

# **Beyond Conflict Settlement: The Policy of Peacebuilding in the Pacific**

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By

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## Abbreviations

ABG	Autonomous Bougainville Government
BCL	Bougainville Cooper Limited
BICWF	Bougainville Inter-Church Women's Forum
BIG	Bougainville Interim Government
BPA	Bougainville Peace Agreement
BRA	Bougainville Revolutionary Army
BRF	Bougainville Resistance Force
BTG	Bougainville Transitional Government
CAVR	Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
CMC	Ceasefire Monitoring Council
CNRT	Council for Timorese National Resistance
CRA	Conzinc Riotinto Australia
CSN	Civil Society Network
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
EPG	Eminent Persons Group
ETTA	East Timor Transitional Administration
EU	European Union
F-FDTL	Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste
FLP	Fijian Labour Party

GPA	Governance and Public Administration
GRA	Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army
HDI	Human Development Indicator
IFM	Isatabu Freedom Movement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	International Force in East Timor
IO	International Organisation
MEF	Malatian Eagle Force
NCC	National Consultative Council
OPM	Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdaeka)
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PFF	Police Field Force
PIDP	Pacific Islands Development Program
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PLA	Panguna Landowners Association
PMG	Peace Monitoring Group
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNGDF	Papua New Guinea Defence Force
PNTL	Policia National de Timor Leste
PPF	Participatory Police Force
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RFMF	Republic of Fiji Military Forces

RPNGC	Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SPC	Secretariat of the Pacific Community
TMG	Truce Monitoring Group
TPA	Townsville Peace Agreement
TPN	National Liberation Army
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UDT	Union for Democratic Timor
UN	United Nation
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNMISSET	United National Mission of Support in East Timor
UNOMB	United Nations Observer Mission to Bougainville
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Authority of East Timor

## **Abstract**

Since the end of the Cold War internal conflict has emerged more and more into the foreground of concern in the international arena. It is seemingly more perverse and intractable than traditional interstate conflict, and as a result it is increasingly harder to resolve. Recurrence of internal conflict has been and remains to be a significant issue. Because of the nature of internal conflict and the underlying causes of the violence, the way in which its resolution is approached has a significant impact on the likelihood of success. The theory of peacebuilding, while still in its infancy, is gaining more and attention as a way in which to approach internal conflict and help to establish long-term peace in post-conflict societies. This thesis analyses the theory of peacebuilding and develops a framework based on this research that includes what I believe are the most relevant aspects of the approach. This framework is then applied to three cases; East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. The theory is based on the idea of building long-term sustainable peace. This is done by not only improving the security situation in the host state but also working through the underlying causes of the violence and helping to establish sustainable and self-reliant institutions that will help support peace within the state long after the peacebuilders have withdrawn. The main focus of this research is internal conflict in the Pacific region. Conflict in the region, while somewhat insignificant on an international scale, is disproportionate to the small size of the region. The effects of conflict are felt long after the fighting has stopped. The theory of peacebuilding in the Pacific is approached by examining three peacebuilding missions that have been undertaken in the region and analysing the strengths and weaknesses of these cases. From here the overall success of these missions is examined. Ideas about peacebuilding success are then developed and a look at the future of peacebuilding in the region is outlined.



# Chapter One

## Beyond Conflict Settlement: The Policy of Peacebuilding in the Pacific

### 1.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War internal conflict has emerged more and more into the foreground of concern in the international arena. For some the end of the Cold War was believed to be the end of conflict altogether and was to mark the beginning of a long era of peace. This, as we now know, was not the case. Instead of a decrease in conflict, the end of the Cold War can be seen to be the catalyst for an increase in the both number and intensity of conflicts in the international system (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004: 147). The breakdown of the Cold War's political barriers opened up new opportunities for self-determination, independence and advancement, especially for the developing nations. Internal conflict is, as the name suggests, internal in nature. It is conflict between groups of people within the boundaries of a single state. It is seemingly more perverse and intractable than traditional interstate conflict, and as a result is increasingly harder to resolve. Because of the nature of internal conflict and the underlying causes of the violence, the way in which its resolution is approached has a significant impact on the likelihood of success. Conflict resolution methods need to be acceptable to the parties concerned and post-conflict societies need to be involved as much as they can be in the process if peace is to be sustained beyond the initial post-conflict phase.

The motivation behind this research is the belief that if better ways of dealing with internal conflict are developed and established as the norm, then this pattern of increasing internal conflicts we have been experiencing since the end of the Cold War will not continue for much longer. New ways of thinking about and approaching internal conflict need to be considered to stop this pattern from snowballing any further. One area in which internal



conflict has been devastating and its effects have wreaked havoc on society in the Pacific region. Many of the small island nations in this region have been plagued by the violence and the long term effects that ensue when internal conflicts take control of a society. The complex nature and relationships that are evident in many Pacific cultures and the deep seeded causes behind much of the violence put real pressure on efforts undertaken to try to resolve them. The focus of this research is the idea that once conflict in the Pacific region is better understood and its root causes are identified then conflict resolution efforts that are put in place are better equipped to deal with the real issues that triggered the violence. This introductory chapter acts as an overview of what is going to be covered during the course of this research. It outlines the main principles and focus points that make up this paper and provides a short summary of what each chapter aims to examine.

## **1.2 Objectives**

The international system has experienced a significant increase in the occurrence of internal conflict since the end of World War II. However, what is more worrying than just the number of internal conflicts that have broken out is the protracted nature of these conflicts. Even though considerable attempts are being made to help resolve internal conflicts, there is a high likelihood of violence reoccurring in the post-settlement phase. A change needs to be made about how these conflicts are approached to help ensure long-term peace in countries that have been devastated by internal conflict. New approaches need to be developed that aim to go beyond simple conflict termination. Peacebuilding is such an approach. Its aim is to help develop stable and self-sufficient communities where people live in peace and are no longer under threat of renewed violence.

This research is based on the theory of peacebuilding, which is the set of activities that are undertaken in the post conflict phase to help build long term, sustainable peace in society and stop conflict from reoccurring. The main purpose of this research is to provide an analysis of conflict in the Pacific region and examine the steps that have been taken to build peace in the post conflict phase. The aim is to identify what needs to be done in the Pacific region in the


post-conflict phase to create a peaceful society where the root causes of the conflict are dealt with and where communities have the ability to deal with future problems without the need to resort back to violence. Establishing sustainable peace will make conflict recurrence far less likely.

The reason for applying the theory of peacebuilding to the Pacific is to see if such an approach will help to curb conflict recurrence that is so common in the region. The fact that it has already been applied in some places in the region with a certain degree of success suggests that the framework could be applied to other zones of conflict in the Pacific as well, with a similar chance of success. Just dealing with actual violence in these situations is not enough; real causes behind the violence need to be uncovered and society needs to be restructured to focus on sustainable peace and how this can be achieved without relapsing into conflict. Peacebuilding measures have already been undertaken in East Timor and Bougainville. Although these were successful in creating peace, they did have certain downfalls that have become evident since reforms were implemented. By looking at both the strengths and weaknesses of these cases it is possible to then see what more needs to be done in other conflict situations in the region to increase the likelihood of establishing long-term peace.

### **1.3 Internal Conflict**

Firstly, a definition of internal conflict is needed before it can be discussed in more depth. Michael Brown describes internal conflict as,

“Violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins can be traced primarily to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place primarily in the borders of a single state” (Brown 1996: 1).



**Figure 1.1** Number of conflicts by type, 1945-2009 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010: 503)

Internal conflict has been on the increase since the end of World War II and its effects have been devastating to many nations around the world. While interstate conflicts are still being undertaken in various areas in the world, internal conflict has been brought to the forefront of international attention in more recent time because of its pervasive and persistent nature and the difficulties that have been experienced in its resolution, or lack thereof. Internal conflict is now becoming the most common form of conflict in the international system. One important problem that is associated with this shift from interstate to intrastate conflict is the ever increasing number of civilians that are now involved in the violence and perhaps more importantly the vast numbers that are being killed in the process. While at the beginning of the twentieth century, during the time of WWI, only one out of 10 casualties was a civilian, now in the twenty-first century, as the nature of war changes, nine out of 10 casualties are now civilians (Misra 2008: 4). This new reality raises various problems, a significant one being how it should be dealt with under international law. The international system is designed to deal with relationships and interactions between states, and not within them. When the United Nations Charter was drawn up after World War II it was designed for the purpose of dealing with interstate conflict, and rightly so since between 1900 and 1941, 80 percent of all conflicts had been between states (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 11). The problem now is that much of the law relating to conflict and conflict management has not evolved to suit the current conflict climate of ever increasing internal conflict. Therefore the ways of

dealing with such conflicts come up against many challenges when trying to be implemented, whether it be an adverse reaction from certain groups within the conflict zone, or more worryingly, total rejection of any proposed intervention by the state itself.

Internal conflict is triggered for many different reasons. The most significant causes of conflict, which are going to be discussed in more depth in *Chapter Three*, are economic factors, land and natural resources, governance and ethnicity. While certain conflicts are caused by just one of these factors, most are caused by a combination. However, although these dimensions may be in a country it does not mean that that country will necessarily spiral into violence. There are certain triggers that are present in areas of unrest that can tip the balance from societal instability to violent conflict and the outbreak of war.

One worrying consequence related to internal conflict is the high likelihood of the violence spilling over into other countries, both in the region and further afield. Internal conflicts are often based on very emotive issues. If one country employs violent means to enact their frustration in relation to these issues, other countries with the same sort of grievances may follow suit. Spill over effects can also be a result of the movement of refugees, which is significant during internal conflicts. People are displaced during conflict and many flee across borders into neighbouring countries. This influx of people puts great pressure on these societies as they struggle to meet the needs of these people. The movement of people can also disrupt the balance in these societies and tensions and violence can be transferred with refugees into these different areas.

A remaining difficulty is how to solve such conflicts which are often based on intractable ideals. Compromise is often not possible and neither party is willing to relinquish any of their demands. Attempts need to be made to help reconcile the people within conflicting societies and help them to realise that the pursuit of peace needs to be the primary aim. Peace needs to become the best option for those involved. If all sides agree to and are involved in building peace after conflict then it will seem less like compromise and more like a mutual pursuit of a safe and stable future for all people within the community. Peacebuilding in one such

approach that aims to deal with and work through the deeply entrenched causes of the violence and attempts to reconcile those who used to be enemies and help to establish a way in which all sides of the conflict can learn to live together and build a sustainable future for their people.

## **1.4 The Pacific Region**

The Pacific region is made up of 22 island countries, about eight million people and spread over more than 30 million kilometres of ocean. The region is usually divided into three distinct areas; Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia. Melanesia is the largest, containing 97 percent of the land and 76 percent of the region's population, excluding Australia and New Zealand (Crocombe 2001: 146). The islands, however, only make up around 2 percent of that area. The Pacific region is somewhat hard to define in specific terms because it is far from homogenous. While similarities can be identified between certain islands, many countries in the region are set apart more by their differences. While some countries within the region, such as Australia and New Zealand, are highly developed both politically and economically, others struggle to provide their citizens with basic amenities such as clean water and power. There is also a vast difference in population sizes across the islands states. Whereas New Zealand, Australia and Papua New Guinea have populations in the millions, others such as Tokelau and Niue have less than 1500 people. And while some states moved easily into independence and self-governance, many others fought long and hard to gain their independence (Boxall 2006: 17-18)

The Pacific region, like so many other developing areas, has been plagued by conflict and low level skirmishes since countries in this region began to gain independence in the 1960's. While the intensity of conflict in the Pacific is no more significant than other regions in the world, its occurrence is disproportionate to the small size of states in the region. Conflict in the region is "sporadic rather than endemic". Only two conflicts in the region, West Papua and Bougainville, have met the Uppsala Conflict Data Program criteria for classifying wars of 25 battle-related deaths each year (Henderson and Watson 2005: 8).

<b>Date</b>	<b>Conflict</b>	<b>Fatalities</b>
Ongoing	Independent struggle in West Papua	100,000 estimated deaths
Ongoing	Tribal fighting in Papua New Guinea Highlands	Several hundred deaths each year
1980s	Independence struggle in New Caledonia	Over 50 deaths
1990s	Bougainville independence struggle	Over 10,000 deaths
1999-2004	Solomon Islands conflict	200 estimated deaths

**Table 1.1 Armed conflicts in the Pacific Islands region 1980-2005 (Henderson and Watson 2005: 5)**


The Pacific region is made up of a vast range of cultures, languages, islands and different peoples. The amalgamation of all these factors has made the transition to independence wrought with tension for many of the islands in the region. However, the conflict is not widespread in the region; the majority of conflict is experienced in Melanesia, as opposed to Polynesia and Micronesia. Melanesia is the largest in terms of population and land area and is the most culturally diverse area in the Pacific region. The decentralised and fragmented nature of its political system and widespread poverty is a catalyst to much of the unrest and conflict.

## **1.5 What can be done about conflict? Prevention, Management, Resolution and Beyond**

There are many different ways of dealing with conflict in the international system. The approach taken may depend on various factors such as the parties involved, the type of conflict, who is undertaking the intervention attempt and even what stage the conflict is at. To better understand where peacebuilding lies in the wider scheme of conflict resolution,

other method of dealing with conflict need to first be defined and analysed. This will help to build a clearer picture of what peacebuilding really is and how it is different from other forms of conflict management.

Conflict can be described as having a life cycle and the methods of dealing with conflict change depending on the stage which the conflict is at. This life cycle of conflict is illustrated in **Figure 1.2**. The figure shows that conflict needs to be understood as being a dynamic situation and not a static one and that the level of intensity changes throughout a conflicts life cycle. By understanding the way in which a conflict develops, the ways in which it can be dealt with, in terms of how, when and where different strategies can be applied, can also be better understood. It needs to be realised that the conflict life cycle model in **Figure 1.2** is a very simplistic model of the conflict cycle. Often conflicts and conflict management approaches will not fit neatly into this model. It is, however, a good starting point in explaining the relationship between conflict, conflict intensity and the different methods of dealing with conflict (Swanström and Weissmann 2005: 9-10).



**Figure 1.2 The Conflict Cycle (Lund 1996: 38)**

The first phase in the escalation of conflict intensity is stable peace which is the situation when tensions between parties are low. The next level is unstable peace, which is when tension has increased but there is still no violence. After that is open conflict when conflict becomes more defined and steps have been taken to deal with it. Following that is the crisis phase which is when war is imminent, but violence is only sporadic. The final phase of conflict intensity is the war phase, which is categorised by widespread and intense violence. The de-escalation phase is this pattern in reverse (Swanström and Weissmann 2005: 11). These different phases all have corresponding methods of dealing with the situation at hand.

The first step to be undertaken in the early stages of the escalation phase is conflict prevention. Conflict prevention is a pre-emptive approach to try to deal with unrest in society before violence breaks out. Conflict prevention can be divided into two specific categories; direct prevention and structural prevention. Direct preventions measures are those with the aim of preventing short term escalation of a potential conflict, through the use of mediation for example. Structural prevention measures focus more on the long term underlying causes of the potential conflict through the use of such means as economic assistance (Swanström and Weissmann 2005: 19).

The next stage is conflict management and is to be attempted when conflict has been identified within a given context. Its aim is to reduce tensions between the parties as a means of preventing further conflict escalation. Conflict management efforts can take many forms, such as reduction of military forces, intervention by a third party and communication between the parties. Conflict management can be described as “the limitation, mitigation and/or containment of conflict without necessarily solving it” (Swanström and Weissmann 2005: 23). The focus is more on a move from destructive behaviour to the creation of more constructive relationships between the parties.

The following phase is crisis management which involves more drastic measure than conflict management and aims at containing the eruption of conflict with all available means. The use of third party interventions is used during this phases. Peacekeeping is also a useful tool in



this phase of a conflict to help to bring the conflict under control and prevent further violence. Peacekeeping is defined as “ the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities through the medium of a peaceful third party interventions, organised and directed internationally, using multinational force of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace” (Butler 2009: 69). Peacekeeping is the main peacemaking tool that is employed by the United Nations. It derives its legitimacy and credibility from two main factors, consent and impartiality. Peacekeeping forces require the consent of the warring parties before they are allowed to intervene in a conflict. They also act as impartial actors in the conflict; their job is to establish and maintain the peace and not to side with either party. Their acceptance into a country is often motivated by the fact that while peacekeepers are an armed force, they are not designed to use force to reach their goals (Butler 2009: 70). Peacekeeping forces normally get involved in a country after a ceasefire has been reached. Their main aim is, therefore, to monitor the compliance with the ceasefire agreement and prevent the re-eruption of violence. They do not, however, deal with the underlying causes of the conflict (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 75, 82). One step on from peacekeeping and one that is also utilised mostly by the UN is peace enforcement. Peace enforcement operations seek to “create or impose, by force, a cessation of hostilities so as to provide the conditions amenable to the negotiations of a ceasefire or peace agreement”. Peace enforcement operations don’t require the consent of both the parties but are undertaken when it has been decided that the conditions for peace need to be imposed by an outside party (Butler 2009: 162-163). While enforcing peace might seem practical in theory, if peace is achieved through force rather than cultivated out of the will of the parties to a conflict, then it has less likelihood of being sustainable in the long term.

Conflict resolution is the next stage on and is a more far-reaching approach that deals with the resolution of the underlying causes of the violence and reconciliation between the parties involved. Conflict Resolution is a “range of formal or informal activities undertaken by the parties to a conflict, or outsiders, designed to limit and reduce the level of violence in conflict, and to achieve some understanding of the key issues in conflict, a political agreement, or a jointly acceptable decision on future interactions and distribution of resources” (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 1). Conflict resolution takes the process one step further than many of the previous methods that have been covered. Its focus is more on trying

to resolve the causes of the conflict and establish some kind of agreement between the parties rather than just focusing on stopping and managing the violence at hand. For an agreement to be reached parties need to be brought together and undertake some form of negotiation, usually with the help of a third party. Conflict resolution will in the end only be successful, however, if the benefits gained from being at peace outweigh the benefits from continuing the conflict. Incentives need to be offered to encourage cooperation from the parties to the conflict and the costs of noncooperation need to be such to maintain ongoing cooperation and commitment to peace. Parties are far more likely to enter into a peace agreement if peace is going to generate higher rewards than continued fighting would (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 45, 57).

The efforts that are undertaken to help resolve conflicts are fundamental to their success. If the process is not acceptable to those involved or does not take into consideration underlying causes of the violence then there is little chance for peace being sustained in the long-term. Conflict settlement should not be seen as the end goal but as the beginning of what should be an ongoing peacebuilding process to help create a situation of sustainable peace throughout society so conflict is less likely to reoccur in the future. The focus of conflict settlement needs to not only be on stopping the violence at hand but more importantly finding out and working through the root causes that lie beneath the surface of a conflict.

Peacebuilding combines the whole array of previously mentioned conflict management methods. Peacebuilding is a conflict management approach that is undertaken in the post-conflict phase, the aim of which is to create sustainable peace and long term stability in war-torn communities. Peacebuilding focuses on the wider aspects of why a society is in conflict and what needs to be changed in order to curb conflict recurrence in the future. This approach was initially conceptualised in 1992 by United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The development of this theory will be discussed in more detail in *Chapter Two*. This approach focuses on initially ending the violence and creating a stable and safe environment, then within that stable environment the focus shifts to resolving the root causes of conflict and rebuilding and re-establishing sustainable institutions within society; political and economic as well as social. This approach has a long term focus on reforming all areas of

society with the help of the local people so that when the external assistance withdraws the people are able deal with future problems without having to resort back to violence. A forward looking approach like this is important and necessary for conflict recurrence after internal wars is so high because those involved in the conflict have to continue to occupy the same space as those it was fighting against. If steps are not taken towards reconciliation between former adversaries and the underlying causes of the violence are not worked through peace will be much harder to sustain in the long term. The central aim of peacebuilding is the creation of sustainable peace and stability in post-conflict societies.

## **1.6 Defining Success and Failure**

To be able to analyse whether various peacebuilding missions have been successful in creating sustainable peace, success must first be defined. However, success is not an easily definable concept and sometimes what seems like success to one person is not the same for another. Success is relative and therefore needs to be defined in terms of tangible and intangible elements in order to establish criteria against which success can be judged. Success in the field of conflict settlement and resolution can relate to common benchmarks in the field. These can be both success in terms of tangible outcomes in political, social and economic arenas such as the return of refugees, increased economic productivity or the holding of peaceful elections, or success in terms of intangible elements like justice and reconciliation which can be evaluated in terms of changes in psychological perceptions and cultural change. Failure of peacebuilding activities, on the other hand, is somewhat easier to determine, but yet is still plagued by some discrepancies. Failure of peace operations is usually signified by the recurrence of war and armed conflict (Campbell 2009: 6). This definition, however, is often characterised as being too simple and minimalist and is in line with what John Galtung describes as ‘negative peace’ (Call 2008: 176).

Many efforts taken to measure peacebuilding success have tended to focus on the general impact of United Nations peace operations in the country in which it had intervened in. Others have measured success in terms of the peacebuilding activities which were undertaken

and how successful these were (Campbell 2009: 5). However, while conflict resolution (dealing with the root causes of a conflict and negating the need for future conflict) might be seen as a more desirable goal, conflict settlement that involves perhaps just a simple cessation of violent behaviour could be considered a success in a situation when total resolution of a conflict may be simply unattainable (Bercovitch 2006: 296-297).

One factor that indicates success and is easier to measure than others is effectiveness. While this indicator was initially conceptualised by Bercovitch to explain mediation success, I believe it can also be applied to explain the success of a peacebuilding mission as well. Bercovitch defines effectiveness as “a measure of results achieved, change brought about or behavioural transformation” (Bercovitch 2006: 293). This means that success is achieved by bringing about a change in the behaviours or attitudes of the parties or causing some positive impact or affect on the conflict, for example moving from violent to non-violent behaviours (Bercovitch 2006: 294). Effectiveness of the process is therefore a concrete indicator of success.

Author Roland Paris defines success as the ‘achievement of a stable and lasting peace’. He believes that the analysis of success of a peacebuilding needs to take into consideration why a society erupted into conflict in the first place and whether or not the reasons for this violence have been ameliorated through peacebuilding. If they have then it can be defined as being a success (Paris in Call 2008: 182). This explanation, based on the resolution of root causes of violence being the determinant for success, has been criticised because many post-conflict countries that have failed to address the root causes of war have not in turn experienced a decline back into violence (Call 2008: 183).

Doyle and Sambanis have also done research into the classification of peacebuilding success and failure. They identify three main criteria for measuring successful conflict resolution. They are:

1. “The stated reconciliation of the parties;

2. The duration of the reconciliation, and;
3. Changes in the way parties behaved towards each other” (2006: 312).

Successful peacebuilding does not only mean a change in behaviour between the parties but also a transformation of identities and the institutional context within which they exist. As Doyle and Sambanis put it, it is ‘more than reforming play in an old game, it changes the game [altogether]’ (2006: 313).

The type of success that needs to be measured in terms of peacebuilding is long-term success in sustaining peace in post-conflict societies. The focus on success being determined by the end of violence in the short-term is far too narrow an approach. Peacebuilding theory emphasises the importance of creating and maintaining peaceful societies and helping develop knowledge about conflict management in these communities so that future problems can be dealt without the need to resort to violent measures. Success needs to be determined instead by the development of what is known as ‘durable peace’ being the maintenance of peace and security over a significant period of time (Hoffman 2009: 16). The general period of time that determines the establishment of durable peace is usually five years. This is because “there are [only] rare instances where in which civil wars resumed after five years of peace” (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001: 187). Success of peacebuilding will be judged in terms of the success in establishing the peacebuilding dimensions that are to be analysed; stopping violence, trust and confidence building measures, governmental, judicial and economic reforms and community education. Longevity of peace will also be a factor in the determination of success or failure of these cases.

## **1.7 Outline of Chapters**

The next chapter provides an overview of the theory of peacebuilding. It begins with an examination of the historical background of theory, when it was first conceptualised and by whom. The chapter then goes on to outline the most important dimensions of the peacebuilding process that, when undertaken in the post-conflict phase, help to reduce

violence and develop sustainable peace. The chapter then concludes with the development of the original framework of peacebuilding that has been designed to include the most important aspects of the peacebuilding approach and is to be applied to the three cases studies that are going to be examined.

**Chapter Three** presents a general overview of internal conflict and how this relates to the Pacific region. It begins by defining what internal conflict is and how it compares to interstate conflict. It then outlines the prevalence of internal conflicts worldwide and what the main causes of such conflicts are. The second half of the chapter relates these general ideas about internal conflict to the Pacific. It provides a summary of conflict in the Pacific and its causes and consequences. The chapter then ends with a brief overview of conflict resolution in the Pacific, with a focus on the main actors that are involved in peace processes in this region.

**Chapter Four and Five** provide an investigation of the peacebuilding processes that were undertaken in East Timor and Bougainville, respectively. These chapters explore the causes of the conflicts in these regions and what attempts have been made to try to resolve them. After that they go on to examine the peacebuilding missions that were then undertaken which resulted in stability and peace within these nations. This is done by applying the dimensions of the framework that was designed in *Chapter Two* to the post conflict situation in these countries. Lastly the successes and failures of both these missions are investigated to see whether peacebuilding in these countries was accomplishment or not.

**Chapter Six** focuses on conflict in the Solomon Islands and follows a similar structure to that of *Chapters Four and Five* but differs in the fact that the post conflict mission being undertaken in the Solomon Islands is still ongoing. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the mission and decide whether or not it can be classed as peacebuilding and also what more needs to be done by those involved to help establish long-term, sustainable peace in the country before their withdrawal. This is done by applying the framework from *Chapter Two* to determine which areas needs more attention before the mission comes to an end.

This thesis is concluded in **Chapter Seven**. Its main focus is on the future of peace in the Pacific and how the concept of peacebuilding fits into this. The aim is to examine the overall success of the peacebuilding cases that have been examined and to offer some policy recommendation about where to go from here in terms of peacebuilding in the Pacific region

# **Chapter Two**

## **Peacebuilding: A Theoretical Background**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Conflict and conflict recurrence are becoming more and more common in the international arena. The way in which conflict is dealt with and how it is managed has a significant impact on the likelihood of establishing durable, sustainable peace in the post-conflict environment. Sustainable peace can be defined as, “a situation characterised by the absence of physical violence; the elimination of unacceptable political, economic and cultural forms of discrimination; a high level of internal and external legitimacy or support; self-sustainability; and a propensity to enhance the constructive transformation of conflicts” (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 12).

