

**HANNIBAL’S NIGHT TIME ANTICS:  
LIVY’S USE OF ‘THE NIGHT’ IN THE THIRD DECADE TO  
PRESENT MILITARY OPERATIONS, DEVELOP MORAL  
EXEMPLA AND EXAMINE ROME’S PAST.**

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## INTRODUCTION

Hannibal is one of the only Carthaginians who is still remembered and even studied in Classics today. As leader of the Carthaginians throughout the Second Punic War from 218-201BCE, Hannibal successfully threatened the Roman dominion of the Mediterranean. However, our understanding of Hannibal as a character is limited. Not only have no Carthaginian sources survived, but other ancient source material discussing Hannibal is scant. The most complete narrative of the Second Punic War, and information on Hannibal, has been preserved by Livy in his third decade, and thus the main source for our investigation.<sup>1</sup> We do also gain some information from Polybius, which supplements the material we get from Livy, but this is fragmentary.

How Hannibal has been presented in the *Ab Urbe Condita* is associated with Livy's aims as an historian, which was to account for history, but also to provide moral instruction for his Roman readers.<sup>2</sup> Livy believed that an examination of history could help explain why Rome in the first century BCE was in ruin, which in Livy's opinion, was associated with Roman contact with Hannibal during the Punic Wars.<sup>3</sup> It is for this reason that an

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<sup>1</sup> Burck (1971) 21, explains that Livy's third decade is particularly important for us, accounted for by the "provision of excellent information which enables to look at the world of Carthage and its leaders," especially Hannibal. See also Hoyos (2003) 3ff, who explains that almost nothing survives of Carthaginian records aside from a few quotations or paraphrases preserved in later authors. As such, the activities of Hannibal and his brothers largely pass to us not from Barcid tradition but as a result of being filtered through Roman historical narratives. This factor, combined with the application of a pro-Roman bias to historical accounts, has resulted in distorted representations at times. Nevertheless, Livy's third decade is important for providing some insight into the Carthaginian leaders of this period.

<sup>2</sup> Livy states in his *Preface* that his aim was to record the entirety of Rome's history and her achievements. Livy highlights his reservations toward this task at *Preface* 1-3, stating that many men before him had written about Roman history. See for instance Quintus Fabius, Cato the Elder and Sallust. Livy's solution to presenting his history from a different perspective was to investigate Roman development and success by examining the moralistic value of history. However, this concept in itself was not a new concept in the ancient world, with the moral value of history a *topos* deriving from antiquated writers such as Hecataeus, Herodotus and Thucydides. History provided the opportunity for individuals to regulate their conduct through 'historical example.' See Ogilvie (1965) 23. Livy adopted this practice in the first century BCE, but he was not the first Roman historian to do so. Sallust similarly included moral messages in his history, which Livy's *Preface* in particular is reminiscent. Refer to Burton (2008) 74ff, for a comparison and analysis of Livy's history to that of Sallust. Similarly, although not a historian, Cicero claims that "history...[is] life's teacher." (*Historia...[est] magistra vitae*). See Cicero, *De Orat.* II.36.

<sup>3</sup> We need to recognise that the notion of history having educational value was associated with *mos maiorum*, the importance of ancestral practices as *exempla*. See Miles (1995) 117ff, who explains that this tradition implies that "the essential character of society is so unchanged and unchanging that the collective wisdom of the *maiores* not only makes sense in the present but constitutes a standard of judgement and is timeless." For

examination into character, especially Hannibal, is important to our investigation, for it is through the presentation of character that Livy expressed his themes. In itself, an investigation into character portrayal and development within Livy's work is not a new topic of study.<sup>4</sup> Our analysis, however, is based on a fresh approach. We will investigate how 'the night' can present new insights in Livy's portrayal of his characters and whether this setting adds to or alters previous conceptions. More specifically, our focus is on how Livy uses events that occur at night, the imagery associated with the night (especially luxury, as we will come to see), and societal perceptions of the night, to develop select characters throughout the Second Punic War, with particular interest on the night time military operations of Hannibal. We need to be aware of Livy's treatment of figures as it affects the depiction of Hannibal and helps account for understanding the multiple levels of depiction.

Traditionally, Hannibal's depiction has been shrouded by hostility. He was a Carthaginian who was considered deceptive and cruel among many ancient historians, with Hannibal and other Carthaginians labelled as having *Punica fraus* (Punic deceit). We will explore reasons why ancient writers viewed Hannibal in this manner. It will become apparent, however, that this viewpoint needs to be altered, with Hannibal a much more complicated character than previously considered. Important for our investigation is how new insight into Hannibal's depiction can be obtained through a focus on the night time setting, with specific emphasis on his military activity. Our understanding of Hannibal as a character can be aided by the way that Livy uses a night time setting for military activity to create a more nuanced characterisation of Hannibal in particular, but also of Roman

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Livy, 'history' can do more. As Miles observes, Livy suggests that "history was specifically about change: Rome's rise to greatness, the development of Rome's distinctive institutions, and its subsequent decline." Also refer to Moles (1993) for insight into how Livy's approach to history differs from his predecessors. Livy believed that Rome's current predicament in the first century BCE, that is, the turmoil and political anarchy following a period of Civil War, could be explained through an analysis of the past and the presentation of moral messages specifically directed to his audience. More specifically, however, was how Roman contact with Hannibal introduced corruption into Roman society, especially the Roman love for wealth and foreign art.

<sup>4</sup> The importance of characterisation to Livy's history cannot be overlooked. Ogilvie in Livy trans. by Aubrey de Selincourt (1960) 1-6, suggests that characterisation was the feature that distinguished Livy's work and that that of others, for Livy saw "history in terms of human characters and representative individuals rather than of partisan politics." Ogilvie also suggests that this was a tradition going back to Aristotle ("actions are signs of characters," *Rhetoric* 1367b) and Thucydides. The job of the historian, then, was "to relate what happens to the appropriate character." For an introduction to characterisation in Livy see: Vasaly (2009); Helenga (1997); Walsh (1961; 1973); Ogilvie (1965); Briscoe (1971); Burck (1971); Levene (2010) esp. 164-214 with and explanation to why characters appear to be stereotypical to the modern reader.

generals and Roman military values more generally. We also, therefore, gain insight into how Livy used the night and whether this was representative of Roman societal perceptions associated with night time activity.

This topic is challenging for two reasons. First, the night time activity highlights the subtleties of Hannibal's complex characterisation to a greater extent. Second, night itself is a complicated *topos* that Livy exploits in various ways. Despite the complexities, re-examining Hannibal by taking night as a setting into account reveals a new dimension to his characterisation, whilst simultaneously providing new insight into the activities of Roman generals and their own use of the night for military operations. How the night was used by both Hannibal and Roman generals alike allows us to examine the issues of proper and improper military conduct. In turn, we are able to examine Livy's characterisation of military figures by determining if their nocturnal military activity was acceptable or improper. In order to do this, we will explore how the night was perceived within Roman society, with a specific focus on perceptions toward military conduct, and apply this analysis to our examination of Hannibal's nocturnal military activity. By taking this approach, we will gain information about Hannibal's use of the night for military operations, the Roman perception of Hannibal's activity in relation to their own nocturnal activities, and how they provide insight into Livy's use of the night, his development of characters, and his moral messages.

In order to understand and examine Hannibal's nocturnal military activities, we need to first introduce the theme of 'the night' and why a focus on military activity is pertinent. We will explore why Hannibal is an important focal point, for the themes of moral instruction, historical narrative, military activity and nocturnal activity come into sharp focus. A fragmentary anecdote from the Republican poet Ennius' *Phoenix* is important to our investigation, for it allows us to introduce the themes of Roman military *virtus*, Roman military ethics, or 'proper' and 'improper' military conduct, whilst simultaneously introducing the topic of the night. Important to our investigation is military insight provided by Polybius, who supports some of Ennius' claims associated with ideal Roman military conduct. This framework is the focus of Chapter One, which also introduces a case study of the nocturnal military activities of the Scipio brothers, that highlights Ennius' conclusions whilst simultaneously introducing the concept of the 'other' and how the Romans viewed

the nocturnal activity of non-Romans. It is from this case study that we can introduce Hannibal and begin to interpret his night time military operations. We also explore how to interpret Livy's night time anecdotes by establishing how 'the night' was perceived in Roman society, highlighting the importance of understanding societal perceptions of the night in order to comprehend the ways that Livy manipulates these conventions to suit his agenda and portrayal of Hannibal. Furthermore, we examine how we can infer that 'the night' in Livy's work is not only a construct of literary embellishment. The importance of Polybius as a source for Livy is highlighted, meaning that night time military action in Livy's third decade are at times representative of historical reflection rather than mere literary creation.

Once we have gained an understanding of the above themes, we can begin our investigation of Hannibal. We introduce that scholars such as Burck and Pitcher believe Livy's complex characterisation of figures, especially in the third decade, may be explained by the historian's new-found fascination in 'paradoxical' characters, with virtues and vices working in co-existence. This is pertinent to our investigation, for it negates the traditional view of Livy only presenting stock figures,<sup>5</sup> whilst simultaneously allowing us to explore and appreciate the complexities of depiction of figures in the third decade. Of particular significance is how this interpretation applies to Hannibal. It has long been considered that non-Romans were only depicted in a hostile manner, a way to highlight that they were not Roman.<sup>6</sup> However, it will become apparent that this interpretation is dated, especially in

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<sup>5</sup> See for instance Dorey in Walsh (1973), Foulkes (1999), Briscoe (1971), Vasaly (2009) and Hellenga (1997).

<sup>6</sup> See Hoyos (2006) xxvi, who claims that "enemies of Rome generally labour under a Livian cloud. Hostile generalisations dominate." Many scholars believe that non-Romans are only included in Livy's work as a way to provide a moralistic comparison to the qualities exhibited by Roman themselves. See Dorey in Walsh (1973); Luce (1977) 231ff. Furthermore, this tendency was not unique to Livy. For information on the 'other' in antiquity and in Roman thought see: Gruen (2011); Noy (2000); Levene (2010) 214ff; Syed (2005); Veyne (1993); Isaac (2004), who discusses a range of both Greek and Roman adverse attitudes toward various foreigners, and explores their subjection to either ethnic-prejudice or proto-racism. It is also important to note that some scholars believe that Livy had no intention to discuss non-Romans within his work. See Mehl (2011) 109, who suggests that "Livy outlines in his preface that he will pass over non-Roman affairs to the extent that they have no importance to Rome." This interpretation is demonstrably wrong, as we can see in our analysis of Hannibal. Furthermore, Rome's development as a nation was arguably both shaped and influenced by Rome's contact with other peoples. This fact can be accounted for by Livy himself, for he makes no claim that he will ignore the affairs of non-Romans and is not naïve in thinking that foreign peoples were indispensable to his history. See for example Livy's digression discussing how Masinissa of the Numidians came to hold his father's kingdom (29.29.6-32.14). Livy himself highlights the importance that Masinissa holds in the eyes of the Romans by stating how he was the greatest King and gave the greatest aid to the Roman state (29.29.5: *ceterum cum longe maximus omnium aetatis suae regum hic fuerit plurimumque rem Romanam iuverit...*).

relation to Hannibal, for Livy's depiction is both multi-dimensional and complex. The main focus of Chapter Two is to draw attention to and examine the negative literary tradition within our sources and accounting for why this tradition may have existed. We pay close attention to a negative character sketch of Hannibal at the beginning of book 21, with particular emphasis on the *Punica fraus* and *crudelitas* that is ascribed to Hannibal, reflective of Roman perceptions of the first century BCE toward Hannibal. We will discover that the traditional view of Hannibal as a hostile figure can be justified from a Roman perspective, but this interpretation is by no means absolute since there is a counter positive literary tradition. Important for our investigation is how an analysis of select Hannibalic nocturnal activity reveals that his military operations probably reflect reality rather than being instances of literary embellishment. This is significant, for it allows us to explore a new dimension of Hannibal's character which simultaneously counters and challenges the notion that the night was only a time of improper military conduct.

A thorough investigation of Hannibal's nocturnal military activity is the focus of Chapter Three, with the negative character sketch of Hannibal's *Punica fraus* and *crudelitas* from book 21 as the framework for our investigation. We will investigate why the Roman accusation may be valid, examining night time anecdotes which confirm the respective accusations. Our main focus, however, is to explore the validity of these accusations by offering counter interpretations of Hannibal's nocturnal activity, a challenging task since we know Livy depicts complex characters. An underlying theme of this chapter whether Hannibal's night time actions were considered 'proper' or 'improper' by the Romans. In order to investigate this sub-theme we will explore the nocturnal military conduct of various Roman commanders such as Camillus, Scipio Africanus, Fabius Maximus and Marcellus. The comparability of Roman action demonstrated by these commanders at night allows us to analyse and interpret Livy's presentation of Hannibal, whilst developing our understanding of Roman perceptions of the night, Roman military *virtus* and Livy's aims as an author. We will see that our investigation into Hannibal's nocturnal character reveals an incredibly complicated character, who challenged Roman military ethics as well as the traditional boundaries of his characterisation. An important aspect of this chapter is the final discussion on wealth and luxury, again with a focus on how the setting of the night is used to express Livy's concerns. We assume that Livy successfully depicts Hannibal as being 'other' in this



segment, with his association with wealth and luxury the factor which unravelled his war effort in Italy. However, we learn that this is not the case, with Hannibal's characterisation difficult to interpret. Livy's use of this episode to foreshadow Rome's own demise following similar circumstances blurs our understanding of Hannibal's depiction. The aim of this chapter, then, is to highlight how night alters perceptions, particularly the boundary between Roman and non-Roman, which is difficult to define and thus becomes blurred. Ultimately, we learn that night and the associated darkness helps to reveal true character, whether of the Romans or of Hannibal, which makes our task of determining Hannibal's character and perception in the Roman world all the more challenging.

By exploring Hannibal's nocturnal military activity in this manner, we are able to assess and alter our understanding of Hannibal's character, as well as gain insight into Livy's multi-level characterisation. We will see that all interpretations of character are valid and supported by anecdotal evidence, with Hannibal's nocturnal actions representing either military or societal perceptions. In this manner, then, an investigation into Hannibal's nocturnal military activities makes it more challenging to determine the level of truth associated with the traditional accusations association with Hannibal. That being said, this investigation provides new insight into Hannibal's character, allowing us to challenge and assess how he was traditionally viewed, whilst providing a fresh understanding of how the night was perceived in Roman society and how the night was utilised within a military context.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **Livy's Characters, Military Operations and the Night time setting**

In Ancient Rome military operations and the conduct of military figures were important to affairs of the state. This is very clearly apparent during the Second Punic War, where the way in which individuals conducted themselves militarily ultimately determined the course of the war and how Rome would survive Hannibal's invasion. For Livy, the association of military conduct, individual action and affairs of the state were inextricably linked, and were inseparable when recounting history.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, Livy felt that Rome's entire history, not just the Punic Wars, could be accounted for through an examination of character and their actions.<sup>8</sup> After all, Roman domination of the Mediterranean was primarily the result of military activity and the leadership of prominent military commanders. Livy, however, does not merely present a record of events. Livy's history highlight the traits which made Romans great by exploring and analysing the actions of select individuals. In this way he was able to express the ideals of his society and the traits the Romans considered imperative to ensure their success.

It does not surprise, therefore, that Livy's representation of Hannibal is both historical, in that it develops our understanding of Hannibal himself; and an *exempla*, presenting Livy's moral lessons. Without doubt Livy's view is also biased, no Carthaginian accounts are extant, so insight into Hannibal's character is limited to Greek and Roman writers, including Livy. As a result, there is a long and complicated tradition associated with the figure of Hannibal. Nevertheless, a fresh approach can provide new insight. Our parameters are twofold. First, an examination of Hannibal's character in a military setting will help us re-examine Livy's representation. This was, after all, a time of war, and

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<sup>7</sup> Livy *Preface* 9. Livy explains that in order to recount for Roman history, the actions of individuals in both peace and war need to be given close attention.

<sup>8</sup> Livy *Preface* 10: "What chiefly makes the study of history wholesome and profitable is this, that you behold the lessons of every kind of experience set forth as on a conspicuous monument; from these you may choose for yourself and for your own state what to imitate, from these mark for avoidance what is shameful in the conception and shameful in the result." (*Hoc ilud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in illustri posita monument intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitare capias, inde foedum exitu, quod vites*). Also see Burton (2006) 76, who explains that the study of history, in Livy's opinion, was designed to teach patriotic lessons and provide good examples to imitate.

Hannibal's ability to challenge the Roman stronghold over Italy and the Mediterranean for sixteen years attests to his capabilities as a commander. Second, an investigation into time and setting, specifically the night, will help us understand the Roman conception of Hannibal's activity. The variance in Roman criticism and admiration of Hannibal can be assessed through an examination of his nocturnal activity. As we shall see this is a setting that has its own complexities enabling events to be interpreted in different ways. However, in order to understand how Livy viewed his characters, Hannibal included, we need to first examine the types of virtues Livy associated with military figures and that were valued by the state.

### ***Roman virtus, Military ethics and the Night:***

Livy introduces the types of ideals valued by the state through his characterisation of Roman figures. In general, Livy's Roman figures are cast to exemplify the traits that the Romans held in high esteem and that determined 'national character.' Dorey highlights some of these qualities, providing a comprehensive list of traditional Roman virtues that included dignity (*gravitas*), self-restraint (*modestia*), fortitude (*fortitudo*), and patriotism (*amor patriae*).<sup>9</sup> In characterising his figures, Livy conveys the Roman belief that through the display of such qualities, success and satisfactory results for the individual and the state would be obtained. Such qualities can be collectively grouped as Roman *virtus*, the traits that ensured that a Roman would comport himself with every kind of excellence.

The insight into characterisation given by Dorey, however, is generalised, as the traits are applicable to all aristocratic men within Roman society. By examining the conduct of military figures within the third decade and understanding the moral lessons associated with their activity, the question of how accurate these general qualities were to the conduct of Roman generals is opened. Fortunately, a fragment from the Republican poet Ennius provides an insight into how military figures were expected to conduct themselves in battle. It does need to be remembered that Ennius as a poet had the ability to inflate and exaggerate details to suit his poetic licence. The content, therefore, may be an idealised

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<sup>9</sup> See Dorey in Walsh (1973) 6-7. Also see Luce (1977) 231, who explains that Livy focused on "the pantheon of values" for the edification and enjoyment of Roman readers. Luce suggests that Livy's focus on history as a series of moral values resulted in him treating history as a panorama.

account of military conduct and provide limited or distorted insights. Nevertheless, the societal values are representative (as Polybius attests) and it is the use of the 'night' and the inherent Roman perceptions associated with the night that makes this fragment so interesting:

*sed virum vera virtute vivere animatum adiecit  
fortiterque innoxium vocare adversum adversarios.  
ea libertas est qui pectus purum et firmum gestitat;  
aliae res obnoxiosae nocte in obscura latent.*

It becomes a man to live, endowed with true courage,  
and to stand with guiltless bravery in the face of his opponents.  
This is freedom – he who carries a pure and steadfast soul;  
all else culpable in nature, skulks about in shady darkness .<sup>10</sup>

Ennius here explains that there were two decisive elements which defined *virtus* for the Roman soldier: to be able to stand his ground in battle and to fight his foe bravely. This may be what one would expect of any soldier, but Ennius here is focused on the Roman attributes. Furthermore, these traits are synonymous with the dignity and patriotism that Dorey explores. In other words, Ennius suggests that to exhibit dignity and patriotism, a soldier must stand his ground and meet his foe in a standard, battle formation. Leigh's interpretation goes further, suggesting that a Roman soldier was to face his enemy down, meaning that there was "no need for dynamic movement and covert operations of the trickster." Leigh continues shortly after with the comment that "it is an appropriate virtue for the Roman legion and its collective determination to hold the line."<sup>11</sup> While we may be tempted to question Leigh's conclusions based on a few poetic lines, the assumption that the Roman legion showed *virtus* by engaging in close-quarter battle is also suggested by Polybius. In discussing the tactics of Philip of Macedon in 205BCE, Polybius contrasts Macedonian practices to those of the Romans. He claims that Roman military tactics were

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<sup>10</sup> Ennius, *Scaenica*, 254-7. See Jocelyn (1967) 125-6; 390-1. *Libertas* (freedom) and standing true with bravery represents freedom and what it means to be free, whereas *obnoxiosae* and the actions that are obscured by night come to represent submissiveness, and are therefore 'other' and un-Roman.

<sup>11</sup> Leigh (2004) 39.

conventional and adhered to the traditional principles of warfare, “for they [the Romans] make declaration of war, they seldom use ambushes, and they fight hand-to-hand at close quarters.”<sup>12</sup> Polybius’ view would seem to compliment that of Ennius: Roman generals of old shunned covert operations in favour of direct fighting on open ground.

A combined interpretation of Ennius’ and Polybius’ comments on ideal Roman military practices allows us to reconstruct Roman character through an analysis of military conduct. Additionally, we are also exposed to the traits that Romans considered to be synonymous with the enemy, or the ‘other.’ While Ennius states that a Roman was expected to hold his ground, he implies that enemies of Rome tended to adopt different tactics which Leigh refers to as “dynamic movement and covert operations.” If we consider Polybius’ views, the ambush was not synonymous with Roman practice, but again by implication was associated with the enemy. Furthermore, Ennius introduces the topic of appropriate time and setting. It would appear that the virtues that Ennius ascribes to Romans ought to occur during day time, with all other activity, which is unethical, occurring in “shady darkness.” His reference to darkness (*nocte*) and the associated guilt (*obnoxiosae*) associated with nocturnal military operations have the connotations of unvirtuous activity. This suggests that, while stead-fastness and bravery were considered to define Roman military *virtus*, any other behaviour was thought to occur at night and under the guise of darkness. The reference to *obscura* highlights this, with the implication that night conceals any activity that is alluded to as being sinful or deceitful. Because Romans prided themselves on face-to-face combat, Ennius makes it clear that military operations at night were not condoned within Roman society as they were incompatible with Roman military *virtus*.

Ennius and Polybius’ views on ethical Roman military conduct introduces a reason as to why an examination of Hannibal’s military operations, particularly at night, is pertinent. Conceptually, Hannibal was an enemy of Rome, and the use of the ambush was a preferred Carthaginian strategy.<sup>13</sup> The association of Hannibal with covert tactics is understandable

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<sup>12</sup> Polybius, 13.3.8: βραχὺ δέ τι λείπεται παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἵχνος ἔτι τῆς ἀρχαίας αἰρέσεως περὶ τὰ πολεμικά· καὶ γὰρ προλέγουσι τοὺς πολέμους καὶ ταῖς ἐνέδραις σπανίως χρῶνται καὶ τὴν μάχην ἐκ χειρὸς ποιοῦνται καὶ (συ)στάδην. All translations for Polybius are based on the Loeb Classical Library, with occasional minor modifications.

