

Effective engagement: the European
Union, liberal theory and the
Aceh peace process

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ABSTRACT

Peace has finally come to Aceh. The Indonesian province has suffered for over 30 years through conflict with the Indonesian army. Instrumental in having achieved this peaceful outcome has been the role of the European Union (EU). Its crucial monitoring role and long term commitment had a profound impact on the province, helping to end the hostilities and to rebuild Aceh. The EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is the central feature of this thesis.

Like Aceh, Europe has experienced wars. However, since the beginnings of Western European institution building, peace and cooperation in the region transpired. This phenomenon has spread across the continent. The progressive structure enabled the EU to flourish as a cooperative institution, especially in the aftermath of the Cold War east-west division. This period also gave the EU an opportunity to expand its peaceful legacy by exporting its values abroad. The development of the EU's external capability to deliver such aspirations is a central part of this thesis.

The thesis seeks to draw a connection with the EU's quest to bring peace to Aceh with international relations (IR) theory. As such, it assesses the EU's motives and interests in the Aceh peace process to discover what they were based on.

After assessing both realist and liberalist IR viewpoints, the thesis' central findings confirm the liberal motives of the EU. The EU has predominantly acted in the interests of Aceh. It helped bring many liberal based values to the province and experienced constructive relations with Indonesia and other powers in the region. Whilst realist-orientated EU power motives are outlined, the EU's liberal agenda based on mediation, peace and security, multilateralism, democracy and human rights – as core liberal elements – are more convincing explanations as this thesis argues.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS


AMIS	African Union Mission in the Sudan
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	Asia Europe Meeting
AU	African Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
Civ / Mil Cell	Civilian Military Cell
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
DR Congo / RD Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EC	European Commission
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDP	European Union Security and Defence Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUJUST LEX	EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission
EUPOL / EUPM	European Union Police Mission
EUSEC	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
EU SSR	European Union Security Sector Reform Mission
FR Germany	Federal Republic of Germany
FYR Macedonia	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAM	Free Aceh Movement
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

HD Centre	Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
HR/CFSP	High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
IGO	Inter-governmental Organisation
IMP	Initial Monitoring Presence
IR	International Relations
JSC	Joint Security Committee
LoGA	Law on Governing Aceh
LoN	League of Nations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RRF	Rapid Reaction Force
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
PSC	Political and Security Committee
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
TNI	Armed Forces of Indonesia
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two
WTO	World Trade Organisation

REGIONAL MAPS



Map of Southeast Asia



Map of Aceh

INTRODUCTION

The EU played an important role in the Aceh peace process. On invitation from the Indonesian government and set in the context of an enhanced EU security role, the AMM has been a prominent EU security venture. The province of *Nanggröe Aceh Darussalam* (Aceh), in northwest Sumatra, Indonesia, has been an ongoing battleground between the Free Aceh Movement [*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM)] and the Indonesian armed forces [*Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI)]. However, in 2005 past differences between the Indonesian Government and GAM were set inside in favour of a peaceful resolution to end the 30-year long conflict.

The realisation of peace has occurred for a number of reasons: from Indonesian reform, GAM compliance and successful negotiations, to the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Peace talks were held in Helsinki and the groundbreaking Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on the 15th of August 2005. Immediately following the historic accords, the EU-led AMM was dispatched to the province to monitor the agreement. Together with a force from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 15-month long successful AMM expired on the 15th of December 2006 after the Aceh elections.

Conflict resolution in Aceh is a significant international development. Aceh may be a small province but in terms of international progress, this example of a successful outcome has wider ramifications. As this thesis argues, the result fits into the post-Cold War drift towards greater inter-state dialogue and cooperation where peace has been given a greater chance. The EU's mediation role has been paramount.

This thesis assesses the motives and interests of the EU in the Aceh peace process. As an interesting and worthwhile area of study, it provides a powerful insight to the EU's new global role and what impact it is having around the world. The thesis takes on a specific and contemporary case study and uses compelling IR theories to construct its argument. Specific to peace studies, it reveals that international cooperation is a powerful phenomenon that has alleviated conflict, where peace in regions like Aceh has been made possible. Liberal theory has primarily been used to analyse the inquiry. Key features of the liberal-inspired investigation include the growth and prominence

of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) in helping to alleviate conflict, the use of mediation and the revelation of a list of post-Cold War liberal international developments that have led to the realisation of international progress. Global order and stability has advanced which is better for global stability and is in the interests of humanity. For these reasons, the inquiry is also a very inspirational area of study.

Aims and objectives

This thesis main aim is to explain why the EU engaged itself in the Aceh peace process. What were its motives and interests? Did it act to expand its position in the region? In other words, was the EU's action based on power motives to compete with other powers? Or on the other hand, did the EU have more altruistic motives? Were its reasons based on a genuine interest in bringing peace and security to another part of the world?

In order to answer these questions, the research developed a wide-ranging political focus. IR theory established the framework for inquiry: to help understand the nature of inter-state relations, to investigate what factors motivate and influence state behaviour and importantly, and to find out in which direction inter-state relations are taking: will there be greater manifestations of competition and conflict (as realists generally perceive), or cooperation and harmony? The impetus of global harmony is a central liberal argument, having transpired in the post-Cold War era.

Directly linked to liberal theory is the case of the EU. With a history of cooperative inter-state relations built on multilateralism and a developing security apparatus, it is emerging as a force of 'good' around the world. Within this context, the EU was an acceptable force to both sides of the Aceh conflict. Its prominent role is a lead example of an international power helping bring stability. This development is thus best understood through a liberal IR inquiry. However, this thesis acknowledges the significance of realist-orientated ideas that have provided alternative explanations. These are explained in the concluding points.

Research methods

A wide range of theoretical and empirical sources was used to answer the research questions. There are a number of publications written on the Aceh peace process and the role of the EU but most are internally EU-based. To add to this area of study, especially from New Zealand, is a unique opportunity. Like Indonesia, New Zealand is an Asia-Pacific country, and has a large external focus in the region.

This thesis brings together existing literature from a broad framework:

- IR theory (realism verses liberalism): this examined material from classical to prominent 20th century ideas and the post-Cold War era
- EU: its background as an international institution, how its development has influenced the world and where it fits into IR theory
- European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): the growth and importance of the EU's security apparatus and how it impacts around the world
- Aceh: history of the conflict, Indonesian rule, the peace process; and also Indonesian-specific material
- AMM: description, implementation, achievements, its impact in the wider Southeast Asian region, its relevance to other ESDP missions

Data collection

Using secondary material, the two overarching IR theories, realism and liberalism, were carefully scrutinised and the main contrasts between the two were drawn out to provide the premise for this inquiry. After a considerable amount of research, as the thesis' title suggests, *'Effective engagement: the European Union, liberal theory and the Aceh peace process'*, the liberal argument was primarily used to justify the research questions. In short, because of liberal theory's ambitious assertion of IR, it provides an 'optimistic forecast' of cooperative inter-state relations and conflict resolution. For this reason, the theory was chosen as the explanatory tool for the research.

The research process was formulated with the use of both primary and secondary material:

Wide ranges of sources were explored to explain the conceptual framework: from the ideas of early theorists to political scientists and officials, and also historical documents.

For the EU-related information, a combination of EU primary documents and secondary material was drawn upon. The internet was widely used in search of these. The use of primary documents gave an insight of first-hand policy and from experts in the field. EU press releases, statements, policy documents, summit outcomes and treaties. Secondary material on the EU's foreign policy development and the EU in general were also extensively used.

A combination of historical material and primary EU-based publications explained the state of affairs in Aceh from early Aceh history to the peace process. Information on the AMM drew upon both primary and secondary sources. This included mission statements, internal EU research papers, pamphlets, articles, journals, member states' ministerial releases and EU parliamentary debates.

Three interviews were conducted:

- European Commission Official, Banda Aceh, Indonesia
- LTG Nipat Thonglek, Director and Deputy Head of AMM, Department of Border Affairs Supreme Command Headquarters, Bangkok, Thailand
- Jüri Laas, AMM Spokesperson, Council of the European Union, Brussels, Belgium.

Data analysis

To overcome the complex nature of the inquiry and to construct the thesis, a step by step analysis technique was used to build the chain of evidence to justify the inquiry. This procedure, as follows, proved particularly beneficial when using the evidence to construct the argument:

- attempting to link the theory with the empirical information proved challenging, but by isolating common themes from the liberal umbrella proved useful. Links were then made with specific liberal aspects to the AMM and EU foreign policy more broadly
- alongside this, to understand the EU from 1957 and its evolution into its current form – especially its security dimension – inter-related ideas on EU history, evolution, important developments and the changing international context (among other factors) were scrutinised as part of the bigger picture of the EU's international output.
- to assist the inquiry, key liberal ideas were extracted from a central EU document. As identified in the following section, the principles were used as the basis of the concluding chapter

Thesis outline

The thesis' four chapters are equally relevant to the thesis' investigation to build the closing argument.

Chapter one

The first chapter explains the definitions of the two conflicting IR theories, realism and liberalism, from their evolution from leading classical thought to post-Cold War international politics. Realism has a pessimistic worldview about creating international order. In its three forms (classicist, modern and neo), realists generally argue that inter-state conflict is inevitable because of the existence of international anarchy. State behaviour is unregulated; states thus reside in mutual fear and must therefore seek to maximise their interests, which is normally defined as their power capability. The reality is a highly competitive international environment as states seek 'power, pride and prestige'. In the 20th century, World War II (WWII) and the Cold War are regarded as confirming the prevalence of realist-orientated IR.

In the post-Cold War era, realism continues to provide compelling arguments of international pessimism, which is backed up by ongoing rivalry and competition between states. A lack of international authority remains to be the case, while prospects for peace are limited. Realist perceptions surrounding power, competition,

capability and interests provide a level of understanding of EU motives in Aceh as the thesis concludes. However, as the chapter explains, this thesis largely rejects realist premises as the explanatory tool for understanding IR in the post-Cold War era. In a similar line of thought, realism falls short to explain the EU's motives in Aceh.

Liberalism helped to overturn these negative viewpoints of global disharmony to provide an alternative perspective. As this thesis explains, the case of the EU delivering goodwill around the world is a key liberal standpoint. Liberalism has made a significant impact upon IR thought from its classicist origins through its current form. Ideas surrounding individual rights and liberty, democracy, capitalism and justice are paramount understandings of the social world and what the prospects are for a harmonious order at both individual and state levels. Classical liberalism, liberal idealism, liberal institutionalism and liberalism in its three 'neo' forms, dominant after the Cold War, rest their cases on the hope for international peace and prosperity. Many liberal values, such as democracy, mediation, multilateralism and institution building have helped facilitate inter-state dialogue and cooperation and help resolve conflict.

The argument of the EU as a prominent post-WWII institution builder is the subject for this inquiry. Its focus on multilateralism, mediation, norm and value promotion, proved to be a successful tool for international peace and prosperity. Its values have expanded beyond Europe and into places such as Aceh, as this thesis explains.

Chapter two

This chapter explains the EU's experience in more detail, from its inauguration as the six-member European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to its current form as the 27-member state EU. Its symbol as a post-WWII institutionally-driven phenomenon was formalised into a political entity in 1993. The end of the Cold War brought both challenges and opportunities for EU external action. Immediate engagement in Iraq and the Western Balkans demonstrated EU limitations but since then major EU foreign policy and security advancements have taken place.

This chapter places most emphasis on the evolution and creation of the ESDP in 1999. Set in the post-Cold War context of greater EU ambitions with renewed liberal ideals, the ESDP has become a formalised EU institution and has expanded the EU's

international role. From 2003, 20 ESDP missions have been executed in the Western Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and to Southeast Asia. Consistent with liberal theory, as this thesis argues, the ESDP is not centred on the EU's drive for power and prestige; most missions are civilian natured and therefore not an attempt to execute large-scale military endeavours. Along with descriptions of the missions, the chapter identifies idioms associated with the ESDP that largely defends it as a liberal-orientated entity largely focusing on civilian crisis management. Key documents such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) are explored to strengthen the case that the EU is predominantly liberal-driven.

Chapter three

The AMM's setting in Aceh is the focus of chapter three. The history of Aceh's struggle goes back to the period of European exploration when the Acehnese were well-known for their defiance to outside rule; this legacy continues. The Portuguese and British both experienced Acehnese resistance but the Dutch managed to establish control. After WWII, free from outside control and during Indonesia's war of independence, Aceh experienced a cultural revitalisation of their identity and had formed a political administration. After independence, Aceh was incorporated into the North Sumatra province. Immediate Aceh resistance manifested with small scale skirmishes. Hereafter, Aceh was granted special autonomy and enjoyed a level of self-rule. However, dictatorial rule in Indonesia from 1967-1998, brought Aceh's special status to an end. This led to the formation of the rebel movement GAM in 1976; war with the Indonesian government (through the TNI) has been ongoing. Aceh has suffered enormously.

Steps to Indonesian reform occurred from 1998 onwards. Alongside reform was the chance to end the conflict in Aceh but progress was slow. An agreement in 2002 broke down and led to renewed conflict. Two years later, important international interest came to Aceh. At about the same time, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami hit the region. The impact of the devastating tsunami gave a massive impetus for both sides to solve the conflict. Among other reasons, a resolution between the two sides was created and signed in August 2005. As part of the agreement, the EU-led AMM was set up.

This introduces the mission. Aceh conflict resolution, with the tsunami relief and reconstruction efforts, provided a significant opportunity for the EU to help realise its goals as an effective and responsive international mediator in crisis management. It has helped bring sustained peace by delivering a list of institutional assistance mechanisms from justice to human rights and democracy. It was the EU's 11th mission but was the first to the Asia-Pacific region. As a small and remote province on Indonesia's vast archipelago, EU engagement in Aceh is minor. Moreover, the mission is a miniscule example of the EU acting around the world but the mission has wider implications. This is because it fits in with the ESDP's development stages and because of its setting, it has brought a wider regional focus for the EU. The chapter identifies the EU's crucial role in Aceh in helping bring peace. It has helped facilitate constructive engagement with Indonesia and as jointly run with ASEAN, the mission has helped advance EU-ASEAN relations. The development of international mediation and cooperation is pronounced in this case.

Chapter four

Chapter four brings the argument to a close. Liberal IR theory, the post-Cold War context with its 'optimistic forecast' and the emergence of the EU's global role with global ambitions help explain the reason for the EU's engagement in Aceh. The chapter summarises IR theory with important emphasis on the liberal section as the formal inquiry of the thesis. It then revisits chapter two's explanation of the EU as a liberal-focused entity, with a key concentration on the ESDP and the ESS as driving forces behind EU actions. Before justifying the liberal framework to conclude the thesis, a brief analysis of realist motives is drawn upon. Motives from power politics, EU competitiveness in Southeast Asia and its strategic interests are made, along with economic opportunities in accord with realism.

The remainder of the chapter largely rejects realist premises. It refutes EU power motives and suggests that the EU is beyond the realist motives listed. Core liberal definitions of chapter one (especially liberal internationalism, liberal institutionalism and the three forms of 'neo' liberalism) are carefully intertwined into three overarching themes to strengthen the liberal inquiry. These are explained as key EU 'exports' to Aceh, resting on peace and security, 'effective multilateralism' and democratic institutionalism. These principles provide the backbone of chapter four to justify the EU's liberal agenda in Aceh, and also in the wider region.

In summary, the EU has entered a new era of exporting its values of peace and security, which is in accord with the 'optimistic' post-Cold War forecast of international cooperation and conflict resolution. The recognition by both sides of the conflict of the EU as an impartial and fair third party mediator is a key achievement. The EU has a long term vision for Aceh, which the chapter highlights. In a similar cooperative framework, the EU is a multilateral institution exporting its values of cooperation. This legacy has spread to Aceh and Indonesia and in the wider region to ASEAN. Backed up by liberal theory, it is a very progressive international development. EU assistance to Aceh through key civil society goals and institution building is further paramount (while key support continues). Bringing democracy, human rights and the rule of law to Aceh, as key EU goals, has been imperative.

The exporting of its principles to Aceh, along with general EU engagement in the region, helped prove that the EU largely had and has 'good' intentions in the peace process and in the wider region. There is simply little space for the realist analogy for this specific example.

Research Limitations

This challenging thesis entailed a list of problems and boundaries. For the theoretical inquiry, the thesis recognised that rather than liberal theory, a constructivist approach could have been used. For example, the latter's emphasis on ideas of social 'norms' on what shapes foreign policy choices was raised in chapter two, but overall, its arguments have been underutilised. Furthermore, to explain IR theory in one chapter (8,000 words) is insufficient. Thus, the information is limited and to some extent incomplete. Similarly, chapter two's focus on the EU's security developments could have taken up the entire thesis, but only selective aspects were able to be incorporated. A greater understanding of other ESDP missions (and comparing them to the AMM) would have been useful. Explaining the history of Aceh, the peace process and the EU involvement in chapter three was also short and brief. A greater understanding, especially of the peace process, would be advantageous for further inquiry.

Finally, trying to draw the connections between the peace process, in terms of the EU's role, and trying to pinpoint key liberal themes (as derived from the ESS) was problematic. The ability to draw precise connections between the two was limited and the number of EU qualities selected was short. Moreover, associating the qualities directly to liberalism caused more problems and entailed much rethinking.

Overall, although limited in scope, a concise investigation has been presented to help provide an understanding of what EU foreign policy, especially the ESDP, is based on, and what impact the mission to Aceh has had in the region and on liberal theory more generally. It proves that key aspects of liberal IR are highly relevant for this specific case.

CHAPTER ONE

International relations theory: realism verses liberalism

In the study of IR, the theoretical debate between realism and liberalism is centuries old. IR theory seeks to explain relations between and amongst states and, more broadly, the workings of the international system and its many actors.¹ Both definitions serve as umbrella terms as realism and liberalism has evolved significantly since their founding principles. In short, realists have a pessimistic viewpoint of IR by suggesting that inter-state conflict is inevitable and that states must therefore seek to maximise their power capability and secure their interests. Liberals, on the other hand, are adamant that inter-state peace and cooperation can be realised. A more recent focus is on the role of IGOs as agents to facilitate inter-state cooperation is a key development as peace has broadened. This argument has enhanced in the post-Cold War era, and is a compelling belief that has informed this thesis' inquiry. By comparing and contrasting the two approaches, this thesis argues that a realist view of IR has major shortcomings – particularly in the post-Cold War. The thesis' title, 'Implementing peace: liberalism and the EU in the Aceh Peace Process', embraces liberal theory as the explanatory tool for the EU's motives in Aceh. Nonetheless, beginning with classical realism and working through to the post-Cold War era, this chapter explores the parameters of both theories and elucidates a number of key principles that have informed this inquiry.

Part I: Realism

Realists are pessimistic about creating a more peaceful and just international order. They regard the lack of order as simply the 'reality' of international politics; and the vision of a world government to bring-about this order as 'unrealistic'.² Rather, realists base their beliefs on a recurring or repetitive world built on conflict and suspicion (perpetual power politics) not subject to reform or change. In the international system, realists regard the state as the 'supreme political authority'.

¹ McLean, I & McMillan, A. (2003). *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 270-271

² Weber, C. (2001). *International relations theory : a critical introduction*. London; New York: Routledge. pp. 14-15

States must safeguard their national interest – where survival is the most pressing concern.³ Considered as the dominant international relations theory, realism and its proponents regard it as the ‘natural’ approach, while liberalism is its opposition.⁴

1.0 Classical realism

The foundations of realist thought are believed to have come from the ancient Greek historian, Thucydides. In 431 BC he wrote the *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*, the wars between city-states of Athens and Sparta. Thucydides’ account provides two illustrations of inevitable power politics and struggle. The first is that the underlying cause of war between the city-states was the growth of power in Athens and the fear that it created in the Sparta. The latter’s main concern was survival, and it therefore had no other choice but to go to war with its more powerful neighbour. The second illustration is that during the wars, there were grave consequences for the minor island of Mesos. By declaring neutrality, Mesos rejected Athens’ demand (as their powerful neighbour) that they be aligned to them. Consequently, Athens destroyed the island. Thucydides’ illustration, called the ‘Melian dialogue’, demonstrated the realist ‘iron law’: that the ‘strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept,’⁵ or “... morality and principle count for little and only the will of the powerful [states] finally matters.”⁶

Thucydides assumed that IR is driven by a perpetual struggle for power that has its roots in human nature. The result is an anarchical situation of competing sovereign states. At face value, states exist in equal terms, but because of international anarchy, state behaviour is not restrained (be it in social, political, cultural, moral or economic terms). It is virtually impossible to manage conflicts of interest or status, or to have universal values, such as justice, law or society. The universal threat of war is thus constant as states always exist in ‘a state of war’.⁷

³ Burchill, S. (2001). *Theories of international relations* (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave., p. 70

⁴ Brown, M. E., Lynn-Jones, S. M., & Miller, S. E. (1995). *The perils of anarchy : contemporary realism and international security*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press., p. ix; see also Baylis, J., & Smith, S. (1997). *The globalization of world politics : an introduction to international relations*. New York: Oxford University Press., pp. 139-149

⁵ Dunne, T., & Schmidt, B. C. (2001). Realism In J. Baylis & S. Smith (Eds.), *The globalization of world politics : an introduction to international relations* (2nd ed., pp. 142-161). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press. p. 145

⁶ Luard, E. (1992). *Basic texts in international relations : the evolution of ideas about international society*. New York: St. Martin’s Press., p. 118

⁷ Doyle, M. W., & Ikenberry, G. J. (1997). *New thinking in international relations theory*. Boulder,

Thucydides' early illustration continues to inform the realist-orientated framework. Modern equivalents to the 'Melian dialogue', identified by Baylis and Smith, are Germany's 1939 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union's offensive against the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and Indonesia's 1975 invasion of East Timor. Neorealists, as described later, continue to suggest that power outweighs morality and that the threat and/or use of force trumps legally-binding principles such as state sovereignty and independence.⁸ These examples show that power and dominance between states (especially those in proximity) always tips in favour of the more powerful state.

Italian political philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli expanded upon Thucydides' writing to focus on the psychological element of human nature, describing it as fundamentally flawed. According to Machiavelli, the self-centred, competitive nature of states derives from the individual, creating a 'hostile' inter-state environment. State decision-making and policy must therefore focus on good judgement and accept the 'ultimate skill' of state leaders.⁹ Machiavelli describes 'good (policy) judgements' as glory and security. Similarly, Machiavelli argues that states should be free to act as they desire, and their policy needs to centre on 'political necessity and prudence' to maximise state power.¹⁰ Machiavelli contends that today's friend can quickly become tomorrow's enemy as neighbouring states upholding coexistence is not guaranteed.¹¹ In *The Prince*, Machiavelli focuses mainly upon the strength of the Roman Empire to suggest that states must attack other states before the latter 'inevitably' attacks. To create universal 'human maxims', meanwhile, is difficult. Universal moral principles, for example, Machiavelli describes as potentially damaging to state interests.¹²

English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in 1651 wrote the *Leviathan* to explain the natural conditions of humankind. Hobbes states that all humans are created equal, but in the state of nature, humans are prone to conflict due to their inherent self-centred competitiveness, diffidence and pursuit of glory. This argues that humans living

Colo.: Westview Press., p. 45; Dunne and Schmidt (2001), p. 149

⁸ Dunne and Schmidt (2001), p. 145

⁹ Weber (2001), p. 15; Baylis and Smith (2001), pp. 142-143, 147-149

¹⁰ Dunne and Schmidt (2001), pp. 147-149

¹¹ Doyle (1997), pp. 119, 196-199; Baylis and Smith (2001), pp. 142-143

¹² Dunne and Schmidt (2001), pp. 142-143, 152

without a common power are in constant fear for their safety; the reality is a constant war: “the war of all against all.”¹³ Hobbes therefore directly associates war with the nature of humankind. However, Hobbes suggests that human conflict can be overcome through a social contract, where humans move out of the state of nature. The contract is a law binding agreement to exchange individual loyalty for a strong central government (or a sovereign), which in return guarantees order within the state and defence against other states.¹⁴

In parallel, Hobbes compares the international anarchical structure (a lack of common power) with humans living in the state of nature (naturally competitive, diffident and seeking glory).¹⁵ The fear of attack is therefore constant – a ‘permanent cold war’. Again, however, Hobbes suggests that conflict can be overcome as states can coexist (more easily than humans with other humans) as ideas on sovereignty, harmony, respect and non-intervention are mutual, and rules can be created. Also, some states (particularly powerful ones) can deter other states’ aggression.¹⁶

The work of 18th century Genevan philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau points to the nature of states as causing war. Rousseau describes the human nature as peaceful. He questions Hobbes’ assumption that if humans were to conquer *all* other humans then it would be regrettable to remain alone in the world. Rousseau claims that there is “... no general war between men [*sic*]; [and that humans have]... not been created solely in order to engage in mutual destruction.”¹⁷ Rousseau uses the idea of reason to explain that human action and behaviour is not constant. Relationships and interests continuously change while quarrels and disputes are short-lived and wars are rare.¹⁸

Rousseau therefore blames conflict on the state. Humans are born as equals with natural liberty and independence. But under the state system, an ‘artificial society’ is created and this leads to inter-human conflict. Similarly, inter-state conflict derives,

¹³ Luard (1992), p. 42

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 40

¹⁵ Doyle (1997) pp. 196-199

¹⁶ Dunne and Schmidt (2001), pp. 148-149

¹⁷ Luard (1992), p. 45

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45

not from human nature, but from anarchy as it encourages ‘fear, jealousy, suspicion and insecurity’.¹⁹

In line with the above theories, a leading classical realist theory and one of the oldest approaches to IR, is the ‘balance of power’ concept. Traced back to the work of Thucydides, the theory suggests that in the anarchical world, states form strategic alliances to counter-balance the threat of a greater power or to oppose expansionist tendencies of other states. The approach seeks to stabilise world politics as states work together to create international composure.²⁰ Dunne and Schmidt define the concept as a ‘mechanism’ to ensure the ‘equilibrium of power’ among states, where no state or an alliance of states dominate(s).²¹ Realists generally regard balance formation as an ‘automatic’ response.²² Examples of balance of power include Europe’s Concert System (1814-1848), which sought to reach a power balance amongst Europe’s great powers, and 1907 British foreign that was proactive in engaging with third states to counter the threat of neighbouring states. The Cold War east-west bipolar balance provides a more recent example.²³

Despite the different approaches amongst realist thinkers, a combination of human nature, the characteristics of states and international anarchy, means that states live in a condition of fear – and therefore in a ‘state of war’. For this reason, classical realists come to a similar conclusion that the inherent state of war dictates state behaviour.²⁴ Furthermore, the main conception derived from the classical period is *raison d’état* – reason of state. The state is the central actor in the international environment, which put ‘survival’ ahead of any other interests. Interests such as the environment, humanitarianism and the economy are secondarily important. The post-WWII rise of the United States (US) as the world’s global hegemon is a lead example of how a state has achieved such a status. Dunne argues that it reached this position through strength and interest rather than ideology.²⁵

¹⁹ Dunne and Schmidt (2001), p. 149

²⁰ McLean and McMillan (2003), pp. 35-36

²¹ Dunne and Schmidt (2001), p. 144

²² Luard (1992), pp. 470-471

²³ See Dunne and Schmidt (2001), pp. 153-154

²⁴ Doyle (1997), p. 200

²⁵ Dunne and Schmidt (2001), pp. 142-144

Classical realism laid the foundations for further realist-orientated IR inquiry. The following part of this chapter focuses on modern realism that emerged with a new generation of realist writers.²⁶ By following the classicalist approach, and in response to post-WWI liberal idealism, the emergence of European dictators, WWII and the Cold War, there was a renewed need for realism to dictate foreign policy as guided by modern realists.

1.1 Modern realism

From 1939 to 1979 a new wave of realism dominated international relations thought. The outbreak of WWII provided a renewed impetus for realism. In reaction to the post-WWI optimistic forecast of sustainable peace under liberal idealism (as discussed in the second part of this chapter), realists were adamant that the liberal ideas to end all wars could not be realised. Idealism was met with strong unease in the realist camp, especially as dictators arose across Europe in the 1920s and 1930s.²⁷

The outbreak of WWII is often said to derive from idealists' 'naïve legalistic and moralistic' hypothesis and their utopian aspirations as neglecting the 'harsh realities of power politics.'²⁸ WWII (1939-1945), followed by Soviet Union-US tensions (which led to the 1946-1991 Cold War), confirmed the prevalence of realism.²⁹ Modern realist theory sought to reinforce the classicist assumptions of state behaviour being largely associated with national interests, power-politics and the aggressive tendencies of states.³⁰ The post-WWII realist approach includes the work of a number of key scholars and policy makers who provided a new intellectual movement. The world views of five prominent modern realists are outlined below.

By following the Machiavellian tradition, leading 20th century modern realist E H Carr, saw the problem with international politics as how to satisfy all powers without

²⁶ Ibid., p. 142

²⁷ Burchill (2001), p. 71; Kegley, C. W., & Wittkopf, E. R. (2006). *World politics : trend and transformation* (10th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson Higher Education., p. 33

²⁸ Carr (1930), in Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 33

²⁹ Weber (2001), p. 37; Wohlforth, W. C. (1995). Realism and the End of the Cold War. In M. E. Brown, S. M. Lynn-Jones & S. E. Miller (Eds.), *The perils of anarchy : contemporary realism and international security* (pp. 3-41). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT press., p. 3

³⁰ Luard (1992), p. 271; according to Dunne and Schmidt, the renewed tradition of realism focused on three 'essential realist' terms: statism, survival and self-help. For a wider explanation see Dunne and Schmidt (2001), pp. 150-154

having to resort to war. His 1939 publication, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919 -1939*, regarded realism as a necessity. He advocated that war should be a state policy instrument and also saw the need for secret diplomacy and for balance of power.³¹ During the inter-war period, Carr objected to the appeasement of Hitler and suggested that the League of Nations (LoN), as described later, was premature and too ambitious for the time period.³²

At the end of WWII and during the beginnings of Soviet Union-US confrontations, US diplomat George F Kennan in 1946 produced the 'long telegraph'.³³ It advocated the need for 'containment' of Soviet communism. WWII enemies Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan had been defeated, but the new 'threat to the peace' was Soviet 'expansionism'. Containment became a powerful factor in US policy for the next 40 years. Consequently, a number of US-centred strategic alliances, particularly in Europe and Asia were set up; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was the most prominent.