Peacebuilding is a conflict management approach that, because of its very nature and design, focuses on helping to build long-term, sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is a set of activities that are undertaken in the post-conflict phase to help create a situation of peace and stop the recurrence of conflict. The main goal is to identify the underlying causes of the violence, not just to focus on dealing with the effects the conflict has had on society. This goal needs to be followed through by peacebuilders. Peacebuilding is a long-term commitment to peace, not just a short-term solution to stop violence. Post conflict societies needs to be rehabilitated and reconciled in such a way that is conducive to sustainable peace for the longevity of the process to be assured (Jeong 2005).

This chapter will focus on the various dimensions that make up the peacebuilding process. Firstly there will be a historical overview which outlines where the theory first came from and who it was established by. This will provide a broad introduction to what peacebuilding is in general terms before its dimensions are explored more thoroughly. The next section will focus on the different dimensions of peacebuilding. These are security, political, judicial, economic and psychological factors. Finally, the last section will outline a framework that



has been designed to incorporate all these factors, and will be applied to the case studies used in the research.

## **2.2 Historical Overview: Peacebuilding and the United Nations**

The theory of post-conflict peacebuilding was first conceptualised in 1992 by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He defined it in his report, *An Agenda for Peace*, as “action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse to conflict” and saw the UN as a main force behind this stability being achieved in post-conflict nations. The UN conducts peacebuilding as one part of its tripartite approach to conflict resolution, the other branches being peacekeeping and peacemaking. Boutros-Ghali went on to further emphasise the main goal of peacebuilding in the *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace* as “the creation of structures for the institutionalization of peace” (Barnett, Kim, O’Donnell and Sitea 2007: 35-37). This approach by the UN conceptualised the fact that peace required more than just the ending of armed violence, it needed the elimination of the root causes of conflict so that those involved no longer need to or have to use violent means to settle their disputes. Post-war countries needed mechanisms to be created in society to foster non-violent processes for overcoming future disputes (Ibid: 42). The majority of the peace operations undertaken by the United Nations in the 1990s focused on the task of post-conflict peacebuilding. The main aim of UN peacebuilders was the importance of promoting democracy as a means for ending conflict. In an *Agenda for Peace* Boutros-Ghali emphasises the point that democracy is an essential element for conflict termination by stating that “peace, development and democracy are inextricably linked” (Paris 2004).

Although peacebuilding was established in the 1990s there was no inherent cohesion between those undertaking peacebuilding missions. There was a need for an institutional mechanism that could address the specific needs of post-conflict societies and help them towards recovery, reconstruction and development. An organisation was needed that would have the support in terms of funds and people power to be able to see peacebuilding projects through into the long-term. This became a reality when world leaders at the 2005 World Summit

decided that the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission was needed. It was to be a United Nations mandated organisation to advise on, coordinate and facilitate peacebuilding missions and activities. The main purposes of the Commission were to be:

- a) “To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.
- b) To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development.
- c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1645, 20 December 2005: 1-2).

While the United Nations are still a leading force in post-conflict recovery worldwide their scope is often limited, as is much foreign intervention, if countries in conflict do not agree to their assistance. The concept of peacebuilding needs to be taken on board by a wider range of international organisations if it is to become an effective and widespread practice in post-conflict situations.

### **2.3 Dimensions of Peacebuilding**

The peacebuilding process has several important dimensions that, when undertaken in the post-conflict phase, help to reduce violence and develop sustainable peace. These factors, when implemented properly, can help to reduce the recurrence of conflict and establish mechanisms within society for dealing with future disputes. The timing of implementation is also important for some of the dimensions need to be established more promptly than others for the process to be not only successful but also sustainable.

## 2.3a Security Factors

### *Ending Violence*

One of the most important tasks of the peacebuilding process is to end the violence and help to curb its resurgence. Peacebuilders need to provide public security in post-conflict societies so that people's basic needs can be addressed in the aftermath of the violence. This role may have to be assumed by external actors in the beginning for communities may not have the capacity for this in the initial post-conflict phase (Jeong 2005: 39). There is a high possibility of renewed violence in the post-settlement phase. With an inherent breakdown in law and order and political authority, there is a chance for various parties to try to establish their dominance in the new regime. These so called "spoilers" need to be dealt with in a constructive manner so as not to disrupt the peacebuilding process. This could come in the form of inclusion into new governmental structures or more general incorporation into the wider peace process. If not dealt with in the early stage, these spoilers will only cause further trouble throughout the later phases of the peace process. It is only after the direct violence is dealt with that other reforms can begin to be developed and rehabilitation can move forward, for such processes need a stable secure foundation to work from.

This step focuses on the need to end violence, create a cease-fire agreement and discourage combatants from further violence. This aspect is a continuance of the work that is started initially by peacekeepers. Unlike peacekeeping, peacebuilding goes further by creating an atmosphere that is conducive to peace and more desirable than conflict for those involved. If conditions of peace are seen as more beneficial for the parties of the conflict then this will lead the way to long-term peace that can be sustained by the wider society. The use of positive incentives helps to keep the parties of a conflict committed to the terms of the peace agreement and end violence in society (Mc Rae and Hubert 2001: 76).

One approach that can be taken to end violence is the establishment of disarmament and demobilisation activities. These activities are vital to the overall success of security sector reforms and rehabilitation. Disarmament is defined as "the collection, control and disposal of

small arms and light weapons and the development of responsible arms management programs in the post-conflict context” (Knight and Ozerdem 2004: 499). The proliferation of small arms is an ongoing problem in many post-conflict societies. Peace agreements may arrange weapons collections but there are no guarantees that these weapons will be stored or disposed of in an appropriate manner. Without proper management of this process, further security initiatives will continue to be undermined (International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 2009). Demobilisation is more of a long-term goal to be established during post-conflict military reforms. If these activities are undertaken too rapidly they can leave people feeling insecure, which could lead to a resurgence of violence as people feel the need to re-arm to protect themselves (Hansen 2000: 42). Demobilisation activities are just one step in the move towards greater demilitarisation of society in the post-conflict period. The newly formed government needs to progress towards downsizing the military forces and reducing defence spending, these resources can instead then be used for reconstruction and development (Rotberg 2004: 170). “DDR is one of the most demanding elements of peacebuilding. In affluent Western societies, there is a notion that violence does not pay. Yet in ethnic and similar types of conflict, well-considered economic interest is more often than not the dominant reason for rampant and continued violence” (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 384).

### ***Intervention***

In the initial stages of the post-conflict phase, war-torn societies may not have the necessary structures to be able to provide physical security for their citizens. Intervention may be needed by an external monitoring force in the early stages of peacebuilding to help curb the possibility of renewed violence.

Military intervention may come in the form of United Nations peacekeeping forces. Peacekeeping forces can act as a neutral monitor to reduce tensions in society. The traditional conception of peacekeeping is that peacekeepers are to undertake impartial activities when given consent to do so from the parties involved and to only use force in situation of self-defence (Chesterman 2004: 101). These forces have to respect the laws of territorial sovereignty so therefore are only able to intervene if authorised by the state in which the

conflict is present. Peacekeeping interventions are less likely in internal conflict for conflict resolution is often seen as unnecessary by the state's administration and therefore is not authorised.

The main aim of peacekeepers in the earliest stages of intervention into a conflict is to establish improved security conditions for the civilian population. Peacekeepers can help to maintain law and order in the early stages of the post-conflict period when renewed violence is a high probability and the country's security forces are severely weakened. This is mostly achieved by helping to implement and monitor ceasefire arrangements between the warring factions (Chesterman 2004: 112). Peacekeepers can also play a part in demobilisation and disarmament activities. They can act as neutral monitors and facilitators of weapon collections and maintain security in society while forces are downsizing and disbanding. Peacekeepers need to establish a credible first impression. This is because the initial stages of the post-conflict period are the most crucial for gathering support and momentum so that peacekeeping activities can be implemented most effectively (Rotberg 2001: 173, 112).

### ***Reforms***

Military reform can be defined as “a reorganisation process...aimed at transforming armed groups from a war to a peacetime organisation” (Hansen 2000: 44). Most peace settlements include the need for some degree of military and police reform. This is because it is these forces that have been most likely involved in the conflict. Steps need to be taken to reintegrate these forces back into society and also make changes to stop such violence among the ranks happening in the future. There are two proposed models of military reform that can be adopted. They are not the only approaches that can be taken but are ones that have already been adopted in various peacebuilding missions. The first of these is the *military merger* model. This model follows the idea that to establish strong internal security in the post-conflict period, former enemy armies need to be integrated into a single, usually government, force. In situations where this approach has been taken there has been less likelihood of renewed violence. This could be because the military personnel are not left unemployed and therefore do not have the need to revert to illicit activities, which may be the case if the forces

had been totally disbanded. The second model follows the path of *demobilisation and police reform*. This approach concludes that the best way to ensure security among former warring factions is to try to demobilise or reduce the power of the armies and shift the balance of security responsibilities to a reformed police force (Darby and MacGinty 2003: 212-215). Demobilisation is defined as “a planned process by which the armed forces of the government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband” (Knight and Ozerdem 2004: 500). Political conditions in the post-conflict period determine what model is most appropriate in any given case. If there were a high likelihood of renewed military conflict then it would be unlikely for a country to undertake demobilisation processes.

Although *military mergers* can have short-term success in maintaining security, post conflict societies should aim towards greater reductions of military power as a means of creating long-term sustainable peace. Demobilisation will create a state of increased confidence and trust between the parties and add symbolic commitment to the peace process. However, demobilisation in the early stages, while fundamental to the establishment of long-term peace, may be more difficult in practice in the short term. Parties may hold onto weapons as a precautionary measure in case proposed ceasefires and elections are not successful (Jeong 2005: 45).

Armed forces, whatever form they may take, need to undergo a vetting process. This means that the leadership and hierarchical structures need to undergo a re-selection process to review the quality of armed services staff and work towards removing unsuitable staff members; those who do not fit into the new mindset of cooperation and control. Another suggestion that is made as part of the larger societal demilitarisation process is to place the armed forces under civilian control. “Civilian control contributes to increased transparency, confidence building and thus cooperation between former components” (Hansen 2000: 45).

## **2.3b Political Factors**

### ***Peace Settlement***

Conflict settlement is often understood as signifying the end of a conflict and is coupled with the belief that a peace agreement will bring about instant and lasting change to a conflictual society. When a peace agreement is signed there is an expectation that the decrease of direct violence will also be accompanied by a decrease in structural violence. This is rarely the case. Relying of a peace agreement as the end goal alone can sometimes even have a negative effect when parties feel like the agreement fails to address their needs appropriately or that the deal is unfair, which can lead to a relapse into conflict. For peace to be sustainable and durable, it needs to be fostered throughout society. It is through the process of peacebuilding that trust and solidarity can be developed between conflicting parties. “Trust and confidence-building measures have to be taken in order to induce cooperation and produce positive attitudes that create an atmosphere more conducive to the peaceful settlement of differences.” Peace agreements must be viewed as a guide for ending hostilities and working through the initial stages of post-conflict transition. It cannot be seen as a blue print for the end of deeply rooted societal unrest.

### ***External Assistance***

Peacebuilding may be initially fostered by external actors for a post-conflict society may not have the capacity to engage in the process without outside assistance. International peacebuilding can be divided into four mandated operations. The first is a monitoring or observer mission. This is when the host government consents to external observers coming in and taking on an interim role to help monitor a truce and start to negotiate a peace agreement. This stage helps to build trust between the parties. The second operation is traditional peacekeeping. This consists of the “deployment of military units and civilian officials in order to facilitate the negotiated settlement of the conflict” with the consent of the parties. Thirdly is multi-dimensional peacekeeping. This process is “designed to implement a comprehensive negotiated peace agreement”. Lastly is peace enforcement. This final operation requires a “military intervention designed to impose public order by force, if needed, with or without host government consent” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 781). This

approach however, is specifically aimed at peacebuilding undertaken by an outside force rather than locally based peacebuilders, which could inherently take a different approach to the process. An internationally driven peacebuilding approach could be better equipped to create a situation of stable peace. However this assistance can also come with certain downfalls, including dependence and lack of local ownership of the process.

External intervention can sometimes, however, create a dilemma. On the one hand a dominant international presence may be needed to help maintain law and order in the post-conflict period and to establish the means for economic, political and societal reforms, but may risk destabilising local government from establishing its own legitimacy and control over the peacebuilding process. On the other hand a less intrusive intervention may be necessary to foster local ownership of the process, but with the risk of further violence from having a lack of capacity to support reforms long-term (Paris and Sisk 2007: 4-5).

### *Elections*

Elections stand to be a contentious issue in the peacebuilding process. Although they are a key aspect in developing liberal democracies, which is the aim of many peacebuilding missions, they can act as a catalyst for the recurrence of violence. Elections are seen as an ‘exit strategy’ for many peace missions; considered the successful end to a mission. This however is a misrepresentation. Peace missions need to be more long-term and forward thinking than this. Violence is a common occurrence during elections in the post-conflict stage. International assistance needs to remain during and after the elections to help to curb and control any possible backlash (Sisk and Jarstad 2008: 25). Another problem that stems from the holding of elections is the competitive element of such an event. “The competitive nature of elections may aggravate existing conflicts and social cleavages”. Elections may act to further polarise society when its social structures are already significantly weakened. Those who held power in the past may risk losing this power through new elections if they cannot gain the support needed from the community. This can also cause unrest and increased violence for these parties may use coercive means as a way of gaining voters (Sisk and Jarstad 2008: 84-85).



### ***Government and Leadership***


Another important aspect of the peacebuilding process is rebuilding state institutions that have the capacity and legitimacy to maintain a peaceful society. This can be done by peacebuilders either replacing the government as an interim monitoring force or working alongside the state to rebuild institutions such as law and order systems, communication networks and public administration. Governmental reform is a key aspect of peacebuilding in post conflict societies. States have to overcome many societal, political and economic difficulties in the post-conflict period and a strong stable government is mandatory for this to be possible. Whatever form the government takes after the settlement process its most important focus is to “provide security for citizens, make decisions in a politically acceptable way and create organisations that will implement these decisions and extract resources from the population to pay for the whole process” (Licklider 2007: 704). Although this step may seem straightforward in theory, in reality governmental reform may be one of the most contentious factors in the post-settlement phase. Problems may include who holds the power positions, what shape the new government should take and whether the new leadership will have the legitimacy to foster the development and reconstruction of state institutions and wider society.

Faith in state institutions needs to be re-established. This alone is a major task for in many post-war territories in has been the state institutions themselves that have been used as a tool of oppression. Establishing transparency and legitimacy of the new state institutions is the key to gaining and enhancing societal support of these institutions (Chesterman 2004: 154). Transparency refers to the openness of the government system. “The process of governing needs to be both visible and understanding to the population. As such it will reassure them that it is trustworthy and encourage their support and cooperation rather than risking their alienation” (Harris and Reilly 1998: 349).

The issue of who should be represented in the new governmental structure of a country can have adverse affects on the process of peacebuilding. Inclusion of warring parties can sometimes be the best approach for parties are more likely to sign a peace agreement if they are assured of having a share in the new government. However, this may be problematic for

these parties may use force or coercive techniques to try to gain the majority of the power (Sisk and Jarstad 2008: 22). A power sharing arrangement might be the most plausible solution in trying to satisfy all parties involved.

Theorist John Lederach has developed a framework that conceptualised the different Levels of leadership in society and their different approaches to and involvement in peacebuilding (See **Figure 2.1**).



**Figure 2.1 Leadership Model (model adopted from Lederach 1997)**

#### *Level One: Top Level Leadership*

This leadership sector is made up of top political and military personal that are involved in the conflict. They hold the majority of power in society and have a strong influence on policy and decision-making. This level of leadership tends to undertake a top-down approach to peacebuilding. The role they take in the peace process is usually as a third party between

warring factions. The peacebuilding approach at this level tends to be short term, focusing on creating cease-fires and the cessation of violence which will in turn lead to the creation of a peace agreement. It is assumed that once these actions are undertaken at the highest level they will then translate to and trickle down through the rest of society (Lederach 1997:38- 40).

### *Level Two: Middle Range Leadership*

This sector is comprised of “persons who function in leadership positions within a setting of protracted conflict, but whose position is defined in ways not necessarily connected to or controlled by the authority or structures of the formal government or major opposition movement” (Lederach 1997: 41). These leaders act as intermediaries between top level leaders and those at the grassroots level. They are respected by and connected to many influential people across the conflictual divide. It is the people at this level who are involved in initiatives such as problem solving. Middle range leaders’ hold an important position in society and can be the key to creating an infrastructure for achieving sustainable peace. Through problem solving workshops these leaders can interact, unofficially, with other middle range leaders from the opposing side of the conflict. Such workshops aim to develop relationships between the participants. These participants are then able to reiterate their new outlook on the conflict along with possible prospects for the future when they return to their own communities (Lederach 1997: 42-46).

### *Level Three: Grassroots Leadership*

This level represents the majority of society. The leadership at this level operates on a day-to-day, more face-to-face basis with the masses. These people understand the conflict better than other leadership sectors for they are involved in it on a more personal and direct basis (Lederach 1997: 45). These leaders take a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding. The aim at this level is to foster relationships between members of society and help to deal with the more personal ramifications of war such as hatred and hurt. Grassroots leaders can work with people in the community to help reconcile grievances and put into practice mechanisms for overcoming them (Lederach 1997: 52-55).

For the peacebuilding process to be a success there needs to be greater coordination and improved channels of communication between these different levels of leadership. Without a more conducive approach, the peacebuilding process will become fragmented and therefore less efficient in dealing with the problems at hand. The assumption about anchoring the approach in the middle and grassroots levels is that “changes in attitudes, perceptions and skills, and relationships and trust building within a small group can translate to the policy makers who have a role in making decisions relating to conflict behaviour” (Obiekiwe 2009: 24). “Working together means that those who have the power to get things done are supported by those who will be most greatly affected by the changes” (Obiekiwe 2009: 100).

### ***Civil Society***

The establishment of a strong civil society is paramount to the success of peacebuilding reforms. Civil society can be defined as “the arena of voluntary, uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values” (Peace Building Initiative 2009: 1). Civil society is a network of autonomous organisations that are founded by citizens to help to give a voice to the people in the public sphere. It is through civil society organisations that people can be active in politics; acting with, not against, the state to create and implement policies designed to address societal issues and advance the public good (CIVICUS 1999: 7). “Civil society operates as the intermediary between the basic units of a society-families and individuals-and the states as represented by the government. Civil society acts both as a channel for participation and to provide useful checks and balances on government action, ensuring accountability and transparency especially in cases where political parties are weak and fail to provide an effective opposition” (Harris and Reilly 1998: 351).

Civil society organisations are essentially a political concept, the main aim being the promotion of democracy and good governance as a way of achieving sustainable development and peace. Although these organisations are not state based, they work with the state and within state structures and channels to achieve their goals. Civil society organisation can help install confidence and legitimacy in state institutions among the people as it creates a vehicle for participation in public policymaking, helping people to make a difference in the

political sphere. Faith in the government and governmental institutions needs to be established and strengthened from the bottom up, civil society organisations act as a catalyst for achieving this support (CIVICUS 1999: 89, 195).

### **2.3c Judicial Factors**

#### ***Rule of Law***

Re-establishment of the rule of law in post-conflict society is also imperative for its successful and sustainable transition from war to peace. The absence of a democratically defined rule of law system in post-conflict society is very common. This may be solely based on the fact that these institutions have been severely weakened by the protracted violence, or may lie at a deeper societal level because, through lack of experience and expertise, there is no rule of law culture and therefore no trust in such institutions within society. Justice and the rule of law are viewed by many as the corner stone of the peacebuilding process for successful peacebuilding cannot be achieved “unless the population is confident that redress for grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair administration of justice.” The establishment of a legitimate rule of law system will make long-term peace more sustainable because the people trust in the institutions that are going to provide a check on government, operational and behavioural rules for society, and stability and conflict resolution mechanisms, therefore creating a more peaceful environment (International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 04/06/09).

#### ***Reforms***

The creation of a stable and legitimate judiciary is a necessary step in the peacebuilding process. Without an effective judiciary many other important reforms will not be possible. An efficient judicial and legal system is needed for economic growth to be achieved and is a core aspect for ensuring and maintaining domestic security (International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 25/05/09). The judiciary needs to be strengthened so that those who were involved in the conflict can be tried and prosecuted if such action is

appropriate. A dysfunctional judicial system will hinder any efforts made towards establishing public confidence in the new political structure.

The judiciary needs to be established as an independent check on both government and the military, and can no longer be hindered by any political agenda, as may have been the case during the conflict (Jeong 2005: 69). New rules need to be established to define criminal and civil offences and how such offences are to be dealt with under the new judicial structures. The creation on these new rules needs to also be further supported by the establishment of institutions such as a reformed police force, prosecutorial office and competent judiciary. Judicial experience may be lacking in the post-conflict phase. Training and education may be needed to help bolster legal expertise in war-torn states. It is common for such a task to be undertaken by an external body (Rotberg 2004: 210).

Judicial reform, though necessary, needs to be kept in check so not to promote corruption from those involved. If court services improve then there will be more demand for such services, therefore increasing the need for resources to maintain these services. This may foster the use of bribes and incentives of those wishing to fast track their cases. Reform strategies needs to be developed to stop such an occurrence and increased demand needs to be monitored to help curb possible corruption and favouritism (Rotberg 2004: 201). “Given that the judiciary and law enforcement agencies are the standardised and replicable pillars of the rule of law, a weak justice system handicaps the transition to a new democratic state” (Jeong 2005: 71).

## **2.3d Economic Factors**

### ***External Assistance***

Economies are greatly weakened in the post-conflict stage and many war-torn societies do not have the capacity for the rebuilding and development that is needed. External donors are usually a necessary aspect in the early stages of post-conflict development. The use of resources as bargaining tools for peace can be a crucial incentive for parties to end violence, for financial incentives make peace seem like a more attractive option (Sisk and Jarstad 2008: 710). However, these incentives are usually underpinned with conditionality aspects.

Although external assistance is often an essential element of the peacebuilding process, donors are rarely committed to long-term economic goals. Recipient countries have severely weakened economic structures that are unable to absorb the large influx of aid in the early stages, when donor commitment is at its peak. These funds are often distributed to sustain short-term humanitarian goals rather than long-term developmentally focused aims. This lack of institutional capacity may lead to economic inefficiency or corruption. Although much emphasis is placed on what each donor is contributing, the reality is that a significant proportion of promised assistance either gets delivered at a very slow pace, or sometimes does not get given at all. Rebuilding a sustainable society after conflict is a long process, the need to help tends to diminish once the conflict is no longer in the international spotlight (Chesterman 2004: 185, 189-190).

Local society needs to aim towards self-reliance in the early stages or will risk becoming too dependent on external assistance, which will only hinder the long-term development process. External economic assistance is usually a reality, but can bring with it some unwanted and undesirable consequences. Prolonged assistance can create a situation of dependence and reduce incentives for local production and internally driven development. This undermines long-term economic sustainability for when the humanitarian assistance is withdrawn there are no societal structures in place to maintain production, predetermining a scarcity of resources (Jeong 2005: 152). Increased consultation between the donors and recipient nations will help to ensure that assistance is structured around local needs and abilities and help foster the economy in a more sustainable manner (Chesterman 2004: 196).

### ***Reforms***

Economies are often severely affected in times of conflict. Lack of production and a decline in income happen for a variety of reasons. These include the decline of physical capital, production capacity is reduced through lack of inputs and labour, there can be significant shortages of trained and skilled worker who have either been displaced as a result of the violence or killed and also investment declines in such hard times (Rotberg 2004: 257). Therefore, economic reform is a key factor in post-conflict societies. The establishment of a working and productive economy will foster development efforts and means reconstruction

and rehabilitation will be more successful and prosperous. Economic reconstruction needs to be treated as a vital partner to the success of a peacebuilding mission, as a contributor to the peace process and not just the result of it. Reforms and reconstruction can provide “the visible benefits of peace that help mollify hostilities, the civilians jobs that absorb demobilised soldiers and the tax revenues that strengthen state capacity” (Sambanis 2008: 31). The revival of the economy will help to reconstruct and improve the quality of life in society, therefore making the backslide into conflict seem less desirable.

## **2.3e Psychological Factors**

### ***Trauma Healing and Reconciliation***

“People need the opportunity and space to express to and with one another the trauma of loss, their grief at the loss and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of the injustices experienced” (Lederach 1997). Trauma healing helps people to better understand and come to terms with their experiences and work through how to move forward into the future. This is a necessary step in the peacebuilding process for if the effects of trauma are not dealt with and worked through this trauma could have further negative effects on the person or the people around them (Peace Building Institute 2009: 2).

The need for reconciliation between former adversaries can be advocated through community mechanisms. Warring factions need a chance to share their personal grievances relating to the conflict. This will hopefully help people move forward with the peace process rather the hold onto the past. Reconciliation is as much about communicating one’s grievances against the actions of the opposing party as it is admitting one’s own role and behaviour in the conflict. Peacebuilders can help to facilitate communication between the warring parties and create an atmosphere that moves away from finger pointing and laying blame to a situation where all those involved can look within and make changes to themselves and not just expect changes from the other side (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 341-342). Emphasis needs to be put on working towards a shared future rather than focusing on what was a divided past. Talking through issues and working through what caused the violence can help people to overcome personal demons relating to the conflict. Without this chance to come to terms with what has



happened and build a more trusting foundation for the future, peace agreements have little chance being successful.

## 2.4 Framework

After researching what key scholars have said about the peacebuilding process, what aspects it may involve and what were the positive and possible negative effects of the approach, I was then able to construct my own peacebuilding framework. This framework is based on my personal interpretation of what I thought were the most important dimensions to be included. The framework that is going to be applied to this study has six dimensions that, when applied in a post-conflict situation, will help to pave the way to long-term peace.

The first dimension is *Security Sector Reform*. This step can involve both internal and external intervention and the focus is to establish an initial peace agreement between the parties and to address domestic security issues, usually through a ceasefire arrangement.

The second focus is to help develop *Trust and Confidence* not only between the conflicting factions but also between them and the intervening forces. This foundation is needed in the early stages before any other reform should be attempted. Conflict is often caused by misperceptions held by opposing parties and conflict settlement attempts are often undermined because of a lack of trust between those involved. If trust is fostered between all involved then other reforms have a higher chance of being successful.