<sup>13</sup> See for instance Leigh (2004) 45ff.

once we understand how Livy characterised Roman enemies, or non-Romans. If Romans displayed traditional virtues, non-Romans were associated with the corresponding vices, and therefore emphasised the traits which Romans were to avoid. Such qualities included recklessness (*temeritas*), arrogance (*superbia*) and indiscipline (*lascivia*).<sup>14</sup> Because Hannibal was a Carthaginian and thus an enemy of Rome, Livy's association of Hannibal with covert tactics is understandable because they were in opposition to Roman values. However, we know that Hannibal was incredibly successful during his campaign in Italy, which means that the association of Hannibal with *temeritas*, *superbia* and *lascivia* is in itself too simplistic. We will examine the how Livy's characterisation of Hannibal is complex, but it is the setting of the night that will help us discover a new dimension to Hannibal's characterisation. This is because the setting of the night provides a new way to interpret the literary aims of the author. As suggested by Ker, "in the moralising tradition of Roman literature...there was a strong tendency to see a person's use of time as an indicator of his or her social identity."<sup>15</sup> Ker seems to suggest, then, that the time when individual activity occurred could possibly provide a moralistic tone or judgement.<sup>16</sup> We know that Ennius at least plays on the perception that nocturnal military conduct was (in some way) improper. This supports Ker's view. Morrison suggests that the negative perceptions of the night (which Ennius alludes to), arise from the ability for an individual to pervert social norms, using the "cover of darkness to do what they might desire by day, but do not dare to do."<sup>17</sup> The association between time, setting and action is therefore significant, providing insight into societal perceptions of the night in relation to issues of identity. What is of interest to us is the application of the same concept to Livy's work so we can explore how Livy may have used the night to aid his character portrayal. There is also the issue of proper and improper military activity. With all this in mind, let us consider Livy's use of the night through an analysis of Gnaeus and Publius Scipio's nocturnal activities.

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<sup>14</sup> See Dorey in Walsh (1973) 6-7.

<sup>15</sup> Ker (2004) 216.

<sup>16</sup> Morrison (2012) 4.

<sup>17</sup> Morrison (2012) 4.

### Case Study: The Scipio bothers and the night:

The correlation between the night, moral instruction and military example is evident in a pair of anecdotes which build upon Ennius' sentiments towards night time military operations. In 212BCE, Publius Scipio decided to adopt a plan of going by night to meet Indibilis and to engage in battle.<sup>18</sup> Livy's disapproval of such action is evident, stating that "though [he was] a general marked by caution and foresight,"<sup>19</sup> here Publius failed to exhibit such qualities and acted impulsively and foolishly. The consequence of such recklessness is that Publius is ambushed and dies in battle.<sup>20</sup> In comparison, Livy explains how Publius' brother, Gnaeus Scipio, only used the cover of night to retreat as far away from the enemy as possible.<sup>21</sup> It is only when the Numidians attack Gnaeus at night that, despite every attempt to retreat, he engages in battle because he was surrounded, and unfortunately is slain in the skirmish.<sup>22</sup> For Livy, the actions of both generals highlight the virtues and vices associated with military conduct, with the setting of 'the night' used as a tool to enhance such qualities. Whereas Publius was usually a man who exhibited caution and foresight, in the night time setting his traits have been inverted, for he demonstrated carelessness and thoughtlessness which had dire consequences. In contrast, Gnaeus' attempts to retreat at night probably reflect a military necessity,<sup>23</sup> but the setting also explains how darkness connotes danger and misfortune. For Livy, Gnaeus is the better general.<sup>24</sup> It was Gnaeus who was able to adapt to and interpret the environment. He recognised the dangers inherent in 'the night' (trying to avoid combat), and instead attempted to utilise the secrecy associated with night time to ensure the safety of his men.

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<sup>18</sup> Livy, 25.34.7: "Consequently Scipio, though a general marked by caution and foresight, being forced by his straits, adopted the rash plan of going by night to meet Indibilis and giving battle wherever he should encounter him." (*dux cautus et providens Scipio victus necessitatibus temerarium capit consilium, ut nocte Indibili obviam iret et, quocumque occurrisset loco, proelium consereret*).

<sup>19</sup> Livy, 25.34.7: *dux cautus et providens Scipio*.

<sup>20</sup> See page 28 for the association between the night, ambush and the 'other.'

<sup>21</sup> Livy, 25.35.7: "Troubled by these anxieties, he [Gnaeus] believed that the one safe course at present was to retreat as far as possible. Then in one night, while the enemy were unaware of it and hence made no move, he marched a considerable distance." (*His anxius curis id modo esse salutare in praesens credebat, cedere inde quantum posset; exinde una nocte ignaris hostibus et ob id quietis aliquantum emensus est iter*).

<sup>22</sup> Livy, 25.35.8-36.13.

<sup>23</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>24</sup> Livy, 25.36.15-16: "Grief for their deaths was not greater in Rome than throughout Spain...Gnaeus more than Publius, because he had been longer in command and had earlier won their favour, and had given for the first time an example of Roman justice and self-control." (*Luctus ex morte eorum non Romae maior quam per totam Hispaniam fuit...Gnaeum magis, quod diutius praefuerat iis priorque et favorem occupaverat et specimen iustitiae temperantiaeque Romanae primus dederat*).

This anecdote referring to Gnaeus Scipio's activity also provides interesting insights regarding the enemy. Livy states that it was the Numidians who attacked the Romans at night, rather than the Romans initiating the skirmish. Similarly, although Publius had chosen to meet Indibilis in a night battle, he was acted in response to Masinissa's readiness to attack both day and night, even approaching the gates of the camp at night in an attempt to create confusion.<sup>25</sup> It would seem that Livy correlates nocturnal military activity with the enemy, and uses the perception of danger and confusion to help enhance the image of the enemy as opposing state values. The 'night' therefore is a literary construct, used to enhance what the traditional Roman values were not, and thus was a way for Livy to give moral instruction. Morrison suggests that while there is a link between time and identity, the inclusion of the night time setting "introduces a link between time and the other, where inversions also construct a perceived social identity."<sup>26</sup> Therefore, "negative actions at night are 'other,' contrary to societal norms and constructs...of the ideal Roman society."<sup>27</sup>

This anecdote provides insight into how the Romans understood night-time military activity. Gnaeus Scipio represents 'proper' nocturnal activity, including avoidance of the night when possible, or using the night strategically to ensure Roman safety. In contrast, Livy condemns Publius because he did not avoid the night and the associated dangers, which led to his death. Livy clearly considers the night as a time to be avoided, most poignantly because of the association with the enemy and a time of enemy activity. This association supports Ennius' claim that unethical military activity occurred in darkness. In order to understand why Livy and Ennius hold these views, we need to establish how the Romans perceived the night, and why they considered darkness a time to be avoided.

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<sup>25</sup> Livy, 25.34.3-6: "With his Numidian cavalry he [Masinissa] now encountered Publius Scipio on his advance, and also was continually at hand day and night, ready to attack, so that he not only captured soldiers who had wandered far from the camp in search of wood and fodder, but also rode up to the camp itself, and often dashing in the midst of the outpost threw everything into great confusion. By night also there was often alarm at the gates and on the earthwork owing to a sudden attack..." (*Is tum cum equitatu Numidarum et advenienti P. Scipioni occurrit et deinde adsidue dies noctesque infestus aderat, ut non vagos tantum procul a castris lignatum pabulatumque progressos exciperet, sed ipsis obequicaret castris invectusque in medias saepe stations omnia ingenti tumultu turbaret. Noctibus quoque saepe incursu repentino in portis valloque trepidatum est...*).

<sup>26</sup> Morrison (2012) 5.

<sup>27</sup> Morrison (2012) 6.



### ***Roman Perceptions of the Night:***

The above anecdotes suggest that there can be more to night time events than the actual occurrence; perception and literary imagery have roles to play. An investigation into how Roman society perceived the night is challenging, especially due to a lack of scholarship and understanding of how Romans utilised the night. Interest in the topic of 'Rome at Night' is a recent phenomenon, with the work of Ker and Morrison introducing this theme and thus providing valuable insight to such a topic. If we consider Ennius and Livy's viewpoints, we can assume that the Roman military avoided activity at night if possible. In a more general context, the Roman avoidance of the night is echoed by scholars such as Balsdon, who notes that "the Romans in general lived by day and slept by night."<sup>28</sup> Balsdon continues by stating that workers and shopkeepers went to bed with the coming of darkness."<sup>29</sup> However, although an overall insight into Roman use of the night is lacking, various anecdotes from Roman authors suggest that the night was not a time of inactivity. There is some mention of nocturnal activity in Martial, who states that bakers began work in the early morning while others slept, and teachers created disturbances because of their early classes.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, Quintilian seems to suggest that the night was even the ideal time to write because good writing was a result of the solitude and silence associated with the night.<sup>31</sup> Rome at night, therefore, was not a time of inactivity, and Balsdon's view is discredited.

The lack of acknowledgment towards night time occurrences in Rome is therefore surprising, with Martial and Quintilian both describing the night as a time of activity. Furthermore, Quintilian suggest that working into darkness was not only accepted, but was an integral part of ensuring the completion of work. Ennius too suggests that night time activity did occur, with darkness used as a cover for military operations. Ennius, however, is not commenting on whether activity occurred or not, for he is more concerned with the imagery and the association of the night in the Roman psyche. Both Martial and Quintilian

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<sup>28</sup> Balsdon (1969) 18.

<sup>29</sup> Balsdon (1969) 55. Also see Shelton (1998) 124 and n.6.

<sup>30</sup> See Martial, *Epigrams*, for evidence of bakers working in early morning (12.57); and teachers having early classes (9.68).

<sup>31</sup> Quintilian 10.3.26: "And so one should burn the midnight oil and let the silence of the night and a closed room and a single lamp especially hold one's eyes, as it were, free from swerving." (*ideoque lucubranti silentium noctis et clausum cubiculum et lumen unum velut rectos maxime teneat*). Also see Ker (2004) 214, who examines the usefulness of the night for writing.

express how Roman society clearly considered night to be an extension of day, a time when tasks not yet completed could continue, or indeed be started. In contrast, Ennius' reference to military night time activity has connotations of negativity which is emphasised through the association with guilt. Morrison explains that the night was not always viewed nor accepted as being a virtuous extension of day: "it was a time of secrecy, darkness provided a cover or screen that challenged and/or transformed normal social activities, providing inversions and different perspectives."<sup>32</sup> Ennius' association of the night as a time of improper military activity is therefore explainable: the association of darkness with military operations has overtones of negativity, for darkness prohibited proper conduct. Because night acts as a screen, Ennius suggests that a Roman line could not be held, which would result in what he considers to be the improper conduct of 'skulking' in the shadows. Moreover, the imagery associated with the word choices seems appropriate for a poet, perhaps adding support for our interpretation. Similarly, Livy's condemnation of Gnaeus' night time activity is justified. As a Roman commander, he would have known that the night was a time of danger, with the screen created by night altering and changing perspectives. However, Gnaeus' decision to fight at night was synonymous with improper conduct, which meant that he was reckless and thoughtless.

The reference to the night in various anecdotes, then, help to reflect the literary aims of the author and to purvey moralistic messages. For the literary author, the setting of the night is a perfect tool to build upon and develop character identity, by drawing upon societal perceptions in order to convey messages. Livy' use of this literary construct is significant, for it possibly emphasises and explains his own moralistic messages. With a focus on character development to provide such messages, the inclusion of night time episodes within in his work help to convey to his reader the values of the state.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, because Hannibal was a non-Roman, through his nocturnal activities we gain insight into Livy's characterisation of the 'other' whilst simultaneously developing our understanding of

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<sup>32</sup> See Morrison (2012) 5.

<sup>33</sup> A good case study within Livy is the story of Lucretia at 1.57: "...it was already late at night, but there, in the hall of her house, surrounded by her busy maid-servants, she [Lucretia] was still ahd at work by lamplight upon her spinning." (*sed nocte sera deditam lane inter lucubrantes ancillas in medio aedium sedentum*). Morrison (2012) 6, believes that the Lucretia episode "is a good, if not the best, example of different night time imagery encapsulated in a single story in the extant literature," indicating a contrast between luxury and work, ethic and honour. Night can therefore be a time of either excess or an extension of the day.

Hannibal as a figure. The night, then, serves a very specific role, providing insight into the Roman societal perceptions of the night, as well as highlighting the moralistic aspects which are important to Livy's purpose.

### ***The Night in Livy: Literary Creation or Historical Reflection?***

In penning their respective narratives, both Ennius and Livy had their own agendas: Ennius to write poetry and thus have poetic licence, and Livy to recount Roman history and provide moral instruction. Therefore, the emphasis on night time activity being unacceptable and devious serves their respective aims and may reflect Roman military ideals rather than history itself. However, because Livy was also a historian, with a goal of giving an extant history of Rome, it is likely that at least some of the nocturnal activities he explores are indeed historical, providing insight into Roman, and Carthaginian, military operations.

The credibility of Livy's historical account arises from the use of Polybius as the chief source for the third decade.<sup>34</sup> Champion explains that Polybius is the most important source for reconstructing the history of the Punic Wars because of his "standard of historical accuracy and precision by which all other examples in classical historiography have been measured."<sup>35</sup> Unfortunately, the vast proportion of Polybius' account of the Second Punic war has been lost. It is for this reason that modern scholars tend to consult Livy's narrative of such events,<sup>36</sup> because the third decade survives in its entirety and thus preserves Polybius' lost work.<sup>37</sup> Additionally, the importance of Polybius' work in the study of Hannibal cannot be overlooked. Hoyos explains that the activities and achievements of the Barcids received admiration amongst the Greeks, in particular Polybius, who "plainly reckoned Hannibal inferior to none in the second (war) except Scipio Africanus, who finally defeated

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<sup>34</sup> For general information on Polybius as a source for Livy see Levene (2010) 126ff and Tränkle (1977) (*non vidi*). For information on all of Livy's sources see Luce (1977).

<sup>35</sup> Champion (2011) 93.

<sup>36</sup> Fronda (2011) 243, explains that "Polybius' narrative of the Second Punic War after Cannae survives only in fragments, leaving us to rely on Livy, supplemented by later and/or fragmentary authors, for the description of the few subsequent battles." Fronda states that Livy has mostly been seen as a storyteller, and a poor military historian (see Daly (2002) 23-25). Yet he is an underrated source for authentic historical material who, despite a lack of evidence, is able to convey a sense "of Hannibal's capabilities and referred tactics."

<sup>37</sup> Burck (1971) 26, explains the importance of Livy as a source for the Hannibal War, for "by and large, Livy has adhered closely to the content-matter of his source [Polybius]," and as such Livy's historical account contains an element of credibility.

him.”<sup>38</sup> With Livy using Polybius as a close source, and thus preserving Polybius’ lost work, the admiration towards Hannibal’s military actions may have been preserved within Livy’s own pages. Furthermore, Livy’s history and his use of Polybius is important to our study because of the inclusion of military accounts. Koon in particular explores and supports the factuality and credibility of Livy’s battle narrative, particularly due to Livy’s understanding of Polybius’ military descriptions. He acknowledges that although sources, such as Livy and Polybius, are literary in nature and therefore cannot describe the realities of ancient combat with certainty, they can, and often do, reflect reality by reproducing a realistic version of combat. As a result, we are able to analyse literary battle accounts and reconstruct a realistic image of ancient battle in general.<sup>39</sup>

The factuality of Livy’s night time military anecdotes is difficult to determine. Undoubtedly, Livy altered some of the information that he found in Polybius’ account in order to suit his own agenda. This does not in itself need to result in an inaccurate account, just a change in focus. Without doubt some of the information conveyed is historically accurate and representative of military reality. This will, in part, be a result of Polybius’ own methodology in gaining historical information and insights. Polybius believed that historical information was only credible if it was obtained from contemporary or near contemporary sources, primarily from eyewitness oral accounts.<sup>40</sup> This methodology supports the likelihood of an accurate account, as explained by Champion: “in keeping with his historiographical prescriptions, Polybius was able to question both Romans and non-Romans of an earlier generation about their experiences in the war against Hannibal, and to interview younger men who had heard accounts from their elders.”<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Hoyos (2006) 4.

<sup>39</sup> See Koon (2010). Also see Briscoe (2013), who similarly suggests that Livy’s use of Polybius was good, and as a result Livy is a credible source. It does need to be noted that a contrary view survives in Walsh (1958), who concludes that Livy’s record of military operations are inaccurate, a result of Livy misunderstanding Polybius’ work, which he carelessly and casually scrutinised.

<sup>40</sup> Champion (2011) 98, explains how Polybius belittled Timaeus due to the authors reliance on written documents, with no personal experience in statecraft and warfare.

<sup>41</sup> Champion (2011) 98. Polybius himself is an important source for this period, being a man with first-hand experience in politics and warfare; he was a military man involved in the Second Punic Wars, most notably being present in the sacking of Carthage as part of the *testudo* formation. Champion (2011) 100-102, also provides insight into the sources Polybius himself consulted, primarily L. Cincius Alimentus who had been taken as a war captive by Hannibal (c.f. Livy 21.28.3) and various Carthaginians who had known Hannibal personally and worked alongside him during his Italian campaigns. It is for these reasons that Polybius’ account of the Second Punic War is considered to be highly accurate and reliable. In comparison, Champion (2011) 98,

Eyewitness accounts would most certainly include insight into military operations and tactics, which may have included nocturnal activities. This is supported by our investigation into the types of night time military operations within Livy's third decade.<sup>42</sup> Some of the activities are logical and credible, undoubtedly reflecting the realities of ancient warfare. Consider, as demonstrative, how Livy records on numerous occasions the Roman tactic of rising in the night, usually in the fourth watch, in order to prepare oneself for an immediate departure from camp at dawn.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, Livy describes how the Romans plan operations, hold meetings and carry out surveillance during the night.<sup>44</sup> Such tactics seem logical, with the night being used to prepare for the forthcoming day and allowing the full potential of daylight to be utilised for actual fighting. Additionally, Livy frequently describes how the Romans use retreat at night; how they conduct positional changes under the cover of darkness, or march throughout the night and even pitch camp in the dark.<sup>45</sup>

Night time events in Livy's narrative can reflect military reality and/or literary imagery. Neither is mutually exclusive. Furthermore, it would appear that some nocturnal activity was considered 'acceptable,' and therefore not synonymous with the 'other' due to being 'unacceptable' or devious. Of particular note here are anecdotes pertaining to the military night watch,<sup>46</sup> which are most definitely reflections of warfare practice, as opposed to literary creations. The importance of the night watch, particularly for the Romans, is revealed through the suggestion that negligent night watch was a state offence: "To leave one's post was among the Romans a capital offence, and fathers had punished that crime with the death of even their own sons."<sup>47</sup> Therefore by examining night time anecdotes in Livy's history, we learn and gain insight into ancient military practices, especially in relation to the night. In doing so, our knowledge of ancient military practices and perceptions of the night are developed. We learn that the night was not only a time of danger or unacceptable

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explores why Polybius' account of the First Punic War is not held in the same regard, which Polybius himself was not happy with due to being in contrast to his ideal kind of research.

<sup>42</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>43</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>44</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>45</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>46</sup> See Appendix 1. Also see Pattenden (1987) for an indepth discussion on the Roman night watch.

<sup>47</sup> Livy, 24.37.9: *Praesidio decedere apud Romanos capital esse, et nece liberorum etiam suorum eam noxiam parentes sanxisse*. Also note Polybius 6.35, who provides detailed insight to the various procedures and duties associated with the Roman night watch.

activity, for the night provided necessary preparation time and allowed for the completion of activities already begun. Functionally, the night was paramount and necessary for ensuring the success of military operations. Without such activity, the armies would not be fully prepared, nor have enough time, to carry out their operations during daylight hours.

Such anecdotes seem to purvey military reality and the demands of ancient warfare. Logically, it was not feasible for all military operations to occur during the day, so the onset of night did not result in the end of all planning and intelligence gathering. The night was an important time for the army, and could be used to complete work separate from the actual fighting.<sup>48</sup> This is not limited to night routines and administration. One interesting observation is that dictators appear to be appointed at night. In 216BCE, Gaius Terentius as consul was summoned to name a dictator, which he did “that night, as was the custom” (*nocte proxima, ut mos erat*).<sup>49</sup> Although this procedure only occurs once during Livy’s third decade, there are other examples of the same practice occurring in the first decade, which are also described as being the custom and traditional.<sup>50</sup> We can speculate all we want as to ‘why;’ but what the practice categorically demonstrates is further complexity as to night time imagery and events.

Not all night time events were considered as being fundamental to the completion of daytime activities. Ennius’ criticism of night time operations seems specifically associated with night battles. His assessment of the night as a time of unvirtuous military activity is not unwarranted. Such a claim is supported by logic; the darkness created by the night was not conducive to battle circumstances, with the issues of maintaining battle formation, engaging with the enemy and being able to see the battle pitch factors to consider. The recognition of such issues is evident within Livy’s work. There are only a couple of instances of night time battles occurring in Livy’s third decade, one of which was the disastrous events associated

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<sup>48</sup> Livy even suggests that the ideal time for meals within the army occurred at night, for with the abandoning of battle with the onset of night, the troops could return to camp, eat, drink and relax before getting some sleep. See in particular 24.38.4; 25.9.8; 24.38.4.

<sup>49</sup> Livy, 23.22.11.

<sup>50</sup> See Appendix 1.

with Publius Scipio meeting Indibilis in battle.<sup>51</sup> What does seem conventional was for battles to be abandoned with the onset of night.<sup>52</sup>

Livy's use of the night therefore aids in our ability to reconstruct Roman history and provide insight into Roman society and military practices. We also gain an understanding into how the night was perceived. However, Livy also has another use for these events. They are manipulated for his own moral lessons and agenda. It is the manner in which these characters act at night that provides for us an insight into these lessons and further understanding of whether nocturnal activity was considered acceptable or not. The difficulty in determining proper and improper use of the night is heightened in the figure of Hannibal. He was a complex figure, a non-Roman but also an astute commander. Associated with this complexity is the difficulty in determining how the Roman perceived Hannibal's activity seeing as it was both improper and proper. Did the Romans only consider Hannibal a foe of Rome, conducting improper military operations? Or was he regarded with ambiguity and an element of confusion because he used the night constructively? What we can foreshadow is that the subtleties of Hannibal's character are heightened in the night time setting, with the boundary between proper and improper conduct, and Roman and non-Roman behaviour becoming incredibly blurred.

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<sup>51</sup> Livy, 25.34.7, as discussed at page 15-16. The other anecdote worth mentioning occurs at 26.5.9, where Livy states that as a result of a lunar eclipse, non-combatants created an uproar through shouting and banging bronze to divert the attention of the opponents (*Proelium non solito modo clamore ac tumult est coeptum, sed ad alium virorum, equorum armorumque sonum disposita in muris Campanorum inbellis multitudo tantum cum aeris crepitus, quails in defectu lunae silent nocte cieri solet, edidit clamorem ut averteret etiam pugnantium animos*). This battle at Capua, although against traditional Roman practice, appears to have resulted from the need of the Romans to defend themselves against both the Capuans and Hannibal who had moved in with the plan to attack the Roman camp.

<sup>52</sup> See Appendix 1.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **Hannibal: The Paradoxical Punic**

There is a long literary tradition associated with the figure of Hannibal, yet our understanding of Hannibal as a character is both limited and complicated. The lack of ancient source material, particularly Carthaginian material, means that our understanding of Hannibal is obtained from Greek and Roman writers who have preserved some information about Hannibal in their work.<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, Hannibal was an enemy, so the depiction of Hannibal in sources is often tainted with bias. Nevertheless, we are fortunate to have the works of Livy and Polybius in particular, who provide valuable insight into Hannibal's character. We will explore the literary tradition of Hannibal in this chapter, which reveals a complicated and misunderstood figure.

The complexities of Hannibal's characterisation within Livy's work can possibly be further explained if we can understand how Livy depicted characters in the third decade. It has long been considered that Livy only presented one-dimensional characters, with his figures representative of stock qualities which were either admired or scorned. Dorey states that Livy ascribed to Romans stock virtues and to non-Roman generic vices, and therefore Livy's characters were not individuals per se.<sup>54</sup> However, the views of Burck and Pitcher refute this traditional view. Both these scholars suggest that Livy's depiction of character altered in the third decade. Burck suggests that prominent Roman figures in the third decade are depicted from the beginning as prudent and cautious, a view influenced by idealisation, but throughout the third decade figures are much more individualised.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, in Burck's opinion, individual figures are no longer assigned stock qualities, for

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<sup>53</sup> See Canter (1929) 564: "Carthage perished leaving no historian to tell her story; hence Hannibal in ancient times has had no sympathetic interpreter of his life and deeds."