Leading post-WWII realist, Hans Morgenthau's publication *Politics Among Nations* (1948), reinforced ideas of power politics and the law of egotist human behaviour. His theory reflected that of Thucydides' earlier account, which focused on principles such as state power, rationality, the national interest, dominance and control, and the need for state action to be autonomous and to have unemotional and amoral intentions. Morgenthau regarded the international system, as an area where "...statesmen [leaders] think and act in terms of interest defined as power."³⁴ Morgenthau sought to reconsolidate realism: the post-World War II US rise to power and US-Soviet Union confrontations were key arguments.³⁵ A further influential theorist, Reinhold Niebuhr, suggested that the amorality (but not necessarily immorality) of state action reflects self interest, selfishness and the right of states to use power without moral restraint.³⁶

³¹ Burchill (2001), pp. 73-75

³² Luard (1992), pp. 292-295

³³ George Kennan US diplomat was deputy head to the US delegation to Moscow from 1944 to 1946.

³⁴ Luard (1992), p. 271; Dunne (2001), p. 143

³⁵ Burchill, S. (2001). *Theories of international relations* (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave., pp. 77-78

³⁶ Luard (1992), pp. 274-275; Dunne and Schmidt (2001), p. 152

WWII, followed by growing Cold War east-west tensions saw the 1940s and 1950s as the ‘pessimistic age’. The persuasive opinion of conflicting inter-state relations concluded that:

... the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the periodic crises that threatened to erupt into violence ... confirmed the realists’ emphases on the inevitability of conflict, the poor prospects for cooperation, and the divergence of national interests among incorrigibly selfish, power-seeking states.³⁷

International pessimism was substantiated by the influential thinker and US policy advisor Henry Kissinger. Compelled by realism, Kissinger responded to international anarchy to conclude that “... a nation’s survival is its first and ultimate responsibility: it can not be compromised or put to risk.”³⁸ Kissinger played a dominant role in US foreign policy between 1969 and 1977 and was a key player during the Cold War.

The various approaches and contributions made by modern realism helped shape IR theory through much of the 20th century. Considered as ‘common sense’, its central ideas were confirmed by a string of events from the 1930s onwards: the rise of European dictators, WWII and the Cold War. The US played the lead role in embracing its ideas as it struggled for power with the Soviet Union.³⁹ However, like classical realism, modern realism lacked in scientific and methodological rigor to explain the assumptions of power politics and the aggressive and power-seeking nature of states.⁴⁰ A greater theoretical understanding was thus sought to explain the behaviour of states by factoring in other international actors and also domestic structures and what impact these elements have on the international milieu.⁴¹

³⁷ Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 35

³⁸ Kissinger (1977), p. 204, in Dunne (2001), p. 151

³⁹ Dougherty, J. E., & Pfaltzgraff, R. L. (1997). *Contending theories of international relations : a comprehensive survey* (4th ed.). New York: Longman., p. 89

⁴⁰ Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 37

⁴¹ Dougherty (1997), p. 89

1.2 Neorealism

Neorealism (also known as structural realism) emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s as resurgence of modern realism and in response to new economic-related theories, which are associated with neoliberalism (as discussed later).⁴² Neorealists highlighted the importance of IGOs, hegemonic stability theory,⁴³ Cold War bipolarity and it reinforced the view that the state is the primary actor on the international stage. The theory tried to bring a more thorough approach to realism by applying greater scientific methods to understand international relations. Neorealists look at the nature of the international system (or global level factors) rather than the classical view of human nature to understand what influences state behaviour. Importantly, they upheld the belief that states reside in an anarchical world and therefore require a strong offensive military capability to overcome international disorder.⁴⁴ In further departure from the classical tradition, neorealists argued that a state's domestic factors (such as its type of political system or leadership style) influence state behaviour and its relations with other states. For example, liberal-democratic states are less likely wage war against one another. Moreover, inter-state relations can fluctuate as states' political systems change or new leaders emerge.⁴⁵

Leading neorealist, Kenneth Waltz, sought to reorganise the 'loose and disjointed' body of realist thought and to formalise it into a 'rigorous, deductive systematic theory of international politics.'⁴⁶ Waltz focused on the international system's lack of order. He reiterated the reality of anarchy – as he put it, the absence of a 'supreme authority' – and focused on power distribution, state capability and upheld the state-

⁴² It emerged consequently to the dual-analysis of first, that the liberalist-orientated interdependence theory (which stated that free trade and lifting commercial trade barriers would create common interests and thus reduce inter-state conflict); and second, the idea that the state-centric model was in decline (as state authority was fading through global market forces). Krasner (1992) in Burchill (2001), p. 87; see also Burchill (2001), p.87

⁴³ Hegemonic stability theory argues that there is a need for a supreme global power to enforce rules and to dominate other states, which will mitigate conflict among smaller states. The theory formally entered the international relations discipline in response to the 1929 Great Depression. It centres on The theory centres on the international economic order where it is argued that international stability is dependant on a dominant state to enforce international rules, see Dunne and Schmidt (2001), p. 151

⁴⁴ Krasner (1992) in Burchill (2001), p. 87; Burchill (2001), p.87

⁴⁵ Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 38; Brown et al. (1995), pp. x-xii

⁴⁶ Keohane (1986b) in Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 38

centric focus.⁴⁷ Waltz's publication, *Theory of International Politics* (1979), describes international anarchy as creating fear and encourages states to maximise power, or to forge alliances, as they compete for survival.⁴⁸ He also suggests that states react differently to anarchy. Waltz contrasts Belgian foreign policy with China's. By using different means to establish security, the small nation of Belgium with few resources, takes an institutional path by joining alliances and being active in regional and international organisations. China in contrast is more inclined to secure its interests through unilateral initiatives as it builds up its military capability.⁴⁹

This brings to the point of institutional theory of states cooperating in a formal arrangement (as described in the liberal part later). According to Waltz, states must only take the institutional path to advance their national interests. He has three main reservations of institutional engagement. First, some states may not follow the set rules. Second, while some states use institutional mechanisms to maximise their power and influence (called absolute gains); at the same time they are concerned by the comparative (relative) gains of other states, which may profit more from the cooperative endeavour. Three, when joining an institution, the state's national security must not be put at risk. All in all, Waltz rejects the idea that an institutionalised security arrangement should be an 'essential' state focus.⁵⁰

The variety of realist arguments have evolved significantly from the Thucydides tradition to the work of Waltz. Realists uphold the belief in international anarchy and consider inter-state conflict as inevitable. State decision making must focus on power and capability to ensure the state's survival, while there is little room for moral

⁴⁷ Weber (2001), pp. 16-19

⁴⁸ Waltz focuses on defensive rather than offensive realism, in contrast to Morgenthau and Mearsheimer. The difference is that the latter suggests that states ought to focus on survival rather than the quest to dominate other states, making their power accumulation for defensive purposes only, see Dunne and Schmidt (2001), pp. 149, 151-155; Waltz (1979), pp. 88-97, 104 in Burchill (2001), p. 91

⁴⁹ See Lamy, S. L. (2001). Contemporary mainstream approaches: neo-realism and neo-liberalism In Baylis & Smith (Eds.) (pp. 182-199). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press., p. 186

⁵⁰ For more information on structural realism, Waltz and the problem of institutionalism, see for example, Lamy (2001), pp. 182-188 and Grieco (1986) in Lamy (2001), p. 186; also, variants of neorealism include neotraditional realism and liberal realism. Neotraditional realists refocus on classical assumptions to argue that foreign policy is determined by individual and state level factors and not by the international structure and highlights the importance of state decision-making. Liberal realism meanwhile suggests that while individuals live in a relative state of nature, states live in war with a constant fear of being attacked as order among states and justice within states are seen as 'mutually exclusive', Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 39

principles. The state is the most important actor on the world stage. It must not be held accountable to any higher authority.

However, realism has many shortcomings and fails to explain the reality of the current global order. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the 1989-1991 peaceful and systematic Soviet Union withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe marked the end of the Soviet quest for dominance and the 45-year power struggle with the US. This development challenged realist assumptions of perpetual power politics. In the post-Cold War era, realism, as the explanatory tool for IR, is under scrutiny. Linked to this idea and central to this thesis is the case of the EU, liberal institutional theory and the expansion of international peace and order. The EU, as a highly successful inter-state institution based on cooperation and perpetual peace, is just one example of regional stability that realism has difficulties explaining. This thesis' investigation, the EU's motives in the Aceh peace process, draws attention to the EU engaged in a peace mission. This example further rejects realist premises as the explanatory tool in the post-Cold War context.

1.3 Post-Cold War realist arguments

Realists consider the immediate post-Cold War era as a 'mere point' in history and thus an 'inaccurate test' for assessing the theory.⁵¹ Realism continues to help shape international political thought as inter-state conflict has certainly not been eradicated. Beginning with heightened Cold War tensions (after a period of *détente*) in the early 1980s, then wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the 2001 and 2004 respective terrorist attacks on the US and Spain (among other attacks) and the 2003 US war on Iraq meanwhile, provided a 'catalyst' for renewed realism.⁵² Furthermore, despite the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new liberal theories, it is argued that states need to continue to act with realist-orientated independence and with rationale; realists argue that the post-Cold War stability could easily change and could see a return to an international break-down of order.⁵³

⁵¹ Wohlforth (1995), pp. 3-5

⁵² Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 36

⁵³ Wohlforth (1995), pp. 3-5

As explained, realism concerns world order and state behaviour in the anarchical international setting. Structurally, the world is made up of sovereign states not accountable to a higher authority. This means that state behaviour is largely unrestrained. States therefore act independently; there is no world government and states only voluntarily sign up to international bodies and treaties. For these reasons, creating international order through universal rules on conduct and behaviour is almost non-existent. The scenario of a lack of order leaves little room for inter-state negotiation or institution building – unless it is in the state’s national interest. Thus the reality of international disorder is comprised of competing states, each securing its survival. Going by realist analysis, the alternative viewpoint for peace is limited.

1.4 Realism: key points⁵⁴

1. People’s natural desire to dominate others is the most prevalent, inexorable, or dangerous feature of humankind, while power eradication is a utopian aspiration
2. The anarchical nature of the international system necessitates states to acquire military capabilities sufficient to deter an attack by potential enemies
3. International politics, under the anarchical system is a struggle for power: “a war of all against all,” the primary obligation of every state thus – where all other national objectives should be subordinated – is to promote the ‘national interest’: the acquisition of power and prestige
4. In terms of collective security and international regime building, allies may increase the ability of a state to defend itself, but allies’ loyalty and reliability should not be assumed. Self-protection, meanwhile, must never be entrusted to international organisations or international law
5. In response to states seeking to maximise power, stability will arise from the *balance of power* concept, lubricated by a fluent alliance system.

For realists, the acquisition of power remains to be the ultimate necessity for individual states as international anarchy gives state’s little choice but to advance their

⁵⁴ [abridged and edited] from Kegley, C. W. (1995). *Controversies in international relations theory: realism and the neoliberal challenge*. New York: St. Martin’s Press., p. 5

national interests to ensure their survival. Inter-state cooperation and collective security meanwhile are idealistic and need to be treated with caution.

1.5 Realism and the EU

Despite the aforementioned shortcomings of realism, particularly with its inability to explain inter-state cooperation, realism continues to provide useful insights to help understand IR and state interests. Ideas on the ambition for the EU to become a ‘superstate’ fit neatly into realist premises. Moreover, the development of EU foreign policy is described as an attempt to create a ‘strong’ and/or ‘permanent’ alliance.⁵⁵ By following Mearsheimer’s analysis (see modern realism), post-Cold War EU unity is about protecting itself from the US.⁵⁶ The idea of the EU being a defensive security alliance holds a level of truth for rational state-decision making, where EU foreign policy cooperation has helped key states to realise their strength.⁵⁷ Based on these arguments, a level of power politics and competition is played out with the EU’s security expansion.

The idea of the EU projecting its power provides an insight for this thesis’ inquiry. Since the end of the Cold War (as chapter two outlines), the EU is playing an increasingly important role in international affairs. Following the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), EU foreign policy has advanced significantly to a form where the EU is playing an important role around the world. Realists argue that the expansion of the EU’s foreign policy innovation means that it endeavours to maximise its power capability and global influence. The EU already is the world’s largest economic power and with increased diplomatic activity and the development of military capabilities, perpetual competition leading to limited cooperation and disharmony with other states would seem inevitable. However, as this thesis argues, the EU is a different type of power which does not seek world domination. While the realist perspective does help understand international politics and some aspects of EU foreign policy, cooperative inter-state relations, conditions of

⁵⁵ See for example Andreatta (2005) *Theory and the European Union’s international relations* In C. Hill & M. Smith (Eds.), *International relations and the European Union* (pp. 18-38). Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, p. 34; Schroeder (1976) in Andreatta, F. (2005), p. 27

⁵⁶ Mearsheimer (1990) in Andreatta (2005), p. 34

⁵⁷ Hill, C., & Smith, M. (2005). In C. Hill & M. Smith (Eds.) (pp. 388-406), p. 390

peace and the idea that the EU is exporting its success around the world, is better understood in the liberalist paradigm, which provides a sufficient explanation of the EU's actions around the world.

Part II: Liberalism

With a 'tradition of optimism', liberalism provides an opposing IR viewpoint. Liberalism is an ambitious ideology. Its core arguments rest on two levels of individual liberty: freedom and fairness in the *political* and *economic* realms. It is the belief that this dual approach to individual autonomy will realise human potential and overcome inter-human conflict.⁵⁸ Liberals believe that it is the state's role to bring security, order and fairness, and to guarantee social progress in the internal workings of the state – thus to serve the 'collective will' of its subjects.⁵⁹ However, to bring order and justice to the 'outside' (between and among states) is much more difficult. For this reason, realism is the generally accepted theory of IR. To counter this argument, liberals contend that it is possible to 'export' domestic liberty to the international arena to help bring conditions of inter-state peace.⁶⁰

1.6 Classical liberalism and liberal internationalism

In 1517, the Dutch humanist and theologian Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus, described war as 'unprofitable' and thus suggested the need for a peaceful order. The work of British born American William Penn, in 1693, spoke for the need of international institutions to constrain international 'outlaws' (or warring states) – thus, Penn proposed the need for a diet (or a parliament) of Europe.⁶¹

Classical liberalism emerged from the concurrence of the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution and the 17th and 18th century political revolutions (especially those in America, France and Scotland).⁶² The beginning of modern Western

⁵⁸ Burchill (2001), p. 29; Clark (1989), pp. 49-66 in Dunne, T. (2001). Liberalism, In Baylis & Smith (Eds.) (2nd ed., pp. 162-181), p. 163

⁵⁹ Burchill (2001), p. 29

⁶⁰ Dunne (2001), p. 163

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 165

⁶² Lamy (2001), p. 188

philosophy derives from the Enlightenment, an 18th century ‘intellectual movement’. During this period, major European and American philosophical developments took place. In particular was the ‘rights of man’ and the individual’s struggle against the arbitrary rule of the state.⁶³ Consequently, a period of revolutionary change manifested, which led to the rise of prominent Western ideals such as individual liberty, democracy and capitalism. Important doctrines included the English Common Law and the Bill of Rights, the American Declaration of Independence and France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen.

A leading contributor to liberalism was English philosopher John Locke. Locke provided the foundations for liberal individualism through a number of 17th century publications such as the *Two Treatises of Government*. Locke focused on the three essentials to individual rights: ‘life, liberty and estate’.⁶⁴ He envisaged a government of free individuals defending law and property. A contributing ideology is commercial liberalism, a 18th and 19th century belief that the spread of markets, free trade and economic interdependence will create ‘human progress’ (peace and prosperity). Commercial liberalism has many advocates including Richard Cobden, John Stewart Mills and Immanuel Kant,⁶⁵ the latter whom laid the foundations for subsequent deliberation: liberal internationalism.

Eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant proclaimed that humans in a ‘state of nature’ are ‘rational autonomous agents’ possessing moral goodness. By closely following traditional liberalism, Kant sought to bring the ideas of individual rights, free markets and democratic institutions together.⁶⁶ In 1795 he wrote *Perpetual Peace*. This envisaged a liberal world order where all citizens are united in a federation of constitutional (international law-binding) republican states, which are open, transparent and accountable to their subjects. Kant regarded this as ‘natural’ progress. Furthermore, Kantian liberal moral theory reinforced the central authority of

⁶³ Burchill (2001), p. 41

⁶⁴ Baylis and Smith (1997), pp. 317-318

⁶⁵ Political (or ethical) rights include freedom from arbitrary state power, persecution and superstition, while fair governance is based on democracy, constitutionally guaranteed rights, equity before the law, justice, equality and free speech. Further rights included assurance of education, healthcare and welfare, restricting and separating government powers and economics, namely through market capitalism, private property and free commerce (among others rights), see for example Burchill (2001), p. 29, 37-39; Dunne (2001), p. 163; McLean and McMillan (2003), pp. 309-310

⁶⁶ Dunne (2001), p. 165-166 ; Doyle (1997), p. 19

the state to suggest that foreign policy direction needs to focus on institutional arrangements based on moral equality and rights.⁶⁷ Under this structure, Kant argues that there would be fewer wars.⁶⁸

Complementing Kant was the early 19th century work of Jeremy Bentham. Bentham focused on the need for a common tribunal to mediate international disputes, but defied the need for a world government. Rather, Bentham looked to the German Diet, the Swiss and American Confederations as models where powerful confederacies alleviated conflicting interests.⁶⁹ Kant and Bentham, inspired by Scottish economist Adam Smith, led the liberal internationalist ideal during the Enlightenment. Smith's moral philosophy suggested that individuals provide goodness to society through the 'invisible hand'. However, progress in the domestic sphere (as described earlier) was not realised in inter-state relations, which Smith regarded as 'barbaric'. Kant and Bentham responded by outlining that inter-state harmony is achievable through liberal internationalism, where 'natural harmony' could deliver international freedom and justice, and thus made plans for the 'coming peace'.⁷⁰

The liberal internationalist vision of a confederation of republican states suggests that these states will act collectively – through economic or military means – to curb or deter 'illiberal' or non-conforming states. In this light, the proposition was for a league of nations to apply 'natural and rational' international laws with universal authority at their core; these laws would replace powerful state actions.⁷¹ This mode of thought marks the beginning of the democratic peace thesis – peace among liberal republics and the end to all wars.⁷²

A final classical liberalist is British diplomat Richard Cobden. Cobden, writing in the mid 19th century, argued that humankind's problems are a result of state intervention (or 'disturbance') in the natural liberal order. He suggested that individual liberty, free

⁶⁷ Doyle (1997), p. 19

⁶⁸ Brown (1995), p. xiii; Dunne (2001), pp. 165-166

⁶⁹ Dunne (2001), p. 166; Utilitarianism, a divergent of traditional liberal thought, is a further aspect of Bentham's ideas, which suggested, "[t]hat action is best which procures the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Nineteenth century British philosopher and political economist John Stewart Mills was the other main contributor to Utilitarianism, see McLean and McMillan (2003), pp. 552-554

⁷⁰ Dunne (2001), pp. 165-167

⁷¹ McLean and McMillan (2003), pp. 289-290

⁷² Doyle (1997), p. 19

trade and interdependence will bring a peaceful and prosperous society as the ‘natural order’. Cobden’s pacifist stance opposed states’ use of ‘excessive, arbitrary power’, while suggesting that freedom could arise through the maintenance of peace, spreading commerce, education and diffusing powers.⁷³

Classical liberalism, with a focus on Kant’s liberal internationalism, but also through the work of others like Locke and Cobden, helped lay the foundations for 20th century liberal thought. The liberal argument that state behaviour needs to centre on self-restraint, compromise and peaceful coexistence are fundamental to create a peaceful and prosperous international order. Without doubt, classical liberal assumptions on self-restraint, compromise and peaceful coexistence amongst states (especially Western democracies) has been realised – particularly in the current international climate. Since the work of the work of the classicalists, liberalism has evolved and been applied to different historical contexts. The following part of this chapter assesses the attempt to create global order through post-WWI idealist developments and what impact these ideas have had on IR.

1.7 Liberal idealism

Liberal idealism made its mark on IR theory from the early 1900s to the 1930s. Unlike liberal internationalism, which bases itself on the ‘natural progress’ of humankind, idealism contested that international order must be *constructed* and managed by a devised organisation. It attempted to replace the balance of power concept with ‘specific’ IGOs, such as the LoN, to deal with international security issues.⁷⁴

WWI is a leading example of a breakdown of international order. Its highly destructive toll on Europe brought great shame to humankind. However, the post-war period brought hope for international order. US President Woodrow Wilson (with a number of scholars and policymakers) lead the way to promote peace and prosperity, arguing for diplomacy rather than war to resolve disputes: where ‘the pen is mightier

⁷³ Hill (1996), p. 114 in Dunne (2001), pp. 166-167; Dunne (2001), p. 164

⁷⁴ Burchill (2001), pp. 4-5; Dunne (2001), p. 167; Luard, E. (1992). *Basic texts in international relations : the evolution of ideas about international society*. New York: St. Martin's Press., p. 465

than the sword'.⁷⁵ The liberal movement was essentially split into three camps but shared a similar aim. The first centred on the need for collective security, the creation of international institutions to replace the anarchical and war-prone balance of power system. The second emphasised the need for international mediation and arbitration to settle disputes. The 1921 establishment of the International Court of Justice and the ratification of the 1928 Kellogg-Brand Pact to 'outlaw' war as national policy are core examples. Arms control and disarmament was the focus of the third group: several consequent naval conferences and negotiations followed.⁷⁶ Despite their different approaches, the three schools brought hope for international post-war stability and order based on rules, treaties and mediation.

Liberal idealism rests its arguments on four principles and needs. The first was national self-determination, which dismissed colonialism and gave nations the right to independence. Second was the need to spread democracy and government openness (which followed Kant's democratic peace thesis and Lockean ideas on government transparency and accountability). Thirdly, the need for a league of democratic nations to settle disputes, facilitate mediation and to form a 'collective response' to deter aggressive states (also following Kantian theory) – and importantly to 'preserve the coming peace'. Fourth, to advance free trade and free commerce to help bring wealth and global harmony. Like early commercial liberalists (including Kant and British economist John Hobson), they believed that laissez-faire economics will help facilitate a peaceful and prosperous international order.⁷⁷

These arguments brought hope for international peace, as liberal idealism became an important force IR theory. As described earlier, Wilson played the lead role. His 14-point programme initiated a number of institution builders, including basic international law through an international system based on universal norms and rules,

⁷⁵ Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), pp. 30-31

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32

⁷⁷ Roberts and Kingsbury (1993), p. 30 in Dunne (2001), p. 167; Dunne (2001), pp. 164-168; Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 32; a further point, however, is that not all idealists were in agreement with all of Wilson's plans. Hobson argued against laissez-faire economics suggesting that is not pacific but rather encourages inter-state competition and imperialism. He suggested that capitalism does not necessarily bring peace as Britain and Germany had highly inter-dependant economies in pre-WWI times, see Dunne (2001), p. 167

and the establishment of the LoN. Institutional arrangements were regarded as a means to regulate international anarchy and to prevent the outbreak of warfare.⁷⁸

In practice, a limited degree of inter-state progress and cooperation occurred, particularly through the LoN (with 31 signatories) and the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaties.⁷⁹ However, the remainder of the liberal reform agenda saw minimal progress. The subsequent rise of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany in the face of a powerlessness LoN, Wilson's liberal dream ended. Chaos returned to Europe and eventuated into WWII.⁸⁰

Despite the failure of liberal idealism and the six-year global conflict, liberal idealism has continued to inform international relations theories, especially in the post-WWII era. An important contribution was the self-determination concept (point 10 of the 14 points), as the European colonial powers started to retreat from their respective empires. Then in 1942 the groundbreaking Declaration of the United Nations (UN), followed three years later by the end of the WWII, saw renewed hope for international order through institutional developments. Compared with the LoN system, consensus requirement was an important modification of the UN (as it was limited to the five great powers of the time – or the power of veto).⁸¹ The UN has become a relatively successful development. Moreover, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are compelling liberal developments.⁸² The positive benefits to inter-state cooperation following WWII led to liberal institutionalist theory.

1.8 Liberal institutionalism

Institutional theory argues that through institutional cooperation, by seeking mutual goals, inter-state harmony is possible. Finding common interests, especially among states with geographical proximity, inspired a new wave of liberal thinkers. Trade and

⁷⁸ Dunne (2001), p. 167; Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), pp. 31-32

⁷⁹ Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 32

⁸⁰ Dunne (2001), p. 168

⁸¹ Roberts (1996), p. 315 in Dunne (2001), p. 169

⁸² Dunne (2001), p. 169

economic cooperation were seen as key developments to help ensure peace and prosperity.⁸³ Through various actors, processes, structures, and especially by the role of IGOs, state behaviour is restrained. IGOs facilitate mediation by promoting norms and values, and bring about cooperative inter-state behaviour as states pool their resources together and give up a degree of sovereignty. Advantages made through institutional engagement include the ability to regulate and predict state behaviour, monitoring compliance and the sharing of interests. The gains made through institutional engagement drives cooperative state behaviour. The theory suggests that it is in states' interests to follow the pattern of institutionalism where states will enter into cooperation even if other states have more to gain. Through formalised agreements and by the creation of expectations, states' concerns and issues are linked therefore alleviates their uncertainty; states' reputations are also exposed.

In the post-WWII era, this mode of thought compelled European states to work together in seeking mutual interests. Cooperation amongst six states (Belgium, France, FR Germany⁸⁴, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) under the ECSC became a lead example of institutional cooperation. By following Mitrany's ramification theory (the 'spill over' effect), inter-state cooperation in one area, generally leads to cooperation in more areas as states become 'embedded' in the integration process. Meanwhile the cost increases for those states choosing not to integrate.⁸⁵ Mitrany's theory provided an 'impetus' for closer cooperation amongst European states. Collaboration in energy was soon followed by other sectors, which led to the Treaty of Rome to create the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.⁸⁶ The key to understand inter-state cooperation is that order is not imposed upon states; rather, order is *created* and *accepted* by states as they engage with each other through coordinated policies.⁸⁷

At global level, as discussed, the development of the UN provided the most important post-WWII liberal institution that now spans the globe with 192 members. Further

⁸³ See for example McLean and McMillan (2003), pp. 368-369; Burchill (2001), p. 40; Dunne (2001), pp. 176-7, 181

⁸⁴ Federal Republic of Germany

⁸⁵ Mitrany (1943), p. 143 in Dunne (2001), p. 169

⁸⁶ Dunne (2001), p. 196; see also chapter two

⁸⁷ Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S., & Hoffmann, S. (1993). *After the Cold War international institutions and state strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press., pp. 1-3

global level initiatives include General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) – now World Trade Organisation (WTO), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank.⁸⁸ Regional IGOs include NATO, ASEAN and the African Union (AU). Along with the UN, all three of these institutions have had a working security relationship with the EU, as discussed in chapters two and three. During this period, especially with growing economic cooperation, the term ‘multilateralism’ arose, which was based on ‘broad’ and ‘sustainable’ agreement among states.⁸⁹ Multilateralism remains as a key liberal concept.

As explained in the first part of this chapter, theories on state behaviour have traditionally been dominated by realism. However, liberalism (especially institutional theory) has challenged realist-focused state-centrism. The EU, as a prominent post-WWII institution builder has evolved into a highly integrated 27 member-state institution covering over half the European continent. It is even “... argued that the EU was somehow ‘beyond [IR]’.”⁹⁰ Central to this thesis, is the EU’s collective foreign policy ideal that breaks from traditional realist-orientated foreign policy (based on state-centricism, the uncooperative nature of states, and war as a foreign affairs instrument – see for example Machiavelli, Carr, Waltz as above). It further rejects realist premises of perpetual power politics and competition. The EU’s collective foreign policy ideal has become institutionalised, as chapter two explains.

The following part of this chapter focuses on the post-Cold War era (1991-), which has helped overturn realist assumptions. It explores new liberal theories – neoidealism, neoliberal institutionalism and neoliberal internationalism – each having sought to explain the new mode of IR. Each theory poses an alternative explanation to the realist-orientated Cold War era that has enhanced the understanding of the new

⁸⁸ Many global organisations, such as GATT and OECD, facilitate easier inter-state negotiation through compliance mechanisms, rules and practices and thus states become less secure. Similarly, Kegley describes the post-WWII global trade and monetary rules as constituting a Liberal International Economic Order of limited government. GATT and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are regarded as playing the central institutionalising role, which revalidated the idea that international institutions advance inter-state cooperation. Keohane et al. (1993), pp. 2-4; Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 44. However, an argument that rules are pushed upon smaller states but not upon larger ones make institutions seem unfair; also, states may use institutions to pursue their national interests rather than acting cooperatively, see *ibid*, pp. 2-4

⁸⁹ McLean and McMillan (2003), pp. 356-357

⁹⁰ Long (1997), p. 187 in Tonra, B., & Christiansen, T. (2004). *Rethinking European Union foreign policy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 121.

liberal order. Specific to this thesis, the theories have widened the conception of the EU's external actions.

