence to Boko Haram include: (i) **One killed in clashes with Islamic sect in Nigeria's northern Borno State** – ‘killed’ in the expression denotes explicit violence by the Islamic sect (one of the labels for Boko Haram); (iii) **Gaidam Police Station Bombing – Boko Haram Claims Responsibility** – the verb phrase ‘claims responsibility’ in conjunction with the subject head ‘police station bombing’ clearly



expresses the violent action of bombing by the Boko Haram; (iv) **Suicide Bombers Strike Kaduna Military Bases** – ‘strike’ in this context connotes violence committed by the suicide bombers (one of the assigned names of Boko Haram); and (viii) **Boko Haram Plans More Attacks On Media** – in the same way as in sample (iv), the verb phrase ‘plans more attacks’ connotes violence by the Boko Haram. This research found that in *Daily Trust*, violence was attributed to Boko Haram through a combination of implicit and explicit constructions. This could suggest that *Daily Trust* did not want to explicitly identify Boko Haram as the actors in the violence.

Additionally, this research examined the verb phrases that were adopted in the headlines about security agents attacking, in headline samples: (ii) **Boko Haram – Army Sends 20 Sniffer Dogs to us** – the expression ‘sends 20 sniffer dogs’ connotes violence by the army towards Boko Haram; (v) **How Soldiers Killed Three at Kano Filling Station** – in this context, ‘killed’ clearly denotes violence perpetrated by the soldiers; (vi) **SSS, Soldiers Battle 'Boko Haram' in Zaria** – the verb ‘battle’ in this context clearly denotes violence by the security agencies against Boko Haram in one of the towns in the north; and (vii) **JTF Raids Bomb Factory, Kills BUK Terror Suspect** – the verb ‘raid’ connotes violent action while the second verb, ‘kill’ clearly expressed violence as well. The actions were committed by the Joint Task Force – one of the security agents.

In these samples, *Daily Trust* ascribed violent actions to security agents through direct and indirect constructions. This finding could imply that in the same way as the analysed samples on Boko Haram, which was discussed in the section above, *Daily Trust* did not want to explicitly assign violence to security agents.

### 5.7.2 CDA Analysis in *ThisDay* – Blame Category

This section presents the CDA findings from analysis of headlines in *ThisDay*. The selection pattern of the headlines is similar to the section on *Daily Trust* above. The following eight samples were selected:

- (i) **Gunmen Open Fire On Maiduguri Police Station** (*This Day*, 5-Aug-11)
- (ii) **Soldiers Kill Suspected Islamist in Adamawa** (*This Day*, 3-Sep-11)
- (iii) **Over 136 Dead in Yobe Boko Haram Attacks** (*This Day*, 6-Nov-11)
- (iv) **Suspected Gunmen Kill Eight** (*This Day*, 5-Apr-12)
- (v) **Victorious Weekend for Military, Police, As They Bomb Boko Haram Hideout** (*This Day*, 23-Apr-12)
- (vi) **Boko Haram Kills Two Prison Wardens in Borno** (*This Day*, 5-May-12)
- (vii) **JTF Kills Boko Haram Member** (*This Day*, 24-May-12)
- (viii) **Army Chief – We're At War With Boko Haram** (*This Day*, 11-Apr-12)

The following table shows the language patterns and their possible implications in headline reporting in *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* relating to who is blamed for attacks between Boko Haram and security agents.

**Table 5.6: The Language Patterns in *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* – Blame Analysis**

Newspapers	Patterns	Implications
<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>Daily Trust</i> ascribed violent actions to both Boko Haram and security agents using direct and indirect constructions.	By using a combination of direct and indirect constructions associating Boko Haram and security agencies to violence, perhaps the sub-editors did not want to seem like they are taking sides.
<i>ThisDay</i>	<i>ThisDay</i> adopted explicit language in attributing violence to Boko Haram and security agents.	This could imply that the newspaper is clearly expressive in reporting about the perpetrators of the violence rather than being descriptive

This study found that in *ThisDay*'s headline reporting, verb phrases were employed to construct blame about Boko Haram and security agents using language that clearly expressed violent actions. Examples of headlines attributing violence to Boko Haram include: (i) **Gunmen Open Fire On Maiduguri Police Station** – ‘open fire’ in the expression suggests shooting which clearly indicates violence; (iii) **Over 136 Dead in Yobe Boko Haram Attacks** – ‘dead’ is a clear indication that lives were lost; (iv) **Suspected Gunmen Kill Eight** – ‘kill’ obviously indicates loss of lives (vi) **Boko Haram Kills Two Prison Wardens in Borno** – ‘kill’ in this context is used in similar ways in sample (vi). The headlines were cast showing that Boko Haram was connected to the violence either through the use of the group’s popular or assigned names.

In this sample, *ThisDay* used direct phrasing in attributing violence to Boko Haram, which may be because the newspaper’s head office is far located from direct confrontations of Boko Haram. This may also

mean that the sub-editors in the newspaper were expressive in exposing the perpetrators of the crisis rather than being descriptive.

Furthermore, the study found that in the category of security agents attacking, the headline reports in this newspaper were constructed using verb phrases that explicitly described the attacks that security agents carried out. Examples of headlines in this category include headlines (ii) **Soldiers Kill Suspected Islamist in Adamawa** – ‘kill’ in this context explicitly indicates violence; (v) **Victorious Weekend for Military, Police, As They Bomb Boko Haram Hideout** – ‘bomb’ is a clear case of violence; (vii) **JTF Kills Boko Haram Member** – ‘kill’ in this expression unarguably indicates violence; and (viii) **Army Chief – We're At War With Boko Haram** – in this context, being at war denotes armed conflict, which is a clear case of violence. The analysis implies that the reports were direct in describing the violent actions carried out by the security agents.

In general, this study found clear differences in the language patterns the two newspapers adopted in attributing violence to Boko Haram and security agents (see Table 5.6).

In regard to research two of this study which seeks to understand whether there are differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *This Day's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012). The following section analyses sampled headlines from the tone category using both the content analysis and CDA.

## **5.8 Findings from Content Analysis – Tone Category**

This study found that in *ThisDay*, more negative tones were employed in reporting on the activities of Boko Haram than in *Daily Trust*. More positive tones were adopted in *Daily Trust's* reporting than in *This Day* (Table 5.7 and Figure 5.4).

The following table presents newspaper headline reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* in relation to type of tone used. By tone, it refers to words and expressions in the headlines showing negative, positive or neutral words and phrases.

**Table 5.7: Newspaper Headline Reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* and the Type of Tone**


		Newspapers		Total	
		<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>ThisDay</i>		
<b>Type of Tone</b>	Negative	Count	220	196	416
		% within Newspapers	38.6%	60.3%	46.5%
	Positive	Count	193	81	274
		% within Newspapers	33.9%	24.9%	30.6%
	Neutral	Count	157	48	205
		% within Newspapers	27.5%	14.8%	22.9%
Total		Count	570	325	895
		% within Newspapers	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

This finding implies that since the head office of *ThisDay* is located in the southern region and most of its reporters are based in the region, – outside Boko Haram’s circle of attack – they tend to be free in emphasising on the negative activities of the group than their counterparts at *Daily Trust* whose reports are more about positive issues concerning Boko Haram.

In the same way, this study further found that headline reports in *Daily Trust* had more neutral reporting about Boko Haram than in *ThisDay*, which shows that *Daily Trust*’s reporting seems impartial in reporting on Boko Haram. But analyses based on positive and negative tones were considered more useful

since they provide clear and distinct interpretations in the study. Therefore, the analysis in the CDA section below is focused on positive and negative tone.

**Figure 5.4: Newspaper Headline Reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* and the Type of Tone**



### 5.9 Findings from CDA – Tone Category

This section presents analysis and findings from the headlines in the tone category using the CDA method. In the same way with the content analysis selection, positive and negative tone categories were selected from the *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay*.

### 5.9.1: Newspaper Analysis in *Daily Trust* – Tone Category

The headlines in this section were analysed using the CDA method. The samples were selected from the *Daily Trust* newspaper. The following eight headline samples were selected from the positive and negative sections within each of the four phases in the study:

- (i) **One killed in clashes with Islamic sect in Nigeria's northern Borno State Maiduguri** (*Daily Trust*, 4-Aug-11)
- (ii) **UN official calls on Nigerian government to improve security measures** (*Daily Trust*, 1-Sep-11)
- (iii) **U.S. – Abuja's Top Three Hotels May Face Bomb Attacks** (*Daily Trust*, 8-Nov-11)
- (iv) **Abuja Judges Proffer Recipe to Curbing Terrorism** (*Daily Trust*, 6- Dec-11)
- (v) **FG Advised Against Use Force On Boko Haram** (*Daily Trust*, 25-Jan- 12)
- (vi) **Breaking News!!! Gun Battle At Kaduna Government House** (*Daily Trust*, 15-Feb-12)
- (vii) **Suicide Bombers Target Police Commissioner - 11 Killed in Jalingo Attack** (*Daily Trust*, 1-May 12)
- (viii) **FG Calls on Boko Haram to Cease Fire** (*Daily Trust*, 12-May-12)

Some the headlines above show that Boko Haram was indirectly identified in violent activities, which suggests negative tone. This clearly shows that *Daily Trust* indirectly cast Boko Haram as a group with capacity for violence. Also, some of the samples identified the Nigerian government and its agencies in cases that seem positive but signified them as not doing enough, which connotes negative. This also could imply that *Daily Trust* seems to suggest that the government/security agency is not adequately addressing the crisis.

Examples of the headlines with negative tone are: (i) **One killed in clashes with Islamic sect in Nigeria's northern Borno –State Maiduguri** – the verb ‘killed’ clearly indicates violence connected with the Islamic sect, also labelled Boko Haram as shown elsewhere in this thesis; (iii) **U.S. – Abuja's Top Three Hotels May Face Bomb Attacks** – the warning by the United States (U.S) about impending bomb attacks

from an unknown source is speculating violence; (vi) **Breaking News!!! Gun Battle At Kaduna Government House** – ‘the noun phrase gun battle denotes violent actions, but Boko Haram or those involved in the battle were unnamed; and (vii) **Suicide Bombers Target Police Commissioner – 11 Killed in Jalingo Attack** – the verb ‘target’ and ‘killed’ both connotatively and denotatively suggest violence respectively. In this case, suicide bombers – one of the labels assigned to Boko Haram - was connected with the violence.

In addition, this research analysed how Boko Haram was identified in the story paragraphs of these agentless and labelled headlines. By agentless, it refers to headlines that do not include persons or groups responsible for the reported violence while labelled headlines describe headlines with alternative names for Boko Haram, such as bomber, Islamist, gunmen and so on. Below are the story paragraphs of the headlines without agencies for violence.

**One killed in clashes with Islamic sect in Nigeria's northern Borno –State Maiduguri** (*Daily Trust*, 4-Aug-11)

*A taxi driver was killed yesterday in an exchange of fire between members of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and those of the **Boko Haram** sect shortly after a bomb explosion at Gomari Junction in Maiduguri yesterday. [emphasis added]*

**U.S. – Abuja's Top Three Hotels May Face Bomb Attacks** (*Daily Trust*, 8-Nov-11)

*The United States embassy in Nigeria yesterday warned that the **Boko Haram** sect which has claimed responsibility for string of attacks that left more than 100 people dead in Damaturu and Maiduguri on Friday could bomb three luxury hotels frequented by foreigners in Abuja. [emphasis added]*

**Breaking News!!! Gun Battle At Kaduna Government House** (*Daily Trust*, 15-Feb-12)

***Boko haram** members had only on Tuesday last week launched an attack on the Headquarters of the 1 Mechanised Division and detonated one other bomb along Kawo fly over and another close to the perimeter fence of the Air force Base in what they claimed were reprisal attacks for the arrest of their sect members in the state.*

**Suicide Bombers Target Police Commissioner – 11 Killed in Jalingo Attack** (*Daily Trust*, 1-May-12)

*The Taraba State Police Commissioner had a close shave yesterday when three suicide bombers riding motorbikes rammed into his convoy in Jalingo, causing an explosion that killed at least 11 people.*

*No group claimed responsibility for the Jalingo attack, but it bears semblance with strikes carried out by the **Boko Haram** sect.*



The analysis above shows that while the headline reports did not identify Boko Haram as responsible for violent actions, the story paragraphs clearly indicated that Boko Haram was connected to the violence in some ways – in some instances, the Boko Haram group reportedly claimed responsibility for the attacks, while in other instances, connections between attacks were used to establish Boko Haram’s involvement.

The following are the examples of headlines that identified the Nigerian government and its agencies in events that seem positive but signified them as not doing enough, which connotes negatives: (ii) **UN official calls on Nigerian government to improve security measures** – the verb phrase ‘to improve security measures’ is constructed in a positive context but it implies that the UN thinks the Nigerian government is not doing enough on security, which is a negative judgement; (iv) **Abuja Judges Proffer Recipe to Curbing Terrorism** – in this case, the plan by the judges (the third tier of government in Nigeria) on ways of stopping terrorism suggests positive action but also implies that not enough is being done or wrong things are being done concerning terrorism. This also is a negative portrayal; (v) **FG Advised Against Use of Force On Boko Haram** – the advice against the use of force was given to the federal government (FG) of Nigeria. It is an advice dissuading the government from engaging in violence with Boko Haram, which seems to be a good idea but portrayed the government as not using the right approach against the Boko Haram; and (viii) **FG Calls on Boko Haram to Cease Fire** – the calls by the federal government to Boko Haram to stop violence looks positive as it suggests putting an end to violence but it also signifies that the government is helpless or not doing enough to provide solutions to the crisis.

Based on the analysis above, this study found that in *Daily Trust*, Nigerian government and its agencies were associated with positive actions that signified they were incapacitated in stemming the violence.

### 5.9.2 Newspaper Analysis in *ThisDay* – Tone Category

The selection process of the headlines in this section follows the same method as the analysis on *Daily Trust*. The samples were analysed using the CDA. Below are the selected headline samples:

- i. **JTF Patrol Team Escapes Explosion in Maiduguri** (*This Day*, 22-Jul-11)
- ii. **JTF Mops Up 5,000 Weapons From Maiduguri Residents** (*This Day*, 4-Nov-11)
- iii. **Dozens Killed in Attacks in Damaturu** (*This Day*, 5-Nov-11)
- iv. **Boko Haram Attacks JTF HQ in Maiduguri** (*This Day*, 5-Nov-11)
- v. **Boko Haram – Police Impound Vehicles With Explosives in Kano** (*This Day*, 23-Jan-12)
- vi. **Boko Haram Threatens to Attack Sokoto** (*This Day*, 30-Jan-12)
- vii. **More Condemnation Trails Attack On This Day Offices** (*This Day*, 28-Apr-12)
- viii. **Kano – SSS Operatives Arrest Suspected Supplier of Bomb Making Chemicals** (*This Day*, 2-May-12)

This analysis shows that the verb phrases in the headlines were constructed in a way that indicates both positive and negative actions: the negative actions were identified with Boko Haram while the positive actions were connected with security agencies. The samples with negative actions include headlines: (iii) **Dozens Killed in Attacks in Damaturu** – the verb ‘killed’ denotes negative action but the agent responsible for the killing is not stated; (iv) **Boko Haram Attacks JTF HQ in Maiduguri** – ‘attack’ clearly signifies a negative action carried out by Boko Haram; (vi) **Boko Haram Threatens to Attack Sokoto** – ‘threatens to attack’ clearly signifies an action with negative intention, in which Boko Haram is clearly indicated as the agent responsible for the threat; and (vii) **More Condemnation Trails Attack On ThisDay Offices** – the construction in this headline clearly signifies a negative action, in which Boko Haram or any agents for the attack was not mentioned.

For clarification on the identity of persons responsible for the negative actions in the headlines with unnamed agents, further analysis was carried out on the story paragraphs to determine how Boko Haram was constructed. The following are the headlines and the accompanying story paragraphs:

**Dozens Killed in Attacks in Damaturu** (*This Day*, 5-Nov-11)

*Bomb and gun attacks targeting police stations and churches in Damaturu left dozens of people dead and at least 100 injured, witnesses said on Saturday.*

*The attackers bombed a city police headquarters, three other police stations and several churches in the capital of Yobe State late Friday after similar raids in another city that had already been the target of attacks by an **Islamist sect**.*

In this case, the attack was connected to an Islamist sect, which this study has identified as one of the assigned labels for the Boko Haram group.

**More Condemnation Trails Attack On ThisDay Offices** (*This Day*, 28-Apr-12)

*More condemnation and outrage have followed Thursday's bomb attacks on **THISDAY's** offices in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, and Kaduna.*

*The offices of **The Sun** and **Moment** newspapers in Kaduna were also affected in the bombings, which were the first direct attack on media houses since the inception of the **Boko Haram** insurgency.*

In the paragraphs above, *ThisDay* newspaper clearly identified Boko Haram in connection with the negative actions but its name was elided in the headlines. This suggests that *ThisDay's* reports implicitly associated Boko Haram with the violence.

Clearly, the analysis has shown that *ThisDay* employed both explicit and implicit constructions in identifying the violent activities of Boko Haram. Explicit negative constructions could suggest that the newspaper is expressive in its report of the violence while implicit expressions could be otherwise. Hence, the use of both expressions could suggest that the newspaper is being cautious.

The samples that employed positive verb phrases about security agents are in these headlines: (i) **JTF Patrol Team Escapes Explosion in Maiduguri** – ‘escapes explosion’ is an indication of positive action since

lives have been saved; (ii) **JTF Mops Up 5,000 Weapons From Maiduguri Residents** – the action of ‘mopping up’ weapons from the residents of Maiduguri (one of the strongholds of the Boko Haram activities) by the JTF signifies a positive action since it could prevent using the weapons for violence by the Boko Haram group; (v) **Boko Haram – Police Impound Vehicles With Explosives in Kano** – in the same way as the headline (ii), the action of seizing or confiscating vehicles with explosives in Kano (one of the northern states known as the flashpoints of Boko Haram) by the police also contextualised the headline in a positive way. It signifies that police were involved in a good act. (viii) **Kano – SSS Operatives Arrest Suspected Supplier of Bomb Making Chemicals** – the arrest of the supplier by the State Security Operatives (SSS) signifies positive action. The finding in this analysis suggests that security agents have been clearly represented with positive actions in order to portray them positively. This could imply that the newspaper seems not to find negative reports about the security agencies.

In sum, the findings present some language patterns that show significant differences in the tone used by the two newspapers (see Table 5.8). The findings proffer answers to the research question two of this study which seeks to investigate whether there are differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust’s* and *ThisDay’s* reporting over the timeline of the study.

The following table shows the language patterns and their possible implications relating to the type of tone used in the reporting.

**Table 5.8: The Language Patterns in *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* – Tone Analysis**

Phases	Patterns	Implications
<i>Daily Trust</i>	Boko Haram was indirectly identified in negative tone in relation to violent activities which suggests negative. Also, the Nigerian government/security agencies were identified in cases that seemed positive but depicted as not doing enough, which also suggests negative.	This could imply that perhaps the newspaper seems to focus on reporting violent actions rather than dwelling on the perpetrators of the act. Also, it could imply that <i>Daily Trust</i> seems to suggest that the government was not adequately addressing the crisis.
<i>ThisDay</i>	Boko Haram was identified in negative tone through constructions that both explicitly and implicitly connected the group to violent actions while the Nigerian government and its agencies were explicitly identified as a positive group through reports that connected them with positive actions.	By connecting Boko Haram to violence using both direct and indirect constructions could suggest that <i>ThisDay</i> was being cautious. While presenting the Nigerian government and its agencies in positive lights seems like <i>ThisDay</i> could not find negative reports about the security agencies.

### 5.10 Findings from Content Analysis – Frame Category

The analysis in this section is focused on examining the type of frames that were employed by *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* in the period of this study. In regards to this, only variables about framing of Boko Haram were selected in the analysis, and they are: Episodic frames and Thematic frames about Boko Haram. By episodic frames about Boko Haram, it refers to specific actions or events about Boko Haram such as killing, bombing, attacking, gun shooting and so on. Thematic frames on the other hand, describe broad issues or events about Boko Haram such as insecurity, violence, terrorism and related issues.


The selection of the categories was made in accordance with the focus of the analysis in this section. The other three categories in the group (episodic frames about security agents/government, thematic frames about security agents/government, and no frame) were not relevant to the discourse.

The following table presents newspaper headline reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* relating to the type of frames that were adopted in representing Boko Haram.

**Table 5.9: Newspaper Headline Reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* and the Type of Frame**

		Newspapers			
		Daily Trust	This Day	Total	
<b>Type of Frames</b>	Episodic frames about Boko Haram	Count	143	111	254
		% within Newspapers	25.1%	34.0%	28.4%
	Episodic frames about security agents/govt.	Count	140	85	225
		% within Newspapers	24.6%	26.1%	25.1%
	Thematic frames about Boko Haram	Count	48	10	58
		% within Newspapers	8.4%	3.1%	6.5%
	Thematic frames about security agents/govt.	Count	9	2	11
		% within Newspapers	1.6%	0.6%	1.2%
	No frames	Count	229	118	347
		% within Newspapers	40.2%	36.2%	38.8%
Total		Count	569	326	895
		% within Newspapers	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Figure 5.5: Newspaper Headline Reporting in *Daily Trust* and *This Day* and the Type of Frame**



This study found that *ThisDay* identified Boko Haram in more episodic frames, accounting for 34 per cent than in *Daily Trust*, which accounts for 25.1 per cent. Also, *Daily Trust* represented Boko Haram in thematic frames with 8.4 per cent more than *ThisDay* with 3.1 per cent (Table 5.9 and Figure 5.5). These findings suggest that specific actions and events about Boko Haram were reported more in *ThisDay* than in *Daily Trust*, while general issues and events about Boko Haram were reported more in *Daily Trust* than in *ThisDay*. This could suggest that *ThisDay* focused more on specific events about Boko Haram than *Daily Trust*. Such event-based issues include reports on killings and other violent actions by Boko Haram. The finding further shows that thematic framing by the two newspapers was less compared to the episodic. The thematic frames emphasised greater depths about the Boko Haram like reports on how to find solutions to the Boko Haram crisis. This finding provides evidence that there are significant differences in the way the two newspapers represented Boko Haram.

The following table presents newspaper headline reporting in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* in relation to type of frame used in identifying Boko Haram. By frames, it describes how events or actions are described in the headlines as either episodic or thematic.

### **5.11 Newspaper Analysis from the CDA – Frame Category**

This section presents findings from the language analysis of the sampled headlines in the categories of episodic frames about Boko Haram and thematic frames about Boko Haram through the CDA methodology. The headlines were separately selected and analysed from *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* newspapers.

Below are the selections of headline samples from *Daily Trust*:

#### **5.11.1 Newspaper Analysis from *Daily Trust* – Frame Category**

This section focuses on frames analysis using CDA method. The headlines were selected from the sub-categories of episodic frames about Boko Haram and thematic frames about Boko Haram in the *Daily Trust* newspaper. These were selected from each of the four phases in the study, making a total of eight samples:

- (i) **Bring Our Money or Risk Your Lives, Boko Haram Tells 'Negotiators'** (*Daily Trust*, 18-Oct-11)
- (ii) **Christmas Day Bombings – Muslim Leaders Disown Boko Haram – Sultan** (*Daily Trust*, 28-Dec-11)
- (iii) **Boko Haram Got Al Qaeda Bomb Training, Niger Says** (*Daily Trust*, 27-Jan-12)
- (iv) **'Boko Haram Ploy to Destroy North'** (*Daily Trust*, 18-May-12)
- (v) **Boko Haram – Be Firm With Security Arrangement, NBA Tells FG**  
(*Daily Trust*, 12-Oct-11)
- (vi) **Saraki – Citizens Must Find Lasting Solution to Boko Haram** (*Daily Trust*, 28-Dec-11)



(vii) **Religious Harmony as Antidote to Boko Haram [opinion]** (*Daily Trust*, 3-Feb-12)

(viii) **Boko Haram – Muslim Army? [opinion]** (*Daily Trust*, 23-Jun-12)

The samples above adopted both episodic and thematic framing about Boko Haram, the verb and noun phrases in the headlines were constructed to describe Boko Haram in activities that were not directly related to violence. For instance, in the episodic frames about Boko Haram, which include headlines (i) **Bring Our Money or Risk Your Lives, Boko Haram Tells 'Negotiators'** – the verb phrase ‘risk your lives’ in the headline connotes violence, as it suggests threat to life; (ii) **Christmas Day Bombings - Muslim Leaders Disown Boko Haram – Sultan** – the verb phrase ‘disown Boko Haram’ in relation to the bombings points to violent action by the Boko Haram; (iii) **Boko Haram Got Al Qaeda Bomb Training, Niger Says** – ‘got Al Qaeda Bomb training’ connotes violent action since Al Qaeda is a group known for violent activities; and (iv) **'Boko Haram Ploy to Destroy North'** – in this context, ‘ploy to destroy’ describes Boko Haram’s violent plan.

This analysis therefore shows that in episodic framing about Boko Haram, *Daily Trust* identified Boko Haram as being involved in actions that have connotations of violence. Ironically, episodic frames are expected to describe the violence in specific terms not by speculation or indirect ways.

The cases of thematic frames about Boko Haram include headlines: (v) **Boko Haram - Be Firm With Security Arrangement, NBA Tells FG** – The construction does not suggest explicit violence but has the connotation of violence in the verb phrase; ‘be firm with security arrangement’, which provides suggestion to the federal government on the safety of the state against activities associated with Boko Haram; (vi) **Saraki – Citizens Must Find Lasting Solution to Boko Haram** – The phrase ‘find lasting solution’ is an indication that there is a challenging situation which prompted Saraki (one of the governors in the northern states of

Nigeria) at the time to make this statement. The context of the headline suggests broad description of violence associated with Boko Haram.; (vii) **Religious Harmony as Antidote to Boko Haram [opinion]** – in this case, the noun phrase ‘antidote to Boko Haram’ connotes negative, since antidote means counteracting an unpleasant situation, and Boko Haram is framed as the signifier of the situation; and (viii) **Boko Haram – Muslim Army? [opinion]** – the noun phrase ‘Muslim army’ in this context, is framed in a question format and metaphorically questions whether Boko Haram is a group meant to fight for the Muslim; suggesting that Boko Haram is a Muslim group capable of acting violently.

The thematic framing describes implicit constructions employed to frame violent activities associated with Boko Haram. This is unsurprising because it is expected that thematic framing provides general or broad descriptions of issues, so if Boko Haram was framed in this way, indirect identification of the group with violence is certain. The analysis finds that in these headlines from *Daily Trust*, caution and evasive tactics were applied in the framing of Boko Haram’s violent activities. Overall, it is evident that *Daily Trust’s* reporting had adopted both episodic and thematic frames to identify Boko Haram’s violent activities. Perhaps, by adopting indirect constructions for episodic frames, which are expected to provide direct and specific reporting of events could suggest that the newspaper was being cautious and evasive.

The following table shows the language patterns employed through the CDA and their possible implications in *ThisDay’s* and *Daily Trust’s* reporting relating to frames about Boko Haram. By frames, it describes how events or actions are described in the headlines as either episodic or thematic.

**Table 5.10: The Language Patterns in *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* – Frame Analysis**

Newspapers	Patterns	Implications
<i>Daily Trust</i>	<i>Daily Trust</i> adopted both episodic and thematic frames in identifying Boko Haram’s violent activities: In episodic framing, <i>Daily Trust</i> identified Boko Haram as being involved in actions had connotations of violence, but in thematic framing the newspaper adopted indirect constructions to frame violent activities associated with Boko Haram.	By adopting indirect constructions of the violence in episodic reports that requires specificity in descriptions of events could imply that <i>Daily Trust</i> was being cautious and evasive.
<i>ThisDay</i>	In episodic frames about Boko Haram, <i>ThisDay</i> identified Boko Haram as being involved in clearly identifiable cases of violence while in thematic frames, Boko Haram was identified with general issues of terrorism and insecurity, connoting negative activities.	By providing explicitly descriptions of the violence in the episodic framing, it shows that the newspaper was bold and forthright.

**5.11.2 CDA Analysis in *ThisDay* – Framing Category**

This section examines eight selected headlines using CDA. The samples were selected from the categories of episodic frames about Boko Haram and thematic frames about Boko Haram in the *ThisDay* newspaper from each of the four phases in the study. The following are the selected headlines:

- i. **Boko Haram – Obasanjo's Host Killed After Talks** (*This Day*, 18-Sep-11)

- ii. **Boko Haram – Isa, NTA Cameraman, Killed for Spying** (*This Day*, 25-Oct-11)
- iii. **Kano – Five Killed As Boko Haram Armoury Discovered** (*This Day*, 7-Feb-12)
- iv. **Another Christmas Day Bomber Arrested** (*This Day*, 22-Jun-12)
- v. **U.S. House Wants Boko Haram Designated Terrorist Group** (*This Day*, 1-Dec-11)
- vi. **Terror Attack – We Now Have Strong Leads, Says Jonathan** (*This Day*, 3-Sep- 11)
- vii. **North Central Governors to Combat Boko Haram, Insecurity** (*This Day*, 17-Feb-12)
- viii. **SSS – Northern Communities Shielding Boko Haram** (*This Day*, 26-Jul-12)

The above headlines show that in episodic frames about Boko Haram, *ThisDay* identified Boko Haram as being involved in clearly identifiable cases of violence, while in thematic frames, Boko Haram was identified with general issues of terrorism and insecurity, connoting negative activities. Cases of episodic frames in *ThisDay* newspaper include headlines: (i) **Boko Haram – Obasanjo's Host Killed After Talks** – the verb phrase ‘killed’ denotes a clear case of violent action, and Boko Haram’s connection with the violence is indicated by the use of Boko Haram as the subject head; (ii) **Boko Haram – Isa, NTA Cameraman, Killed for Spying** – similar to sample (ii), ‘killed’ in this case, signifies violent action associated with Boko Haram. The placement of Boko Haram as the subject head strongly implies that Boko Haram is connected with the killing; (iii) **Kano – Five Killed As Boko Haram Armoury Discovered** – ‘killed’ in this instance actually denotes violence, and Boko Haram was named in connection with the killing; and (iv) **Another Christmas Day Bomber Arrested** – in this case, the bomber is not identified as a member of Boko Haram but bomber in the previous analysis is known as one of the alternative labels for Boko Haram. So, the expression is an indirect reference to Boko Haram.

