Freedom consequentialism: In support of a new measure of utility

Type of content
Theses / Dissertations
Publisher's DOI/URI
Thesis discipline
Philosophy
Degree name
Master of Arts
Publisher
University of Canterbury. Philosophy
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Language
Date
2013
Authors
McKay, Daniel Christopher
Abstract

Classical utilitarianism faces significant problems: it ignores moral rights; it cannot take account of all free rational agents; and its focus on happiness means that it dismisses the other things that people value for their own sake. These problems lead to conflicts with autonomy, personal integrity and inconsistencies with the way in which utilitarianism justifies the value of happiness. This thesis seeks to solve these problems by introducing the protection of freedom as a new measure of utility.

Description
Citation
Keywords
Ethics, utilitarianism, consequentialism, freedom consequentialism, normative ethics
Ngā upoko tukutuku/Māori subject headings
ANZSRC fields of research
Rights
Copyright Daniel Christopher McKay