1.9 Neoidealism

In the aftermath of Cold War, many liberal commentators strongly criticised the realist-guided Cold War era. Kegley identified three counter-arguments to describe the shortcomings of realism. Firstly, realists failed to predict Soviet Union-US disarmament initiatives of the 1970s, nor did they foresee the Soviet Union's demise from its international status and the consequential democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, realists could not explain the sweeping post-Cold War east-west cooperation, which exposed realism's 'incomplete' description of international relations and its inability to explain change.⁹¹ Third, with the advancement of arms control treaties, international democracy, human rights and humanitarianism, along with increased inter-state political and economic cooperation, interdependence, and a renewed UN role for collective security and international law, a new post-Cold War mode of thought was clearly required.⁹² In parallel, there are growing concerns (and public discussions) on morality, economic justice, human rights and environmental concerns.⁹³ These manifestations stimulated a refocus on classical liberalism and liberal idealism, which paved the way for new liberal ideas to outline new "... prospects for progress, peace and prosperity."⁹⁴

A further argument that goes alongside post-Cold War cooperation is that there has been a decrease in territorial conquest and imperialism. This development, along with a renewed role for the UN, is described by neoidealists as a 'rediscovery' of international order.⁹⁵ Kegley suggests the need to put liberalist ideas firmly back to the study of IR. Despite the failures of Wilson's idealism, his ideas had not been disregarded as new answers were required on how to bring international order and justice.⁹⁶ Wilson's idealism has even been labelled simply as 'premature'. One

⁹¹ Scholte (1993), p. 8 in Kegley (1995), p. 7

⁹² Weber (2001), pp. 37-39; Kegley (1995), pp. 12-14

⁹³ Halliday, F. (1994). *Rethinking international relations*. Vancouver: UBC Press. p. 236; Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 42

⁹⁴ Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), pp. 40-41

⁹⁵ Kegley (1995), pp. 12-14

⁹⁶ Kober (1990), p. 9,16 in *ibid.*, p. 8

prominent thinker Frances Fukuyama argued that the interwar (post-WWI) period was inconsistent with Wilson's ideals, but several years on "... there are good reasons for examining aspects of the liberal international [idealist] legacy once again."⁹⁷

The list of specific liberal advancements described coincides with renewed ideas on liberal institutionalist-orientated multilateralism and institutional building. International progress has signalled a shift away from the 'conflict-ridden' Cold War era.⁹⁸ However, there is also a more critical side to neoidealism to suggest that the concept of liberalism does not go far enough. The main critique rests on the idea of a 'democratic deficit', where institutions and global market forces are harmful to many social problems and falls short of democracy.⁹⁹

1.10 Neoliberal institutionalism

Neoliberal institutionalism arose largely in response to neorealism, as key liberals sought to find a middle ground between the liberal-realist debate. The revised liberal theory came during a time of both US relative power decline and liberal inspiration of the progressive European integration model.¹⁰⁰ Neoliberal institutionalism (also called pluralism) is traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, providing a new wave of institutionalism.¹⁰¹ Like its earlier version, neoliberal institutionalism rejected state-centricism to suggest that international politics is no longer an exclusive arena of states. The theory expanded upon institutionalism to explore how the forces of economic modernity – namely globalisation, transnationalism and interdependence – affect the state. Interdependence, for example, means that national economies are

⁹⁷ Fukuyama (1992a), p. 28 in *ibid.*, p. 14

⁹⁸ Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 42

⁹⁹ Ideas on democratic shortcomings argue that institutions, alongside states, need to be more democratic (referred to as 'double democratisation'). This shortcoming is considered the dark side of globalisation, where many global voices go unheard. Therefore, a third force – social movements (such as indigenous groups or other minorities and their rights) need to be brought into the design. Further negative aspects of (neo)liberalism include the increasing global disparity of wealth and the undermining of civil society and welfare through global market forces ('globalisation from above'). see Dunne (2001), pp. 163-177. Held's ideas meanwhile rest on the 'cosmopolitan model of democracy', where there is greater inter-state democracy including UN reform, stronger regionalism and closer human rights. Held (2003) in (Dunne, 2001 #69), p. 175

¹⁰⁰ Mainstream liberal tradition's 'critical and political' tendencies of critical theory on the one hand and Waltz's realist impulse on the other, see Long (1996), in Dunne (2001), p. 176

¹⁰¹ Pluralism is an umbrella term that rejects realist perceptions of the primacy of the state and the coherence of the state-as-actor, see Dunne (2001), p. 179

closely tied into one another, creating a form of mutual dependence. The forces have endangered national sovereignty and changed the nature of inter-state relations.¹⁰²

Prominent thinkers include Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye suggested that the prominence of diverse interests groups, transnational corporations and international organisations (especially IGOs) were having a huge impact on global politics. This phenomenon marked a major break from the 300-year old post-Westphalian state-centric model.¹⁰³ In this situation, the global environment where states operate has changed and thus so has state behaviour. Alongside these arguments, the new thinkers sought to explain why states cooperate under anarchy. Like realists argue, anarchy remains ‘constant’, but alternative views suggest that interdependence and mutual interests have led states into a ‘condition of cooperation’, and away from pursuing self-help strategies.¹⁰⁴ In a similar light, with specific focus on the role of IGOs as helping to facilitate cooperation, multilateral approaches to international problem solving are likely to increase.¹⁰⁵

Neoliberal institutionalism accelerated with the end of the Cold War. As outlined by liberal institutional theory, Western Europe had become a highly institutionalised community based on rules and agreements. After the Cold War, the EU expanded to include many states that formally fell under Soviet hegemony. The EU’s direction, as a lead example of a peacefully integrated union of states, is considered a ‘vital test case’ for neoliberal institutionalism.¹⁰⁶

The rise of the EU is clearly consistent with much of the neoliberal institutional theory as outlined. Moreover, with the end of the Cold War and the list of many liberal advancements, gives a powerful insight to current international order, and especially vis-à-vis the role of the EU as a peaceful institution. The EU’s global outlook through its newly founded security policy, its behaviour and how it impacts

¹⁰² These developments of the 1970s are also referred to as neoliberal theory. Both economic and technological developments, under ‘globalisation’, are said to have ‘transformed’ the nature of international politics and thus challenged realist thought. Cross border capital flows, trade and investment liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, and the growth of transnational corporations, have all led to the decline of state power and a so-called ‘borderless’ world, see Burchill (2001), p. 95

¹⁰³ see Dunne (2001), p. 170

¹⁰⁴ Reus-Smit, C. (2001). Constructivism In S. Burchill (Ed.) (pp. 200-237), pp. 211-212

¹⁰⁵ Kegley and Wittkopf (2006), p. 45

¹⁰⁶ Dunne (2001), pp. 176-177

around the world is the focus of chapter two. The next part of this chapter on neoliberal internationalism provides an understanding on the strategies and types of measures that Western states take to help realise the Kantian-inspired expansion of liberal ideals and the need to extend the ‘liberal zone of peace’.

1.11 Neoliberal internationalism

With the Western liberal model at its core, neoliberal internationalism is regarded as ‘one of the big ideas’ of the 1990s. The approach derives from Kant’s democratic peace thesis.¹⁰⁷ Fukuyama’s post-Cold War *End of History* publication claims that the liberal triumph over other ideologies was because liberal states are more stable and passive, and therefore provides a disincentive for war as they recognise each other’s ‘legitimacy’. Fukuyama’s neo-Kantian belief in the supremacy of the Western liberal-democratic model and the ‘unchallenged’ theory of liberal capitalism, signals that the rest of the world will follow.¹⁰⁸ Fukuyama restarted the neo-internationalist theme by suggesting the need to export liberal values to *all* states.¹⁰⁹

This leads to the question on what the best means are to export liberal values to ‘illiberal’ (or authoritarian) states and to convert them into the ‘liberal zone of peace’. A leading idea is the ‘dual-track’ approach. Track one is defensive by seeking to uphold the liberal community by creating strong alliances with like-minded states. Track two is expansionist: to enlarge the liberal zone through a range of economic or diplomatic means. Track two has three potential outcomes: ‘aspiration’, ‘intervention’ or ‘instigation’. Aspiration is the hope that citizens of illiberal regimes will resist their government by demanding liberal reform. Intervention proposes the use of external force (or ‘hard power’) by liberal states if the population of the regime shows widespread disaffection with their government or when basic rights are abused. Instigation is a provision of liberal-directed peace-building and economic restructuring from the liberal to the illiberal zone. The main economic restructuring

¹⁰⁷ Keohane and Nye (1993), p. 4

¹⁰⁸ Burchill (2001), p. 31

¹⁰⁹ Fukuyama (1989), pp. 3-18 in Dunne (2001), p. 172; Burchill (2001), pp. 30-31; a more critical variation of neoliberal internationalism questions whether all democracies are actually peaceful as some of their actions against autocratic states or stateless people have been aggressive. A further illustration is that there is a ‘separate peace’ that is limited to most affluent western nations as the ‘wealth factor’ or ‘friend factor’ creates peace and unifies them, see Doyle (1995), p. 100 in Dunne (2001), p. 172

approach, called conditionality, is the use of soft power (or non-military instruments) to promote Western (liberal) values as Western states provide economic benefits in return for the receiving states to reform and liberalise parts of their economy.¹¹⁰

In the post-Cold War era, the US is particularly active with its use of foreign policy tools to pressure autocratic or illiberal regimes. The US generally uses hard power to acquire its objectives. In contrast, the EU, with its internal reliance on law, negotiation and multilateralism has secured its objectives through soft power.¹¹¹

As described, a lead (neo)liberal internationalist theme is the expansion of democracy. Democratic promotion was incorporated into the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in 1993.¹¹² A lead example of EU soft power, which has assisted in external reform, includes the EU's post-Cold War policy towards Eastern Europe.¹¹³ Similar techniques were directed at Indonesia during its reform era. As the more relevant case for this thesis, the case of Indonesia is briefly outlined in chapter four. In addition, the meaning of soft power varies as it has taken on wider meanings. Generally, any non-military approach, such as peacekeeping, is accepted as 'soft power'.¹¹⁴ This explanation is partly applied to explain the EU's approach to the Aceh peace process as it primarily used non-military instruments.

Closely associated with neoliberal internationalism is the argument for or against international intervention, as briefly discussed in the above. In the mid-late 1990s, an unwelcoming picture was presented to the world (and especially to Europe) during the collapse and consequent wars in the Western Balkans (the former Yugoslavia) – particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Compared with the African wars in Rwanda and Burundi in the early 1990s, this conflict occurred on the 'doorstep of the

¹¹⁰ Doyle (1999) in Dunne (2001), p. 172; Dunne (2001), pp. 172-3

¹¹¹ Cooper, R. (2004). *Hard Power, Soft Power and the Goals of Diplomacy*. In D. H. a. M. Koenig-Archibugi (Ed.), *American Power in the 21st Century* (pp. 167-180 ed.). Retrieved from <http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/CooperarticleGoalsofdiplomacyweb.pdf> (Retrieved 21-03-2008)

¹¹² Youngs, R. (2001). *The European Union and the promotion of democracy*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press., pp. 1-3

¹¹³ Dunne (2001), pp. 173-177

¹¹⁴ see, for example Cooper, who presents an excellent overview of the difference between hard and soft power, Cooper (2004)

liberal peace zone' [the EU].¹¹⁵ Leading liberal internationalist Michael Ignatieff questioned how ideas from the Enlightenment on human rights and humanitarian law – as core liberal elements – were not respected on its 'home continent'. In this light, (neo)liberal internationalists advocate the right to intervene other state's internal matters in pursuit of advancing the liberal cause. However, it is a highly contested area of foreign policy matter as the question is asked whether state sovereignty should be overridden by external intervention in pursuit of ethnic and national rights.¹¹⁶

Three examples of intervention help answer this question. The first is the Kurdish Crisis, which followed the Gulf War. Despite the end of Iraqi-Coalition hostilities, three important Coalition powers, the US, United Kingdom (UK) and France, worked together to establish Kurdish 'safe havens' in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from the Iraqi army. The operation was unprecedented as it sought to defend an ethnic minority from repression by their own government, where the Coalition powers were in violation of Iraq's sovereignty. In the end, the intervention was just as the operation successfully protected the Kurds.¹¹⁷ Similarly, international interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia provide the best examples where moral concerns countervailed state sovereignty. The decision to for Western states to intervene in these countries imposed a dilemma. On the one hand, intervention for liberal principles based on morality and human rights was advocated, while on the other, international law of non-intervention and state sovereignty.¹¹⁸ Halliday traces the right to intervene concept back to Mills'¹¹⁹ dual-analysis theory by asking at what degree of tyranny or oppression should justify intervention, and at what cost. By following this parameter, Halliday identifies the UN Charter as the main provider of international code of conduct.¹²⁰ This suggests that if the UN Charter based on fundamental rights is violated, then international intervention is justified.

However, there are problems with this argument. International law outlines that states are sovereign and equal, but in reality, they are not. Factors such as a state's power (as reflected by realism), especially in terms of its population size, economic weight,

¹¹⁵ Dunne (2001), p. 177

¹¹⁶ Ignatieff (1995) in *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ Halliday (1994), p. 238

¹¹⁸ see *ibid.*, pp. 124-125

¹¹⁹ see footnote 66

¹²⁰ Halliday (1994), p. 238

military might, and whether or not it has a seat on the UN Security Council, essentially determine its position in the international arena.¹²¹ This means that only states in a powerful position can implement this so-called ‘liberalising’ mission. Furthermore, great powers’ legitimacy to create universal norms are often seen as hypocritical. A first example is that key Western powers have a past of imperialism and colonialism, which totally disregarded the idea of state sovereignty. Second, major 20th century wars were fought mostly amongst Western powers. Thirdly, there are reservations about the current hegemonic role that the US plays in managing international economics and finance. This function is often associated with unilateralism, competitiveness and lacking in foresight. These practices are opposed to multilateralism and cooperation and having long-term goals. These arguments suggest that any international role played by Western powers should be treated with caution.¹²²

The purpose of this final argument was to draw attention to global perceptions of international intervention, which has grown since the end of the Cold War. While the mission to Aceh was not ‘intervention’ as described – as it was based on an invitation – ideas on the roles of Western powers in involvement in other states’ domestic matters is noteworthy.

The post-Cold War era has seen a significant advancement of liberal IR theory. The neoidealist-based important rejection of realism and the associated list of many liberal

¹²¹ *ibid.*, pp. 238-239

¹²² Furthermore, there are four noteworthy factors that challenge the so-called ‘liberalising mission’, particularly under neoliberal international guise. First, a number of states and other actors are not convinced that Western-orientated ‘universal’ norms are in fact universal. The values in question derive from 18th century Western political rights are not comprehensively embraced. Various religions, states and other social groupings may not regard them as universal. Rather, they are an infringement upon their sovereignty and violate their own sets of norms and values. Gray considers the ‘universalising mission of liberal values’ (especially democracy, capitalism and also secularism) as undermining non-Western practices and cultures. In this case, ‘liberal’ intervention is unjustified. Second, the neoliberal free market propagation is not always consistent with the social democratic model, especially in Northern Europe. Third, there is scepticism that the liberal economic model is a tool used to advance the economic agenda of Western commercial interest, especially those of Western firms. These reservations also coincide with Marxian tradition, which question the motives of state actions in their so-called liberalising missions. Marxists generally consider the unfair power relationship between the dominant and weaker players. Fourth, to be eligible for western aid, harsh liberal-centred economic reform is often required, which has often come at the expense of the receivers’ social net. For further critique of neoliberal internationalism and general liberal propagation, see for example Dunne (2001), p. 173; Booth and Dunne (1999), p. 310 in Dunne (2001), p. 173; Gray (1995), p. 164 in Dunne (2001), p. 179; Hoffmann (1995), p. 169 in Dunne (2001), p.179; Halliday (1994), pp. 238-239

advancements provide a compelling explanation to post-Cold War optimism and hope, where conflict resolution is a key development. Equally, neoliberal institutionalism, alongside its focus on economic globalisation and interdependence, has helped to explain international stability with a key focus on the role of IGOs and the contribution that they have made in facilitating inter-state cooperation. In parallel, neoliberal internationalism propagates the expansion of Western-based liberal values, especially by using soft power – where Western-based liberal reform promotion has transpired. Coupled with the liberal intervention conception, neoliberal internationalism has helped to understand Western actions in the post-Cold War context and how they impact around the world.

By following Halliday's line of thought, with the end of Cold War bipolarity, IR could take three different paths: one, a return to pre-WWI nationalism with inter-state rivalry and the renewed potential for war; two, with the demise of the Soviet Union, a US dominated international order; or three, a period of global optimism through enhanced inter-state cooperation. Through a liberal lens, there are high expectations for the third scenario to be realised.¹²³ This optimism, which is associated with all three 'neo' theories, provides the basis for this thesis' argument of a liberal-centred EU seeking to expand its values of peace around the world. Conflict resolution through mediation and other forms of support in Aceh is a highly relevant case.

1.12 Liberalism: key points

This study embraces these competing international relations worldviews. The key liberal points most relevant for this research are that:¹²⁴

1. Human nature is essentially 'good' or altruistic; mutual aid, cooperation and concern for others' welfare make mutual progress possible
2. War and injustice are international problems. Collective or multilateral rather than national efforts are required to eliminate them
3. International society must recognise itself institutionally to eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war likely

¹²³ Halliday (1994), p. 205

¹²⁴ [abridged and edited], see Kegley (1995), p. 4

4. Bad human behaviour is the product not of evil people but of bad institutions and structural arrangements that motivate people to act selfishly and to harm others – including making war

The liberal approach to IR basis itself on the belief that humans have the capacity to work in harmony and behave with mutual respect. The early ideas of Locke on individual liberty, and Penn's and Kant's approaches to international order, remain informative societal beliefs. Further liberals such as Wilson and Kegley have helped shape IR theory and shift away from the realist-dominated paradigm. Ideas on institutional, cooperative and multilateral arrangements provide core alternative features that have manifested in more recent times. Idealism, liberal institutionalism, through to post-Cold War 'neo' liberal ideas, have helped build upon notions of liberal progress. From these, the elimination, or at least reduction, of war has been realised as liberal theory has progressed; the case of the EU as a peaceful inter-state institution, is a core vindication. Chapter two introduces the EU and the post-Cold War development of its enhanced foreign policy role and security system. It extends chapter one's liberal argument to suggest that the EU's external action is largely liberal-driven. It explores many policy statements and agreements, and other documents, to reach this conclusion. The case of the EU mission to Aceh is a prime example of this liberal assertion.

CHAPTER TWO

The EU's post-Cold War security developments

The EU has come along way since its establishment as the ECSC in 1957. This chapter analyses the EU's growing institutional capability, and in particular its security dimension and international outlook in the post-Cold War era. Chapter one's liberal focus is central to this inquiry and informs the remainder of this thesis. Beginning with a brief outline of European institutional developments, the chapter briefly explores EU history, identity and institutional form, and gives a theoretical perspective of the EU's international role. Following, are the important post-Cold War developments and EU actions in the immediate post-Cold War era. The early missions were largely failures but they provided a catalyst to develop an effective EU response and security apparatus. The consequent development of the ESDP and a number of associated treaties and documents are then elucidated. Following, is a brief discussion on the twenty ESDP missions around the world. This introduces the AMM and its significance as the first mission to the Asia-Pacific and its status as a joint EU-ASEAN operation. There are a number of positive regional affects of the AMM that the chapter identifies. The chapter's final part explores EU foreign policy advancements and set-backs from 2003 onwards. These provide an insight on prospects for further EU engagements that reflect its enhanced external role.

2.0 International institutional developments

Multilateralism is an important lens for liberal-advocated IR and is a key aspect of this thesis. It is when three or more actors engage in a broad range of issues, which are characterised by rules, norms and decision making.¹²⁵ Beyond multilateralism is the idea of a 'political community'; this arrangement is best described by integration theory as an explanation to why states choose to integrate.¹²⁶ The creation of IGOs are key multilateral developments that are formed at regional or international level. The EU as a regional and the UN as an international IGO are lead examples.

¹²⁵ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1997), p. 420

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 420-422; see also chapter one's explanation of institutional theory

European multilateral engagement is centuries old. The Concert system, under the 1815 Treaty of Chaumont, brought together the four major victors of the Napoleonic wars (Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain). This system attempted to bring European stability by reducing inter-state confrontation. The four major powers agreed to meet at:

[f]ixed intervals ... for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the examination of the measures which ... should be considered most salutary for the repose and prosperity of the nations and for the maintenance of peace of Europe.¹²⁷

This development of the European Concert loosely coincides with classical liberal ideas on formalised inter-state cooperation. Important multilateral decision-making tools to advance common interests paved the way for this initiative. The beginning of the 20th century witnessed two crises that the Concert dealt with successfully: British and French territorial disputes in Egyptian Sudan and colonial disputes in Morocco. However, following these disputes was the 1908 Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina which went unresolved; the four-year long WW I followed.¹²⁸ While there were successes under the Concert system, overall it was largely ineffective. A major flaw was that to reach any decision, consensus among great powers was necessary.¹²⁹

After WWI, there was hope for a renewed collective security system with an entirely new method to bring-about and uphold peace.¹³⁰ As described in chapter one, US President Wilson lead the way by attempting to create a liberal-orientated international convention built on peace and prosperity. Point 14 of Wilson's famous 14-point speech in 1918 laid the foundation for a new diplomatic structure under the LoN, arguing that:

A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Luard (1992), p. 424

¹²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 453

¹²⁹ For a comprehensive explanation to the issues surrounding the Concert of Europe, see, for example *ibid.*, pp. 424-428; 439-452

¹³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 460

¹³¹ Wilson, W. (1918). Wilson's Fourteen Points, *The World War I Document Archive on the server of the Brigham Young University Library* Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library

However, the US failed to ratify the LoN, and along with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, Italy, Germany and Japan, international order again broke down through two initial invasions: Japan in Manchuria and Italy in Ethiopia. These events destroyed the renewed hope for the collective security ideal as WWII followed.¹³²

With the end of the six-year war – the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan – a new hope for global security arose with the establishment of the UN.¹³³ The next 15-20 years saw large-scale legal and institutional developments. Among them is the UN's role to facilitate international progress in the economic and social spheres, and in other aspects such as human rights. In addition, international law, democratisation and the proliferation of other IGOs, were further liberal advancements.¹³⁴ The post-WWII era of inter-state institutional developments and progress in the economic, social and legal spheres reflect the liberal framework as described in the first chapter.

The 1957 Treaty of Rome integrated the industries of six European countries: Belgium, France, FDR Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, to form the ECSC. This development was in parallel to the post-WWII international system as described. The ECSC was soon renamed the EEC, which aimed to unite its Member States' economies under a single market. Consolidation in 1967 gave rise to the European Community (EC). Expansion in 1973, 1981 and 1986 gave the EC six further members to a total of 12. The 1993 TEU gave rise to the EU as a political, supranational and intergovernmental institution. Since the TEU's signing in Maastricht, the EU expanded three more times: in 1995, 2004 and 2007 to give it 27 members. The EU, as a large supranational organisation deals with a wide range of inter-state cooperative mechanisms. Important aspects include the single market and trade policy.¹³⁵

http://www.woodrowwilson.org/learn_sub/learn_sub_show.htm?doc_id=377217 (12-05-2007)

¹³² Luard (1992), pp. 453-456, 462

¹³³ Luard (1992). p. 456

¹³⁴ Keene, E. (2002). *Beyond the anarchical society: Grotius, colonialism and order in world politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p. 9

¹³⁵ Further common policies include agriculture, fisheries, customs, a single mobility for EU citizens to live, travel, work and invest, while border checks at many EU borders have been abolished. The most important EU institutions include the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, see Europa.eu <http://europa.eu> (Retrieved 18-12-2007)

2.1 Early post-Cold War developments: the EU's response

During the Cold War bipolar system, the US and the Soviet Union competed on a global scale and there was a perceived Soviet threat to Western Europe. Unity amongst Western European states was thus desirable and helped to progress the EU project. However, in terms of external action, the EC12¹³⁶ were largely impeded to act militarily because of constraints imposed upon them by the two superpowers; the EC, thus, lacked in external capability and experience.

The end of the Cold War brought important international structural changes, especially with new US-dominated unipolar world. The collapse of the bipolar structure led to new security concerns as the Soviet Union retreated from Central and Eastern Europe and war and instability broke out in Yugoslavia. These factors gave rise for both challenges and opportunities for the EC.¹³⁷ Importantly, the new post-Cold War global environment provided the EU with a 'closer impetus' for security cooperation.¹³⁸

In the immediate post-Cold War era, several crises took place: the Gulf War and the security concerns of Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq; the violent dissemination of Yugoslavia; and dual African crises in Somalia and Rwanda. These conflicts provided an opportunity for independent EC involvement, but shortcomings soon transpired. During the 1991 Gulf War, Jakobsen describes the EC's response as militarily, mentally and institutionally unprepared, while the Belgian Foreign Minister described the EC as "an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm."¹³⁹ Most EC states (except for France and the UK) lacked in combat experience. The Gulf War

¹³⁶ The 12-member EC at the time, which composed of the original six, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK

¹³⁷ For more information on the post-Cold War international paradigm shift and the EU's reaction to it, especially concerning the 1990s response to adapt to these changes, see, for example, Jørgensen, K. E. (1997). Another World- Another Task for Europe's Armed Forces In K. E. Jørgensen (Ed.), *European approaches to crisis management* (pp. 3-12). The Hague ; Boston: Kluwer Law International. pp. 3-12

¹³⁸ Jones, S. G. (2007). *The rise of European security cooperation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p. 8

¹³⁹ Anderson (1992), p. 151 in Jakobsen, P. V. (1997). The Twelve and the Crises in the Gulf and Northern Iraq 1990-1991. In Jørgensen (Ed.), (pp. 15-34), p. 15

demonstrated a major EC shortcoming; any initiative that it took was clearly ‘second fiddle’ to the US response.¹⁴⁰

As also described in chapter one, following the Gulf War and despite the end of Iraqi-Coalition hostilities, an EC summit in Luxembourg responded to the plight of northern Iraqi Kurds in the face of Iraqi military aggression – known as the ‘Kurdish Crisis’. During the summit, the EC spoke with a single voice. Kurdish aid was pledged and an immediate agreement was reached for the EC to help create UN protected Kurd ‘safe havens’. The EC provided useful practical support and pressure, which prompted the US, UK and French led ‘Operation Provide Comfort’.¹⁴¹

Despite times of disunity and periods of support deficiency, the EC showed important signs of crisis management initiative. The EC’s contribution was valuable. It wrote most of the mandate and the operational process, and it contributed much of the personnel and financial support. On the ground, the EC (unlike the US) was steadfast in troop deployment until the safety of the Kurds was declared. This was highly important aspect of the operation.¹⁴²

The operation was successful. The EC had proved its worth by responding to a crisis, which provided an important step for its external action capability. General EC motives for the operation were described as *opportunistic*: to overcome the ineffective Gulf War response, and especially to prove that a common EC position is achievable. Moreover, since the nature of the operation was humanitarian rather than military, the need for justification was minimal; the perceived risk to the EC was also low.¹⁴³

The two crises in Iraq served as a platform for three important EC developments: it created a strong desire for members states to act as a single unit; it provided a catalyst to urge the Common Foreign and Security Policy’s (CFSP) progress (as described later in this chapter); and it led to reforms to help create a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), for ‘out-of-area’ intervention (also described later). These developments

¹⁴⁰ Jørgensen (1997), pp. 2-4

¹⁴¹ Jakobsen (1997), pp. 15, 26-27

¹⁴² *ibid.*, pp. 26-27

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, pp. 28-29

reflected the EC's desire to have an advanced military capability able to deal with out-of-area crises.¹⁴⁴

The post-Cold War (and also the post-Gulf War) environments were calling for an 'ever closer union'. The violent break-up of Yugoslavia presented the EC/EU¹⁴⁵ with a new opportunity. The term 'hour of Europe', coined by the Luxembourg presidency in 1992, described the emotions running through the EU to effectively respond to the unfolding crisis. Following brief conflict in Slovenia, the calamity emerged in Croatia where succession incited clashes between ethnic Serbs living in Croatia and the newly established Croat Army, with the former being supported by the joint Yugoslav-Serb forces. The outcome was war; hundreds of thousands of refugees fled the scene. Thousands were killed either in battle or through 'ethnic cleansing'.¹⁴⁶ The conflict provided the next test for the EU.

A collective EU response was largely upheld while diplomacy advanced and a small EU force was deployed. Crisis management leadership remained with the EU but in 1992 a UN force, UNPROFOR¹⁴⁷, dealt with the deteriorating security. As war broke out in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR was extended. In addition NATO became involved as US-directed air strikes assisted the UN relief.¹⁴⁸ The EU-led crisis management operation seemed to be going reasonably well. However, the situation deteriorated following a Serb army massacre where and the EU could do little to prevent it. In addition, the US-led air-strikes were growing in importance and then, NATO, again under US leadership, launched its own ground offensive. Increased US diplomacy followed, which marked the end of EU leadership. Following the violation of a US-directed ceasefire, NATO responded with a major air

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 16, 31; see footnote 193

¹⁴⁵ The Yugoslav conflict occurred between 1992-1995. The TEU, which established the EU, was signed in 1992 and came into force in 1993. However, for this thesis, the term EU is used from the period of 1992 onwards for consistency purposes.