Given that all the headlines analysed here implied Boko Haram's connection with the reported violence, the following analysis is therefore focused on how Boko Haram is identified in the story paragraphs that follow those headlines. The analysis finds that members of Boko Haram are often identified as the culprits in these stories. Below are the headlines and the accompanying story paragraphs:

**Boko Haram – Obasanjo's Host Killed After Talks** (*This Day*, 18-Sep-11)

*Two days after he received former President Olusegun Obasanjo who was in Maiduguri to broker peace over the bombing attacks by **Boko Haram, the terrorist group yesterday killed Babakura Fugu, the in-law of the slain leader of the Islamic fundamentalist group, Mohammed Yusuf.***

**Boko Haram – Isa, NTA Cameraman, Killed for Spying** (*This Day*, 25-Oct-11)

*Barely 48 hours after the killing of a Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) cameraman, Zakariyya Isa, and the widespread condemnation of the act, **Boko Haram, the group that has claimed responsibility for the killing, Monday said it took the action because the deceased was a spy for the security agencies.***

**Kano – Five Killed As Boko Haram Armoury Discovered** (*This Day*, 7-Feb-12)

*At least five **Boko Haram members have lost their lives while several others** sustained gunshot wounds following a shootout between a combined team of army and policemen and suspected sect members at Mariri on the outskirts of Kano Municipality Monday night.*

**Another Christmas Day Bomber Arrested** (*This Day*, 22-Jun-12)

*Security agents yesterday recorded a breakthrough in their fight against terrorism with the arrest of Habeeb Bama, one of the alleged masterminds of the Christmas Day bombing of St. Theresa's Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State last year. Bama was apprehended in Damaturu, the Yobe State capital.*

*His arrest occurred just as residents of Damaturu got some respite yesterday as the state Governor, Alhaji Ibrahim Gaidam, relaxed the lockdown on the state following the terrorist attacks by **Boko Haram** that had kept residents indoors since Monday.*

The analysis of the story paragraphs shows that Boko Haram was clearly connected to the reported violent incidents, although the headlines avoided ascribing clear agency for the violence.

Examples of thematic framing that associated Boko Haram with general issues of violence are found in headlines: (v) **U.S. House Wants Boko Haram Designated Terrorist Group** – the verb phrase ‘wants

Boko Haram designated terrorist group’ clearly connects Boko Haram with terrorism; (vi) **Terror Attack – We Now Have Strong Leads, Says Jonathan** – the verb phrase ‘have strong leads’ is connected to the terror attack in the subject head. The construction also connotes violence; (vii) **North Central Governors to Combat Boko Haram, Insecurity** – the verb phrase ‘to combat Boko Haram, insecurity’ clearly connects Boko Haram with insecurity; and (viii) **SSS – Northern Communities Shielding Boko Haram** – the expression in this headline suggests that the State Security Service (SSS) alleged that the northern communities are providing Boko Haram with some form of protection.

In sum, the analysis in this section shows that there are significant differences in the frames adopted by the two newspapers in framing Boko Haram. The study finds that in *Daily Trust*, both the episodic and thematic frames about Boko Haram identified the group in activities that had connotations of violence. While in *ThisDay*, the episodic frames clearly identified Boko Haram in relation to cases of violence, and the thematic framing generally connected Boko Haram to the violence. The findings imply that *Daily Trust* exercised restraint in framing Boko Haram to the violence through a mix of explicit and broad constructions while *ThisDay* largely framed the violence directly around Boko Haram. The findings show that there are clear differences in the framing of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust’s* and *ThisDay’s* reporting in the timeline of the study (Table 5.10).

## 5.12 Concluding Remarks

This chapter addressed research question two, which asks: Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust’s* and *This Day’s* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012)? It reports on findings from analysis of headline samples and news story body paragraphs, using content analysis and CDA.

The chapter shows that the newspaper articles were analysed based on each of the five content variables (the type of source, label, blame, tone and frame) identified in the study. The content analysis cross tabulated the newspaper articles in *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* with each of the variables. The CDA also analysed the language adopted in the headlines by examining the type of noun and verb phrases used in the headline samples. The selected headlines were also analysed within each of the content variables.

Following the analysis, this research argues that there are clear and distinct differences between the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *This Day's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012). This study found the differences in both the content analysis and the CDA findings.

Having discussed in this chapter the analysis of research question two and provided answers to the question, the following chapter examines analysis of research questions three and four of this thesis. The research questions adopted the in-depth interview method. Ten journalists reporting on the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria were interviewed. The responses were qualitatively analysed through identifying and categorising the themes and sub-themes identified from the responses of the journalists.

## CHAPTER SIX

### **Concerns about Risks in Reporting Boko Haram and an Assessment of the Safety Training, Insurance and Remuneration of Reporters in Nigeria**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, the study presents the data analysis and discussion of findings from the in-depth interviews conducted with 10 reporters in Nigeria covering the activities of Boko Haram. Five reporters each were selected from the northern and southern regions of the country for equal representation. As mentioned previously in Chapter Three of this study, due to the sensitivity of the Boko Haram issue, identities of the interviewed journalists cannot be revealed in this thesis or anywhere else. Therefore, pseudonyms were used in identifying the reporters. Below is the list of the ten reporters and the regions they covered:

The five selected reporters from the Northern region are:

Reporter A

Reporter B

Reporter D

Reporter G

Reporter I

The five reporters that were selected from the Southern region are:

Reporter C

Reporter E

Reporter F

Reporter H

Reporter J



These journalists were purposively selected from the 20 national newspapers in the two regions in Nigeria. The journalists' experience and knowledge regarding their profession reflected in the pattern of the selection. Six out of the 10 reporters had practised journalism in Nigeria for between 14 to 16 years while the remaining four had been in the profession for between 7 and 10 years.

These interviews have been done in order to answer research questions 3 and 4 namely:

(RQ3): Do concerns about risks have impacts on how journalists covering Boko Haram in Nigeria conduct their reporting?

(RQ4): To what extent do provision of safety training, insurance and remuneration of journalists covering Boko Haram by the Nigerian media ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram activities?

The format of this chapter is based on reviewing the answers to these two questions in turn. This was done through the formulation of main themes and sub-themes from these two research questions. Below are the two themes and sub-themes:

Main theme in (RQ3):

Concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram influence the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists.

Sub-themes:

- iv. Boko Haram's threats to journalists lead to news gathering and reporting patterns that suit the group.
- v. Problem of access to credible information about the crisis (due to both Boko Haram and security agencies' claim of being on top of the crisis).
- vi. Security agents' mistrust of journalists leads to insecurity.

Main theme (RQ 4):

Safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by the Nigerian media ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram's activities.

Sub-themes:

- i. Provision of job insurance cover for reporters
- ii. Provision of safety and security training
- iii. Good remuneration and regular payment in salaries motivate reporters

## **6.2 Concerns about Risks in Reporting on Boko Haram**

The findings in this section are presented through analysis of the responses from the interviewed journalists. The responses are categorised into three sub-themes for easy analysis, which are Boko Haram's threats to journalists lead to news gathering and reporting expressions suitable to Boko Haram, problems of credible sources and mistrust from security agents leading to insecurity from Boko Haram. The discussions of these sub-themes are presented in the following sections:

### **6.2.1 Impact of Boko Haram's Threats to Journalists**

This section examines the influence of Boko Haram's threats to journalists in regards to news gathering formats and reporting expressions. Most of the journalists interviewed expressed that Boko Haram's threats are real. In the accounts of these journalists, especially those working in the northern region of the country, Boko Haram members knew the journalists' identities and sometimes called them on phone to warn them about some reporting they did.

### 6.2.1.1 Boko Haram's Threats to News Gathering

This study found that the patterns of news gathering by the journalists are often influenced by the dictates of Boko Haram. Reporter A, covering the northern region (Personal Communication, April 21, 2016), provided graphic details of such challenges:

*Sometimes in Maiduguri, Boko Haram used to organise teleconference with reporters. They will call a particular reporter and say they want to speak with the press. They will ask that phones be put on hands-free. The reporter will be there and they will be talking. The reporter will be asking them questions and they will be replying. That is a way they used to disseminate information to the press (Interview with Reporter A, April 21, 2016).*

Furthermore, Reporter 1, also covering northern Nigeria, notes that Boko Haram has one of the most sophisticated networks of intelligence. The reporter provided an interesting narration on other means of disseminating information outside teleconferencing discussed by Reporter A. According to this reporter, “the Boko Haram members produce audio and video recordings of their activities or certain information, which they place in envelopes at certain places, and thereafter call on a reporter to pick up the envelopes. Sometimes, they warn the reporters, saying ‘we are watching you as you are picking the envelope’. This is one of the ways Boko disseminates information to the press.” Reporter I (Interview with researcher, May 5, 2016)

The above context therefore suggests that reporters within Nigeria covering the Boko Haram activities have been compelled to follow the news gathering styles that have been dictated to it by the Boko Haram group. In addition, Reporter D, (Interview with researcher, February 11, 2016), also reporting from the North, affirms that most journalists, especially those reporting within the northern part of the country are most prone to the risks from Boko Haram: “It is riskier for journalists around here (in the North), especially when we are gathering information, because most of these people (Boko Haram) know us (journalists) and they know that

we will definitely come to the scene of incidents to report. They must have been hiding somewhere close to the scenes and we don't know how they get our phone numbers. They will call, saying 'you have to be very careful; if you do not report this story well, we will deal with you'". In addition, Reporter I (who covers the North) contends that journalists have been denied their privacy outside the field of reporting. He asserts: "On several occasions, some members of Boko Haram even went to journalists' houses threatening them that they had reported badly about them, which usually necessitated transfer of journalists from the northern region to any other states in the South" (Reporter I, Interview with researcher, May 5, 2016). It is noteworthy that all the reporters interviewed from the North expressed that Boko Haram's threats affected their styles of expressions in reporting the crisis.

However, Reporter C and Reporter E, from the southern part of the country, noted that Boko Haram's threats have gone beyond only reporters within the northern region. They affirmed that even columnists and editors had, most times, received threatening text messages and phone calls over stories pertaining to the group. Reporter C states: "We received a lot of threatening text messages. At times, they (Boko Haram) might even trace one's address making our families afraid for our and their safety". (Reporter C, Interview with researcher, February 8, 2016). According to Reporter E (Interview with researcher, March 4, 2016), "For those of us who have regular columns, if you write anything that affects Boko Haram or that they feel is insulting to them or that reveals their strategy or tactics, or you write things advising the government on the best way to go about tackling them, then they are all out for you. They send all manners of text messages, phone calls, etc."

In this discussion, this thesis found notable differences in the responses of the reporters covering the northern and southern regions. The reporters from the North were more at risk than their counterparts from the South because of their relative locations to Boko Haram's direct attacks. This result can be supported by the findings from both the content analysis and CDA. The finding from the content analysis confirms that

*ThisDay* newspaper with its head office located in the South, provided more discourse on the activities of Boko Haram than *Daily Trust*, which has its head office located in the North. In addition, the CDA finding shows that while *Daily Trust* used indirect expressions to articulate discourse about Boko Haram, *ThisDay* newspaper adopted clear and direct expressions to report on the Boko Haram activities.

### **6.2.1.2 Boko Haram's Response to Negative Coverage**

According to most of the journalists interviewed, one of the foremost challenges they encountered in covering the crisis is the threats from Boko Haram. The reporters explained that the Boko Haram often threatened to attack journalists for using expressions they considered offensive to their group. Hence, the reporters became confused and tried to moderate expressions to use in identifying Boko Haram in relation to attacks. Reporter B (Interview with researcher, March 10, 2016), who covers the northern region, explained that if a news report is not in the interest of the Boko Haram group, the reporter of such news were called upon by phone with the threat message of: 'you lied on us and we know how to deal with you'. Due to the threats, the reporter needed to request relocation to Abuja (the headquarters of most news outlets in Nigeria) or other places the reporter considered safe and would not venture to get back to the location until the heat had cooled off. This reporter further emphasised that Boko Haram's threats were not empty; they carried them out in reality. He cited the example of one of their colleagues that was killed in the cause of reporting. "They (Boko Haram) went to the house of one of our colleagues in NTA (Isa Zakariyah) and killed him. That is why, at a point, we (reporters in the North) had to abandon our offices to relocate to Government Houses at the heat of the crisis because it seemed to be more secure" (Reporter B Interview with researcher, March 10, 2016).

In the same context, Reporter A affirms, "at that time, Boko Haram was launching attacks on a daily basis. We were afraid they would overrun the whole of Maiduguri and other states in the North. In Maiduguri

alone, Boko Haram had occupied 22 local governments out of 27. We were really agitated” (Reporter A Interview with researcher, April 21, 2016). In the same way, (Reporter D Interview with researcher, February 11, 2016) states that, “those reporters that cannot withstand the pressure had to seek transfer. At a point, some media houses did not even have reporters, because if the administrative bosses in the media houses refused to grant transfer, the reporters would just go away, and for the media houses to see another person to cover the state would be quite difficult.”

Furthermore, Reporter D (reporting from the North) asserts: “As journalists, covering insurgency is a new trend. Sometimes, we don’t know the actual words to use when writing a report.” He notes that the Boko Haram group did not want to be addressed as terrorists and rather preferred to be addressed as *Jama’atu Ahli Sunna Lidda’awati Li-Jihad*. According to this reporter, “knowing the appropriate name to settle for in addressing Boko Haram became an issue since one does not want to be in any problem with this group” (Interview with researcher, February 11, 2016).

In support of this argument, Reporter B, also covering the northern region, explains that lack of security from the military against Boko Haram’s attacks beset the activities of reporters covering the North. “In fact, at a point in 2013, I had to be shuttling between two houses. I decided not to stay in my house because the insurgents have said that they know my house, that they know where I live. Although I have written about their operations, which have been very unpalatable that made them to warn me against such reports and I became agitated and had to think about my security because I know that it’s only when you are alive that you can write a good story” (Reporter B, Interview with researcher, March 10, 2016).

Additionally, in the opinions of Reporter H from the southern region (Interview with researcher, April 14, 2016), even reporting on a remote issue that does not directly concern Boko Haram could put one in

serious danger. This reporter claimed that he was beaten and had his car snatched at gunpoint by unknown people a few days after writing on a topic related to Boko Haram.

The accounts of the reporters from the North show that they were having difficulties on the appropriate words and expressions to use in identifying Boko Haram. Also, reporters from the South also encountered risks in other aspects of their reporting. The findings show that there are differences in the type of risks that the reporters from the two regions encountered. These findings resonate with the results from the content analysis in this study, which confirm that *Daily Trust* newspaper with its head office located in the northern region identified Boko Haram by nominalised label, that is, the popular names the group is known by such as Boko Haram, Jamaa'tul Ahlu Sunna Lidawaati li Jihad and Yusuffiyah. These are names that have no emotionally charged meanings attached. This could suggest that the newspaper did not want to be seen as associating Boko Haram with negative connotations. On the other hand, *ThisDay*, represented Boko Haram by functionalised label – names that clearly depict the actual roles that the Boko Haram group carried out in the reported violent activities. Such names include gunmen, suicide bomber and killers. This could mean that the reports identified Boko Haram as a group capable of violence.

### **6.2.2 Problem of Access to Credible Information**

This study found that the journalists encountered problem in accessing accurate information about the crisis due to the conduct of Boko Haram and the security agencies' claim of having upper hand in the crisis. The reporters interviewed in this study explained that, apart from threats from Boko Haram, both Boko Haram and security agencies wanted to be viewed as being on top of the crisis. As a result, the reporters were often provided with contradicting information. According to Reporter G (Interview with Researcher, February 16, 2016), who covers the northern Nigeria, journalists encountered problems on how to strike a balance between information from Boko Haram and the government regarding the crisis. This reporter further expatiates:

*From the beginning of the crisis, there is high fear among reporters on how to report information. The insurgents want to give information on their activities, at the same time, government also want to tell the public on what they are doing. So, we are placed in between the insurgents and the government. At the same time, when the government wants to tell people that they are winning the war (the Boko Haram crisis), Boko Haram also wants to create the impression that they are on top of the situation. So, as a journalist, when you are trying to report these issues, you just have to strike a balance (Reporter G, Interview with Researcher, February 16, 2016).*

Another related issue is the problem of inaccessible road networks in the North, which often make the reporters depend on available sources. Most of the reporters noted that such sources usually provide information that suits their purposes. Reporter A (Interview with Researcher, April 21, 2016), covering the North, states that “how to get accurate information is a great problem because most of the villages are not accessible: the roads are often blocked by the military during their operations and there are no means of transportation”. This reporter stresses that “if the military heads did not make proper arrangements for reporters to have access to the scene of incidents, the officers on the field will not permit reporters to cover the incidents. The officers will say that ‘they have not been given orders by their boss to allow journalists to take pictures or interview people’. The only option left is to ask people around the area” (Reporter A Interview with Researcher, April 21, 2016).

Another related issue to this, according to Reporter G (Personal Communication, February 16, 2016), is the difficulty of ascertaining the authenticity of the sources. It is usually problematic for reporters to differentiate between Boko Haram members and residents that might be fleeing from a crisis area. He explains:

*If a reporter unfortunately comes across a Boko Haram member (which the reporter might mistake for residents in the area), who volunteers to provide information about the crisis, he is most likely to misinform the journalist. He could say that so many people had been killed (just for propaganda). So, in gathering our news, we have to be very careful since we get news from all sides – Boko Haram and the military (Reporter G Interview with Researcher, February 16, 2016).*



In the opinions of most of the reporters covering the northern region, accuracy of information is most germane to reporting the Boko Haram crisis. This is reflected in the views of Reporter B (Personal Communication, March 10, 2016), Reporter I, (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016) and Reporter D (Personal Communication, February 11, 2016), who noted that the reluctance of the military in providing accurate and timely information about casualty figure during Boko Haram crisis is a major challenge hampering reporting about the group among reporters in Nigeria. According to Reporter D (Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016) who affirms that the military or the authority will never tell you the specific number of people that were killed and when they do, they do it belatedly. You will discover that our Nigerian dailies are replete with stale news that are not useful since foreign news media had reported on them earlier. Specifically, Reporter I (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016) affirmed that “sometimes, if reporters could convince the military, they could provide access for the reporters to the scenes of Boko Haram attacks. In most cases, the reporter is only able to take pictures of few corpses on ground while other bodies might have been taken to the mortuary and hospitals. It is only left for reporters to visit these hospitals or mortuaries. Even at that, it is difficult to ascertain the accurate number of deaths or casualties because some of the victims might have been running for their lives and got killed; some might have been buried in the bush and it might take two to three days to discover their bodies. So, for us to get accurate information is a problem.” (Reporter I, Interview with Researcher, May 9, 2016).

The responses of the journalists suggest that the reporters covering the northern region were in direct contact with the military and Boko Haram group as a result of their relative location to the Boko Haram’s operational base in the North. However, the proximity of the reporters to the scene of Boko Haram’s attacks did not provide the reporters accurate information about violent actions.

### **6.2.3 Security Agents' Mistrust of Journalists**

In addition to the threats from Boko Haram, most of the reporters in this study also confirmed that security agents distrust journalists reporting on the Boko Haram crisis. They acknowledged that reporters operating in the North-east (the conflict zone of Boko Haram) are mostly affected. According to Reporter B who affirms, “as journalists in a hostile environment of the North-east, we are faced with daunting challenges of security because the security agents see us as enemies of the people – on the side of Boko Haram, and the Boko Haram see us as working for the government. We are working between the devil and the deep blue sea. This, to a large extent, affects my own security.” (Reporter B, Interview with Researcher, March 10, 2016). Similarly, Reporter I further affirm: “security is one of the biggest problems. Unlike in other climes where there are violent activities by insurgents or in war situations, the journalists are embedded and are provided security. But in this part of the country, especially in the North-east, in my coverage of insurgency in the last seven to eight years, the military is not ready to protect journalists. Hence, journalists become vulnerable to Boko Haram’s attacks” (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016).

Given the lack of security for the reporters, Reporter F (Interview with researcher, May 9, 2016), covering the southern Nigeria, emphasised the need for journalists to be cautious and careful while carrying out their professional obligations. According to this reporter, “since security is the biggest challenge, as journalists, we need to weigh what we write so that our reporting would not offend the thinking of the military and of course, the Boko Haram insurgents. He further asserted that the unsafe reporting environment has become a dilemma for reporters covering the Boko Haram crisis.

In a similar vein, this study found that military mistrust of journalists in Nigeria emanated from what Reporter D, who covers the northern region termed, ‘politicisation of security’. This reporter explains in this way: “Previous government of Goodluck Jonathan actually politicised security challenges in Nigeria, and as

such, they made Nigerians think that Boko Haram is a product of northern elites to fight the government. So, the problem emanates from the fact that once this idea was passed onto those in the highest military authority, then it was as if commands had been given to those on ground (the security agents on the fields) not to work with us, journalists” (Reporter D, Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016). This reporter further noted that the security agents see everybody in Borno (one of the states in the North where Boko Haram has the strongest hold), including journalists, as Boko Haram. He states, “The way everybody in Borno, including even journalists, is viewed as Boko Haram has worsened the situation. Rather than seeing journalists as partners in progress, there is that deep mistrust”. In addition, another reporter from the northern region, Reporter G, affirmed that at a point during the crisis, the threats were coming from both the military and Boko Haram. “The military were suspecting us that we (journalists) were the real Boko Haram members; the military were really against us. In fact, during one of the crises, the military seized the camera of a colleague and threatened to shoot us if we made any wrong moves. Even the Boko Haram members were threatening us over our reports” (Reporter G, Interview with Researcher, February 16, 2016).

The reporters confirmed that, given the lack of military support, the journalists called for interactive sessions and workshops between the reporters covering Boko Haram in the North-east and the military. The workshops eventually engendered understanding between the two parties. Reporter A, covering the North, states: “We were lucky to convince the military authority about our professional sincerity when we rubbed minds during a workshop. They sent some officers from the Defence Headquarters to organise the workshop on how we can work together as a team. The military, before this time, believed that we were informants to the Boko Haram insurgents. Later on, they understood that we just do our work.” (Reporter A, Interview with Researcher, April 21, 2016) This reporter further noted, “Sometimes in the past, the Boko Haram will just call reporters confirming an attack somewhere and the military had no idea about these attacks. The military were suspecting us (journalists) that we had had prior information about the attacks. But after the interactive

workshops with the military, they understood our position” (Reporter A Interview with Researcher, April 21, 2016). The reporter asserted that afterwards, the journalists recorded tremendous success in the access to the coverage of the crisis through the support of the military. Although this marked a turning point in their working relationship, the journalists were still being careful and cautious (Reporter G, Interview with Researcher, February 16, 2016).

The discussion above shows that journalists covering the northern region were mostly affected by the lack of safety support from the security agencies. This could be as a result of the journalists’ close proximity to nerve centre of Boko Haram violent activities.

#### **6.2.3.1 Positive Relations with Security Forces**

In relation to the discussion about the initial tensions between the security agencies and the journalists as highlighted above, this section covers the positive relations between journalists covering the Boko Haram’s crisis and the military. This study has found that the understanding between the military and journalists covering Boko Haram has assisted the security agents in defining and projecting a good public image about their actions in northern Nigeria. Reporter D (Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016) covering the northern region, notes that “the military now knows that we (journalists) are part of the war against insurgents because information is necessary for them (security agents) to effectively carry out the war against the Boko Haram insurgents. Also, the perception of the security agents among the civilian populace in Maiduguri and other places in the North has changed. Prior to this time, people think that even the military were responsible for some of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that were planted around.” This reporter also affirmed that, “but with these enlightenment activities, people begin to understand the situation better. Even, the military understand that the civilian populace is not against them.” (Reporter D, Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016). Similarly, Reporter A covering the northern region notes: “With the inception of Joint

Task Force – JTF (the Para-military group among the civilian populace), the military began to understand that the civilian populace supports their actions against Boko Haram. Prior to this period, they assumed that everybody was associated with Boko Haram. (Interview with Researcher, April 21, 2016). This finding shows that the journalists have developed understanding and cooperation with the security agencies. This correlates with some of the findings in the content analysis and CDA of this study which confirm that after attacks on the journalists, the headlines represented Boko Haram using negative tones while the security agents were represented in positive tones. The study further found that while positive constructions referred to security agents/government officials, headlines with negative constructions did not attribute agency for the actions. However, Boko Haram was identified as the agent responsible for negative actions in the story paragraphs. This clearly shows that security agents were positively represented on topics relating to security, amnesty and dialogue while Boko Haram was negatively signified as a group capable of destruction and a capacity for violence, which could influence public's perception of them.

### **6.3 Organisational Support for Journalists**

All the reporters interviewed were of the view that without the requisite welfare packages, reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram would be less committed to reporting on the crisis. Outside the threats of Boko Haram, other challenges that the journalists noted as causing hindrance to reporting on Boko Haram include lack of insurance job cover, lack of safety and security training by media organisations and poor remuneration and irregular payment of salaries. Each of these is separately discussed in the following paragraphs.

### 6.3.1 Lack of Job Insurance Cover

This research found that all the reporters covering Boko Haram's activities in Nigeria viewed lack of job insurance cover as a major challenge confronting reporters covering conflicts. Reporter H, covering southern Nigeria states:

*No journalist in Nigeria is insured, which has been the basic problem we have been having since covering Boko Haram in the north-eastern part of Nigeria. With the way the media houses have been working in Nigeria, they don't have any package in terms of insurance for their reporters to cover such crisis which have been affecting their journalists to go for full investigative stories. This issue has hindered the reporters from getting good stories for publication. (Reporter H, Interview with Researcher, April 14, 2016).*

This reporter notes that if a reporter should cover any insurgency or Boko Haram crisis specifically, and he dies, it then amounts to total loss since his family has no insurance claims for such eventualities. Similarly, Reporter J (Interview with Researcher, February 9, 2016) from the South cited the case of Enenche Akogwu, who reported for *Channels Television* in Nigeria and was killed in Kano (a state in the north-eastern part of Nigeria) in the cause of reporting. Boko Haram claimed responsibility for his death. Reporter H notes that none of his family was compensated, and he had since been forgotten. He also stated that Bayo Owu, an editor with the *Guardian* newspaper in Nigeria who was killed by unknown gunmen, was also forgotten with no compensation for his family like Akogwu.

Furthermore, Reporter E, who reports from the southern region (Interview with Researcher, March 4, 2016) is of the opinion that lack of insurance cover has created an avenue for journalists to avoid major stories on Boko Haram. He states:

*Even columnists that are on the desks writing regularly on Boko Haram do encounter danger if the reports seem insulting to the group. Boko Haram often send all manners of text messages, make phone calls to threatening such reporters. As a matter of fact, a lot of our colleagues have been killed. Many journalists have been shot dead on their way home from work, while some have been attacked at their residence.*

Consequently, Reporter E further affirmed, “So all these attacks and deaths affect us as journalists because the insurance cover is not there for us and we are being threatened here and there. So, we don’t understand how we can continue writing about these people (Boko Haram).” (Interview with Researcher, Reporter E March 4, 2016).

In addition, Reporter B (Interview with Researcher, March 10, 2016), covering the northern region, is of the view that most journalists avoid topics relating to Boko Haram. He asserts: “As a matter of fact, most of our colleagues shy away from discussing the Boko Haram issue. A lot of our colleagues, at times, when they have to report about Boko Haram or cover events relating to it, they always run away from such assignments; they always find excuse not to be involved. He further notes, “The Boko Haram group have a way of tracing journalists’ identities, they have a way of finding out the identities behind a particular story. Because there is no guarantee of security of lives, it is better to be safe than becoming a dead person. It is when we are alive that we can tell any story and it is better to avoid a ‘killing’ story than for one to become the story” (Reporter B Interview with Researcher, March 10, 2016).

Furthermore, most of the reporters interviewed for this research stated that there was no basis for comparison between journalists in Nigeria and other countries specifically in the aspect of insurance. Reporter D (Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016) states: “The media houses in Nigeria don’t have insurance for their staff. I have been to other African countries for journalism training on how to report in volatile environments. My international colleagues at the training confirmed that they had insurance cover by their employers, whereas those of us in Nigeria that are working in the heartbeat of Boko Haram insurgency are without any insurance cover. So, if anything happens that is just it.” Based on this scenario, this reporter affirms: “this situation hampers my commitment to my organisation because I feel my employer does not care

about my welfare. All they care about is the news report: once reporters have sent in their reports and are not delaying there is no problem” Reporter D (Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016).

This suggests that the reporters from both the northern and southern regions were of the views that lack of insurance cover for journalists covering terror groups could make them less committed to the reporting on Boko Haram and also avoid topics relating to the group and the crisis. The findings from the CDA in this thesis also support this claim. It shows that after Boko Haram’s attacks, headline reports did not indicate agencies for the violent actions and also employed vague and indirect language in naming Boko Haram in violent actions. This clearly shows that the newspapers distanced itself from the way it identified Boko Haram in violent events.

### **6.3.2 Lack of Safety and Security Training**

This research found that safety and security training for reporters in Nigeria are considered very essential, especially for reporters covering conflicts such as Boko Haram. Reporter B reporting from northern region asserts, “Most of our colleagues and even editors do not understand this issue about insurgency. We need constant training. For a reporter to report violence or insurgency very well, he needs to be properly trained. One must understand terminologies and tactics involved in violence or insurgency such as ‘the First Bomb’, or ‘the Second Target’. How does a reporter ensure his own safety when there is crisis and how does he treat the reports provided by sources? Does he cross-check his information by having a second source? One can cross-check and double check using eye-witness account, military sources or local vigilante officials” (Personal Communication, Reporter B March 10, 2016). This reporter further expressed the need for editors to be trained in the acts of reporting and writing about conflicts because “some of the editors, in the process of editing the stories, would expunge what is credible like 2 to 3 paragraphs from the report. They do this in



order to provide space for other stories of less importance like politics. So, training is very important” (Reporter B, Interview with Researcher, March 10, 2016).

Additionally, other reporters covering the Boko Haram’s activities that were interviewed contend that trainings are usually organised by donor agencies, international organisations, and foreign media houses. Reporter D (Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016) covering the northern region stated that he had attended over 20 workshops or trainings on Conflict Reporting and Peace Building, which have helped in providing safety skills in the coverage of Boko Haram crisis but these trainings were not provided by the news organisations he worked for. The reporter affirmed that “some non-governmental organisations such as International Red Cross Society, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, Democratic Good Governance, DFID, UN Women and some Nigerian agencies which include the Nigerian military headquarters, Defence headquarters, Nigerian Police and so on, all volunteered organised workshops for us on how to engage in reporting conflict.” Reporter D (Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016). Additionally, Reporter I concurs that trainings for reporters are conducted by external agencies, not by media organisations. “We get our training for safety in collaboration with the military or from the Office of the National Security Adviser. They provide us security tips on how to be safe while covering the Boko Haram crisis and other crisis situations.” (Reporter I, Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016).

