


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Towards disaster resilience: A scenario-based approach to co-producing and integrating hazard and risk knowledge

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1 **Perspective**

2 **TOWARDS DISASTER RESILIENCE: A SCENARIO-BASED APPROACH TO CO-PRODUCING AND**
3 **INTEGRATING HAZARD AND RISK KNOWLEDGE**

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6 Wilson¹

7 **Abstract**

8 Quantitative risk assessment and risk management processes are critically examined in the context
9 of their applicability to the statistically infrequent and sometimes unforeseen events that trigger
10 major disasters. While of value when applied at regional or larger scales by governments and
11 insurance companies, these processes do not provide a rational basis for reducing the impacts of
12 major disasters at the local (community) level because in any given locality disaster events occur too
13 infrequently for their future occurrence in a realistic timeframe to be accurately predicted by
14 statistics. Given that regional and national strategies for disaster reduction cannot be effective
15 without effective local disaster reduction measures, this is a significant problem. Instead, we suggest
16 that communities, local government officials, civil society organisations and scientists could usefully
17 form teams to co-develop local hazard event and effects scenarios, around which the teams can
18 then develop realistic long-term plans for building local resilience. These plans may also be of value
19 in reducing the impacts of other disasters, and are likely to have the additional benefits of improving
20 science development, relevance and uptake, and of enhancing communication between scientists
21 and the public.

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22 KEYWORDS: disaster risk quantification: risk management: community resilience: event and effects
23 scenarios: co-production of knowledge.

24 1. Introduction

25 Current disaster reduction strategies are not working as well as anticipated (United Nations, 2011;
26 Wisner et al., 2012); the societal impact of major naturally-triggered disasters continues to increase
27 with time, although the number of fatalities appears to be falling (United Nations, 2009). The
28 increasing impacts of natural events in part reflect increasingly vulnerable and growing populations,
29 as well as the vulnerability of expanding infrastructure and investments, so that there is ever more
30 to lose in any given disaster. The increasing impact of natural events may also reflect changes in
31 earth system processes, due for example to climate change. Nevertheless, we suggest that more can
32 be done to reduce the impacts of disasters at the local (community) level, by taking a novel
33 approach to describing what we can know about future disasters. In particular, we suggest that
34 current disaster *risk* reduction (DRR) strategies are not fully effective in anticipating the *impacts* of
35 disasters, and thus in allowing those potentially affected to take action to reduce these impacts.

36 The present article is intended as a multi-disciplinary commentary, in the hope that it engages a
37 multi-disciplinary audience in the topics of local-level disaster reduction and resilience building. Our
38 aim is to facilitate productive dialogue; we present what we see as key principles in a form that is as
39 accessible as possible, to as many disciplines as possible, in order to encourage inter-disciplinary
40 debate. In taking this approach we acknowledge that many of the topics we touch on have deep
41 background literatures, and may in due course require much fuller treatment than we provide here.
42 We begin by outlining some of the problems, both theoretical and practical, with current disaster
43 reduction strategies. This leads to the suggestion that local event and effects scenarios, developed in
44 collaboration with communities, could support local-level planning, complementing the use of
45 conventional probabilistically-based risk analyses at regional and larger spatial scales by, for
46 example, governments and insurance companies. We also suggest that community/local

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47 government/civil society organisations/scientist teams can work to integrate community knowledge
48 with science and ‘expert’ knowledge (or what Lane et al. (2011) call non-certified and certified
49 expertise), so as to develop these disaster scenarios together. We argue that these co-produced
50 scenarios, if generated with an awareness of the relevant policy and governance contexts, can serve
51 as a useful consensual basis for developing more effective resilience strategies over time-scales of
52 societal interest.

53 2. Definitions

54 “Community” is used widely in disaster risk reduction circles as a focus for local-level planning and
55 bottom-up engagement but the concept is complex and contested. Cannon (2014) interrogates the
56 concept of community in the context of grassroots work and the role of community level work in
57 DRR, specifically arguing that there is no such thing as community; it is simply a convenient entry
58 point for research, policy and practice. Whilst acknowledging this critique and the internal divisions
59 and associated power dynamics that can exist, we use the term here to represent a varied group of
60 people, spatially situated, who are – to some extent – socially and economically interlinked; and
61 exposed to a disaster or disasters, both by virtue of their location in relation to particular hazards,
62 and also as a result of development and increasing social inequality. We are particularly interested in
63 communities from which a desire to increase their ability to plan for, cope with, and redevelop
64 following a major disaster has been expressed. We recognise that every community is linked to and
65 part of wider society, and that this two-way linkage helps shape community aspirations, behaviour
66 and wellbeing.