¹⁴⁶ The brief conflict in Slovenia was resolved through negotiations and truce as the Yugoslav army withdrew from Slovenia. The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia saw limited success (developments included UN supervision of Serb weapons handover, the opening of humanitarian relief lines and the creation of a no-fly zone), see Lucarelli, S. (1997). *Europe's Response to the Yugoslav Imbroglio*. In Jørgensen (Ed.), *European approaches to crisis management* (pp. 35-64), pp. 35-37

¹⁴⁷ United Nations Protection Force, initially to Croatia

¹⁴⁸ Lucarelli (1997), pp. 50-51

strike which finally led to Serb cooperation and the US-led Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995.¹⁴⁹

With the US taking over the leadership role, the EU was still regarded as too weak, lacking the capability and diplomatic initiative as well as military expertise to deal with the crisis. While the EU was very much ‘alive and kicking’ at the time – with a strong will to act – it simply lacked a prevention mechanism to stop the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Lucarelli called the EU response ‘reactive-punitive rather than proactive.’¹⁵⁰ Keohane and Hoffmann meanwhile considered the experiences as demonstrating a ‘limited institutional coherence’ of the EU and a lack of military capacity.¹⁵¹

However, despite the diminished role of the EU towards the end of the crisis, it is important to reflect upon what the EU had achieved as a collective unit. The EU had largely upheld its united front, and French and British commitments that soldiers remain on the ground held (especially as the two powers had been in strong disagreement at the beginning of the operation).¹⁵² Furthermore, the failure of the EU in the operations provided a ‘wake up call’ for the EU to improve its security and defence.¹⁵³ In terms interests and motives, Lucarelli suggests that the EU (and the US) acted upon domestic matters: whilst the public did not want to see body bags coming home, it was general public (along with the media and intellectuals) reaction to the crisis that spurred governments into action.¹⁵⁴

During the Somali humanitarian crises and the ill-fated UN intervention, the EU did not lead a separate initiative (in contrast to the Yugoslav response). Rather, it pledged full diplomatic, military and economic support to the UN. The crisis occurred prior to the signing of the TEU, thus the EU had no official foreign policy.¹⁵⁵ Furthermore,

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 51-58

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 35-36, 58-61.

¹⁵¹ Keohane and Hoffmann (1993), p. 404

¹⁵² Lucarelli (1997), pp. 62-63

¹⁵³ ESDP newsletter: Africa-EU (2007), Council of the European Union
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/CEU_70400%20ESDP_%205_final301107.pdf
 (Retrieved: 22-01-2007)

¹⁵⁴ Lucarelli (1997), p. 62; Hanrieder (1991), p. 151 in Lucarelli (1997), p. 62

¹⁵⁵ see von Hippel, K., & Yannis, A. (1997). The European Response to State Collapse in Somalia In Jørgensen (Ed.), *European approaches to crisis management* (pp. 65-81). The Hague ; Boston:

Somalia had ‘no collective strategic interest’. At the 1992 Lisbon Summit, CFSP joint actions did not name Sub-Saharan Africa as areas of particular benefit for the EU’s objectives.¹⁵⁶

In parallel to the EU’s development contribution to Somalia, were the TEU’s objectives, which included international development cooperation, democracy promotion and strengthening governance and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. These policy objectives progressed during the Somali assistance operation and very much applied to the country’s plight.¹⁵⁷

Furthermore, the Somali conflict occurred during the advancement of the CFSP, which helped create a more assertive EU role. Consequently, a conflict management and rehabilitation obligation for Somalia was endorsed together with a special EU representative. The Somali experience was unique; it highlighted the need for humanitarianism, rehabilitation and development mechanisms. It also served as a catalyst for an institutional framework for Africa in the post-Cold War era of widespread fragile state institutions.¹⁵⁸ Although the EU was less willing to be involved in Somalia as the country had little interest for the EU, the case highlighted the need to set up an EU-African-centred institutional framework. Africa has since then become a priority area of engagement for the EU.¹⁵⁹

While there were different EU responses and outcomes, the crises in Kurdish northern Iraq, Yugoslavia and Somalia, provide leading EU post-Cold War crisis management initiatives and present wide implications for the EU’s direction. The following section focuses on the development of the ESDP, which as suggested, largely came as a result of the operations described.

Kluwer Law International., pp. 65-66

¹⁵⁶ Nugent, N. (1994). *The government and politics of the European Union* (3rd . ed.). Durham, NC.: Duke University Pres., p. 398

¹⁵⁷ Treaty on the European Union (1992). *Official Journal C 191*.

<http://europa.eu.int> (Retrieved 12-09-2007); cited in von Hippel and Yannis (1997) p. 66

¹⁵⁸ von Hippel and Yannis (1997), pp. 66, 79; see also Illing, S. (1997). ‘Somalia-EU cooperation: Helping the people in their time of greatest need’, Europe’s forum on International Cooperation.

http://www.euforic.org/courier/so97_gb.htm?=&groups=EUFORIC&password=9999&username=gues
t@euforic.org&workgroup=

¹⁵⁹ ESDP newsletter: Africa-EU (2007)

2.2 EU security developments and the ESDP

Central to this thesis is the creation of EU foreign policy, which developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The TEU, as described, provided the framework for formal political integration and the blueprint for the EU. It was also the first EU document outlining its security responsibilities, including common defence policy delineation.

The EU has three ‘pillars’ forming its basic structure:

- the Community pillar, corresponding to the three Communities: the European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community and the former ECSC
- the pillar devoted to the common foreign and security policy, which comes under Title V of the EU Treaty
- the pillar devoted to police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which comes under Title VI of the EU Treaty.¹⁶⁰

The second pillar, the CFSP, replaced the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The CFSP aims to create joint actions and common positions. First defined under the TEU, it was broadened in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and finally came into effect in 1999. The Treaty of Amsterdam gave the EU the important new instrument of ‘common strategy’. Foreign policy principles and responsibilities aim to project EU values abroad, improvement its methods while protecting its interests.¹⁶¹

The ESDP is an important component of the CFSP. Howorth identifies two variables that helped it come about. First, changes in the international structure in the post-Cold War as US attention turned away from Europe and towards Asia and the Middle East. This reflects the earlier argument of increased EU engagement since the end of the Cold War and the notion of international responsibility. After the Cold War, the EU realised that it needed to get ‘serious’ about its security domain, especially along its eastern border. Second, the desire of ‘actorness’. This term derives from developments in the 1980s and 1990s when questions were asked on how best to bind

¹⁶⁰ Common Foreign and Security Policy. (2002). European Commission: External Relations, <http://ec.europa.eu> (Retrieved 26-09-2007)

¹⁶¹ For further ESDP principles, see for example, Fontaine, P. (2008). Europe in ten points, *European Commission: General publications.*; also The Treaty of Amsterdam. (1997). In Eurotreaties, <http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf> (Retrieved 12-11-2007)

its core nations, how to continue the ideal of war as ‘unthinkable’, and how to expand its global influence.¹⁶²

2.3 The ESDP’s launch (1998-1999)

Through the 1990s (and during the various crises previously described), the EU underwent a rapid expansionary phase in terms of strategy and reach.¹⁶³ December 1998 to December 2000 were ‘almost revolutionary’ in terms of solidifying an EU-wide defence policy. Following early EU failures in Yugoslavia, the March-June 1999 allied military action in Kosovo again showed an inadequate response. This spurred key states (especially the UK) into action.¹⁶⁴ The aforementioned Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force in May called for an enhanced CFSP, as stated under Title 5, and a common defence policy (Article 17) of the TEU. For operational activities, the Western European Union (WEU) – the former seven-member European defence and security organisation founded in 1948 – would be incorporated into the EU. Furthermore, the Petersberg Tasks (Article 17.2), formulated by the WEU in 1992, were also incorporated into the Treaty. The Tasks provide the foundation for the ESDP’s operational development:

The [CFSP] shall include all questions relating to the security of the [EU], including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. The [WEU] is an integral part of the development of the [EU] providing it with access to an operational capability The [EU] shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of integrating the WEU into the [EU], should the European Council so decide. Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (known as the Petersberg tasks) [shall be included in this Article].¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Howorth, J. (2005). From Security to Defence: the Evolution of the CFSP. In C. Hill & M. Smith (Eds.), *International relations and the European Union* (pp. 179-204). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press., pp. 183-185

¹⁶³ Jørgensen (1997), p. 2

¹⁶⁴ Rutten describes the UK government’s response as a U-turn, which led to the British-Franco St-Malo agreement, Rutten, M. (2001). From ST-Malo to Nice- European Defence: Core Documents *Chaillot Paper 47: ISS*. www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.pdf (Retrieved 02-02-2007)

¹⁶⁵ EU Security Policy and the role of the European Commission. (2006).

European Commission: External Relations: European Commission: External Relations. <http://ec.europa.eu> (Retrieved 03-03-2008); Nowak, A. (June 2006).

Civilian Crisis Management within the ESDP. In A. Nowak (Ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU way* (Vol. 90 Chaillot Paper pp. 15-38).

A combination of factors helped realise the EU's important new developments that paved the way for civilian and military operations abroad. First, Britain's changed attitude, the 'sea change', towards a collective EU security and defence policy; second, the realisation that the US needed to be assisted with international 'burden sharing'; and third, the diminishing presence of the US in post-Cold War Europe gave the EU greater continental responsibility; and fourth, the devastation caused by the crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.¹⁶⁶

During the December 1998 Franco-British St-Malo summit, major progress was made towards an autonomous EU defence capability as the joint declaration shows:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the [EU]. It will be important to achieve full and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. [...]
2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty¹⁶⁷, Article V of the Brussels Treaty¹⁶⁸) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the [EU], in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.

Paris: Institute for Security Studies., p. 18

¹⁶⁶ For more information, see Haine, J.-Y. (2004). ESDP: an overview, EU Institute for Security Studies.

http://www.eupt_kosovo.eu/training/material/docs/esdp/reading_material/ESDP_an_overview_by_JY_Haine_ISS.pdf (Retrieved 12-11-2006)

¹⁶⁷ Article five of the 1949 Washing Treaty states: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." See The North Atlantic Treaty: article 5. (2007). On-line library: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Washington DC., <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm> (Retrieved: 12-12-2007)

¹⁶⁸ Article V of the 1954 Brussels treaty, the WEU. If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power. Text of the Modified Brussels Treaty. (2002): Western European Union, <http://www.weu.int/Treaty.htm> (Retrieved 12-12-2007)

The need for ‘capacity for autonomous action’ ... to improve the EU military capability and ... to push ahead with the Petersberg tasks.¹⁶⁹

St-Malo provided a strong initiative for an autonomous European defence mechanism. It presented a great willingness to create a strong military force able to respond to international crises. The ‘solidarity’ notion among member states reinforces a full EU commitment to its military developments.

Six months after the St-Malo declaration was the 1999 Cologne Summit where the Petersberg Tasks were the central focus.¹⁷⁰ Under the German Presidency, fifteen Heads of State or Governments and the President of the Commission declared:

In pursuit of our [CFSP], we are convinced that the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the [TEU], the ‘Petersberg Tasks’. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter.¹⁷¹

The Cologne Summit laid out the ESDP’s specifications before its official launch. Military and civilian forces composition, requirements and capabilities were carefully planned out as the ESDP’s objectives were put into practice. Expertise in political, security and intelligence services were further implementations while security cooperation with NATO non-EU members was also fostered. A number of initiatives were taken to help realise these goals, among them: the development of the Political and Security Council (PSC) (where ambassadors of each member state would meet

¹⁶⁹ Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December, 1998, Franco-British summit: Joint Declaration on European defence (1998). Atlantic Community Initiative <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html> (Retrieved 12-12-2007)

¹⁷⁰ Nowak (2006), p. 18

¹⁷¹ EU Security Policy and the role of the European Commission (2006)

twice weekly) and the nomination of Javier Solana as High Representative for the CFSP (HR/CFSP).¹⁷²

The strong initiative expressed at Cologne demonstrated that the EU and its member states had sizeable experience and resources in areas such as civilian police, humanitarian assistance, administrative and legal administration, search and rescue and electoral and human rights monitoring.¹⁷³ Cologne set the guidelines for the next summit: the Helsinki European Council, scheduled for December 1999.¹⁷⁴

The Helsinki Summit, while focusing on the political and military necessities of its member states, expressed obligations to the principles of the UN Charter and primary role of the UN Security Council for maintaining peace and security. This was reinforced at the Feira European Council (June 2000), then at Nice (December 2000) when the ESDP was officially put into policy.¹⁷⁵

The road from Cologne to Nice, which set up the ESDP, helped realise the EU's objectives for an enhanced security apparatus, to expand its global input and to become an effective and responsive institution engaged in international crises. Its new security direction as an 'institutional change', has led to an "... acquisition of strategic responsibility in post-Cold War crisis management."¹⁷⁶ However, it was strongly expressed that process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² *ibid.*; for a full list of measures taken see also, for example Haine (2004)

¹⁷³ Nowak (2006), p. 18

¹⁷⁴ The summit in Helsinki produced the following: cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, member states must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year, military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks [as under the Helsinki Headline Goal (or Headline Goal 2003)]; new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the EU to ensure the necessary political guidance and strategic direction of such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework; modalities will be developed for full *consultation, cooperation and transparency* between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States; appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the EU's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested states to contribute to EU military crisis management; a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various *civilian means and resources*, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the EU and its member states. EU Security Policy and the role of the European Commission (2006)

¹⁷⁵ EU Security Policy and the role of the European Commission (2006)

¹⁷⁶ Rutten (2001)

¹⁷⁷ EU Security Policy and the role of the European Commission (2006)

Rutten's above description of the ESDP as an 'institutional change', like the CFSP's development, is a noteworthy development. As a lead foreign policy mechanism, the ESDP demonstrates a new focus for the EU, where policies – through the formal setting of committee meetings, ad hoc working parties and leadership – are officially produced.¹⁷⁸ To deal with external conflict, as a central aspect of the ESDP's purpose, the EU adopts a range of instruments: development and economic cooperation, external assistance, trade policy, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments such as political dialogue and mediation, as well as economic or other sanctions. Along with cooperation instruments, the ESDP became one of many EU foreign policy instruments. The new 'ultimate' instrument of the ESDP includes information gathering for anticipating potential conflicts situations and monitoring international agreements.¹⁷⁹ The development of ESDP initiatives, demonstrate a new focus for the EU.

The creation of the ESDP has been a major step to help realise the EU's global foreign policy objective. The description of the ESDP above shows that it has a comprehensive scope. The many policy instruments developed by the EU, which the ESDP is part of, reflects the use of 'soft power' to expand the EU's principles (as described by neoliberal international theory of chapter one). This chapter now provides a brief theoretical section of EU foreign policy. Liberal premises, with also a focus on constructivism, are used to explain the EU foreign policy phenomenon.

2.4 The European Security Strategy

Coinciding with the ESDP's development was the launch of the 2003 ESS, as proposed by Solana and approved by EU Heads of States. The publication, 'Europe in a better world', focuses on the EU's global role, its strategic vision and security requirements, as well as its values and ideals. With a make up of 25 (now 27) states, a population of 450 (now about 500) million and a quarter of the world's Gross

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention. (2001). European Commission. Brussels. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf (Retrieved 31-03-2007)

Domestic Product (GDP), the ESS describes the EU as an ‘inevitable global player’. The paper addresses negative global factors. Since 1990 wars have caused about four million deaths (90% civilian), a further 18 million have lost their homes, while poverty, disease, deprivation and social order break-down are commonplace. The ESS suggests that economic failure, political problems and violent conflict are often linked and that security is a precondition for development. In many countries there is a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.¹⁸⁰

The ESS suggests that political solutions are the best means to prevent regional conflict, but that a combination of military action or policing may be required in the post-conflict phase. It specifies that civil-military interactions are becoming a crucial part of EU operations, therefore it is essential to have good coordination between the two. It also stresses that economic assistance and reconstruction help restore civil governance.¹⁸¹

The main conflicts areas identified are the Western Balkans, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo)¹⁸² while the southern Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean area are central neighbourhood concerns. Building strong neighbourhood security is of essence; crime, dysfunctional societies, violent conflict and weak states are the most alarming for the EU. The ESS describes these conflict areas as ‘multi-faced situations’, but confirms that the EU has the confidence, equipment and resolve to deal with them.¹⁸³

The ESS describes the EU as progressing towards both a coherent foreign policy and an effective conflict management response. While key instruments were used effectively in the Western Balkan conflicts, the EU needs to be more active in pursuing its strategic objectives. A ‘full spectrum’ of instruments is required at the EU’s disposal for both conflict management and conflict prevention. Political,

¹⁸⁰ A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. (2003). Council of the European Union. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (Retrieved 31-03-2007)

¹⁸¹ *ibid.*; in further aspect to military component, and in line with the Civilian Headline Goal, is the call for ‘close cooperation and coordination’ with the military component throughout the phase of an operation’, see for example Khol, R. (2006). Civil-Military Co-ordination in EU crisis management. In Nowak (Ed.) (pp. 123-138), p. 123

¹⁸² The French acronym République démocratique du Congo (RD Congo) is also made reference to

¹⁸³ A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003)

diplomatic, military, trade and development activities are essentials. “We [the EU] need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.”¹⁸⁴ Consistent with a range of aforementioned EU foreign policy doctrines and treaties, and set in the post-Cold War context of an enhanced EU role, the ESS stresses that:

This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The [EU] has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable [EU] would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world.¹⁸⁵

The ESS identifies the need for peace and stability. The best means to deal with threats to peace and stability is to create an ‘international society’ that has ‘effective multilateralism’ at its core. Core liberal principles of democracy promotion, the spreading of good governance, supporting social and political reform, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights, and countering corruption and abuse of power are the ‘best means’ to improve international order.¹⁸⁶ The promotion of EU values through greater capabilities, stronger coherence and working together with partners are crucial.

Aligned to the ESS, a 2004 action plan ‘Ambition for the future- Horizontal and Integrated Approach’, outlined the need to enhance the EU’s aspirations by widening its role and taking a number of measures to improve its security yield. It states that:

... the EU should become more ambitious in the goals it sets for itself in civilian crisis management, the [European] Council set out an action plan, based on a comprehensive and integrated approach, covering: EU operational capabilities for civilian crisis management; strengthening synergies between civilian and other instruments; the development of a European security culture; and cooperation with partners, including both government organisations and [Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)].¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ General Report (2004) Chapter XVIII: External relations - general European Security and Defence Policy (5/8) (2005). Brussels: European Union, <http://europa.eu/generalreport/en/2004/pt0545.htm#fn2> (Retrieved 24-10-2007); Nowak (2006), p. 29

The ambitious ESS is a leading defence document that pushes for an enhanced EU role around the world. Most relevant for this thesis are its core liberal principles based on: first, effective multilateralism, through international cooperation and strengthening regional partnerships; second, peace and security through political solutions and ongoing support; and third, societal improvement and internal reform by means of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. All of these components are core EU values that are elucidated in chapter four used justify the EU's liberal motives in the Aceh peace process.

2.5 ESDP missions

In early 2003, the first mission was the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM/BiH) – after a Council Joint Action assessment in March 2002. EUPM/BiH marked the first attempt of an EU crisis management operation, which suggested that rapid ESDP progress had been made since 1999.¹⁸⁸ Set to expire in 2005, on request by the Bosnian authorities the mission was refocused with a new expiry date for the end of 2008.¹⁸⁹ As a civilian mission, EUPM/BiH was followed up to include a military operation, EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (or EUFOR *Althea*) in 2004. Initially designed for one year, *Althea* was reconfigured and scaled down in 2007; it has an ongoing task of maintaining stability in the country.¹⁹⁰ *Althea* had taken over NATO's Stabilisation Force, which had been in operation since December 1996. Furthermore, *Althea* was carried out under the Berlin-Plus agreement to coordinate EU-NATO operations.¹⁹¹ With an initial force of 6,500, the mission has been the largest of the ESDP's operations in terms of personnel. EUPM/BiH, meanwhile, is the largest in terms of cost and duration, with an annual budget of €38 million and has so far lasted for six years. Prior to EUFOR, were two missions to FYR Macedonia.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁸ Nowak (2006), p. 24

¹⁸⁹ European Security and Defence Policy operations. (2008). Brussels: The Council of the European Union. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu> (Retrieved 17-04-2008)

¹⁹⁰ EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR - Althea). (2008). European Council. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080220Altheaupdate10.pdf> (Retrieved 22-11-2007)

¹⁹¹ European Security and Defence Policy operations. (2008)

¹⁹² Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The EU Military Operation in FYR Macedonia, *Concordia*, marked an important development as the EU's first use of the RRF.¹⁹³ EU Police Mission (EUPOL) *Proxima*, meanwhile, was essentially a police mission to support, monitor and mentor the consolidation of the state's law and order.¹⁹⁴ Organised crime through criminal networks (especially drug trafficking and the sex trade), along with the need for better policing, border management and cooperation with bordering countries are identified as the key requirements to advance stability in the FYR Macedonia.¹⁹⁵ EU missions to the Western Balkans highlight the important ongoing role that the EU's plays in the volatile region. Both *Concordia* and *Proxima* are ongoing.

The first mission to Africa was the 2003 military operation *Artemis* to the DR Congo. The short mission, which worked alongside an established UN operation, consisted of 1,800 personnel aiming to bring stability and to improve the humanitarian situation in the country. The French-led force, and the first outside of Europe, centred on bringing security and stability to the unstable Ituri district. It became the first mission that did not rely on NATO.¹⁹⁶ As described earlier in this chapter, the EU's focus to deliver stability to Africa has become a priority. In the Caucasus, the first law implementation assistance mission: Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST *Themis*), was launched to Georgia in July 2004. The team of nine legal experts operated for twelve months. *Themis* focuses on countering criminal activity, judicial reform, corruption and international and regional cooperation.

The years 2005-2006 saw a further nine missions: civilian, military or combination of both. Two operations to the DR Congo: a civilian police and security sector reform mission; and a military mission in support of the UN operation during the country's elections. Missions were also executed to Iraq, Indonesia (Aceh), Sudan (Darfur), Palestine, a third mission to FYR Macedonia and one to the Egypt-Palestine border (at the Rafah Crossing). The ongoing EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq

¹⁹³ Formally established in November 2004, the RRF (or ERRF) is designed as a transnational military force managed by the EU. Aiming to have 60,000 soldiers deployable for a year, the tasks available to the RRF are those of the standard Petersberg tasks – humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and peacemaking – as well as encompassing the areas of joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks and post-conflict stabilisation, Haine (2004)

¹⁹⁴ Nowak (2006), p. 141

¹⁹⁵ Jones (2007), p. 202

¹⁹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 205; Cameron, F. (2007). *An introduction to European foreign policy*. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York: Routledge., p. 83

(EUJUST LEX) aims to improve the country's judicial, police and penitentiary systems. In Sudan, operation EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS) was the fourth mission to Africa and first outside of the DR Congo. AMIS was a unique mission that combined civilian with military tasks to provide support to an existing AU mission.¹⁹⁷ The dual missions to the Palestine Territories were civilian. EU Border Assistance Mission (EU BAM) Rafah was a response to an Israeli and Palestinian request for the EU to play a third-party mediation role on the volatile border to help facilitate closer border relations amongst the authorities of Israel, Egypt and Palestine, and to supervise the border's traffic flow. EUPOL to the Palestinian Territories dealt with police reform and has a wider strategy for law improvement in the territory.¹⁹⁸ Both missions to Palestine are still in operation but EU BAM's status is a temporary suspension due to the obstructive political situation.¹⁹⁹

There were three undertakings in 2007: two police missions: EUPOL Afghanistan and EUPOL RD Congo; and a security sector reform mission (EUSEC RD Congo). The first sought to create an effective civilian policing arrangement under Afghan control,²⁰⁰ while the second provided a temporary control measure in the city of Kinshasa during elections. EUSEC RD Congo, meanwhile, provided an assistance measure to the Congolese defence unit and promoted principles such as the rule of law and human rights.²⁰¹ The two DR Congo missions have expired, while EUPOL to Afghanistan remains in operation.

The more recent (and ongoing) missions are EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR) and EUFOR Tchad/RCA.²⁰² The former is helping to improve the country's security sector, while the latter is part of the joint EU-UN force to facilitate aid delivery, to support civilians, refugees and displaced persons and to protect, and to assist a UN force. Finally, EULEX to Kosovo is a rule

¹⁹⁷ Nowak (2006), p. 142

¹⁹⁸ Jones, p. 207 ; for a brief overview of all of the ESDP missions until 2006, see for example Nowak (2006), pp. 141-142

¹⁹⁹ European Security and Defence Policy operations. (2008)

²⁰⁰ *ibid.*

²⁰¹ Working for Peace, Security and Stability: Europe in the World. (2007). European Communities. Luxembourg: European Union., pp. 14, 43; separate from the ESDP are 'conflict prevention and crisis response' missions which deal with issues from political assistance, peace support, post-conflict assistance and police training. These missions come under the RRM and Africa Peace Facility, where there are 16 further missions across the globe from the Western Balkans to Eastern Europe, the Middle East to Central Asia and also in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, see, pp. 60-61

²⁰² Chad and the Central African Republic

of law assistance operation that followed Kosovo's independence declaration. It centres on police, civilian and planning purposes.²⁰³

To summarise the AMM as the focus of this thesis, the civilian mission, launched in May 2005 is the first to the Asia-Pacific region. Its initial six-month operation was extended to 15-months while its initial force of 226 monitors was reduced to 36 by the last stages of the operation; its budget was €9.0 million. The AMM, along with EUJUST LEX to Iraq, were the ESDP missions to use 'packages' of experts for mission assessment prior to its launch. Following the Aceh mission assessment, the EU, along with five ASEAN contributing countries, and Norway and Switzerland, instigated the AMM.²⁰⁴ The successful mission, regarded as the most successful, expired following Acehnese elections in December 2006.

2.6 Conceptualising the EU's global role

As described, following the Cold War, the EU was uncovered as a highly institutionalised grouping of states. Under the institutionalist guise, state behaviour is largely grounded by rules. In the face of the EU's institutional developments, the realist analyses (as described in the first chapter) of states residing in conditions of anarchy, having to safeguard their own security and interests, is considered a 'distant' analogy in the EU case.²⁰⁵ In the Cold War's aftermath, one argument describes the EU's identity as a 'security community' or a 'zone of peace'.²⁰⁶ However, elements of realism continue to inform this inquiry and notable realist aspects of the AMM are outlined in chapter four.

As outlined in chapter one, under the realist inquiry, some commentators argue that the EU is enhancing its global role due to its desire for 'power, pride and prestige'.²⁰⁷ While this suggestion may have some worth, liberals regard it as a simplistic analysis of IR that narrowly focuses on state (or in this case institutional) supremacy.

²⁰³ European Security and Defence Policy operations. (2008)

²⁰⁴ Nowak (2006), p. 34.

²⁰⁵ Keohane and Hoffmann (1993), pp. 1-3

²⁰⁶ Kelstrup and Williams (2000) and Schimmelfenning (2003) in Hill and Smith. (2005). International relations and the European Union: Themes and Issues. In C. Hill & M. Smith (Eds.) (pp. 3-16). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, p. 5

²⁰⁷ Jørgensen (1997), p. 4

To briefly return to institutionalist theory, Hyde-Price argues that realists ignore historical, political and societal changes of international politics. He identifies that domestic circumstances, economic interdependence and the influence of international organisations have an impact upon foreign policy, meaning that it differs from traditional (realist) forms. To extend this argument, with specific reference to the EU, Hyde-Price argues that the EU's multilateral composition – as a system codifying various states, commissioners, lobbyists and public opinion – gives it a diverse set of factors shaping foreign policy interests.²⁰⁸

These ideas are generally associated with constructivist approaches to IR that rest on 'norm based' principles: where 'identity' rather than 'interest' shapes foreign policy choices.²⁰⁹ Hyde-Price embodies the complex institutional makeup of the EU with the idea that "[i]nternational institutions and multilateral structures ... facilitate the emergence of a sense of – *Gemeinschaft* – (community) based on shared interests, trust and a common identity."²¹⁰ He identifies two over-arching causes of interests: 'material factors', such as geographical position, size and wealth; and 'subjective normative considerations', which consist of community, identity, political culture, moral and ethical values, a sense of judgement, conception of common good and belief in what makes the EU a distinctive community.²¹¹ He equates 'core elements' of EU foreign policy (since the early 1970s) with liberal democracies, social market economies and peaceful dispute resolution.²¹² These elements are identified as the 'European ideal'. Further principles include stability, cooperation, integration, liberal democratic values and practice, human rights, the rule of law and conflict resolution. Hyde-Price argues that these features constitute the EU's evolving 'role set'. These principles help define interests and separate them from (realist-orientated) 'power'.²¹³ All of these features suggest that the EU's foreign policy and thus global 'actorness' is unique and principle-based.

²⁰⁸ Hyde-Price (2004), p. 100-101

²⁰⁹ Tonra offers a list of constructive-based accounts of foreign policy, Tonra (2004), p. 127

²¹⁰ Hyde-Price (2004), p. 104

²¹¹ Hyde-Price suggests that because of these factors, a richer understanding of foreign policy is required (rather than focusing on realists' assumptions that power capabilities largely determine interests), see *ibid.*, pp. 102-103

²¹² *ibid.*, p. 108

²¹³ Other 'role' factors identified include, socio-psychological factors such as historical precedents, cultural values and normative beliefs, Hyde-Price, p. 107-110; a further constructivist explanation suggests that the EU is "... a normative actor driven by identity and values rather than interests." Manners (2002), Matlary (2002) in Tonra (2004), p. 126

Similar to liberalism, constructivist arguments reject realist assumptions of power politics. The principles closely tie in with the evolution of the CFSP (and ESDP), which Hyde-Price associates with ‘we’ (the EU – as a harmonious community). He identifies important EU norms with transparency, consultation and compromise²¹⁴ – furthering liberal rhetoric.