Reporter J (Interview with Researcher, February 9, 2016) reporting from the South also contends that safety training is usually provided by external bodies, not the media owners in Nigeria. Reporter J noted: “We have a lot of international media houses like Reuters and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) that provide trainings for journalists. One can personally go to their sites and apply. The World Bank sponsored BBC trainings at a time. We have other international groups and agencies that conduct training. If one applies online and one meets their requirements, then one will be offered the training” (Reporter I, Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016). The findings from the reporters from both regions show that media owners in the

country do not provide trainings rather, external agencies are responsible for doing that. This suggests that the news owners in Nigeria did not consider the issue of journalist training as a priority.

### **6.3.2.1 Personal Safety Measures**

Apart from the discussion in the above paragraph about lack of security and safety training for journalists by their news organisations in Nigeria, this research found that reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram usually devise some personal safety tips to protect themselves while performing their tasks. Reporter D (Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016) from the northern region states that reporters must imbibe safety knowledge when covering Boko Haram crisis. He stated:

*From our knowledge of Boko Haram's attacks, whenever there is suicide bombing, there is always a possibility of a second blast because it is expected that people would rush out to find out what is happening, then the second blast would occur thereby increasing the number of casualties. Although, we have the knowledge through our training, we need to imbibe them for our own safety (Reporter D, Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016).*

Most of the reporters interviewed are of the views that reporters must have security support whenever they are on assignments in ensuring security against the Boko Haram. Reporter B covering the North, states that “whenever we are going out on assignments, especially to the villages, one has to ensure that one has enough security backing that will provide some security and safety. One should not risk going alone because anything can happen. Even when driving, one has to be very careful by watching both sides, and even at the back” (Reporter B, Interview with Researcher, March 10, 2016).

Reporter C from the South, who is in support of this view adds, “There are so many personal safety measures we need to engage in because of the nature of our job in order to ensure our security. We should be concerned about the type of people we allow into our private residences. We should educate our family members, especially our children, on what to do in terms of security; they should be made to understand the

nature of their parent's jobs. We need to be security conscious as we go out for shopping and other places because you do not know who is looking out for you" (Interview with Reporter C February 8, 2016).

In the same context, Reporter I from the northern region (Reporter I, Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016) notes that, "as reporters on Boko Haram activities, we have to work closely with the security agents who know the terrain. It is the army that can tell reporters the appropriate routes to follow because reporters do not know who-is-who; we do not know who Boko Haram is. Then, we have to follow the guidelines given by the army who are always on ground because as a journalist who does not know anything about military and who does not have any military background cannot just dabble into Boko Haram enclave" (Reporter I, Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016).

Moreover, Reporter A (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016), another journalist from the North, states: "reporters should make sure not to follow one route always. For instance, if one is going home, one need to change the route different from the one taken earlier. The following day, if one is going out, one should not follow the same route one took yesterday so that whoever is monitoring such reporter will be confused because of the changing tactics" (Reporter F, Interview with Researcher, May 9, 2016). Also, Reporter I covering the North concurred with this view and suggested that "we have to be vigilant on both sides: Most of all, when we are driving. Whenever we see any potholes, we should be careful not to rush into it. One should divert or manoeuvre it out; you should not fall into them; they might be traps. Even small items like polythene bags on the roads must be carefully avoided. These are part of the security tips we have been using, and have been assisting us in regards to safety" (Reporter I, Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016).

The above narration by the interviewed reporters from both the northern and southern regions of the country provides evidence that inasmuch as journalists are involved in covering terrorist groups, they are expected to learn safety rules that would protect them against attacks from the groups. In addition, the

evidence provides support on the dangers involved in covering the activities of terror groups like the Boko Haram.

#### **6.4 Poor Remuneration and Irregular Salaries**

The reporters in these interviews believed that poor remuneration and irregularities in salary payment for journalists in Nigeria are hindrances to motivating reporters covering Boko Haram. Reporter F covering the southern part of the country states: “If a reporter is not paid well, he cannot do his job effectively in the midst of all these crises. How does one risk his life to get stories where there are bomb explosions? How do you get to the mortuary or hospitals emergencies to get the precise casualty figures as journalist in order to beat your competitors? How do you do all these without being paid salaries?” (Reporter F, Interview with Researcher, May 9, 2016). In support of the argument about the implications of poor remuneration and irregular salaries, Reporter H further explains that the journalists can become frustrated and resort to use any available and convenient sources rather than wasting his time and efforts (Reporter H, Interview with Researcher, April 14, 2016). Therefore, non-payment of salaries, to a large extent, affects the productivity of the Nigerian dailies. In addition to this, Reporter H, covering the southern region avers:

*While most of the international newspapers had reported about an attack, the Nigerian dailies will later be reporting it the following day when it is no longer news, because it has been read elsewhere. News is what is fresh, what has not been read and what has not been seen. If a reporter is not motivated, he does not want to look at the other angles in a story such as the human angle that will make the news interesting or getting other sources. With good remuneration, you can expect good productivity. When reporter is well motivated, he can go extra mile to source for story. (Reporter H, Interview with Researcher, April 14, 2016).*

This part of the argument concerning limitation to few sources and news angles can be supported from the content analysis finding that shows that while the journalists were the most identified source in reporting about Boko Haram, they significantly reduced their reports on Boko Haram following the Boko Haram attacks. This seems to suggest that journalists used less diverse sources in reporting the crisis.

## 6.5 Coping with Challenges in Reporting Boko Haram

In addition, most of the reporters interviewed affirmed that given the poor remuneration of journalists in Nigeria, reporters covering Boko Haram are not likely to be committed to reporting. Reporter J from southern Nigeria notes: “We have some media houses owing their staff – reporters, correspondents and editors – years of unpaid salary like one to two years” (Reporter J, Interview with Researcher, February 9, 2016). On this, Reporter E (Interview with Researcher, March 4, 2016) covering the southern region adds that “if a reporter who has not been paid for upward of 3-6 months is asked to go to crisis zones to cover the story on Boko Haram, such a reporter would not go, simply because there is no motivation in covering the assignments”. In addition, Reporter I covering the northern region (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016) states: “Right now, most of our colleagues in the North here are complaining that they have not been paid. It is because some of us have the passion for journalism; if not, we would have left. It is because we don’t have any other jobs to do.” This reporter notes that some media organisations believe that if they provide job opportunities for reporters, it allows the reporters to make his money. Some of the reporters had to be following politicians looking for gratifications” (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016). The opinions of the interviewed reporters suggest that given the poor remuneration and irregular payment in salary, reporters covering Boko Haram become limited in the number of sources they could access.

In spite of the irregular payment of salaries among journalists in Nigeria, the reporters interviewed were of the view that lack of job opportunities in the country and passion for their profession account for reasons journalists stay on their jobs. Reporter H from the South asserts: “Some have not been paid for a year plus two to three months, yet they still have the hope that one day the owners of the news organisations will pay them. They stay on for this long because they do not have any other job options” (Reporter H, Interview with Researcher, April 14, 2016). Reporter G covering the northern region concurs with this view, stating that,

“actually, there is no motivation to keep us reporting on these insurgents; it is because there are no jobs. It is the only thing we find available.” (Reporter G, Interview with Researcher, February 16 2016). In a similar vein, Reporter C from the South asserts: “Despite the fact that we (reporters) are not getting salaries as and when due and we keep on reporting. The citizens acknowledge our efforts; they see us as their last hope and their mouths and ears. That is what keeps us going because the people appreciate us” (Reporter C, Interview with Researcher, February 8, 2016). This view is also supported by Reporter A from the North, who states, “The life of a journalist is about enjoying what he does. Most of our colleagues from outside the country that come to do some reports here in Nigeria complain that we are working against all odds. For instance, Internet facility in the North-east is quite poor. In 2013, for six months, no telephone services, we only rely on cybercafé to send in reports. When these colleagues see the problems we go through in sending in our reports, they marvel” (Interview with Researcher, April 21 2016).

The opinions of these reporters confirm that journalists covering the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria are not motivated to report the crisis due to the many challenges ranging from lack of insurance cover to lack of provision for safety training by media owners in the country, poor remuneration and irregular salaries. Although both the reporters from the two regions in the country are affected, the reporters in the North seem to be more impacted by these problems.

## **6.6 Concluding Remarks**

Having discussed the findings of this thesis in this chapter, the important issue is that reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram have faced risks of death and other forms of threat from the Boko Haram group in the process of news gathering and reporting. The chapter further shows that aside from Boko Haram, the reporters also encounter challenges from security agencies/government and the news owners. The problems from these three quarters have combined to impact on how journalists report on the activities of

Boko Haram. The chapter differentiated the responses of the reporters from the northern and southern Nigeria in order to highlight the differences in their experiences and identify which of the two groups is more affected by the Boko Haram attacks.

The next chapter focuses on discussion of findings from the four research questions in relation to claims in existing research on Boko Haram and conflict. This is done in order to establish whether the findings from this thesis validate, add to or challenge existing studies. Each of the four research findings is examined separately.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### Discussion of Findings

#### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings in this thesis in relation to previous studies on Boko Haram and conflict. This discussion highlights the contributions of this thesis in relation to previous studies on Boko Haram and framing conflicts/terrorism. The chapter covers the findings on the four research questions that were put forward in this thesis. It discusses the findings in research questions 1 and 2, which were answered largely with a combination of CDA and content analysis methods, and research questions 3 and 4, which were answered with the in-depth interview methodology. The chapter addresses the following themes (based on the main research questions):

- (i) The changes in news content when representing Boko Haram following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria.
- (ii) The differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012).
- (iii) The impact of risks in reporting on Boko Haram on the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists.
- (iv) The extent of provision of safety training, insurance cover and prompt remuneration of journalists by media owners in Nigeria on continuous reporting on Boko Haram.



## 7.2 Change in Representation of Boko Haram

This section focuses on Research Question 1 of this thesis: (*Did reporters change their news content when representing Boko Haram following the group's attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria?*) The discussion is examined in relation to other studies on Boko Haram and conflict studies and is based on the five content categories of source, label, blame, tone and frames, which were identified and used in the analysis.

The finding in the content analysis of the source category (who is making statements in the headlines about Boko Haram) shows that journalists are the most identified source in reporting about Boko Haram in relation to other sources like government, security agencies and Boko Haram itself. In addition, this thesis found a significant decrease in how frequently journalists were sources in reporting on Boko after the group's attacks on reporters and media in the country. This is also supported by the CDA finding that demonstrates that after the Boko Haram attacks, journalists changed their representation of the group. In this period, Boko Haram was only mentioned in other topics that were indirectly related to violence but in connection with issues about the group. Such topics include proposed peace dialogue, solutions to the crisis and general issue concerning insecurity. This could be responsible for Schlesinger's (2010) call for a new, more cautious approach to danger zone journalism after a dozen deaths just within the first 10 years of the 21st Century.

This thesis therefore argues that following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and the media in Nigeria, journalists reduced stories that explicitly tied Boko Haram to violence. This argument is supported by Tumber's (2002) observation that journalists' ability to cover the conflicts has been eroded, citing Daniel Pearl's kidnapping and public execution, which shows that terrorists view journalists as handy targets.

In relation to the findings on label in the content analysis, this research confirmed that the headline reports mostly used 'no label', which was followed by nominalised label which describes names that seem

inoffensive and have been popularly identified with the Boko Haram group. The names include ‘Boko Haram’, ‘Jamaa’tul Ahlu Sunnah Li dawwati Li Jihad’ or ‘Yusuffiyah’. The use of nominalised label, which mostly do not have emotional meanings attached could perhaps indicate that the journalists largely distanced themselves from potential attacks from Boko Haram. Specifically, the journalists changed their representation of the group after the Boko Haram attacks with the nominalised label significantly reduced while the ‘no label’ increased. Also, the CDA findings show that before the attacks, the headlines identified Boko Haram by its nominalised or popular label of ‘Boko Haram’ in connection with violent cases but after the attacks on the journalists, the reports only detailed violent issues that did not feature Boko Haram or any group as being responsible for the violent incidents. This could imply that by having mostly no labeled headlines, which did not mention Boko Haram in the violence, the news reports and by extension, the journalists did not want to be seen as having identified any group or persons with the crisis. The findings can be related to the Committee to Protect Journalists’ (CPJ’s) report that stated many journalists have resigned their appointments because of fear of being killed. Specifically, eight Nigerian journalists have been murdered for their work (Nkanga, 2014 and CPJ, 2011). The killings may perhaps have been part of the reasons for the adoption of less critical labels in referring to Boko Haram after the group’s attacks.

The arguments also capture the views by Jaspersen and El-Kikha (2003) that the selection of particular attributes of a story gives important information about the perspectives of the media source. In other words, the way the reporters named Boko Haram in the violent reports reflect their views about Boko Haram. In view of this, the thesis argues that after the Boko Haram attacks on the media group, journalists did not want to be seen to have connected Boko Haram to the crisis or show interest in the perpetrators of the violence but rather have more interest in the crisis itself.

The third category of the analysis is about blame attribution in the news reports. The most substantial finding in the content analysis shows that the reports had less reduction in the attribution of violence to Boko

Haram after the group's attacks. This may imply that the journalists focused more on other reports that had less to do with violent reports and Boko Haram group, which can influence how Boko Haram members are perceived by the public. This finding is related to the arguments by Ayedun-Aluma *et.al* (2014), which posited that Nigerian media have shown little understanding of Boko Haram's creative destructive tendencies in reporting the group's activities. In support of the finding, the CDA results show that journalists changed their representation of Boko Haram after the group's attacks by using a mix of implicit and explicit language to represent the role of Boko Haram while the security agencies were explicitly ascribed violence against Boko Haram. This thesis therefore claims that following the Boko Haram's attacks, the newspapers had less reporting which identified Boko Haram as the actor in violent or terror-related actions.

Following on from the attribution of blame, the tone analysis in this study confirmed that the reports on Boko Haram were mostly negative. The results from the content analysis show that negative reporting of the Boko Haram group increased after the group's attacks on reporters. This is also supported by the CDA finding which shows that before the attacks, the news reports represented Boko Haram with language that signified destruction and a capacity for violence but after the attacks, the headlines did not attribute agencies for the negative actions except in the lead stories or story paragraphs. Also, positive expressions were employed in referring to security/government's actions in both periods. These findings are additions to the research by Nkanga (2014) which claimed that in Nigeria, Boko Haram had threatened and carried out attacks on journalists and media outlets over reporting deemed unfavourable to their cause. These negative actions might be responsible for the evasive tactics that the journalists employed after the Boko Haram attacks on the media group, by omitting the name of Boko Haram in those headlines with negative contents.

Finally, finding from the framing analysis demonstrates that in general, the headlines had more reports on episodic framing about Boko Haram than thematic framing of the group. This finding is related to previous research which confirms that under episodic framing, news audiences ascribed responsibility for national

problems to the actions of individual and group rather than societal or structural forces, as is typically featured in thematic framing (Iyengar and Simon, 1993). The preponderance of episodic framing in this thesis shows that the reports on Boko Haram were focused on the violent activities of the group rather than news items that reported the political and social contexts surrounding the crisis, such as the underlying problems and possible grievances as well as solutions to them. The episodic framing invariably puts more focus on the issues that Boko Haram wants.

In addition, the thesis found that journalists changed their representation of Boko Haram following the group's attacks. The content analysis demonstrates that episodic framing about Boko Haram reduced following the group's attacks, showing fewer reports about the violent activities of Boko Haram. In the same way, the CDA result shows that after the group's attacks, the representation of Boko Haram with regard to episodic framing remains the same for the two periods (before and after attacks). Most of the reports implicitly expressed violent actions about Boko Haram by avoiding specific identification of the group in connection with the reported violence. Issues relating to underlying problems, possible grievances, and solutions to the crisis were reported. By this, even in episodic framing context, the newspapers focused more on issues with deeper contexts and reducing emphasis on violent topics that the Boko Haram would prefer.

This result is backed up by the findings from the reporters interviewed for this study, which confirmed that the journalists were aware of Boko Haram's preferences and thus adjusted their reporting accordingly. Reporter B explained that journalists were often threatened by the Boko Haram group to report positive stories about them or the reporters would face the consequences (Reporter B Interview with Researcher, March 10, 2016). This account might also be connected to the report by *Premium Times* (2012) that the Boko Haram group identified deliberate misinformation that the Nigerian and foreign media are disseminating about the group as a major reason for its onslaught on the media. Therefore, this thesis argues that following the

Boko Haram attacks, the public is largely presented with issues of deeper contexts than the violent actions perpetuated by the group.

### **7.3 Differences in Representation of Boko Haram**

This section discusses the findings in Research Question 2: Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012)? The five content categories of source, label, blame, tone and frames, which collectively signified representation of Boko Haram, were used in discussing the thesis findings in relation to other findings on Boko Haram and conflict studies.

Starting with the source analysis, this study found that *ThisDay* used journalists as sources in covering Boko Haram than *Daily Trust*. This finding suggests that the different geographical locations of the journalists from the two newspapers (*Daily Trust's* proximity to or *ThisDay's* distance from the epicentre of Boko Haram activities) bring varied experiences that make their input more important in reporting the crisis. This is also supported by the findings from the CDA that demonstrate that while *ThisDay* employed explicit descriptions of violence in reporting the Boko Haram crisis, *Daily Trust* adopted a mix of implicit and explicit descriptions of the violence. The evasive expressions noted in *Daily Trust's* reporting of the crisis suggest that the reporters in this media organisation feared Boko Haram's attacks due to their proximity to the insurgents and thereby refrained from directly referencing the negative activities of the group. This can be related to Popoola's (2012) argument that the killing of many journalists by the Boko Haram has instilled fear in others who now tread cautiously to avoid being eliminated by the group.

The next discussion is on findings in the label analysis. The result from the content analysis shows that *Daily Trust* adopted more nominalised labels which identified Boko Haram by its popular names such as, 'Boko Haram', 'Yusuffiyah', and 'Jamatul Ahlu Sunnah' more than *ThisDay*, which employed more of the

functionalised labels. The names in the functionalised label referred to the roles that Boko Haram performed in the reported activities, which include ‘gunmen’, ‘bomber’, ‘suicide bomber’, and so on. The findings from the CDA show that *Daily Trust*’s use of names in the nominalised label which are considered not offensive to Boko Haram or have no negative connotations attached to them, perhaps suggests that the newspaper was cautious in identifying members of the Boko Haram group as the actors in the violent reports. On the other hand, *ThisDay* adopted more functionalised label to explicitly associate Boko Haram to the reported violence, which suggests that the newspaper was more descriptive in identifying the roles performed by the group in the reported violence. The thesis therefore argues that *Daily Trust* was less descriptive and exercised more restraint in identifying Boko Haram in relation to the violence than *ThisDay*. The implication of these findings is that both newspapers avoided potentially risky reporting. Although the functionalised label mostly adopted by *ThisDay* – calling Boko Haram bombers, gunmen, etc. – is less risk averse. The differences in the risks encountered by journalists in these two newspapers are in line with Armoudian (2017) who states:

*The perils besetting the local danger zone journalist are proportionally greater. As foreign correspondents slip in and out of the danger zones, local journalists live there and must contend with the hazards on a daily basis, navigating physical, legal and rhetorical battles that threaten their lives and livelihoods. A misplaced word, a misquotation can bring the wrath of the state or insurgent, or cost their jobs and sources. They cross these terrains like obstacle courses, using objectivity as more than a news norm but as a virtual shield for life or livelihood.*

Although the journalists in the two selected newspapers for this study are based in the same country and their newspapers have national coverage but the differences in their locations to the nerve centre of the Boko Haram activities have marked them separately. Moreover, the result in the content analysis of the blaming analysis shows that *ThisDay* ascribed more blame for the violence to Boko Haram than *Daily Trust*. This could also be attributed to the differences in the locations of the newspapers’ head offices to the stronghold of Boko Haram activities in the north. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that both *Daily Trust*

and *ThisDay* assigned violence to Boko Haram more often than to security agencies. This could mean that there were fewer incidents of violence by security agencies, but could also mean that journalists needed the military for security in covering their beats. This finding is backed by the interview findings that pointed out that, at the start of the Boko Haram crisis, the military did not provide security for reporters in the North-east. This was due to the military's suspicion that some reporters collaborated with Boko Haram. The military did not cooperate with the journalists until interactive workshops were held which provided some understanding of the journalists' roles in the crisis Reporter I (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016). In addition, Reporter A (Interview with Researcher, April 21, 2016) affirmed that after the workshops, reporters were granted access to scenes of attacks only after receiving permission from the security heads at the scenes. This showed that reporters were dependent on the security and access from the military in reporting the crisis.

In line with the findings, Idowu (2014) notes that many observers have confirmed that a mixture of cooperation and tension has historically characterised the relationship between the media and military in Nigeria. He, however, stated that embedding with the military is important, which could be the reason for the call by media managers in Nigeria requesting the military to embed reporters in covering conflict zones like the Boko Haram conflict. The thesis therefore posits that *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* ascribed violence to Boko Haram more often than to security agencies which may be due to reasons of security and reporting access to scene of attacks.

The thesis found that the tone analysis reflects significant differences in the degree of negative tone employed by the two newspapers. Specifically, the content analysis findings demonstrate that *ThisDay* employed a more negative tone than *Daily Trust* in their reporting of the Boko Haram group. Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) have observed that negativity conditions the perception of subjects in reporting. If this is so, then it raises a question on how *ThisDay* newspaper whose head office and most of its reporters are flung far and outside the Boko Haram environs could provide more critical reporting of the crisis than *Daily Trust*

which has its head office located within the crisis zones. The possible explanation to this could mean that *Daily Trust* exercised caution and restraint due to its proximity to the flashpoints of Boko Haram activities.

Furthermore, the CDA findings show that *Daily Trust* adopted implicit expressions in representing Boko Haram's association with violent crimes while *ThisDay* adopted a mix of implicit and explicit constructions in the same negative contexts. Both newspapers adopted a positive tone in representing security agents and/or government forces. These findings could simply be reflecting the lower level of violence committed by security agencies against civilians and journalists.

Based on the findings, the thesis argues that *ThisDay's* reporting employed a more negative tone and adopted a mix of explicit and implicit constructions in associating Boko Haram to violent actions than *Daily Trust* which employed only indirect expression to identify Boko Haram in relation to the reported violent. In regard to this argument, Reolofs (2012) cited a case in point during the Boko Haram uprising in 2009 in Nigeria when the BBC was a widely cited source in the country. He argued that BBC reported the Boko Haram crisis from a political agency discourse, presenting the police as 'agents for whom violence is a legitimate means of control'. The point is clearly reflected in the CDA finding of this thesis, which confirms that reports in the two analysed newspapers explicitly represented security agents in positive lights even while engaging in similar violent acts of shooting and killing of Boko Haram members. This is unlike the negative way the Boko Haram group has been framed. Reolofs (2012) therefore cautioned that:

*Journalists should be aware of power hierarchies they are supporting when they subconsciously use certain metaphors to describe and explain the conflict, not just in editorials and analysis pieces but in 'factual' news reports.*

The last aspect of this discussion is the framing category. The content analysis finding shows that both *ThisDay* and *Daily Trust* employed more episodic framing than thematic. The use of more episodic framing resonates with other research that employed this form of framing categories. However, *ThisDay* identified



Boko Haram in more episodic frames than *Daily Trust*, and *Daily Trust* represented Boko Haram in more thematic frames than *ThisDay*. In this thesis, since episodic framing is about specific events, such as killing, bombing, abduction and related ones, the greater use of episodic frames by *ThisDay* was possibly intended to focus attention on the negative and violent activities of Boko Haram. In this respect, *Daily Trust*'s thematic framing could be a tactical way of creating distance about violent reporting or inactions of the sect as most of the newspaper's reporting bordered on broad issues such as security, insecurity, dialogue and so on. Iyengar's (1996) distinction of episodic and thematic framing in his study provides further insights to the finding of this thesis. He found that television's systematic reliance on episodic as opposed to thematic depictions of political life elicits individualistic attributions of responsibility for national problems such as poverty and terrorism. Specifically, he noted that these attributions emphasise the actions of private rather than governmental actors.

Therefore, it can be inferred from the argument that *ThisDay*'s use of episodic framing could be a way of identifying Boko Haram as the actor in the violent reports and largely presenting the public with acts of violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram. Conversely, *Daily Trust*'s use of thematic framing suggests the emphasis of the newspaper on government activities, the underlying issues and solutions to the Boko Haram crisis. Based on the findings, this thesis argues that reporting in *ThisDay*, which focused more on episodic framing, intentionally aimed to expose violent actions by the Boko Haram insurgents while *Daily Trust* emphasised thematic framing of the events. Although it is expected that *Daily Trust* should be in a better position to have access to first-hand information and report events as they unfolded, including identifying suspects and victims of violence, the precarious location of the reporters exposed them to attacks and hindered their access to the events and people in the Boko Haram area.

## **7.4 Concerns about Risks in Reporting on Boko Haram**

The discussion in this section is focused on Research Question 3 of this study, which asks: Do concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram have an impact on the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists? The discussions in this section are categorised into three sub-themes. They are as listed:

- vii. Boko Haram's threats to journalists lead to news gathering and reporting patterns that suit the group.
- viii. Problem of access to credible information about Boko Haram
- ix. Security agents' mistrust of journalists leads to insecurity

### **7.4.1 Impact of Boko Haram's Threats to Journalists**

The thesis argues that due to the threats by the Boko Haram to the journalists, reporters covering the activities of the group employed reporting expressions that are in line with Boko Haram's demands. They avoided frames that the group considered offensive. This is reflected in the interview finding that the Boko Haram group had warned and threatened reporters in the country, especially those that lived within the northern part of the country, for reporting 'badly' or misrepresenting reports about their activities. According to Reporter I, covering the northern region (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016), who asserts that, "on several occasions, some members of the Boko Haram went to the residences of journalists, threatening them that they have reported badly about them. Often times, the threatened reporters seek relocation from the North to any other states in the South" (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016).

The result from the interviews correlates with Fairclough's (2007:220) argument that as a practice, newspaper discourse must necessarily be situated in a context – in a social setting. Hence, Fairclough claims that the social setting frames and structures the language used – enabling certain people to speak and restricting others; certain words or phrases will be obligatory, or considered more suitable, and others words

or phrases will be prohibited. In other words, threats by Boko Haram could influence reporting content favourable to Boko Haram. Therefore, the reporters who have been threatened or attacked, or who have witnessed or heard of colleagues' deaths could perhaps frame reports about Boko Haram based on the social constraints he has found himself.

The finding is also supported by the results in the content analysis that demonstrate that whenever *Daily Trust's* newspaper, which has its head office located in the North adopted episodic framing, rather than being specific, it identified Boko Haram as being involved in actions that are suggestive of violence. In the same episodic context, *ThisDay*, with its head office based in the South, identified Boko Haram as being involved in clearly identifiable cases of violence. The differences in the framing of the newspapers could be attributable to their different locations to Boko Haram's direct attacks. Although in some instances, *ThisDay* exercised restraint by suggesting that no person or group was identified as having agency in the violence. The phrasing might be due to previous threats and attacks on the newspaper and its staff. In the context of terror threats by Boko Haram, Chilwa's (2017) provides some insights. He explained that terror threats by Boko Haram and Ansaru (a splinter group of Boko Haram) are inter-textually and ideologically related to threats associated with Al-Qaeda. The connection also goes to establish links with other terror groups around the world, which is an indication of Boko Haram's capacity for violence, just like Al-Qaeda.

#### **7.4.2 Problem of Access to Credible Information**

The thesis argues that journalists encountered problem in accessing accurate information about the crisis due to the conduct of Boko Haram and the security agencies, both of whom claimed to have upper hand in the crisis. The journalists interviewed in this study claimed that both Boko Haram and security agencies wanted to be viewed as being on top of the crisis. As a result, the reporters were often provided with contradicting information. Reporter G (Interview with Researcher, February 16, 2016), who covers the

northern Nigeria, noted that journalists encountered problems on how to strike a balance between information from Boko Haram and the government regarding the crisis. This is also backed by the finding from the content analysis that shows that after the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media in the country, ‘no frames’ increased which was then followed by increase in the episodic frames about Boko Haram. The finding could imply that, perhaps, by avoiding frames, the journalists mostly seem not to align to any side between Boko Haram and security agents/government officials.

These findings contribute to the claim by Nohrestdt and Ottosen (2014:47) who demonstrate that journalists have become regular ‘targets of attacks’ – whether from the military or other quarters. The reference to ‘other quarters’ could mean terror groups, drug cartels or other groups that have dislike for journalists because of the message they disseminate. In this context, the terror group is the most appropriate meaning. The author further asked whether the media were targeted because of the role they played in informing the global public about the warfare (Nohrestdt and Ottosen, 2014). Therefore, in relation to this thesis, it could perhaps imply that the journalists did not only refuse to align to any side between Boko Haram and security agencies because of credible information but could also be as a result of being targets of attacks by both parties. This argument is also related to the concerns by Armoudian (2017) in the interviews for her work. She confirmed that simply staying alive in the face of opposing forces is a problem for journalists around the world. The view is captured thus:

*It makes it really difficult to do your job when all sides regard you as fair game, and at best, you're in the way, and you're taking pictures of them doing things they shouldn't be doing.*  
(Carol Williams, *Los Angeles Times*)

### **7.4.3 Security Agents’ Mistrust of Journalists**

This section explores the findings that security agencies’ mistrust of the reporters could result in security challenges. The journalists from the North-east were mostly affected by the insecurity because of their

proximity to Boko Haram. Reporter B (Interview with Researcher, March 10, 2016) confirmed that journalists in the hostile environment of the North-east encountered security challenges from Boko Haram because the security agencies viewed the reporters as being on the side of Boko Haram while Boko Haram, on the other hand, perceived the journalists as supporting the government/ security agencies. This has made the journalists to be in a precarious situation, which Reporter B termed as ‘working between the Devil and the Red Sea’. However, positive relationships later emerged between the security agencies and the journalists after enlightenment workshops that cleared the misunderstanding between the two parties (Reporter D, Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016).