67 “Resilience” is notoriously difficult to define in an operational sense, even if intuitively less difficult
68 to conceptualise in general terms (Alexander, 2013). For present purposes, we adopt the following
69 definition of disaster resilience: *‘the ability of individuals, communities and states and their*
70 *institutions to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their*
71 *structures and means for living in the face of long-term changes and uncertainty’* (OECD, 2013b, 1). A

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72 current definition of disaster risk reduction (DRR) is *'the concept and practice of **reducing disaster***
73 ***risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including***
74 *through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise*
75 *management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events"* (our
76 emphasis; <http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology>).

77 The essential purpose of DRR is to reduce the impacts of future disasters on society. The measures
78 needed to achieve this are, by implication, measures that increase the resilience of society to
79 disasters. In this commentary, we focus on rare and severe disaster events that are rapid in their
80 onset e.g. earthquakes, landslide and floods. However in doing so, we recognise that building
81 resilience to such events cannot be tackled in isolation from the more frequent "everyday" hazards
82 that impact people's lives and livelihoods. We also acknowledge that people may be constrained in
83 terms of the actions that they can and are willing to take due to poverty and poor health, among
84 other factors. Our focus here is on often known but rare events whose nature and time of
85 occurrence are unpredictable, as these tend to be overlooked by comparison with the more
86 frequent events that are more to the fore in public consciousness (and can, as we show, be used to
87 develop awareness of more damaging events). The rare events are however very catastrophic when
88 (inevitably) they do occur; our intent is to show that their effects can nevertheless be reduced, albeit
89 not by using conventional disaster risk reduction procedures alone.

90 On this basis, we now consider some of the impediments to improving the resilience of communities
91 and the societies of which they are a part.

92 **3. Problems**

93 Disaster reduction has advanced considerably since the late 20th century. It has become more
94 rigorously defined and organised, centring around risk management (UNISDR, 2009); it has also
95 become more multidisciplinary and integrative (Twigg, 2004; Wisner et al., 2012). We have, for

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96 example, seen a recent surge of interest in incorporating science into DRR (e.g. Southgate et al.,
97 2013; DFID, 2012; Duncan et al., 2014; Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2015). When compared with the parallel
98 area of environmental management, however, there remain a number of issues that impede
99 progress in building the resilience of communities to disasters. Lavell and Maskrey (2014) identify
100 many such obstacles, but two of the most important for the present argument are lack of political
101 will and very limited decentralization and devolution of resources (financial and technical) to local
102 government units to support local level disaster risk reduction .

103 We see, in addition, three more fundamental difficulties in the conventional methodologies of
104 disaster reduction:

- 105 1. Limited and ineffective integration of science into disaster reduction planning, policy and
106 practice.
- 107 2. Lack of effective community participation in developing resilience to major disasters.
- 108 3. Overemphasis on probabilistically-based hazard/risk assessment and management in the
109 context of disasters.

110 These difficulties are expanded on in turn:

- 111 1. The natural and social sciences provide information on the behaviour of the natural
112 processes of the planet, how they impact society, and how society responds to such
113 impacts. We contend that these insights are as yet relatively poorly utilised in disaster
114 reduction, for a number of reasons that include lack of or poor communication among
115 the broad range of involved scientists, practitioners, policy-makers and lay persons. This
116 limits the production and uptake of useful and useable science, with the result that
117 planning and policy tend to be driven to a large extent by short-term economic and
118 political concerns and priorities.
- 119 2. In a specific locality, resilience-building aims to reduce the effects of future disasters on
120 the people who live, work or play there, whether permanently or temporarily. Yet these

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121 interest groups are rarely closely involved in the development of disaster reduction
122 measures. Although there is often some degree of consultation with representatives of
123 local interest groups, or even public meetings and focus groups, in many cases local
124 community knowledge of societal and natural processes is neither sought nor
125 incorporated into the disaster reduction planning process. When community
126 participation is sought, it is not uncommon for the debate to be captured by more
127 influential or powerful stakeholders (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Mansuri and Rao, 2013;
128 Mosse, 2005).