Returning to the ESDP missions, the 20 operations described have provided the EU with a comprehensive and diverse set of tasks; but they all centre on security and stability provision with a predominant focus on civilian needs and internal assistance. Police training, security reform, law and order, justice and legislative support to planning and mediation are key areas. Societal focuses, meanwhile, include humanitarian assistance, human rights and refugee support. Fostering regional cooperative measures are additional channels of assistance. The mission’s have produced a variety of outcomes, most are described as ‘modest achievements’ that still require much work.²¹⁵

To conceptualise the ESDP, with reference to the ESS, Jones calls the missions an ‘explosion’ of constructive EU developments in security and defence. The ESDP is supported by *all* EU Member States and has close and professional interaction with NATO.²¹⁶ Haine argues that the “ESDP has changed its dimension. From a tool of crisis-management in the Balkans, it has become a necessary device to enhance Europe’s role in the world.”²¹⁷ The ESDP operations described have clearly given the EU plenty of scope to engage in civil and military missions. The diverse and internationally focused nature of the 20 missions suggests that the EU’s influence in the world has dramatically expanded. This contrasts to the past, where for years, Solana argues, large sums of money had been spent abroad but the EU never exerted much political influence. Solana describes the expanded EU presence on the ground as very positive. It is developing as a stronger and more capable international actor, and a stronger partner to the US.²¹⁸

²¹⁴ Hyde-Price (2004), p. 87

²¹⁵ See Jones (2007), pp. 178-180

²¹⁶ Jones (2007), p. 208

²¹⁷ Haine (2004)

²¹⁸ Solana, J. (2005). A new era for peace in Aceh, Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM).

Similar to realist premises, as identified in the beginning of this section, an alternative explanation to the ESDP is that the EU is trying to create a 'balance' with the US.²¹⁹ This closely reflects realist theory as described in chapter one and as above. For example, the mission *Artemis* to the DR Congo, with strong French leadership, can be seen as a catalyst of the EU's growing global influence. Germany has similar interests, and along with France, were lead players in the ESDP's development.²²⁰ The subsequent mission AMIS to Sudan, Jones identifies as on the one hand, the EU was seeking autonomous capability, while on the other the EU was projecting its power. Further EU incentives for greater autonomy include EU failures during the Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo crises and US unilateralism in the build up to the War in Iraq and the divisions that it created in Europe (as discussed later). Germany and France were again key players.²²¹

To extend this argument, the combination of increased EU capability, the demise of the Soviet Union and the consequential global 'demand' for crises management, saw the EU's power projection increase.²²² Teixeira argues that the development of the ESDP's military component "... challenges the old notion of the EU as a 'civilian power'."²²³

The realist belief that the EU is attempting to expand its power and influence around the world to gain the upper hand in global politics remains a relevant argument. This would mean that the EU is posing a challenge to other powers. It already possesses strong economic and political clout. Thus, its enhanced foreign policy, backed up by credible security forces will enable it to further compete around the world as it strengthens.

<http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/061215%20Aceh%20Article.pdf> (Retrieved 24-10-2006)

²¹⁹ See for example, Jones (2007), p. 10; Gegout even argues that a neorealist interpretation of the EU mission *Artemis* provides the best explanation of the EU's motives in the DR Congo. See Gegout, C. (2005). Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: a Realist Explanation. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10, pp. 427-443.

²²⁰ Jones (2007), pp. 214-215

²²¹ *ibid.*

²²² *ibid.*, pp. 209-213

²²³ Teixeira, N. S. (2007). European crisis management policy: capabilities, political implications for employment of European forces in crisis, *Ministrio da Defesa Nacional; National Defence Institute (Portugal)*.

http://www.mdn.gov.pt/NR/rdonlyres/08F497FF-7BDD-4227-9DA9-B81C28ED6275/0/IDN_Out07_final.pdf (Retrieved 25-03-2008)

However, as previously described, based on collective ideals, the EU is driven by a unique foreign policy and closely follows a wide spectrum of liberal theory as identified in chapter one. As stated in the Treaty of Amsterdam, as a key foreign policy development, the EU's philosophy of liberty, democracy and the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms are common to all member states.²²⁴

To expand upon the constructivist arguments identified, the EU's unique history and institutional form means that its foreign policy differs from traditional realism as it does not completely focus on the demands of national self interest. "For a state [...] the starting point is the national interest. For an organisation like the EU, it is principles – the rule of law, UN resolutions, human rights."²²⁵ A key principle is 'effective multilateralism' (as described in the ESS). Globalisation has created dependence where a 'strong international society' is a requirement with 'well-functioning international institutions' and 'rule-based international order.'²²⁶ The cooperative nature of the EU, as the ESS states, gives it will to work with other IGOs.²²⁷ The EU is committed to uphold its collective defence arrangements with NATO and will continue to consult with non-EU NATO members. It sees the need to work with partners as 'crucial'. ESDP missions have utilised regional organisations: the UN, NATO, AU and ASEAN. It also recognises the UN Security Council as the primary body dealing with peace and security maintenance and suggests that its contribution to international peace and security is in accordance with the UN Charter.²²⁸

Thus, the EU does not see itself as an exclusive body. In this light, parallels can be drawn with institutional theory as it emphasises cooperative inter-IGO relations (and the neoidealist emphasis on the importance of the UN for collective security). Under the institutionally-driven 'condition of cooperation', the role of IGOs and through other multilateral channels, international problem solving is likely to increase (see chapter one).

²²⁴ Treaty of Amsterdam (Title I Article 6), The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)

²²⁵ According to one EU diplomat, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6460925.stm>

²²⁶ A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003)

²²⁷ Feith (2007), p.3

²²⁸ Sourced from the Cologne and Helsinki Summits, ESS, Amsterdam Treaty (Article 17), see previous information in this chapter specific to these documents

An additional consideration, consistent with neoliberal internationalism, points at the EU's use of 'soft power'. As identified, the EU can deploy a the range of external assistance instruments and policies ranging from developmental, economic and trade to humanitarian, social and environmental to deal with international problems. Diplomatic instruments include political dialogue and mediation and the use of economic or other sanctions.²²⁹

A key illustration of EU soft power points to the EU as being:

[f]reed from the restraints and demands of national self interest ... starts from a different base – at its best, the desire to spread democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.²³⁰

The EU is increasingly incorporating liberal practices into its foreign policy. EU-directed reform promotion has expanded to include 'good governance' and human rights.²³¹ The ESDP's crisis management framework meanwhile specifies a target to mainstream human rights into all phases of ESDP operations.²³²

These considerations, based on EU foreign policy impacts, EU principles (especially multilateralism), the use of soft power, along with the ESS-based EU premises, are key factors to suggest that the EU has good intensions around the world. The case of engagement in the Aceh peace process is a central example. A final noteworthy point is Solana's justification that the expanded EU's role is not about militarising the EU. Rather, it is about effective crisis management: to increase the role of the EU as an advocate of 'stability and security' – to act as a 'good' force in the world.²³³ Solana's liberal description of ESDP engagement also suggests that effective crisis management is a necessity, rather than a choice.²³⁴

²²⁹ Teixeira (2007)

²³⁰ The puzzle of Solana's power. (2007). British Broadcasting Corporation. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6460925.stm> (Retrieved 29-03-2007)

²³¹ Dunne (2001), pp. 173-177

²³² Presidency Report on ESDP. (2006). Council of the European Union. www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=162 (Retrieved 12-11-2007)

²³³ Solana, J. (2005a). EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the 40th Commanders Conference of the German Bundeswehr, Council of the European Union. http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/86523.pdf (Retrieved 21-02-2008)

²³⁴ A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003)

2.7 The EU's foreign policy outlook (2003-)

To maintain a unified EU response to international crises, shortcomings were pronounced following the lead up to the 2003 Iraq war when the EU was effectively split into two camps: the UK-centred pro-war US stance (with support from Spain, Portugal and Italy²³⁵ and most candidate countries who were to join the EU the following year); versus the Franco-German stance (who were supported by mostly older EU members). The subsequent 2004 'Big Bang' enlargement further tested the CFSP as enlargement was thought to make consensus-building even more difficult.²³⁶

Smith et al. argue that in the post-2004 enlargement there was no shortage of opportunities (and demands) for the EU to speak with one voice in foreign policy issues. Middle Eastern violence, ongoing problems in the Western Balkans and political instability in countries on the EU's new eastern borders (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) are primary examples, while the Caucasus and North Africa were further problem areas for the EU. Threats and other issues related to terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the rise of Chinese global influence, the North Korean nuclear issue²³⁷, US-EU disputes and the democratic 'erosion' in some former Soviet Union countries put great pressure on the EU.²³⁸

Douglas Alexander, of the European Parliament, referred to 2005 as a 'tumultuous year' for the EU. He argued that the aftermath of the French and Dutch EU Constitution rejection along with the dual challenge of globalisation and terrorist attacks across Europe, the EU countered these challenges by asserting its global role through participation in assistance missions to places such as Aceh, the Rafah border crossing, and by organising Euromed Summit and continued support for the UN.²³⁹

²³⁵ However, since 2003, all three states have seen a change of government and consequently withdrew support for the US

²³⁶ Smith et al. (2006), pp. 268-269

²³⁷ Now also the nuclear issue with Iran

²³⁸ Smith et al. (2006), p. 268

²³⁹ Alexander, D. (2005). Policies delayed are policies denied - MEPs press for ambitious deal on EU budget, European Council - live.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/004-3788-348-12-51-901-20051215IPR03787-14-12-2005-2005-false/default_en.htm (Retrieved 25-10-2007)

This chapter's primary focus on post-Cold War security developments has provided an insight to how far the EU has come to since its inauguration as the ECSC in 1957. The chapter summarised many levels of the EU's foreign policy evolution and the various factors that have helped institutionalise the CFSP and ESDP. From the post-Cold War order, through to EU institutional arrangements and ESDP missions, it has evolved into an important international player. Within this new milieu, the EU has primarily liberal motivations, as reflected in much of the rhetoric outlined: from EU treaties and documents and by liberal theorists and constructivists alike: where EU values of peace and security, multilateralism, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are key frameworks for discussion. The EU's role in the AMM is the centre piece of this thesis, is an excellent example of EU liberal actorness in the post-Cold War and ESDP contexts.

CHAPTER THREE

Aceh: the mission setting

On August the 15, 2005, the Indonesian government and GAM signed the MoU in Helsinki to end nearly three decades of fighting. Peace facilitator and head of CMI Martti Ahtisaari, after shaking hands with the signatories, called the MoU the “[...] beginning of a new era for Aceh ...”²⁴⁰ Following the signing he said that “[i]t is of utmost importance that the parties [honour] the commitments they have made in the agreement.”²⁴¹ The EU-led mission to Aceh is the first such mission to the Asia-Pacific region. A team of 200 to 250 monitors from the EU and five ASEAN countries are to supervise the remarkable MoU. The team’s most important tasks are to oversee the agreed disarmament of separatist rebels and the withdrawal of the TNI from the province.

This chapter provides the empirical approach for this thesis. It presents historic detail of the conflict in Aceh: the idea of an early Acehnese empire; colonial resistance; objections to Indonesian rule; the establishment of GAM and its struggle from 1976 to 1998; then positive developments since 1998 and the affect of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Major focus is on the important mediating role that the EU has played between the two sides that helped end the war. The successful mission, one of many operations carried out by the ESDP, expired following Acehnese elections of August 2006. In a wider context, the chapter compares the AMM with the other ESDP missions; in a regional context it explores the impact of the mission in terms of EU-Indonesia and EU-ASEAN relations. Central EU values and attributes on peace and security, cooperation, conflict management and other liberal elements are highlighted to set the parameters for the concluding fourth chapter.

²⁴⁰ Ahtisaari, quoted in Indonesia, GAM Sign Peace Treaty. (2005). Indonesia Tsunami Relief Portal. <http://www.indonesia-relief.org/mod.php?mod=publisher&op=viewarticle&cid=24&artid=1534> (Retrieved 21-12-2007)

²⁴¹ *ibid.*

3.0 Aceh: a history of struggle

Aceh is well-known for its political independence and resistance to outside control, whether by former European colonists or by the Indonesian government. Although it is part of the unitary state of Indonesia and has been under direct rule from Jakarta since 1959, Aceh – like some other parts of Indonesia, especially on the ‘outlying’ regions – lacks a ‘common destiny’ with Jakarta.²⁴² For geographical, historical, cultural and religious reasons, among others, Aceh is unique and different. It has a rich history of defending its identity and interests against ‘outsiders’, especially against the incursion of post-independence Indonesia.

Historians give credit to the existence of an Acehnese Empire. With a legacy of guerrilla warfare, the Empire emerged with a strong social organisation. Generations of ‘rebellion, fighting and revenge’ are central characteristics of its legacy.²⁴³ Aceh experienced a ‘golden age’ in the early 1600s and became an important regional power, but its influence did decline.²⁴⁴

During early European exploration and colonialism, Aceh was known for its strong defiance, first against Portugal then with Britain. During the period of British pioneering, the 1824 Treaty of London gave the Aceh Sultanate territorial sovereignty in Aceh. However, at the beginning of the Dutch arrival, the 1871 Treaty of Sumatra with Britain gave the Netherlands full authority in Sumatra, which ended Aceh’s sovereignty status.²⁴⁵ From 1873 until 1903 the Acehnese, during the famous ‘long war’, resisted the Dutch controlling forces. Despite ongoing guerrilla warfare, the Dutch eventually gained control over much of Aceh and formed an administration; however, their control was never formal.²⁴⁶

²⁴² Hasan di Tiro (1984) in Kell, T., & Cornell University. Modern Indonesia Project. (1995). *The roots of the Acehnese rebellion, 1989-1992*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Cornell University., p.62

²⁴³ Martinkus, J. (2004). *Indonesia's Secret War in Aceh* Sydney: Random House., p. 44

²⁴⁴ Kell (1995), p. 62; furthermore, Brown identifies Aceh in the early 18th century as being a wealthy and independent state and the region’s primary pepper exporter, see Brown, C. (2003). *A Short History of Indonesia: the Unlikely Nation?*. Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin., p. 96

²⁴⁵ Steinburg (1987) in Kell (1995), p. 7; Ricklefs (1981) in Kell (1995), p. 7

²⁴⁶ Reid (1969) in Kell (1995), p. 8

Through the 1920s and 1930s a rebellion against the Dutch intensified. Resistance under the religious *Ulama* gained strength and led a successful revolt: ‘the holy war’. During WWII, the Acehnese initially welcomed the 1942 Japanese occupation, but when the Japanese imposed similar colonial-style rule, renewed resistance broke out. After the Japanese defeat in 1945 and the return of the Dutch, Aceh joined the 1945 to 1949 Indonesian independence movement. However, the Dutch never attempted to retake control of Aceh while *Ulama* enjoyed authority over the territory through the late 1940s, running Aceh’s own affairs. During this period, a clearly defined unique culture and structure prevailed in Aceh. The province also served as an important source of support for Indonesia’s War of Independence. Consequently, the Acehnese believed that their historical and cultural separateness, and contribution to the national revolution, would give them independence from a future Indonesian state.²⁴⁷

Indonesia declared independence in 1949; Aceh independence did not follow. Instead, the territory, to the dismay of the Acehnese, was incorporated into the North Sumatra province. Aceh resisted. The strong independence movement aligned itself with *Darul Islam*, who had been rebelling in West Java since 1948 for an Islamic State: the ‘Islamic Republic of Indonesia’. Aceh joined the movement in 1953 in the hope to regain control of their province.²⁴⁸ However, after the defeat of *Darul Islam* by Indonesian forces, a military campaign against Aceh begun. The objective was Indonesian power consolidation so that the “...territorial and political unity of the [Indonesian] Republic would be put beyond question.”²⁴⁹ Consequently, a military crackdown in Aceh under Indonesia’s first President Sukarno ensued.

In 1953, a successful rebellion broke out in Aceh. It had extensive support and was not put down by Indonesian forces. As a result, Aceh became a separate province. In 1959, negotiations led to ‘special autonomy status’, which gave sovereignty over religion, customary law and education. This development ended most of the

²⁴⁷ May (1990) in Kell (1995), p. 10; see also, Vickers who describes Aceh as a ‘firm Republican stronghold’ throughout the Revolution, Vickers, A. (2005). *A History of Modern Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., p. 102

²⁴⁸ Martinkus (2004), pp. 44, 50-51

²⁴⁹ Brown (2003), p. 215

conflict.²⁵⁰ However, six years later Indonesia experienced a political upheaval and the rise of General Haji Mohammad Suharto. Under his iron rule from 1967-1998, tight state control and centralisation ensued, which overturned Aceh's autonomy status.

3.1 GAM formation

Suharto's 'intrusive' and 'exploitative' measures led to secessionist movements in the 1970s.²⁵¹ In Aceh, strong resentment galvanised Hasan di Tiro, a descendant of Aceh's last Sultan, to form the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front in 1976 (renamed GAM in the late 1980s). Di Tiro emerged from the aforementioned *Ulama* force, who led the 'holy war' against the Dutch. Di Tiro was active during the 1953 rebellion when he declared himself *Darul Islam*: Aceh's 'ambassador' to the UN.²⁵² Di Tiro described the Javanese as land grabbers and pillagers of economic assets, while destroying Aceh's "... political, social and cultural heritage."²⁵³ The emergence of GAM was met with 'widespread attention and sympathy' in the province.²⁵⁴ Di Tiro, with 24 *Darul Islam* veterans, declared Acehnese independence in December 1976.²⁵⁵

However, GAM's rebellion was easily defeated by the TNI. Di Tiro (along with others) fled abroad in 1979. Throughout the 1980s, small scale GAM resistance continued, while the TNI eradicated top GAM leaders. By the mid-late 1980s, GAM exiles began returning to the province as the military campaign resumed. By 1989 GAM had strengthened and began a comprehensive and well-organised revolt, which was often linked to terror attacks. Their presence was felt everywhere. The 1989 revolt demonstrated to Indonesia that 'mayhem, uprising and blood-letting' would persist. The following year, GAM's campaign was challenged by strong TNI counterinsurgency forces, which were given a virtual 'freehand' in Aceh as it was

²⁵⁰ Kell (1995), pp. 10-11; Brown (2003), p. 216

²⁵¹ O'Rourke, K. (2002). *Reformasi: the Struggle for Power in post-Soeharto Indonesia*. Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin., p. 323

²⁵² For more information see for example Martinkus (2004), pp. 45-46; Kell (1995), pp. 63-65

²⁵³ Hasan di Tiro (1984) in Kell (1995), pp. 64-65; Kell also has discrepancies with some of Di Tiro's explanation, see p. 63

²⁵⁴ Morris (1983) in Kell (1995), p. 65

²⁵⁵ Martinkus (2004), p. 44

declared a Military Operation Area.²⁵⁶ Widespread TNI atrocities followed, as the military campaign also targeted civilians.²⁵⁷

Linked to the conflict are Aceh's large natural gas reserves. Discovered in 1971 by Mobil Indonesia, Aceh has made a significant contribution to Indonesia's economy and was thus greatly important to the Indonesian government.²⁵⁸ Key areas in Aceh, along with other parts of Indonesia, went through an industrial transformation during the early 1970s. This transformation was also met with strong Acehnese resentment. Many Jakarta-based and foreign firms penetrated into Aceh, while social and economic disparities became apparent. The stark contrast between the heritages of traditional Acehnese society compared with the power of Jakarta and the industrial complex was clearly apparent when seen alongside each other. This contradiction is best explained as

... the obstructive character of a high-income, capital intensive, urban, non-Muslim, non-Acehnese enclave [operating adjacent to a] ... basically low-income labour-intensive, rural, Muslim, Acehnese province.²⁵⁹

While Aceh has received very little, Jakarta has greatly benefited from Aceh's resources. Further problems such as industrial pollution heavily affected the Acehnese way of life.²⁶⁰ Following the peace process, accusations of human rights abuses by Mobil (now known as ExxonMobil) resurfaced.²⁶¹ Under the MoU, article 1.3.4, Aceh is entitled to retain 70% of the revenues from all current and future hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources.²⁶²

²⁵⁶ Kell (1995), p. 1, 66-72; Martinkus (2004), pp. 60-61; Brown (2003), p. 218

²⁵⁷ Widespread atrocities continued into the mid-1990s, see Martinkus (2004), pp. 60-61

²⁵⁸ Kell (1995), pp. 14-16; Martinkus (2004), pp. 15-16

²⁵⁹ Emerson (1983) in Kell (1995), p. 17

²⁶⁰ The period under General Suharto under the so-called 'new order' had a major impact upon Acehnese society, for more information see Kell (1995), pp. 16-21

²⁶¹ A lawsuit brought by 11 Indonesians was dismissed in 2001, but since then has resurfaced. A US appeals court has ruled that ExxonMobil must now respond to the lawsuit alleging that Indonesian soldiers under its control at a natural gas plant abused and murdered local people.

US court orders Exxon to answer Aceh suit. (2007). *Financial Times*.

http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?queryText=US+court+orders+Exxon+to+answer+Aceh+suit&y=5&aje=true&x=11&id=070118003927&ct=0&nclick_check=1 (Retrieved 19-03-2008)

²⁶² Memorandum of Understanding. (2005). The Aceh Monitoring Mission, <http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%20MoU.pdf> (Retrieved 26-10-2006)

Overall, Brown identifies four factors as central features of Aceh's quest for independence. First, religion: Aceh's stricter version of Islam and the call for Islamic law. Second, economics: Aceh's resentment towards resource exploitation and the lack of benefit that it receives. Third: Aceh's strong identity and history of resistance to outside control. Fourth: moral outrage against Indonesia's military campaign against the province.²⁶³ O'Rourke argues that by the late 1990s, the TNI's history of 'widespread human rights abuses, injustice and upheaval' had galvanised the bulk of the population to demand independence.²⁶⁴

3.2 Developments and setbacks: 1998 - 2000s

Suharto's rule ended in 1998. Widespread protest and disobedience helped bring down the regime as Indonesia shook off its 30-year long dictatorial rule. Under the former regime, Aceh was not the only province to suffer. Conflict in other regions included Irian Jaya (or Papua), Riau and Kalimantan; many independence movements followed Suharto's fall from power.²⁶⁵

The first steps to Indonesia's reform arose under the 1998-1999 leadership of President Jusuf Habibie. Associated with the 'third wave' of international democratisation, Habibie sought to reform the country's electoral system, giving rise to free and fair multiparty elections in 1999. The unprecedented 2004 election saw the electorate directly choosing its president and vice-president. In the following year, 262 local elections took place.²⁶⁶ The period also saw political prisoner release, press freedom, the end to repressive laws and power devolution (including the referendum in East Timor).²⁶⁷

²⁶³ Brown (2003), pp. 241-242

²⁶⁴ O'Rourke (2002), p. 333

²⁶⁵ For more information on post-Suharto Indonesian succession, see for example Kingsbury, D., & Aveling, H. (2003) (pp. 1-8). Introduction. In D. Kingsbury & H. Aveling (Eds.), *Autonomy and Disintegration in Indonesia*. Oxon: Routledge., pp. 1-8

²⁶⁶ Yudhoyono, S. B. (2006). "Governance, Reforms and Democratic Transformation in Indonesia" - Speech by Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, At the presentation of Doctor Honoris Causa in Media and Governance: Tokyo. Situs Web Resmi Presiden Republik Indonesia

<http://www.presidentri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2006/11/27/496.html> (Retrieved 14-10-2006)

²⁶⁷ Vickers (2005), pp. 220-221

Under Habibie's rule, an Acehese delegation visited Jakarta requesting special autonomy status for Aceh, along with a tribunal for human rights abuses and political prisoner release. Habibie rejected the demands but during a subsequent visit to Aceh, he expressed commitment to make improvements in the province.²⁶⁸ During the following presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, the first period of Indonesian-GAM dialogue occurred when he met with GAM commander Tengku Abdullah Syafei. Both sides generated 'goodwill', but with the military influence of Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri (which also occurred during a highpoint of military-government conflict), talks with GAM stalled due to the military's anti-GAM position.²⁶⁹ However, this period of talks saw the rise of international interest in the conflict. First officially initiated in May 2000, the small Swiss-based NGO the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre) sought to create and monitor a 'joint understanding on humanitarian pause in Aceh' to allow humanitarian aid to reach the province.²⁷⁰

The HD Centre's intercession soon broke down. The end of the 'humanitarian pause', in 2001 also marked the bloodiest conflict since the Suharto era. Human tragedy and massacres by the TNI were again reported. Journalists were refused access to the province; and meanwhile, media attention was focusing on the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington. To make matters worse, while the Indonesian military efforts intensified, authorities were comparing the US 'war on terror' with Indonesia's 'struggle' against Aceh 'terrorists'. While GAM was not on the US list of terrorist organisations, for Indonesia it was ranked 25th. Increased US support for Indonesia's campaign, according to one source, was to protect the former's economic interests. Meanwhile, GAM's lawyer spoke out on the need for global awareness to human rights violations and killings; only the international community could 'save' Aceh.²⁷¹

Formal Acehese-Indonesian negotiations began under the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA), signed in Geneva during December 2002. The HD Centre again

²⁶⁸ Braud, P.-A., & Grevi, G. (2005). The EU mission in Aceh: implementing peace *Occasional Paper*. Paris: Institute for Security Studies., p. 18

²⁶⁹ Martinkus (2004), p. 30; Braud and Grevi (2005), p. 18; Wahid had even suggested a referendum for Acehese independence be conducted had been the case with East Timor in 1999. The idea was later retracted, see O'Rourke (2002), pp. 333-334

²⁷⁰ Martinkus (2004), pp. 24-26, 58

²⁷¹ For more information on this period of conflict, see for example *ibid.*, pp. 67-76

coordinated talks. Under CoHA, the two parties agreed to end all hostilities, while over five months, GAM was to gather in its troops and hand over its weapons; the TNI, meanwhile, was to be reduced and to serve as a defence force only. The deployment of a 150-member international monitoring force worked alongside a tripartite Joint Security Committee (JSC) made up of military commanders from Indonesia, GAM and HD Centre representatives. CoHA was initially judged as successful. The ceasefire held; the number of fatalities dropped; the livelihood of Acehese people improved; and local business activity and international aid increased. By mid February 2003, the JSC had established peace zones as a period of calm followed.²⁷²

However, by mid 2003 large-scale violence returned to Aceh. CoHA was not sustained as the crucial need for demilitarisation failed. GAM's demand was for greater freedoms than Indonesia was not willing to give. The failed agreement led to what is seen as an 'obstinate cycle of violence': GAM's persistent armed insurgency versus the government's intensifying military campaign. In April 2003, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri (who was in office since 2001) ordered military action to wipe out GAM.²⁷³ GAM was systematically ostracised in public debates, while Indonesian troop brutality returned.²⁷⁴ With the failure of CoHA and what Morfit describes as a growth of suspicion, hostility and mutual accusations, the image of a peaceful and prosperous Aceh diminished.²⁷⁵

With 40,000 troops stationed in Aceh, Indonesia gave GAM the option to accept autonomy and disarm. Again, talks failed as the pre-planned six-month TNI operation began. It was Indonesia's largest scale military operation since its 1975 invasion of East Timor. Martial Law was imposed and lasted until 2004 when the conflict was downgraded to a civil emergency.²⁷⁶

²⁷² *ibid.*, pp. 146-147, 154-170; Gorman, D. (2004). *Demilitarisation in Aceh: Lessons learned*. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.

http://www.hdcentre.org/datastore/Demilitarisation_in_Aceh.pdf (Retrieved 30-10-2006)

²⁷³ Martinkus (2004), pp. 180-184; Gorman (2004)

²⁷⁴ Martinkus, (2004), pp. 184, 190; O'Rourke (2002), pp. 164-165

²⁷⁵ Morfit, M. (2006). *Staying on the Road to Helsinki: Why the Aceh Agreement was Possible in August 2005*. The United States-Indonesia Society.

<http://www.usindo.org/pdf/Aceh%20rpt%20ICWA%20conf.pdf> (Retrieved 30-11-2006)

²⁷⁶ Martinkus (2004), pp. 194-196

The devastating Indian Ocean Tsunami that swept through the region on Boxing Day 2004 led to great exposure of Aceh's plight. A lot of international attention turned towards the humanitarian response and also to the conflict. Prior to the catastrophe, secret negotiations between GAM and newly elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had taken place but the terrible impact of the Tsunami drove the two sides to set aside their differences and negotiate publicly to find a solution to the three-decade long conflict.²⁷⁷

3.3 Post-Tsunami Aceh and the peace agreement

As described earlier, peace talks in Aceh had taken place in the early 2000s and a level of progress under CoHA was made. However, it was not until the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI)-instigated talks that real progress took place.²⁷⁸ With EU financial support, the first two rounds of negotiations were held in Helsinki in late January 2005. Subsequent meetings were held in February, April and May. Following the five rounds of negotiations, the break-through MoU was signed on 15 August 2005.