<sup>54</sup> See Dorey in Walsh (1973) 3. Dorey 10, also states that Livy depicted 'types' rather than individuals, suppressing any details that conflicted with the pattern that he had in mind. Foulkes (1999) 72, shares the same sentiments as Dorey, as he states that Romans were woven into a tapestry of generally positive features within Livy's history. Also see Briscoe (1971) for a discussion of Livy's methods of collecting historical information and character portrayal for the first decade. Vasaly (2009) 256, suggests that characters in Livy's first decade are "one-dimensional," a viewpoint shared by Hellenga (1997) who believes that characters in the first decade are "black and white."

<sup>55</sup> Burck (1971) 31.



their depiction was more varied rather than conforming to an accepted, generic model.<sup>56</sup> Pitcher suggests that Livy's altered characterisation in the third decade can be explained by a growing Roman fascination in the development of character depiction. Pitcher explains that a new focus on paradoxical characters was introduced in Rome, where individuals were depicted as having both great virtues and great vices working in coexistence.<sup>57</sup> For our study of Hannibal, this new interest in paradoxical characterisation may help us explain both the varied literary tradition and why Hannibal's representation by Livy is complex and difficult to ascertain. Trying to understand how these varying depictions arose is important to our study, for once we know how Hannibal was represented, we can explore whether the same depiction occurs in reference to Hannibal's nocturnal military activity.

### ***The Negative Literary Tradition:***

In the opening lines of the third decade, Livy highlights that his focus will be an examination of Rome's contact with Hannibal during the Second Punic War:

*...bellum maxime omnium memorabile quae unquam gesta sint me  
scripturum, quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano  
gessere.*

...the war which I am going to describe was the most memorable of wars ever waged – the war, that is, which, under the leadership of Hannibal, the Carthaginians waged war with the Roman people.<sup>58</sup>

The negative depiction of Hannibal is immediately established. Livy claims that this 'memorable' war was instigated by the Carthaginians since they were the aggressors who

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<sup>56</sup> To suggest that Livy no longer includes idealistic representation of characters is a naïve assumption, but it is not inaccurate to suggest that his characters are more realistic than those of his first decade. Livy himself acknowledges and shows awareness that the stories surrounding Rome's foundation and early history are likely to be fictional, or at the very least embellished (*Preface*, 6-7). Characters of his third decade were chronologically closer in time to the collective memory of the Romans, with a better record of their exploits in existence. Livy is therefore able to use this information when developing his character portrayal. However, due to his aims of providing moralistic instruction, it is only natural to assume that his military 'heroes,' such as Scipio Africanus, will have exaggerated emphasis on their positive qualities, in order to highlight and emphasise his messages.

<sup>57</sup> Pitcher (2007) 106.

<sup>58</sup> Livy, 21.1.1.

attacked Rome and consequently provoked the Punic Wars. From the outset, the Carthaginians are depicted as a hostile people, contrary to how the Romans perceived themselves.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, by specifically drawing attention to Hannibal as the leader of the Carthaginians, Livy appears to associate the war with an individual. By doing so, Livy asserts from the beginning that Hannibal was hostile and a barbarian, choosing to openly attack and wage war on Rome, and leading the Carthaginians in their task to do so. Therefore, Livy explains that within the Roman psyche, the Carthaginian race was hostile, but this Roman view was created when the Carthaginian general and main antagonist, Hannibal, started the war.

We can conclude that the general depiction of Carthaginians was motivated and shaped by the figure of Hannibal. This conclusion is supported by Livy's initial character sketch of Hannibal, which portrays the Carthaginians as a race that was deceitful and loyal, whilst simultaneously highlighting Hannibal's unscrupulous vices:

*...inhumana crudelitas perfidia plus quam Punica, nihil veri nihil sancti...*

...his cruelty was inhuman, his perfidy worse than Punic [and] he had no regard for truth...<sup>60</sup>

In claiming that Hannibal's perfidy was worse than Punic, Livy infers that *perfidia* itself was considered to be a Carthaginian trait. It just so happens that Livy thought that Hannibal was more deceitful than what the Carthaginians were perceived to be. Livy again draws attention to Punic deceit when he describes the loyalty of Carthaginian deserters who trapped the Romans at Cannae, for he states the Carthaginians acted with *Punica fraus* (Punic deceit) when it was discovered that their deferment was false.<sup>61</sup> Livy here is highlighting that Carthaginians as a whole displayed traits which the Romans shunned

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<sup>59</sup> The Romans would have felt that Hannibal's invasion of Italy was unwarranted and was a personal attack upon their dominion. Although Romans similarly attacked other nations, the reason behind Roman activity was perceived as fundamentally different. Where Hannibal attacked out of arrogance, Rome invaded other areas through her imperialistic goal of extending Roman goodwill to other peoples and thus welcoming them into the Roman sphere.

<sup>60</sup> Livy, 21.4.9.

<sup>61</sup> Livy, 22.48.1.

within their own society. In other words, such qualities were synonymous with the non-Roman. It is for this reason that Carthaginians were depicted in a manner that distinguished them from Roman figures since they represented opposing Roman values. Gruen supports the claim that Romans viewed Carthaginians negatively, for he states that the “construct of *Punica fides* as the antithesis of all that Rome stood for could provide a valuable vehicle for projecting that desirable image, and would bring a reassurance of moral superiority.”<sup>62</sup> In Roman eyes, all Carthaginians were treacherous and deceptive, with the association of Carthaginians with perfidy a tool to highlight that the Romans viewed themselves to be superior. However, although Livy is clearly using the negative depiction of the Carthaginians as a tool within his moral agenda, this characterisation was not unique to the Roman historian. The depiction of the Carthaginian as deceitful was a Roman *topos*. Ancient writers such as Polybius, Cicero and Sallust all associated the Carthaginians with such vices.<sup>63</sup>

Livy uses and builds upon this *topos*. Hannibal represents all that the Romans loathed (and perhaps feared) about Carthage, and so the negative imagery was created, developed and sustained. The Carthaginians were despised, Hannibal was hated.<sup>64</sup> This should not surprise. Hannibal was arguably the greatest antagonist the Romans had encountered since he challenged and stretched Roman resources to the extent that Roman control of Italy was nearly overturned.<sup>65</sup> The strength of Hannibal as a military commander is attested for by the duration of his campaign within Italy, his ability to defeat the Romans in battle, but also his ability to recover and continue to threaten the Romans even after the Carthaginians themselves suffered military defeats.<sup>66</sup> It is for this reason that we can

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<sup>62</sup> Gruen (2011) 115.

<sup>63</sup> See Levene (2010) 217.

<sup>64</sup> Gruen (2011) 115, alludes to Roman disdain toward Hannibal by stating that “Hannibal was the bogeyman for generations of Roman children.”

<sup>65</sup> The Romans suffered various defeats, especially in the first stages of the war. Carthaginian victories included Trebia (218BCE), Trasimene (217BCE), and Cannae (216BCE). Cannae in particular was devastating for Rome. Polybius 3.118.5, explains that Roman pride and prestige was badly shaken following this defeat: “The Romans on their part owing to this defeat at once abandoned all hope of retaining their supremacy in Italy, and were in the greatest fear about their own safety and that of Rome, expecting Hannibal every moment to appear.” (Ῥωμαῖοί γε μὴν τὴν Ἰταλιωτῶν δυναστείαν παραχρῆμα διὰ τὴν ἥτταν ἀπεγνώκεισαν, ἐν μεγάλοις δὲ φόβοις καὶ κινδύνοις ἦσαν περὶ τε σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους, ὅσον οὕτω προσδοκῶντες ἤξειν αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀννίβαν).

<sup>66</sup> Such as following the siege of Capua and the destruction of the Carthaginian army in Sicily in 211BCE. Hannibal’s ability to continue to threaten Rome, despite such defeats, confirms that he was a commendable general who was incredibly successful.

understand why a hostile tradition has been preserved in our sources, including Livy: Hannibal seriously threatened Roman power, and succeeded in gaining the support of Italians to aid his cause. Furthermore, in the character sketch provided of Hannibal, Livy suggests that it was due to his cruelty and deceitfulness that Hannibal was able to challenge the Romans for as long as he did.<sup>67</sup>

For Leigh, the hostile depiction of Hannibal is directly associated with his military activity and the manner in which the Romans interpreted such actions. It cannot be denied that Hannibal was incredibly successful throughout his Italian campaigns, for he was capable of beating his Roman adversaries and inflicting grievous defeats upon the state. However, from a Roman perspective, such activity would have stimulated decreased morale as a result of such traumatic defeats.<sup>68</sup> That Hannibal was a great general cannot be denied. For the Romans though, Hannibal's capabilities were overshadowed by what the Romans viewed to be 'dirty tactics,' with his expertise in trickery and deceit ensuring his repeated success. As summarised by Leigh, Hannibal was able to achieve victory through the use of "traps, snares and deceptions."<sup>69</sup> This is because ambushes were dependent upon concealment, cunning and deception. That Rome suffered all too much as a result of such manoeuvres was testament to Hannibal's mastery of such trickery. Leigh concludes that the attributing of the term *insidia* to Hannibal is motivated by both the literal meaning (trickery) as well as the figurative association of ambush.<sup>70</sup> Therefore, the negative depiction in Livy is in part motivated by how the Romans perceived his military activity.<sup>71</sup> Hannibal's actions contrasted with the values that Romans admired, especially of declaring war openly and standing one's ground in hand-to-hand combat.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> The reference to cruelty is also being used as a moral lesson by Livy, to demonstrate to the Romans the traits not to emulate, for such dishonesty and cruelty are not the ways in which to gain domination. Ultimately, such traits will not be successful; Hannibal was in the end defeated by the Romans and Carthage itself was captured and subjugated.

<sup>68</sup> See Leigh (2004) 45.

<sup>69</sup> Leigh (2004) 45.

<sup>70</sup> Leigh (2004) 47. Burck (1943) also accounts for the theme of *insidia* in Livy's account of Hannibal's victories (*non vidi*).

<sup>71</sup> Valerius Maximus (7.4) describes Hannibalic tactics in relation to the Roman defeat at Cannae. Valerius' account is reminiscent of that in Livy (22.1ff), and indeed encapsulates the general feeling on animosity ascribed to Hannibal within wider literature. Also see Cicero *Off.* 1.38, 1.108; *Inv.* 1.71-2.

<sup>72</sup> The proper and improper military conduct that Ennius explains again becomes pertinent. Hannibal's use of ambushes was not accepted by the Romans, for the tactics involved in the success of ambush had no place in Roman military tactics. Leigh (2004) 43, suggests that the Roman avoidance of ambush led the Romans to

### ***The Positive Literary Tradition:***

We have explored how Livy's initial character sketch depicts Hannibal, and the Carthaginians, in a negative fashion. However, what is often overlooked is that Livy actually outlines some of Hannibal's attributes before presenting his vices. Consider the following lines at the start of book 21:

*Itaque haud facile discerneres utrum imperatori an exercitui carior esset; neque Hasdrubal alium quemquam praeficere malle, ubi quid fortiter ac strenue agendum esset, neque milites alio duce plus confidere aut audere. Plurimum audaciae ad pericula capessenda, plurimum consilii inter ipsa pericula erat; nullo labore aut corpus fatigari aut animus vinci poterat...*

And so one could not readily have told whether he [Hannibal] was more dear to the general or the army. When any bold or difficult deed was to be done, there was no one whom Hasdrubal liked better to entrust it with, nor did any other leader inspire his men with greater confidence or daring. To reckless courage in incurring dangers he united the greatest judgement when in the midst of them. No toil could exhaust his body or overcome his spirit.<sup>73</sup>

Livy explains here that Hannibal was a charismatic leader with the ability to inspire his men. Foulkes agrees with Livy's inference, stating that the virtues draw attention to an individual who encompassed physical courage and indefatigability, tactical skill, dash and confidence.<sup>74</sup> This depiction is a complete contrast to the Hannibal that we have introduced and would expect. Livy provides no explanation as to why such attributes are mentioned, instead moving on to provide the more hostile character sketch already discussed. Burck suggests that in the first year of the war Livy ignores both the strategic and tactical genius of

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considerer themselves "ethically superior, not only in how they embark on war, but also in how they fight once engaged." It cannot be forgotten however, that the Romans did adopt the tactic of ambush, which they possible learnt from Hannibal himself, yet this created concern for the state. Polybius highlights this contradiction, for he takes a moral tone against ambush at 8.35.1, and further explains at 13.3.8 that the ambush had no place within the Roman repertoire. However, Polybius also celebrates when Roman generals adopted similar tactics, with Scipio Africanus being accredited as being Hannibal's equal (18.28.6-9).

<sup>73</sup> Livy, 21.4.3-6.

<sup>74</sup> Foulkes (1999) 71.

Hannibal: “he sees only *insidia*, *dolus*, and *fraus*, only inhuman cruelty, satisfaction of vengeance and greed for booty.”<sup>75</sup> This explanation, however, is not completely satisfactory. It would appear that more emphasis has been placed upon viewing Hannibal negatively and understanding so. Livy himself seems to be more concerned with presenting the adverse depiction of the Carthaginian general, yet Livy was clearly aware that an alternative view of Hannibal existed in Roman society. Even though he advances the hostile tradition, Livy’s ability to praise Hannibal’s qualities suggests that he did not wholeheartedly agree with the hostile accusations which were prevalent, or that the man and/or the tradition were more complex.

Livy’s praise and acknowledge of Hannibal’s merits occurs once again at book 28. Here Livy re-evaluates Hannibal’s depiction, for he is presented in a less hostile manner. Hannibal’s capabilities as a general are acknowledged by Livy, especially his success in keeping his men united, despite coming from varying fortunes, backgrounds and customs:

*Ac nescio an mirabilior adversis quam secundis rebus fuerit, quippe qui, cum in hostium terra per annos tredecim, tam procul ab domo, varia fortuna bellum gereret, exercitu non suo civili, sed mixto ex conlutione omnium gentium, quibus non lex, non, mos, non lingua communis, alius habitus, alia vestis, alia arma, alii ritus, alia sacra, alii prope dei essent, ita quodam uno vincula copulaverit eos et nulla nec inter ipsos nec adversus ducem seditio exstiterit...*

And I am inclined to think he was more marvellous in adversity than in success. For here he was, carrying in war in the enemy’s land for thirteen years, so far from home with varying fortune, having an army not made up of his own citizens but a mixture of the offscourings of all nations, men who had in common no law, no custom, no language, differing from each other in bearing, in garb, in their arms, differing as to religious rites, sacred observances, one might also say as to their gods. Yet he somehow bound

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<sup>75</sup> Burck (1971) 32.

them together by a single bond, so that no outbreak ensued among the men themselves nor any mutiny against their general.<sup>76</sup>

The praise directed towards Hannibal's character is undeniable. Livy is clearly and directly outlining Hannibal's success as a general. This in itself is interesting. In order to account for Hannibal's success, Livy is describing 'Hannibal the General,' not 'Hannibal the Carthaginian.' It could be suggested that Livy develops his depiction of Hannibal as a means to build up his image and in turn make the glory of Rome, and her ultimate survival, all the greater. Nevertheless, Livy presents the General as possessing superior leadership skills, which in turn gains him the support and respect of his men. This supports the praise Livy directs toward Hannibal at book 21. As summarised by Burck, Livy presents Hannibal as a man who had "magnitude of his authority in dealing with the great variety of men under his command and also his constant greatness in adversity."<sup>77</sup> When compared to the negative character sketch at book 21, Livy appears to offer conflicting views on the manner in which Hannibal was to be viewed, especially within the historians' own work. Livy's varied portrayal of Hannibal, then, is evidence of the complexities associated with Hannibal's character.

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<sup>76</sup> Livy, 28.12.2-5. However, Livy is not the only ancient who describes Hannibal in this fashion, suggesting that an accepted characterisation of Hannibal as an astute commander was already in circulation. This is especially true of Polybius, whose tribute to Hannibal in a fragment at 9.11.1-5 is reminiscent of Livy's own praise: "No one can withhold admiration for Hannibal's generalship, courage, and power in the field, who considers the length of this period, and carefully reflects on the major and minor battles, on the sieges he undertook, on defections from the cities from one side to the other, on the difficulties that at times faced him, and in a word on the whole scope of his design and execution, a design in the pursuit of which, having constantly fought the Romans for sixteen years, he never broke up his forces and dismissed them from the field, but holding them together under his personal command, like a good ship's captain, kept such a large army free from the sedition toward him or among themselves, and this although his regiments were not only of different nationalities but of different races. For he had with him Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, and Greeks, peoples who neither in their laws, customs, or language, nor in any other respect had anything naturally in common. But nevertheless, the ability of their commander forced men so radically different to give ear to a single word of command and yield obedience to a single will." (Τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐπισημήναιτο τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις τάνδρος, βλέψας εἰς τὸ μῆκος τούτου τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ συνεπιστήσας αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τε τὰς καθόλου καὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μάχας καὶ πολιορκίας καὶ πόλεων μεταβολὰς καὶ περιστάσεις καιρῶν, ἐπὶ τε τὴν περιοχὴν τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς καὶ πράξεως, ἐν ᾗ συνεχῶς Ἀννίβας ἑκαταίδεκα πολέμησας ἔτη Ῥωμαίοις κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν οὐδέποτε διέλυσε τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκ τῶν ὑπαίθρων, ἀλλὰ συνέχων ὑφ' αὐτόν, ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς κυβερνήτης, ἀστασίαστα διετήρησε τοσαῦτα πλήθη καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, καίπερ οὐχ οἷον ὁμοεθνέσιν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁμοφύλοις χρησάμενος στρατοπέδοις. εἶχε γὰρ Λίβυας, Ἰβήρας, Λιγυστίνους, Κελτοὺς, Φοίνικας, Ἰταλοὺς, Ἑλληνας, οἷς οὐ νόμος, οὐκ ἔθος, οὐ λόγος, οὐχ ἕτερον οὐδὲν ἦν κοινὸν ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους. ἀλλ' ὅμως ἡ τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀγχίνοια τὰς τηλικαύτας καὶ τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ἐνὸς ἐποίει προστάγματος ἀκούειν καὶ μιᾷ πείθεσθαι γνώμῃ).

<sup>77</sup> Burck (1971) 22.

Inconsistencies in Hannibal's character are identifiable in Livy's depiction. This in itself is probably a reflection of the wider literary tradition. For us, the different views are both interesting and confusing, and they certainly highlight the complexities of Hannibal's character. We learn that Hannibal was praised for his capabilities and successes as a general, yet scorned for his vices and hostile tendencies.<sup>78</sup> Hoyos highlights the contradictory perception of Hannibal within the Roman world. First, Hoyos claims that "once they [the Romans] had driven their old enemy to suicide in 183, the Romans chose to remember him with tempered but genuine admiration, a compliment they extended to his family."<sup>79</sup> Alternatively, Hoyos explains that "Hannibal's war was enshrined in the memory as a testing time for the Roman people and their victory as the warrant for world mastery."<sup>80</sup> The variance of Hannibal's character portrayal therefore become evident when we examine the literary traditions surrounding Hannibal's depiction.

### ***Hannibal and the Night: Nefarious or Literary?***

Our understanding of Hannibal's character is largely formulated by Livy's anecdotes pertaining to Hannibal's military activity.<sup>81</sup> It can even be suggested that Livy chose to focus on examining Hannibal's military capabilities as a way to highlight the complexities of his character, for his decisions and actions were both commendable and ignoble. This suggests that Livy deliberately constructed his depiction of Hannibal in this way. Our focus is to determine whether Livy's varied and complex characterisation continues when we take the setting of the night into consideration, or whether the night reveals another dimension to Hannibal's character.

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<sup>78</sup> See Gruen (2011) 115ff, who explore the origins of the term *Punica fides*. Gruen states that the image of the Carthaginians needs to be re-explored, being subject to ambiguity and complexity rather than constant slander. In Gruen's opinion, much of this ambiguity stems from an alteration in how Carthage were viewed following the destruction of Carthage in 146BCE, in which the concept of Punic perfidy emerged. With consideration of Gruen's view, we can surmise that Livy's own writing accounts for this development in depiction, incorporating various perspectives which may have gradually become more scathing, especially seeing as the Carthaginians no longer existed as an entity to challenge the construct.

<sup>79</sup> Hoyos (2003) 4.

<sup>80</sup> Hoyos (2004) 4.

<sup>81</sup> Canter (1929) 565, states that "the detached facts and anecdotes that we read of him [Hannibal] nearly all have to do with military operations."



An investigation into when Hannibal was militarily active reveals that a vast proportion of Hannibal's operations occurred at night.<sup>82</sup> If we consider the negative literary tradition in association with the negative perception of 'the night,' this setting makes sense. The dangers, confusion and improper military activity that Roman society associated with night time heightens the hostile tradition, with the vices of *temeritas*, *superbia*, *lascivia* and *Punic fraus* enhanced by the imagery. However, there are numerous examples which suggest that Hannibal's use of 'the night' was not merely nefarious, with the cover of night at times being used for strategic manoeuvres. A prime example of such nocturnal activity is seen in the Carthaginian's tendency to order troop withdrawal under the cover of darkness.<sup>83</sup> In such instances, Hannibal was operating based on necessity, demonstrating his astuteness as a military commander and his ability to interpret the dangers of the present situation, using the opportunities that darkness provided to shield his activities. The use of the night in this manner is reminiscent of Gnaeus Scipio's tactics, who similarly exploited the cover of darkness to retreat.<sup>84</sup> Nevertheless, it is possible that the Romans interpreted Hannibal's night time withdrawal in an alternative light. The cover provided by the night allowed Hannibal to retreat secretly, being a tool to aid in, what the Romans considered to be, Hannibal's trickery and deception. However, from a military perspective, such tactics were wise and demonstrative of Hannibal's thoughtfulness and foresight.

We have previously described how the Romans utilised the night for various strategic manoeuvres.<sup>85</sup> Similarly, there are numerous anecdotes within Livy's history that describe a Carthaginian tendency to conduct positional changes under the cover of darkness,<sup>86</sup> to march throughout the night<sup>87</sup> and even to pitch camp.<sup>88</sup> The correlation between Roman and Carthaginian use of the night for military related operations suggests that such activity was an accepted aspect of military conduct and a very real part of ancient warfare practices. Gnaeus Scipio's use of the night, for example, was praised by Livy, with

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<sup>82</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>83</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>84</sup> Refer to page 15-16.

<sup>85</sup> Refer to page 21.

<sup>86</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>87</sup> See Appendix 1.

<sup>88</sup> See Appendix 1.

the Roman general receiving recognition for his actions.<sup>89</sup> That the Romans viewed such Carthaginian activity with such a hostile outlook most certainly arose from Hannibal's ability to carry out his actions successfully, which thereafter provided a tactical advantage. The fact remains, however, that such practices did not serve a nefarious purpose. Livy was merely recounting historical fact and military activity, confirmed by the Roman tendency to also carry out such acts.

The night time setting, therefore, intensifies the complexities associated with examining Hannibal's character, with his nocturnal activities having both positive and negative overtones. Despite this observation, the hostile representation within Livy's work is more prevalent. Since Livy manipulated events and settings to express his moral lessons, Hannibal's night time activity allows Livy to cast him in the framework of the initial negative character sketch. By undertaking a case study of Hannibal in relation to his supposed vices in turn, with specific focus on his nocturnal operations, we can investigate why the Romans considered Hannibal in this manner. The issue, however, becomes incredibly complex, due to the knowledge that Hannibal himself was depicted as a complicated character, but also the knowledge that the Romans themselves conducted night time military activity. The issue then centres around not how Hannibal himself was viewed, but how his military actions were interpreted and received within Roman society. The extent to which the Romans could identify with Hannibal's actions determined the manner in which he was represented. In turn, through analysing Hannibal's reception within the Roman world, our understanding of how the Romans perceived Hannibal within Roman society will be developed, whilst simultaneously highlighting Roman views on ethical conduct and military *virtus*, and how society perceived the night.