Along this line, as some regions have become entirely unsafe, the primary safety strategy for journalists was avoidance altogether (Armoudian, 2017). The northern part of Nigeria, where Boko Haram often operated, became unsafe for reporters. The author further asserts that although some journalists still take the risks, by sneaking in and blending with the local people, others embed with either military forces or insurgents to gain access to the frontlines while receiving some protection. But embedding comes with a cost, as ‘journalists readily admitted’ (Armoudian, 2017). In other words, as a result of Boko Haram’s threats, reporters embed with the military for reasons of both safety and continuous reporting of the crisis. But they often had to pay the price by adopting the guidelines set by the military. This clearly suggests the possibility that the reporters are likely to provide favourable reporting for the security agencies.

The argument above is also backed by the CDA findings, which expressed that *Daily Trust* ascribed violent actions to both Boko Haram and security agents using direct and indirect language while, on the other hand, *ThisDay* adopted only explicit phrasing in attributing violence to Boko Haram and security agents. This suggests that journalists reporting in dangerous zones, like the reporters from the *Daily Trust* in the northern part of Nigeria, were cautious of the way they framed the actions of both the security agencies and Boko Haram. This may be due to their proximity to direct attacks of Boko Haram and the need for security

protection by the security agencies. However, Ignatius (2010) noted that embedding could be counter-productive since journalists are often required to see things from only the military side as a condition of doing their job. This argument also provides support for the argument about cautious framing by the journalists, especially in relation to the security agencies that provided the reporters security support.

In support of the claim about cautious framing, Thussu and Freedman (2003), also argued that military and media networks have converged to the point where they are now virtually indistinguishable, explaining that media constitute the spaces in which wars are fought and are the main ways through which populations (or audiences) experience war. Their argument is not whether media promote or oppose particular conflicts but that they are the means by which media audiences gain understanding of the war (Thussu and Freedman, 2003). Therefore, this thesis argues that security agencies' mistrust of the journalists has caused insecurity challenges for the reporters covering the Boko Haram, leading to the reporters embedding with the military for safety and continuous reporting of the Boko Haram crisis.

## **7.5 Organisational Support for Journalists**

This section addresses the Research Question 4: (*To what extent do provision of safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by media owners in Nigeria ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram's activities?*) This section examines three issues that are associated with the research question. They are as listed:

- i. Lack of job insurance cover
- ii. Lack of safety and security training
- iii. Poor remuneration and irregular salaries

### **7.5.1 Lack of Job Insurance Cover**

Concerning the provision of insurance cover for journalists covering the Boko Haram activities in Nigeria, the finding of the guidelines on security for journalists covering danger zones by the Committee to Protect Journalists confirmed the disparity in the working conditions among journalists working in dangerous zones in developing countries such as Nigeria and other developed nations like the USA. For instance, the guidelines state that journalist associations in more affluent nations like the USA offer access to different health and life insurance plans. The Society of Professional Journalists in America offers a number of insurance plans, including hospital income insurance, major medical insurance for severe and long-term injuries, accidental death or dismemberment benefits, and disability income insurance (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012). However, the insurance provision in Nigeria is different. According to the reporters interviewed for this research, the media organisations do not provide insurance cover for journalists. The umbrella body of journalists in Lagos (the commercial centre of the country, located in the South) made an attempt at providing journalists with insurance cover but the effort was not sustained because it was not given support by media owners.

This type of provisions for health and insurance by media organisations in developed nations is absent for reporters in Nigeria, and this is affecting the quality of reporting. According to Reporter H (Interview with Researcher, April 14, 2016), one of the journalists interviewed for this study, who noted that lack of insurance cover by the news organisations for journalists in Nigeria had constrained the reporters from engaging in thorough investigative reporting of the crisis. This organisational support might explain why CNN and Al Jazeera have correspondents on the ground in Nigeria to report the insurgency in the country (Musa & Yusha'u, 2013).

In spite of this and other challenges that journalists covering the activities of Boko Haram are facing, journalism practice in Nigeria has been described as the most robust and vibrant in Africa (Oso et al., 2011,

African Media Barometer, 2011). This may imply that if journalists covering the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria were to be provided with better safety and other welfare packages as being enjoyed by their counterparts in other climes, the reporters covering this crisis may be able to show more commitment to reporting the Boko Haram crisis.

### **7.5.2 Lack of Safety and Security Training**

On the issue of safety and security training, most of the journalists interviewed in this study claimed that news organisations in Nigeria do not provide training for reporters covering the conflict. Instead, they confirm that training is usually organised by donor agencies, international organisations and foreign media houses. Reporter D (Interview with Researcher, February 11, 2016) states:

*Some non-governmental organisations such as International Red Cross Society, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, Democratic Good Governance, DFID, UN Women and some Nigerian agencies which include, the Nigerian military headquarters, Defence headquarters, Nigerian Police, and so on, all volunteered organised workshops for us on how to engage in reporting conflict.*

The finding resonates with the study conducted by Lisosky & Henrichsen (2009) on protection of journalists in conflict situations, which found that NGOs such as the INSI (International News Safety Institute) and RSF (Reporters sans frontiers) provide training at a reduced cost for journalists. The scholars further note that while relatively effective, these strategies are also the most expensive, creating financial difficulty for many news organisations around the world. Although the reporters interviewed for this study did not mention cost of training as a factor inhibiting the news organisations in Nigeria from providing training for their staff, perhaps, media owners in Nigeria view media training as additional costs considering that many of them have many months of unpaid salary.



It is noteworthy that many international news organisations and NGOs around the world have acknowledged the need for security and safety training for journalists covering dangerous zones, and thereby prescribed some global safety guidelines for the journalists and their news organisations (ICFJ, 2015). Given the lack of security and safety training for journalists in Nigeria, it appears the reporters covering the Boko Haram crisis in the country seem to be ambitious or unreasonable for undertaking ‘undue’ risk, but the findings from the interviews conducted in this study confirmed otherwise. According to Reporter I (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016), who was interviewed in the study, he affirmed that passion and commitment to the job account for their continuous reporting of the Boko Haram crisis.

### **7.5.3 Poor Remuneration and Irregular Salaries**

In spite of the threats from Boko Haram and the security agencies’ mistrust of journalists, the reporters interviewed in this study claimed that passion and motivation for the profession was paramount. They claimed that despite the challenges of irregular salaries, they kept on reporting in order to get people informed although most of them acknowledged that lack of alternative jobs was another factor. This thesis found that the absence of organisational support for journalists covering Boko Haram has hindered the zeal and commitment required by the journalists in reporting the Boko Haram crisis.

Specifically, on the issue of poor remuneration of journalists by media owners in Nigeria, this study finds that reporters covering Boko Haram mostly lacked commitment to continue reporting the Boko Haram crisis due to bad remuneration and irregular payments of salaries. Accounts from the interviewed reporters identify that some journalists in Nigeria had not received salaries for close to two years. According to Reporter F (Interview with Researcher, May 9, 2016), if reporters are not motivated, they will not want to look at the other angles in a story such as the human angle that will make the news interesting, or seek other sources. With good remuneration, one can expect good productivity. When reporter is well motivated, he can

go extra mile to source for stories.” (Reporter F, Interview with Researcher, May 9, 2016). This finding is backed by the finding from the content analysis that shows that journalists were the most identified source in articulating discourse about Boko Haram and that they significantly reduced their discourse following the Boko Haram attacks. This signifies that journalists used less diverse sources in reporting the crisis. This result resonates with the findings of previous studies, which also found that many African journalists suffer from being badly paid, poorly trained and working under political and commercial pressures. This devaluing of their profession has left them vulnerable and isolated (Schiffrin, 2010). This thesis therefore argues that due to bad remuneration of journalists by the media owners in Nigeria, reporters covering the Boko Haram crisis seem to be limited in the way they sourced information about the crisis. In addition, due to the attacks from Boko Haram, the journalists are likely to source news from avenues that seem less risky and are readily available.

This chapter has discussed the findings from the four research questions in relation to related studies on Boko Haram and conflict. Each of the research questions was examined based on the content categories and /or themes identified at the analysis stage. Thereafter, claims were made from the findings. The next chapter focuses on the summary of the findings, conclusions drawn and recommendations for further studies.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### Summary, Conclusion and Findings

#### 8.1 Introduction

This thesis adopts mixed methods of in-depth interview, content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA). The thesis aims to answer four questions. To do this, it covers three themes: conflict-sensitive reporting, risk in reporting Boko Haram and differences in locations of the newspapers to the epicentre of Boko Haram activities. The research questions were formulated and drawn out of these themes. The first research question examines whether journalists changed their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following Boko Haram's attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria. The second explores whether there are differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study. The third research question attempts to uncover whether concerns for risk in reporting on Boko Haram have an impact on the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists. Finally, the last question investigates the extent to which provision of safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by media owners in Nigeria ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram.

This chapter concludes this study, and therefore, provides a reflection on the thesis. It contains a summary of this research, underpinning its goals and the novel values it offers in terms of contributions to the body of knowledge in the area of risk journalism. The chapter draws out conclusions based on its key findings in the context of the Nigerian situation, highlights the limitations of this study and the recommendations for further studies.

## 8.2 Thesis Summary

This thesis argued that although journalists covering conflicts have always faced risk in their work, the changing nature of conflict had changed the danger from accidental shootings in war fronts to deliberate targeting by terrorist groups. The thesis formulated its central ideas around the inherent gaps in the literature. In consideration of the gaps, this research set out three main objectives namely, Boko Haram and media-related objective; journalist and risk objective; and methodology objective. Each of these contributed to scholarship on journalism and risk, and Boko Haram studies.

The thesis was focused on gaining understanding into whether journalists changed the way they identified Boko Haram in their news content after the Boko Haram attacks on the reporters and their media offices. To do this, the research analysed newspaper headlines on Boko Haram over the timeline of the study. This study assumed that journalists might be influenced in framing the news concerning Boko Haram based on the attacks from the group. In relation to this focus, the study examined whether there were differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012). The rationale for this question was based on the assumption that differences in the locations of the two newspapers' head offices to the epicentre of the Boko Haram activities and the reporters' experiences in their varied locations might influence framing about the group. Notably, studies on framing and representation in conflict communication were considered useful to communication scholars, especially in the Nigerian context. This was useful in gaining insights into how journalists framed the social actors and their actions in conflict reporting. In this thesis, the major actor was the Boko Haram group while the other minor actors were the security agencies/government.

The thesis further sought to uncover whether concerns about risk in reporting on Boko Haram had an impact on the techniques of news gathering and reporting by the journalists. This aspect of the thesis also led to concerns on whether provision of organisational support such as safety training, insurance cover and

remuneration for the journalists by the media owners in Nigeria enhanced continuous reporting on the activities of Boko Haram. The emphasis on these two areas was borne out of the understanding that the journalists covering the Boko Haram group encountered devastating challenges that could most likely impact on their work and safety. Against this constraints, this thesis assumed that in order to enhance reporting in this dangerous beat, the journalists required support from the media owners.

Chapter two of the thesis reviewed literature across the main themes and sub-themes identified in the study. The three main themes are: Conflict-sensitive reporting, risk in reporting Boko Haram and differences in the newspapers' locations to the epicentre of Boko Haram. The research questions in this study informed the literatures that were examined. The various literatures reviewed further provided the rationale for situating this study under framing theory. Framing was used in this study to explain how language (words and phrases) was used in representing Boko Haram group after the group's attacks and in the selected newspapers for the study. The use of framing also emphasised the coverage on how Boko Haram was represented following the group's attacks and between the two newspapers. In other words, both qualitative and quantitative aspects of framing were employed in the thesis. This approach was considered the most relevant based on the literature and previous studies on this subject. Four research questions covering the themes of the study were drawn. The research questions are thereby restated:

1. Did journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria?
2. Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust's* and *ThisDay's* reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012)?
3. Do concerns about risks in reporting on Boko Haram have an impact on the patterns of news gathering and reporting by journalists?

4. To what extent do provision of safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by the media owners in Nigeria ensure continuous reporting on Boko Haram?

Chapter three of this thesis identified the three research methods adopted in the study and the justifications for each of the methods in relation to the central question of this study, which asked: How do journalists report within the context of risk and fear during conflict, war and terrorism? The question was then followed by a sub-question: What gaps in the literature can an analysis on reporting about Boko Haram in Nigeria fill? More so, the chapter presented rationale for the adoption of mixed methods approach of both qualitative and quantitative research designs in the study. The chapter showed that this study employed both quantitative and qualitative analyses in answering the research questions highlighted above. The first two research questions adopted content analysis (quantitative) and CDA (qualitative) to answer the questions while the last two research questions employed the in-depth interview method, a qualitative technique in proffering answers to the questions.

For the content analysis and CDA methods, the thesis adopted the stratified scheme in drawing samples from two selected newspapers in Nigeria – *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay*, whose head offices are located in the northern and southern regions respectively. This was followed by a purposeful sample of news articles on Boko Haram within the timeline of the study. In all, 897 and 120 articles were drawn for the content analysis and the CDA respectively. For the in-depth interviews, using stratified purposeful scheme, the research drew samples from the reporters representing each of the two geo-political strata of northern and southern regions in Nigeria and a purposeful sample of reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram was further selected from each stratum.

Chapters four, five and six of the study focused on the presentation of findings and data analysis. Chapters four and five presented data analyses and findings from the first two research questions. These chapters highlighted five categories that provided insights about changes in the way Boko Haram was

represented in the headlines after their attacks. The five content categories used were: sourcing (who is making statements about Boko Haram?); labels (how Boko Haram is named); blame (who is attributed with blame for violence – Boko Haram or security agents?); tone (positive, negative or neutral); and type of frames adopted in representing Boko Haram (episodic and thematic). These content categories were used to explain the thesis findings in the section below.

Chapter six presented findings related to research questions three and four of the study. The emphasis of the analysis was on the responses from the interviewed journalists in Nigeria covering Boko Haram. The chapter showed that responses from the journalists interviewed were analysed using the themes and sub-themes identified in the interview data. The two main issues covered in the analyses were based on concerns about risk in reporting on Boko Haram and organisational support for journalists. Chapter seven of the thesis discussed the findings in the entire study in relation to other literature on Boko Haram and conflict studies.

### **8.3 Research Findings and Recommendations**

This section presents summary of the research findings and the recommendations for further studies. The findings are presented as thus:

Research Question 1 asks: “Did journalists change their news content when representing Boko Haram in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media organisations in Nigeria?” This study concludes that in the aftermath of the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media offices, journalists significantly reframed Boko Haram. Most of the reports significantly reduced naming Boko Haram in the violence and focused on topics relating to insecurity but not specifically about Boko Haram’s attacks.

After the Boko Haram attacks, the thesis further found a significant reduction in the volume of nominalised label (names popularly used to identify Boko Haram, such as Boko Haram, Jama’tul Ahlus Sunnah LiDawwati Li Jihad, Yusuffiyah). The reports adopted the nominalised label more than the

functionalised label which depicted Boko Haram by the exact violent roles it played in the crisis. In addition, the headlines largely used indirect language to refer to the actions of Boko Haram in the violence. This evidence shows that the newspapers avoided direct reference to Boko Haram following the group's attacks. In the opinions of the reporters interviewed for this study, Boko Haram members often suggested specific styles for the journalists to gather and report news about their group.

In relation to who is assigned blame for attacks, this study shows that in the period following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and the media, there was reduction in the volume of reports which ascribed blame to Boko Haram for the reported violence. The finding could also suggest that the reporting seems to tone down the way it attributed blame for violence to Boko Haram. However, in comparison to security agencies, Boko Haram was attributed more blame for violence than security agents. The finding also shows that the headlines were more positive towards security agents than Boko Haram. Moreover, in the period after the Boko Haram attacks, the reporting adopted a combination of explicit and implicit language in identifying Boko Haram in relation to the violent actions, which demonstrates that the reports moderated the choice of words used in describing the violence in relation to Boko Haram. Also, explicit language was used in referring to the violent actions by the security agencies against Boko Haram. In other words, the violent actions of the security agents seemed to be justified against Boko Haram. This, perhaps, seems to mean that the security agencies committed less violence.

Regarding the type of tone used in representing Boko Haram, the thesis found that mostly negative actions were attributed to Boko Haram and positive phrasing represented actions performed by security agencies or government. In the period following the Boko Haram attacks, headlines with negative words and phrases did not attribute agency for the actions they described, but explicitly identified Boko Haram as being responsible for the negative actions in the leads or story paragraphs. The reports also identified the security



agents/government in positive terms and offered excuses or justifications for their activities, even when these were violent, which could position them as defending the public against Boko Haram.

Concerning the type of frames used in identifying Boko Haram, the thesis confirms that after the Boko Haram attacks, there was reduction in the episodic framing about Boko Haram, which featured specific violence perpetrated by the group such as bombing, gun shooting and other specific violence. The reports indirectly connected Boko Haram to the violence largely using the assigned names of Boko Haram such as bomber, Islamist, gunmen – which indirectly referred to Boko Haram. This result is backed by the interview finding that confirms that Boko Haram members were averse to being identified as terrorist but preferred to be called Jamatul Ahlus Sunnah Li Dawaati Li Jihad (People committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings). The finding suggests that the newspapers were being cautious by reducing the specific mention of the violence that Boko Haram was connected to and indirectly naming Boko Haram in the violent reports. It is pertinent to note that the study found that in the period after the Boko Haram attacks, the category of ‘no frames’ increased, which means the reports did not frame the crisis around Boko Haram or security agents/government. Perhaps, by avoiding frames, the newspapers did not want to be seen as taking sides.

The findings from Research Question 2 which asks: “Are there differences in the representation of Boko Haram in *Daily Trust*’s and *ThisDay*’s reporting over the timeline of the study (2011-2012)?” established that there are significant differences in the representation of Boko Haram between *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* in the period of the study. Concerning the type of sourcing used in the reports, this research confirmed that journalists from *ThisDay* ranked higher than their counterparts from *Daily Trust* in reporting on Boko Haram’s activities. While *Daily Trust* adopted a combination of implicit and explicit language in reporting the violence, *ThisDay* reported the violence clearly and explicitly. This shows that *Daily Trust* chose words and expressions that have implied meanings in reporting Boko Haram because of the relative location of the newspaper’s head office to the epicentre of Boko Haram activities: the newspaper staff encountered

direct threats of Boko Haram insurgents. This finding is supported by the interviews from the reporters covering the crisis from the northern region who asserts that, “on several occasions, some members of the Boko Haram went to the residences of journalists, threatening them that they have reported badly about them. Often times, the threatened reporters seek relocation from the North to any other states in the South” (Interview with Researcher, May 5, 2016). The implication of the ‘relocation from the North to any other states in the South’ mentioned in the narration above shows that the reporters in the southern region of the country were considered safe from the insurgents’ direct attacks, which also confirms that the use of explicit language by these reporters from *ThisDay* was based off their distance from the Boko Haram.

With regard to the type of label adopted in representing Boko Haram, the thesis shows that *Daily Trust* adopted more nominalised labels which identified Boko Haram by its popular names and pictured the activities of Boko Haram as mostly having little or nothing to do with the violence than *ThisDay*. In addition, *ThisDay* represented Boko Haram by more functionalised label (such as gunmen, suicide bomber) which depicted the actual roles that the Boko Haram group carried out in the reported violent activities than *Daily Trust*. This finding demonstrates that *Daily Trust* was being cautious in identifying Boko Haram as the actor in the violent activities. Conversely, *ThisDay*’s choice of words could suggest that the newspaper was more forthright but also cautious in representing Boko Haram as the actor in violent events.

In regard to who is attributed blame for violence by the newspapers, this study found that both *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* ascribed more blame for the violence to Boko Haram than security agencies. In specific terms, *ThisDay* attributed more violence to Boko Haram than *Daily Trust*. Also, *ThisDay* adopted clearly defined language in attributing the violence to Boko Haram and security agents, while *Daily Trust* ascribed the violent actions to both Boko Haram and security agents using a mix of direct and indirect phrasing. The findings, therefore, show that by using a combination of direct and indirect wording in associating Boko Haram and security agencies to the reported violence, perhaps, the sub-editors in *Daily Trust* did not want to

be perceived as taking sides. Also, by adopting explicit language in attributing violence to Boko Haram and security agents, it suggests that *ThisDay* was bold and direct in ascribing the violence to both Boko Haram and security agents.

The findings on the type of tone used in representing Boko Haram show that in *ThisDay*, more negative tones were employed in reporting the activities of Boko Haram than in *Daily Trust*. In *ThisDay*, Boko Haram was represented using negative tone through language that both explicitly and implicitly connected the group to violent actions. The finding demonstrates that *ThisDay* was being careful in the way it represented the actions of Boko Haram in the violent reports. In addition, the newspaper clearly presented the Nigerian government and its agencies as a positive group through reports that connected them with positive actions. This suggests that *ThisDay* seems not to find negative reports about government agencies.

Conversely, in *Daily Trust's* reporting, more positive tone was adopted than in *ThisDay*. In the newspaper, Boko Haram was in some cases, indirectly identified in negative tone in relation to the violent activities, which suggests negative. In other instances, no person or group was identified as having agency in the violence. The finding demonstrates that, perhaps, the newspaper seems to focus on reporting violent actions rather than dwelling on the perpetrators of the act. Also, the newspaper identified Nigerian government and its agencies in cases that seemed positive but were depicted as not doing enough. The finding shows that *Daily Trust* seems to suggest that the government was not adequately addressing the crisis.

The finding regarding the type of frame adopted in representing Boko Haram shows that *ThisDay* identified Boko Haram using more episodic frames which described specific events and actions by Boko Haram than *Daily Trust*. Also, *Daily Trust* represented Boko Haram using thematic frames that dwelt on broader issues around Boko Haram more than *ThisDay*. This shows that *ThisDay's* reporting largely framed the exact violent actions that Boko Haram was connected to, such as bombing, killing and gun shooting. In

comparison, *Daily Trust*, to a large extent, framed the actions of Boko Haram by describing general issues which include insecurity, violence and terrorism. This finding shows that due to its proximity to the epicentre of Boko Haram activities, *Daily Trust* is expected to have access and exclusive information to report events about Boko Haram as they unfolded such as identifying suspects and victims of the crisis, but was unable to do that due to the dangerous environment it is operating.

Additionally, *Daily Trust* adopted both the episodic and thematic frames in identifying Boko Haram in the reported violent activities. Significantly, the newspaper used the episodic framing to represent Boko Haram as being involved in events that were suggestive of violence instead of explicitly describing the violent actions. *ThisDay* on the other hand, employed the episodic frames, which clearly identified Boko Haram in relation to specific cases of violence but it also omitted the agency for the violence in some other instances. The findings demonstrate that *Daily Trust* was being careful and evasive in the use of indirect phrasing to connect Boko Haram to the violence. The evidence here is significant since episodic framings are expected to clearly define events. In comparison, *ThisDay* mostly used explicit descriptions in reporting the violent activities of Boko Haram, which shows that the newspaper was bold and forthright. But in the few cases where the newspaper omitted names of persons or organisations responsible for the violence, this also suggests that although the newspaper was direct in the language used but was cautious so as not to indict anyone for the violence.

The Research Question 3 asks: “Do concerns about risks in reporting Boko Haram have an impact on how journalists in Nigeria conduct their reporting, and if so in what ways? The findings from this research question establish that reporters covering the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria encountered major challenges in covering the activities of the group. Boko Haram was identified as constituting the major risks to the journalists in the form of threats and attacks. In the opinion of the reporters interviewed for this study, journalists also encountered other challenges from security agencies and media owners in the country. The

journalists averred that the combination of the security challenge from security agencies and media owners with Boko Haram's threats and attacks had created a general insecure reporting atmosphere for them. Specifically, the reporters acknowledged that journalists covering the activities of Boko Haram, especially those located in the northern Nigeria, were made to 'forcefully' accept the reporting frames from the Boko Haram insurgents and followed news gathering patterns preferred by the group. The reporters further confirmed that they either had to scale down on their reporting on the group's activities or avoid the news altogether for their safety.

These results correlate with the findings in the content analysis of this study, which show that although the volume of coverage of Boko Haram by journalists was the highest in comparison to other sources such as security agencies, government and Boko Haram itself but the coverage declined after the Boko Haram attacks. The finding suggests that in spite of the risks involved in reporting the crisis, journalists still showed some commitment to the reporting but became agitated after the direct attacks on them. The interviews further show that they were often forced to cover Boko Haram by editors against their will, and they had to due to lack of job opportunities. Hence, the government, media owners and other stakeholders should make efforts to address the security challenges in the country as they do not only affect the security and safety of the journalists covering the Boko Haram imbroglio but also the news content.

In the same way, the reporters interviewed in this study confirmed that security agents' mistrust of journalists initially made the military to be hostile and uncooperative with the reporters. But after series of workshops conducted for the military and journalists to foster understanding, the journalists had to follow instructions and guidelines by the security agencies. In the opinions of the interviewed reporters, part of the understanding and cooperation required that reporters would have to obtain clearance from the military in order to gain access to scene of Boko Haram's attacks. Consequently, the reporters had to rely more on press releases and other information from the security agents. The thesis therefore argues that the journalists'

dependence on support and cooperation of the security agencies is likely to lead to subjective news of the crisis. In this case, the preferred frames and narratives of the security agencies may be difficult to discern from objective reports about the crisis.

In support of the argument, the content analysis and CDA findings in this study show that following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media offices in Nigeria, headline reports largely identified the security agents/government in positive terms and offered excuses or justifications for their activities, even when these were violent, positioning them as defenders of the public against Boko Haram. The findings further confirmed that the selected newspapers often attributed more violence to Boko Haram than the security agencies, and often adopted positive tone in representing the activities of the security agencies. This finding largely reflects the different targets of violence between the security agencies and Boko Haram. In order to ensure objectivity, accuracy and trust, security agencies should provide unconditional access and not inhibit reporters from accessing information. The government should also provide legislation on the requisite organisational support for the journalists.

Lastly, the findings from Research Question 4, which asks: “To what extent do provision of safety training, insurance cover and remuneration of journalists by the Nigerian media ensure reporting on Boko Haram activities?” confirms that given the growing intimidations and killings of journalists covering conflict zones, it is important that the reporters are provided the requisite training and other organisational support. The thesis therefore concludes that journalists covering dangerous activities of terror groups need to be trained in order to heighten their awareness of what to expect, how to venture into the crisis and how to effectively report on it. In support of this argument, reporters interviewed for this study confirmed that covering crisis such as Boko Haram requires understanding of the terminologies and tactics involved, such as ‘the First Bomb’, or ‘the Second Target’. The need for understanding the strategies resonates with the guidelines by the BBC for journalists covering terrorist bomb threats or un-exploded bomb (UXB) cases. The guidelines

stipulate that journalists need to “consider the possibility of a second planned or subsequent explosion this includes identifying anything that could be a risk” (BBC, 2017). Also, the reporters interviewed for this study affirmed that safety training for journalists in Nigeria is usually provided by donor agencies and international organisations. This suggests that journalists covering the Boko Haram crises were not obtain the required safety training and other supports to cover the Boko Haram crisis from their employers.

Similarly, the thesis argues that lack of insurance cover and prompt salary payment for journalists by the media organisations in Nigeria seem to discourage reporting on the crisis. For reasons of safety and sustenance, journalists covering the Boko Haram crisis in the country are most likely not to be committed to and passionate about the job. The reporters interviewed for this study confirmed that most of the journalists covering Boko Haram tactically avoided reporting on the crisis out of fear for their safety and those of their families. The argument correlates with the findings from the CDA which confirmed that most of the reports from *Daily Trust* (located in the northern region, which is the operational base of Boko Haram) largely employed indirect and evasive constructions in describing the violence. Media organisations in Nigeria need to use best global practices in ensuring safety and welfare for their journalists covering dangerous groups such as the Boko Haram insurgents.

In general, this study therefore argues that the noticeable change in the coverage and language patterns found in the reports following the Boko Haram attacks on journalists and media offices in Nigeria may be attributable to the threats and attacks of journalists by the Boko Haram group, which may result in making the reporters less committed. Similarly, the difference between *Daily Trust*'s and *ThisDay*'s reporting on Boko Haram may be due to the differences in the geographical locations of the newspapers to the epicentre of Boko Haram activities. In addition, the thesis concludes that journalists covering dangerous activities of terror groups need to be trained in order to heighten their awareness of what to expect, how to venture into the crisis and how to effectively report on it.

## 8.4 Conclusion

Based on the above thesis summary and its key findings, this study concludes that journalists covering hotspots in their home countries, and particularly reporters covering Boko Haram in Nigeria, have been deliberately attacked, killed and had their news offices bombed by the terror groups they cover. This study argues that due to terror attacks, journalists changed the way they covered the Boko Haram mostly focusing on related topics but not on the nefarious acts of the group itself.

The thesis findings also show that the security agents/government were represented in positive terms and offered excuses or justifications for their activities, even when these were violent, which could position them as defending the public against Boko Haram. Based on this finding, this thesis argues that the government /security agents who engaged in violent actions were identified in positive lights. The argument provides a clear warning to journalists to be aware of the extent of cooperation they provide to security agents/government which could impact their objectivity.

This study further concludes that journalists reporting on conflict regardless of whether it is local or foreign are most likely to encounter challenges from insurgents, security agencies and even the news organisations employing them. In Nigeria, constraints on reporting about terrorism were multi-faceted and came from the terror groups, the media owners and security agencies/government. Therefore, policy makers and other stakeholders in Nigeria should be aware of these challenges and find solutions to them in order to ensure an open, democratic and effective media sector, thus allowing for effective reporting of conflicts in the country.

In addition, this study argues that media organisations in Nigeria should provide enabling/conducive working conditions in terms of insurance cover and adequate and timely salary payment. This can facilitate effective reporting of conflicts. This thesis further argues that reporters who are geographically close to the



scenes of violence are more at risk, as opposed to journalists that report outside conflict areas. Moreover, the study concludes that journalists that live and report close to the location of attacks or to violent groups may be evasive and indirect in appropriating blame for the violence due to fear of attacks by the perpetrators of the violence. Based on the findings in this study, reporters in the North who are expected to provide first-hand information and on-the-spot reports of the crisis due to their proximity to the epicentre of Boko Haram seem to be constrained by direct confrontations from the terror groups. Therefore, while the policy makers in Nigeria are making efforts at ensuring safe reporting environment for journalists covering dangerous zones, special considerations should be made for reporters in the North where the stakes against them are higher, direct and real.