Morfit identifies a number of factors as to why the peace talks were so swift and successful. He identifies five internal and four external factors. Focusing on internal developments, first, are early intentions of Yudhoyono to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Under his leadership, Indonesia is argued to be 'coming right' in political and security matters, which may well set the precedent for a similar settlement in Papua.²⁷⁹ Second, and linked to the last point, is the 'greater will' of the Indonesian government to resolve the conflict. During CoHA, Indonesia stood firmly *against* a strong international role because it represented diminutive sovereignty and a symbol of internationalisation.²⁸⁰ This coincides with Indonesia's 'openness' in the post-Suharto era, where the problem of Aceh was fully exposed to the outside world. The

²⁷⁷ Glasius (2006), p. 361

²⁷⁸ For more on the Finnish-based CMI see Mission Statement (2008). Crisis Management Initiative. <http://www.cmi.fi>

²⁷⁹ Aceh's peace agreement: Will it hold? (2005). *Strategic Comments: International Institute for Strategic Studies* (Vol. 11, pp. 1-2), <http://www.informaworld.com.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/smpp/section?content=a768136570&fulltext=713240928> (Retrieved 24-10-2006)

²⁸⁰ Aspinall, E. (2006). The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh? <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/ewc-lka-1mar.pdf> (Retrieved 20-11-2006)

Indonesian government showed a determination to end the conflict with coherent policies and good governance.²⁸¹

Concurrent with the above two points, a third reason points to the government's realisation that a military response was no longer the best option to deal with GAM. "We must negotiate, because otherwise they will always come back," Yudhoyono reasoned.²⁸² He also suggested that peace or resolve of Indonesia's internal conflicts can be settled within the democratic context.²⁸³ Fourth, is the 'energetic and entrepreneurial' style of Indonesian vice-president Jusuf Kalla. His efforts are also seen as an important component of the government's negotiation skills. Kalla played a central role long before the formal Helsinki process and throughout the negotiations – bringing a lot of time, energy, political capital, experience and commitment to the negotiations. Kalla organised the political parties while Yudhoyono took care of the military as the two men appeared 'determined' to make the peace process work.²⁸⁴

These internal Indonesian factors provide compelling explanations for the peace process' success. Morfit goes on to argue that it was essentially an Indonesian procedure: motivated, orchestrated and implemented by Indonesians – through an arrangement of informal and sincere personal contacts, the use of mediators and personal networks, through unofficial, secret negotiations and by the use of ad hoc trial-and-error approaches. This is described as typical Indonesian negotiation style (also seen in marriages or business alliances). It provides further explanation as to why the agreement has survived.²⁸⁵

²⁸¹ Indonesian openness and transparently is argued to be in contrast to GAM's structure. For a further explanation on Indonesian progress and the peace process, see Morfit (2006); also Masters, A. (2006). *The Aceh Peace Accords: one year later and still holding*. Japanese Institute of Global Communications.

http://www.glocom.org/debates/20060914_masters_aceh/index.html (Retrieved 11-11-2006)

²⁸² Morfit (2006)

²⁸³ Yudhoyono, S. B. (2006). "Governance, Reforms and Democratic Transformation in Indonesia", *At the presentation of Doctor Honoris Causa in Media and Governance: Tokyo: Situs Web Resmi Presiden Republik Indonesia*

<http://www.presidentri.go.id/index.php/eng/pidato/2006/11/27/496.html> (Retrieved 14-10-2006)

²⁸⁴ Additionally important is the government's ability to subdue TNI officer corps and parliamentary fears that had generated since the 'loss' of East Timor where international involvement in the peace talks may lead to Aceh to form a separate state. See Aceh's peace agreement: Will it hold? (2006)

²⁸⁵ Morfit (2006)

A final internal factor is traced back to the collapse of CoHA and the subsequent 2003 TNI military action in Aceh. This crackdown on GAM led to severe repercussions for its political existence and also its financial means and military capabilities. It is even argued that GAM was largely defeated and that it had little choice but to negotiate a peaceful settlement.²⁸⁶ GAM's weakened political and military position, its lack of international support, and incompetent organisation skills had left them isolated and very vulnerable to the TNI. In this case, the Tsunami acted as a 'face-saving' phenomenon for the organisation and led them to accept special autonomy for Aceh, resigning their independence assertion. Yet, despite their poor organisation skills, GAM was well-disciplined. Key commanders could not be isolated by Indonesia and GAM remained well-intact. Indonesian negotiators were meanwhile less coherent, but better organised than previous administrations.²⁸⁷

The impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami provides a further reason. Despite the Tsunami's massive humanitarian toll on the province, it had a profound political impact and fundamentally 'changed everything' in Aceh. Personnel and supplies of the two conflicting sides were wiped out as they sought to reconsider their positions and took advantage of significant international assistance that preceded the Tsunami. The new environment heavily influenced both sides' will to talk.²⁸⁸

Along with the internal developments above and the Tsunami's impact, Morfit identifies three further (external) reasons that contributed to the peace outcome. First, the series of events that led up to the signing of the MoU was the product of 18 months' continuous effort, which established the basis for direct negotiations. Concrete plans, which convened the first round of negotiations, were well in progress by mid-December 2004. Formal invitations were actually made to the Indonesian government and GAM three days before the Tsunami hit.²⁸⁹ Instrumental in creating the breakthrough was head of CMI Martti Ahtisaari.²⁹⁰ Ahtisaari's strong personality,

²⁸⁶ *ibid*

²⁸⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸⁸ *ibid.*; Aceh's peace agreement: Will it hold? (2006)

²⁸⁹ Morfit (2006)

²⁹⁰ Ahtisaari was nominated for the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize for brokering the Aceh peace agreement. The former Finnish president had been nominated several times in recent years and noted for his international peace work. His long history of peacemaking includes mediation efforts in Namibia, the former Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland. He is currently the UN special envoy for talks on the final status of Kosovo. Former Finnish President Nominated for Nobel Peace Prize. (2007).

firm mediation skills and clarity of objectives were vital assets for the peace process. He immediately affirmed that an independent Aceh had ‘absolutely no chance of international support’, while his ‘no nonsense’ approach during negotiations was made clear: “Gentlemen, don’t waste my time!” he is reported as having said.²⁹¹ As a former head of state, Ahtisaari brought international calibre to the talks and could draw upon an exceptionally wide personal network. He brought external resources, advice and expertise to the peace process and had convinced the Finnish government to provide the negotiations venue and logistical support. Ahtisaari’s connections with top-level EU officials were a further central feature. He had close personal contact with Solana – and through this association – the EU became involved.²⁹² This brings the second important external factor: the role of the EU. As the mediation force, Ahtisaari described the EU as a viable alternative to ASEAN knowing that the UN would not be accepted as the conflict was an internal Indonesian matter.²⁹³ Also through Ahtisaari’s personal network, Peter Feith, an experienced international civil servant who had been involved in mediating conflicts in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, became head of AMM.²⁹⁴

The third and final point is the strength of the MoU as a very valuable asset to the peace process. The MoU’s signatory ceremony in August 2005, by Hamid Awaludin (Indonesia’s Minister of Law and Human Rights) and Malik Mahmud (GAM leadership), was witnessed by Ahtisaari. The six-chapter agreement consists of governing of Aceh, human rights, amnesty and reintegration, security arrangements, establishing the AMM and dispute settlement (see appendix one). In contrast to CoHA, the MoU’s design gave greater strength to the AMM and significantly increased the likelihood of sustained peace. The urge for the Indonesian government and GAM to build ‘mutual confidence and trust’ is expressed, along with the need for a “...peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict ... with dignity for all.”²⁹⁵ The comprehensive settlement, acceptable to both parties and built on a long-term strategy, has helped maintain the serenity in Aceh.

ScandAsia.com. http://www.scandasia.com/viewNews.php?news_id=3073&coun_code=fi
(Retrieved 08-02-2007)

²⁹¹ Morfit (2006)

²⁹² Masters (2006)

²⁹³ personal communication from President Ahtisaari, 18-10-2005 in Aspinall (2006)

²⁹⁴ Morfit (2006)

²⁹⁵ Aceh Peace Process Negotiations. (2006). Crisis Management Initiative.
http://www.cmi.fi/?content=aceh_project (Retrieved 31-03-2007)

The combination of factors listed gives a wide explanation of the reason for the prevalence of peace in Aceh; both internal and external factors, along with the Tsunami, help explain the positive outcome. During the mission, Feith described that despite the failed CoHA agreement, the atmosphere in Aceh is cheerful for a positive outcome. "... [T]here is a distinct optimism prevailing that this time peace has come for real [...]. the peace process is irreversible."²⁹⁶ Feith identifies key aspects that differentiated it from CoHA: AMM is made up of EU and ASEAN monitors and has the important backing of the international community that gives it greater drive. He also praised the 'invaluable' work of Ahtisaari, the new direction taken by Jakarta through the negotiation process and the Tsunami effect. Overall, there was a great impetus for a peaceful outcome to the conflict.²⁹⁷

3.4 The EU: initiating the AMM

The PSC oversaw the political and strategic management of the mission. Feith was Head of Mission while LTG Nipat Thonglek²⁹⁸ was Principle Deputy; two Finns meanwhile took up the deputy roles. The EU, including forces from Norway and Switzerland, contributed 130 monitors to the initial force, a further 96 were from ASEAN (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) – the total force being 226. The mission's initial duration of six months was extended twice. The final force size of 36 was for election monitoring. As with most ESDP missions, the AMM is funded by the community budget line.²⁹⁹ The mission's Head Quarters, located in Banda Aceh, monitors cells covering 10 districts; there were four mobile weapons decommissioning teams.³⁰⁰

EU engagement in monitoring the agreement was imperative. It presented a force of 'good' and was carried out as a valuable and well-presented operation. For both the

²⁹⁶ Feith, P. (2006). Beyond the Tsunami from Recovery to Peace; the Aceh Monitoring Mission Experience (seminar) *Aceh Monitoring Mission*.
<http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/The%20AMM%20Experience.pdf> (Retrieved 05-12-2007)

²⁹⁷ *ibid.*

²⁹⁸ Thonglek, Director, Department of Border Affairs Supreme Command Headquarters, Bangkok, Thailand

²⁹⁹ European Security and Defence Policy operations (2008)

³⁰⁰ EU Mission to Aceh (2006)

Indonesian government and GAM, mistrust and failure from previous peace agreements could have persisted. A robust monitoring mechanism was therefore centrally important to alleviate the uncertainty; a level of international involvement and support for the peace agreement was critical to both sides.³⁰¹

Speaking in Aceh in May 2006, Frances Fontan Pardo [of the European Commission (EC)³⁰² and Head of Europa House, Banda Aceh] and Feith expressed the EU's commitment to Aceh. They spoke of Europe having a 'new vision' – where war among Europe's nations has become 'unthinkable'. They described the EU as a block of 27 sovereign democratic nations, which has not only become the world's largest trading bloc, but leads the world in development and humanitarian assistance, and is the largest donor of development aid. Reflecting much of the liberal rhetoric of chapters one and two, Feith and Pardo describe the EU's vision – central to reconciliation, solidarity, democracy and human rights – as having assured its success as a peaceful regional institution.³⁰³ According to Pardo and Feith, the EU stands for many of its support provisions that Aceh has received, these are: reconstruction, decommissioning (of weapons), emergency aid, human rights, reintegration, technical assistance, financial support, capacity building in local governance, health, security and stability. In this light, the EU implements these programmes "... in the spirit of peace, solidarity and friendship."³⁰⁴

Grevi et al. described the EU as the 'top candidate' for the task in Aceh.³⁰⁵ Much like Solana's argument above, Masters describes the EU as "... more effective than ASEAN ... and more trusted than the UN."³⁰⁶ Meanwhile, in full support and in admiration of the EU's engagement in the territory, Thonglek contrasted the EU with an ineffective ASEAN and negative associations surrounding previous drawn-out UN

³⁰¹ EC Official. (2007). Interview. By K. Keizer. Banda Aceh

³⁰² Previously in this thesis, EC referred to European Community. The remainder of thesis does not refer to the European Community; rather EC stands for European Commission.

³⁰³ Pardo, F. F., & Feith, P. (2006). The EU in Aceh - a commitment to 'peace and reconstruction' *Aceh Monitoring Mission News Archive*.

<http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Aceh%20Article%20for%20Europe%20Day.pdf>
(Retrieved 01-11-2007)

³⁰⁴ *ibid.*

³⁰⁵ Grevi, G., Lynch, D., & Missiroli, A. (2005). ESDP operations, *Institute for Strategic Studies*.

<http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/09-dvl-am.pdf> (Retrieved 12-12-2006)

³⁰⁶ Masters (2006)

missions.³⁰⁷ A further European Official regarded the EU as the ‘best placed’ force for conducting such a mission: the US, as an alternative, was caught up in Iraq, while GAM, suspicious of ASEAN, favoured an EU force.³⁰⁸ With these central factors in mind, further commentators describe that the EU’s ‘almost unique position’³⁰⁹ gave it ‘incomparable advantages over others’, which enabled it to be an acceptable mediator to both sides.³¹⁰

As described, Ahtisaari’s close contact with Solana, paved the way for EU involvement. The countries that expressed most enthusiasm for the AMM were Finland, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, and later the UK. This ‘silent majority’ held the views that despite the EU’s internal problems: the mid-2005 constitutional rejection and the budgetary stalemate, the ESDP *was* making good progress. The AMM was seen as an opportunity to advance the EU’s quest to become global player that was not restricted to its neighbourhood area. It also performed as a test for the ESDP, especially its civil crisis management competency and its newly developed Civilian Military Cell (Civ/Mil Cell³¹¹). In a more altruistic sense, to see an end to the conflict in Aceh, gave the EU further momentum. A ‘credible’ and ‘impartial’ force was crucial.³¹² In addition, specific national interests came from the Netherlands and Sweden. Both countries were eager to improve their relations with Indonesia. The Netherlands, as the former colonial ruler, which Indonesia fought against during the War of Independence, and Sweden’s role of harbouring GAM, had restrained relations with Indonesia. The UK meanwhile, as holding EU Presidency at the time, provided further weight behind the mission.³¹³

³⁰⁷ Thonglek, L. N. (2007). Director. By K. Keizer. Bangkok.

³⁰⁸ EC Official (2007)

³⁰⁹ Glasius (2006)

³¹⁰ Feith, quoted in: Could EU’s global sway be rising as U.S. clout ebbs? (2007). *International Herald Tribune*. <http://www.ihf.com/articles/ap/2007/01/16/europe/EU-GEN-EU-Soft-Power.php> (Retrieved 13-02-2006)

³¹¹ The Civ/Mil Cell developed alongside the ESDP. It was launched under the April 2003 ‘Tervuren Initiative’ - by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg at the so-called ‘Chocolate Summit’. As part of the Headline Goal 2010, the creation of the Civ/Mil Cell specifically intended to assist with strategic planning and operational tasks for the conduct of autonomous EU operations across the range of the military, civil-military and civilian tasks. EU experiences, especially the Western Balkans, helped shape its development.

Quille, G. (2006). Developing EU Civil Military Co-ordination: The Role of the new Civilian Military Cell Joint Report by ISIS Europe and CeMiSS. Brussels. http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/reports_10.pdf (Retrieved 08-02-2007)

³¹² Grevi et al. (2005)

³¹³ Laas, J. (2007). Interview: European Council. By Keizer K. Brussels.

However, the PSC, responsible for the AMM's establishment, initially showed little enthusiasm. Aceh was not seen as a priority region; rather, the EU should be concentrating in areas of proximity.³¹⁴ Similar disapproval came from the EU Parliament. Critique was that the AMM fell too far from the EU's traditional zones of influence, while the mission's virtues were also questioned, especially the perceived costs of the mission versus the minimal gains that would be made.³¹⁵ As the CMI-directed negotiations were making good progress, the political issues, including budgetary problems, were interrupting the developments. At this time it was unclear whether or not the mission's execution date (15 August 2006) would actually go ahead.³¹⁶ In the end, an 'assertive intervention' by Solana, which outlined the mission's worth, broke the impasse.³¹⁷ It is also argued that the small scale and the perceived success of the mission alleviated the earlier concerns.³¹⁸

Based on an 'official invitation' from the Indonesian Government and with 'full support' from the GAM leadership, on the 9th of September 2005, under legal bases of the Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP and the MoU (signed 15 August 2005), the Indonesian Government called on the EU-led AMM force to help implement the MoU. Both parties gave their pledge in support to the AMM.³¹⁹

3.5 The AMM: demonstrating EU competence

There are notable aspects of the AMM that have made it a particularly effective mission. No mission had been deployed more quickly and effectively. According to Feith:

³¹⁴ Grevi et al. (2005)

³¹⁵ EU Mission to Aceh. (2006). DE Defence-Europe.org. <http://www.wsibrussels.org/aceh.htm> (04-10-2007); Grevi et al. (2005)

³¹⁶ Grevi (2005); Grevi, G. (2005a). The Aceh Monitoring Mission: towards integrated crisis management. In P.-A. Braud & G. Grevi (Eds.), *The EU mission in Aceh: implementing peace* (Vol. 61): Occasional Paper <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ61.pdf> (Retrieved 02-12-2007)

³¹⁷ Grevi (2005a)

³¹⁸ EU Mission to Aceh. (2006). DE Defence-Europe.org. <http://www.wsibrussels.org/aceh.htm> (Retrieved 04-10-2007)

³¹⁹ Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP: The European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission - AMM). (2005). *Official Journal of the European Union*. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:234:0013:0016:EN:PDF> (Retrieved 21-12-2007); see also appendix two; Memorandum of Understanding (2005); for more information on the AMM implementation, see also Feith (2006); Aspinall (2006)

[the] AMM is breaking new ground for future ESDP missions and we like to think it will change the way the EU conducts crisis management operations. The AMM has a unique mix of competencies, drawing on both civilian and military experience. The future of crisis management may require a broad range of instruments and expertise – something that the EU is increasingly showing that it is capable to provide – thereby implementing a coherent action across its institutional pillar.³²⁰

AMM implementation tasks are broad. The presence of monitors is reinforced by a Status of Mission Agreement between Indonesia and the EU. Monitors are to have ‘unrestricted freedom of movement in Aceh’, while the parties ‘do not have a veto over the actions or control of the AMM operations’.³²¹ The agreement formed a partnership-like arrangement between the AMM and the two sides. A notable feature was that the Head of Mission had arbitration authority between the parties, which was obligatory to the parties. Aspinall describes this function as a ‘remarkable’ development. The extra powers given to the monitoring mechanism were much stronger than what was given under CoHA as the CMI had learned from past mistakes.³²²

The AMM is a civilian mission but draws upon military expertise. No weapons were carried while the Indonesian military was responsible for their protection. Some monitors have a military background as a necessary to carry out specific technical tasks as required. There are regular meetings both at central and local levels.³²³ The AMM mandate is to:³²⁴

- monitor the demobilisation of GAM and assist with the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives
- monitor the relocation of non-organic (or non-local) police troops
- monitor respect for the end of hostilities between the parties
- monitor the re-integration of active GAM members into civil society
- monitor the human rights situation in the context of the disarmament and demobilisation of active GAM members

³²⁰ Feith (2006)

³²¹ Aspinall (2006); Memorandum of Understanding (2005)

³²² Aspinall (2006)

³²³ Feith (2006)

³²⁴ Modified from source, Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP (2005); see appendix one

- fulfil certain responsibilities in ruling on disputed amnesty cases in accordance with agreed dispute settlement procedures agreed in the MoU
- investigate and fulfil responsibility in ruling on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU in line with agreed dispute settlement procedures.

The AMM serves to “...keep the momentum in the peace process, [and] to act as a facilitator and to build confidence between the two parties.”³²⁵ With a goal to end the conflict, the AMM had broad implementation tasks. Militarily, the decommissioning of weapons and mobilisation of forces was centrally important to sustain the peace. Equally important is the arbitration role with a focus on justice, fairness and for both sides to uphold their obligations. The EU’s involvement in both of the above two areas and to ‘end the hostilities’ are core EU values of mediation and peace promotion as chapter four elucidates. The societal task of reintegration and human rights application added a further dimension to the mission. For human rights the AMM was the first ESDP mission to include human rights monitors.³²⁶ Ongoing EU engagement in Aceh is directed from the EC’s Aceh Peace Process Support Programme, these include reintegration, technical assistance and capacity building in local governance and police training.³²⁷ Societal support is an important liberal explanation of the EU’s liberal motives in Aceh that chapter four also describes.

To achieve such comprehensive ambitions, competency in planning and tactic is essential. A notable feature for launching the AMM was the use of the aforementioned Civ/Mil Cell to create a ‘fully integrated’ crisis management operation. Described as a ‘remarkable’ development, its preparation and deployment tasks included preparing the background draft, conducting a fact finding mission (for strategic planning), framing the Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP)³²⁸, setting up the Mission’s headquarters and organising the monitors’ training.³²⁹ Alongside the Civ/Mil Cell is the effective use of the Civil-Military Coordination. Under this unit, all phases of ESDP operations (assessment, planning, and implementation) are

³²⁵ Feith (2006)

³²⁶ Cameron (2007), p. 183

³²⁷ see Working for Peace, Security and Stability: Europe in the World. (2007). European Communities. Luxembourg: European Union., pp. 46-48

³²⁸ The month-long IMP consisted of 80 personnel, which was set up to prevent a potential power vacuum between the signing of the MoU (15 August 2005) and the AMM deployment (15 September 2005), Feith (2006)

³²⁹ Quille (2006)

coordinated as early as possible, rather than ‘bolted on’ at a later stage. This arrangement was also put into practice in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the DR Congo, Afghanistan and Rafah.³³⁰ A final unique feature of the AMM is the use of the ESDP’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism. Established in 2001, it is designed to enable the swift disbursement of funds (for up to six months) to support stability measures, or to finance civilian activities to counter or resolve crisis. So far it has been used on numerous occasions, including similar support mediation efforts and monitoring peace or ceasefire agreements in Sri Lanka, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia.³³¹

EU/ESDP competency has expanded with the successful launch and outcome in Aceh. Its substantial mandate had strong backing and full compliance with the warring parties, while EU strategy and operational aptitude made the mission very successful. Nipat admired the EU’s tactical implementation of the mission: from assessment stages to mission execution (which he termed ‘impact’), and then 15 months later the force withdrew from the province. Such a swift triumph avoided negative connotations such as dependency, colonialism or an operation which is dragged out (avoiding the familiar and often failed UN 20-30 year operations), whilst still providing essential long-term support.³³²

Along with the notable developments above, a further feature of the AMM was the inclusion of ASEAN. Its status as a joint mission made a lot of sense for the EU’s multilateral vision, as both chapters one and two outline. ESDP coordination with NATO were features of earlier missions to the Western Balkans while the mission AMIS to Sudan and EUFOR to the DR Congo were in support of existing AU and UN missions, respectively.

One EU Official saw the mission setting as a providing an ‘opportunity’ to link the EU with ASEAN.³³³ Both IGOs contributed very valuable attributes to the mission.

³³⁰ Khol, R. (2006). Civil-Military Co-ordination in EU crisis management. In A. Nowak (Ed.), pp. 127; for related topics on the Crisis Management Procedure, the role of Civ/Mil Cell and Joint civil-military training, see for example Khol (2006), pp. 129-135; Cameron makes an important referral to the Civ/Mil Cell that helped with AMM planning and launch, see Cameron (2007), pp. 180-181

³³¹ For more details, see Gourlay, C. (2006). Community instruments for civilian crisis management. In A. Nowak (Ed.), pp. 52-53

³³² Thonglek (2007)

³³³ EC Official (2007)

AMM spokesperson Jüri Laas suggests that, rather than counterparts, the sides were ‘complimentary’ to each other, working in tandem.³³⁴ ASEAN, having the operation’s regional legitimacy and superior local knowledge, assisted in many areas where the EU lacked, including culture, custom, religion, language, and regional expertise. These aspects Laas regards as ‘anchoring’ the mission – in contrast to the EU as ‘outsiders’.³³⁵ The EU, meanwhile, brought organisational skills, crisis management experience and the finance.³³⁶ Had the EU gone it alone, there would have been many difficulties on the ground. Laas even suggested that the mission, without ASEAN, may not have been executed because Indonesia was willing to accept ASEAN but was more reluctant with the EU.³³⁷ The significance of the AMM, as a joint-mission, means that it is “...an integrated team, pooling their hearts and minds towards a common aim of promoting peace and reconciliation in Aceh.”³³⁸ Further notions of multilateralism are that both the UN and the US expressed support of the mission.³³⁹ The mission has helped advance EU-ASEAN relations, especially in the security realm. This multilateral idea is an important focus of the fourth chapter.

3.6 The AMM: a unique mission

Set in the Asia-Pacific region and jointly run with ASEAN distinguishes the AMM from other missions. Feith described the operation in Asia as representing a ‘quantum leap’ for the EU’s CFSP building. “I would not in my wildest dreams have thought that we [the EU] would set foot in Asia.”³⁴⁰ Because of Aceh’s distance from the EU, to compare the AMM with other ESDP missions (particularly those set in Europe), makes it appear uncharacteristic. Engaging in areas closer to its borders makes perfect sense for the EU’s outlook, especially in terms of security and stability. The following section briefly compares other ESDP missions with the AMM but then looks at the greater picture of the AMM to help explain why the operation took place.

³³⁴ Laas (2007)

³³⁵ *ibid*; also Feith (2006)

³³⁶ *ibid*.

³³⁷ Laas (2007)

³³⁸ Pardo and Feith (2006)

³³⁹ Laas (2007)

³⁴⁰ Aceh role force boosts EU's foreign policy credentials. (2005). *Financial Times*. <http://search.ft.com/nonFtArticle?id=050815005571> (Retrieved 10-12-2007)

In the Western Balkans the main reason given for EU engagement during the crises of the 1990s was that war was on the EU's 'doorstep', therefore it was 'forced' to take action.³⁴¹ Considered the key area of EU responsibility, stability is an ongoing concern in the region where three ESDP operations are ongoing (see chapter two). The Western Balkan countries are moving closer to their eventual goal of EU entry, especially the FYR Macedonia.³⁴² Furthermore, along with EUJUST *Themis* to Georgia, EU engagement in the Western Balkans fits in with the ESS to "... promote a ring of well governed countries to the [e]ast of the [EU] and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations."³⁴³

Engagement in other areas is also important. The EU identifies both the Middle East and Africa as regions that are high on the EU's political agenda.³⁴⁴ As outlined in chapter two, Middle Eastern violence, ongoing problems in the Western Balkans, political instability in countries on the EU's new eastern borders (Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus) along with the Caucasus and North Africa were main problem areas.³⁴⁵ A key branch of the EC is the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which is directed at a set of countries sharing a land or sea border with the EU. The ENP seeks to build closer relations with these countries while promoting reform and cooperation in important areas of democracy, human rights, economics and environment, and to strengthen prosperity, stability and security. All of the regions listed above (except for sub-Saharan Africa) are part of this policy.³⁴⁶

Whilst Southeast Asia is an important region, it falls outside of the EU's traditional zone of influence (as described by internal debates in the lead-up to the AMM). Consistent with the argument, Laas suggested that the AMM is low on the EU's foreign policy agenda. However, he identified two areas of higher foreign policy interest that matter for the EU. First, the AMM has wider implications for EU-Asia

³⁴¹ Working for Peace, Security and Stability: Europe in the World. (2007), p. 5

³⁴² *ibid.*

³⁴³ Jones (2007) pp. 206-07; A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy. (2003).

³⁴⁴ Working for Peace, Security and Stability: Europe in the World. (2007), pp. 11, 28

³⁴⁵ Smith et al. (2006), pp. 268-269

³⁴⁶ European Neighbourhood Policy (2008). European Commission.
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/welcome_en.htm (Retrieved 22-02-2008)

relations; second, as a mission not within EU proximity, it has helped with the ESDP's development. Success in Asia (through the AMM) was thus important.³⁴⁷

The concrete engagement in the Asia-Pacific suggests that the EU's successes security engagement in its periphery, its global ambitions have truly expanded as the EU has recognised its responsibility to maintain stability on an international scale. The case of Indonesia, thus, is a clear example of realising these ambitions. As one EU Parliamentarian put it:

It [is] an important commitment ... to respond to the Indonesian authorities and We [*sic*] [the EU] want to prove that our concept of a common foreign and security policy works—not just on paper, but in practice as well.³⁴⁸

Engagement with ASEAN and the EU's contribution to an important security issue in Southeast Asia reinforces its global ambitions to expand itself outside of its periphery. These developments are further explained in chapter four, which evaluates the EU's global aspirations in terms of multilateral security cooperation and positive inter-IGO engagement. However, it also assesses the power argument which, suggests that the EU engaged itself in Aceh to expand its influence in the region as part of the power equation in international politics.

3.7 Mission success and local elections

On 19 December 2005, GAM met the MoU's obligations by handing over 840 weapons; its military wing was dissolved eight days later. Meanwhile, the fourth and final TNI pull-out force (of non-local forces) was completed on January 5, 2006: a total of 7,600 troops and 2,200 police had departed from the province.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁷ Laas (2007)

³⁴⁸ EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh. (2005). European Parliament Live http://www.europarl.europa.eu/eplive/expert/shotlist_page/20051003SHL00995/default_en.htm (Retrieved 24-10-2006)

³⁴⁹ Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, met with Muhammad Yusuf Kalla, Vice President of Indonesia. (2006). Council of the European Union http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/declarations/88066.pdf (Retrieved 21-09-2007)

In accordance with the MoU, an important clause on the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) allows for local elections followed by local law. This is an important step for Aceh's democratic progression. During the stages of the operation, Feith described the LoGA process as very 'inclusive, transparent and truly democratic'.³⁵⁰ Acehese elections were held in December, 2006 for Aceh Governor, Deputy and 19 local district leaders – becoming Indonesia's last province to hold direct elections. Furthermore, Acehese political parties have been allowed to run in the province's 2009 legislature. Following the elections, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was 'encouraged by the orderly conduct' of the polls.