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<sup>89</sup> Refer to page 15.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **Livy's Characterisation of Hannibal**

Livy develops and portrays the character of Hannibal in a complex way. The paradoxical representation of the Carthaginian general is especially evident when anecdotes pertaining to Hannibal's nocturnal activity are considered. In analysing these anecdotes, it is clear that at times Livy blatantly adheres to tradition, painting Hannibal in a negative fashion and thus expanding upon the hostile character sketch provided at book 21. However, the analysis of such anecdotes is also open to alternative interpretations. We need, for example, to balance the negative depictions with Hannibal's astuteness and capabilities as a good general. By analysing Livy's complex depiction of Hannibal through nocturnal military activity, we gain an insight into how the Romans viewed and perceived Hannibal's nocturnal military activity. As a result, we learn that Hannibal was considered as both a hostile foe and a successful military general who was comparable to the Roman leaders of old. The difference between these views is at times difficult to determine, further highlighting the complexities of Hannibal's character. The complexities associated with determining such character development can be seen through a systematic analysis of some of the traits which Livy ascribed to the Carthaginian leader, with consideration of a nocturnal military setting.

#### ***The Perfidious General vs Heedful Hannibal***

We can both understand and appreciate Hannibal's 'improper' military tactics if we consider Hannibal's actions from a Roman perspective. For the Romans, Hannibal's ability to use the 'dirty tactics,' which comprised of traps, snares and deceptions, only confirmed the view of Hannibal as a barbarian and very un-Roman.<sup>90</sup> Hannibal's use of tactics, which rebuffed tradition and were not synonymous with Roman military *virtus*, meant that he was regarded with contempt. The *Punica fraus* that was ascribed to the Carthaginian leader is enhanced by Livy through the addition of night time anecdotes, which provide insight into Hannibalic deceitfulness. Yet, as we will see, this interpretation is too simplistic.

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<sup>90</sup> See Leigh (2004) and Foulkes (1999). Note also comments on page 28 above.

### Hannibal, fire and nocturnal operations:

On initial assessment, the correlation between the night, military action and trickery is evident. A prime example of this association can be seen when Hannibal decided that the best strategy for Carthaginian success was to take the mountains of Formiae and cross the ridge of Callicula:

*...ludibrium oculorum specie terribile ad frustrandum hostem commentus, principio noctis furtim succedere ad montes statuit. Fallacis consilii talis apparatus fuit: faces undique ex agris collectae fascisque virgarum atque aridi sarmenti praelingantur cornibus boum, quos domitos indomitosque multos inter ceteram agrestem praedam agebat. Ad duo milia ferme boum effecta, Hasdrubalique negotium datum ut nocte id armentum accensis cornibus ad montes ageret, maxime, si posset, super saltus ab hoste insessos.*

...he [Hannibal] resolved to approach the mountains under cover of darkness in the early of the night, after first contriving a terrifying exhibition, to fool the enemy's eyes. Preparations for the ruse were made as follows. Pine-knots, collected from all the country round, and bundles of twigs and dry branches were tied to the horns of the cattle, of which – counting those that were broken in and those that were not – they possessed, among their other rustic spoils, a considerable number. Of these they got together about two thousand head, and Hasdrubal was commissioned to drive this heard in the night, with their horns ablaze, on to the mountains, and particularly – if it should be feasible – above the pass held by the enemy.<sup>91</sup>

Livy emphasises Hannibal's deception here. Hannibal specifically chose the night time setting to carry out his operations. He purposefully used the cover of darkness to keep his intentions and actions undetectable by the Romans. It does need to be noted that Livy is not placing emphasis on the decision to retreat at night, for we know that night time withdrawal was a military tactic shared and appreciated by both Romans and Carthaginians alike.<sup>92</sup> The

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<sup>91</sup> Livy, 22.16.6-8. The same account occurs in Polybius at 3.93-4.

<sup>92</sup> Refer to page 21 and 33.

disapproval, it would seem, was directed towards the “terrifying exhibition” contrived with the sole aim to “fool the enemy’s eyes.” Hannibal’s deception manifests into a new level of trickery, for he adopted a secondary ruse in conjunction with the night time setting. As a result of setting the horns of the beasts ablaze, Hannibal was able to manipulate the Romans into thinking that they were surrounded and under attack. The plan itself was successful, for the beasts, on becoming scared by the fire, panicked and set all the bushes surrounding the Roman position ablaze, which the Romans perceived as a Carthaginian ambush. In the meanwhile, Hannibal was able to move his entire army through the pass and pitch camp in the district of Allifae.<sup>93</sup> Similarly, Hannibal’s use of the night to deceive is expressed at another point. Livy explains that Hannibal left a fire burning to conceal his retreat, and he left tents to create the illusion of a pitched camp.<sup>94</sup> In reality, this was merely a ploy used to fool the Romans and serve as a distraction. In this instance, Hannibal’s retreat depended upon good planning and Roman gullibility that they would believe the artifice. As the course of the campaign continues, Livy presents Hannibal’s ruses as more elaborate in their deceptiveness, with the illusion of the simple camp fire aided by the addition of tents,<sup>95</sup> and further with the presence of a few men.<sup>96</sup>

From a Roman perspective, then, simple night time withdrawals were morphing into what were perceived to be ambushes, with deceit, trickery, snares and traps central to the success of these operations. This is especially true in regards to Hannibal’s retreat over the

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<sup>93</sup> Livy, 22.17.1-7.

<sup>94</sup> Livy, 22.41.9: “He [Hannibal] had left a large number of fires burning, as though he had sought by means of his illusory appearance of an encampment to hold the consuls to their positions...till he could gain as long a start as possible in his retreat.” (*Crebri relictis in castris ignes, ut fides fieret, dum ipse longius spatium fuga praeciperet, false imagine castorum...tenere in locis consules voluisse*). Although there is no direct mention of tents in this quote, Livy had explained at 22.41.7 that Hannibal had led his men from the camp, with his men carrying nothing but their weapons. This implies that the whole camp, including the tents, was left in place to help create the illusion of a Carthaginian encampment.

<sup>95</sup> Livy, 22.43.6: “He [Hannibal] set out in the night, after making up some fires, as before, and leaving a few tents standing where they would be seen, so that the Romans might be withheld from following him through the fear of ambush.” (*Profectus est nocte ignibus similiter factis tabernaculisque paucis in speciem relictis, ut insidiarum par priori metus contineret Romanos*).

<sup>96</sup> Livy, 27.42.10: “...at the third watch Hannibal set out, leaving numerous fires and tents in that part of the camp which faced the enemy, also a few Numidians to show themselves on the earthwork and at the gates; and he pushed on toward Apulia.” (*...Hannibal tertia vigilia crebris ignibus tabernaculisque, quae pars castorum ad hostes vergebat, et Numidis paucis qui in vallo portisque se ostenderent relictis, profectus Apuliam petere intendit*).

mountain pass.<sup>97</sup> For the Romans, Hannibal's use of the night confirmed the Roman societal perception that night could be a time of danger, with the darkness bringing confusion and uncertainty, and ultimately synonymous with the 'other;' Hannibal's mastery of the night and his surroundings highlighted to the Romans the dangers associated with Hannibal's nocturnal operations.

In Livy's characterisation of Hannibal, the issue of 'proper' and 'improper' use of the night is significant. Livy does not criticise Hannibal's tactics, or his use of the night. What Livy does draw attention to is Hannibal's decision to manipulate the night, using the darkness to both conceal and allow alternative activities to occur. It is this manipulation that Livy considers improper. Hannibal's use of illusion and elaborate guises supports the *Punica fraus* traditionally ascribed to the Carthaginians. Additionally, it is perhaps not untoward to suggest that the Romans viewed Hannibal's actions as cowardly, retreating at night in secrecy. Regardless, Hannibal's use of the night is taken to a new extreme with the illusion of fire elaborated upon and used as a distraction for the actual military tactics. As a result, Hannibal's deceit is once again morphed and altered. Hannibal's nocturnal activities were therefore considered as improper, for such an elaborate deceit was 'un-Roman' and unacceptable. As such, the claim of Hannibal as being the antithesis of the aristocratic Roman is justified.

From a military perspective, however, Hannibal's tactics were clever. His actions at the mountains of Formiae in particular, are testament to this. As a commander, he had clearly recognised the advantages that night presented to allow his escape, for the passage over the mountains would have been fruitless without the concealment that night provided. Evidently, concealment alone was not enough and thus an elaborate plan was conceived, with the intention to divert Roman attention and ensure the safe retreat of his men. Whether such tactics reflect military reality or not is unknown. Nevertheless, Livy is clearly making comment on Hannibal's deception here, with the implication that the night was a construct to enhance the elaborate nature of the ruse; the plan itself would have failed if it

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<sup>97</sup> Fronda (2011) 245-6, suggests that through such tactics Hannibal appears to have been a master of deception, in which the image of "Hannibal-as-trickster fits the Roman stereotype of Carthaginian faithlessness."

were not for the cover provided by darkness. Hannibal's ability to master and employ such tactics allowed him to control the environment and use the night to his advantage. In doing so, he demonstrates his capabilities as a good general. Livy's praise of Hannibal's actions was probably in acknowledgement of Hannibal's cleverness and his use of the night in an advantageous manner. Additionally, Livy mentions later that Hannibal had to retreat out of necessity, for his men were threatening to defect to the enemy.<sup>98</sup> Hannibal was clearly presented with a dilemma within his camp, for the men's hunger resulted in the threat of defecting. Livy continues by stating that cold also played a factor, for Hannibal made the decision to move his quarters to Apulia where the climate was warmer, and where there would also be an earlier harvest.<sup>99</sup> In moving his entire quarters, the decision to retreat at night was a strategic move; with such a large body of men moving all at once, and with the intention of retreat and not battle, the night provided sufficient cover for Hannibal to undertake this task with reasonable safety.

Livy uses these anecdotes to explain that the night could be, and was, used constructively for military operations. In the above scenario 'the night' was an essential feature that ensured Hannibal's plan could work. Making use of night time ensured the safety of his men and demonstrates that he had the ability to adapt his military operations when needed. Moreover, the attempt itself indicates how Hannibal was aware of the attitude (moral) of his men, and how he was heedful of the need for decisive action. The success of this strategy is attested by Polybius, for shortly after Hannibal's departure to Apulia, and after securing the Roman granary at Cannae, Hannibal and his men engaged the Romans in battle and won.<sup>100</sup> The night, then, does not have any connotations of negativity

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<sup>98</sup> Livy, 22.42.3-4: "For the men, with murmurs at first and afterwards with loud clamours, demanded their arrears of pay, and complained at first of the scarcity of corn, and finally of being starved; and the report went around that the mercenaries – particularly those of Spanish blood - had resolved on going over to the enemy." (*Nam cum initio fremitus, deinde aperta vociferation fuisset exposcentium stipendium debitum querentiumque annonam primo, postremo famem; et mercennarios milites, maxime Hispani generis, de transitione cepisse consilium fama esset*).

<sup>99</sup> Livy, 22.42.5: "Such being the projects that were entertained in camp and such the temper of his soldiers, he decided to move from his present quarters to Apulia, where the climate was warmer and in consequence of this the harvest earlier; at the same time it would be the more difficult, the greater their distance from the enemy, for those of his followers who were fickle to desert." (*Cum haec consilia atque hic habitus animorum esset in castris, movere inde statuit in caldiora atque eo maturiora messibus Apuliae loca, simul quod, quo longius ab hoste recessisset transfugia impeditiora levibus ingeniis essent*).

<sup>100</sup> See Polybius, 3.107-117 for a detailed account of the battle at Cannae. Also see Daly (2002) for an extensive insight into details of the battle at Cannae.

when considered within this context. The night was merely a setting in which a strategic action was undertaken.

The complexities of characterisation in association with analysing nocturnal military activity is further evident in the actions of Hasdrubal. Hasdrubal was one of Hannibal's generals, who also exhibited the traits that the Romans disapproved of, further supporting the Roman perception of Carthaginian *fraus*. According to Livy, while encamped near the Black Rocks, Hasdrubal devises of a plan in which the Carthaginians can escape, despite the fact that they are engaged in a conference with the Romans:

*...extemplo primus tenebris atque inde tota nocte quod gravissimum exercitus erat Hasdrubal quacumque posset evadere e saltu iussit. Data sedulo opera est ne multi ea nocte exirent, ut ipsa paucitas cum ad hostem silentio fallendum aptior, tum ad evadendum per artas semitas ac difficilis esset...Addita insequens nox spatium dedit et alios emittendi...*

...Hasdrubal at once gave orders that at dusk and then all through the night the heaviest troops should escape from the pass by any possible way. Great pains were taken not to have many leave that night, that even their small numbers might be better suited both to escaping the enemy's notice by silence and to making their way out by narrow and difficult paths...The addition of the following night gave them time to send out others as well...<sup>101</sup>

Just as Hannibal utilised the illusion of fire to manipulate and deceive, Hasdrubal exploited the cover provided by darkness. Hasdrubal selected a few men each night to escape the pass, creating the illusion that all was well. As a result, the Carthaginians were able to escape undetected by the Romans. Livy, then, links 'the night' with Carthaginian military operations. Based on this fact, we can assume that Livy uses the night as a literary feature, manipulating the association of danger and uncertainty with Carthaginian nocturnal activities. This is made explicitly clear when Livy describes the Roman response after

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<sup>101</sup> Livy, 26.17.7-11.



discovering the abandoned Carthaginian camp; Claudius was able to recognise the *Punicam fraudem* and that he had been tricked.<sup>102</sup>

The association between Punic deceit, trickery and the night is unavoidable. Livy is elaborating upon the image of the Carthaginians presenting characteristics that were in contrast with those of the Romans. In reality however, Hasdrubal, similar to Hannibal, demonstrates his astuteness and capabilities as a commander. Hasdrubal successfully controls the environment by utilising the darkness, rather than allowing 'the night' to hinder him. Livy here demonstrates the complexities of his themes and his narrative; both interpretations of Hasdrubal's activity are credible and occur simultaneously. In sort, Hasdrubal's activity reflects both reality and literary embellishment. Consider how the night was central to Carthaginian military strategy, with the concealment and darkness that night provided utilised for Carthaginian advancement. Alternatively, Livy exploits societal perceptions of darkness to advance his own agenda. By playing on the association of night with connotations of secrecy and danger, Livy uses this anecdote to emphasise a difference between Roman and Carthaginian military conduct. This interpretation is relatively straightforward, but there is, however, more to the account. Livy later provides evidence of Romans using fire to aid their nocturnal operations, a tactic especially associated with the Roman general, Scipio Africanus.

#### Scipio, fire and nocturnal operations:

The use of the fire at night as part of military operations makes sense, as it can give a tactical advantage. It should not surprise, therefore, that Livy records how the Romans used the ruse of a fire in order to aid in their tactics. In fact, it would appear that the use of fire within nocturnal military operations was an antiquated Roman convention, a tradition that existed before Roman contact with Hannibal. In 322 BCE, Aulus Cornelius Arvina used fire to help move his legions in secret, an attempt to avoid an unexpected battle with the Samnites.<sup>103</sup> In the third decade, Scipio Africanus was one such Roman to include fire as a

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<sup>102</sup> Livy, 26.27.15: *Tum demum Claudius Punicam fraudem adgnosces, ut se dolo captum sensit...*

<sup>103</sup> See Livy 8.38.3-4: "Night was now drawing on...The dictator saw that the battle was coming sooner than he had anticipated, and feared that the courage of his men would be affected by their cramped position. So, leaving behind him numerous fires to deceive the enemy, he silently led the legions out." (*Nox iam*

strategy, evident in his besieging of Utica in 203BC where Hannibal and King Syphax were encamped. After first re-telling how Masinissa first noticed the fire in Syphax's camp, Livy accounts for how the Carthaginians also fell for the ruse created by the fire:

*Relucentum flammam primo vigils Carthaginensium, deinde excitati alii nocturne tumult cum conspexissent, ab eodem errore credere et ipsi sua sponte incendium ortum; et clamor inter caedem et volnera sublatus an ex trepidatione nocturna esset confuses sensum veri adimebat. Igitur pro se quisque inermes, ut quibus nihil hostile suspectum esset, omnibus portis, qua cuique proximum erat, ea modo quae restinguendo igni forent portantes, in agmen Romanum ruebant.*

When the light of the fire had been seen, first by the Carthaginian sentries and then by others whom the uproar in the night had aroused, they likewise made the same mistake in believing the fire to be spontaneous. And outcries raised in the midst of slaughter and wounds made men unable to grasp the real situation, being half-inclined to think it due to a disturbance in the night. Accordingly, having no suspicion of any attack, they outdid one another in dashing out of all the gates unarmed, each taking the nearest way, carrying only what would be of use to extinguish the fire, and suddenly encountered the Roman column.<sup>104</sup>

Scipio's use of fire as a strategic ploy is undeniable, for the fire was lit intentionally in order to entice the inhabitants of the Carthaginian camp out of the gates to douse the flames. However, Scipio's use of fire differs from that of Hannibal, although the concept of deceit is still applicable; where Hannibal used fire as an illusion of encampment to aid his departure, Scipio used fire as a way to create panic and alarm in an attempt to enter the enemy's camp in a surprise night attack. Although he possibly learnt such tactics from Hannibal, Livy shows that Scipio developed Hannibal's initial trick, using the distraction of fire in a more elaborate

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*appetebat...Dictator ubi propiore spe dimicationem vidit, ne militum virtuti damno locus esset, ignibus crebris relictis, qui conspectum hostium frustrarentur, silentio legiones educit).*

<sup>104</sup> Livy, 30.6.1-2.

manner. The setting of the night aids in the elaborate nature of this tactic, with the darkness concealing Scipio's troops and allowing for the surprise attack. Furthermore, the timing of Scipio's attack is reminiscent of the circumstances in place when Hasdrubal withdrew his troops from the Black Rocks; Scipio too, like Hasdrubal, was in the process of negotiating peace with Hannibal when he decided to light the fire and then attack.<sup>105</sup>

Our perception of this strategy, then, needs to be re-considered. While on the one hand the use of fire can be interpreted as supporting the claim of Carthaginian deceptiveness, the Romans also adopted such tactics, and even developed the ruse. The progress from the fire as merely a distraction into a military tool develops our understanding that the night time setting allows perceptions and realities to be altered. Scipio's actions are demonstrative of this alteration, for he was able to exploit the atmosphere of panic in order to gain a military advantage through tricking the Carthaginians. Livy's decision to create a parallel between Hannibal's and Scipio Africanus' adoption of fire as nocturnal military tactic is therefore significant. Livy praises Scipio for his military action, with his stratagem bringing success to the Roman war effort. Hannibal, however, although he used the same tactic, and possibly even introduced it to the Punic Wars, is depicted by Livy in a very ambiguous way. Livy praises Hannibal's actions, however there is also a focus on Hannibal's conduct as being improper, possibly motivated by his ability to beat the Romans in a military context. For the Romans, there was a fundamental difference between Scipio's and Hannibal's nocturnal actions: Scipio used the ruse of fire merely to attack, yet Hannibal took advantage of the deception that was created in order to retreat. This distinction is significant, for the Romans viewed Hannibal's actions as a means to conceal his activity, and as such his *Punica fraus* was enhanced.<sup>106</sup> Therefore, Scipio's motives behind the use of fire were fundamentally different to those of Hannibal. As such, Livy presents Hannibal's nocturnal military actions as opposing Roman tradition. Furthermore, Livy uses the opportunity to make comment on the ethical nature of

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<sup>105</sup> Livy, 30.4.1-12.

<sup>106</sup> When such actions are considered in parallel, however, the differences are not as distinct. Although the Romans would have viewed Hannibal's actions in a negative light, the Carthaginians themselves would have held Scipio's own actions with animosity – as to be expected. Whereas the Romans interpreted Hannibal's actions as deceitful and synonymous with the trickster, Scipio's own actions smack of the same overtones: the fire was merely a trick, a deceptive tool created by the Roman to allow his attack to be successful.

Hannibal's actions, whilst simultaneously highlighting that he was 'other' because his actions were adverse to Roman practices.

#### Re-Evaluating Hannibalic deceit:

The complexities associated with determining Livy's own view of Hannibal's supposed deceit is heightened when we consider an anecdote praising Hannibal's use of the night. When Hannibal abandoned his camp in 216BC, Livy pens that the Romans were amazed at Hannibal's skill in retreating, which was undetected by the Romans:

*Ubi inluxit, subductae primo stationes, deinde propius adeuntibus insolitum silentium admirationem fecit.*

When day came, first the fact the outposts had been withdrawn, and afterwards – as they came nearer – the unwonted silence filled the Romans with amazement.<sup>107</sup>

Livy's use of the word *admiratio* is significant as it demonstrates that the Romans were impressed by Hannibal's tactical manoeuvre, allowing him to retreat undetected. In doing so, Hannibal again demonstrates his control of the environment, mastering the opportunities that night provided for his war effort and specific strategies. Furthermore, Livy implies that the Romans respected Hannibal's night time withdrawal, for they recognised, appreciated and accepted the use of the night as a time to retreat, as well as acknowledging the skills needed to successfully carry out an undetectable withdrawal. Livy's use of *admiratio* also suggests that Hannibal's actions were miraculous and unbelievable, inferring that the Romans considered Hannibal's withdrawal to be spectacular yet also bewildering. Livy, then, indirectly praises Hannibal's military action and stratagem, for he uses the night constructively and in a controlled manner. The fact that Livy allows his Roman characters to praise and recognise Hannibal's tactical prowess suggests that the traditional hostile view directed towards the Carthaginian general was altering in the first century BCE,

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<sup>107</sup> Livy, 22.42.1.

at the time of Livy's writing.<sup>108</sup> Livy therefore challenges and develops the character of Hannibal, giving him credit and acknowledgment for his strategic achievements through his undeniable praise of Hannibal's military prowess. Such recognition suggests that the Romans at time respected and even admired Hannibal's military abilities, which negates the traditional conception of Romans only viewing the Carthaginian in a negative light. The Romans were also able to recognise the parallels between their own practices, especially nocturnal ones, to those of Hannibal.<sup>109</sup>

Through such anecdotes it would appear that Livy was conflicted on how to interpret Hannibal's actions, and thus a complicated representation of the Carthaginian general is presented. On the one hand, Livy scorns and criticises Hannibal's actions, yet he praises Hannibal's use of skills known to be effective within Rome's own military history. Livy therefore acknowledges that although carrying out such tactics at night was considered to be unique to his antagonist's strategies, it was in fact adopted by both armies. As a result, we can infer that the use of the night was a universal military tactic, rather than being attributed to and adhering to tactics determined by ethnic distinction. In part, Livy was able to praise Hannibal's military prowess since he had the knowledge of hindsight. Rome was the ultimate victor of the Punic Wars, with Scipio Rome's hero, and thus Livy had the ability to praise and acknowledge Hannibal's capabilities as a commander. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Livy presents a sympathetic view towards Hannibal, recognising that Hannibal's nocturnal tactics recalled those adopted by the Romans, with similar success also awarded to the Carthaginians. Livy, therefore, could acknowledge and praise Hannibal's military astuteness as he emulated and utilised night time manoeuvres sanctioned by Roman tradition. Certainly Livy's presentation of Hannibal still retains some of the hostile undertones. Nevertheless, Hannibal's military practices were ultimately ethical and proper,

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<sup>108</sup> This altering Roman perspective is supported by Livy. On discovering the Carthaginian withdrawal, a Roman soldier concludes that Hannibal only acted in this manner on account of his trepidation (22.42.2: *fugam hostium adeo trepidam ut tabernaculis stantibus castra reliquerint*). We can conclude that Livy disagrees with this conclusion, for he specifically makes a point of highlighting how amazed the Romans were at his silent withdrawal, with connotations of praise evident in the term *admiratio*.