The next two dimensions, *Governmental Reform and Judicial Reform*, need to be undertaken in parallel. A strong and legitimate government is pertinent for sustainable peace to be possible. This is not possible without having a successfully reformed judicial system to act as a check and balance on the new leadership and verify the government's legitimacy.

This leads to the next aim, which is *Economic Reform*. This sector would have been thoroughly destabilised during conflict so reform of the economic system is an important step in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.

The last aspect that needs to be undertaken by post-settlement peacebuilders is *Community Education and Reconciliation*. Post-conflict societies need to be educated on how best to deal with future problems without resorting to violent means and support for the new economic and governmental changes needs be established at a grass-roots level. Having strong community support as a foundation will make long-term peace a more achievable reality.




Figure 2.2 Peacebuilding Framework

## 2.5 Conclusion

Peacebuilding can be seen as a forward looking and comprehensive approach to ending violence and helping to establish long-term peace in war-torn communities. The focus goes well beyond just the need to stop the violence at hand. Its greater focus is on reforming institutions within society so they are more conducive to peace. It is also about involving the wider community from the grass roots level up so that any reforms that are established are supported by all levels of society. Peacebuilding also emphasises the need to teach the local people how problems and tensions can be dealt with in the most constructive manner without the need to resort back to violence. This approach, when applied in the post-conflict phase, can have real success in establishing long-term sustainable peace. The framework that was established in this chapter is now going to be applied to three cases, East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, to illustrate real cases where peacebuilding has been attempted and the strengths and weaknesses of these various approaches to building peace.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Internal Conflict: Causes, Consequences and the Pacific Region**

“The region has not seen any interstate violent conflict in recent times, nor is it likely to develop in the foreseeable future. The focus therefore is on (potential) intrastate or internal violent conflict” (Spence and Wiolders 2006).

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Conflict in the Pacific region, as is increasingly more common worldwide, is generally internal conflict, based on intractable issues that are becoming more and more difficult to resolve. This kind of conflict is different from others because of the actors that it involves. Violence is not just restricted to trained military forces, but other parties such as rebels, insurgents, militia and even a significant number of civilians. This is why it is, in a way, more dangerous than traditional interstate war. There are fewer rules determining what people are allowed to do, and more limited authority to stop them from doing it. Although conflict in the region is not qualified as severe on an international scale, its occurrence is disproportionate to the size of states in the region. One of the major problems with the incidence of internal conflict is the fact that such unrest is significantly harder to solve using traditional methods of conflict resolution, which in turn further extends the possible conflict cycle (Reilly 2002: 10). By looking at how conflict is undertaken in the region and how it has been approached, we can then analyse the appropriateness of undertaking peacebuilding activities in the region as a way of assuring long term peace is sustained in the post-conflict phase.

#### **3.2 Nature of Internal Conflict**

To best understand conflict in the Pacific region, intrastate and interstate conflict need to first be clearly defined. From there we can examine more closely what is meant by intrastate conflict and outline the causes and consequences of such conflict. By examining intrastate

conflict in more general terms we can develop a strong conceptual basis for the specific analysis of intrastate conflict in the Pacific region that is being undertaken in the second part of this chapter.

### **3.2a Interstate versus Intrastate**

It is important to first define what is meant by armed conflict before a more in depth comparison of interstate and intrastate conflict can be made. According to the UCDP database, armed conflict can be defined as:

“A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, resulted in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP Database 2010).

Whereas interstate conflict is, as the name suggests, an “armed conflict [that] occurs between two or more states”, intrastate conflict is, “a conflict that occurs between a government and a non-government party, with no interference from other countries” (UCDP Database 2010). Internal conflict is in a way more violent and deadly than interstate wars. This is because the conduct of those involved is not monitored or constrained by international norms and laws of war. There are no specific rules on how a country is to act when it is at war with itself, as there is with interstate conflict. One of the main problems about internal conflict, and the way in which it is dealt with in the international system, is that there is a significant blurring of the lines between civilians and combatants. Civilians are not only the primary victims of internal violence, but also the main perpetrators. This affects the way in which wars are fought, how combatants are controlled and also how and if they can be held accountable under international laws of war (Alley 2001: 45).

Another difference is that parties involved in intrastate conflict are not as easily identifiable compared to those involved in interstate wars. Internal conflicts are often multi-dimensional, with many parties and many issues underlying the violence. This also makes these conflicts inherently harder to resolve. Because there are usually multiple parties involved, negotiating an agreement that satisfies all factions is extremely difficult. In the last 50 years more than twice as many interstate conflicts have ended in successful negotiated settlements as have internal conflicts (Hartzell 1999: 5).

<b>Characteristics</b>	<b>Interstate Conflict</b>	<b>Intrastate Conflict</b>
<b>Parties</b>	Primary warring parties are state governments	Conflict between a government and non-government party; inter-group rivalry
<b>Issues</b>	Power relations, border disputes, terrorism, resources	Identity and ethnicity, Collective grievances, discrimination, type of government, economic distress, collapse of government, territory
<b>Duration</b>	6 Months (on average)	5 years (on average)
<b>Perpetrators</b>	Government forces	Government forces, rebel groups, militia forces, civilians
<b>Victims</b>	Mostly military forces	Mostly civilians

**Table 3.1 Characteristics of Interstate versus Intrastate Conflict (UCDP database 2010; Yilmaz 2007; Collier 2007)**

### **3.2b Prevalence of Internal Conflict: Causes and Consequences**

The question remains, why are some countries more susceptible to internal conflict and what are the main factors behind such outbreaks of violence? Internal conflict has become more and more prevalent since the end of the Cold War. They have replaced the Cold War's ideological clashes as the primary sources of current conflict (Yilmaz 2007: 12). Almost all major armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been internal conflicts; internal conflicts have made up over 80 percent of the wars and casualties since the end of the Second World War (David 1991: 553). These conflicts have been mostly situated in the developing countries. By 2007, economist Paul Collier noted that, "seventy-three percent of people in societies of the bottom billion have recently been through a civil war or are still in one" (Collier 2007: 17).

Internal conflict tends to be more persistent than interstate conflicts. This is perhaps because this type of conflict is usually based on intractable ideals that cannot be resolved as easily by compromise. "The average international war lasts about six months. But the average civil war lasts more than ten times as long, even longer if they start off poor" (Collier 2007: 27). There is rarely a finite beginning or end to internal conflicts as the conflict usually builds slowly but the political destabilisation and negative impacts on society last long after the physical violence has ended (Alley 2001: 1).

Internal conflicts cannot necessarily be defined as having only one main cause; rather it is the intersection of many variables and social triggers that will lead to the outbreak of violence. There are however, some significant factors which are evident in most internal conflicts. These are economic factors, usually a weak economy and the issues related to that such as poverty; issues to do with natural resources, whether it be an abundance of such or a shortage; weak governance structures; and finally ethnicity, which, whether it was the cause of violence or not, is present in most internal conflicts.

There is a higher risk of violence breaking out in a country with a weak economy. This does not mean that all poor countries are overrun with war, but it is one factor that tilts the chances more towards possible internal violence (Collier 2007: 19). A weak economy leads to high levels of poverty and unemployment, which are significant causes of social grievances and unrest. Lack of development and economic stagnation can be the result of weak state institutions that do not have the capacity to help create a well-functioning and efficient economic sector. Many of these poor, underdeveloped countries rely on external assistance. But handouts do not foster self-reliance or sustainability. Lack of knowledge about economic growth and development coupled with the high probability of corrupt government institutions forces these countries into the poverty trap even further. All these factors increase the likelihood of violence (Misra 2008: 17-18).

Another cause of internal conflict is natural resources. However, there are arguments for both sides as to whether natural resource fuelled violence is because of their scarcity or because of their abundance. Economists Paul Collier and Anne Hoeffler have done significant research into the link between resources and conflicts. They have found that countries that are dependent on natural resources are more prone to civil war (Le Billon 2005: 12). Disputes over ownership and revenue allocation are at the core of resource conflict but they are not the only factors. Other problems can include loss of local livelihood due to pollution or displacement, uneven employment opportunities, disruption of societal hierarchy structures and influx of outsiders into the resource rich region, leading to increased us versus them disparities, and in turn the escalation into violent conflict (Le Billon 2005: 25).

When the government of a country is weak there is more chance of civil war, for those countries do not have the capacity to deal with unrest or the ability to control internal attacks. Weak governments promote internal war by tempting would-be rebels to challenge the regimes authority. Weak governments leave themselves open to violence for those who wish to challenge the power structure believe that they have a high chance of success against weak governmental institutions (David 1991: 554). These countries have come to be known as 'failed states' and are those that have had their governments break down completely. This gives other parties an opportunity to try and gain back some of the control or further destroy the already weak government structure; this is usually done through violent means (Snow 1996: 100). Weak state structures can also lead people to be compelled to provide for their



own safety, as they can no longer rely on the state for protection. However in taking steps to defend themselves, they can be seen as a threatening the security of other groups. This is known as the security dilemma and is rife in internal war situations.

A further cause of internal violence is ethnicity. This is, however, not usually the stand alone cause of conflict but is another factor that, when linked to aspects such as poverty, social uncertainty and a history of conflict, can act as the catalyst for social unrest (Misra 2008: 14). Lake and Rothchild (1998) believe that there are two main fears that ethnic groups have that could be the root causes behind ethnically fuelled violence. The first is the fear of assimilation into a dominant culture and hegemonic state. However, because of the strength of the dominant culture, conflict is unlikely because of the relative weakness of the fearful minority. The other fear is for their personal safety and survival. When ethnic groups are evenly matched in a country and neither can absorb the other, insecurity emerges. This is because there can be increased competition between groups to gain dominance in society. If state structures are weak and lack the ability to arbitrate between the groups, this competition is, more often than not, likely to erupt into conflict. This competition is usually signified by the competition for resources between different ethnic factions (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 8). Ethnic conflict is often triggered by elites in times of trouble who use ethnicity as a way of mobilising the people against other groups who may be threatening the position of the elites within society (Brown 1996: 18). Support may be gained by blaming a certain group in society for the problems their country may be experiencing.

Although internal wars are, as the name suggests internal, they can have significant spill over effects that can have an impact on the international system. They can generate the movement of refugees that require assistance from humanitarian organisations, which is an expensive process. Refugees can also destabilise the greater region in which they are situated, which affects regional stability and can stimulate cross-border linkages with similar resistance organisations, which can in turn internationalise the conflict. As a result of internal violence people become displaced and often flee across borders in large numbers in search of some degree of security. Refugees impose a high economic burden on the host states and can be the source of further unrest in the places in which they seek refuge (Brown 1996: 3). Internal conflicts can also become internationalised as they may breed contempt in other countries who are suffering similar sorts of problems. Internal conflict in one country can act as a

catalyst for violence in other countries where people see themselves as political or ideological allies and believe their plight could to be resolved using the same means (Brown 1996: 8).

Another significant consequence of internal conflict compared to interstate conflict is the extreme number of civilian that are involved in the violence. The nature of internal conflict means that civilians are now both the main perpetrators and victims of violence. People within internal conflict situations are being subjected to significant human rights abuses, many at the hands of their own government. The increased proliferation of small arms has been a significant factor in the increasing violence that is experienced in internal conflicts. The spread of small arms has meant that civilians are now more able to become directly involved in conflict (Dahal, Gazdar, Keethaponcalan and Murthy 2003: 19).

Internal conflict weakens the state from the inside out. State institutions become so weak that the state can barely function, if at all. The economy usually collapses as a result, from both the overwhelming cost of war and the withdrawal of foreign investors and trade connections. Insecurity and corruption become ingrained in society as a result of people doing what they can do survive. With the state lacking virtually any ability to contain the violence, the security situation gets escalated further as each day passes. The affects of internal conflict are felt throughout all levels of society. The next question to face is how such a situation can be remedied. Conflicts that have ravaged the lives of those within the state do not just get turned around over night. Conflict management in the aftermath of internal violence needs to combine a security focus with an emphasis on institutional reform and society wide reconciliation. Peacebuilding is such a process that endeavours to incorporate these factors into a long term focus aimed at establishing sustainable peace.

### **3.3 Conflict in the Pacific**

Conflict in the Pacific region has been mostly internal conflict, much of which has taken place in the aftermath of decolonisation in the 1960s. The Pacific is a vast region which is a melting pot of different cultures, languages, peoples and traditions. While this diversity adds to the uniqueness of the region, it is also at the centre of much of the unrest that has been experienced by the people in the Pacific.

### 3.3a Overview of the Region

The Pacific region is one of extremes. Although it is small in terms of population, with approximately eight million inhabitants, it is vast in terms of geographical size, spanning over 30 million kilometres of ocean. There are 22 island countries and territories in the Pacific region, most of which are highly heterogeneous with hundreds of different languages and cultures. Generally, the Pacific region is usually divided into three broad ethnic groups; Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian (NZ AID website 2010).

Conflict in the Pacific Islands region usually eventuates from a range of different causes. In some cases the underlying cause may be straightforward and easily identifiable; in others it may be much more complex and intertwining with a range of conflict inducing aspects. From the literature, there is evidence that the causes of conflict can be divided into four main categories. These are economic factors, ethnic divisions, land and resource issues and good governance. By expanding on the causes of conflict in the region in general, the causes of specific conflicts become easier to identify when case studies are reviewed in more detail in later chapters.

<b>Location</b>	<b>Parties</b>	<b>Conflict</b>
West Papua	Indonesian Government/OPM	Independence struggle by West Papua, 1960s-ongoing
Bougainville	Papua New Guinea Government/Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA)	Independence struggle by Bougainville, 1988-1998
Fiji	Fijian Government/ Fijian armed forces	Ethnic conflict-multiple coup d'états
Solomon Islands	IFM/MEF; Solomon Islands Government/MEF	Ethnic conflict, territorial dispute, 1998-2003

Papua New Guinea	Highland tribes	Tribal fighting between competing groups, ongoing
Vanuatu	Anglophone/Francophone groups	Civil War, 1980-ongoing
New Caledonia	French security, local European settlers/indigenous Kanak population	Ethnic conflict
East Timor	Indonesian Government and armed forces/ Fretilin	Independence struggle by East Timor, 1975-1998

**Table 3.2 Major Conflict in the Pacific Region (adapted from Henderson 2005 et al; Bercovitch, DeRouen and Wei 2009; Siegmund 2003)**

Intrastate conflicts are not fought with tanks and high powered weaponry, which is common in interstate war, but rather with small arms and light weapons (SALW). These weapons are relatively affordable and attainable, can be concealed easily and are simple to use and maintain. It has been suggested that small arms are responsible for as many as 90 percent of all casualties in contemporary armed conflicts. The proliferation of small arms in the Pacific region has had a dire effect on the nature of internal conflict and general security in the Pacific. Arms left over from the Second World War are still being used in the region. The issue of disarmament has been evident in many peace agreements in the region but has often been a contentious provision in many states (Capie 2003: 15-17).

Various terms have been applied to the Pacific region to try to explain the presence of conflict and perhaps offer some insight into how it should be approached. Many of these terms however, paint a bleak picture of the region, which is not altogether accurate when conflict is examined at more closely. Much of the academic literature on conflict in the Pacific refers to the presence of an “arc of instability”, “failed states” and even the “Africanisation” of the region. While much of this is somewhat exaggerated or overemphasised, the region has been plagued with a substantial numbers of internal conflicts

since the end of the Second World War. This conflict, however, has been mainly confined to Melanesia (Spence and Wienders 2006: 8). The “arc of instability” refers to the chain of islands which extends from Indonesia right through Melanesia. This area is one of the most conflict prone regions in the world today. Every one of these nations in the arc is facing or has faced in the past some sort of unrest and, in most cases, violent armed conflict (Reilly 2002: 11). However, putting this blanket generalisation on the region as being homogeneously unstable is an artificial construct. It has been suggested by some scholars that the term vulnerability is more suitable than instability to describe the unrest in the region. Instability is too relative a concept, the need to qualify each state as having a certain degree of instability is a clearer representation rather than just grouping all states together for analysis (Rumley 2006: 40-41).

The nature of conflict in the Pacific has been regularly compared to other fragile and failing regions in the world. Perhaps most importantly is the comparison made with Africa. Benjamin Reilly made this correlation in his paper titled the *Africanisation of the South Pacific*. This article outlines the four inter-related criteria that have been associated with the failure of states in Africa and what Reilly believes is reflected in the same way in the Pacific. These are:

- The growing tensions in the relationship between civil regimes and military forces;
- The intermixture between ethnic identities and the competition of natural resources as factors driving conflicts
- The weakness of basic institutions of governance such as prime ministers, parliaments and, especially, political parties; and
- The increasing centrality of the state as a means of gaining wealth and of accessing and exploiting resources (Reilly 2000: 262-263).

This comparison however, may be somewhat over-emphasised. Although the nature of conflict is similar between the two regions the scale and calibre of the violence is far from comparable. The ill fit between modern systems of government and traditional forms of governance is a significant similarity however. Many countries in both the Pacific and Africa were colonised by the British, and the ill fit of the British system of governance has been

noticeable since decolonisation. The indigenous structures in these regions do not bode well with western concepts of leadership and government and this has been at the root of much of the unrest of the Pacific region especially.

### **3.3b Causes of Conflict in the Pacific**

The main causes of internal conflict that were identified in the first section of this chapter are also evident as being behind much of the violence in the Pacific region. Ethnic clashes, issues over land and natural resource, economic factors and the ill fit between traditional systems and western notions of governance have all been factors which have underpinned internal conflict in the region. However, these causes cannot be looked at in a vacuum. Much of the conflict has various degrees of all these elements which have served as a catalyst for the violence. These causes will now be examined in the Pacific context.

#### ***Ethnic Divisions***

“Ethnic identities are constricted when some people self-consciously distinguish themselves from others on the basis of perceived common decent, shared culture (including values, norms, goals, beliefs and language) or both” (Burnell and Randell 2008: 112).

Ethnic divisions are a leading dimension in many Pacific conflicts. Whether it is the main cause or an underlying factor, it is one aspect that is extremely predominant throughout the conflicts in the region. The underlying catalyst for many ethnically fuelled conflicts relates back to the colonial era when national boundaries were carved out by colonial powers, with little or no respect for already established cultural and ethnic divisions (Henderson and Watson 2005: 10). This created artificially homogenous states with state institutions that have no salience with traditional ethnic structures and as a result there is no sense of national identity (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 15). Self-determination has been and continues to be a source of many of the violent clashes in the region. Border divisions have

fused islands that hold little allegiance to one another. The fight to break away is usually signified by violence as a sign of reluctance to grant independence and relinquish some of the majority share of power (Brown 2007: 25).

### ***Land Issues***

Land is also an important factor when examining causes of Pacific conflicts. This is mainly to do with the way land is viewed in terms of community and ownership in many Pacific Island cultures. Land holds a deep spiritual importance for people in the Pacific and it is usually communally owned, therefore the individual purchase or alienation of land is not allowed. This is what most land-based conflict stems from, when land rights and ownership are not respected. Land is at the centre of life for many people in the Pacific region. It is a source of livelihood and income, a sign of power and authority, and a source of security and identity. Conflict can occur when one of these aspects comes under threat, whether it be from central government, resource owners or foreign companies who might try and exploit the states resources for their own benefit, disregarding the local people altogether (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 528).

### ***Natural Resources***

A subset of land issues is that of natural resources, or more specifically the exploitation of resources as a source of conflict. This is because natural resources, and the profit that is gained from their exploitation, gives people something of value to fight over. Mining has been and remains to be a contentious issue in the Pacific. Factors relating to the mining industry that have been the cause of conflict include “disputes over royalties and compensation for loss of land and other environmental impacts” (Henderson and Watson 2005: 10). The way these natural resources are extracted can cause further tension in society because of the environmental degradation and devastation that extraction can cause (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 528). Extraction of resources has been undertaken on many island nations in a haphazard fashion with little or no attention paid to future sustainability. The forestry industry is where this aspect is most visible. The forests belong to all the people but immense pressure is being put on locals by timber companies who want to extract this resource for their own benefit. These companies undertake

unsustainable deforestation techniques with no long-term commitment to the land or the people who own it and no interest in conservation for future generations (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 89). This issue is summed up in a statement made by AusAID, “Economic growth in many parts of the region has come at the expense of the natural environment and has significantly impacted on the sustainability of the region’s fragile resource base” (2004: 12).

### ***Economic Factors***

The transformation of a society’s economy from traditional structures to modern fiscal systems brings with it the creation of uneven economic cleavages within society. This new economic competition creates winners and losers, with some of those on the losing side willing to resort to violence to gain some of the winner’s benefits, such as access to natural or economic resources (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 17). Slow and stagnant development in many Pacific states is the cause of much of the poverty in the region, therefore it can be seen as one of the reasons why these societies turn to violence. Many of the states in the region are economically unstable and have experienced low or even negative economic growth rates. Of the 14 Pacific Islands Forum countries (excluding Australia and New Zealand), five are among the world least developed countries according to United Nations indicators. They are Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu (Peebles 2005: 15). Most states in the region are also heavily reliant upon a relatively small pool of donor countries for development assistance (Rumley 2006: 44). Violence can be seen as a way to get something one does not have; to shift the balance of power in one’s favour so they can gain certain benefits they have not had in the past.

There is a significant correlation between population growth and economic development in the Pacific region. As a result of increases in life expectancy and fertility rates and decreases in infant mortality rates, population growth is increasing at around three percent per annum. While this is a positive indicator, it is well ahead of economic growth in the formal sector. The weak economies of most island states cannot support this acceleration in population. One of the most significant effects of this population growth is the urban drift that it has caused people, mostly youths, to move to urban centres looking for work. Economies are



struggling to expand sufficiently to support this influx of people to urban centres. Youth unemployment is also high in many urban areas in the Pacific. Many who move cannot find work. As a result crime rates are also increasing in these places. It is these unemployed youths who are a common target for those pursuing political unrest (Brown 2007: 20).

### ***Good Governance***

Good governance is defined by the Pacific Islands Forum in the 2000 Biketawa Declaration as the “practice of open, transparent, accountable, participatory, consultative, fair and equitable government.” Governance generally focuses on four main areas; legitimacy, accountability, respect and competence. The meaning and establishment of these ideals tends to differ between Western and traditional Pacific societies. This is when governance becomes a cause of conflict (Henderson 2006: 11-12). International aid agencies promote good governance as a condition for continued support. “A major focus of the governance aid is to counter corruption and promote accountable government. The adoption or blending of Western forms of government has worked better for some island states than others” (Henderson and Watson 2005: 10). Conflicts highlight the poor fit between Western forms of governance, which have been imposed on many Pacific states as a result of colonisation, and traditional systems of authority and culturally based hierarchical structures (Henderson and Watson 2005: 21). Many Pacific communities still have an allegiance to their tribe or community group, so the idea of a national authority run by centralised state based institutions can seem a somewhat foreign concept in the Pacific. The problem dates back to the end of the colonial era, when the belief and expectation was that traditional allegiance would wither away in the face of modernisation and would be replaced with new societal structures such as class interests. This however, was the reverse; imposed modernisation led to a strengthening of ethnic, linguistic and group bonds and has become a basis for mobilising support (Reilly 2002: 12). Many Pacific conflicts reflect the turbulent nature of this relationship. It is because of the fractious relationship between tribal structures and state authority, combined with the short lifespan of these newly independent states, that there are no mechanisms in place for dealing with social and political tensions before they erupt into violent conflict (Brown 2007: 3, 8).

Independence wasn't gained by most states until the 1970's. This makes these countries very young on the international stage. Independence, while much sought after, can be seen as a double-edged sword, for many countries did not have the capacity to take over the state institutions that had been created and administered by colonial powers (Brown 2007: 17). The Westminster form of government is prevalent in most of Polynesia and Melanesia. There have been many difficulties in implementing this system of governance in Pacific societies. Since transplanting the Westminster system into the Pacific, there has arisen the criticism that by creating a clear division between those in power and those in the opposition, internal divisions along racial and ethnic lines are further exacerbated. This approach to government also clashes with the traditional consensus based decision-making structures of many Pacific Island states (Henderson 2006: 15).

As has been covered above, conflicts in the Pacific region are mostly based around intractable issues. It is because of the very nature of conflict in the region that makes peacebuilding an appropriate approach to try. Peacebuilding's aim is to go beyond just the need to improve security in the post conflict phase. Those involved in the process aim to pay ongoing attention to working through the underlying causes of violence and work towards a mutually beneficial solution that meets the needs of all parties involved. By taking a gradual and inclusive approach to building peace past grievances can begin to be reconciled. By changing the relationship between the parties to one based around peace and not violence society can begin to be reformed and rehabilitated.

### **3.4 Conflict Resolution in the Pacific Region**

There are various players who have been involved in conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation in the Pacific. However, there are three main actors who have had the most influence and input in this region in the area of peace and security. They are the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Australia and New Zealand. Their involvement has come in the various forms such as aid, facilitation of peace talks, peacekeeping, peace monitoring and other conflict management activities. The extensive involvement of these actors is due mainly to the geographical proximity and ongoing engagement in the region. The need to maintain regional security and stability is a top priority for these actors. Additional to the involvement

of these regional actors has been the contribution made to conflict resolution in the region by other international actors such as the United Nations and the European Union and other nations such as China. These actors have also employed a range of conflict management techniques in an attempt to stabilise various conflicts in the Pacific region.

### **3.4a Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)**

The Pacific Islands Forum has increasingly addressed security and conflict issues in the region since it was formed in August 1971. The Pacific Islands Forum is made up of 16 independent or self-governing states, with three observers, one special observer and 13 dialogue partners<sup>1</sup>. It is a means for Pacific leaders to meet and deal with issues in the region along with developing strategies for the region to maintain stability. There are no formal procedural guidelines for the Forum; however, decisions are usually made by consensus. Australia and New Zealand are the main contributors to the annual budget of the Forum, paying one third each of the budget, while Pacific Island members collectively make up the other third (Boxall 2006: 20).

Two of the initial efforts of the PIF to become involved in conflict resolution in the Pacific were both turned down. In the aftermath of the 1987 coup in Fiji, the Forum offered to send a mission to Fiji that would help facilitate talks between the parties that were involved. This offer, however, was declined by the Governor General of Fiji. The PIF had the same response in 1992 when it offered to send a mission to Bougainville. The Papua New Guinea government announced that it was an internal problem and accepting their help would legitimise the claims of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, so, therefore, their offer to intervene was once again denied (Urwin 2005: 14). The PIF began to become more involved in the resolution of Pacific conflict from 2000 onwards. Its support was instrumental in the creation and allowance of RAMSI to intervene in the Solomon Islands.