129 3. Risk management is currently the common basis for disaster reduction worldwide; it
130 depends on anticipation of future events able to trigger disasters, and their
131 quantification and analysis (usually in terms of magnitude and probability). However
132 there are (at least) five fundamental problems that limit the effectiveness of this
133 approach for reducing disaster damage in a specified locality:

134 a. Probabilistically-based event predictions for a specific locality are intrinsically
135 unreliable even for known and well quantified disaster events because, *by definition*,
136 potentially disastrous events occur only a small number of times at a given location
137 in any realistic planning time-frame, and probabilistic predictions of small samples
138 have an intrinsically high degree of unreliability (Davies, 2015). In other words, when
139 only a very small number of disaster events will occur in a realistic planning time-
140 frame, it is extremely unlikely that their occurrence will match the probability of
141 their occurrence. A further difficulty – albeit one that is less fundamental and more
142 able to be remedied – is the fact that statistics for most disaster events are poorly-
143 defined. Probabilistically-based risk analysis is essential and useful to the disaster
144 insurance industry, in part because this industry spreads risk over large spatial areas
145 and temporal periods, so that the number of disaster events considered is always
146 high. It is also useful for governments responsible for disaster reduction across large

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147 areas of nations or regions. For local communities, however, it is of far less utility
148 than conventionally assumed. Despite this, probability-based risk analysis is often
149 the default mechanism for risk management, even at local scales (e.g., Papathoma-
150 Kohle et al., 2015; Anderson et al., 2014)

151 b. The impacts of large natural events on society result from the interaction of two
152 complex dynamic systems: Earth processes and societal processes. Knowledge of the
153 behaviour of complex systems suggests that the major hazard events that impact
154 society are intrinsically unpredictable in location, timing and intensity (Kagan, 1997;
155 Park et al, 2013; Sornette, 2002; 2009), and thus the societal consequences are likely
156 to be unexpected when they occur. In addition, from (a) above, only the risks
157 associated with smaller and more frequent events can be quantified adequately at
158 the community scale. Risk management by definition requires risks to be known and
159 therefore expected, and also adequately quantified, so cannot be reliably applied to
160 disaster situations. Furthermore, the complex interactions between physical,
161 ecological and human systems have to be seen and understood in the context of a
162 rapidly transforming society. Social vulnerability, on the other hand, although also
163 complex, is grounded in everyday life and reflects the structure of society (Wisner et
164 al., 2004). Ultimately, integrating both the unpredictable dimension of natural
165 hazards and the everyday nature of vulnerability is necessary and constitutes one of
166 the key challenges facing us (Berkes, 2007; Folke, 2006; Wisner, 1995; Wisner et al.,
167 2012).

168 c. The use of quantified risks to calculate cost-benefit ratios (or other utility
169 optimisation criteria) leads to extremely imprecise results. These procedures involve
170 calculating the differences between large and imprecise numbers (e.g. unmitigated
171 annual damage and mitigated annual damage), the result of which is, inevitably, a
172 much smaller and very much less precise number (in this case, gross benefit). When

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173 the cost of mitigation measures (also necessarily imprecise) is subtracted from gross
174 benefit to yield net benefit, the imprecision increases even more (see text box).

175 d. Assigning an identified, large future event a very low probability usually means that it is
176 assumed to be of lesser priority than more frequent - and therefore more “urgent” -
177 smaller (but still large) events. Thus, when the large event does (inevitably) occur, it is in
178 most cases unexpected because society – including local communities - has decided to
179 ignore it or delay its consideration; in this context its low probability effectively becomes
180 zero probability.

181

182

TEXT BOX: Sensitivity of cost-benefit analysis to small errors:

183

Unmitigated average annual damage cost: $\$1,000,000 \pm 10\% = \$900,000 - \$1,100,000$

184

Mitigated average annual damage cost: $\$600,000 \pm 10\% = \$540,000 - \$660,000$

185

Gross average annual benefit: $\$560,000 - \$240,000$ ($\$400,000 \pm \$160,000$ or $\$400,000 \pm 40\%$)

186

Annual average mitigation cost: $\$300,000 \pm 5\% = \$285,000 - \$315,000$

187

Net average annual benefit: $\$275,000 - \$75,000$ ($\$100,000 \pm \$175,000$ or $\$100,000 \pm 175\%$)

188

Thus the net average annual return on investment, neglecting errors, of $\$100,000/\$300,000 =$

189

33%, is in fact anywhere between 92% and -25%. With increasing errors, the precision of the

190

net average annual benefit deteriorates rapidly. While utility optimisation is only one of a suite

191

of criteria relevant to disaster reduction decision-making, it often has considerable influence on

192

decision-making because it is quantitative.