The secretary-general call[ed] on all parties to respect the results of these elections in order to help consolidate the peace process, which aims to build a secure and prosperous Aceh within a united and democratic Indonesia.³⁵¹

Following the elections, the situation in Aceh was described as 'irreversible' and 'self-sustaining':

The peace process belongs to the people of Aceh and now the signatories of the MoU, together with the newly and democratically elected Governor, and with the support of the EU, ASEAN and the wider international community...³⁵²

Aside from the strategic and functional competence of the ESDP, further strengths were included: a well-managed operation, the crucial role of mediation, good coordination from key players, and Indonesian and GAM commitments to the important MoU. Whilst the AMM produced a good outcome, key risks were identified that could have jeopardised the whole process. Thonglek suggested that after initial doubts, the work of Feith, Yudhoyono and Kalla, and with full cooperation of TNI commanders, early problems were solved.³⁵³ He identified the main challenges as the budget and good understanding from Indonesia. Nipat especially praised the role of

³⁵⁰ Feith (2006)

³⁵¹ UN chief hails Aceh elections. (2006). AlJazeera.net.
<http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/F740816C-01C3-41BA-95CD-7F8260EC29EE.htm>
 (Retrieved 21-09-2007)

³⁵² Mission Accomplished (2008). Aceh Monitoring Mission
http://www.aceh-mm.org/english/info_menu/archive.htm (Retrieved 13-01-2007)

³⁵³ Thonglek (2007)

Feith, whose great leadership skills and experience steered the operation and made him the “right person at the right time for Aceh.” Feith’s main task of socialisation, talking to the Acehnese, was a very important component of the MoU.³⁵⁴

Laas argued that the EU was neutral, even-handed and transparent; it sent reports to both parties, which created a climate of reassurance. The public display of chopping up GAM weapons was clear symbolism for all. While on the ground, both parties showed commitment and trust. These factors were ‘crucial’ components of the operation.³⁵⁵ On the political level, Feith describes the settlement process as the “[...] existence of a comprehensive agreement on both sides with important stakes.” On the one hand was “[...] the strong political will on the government’s side to reform the country.” While on the other hand, “[...] [t]he readiness of the rebel side to accept the proposal of autonomy offered by the Indonesian Government.”³⁵⁶

The successful outcome of the mission, which includes the election process, has been a major breakthrough for the EU, Aceh, Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region as a whole. Improved EU interaction in Southeast Asia has been a positive spin-off from the AMM.

3.8 The AMM’s wider regional implications

As outlined earlier, Laas suggests that while the AMM was low on the EU foreign policy agenda, there were wider implications for EU-Asian relations. The year 2006 marked a ‘milestone’ in the 30-year EU-Indonesian ties. There was a great deal of activity in 2006 for both sides in many fields: the peace mission in Aceh, tsunami reconstruction and bilateral trade. These activities contributed to a ‘new era’ marked by mutual understanding and cooperation.³⁵⁷ List, principal administrator for the Southeast Asia Unit at the EC suggests that EU-Indonesian relations “... are at an

³⁵⁴ *ibid.*

³⁵⁵ Laas (2007)

³⁵⁶ Feith, P. (2005a). EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh, European Parliament Live http://www.europarl.europa.eu/eplive/expert/shotlist_page/20051003SHL00995/default_en.htm (Retrieved 26-10-2007)

³⁵⁷ Ties between Indonesia, EU reach historic high The Jakarta Post. Jakarta. (2006) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/12/27/ties-between-indonesia-eu-reach-historic-high.html> (Retrieved 27-12-2007)

historic high.”³⁵⁸ The EU regards development and security as providing important goals to build a long-term constructive partnership with Indonesia, where terrorism and regional conflicts are described as pressing concerns. In terms of trade and economics, Indonesia is a major EU partner. It is also worth noting that the EU provided 85% of the post-tsunami aid for reconstruction and development.³⁵⁹

During a January 2006 meeting between Solana and Kalla, Solana hailed the excellent EU-Indonesia relations that have been strengthened by the EU’s successful involvement in Aceh. Solana emphasized that EU engagement presents an optimistic impetus for ever closer EU-Indonesia dialogue and cooperation. Furthermore, the 2007 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Indonesia, signifies that the EU has an ‘obligation’ to Indonesia, which is ‘deepening and lasting’.³⁶⁰ The EU has both economic and political goals as outlined in the *Indonesia Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006*.³⁶¹ The agreement is set to ‘cement ties’ and increase development cooperation for 2007-2013.³⁶² In Aceh, Solana describes the EU’s commitment as promoting peace, stability, reconstruction and sustainable development.³⁶³ In terms of Indonesia in a regional context, he commented on the ‘crucial’ role that the country plays for regional integration, which has ‘full EU backing’.³⁶⁴

The history of Indonesian reform has been a decisive parts of the Aceh peace process. One European official suggests that Yudhoyono has done his ‘homework’ as Indonesia has opened up, bringing transparency and the will to talk.³⁶⁵ European

³⁵⁸ *ibid.*

³⁵⁹ Working for Peace, Security and Stability: Europe in the World. (2007), pp. 46-47

³⁶⁰ Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, met with Muhammad Yusuf Kalla, Vice President of Indonesia. (2006).

³⁶¹ The EC’s strategy paper for Indonesia sets out financial assistance with a main goal to encourage democratic consolidation and good governance through EC support for economic, social and environmental development and sustainability. See *Indonesia -European Community Strategy Paper 2007-2013*. (2007). Delegation of the EC to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam. http://www.delidn.ec.europa.eu/en/references/docs/references_2_4_csp-indonesia20072013en.doc (Retrieved 22-11-2007)

³⁶² Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2006). *Indonesia and the European Union: building on common ground Paper* presented at the 'Pluralism and Democracy: Indonesian Perspectives' EU-Indonesia Day <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/787&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>. (Retrieved 12-12-2007)

³⁶³ Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, met with Muhammad Yusuf Kalla, Vice President of Indonesia. (2006).

³⁶⁴ *ibid.*

³⁶⁵ EC Official (2007)

Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy Ferrero-Waldner argues that the peace process should be considered a proud achievement for Indonesia. Peace has been realised through better public services and reliable state institutions rather than a forceful military response.³⁶⁶ Indonesia, with its recent transition from an authoritarian regime to democracy is a good example of the post Cold War democratic enlargement, post-Cold War cooperation and conflict resolution ideals (as identified in chapter one). These significant advancements are referred back to in chapter four.

Along with improved EU-Indonesian relations, ties with the wider region have equally advanced. As a ‘fully integrated’ EU-ASEAN mission, Feith argued that the AMM provides a ‘new dimension’ for EU-Southeast Asia ‘partnership and cooperation’.³⁶⁷ As the first ESDP mission to the Asia-Pacific, “... the EU underlines its commitment not only to the peace process in Aceh but also to peace and stability in the [entire] region. This mission is a further step in [EU partnership building] with East [*sic*] Asian countries.”³⁶⁸ Feith identifies security and stability as key areas of reinforced EU-ASEAN relations.³⁶⁹

Conflict in Aceh has been resolved. This chapter has shown that intra-state wars can be managed peacefully through dialogue and mediation. The work of the CMI, followed by the EU – with the latter as the core of this thesis – are principal features of the peace process. Despite the mission to Aceh being outside the EU’s traditional area of interest, it has helped the EU improve its relations with the wider Asia-Pacific region, especially with Indonesia – in its post-Suharto era reform, and with ASEAN, as a fellow IGO. This chapter has made it clear that the EU has wider security interests, which has fuelled EU-ASEAN inter-regional cooperation. The next part of this thesis returns to the core arguments presented in chapters one and two on liberal IR theory and the EU’s security outlook respectively, and brings in the information from this chapter on the AMM to bring the thesis to a close.

³⁶⁶ Ferrero-Waldner (2006)

³⁶⁷ Feith, P. (2007). The Aceh Peace Process: Nothing Less than Success, *Special Report 184* (pp. 1-8). Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace., p. 5

³⁶⁸ Solana, J. (2005). A new era for peace in Aceh, *Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)*. <http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/061215%20Aceh%20Article.pdf> (Retrieved 24-10-2006)

³⁶⁹ Feith (2007), p. 4

CHAPTER FOUR

The EU's liberal agenda in Aceh

Solana welcomed the signing of the MoU in Aceh and expressed strong delight with the AMM's role:

The EU wants to support Indonesia and the people of Aceh on the path to peace, security and prosperity. It wants in particular to help the Aceh region, which has been devastated both by conflict and by the consequences of the tsunami.³⁷⁰

The AMM is an example of the EU implementing 'good' around the world. Considered as an EU aspiration,³⁷¹ the AMM is part of the EU's ambition to play a greater role in international politics. As its first mission to the Asia-Pacific region, the EU is committed to peace in Aceh, as part of its undertaking to make a meaningful contribution to *international* peace and security.³⁷² This chapter confirms these notions; the EU's motives in Aceh are primarily liberal-driven as it aims to spread its successful legacy of peace around the world.

This chapter codifies key arguments from the previous chapters in order to understand how the EU came to become such an international actor. It revisits the 'realist verses liberal' IR framework to substantiate the prevalence of liberalism for this inquiry. It then ties in the EU's post-Cold War security apparatus and its outlook to give reason for the EU's promotion of liberal values. After a short discussion on possible realist motives in Aceh, the chapter rejects power politics and accepts liberal motives for the explanatory tool. To this end, the positive and encouraging outcome of the AMM centers on ESS-based values: peace and security, 'effective multilateralism', and democratic institutionalism (founded on societal principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights). These ideas have expanded beyond the realm of Aceh to Indonesia and Southeast Asia. With these factors in mind, the EU mission to Aceh strongly fits into post-Cold War principle-based international optimism.

³⁷⁰ Solana (2005)

³⁷¹ Laas (2007)

³⁷² Presidency Report on ESDP (2006)

4.0 Revisiting realism and liberalism

Beginning with classical realism, key thinkers like Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes formed an early understanding of IR based on power politics and the inevitability of inter-state conflict. They believed that human nature was primarily to blame for all inter-state conflict. Later, modern realists such as Carr and Kennan regarded the international system as anarchical and made up of highly competitive sovereign states. Both classical and modern realists consider this ‘unruly’ inter-state environment as the being the ‘natural order’. For this reason, state survival is the most pressing concern for state leaders. States must therefore exercise their will without restraint to maximise their power and capacity. While institution building may be a useful tool for states, realists contend that it must only be used to advance their interests.

Neorealists argue along similar lines, but rather than solely blaming human nature they consider global level factors, primarily the lack of international accountability, as the prime cause of global disharmony. Theorists such as Waltz acknowledged factors that contribute to alleviate world conflict, for example the role of IGOs and states having commonalities. However, Waltz validated the realist tradition to argue that states must maximise their power. As expressed in chapter one, this thesis largely rejects realism and its simplistic state-centric world view. Realism fails to provide a sufficient understanding of inter-state relations, especially in the post-Cold War era. In the relation to the case study of this thesis, realism falls short in explaining the EU’s motives in the Aceh peace process. Therefore, a liberal understanding is necessary for creating a more substantial understanding of the EU’s involvement in this war-torn region of Indonesia.

In contrast to realism, liberalism provides a greater understanding of IR, particularly inter-state relations in the post-Cold War era. Its roots lie in the work of prominent liberal classicists such as Erasmus and Penn who identified that state behaviour needed restraint and that peaceful coexistence is good for all states. Following on, Locke argued that human progress would come about through individual liberty, democracy and capitalism. Kant followed this tradition but sought to expand individual liberty by suggesting that governments need to be ‘open, transparent and

accountable to their subjects'. These liberal principles will naturally spread to foreign policy, and thus state-level, to form a 'federation of constitutional republican states'. International peace, freedom and justice would follow. Coined as liberal internationalism, Kant suggested that it is obligatory for states (through economic or military means) to 'liberalise' or deter non-liberal states.

Despite the optimistic beliefs of liberalism, universal liberty and democracy was not accomplished as realism continued to dominate IR theory. However, classical liberalism helped to lay the foundations for further academic inquiry that challenged realism's supremacy. The first important challenge was post-WWI idealism. Idealism focused on inter-state mediation. Like classical liberalism, the importance to spread liberal democracy, peace, prosperity and capitalism were key principles. Additional beliefs were in national self-determination and arms control. However, idealism's renaissance was short lived. The theory subsided following the outbreak of WWII. However, liberalism gained renewed traction in the war's aftermath with the realisation of enhanced inter-state cooperation and diplomacy, and led to the signing of international treaties and the creation of number of IGOs, particularly the UN.

This led to liberal institutionalism, which brought a new perspective to IR based on the importance of multilateralism, inter-state cooperation, and the development of international norms. Despite the bipolar power struggle during the Cold War (which was typically rationalised through realism), the general outcome of the period was peaceful. In Western Europe, old enemies reconciled under various treaties. In 1957 the Treaty of Rome formally established the ECSC. As a result, the proliferation of inter-state institutional developments saw the realist approach to IR firmly contested. Realist viewpoints of perpetual inter-state competition and conflict, power politics and state centricism lost credit as liberal theory advanced.

The end of the Cold War was central to this development. The retreat of the Soviet Union both geographically and militarily, brought about a great change to the international geopolitical landscape. This was especially visible in Europe as the fifty year east-west division ended. The hope of greater international peace and prosperity helped advance liberal theory, which needed to rise to new challenges. Neoidealism

sought to re-establish idealist themes based on the importance of collective security through multilateralism, arms control and the spreading of democratic principles. Moreover, it emphasised many progressive developments such as human rights, humanitarianism and the relevance of the UN that has helped bring peace and progress.

A variant to neoidealism was neoliberal institutionalism, which acknowledged the decline of state-centricism because of the importance of actors other than nation states. Moreover, the cooperative nature of key IGOs and the drive towards cooperation reinforced the importance of institutions, which had led to a 'condition of cooperation' among a growing number of states. The theory posits that through these multilateral channels, international problem-solving is likely to increase as states (and other actors) work closer together.

Neoliberal internationalism refocused on the Kantian democratic peace thesis. While embracing the supremacy of Western liberal democracies (among other liberal values), it argues that there are two broad techniques to export liberal values to non-liberal states in order to extend the 'liberal peace zone'. On the one hand is the use of military 'hard power', while on the other, applying so-called 'soft power' tactics such as diplomacy and economics.

Overall, the post-Cold War era and the emergence of important new liberal theories led the way to help create an international system based on four principles: greater institutional capacity, inter-state cooperation, peace and prosperity. The final section of chapter one identified a comprehensive list of post-Cold War progress (although some had occurred before the end of the Cold War), these were: arms control treaties, democratic enlargement, human rights, humanitarianism, political and economic cooperation, free trade, economic justice, environmental issues, strengthened international law, multilateralism and a renewed hope for UN-based collective security. Post-Cold War liberal theory was central in helping to understand these achievements. The following section addresses how these elements have helped direct EU foreign policy and thus expanded to Aceh and beyond.

4.1 Post-Cold EU security and the ‘hope for a better world’

The short period of international success, especially vis-à-vis the list of post-Cold War liberal progress, is consistent with liberalism’s tradition of ‘optimism’. One of the most prominent examples of this has been the political developments of the EU as it strived to redefine itself following the Cold War. As described in chapter two, the immediate post-Cold War era helped to characterise the EU as a successful liberal-centred multilateral institution. However, it lacked a coherent foreign policy mechanism and consequently the ability to project its power and influence abroad. The period provided new external challenges and opportunities for the EU but as the EU engaged itself militarily, it demonstrated EU incapability. Crises in Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by EU inadequacies to respond effectively are central examples. Since then the EU has established an advanced security capability to enable it to deal with external crisis management more successfully, namely through the CFSP and ESDP. As described in chapter two, the various ESDP missions that resulted from this development, has enabled the EU to take on greater global responsibilities, enabling it to realise its ambitions for an enhanced capability.³⁷³ The mission to Aceh is a prime example of this achievement.

Chapter two argued that rather than realism as providing the best explanation of EU foreign policy, it is best understood through a liberal lens. The creation of the ESDP is not an attempt for the EU to become a global force. Rather, its primary function is to act as a civilian crises management mechanism, and it is driven by soft, rather than hard power. Chapter two made it clear that the collective and cooperative nature of the EU means its outlook differs from realist foreign policy explanations. Equally important are internal and external influences on EU decision-making that must be taken into account (for example: global market forces, other IGOs and NGOs). The creation of its liberal principles on liberal democracy, social market economies, stability, cooperation, integration, human rights, fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, peaceful dispute resolution and conflict resolution are further important factors that impact upon its foreign policy choices.³⁷⁴

³⁷³ Derived and summarised from the Amsterdam Treaty, TEU, the St-Malo Declaration, the Cologne and Helsinki Summits, see chapter two.

³⁷⁴ Hyde-Price (2004), p. 108; Treaty of Amsterdam (Title I Article 6), see chapter two

From these ideas, the foreign policy-based ESS advocates the promotion of EU values. Its blueprint is directed at the ‘hope for a better world’ and the growing important role of the EU to help create such a world. Comparable to idealist principles, the ESS outlines the need for international peace, stability and war prevention. It suggests that war, poverty and general misery are major international problems that require political solutions and greater security mechanisms. Further instruments include trade and development programmes, and in some cases military solutions.³⁷⁵ The post-Cold War era has undoubtedly given the EU an abundance of opportunities to export its ideals, including to Aceh.

4.2 The Aceh peace process: an EU opportunity

With a combination of the political environment coming right in Indonesia and Aceh, the EU increasing its global role largely through the ESDP alongside ten previous missions, the EU acted upon an opportunity. Despite initial reluctance by a number of EU member states and difficulties encountered in the lead up to the AMM (see chapter three), Aceh was seen as a great chance to help the EU realise its global ambitions. Also, the unique setting in the Asia-Pacific, a region far from the EU and where it traditionally holds minimal influence gave it an additional challenge and opportunity. The chance to coalesce with ASEAN provided a further incentive. According to a key EU official, the Aceh mission was a ‘major EU initiative’ of 2005.³⁷⁶

The example of the EU’s positive engagement in Aceh furthers its image as a forward looking, cooperative, peace-driven institution helping to bring peace around the world. It has also helped overturn realist assumptions based on power, inevitable conflict and the uncooperative nature of states. Whilst the EU primarily has good intentions in Aceh, there are five noteworthy features to the mission that could lead to the belief that the EU has ulterior motives where realism is disguised under the presumption of a liberal agenda. The following section thus returns briefly to the realist subsection of chapter one to draw connections with realism and the EU mission

³⁷⁵ A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003)

³⁷⁶ EC Official (2007)

to Aceh. Ideas on the EU's power capability and competitiveness, the testing of its security reach, its selective engagement, and potential economic gains are assessed.

4.3 The EU: realist motives in Aceh

First, as outlined in the ESS, the EU has formidable political, economic weight and resources. This means that it has an obvious advantage in international engagement. As outlined earlier, the ESS states that the EU is an 'inevitable' global player. The EU's magnitude fits with 'material factors' as determining foreign policy (see chapter one and two). This reason of the EU's considerable power capability means that it is more likely to engage in third countries and areas of conflict such as Aceh. In this sense, realist elements are pertinent; without sizeable power possession, the EU's capacity and reach would be significantly less comprehensive where engagement in Aceh would be very unlikely.

This brings the second point: the EU's motives in Aceh could be viewed as expansionist, with a desire to assert its global influence and compete with other world powers such as the US. As stated, Aceh falls outside of the EU's traditional sphere of influence, so it has embarked upon an opportunity to be more active in the region. Realist belief in global competition, deriving from a quest for 'power, pride and prestige' is applicable in this case. In a broad sense, a number of commentators view EU growing capabilities as exercising 'formidable' power unity that challenges the US's apparent supreme power status. The 21st century is even viewed as being European rather than US dominated.³⁷⁷ Conservative commentary from the US, while depreciating EU strength because of its internal divisions, suggests that the US's unrivalled military status will remain, but "... [i]ts political leadership will be increasingly challenged by the EU, China, India and others."³⁷⁸

Specific to Aceh, Gunaryadi suggests that the EU capitalised upon an opportunity to be closer to Indonesia, with the latter being the dominant force in Southeast Asia. Reasons include economic advantages (as discussed later), interests in anti-terrorism,

³⁷⁷ Kuphan (2003), Haseler (2004), Reid (2004) among others, see Peterson, J., & Shackleton, M. (2006). The EU's institutions. In J. Peterson & M. Shackleton (Eds.), *The institutions of the European Union* (2nd ed., pp. 1-16). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press., pp. 10-11

³⁷⁸ Gardiner, N (of the Heritage Foundation), in Could EU's global sway be rising as U.S. clout ebbs? (2007). *International Herald Tribunal*. <http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/01/16/europe/EU-GEN-EU-Soft-Power.php> (Retrieved 13-02-2008)

countering the drug trade and environmental mismanagement.³⁷⁹ Gunaryadi also viewed Indonesia as being an ideal partner for the EU against unilateralist forces.³⁸⁰ In other words, the EU is seeking to expand its influence through partnership building against more unilaterally-driven states. A similar argument, with specific reference to the AMM, contends that the EU's growing power and diplomatic weight is:

... [I]argely rooted with the decline of influence of the [US], which is militarily bogged down in Iraq and distrusted over the Bush administration's perceived unilateralist policies.³⁸¹

Engagement in Aceh has given the EU greater influence and enabled it to be a potential competitor with the US in Southeast Asian. It presents itself as an alternative power in a region of traditional US dominance.³⁸² In a similar argument, the EU has moved closer to Asia where it is countering US hegemony through non-military means.³⁸³ The idea of an EU challenge to US power has a level of truth.

Thirdly is the assumption that the EU mission to Aceh is a test for the ESDP's long-range competence. Earlier ESDP missions to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FYR Macedonia and the DR Congo were seen as important tests for the EU to gauge its ability to perform a variety of security tasks.

Although limited in scope and time, the ... engagements are ... first hands-on manifestation[s] of the EU's security and defense dimension, which may lead to more ambitious interventions within and beyond its periphery."³⁸⁴

The AMM was also limited in time and scope, and as the first mission to the Asia-Pacific, Laas did not deny that the AMM was a test for the ESDP, given that the EU was "trying its wings" elsewhere. He suggested that capability testing was not as a main aim but a "contributing factor."³⁸⁵ As another EU official put it, the AMM,

³⁷⁹ Although the environmental argument is not blatantly realist, Gunaryadi makes some valid points on ulterior EU motives. Gunaryadi. (2006). The EU in the peace process for Aceh. *Asia Europe journal*, 4(1) (pp. 87-100), pp. 90-96

³⁸⁰ Gunaryadi (2006), p. 96

³⁸¹ Could EU's global sway be rising as U.S. clout ebbs? (2007)

³⁸² *ibid.*

³⁸³ Gunaryadi (2006), p. 97

³⁸⁴ Grevi et al. (2005)

³⁸⁵ Laas (2007)

among other reasons, was an experiment for the EU's technological reach.³⁸⁶ It is also worth noting that the newly established Civ/Mil Cell was used in Aceh.

The fourth argument concerns pragmatism and risk calculation of the EU in selecting where it chooses to engage. The AMM's relatively small scale and the idea of it as a low-risk operation almost assured it would be successful.³⁸⁷ Laas acknowledged that the AMM had a level of risk but admitted that it was minimal.³⁸⁸ Another EU Official said that because the government of Indonesia approved the mission, it was overall a low risk operation.³⁸⁹ Without such assurances, the EU adventure was unlikely to have taken place. With these factors in mind, the EU is carefully considers where it engages (in areas where it knows it can win) – or the idea that the EU “picks its fight.”³⁹⁰ In contrast, are conflict areas around the world where the EU has no presence: for example, to high-risk African wars, or to more dangerous conflicts in Sri Lanka or Thailand.¹ In these areas, the EU is not engaged (at least militarily). In this case, while engagement through the AMM has made the EU look ‘good’, it was only engaged because it knew that the mission would succeed. In a variation of this argument, Gunaryadi calls the EU venture in Aceh based on ‘rational choice’, or even a ‘geopolitical gamble’, which entailed both risks and opportunities.³⁹¹ In the end, the careful selection process ensured the AMM to be more of the latter.

The final point concerns the potential for economic advantages. Since Indonesia's reform era, EU economic interest in the country has increased, especially as the EU assisted Indonesia's economic reforms (see chapter three). Gunaryadi suggests that the EU has a ‘grand strategy’ in Indonesia, where economic gains (along with the aforementioned geostrategic interests) were important factors behind the EU's involvement. EU economic gains through investment, development and trade have already been made since the reform era; to expand these gains further serves EU interests in Indonesia.³⁹² Laas did not deny the EU as having economic interests in

³⁸⁶ EC Official (2007)

³⁸⁷ Gunaryadi (2006), p. 95

³⁸⁸ Laas (2007)

³⁸⁹ EC Official (2007)

³⁹⁰ *ibid.*

³⁹¹ Gunaryadi (2006), pp. 92, 97

³⁹² *ibid.*, pp. 90-93

Indonesia as prior to the AMM the economic potential was raised. However, he argued that the AMM was never calculated as an economic deal.³⁹³

Whilst these realist motives in Aceh present a relevant case, the remainder of this chapter argues that the EU objectives in Aceh are driven through liberal ideals. As argued earlier, the post-Cold War climate has seen improved IR based on goodwill and success among other developments. The following section rejects the notion of a ‘power motivation’ of the EU in Aceh, and then rebuffs the other realist concepts identified.

4.4 Beyond power politics: the EU in Aceh

By rejecting the idea of realist aspects on power and military strength, Feith hailed that the success in ending one of history’s longest wars in Aceh, ‘the forgotten war’, an example of EU soft power, built around diplomacy, trade and aid, which contrasts to the military might of the US.³⁹⁴ In parallel, Thonglek disputed the idea that the EU engaged itself in Aceh to expand its position in the region. From the outset, the EU made it clear that the mission had humanitarian rather than military goals. Moreover, Thonglek rejected the idea of the EU having a ‘hidden agenda’ in Aceh.³⁹⁵ In terms of the claim that the EU is seeking to compete with the US in Southeast Asia, Laas, while acknowledging the EU as a potential threat to US international hegemony, rejected the claim that it was challenging the US through the Aceh peace process.³⁹⁶ Furthermore, the EU’s use of soft power, coupled with it moving beyond realist-driven power politics and competitive tendencies, leads to the point that the EU is cooperative, rather than confrontational. Examples are that while the UN and the US were in support of the AMM, the EU’s cooperative endeavour has expanded to Southeast Asia, where the AMM has fuelled this enlargement. This multilateral concept is described in more detail later in this chapter.

³⁹³ Laas, (2007)

³⁹⁴ Indonesia’s Aceh Deal Example of EU “Soft Power” - Official. (2006). *The Associated Press*. http://www.aceh-eye.org/a-eye_news_files/a-eye_news_english/news_item.asp?NewsID=4912 (Retrieved 25-03-2007); Could EU’s global sway be rising as U.S. clout ebbs? (2007)

³⁹⁵ Thonglek (2007)

³⁹⁶ Laas (2007)

In further rejection of potential realist motives, the perception of Aceh being a low risk operation with guaranteed success was not an accurate reflection; as suggested, it still carried risks. Rather, Laas suggested that the mission could easily have gone wrong and therefore caused great problems for the EU's operational competence; it certainly was not a 'forgone conclusion'. Prior to the operation, most EU states expressed strong reluctance *vis-à-vis* the worth of the mission worth, and did not think that the MoU would hold (see chapter three). The EU certainly had a lot to lose should the mission fail, which would have been a major setback for the ESDP's progress.³⁹⁷

Regarding EU economic gains through the AMM, Laas argued that during the planning stage, the EU did not have a detailed economic plan for Aceh or in the wider region. Moreover, the quick-launch nature of the mission (see chapter three), gave planners very little time to assess the potential for economic spin-offs.³⁹⁸ Another EU official has even suggested that the EU showed little interest in Aceh's renowned gas reserves.³⁹⁹

In further contrast to the realist arguments, according to an EC Official, the combination of the Aceh Tsunami aid, the construction of the Europa House, high-level diplomacy (such as the visit of Solana to Aceh), and the EU's long-term commitment to Aceh – where it has seemingly received very little in return – gave the EU an "extremely idealistic agenda."⁴⁰⁰ In a similar language, Laas described the EU's motives as 'idealistic': in other words, as a moral obligation and responsibility to the Acehnese people and to the Indonesian government, where peace was in the interests of both sides. Despite Aceh being outside the EU's traditional sphere of influence, it is in a region where the EU can and does willingly help.⁴⁰¹ Comparable to the ESS's idioms, Laas suggested that through the AMM, the EU – as a twenty-seven member state multilateral entity has something to share with the world and is able to contribute to a safer and better world by exporting its values of peace.⁴⁰²

³⁹⁷ *ibid.*

³⁹⁸ *ibid.*

³⁹⁹ EC Official (2007)

⁴⁰⁰ *ibid.*

⁴⁰¹ Laas (2007)

⁴⁰² *ibid.*

Aid, reconstruction, diplomacy, lasting commitments, morality and peace, which are values present in general liberal theory, contrast starkly to the traditional realist-based power politics and amorality. The morality concept for example is an ongoing realist rejection (see chapter one). The EU's post-Cold War security developments, the buoyancy of ESDP missions and the ESS's design, (see chapter two and chapter three), especially highlighted in this Aceh case study, has been progressive and helped shift IR away from realism. The case of conflict resolution in Aceh is a particularly relevant illustration of post-Cold War optimism. Chapter three described the 'cheerful' and 'optimistic' ambience in Aceh that preceded the MoU. In accord with Kegley's post-Cold War forecast of 'progress, peace and prosperity', international goodwill has expanded to Aceh.