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<sup>1</sup> **Members:** Australia; Cook Islands; Federated States of Micronesia; Fiji; Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Nauru; New Zealand; Niue; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tonga; Tuvalu; Vanuatu.. **Observers:** French Polynesia (2004); New Caledonia (1999); Tokelau (2005). **Special Observer:** Timor Leste (2002). **Dialogue Partners:** Canada; PRC; EU; France; Indonesia; India; Malaysia; Japan; Philippines; Korea; Thailand; UK; US.

The PIF has drawn up various agreements relating to conflict and security in the region. These include the 1992 Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation; the 1997 Aitutaki Declaration of Regional Security and Cooperation; and, perhaps most significantly, the 2000 Biketawa Declaration. While the PIF has had some success in this area there have been concerns raised over the slow implementation of regional security policies and lack of capacity of some Forum nations to meet the provisions of these declaration (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 531-532).

### ***Biketawa Declaration***

The Biketawa Declaration was signed by Forum leaders in Biketawa, Kiribati in 2000. It is a regional security framework that builds upon past agreements that have been implemented in the region. Its key features include “its commitment to upholding democratic processes and good governance, its recognition of indigenous rights and cultural values and the process for addressing crises in the region” (Pacific Islands Forum 2009). The Biketawa Declaration outlines the importance of regional cooperation amongst its member countries when conflicts arise in the region. It also makes a commitment to the reduction and resolution of all conflicts in the region and the use of customary practices as a way in which this can be achieved. This Declaration highlighted the recognition by Forum leaders of “the need in time of crisis or in response to members’ request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family” (2000: 1). The Biketawa Declaration did, however, run into strong opposition, especially from Fiji. They believed that under this new agreement they would be singled out and face further sanctions as a result of the 2000 coup (Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer 2006: 19). The Biketawa Declaration has been invoked twice since its creation, both times in relation to the Solomon Islands conflict. The first time was in 2001 when it was used to explore a possible role for the Forum in ending the conflict and secondly in 2003 when it was used to legitimise the intervention of RAMSI (Henderson and Watson 2005: 17).

### **3.4b Australia and New Zealand**

Though many other countries have been involved, Australia and New Zealand have been, and remain to be, the leading powers involved in conflict resolution in the Pacific region. Because of their significantly overlapping interest in the region the relationship between Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific is one of cooperation, consultation and coordination (Seed in Henderson et al: 136). Over time Australia has maintained more of a focus in Melanesia while New Zealand's attention has been focused more on Polynesia. Both have also maintained close links with their former colonial territories in the region, Papua New Guinea and Nauru in the case of Australia and Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau for New Zealand (McDougall in Henderson et al: 128).

Australia and New Zealand have both maintained important development assistance programs in the region and, because of their size and resources, are both significant actors within the Pacific Islands Forum. Both countries have strived to maintain stability in the Pacific, with a particular focus and emphasis on sustainable development and political democracy. For New Zealand the Pacific region is more central to its foreign policy than it is perhaps for Australia. New Zealand sees itself as a Pacific nation and places itself within the region, whereas Australia is more likely to see itself as a bordering power rather than a Pacific country and its assistance in the region is based more on security concerns due to its geographical proximity to the Pacific (McDougall in Henderson et al: 128-134).

New Zealand's main contribution to conflict resolution in the Pacific was the role it played in bringing peace to Bougainville. While earlier efforts, such as the Endeavour Accords, failed, the facilitation of talks between Bougainvillean representatives and those from Papua New Guinea at Burnham in 1997 were instrumental in bringing an end to the conflict and have shaped how conflict resolution is viewed in the region. New Zealand is a key actor in the region. Unlike Australia, New Zealand has maintained a constant presence in the region (Peebles 2005: 54). Conflict resolution and intervention by the Australian government in the Pacific is best demonstrated by RAMSI. RAMSI marked a turning point in Australian foreign

policy. This mission signalled a move from what had been a generally hands-off policy to one that focused on cooperative intervention. Before RAMSI, Australia had been reluctant to intervene in the region for fear of being perceived as acting in a neo-colonial manner. Australia's involvement in the region was restricted mostly to the provision of bilateral aid (Brown 2007: 20). The Solomon Islands, however, posed a threat that was deemed too close to home. Any spill over effects would have had dire consequences for Australia because of its geographical proximity (Dinnen 2008: 51). While RAMSI has made inroads in resolving the situation in the Solomon Islands it has also received criticism that it is too Australian-centric in its approach, rather than being a regional force as it should be.

### **3.4c International Organisations**

Various International Organisations (IO's) have also played a role in conflict resolution in the Pacific region. Two significant IO's that are involved in the region are the United Nations and the European Union. The United Nations has taken on an important role in various conflicts in the region, including East Timor, Fiji and Bougainville. The UN has a significant involvement in East Timor. The first step in their involvement was their role in monitoring the referendum vote for independence in 1999. It was after this election turned violent that the UN intervened and undertook an extensive process of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in East Timor. They played an important role in controlling violence and re-establishing law and order throughout the state. This intervention, which is being covered in more depth in *Chapter Four*, has however been criticised as having a general lack of engagement with and inclusion of the local people in the post-conflict process. The United Nations became involved in Fiji in the aftermath of the 2006 coup. They tried to engage in dialogue with coup leader Commodore Bainimarama, although these attempts proved to be less than fruitful. Due to this breakdown in relations and the actions taken by Bainimarama, there has been a virtual freeze on Fiji's participation in the UN and subsequent UN missions. The UN also played an important role in Bougainville where they were involved in peace monitoring and provided general support for the peace process. They were also significant in terms of the weapons disposal program, which will be covered in more detail in *Chapter Five* (Wainwright 2010: 13-14).

The European Union also has maintained an ongoing link with the Pacific region. France still retains three territories in the region (New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna). This link is also maintained by the United Kingdom as a result of old colonial ties. Their influence is enacted through not only the EU, but also the Commonwealth as a member of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and as a PIF Dialogue partner. The EU's conflict resolution focus comes mainly in the form of development assistance through the European Development Fund, but the EU have also been involved in broader political dialogue as a way of approaching peace and development issues in the region (Siegmund 2003: 5).

New Zealand, Australia and the United Nation have been the leading forces when it comes to peacebuilding in the region. New Zealand's approach to conflict management tends to stem from the need to create good relationships between the parties before any other steps can be taken forward in building peace in society. Their intervention in the Bougainville conflict has set a precedent for how Pacific conflicts should be approached and how rehabilitation and reconciliation in the region needs to follow a specific format, the idea of the Pacific Way, if it is going to be acceptable to the local people. Australia and the United Nations have encountered some problems in their attempts to undertake peacebuilding activities in the Pacific, most of which stem from a lack of engagement with local customs and communities. These downfalls are going to be discussed in subsequent chapters.

In the book *Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific* author Nic Maclellan identifies certain common aspects that he believes will make or break a peace process in this region. They are:

- “The importance of operating at a range of levels: from community to national, from regional to international
- The importance of time: allowing people to meet, consult and decide at their own pace
- The often undervalued Pacific tradition of consensus; talking together; the power of the spoken word, shame, and personal pledges and commitment
- The need to engage a range of players: not just government officials, soldiers and leaders of armed militias, but a full range of civil society, church, and customary leaders
- The key role of women's groups, church leaders and customary authorities in catalysing grassroots consultation, disarmament and reconciliation initiatives

- The catalysing effect of outside groups: whether through lobbying and advocacy by solidarity and human rights groups or the provision of resources and meeting spaces by outside governments and neutral brokers” (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 531).

The criteria mentioned provide an important insight into the various aspects that need the most attention during conflict resolution activities in the Pacific region. It also demonstrates the importance of creating a culturally acceptable approach to peace and the inclusion of all levels of society. This provides a good starting point for the case study analysis of peacebuilding in the region and can provide an indicator as to why some cases have been more successful than others due to the approach that has been taken by the various intervening parties.

### **3.5 Conclusion**

Internal conflict is becoming more and more prevalent worldwide. Its increase not only threatens the countries where it is being experienced but also the wider region in which that country is situated. Internal conflict is having a greatly destabilising effect in the Pacific region. Many countries in the region have been plagued by unrest, much of which has been stimulated by the transition to independence. These conflicts have caused widespread devastation in the region.

Three cases of conflict in the region are now going to be examined in more detail. They are East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. The causes of each are going to be identified and efforts that have been taken to resolve them will be outlined. This will lead on to the final investigation into the overall success of these missions in building long term peace in these societies.



## **Chapter Four**

### **The Policy of Peacebuilding in East Timor**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The conflict in East Timor was the result of the fight by the East Timorese people to gain independence from Indonesia. While East Timor was initially under Portuguese authority, the Indonesian government proceeded to invade the province in late 1975 where it remained under their occupation for 24 years. During this time the people of East Timor suffered tremendously, with an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 lives lost (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 348; CIA World Factbook 2010). This devastation looked as if it was coming to an end in 1999 when Indonesia, with the assistance of the United Nations, announced that a referendum would take place so the people of East Timor could vote on whether they wanted independence from Indonesia or not. Indonesia promised the United Nations that they would respect the decision that was reached by the referendum. However, after the vote, which was in majority favour of independence, they reneged on this promise and the Indonesian military invaded the country once again. In response to this renewed violence, the United Nations intervened and began a peacebuilding campaign in East Timor.

This aim of this chapter is to outline the peacebuilding activities that were undertaken by the various United Nations missions that intervened in East Timor after the 1999 vote for independence and examines how successful the peacebuilding process has been in East Timor. While the theory of peacebuilding, which has already been outlined in *Chapter Two*, may seem straight forward, in reality peacebuilding missions do not always go as smoothly as anticipated. Peacebuilding in East Timor was less than successful due to a general lack of engagement with the local community. This chapter will aim to link up the ideas about peacebuilding and internal conflict that have already been covered in the first few chapters and use these ideas to analyse the level of success of the United Nations peacebuilding mission in East Timor.

## 4.2 Causes of the Conflict

The fight for self-determination in East Timor was pushed forward significantly by the overthrow of the fascist Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974. This broke down the barriers against political participation and led to the establishment of several political parties in East Timor. The main parties that emerged were the right wing Union for Democratic Timor (UDT) and the more liberal Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin). Initially the political aims of these parties were not radically different but Indonesian authorities needed the support of the party that was more closely aligned with their agenda, which was UDT. They conspired against Fretilin by spreading false intelligence about possible Fretilin plans for a coup (Kingsbury 2000: 18). As a precautionary act against this threat, the UDT aligned itself with the Indonesian authorities and launched a pre-emptive strike against Fretilin (Robie 1999: 104).

Civil war erupted between the factions that wanted independence and those that wanted to integrate with Indonesia. UDT forces, which supported integration with Indonesia, launched a coup in Dili, East Timor's capital. Fretilin, who were adamantly against Indonesian rule, fought back and managed to defeat UDT forces gaining almost complete control of the territory (Robie 1999: 104). It was during the initial stages of this civil war that Fretilin established an armed branch called Falintil (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) (Tanter, Selden and Shalom 2001: 17). The violence began to escalate and Portugal withdrew, leaving East Timor open to invasion. In November of 1975, the Democratic Republic of East Timor was established (Robie 1999: 104). Indonesia was losing the battle so launched an assault just over a week later. It intervened with over 10,000 Indonesian troops and annexed East Timor (Paris 2004: 218). Before this time Indonesia had never tried to lay claim to East Timor or ever challenge the legitimacy of Portuguese rule over the territory (Robie 1999: 104). It is estimated that over 60,000 people were killed in initial two months of the invasion. Tens of thousands of East Timorese fled from their houses into the mountains, which were Fretilin territory (Tanter, Selden and Shalom 2001: 18).

#### 4.2a Santa Cruz Massacre

Indonesian rule of East Timor was dominated by the military, with all levels of the administration involving army personnel. The regime was characterised by brutality and repression, with little or no respect paid to East Timorese culture or traditions (Robie 1999: 105). One event that epitomises the violent and domineering rule of Indonesia in East Timor is known as the Santa Cruz Massacre, which took place in November 1991. Indonesian soldiers opened fire at close range on a peaceful protest at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. The protestors had gathered to mourn the loss of a student who had been killed just days before by Indonesian military forces (Kingsbury 2000: 23-24). Sebastio Gomes had been killed during an attack on the Motael Church, which had become a refuge for a number of political activists. The peaceful procession, which began after an early morning memorial service for Gomes, was estimated to have had nearly 4000 unarmed participants. During the procession a plain clothed army major and private were reportedly injured by some of the protesters. This spurred a violent response from the Indonesian forces, who later used this as the justification for the murder of hundreds of East Timorese (Inbaraj 1995: 88). Due to an increase in openness of the borders by President Suharto in the late 1980s, there were now international media present in the country. There were foreign reporters present at the Santa Cruz cemetery. They were able to capture the whole attack on film and broadcast it internationally. This provided a turning point in international opinion and support because it turned the media spot light on to the grim realities of the Indonesian occupation in East Timor (Tanter, Selden and Shalom 2001: 22). The situation in East Timor was transformed from an internal problem, which had long been ignored by the international community, to major international news, which heralded attention from all around the world (Inbaraj 1995: 88).

One of the driving forces behind the East Timorese independence movement was Xanana Gusmao. He was a Fretilin supporter and, because of his previous military training in the national service, became the commander of Falintil. The Indonesian authorities followed his support of the movement and in 1992 he was captured in Dili and arrested. Xanana Gusmao was sentenced to life imprisonment. This, however, only fuelled the movement and by 1993 he had taken up leadership from inside prison. His imprisonment also opened him up to greater international support. He received visits from top international figures, such as Nelson

Mandela, and also international organisations like the United Nations (Tanter, Selden and Shalom 2001: 18, 22-23).

By the 1990s, the UDT and Fretilin had begun to work together towards a mutually supported goal; the goal of independence. A united effort was needed. This came into fruition through the establishment of the Council for Timorese National Resistance (CNRT) in 1997. This council became the main driving force behind the fight for independence (Kingsbury 2000: 25).

The struggle for independence took a turn for the better in 1998, with the instillation of the new Indonesian President BJ Habibie after Suharto's resignation. Although his initial stance was one against East Timorese independence, he was willing to open up for discussion the possibility of granting special autonomy to the region. In early 1999, however, he announced that a referendum on independence was to take place, to give the East Timorese the chance to decide their own future (Kingsbury 2000: 260). In response to this Xanana called for a ceasefire and disarmament and reduction of troops. The CNRT and Falintil abstained from violence as a show of support and dedication to the voting process, maintaining the moral high ground and encouraging compromise and tolerance with Indonesia (Tanter, Selden and Shalom 2001: 24-25). In May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal formally allowed the United Nations to come into the country and monitor the referendum. Indonesia had to accept that if the referendum concluded with the call for separation by the East Timorese people then these results would be respected (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 349). The election monitoring mission was known as the United Nation Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). The mission was set to take five months and began in early June, 1999. The main tasks of UNAMET were to "register voters, prepare and authenticate electoral roles and facilitate eligible voters to secretly cast their preferences". The mission concluded with the undertaking to the vote on the 30<sup>th</sup> of August 1999 (Smith 2003: 18).

History was made on August 30<sup>th</sup> 1999 when, with a monumental voter turnout of 98 percent, 78.5 percent of the East Timorese voted for a transition to independence and a separation from Indonesia. Indonesia, however, backtracked on its promise to allow the move to independence. The Indonesian military and supportive militia undertook a bloody campaign against East Timor, where countless civilians were subjected to rape, torture and

approximately 1,400 people lost their lives (CIA World Factbook 2010). In the following weeks the military and militia forces destroyed the majority of buildings in East Timor, infrastructure crumbled under the violence and up to 75 percent of the population was displaced as a result. By late 1999, the United Nations was authorised to intervene to try to take control of the situation that had become out of hand (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 349-350).

### 4.3 Conflict Summary

<b>Conflict Type</b>	Internal armed conflict
<b>Incompatibility</b>	Territory, Self-determination
<b>Duration</b>	1975-1999
<b>Parties in conflict</b>	Indonesian Government, Indonesian Militia, Fretilin
<b>External Intervention</b>	INTERFET
<b>Conflict Resolution Attempts</b>	N/A
<b>UN Involvement</b>	UNAMET, UNTAET
<b>Peace Agreements</b>	Agreements Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese through a Direct Ballot 1999  East Timor Popular Consultation Agreement Regarding Security 1999  Various UN Security Council Resolution 1999-onwards
<b>Fatalities</b>	Estimated 100,000-250,000 deaths
<b>Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons</b>	Estimated 100,000 (UNDP 2007)

Table 4.1 Conflict Summary: East Timor (UCDP Database 2010; CIA World Factbook 2010)

## **4.4 Peacebuilding in East Timor**

A peacebuilding approach was appropriate because in the aftermath of the conflict it was not just the matter of the violence that needed to be dealt with, but a greater focus on the need to rebuild and rehabilitate society from the ground up. Due to the nature of the conflict and the parties involved external intervention was needed because of lack of local capacity in terms of both resources and state-building expertise. Post-conflict peacebuilding in East Timor was characterised by an overwhelming concentration of international intervention. The international community poured vast resources, both in terms of funds and time, into the reconstruction of East Timor. Although, in theory, this cannot be seen as being negative, in reality it left a country with limited ownership of the process and little knowledge of what to do after the help had withdrawn (Call 2008: 272). The United Nations were the main international actors during the peacebuilding process in East Timor. Their intervention can be broken down into three distinct phases. The first phase of its intervention was their administration of the independence vote in 1999 (UNAMET), the second was the restoration and maintenance of security by the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), and the third was the work done to prepare the East Timorese for independence, which was undertaken by UNTAET (Smith 2003: 18).

### **4.4a After the Vote of Independence**

The policy of peacebuilding was officially begun as soon as the United Nations intervened in the aftermath of the vote for East Timorese independence in late 1999. The United Nations authorised the intervention of an Australian-led military force whose main aim was to restore law and order in East Timor. This force was known as INTERFET and was a multinational force whose role was to restore and maintain security until the United Nations could properly assemble a peacekeeping force. INTERFET was made up of forces from 22 contributing nations and at its peak included around 11,000 personnel. INTERFET remained in operation for five months, until UNTAET was established at the end of October 1999 (Smith 2003: 19). Although INTERFET's main task of restoring law and order in East Timor was eventually

achieved, it was undertaken somewhat too late for much of the physical infrastructure, civil administration and judicial systems had already been thoroughly destroyed (Paris 2004: 218).

In September 1999, Indonesia handed over control of East Timor to the United Nations. The peacebuilding operation, authorised by the Security Council, was to be known as the United Nations Transitional Authority of East Timor (UNTAET) and was under the direction of Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sergio Vieira de Mello from Brazil (Smith 2003: 59). UNTAET, which took control in October 1999, was to “assume overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice” (Paris 2004: 218). UNTAET was a much larger force than its previous counterparts in East Timor. It had a broadly defined mandate of “preparing East Timor for sustainable independence” (Smith 2003: 19). UNTAET assumed authority over East Timor up until May 2002.

#### **4.4b Security Sector Reforms**

INTERFET were tasked with ending violence in the initial stages after the independence vote. Their main focus was on the restoration of law and order in East Timor. INTERFET’s initial task was to secure Dili first and then to move out into other regional centres, until the entire territory had been secured. This process, under the command of Major General Peter Cosgrove from Australia, was undertaken at a calculated rate. Although Cosgrove was criticised for taking an exceedingly cautious approach, moving too quickly would have increased the risk of further destabilisation in the regions. When INTERFET arrived in East Timor, their presence prompted the militia to flee to West Timor. This made the initial security situation very different from in other conflict zones for the risk of renewed conflict was greatly reduced for the potential resistance forces had fled the country. Disarmament was not a significant issue in East Timor. None of those involved in the conflict possessed heavy weapons. What weapons the militia did have, they took when they fled into West Timor and INTERFET confiscated all other weapons in East Timor (Call 2008: 47-50). UNTAET’s military component, which consisted of around 8,000 personnel, replaced INTERFET in early 2000 and continued to maintain security in East Timor (Smith 2003: 62).

In post-independence East Timor, international attention paid to local security forces quickly diminished over time. Once Indonesian troops withdrew from East Timor there was thought to be no immediate threats to security. Since threats to security remained low they were not on the agenda of most international donors. UNTAET's mandate did not include any reference to security sector reform or how to deal with the East Timorese resistance force, Falintil.

### *Army*

Unlike in other peacebuilding situation, where resistance forces have been absorbed as the national armed forces, Falintil did not automatically become the national army. There was some debate over whether East Timor needed a national army at all. But there was wide support for the establishment of such a force and the Timorese leadership would only agree to demobilise Falintil if this came into fruition. The new national force was formed on February 1<sup>st</sup> 2001 and was known as Falintil-Forças de Defesa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL); 650 of the new F-FDTL troops were previous members of Falintil (Call 2008: 292-293). Since its establishment, however, the F-FDTL has remained a source of contention and threat against the government. The reality is that the force is too small to really be effective against the main possible aggressor, Indonesia, but is too large and expensive a force for a small state such as East Timor (Kingsbury and Leach 2007: 24).

### *Police*

In 2000 a Timorese police force was hastily created by UNTAET. It was known as the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL). The mode in which this was done, however, has many weak points. The UN training approach lacked cohesion with the UN police having members from over 40 different countries. They did not share a common language with the Timorese people or have any specialised knowledge of Timorese law. The UN model made no attempt to incorporate a Timorese identity into its structure, which made for a weak and disjointed organisation (Call 2008: 294).



Security in East Timor, or Timor-Leste as it was then known as, was threatened in April of 2006 when a military strike led to the outbreak of violence and the near collapse of law and order in the country. At the request of authorities in Dili, an Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) was deployed to Timor-Leste in late May. The UN also reacted to this renewed violence and established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which included over 1600 police personnel. The ISF and UNMIT managed to restore stability in Timor-Leste, allowing for presidential and parliamentary elections to take place in 2007 in a largely peaceful environment (CIA World Factbook 2010).

#### **4.4c Trust and Confidence Building Measures**

There was minimal effort made on the part of UNTAET to form a strong working relationship with the Timorese people or a bond with Timorese society. The main concern in the post-independence phase was the need to totally rebuild and redefine a national identity and create a common sense of political interest among the people of East Timor. The idea of nationhood was not properly fostered in the early stages of post-war rehabilitation. There had been no planning regarding the way in which UNTAET would work in partnership with the East Timorese.

One way in which the society was further divided, instead of draw together, was the decision to implement Portuguese as the official language in East Timor. This decision was a reflection of the interests of those who held the power in the new government. Portuguese was used by the country's elites but was little understood by the common majority of East Timor. This further divided an already fractious new state, and installed little trust of the people in the government (Kingsbury 2000: 23).

#### **4.4d Governmental Reform**

The main focus of UNTAET was to act as an interim administration therefore governmental reforms gained the most attention in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase. In the haste to

create new state institutions, little attention was paid to Timorese society. Ready-made institutions were created and then handed over to the Timorese people who had very limited input into their formation. UNTAET used its own model of state building and never really attempted to include existing social structures such as kinship networks. If this approach had been taken there may have been a more fluid transition from UN administration to Timorese rule, rather than the disjointed nature of society that now exists (Call 2008: 272).

This phase of UNTAET's mission was known as Governance and Public Administration (GPA). The aims of this phase were to re-establish governance at both the central and district levels, to restore public and social utilities and to encourage and regulate investment in the private sector. UNTAET faced significant challenges when trying to implement this phase, including creating a sustainable budget, developing an experienced staff base and gaining the confidence and trust of the East Timorese people. This aspect of the mission was accused of being too Dili-centric, with too much focus being on establishing governance in the capital and little attention being paid to other districts. The GPA was later replaced by the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA). The ETTA had a greater focus on preparing the East Timorese for self-government, by giving the people direct experience in government. This shift in focus helped to improve the partnership between the UN and the East Timorese (Smith 2003: 63-65). There was a need to create a joint decision making body to ease the transition from UNTAET. The initial transition from a UN dominated administration to a local administrative body came in the form of the National Consultative Council (NCC) and its successor, the National Council. The NCC was created in early December 1999 with 11 Timorese members and four UNTAET representatives. This body was replaced by the National Council on 23 October 2000 by a 36-member council made up of all Timorese members (Kingsbury 2000: 35).

Elections are an important aspect of any peacebuilding mission but they can also be the cause of disagreement within society, as was the case in East Timor. The CNRT was dissolved on 9 June 2001 to allow parties to contest the election. One problem that was faced in the lead up to the first elections was the dominance of the Fretilin party. UNTAET tried to encourage the people of East Timor to adopt a mixed voting system with proportional representation, to try

and spread the votes across some of the smaller parties as well. In the end, however, Fretilin did eventually win an overwhelming majority and gained 55 of the 88 seats in government. The first Presidential elections were held on 14 April 2002. Independence leader Xanana Gusmao won the elections with an overwhelming majority of the votes. It was after this election that independence was officially declared in East Timor on 20 May 2002 and UNTAET was replaced by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET), which remained until 2004 (Chesterman 2004: 141, 231).

The creation of a workable Constitution was a significant step towards sustainable independence for East Timor. The main features of the new Constitution, which was implemented with some international help, are respect for the rule of law, democracy and human rights. The human rights section was a necessary addition in light of all that had happened in East Timor in the past. The Constitution was drafted with the aid of popular participation. Commissions were established throughout the country to consult with the people. Input was welcomed and received by many. Sometimes this input came from individuals but mostly it came from civil society organisations, particularly the Catholic Church (Hill and Menzel 2008: 71, 75).

#### **4.4e Judicial Reform**

Judicial reform remains the weakest aspect of the peacebuilding process in East Timor. There was a general lack of cohesion between UNTAET's judicial policy and existing customary law. As with many other aspects of UNTAET reform, there was no effort made to incorporate and include existing local judicial practices with the new UN-initiated judicial reforms (Call 2008: 287).

Reforms that were undertaken were unrealistic from the beginning, with most of the trouble centring on the overall lack of judicial expertise amongst the East Timorese people. The transitional administration chose to install Timorese judges, prosecutors and public defenders. At the time of independence there were only 60 Timorese people who had law degrees, most

with very limited work experience, and none having ever served as a judge. After a short training period by UNTAET, the first Timorese Judges were installed in early 2000. The lack of experience in such a specialised and significant field was only too obvious. By 2002 there was a formidable backlog in the justice system, with any decision that were made being of varied quality (Call 2008: 287). Indonesian Law was re-instated in the judicial sector, however it did undergo certain modifications to ensure that it complied with UN conventions on human rights (Smith 2003: 82).