193

194

e. The lack of effective local-scale disaster reduction caused by the limitations of risk

195

management in turn means that efforts to reduce larger-scale (regional, national and global)

196

disaster impacts (for example by optimising the availability of emergency resources and

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197 advice) cannot be fully effective, although the probabilistic methodology can in principle be
198 applied at the larger scales.

199 4. A way forward

200 From the above, it is evident that alternative strategies are required that enable communities to
201 plan for large, poorly-quantified or unexpected events that occur rarely (but will occur, and can
202 occur at any time), and to improve the uptake, relevance and completeness of science for local level
203 resilience planning (Paton and Johnston, 2001). These alternative strategies – whatever they are –
204 are required to complement the conventional risk-based disaster reduction strategies commonly in
205 use.

206 We outline below how these requirements can be met by using sets of scenarios, co-developed by
207 communities, civil society organisations and local government officials working closely in teams with
208 scientists (with a range of disciplinary expertises), to address those situations where risk
209 management-based solutions are inadequate for the reasons set out above. These scenario sets
210 describe the effects of large natural events on a community³, and provide a basis for further work by
211 community-civil society-scientist-local government teams to devise strategies for reducing the
212 impacts of these effects, thus increasing resilience. Finally, long-term partnerships between the
213 different stakeholder groups are needed to build trust and to develop a more in-depth
214 understanding of the social and natural systems and their changing vulnerability over time, and to
215 maintain and improve resilience as both communities and natural systems – and our understanding
216 of them – alter over time.

217 This suggestion is a substantial departure from current practice. Its implementation will require local
218 governments, civil society organisations, scientists and communities to learn how to work equitably
219 and constructively with each other. These kinds of collaborations are presently being explored in a

³ We mention here that these scenarios are in many ways similar to those commonly used in existing community-based DRR activities, although rarely for large events because of the lack of collaboration with scientists.

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220 locality in New Zealand and as part of the Earthquakes without Frontiers project in Central and South
221 Asia (<http://ewf.nerc.ac.uk>) by a number of authors of the present Commentary. What is really
222 needed, however, is a set of simple methodologies that can be adapted for different contexts to
223 guide the co-production of scenarios. Examples geared towards integrating different forms of
224 knowledge and actions through enhanced dialogue between local and outside stakeholders have
225 been trialled and the outcomes are encouraging in the context of expectable hazards such as floods
226 (e.g. Lane et al. 2011; Cadag and Gaillard, 2012; Wisner et al., 2012). However, we argue that such
227 approaches need to be developed further to move beyond conceptual framings of knowledge
228 integration and one-off examples, and to consider how such collaborations might work in the
229 context of less predictable hazards such as earthquakes where the role of scientific knowledge is less
230 clear. Alongside, and informed by, this practical exploration of methodologies, work is needed to
231 establish how these methodologies could be produced, piloted, evaluated, rolled out, monitored
232 and revised. Within this work, there is a need to address the question of precisely who in a
233 community should be involved (and what social sub-groups they represent), how to identify and
234 recruit people (especially the less visible and harder to reach), and how to support those involved.
235 Within local government and civil society, there is also a need to establish the approximate profile of
236 the kinds of groupings required to complete the group that successfully produces scenarios
237 together.

238 **4.1 Scenarios**

239 Rather than describing future disaster events primarily in terms of their magnitudes and
240 probabilities, we suggest that information about what can happen in the most important disaster–
241 the next one – can be better developed by communities, practitioners and policy-makers by using
242 sets of scenarios. These scenarios describe the natural events that trigger disasters, together with
243 anticipated consequences for other natural systems (such as the triggering of landslides and
244 consequent river aggradation by earthquakes, e.g. Gill and Malamud, 2014). Together, they