<sup>109</sup> This supports the argument by Gruen (2011) 137ff, that the charge of *Punica fides* needs to be re-evaluated. Hannibal's use of fire and the praise that it receives supports Gruen's conclusion: the Roman depiction of Carthaginians was ambivalent, and their appreciation of Carthaginian achievements helped to eclipse any nasty stereotypes.

demonstrating successful military stratagem and mastery of the night, wisely using the darkness and the concealment that it provided in order to advance his own efforts.

### ***The Callous Carthaginian vs The Genial General***

Included in Livy's initial character sketch of Hannibal is the reference to his *inhumana crudelitas*. According to Canter, this reference is "the chief and most venomous accusation against Hannibal."<sup>110</sup> The tendency for Hannibal's alleged cruelty to be emphasised has not gone unnoticed by other scholars. Walsh claims that a feature consistently attested for within Hannibalic discussions is 'Carthaginian cruelty.'<sup>111</sup> Similarly, Burck states that Hannibal adopted inhuman cruelty in the execution of his deceitful military operations.<sup>112</sup> There is one specific episode that clearly demonstrates Hannibal's cruelty. Hannibal learns that Dasius Altinius of Arpi was missing and realises that he had an opportunity to take possession of his property and sell it.<sup>113</sup> Livy states that:

*Ceterum ut irae magis quam avaritiae datum crederent homines,  
crudelitatem quoque aviditati addidit, coniugemque eius ac liberos in castra  
accitos, quaestione prius habita primum de fuga Altini, dein quantum auri  
argentique domi relictum esset, satis cognitis omnibus vivos combussit.*

But that men might believe he was yielding to anger rather than greed, he [Hannibal] added cruelty also to his avarice, that is, he summoned the wife and children to the camp, and, after investigating first the flight of Altinius, then how much gold and silver had been left in his house, now fully informed, he burnt them alive.<sup>114</sup>

Hannibal's decision to burn Altinius' family was undoubtedly cruel, fulfilling no specific purpose aside from satisfying his own malicious tendencies. Altinius' wife and children were

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<sup>110</sup> Canter (1929) 575. However, Canter believes that too much emphasis is placed upon Hannibal's cruelty, which will be discussed in due course.

<sup>111</sup> Walsh (1961) 104.

<sup>112</sup> Burck (1971) 33.

<sup>113</sup> Livy, 24.45.12-13.

<sup>114</sup> Livy, 24.45.13-14.

innocent bystanders who were victims of Carthaginian brutality. Even though this anecdote is not associated with Hannibalic night time activity, it is important for our understanding of how Livy developed Hannibal's characterisation and represented the Roman perception of the Carthaginian general. The Roman view of Hannibal as a cruel and barbaric foe was justified: the merciless burning of women and children was a heartless act. Livy conveys his own recognition of Hannibal's callousness most explicitly through the military tribune Publius Sempronius Tuditanus, who describes Hannibal as being *crudelissimo hoste* (the most cruel of foes).<sup>115</sup> Such animosity further develops our understanding of how the Roman's viewed the figure of Hannibal. The accusation of cruelty was another means for the Romans to distinguish themselves from their foes, for we know that *crudelitas* was not a Roman trait so therefore was synonymous with the 'other' by default. Livy must conform to the opinions of the state, and so depicts his antagonist accordingly. As a result, animosity was central to his depiction of Hannibal, who is cast as a malicious and barbaric general. What is therefore preserved for us is a Romano-centric viewpoint<sup>116</sup> of Hannibal, with the implication that Carthaginian success was not a result of military prowess but callous and barbarous acts.

The extent to which Livy himself believed the claim of Hannibal's callousness is debatable. On the one hand, Hannibal presented cruel tendencies, further demonstrative by his treatment of the people of Saguntum,<sup>117</sup> the Victimulae<sup>118</sup> and the Locrians.<sup>119</sup> In such anecdotes we would expect the night to be used in a way to reinforce Hannibal's alleged cruelty, and thus allow Livy to develop his own agenda, yet its absence is glaring. Such absence could suggest that Livy did not whole-heartedly agree with the charges against Hannibal, and thus the setting of the night was not need to enhance or develop Hannibal's supposed *crudelitas*. Alternatively, Livy could have considered that the setting of the night was not appropriate since the nuances of secrecy and concealment were invalid. We can assume that Livy recognised that cruelty and war accompanied one another, with the

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<sup>115</sup> Livy, 22.50.6.

<sup>116</sup> Term accredited to Foulkes (1999) 74.

<sup>117</sup> Livy, 21.13.3-4.

<sup>118</sup> Livy, 21.57.13-14.

<sup>119</sup> Livy, 24.1.1-13, as described at 29.8.6. Hannibal also orders the burning of Acerrae (23.17.6) and Locri (29.7.10), but these are evidently practices associated with military operations, which the Romans themselves are not adverse to conducting; they do wipe Carthage off the map after all.

understanding that cruelty was at times unavoidable. Canter suggests that it is expected that Hannibal sometimes exhibited cruel tendencies, for ancient warfare, and even modern warfare, was at times inhuman.<sup>120</sup> Thus, through reflecting military reality, Canter concludes that due to Hannibal acting according to the spirit of warfare “many of the charges of cruelty against Hannibal are calumnies pure and simple.”<sup>121</sup>

If Livy did believe the claims of Hannibalic cruelty to be both unjustified and unsupported, then he was not alone. Polybius also appeared to have noticed that the charges against Hannibal were mere invention, for he explains how the Romans credited Hannibal the traits associated with one Hannibal Monomachus in order to maintain their accusations of cruelty.<sup>122</sup> We can infer that the accusation of cruelty itself was a literary device, a farcical narrative included to serve an alternative purpose. This conclusion is

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<sup>120</sup> Canter (1929) 575. Fronda (2011) 249, agrees, stating that it served the Romans to portray Hannibal as exceptionally cruel, yet there is little to indicate that he behaved outside the harsh standard of the day. Polybius 9.16.23-29, also suggests that great leaders must adapt their conduct to the current situation, which at times requires occasional brutality. As such, Polybius dismisses those who accuse Hannibal of excessive cruelty and atrocities.

<sup>121</sup> See Canter (1929) 575. Evidence for Hannibal’s supposed cruelty is in Livy, 23.5.11-12: “A Carthaginian enemy, not even of African origin, is dragging after him from the farthest limits of the world, from the strait of Ocean and the Pillars of Hercules, soldiers who are unacquainted with any civilised laws and organisation and, one may almost add, language too. Ruthless and barbarous by nature and customs, these men have further been barbarized by the general himself, in making bridges and embankments of piled up human bodies, and by teaching them – horrible even to relate – to feed upon the bodies of men.” (*Poenis hostis, ne Africae quidem indigena, ab ultimis terrarum oris, freto Oceani Herculisque columnis, expertem omnis iuris et condicionis et linguae prope humanae militem trahit. Hunc natura et moribus inmitem ferumque insuper dux ipse effervit pontibus ac molibus ex humanorum corporum strue faciendis et, quod proloqui etiam piget, vesci corporibus humanis docendo*). These examples are clearly farcical and have been invented by the Romans to help justify the accusations of Hannibalic cruelty. This claim is supported by the fact that Livy puts the speech in the mouth of Varro, and states at 23.5.2 that the speech “increased the contempt of him [Hannibal]” among his audience. The accusations seem exaggerated, and Livy’s omission of any evidence make the claim implausible. Polybius too seems to discredit the claims.

<sup>122</sup> Polybius, 9.24.5-8: “It seems that the difficulty was more than once discussed in the Council, and that one of Hannibal’s friends, Hannibal surnamed Monomachus (gladiator), stated that he foresaw only one way by which it would be possible to reach Italy. When Hannibal asked him to explain himself, he said that he must teach his troops to eat human flesh and accustom them to this...Hannibal had nothing to say against the boldness and usefulness of this suggestion, but he could persuade neither himself nor his friends actually to entertain it. They say that the acts of cruelty in Italy of which Hannibal is accused were the work of this man, but in no less degree that of circumstances.” (τότε δοκεῖ καὶ πλεονάκις ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ περὶ τούτου τοῦ μέρους ἐμπιπτούσης ἀπορίας εἶς τῶν φίλων Ἀννίβας ὁ Μονομάχος ἐπικαλούμενος ἀποφύνασθαι γνώμην διότι μία τις ὁδὸς αὐτῷ προφαίνεται. δι’ ἧς ἐστὶν εἰς Ἱταλίαν ἐλθεῖν ἐφικτόν. τοῦ δ’ Ἀννίβου λέγειν κελεύσαντος, διδάξαι δεῖν ἔφη τὰς δυνάμεις ἀνθρωπο-ποφάγειν καὶ τούτῳ ποιῆσαι συνήθεις ..... Ἀννίβας δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ τόλμημα καὶ τὸ πρακτικὸν τῆς ἐπινοίας οὐδὲν ἀντειπεῖν ἐδυνήθη, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος λαβεῖν ἔννοιαν οὐθ’ αὐτὸν οὔτε τοὺς φίλους ἐδύνατο πείσαι. τούτου δὲ τάνδρὸς εἶναι φασὶν ἔργα καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἱταλίαν εἰς Ἀννίβαν ἀναφερόμενα περὶ τῆς ὀμότητος, οὐχ ἦττον δὲ καὶ τῶν περιστάσεων).



supported by a lack of evidence to support Livy's accusation of Hannibal's *inhumana crudelitas*, not only in association with the night,<sup>123</sup> but throughout the entirety of the *Ab Urbe Condita*. This is surprising, for we would assume that anecdotes referring to Hannibal's cruelty would be plentiful, especially because we know that the association between military action, brutality and ruthlessness appeared to be synonymous, with Livy further exploiting the understanding of the night as synonymous with the 'other.' Rather, it would appear that through the claim of Hannibalic cruelty, Livy was commenting on and highlighting the destructive nature of warfare and conflict, and the affects that such activity had on Italy. Livy was perhaps conveying moral instruction here, referring to the Civil Wars and events of his contemporary society which created both political and social ruin.<sup>124</sup> This could further explain why a night time setting was excluded from his anecdotes: Livy had no need to disguise or conceal callousness with a night time guise, for such acts were not secret to his readers who had witnessed the destruction associated with the realities of warfare within their own society.

Livy's complex and multi-level characterisation, especially of Hannibal, makes it challenging for us to interpret his methodology associated with such depictions.<sup>125</sup> This difficulty is heightened by Livy's presentation of Hannibal as a genial general, embodying the virtues that the Romans esteemed. Hannibal's night time operations reveal a figure more concerned with *moderatio*, rather than *crudelitas*. Hannibal was instead a general who embodied *clementia*, a trait deemed to be a traditional aristocratic value within Roman society. Hannibal first showed *moderatio* towards his Roman adversaries after the battle of Cannae in 216. Before nightfall, Hannibal sent ten representatives from his prisoners to Rome to negotiate terms for peace:

*Placuit suffragio ipsorum decem deligi qui Romam ad senatum irent, nec pignus aliud fidei quam ut iurarent se redituros acceptum. Missus cum his*

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<sup>123</sup> There are instances in which the Carthaginians will scale the walls of a citadel and slay the sleeping sentries (see Appendix 1), but it seems harsh to categorise such acts as 'cruel' when other peoples, such as the Romans, carry out the same practices, and ultimately such practices are a reality of warfare and cannot be avoided.

<sup>124</sup> See Moles (1993) and Burton (2008).

<sup>125</sup> Despite this fact, the ancient reader would have understood the references to the night, and the moral lessons that Livy conveys.

*Carthalo, nobilis Carthaginensis, qui, si forte ad pacem inclinare cerneret animos, condiciones ferret.*

It was resolved that the prisoners should themselves elect ten representatives to go to the Senate in Rome; nor did Hannibal take any other pledge of their good faith than their oath that they would return. Carthalo, a Carthaginian noble, was sent with them, so that, if he should see that the Romans inclined to peace, he might offer terms.<sup>126</sup>

Even though the term *clementia* is absent from the text, we can infer that Hannibal's actions towards the Romans did not conform to the supposed *crudelitas* that was ascribed to him, as he demonstrates moderation. Hannibal was lenient towards the Romans, for he allowed them to elect whom from among them should be the envoy representatives. Arguably, Hannibal demonstrates an element of cruelty since his request would humiliate his prisoners, but the point is that he did not kill them, he allowed them to live. By doing so, Hannibal effectively gave the Romans limited control over the situation, with the freedom to make their own decision, rather than Hannibal dictating the terms of the peace process. Furthermore, Hannibal demonstrates a high degree of trust in the Romans for although he made them swear an oath assuring him of their immediate return, he sent only one Carthaginian representative. The Romans therefore were not threatened with danger, with Hannibal relying on their word and ethical demeanour.<sup>127</sup> More importantly, however, it was Hannibal's decision to engage in peace discussions rather than march on Rome. Hannibal had just severely defeated the Romans at Cannae and could have easily exploited the current lack of morale which would have evidently been among the Roman camp. However, he refrains from such action, opting to take a diplomatic and peaceful approach. Because of the context of war, Hannibal's behaviour is confusing and difficult for us to interpret. We would assume that Hannibal would be eager to march on Rome and end the

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<sup>126</sup> Livy, 22.58.6-7.

<sup>127</sup> The Romans themselves upheld their oath, returning to Hannibal after being turned away by the Senate. The one official who did take the opportunity to return home in Rome was scouted out and returned to the Carthaginian camp. The Roman envoys, then, demonstrated that they trusted Hannibal, for they did not take the opportunity to hurt their Carthaginian companion, and they respected their oath and returned as stipulated.

war, but he does not. The reasons for this decision are unknown, but, with the knowledge of hindsight, we can conclude that this decision was Hannibal's biggest mistake. We can say that Hannibal was not acting with cruel tendencies, for his actions were not threatening. Hannibal himself states he does not desire to be malicious toward the Romans:

*...benigne adlocutus sine pretio dimisisset, Romanos quoque vocatos, quod nunquam alias antea, satis miti sermone adloquitur: non internecivum sibi esse cum Romanis bellum; de dignitate atque imperio certare.*

He then called up the Romans also and spoke to them with a mildness he had never shown before. He was waging, he said, no war of extermination with them, but was contending for honour and dominion.<sup>128</sup>

Again, Hannibal's decision not to march on Rome is surprising, for in doing so he could have ended the war and gained the dominion that he desired. Regardless, the importance of this anecdote is Hannibal's claim that he had no desire to 'exterminate' the Romans. Arguably, Livy is also passing judgement on Rome's policy nearly a century later, when Carthage is destroyed by Roman soldiers and many of the inhabitants killed. Livy, then, develops the depiction of Hannibal, showing him to be a general commanded by *moderatio* and *clementia*. In doing so, Livy comments on Hannibal's success (in general), for such traits were synonymous with the successful Roman commander. Livy uses the image of Hannibal to advance his own agenda, representing Hannibal as the paradigm of success and military *virtus* that the Romans themselves should prize themselves on. Hannibal's supposed *crudelitas* is unaccounted for, with Hannibal himself indicating that unjustifiable bloodshed was to be avoided. With the non-threatening release of the Roman envoys, combined with his declaration of not intending for the war to be a bloody affray, it is difficult for us to believe the allegations of cruelty, which appear to be poorly supported claims and therefore circumstantial. Canter would appear to support this view, stating that Hannibalic *crudelitas* was an unfair assumption especially "when imprisonment was the greatest severity shown by him [Hannibal] towards prisoners of war."<sup>129</sup> By interpretation, then, with the exception

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<sup>128</sup> Livy, 22.58.2.

<sup>129</sup> Canter (1929) 576.

of Hannibal's slaughter of Altinius' family, Hannibal only engaged in what could be deemed 'cruel' acts when he was presented with direct fighting in battle circumstances, for it was rare for him to slaughter any Romans unless in battle conditions.<sup>130</sup> This episode, then, encapsulates the complexities of Hannibal's character.

An understanding of this anecdote also provides insight into how Hannibal used the night-time setting to his advantage. Consider how the men departed the Carthaginian camp just before nightfall, suggesting that they intended to march throughout the night and to be received by the Senate on their arrival.<sup>131</sup> Hannibal (or Livy) appeared to have made a conscious decision to correlate the departure of the Roman envoys with the onset of night, taking advantage of the night with the hope that the darkness would provide a screen to ensure the safe and undetected arrival of his prisoners. Hannibal may have been genuinely concerned with the safety of the Romans, using the night as a strategic mechanism to aid a fast and unimpeded journey, as well as there being no indication at any stage that he intended to harm his prisoners. By portraying Hannibal in this manner, Livy effectively invalidates the accusation of cruelty that he ascribes to the general, for rather than killing the prisoners, Hannibal made the decision to send them back to Rome during the night. However, Livy may still be using the night here to represent Roman sentiments towards Hannibal's nocturnal military activity. Even though Hannibal himself did not demonstrate callousness, the night was used to conceal and disguise his actions. We know that the Romans perceived some of Hannibal's nocturnal activity as evidence of his deceit. Hannibal's concealment of his prisoners here could be interpreted as a further example of *Punica fraus*. Hannibal was using the cover of night due to the secrecy that darkness could represent, and thus his actions were sneaky and deceptive. Alternatively, the success of Hannibal's plans is further testament to his mastery and control of the environment, using the night to ensure the success of his actions and the safety of all those involved. Both interpretations of Hannibal's activity are valid, and are further demonstrative of the complexities associated with Livy's character development, as well as the social perceptions of Hannibal's night time activity. We can explore how Hannibal demonstrates *moderatio* in

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<sup>130</sup> As it will be seen shortly in the case study of Hannibal's actions whilst in Tarentum.

<sup>131</sup> Livy, 22.58.6-9.

more detail through an examination of his nocturnal actions in Tarentum, whilst simultaneously highlighting how the Romans would have held a different interpretation.

### Tarentum Case Study:

An examination of Hannibal's night time military actions within the city of Tarentum in 214BCE<sup>132</sup> is an important episodes to analyse, for it further refutes the accusations of Hannibalic cruelty whilst simultaneously emphasising the complexities of Livy's character development.

We learn that Hannibal was invited to move his army toward Tarentum by the youths of the city,<sup>133</sup> who, represented by Nico and Philemenus, subsequently made the arrangements to meet Hannibal in the night to discuss the terms of mutual friendship.<sup>134</sup> Associated with the hope of forming an alliance was the Tarentine plea for aid against the Romans who currently held a garrison in the city and had invoked a haughty rule.<sup>135</sup> Immediately the setting of the night is important, serving as a means for Livy to convey Roman perception of the night as a time of danger and improper activity, with the concealment of the night emphasising the perils associated with a political rebellion for the

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<sup>132</sup> The full narratives of events at Tarentum are described in various episodes within the *Ab Urbe Condita* due to Livy following an analogical format with all events occurring chronologically. The events at Tarentum actually span five years from 214 to 209, thus accounting for the apparent haphazard placement of events (24.13.1-4; 24.20.9-16; 25.7.10-11.20; 27.15.4-16.9). Due to the restraints placed upon this discussion as a result of examining Hannibal's depiction within a night time setting, not all of the episodes relating to Hannibalic activity in Tarentum will be presented. For a cohesive and insightful examination of general Hannibalic action whilst in Tarentum, see Chlup (2009).

<sup>133</sup> Livy, 24.13.1-3: "While Hannibal was at the Lake of Avernus five noble young men came to him from Tarentum...mindful of his favours, they reported that they had induced a large part of the young men of Tarentum to prefer the friendship and alliance of Hannibal to those of the Roman people; and that, as legates sent by their people, they asked Hannibal to bring his army nearer to Tarentum." (*Ad Hannibalem, cum ad lacum Averni esset, quinque nobiles iuvenes ab Tarento venerunt...Ei memores beneficiourum eius perpulisse magnam partem se iuventutis Tarentinae referent ut Hannibalis amicitiam ac societatem quam populi Romani mallent, legatosque ab suis missos rogare Hannibalem ut exercitum propius Tarentum admoveat*).

<sup>134</sup> See Livy, 25.8.1-10.

<sup>135</sup> Livy, 25.8.8: "On meeting Hannibal again they had his formal assurance that the Tarentines as free men should have their own laws and all their possessions, and pay no tribute to the Carthaginians nor admit a garrison against their own wish; that houses occupied by Romans should be handed over, together with the garrison, and be assigned to the Carthaginians." (*Congressi cum Hannibale rursus fide sanxerunt liberos Tarentinos leges suas suaque omnia habituros neque ullum vectigal Poeno pensuros praesidiumve invitos recepturos; prodita hospitia Romanorum cum praesidio Carthaginiensium fore*). Due to Hannibal making such assurances and promises to the Tarentines, it suggests that the Romans themselves were exerting control over such areas and abusing their presence in the city. It therefore makes sense that the inhabitants of Tarentum had grievances and appealed to Hannibal for aid against the Roman oppressors. Hannibal here delivers on the promises which he had initially given to the youths when he was first approached at 24.13.1-3.

state. Indeed, there is no claim of cruelty here, rather Hannibal was aiding a rebellion. Hannibal's involvement is emphasised, with the imagery of the night accentuating the secrecy associated with planning a night time rebellion. However, Livy once again demonstrates his complicated characterisation of figures, for Hannibal is portrayed as a potential liberator and saviour rather than a military commander set on Italian domination and oppression of all Italian citizens. As stated by Chlup, "in saying that he will respect the *libertas* of Tarentum, Hannibal...arguing that he will re-establish what the Romans have so egregiously removed...appears as a politician arguing for the independence and good governance of his own *civitas*."<sup>136</sup> Hannibal was therefore able to use the feelings of animosity towards the Romans in his favour, acting with kindness and respect in order to gain the allegiance of Tarentum.

Livy clearly states that Hannibal had no intention to act callously, for he did not perceive the area to be hostile.<sup>137</sup> Hannibal is therefore depicted as operating on at least two levels: on the one hand, he was a leader who recognised the importance of his word and acted with the locals against Rome. Hannibal's actions were in accordance to proper military standards, only resorting to violence when necessary and when faced with combat circumstances. Nevertheless, it remains that Hannibal was aiding a revolution, with the Romans viewing the nocturnal meeting with the locals as hostile and synonymous with distrust and a lack of Tarentine loyalty.

Following the various negotiations which discuss a mutual alliance, the subsequent siege of Tarentum and the quashing of Roman oppression is a pivotal episode. For the purpose of this discussion, this section is especially important, a result of how Livy depicted Hannibal, shedding new light on his character and thus developing the framework in which Hannibal should be perceived by Livy's audience. Hannibal decided to break camp in the early night (*Hannibal concubia nocte movit*),<sup>138</sup> and approach the gate of Tarentum. With

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<sup>136</sup> Chlup (2009) 25.

<sup>137</sup> Hannibal's avoidance of cruelty when possible is supported by the formal promises made by Hannibal towards the Tarentines. See Livy, 25.8.8-9.

