<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
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  <title>UC Research Repository Collection:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10092/653" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10092/653</id>
  <updated>2013-04-16T19:02:15Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2013-04-16T19:02:15Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>Does Cyberspace Need Antitrust?</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10092/3175" />
    <author>
      <name>Crampton, E.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Boudreaux, D.J.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10092/3175</id>
    <updated>2010-04-07T02:51:33Z</updated>
    <published>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Does Cyberspace Need Antitrust?
Authors: Crampton, E.; Boudreaux, D.J.
Editors: Thierer, A.; Crews, C.W. Jr.</summary>
    <dc:date>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Robust analytical egalitarianism: Worst-case political economy and the socialist calculation debate</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10092/2617" />
    <author>
      <name>Farrant, A.</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Crampton, E.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10092/2617</id>
    <updated>2009-07-23T12:45:33Z</updated>
    <published>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Robust analytical egalitarianism: Worst-case political economy and the socialist calculation debate
Authors: Farrant, A.; Crampton, E.
Editors: Peart, S.; Levy, D. M.
Abstract: Robust political economy built on worst case assumptions must carefully state joint hypotheses as the best or worst case nature of individual assumptions can  hinge critically on these joint assumptions.   Where benevolence is assumed, ignorance is the appropriate worst-case informational assumption; however, when planner benevolence is in doubt, a planner endowed with calculative efficacy is the appropriate joint worst-case assumption.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Market Failure</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10092/2597" />
    <author>
      <name>Crampton, E.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10092/2597</id>
    <updated>2009-07-14T12:51:58Z</updated>
    <published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Title: Market Failure
Authors: Crampton, E.
Editors: Clark, D.S.
Abstract: Market failure theories underlie most economic arguments&#xD;
for government intervention in the economy.&#xD;
When markets operate in accordance with standard&#xD;
economic assumptions, no person can be made better&#xD;
off except by making someone else worse off. The&#xD;
range of government activity in such a world consequently&#xD;
is constrained. However, when markets fail to&#xD;
operate in accordance with the standard model, government&#xD;
policy may improve economic outcomes by&#xD;
ameliorating the market failure.
Description: Encyclopedia entry</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
  </entry>
</feed>