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245 comprise the *event or hazard scenarios*. The scenario sets also describe the effects of these natural
246 events on societal systems (the *effects or impact scenarios*). In reality the variation in event
247 scenarios is much greater than the variation in effects scenarios: the latter are mostly injuries,
248 deaths and damage, loss of commerce, loss of communications, and isolation, whereas the former
249 encompass earthquake, landslide, flood, storm, snow, ice, tsunami, debris flow and other processes.
250 Thus we suggest that effects scenarios are more useful than event scenarios, both because they are
251 more easily foreseen, and because these are the scenarios to which a community needs to develop
252 and respond in order to become more resilient. Co-developed by local and outside experts, the
253 outcome is potentially better than any group could achieve on its own, or by means of consultation
254 or communication with other groups. The event scenarios are based on known science, but crucially
255 are informed and improved by the community's experience of natural system behaviour and
256 knowledge of the local social, cultural, economic and political context. The effects scenarios are
257 based on the community's knowledge of how it has been or could be affected by a particular hazard
258 or hazards, the impact of the hazard(s) in terms of loss of life and livelihood (including the potentially
259 uneven effects across society) and how the community wants to develop into the future e.g. the
260 building of a new road to provide market access for the sale of cash crops. They are also informed by
261 what science can say about future natural and human system behaviours e.g. the potential for future
262 earthquakes and the impact of demographic change through labour migration on local level
263 resilience (Rigg and Oven 2015). This process requires scientists to engage closely with the different
264 members and parts of communities (including commercial and cultural interests, formal and
265 informal governance structures, policy-makers, marginalised and vulnerable social groups, and other
266 key stakeholders), and this in turn requires development of mutual trust among all involved (Gaillard
267 and Mercer, 2013). This co-development process is beneficial not just because such engagement
268 permits mutual learning, the sharing of existing knowledge and the co-production of new
269 knowledge, but also because the knowledge that emerges is much more likely to have societal and
270 scientific traction, *because it will be perceived as relevant by all involved* (Mercer, 2012; Wistow et

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271 al. 2015). Knowledge and understanding of hazards and their effects is not only increased, improved
272 and integrated into resilience planning, but is also intrinsically produced, rather than being simply
273 disseminated, so as to become common to all involved.

274 While it is well recognised that such initiatives should be community-owned and led to be successful,
275 the role of government (local and national) and civil society organisations in these resilience teams is
276 essential to unlock the political and economic resources required for local level resilience building
277 (Maskrey 2011). As summarised by Maskrey (2011: 51), in his review of community-based disaster
278 risk management, such government-civil society partnerships 'enable the investment of resources
279 that are unavailable locally and increase continuity and sustainability as initiatives move from stand-
280 alone projects and programmes to longer-term processes' (Maskrey 2011: 51).

281 The quality of communication within the diverse community-civil-society-scientist-local government
282 teams is crucial to the quality of the outputs. This requires acknowledgement and specific attention,
283 involving perhaps an experienced and independent facilitator.

284 ***4.2 Resilience planning***

285 When a set of scenarios has been developed that the team agrees is a useful representation of what
286 can occur when the community experiences a disaster, the next stage is to develop ways of reducing
287 the impacts of the chosen scenarios on society, in particular in the context of how the community
288 foresees itself changing into the future. Indeed, thinking into the future is likely to highlight some
289 specific strategies for increasing resilience, for example, by reducing dependence on particular social
290 arrangements, processes or behaviours that contribute to present-day vulnerability to the given
291 scenarios. This may involve, for example, agricultural diversification; or, in extreme cases, gradual
292 relocation of assets.

293 In this strategy there is an implied assumption that increased resilience to the scenario effects will
294 result in increased resilience to the next major event to affect the community, whatever it is, and so

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295 the choice of the set of scenarios is clearly important (Alexander, 2000). By concentrating on the
296 effects scenarios, and developing resilience to them by addressing the causes of vulnerability, there
297 is also the possibility – albeit one that cannot be tested in advance - that societal resilience to events
298 that differ significantly from the event scenarios will also be increased. As noted above, a powerful
299 justification for community-chosen scenarios is that they are by definition *highly relevant to the*
300 *community*; this perspective may need to be emphasised to counter external challenges that the
301 chosen scenarios are less relevant than other scenarios.

302 It may also be possible to use some scenarios, based on less extreme events whose effects are
303 known locally, as ‘gateways’. These scenarios can be used as ways of building resilience to the
304 effects of other events that the community has not yet experienced (Robledo et al., 2004). For
305 example, a community with rich experience in dealing with the effects of frequent landslides may be
306 able to use that experience to design arrangements or processes that will help build resilience to the
307 effects of less frequent (but potentially much more damaging) earthquakes. Again, building
308 scenarios for the effects of one event may help to build resilience to the effects of other events.
309 Engagement and therefore empowerment with regard to the development of one scenario has the
310 potential, we argue, to ripple through to other scenarios and events; this potential, however,
311 remains to be tested, and is an avenue for future research.