Based on the findings, the thesis argues that local reporting of violent crisis in Nigeria often excludes the reportage of criminal aspects of the story due to fear of attacks from perpetrators of the crimes. In most cases, the journalists have become vulnerable, as the people involved in the crimes may know their identities. More so, due to lack of detailed reporting on the perpetrators and supporters of crimes, policy makers would not have adequate information on how to combat the crisis.

In general, based on the findings of this study, it can be concluded that reporters covering crisis have become less committed following perceived personal risks from their reporting. This is especially found to be the case with journalists covering the Boko Haram crisis, as this thesis has confirmed that the reporters covering the crisis lacked the requisite security and organisational support. This is most evident in the responses of the journalists interviewed for this study. It is also supported in the content analysis and CDA findings which confirmed that the reporting by the newspapers on Boko Haram rarely attributed violence to Boko Haram directly. The headlines usually lacked agencies for the violent actions. Most often, Boko Haram was not directly connected to the reported violence in the story paragraphs. The thesis therefore argues that

threats and intimidation from the Boko Haram group have engendered evasive techniques that are evident in most crime reporting in Nigeria.

### **8.5 Limitations of the Study**

It should be acknowledged that this study has a number of limitations. These limitations can be categorised into three types, namely:

- The framework of research objectives
- Methodologies
- Timeframe

#### **Limitation of Primary Sources**

In this thesis, reporters covering the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria were interviewed to determine the challenges they encountered in the cause of reporting on the group. This research found that the journalists faced risks from three quarters, which are: the Boko Haram, security agencies and newspaper owners in Nigeria. This study only conducted interviews among the journalists, as the main focus of the thesis is on journalists. It seeks the opinions of reporters on these challenges but did not conduct research among any of the other three groups that the reporters alleged constituted the risks. The reason for this is that these other sources were difficult to access and therefore it is considered a study that can be examined separately and independently of this research.

#### **The Type of Methodologies**

All research methods have important limitations. In this dissertation, three methods were used to try to offset the limits of any particular method. However, it is worth acknowledging some of the important limitations of each. CDA, as a conceptual framework for discourse analysis, has been criticised for selecting

and using only a small number of texts, in some cases even just one or two, which has led to concerns regarding representativeness and generalisability. However, this study has been able to surmount this problem by including content analysis, which covers a representative sample of headlines from which the data for the CDA was drawn.

Another limitation is on the lack of related studies that adopted CDA that this study can draw inferences from. It was noted that only a few studies on Boko Haram in Nigeria adopted the CDA method. While some studies employed content analysis and interviews, most of the research engaged in case studies and historical analyses. This made it difficult for this study to draw relevant comparisons with previous studies or to validate conclusion based on previous research.

In addition, another limitation in this study can be discerned in the area of low number of interviews. Initially, fifteen reporters accepted to be interviewed but only ten of them granted the interviews.

### **A Specified Timeframe**

Another limitation identified in this thesis is the analysis of two out of the four phases in the study. In this thesis, the selected time frames are phases 1 and 4, representing the period before and after Boko Haram's attacks. The reason for this selection is to proffer clear and valid conclusions in line with the focus of this aspect of the research question which seeks to determine how journalists in Nigeria represent the activities of the Boko Haram group following the group's attacks on them.

### **A Specific Number of Newspapers**

Another limitation of this study is on the selection of only two newspapers to represent the northern and southern regions in Nigeria. Although there are many vibrant newspapers in Nigeria covering these two zones, most do not often report on national issues like Boko Haram as *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay*. This may be

due to the sensitive nature of the Boko Haram issue in the country or the financial capability to employ and sustain staff. However, *Daily Trust* and *ThisDay* have been noted as the most prominent and consistent in the coverage of Boko Haram.

## **8.6 Recommendations for Further Studies**

Based on the limitations identified above, this study makes the following recommendations:

### **Expansion in Research Scope**

This study did not conduct research among any of the three groups (Boko Haram, media owners and security agencies) that were identified as constituting risks to journalists covering the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Although attempts to conduct and carry out research on Boko Haram members might pose much difficulty and be dangerous, other studies could extend their scope to cover research on the perceptions of media owners and security agents/key government officials in Nigeria. The effort is most likely to be useful in understanding their perceptions towards provision of safety and other welfare support not only for journalists covering Boko Haram crisis but journalists in the country in general in order to make appropriate recommendations.

Furthermore, it is recommended that in cognisance of the limitations in the current research, other studies should focus on incorporating and analysing more than two newspapers with audience base in the two major regions in Nigeria. Other studies should also focus on radio, television and social media. This is hoped to expand the scope and provides enriching findings that would be more encompassing in policy formulation on the reporting of dangerous zones and groups in the Nigeria.

## **Expansion in Methodology**

This study employed content analysis and CDA methodologies in analysis of the newspaper headlines. Although headline analysis provides useful information about the entire text, further insights could be gained through examining the entire body text of newspaper. Therefore, it is recommended that other studies should include analysis of body texts in subsequent research.

In addition, since few studies on Boko Haram adopted CDA method, it is recommended that more studies should engage in the use of this method in order to gain insights into the denotative and connotative meanings that are present in texts. This could be useful in providing a clearer understanding of social relations of power that drive constructions of language in texts.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix (I)

#### CODE BOOK FOR DATA COLLECTION

Programme: PhD Media and Communication

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#### Coder:

ARM

Story Identity: Newspaper

Year

Month

Day

Item no

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**(1) SOURCE**

- Boko Haram 1
- Security agents 2
- Journalist 3
- Citizen 4
- Government 5
- International 6
- Anonymous 7
- Other 8

**(2) LABEL**

- Group 1
- Functionalised 2
- Nominalised 3
- Personalised 4
- No labels 5

**(3) BLAME**

- Boko Haram attacking 1
- Security agents defending 2
- Boko Haram defending 3
- Security agents attacking 4
- Actions but no responsibility 5
- No actions 6

**(4) FRAMING**

- Episodic frames about Boko Haram 1
- Episodic frames about security agents/government 2
- Thematic frames about Boko Haram 3
- Thematic frames about security agents/government 4
- No Frames 5

**(5) TONE**

- Negative 1
  - Positive 2
  - Neutral 3
-

**Appendix (II)**

**CODE BOOK INSTRUCTION FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS**

**Programme: PhD Media and Communication**

<b>Coder:</b>		
Koiki		1
<b>Story Identity</b>		
Newspaper headlines:	<i>Daily Trust</i> <i>ThisDay</i>	1 2
Year:	2011 2012	1 2
Phase:	Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV	1 2 3 4
Month:	January February March April May June July August September	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

October	10
November	11
December	12

1) **SOURCE** – Who is responsible for statements in the headlines

- Boko Haram: Statements credited to Boko Haram members/ leaders/spokesperson/other names assigned to Boko Haram
- Security agents: Statements credited to military/police/JTF (Joint Task Force)/SSS (State Security Service)/DSS (Director Security Service)
- Journalist: Summarised reports/statements by journalists in Nigeria
- Citizen: Statements showing names of individuals/religious groups/organisations in the private sector in Nigeria
- Government: Statements credited to persons/officials/organisations in Nigerian public sector (such as, ministries, state/house of assemblies, judiciary, etc.
- International: Statements showing names of persons/organisations/ agencies based outside Nigeria
- Anonymous: Statements in quotes but not showing names of any sources
- Other: Statements different from the ones identified above and are clearly labelled as ‘opinion’, ‘editorials’, ‘columns’ ‘analysis’ ‘interview’, etc.

(2) **LABEL** – References to how Boko Haram is described or named in headlines

- Collectivised: addressing Boko Haram as a group such as terrorist/ Islamic sect/extremist/ militant group
- Functionalised: references to Boko Haram in terms of what they do or according to their roles (as bomber/ kidnapper/gunman/ killer, etc.)
- Nominalised: references to Boko Haram according to the popular names it is known by such as Boko Haram/Jamaa’ul Ahlu Sunna Lidawaati li Jihad/ Yusuffiyah.
- Personalised: Identifying Boko Haram as representing a certain particular person (as spokesperson/ sponsor/ leader etc.)
- No labels: headlines with no label about Boko Haram

(3) **BLAME**: References showing who is responsible for attack/threat or responding to attack/defending between Boko Haram and security agents

- Boko Haram attacking: started violent actions such as killings, shootings, kidnappings, bombings, issuing threats etc.
- Security agents defending: responding to Boko Haram attacks, right to defend itself and the public, fighting terror, high troop morale etc.
- Boko Haram defending: responding to attacks from security agents, resisting (resistance), high morale among members, etc.
- Security agents attacking: actions unjustified (disproportionate), costs too high, tactics mis-directed, criticism of tactics, etc.
- No blame for attacking: attacking/fighting not referenced to any side - neither Boko Haram nor security agents is to blame for the actions
- No attack: no references to actions about attacks or fighting

(4) **TONE** – Words, phrases or expressions in the headlines showing Negative, positive or neutral descriptions of violence.

- Negative: Words/phrases/ expressions showing issues relating to killing, bombing, gun shooting etc.
- Positive: Words/phrases/expressions showing issues relating to dialogue, amnesty, cooperation etc.
- Neutral: words/ phrases/expressions that are neither positive nor negative

(5) **FRAMING** – how events/ actions are described in the headlines as either episodic or thematic frames:

Episodic frames are specific incidents (such as bombing, killing, etc.)

Thematic frames are general or broad issues or actions (such as, insecurity, violence, terrorism etc.)

- Episodic frames about Boko Haram: specific actions/events about Boko Haram (e.g. killing, bombing, attacking, gun shooting etc.)
- Episodic frames about security agents/government: specific events about security agents/government (such as defending, arresting, attacking, etc.)
- Thematic frames about Boko Haram: general issues/events about Boko Haram (such as insecurity, violence, etc.)
- Thematic frames about security agents/government: general issues/events about security agents/government (such as dialogue, security, tolerance etc.)
- No Frames: Issues that are neither about Boko Haram nor security agencies/ government

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**Appendix (III)**

**UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY RESEARCH CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS**

**College of Arts**



School of Language, Social and Political Sciences

Department of Media and Communication

Office: Room 516, Locke Building

Tel: +64 21 0299 1280.

[adebate.mustapha-koiki@pg.canterbury.ac.nz](mailto:adebate.mustapha-koiki@pg.canterbury.ac.nz)

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**Project Title:** Journalism and Risk: An Examination of the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria.

**Researcher:** Adebate Mustapha-Koiki, PhD Candidate

Department of Media and Communication

University of Canterbury

December, 2015

**RESEARCH CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS (REPORTERS COVERING BOKO HARAM)**

I have read the attached information form and I understand the description of the project named above.

I understand that my participation in the project will involve audiotaped interviews.

I understand and I am satisfied that all measures will be taken to protect my identity and ensure my interests are well protected.



I understand that I may withdraw from the project at any time, and may decide to withdraw any information I have provided from use in the final PhD report.

I understand and I agree to publication of the research findings provided my identity is not disclosed. That is, anonymity will be ensured by the researcher.

I am convinced that this research has been properly examined, reviewed and approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.

I voluntarily agree to participate in this research project based on the written information sheet and the information provided in this consent form.

I understand I will be given an opportunity to read and review the transcript of the recorded interview to correct any observed factual errors. After this stage, revision or review will no longer be possible.

Signature: ..... Date: .....

If aged under-18, a parent or caregiver must also grant consent:

Name of Parent/Caregiver: ..... Signature and Date.....



## Appendix (IV)

### CODING SHEET FOR THE FIVE CONTENT CATEGORIES FROM *DAILY TRUST* AND *THISDAY* ARTICLES

S/ N	DATE	HEADLINES	NEW SPAP E	PH ASE S	SO URC E	LA BE L	BL AM E	FRA MIN G	TO NE
1	23-Jul-11	I Didn't Say Sheriff Created Boko Haram - Gen. Useni [interview]	1	1	2	3	6	1	3
2	23-Jul-11	No Need for State of Emergency in Borno - ANPP	1	1	5	5	6	5	2
3	23-Jul-11	Boko Haram - Borno Will Rise Again As Home of Peace - Inuwa Bwala [interview]	1	1	4	3	6	3	2
4	23-Jul-11	Country to Work On Terrorism	1	1	3	1	6	5	2
5	25-Jul-11	Police Burdened by Insecure Security	1	1	3	5	6	4	1
6	26-Jul-11	Christ Apostolic Church Says Boko Haram is Seed of Discord	1	1	4	3	6	3	1
7	26-Jul-11	Police HQ Bombing Probe Stalled	1	1	3	5	6	2	1
8	27-Jul-11	Boko Haram - Presidency Rules Out State of Emergency	1	1	3	3	5	4	2
9	27-Jul-11	NASFAT Urges FG to Dialogue With Boko Haram	1	1	4	3	6	2	2
10	27-Jul-11	Amnesty International to FG - Stop Random Killings in Borno	1	1	6	5	6	2	1
11	27-Jul-11	Nation's Image Damaged By Boko Haram	1	1	3	3	4	1	1
12	27-Jul-11	Borno Imbroglio - the Truth Behind the Lies	1	1	3	5	1	5	3
13	27-Jul-11	Nigeria: Suspected Islamic sect member killed in Borno State	1	1	3	1	6	1	1
14	28-Jul-11	Nigerian security agency trains officials from states affected by Islamic sect	1	1	3	1	5	2	2
15	28-Jul-11	How We Formed Boko Haram, By Spokesman	1	1	1	3	2	1	3
16	29-Jul-11	Not All Crises in the North Are Caused By Boko Haram - Sultan	1	1	4	3	6	3	3

17	30-Jul-11	Boko Haram - FG Should Change Tactics, Says ACN	1	1	4	3	6	4	3
18	30-Jul-11	Nigerian Islamic sect said threatens to attack Kano State	1	1	1	1	6	1	1
19	1-Aug-11	No Dialogue With Boko Haram - Petinrin [interview]	1	1	4	3	1	1	3
20	2-Aug-11	Nigeria army boss seeks help of foreign agencies against Islamic sect	1	1	3	3	6	2	2
21	4-Aug-11	Don't Victimise Northern Security Personnel Over Boko Haram, Jonathan Advised	1	1	5	3	2	2	2
22	4-Aug-11	One killed in clashes with Islamic sect in Nigeria's northern Borno State	1	1	3	1	6	1	1
23	5-Aug-11	Northern Nigeria political group backs talks with Islamic sect	1	1	3	1	1	2	3
24	9-Aug-11	Youth CAN to FG - Don't Dialogue With Boko Haram	1	1	4	3	6	1	1
25	9-Aug-11	Boko Haram - the Expedience of Dialogue [opinion]	1	1	8	3	6	3	3
26	9-Aug-11	Presidential Panel On Security in the North East	1	1	3	5	6	4	3
27	16-Aug-11	Army Denies Killing Nursing Mother in Borno	1	1	2	5	6	2	3
28	16-Aug-11	Borno - Facing the Boko Haram Challenge	1	1	3	3	5	3	1
29	16-Aug-11	Panacea to the Boko Haram Crisis [opinion]	1	1	8	3	1	2	2
30	17-Aug-11	Insurgency - U.S. Pledges Support for Military	1	1	6	5	6	2	2
31	18-Aug-11	Boko Haram - General Faces Court Martial	1	1	3	3	6	2	3
32	18-Aug-11	Party Boss Asks Fleeing Maiduguri Residents to Return	1	1	5	5	6	2	2
33	19-Aug-11	Re - Jang's Boko Haram Tactics in Plateau Education Sector [analysis]	1	1	8	3	6	1	3
34	19-Aug-	ANPP Boss Asks Fleeing Maiduguri Residents to Return	1	1	5	5	6	2	2

	11						
35	23-Aug-11	Chanchangi - I Am Not Financier of Boko Haram Sect					
			1	1	6	3	6
							1
							3
36	26-Aug-11	ANPP Chieftain, Pregnant Woman Killed By Gunmen in Borno					
			1	1	3	2	6
							1
							1
37	29-Aug-11	Adamawa Gun Attack - the Untold Story					
			1	1	3	5	1
							5
							1
38	29-Aug-11	A Senseless And Cowardly Attack [editorial]					
			1	1	8	5	5
							5
							1
39	30-Aug-11	Why We Struck - Boko Haram Har am					
			1	1	1	3	5
							1
							1
40	30-Aug-11	UN Building Bombing - Jonathan Vows to Track Down Bombers I [analysis]					
			1	1	5	2	1
							2
							2
41	30-Aug-11	Locals Prefer Military Action, Dialogue With Boko Haram - Survey					
			1	1	8	3	5
							1
							3
42	30-Aug-11	Boko Haram - Country's Youth in Ghana Urge Ceasefire					
			1	1	4	3	6
							1
							2
43	30-Aug-11	UN Bombing - Labour Minister Commiserates With ILO					
			1	1	5	5	1
							2
							2
44	30-Aug-11	UN Headquarters Bomb - More Attacks Under Way - Boko Haram Har am					
			1	1	1	3	5
							1
							1
45	30-Aug-11	Nigeria's Kano State denies arrest of Islamic sect members					
			1	1	5	1	1
							2
							2
46	30-Aug-11	Trade Union Urges FG to Deal With Boko Haram					
			1	1	4	3	2
							2
							1
47	31-Aug-11	A Tragic Bombing And Its Politics [column]					
			1	1	8	5	4
							5
							1
48	1-Sep-11	UN official calls on Nigerian government to improve security measures					
			1	1	6	5	5
							2
							2
49	1-Sep-11	Nigerian government urged to dialogue with Islamist Boko Haram sect					
			1	1	3	1	3
							4
							2

50	1-Sep-11	'Don't Allow Bombings to Take Sectional Dimensions'	1	1	7	5	6	5	3
51	2-Sep-11	AYF to Boko Haram - Stop Killing Innocent People	1	1	4	3	5	1	1
52	2-Sep-11	NIM Boss Condemns Bomb Blast	1	1	4	5	1	5	1
53	2-Sep-11	UN Building Bomb Two Boko Haram Suspects Held	1	1	3	3	5	1	1
54	2-Sep-11	Islamic sect reportedly plans bomb attack in Nigeria's Enugu State	1	1	3	1	1	1	1
55	2-Sep-11	Soldiers Gun Down Two Boko Haram Suspects	1	1	3	3	1	2	1
56	2-Sep-11	Investigate Boko Haram Scare in Kano, Kwankwaso Urged	1	1	5	3	4	1	1
57	2-Sep-11	Apathy of a Boko-Sceptic	1	1	3	5	1	5	3
58	2-Sep-11	UN Building - Boko Haram Names Bomber, Abul Barra	1	1	1	3	6	1	1
59	3-Sep-11	Third Mainland Bridge - Motorists Panic Over Boko Haram Threat	1	1	3	3	1	1	1
60	6-Sep-11	Deconstructing Terrorism [opinion]	1	1	8	5	1	5	3
61	6-Sep-11	100 Days of Insecurity [opinion]	1	1	8	5	6	5	1
62	6-Sep-11	Issues in the UN Office Bombing in Abuja [opinion]	1	1	8	5	6	5	1
63	6-Sep-11	UN Building - FBI Dismantles Bomber's Car for Probe	1	1	3	5	5	2	1
64	6-Sep-11	Bloodbath in Biu - Soldiers, Youths Clash in Borno	1	1	3	5	4	2	1
65	7-Sep-11	Why We Are Engaging Boko Haram in Dialogue - Bwala [interview]	1	1	5	3	5	1	2
66	8-Sep-11	SSS Uncovers Boko Haram Bomb Factory	1	1	3	3	6	2	2
67	8-Sep-11	Jonathan Is Instigating Mass Action - Farouk Adamu	1	1	4	5	2	5	1
68	8-Sep-11	Insecurity - Council of State Okays Overhaul of Security System	1	1	3	5	6	5	2
69	10-Sep-11	Wikileaks - Boko Haram Leader Shot in the Head	1	1	3	3	6	1	1
70	10-	Nigerian security forces resolve to detect vehicles used to commit	1	1	3	5	5	2	2

	Sep-11	crimes							
71	11- Sep-11	Country's War On Terror Heats Up	1	1	3	5	2	5	1
72	13- Sep-11	Nigerian student in Kogi State questioned over suspected link to Islamist sect	1	1	7	1	6	1	3
73	13- Sep-11	Police Move All Boko Haram Suspects to Abuja	1	1	3	3	6	2	3
74	13- Sep-11	Boko Haram - Youth Leader Urges Jonathan to Be Courageous	1	1	4	3	2	1	2
75	13- Sep-11	Boko-Haram and the U.S. Counter-Terrorism Partnership	1	1	3	3	6	3	3
76	14- Sep-11	The Many Harams in the Country	1	1	3	5	6	5	3
77	15- Sep-11	Eight Boko Haram Suspects Charged to Court	1	1	3	3	6	1	1
78	16- Sep-11	Bombings - Representatives Summon Security Chiefs	1	1	3	5	5	2	1
79	16- Sep-11	Protest Over Boko Haram Scare Halts Exams At Ibadan Varsity	1	1	3	3	5	1	1
80	20- Sep-11	Obasanjo Visits Boko Haram Leader's Family - Meets Jang in Jos	1	1	3	4	1	1	3
81	21- Sep-11	Nigerian Islamic sect asks Katsina State to repeal new law on preaching	1	1	1	1	6	1	1
82	21- Sep-11	Report says Nigeria witnessing "biggest" military deployment to tackle violence	1	1	8	5	6	2	2
83	21- Sep-11	'Boko Haram Peace Moves Won't Work Unless FG Provides Security'	1	1	7	3	6	3	1
84	21- Sep-11	Group Applauds Obasanjo's Peace Moves	1	1	3	5	6	5	2
85	23- Sep-11	Nigeria's Delta State police said intensifying security to tackle Islamic sect	1	1	2	1	6	2	2
86	24- Sep-11	Nigeria ready to tackle terrorism, President Jonathan assures foreign investors	1	1	5	1	2	2	2
87	24- Sep-11	Nigerian army deploys 1200 soldiers in Plateau State to restore peace in area	1	1	3	5	6	2	2
88	24- Sep-11	Nigeria police on red alert after Islamist sect warns of Katsina attack	1	1	3	1	2	2	2
89	30- Sep-11	Nigerian Islamic sect says factions not willing to hold talks with government	1	1	1	1	2	1	3
90	30- Sep-11	Cleric ready to take part in dialogue between Nigerian government, Islamic sect	1	1	3	1	6	5	2

91	30-Sep-11	Nigerian official says man associated with Boko Haram questioned before release	1	1	2	3	6	2	3
92	30-Sep-11	Borno State governor says dialogue "best option" to tackle insecurity in Nigeria	1	1	5	5	2	2	2
93	3-Oct-11	Nigeria to intensify inter-agency cooperation to tackle threats of Islamic sect	1	1	3	1	6	4	2
94	4-Oct-11	Boko Haram - Why We Won't Listen to Sultan	1	1	1	3	6	1	1
95	5-Oct-11	How to Defeat Terrorism [opinion]	1	1	8	1	3	3	2
96	5-Oct-11	Terrorism - FG to Intensify Inter-Agency Cooperation	1	1	3	1	6	4	2
97	5-Oct-11	Bomb Scare Prompts Tight Security in Abuja	1	1	3	5	6	5	1
98	5-Oct-11	Debate Over Release of Tashako By Police - How Sss Planted 'Boko Haram Leader' On Us -Sect *	1	1	1	4	5	2	3
99	5-Oct-11	Ecowas Defence Chiefs Meet Over Boko Haram	1	1	3	3	6	2	3
100	11-Oct-11	Islam and Peace Building in Region [analysis]	1	1	8	5	6	5	3
101	11-Oct-11	Boko Haram Scare Changes NDA Passing Out	1	1	3	5	6	1	1
102	12-Oct-11	Boko Haram - Be Firm With Security Arrangement, NBA Tells FG	1	1	4	3	5	3	3
103	12-Oct-11	Islam and Peace Building in West Africa [document]	1	1	8	5	6	5	3
104	14-Oct-11	Why Government Should Talk With Boko Haram Sect	1	1	3	3	6	2	2
105	17-Oct-11	Gunmen Bomb Gombe Mopol Base, Four Dead	1	1	3	5	6	1	1
106	18-Oct-11	Bring Our Money or Risk Your Lives, Boko Haram Tells 'Negotiators'	1	1	1	3	1	1	1
107	18-Oct-11	FG Seeks U.S. Assistance Over Terrorism	1	1	3	1	1	2	1
108	19-Oct-11	Boko Haram - Muslims Asked to Vacate Niger Delta Within One Week	1	1	1	3	6	1	1
109	20-Oct-11	Obasanjo - If I Were President, I Would Dialogue With Boko Haram	1	1	4	3	6	3	2
111	20-	Boko Haram - Retired General Condemns Use of Military	1	1	2	3	6	2	1

0	Oct-11								
11	22-	If This Not a Threat to National Security, What Is?							
1	Oct-11	[opinion]	1	1	8	5	6	5	1
11	22-	'Threats' Send Some Northerners Fleeing Niger							
2	Oct-11	Delta	1	1	3	5	6	5	1
11	23-	Intrigues Over Obasanjo's Boko Haram Peace Deal							
3	Oct-11		1	1	3	3	5	1	3
11	24-	FG Sets up White Paper Panels On Lemu, Boko Haram							
4	Oct-11	Reports	1	2	3	3	6	2	3
11	25-	Gunmen Bomb Two Banks in Saminaka							
5	Oct-11		1	2	3	2	6	1	1
11	25-	ACN Condemns Killing of Borno Journalist							
6	Oct-11		1	2	4	5	1	5	1
11	25-	Boko Haram - Army Sends 20 Sniffer Dogs to us							
7	Oct-11		1	2	1	3	5	1	1
11	26-	Stop Crime Against Journalists--- AU Rights Commission							
8	Oct-11	Told	1	2	6	5	4	5	1
11	29-	Man Arraigned for 'Plotting' Third Mainland Bridge							
9	Oct-11	Bombing	1	2	3	5	6	5	1
12	8-	U.S. - Abuja's Top Three Hotels May Face Bomb Attacks							
0	Nov-11		1	2	6	5	5	5	1
12	8-	Police Inspector Killed On Way to Mosque							
1	Nov-11		1	2	3	5	6	2	1
12	8-	NAC Condemns Boko Haram Over Latest Killings							
2	Nov-11		1	2	4	3	5	1	1
12	9-	Group Condemns Killings in North-East							
3	Nov-11		1	2	4	5	1	5	1
12	9-	FG Dismisses U.S. Bomb Warning							
4	Nov-11		1	2	5	5	5	2	1
12	10-	Garden Operators React to Bomb Threat As Eld-El-Kabir							
5	Nov-11	Celebration Ends	1	2	4	5	5	5	1
12	10-	Heightened Security but Still Business As Usual At Abuja							
6	Nov-11	Hotels	1	2	3	5	5	5	2
12	11-	Yobe Bombings - Police Move Boko Haram Suspects to							
7	Nov-	Abuja	1	2	3	3	6	1	1



	11							
12	11-							
8	Nov-	FG Absolves Security Agencies Over Boko Haram	1	2	5	3	1	2
	11							2
12	11-							
9	Nov-	Security Tightened in Lagos Over Bomb Scare	1	2	2	5	6	2
	11							2
13	12-							
0	Nov-	Military Links Boko Haram With Al Qaeda's North African Wing	1	2	2	3	5	2
	11							1
13	12-							
1	Nov-	Deadly Silence [opinion]	1	2	8	5	6	4
	11							1
13	12-							
2	Nov-	'Armed Forces Will Strike Back'	1	2	7	5	6	2
	11							1
13	15-							
3	Nov-	Bishop Tasks Jonathan On Insecurity	1	2	4	5	2	5
	11							1
13	16-							
4	Nov-	Jonathan to Boko Haram - Justice Could Be Swift and Certain	1	2	5	3	6	2
	11							3
13	17-							
5	Nov-	Insecurity - Cleric Tasks FG On Youth Employment	1	2	4	5	6	5
	11							1
13	17-							
6	Nov-	A Nation at War [analysis]	1	2	8	5	6	5
	11							1
13	17-							
7	Nov-	Options to Contain Security Threats	1	2	3	5	6	5
	11							2
13	17-							
8	Nov-	Boko Haram - Senate Summons Azazi, Security Chiefs	1	2	5	3	6	2
	11							3
13	17-							
9	Nov-	Maiduguri Residents Woken up By Dawn Explosion	1	2	3	5	5	5
	11							1
14	19-							
0	Nov-	Civil Unrest - Army to Set Up Civil-Military Teams	1	2	3	5	5	2
	11							2
14	22-							
1	Nov-	Military Operation Not Solution to Boko Haram - Governor Aliyu	1	2	5	3	6	5
	11							3
14	23-							
14	Nov-	Ex-Boko Haram Spokesman Sings - I Sent Threats to VIPs -	1	2	1	4	1	1
								1

2	11	Implicates Pindar, Ndume							
14	23-Nov-11	Sack All Security Chiefs Now - Representatives Tells Jonathan	1	2	5	5	6	2	1
14	23-Nov-11	Danja - I Have Fans Among Boko Haram Followers	1	2	4	3	6	5	3
14	26-Nov-11	Jonathan - Boko Haram's Days Are Numbered, As Sect Issues Fresh Threats	1	2	5	3	1	1	1
14	26-Nov-11	Jonathan - Boko Haram Will Soon Be History	1	2	5	3	6	3	3
14	29-Nov-11	Gaidam Police Station Bombing - Boko Haram Claims Responsibility	1	2	1	3	1	1	1
14	2-Dec-11	Boko Haram Not Invited to Our Peace Confab - - ACF	1	2	4	3	6	1	3
14	2-Dec-11	Boko Haram - SSS Parades Seven for Circulating Threatening Messages	1	2	3	3	1	2	1
15	2-Dec-11	SSS Parades U.S. Embassy Terror Threat Craftsman	1	2	3	1	1	2	1
15	3-Dec-11	Boko Haram - 185 Muslims Repatriated From Taraba	1	2	3	3	6	1	1
15	6-Dec-11	Abuja Judges Proffer Recipe to Curbing Terrorism	1	2	5	1	6	2	2
15	7-Dec-11	Mark - We Must Find Solution to Boko Haram	1	2	5	3	6	2	2
15	8-Dec-11	Playing Dangerous Politics With Boko Haram [column]	1	2	8	3	6	3	1
15	8-Dec-11	Ex-Boko Haram Spox Goes to Special Jail	1	2	3	4	6	1	1
15	8-Dec-11	Osun Deputy Governor Adopts Boko Haram Victim in Katsina	1	2	3	3	6	2	2
15	9-Dec-11	Police in Pre-Dawn Mosque Arrests Row	1	2	3	5	2	2	3
15	10-Dec-11	Conflict and the Decline of Private Sector in the North [opinion]	1	2	8	5	6	5	3
15	12-Dec-11	Re - How Boko Haram Began, by Borno PDP [analysis]	1	2	8	3	6	3	3