The implementation of Portuguese as the official language had serious repercussions in the judicial sector. Many of the judiciary had very little comprehension of Portuguese, the language in which they were trained in and had to conduct their affairs in. The main problem was the fact that the legal code was also written in Portuguese, therefore understanding of the main pillar of the judicial system was weak among legal practitioners and the general population (Kingsbury 2000: 23). This problem was further illustrated when, in 2005, none of the local candidates passed the minimum requirement of the exam for becoming a judge and this was mostly because of problems with the Portuguese language (Hill and Menzel 2008: 87).

#### **4.4f Economic Reform**

At the time of the declaration of independence, East Timor was the poorest country in the Asia Pacific region. It had a per capita income of about \$300 and around 70 percent of its building stocks were damaged or destroyed in the aftermath of the vote for independence in 1999. Every decision to be made about economic policy was urgent for each choice was crucial in shaping the future of the new nation. These decisions would have a direct impact on how quickly the country could be lifted out of poverty and begin down the path of rehabilitation and restoration. One significant weakness of East Timorese society is the dependence on a small export base of commodities, such as coffee and oil, which have volatile prices on the world stage. Being reliant on a small number of products which do not have a fixed value is a huge risk for an already weak economy (Hill and Saldanha 2001: 3-5, 40).

The public finance system was initially created by a joint effort involving UNTAET, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Portugal and Australia. The system, although workable, is not self-reliant. It remains dependent on international assistance, which on the one hand was necessary in the beginning, but on the other is unsustainable in the long-term. There have been considerable donor resources dedicated to rebuilding, or more so creating, workable institutions. Although this process has been on the whole a success there remains doubt about whether they can remain sustainable once donor funding reduces. Lack of local resources will have an impact on the resilience of these institutions to perform once donors have withdrawn their support (Hill and Saldanha 2001: 290-295).

Although the Fretilin government made some sound economic decisions when it came to power after independence in 2002, such as the strengthening of the oil and gas field revenues, it also made some poor decision that caused the economic sector to suffer. One of these was the implementation of the US dollar as the official currency of East Timor. Even though such an action was suggested by the UN, its effects were, however, more negative than positive. This move made the local economy less competitive and caused an increase in inflation and relative costs of goods. Such a decision could not be seen as beneficial in such a weak economic system, which was already in a dire state in the post-independence phase (Kingsbury 2000: 19).

While the development of oil and gas resources has greatly supplemented government revenues, the challenge for the country now is how to best to use the oil and gas wealth to urge higher growth in other sectors of the economy and to reduce widespread poverty that is still present in Timor-Leste (CIA World Factbook 2010). East Timor is still severely underdeveloped; even after all the assistance it has received since independence. It has an extremely low Human Development Index (HDI) rating due to the high levels of poverty, with nearly half of the population on or below the poverty line of \$0.55 per day (Richmond and Franks 2008: 189).

#### 4.4g Community Education and Reconciliation

One positive aspect in the field of community education and reconciliation was the creation of a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, which uses the Portuguese acronym CAVR (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação). Established by the East Timorese Government in 2002, its aim is to examine the violence that occurred in the country from 1974 to 1999 and to promote ongoing community reconciliation. The main motivation behind the creation of the Commission was the reintegration of refugees. This is because many among the returning refugees were perpetrators of serious crimes and it was believed that their reintegration would threaten the peace and stability in East Timor (Kingsbury 2000: 129-130). Building a more united and reconciled community will help strengthen the support base for other peacebuilding reforms that have taken place. This Commission incorporates customary laws and traditions into its mandate, which has helped to enhance its local legitimacy. CAVR facilitates reconciliation between victims and offenders. The process is based around that of restorative justice which puts an emphasis on getting the offender to accept responsibility for their behaviour and apologise to the victims for their wrongdoings so that both parties can begin to heal and move forward. The aim is to restore social relationships, which is important when trying to create a more peaceful future for all those involved in the conflict (Kingsbury 2000: 133).

#### 4.5 Summary of Peacebuilding Activities

<b>Dimensions</b>	<b>Actors</b>	<b>Activities</b>
<b>Security Sector Reforms</b>	<b>INTERFET</b>	Restoration of law and order  Weapons disposal
	<b>UNTAET</b>	Maintenance of security

	<b>ISF and UNMIT</b>	Restored stability post-2006 military strike
<b>Trust and Confidence Building Measures</b>	<b>UNTAET</b>	Minimal effort was made on the part of UNTAET in this area
<b>Governmental Reform</b>	<b>UNTAET</b>  <b>GPA</b>  <b>ETTA</b>  <b>NCC</b>	Formed an interim administration-focus on statebuilding  Organised first presidential elections in 2002  Aim was to re-establish governance at both the central and district levels, restore public and social utilities and encourage investment in private sector  Prepared the East Timorese for self-government  Acted as the initial local administration body
<b>Judicial Reform</b>	<b>UNTAET</b>	Training and instillation of East Timorese judges
<b>Economic Reform</b>	<b>UNTAET, World Bank, IMF, Portugal and Australia</b>	Creation of a public finance system

	<b>Fretilin Government</b>	Strengthening oil and gas field revenues
<b>Community Education and Reconciliation</b>	<b>CAVR</b>	Community Reconciliation  Reintegration of refugees

**Table 4.2 Summary of Peacebuilding activities in East Timor**

#### **4.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Process**

The peacebuilding mission undertaken by the United Nations in the East Timor has been hailed as an overall success. However, along with the strengths that have been portrayed by this mission, there were also weaknesses in the process. Both strengths and weaknesses of the UN's missions in East Timor are now going to be identified. By doing this type of analysis future missions can recognise what were the most beneficial features of the process and what areas need more attention.

One of the greatest strengths of the United Nations mission in East Timor was the legitimacy of the intervention and the acceptance of it by the East Timorese people. Legitimacy and acceptance are important parts of any international intervention and were a positive aspect of the intervention into East Timor. The UN mission was authorised due to the failure of Indonesia to uphold its requirements to respect the outcome of the referendum in 1999. In the violence that followed the election results, Indonesia agreed that a force was needed to restore security and governance in East Timor. The UN's mission in East Timor was not only legitimised by Indonesia but was also accepted by the people of East Timor. Host country support is of the utmost importance for a mission to be a success. The UN's involvement in East Timor was strongly supported by the people. While there was criticism of the certain aspects of the process and although proper partnership between UNTAET and the East Timorese was slow to be established, there was no significant backlash to the UN being present in the country, or any desire for them to withdraw too quickly (Smith 2003: 98-101).



Another strength of the mission, which in part relates to the legitimacy factor, was the sustained international commitment of all those involved in East Timor. The longevity of international commitment has a direct effect on the sustainability of peace during and intervention. International support in East Timor remained strong throughout. One reason for this was that the UN's intervention had political support from the Security Council and other powerful nations such as the United States. If an intervention can gain such support, donors are more willing to become, and more importantly remain, involved. East Timor was seen as a manageable size, with a population of less than a million (Smith 2003: 98-99).

While many aspects of the mission were deemed to be a success it also had various weaknesses. One weakness that was evident was the lack of forward planning by UNTAET. The planning process for the mission was slow and ambiguous. There was little planning in the early stages that set out the arrangements for acting in partnership with the East Timorese. This meant that coordination between UN staff and East Timorese did not eventuate properly until mid-2000 (Smith 2003: 104).

Another weakness was the lack of donor coordination, which had an impact on economic and social development. Peacebuilding requires an emphasis on creating sustainable institutions. Development should be a high priority in the early stages of an intervention. Well planned development strategies were slow to emerge in East Timor. The UN Development Program did not open their office in Dili until March 2000.

Many of the reforms that have been undertaken in East Timor have been criticised as being too Dili-centric. The reformed governmental institutions are accused of having minimal outreach beyond Dili and are said to have little connection with traditional governance practices that still provide much of the social order in the country, especially in the rural areas. There has been a general lack of attention paid to the rural sector which is sliding further and further into poverty (Brown 2009: 150). If changes are not made to help

rehabilitate the rural sector and the wider population, poverty levels will continue to rise beyond the already alarming levels that they have been reached in East Timor.

Although this peacebuilding mission was classed as a success by the United Nations, the cracks in the process began to show by early 2006. In January of 2006, 400 soldiers went on strike, sighting east-west discrimination, ill treatment and poor conditions as the catalyst for this reaction. These soldiers were dismissed from the F-FDTL in early March of the same year. These soldiers remained disgruntled and at the end of April a demonstration by them turned violent. What had begun as a demonstration by members of the armed forces about internal problems, soon turned into a violent protest against the Alkatiri government. The police were not able to control the violence so the army were called in to re-establish law and order. The official death toll was five, but others alleged that up to 60 people had lost their lives. By June, as the conflict escalated, foreign peacekeeping forces were invited into the country to help restore law and order. This prolonged violence led to the resignation of the country's Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri (Palmer, Niner and Kent 2007: 1). The unrest continued into 2007, although there was some order restored along the way. The crisis severely damaged the capability of both the army and the police. This breakdown in law and order among the armed forces signifies the institutional weakness and lack of a cohesive framework for both forces (Call 2008: 297).

In this case it is clear that the weaknesses tend to outweigh the strengths of this peacebuilding process. While the United Nations may have succeeded in terms of their state-building agenda, a wider campaign of peacebuilding that focuses of community reconciliation and local capacity peacebuilding was not followed through. A further analysis of the relative success of this peacebuilding mission will be undertaken in *Chapter Seven*.

## Chapter Five

### The Policy of Peacebuilding in Bougainville

#### 5.1 Introduction

Bougainville is a small island that lies between Papua New Guinea to the west and the Solomon Islands to the east. With a population of approximately 200,000 people, while being relatively large in regional standard, this island holds little significance on the international stage. However, in the last 20 years it has been host to one of the deadliest conflicts in the region since the Second World War (Boege 2009: 29). The crisis in Bougainville began initially as a localised dispute between disgruntled employees of the Panguna Mine and those who ran it, but eventually snowballed into a full scale internal conflict which devastated much of Bougainville and lasted nearly 10 years. The triggers of the conflict stemmed from discontent among local landowners over the effects the mine was having on the local environment and the perceived inadequacy of compensation being received by locals in comparison to the profits being gained by the owners of the mine and the Papua New Guinea government. These disgruntled land owners eventually banded together to form the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). Their actions led to the closure of the mine, a service blockade to Bougainville and ongoing violence which lasted for nearly a decade. While this conflict was small on an international scale, in relation to the sparsely populated Pacific island, this incident became one of the most devastating conflicts in the region since World War II (Adams 2008: 63).

While various attempts were made to try to reconcile the parties, none were successful until New Zealand became involved for the second time in the peace process in 1997. This chapter follows the same structure as *Chapter Four*. It first outlines the main causes of the conflict and analyses what attempts were made to create peace between the Bougainvillean factions and Papua New Guinea. It then goes on to outline the successful efforts undertaken by New Zealand to facilitate a peace agreement between the parties, which set in motion a process of

peacebuilding in Bougainville. The process undertaken by New Zealand was ultimately successful because it prescribed a long term approach to building peace between the warring parties. An in-depth analysis of what made the mission an overall success will be undertaken in *Chapter Seven*.

## **5.2 Causes of the Conflict**

The initial catalyst of the Bougainville conflict was the external exploitation of natural resources in Bougainville and centres around the Panguna mine. The Panguna copper mine was established in 1979 by Australian owned company Bougainville Copper Limited at Panguna in central Bougainville. The mine was the cause of much unrest relating to the perceived unfair benefits that were being gained by both Australia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) at the expense of the Bougainvillan people and their environment (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008: 186). Although the most visible cause of the conflict was to do with land and the unequal extraction and distribution of resources and revenues there was an underlying ethnic component to this conflict. Bougainvilleans felt no allegiance to PNG; nonetheless, their calls for self-determination were met with violence not support.

For Bougainville, the late 1980's were signified by an uprising of discontent among local landowners over the degradation of the environment that the mine was causing, the loss of traditional land and the perceived inadequacy of compensation being received by locals (Henderson and Watson 2005: 459). Claims for compensation were made to the mine but when these were not met mine workers began to destroy mine property. These local landowner formed the basis of what was to become known as the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), part of a breakaway faction of the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA), which was formed in 1979 to facilitate between locals and the mining company. Francis Ona, a former driver at the mines, led the newly adapted PLA. In 1988 the BRA began orchestrating attacks against mining infrastructure, resulting in its eventual closure in May 1989 (Adams 2001: 26). As a result of these attacks a state of emergency was declared and police squads and military forces were brought in to help curb the violent backlash.

Landowners believed that the culture of Bougainville was being destroyed by having outsiders, more specifically those who were involved with the mine, present in the region. The need to breakaway was further fuelled by the fact that Bougainvilleans saw themselves as culturally and physically different from the people of PNG (McKinnon 1999: 22). In early 1990, fuelled by the mistreatment of Bougainvilleans that were suspected of supporting the BRA by the Papua New Guinean Defence Forces (PNGDF), a wide spread secessionist movement was established on Bougainville. Strengthened by this newfound support, Francis Ona announced a unilateral declaration of independence and moved to establish the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) (Henderson and Watson 2005: 460). This declaration of independence was not recognised by the PNG government, or by any other state in the international community (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 567).

The PNG government was unable to control the increasingly violent situation on Bougainville and in an attempt to help subdue it they implemented a service blockade and withdrew all security personnel from the region. The blockade prevented all import and export of goods to Bougainville and had a dire impact on health and education services. However, the violence was not only between PNG forces and the BRA. Opposition factions within Bougainville began to emerge in resistance to the BRA. The main group that formed was the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) who supported the PNGDF and emulated this support by demonstrating acts of violence against members of the BRA (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008: 186-187).

This crisis recorded the largest number of casualties in any South Pacific conflict since World War II. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people lost their lives during the conflict from both direct and indirect violence (McKinnon 1999: 22). The conflict caused severe trauma to those involved and had an incredibly disruptive impact on everyday life. The service blockade brought industry and infrastructure to a standstill, leading to major economic and societal degradation (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008: 187).

### **5.3 Initial Efforts to Resolve the Conflict**

There were many attempts undertaken to resolve the Bougainville conflict throughout the 1990s. Negotiations spanned over a period of nearly 13 years between 1988 and 2001. During this time some 46 major agreements were negotiated between and among the various parties that were involved the conflict throughout this period (Bowd 2009: 5). Although steps were taken towards resolution they were perhaps too narrow in their scope to be successful. Conflict settlement is not a rapid process. It takes time and commitment by those involved to reach an agreement that is mutually acceptable and provides for sustained cooperation and negotiation.

#### **5.3a Endeavour Accords**

One of the first conflict resolution initiatives is known as the '*Endeavour Accord*', and was undertaken by New Zealand. In July of 1990, New Zealand sent its naval vessel the HMSNZ Endeavour to Bougainville to act as a neutral venue where peace talks could take place between the PNG government and representatives from Bougainville. The agreement that was reached during these talks was supposed to lead to the restoration of services on Bougainville. However, disagreement over who would be involved in delivering those services hindered its final implementation (Rosanowski 2001: 75).

#### **5.3b Honiara Declaration**

The government of the Solomon Island also tried to undertake its own effort to resolve the Bougainville crisis. At the start of 1991 representatives of the PNG government and leaders from Bougainville all signed the '*Honiara Declaration*'. The provisions of this agreement were that, "the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) would be annulled, that services would be restored to Bougainville and that a truce would be supervised by a multinational supervisory team'. The supervisory team was also to be in charge of a weapons collections scheme and would grant amnesty to all BRA fighters who complied with the agreement. However, this initiative was also unsuccessful, as members of the BRA were reluctant to relinquish their arms (Rosanowski 2001: 75).

### 5.3c Sandline Affair

Yet another unsuccessful attempt to resolve the crisis on Bougainville is referred to as the '*Sandline Affair*'. In January of 1997, the then Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan made a secret arrangement with a private military consultancy firm called Sandline International, to use mercenaries to sort out the rebels on Bougainville. Sandline were supposed to train and accompany PNGDF troops on an operation to defeat the BRA and take back control of the Panguna mine (Rosanowski 2001: 79). This plan, however, was never launched for details of the operation were leaked to the public, who were adamantly against such measures being used. This misguided attempt at conflict resolution led to Sir Julius Chan stepping down from the position of prime minister (McKinnon 1999: 23).

In a working paper for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, author Reuben Bowd identifies that in this initial stage of conflict resolution attempts there were various factors that led to the failure in securing peace on Bougainville. These included:

- Lack of ripe moment: The conflict had not run its course yet as parties believed they could still resolve the conflict through use of force;
- Unwillingness to negotiate the main issues: The issue of the future of the political status of Bougainville keep being omitted from agreements;
- A continued failure to involve all parties: not all parties were recognised or represented in the early stages of the peace process;
- Spoilers: The early attempts at peace were thwarted by the presence of spoilers, including factions of the PNG defence force and elements of the BRA and BIG;
- Lack of motivation to negotiate: For much of the crisis PNG still believed the conflict could be resolved through a military solution (Bowd 2009: 10-12).

The second phase of the peace process, 1997-2001, however was characterised by a significant number of breakthroughs which led to the establishment of peace on Bougainville. This phase began with the Burnham peace talks. These talks, which were facilitated by New Zealand, overcame many of the problems and downfalls of earlier attempts to facilitate peace between the parties. One breakthrough that was made was the realisation that there was not just one Bougainvillean faction, but many different groups within society that had different motives, aspiration and positions in the conflict. It was recognised that reconciliation between the different Bougainvillean factions was needed before any attempt at negotiations with the Papua New Guinean Government could be made. This was accomplished at Burnham for the first round of talks were only among representatives from the different Bougainvillean factions to try to establish a common Bougainvillean position. It was only after this had been achieved that talks were held between representatives from Bougainville and those representing the Papua New Guinea Government (Wolfers 2006: 6).

#### **5.4 Burnham and Beyond**

It was in July 1997 that peace initiatives in Bougainville took a turn for the better. After many failed attempts to try to resolve the Bougainville conflict, the first step toward future peace was solidified at Burnham Military Camp in Christchurch, New Zealand. The way these peace talks were undertaken, who was included and the pace at which it was achieved are all aspects that contributed to its success. It is because of these elements that this process can be said to be in line with an overall policy of peacebuilding and not just solely conflict resolution or settlement. The Burnham peace talks were a forward thinking approach that made long-term plans and arrangements and not just short-term goals.

After failed attempts at reconciliation such as the *Endeavour Accord*, New Zealand decided a new approach was needed to help resolve the Bougainville conflict. New Zealand realised that for the outcome of any resolution attempts to not only be successful but also sustainable the parties would have to work towards creating a solution themselves, not having one forced upon them by an outside actor (Hayes 2005: 143). New Zealand's aim was to create a neutral and secure environment for talks between the opposing parties to take place. New Zealand



decided it needed to act as a supporting third party and not an active mediator facilitating discussions. The Burnham talks were orchestrated by the then New Zealand Foreign Minister Don McKinnon.

The first round of talks began on July 5 1997. These first set of talks were between various Bougainvillean factions. Its purpose was to create some kind of unity in the Bougainvillean position. This gave the representatives of the different Bougainvillean factions a chance to talk amongst themselves and resolve the differences they had with each other, before tackling the grievances they had with Papua New Guinea. Those who were included in the talks were representatives of the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG), the BRA-BIG, the resistance and Bougainville's four members of parliament (Rosanowski 2001: 189). The talks were successfully completed on Friday 18<sup>th</sup> of July. During the time at Burnham, the delegates participated in social activities such as sightseeing trips. This gave them a chance to interact without the pressure of a more formal setting. It was such interactions that were the backbone to building greater trust and confidence between all those involved. It was at the conclusion of this first round of talks that the Burnham Declaration was drawn up. As part of this agreement the signatories "recognised the importance of unity and reconciliation between the divided Bougainvillean people". They also "acknowledged the desirability of the development of a process for negotiation between Bougainville leaders and the PNG government to bring about an end to the war" (Rosanowski 2001: 194).

The second round of Burnham talks were held at the beginning of October 1997. Burnham II was to also include representatives of PNG, and act as the next step on from what had been achieved during the July round at Burnham. This round was more formal and included more officials. The agenda of the talks included the establishment of a truce on the island and also organisation for future talks to be had between the parties. The talks concluded with the signing of an agreement known as the Burnham Truce. According to the agreement "the PNG government, the BTG, the resistance, the BIG and the BRA recognised the desirability of taking immediate positive measures to end the armed conflict, to promote peace and reconciliation, to encourage the restoration of services and to actuate a return to normalcy by all parties" (Rosanowski 2001: 199).

## 5.5 Conflict Summary

<b>Conflict Type</b>	Internal armed conflict
<b>Incompatibility</b>	Resources, Self-determination
<b>Duration</b>	1989-1997
<b>Parties in Conflict</b>	Papua New Guinea, BRA
<b>External Intervention</b>	Truce Monitoring Force 1997  Peace Monitoring Force 1998-2003
<b>Conflict Resolution Attempts</b>	Endeavour Accords 1990 (unsuccessful)  Honiara Declaration 1991 (unsuccessful)  Cairns Talks 1995 (unsuccessful)  Sandline Affair 1997 (unsuccessful)  Burnham Peace Talks 1997 (successful)
<b>UN Involvement</b>	United Nations Observer Mission to Bougainville 1998
<b>Peace Agreements</b>	Burnham Truce 1997  Lincoln Agreement Concerning Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville 1998  Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001
<b>Fatalities</b>	Approximately 10,000 lives lost
<b>Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons</b>	Approximately 50,00 displaced persons

Table 5.1 Conflict Summary: Bougainville (UCDP database 2010; Downer 2001)

## 5.6 Peacebuilding in Bougainville

The next section of this chapter is going to analyse the peacebuilding activities that were undertaken in Bougainville after the post-conflict settlement had been reached at Burnham. It is going to be set out using the dimensions of the framework from *Chapter Two*. After an analysis of the various peacebuilding dimensions that were focused on in Bougainville, the chapter will conclude with an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the peacebuilding mission in Bougainville.

### 5.6a Security Sector Reform

The Burnham Truce was the first real concrete step in the direction of peace on Bougainville since the beginning of the conflict in 1989. The truce was not formally a cease-fire agreement but provisions were made so that it would eventually lead to the creation of one. It was agreed that the parties who took part in Burnham II would make recommendations to the PNG government for the authorisation of a regional peacekeeping group to be invited to Bougainville to help monitor the provisions of the truce (Rosanowski 2001: 199). This force was to become known as the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG). The TMG were to be an unarmed force made up of participants from various Pacific nations. The mandate of the TMG was to “monitor and report on the parties’ compliance with the truce, to promote confidence in the peace process by its presence and interaction with the community, and to provide information to the Bougainvilleans on the truce and the peace process” (Regan 2008: 193). The TMG was made up of personnel from New Zealand, Australia, Vanuatu and Fiji and commenced their time on Bougainville in November 1997. The TMG was in force for only five months, but was then replaced by a regional Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), which finally withdrew from Bougainville in 2003 (Adams 2001: 10, 31).

The next step towards decreasing violence came about in January 1998 with the signing of the *Lincoln Agreement Concerning Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville*. In terms of stopping violence, the agreement provided for “an extension of the truce and

continued presence of the TMG until April 1998; a permanent cease-fire; a phased withdrawal of the PNGDF...and the deployment of a UN Observer Mission to Bougainville (UNOMB)” (May 2005: 462).

The Bougainville Peace Agreement which was drawn up in 2001, and is mentioned in more detail later in this chapter, made another important step forward in establishing improved security in Bougainville. One of the three main aspects of this agreement was weapons disposal. This agreement outlined a three staged weapons disposal process that was to be undertaken before any steps towards greater autonomy could be put in place. Weapons disposal, along with the other aspects of this agreement, is covered in more detail in the **Governmental Reform** section.

### **5.6b Trust and Confidence Building Measures**

The way in which the peace process was undertaken was the backbone to building increased trust and confidence between all the opposing factions. The fact that New Zealand led the way and coordinated the Burnham meetings was a deliberate act. Trust and confidence in the third party is just as important as trust and confidence between warring factions. Bougainville accepted New Zealand as an impartial third party. The same cannot be said about Australia, and this is why their participation came at a later stage. Australia was regarded with suspicion and apprehension in Bougainville because of their close historical ties with Papua New Guinea. It was also an Australian company, Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA), who was the owner of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) and it was BCL that operated the Panguna mine, the initial catalyst of the ten-year conflict. Australia agreed that New Zealand was seen as neutral by all the parties involved so did not take part in the peace process until 1998, when it became part of the TMG (Regan 2008: 188-189).

Another way in which trust between members of society was re-established was the use of customary dispute resolution mechanisms, which focused less on punishment of the perpetrators and more on the “restoration of social harmony among the conflict parties”. The

way in which this is achieved is that the “perpetrators have to confess, they have to take responsibility for their wrongdoings and admit their faults, they have to apologise to the ones they have wronged and ask for forgiveness; victims have to develop a willingness to forgive and to reconcile; on this basis parties can overcome hate and mistrust and achieve reconciliation; and finally justice”. This reconciliation is finalised by the exchanged of gifts which act as compensation for the wrongdoings and is a visible sign of this move towards rebuilding of harmonious relationships within society (Boege 2006: 9).

### **5.6c Governmental Reform**

#### ***Bougainville Reconciliation Government***

The Bougainville Reconciliation Government (BRG) was established on January 1 1999. Its creation was outlined in the Lincoln Agreement. The BRG was established to “provide an agreed political framework through which the parties and other participants in previous conflicts can cooperate in providing good government for Bougainville”. The main aims of the BRG were to strengthening the peace process, work towards a political settlement, undertake reconciliation activities with the assistance of civil society groups and keep the public up to date about plans for restoration and development (Bougainville Reconciliation Government 1998). The BRG had both legislative and executive arms and was structured to be broadly representative of the people of Bougainville.

#### ***Bougainville Peace Agreement***

The most significant agreement that was aimed towards governmental reform and the more serious question of the future political status of Bougainville did not come into force until late 2001. The *Bougainville Peace Agreement* was signed in Arawa on 30<sup>th</sup> August 2001 (May 2005: 462). This agreement was based on three pillars and was to signify the basis of a comprehensive political settlement for Bougainville. The three pillars were autonomy, the referendum on independence and weapons disposal.