<sup>138</sup> Livy, 25.9.8.

the aid of Nico and Philemenus, Hannibal was able to enter the city silently, position his troops accordingly and give his orders:

*Tum duo milia Gallorum Poenus in tres divisi partis per urbem dimittit;  
Tarentinos iis addit duces binos; itinera quam maxime frequentia occupari  
iubet, tumultu orto Romanos passim caedi, oppidanis parci.*

The Carthaginian then sent two thousand Gauls, divided into three units, through the city, and to each he attached two Tarentines as guides. He ordered them to occupy the most frequented streets, and when the uproar had begun, to slay the Romans everywhere, but to spare the townspeople.<sup>139</sup>

Again, the concealment that darkness provided confirms and emphasises the dangers associated with a political rebellion for the state. However, Hannibal demonstrates his control over the situation and the environment by using the night constructively. Despite Roman opinion here, Hannibal shows that he was a man of his word. By affirming that no Tarentine citizen was to be harmed, Hannibal adheres to the agreement previously made that he would liberate the city from the oppressive Roman control and become an ally. In stark contrast, however, was his treatment of the Romans, who he claimed should be slain. Whilst this may come across as being a cruel act, and indeed how the Romans would have interpreted it, Livy does not appear to present it as such. He instead focuses on how Hannibal's exemplary military skills were advantageous and central to ceasing the Tarentine's predicament.

Livy justifies Hannibal's involvement in Tarentum by explaining how the Romans were no longer acting in accordance with traditional and 'proper' military practices. The Roman treatment of the Tarentines was cruel and oppressive, creating resentment among the city's inhabitants and a feeling of general hatred towards the Romans. The Romans had not only seized control of property and established a garrison within the city, but they had

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<sup>139</sup> Livy, 25.9.16-17.

also taken it upon themselves to execute Tarentine hostages.<sup>140</sup> Such actions differ greatly from those of Hannibal, who tended to release his prisoners or hostages, exhibiting *clementia* as opposed to *crudelitas*.<sup>141</sup> It would therefore appear that cruelty was more synonymous with Roman conduct rather than that of Hannibal. Canter himself has also made this observation, stating that cruelty was habitual to the Romans.<sup>142</sup> Additionally, Chlup suggests that it is the Romans who were placed in a negative light by Livy, with their arrogance highlighted, especially due to the reference of *dominationem superbam Romanorum* at 25.10.9.<sup>143</sup> The reference to *superbam* is significant as it is Livy's own opinion, suggesting that the Roman historian supported and validated Hannibal's night time actions, with the Roman soldiers exerting themselves based on their arrogance and ill-discipline and thus un-Roman tendencies. Livy was undoubtedly commenting on affairs of his own day here and making a moral comparison between Roman action in the past and that which he had witnessed in the first century BCE.

It would appear that Livy was faced with a predicament. As a Roman historian, he was obliged to conform to societal perceptions, both of Hannibal and the night. Livy draws attention to the dangers and confusion that accompanies the night,<sup>144</sup> which was most certainly part of Hannibal's plan, and thus his ability to exploit the darkness ensured his success. For the Romans however, it was detrimental and concluded their control in the city. In Roman thought, Hannibal exploited the night to aid a political rebellion, interfering in the

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<sup>140</sup> Livy, 25.7.13: "They [the Tarentines] were led into the Comitium, scourged with rods with the approval of the people and thrown down from the Rock." (*Deducti in comitium virisque adprobante populo caesi de saxo deiciuntur*). At 25.8.2 Livy states his disgust at Roman action, stating that the Tarentines were "cruelly executed" (*foede interemptos*). Livy alludes to Romans ceasing the property of the Tarentines at 25.8.8, for Hannibal promises to the Tarentines that "houses occupied by the Romans should be handed over." (*prodita hospitia Romanorum*).

<sup>141</sup> Hannibal had a policy to release or ransom prisoners, especially non-Romans, after battle. Livy describes the release of prisoners after the battles of Trebia in 218 BCE and Lake Trasimene (24.30.18: 600 Cretans had been captured and then released). Note too Hannibal's decision to release prisoners following the battle of Cannae (22.58.1-8).

<sup>142</sup> Canter (1929) 575.

<sup>143</sup> Chlup (2009) 28.

<sup>144</sup> Livy, 25.10.2: "The Tarentines believed the Romans had surprised them, in order to plunder the city; the Romans thought it was some kind of uprising treacherously started by the townspeople." (*Tarentini Romanos ad diripiendam urbem credere coortos; Romanis seditio aliqua cum fraude videri ab oppidanis mota*). The extent of the night-time confusion is exemplified by the Romans having no idea what is currently happening, and are unsure who they are fighting and thus how to act accordingly. This sense of disorder would also have been heightened by the uproar and shouting, emphasising the confusion. Hannibal clearly thought out this plan, using the night to his advantage and thus indicating his effectiveness as a leader.



concerns of the state and the order of Roman rule, whilst simultaneously massacring Roman soldiers. However, Livy clearly respected Hannibal's capabilities as a good commander and leader, demonstrating his astuteness through his mastery of the environment. Hannibal's ability to take advantage of the night allowed him to utilise the darkness as a screen to conceal and protect his actions. Such abilities were paramount to determining the effectiveness of his plan, with his success in doing so allowing him to liberate the oppressed Tarentine inhabitants. The importance of this episode is therefore undeniable: Livy demonstrates his respect for Hannibal as a military commander, while simultaneously expressing his disgust towards Roman conduct. Hannibal is depicted as exhibiting traits much more synonymous with Roman military *virtus* rather than the 'other,' for he demonstrated honour, respect, moderation and sense of justice. In doing so, Hannibal was able to be a friend, liberator and ally toward troubled Italian people. Chlup concludes that "Hannibal's positive behaviour here might be seen as indicative of the historians' re-assessment of him which culminates in the second character portrait at 28.12."<sup>145</sup> Livy's use of the night served two purposes: on one level, the night highlighted Roman anxiety toward both the darkness and Hannibal's activity. Alternatively, Livy used the night not as a literary construct, but to reflect reality. In doing so, Livy shows us that not every event at night signifies literary embellishment, nor does it always denote the 'other;' the night was, at times, used for military activities based on necessity and practicality.

Livy is able to further develop his praise of Hannibal as an astute commander, who embodied the trappings of Roman *virtus*, by exploiting Tarentine memory. Livy was able to construct an indirect Tarentine view that may in fact express Livy's own assessment of Hannibal.<sup>146</sup> This is important, for Livy was able to take advantage of the supposed Tarentine perspective and their memories of Hannibalic kindness that we have in this episode to challenge Hannibalic stereotypes. As a result of the Tarentines considering Hannibal as a liberator, Chlup concludes that:

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<sup>145</sup> Chlup (2009) 28.

<sup>146</sup> Chlup (2009) is of the opinion that although the Romans held hostility towards Hannibal, the Tarentines were an unbiased third party, previously independent from both a Carthaginian and Roman alliance, and therefore do not have a pre-determined judgement on either. Given Tarentine history, 'un-biased' may not be an accurate description, but the view is important nevertheless.

“*Memores* would seem to have serious implications: if it may be read as implying *historia*, then the Tarentines are presenting an alternate history which, ultimately, endangers the *Ab Urbe Condita*:...Rome’s response to the past is threatened by the memory of the Tarentines, who think not of their misfortune at being on the losing side, but of Hannibal’s kind treatment of them.”<sup>147</sup>

By taking advantage of what were thought to be Tarentine memories, Livy is able to revoke the accusation of Hannibal’s cruelty since there was evidence of kindness that was ascribed to him. Livy is inadvertently able to challenge traditional Roman perceptions through his exploitation of an alternative evaluation surviving in the source material. Therefore, by depicting Hannibal as such, Livy allows the Carthaginian general to escape the constraints placed on his character by challenging and subsequently crushing the traditional depiction conceived by the Romans themselves. Furthermore, the assumption that such sentiments were based on memory further suggests that Hannibal’s nocturnal activity could be a result of reality rather than mere literary embellishment. Chlup’s conclusion therefore seems valid: “Hannibal in Italy appears not as a cruel enemy of Rome, but as a defender of freedom against Rome.”<sup>148</sup> By portraying Hannibal in this fashion, Livy also highlights why the negative depiction of Hannibal may have emerged within the Roman psyche; by being liked and an ally of the Italians, Hannibal obtained extensive support which the Romans were unable to achieve, which consequently threatened Roman consolidation of power within Italy. Livy, however, looked further than imperialistic goals, re-evaluating the manner in which Hannibal should be viewed. Hannibal’s night activity in Tarentum demonstrated his capability and astuteness as a military commander that deserved respect and recognition. In doing so, Livy challenges traditional perceptions of the Roman’s own conduct, with their own actions being ‘other’ rather than complying with traditional military *virtus*. The night inverts traditional sentiments, with the actions of the Romans heightened and emphasised by the setting. The reversal of Roman and Hannibalic traits is most evidently seen in the episode at Tarentum, for Livy supports and sympathises with Hannibal’s actions whilst simultaneously shunning Roman oppression and callousness. Hannibal’s ability to show

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<sup>147</sup> Chlup (2009) 19-20.

<sup>148</sup> Chlup (2009) 31.

honour, respect, moderation and justice aligns him with Roman general of old. It is worthwhile to examine here a Roman general who Livy reveres, with a close analysis of the similarities with Hannibal's own conduct.

#### Hannibal, Camillus and 'Ruthless' Romans of the third decade:

We know that the acts of cruelty demonstrated by Romans towards the Tarentine citizens were not synonymous with traditional Roman military practices. In contrast, the conduct of Marcus Furius Camillus<sup>149</sup> during his various campaigns encapsulate the ideals and values which Rome valued and that Livy promoted.<sup>150</sup> As suggested by Ravindra, Camillus is "most prominently characterised by Livy as the epitome of Roman leadership qualities...[and] there is not one episode from Camillus' biography which is not an exemplum."<sup>151</sup> There is very little evidence discussing Camillus' night time military conduct; this in itself provides insight about 'ideal' Roman commanders and their activities. Regardless of this, there is one example in particular which exemplifies Camillus' *virtus* and *iustia*. After Camillus was presented Falerian youths by a school master, he demonstrates military honour by not harming them, highlighting how Roman military practice was not inherently cruel or malicious:

*Sunt et belli sicut pacis iura, iusteque ea non minus quam fortiter didicimus gerere. Arma habemus non adversus eam aetatem cui etiam captis urbibus parcitur, sed adversus armatos et ipsos, qui nec laesi nec lacessiti a nobis castra Romana ad Veios oppugnarunt.*

There are rights of war as well as of peace, and we have learnt to use them justly no less than bravely. We bear no weapons against those tender years which find mercy even in the storming of a city, but against those who are

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<sup>149</sup> See Gaernter (2008) for insight into the importance of Camillus within Roman thought.

<sup>150</sup> As such, Livy notes how Camillus was often esteemed as the "second founder of the city" (*conditor...alter urbis*) 5.49.7. Also see Livy 7.1.10. Gaertner (2008) 37, suggests that it was Camillus' actions during the Gallic Sack that earned him the title of second founder: "It was only natural to compare Camillus, as the major statesman involved with this re-foundation, with Rome's mythical founder Romulus, and it is therefore hardly surprising that we find his comparison several times in Livy."

<sup>151</sup> Ravindra (2010) 32.

armed themselves, who, without wrong or provocation at our hands,  
attacked the Roman camp at Veii.<sup>152</sup>

Camillus here demonstrates that in the Roman psyche, there was a code of conduct associated with military practice, which was expected to be adhered to and respected. This insight echoes what Ennius said about proper and improper conduct, as we have previously discussed. As Camillus states, he would not raise his arms to youths who were innocent of fault and had no military associations. Livy suggests that a Roman soldier should inherently exhibit moderation, embodying *virtus* and *iustus* to act as such. By doing so, it would appear that cruelty in warfare was discouraged, with raised weapons only acceptable when faced with battle circumstances. Therefore, as stated by Ravindra, Livy used Camillus as a model, highlighting that “morality and justice should prevail, even during war.”<sup>153</sup> Camillus embodied and represented *mos maiorum*, which Livy himself was at pains to emphasise. As such, Camillus’ actions were synonymous with traditional Roman practice. However, it is important to recognise the parallels between Camillus’ actions and those of Hannibal. At Tarentum, for example, we know that in a night time setting Hannibal expressly spares the citizens and targets only the Romans soldiers. His decision to use Hannibal as a model of Roman *virtus* is interesting, and suggests that Hannibal’s military conduct was ethical and more ‘proper’ than the Romans themselves. Hannibal’s nocturnal actions at Tarentum in particular are evident of this proper conduct, for his *moderatio* was demonstrated. Livy, then, uses the night not to criticise Hannibal, but to disprove societal perceptions of Hannibal as only viewed as ‘other.’ The night setting creates an inversion, with Hannibal demonstrating the *moderatio* and ethics that the Romans had themselves failed to achieve,

Camillus’ night time activity is indicative of appropriate military conduct, which again is synonymous with the actions Livy later accredits to Hannibal. With the order for his men to arm themselves and prepare for departure at first watch, Camillus led his men towards a massacre of the Gauls.<sup>154</sup> While this may seem inherently cruel and heartless, Livy was

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<sup>152</sup> Livy, 5.27.6-8.

<sup>153</sup> Ravindra (2010) 32.

<sup>154</sup> See Livy, 5.24.6-25.3: “If you have a mind to protect your city and not to suffer all this country to become Gaul, arm yourselves in the first watch, and follow me in force, not to a battle but a massacre.” (*Si vobis in*

discussing battle circumstances,<sup>155</sup> and was comparable to Hannibal's slaughter of Roman forces whilst at Tarentum. Similarly, Camillus' use of the night to aid in his military preparations demonstrates that the night was not only synonymous with the actions of the 'other,' for Camillus too mastered the concealment that darkness provided for his own advantage. Additionally, Livy does not present Camillus as waning from Roman values, for he is still recognised as representing military conventions and adhering to the code of conduct.<sup>156</sup> The manner in which traditional Roman figures such as Camillus conduct themselves within a nocturnal military setting is clearly comparable to Hannibal's actions. Hannibal, then, represents the virtues of warfare traditionally practiced by the Romans, and Livy uses this to demonstrate how later Romans appear to have forgotten the traditional expectations of military conduct, and had themselves become callous. Livy highlights how Hannibal's proper use of the night enabled him to be successful, particularly his use of conduct which the Romans revered, and as such Livy uses the figure of Hannibal to emphasise the correlation between traditional Roman values and obtaining success. However, unlike Hannibal, Camillus does not use the cover of night to retreat. Even though Camillus and Hannibal were comparable in their use of the night, Livy takes caution and creates a distinction, and thus expresses the subtleties between Roman and 'other.'

It has traditionally been considered that Rome's great military heroes from the Second Punic War resembled qualities which were praiseworthy and honourable. Livy adheres to this tradition by describing figures as either heroes or saviours of Rome. Such figures include Scipio Africanus,<sup>157</sup> Fabius Maximus Cunctator<sup>158</sup> and Marcellus.<sup>159</sup> However, after examining some of their respective actions within a night time setting, it becomes

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*animo est tueri moenia vestra nec pati haec omnia Galliam fieri, prima vigilia capite arma frequentesque me sequimini ad caesem, non ad pugnam*) 5.24.7.

<sup>155</sup> Livy presents the slaughter of the Samnites at 8.33.15 in a similar fashion, suggesting that such acts were deemed acceptable when contained within warfare circumstances, and as such were deemed to adhere to conventional military practices.

<sup>156</sup> Livy makes a point of emphasising Camillus' *virtus*, for after the massacre of the Gauls and the introduction of a new commander, Livy implies that despite the success of Quintus Caedicius, he did not possess the same traits as Camillus: 5.45.8: "The only thing wanting was a leader like Camillus; in all else the order followed was the same and the same success was achieved." (*Tantum par Camillo defuit auctor: cetera eodem ordine eodemque fortunae eventu gesta*).

<sup>157</sup> Walsh (1961) 93, states that Scipio "undoubtedly approaches nearest to Livy's ideal Roman;" Hoyos (2006) xxv, claims that "Scipio Africanus is almost Livy's perfect hero. Resourceful, self-controlled, charismatic, fully aware of his own genius and industrious self-promotion."

<sup>158</sup> Livy comments on and praises Fabius for being one of the saviours of the state (30.26.7-9); Burck (1971) 34, claims that "in Livy [Fabius] is characterised by his cautious good sense and conservatism in both military and political planning and action;" Walsh (1961) 86, suggests that Fabius exhibits prudence.

<sup>159</sup> Walsh (1961) 102, states that "after Scipio, Marcellus is the most heroic figure of the war."

apparent that even these figures have failed to abide by the traditional conduct which they were so readily praised for adhering to, especially within the realms of moderation and self-control within a military setting.

Scipio Africanus has been remembered for defeating Hannibal and sacking Carthage. He has also been exemplified as being a model of *clementia*<sup>160</sup> and as such became an *exemplum* within Roman society. However, through an analysis of Scipio's nocturnal activity, it becomes apparent that he could be ruthless and callous. Recall his use of fire at Utica in 203BC, which resulted in the slaughter of the enemy camp.<sup>161</sup> While this conforms to tactics used by Camillus and Hannibal, with slaughter occurring on the battlefield, some scholars believe that Livy refrained from depicting Scipio accurately, focusing on his attributes rather than his faults. Walsh is one scholar who supports this view, stating that Livy discusses how Scipio represented the Roman ideal of *clementia*, whilst "minimising the savagery of which he was occasionally guilty."<sup>162</sup> This view is supported by Foulkes, who claims that Livy presents his Roman characters as individuals who "are woven into a tapestry of generally positive features."<sup>163</sup> It therefore becomes difficult for Livy to criticise Scipio, but it would appear that the manner in which Livy has presented his hero is not credible. Certainly the omission of any faults complicates the understanding of Livy's development of characters, but all may not be as it seems. Livy may not address Scipio's faults directly or in detail, instead he criticises through night time imagery and nocturnal actions. We know that Scipio, like Hannibal, used the ruse of fire to aid in his night time operations, and this comparison is undeniable. By including the imagery of the night, Livy is able to indirectly criticise Scipio's faults, exploiting the imagery of night as a time of danger associated with the 'other' to convey his disgust in Scipio's actions. Livy simultaneously comments on Scipio's own actions as being 'other' due to the comparability to Hannibal's nocturnal activity. As such, the night time setting allows Livy to criticise Scipio's nocturnal activities without actually writing anything negative.

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<sup>160</sup> See Walsh (1961) who explores Scipio's *clementia*.

<sup>161</sup> Refer to page 41-44.

<sup>162</sup> Walsh (1961) 97.

<sup>163</sup> Foulkes (1999) 72.

Despite the difficulties in placing fault upon Scipio's nocturnal actions, Livy does not appear to address Fabius or Marcellus with the same restraint. By exploring the nocturnal activity of Fabius it becomes apparent that at times he did show restraint and moderation towards his enemies, and thus adhered to traditional Roman values. This can be seen following the siege of Arpi, where Fabius offered *clementia* to the Carthaginian foes by releasing Hannibal's troops and allowing them passage back to the Carthaginian camp.<sup>164</sup> However, Livy also exploits the imagery associated with the night to describe how Fabius did not always act within the parameters of virtuous and moral military conduct, exhibiting cruelty and vice towards his enemies. Such callousness is best seen during the Roman attempt to recapture Tarentum in 209BC, where Fabius led the Roman nocturnal effort.<sup>165</sup> Livy himself indicates that Fabius did not act in accordance to Roman practices, stating that Fabius' "lack of character" (*dein satis explorata levitate*)<sup>166</sup> was exhibited in the manner that he carried out his plan. For Livy, it would appear that Fabius' lack of *moderatio* and *iustus* gained the most condemnation:

*Inde et proxuma refracta porta, ut frequenti agmine signa inferrentur. Tum clamore sublato sub ortum ferme lucis nullo obvio armato in forum perveniunt, omnesque undique qui ad arcem portumque pugnabant in se converterunt.*

Then also the nearest gate was broken open, so that a dense column might march in. Thereupon raising a shout they made their way into the market-place at about daybreak, while no armed men encountered them, and they drew against themselves an attack on every side from all the men who were fighting at the citadel and by the harbour.<sup>167</sup>

By highlighting that the Romans met unarmed men, Livy addresses his own disappointment in Roman action and the decision to engage in battle with men who could not defend

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<sup>164</sup> Livy, 24.47.3: "The gates were opened for the Carthaginians, they were allowed to leave, as promised, and came unharmed to Hannibal at Salapia." (*Carthaginiensibus portae patefactae emissique cum fide incolumes ad Hannibalem Salapiam venerunt*).

<sup>165</sup> For a brief discussion on Fabius' character, especially his conduct in Tarentum, see Levene (2010) 208-10.

<sup>166</sup> Livy, 27.15.11.

<sup>167</sup> Livy, 27.15.18-19.

themselves. Fabius' activity contrasts to Camillus' actions, who showed *clementia* toward unarmed men and thus conducted himself in accordance with Roman military values and ethics. Of particular interest is Livy's absence of the night time setting when describing Camillus' actions, which heightens the difference between his and Fabius' military activity. It would appear that the night alters and morphs Fabius' judgement, imagery that Livy purposefully exploits. In contrast to Camillus' actions, Livy therefore suggests that there was no honour to be found in the Roman re-capture of Tarentum, for the battle tactics became dishonourable and cruel in the night time setting, with the streets of Tarentum transformed to a slaughter house for the unarmed inhabitants. As such, while the cover of darkness cloaked Fabius' actions, the light of day reveals true Roman atrocities and so Fabius' true nature. Livy continues by addressing how even after arms had been laid down in surrender by those few men who were equipped for battle, the Roman forces still slew men everywhere:

*Carthalonem autem, praefectum Punici praesidii, cum commemoratione paterni hospitii positis armis venientem ad consulem miles obviis obtuncat. Alii alios passim sine discrimine armatos inermis caedunt, Carthaginienses Tarentinosque partier.*

Moreover Carthalo, commander of the Punic garrison, mentioning his father's guest-friendship, had laid down his arms and was on his way to the consul, when he was slain by a soldier who met him. Other soldiers slew other men everywhere, whether armed or unarmed, Carthaginians and Tarentines alike.<sup>168</sup>

Livy's presentation of Roman action, ordered and led by Fabius, condemns the Romans. In particular, Fabius' lack of moderation and obvious savagery is noted by the Roman historian, who blatantly states that such action was disappointing and uncharacteristic of traditional Roman conduct. Because Fabius was one of Rome's great heroes, Livy presents this episode as if he was embarrassed by the consul's nocturnal actions, for Fabius receives a damning

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<sup>168</sup> Livy, 27.16.5-6.



report that he exhibited a lack of character. Fabius' night time activity in Tarentum is a direct contrast to that of Hannibal, who we know was painted as a liberator and friend of the citizens. While Hannibal displayed *moderatio* by only punishing Roman oppressors, Fabius showed no restraint. Livy, then, demonstrates that the Romans did not always observe traditional Roman practices, and at times exhibited cruelty towards both innocent bystanders as well as their foes. By doing so, Hannibal is portrayed as embodying the trappings of Roman *virtus*, mastering nocturnal activity which the Romans themselves struggle to control, with the darkness altering their perceptions and better judgement.

We can also suggest that the nocturnal setting inverts Fabius' characterisation, with his praiseworthy traits morphing and developing into brutality at night. However, the episode at Tarentum is not the first evidence of an alteration to Fabius' character. During a Carthaginian threat to his camp, Fabius is cast as a coward by Livy. Fabius decides to sleep rather than address the issue, choosing to instead investigate the problem in the morning.<sup>169</sup> We would assume that an astute Roman commander such as Fabius would have addressed the threat immediately in order to protect his camp and his men, yet this is not the case. Therefore, while Fabius does at times exhibit *clementia* at night, he tends to use the darkness to conceal his actions and carry out his more sinister plans. Livy clearly condemns Fabius' action at Tarentum, and in doing so presents the Roman commander as a savage barbarian. Livy, then, places further emphasis upon the argument that Hannibal conducted himself in a manner reminiscent of Roman tradition, more so than the Romans themselves. Because he was embarrassed by Fabius' action, Livy praises Hannibal's nocturnal actions and highlights his moderation and clemency, for it is clear that the Carthaginian exhibits the traits which the Romans themselves have forgotten.