16 0	12- Dec- 11	Why Security Agencies Are Unable to Fight Boko Haram - Minister	1	2	5	3	6	2	3
16 1	12- Dec- 11	Only Justice Can Solve Boko Haram Menace - Usman Faruk [interview]	1	2	4	3	6	3	1
16 2	13- Dec- 11	Ndume Charged With Terror Acts	1	2	3	1	6	2	1
16 3	13- Dec- 11	Place to Serve Jail Term Is Prison - Liman [interview]	1	2	8	5	6	5	1
16 4	14- Dec- 11	Ekiti Bomb Blast - OPC Rules Out Boko Haram	1	2	4	3	5	1	2
16 5	17- Dec- 11	Jos, Kafanchan, Boko Haram and the Quest for Peace in the North [analysis]	1	2	8	3	6	3	1
16 6	17- Dec- 11	Reign of the Crime Gangs [analysis]	1	2	8	5	6	5	3
16 7	20- Dec- 11	Chief Dan Asuquo Speaks on the Security Challenges Confronting the Nation	1	2	4	5	6	5	1
16 8	21- Dec- 11	Ndume Gets Bail Set at N25 Million	1	2	3	5	6	2	2
16 9	21- Dec- 11	2012 and the Spectre of Revolution	1	2	3	5	6	5	1
17 0	21- Dec- 11	Court Grants Ndume Bail	1	2	3	5	6	2	2
17 1	23- Dec- 11	To Be Fair to Boko Haram [opinion]	1	2	8	3	6	1	3
17 2	28- Dec- 11	Suicide Bomber Hits Yobe SSS HQ, Four Killed	1	2	3	2	1	1	1
17 3	28- Dec- 11	Suicide Bombers Spoil Christmas	1	2	3	2	1	1	1
17 4	28- Dec- 11	Gold Medal for Fear [column]	1	2	8	5	6	5	1

17	28-Dec-11	Christmas in Blood	1	2	3	5	5	5	1
17	28-Dec-11	...no Justice, No Peace - Bishop	1	2	3	5	6	5	1
17	28-Dec-11	Human Rights Commission to Investigate Violence in Northeast	1	2	3	5	5	5	1
17	28-Dec-11	Targeted for Destruction for Those Who Have Ears to Hear [opinion]	1	2	8	5	5	5	1
17	28-Dec-11	Lawyers Denounce Christmas Day Bombings	1	2	4	5	5	5	2
18	28-Dec-11	Saraki - Citizens Must Find Lasting Solution to Boko Haram	1	2	5	3	6	3	3
18	28-Dec-11	Sheath Your Sword, Mark Begs Boko Haram	1	2	5	3	6	3	3
18	28-Dec-11	Christmas Day Bombings - Muslim Leaders Disown Boko Haram - Sultan - Attack On Churches Unislamic	1	2	4	3	1	1	1
18	28-Dec-11	Dialogue With Boko Haram, ACN Tells FG	1	2	4	3	6	1	2
18	28-Dec-11	'Boko Haram Not Fighting for Muslims'	1	2	7	3	1	3	2
18	28-Dec-11	Labour Leaders Urge FG to Tackle Insecurity	1	2	4	5	6	2	2
18	28-Dec-11	Filipino Workers to Return to Country Despite Blasts	1	2	3	5	6	5	2
18	28-Dec-11	Minister - FG Reviewing Security Plans	1	2	5	5	6	2	2
18	28-Dec-11	Christmas and Inter-Religious Harmony in Country [opinion]	1	2	8	5	6	5	3
18	28-Dec-11	AU Condemns Bombings	1	2	6	5	5	5	2

19	28-Dec-11	War Without End? [opinion]	1	2	8	5	5	5	1
19	28-Dec-11	Clerics Urge Boko Haram to Resort to Dialogue	1	2	4	3	6	1	2
19	28-Dec-11	We Can't Risk Religious Crisis - Senate	1	2	5	5	5	5	1
19	28-Dec-11	Christmas Day Bombings - TUC Wants Christians to Install Bomb Detectors in Churches	1	2	3	5	5	5	2
19	28-Dec-11	Abuja Security Unchanged Despite Bombings	1	2	3	5	5	5	1
19	28-Dec-11	Christmas Day Bombings - Sultan, Jonathan Move to Douse Tension	1	2	3	5	5	5	2
19	28-Dec-11	Hold FG Responsible for Blasts, Says JNI Vice Chairman	1	2	4	5	5	5	1
19	28-Dec-11	Who Is Really Throwing Those Bombs? [opinion]	1	2	8	5	5	5	3
19	28-Dec-11	Spain Condemns Madalla Attacks	1	2	6	5	5	5	1
19	28-Dec-11	Imo CAN Chair Urges Jonathan to Tackle Security	1	2	4	5	6	5	2
20	28-Dec-11	TUC Wants Bomb Detectors Installed in Churches	1	2	3	5	2	5	2
20	28-Dec-11	Kukah - Boko Haram Not Properly Diagnosed	1	2	4	3	6	1	3
20	28-Dec-11	A Hideous and Despicable Act [editorial]	1	2	8	5	6	5	1
20	29-Dec-11	Izala Group Condemns Christmas Day Bombings	1	2	4	5	5	5	1
20	29-Dec-11	Senator Says Political Courage Needed to Tackle Boko Haram	1	2	5	3	6	2	2

20	30-Dec-11	Death Toll of Aug Blast at UN Building Rises to 25	1	2	3	5	5	5	1
20	30-Dec-11	Insecurity - Lawyers Calls for National Conference	1	2	4	5	6	5	2
20	30-Dec-11	Bomb Blasts - Politicians Advise On Security Challenges	1	2	5	5	5	5	2
20	30-Dec-11	OPC Wants Mediation Between FG and Boko Haram	1	2	3	3	6	5	2
20	30-Dec-11	Boko Haram is Jihad On Christians - CAN	1	2	4	3	6	3	1
21	30-Dec-11	Islamic School Bombed in Delta	1	2	3	3	5	5	1
21	30-Dec-11	FG Urged to Convene Summit of Traditional, Religious Leaders	1	2	7	5	6	2	2
21	30-Dec-11	Christmas Day Bombings Irresponsible - Aregbesola	1	2	5	5	5	5	1
21	31-Dec-11	Jonathan to Security Chiefs - Tackle Boko Haram	1	2	5	3	6	2	3
21	31-Dec-11	Muslim Groups Ask FG to Tackle Insecurity	1	2	4	5	6	2	3
21	31-Dec-11	Church Identifies 27 Corpses	1	2	4	5	5	5	1
21	31-Dec-11	FCT NUJ Seeks Compensation for Madalla Bomb Victims	1	2	3	5	5	5	2
21	2-Jan-12	Mark - FG Must Declare Total War On Boko Haram	1	2	5	3	6	2	1
21	3-Jan-12	You Can't Intimidate us, JNI Tells CAN President	1	2	4	5	6	5	2
21	4-Jan-12	Boko Haram - State of Emergency Meant to Attack Muslims	1	2	7	3	5	1	1
22	4-Jan-12	Killing in God's Name? [analysis]	1	2	8	5	5	5	1

22	4-Jan-12	Lawyers Back FG Over State of Emergency	1	2	3	5	6	5	1
22	4-Jan-12	Borno Elders Say Dialogue is the Solution	1	2	4	5	6	5	2
22	4-Jan-12	Mixed Reactions Trail Emergency Rule in Plateau	1	2	3	5	6	5	1
22	4-Jan-12	Azazi Dismisses Boko Haram's Ultimatum to Southerners	1	2	2	3	1	1	2
22	4-Jan-12	2012 - Keep Faith, but Prepare for the Worst [opinion]	1	2	8	5	6	5	1
22	4-Jan-12	Address By President Jonathan On State of Emergency in Borno, Yobe, Plateau	1	2	3	5	6	5	3
22	4-Jan-12	Aftermath of Christmas Day Bombings	1	2	3	5	5	5	3
22	4-Jan-12	Boko Haram Wants to Divide Country, Say Northern Christians	1	2	4	3	6	1	1
22	4-Jan-12	Security - Maku Pleads for Confidence in Jonathan	1	2	5	5	6	2	2
23	4-Jan-12	We Were Detained With Boko Haram Suspects - Dino	1	2	4	3	6	1	3
23	4-Jan-12	NIREC Urges Southerners to Disregard Boko Haram Threat	1	2	4	3	1	1	3
23	5-Jan-12	Re - Aftermath of Christmas Day Bombings [opinion]	1	2	8	5	5	5	1
23	5-Jan-12	Dokubo-Asari Warns of Southern Backlash at Boko Haram	1	2	4	3	6	1	1
23	5-Jan-12	Boko Haram Is Not the Problem [opinion]	1	2	8	3	6	1	2
23	6-Jan-12	Police Dismiss North, South Attack Threats	1	2	2	5	2	5	2
23	10-Jan-12	Lagos Oppose Relocation of Northerners From South	1	2	4	5	6	5	2
23	10-Jan-12	Niger Delta Youths Vow to Resist Protest Against Jonathan	1	2	4	5	6	5	2
23	10-Jan-12	Jonathan - Boko Haram Members Infiltrate my Government	1	2	5	3	6	1	3
23	10-Jan-12	Soldiers, Police Evacuate Northerners From Edo	1	2	3	5	2	2	2
24	10-Jan-12	Shettima Assures Non-Indigenes of Safety	1	2	5	5	6	5	2

0	Jan-12								
24	11-								
1	Jan-12	Boko Haram - Azazi Seeks U.S. Support	1	2	3	3	2	1	3
24	12-	'Sinister Agents Hiding Under Boko Haram to Destroy the Country'	1	2	7	3	6	1	1
2	Jan-12								
24	12-	Army - No Cause for Alarm Over North, South Attacks	1	2	2	5	2	2	2
3	Jan-12								
24	12-	Hausa Community in Anambra Denounce Killings in North	1	2	4	5	5	5	2
4	Jan-12								
24	13-	Curtailing Reprisal Attacks	1	2	3	5	5	5	2
5	Jan-12								
24	13-	Mark Asks Jonathan to Fish Out Boko Haram Sponsors	1	2	5	3	6	1	3
6	Jan-12								
24	14-	ACF Asks Southerners to Disregard Boko Haram Ultimatum	1	2	4	3	1	1	2
7	Jan-12								
24	14-	UN Rights Chief Urges Leaders to Halt Violence	1	2	6	5	5	5	2
8	Jan-12								
24	17-	Al-Makura in Church to Allay Fear of Attacks	1	2	3	5	5	5	2
9	Jan-12								
25	17-	Ex-Soldiers Task Jonathan On Security	1	2	3	5	6	5	2
0	Jan-12								
25	17-	Madalla Blast - Detained Suspect Escapes	1	2	3	5	5	5	1
1	Jan-12								
25	17-	Borno SSG - Boko Haram Suspect Was After Shettima	1	2	5	3	6	1	1
2	Jan-12								
25	19-	Minister - Boko Haram Confined to Northeast	1	2	5	3	6	1	3
3	Jan-12								
25	19-	Boko Haram Suspect's Escape - Police Commissioner Zakari Biu Suspended	1	2	3	3	6	1	1
4	Jan-12								
25	19-	'Gang, Not Boko Haram, Attacked Jigawa Police Post'	1	2	7	3	5	5	1
5	Jan-12								
25	19-	Escape of a Boko Haram Suspect [opinion]	1	2	8	3	6	1	1
6	Jan-12								
25	19-	Ringim Should Explain Suspect's Escape, Says Audu Ogbe	1	2	5	5	6	5	3
7	Jan-12								
25	19-	Tightening Gun Control Laws [opinion]	1	2	8	5	6	5	2
8	Jan-12								
25	19-	Activities of Boko Haram Un-Islamic - Group	1	2	4	3	6	3	1
9	Jan-12								



26	19-0	Oritsejafor Urges Jonathan to Investigate Boko Haram Suspect's Escape	1	2	4	3	6	2	3
26	19-1	Lessons From the Country's 'Pawpaw Revolution' [opinion]	1	2	8	5	6	5	3
26	20-2	Afe Babalola Wants IG, Others Tried Over Boko Haram Suspect's Escape	1	2	4	3	6	2	2
26	20-3	The Story of Boko Haram Suspect Kabiru Sokoto - Police Detain His Wife, Kids	1	2	3	3	6	1	3
26	20-4	'How Port-Harcourt Barracks Bomb Attempt Was Foiled'	1	2	7	5	5	5	2
26	20-5	Christmas Day Blast Suspect Declared Wanted	1	2	3	5	5	5	3
26	24-6	Sad Times [opinion]	1	3	8	5	6	5	1
26	24-7	Indian, Nepalese Killed in Kano Blasts	1	3	3	5	5	5	1
26	24-8	Review Your Security in Nigeria, U.S. Tells Citizens	1	3	6	5	6	5	3
26	24-9	Boko Haram Insurgency Against Religious Tenets - ACF	1	3	4	5	1	3	1
27	25-0	Chadians Among Kano Attackers, Police Say	1	3	2	5	5	2	1
27	25-1	FG, U.S. to Address Boko Haram Onslaught	1	3	3	3	1	2	1
27	25-2	Religious Tolerance in the Country - A View From the North [opinion]	1	3	7	5	6	5	2
27	25-3	FG Advised Against Use Force On Boko Haram	1	3	5	3	6	2	2
27	25-4	Citizens Need to Unite to Confront Boko Haram - Colonel Umar	1	3	2	3	2	2	2
27	25-5	States in Emergency	1	3	3	5	6	5	3
27	25-6	Boko Haram - National Assembly to Review Anti Terror Law - Mark	1	3	5	3	6	3	2
27	25-7	Don't Give in to Boko Haram, Soyinka Warns FG	1	3	4	3	6	2	3
27	26-8	An Inexplicable Dereliction	1	3	3	5	6	5	1
27	26-	Bafarawa Wants FG to Dialogue With Boko Haram	1	3	3	3	6	1	2

9	Jan-12								
28	26-	Kano Explosions Changed the Way We See Things -							
0	Jan-12	Shekarau	1	3	5	5	5	5	3
28	26-								
1	Jan-12	Boko Haram - Braithwaite, Nwabueze Flay U.S Intervention	1	3	4	3	6	3	1
28	26-								
2	Jan-12	Kano Blasts a Declaration of War - FG	1	3	5	5	5	5	1
28	26-								
3	Jan-12	A Nation at War - Now What? [column]	1	3	8	5	5	5	1
28	26-								
4	Jan-12	Boko Haram Killed 935 From 2009 to Date - HRW	1	3	6	3	1	1	1
28	27-								
5	Jan-12	Boko Haram Got Al Qaeda Bomb Training, Niger Says	1	3	6	3	1	1	1
28	27-								
6	Jan-12	Friday's Carnage in Kano [editorial]	1	3	8	5	5	5	1
28	27-								
7	Jan-12	Boko Haram - NSCDC to Deploy Personnel to Volatile Areas	1	3	3	3	2	2	2
28	28-								
8	Jan-12	Soft-Core Boko Haramists [opinion]	1	3	8	3	6	5	3
28	28-								
9	Jan-12	Arewa Youths Task New Police Boss On Security	1	3	3	5	2	5	2
29	28-								
0	Jan-12	That Black Friday in Kano [analysis]	1	3	8	5	6	5	3
29	28-								
1	Jan-12	Jonathan Urges Boko Haram to Come Out for Dialogue	1	3	5	3	6	2	2
29	30-								
2	Jan-12	Tracking Criminals Via Phone Calls [analysis]	1	3	8	5	6	5	2
29	31-								
3	Jan-12	Nation at a Crossroads - 50 Citizens to Look Up to [analysis]	1	3	8	5	6	5	2
29	1-Feb-								
4	12	How to Prevent Religious Violence Is Our Concern	1	3	7	5	6	5	2
29	1-Feb-								
5	12	Representatives, Army to Form 'Think-Tank' on Insecurity	1	3	3	5	2	2	2
29	1-Feb-								
6	12	Boko Haram, Azazi, America and the Rest of Us	1	3	7	3	6	5	3
29	2-Feb-								
7	12	Boko Haram Spokes Person Abul Qaqa Captured	1	3	3	3	6	1	1
29	3-Feb-								
8	12	Don't Report Things That Will Disintegrate the Nation, Journalists Told	1	3	7	5	6	5	2

29	3-Feb-12	Religious Harmony as Antidote to Boko Haram [opinion]	1	3	8	3	6	3	2
30	3-Feb-12	Tambuwal Seeks British Assistance Over Boko Haram	1	3	5	3	6	2	2
30	3-Feb-12	How Boko Haram Chief Holed Up in Kaduna - Our Man Was Deceived - Sect	1	3	1	4	6	1	3
30	3-Feb-12	Air Force Denies Barracks Attack	1	3	2	5	2	2	2
30	3-Feb-12	Gwagwalada Chairman Urges Support for Security Agencies	1	3	5	5	6	2	2
30	3-Feb-12	'Govt's Incompetence Abets Insecurity' [analysis]	1	3	8	5	6	5	3
30	7-Feb-12	Injustice Fuels Insecurity - Imam Khalid	1	3	4	5	6	5	3
30	7-Feb-12	Muslim Group Tasks Boko Haram On Dialogue	1	3	3	3	6	3	2
30	8-Feb-12	Dasuki Suggests Wayout of Boko Haram	1	3	4	3	6	3	3
30	8-Feb-12	The Democratisation of Violence [opinion]	1	3	8	5	6	5	3
30	9-Feb-12	Disgruntled Politicians Behind Boko Haram - Balarabe Musa	1	3	4	3	6	2	3
31	9-Feb-12	Boko Haram Disowns Clip Aired On NTA	1	3	1	3	6	1	3
31	9-Feb-12	'210 People Arrested Not Boko Haram Members'	1	3	7	3	6	3	3
31	9-Feb-12	Suicide Bombers Strike Kaduna Military Bases	1	3	3	2	1	1	1
31	9-Feb-12	Boko Haram Conceived to Destroy Islam - Prof. Bunza	1	3	4	3	6	1	1
31	10-Feb-12	Sultan SA'ad and Conflict Resolution	1	3	3	5	6	5	3
31	10-Feb-12	Boko Haram - Symptom of Crisis in Our Nation-Building Project (I)	1	3	3	3	6	3	1
31	10-Feb-12	SSS Director - I Never Said Abul Qaqa Was Arrested	1	3	2	5	6	2	3
31	10-Feb-12	No Chadians Arrested Over Kano Attacks - Report	1	3	8	5	5	5	3

7	12							
31	10-							
8	Feb-	Tambuwal Urges Boko Haram to Embrace Dialogue	1	3	5	3	6	2 2
	12							
31	10-							
9	Feb-	The Right Strategies to Curb Insecurity [opinion	1	3	8	5	6	5 2
	12							
32	10-							
0	Feb-	Dasuki Cautions Advocates of Breaking Nigeria	1	3	4	5	6	5 2
	12							
32	10-							
1	Feb-	FG - Boko Haram is Killing North's Economy	1	3	5	3	1	3 3
	12							
32	10-							
2	Feb-	NIS Vindicates Chadians on Kano Attacks - Envoy	1	3	6	5	5	5 2
	12							
32	11-							
3	Feb-	The New Police Chief and National Security [opinion]	1	3	8	5	6	2 2
	12							
32	11-							
4	Feb-	How We Raided Boko Haram Hideout in Kano - JTF	1	3	2	3	2	2 2
	12							
32	11-							
5	Feb-	IGP Seeks Military Support	1	3	3	5	6	2 2
	12							
32	14-							
6	Feb-	Kabiru Sokoto's Arrest Will Expose Boko Haram Sponsors - Tsav	1	3	2	3	6	1 2
	12							
32	14-							
7	Feb-	Boko Haram - to Negotiate, or Not? That's the Question [opinion]	1	3	8	3	6	3 3
	12							
32	14-							
8	Feb-	Ibadan Hausa Leader Call for Rehabilitation of Bomb Victims	1	3	4	5	5	5 2
	12							
32	15-							
9	Feb-	Breaking News!!! Gun Battle At Kaduna Government House	1	3	3	5	5	5 1
	12							
33	15-							
0	Feb-	'CBN Donation to Kano Victims of Boko Haram Commendable'	1	3	8	3	1	2 2
	12							
33	16-							
1	Feb-	Arrest Boko Haram Members Responsible for Blasts - Sani	1	3	4	3	1	1 2
	12							
33	16-							
33	Feb-	Hysteria Over Boko Haram [opinion]	1	3	8	3	6	3 3
	12							

2	12								
33	17-Feb-12	Boko Haram - Symptom of the Crisis in Our Nation-Building Project (II)	1	3	3	3	1	3	1
33	17-Feb-12	Army Arrests Two Boko Haram Suspects in DIC Kaduna	1	3	3	3	2	2	3
33	17-Feb-12	Tinubu Wants FG to Dialogue With Boko Haram	1	3	5	3	6	2	2
33	18-Feb-12	Boko Haram Has Made Me a Pregnant Widow - Bomb Disposal Cop's Wife	1	3	4	3	6	1	1
33	18-Feb-12	NAFSAT Urges Residents to Shun Violence	1	3	4	5	6	5	2
33	20-Feb-12	Director Shot At Govt House Dies	1	3	3	5	5	2	1
33	20-Feb-12	SSS Releases Suspects Arrested With Boko Haram's Abul Qaqa	1	3	3	3	2	2	3
34	20-Feb-12	Boko Haram - JNI Condemns Spate of Violence	1	3	3	3	5	3	2
34	22-Feb-12	Kaduna Will Overcome Security Challenges - Yakowa	1	3	5	5	6	5	2
34	22-Feb-12	FG Hands Over Seized Arms to Owners	1	3	3	5	2	5	3
34	22-Feb-12	Controversy Trails Arrest of Boko Haram Suspects	1	3	3	3	6	1	1
34	24-Feb-12	725 Weapons, 30,548 Ammunitions Recovered in 12 Months - Presidency	1	3	5	5	2	5	2
34	24-Feb-12	Boko Haram - Irish Envoy Urges FG to Dialogue	1	3	6	3	6	2	2
34	27-Feb-12	Maku Assures World of the Nation's Security	1	3	5	5	6	2	2
34	28-Feb-	Why We're Yet to Contain Boko Haram - DG SSS	1	3	2	3	2	2	3

7	12								
34	28-Feb-12	Christians Tried to Bomb Church in Bauchi, Police Say	1	3	2	5	2	2	1
8	12								
34	28-Feb-12	Atiku, Acf Urge Boko Haram to Enter Dialogue	1	3	4	3	6	3	2
9	12								
35	29-Feb-12	Four Villagers Shot Dead in Kaduna	1	3	3	5	5	5	1
0	12								
35	2-Mar-12	Immigration - 11,000 Deported Foreigners Not Boko Haram Members	1	3	5	3	2	1	3
1	12								
35	2-Mar-12	Gunmen Sack Four Maiduguri Schools	1	3	3	2	1	1	1
2	12								
35	2-Mar-12	Muslims, Christians Hold Joint Protest in Rivers	1	3	3	5	6	5	3
3	12								
35	5-Mar-12	October 1 Blast - Prison Service Probes Death of Suspect	1	3	3	5	5	5	1
4	12								
35	6-Mar-12	Nigeria Is Not a Terrorist Country - American Envoy	1	3	6	1	6	5	2
5	12								
35	7-Mar-12	Why We Attacked Schools - Boko Haram	1	3	1	3	1	1	1
6	12								
35	7-Mar-12	Kano Police Deny Arresting Shekau's Wife	1	3	2	5	2	1	3
7	12								
35	7-Mar-12	Military Denies Involvement in Jos Church Attack	1	3	2	5	2	2	3
8	12								
35	8-Mar-12	CAN Blames FG Over Boko Haram Attacks	1	3	4	3	1	2	1
9	12								
36	9-Mar-12	Boko Haram - Navy Tasks Security Agencies On Co-Operation	1	3	3	3	6	2	2
0	12								
36	9-Mar-12	SSS, Soldiers Battle 'Boko Haram' in Zaria	1	3	3	3	2	2	1
1	12								
36	10-Mar-12	Briton, Italian Killed in Sokoto - After 10 Months in	1	3	3	5	5	5	1
36	12								

2	12	Captivity							
36	13-Mar-12	Before Killing Briton, Italian... 'kidnappers Received N207 Million Ransom'	1	3	7	5	5	5	1
36	13-Mar-12	PDP's Injustices Responsible for the Country's Crises - Dr. Ardo [interview]	1	3	8	5	6	5	1
36	13-Mar-12	Inside Zaria Raid That Led to Sokoto Operation to Free Foreigners [analysis]	1	3	8	5	6	5	2
36	13-Mar-12	How Soldiers Killed Three at Kano Filling Station	1	3	3	5	4	2	1
36	13-Mar-12	That Failed Rescue Mission [opinion]	1	3	8	5	6	5	1
36	14-Mar-12	Six Bullet-Ridden Bodies Dumped in Mubi	1	3	3	5	5	5	1
36	14-Mar-12	Boko Haram Ceasefire - Any Hope? [opinion]	1	3	7	3	6	1	3
37	15-Mar-12	Rights Group Urges FG to Accept Boko Haram Truce	1	3	4	3	6	2	2
37	16-Mar-12	Boko Haram Chief Dies in SSS Custody	1	3	3	4	5	1	1
37	16-Mar-12	South-South Governors Want FG to End Killings	1	3	3	5	6	2	2
37	16-Mar-12	As Talks Begin - FG, Boko Haram Consider Ceasefire	1	3	3	3	6	5	2
37	20-Mar-12	Jos Reprisal Attacks Embarrassing - Lar	1	3	5	5	5	5	3
37	20-Mar-12	Country's Security Challenges Less Than Civil War - Obasanjo	1	3	4	5	6	5	2
37	20-Mar-12	Reporter Threatened Over Boko Haram Coverage	1	3	7	3	5	1	1
37	21-Mar-	Two Policemen Injured As Gunmen Attack Jos Police	1	3	3	2	2	1	1

7	12	College							
37	21-Mar-12	Stakeholders Find New Strategy to Solve Insecurity	1	3	3	5	1	5	2
37	23-Mar-12	Boko Haram Says No More Talks With FG	1	3	1	3	6	1	3
38	23-Mar-12	JTF Guns Down Nine in Kano	1	3	3	5	4	2	1
38	23-Mar-12	Dialogue - FG Urges Boko Haram to Re-Think	1	3	5	3	6	2	2
38	23-Mar-12	Boko Haram and the Defence Minister's Stance	1	3	3	3	6	5	3
38	23-Mar-12	Reporter Threatened Over Coverage of Islamist Sect [press release]	1	3	8	1	1	1	1
38	28-Mar-12	FG Asked to Resume Dialogue With Boko Haram	1	3	7	3	6	2	2
38	28-Mar-12	Kidnap of German - Mauritanian, Four Others Arrested in Kano	1	3	3	5	5	5	2
38	29-Mar-12	North-East Churches Blame Governors for Killings	1	3	4	5	5	5	1
38	30-Mar-12	Boko Haram - JNI Tackles Oritsejafor	1	3	3	3	6	1	1
38	30-Mar-12	Soldiers Arrest Suspected Boko Haram Members in Kaduna	1	3	3	3	2	2	2
38	30-Mar-12	Kaduna - Arrested Boko Haram Suspects Innocent - District Head	1	3	4	3	5	1	3
39	30-Mar-12	Boko Haram - 'Security Agents Breeding Resentment'	1	3	7	3	6	2	1
39	3-Apr-12	Senator Gaya Urges FG to Dialogue With Boko Haram	1	3	5	3	6	2	2
39	4-Apr-12	GOC Explains Arrest of 33 Suspected Boko Haram Members	1	3	2	3	2	2	2



39	6-Apr-	U.S. to Partner With FG Over Boko Haram	1	3	2	3	6	2	3
39	6-Apr-	No Plan to Attack Dolphins in Kano - Pillars' Spokesman	1	3	4	5	6	5	2
39	6-Apr-	Easter - IG Orders Extra Security for Places of Worship	1	3	2	5	6	2	2
39	6-Apr-	UK, U.S. Issue Travel Warning in the Country	1	3	5	5	6	5	2
39	6-Apr-	Sheikh Zakzaky Says U.S. Behind Boko Haram Attacks	1	3	4	3	1	1	1
39	9-Apr-	Kaduna Car Bomb Kills 20 Achaba Riders	1	3	3	5	5	5	1
39	11-Apr-	The Kaduna Sunday Easter Bombing and All That [column]	1	3	8	5	5	5	1
40	11-Apr-	Army Chief - We're At War With Boko Haram	1	3	2	3	4	2	1
40	11-Apr-	Terrorism is War Against the Poor - NLC	1	3	4	1	6	1	1
40	11-Apr-	Kaduna Hosts World Cup Tie Despite Bomb Attack	1	3	3	5	5	5	3
40	12-Apr-	Boko Haram 'Desperate' As War on Terrorism Nears End - SSS	1	3	2	3	4	1	3
40	12-Apr-	Gunmen Kill 22-Year-Old Applicant in Kaduna	1	3	3	2	1	1	1
40	12-Apr-	U.S. to Jonathan - Create Ministry to Tackle Boko Haram, Poverty	1	3	6	3	6	1	2
40	13-Apr-	End of Boko Haram Is in Sight SSS	1	3	2	3	2	1	3
40	13-Apr-	FG Ready to Resume Talks With Boko Haram - Minister	1	3	5	3	6	2	2
40	13-Apr-	How Refuse Bag Caused Pandemonium in Kaduna	1	3	3	5	5	5	1
40	16-Apr-	UN Building Bomb Victim Calls for Dialogue With Boko	1	3	4	3	1	1	2