### *Autonomy*

This agreement provided the Bougainville government with a higher degree of autonomy. This new level of autonomy allows the Bougainville government to have its own public service and control over police and prison services. As a result of this agreement Bougainville is allowed to legislate its own criminal code, but it has to be in line with national PNG governmental standards (May 2005: 463). The new constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville was also created. It outlined the power and responsibilities of the new Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG).

### *The Referendum*

The *Bougainville Peace Agreement* provided arrangements for a future referendum to be held to consider Bougainville's political status, with full independence from PNG to be posed as an option. It is not to be held for at least ten years after the autonomous government has been established and "when weapons disposal has been fully implemented and good governance has been achieved" (May 2005: 463).

### *Weapons Disposal*

Weapons disposal is the third and final pillar of the *Bougainville Peace Agreement*. The Agreement sets out a three-stage process for this to be achieved.

1. "The withdrawal of RPNGC (Royal PNG Constabulary) and PNGDF personnel and the placing of weapons surrendered by combatants in secure containers controlled by local BRA and BRF commanders;
2. The movement of weapons to more central containers jointly controlled by local BRA/BRF commanders and UNOMB (United Nations Observer Mission on Bougainville);
3. The final stage envisages the removal of all weapons" (May 2005: 464).

Weapons disposal is possibly the hardest area in which to rally support. Security concerns were still high even in 2001 in Bougainville so asking people to give up their weapons was always going to encounter some opposition. To provide an incentive it was agreed that

arrangements concerning autonomy would not be put in place until stage two of the weapons disposal was completed. This was done in 2003 (May 2005: 464). As a result of the completion of stage two of the weapons disposal, arrangements concerning autonomy were begun. A Bougainville Constitution was drafted in 2003. However, its finalisation and implementation were somewhat slow to eventuate. It seemed that there was a certain amount of reluctance on the part of the PNG government to accept the realities of Bougainvillean autonomy.

### ***Bougainville Constituent Assembly***

The new constitution was drafted by the Bougainville Constitutional Commission (BCC) between 2002 and 2004 and was adopted by the Bougainville Constituent Assembly (BCA) on the 12<sup>th</sup> of November, 2004. It was then brought into force by the national Papua New Guinea government in early 2005. The drafting of the constitution was a highly inclusive process and several drafts were presented to the people for discussion before it was adopted by the BCA (Boege 2006: 19)

The first elections for the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) were held in May 2005. Elections were conducted from 20 May to 2 June. These resulted in the democratic election of a 39 member government on 15 June 2005 (Bowd 2009: 18). Joseph Kabui became the first Bougainvillean president. The capabilities of the ABG were outlined in the Bougainville Peace Agreement. These stated that Bougainville “has the right to establish an independent administration, judiciary, police and correctional system, which are subject solely to the control of the ABG”. However, the Papua New Guinean government remains in control of “defence, foreign relations, immigration, highly migratory and straddling fish stocks, central banking, currency, international civil aviation, international shipping, international trade, posts and telecommunications” (Boege 2006: 18). This shows that while Bougainville has been liberated in some areas, it still remains until the central control of PNG in others. The ABG, however, lacks strong administrative capacity making its ability to govern effectively and efficiently a slow process.

## **5.6d Judicial Reform**

A strong judicial system is the corner stone to successful state building. The Bougainville Constitution was at the centre of the restructuring and rehabilitation of the Bougainville judicial system. The judicial system, like so many other areas of the new autonomous government, shows a strong correlation between traditional practices and modern state-building activities. The ABG stressed the need to “build on what was happening on the village level and to build the capacity of Bougainvilleans to implement and manage the new judicial system” (ICJ Australia 2010).

As noted earlier there was a significant focus placed on reconciliation and restoration of relationships and not just on the punishment of crimes. The emphasis is on restorative justice. Making those admit their wrongdoing and working towards rebuilding stronger and more harmonious relationships between those involved are the main aims of Bougainville’s new justice system (Boege 2006: 21). The reason why the inclusion of traditional customs into the judicial system was so well supported and has been successful, is that the structure of a modern (Western) judicial system is somewhat of an alien concept to many in the Pacific. Traditional structures of justice have always been of special significance in Bougainville so therefore their inclusion in the new judicial system of the autonomous region was of particular importance to the people of Bougainville.

## **5.6e Economic Reform**

There were significant donor funds that were allocated to the peace process in Bougainville. Humanitarian assistance during the conflict and in the early stages of the peace process was generally well targeted. The focus on rehabilitation and small scale projects helped to restore basic services such as health and education in many areas. This assistance did, however, have somewhat of a negative effect in the community as well. Allowances and financial benefits were offered to those Bougainvilleans who were playing a part in the peace process. However, such offers led to payments becoming a necessity for people became reluctant to take part unless they received some kind of financial compensation. This fostered an attitude of dependence for it formed a misperception that there were unlimited donor funds allocated



to the peace process in Bougainville. This kind of dependence and expectation of hand-outs undermines any efforts aimed towards fiscal self-reliance (Brown 2007: 106).

After his election in 2005, President Joseph Kabui reiterated that fact that Bougainville was still too dependent of foreign assistance. The Papua New Guinea government subsidised 64 percent of Bougainville's 2005 revenue with donor countries making up a further 34 percent. He was saddened to think that Bougainville could only raise two percent of what was needed to run its own affairs. This type of reliance does not bode well for the future as independence is only viable when Bougainville becomes financially self-sufficient. President Kabui believes that the economy is too limited and too reliant of copra and cocoa crops. This narrow scope of exportable products is not only a problem in Bougainville, but remains to be a significant weakness of many Pacific Island nations. Mining could be resumed as a way of increasing Government revenue but this idea is not widely supported as it was the source of the past violence in Bougainville (Radio New Zealand 2010). While peace agreements relating to this conflict have been very successful at addressing the wider issues and concerns over identity, they have left the trigger of the conflict, the mine, to be dealt with at a later stage (Adams 2008: 77).

#### **5.6f Community Education and Reconciliation**

Community education and involvement was significant during the peacebuilding process in Bougainville. The Bougainville peace process was a "bottom-up" approach. The whole society was involved in the process, with ex-combatants leading the way in discussions and activities to help build a stronger and more sustainable peace on Bougainville. Grassroots organisation such as women's and church groups have had a significant role in helping to build peace among the Bougainvillean people (May 2005: 466). The Church is an important institution in the everyday lives of the people of Bougainville. The Church can act as a bridge between opposing factions and as a neutral mediator who is not seen as a threat or as having its own agenda in the conflict.

One significant women’s group during the time of the Bougainville conflict was the Bougainville Inter-Church Women’s Forum (BICWF) which was established in 1995. They had four main objectives, which were:

- “To establish better cooperation and a working relationship between churches;
- To develop a unified stance on human rights and justice issues;
- To encourage women to take a leading role in the search for a genuine and peaceful solutions to the conflict; and
- To develop plans and a program for a peaceful Bougainville” (Tankunani Sirivi and Taleo Havini 2004: 96).

The BICWF formed strong working groups throughout Bougainville’s various districts and put in place concrete plans for establishing a lasting solution to the conflict. One significant aspect of the conflict that they were involved in was halting the Sandline Affair. A delegation of women from the organisation went to Port Moresby with a petition that was to be presented to the Prime Minister’s First Secretary that urged the Government not to involve the Sandline Company and search instead for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Alongside this official action they continued to plan community development projects and also build links with NGO partners from overseas. Their actions helped to enhance community involvement in the peace process and stimulate the participation of women, who had suffered greatly during the conflict (Tankunani Sirivi and Taleo Havini 2004: 97).

## 5.7 Summary of Peacebuilding Activities

Dimensions	Actors	Activities
<b>Stop Violence</b>	<b>TMC</b>	Peacekeeping  Monitoring compliance with the true, promote confidence in the peace process in the community, providing information about the peace process

	<b>BPA</b>	Weapons disposal
<b>Trust and Confidence Building Measures</b>	<b>New Zealand</b>	Burnham peace talks- focus on reconciliation between all parties involved  Undertook process in a way that was acceptable to those involved
<b>Governmental Reform</b>	<b>BRG</b>  <b>Bougainville Constituent Assembly</b>  <b>BPA</b>  <b>ABG</b>	Strengthen peace process, work towards a political settlement and undertake reconciliation activities  Review, debate and approve the proposed constitution  Provided Bougainville government with a higher degree of autonomy  Provided arrangements for a future referendum on Bougainville's political status  Elections held in May 2005
<b>Judicial Reform</b>	<b>BPA</b>	Establishment of the Bougainville Constitution
<b>Economic Reform</b>	<b>International</b>	Provision of significant economic assistance

	<b>donors</b>	
<b>Community Education and Reconciliation</b>	<b>BICWF</b>	<p>Established better cooperation between churches</p> <p>Formed working groups and put in place plans for establishing lasting solutions to the conflict</p> <p>Community development and community involvement in the peace process-especially fostered the involvement of women</p>

**Table 5.2 Summary of Peacebuilding activities in Bougainville**

## **5.8 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Process**

Possibly the greatest strength of the peacebuilding process in Bougainville was that it was a bottom-up approach that was inclusive of a wide range of society. Each step, from Burnham onwards, was directed by the people involved and not imposed on them by outside forces. Trust and confidence building measures took priority in the initial stages of the peace process. It was only after trust had been established, not only between the parties but also within them, that any other issues were brought to the table. The strong foundation this created was crucial to its overall success. Wide community involvement on both sides helped to facilitate greater support of peacebuilding activities and acceptance of the overall peace process (May 2005: 466). Another aspect related to the importance of building trust and confidence between those involved in the peace process was that fact that the TMG and the PMG were unarmed. This was a necessary precursor for the force being allowed on Bougainville. While there were worries about the safety of the force, the benefits that came from being unarmed overshadowed these fears

The agreements that were drawn up not only after Burnham but on other subsequent occasions were future focused. They put an emphasis on ongoing consultation and future requirements. This meant that parties were kept on track well beyond the initial implementation of the agreements. This aspect is of significant importance in terms of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding in post-conflict society is about looking towards creating a more prosperous and peaceful future in war-torn communities. While many interventions focus on establishing peace, there is often not enough of a long term focus or more importantly long term commitment from those initially involved. In Bougainville this was not the case. Those involved, especially New Zealand, maintained an ongoing interest and dedication to the peace process long after their initial facilitation of talks at Burnham. This provided not only continuity in approach for those involved but helped to solidify the trust of the parties and made future agreements develop smoothly and be implemented with greater ease.

Another positive aspect of this approach was that a significant effort was made by all involved to draw on traditional models and incorporate them into the new system, rather than just trying to impose a Western approach to state-building on the people. While the organisation of the new autonomous region may seem fragmented and somewhat incomplete to western observers, the structure is one that is supported and seen as highly legitimate by the local people.

Although this peacebuilding process, such as was the case in East Timor, was applauded as a success, it did still possess some weaknesses. One significant weakness in the post-conflict phase is the fragile economy and ongoing dependence on donors. Economic reform is one of the most significant activities to be undertaken during the peacebuilding process. If a stable economy cannot be established in the early stages and is slow in becoming financially self-reliant huge pressure is put on those external parties involved to foot the bill. This is what has happened in the case of Bougainville. Nearly a decade on since the peace talks in Burnham, the economy is still weak in Bougainville and donor dependence remains high. This continued dependence is not healthy in terms of future plans for independence.

## **Chapter Six**

### **The Policy of Peacebuilding in the Solomon Islands**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

The Solomon Islands is a former British Protectorate that is located to the east of Papua New Guinea. The country is made up of a large chain of islands and has a population of just over half a million people. (BBC News Website 2010). Peace and stability in the Solomon Islands took a severe turn for the worst in the late 1990s. What began as unrest between the people from Malaita and Guadalcanal escalated into a conflict that divided the society and wrecked havoc throughout the Solomon Islands. Social tensions, feelings of inequality and economic hardship fuelled the outbreak of violence in the Solomon Islands. While attempts were made to try to contain the conflict, none were successful. This was until the intervention of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, RAMSI. What is different about this case compared to the two previous cases that have been covered is that RAMSI is still present in the Solomon Islands, and even though the violence has been subdued, the country still remains very unstable.

The purpose of this chapter is to review RAMSI, the post-conflict mission being undertaken in the Solomon Islands, and determine whether or not it can be truly classified as being peacebuilding. This will be done, as was done in the previous two chapters, by first giving an overview of the conflict that occurred before RAMSI intervened. It will outline the causes of the conflict, which parties were involved and what was done in the lead up to RAMSI's intervention to try to curb the violence between the warring factions. This will be followed by a breakdown of the RAMSI mission, what its purpose was in the Solomon Islands and how it went about achieving this. The final section of this chapter will be an analysis of what more needs to be done in the Solomon Islands before RAMSI withdraws so that it can constitute a true peacebuilding mission. For the mission to successfully build long term peace in the

Solomon Islands certain dimensions of the peacebuilding framework need significantly more attention before RAMSI can contemplate full withdrawal from the country.

## **6.2 Conflict in the Solomon Islands**

### **6.2a Background to the Conflict**

The conflict on the Solomon Islands that occurred between 1998 and 2003 mirrored much of the conflict that has taken place in the Pacific region since decolonisation in the 1960's. As with many other Pacific nations, independence brought with it a rural-urban shift. Many people from the densely populated island of Malaita moved to other areas such as Guadalcanal where the capital city, Honiara, was located (Henderson and Watson 2005: 402). The population of Guadalcanal increased from 195, 000 in 1978 to 450,000 by 2000.

Social and economic pressures were at a critical level in the lead up to the outbreak of conflict in the Solomon Islands in 1998. Poor economic development had plagued the country since independence. Those on Guadalcanal felt like they should be compensated for allowing the influx of Malaitans coming to their islands and also allowing the capital city to be situated on Guadalcanal as well. The Governor of Guadalcanal, Ezekiel Alebua, demanded that all lands that were occupied, rented or purchased by Malaitans be returned to the people of Guadalcanal. Militia groups began arming themselves in Guadalcanal and forcing Malaitans off the island. Hordes of people began evacuating in the face of this armed intimidation which was mainly perpetrated by young Guadalcanal men. This group came to be known as the Guadalcanal Revolution Army (GRA), later changing its name to the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM). In opposition to this insurgency and because of frustration at the lack of response from the government, some Malaitans banded together to form the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF) and began to attack IFM strongholds and villages. The flood of Malaitan refugees mostly ended up in Honiara or back on the island of Malaita. This sudden influx of people put enormous pressure on the local resources of these settlements, which in turn

fuelled further unrest. By 1999 it was estimated that around 35,000 people had been displaced from their homes and communities. The unrest was attempted to be contained by the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIP) and its paramilitary wing, the Police Field Force (PFF). However, the police force's impartiality was somewhat questionable for the majority of its personnel were ethnic Malaitans. The RSIP was considered to be practically another unit of the MEF by many on Guadalcanal (Henderson and Watson 2005: 403-404, 413).

An initial attempt at conflict resolution was made in 1999, under the auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat, by Fiji coup leader Major Sitiveni Rabuka. He was sent to the Solomon Islands to try to facilitate talks between the IFM and the Solomon Island government. His visit resulted in the creation of two agreements, the Honiara Peace Accord and the Panatina Agreement. Both agreements eventually failed. The main reasons for this failure were the lack of inclusion of Malaitan groups in discussions and Rabuka's lack of authority as a mediator (Henderson and Watson 2005: 404).

## **6.2b The 2000 Coup**

The MEF continued to place pressure on the government with their demands for compensation for the damages inflicted by the IFM. When these demands were not delivered the MEF decided to take action against the government itself (Adams 2008: 101). In early June 2000, the MEF, supported by members of the police, took over the police armoury in Honiara, forced Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'ulu to resign and took control of the government. A few weeks later, parliament met and elected Manasseh Sogavare as the new prime minister. Once installed in parliament, Sogavare announced a 100-day plan to "restore law and order and promote economic recovery" (Henderson and Watson 2005: 403-404).

After the election of Sogavare, Australia and New Zealand proceeded to revive efforts to bring the militant groups to the negotiation table. In August of 2000, Australia orchestrated talks between the two groups on board an Australian naval vessel. These talks concluded in



the signing of a ceasefire agreement. The provisions of this agreement required the MEF and IFM to “lay down their arms and refrain from hostile, offensive, insulting or provocative behaviour”. A Ceasefire Monitoring Council (CMC) was set up to enforce and monitor the conditions of the agreement and report any breaches. The initial period of the ceasefire was to be 90 days and was to be extended if necessary. However, before this period was up breaches were reported on both sides (Dinnen 2002: 290).

### **6.2c Townsville Peace Agreement**

Talks took place later that year in Townsville, Australia to try to broker some kind of peace agreement for the Solomon Islands. These talks concluded with the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA). This Agreement called for “the surrender of weaponry, greater ethnic equality in appointments to the security forces and an amnesty for members of the IMF and MEF”. An International Peace Monitoring Group was established to oversee the disarmament process. Although there was some decrease in tensions after the implementation of the TPA, disarmament was generally unsuccessful for lack of incentives offered to militants for compliance with disarmament provisions (Fraenkel 2004: 99, 205). The lack of disarmament continued to be a source of trouble for there was extensive proliferation of small arms on the island. This fear of the gun stood in the way of community-based peace initiatives. Although disarmament provisions could help to take weapons off the street, such action did not remedy the deeper societal problem of the total collapse of law and order in the Solomon Islands. Corruption was evident at all levels of government and throughout the civil services, people lost faith in the security forces and the government. It was because of this inherent state failure that the new Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza requested outside assistance (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008: 3).

Although there were repeated calls for assistance from the Solomon Islands government, Australia, while offering advice and financial support, refused to physically step in, retaining their position of non-intervention in the Pacific. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer announced in January 2003 that “sending in Australian troops to occupy Solomon

Islands would be folly to the extreme... The real show stopper is that it would not work... The fundamental problem is that foreigners do not have the answers for the deep-seated problems afflicting Solomon Islands.” However, only six months later, Downer revoked this statement and announced Australia’s plans for a military intervention in the Solomon Islands, stating that the “unrest had forced Australia to produce a new Pacific policy involving nation rebuilding and cooperative intervention” (Henderson and Watson 2005: 413).

Poor governance was a not only a major cause of conflict in the Solomon Islands, but also a hindrance to its resolution. Successive incompetent and corrupt governments stood in the way of any possible development or financial growth during the conflict, further contributing to the weakness of the state. The ongoing conflict impacted heavily on the economy, not only because of the violence that cut off trade but also because companies began to withdraw from the Solomon Islands because of it. This led to both a loss of revenue and employment in the Solomon Islands (Hegarty, May, Regan, Dinnen, Nelson and Duncan 2004: 6).

International donors reduced the amount of aid being given to the Solomon Islands for they were unwilling to continue to prop-up the corrupt regime. During the time of the crisis Taiwan provided the Solomon Islands with substantial loans and grants. This however, was in return for diplomatic recognition, a precursor to financial assistance from Taiwan and China alike (Moore 2004: 195). This sort of bilateral ‘aid’ is frowned upon by other powers in the region such as the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT). DFAT stated that “Australia opposes such chequebook diplomacy because... we have made a very considerable effort to address governance issues... [and we] see chequebook diplomacy directly undermining the efforts that we have made” (Atkinson 2009: 52).

### 6.3 Conflict Summary

<b>Conflict Type</b>	Internal armed conflict
<b>Incompatibility</b>	Territory, ethnicity
<b>Duration</b>	1998-2003

<b>Parties</b>	MEF, IFM and Solomon Islands Government
<b>External Interventions</b>	RAMSI 2003
<b>Conflict Resolution Attempts</b>	Ulufa'alu Government, Papua New Guinea 1998 (unsuccessful)  Commonwealth Secretariat (the Honiara Peace Accords and the Panatina Agreement) 1999 (unsuccessful)  Townsville Peace Talks 2000 (unsuccessful)
<b>UN Involvement</b>	N/A
<b>Peace Agreements</b>	Townsville Peace Agreement 2000 (unsuccessful)
<b>Fatalities</b>	Around 200 deaths
<b>Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons</b>	Approximately 35,000 displaced persons

**Table 6.1 Conflict Summary: Solomon Islands (UCDP Database 2010; Hameiri 2007: 410)**

#### **6.4 RAMSI: Peacebuilding or Neo-colonial Reassertion?**

The situation in the Solomon Islands at the time of intervention is best articulated in a comment by Mark Otter. He stated that:

“Solomon Islands is in a perilous state...The government is bankrupt, development has stalled, investment has ceased and the economy is at an all time low. Lawlessness is rife on the streets of Honiara where ‘order’ is maintained through the barrel of a

gun. The police force is incapable and unwilling to maintain law and order. Solomon Islands is a failed state. Its future is bleak” (Otter cited in Moore 2004: 177).

The Australian-led ‘cooperative intervention’ mission was known as the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The mission derives its legitimacy from the fact that its intervention was requested by the Solomon Islands government and that it was, in theory anyway, a regional mission (Weiders 2004: 140).

#### **6.4a Australia Steps In**

In the words of the then Prime Minister John Howard, the force was designed to “arrest this downward spiral, which if not addressed could result in the total collapse of the Solomon Islands’ governance and sovereignty...A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the people of the Solomons’, but could also pose a significant security risk for the whole region” (Hameiri 2007: 410). This reaction and justification by Prime Minister John Howard shows that intervention is often prompted as much by self-interest as it is by humanitarian awareness. Geographical proximity was an important factor for certain spill over effects from the conflict would have impacted on Australia, such as movement of refugees. The final decision to intervene was in reaction to the threat of what effect instability would have on Australia and the wider region as much as it was to do with the effect it was having on the Solomon Islanders themselves (Wainwright 2003: 490).

The Pacific Islands Forum also came on board with their support. Their justification was embedded in the principles of the Biketawa Declaration, signed in 2000, which provided for “a regional response when developments within a member country raised issues for the region as a whole”. The Solomon Islands government were also in agreement with the intervention and made this stance official when they passed legislation in parliament which approved the intervention, and allowed for it to enter the country (McDougall 2004: 218). This legislation also gave RAMSI personnel immunity under Solomon Islands law.

## 6.4b RAMSI's Mission

RAMSI is constructed around three main pillars: law and justice, economic reform and machinery of government (Morgan and McLeod 2006: 419). After outlining what was undertaken during the various phases of RAMSI's operation, a closer investigation can be made into whether this mission can be classified as peacebuilding or not and what improvements need to be made to set it on the path towards durable and sustainable peace.

### *Phase One:*

The first phase of RAMSI focused on the restoration of law and order in the Solomon Islands. The initial intervention was led by a police force made up of approximately 300 police, drawn mostly from Australia but also New Zealand and other Forum member nations (**Table 6.2**). This force was to be known as the Participatory Police Force (PPF) and they were able to swiftly restore security without any bloodshed (Dinnen and Firth 2008: 12). A 21-day amnesty was announced on arrival of RAMSI which was to cover charges relating to the possession of weapons. By the end of this amnesty period, RAMSI declared that over 3,700 guns had been surrendered (Fraenkel 2004: 169).

<b>Country of Origin</b>	<b>Police Personnel</b>	<b>Military Personnel</b>
Australia	196	1,379
New Zealand	33	240
Fiji	15	121
Papua New Guinea	-	83
Samoa	15	-
Tonga	10	35

Kiribati	5	-
Cook Islands	2	-
<b>Total</b>	276	1,858

**Table 6.2 Initial Police and Military Deployment under RAMSI (Fraenkel 2004: 167)**

By the end of 2003, over 1,300 people had been arrested, including key militant leaders and 25 police officers. However, the courts were struggling to process all these convictions. Gaining evidence and persuading witnesses to testify was plagued with difficulty. People were scared of the repercussions from getting involved, which they believed would be felt after the withdrawal of the intervention force (Fraenkel 2004: 175). This backlog has been eased somewhat with RAMSI personnel providing free legal advice and representation for those charged, usually those who had committed criminal offences. The help and support of RAMSI has strengthened the justice system so that it can more effectively deal with cases. RAMSI have also helped with reconstruction of prison services in the Solomon Islands. This includes both the training of prison personnel and the improvements to prison infrastructure and equipment (RAMSI Website 2009).

This phase, overall, has been highly successful. Its success is in a large part due to the wide support RAMSI received from the Solomon Islands people at the time of the intervention. Law and order had improved markedly, which has helped restore normality of movement to the region and also encourage the return of investors, which has been a great boost to the severely weakened economy. RAMSI have also undertaken reforms of the RSIP, which was involved in much of the unrest when it acted alongside the MEF. Corrupt and ill-disciplined officers have been removed from the RSIP force. These reforms have helped to restore some confidence back in to the police, and the wider legal and judicial systems (Leua Nanua 2008: 150).

### ***Phase Two:***

The second phase of the mission was aimed at broader state reconstruction and capacity building. RAMSI aimed to strengthen the failing state before it totally collapsed. One difference between this mission and others such as East Timor was that, even though it was weak, there was still a functioning government to work alongside in the Solomon Islands. One way in which RAMSI approached this phase was to install in line appointments of RAMSI personnel in Treasury, Finance and Health.

RAMSI also made inroads with reform of the security and justice sector. RAMSI police began to work with local forces. There was large scale reform of the Solomon Islands Police Force (SIPF), which included the removal of approximately a quarter of the force. Although this sort of reform seemed necessary, such an approach was to be problematic. Many of those removed were senior officers, their removal led to a weakening of the knowledge and authority base of the SIPF. Although these reforms and reconstruction of the forces was a necessary step towards a new law enforcement culture in the Solomon Islands, it was also somewhat of a step back at the same time (Moore 2007: 145).

This phase is likely to be more time consuming and a lot less straightforward than the disarmament initiatives. This is because of the long history of corruption at all levels of government and a general lack of trust and confidence in state institutions by the people of the Solomon Islands (Roughan 2003: 2). Rehabilitation of the public service will be a long and arduous process, for much of the corruption is entrenched in the political culture of the Solomon Islands. There had been limited implementation of checks and balances on the country's leadership and political elites (Moore 2004: 222). Why the corruption has become so entrenched relates back to cultural and societal norms in the Solomon Islands. This concept is known as *wantokism*. This term literally means 'one talk', meaning "from the same language and implies giving preference to kin in the expectation of a series of reciprocal obligations being fulfilled". This could in some instances help to strengthen relationships in the community but can also have negative implications when preference and favouritism are given in the political realm (Moore 2008: 392). This favouritism is most significant during

the election period. Political parties in the Solomon Islands are fluid entities and loyalty to ones party can be easily bought and sold.