To strengthen the case that the EU has liberal motives in Aceh, the next section specifies key aspects of the AMM that help justify the EU's role in Aceh as driven by liberalism or the 'exporting' of EU liberal values. Derived from the ESS, the following principles closely follows the liberal themes of chapter one, especially the post-Cold War arguments. With considerable overlap, the principles identified are individually and collectively relevant for this inquiry.

4.5 Peace and security: a long term strategy and commitment to Aceh

The EU commits itself to a 'lasting peaceful settlement' to the Acehese conflict and to increase stability throughout Southeast Asia.⁴⁰³ According to the ESS, political solutions are the best means to prevent regional conflict but a combination of military force or policing may be necessary in the post-conflict phase. For this reason, civil-military interactions are becoming a central part of EU missions. It also stresses that economic assistance and reconstruction are often required to help restore civil governance.⁴⁰⁴ The course of action in Aceh, as described in chapter three, is consistent with the EU's programme of tackling regional conflicts.

Peace through mediation is a central liberal concept. The EU's mediation role in Aceh was acceptable to both sides of the conflict. Throughout its efforts, it expressed long

⁴⁰³ Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP: The European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh

⁴⁰⁴ A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003)

term dedication to the province. Among Feith's list of reasons for the engagement in Aceh, he named 'governance, political participation, economy, rule of law, human rights, amnesty and reintegration of GAM members into society, security arrangements, monitoring, and dispute resolution' – as the *raison d'être* of the AMM. In further rhetoric, with a focus on long term mediation, Feith suggested that the EU's objective was to 'build mutual confidence and trust' between the conflicting parties.⁴⁰⁵ To this end, exporting peace and security through a long term vision centring on justice, legislative reform, democracy, mediation and societal considerations is an assertive accomplishment. The EU as a 'zone of peace' clearly has a desire to expand its legacy; creating a comprehensive and sustainable solution to the conflict in Aceh was paramount.

To analyse the EU peace and security facilitation further, according to an AMM statement, the EU's commitment in Aceh to help build stability and peace for long term social and economic development will help to ensure a prosperous future for the Acehese people.⁴⁰⁶ To bring security, both economic and social programmes are essential. One EC Official pointed out such features, arguing that the AMM had 'multiple factors for engagement': from humanitarianism, development, reconstruction, reconciliation, relief, rehabilitation through to economic development aid. He hopes for Aceh's wellbeing that the EU will continue to invest in the region. The current situation in Aceh provides stark contrasts to its history of enclosure and isolation.⁴⁰⁷

This comprehensive list of EU implementations in Aceh, underpins core liberal themes as outlined in chapter one. It brings the attention of political and economic reforms through mediation and monitoring to assist with dispute resolution, and ultimately to bring peace and stability. Lasting peace is a lead example of international progress and problem solving, championed by liberal theory. Peace building, economic development, aid and post-Tsunami reconstruction, with a strong EU contribution, corresponds well with this positive notion. The EU, as the accepted mediation party, with its all-inclusive societal tasks and commitment is evidence of their sincerity to peace in Aceh.

⁴⁰⁵ Feith (2006)

⁴⁰⁶ The Aceh Peace Process. (2005). Aceh Monitoring Mission: unpublished

⁴⁰⁷ EC Official (2007)

As chapter three pointed out, the EU, as the world's number one development, aid and humanitarian agency, has meaningful and strong global intensions. As a 'peaceful' institution, it is pushing its reconciling peace agenda in 'peace, solidarity and friendship'. Its powerful and long-term determination, based primarily on cooperative actions, sharply contrasts with short-sighted realist-orientated unilateralism and competition. All the aspects centre on the EU as providing a positive long term commitment, in line with liberal-orientated post-Cold War global optimism. The cooperative aspect of the EU's engagement leads to the next parameter based on bringing peace through multilateral channels.

4.6 'Effective multilateralism'

A core ESS caption labelled 'effective multilateralism' provides a further key EU export. First identified under liberal institutionalism, multilateralism is a key ongoing EU practice. In parallel to cooperative long term commitments for peace and security in Aceh, the idea that the EU is exporting multilateralism to Southeast Asia is a significant development. As identified in chapter one, the term reflects idealist and neoidealist rhetoric of hope for dispute resolution through 'collective action'. According to neoliberal institutional theory, the role of IGOs (as well as through other multilateral channels) has seen a 'condition of cooperation'. The theory states that through these channels, international problem solving, such as conflict resolution, is likely to increase (see chapter one).

There are a number of examples of multilateralism central to the EU's engagement in Aceh to strengthen the argument. Multiparty dialogue in favour of peace in Aceh is a leading illustration of this. Throughout the negotiations, participants came from the CMI, Aceh, Indonesia, the EU and ASEAN. In addition, the UN and the US both expressed full support to the mission. Dialogue continued through the subsequent EU-led mediation efforts, with the idea of partnership formation amongst the parties (see chapter three). A central driving force was the EU's multilateral coordination efforts, which has made a significant impact upon the peace process. The EU's impartial third party role brought confidence to all the parties involved, as a crucial partnership building task among Indonesia, the TNI, GAM and the AMM formed (see chapter three). The multilateral endeavour undertaken in Aceh can therefore be understood

through the liberal argument that is based on cooperation, consultation, dialogue and mediation.

To strengthen the multilateral argument, the AMM as jointly EU-ASEAN run, gave the mission additional vigour. The two sides, alongside Indonesia and GAM, worked in tandem. This reinforces the importance of multilateral solutions. A notable feature was that ASEAN headed six of Aceh's eleven district offices. Thonglek considered this 'fully integrated' EU-ASEAN arrangement a 'highlight' of the mission.⁴⁰⁸ Moreover, the EU-ASEAN efforts have broadened the impression of global level inter-IGO cooperation.

As described, collective action mirrors the neoidealist vision of international order needing to be based on collective security with the UN at its core. The ESS acknowledges the UN as the primary provider of peace and security, while the EU's vision to work alongside the UN fits in with the multilateral ideal. Expanded EU-ASEAN security arrangements through the AMM is just one (but a very good) example of inter-IGO dialogue. Alongside this development is improved EU-Indonesian relations, which emerged largely due to the latter's reform era (see chapter three). International cooperation assisted post-reform Indonesia and peace in Aceh has brought greater wellbeing to the country. It is a central example of international success in the modern (post-Cold War) inter-state system, built on the spirit of trust and cooperation. By analysing the Aceh peace process, Yudhoyono suggested the EU and Asia are at the forefront of multilateralism, in contrast to unilateralist forces:

Europe [the EU] today is a greater and more active force for peace than it was ten years ago. More important, Europe, like Asia, is a force that keeps kept faith with multilateralism in a world that has suffered much from unilateralist trends.⁴⁰⁹

To further multilateral observations, Cameron suggests that the AMM presented an opportunity to strengthen ties with ASEAN, which were previously neglected in favour of closer EU-China ties.⁴¹⁰ This fits in with Solana's suggestion that the "...

⁴⁰⁸ Thonglek (2007)

⁴⁰⁹ Yudhoyono (2006)

⁴¹⁰ Cameron (2007), p. 184

EU is keen to develop a lasting and comprehensive partnership with Indonesia and with [Southeast Asian] as a whole.”⁴¹¹ The AMM illustrated the EU’s growing cooperation in a region where the EU has traditionally wielded little clout. Similar to realist observations, but in a different sense, influence has been through partnership and cooperation, where security, stability and economic ties are key areas of strengthened ties that have expanded beyond the EU-Aceh context into the wider region. As described in chapter three, both ASEAN and the EU hope to expand their dialogue on political and security matters, including conflict prevention and crisis management.⁴¹² Feith and Bretichi describe the condition as mutually reinforced EU-ASEAN cooperation on issues of regional peace and security.”⁴¹³

To link back to the EU’s notion of peace and security, during a 2008 EU-ASEAN summit, the two blocs’ shared views and interests in the efforts to pursue world peace and prosperity. The EU spoke of a ‘strategic approach’ towards ASEAN, which set about to counter the emergence of ‘failed states’ and to keep states ‘strong and united’, and therefore capable to meet the challenges of ‘global terrorism, transnational crime, WMD and violent religious extremism’.⁴¹⁴ The EU and ASEAN, in a joint statement, said that the two organisations aim to expand their cooperation with an ‘enhanced partnership’.⁴¹⁵

In a more bilateral observation, with half of ASEAN’s population and economic output, Indonesia is highly active in both Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and ASEAN and thus a key player in Southeast Asia. The Bali bombings in the early 2000s and further terrorist threats brought the troubled country to the attention of the EU.⁴¹⁶ The result is that a number of EU-Indonesian summits have taken place since then. At the 14th EU-ASEAN Ministerial meeting in January 2003 (after the signing of CoHA), the EU expressed support for the “... stability, territorial integrity and national unity of Indonesia, and welcomed its efforts to solve internal conflicts through dialogue and

⁴¹¹ Solana (2005)

⁴¹² Cameron (1999), p. 184

⁴¹³ Feith (2006); Bretichi, J., & Feith, P. (2006). A Cooperation in Favour of Peace and Development *The Jakarta Post*.

http://www.aceh-eye.org/a-eye_news_files/a-eye_news_english/news_item.asp?NewsID=3110 (Retrieved 21-03-2007)

⁴¹⁴ Feith (2007)

⁴¹⁵ ‘EU, ASEAN Declare Enhanced Partnership’ (2008). China.cn.

<http://china.org.cn/english/international/203261.htm> (Retrieved 23-02-2008)

⁴¹⁶ Cameron, p. 182

negotiation.”⁴¹⁷ The EU’s 2005 engagement in Aceh then presented a further opportunity to strengthen existing bilateral ties.⁴¹⁸ In the final stages of the AMM, the EU expressed its determination for an ongoing and wide-ranging partnership with Indonesia.⁴¹⁹ Ideas on democracy and reform in Indonesia and the strengthening EU ties are further outlined in the next section.

Finally, improved EU-Thai relations are a further example of the EU’s cooperative endeavour in Southeast Asia. Thailand’s strong involvement in the AMM is significant. Deputy Head of Mission Thonglek commented on the significance of EU-Thai peacekeeper training, which gave the chance for greater EU-Thai security cooperation in a country of traditional stronger ties to the US. Thonglek even suggested that the experience in Aceh could be used to solve unrest in southern Thailand. Thai-Indonesian security relations have also advanced because of the AMM with the establishment of six-monthly high-level committee meetings between the two armies.⁴²⁰

The importance of Thailand’s cooperative role in the AMM is a further example of states working together in order to achieve set goals. Inter-ASEAN multilateralism on areas such security is a progressive liberal advancement as stressed by liberal institutionalism and collective security under neoidealism. As chapter one outlines, cooperation leads to the creation of norms and the promotion of common values as gains increase and state uncertainty decreases. The example of increased inter-state cooperation in Southeast Asia portrays a convincing picture of how inter-state cooperation in the EU can be realised in other regions.

⁴¹⁷ Joint co-chairmen’s statement: 14th EU-ASEAN ministerial meeting. (2003). *Council of the European Union*.

http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/74270.pdf (Retrieved 26-03-2008)

⁴¹⁸ Cameron, p. 184

⁴¹⁹ European Union Council Welcomes Progress in Aceh After Election. (2006). *Indonesia in brief: weekly news on Indonesia Information Division*. The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia <http://www.embassyofindonesia.org/indonesiaatglence/img/december15.pdf> (Retrieved 26-03-2008)

⁴²⁰ Thonglek (2007)

4.7 Democratic institutionalism

Civil society and institution building are final key principles that the EU has exported through the AMM. As suggested in the ESS, the best protection against international disorder is through democratisation. Other internal development mechanisms identified include good governance, social and political reform, rule of law and human rights.⁴²¹ The need to build institutional structures in vulnerable zones around the world is a comprehensive EU value. General liberal reform, especially democratic arrangements, echoes liberal theory (from classicist to neo theories) as expressed in chapter one. Post-Cold War liberalism is particularly driven by democracy and other institutional arrangements. Most noteworthy are the need for democracy and human rights, as repeated in EU foreign policy doctrines, especially the ESS. As argued in chapter two, these principles are increasing important to the EU, so far as having become institutionalised into foreign policy. A range of institution building tasks were identified in chapter three as ESDP mission objectives. Examples include police reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina, rule of law in Iraq and security sector reform in the DR Congo. The AMM as a monitoring mission carries out similar liberal-orientated institution builders.

Under the LoGA, the MoU granted local elections and local law to the province.⁴²² After Aceh's successful elections, peace and stability in the province was fully realised, and concluded the mission. In terms of EU support, in the lead up to Acehese elections Ferrero-Waldner stated that the EC continued to support the peace process with governance assistance, election support, reintegration, and police and justice reforms. The breakthrough Aceh elections were seen as "... a triumph for democracy and peace."⁴²³ The EU's focus on Aceh's legal developments highlights the importance of the rule of law, political participation and liberal democracy, where the EU's commitment, again, is ongoing. In line with Ferrero-Waldner's assessment, Feith and the EC Official identified: democracy, human rights reconciliation and

⁴²¹ A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (2003)

⁴²² However, this thesis recognises the implementation of Sharia Law in Aceh, which non-Muslims sometimes associate with hardline and controversial punishments. The gradual introduction of the law however is not directed at violating human rights or gender issues according to Aceh's governor. See for example, Aceh's Sharia court opens. (2003). British Broadcasting Corporation <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2816785.stm> (Retrieved 14-04-2008)

⁴²³ Ferrero-Waldner (2006)

solidarity, justice, police, government and reintegration as key EU provisions to Aceh.⁴²⁴

In describing the atmosphere of post-Aceh elections, chapter three described the UN's welcoming response of a 'united and democratic' Indonesia. As described, Indonesia's political transformation was met with strengthened EU-Indonesian relations. The opening up of Indonesia followed by Aceh is a significant development for IR. Consistent with the new liberal theories, the EU's involvement helped expand democracy and other liberal values. In a broader sense, like Aceh's reform, Indonesia's transition from an autocracy to a buoyant multiparty system certainly fits into the EU's vision of promoting its values of democracy and good governance – where the use of non-military (soft power) instruments were used to promote EU liberal values. As described by neoliberal international theory, conditionality, to promote Western values, especially economic liberalisation, was a key application (see chapter three).⁴²⁵ Ferrero-Waldner suggests that the government of Indonesia is committed to dialogue and reform and is taking "...bold steps to combat corruption, promote good governance and decentralisation, and implement economic and structural reforms."⁴²⁶

The importance of Indonesia's democratic advancements and openness is best described by Aspinall, who points out that past Indonesian-GAM distrust and conflict has been overcome in favour of diplomacy, mediation and adherences to human rights.⁴²⁷ Aspinall describes Indonesia's 'old days' of trying to eliminate GAM as

... just one example of how the old Indonesia, built on military force, is giving way to a new one which is not only more democratic, but which will also in the long run prove to be more stable.⁴²⁸

Similar to the EU principle of mediation, military force was overcome through peaceful conflict resolution. Democratic advancements and human rights – as key ESS components – are values central to universal morality, freedom and justice. These encompass a wide spectrum of innovative liberal principles – as rejected by

⁴²⁴ EC Official (2007)

⁴²⁵ Youngs, R. (2001). *The European Union and the promotion of democracy*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press., p. 157

⁴²⁶ Ferrero-Waldner (2006)

⁴²⁷ *ibid.*, see also chapter three

⁴²⁸ Aspinall, E. (2007). *A Conflict Transformed*. Canberra: Asian Analysis.

<http://www.aseanfocus.com/asiananalysis/article.cfm?articleID=1016> (Retrieved 27-03-2008)

realism – but have been extended to both Aceh and Indonesia. Glasius emphasises the AMM’s particular attention to human rights as popular among EU citizens.⁴²⁹ Chapter three claimed that human rights was a major objective of the AMM, and was the first mission that included human rights monitors. Its mission statement also made reference to the UN Human Rights convention.

Post-Cold War (or Post Suharto era) reform has certainly advanced Indonesia’s position in the international community of liberal democratic states – and the opening up of Aceh has extended this even further. Indonesia’s transformation is one of many examples of previously undemocratic states embracing liberal democratic principles. Ferrero-Waldner argues that the promotion of tolerance and respect highlights the importance of democracies working together to alleviate conflict.⁴³⁰ As described in Chapter One, Kant’s liberal international theory suggests that a community of liberal democratic states together form a liberal ‘zone of peace’. As this zone extends to other states, mutual understanding increases along with institution building and dialogue.

The information above presents a very convincing picture of the EU implementing ‘good’ in Aceh. Feith, Glasius, Ferrero-Waldner and the European Official interviewee all present similar arguments that centre on the EU’s motives in Aceh as a set of political, judicial, developmental and social reforms, and that their goals are long term. In this vein, Ferrero-Waldner suggested that “[o]ur commitment to Aceh is as strong as ever.”⁴³¹ These beliefs, along with the “idealistic” motives that have been outlined by Laas and the European Official interviewed for this research, are central to understanding the liberal motives of the AMM.

4.8 Liberal summary

This chapter has primarily used the ESS based liberal objectives to justify the EU’s motives in Aceh. Consistent with post-Cold War optimism, a commitment to long term peace and security, ‘effective multilateralism’ and democratic institutionalism among other liberal values, have provided the parameters for this inquiry. By

⁴²⁹ Glasius (2006)

⁴³⁰ Ferrero-Waldner (2006)

⁴³¹ *ibid.*

returning to the liberal summary provided in chapter one (see footnote 124), further liberal assumptions help to reinforce the argument. These are:

1. Human nature is essentially ‘good’ or altruistic; mutual aid, cooperation and concern for others’ welfare make mutual progress possible.
2. War and injustice are international problems: collective or multilateral (rather than national) efforts are required to eliminate them.
3. International society must recognise itself institutionally to eliminate the anarchy that makes problems such as war likely.
4. Bad human behaviour is the product not of evil people but of bad institutions and structural arrangements that motivate people to act selfishly and to harm others – including making war.

These four broad indicators provide further compelling argument of the EU’s perceived ‘liberal motives’ in Aceh. Humans have the capacity to be good and altruistic. Within the EU, concern for other states’ welfare has seen progress of inter-state cooperation, with mutual aid at the forefront of such endeavours. This ideal has been expanded to Indonesia where ongoing support flows to Indonesia, and then to Aceh, has facilitated progress. Liberal-directed reform, aid, economics and conflict resolution are central premises. EU-ASEAN relations have seen comparable progress, and with the AMM as a joint-venture, reciprocal EU-ASEAN assistance was realised throughout the operation.

Meanwhile, to combat war and injustice, collective or multilateral action helped to end the conflict in Aceh. This assumption has been reaffirmed throughout this chapter which highlighted the importance of the involvement of impartial international mediators, together with a multilateral response and good coordination amongst the AMM, the Indonesian government, TNI and GAM. Increased inter-state, inter-IGO cooperation and institutionalisation has enhanced the idea of an ‘international society’ and moved the world away from anarchy, towards order. This leads to the idea of having ‘good’ global intuitions to deal with world problems and decrease in the chance of war. For the EU, Aceh is a ‘good news story’ and should receive some

credit.⁴³² The case that the EU is carrying out liberal objectives through the AMM is convincing.

This chapter brought together the liberal IR framework from the classical period through to the progressive post-Cold War developments and applied them to the motives of the EU-led AMM. Key developments included the post-Cold War environment, the development of the ESDP, the ESS, missions to the Balkans, the DR Congo and others and to Aceh. The EU's global role, based on liberal promotion, has advanced, and delivered a wide spectrum of cooperative advancements to Aceh, Indonesia, ASEAN and has broadened inter-ASEAN collaboration. Post-Cold War EU security developments coincide with a greater international order, where the EU is very active and has moved to a position that goes beyond realist-orientated power politics and rather into the optimistic post-Cold War order of greater international peace and harmony.

⁴³² Glasius (2006)

CONCLUSION

Aceh, once a highly militarised, conflict-ridden and isolated part of the world, has experienced a major transformation. With the help of the CMI, followed by the EU's comprehensive strategy, peace has finally come to the province. Signed in August 2005, the peace accords were followed by the successful EU-led AMM; EU support continues. This thesis aimed to explain the reasoning behind the EU's engagement in Aceh. To return to the research questions: what were the EU's motives and interests in Aceh? Did it have a power motive, as an act to expand its position in the region and compete with other powers? Or did its motives centre on a genuine interest to bring peace and security to other parts of the world? The evidence in this thesis pointed to the latter argument.

The framework for inquiry was divided into four distinct but inter-related chapters. The important task to draw links between each one was made in order to build the conclusion. Chapter one analysed the important IR theories. Realists claim that war is inevitable because of international anarchy. Power, interests, competition and state-centrism are core realist points of view, having informed this research significantly. To pinpoint the aspect of realism most relevant to this inquiry is the idea that the EU, through its quest in Aceh, is motivated by 'power, pride and prestige' in search of its global interests. The EU's growing external security role in the post-Cold War era is an attempt to accumulate power. Engagement in Southeast Asia is thus a key impetus. While realist aspects contributed to this research, liberal IR deserves greater attention. From the classical era, through 20th century developments, and into the post-Cold War environment, liberalism has provided an alternative perspective to IR thought, providing a more optimistic outlook. The work of key thinkers such as Locke, Kant, Wilson and Kegley have helped shape IR theory and shift attention away from the dominant realist-orientated paradigm. Chapter one emphasised the key post-Cold War liberal arguments as they are central to address the research questions.

Chapter two drew the crucial link between the EU and liberal theory. As a collection of 27 states, having successfully maintained order in Europe through institution building (especially since the end of the Cold War), the chapter described realist-

driven power politics within the EU as outdated. The EU as a peaceful institution has prevailed and thus helped to advance liberal theory. Within the EU's institutional framework is the ESDP. Developed in the post-Cold War environment, it was primarily developed as an EU mechanism to deal with global crises. It has made significant progress enabling autonomous EU action, having executed 20 missions to date. Set in the post-Cold War context of enhanced liberal thought, the advancement of the EU's security mechanism, together with its constructive global outlook has made it possible for the EU to export its value-based liberal ideals. As outlined in the ESS and other EU documents, bringing peace, stability, democracy, human rights and the rule of law are key export values; provision to Aceh is just one example.

Chapter three set the scene. With an overview of Aceh's history of conflict and developments towards the peace agreement, it explained the reasons for the successful outcome and provided detail about the AMM. The AMM's wider regional focus was also outlined. This included key progress from EU-Indonesian to EU-ASEAN relations, as generated by the AMM.

Chapter four brought the three chapters together. Its title: 'The EU's liberal agenda in Aceh', produced a list of liberal principles to validate the case. The deliverance of peace and security, the use of 'effective multilateralism' and bringing democratic institutionalism are central features. The EU's effective engagement has many facets: from helping to bring peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, to its cooperative and multilateral framework with the other parties. This broad spectrum of liberal principles, as chapter four argued, fits neatly into the liberal IR discussion. The EU has not acted for itself but for the greater good. It has provided key liberal designs to help bring peace and stability to other regions. However, it also acted largely because it could; the circumstances in Aceh were suitable. This last point leads to some of the more realist-orientated perspectives. The EU is certainly pushing its global agenda to become a more effective power albeit through predominant civilian means. Aspects of power expansion in Southeast Asia and competitiveness raise further questions, especially when considering Southeast Asia as a region of traditional US dominance. EU capability testing is a further example.

From the evidence provided, the inquiry has important theoretical implications. It contributes to the IR liberal framework by demonstrating that conflict can be

overcome. The experience in Aceh is an example of liberal progress. By embracing these arguments, the AMM's occurrence clearly expanded post-Cold War liberal thought. Based on an invitation by the Indonesian government, the EU (and the CMI) facilitated cooperative actions between the warring parties. Mediation and dispute resolution reflect leading post-WWI liberal idealist propagation. Neoidealist arguments based on collective security and important liberal progress made since the end of the Cold War are further central aspects – especially when considering democratic and human rights advancements. The bringing of other social-civil institutions has similar impacts. Collective security arrangements through the AMM, by engaging the parties and by working with ASEAN, represent comparable progress.

The cooperative nature of the peace process also stems from liberal institutionalism. Neoliberal institutional, meanwhile, emphasise increasing IGO competence (as well as inter-IGO cooperation) to help maintain order. This provides a further understanding of the peace progress' outcome. Finally, the experience could enhance neoliberal internationalism. The latter's argument based on the central importance of democratic enlargement and the use of tools to deter non-liberal states is a further feature of the AMM. To an extent, the EU has used 'soft power' to export its values to Aceh and has helped extend the 'liberal zone of peace' to both Aceh and Indonesia. The use of non-military instruments to help improve the Acehese situation is a compelling development.

Overall, the Aceh peace process is part of the 'optimistic' post-Cold War order as presented by current liberal theorists. The cooperative nature of the EU has allowed the institution to flourish in terms of perpetual peace and cooperation and to expand these ideals. These developments help to identify the post-Cold War order a growing arena of international harmony; the EU has made a significant contribution.

To close the argument, an excellent illustration of the EU's role was given by the Thai Deputy Head of the AMM, Thonglek, who described the EU as 'very generous', and playing a 'positive' and 'constructive' role in Southeast Asia.⁴³³ The EU has presented itself as a force of 'good' in Aceh and in the wider region. Further examples of such positive and effective engagement and ending conflict are desirable.

⁴³³ Thonglek (2007)

Prospects of the AMM and further research

As indicated by Laas, the ESDP is still work in progress. It has progressed well and major developments have taken place. However, he argued that there is a need for ‘appetite’ and ‘maturity’ to develop the mechanism further. Aceh is a great example of EU success, but the ESDP needs more triumphs to prove that peace is a tangible outcome; thus many more examples are required.⁴³⁴

From this idea, within a Southeast Asian context, the EU has presented to ASEAN a skilful model on how to engage effectively in regional conflicts. Thonglek was particularly praiseworthy of the EU’s efforts. He commented that ASEAN played a constructive but a minor ‘supportive role’ in the AMM. ASEAN needs to ‘step in’ and provide a greater input, he said.⁴³⁵ While commenting on ASEAN’s shortcomings, Thonglek suggests that the organisation is still in its learning stages and can learn from the EU as a ‘great model’.⁴³⁶ The working relationship between the EU and ASEAN is a leading example of international progress. Not only has it produced a good outcome in Aceh, but the model could be used elsewhere.

The thesis outlined comparable ESDP missions, that worked alongside existing UN and AU missions, but the AMM has been the most effective. There are many other conflicts in the region where the model could be applied. Thonglek commented on the EU’s broad regional security agenda and questioned if it could assist with the unrest in Sri Lanka or Southern Thailand.⁴³⁷ Similarly, Feith suggested that the Indonesian government should consider using the EU in two other conflict-ridden regions: Poso and West Papua.⁴³⁸

There are no obvious signs of further ESDP missions in the region, but security dialogue is an ongoing practice between ASEAN and the EU. To reiterate, this thesis outlined the EU’s ‘strategic approach’ towards ASEAN. It identified the main regional challenges as ‘failed states’, terrorism, transnational crime, WMD and

⁴³⁴ Laas (2007)

⁴³⁵ *ibid.*

⁴³⁶ *ibid.*

⁴³⁷ *ibid.*

⁴³⁸ see, Indonesia’s Aceh Deal Example of EU “Soft Power” - Official. (2006)

violent religious extremism.⁴³⁹ Through cooperation and enhanced partnership, EU-ASEAN dialogue is momentous and ongoing. This shows that peace and security is in the interests of both. Thus, there is significant scope to spread the AMM's positive legacy to other regions, as identified by Thonglek and Feith. Like Laas' comments, there is a need for more examples of peaceful outcomes to regional conflicts. Southeast Asia could lead the world with such progress.

There is opportunity to assess this situation further. As identified in the introduction, there were a number of limitations to the research, most to with word limit. As such, the ideas expressed could be expanded, especially vis-à-vis other ESDP missions and how the AMM differs. Other missions for example may not be driven by such liberal motives.⁴⁴⁰

There is a lot to be learnt from this research problem. European Studies, and in this case conflict resolution and the ESDP, has significant scope for further inquiry, especially as an inspirational area of peace studies. By the end of writing, for example, comparisons were being made between the 2004 Tsunami consequence in Aceh, with the devastating Myanmar Cyclone in 2008. Following the Tsunami, the conflict in Aceh was fully exposed to the international community, but so far, Myanmar openness and the need for its authority to engage more fully with the international community has not occurred.⁴⁴¹ The EU has expressed great concern for the country.⁴⁴² Considering both Indonesia and Myanmar are members of ASEAN, this could make a relevant comparison. This is just one example of how the EU's experience in Aceh has impacted upon the wider world and the attention that it has generated by the successful outcome.

⁴³⁹ see footnote 414

⁴⁴⁰ see for example Gegout (2005), pp. 427-443, who explores the ESDP missions to the DR Congo through a neorealist viewpoint.

⁴⁴¹ see for example Brookings (2008). Cyclone Nargis: Catalyst for Change in Myanmar? http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0516_myanmar_ferris.aspx (Retrieved 18-05-2008)

⁴⁴² European Commission (2008) Burma / Myanmar - A silent crisis. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/field/myanmar/index_en.htm (Retrieved 18-05-2008)

APPENDIX ONE

APPENDIX TWO

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