9	12	Haram							
41	17-	'Civil-Military Collaboration Panacea to Boko Haram							
0	Apr-	Insurgency'	1	3	7	3	2	3	2
	12								
41	17-	Counter-Terrorism Measures Must Be Human Rights							
1	Apr-	Compliant - Cj Dakas	1	3	4	5	6	5	3
	12								
41	17-	Northern Elders Want Talks With Boko Haram Revived							
2	Apr-		1	3	3	3	6	1	2
	12								
41	17-	Confusion Over 'Death' of Abul Qaqa II							
3	Apr-		1	3	3	5	6	1	3
	12								
41	18-	Information Will Aid Security Agents Against Boko Haram							
4	Apr-	Yakowa	1	3	3	3	6	3	3
	12								
41	18-	The Easter Sunday Kaduna Bomb Blast [editorial]							
5	Apr-		1	3	8	5	5	5	3
	12								
41	19-	U.S. Issues Boko Haram Attack Warning for Citizens in							
6	Apr-	Abuja	1	3	6	3	1	1	2
	12								
41	19-	U.S. Embassy Alert - Security Beefed Up in Abuja							
7	Apr-		1	3	3	5	2	5	2
	12								
41	19-	Tackle Boko Haram Before Collapse, Senators Tell							
8	Apr-	FG	1	3	5	3	6	1	2
	12								
41	20-	Boko Haram Plans to Attack Abuja, Says U.S.							
9	Apr-		1	3	6	3	1	1	1
	12								
42	20-	Court Adjourns Suleja Bomb Case to May 14							
0	Apr-		1	3	3	5	5	2	3
	12								
42	20-	Jonathan Pleads for German Help to Fight Boko Haram							
1	Apr-		1	3	5	3	4	2	1
	12								
42	21-	Unknown Gunmen Wound Two Policemen in Kano							
2	Apr-		1	3	3	2	1	1	1
	12								
42	24-	'Boko Haram Not At War With Christians, Southerners'							
3	Apr-		1	3	7	3	6	3	3
	12								
42	24-	Kabiru Sokoto, Other Boko Haram Suspects Yet to Be							
42	Apr-		1	3	3	3	6	1	3

4	12	Arraigned							
42	25- Apr- 5 12	Kidnapping Back With a Bang [opinion]	1	3	8	5	5	5	1
42	27- Apr- 6 12	This Day Blast Sparks Social Media War	1	4	3	5	5	5	1
42	27- Apr- 7 12	Police Beef Up Security Around Media Houses in Lagos	1	4	3	5	2	2	2
42	27- Apr- 8 12	How Suicide Bomber Hit ThisDay Office	1	4	3	2	1	1	1
42	30- Apr- 9 12	As Gunmen Fire On Worshippers...Two Profs, 17 Others Killed in Buk Attack	1	4	3	2	1	1	1
43	30- Apr- 0 12	'FG Should Not Negotiate With Sect'	1	4	7	5	6	2	3
43	30- Apr- 1 12	Mark to Boko Haram - No War Yields Positive Result	1	4	5	3	6	3	3
43	30- Apr- 2 12	Does Anyone Still Doubt That This Is War? [column]	1	4	8	5	5	5	3
43	30- Apr- 3 12	How the Gunmen Escaped	1	4	3	2	3	1	1
43	1- May- 4 12	ACN Says Why PDP Can't Tackle Insecurity	1	4	4	5	6	2	1
43	1- May- 5 12	Azazi's Bombshell [opinion]	1	4	8	5	6	2	1
43	1- May- 6 12	Suicide Bombers Target Police Commissioner - 11 Killed in Jalingo Attack	1	4	3	2	1	1	1
43	1- May- 7 12	Christian, Muslim Group Condemns Attack On Media	1	4	4	5	5	5	2
43	2- May- 8 12	Boko Haram Threatens Daily Trust, the Guardian, Others in New Video	1	4	1	3	1	1	1
43	2- May- 43	JTF Raids Bomb Factory, Kills BUK Terror Suspect	1	4	3	1	4	2	1

9	12							
44	2-							
0	May-	Before the Next Terror Victims [opinion]	1	4	8	1	6	5 1
	12							
44	3-							
1	May-	Sect Threatens More Attacks On Media	1	4	1	1	1	1 1
	12							
44	3-							
2	May-	Datti - Hassan Tukur Sabotaged Talks With Boko Haram	1	4	4	3	6	1 1
	12							
44	3-							
3	May-	President Deby - Boko Haram Threatens Us	1	4	6	3	1	1 1
	12							
44	3-							
4	May-	NLC to FG - Tackle Terrorism With Social Security	1	4	4	1	6	2 2
	12							
44	3-							
5	May-	Boko Haram Plans More Attacks On Media	1	4	3	3	1	1 1
	12							
44	3-							
6	May-	El-Rufai - Northern Leaders Have No Conspiracy Link With Boko Haram	1	4	5	3	2	3 3
	12							
44	3-							
7	May-	Boko Haram - We're Behind You, Senate Tells Media	1	4	5	3	2	2 2
	12							
44	3-							
8	May-	Don't Be Deterred By Boko Haram Threats, Senate Urges Journalists	1	4	5	3	2	2 2
	12							
44	3-							
9	May-	'Jonathan Not Sincere About Boko Haram'	1	4	7	3	6	2 1
	12							
45	3-							
0	May-	Boko Haram Killings, Attempt to Wipe Out Christians - CAN	1	4	4	3	1	1 1
	12							
45	4-							
1	May-	Nigeria Under Siege	1	4	3	5	6	5 1
	12							
45	4-							
2	May-	Video Shows Boko Haram Plans More Attacks On Media Houses	1	4	5	3	1	1 1
	12							
45	4-							
3	May-	Maku Tells Media to Keep Out 'Destroyers and Dividers'	1	4	5	5	6	5 2
	12							
45	4-							
	May-	UN House Bomb Survivor - I Was the Worst Case in Hospital	1	4	4	5	5	5 2

4	12	...thank God I Survived [interview]							
45	4- May- 5	12 Massacre in Potiskum - Dozens Killed in Cattle Market Raid	1	4	3	5	5	5	1
45	5- May- 6	12 Hassan Tukur - I Never Sabotaged Boko Haram Talks	1	4	4	3	6	1	3
45	5- May- 7	12 Boko Haram Threat - Media Houses in Kaduna Remove Sign Boards	1	4	3	3	1	1	1
45	7- May- 8	12 Nigeria - to Be or Not to Be?	1	4	3	5	6	5	3
45	7- May- 9	12 Muslim Leaders Not Doing Enough to Tackle Boko Haram - Prof Yakubu	1	4	4	3	6	1	1
46	7- May- 0	12 Subsidygate as Economic Terrorism [opinion]	1	4	8	5	6	5	1
46	8- May- 1	12 NPAN Condemns Threat On Newspapers	1	4	4	5	5	5	2
46	8- May- 2	12 NPAN Condemns Attacks On Media Houses	1	4	4	5	5	5	2
46	8- May- 3	12 Daily Abuses Suffered By Journalists	1	4	3	5	5	5	1
46	8- May- 4	12 The Massacre in Potiskum [opinion]	1	4	8	5	5	5	1
46	9- May- 5	12 Mark to FG - Dialogue With Boko Haram	1	4	5	3	6	2	2
46	10- May- 6	12 Country's Disintegration Not Visible Yet - Balarabe Musa	1	4	4	5	6	5	3
46	11- May- 7	12 Court Orders IGP to Arraign or Grant Bail to Two Suspects	1	4	5	5	2	5	3
46	11- May- 8	12 Robbed Residents - Abuja CCTV Is a Sham	1	4	4	5	5	5	1
46	11- May- 46	12 The Attack at Bayero University [editorial]	1	4	8	5	5	5	1

9	12								
47	11- May- 0	Boko Haram - FG to Adopt 'Non-Violence' Approach	1	4	3	3	2	2	2
47	12- May- 1	FG Calls on Boko Haram to Cease Fire	1	4	5	5	2	2	2
47	14- May- 2	Vigilante Leader Seeks Withdrawal of Military From Streets	1	4	3	5	6	2	2
47	17- May- 3	We Say No to Bloodshed in 2015 - CHAIN	1	4	4	5	6	5	2
47	17- May- 4	Jonathan, PDP Blast Buhari	1	4	5	5	6	2	1
47	17- May- 5	Injustice Breeds Boko Haram - Bamanga	1	4	4	3	6	3	1
47	17- May- 6	War of Words As CPC Replies Jonathan [opinion]	1	4	8	5	6	5	1
47	18- May- 7	'Boko Haram Ploy to Destroy North'	1	4	7	3	1	1	1
47	18- May- 8	That We May Not Be Consumed By This Inferno [analysis]	1	4	8	5	5	5	3
47	21- May- 9	Abandoned Bags Cause Pandemonium At Old Secretariat	1	4	3	5	5	5	1
48	22- May- 0	TMG Warns of Anarchy in Country	1	4	4	5	6	5	1
48	23- May- 1	Jonathan Cannot Contain Boko Haram - Prof. Kasunmu [interview]	1	4	8	3	6	2	1
48	23- May- 2	Akwa Ibom Man Arrested Over Bayero University Attack	1	4	3	5	5	5	1
48	23- May- 3	Christians Are Also Involved in Terrorism - JNI	1	4	4	1	6	5	1
48	24- May- 4	Azazi to U.S. - Don't Put 'Terror' Label On Boko Haram	1	4	2	1	5	2	2

4	12							
48	24-May-12	Gowon Urges Boko Haram to Accept Dialogue	1	4	4	3	6	1 2
48	25-May-12	Insecurity - We Must Dialogue - Sultan	1	4	4	5	6	5 2
48	29-May-12	You Can't Defeat Boko Haram, Cleric Tells Jonathan	1	4	4	3	6	1 3
48	30-May-12	Make Peace With Boko Haram, Clark Tells Northern Governors	1	4	4	3	6	1 2
48	31-May-12	Ajimobi - We Must Revive Economy to Tackle Insecurity [interview]	1	4	8	5	6	2 2
49	31-May-12	Jonathan Vows to End Insurgency	1	4	5	5	2	2 2
49	2-Jun-12	Kidnapped German Killed in Kano	1	4	3	5	5	5 1
49	5-Jun-12	Obasanjo Blames Boko Haram, Militant Groups On Illiteracy	1	4	4	3	6	1 1
49	5-Jun-12	Northern CAN Condemns Blast	1	4	4	5	5	5 2
49	5-Jun-12	Boko Haram Again Warns Media	1	4	1	3	1	1 1
49	5-Jun-12	Maiduguri - Residents Flee Hot Spot for Fear of JTF Excesses	1	4	3	5	4	5 1
49	5-Jun-12	Jingir Raises Alarm Over Imbalance in Plateau Security Chiefs	1	4	5	5	6	5 1
49	7-Jun-12	How JTF, Boko Haram Fought for 20 Hours in Maiduguri	1	4	3	3	5	5 1
49	7-Jun-12	Boko Haram - Be Combat Ready At All Times, Ihejirika Tells Soldiers	1	4	4	3	2	3 1
49	8-Jun-12	Boko Haram - No Talks With FG Sect Disowns Dahiru Bauchi	1	4	1	3	6	1 3
50	8-Jun-12	Group Supports Dahiru Bauchi As Boko Haram Mediator	1	4	3	3	6	1 2
50	11-Jun-12	Boko Claim Responsibility for Jos, Biu Attacks	1	4	1	3	1	1 1

50	11- 2	Boko Not Haram, Northern Elite Behaviour Is Haram'	1	4	7	5	6	5	1
50	12- 3	Mark to Boko Haram - Please, Accept Dialogue	1	4	4	3	6	3	2
50	12- 4	Attacks On Churches - We Are Ready to Defend Our People - CAN	1	4	4	5	5	5	2
50	20- 5	Oblique Force Behind Bombing in the North - Northern Governors	1	4	5	5	5	5	1
50	20- 6	Boko Haram - Senate Fingers External Influence	1	4	3	3	6	3	1
50	21- 7	Shehu of Borno Renews Call On Boko Haram to Dialogue	1	4	4	3	6	1	2
50	21- 8	Kaduna Crisis - Tanko Yakasai Calls for Calm	1	4	5	5	5	5	1
50	22- 9	Killings in North - PENGASSAN Threatens Strike	1	4	4	5	5	5	1
51	22- 0	JTF Arrests BIU Church Attackers	1	4	3	5	5	2	2
51	22- 1	Boko Haram - Madallah Bomb Blast Mastermind Captured - Shekau Makes U.S. Terror List	1	4	3	3	1	1	2
51	23- 2	A Troubling Dimension [editorial]	1	4	8	5	6	5	1
51	23- 3	NSCIA to U.S. - Don't List Boko Haram As Terror Group	1	4	4	3	6	3	1
51	23- 4	Boko Haram - Muslim Army? [opinion]	1	4	8	3	6	3	3
51	23- 5	NSCIA Meets CAN Over Fear of Reprisal Attack in South-South	1	4	3	5	5	5	3
51	26- 6	Insecurity - Jigawa, Rivers, Bayelsa Evacuate Students From Abu	1	4	3	5	5	5	2
51	26- 7	Blame Jonathan for U.S. Terror Label On Boko Haram Leaders- ACN	1	4	4	4	6	3	1
51	26- 8	Boko Haram New to Us - Bamanga Tukur	1	4	4	3	6	1	3
51	26- 9	'Micro Banks Will Reduce Crime in Nigeria'	1	4	7	5	6	5	2
52	26- 0	Jonathan to Nigerians - Let's Unite Against Terrorism	1	4	5	1	5	2	2
52	27- 1	Boko Haram - Nigeria Can't Break-Up - Shettima	1	4	5	3	6	1	2



1	Jun-12							
52	27- Jun-12	Insecurity - Tanko Yakasai Berates Mark, Calls for His Resignation	1	4	5	5	6	5 1
52	28- Jun-12	NSCDC Declares 21-Day Fasting Against Boko Haram	1	4	4	3	6	1 3
52	28- Jun-12	Kaduna Reprisal Attacks Call for Concern, Says Bishop Idowu-Fearon	1	4	4	5	5	5 3
52	28- Jun-12	Nigeria Can't Break Up Over Boko Haram - Shettima	1	4	5	3	6	3 2
52	28- Jun-12	Gunmen Attack, Rob Three Banks in Taraba	1	4	3	2	1	1 1
52	28- Jun-12	When Shall We Cry Out to God for Help? [opinion]	1	4	8	5	6	5 3
52	28- Jun-12	Kaduna - Dealing With Communal Attacks and Reprisals [opinion]	1	4	8	5	5	5 1
52	28- Jun-12	El-Kanemi Contributing to Peace in Borno - Zanna	1	4	4	5	6	5 2
53	28- Jun-12	Kanti Bello to Mark - You're Blackmailing Muslims	1	4	4	5	6	5 1
53	28- Jun-12	Senate Wants Special Courts for 'Terrorists'	1	4	3	1	6	2 2
53	30- Jun-12	Summit Group Wants Jonathan to Dialogue With Boko Haram	1	4	3	3	6	1 2
53	3-Jul- 12	Middle Belt Youths Defend Mark Over Comments On Boko Haram	1	4	4	3	6	1 2
53	3-Jul- 12	LGs to Jonathan - Don't Extend Emergency	1	4	5	5	6	2 2
53	3-Jul- 12	Youth Group Advocates for Fairness to End Insecurity	1	4	4	5	5	5 2
53	4-Jul- 12	Group Condemns Politicisation of Insecurity	1	4	4	5	5	5 2
53	5-Jul- 12	Insecurity - Shema Calls for Healing Processes	1	4	5	5	5	5 2
53	5-Jul- 12	'How We Tackle Insecurity, Begging'	1	4	7	5	5	5 2
53	6-Jul- 12	ICC Beams Search Light On Jos, Boko Haram Crises	1	4	3	3	1	1 3
54	6-Jul- 12	To the President - Nigeria's Descent to Sovereign Insolvency [document]	1	4	8	5	5	2 1

54 1	6-Jul- 12	The 'Failed State Index' As a Tool of Imperialism [opinion]	1	4	8	5	6	5	1
54 2	6-Jul- 12	NSA Dasuki to Meet Boko Haram Chiefs - I Have Their Phone Numbers, He Says	1	4	2	3	6	1	3
54 3	6-Jul- 12	U.S. Warns of Possible Nigeria Attacks	1	4	6	5	5	5	1
54 4	6-Jul- 12	'Of 16 Zaria Church Attack Victims, 10 Were Muslims'	1	4	7	5	5	5	1
54 5	6-Jul- 12	UN Investigates Nigeria Over Smuggled Weapons From Libya	1	4	3	5	6	5	1
54 6	6-Jul- 12	Nigeria Not Ripe for State Police - IG	1	4	2	5	6	2	3
54 7	12-Jul-12	The Deserted Areas of Maiduguri - As Thousands Flee Homes	1	4	3	5	5	5	1
54 8	12-Jul-12	Jos - Who Profits From This Madness? [column]	1	4	8	5	6	5	1
54 9	12-Jul-12	Boko Haram Tarnishing Nigeria's Image - - Anyaoku	1	4	6	3	6	3	1
55 0	12-Jul-12	Religious Riots, Bomb Blast Victims and the Matter of Compensation [opinion]	1	4	8	5	5	5	1
55 1	14-Jul-12	'Soldiers Raid Fulani Settlements in Plateau' - it's Not True, Says JTF	1	4	2	5	4	2	2
55 2	14-Jul-12	Employers Association Worries Over Insecurity	1	4	3	5	5	5	1
55 3	14-Jul-12	Madalla Bombing - Furore Over Cash Donations	1	4	3	5	5	5	1
55 4	14-Jul-12	State of Emergency - Two Weeks After, Residents Unsure of Fate	1	4	3	5	5	5	1
55 5	16-Jul-12	'South-Easterners Victims of Ethnic, Religious Cleansing'	1	4	7	5	5	5	1
55 6	16-Jul-12	Can the Church and the Mosque Really Co-Exist in Nigeria? [book review]	1	4	8	5	6	5	3
55 7	17-Jul-12	Of Killing Fields and Irresponsible Leadership [column]	1	4	8	5	5	5	1
55 8	18-Jul-12	Foreigners Not Involved in Boko Haram Attacks - Immigration Boss	1	4	2	3	1	1	2
55 9	19-Jul-12	The Media, Civil Liberties, Boko Haram and Nigerian Nation [column]	1	4	8	3	6	3	3
56	19-Jul-12	'Politics Behind Jos Crisis' [interview]	1	4	8	5	5	5	3

0	Jul-12									
56	19-Jul-12	CAN Urges Islamic Groups to Stop 'Insulting' Christian Leaders		1	4	4	5	6	5	2
56	20-Jul-12	Five Imams, Five Other Clerics Abducted in Madalla		1	4	3	5	5	5	1
56	20-Jul-12	Nigeria Graduates 5th Batch of Counter-Terrorism Experts		1	4	3	5	6	5	3
56	23-Jul-12	Kaduna Bomb/Reprisal Attack - Attacked Journalist Recounts Experience		1	4	3	5	5	5	1
56	23-Jul-12	Revealed - Army, Police Rivalry Stalls Talks With Boko Haram		1	4	3	3	6	2	1
56	24-Jul-12	Boko Haram Insurgency - Beaming the Searchlight On Nigerian Media		1	4	3	3	1	3	3
56	24-Jul-12	Life Enters Faster Lane in Borno After Emergency Rule		1	4	3	5	6	5	1
56	24-Jul-12	How Football Can Tackle Boko Haram - Toro [interview]		1	4	4	3	6	1	3
56	24-Jul-12	Securing Nigeria [opinion]		1	4	8	5	6		3
57	26-Jul-12	Ramadan - a Breakfast for Peace [opinion]		1	4	8	5	6	5	3
57	22-Jul-11	JTF Patrol Team Escapes Explosion in Maiduguri		2	1	3	5	2	2	2
57	24-Jul-11	Bomb Explodes Near Shehu of Borno's Palace		2	1	3	5	5	5	1
57	16-Aug-11	Boko Haram is an Offshoot of Taliban, Says Yuguda		2	1	5	3	6	3	3
57	28-Jul-11	Defence Chief Admits JTF's Mistakes in Maiduguri		2	1	2	5	2	2	2
57	1-Aug-11	Court Denies Suspected Killer of Boko Haram Leader Bail		2	1	5	4	5	2	3
57	2-Aug-11	Bomb Explosion Rocks Maiduguri Again		2	1	3	5	5	5	1
57	4-Aug-11	Another Bomb Blast Kills Two in Borno		2	1	3	5	5	5	1
57	5-Aug-11	Gunmen Open Fire On Maiduguri Police Station		2	1	3	2	1	1	1
57	26-Aug-	UN - Several Persons Dead at Office Bomb Attack		2	1	3	5	5	5	1

9	11							
58	26-Aug-							
0	11	16 Gunned Down in Adamawa Bank Robbery	2	1	3	5	5	5 1
58	27-Aug-							
1	11	Horror, Condemnation Trail Abuja Terror Attack	2	1	3	1	1	1 1
58	29-Aug-							
2	11	Abuja Blast - Death Toll Hits 23	2	1	3	5	5	5 1
58	30-Aug-							
3	11	UN Blast Suspects Arrested	2	1	3	5	5	5 2
58	1-Sep-							
4	11	Bomb Scare Threatens South East Economic Summit	2	1	3	5	5	5
58	2-Sep-							
5	11	Revealed - Wanted Suspect Arrested, Released in 2007	2	1	3	5	5	5 2
58	3-Sep-							
6	11	Terror Attack - We Now Have Strong Leads, Says Jonathan	2	1	5	1	1	3 2
58	3-Sep-							
7	11	Soldiers Kill Suspected Islamist in Adamawa	2	1	3	1	4	1
58	5-Sep-							
8	11	Fighting Terrorism - 10 Rules	2	1	3	1	5	5 2
58	5-Sep-							
9	11	Jos - Eight Family Members Killed in Fresh Attack	2	1	3	5	5	5 1
59	7-Sep-							
0	11	State Security Unveils the Boko Haram Bomb Factory	2	1	3	3	4	2 2
59	13-Sep-							
1	11	FIVE Policemen, One Civilian Killed in Bank Robbery	2	1	3	5		2 1
59	14-Sep-							
2	11	Suleja Bomb Blast - SSS Arraigns 8 Suspects	2	1	3	5	5	5 2
59	16-Sep-							
3	11	Obasanjo in Secret Visit to Boko Haram Family	2	1	3	3	6	1 3
59	18-Sep-							
4	11	Boko Haram - Obasanjo's Host Killed After Talks	2	1	3	3	5	1 1
59	17-Sep-							
5	11	Four Boko Haram Men Charged Over UN House Bomb Blast	2	1	3	4	1	1 1
59	19-Sep-							
6	11	UN House - Boko Haram Unveils Suicide Bomber	2	1	3	2	1	1 2
59	21-Sep-							
59	21-	Stampede As Bomb Scare Rattles National Assembly	2	1	3	5	5	5 1

7	Sep-11								
59	24-								
8	Sep-11	Customs Intercepts Container Load of Explosives at Tin Can Port	2	1	3	5	6	5	2
59	1-Oct-								
9	11	Six Boko Haram Suspects Arraigned Over Bombings	2	1	3	3	1	1	2
60	3-Oct-								
0	11	Boko Haram Scare Sparks Demolition in Lagos	2	1	3	3	1	1	1
60	17-								
1	Oct-11	Gombe - Four Killed As Gunmen Attack Mobile Police	2	1	3	2	1	1	1
60	25-								
2	Oct-11	Boko Haram - Isa, NTA Cameraman, Killed for Spying	2	2	3	5	5	1	
60	25-								
3	Oct-11	Army Absolves Self From Killing of Boko Haram Leader	2	2	2	4	2	2	3
60	2-Nov-								
4	11	Boko Haram - Trial of Suspects Adjourned	2	2	3	3	6	1	3
60	3-Nov-								
5	11	Police Arrest Boko Haram Suspect in Maiduguri	2	2	3	3	2	2	2
60	3-Nov-								
6	11	Villa - False Bomb Scare Sms Traced to Students	2	2	3	5	5	5	1
60	4-Nov-								
7	11	JTF Mops Up 5,000 Weapons From Maiduguri Residents	2	2	3	5	2	2	2
60	5-Nov-								
8	11	Dozens Killed in Attacks in Damaturu	2	2	3	5	5	5	1
60	6-Nov-								
9	11	Over 136 Dead in Yobe Boko Haram Attacks	2	2	3	3	1	1	1
70	5-Nov-								
0	11	Boko Haram Attacks JTF HQ in Maiduguri	2	2	3	3	1	1	1
70	9-Nov-								
1	11	Boko Haram - US Trains Nigerian Soldiers On Counter Terrorism	2	2	3	3	5	2	2
70	10-								
2	Nov-	Bauchi Police Arrests Illegal Firearm Manufacturer	2	2	3	5	2	2	2
70	11-								
3	Nov-	Gunmen Attack Police Station, FRSC Office	2	2	3	2	1	1	1
70	15-								
4	Nov-	Nigeria: Bomb Blast as Shettima Returns to Maiduguri	2	2	3	5	5	5	1
70									
5	22-	Senator Ali Ndume, Boko Haram Spokesman Konduga Charged to Court...	2	2	3	4	5	2	1
	Nov-								

	11							
70	22-							
6	Nov-							
	11	Boko Haram -Senator Ali Ndume Charged to Court	2	2	3	3	5	2 1
70	28-							
7	Nov-							
	11	Gunmen Attack Geidam, Yobe Governor's Village, Kill Four	2	2	3	2	1	1 1
70	30-							
8	Nov-							
	11	Boko Haram - FG Worried Over Inflow of Libyan Weapons	2	2	3	5	6	2 1
70	1-Dec-							
9	11	U.S. House Wants Boko Haram Designated Terrorist Group	2	2	3	3	6	3 1
71	2-Dec-							
0	11	Boko Haram Targets Aviation, Energy Sectors, Warns U.S. House	2	2	6	3	1	1 1
71	6-Dec-							
1	11	Boko Haram - Ndume Faces Fresh Charges	2	2	3	3	6	2 1
71	7-Dec-							
2	11	Boko Haram Spokesman to Spend Three Years in Jail	2	2	3	4	6	1 1
71	9-Dec-							
3	11	OPC Protests, Threatens Boko Haram in Lagos	2	2	4	3	5	1 1
71	11-							
4	Dec-11	Explosion Rocks Mosque in Delta State	2	2	3	5	5	5 1
71	10-							
5	Dec-11	Boko Haram, Armed Robbers Attack 100 Bank Branches	2	2	3	3	1	1 1
71	13-							
6	Dec-11	Boko Haram - Ndume Pleads Not Guilty to Terrorism Charge	2	2	4	1	5	2 3
71	13-							
7	Dec-11	Bomb Blast Kills Ten in Maiduguri	2	2	3	5	5	5 1
71	14-							
8	Dec-11	Bomb Explodes On a Bomber in Maiduguri	2	2	3	2	5	1 1
71	16-							
9	Dec-11	Girl, 12, Loses Eyes to Boko Haram Attack	2	2	3	3	1	1 1
72	18-							
0	Dec-11	Boko Haram Bomb Kills Three Members	2	2	3	3	1	1 1
72	17-							
1	Dec-11	Gunmen Kill Three Soldiers At Kano Airforce School	2	2	3	2	1	1 1
72	19-							
2	Dec-11	Police Seize Would-Be Suicide Bomber's Car	2	2	3	2	2	2 2
72	20-							
3	Dec-11	Explosion Kills Another Bomb Maker	2	2	3	2	5	5 1

72	20-									
4	Dec-11	Boko Haram - Court Grants Ndume Bail	2	2	3	3	6	2	3	
72	23-	Multiple Bomb Blasts, Gun Shots Rock Damaturu, Potiskum,								
5	Dec-11	Maiduguri	2	2	3	5	5	5	1	
72	25-									
6	Dec-11	Abuja Church Bomb Blast Kills About 40, Leaves Many Injured	2	2	3	5	5	5	1	
72	24-									
7	Dec-11	Army, Boko Haram Clashes Continue in Maiduguri, Damaturu	2	2	3	3	5	5	1	
72	27-									
8	Dec-11	24 Burnt Victims, Others Deposited in Abuja, Suleja Hospitals	2	2	3	5	5	5	1	
72	27-									
9	Dec-11	U.S. - We'll Hunt Down Bombers	2	2	6	2	5	1	2	
73	25-									
0	Dec-11	Boko Haram Bombs Churches in Abuja, Jos, 40 Dead	2	2	3	3	1	1	1	
73	25-									
1	Dec-11	Christmas Fails to Stem Violence in Borno, Yobe	2	2	3	5	5	5	1	
73	25-									
2	Dec-11	Sultan Flays Extremism	2	2	3	1	5	5	2	
73	26-									
3	Dec-11	Boko Haram Lets All Hell Loose At Christmas	2	2	3	3	1	1	1	
73	26-									
4	Dec-11	'We Watched As Horror Unfolded'	2	2	7	5	5	5	1	
73	28-									
5	Dec-11	10,000 Persons Displaced in Damaturu, Says Nema	2	2	5	5	5	5	1	
73	29-									
6	Dec-11	SSS Arrests Alleged Bomber in Bayelsa	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	
73	29-									
7	Dec-11	Pupils Hurt As Blast Hits Islamic School in Sapele	2	2	3	5	5	5	1	
73	30-									
8	Dec-11	Ringim - We've Only Arrested Boko Haram's Errand Boys	2	2	5	4	2	1	3	
73	31-									
9	Dec-11	JTF, Boko Haram Trade Claims Over Explosion	2	2	2	3	5	5	3	
74	2-Jan-	Boko Haram Issues Three-Day Ultimatum to Christians, Ready to								
0	12	Attack Soldiers	2	2	1	3	1	1	1	
74	1-Jan-									
1	12	Jonathan Declares Emergency Within Four States	2	2	5	5	6	2	1	
74	5-Jan-									
2	12	Emir of Suleja Shuns Christmas Blast Victims	2	2	4	5	5	5	1	
74	6-Jan-									
		3 Feared Dead, Others Wounded in Church Attack	2	2	3	5	5	5	1	

