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Title: Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission
Authors: Cox, J. C.
Vadovic, R.
Servátka, M.
Issue Date: 2012
Citation: Cox, J.C, Servátka, M., Vadovic, R. (2012) Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission. Department of Economics and Finance. 42pp..
Source: http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/1201.pdf
Abstract: Intent to help or harm is revealed more clearly by acts of commission that overturn the status quo than by acts of omission that uphold it. Both the law and culture make a central distinction between the two types of acts. Acts of commission elicit stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission. In this paper we compare reciprocal responses to both types of acts and ask whether behavior of subjects in two experiments is consistent with existing theory. The design of the experiments focuses on the axioms of revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) that make it observationally distinct from other theories, Axiom R (for reciprocity) and Axiom S (for status quo). We find support for this theory in both experiments.
Publisher: College of Business and Economics
University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance
Research Fields: Field of Research::14 - Economics::1401 - Economic Theory
Field of Research::22 - Philosophy and Religious Studies::2203 - Philosophy::220305 - Ethical Theory
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10092/6500
Rights URI: http://library.canterbury.ac.nz/ir/rights.shtml
Appears in Collections:Working Papers

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