Marcellus is another of Livy's military figures who has been credited with exhibiting moderation and clemency whilst carrying out his military duties. This is especially the opinion of Walsh, who states that Marcellus' *clementia* is "emphasised when he orders that no free persons should be harmed in the looting of Syracuse."<sup>170</sup> Walsh also concludes that

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<sup>169</sup> Livy, 22.17.16.

<sup>170</sup> Walsh (1961) 102, with reference to Livy, 25.31.7.

“after Scipio, Marcellus is the most heroic figure of the war.”<sup>171</sup> However, we can surmise that Walsh has over emphasised the episode at Syracuse and has drawn conclusions that Livy does not suggest. Livy does not mention whether the Syracusan plea for mercy was accepted by Marcellus, especially since Marcellus states that there was a need to punish Syracuse, and subsequently allowed his men to plunder and pillage the citadel. Additionally, the reader knows that just prior to his involvement in Syracuse, Marcellus had condoned a treacherous Roman massacre of Sicilian inhabitants in 214BC.<sup>172</sup> With this in mind, it is unlikely that the inhabitants of the city managed to escape Marcellus’ intervention unharmed. Even though there is no mention of slaughter per se, Livy alludes to Roman violence and brutality by stating that “many shameful examples of anger and many of greed were being given” (*multa irae multa avaritiae foeda exempla ederentur*).<sup>173</sup> Livy’s use of *foeda* demonstrates his disgust and condemnation of Marcellus’ actions, implying that the soldiers were able to exert their anger upon the inhabitants in an unrestrained manner. Marcellus, then, chose to disregard the Syracusan pleas of mercy in exchange for unreserved hostility, and consequently exhibited characteristics which were barbaric and callous. In doing so, Marcellus demonstrates his unethical character, with no comparison to the traits exhibited by Romans of old, such as Camillus. Additionally, Marcellus exhibits characteristics that the Romans traditionally associated with the barbarian, yet it is obvious that Marcellus shows less restraint than Hannibal. Through his callous activity, Marcellus demonstrates traits which are ‘other,’ and as such Hannibal is cast as being more ‘Roman’ than Marcellus himself. Thus, by describing his actions as “shameful,” Livy scorns Marcellus’ actions, especially his involvement in Syracuse, and does not hesitate to convey to his readers an alternative character sketch of the supposed Roman hero.<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Walsh (1961) 102. Walsh makes this conclusion based on Marcellus’ victory at Cannae and his repulsion of Hannibal at Nola. See Livy (23.16.16). For insight into Marcellus’ character see Levene (2010) 197-208; 211-14.

<sup>172</sup> Livy, 24.39.5: “The men of Henna, shut up in the cavea, were slain and piled together not only owing to the slaughter, but also by the panic, since they rushed down over each other’s’ heads, and as the unharmed fell upon the wounded, the living upon the dead, they were lying in their heaps.” (*Caeduntur Hennenses cavea inclusi coacervanturque non caede solum sed etiam fuga, cum super aliorum alii capita ruerent, et integri sauciis, vivi mortuis incidentis cumularentur*).

<sup>173</sup> Livy, 25.31.9.

<sup>174</sup> See Carawan (1985) for an indepth discussion of Marcellus’ recklessness foolishness; traits which are uncharacteristic of traditional Roman military conduct.

It is interesting that Livy does not exploit the imagery of the night to enhance his portrayal of a man who no longer exhibited *moderatio* and displayed a merciless attitude toward his enemies. Because we know Marcellus was considered as a Roman hero, the setting of the night could have been used as a tool, a way to justify Marcellus' apparent inversion of character. Nevertheless, Livy does not hesitate to highlight Marcellus' flaws, drawing the reader's attention to his 'un-Roman' tendencies.<sup>175</sup> Despite this, Walsh, who himself draws attention to Marcellus' flaws, states that Marcellus receives a glowing report from Livy, who "constantly seeks to mitigate his savagery in Italy",<sup>176</sup> and "in common with the general tradition, seeks to idealise him, and does violence to the truth in the attempt."<sup>177</sup> Walsh contradicts himself here, and even becomes more 'Livian' than Livy himself, as it is Walsh who seems to idealise Marcellus, because he was the hero at Cannae. However, if we consider the anecdote above, it is evident that Livy does not hesitate to condemn Marcellus' actions or to depict him negatively. Livy's most damning character portrayal follows Marcellus' death in 208BCE, for the Roman historian states that because of his lack of foresightedness and his imprudence, Marcellus had "carried himself and his colleague and almost the entire state over the brink."<sup>178</sup> Livy clearly states that Marcellus exhibited traits which were against Roman practice, particularly his savagery, and ultimately he was responsible for the near collapse of the Republic.<sup>179</sup> Marcellus, then, was specifically cast by Livy not as a Roman hero, but as a Roman commander who had lost his way and had overlooked the various military restraints expected of him. The absence of the night time setting in this anecdote is therefore explainable, for Livy had no need to indirectly criticise Marcellus' faults. His direct and explicit condemnation of Marcellus' character suggests that

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<sup>175</sup> Livy also highlights Marcellus' merciless attitude towards the Campanian garrison of Casilinum (24.19.9), and mentions how the Sicilians would prefer an eruption of Aetna or a tidal wave rather than enduring another term of Marcellus' government (26.29.4).

<sup>176</sup> Walsh (1961) 101.

<sup>177</sup> Walsh (1961) 103.

<sup>178</sup> Livy, 27.27.11: "Marcellus' death was pitiable both for other reasons and also because it was neither consistent with his age – for he was now more than sixty years old – nor with his foresight as a veteran commander, that with such imprudence he had carried himself and his colleague and almost the entire state over the brink." (*Mors Marcelli cum alioque miserabilis fuit, tum quod nec pro aetate – iam enim maior sexaginta annis erat – neque pro veteris prudential ducis tam inprovidae se conlegamque et prope totam rem publicam in praeceos dederat*).

<sup>179</sup> Carawan (1985) 141. Marcellus' blunders were demonstrative of his nonchalance and negligence, whilst being overly determines. Polybius 10.32.7-12, also condemns Marcellus' actions, stating that he had acted more like a fool than a politician. Carawan suggests that "Marcellus' recklessness is unsuitable in a commander-in-chief, and Livy is concerned with his failings of character."

it was well known in Roman society that Marcellus had forgotten his Roman values, and thus the inclusion of the night and the exploitation of the negative imagery and inversion associated with the darkness was not necessary.

Hannibal therefore represented the virtues which the Romans had themselves forgotten. His success in Italy meant that Livy could praise Hannibal's nocturnal military prowess, and therefore acknowledge him for his night time activities. Livy is not alone in praising Hannibal's successes, for Canter states that "Hannibal's kindness towards his enemies impressed Plutarch and is noted with emphasis by Polybius, Livy and other writers."<sup>180</sup> It would seem, then, that later Roman writers saw it as their task to re-address history, challenging the by then established perceptions of Hannibal and the Carthaginians. Through our analysis of night time anecdotes, we can conclude that Livy succeeded in this task. The setting of the night is important to Livy, as it allows him, or at least helps him, to present another side of Roman commanders by exploiting societal perceptions of the night as a time of danger and inversion. By doing so, he is able to criticise and judge Roman military action, whilst simultaneously manipulating the inversion associated with the night to present a new dimension of Hannibal's character. Thus, Hannibal is presented as a resourceful, astute and virtuous commander who demonstrated the values that the Romans themselves had forgotten when conducting nocturnal tactics.

Livy's presentation of Hannibal's nocturnal activity therefore indicates that he tended to act with kindness and respect, being more likely to show *clementia* towards his enemies rather than the supposed *crudelitas* which was ascribed to him. Chlup even claims that with the debunking of Hannibalic cruelty, the other negative traits accredited to him at 21.4.5-10 are also farcical accusations.<sup>181</sup> Similar sentiments are expressed by Canter, who asserts that the charge of cruelty is "probably pure fiction or gross exaggeration, occasioned with individual acts of barbarity, such as have been known to occur even in the best disciplined armies."<sup>182</sup> Livy's depiction of Hannibal supports these claims, which suggest that Hannibal has been represented unfairly, with preposterous and farcical accusations

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<sup>180</sup> Canter (1929) 575.

<sup>181</sup> Chlup (2009) 31.

<sup>182</sup> Canter (1929) 576.

invented as a means for the Romans to place their own pre-conceived image of Hannibalic barbarity upon the general. However, in their attempt to adhere to tradition and to taint his memory, the Romans have actually aided in Hannibal's depiction. Since Roman sympathisers could see through the façade of lies, the representation and embodiment of Hannibal reveals that the Romans demonstrated 'un-Roman' and improper tendencies. Hannibal is depicted by Livy as being the real hero of the Second Punic War. Despite being 'other,' his adherence to the universal ethics of warfare, even in a night time setting, allowed him to gain great success in Italy, mastering his environment in both day and night. Such control and utilisation of his surroundings could not be ignored by Livy, and as such the realities and consequences of Hannibal's campaign were recorded. The Roman failure to similarly master their environment, especially the night, resulted in the loss of Roman ethics and ultimately aided in the ruin of Rome herself. Livy exploits the imagery of the night to reveal an alternative side to Roman commanders, whose *virtus* and 'proper' conduct had been morphed and inverted in darkness.

### ***The Lavish Leader***

We cannot ignore that Livy's characterisation was incredibly complex. Livy's accounts of Hannibal's various night time actions tend to discredit and undermine the traditional vices assigned to Hannibal. Even though we have disproven the accusations of cruelty in particular, we learn that accepting this as indicative of Livy's representation of Hannibal is incomplete. As we are aware, new insight into Hannibal's character can be obtained through an investigation of his nocturnal military activities. However, Hannibal was still an enemy of Rome, and more importantly, was a non-Roman, factors which Livy could not ignore and had to address within his work. We know that Hannibal's night time actions were sometimes in opposition to Roman practices and ideals, and that Livy sometimes portrayed Hannibal in contrast to prominent Romans. There is more. Livy also associates Hannibal with wealth, with particular emphasis on its corruptive nature and the affect that it had upon the Carthaginian war effort. While it is not mentioned as being one of Hannibal's vices in the initial character sketch, Livy clearly assumes that luxury and excess were Hannibalic depravities. It is this preoccupation, as suggested by Livy, which ultimately caused a decline in morality and a weakness that Rome could exploit in order to defeat the Carthaginian leader.

Livy's own personal resentment towards luxury and excess is highlighted in the *Preface*, for it was his own opinion that such vices were responsible for corrupting men and causing wide-spread destruction:

*Adeo quanto rerum minus, tanto minus cupiditatis erat; nuper divitae avaritiam et abundantes voluptates desiderium per luxum atque libidinem pereundi perdendique omnia invexere.*

For true it is that the less men's wealth was, the less was their greed. Of late, riches have brought in avarice, and excessive pleasures the longing to carry wantonness and licence to the point of ruin for oneself and of universal destruction.<sup>183</sup>

It is clear that Livy believed that luxury and excess were evils that had entered into Roman society and had caused moral decline. In turn, the strength and might of the Roman Empire waned, resulting in the anarchy which Livy witnessed in the first century BCE. We will see that Livy possibly indirectly exploits the imagery associated with the night in order to emphasise the negative connotations associated with obtaining excessive wealth. However, at the time of the Second Punic War, the wealth and consequent greed that Livy alludes to was, in his opinion, not yet present in Rome.<sup>184</sup> By highlighting the period before wealth became a Roman preoccupation, Livy avoids associating the Romans with such vices. In contrast, however, anecdotes that refer to Carthaginian excess demonstrate how Hannibal differed to aristocratic Romans, for he succumbed to his moral weakness and his ability to be swayed by material pleasures. Livy, then, actually adheres to the traditional depiction of the Carthaginians, and uses the imagery associated with the night to strengthen his characterisation of the Carthaginians as 'other.' Hannibal is portrayed as being the antithesis of the virtuous Roman, driven by greed and excess. Furthermore, as representative of

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<sup>183</sup> Livy, *Preface*, 12.

<sup>184</sup> It is Livy's opinion that the luxury and excess which the Roman's gained as a result of the defeat of Carthage in 146BCE was the catalyst which saw the development of Roman greed. From here onwards, Roman wealth and greed continued and ultimately aided in the causation of Civil War which erupted in the first century BCE. See Rossi (1963) 377-8.

Carthaginians as a whole, Hannibal's nocturnal activity demonstrates the Carthaginian tendency to show moral weakness and consequently pre-empt their own ruin.<sup>185</sup>

We learn from the outset of the third decade that Livy believed Hannibal was motivated, in part, by securing wealth and riches. Livy implies that the first Italian towns that Hannibal targeted was driven by a prospect of acquiring booty. Livy explains that Cartala, a wealthy town in the territory of the Olcades, was stormed and sacked first, from which the victorious army departed enriched with spoils.<sup>186</sup> Saguntum was also targeted as it was the wealthiest city beyond the Ebro, and consequently brought the Carthaginians great prosperity.<sup>187</sup> Naturally, these towns would have been targeted due to their strategic importance to the Carthaginian war effort, which Livy himself recognises.<sup>188</sup> However, Livy places particular emphasis on highlighting the wealth associated with these towns. The emphasis, then, is assigned not to the strategic importance of the towns, but Hannibal's desire to acquire booty and spoils.

We learn more of Hannibal's love of wealth when he abandoned the Carthaginian camp: "he left the camp full of ever sort of public and private riches, and putting himself at the head of his troops, who carried nothing but their weapons, marched over the nearest ridge."<sup>189</sup> The importance of the acquired wealth is undeniable, for Livy implies that Hannibal took careful measures to ensure that all of the "public and private riches" were accounted for on departure. Moreover, it is also interesting that Livy makes use of a night time setting. On this occasion the darkness and the cover of night were used by Hannibal constructively, as it disguised his departure and provided the security he needed to transport his riches safely. As such, Livy does not criticise Hannibal's acquisition of booty, for he showed mastery of his environment and used the night to obtain the wealth necessary for conducting military operations. Of course, it could also be that Livy was using the secrecy of the setting to advance a character flaw in Hannibal, that of greed. So while the

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<sup>185</sup> It was this drive that ultimately led to Hannibal's defeat at the hands of his Roman adversaries.

<sup>186</sup> Livy, 21.5.3-4.

<sup>187</sup> Livy, 21.7.2.

<sup>188</sup> Livy, 21.5.17: "And now everything south of the Ebro, except Saguntum [which Hannibal soon acquires], was in the hands of the Carthaginians." (*Et iam omnia trans Hiberum praetor Saguntinos Carthaginiensium erant*).

<sup>189</sup> Livy, 22.41.6.

procurement of wealth was a part of any military campaign, we should not ignore the imagery, which provides an alternative dimension to both Hannibal's character and Livy's attitude toward military operations that were deemed excessive and therefore 'improper.'

We can understand Livy's position in regards to the procurement of military wealth through an analysis of Marcellus' and Fabius' actions. In analysing how these Romans obtained wealth, it is interesting to note that there is no direct association with the night. This in itself is important, for Livy is able to express his ideas of 'proper' conduct, and thus provide a framework for interpreting Hannibal's nocturnal activity. We learn, then, that the obtaining of booty from various towns to fund military campaigns was not unique to the Carthaginian war effort, for Livy ascribes the same action to the Romans. We learn that following his capture of Syracuse in 212BCE, Marcellus plundered the city for its wealth:

*...ornamenta Urbis, signa tabulasque quibus abundabant Syracusae, Romam devexit, hostium quidem illa spoila et parta belli iure.*

The adornments of the city, the statues and paintings which Syracuse possessed, he carried them away to Rome. They were spoils of the enemy, to be sure, and acquired by the right of war.<sup>190</sup>

By suggesting that the acquisition of such booty was sanctioned by the right of warfare, Livy claims that Marcellus acted in accordance to proper conduct, for he gained booty not only for funding his war effort but also to bring heightened honour to Rome herself.<sup>191</sup>

Therefore, Livy claims that the procuring of booty was an accepted, and almost expected, factor of warfare practices. This inference is supported by the use of the term *ius belli* which suggests a 'rule of battle' that gaining wealth was an accepted and obligatory convention. Furthermore, by incorporating this factor, Livy legitimises Marcellus' plunder of Syracuse

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<sup>190</sup> Livy, 25.40.2.

<sup>191</sup> Livy praises Marcellus' actions at 25.4.1: "...Marcellus, having captured Syracuse, after he had settled all else in Sicily with such good faith and integrity that he increased both his own repute and the dignity of the Roman people, removed to Rome the ornaments of Syracuse, the statues and paintings which Syracuse possessed in abundance..." (*Marcellus captis Syracusis, cum cetera in Sicilia tanta fide atque integritate composuisset ut non modo suam gloriam sed etiam maiestatem populi Romani augeret, ornamenta urbis, signa tabulasque quibus abundabant Syracusae, Romam devexit...*). Trans. by Rossi (2000).



through obeying the law of battle.<sup>192</sup> As we have mentioned, the absence of the night in this anecdote is significant, with the omission alone indicative of ideal Roman conduct and of Livy's own attitude toward the night and the procurement of wealth. Similarly, Fabius plundered Tarentum after the re-capture of the city from Carthaginian possession in 209BCE. Livy provides an account of the plethora of wealth obtained during Fabius' plunder of the city:

*Triginta milia servilium capitum dicuntur capta, argenti vis ingens facti  
signatique, auri tria milia octoginta pondo, signa et tabulae, prope ut  
Syracusarum ornamenta aequaverint.*

Thirty thousand slaves are said to have been captured, and immense quantity of silver, wrought and coined, of gold three thousand and eighty pounds, statues and paintings, so that they almost rivalled the adornments of Syracuse.<sup>193</sup>

We have already explored how Fabius' assault on Tarentum was negative, with Livy criticising his lack of *moderatio* toward the inhabitants.<sup>194</sup> Even though Livy's disgust in Fabius' treatment of the inhabitants is justified, it still remains that the general needed monetary funds. It was this need to obtain monetary resources that Livy supported, but not the manner in which he executed his plan. Therefore, the absence of negative commentary in the anecdote above implies that Livy acknowledged Fabius' need for monetary resources, which he successfully obtained. The reference here to Syracuse is important, for it suggests that Fabius was following the same conventions that Marcellus had, similarly acting in

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<sup>192</sup> It needs to be noted that scholars such as Carawan (1985) consider Livy to be condemning Marcellus for his plunder of Syracuse, stating that the appropriation of art and treasure was a tactical error which set a dangerous precedent in the moral decline of Roman national character. This is true in the sense that Marcellus maybe went too far, yet it cannot be denied that the acquisition of booty was Marcellus' right. Rossi (2000) 61, also explores how despite the praise towards Marcellus' siege, Livy interprets this episode as an important change in the city of Rome: "Rome, as a result of the spoils of Syracuse, has brought into its own space something that is alien to it." However, the praise that Livy gives to Marcellus suggests that Livy does not wholeheartedly blame Marcellus; he seems to suggest that the blame for Rome's demise needs to be placed on Rome herself, due to revelling in new luxuries. Thus, the story of Marcellus, not Marcellus himself, becomes and exemplum of this decline and the loss of identity.

<sup>193</sup> Livy, 27.16.7.

<sup>194</sup> Refer to page 63-65.

accordance with accepted laws of battle. Livy, then, condones the necessary procuring of booty if it had the pretence of supporting the expensive war effort, which was a reality of military warfare. Similarly, Hannibal's acquisition of booty from various towns in a day time setting was not synonymous with his apparent lust for wealth as he was merely following recognised and accepted military conventions, essential for funding and maintaining his military campaign. In contrast, however, the inclusion of the night in anecdotes describing Hannibal's obtaining of wealth alters this perception, with Livy casting Hannibal as a greedy general who did not conduct himself properly. Livy exploits the imagery of the night to heighten Hannibal's greed, and to emphasise how the night had the ability to alter a person's judgement and character.

The understanding that Hannibal was initially abiding to the established and accepted conventions associated with wealth is undeniable. However, we learn that the difference between the Roman and Carthaginian association with wealth, as outlined by Livy, was Hannibal's obsession with material possessions, and his exploitation of night to obtain it. Hannibal's weakness for wealth corrupted his abilities to conduct himself in the proper fashion, transforming him into a negligent and ineffective leader. Hannibal's association with wealth has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Walsh suggests that Hannibal had a tendency to put his trust wholly in fortune,<sup>195</sup> and Burck claims Hannibal was motivated by "mere satisfaction of vengeance and greed for booty" in victory.<sup>196</sup> Our investigation of Hannibal's association with wealth is important, for we learn that Livy clearly uses the night to aid in the manipulation of Hannibal's characterisation, changing from a man associated with acquiring monetary funds, into a general who was negligent of his troops. This inversion of Hannibal's character is most explicitly seen during his stay at Capua.

#### Hannibal in Capua:

After the decisive Roman defeat at the Battle of Cannae in 216BCE, Hannibal withdrew his troops to Capua for the winter, where the Carthaginians revelled in the luxuries of comfort and immoderate pleasures:

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<sup>195</sup> Walsh (1982) 1068.

<sup>196</sup> Burck (1971) 33.

*Itaque, quos nulla mali vicerat vis, perdidere nimia bona ac voluptates  
inmodicae, et eo impensius quo avidius ex insolentia in eas se merserant.  
Somnus enim et vinum et epulae et scorta balineaque et otium consuetudine  
in dies blandius ita enervaverunt corpora animosque ut magis deinde  
praeteritae victoriae eos quam praesentes tutarentur vires...*

And so those whom no severe hardship had conquered were ruined by excess of comfort and immoderate pleasures and the more completely ruined the more eagerly they in their experience had plunged into them. For sleep and wine, and feasts and harlots, and baths and idleness, which habit made daily more seductive, so weakened their bodies and spirits that it was their past victories rather than their present strength which thereafter protected them...<sup>197</sup>

Even though wealth and material possessions are not mentioned here,<sup>198</sup> the comforts that the Carthaginians indulge in were clearly luxuries, especially for an army of hardened soldiers, who, as Livy states, had “no experience or familiarity with comforts” (*bonis inexpertum atque insuetum*).<sup>199</sup> There is also the difference that the type of wealth discussed here is no longer associated with the acquisition of military resources and the maintenance of a campaign. Livy describes luxuries such as sleep, wine, feasts and idleness, which he criticizes since the Carthaginian army became “ruined” over the winter season. Through this example, Livy provides the reader with his own opinion towards the effects of indulgence. Livy explains that the luxuries associated with comfort were detrimental to even the hardest of men, as they weakened the bodies and souls of those individuals who succumbed to such pleasures. Consequently, when the Carthaginians departed Capua, Livy states that “not a trace of the old-time morale survived” (*nihil usquam pristinae disciplinae tenuit*).<sup>200</sup> Livy comments on Hannibal’s excess here, for although gaining monetary

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<sup>197</sup> Livy, 23.18.11-13.

<sup>198</sup> Polybius’s account at 7.1 differs, in that he does attribute the luxury associated with Capua to its wealth.

<sup>199</sup> Livy, 23.18.10.

<sup>200</sup> Livy, 23.18.14 .

resources was essential to the war effort, the indulgence in such luxuries had no economic gain so was purely a means to satisfy materialistic desires.

The detrimental effects that the stay at Capua had upon the Carthaginian army has been noted by scholars such as Rossi, who states that “the Carthaginian army, seduced by the *luxuria* of Capua, undergoes a dangerous metamorphosis...[and] becomes a shadow of its former self.”<sup>201</sup> Livy claims that the Romans themselves were aware of the dangers associated with luxury and excess, especially Fulvius Flaccus, who ensured that the Roman army did not pass through Capua out of the fear that the luxuries associated with the city would weaken the army, as they had to Hannibal’s men.<sup>202</sup> Carthaginian excess, therefore, highlights the complexities associated with characterising Hannibal, with the Carthaginian preoccupation with luxury being a vice which Romans themselves shunned. For Livy luxury and excess were to be avoided unless they were driven by economic motive, and was another trait that aided the depiction of Carthaginians as barbarian foes.