3	12								
74	6-Jan-								
4	12	Six Killed As Gunmen Attack Church in Gombe	2	2	3	2	1	1	1
74	6-Jan-								
5	12	Gunmen Kill 10 in Mubi Attack	2	2	3	2	1	1	1
74	7-Jan-								
6	12	Boko Haram - Army Warns Against Reprisal Attacks	2	2	2	5	2	2	2
74	11-								
7	Jan-12	Boko Haram Kills Eight in Damaturu	2	2	3	3	1	1	1
74	11-								
8	Jan-12	Obasanjo, Nyako, Others Condemn Adamawa Killings	2	2	4	5	5	5	2
74	12-								
9	Jan-12	Gunmen Kill 4 in Maiduguri	2	2	3	2	1	1	1
75	12-								
0	Jan-12	Boko Haram Leader Appears in Video	2	2	3	4	6	1	3
75	11-								
1	Jan-12	Boko Haram - Why We're Attacking Christians	2	2	1	3	1	1	1
57	12-								
1	Jan-12	Killings - Oritsejafor Challenges National Assembly	2	2	4	5	5	5	3
57	13-								
1	Jan-12	2 Killed As Mob Set Police Van Ablaze	2	2	3	5	5	5	1
57	15-								
1	Jan-12	Attacks At Bars Leave Four Dead in Adamawa, Gombe	2	2	3	5	5	5	1
57	17-								
1	Jan-12	How Boko Haram Infiltrated Borno Governor's Lodge	2	2	3	3	6	1	3
57	19-								
1	Jan-12	Sokoto's Escape Aimed At Embarrassing Borno Govt	2	2	3	5	6	2	2
57	19-								
1	Jan-12	Ringim Faces Sack Over Suspect's Escape	2	2	3	5	6	2	1
57	18-								
1	Jan-12	CP Suspended Over Escape of Boko Haram Operative	2	2	3	3	6	2	1
57	20-								
1	Jan-12	IGP Ringim Fights Back, Declares Sokoto Wanted	2	2	3	5	6	2	1
57	21-								
1	Jan-12	Uduaghan Advises Christian Against Reprisal Attack	2	2	5	5	5	2	2
57	21-								
1	Jan-12	Boko Haram Attacks Drinking Joint in Potiskum	2	2	3	3	1	1	1
57	21-								
1	Jan-12	Multiple Blasts in Kano	2	2	3	5	5	5	1



57	22-									
1	Jan-12	Explosions Return to Bayelsa - Govt House Targeted	2	3	3	5	5	2	1	
57	22-									
1	Jan-12	Horror, Anger in Kano As Death Toll Reaches 200	2	3	3	5	5	5	1	
57	23-	Boko Haram Blasts - Kano Relaxes Curfew, as UK Issues Travel								
1	Jan-12	Alert	2	3	3	3	1	2	2	
57	23-	Oshiomhole, Fayemi Condole With Channels TV	2	3	5	5	5	5	2	
1	Jan-12									
57	23-	Fresh Explosions Kill 10 in Bauchi	2	3	3	5	5	5	1	
1	Jan-12									
57	23-	Boko Haram - Police Impound Vehicles With Explosives in								
1	Jan-12	Kano	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	
57	24-	Kano Police - 186 Killed in Boko Haram Attack	2	3	3	3	1	1	1	
1	Jan-12									
57	24-	Fresh Blasts, Gunfire Rock Kano	2	3	3	5	5	5	1	
1	Jan-12									
57	24-	Kano - Soldiers, SS in Four-Hour Shootout With Boko Haram								
1	Jan-12	Suspects	2	3	3	3	5	5	1	
57	24-	Borno Elders Want Killings Halted, Advocate Dialogue	2	3	3	5	5	5	2	
1	Jan-12									
57	25-	Soyinka Warns Against Reprisal Attacks On Boko								
1	Jan-12	Haram	2	3	4	3	5	1	2	
57	25-	Nigeria, U.S. Facing Similar Terror Threats, Says Envoy	2	3	6	1	5	1	1	
1	Jan-12									
57	25-	Mass Burial for 50 Kano Blast Victims	2	3	3	5	5	5	1	
1	Jan-12									
57	26-	Boko Haram - Army Seeks Public Rejection of								
1	Jan-12	Terrorism	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	
57	26-	A Massacre Forewarned	2	3	3	5	5	5	1	
1	Jan-12									
57	28-	German National Kidnapped, As Explosion Causes								
1	Jan-12	Pandemonium	2	3	3	5	5	5	1	
57	29-	Police Arrest 25 Boko Haram Suspects in Enugu	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	
1	Jan-12									
57	29-	Kano Bombings Not Targeted At Any Tribe	2	3	7	5	5	5	1	
1	Jan-12									
57	29-	Nigeria: Gunmen Attack Police Station in Kano	2	3	3	2	5	1	1	
1	Jan-12									
57	30-	Boko Haram Threatens to Attack Sokoto	2	3	1	3	1	1	1	

1	Jan-12								
57	30-								
1	Jan-12	UN, AU Back Nation in War Against Terrorism	2	3	3	1	6	5	2
57	1-Feb-								
1	12	Police to Arraign Suspected Boko Haram Members	2	3	3	3	2	2	2
57	1-Feb-								
1	12	Families of Slain Boko Haram Suspects Cry Out	2	3	4	3	5	1	1
57	2-Feb-								
1	12	DSS Arrests Boko Haram Spokesman	2	3	3	4	2	2	2
57	2-Feb-								
1	12	Qaqa - 'We will bring government to its knees'	2	3	1	5	1	1	1
57	2-Feb-								
1	12	How Qaqa, Boko Haram Spokesman, Was Arrested	2	3	3	4	2	1	2
57	3-Feb-								
1	12	Boko Haram - Arrest of Our Member, Obstacle to Dialogue	2	3	1	3	5	1	3
57	3-Feb-								
1	12	Boko Haram - Six Killed in Factional Clash	2	3	3	3	5	1	1
57	4-Feb-								
1	12	Abu Qaqa Confesses in Custody	2	3	3	5	6	1	2
57	4-Feb-								
1	12	No Boko Haram Attack in Kogi'	2	3	7	3	6	5	3
57	4-Feb-								
1	12	France Aides Kano Attack Victims	2	3	3	5	5	5	2
57	5-Feb-								
1	12	Boko Haram Kills Ex-Council Boss	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	5-Feb-								
1	12	Tambuwal Seeks Britain's Assistance On Terrorism	2	3	3	1	5	2	2
57	6-Feb-								
1	12	Boko Haram Attack Two Police Stations in Kano	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	6-Feb-								
1	12	Gunmen Shoot SSS Officer in Damaturu	2	3	3	2	1	1	1
57	7-Feb-								
1	12	Qaqa - Boko Haram Is Under Duress, Divided	2	3	1	5	5	1	1
57	7-Feb-								
1	12	Kano - Five Killed As Boko Haram Armoury Discovered	2	3	3	3	5	1	1
57	11-								
1	Feb-12	How Escaped Christmas Day Bomb Suspect Was Nabbed	2	3	3	5	5	5	2
57	12-								
1	Feb-12	Ohanaeze Chides Sanusi Over N100 Million Donation to Kano Boko Haram Victims	2	3	4	3	6	1	1

57	12-1	Feb-12	SSS Beefs up Security Around Kabiru Sokoto	2	3	3	5	2	2	2
57	13-1	Feb-12	Boko Haram Kills 7 in Borno	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	14-1	Feb-12	Civil Servant Mistaken for Suicide Bomber Shot in Kaduna	2	3	3	2	5	1	1
57	16-1	Feb-12	Madalla Bombing - SSS Declares Ex-Soldier Wanted	2	3	3	5	2	2	2
57	16-1	Feb-12	Boko Haram, Soldiers Engage in Shootout in Maiduguri	2	3	3	3	5	5	1
57	17-1	Feb-12	North Central Governors to Combat Boko Haram, Insecurity	2	3	3	3	2	3	2
57	17-1	Feb-12	JNI, CAN Trade Blames Over Attacks On Churches	2	3	4	5	5	5	3
57	17-1	Feb-12	Boko Haram Invades Immigration Office	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	18-1	Feb-12	Two Boko Haram Suspects Arrested	2	3	3	3	2	1	2
57	20-1	Feb-12	Four Boko Haram Suspects Arrested	2	3	3	3	2	1	2
57	20-1	Feb-12	Another Bloodbath Averted As Bomber Targets Suleja Church	2	3	3	2	1	1	2
57	21-1	Feb-12	Boko Haram - Qaqa Discloses More Operational Clues	2	3	1	3	6	1	2
57	21-1	Feb-12	JTF Kills Eight Boko Haram Suspects in Shootout	2	3	3	3	2	2	1
57	23-1	Feb-12	Madalla Blast - SSS Manufactured Statement Against Me	2	3	7	5	5	2	1
57	23-1	Feb-12	Unknown Gunmen Kill Two Policemen in Kano	2	3	3	2	1	1	1
57	25-1	Feb-12	IG - My House Was Not Attacked By Boko Haram	2	3	2	3	6	2	2
57	26-1	Feb-12	Boko Haram Kills Policeman in Kaduna	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	26-1	Feb-12	Suicide Bomber Kills Two in Church in Jos	2	3	3	2	1	1	1
57	27-1	Feb-12	Eight Killed As Bombers Target Jang's Church	2	3	3	2	1	1	1
57	27-1	Feb-12	Why Attacks By Boko Haram Persists, By SSS	2	3	2	3	1	1	1

1	Feb-12								
57	27-								
1	Feb-12	Tinubu Wants U.S to Back Nigeria Against Terrorism	2	3	3	1	5	1	2
57	29-								
1	Mar-12	Boko Haram Bombs School in Maiduguri	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	1-Mar-								
1	12	One Killed As Gunmen Attack Police Stations	2	3	3	2	1	1	1
57	2-Mar-								
1	12	Four Boko Haram Suspects Killed	2	3	3	3	5	1	1
57	3-Mar-								
1	12	Three Boko Haram Members Killed Making Bomb	2	3	3	3	5	1	1
57	5-Mar-								
1	12	Kano - Suspected Boko Haram Kill Two Policemen, Injure Two Others	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	5-Mar-								
1	12	Boko Haram Kills 4 in Maiduguri	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	6-Mar-								
1	12	Suspected Boko Haram Killed Trying to Burn Primary School	2	3	3	3	5	1	1
57	7-Mar-								
1	12	Boko Haram Kills Borno/Yobe Comptroller of Customs	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	8-Mar-								
1	12	Briton, Italian Die in Hostage Rescue Bid in Birnin Kebbi	2	3	3	5	5	5	1
57	9-Mar-								
1	12	Gunmen Kill DPO, Four Others	2	3	3	2	1	1	1
57	9-Mar-								
1	12	Briton, Italian Killed in a Failed Rescue Mission in Sokoto	2	3	3	5	5	5	1
57	9-Mar-								
1	12	Boko Haram - Northern Governors Vow to Fight Criminality	2	3	5	3	6	2	2
57	10-								
1	Mar-12	Death of Hostages Sparks UK, Italy Row	2	3	3	5	5	5	1
57	11-								
1	Mar-12	Bomb Blast Hits Catholic Church in Jos	2	3	3	5	5	5	1
57	11-								
1	Mar-12	Killing of Briton, Italian May Scare Investors - FG	2	3	5	5	5	5	1
57	12-								
1	Mar-12	Boko Haram Attack Mandawari Police Division in Kano	2	3	3	3	1	1	1

57	13- Mar- 1	12 Pure Water Bags, Taken for Bombs, Cause Panic in Kaduna	2	3	3	5	6	5	1
57	13- Mar- 1	12 Makinde Condemns Incessant Attacks On Christians	2	3	4	5	5	5	2
57	13- Mar- 1	12 Boko Haram Kill Two Policemen in Kano	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	14- Mar- 1	12 Tension Mounts in Jos	2	3	3	5	5	5	1
57	15- Mar- 1	12 SSS Parades Suspected Killers of Briton, Italian	2	3	3	5	2	2	2
57	20- Mar- 1	12 Lar - We Know Those Behind Boko Haram Bombings	2	3	4	3	1	1	3
57	21- Mar- 1	12 Two Injured as Gunmen Attack Police College	2	3	3	2	1	1	1
57	21- Mar- 1	12 Gunmen Kill Two, Injure One	2	3	3	2	1	1	1
57	21- Mar- 1	12 Kano - JTF Kill Nine Boko Haram Members, Arrest Two	2	3	3	3	4	2	1
57	22- Mar- 1	12 ACF Drums Support for FG On Terrorism	2	3	3	1	6	5	2
57	24- Mar- 1	12 Boko Haram Kills Two in Maiduguri	2	3	3	3	1	1	1
57	25- Mar- 1	12 Five Boko Haram Members Killed in Kano, Maiduguri	2	3	3	3	5	1	1
57	26- Mar- 1	12 STF Arrests Suspected Gun Fabricator, Car Snatchers	2	3	3	5	2	2	2
57	26- Mar- 1	12 German's Kidnap Rattles Security Agencies	2	3	3	5	5	2	1
57	26- Mar- 1	12 CAN Advises Citizens On Masterminds of Bomb Attacks	2	3	4	5	5	5	2

	12							
57	29-							
1	Mar-							
	12	Boko Haram Attacks Police Station, Military Base	2	3	3	3	1	1
57	30-							
1	Mar-							
	12	SSS Parades Seven for Kidnapping UAE National for 60 Days	2	3	3	3	2	2
57	31-							
1	Mar-							
	12	Boko Haram Kills 4, Robs Bank in Maiduguri	2	3	3	3	1	1
57	3-Apr-							
1	12	Prisons Fortified to Check Attacks	2	3	3	5	5	5
57	3-Apr-							
1	12	JTF Kills Two Boko Haram Members as Renewed Clashes Claim Nine	2	3	3	3	2	2
57	4-Apr-							
1	12	JTF Kill Three Gunmen in Kano	2	3	3	2	2	2
57	5-Apr-							
1	12	Suspected Gunmen Kill Eight	2	3	3	2	1	1
57	6-Apr-							
1	12	51 Rocket Launchers Uncovered in Gombe	2	3	3	5	5	5
57	7-Apr-							
1	12	JTF Kills Two Boko Haram Members in Borno	2	3	3	3	2	2
57	8-Apr-							
1	12	36 Confirmed Dead in Kaduna Bomb Blast	2	3	3	5	5	5
57	10-							
1	Apr-12	Abandoned Car Filled With Bombs Discovered in Kano	2	3	3	5	6	5
57	10-							
1	Apr-12	Blast Traumatizes Kaduna Residents	2	3	3	5	5	5
57	11-							
1	Apr-12	Obada - Looted Libyan Weapons Now in Country	2	3	3	5	6	5
57	12-							
1	Apr-12	Ihejirika - Bombing, A Challenge to the Army	2	3	2	5	5	2
57	13-							
1	Apr-12	Boko Haram - Security Agents Re-Affirm Success Against Terrorism	2	3	2	3	2	2
57	15-							
1	Apr-12	Boko Haram Kills Spokesman Abu Qaqa Two	2	3	3	3	1	1
57	15-							
1	Apr-12	The Kaduna Bomb Blast	2	3	3	5	5	5
57	18-							
1	Apr-12	Senate to Jonathan - Crush Boko Haram Now	2	3	5	3	6	2

57	18-	State Security Services Uncovers Another Bomb								
1	Apr-12	Factory	2	3	3	5	2	2	2	
57	19-	JTF Kills Three Robbery Suspects in Maiduguri	2	3	3	5	4	2	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	19-	Unknown Gunmen Shoot Two Policemen in Kano	2	3	3	2	5	1	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	19-	U.S Stands By Boko Haram Attack Warning	2	3	3	3	6	1	2	
1	Apr-12									
57	20-	Boko Haram Kills Seven in Maiduguri	2	3	3	3	1	1	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	21-	JTF Kills Two Suspected Boko Haram Members	2	3	3	3	4	2	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	22-	Kidnapped Spanish Doctor Freed in Enugu	2	3	3	5	6	5	2	
1	Apr-12									
57	23-	Victorious Weekend for Military, Police, As They Bomb Boko								
1	Apr-12	Haram Hideout	2	3	3	3	4	2	2	
57	23-	Explosions Kill Five Suspected Boko Haram Members	2	3	3	3	5	1	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	25-	JTF Bursts Another Boko Haram Bomb Factory, Kills								
1	Apr-12	Three	2	3	3	3	3	2	1	
57	26-	Explosion Rocks Army Barrack	2	3	3	5	5	2	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	27-	They Can Bomb Our Offices But They Can't Bomb Our								
1	Apr-12	Resolve!'	2	4	7	5	5	5	3	
57	27-	Citizens Condemn Attacks On ThisDay Newspaper	2	4	4	5	5	5	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	27-	U.S. - It's an Attack On Free Speech	2	4	6	5	5	5	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	28-	More Condemnation Trails Attack On ThisDay Offices	2	4	7	5	5	5	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	28-	Boko Haram Kills Lecturer	2	4	3	3	1	1	1	
1	Apr-12									
57	29-	Bloodied but Unbowed, We March On	2	4	7	5	6	5	2	
1	Apr-12									
57	29-	Jonathan At ThisDay, Says PDP Not Responsible for Terrorism	2	4	5	1	6	5	3	
1	Apr-12									
57	29-	Condemnation, Apprehension Continue to Trail Attacks On								
1	Apr-12	ThisDay	2	4	3	5	5	5	1	
57	30-	More Citizens Condemn Attacks On Thisday	2	4	4	5	5	5	1	

1	Apr-12								
57	30-								
1	Apr-12	Five Killed in Jalingo Bomb Blast, Bomb Scare in Yola	2	4	3	5	5	5	1
57	30-								
1	Apr-12	Police Diffuse Bomb At BUK's New Site	2	4	3	5	2	2	2
57	1-								
1	May-12	Fear Not, Jonathan Pleads As Boko Haram Strikes Again	2	4	5	3	5	2	1
57	1-								
1	May-12	Kano - JTF Uncovers Bomb Factory, Recovers 35 IEDs	2	4	3	5	2	2	2
57	2-								
1	May-12	Robbers Attack Three Banks, Kill Five	2	4	3	5	5	5	1
57	2-								
1	May-12	Jalingo Blast - Victim Says Bombers Must Face Judgment	2	4	4	2	5	1	1
57	2-								
1	May-12	JTF Raids Bomb Factory, Kills BUK Terror Suspect	2	4	3	1	2	2	1
57	2-								
1	May-12	Nigeria: TUC, Maritime Workers Condemn Thisday Attacks	2	4	4	5	5	5	1
57	2-								
1	May-12	Kano - SSS Operatives Arrest Suspected Supplier of Bomb Making Chemicals	2	4	3	5	2	2	2
57	3-								
1	May-12	SSS Arrests Suspected Boko Haram Bomb Manufacturer	2	4	3	3	2	2	2
57	3-								
1	May-12	Why Terrorist Attacks May Linger	2	4	3	1	5	5	3
57	4-								
1	May-12	Gunmen Hit Potiskum Cattle Market, Kill 34	2	4	3	2	1	1	1
57	4-								
1	May-12	Despite Attacks and Threats, NHRC, Media Celebrate World Press Freedom Day	2	4	3	5	5	5	2
57	5-								
1	May-12	Boko Haram Kills Two Prison Wardens in Borno	2	4	3	3	1	1	1
57	6-								
1	May-12	Boko Haram - No Reason to Attack Media, Says NPAN	2	4	4	3	5	1	3



	12							
57	6-							
1	May-							
	12	FG to Amend Anti-Terrorism Act	2	4	3	5	6	2 3
57	8-							
1	May-							
	12	Kano - Three Bombs Diffused at BUK	2	4	3	5	5	5 1
57	9-							
1	May-							
	12	Police Train Personnel to Fight Terrorism	2	4	3	1	2	2 2
57	11-							
1	May-							
	12	Between Terrorism and Corruption (II)	2	4	3	1	6	5 3
57	13-							
1	May-							
	12	Three Killed as Explosion Rocks Bauchi	2	4	3	5	5	5 1
57	15-							
1	May-							
	12	Buhari Blames FG for Security Challenges	2	4	4	5	6	2 1
57	17-							
1	May-							
	12	FG, ACF Partner to Tackle Boko Haram	2	4	3	3	6	2 2
57	17-							
1	May-							
	12	IBAN Visits ThisDay, Decries Attacks On Media Houses By Boko Haram	2	4	3	3	1	1 1
57	18-							
1	May-							
	12	Panic in Port Harcourt as Explosion Rocks Commercial Bus	2	4	3	5	5	5 1
57	20-							
1	May-							
	12	JTF, STF Raid Boko Haram Hideout in Jos	2	4	3	3	2	2 1
57	22-							
1	May-							
	12	Panic in Abuja As Police Arrest Two Terror Suspects	2	4	3	1	2	2 1
57	23-							
1	May-							
	12	Again, JNI, CAN Trade Blame Over Bomb Attacks	2	4	4	5	5	5 3
57	24-							
1	May-							
	12	CAN - Silent Killings Thriving in Maiduguri	2	4	4	5	5	5 1
57	24-							
1	May-							
	12	JTF Kills Boko Haram Member	2	4	3	3	2	2 1

57	25-May-12	24 U.S. Scholars Move to Stop Boko Haram's Designation	2	4	3	3	6	5	3
57	25-May-12	CAN - 1,000 Lost to Boko Haram Attacks	2	4	4	3	1	1	1
57	26-May-12	JTF - Boko Haram Planning Mayhem May 29	2	4	4	3	1	1	1
57	31-May-12	Bandits Kill 10 in Borno	2	4	3	2	1	1	1
57	2-Jun-12	Five Killed in Maiduguri	2	4	3	5	5	5	1
57	2-Jun-12	Army Moves Against Terrorism	2	4	3	1	2	2	2
57	3-Jun-12	Maiduguri and Unclaimed Corpses	2	4	3	5	6	5	1
57	4-Jun-12	We Heard the Explosion and Thought Boko Haram Has Finally Hit Lagos	2	4	7	3	5	5	3
57	5-Jun-12	CAN Confirms 21 Dead, 45 Injured in Bauchi Bomb Attacks	2	4	4	5	5	5	1
57	8-Jun-12	Borno - Suicide Bomber Hits Police Headquarters	2	4	3	2	1	1	1
57	9-Jun-12	Suicide Bomber Kills 6 At Borno Police Headquarters	2	4	3	2	1	1	1
57	14-Jun-12	Gunmen Kill Two, Injure Three Policemen On Highway Patrol	2	4	3	2	1	1	1
57	14-Jun-12	Customs Controller, Others Arrested Over Gun Running Allegation	2	4	3	5	5	5	2
57	15-Jun-12	Kano - Four Killed As JTF Raids Militant's Media Centre	2	4	3	1	2	2	1
57	18-Jun-12	Another Black Sunday	2	4	3	5	5	5	1
57	18-Jun-12	Scores Killed in Kaduna, Zaria Bombings, Reprisals	2	4	3	5	5	5	1
57	19-Jun-12	Yobe Attacked As Death Toll in Kaduna Bombings Climbs to 74	2	4	3	5	5	5	1
57	19-Jun-12	Jonathan Meets Mark, Others Over Insecurity	2	4	3	5	6	4	1

57	19-									
1	Jun-12	Boko Haram - Igbo Youths Threaten Reprisal	2	4	4	3	6	1	1	
57	20-									
1	Jun-12	CNPP Tasks FG On Security	2	4	4	5	6	5	2	
57	21-									
1	Jun-12	Jonathan Defends Trip to Brazil Amid Insecurity	2	4	5	5	6	2	3	
57	21-									
1	Jun-12	Gaidam, CAN Disagree On Attacks On Churches	2	4	4	5	5	5	3	
57	22-									
1	Jun-12	United States Puts Three Boko Haram Leaders On Terror List	2	4	3	4	6	5	1	
57	22-									
1	Jun-12	Another Christmas Day Bomber Arrested	2	4	3	2	5	1	2	
57	23-									
1	Jun-12	Fayemi, Daudu Blame Insecurity On Failure of Leadership	2	4	4	5	6	5	1	
57	23-									
1	Jun-12	Boko Haram - U.S Mulls Broader Designation	2	4	3	3	6	3	3	
57	24-									
1	Jun-12	JTF Kills Four Suspected Boko Haram in Kano	2	4	3	3	4	2	1	
57	24-									
1	Jun-12	Terrorism and Conspiracy Theories	2	4	3	1	6	5	3	
57	24-									
1	Jun-12	Steer Clear of Yorubaland, Fasehun Warns Boko Haram	2	4	4	3	6	3	3	
57	25-									
1	Jun-12	Serial Bomb Attacks Scare Northern Christians From Churches	2	4	3	5	5	5	1	
57	25-									
1	Jun-12	Boko Haram Invades Damaturu Prison As Explosion Rocks Bauchi	2	4	3	3	1	1	1	
57	26-									
1	Jun-12	Governors Insists On State Police, Seek Special Fund for Security	2	4	5	5	6	2	2	
57	26-									
1	Jun-12	Kuku - Grant Amnesty to Boko Haram Members If...	2	4	4	3	6	1	2	
57	28-									
1	Jun-12	Senate Canvasses for Special Courts On Terrorism	2	4	5	1	6	2	2	
57	29-									
1	Jun-12	Dasuki Visits Yobe As Gaidam Asks for More Troops	2	4	3	5	6	2	3	
57	30-									
1	Jun-12	NSA- No Timeline to End Boko Haram Bombings	2	4	2	3	5	1	1	
57	1-Jul-									
1	12	Again, Unknown Gunmen Attack Damaturu	2	4	3	2	5	1	1	
57	3-Jul-									
1		Jonathan - We Will Tackle Insecurity Head On	2	4	5	5	6	2	2	

1	12								
57	3-Jul-								
1	12	Boko Haram Kills Nine Construction Workers	2	4	3	3	1	1	1
57	3-Jul-	Jonathan Considers House Request On Security Briefing	2	4	3	5	6	2	2
1	12								
57	4-Jul-	Boko Haram Attacks Aimed At Dislodging Northern Minorities, Says MBYF	2	4	4	3	5	3	1
1	12								
57	4-Jul-	Terrorism - Court Resumes Ndume's Trial	2	4	3	1	6	2	3
1	12								
57	5-Jul-	Boko Haram - Police Now Victims of Human Rights Abuses	2	4	3	3	6	2	1
1	12								
57	6-Jul-	Abuja - Occupancy Rates in Hilton, Sheraton Drop Over Security Concerns	2	4	3	5	6	5	1
1	12								
57	6-Jul-	U.S. Promises to Assist Security Agencies	2	4	6	5	6	4	2
1	12								
57	7-Jul-	Abandoned, Peace Don't Live Here Anymore!	2	4	7	5	6	5	3
1	12								
57	7-Jul-	Senator Ndume and the Security Challenge	2	4	3	5	6	2	1
1	12								
57	8-Jul-	Ex-Militants Threaten to Return to the Creeks	2	4	4	5	6	2	1
1	12								
57	10-Jul-	CAN Urges Jonathan to Demonstrate Capacity to Tackle Terrorism	2	4	4	1	6	2	2
1	12								
57	10-Jul-	Caught in the Throes of Insecurity	2	4	3	5	6	5	1
1	12								
57	12-Jul-	Designate Boko Haram As FTO, CAN Urges U.S.	2	4	4	3	6	3	1
1	12								
57	14-Jul-	The North, Boko Haram and an American Journalist's Prayer	2	4	3	3	6	1	3
1	12								
57	14-Jul-	Nigeria Descending Into Anarchy, Says Attorney-General	2	4	5	5	6	5	1
1	12								
57	14-Jul-	Shehu of Borno Unhurt As Five Die in Maiduguri Blast	2	4	3	5	5	5	1
1	12								
57	14-Jul-	Plateau Crisis - Fulani Leader Arrested, Detained	2	4	3	5	5	5	1
1	12								
57	15-Jul-	Soyinka Lecture Advocates Decentralised Security Structure	2	4	4	5	6	5	3
1	12								
57	15-Jul-	CAN, Tambuwal Condemn Bomb Attack On Borno Mosque	2	4	4	5	5	5	1
1	12								

88	15-Jul-									
7	12	How We Were Attacked - Borno Deputy Governor	2	4	5	5	5	2	1	
88	15-Jul-									
9	12	Death, Why Art Thou So Cheap?	2	4	7	5	6	5	3	
89	18-Jul-	Boko Haram Doing Islam More Harm Than Good, Says								
0	12	Shettima	2	4	5	3	6	3	1	
89	18-Jul-									
1	12	Commotion in Damaturu As Gunshots Rent the Air	2	4	3	5	5	5	1	
89	18-Jul-									
2	12	Jonathan - Boko Haram Not Behind Plateau Crisis	2	4	5	3	5	1	3	
89	18-Jul-									
3	12	Bomb Scare As ANPP Swears in Sheriff BoT Chairman	2	4	3	5	5	2	1	
89	19-Jul-	Tributes Pour in for Slain Dantung At Senate Valedictory								
4	12	Session	2	4	5	5	6	5	3	
89	20-Jul-									
5	12	Four Traders Killed in Maiduguri	2	4	3	5	5	5	1	
89	24-Jul-									
6	12	Five Persons Killed in Maiduguri	2	4	3	5	5	5	1	
89	26-Jul-									
7	12	SSS - Northern Communities Shielding Boko Haram	2	4	2	3	6	3	3	

## **Appendix (V)**

### **STRUCTURED QUESTIONS FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS**

**Programme: PhD (Media and Communication)**

**University of Canterbury,**

**Christchurch 8140,**

**New Zealand.**

**Working Title: Journalism and Risk: The impact of Boko Haram Attacks on News**

**Content and Journalists' Patterns of News Gathering and Reporting in Nigeria  
(2011-2012)**

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### **QUESTIONS**

1. Could you please introduce yourself in detail? Your educational background and professional experience in political reporting in Nigeria.
2. What are the challenges confronting you in gathering news on the activities of Boko Haram as an embedded journalist (under military protection) or unilateral (not under military unit)?
3. What are the challenges in reporting or writing news stories on the activities of Boko Haram in the face of threat or violent acts to journalists by the Boko Haram group?
4. What effects do the threat or violent acts of the Boko Haram group have in the discharge of your professional duties as a political reporter, and how has it shaped your professional experience?
5. What are the common reactions or complaints that reporting on Boko Haram usually generate among reporters in the country covering the group's activities?
6. What are the other challenges you confront in discharging your professional duties aside from Boko Haram's threat and violent acts while reporting on the group's activities?
7. In the face of threat and danger to reporters' lives, what are the factors that encourage or discourage you from reporting on Boko Haram's activities?
8. What is the influence of Nigerian and other African states declared War on Boko Haram in reporting on the activities of Boko Haram?

9. Have specific protocols or safety procedure being put in place by the media organisation you work for?
  10. What strategies do you adopt in managing the issue of safety and security in your practice?
  11. What strategies do you adopt in managing other challenges involved in reporting Boko Haram group in Nigeria?
  12. Follow up questions as demanded by the situation.
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