The economy was totally stagnant at the time of intervention and had been for much of duration of the conflict. Logging, which had contributed to almost half of government earning in the mid-1990s, had been undertaken in an unsustainable manner that provided minimal lasting benefits to the country. Stabilising the country's economic capacity was to be a major task for RAMSI. To help re-invigorate the economy, and also to weed out corrupt officers, RAMSI installed members of its own civilian team in various posts within the Ministry of Finance. RAMSI has been working with the Solomon Islands Government to "strengthen financial management systems, to encourage broad-based economic growth and create a more prosperous Solomon Islands". With the re-establishment of greater law and order in the country importing and exporting has been able to reconvene and foreign investment in the country in increasing. Economic reforms have been undertaken by the Solomon Islands government, in partnership with RAMSI, in the areas of "taxation, transport (including aviation and shipping), industry revitalisation and simplifying regulatory requirement"(RAMSI Website 2009). Significant progress has been made in strengthening government revenues and restoring the stability of government finances. Government revenues increased by around 170 percent during the first three years of RAMSI.

RAMSI's Machinery of Government program is an essential part of RAMSI's agenda in the Solomon Islands. This program has helped to improve the function of government so that it provides better services to the Solomon Islands people. One important aspect of this program is the four-day induction session for Members of Parliament (MP). Experts from around the region were brought in to educate new MPs on what it means to be an MP, procedures of parliament, constituency relations, parliamentary scrutiny, ethics and communication. The track record of the Solomon Islands Government shows that there was a lack of education about what it really means to be an MP and what the job actually entails. Therefore, this type of education and training was necessary and was well-accepted by those involved. RAMSI is helping to establish accountability mechanisms that can act as a check on government on behalf of the people of the Solomon Islands. These accountability mechanisms will need a lot



of support and sufficient resources to help uncover corruption and mismanagement and to properly deal with offenders. These mechanisms are an important step towards creating a more trustworthy and productive government administration (RAMSI Website 2010).

Unlike other intervention forces such as UNTAET in East Timor, RAMSI was different in its approach to state building. While RAMSI have extensive practical influence and input in the Solomon Islands they still work with the Solomon Islands government, which has retained executive, legislative and judicial powers. This issue was somewhat contentious for Australia has continually labelled Solomon Islands as a failed state. The question arises then, why did RAMSI proceed to partner with and work alongside a government which is failed, and even worse which holds little legitimacy with the local people because of its corrupt track record (Leua Nanua 2008: 155).

### ***Phase Three:***

The third step of the RAMSI program focuses on self-reliance and sustainability of peace. This phase “concentrates on sustainable long-term development and will strengthen earlier reforms” (Moore 2007: 145). This is the phase that has come under the greatest scrutiny for many of the activities undertaken by RAMSI are criticised as being unsustainable because of the lack of involvement and coordination with the local population. This outlook is further weakened by the fact that neither the Kemakeza government (2001-2006) nor the second Sogavare government (2006-2007) demonstrated much interest in engaging cooperatively with the implementation and operation of RAMSI’s work and reforms. This lack of local engagement on the part of the government tends to undercut claims of genuine partnership between RAMSI and Solomon Islands authorities and does not bode well for long-term sustainability (Dinnen 2008: 69).

The civil society movement made a significant effort towards building peace in the Solomon Islands, but were not, however, utilised by government in the way which would make them significant vehicles for change. The Civil Society Network (CSN) was a way in which

women could become part of the peace process. Women had a vested interest in peace for they were often the victims of much of the violence and unrest in the Solomon Islands. The CSN were in full support of the intervention of RAMSI (Moore 2004: 194).

#### ***Phase Four:***

The fourth and final phase will be the withdrawal of RAMSI. The initial timeframe for the RAMSI mission was estimated to be at least 10 years, but there is no finalised exit date. However, this estimation may soon come under some scrutiny for the Sogavare government have put the pressure on RAMSI to come up with a clear exit strategy, and have even threatened to terminate the RAMSI intervention altogether (Moore 2004: 146).

### **6.5 The 2006 Riots**

The cracks in the RAMSI intervention began to show in 2006. After the widely unpopular appointment of Snyder Rini as Prime Minister, large numbers of disgruntled Solomon Islanders' took to the streets, targeting mainly Chinese businesses in the destruction; burning down 90 percent of shops in the Chinatown area. There was a wide belief that the use of back door politics and finance had been behind the election victory, with funds coming from the wealthy Chinese migrant community. The idea that money changed hands during the political process was widely believed throughout the country. Labour Party leader Joses Tuhnuku was quoted by an Australian radio station as stating that, "...it's common knowledge here that the election of the prime minister was not a fair and free one. It has been corrupted by Taiwanese and by business houses owned by Solomon Islanders of Chinese origin" (Senevirtne 2006: 1). As a result of the riots, Rini was forced to resign from his post as Prime Minister, before a certain no-confidence vote, in order to keep the peace in the wider community.

## 6.6 Criticisms of RAMSI

One ongoing criticism of RAMSI is that, apart from its name, there are very limited aspects that are regional about this mission. The majority of RAMSI personnel are from Australia. There is a lack of collaboration with the local people and lack of local ownership of the peace process. Both of these issues are a threat to the longevity of peace. In line with this concern is that fact that this mission is somewhat top down in its approach. For the mission to build sustainable peace it needs to have a more wide society approach. Without building a solid foundation of support from the bottom up many efforts undertaken by RAMSI will collapse once they withdraw. There is little point in undertaking any reconstruction activities if local staff are not being trained at the same time for efforts have a limited chance of being sustained once RAMSI withdraws.

Another problem that has come to light with RAMSI is their overemphasis on law and order at the expense of other important issues such as regional development and land reform. RAMSI needs to broaden its approach for peace to be sustainable. These reforms are necessary and if RAMSI does not attempt to resolve issues other than law and order then they will be left up to the national government to sort out, which is weak to say the least (Moore 2007: 146).

There has been a lack of attention paid to addressing the underlying causes of the violence, with the majority of resources going towards the damage the conflict has caused. This emphasis on resolving the deep seated issues that caused violence to erupt is one of the main focuses of peacebuilding. By unearthing and working through the initial causes of the conflict, society can begin working towards building a more peaceful future. If these causes are not dealt with then there is a chance that the conflict will recur further down the track, undoing all efforts made towards conflict resolution. RAMSI needs to now focus on working with community organisation to rehabilitate society (Leua Nanau 2008: 159). Building trust and confidence between opposing faction should be the first task that is undertaken in the

post-conflict phase. Working from a more stable societal foundation will help solidify the success of all other reforms.

An ongoing issue is that of what will happen when RAMSI finally withdraws. This is when the reality of whether or not RAMSI is really peacebuilding will come to a head. The reforms that have been made will have to endure without help from RAMSI, both financial and personnel oriented, and the sustainability of the mission will be truly challenged. RAMSI has been accused of merely providing a band aid to the areas problems, therefore when it withdraws its reforms will have little chance of being sustained successfully by the people in the Solomon Islands (Adams 2008: 113).

## **6.7 Exit strategy: Where to From Here?**

By applying the peacebuilding framework developed in *Chapter Two* to the Solomon Islands it can offer another approach to conflict resolution that could be a more sustainable option compared to the approach being undertaken by RAMSI, which is reality cannot really be considered peacebuilding. When RAMSI withdraws there is a chance that, because of the lack of sustainability of their reforms, recurrence of violence may be likely. This section is an outline of what more needs to be done in the Solomon Islands to stop that from happening.

### **6.7a Security Sector Reforms**

This dimension has been well covered by RAMSI and does not need much more additional attention. The re-establishment of law and order in the Solomon Islands was one of the main aims of the RAMSI intervention. Their dedication to disarmament and weapons collection, along with the restructuring and retraining of the armed forces, has meant that the Solomon Islands had become a safer place. This stability was, however, tested during the 2006 riots. It reflects the reality that the use of violence is still seen as a legitimate way of expressing one's grievances. This mentality needs to be curbed and a greater emphasis needs to be put on

educating the people about more productive and peaceful ways of dealing with grievances to reduce the need to resort to violent means.

One change that still needs to be made in the security sector is the strengthening of the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) force. Since the intervention began, RAMSI's own police force, the PPF, has been operating in the Solomon Islands. They filled a gap that was needed in the initial aftermath of the conflict and while the national force was undergoing reforms but it is now time for the PPF to scale back and the RSIP to increase capacity. This will mean that when the PPF does withdraw, the RSIP has the competence and support to perform as the central law enforcement mechanism (Eminent Persons Group 2005: 12).

#### **6.7b Trust and Confidence Building Measures**

For peacebuilding to be successful there needs to be the establishment of trust between the parties. If there is not a trusting and committed foundation to start from then reforms have little chance of being maintained in the long term. The issues and differences between the Malitan and Guadalcanal people were enough for people from each side to turn to violence. These issues do not just get resolved because the weapons have been taken away and the fighting has stopped. Active attempts need to be made to create a better relationship between all people in the region. There needs to be some sort of institutional mechanism created to help with reconciliation. While efforts have been made to calm violence in society, the underlying grievances that led to the initial outbreak of conflict have not been adequately dealt with. There still needs to be more effort taken in the area of reconciliation between not only the Guadalcanal and the Malitan people, but throughout Solomon Islands society to work through the feelings of resentment and inequality still held but many who were involved in the conflict.

## 6.7c Governmental Reform and Judicial Reform

This area has had a lot of attention and resources poured into it by RAMSI, but its sustainability will be put to the test once RAMSI withdraws. There has been vast criticism of RAMSI's actions in this sector, especially the idea that RAMSI is acting like a shadow government, placing their personnel in high level government position at the expense of Solomon Islanders. More effort needs to be placed on creating an equal partnership between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands government. A change needs to be made from an interventionist approach, which is the way in which RAMSI has been operating, to a more developmental approach to curb the risk of dependency by people of the Solomon Islands. They need to be involved and take ownership of the development and not just get it handed to them by RAMSI (Eminent Persons Group 2005: 6). Also, if RAMSI works more closely with the Solomon Islands government then that helps to restore people's confidence in their own leadership, which is lacking due to the history of corruption and mismanagement.

One important issue relating to government reform that has not yet been addressed is whether the Westminster system in the Solomon Islands is really workable or if a move towards federalism should be considered. The ill fit between the Westminster system and Solomon Islands culture is extremely apparent. There was little attempt made by the colonial administrators when creating the government in the Solomon Islands to blend the Westminster system with local cultures and traditions (Tara Kabutaulaka 2008: 101-102). One significant difference of the Westminster system from traditional Solomon Islands culture is that it is inherently confrontational and competitive in nature. Traditionally differences are worked through and discussed by large groups until a consensus is reached. The Westminster system, however, fosters somewhat of an 'us against them' mentality with each side vying for what they want. Another issue that relates to the ill fit of the Westminster system is that of the electoral law. The Solomon Islands has a First-Past-the-Post electoral system. With parties being so weak and individuals being the main contenders in elections, no one person is going to get the majority. Therefore, whoever is elected in the end does not represent the majority interests of the people. An electoral system that would possibly better

suit the Solomon Islands would be some kind of system of proportional representation such as MMP.

#### **6.7d Economic Reform**

RAMSI has helped to strengthen the country's economy in the time that it has been in the Solomon Islands. Government domestic revenue has increased from SBD258 million in 2002 to SBD625.9 million in 2005. Much of the debt accrued by the Solomon Islands has been relieved with the help of RAMSI personnel. Over 90 percent of government business arrears have been paid and nearly all small debts to business have also been paid. The lifting of some of the debt is a positive step forward for the country's economy, which was severely affected by the conflict. However, while steps have been taken to service debts this still remains an issue and is putting constraints on economic growth and development (Eminent Persons Group 2005: 9). Efforts have been made to re-attract foreign investors back into the country. The strengthening of law and order has made this possible as investors feel it is now a safer place to do business. Although economic reforms have led to an increase in domestic revenues and a reduction of national debt, there is concern that the country is still too dependent on donor support, especially in terms of the provision of basic services such as education and health (Eminent Persons Group 2005: 22). There is also ongoing criticism that most of the economic reconstruction efforts have focused solely on Honiara, will the rural areas remain in disarray. This is a worry for the majority of the population live in these rural areas and up to 75 percent of the population are dependent on subsistence farming and fishing (NZAID Website 2010). If this rural sector is not supported then poverty will continue to be an issue for much of the country's population.

#### **6.7e Community Education and Reconciliation**

This is one of the main dimensions that needs to be fostered while RAMSI is still present in the Solomon Islands. There has been a general lack of community education and involvement

in the peacebuilding process. This will become problematic when RAMSI withdraws for the local community will not have the capacity to maintain the changes and reforms undertaken by RAMSI. The people of the Solomon Islands are still very much tribally based in many of their associations and interactions. By supporting this community focus with regionally based education about what reforms are being undertaken and what the local community needs to be doing in order to help peace flourish would be a start to building more peaceful and capable communities. Interaction with civil society groups needs to also be encouraged further by RAMSI, for they can act as an informal, but important, link between RAMSI and the wider population.

## **6.8 Conclusion**

After an analysis of RAMSI, its structure and the work it has done in the Solomon Islands, it is fair to say that it still had a way to go before it can be truly classified as a peacebuilding mission. While significant steps have been taken to stop the violence and restore law and order in the Solomon Islands, there has not been enough attention or resources paid to the other important elements that make up the peacebuilding process. As noted above, there has been a significant lack of focus in the area of community education and rehabilitation. The approach taken by RAMSI is essentially top down, with little attention being paid to resolving the tensions in the wider society and reconciling the community as a whole. An overall analysis of the success of the mission will be undertaken in the next chapter. This will provide a critique of whether, in term of peacebuilding, this mission will be a success.



## **Chapter Seven**

### **The Future of Peacebuilding in the Pacific**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

The main purpose of this research was to provide an analysis of conflict in the Pacific region and examine the steps that have been taken to build peace after conflict has occurred. The foundation for this analysis was the theory of peacebuilding, which was first conceptualised by United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The development of peacebuilding was primarily motivated by the fact that new ideas needed to be created about how to deal with the changing nature of conflict in the international system. This change in approach came about in reaction to the significant increase in internal conflicts worldwide. The international system was developed to deal with states and the interactions between states, not within them. State sovereignty permits countries to act as they like within the confines of their borders. However, it is within these borders that some of the most severe atrocities are taking place. Many international agencies are powerless to do anything though, for they are not permitted to intervene in the internal problems of states without being invited to do so by those in power. Article II of the United Nations Charter states that the organisation “does not have the right to interfere in matters that fall under the domestic jurisdiction of any member state” (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 12). States must give consent and invite intervention by the United Nations. So therefore new institutions need to be developed that are more suited to dealing with situations of internal conflict to fill this void. Peacebuilding processes can offer states a new approach to conflict management that has a long term focus and emphasises cooperation and reconciliation. This approach highlights the importance of working with the local people in the post war environment. It is about working in partnership with all levels of society, from the grassroots up, to help to create durable and self-sustaining peace that can be maintained long after the peacebuilders withdraw.

The reason for studying the Pacific region is not so much because of the severity of conflict that has been experienced, but more so because of the disproportionate nature of conflict compared to the size of the region. The Pacific region has suffered significant unrest for its small size, much of which was spurred on as a result of decolonisation in the 1960s. Three conflicts which have been significant in the region, and have been the case studies used in this analysis, are the struggles for self determination in East Timor and Bougainville and the civil conflict in the Solomon Islands. Even though it's not necessarily defined as a Pacific nation, East Timor is included in this analysis because of the cultural connection between the East Timorese people and the Pacific region, as many see themselves as more of a Pacific people than affiliated with Indonesia and also because of the geographical position of East Timor in relation to other countries in the region, particularly Australia

## **7.2 Overall Success of Peacebuilding**

As was mentioned in the introductory chapter of this research, success is hard to characterise in definitive terms. Success in peacebuilding needs to not only be about stopping the visible violence at hand, which is the first obvious step, but more so about developing durable, sustainable peace. The underlying causes and triggers of the violence need to have been addressed and reconciliation between the parties needs to have taken place for these cases to be considered a peacebuilding success. Ultimately, success in peacebuilding is related to a nation's "ability to make the transition from a state of war to a state of peace" (Hampson 1997: 716).

So how do we know if peacebuilding has been a success? First an analysis of wider conflict resolution success will be outlined. This will provide a clear understanding about how conflicts can be transformed. The next step is to identify what the dimensions are that lead to successful peacebuilding. This will help to characterise the differences between general conflict resolution and peacebuilding and how these differences can affect the likelihood of long term peace in the post conflict environment.

The most basic determinant of success of any conflict management approach is whether violence has come to an end or not. If violence continues then conflict management attempts have obviously failed to reach their most basic goal. Ending violence usually comes about through the intervention of a third party who can help to facilitate initial contact between the parties and work towards the creation of a ceasefire agreement to put the parties on a more stable track towards peace. It is at this stage that efforts towards disarmament and demobilisation also need to be embarked on to help create a more secure environment from which to begin further peacebuilding activities. The establishment of peace is usually defined in terms of a five year time frame. This means that if violence has not relapsed within five years after the initial peace agreement then this settlement has been a success. If peace has been sustained for five years or more, it is considered to be durable peace. This timeframe is commonly used, although certain sources sight a longer time period of up to 10 years. The five year indicator is supported by Hartzel, Hoddie and Rothchild who state that “there are rare instances in which civil wars is resumed after five years of peace” (2001: 187).

However, success of conflict resolution moves beyond just the basic goal of stopping direct violence. The next step that needs to be taken to ensure success is the resolution of the underlying causes of the conflict. If the factors that ignited the initial violence are not worked through, the likelihood of peace being sustained in the long term is debatable. Success of conflict resolution depends significantly on the willingness of parties to be involved in the process and to either accept external assistance or make steps forward in resolving the conflict themselves. Resolution cannot be forced upon parties in conflict. They need to be involved in the process in order to establish common ground upon which to build a future free from conflict and instability (Bercovitch 2006: 295). There needs to be a significant change in the relationship between the parties for the conflict to be considered successfully resolved. If parties’ have not made steps forward in establishing a more harmonious relationship then future violence may result. Parties need to be able to exist in the same space and this will not be possible if steps towards reconciliation have not been made. Lederarch supports this idea and argues that there needs to be a shift from a “concern with the resolution of issues and toward a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships” (Lederarch cited in Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 170).

Successful peacebuilding goes another step beyond the determinants of successful conflict resolution. Its focus is not only on stopping the violence at hand and working through the underlying causes of the violence, but also about helping to re-establish strong, capable and legitimate institutions that will help to foster long term self reliance and sustainability of peace. Peacebuilding success is pinned on the ability of post-conflict countries to function after the peacebuilders have withdrawn. Peacebuilding needs to be a locally driven process where the main focus needs to be on integrating the local people at every stage of the peace process so that they have the skills and capacity to maintain the institutional reforms long after assistance has withdrawn (Call 2008: 183-184).

The peacebuilding process needs to also take into consideration the local culture of the host country and traditional practices in terms of dispute settlement and governance. Efforts taken to incorporate these traditional approaches with modern state building practices will be of significant benefit in the long run. People will feel a greater affiliation with state institutions, which in turn will mean sustained support and participation in all aspects of society. If peacebuilding missions do not take into consideration local traditions and practices and enact their missions in a culturally sensitive and inclusive manner then there is a greater likelihood of a backlash by the local people.

In line with this approach is the need to maintain an ongoing focus on reconciliation within society. Parties in a conflict have over time developed a very negative and distrusting view of each other. These insecurities and misconceptions need to be broken down and worked through for society to begin to heal. Psychological effects of war are in a way more problematic in the long run, in terms of community stability, than the physical effects of conflict. Efforts need to be taken to reconcile all those involved and try to establish a good working relationship between the parties who have to be able to exist side by side in society. If attention is not paid to reconciliation between all factions of the conflict then past grievances could once again be the source of violence in the future.

While peacebuilding failure can be attributed to the renewal of violence, other dimensions need to be examined that can also signify failure of the process. A significant sign of failure is a lack of sustainability and self-reliance. During the peacebuilding process, there is an important need to foster local capacities in all areas of society. When the peacebuilding mission withdraws those within society should be confident and able to maintain the reforms that have been made and take ownership of the new state institutions. If the local people are not able to cope on their own then this indicates failure on the part of the peacebuilders to meet an important goal. Indicators of this are a general weakness of state institutions, lack of legitimate leadership and a fair and honest judicial and governmental sector. Another key sign of failure is ongoing economic dependence. The peacebuilding process is meant to help establish fiscal self-reliance. Economic reforms are supposed to have been undertaken to strengthen the economic sector, which is key to ongoing self-sustainability. If improvements have not been made in the financial sector, including helping to reduce external debts and attract foreign investors and trade opportunities, then long-term rehabilitation of society is unlikely.

From the examination undertaken above, peacebuilding success can be defined as being a four-fold approach. The key determinants of peacebuilding success are stopping violence, the duration of peace in the post-conflict environment, social and political transformation and psychological transformation. If these four factors are achieved then the peacebuilding mission can be said to have been a success. An outline of how these factors can be achieved is demonstrated below (See **Figure 7.1**).

### 7.3 Typology for Determining Peacebuilding Success

<b>Determinants of Success</b>	<b>What is required to achieve each determinant of success?</b>
Stop Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Get parties together: mediation/negotiation activities by a mutually agreed upon third party</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ceasefire agreement: use of incentives to encourage commitment from all sides</li> <li>• Start disarmament and demobilisation activities and the reintegration of combatants</li> <li>• Peacekeeping/peace monitoring activities</li> </ul>
Duration of Peace (5 year timeframe)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Credibility and legitimacy of intervention forces/peace process</li> <li>• Creation of a peace agreement that is inclusive of all factions who were involved in the conflict and meets the needs of all parties</li> <li>• Involvement of warring parties in the peace process: desire for peace; local ownership of the peace process</li> <li>• Undertake trust and confidence building measures: help to encourage mutual commitment and willingness to be involved in the process by all sides</li> <li>• Work through underlying causes of the violence</li> </ul>
Social and Political Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intervention by a legitimate third party</li> <li>• Institutional reform: Political, Judicial, Economic</li> <li>• Focus on building local institutional capacity</li> <li>• Foster self-reliance and sustainability</li> <li>• Inclusion of traditional practices and customs into state building process</li> </ul>
Psychological Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Initially the role of peacebuilders: act as facilitator between the parties</li> <li>• Change in attitude between the parties</li> <li>• Transformation of relationship to one of cooperation</li> <li>• Ongoing focus on reconciliation: creating a good working relationship between the parties</li> <li>• Use of traditional methods of trauma healing and reconciliation</li> <li>• Community education: teach the local communities about alternative dispute resolution methods so violence will not</li> </ul>

	<p>need to be resorted to again in the future</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deal with underlying causes of the violence, emotions and psychological effects of the conflict</li> <li>• Involvement of civil society organisations: trauma healing; truth commissions</li> </ul>
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**Table 7.1 Typology for Determining Peacebuilding Success**

One problem that comes up when trying to decide about peacebuilding success is whether success should be defined in terms of the overall mission or be analysed on an activity or sector specific basis. While none of the cases were peacebuilding failures (keeping in mind that true success in terms of the Solomon Islands cannot be judged until RAMSI withdraws) there were certain areas that could be considered as being more successful than others. The relative success of each of the three cases of peacebuilding that have been examined will now be assessed.

#### **7.4 Peacebuilding Success in East Timor**

After an analysis of the peacebuilding mission that was undertaken in East Timor, success of the process can now be examined. While there was significant success in the area of security restoration and reform, the overall peacebuilding mission in East Timor was not that successful in terms of the criteria mentioned in the above section. The main area that impacted on this poor overall level of success was a general weakness of institutional reforms, especially in the political arena, due to a lack of local capacity building and community education and development during the reform process.

The central trigger for this conflict was the need by the Timorese people for self-determination. The people of East Timor wanted to become independent from Indonesia and have the chance to build their own unique nation. This central goal has been achieved as independence was declared in May 2002. Achieving this aim is, however, only the first step.

While independence was a long sought after goal, the ability to sustain a new nation is a whole new challenge in itself.

Both INTERFET and UNTAET made important steps forward in improving the security situation in East Timor in the post-conflict stage. They were able to curb the violence efficiently and create a more secure environment for the people of East Timor. A significant benefit in this case was the fact that most of the violent perpetrators fled to West Timor after INTERFET arrived in East Timor. This meant that any possible resistance to the intervention forces was greatly reduced. However, because relative peace was achieved rather easily, the attention paid to local security forces began to diminish over time. Since Indonesian forces had withdrawn from East Timor and much of the militia had fled to West Timor there were thought to be no immediate threats to security. There was little attention paid to capacity building of local security forces. The army remains a source of contention and the hasty creation of the police force has led to an inherent weakness in its structure. Problems in the armed forces came to a head in 2006 when a military strike led to a resurgence of violence and the near collapse of law and order in East Timor. This violence also brought to the surface underlying ethnic issues that had not been dealt with during the initial intervention. International forces had to be called in to help stabilise the situation. This backslide into violence suggests an ongoing weakness of local capacity to deal with unrest and a lack of knowledge about how to work through problems without resorting to violence. Peacebuilding missions aim to educate local communities about peaceful conflict management practices, so that if problems arise in the future the local people will be able to deal with them in a nonviolent way. This aspect was clearly not emphasised by the UN mission in East Timor.

Governmental reform is a key aspect of any peacebuilding mission and was the main focus of the UN mission in East Timor. Reform and rehabilitation of the government followed the UN state building model. Although improvements were made in re-establishing the government in East Timor there was a general lack of cohesion with the local culture and community. While successful elections have been undertaken since independence it has been hard to start afresh because politics is still dominated by past allegiances and divisions that existed during the conflict. Reforms may have taken place but East Timor has not made any significant steps



forwards in terms of local involvement, development of local capacity and the creation of a uniquely East Timorese governmental system. Peacebuilders are tasked with assisting war torn countries in establishing a government that reflects the local culture and traditions and can be maintained by the local people once assistance is withdrawn. On the whole, this has not been achieved in East Timor.