We can add another dimension to this analysis. While there is no specific reference to the night in Livy’s account of Carthaginian excess at Capua, it is reasonable to infer that such activities did occur within a night time setting. Simply, Livy draws reference to the indulgence in sleep, which we naturally associate with the night. Additionally, Morrison convincingly suggests that the night and the associated darkness was the preferred and even ideal time and setting for excess and luxurious activity to occur.<sup>203</sup> While it is suggested that the night was sometimes used as a screen to hide activities within a setting associated with secrecy, the use of the night as a time to indulge in such excesses was a societally accepted norm.<sup>204</sup> As stated by Morrison, “excess and luxury, therefore, are accepted and expected constructs of the night, a part of how Romans present and understand their society.”<sup>205</sup> Even though Hannibal was not a Roman (despite exhibiting Roman tendencies),

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<sup>201</sup> Rossi (1963) 369.

<sup>202</sup> Livy, 27.3.2: “Flaccus...feared that the great charms of the city might weaken his army also, as they had Hannibal’s.” (*metuens ne suum quoque exercitum sicut Hannibalis nimia urbis amoenitas emorilliret*).

<sup>203</sup> See Morrison (2012). Even though examples are taken from Tacitus, Juvenal and Martial, the abundance of reference to the occurrence of luxury at night suggests that the view of the night as being a time of excess was a common Roman perception, and the same principals can be applied to Livy and his treatment of night time indulgences.

<sup>204</sup> Morrison (2012) 4.

<sup>205</sup> Morrison (2012) 5.

we can apply the same concepts to Carthaginian activity since Livy was a Roman historian who applied his own perception of societal norms upon the Carthaginians. Furthermore, Livy was perhaps accentuating these norms, knowing that his Roman readers would have understood the association with 'the night.' In no way does this mean that Carthaginian indulgence in such decadences would be reserved solely for the night. Rather, it seems unquestionable that the night would be the setting for a variety of these Carthaginian comforts, and/or the reader was meant to make the link. In this way, the argument that night time perceptions were further employed to aid the imagery of luxury and deceit can be applied.

If we accept this association (between the night and the Carthaginian seduction by *luxuria* at Capua) we have another instance in which night time is used, albeit indirectly, to develop Hannibal's character. It is surprising that Livy makes an indirect association with the night here, rather than directly mentioning it. Perhaps he wanted to be more subtle, with the connection to the night being obvious to his audience. Nevertheless, Livy makes it clear that Hannibal allowed his men to indulge in such depravities, and possibly even encouraged such behaviour. It would be naïve to suggest that the general himself did not also fall victim to the alluring nature of such comforts. Livy, therefore, exploits the nuances associated with night to manipulate Hannibal's gaining of campaign wealth into a love for luxury, whilst further undermining Hannibal's character and highlighting the factor which led to the Carthaginian failure. Hannibal's thirst for luxury placed him in the position of being a negligent leader. By allowing the military discipline and training to wain and become lax, Hannibal effectively turned his army into one of effeminates, corrupted and weakened by the comforts which he had allowed them to indulge in. Livy himself explores the notion of Hannibal failing in his responsibilities as a general, for he states that the winter spent at Capua "was regarded by military experts as a more serious failure in their commander than that he had not led his men from the field of Cannae forthwith to the city of Rome."<sup>206</sup> Hannibal's decision to camp at Capua therefore not only ruined the Carthaginian army, but also ensured that the remainder of his campaign in Italy would be met with severe challenges and ultimate defeat.

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<sup>206</sup> Livy, 23.18.13: *...maiusque id peccatum ducis apud peritos atrium militare haberetur quam quod non ex Cannensi acie protinus ad urbem Romanum duxisset.*

In his failure to recognise the dangers associated with the comforts of luxury, Hannibal demonstrates his moral weakness, with the night altering his previous astuteness. Livy clearly describes Hannibal as acting in an ‘improper’ manner, for in Capua he abandons the sensibilities and astuteness that he had previously demonstrated. We have explored how it was Hannibal’s ability to demonstrate these qualities that aligned him with Roman commanders, a result of his *virtus* and proper military conduct. Even though night is not mentioned directly, the manifestation of Hannibal into a negligent leader could suggest that Livy was subtly exploiting the night-time imagery to heighten and emphasise the alteration to Hannibal’s character. Therefore, Livy exploits the connotations of inversion associated with darkness and night time activity to help him present an alternative side of Hannibal with emphasis on a character flaw, that of greed and extravagance. The imagery of the night, then, with Livy’s focus on Hannibalic luxury, allows us to identify the fundamental difference between the character of Hannibal in contrast to aristocratic Roman values. As summarised by Rossi, the presentation of Hannibal as being a man driven by luxury opposes Livy’s presentation of the Roman commanders, especially Scipio Africanus, who are represented as being the embodiment of *virtus*. In contrast, Hannibal embodies foreign vices.<sup>207</sup>

Even though the night was a societally accepted time for indulgence, Livy makes comment on the improper nature of such luxuries for the army. The danger associated with the night again becomes significant, with the ability to morph and alter preconceived norms. Livy uses the night to serve his own agenda, providing moral instruction to his audience. Although he was writing with the knowledge of hindsight, by commenting on Hannibal’s stay at Capua Livy highlights the destructive tendencies associated with night, as well as excessive greed. While Roman abstinence from excess may have aided their war effort during the Punic Wars, the introduction of wealth into Rome thereafter, in Livy’s opinion, resulted in the corrupted Rome that he lived in. The metamorphosis of the Carthaginian army at Cannae represented a microcosm of what the Roman army would become and, as

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<sup>207</sup> Rossi (1963) 362.

stated by Rossi, foreshadowed the destiny endured at a later time by the Roman army and eventually by Rome herself.<sup>208</sup>

The episode at Capua, then, is important in the scheme of both Livy's history and the depiction of Hannibal due to being a major turning point in the Italian campaigns during the Second Punic War. Hannibal's indulgence in luxury rendered him incapable of being a 'complete' military commander, with his admirable leadership qualities altered in the night-time setting, becoming tainted by corruption. By highlighting how the Romans avoided Capua, Livy explains how, despite his admirable qualities, Hannibal's nocturnal indulgences ultimately revealed him as a foreigner who did not possess the strengths and virtues synonymous with aristocratic Romans. Hannibal's failure to conduct himself in the 'ideal' Roman fashion placed him within a negative framework and thus accounted for the traditional hostile characterisation present within Roman society in Livy's own time. Therefore, although Livy demonstrates Hannibalic sympathy, the Roman historian subtly exploits the imagery associated with the night, allowing him to recognise the facts and present them. Hannibal was a great leader whose obsession with wealth demonstrated his 'un-Romanness' and ultimately sealed his own fate. In doing so, the Capuan episode serves as a valuable tool for Livy's moralistic messages, for he used the night to convey that even the best commanders, when undermined by excessive luxury, would fail themselves and their people.

Livy's indirect use of the night in the Capuan episode is significant. He possibly utilised the negative imagery to parallel and foreshadow Rome's own demise following similar circumstances at Carthage in 146BCE. Livy suggests that the episode at Capua should have served as a learning mechanism for the Romans, with Hannibal's corruption being used as a moral lesson to educate Romans about the dangers of both the night and of excess.<sup>209</sup> However, if the Romans were to refer to their own history and learn from the conduct of

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<sup>208</sup> See Rossi (1963) 371.

<sup>209</sup> Livy further foreshadows Rome's demise and the failure to learn from the mistakes made by Hannibal at 25.40.2 by addressing how Rome's preoccupation and obsession with wealth was introduced to the Roman psyche following Marcellus' sack of Syracuse in 212BC: "Yet from that [the plundering of Syracuse] came the very beginning of enthusiasm for Greek works of art and consequently of this general licence to despoil all kinds of building, sacred and profane..." (*ceterem inde primum initium mirandi Graecarum artium opera licentiaeque huius sacra profanaque omnia vulgo spoilandi factum est*).

traditional Roman figures, the corruption in Rome need not have happened. An analysis of Camillus' actions again becomes pertinent, for during his siege of Veii in 396BCE, although presented with the prospect of an unparalleled quantity of booty,<sup>210</sup> he refrained from acquiring it. Livy provides evidence of a debate in the Senate,<sup>211</sup> where it was recognised that the public treasuries were full and therefore it was unnecessary to plunder the city, yet it was also a soldiers right to do so.<sup>212</sup> Livy explains that although individual soldiers were given permission to plunder if they desired, Camillus sold the free-born inhabitants into slavery which was "the only money that went into the state treasury."<sup>213</sup> These anecdotes are significant, for they identify the differences between gaining wealth for funding war as opposed to indulgence and corruption. Furthermore, Livy does not associate the night with Camillus' actions, suggesting abstinence from nocturnal activity was in this instance demonstrative of proper conduct and Roman *virtus*. Camillus, as an idealised figure, was able to make the separation between economic necessities and self-gain, demonstrative of his *moderatio*. Livy implies that if Rome had considered Camillus' actions, combined with observing and learning from Hannibal's mistakes, Roman corruption would not have happened.

The indirect association with the night can be inferred to highlight the warnings related with Hannibal's stay at Capua, which are ignored by the Romans. As a result, Carthage was the equivalent of Capua for Rome, with the comforts associated with each corrupting the men who succumbed to them. Livy, then, rather than depicting Hannibal as adverse to Roman tendencies, actually draws attention to their similarities once again. By falling victim to the same vices, and using the night in improper ways, both Carthage and Rome await the same fate.

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<sup>210</sup> Livy alludes to the unprecedented wealth of Veii at 5.20.1: "The dictator saw that victory was at last within his grasp, and that a city of great wealth was on the point of being taken, with booty more than if all previous wars had been put together." (*Dictator cum iam in minimis videret victoriam esse, urbem opulentissimam capi, tantumque praedae fore, quantum non omnibus in unum conlatis ante bellis fuisset*).

<sup>211</sup> See Livy 5.20.4-10 for an account of this debate.

<sup>212</sup> Livy explains how it was thought to be wicked for so much money should lie in a treasury already exhausted from the wars (5.20.5), yet to maintain their popularity the Senate proclaims that any man who wanted to plunder Veii could do so (5.20.7-10). Livy highlights at 5.22.2 that the commons were angry about the decision to not sack Veii wholeheartedly, and blamed their commanders "niggardliness" (*malignitatis*).

<sup>213</sup> Livy, 5.22.1: "On the following day the dictator sold the free-born inhabitants into slavery. This was the only money that went into the state treasury." (*Postero die libera corpora dictator sub corona vendidit. Ea sola pecunia in publicum redigitur...*).



With a focus on the correlation between night and luxury, Livy's multi-level characterisation of Hannibal again becomes apparent. While the episode at Capua highlights the depravities associated with the darkness, we would assume that Livy would succeed in conveying Hannibal's barbarian status as the distinguishing factor between him and his Roman counterparts. Yet, the boundary between 'other' and Roman once again becomes blurred, with the Roman demonstration of 'un-Roman' traits at Carthage rendering the two foes indistinguishable. Livy further uses the night to cast the figure of Hannibal, despite his flaws, in a similar light to the Romans: his expert military skills and astute leadership was clearly admired, and, despite his vices, was a foe deserving of his various successes within Italy.

## CONCLUSION

Through our examination of Hannibal's nocturnal military activity, we have learnt that Hannibal was perceived in Roman society with a degree of complexity. Added to this difficulty is understanding that Livy presented multi-level and complicated characters, which is especially applicable to Hannibal. As such, determining how Livy presented Hannibal within his *Ab Urbe Condita*, specifically the third decade, is challenging. Furthermore, the setting of the night only adds to this challenge, for we know that Livy at times manipulated and utilised the imagery associated with the night, in order to advance his themes and messages through literary embellishment. By examining Hannibal's nocturnal military activities, we have revealed that Hannibal was an incredibly complicated figure, and the manner that he was received in Roman society was equally as ambiguous. This in itself is interesting, for we learn that Hannibal was not merely a one-dimensional hostile foe, and that the Romans themselves viewed Hannibal in such a varied fashion. Our focus, then, has successfully allowed us to explore and provide new and valued insight into the dimensions of Hannibal's character, whilst simultaneously advancing our understanding of the perception of the night in society, Roman military *virtus*, and Livy's treatment of figures within his history.

We have learnt that Hannibal has widely been portrayed as one of Rome's most formidable foes, threatening Roman domination of the Mediterranean with an extensive campaigning season in Italy, in which he was rewarded numerous successes. As such, Hannibal's depiction by Roman sources has been primarily shaped by accusations of *Punica fraus* and *crudelitas*. As a result, Hannibal has traditionally been viewed as the antithesis to Roman *virtus*, embodying many of the traits scorned within Roman society due to being contrary to ethical military conduct, and therefore synonymous with the 'other.' Livy has previously been viewed as one such source that depicted Hannibal negatively, but our investigation into Hannibalic night time military activity proves that this was not the case. As a historian, Livy had to acknowledge and account for the negative view, yet night time anecdotes offer an alternative and new perspective.

The use of the night by Livy aids in analysing an alternative manner to consider how both Livy, and the Romans, viewed Hannibal within Roman society. The comparability of his own night time tactics to those of the Romans, especially the heroes of the third decade such as Scipio Africanus, Fabius Maximus and Marcellus, provided Livy with the ability to praise and acknowledge Hannibal's astuteness and capabilities as a military commander. Hannibal's use of the night was mostly synonymous with tactics of the Romans, which were usually sanctioned as being accepted military conventions from early in Roman development; a time of idealisation and moral strength. Livy, however, must also conform to societal perceptions regarding Hannibal, with the nuances associated with the night, especially those of danger and confusion, being used and manipulated by Livy to ultimately highlight Hannibal's barbarian status and the fundamental difference between the Carthaginian general and his Roman counterparts. In particular, Livy uses the night time setting to enhance and morph what the Romans considered to be *Punica fraus*, with Hannibal's tactics becoming more elaborate under the cover of darkness and in opposition to traditional military *virtus* and ethics. Thus, through the figure of Hannibal we can identify Livy's manipulation of the night and Hannibalic activity to suit his own agenda and to provide moral lessons to his Roman readers. Livy uses Hannibal's nocturnal military escapades as a way of highlighting how character perception and presentation provides insight into and further understanding of Roman values.

Through our analysis of night time anecdotes we have highlighted the difficulties associated with examining not only the character of Hannibal, but the manner in which Livy characterised figures more generally. Livy's multi-level and complicated character portrayal has allowed us to offer a new perspective on how characters were treated within Livy's work. In particular, our investigation has provided valuable insight to the dimensions of Hannibal's character, providing a new interpretation of a figure who we know little about. However, this investigation has not been without its challenges. Because we know Livy presents complex characters, we see Hannibal depicted in various ways. We would assume that Livy would succeed in utilising the night to enhance the imagery associated with Hannibalic activity, yet ultimately this is not the case. Instead, Livy portrays Hannibal in a very ambiguous manner, in which negative depictions are countered and balanced, with the night revealing Hannibal's astuteness and capabilities as a good commander. Rather than

shedding light on Hannibal's depiction, we learn that the night further reveals the complexities associated with Hannibal's character.

Ultimately, all of our conclusions on how Hannibal was viewed in Roman society are valid and credible, depending on whether Hannibal's actions were considered from a military perspective or a Roman societal perspective. Some of Livy's praise may come from the knowledge of hindsight, with Rome the ultimate victor of the Punic Wars. Because of this, night time anecdotes reveal that Livy admired Hannibal militarily as an astute commander who respected his troops. Despite his status as 'other,' Livy was able to acknowledge Hannibal's adherence to universal ethics of warfare, which were synonymous with Rome's own tactics. Hannibal demonstrated his mastery of military *virtus*, but primarily he showed his control over his environment, especially the night. Livy cannot ignore Hannibal's control and utilisation of his surroundings which enabled the success of his stratagems. In contrast, however, the Roman failure to master their environment, especially the night, resulted in the loss of Roman ethics and ultimately aided in the ruin of Rome herself.

Although Livy uses night time anecdotes to emphasise his agenda and to provide moralistic messages, we need to remember that he was first and foremost a historian. Some of Livy's reference to Hannibalic night time activities are most certainly reflections of reality, an observation supported by the utilitarian aspect of Polybius' *Histories*. Livy's historical account benefits from the inclusion of such anecdotes, giving him a more accurate account of Roman history, while also preserving valuable insight into a near lost Carthaginian history. Furthermore, Livy is able to highlight the realities of ancient warfare practices for both Romans and Carthaginians alike. In the scheme of reconstructing Roman history, our investigation into Hannibal's nocturnal military activities provides new insights into aspects of Roman society, particularly in regards to their own perceptions and use of the night.

Therefore, through our examination of Hannibal's utilisation of the night for military strategy, we gain additional insight into not only Livy's moral messages and history of Rome and Carthage, but Livy's methodology as a historian and his treatment of characters. In the process, the sub-theme of the 'other' becomes important and difficult to define. The

boundary between Roman and non-Roman becomes incredibly blurred, with darkness ultimately revealing true character. Hannibal as representative of the 'other' is not fundamentally different from the Romans themselves. It would appear that Hannibal's mastery of night time stratagem brought him hatred in Roman society, a result of his skill and success. Whether there is any truth in the accusations ascribed to Hannibal is difficult for us to determine. What we do know, however, is that an examination of the night in Livy's third decade reveals the Carthaginian to be a great commander, whose skill was worthy of praise. Our investigation into Hannibal's nocturnal military activities reveals that Livy ultimately portrayed Hannibal as comparable to some of the best Roman generals, demonstrating ethical warfare and the military *virtus* revered within Roman society. As such, the night provides new and interesting insight into a very ambiguous figure, allowing us to develop our understanding of the dimensions of Hannibal's character and how he was viewed from a Roman perspective.

# **APPENDIX 1: The occurrence of *nox*, *nocturnus* in Livy books 21-30.**

	The Romans	The Carthaginians
<b>Measure of Time</b>		
Retreat to Camp (at onset of night/during night)	25.36.2.	27.18.15.
End of days events	21.29.8; 22.59.3; 23.18.6; 24.17.3; 24.32.9; 25.8.9; 25.34.14; 27.2.9; 27.12.10; 27.42.14; 28.15.12; 30.32.2.	
'Watches' as a means of telling time	21.48.1; 23.35.15; 24.46.4; 25.13.11; 25.30.7; 25.38.16; 26.15.7; 27.15.12; 30.5.2.	21.27.2; 25.9.1; 27.47.8.
Timeframe of "All day and night"	25.39.11.	
<b>Danger of Night</b>	25.38.1; 28.15.12; 29.27.11 (on the sea).	
<b>Rest/Sleeping</b>		
Sleeping	23.35.15 (inversion); 24.38.4; 25.9.8; 25.38.16 (inversion); 27.45.11 (no sleep).	21.2.8 (no sleep); 22.50.4; 23.18.10; 25.23.15; 27.47.8; 28.15.12; 29.6.10; 29.28.9 (no sleep).
Slaughter of the sleeping	23.35.15; 24.40.11; 25.24; 29.6.10.	23.17.10; 25.9.8; 25.39.1.
Eating/drinking	24.38.4.	23.35.13; 25.23.15.
Debauchery	29.18.6.	27.31.6.
<b>Sentries/Nightwatch</b>		
General nightwatch/guard	21.48.1; 21.57.7; 22.16.17; 22.5.9; 23.35.15; 24.20.13; 24.37.4; 24.45.10; 25.8.11; 25.34.4; 27.28.8; 28.15.16; 28.36.5.	22.22.15; 23.19.9; 25.23.15; 29.28.9; 30.5.3.
Negligent guards	27.24.4.	23.17.6; 23.35.15; 24.40.11; 24.46.4; 25.13.9; 25.38.16; 28.15.12; 29.6.10.
<b>Scouting/Surveillance</b>		
Observing enemy camp	25.13.9; 27.15.12; 30.4.3.	

Following the enemy	24.17.3.	25.35.8.
<b>Organization/Planning</b>		
Armed, organized “before dawn” etc	21.57.7; 23.35.15; 25.9.1; 25.13.9; 25.13.11; 27.12.11; 27.41.6; 27.42.14; 28.15.12 (to have breakfast); 28.15.12; 29.3.7.	21.35.7; 25.21.2.
Speech to troops	24.38.4.	
Planning/Meetings	24.38.4.	23.16.6.
Positioning of guards/troops	24.13.10; 24.37.4.	
<b>Travel/Movement/ Activities (stealth)</b>		
General Travel	22.25.17; 22.58.9; 23.23.9; 24.12.5; 24.17.8; 27.5.18; 27.50.1; 29.3.7.	
Night March	21.42.2; 23.35.15; 25.19.6; 25.35.7; 26.15.7; 27.43.12; 27.45.11.	21.27.2; 22.2.8; 22.41.6; 21.43.6; 24.35.8; 24.40.3 (Philip); 27.2.10; 27.12.10; 27.14.15; 27.16.10; 27.8.8; 27.42.14.
Positional Change	25.30.7; 27.41.6.	22.16.7; 22.24.6; 25.21.2; 27.26.8.
Crossing the River	21.42.2; 21.56.8.	21.27.2; 26.7.10.
Retreat/Flight	21.48.1; 21.56.8; 21.29.8; 22.50.4; 25.35.7; 27.28.2.	22.17.6; 24.17.3; 24.30.2; 24.40.11; 26.17.7; 27.13.4; 27.40.12; 27.41; 27.48.16 (Gauls); 28.15.12; 28.16.8; 29.7.10; 29.18.6; 30.5.3; 30.19.1.
Messengers/Envoys	22.50.4; 26.9.6; 29.36.6.	22.22.15; 26.4.2.
Ships	27.32.2; 29.27.7.	25.25.11.
Leave/“Break” Camp	21.42.2.	22.16.7; 22.41.6; 22.43.6; 25.9.8; 27.2.10; 27.14.15; 27.47.8; 28.15.16; 29.7.10.

Pitch Camp	25.36.2; 27.28.2.	22.17.6; 24.35.8; 25.9.1; 28.15.12.
Supplying (aid, food, firewood etc)	23.19.9; 25.8.4 (hunting guise); 25.34.4.	21.61.8; 25.39.1.
General Tactics	27.45.12; (unite camps); 29.36.6 (unite camps); 30.5.3 (fire).	22.16.7; 25.9.1; 25.21.2; 25.34.4; 27.2.7; 27.26.8; 28.36.5.
<b>Aggressive/Negative use of Night</b>		
Attack/Ambush	24.40.11; 24.46.4; 25.11.10; 25.23.15; 28.26.5; 30.5.3.	21.57.7; 21.61.8; 22.6.11; 25.34.5; 27.26.8.
Entering enemy camp	23.35.15; 24.40.11; 25.39.12.	
Entering/taking city	24.40.9; 24.46.4; 25.13.9; 25.24; 27.15.12; 29.6.10.	23.17.10 (not Hannibal); 25.9.8; 27.8.8 (a trick).
Raiding/pillaging/plunder	28.24.8 (bad Romans).	
Deserting	21.48.1 (Gallic aux.); 25.8.4 (Greeks in Italy).	21.12.4; 22.22.15; 24.45.1; 26.7.10; 27.47.8.
Suicide		23.41.4; 26.14.5.
Battle	24.46; 25.37.4 (Scipio); 25.39.11; 26.5.9.	
<b>Appointment of Dictator</b>	23.22.11.	
<b>Burial</b>	25.26.10 (disease, wailing); 27.2.10.	



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