312 As in all attempts to manage human-natural system interactions, the effects of the resilience
313 measures developed and implemented by the community-civil society-scientist-local government
314 teams need to be continually monitored, evaluated, reflected on and adapted as the community and
315 its natural environment evolve. The real effect of the resilience measures adopted will only become
316 clearly evident following a disaster event, but the effects of minor events may give some useful
317 indications of measures that could usefully be modified. This monitoring, evaluation and reflection
318 need to be carried out by the community-scientist-local government team, which means that this
319 team is not a one-off project collaboration but must continue to act as a resilience advisory team for

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320 the community, as suggested by many community-based disaster risk reduction and management
321 initiatives over the past three decades (e.g. Maskrey, 1984; Delica-Willison and Gaillard, 2012). Thus
322 while such community-science-local government partnerships clearly have the potential to offer
323 immediate benefits, it is also likely that these will increase over time. Ongoing joint engagement
324 offers the best chance of maximising such benefits, and of facilitating adaptation to medium- and
325 longer-term changes in natural and social systems. Involving communities in building scenarios for
326 resilience will help to ensure maintenance of local focus when national policy attention turns
327 elsewhere (Delica-Willison and Willison, 2004).

328 Using the information derived from the documented co-production of scenarios and resilience-
329 building initiatives, both natural and social scientists can develop increasingly-sound scientific bases
330 for understanding natural events and the vulnerability and resilience of society to disasters resulting
331 from them.

332 It is perhaps useful here to think about where the responsibility lies for planning community
333 resilience to future disasters. Any community is a deeply-linked component of local, regional and
334 national society, and while its well-being is of significance at all scales, its significance is nevertheless
335 highest locally. Thus direct responsibility for planning for future disasters lies primarily in and around
336 the community. In some cases, however, the regional and national linkages may be so important
337 that a disaster to the community severely affects regional and national economies, for example the
338 devastation of an iconic but small tourist town. Here responsibility is more widely distributed. In any
339 case, implementation of resilience strategies will often be beyond local resources, and higher-level
340 assistance will be needed.

341 Finally, we acknowledge that the strategy we suggest has a number of potential drawbacks that may
342 hinder its uptake. For example, the co-development of scenarios:

- 343 • is likely to be time-consuming, a difficulty in an age of ever tighter deadlines and planning
344 horizons, together with fixed project durations;

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- 345 • requires trust, development of which also requires above all time to know others well;
- 346 • requires considerable flexibility on all sides, which in turn requires that established positions
- 347 need periodic reflection and re-examination;
- 348 • requires a community to recognise the existence of specific and unknown hazards and
- 349 express a desire to address them which cannot be forced upon them;
- 350 • requires recognition from the team that this may mean focusing on more immediate
- 351 concerns of the community in the first instance until trust is built and priorities are aligned;
- 352 and
- 353 • requires recognition and navigation of the tensions between practical actions and research,
- 354 and between practical actions and policy.

355 Nevertheless, this strategy does appear to offer a way to increase the relevance of disaster risk
356 reduction to local communities, leading to genuine reduction of future disaster impacts.

357 5. Summary

358 The imprecision intrinsic to probabilistically-based risk management means that it can be applied
359 reliably only to large numbers of potential disaster events. This means in turn that, while applicable
360 to disaster reduction across large areas (e.g., over nations or regions by governments, and over even
361 larger areas by insurance companies), probabilistically-based risk management cannot reliably be
362 used as the basis for community disaster reduction – which necessarily involves a limited spatial area
363 – over planning time scales relevant to society. This leaves a crucial gap in disaster reduction
364 methodologies locally, and therefore also at larger scales. Here we have suggested complementing
365 the probabilistic risk management process, which operates effectively on well-known and frequent
366 risks, with the development of disaster event and effects scenarios as a basis for local level resilience
367 building for poorly-known or unknown risks (in which risk management has intrinsic unreliability).

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368 The active and ongoing process of joint learning by community-civil society -scientist-local
369 government teams engaged in developing these scenarios, and the resulting plans for gradually
370 reducing vulnerability, have in addition the potential to (i) achieve greater integration between
371 community experience and formal science, (ii) produce increased understanding of the complex
372 behaviours of natural and social systems, and (iii) advance the natural and social sciences that
373 describe hazard events and their effects (Lane et al., 2011) in relevant and applicable directions.
374 This, we argue, is a key to making science more 'useful, usable and used' in DRR (Boaz and Hayden,
375 2002) while providing communities with a basis for developing increased resilience to the next major
376 disaster event.

377 6. Acknowledgements

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