Judicial and economic reform also came up against various challenges. While efforts were taken to train local people in the judicial sector the transition from training to implementation in key judicial roles was too hasty. The East Timorese people lacked any significant skills in this sector. There was an overall shortage of trained lawyers for one, many of whom had minimal work experience, and none of which had ever served as judges. While the need to train and employ local people in the judicial sector is an important aspect of peacebuilding, an overall lack of judicial experience made this transition unmanageable and weak from the outset. If local people do not have the ability to act in positions of power such as this there is no real benefit for them being placed in these positions. While UNTAET's motivation to train the local people in the judicial sector is commendable, installing inexperienced local people in such an important role has led to a severe weakness of the judiciary. This will have a major effect on these reforms being successful in the long term for the judiciary is supposed to act as a check of government. If it cannot maintain this function then serious problems within governmental institutions could ensue. Economic reforms have also been generally unsuccessful. East Timor still remains to be one of the poorest countries in the international system. The country needs to become fiscally self-reliant for stability to be achieved in the long term. As has already been suggested earlier, there is a strong correlation between poverty and violence. If East Timor does not improve its economy then future violence could be expected.

While this mission is deemed a success by the United Nations missions that were involved in the country, when aspects of the intervention are looked at more closely cracks in the approach begin to show. While the various UN missions that intervened in East Timor undertook various reforms within the country, these changes were dictated by the United Nations state-building model. There was a general lack of engagement with the local

community and limited inclusion of traditional practices within the new state institutions that were developed. It is these aspects that set the peacebuilding approach apart from other types of conflict resolution. As a result of this the local people feel very little connections with the newly reformed state institutions. This will have a significant impact on East Timor's ability to sustain the changes that have been made to the key state institutions for they lack legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This could have an effect on long-term self-reliance and self-sufficiency within the country.

<b>Determinants of Success</b>	<b>Efforts undertaken in East Timor</b>
Stop Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intervention by INTERFET and UNTAET</li> <li>• Weapons collection</li> <li>• Lack of reform of armed forces</li> <li>• Minimal demobilisation efforts</li> </ul>
Duration of Peace (5 year timeframe)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of trust and confidence building measures undertaken between UNTAET and East Timorese people</li> <li>• General lack of local ownership throughout the peace process</li> <li>• Renewed violence in 2006 as a result of problems in the armed forces relating to discrimination and ill-treatment</li> </ul>
Social and Political Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Successful elections in East Timor</li> <li>• Weak institutional reforms in areas of the judiciary</li> <li>• Ongoing economic dependence</li> <li>• Lack of cultural affiliation between local people and UN state building approach</li> <li>• Lack of focus on long-term sustainability of institution or fostering of local self-reliance</li> </ul>
Psychological	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insufficient reconciliation activities by UN missions</li> </ul>

Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CAVR: positive step taken by East Timorese government to foster unity and reconciliation within the community</li> </ul>
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**7.2 Summary of Peacebuilding Success in East Timor**

**7.5 Peacebuilding Success in Bougainville**

Overall, Bougainville is the most successful case of peacebuilding of those analysed. Goals that were established and activities that were undertaken were future focused and maintained an emphasis on equality and reconciliation between the parties. The parties were the main focus and drivers of the process. Over a decade on from the Burnham peace talks and nearly a decade since the signing of the Bougainville Peace Accords a stable and durable peace has been achieved in Bougainville. The initial approach taken by New Zealand at Burnham, one of patience, equality and cooperation, laid a solid foundation for the building of sustainable peace in Bougainville. The focus on reconciliation of the parties as well as the need to curb the violence and improve security on the island meant that peace was achieved at all levels of society. The parties learned how to live together in a new peaceful future that they have carved out for themselves. While fears still remain about future problems relating to the possible reopening of the mine, overall peace remains stable and durable in Bougainville.

The root causes of the Bougainville conflict were territory and Bougainville’s fight for self-determination from Papua New Guinea. While the violence has subsided and an autonomous government has been established in Bougainville, independence has still not been achieved in full. As outlined in the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which was established in 2001, a referendum to consider Bougainville’s political status was not to be held for at least 10 years after the agreement was signed, conditional on the achievement of other aspects such as weapons disposal and the establishment of good governance. While peace in Bougainville is more or less stable and the government is growing in capacity, this referendum could bring possible renewed violence. However, by the time this referendum is enacted it is assumed

that the Bougainville government and society in general will have the means to deal with any possible backlash to the results of the vote.

One significant aspect that had a real impact on the success of peacebuilding in Bougainville was that at the time of the Burnham talks both sides were committed to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. Earlier attempts to resolve the conflict had been unsuccessful because neither side had wanted to make too greater concessions. The Burnham talks acted as a turning point in the conflict. At the time of these talks both parties were ready to work towards a mutually agreed upon solution to the conflict and peace became the most important goal for all those involved. The Burnham talks were a positive first step in the peacebuilding process. The focus was on building strong relationships both within the parties and between them. This process upheld one of the most important aspects of peacebuilding, trust and confidence building in the initial stages of the post-conflict phase. It is at this time that suspicion and mistrust between warring factions is at its highest. Those at Burnham were able to help develop a good working relationship between the participants, which made future discussions and negotiations easier. These initial steps that were taken at Burnham in 1997 laid the foundation for success for the rest of the peacebuilding activities that were then undertaken.

Another factor that added to the overall success of the peacebuilding mission was the way in which governmental reform was undertaken in Bougainville. Reforms were embarked on in stages, gradually easing the local people into self-sufficiency in the political sector. The Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) was a central document in the peacebuilding mission in Bougainville. It outlined a staggered approach to political developments for Bougainville. The first stage of the BPA was establishing Bougainville as an autonomous region. This meant the development of a new autonomous government. Elections were held for the Autonomous Bougainville Government in 2005 and resulted in the democratic election of a 39 member parliament, with Joseph Kabui as Bougainville's first president. The next stage of the BPA, weapons collection, was completed in 2003. The final stage of the BPA outlines arrangements for a future referendum to be held concerning Bougainville's political status. This, however, is not to be held for at least 10 years after the autonomous government has been

established and good governance has been achieved. This vote could potentially be the source of future unrest in Bougainville, but only time will tell.

The strong community focus and inclusion of traditional practices in Bougainville’s new institutions were paramount to the mission’s overall success. It is these factors that helped to transform this mission from conflict resolution to sustainable peacebuilding. The peacebuilding process in Bougainville had a community wide focus and involved a wide spectrum of people from all levels of society. This helped to increase the legitimacy of the process and made any reforms more sustainable. There were also significant efforts made to weave traditional practices with modern state building approaches. This made the transition to self-reliance much smoother as people felt a cultural connection with the new institutions.

Durable peace has been established on Bougainville and there has been no significant renewal of violence since the Burnham talks in 1997. The peacebuilding activities that were undertaken by a range of actors on Bougainville, perhaps most importantly New Zealand, helped to create a situation of stable, long term peace that has been sustained over time by the local people. Efforts taken to reconcile the warring parties in the initial stages of peacebuilding helped to build a solid foundation from which other reforms could then be begun. This helped to create a strong working relationship between the local people and meant that future state-building activities could be undertaken in a peaceful and stable environment. The weaving of traditional practices with modern state-building activities helped to legitimise the process among the local people. The people of Bougainville were in control of all stages of the peacebuilding process and the changes that were made within society reflected this.

<b>Determinant of Success</b>	<b>Efforts Undertaken in Bougainville</b>
Stop Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Burnham peace talks 1997</li> <li>• Burnham Truce: Truce Monitoring Force/Peace</li> </ul>

	<p>Monitoring Force</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lincoln Agreement 1998: arrangements for a ceasefire</li> <li>• Weapons collection and disposal activities</li> </ul>
Duration of Peace (5 year timeframe)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Credibility and legitimacy of external involvement</li> <li>• Mutually agreed upon and future focused peace agreement (BPA)</li> <li>• Involvement of PNG and Bougainvillean factions throughout the peace process</li> <li>• Commitment and willingness of the parties to be involved in the peace process</li> <li>• Long-term, durable peace within society</li> </ul>
Social and Political Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legitimate intervention and third party facilitation by New Zealand</li> <li>• Strong institutional reform</li> <li>• Inclusion of traditional practices and customs in state building process</li> <li>• Focus on long-term sustainability of institution and fostering of local self-reliance</li> </ul>
Psychological Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ongoing focus on reconciliation: firstly by New Zealand and then maintained by local community</li> <li>• Emphasis on the need to change attitudes of the parties and develop a good working relationship between all parties involved in the process</li> <li>• Use of customary dispute resolution mechanisms</li> </ul>

### 7.3 Summary of Peacebuilding Success in Bougainville

## 7.6 Peacebuilding Success in the Solomon Islands

Peacebuilding success in the Solomon Islands cannot truly be judged until after RAMSI has withdrawn from the country and the people have taken charge of the new state institutions.

Until this happens however, suggestions can still be made about whether the mission will be a success in relation to how the process is unfolding at the present. By analysing how successful the intervention has been so far, we can judge not only whether the process will or will not be a success in the long term, but also if this intervention can truly be categorised as peacebuilding.

The nature of the intervention will have a significant impact on whether this mission is successful or not. The mission has been divided into four phases. Phase one was restoration of law and order. This phase was praised as a success by those involved and it is the aspect that RAMSI have paid the most attention to. However, as was seen in *Chapter Six*, the stability of the Solomon Islands recently came under threat when riots broke out in Honiara after the 2006 election results were announced. This outbreak of violence reflects the ongoing problems that are being experienced in the Solomon Islands. It also exemplifies how the hastiness in of need resorting to violent means is still deeply ingrained in the population. Other channels could have been used to voice frustrations about the election, but instead violence was used as a way of airing grievances. Until the security situation is properly dealt with in the Solomon Islands and real attention is paid to building the capacity of the armed forces so they can deal with unrest and educate the people about how to best approach problems then long-term peace remains debatable.

The second phase of this intervention was state reconstruction and capacity building. While efforts were made by RAMSI to help build the capacity of local state institution there was a general lack of inclusion of the local people in this process or inclusion of traditional methods of governance that would have made the transition to peace both more acceptable and also more sustainable.

The third phase of the mission was self-reliance and sustainability of peace. It is this phase which has received the most criticism. Many of the reforms that have been undertaken by RAMSI have been criticised as being unsustainable due to a lack of engagement with and inclusion of the local people. Peacebuilding reforms need to be enacted from the bottom up to

have the best chance of being sustained in the long-term. There is no point in making changes in a society if those within that society cannot maintain the changes once the intervening force withdraws. Another significant aspect relating to this phase is the need for greater reconciliation efforts to be undertaken to help create a more stable relationship between those who were involved in the conflict.

The final phase of the mission is the withdrawal of RAMSI. This stage is crucial in terms of long term sustainability of the mission and will be the biggest test of what has been undertaken by RAMSI during its time in the Solomon Islands. If RAMSI withdraws too rapidly then the local people may not have been able to develop the capacity to take over the country's reformed institution. But if RAMSI stays on for too long then this can breed contempt and dependence in the country and RAMSI staff may be met with a violent backlash.

One of the main concerns about the future stability of the Solomon Islands is the seemingly ingrained need to resort to violence as a way of settling disputes. This was most recently demonstrated during the post-election riots in 2006. There is a strong need to increase education on alternative dispute resolution methods in the Solomon Islands before RAMSI withdraws. People need to be taught how to deal with problems without using violence. If further measures are not taken to help with reconciliation and rehabilitation of society then long-term success is somewhat unstable. Significant problems still need to be addressed in the Solomon Islands before RAMSI can begin to consider withdrawal. The greatest task now is to establish a better partnership between RAMSI and the local people. RAMSI needs to act in greater consultation with the local people so that reforms are acceptable to the people and can be sustained once RAMSI withdraws.

<b>Determinant of Success</b>	<b>Efforts Undertaken in the Solomon Islands</b>
Stop Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong focus on the restoration of law and order</li> </ul>



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ongoing use of violence as a way of expressing grievances</li> </ul>
Duration of Peace (5 year timeframe)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ongoing criticisms over legitimacy of external involvement</li> <li>• Lack of cohesion and cooperation between RAMSI and Solomon Islands government</li> <li>• Renewed Violence in 2006</li> </ul>
Social and Political Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of inclusion of local people or traditional practices in state building process</li> <li>• Weak institutional reforms</li> <li>• Limited focus on sustainability of reforms or efforts to build local institutional capacity within society</li> </ul>
Psychological Transformation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of focus on reconciliation efforts between warring parties</li> <li>• Limited involvement of civil society organisations</li> <li>• Lack of focus on community education and the peace process or development of local alternative dispute resolution methods</li> </ul>

#### 7.4 Summary of Peacebuilding Success in Solomon Islands

### 7.7 Lessons Learned: Success of Future Missions

The next issue that needs to be addressed is how to make sure a peacebuilding mission is going to be successful in the long term. From the cases above it is clear to see that certain factors of the interventions have been significant in terms of overall success. One critical factor that has impacted on the success of these peacebuilding missions is the level of local involvement in the peace process and engagement with the community. If peacebuilding activities are going to be undertaken in the post-war environment, they need to be done so with the support of the local community and in consultation with the local people. As can be seen from the Bougainville case, overall success of the mission was heavily influenced by the

fact that, first at Burnham and then with later reforms, the local people were involved from the very beginning and were in control of the process throughout. The new state institutions reflect this relationship because they were able to weave together traditional approaches with modern state-building practices. This aspect was not taken on board in terms of the mission in both East Timor and Solomon Islands. A lack of cultural inclusiveness throughout both missions has led to significant weakness of reforms as a result. The local people feel very little affiliation with the new state institutions and lack the capacity to sustain these institutions themselves in the long term. Both the mission in East Timor and Solomon Islands was created to fit the ideals and aims of the intervening forces and not designed to suit the particular needs of the host countries. For peace to be sustainable the local people need to have taken ownership of the process. This, while emphasised in Bougainville, was not the case in East Timor or the Solomon Islands.

Another aspect that helps to increase the likelihood of success of peacebuilding missions is the amount of attention paid to reconciliation and trust and confidence building measures between the parties of the conflict. Efforts taken to help create a better relationship between the parties of a conflict will have a considerable impact on success and the stability of peace in the long term. Unlike interstate conflict, parties cannot retreat back to their own territory once the conflict ends. They have to find ways of being able to exist in the same space after the conflict has been resolved. Trust is at an all time low after conflict so efforts need to be taken to reconcile those involved in the conflict and try to come up with some solution about how these people who were once enemies can now live side by side. Since peacebuilding is a long term process, intervening personnel can help to facilitate ongoing reconciliation efforts between all parties who were involved in the conflict. The inclusion of traditional approaches to reconciliation and justice can also be encouraged during this time as a way of furthering the connection between the peacebuilding process and wider society. This aspect was supported in both East Timor and Bougainville. In the case of East Timor a commission was set up, CAVR, whose aim was to build a more united and reconciled community. CAVR incorporated customary law and traditions into its mandate. This commission was not however set up by the United Nations peacebuilding team but was in fact was created by the East Timorese government in 2002. On the part of the United Nations, the aspect of reconciliation was not fostered to any great degree. In Bougainville various grassroots

organisation along with the peacebuilding team encouraged reconciliation among the warring factions. Building trust and attempting to heal past wounds was a significant and ongoing aspect right throughout the peacebuilding mission in Bougainville. No significant emphasis on reconciliation has been undertaken by RAMSI as of yet in the Solomon Islands. This aspect needs considerable attention before RAMSI withdraws.

## **7.8 Where to From Here: Towards a Pacific Peacebuilding Commission**

The need to build long term, sustainable peace in war torn countries is becoming a more and more important goal for post conflict interventions. A vital need is being developed to go beyond the basic conflict management approach of stopping the violence, and instead focus more on working through the underlying causes of violence in post conflict societies and helping to establish peaceful communities who have the ability and the tools to be self-sufficient and stable nations. As outlined in the three cases studies that have been covered over the course of this research, peacebuilding missions have been undertaken in the Pacific region with varying levels of success. A shift in focus now needs to take place that emphasises how peacebuilding processes can be undertaken in the region.

Conflict in the Pacific region continues to be an important area of research and one that deserves ongoing attention. Significant steps still need to be taken in order to reduce conflict and establish regional peace and security. The development of a regional peacebuilding commission could help move the region towards a more peaceful future. The arrangement of the commission could be based on the shape that the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission has taken. The advantage of a regional mechanism designed to undertake peacebuilding activities is that it can be more culturally aware than an outside actor would be. It would also be able to act as a monitoring agency that could undertake conflict prevention measures in places where unrest has been identified but violence has not yet broken out.

## **7.8a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission**

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission was established in 2005 as a mechanism for addressing the specific needs of post-conflict societies and helps them towards recovery, reconstruction and development. The Commission was the result of discussions by world leaders at the 2005 World Summit. It was to be a United Nations mandated organisation to advise on, coordinate and facilitate peacebuilding missions and activities. The purpose of the Commission is summarised in a statement made by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in June 2007, “By establishing the Commission, Members States of the United Nations have created an important new structure to support fragile societies recovering from the devastation of war” (United Nations Peacebuilding Website 2009).

### ***Mandate and Aim***

Under Resolution 60/180 and Resolution 1645 (2005) the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council mandated the Peacebuilding Commission to:

- “Bring all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- Help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to long-term;
- Develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian and development actors” (United Nations Peacebuilding Website 2009).

These resolutions outlined the purpose and aims of the Commission and also why such a mechanism was necessary in the international system. The main aim of the Commission is the need for a coordinated approach to peacebuilding and reconciliation in post-conflict societies with an emphasis of the long-term sustainability of peace. The Commission sees its role as a vehicle for addressing the special needs of countries emerging from conflict and assist them in their recovery and post-conflict development. However, they also recognise and emphasise the need to act in coordination with national government, and support their

priorities and strategies for peacebuilding, to maintain and strengthen national ownership of the process, which will help to ensure its sustainability (United Nations Peacebuilding Website 2009).

### ***Funding***

In 2006 the United Nation Secretary-General established the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund to help with the financing of post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is designed to “address immediate needs in countries emerging from conflict at a time when sufficient resources are not available from other funding mechanisms and will support interventions of direct and immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process” (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund Website 2009). The PBF relies on donations from Member states, organisations and individuals.

The PBF allocates money through two branches, the Immediate Response Facility and the Peacebuilding Recovery Facility. Both fund initiatives that respond to the one or more of the following criteria:

- “Immediate threats to the peace process and initiatives that support peace agreements and political dialogue;
- Build or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict;
- Stimulate economic revitalisation to general peace dividends;
- Re-establish essential administrative services” (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund Website 2010).

## **7.8b Pacific Peacebuilding Commission**

One of the main benefits of creating a regional peacebuilding commission is that it could be organised in a way that was culturally appropriate for the region, therefore, enhancing its legitimacy and effectiveness in the eyes of the Pacific people. The commission could reflect the ‘Pacific way’ of reaching decisions through consensus and having fluid agendas for discussions and decision making. The commission’s aim would be to undertake the various aspects relating to peacebuilding success that were outlined earlier in this chapter. If it can follow this typology for peacebuilding success then its ability to build sustainable peace in post-conflict societies will be greatly improved.

The Bougainville peace talks that were held at Burnham in 1997 could act as a constructive guide to how peace can best be established in a Pacific context. In Bougainville, New Zealand peacebuilder’s had a wide society approach to the process, involving as many people as possible in the process. The focus was on the process and not the end result. New Zealand recognised that for peace to be sustainable in a society it had to be sought after by the people. Their help was not forced on the people of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea; it was requested by those that were involved. The process was undertaken using a traditional approach. New Zealand understood the idea of the ‘Pacific Way’ which included no strict timetables, the use of consensus in decision making and the inclusion of large numbers of people. While the ‘Pacific Way’ of collective decision making may seem more time consuming to outsiders, it increases the legitimacy of the process for those involved and its inclusion will be a major factor in increasing regional cooperation (Henderson and Watson 2005: 181). This mission also reflects the way that local culture and traditional practices need to be weaved into all levels of the peacebuilding process. This helps to ensure local understanding of the new institutions and fosters greater support and sustainability of reforms that have been made to the state system.

RAMSI could act as a blue print for the formation of a regional response to conflict in the Pacific. It was the first true regional mission in the Pacific, even if it was mostly Australian

personnel who were involved. However, for future missions to have more regional legitimacy they need to be led by someone other than New Zealand or Australia, whose motives for intervention are sometimes brought into question. This, while advantageous in theory, will be harder to achieve in reality. This is because Australia and New Zealand, being the most developed nation in the Pacific, have the capacity to not only lead an intervention force but also to fund it. Without the creation of some sort of funding mechanism for the commission, true regional intervention by a country other than Australia or New Zealand is unlikely.

The Pacific Plan, adopted by Forum leaders in October 2005, is the main regional initiative focused on security in the region. Regionalism has long been recognised as a way of overcoming national short falls. The Pacific Plan seeks to enhance regionalism in the Pacific as a way to tackle the region's main developmental challenges (Robertson 2005: 1). The Plans four main pillars are economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security, the same as that of the PIF. The aim of the Pacific Plan is to:

“strengthen regional cooperation and integration including through pooling of regional resources of governance and the alignment of policies in order to further Forum members shared goals of economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security” (Robertson 2005: 20).

The Pacific Plan could act as the foundation for the development of a regional peacebuilding commission. Its aim is to try to enhance regional security and cooperation to make the region a safer and more peaceful place (Henderson and Watson 2005: 167). A regional peacebuilding commission could put this plan into action and act as the vehicle for achieving greater regional cooperation and stability.

### ***Structure of the Commission***

As outlined earlier in ***Chapter Three***, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is the leading regional organisation in the Pacific region. Their membership outnumbers all other institutions in the region. It is because of this and their targeted focus on the improvement of security and establishment of regional peace that the Forum would be an appropriate vehicle for the

creation of a regional peacebuilding commission. Establishing the commission under the auspices of the Forum would mean it would have the support and resources of the Forum to draw on to help enhance the capacity of the commission, which will be especially important in the early stages. To further increase capacity, the commission could be made up of special delegates from each of the PIF member countries, instead of heads of government. This way the commission can have a standing committee whose sole focus is on peacebuilding and post-conflict settlement. This committee should have regular meeting and act as a monitor of potential conflict hot spots in the region, with a focus on prevention as well as resolution of conflict. This way they can alert the Forum of unrest before major conflict breaks out.

The commission could act as the leading regional actor in reducing conflict in the region and the main force behind post conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. It could also take on a central role of conflict monitoring and conflict prevention as a way of reducing violent conflict from erupting in the first place. There is currently no early conflict warning system in the region so the commission could fill this void (Henderson and Watson 2005: 199). The Pacific peacebuilding commission's activities need to have a long term focus. Sustainability of peace should be the main goal of the commission. The focus needs to be on the process and not the end result.

Peacekeeping will be an important aspect for the work of the Pacific Peacebuilding Commission. However, the likelihood of it having a standing peacekeeping force is somewhat unrealistic. Pacific Island nations are too small themselves to be able to give up members of their military forces. The cost of training and maintaining such a force would be far too expensive for the commission. Perhaps a more realistic alternative is if countries were willing to pledge certain numbers of troops from their forces to be used if peacekeepers needed to be deployed.

Deployment of a peacebuilding mission should be on a by request basis only. When New Zealand intervened in the Bougainville conflict in 1997 it was only because their help had been asked for and agreed to by all parties involved. Although this process might be slow-



moving and frustrating for those involved, for a request for intervention might take a while to eventuate, it is the best option if peace is to be sustainable. If intervention is forced on a country then they feel they have no ownership of the process and this will have an impact on its long term durability.

The Pacific Peacebuilding Commission needs to establish and maintain links with local NGOs and civil society organisations during any missions it undertakes. This will provide the commission with good grassroots support and also with local knowledge of conflict situations. Civil society groups can act as a good bridge between the local people and the peacebuilding team. Community based initiatives for peace need to be fostered, as they act as a good partner to formal efforts.

It would be beneficial to base the commission somewhere other than Fiji. Fiji is already the home to many regional institutions and these provide certain benefits to the area. This commission could be based in a post-conflict nation which has already had to deal with building peace on a community level and who may be better equipped to be the base of a regional peacebuilding commission. Honiara could be a good option for it is the capital that is most central in terms of population centres and also resources and is itself a post-conflict nation (Henderson and Watson 2005: 159).

### ***Funding***

Funding is a crucial issue that could hinder the success of such an organisation. Without financial support the commission would not be able to undertake long-term strategies, which are the key to establishing sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is a long term process and if there is not adequate funding to support its activities then it will not be able to produce the most sustainable results. Finding funding within the region could be problematic as many island nations are very poor and would have limited ability to provide funds to a regional organisation when they are so desperately needed at home. An international agency or NGO

could fill this void by providing funding for the establishment of such a commission and could potentially finance its ongoing costs.

## **7.9 Final Remarks**

The theory of peacebuilding requires ongoing attention and analysis in the international community. This approach to conflict management offers a new and innovative alternative to conflict zones and could provide a future free from violence for these states. While ideas surrounding peacebuilding are still in their infancy, the potential benefits that a peacebuilding approach could have are already quite obvious. By incorporating modern state building practices with traditional approaches and local customs, new systems of governance can be derived which are legitimate in the eyes of all involved. The strength of this process is in its ability to work alongside the local population and allow them to take ownership of the peace process. This is not an approach which can be implemented within these states. It requires the help and support of the wider society. Change needs to be driven from within for peace to be sustained and for local capacity to flourish.

The three cases which were covered show the different approaches that can be taken under the guise of peacebuilding. While all three cases portrayed different strengths and weaknesses, the peacebuilding mission in Bougainville was the most successful. All activities that were undertaken in the post-conflict phase placed a strong emphasis on inclusion of the local people and developing a trusting relationship both with and between the parties. The solid foundation that was established at Burnham provided a strong basis for all future efforts that were undertaken. The mission followed a clear structure driven at all times by those in the community. As a result a peaceful future is now being enjoyed by the people of Bougainville. The peacebuilding mission in East Timor had various drawbacks which have led to a somewhat weak state. Although much attention was paid to security reforms in the country, little emphasis was placed on important factors such as the economy and encouragement of local participation and education. East Timor is still very reliant on outside assistance and legitimacy of state institutions is still weak. Finally, as has already been stated,

the true success of RAMSI cannot be realised until after their withdrawal from the Solomon Islands. Until coordination and cooperation between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands government is improved, long-term success of the activities that have been undertaken by RAMSI remains uncertain.

Looking towards the future, a Pacific Peacebuilding Commission could offer a solution for much of the unrest that is still going on in the region. However, regional capacity is still very low within the Pacific. Establishing and maintaining an institution such as this would be both time consuming and expensive. Unless actors from outside the region get on board to support the establishment of such an institution, the likelihood of it being set up and sustained by parties within the region is doubtful.

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